

SPARTA AND LAKONIA

A REGIONAL HISTORY 1300 TO 362 BC



PAUL CARTLEDGE

SECOND EDITION

**Also available as a printed book
see title verso for ISBN details**

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Paul Cartledge



London and New York

First published 1979
by Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd

Second edition first published 2002
by Routledge
11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Routledge
29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group

This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2002.

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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
A catalog record for this book has been requested

ISBN 0-203-47223-3 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-203-78047-7 (Adobe eReader Format)
ISBN 0-415-26356-5 (Hbk)
ISBN 0-415-26276-3 (Pbk)

To Judith Portrait (again)

Contents

List of figures	ix
Preface	xi
Preface to the second edition	xiii
Notes on the spelling of Greek words and on dates	xiv
PART I INTRODUCTION	
1 Boundaries	3
2 The physical setting	11
3 Climate	21
4 The Stone and Bronze Ages to <i>c.</i> 1300	26
PART II PRECLASSICAL LAKONIA <i>c.</i> 1300–500BC	
5 Greek oral tradition as history	43
6 The last Mycenaeans <i>c.</i> 1300–1050	52
7 The first Dorians <i>c.</i> 1050–775	65
8 The Lakonian renaissance <i>c.</i> 775–650	88
9 The consolidation of Lakonia <i>c.</i> 650–490	113
10 Helots and Perioikoi	138
PART III CLASSICAL LAKONIA <i>c.</i> 500–362 BC	
11 The crisis of Lakonia 490–460	171
12 The Athenian wars <i>c.</i> 460–404	192
13 The reduction of Lakonia 404–362	228
PART IV RESULTS AND PROSPECTS	
14 The decline of Spartiate manpower	263
15 Epilogue	273

Appendix 1	Gazetteer of sites in Lakonia and Messenia	278
Appendix 2	The Homeric poems as history	288
Appendix 3	The Spartan king-lists	293
Appendix 4	The Helots: some ancient sources in translation	299
Appendix 5	The sanctuary of (Artemis) Orthia	308
Abbreviations		313
	Bibliographical appendix to the second edition	315
	Bibliographical addenda to the second edition	318
	Bibliography	323
	Index	338

Figures

1	The frontiers of Sparta <i>c.</i> 545	2
2	The geology of Lakonia	12
3	The Helos plain: geological change	17
4	Neolithic and Early Helladic Lakonia	27
5	Middle Helladic and Late Helladic I-III A Lakonia	34
6	The Menelaion hill near Sparta	38
7	Late Helladic IIIB Lakonia	55
8	Late Helladic IIIC Lakonia	60
9	Protogeometric Lakonia	67
10	Stratification at the Amyklaion sanctuary	71
11	Lakonian Protogeometric and Geometric pottery	74
12	The villages of Sparta	91
13	The distribution of Lakonian Late Geometric pottery	95
14	Messenia in the eighth century BC	101
15	The colonization of Taras <i>c.</i> 706	108
16	Archaic sites in Lakonia and Messenia	114
17	Routes in Lakonia and Messenia	160
18	Classical sites in Lakonia and Messenia	172
19	The sanctuary of Orthia at Sparta	309

Preface

The basis of this book was laid in an unpublished doctoral thesis 'Early Sparta c. 950–650 BC: an Archaeological and Historical Study' (Oxford 1975). To my former supervisor, Professor J.Boardman, and my examiners, Professors C.M.Robertson and W.G.Forrest, I am principally indebted for its conception and fruition. It could not, however, have been completed without the unstinting assistance of many archaeologists, historians and geographers, the staffs of museums and libraries in Greece, Ireland and England, and grants from research funds in the Universities of Dublin and Oxford. The following scholars and friends are owed especial thanks: R.Beckinsale, D.Bell, J.N.Coldstream, K.Demakopoulou-Papantoniou, the late V.Desborough, L.Marangou, G.E.M.de Ste. Croix, G.Steinbauer (Acting Ephor of Lakonia), E.Touloupa, P.M.Warren, J.G.Younger.

The present book represents a considerable expansion, conceptual as well as geographical and chronological, of the thesis. It is not primarily a political history, but an attempt, inevitably provisional, to map out a new kind of history of ancient Sparta—one which does justice as well to the area unified and exploited by the Spartans as to the inhabitants of the central place. The inspiration to write it was provided by the invitation of Professor R.F.Willetts to contribute to the series of which he is general editor. I wish to thank him and Mr N.Franklin for their constant encouragement and helpful criticism. Drafts of various chapters have also been read and greatly improved by O.T.P.K.Dickinson, W.W.Phelps, J.B.Salmon and G.E.M.de Ste. Croix. None of these of course should be regarded as incriminated by the results, for which I alone bear full responsibility.

I am also most grateful to the following for permission to reproduce, sometimes in modified form, published maps and illustrations: the Managing Committee of the British School at Athens; the Swedish Institute in Athens; J.Bintliff, J.N.Coldstream, R.Hope Simpson and W.A.McDonald (Director of the Minnesota Messenia Expedition).

Trinity College, Dublin
June 1978, P.A.C.

Preface to the second edition

The original edition of this book was commissioned by Norman Franklin, when Routledge was 'Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd' and operated out of London, Henley, and Boston. This new edition was commissioned by Dr Richard Stoneman, by which time Routledge had become part of Taylor & Francis and was based in London and New York. I am most grateful to Richard for suggesting this republication and for his patience in awaiting what I hope are the improvements I have been able to effect. Errors of one sort and another in the original edition have been silently corrected. An appendix (below, pp. 315–22) deals briefly with the book's reception and lists certain bibliographical addenda covering the period 1979–2000, paying special regard to the book's particular conception as a regional history. I am most grateful to all those colleagues, scholars and friends who have written to me pointing out errors or other deficiencies; they include: Michel Austin, Ephraim David, David Harvey, Stephen Hodgkinson, Pavel Oliva, Richard Talbert, and Helen Waterhouse.

February 2001, P.A.C.

Notes on the spelling of Greek words and on dates

Consistency in the transliteration of Greek words is impossible of attainment. In general I have preferred to reproduce Greek letters by their nearest English equivalents rather than Latinize them: thus Krokeai not Croceae, Lykourgos not Lycurgus. On the other hand, Lysandros for Lysander, and similarly for other 'household' names, must have seemed merely pedantic.

Unless otherwise specified, all dates are BC.

I



Introduction






Figure 1 The frontiers of Sparta c.545

Boundaries

‘Without a geographical basis the people, the makers of history, seem to be walking on air.’ So wrote Jules Michelet in the 1869 Preface to his celebrated *Histoire de France*—but in vain, it seems, so far as most historians of Sparta have been concerned. For it remains as true of them today as it was of historians in general in the nineteenth century that, once the *de rigueur* introductory sketch of geographical conditions is out of the way, the substantive analysis or narrative proceeds ‘as if these complex influences...had never varied in power or method during the course of a people’s history’ (Febvre 1925, 12).

There is, however, perhaps even less excuse for this outmoded and harmful attitude in studying classical Sparta than in studying some other ancient Greek states. For, as is well known, the Spartans throughout the period of their greatest territorial expansion and political supremacy (c. 550–370) rested their power and prosperity on the necessarily broad backs of the Helots, the unfree agricultural labourers who lived concentrated in the relatively fertile riverine valleys of the Eurotas in Lakonia and the Pamisos in Messenia. And besides the Helots there literally ‘dwelt round about’ the Perioikoi, who were free men living in partially autonomous communities and providing certain essential services for the Spartans but farming more marginal land. Any serious account of Spartan history therefore is obliged to make more than a token gesture at understanding the mutual relationships of these three groups of population. Thus it is with the ‘infrastructure of land allotments, helots and perioeci, with everything that includes with respect to labour, production and circulation’ (Finley 1975, 162) that this study will be primarily concerned, in a determined effort to bring the Spartans firmly down to earth.

In this connection it is encouraging to note the recent upturn of interest in a more broadly geographical and materialist approach to Graeco-Roman antiquity—not to mention prehistoric Mediterranean studies, where, as we shall see in more detail in Chapters 4 and 6, the lack of written texts necessitates an overriding concern with the total recoverable human and natural environment. A leading exponent of Roman agrarian history has

recently defined a major desideratum as ‘close study, region by region, of the changing patterns of land use and agricultural production, supported by analysis of demographic and other socio-economic data provided by our sources’ (White 1967, 78). This applies equally to Greece. Moreover, not only does he state the objective clearly, but he conveys too the limitation imposed by the available evidence.

However, before the nature, extent and quality of the evidence can be explored, a prior question obtrudes itself. What is a ‘region’? The answer is not as straightforward as might at first blush be supposed, for it implies a solution to the notorious problem of frontiers or boundaries. ‘Natural’ frontiers may have been consigned for good to the conceptual rubbish-heap, but should they be replaced by a strictly geographical, a vaguely cultural or a broadly political notion of regional demarcation? I have little doubt that for the geographically minded historian like myself, as opposed to the historical geographer, the third course is the one to be adopted. To quote Lucien Febvre (1925, 311) once more, ‘all States consist of an amalgam of fragments, a collection of morsels detached from different natural regions, which complement one another and become cemented together, and make of their associated diversities a genuine unity.’ Our task therefore will be to explain how the frontiers of Lakonia came to be fixed where they were and why from time to time they fluctuated.

There have been many Lakonias. That is to say, ‘Lakonia’ has experienced many incarnations and metamorphoses between the earliest use of the name (in late Roman or early mediaeval times) and its present application to one of the provinces of contemporary Greece. The Lakonia of my title, however, is none of these. Indeed, the name is convenient and useful precisely because it has no exact political denotation for the period chiefly under consideration in this book, *c.* 1300 to 362. It should serve therefore as a constant reminder that the size of Lakonia in antiquity varied directly in proportion to the strength and inclinations of the inhabitants of its central place, which from about 1500 has been located in the vicinity of modern Sparta.

Frontiers should not of course be viewed as it were from the outside; but if ‘Lakonia’ is to be used for purposes of description and analysis, it requires spatial definition. It has seemed most convenient, and on balance historically least misleading, to fix upon the status quo of *c.* 545, a high-water mark from which the Spartan tide was not compelled to recede for almost two centuries. Hence my Lakonia, like the ancient terms ‘Lakedaimon’ and ‘Lakonike’ (*sc. ge*), will also encompass south-west Peloponnese, which will be referred to hereafter for convenience as Messenia. I shall not, however, use ‘Lakonia’ to obliterate the separate identity of Messenia in the way that ‘Lakedaimon’ and ‘Lakonike’ designedly did. For I shall be principally concerned with Lakonia in a narrower and more familiar sense, roughly the territory east of the Taygetos mountain range (but including the whole of the Mani). This is primarily because this smaller Lakonia was the heartland and laboratory

in which the Spartans first experimented with the system whose essentials they later transferred to Messenia, but also because the evidence for Messenia has recently been collected, sifted and published (admittedly with a primary emphasis on the Late Bronze Age) in exemplary fashion by the University of Minnesota Messenia Expedition (*MME*; cf. now Meyer 1978).

Our sources for the frontier consist of scattered notices in ancient authors, especially Strabo and Pausanias, and those physiographical features that have undergone no—or no significant—alteration since our period. (Epigraphical evidence, apart from some dubious cuttings in the living rock at Arkadian Kryavrysi, is confined to the western frontier of the reduced Lakonia after the liberation of Messenia from the Spartan yoke in c. 370: Chapter 15.) Needless to say, no ancient literary source made a consistent effort to define the extent of territory under Spartan control at any given point in history, so all due credit should go to Friedrich Bölte, the first scholar to appreciate and exploit the potential of clear and detailed geological maps (Bölte 1929, 1303–15).

On the east, south and west Lakonia is bounded by the Mediterranean. Only in the north are the geographical limits blurred, and even here the lack of clarity is merely in detail, for the main outline can be simply described. Once the Thyreatis (ancient Kynouria) had fallen permanently to Sparta as the prize for winning the ‘Battle of the Champions’ in c. 545, the frontier ran from a point on the east coast some two kilometres north of modern Astros (near ancient Thyrea) along a range of hills above the River Tanos east of Mount Parthenion (1,093 m.). Westwards the border was formed by the watershed of the Eurotas and the tributaries of the east Arkadian plain. To the west of the Taygetos range the northern frontier of Messenia skirts the southern edge of the plain of Megalopolis. West of the latter it loops round the ancient Mount Hira (864 m.) to run out into the sea along the Nedha valley, the southern boundary of the transitional region of Triphylia.

The details are more complex, but the Thyreatis at least poses few problems. It is bounded on the north by Mount Zavitsa, on the west by the Parnon mountain range and in the south by the river of Ay. Andreas. In the mid-second century AD the frontiers of the Spartans, Argives and Tegeans met on the ridges of Parnon (Paus. 2.38.7). Thus if the Hermai have been correctly identified at modern Phonemenoi (Rhomaïos 1905, 137f.; 1951, 235f.), the frontier will have made the expected abrupt turn south of Mount Parthenion and followed Parnon in a southerly direction for about ten kilometres.

Our next evidence consists in the identification of Perioikic Karyai, which lay on the ancient frontier. It almost certainly occupied the vicinity of modern Arachova (now renamed Karyai) a short way south-east of Analipsis, which remains a border-village to this day (Loring 1895, 54–8, 61; Rhomaïos 1960, 376–8, 394). The statement of Pausanias (8.54.1) that the River Alpheios marked the border between Spartan and Tegeate territory has caused difficulties, perhaps to be resolved by identifying Pausanias’ Alpheios with

the river of Analipsis, the uppermost course of the Sarandapotamos, which either did, or was believed to, form part of the great Alpheios (Wade-Gery 1966, 297f., 302).

Our next clue is the frequent mention in the sources of the sub-region of Skiritis, whose control was vital to Sparta since it lay athwart routes from Arkadia to Lakonia and Messenia. Bölte identified Skiritis with the crystalline schist zone between the River Kelephina (ancient Oinous) and the Eurotas to west of the 'saddle' of Lakonia. This is in harmony with the fact that the only ancient settlement in Skiritis accorded independent mention in the sources is Oion, a frontier-village and guardpost which was probably situated in a small ruined tract north of modern Arvanito-Kerasia (Andrewes in Gomme 1970, 33). In other words, at Analipsis the ancient frontier deviated sharply from its modern counterpart and moved north-west to make considerable inroads into the present-day province of Arkadia.

West of the headwaters of the Eurotas Mount Chelmos rises to 776 m. above sea-level. The region at its foot has been securely identified with ancient Belmina or Belminatis (other variant spellings are found). This was a frontier-zone hotly disputed between Sparta and Megalopolis after the foundation of the latter in 368 (Chapter 13) as much for its abundant water-supply as for its strategic position (Howell 1970, 101, no. 53). In the extreme north-west angle of Lakonia lay Aigytiis, a large trough drained to the northwest by the River Xerillos (ancient Karnion). Entering Messenia Mount Hira, like Andania further south (*MME* 94, no. 607?), is perhaps best known for its role in the final stage of the Spartan conquest in the seventh century. Further expansion to the north was barred at this point by Phigaleia, but neither Phigaleia nor Elis was able to prevent Sparta from exercising a fitful *de facto* control over Triphylia, perhaps from as early as the late eighth century. Messenia proper, however, was bounded on the north by the Nedha valley, a 'natural no-man's land' (Chadwick 1976a, 39).

Such was the area available to the Spartans from c.545, some 'two-fifths of the Peloponnese' according to an ancient estimate (Thuc. 1.10.2) or about 8,500 km². No other polis (city-state) could compete; Athens, for example, Sparta's nearest rival, commanded only about 2,500. Mere size, however, does not by itself account for the power and influence wielded by Sparta for so long a period. The question which the present work will attempt to answer is how, and in particular how efficiently, did Sparta utilize the possibilities afforded by this (in Greek terms) enormous land-mass.

We must conclude this first introductory chapter by looking at a second, and in some ways the most important, boundary, the one fixed by the available source-material. Greek geography, broadly interpreted, developed alongside history as a branch of Ionian 'historie' (enquiry) in the sixth and fifth centuries. But whereas history (in something like the modern sense) was an invention of the fifth century (Chapter 5), 'scientific' geography was a Hellenistic creation. At the threshold of the latter epoch stood Theophrastos,

the most distinguished pupil and successor of Aristotle at the Lyceum, to whom we owe the first fumbblings towards a systematic botany and geology. Theophrastos by himself, however, despite his frequent references to Lakonia, is totally inadequate for our purposes and must be supplemented by ancient literary evidence of the most disparate origins and of correspondingly disparate value. We have already met Thucydides, Strabo and Pausanias: in what follows I shall have occasion to draw on—among many others—Alkman, Herodotus, Aristophanes, Plato, Vitruvius and Athenaios. By no means all of these inform us directly of conditions in Lakonia, or even of conditions in our special period; many have no interest in the information for its own sake; all too often they convey only the extremes experienced, precisely because they were extreme.

There are, though, two main types of evidence by which the unsatisfactory literary sources can be complemented or corrected, archaeology and modern scientific data relating to all aspects of the environment. Controlled excavation in Lakonia has for a variety of reasons been lamentably slight, a deficiency that for many historical purposes is irremediable. There are, however, other methods of building up the archaeological record besides excavation, and in the following chapters I shall be discussing, and utilizing the results of, all available archaeological techniques. Here, however, I propose to examine briefly what I take to be the inherent limitations of archaeological material as historical evidence, regardless of the quantity or quality of the available data (ideally of course data susceptible of statistical analysis). For even though the spade may be congenitally truthful, 'it owes this merit at least in part to the fact that it cannot speak' (Grierson 1959, 129). Material remains, in other words, may be authentic testimony to the times they represent, but they are not self-explanatory, and a long-standing dispute concerns itself with the problem of precisely what kinds of inference it is possible or legitimate to draw from them. This dispute has of late received a fresh injection of vitality from the so-called 'new' archaeologists, who (in the words of a leading spokesman) advocate a 'shift to a rigorous hypothetico-deductive method with the goal of explanation' and believe 'there is every reason to expect that the empirical properties of artifacts and their arrangement in the archaeological record will exhibit attributes which can inform on different phases of the artifact's life-history' (Binford 1972, 96, 94).

Now while I agree wholeheartedly with the stated aim of the 'new' archaeologists of explaining whole societies in systematic terms, I have to confess my profound disagreement on two counts. First, I do not believe that our categories of social analysis are yet sufficiently fine to be capable of expression in the form of laws from which deductions may automatically be made. Symptomatically, the 'new' archaeologists have been surprisingly happy to operate with models which resemble 'parables' and betoken 'creeping crypto-totalitarianism' (Andreski 1972, ch. 13). Second, I

remain firmly within the camp of such ‘old’ archaeologists as Piggott (1959, ch. 1) on the question of what kinds of inference one may legitimately draw from the accidentally surviving durable remains of complex social arrangements. I believe, in short, that there is a hierarchy or pyramid of levels at which material data may be explained in economic, political and social terms. From archaeological evidence alone we may infer (relatively) much about material techniques, a considerable amount about patterns of subsistence and utilization of the environment, far less about social and political events and institutions, and least of all about mental structures, religious and other ‘spiritual’ ideas and beliefs. To take a simple example, the fact that the art of Sparta’s colony Taras was largely in the Spartan tradition does not by itself show that political relations with the mother-city were cordial: the art of Kerkyra was wholly in the Corinthian tradition, and yet we know from literary sources of political friction, even outright warfare, between Kerkyra and Corinth from an early date (Boardman 1973, 219). This is not of course to deny that technique and subsistence-patterns may themselves imply non-material features of social existence. It is to deny that there are assured criteria whereby one may automatically infer the latter from the former. For ‘there is sufficient evidence that identical artifacts and arrangements of artifacts can result from different socio-economic arrangements of procurement, manufacture or distribution’ (Finley 1975, 90).

On the other hand, the ‘new’ archaeologists—apart from those who adopt a non-historical or anti-historical approach—have performed a signal service in asking questions which ‘old’ archaeologists, especially perhaps those whose business is with the classical Graeco-Roman world, had considered either outside their province or not worth asking. To this extent ‘social archaeology’ (Renfrew 1973) represents a major step in the right direction, and it is to be hoped that the questions, techniques and methods it employs (minus the inappropriate ‘systems’ models) will consistently be directed to the material remains of Graeco-Roman antiquity both in their excavation and in their interpretation.

The rest of this chapter will consider how far the historian of ancient Lakonia can use modern scientific data to eke out, modify or explain the notoriously unstatistical ancient sources. Here we are brought hard up against the recalcitrant problem of climatic change. For, since climate influences human social behaviour primarily through the medium of the plant, and since we are relatively well informed on the agricultural potentialities of contemporary Lakonia, it is essential to assess first how far the climate in our period resembled that known to have prevailed in the last century or so and then whether it had remained more or less constant in the interim.

Climate itself, however, is a complex concept. Its basic conditions have been elucidated as follows (Lamb 1974, 197): the radiation balance; the heat and moisture brought and carried away by the winds and ocean currents; the local conditions of aspect towards the midday sun and prevailing winds; the

thermal characteristics of the soil and vegetation cover; and the reflectivity of the surface. Human influence on climate, though by no means negligible, is problematic (Mason 1977). Thus the reconstruction of past climate involves a variety of techniques, mainly scientific. Progress in their application has brought the realization that a rigorous distinction must be drawn between climatic fluctuations or oscillations, which are regular and occur in cycles ranging from decades to centuries (intervals of 200 and 400 years appear to be quite prominent), and climatic changes, which are relatively infrequent.

However, it is also clear from the extent of disagreement among experts that there is, in the first place, room for more than reasonable doubt as to which of the basic conditions of climate are decisive for climatic change; and, second, that for many periods of antiquity there is insufficient evidence to decide for or against the inference of a climatic change as opposed to a fluctuation or oscillation. These two points are well illustrated by a controversy affecting the interpretation of the late prehistoric and early historical period in Greece. In 1966 Rhys Carpenter put forward the hypothesis that the downfall of Mycenaean civilization and the impoverishment of the ensuing Dark Age were due in part to a shift in the prevailing trade winds which brought on extended drought lasting perhaps as late as 750. This hypothesis has received qualified approval on the climatological side from Lamb and others, but another expert, H.E. Wright, whose views pack the extra punch of first-hand experience in the relevant area and period, has not only impugned the atmospheric mechanism invoked by Carpenter but adduced pollen evidence which certainly does not confirm and may even refute the hypothesis of extended drought (Wright 1968). But in case anyone should be overawed by this seemingly 'hard' evidence, note should also be taken of the opinion of a colleague of Wright, W.G. Loy (1970, 43), that, although drought may never be 'proven as the cause of the Mycenaean downfall, it is even less likely that it will be disproven as a major or at least contributing cause for the apparent depopulation of the south-west Peloponnese during the sub-Mycenaean period'.

The lay onlooker has every right to feel baffled in face of such confusion and apparent contradictions. However, even if Carpenter's hypothesis should be proved correct, much of our period remains unaffected. More important still, an authoritative historical geographer has recently expressed what appears to be the more representative view that during this epoch 'in the Mediterranean region the climate was probably not perceptibly different from that of today' (Pounds 1973, 14). We may therefore cautiously adopt the working hypothesis that the climate of Lakonia in our period more or less closely resembled that of the present day (Chapter 3).

It still remains, however, to ask whether the climate in this region has remained substantially constant since the fourth century BC, and the answer is that it has not. That we may answer thus unequivocally is due to the intensive application to Greece by Bintliff (1977) of the findings of Vita-

Finzi (1969) in the Mediterranean valleys generally. To summarize, the geomorphology of contemporary Greece differs radically from that of Greece in our period in that today's prime arable land, the 'Younger Fill', is ultimately the product of a climatic fluctuation occurring in the late Roman and mediaeval periods. The prime arable land of antiquity, on the other hand, was the 'Older Fill' laid down by at the latest 20,000. Both the 'Older' and 'Younger' Fills were generated, according to Bintliff, by cold and wet ('pluvial') climatic phases, between which there was sandwiched a warmer, dryer phase more akin to that obtaining today. It was this warmer, dryer climate which Lakonia enjoyed during our period. The most striking implications of Bintliff's research for our subject will be disclosed in Chapter 10, but it has of course a wider importance. For it bears on all matters relating to the utilization of the physical environment.

Not, to return to Febvre, that the physical environment is a narrowly determining factor in human history. Perhaps the chief merit of Febvre 1925 was to develop the insights of Vidal de la Blache, who rigorously distinguished between the possibilities and necessities offered or imposed by a given environment. On the other hand, Febvre perhaps did not go far enough. As I hope to show, it is the conditions of production, the economic basis of human society, which in the long run explain the nature and direction of social and political change.

Notes on further reading

The conception of 'human geography' developed by Gourou (1973) owes much to Febvre, to whose memory the book is dedicated. The ideas of Vidal are conveniently brought together in the posthumous Vidal de la Blache 1926.

For a distinguished survey of the role of the environment in the Mediterranean, focused on the sixteenth century AD but with an enormously wider application, see Braudel 1972, I. A start has been made in the study of Greece from a regional and ecological standpoint by Doxiadis and his 'ekistics' school, but this seems on the whole to be a false one: see Wagstaff 1975. Bakhuizen 1975 is on the right lines.

A map of the contemporary provinces ('*nomoi*') of Greece is given in *ESAG* no. 107.

For the history of ancient geography see Aujac 1975; Pédech 1976.

For all my strictures on the 'new' archaeology, there is much of value in Renfrew 1972 (esp. the first four chapters) and 1973.

Rhys Carpenter's hypothesis of a prolonged drought from c.1200 is considered in context in Chapter 6.

The physical setting

The separation of the Peloponnese from the mainland and its upheaval to its present altitudes can be shown to be geologically recent from the strong resemblances in structure and relief between the mountains of the Peloponnese and those of central Greece both east and west of the Isthmus (of Corinth). At the end of the Pliocene (about two million years ago) much of the peninsula was still covered by a shallow sea or lakes, while the remainder consisted of subdued mountains or hills. When the crust eventually began to break irregularly, the bottoms of new gulfs sank as bordering land was thrust up. This new land around the margins ('Neogen') was composed of clays, marls, sands and conglomerates, the old inland region being made up mainly of limestone.

Tectonically Lakonia, as we have defined it, falls into six sections. (The geomorphology of Messenia is discussed more briefly in Chapter 8.) From east to west they are: the east Parnon foreland; Parnon; the west Parnon foreland, including the Malea peninsula; the Eurotas furrow; Taygetos, including ancient Aigytiis and Dentheliatis; and the west Taygetos foreland. The principal features of their relief and geology may now be described in this same order.

The east Parnon foreland extends south from Mount Zavitsa to Cape Ieraka, where the Parnon range sheers off obliquely and runs out into the sea. It takes the form of an inverted triangle whose base is formed by the Parthenion mountains and their continuation eastwards as far as the pass of Anigraia. The region subdivides naturally into a northern section, the ancient Thyreatis or Kynouria (the ancient names were interchangeable: Meyer 1969), and a southern section south of the river of Ay. Andreas. These differ from each other especially in geological composition. The Thyreatis is a high upland plateau, made up principally of Olonos limestone but overlain sporadically by schist, whose imperviousness provides spring water and so encourages settlement (Bintliff 1977, 100). The cultural centre in antiquity was the deltaic alluvial plain of modern Astros formed by the action of the River Tanos and that of Ay. Andreas which flow into the sea just six




Figure 2 The geology of Lakonia

kilometres apart. The southern section of the foreland by contrast is mainly Tripolis limestone and, so far as is known, schist occurs only on the margins of Parnon. The coastline is the steep edge of a typical karstic plateau broken by a fault. The area around Leonidhion (ancient Prasiai) gives a good idea of the character of the area as a whole. Inland the broad, high plateaux for the most part reach 800 m. close to Parnon, fall away to 600 m. further east, only to rise once more towards the coast, this time to 1,200 m. The disappearance

of the eastern portion of the foreland through foundering has caused the underground water of the remainder to flow steeply to the sea and made the surface more waterless than ever.

Not unexpectedly, therefore, settlements are today few and relatively large. Communications both within the foreland and between it and the rest of Lakonia are poor. True, the main route in antiquity from Sparta to Argos via Tegea crossed the Thyreatis (Chapter 10). But north-south travel by land was and is hindered by the deep, narrow and steep gulleys created by rivers flowing from Parnon, and there are no low passes over Parnon to link the foreland to the Eurotas valley. Hence communication continues to be chiefly by sea from coastal settlement to coastal settlement, although the exposure of the coast to north-easterly winds must have made seafaring under ancient conditions perilous. These physiographical features militated against the political unification of the area, but this was nevertheless achieved by the Spartans, in the teeth of Argive competition, after the middle of the sixth century (Chapter 9).

The mountain range of Parnon (only once so called in an ancient source, Paus. 2.38.7) is a residual ridge rising quite gently from the plateau. Beginning in the hills north of Dholiana it runs for ninety kilometres in a south-easterly direction, the outermost spurs reaching the sea north of Monemvasia (near ancient Epidauros Limeria). Its northern section, about thirty kilometres long, is on average between 1,600 and 1,800 m. above sea-level. Here the summit of Mount Malevos (1,935 m.) is clad on both flanks with fir and black pine. Despite the claim of Bölte (1929, 1296) that the northernmost ridges are nowhere difficult to cross, although they are between 1,100 and 1,300 m., communication must always have been desultory. Central Parnon occupies the twenty-two kilometres between Platanaki Pass and Kounouphia ('mosquito-place'—ill-omened name); like south Parnon, it is lower than the northern section. Geographically and geologically Parnon is but the continuation of the inner Arkadian chain, to which it is joined by the broad threshold known in antiquity as Skiritis. The blue-grey, coarse-grained marble, crystalline limestone and schist of the north give way to Tripolis limestone south of Kosmas (ancient Glympeis/ Glyppia?). Above the fir woods, which grow in places at 1,750 m., 'alpine' grasses provide pasturage for the numerous sheep, which apart from sporadic charcoal- or lime-burning today as in antiquity constitute the chief means of livelihood in this inhospitable area.

The west foreland of Parnon may be subdivided into two. The northern section to Goritsa expands southwards from about six to fifteen kilometres in breadth. It is joined to Skiritis, and thereby to the Eurotas furrow, on the west and borders on the Spartan plain further south. Although it is predominantly a limestone plateau thinly veiled by Kermes oak and phrygana (maquis-like scrub), impervious mica-schists crop out to provide sites for fairly large settlements. Skiritis geologically is a continuation of the central Arkadian

highlands, but like Parnon is distinguished from them by its substrate of schist. The latter subdivides naturally at Kaltezaí into a northern and southern section, the whole forming an inverted triangle thirteen kilometres wide at the base and only four at the apex where it disappears into the basin of Sparta. South of the latitude of Sparta outcrops of mica-schist become rarer, necessitating settlement on the limestone outliers of Parnon itself. Here the inhabitants are forced to rely on cistern water, but this is not plentiful since west Parnon falls in the rainshadow of Taygetos.

The southern section of the west Parnon foreland is for the most part a mere three kilometres wide, but it broadens out to nine kilometres where it abuts on the north-eastern perimeter of the Lakonian Gulf at Mount Kourkoula (916 m.). Generally it does not rise above 500 m. and is often hard to distinguish from Parnon itself. Worthy of note is a series of basin plains ('Karstpolje') extending south from Geraki (ancient Geronthrai) to the northern end of the Molaoi plain and thence towards the bay of Monemvasia. Their surface is composed of relatively fertile alluvial soil and contrasts with the surrounding area where life-facilitating springs occur only on the impervious schist. The foreland with few exceptions has never played any very important historical role and in recent times has suffered severe depopulation.

The Malea peninsula continues the west foreland and not Parnon. It is bounded on the north by a line running N 55° W from Epidauros Limerá to the northern end of the plain of Molaoi and thence around Mount Kourkoula to the Lakonian Gulf. From Molaoi to Cape Malea (of 'round Malea and forget your home' notoriety) is a distance of fifty kilometres; below Neapolis (ancient Boiai) the peninsula is only five kilometres wide. Apart from a few depressions filled with Pliocene deposit and alluvium, the upland is composed of strongly folded schists overlain by massive black or grey Tripolis limestone. On the east the highland descends abruptly to the sea, while on the west groups of flat-topped hills fall steeply to the Lakonian Gulf. Settlements today are located on the edges of plains or at the junction of schist and limestone, as for example the chain of villages near Neapolis. The area is noted for its production of onions, part of which is exported. But in antiquity by far the most important natural resource it contained was iron (Chapter 7). Attempts to re-open the workings in the nineteenth century failed for lack of water, adequate transport and, it was said, enthusiasm on the part of the workers.

Three offshore adjuncts of the Malea peninsula deserve separate mention—Elaphonisos, Kythera and Antikythera. In Pausanias' day, the second century AD, what is now the island of Elaphonisos (ancient Onougnathos or 'Ass-jaw') was still joined to the mainland (3.22.10). It had become separated by at the latest AD 1677, and in the process of separation at least one ancient settlement, the Bronze Age site at Pavlopetri (Chapter 6), found its way underwater. The cause of the separation is perhaps to be sought in a eustatic rise in sea-level rather than in crustal movements due to

earthquakes or in the compaction of sediments (Bintliff 1977, 10–26, esp. 15, 25f.); but these are troubled interpretative waters into which I need only dip my toes. At any rate, the area has certainly been strongly affected by seismic activity during the period since records have been kept (Galanopoulos 1964). Further up the Lakonian Gulf at Plytra (ancient Asopos) submarine remains suggest a land-shift of at least two metres. Elaphonisos is now a roughly triangular slab of soft dark limestone rising to 277 m. Its light and sandy topsoil is liable to erosion and unsuitable for cultivation. For its water-supply the population (a mere 673 in 1961) relies on a few deep wells.

Kythera belongs today to the province of Attiki. Previously it had been incorporated in the province of Argolis, and it has often been somewhat distinct, historically, from the rest of Lakonia—not least, as we shall see (Chapter 4), in the Bronze Age. The separation of the island from the mainland is geologically recent: its structure is similar to that of the Malea peninsula, consisting largely of Tripolis limestone. South of the limestone hills around Cape Spathi a belt of schist stretches from coast to coast as far south as Potamos, in whose vicinity a fine-grained white marble is found. Despite the general lack of fertile and cultivable land, the economy remains primarily agricultural, supplemented by a plentiful supply of seafood. The present-day pattern of settlement is dictated by considerations of security rather than accessibility to natural resources, a reversal of the ancient priorities.

Antikythera (variously named in antiquity) lies equidistant from Kythera and western Crete. It resembles an oval with extended points, having a longitudinal axis of ten kilometres and a maximum width of almost four. Its plains and terraces rise to 364 m. and are composed of marl up to 60 m. Although the island is poor in water and mainly provides only fodder for goats (hence perhaps one of its ancient names, Aigilia), it also yields barley in the valleys and is self-supporting. However, population density in 1961 was a paltry eight per km².

In the sharpest possible contrast the Eurotas furrow is, and must always have been, the heartland of Lakonia: population density in 1961 was sixty-eight per km². It occupies an area of about 800 km² between the basin of Megalopolis and the Lakonian Gulf. From a width of only six kilometres in the north it broadens out to twenty-five around the Gulf. Its relationship with the Megalopolis basin is not clearly defined, for the upper reaches of the latter spill over into the furrow at 500 m. without a break, and the tributaries of the Alpheios and Eurotas are linked by a valley watershed at 483 m. The furrow takes its name from the Eurotas, the second largest river in the Peloponnese, which flows mostly along its eastern margin but is diverted below Goritsa to the western. Almost exactly in the centre of the furrow, on the Eurotas itself, lies Sparta, the ancient and modern capital of Lakonia. For convenience of exposition the furrow may be split into four: a northern

section stretching as far south as the Langadha gorge on the west and the confluence of the Kelephina (ancient Oinous) and Eurotas on the east; the Spartan basin; a section comprising the hill-country of Vardhounia on the west and the Pliocene table of Vrondama on the east; and finally the present Helos plain.

The northernmost section lies between north Taygetos and Skiritis, whence flow the upper course and most important tributaries of the Eurotas. Geologically the upper part of this section is Oionos limestone and flysch, the lower schists. Population here has remained more or less static since the end of the nineteenth century, but Georgitsi (near ancient Pellana) has suffered appreciable depopulation, from 1,646 in 1928 to 984 in 1961.

The basin of Sparta lies between the sharply defined central portion of Taygetos and Parnon. It is twenty-two kilometres long, between eight and twelve kilometres wide, and trends in a south-south-east direction. It was originally filled with Pliocene deposits of an inland sea, the 'Neogen' soil which formed the backbone of agriculture in our period. But these have been partly removed by erosion and partly overlain by the recent alluvium generated during the late Roman/mediaeval climatic oscillation mentioned at the end of Chapter 1. There are today three main cultivated areas: the well-watered piedmont of Taygetos, thickly forested with citrus (a post-classical import), olive and mulberry (now fostered by artificial irrigation), and fertile in vegetables; the centre of the Spartan plain, which bears olives, wheat, barley and maize (an import of the sixteenth or seventeenth century AD), the peculiarity of its soil being that it can produce two cereal harvests in a single year; third, the hills along the Eurotas, which yield wheat or barley. Population in the basin has unsurprisingly fluctuated little overall in recent times. Sparta itself has grown by well over a half since 1928, despite the relatively primitive level of industrialization.

In the south the basin of Sparta is blocked by the Vardhounia hill-country, eighteen kilometres wide. Its western portion merges with Taygetos and is composed largely of schists; its eastern limit is marked by the stream west of modern Krokeai, the Kourtaki. The area rises to 516 m. at Mount Lykovouni and is geologically very similar to south Taygetos. East of Vardhounia lies the Vrondama plateau, composed of Pliocene conglomerates and marls and named for its most important modern village. The plateau is separated from the Spartan basin by a limestone ridge south-west of Goritsa. It declines gradually from 300 m. in the north to 150 m. at Myrtia along a bed of conglomerate overlying the marl. West of Grammoussa the Eurotas buries itself in the Tripolis limestone causing routes of communication to deviate from the river and pass either over the Vrondama plateau south-eastwards to the Malea peninsula or through Vardhounia to Gytheion.

The Helos plain and adjoining land are bounded on the west by the Vardhounia hills and on the east by Mount Kourkoula, whose spurs in the form of a Pliocene table-land reach down to the marshy coast. Apart from

this narrow strip of marl on the east the soil is alluvium brought down by the Eurotas and its tributary the Mariorhevma (which preserves the name of ancient Marios). A fact of inestimable significance, however, is that the present form of the Helos plain differs markedly from that of its ancient forerunner, which indeed was not strictly a plain. For the 'Younger Fill' around the head of the Lakonian Gulf is due to the climatic oscillation already noted, in which cool and moist phases promoted alluviation and coastal aggradation (Figure 3). The ancient shoreline, that is to say, lay appreciably further inland and, as has recently been proved by a deep core, the ancient landscape lies buried beneath in places five to fifteen metres of recent alluvium. Thus the agricultural character of the region today cannot simply be read back into antiquity. For example, the abundant irrigated crops of citrus, cotton and rice grown on the 'Younger Fill' are post-classical and indeed, in the case of the two last, twentieth-century imports.

The Taygetos range, known locally as Pendedaktylo ('five-fingered') or Makrynas ('far-off one'), runs for some 110 km. from the Megalopolis basin to Cape Matapan (ancient Cape Tainaron), the second most southerly point in continental Europe. In structure it is an upfold of several Peloponnesian rock-types. Crystalline schists and marble are overlain by various slates and limestones. With the last major upheaval great faults appeared along both sides of the range, the western marking the shore of the Messenian Gulf and




Figure 3 The Helos plain: geological change

the high eastern edge of the plains of Messenia. Transverse faulting split the range into three main sections, the central being elevated above the rest.

Northern Taygetos extends south as far as the Langadha gorge and the north-east angle of the Messenian Gulf. Its breadth (from twenty-one to twenty-four kilometres) falls into three longitudinal subdivisions. The eastern ridge is narrow and straight, rising gently southwards to 1,610 m. above the Langadha, and is made up of dark limestones, schists and shales. The western ridge is fairly broad but never exceeds 1,300 m.; it is uniformly composed of massive limestones. Between these two ridges lies much lower country worn out of the sandstones and fissured limestones by the southward flowing Nedhon (ancient Nedon) and the northward draining Xerillos (ancient Karnion). The inhabitants of this intermediate zone, which embraces the ancient Aigyitis and Dentheliatis, were the most backward of any encountered by Philippon.

Central Taygetos extends for thirty-six kilometres from the Langadha to the valleys of Xirokambi and Kardamyli (ancient Kardamyle) on the east and west respectively. This is the highest part of the range, the limestone peaks culminating in Proph. Elias at 2,407 m. The magnificence of the aspect on the east stems from the sharp contrast between the craggy walls of Taygetos and the flatness of the Spartan plain. To the west the lower crests are of marble and mica-schist; the eastern terrace is composed by bold limestone bluffs interrupted by deeply etched ravines. Central Taygetos seems to have been largely uninhabited in antiquity, when it was used by the Spartans as a hunting-ground (Chapter 10). Today the schist has been extensively planted to wheat, barley, rye and maize (the latter up to 1,300 m.).

Southern Taygetos comprises the block between the Xirokambi-Kardamyli pass and the gap between Karyoupolis and Areopolis, which carried the main ancient route to the southern Mani from Gytheion. This section is considerably larger than the preceding and less sharply defined from its surroundings. The eastern limestone chain sinks abruptly from the summit to 1,500 m., but rises again to 1,700 m. at Mount Anina. On the west the marble is less rigid and is dissected by valleys. The region as a whole is more favourable to vegetation and habitation than those to north and south. The whole eastern side is today rich in small settlements, which often perch picturesquely on ridges and slopes amid dense tree-growth; this may, however, have been largely virgin forest in our period.

South Mani is a continuation of Taygetos. Its main summits, which are of marble, decline southwards from 1,100 to 310 m. three kilometres north of Cape Matapan. In only a few places is the marble overlain by mica-schist, where the mere four springs known to Philippon take their rise. Unusually scanty amounts of soil result from the weathering of the hard marble, and this is quickly swept away in winter by rain-storms. Where it does stay put, it is mixed with coarse blocks and small stones ('the Mani is all stones' is a proverbial saying)—the farmer's bug-bear. In such a context the annual

migration of the quail is of more than sporting interest; hence Porto Kayio (on the site of ancient Psamathous) from the Venetians' Porto Quaglio and the Frankish Port des Cailles. Depopulation in the twentieth century has been drastic.

The final tectonic division of Lakonia, the western foreland of Taygetos, runs from Kalamata (ancient Pharai) to Cape Grosso not far north-west of Matapan. It is a coastal terrace and a remarkable erosion-feature, originally cut level by the waves but unequally elevated thereafter by earth-movements. Later still, rivers incised deep ravines, at whose mouths inlets have been produced by sinking. The latter process has probably been furthered by the solution of the marble through weathering. At Cape Kitries in the north the terrace is eight kilometres wide; it narrows to its smallest breadth at Trachilas Bay. From 400 m. at Kitries (ancient Gerenia?) it declines to 98 m. at Cape Grosso. From Kardamyli to the estuary of the river of Milia (Little Pamisos, an ancient frontier between Lakonia and Messenia: Chapter 15) the foreland is chiefly composed of Tripolis limestone patchily overlain by marl; in the Milia valley a zone of mica-schist gives rise to the exceedingly rare spring water. Further south marble is ever-present covered only by a shapeless mass of loam produced by weathering. However, despite the forbidding nature of the terrain, Perioikic communities succeeded in maintaining themselves here—a suitable reminder with which to close this chapter that man is never wholly the slave of the physical environment.

Notes on further reading

The outstanding though somewhat outdated contribution to our understanding of Greek geography has been made by Philippon: Kirsten 1956 includes a bibliography of his numerous works (by no means confined to Greece); for his discussion of Lakonia and Messenia see Philippon 1959, 371–523. Also useful for many points is the Admiralty Naval Intelligence Division Geographical Handbook of Greece (3 vols, March 1944, October 1944, August 1945). See now, however, Bintliff 1977, I, ch. 2; II, chs. 3–4. The technical terminology can most easily be grasped through Whitten and Brooks 1972 and Moore 1976. For the relief of Lakonia and Messenia, and for the location of modern place-names, the regional maps issued by the Greek Statistical Service should be consulted. My Figure 2 is modified from the map produced by the Institute of Geology and Subsurface Research at Athens (1954). I have also used the air photographs taken by the RAF in the last world war, prints of which are housed in the British School at Athens.

In general I have avoided citing modern population figures, partly because there are inherent dangers in interpreting census-returns (Cox 1970, 33–43), in part because the most reliable modern census, that of 1961 (Kayser 1965), was taken well after Greece had been sucked into the orbit of international finance capital. It is, however, perhaps worth noting that one third of the total

population was then living on less than 5 per cent of the total surface area, almost one half on less than 15 per cent.

The survival in the north Parnon region of a language which retains certifiable traces of its ultimate Doric ancestor, Tsakonian, bears eloquent witness to the isolation of the region.

Rogan 1973 is the work of an interested amateur; but her maps clearly mark the extent and subdivisions of the extraordinary Mani, and she traces settlement here from prehistory to the present day site by site (with some bibliography).

Climate

The ancient Greeks' equivalent of our word climate was not 'klima' but something like *krasis aëros* or simply *horai* (seasons). By these terms they understood primarily changes in temperature, relative humidity and prevailing winds, but even for these they devised no instruments to record their fluctuations. Our concept of climate is immensely more complex, and modern instrumentation permits it to be considerably more sophisticated (Chapter 1).

Climate rivals relief in its importance as a geographical factor. Since it determines which crops cannot be grown in a particular region, it sets limits to the range of ecological adaptations available to man. How far the influence of climate extends into the spheres of personal character or political organization were matters for debate even in antiquity, but its effects on health, patterns of settlement and life-styles are less obscure. In this chapter only the climate recorded for Sparta will be considered in detail, since it is not greatly different from that recorded for Gytheion, Kythera and Leonidhion. By contrast Messenia (represented by readings taken at Kalamata) lies on the other side of the Taygetos weather-shed, on the wetter, western side of the Greek mainland.

If the arguments of Chapter 1 are cogent, the Spartan climate for most if not all of our special period will not have been very different from that of today, although within this period there will undoubtedly have been fluctuations. Our scanty literary sources tend to support this assumption, apart from their suggestion of heavier forestation, which can be more satisfactorily explained on historical than on climatological grounds (Bintliff 1977, I, chs 3–4). The overall picture of classical Greece they present is of a generally rocky, infertile and poor country (esp. Hdt. 7.102.1), blessed with a few fertile plains, notably those of Lakonia and Messenia (Eur. fr. 1083N). Nothing has changed here. The relative prosperity enjoyed by mainland Greece between c. 700 and 300 was due to a combination of historical variables, not to the fact that its climate was in important respects better than it is now.

Lakonia belongs to the climatic sub-group which embraces Attiki, Corinthia, Argolis and the Kyklades. This does not of course mean that there

are no divergences within the sub-group: in temperature, for example, Sparta is more continental, Athens more maritime. Indeed, there are divergencies, though insignificant ones, within Lakonia itself. However, the sub-group as a whole is characterized by slight rainfall and marked, prolonged summer drought, thereby possessing to the fullest degree the differentiating qualities of the 'Mediterranean' climate and landscape.

The most important climatic factor is warmth. The formula adopted in Greece for calculating mean daily temperature is to divide by four the sum of the temperatures recorded at 0800 and 1400 hours plus twice the temperature recorded at 2100. The mean temperature at Sparta in July is 27°C, which when adjusted to allow for the height of the meteorological station above sea-level (c.200 m.) is the hottest in Greece. The (unadjusted) mean for January is 8.8°C, the range of 18.2°C between January and July being higher than that of Athens (17.8°C). The absolute minimum temperature recorded at Sparta is -6.3°C, the absolute maximum a stifling 43.5°C: again, there is an enormous range here comparable to that recorded for Athens. As far as the effect of temperature on crops is concerned, however, mean monthly values are of little analytical significance (Papadakis 1966, 16f.). What ought to be recorded are the daily maxima and minima, from which the mean monthly maxima and minima may be computed. (The 0800 and 1400 hours recordings are perhaps not far off the daily minimum and maximum, but they are far enough astray to ensure systematic distortion.) Thus a freak reading like the -6.3°C (or the -11°C at Athens) will lose much of its merely apparent significance when it is thrown into the scales with all the other daily minima for that month. In general temperatures do not begin to drop appreciably until December, when the Spartan winter properly speaking starts, and even then there are considerable day-to-day fluctuations. In March the transition to spring is completed, the opening of the ancient campaigning and sailing seasons and a time of hunger (Alkman fr. 20.3-5 Page). By June summer has come round again. The hottest days ('of the Dog') occur towards the end of July and beginning of August, in other words during the close season between the cereal-harvest and planting.

Next after warmth in order of importance is rainfall, the 'key challenge' (Angel 1972, 88). Merely to state the average annual rainfall at Sparta (81.66 cm.) is to disguise the essential characteristic of all Mediterranean rainfall, its seasonal distribution. What we need to know is for how long and how much rain falls on the days it does fall, on how many days it falls, and in which months. On Kythera, for example, one fifth of the total annual rainfall recorded for one year fell within the space of a few hours. Such rainfall causes severe flooding and extensive soil-removal: with good reason Theophrastos described Lakonia as 'liable to flooding, rainy and marshy'.

The average annual number of rain-days at Sparta is eighty-seven, about half that of southern England, which receives a comparable quantity of rain per annum. The annual drought at Sparta lasts two months: that is to say,

fewer than three centimetres of rain fall on average in July and August together, compared to 1.25 at Gytheion, 1.5 at Leonidhion. As in most other places in Greece, the mean monthly rainfall values show their sharpest rise between September and October, and one third of the total annual rainfall is deposited in November and December. The seasonal distribution does, however, have its compensations. For it makes a harvest of essential cereals possible everywhere in Greece—indeed, two harvests in central Lakonia. But Sparta does not of course receive the same amount of rainfall each year: the lowest annual figure is less than half the annual mean, as it is for Gytheion and Kythera too. What makes the average as high as it is, bearing in mind how far south Sparta lies, is its proximity to Taygetos, which increases the uplift effect on moist airmasses in late autumn and winter.

The key to understanding the Greek climate lies in the study of atmospheric circulation and airflow. We lack direct evidence for Sparta, but the picture obtained by Lehmann (1937) for the plain of Argolis is said to hold good for the east Greek mainland as a whole. From April to June southerly winds prevail, but in all other months winds are mainly northerly, reaching maximum frequency in July and August. Sparta, exceptionally, receives northerly winds throughout the year—an important fact, because it confirms the view that it is not the prevailing northerlies which cause the summer drought; besides, the drought is shorter in Sparta than in many other places. The cool north-easterly summer trade wind, the Meltemi, which often reaches Force 7 or 8 on the Beaufort scale, blows hard until 1700 hours and slows down the rise of air-temperature. On summer evenings katabatic winds gravitate down the slopes of Taygetos to Sparta and accelerate the cooling of the air, which begins in earnest when the sun disappears behind the mountain and suddenly swathes the town in shadow. In winter stormy rain-bearing southerlies alternate with gusty northerlies which bring rain to the eastern side of the Peloponnese and cause snowfalls on the lowlands in December.

As far as thunderstorms are concerned, Parnon acts as a weathershed for the Eurotas valley. One May Philippon observed repeated heavy storms on the west side of Parnon, while on the east there was either no rain or an insignificant amount. His observations are confirmed by the meteorological data. In May and June Sparta has on average twelve thunderstorm days per 1,000, few but over twice as many as Leonidhion. The picture repeats itself in the mean annual figures: 3.5 per 100 at Sparta, only 1.3 at Leonidhion. In July the frequency of thunderstorms declines to 2.3 per 1,000 at Sparta; they are virtually unknown in this month on Kythera.

Hail is not particularly common in Greece, and it was fortunate for the Spartans that the beginning of the growth period for cereals coincides with the lowest average number of hail-days (November). The highest figure is recorded for May, before and during the harvest, but even this is insignificant. In July it declines once more into non-existence. The annual average

compares favourably with that of Athens whose higher figure is accounted for by the amount it receives on average in October to December.

Snow is a climatic variable of considerable importance to the organization of daily life. Brought by north-east winds, it falls especially in February on the north and east flanks of mountains. Sparta itself receives snow very rarely: of the more important states of ancient Greece Athens and Sparta occupy opposite ends of the scale in this regard. But the Spartans directly or indirectly experienced the effects of snowfalls. For it remains on Taygetos, in appreciable quantity in some places, until the end of June, and so constituted a most effective obstacle to communication via mountain passes (Chapter 10). On the other hand, as was shown in midwinter 370–69 (Chapter 13), snow could act as a useful protection for Sparta by causing the Eurotas to run high; and in the summer the melting snow refills the mountain streams, which have a particularly beneficial influence on the piedmont at the western edge of the Spartan plain.

The harmful effect of frost on growing crops hardly needs special emphasis. But in view of the undoubted hardness of a Spartan upbringing it is perhaps significant that between November and April Sparta has on average twice as many frost-days per 100 as Athens. Although white frost is not uncommon in Greece, we have no information for Sparta.

Fog and cloud are negligible climatic factors in Greece and neither appears with sufficient frequency to detract from the famed blueness of the Greek sky, which is due to the dryness of the air. Attempts to classify visibility in terms of distance are of course ludicrous, and there is no better foundation for claims that there is a significant correlation between blueness of sky or clarity of air and traits of character. Sunshine, however, the inverse of cloud and fog, does have therapeutic qualities, and insolation at Sparta is among the highest recorded in Greece. On average Sparta receives 329 sunshine-hours in June, 387 in July and 364 in August. As for relative humidity, another favoured candidate for the role of character-moulder, it reaches its peak at Sparta in December, then declines to its minimum in July, remaining throughout the year higher than that of Athens.

Finally, dew deserves a special mention, for a form of condensation which lies directly on vegetation is very important in a relatively rainless country. (Fog-drip from trees is negligible.) Figures for dew-nights are not available for Sparta, but the ancient evidence for the importance of dew in cult (mainly from Athens) suggests that they will not have been frequent.

To conclude, the climate of Sparta represents, what we might have expected from its location, a compromise between eastern and western Greece. In comparison to its nearest recorded neighbours, Sparta has a somewhat rougher winter climate, akin in soIndexme respects to that of Athens. In summer the differences are much slighter, Sparta being rather hotter, owing to its inland situation. In our brief survey the climates of Athens and Sparta have occasionally been compared. If such a comparison has any historical value, that of Sparta is harsher and more demanding.

Notes on further reading

The standard work of synthesis on the Greek climate is Philippon 1948; but see Lauffer 1950 for many supplements and some corrections. Useful companions are Livathinos and Mariolopoulos 1935 and *ESAG*. The figures I have cited are based on recordings made between 1900 and 1929. The relevant tables are reproduced in the Admiralty Handbook I, App. 9.

There is much of relevance in Papadakis 1966. He discusses in detail (39ff.) how he would set about making a climatic classification and attacks attempts to base a classification on figures like those used by Philippon. The latter are, however, adequate for our purposes.

The Stone and Bronze Ages to c. 1300

'Revolution', like 'democracy', is a grossly overworked term, one of the list of slogan-words which seems to justify the emotive theory of morals. But if ever a human process merited the title, it is the one compendiously dubbed the 'Neolithic Revolution'. For this was perhaps 'the greatest revolution... in the history of Mankind' (Theocharis 1973, 19). After maybe the better part of three million years of hunting and gathering by various species of homo, homo sapiens began instead to produce its means of subsistence. Through the domestication of wild grasses and animals there was unleashed the only kind of progress of which it is any longer possible to speak without equivocation, progress in man's control over nature. Not that the Neolithic Revolution was an inevitable process, nor did its onset mark a sudden complete break with the past. Its advance, moreover, should not be likened to that of a steamroller, especially if for any reason we should be unwilling to accept that Neolithic techniques of farming were diffused from the Fertile Crescent. It was for its consequences, in other words, rather than the manner of its introduction, that its title is most fully justified.

As recently as a generation back it would have been impossible to write a general survey of the Neolithic period in Greece such as Theocharis 1973. Now, however, thanks to the remarkable finds at the Franchthi cave in the Argolis, all the stages of the Revolution can be traced in Greece from its immediate Mesolithic origins to the Final or Epi-Neolithic threshold of our more immediate concern, the Bronze Age. To specify, this cave has yielded a continuous stratigraphic sequence from the Late Palaeolithic to the advanced Neolithic. Greece, however, may prove to have yet greater surprises in store. For although Neanderthal skulls and Mousterian tools had signalled the presence of man here, including the Peloponnese, from as early as the Middle Palaeolithic period, it was reported in 1976 that human bones found embedded in a stalagmite in Chalkidiki had been dated some 700,000 years before the present. If corroborated (which is, however, unlikely), this find would upset prevailing theories about the geography of the evolution of man.

Fortunately we need not concern ourselves here with such lofty heights of speculation about the progress of man from ape to artist nor even with the




Figure 4 Neolithic and Early Helladic Lakonia

ultimate origins of plant-cultivation, which have recently been placed in Palestine some 12,000 years ago. There is for a start no Lakonian equivalent of the Franchthi cave. Its nearest rival, however, is in Lakonia, the Alepotrypa ('Fox-hole') cave in south Mani on the east coast of the Messenian Gulf; but this does not seem to have come into its own until towards the end of the Neolithic (Figure 4). Recent excavations have, it is true, revealed doubtful traces of Late Palaeolithic occupation in the form of tools and bones. But the certainly datable evidence of pottery does not make its appearance until the middle of the sixth millennium or late on in the Early Neolithic period. To date, this pottery is the only sure evidence that Lakonia was inhabited at this time, unless three remarkable marble figurines (two certainly female) belong to the Early Neolithic (Theocharis 1973, figs 17, 200, 226).

These tiny sculptures were reportedly found in the vicinity of modern Sparta, but a more likely provenance is Kouphovouno, a low mound site about two kilometres south-south-west. This was, as it were, the Sparta of Neolithic Lakonia, but settlement here cannot be firmly documented before the last third of the sixth millennium, that is in the Middle Neolithic period. By this time, however, attested settlement in Lakonia was attaining a wider distribution. Apart from Kouphovouno and (probably) the Alepotrypa cave, there is evidence of occupation near modern Apidia in the west Parnon foreland south-east of Geraki. At Apidia, however, the pottery in question was not unearthed in controlled excavation but picked up during surface survey, and so this is perhaps an opportune moment to stress how flimsy is the basis of evidence on which any reconstruction of the prehistoric ('text-free') period in Lakonia rests.

This may best be done by taking as our frame of reference the arguments of a leading prehistorian with experience of the problems of the Aegean (Renfrew 1972, 225–64). Attempting to trace the pattern of settlement in Greece from the Neolithic through the Bronze Age, Renfrew began correctly by pointing out the inadequacy of the available evidence, overwhelmingly assembled through surface exploration rather than scientific digging. Such evidence is subject to a series of limitations as raw material for 'history' that can only be surmounted by—or at least not without—excavation. For example, soil erosion, later settlement, deep ploughing, alluviation and maquis-type vegetation can singly or in combination obliterate or temporarily obscure traces of habitation. Different settlement patterns and cultural assemblages paint surface pictures of unequal perceptibility. Accidentally uncovered worked stones can swiftly take on a new lease of life in modern structures far perhaps from the site of their original discovery. Finally, and by no means least, the preconceived notions of archaeologists can blinker their field of vision.

Expressly recognizing these limitations, all of which apply to the Lakonian evidence, Renfrew concluded that, although inter-regional comparisons might be seriously misleading, figures for developing intra-regional settlement

patterns and population density could be statistically significant. In fact, not even this more modest claim will withstand scrutiny, at least not in the case of Lakonia; survey has been notably more thorough in, for example, Messenia. For a 50 per cent or less surface coverage of the region leaves far too great a margin of error, given the dearth of excavation; and the pre-conception that prehistoric settlements of all periods were typically centred on 'akropolis' sites has been contradicted by more recent surveys of other regions, which have restored the low hillock and indeed the valley-floor to their rightful place.

Renfrew's misapprehension of the number of sites occupied in the various prehistoric phases is compounded by unwarranted assumptions about the character and size of settlements, as we shall see in Chapter 6. However, to return to the Neolithic, we have so far registered the occupation by 5000 of three sites, located in three of Lakonia's six main geological subdivisions. These three continued to be inhabited into the Late Neolithic (c.4500–3500, according to Phelps 1975), when they were perhaps joined by a fourth at Geraki. Although the quantity of skeletons recovered from the Alepotrypa cave represents the most impressive concentration in Greece, the situation in Lakonia as a whole can hardly be described as one of overpopulation. Something of a transformation, however, seems to have been effected in the Final Neolithic period (3500–3000/2500). Now the southern part of the Eurotas furrow was settled at Asteri (Karaousi) and Ay. Efstratios, while occupation continued to the north at Kouphovouno and perhaps Palaiokastro (between Chrysapha and the Menelaion site) and to the south at Alepotrypa. The presence of silver jewellery in the latter suggests a measure of prosperity, but all good things must end and the collapse of the roof crushed or trapped a veritable charnel-house of corpses (Lambert 1972, 845–71). Traces of habitation probably to be assigned to this same phase have been detected in a double cave at Goritsa in the west foreland of Parnon west of Geraki (itself still occupied), at Goules near Plytra in the Malea peninsula, and at Kardamyli, Kambos and Kokkinochomata in north-west Mani.

Can we create a pattern out of these scanty and disparate materials? Given the apparent break in Lakonia between the Upper Palaeolithic and Early Neolithic (no Mesolithic), Neolithic techniques of farming must have been imported rather than spontaneously developed here. At any rate, the wild ancestors of the relevant domesticated grasses and animals have only been found at Franchthi (oats, barley). Whether the importation was through diffusion or immigration cannot be firmly decided without a good deal more exploration and excavation, but 'the distribution of the known sites suggests that the neolithic people first entered Lakonia by sea, via the Helos and Molaoi plains' (Hope Simpson and Waterhouse 1961, 168). On present evidence they did not venture far from the coast but occupied roughly south-central Lakonia. Kouphovouno, however, is fairly far to the north and, to judge by its houses, graves and stone artefacts, was perhaps the single most

important site. It would of course be rash to speak of a hierarchy of settlements at this stage, but Kouphovouno's central position in the Spartan basin is noteworthy. For in view of the strong correlation between the distribution of cornlands in Greece today and that of the Neolithic tells, the chief crops must have been cereals, probably emmer wheat and barley (J.Renfrew in Theocharis 1973, 149).

Direct palaeobotanical evidence is lacking for Lakonia, but three disc-shaped clay bread-ovens have been found in the Alepotrypa cave. Here too were discovered the bones of ovines or caprines and bovines, together with marine shells. However, the chief evidence for the Lakonian Neolithic is its pottery, although this was a concomitant, rather than a basic ingredient, of Neolithic culture. It was hand-made (like all pottery in Greece before the Middle Bronze Age) and sometimes beautifully decorated, as was for example the late polychrome ware at the Alepotrypa cave and Apidia. By the Late Neolithic it is possible to speak, with special reference to the pottery, of a cultural 'koine' stretching from Thessaly to the Mani.

More obvious evidence of cultural contact and communication is provided by the obsidian artefacts from Kouphovouno and Alepotrypa. The source of this volcanic rock has been proved beyond doubt to be the island of Melos, whence it was being obtained by the occupants of the Franchthi cave as astonishingly early as 7000 or even earlier (C.Renfrew in Theocharis 1973, 180, 339–41). But perhaps most exciting of all is the discovery of copper tools in the Alepotrypa cave. The source of the ore and the place where the metal was smelted are not yet established, but these implements provide a convenient transition to the Early Bronze Age, known in mainland Greece as the Early Helladic (EH) era.

For 'man's discovery of copper ore and the means whereby it could be turned into metal was one of the major discoveries in history' (Branigan 1970, 1). Since there was apparently no transitional ('Chalkolithic') phase in the Peloponnese, the sharp break from the Neolithic to the Bronze Age argues diffusion of the secrets of metallurgy, possibly by immigrants, from the Near East via the Kyklades and perhaps the Troad (Branigan 1974, 97–102). At first copper, beaten and hammered, was employed on its own, then tin from Etruria, Sardinia or Spain was alloyed with it to produce implements and weapons of bronze. However, EH and its tripartite subdivision are, like the entire subdivision of the Aegean Bronze Age (Stubblings 1970, 241), based on the classification of pottery not the typology of metal artefacts. So there is inevitably some elasticity about the date at which a particular region or site can be said to have entered the Bronze Age properly speaking. For Lakonia, 2700 or thereabouts is a reasonable approximation.

The general features of EH Greece are fairly clear: a dispersed 'farmstead' pattern of settlement on low hill-sites preferentially near the sea; 'Urfinis' pottery and the 'sauceboat' shape diagnostic of EH II; active trade and communications, especially by sea; increasing use of copper and silver. In

short, this was a progressive and on the whole prosperous era, although, as we shall see, hardly one in which the 'way of life was urban and commercial rather than rural and agricultural' (Hooker 1977, 17). As far as Lakonia is concerned, however, the dearth of excavated evidence and especially of metal artefacts enforces a probably distorting reliance on the testimony of pottery. On the other hand, the evidence from Kythera, to which I shall return at the end of my discussion of EH Lakonia, is unique in the Aegean world as a whole and potentially of great significance.

Surface surveys have revealed some thirty to forty Lakonian sites, mostly dispersed farms or hamlets, occupied in EH times (Figure 4). The majority of these was attested by sherds alone, a handful by stone celts alone, but it is at least clear that in this period all the main geological sub-regions were settled, chiefly on or near coasts. The main concentration was in the most fertile area, the Eurotas valley, but the district around Vatika bay in the Malea peninsula was also extensively settled. No pottery of either the EH I or EH III sub-phases has been picked up, but the quantity of the ware from the intervening sub-phase suggests that in Lakonia as elsewhere EH II was a long and mainly peaceful epoch. Apart from the pottery and celts, two fragmentary animal figurines have been found, at Palaiopyrgi near Vapheio in the Spartan basin and at Laina near Goritsa. A special position is occupied by the long since known but only recently published hoard of gold and silver jewellery allegedly from the Thyreatis (Greifenhagen 1970, 17f.). This belongs to the end of the EH period (c.2000) and includes filigree work and other features betraying links with the Troad. I suspect, though, that its original home was Lerna (below).

Fortunately the surface surveys have been followed up by excavation—but unfortunately at only one site, Ay. Stephanos on the western edge of the present Helos plain. EH pottery was unearthed in appreciable amounts associated with burials (often in stone cists, perhaps an anticipation of Middle Helladic practice) as well as in settlement areas (Taylour 1972, 261). There was no EH III and apparently no EH I either, a satisfying confirmation of the picture derived from survey. So far as I can see, the only published metal object from an EH context was a pair of bronze tweezers (Branigan 1974, Cat. 1320). Indeed, apart from the Thyreatis hoard, this is the only EH metal object known so far from Lakonia. Finally, we must note the now underwater necropolis of some sixty tombs, probably mostly EH, on the mainland side of the strait between Pavlopetri islet and the Malea peninsula. Within the adjoining settlement (also submerged) many of the finds were apparently of the end of the Bronze Age, and I shall return to them in various connections.

In this present state of our knowledge of EH Lakonia we cannot even begin to ask how the region may have compared to the better known ones of the Peloponnese, Argolis and Messenia. This is, to say the least, disappointing, because certainly two and possibly three major developments

occurred on the Greek mainland in the EH period. First, social differentiation and societal complexity became such that at Lerna in Argolis and at Akovitika on the north-east shore of the Messenian Gulf (four kilometres west of Kalamata) successive stages of building culminated in the erection during EH II of structures suggesting the emergence of an individual or family-group as political over-lord. The function of such structures as centres for the redistribution of goods and services has been admirably explicated by Renfrew (1972, 52f.), although I cannot accept the 'systems' model of 'culture process' that he employs to explain them. Rather, the appearance of such centres presupposes exploitation, that is the extraction by a few rich people from the many primary producers of a surplus of products thereby made available for redistribution.

This surplus resulted from the second of our three major EH developments, the establishment of the 'Mediterranean triad' of dietary staples (corn, olives and wine) as the basis of subsistence. Again, the demonstration of the occurrence and significance of this development is due to Renfrew (1972, 265–307), and it is this development which explains my earlier rejection of Hooker's characterization of the Early Bronze Age. I shall consider the special qualities of the triad at the appropriate points in later chapters.

The third major EH development is far more controversial. Either towards the end of the period or, more rarely, actually terminating it, several destructions occurred in mainland Greece. For reasons which it is outside the scope of this book to explore, these destructions have been attributed to Indo-European invaders from the north, who spoke an early form of Greek, rode horses and used the potter's wheel. Suffice it to say here that this neat connection cannot be demonstrated on linguistic or archaeological grounds (Hooker 1976; 1977, 12–32). However, what is more or less beyond dispute is that between c.2000 and 1900 the EH culture gave way to the Middle Helladic (MH), that the foremost types of MH pottery were thrown on the wheel and that some time before the inscription of the earliest known Linear B tablets (Chapter 5) a form of Greek was being spoken in mainland Greece.

None of these three major developments, as I have said, can be positively identified in Lakonia as yet. However, some consolation for this lack of evidence may be gleaned from Kythera. This island's destiny has often been a little distinct historically from that of mainland Lakonia, but at no time was this distinctness more marked than in the Bronze Age. Surface exploration had been conducted since the nineteenth century, but it was only in 1963–5 that excavations were carried out in the most fertile area, the Palaiopolis valley on the east coast. About 100 m. inland from the Kastri promontory a trial trench on the Kastraki spur yielded sherds not only of EH II (and nothing later) but also of EH I, the only sample of this so far attested in Lakonia (it has Boiotian analogies).

Still more remarkable, however, were the finds from the main dig on the Kastri promontory itself. For these represented the earliest known ‘colony’ of Cretan settlers, who had emigrated to Kythera during the currency of Early Minoan II pottery. The most economical explanation of this succession of culturally distinct settlements is that around 2500 ‘the Cretan newcomers ousted the mainlanders’ (Coldstream 1973, 35). Coldstream, indeed, goes further and speculates that the Cretan occupation of the best land on Kythera may have set up a kind of frontier between the Minoan sphere of influence on the one hand and the Helladic/Cycladic on the other. I feel doubtful whether the evidence (mainly pottery) will bear such a weighty superstructure of hypothesis. Equally dubious is the suggestion that a small marble vase inscribed in hieroglyphs (with the name of an Egyptian Fifth Dynasty solar temple erected by Userkaf) is evidence of wide foreign relations. For it was a sporadic find and could have made its way to Kythera at a much later date.

Returning to rather firmer ground, we find that evidence from survey has revealed widespread settlement in MH Lakonia, but a slightly altered settlement pattern (Figure 5). An appreciable number of EH sites is given up and some new ones are selected, often on and around an ‘akropolis’. The result is that, although fewer actual sites are known in MH (between twenty and thirty) than in EH, these can sometimes be described as of ‘village’ type rather than isolated farmsteads and hamlets. The concentration of sites in the Helos plain has provoked the suggestion that MH invaders entered Lakonia by sea (Hope Simpson and Waterhouse 1961, 170); but in the present state of our evidence it is perhaps prudent not to fall back too readily on the invasion hypothesis. What is certain is that local versions of the leading types of MH pottery—grey and yellow ‘Minyan’ and matt-painted—are present in Lakonia.

Three excavated sites call for special mention, two in the Eurotas valley, the third in the west Parnon foreland. The latter, Geraki, utilizing one of the basin plains mentioned in Chapter 2, had perhaps been occupied more or less continuously from Neolithic times. But the trial excavation of 1905 suggested that it only grew to importance in the MH period. Characteristically MH cist-graves (one containing a fine bronze bird-pin) and matt-painted pottery were unearthed, the latter belonging especially to the latest, MH III, phase. Potentially of most significance, perhaps, were the large blocks of walling on the akropolis, but these are not certainly MH in date nor necessarily defensive in purpose. In the Spartan plain Amyklai, later to form part of classical Sparta, had been first settled in the EH period. Apart from an apparent break at the end of MH (there is no LH I, at least), the excavated site seems to have been occupied continuously thereafter at any rate to the eleventh century (cf. Chapter 7). MH wares represented include grey and black (‘Argive’) Minyan, matt-painted and light-on-dark. The latter may reflect contact with Minoan Crete, but it is from our third and best known excavated site, Ay. Stephanos, that the Cretan connection is most clearly apparent.




Figure 5 Middle Helladic and Late Helladic I-III A Lakonia

Several burials and remains of houses have been found at Ay. Stephanos, including a MH III house comprising one long room communicating with a smaller one; along the long side of the main room ran a low stone bench adjoining a rectangular hearth composed of slabs and small stones. Most significant of all, however, is the conclusion drawn from a preliminary study of the pottery excavated in 1974, which emphasizes the importance of the site in the transition from the Middle to the Late Bronze Age in Lakonia. 'There is a strong Minoan influence, and a very high percentage (over 50%) of the painted pottery finds persuasive parallels for shape, range and decoration with the MM IIIB and LM IA pottery of Kythera' (Taylour 1975, 17). In other words, the cultural frontier postulated by Coldstream for the second half of the third millennium had been trampled underfoot by the end of the seventeenth century. Ay. Stephanos thus provides a perfect illustration of Hooker's 'First Phase of Minoan Influence (Middle Helladic and Late Helladic I pottery)', in which 'an imperfect fusion between Helladic and Minoan leads to the beginning of a distinctive Mycenaean culture' (Hooker 1977, 6; but he is wrong in thinking that it was largely confined to the Peloponnese).

A further note on terminology is appropriate here. The Late Bronze Age in the Greek mainland is known conventionally as either the Late Helladic (LH) or the Mycenaean period: Mycenae 'rich in gold' and the seat of Homer's Agamemnon, sceptred 'lord of many islands and all Argos', has yielded its treasures to the spade on a scale that only an unbridled optimist like Schliemann could have envisaged. For many scholars the epithet 'Mycenaean' remains no more than a convention convenient to describe the period of c.1550 to 1100/1050. By others, however, it is given a precise political connotation, at least for the thirteenth century. I am personally out of sympathy with the latter, for reasons given in Chapter 6 and Appendix 2. But Mycenae none the less cannot be ousted from its central position in the transition from the MH to the LH period, despite the recent accessions of material from excavation which fill out and balance the picture.

Part of this balancing material comes from Lakonia, and a relatively recent attempt to define LH I pottery (Dickinson 1974; 1977, 25f.) has drawn extensively on the finds from Ay. Stephanos and, especially, Kythera. Of far greater moment, however, are the finds from the two grave-circles at Mycenae and their paler reflections at, for example, Peristeria in Messenia. The art of the Mycenae shaft-graves and the raw materials of the artefacts entombed within them display an enormously widened range of foreign relations, extending from Egypt perhaps to the Black Sea, from Syria perhaps even to Britain. Hooker (1977, 36–58) has convinced me that we should not regard the occupants of the shaft-graves as barbarian intruders incarcerated with the loot of their raids. Instead the evidence from Mycenae, where both grave-circles were inaugurated in the late MH period, may be seen as a greatly enlarged and enlivened version of the humbler process of transition under heavy Minoan influence apparent at Ay. Stephanos. Indeed, Dickinson

has suggested that the originators of the LH I style of pottery could have been potters who emigrated to Central Greece from Kythera, since mature Kytheran LM IA seems to be the single most important influence on the style.

However that may be, relatively little is known of LH I in Lakonia, apart from Ay. Stephanos and perhaps Epidauros Limeria. Taking together therefore LH I and LH II, which span roughly the sixteenth and fifteenth centuries, we find occupation on only some fifteen to twenty sites, an apparent decrease on the MH figure. The discrepancy, however, may simply be due to failure to find or distinguish the relevant pottery, for by LH II at any rate there is unambiguous evidence that a qualitative change has been effected in Lakonian social, economic and political organization. In none of the preceding periods, as we have seen, was it possible to establish with certainty the existence of a settlement hierarchy. But by the fifteenth century three of the six main subdivisions of Lakonia can boast a kind of monument which seems to presuppose economic prosperity, a high degree of social differentiation and centralization of political control—the tholos (beehive) tomb. From east to west early Mycenaean tholoi have been excavated at Analipsis in the west Parnon foreland, Vapheio in the Eurotas furrow and, if it may be dated so early (cf. Dickinson 1977, 92), Kambos in the west Taygetos foreland.

Each has produced exotic and expensive grave-goods, but far and away the most striking is the one at Vapheio, which deserves closer attention for four main reasons: first, the central place of Lakonia, whatever its precise location, will henceforth always be found in the Spartan basin; second, Lakonia is now seen to be marching in step with the hitherto seemingly more progressive regions of the Peloponnese; third, the quality of the artefacts from the Vapheio tholos is strikingly high; finally, and perhaps most instructively, the promise of the fifteenth century is not apparently fulfilled in the thirteenth in Lakonia, as it is in the Argolis and Messenia.

The tholos itself is quite large (10.35 m. in diameter) with a built approach (dromos) measuring 29.80 m. The stones, however, are not well worked or laid, and the tomb is somewhat unusual for being sited in the top of a hill rather than cut out of the base of a slope. It was robbed in antiquity for its contents (and more recently for its worked stones), but the tombaroli overlooked an underground pit in the floor of the chamber. Herein lay the 'Vapheio Prince', his splendidly intact grave-goods offering a sharp contrast to his utterly disintegrated skeleton. Rings, gems, beads, a mirror, an earpick, perfume vases, cups, a sword, nine knives and daggers, a pair of hunting-spears and axes—the range of artefacts is impressive enough. Overwhelmingly impressive are their materials and quality: 'Palace Style' pottery, two vases of alabaster, an axe of Syrian type, a finger-ring of iron, beads of amethyst and Baltic amber, scale-pans of bronze, lamps of stone, two daggers inlaid with metal cut-outs and niello, cups of silver. Finally, there

are the most famous items of all, the two gold cups now prominently displayed in the National Museum at Athens; their bovine scenes have a strongly Cretan flavour even if they were not necessarily both executed by Cretan craftsmen. In short, the Vapheio tholos and its contents seem to me neatly to encapsulate the distinguishing features of Hooker's 'Second Phase of Minoan Influence', namely 'the almost complete fusion between Helladic and Minoan and the adoption on the mainland of Minoan art-forms and the external features of Minoan cult' (Hooker 1977, 6).

Thus we may suppose that much of LH II Lakonia was divided into local 'princedom'. But LH II was not only the great age of the tholos tomb in the region. It also witnessed the inception or growth of the burial practice which some prehistorians consider to be diagnostic of the LH period as a whole, the entombment of generations of families in chamber-tombs excavated from the softer rocks rather than built in to them as most tholoi were. Chamber-tombs of LH II date are known from Krokeai in Vardhounia and Epidauros Limera in the Malea peninsula; the contemporary stone-built oval tombs at Palaiochori in the east Parnon foreland may have been derived from the latter (Dickinson 1977, 63f.)

As far as the scanty excavated evidence from settlements is concerned there is just one site to be added to Ay. Stephanos, that occupied in historical times by the sanctuary of Menelaos and Helen on a bluff overlooking the Eurotas east of Sparta (Figure 6). British excavations were resumed here in 1973 after an interval of over sixty years, and preliminary reports speak of a MH phase of occupation followed by one datable to LH IIA (including LM IB imports). Neither of these deposits unfortunately was associated with any structure, but an impressive though relatively short-lived LH IIB-III A1 building complex of two storeys has been identified, from which came a seal, two female terracotta figurines and a contemporary house-model, perhaps representing a shrine. The potential significance of these discoveries is that they mark the earliest phases of occupation of the site which many believe to have become in the thirteenth century the Lakonian equivalent of Mycenae, Pylos, Thebes and other palatial centres. But as yet, as we shall see in more detail in Chapter 6, this supposition cannot be corroborated.

However, the Menelaion site undoubtedly reflects the general expansion of Mycenaean civilization in Lakonia in LH IIIA or roughly the fourteenth century. The building complex referred to above was itself quickly replaced at the end of the fifteenth century by an even more elaborate 'Mansion'. The suggested explanation for the replacement is the occurrence of an earthquake or tremor of the kind to which the region as a whole is still prone. But the 'Mansion' too was abandoned before the end of LH IIIA1, and the 'Mansion' area was not reoccupied for another century and a half, and then only on a reduced scale. Settlement is, however, attested elsewhere on the site in the interim.




Figure 6 The Menelaion hill near Sparta

The twenty-five or so other LH IIIA sites in Lakonia (identified chiefly by surface survey) pale somewhat by comparison. However, excellent quality kylix (stemmed goblet) fragments of this phase are reported in association with substantial building remains at Ay. Stephanos, which has also produced a LH IIIA sealstone. There are LH IIIA sherds from Palaiopyrgi, the large hill occupied since the EH period with which the Vapheio tholos some 300 m. away is most easily associated. A chamber-tomb at Melathria near Skoura in the Spartan basin has yielded one of the earliest known Mycenaean pictorial vases, dated to the end of the fifteenth century by Demacopoulou (1971). A terracotta from Lekas in the Helos plain has been classed among the earliest ('naturalistic') Mycenaean figurines (French 1971, 110). Finally, an amber seal with indecipherable design, one of the more ambitious Mycenaean attempts at carving the material, was found with LH IIIA pottery and other impressive grave-goods in a chamber-tomb at Pellana in the northern Eurotas furrow (Strong 1966, 17f.)

I have left to the end of this final introductory chapter the early Late Bronze Age evidence from Kythera, which yet again offers us a window on the wider Aegean world. As we have seen, a Cretan 'colony' at Kastri probably ousted a settlement of mainland stamp around 2500. The Cretan character and connections of the 'colony' were maintained unbroken until the LM IB phase; an eighteenth-century inscription of Naram-Sin, King of Eshnunna, testifies to continuing widespread foreign relations (unless it too is a later immigrant like the Userkaf inscription). Cretan influence on the mainland increased noticeably at the transition between MH and LH, and the credit for the change to LH I pottery was perhaps partly due to potters from Kastri. About 1500, however, a cataclysmic volcanic eruption on the island of Thera destroyed a flourishing 'Minoanized' settlement there and perhaps much else: some pumice was carried as far as Nichoria in Messenia during the currency of LH IIA (Rapp and Cook 1973). Thereafter, perhaps in direct or indirect consequence of the Thera eruption, Cretan influence in the Aegean waned. Indeed, it is widely believed that c.1450 the palace of Knossos was taken over by mainlanders. However, some seventy-five years later Knossos too was reduced to political if not physical insignificance.

This change in relations between Crete and the mainland is nicely reflected in the way LM IB pottery (exported, incidentally, to Palaiochori and Epidauros Limera as well as to the Menelaion site) is increasingly jostled by LH IIA at Kastri, until the settlement was actually abandoned at the end of the currency of the style (c.1450). Hardly any LH IIB was found, but there was LH IIIA pottery in a chamber-tomb further south at Lioni, and Kythera appears to have attracted Egyptian attention in the first half of the fourteenth century (Sergent 1977, 138). In the succeeding LH IIIB phase (Chapter 6) the destiny of Kythera was reunited with that of the mainland: both were firmly Helladic. Thus in the light of the Kytheran evidence above all, but taking account also of the rest of the finds from Lakonia, it seems to me misleading

to describe even the LH IIIA2 period, let alone LH IIIB, as the ‘Third Phase of Minoan Influence’ (Hooker 1977, 6).

Notes on further reading

For bibliography on the individual sites mentioned in this and later chapters see Appendix 1.

With my remarks on the impossibility of giving figures for population density in Lakonia compare and contrast McDonald and Hope Simpson in *MME* 132: ‘Of course, a solid basis for even the most carefully hedged estimates of prehistoric population in Messenia does not yet exist. Some of our colleagues have therefore pressed us to avoid absolute numbers entirely, since it is so easy for the most cautious estimates to become accepted facts. Perhaps we should have heeded their advice...’

The ‘Neolithic Revolution’ is succinctly discussed by Cole 1970. Hauptmann 1971 is an excellent review of research on the Stone Age, especially the Neolithic, in the Aegean.

For the Early and Middle Bronze Ages in general see Caskey 1971, 1973; Schachermeyr 1976. A good, though dated, discussion of the transition between the two, as indeed of all aspects of the Greek Bronze Age, is Vermeule 1964. The most recent discussion of the Mycenae shaft graves is Dickinson 1977, 39–58. A pottery deposit from Ay. Stephanos spanning the MH/LH transition (c.1700–1450) has been fully published by Rutter and Rutter 1976. Disagreeing with Dickinson 1974, J.B.Rutter suggests that LH I was developed in the southern Peloponnese (perhaps actually in Lakonia) earlier than in the northern Peloponnese and that the stimulus to the change was the immigration of potters from Kythera to Crete in MH III. Dickinson’s most recent views may be studied in Dickinson 1977, especially 24 and 108 (with its n. 2).

For the ‘Cretan connection’ from c.1525 to 1375 see Hooker 1977, ch. 4. But his conclusions on the ‘Mycenaeanizing’ of Knossos in the fifteenth century are vitiated by his omission of the Warrior Graves and his unclear account of Linear B.

II

Preclassical Lakonia
c.1300–500BC

Greek oral tradition as history

Almost half a century ago the Mycenaean period was fully prehistoric in the sense that it was ‘text-free’. (The Homeric poems, some aspects of whose historicity are considered in Appendix 2, are not of course contemporary texts.) But thanks to a combination of cryptographic detective work and linguistic scholarship it is now possible to read some of its documents. These are the accidentally baked clay tablets of varying shapes and sizes inscribed in ‘Linear B’, a syllabary devised to transcribe an early form of the Greek language. We cannot say certainly where or when the syllabary was invented, but the few findspots of the tablets are significant: Knossos, Pylos, Mycenae, Thebes and Tiryns. To these we may add the sites which have produced vases inscribed with Linear B symbols: Eleusis, Kreusis, Orchomenos, Chania and now the Menelaion site (Catling 1977, 34). The syllabary’s total attested number of symbols (signs and ideograms) is about 200. To judge from the evidence of handwriting, the only available criterion, there were about 100 scribes working at any one time at Knossos, about fifty at Pylos. The contexts in which the tablets were found may be spread over a period of up to two centuries (*c.*1375 at Knossos to *c.*1200 at Pylos), but little or no stylistic development is discernible. The tablets reveal the existence of a basically agrarian economy with a developed division of labour and a multiplicity of social statuses and factors of production.

Such are the bare facts. The decipherment of the script—still contested by a few diehards—has undoubtedly made available an important new source of information and provoked a staggering volume of research. Yet in view of the tendency of some Mycenologists to rush to premature judgments it is necessary to state at the outset that the scope of the advance is restricted in terms both of geographical applicability and of the type of information the tablets convey. Thus Lakonia is only one of the (archaeologically) important regions which have yet to produce Linear B tablets, unless one of the two signs incised on a schist tab found sporadically at Ay. Stephanos really is Linear B (*BCH* 1974, 613). It is uncertain how far this negative evidence should be pressed, although it is perhaps fair to comment that, if there had

been a Lakonian Pylos, it ought to have been discovered. Second, the tablets are in fact merely the everyday administrative mnemonics of centralized and bureaucratic monarchies, used for the collection of raw facts primarily of a narrowly economic nature (accounts, lists, prices, assignments, requisitions and the like) and not for final digests or permanent records. They contain not a scrap of poetry, law, history or oratory. In short, although there is perhaps a case for redefining the fourteenth and thirteenth centuries in the Mycenaean world as 'protohistoric', the Linear B tablets do not mark the beginning of Greek history in the strict, narrower sense in which that word is employed in this chapter.

Moreover, although it can never be demonstrated, it has proved a highly fruitful working hypothesis that in *c.*1200 the Linear B script shared the fate of the palace-economies it had exclusively served (Chapter 6) and that subsequently there was felt neither the need nor the inclination to transmit the technique of writing to the rising generation. In other words, in the 400 or so years before the Greeks created an alphabet out of the Phoenician non-vocalic sign-system they again communicated among themselves, as they had done before *c.*1500, solely through oral discourse, whether in poetry or prose, and normally in face-to-face contact. The fact of renewed illiteracy is not perhaps in itself remarkable, since the Linear B script was almost certainly a scribal preserve. But for the historian of the period from 1300 to the eighth century or even later it raises the crucial problems of method involved in handling Greek oral tradition.

Before discussing these, however, I should point out that, although 'historian', 'historiography' and kindred expressions have a classical Greek etymology, their respective spheres of reference in ancient and modern (i.e. 'western') cultures do not wholly overlap either in the activities they describe or in the aims to which the activities in question are directed. It is therefore at first sight somewhat anomalous that Herodotus is now fêted in the phrase of Cicero as the 'Father of History' and that Thucydides is considered—admittedly with qualifications and serious reservations—to be Klio's favourite son. But it was long ago recognized that Herodotus was a very different kind of historian from Thucydides and that both differed again from the ideal type of the modern historian. Where then do the differences lie? Not surely in the matter of objectives narrowly conceived—'We have to discover not merely how it actually happened but why it happened that way and had to happen that way' (Beloch 1913, 7)—but rather in general outlook and technical methods, above all in the treatment of sources.

From the second half of the seventeenth century onwards the idea had become accepted that a modern scholar had as much justification in writing the history of antiquity as the ancients themselves, even if the methods adopted were strictly speaking as often those of the antiquarian as of the historian proper. The modern historiography of the ancient world began with Edward Gibbon, in the sense that it was he who fused the outlook and methods of the

(antiquarian) 'érudits' with those of the enlightened but airy 'philosophies' (below). But the nineteenth century witnessed a remarkable development, sometimes dismissed unfairly as 'Hyperkritik', whose effect can be seen in a work like Bernheim 1894. The essence of the new approach, if it may be shortly summarized, was its canonical insistence that usable evidence must be securely dated, contemporary, documentary and of known provenance. When applied to the ancient world, this approach could lead to excesses, and Beloch himself was rightly castigated for confusing the methods of the historian with those of the various kinds of natural scientist. However, in what follows I hope to show that the reaction against the scepticism of Beloch has in some respects and in some quarters been too sharp.

A leading Homerist has written that 'the question how far tradition may be legitimately called in evidence is a living problem and a chief cause of irreconcilable disagreement among historians and critics' (D.H.F.Gray in Myres 1958, 228). The peculiar qualities of the Homeric epics may require, and they have been given (Appendix 2), somewhat specialized treatment. But this remark applies none the less to all the preserved literary evidence relating to the period from c.1300 to 480 or roughly the late Mycenaean, Dark and Archaic Ages. The discussion cannot be entirely confined to Sparta, but here the problems are seen in particularly sharp relief. For the state never produced a historian of its own, and the course of its eccentric development occasioned with time the phenomenon (by no means confined to the ancient world) aptly named 'the Spartan mirage', the distorted image of what both Spartans and non-Spartans for various and often mutually inconsistent reasons wanted Sparta to be, to stand for and to have accomplished. The reasons why Sparta never produced a historian have repeatedly been canvassed, and the conventional solutions are given in terms appropriate to differing views of Spartan abnormality. What is really remarkable, however, is not that Sparta produced none but that any Greek state ever produced one. If that seems paradoxical, in view both of known historical traditions of long standing in other civilizations and the fifth-century achievement in Greece, then a glance first at the ways in which Greek writers from Homer to Herodotus represented the past and then at the available means of reconstructing it should render the paradox less impressive.

There is some dispute whether Greek historiography experienced a lengthy gestation or sprang fully formed from the head of Herodotus. But there should be no doubt that the earliest Greek literature, the Homeric poems, are not history books. This fact can be established from several different viewpoints—aetiology, chronology, geography, delineation of character and motivation, overall intention and so on—but it remains a fact, despite attempts at interpretation which seem 'to make no distinction in principle between the tales of prehistoric wars and heroic deeds retailed by the epic poets and, say, the account of the Peloponnesian War by Thucydides' (Hampl 1962, 39).

Again, some (including even A.D.Momigliano) have seen in Hesiod (c.700) the first stirrings of a historical consciousness. But the most immediately relevant passages, the invocation of the Muses and their ambiguous response in the preface to the *Theogony* and the myth of the Five Races in the *Works and Days*, seem to me to indicate the contrary. A concept of truth which includes more (but not much) than simply not-forgetting is outlined, but there is no hint of methods of verification; truth is guaranteed by memory, but memory is sacralized as the goddess Mnemosyne, mother of the Muses, and thereby removed from the human, empirical sphere; the time factor is taken into account, but mutually incompatible ways of representing it are hopelessly confused; the aetiological perspective of history is implicit in the attempt to account for present ills by a description of the past, but the mortal races of Bronze and Iron receive no connected narrative and are separated by a notoriously inorganic interpolation (taken over from Homer), the Race of semi-divine Heroes. In short, the historical achievement of Hesiod was no more—but from a religious standpoint no less—than to provide the Greeks with a mythical past from the Creation of the Gods to the unexplained end of the Race of Heroes.

Lesser poets than Hesiod, both inside and outside the ‘Epic Cycle’, who were partly at least utilizing an inherited stock of traditional oral poetical language, merely ‘completed’ the stories of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* by providing their events and characters with antecedents and issue. A large portion of their work, however, consisted in doing for contemporary humans, especially the blue-blooded variety, what Hesiod had done for the immortal gods: elaborating respectable but no less fictional family-trees. The only Spartan poet in this genre—of whom the name, a few lines and a handful of doubtfully attributed works are known—is Kinaithon (probably seventh century). The suggestion that his subjects included the deeds of Herakles and Orestes makes sense in the light of the attempt of the Spartan royal families to connect themselves with these ‘Achaean’ (Appendix 3) but it hardly inspires confidence in Kinaithon’s impartial striving after veracity. Indeed, he may owe his rather dim remembrance to precisely this sort of religiose parapolitical activity rather than to his skill as a poet.

By about the mid-seventh century ‘original’ epic poetry was beginning to lose its fascination for singers and audiences alike and was being challenged by the more personal genres of elegy and lyric, in which Sparta was excellently represented by Tyrtaios (c.650) and Alkman (c.600) respectively. Apart from citing a few acceptable mythological precedents, including the first surviving version of the conflated myths of the ‘Dorian invasion’ and the ‘Return of the Herakleidai’, Tyrtaios devoted himself to the present in a pragmatic fashion. Through a skilful fusion of old and new, both in language and in ideas, he advocated a moral and political ideal to which future generations of military-minded Spartans paid more than lip-service. Alkman was proud of his pedagogic inventiveness, but he too was largely content to

draw on an inherited mythological stock for his themes and may have had the same kind of anti-historical outlook and effect as Tyrtaios and Kinaithon. His death meant also the death of the local poetic tradition. Half a century later, around 550, the Sicilian Stesichoros visited Sparta. It is significant of the prevailing Spartan intellectual climate that he lent his voice to an interpretation of a myth-historical tradition (Orestes again) designed to validate the Spartan claim to sovereignty over Arkadia and perhaps even the Greek world as a whole.

By 550, however, the intellectual epicentre had shifted for good from the Peloponnese to east Greece, especially Miletos. The prime movers in this inchoate Enlightenment were natural philosophers (it is wrong to describe their explanations of natural phenomena as ‘scientific’ or ‘materialist’), and their advance was premised on ‘two great mental transformations: a positive way of thinking, excluding every form of the supernatural and rejecting the implicit assimilation established by myth between physical phenomena and divine agents; an abstract way of thinking, depriving reality of that power of change with which myth endowed it’ (Vernant 1971, II, 106). These ‘mental transformations’ were accompanied by or presupposed corresponding changes in language, which perhaps is not merely ‘a reproducing instrument for voicing ideas, but rather is itself the shaper of ideas, the program and guide for the individual’s mental activity’ (Whorf 1956, 212). Together they made possible history as we understand it.

Yet initially the spirit of critical secular enquiry they expressed, including the new notion that men acquire their knowledge through their own unaided efforts, led to no search for new sources of information about the past and no development of a historical consciousness beyond the tendency, exemplified c.500 by Hekataios (not coincidentally from Miletos), to use personal experience as a yardstick to measure the intrinsic plausibility of the ‘many and ridiculous tales’ about the past he picked up on his travels. (The words in inverted commas are taken from the Preface to Hekataios’ *Genealogies*, which is quoted in full in Jeffery 1976, 34.) These tales, whose content was often ultimately religious, were thereby pruned of their fantastic accretions, but the historicity of the residue was not questioned. Thus still in the fifth century ‘the atmosphere in which the Fathers of History set to work was saturated with myth’ (Finley 1975, 13).

Not all myths of course are narrowly speaking historical. But in one application of their general function—myth ‘anchors the present in the past’ (Cohen 1969, 349)—they can present themselves to the historian as evidence about the past, and we must decide by what criteria they are to be assessed. Clearly the strict application of nineteenth-century ‘hyper’-critical methods is inappropriate. But how far and in what direction can or should we today improve on the rationalizing of a Hekataios or the limited but devastating scepticism of an Eratosthenes, the Voltaire of antiquity? There is no straightforward answer to this question, but the best account of the problems

involved of that I know is a now undeservedly little-read essay by George Grote (1873), to which I shall return.

Any answer, however, must depend on the evaluation of at least the following factors: the nature of oral tradition (defined as ‘verbal testimony transmitted from one generation to the next one or a later one’ in Vansina 1973, xiii) in an illiterate or semi-literate society, or in a society which did not keep records of a detailed, documentary kind; the distinction between accurate or exaggerated matter of fact on the one hand and variously plausible fiction on the other, and the psychological and sociological circumstances affecting the relationship between them; the ultimately religious content of much Greek legend; and the effects of political and social change on traditional material. It is only when the implications of all these factors taken together are squarely faced that the vastness of Herodotus’ achievement—‘there was no Herodotus before Herodotus’ (Momigliano 1966, 129)—can be viewed in correct perspective.

It will always be easier to say what Herodotus’ achievement amounts to than how it was effected, because he was ‘one of the great innovating geniuses of the fifth century’ (Collingwood 1946, 28). The three aspects of his achievement which perhaps most commend him to modern scholars are these: his hierarchical ordering of types of evidence and the methods of obtaining it according to their intrinsic reliability; his unobtrusive creation of an acceptable though inevitably lacunose chronological framework; and his generally temperate exercise of that ‘judgement’ whose indispensability is primarily responsible for keeping the methods of the historian and those of the natural scientist conceptually distinct. We should not, however, exaggerate the discontinuity that Herodotus’ work represents. Among his conscious influences must be counted Homer as well as Hekataios: the ancients hit the mark when they characterized Herodotus as ‘most Homeric’ (‘Longinus’ 13.3), for style is an essential ingredient of any historian’s makeup. It is ‘the image of character’, as Gibbon put it in the first page of his autobiography. Besides, the critical principles of Herodotus fall short of the rigorousness of Thucydides, for whom ‘getting the facts right was all-important’ (Ste. Croix 1972, 6).

Thucydides, however, in striving for higher standards of veracity, set up a contradiction never resolved by his successors, even when altered conditions would have made its resolution possible. He believed that only contemporary, and above all political, history could be written adequately, but that the basis of historical documentation should remain oral testimony. That this was not unreasonable in his own day (and a *fortiori* at all earlier periods) may be judged from the fact that not before the end of the fifth century did his own democratic Athens, for all its energy in publishing documents involving the common weal, establish a central archive. This fact needs emphasis, since the historical methods described and practised by Bernheim and his fellow-thinkers paradigmatically presuppose the existence

of 'objective' documentary records, securely dated and incapable of distortion with the passage of time. So powerful, however, was the example of Thucydides that the habit of personal inspection of documents was but rarely acquired in antiquity, the supreme irony being that from his day onwards the quantity and quality of documentary material were steadily increased by antiquarians like Hippias of Elis and Hellanikos of Lesbos, both of whom, incidentally, visited Sparta and wrote about Spartan institutions. The result was that, to the detriment of the respective practitioners, 'political history and learned research on the past tended to be kept in two separate compartments' (Momigliano 1966, 4), a restrictive practice finally overcome by Edward Gibbon.

The intellectual development begun by the East Greek philosophers in the mid-sixth century and embraced by all leading Greek thinkers before Plato has been described as 'the emancipation of thought from myth' (Frankfort et al. 1946, ch. 8). However, even the most fervent admirers of the 'rationalist' *par excellence*, Thucydides, are obliged to admit that his acceptance as fact of certain beliefs about the very distant (even pre-Trojan War) past sits uneasily with his rigorous inspection of contemporary testimony and that in this respect he went further even than the 'credulous' Herodotus. The fourth-century 'universal' historian Ephorus, it is true, declined to treat of the period before the 'Return of the Herakleidai'; but it is not clear whether this reflects a sceptical outlook or the view that the earlier period was irrelevant or had been adequately treated already (e.g. by Homer). In any case, neither he nor any other surviving author before Eratosthenes, head of the Library at Alexandria in the late third century (and 'Beta', as he was known, was the exception to prove many rules), impugned the historicity not merely of the variously fantastic accretions but also of the supposedly true kernel of the traditional tales.

The proper question to ask then is not why it took so long, but how far it would be possible—for historians in antiquity from the fifth century on and for us alike—to distinguish historical fact among the mass of traditional material, which consisted partly of knowledge about the past embedded in poetical or prose narratives handed down through the generations, in part of sheer fiction handed down in the same way, and partly of the learned speculations of over-heated imaginations. For it seems probable, as I have pointed out, that between c.1200 and c.800 Greece was illiterate and that between c.800 and c.450 there was no recitation or writing of history (as we understand that word) and precious little retrieval and storage of the stuff from which history can be created. Indeed, in the case of Sparta an apocryphal *rhetra* (ordinance) expressly forbade the inscribing of laws, and the only other records kept here were lists of names (victors at the great religious festivals, eponymous magistrates and kings) and oracles. The authenticity of the earliest sections of these lists and their properly historical value have both been questioned, with some justice.

Faced with this situation, Grote correctly asked (1873, 87): ‘With what consistency can you require that a community which either does not command the means, or has not learned the necessity, of registering the phenomena of its present, should possess any knowledge of the phenomena of its past?’ He himself, however, was too good a historian to deny outright that traditional material contained any factual element. He insisted only that belief should be withheld until the tradition itself could be independently verified.

The advantage we hold over Grote today is not so much a greater sophistication in methods as a vastly increased knowledge of the contemporary material remains, which are authentic, though not self-explanatory, records of the times they represent. These are the only sure basis on which to reconstruct the history of the period down to the eighth century, if not later; but they do not constitute a sufficient basis. In particular, archaeology rarely if ever warrants narrowly political inferences (see further Chapter 1). Certainly an explanation which takes account of both the traditional literary evidence and the material remains may be preferable to an explanation which ignores one or the other. But this by itself does not increase its likelihood of being correct. In short, I agree with Gibbon that ‘ancient history’ (properly so called) begins in the sixth century ‘with the Persian Empire and the Republics of Rome and Athens’. I remain extremely doubtful that it will ever be possible to write a wholly convincing narrative or systematic account of Greek history before *c.*550, the starting-point of Herodotus, the ‘Father of History’. In the remaining chapters of this Part, therefore, I can claim no more than to have based my account on all the available ancient evidence.

Notes on further reading

The fundamental publication of the Linear B syllabary is Ventris and Chadwick 1973. Most of the tablets are now fully published and transcribed. For the inscriptions on vases see Sacconi 1974. The controversy over the dating of the Knossos tablets is briefly resumed by Hood (1971, 112–15); but Hood is one of the few who still reject the decipherment. Perhaps the best general discussion of the bearing of the tablets on the various aspects of Mycenaean civilization is Hiller and Panagl 1976; a good short summary is Dow 1968.

An introductory work on the historical value of oral tradition is Vansina 1973, but this is controversial even among Africanists. Henige 1974 is in some ways superior, but he too relies heavily on African evidence. This qualification is crucial, since the evaluation of oral tradition as historical evidence depends largely upon detailed ethnographic knowledge of the features of oral history as a system within the culture under study rather than as isolated scraps of ideas.

I have briefly discussed the origins of the alphabet, with special reference to Lakonia, in Cartledge 1978. The basic account is still Jeffery 1961, 1–42; add now Coldstream 1977, ch. 11.

For the distinct activities of the historian and the antiquarian, and a historical perspective on this restrictive practice, see Momigliano 1966, ch. 1. An excellent discussion of Gibbon's contribution to historical method is Momigliano 1966, ch. 2. But antiquarianism retains a strong foothold in ancient history to this day.

For the essential distinctions between the methods of the historian and those of the natural scientists see Berlin 1960; Hexter 1971, ch. 1. But the gap may not be quite as wide as they suppose.

The standard work on the 'Spartan mirage' in antiquity is Ollier 1933, 1943. Tigerstedt 1965 and 1974 is more complete, but belies its title; it is particularly useful for its massive bibliographical footnotes. Far more enlightening is Rawson 1969, which brings the story down to the Second World War. Starr 1965 is usefully succinct.

On post-Homeric epic poetry see Huxley 1969, esp. 86–9 (Kinaithon); but the assertion that 'a flourishing body of local legends in Lakedaimon... came down from the Mycenaean age, preserved and elaborated by the ...Achaean survivors from the ruin of the bronze age civilisations of Peloponnese' (85) should be treated with caution.

Bibliography on Tyrtaios and Alkman may be found in the notes to Chapters 8 and 9. For Stesichoros and Sparta see West 1969, 148.

On Hekataios generally see Pearson 1939, ch. 2. His possible contribution to the transmission of the Spartan king-lists is considered in Appendix 3. For Herodotus' place in the history of historiography see Momigliano 1966, ch. 8. On Thucydides see the notes to Chapter 12.

Eratosthenes' multifaceted intellectual achievement is assessed by Fraser (1970; 1972 *passim*).

An excellent restatement of what seems to me essentially Grote's position on mythical and legendary tradition is Finley 1975, ch. 1.

The last Mycenaeans c. 1300–1050

The Linear B tablets, as we saw in the previous chapter, do not enable us to write a history properly so called of the late Mycenaean period. However, the use of tablets made of clay does suggest at least a *prima facie* comparability with the contemporary civilizations of Egypt, Anatolia and the Levant and so provides a convenient transition to what I believe to be a proper context for studying late Mycenaean Greece. The documentary evidence for contact or conflict between the Mycenaean Greeks and their eastern neighbours in the political, diplomatic or military spheres may in many cases merely be the spurious outcome of ‘a sort of philological game of hopscotch’ (Carpenter 1966, 45). But the intercourse in articles of trade (actual finds and inferences from the Linear B tablets), linguistic borrowings, artistic interconnections and, I should say, the very use of the unsuitable medium of clay for Linear B script—these are not so easily dismissed. I am of course far from believing that Mycenaean Greece was just ‘a peripheral culture of the Ancient East, its westernmost extension’ (Astour 1967, 357f.). But I find it implausible that the contemporaneity of the Mycenaean ‘time of troubles’ with the series of destructive upheavals engulfing the whole eastern Mediterranean basin was just a coincidence, even if the nature of the connection between them cannot be precisely demonstrated.

Underlying tensions in the Middle East were given ominously concrete expression in c.1300, when Egypt and Hatti (the Hittites) fought a major but inconclusive battle at Qadesh in Syria. Sixteen years later Rameses II and Hattusilis III concluded peace on terms which included guarantees of mutual aid in case either power was attacked by a third party. The treaty was then sealed in the accepted manner by a marriage-alliance. The practical effect of this elaborate diplomacy, however, was relatively short-lived. In c.1232 Merenptah was obliged to repulse an invasion of Egypt mounted by Libyans from Cyrenaica and ‘northerners from all lands’; and in c.1191 and again in c.1188 Rameses III defeated insurgents who came by land and sea from the north-east to settle in the Nile delta. In the interval between these onerous but successful exploits of the two Pharaohs the capital of the Hittites at Hattusas

in Anatolia was destroyed and their empire disintegrated. The kingdoms of Ugarit, Alalakh and Alasia (Cyprus?) met a similar fate, and there were further disasters elsewhere in the Levant. In the space of about a century the balance of power in the Middle East had been forcibly and irretrievably altered.

In round numbers 1300 can therefore legitimately be regarded as a pivotal date in the history of the Bronze Age civilizations abutting the east Mediterranean basin. In Greece it was approximately then that the Mycenaean civilization received its diagnostic expression in the construction of massive fortifications and palatial complexes at Mycenae and elsewhere. To be more exact, 1300 was the date now most widely accepted for the transition from the LH IIIA style of pottery to LH IIIB. This may seem an improbable way of making a historical assertion, but history is nothing without chronology, and the chronology of the Aegean Bronze Age, as already remarked, is a matter of the typology of its pottery. The three main ceramic phases of the Mycenaean period (LH I-III) are not incompatible with the few available excavated stratigraphies (most recently that from Nichoria in Messenia). But the sub-divisions of these phases—seven for the third alone and ten in all, according to the still generally useful scheme of A. Furumark first proposed in 1941—are based on somewhat subjective judgments of the direction and pace of stylistic change and on arbitrary decisions as to where one sub-phase ends and the next begins. Absolute dates, moreover, may be derived only from the association of Mycenaean pottery in datable Egyptian contexts or with objects that can be cross-referenced with the Egyptian series. Thus it is hardly surprising that both the initial and the terminal dates of LH IIIB pottery are disputed (1300 and 1200 are strictly approximations and perhaps considerably too low) and that the nature and pace of stylistic change are detectable with assurance only at Mycenae. These are not trivial matters, since the ‘historiography’ of the late Mycenaean period depends upon them.

It is not disputed though that pottery can and must be used as evidence for chronology. However, deeper problems confront those who wish to draw other kinds of inference from the various facets of pottery manufacture and distribution. These problems are particularly acute when pottery, thanks to its fitness to survive, constitutes the bulk of the artefactual or—as so often in prehistoric contexts—the total evidence, and when the amount of controlled excavation has been comparatively slight. Such is the situation in Mycenaean Lakonia. Take, for instance, the question of population density. Of the inherent limitations of evidence from survey listed in Chapter 4 the one particularly relevant here is that not all types of pot have the same or even comparable potential for survival or for survival in an obvious or diagnostic way. For the overwhelming proportion of Lakonian LH IIIB sites identified by surface survey alone made their presence known through the medium of kylikes, deep bowls and stemmed bowls, often by a combination of sherds from all three shapes. Since the stems of the kylikes and stemmed bowls are particularly

durable and eye-catching, it is theoretically possible that the apparently high relative density of population in Lakonia in LH IIIB is a mirage arising from an accident of cultural choice in the ceramic sphere. Fortunately this inference can be checked against evidence of other kinds and from other areas and is unlikely to be correct. But it is not beyond a doubt incorrect, and the possibility underlines the urgency of the need for more excavation.

Mycenaean IIIB pottery was diffused very widely. 'Developed LH IIIB is the great period of the *koine* and mass production' (Wace 1957, 222). On the mainland it enjoyed common currency as far north as Thessaly, though it was imported only desultorily into the mountainous interior of Epirus. Overseas it was used in the east and the west both by non-Greeks and by temporary or permanent Mycenaean expatriates. The concentration of exports, which had begun to gather momentum during LH IIIA, may be somehow connected with the fall of Knossos c.1375 or more directly with the establishment of Mycenaean traders in semi-permanent overseas emporia, for example at Scoglio del Tonno in the instep of Italy (near the later Spartan settlement of Taras: Chapter 8), Ugarit in Syria and various places in Cyprus. However, along with the increasing weight of production and breadth of distribution there developed a striking homogeneity of fabric and style which makes it difficult to discover the provenance of individual pots or sherds. Thus the hope expressed by Wace and Blegen (1939) that it would one day be possible to differentiate Lakonian and Corinthian LH IIIB pottery in the same routine way as their Archaic successors has so far proved vain, although some progress has been made through optical emission spectroscopy and neutron-activation analysis. There is, however, a certain amount of regional differentiation, visible to the naked eye and apparent to the touch, in both clay and paint.

So far thirty-five sites in Lakonia have certainly yielded LH IIIB pottery, and four more doubtfully so (Figure 7). Of the maximum of thirty-nine, however, only five are scientifically excavated habitation-sites. I shall return to these in due course, but first I want to dwell briefly on Pavlopetri in the Malea peninsula, the chief site in the Vatika plain and so the prehistoric forerunner of classical Boiai. This would have been the sixth excavated habitation-site were it not now underwater, where natural conditions prevented the recovery of more than a bare outline. But even this outline is instructive, in three main ways. First, the divers located only two chamber-tombs, which are usually considered the customary receptacles of dead Mycenaean, as against thirty-seven cist-graves, which had been typical of the MH period. In view of this find (if the cists are indeed Mycenaean) and of recent discoveries of cist-grave cemeteries in Boiotia and Thessaly, it is perhaps prudent to suspend judgment on what was normal Mycenaean burial practice. Second, the settlement came to an end in LH IIIB and was not apparently reoccupied for many centuries. This experience is repeated throughout Lakonia. Finally, and uniquely, it was possible to get some idea of




Figure 7 Late Helladic IIIB Lakonia

the total area of the settlement (at least 45,000 m.²) and to rescue something of its plan, including rectilinear streets with their frontages of houses. These details bear directly and informatively on our discussion of Renfrew's estimate of the population of prehistoric Greece which we left hanging in the air in Chapter 4.

For Renfrew assumed that Late Bronze Age settlements in the Aegean were typically 'of urban or proto-urban nature'. This assumption may perhaps not be contradicted by Pavlopetri; but his second assumption, that the average size of a Mycenaean settlement was 20,000 m.², certainly seems to be. The difficulty of course is to decide whether Pavlopetri was of 'average' size, since what Renfrew keeps well hidden is that in the absence of total excavation or survey there is no scientific way of estimating the size of an ancient settlement with any precision. True, Hope Simpson (in Loy 1970, 149–55) has attempted a self-confessedly subjective classification of some ninety Mycenaean sites in Messenia as Small, Small-Medium, Medium, Medium-Large or Large on the basis of the scatter of surface sherds. But the sherd-scatter is a wildly unreliable criterion: for example, the area of some 200,000 m.² assigned on this basis to the Palaiopyrgi hill near Vapheio, which thus becomes the largest known site in prehistoric Lakonia, seems utterly disproportionate. However, to be fair to Hope Simpson, a cursory comparison of his individual classifications with the evidence of the sherd-scatter ostensibly supporting them reveals no strict correlation. In other words, factors besides sherd-scatter—such as extent of arable land (by far the most important), strategic/commercial position and available water supply—were equally and rightly taken into account. Thus, to sum up our long discussion, Renfrew's estimate of 50,000 inhabitants for Mycenaean Lakonia may or may not correspond to reality. We just cannot say for certain. However, since this is the figure attributed by McDonald and Hope Simpson to the larger and far more intensively surveyed region of Messenia in LH IIIB, I should suppose it to be a considerable overestimate, at least on present evidence.

The five excavated LH IIIB habitation-sites in Lakonia are Amyklai and the Menelaion complex in the Spartan basin, Karaousi and Ay. Stephanos on either side of the Helos plain, and Anthochorion in west Vardhounia. The results from Karaousi and Anthochorion were relatively disappointing, but the other three were interesting in their different ways. Amyklai's chief significance lies in its evidence of late Mycenaean cult (below). The akropolis of Ay. Stephanos was fortified, perhaps more than once, during LH IIIB (to judge from the associated pottery). It thereby takes its place with Mouriatadha in northern Messenia among fortified settlements in the southern Peloponnese, and its identification with the Helos of the Homeric 'Catalogue of Ships' (Appendix 2) is a definite possibility. Certainly the site was strategically placed to guard both the western side of the lower Eurotas valley and the approach to Lakonia via the Lakonian Gulf and was advantageously

situated to exploit marine resources. On the other hand, the surrounding arable land is extremely poor, a deficiency which was remedied maybe through symbiosis with ‘the land-locked Panayiotis community around the extensive Neogen soils on the north-east corner of the plain’ (Bintliff 1977, 476). Thus the main focus of interest must be the apparently unfortified settlement on the site of the historical sanctuary dedicated to Menelaos and Helen.

As we have seen, the archaeological picture for the Mycenaean occupation has been clarified by the recent (and not yet finally published) British excavations, but there is still no conclusive corroboration of the widespread view that this was the palatial seat of a Mycenaean Menelaos. The settlement was undoubtedly the central place of Mycenaean Lakonia, but archaeologically all we have is a well-appointed ‘mansion’ reoccupied partially, after a gap of more than a century, during LH IIIB (‘Dawkins House’) and then destroyed by fire, together with its store of sealed wine-jars, towards the end of the same phase. The agents and motive of the destruction are alike unknown, and it would be incautious as yet to link this destruction of a single building with those attested on a number of the major Mycenaean centres elsewhere on the mainland in LH IIIB or C, let alone to think of the settlement as a whole in terms of Mycenae, Tiryns or Pylos. An isolated find complicates the picture further. This is a fibula (safety-pin) of the ‘violin-bow’ type which Blinkenberg in his classic synoptic study (1926, 50) deemed to be the earliest of the class and of LH IIIB/C origin. Our example could have come from a late Mycenaean tomb. Alternatively, like a handful found in the Orthia sanctuary at Sparta itself, it was dedicated in the eighth century or later and had survived the interval perhaps as an ‘antique’ heirloom.

The evidence for cult in LH IIIB Lakonia is even less extensive than that for habitation, being practically confined to the site at the historical sanctuary of Apollo at Amyklai four to five kilometres south of classical Sparta. There was a Bronze Age settlement here from EH times but this seems to have been temporarily interrupted at the close of the MH period. In LH IIIB a sanctuary was established, as is shown by the large number of terracotta figurines of stylized ‘goddesses’ and animals found, together with two fragments of almost life-sized human figures in clay. The motive for setting up the cult is of course unknown, and, given the nature of our evidence for Mycenaean religion—inferences from archaeological material, later literary testimony and in some cases Linear B tablets—it is always hazardous to conjecture the identity of Mycenaean deities, let alone their possible powers and attributes. But Amyklai is one of the places where the evidence has seemed to justify bolder hypotheses. Since this has a more immediate bearing on the ‘Dorianizing’ of Lakonia, discussion has been deferred to the next chapter.

The remainder of the excavated LH IIIB evidence comes from tombs distributed throughout Lakonia, nearly all of the chamber-type (Melathria,

Krokeai, Tsasi, Mavrovouni, Pellana, Kotroni, Epidauros Limera and Kythera). Krokeai, however, in east Vardhounia has also produced a slab-covered shaft-grave in use from LH II onwards. The associated settlement was probably connected with the 'antico verde' or 'lapis Lacedaemonius' (i.e. labrador porphyrite) quarries at the appropriately named Psephi. The stone was widely used in Mycenaean Lakonia; worked cores have been found, for example, at Ay. Stephanos. Indeed, it was certainly being used in Crete by LM I for both vases and sealstones (Warren 1969, 132f.). Like the 'antico rosso' from Kyprianon in south Mani, it was employed to face the thirteenth-century tholos tomb known as the Treasury of Atreus at Mycenae. Neither stone, however, appears to have been used in Lakonia between the thirteenth century BC and the Roman period, although there may be a reference to 'verde antico' in Theophrastos (*De Lapidibus* 4.25, if the emendation *Lakainon* is adopted). The tholoi at Analipsis and Kambos may just have remained in use until LH IIIB, suggesting the continued existence of local nobilities. The other side of the social coin may be represented by the above-mentioned cists from Pavlopetri and some single inhumations from Ay. Stephanos.

This leaves twenty-one sites where occupation is attested by surface finds alone and one, classical Sparta, where LH IIIB has indeed turned up in excavation on the akropolis hill but (despite the intensity of exploration) in such minute quantity as to suggest a minor and perhaps not even a permanent settlement. This is of considerable significance, as we shall see in the next chapter.

The resulting settlement-pattern suggests a relatively high density of population in thirteenth-century Lakonia, concentrated unsurprisingly in the Eurotas valley but extending suggestively into upland and sometimes mountainous country too. As Bintliff (1977, 699) has noticed, the major settlements in the Sparta plain are regularly spaced at intervals of five kilometres so as to exploit the adjacent terrain with maximum efficiency. If we include those sites whose surface pottery cannot be more precisely classified than LH III, the total of sixty-three does not lag so conspicuously behind that obtained for south-west Peloponnese after several seasons of intensive and coordinated survey work. The latter region too shows a maximum density of settlement in the LH IIIB period, as one might have inferred from the plentiful archaeological and documentary evidence from the 'Palace of Nestor' not far north of classical Pylos. However, the Messenian evidence is perhaps significantly richer and more variegated: the palace has its mortuary correlates in a finely constructed and lavishly endowed tholos and impressive chamber-tombs for which the only real Lakonian parallel, Vapheio, belongs to an earlier epoch. The correspondence, in short, is only of a very general nature.

Nevertheless, one aspect of this generally weak correspondence has been heavily stressed in some recent 'historical' accounts of the Mycenaean period,

perhaps with good reason, namely the exponential decline in the number of Lakonian sites attested for the LH IIIC period (seven certain, another eight possible) in contrast to the LH IIIB peak of thirty-nine (max.). The corresponding figures for Messenia are thirteen certain and another three possible LH IIIC sites as against sixty-seven (min.) LH IIIB. It therefore seems a fair inference that ‘in the twelfth and eleventh centuries this fertile and well-watered area was occupied by scarcely more than 10 per cent of the people who had lived there in the thirteenth century B.C.’ (*MME* 143). The rest of this chapter will be addressed to an attempted explanation of this massive problem.

First, though, the evidence for LH IIIC occupation of Lakonia (Figure 8). At Amyklai there is actually an observable increase either in population or perhaps just in cultic activity; continuing external contact is shown by one sherd and a fragment of a wheel-made terracotta statuette, both decorated in the ‘Close Style’ of the Argolis. Occupation may have continued in the area into the eleventh century, but thereafter, archaeologically at any rate, there is a break in continuity—to whose significance I return in Chapter 7. Geraki yielded three ‘goddess’ figurines apparently of the ‘psi’ type, but these may not even be Mycenaean (French 1971, 139). A little LH IIIC pottery has been excavated at Karaousi and Anthochorion and found on the surface at Apidia. The excavated tomb-sites are slightly more promising. A kernos of unique form from a chamber-tomb at Krokeai shows that life was still supportable in eastern Vardhounia. Seven LH IIIC vases from two chamber-tombs at Pellana (Kalyvia Georgitsi) and one whole pot and some sherds from Ay. Stephanos indicate the same for the northern and southern ends respectively of the Eurotas furrow.

But most impressive and revealing of all in their richness and chronological range, together with their evidence of external contacts, are the finds from chamber-tombs at Epidauros Limera. These may be thought to represent some general trends of the period in Greece as a whole. The area undoubtedly received an influx of settlers during LH IIIC. We cannot be sure whether their Aegean connections (below) were established before or after their arrival, but in view of the evidence for depopulation elsewhere in Lakonia it is reasonable to suggest that the newcomers were displaced Lakonians. The most obvious point of origin is the Spartan basin, which has easy routes of communication with Epidauros Limera (Chapter 10) and suffered apparently the greatest depopulation. It is at least highly suggestive that this area was precisely the place of refuge selected by the inhabitants of the Sparta area in face of the Slav invasions of the late sixth century AD (Pavlopetri was another). Once established at Epidauros Limera, these Mycenaean formed part of an Aegean *koine* embracing sites like Perati in Attika (probably another refugee-settlement), Asine in the Argolis and Naxos in the Kyklades. Indeed, their pottery in the earlier stages of LH IIIC shows contact even with Crete. The cemetery, moreover, remained in use into sub-




Figure 8 Late Helladic III C Lakonia

Mycenaean times, perhaps as late as c.1050. When the other members of the *koine* dropped away, the potters of Epidauros Limera may have turned for their continuing inspiration to the communities of central Greece. The latest finds, however, fail to bridge the all-important transition from the sub-Mycenaean to the Protogeometric period, and the subsequent fate of the erstwhile refugees is unknown. In fact, Epidauros Limera ceases to exist, archaeologically, until the seventh century.

To sum up, the LH IIIC settlement-pattern marks a radical departure from that of LH IIIB in Lakonia. The number of inhabited sites is reduced by about 62.5 per cent overall and by a greater percentage in the Eurotas valley. Some habitation, it is true, is apparent in all the main geological areas of the region, but it is on an enormously reduced scale. Conversely, Amyklai possibly and Epidauros Limera certainly increased in size. After c.1100, however, Lakonia to all outward appearances was uninhabited for the first time since Middle Palaeolithic times, but that is a problem to be considered in Chapter 7.

The phenomenon of late Mycenaean decline, if correctly identified, is by no means peculiar to Lakonia. The parallel situation in Messenia has already been noted and in fact it extends to all the major regions of Mycenaean settlement. Equally the internal redistribution of population inferred from the Epidauros Limera evidence is written large in the influx of settlers during LH IIIC to previously marginal areas such as Achaia and the Ionian islands of Ithaka and Kephallenia, not to mention those who went as far afield as Cyprus and Crete. Indeed, there is later literary evidence which suggests that Lakonians figured prominently among the emigrants. However, these parallels should not perhaps be pressed. The Lakonian evidence is provisional, and in particular there is only the destruction of the ‘Dawkins House’ at the Menelaion site to compare to the disasters which overtook Thebes, Gla, Iolkos, Mycenae, Tiryns and Pylos (to name only the more prominent centres) during LH IIIB and C. None the less, the mainland Greek disequilibrium coincides broadly with the upheavals that engulfed the entire east Mediterranean basin at about the same time, and it would be anomalous, I think, if the Lakonian development were wholly independent of them.

At first blush a hypothesis which accounted for all these geographically disparate yet superficially similar and roughly contemporary phenomena would appear to have the merits of simplicity and economy. But in the present state of our knowledge no such hypothesis can be convincingly advanced. That of Rhys Carpenter, for example, which postulates a shift in the trade winds bringing on an extended drought and consequential famine, disease and possibly riots, seems unsupported and possibly falsified by what relevant evidence there is from Greece (Chapter 1). Nor does the documentary evidence of famine at Hattusas and Ugarit c.1200 prove that there was a climatic change then either in the central Anatolian plateau or anywhere else in the Near East, let alone Greece. Conversely, the theory of a

widespread epidemic of bubonic plague cannot be evaluated for lack of evidence. Nor can it be shown that the peoples who confronted the Egyptian Pharaohs were directly responsible for the downfall of the Hittite empire or the destructions of Ugarit and other sites in the Levant and Greece.

It is therefore permissible to look for more localized and specifically Greek explanations. Using the evidence of archaeology and the Linear B inscriptions, it could be argued that the intensification of settlement, large-scale pasturage and expansion of overseas trade during LH IIIB had led to extensive forest-clearance and the exhaustion of marginal land, and that the resulting deforestation and erosion had had a critically deleterious effect on the vegetational climax. Thus the depopulation in LH IIIC could have been the consequence both of flight to less heavily settled areas in search of food and of the death by famine and disease of many of those who remained behind.

Deforestation and soil-erosion, however, are not a sufficient explanation of the material record: they leave out of account the destructions. Since these were inflicted by people who have left no other distinguishing mark of their presence, and since the Mycenaean way of life continued thereafter, albeit on a reduced scale, it follows that the attackers either were themselves Mycenaeans or were outsiders whose material accoutrements were either Mycenaean or perishable or hitherto unrecognized or not left behind. Unfortunately, the Linear B tablets—despite the ingenuity of those who regard a possibly extraordinary requisition of bronze, the disposition of a coastal watch and possible human sacrifice as signs of a military and social crisis in the Pylos kingdom—cannot shed further light on the nature of the crisis or the identity of the destroyers. The wall across the Isthmus of Corinth (if, as it surely is, it is a fortification-wall and spanned the entire Isthmus) is ambiguous too: it was built in the LH IIIB/C transition by users of Mycenaean pottery and, like the attempts to safeguard water-supply at Athens, Mycenae and Tiryns, seems to betoken exceptional concern for defence; but the dispute over relative pottery chronology at this critical point leaves open the possibilities that it was constructed after some, most or even all of the LH IIIB destructions in the Peloponnese.

Two competing hypotheses, which are not in fact mutually exclusive, have therefore been proposed to explain the archaeological ‘facts’ of destruction followed by dispersal and reduction of population. The first, which brings invaders by land from north of the Isthmus and indeed of Greece, suits the LH IIIC picture of relative prosperity in the Aegean and influxes of population into Achaia, the Ionian islands and further afield to south and east. It might also account for a number of intrusive artefacts of vaguely ‘northern’ type, especially hand-made pottery, which made an appearance in southern Greece around the LH IIIB/C transition. On the other hand, the marked increase in cist-burials after *c.*1150, which has been claimed as another indication of northern intruders, could be a purely

endogenous phenomenon. More important still, though, this hypothesis fails to explain satisfactorily why the postulated invaders confined their attention in western Peloponnese to the ‘Palace of Nestor’ and why they did not settle in Greece—unless, that is, they were in fact Mycenaean and so archaeologically indistinguishable.

It is this latter possibility which has given rise to the second main explanatory hypothesis, embraced for example by Hooker (1977), namely civil war. For if the destroyers were Mycenaean, then they could be either the common people in opposition to the palace-bound ruling class in each region, or disaffected members of the ruling stratum and their supporters, or rulers (or coalitions of rulers) of other regions. Further speculation could be, and usually is, conducted on the basis of the material remains alone. But as a rule it is not long before recourse is had to the very much later literary sources to eke out the archaeological evidence. For the reasons set out in Chapter 5 and Appendix 2 I do not believe such recourse is legitimate.

However, if pressed to provide an explanation I would adopt elements of the two main hypotheses outlined above and combine them with my starting-point in this chapter, the wider upheavals in the east Mediterranean basin. Thus a domestic economic slump aggravated by the disruption of overseas trade could have weakened the authority of the Mycenaean rulers and impelled them to solve their problems, in a manner familiar to students of the eighth century (Chapter 8), at the expense of the cultivable land of their neighbours. The resulting warfare, perhaps accompanied by civil strife and influxes of barbarian intruders, might have destroyed the finely balanced economic and social system which the palace-bureaucracies administered, together with the palaces themselves. Once their centripetal force was gone, the unified regions of the Mycenaean cosmos will have dissolved once more into isolated islands of population adrift in an uncharted political sea and forced back on their own immediate resources much as at the beginning of the MH period.

Notes on further reading

The problem of correctly characterizing the political and economic structure of the (tablet-using) Mycenaean state can only be complicated by the use of misleading analogies or loose terminology, above all that of feudalism: Finley 1957. On the other hand, that mediaeval analogies can elucidate Mycenaean economic development is shown in Hutchinson 1977, even if many of his historical conclusions are unconvincing.

The ‘philological game of hopscotch’ referred to by Rhys Carpenter is best exemplified in Astour 1967, ch. 1. Like hopscotch, this sort of approach explains nothing and gets you nowhere. For artistic interrelations between Greece and the Orient see Kantor 1947 and Smith 1965. The mechanisms of foreign trade, however, are opaque: it could perhaps be argued that the need

for metals impelled the Mycenaean to take to the sea, but the equally crucial Athenian corn-supply in the Classical period was by no means in Athenian hands exclusively; and the only excavated wreck of the period, really a travelling bazaar, is probably Syrian or Palestinian (Bass 1967).

For the absolute chronology of the Late Bronze Age I have followed Thomas 1967 and Rowton 1970. The destructions and upheaval in the east Mediterranean basin are discussed by Hooker (1977, 156–60). I agree with his rejection of ‘the picture of the Sea Peoples as a powerful army, moving irresistibly and of set purpose, until their final defeat at the hand of the Egyptians’ and with his explanation of the ferment as stemming from the collapse of the Hittite empire; on the ‘Sea Peoples’ see now the intelligent synthesis of Sandars (1978).

The standard textbook of Mycenaean pottery is still Furumark 1941. For the LH IIIA and B phases at Mycenae a stream of articles by E. French is indispensable reading, but the details of the sequence elsewhere are still controversial: ‘when we say Mycenaean IIIB pottery, what exactly do we mean?’ (Mylonas 1964, 373). For more recent developments in scientific analyses of Mycenaean pottery see Bieber et al. 1976.

The most convenient reference work on Mycenaean sites is Hope Simpson 1965; a second edition by Hope Simpson and O. Dickinson is in preparation. For the stoppered wine-jars from the Menelaion see Vickery 1936, 32, 59. *Pace* Oliva (1971, 16), there is no evidence that they were ‘clearly ready for despatch’.

Mycenaean cult-places are conveniently listed in Hägg 1968. For some sensible remarks on the difficulties of discussing Mycenaean religion see Hooker 1977, 192ff. (but even he succumbs to the desire to know).

The evidence of destructions in LH IIIB is given in Buck 1969. For the decline in population in LH IIIC in Greece generally see the table in Ålin 1962, 148 (now considerably out of date).

The first Dorians c.1050–775

The middle word of this chapter's title, like my agnostic discussion of the destructions and depopulation in southern Greece during the latest Mycenaean period, conceals a *parti pris*. For although an impressive roll-call of scholars has attempted to explain the archaeological facts (if they are facts) set out in Chapter 6 in terms of the 'tradition' concerning the Dorians and their movements (Buck 1969, 280 n. 31; Rubinson 1975), most of these have not perceived that the 'tradition' must itself first be evaluated on its own merits before it is appropriate to apply external tests. When the 'tradition' is thus evaluated, it is seen that the literary evidence is so far removed from the 'Dorian invasion' in time and so distorted according to the bias or ignorance of the speaker or writer that an extreme sceptic like Beloch (1913, 76–96) could even legitimately deny its very occurrence. I shall argue that scepticism need not be carried so far, but a glance at the main items of literary evidence (Hooker 1977, 213–22) will help to explain Beloch's stance. The deceptively coherent narrative of the Dorian migration and occupation of the Peloponnese produced by a rationalizing mythographer like Apollodoros in the second century represents 'only the main element in the tradition'; and there are other elements recorded by various authors at sundry times and places which are 'conflicting and even contradictory' (Tomlinson 1972, 59–61).

The history of Sparta was particularly badly mauled in this regard, not at all without Spartan connivance, in a manner made possible by the attitudes to preservation of knowledge about the past described in Chapter 5. We may perhaps distinguish four main levels in the process of systematic distortion. In the first place, as Edward Gibbon put it, 'some decent mixture of prodigy and fable has, in every age, been supposed to reflect a becoming majesty on the origin of great cities'. Since the real Dorian Sparta could hardly be called a 'great city' before the eighth century, it was presumably then that 'prodigy and fable' in the guise of the myth of the 'Return of the Herakleidai' (Tigerstedt 1965, 28–36) were first laid under contribution to shed their retrospective glory. Next, the power and territory acquired by force of arms were justified, again in the language of myth but also with the aid of Delphic

Apollo, as merely the taking of what anyway belonged to the Spartans by right of their rulers' 'Achaean' descent. Third, and by a less obvious process, the king-lists of the two Spartan royal houses transcended their local significance to secure a cardinal position in the chronography and historiography of the post-heroic age of Greece as a whole (Appendix 3). The surviving narrative accounts of the 'Return', the earliest of which is that of Ephorus (70F117), all show signs of contamination from this source. Finally, the Sparta which emerged into the light of history as the most powerful state in Greece possessed customs and institutions that seemed alien and antiquated to those interested in recording them. Revivalist movements in the third century and again during the early Roman Empire naturally served to reinforce this conservative image (Bourguet 1927, 21), and Sparta came to be regarded as archetypally 'Dorian'. This aspect of the 'Spartan mirage', as we shall see, is perhaps the hardest of all to penetrate with assurance.

The most hopeful method of demolishing the more extravagant claims of 'tradition' is a sober statement of the archaeological record, fragmentary and one-sided though this undoubtedly is. Before examining it closely, however, it is necessary to reiterate that, as with the Trojan War (Appendix 2), disbelief in the elaborated details and alleged attendant circumstances of an event does not entail disbelief in the event itself. For by one of those quirks of scholarly fashion Beloch's formerly generally discredited denial of a 'Dorian invasion' has recently received seemingly powerful and independent support from philology, archaeology and the history of religion.

First, then, philology. In the last chapter I asserted dogmatically that the Linear B tablets were unable to shed light directly on the destructions which accidentally ensured their preservation. However, Chadwick (1976b) has now argued that the presence of Dorians in the Peloponnese already in the Mycenaean period may be inferred from certain linguistic features of the tablets. To be more precise, Chadwick is even prepared to argue on this dialectological basis that the oppressed majority in each of the Mycenaean kingdoms spoke Doric (or rather proto-Doric) and that it was these proto-Doric speakers who overthrew their 'Mycenaean' masters, burned their palaces and emerged later as the historical Dorians.

I am no philologist, let alone Mycenologist, and we must wait to see what considered reactions this startling theory provokes from the experts in the field (initial reaction, I understand, has been far from unanimously favourable). It is, however, fair for me to point out that it is extremely dangerous to draw far-reaching inferences of a dialectological nature from the Linear B tablets. This should be obvious simply from their fragmentary preservation and the character of the information they convey, but it is worth stressing that current philological views of their dialectal significance are highly heterogeneous, leaving aside those which do not even accept the decipherment as Greek. At one end of the spectrum there is the view that Linear B is merely a 'common trading language,...some kind of lingua




Figure 9 Protogeometric Lakonia

franca, or commercial “jargon” (Hooker 1977, 77), which may bear little or no relation to the language or languages actually spoken in the Mycenaean kingdoms or elsewhere in Greece. At the other end scholars like Bartonek (1973) hold that the language of the tablets is the dialect common to all areas of Mycenaean culture (apart perhaps from Thessaly and Boiotia, where proto-Aeolic may have been spoken) but distinct from the dialect of north-west Greece, which was early Doric. (The hypothesis that of the historical dialects Ionic and Aeolic but not Doric are post-Mycenaean formations was first proposed by Ernst Risch and is now commonly accepted.) It will become clear later on why I incline to place myself at Bartonek’s end of the spectrum. Here I shall confine myself to what seem to be the fatal historical and archaeological objections to Chadwick’s new theory.

First, and most obviously, although the Dorians could have invented the idea of an immigration into the Peloponnese to hide their subjection to

Mycenaean overlords, the theory does not explain why they invented the myth of the 'Return of the Herakleidai' if in fact the Heraklid rulers of the Dorian states could have claimed hegemony in their respective areas of the Peloponnese as the just reward of their revolutionary efforts. Nor does it account for the fact that the 'Return' myth applied only to those Dorians who could claim descent from Herakles. For Thucydides (1.12.3) does not, *pace* Chadwick (1976b, 105), call the Dorians Herakleidai but, like Tyrtaios (fr. 2.13–15), our earliest surviving source, expressly distinguishes between the Dorians and the returning Herakleidai. In other words, both of these ancient sources clearly believed that there were no Dorians at least in the Peloponnese before the fall of Troy, a belief which is consonant both with the claim of the Arkadians to be the only 'autochthonous' population in the Peloponnese (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.23; cf. Hdt. 2.171.3; 8.73.1) and with the clear affinity between Linear B and the historical Arkado-Cypriot dialect. Third, the theory presupposes not merely continuity of settlement but identity of culture between the Mycenaean and historical Peloponnese. This may be demonstrable in some sense for the Argolis (Tomlinson 1972, 64), but the archaeological evidence for the other Dorian areas of the Peloponnese indicates a sharp, though not of course a complete, cultural break after c.1050. For example, Lakonian Protogeometric pottery, as we shall see, notoriously does not 'grow out of Submycenaean' (Chadwick 1976b, 104); strictly speaking not even continuity of settlement can be proved archaeologically for Lakonia; and the central place of Dorian Lakonia was significantly different from its Mycenaean predecessor.

Bearing this in mind, let us turn to the specifically archaeological arguments of the neo-Belochians. It has of late become an acknowledged scandal that the Dorians, archaeologically speaking, do not exist. That is, there is no cultural trait surviving in the material record for the two centuries or so after 1200 which can be regarded as a peculiarly Dorian hallmark. Robbed of their patents for Geometric pottery, cremation burial, iron-working and, unkindest prick of all, the humble straight pin, the hapless Dorians stand naked before their creator—or, some would say, inventor. For, it is argued, if they cannot be identified archaeologically, this is because they had been in the Peloponnese all the time—or at least for a considerable time before 1200. How then did they obtain their political and linguistic dominance in the Peloponnese? It was, according to Hooker (1977, 179), the 'Doric-speaking subjects' who were 'responsible for the overthrow of the palatial system (and perhaps for the destruction of the palaces themselves)'; and 'it is these insurrectionists who are commemorated in the traditions about the Return of the Heraclids'.

This hypothesis is clearly vulnerable to the same objections as Chadwick's philologically based theory; indeed, it is more obviously vulnerable inasmuch as it was not the mass of the insurrectionists but primarily their later rulers who are commemorated in the 'Return' myth. It should, however, also be

noted that invasions do not necessarily leave recognizable material traces, often because the conquerors have taken over the culture of the conquered when the latter stood on a higher level. We might cite the Slav invasions of Greece in the early Byzantine period as an instance. Thus continuity of material culture despite a series of man-made destructions such as is attested for the Argolis during LH IIIB and C does not by itself exclude the possibility of an invasion by non-Mycenaeans. But such an *argumentum ex silentio* is no more susceptible of proof and no less hazardous than the one on the other side drawn by Hooker from the non-intrusion of ‘Dorian’ cultural traits into the Peloponnese at this or a later time. Again, the crucial point is the fact of cultural discontinuity after the Mycenaean period, at least in Lakonia.

The argument from the history of religion is even more complex in its ramifications and is based explicitly on Lakonian evidence. As stated in Chapter 6, it is impossible to be too precise about the identity, powers and attributes of Mycenaean deities. None the less, evidence from Amyklai has been used to support confident hypotheses. In the historical period, after Amyklai had become the fifth constituent village of Dorian Sparta (Chapter 8), the chief deity here was Apollo, worshipped in martial guise. His cult, however, coexisted happily, if to us rather obscurely, with that of Hyakinthos: the three days of the annual Hyakinthia festival, whose importance will emerge in later chapters, were divided between them, the first being consecrated to Hyakinthos, the last two to Apollo. Now Apollo was of course a key member of the celestial Olympian pantheon. But Hyakinthos, a more shadowy figure, may originally have been a vegetation deity, and his worship was clearly chthonic (earth-bound) in character. How, then, when and why did the cult of these disparate immortals become associated in this way?

According to the mythical account, Apollo killed his favourite Hyakinthos with an accidentally misdirected discus-cast. This type of myth ‘may reflect dimly Apollo’s increasing popularity during the Dark ages’ (Starr 1961, 182), and that may be thought to answer the why of the question posed above. It does not, however, tell us how and when the two cults first came into contact or collision. The pooled resources of philology, archaeology and the history of religion produced a solution along these lines (e.g. Desborough 1972, 280). The name Hyakinthos contains the -nth- suffix which is not merely pre-Dorian but pre-Greek; the name itself perhaps referred to a natural topographical feature. Thus Hyakinthos was the aboriginal deity of Amyklai taken over by the Indo-European speakers when they arrived in Lakonia around the turn of the third millennium. It was to Hyakinthos that the archaeologically attested cult was being paid at Amyklai late in LH IIIB and/or in IIIC. The date of Apollo’s entry upon the Greek scene and his place of entry cannot be firmly ascertained, but his close association with Dorian communities in the historical period suggests that it was the incoming Dorians who amalgamated the Bronze Age cult of Hyakinthos with that of

Apollo some time after the inauguration of a non-Mycenaean, Dorian culture in Lakonia.

This looks a plausible and economical hypothesis. It is not in fact so secure as it seems. For a start, the date and manner of the 'coming of the Greeks' are controversial (Chapter 4), and the exclusively Dorian affiliation of Apollo has been exaggerated, most conspicuously by Müller (1839). More specifically, there are two major obstacles to accepting the hypothesis as it stands. First, the historical Hyakinthia remained pre-eminently a local Amyklaian rather than a generally Spartan festival, which suggests that the Dorian/Mycenaean and Apollo/Hyakinthos antitheses have been misconceived or are irrelevant in this context. Second, the distribution of the month Hyakinthios in historical times (Samuel 1972, 93, 291) indicates an exclusively Dorian rather than a broadly Mycenaean Greek attachment: Hyakinthos, in other words, is more likely to be 'Dorian' *par excellence* than Apollo, and if any elements in the Hyakinthia may be considered intrusive they are those associated with Apollo. For these reasons therefore (and others which could be adduced by advocates of either hypothesis) Dietrich (1975) has argued that Hyakinthos was already a Dorian cult-figure in the Late Bronze Age and that his cult, which began at Amyklai, was diffused thence by Dorians. In other words, there was no 'Dorian invasion' of Lakonia as usually conceived, either at the end of the Bronze Age or in the immediate post-Bronze Age period.

There is much of value in Dietrich's article. In particular, he has attacked the 'traditional' picture of an ethnically distinct and mutually antagonistic 'Dorian' Sparta and 'Achaean' Amyklai at its weakest spot, religious practice, and his attack has struck home. On the other hand, neither he nor Chadwick nor Hooker has yet persuaded me to stop flogging the old warhorse of a Dorian invasion of some kind. For all three are obliged to appeal to archaeological evidence, and this is really their Achilles heel. It may be true, as Dietrich argues, that archaeology need not signify an actual break in cult for a century or more at Amyklai, though formally, as we shall see, it does just that. But archaeology undeniably does signify a break in cultural continuity at the site, and the picture is repeated throughout Lakonia. It is time therefore to examine the archaeological evidence more closely, and in particular the stratification and pottery-sequence of Amyklai, which happens also to be the type-site for Protogeometric (PG) and Dark Age Lakonia as a whole. (The significance of these labels will emerge in due course.)

The hill of Ay. Kyriaki, one of the central chain running down the Spartan plain on the right bank of the Eurotas, was occupied, though not perhaps continuously, from the early Bronze Age. What concerns us particularly here is a small layered deposit uncovered in the German excavations of 1925 at one point immediately outside and below the terrace-wall which wholly or partly enclosed the historical sanctuary (Figure 10). The uppermost layer




Figure 10 Stratification at the Amyklaion sanctuary

contained a little Byzantine and other material. Below came the 'Aschenschicht' permeated by charred earth with objects ranging in date from Hellenistic back to Archaic. Under this was the layer of clay, one metre deep, which is the crucial one for our purposes. The top twelve or so centimetres contained 'Geometric' pottery, the bottom few some pre-fourteenth-century ware; in between fell the 'Protogeometrische Schicht' characterized by PG pottery but contaminated at varying levels by three small Mycenaean sherds, one Mycenaean terracotta 'goddess' figurine and a fragment of a large Mycenaean terracotta animal statuette. The layer also held several artefacts of bronze of post-Mycenaean manufacture.

The problem of interpretation results from the fact that this is not the stratification of a settlement, with recognizable and continuous floors of occupation, but an isolated votive deposit (no sanctuary building was recovered) formed by the discarding of accumulated votives. The question is whether we are to suppose that votives were continuously washed or thrown down this same part of the hill. Discontinuity seems inevitable as between the Byzantine layer and the 'Aschenschicht', but how does the PG layer relate to those immediately below and above?

There are a couple of footholds in this slippery moraine. First, the 'Geometric' pottery above the PG layer is in fact what we now call Late Geometric in style. Thus the supposition of continuous deposition would entail the view that Lakonian PG pottery continued to be made or dedicated until roughly the mid-eighth century. Second, although there was no purely Mycenaean stratum below the PG layer, the Mycenaean material found in the latter or closely associated with PG pottery on the surface included sherds, animal statuettes and 'goddess' figurines of the latest (LH IIIC) phase. Thus if the 'stratigraphical' and surface associations imply direct continuity between LH IIIC and PG, then Lakonian PG pottery should have begun not later than 1050, giving a timespan for the fabric of some three centuries.

However, detailed stylistic analysis, of which a highly condensed summary follows here, does not bear out the truth of either the protasis or the apodosis of the preceding sentence.

The fundamental study of the PG style of pottery in Greek lands is still Desborough 1952. Thanks to this, we are able to say that the style is not merely an amalgam of shapes and decorative motifs antedating and perhaps prefiguring the full Geometric style but comprises shapes and decoration that would have been impossible but for two, possibly Athenian, technical innovations of the eleventh century, the faster wheel and the use in conjunction of a multiple brush and dividers. It is not possible to say much about Lakonian PG shapes for lack of complete profiles, and the multiple brush and dividers were used here in a highly individualistic fashion. Nevertheless the substantive point remains that Lakonian PG shares after its own manner the two fundamental technical ideas of the style.

I have spoken of 'Lakonian' PG. This is meant to convey that the conclusions of Desborough—namely that there existed a local pre-Geometric PG style at Amyklai and 'related' or comparably early wares at the sanctuaries of Athena and Orthia in Sparta—may now be expanded into the assertion that a PG style was common to much if not most of Lakonia (Figure 9). Surface finds have been made at Stena near Gytheion, Apidia in the west Parnon foreland, Daimonia (ancient Kotyrta) in the Malea peninsula, Volimnos (sanctuary of Artemis Limnatis) in the west Taygetos foreland (ancient Dentheliatis) and perhaps also Phoiniki (temple of Apollo Hyperteleatas) in the Malea peninsula. Indeed, Lakonian PG found its way outside Lakonia to Tegea and perhaps the Argive Heraion, and sherds of Lakonian PG type have been picked up at Kaphirio and Hellenika (ancient Thouria) in south-east Messenia. The possible historical significance of this distribution will be considered at the end of this chapter. Here we must first discuss the origins, development and chronology of the style.

It should be stressed straightaway that any discussion is necessarily provisional and tentative, since no stratified occupation levels have yet been excavated in an early post-Mycenaean Lakonian settlement. So far only three sites have produced both LH IIIC and PG material: Amyklai, Anthochorion in west Vardhounia and Apidia. The last can safely be discounted, since there is only a handful of relevant sherds and the finds are sporadic. The other two have at least revealed some form of stratification in controlled excavation, but at Amyklai certainly and at Anthochorion possibly the stratification is that of votive accumulations, and both sites show disturbance in the levels that concern us here. The test of continuity therefore resolves itself into the question of the stylistic relationship between the latest Mycenaean and the PG pottery. Can the latter be said to grow out of, be derived from or throw back to the former?

Since we are dealing with levels in which indubitably Mycenaean and indubitably PG ware was found in association, we cannot without begging the

question answer it with reference to artefacts whose stylistic attribution is uncertain. A special problem, however, is posed by the wheel-made animal statuettes from Amyklai. These bulls, horses and so on were first made some time in the late thirteenth century, but they certainly continued into the twelfth, and one Mycenaean example may be from the early eleventh. In a masterly survey of Greek terracotta votive statuettes between c.1200 and 700 Nicholls (1970, 10) stated that there are fragments of this type with PG ornament from the PG level. In fact, though, the only example he cites is not beyond a doubt PG, and there are no others so decorated from the PG level. I do not therefore think it justified to use this one piece as evidence of continuity except to corroborate such a finding based on other evidence. To this we must now turn.

The criterion of shape is barely considerable, since we have only two wholly preserved profiles: the hydria (water-jar) and the trefoil-lipped oinochoe (wine-jug). The former was developed during the sub-Mycenaean, not the full Mycenaean, period. The latter makes its first appearance in early LH IIIC (an example has been excavated at Epidaurus Limera), but the developed conical foot of the example from the Heroon sanctuary in Sparta is apparently a PG innovation. For the rest, the fairly common deep skyphos (drinking cup) is probably derived from the ‘Granary Class’ LH IIIC deep bowl of the Argolis, but the decoration of the best preserved Lakonian PG example, again from the Heroon, isolates it somewhat from the main Lakonian series. The neck-handled amphora, a good example of which was found at Stena (Figure 11c), is ‘plainly an adaptation of a Mycenaean type’ (Desborough 1952, 6), but the adaptation took place in Attika.

If we move from shape to decoration, the signals are equally muted. The use of horizontal grooving, whether tectonic or decorative in function, is one of the two most distinctive Lakonian PG traits and is unambiguously not of Mycenaean ancestry. On the other hand, the system of panelling and the use of cross-hatched triangles (Figure 11a,b) do have forebears in the latest local variants of the Mycenaean style. Formal similarity, however, is not a guarantee of derivation, and the Lakonian way with these was substantively different. Thus the treatment of the panelling in a rigidly compacted manner contrasts with the more relaxed Mycenaean approach; the triangle is greatly outnumbered by the un-Mycenaean horizontal or vertical lattice as a configuration for cross-hatched ornament; and the overwhelming predilection for cross-hatching *per se*, the other peculiarly Lakonian PG characteristic, is foreign to Mycenaean. Lastly, but perhaps most important, there is the question of the conception of the pot as a whole. Lakonian PG is ‘an entirely dark-ground system not to be found in Mycenaean’ (Desborough 1952, 287). If these arguments are thought inconclusive, a comparison between the Lakonian and Ithakan PG styles, as suggested by Desborough, should settle the matter. Despite significant points of mutual contact (to be considered further below), the Ithakan relates to its Mycenaean predecessor in a




Figure 11 Lakonian Protogeometric and Geometric pottery a-d PG (a-b Amyklaion; c-d Stena, near Gytheion) e LG (Orthia)

discernible way that the Lakonian does not. In sum, the origins of Lakonian PG are not to be found in the local LH IIIC or the (barely attested) sub-Mycenaean styles. The significance of this is enhanced by the absence of anything later than sub-Mycenaean at Epidauros Limera (cf. previous chapter).

Are its origins then to be sought in the leading PG regional styles of Thessaly, Attika or the Argolis, for each of which an originating or inspirationally independent role has been claimed? Thessaly could be ruled out on grounds of geography alone, but there are in fact no grounds for suggesting a link with Lakonia in any case. The influence and often the inspiration of Attic PG have been demonstrated for many areas of Greece, but for Lakonia neither can even be argued with confidence. As for the Argolis, the shape and decorative scheme of the Heroon skyphos, together with its

conical foot, may well be derived from here, but otherwise evidence of such contact, so rich in the succeeding period (Chapter 8), is conspicuous by its absence, even if we allow that Attic influences (such as they are) may have been transmitted indirectly through the Argolis. We must therefore answer the above question in the negative. Nor ought this to surprise us. For in each of these areas continuity or virtual continuity of settlement from the Mycenaean into the historical period is assured, and there is a corresponding congruence between the relevant pottery styles. Lack of such congruence in Lakonia suggests the possibility of a break in occupation or at least external communications.

If this possibility is admitted, whatever form the break may have taken, then we have grounds for looking away from the three ‘mainstream’ styles to discover the source or sources of the PG elements in the Lakonian style. In practice this means either to those styles which stand in some demonstrable relation to the mainstream (the ‘related’ group) or to those whose individuality argues some degree of independence from it (the ‘independent’ group). Crete apart, geography alone tends to exclude the members of the ‘related’ group as potential inspirers or influences; and Cretan artistic development appears somewhat esoteric after the Mycenaean/Minoan period. Let us therefore direct our attention to the ‘independent’ group, which embraces Ithaka, Aitolia, Achaia and Messenia besides Lakonia itself.

Gratifyingly we find immediately satisfied here two *a priori* criteria of inspiration, geographical proximity and stylistic affinity. The latter is worth dissolving into its constituent parts: the mug shape, especially common in Achaia but also frequent on Ithaka and in Aitolia; the shape and decoration of a skyphos from Tragana just north of Navarino Bay; grooving and cross-hatching at Nichoria in south-east Messenia; a special fondness for cross-hatched ornament in Achaia, Ithaka and perhaps Aitolia; a singular triangular motif from Derveni in Achaia, paralleled at Medeon in Phokis and perhaps Aetos on Ithaka; the enclosing of cross-hatched triangles in metopes in Achaia; concentric circles with few arcs and a suggestively similar total decorative approach at Aetos. The exports, if they are exports, to Thouria and Kaphirio are perhaps also relevant. However, and this is the salient fact, for all these points of resemblance Lakonian PG still remains a law unto itself. Admittedly we still have scanty evidence of PG from the western Peloponnese or Ionian islands (see Desborough 1972, 243–57); but there is perhaps enough to justify their classification stylistically as a ‘West Greek’ group and enough to see that Lakonia cannot be neatly slotted into it.

So the outcome of this extended discussion is that Lakonian PG cannot be simply derived either from an antecedent Mycenaean style in Lakonia or from a contemporary PG style elsewhere. Contact with the ‘West Greek’ group may have been a necessary, but it was not a sufficient, condition of its origin. Some further factor or factors must be postulated, and it is not wholly frivolous nor (*pace* Hooker 1977, 173) merely reactionary to suggest that,

had we not been told that newcomers made their way to Lakonia some time after *c.*1200, we would have had to invent them to explain their pottery. Since the style could not have originated within Lakonia in total isolation, the most economical hypothesis from the archaeological side would so link the newcomers with the new style of pottery as to explain both the PG and 'West Greek' elements. This is done most easily by postulating that the 'West Greek' area was where they became acquainted both with the techniques of the PG style in general and with particular local shapes and decorative motifs.

I am of course keenly aware that it can be 'highly simplistic and misleading' to explain ceramic change in terms of a movement of population, in view of the range of factors (excluding invasion) which are known to precipitate it (Nicklin 1971, 47)—for example, the quality of the craftsmen, local fashion or utilitarian considerations. Moreover, I appreciate that the stylistic range of a ware is more likely to have a geographical than a tribal or ethnic significance, and that I must seem to be imposing an intolerable burden of inference on ceramic evidence. Above all, I am only too conscious of the irony in my holding the views expressed in Chapter 5 and yet also in some sense defending 'tradition' against Beloch, with whose sceptical outlook I am in general sympathy. Still, the hypothesis outlined above seems to me to account best for the stylistic anomalies of Lakonian PG and in particular to explain how the craft of pottery-making, which is highly traditional and resistant to political disturbance, was apparently interrupted and restarted in Lakonia. Furthermore, this hypothesis may be accommodated within a larger historical scheme. However, before pottery can become fodder for the historian a further ingredient, chronology, must be added to the farrago.

In this connection the student of early post-Mycenaean Lakonia is confronted by one of those dispiriting paradoxes with which all students of Sparta must make their peace. The archaeological contexts which have produced apparent links with the more securely dated mainstream styles, the Heroon and Stena, are unstratified and without chronological anchors, whereas the 'stratified' Amyklai and Anthochorion deposits betray no chronologically significant external relations.

To take the unstratified material first, it seems on balance unlikely that such knowledge of Aegean styles could have been displayed in quite this way very long after PG in Attika and the Argolis had given way to Early Geometric *c.*900. It is, however, worth emphasizing that these vases stand apart from the main Lakonian PG series both in technique and in decoration. For example, they lack the metallic gleam of the paint produced both at Amyklai and (on a lesser scale) in Sparta by firing at high temperatures. The Heroon vases, seemingly the earliest of any, perhaps represent an unrepeatable attempt to translate mainstream styles into a Lakonian idiom. The Stena group (Figure 11c and d) may show the fruits of maritime contact with the Aegean through nearby Gytheion, but, if so, this would be the earliest

evidence for the occupation of Gytheion since the thirteenth century and there is none thereafter until the sixth.

For the main series we must rely on the stratification at Amyklai, and it is salutary to reflect that we do not know either whether this isolated votive deposit contains the earliest PG material or what proportion of the total PG dedications it represents. Our only control lies in the overlying stratum with Late Geometric pottery. This, taken with the absence of a settled Early or Middle Geometric phase in Lakonia, allows us to be fairly sure that the PG and Geometric layers are immediately successive. We thereby arrive at a terminal date for Lakonian PG of c.750, which is perhaps confirmed by the indiscriminate mixture of PG and Late Geometric in the ‘Geometric’ levels at the Orthia sanctuary (cf. Chapter 8 and Appendix 5). For the upper terminus we have a date of c.950–900 to allow for the non-derivation from Mycenaean and the presumed imitations of Attic or Argive PG.

The question then arises whether we can conceive the style lasting upwards of a century and perhaps as much as two. There are a number of arguments, individually weak but reasonably cogent in conjunction, to suggest that we can. Droop (in *AO* 66 n. 16) thought he could detect a chronological development from Amyklai (no slip, few concentric circles) through the sanctuary of Athena on the Spartan akropolis (some slip, more concentric circles) to the Orthia sanctuary (mainly slip, many concentric circles). He was writing before PG had been distinguished from ‘Geometric’, and he may have been wrong to explain the development in terms of the order in which the cults were founded, but there is still something to be said for the developmental scheme itself. A second argument is based on the natural inference from the character of Lakonian PG that the potters and painters were considerably isolated from their counterparts in other regions, an inference corroborated by the metallic dedications at Amyklai (below). In conditions of cultural isolation or deprivation there is a tendency towards conservatism or at least an absence of stimulation to innovate. Finally, we may argue from the simplicity and monotony of the decorative repertoire that the style could have lasted a relatively long time, since as a rule it is where decoration is complex that there is a propensity to variation and style changes relatively fast. Thus, I suggest that Lakonian PG began in the later tenth century, at least at Amyklai, and ended around the middle of the eighth, thereby spanning between one and two centuries.

Let me correct any misapprehensions created by my concentration on pottery by examining the metal artefacts ‘stratified’ with PG pottery or typologically similar to independently datable contemporaries from other areas. The immediate post-Mycenaean era in Lakonia is often described as the ‘Early Iron Age’, but it must be realized how far this equation is merely conventional. For, whatever the cause, the quantity of known iron artefacts from Lakonia becomes considerable only in the seventh century and even thereafter remains slight. This is surprising, for two main reasons. First, as the

later literary sources such as the third-century Daimachos (65F4) stress, Sparta was fortunate in possessing extensive amounts of workable iron ore within its own territory. This testimony is corroborated by geological and archaeological study: ores are widely distributed, and the chief ancient workings were situated near Neapolis (ancient Boiai), whose ores show the highest percentage of iron content in Greece. Second, by c.700 Sparta controlled not only Lakonia but a sizable chunk of trans-Taygetan Messenia, and the latter was, to use the Greeks' expression, 'obtained by the spear'; by that date spearheads, like swords, daggers, knives and axeheads, had for some time typically been made of iron. In short, the apparent dearth of iron artefacts in 'Early Iron Age' Lakonia must surely be put down to the chances of survival and discovery.

However, the supersession of bronze by iron for cutting implements is not in any case a straightforward process. It is true that iron in its various natural states is distributed more plentifully than copper and tin in Greece as elsewhere (Muhly 1973); in fact, both copper and tin had to be imported. On the other hand, the techniques of iron-working are more intricate and differ in kind from those relevant to the production of serviceable bronze. Thus while the ideal superiorities of iron artefacts are easy to state—larger and local supplies potentially cheapened production; greater rigidity, lightness and ability to take an edge increased efficiency and working life—it is more difficult to say by what steps and over what period these superiorities were realized in finished Greek goods. The case of Lakonia must be dismissed for lack of evidence, but there is enough to attempt to interpret the overall Greek experience.

This has been done, to put it schematically, according to two mutually incompatible hypotheses, which envisage respectively a long, drawn out, piecemeal process extending over several centuries (Pleiner 1969) and a relatively sudden and great leap forward c.1000 (Snodgrass 1971, ch. 5). The divergence stems partly from disagreement over the definition of an Iron Age, in part from the uneven character of the evidence; and neither hypothesis perhaps is wholly persuasive. That of Pleiner goes beyond the archaeological evidence and rests on a false distinguishing criterion of diversity in usage. In fact, Greek blacksmiths (significantly called bronzesmiths, *chalkeis*) never learned to cast iron; and bronze was retained for almost all large objects of beaten metal even after the beginning of the Iron Age (on any definition). Snodgrass's hypothesis, on the other hand, has limited conceptual and geographical applicability. The evidence forbids us to judge whether the known sample of his 'fundamental classes' of edged implements is statistically significant; above all, there are insufficient agricultural implements for comparative purposes. However, if an approximate date for the beginning of the Iron Age in Greece should still be sought, then perhaps Hesiod's iron-shod plough of c.700 (Kothe 1975) provides a feasible *terminus ante quem*.

To return to Lakonia and darkness from the confused light of the outside world, we find just one iron artefact securely dated to the PG period. Its preserved length is 32 cm., but it is so poorly preserved that its identification as a spearhead is no more than plausible. It was found at Stena with the two PG pots already discussed, so we should probably infer that we have here a male burial. In fact, this is almost the only burial of the period known from Lakonia, but both the burial rite and the form of grave are unrecorded. The only other possibly PG iron artefact from Lakonia is a sword from Amyklai assigned to this period on typological grounds. The material at least conforms to that of the majority of PG swords.

The bronze artefacts from the PG stratum at Amyklai are perhaps marginally more informative. There were two small spearheads, but their material and size suggest they never saw the front line. Certainly too they are remarkably primitive in technique, and Snodgrass's date of c.800 (1971, 245 and fig. 88) may be appreciably too low. There were also several ringlets of rolled sheet bronze, some with a midrib, others decorated with repoussé dots. A few at least may have been used to hold locks of hair dedicated on the occasion of a perilous undertaking such as a long journey, war or a *rite de passage*. The magical significance of hair is well attested in ancient as in modern Greece (and elsewhere), and the Spartans' interest in capillary matters was notorious. Finally, some strips of sheet bronze have been interpreted as the legs of simple tripod-cauldrons which, as we know from Homer and archaeology, served as a symbol and store of wealth and were regarded as particularly acceptable dedications to Zeus and his son Apollo.

The impression of isolation and relative cultural deprivation conveyed by the pottery is thus amply corroborated by the metal-work. Referring to the spearheads, Snodgrass (1971, 246) has remarked that 'the bronzes would have looked very old-fashioned even at the earliest possible date suggested by their associations; and this...suggests such a period of restricted and somewhat primitive metallurgy, with partial dependence on Bronze Age heirlooms, as we have inferred elsewhere.' It is, I think, not irrelevant that the areas with comparably backward metallurgy include Achaia and Kephallenia, both within the ambit of the 'West Greek' PG pottery group.

We may sum up the historical implications of the archaeological evidence as follows. First, the Amyklai 'stratigraphy' and the stylistic analysis of Lakonian PG pottery demonstrate a sharp cultural break between Mycenaean and PG Lakonia and strongly suggest an influx of newcomers, immediately from 'West Greece', some time in the tenth century. On the other hand, if taken at face value the pottery evidence would also indicate that, following the apogee of prosperity in the thirteenth century and the exponential decline of population in the twelfth and early eleventh, Lakonia was actually uninhabited between c.1050 and 950. For reasons to be given below I do not believe that the pottery should be so taken in this regard. Undoubtedly, though, the small number of sites known to have been occupied in PG times

(nine) and the backward character of the pottery and metal-work do suggest that the label 'Dark Age', which has been vindicated by Snodgrass (1971) for Greece as a whole at least between c.1100 and 850, is nowhere more appropriate than in Lakonia.

Too much retrospective doomwatching, however, would not be appropriate. For the years from c.950 to 775 were also, as we can say with hindsight, the formative period of historical Lakonia and specifically of Dorian Sparta. We are bound therefore to make what we can of the literary evidence and attempt to spin some 'gossamer...out of legend and the weakest of tradition' (Starr 1968, 19), using the archaeological evidence as a kind of quality control on the flimsy product. The following summary account is necessarily provisional and highly speculative, but it may claim to have used all the available evidence. In accordance with the aim of the book as a whole I shall be less concerned with internal political developments in Sparta itself than with the relationship between Sparta and the rest of Lakonia.

The three Dorian tribes of the Hylleis, Dymanes and Pamphyloi, whose existence in Sparta is directly attested for the first and only time by Tyrtaios (fr. 19.8), almost certainly joined forces before the long march south. Their most likely point of immediate origin is the Illyrian-Epirote region of north-west Greece, which had been for the most part untouched by Mycenaean civilization; some have seen an etymological link between the names Hylleis and Illyria. But the Dorians may have been impelled and even joined by peoples from still further north. (One thinks of the hand-made pottery mentioned in Chapter 6.) The etymology of 'Dorians' is unclear, but their alleged connection with Doris in central Greece was probably invented or at least enhanced by later propaganda from as early as the seventh century (Tyrtaios fr. 2.14).

The route or routes the Dorians took are not certainly ascertainable, but the suggestion that those who became Spartans or Lakonians followed a westerly course may, I believe, be supported by reference to the ceramic evidence discussed earlier. If this suggestion is correct, they will have proceeded southwards through Aitolia, crossed the Corinthian Gulf from Antirhion to Rhion (a crossing supposedly commemorated by the carrying of model rafts at the annual Karneia festival in Sparta: Huxley 1962, 99 n. 34), then continued down the western Peloponnese to the Alpheios valley, across to the headwaters of the Eurotas and finally along the Eurotas furrow to Sparta.

The very choice of this low hill site may be thought to corroborate the inference of a dramatic change in political and economic conditions, if not of population, in Lakonia. For under the Mycenaean régime the site of classical Sparta had not been important, if indeed it had been permanently settled; and the central place of Lakonia had been situated on and around the Menelaion hill to the south-east on the other, left, bank of the Eurotas. The considerations governing the Dorians' choice will have included at least the

following factors, apart from the absence of an existing settlement: first and foremost the availability of adequate arable and pasturage; then a constant supply of fresh water; third, good communications north and south; fourth, distance from potentially hostile mountain-dwellers; and finally the settlement a few kilometres south at Amyklai, to whose political relationship with Sparta I shall return in the next chapter.

The date of the Dorian settlement of Sparta is an open question, but archaeology, that is pottery, indicates a *terminus post quem* of c.950. This flatly contradicts the central article of the much later ‘tradition’ embodied in the ‘Return of the Herakleidai’ myth and the Spartan king-lists, namely that Dorians occupied Lakonia under Heraklid leadership a couple of generations after the Fall of Troy or, in our terms, within the twelfth century. ‘Tradition’ should in this case be rejected, but it is harder to say how far excision and oblivion should be carried. Indeed, it is almost impossible to conjure up any sort of picture of what was happening in Sparta and Lakonia between the Dorian settlement and what I take to be the next certifiable event in Spartan history, the conquest or rather assimilation of Amyklai in the first half of the eighth century.

Certainly there can be no question of describing personalities, even though the literary sources generally put the wondrous reformer Lykourgos somewhere in the ninth century in our terms (Kiechle 1963, 183). But our ignorance of fundamentals is more difficult to have to admit. For instance, we do not know the size and nature of the original settlement or the number of settlers; the 2,000 suggested by Isokrates (12.255) in the fourth century is merely a guess (cf. Chapter 14). We do not know the extent of surrounding land utilized directly or indirectly by the Spartans nor, despite the ingenuity of those scholars who have tried to salvage something from the mess left by the ‘Spartan mirage’, on what conditions it was originally distributed and held. Nor do we know whether the settlers were predominantly agriculturists or pastoralists. And so the basic problems continue. Not that our ignorance is greatly diminished for the period after 775, but here it is well-nigh total. However, despite the correct warning that, in regard to early Spartan history, ‘we are, I fear, sometimes in danger of becoming Hellenistic rumor-mongering historians’ (Starr 1965, 258), I shall tentatively offer some suggestions on the process of the Dorian settlement and on the origins and status of the Helots and Perioikoi.

At the risk of being dismissed as a reactionary traditionalist by Hooker, I suggest that the old picture of the Dorians as Vlach-type transhumance pastoralists (e.g. Myres 1943, 41) still has something to commend it. At any rate in Byzantine times the Koutsovlachs from the eleventh century regularly travelled from the Pindus to Cape Matapan (ancient Tainaron); and the Dorians’ suggested place of origin, north-west Greece, together with the apparent gap in time between the Dorian settlement of Argos (eleventh century) and Sparta, may be indications of a primarily pastoral orientation.

Possibly relevant is the name *bouai* meaning 'herds' given by the Spartans to the age-classes into which the youth was divided for educational purposes. If a more recent parallel be sought, the case of the Bahima or Bahuma in Uganda comes to mind: these invading pastoralists enslaved the resident agricultural population (Oberg 1940).

If this suggestion is cogent, then the political vacuum ensuing after the Mycenaean débâcle would certainly have provided a perfect opportunity for such an infiltration of pastoralists into the Peloponnese. What was it, then, that chiefly encouraged the Dorians to settle permanently in Lakonia? The answer, I suggest, is 'the cultivation of useful trees—a culture long in maturing, which requires great care both against the crafty hands of men and the voracious teeth of animals' (Febvre 1925, 294). In particular, it was perhaps the cultivation of the useful olive which played the decisive role. There is no direct evidence from Lakonia to support this suggestion, but it is at least not contradicted by pollen evidence from the Osmanaga lagoon near Pylos (Wright 1968, 123–7; but see Bintliff 1977, 70) nor by the olive-press of c.700 found above the ruins of the Mycenaean palace nearby (Coldstream 1977, 162). It is therefore worth digressing briefly to consider the merits of the olive and the history of its cultivation in Greek lands, especially as the olive without doubt occupied an important position in Spartan life subsequently (Chapter 10).

Seeds of the less productive wild olive (oleaster) have been found in the Mesolithic levels of the Franchthi cave (cf. Chapter 4), but it was not apparently firmly established in its domesticated form before the Early Bronze Age. Indeed, production may not have become significant, at least in the Peloponnese, until Mycenaean times, when the role of olive oil as lighting fuel may be inferred from lamps found, for example, in the Vapheio tholos. However, between c.1100 and 700, according to the palynological evidence just mentioned, the olive became not merely important but actually the single most important agricultural product in western Messenia, taking the place held previously by cereals. The radiocarbon date should perhaps be calibrated and so raised somewhat, but the evidence is still, I feel, highly suggestive of changed agricultural conditions in the Dark Age. However that may be, the calcareous soils and climatic conditions of south-eastern Greece in particular are ideally suited to olive-production. Today some 95 per cent of all olives are crushed for oil. The percentage will have been even higher in antiquity, when olive oil provided not only food but light and unguent. Besides, olive wood is a suitable material for building and fuel, and cereals can be grown in among olive trees (*cultura promiscua*) to maximize the use of Greece's restricted arable soil.

My second set of tentative suggestions concerns the human aspect of the economic basis of Sparta's future power, the Helots. Archaeologically, as we saw, it is not possible to demonstrate that Lakonia was inhabited between c.1050 and 950. There are, however, several reasons why I am unwilling to

reject out of hand the literary evidence for continuity of settlement between the ‘Achaean’ and ‘Dorian’ periods. First, Hyakinthos, whatever his ethnic affiliation, was probably worshipped continuously from the Bronze Age at Amyklai. In the archaeological intermission of a century or so his cult must have been perpetuated with perishable offerings or in media we have not yet found or recognized. Second, the evidence of dialect (Solmsen 1907) and religion (Kiechie 1963, 95–115) in historical Lakonia indicates a thorough interpenetration of Dorian and non-Dorian elements. For example, a bronze fish found near Amyklai was dedicated in the sixth century to Pohoidan (Jeffery 1961, 200, no. 34). This Lakonian form of the Earthshaker Poseidon’s name is clearly related to Arkadian Posoidan and so to the language of the Linear B tablets, whereas the normal Doric form is Poteidan. Other cults of Pohoidan are attested epigraphically, from the sixth century (restored) at Akovitika in south-east Messenia, from the fifth at Tainaron (a recognized asylum for Helots) and Helos. These last two are especially suggestive. For my chief reason for believing in the survival of a remnant of the Mycenaean population is that this seems to explain most plausibly the origin of the Lakonian Helots.

The ancients were no less fascinated by this problem than the moderns, and the variety and mutual incompatibility of their views are displayed in Appendix 4. As usual, however, it is the modern tools of geoarchaeology and philology which have made the decisive contributions to our still incomplete understanding. In the time of Thucydides (1.101.2) most of Sparta’s Helots were descendants of the Messenians enslaved in the eighth and seventh centuries; indeed, the terms ‘Helots’ and ‘Messenians’ were by the late fifth century more or less interchangeable. Consideration of the geomorphology of Lakonia, as recently explicated by Bintliff (1977), confirms that the numerical balance will always have been tipped in favour of the Messenians. There just was not enough arable land in the lower Eurotas furrow in our period to accommodate as many Helots in Lakonia as could the Pamisos valley in Messenia. Presumably, though, it was in the Helos plain, as this stood in antiquity, that most of the Lakonian Helots were always concentrated. The Heleia was the most fertile region of Lakonia (Polyb. 5.19.7), and a recurrent ancient aetiology derived the name ‘Helots’ from a place called Helos.

In reality, however, the name was almost certainly derived from a root meaning ‘capture’, and this is a powerful hint that the status of the Lakonian Helots, like that of the Messenians and indeed of the other serf-like populations of the classical Greek world, was acquired through conquest. At all events, there is nothing in the ancient literary sources to suggest that the status of the Lakonian Helots differed from that of the Messenians, whose origins are not in this respect controversial. The transformation of the inhabitants of the lower Eurotas furrow into Helots occurred, I believe, not only long before the full development of chattel slavery (the characteristic form of forced labour in Greece down to the later Roman Empire) but early

enough for them, unlike their Messenian fellows, to have forgotten their 'nationality' by (at latest) the fifth century. In other words, I am prepared to suggest that the relatively few Lakonian Helots acquired their status soon after the Dorian settlement of Sparta, perhaps as early as the tenth century. Again, the Bahima analogy may be worth recalling or, closer to home, the fate of the Thessalian Penestai. Thus the 'narrative' of Pausanias' third book may be nowhere more seriously misleading than in its suggestion that Sparta did not secure its Lakonian Helots until the eve of the invasion of Messenia c.735 (cf. Chapter 8). On the other hand, for the reasons given in Chapter 5, I would not wish to adduce as 'proof' of my dating the 'traditions' ascribing the conquest of the Lakonian Helots to either Agis I or Soos (who was in fact fictitious: Appendix 3).

We shall return to the status and functions of the Helots, Messenian as well as Lakonian, in later chapters. To conclude the present chapter on the formative period of Lakonia, some suggestions will be made concerning the 'third force' in Lakonian political and economic development, the Perioikoi. Whereas the ancients agreed that the institution of Helotage was a once-for-all affair (though they disagreed over the modalities), they offered no such unitarian solutions to the problem of the origin of the Perioikoi. Indeed, with rare and axe-grinding exceptions, they can hardly be said even to have addressed themselves to it systematically. We are therefore mostly reduced yet again to speculation, constrained only by our suggested view of the origin of the Lakonian Helots and by the archaeological evidence.

Of one thing, however, we may be sure: the Perioikoi of the classical period had not all arrived at their shared half-way political status (Chapter 10) by the same route. Of the supposedly 100 Perioikic communities in Lakonia and Messenia (Androton 324F49, with Jacoby's commentary) at least two were the outcome of Sparta's resettlement of refugee populations. The earlier of these, Asine (modern Koroni), suggests that already by the end of the eighth century Spartan writ ran as far as the southern tip of Messenia. But what was the situation in Lakonia prior to Spartan intervention in Messenia, which was said to have occurred first in the reign of Teleklos (perhaps 760–740)? Given that the Lakonian Perioikoi of the classical period were indistinguishable ethnically, linguistically and culturally from the Spartans, there are three main ways whereby a Perioikic community could have been created. First, a formerly independent pre-Dorian or Dorian community could have been conquered or otherwise politically subjected by Sparta or even perhaps have submitted to Spartan suzerainty voluntarily. Second, a settlement could have been established *ex nihilo* by Sparta with Perioikic or perhaps rather proto-Perioikic status. Third, a pre-Dorian community could have received an influx of Dorian settlers, the latter perhaps constituting themselves a ruling stratum.

Each of these three possibilities has received vigorous support in the modern scholarly literature, and parallels of varying degrees of plausibility

from both Greek and Roman history have been produced. In the present state of our evidence, however, it is illegitimate to come down heavily in favour of any one of them. For example, if we were to take the archaeological record of total depopulation at face value, we might argue that all the Perioikic communities in Lakonia were new foundations sponsored or adopted by Sparta on the lines of the Roman colonization of Italy. However, as already suggested, the archaeological evidence should not be so taken. On the other hand, the apparently circumstantial accounts of the fate of such ‘Achaean’ communities as Helos cannot in my view form the basis of a historical reconstruction either. On balance therefore I would tentatively accept the third of the possible solutions outlined above, but I would lay less emphasis on such speculation than on the distribution of PG pottery in Lakonia outside Sparta and Amyklai.

The number of sites involved is admittedly very small, but their geographical range may none the less be significant. For it suggests, what we might have suspected on other grounds, that ‘Lakedaimon’ or ‘Lakonike’ did not yet encompass the east Parnon foreland by c.775. True, a ‘PG necropolis’ was reported in the 1920s from Astros in the Thyreatis (Wrede 1927), but this report has never been corroborated by published finds, and the pottery is anyway more likely to have been in the Argive than in the Lakonian style. Moreover, despite the migration of a few Lakonian PG pieces to Tegea and possibly one to the Argive Heraion, I cannot accept the ‘tradition’ that Sparta was in contention for the Thyreatis as early as the reign of Labotas (c.850?: Paus. 3.2.3). As Kelly (1976) has forcefully, perhaps even too forcefully, argued, much of early Argive history was distorted retrospectively by the idea that the mainspring of the foreign policy of Dorian Argos was from the start rivalry with Dorian Sparta for leadership of the Peloponnese. Whether Spartan influence or control had been extended as far south as the Mani by 775 cannot be tested archaeologically, but the inclusion in the ‘Catalogue of Ships’ (Appendix 3) of Oitylos and Messe (if it is to be located at modern Mezapos) may indicate at least a Spartan claim to control them during the Dark Age.

What we are left with, then, is the core of historical Lakedaimon between the Taygetos and Parnon ranges, together with one site in the west Taygetos foreland whose marginal situation was pregnant with future developments. Anthochorion, just south of the Spartan plain and somewhat off the beaten track from Sparta to Gytheion (Chapter 10) has not been securely identified with an ancient site. Stena, however, is near Gytheion, which, thanks to its role as Sparta’s port, became the single most important Perioikic community at latest by the sixth century. (Toynbee 1969, 192f., has not convinced me that Gytheion was a Spartan town between c.750 and 195.) Apidia is generally, and probably rightly, identified with Palaia (Paus. 3.22.6) or Pleiai (Livy 35.27.3), but its political status, presumably Perioikic at least by the seventh century, is not known for certain. In the Malea peninsula the PG (or

LG?) pottery reported from the Hyperteleton (Skeat 1934, 34 n.4) is of uncertain style; I failed to locate the sherds in the Sparta Museum. In Roman times, following the liberation of the Perioikoi from Sparta in 195, the sanctuary became the centre of the Eleutherolakonian League (Chapter 15); under the Spartan domination there may have been a Perioikic community called Leukai here. Daimonia further south is Perioikic Kotyrta, presumably linked to the Eurotas valley chiefly by sea at this time. Finally, the Volimnos site is that of the sanctuary of Artemis Limnatis on the ancient border with Messenia. The alleged assassination of king Teleklos here *c.*740 provided the Spartans with a *casus belli* for their invasion of Messenia.

In conclusion we may, I think, fairly infer from the conquest of Aigys (to which I return at the beginning of the next chapter) that by *c.*775 the northern end of the Eurotas furrow, including the Skiritis and the important Perioikic communities of Sellasia and Pellana, was also under Spartan control. Thus by the second quarter of the eighth century the disunion of LH IIIC and sub-Mycenaean Lakonia had been healed by the military and diplomatic physic of the Spartans. Economically speaking, however, we can do little more than apply to Sparta and the Eurotas valley, *mutatis mutandis*, the words of Braudel (1972, 101): ‘while a plain is coming to life, overcoming its dangerous waters, organizing its roads and canals, one or two hundred years may pass by.’ Clearly, though, by about the middle of the eighth century the stage was set for perhaps the most remarkable century or so in all of Sparta’s long and chequered history.

Notes on further reading

‘Dorian’ probably did not acquire its adulatory or pejorative connotations until after the Persian Wars of the early fifth century, and the reason for this semantic development was a political, not a cultural, dichotomy: Will 1956; Rawson 1969, esp. 57–9, 318–20; Oliva 1971, 9–11. Will and Rawson note how comparatively recent racist ‘theorizing’ has further distorted perspective.

Vitalis 1930 and Kiechle 1966 are notable exceptions to the rule that the ‘tradition’ about the ‘Dorian invasion’ is not evaluated on its own merits. I cannot, however, accept many of their substantive conclusions.

Chadwick’s new hypothesis concerning Dorian origins (1976b) has already made at least two other appearances. It is incorporated in his résumé of the contribution of philology to the reconstruction of early Greek history (1976c); the responses of Schachermeyr, Pittioni and Kirsten, which are printed after Chadwick’s paper, are uniformly unfavourable. I am in general sympathy with Kirsten’s position, especially his picture of the Dorian newcomers as shepherds; cf. Sarkady 1975, esp. 121. Second, the new hypothesis is hinted at in Chadwick’s survey of the Mycenaean world (1976a). Here the historical Helots are explained as ‘presumably the subject class of Mycenaean times, a people of non-Greek origin’ (62: but where then are the Late Bronze Age

Dorians? or were there two ‘subject classes’ in Mycenaean Lakonia?); the Perioikoi are regarded as being ‘very likely the pre-Dorian Greeks of Lakonia, the descendants of the Mycenaean population’ (62: but if, as Chadwick argued in 1976b, there was not room in north-west Greece to accommodate the number of Dorians required to complete the ‘Dorian invasion’ of ‘tradition’, then it seems to me even less likely that there were enough ex-Mycenaean to go round the numerous Perioikic communities of historical Lakonia).

Burkert (1977, 228) has suggested that the form in which Apollo was represented at Amyklai may have been borrowed in the twelfth century from the Syro-Hittites via Cyprus, but that Apollo as such originated in the Peloponnese.

The most recent published study of Lakonian PG pottery is Desborough 1972, 241–3; I added some details in my unpublished doctoral dissertation (1975, 87–99). On the problems of method involved in interpreting pottery evidence see Desborough 1972, ch. 19. Nicklin 1971 is a stimulating review article discussing the sociological approach to the potter’s craft.

For the geological properties of Lakonian iron see *ESAG*, no. 401.

Snodgrass 1971 is probably the finest historical discussion of the Greek Dark Age, although his chronological limits (c.1100–700) are too wide at the lower end. Desborough 1972 ends the Dark Age too soon (c.900). For an intermediate position see Coldstream 1977. Also useful is Bouzek 1969, but this somewhat exaggerates the undoubted connections between Greece and central Europe.

On the ‘Dorian invasion’ see Starr 1961, ch. 4; Bengtson 1977, 50–66; and with special reference to Sparta Oliva 1971, 15–23. Of the older accounts Busolt 1893, 201–62, is perhaps the most valuable.

For the cultivation of the olive see *ESAG*, no. 316. In 1961 the eparchy of Gytheion came ninth in the whole of Greece with 9.58 per cent of its cultivated area being devoted to the fruit, that of Lakodaimon (roughly the Eurotas valley) nineteenth with 6.78 per cent.

On Pohoidan see Solmsen 1907, 332f.; Gschnitzer 1962; the discoveries at Akovitika are published in Themelis 1970. The case for continuity of occupation in southern Lakonia, especially the Mani, has been stated forcefully, if somewhat uncritically, by Kiechle (1963, 95–115). For reasons given in Chapter 8, I cannot accept his picture of Amyklai (49–67) as the bulwark of ‘Achaean’ Lakonia resisting the Dorian intruders.

Modern views on the Helots are cited in the notes to Chapter 10; so too for the Perioikoi.

The Lakonian Renaissance

c.775–650

George Grote, taking his cue from Eratosthenes, sub-divided the ancient Greek past into a 'mythical' and a 'historical' portion. The dividing-line he put at 776, the traditional date established by the Sophist Hippias of Elis (c.400) for the foundation of the Olympic Games, which were a truly panhellenic festival open to all and only Greeks. I should myself put the dividing-line rather later, but recent scholarship has in a sense vindicated Grote by demonstrating that the years around 775 did indeed mark the beginning of a new epoch in Greek history. First, 'after centuries of illiteracy...the country got a script once more: the simple, practical, easily-taught alphabet from which all our western scripts descend' (Jeffery 1976, 25). Second, the movement of western 'colonization' began about this time, with the settlement of Euboian islanders on the island of Pithekoussai (modern Ischia) off the bay of Naples. Third, a great advance in metal-working was made, visible initially in the production of solid bronze figurines but culminating within a couple of generations in the manufacture of sophisticated armour of hammered bronze and such agricultural implements as Hesiod's iron-shod plough. Finally, the Homeric epics, with all their ethical, religious and national significance, were being shaped into their monumental form.

Lakonia in fact did not play a leading role in any of these four developments, despite some unreliable ancient testimony to the contrary. The Lakonian Doric dialect had presumably evolved into its historical form by the eighth century, but the earliest known example of the Lakonian local script is of mid-seventh-century date (below). L.H.Jeffery (1961, 185) suggested that the alphabet was transmitted to Olympia from Sparta, but, if true, this would merely serve to confirm doubts held on other grounds that a contemporary written record of victors was kept at Olympia from 776. Still more dubious is the role of co-founder of the Olympic Games assigned to the Spartan lawgiver Lykourgos by Aristotle (fr. 533 Rose) on the basis of an inscribed discus he had seen at Olympia. Regrettably too the story that Lykourgos was responsible for bringing the Homeric poems from Ionia to the Greek

mainland (Plut. *Lyk.* 4.4) must be dismissed as a fable of the kind which tended to accrete around such legendary figures. However, the establishment of the Menelaion sanctuary c.700 (below) suggests that the Homeric poems had by then reached Sparta, and the language of Tyrtaios is heavily influenced by the epic. As far as metal-work goes, worked iron is conspicuous by its dearth in Lakonia before the seventh century. On the other hand, it was perhaps as early as c.775 that the first bronze animal figurines made by Lakonian craftsmen were being dedicated at Olympia. Finally, Sparta barely participated in the colonization of the west (or indeed elsewhere) for reasons to be explored in the present chapter. It is possible though that the settlement of Lakonians on Thera c.800 or shortly after reflects economic pressures similar to those which stimulated the Euboian pioneers.

From what has been said so far it would be justified to infer that in c.775 Lakonian horizons did not extend beyond Olympia in north-west Peloponnese at the very furthest. On the whole, I think, this fairly reflects the continuing isolation of Lakonia from the wider Greek or even Peloponnesian world down to the middle of the eighth century. There is, however, one piece of evidence suggesting this was not the whole story. For in the joint reign of Archelaos and Charillos the Delphic Oracle is said to have given its blessing to the Spartan conquest and annihilation of Aigys in the north-west angle of Lakonia (Parke and Wormell 1956, I, 93; II, no. 539). Chronologically, this is just possible. The joint reign may be dated c.775–760, and this seems to have been about the time the Oracle began to attract ‘international’ attention on the political plane. Moreover, as with Olympia, the Spartans undoubtedly established an early and continuing ‘special relationship’ with Delphi of a religious-cum-political nature. My chief reason, however, for believing in the authenticity of this oracle is that it was delivered to both the Spartan kings jointly. Indeed, the conquest of Aigys is the first enterprise of the Spartan state recorded to have been undertaken by both kings, a circumstance which has prompted the suggestion (most recently Jeffery 1976, 114) that Archelaos and Charillos were in fact the first joint kings of Sparta.

It is outside the scope of the present book to discuss internal political developments at Sparta in any detail, but a brief comment on the dual kingship may help to bring the political background of the Lakonian renaissance into sharper focus. In the long view the Spartan kingship was remarkable on two main counts: first, it was a collegiate kingship with hereditary succession to the thrones through two distinct royal houses, the supposed descendants of Agis I (Agiads) and Euryp(h)on (Eurypontids); second, it was a by no means titular kingship, which lasted in something like its traditional form (at least as we know it from the sixth century) until the second half of the third century, thereby surviving the general extinction of hereditary monarchy in Greece in the early Archaic period as well as the establishment of extra-constitutional personal rules known as tyrannies. The

fact of kingship in Dark Age Sparta calls for no special comment: the process of the Dorian settlement and subsequent survival of Sparta in an alien and potentially hostile environment will have called for strong, centralized leadership. But the origin of the dual kingship, thanks to its uniqueness (Molossian and still less Iroquois parallels are not really convincing) and the poverty of the evidence, is and will remain a vexed question. From the welter of speculation both ancient and modern I would distinguish only two hypotheses as more than merely plausible, namely that the founders of the royal lines were the eponymous Agis and Euryp(h)on, not (as the 'Return of the Heraklids' myth demanded) Eurysthenes and Prokles or even, as the Spartans uniquely believed, Aristodamos (Hdt. 6.52.1); and that succession was from the start hereditary within each family or clan.

There are, however, good reasons for thinking that the two royal houses did not rule jointly as early as the lifetimes of the eponyms. The Eurypontid Soos is almost certainly a 'spurinum' and is omitted from the most reliable Eurypontid king-list (Appendix 3). No less unreal, to judge from their names and association with Lykourgos, are Prytanis and Eunomos, supposedly the son and grandson respectively of Euryp(h)on himself. Thus, if we strike out these three and the eponym, there is just one Eurypontid predecessor for Charillos compared with four or five for the Agiad Archelaos. The source of the discrepancy should be sought in reality: the fact that the Agiads were reckoned, apparently with Delphic approval (Hdt. 6.52.5), to be the senior of the two royal houses (Hdt. 6.51) suggests that they had been in some sense royal before the Eurypontids, perhaps indeed as early as the second half of the tenth century, when Sparta may have been settled by Dorians (Chapter 7). This at any rate corresponds to a genealogically plausible modern dating of Agis I (930–900).

The questions therefore arise how, when and why the two houses came to rule jointly. I have no new hypothesis to add to those collected by Oliva (1971, 23–8), but I suggest that an explanation in terms of the amalgamation of two communities makes the best historical sense. In the fifth century it was a cause for remark (Thuc. 1.10.2) that the town of Sparta had never been fully 'synoecized'. That is to say, the separate identity of the four villages of Sparta town—Limnai, Kynosoura (or Konooura), Mesoa and Pitana—had never been entirely reduced. Indeed, the fifth village of Sparta, Amyklai, to whose incorporation I shall shortly turn, was physically separated from the other four by several kilometres. Now the two royal houses were based in the original Sparta, the Agiads in Pitana, the smartest village, the Eurypontids in Limnai. At least, this was where they had their respective burial-grounds, burial within the settlement area being permitted in Sparta contrary to normal Greek custom. Thus the joint kingship could have been established when Pitana and Limnai coalesced politically to form the *polis* of Sparta, the former taking with it Mesoa, the latter Kynosoura/Konooura—if topography is any guide (Figure 12). That the amalgamation of these four was completed




Figure 12 The villages of Sparta

before the absorption of Amyklai is strongly suggested by an institutional survival; the important cult of Orthia in Limnai was common only to the original four villages (Paus. 3.16.9), whereas the cult of the patron deity of the state Athena Poliachos was naturally shared (after the absorption of

Amyklai) by all five. The dates at which these cults were established cannot be precisely determined, but one would expect the cult of the state's patron to have come first, an expectation that is not belied by the archaeological evidence, if Droop's relative chronology of Lakonian PG pottery is accepted (Chapter 7). Both at any rate were certainly in existence by the joint reign of Archelaos and Charillos. Thus, to conclude this discussion of the early history of the Spartan monarchy, the suggestion that Archelaos and Charillos were the first joint monarchs is consistent with the literary and archaeological evidence deployed above and so should perhaps be accepted as a working hypothesis.

Let us make it work first to help explain the political status of Classical Amyklai. According to the dominant tendency of the much later literary evidence, conveniently represented by the 'narrative' in Pausanias' third book, 'Achaean' Amyklai and 'Dorian' Sparta were locked for centuries in an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation in the Spartan basin. Their route to the south thus effectively blocked, the Spartans eventually turned their aggressive attention to the north and, as we have seen, under Archelaos and Charillos destroyed Aigys. In the reign of Teleklos, son of Archelaos, Amyklai at last fell to Sparta through treachery and armed attack. The way now lay open to the rest of Lakonia—and even Messenia, on whose borders Teleklos met his end. Pharis and Geronthrai were also taken by Teleklos, Helos by his son Alkamenes despite Argive intervention.

Thus far 'tradition'—geographically not impossible perhaps, but historically worthless, notwithstanding the claims of Pausanias' modern supporters. For, leaving aside the question of Pausanias' sources, it is unlikely that Teleklos would have been dabbling in Messenia before getting Helos (or the Helos region) under his belt. Moreover, as argued in Chapter 7, the conquest of the area of which Helos was the chief place is more likely to have occurred in the tenth or ninth century. Second, the notion of Amyklai blocking Sparta's progress southwards is anachronistic for the eighth or any earlier century. Third, the alleged captures of Pharis (site unknown) and Geronthrai are probably no more than a clumsy attempt to accommodate the data of the Homeric 'Catalogue' (Appendix 2) in a coherent historical picture. Finally, and most seriously, the 'Dorian'/'Achaean' antithesis is greatly overdone. This point has already been made in connection with the Hyakinthia (Chapter 7); we may add here that, so far as the evidence of archaeology goes, there is nothing to justify the idea that Sparta and Amyklai were after *c.*900 culturally distinct. How then should we interpret the 'tradition' of conquest by Teleklos?

An inscription of Roman date (*IG* V.1.27) proves that Amyklai became one of the 'obes' of Sparta, but there is considerable controversy both over the number of the 'obes' and over their relationship to the 'villages' of Thucydides and the 'tribes' referred to in the Archaic document known as the 'Great Rhetra' (Plut. *Lyk.* 6). To cut a very long story short, I follow the line

of argument proposed by Wade-Gery (1958, 37–85), to the effect that there were in all five ‘obes’, namely the four ‘villages’ of Sparta plus Amyklai. The most economical hypothesis to explain the ‘traditional’, archaeological and epigraphical evidence is to suppose that Amyklai, already considerably ‘Dorianized’ and perhaps politically subordinated, was incorporated as the fifth ‘obe’ of the enlarged Sparta by Teleklos c.750. The precise location of the ‘obe’, however, is still unclear. Several pieces of evidence, including the Roman inscription, suggest that it lay at Sklavochori (now, typically, officially renamed Amyklai); but this location tallies neither with the distance of Amyklai from Sparta given by Polybius (5.19.2) nor with the historian’s description of the sanctuary of Apollo as lying on the seaward side of the settlement. One solution might be that Amyklai extended in an arc from the range of hills north and north-west of the sanctuary to the site of modern Amyklai.

We need not of course believe the story of an actual military conquest involving the pitched battle and fifth-columnry characteristic of the fifth and subsequent centuries rather than the eighth. In particular, the leading military role assigned to Timomachos may owe more to mid-fourth-century Theban propaganda than to mid-eighth-century Spartan reality (cf. Toynbee 1913, 251–4). On the other hand, there is no good reason to reject the ‘traditional’ view that the incorporation was far from being a painless and smooth operation. The cult of Apollo/Hyakinthos remained a pre-eminently Amyklaian affair, in contrast to the Spartan cult of Orthia. This may have been part of the price Sparta had to pay to persuade Amyklai, or rather its leading aristocrats, to come over quietly. Above all, the king of Amyklai, if such there was, may not have taken too kindly to losing his throne.

The other main group of dissidents in Amyklai seem to have been the so-called Minyans, whose story is told so picturesquely by Herodotus (4.145ff.) in connection with the settlement of Thera, the island whose massive eruption in c.1500 we noticed in Chapter 4. It is hard to disembed fact from fiction in Herodotus’ account, but the Minyans were presumably survivors of the Bronze Age population of Lakonia, who had taken to the hills (Taygetos) during the Mycenaean ‘time of troubles’ and returned to the plain when the dust had settled. Archaeology may provide a clue to the date of their migration to Thera, led by the suspiciously eponymous Theras; for the earliest evidence of post-Mycenaean habitation on the island belongs around 800. It is therefore tempting to see the settlement as a consequence of increasing political disagreement between Sparta and Amyklai which ended in the latter’s partial loss of its separate identity or formal independence.

There may, however, have been more narrowly economic factors involved too. In the fifth century Thera regarded itself as a colony of Sparta, a claim backed by its Doric dialect and perhaps also by its possession of Ephors (cf. Kiechle 1963, 83–95). The same claim was advanced by the nearby Melos

(Thuc. 5.84.2, 89, 112.2), by Knidos in southern Asia Minor (Hdt. 1.174.2) and by Kythera (Thuc. 7.57.6). Not all of these can have borne the same relationship to the alleged mother-city, and Kythera at least, as we shall see later in this chapter, shows no organic connection with Sparta in the eighth century. But it is at least possible that the settlement of Melos (traditional date 1116) like those of Amyklaion near Gortyn and Amyklai on Cyprus, is to be associated with a ninth- or eighth-century rather than a twelfth-century emigration from Lakonia and so to be regarded as an anticipation of the full-blown colonization movement of the 730s onwards, from which the enlarged Sparta preferred to abstain.

However that may be, the reign of Teleklos (c.760–740) was clearly a time of movement in other respects. In archaeological, specifically ceramic, terms it witnessed the transition from PG to Late Geometric (LG) pottery in Lakonia—or rather the abrupt break between them. For after some two centuries of what looks for the most part like conservative stagnation the native pottery tradition was transformed by a deluge of external influences emanating above all from the Argolis and the Corinthia. Only a few items from the old stock managed to keep their heads above water and that at the cost of varying degrees of metamorphosis. The new synthesis, the local Lakonian LG style, was generally colourless and insipid, enlivened by few sparks of native ingenuity (Figure 11e). But at least it was new, it was in line with changes elsewhere in Greece, and the fabric achieved a far wider distribution than its PG predecessor both inside and outside Lakonia, particularly within Sparta itself (Figure 13).

The causes of change in ceramic style are complex and hard to discover, even where both the literary and the archaeological evidence are rich, but broadly speaking they are social. No artist is an island. His (one assumes that specialist potters and painters were male) thought-patterns, potentialities and techniques alike reflect and reveal the level of development attained by the society of which he is a part. Indeed, we are entitled to assume that the Greek Geometric artist, no matter what his medium, was more firmly affixed to his cultural matrix than his modern counterpart through direct social, economic and psychological ties. Thus a change in style so profound as that from PG to LG pottery in Lakonia (and elsewhere) presupposes equally radical changes in Lakonian society affecting the relationship between Lakonia and the wider world outside. If the stagnation of PG was fostered by geographical isolation, insecurity and a low level of technology, then the re-establishment of communication by land and sea and the rising standard of technique should be at least part of the explanation of the change from PG to LG. Certainly, the Spartan ruling aristocracy, as we have seen, had begun to display an interest in the world beyond their immediate purview during the first half of the eighth century. ‘Governmental’ action, however, is unlikely to have preceded the activities of individuals and small groups who, in transacting their daily business, established peaceful, stable and routine channels of





Figure 13 The distribution of Lakonian Late Geometric pottery

intercourse, at first within Lakonia (witness the distribution of Lakonian PG) and then between Lakonia and other regions of the Peloponnese.

The decisive contacts, artistically speaking, were with the Argolis, another major area of Dorian settlement entering an expansionist phase. On present evidence the medium of Argive influence was not imported pottery, although a few Argive MG pieces did make their way to the Orthia sanctuary. So, if pots were not travelling, people must have been; and I see no difficulty in visualizing Lakonian potters and painters visiting Argive workshops and sanctuaries or, if the Argolis is thought to be too distant, at least Tegea, where Argive pottery was imported for dedication in some quantity. (I cannot support the political explanation of Argive ceramic influence proposed by Coldstream 1977, 156, 163.) From the Argives the Lakonians borrowed the essential LG motifs like the meander (including the characteristically Argive step-meander), the lozenge or diamond, and the zigzag. These and the 'metopal' scheme of composition they applied to the larger, cruder shapes such as the krater (mixing-bowl) and amphora. It was also under Argive inspiration that the Lakonians inaugurated a somewhat clumsy and inchoate figure-style, depicting chiefly horses, the aristocratic hallmark, and rows of dancing men and women.

Corinthian influence was less marked to begin with. For whatever reason, the Corinthians did not follow the Argives in developing a Geometric figure-style, but their LG was exceedingly competent and may well have influenced Lakonian at least by its characteristic system of fine banding. It was, however, the revolution implied by the Early Protocorinthian (EPC) linear and orientalizing styles that was most keenly felt in Lakonia from *c.*720. A few bolder spirits flirted with the new black-figure technique in blatant imitation of Corinthian work, but the majority sensibly decided that the time was not yet ripe for moving into a full-blown black-figure style. Instead, they turned to Corinth for the fine 'half-tone' ornament which they applied to the smaller, thin-walled shapes like the skyphos and lakaina (both drinking-vessels). New shapes like the globular aryballos (scent-bottle) and lekythos (oil-flask) were also borrowed from the same source. Utilizing our understanding of the relationship between, on the one hand, Lakonian LG and, on the other, Argive LG and Corinthian LG and EPC, we may justifiably argue that Lakonian LG began *c.*750 and ended *c.*690. Neither date unfortunately receives independent corroboration from the stratigraphy of the Orthia sanctuary in Sparta, the site which, for the reasons summarized in Appendix 5, provides the basis of our knowledge of all Lakonian archaeology from the mid-eighth century onwards.

Lakonian LG pottery was, as I remarked earlier, far more widely distributed than PG, though this need not of course mean in each case that the site in question had previously been unoccupied. Outside the two main Spartan sanctuaries of Athena and Orthia, it has been excavated in a 'domestic and commercial' area of the village of Pitana, at several sites in

Limnai (including the Heroon sanctuary) and a couple of places in Mesoa. Across the Eurotas, LG pottery dates the inauguration of the important cult of Menelaos and Helen, whose significance will be considered further below. At Amyklai in addition to the continued worship of Apollo/Hyakinthos another new LG cult was established near the modern chapel of Ay. Paraskevi. The recipient deity was probably Alexandra, whom the Amyklaians identified with Trojan Cassandra in Pausanias' day (3.19.6); but her worship may only have been associated with that of the heroized Agamemnon from the sixth century, when such 'Achaean' connections were found politically expedient (Chapter 9). 'Geometric' pottery is reported confidently from Analipsis (perhaps ancient Iasos) on the northern frontier, and from Helleniko (ancient Eua) and Chersonisi in Kynouria, more doubtfully from Geraki (ancient Geronthrai). Since I have not seen these pieces, I cannot say whether they are to be assigned to the Lakonian LG style properly so called; perhaps, like those from Kastri/Palaiopolis on Kythera, they are strictly local products. Outside Lakonia, though, certainly Lakonian LG ware has been excavated at Volimidhia in Messenia, at Tegea and Asea in Arkadia, and at the sanctuary of Poseidon north of the Isthmus of Corinth; the suggested pieces from Nichoria, Mantinea and Delphi, however, are doubtfully Lakonian.

Of all these finds the most directly relevant in the immediate context is the two-handled cup or tankard from Volimidhia. It was found, together with two local Messenian pots and seven Corinthian LG I imports, in the dromos of a Mycenaean chamber-tomb, part of an offering to a bygone hero. This humble tankard is thus proof positive of relations between Sparta and Messenia c.740–730 (Coldstream 1977, 162, 182), although we cannot of course say precisely how or why it made the journey to its place of discovery. It may not, however, have been the first Lakonian pottery to make the trip. In Chapter 7 we noticed the certainly Lakonian PG from the border sanctuary of Artemis Limnatis at Volimnos and the sherds of Lakonian PG type at Kaphirio and perhaps Hellenika (ancient Thouria). These, together with some suggestive stylistic analogies at Nichoria, also in the same general area of south-east Messenia, may indicate that contact between Messenia and Sparta had been firmly established before 750.

This indication receives apparently powerful support from a notice in Strabo (8.4.4, C360) that Teleklos established colonies in south-east Messenia at Poieessa, Echeiai and Tragion (none of these has been identified archaeologically). Indeed, the sober Busolt (1893, 229–32) was prepared to argue that south-east Messenia, or the part of it probably to be identified with the ancient Dentheliatis, was actually under Spartan control in the time of Teleklos before the full-scale invasion of Messenia from the north-east c.735. If so, then the three towns will presumably have been of Perioikic status, and their foundation will have had a direct bearing on the outbreak of Spartan-Messenian hostilities.

The route taken by Teleklos into Messenia is not recorded, but, if Kiechle (1963, 100) is right, he did not take the short cut over Taygetos from Xirokambi to Kardamyli, which would have been hazardous for an army. Instead perhaps he will have marched down the Eurotas valley, across Vardhounia to Gytheion, then along the 246 m.-high Karyoupolis divide to the site of modern Areopolis before continuing up the coast via Oitylos and Kardamyle to Pharai (modern Kalamata). The latter Teleklos may have brought into the Spartan sphere, again as a Perioikic dependency; at any rate, it was later regarded as a Spartan colony. In the end, however, Teleklos appears to have overreached himself and was assassinated by dissident Messenians—or so the Spartans claimed—at the border sanctuary of Artemis Limnatis.

It is now time to consider what may have prompted this first intervention of the Spartans in Messenia in the light of their full-scale invasion a generation or so later. First it must be made abundantly clear how poor is the available literary evidence for this crucial moment in Lakonian history. Apart from a few scraps of the fourth-century Ephorus, we are chiefly dependent on the fourth book of Pausanias, who utilized, directly or indirectly, the prose *Messenika* of Myron of Priene and the verse epic of Rhianos of Bene, both third-century writers, correcting or supplementing them from the poems of Tyrtaios. This is a dispiriting reversal of the proper historical procedure, but then Pausanias was of course no more a historian than the writers upon whom he chiefly drew. There is, however, also a wider problem of evidence. For the Spartan conquest and annexation of Messenia introduced a new and enduring facet of the Spartan ‘mirage’ (Chapter 5), what we might more properly call the ‘Messenian mirage’.

The chief causes of the distortion of early Messenian history were threefold (apart from those applicable to all early Greek history). First, as the Greek expression ‘Messenian War (or Wars)’ implies, the conflict has usually been viewed from the Spartan side of the barricades, like, for example, the struggle between Rome and the Etruscans; and the main—some would say the only—reliable literary source is the Spartan Tyrtaios. Second, as with the ‘Tourkokratia’ from AD 1453, the harshness of the Spartan occupation stimulated among the vanquished Messenians (including those of the Diaspora) a flourishing folklore of resistance, of which the exploits of Aristomenes are but the most conspicuous products. Third, the liberation of Messenia from the Spartan yoke and the (re-)foundation of the *polis* of Messene in 370–369 (Chapter 13) transferred the war from the physical to the verbal plane. Every aspect of the post-Mycenaean past of Messenia became raw material for political propaganda and ‘creative’ historiography in a fiery debate whose strength can be gauged from the embers raked over for us in Pausanias’ travelogue. In short, while our sources give us a variety of unconvincing and mutually inconsistent *aitiai kai diaphorai* (causes of complaint and clashes of interest) before the

outbreak of hostilities, they provide us with no cogent *alethestate prophasis* (truest explanation).

We are forced, therefore, to look elsewhere, and the most fruitful line of approach is undoubtedly to view the Spartan initiative in the context of Greek, and especially Peloponnesian, development as a whole. The sudden increase in direct and indirect external contacts around 750 suggests that at this stage Sparta was in some sense becoming one of the more advanced mainland Greek communities. Some fifteen years later Corinth, another Dorian city and then perhaps the most advanced of all, followed the lead given by the Euboians, though perhaps for different purposes, and despatched settlers to the west (Kerkyra and Sicily). Since this was just about the time, according to a plausible chronology inferred from the Olympic victor-lists, that the Spartans invaded Messenia, there is a case for asking whether these events had anything in common. Despite large differences of geographical situation and political organization, the answer, I believe, is that the common factor was overpopulation—or, to be precise, relative overpopulation. Hypothetically, the causal nexus was roughly as follows. The fertile Eurotas valley had been somehow distributed among the Spartans, but inequality of ownership allied to an increase in population had created an unacceptable level of social discontent and physical hardship. The settlement of more marginal areas of Lakonia and of the fertile (but politically far more sensitive) south-east Messenia had proved ephemeral palliatives. A more drastic solution was required, and the conquest of Messenia or rather the Pamisos valley filled the bill.

Several theoretical objections might be raised to this hypothesis, but they can all be met so long as it is remembered that the overpopulation in Lakonia was relative and that it was in any case a necessary not a sufficient condition of such a giant undertaking. The ancient sources, needless to say, are more interested in personalities than in what we might call social pressures, but an eccentric apophthegm attributed to the Agiad king Polydoros (Plut. *Mor.* 231E) provides a whisper of support for the view that land-hunger was the primary motivation. If we were to treat seriously the story of the quarrel between the Messenian Olympic victor Polychares and the Spartan Euaiphnos (Paus. 4.4.5–5.7), which was the Messenians' reply to the Spartan claim to be avenging the death of Teleklos, we might perhaps infer that a dispute over transhumance rights was a contributory factor. It remains true, however, that the case in favour of the hypothesis outlined above must be argued in terms of probabilities.

Let us first approach the question negatively. If for the sake of argument it is granted that there was critical overpopulation in the Eurotas valley, what other remedies besides the conquest of the Pamisos valley were open to the Spartans? 'Internal colonization', of the kind successfully practised in comparably spacious Attika, Boiotia and the Argolis in this period, had already been tried in Lakonia and found wanting. Moreover, it was ruled out

for the future by political considerations, since the bait of land in exchange for the loss of citizen rights (however ill-defined at this primitive stage) was not so attractive to the poor Spartan as it later proved to be for the poor Roman of the early Republic, for two main reasons: first, the land available was less desirable agriculturally; and, second, the divide between Spartan and Perioikic political status was in decisive respects absolute, unlike that between Latin and Roman status. On the other hand, overseas colonization was not a natural choice for an inland state like Sparta (compare, for example, Thebes), as is amply demonstrated by the circumstances in which Sparta's only true colony, Taras, was later established (below). Third, the importation of essential foodstuffs to offset any shortfall there may have been in domestic production was not a practical proposition in the second half of the eighth century, for both economic and political reasons.

Negatively, therefore, the acquisition of new land was the only feasible solution. There were strong positive arguments in its favour too. The Spartans had already demonstrated skill both in war and in the control of dependent populations. They had proved in Lakonia that they could compel their subjects to yield up a surplus of agricultural production which they were unable or perhaps unwilling (Hesiod apparently attests the regular employment of slaves in Boiotia by 700) to extract by other means. Furthermore, the potential source of new land was one of the most fertile areas of all mainland Greece, Messenia 'good for ploughing, good for growing', as Tyrtaios (fr.5.3) succinctly put it. However, the final and, for me at least, incontrovertible proof of the kind of pressing need created by overpopulation lies in two further considerations. First, between Sparta and Messenia runs the Taygetos massif, a formidable deterrent to communication, let alone conquest and permanent subjugation, even if such strategic advantage as it offers does lie on Sparta's side. Second, the treatment meted out to the unfortunate Messenians was unparalleled in the whole of Greek antiquity, being comparable perhaps only to the treatment of the Irish by England in more recent times. I conclude, therefore, that the so-called First Messenian War (c.735–715) was triggered by relative overpopulation in the Eurotas valley.

Before we look briefly at the course of the war it is necessary to consider the physical setting and post-Mycenaean history of Messenia (Figure 14). The northern boundary is marked by the valley of the River Nedha (Chapter 1), the eastern by Taygetos. The area thus delimited may be sub-divided in the following manner. On the north-west south of the River of Kyparissia there begin the Kyparissia mountains, which extend southwards in the Aigaleon and other ridges, Mount Ithome being the easternmost. Southwards again lies the plateau east of Pylos, which continues to the foot of the Messenian peninsula. East of the Kyparissia mountains is the central valley of Messenia, essentially a northward projection of the Messenian Gulf, whose geomorphology appears not to have been so drastically altered by late Roman and mediaeval




Figure 14 Messenia in the eighth century BC

alluviation as its counterpart in Lakonia. It is this valley which occasioned the eulogies of Tyrtaios and later writers such as Euripides (fr. 1083 N). The valley itself is further sub-divided by the Skala ridge east of Ithome into a lower portion, known in antiquity as Makaria (Blessedness), and an upper, the plain of Stenyklaros. To west of the latter extends the Soulima valley, while the east of the central plain as a whole is blocked by Taygetos.

This region had been among the most populous and important of all Greece during the Mycenaean heyday of the thirteenth century (Chapter 6). By the tenth century, however, the dismal picture we have painted for the region on the other side of Taygetos was mirrored here, although it should be stressed that the participants in the University of Minnesota Messenia Expedition were concentrating on the Late Bronze Age and so may have

missed some Dark Age material. Instead of perhaps over 200 occupied sites there were now only about a dozen, concentrated in the Pylos area and the Pamisos valley. Turning to the 'traditional' literary evidence, we find that Messenia had supposedly been allotted to the returning Heraklid Kresphontes, but that the successor dynasty of the Dark Age was known as the Aipytyds, whose capital lay in the Stenyklaros plain. In other words, Messenia too received an influx of Dorian settlers, but hardly as early as 'tradition' suggested. On the other hand, unlike Lakonia, Messenia can at least boast archaeological continuity from the Bronze Age into the historical period at excavated sites like Nichoria on the north-west shore of the Messenian Gulf. However, there is no archaeological support for the view that the Stenyklaros plain was the centre of a unified and prosperous kingdom; and the alleged activities of Teleklos in south-east Messenia suggest that Dark Age Messenia was considerably more politically heterogeneous even than Lakonia. The extent to which Messenia had been 'Dorianized' before the Spartan takeover is problematic, but the fact that the Messenians laid so much stress on their Dorian ancestry and retained Dorian institutions even after their liberation from Sparta in 370 (Chrimes 1949, 276f.) may indicate that it was not negligible.

The course of the First Messenian War is barely recoverable from our sources. Their few topographical indications suggest that the invasion was launched through the recently annexed and desolate 'bridgehead' of Aigythis and that the Spartans limited the aim of their aggression initially to the capture of the Stenyklaros plain. Neither suggestion, however, receives archaeological support. Moreover, the precise route followed by the Spartan army to Aigythis is controversial. Most scholars prefer to think of it as proceeding up the Eurotas valley to the southern edge of the Megalopolis plain and so skirting the northern extremity of Taygetos. Bölte (1929, 1343f.), however, argued cogently for a shorter, more southerly route actually crossing Taygetos from modern Georgitsi to Neochori and Dyrhachi. According to Tyrtaios (fr. 5.7), the fighting was spread over twenty years, but this figure is suspect as being twice the length of the Trojan War. There is no reason, however, for doubting that the war was a long drawn out affair nor that (not for the last time) the final resistance centred on the low mountain bastion of Ithome. The generalship of the victorious Eurypontid king Theopompos (Tyrtaios fr. 5.1f.) is an unknown quantity, but his employment of Cretan mercenary archers (Paus. 4.8.3, 12; 4.10.1) is perhaps supported by the find of an as yet unpublished bronze helmet of Cretan type. The only other pieces of archaeological evidence which may be directly connected with the war are a warrior's pithos burial of c.725 excavated at Nichoria (Coldstream 1977, 162, 163f.) and two rather earlier inhumations in a possibly Mycenaean chamber-tomb from the same site (Coldstream 1977, 161). Unfortunately, though, we cannot tell which side our heroes had fought on.

For the moment, then, the Spartan snake had triumphed over the Messenian fox. The consequences were dramatic. The Stenyklaros plain and perhaps also the western half of the Makaria were seized by Sparta, and some of the former owners, it seems, were compelled ‘like asses exhausted under great loads to bring their masters full half the fruit their ploughed land produced’ (Tyrtaios fr. 6). Other Messenians were more fortunate and escaped either to other parts of Greece (Arkadia was a natural haven) or perhaps overseas (to Sicily and south Italy). Yet others, outside the Pamisos valley, acquired or had confirmed the then status of Perioikoi. We should not perhaps envisage Sparta as controlling all Messenia as early as 700, but the founding of a New Asine at modern Koroni about the same time (in the circumstances described below) implies that Sparta was at liberty to intervene at least in the foot of the Messenian peninsula. This Asine, together with Mothone (Chapter 9), were illuminatingly described by Professor Wade-Gery in a marginal note to his copy of Pareti 1917 as ‘the Ulster of the Messenian Ireland’.

The conquest made the Spartan state—or rather certain Spartans—the wealthiest in Greece, and we could ask for no clearer indication of the influx of riches to Sparta than the finds from the sanctuary of Orthia. G.Dickins (in *AO* 163) convincingly linked the building of the second, all-stone temple of Orthia to a notice in Herodotus (1.65.1) concerning Spartan military success in the joint reign of Leon and Agasikles (c.575–560), a link reinforced by the revised dating (Boardman 1963, 7) of the second temple to c.570–560. Precisely the same connection can be posited for the construction of the first temple on the site, correctly downdated by Boardman to c.700. For, as Pritchett (1974, I, 100) has aptly remarked, ‘without wars, few of the temples and other sacred buildings of Greece would have been built.’

Like warfare, the construction of a temple was always a public enterprise in Greece, but in the Archaic period it was regarded pre-eminently as an opportunity for the rich to display their wealth in a gesture of apparent piety towards the gods and goodwill towards the community as a whole. The early temples, in fact, were among the first known examples of that system of liturgies or ‘giving for a return’ which was to be politically institutionalized in the Athenian democracy and later throughout the Roman Empire. They also had important side-effects. The existence of a permanent roofed structure was an inducement to dedicate objects in precious perishable materials. The desire to make such dedications created a demand for skilled labour which could not always be satisfied by local resources. The introduction of foreign artisans to carry out specific commissions provided a tremendous stimulus in ideas and expertise to the native tradition. This, I suggest, explains how in the last quarter of the eighth century Lakonia was for the first time brought within the orbit of trade in luxury goods and raw materials and introduced to the most progressive (‘orientalizing’) artistic currents of the day.

In other words, it is the conquest of Messenia, or at least the upper Pamisos valley, which accounts for the presence at the Orthia sanctuary from *c.*700 of expensive and exotic ex-votos in imported materials like gold, silver, ivory, glass, faience and amber, as well as a variety of bronze manufactures from within and outside the Greek world. The certain or probable provenances of the bronzes alone include Macedonia, central Greece, the Aegean islands, East Greece, Phrygia, the Near East and Cyprus, together with other regions of the Peloponnese. Of the local schools of craftsmen thus stimulated we might single out the workers in ivory and bronze for the quantity and quality of their production. For example, bronze horse figurines of Lakonian style datable *c.*750 to 700 have been found not only in Messenia (at Akovitika) but in Attika, Boiotia, Achaia, Phokis, Arkadia and perhaps even Egypt. Indeed, by 750 the makers of such figurines were established in workshops in the Altis at Olympia, a sign of fairly advanced organization of the craft; their products were no doubt dedicated principally by the outstandingly successful Spartan aristocratic competitors in the Games. Taken as a whole, the finds from Orthia will stand comparison with the contemporary votive assemblages to Hera at Corinthian Perachora and the Argive Heraion. The sanctuaries of Athena on the Spartan akropolis and Apollo/Hyakinthos at Amyklai are admittedly less well appointed, but this may be simply because there was no protective layer of sand at these sites to seal in the earliest finds. For the bronze cauldron-attachments found here do suggest wealth comparable to that displayed at the Orthia sanctuary.

Moreover, about the same time as the building of the first temple of Orthia the Spartans established a new sanctuary with interesting implications. This was the Menelaion, dedicated to Menelaos and Helen on the site of the most important Late Bronze Age settlement in Lakonia. The sanctuary had been excavated on and off since the 1830s and long since identified from the fairly abundant literary sources. But it was not until 1975 that incontrovertible proof of the identification was discovered in the shape of bronze artefacts inscribed with dedications to Helen (Catling and Cavanagh 1976). The earlier of the two, a pointed aryballos of *c.*650, provides the earliest evidence of Lakonian alphabetic writing.

Helen is arguably a faded version of the 'Great Mother' or, less grandly, a tree-goddess; her brothers, the Dioskouroi, who were supposed to live underground at Therapne (Alkman fr. 7) and generally played a major role in Lakonian cult and politics, may have been house-spirits before they became heroes. But Menelaos' only previous existence had been in the world of Homer (Appendix 2). On one level, therefore, the establishment of a sanctuary of the Homeric king of Lakedaimon, brother of Agamemnon and alleged occupant of a fine palace, was a matter of political convenience for Dorians seeking to bolster their claim to rule the south-east Peloponnese by right. On another level, though, this was simply a variation on a theme being

played in widely separated parts of the Greek world at this time, the veneration of the heroes of the past.

There is, however, no other archaeologically attested Lakonian site of the late eighth century which remotely rivals the Menelaion in its apparent display of wealth and prosperity. This dearth of evidence is especially disappointing in the case of Periokic communities like Pellana, Geronthrai, Boiai and Prasiai, whose early importance is strongly suggested by literary evidence. Pellana disputed with little Pephnos in north-west Mani the privilege of being the birthplace of the Dioskouroi (Chapter 10). Geronthrai, as we have seen, was reportedly conquered and resettled by Teleklos. Boiai was said to have been ‘synoecized’ by the Heraklid Boios at an unspecified, but presumably early date (Moggi 1976, no. 5). Finally, Prasiai was an independent member of the Kalaureian Amphiktyony (Strabo 8.6.14, C374), a primarily religious association for the worship of Poseidon centred on what is now the tourist island of Poros, before Sparta assumed Prasiai’s responsibilities. Unfortunately, though, the date of the origins of the Amphiktyony is uncertain. Some would put it as early as the ninth century (Coldstream 1977, 54 n. 65), others as late as the seventh (Kelly 1966). The earliest archaeological evidence from Prasiai belongs perhaps to the second half of the seventh century. Apart from these, in some ways the most disappointing archaeological gap of all is the lacuna in our evidence for Gytheion between the PG period and the sixth century. For it must have been through this port that most of the expensive raw materials and finished manufactures referred to above (and perhaps some foreign craftsmen too) made their way to the Spartan basin.

Again, though, as in the third and second millennia (Chapter 4), Kythera served as a window on the wider Aegean world and indeed on that disturbed Near East which indirectly stimulated what is referred to in art-historical terms as the ‘orientalizing’ period of Greek history. By the fifth century Sparta sent out officials called ‘Kytherodikai’ or harmosts to supervise Kytheran affairs (Chapter 12), and the islanders were regarded as colonists of Sparta; indeed, a remark attributed to the sage Chilon (discussed in Chapter 11) suggests that the island had already become of some strategic concern to Sparta by the mid-sixth century. But between c.1200 and c.550 the history of Kythera is opaque; archaeologically, there is nothing known between the thirteenth and the early eighth centuries. However, Homer (*Iliad* 10.268) does mention Skandeia, the port of Kythera town, which is almost certainly to be identified with the Kastri/Palaiopolis area on the east coast. Kythera town itself, according to Pausanias (3.23.1), lay ten stades inland and has accordingly been identified with the area centring on the hill of Palaiokastro.

In the present context, however, undoubtedly the most intriguing piece of literary evidence is the passing mention by Herodotus (1.105.3) that the temple of Aphrodite at Kythera town had been founded by Phoenicians. Should this report be believed? First, let us consider the role of the

Phoenicians. After briefly summarizing the archaeological evidence for the resumption of contact between Greece and the Near East after the Mycenaean period Boardman (1973, 36) comments: 'It is none too easy to fit the Phoenicians into this picture of relations in the Aegean in the Early Iron Age—or at least to fit in the reputation which the Phoenicians had acquired as mariners and traders.' None the less, he accepts cautiously that 'they may have been the carriers of what little did travel into the Greek world from the east before the eighth century.' None of that little has yet turned up in Lakonia, but a comprehensive survey of the archaeological and literary evidence bearing on the Phoenicians (Muhly 1970) indicates that, if they were ever active on Kythera, this should have been between the eleventh and eighth centuries rather than before or after.

In the light of these conclusions the very absence of direct corroborative evidence from Kythera is perhaps significant. Greek Aphrodite could of course have supplanted the Phoenician Astarte (Biblical Ashtoreth), but nothing is known of the cult before some wholly Greek dedications of the sixth century and the *disiecta membra* of a Doric temple of c.500 (the site of the temple itself is not yet agreed). The harbour called Phoinikous (probably modern Avlemonas bay) mentioned by Xenophon (*Hell.* 4.8.7) need have nothing to do with Phoenicians. No Phoenician inscriptions have been found anywhere on the island. In fact, the only sign of life in eighth-century Kythera is provided by a provincial Geometric pottery, unrelated to Lakonian LG, and a couple of Argive imports. The latter (*pace* Coldstream 1977, 84) can hardly be used to support the view (highly improbable on other grounds as we have seen) that Kythera was controlled by Argos at this time. In short, the report of Herodotus is something of a puzzle. The only suggestion I can bring in its support is that it was Phoenicians who introduced or reintroduced the purple-dye industry to the island (discussed further in Chapter 10).

The rest of this chapter will consider Sparta's external relations and cultural development between c.715 and 650. So far the picture I have painted of the consequences for the Spartans of their victory in Messenia has been fairly rosy. In reality, it was rosy only for some, as the circumstances of the foundation of Taras will adequately reveal. The traditional date of settlement, 706, is not contradicted by the earliest archaeological finds (below). The rest of the ancient evidence, however, is almost entirely worthless, and my tentative reconstruction of the process departs from it in several particulars.

A war of long duration is almost bound to exacerbate, if not create, internal social tensions, and the origins of the colony certainly lie in social discontent, whose focus may have been a group enigmatically known as the Partheniai. We shall never know exactly who they were, but the common opinion of the ancient sources, that they were in some sense impure in birth, deserves respect. The shake-up of the eighth century could well have led to a

questioning of fundamental values: why should a family-tree—and pre-eminently descent from Herakles—give a man the right to cheat, oppress, dominate and impoverish his fellows? It is no accident that the Partheniai were contemporaries of Hesiod. For them too land was a part, perhaps the major part, of their grievance. It was, however, probably only one aspect, if a crucial one, of a broader political discontent, ‘political’ precisely in the sense that the birth of a concept of citizenship and the full development of the *polis* were phenomena of the decades around 700. This was why, as Aristotle (*Pol.* 1306b 29–31) correctly saw, the Partheniai represented potential revolution. But there may have been a further contributory grievance, Amyklaian ‘nationalism’: for the settlers took with them to Taras the cult of Apollo Hyakinthios.

Plato (*Laws* 735f.) observed with hindsight that one solution to such social discontent is to export the discontented, and traditionally this is what occurred in the case of the Partheniai. My own view, however, is that Taras was not originally sanctioned by the Spartan state, but was a foundation as it were ‘from below’ effected by a few enterprising families, whose success was only later given the official seal of approval. The contradictory evidence concerning the supposed ‘oikist’ (leader of the colony) Phalanthos may be thought to support this interpretation. So too may the Delphic Oracle which advised settlement, not at Taras, but at Satyrion twelve kilometres further south-east in the heel of Italy (Parke and Wormell 1956, I, 71–3; II, no. 46). At any rate LG pottery has been found here, as it has at Scoglio (or Punto) del Tonno on the other side of the lagoon entrance from Taras, and these sites may represent temporary stopping-places before the occupation of Taras itself (Figure 15). The latter, however, was the real prize. The best harbour in Italy (the modern Mar Piccolo), protection by the sea on three sides and good communications inland—these are only some of its advantages. The only trouble was that the native Iapygians were already occupying it. With some difficulty, however, they were dislodged, and perhaps before 700, to judge from the find of Lakonian LG pottery on the site of the akropolis of the ancient city (Lo Porto 1971, 356–8). The relations of Taras with Sparta, though not with the Iapygians, were exceptionally close thereafter: the archaeological, epigraphical and literary evidence is at one on this.

The conquest of Messenia was presumably the main reason why Taras remained Sparta’s only colony, but it would be wrong to follow the sensationalist bent of our sources and so isolate Taras from the general wave of agrarian colonization of south Italy and Sicily initiated a quarter of a century or so earlier. Messenia after all was still unfinished business in 706. Indeed, if we can trust Pausanias and others, the Spartans’ search for new land—and perhaps now also for wider political influence—in the Peloponnese was still on, and the next target was the Thyreatis or Kynouria. To repeat, I do not believe in the pretended Argive control of the eastern seaboard of Lakonia and of Kythera at any time. Nor can I accept that Sparta and Argos





Figure 15 The colonization of Taras c.706

had come to blows before the First Messenian War. It does, however, seem feasible that after its initial successes in Messenia Sparta, already presumably in control of Skiritis, following the conquest of Aigytis, should have attempted to seal off its frontier in the north-east against a power whose might in the second half of the eighth century is amply attested in both the literary and the archaeological record. Moreover, the Partheniai were perhaps not alone in their disappointment at the unfair distribution of land in Lakonia and most recently Messenia.

The Thyreatis, because of its relative fertility (especially in olives) and more especially its strategic location, was the appointed scene of physical conflict between the rival Dorian states. However, the earliest more or less reliably attested clash between them occurred when the Argives conquered and destroyed Asine in the last decade of the eighth century (Coldstream 1977, 154 and n. 57; but see Styrenius 1975, 183), and Sparta resettled the refugees in a new Asine in southern Messenia (Paus. 4.14.3). Whether or not this action was regarded as provocative by the Argives, it was also in the reign of Theopompos (c.720–675) that the first battle for the Thyreatis that I would accept as historical (Paus. 3.7.5) took place.

Pausanias (2.24.7) is also the only source to mention the subsequent battle of Hysiai (dated 669), but a fragment of Tyrtaios (*P. Oxy.* 3316)* confirms Sparta's military preoccupation with Argos in the mid-seventh century. I therefore accept the battle as historical and as having important implications and consequences. For a start the site of the battle—near modern Achladokambos and north of the Thyreatis—clearly shows that Sparta was the aggressor. Second, that the defeat was severe may be inferred both from the institution of the Gymnopaïdiai, traditionally in 668, to commemorate it (Wade-Gery 1949) and from Sparta's avoidance of another military show-down with Argos for more than a century. The reasons for the defeat can only be surmised, but part of the explanation may be that Sparta had been slower than Argos to adapt to the new hoplite mode of infantry warfare (Cartledge 1977, 25).

However that may be, Argive power in the second quarter of the seventh century seems to have been at a peak, perhaps under the aegis of its revolutionary king Pheidon (Tomlinson 1972, ch. 6). Sparta's fortunes were in a correspondingly low trough. The demand for the redistribution of land attested by Tyrtaios (as reported by Aristotle) and the murder of king Polydoros, who was credited with attempting to satisfy the demand, are political expressions of grave social conflicts which fit most naturally into this post-defeat context. The effect on Messenian morale can be easily imagined; and it was this combination of circumstances, according to a plausible modern theory, which stimulated the Messenians to revolt. The

* I am greatly indebted to the Finance and General Purposes Committee of the Egypt Exploration Society for permission to refer to this papyrus in advance of publication.

silence of the ancient sources is far from being a fatal objection to this theory; for with few exceptions they are primarily interested in the web of myth and fantasy that surrounded the supposed leader of the revolt, the Messenian folk-hero Aristomenes. Thus the evidence for the revolt or Second Messenian War is if anything worse than that for the First War, despite our one anchor, Tyrtaios, a participant.

The *floruit* of Tyrtaios, the second or third quarter of the seventh century, makes it almost certain that the Second War began appreciably later than Pausanias' source believed (685); this accords with the 'tradition' (Paus. 4.15.3) that the revolt occurred in the reign of Anaxandros, who ruled in the sixth generation before Xerxes' invasion. But there Tyrtaios' direct utility more or less ends, apart from the certain inference from his battle-exhortations that the fighting was between hoplites (a warrior-grave of the seventh century from Pyla in western Messenia may be that of a Spartan) and his mention and perhaps description of a battle at or near a trench (fr. 9; cf. Paus. 4.17.2–9), which may have marked a turning-point in the struggle.

The names of those supposed to have fought on the Messenian side are with one exception superficially plausible, but their alleged participation is perhaps more likely to be a product of the 'Messenian mirage'. Sparta's alleged allies are no less problematic. The Corinthians, whether ruled by the Bacchiads or Kypselos (who became tyrant c.657), would perhaps have in either case sided with Sparta against Argos. The Lepreates of Triphylia might have taken the opposite side to Elis, but Elis, the exception referred to above, was unlikely to have been on the Messenian side at this time. Samos (Hdt. 3.47.1) is at first sight the least likely ally of all, although at least one Lakonian Subgeometric amphora found its way to the island about this time. Perhaps some individual Samians came by ship in the hope of collecting booty. On the other hand, there is nothing intrinsically implausible in the story that the main focus of resistance was Andania in north-east Messenia towards Arkadia (site not certainly identified) and that the last stand was made, not on Ithome this time, but on Mount Hira not far from Andania. The Arkadian involvement presaged Spartan reprisals in succeeding reigns.

The Spartan victory should perhaps be interpreted as a gradual process of pacification including the spread of Spartan control to the west coast of Messenia south of the Nedha, which may not have been completed much before the end of the seventh century. This would at least accord with a remark attributed to Epameinondas (Plut. *Mor.* 194B; Aelian, *VH* 13.42), that he had (re-)founded Messene after 230 years. I do not, however, think that we need to postulate a Third ('Hira') War to account for this figure. Indeed, the loose ends of the conquest can only be said to have been properly tied up with the treaty of c.550 between Sparta and Tegea, whose one known clause (Chapter 9) symbolizes the nerve-racking consequence of the Messenian War: Sparta, in G.B.Grundy's adaptation of an expression of the emperor Tiberius, had 'a wolf by the throat'.

To conclude this chapter, however, let us look briefly at Sparta's cultural development in the first half of the seventh century. It is immediately apparent that this was as little affected by the almost uninterrupted warfare as was that of Athens in the fifth. Terpander of Lesbos, traditionally the first victor in the musical contest at the reorganized Karneia in 676 (the date worked out by Hellanikos of Lesbos in the late fifth century), inaugurated a succession of visits by foreign poets who found Sparta a congenial—and no doubt lucrative—field for the display of their talents. After c.690 Lakonian vase-painters under Aegean influence made their first forays into an orientalizing style, but 'third-rate and unpretentious' (Cook 1972) is probably a fair description of their products in this unsettled and confusing epoch. However, as we have seen, at least one Lakonian Subgeometric pot travelled abroad, and it was presumably pottery of this transitional phase (described as 'orientalizing Geometric') which was found at ancient Hippola in the Deep Mani, the first material evidence of settlement so far south in Lakonia in the historical period. Simultaneously, the Lakonian bronze-workers began to show an increasing interest in human subjects; perhaps their most engaging product is the so-called 'Menelaion goddess' of c.675, crude in conception but competent in execution. Following a generation or more of preparation Lakonian ivory-carving began to flower shortly before 650. No less technically competent, if more parochial in flavour, was the output of the coroplasts, who were among the earliest in Greek lands to borrow the Syrian mould and create a local 'Daedalic' style with strong Cretan affinities. At a humbler level still, the 'mass-production' of mould-made lead figurines, perhaps using the ore found near Kardamyli, also began in the first half of the seventh century: we might single out the representations of hoplite warriors which were first dedicated at the Orthia sanctuary around 650. In short, the cultural picture for Lakonia between c.775 and 650 has no features in common with the image of sterility beloved by the ancient and—more reprehensibly—the modern 'mirage'.

Notes on further reading

Perhaps the best discussion of the Greek world as a whole in the period covered by this chapter is still Starr 1961, part III; cf. Starr 1977. Bouzek 1969, Snodgrass 1971 and Coldstream 1977 deal with all aspects of the archaeological record down to about 700; a comparably comprehensive work for the succeeding period is a desideratum. Jeffery 1976 is a survey, by region, of the entire Archaic period (to c.500); the chapter on Sparta (111–32) includes a good discussion of Lakonian art.

The office of the Pythioi, who were permanent and hereditary ambassadors to Delphi (Hdt. 6.57, 60; Xen. *Lak. Pol.* 15.5), may have been instituted in the eighth century: Cartledge 1978.

On the (incomplete) 'synoecism' of Sparta see Toynbee 1969, 171–4; Moggi 1976, no. 6 (with very full bibliography). On the status of Amyklai as an 'obe' I agree with Ehrenberg 1924, 28f. (=1965, 165f.) against e.g. Grote, who believed that Amyklai was Perioikic.

The basic study (in default of new information from grave-groups or stratified settlement-deposits) of Lakonian LG pottery is Coldstream 1968, ch. 9 (cf. pp. 330, 364f.). I have filled in more details in my unpublished thesis (1975, 139–67), where I also attempt to elucidate the 'Transitional' pottery of c.690–650.

Ephorus (*FGrHist* 70F216) may have been the first to write in terms of more than one original war of conquest in Messenia, but Aristotle (*Pol.* 1306b38) still uses the singular form, which, historically, is perhaps the less misleading of the two. Against the notion that the early history of Messenia was created *ex nihilo* after 369 see Shero 1938, esp. 504, 511; Treves 1944. But Pearson (1962) rightly shows that much of the tradition is 'pseudo-history', and Niebuhr (1847) long ago exposed the deficiencies of Pausanias' fourth book. For the view that Tyrtaios is the only real source see the works cited in Tigerstedt 1965, 347 n. 306. Among the many modern accounts of the war(s) see Kiechle 1959, 65ff.; Oliva 1971, 102–14; J.F.Lazenby in *MME* 84–6.

My very brief summary of the physical setting of Messenia is drawn from W.G.Loy and H.E.Wright, Jr in *MME* ch. 3. For some important qualifications of their picture in detail see Bintliff 1977, II, ch. 5.

On the cult of Helen at the Menelaion see Wide 1893, 340–6; on the type of cult accorded Menelaos see Coldstream 1976, esp. 10, 15; and 1977, esp. 346–8.

The foundation of Taras is discussed by Pembroke 1970; earlier bibliography in Tigerstedt 1965, 340 n. 261; add now Moretti 1971; Carter 1975, 7–14. The Spartans were allegedly particularly interested in stories about the foundations of cities (Plato *Hipp. Ma.* 285D). For the close links between Sparta and Taras see e.g. Jeffery 1961, 279–84 (dialect and script); Pugliese Carratelli 1971 (cult and myths); Pelagatti 1957 (Lakonian pottery at Taras). On western colonization in general see Bengtson 1977, 88–127; the contributions to *Dialoghi di Archeologia* for 1969; and Jeffery 1976, ch. 4. The latest archaeological discoveries are reported in the *Acts* of the annual congresses of Magna Graecia Studies held in Taranto and of the Centre Jean Bérard in Naples.

Concerning the power of Argos in the early seventh century, Kelly (1976, ch. 6) has mounted a sustained attack on a widely accepted modern view that Pheidon should be dated to this period. However, while I agree that the ancient evidence is hardly inspiring or inspired, I cannot agree that Hdt. 6.127.3 is a sufficient ground for dating the great Pheidon to c.600; Herodotus might after all, as Jeffery (1976, 137) has suggested, have got his Pheidons muddled.

The consolidation of Lakonia

c. 650–490

I have succeeded thus far in confining my notice of the ‘Great Rhetra’ to a single, oblique reference. For if anything justifies the description of the study of early Sparta as ‘intellectual gymnastics’ (Ehrenberg 1973, 389), it is surely this document of some fifty words preserved for us by Plutarch (*Lyk.* 6), over which more scholarly ink has been spilt than over any other Greek text of comparable length. None the less, for two main reasons, the ‘Great Rhetra’ must now be pulled out from under the carpet, dusted off and, if only briefly, held up to the light of historical scrutiny. First, it represents in kernel the political solution which has been precisely characterized by Andrewes (1956, ch. 6) as the ‘Spartan alternative to tyranny’. Second, it was the attainment of internal political equilibrium at an early date which, as Thucydides (1.18.1) saw, enabled the Spartans to intervene in the affairs of other states—and, we might add, to control their own *Perioikoi* and Helots in the manner analysed in the next chapter. Two questions, however, remain to be answered: at how early a date was this triumphantly successful solution devised and acted upon, and to what problems did it offer a solution?

Two overlapping and mutually reinforcing aspects of the ‘Spartan mirage’ have played havoc with our evidence for early Spartan political history. The first in point of time and significance was the ‘Lykourgos legend’, which held that Sparta was the paradigm of a state owing all its institutions to the legislative enactments of a single lawgiver—in this case to the wondrously omniprovident Lykourgos, for whom dates ranging (in our terms) from the twelfth to the eighth centuries were offered. The second distorting aspect of the ‘mirage’ was the theory of the ‘mixed constitution’, developed perhaps in the fifth century but not apparently applied to Sparta until the fourth (Rawson 1969, 10). This theory contended that the best, because most stable, form of state was either one which combined ingredients from each of the basic constitutional types (monarchy, aristocracy/oligarchy, democracy) in a harmonious whole (the ‘pudding’ version) or one in which the different elements acted as checks and balances to each other (the ‘seesaw’ version). The combined effect—and, no doubt, the object—of the ‘Lykourgos legend’ and the

theory of the ‘mixed constitution’ was to suggest that Sparta had achieved an internal political equilibrium considerably earlier than could in fact have been the case. Indeed, the devoutly pro-Spartan Athenian exile Xenophon could even, by making Lykourgos contemporary with the (Return of the) Herakleidai (*Lak. Pol.* 10.8), contrive to suggest that there had never been *stasis* or civil strife on the political plane in Sparta since the Dorian foundation.

Happily for us, however, not all of our sources were equally persuaded of the truth of every aspect of the ‘mirage’, and Xenophon’s optimistic and partisan view was eccentric. Even Plutarch was unable to keep *stasis* (civil strife) out of his biography—or rather hagiography—of the lawgiver (*Lyk.* 5.4f.). More instructive, though, are the sources who were not a party to the mirage. Herodotus (1.65.2) went so far as to say that before Lykourgos’ reforms Sparta had suffered the worst *kakonomia* (lawlessness) of any Greek state, while Thucydides (1.18. 1), without mentioning Lykourgos by name, agreed for once with Herodotus that there had been *stasis* followed by *eunomia* (orderliness). (I shall bring out the significance of these antonyms presently.) But perhaps the most impressive testimony of all is that of Aristotle (*Pol.* 1306b29–1307a4), who knew of no fewer than five potentially revolutionary situations in Sparta between the late eighth and early fourth centuries. Had it not been for what Thucydides (5.68.2) calls the ‘secretiveness’ of the Spartan state, he might conceivably have learnt of more. It is no accident that two of these—the Partheniai affair and a demand for the redistribution of land, both cited in Chapter 8—fell in the reigns of Theopompos and Polydoros.

The Eurypontid Theopompos and the Agiad Polydoros, who reigned jointly during roughly the first quarter of the seventh century, are the first two individuals known to us as distinct personalities in Spartan history. We need not of course accept all the elaborated details of their reigns, but it was certainly remembered in Sparta that they had played active and decisive roles, and the general tenor of their rule has perhaps been accurately enough conveyed. Theopompos was known to Tyrtaios (fr. 5.1f.) as the general who led the Spartans to victory in the ‘First’ Messenian War. In much later authors, the first known being Aristotle (*Pol.* 1313a26f.), he displaced the Lykourgos of Herodotus (1.65.5) as creator of the Ephorate. This innovation was represented as a major concession to non- or rather anti-monarchist sentiment and allegedly justified by its author as a pragmatic device to ensure the monarchy’s perpetuation. The original purpose and functions of the office are in fact by no means clear, but it seems likely that it did not from the start possess the extensive executive, judicial and administrative powers symbolized by the oaths exchanged monthly between kings and Ephors in the fourth century (Xen. *Lak. Pol.* 15.7). At any rate, there was no place for the Ephorate in the ‘Great Rhetra’ (below).

The evidence for the career of Polydoros is of a more unambiguously inflammatory character, but the chief difficulty in assessing its value is that

Polydoros was looked back to as, or transmogrified into, a prototype by revolutionary Spartan monarchs of the third century (when, perhaps, his supposed image was first employed as the official state seal). Thus he was alleged to have espoused the cause of the ordinary Spartan and to have initiated some form of land-distribution, only to be murdered for his reformist pains by a disgruntled noble called Polemarchos (Paus. 3.3.3). In reality, his populist politics are unlikely to have been ideologically motivated or even wholly altruistic, although it is open to argument how far they were dictated by reason of state (the Argos crisis) or concern for his personal position as king, which was perhaps being undermined in Sparta as elsewhere by the jealous non-royal nobility. But whatever the motivation, the defeat at Hysiai in 669—if indeed Polydoros was the defeated general—would have added weight to the opposition, and it is to be assumed that Polydoros’ schemes were robbed of fruition by his death. This, at any rate, is how I would explain the demand for land-redistribution recorded by Tyrtaios.

Two events, however, could have served to breathe fresh life into the Polydoros corpse, the revolt of the Messenian Helots and the establishment of tyrannies on either side of the Isthmus of Corinth c.650. These, I suggest, provided the context in which the ‘Great Rhetra’ was either produced or—if the whole document and not just the appended clause (4) is to be attributed to Theopompos and Polydoros—acted upon. The text may be translated thus:

Having established a cult of Syllanian Zeus and Athena, having done the ‘tribing and obing’, and having established a Gerousia of thirty members including the kings, (1) season in season out they are to hold Apellai between Babyka and Knakion; (2) the Gerousia is both to introduce proposals and to stand aloof; (3) the *damos* is to have power to (in Plutarch’s gloss on a badly garbled Doric phrase) ‘give a decisive verdict’; (4) but if the *damos* speaks crookedly, the Gerousia and kings are to be removers.

At a moment of supreme crisis at home and abroad this formula offered something, politically, to all the contending groups. As a result of its enactment the monarchy survived, though with diminished power. The Gerousia (Senate), which included the two kings *ex officio*, became the supreme political organ in effect, but its membership was limited numerically and (except for the kings) formally subjected to the constraint of public election though not to public accountability. The non-aristocratic *damos* was granted political recognition, indeed formal sovereignty, but its power of initiative was effectively bridled. Such a reform might well have been characterized as the institution of *eunomia*, and it is to be noted that towards the end of the seventh century Alkman (fr. 64) made Eunomia the sister of Fortune and Persuasion and the daughter of Foresight. Finally, the authority of Apollo (the ‘Great Rhetra’ was represented as a Delphic oracle) and the

prestige of Theopompos and Polydoros was invoked to provide the necessary cement of loyalty.

No less important, however, than what the ‘Great Rhetra’ (to us opaquely) states was what it left unsaid. The exclusion of the Ephorate was presumably due to its relative unimportance at this date or, what Tyrtaios’ paraphrase of the document (fr. 4) implies, to the stress placed by official propaganda on the traditional hierarchy with the kings at the top of the political pyramid. Second, and yet more important, provision must have been made for the redistribution of land in a separate initiative, perhaps in the form of a reward offered for success against the now revolted Messenians. (I cannot agree with Chrimes 1949, 424 that ‘having obeyed the obes’ implies a redistribution of land.) Thus the carrot of land-allotments in Messenia for the poor, together with the stick of the likely consequences of defeat for all Spartans alike, would have helped to ensure that success was achieved. By tying citizen-rights to the exploitation through Helot labour-power of the land distributed in *kleroi* (allotments), Sparta created the first (and only) all-hoplite citizen army, truly a ‘new model’. The elite order of Homoioi (‘Peers’) came into being.

Eventual victory in the ‘Second’ Messenian War and the spread of Spartan control to all south-west Peloponnese gave Spartan society an enormous fillip. The second half of the seventh century witnessed the apogee of Lakonian ivory-carving, when the products of Spartan workshops achieved an extraordinarily wide distribution in the Greek world—to Tegea, the Argive Heraion and Perachora within the Peloponnese; to Athens and Pherai beyond the Isthmus of Corinth; to the islands of Delos, Siphnos, Chios, Samos and Rhodes; and even to Taucheira in north Africa. In the first half of the sixth century, however, the quantity (and quality) of ivory artefacts dedicated at the Orthia sanctuary fell off sharply, and ivory was to some extent replaced by bone as the medium of fine carving (apart, that is, from carving in wood, which is attested in the literary sources but naturally has not survived the Lakonian soil and climate). Since this phenomenon was not confined to Lakonia, it has been suggested that the trade in ivory tusks may have been interrupted by the fall of Phoenician Tyre to Nebuchadnezzar of Babylon in 573; the Syrian port of Al Mina on the Orontes, where actual tusks have been excavated, may also have been destroyed about this time.

The leading position occupied by ivory-work in Lakonian craftsmanship was assumed by the bronzesmiths, but not apparently much before the sixth century, when they produced a series of fine hammered and cast vessels, also widely disseminated. Contemporary with the apogee of ivory-carving was the slow metamorphosis of the Lakonian pottery from a ‘third-rate and unpretentious’ fabric into a full-blown orientalizing black-figure style by c.625. By the end of the century work of good quality and lively conception was being not only dedicated in Sparta but exported as far as Sparta’s south Italian colony, Taras. The two delightful cups from Grave

285 at Taranto with their interior designs of sea-fish betray a maritime interest that is also evident from the well-known ivory of c.625 depicting a warship and, not least, from the poems of the contemporary Alkman (Huxley 1962, 108 n. 124). The latter represents perhaps the jewel in the crown of Spartan high culture.

It was not, however, by sea that the Spartans chose to extend the long arm of their suzerainty. With Messenia under their belt one might have expected them to complete the unfinished business of the Thyreatis or at least to absorb the east Parnon foreland politically. The power of Argos, after all, was not what it had been under Pheidon or at the time of the battle of Hysiai (if these two were chronologically distinct). Instead, however, Sparta seems to have elected to repeat the Messenian trick in Arkadia. There were, it is true, grounds for representing the aggression as a ‘just war’: the Arkadian king Aristokrates (of Orchomenos or Trapezous), who was the grandfather of the wife of Periander tyrant of Corinth, had fought on the wrong side in the ‘Second’ Messenian War; and traditionally Sparta had been defeated at Phigaleia, again in south-west Arkadia, in 659 (Paus. 8.39.3). Moreover, Arkadia offered to Messenian refugees a natural haven, if not a continuing incitement to revolt.

However, the Spartan objective was apparently not merely to punish and neutralize Arkadia but to turn the Tegeans, the nearest Arkadians to Sparta with desirable land, into Helots and the Tegeate plain into *kleroi*. This at least is the inference to be drawn from the story as preserved in our earliest source, Herodotus (1.66), who describes the overconfident Spartans (trusting, typically, in a Delphic oracle) as marching on Tegea with chains to shackle the future Helots and with measuring-rods to parcel out the plain. With true dramatic irony the Spartans, defeated in battle, ended up working the Tegeans’ land as war-captives bound in their own chains. A century or more later Herodotus was purportedly shown the very chains hanging as a trophy in the temple of Athena Alea; indeed, they were still on display more than seven centuries later—or so the cicerone assured Pausanias (3.7.3; 8.47.2). So unsuccessful in fact may have been the Spartans’ Arkadian venture that the ‘Battle of the Fetters’ was not perhaps their only defeat here in the first half of the sixth century. Combining scattered references in later sources to regions further to the south-west than the Tegeate plain, Forrest (1968, 73–5) has suggested that Sparta may also have been frustrated in an attempt to annex the Megalopolis plain.

However this may be, it is doubtful whether the defeat or defeats were as severe as Herodotus’ Arkadian informants liked to think. For, as Herodotus himself put it (1.65.1), though with infuriating vagueness, the Spartans under the Agiad Leon and the Eurypontid Agasikles (c.575–560) were successful ‘in all their other wars’. I have already remarked in Chapter 8 that the construction of the second temple of Orthia at Sparta c.570 is probably to be interpreted in the light of this comment. We might add that the second quarter

of the sixth century was also the heyday of the Lakonian painted pottery, which was exported as far north as Olbia in south Russia, as far west as Ampurias in north-east Spain and as far south as Naukratis in Egypt, with especially heavy concentrations occurring at Taras, Taucheira and Samos. However, the only ‘other’ war that we may fairly confidently assign to their reign is the struggle for the control of Olympia, in which Sparta helped Elis oust the local Pisatan dynasty (possibly in 572).

Our general ignorance of Spartan foreign policy at this time is particularly disheartening in view of another highly controversial statement of Herodotus (1.68.6), that in the next generation, under kings Anaxandridas and Ariston, Sparta had already ‘subjugated most of the Peloponnese’. The context of this statement is the request by king Croesus of Lydia for an alliance with Sparta against the rising power of Persia following Sparta’s eventual triumph over Tegea (below). The alliance was granted and sealed, in suitably archaic fashion, by a prestation. Croesus had previously donated Lydian gold to the Spartans, who used it to face the statue of Apollo at Amyklai. Now in return Croesus was sent—though he did not receive—an elaborate bronze bowl, presumably fashioned by Lakonian craftsmen and perhaps of the type of the stupendous bowl buried with a Celtic princess at Vix in France c.500. Thus by c.550, according to Herodotus, Sparta had extended its control from the southern two fifths of the Peloponnese to at least one of the remaining three, so that its strength was such as to attract the notice of a foreign, if philhellene, potentate. Yet all we learn from Herodotus of this sea-change in Lakonian affairs is contained in his considerably mythical story of the transfer of the bones of Orestes from Tegea to Sparta, whereafter, he says, Sparta proved superior to Tegea in battle (1.67f.). There is no mention of other military exploits, and the significance of the recovery of the relics is restricted by him to the military sphere. Ancient and modern scholarship has done rather better than the Halikarnassian.

It is of course hazardous to correct Herodotus from later sources, but it is reasonable to supplement him in such matters as diplomacy and constitutional history in which he displays distressingly little interest. It is not therefore surprising that he should have omitted to mention the stele set up ‘on the (banks of the) Alpheios’, which recorded the pledge of the Tegeans to Sparta not to make the Messenians ‘useful’, i.e. give them citizen-rights in Tegea (Jacoby 1944). We owe our knowledge of this stele proximately to Plutarch (*Mor.* 292B), ultimately to Aristotle (fr. 592 Rose); but unfortunately we know little more than its existence (Bengtson 1975, no. 112). The very place at which it was erected has been disputed, some (like Beloch) arguing that it was at Olympia, where the gods could act as witnesses and guarantors, others believing that it was on the borders of Spartan and Tegeate territory. What does seem probable is that the document inscribed on the stele should be distinguished from the treaty of military alliance concluded between Sparta and Tegea, which was among the earliest (the first may have been with

Elis) of those unequal alliances by which Sparta built up its commanding position in the Peloponnese.

As for the recovery of Orestes' bones from Tegea, and perhaps also those of his son Teisamenos from Achaia (Paus. 7.1.3), this symbolized and emphasized the shift in Spartan policy from aggression to peaceful co-existence, from 'Helotization' to diplomatic subordination. The Spartans could now give preponderant emphasis in their propaganda to their claim to be the legitimate successors to the 'Achaean' rulers of the Peloponnese and even represent themselves as champions of all Hellas. The poet Stesichoros (West 1969, 148) lent his voice to the change of policy; and it may have been about 550 that Agamemnon, brother of Menelaos and father of Orestes, began to be worshipped as a hero at Amyklai. If any one Spartan was chiefly responsible for the new direction, he may have been Chilon, eponymous Ephor c.556 and one of the 'Seven Sages' of ancient Greece, to whom may also be given some of the credit for elevating the status of the Ephorate (cf. Diog. Laert. 1.68). A tantalizing fragment of a sixth-century relief bearing the name of [Ch]ilon found at Sparta is perhaps to be associated with the much later report (Paus. 3.16.4) that the Spartans established a hero-cult to Chilon.

Tegea, then, had been 'subjugated' through a quintessentially Spartan combination of magic, military might and diplomacy. But what about the rest of the Peloponnese, and in particular Corinth and Argos? Corinth was certainly allied to Sparta on some basis by c.525, when the two states undertook a major naval expedition against Polykrates tyrant of Samos (below); but we know little or nothing of relations between the two states before that date. The alleged Corinthian aid to Sparta in the 'Second' Messenian War is doubtful, and the statement (Plut. *Mor.* 859D) that Sparta terminated the Kypselid tyranny at Corinth is incorrect either in fact or in MS. transmission. There is nothing very surprising about this. Distance and an accident of geography had prescribed different and separate destinies for the two Dorian states down to the seventh, if not the sixth, century. However, once Sparta became involved with Argos and concerned about communication into and out of the Peloponnese, Corinth was bound to become of particular importance. If there is anything to Herodotus' statement that Sparta had 'subjugated most of the Peloponnese' by c.550, then it is possible that Corinth was received into alliance following Sparta's deposition of Aischines, last of the Orthagorid tyrants of Sikyon, in c.556. However, the evidence for this latter transaction is extremely suspect, partly because Sparta acquired a reputation as a tyrant-slayer, partly because the sources—a second-century papyrus perhaps transcribing Ephorus (*FGrHist* 105F1) and Plutarch (*Mor.* 859D)—are unreliable and far removed in time. Its date too is uncertain (some prefer c.510), but c.556 receives some support from the mention by the papyrus of Chilon as acting in a military capacity with king Anaxandridas.

We are rather better informed on relations between Sparta and Argos. Not, that is, that we hear directly of any contact between them after the battle of

Hysiai down to the struggle for the Thyreatis in the mid-sixth century; but Sparta's resettlement of the exiles from Argive Nauplia at Messenian Mothone (Paus. 4.35.2) probably belongs to the late seventh century (Huxley 1962, 59f.). However, the 'Battle of the Champions' in c.545 caught the imagination of Herodotus (1.82)—and indeed remained indelibly stamped on the consciousness both of the Argives, who actually proposed a return match on the same terms in 420 (Thuc. 5.41.2), and of the Spartans, who took to wearing 'Thyreatic crowns' at the Gymnopaïdai (Sosibios, *FGrHist* 595F5); possible representations of these crowns appear in two bronze figurines found at Amyklai and Kosmas (Perioikic Glympeis or Glyppia).

According to Herodotus, the Spartans had in fact seized the Thyreatis before the ritualistic battle, but he unfortunately omits to say how long before. This is important for the history of Lakonia, because for Herodotus it was only after Argos had been comprehensively defeated in the full-scale engagement subsequent to the 'Battle of the Champions' that Argos was deprived of the territory east of Parnon to the south of the Thyreatis, the eastern seaboard of the Malea peninsula and the island of Kythera. If we rule Herodotus' testimony to such an Argive 'empire' out of court, as I think we should, then we must admit that we have no direct literary witness to the process whereby Sparta completed the enlargement of Lakonia. To be strictly accurate, a reference to it has been detected in the second-century papyrus cited above, but this is too fragmentary to illuminate the nature of the process or to fix the date of its completion. There is, however, a little indirect evidence—archaeological and epigraphical as well as literary—which may be thought relevant.

For the Thyreatis itself there is nothing known between, on the one hand, Spartan campaigns and the 'Geometric' pottery of the late eighth or early seventh century and, on the other, a handful of bronzes (one inscribed) and a stone head of the last third of the sixth century. But this sixth-century material is wholly Lakonian, which suggests either that the alleged 'Dorianizing' of Kynouria by the Argives (Hdt. 8.73.3) had not been a process affecting high culture or that the Argive veneer was stripped off remarkably soon after c.545.

As for the east Parnon foreland, there are only two sites which merit consideration. The first, Prasiai, was cited in the previous chapter as originally an independent member of the Kalaureian Amphiktyony, whose role therein was later assumed by Sparta. If Kelly (1976, 74) is right in dating the foundation of the Amphiktyony to the mid-seventh century, this would of course support his view that Argos was not in control of the foreland at this time. We need not, however, follow him in thinking that Sparta's involvement in the Amphiktyony began only after the defeat of Argos in c.545. At any rate, the only Archaic finds from the site of which we may speak with confidence—a four-sided bone seal of the seventh century and a fine bronze mirror with a handle in the form of a draped woman of the late sixth—are

both of Spartan manufacture. The other site, the sanctuary of Apollo Tyritas, lay north of Prasiai on the coast near the modern Tsakonian village of Tyros. Controlled twentieth-century excavations followed tardily on the illicit diggings of the nineteenth, but although nothing of the foundations of the temple was discovered, a handful of architectural fragments indicated that the earliest version was built around 600. What is particularly interesting is that the disc akroterion which surmounted the pediment is of undoubtedly Spartan type (used in at least six other Lakonian sanctuaries, as well as at Bassai and Olympia) and that all the inscribed dedications (none, though, certainly earlier than 545) are in the Lakonian local script.

The sole site on the east coast of the Malea peninsula for which there is archaeological evidence prior to the fifth century is Epidauros Limera, but even this is hardly revealing. An island gem of the seventh century is reported to have been found here, suggesting Aegean contacts; and a fine handle from a bronze hydria made at Sparta in the sixth century has turned up at nearby Monemvasia. Let us therefore move swiftly on to Kythera. Such cultural connections with the Argolis as the island may betray before 650 disappear completely thereafter. A striking, if crudely executed, bronze figurine of a draped woman datable c.630 reminds me somewhat of the 'Menelaion Goddess' (Chapter 8), although its most recent publisher, J.N.Coldstream (Coldstream and Huxley 1972, 271), thinks rather of Crete. There then ensues an archaeological and epigraphical gap of a century or so. To the last third of the sixth century belong, for example, a marble lion, which perhaps served as a grave-marker; a bronze figurine of a draped woman dedicated, presumably to Aphrodite, by one Klearisia; and a fine bronze head of a youth. Only the latter reveals strong affinity with the Lakonian mainland, and the quasi-Lakonian lettering of an inscription from Kastri bearing the single word 'Malos' (c.525–400) confirms that down to the fifth century Kythera stood somewhat apart from cultural developments in the rest of Lakonia. Its political position, however, is another matter—a salutary reminder that material artefacts do not yield straightforward political conclusions.

To conclude this discussion, I do not believe it is possible at present to say when Sparta absorbed the east Parnon foreland politically into the polis of Lakedaimon. The same goes for the east coast of the Malea peninsula and Kythera. The testimony of Herodotus, however, when we have subtracted the element due to Argive propaganda, almost proves that the process had been completed by c.540. Kelly (1976, 74f., 87) has argued that Sparta would not have moved to annex the Thyreatis until after it had established its superiority securely over Tegea, since the route from the Eurotas valley to the Thyreatis passes uncomfortably close to Tegeate territory. This may well be so, but geography alone cannot exclude *a priori* the possibility that the territory south of the Thyreatis had been absorbed politically, as it had undoubtedly been influenced culturally, by Sparta at an earlier date. On balance, though, I am inclined to think that this incorporation, like the favourable

accommodation with Tegea, belongs to the reign of Anaxandridas and Ariston (c.550–520) rather than to the ‘other wars’ of their immediate predecessors.

The only external event of the joint reign of Anaxandridas and Ariston related by Herodotus (3.39.1, 44–8.1, 54–8)—although, as with the battles for the Thyreatis, he does not introduce the kings into his narrative—is the naval expedition to Samos in c.525. This was undertaken ostensibly to restore some Samian aristocrats but perhaps had longer-range, anti-Persian ends in view. Sparta, as already noted, was aided by Corinth, who may have provided the bulk of the ‘large’ (Hdt. 3.54.1) fleet. Sparta, however, was perhaps not a complete stranger to naval activity. One of the five Archaic regiments of Sparta was called Ploas, which may mean ‘Seafarers’ (Burn 1960, 275). We have already cited the depiction of a warship at Sparta before 600. The far-flung export of Lakonian pottery between c.575 and 550 suggests nautical skill at least on the part of some Perioikoi. The alliance with Croesus, moreover, seems to indicate a Spartan preparedness to undertake an expedition by sea c.550, even if in the event only a token penteconter actually reached Asia Minor (Hdt. 1.152f.). Finally, the incorporation and control of the eastern seaboard of Lakonia and of Kythera presumably involved the use of a fleet. However that may be, an expedition of the kind undertaken in c.525 certainly implies military co-operation of some nature between the Spartans and Perioikoi, for all naval muster-stations or ports in Lakonia were located in Perioikic territory (Chapter 10). We are not told where the fleet sailed from, but there was presumably a harbour of sorts at Tainaron in c.600, when Arion of Methymna landed there (Hdt. 1.24.6), and we hear of fleets at anchor off Gytheion, Las and Messenian Asine in the fifth century.

We should not, however, distort the perspective. In 480 Sparta contributed a paltry ten ships to the Hellenic fleet at Artemision (Hdt. 8.1.2); and the series of Lakonian bronze figurines of hoplite infantrymen, which belong principally to the third quarter of the sixth century, confirms that the expedition to Samos was an exceptional undertaking. (I consider the alleged Spartan ‘thalassocracy’ of 517–515 below.) Most important of all, though, the naval expedition was also both costly and unsuccessful. Hence perhaps Sparta’s failure to seize the opportunity to become the dominant naval power of mainland Greece before Themistokles persuaded the Athenians in the 480s that their future lay on the sea (Thuc. 1.93.3f.).

Regrettably, our main source for the period c.525–480, Herodotus, was less impressed by this momentous failure than by the outcome of Anaxandridas’ marital irregularities (5.39f., esp. 40.2). His eldest son and successor, Kleomenes I, was undoubtedly the most powerful Spartan king since Polydoros, and his like was not to reappear until the Eurypontid Agesilaos II. But Herodotus’ impressionistic and distorted account of his reign makes it abundantly clear that his information was derived overwhelmingly from hostile informants—the descendants, we may surmise, of Kleomenes’ half-brothers (Dorieus, Leonidas and Kleombrotos) and those

of the Eurypontid colleague whose deposition he engineered in *c.*491 (Damaratos). For Kleomenes himself failed to leave behind a son and heir, and, although his daughter Gorgo was married to Leonidas, in the pages of Herodotus she serves merely to show her father up rather than to vindicate his sullied reputation. Moreover, the one man whose descendants would have been most likely to give Herodotus a favourable account, Latychidas (Damaratos' cousin and replacement), had died a disgraced exile (Hdt. 6.72). The extent of Herodotus' bias against Kleomenes may be gauged from the fact that he is prepared to present a highly sympathetic picture of a proven 'medizer' (Damaratos) and an unsuccessful colonizer (Dorieus). To add to our problems, there are also major chronological difficulties in his account. Thus, since Herodotus provides us with practically all our information on Kleomenes, it is impossible for us to reconstruct with confidence the main lines of his—and so, in the main, Sparta's—domestic and foreign policy in the late sixth and early fifth centuries.

I labour Herodotus' inadequacies because the reign of Kleomenes was crucial not only for Lakonian but for all Greek history and as such demands the closest possible scrutiny. In the course of it Sparta became firmly established as supreme in the Peloponnese and a leader of the Greek world generally, through the control of what we call the 'Peloponnesian League' and the crushing of Argos. Athens, in spite of and to an extent because of Kleomenes' best efforts, became a democracy (the world's first) and later, this time with the backing of Kleomenes, set its face successfully against Persian expansion. Finally, and more parochially, it was in Kleomenes' reign that the peculiar system of Perioikoi and Helots elaborated over the centuries underwent its first real testing on a wider stage. Since space forbids me to deal in detail with the reign as a whole, I shall concentrate on these three main issues.

A.H.M.Jones opens his history of Sparta (1967) by remarking that 'the Spartans had short memories'. As an illustration he cites Herodotus' picture of Kleomenes: 'on a simple point of fact he says that his reign was short (5.48), while from the information he gives it appears that he must have ruled for nearly thirty years.' Kleomenes was certainly on the throne in *c.*517, when the Samian Maiandrios unsuccessfully appealed to him to eject the pro-Persian puppet Syloson (Hdt. 3.148), and he may have acceded before 519, the date given by Thucydides (3. 68.5) for the alliance between Plataia and Athens. For, according to Herodotus (6.108.2–4), it was 'the Spartans', then coincidentally in the vicinity (Megarid) under the leadership of Kleomenes, who had advised the Plataians to seek this alliance, in order to make trouble for the Athenians. But the Athenians were not of course obliged to ally themselves to Plataia, and Herodotus' explanation looks anachronistic: for the real sufferers from such an alliance would have been the Thebans, whose claim to control all Boiotia was thereby undermined. If the Spartans were really in the Megarid to procure an alliance for themselves with Megara in

519 (Burn 1960, 265) this would be a further reason for their wanting to keep Athens—with whose rulers, the Peisistratids, they were apparently then on good terms (below)—well disposed; for Athens and Megara were traditional enemies. On the other hand, should Athens and Sparta fall out, a possibility not to be overlooked given Athens' increasing power and its hostility to Megara and Aigina (also perhaps already allied to Sparta), then Thebes would be likely to take Sparta's side anyway. Herodotus does not attribute the advice given to Plataia specifically to Kleomenes, but such a masterstroke of diplomacy would not be inappropriate for a descendant of Chilon (the family-tree is plausibly reconstructed in Huxley 1962, 149).

The words with which Kleomenes reportedly resisted the arguments and bribes of Maiandrios are consistent with Sparta's claim to the hegemony of the Peloponnese, even if they are in fact the invention of Herodotus: 'it was better for Sparta that the Samian stranger should be removed from the Peloponnese' (not just Lakedaimon). However, according to Eusebius (*Chronikon* I, 225 Schoene), or the source upon which the good bishop drew, it was just about this time that Sparta was enjoying a period of 'thalassocracy', i.e. 517–515. The reliability of the 'thalassocracy list' is highly questionable, at least in all its details (Jeffery 1976, 253f.), and attempts to explain the Spartan 'thalassocracy' in terms of its alleged deposition of Lygdamis, tyrant of Naxos (Plut. *Mor.* 859D), involve postulating a naval expedition nearly as far as the one to Samos which Sparta simultaneously declined to undertake. In fact, Lygdamis is more likely to have been deposed during the expedition to Samos of c.525.

If therefore the attribution of a 'thalassocracy' to Sparta has any justification, or explanation, a more likely one is to be found in the activities of Dorieus in the central Mediterranean, unsuccessful though these ultimately proved. According to an ingenious emendation of Pausanias 3.16.4f., proposed by Edgar Lobel, Dorieus took with him to the west men from Perioikic Anthana in the Thyreatis (modern Meligou?), a community whose existence is otherwise first recorded by Thucydides (5.41.2). The entry in the sixth-century AD lexicon of Stephanos of Byzantium under 'Anthana' states that Kleomenes flayed alive the eponymous hero of the place and wrote oracles on his skin. This evidence is hardly impeccable, but it is possible that Dorieus was attempting to play on discontent in this recently Perioikized region in order to bolster his frustrated claim to the Agiad throne. As we shall see, however, there is no discernible trace of Perioikic discontent in the Thyreatis twenty years later.

The next major episode in Kleomenes' turbulent career concerned relations between Sparta (and its allies) and Peisistratid Athens. Herodotus goes out of his way to stress that prior to the outbreak of actual warfare Sparta had been on friendly terms with Athens' tyrant rulers (5. 63.2; 90.1; 91.2) and that it was Spartan religiosity, in the form of unquestioning obedience to the injunctions of Delphic Apollo, which prompted the change of heart. However,

if one thing is clear about Kleomenes' career, it is his remarkably flexible, not to say unorthodox, attitude to religion. A man who in 491 could bribe the Delphic priesthood itself (he more or less admitted his guilt by his flight from Sparta) was surely not one to be over-impressed by Delphic commands—unless they coincided with his own views. Thus the modern suggestion that the Peisistratid Hippias' medism was the cause of Spartan hostility may be more than a 'post hoc, ergo propter hoc' explanation. Interestingly, the first Spartan expedition to unseat Hippias travelled to Attika by sea. It was led in c.512 by one Anchimolios or Anchimolos, possibly the first Spartan navarch (Sealey 1976, 339), presumably in Perioikic bottoms and perhaps with Perioikic marines. The expedition, however, was an unmitigated disaster, and its admiral was killed. About two years later the Spartans sent a larger force, this time by land and under the command of Kleomenes (Hdt. 5.64f.). But even this was successful only through the chance capture of the children of the Peisistratids.

The status of Athens after the overthrow and expulsion of Hippias, who duly went over to the Persians, is unclear. There is no ancient evidence for the modern suggestion that it became a subordinate ally of Sparta on similar terms to those allies who later formed the 'Peloponnesian League'. On the other hand, the head of the Alkmaionid family, Kleisthenes, and 700 other families did leave Athens after Kleomenes' personal intervention in c.508 with a lack of fuss surprising if Athens was in no way bound to Sparta (Hdt. 5.70; 72.1). This, however, marked the end of Kleomenes' success. However much he may have been impelled originally by anti-Persian sentiment, his predilection for the Athenian noble and would-be tyrant Isagoras (or, so rumour had it, for Isagoras' wife) proved scarcely politic, his imprisonment in Athens scarcely flattering. The democratic reforms sponsored by Kleisthenes (508/7) might well have been passed anyway, but the speed and smoothness with which they were adopted and implemented owed much to the hostility of the Athenian assembly towards Kleomenes' political schemes.

Thus it was specifically to avenge himself upon the Athenian *demos*, according to Herodotus (5.74.1), that Kleomenes in c.506 mounted the largest Spartan expedition against Athens so far. It comprised all Sparta's Peloponnesian allies, the Boiotians (Thebes and its allies), and the Chalkidians of Euboia, as well as the Spartans (including presumably Perioikic hoplites) themselves. Yet this invasion of Attika too was a complete failure, largely because Damaratos and the Corinthians abandoned Kleomenes before the fighting began. It was not, however, a wholly unproductive failure. The reputations of Sparta and Kleomenes were heavily tarnished, but the law subsequently passed by the Spartan assembly that only one king should command on campaign prevented a recurrence of the fatal disagreement in Attika between Kleomenes and Damaratos. (One thinks, for example, of the situation in 403.) Perhaps more important still, a couple of years or so later (c.504?) a rudimentary formula for collective decision-making was put into

operation and the ‘Peloponnesian League’ more or less properly so called was born, destined for an active life of nearly a century and a half.

To put it another way, the allies of Sparta had won a collective right of veto denied to the Perioikic towns, whose relations with Sparta in other respects provided both the precedent and the model for the series of individual, unequal alliances Sparta had built up in the Peloponnese and outside (Megara, Thebes, Aigina) since around the middle of the sixth century. (I shall return to this point in the next chapter.) We are very poorly informed on the dates at which Sparta had contracted its various alliances, and we know virtually nothing of the obligations and rights of members of the ‘League’ before the Peloponnesian War. Indeed, our most extensive source is the Athenian Xenophon writing in the 350s, who witnessed and recorded its demise. It may, however, be worth briefly summarizing here what we do know, for there do not seem to have been any momentous innovations between 500 and the 380s (Chapter 13), and it was as leader of the ‘League’ that Sparta became the automatic choice as leader of the Greek resistance to Persia in 481.

The ‘League’ was known simply as ‘the Lakedaimonians and their allies’. Its members were all officially autonomous allies of Sparta, though Sparta in practice took care to ensure that they were mostly controlled by pro-Spartan oligarchies of birth or wealth. In peacetime wars were permitted between members, but if one was attacked by a non-member Sparta was bound to come to its aid ‘with all strength in accordance with its ability’. The clause binding the ally to ‘follow the Spartans whithersoever they may lead’, wherein lay the ally’s formal subordination, was modified in practice after c.504 to mean that, if the Spartan assembly voted to go to war, its decision had to be ratified by a majority decision of a ‘League’ Congress, in which each ally regardless of size had one vote. If the decision for war was ratified, Sparta levied the ‘League’ army, decided where the combined force was to muster, contributed the commander-in-chief (normally a king) and provided officers to levy the allied contingents. Peace, like war, was subject to a majority vote, but an individual member might claim exemption on the grounds of a prior religious obligation. Finally, there was possibly contained in each individual treaty a clause binding the ally to provide Sparta with assistance in the event of a Helot revolt.

The purpose for which the first ‘Peloponnesian League’ Congress was convened in c.504 was to debate the Spartan proposal (not ascribed by Herodotus specifically to Kleomenes) to reinstate Hippias as tyrant of Athens (Hdt. 5.90–3). This proposal is important for two reasons. First, it destroys the myth of Sparta’s principled opposition to tyranny. Second, perhaps for the first but certainly not the last time, Corinth led a majority of allies to reject a Spartan decision. Hence, with the Athenian question temporarily shelved, the next major episode in Kleomenes’ reign involved Sparta’s attitude to the Ionian revolt envisaged by Aristagoras (tyrant of Miletus) about 500. This

time Kleomenes' resolve to resist bribery needed stiffening—or so Herodotus was told—by his eight-year-old daughter Gorgo, which may mean that Kleomenes was in fact inclined to support Aristagoras. Scholarly opinion is rather sharply divided over the wisdom of Kleomenes' refusal. But the Delphic Oracle, which had been 'medizing' since c.540, was in no doubt that Aristagoras' designs were misguided—if, as I think we should, we accept as genuine the unique double oracle delivered to the Argives and, in their absence, the Milesians (Hdt. 6.19; 77). A possible occasion for its delivery was when Aristagoras was in Sparta canvassing support; Argos would naturally have been interested in the transaction.

Usually, however, the oracle is regarded as *post eventum*, the conjoint doom prophesied for Argos and Miletos arising from the coincidence of their disastrous defeats in 494—the former at the hands of Sparta, the latter inflicted by the Persians or rather their Phoenician fleet. But if the double oracle is genuine, then of course we have no sure way of dating Kleomenes' massively successful campaign against Argos. In Herodotus (6.75.3.82) the episode is allowed to float freely in time. On balance I prefer a date late in Kleomenes' reign, after rather than before the Athens affair of c.512–504. But I leave open the question whether Sparta's aim was simply to nullify its major rival for Peloponnesian hegemony or also in the process to remove a possible source of aid and comfort to an invading Persian army (Tomlinson 1972, 96).

In sharp contrast to the invasion of Attika in c.506, the Argos campaign was a purely Spartan affair. For Herodotus describes Kleomenes' army as 'Spartiatai', by which, if he was being precise (but see Westlake 1977, 100), he meant citizens of Sparta as opposed to the Perioikoi (a mixed force should have been called 'Lakedaimonioi'). We are not told exactly how large the force was, but it numbered above 2,000 since the 1,000 troops retained by Kleomenes after the main engagement in the Argolis constituted a minority of the total (Hdt.6. 81). They were accompanied by Helots, perhaps one for each hoplite, whose function was to carry their masters' armour and look after their other needs. The route taken to the Thyreatis from Sparta was presumably the one used in reverse by Epameinondas in 370 (Chapter 13), past Sellasia through the Kleissoura pass and the bed of the Sarandapotamos to the territory of Tegea, rather than the more difficult route over north Parnon via Arachova, Ay. Petros, Xirokambi and Ay. Ioannis to Astros. Herodotus, however, provides no geographical indications until the Spartans reached the River Erasinus, well into Argive territory, to whose god Kleomenes duly sacrificed. Since the omens were inauspicious—or perhaps more prosaically, since the narrow passage between mountains and sea was blocked by the Argives—Kleomenes withdrew to the Thyreatis and took ship for the Argolis. Again, we are given no geographical indications for the point of embarkation, but the bay of Astros alone provides suitable anchorage. This must have been the port of ancient Thyrea, a settlement which, though

frequently mentioned by Pausanias, cannot be precisely located. Of the possible sites in the area only Ay. Triada, some three kilometres inland to the south-west of Cape Astros, suits the information of Thucydides (4.57.1) that Thyrea lay ten stades inland. Presumably, therefore, the Perioikoi of Thyrea provided at least some of the ships to transport the Spartan troops, but we learn from Herodotus (6.92.1) that Aigina and Sikyon also lent naval assistance, either further transports or warships to convoy them.

Kleomenes was careful to land well to the east of Argos at Nauplia (robbed of its separate political existence perhaps a century earlier: see above) and in the territory of Tiryns, which was also subject to Argos. The pitched battle took place at Sepeia near Tiryns, and the Spartans won; but by far the majority of the Argive force, to the (surely exaggerated) number of 6,000, took refuge in a sacred grove nearby. Then in what Tomlinson (1972, 94) has rightly called an ‘un-Greek’ act of treachery and sacrilege, some fifty of the Argives were lured out of the grove by Kleomenes and killed, while the rest were burned to death in the grove itself. The fire, however, was applied by Helots, presumably to absolve the Spartans themselves technically from any possible taint of ritual pollution. Kleomenes then dismissed the majority of his army and, instead of marching on Argos, proceeded to the Argive Heraion, possibly (a suggestion of A.Blakeway) to parley with the men of Mykenai. On being refused permission by the priest to sacrifice to Hera, Kleomenes had the man whipped—again by Helots.

The consequences of the Sepeia campaign made themselves felt during the Persian invasion of 480–479. Argos itself preserved a spineless neutrality, while Tiryns and Mykenai, briefly independent again, sent hoplites to Thermopylai (the Mykenaians only) and Plataia. Their names were duly inscribed on the Serpent Column erected at Delphi. But between Sepeia and Plataia a very great deal had happened. The defeat of the Ionians in 494 paved the way for Persian intervention in first Thrace then the southern Greek mainland. The envoys sent by the Great King in c.492 to demand earth and water (the customary tokens of submission to Persia) were rejected without ceremony by both Sparta and Athens, but they were received treacherously by Aigina. Athens, threatened with the use of Aigina as a base by the Persian fleet, appealed to Sparta. It is not entirely clear that Aigina was already a member of the ‘Peloponnesian League’ (I personally believe it was), but Kleomenes’ response to the appeal of his former opponents and to the medism of Aigina was unambiguous and unhesitating, according to the account of Herodotus (6.48–51; 61.1; 64–67.1; 73). He went in person to Aigina and demanded hostages as a guarantee of Aigina’s loyalty, only to be rebuffed—perhaps on a technicality on which Damaratos, hostile to Kleomenes since at least c.506, had advised the leading Aiginetans to insist (but see Carlier 1977, 78f.).

Kleomenes now stretched his cavalier attitude to religion to the limit—or rather beyond it: for he bribed the Delphic Oracle to pronounce Damaratos

a bastard and so had him deposed. Most Greeks, Herodotus (6.75.3) says, imputed Kleomenes' gruesome end (below) to this sacrilege, and the pious Herodotus naturally could hardly have approved such an action. But even he, despite the hostile sources he used, explicitly remarked of Kleomenes' first intervention in Aigina that he was 'striving for the common good of Hellas' (6.61.1). We of course may feel free to apply this comment to the sequel also, in which Kleomenes returned to Aigina with his new co-king Latychidas and not only extracted the required hostages (the ten most powerful and wealthy Aiginetan aristocrats) but actually handed them over to their bitterest enemies, the Athenians. Nothing was better calculated to prevent Aiginetan medism, and, when the Persian fleet sacked Eretria and landed in Attika in 490, Aiginetan aid to Persia was conspicuous by its absence.

Had Kleomenes died after handing over the hostages, he might not have received quite so sweeping a 'damnatio memoriae' at Sparta. Damaratos, after all, did go over to the Persian side in 491, and it is doubtful whether those in authority at Sparta at the time thought so highly of him as Herodotus did, despite his prestigious victory in the four-horse chariot-race at Olympia in about 500 (Ste. Croix 1972, 355 n. 5). (Damaratos' direct descendants were excluded from the Eurypontid throne thereafter until the elevation of Nabis in the late third century.) Besides, the Spartans themselves rather curiously ascribed Kleomenes' mode of death to his habit of taking wine neat (Hdt. 6.84.1), not to his tampering with the Delphic Oracle. However, when Kleomenes' sacrilege became known in Sparta, he at any rate feared for his throne (or his life) and withdrew from Sparta.

According to the manuscripts of Hdt. 6.74.1, Kleomenes went to Thessaly (Forrest 1968, 91, says to the Aleuadaei of Larissa, though on what authority I do not know). But the emendation of 'Thessalia' to 'Sellasia' (proposed by D.Hereward) is attractive: Sellasia was the first Perioikic town Kleomenes would reach on his way north from Sparta. Sellasia, however, proved too close to Sparta for Kleomenes' liking (or Thessaly proved too far), and he is next heard of in Arkadia engaged in the revolutionary activity of uniting the Arkadians against Sparta and binding them by the most awful oaths to follow him whithersoever he might lead them (Hdt. 6.74). Herodotus, typically, quickly loses interest in this small matter of royal revolution and, after spending the rest of his space on Arkadia in discussing a minor point of geography, goes on to describe Kleomenes' recall and death. We, however, must fill out the picture.

Arkadia is an upland area of central Peloponnese, difficult of access and yet of crucial strategic importance. It was no coincidence that the historical dialect most akin to the language of the Linear B tablets should have been developed here nor that so many decisive battles were fought in the plain of Mantinea. For Sparta, once it had gained control of Messenia and pushed its frontier in the north-east as far as the northern boundary of

the Thyreatis, Arkadia was the single most important area with which it had to deal. Its boundaries marched with those of the Messenians in the south-west and those of the Argives on the north-east, in other words, with those of Sparta's most important internal and external enemies. It was through Arkadia that Sparta was bound to proceed in the event of war in central or northern Greece. Conversely, Arkadia served as a buffer-zone against any enemies who might be interested in invading Lakonia or Messenia. The full significance of the role of Arkadia was expressed soon after the battle of Leuktra in 371: Sparta's Arkadian allies defected, taking with them the Perioikoi of the Belminatis, Skiritis and Karyatis on the northern frontier of Lakonia, and constituted themselves the Arkadian League (Tod 1948, no. 132); Epameinondas led the first-ever invasion of Lakonia since the 'Dorian invasion' of the Dark Ages and liberated the Messenian Helots; finally, the *polis* of Megalopolis was created out of forty Arkadian villages as a permanent watchdog on Messenian independence and a rival claimant to the Belminatis. It is only if we keep this longer perspective in view that the full import of Kleomenes' behaviour in Arkadia in 491 can be grasped.

Kleomenes, however, may not have been responsible for uniting the Arkadians in the first place. Rather, he may have placed himself at the head of a 'nationalist' conspiracy, in much the same way as Catiline was forced to lead the Italians in 63. For Herodotus (5.49.8) makes Aristagoras in c.500 refer to Spartan difficulties with the Arkadians, and it was just about then or perhaps ten or fifteen years later that the coinage bearing the legend 'Arkadikon' was first minted at Heraia. The propaganda significance of these coins cannot have escaped the Spartan authorities: the Arkadians were announcing that in some sense they wished to act and be treated as 'the Arkadians', whereas Sparta's consistent policy towards their allies from the mid-sixth century onwards was (anticipating Rome) to divide and so rule. The really extraordinary and paradoxical thing, therefore, about Kleomenes' behaviour was that the very same man who had been instrumental in keeping the Boiotians divided in 519 should also have been prepared to foster the unity of the Arkadians some thirty years later.

Herodotus does not explain this *volte-face* of Kleomenes, but I prefer to think of it as yet another instance of his political opportunism rather than as a sign of mental imbalance. In the words of Herodotus (6.75.1), however, Kleomenes had always been 'slightly touched'; and on his return to Sparta he went stark staring mad. He took to poking his staff in the face of anyone he chanced to meet, until his relatives (one suspects his surviving half-brothers) clapped him in the stocks. Here he persuaded his Helot guard to lend him his iron dagger (some Helots at least were trusted to carry offensive weapons in Sparta) and proceeded to butcher himself from the calves upwards. Such a suicide is not, I understand, unexampled in the psycho-analytical literature, but I prefer to follow the amateur detectives

who suspect foul play on the part of the Spartan authorities. The case of the Mairgrets would certainly be greatly strengthened if Sparta in 491 was faced with not only Arkadian dissidence but a revolt of the Messenian Helots to boot.

Such a revolt is not mentioned by Herodotus. He does, however, make Aristagoras (in the passage just referred to) describe the Messenians as 'well-matched' enemies of Sparta; and it has been argued that a Helot revolt makes a better explanation than an alleged religious scruple (Hdt. 6.106.3; 120) for Sparta's failure to arrive at Marathon in time for the historic battle of 490. Moreover, about twenty years later a Spartan ruler (Pausanias the Regent) could plausibly be accused of conniving at a Helot revolt. However, the Spartans undoubtedly were monumentally superstitious (see above all Hdt. 6.82), and we should, I think, take a lot of convincing that Herodotus ignored, deliberately suppressed or was ignorant of so crucial an event in Spartan history. Since I have an open mind on the question, I shall simply set out the evidence and arguments that have been mustered in favour of its occurrence.

First, Plato (*Laws* 698DE) specifically states that there was a Messenian revolt at the time of Marathon. Second, if the so-called 'Rhianos hypothesis' (a tissue of interdependent conjectures without direct external corroboration) is correct, the war starring Aristomenes the Messenian and celebrated by Rhianos was a war fought in the early fifth century, not (as Paus. 4.15.2) the 'Second' Messenian War of the seventh. Third, a dedication of war-spoils at Olympia by the Spartans belongs epigraphically perhaps to the first, rather than the second, quarter of the fifth century (M/L no. 22). Pausanias (5.24.3) apparently knew that the inscription referred to spoils from the Messenians, but he wrongly believed it to have been inscribed at the time of the 'Second' or perhaps the 'Third' (the revolt of the 460s) Messenian War. Fourth, the bronze tripods wrought by the Lakonian Gitiadas (*flor.* c.550) and the Aiginetan Kallon, which Pausanias (3.18.7f.) saw at Amyklai, cannot both have commemorated the same Spartan victory over the Messenians, let alone a victory in the 'Second' Messenian War; but that of Kallon, who is known to have been active at Athens in the 480s, could have commemorated a victory in the early fifth century. Fifth, the statue of Zeus made by the Argive sculptor Ageladas could not have been originally made for the Naupaktos Messenians, as Pausanias (4.33.2) was told, since Ageladas worked in the early years of the fifth century, not c.460 or later. It might, however, have been commissioned at a time when the Messenians were in a state of revolt. (A large dedication by the Messenians at Delphi in the first half of the fifth century is even more problematic: Jeffery 1961, 205.) Finally, Anaxilas, tyrant of Rhegion in the early fifth century, settled some Messenians at Zankle in north-east Sicily, according to Pausanias (4.23.6), who, however, wrongly dates Anaxilas to the seventh century by connecting the resettlement with the 'Second' Messenian War.

It should be obvious that singly none of these scraps of evidence is incontrovertible or even compelling; but taken together they do at least add up to an arguable case, though not an ‘overwhelming’ one, as J.F.Lazenby believe (*MME* 87). A Helot revolt in the 490s would have been the red light as far as Spartan expansion was concerned and a powerful argument for abandoning the extra-Peloponnesian adventures (as they may have seemed to the more conservative members of the Spartan ruling class) favoured by Kleomenes. As we shall see in Chapter 11, Sparta was considerably reluctant to commit large numbers of its troops north of the Isthmus of Corinth in the defence of Greece in 480–479, and one reason for this reluctance may well have been Helot disaffection.

I cannot leave Archaic Sparta and Lakonia without contributing to the perennial debate on Spartan ‘austerity’ or the supposed ‘death’ of Spartan (or, as I prefer, Lakonian) art. One of the most alluring and enduring aspects of the Spartan ‘mirage’ has been the idea of an austere, barrack-like Sparta, hostile to the higher arts. The ‘mirage’ as a whole of course was (and is) a myth, in part a groundless fabrication, partly a half-conscious distortion of the realities. But its cultural aspect seemed more firmly anchored in fact than some others, the more so because it seemed to be independently confirmed by Herodotus (2.167.2) and Thucydides (1.10.2). Furthermore, it appeared that participation in the manual crafts was not merely despised in Sparta but legally prohibited to citizens, at least by the early fourth century.

However, this resilient aspect of the ‘mirage’ suffered a near-fatal blow from the British School excavations at Sparta in the first decade of the twentieth century. These proved that the ‘austere’ Sparta of the myth had had no counterpart in reality before the mid-sixth century at the earliest. The ‘mirage’ was accordingly revised, and Chilon, a veritable Lykourgos *redivivus*, was credited with sponsoring c.550 a sort of Spartan Arusha Declaration, a self-denying ordinance through which Spartan society abandoned its fun-loving ways and transformed itself, overnight, into the familiarly philistine barracks. Unfortunately, subsequent archaeological and art-historical research has shown that the revised picture will not do either, at least not when it is presented in this black-and-white form.

In the first place, the literary and archaeological evidence will not support the hypothesis of a sudden and comprehensive change of attitude. It is true that Alkman (c.600) was possibly the last representative of a native tradition of poetic creativity, but it was not perhaps a very deep-rooted tradition in any case; and Sparta continued to be visited by poets at least to the end of the fifth century, for example by Stesichoros, Simonides, Eupolis and Kratinos. But even if creative poetry was no longer being produced by Lakonians after the early sixth century, there was no comparable shutdown in the visual arts. Ivory-work may have ceased by c.550, but this was not due to ‘austerity’ (see above). Bronze-work continued well after the mid-

century, the series of bronze vessels to the last quarter of the sixth century, the figurines into the fifth. Stone sculpture was never highly developed in Lakonia, whether in the form of statues or of public buildings, but *c.*550 Theodoros of Samos allegedly designed the Skias in Sparta; towards the end of the sixth century Bathyklēs of Magnesia was commissioned to remodel the Amyklaion and employed Lakonian masons (Jeffery 1961, 200, no. 32); the third Menelaion was built in the first third of the fifth century, perhaps about the same time and for the same reason as the Persian Stoa in Sparta; and in the 480s the Spartans were prepared to pay for the marble group to which the misnamed 'Leonidas' belongs. Besides, the series of stone 'hero reliefs' found all over Lakonia ran from *c.*550 into the Hellenistic period. The Lakonian painted pottery continued to *c.*520, its demise, like that of the Corinthian fabric, being due to Athenian competition rather than Spartan 'austerity'; and black-painted Lakonian ware of high quality continued to be produced into the fifth century and found its way as far afield as Olympia.

Second, the decision not to coin silver, which must have been taken around 550, should not be interpreted as either implying an attitude of or leading inexorably to 'austerity'. Coinage was not invented or introduced elsewhere in Greece for primarily economic reasons, and its use did not become synonymous with trade until the later fifth century. The Spartan state could always use coins minted elsewhere, as other states did, and there is no evidence that the retention of iron spits as a store of wealth and standard of value prevented internal economic exchanges. In any event, Sparta through its control of the Eurotas and Pamisos valleys was extraordinarily autarkic in essential foodstuffs; and its possession of abundant deposits of iron ore within its own frontiers may have been a contributory factor in the decision not to import silver to coin.

However, even if there was no sudden death of Lakonian art *c.*550, the question remains how, when and why did the transformation occur that culminated in the philistine fourth-century Sparta presented by Xenophon, Plato and Aristotle, in which citizens were debarred from manual crafts and the products of craftsmen were at a discount? The answer, I believe, lies in what Finley (1975, ch. 10), has called the 'sixth-century revolution', a complex and gradual transformation of the Spartan social system designed to perpetuate Spartan control over the Helots and Perioikoi without abolishing the wide and growing disparities within the citizen-body itself. Thus it was the Spartans, for example, who took the lead in adopting a simple and uniform attire and 'in other ways too did most to assimilate the life of the rich to that of the common people' (Thuc. 1.6.4). The new social system, in operation by the time of Herodotus, was characterized by an overriding emphasis on military preparedness and a reduction of non-military wants to the barest minimum. In this new Sparta there was no longer any room for expensive private dedications to the gods or the ostentatious trappings of the

‘good life’. Here alone could Wealth be described by a comic poet as ‘blind like a lifeless picture’.

With the decay of patronage, craftsmanship and attitudes towards it in Sparta took an irreversible dive. Lakonian craftsmen were not slow to perceive and reflect the change: as early as c.525 some bronzesmiths emigrated to a more congenial yet somewhat familiar environment, Taras in southern Italy; and Lakonia had no part in the cultural efflorescence of the fifth century. Instead of conspicuous consumption in food, clothes, personal possessions or dedications to the gods, the Spartan plutocrats from c.550 onwards displayed their riches with enormous success and rare gusto in that ‘most expensive, most aristocratic and most glory-bringing of all events in the Greek games’ (Finley 1968a, 45), the four-horse chariot-race at Olympia (Ste. Croix 1972, 354f.). For victory here satisfied the claims both of personal prestige and of patriotism.

The Spartan social structure, however, was fatally flawed. The gap between rich and poor Spartans widened, and eventually by the early fourth century moral pressure grew inadequate to suppress differences in life-style at home. The most serious and glaring symptom of internal contradictions was the catastrophic decline in the full citizen population, that *oliganthropia* through which, as Aristotle (*Pol.* 1270a33f.) laconically put it, ‘Sparta was destroyed.’ This will be the major theme throughout the rest of this book.

Notes on further reading

The older bibliography on the ‘Great Rhetra’ may be found in Busolt 1893, 511f. (n. 1), the more recent in Oliva 1971, 71–102. Still fundamental is Wade-Gery 1958, 37–85 (originally published 1943–4). The most recent study I know is Lévy 1977.

On the historicity of Lykourgos (as opposed to that of ‘his’ laws) see Toynbee 1969, 274–83; Oliva 1971, 63–70. The theory of the ‘mixed constitution’ in antiquity is discussed generally in Aalders 1968; its application to Sparta from antiquity onwards is examined in Rawson 1969 (Index s.v.).

On the Ephorate see generally Oliva 1971, 123–31; on the Ephor-list, Jacoby 1902, 138–42; Samuel 1972, 238–41.

For tyranny in the seventh and sixth centuries see Andrewes 1956; Berve 1967; on Sparta’s avoidance of it, Andrewes 1956, ch. 6 (to be read with his earlier study of *eunomia*: 1938). The connection between the institution of hoplite warfare and the emergence of tyranny is discussed, with differing emphases and conclusions, in Salmon 1977 and Cartledge 1977.

For all aspects of Lakonian ivory-work see the meticulously thorough, if chronologically over-precise, Marangou 1969. The study of Lakonian bronze-work is bedevilled by the problem of stylistic attribution: for the hydriai see Diehl 1964; for the hoplite figurines Jost 1975, 355–63. Leon 1968 is among

other things a pioneering attempt to isolate regional workshops within Lakonia and Messenia. The fundamental study of the development of the Lakonian pottery in the seventh century is still Lane 1934; for the sixth century see now Stibbe 1972. Rolley 1977 provides an admirable conspectus of Archaic Lakonian art.

On the dispute over Alkman's place of origin see Page 1951, 102–70; for his language see Risch 1954. His date is discussed in West 1965 and Harvey 1967, 69, on the basis of a recently published papyrus (*P. Oxy.* 2390). Treu 1968 is a useful review of all aspects of Alkman's life and work. The modern literature is exhaustively cited in Calame 1977.

For Sparta's relations with Arkadia and especially Tegea in the seventh and sixth centuries see the works cited in Kelly 1976, 176 n. 13; for the character of the Tegeate plain see briefly Howell 1970, 88f. Forrest 1968, ch. 6, is a typically stimulating account of the 'Second' Messenian War and its Arkadian aftermath.

The 'Bones of Orestes' policy is looked at in Leahy 1955; Griffiths (1976) has detected a trace of it in Herodotus 7.159 (where he would emend 'Pelopides' to 'Pleisthenides'). The policy is attributed to Chilon by Forrest (1968, 75–7); for the papyrus in which Chilon is yoked with Anaxandridas see Leahy 1956 and 1959.

The Argos vs. Sparta struggle for the Thyreatis is discussed in Tomlinson 1972, 87–90 (but his implication that the 'Battle of the Champions' took place in the seventh century is not cogent) and Kelly 1976, 137–9 (but it is unnecessary to deny that the relationship between Sparta and Argos after the Spartan capture of the Thyreatis was for the most part one of mutual hostility).

On Lakonian akroteria of the type found at Tyros etc see now Lauter-Bufé 1974; add Catling 1977, 36 (the 'Old Menelaion' of c.600).

A relatively recent discussion of the Spartan navarchy is Sealey 1976, who argues that it did not become a regular, annual office until after the Battle of Kyzikos in 410. The expedition to Samos of c.525 is briefly considered in Jeffery 1976, 216f. Forrest (1968, 80–2) discounts the view that Sparta was pursuing a consistently anti-Persian policy from the time of its alliance with Croesus, but his tentative reconstruction of a loose 'Argive-inclined' grouping is not an adequate explanation of Spartan actions either. Perhaps here we must allow purely personal considerations some weight: the extraordinarily wide distribution of Lakonian pottery on Samos in the sixth century (it had been imported since the early seventh) and the dedication of a bronze lion at the Samian Heraion by 'Eumnastos a Spartiate' (Jeffery 1976, p1. 14) seem to betoken strong ties of *xenia* (guest-friendship) between Spartan and Samian aristocrats of the kind attested by Herodotus (3.55.2) for the fifth century. We recall the tradition that Samians had helped Sparta in the 'Second' Messenian War (Chapter 8).

The most stimulating and convincing recent account of Kleomenes' reign is Carlier 1977. He, like Jeffery (1976, 123–7), rightly holds that Kleomenes

was a strong king; whether his strength was used for the good or ill of Sparta or indeed all Greece is of course another matter. On all aspects of the origin, character and development of the ‘Peloponnesian League’ see Ste. Croix 1972, ch. 4.

The Sepeia campaign is handled in Tomlinson 1972, 93–5, and Kelly 1976, 140f.; the epitaph of the Argive Hyssematas (Daly 1939) should perhaps be connected with the battle.

On the role of Kleomenes in Arkadia see Wallace 1954. The fifth-century ‘Arkadikon’ coinage, however, has been more recently studied by Williams (1965; cf. Kraay 1976, 95–8), and it seems not to have begun until some ten or fifteen years after Kleomenes; it may betoken a religious not a political organization.

Of modern attempts to read back the ‘austerity’ vaunted by the ‘mirage’ into the historical record the most successful to date is Holladay 1977a.

Helots and Perioikoi

By the time Kleomenes I died, the process of internal construction in Lakonia, including now what Thucydides (4.3.2; 41.2) accurately described as ‘the land that was once Messenia’, had been completed; and Spartan hegemony was recognized generally within the Peloponnese and to some extent outside it. A decade later Sparta was the automatic choice as leader of loyalist Hellas against the invading forces of the Persian Empire. Since this military and political supremacy can only be explained against its Lakonian background, I propose to pull together the threads of the foregoing chapters by discussing systematically the status and functions of first the mainspring and then the essential complement of the Spartan power, respectively the Helots and the Perioikoi. As far as the archaeological and epigraphical evidence goes, 500 will be taken as an approximate terminus. But it will be necessary to draw on literary and environmental evidence from a far wider period than the seventh and sixth centuries.

I

Plato* had occasion to remark that the Helots afforded the subject for the liveliest controversy in Greece; the remark was noted and repeated some six centuries later by the learned Naucratic Athenaios. The controversy was not of course conducted primarily on the moral plane, for the number of Greeks who argued that slavery was not merely not in accordance with nature but actually contrary to it and wrong was small; slaves found a place even in some of the literary utopias which envisaged a general liberation from backbreaking toil and a superabundance of the good things of life (Finley 1975, ch. 11; Vogt 1975, ch. 2). The question rather was one of practical management, and it was in this sense that in the eyes of Aristotle (*Pol.* 1269),

* Where no specific reference is given, the ancient sources cited in this chapter may be found translated in Appendix 4.

for example, the Helot-system was one of the seven most defective elements in the Spartan polity.

What struck non-Spartans from at least the fifth century was, in the first instance, the sheer number of the Helots in comparison to the surprisingly small, and shrinking, master class. Secondly, it was noted that the Helots were Greeks who, at least in the case of the Messenians, were being denied their legitimate political aspirations—political precisely because the Messenian Helots wished to become the *polis* of ‘the Messenians’. Modern scholarly controversy, which can afford to stay neutral on the moral and political aspects, has arisen chiefly from the inadequacies of the ancient sources. The origin of the (Lakonian) Helots, a vexed question already in antiquity, has been considered above (Chapter 7). Here I shall be concerned with the further problems of their juridical status, their economic functions within the complex system of Spartan land-tenure, and the way in which the juridical and economic aspects of Helotage conditioned Spartan political practice.

Unlike the Romans, the Greeks lacked a ‘developed jurisprudence’ (Finley 1973, 64). But even the Roman lawyers were not always able to articulate the complexities of social status and structure in precise and unambiguous legal language. Particularly instructive is the case of the late Roman colonate. We need not here consider its origins, which so nicely express the transformation of economic life in the Roman Empire during the first three centuries AD. What matters is that after Diocletian the ‘colonus’ though formally free was in a condition so close to slavery that only the (technically inappropriate) vocabulary of that institution was found adequate to describe his subject status. The Helot, by contrast, was formally unfree, but yet he or she apparently enjoyed aspects of life normally associated with the status of a free person rather than a slave—or, to be precise, a chattel slave. Hence there was coined, perhaps by Aristophanes of Byzantion in the third century, the expression ‘between free men and slaves’ to characterize the Helots and several other unfree populations scattered over the Greek world from Sicily to the Black Sea.

Unfortunately, though, Pollux, a lexicographer of the second century AD, is our only source for this expression, and he fails to tell us exactly in what respects these populations were thought to resemble each other. It seems to me therefore to be in principle wrong to regard this unclear and ambiguous expression as the most useful classificatory label. Rather, I suggest, we should follow the lead of the Spartans themselves and most of our non-Spartan literary sources, who describe the Helots simply as ‘slaves’, whether using the most general word *douloi* or terms which more strictly refer to their place of work (*oiketai*) or mode of acquisition (*andrapoda*). Indeed, Kritias, the pro-Spartan Athenian oligarch (Chapter 13), reportedly said that in Lakedaimon could be found the most free and the most enslaved of all Greeks. It is this formulation, rather than the one recorded in Pollux, which deserves consideration above all.

For one of the key questions in Greek history, as I see it, is whether the propertied class ('the rich' or 'richest' in Greek parlance) derived their surplus wealth mainly from the exploitation of unfree and especially slave labour. As far as the propertied classes of most Greek states are concerned, the evidence is scattered, allusive, slight. But for the Spartiates (to use the technical term for Spartan citizens of full status) the evidence is relatively full and unambiguous. Spartan citizen-rights were tied strictly to the ability to contribute a certain amount of natural produce to a common mess in Sparta (below). This produce was procured by Helots who were bound, under pain of death, to hand it over to the individual Spartan on whose land they worked. Thus were Spartiates wholly freed from agricultural production and able—indeed, in a sense compelled—to devote their lives to the one practical craft to which no social stigma was ever attached, the craft of warfare.

Two passages will sufficiently illustrate this peculiar feature of Spartan society. The first comes from Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* (4.20–5), a disquisition on good husbandry probably composed in the 350s. In accordance with the then ideology of the Greek propertied class, Sokrates is here made to commend agriculture as the only one of the mechanic arts worthy to be cultivated. In passing he recounts the story of the visit by the Spartan Lysander to the home of his friend Cyrus, the Persian prince (cf. Anderson 1974, 68f.). What particularly amazed Lysander were not so much the sweet smells and beautiful colours of Cyrus' garden as the fact that Cyrus had actually laid it out and planted it with his own hands. The other passage occurs in the *Rhetoric* (1367a28–33) of Aristotle, according to whom the wearing of long hair in the Spartan manner is the mark of a 'gentleman', since long hair is incompatible with manual labour.

What Kritias was saying, then, is that the Spartans were the 'freest' of the Greeks because they had taken the exploitation of slave labour to its logical limit and contrived to perform no productive labour themselves whatsoever. It should be noted in this connection that Aristotle did not criticize the Spartans for thereby securing an abundance of leisure but for misusing the leisure thus obtained. The Spartans, he thought, through devoting themselves exclusively to military matters and neglecting the arts of peace had become little better than wild beasts (passages cited in Ste. Croix 1972, 91). For Aristotle shared the view generally accepted in Greek (and Roman) antiquity that to be a fully free man almost necessarily involved being able to utilize slave labour.

The Helots therefore were properly called slaves in this basic economic sense. But it was also recognized from the fifth century that they differed from the more characteristic chattel slaves in important respects. Since the Spartans had no written laws, we have no Spartan equivalent of the Cretan Gortyn Code inscribed c.450 (Willettts 1967), and we cannot therefore establish precisely the regulations governing the marriages of Helots or their ownership of property. So far as marriages are concerned, in fact, we have just a single reference to Helot wives (Tyrtaios fr. 7) to prove that they were

effected, though not necessarily recognized at law. Some kind of family life, however, is implied by the fact that, like slaves in the Old South, they apparently managed to reproduce themselves or at least to maintain themselves in sufficient numbers to constitute a permanent and indeed growing threat to the diminishing body of Spartiates.

This self-reproduction is of great interest in view of the modern debate over the economics of slavery, particularly slavery in the western hemisphere. But already in the eighteenth century David Hume had remarked in his essay 'Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations' that 'the only slaves among the Greeks that appear to have continued their own race, were the Helotes (sic), who had houses apart.' It is uncertain whether their 'houses apart' were all scattered on the *kleroi* (allotments) to which they were attached or might also be grouped in villages. Strabo's *katoikiai* could refer to either mode of habitation; Livy's *castella* could be either forts or farms; and the Helos of Thucydides (4.54), Damonon (*IG* V.1.213) and Xenophon (*Hell.* 6.5.32) could be either a village or a cult-centre. Since the archaeological evidence does not resolve the matter, we can only speculate that in both Lakonia and Messenia the Helots were forced to abandon the villages of their ancestors and kept dispersed on the land of their masters (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 3.3.5) as a precaution against rebellious combination.

It does seem certain, however, that the Helots could in some sense own or perhaps rather possess personal property. Whether or not they possessed instruments of production is unclear and perhaps unimportant, but it appears that in 425 some Messenian Helots had their own boats (Thuc. 4.26.6f.); and in 223 or 222 6,000 Lakonian Helots were allegedly able to raise the five Attic minas required by Kleomenes III for the purchase of their freedom (Plut. *Kleom.* 23.1, with Welwei 1974, 163–8). Moreover, the Helots not only enjoyed private rights of religious practice, like slaves in other states, but they were also granted at least one public religious guarantee, that of asylum at the sanctuary of Poseidon at Perioikic Tainaron (though this might be violated: Chapter 11).

Such elements of 'freedom' in the Helot way of life may have suggested the first term of the designation 'between free men and slaves'. We are more surely informed as to the reasons why the Helots could not be called 'slaves' without qualification. The main one, to continue the quotation from Hume, was that they were 'more the slaves of the public than of individuals'. That is, relations between a Spartiate and the Helots attached to his land were as it were mediated through the state, in the sense that the Spartiate 'owned' Helots only in virtue of his membership of the Spartan citizen-body. This is why, incidentally, Diakonoff (1974) has appropriated the term 'Helots' as a generic classification for state-owned direct producers in the Ancient East.

Thus the informal agreement existing among other Greek slaveowners 'to act as unpaid bodyguards of each other against their slaves' (Xen. *Hieron* 4.3) was formalized in Sparta, where the state, represented by the Ephors,

declared war annually on the Helots—a typically Spartan expression of politically calculated religiosity designed to absolve in advance from ritual pollution any Spartan who killed a Helot. The Spartan state alone had the power to manumit Helots and release them from the land to which they were forcibly bound (Thuc. 5.34.1 is an example). And any Spartan who exacted from 'his' Helots more than the maximum rent was liable to a public curse. Conversely, every Spartan citizen had the right to use the Helots attached to the service of any other, in the same way that he was entitled to use another Spartiate's horses and country-stores on hunting expeditions.

Following this lead, therefore, Pausanias described the Helots as 'slaves of the community'. Strabo, however, was yet more exact: the Spartans, he says, held the Helots as 'in a certain manner public slaves'. The qualification, which applies to the epithet and not the noun, is crucial. For although no individual Spartiate owned Helots as other Greeks owned their chattel slaves, yet it was to an individual Spartan master that the Helots working a particular estate handed over their rent in kind, out of which the Spartiate paid his mess dues and so exercised the rights of citizenship. It is because the Helots were thus 'tied to the soil' and bound to pay a rent that the terminology of serfdom may be employed to describe their legal status as that of 'state serfs'. That this does not necessarily imply any close similarity between Helotage and mediaeval feudalism will emerge as we examine in some detail the Spartan system of land-tenure.

Let us first be clear that we are being sucked into a bog: the problem of Spartan land-tenure is 'one of the most vexed in the obscure field of Spartan institutions' (Walbank 1957, 628). Part of the reason for this is that of the surviving sources none was writing before Sparta lost Messenia in 370. But the major complicating factor is the twist given to the Spartan 'mirage' in the third century by the revolutionary kings Agis IV and Kleomenes III, who claimed, inevitably, to be restoring the 'Lykourgan' system. The essential problems seem to me to be twofold: from what date was there private and legally alienable landed property in Lakonia and Messenia? and did this include, or was it coextensive with, the *kleroi* worked by Helots?

The first point to establish is that the literary sources from at least Tyrtaios onwards are unanimous that there were rich and poor Spartans. This literary evidence is fully corroborated by archaeology (from the eighth century) and epigraphy (from the mid-seventh). Again, we might cite the string of victories won by Spartans in the four-horse chariot-race at Olympia. For king Agesilaos II, according to the presumably well-informed Xenophon (*Ages.* 9.6), pointed out that such victories depended on the ownership of private wealth; and being the brother of a victor—or rather victrix (Kyniska)—he should have known.

The specific problems posed by the sources on Spartan land-tenure concern above all the precise meanings of certain technical or semi-technical terms. We are told by Aristotle (*Pol.* 1270a19–21) that Lykourgos

(for Aristotle an eighth-century figure) had declared it immoral for a Spartan to buy or sell landed property. It may be anachronistic to think of ownership in juridical terms at so early a date, but, given the congruence at Sparta between what was customary and what was legally permitted, we might assume that Spartans practically never bought or sold privately owned land. This assumption seems to be supported by Aristotle himself, since he then points out that the lawgiver in effect frustrated his own intention by allowing anyone complete freedom to donate his land away from the heirs by gift or bequest.

It is important to realize that Aristotle is here discussing only one category of land, legally alienable private property. But in a passage of the Aristotelian *Lak. Pol.* preserved by Herakleides Lembos (373.12 Dilts) a different distinction is drawn. While it was deemed shameful for a Spartan to sell any land whatsoever, it was forbidden, presumably by law, to sell the ‘ancient portion’. However, although the notion of two different categories of land is introduced, the two passages are not formally irreconcilable. For it is not denied that the ‘ancient portion’ might also be alienated through gift or bequest. We might recall Aristotle’s definition of ownership as ‘alienation consisting in gift and sale’ (*Rhet.* 1361a21f.). This ‘ancient portion’ reappears in slightly different wording in Plutarch (*Mor.* 238E).

Polybius (6.45.3), however, introduces a further complication. Writing in the second century and discussing the allegedly unique features of the ancestral Spartan polity, he says that the first of these, according to the fourth-century writers Ephorus, Xenophon, Kallisthenes and Plato, was the landed property régime: no Spartan citizen might own more land than another, but all must possess an equal quantity of the ‘politike’ land. Unfortunately, ‘politike’ is ambiguous, since it could be the adjective of either *polis* (city) or *politai* (citizens). Most scholars have in fact derived it from *polis* and argued that Polybius provides evidence for a pool of state property distinct from the land owned privately by the citizens. It seems to me, however, that Polybius is most easily interpreted as referring only to land owned by the citizens. For this would be a natural distinction to make in the case of the Spartans, whose own land was not coextensive with the territory of the *polis* as a whole, which embraced also the land of the Perioikoi.

At all events, this interpretation would bring Polybius into line with Plutarch (*Lyk.* 8.3), who, perhaps drawing ultimately on a common source, agrees with Polybius in the matter of equal shares. Significantly, though, he adopts a different criterion of equality, according to yield of produce rather than surface area; and he is far more explicit and detailed than Polybius. In his account Lykourgos conducted a thoroughgoing land-redistribution and carved up Spartan territory into *kleroi*. Plutarch was uncertain how many of the 9,000 *kleroi* had been created by Lykourgos (Polydoros had a reputation for distributing *kleroi* too), but he was certain that 9,000 was the eventual total and that the corresponding number of 9,000 citizens, one per *kleros*, had

remained constant down to the reign of Agis II at the end of the fifth century (*Lyk.* 29.10; cf. *Agis* 5.2).

The implication that all Spartan land was distributed into *kleroi* and that these *kleroi* were somehow in public control is consonant with Plutarch's description of the process whereby a Spartan acquired his *kleros*: the allocation was made at birth, provided that the 'eldest of the tribesmen' had passed the infant as fit to be reared. Here, however, Plutarch is undoubtedly in error, and the error is instructive. For he has conflated two separate procedures, the enrolment of the new-born into a tribe and the allocation of a *kleros*. The latter, even if we accept that it was a tribal matter, could only have been effected at a later stage, when a man had passed through the controlled system of public training called the *agoge* and been elected to a common mess. The simplest explanation of Plutarch's error is to suppose that he has tried to reconcile the fact (made unambiguous by Aristotle) of hereditary succession to a privately owned and legally alienable *kleros* with his false belief in a publicly owned and controlled system of equal and inalienable *kleroi*.

This explanation of the error, to whose source I shall shortly return, is confirmed in my view by his description, apparently following the third-century Phylarchos, of the *rhetra* of Epitadeus (*Agis* 5.3). This measure is said to have provided that anyone who wished might legally dispose of his household and *kleros* by gift or bequest. Most scholars have automatically identified the freedom of gift and bequest criticized by Aristotle as the consequence of this measure. Aristotle, however, as we saw, attributed the dispensation to Lykourgos, and there is reason to suspect that the *rhetra* of Epitadeus may be an invention designed to explain away the failure of 'Lykourgos' to foresee the drastic fall in citizen numbers during the fifth and early fourth centuries (Chapter 14). For no matter what measures had been taken to forestall the alienation of *kleroi*, these had been circumvented long before the date usually assigned to Epitadeus' *rhetra*, the early fourth century. As Forrest (1968, 137) has succinctly put it, 'Epitadeus, if he existed, does not belong to the fourth century or, if he does, did not create the trouble.'

I cannot therefore accept that there had ever been a pool of equal and inalienable *kleroi* owned or controlled by the state. On the other hand, I do not of course mean to deny that there had ever been a redistribution of Spartan land before the redistributions of Kleomenes III and Nabis in the third century. Some form of distribution was indispensable to provide the economic basis for transforming all Spartan citizens into hoplites in the seventh century. Moreover, if we can give any sense to the expression 'ancient portion', I feel this must refer to the land owned in Lakonia, mostly by aristocrats, prior to the creation of what we might call the 'new portions' in Messenia. An attempt must have been made to achieve a rough equality between these new *kleroi*, since it was on the produce from a *kleros* that a

Spartan's citizenship and membership of the hoplite army was made to depend—in a manner to be discussed shortly.

For two reasons, however, I do not believe there is any way we can rationally calculate the size or number of the *kleroi*. First, we lack the requisite ancient evidence for all the relevant factors; in particular, the recent demonstration that the geomorphology of the Eurotas and Pamisos valleys has changed significantly since our period (Chapter 2) makes it impossible to estimate with any precision the ancient agricultural potential of the Spartans' land, besides automatically ruling out of court all modern calculations based on existing conditions. Second, such ancient evidence of a quantitative nature as we do possess is either relevant only to the third-century reforms or, if relevant to the period from c.650 to 370, is not sufficiently reliable or precise. It may none the less be useful to set out this evidence in some detail, if only to demonstrate that the host of wildly fluctuating and mutually incompatible modern estimates are indeed built on sand.

According to Isokrates (12.255), the original number of Dorians who 'invaded' Lakonia was 2,000. This figure can only have been a guess, perhaps related to the number of Spartan citizens at the time (339 BC)—an even smaller figure. Aristotle (*Pol.* 1270a36f.), however, about the same time as Isokrates referred vaguely to a report that there had once been as many as 10,000. Obviously he is referring to the period before 370, when Sparta controlled Messenia as well as Lakonia, and indeed to a time well before 370, since he knew that then there were only about 1,000 Spartan citizens. It would be rash to place much trust in such a round number thus allusively cited, although it is possible that Aristotle's 10,000 is a rounding up of Herodotus' 8,000 given for 480 (*Hdt.* 7.234.2). Certainly, though, Herodotus' figure is the earliest reliable figure we have.

Whether or not it is absolutely correct, when taken with Aristotle's figure for the second quarter of the fourth century it is sufficient to prove that, despite Plutarch, there was no necessary one-to-one correspondence between the number of citizens and the number of *kleroi*. In other words, even if each Spartan paterfamilias had been allocated a *kleros* in the seventh-century distribution, that number of *kleroi* did not determine the size of the citizen body for all time. Yet this was precisely what Plutarch wrongly but revealingly believed. We may now turn to consider the possible source or sources of his error.

First, we recall a serious discrepancy between Plutarch and Polybius. The latter, naming four fourth-century sources, gave size as the criterion of equality among the holdings of 'politike' land. Plutarch, however, is confident that the *kleroi* were so carved out as to yield an equal amount of produce, from which the Spartan master and his wife might receive respectively seventy and twelve medimnoi of barley and a corresponding amount of fresh fruits. The simplest explanation of the discrepancy is that Plutarch has followed the sources implicitly rejected by Polybius, namely those of the

third century who swallowed or indeed formulated the propaganda of Agis and Kleomenes. This explanation is perhaps supported by the number 9,000 given by Plutarch for the *kleroi* distributed by Lykourgos and Polydoros. For Agis proposed to raise the citizen body from 700 to 4,500 by redividing Spartan land in the Eurotas valley, and this land was thought to be roughly equal to the land once held in Messenia.

It could of course be argued that Agis' projected figure was based on the number of citizens known or believed to have existed in the 'Lykourgan' heyday. But for me this would only reinforce the suspicion that Plutarch was using Agis-tainted sources, as there was in fact no one-to-one correspondence numerically between citizens and *kleroi* in the fifth and fourth centuries at least. A second clue pointing in the same direction is Plutarch's statement that Lykourgos had also redistributed the land owned by the Perioikoi into 30,000 *kleroi*. Since there is no evidence, and no reason to suspect, that the Spartans had interfered with Perioikic land before the third century—apart from assigning 'choice precincts' to their kings (Xen. *Lak. Pol.* 15.3)—this figure can only be explained as a doubling of the 15,000 Perioikic allotments envisaged by Agis. In short, it seems highly probable that Plutarch's figure for the *kleroi* and citizens under the 'Lykourgan' dispensation is a backwards projection of the figure envisaged by Agis and almost achieved by Kleomenes.

It is far harder to handle the figure of eighty-two medimnoi of barley given by Plutarch as the (maximum) annual rent to be paid by the Helots to a *kleros*-holder and his wife. On the one hand, the fact that in Plutarch the rent was to be paid just to a Spartan master and his wife corresponds to the situation immediately following or envisaged in the third-century redistributions rather than to the one criticized by Aristotle in the *Politics*, in which the sons of such a couple were falling into poverty and forfeiting citizen-rights through division of the inheritance (cf. Chapter 14). Moreover, it was only after a relatively large number of approximately equal *kleroi* had been created that an average rent could have been fixed. On the other hand, these arguments would apply no less to the situation following the seventh-century distribution, and it could be argued further that Agis aimed to produce *kleroi* commensurate with the payment of the 'Lykourgan' mess dues.

For in the case of the latter Agis could have been genuinely following rather than setting a precedent. That is, the quantities given by Plutarch (*Lyk.* 12) for the monthly mess contributions so correspond to those given by the fourth-century Dikaiarchos (fr. 72 Wehrli) that both must have been drawn from a common source (Kritias or Aristotle has been suggested). This does not of course mean that we may extrapolate from these quantities the size and yield of a 'Lykourgan' *kleros*. For it is unclear precisely which land was redistributed in the seventh century; we do not know the ratio between rent and yield (the proportion of one half cited in Tyrtaios fr. 6, even if it is a rent paid by Helots, does not necessarily apply to the situation after the 'Second'

Messenian War); and the minimum contributions to the mess do not exhaust the commodities produced on Spartiate land. None the less, these contributions do provide our best evidence for the economy certainly of Lakonia and probably of Messenia too before the third century.

According to Dikaiarchos, the prescribed minimum contribution was: one and a half Attic *medimnoi* (roughly bushels) of barley flour; eleven or twelve *choes* of wine; an unspecified weight of cheese and figs; and ten or so Aiginetan obols to buy extras. Plutarch gives: one *medimnos* of barley; eight *choes* of wine; five minas of cheese; two and a half minas of figs; and an unspecified sum of money for extras. In other words, Dikaiarchos has translated Lakonian measures and weights into their Attic equivalents where he was reasonably sure of the ratio. Let us consider each item in turn, incorporating other literary, archaeological and epigraphical evidence.

Barley today is merely a major feed grain for animals and is ingested by humans only indirectly; in Lakonia, for example, it is grown widely, especially in the Malea peninsula and east Helos plain (*ESAG* no. 304). In antiquity, however, it was used as well for human food as for animal feed (Moritz 1955; 1958, xxi, 167). Indeed, it appears that until perhaps as late as the fourth century barley, eaten as a 'kneaded thing' (*maza*: Plut. *Kleom.* 16.5 etc.), was widely preferred to wheat as food in Greece, partly for technological reasons and partly because tastes in food are always partly irrational (the ancients were aware from experience that wheat was more nutritive). The stipulated mess contribution being in barley suggests therefore that the rule had been established before the fourth century; 'home' rations for kings in the fifth century were also provided in barley (*Hdt.* 6.57.3). However, by the first half of the fourth century rich Spartiates were contributing wheaten bread to their messes (*Xen. Lak. Pol.* 5.3), although Theophrastos (*Hist. Plant.* 8.4.5; *Caus. Plant.* 4.9.5) remarked on the lightness of Spartan wheat at the end of the century.

A Spartan *medimnos* of barley a month, perhaps seventy-three or seventy-four litres in volume, undoubtedly constituted a living ration for an adult male; this can be seen by comparing our other evidence for rations, especially those sent over to the men trapped on Sphakteria in 425, although we must allow for exceptional circumstances here (*Thuc.* 4.16). Thus the rent of eighty-two *medimnoi* per annum maximum should have fed at least six or seven persons. Presumably, if the figure applies to our period and not just the third century, the surplus was either consumed by the members of the Spartiate's household or put into a public store. We are not told how the barley made its way from field to mess, but there may have been a central mill at a place near Sparta called 'the grindings' (*Alesiai*: not yet certainly located). Alkman (fr. 95a) mentions a mill, and stone suitable for millstones occurs near Mistra in the Taygetos piedmont west of Sparta.

The grapevine can flourish in droughty, rocky and calcareous soils, on level and sloping ground, and at considerable altitudes (up to 1,219 m. today

in the Peloponnese). The Mediterranean type of climate normally provides sufficient moisture for its spring vegetative phase and the dry, sunny weather to ripen the fruit. Both in relief and in climate Lakonia (especially) and Messenia are admirably suited to viticulture, although we should note that vines 'require a greater degree of tendance and control of the environment than any other Mediterranean crop' (White 1970, 229). The recent discovery of grape-seeds at the Menelaion site should confirm that the wine in the stoppered jars found in the Mycenaean mansion was locally produced. Pedasos (Mothone?) was noted for its vines by Homer (*Il.* 9.152). By 600 Alkman could write as a connoisseur of five local wine-growing districts (fr. 92d: Oinous, Dentheliatis, Karystos, Onoglos, Stathmis) and even suggest an intimacy with viticulture by referring to the grubs that destroy the 'eyes' of vines (fr. 93). The districts, however, where they can be securely located, were in Perioikic territory. Perhaps the Spartans' own Helot-produced wine was *vin ordinaire*, a potent enough brew to dement Kleomenes I if taken neat too often no doubt.

Cheese will have been made from the milk of sheep and goats rather than cows. 'Pasture' in the northern European sense does not exist in Greece today, and since cultivable land is a maximum of 20 per cent of the surface area per annum, livestock may merely graze the stubble to manure the soil for the next planting. Normally they must make do with the terrain between the 'cultivable' and the totally barren (30 per cent of the surface area in 1961), and on this basis Kythera in 1961 was reckoned to have the highest proportion of 'pasture' of any eparchy (ESAG no. 319). Ancient conditions will not have differed greatly. None the less, in 1961 the eparchy of Lakedaimon (roughly the Eurotas furrow) had the seventh largest number of goats, and it seems from the Pseudo-Platonic *Alkibiades* (1.122D) that Lakonia and Messenia were no less well equipped with small stock animals in antiquity. Indeed, it has been suggested that land in Messenia planted to wheat in the Mycenaean period was turned over to pasture under the Spartan domination. Apart from cheese, sheep and goats will have provided skins, wool, hair, animal fat and, to a minor degree, meat.

The fig, like the grapevine, was pre-eminently well adapted to the Lakonian and Messenian environment. Today the first crop in June-July is mostly eaten fresh, the second in August-October is used for drying. Charmis, Spartan victor in the prestigious *stadion* foot-race at Olympia in 668, is said to have trained on a special diet of dried figs. Aristophanes (fr. 108) provides a typically humorous political explanation of the relatively small size of the 'Lakonian' fig, but this may be a generic name rather than a reference to the figs actually grown in Lakonia or Messenia. Theophrastos (*Hist. Plant.* 2.7.1) adds that irrigation improves the fruit of the Lakonian fig.

The last of the items mentioned by Dikaiarchos and Plutarch is money. As we have seen, Sparta did not coin silver as early as most other states—in fact not until the early third century. Exchanges, however, did take place in

Lakonia, in which iron spits seem to have been somehow involved. This subject is too complex to go into here, but Dikaiarchos may have translated into the Aiginetan standard monetary contributions that were in fact made in the form of iron spits. It should, however, be added that at least one Aiginetan coin has been found in an Archaic context on Spartan territory, at Anoyia in the Spartan plain (perhaps the Dereion of Paus. 3.20.7). Spits, square in section, have been excavated at all the major Spartan sanctuaries, but it is unclear whether they are monetary or purely functional.

The items mentioned so far exhaust the range neither of the food consumed in the mess nor of the plants and animals raised in Lakonia and Messenia by Helots. The first notable omission is the third member of the 'Mediterranean dietary triad' (Chapter 4), the olive, whose possibly crucial role in the Dark Ages has been considered in Chapter 7. In fact, Dikaiarchos does mention the olive earlier in the same passage, where he indicates the range of food actually consumed in the mess. We may add that, according to Thucydides (1.6.5), the Spartans were the first Greeks to anoint themselves with olive oil and scrape themselves off after athletic exercise. This presumably betokens an abundance of the oil in Lakonia.

The same passage of Dikaiarchos also introduces another dietary staple, pork, from which the Spartans made their state speciality, the bloody black broth that so disgusted a visiting ruler and so delighted Hitler (Rawson 1969, 7, 343). The Spartan kings were privileged to receive the hides of all sacrificed animals (Hdt. 6.57.1), and Xenophon (*Lak. Pol.* 15.5) refers to pigs in the context of royal sacrifices.

Dikaiarchos notes that exceptionally fish, a hare or a ring-dove might be eaten in the mess. The fish were presumably sea-fish caught by Perioikoi and perhaps dried, but the hare and the dove were prizes of a favourite Spartan pastime, hunting. The chief prize, however, was the wild boar, to the capture of which the Spartans apparently devoted considerable thought. The specially bred 'Lakonian' hound was valued as a scenter; horses, dogs and provisions were made available on demand to all Spartans, though they were no doubt owned only by the rich; and a hunting party was one of the only two legitimate excuses for being absent from the common meal. The popularity of boar-hunting with the Spartans is demonstrated by archaeology. Lakonian artists represented boars and sometimes hunting scenes in vasepainting, terracotta, bronze and stone during the sixth century and later. A funeral mound of c.600, to which we shall be returning in various connections, contained bones of wild boar. The chief hunting area near Sparta seems to have been the region of the lower eastern slopes of central Taygetos known as Therai (Paus. 3.20.5). The area was no doubt more densely wooded than it is today.

The horse deserves separate mention, for it occupied a special place in Lakonian life. Small bronze representations of the animal were fashioned by Lakonian craftsmen and dedicated in Spartan sanctuaries from c.750. Alkman

(fr. 1.51, 59; 58.2; 60.3) displays a virtuoso familiarity with the various regional breeds and mentions galingale, which was particularly used as horse-fodder. Probably it was in Alkman's lifetime that horses were sacrificed on the funeral mound just mentioned. Finally, there are the horses bred for racing. Being extremely expensive to maintain, horses were the prerogative of the rich and often aristocratic few. Since they require extensive pasture and abundant water, conditions in the ancient forerunners of the modern Helos plain and Pamisos valley appear to have been most suitable. The Pseudo-Platonic *Alkibiades* suggests there was a remarkably large number of horses kept in Lakonia and Messenia, and it is no surprise to meet a Messenian supplying horses to Alexandria in the third century (Plut. *Kleom.* 35.3).

Three more life-sustaining creatures deserve a mention. The bee, first represented in Lakonian art on a four-sided ivory seal of 700–675 and beautifully evoked by Alkman (fr. 89.4), yielded the essential sweetener honey and the multi-purpose wax. Second, migratory quails were presumably netted in antiquity, as they are shot today, at the foot of the Tainaron and Malea peninsulas; Xenophon (*Mem.* 2.1.3f.) commented that their sexual ardour made them easier to catch. Third, the domesticated fowl, besides providing meat and eggs (the symbol of Helen, represented for instance on a sixth-century relief from Sellasia: below), was also a suitable object for sacrifice.

Finally, let us turn from animal to vegetable. Another unknown forbidding us to use the available quantitative evidence as a sufficient basis for estimating the size of a *kleros* is the amount of land planted to legumes. That they were important in the Spartan diet is suggested by Alkman's references (fr. 17.4; 96) to a porridge of mixed pulse (perhaps pea, lentil, lupine and vetch), the food of the common man, and by Theophrastos' citations (*Caus. Plant.* 7.4.5f.) of 'Lakonian' types of vegetable (lettuce and cucumber). Alkman also mentions sesame, a soil-improver whose seeds might be used both to flavour bread (fr. 19.2f.) and to feed animals. Flax, which is labour-intensive and requires much water for its growth and processing, was grown for its fibre in Messenia in late Mycenaean times, but for the historical period we hear only of edible linseed (Alkman fr. 19.2f.; Thuc. 4.26.5). I would guess, however, that the linen used, for example, in hoplite tunics was locally produced.

Those then are the crops and animals raised by Helots in Lakonia and Messenia for Spartan use at home and abroad. We cannot estimate with precision or even roughly the size of a *kleros*. It is clear, however, both from the imbalance in numbers between Spartiates and Helots and from a crucial passage in Xenophon (*Hell.* 3.3.4–11, fully discussed in Chapters 13 and 14) that more than one Helot family worked each *kleros*. Unfortunately, though, only one source gives a numerical ratio, and that for a military not an agricultural context. In 479 each Spartiate who fought at Plataia was accompanied by seven Helots (Hdt. 9.10.1; 28.2; 29.1). If the figure has been

correctly transcribed by Herodotus or his copyists, this would certainly be the largest number of Helots ever known to have left Lakonia. In fact, to many scholars it has seemed implausibly high. Clearly it was not demanded on strictly military grounds, although Welwei (1974, 120–4) has properly stressed the supply problem of this campaign and suggested that Helots were used to solve it. Moreover, even if the Spartans were afraid of revolution in their rear—a plausible suggestion in view of the evidence mustered for a possible Helot revolt c.490 (Chapter 9)—it is highly unlikely that they would have risked taking so many potential enemies with them on a vital campaign. It is worth remembering Xenophon's statement that on campaign the Spartans took the precaution of debarring the Helots from the arms-dump. So if Herodotus' seven-to-one proportion has any validity, it seems more likely to represent the ratio of the Helot to Spartan populations as a whole than the proportion at Plataia.

However that may be, all our evidence indicates that at least by the fifth century the Helots were vastly more numerous than the Spartans and that this very numerical disproportion was an important factor governing relations between the two. However, the precise character of these relations is harder to discover. Thucydides in a celebrated passage (4.80) fully discussed in Chapter 12 regarded the liquidation of some 2,000 Helots in 425 or 424 as an instance, if a spectacularly horrific one, of the normal precautionary attitude of the Spartans towards the Helots. Myron too, who is of course a less reliable witness, treats the killing of Helots as a regular mode of control. Then there is the evidence for the 'Krypteia', which has been illuminated by Jeanmaire (1913) with a wealth of comparative anthropological material. This too appears to have been a routine institution, whereby youths who had passed through the *agoge* (the state educational system) completed their apprenticeship by going out into the country, lying low by day and killing Helots by night. Plutarch is emphatic that this exercise in brutality was no part of the 'Lykourgan' order, but only became general after the revolt following the great earthquake of c.465. Herodotus, however, in a rarely noticed passage (4.146.2) almost casually remarks, ostensibly with reference to a context of c.800, that the Spartans perform their official killings by night; and Isokrates (12.181), admittedly with hyperbole, claimed that only the Spartans denied the wickedness of all homicide.

Some modern scholars, on the other hand, have preferred to follow Plutarch and minimize the role played by hatred, fear and judicial murder in Spartano-Helot relations. As Grote put it (though he was careful to distinguish between domestic and agricultural Helots in this regard), 'the various anecdotes which are told respecting their treatment at Sparta betoken less of cruelty than of ostentatious scorn—a sentiment which we are noway surprised to discover among the citizens of the mess-table.' This milder interpretation has been followed most recently by Ducat (1974), who suggests that it was because the Helots were in some ways so similar to the

Spartans that the latter were anxious to exaggerate the differences. For example, it was because the Helots were in a sense 'within the city' that war was declared upon them annually in order to render them legally outsiders. And the murder of Helots, Ducat argues, was essentially a magical rite, a symbolic representation intended to reaffirm the norm that Helots were not and could not become Spartans. In short, the characteristic attitudes of the Spartans towards the Helots were scorn and contempt. Hence the beatings, the intoxications, the enforced wearing of a dogskin cap and rough animal pelts—all measures designed to remind the Helots of their 'alterity'.

No doubt there is truth in both versions. The main point, however, remains: Helotage had been initiated and maintained to serve the class interests of the Spartans. The proper question to ask then is why the Spartans, unlike other Greek master classes, found themselves constantly menaced by revolt and felt compelled to resort to such extreme repression. There is no single answer.

In the first place, as Finley (1973, 63, 68) has emphasized, the Helots were in comparison to chattel slaves a privileged group, enjoying 'all the normal human institutions except their freedom'. Of course the context in which these institutions were forced to function was highly abnormal, but their relative privilege in such matters as family-life and the possession of personal property could have encouraged them to lay claim to greater rights and freedoms, especially since they were Greeks.

Second, the Messenian Helots, who at least by the time of Thucydides (1.101.2) greatly outnumbered the Lakonian, were politically motivated men. In fact, they were precisely what Vernant (1974, 28) denies to have been possible in ancient Greece, 'an active and unified social force, a group of solidary men intervening on the historical stage to orient the course of events in a direction conformable to their interests and aspirations'. They lived, moreover, far from Sparta and separated from it by a formidable mountain barrier. For these reasons no doubt it was against them rather than the Lakonian Helots that Spartan repression was more particularly directed. We should, though, recall that in 465 it was the Lakonian Helots (if Diodorus may be trusted) who began the revolt, that in the late fifth and early fourth centuries the Athenians devoted some attention to disaffecting the Lakonians as well as the Messenians, that Kinadon's conspiracy of c.399 may have been a primarily Lakonian affair, and, finally, that Aristotle's often quoted comparison of the Helots to 'an enemy constantly sitting in wait for the disasters of the Spartans' was made after the liberation of Messenia.

Third, however, and for me decisively, the relationship between the Spartans and the Helots had been conceived in conquest, and it was essentially as a defeated enemy that the Spartans treated the Helots, whose very name perpetually recalled the fact. The relationship, however, was dialectical. The militarism which Aristotle deplored was the price Sparta

inevitably paid for maintaining a uniquely profitable system of economic exploitation.

II

The origins of the Perioikoi, as already stressed in Chapter 7, were more heterogeneous than those of the Helots, but their status, as it had been gradually defined by the end of the seventh century, was no less uniform in relation to the Spartans. They were the inhabitants of the towns in Lakonia and Messenia apart from Sparta and Amyklai, free men but subjected to Spartan suzerainty and not endowed with citizen-rights at Sparta. Their free personal status and disfranchisement are not controversial. Disagreement abounds over the character of their subjection, and the social and political organization of their own communities.

According to Larsen (1938, 818), the Perioikoi stood somewhere between Helots and free allies of Sparta. According to Oliva (1971, 62), they occupied a station between Spartan citizens and foreigners or allies. The latter, I suggest, is the more fruitful perspective. For on the one hand the Perioikic communities were regarded as *poleis*, not only by inexact writers like Herodotus (7. 234), Xenophon (*Hell.* 6.5.21; *Lak. Pol.* 15.3; *Ages.* 2.24) and Stephanos of Byzantium, but even by Thucydides (5.54.1). The same idea that they were in some sense politically autonomous is conveyed by the formally incorrect description of Pharai, Geronthrai and Kythera as ‘colonies’ of Sparta. (However, the apparently corroborative epigraphical evidence for magistracies in Perioikic towns belongs to the second and first centuries and may not therefore be relevant to the period before 195, when Flamininus completed the political liberation of the Perioikoi from Sparta: see Chapter 15.) On the other hand, it was a peculiarity of the Spartan *polis* that its territory was not identical with the land owned by its citizens, and that the name of the state was not ‘the Spartiates’ but ‘the Lakedaimonians’, which in military contexts embraced the Perioikoi as well. Xenophon indeed several times refers to a mixed force as ‘the citizen army’ (*Hell.* 4.4.19; 5.4.41, 55; 7.4.20, 27). In what then did the subjection of the Perioikoi lie?

The answer, I suggest, is that they were bound, as it were, ‘to follow the Spartans whithersoever they might lead’. We do not in fact know the terms of any individual treaties between the Spartans and a Perioikic community, and their mutual relationship need not ever have been so formalized. Undoubtedly, though, they were obligated to submit without question to Spartan direction in foreign policy, and in this respect their position resembled that of the allies of Sparta outside Lakonia and Messenia before the formation of the Peloponnesian League. Indeed, I would argue that it was Sparta’s experience in dealing with its Perioikoi which provided the model for the Peloponnesian League. Unlike the League members, however, the Perioikoi never won and may never have sought the right of collective veto of

a Spartan decision provided by a majority vote of the League Congress. The King's Peace of 386, which guaranteed 'autonomy' to every separate Greek city, was only once interpreted to support Perioikic independence from Sparta. And the 'haughty roughness' (Grote) dealt out by the Spartans to their foreign allies may have been felt the more strongly by the Perioikoi.

Thus in order to explain their subjection we need not believe (*pace* Parke 1931; Bockisch 1965, 131–7) that the twenty harmosts mentioned in an ancient commentary on Pindar were imposed on the Perioikoi (the harmosts at Kythera and perhaps Thyrea and Aulon were exceptions due to strategic exigencies) nor that the Ephors, as Isokrates (12.181) claimed, could have any Perioikos put to death without trial. We do not, however, know when the military burden was first imposed nor when Perioikoi first fought with Spartans against an external enemy. The suggestion that the *gymnetes* of Tyrtaios (fr. 11.35; cf. *P. Oxy.* 3316) were Perioikoi is unconvincing. But the bronze figurines and grave stelai depicting hoplites found in Perioikic territory (below) suggest a *terminus ante quem* of c.525. Our earliest literary evidence concerns the campaigns of 480–479, but by 418, and probably by 425, Perioikoi were brigaded individually with Spartiates in the hoplite phalanx (Chapter 12).

The Perioikoi in question will have been drawn from the ranks of the wealthy, who, as elsewhere in Greece, will have included but not been coextensive with the 'true gentlemen' (presumably aristocrats) who volunteered for hoplite service in 380 (Xen. *Hell.* 5.3.9; cf. Plut. *Kleom.* 11 for this stratum). Again like other Greeks, these rich Perioikoi will have derived their surplus from the exploitation of chattel slaves (not Helots: see below). We have unfortunately no positive ancient evidence that they did so, but there are four pieces of evidence which strongly suggest this.

First, a fifth-century inscription cut into the living rock of Mount Koumaro (ancient Larysion) at Gytheion (*IG* V.1.1155) forbids anyone, whether free or slave (*doulos*), to quarry stone. Second, five manumission stelai of the late fifth and early fourth centuries from the sanctuary of Poseidon at Tainaron (*IG* V.1.1228–32), which dedicate the freed persons to the god, must be attributed to Perioikoi. It is true that the transactions are dated by the eponymous Ephor at Sparta and that Helots used Tainaron as an asylum, but from all we know it was the Spartan state alone, and not individual Spartiates, that could manumit Helots. Third, a famous anecdote concerning Agesilaos (Plut. *Ages.* 26.5 etc.) implies that in the early fourth century there were no craftsmen among the Perioikic hoplites; they must therefore have been farmers but freed by slaves from the necessity to labour constantly with their own hands. Finally, in c.240 a raid by the Aitolian League on Lakonia allegedly netted no fewer than 50,000 slaves (Plut. *Kleom.* 18.3). The raid was directed at least in part against the Perioikoi (Polyb. 4.34.9), so if the figure is to be trusted it seems necessary to postulate that some at least of the captives were slaves of the Perioikoi rather than Helots.

A second related function of the Perioikoi, but antedating the seventh century, was to serve as a kind of territorial reserve against the Helots. The general lack of military co-operation between the Perioikoi and the Helots against the Spartans may or may not betoken different ethnic affiliations, but it is true that only once before the liberation of Messenia did Perioikic towns join a Helot revolt (in c.464) and that in this instance both were Messenian. The majority, however, was in Lakonia, where they served to separate the Helots from the Arkadians and Argives in the north and to keep an eye on the lower Eurotas valley from their less favoured situations in Vardhounia and the Tainaron and Malea peninsulas. Forts at Kosmas and Trinasos prevented the Helots from communicating with the outside world respectively across Parnon and by sea. Similarly in Messenia the fort at Vasiliko divided the Messenians from the south-west Arkadians, and Aulon blocked the way to Triphylia and Elis. All this may become clearer after the review below of Perioikic towns archaeologically attested by c.500.

The third main function of the Perioikoi was broadly economic. There is no good reason to believe that they actually paid tribute to Sparta: the 'royal tribute' mentioned in the *Alkibiades* (1.123A) is a mystery, and the comparable reports in Strabo (8.5.4, C365) and Hesychius (s.v. *kalame*) are inconclusive. They may, however, have been required or encouraged to make monetary or other contributions on an individual and *ad hoc* basis. However this may be, it is quite certain that the chief rock, mineral and marine resources of Lakonia and Messenia lay in Perioikic territory, that imports to Sparta and other commercial relations with the outside world had to pass through Perioikic hands, and that Perioikoi played a major role in Lakonian craftsmanship.

Most of the marble used for the sculpture now in the Sparta Museum was won from Spartiate land on the eastern slopes of Taygetos in a quarry difficult of access between Anavryti and Mistra. But Lakonia was not distinguished at any period for its buildings or sculpture of marble. Subsidiary marble quarries are known at Vresthena in northern Lakonia, Chrysapha in the west Parnon foreland and Goranoi in west Vardhounia. In its uppermost course the marble from Dholiana just north of the Spartan frontier resembles Pentelic, but in Lakonia it seems only to have been used at Tyros in the east Parnon foreland. Transport was presumably too expensive for it to be used at Sparta. In fact the stone most widely used for buildings in Lakonia and Messenia was local limestone of varying quality. The chief sources for other than local use seem to have been the quarries in north-west Mani at ancient Thalamai, Leuktra and Kardamyle. Finally, poros, which was used for monumental carving in Sparta, occurs in the plain of Molaoi.

Iron ores are widely distributed throughout Lakonia. Apart from the important deposits at Neapolis (Chapter 7), we might cite those at Kollinai in the Skiritis and Porto Kayio (ancient Psamathous) in south Mani. The quantity of small, mould-made lead figurines dedicated at Spartan sanctuaries

in Lakonia (over 100,000 at Orthia alone) and exported, probably by Spartan pilgrims for the most part, to sanctuaries elsewhere in Lakonia (Anthochorion, Analipsis, Tyros) and the Peloponnese suggests an extensive local supply of the ore; there were certainly ancient workings in the Kardamyli district. Finally, O.Davies in 1935 made a tantalizing reference to the known location of copper ore at Alagonia, at the western end of the Langadha pass over Taygetos; but the localities in question have been shown to contain 'very small, low-grade sulfide deposits with little or no copper mineralization' (*MME* 232).

Lakonia, then, was remarkably self-sufficient in useful rocks and minerals as well as agricultural potential, and overseas trade in essentials was relatively unimportant. From one standpoint this was fortunate. For although the borders of Lakonia and Messenia are washed on three sides by the Mediterranean, communications inland are generally poor (below), and the number of harbours offering both protection from winds and heavy seas and a holding anchorage is small compared to the extent of coastal frontage. The only harbours of any practical significance on the long eastern coastline of Lakonia were, north to south, Astros (ancient Thyrea), Tyros, Leonidhion (ancient Prasiai), Kyparissi (ancient Kyphanta), and Palaia Monemvasia (ancient Epidauros Limera). On the Lakonian Gulf Gytheion was the chief port of Sparta; the next best anchorages were Neapolis (ancient Boiai) and Skoutari Bay (ancient Asine). In the Messenian Gulf Kardamyli served as Sparta's port after Gytheion had become independent in the second century; Kalamata (ancient Pharai) did not become important until the modern breakwater was built. On the west coast of Messenia the best natural harbour was of course Navarino Bay (ancient Pylos), but the Spartans made little or no effort to develop its strategic or commercial potential.

However, despite this dearth of good harbours, there were still of course Perioikoi who engaged in fishing and trade. The economic significance of fishing in the Mediterranean world generally is often grossly inflated (cf. Braudel 1972, 140, 145); and we should regard it as of secondary importance even for most coastal settlements. There is, however, one marine resource, the murex mollusc (trunculus or brandaris), which merits special mention. As Edward Gibbon remarked, 'by the discovery of cochineal, etc. we far surpass the colours of antiquity.' But of the latter 'royal purple', obtained by processing the milky secretions of the murex, exercises a certain fascination (Reinhold 1970). Its production in antiquity was primarily associated with the Phoenicians of Tyre, but among the Greeks the Lakonians and Tarentines were leading producers. Murex shells have been excavated in prehistoric contexts at Kastri on Kythera and Ay. Stephanos, and the waters off Kythera and Gytheion are still major sources of the mollusc. I suspect, however, that it was the Phoenicians calling at Kythera in the eighth century or earlier who firmly established the production of the dye, which in historical times was

used to colour the *phoinikis* or short cloak worn by all members of the Spartan hoplite army (Cartledge 1977, 15 and n. 38).

The problem of Perioikic trade and traders is more complex. As already remarked, overseas trade will have been relatively restricted. Apart from the copper and tin needed for bronze artefacts, it will have been concerned mainly with the import and export of fine ceramic tableware or bronzes for display or votive dedication. This trade will undoubtedly have been in Perioikic hands to some extent, but, when it more or less disappeared in the course of the fifth century, we should not imagine that this precipitated an economic crisis in the Perioikic communities, of which Gytheion was the most important in this regard. For even if Gytheion had acted as a sort of 'port of trade' linking the closed and archaic Spartan system with the more open and developed economic systems of the Greek world, most Perioikic communities were no doubt dominated by the same land-oriented values as the Spartans themselves. A possible index of this is the fact that, although Perioikoi were presumably not forbidden to handle coined money, pre-Hellenistic coins have been found on only two Perioikic sites (Prasiai and Kythera). On the other hand, trade within Lakonia between Spartans and Perioikoi was crucial, not merely for the procurement of chariots for horseracing but for the very maintenance of the military machine. This leads us naturally, and finally, to consider the role of Perioikoi in Lakonian craftsmanship.

I have been careful hitherto to speak of 'Lakonian' art and artefacts. That label must now be unpacked, and the discussion placed within the modern debate over the status of craftsmen and craftsmanship in ancient Greek societies generally. This debate is focused on two main problems: how typical of Greek sentiment as a whole was the hostile attitude towards 'banauistic' (manual) enterprise manifested by intellectuals and aristocrats like Sophokles, Xenophon and Plato? Second, if their attitude was typical, was it long or recently established? Briefly, my own view is that the attitude was largely confined to the propertied classes, whose members did not have to work for their living, and that it only took on its acrimonious overtones with the rise of democracy (cf. R.Schlaifer in Finley 1968b, 99ff.). Sparta, thanks to the exploitation of the Helots, was somewhat peculiar, though not unique, in its official hostility to manual craftsmen (Hdt. 2.167.2; Plut. *Ages.* 26.5). However, as we saw in Chapter 9, neither the belief of the 'Spartan mirage' in archetypal Spartan austerity nor its modern substitute, the belief that Lakonian art suddenly 'died' around 550, is consistent with the facts. In the same way the problem of craftsmanship in Lakonian society must clearly be reappraised.

According to the conventional wisdom, perhaps most pithily expressed by Cook (1962), craft production at Sparta and *a fortiori* in the rest of Lakonia was from a very early period exclusively in the hands of the Perioikoi. I have already tried to show elsewhere that the picture is more complex (Cartledge

1976b); space forbids much more than a summary of those arguments here. In the first place, Pausanias expressly distinguishes two Lakonian craftsmen of the sixth century as Spartan citizens. Unreliable evidence, no doubt, but I wonder if they, like the 'local' man Gitiadas, would have secured such firm remembrance had they been Perioikoi. Second, there are two scraps of epigraphical evidence possibly tending to the same conclusion. One of the masons working at Amyklai under Bathykleas at the end of the sixth century had the extraordinary—indeed, so far unique—name Technarchos (Jeffery 1961, 200, no. 32), whose suffix is more usually associated with aristocrats. In the first quarter of the fifth century a sculptor called Kyranaios executed an expensive and perhaps royal commission at the Hyperteleton sanctuary (Jeffery 1961, 201, no. 43). If he was a Lakonian, as the script of the inscription may suggest, his name recalls those like Athenaios (Chapter 11) and Chalkideus (Chapter 12) and seems more appropriate for a citizen than a Perioikos.

The evidence cited so far hardly constitutes proof that Spartan citizens had once practised a manual craft. Inferences from archaeological evidence, however, are more compelling. To begin with, the dogma that only Perioikoi were responsible for Lakonian art founders on the rock of the continuity of Lakonian art from the tenth century. Spartan citizenship may not have been precisely defined before the eighth century (the Partheniai episode), but it is hard to believe both that none of the craftsmen working in Sparta before the seventh century was a descendant of the Dorians who had settled Sparta in the tenth and that all craftsmen working in Sparta in the eighth century were automatically excluded from the citizen body. At any rate, we know that cooks, like heralds and flautists, enjoyed hereditary citizen rights in the fifth century (Hdt. 6.60).

We need not, however, rely on speculation alone. A burial-group has been excavated in what was the village of Mesoa at Sparta, comprising four cist-graves marked by a terracotta relief amphora of c.600 and covered by an earthen tumulus (Christou 1964). This group has already been cited for the bones of horses and wild boar found in the earth. We can now add that nearby were discovered the remains of a house-wall and—the point of the story—a potter's kiln. The location of the graves, the elaborate nature of the funeral rites, possible ancestor-worship, the hunting-scene depicted on the amphora—these can only mean that the occupants of the graves were of citizen status. Thus, as far as Spartan citizens' involvement in craft-production is concerned, the proper question to ask is the one to which I sketched an answer at the end of Chapter 9.

I do not, however, wish to deny that Perioikoi, at least from the seventh century, played the major role therein. Far and away the most important function they will have performed in this connection was the manufacture and repair of armour and weapons. Copper and tin for the bronze protective armour had to be imported, but iron for swords and spearheads was available

locally. Metalworking in Lakonia, however, remained backward down to the eighth century (Chapter 7), although it is illegitimate to infer from the story of the Spartiate Lichas marvelling at a Tegean blacksmith (Hdt. 1.67) that forges were unknown in Lakonia as late as c.550. Armour and weapons, I assume, were manufactured in Sparta itself as well as the Perioikic centres where iron slag has been found (below). But a problem arises over the mechanism whereby a Spartan hoplite acquired his equipment.

Most scholars have assumed that he did so by direct individual purchase in the same way as hoplites in other states—and indeed Perioikic hoplites. It seems to me, however, more likely that the Spartan state made itself somehow responsible for supplying citizens—as from 424 it certainly supplied Helots and Neodamodeis (Chapter 12)—with their arms and armour. For then the qualification for hoplite service for a Spartiate would have been on a par with that for membership of the citizen body, namely election to a common mess and the ability to contribute to his mess the minimum fixed quantities of produce and money discussed earlier in this chapter.

III

I shall conclude my study of Archaic Lakonia and Messenia by passing in review the Perioikic sites identifiable archaeologically by 500. There were many more sites than the thirty or so for which we have archaeological evidence, but precisely how many is unclear. Herodotus (7.234.2) says vaguely that there were many, Strabo that in his day (the turn of our era) there were about thirty *polichnai* apart from Sparta itself. But Strabo was referring only to Lakonia. In ‘ancient times’, when Sparta had also controlled Messenia, there were reportedly around 100 Perioikic communities. This report goes back at least to Androtion (324F49) in the fourth century, but the eighty or so known by name, mostly contained in the lexicon of Stephanos, represent a more likely number.

The vast majority of these were in Lakonia. Their small size as a rule was a natural consequence of the restricted quantity and quality of the arable land left to them after the Spartans had taken the most fertile for themselves. Indeed, it was no doubt precisely because their land was less desirable that the Perioikoi had not been transformed into Helots—a line of argument which would, incidentally, rule out the suggestion of Hampl (1937, 35f.) that Perioikoi too had Helots. Sparta did not actively encourage, and may have generally discouraged, combinations between the Perioikic communities; it is noticeable that independence in the second century was swiftly followed by some form of confederation. But no attempt was made to disband the ‘synoecism’ of Boiai (Chapter 9) or the ‘Tripolis’ in northern Lakonia to which Pellana belonged (Polyb. 4.81.7; Livy 35.27.9).

Where possible, in my survey I shall follow the lines of the ancient routes (Figure 17). For although Lakonia was notoriously hard to penetrate from




Figure 17 Routes in Lakonia and Messenia

outside (Eur. fr. 1083; Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.24; *Anth. Pal.* 7.723.1), it was of paramount strategic and economic importance to the Spartans to be able to communicate both within Lakonia and with Messenia. The importance can be gauged from the fact that it was the responsibility of the kings, presumably *qua* generals, to ‘give judgment in all matters concerning public highways’ (Hdt. 6.57.4). These highways, however, were probably the handful of arterial routes suitable for the transport of Helot produce or military supplies by wooden cart or waggon (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.22). Theophrastos (*Hist. Plant.* 3.16.3) mentions a type of oak used for carts in Lakonia. The remainder perhaps approximated more nearly to the Greek norm, being hardly more than footpaths or bridlepaths, many barely suitable even for pack-animals.

The most convenient route linking Sparta with central Peloponnese followed the Eurotas furrow northwards as far as the small plain at the foot of Mount Chelmos, the site of ancient Belmina, where it split and continued either to the plain of Asea or to the Megalopolis basin. *En route* it took in the unidentifiable Charakoma and Perioikic Pellana (Paus. 3.21.3). The latter lay at Kalyvia Georgitsi about twenty-seven kilometres by road from Sparta. The settlement was probably centred on the hill of Palaiokastro, where the walling of a small ruined mediaeval fort may incorporate earlier Greek work and black-painted sherds have been found on the surface. Trial excavations yielded a small black-painted oinochoe and an iron spearhead. The site is favourable, lying in a fertile plain and fed by a nearby perennial spring. Pellana’s claim to be the birthplace of the Dioskouroi was challenged by little Pephnos in north-west Mani, but Alkman (fr. 23) sensibly sought a compromise, no doubt chiefly to conciliate the strategically vital Pellana when Sparta was turning its aggressive attentions to Arkadia.

Belmina was also strategically crucial. Mount Chelmos overlooks the whole upper Eurotas valley. On its summit are preserved the extensive remains of fortification walls some of which go back to the third-century or earlier ‘Athenaion’ (Polyb. 2.46.5; Plut. *Kleom.* 4.1). Remains of house-walls associated with Classical black-painted pottery were found a short way south, and from the village of Petrina about four kilometres north-west comes a limestone relief of 500–475 depicting a naked youth with a snake rearing up before him. This must belong to the series of such funerary reliefs made in Lakonia in the last six centuries BC and found all over the region.

To reach Tegea, a route *via* the old Khan of Krevata and bypassing Sellasia was followed through the Kleissoura pass and the bed of the Sarandapotamos. Perioikic Sellasia, which lay on the border of the territory held directly by Sparta (Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.13, 19), was situated most probably on the hill of Palaiogulas, some twelve kilometres north of Sparta and close to the west bank of the Kelephina (ancient Oinous). Excavation has revealed a rubble circuit-wall and sherds from the fifth to second centuries. A stone relief of the sixth century, dedicated by a Pleistiadas to the Tyndaridai (Jeffery 1961, 200, no. 24), was found in modern Sellasia further west.

At the old Khan of Krevata the route joins up with those leading to the villages of north Parnon and the Thyreatis; Chateaubriand in 1806 bitterly noted that they were among the roughest and wildest in Greece. Since drinking water is not available in the Kleissoura, the muletrack *via* Arachova (ancient Karyai) was sometimes preferred for journeying to Tegea. Ancient Karyai lay on the border of Lakadaimon (Thuc. 5.55.3), but has not been certainly located. K.Rhomaïos, a native of the area, initially placed it at Analipsis, the hill about four kilometres west of Vourvoura close to the junction of the routes from Sparta to Tegea and the Thyreatis. Later, he preferred to identify Analipsis with Iasos or Iasaia (Paus. 7.13.7; 8.27.3). The hill was the site of an extensive Classical and Hellenistic settlement, encircled by a wall of polygonal style. Earlier occupation is attested by Geometric pottery (Chapter 8) and a few Archaic finds, including terracotta figurines and small lead wreaths. In the Sarandapotamos river west of Vourvoura a tiny bronze 'bucket' was fished up at the end of the nineteenth century, inscribed 'Alphios' in lettering of c.500 (cf. Chapter 1).

The pass over Parnon to the Thyreatis continues northeast from Karyai to Ay. Petros. Just before the crest of the ridge forming the watershed of water flowing to the bay of Astros, Tegea and Sparta are three heaps of stones, each about five metres in diameter, the whole forming a triangle. Their identification with the Hermai (Paus. 2. 38.7) is not proved, but there was an Archaic sanctuary here. Rhomaïos excavated a schist slab bearing a sixth-century inscription, a small fragment of an Archaic terracotta gorgoneion, a broken spherical aryballos and some scraps of roof-tiles and black-painted pottery.

From Ay. Petros (the site of a well-preserved fourth-century kiln) the route leads to Xirokambi, Helleniko (ancient Eua), Meligou (?ancient Anthana) and Astros (near ancient Thyrea). The sixth-century finds from Meligou and Astros have already been cited (Chapter 9). A secondary route leads from Helleniko *via* a monastery of St Luke to the foot of Mount Zavitsa, the northern boundary of the Thyreatis. An inscription of c.500 from Mount Zavitsa (*SEG* XIII.266) marked an Argive cenotaph commemorating an otherwise unrecorded battle with the Spartans, perhaps to be connected with the Sepeia campaign. Communications within the Thyreatis are difficult by land, so most traffic will have been by sea. Ancient Tyros well illustrates the point: it lies between Astros, whose natural lines of communication are to the north, and Leonidhion (ancient Prasiai), whose links are southwards; and the routes across Parnon from the Eurotas valley lead to Astros and Leonidhion.

On the principal pass across Parnon, from Chrysapha or Geraki (ancient Geronthrai) to Leonidhion, lies modern Kosmas, which is possibly to be identified with ancient Glympeis or Glyppia. Bronze figurines have been found sporadically here, the most notable being a resplendent hoplite dedicated to Apollo Maleatas by one Charillos c.525 (Jeffery 1961, 200, no.

37). A considerable scatter of black-painted sherds on the hill Proph. Elias prompted an excavation, which revealed the existence of a Classical fort stocked with iron spearheads and arrowheads, small knives and pointed bronze objects (apparently missiles).

The only other Perioikic site on the east coast of Lakonia known to have been inhabited by 500 is Epidauros Limera (Chapter 9), whose epithet is probably a tribute to its harbour. The town could be reached from Sparta by skirting Parnon *via* Chrysapha, Goritsa, Geraki and Apidia (?ancient Palaia); ancient wheel-ruts have been detected between Goritsa and Geraki. Chrysapha lies twenty kilometres south-east of Sparta and has been doubtfully identified with ancient Therapne (Appendix 2). About three kilometres south of the village is a hill which is the reported provenance of a fine hero-relief of 550–530 (now in the Pergamon Museum, Berlin). One of the two dead portrayed holds a pomegranate in her hand, as does one of the two diminutive worshippers; the other worshipper bears a cock. The hill itself is scattered with iron slag and a good deal of Classical pottery, and I would therefore adjudge the site to have been Perioikic.

Geraki has yielded several of the series of hero-reliefs, including what seems to be the earliest of all. Yet more important, however, are the fragments of two Archaic korai, the only such figures known from Lakonia (Ridgway 1977, 90, 114), and an inscription of c.500 concerning Apelon, the Doric form of Apollo (Le Roy 1974, 220–2). Also worth mentioning are three lists of names of the same date, one certainly a victor-list (*SEG* XVII.189), the others possibly so (Jeffery 1961, 201, nos 45–6). One of the names recorded is Tebukios, which has been interpreted as an epichoric form of Homeric Teukros. A tomb near Gouves not far away has produced aryballoi described as ‘orientalizing’ and so possibly Archaic; the settlement to which the tomb belonged probably lay on the Geronthrai-Palaia route. About sixteen kilometres east-north-east of Geraki across Parnon lay ancient Marios. Near the ancient akropolis there are fine springs, and a small bronze horse and another list of names of c.500 were discovered close by. On the akropolis itself some of the roughly squared walling may go back to the first half of the fifth century.

The ‘Hyakinthian Way’ (Athen. 4.173F) between Sparta and Amyklai, along which the common messes lay, ran on a short distance to Vapheio. A little south of here the road bifurcated, the left fork continuing along the Eurotas to Mount Lykovouni, crossing the river by ruined Vasilo-Perama and thence following the left bank to what is now the Helos plain. Below Vrondama the ancient route can be followed in sections for almost the whole way between Grammoussa and Tsasi. About 200 m. west of Tsasi a hill is sprinkled with sherds, including perhaps some Archaic.

Near Tsasi there is a second fork in the road, one branch going eastwards to ancient Helos (general region of Vezani), the other continuing south to Gytheion and skirting the Helos plain. From Vezani the road continued

through the pass of Mount Kourkoula to Molaoi and thence either to Epidauros Limeria or *via* Plytra (ancient Asopos) to Neapolis (ancient Boiai).

In the hills surrounding the Molaoi plain, midway between the plain and Monemvasia, lies the village of Angelona. A short distance east of here an Archaic and Classical heroon was excavated, which yielded for example miniature votive kantharoi, a few terracotta figurines and two loomweights. The surface finds were even more impressive, in particular a bronze snake and the base of a marble statue, both late Archaic. The heroon perhaps belonged to the territory of Epidauros Limeria.

Not far north-east of Asopos lay the Hyperteleton, which may once have been attached to Perioikic Leuke or Leukai (Polyb. 4.36.5; 5.19.8; Livy 35.27.3). Numerous inscriptions have been found here, mainly Hellenistic and Roman in date, although some bronze vessels and a stone lustral basin were inscribed before 500 (*SEG* XI.908). The most interesting Archaic finds, however, are the temple itself, a long narrow structure; and a bronze figurine of an oldish man carrying a hydria, whom one is tempted to identify as the owner of a hydria workshop (but see Rolley 1977, 130 and fig. 7).

In the small plain on the coast south of Plytra lies Daimonia (ancient Kotyrta), where a rare black-figure sherd has turned up. In the Vatika plain behind Neapolis a fragmentary Archaic kylix has been reported from Ay. Georgios. Perioikic Boiai will presumably always have been in fairly close contact with Kythera. Iron slag from Vithoulas not far from the northern harbour of Ay. Pelayia corresponds to the slag from Neapolis. The sixth-century finds from Kythera town and a coin-hoard (buried *c.*525–500) have already been mentioned. Worth adding here is a black-painted mug of *c.*500 from Gonies inscribed ‘hemikotyliion’ (*IG* V.1.945).

The direct route from Sparta to Gytheion has been outlined above. An alternative route skirted Taygetos *via* Bryseiai (not precisely located: see Appendix 2), the Eleusinion at Kalyvia tis Sochas and Xirokambi. The settlement at Anthochorion (Chapter 7) lay about two kilometres south-east of Xirokambi. Archaic finds included lead figurines, suggesting the existence of a sanctuary.

Thirty stades before Gytheion, according to Pausanias (3.21.5), to the right of the road lay Aigiiai. This has been plausibly located at Palaiochora, where farmers have unearthed Archaic terracottas and bronzes, the latter including a figurine of Zeus (?) and a bowl dedicated apparently to Athena. At Gytheion itself, however, sixth-century archaeological evidence is rather slight: a bronze figurine of Hermes, an engraved gem (perhaps made on Euboia), and two inscriptions in the living rock (one already cited, the other a dedication to Zeus Kappotas). The floruit of the town seems not yet to have arrived.

The obvious route from Gytheion into the Tainaron peninsula, perhaps taken already by Teleklos (Chapter 8), followed the modern road to Areopolis

via the Karyoupolis divide. Along this lay ancient Las (modern Chosiario), whose sixth-century products include a pyramidal stone 'herm' of a ram-headed deity, probably Apollo Karneios, and a fragmentary hero-relief. At Dichova near Kamares on the west coast of the Lakonian Gulf between Ageranos (probably ancient Arainos) and Skoutari (ancient Asine) disiecta membra of an Archaic temple to Aphrodite have come to light.

Communications in south Mani were perhaps always desultory. Between Oitylon (ancient Oitylos) and Mezapos (ancient Messe?) a sixth-century marble hero-relief (now in the Sparta Museum) was built into a mediaeval church at Charouda. It depicts a nude male figure with his hoplite equipment on the ground before him. Another Perioikic hoplite, then, but hardly from barren Charouda and so perhaps from Messe. South of Messe at ancient Hippola, occupied certainly by the seventh century (Chapter 8), there has been found Lakonian black-figure pottery of the sixth.

From Oitylon an ancient road may have run along the coast to Kalamata (ancient Pharai). Wheel-tracks, but of uncertain date, have been noted between Koutiphari (ancient Thalamai) and Platsa; near Levтро (ancient Leuktra); and north of Kardamyli (ancient Kardamyle). The main attractions of Thalamai's site were two natural springs. Sixth-century finds include a Doric capital in the local limestone and the elaborate handle of a bronze hydria, but for the historian the main significance lies in the oracular shrine of Ino-Pasiphae, in which the Spartans took a direct, political interest (Oliva 1971, 131 n. 1). The cult is attested for the fifth century (*IG* V.1.1316), but it is not known when or why the Spartan involvement began. A fourth-century dedication by a member of the Spartan Gerousia (*IG* V.1.1317) presumably gives a *terminus ante quem*.

Kardamyle was blessed with a defensible akropolis as well as the harbour, limestone and lead-deposits already mentioned. Sixth-century objects from here include a Doric capital and a bronze figurine of a bull. Another such figurine has been found in Kalamata, as well as a sherd from a black-figure krater. In the valley of the Nedon close by several names of uncertain significance were incised *c.*500 on a smoothed surface of rock (Jeffery 1961, 206, no. 5).

From Kalamata main routes radiated north along the eastern side of the Pamisos valley *via* Hellenika (ancient Thouria) and Ay. Floros to the Leondari pass into Arkadia; north-west to Ithome and the Stenyklaros plain; and west to Pylos *via* Akovitika, Nichoria and Chandrinou.

At Ay. Floros was built the temple of the river-god Pamisos. (Compare perhaps the bucket inscribed 'Alphios' and Kleomenes' sacrifice to the god of the Erasinos.) This has yielded the earliest known Messenian inscription, a dedication of *c.*550 (Jeffery 1961, 206, no. 1). Akovitika on the east bank of the Pamisos was of great prehistoric significance (Chapter 4). In historical times it was the site of a sanctuary of Pohoidan (Poseidon), the identification being guaranteed by dedications inscribed on sixth-century

and later pottery. It was presumably here that the Pohoidaia festival managed by Thouria was held. Of the other sixth-century dedications particularly noteworthy are the bronze figurines apparently made by a school of local craftsmen (Leon 1968).

The latter may also have been responsible for the bronze figurine of Hermes dedicated to Zeus at Ithome *c.*525 (Athens, N.M.7539: Lamb 1926, 138, no. 9; I cannot accept Miss Lamb's attribution to an Arkadian workshop). This figurine is perhaps the sole material evidence that the cult of Zeus Ithomatas was maintained between the late eighth century (attested by an ithyphallic terracotta) and the mid-fifth, and one wonders whether a Helot would have been able to afford so costly a dedication.

Nichoria (?ancient Aipeia) is exceptionally well situated for both agricultural and strategic purposes, but was apparently abandoned *c.*750, perhaps following the intervention of Teleklos (Coldstream 1977, 164). Chandrinou, however, has produced an Archaic bronze figurine of a horseman (now in the National Museum, Athens).

To the south of Nichoria ran the route to Koroni (ancient Asine) bypassing the sanctuary of Apollo Korynthos, which may have been attached to the predecessor of ancient Kolonides (founded in the 360s). This Apollo received a sixth-century bronze figurine of a hoplite second in quality only to the one dedicated to the Apollo of Kosmas. An inscribed spear-butt of the early fifth century maintains the martial flavour. A PC sherd is reported from Koroni, but there is nothing from the sixth century, although the harbour may already have been used by the Spartans before 500 (cf. Hdt. 8.73.3). North of Nichoria ran another route to the Stenyklaros plain.

From Chandrinou a route led south-westwards to ancient Mothone, where late Archaic pottery has been found in cist-graves. A road presumably linked Mothone to Pylos, whence a coastal route led *via* Kyparissia (ancient Kyparissia) to Aulon (Chapter 13). An Archaic head has been found at Kyparissia, and on the offshore island of Prote graffiti begin in the sixth century (Jeffery 1961, 206, no. 2). Most of these are concerned with sailing ventures, but ironically it was the arrival of an Athenian fleet in 425 which put the area on the map and gave it a significance most unwelcome to the landlubbing Spartans.

Notes on further reading

Helots

Most of the ancient sources and a representative selection of the more influential modern views are brought together in Toynbee 1969, 195–203, and Oliva 1971, 38–48. For the use of Helots in war, not directly attested before 494, see Welwei 1974, 108–74, which also touches on many other aspects of their status.

The groups of dependent labourers classified as ‘between free men and slaves’ are discussed in Lotze 1959 (26–47 on the Helots), Finley 1964, and Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977, ch. 4. For chattel slavery, with which Helotage is to be compared and contrasted, see the studies reprinted in Finley 1968b, and Finley 1976 (a succinct summary of its essential character). The quantity of excellent work on chattel slavery in the Old South is prodigious: see the bibliography in Weinstein and Gatell 1973, 411–39. Degler 1970, a comparative survey of slavery in Brazil and the southern States in the nineteenth century, is full of suggestive analogies and contrasts to the ancient experience on such matters as reproduction, family-life, religion and revolts.

For work on Spartan land-tenure see Oliva 1971, 32–8, 48–54; his discussion of the ancient evidence is less satisfactory. Lotze 1971 tries to determine (1) the boundaries of the land held directly by Spartan citizens and the Spartan state; (2) the number of *kleroi* or at least citizens; (3) the quantities of produce handed over by Helots; and (4) the proportion of Spartiates to Helots. He rightly stresses that the literary evidence is reliable, if at all, only for Agis and Kleomenes, but, like Roebuck 1945 (on Messenia, mainly after the liberation), he makes insufficient allowance for our ignorance of crucial quantitative data; and, like Jardé (below), he is not aware of the altered geomorphology of modern Lakonia and Messenia.

On cereal-growing in ancient Greece generally see Jardé 1925; but his attempt (109–15) to calculate the size of yields in Lakonia and Messenia fails to distinguish between Spartiate and Perioikic land. The view that there was a marked shift from pasturage to cereal-growing in the eighth century has been most persuasively advanced by Snodgrass (1977, 12–15). The instruments and techniques involved are discussed in Moritz 1958 and by W.Schiering in Richter 1968, 147–58.

On olive-cultivation in modern Greece see *ESAG* no. 316; also Richter 1968, 137–40 for ancient Greece, and White 1970, 225ff. for ancient Italy.

For early Greek hunting in general see Buchholz 1973. The ‘Lakonian’ hound in literature is considered in Hull 1964, 31–4; in visual art by Freyer-Schauenburg (1970).

Perioikoi

Useful summary accounts of their origins, status and functions may be found in Toynbee 1969, 204–12, and Oliva 1971, 55–62. Gschnitzer 1958, 66ff., 188, is a useful collection of the ancient evidence, but his interpretation suffers from the thesis, adopted from Hampl 1937, that the Spartans were an aristocratic group, the Perioikoi the Dorian commons. The fullest periegesis of the individual towns is Niese 1906; see also Bölte 1929, 1303–21.

The military functions of the Perioikoi will be looked at more fully in Part II. For their economic role see now Ridley 1974; it seems, however, he has set up an ‘Aunt Sally’ by arguing against ‘the still standard view that they

were basically an industrial and commercial class'. For even if most Perioikoi were somehow engaged in agriculture, this would not exclude the existence of Perioikic mining contractors, merchants, small traders, craftsmen and so on. As for Ridley's doubts that the Perioikoi could have so faithfully reflected Spartan values, Holladay (1977a, 123) has rightly observed that 'subjected groups have often tended to accept and emulate the values...of dominating groups'. I am not, however, sure I agree with Holladay that life in a Perioikic town might not have differed substantially from life at Sparta.

III

Classical Lakonia
c.500–362BC

The crisis of Lakonia 490–460

Herodotus is generally acknowledged, even by thoroughgoing sceptics like C.Hignett (1963), as our primary source for Xerxes' invasion of Greece. It is no less generally recognized, however, that his account of its immediate antecedents—the period from Marathon to the Isthmus Congress of 481, punctuated by the death of Darius in 486—is wholly unsatisfactory. Herodotus assumes, perhaps rightly, that a full-scale Persian campaign of conquest in Greece was inevitable after 490, but instead of discussing in detail the attitudes and responses of the Greeks to the barbarian menace he indulges his theological and dramatic bent by casting Xerxes' expedition in the form of a tragedy with full supernatural apparatus. Part of the reason for this one-sided approach was no doubt the kind of Greek sources he had available or chose to use. The treatment of the role of Themistokles is only the most notorious product of biased reporting. However, the history of Sparta is equally personalized and distorted by being presented, fitfully, through the medium of Damaratos, one of Herodotus' most audaciously exploited *dramatis personae* (and sufficiently impressive to excite the muse of C.P.Cavafy).

Damaratos, it will be recalled, had been deposed from the kingship in c.491 at the instigation of Kleomenes, who was then—as even Herodotus conceded—pursuing a thoroughly 'panhellenic', anti-Persian foreign policy. The motive for Damaratos' opposition to Kleomenes' coercion of medizing Aigina is not specified and probably not creditable, but not even Herodotus could turn a blind eye to Damaratos' subsequent, unambiguous medism. I put it this way because Herodotus' account of Damaratos' career after his deposition is quite remarkably sympathetic. Both the alleged suicide of Kleomenes in c.491 (6.84.3) and the death in exile over twenty years later of Latychidas (6.72.1) are explained as retribution for their engineering of the deposition of Damaratos. His self-imposed exile from Sparta soon after being dethroned is ascribed to an intolerable insult from Latychidas (6.67), and he is made to say that the insult will be the source of countless blessings or (what Herodotus clearly believed) troubles for Sparta. His flight to Persia is




Figure 18 Classical sites in Lakonia and Messenia

represented as enforced upon him because the Spartans would not permit his exile in Elis (6.72), although Herodotus does not say why they would not nor why Damaratos chose to go first to Elis (see below). His extremely favourable treatment at the hands of Darius is recorded without comment (6.70.2; 7.104.2), and he is then introduced at several important junctures in the narrative of Xerxes' invasion to serve as a mouthpiece for Herodotus' ideas, even when this results in the psychologically implausible situation of the unjustly exiled king lauding Sparta to the skies for embodying the rule of *nomos* (law: 7.102.2).

The reason for this favourable and circumstantial account of Damaratos' medism is doubtless that Herodotus had talked to Damaratos' descendants in the Troad, where they were still ensconced in the time of Xenophon (Lewis 1977, 54 and nn. 29–30). But revealing though this is of Herodotus' historical methods it is less important in the immediate context than Damaratos' alleged role in bringing the proposed Persian invasion to the notice of the Greeks. The chapter describing the concealed message sent by Damaratos to Sparta (7.239) has in fact been suspected as an interpolation, but it poses no more difficulties than the formally similar story of how the Milesian Histiaios, also at Susa, allegedly urged the Ionians to revolt from Persia; and it accords perfectly with the generally favourable picture of Damaratos that Herodotus is so anxious to paint. However, whether or not it was Damaratos' doing, it is not implausible that the Spartans should have been the first of the Greeks to hear of the Great King's design on their land. For as leaders of the Greeks their reaction to this intelligence would have been one of the first to be canvassed, and the Greeks, we are told (7.138.1), had ample advance warning of the invasion.

Xerxes took four years to prepare his expedition, so it was perhaps not long after 485 that the Spartans sent to Delphi, as was their wont, to ask Apollo what attitude they should adopt (7.220). The god's response, in accordance with his general line at this time, was blatantly medizing: either Sparta would lose a king in battle or the Persians would overrun Lakonia. Since Sparta had never yet lost a king in battle, the message was plainly intended to discourage resistance. It was at this awkward juncture, I believe, that the Spartans took the extraordinary—indeed, so far as we know, unique—step of holding repeated assemblies, at which the sole agenda was 'Is anyone willing to die for the fatherland?' (7.134). Herodotus does not link the news from Susa with these assemblies. He is primarily interested in the 'wrath of Talthybios', whereby two Spartan heralds paid the penalty in 430 for the Spartans' impious treatment of Darius' herald in 492; and it is somewhat incidental that the fathers of these two heralds were the men who had volunteered to die for the fatherland between 485 and 481. However, as the Spartans 'esteemed the things of heaven more highly than the things of men' (5.63.2), it is just conceivable that the volunteers, who were leading aristocrats and so not lightly dispensable, were sent as a kind of expiatory

and at the same time apotropaic sacrifice to Xerxes. Alternatively, and more prosaically, they went as ambassadors in the ordinary way to discover whether Xerxes was prepared to consider a diplomatic rather than a military settlement.

When it was learned that he was not, it is to Sparta's credit that (so far as we know) no attempt was made to give earth and water. For most of the Greek states which had not been incorporated into the Persian empire by Darius were medizing, whether positively (7.138.2) or negatively (by remaining neutral: 8.73.3); and there must have been more than a few Spartans who believed that the Athenians should suffer for a war they had provoked without consulting the Spartans (8.142.2). As it was, Sparta was unanimously adopted as leader of the loyalist Greeks who met at the Isthmus of Corinth in autumn 481 to form what is usually known today (from Hdt. 7.205.3) as the 'Hellenic League', to distinguish it from the pre-existing Peloponnesian League and the subsequent Delian League. Herodotus, however, is typically unhelpful in dealing with the organization of the loyalist alliance. He speaks generally of mutual pledges, but mentions only two specific decisions, those to suspend internal disputes and to send ambassadors to persuade the Argives, Gelon of Syracuse and the Cretans to join the alliance (7.145). The remaining details have to be inferred from Herodotus' narrative.

The Hellenic League was an offensive and defensive alliance with one state, Sparta, recognized as the overall leader. If we can believe Herodotus, Sparta had been regarded as 'leader of the Greeks' since the middle of the previous century (1.69.2; 141.4; 152.3; 5.49.2); but for the period 481–479 he simply assumes Sparta's position (cf. Thuc. 1.18.2), and allows it to emerge indirectly. Thus the claims of Argos and Athens to joint, and of Gelon to sole, command are all rejected out of hand by Sparta and the other allies, if indeed they were seriously (or actually) put forward; and Spartans hold the supreme command of either the naval or the land forces and once (Latychidas briefly in spring 479) of both at the same time. On the other hand, although the decisions eventually taken by Spartan commanders are regarded as final and binding on the other Greek states in the alliance, Herodotus makes it abundantly clear that the Spartans were by no means always responsible for initiating strategy and tactics. Indeed, on the central issue of which Greek state deserved the most credit for preserving Greek independence, Herodotus silently rejects the claim of Sparta. The fairness of this judgment may be assessed from the following account, which will concentrate on the main engagements and in particular on the way in which Sparta's conduct of the war was conditioned by its position in Lakonia and the Peloponnese.

Herodotus does not comment on the choice of the Isthmus of Corinth as the general headquarters of the loyalists, but it presumably recommended itself in the first instance for its geographical centrality. From here the first allied force of some 10,000 hoplites was sent out by sea to the Pass of Tempe

separating Thessaly from Macedonia, in order to secure the militarily exposed and politically divided Thessalians for the loyalist cause (7.173). It returned a few days later, mission unaccomplished, to be replaced by the first serious attempt at resisting the Persians in a joint land-sea operation. It is not, however, entirely clear that Herodotus fully appreciated the Persian strategy of keeping the fleet and land-army in close communication with each other (7.49, 236.2; 8.60a) or the necessity for the Greeks to counter this strategy by adopting it themselves (8.15.2). He may therefore have misunderstood the objective of the defence of the Thermopylai pass from Thessaly into Phokis undertaken in conjunction with the fleet stationed off northern Euboia. But even if he did not, his account is full of other puzzles, which have only been exacerbated by the relatively recent discovery at Troizen of the possibly forged ‘Themistokles Decree’ (Fornara 1977, no. 55).

First, there is the question of numbers. Those on the Persian side (7.60, 89, 184–6) are of course hugely exaggerated (Cawkwell 1968); faced with Herodotus’ 1,700,000 land troops, one is tempted to remind him of his own scathing comment that ‘neither the Ionians nor any of the other Greeks know how to count’ (2.16.1). But this comment is even more apropos when we consider his woeful mishandling of the numbers on the Greek side at Thermopylai. He quotes (7.228) an honorific inscription which quite plainly states that 4,000 Peloponnesians had fought there, but later (8.25.2) appears to take this figure as the number of those (not only Peloponnesians) who died in the pass. Moreover, in his own enumeration of the Greek force sent to Thermopylai (7.202) the Peloponnesian contingent adds up to only 3,100. The simplest explanation of the discrepancy is that Herodotus in his enthusiasm for the derring-do of Leonidas and his 300 picked Spartiates has forgotten the 900 or 1,000 ‘Lakedaimonians’ (i.e. Perioikoi) mentioned in Diodorus (11.4.2,5) and Isokrates (4.90). These Perioikoi would be the first known from literary evidence to have participated with Spartans on campaign.

The other major problem concerns the composition of the Greek forces under Leonidas’ command. The presence of eighty hoplites from Mykenai is to be explained as a consequence of the liberation of this town by Kleomenes from Argos, which in 480 was in effect medizing. The absence of men from Tiryns is slightly surprising, especially as they turn up alongside the Mykenaians at Plataia. But the biggest question-marks are these: why was more than half the Peloponnesian contingent drawn from Arkadia, while Corinth, in whose territory lay the general headquarters, provided a mere 400 men (some hoplites may of course have been serving at Artemision)? And why did Sparta send even fewer of its citizens than Corinth? The first of these questions, both of which are unanswerable, is less crucial than the second, which introduces the ‘final problem’ of Thermopylai.

According to Herodotus, the Spartans through Leonidas (who had succeeded his half-brother Kleomenes) claimed that this force was merely an advance guard (7.203). The Spartans would be sending a full contingent when

the Karneia was over; the other allies, a minority of whom were Dorians, were to follow suit after celebrating the Olympic Games (7.206). However, Leonidas clearly interpreted his mission as being in effect akin to that of a Kamikaze squadron. For although he took with him 300 men, which was the number of the Hippeis (the crack royal bodyguard selected from the ten youngest age-classes), he deliberately chose men who already had sons and so men who were not all Hippeis. Had he really been meant to hold the pass until the Karneia and the Olympics were over, he would presumably have taken, if not more troops, at least the best Spartan warriors rather than the best of those who had sons. Here is the first concrete sign of that drastic fall in citizen manpower which had become critical by 425.

Sparta has therefore been accused of pursuing a narrow and Peloponnesian policy in sending an inadequate force to Thermopylai. To this charge, however, three replies are possible. First, it might be argued that the force was adequate for its stated purpose, and that the cardinal though excusable error was that of Leonidas in posting the unreliable Phokians to guard the pass (discussed in Gomme 1956, 397f.) through which the Greek position was eventually turned. Second, believers in the authenticity of the Themistokles Decree or disbelievers in Herodotus' chronology could point out that Themistokles had already persuaded the Athenians to envisage the abandonment of Attika even before the defence of Thermopylai was undertaken, whereas in Herodotus the retreat to the Isthmus appears as the necessary consequence of the pass being forced sooner than anticipated. Third, those who still think that Leonidas' force was inadequate and are not convinced that the Themistokles Decree is authentic can yet argue that Sparta' policy was narrow and Peloponnesian from necessity rather than choice and that within the constraints imposed Sparta did the best possible.

For, as even Herodotus' generally unsympathetic account makes clear, Sparta genuinely did have difficulties in the Peloponnese at this time, not only from Argos, but also from Peloponnesian League allies. Some time in the 480s Tegea was hostile to Sparta (9.37.4); in 479 Elis (significantly, the first refuge of Damaratos) and Mantinea were suspiciously late for Plataia, apparently because their leaders had been medizing (9.77); and within a decade all these were in open revolt from Spartan hegemony assisted by a somewhat revitalized Argos. Besides—a point Herodotus fails to mention—Perioikic Karyai is reported, admittedly only by Vitruvius (1.1.5), to have medized. The strategic importance of Karyai to Sparta has been emphasized already, an importance symbolized by the fact that Spartan girls participated in the cultic dancing at the temple of Artemis Karyatis (Burkert 1965, 172). Here we need only repeat that Karyai lay on the border with Tegea and *en route* to medizing Argos.

Seen in this light, the despatch of 300 picked citizens and a king in effect to their deaths acquires an almost heroic aura; and this is certainly how the behaviour of these men struck most other Greeks (cf. Simonides fr. 26

Page)—and indeed the Persians. We, however, should not forget the Perioikoi, who alone remained with the Thespians and the reluctant Thebans to withstand the final assault, nor indeed the Helot shield-bearers (8.25.1, with Welwei 1974, 125 and n. 21), not all of whom emulated the one who took to his heels after leading his blinded master to the fray (7.229.1).

The Greek fleet at Artemision was commanded by Eurybiadas, who like his predecessor at Tempe and Anchimolios in c.512 was not of royal blood. A mere ten of the 271 ships were provided by the Lakedaimonians, and these were presumably manned by Perioikoi or Helots. The skirmishes with the Persian fleet, weakened already by losses in storms, were surprisingly successful from the Greek standpoint, but the forcing of Thermopylai rendered the station at Artemision untenable. Withdrawal was anyway apparently greatly to the taste of Eurybiadas, who cuts a poor figure in Herodotus. For even before the defeat at Thermopylai he had contemplated withdrawal (8.4.2) and had had to be bribed to stay put (8.5.1,3). Then, after ruling out fighting off Attika (8.49.1) and voting to fight ‘on behalf of’ or ‘at’ the Isthmus (8.56), he is only reluctantly persuaded to remain at Salamis (8.64.1). Presumably he shared the views of most Peloponnesians, who were now encamped under the command of Leonidas’ brother and successor Kleombrotos at the Isthmus and desperately throwing a fortification wall (which has left no certain archaeological trace) across its six-kilometre narrowest width (8.40.2, 71). Herodotus, however, insists, rightly, that such a wall would have been futile without a fleet to counter the Persians at sea. Indeed, it is on this very point that he felt ‘constrained to deliver an opinion, which most men, I know, will dislike, but which, as it seems to me to be true, I am determined not to withhold...the Athenians were the saviours of Greece’ (7.139). By this he means that without the Athenian contribution to the fleet the Spartans would have had their allies removed from them one by one as the Persian fleet sailed at will round the Peloponnese (cf. Thuc. 1.73.4).

In case any reader might be either unclear as to what Herodotus’ view of the matter was or doubtful as to its truth, Herodotus makes his point in several ways in addition to this directly expressed personal judgment. For example, he puts into the mouth of Damaratos the advice to Xerxes to occupy Kythera (7.235). This would, he says, distract the Spartans, without whose aid the cities of the other Peloponnesian Greeks would be easily taken. Scholars like Fornara (1971, 33f.) have thought this passage was written by Herodotus in or after 424, when Kythera was in fact seized by the Athenians and the spectre of a Helot revolt was raised in the minds of the Spartans (Thuc. 4.53–6). But Kythera had already been taken by the Athenians under Tolmides in 456 (Chapter 12), and Damaratos is made to imply that Chilon in the mid-sixth century had already anticipated such a use of Kythera by a foreign power. Above all, if there had indeed been a Helot revolt in the late 490s, then Damaratos’ advice (or at least the idea he is made to express) would have been particularly opportune. Xerxes, however, seems to have been

anxious to settle matters once and for all with the Greek fleet. At least this would help to explain his rash plunge into the straits of Salamis and his ensuing defeat. Sparta needless to say did not contribute greatly to that defeat with its sixteen ships (8.43). But at least their flotilla had managed to round the awesome Cape Malea, unlike the considerably larger and avantgarde (Thuc. 1.14.2) Kerkyraian fleet, which after putting in at Pylos and Tainaron pleaded inability to pass Malea as its excuse for absence from Salamis (7.168; cf. 4.179.2 for the wind off Malea).

The other main way in which Herodotus brings out the futility of the Spartans' faith in the Isthmus wall is again through a speech, this time of a more Thucydidean character and placed in the mouth of the Tegean Chileos, said to be the foreigner with the greatest influence at Sparta (9.9.1). The occasion of Chileos' homily is the Athenian threat to come to terms with the Persians in 479 if the Spartans persist in their failure to send troops into Boiotia; and, like Herodotus himself, Chileos argues that the Peloponnesse cannot be protected by the Isthmus wall alone. The alleged cause of the Spartan delay was not this time the phase of the moon (Marathon) or the Karneia (Thermopylai) but the Hyakinthia. However, on hearing the words of Chileos, whose Tegean nationality will have carried as much weight as his personal influence, the Spartans moved swiftly, thereby illustrating Thucydides' general rule (1.118.2) that they were 'traditionally slow to go to war, unless they were forced into it'. The compulsion in this case was a combination of Athenian blackmail and Peloponnesian unrest.

The details of the Spartans' eventual response give us our greatest insight to date into the Spartan state at war. The Ephors made the decision to despatch the troops. Pausanias, son of the now dead Kleombrotos and Regent for his under-age cousin Pleistarchos, was given the command, in which he associated with himself Euryanax, the perhaps illegitimate son of his uncle Dorieus. Five thousand Spartiate soldiers were sent off overnight, perhaps 1,000 from each of the five Spartan villages, putting into practice their deliberately fostered familiarity with movement in darkness (Xen. *Lak. Pol.* 5.7; Plut. *Lyk.* 12.14). They constituted about two thirds of the Spartiates of military age (20–59), if 'Damaratos' was correct in saying that the Spartan citizen-body in 480 numbered 8,000 (Hdt. 7.234.2). Two thirds was a normal figure for a state's full levy on an allied campaign (Thuc. 2.10; 3.15). To each of the 5,000 there were reportedly attached seven Helots, but I have suggested in Chapter 10 that this figure is inflated. More likely to be right is the figure of 5,000 given for the Perioikic hoplites who were sent off after the Spartiates the following morning. Since these are said to have been picked men (9.11.3), it is possible that they had been quartered in Sparta for the duration of the war and had been training with the Spartiates. Herodotus, unfortunately, is not interested in such mundane details, and he fails to elucidate the relationship between the Spartiate and Perioikic troops at the battle of Plataia itself (9.28, 47f. etc.). But perhaps the fact that the two

contingents were despatched separately is enough to show that Perioikoi and Spartiates were not yet commingled in the same regiments as they were (or so I argue in Chapter 12) at Mantinea in 418. Each Perioikic hoplite had just one batman (an inference from Hdt. 9.29, 61.2), possibly his personal slave. This was the usual ration, obtaining, for instance, for the Spartiates at Thermopylai.

The route out of Lakonia taken at least by the 5,000 Spartiates went *via* Orestheion, which appears to have been situated in the centre of the Oresthis in Arkadian Mainalia (Thuc. 4.134.1; 5.64.3) and to have been the same as the Oresthasion of Pausanias (8.44.2) that was later called Oresteion (Paus. 8.3.2). If these identifications are correct, then the Spartans were following the route taken by Agis in 418, not, as has been suggested, to avoid the Argive frontier, but because this was the easiest way out of Lakonia for an army travelling with waggons. Although Orestheion must have lain a short distance south-west of Megalopolis (not of course built until the 360s), it seems not to have been unusual for Spartan armies to march north-north-west to here and yet still turn back eastwards towards Tegea (A.Andrewes in Gomme 1970, 91–3).

The bulk of Pausanias' Lakedaimonian army waited at the Isthmus for the other Peloponnesians to rally to the loyalist cause (9.19.1), but 1,000 men were sent on ahead into the Megarid (9.14.1). Mardonius, the Persian general left behind by Xerxes, had meanwhile withdrawn to Plataia, and here after much manoeuvring for position and preliminary skirmishing (the problem of supplies was perhaps the greatest the Greeks as a whole ever faced) the Greek and Persian forces eventually met in a decisive battle. The Helots are reckoned among the 'light-armed troops' by Herodotus (9.28.2, 29.1, 61.2), but even if armed they did no fighting and served as supply troops, armour-bearers and baggage-carriers (Welwei 1974, 63, 120–6). The laurels clearly belonged to the heavy-armed citizen hoplites, above all the disciplined and skilful Spartans. The generalship of Pausanias has been criticized, but it was well thought of at the time (Thuc. 1.130.1). The seers on both sides also deserve a mention, honourable in the case of Teisamenos, who with his brother had been received into Spartan citizenship perhaps at Pitana (Huxley 1975a, 29f.) shortly before 480, a unique grant in the view of Herodotus (9.35.1); slightly less honourable in that of Hegesistratos, another Eleian, who seems to have put the liberation of his own city from Spartan domination before the 'common good of Greece' and so hired himself out to the Persians (9.37). Herodotus' casualty-figures (9.70.5) seem improbably low, but they may not have been meant for grand totals. Apart from anything else, both here and in describing the Spartans' burial arrangements (9.85) he has again forgotten the Perioikoi. Finally, the booty. We do not know if the Spartans had yet created the office of the 'booty-sellers' (Pritchett 1974, I, 90), because Herodotus is only interested in an earlier stage in the booty's distribution. Pausanias ordered the Helots to bring in the Persians' gold and

silver articles (9.80. 1; cf. 7.119.2, 190; 8.8, 41; 9.106), but they allegedly managed to withhold a fair amount and later sold what they could not hoard to the Aiginetans, who had not participated at Plataia (9.85.3). The Aiginetans paid knock-down prices, since the Helots could not tell gold from bronze. Thus Herodotus, but the whole story is revealed as a malicious Athenian joke by Herodotus' obviously false view that it was from this bargain purchase that the Aiginetans became extremely wealthy. The innocence of the Helots, though, is perhaps true to life, but whether they could have been involved in such a sale of valuable metal-work is more than doubtful.

According to the loyalist mythology, the remainder of the retreating Persian army was defeated at Mykale, on the mainland of Asia Minor opposite Samos, on the same day as Mardonius was beaten at Plataia (9.100). The leader of the Greek fleet was Latychidas—the first (and nearly the last) Spartan king to be appointed admiral—who had succeeded Eurybiadas in spring 479. Despite the fervent appeals of an Ionian delegation for 'the Greeks' to liberate Ionia (8.131.1f.), the fleet had proceeded from Aigina with the utmost caution and at first only as far as Delos. Here it was greeted with further 'Hellenic' appeals from a Samian delegation, through whom Samos was admitted to the Hellenic League (9.90–2). After yet more indecision the Greek force, more than half of which was provided by Athens, at last engaged the Persians on land at Mykale and won. 'Ionia therefore on this day revolted a second time from the Persians' (9.104). Next on the agenda were the Hellespont and the islands (9.101.3).

Now for the first time the Spartans, represented by Latychidas, were faced with a wider issue than resistance to a Persian invasion; and, if Herodotus' account is accurate, they failed the test signally. A proposal was made by 'the Peloponnesians' to remove the Ionians from Asia and settle them in the coastal towns of the mainland Greek medizers (9.106.2f.). This was scarcely diplomatic. The Ionians' fears of such a transfer had been aroused in 499 by Histiaios, who had lied to them that Darius planned to place them in Phoenicia (6.3); and in 494 and 490 the Milesians and Eretrians respectively had indeed been resettled by the Persians (6.20, 101.3). The 'Peloponnesian' proposal was, however, in line with a strand of Spartan thinking stretching back to the origins of Graeco-Persian relations. For although the Spartans had repeatedly claimed to champion all Greeks against Persia, Mykale was in fact the first time (despite Hdt. 3.56.2) that they had fought the Persians in Asia, which the Great King in some sense considered his own preserve (e.g. Hdt. 1.4; 9.116.3).

The speech attributed to Eurybiadas after Salamis (8.108) precisely captures this Spartan attitude: he would not follow Themistokles in advancing to destroy the Hellespont bridge, but he did envisage challenging the Persian king for his empire at some future date. Likewise Latychidas, after the 'Peloponnesian authorities' had withdrawn their proposal to transfer the Ionians to European Greece and the islanders had been admitted to the

Hellenic League (9.106.3), yet declined to follow the Athenians in liberating the cities of the Hellespont. The attitude of Herodotus himself emerges from his description of an essentially Athenian force at Sestos as ‘the Greeks’ (9.116.3), but he would have given a more balanced picture if he had remarked upon the importance of the Hellespont for the Athenian wheat-supply: Sestos was the ‘meal-table of the Peiraeus’ (cf. Ste. Croix 1972, 48).

It is at this point that Thucydides takes up the story in his tantalizingly brief excursus on the ‘Pentekontaëtia’ (1.89–118), the fifty or so years prior to what has come to be known as ‘the’ Peloponnesian War. For Herodotus, everything after the liberation of Sestos was ‘after the war against the Medes’ and so outside his brief. However, apart from a score of references in passing to individual incidents after 479, he does also make a general comment on this period: as in the forty or so preceding years ‘Greece suffered more misery than in the 600 years before Darius was born, partly from the wars against the Persians, partly from its own internal struggles for supremacy’ (6.98.2). It is precisely the latter, seen from the standpoint of Athens’ growing power, with which Thucydides’ excursus is concerned; and he begins it with a richly symbolic episode, the rebuilding of the walls of Athens master-minded by Themistokles.

In Herodotus Themistokles is presented in an ambiguous light, thanks to the generally hostile sources the historian chose to follow. Thucydides, silently reacting as so often against his predecessor, put the record straight at the end of another excursus (1.126–38), to which we shall return in a different connection. Two sentences in his encomium are particularly relevant here: ‘in estimating what was likely to happen his forecasts were always more reliable than those of others...he was particularly remarkable at looking into the future and seeing there the hidden possibilities for good or evil’ (1.138.3). Written with hindsight, this can only mean that in Thucydides’ view Themistokles had in effect foreseen (among other things) the Peloponnesian War. He realized, in other words, that Sparta not Persia was the more likely to pose a threat to Athens in the long run. Indeed, Themistokles seems to have come to this conclusion as early as 479.

Herodotus (8.124) gives us only half the story, when he describes how in the winter of 480–479 Themistokles had been feted in Sparta and granted a guard of honour to escort him from Sparta to the Tegean border. For in 479, despite his alleged appeal to the common good of the Hellenic League, Themistokles was prepared to risk an open breach with Sparta by resisting with trickery the ‘request’ made by the Spartans, at the urging of their allies, that the Athenians should not rebuild their walls (Thuc. 1.90–3). One suspects that Themistokles will have gained from his two visits to Sparta a rather different impression from the one held by the international aristocrats who were welcomed to the annual Gymnopaïdai festival; and one wonders whether that ‘guard of honour’ might not have been designed to ensure that Themistokles went where the Spartan authorities wished (cf. Thuc. 2.12.2). In

the light of his subsequent career it is not irrelevant to observe that his trips through the Peloponnese will have taken him through Arkadia and the Argolis.

So far in this chapter I have stuck closely to Herodotus and Thucydides. Hereafter, although I shall generally attribute the greatest weight to the testimony of the latter, it will be necessary to use other sources, ranging in date from the fifth century BC to the second century AD. It is often difficult to evaluate their reliability when they include events omitted by Thucydides. For example, did Themistokles really propose the burning of the Greek fleet (except presumably the Athenian ships) at Pagasai in 480–479 (Plut. *Them.* 20.1) or even just the Spartan ships at Gytheion (Cic. *Off.* 3.11.49)? Did he, presumably early in 478, oppose the Spartan proposal to expel the medizers from the Delphic Amphiktyony (Plut. *Them.* 20.3f.)? However, whether he did any of these or not, it is clear that he took no part in the ‘Delian League’, whose foundation constituted for Thucydides the second major step in the growth of Athenian power between 478 and 431.

The details of the ‘constitution’ of the League need not concern us here, except in so far as the Spartans attempted to use it as a propaganda weapon against the Athenians perhaps from as early as 465. What does concern us are the immediate circumstances in which the League was founded. Sparta, as we have seen, had been less than responsive to the Ionians’ appeals for aid towards their liberation from Persia. But it would be a mistake to regard Spartan foreign policy as clearcut and monolithic at this or any subsequent time until perhaps the second decade of the fourth century (Ste. Croix 1972, 151). In 479 Sparta was faced with three choices: to continue the war against Persia by sea, as the Ionians had requested; to extend the crusade against the medizers north of the Isthmus with a view to possible consolidation of Spartan influence here on a permanent basis; or to adopt a ‘little Spartan’ policy and concentrate on retaining the Peloponnese in a pacified and submissive condition. In practice, the first two options were successively exercised, but with such signal lack of success that the third was brought into play perforce.

Regent Pausanias seems to have stood for the first option. In 478 he led the Hellenic League in a naval expedition of liberation first to Cyprus and then to Byzantion. From the latter, however, he was recalled by the Spartan authorities to stand trial, and here our source-problem begins in earnest. For our primary account is the excursus mentioned above, whose Herodotean flavour and un-Thucydidean linguistic usage have provoked the suggestion by Westlake (1977) that Thucydides is here reproducing, with uncharacteristic credulity, the account of a written source, perhaps Charon of Lampsakos.

However that may be, Pausanias at this first trial was apparently condemned for various acts of injustice against individuals but acquitted on the more serious charge of medism (for which Thucydides says there seemed to be very good evidence, although Herodotus, 5.32, preferred to suspend

judgment). The next year Pausanias returned to the Hellespont off his own bat, allegedly intending to make himself governor of Greece in the Persian interest. The Athenians, who had clearly been the ones to object to his behaviour in 478 and were now leaders of the Delian League, this time drove him out of Byzantion. Indeed, Herodotus (8.3.3) links the behaviour of Pausanias in 478 with the seizure of the hegemony of the Greeks by the Athenians. In Thucydides (1.95) the loss of hegemony is accepted philosophically by the Spartans, but a remarkable passage in Diodorus Siculus (11.50), a first-century historian who mainly reproduced the fourth-century Ephorus, throws much light on internal Spartan wrangling. On losing the hegemony a great majority of the Spartan citizen body, above all the younger men, was in favour of declaring war on Athens to recover it, but they were dissuaded by a distinguished member of the Gerousia.

After his expulsion from Byzantion, Pausanias took up residence in the Troad. It is unfortunately unclear how long he remained here, but before his return Latychidas—and with him the second of Sparta's three options in foreign policy—had also fallen out of favour with the home authorities. Again, there is an uncertainty over the date (476/5, according to Diod. 11.48.2), but it seems clear that when on campaign against the medizing Thessalians Latychidas was discovered to have embezzled public funds (Hdt. 6.72). Recalled to Sparta, found guilty and banished (though not perhaps formally deposed), he went into exile at Tegea, where he died in c.469. The significance of his chosen place of asylum will emerge shortly.

Between 474 and 470 Pausanias was summoned back to Sparta and summarily incarcerated. He was, however, released, but his offer to stand trial again was turned down because neither the state nor his personal enemies had sufficient evidence to condemn the victor of Plataia and the only active king of Sparta. Such evidence, though, was not long in appearing, and Pausanias was accused not merely of medism this time but also of intriguing with the Helots, to whom he was said to have offered citizenship as well as freedom. The charge of medism, according to Thucydides or his (written?) source, was the one that sealed his doom; but modern scholarship has generally, if sometimes intemperately, placed greater emphasis on the other one (Oliva 1971, 146–52; Welwei 1974, 122 n. 7). As with Kleomenes and the Arkadians in c.491, Pausanias' offer to the Helots, whatever it was, would have been at the least a potent method of silencing his enemies.

There may, however, have been more to it than that. For I find it extraordinary that Pausanias should have gone to the sanctuary of Poseidon at Tainaron to incriminate himself in the naive manner described by Thucydides. Rather, I would connect his presence there with the sacrilege to which the Spartans themselves attributed the great earthquake of c.465, the dragging of Helot suppliants from Poseidon's altar to be murdered. The information that the Tainaron sanctuary could be used as an asylum by Helots is interesting in itself (Bömer 1960, 18f; cf. Hdt. 2.113.2, for an Egyptian sanctuary for

deserting slaves). But the real question is why the Spartans should have attributed the earthquake to this particular affront to Poseidon (who was generally held to be responsible for sending earthquakes). I suggest that the 'secretiveness' of the Spartans (Thuc. 5.68.2) may have concealed from Thucydides or his source an abortive Helot uprising of c.470, in which Pausanias was somehow implicated.

One argument in favour of this hypothesis is based on Aristotle's general statement that the Helots as it were lay in wait for their masters' misfortunes. For the late 470s and the early 460s (the general period in which the death of Pausanias, synchronized with the flight of Themistokles to Persia, is to be placed) threw up the greatest crisis the Spartans had faced since their decisions first to base their power and wealth on the exploitation of Helots and then to protect their economic base with a network of alliances in the Peloponnese. Such a crisis would help to explain the extraordinarily savage reprisals taken against Pausanias, treatment which even Delphic Apollo, usually so agreeable to the dictates of the Spartan authorities, found himself unable to sanction. Moreover, as Thucydides (1.132.5) parenthetically observed, the Spartans were habitually cautious in taking action against any Spartan citizen regardless of his rank—another hint that the problem of citizen numbers was already being felt before the mid-fifth century.

The crisis is summarily and artistically referred to by Herodotus (9.35.2) in one of his rare flash-forward passages. Teisamenos, the Eleian seer who had won Spartan citizenship (above), helped Sparta to five victories. The first and last were Plataia in 479 and Tanagra in 458–457. Sandwiched between these, presumably in chronological order, are a battle near Tegea against the Tegeans and Argives, one at Dipaieis (or Dipaia) against all the Arkadians except the Mantineians, and one at 'the Isthmos' against the Messenians. Our other sources do not elucidate the background or dating of these battles, and it is chiefly due to the scholarly acumen and ingenuity of Andrewes (1952) and Forrest (1960) that a coherent account can be attempted.

In the 480s Tegea had been hostile to Sparta, and Forrest believes that with Tegea we should understand the whole Arkadian League. Andrewes argued that during and immediately after the Persian Wars Tegea was reconciled to Sparta once more. However, the retirement of Latychidas to Tegea by 475 suggests that hostility continued. Indeed, it may not be fanciful to connect the presence of Latychidas with the Arkadian troubles. The issue was presumably the same as it had been in the 490s: the Arkadians wished to be recognized and treated as such, whereas Sparta preferred to divide and rule, fostering above all the rivalry and mutual suspicion between Mantinea and Tegea. Latychidas, the creature of Kleomenes, will not have been above using the same tactics as his mentor to effect his recall, whatever his private feelings about the justice of the Arkadian cause may have been.

Elis and Mantinea had arrived late for Plataia. It was alleged that their generals had favoured the Persian cause, an allegation perhaps to be

connected with the fact that Damaratos had regarded Elis as a congenial asylum. But the establishment of a democracy at Elis before 470 (A. Andrewes in Gomme 1970, 60f.) suggests that there were wider and deeper socio-political issues involved as well. Mantinea too received a democratic constitution, certainly before 421 (Thuc. 5.29.1) but not necessarily as early as Elis. Forrest would also place the synoecism of Tegea around 470. This extraordinary conjunction of political revolutions coincided with the revitalization of Argos, which fought with Tegea against Sparta. Whether Forrest (1968, 100) is right to postulate an actual alliance against Sparta between Elis, the bulk of the Arkadian cities and Argos I am doubtful. But his suggestion that the hand of Themistokles lay heavy on this anti-Spartan activity is cogent. He was apparently a convinced democrat and certainly since 479 an opponent of Sparta. After his ostracism at Athens (late 470s?) he based himself at Argos, from where he made frequent trips around the rest of the Peloponnese (Thuc. 1.135.3): as Tomlinson (1972, 106) tersely remarks, ‘there is no reason to suppose that he was engaged in mere sightseeing.’

Space forbids discussion of internal political developments at Argos since its defeat at Sepeia in 494 or of the circumstances and date of Themistokles’ ostracism. But I would like to apply the ‘hand of Themistokles’ hypothesis to a remarkable piece of inscriptional evidence from Argos (Jeffery 1961, 169, no. 22). Some time around 470 epigraphically, the Argives erected in their agora a bronze tablet in honour of Gnosstas, their proxenos (political representative) in the Perioikic town of Oinous, which has not been certainly located but presumably lay near the river of the same name. That the tablet should refer to Gnosstas as ‘Oinountios’ (of Oinous) and not ‘Lakedaimonios’ has rightly been interpreted as a deliberate affront to Sparta. But the fact that the Argives should have thought it worthwhile to make a citizen of an otherwise insignificant Perioikic town their proxenos has not received the comment it deserves. Gnosstas may not in fact have been the only Perioikos who acted as proxenos for a foreign state; a fourth-century proxeny-list from Keos (*IG* XII.5(1).542) has been restored to include a citizen of Kyphanta. But his favoured treatment, I suggest, could represent a deliberate attempt to create or exploit sympathy for Argos at least among the Perioikoi of northern Lakonia, perhaps with a view to detaching them from their Spartan allegiance. We recall the medism of Karyai about a decade earlier.

At any rate the Spartans certainly felt sufficiently strongly about the activities of Themistokles to suspend their latent hostility towards the Athenians and co-operate with them in hounding Themistokles out of Greece. As we have seen, his flight to Asia Minor is synchronized with the death of Pausanias, but this scarcely helps us to penetrate the chronological obscurity, since the date of his flight is perhaps the major difficulty of the first half of the Pentekontaëtia (White 1964, 140). If there was a change to a more

oligarchic régime at Argos in the early 460s following on the defeat of the Tegeans and Argives by Sparta, and if Themistokles left Argos as a result of the change, then the battle near Tegea could have occurred about 470. The next battle took place at Dipaieis in west Arkadia (for its suggested site see Howell 1970, 100, no. 49) and is apparently synchronized by Diodorus (11.65.4) with the great earthquake of c.465. An interval of about five years allows plenty of time for Mantinea and Argos to abandon the entente of c.470, but our sources give no other insight into the reason for the Spartan victory. Archidamos, to whom a stratagem perhaps to be assigned to the battle is attributed by Polyainos (1.41.1), must have been in command of the Spartan forces. He had reigned *de facto* since Latychidas' exile, *de iure* since the latter's death (Diod. 11.48.2; cf. 12.35.4). His Agiad co-king Pleistarchos may still have been under age. At all events it was reputedly the resolution and authority of Archidamos which saved the day for Sparta immediately after the great earthquake of c.465 (Diod. 11.63.5–7; Plut. *Kim.* 16.6f.; Polyain. 1.41.3).

This earthquake is directly relevant to the major themes of this book in two main respects. First, it is said to have caused enormous loss of life at Sparta and so has been held in varying degrees responsible for the catastrophic drop in citizen numbers (Chapter 14) and for a major reform of army organization. Second, it either occasioned or intensified the Helot revolt otherwise known as the Third Messenian War, a revolt rightly characterized as 'not only the greatest upheaval in Sparta during the classical period, but one of the most significant social outbreaks in ancient Greece altogether' (Oliva 1971, 163). For these reasons the earthquake and revolt deserve the closest possible scrutiny, but, unlike many of my predecessors, I shall try not to allow the chronological problems to overshadow the more important—and, I believe, more problematic—issues.

The relationship between the earthquake and the revolt is made unambiguous by Thucydides' use of a relative clause indicating simultaneity (1.101.2). Thucydides, however, also says that the revolt lasted ten years (1.103.1), as does Diodorus (11.64.4). Since on this reckoning the revolt would still have been in progress at the time of the Battle of Tanagra in 458 or 457, it has been felt that Thucydides' text must have been corrupted either palaeographically or by the 'editorial' insertion of the ordinal 'tenth' to accord with the text of Diodorus. The latter explanation of the alleged corruption is not cogent: in the *Pentekontaëtia excursus* Thucydides gives only seven figures indicating duration of time, but three of these concern the duration of sieges and two of them (our passage and 1.117.3) are precisely parallel in form (after so much time the besieged were unable to hold out and surrendered). Thus the corruption, if it is a corruption—as on balance I am inclined to believe, principally because of the strict chronological sequence adhered to by Thucydides in the *Pentekontaëtia excursus* as a whole—must be explained palaeographically; and 'fourth' or 'sixth' seem to be the most

plausible emendations of ‘tenth’, giving a terminal date for the revolt of c.460. What is not permissible, however, is both to maintain that the text of Thucydides should not be tampered with and at the same time to ignore his explicit statement of simultaneity between the earthquake and the revolt, in order to put its outbreak back to c.469 and so link it directly with the death of Pausanias. There may have been an abortive Helot rising at the time of the death of Pausanias, but Thuc. 1.103.1 is not evidence for it.

More important, however, is the problem of how far Diodorus can be used to supplement or correct Thucydides. For although his account (11.63f., 84.7f.) is far more detailed and even circumstantial, it is also at variance with that of Thucydides in crucial respects. According to Thucydides, the Helots, most of whom were of Messenian origin, revolted immediately after the earthquake and seceded to Ithome, supported by the Messenian *Perioikoi* of Thouria and Aithaia. The siege went on for some time until the Spartans, feeling their inadequacy in this department of warfare (cf. Hdt. 9.70.1f.), summoned their allies, especially the Athenians, whom they thought were expert in taking fortified positions by assault. When, however, the siege did not have quick results, the Spartans suspected the Athenians of revolutionary sympathies towards the Helots and dismissed them forthwith. With their remaining allies (below) they compelled the rebels to surrender after a siege lasting ten (or, as I prefer, four or six) years in all.

According to Diodorus, however, great earthquakes (in the plural) hit Sparta and continued for some time, razing the dwellings to their foundations and killing more than 20,000 ‘Lakedaimonians’. The (Lakonian) Helots and the Messenians, emboldened by this loss of life, joined together in revolt. Their first idea, to march upon Sparta itself, was thwarted by Archidamos, whereupon they decided to secure a strong base in Messenia (Ithome). The Spartans summoned their allies (only the Athenians are named), but after some fighting in which the Athenians at first distinguished themselves the Spartans dismissed them for sympathizing with the rebels. Then and only then the Spartans and the remaining allies marched to lay siege to Ithome, whereupon the (Lakonian) Helots revolted in full force in support of the Messenians. After ten years the Messenians from Ithome were sent away under a truce; the ringleaders of the Helots were punished (presumably with death).

Other sources provide further details, some of which are journalistic, some plausible but problematic. None, however, resolves a major inconsistency between Thucydides and Diodorus. For the former the revolt was a Messenian, indeed almost a ‘nationalistic’, affair. Diodorus, on the contrary, distinguishes between the Messenians and the (Lakonian) Helots throughout and ascribes a not insignificant role to the latter. It has been suggested that Ephorus made the distinction because he was writing after the liberation of the Messenians in 370, at a time when the only Helots were the Lakonians. But even if this suggestion is true (it is certainly

plausible), it is unclear why Ephorus or his source should have invented a distinct role in the rebellion for the Lakonian Helots. I have already intimated in Chapter 10 that modern scholars have underestimated the potential hostility of the Lakonian Helots towards the Spartans; this Diodoran passage is one of the pieces of direct evidence to be adduced in favour of my view. For only the Lakonian Helots would have been in a position to take such quick advantage of an earthquake in Sparta, and it will have been they who communicated the news of their masters' disaster to their brothers on the other side of Taygetos.

For the rest, Thucydides' more sober account is surely preferable, although his severe concision requires expansion and exegesis. In the first place, it is implausible that all the Messenian Helots should have revolted and then retired at once to Ithome without a blow being struck. More likely only a proportion rebelled and only a proportion of these resorted to Ithome after skirmishing in the fields. This at any rate would make sense of Herodotus 9.64.2, where we learn in passing that the Spartan credited with felling Mardonius at Plataia was himself killed 'in Stenyklaros' during 'the Messenian War' together with the detachment of 300 men under his command. Such a feat could have been effected by an ambush of Helots armed with agricultural implements. On the other hand, Teisamenos' victory 'at the Isthmos' (9.35.2) is presented as if it were a regular pitched battle. The reading 'Isthmos' has in fact usually been emended to 'Ithome', but the Isthmos in question could be the nearly continuous Skala ridge stretching from Ithome to Taygetos and dividing the upper (Stenyklaros) plain of the Pamisos valley from the lower (Makaria). Either way, however, the Helots would seem to have required less rustic weapons. These could have been supplied by their Perioikic supporters or conceivably by dissident Arkadians or Eleians.

As for the allies on the Spartan side, I assume that hoplites among at least the Perioikoi either volunteered or were drafted as a matter of course, and I suspect that the 'planters' of Mothone and Asine were conspicuously loyal to Sparta. But of Sparta's foreign allies apart from the Athenians (who require separate treatment) we hear explicitly only of Aigina (Thuc. 2.27.2, 4.56.2) and Mantinea (Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.3), who were members of the Peloponnesian League, and of the Plataians (Thuc. 3.54.5). If the revolt was on a smaller scale than Thucydides implies, then there may not have been need for help from other allies, and Thucydides does say that the Athenians were summoned specifically for their reputed skill in siege-warfare. Probably, though, it is just by chance that other allies, especially those of the Peloponnesian League, are not recorded. We may, however, suggest some special reasons for the presence of those that are known. The Plataians may have acted out of a double sense of gratitude, to the Spartans for suggesting their alliance with Athens in 519/18 (Chapter 9), to the Athenians for being good allies. The Aiginetans were no doubt jealous and fearful of the growing

naval power of the Athenians and perhaps also anxious to atone for their non-appearance at the Battle of Plataia. The Mantineians had declined to join the rest of the Arkadians against Sparta at Dipaieis and so were possibly particularly reliable at this time.

The Helot revolt among other things marked a turning-point in relations between Athens and Sparta. In 479 the Spartans had been secretly angered by Themistokles' circumvention of their wish that the walls of Athens should not be rebuilt. Probably in 478–477 a majority of them had been dissuaded only with difficulty from voting to declare war on Athens. In c.465, if Thucydides (1.101.2) is to be believed, they had actually voted to send help to Thasos in its revolt from Athens and had only been prevented from sending it by the earthquake and Helot revolt. This vote of assistance has been doubted, but Ste. Croix (1972, 178f.) has argued cogently that Thucydides is to be believed. The Athenians, however, unquestionably were not aware of the Spartan vote when they themselves agreed, perhaps after heated debate (Plut. *Kim.* 16.9), to send 4,000 hoplites under Kimon to Ithome in c.462.

Kimon, son of Miltiades, was the leading Athenian general of the day, vanquisher of the Persians at the famous Battle of the Eurymedon (c.469). Correspondingly, he was the foremost Athenian supporter of the 'dual hegemony' thesis, according to which Athens should lead the Greeks by sea, Sparta by land. Significantly in the 470s he had named one of his sons Lakedaimonios, just as the Spartan Perikleidas called a son of his Athenaios (Thuc. 4.119.2); Perikleidas was the ambassador who successfully sought Athenian aid in c.462 (Aristoph. *Lys.* 1138). This amicable policy was in shreds after the Spartans dismissed the Athenians, alone of their allies, from Ithome.

The probable reason for Spartan suspicion has been admirably expressed by Ste. Croix (1972, 179f.): 'the ordinary Athenian hoplite...may well have been shocked when he arrived in Messenia and found that the revolting "slaves" of the Spartans were Greeks, the majority of them Messenians, who had never lost consciousness of the fact that their ancestors had been citizens of the *polis* of Messene, and were now fighting for their freedom and the right to be "the Messenians" once more.' Thereafter the Athenians and Spartans were openly hostile. The Athenians allied themselves first with Sparta's major Peloponnesian enemy, Argos, and then with one of the more prominent groups of former medizers, the Thessalians. Moreover, they had been made forcibly aware of Sparta's Achilles heel, the Messenian Helots, and it was not long before they sought to exploit it (Chapter 12).

I have set out above the problem posed by Thucydides' text for dating the end of the revolt. My preference for an emendation giving a terminal date of c.460 will be further reinforced in the next chapter. However, as with the campaign of Theopompos in the 'First Messenian War' (Chapter 8), we can only guess at the manner in which the rebels were forced to capitulate. There

is no archaeological evidence for a stone-built fortification on the mountain before the fourth century; but Ithome is (with Akrocorinth) one of the two best natural fortresses in the Peloponnese, so a palisaded camp will have been adequate to keep at bay an army self-confessedly incompetent at sieges. Besides, there is a well within twenty metres of the summit. Thus we must suppose that the Spartans and their allies gradually cut off sympathetic sources of supply and starved the Helots out.

Under the terms of the surrender the rebels (only the Messenians, not the Lakonians, according to Diod. 11.84.8—divide and rule?) were permitted to withdraw from the Peloponnese (Sparta's preserve) on pain of instant enslavement should they set foot within it again. These terms have been seen as mild and an indication of Spartan weakness. But there may in fact have been relatively few Helots involved at the finish, and Sparta could hardly have anticipated either the brilliant move of the Athenians in settling them at Naupaktos or the havoc the Naupaktos Messenians would wreak in Messenia after the Athenian seizure of Pylos in 425 (Chapter 12). Indeed, 'dual hegemony' theorists in Sparta may have misguidedly hoped that a gesture of leniency towards the Helots might help to reconcile Sparta to Athens. Nor should we underestimate the power of religion or rather superstition. For the Helots had cleverly placed themselves as suppliants under the protection of Zeus Ithomatas, mindful perhaps of the Spartans' own explanation of the great earthquake as caused by the wrath of Zeus' brother Poseidon. However, even if the terms given to the rebels do not necessarily imply Spartan weakness, it still remains to consider the argument for weakness drawn from the alleged effects of the earthquake.

A full statement of this argument is Toynbee 1969, 346–52, but I find most of his views unconvincing. In the first place, he starts by saying (rightly) that 'the meagreness of our information makes it impossible to reach any sure conclusion about either the statistical facts themselves or their demographic, social, political and military consequences.' Yet a few pages later he concludes that 'these facts and figures' (i.e. his inferences from the meagre information) 'are illuminating' and help to explain several major cruces of Spartan history between c.460 and 432. Second, the sources are in fact not only meagre but unreliable. The ancients, as David Hume so elegantly demonstrated ('Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations'), had a notorious weakness for large figures, and Diodorus' 'more than 20,000' fatalities need not be taken at its face value, even if we could be sure what he or his source meant by 'Lakedaimonians'. Toynbee tries to save his credit by arguing that the casualties were principally women and very young children—hence Archidamos' ability to rally the male warriors against the encroaching Helots. But if about half the total population of citizen status had really been wiped out (the total of 35,000–40,000 is extrapolated from our only usable figure, the 8,000 adult male warriors cited by 'Damaratos'), and if the proportion of the casualties among the women and very young children

was relatively even higher, then the catastrophe would have been still more immense and its effects yet more long-lasting than even Toynbee depicts them.

I do not of course wish to deny that the earthquake brought death and destruction to Sparta. But elementary comparative demography shows that, other things being equal, a population which suffers even a major loss of life from a disaster quickly reconstitutes itself; we might perhaps compare the recovery of Argos by 460 after losing perhaps as many as 6,000 hoplites at Sepeia in 494. Transparently, then, at Sparta other things were not equal, and the constant and eventually catastrophic decline in the number of male Spartan citizens—from 8,000 in 480 to at most 1,500 in 371—cannot be attributed to the earthquake alone. Neither can the army reform, which, as we shall see in the next chapter, was certainly carried out between 479 and 418 but not necessarily nearer 460 than 420.

Notes on further reading

Most of the essential secondary literature has been cited in the text. Here follow just a few supplements. For a fuller citation of the ancient sources for the Pentekontaëtia, reference should be made to the invaluable indices compiled by R.Meiggs and A.Andrewes in Hill 1951.

A new commentary on all Herodotus is a major desideratum. The Hellenic League is most usefully discussed by Brunt (1953/4); cf. Ste.Croix 1972, 301f. On all aspects of the Delian League and subsequent ‘Athenian Empire’ see Meiggs 1972. For the ‘final problem’ of Thermopylai see Hope Simpson 1972.

For the Thucydidean chronology of 465–431 see Deane 1972; but I cannot follow him in retaining ‘tenth’ in Thuc. 1.103.1 and dating the Helot revolt 464–455/4. See rather Bayer and Heideking 1975, 120f., 130–4.

The history of Argos 494–461 is succinctly handled in Tomlinson 1972, 96–109.

The Athenian wars c. 460–404

The war between Sparta and Athens and their respective allies, which broke out in 431 and ended definitively in 404, is generally known today as ‘The Peloponnesian War’. The very title is not the least remarkable achievement of its historian. For that it should be viewed as a single war temporarily interrupted by a ‘phoney’ peace, that this was ‘the’ war of the two fought in the fifth century between these antagonists, and that it should be seen primarily from the Athenian side—these are the legacies of ‘Thucydides the Athenian’ (1.1.1; 5.26.1—where no other indication is given, the references in brackets in this chapter are to Thucydides), who undertook his history ‘at the very beginning of the war in the belief that it was going to be a great war and more worth writing about than any of those which had occurred in the past’. As M.I.Finley has observed in his introduction to the 1972 reissue of the Penguin Classics translation of Thucydides, ‘no other historian can match this achievement; no other war, for that matter no historical subject, is so much the product of its reporter.’

Thucydides had his rivals, above all Ephorus, who survives for us mainly in the garbled version of Diodorus. But it is a measure of Thucydides’ impact in his own time that men like Xenophon, Kratippos and the unknown author of the ‘Hellenica Oxyrhynchia’ fragments (if indeed he was not Kratippos) preferred to complete rather than rewrite his unfinished manuscript. With scarcely a dissenting voice (Dionysios of Halikarnassos being a notable case in point) the judgment of posterity on Thucydides as an historian has echoed that of his continuators, whether explicitly (for instance Lucian, Hobbes and von Ranke) or implicitly. Until, that is, the twentieth century, when something of a reaction against Thucydides appears to have set in, some students preferring the broader vision of his main predecessor Herodotus, others stressing his subjectivity, yet others querying his self-proclaimed accuracy, and all in some way touching upon ‘the’ Thucydides problem, that of the order of composition and degree of revision of the work as we have it.

My own view is that, for all its narrowness of outlook, subjectivity of interpretation, inaccuracy in detail and self-inconsistency due to lack of final

revision, the history of Thucydides must be the bedrock of any account of Greek history from 433 to 411 (where it abruptly ends). Moreover, I agree with Ste. Croix (1972, 5–34) that Thucydides has a claim to both originality of thought and permanency of value in his unswerving insistence, for purposes of historical interpretation, on the amorality of interstate relations.

Reliance on Thucydides for ‘the’ Peloponnesian War, however, cannot automatically be extended to his account of the period before 433. The contemporary historian *par excellence*, Thucydides mainly confines his treatment of the preceding half-century to a prefatory excursus (1.89–118), which is both sketchy and chronologically fluid—oddly, because these are precisely the defects he berates in the work of his only forerunner in this field, Hellanikos (1.97.2). The difficulties posed by his excursus have been sampled in the previous chapter, but these pale when we turn to consider the role of Sparta in the origins, character and even duration of the so-called ‘First’ Peloponnesian War of c.460–445.

This does not mean that we should not base ourselves on Thucydides here too, but it is necessary to invert his perspective. For he viewed this war solely in the context of the growth of Athenian power, whereas we shall attempt to see both of the Peloponnesian wars and the fourteen years of genuine, if uneasy, peace which separated them from the Spartan side of the barricades—as Thucydides himself was more able to do during his enforced exile from Athens between 424 and 404 (5.26.1). Hence the deliberately unfamiliar title of this chapter, modified from Thucydides (5.28.2; 31.3, 5). No attempt, however, has been made here to give as complete as possible an account of the formulation and execution of Spartan domestic and foreign policy between c.460 and 404. Rather, the literary, epigraphical and (scanty) archaeological evidence pertaining to Lakonia and Messenia in this period has been set out in the belief that any account of Spartan policy should start from a consideration of developments within the *polis*-territory as a whole.

The dominant section of Spartan opinion in the late 460s was not necessarily anxious to effect a rift with Athens. But whatever its intentions, the rift was occasioned by the dismissal of Kimon from Ithome and the discrediting at Athens of his ‘dual hegemony’ thesis. Once this policy had been jettisoned, the newly radicalized Athenian democracy warmly embraced the interventionist ideas apparently fathered by Themistokles. An alliance was concluded with Argos (Hill 1951, I.4.5), which had recently recovered control of the Argolis and lovingly nursed longstanding grievances against Sparta, both specific (possession of Kynouria: 5.41.2) and general (hegemony of the Peloponnese: cf. 5.28.2). Shortly after, Megara seceded from the Peloponnesian League—the first state to do so, unless Mantinea, Tegea and Elis really had concluded an offensive alliance with Argos in the late 470s—and made a full offensive and defensive alliance with Athens (Hill 1951, I.4.8). Hence, according at least to Thucydides (1.103.4), Corinth’s ‘bitter hatred’ for Athens, exacerbated by the Athenian masterstroke of settling

Naupaktos at the mouth of the Corinthian Gulf with the Helot rebels from Ithome (Hill 1951, I.4.7: perhaps in 460). An Athenian inscribed relief of c.450 depicting a seated goddess (*IG* I².37) has been interpreted as evidence of an actual treaty of alliance between Athens and the Naupaktos Messenians (Meritt 1944, 224–9).

No doubt Corinth, which was now threatened at either end of the gulf named after it, was anxious to induce Sparta and the Peloponnesian League to declare war on the Athenian alliance. Sparta, however, was not lightly to be drawn into a war not of its own seeking; and although Thucydides (1.18.3) describes the Pentekontaëtia as a period in which Sparta and Athens were for the most part ‘either fighting each other or putting down revolts among their allies’, the ‘First’ Peloponnesian (or Athenian) War should be understood mainly as a conflict between the Athenian alliance and Sparta’s Peloponnesian League allies. The informal character of the struggle is implied in the scholarly controversy over the precise date at which the war may be said to have begun (Holladay 1977b). Whatever the solution to that, it seems clear that Sparta’s direct involvement before the battle of Tanagra in 458 or 457 was negligible. Not even after the Athenians had reduced Aigina by siege in 457/6 and compelled it, though nominally still within the Peloponnesian League, to pay tribute (Hill 1951, I.5.3) did Sparta engage more energetically.

On one level the reason for Spartan abstention is quite straightforward. The Athenians’ alliance with Argos (followed perhaps by a minor victory over a Spartan force at Oinoe in the Argolis: Meiggs 1972, 459–62) and their occupation of the passes through Mount Geraneia in the Megarid (1.107.3) made it virtually impossible for the Spartans to venture north of the Isthmus and return to Lakonia without risking a full-scale battle. Also perhaps relevant in this context is Thucydides’ reference (1.118. 2) to the ‘internal/ domestic wars’ by which Sparta was hindered from resisting the increase of Athenian power. On another level, however, this geographical and also perhaps political constraint only makes Sparta’s two forays into central Greece during the ‘First’ Peloponnesian War the more problematic and potentially revealing.

The first of these was undertaken in the early 450s, ostensibly to aid Doris, the supposed motherland of the Dorians (1.107.2; 3.92.3), against Phokis. Phokis, it has been suggested, had seized Delphi, as it certainly did in 449. However, powerfully though the Spartans could be affected by ties of sentiment and religion, it is unlikely that they were not moved equally by considerations of prestige and profit (cf. 5.105.3f.). The defection of Megara, the siege of Aigina (then still in progress) and a defeat suffered by the Corinthians in the Megarid (Hill 1951, I.5.4) constituted a powerful challenge both to the unity of the Peloponnesian League and to Sparta’s leadership of it. So powerful indeed that, notwithstanding the recent earthquake and Messenian revolt, Sparta was prepared to send out of Lakonia 1,500 of ‘its own’ hoplites. Despite the arguments of Holladay 1977b, Thucydides’ elliptical account must surely presuppose a decision taken by Sparta and then

the Peloponnesian League as a whole, although I agree that this was not necessarily a decision for war specifically against Athens. However, more important for us perhaps are the two other facets of Sparta's action.

First, what is meant by 'its own' hoplites? In 3.92.5 Thucydides uses this expression to distinguish Spartiate from Perioikic colonists of Herakleia Trachinia; but such a distinction would be inappropriate here, where the contrast being drawn is between the troops contributed by Sparta and those by its allies. As in 5.57.1 and 5.64.2, therefore, where by 'themselves' Thucydides does not refer only to Spartiates, he is describing a mixed force of Spartiate and Perioikic hoplites. Still, even if not all and perhaps not even half of the 1,500 were Spartiates, the total is high as a proportion of the allied force as a whole, indeed 'about the highest...that was likely to occur' (Ste.Croix 1972, 209). This, I believe, not only underlines the importance of the expedition of 458–457 in Spartan eyes, but also supports the views tentatively advanced in the last chapter that the earthquake had not had catastrophic demographic effects and that the Helot revolt was over by c.460.

The second major point of interest concerns the routes whereby the allied force made its way into and out of the Peloponnese. The Isthmus being blocked, it has been inferred from Thuc. 1.107.3 that it went north by sea across the Corinthian Gulf, perhaps from Pellene or Sikyon, to modern Itea and thence *via* Amphissa to the upper Kephissos valley. The knife-edge victory over the Athenian alliance at Tanagra in Boiotia (Hill 1951, I.5.7) facilitated its return by land through the Isthmus, but it is significant of the prevailing strategic situation that, even if Delphi had been temporarily liberated from Phokian control, the dedication offered by the Spartans and their allies for Tanagra was apparently made not at Delphi but at Olympia alone (M/L no. 36).

In a broader perspective the Athenian defeat at Tanagra was but a momentary set-back in a quinquennium or so of resounding success. From the Lakonian point of view the most portentous Athenian undertaking in this period was the Periplous or 'sailing-round' of the Peloponnese by a fleet under Tolmides (Hill 1951, I.5.11). Thucydides (1.108.5) gives the barest of summaries, but he does at least record that Tolmides fired the Spartan dockyards. These can only have been at Gytheion, as Diodorus (11.84. 6) states in his much more circumstantial account under the year 456/5; a sonar search offers some confirmation of the ancient report (Strabo 8.5.2, C363) of built docks here (Edgerton and Scoufopoulos 1972). They may have been inaugurated under the influence of Athens' construction at Peiraieus (1.93) or at the urging of regent Pausanias, but they can hardly have been a hive of activity as far as the actual construction or refitting of Spartan warships was concerned, given the dearth of these before the final phase of 'the' Peloponnesian War.

The rest of Diodorus' narrative of Tolmides' expedition is of uneven value. An alleged motive of personal rivalry between Tolmides and Myronides (who

by defeating the Boiotians at Oinophyta in 457 had won Boiotia for Athens) is given undue prominence. But to his credit Diodorus does stress that Lakonia and Messenia had never before been ravaged and that such an exploit would depress yet more the Spartans' prestige (11.84.3)—and so, though Diodorus does not draw the conclusion, further 'destabilize' the tottering Peloponnesian alliance.

Tolmides indeed may have had even more far-reaching intentions. For apart from Gytheion he attacked and briefly held Kythera and Boiai in Lakonia (Paus. 1.27.5) and Mothone in Messenia (Diod. 11.84.6) and then sailed round to Naupaktos. Diodorus is wrong to say (11.84.7) that it was Tolmides who planted the freed Messenian rebels here, at least at this date, but Tolmides may well have anticipated Demosthenes (below) in believing that the Naupaktos Messenians could contribute essentially to a strategy which would distract, though not necessarily by itself defeat, Sparta. We recall the alleged advice of Damaratos to Xerxes to seize Kythera in 480. Thus it seems to me that the modern debate about the tactic of *epiteichismos* (or *epiteichisis*), the occupation and fortification of a promontory or island in the enemy's own territory, may have sometimes been misconceived. The question is surely not whether this tactic was discussed as a possibility at Athens so early as 432 (1.142.2; cf. 122.1) but why, since it was an obvious possibility for a naval power (Ps.-Xen. *Ath. Pol.* 2.13), it was not in fact employed until 427. The answer, implied by Thuc. 4.3.3, seems to be that permanent occupation of a piece of enemy territory was considered too expensive; but Tolmides, I suggest, was among the first to draw the correct lesson from the great Helot revolt and to advocate *epiteichismos* as a peculiarly effective way of exploiting the antagonism between the Spartans and the Helots.

Perhaps in 449 the Spartans made their second excursion north of the Isthmus in the 'First' War. By then, however, the international situation had radically changed. In 451 a Sparta which had never been able, even if it had wished, to prosecute the war vigorously made a truce for five years with an Athens then perhaps influenced by the returned Kimon (Hill 1951, I.5.17; Piccirilli 1973, no. 20). Soon after, early in 450 rather than late in 451, Sparta granted to Argos the Thirty Years' Truce (cf. 5.14. 4; 28.2) that Argos itself had spurned in 481 (Hdt. 7. 148.4).

This stalemate between the great powers was symbolized by the 'Second Sacred War' (Hill 1951, I.7.1): after Sparta had (again?) wrested Delphi from Phokian control, Athens promptly returned it to their Phokian allies. In 447, however, the equilibrium was shattered. Defeated at Koroneia, the one victory over Athens that the Boiotians could boast before 424 (3.63.3; 4.92.6), the Athenians were swiftly relieved of Boiotia. Worse followed in the shape of the revolt of Euboia, an island whose economic, strategic and psychological significance for Athens was laid bare in the closing phase of 'the' Peloponnesian War. At Sparta the tails of the 'hawks', those who since 478—

477 had resented and feared the growth of Athenian power and wished to see it cut down to size, were up; and when Megara too, perhaps on cue, revolted from Athens (1.114.1), the way was open for a full-scale Peloponnesian League invasion of Attika (Hill 1951, I.7.4–5), the fifth such incursion by Dorians (cf. Hdt. 5.77), the first by the League properly so called. But with Athens apparently at his mercy King Pleistoanax tamely withdrew from Attika and was later exiled on a charge of having been bribed by the Athenians (2.21.1).

The real bribe, however, may not have been monetary but ‘the offer to surrender, or to discuss the surrender of, Megara, Troizen and Achaia’ (Gomme 1956, 74; cf. Ste. Croix 1972, 196–200). For in the winter of 446–445 Sparta and Athens concluded a Thirty Years’ Peace whereby each side recognized the hegemony of the other, on land and by sea respectively (Hill 1951, I.7.7). Athens, we note, retained Naupaktos and—a major gain from the war—Aigina. Argos was not a party to the treaty, but specific provision was made for the eventuality of its establishing friendly relations with Athens (Paus. 5.23.4).

Sparta entered into the peace from a bargaining position crucially weakened by what some Spartans took to be the too ready compliance of Pleistoanax and his adviser. The peace, however, might have been expected to preserve the status quo about the Isthmus that had been so rudely disturbed by the defection of Megara. In the event, it lasted for only fourteen of its intended thirty years. For in 432 Sparta voted that the Athenians had broken their oaths and in 431 began ‘the’ Peloponnesian War by invading Attika once again. ‘What made war inevitable’, wrote Thucydides (1.23.6), ‘was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta’, a judgement he repeats in different words and with some amplifications. It was not, he says (1.88), the specific grievances which Sparta’s allies Corinth, Megara and Aigina brought forward against Athens so much as Athens’ growing power that influenced the Spartan vote for war. By 432, he adds (1.118.2), Athens’ power had reached the point where it had begun to encroach upon and disrupt the Spartan alliance, particularly the Peloponnesian League, a situation Sparta found intolerable. Again, looking back from the vantage point of 413, Thucydides (7.18.2) says that the Spartans themselves then thought that in 432 the fault (*sc.* for breaking the peace) lay more on their side and that ‘there was some justice in the misfortunes they had suffered’ since 431, a remarkable admission on many counts, not least because it involved the retrospective recognition that Apollo’s approval (1.118.3) had not turned the conflict into a ‘just war’ (contrast the view of Thucydides’ Corinthians: 1.123).

The judgment of Thucydides on the origins of the war is still today, no less than in antiquity, monumentally controversial (e.g. Sealey 1975). But readers of Ste. Croix 1972 should at least be convinced that, whether or not Thucydides was right, his judgment is at least consistent with his portrayal of

Sparta's behaviour in 432. That is to say, in contrast to 479, when it was 'chiefly because they were urged on by their allies' (1.90.1) that the Spartans had tried to prevent the rebuilding of Athens' walls, in 432 they took their decision for war chiefly through fear for their own position, specifically for fear that the Peloponnesian League might break up and so expose Lakonia to the kind of devastating invasion that did in fact occur in 370. In this judgment I believe Thucydides to have been essentially correct, although his own jejune narrative of the period 445–433 has made some historians wonder why he could have thought Athens' power was growing then.

The answer to this apparent puzzle is, I suggest, to be found in Thucydides' attitude to the challenge to Athenian domination in the Aegean thrown down by Samos between 440 and 439. He bestows his longest treatment of any episode in the *Pentekontaëtia* on this challenge (1.115.2–117), which (in the words of Athenian democrats in 411) had 'come very close to depriving the Athenians of their control of the sea' (8.76.4f.; cf. 73.4; 86.4; 98.4). In other words, if even the most powerful of Athens' subject-allies could not shake the grip of Athens on its Empire, there was small chance of any other ally's loosening it. Thus the suppression of Samos, together with the terms of surrender imposed (the Samians 'pulled down their walls, gave hostages, handed over their fleet, and agreed to pay reparations in instalments at regular intervals'), could be seen as a great advance in Athenian power. The effect at Sparta will have been to play once more into the hands of the 'hawks'. Indeed, it is probable that already in 441–440 the Spartans had voted to aid the Samians and so break the peace after only four years. To the arguments of Ste. Croix (1972, 117, 143, 200–3) we may perhaps add one drawn from the special relationship between Sparta and Samos—or rather between certain Spartan and Samian aristocrats—that had existed perhaps since the Second Messenian War.

In 432 the immediate occasion of Sparta's vote was Corinth's bringing into the open at Sparta its grievances against Athens over its colonies Kerkyra and Poteidaia. Corinth was not the only ally of Sparta with grievances, but Thucydides underlines Corinth's cardinal role within the Peloponnesian League by writing speeches for 'the Corinthians' alone of the allies both at the meeting of the Spartan Assembly which voted for war (1.68–71) and at the subsequent Peloponnesian League Congress which confirmed the Spartans' decision (1.120–4). How far Thucydidean speeches correspond to speeches actually delivered is another of those eternally vexed problems of Thucydidean scholarship, but fortunately in the case of the first Corinthian speech we need not trouble ourselves too much over this, given Thucydides' own personally expressed judgment of why Sparta voted for war. Instead, we may select what seem to me the two most revealing points made by 'the Corinthians'—that, if Sparta does not vote for war, they will look for 'another alliance' (1.71.4); and that Sparta's 'whole way of life is out of date when compared with theirs (*sc.* the Athenians')' (1.71.2; cf. 70).

The first of these points raises the whole question of diplomatic relations within the Peloponnesian League and between the League or its individual members and Athens or Argos. An ancient commentator on 1.71.4 inferred that Corinth was threatening to secede from the League and ally itself with Argos, and his view receives *prima facie* support from the diplomatic situation in 421 (below). However, as Ste. Croix (1972, 60) has pointed out, in 432 Argos' truce with Sparta still had more than a decade to run and in the event Argos showed no sign of willingness to break it. His alternative suggestion, that Corinth contemplated a separate alliance with Athens, may seem somewhat implausible. But students of Middle Eastern affairs in late 1977 were presented with a no less extraordinary diplomatic *volte-face*; indeed, there was even talk of a 'separate peace' between Egypt and Israel, which could hardly be said to be less ideologically and politically opposed to each other than Corinth and Athens.

The second point, about the archaic character of the Spartan way of life, takes us back to the alleged 'death' of Spartan high culture. It was argued at the end of Chapter 9 that this process had been either misdescribed or misconstrued but that by the time of Herodotus Spartan society had been reorganized along almost exclusively military lines, partly to palliate the disparities of private wealth among citizens and so abort civil strife, partly to compensate for shrinking citizen military manpower in face of the Helot threat. It is therefore entirely appropriate that Thucydides' Corinthians should draw an analogy between archaism in politics and archaism in the arts and crafts: for, according to Herodotus (2. 167.2), the Corinthians—upper-class Corinthians, that is—were of the Greeks the least unfavourably disposed towards the practitioners of manual crafts, the Spartans the most contemptuous of all. Herodotus himself adds a telling commentary on the anachronistic ossification of Spartan society. For Sparta is the only Greek state which he treats 'ethnographically' by describing some of the 'customs of the Spartans' (6.56–60) as if they were a 'barbarian' or non-Greek people. Indeed, he specifically remarks of one aspect of the elaborate funeral rites of Spartan kings that it was common to pretty well all non-Greek peoples.

It was also suggested in Chapter 9 that the military reorganization of Spartan society was to be associated with the remarkable passion for horseracing attested by the outstanding record of rich Spartans in the four-horse chariot-race at Olympia between c.550 and 370. The palm or rather wreath must go to Euagoras, who in the late sixth century won at three successive Olympics with the same team of mares (Hdt. 6.103.4). But no less noteworthy in its own way, and for our purposes yet more informative, is the *curriculum vitae* of Damonon and his son preserved on a stele of the third quarter of the fifth century, precisely the period to which the remarks of 'the Corinthians' refer (Jeffery 1961, 196f., 201, no. 52; Schwartz 1976). The stele, originally set up in the sanctuary of Athena on the Spartan akropolis, records among other victories the well over thirty won by Damonon in horse-

races at Lakonian festivals held in both Spartan and Perioikic territory: the Pohoidaia at Sparta, Helos and Thouria; the Athenaia and Ariontia (?) at Sparta (?); the Eleusinia at modern Kalyvia tis Sochas; the Lithesia near Cape Malea (?); and the Parparonia in the Thyreatis (on the site of the great victory over the Argives in c.545). One can think of few better ways by which a Spartan might at once take advantage of the political unification of Lakonia and Messenia and emphasize his economic superiority over his Perioikic rivals and subjects. As if to ram the point home, Damonon stresses that his victorious teams were bred in his own stables.

Thucydides' Corinthians were of course concerned not with local Lakonian economics and politics but with the effect of the Spartans' outmoded way of life on their perception (or lack of it) of shifts in the contemporary diplomatic constellation. Thucydides himself, however, clearly believed that their general point had a yet wider, indeed almost a universal, application. For the contrast between stick-in-the-mud Sparta and go-ahead Athens drawn by 'the Corinthians' in 432 is one to which he recurs in different contexts and for various purposes throughout his history. One of the most revealing of these passages occurs near the end of the work as we have it (8.96.5): 'Athens, particularly as a naval power, was enormously helped by the very great difference in the national characters—her speed against their slowness, her enterprise as against their lack of initiative. This was shown by the Syracusans (*sc.* during the Sicilian expedition of 415–413, below), who were most like the Athenians in character and fought best against them.'

In fact, though, the Spartans were not absolutely slow, and in the type of situation exemplified in 432, when they felt 'compelled' to go to war in the sense that the alternatives to fighting were intolerable, they had never been slow at all (1.118.2, with Ste. Croix 1972, 94f.). And although Thucydides' retrospective judgment on the degree of Spartan success down to 411 does of course hold good, it is doubtful whether even he would have predicted this in 432 on the basis of the difference in national characters. At any rate, it is certain that the Corinthians had no such notions in 432. On the contrary they, like the majority of Greeks, confidently expected that, if the Spartan alliance invaded Attika annually shortly before the grain-harvest, Athens would be unable to hold out for more than three years at the outside (7.28.3; cf. 4.85.2; 5.14.3). It was not the least of the many paradoxes of 'the' Peloponnesian War that this confidence was largely misplaced. Let us therefore briefly review the strategy of the war.

On the Spartan side there is relatively little controversy. Since the Persian Wars of 480–479 it had been dogma, both inside and outside the alliance, that an invasion of Attika was the optimum method of bending Athens to its enemies' will. Moreover, in 432, Sparta as aggressor was bound to adopt such a primarily offensive strategy aimed at eliminating the threat posed by Athens to its hegemony of the Peloponnesian League; and as a land power

heading an alliance mostly composed of primarily land-orientated states Sparta was bound to play to its strength. The Athenians, it was calculated, would either refuse a pitched battle and so lose their crops and be starved into submission or be demoralized into risking a battle they would assuredly lose. The naval aspect of Spartan strategy was emphatically secondary for the simple reason that the Spartan alliance could not pack enough nautical punch and lacked sufficient expertise in naval warfare to threaten Athenian supremacy at sea. As late as 411 the inhabitants of Iasos on the south coast of Asia Minor could not believe that the fleet advancing on them was not Athenian (8.28.2). Instead, therefore, the Spartans relied on words rather than deeds to break the cohesion of the Athenian war-effort. To exacerbate existing discontent within the Athenian Empire, they proclaimed that their aim in the war was to liberate Athens' allies from the yoke of the 'tyrant' city (esp. 2.8.4).

The strategy of Athens, by contrast, remains controversial. Thucydides' representation of it cannot be fully discussed here because it forms part of the wider problem of the composition of the history. But the narrower question, that of the balance intended or struck by Athens between offence and defence, must be raised. To Thucydides the architect of Athenian strategy at the outbreak of war was Perikles, who spoke first at a meeting of the Assembly called when the Peloponnesians were on the point of invading Attika in 431 and gave the Athenians 'just the same advice as he had given before. This was that they were to prepare for war and bring into the city their property in the country. They were not to go out and offer battle, but were to come inside the city and guard it. Their navy, in which their strength lay, was to be brought to the highest state of efficiency, and their allies were to be handled firmly, since, he said, the strength of Athens came from the money paid in tribute by their allies, and victory in war depended on a combination of intelligent resolution and financial resources' (2.13. 2; cf. 65.7). The allied tribute was of course employed to finance the fleet, but what is left unclear in Thucydides is what role or roles Perikles envisaged for the fleet thus financed and mobilized. Was it to be used mainly defensively to keep the allies in hand and so preserve Athens' lifeline, the sea-lanes along which travelled the merchantmen carrying wheat from the Crimea to the Peiraieus? Or did Perikles also plan a major offensive role for fleets to be sent round the Peloponnese in order to ravage and even occupy the territory of Sparta's coastal allies and that of Sparta itself?

In the early books Thucydides lays the emphasis squarely on the first of these alternatives in line with the overwhelmingly defensive aura he imparts to Perikleian strategy as a whole. The only passage with a different colouring is 3.17, but its authenticity is often—and reasonably—contested. In Book 6, however, after describing the Athenian armada prepared against Sicily in 415 as 'by a long way the most costly and the finest-looking force of Greek troops that up to that time had ever come from a single city' (6.31.1), he

points out that in numbers of ships it was no larger than the Athenian fleet of 430. From this and other indications scholars have inferred that Thucydides underestimated the role Perikles had allotted to sea-borne raids (cf. Westlake 1969, 84–100).

That may be true, but we should not, I think, allow this to outweigh Thucydides' view that Perikleian strategy taken as a whole was preponderantly defensive in intention. For if we follow his judgment on the origins of the war (as interpreted above), it was enough for Athens as the aggrieved party to 'win' the war if it simply survived the annual Spartan onslaughts by land and, by keeping a firm hold on its alliance, maintained a supply of foreign grain sufficient to feed a population temporarily deprived of part of the produce of its own territory. Indeed, this is precisely what Perikles is made by Thucydides to say to the Athenian Assembly in 432, 431 and 430 (1.144.1; 2.13.9; 62.1; cf. 65.7), when he recommended his strategy as one that entailed suffering but would enable Athens, not to win an outright victory, but to 'win through' (cf. Ste. Croix 1972, 208).

And so it proved, at least in the first phase of 'the' Peloponnesian War from 431 to 421, which is sometimes known as the 'Archidamian War'. Thucydides of course could never have used this title (and in fact refers descriptively to 'the Ten Years' War': 5.25.1; 26.3). For not only did Archidamos die about halfway through the decade, but, if Thucydides represents him with substantial fidelity (see, however, Westlake 1968, 123–5), he actually opposed the majority Spartan view of Athens in 432 and advised that war should at least be postponed until Sparta was ready for it (1.80–5, esp. 83). It is of course possible that Thucydides the 'artful reporter' (Hunter 1973) used Archidamos to foreshadow dramatically the actual course of the initial phase of the war. On the other hand, as a guest-friend of Perikles and the most experienced Spartan general (though not in warfare against Athens), Archidamos was perhaps the best placed of the Spartans to evaluate the relative strengths of the two sides; and his experiences as general in the 460s may well have made him a 'dual hegemony' theorist and a supporter of the Thirty Years' Peace.

However that may be, Archidamos led the first three invasions of Attika, until in 427 he stood down in favour of the Agiad regent and in 426 was replaced by his son and Eurypontid successor, Agis II. The invasion of 430, though only lasting about forty days, was the longest of all (2.57.2), while the first, taking a maximum of thirty-five, is said to have continued 'a long time' (2.19.2). They were so short simply because they could last only as long as did the supplies the Peloponnesians brought with them or found in Attika. It was part of the amateurism of hoplite warfare that an army was expected to live literally from hand to mouth (Pritchett 1974, I, ch.2). In these circumstances it is not surprising that the invasions did no permanent and irretrievable damage, and that the damage they did cause was as much psychological as material.

Indirectly, however, they were responsible for the devastating effects of the greatest unforeseen accident of the Ten Years' War, the plague which first hit Athens in 430 (2.47.3–54; 3.87; cf. 6.12.1; 26.2; and generally 1.23.3). The concentration of population in the city of Athens in insanitary conditions aggravated the plague's virulence, and this further sapped the morale of a people already severely depressed by seeing their property destroyed under their noses. In fact, so powerful became the depression that envoys were sent to Sparta to treat for peace (2.59.1; 4.21.1), until a speech of Perikles (2.60–4; cf. 65.2), combined with 'hawkish' Spartan intransigence, convinced the Athenians that such diplomacy was pointless.

Not everything, however, went the way of Sparta in the first years of the war. For apart from mounting annual counter-raids on the Megarid and reducing Poteidaia eventually in 429 Athens had been notably active by sea round the Peloponnese. In 431, shortly after the first Peloponnesian invasion of Attika had begun, an Athenian fleet of 100 ships carrying 1,000 hoplites was despatched (2.23.2). Diodorus (12.43.1) mentions an attack on the Argolis, but Thucydides chooses to record only the raid on Perioikic Mothone in Messenia. The town was apparently fortified but not garrisoned, since the Spartans sent a mobile detachment (*phroura*) under the brilliant Brasidas to defend it (2.25.1f.). Gomme (1956, 84f.) did not believe that the Athenians intended Mothone to become their first *epiteichismos*, and he is probably right, since Mothone is rather far from the main object of such a tactic, the Helots working the central Pamisos valley. It is, however, highly significant, in the light of subsequent events, that among Athens' allies at Mothone were Messenians from Naupaktos. Moreover, after the Peloponnesians had withdrawn from Attika the Athenians 'established and garrisoned positions both by land and sea, with the intention of keeping these up for the duration of the war' (2.24.1). One of these positions was certainly Salamis (2.93.4); others may have been Aigina, from which the Athenians expelled the inhabitants in 431 and replaced them with their own colonists (2.27.1; cf. 8.69.1), and Naupaktos itself (2.69).

In 430 precisely the same response was made to the second Peloponnesian invasion of Attika (2.56), but this time Thucydides gives more details. First stop was Epidauros, which lay *en route* to Argos and was friendly to Sparta; then Troizen, Halieis and Hermione; and finally Lakonian Prasiai. Like Mothone, Prasiai was seemingly fortified but ungarrisoned; but the Spartans appear not to have sent a defence force and the Athenians captured and sacked the *polis* (2.56.6). Although Prasiai lay at the end of a difficult route of communication with the Eurotas valley, there was little profit in occupying it permanently. Naval raids were the best way of harming one of Sparta's more important Perioikic subjects, and to judge from some lines of Aristophanes' play *Peace* (242f.) invoking 'thrice-wretched Prasiai' they seem to have been effective.

In 429 the Spartans did not invade Attika, and the Athenians did not send a fleet round the Peloponnese until early in Thucydides' 'winter'

(November to February). Instead, the Spartans laid siege to Plataia, whose eventual capitulation in 427, followed by a notorious instance of Spartan bad faith (3.68.4), helped to thwart Athenian designs on Boiotia in 424. The fleet that went round the Peloponnese late in 429 (thereby incidentally helping to diminish the terrors of Cape Malea outside the official sailing season) was commanded by Phormion, who used Naupaktos as a base to block fleets sailing from Corinth (2.83) and resoundingly demonstrated Athenian naval superiority by crushing a much larger Peloponnesian fleet.

Against the view of Brunt (1965, 271) that ‘if Perikles set high hopes on the effectiveness of such attacks (*sc.* by sea on the Peloponnesian coast), this only shows that...he overestimated the potency of maritime superiority’, I would point out first that the Spartans were persuaded to prepare a second fleet against Phormion in 429 precisely because they thought they might thereby ‘make it more difficult for the Athenians to send their fleets round the Peloponnese’ (2.80.1). In 428 their resolve can only have been confirmed by an Athenian expedition under Phormion’s son which ravaged several places in ‘Lakonike’ (3.7.1–2) and a later one of 100 ships (as in 431 and 430) which landed at will in the Peloponnese and ravaged the Spartan Perioikis (specifically so called by Thucydides at 3.16.2). Second, the decision of the Spartans in 426 to found a colony in Trachis (Herakleia Trachinia: 3.92–3) should be taken as a firm indication that they were by then aware that land invasions of Attika would not alone win the war. For Herakleia was envisaged partly as a base for naval operations against Euboia, and partly as a way-station *en route* to Athens’ allies in Thrace. As Gomme (1956, 395) remarks, ‘clearly we can see the mind of Brasidas behind this.’

The Athenians’ use of *epiteichismos* on the island of Minoa off Megara in 427 (3.51) marked a turning-point in the Ten Years’ War. Thucydides, as we have noted, represents Athenian strategy in the first years as essentially that of Perikles. The great man, however, died of the plague in 429, and Thucydides in the course of a summary of Perikles’ influence written at least in part after 404 commented that his successors as democratic leaders entirely reversed the essentially defensive direction of his strategy (2.65.8). This judgment is hardly sustained even by Thucydides’ own narrative, at least of the Ten Years’ War (Gomme 1951, 70f., 76–80), and Perikles’ followers, if not Perikles himself, may well have contemplated *epiteichismos*. Thucydides, though, tells us nothing about any debates over strategy there may have been in Athens after Perikles’ death, so we can only guess that in 427 *epiteichismos* had been promoted from a longer-term to a short-term objective. Among the men elected general who actively favoured this tactic I would single out Nikias, who completed the first *epiteichismos*, and Demosthenes. Between them, by employing the tactic in Messenia and Lakonia, they very nearly won the war for Athens in the full sense, although the element of chance should not be overlooked. Historians have perhaps

underestimated the extent to which such a tactic was the logical one to employ against Sparta in the light of its geographical situation and the course of its history since the Persian Wars.

Demosthenes makes his first appearance in Thucydides in the summer of 426 as one of the commanders of a fleet sent round the Peloponnese (3.91.1). His career as general in Aitolia in 426–425 was chequered, though ultimately successful, but its main significance for the future was that it brought him (like Tolmides and Phormion before him) into a close working relationship with the Naupaktos Messenians, for whose strategic and tactical skills he conceived a healthy respect. It was they who persuaded him to undertake the Aitolian campaign on the grounds that the Aitolians constituted a threat to Naupaktos (3.94.3; 95.1); one of their number acted as guide (3.98.1); their hoplites played a crucial role in the decisive battle with the Aitolians and Peloponnesians (3.108.1); finally, and not least, their Doric speech was for the first time used to confound Doric-speaking adversaries, in this instance the Ambrakiots (3.112.4). It was perhaps to mark these exploits that the Naupaktos Messenians erected a monument in the Athenian portico at Delphi (M/L, p.244). A similar offering at Olympia is perhaps to be dated about five years later (M/L no.74).

With 425 we reach the episode which more than any other before the abortive conspiracy of Kinadon in c.399 unmasks the realities of life in Lakonia and Messenia and so exposes Spartan priorities in decision-making to the glare, as unusual as it was unwelcome, of publicity: the Pylos affair—or ‘disaster’ as it seemed to the Spartans (4.15.1; 7.71.7). Reverting superficially to the pattern established in 431 and 430, the Spartans led an invasion of Attika in the spring, to which the Athenians responded with an expedition round the Peloponnese (4.2.1f.). For once, however, Thucydides permits us some insight into the character of Athenian policy since Perikles’ departure. This Athenian fleet had for its main objective an intervention in Sicily (where Athenian forces had been engaged since 427), but *en route* to Sicily it was to settle the vicious civil war in Kerkyra that had raged since 427, and *en route* to Kerkyra it was envisaged that Demosthenes might make some special use of the fleet on the Peloponnesian coast (4.2.4). ‘No wonder’, comments Gomme (1956, 438), ‘that Athens had little success in Sicily.’ What concerns us is the role of Demosthenes.

According to Thucydides (4.3.2), who seems to have had Demosthenes for a source, he had joined the expedition expressly to conduct an *epiteichismos* at Pylos on the west coast of Messenia. The discrepancy between this specific statement and the vague wording of 4.2.4 is ambiguous: Demosthenes may have wished to keep secret the location of his intended fortification or he may have felt that the majority of the Athenian Assembly would not share his views on Pylos. At any rate, neither his two fellow-commanders nor the junior officers nor the other ranks were convinced by the array of arguments he adduced *in situ* in support of his

project (4.3.2f.): that Pylos possessed abundant timber and stone; that its situation was naturally strong; that it was unguarded; that it had a harbour close by; and finally that the Naupaktos Messenians, who knew the terrain and spoke the same language as the Spartans, would both provide a reliable garrison and do great damage to the surrounding country. The last of these arguments strongly suggests that Demosthenes was acting on the advice of the Naupaktos Messenians, whose motivation is implicit in Thucydides' description of Pylos as lying in 'the land that was once Messenia' (4.3.3; cf. 41.2). (Thucydides is wrong, however, to place Pylos at 400 stades from Sparta; by the easiest route *via* Oresthasion in south-west Arkadia it is some 600 stades or 90 kilometres.)

In the event, the only unanswerable argument in Demosthenes' favour was provided by an opportune storm, the second most portentous accident of the Ten Years' War. The Spartans at the time (May/June) were celebrating a festival and, confident that they would easily storm the Athenian fortification (it had been hastily erected and was manned by a few soldiers; there was not much grain in the place), merely informed the Peloponnesians, who were then encamped in Attika, of the occupation. Agis, however, perceptively and promptly withdrew from Attika, and a Spartan force was immediately despatched to Pylos, where it joined up with the nearest of the *Perioikoi* (presumably those of Mothone and Kyparissia). The other Lakedaimonians who had returned from Attika (presumably Lakonian *Perioikoi*) were slower to respond (4.8.1). Sparta's Peloponnesian allies were also summoned and the Peloponnesian fleet of sixty ships was recalled from Kerkyra.

Against them the Athenians despatched a fleet of fifty ships from Zakynthos, including some from Naupaktos, to supplement the five left with Demosthenes when the rest had continued on to Kerkyra. The reinforcements anchored off the unguarded island of Prote which served as the harbour of Kyparissia. Before their arrival, however, and presumably by prior arrangement, Demosthenes was joined by forty hoplites of the Naupaktos Messenians. The Spartans meanwhile sent over hoplites in relays to garrison the island of Sphakteria, Thucydides' ignorance of whose topography argues against autopsy (4.8.6, with Gomme 1956, 484). When their fleet arrived, some ships were detached to fetch timber from Asine for siege-engines (4.13.1); there are the remains of extensive oak-forests on the hills west of modern Koroni.

This stalemate continued until the Athenians by a victory at sea as it were put the Spartans permanently in check by taking their queen. For cut off on Sphakteria was one of the relays of hoplites, 420 men (4.8.7,9). The significance of the composition of this garrison for the organization of the Spartan army and the development of Spartan society will be considered at length below. In the immediate context what matters is the electrifying effect the potential loss of citizen hoplites had on the Spartan authorities. Treating the matter as a 'disaster', they concluded a local armistice and sent

ambassadors to Athens to negotiate for the release of ‘the men’. The terms of the armistice (4.16) were manifestly one-sided, only one clause—that forbidding the Athenians to land on Sphakteria—restricting the Athenians’ freedom of movement. The Spartans on their side handed over all their remaining ships at Pylos and further agreed to place in Athenian custody all their warships from elsewhere in ‘Lakonike’ (meaning presumably those at Asine and perhaps also Gytheion); in all, sixty ships were surrendered. They contracted not to attack the Athenian fortification and to send over to the blockaded garrison on Sphakteria only moderate and perishable rations (two Attic *choinikes* of barley meal, two *kotylai* of wine and some meat for each soldier; half-rations for each servant).

The speech written by Thucydides for the ambassadors to Athens (4.17–20) is the most telling possible comment on the course of the war to 425, and best illustrates the foresight displayed in their different ways by Perikles and Demosthenes. Yet again one wishes one could be sure how closely Thucydides stuck to the original. The ambassadors begin with ‘the men on the island’ (4.17.1; cf. 19.1), their chief though not their only cause for anxiety. They continue with an unmistakable reminiscence of the fundamental provision of the Thirty Years’ Peace, over whose alleged breach Sparta had gone to war in 431: ‘You (*sc.* Athenians) are now in a position where you can turn your present good fortune to good use, keeping what you hold...’ The idea had already been present to the Spartans’ mind in 427 (3.52.2), and it is even possible that they had actually made a proposal for peace on these terms towards the end of 426 (Gomme 1956, 391). Anyway, a little later in the speech the idea is made explicit by an appeal to the ‘dual hegemony’ thesis: ‘if we, Athens and Sparta, stand together, you can be sure that the rest of Hellas, in its inferior position, will show us every possible mark of honour’ (4.20; cf. Aristoph. *Peace* 1082).

To bring out the full import of this speech the comment of Gomme (1956, 459f.) cannot be bettered: after ‘a war begun with so many hopes, such high-sounding promises, such favour from the greater part of the Greek world, and continued with a series of miserable failures and but one success, the inglorious victory over Plataia’, the Spartans, for the sake of a handful of men, were reduced to making ‘an empty and, almost certainly, a vain offer’ (*sc.* of peace, alliance and friendship: 4.19.1). So much for the avenging of the injuries done by Athens to Sparta’s allies. So much for the ‘liberation’ of the Greeks from the Athenian yoke.

The rest of the story is more quickly told. The Athenian Assembly, then influenced mainly by Kleon (whose stature cannot be truly grasped because of Thucydides’ transparent animosity towards him), refused to negotiate. The armistice at Pylos ended, and the Athenians robbed Sparta of its (mainly allied) fleet by refusing to hand back the ships in their custody. The Athenian blockade of Sphakteria was prolonged, however, both by the difficulties of the Athenians’ own position (*esp.* 4.29.1) and by desperate

Spartan counter-measures. The most notable, and drastic, of the latter was the unprecedented offer of freedom to any Helot who would take over supplies (4.26.5).

Eventually Kleon secured an extraordinary personal command, resigned to him by Nikias, and, thanks chiefly to the experience of Demosthenes (4.30.1) and the local knowledge of the Naupaktos Messenians (4.36.1), succeeded in storming the Sphakteria garrison remarkably quickly. To the astonishment of the Greek world (nicely captured by the anecdote in 4.40.2) the 292 survivors, of whom only about 120 were Spartan citizens (4.38.5), surrendered rather than fight to the death. They were taken back to Athens and used as hostages for Sparta's good behaviour; their physical presence is attested by the find of one of their shields in the Agora, where it had originally been hung in the Painted Stoa (Cartledge 1977, 13 n. 14). It was these prisoners, or rather the Spartiates among them, who did most to hamstringing the Spartan effort in the remainder of the Ten Years' War.

Sparta's troubles, though, had only begun. The fortification at Pylos was garrisoned with Naupaktos Messenians, who, as Demosthenes had predicted, channelled their 'nationalist' aspirations, knowledge of the terrain and Doric speech into successful guerrilla warfare, of which the Spartans had had no previous experience. So successful indeed was this warfare that the Messenian Helots began to desert in sufficient numbers to conjure up the spectre, always lurking in the Spartan subconscious, of a full-scale Helot revolt (4.41.3).

For some time, perhaps until the conclusion of an armistice in 423, the Spartans continued to send embassies to Athens to get back Pylos and 'the men' (cf. Aristoph. *Peace* 665ff.). But the Athenians not unnaturally were at first unwilling to do any deals. Rather they redoubled their efforts at *epiteichismos*. Later in 425 a large fleet under Nikias attacked the Corinthia and Epidauros; and Methana between Epidauros and Troizen was permanently fortified (4.45.1f.). It has been suggested that Nikias was merely anxious not to be outshone by Kleon and Demosthenes, but his exploits of 424, for which the ground had been carefully prepared, argue that he had perceived the wisdom of their strategy and felt it could profitably be extended to Lakonia.

For 424 was the first year of the war in which the major sea-borne campaign was directed specifically against Lakonia. Nikias' colleague in joint command of a fleet of sixty ships was Autokles son of Tolmaios. He may have been a relative of Tolmides (Davies 1971, no. 2717), and, if so, the kinship may not be irrelevant, since the primary objective of the expedition was the capture of Kythera, a feat Tolmides had accomplished in c.456–455. It appears from an inscription that Nikias received 100 talents for the expedition and that it departed in about the second week of May, a favourable time for the rounding of Malea with the Etesian wind blowing from the north-east.

Thucydides notes that the inhabitants of Kythera are Lakedaimonian Perioikoi, who are governed by an officer (called ‘harmost’ in a fourth-century inscription: *IG* V.1. 937) sent out annually from Sparta with a garrison of hoplites from the mainland. He does not say when the Spartans had instituted this method of control, which was not normally applied to other Perioikic communities; but, if it did not go back to the mid-sixth century, Tolmides’ *Periplus* provides an obvious occasion. Certainly it appears to have been a necessary precaution (if an ineffective one) during the Ten Years’ War, since Nicias had been able to enter secretly into discussions with ‘some Kytherians’ (4.54.3).

It is tempting to infer from a general remark of Thucydides (3.82.1) about civil strife progressively convulsing practically the whole Greek world after 427 that these fifth-columnist Kytherians were in some sense democratically inclined. But they may simply have wished to use the Athenians to secure independence from the Spartans, who, as is implied by the alleged advice of Damaratos to Xerxes, were well aware of the strategic implication of Kythera’s geographical situation. For apart from being a port of call for merchantmen from Egypt and Libya, Kythera also offered a convenient base for raids on Lakonia by sea, the only method of harming the region, as Thucydides (4.53.3) emphatically notes—since, that is, the land-route through the Peloponnese was normally shut off. In 424 Kythera was besides the one link the Athenians needed to complete a chain of bases around the Peloponnese: Aigina, Minoa, Methana, Pylos, Zakynthos, Naupaktos and Kerkyra were already in their control; Nisaia off Megara was soon to be added (4.69).

Nicias divided his fleet in two and made separate landings, the main one at Skandeia, which he occupied and garrisoned, the other at ‘the part of the island that faces Malea’ (4.54.1), that is either at Ay. Pelayia on the northeast (Gomme 1956, 733) or near Diakophti much further south (G.L.Huxley in Coldstream and Huxley 1972, 38). The latter force advanced on (and presumably took) the upper town of Kythera itself, notwithstanding the Spartan garrison, which indeed is conspicuous by its absence from the narrative and had perhaps been withdrawn to forestall a repetition of the *Sphakteria débâcle*.

Using Kythera as a base, the Athenians made wide-ranging raids on most of the coastal settlements in the Lakonian Gulf over a period of seven days. Asine (near Skoutari bay: this is the only certain reference to Lakonian Asine in ancient literature), Helos, Kotyrta and Aphroditia are mentioned by name (4.54; 56.1). To increase the Spartans’ embarrassment, the Athenians also made raids round Malea on the eastern coast of Lakonia, first at Epidaurus Limera and then at Thyrea. The latter had a double point, because Aiginetan refugees had been settled here in 431. Thyrea was captured, looted, burnt and not apparently rebuilt. All Aiginetan captives were put to death at Athens, but the commander of the Spartan garrison and some Kytherian hostages suffered

the milder fate of the ‘men from the island’ (4.57.3f.). Finally, Kythera became a tribute-paying member of the Athenian Empire at the rate of four talents a year, although no record of actual payments survives on stone.

To counteract these raids, the Spartans could not follow the example of the Corinthians in 425 and muster a single force for a decisive battle (4.42–4), but, as in 431 for Mothone, despatched mobile garrisons to various key points (e.g. Thyrea, as we have seen). They also took the extraordinary step of raising a small force of cavalry and archers, a sign of the exceptional nature of the situation as it was apprehended at Sparta. For, as Thucydides is careful to remark—and to underline by employing his favourite comparison between the Spartan and Athenian national characters—the Spartans were now more timid and hesitant than ever. They had suffered a great and unexpected disaster on Sphakteria; Pylos and Kythera were in enemy hands; and the Athenians were making lightning raids on their own territory (4.55.1f.). Indeed, the situation was so grave that the Spartans feared ‘there might be a revolution’. It is probable that, as in 425, what the Spartans mainly feared was a Helot revolt, but Thucydides’ wording does not exclude civil strife within the Spartan citizen body, the one thing the ‘Lykourgan’ system was at such pains to prevent.

In this desperate crisis even the cautious Spartans were bound to review critically the course of the war so far and to draw radical conclusions. Such was the fertile soil into which Brasidas could sow the seeds of a new and more profitable approach. The ground for his Thracian expedition had been laid by the foundation of Herakleia Trachinia and by the long since (1.56.2) wavering loyalty of Athens’ Thraceward allies, whose importance lay chiefly in their control of crucial raw materials like shipbuilding timber. Even so Brasidas failed to receive the wholehearted Spartan support that he required and—so Thucydides (4.81.2) fervently believed—richly deserved. The reason emerges later: the ‘leading men’ of Sparta were jealous of Brasidas, and besides it was not clear to them how Brasidas’ Thracian excursion would help to secure their main objective in the war since 425, the return of ‘the men from the island’ (4.108.7).

It is of course regrettable for the historian of ancient Sparta at this and many other junctures that ‘Sparta did not wash her linen in public’ (Gomme 1956, 358; cf. Brunt 1965, 278–80). But it seems certain that it was a mixture of this selfish jealousy with patriotic prudence, actual necessity and perhaps financial stringency which explains the composition of Brasidas’ army—700 Helots and 1,000 Peloponnesian mercenaries. The Helots selected presumably had had some military experience as armour-bearers and were of proven loyalty, but this time they were equipped as hoplites by the state, the first known instance of this remarkable procedure; and they were despatched, if Thucydides is right, expressly because the Spartans were anxious to get some Helots out of the country (4.80.5). The reason for their anxiety is given earlier in the same chapter, when Thucydides repeats (there are clear signs of

a lack of revision at this point) that the Spartans were afraid of a Helot revolt, and then goes on to retail what is possibly the single most illuminating episode bearing on Spartano-Helot relations (4.80.2–4).

With Pylos in Athenian hands, Thucydides says, the Spartans wanted a good pretext for sending some Helots out of Lakonia or (Thucydides' Greek is ambiguous) they had good reason to send them. For they feared the unyielding character of the Helots (or, according to a variant reading, their youthful impetuosity). Then Thucydides inserts the famous parenthesis already considered in Chapter 10 (again, however, the Greek is ambiguous): 'Spartan policy is always mainly governed by the necessity of taking precautions against the helots' (Ste. Croix) or 'most of the relations between the Lacedaimonians and the Helots were of an eminently precautionary character' (Gomme). Even if Gomme's interpretation of Thucydides' word-order is correct, I would still subscribe to the broader version of the generalization.

Next, Thucydides describes the Spartans' action. They made a proclamation that the Helots should select from among themselves those who thought they had best served Sparta in the wars. The implication of the proclamation was that these Helots were to be freed (like those who had volunteered to take over provisions to Sphakteria), but the real intention was to sort out the most obdurate dissidents, who, the Spartans anticipated, would be the first to put themselves forward. The Helots selected about 2,000 from their number, who crowned themselves with wreaths and made a progress of the local sanctuaries as if they were freed. The Spartans, however, 'liquidated' them (presumably at night), and no one knew how (a journalistic exaggeration designed to convey the secrecy and enormity of this mass execution; Plutarch, *Lyk.* 28.6, makes the educated guess that the Krypteia was responsible). No doubt this 'necessary' measure was to some degree exceptional, and a reflection of the critical post-Pylos situation in Lakonia; but, I repeat, Thucydides chose this episode as a vehicle for his generalization about relations between Spartans and Helots, so we should concentrate on its 'normal' features. These I take to be, first, the fact that these relations were based on fear and, second, the willingness of the Spartans to go to extreme lengths of cruelty to maintain their Helot base intact.

Brasidas' Thracian campaign was triumphantly successful, not least because he made great play with Sparta's 'liberation' propaganda (4.85.1–5; 86.1, 4f., 108.2; 114.3; 121.1) and because he was believed—somewhat naively (cf. 4.87.4–6)—to be sincere. Other significant features were his repeated use of marching by night (including one of the rare Greek attempts at surprise attack on a defended town) and the foreshadowing of the widespread Spartan use of governors known as 'harmosts' to control supposedly friendly or allied states (4.132.3). The home authorities, however, were insufficiently impressed, despite Brasidas' masterstroke of capturing Amphipolis (Thucydides' failure to save it led to his exile and no doubt helps

to explain his admiration for Brasidas); and in spring 423 they concluded a one year's armistice (4.117f.; Piccirilli 1973, no. 25) with an Athens chastened not only by its Thracian setbacks but by its defeat at Delion in Boiotia also in 424 (4.89–101.4).

The armistice is interesting primarily as an anticipation of the full peace that came two years later, many of whose clauses it shares. Again, as in 425, the Spartans were chiefly anxious to recover 'the men' (4.117.2), but the terms reflect the improvement in Sparta's position since then. For example, although each side was to keep what it held, and thus the Athenians were to retain Pylos (or Koryphasion, as the Spartans called it; cf. 4.3.3; 5. 18.7), they were not to venture beyond Boupheiras (Voïdhokoilia Bay?) and Tomeus (inland—but where?); and as for the Athenians on Kythera, they were not to enter into any communication with 'the alliance' (presumably the Peloponnesian League, but just possibly Sparta's other Perioikic 'allies' as well). On the other hand, the sixth clause exposes Sparta's Achilles heel: neither side was to receive deserters, whether free or slave (i.e. Helots above all).

Not all Sparta's allies 'signed' the armistice, although those who did so included the all-important Isthmus block. Less surprisingly, Brasidas refused to countenance what he saw as an impediment to his projects and a poor return for his labours, and he proceeded at once to breach it in spirit if not also in the letter (4.123.1). This naturally fuelled the arguments of those Athenians like Kleon who had not favoured the armistice, and after its expiry Kleon led an army in August 422 specifically to recover Amphipolis. Overconfident and inexperienced, he was soundly defeated by Brasidas, but both generals died in the battle, and at a stroke two important obstacles to the conclusion of a full peace were removed. Negotiations to that end were begun in winter 422–421 and concluded, to the satisfaction at least of the principals, in mid-March 421.

Thucydides sums up the considerations that weighed most with the Athenians and Spartans, although the text of the relevant chapters (5.13–17) is certainly interpolated to some extent. With two exceptions Thucydides adds nothing to the reasons influencing the armistice of 423. The first exception is that 'the men from the island' are now said to have included 'leading' Spartan citizens (5.15.1), an expression which an ancient commentator glosses by saying that they were related to 'leading' Spartans, i.e. men formulating and executing policy. The second additional reason is the 'Argos question'. The Thirty Years' Truce of early 450 between Sparta and Argos was soon to expire, and the Spartans judged, wrongly in the event, that it would be impossible to fight Argos and Athens at once. They also suspected, rightly, that some Peloponnesian states planned to go over to Argos. In particular, though Thucydides does not explicitly say as much, Sparta was threatened by the attitude of Mantinea. This important state had carved out for itself a small 'empire' in south-west Arkadia, had recently crossed swords

with Tegea (4.134.1) and had built a fort in Parrhasia threatening the strategically crucial Skiritis (5.33.1, with A.Andrewes in Gomme 1970, 31–4).

The Spartans, in short, whose territory was menaced from the south-west (Pylos), the south-east (Kythera) and the north (Skiritis), were more ‘compelled’ (in the Thucydidean sense) to make peace than the Athenians. There is also perhaps a hint in Aristophanes (*Peace* 622ff., with Ehrenberg 1962, 89) of Perioikic discontent with the war. So, to stiffen Athens’ resolve, they threatened an invasion of Attika, but an invasion on a new, improved model: ‘orders were sent round to the cities to prepare for building permanent fortifications in Attika’ (5.17.2). The lesson of Pylos and Kythera had been learned, even if it was not to be acted upon for another eight years.

The basis for the negotiations in 422–421 was the same as that of Sparta’s proposals for peace in 425: a return to the status quo of 431 and by implication of 445. The only difference was that in 421 the Spartans were not only prepared but able openly to ride roughshod over the wishes both of their allies and of their recent adherents in the Thraceward area (Ste. Croix 1972, 18, 157–9). This emerges starkly from the clause in the ‘Peace of Nikias’ (as it is usually called, after one of its chief sponsors) permitting Athens and Sparta to change any other clause by mutual agreement (5.18.11; cf. 23.6). This clause above all aroused consternation in the Peloponnese (5.29.2; cf. 30.1), and it was small wonder Athens insisted that Sparta’s allies should swear separately to abide by the peace (5.18.9): this would prevent Sparta from concealing which of its allies declined. In practice these were the Boiotians, who refused to give up the fort of Panakton on the frontier with Attika (5.18.7; with 35.5; 36.2; 39.2f.; 40.1f.; 42.1f.); the Corinthians, who in fact objected to the losses they had incurred (5.30.2–4) but claimed publicly to be opposing Sparta’s attempt to ‘enslave’ the Peloponnese (5.27.2); the Eleians, who considered the long-contested Lepreon in Triphylia on the border with Messenia to be theirs (5.31.1–5); and the Megarians, who wished to recover Nisaia (5.17.2).

Space forbids a listing of all the other clauses in the Peace of Nikias (Piccirilli 1973, no. 27). We may single out the one which both bears immediately on the main theme of this book and nicely illustrates the inefficacy of the peace. Athens contracted to return among other places Koryphasion (Pylos) and Kythera and to restore any Spartan prisoners of state held in Athens or Athenian territory (5.18.7). In fact, though, neither Pylos nor Kythera was returned, and it took yet another agreement, between Sparta and Athens alone, for Sparta to retrieve ‘the men’. This second agreement, concluded perhaps in late March 421, was a defensive alliance to last fifty years concurrently with the Peace of Nikias.

One of the main reasons for the alliance is implicit in a unilateral clause binding the Athenians to aid Sparta ‘if the slave population (*sc.* the Helots) should revolt’ (5.23.2). The other reasons are given by Thucydides in a passage which most unfortunately is corrupt (5.22.2). When emended in

accordance with Gomme's plausible suggestion, it reads like this (with my exegetical notes in parenthesis): the Spartans thought that the Argives (who had refused to renew their Thirty Years' Truce with them) would be least dangerous to them without Athenian aid and that the rest of the Peloponnesians would be cowed (because, if they attacked Sparta or its loyal allies, they would be faced by both Athens by sea and Sparta by land); for, if it had been possible, the rest of the Peloponnesians would have gone over to the Athenians. The Spartans, in other words, anticipated that the opposition to their hegemony of the Peloponnesians would crystallize around a potentially resurgent Argos (5.28.2) and saw that, to safeguard their own narrow interests, it was imperative to forestall a renewal of the alliance between Athens and Argos. As it turned out, however, the alliance between Sparta and Athens was no less inefficacious than the Peace of Nikias.

The diplomatic manoeuvrings after March 421, which radically dislocated the pattern of alliances since 445, are too complicated to discuss here (see now Seager 1976); discussion is anyway frustrated by the state of the first eighty-three chapters of Thucydides' fifth book ('the odd man out in style and technique, apparently not revised even to the standard of Book VIII': Dover 1973, 20). Clearly, though, the second phase of 'the' Peloponnesian War opened like the first against a background of strong dissatisfaction with Sparta's leadership among its allies. Indeed, even stronger, since in 421 Mantinea actually seceded from the Peloponnesian League, the first state to take this drastic step since Megara in *c.*460. It naturally turned to Argos, chiefly because the latter, on the advice of Corinth, had passed a decree inviting 'any Greek state that chose, provided that such a state were independent and would deal with other states on a basis of legality and equality, to enter into a defensive alliance with Argos' (5.27.2; cf. 28). The lead of Mantinea was followed by Corinth and Elis, but Megara and Boiotia held aloof, expressly because they thought the Argive democracy would be less congenial to their own oligarchies than Sparta was (5.31.6; cf. generally 1.19). Tegea too held true to Sparta, vitally so, since the Corinthians and Argives believed that, if they could win over Tegea, they would have the whole Peloponnesians (5.32.3). It would be hard to cite a more spectacular dividend of Sparta's policy of 'divide and rule' in Arkadia; a major factor in Tegea's loyalty was precisely Mantineian disloyalty.

Sparta was not backward in reasserting its supremacy. Probably soon after the middle of March the perhaps 500 or so survivors among Brasidas' 700 Helot hoplites returned from Amphipolis. The Spartans voted to liberate them (a vote was needed because they were 'in a manner public slaves') and allowed them to live where they wished (normally Helots were, as it were, tied to the soil)—so long, that is, as they undertook garrison duty at Lepreon (5.34.1). This was not the first time Helots had been liberated, but it is the first time that we get an indication of what liberation might mean in practice.

Despite much modern scholarship, there is no evidence and no reason to believe that they received grants of land in Triphylia, and the direction to garrison Lepreon implies that these men were not made citizens, even of inferior status. Other ex-Helots sent to Lepreon, however, had been made precisely that, as their title Neodamodeis (virtually ‘new citizens’) signifies. Thucydides infuriatingly provides no information on their origins or status, but it is a fair inference from the fact that Brasidas took unliberated Helots to Thrace that there were no Neodamodeis available in 424. The further facts that we hear of Neodamodeis only between 421 and 370–369 and that they appear exclusively in military contexts suggest that they were a systematically trained body first raised between 424 and 421 following the success of Brasidas’ Helots and intended chiefly to compensate for that deficiency of manpower which, as the Pylos episode demonstrates, had by 425 become critical. Their special name will have been devised to differentiate them by origin and status from the hoplites who had entered the army via the *agoge* and participated in the common messes and Assembly. They will have differed from the ‘Brasideioi’ and the Helots sent to Sicily in 413 (below) in being manumitted prior to enrolment in the army.

The Spartans, then, held on to Lepreon, and in the summer of 421 they demolished the Mantineians’ Parrhasian fort (5.33.1). But this was the limit of their success. In particular, they were aggrieved that Athens had not evacuated Pylos (5.35.6; cf. 39.3). After much negotiation the Athenians were in fact persuaded to withdraw at least the Naupaktos Messenians, the other (*sc.* Messenian) Helots and the deserters from Lakonike (?Lakonian Helots) who had taken refuge there (5.35.7). But in winter 419–418 some of these, perhaps only the Naupaktos Messenians, were returned (5.56.2f.), and they remained until Sparta recaptured Pylos in 409 or 408.

More grave even than this was the disunity within the Spartan citizen-body. There had from the start been a ‘hawkish’ faction opposed to the conclusion of the Peace of Nicias (and presumably yet more so to the alliance with Athens). This faction had considerable success in the elections to the Ephorate for 421–420, and ironically its hand will have been much strengthened by the return of ‘the men from the island’, who would naturally have supported a strong anti-Athenian line. Hence, I believe, the remarkable punishment some of the latter incurred, probably in the summer of 421. Being ‘leading men’, they were already holding public offices, but they were behaving in such a way that the highest Spartan authorities feared internal revolution and deprived them of their full citizen rights (5.34.2). In particular, they were forbidden to buy and sell, a prohibition to whose significance we shall return in Chapter 14.

Argive prospects of fulfilling their most cherished ambition, the hegemony of the Peloponnese (5.40.3), could hardly, one would have thought, have been rosier. They chose paradoxically to play safe. Having failed to renew their truce with Sparta before it expired, in 420 they sent ‘fresh’ proposals to

Sparta (5.41.2): Kynouria was to be restored to them as the price of their standing aside from the conflict within the Peloponnesian League. When the Spartans refused even to discuss its restoration, let alone submit to independent arbitration, the Argives proposed a ‘romantic and preposterous combat’ (Tomlinson 1972, 120)—a re-run ‘Battle of the Champions’! The Spartans were not amused, although in their anxiety to secure Argive neutrality they did at least draft the terms of a new agreement (5.41.3). This, we infer, would have been concluded but for the timely intervention of Alkibiades, who used his family connections with Sparta and his ample diplomatic skills to effect a rift between Sparta and Athens and bring Athens into alliance with Argos, Mantinea and Elis. Corinth, however, withdrew from this axis (5.48.2; 50.5), consistently enough since its aim had probably been simply to bring pressure on Sparta to abandon the foreign policy of 421.

In the summer of 419 the Argive alliance tried to coerce pro-Spartan Epidauros. The Spartans marched out in full force, apparently for the first time in their history, but they got no further than Leuktra (probably near modern Leondari in ancient Aigytis) on their frontier opposite Mount Lykaion; and ‘no one, not even the cities which had sent contingents, knew what was the aim of the expedition’ (5.54.1). This passage contains two major difficulties. First, who were ‘the cities’? Andrewes (in Gomme 1970, 74) argued that the reference is to the loyal members of the Peloponnesian League, but I share the view of Ste. Croix (1972, 345f.) that the *Perioikoi* are meant. For this expedition, like the one against the Parrhasian fort in 421, was a purely Lakonian affair, and the Spartans’ paramount consideration was secrecy. Thucydides was not alone in referring untechnically to the *Perioikic* communities as ‘cities’, and such an unquestioning duty of obedience corresponds to what else we know of relations between Sparta and the *Perioikoi* but is not appropriate to the relationship of Sparta to its Peloponnesian League allies since c.504.

The second main difficulty is to decide what was the true aim of the expedition—and indeed of a subsequent expedition in the same summer, which this time only got as far as the Lakonian frontier at Karyai (5.55.3), the first recorded use of the more direct route from Sparta to Tegea (Figure 17). The answer, I suspect, is that they were designed not so much to relieve Epidauros as to secure Sparta’s northern frontier against the kind of diplomacy illustrated in the 470s by Gnosstas’ proxeny of the Argives at Oinous (Chapter 11). Alkibiades will not have been less astute in this than Themistokles. However that may be, in winter 419–418 the Spartans felt compelled to send in a small garrison to Epidauros. This, however, the Argives regarded as a breach of their alliance with Athens (5.47.9), while the Athenians in reply ostentatiously drew attention to Sparta’s failure to implement all the provisions of the Peace of Nikias (5.56.3). In 418, with the renewal of fighting between the Argives and the Epidaurians, the Spartans decided to try conclusions with the Argive alliance.

In midsummer after the grain-harvest they again marched out in full force ‘themselves and the Helots’ (5.57.1). This expression, used by Thucydides only here and at 5.64.2 introduces one of the two main problems plaguing discussion of this crucial campaign, that of terminology. ‘Helots’, it has been suggested (Andrewes in Gomme 1970, 79), includes Neodamodeis as well as Helots proper, unless (what is unlikely) Sparta maintained a reserve of trained but not liberated Helots. Alternatively these Helots were not combatants but assigned to the necessarily large baggage-train (Welwei 1974, 127). But what is meant by ‘themselves’? Thucydides of course refers to the Spartan forces of 418 collectively as ‘the Lakedaimonians’, but this term as used by and of the Spartans was always potentially misleading, since it could refer either to the Spartans alone or to the Perioikoi alone or to a mixture of the two (Toynbee 1969, 159–61). In 418, it has been argued, the term achieved one of its most impressive and disturbing feats of deception, the hoodwinking of Thucydides himself.

This brings in the second main problem of interpretation, that of numbers. Thucydides was struck by the size of the forces put into the field by both sides in 418. He describes the first Spartan force led out by Agis, together with its Peloponnesian League allies, as ‘the finest Greek army that had ever been brought together’ (5.60.3), and he goes out of his way to give as detailed and accurate an account of the numerical composition of the second Spartan force (the one that fought the Battle of Mantinea) as ‘the secrecy with which Sparta’s affairs are conducted’ (5.68.2) made feasible. Yet most modern scholars have refused to accept Thucydides’ figures as they stand and have accused the historian, albeit reluctantly, of committing a fundamental category error. Both of these major problems must be tackled here, for on their resolution or at least illumination depends our evaluation of the changing military role of the Perioikoi since 479.

The first phase of the campaign of 418 may be ignored, beyond noting that Agis’ conclusion of a four-month truce with Argos on his personal initiative led to his being tried and heavily fined (5.63.2–4, with Ste. Croix 1972, 351). So we begin with Thucydides’ repeated observation that Agis’ army at Mantinea was perceptibly larger than the opposition (5.68.1; 71.2). This provides the surest indication that something is awry either in the transmission of Thucydides’ text or in his calculations. For if the aggregate strength of the ‘Lakedaimonians’ comes out at only 4,484 (5.68.3), then they together with their Arkadian allies (only the Heraians, Mainalians and Tegeans) should have been far too inferior numerically either to have camouflaged their inferiority in such a way as to deceive Thucydides’ informants (the historian was not himself an eyewitness apparently) or to have won the decisive victory they did. Wherein does the error lie?

To oversimplify grossly, two main solutions have been proposed. The first, and most popular, holds that the error springs partly from confusion over Spartan technical terminology (Toynbee 1969, 396–401; and more tentatively

Andrewes in Gomme 1970, 111–17). Thucydides, it is contended, wrongly speaks of the highest multiple of the Spartan *enomotia* (platoon) as the *lochos* (battalion), when he ought to have called it *mora* (brigade). Thus, since there were two inter-linked *lochoi* in each *mora*, of which there were seven at Mantinea (one of Brasidas' veterans and Neodamodeis, six of the Spartiates and Perioikoi brigaded together), Thucydides has almost precisely halved the true total of 'Lakedaimonians'—almost, because the 600 Skiritai and the 300 Hippeis are not to be included in the organization by *morai*. The second solution (Forrest 1968, 132–5) rescues Thucydides' credit to some extent by postulating that in 418 Spartans and Perioikoi were not yet brigaded together in the *mora*, as they certainly were by 403 (Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.31), and that Thucydides' figures should be taken as referring only to Spartiates.

The difficulties in the way of accepting either solution are wellnigh insuperable. Against the first, for example, and leaving aside Thucydides' putative confusion, it can be urged that there is no positive evidence for the *mora* before 403 and that Xenophon in his 'Constitution of the Spartans' (*Lak. Pol.* 11.4) implies that there were four, not two, *lochoi* to each *mora*. Thus, although both Thucydides' and Xenophon's analyses yield the same total number of the smallest constituent units (*enomotiai*) in the 'Lakedaimonian' army, they arrive at this figure by different computations, each of which is in its way unsatisfactory. Against the second solution it may be argued that Thucydides' failure to remark on the numbers and organization of the Perioikoi in the situation of 418 practically constitutes criminal negligence and, more decisively, that there is some indirect evidence that the Spartiates and Perioikoi were indeed brigaded together by 418.

On balance I find the latter objections the weightier, and it may be added that a simple emendation of Xenophon's text, suggested well over a century ago (Welwei 1974, 129 n. 40), would remove the contradiction between him and Thucydides over the number of *lochoi* in a *mora*. Moreover, as we shall see, the adoption of the first solution facilitates a coherent reconstruction of Lakonian social and military history since 479.

The indirect evidence just mentioned is as follows. First, a barbed shaft loosed by Thucydides (1.20.3) against an unnamed predecessor: 'it is believed, too, that the Spartans have a company of troops (*lochos*) called "Pitanate". Such a company has never existed.' The unnamed predecessor is of course Herodotus (9.53.2), who mentions the 'Pitanate *lochos*' in his description of the Battle of Plataia. Herodotus, as we have remarked, is notoriously unreliable on technical matters, and Aristotle (fr. 541), when describing a Spartan army organized into five *lochoi*, does not mention one called 'Pitanate'. However, since one of Aristotle's five is variously transcribed as 'Mesoatas' or 'Messoages', and clearly derived its name from the 'obe' or village of Mesoa, Herodotus may plausibly be understood as 'giving a common-sense explanatory paraphrase of an esoteric technical term' (Toynbee 1969, 372), whereas Thucydides' criticism though formally justified

would be pedantic. In 479, then, the Spartiates were organized in five ‘obal’ regiments, as they had been probably since the ‘Lykourgan’ reforms of the mid-seventh century. But by 418 there were six ‘Lakedaimonian’ regiments and by 403 the *mora* was in existence, a mode of organization that we know from Xenophon (*Hell.* 4.5.10f.) cut across local demarcations. Can we date the transition from ‘obal’ to ‘moral’ army more precisely than ‘between 479 and 403’?

Here we invoke the other two pieces of indirect evidence. Xenophon in his *Lak. Pol.*, which was written in the second quarter of the fourth century, attributed the institution of the ‘moral’ army to Lykourgos; in itself obviously false, this attribution seems progressively more implausible the nearer the date of the change is brought to 403. Second, and more decisively, Thucydides in describing the Spartans’ attempted defence of Sphakteria in 425 says that ‘they sent the hoplites across to the island, choosing the men by lot from each battalion (*lochos*) of their army...the one that was caught there numbered 420 hoplites, with Helots to attend on them’ (4.8.9); later he tells us that of the 292 survivors from the 420 about 120 were Spartiates, the rest Perioikoi (4.38.5). Toynbee’s explanation of the 420 (1969, 373f., 376f., 382f., 391) as the sum of one *enomotia* of thirty-five men from each of twelve *lochoi* possesses what Einstein called the ‘beauty’ of the truly fruitful scientific hypothesis. For Toynbee’s analysis of the *enomotia* as consisting of one man from each of the forty active-service Spartan age-classes (20–59 inclusive) ‘is as secure as any hypothesis about the Spartan army can hope to be’ (Andrewes in Gomme 1970, 115). In 425, therefore, Sparta would have called up thirty-five of the forty age-classes, and the presence of Perioikoi in the garrison was a consequence of the fact that they were now brigaded with Spartiates in the twelve *lochoi* of the ‘moral’ army (two *lochoi* to each of the six *morai*). Thus the *terminus ante quem* for the army reform would be 425.

I cannot, however, follow Toynbee in linking the reform exclusively with the great earthquake of c.465, since I believe he has exaggerated its demographic effects (Chapter 11). On the other hand, he is surely right in arguing that the purpose of the reform was to ease the share of the military burden borne by Spartiate hoplites and shift it more on to the shoulders of the Perioikoi. In 480 there had been a rough total of 8,000 Spartiates of military age. In 425 the potential loss of about 120, albeit men of high social status, caused the Spartans to sue for peace. Moreover, even though these men had surrendered to save their skins, they, unlike the men who for one reason or another had failed to die at Thermopylai, were neither ostracized socially nor made to feel compelled to commit suicide. Similarly, the two Spartan commanders who refused to obey orders at Mantinea (5.72.1) were merely banished. Finally, since at Mantinea five sixths (5.64.3) of a full Spartiate call-up amounted to only about 3,000 men, the total number of Spartiates of military age had dropped by a little over half in about two generations. A drastic step like the army reform was needed to compensate for this decline

of Spartiate military manpower, since other measures (Chapter 14) were proving manifestly inadequate.

Regrettably, we are wholly ignorant of the provision made for the training of those Perioikoi who now found themselves brigaded with Spartiates in the *mora*, and we can only guess at the proportion they comprised of the 'Lakedaimonian' complement (against Toynbee's suggested ratio of 6:4 see Welwei 1974, 130 n. 64). It is certain, however, that the Perioikoi as a whole were well equipped to handle a larger share of military responsibilities. Of the notional 100 Perioikic communities some forty are attested archaeologically in the fifth and fourth centuries (Figure 18). This would give an average requirement of no more than 100 hoplites per community, if we assume that Thucydides has roughly halved the true figure for the 'Lakedaimonians' at Mantinea. We may single out in this connection the Skiritai of northern Lakonia, whose troops, presumably armed as hoplites, were stationed in a position of honour on the extreme left wing; and also Eualkes of Geronthrai, who lost his life in the battle and was proudly commemorated with the laconic epitaph 'Eualkes in war at Mantinea', exactly as if he had been a Spartiate (Jeffery 1961, 197f., 202, no. 60).

Victory for the Spartans at Mantinea was hardly won and dearly bought. But victory in 'the greatest battle that had taken place for a very long time among Greek states' (5.74.1) repaired the damage done to Sparta's reputation in 425 (5.75.3) and re-established its hegemony of the Peloponnese (5.77.6). Argos, rent by civil strife, withdrew from its alliance with Athens, Mantinea and Elis, and in winter 418–417 made a treaty with Sparta (5.77, 79). The two parties moreover made a joint resolution not to enter into diplomatic relations with Athens until it had abandoned its fortified posts in the Peloponnese (5.80.1), namely Pylos, Kythera and Epidauros. Mantinea too was reconciled to Sparta and, on condition of relinquishing its Arkadian 'empire', made a special separate treaty (5.81.1; Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.2). The position of Elis is uncertain, although it may have rejoined the Peloponnesian League by 413 (7.31.1; cf. 6.88.9).

Sparta's buoyancy is shown by the confident way in which in 417 it intervened, on the side of oligarchy, in Sikyon, Argos, Achaia and Tegea (5.81.2; 82.1; 82.3). The only failure was at Argos, where a democratic restoration brought the state back into alliance with Athens. Thucydides mentions almost in passing a winter campaign of the Spartans against the Argolis in 417–416, their capture of Hysiai and massacre of the free population (5.83.1f.). He is also careful to remind readers of the continued occupation of Pylos, noting that in 416 the Athenians there captured a great deal of plunder from Spartan territory (5.115.2).

In short, 'all of Alkibiades' fine plans for completing the humiliation of Sparta had gone astray' (Gomme 1970, 147; cf. K.J.Dover in Gomme 1970, 242, 248), and he required a fresh initiative to re-establish his charismatic authority with the Athenian people. Weariness with fighting Sparta, the rise of

a new inexperienced generation, the fabled wealth of Sicily, the eagerness of Alkibiades himself—these and other factors opportunely conspired to recommend the ‘Sicilian Expedition’, to which Thucydides devotes most of his sixth and seventh books. His admiring comment on the quality of the armada that left Peiraieus in 415 has already been quoted in a different connection; his final remark on the expedition was that ‘this was the greatest Greek action that took place during this war, and, in my opinion, the greatest action that we know of in Greek history’ (7.87.5).

For the Athenians, however, it began as it ended, disastrously. On the eve of sailing many of the Herms were inauspiciously mutilated. There were also allegations in circulation, directed chiefly against Alkibiades, concerning a plot to establish a tyranny and the profanation of the Eleusinian Mysteries. (Intriguingly, one of those eventually convicted, an uncle of Alkibiades, owned a male Messenian slave: Pritchett 1953, 288, X.9; 1956, 278; it would be pleasant indeed to know how and why a Messenian had exchanged serfdom in his native land for chattel slavery at Athens.) Then, shortly after the expedition sailed, its prime mover was recalled to stand trial for his alleged profanity.

Here began Sparta’s involvement, since Alkibiades jumped ship *en route* back to Athens, made his way to Sparta and (so Thucydides’ account goes, but Alkibiades may have been his source) persuaded the Spartans to engage Athens on two fronts (6.89–92). At a crucial juncture in 414 they sent Gylippos to bring reinforcements to the beleaguered Syracusans (6.93.2); he sailed with two Corinthian and two Lakonian ships from Messenian Asine (6.93.3; 104.1) and slipped through the Athenian blockade to swing the balance in the Syracusans’ favour (7.1.3f.). In 413 the Spartans sent a further force of 600 of the best Helots and Neodamodeis (7.19.3; 58.3). At the same time they implemented a decision at last taken in 414 (6.93.1f.), to effect an *epiteichismos* in Attika (7.19.1). The turning-point in ‘the’ Peloponnesian War had been reached.

Any lingering sympathy the Spartans may have had for the Peace of Nikias was killed in 414. After a lull of two years the Spartans had invaded the Argolis twice that summer (6.95.1; 105.1). To the first invasion the Argives replied with a profitable reprisal against the Thyreatis, but on the occurrence of the second the Athenians despatched a fleet not directly to the Argolis but against the east coast of Lakonia (6.105.2). It landed at Epidaurus Limera, Prasiai and elsewhere (perhaps Kyphanta and Zarax) and laid waste the land in flagrant breach of the peace.

This violation, together with the continuing raids from Pylos and Athens’ refusal to submit to arbitration, persuaded the Spartans that now, in contrast to 432, justice and religion were more on their side (7.18.2f.). A further incentive to action was provided by Demosthenes in 413. *En route* to Sicily he first ravaged Epidaurus Limera (cf. 7.20.2) and then established a fortified post ‘opposite Kythera’ on ‘a kind of isthmus’ (7.26.2: probably near what is

now the island of Elaphonisos). The chief interest of this intended counterpart to Pylos is that Demosthenes thought it worthwhile trying to disaffect the Helots of Lakonia too. The fort at Trinasos (Paus. 3.22.3) north-east of Gytheion, whose remains perhaps go back to the fifth century, should probably be interpreted as a Spartan precaution against just this contingency. A final fillip to the Spartans was given by the result of the Sicilian expedition in 413—‘to the victors the most brilliant of successes, to the vanquished the most disastrous of defeats’ (7.87.5). No less brilliantly Thucydides twice (7.71.7; 86.3) illustrates the meaning and irony of the Athenian defeat by comparisons with Sparta’s Pylos/Sphacteria disaster.

In a general reflection on the significance of the Spartan *epiteichismos* at Dekeleia (7.27f.) Thucydides comments that it was ‘one of the chief reasons for the decline of Athenian power’ (cf. Xen. *Por.* 4.25). Looking back on the invasions of Attika in the Ten Years’ War, he points out that they had been short and had only temporarily interrupted the Athenians’ access to some of their land, whereas between 413 and 404 they were permanently deprived of all of it. For Dekeleia was equidistant (at about eighteen kilometres) from the Boiotian frontier and Athens, and from here Agis could see not only Athens itself but the grain-ships arriving in Peiraieus (7.19.2; cf. Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.35). Agis, moreover, had the power to send troops where he wished, to raise fresh forces and to levy money; indeed, to begin with he had more contact and influence with Sparta’s allies than did the home government (8.5.3).

Hence one ancient name for the final phase of ‘the’ Peloponnesian War is the ‘Dekeleian War’. The rest of this account, however, will concentrate on an alternative title, the ‘Ionian War’ (8.11.3), for two reasons: by more of those ironies mentioned earlier in this chapter ‘the’ Peloponnesian War was decided not by land in mainland Greece but at sea, specifically at the Hellespont; and it was decided less by Peloponnesian prowess than by Persian gold.

The Sicilian disaster excited the optimistic belief among the Greeks (not including Thucydides) that the war would soon be over. In particular, both Athens (8.1.2) and ‘the city of the Spartans’ (8.2.3: an unusual expression) expected the arrival shortly in the Aegean of a Sicilian armada. Not for the first time, however, Sparta’s hopes of Sicilian ships were disappointed (for 431 see 2.7.1 with Gomme). So in 413–412 a total of 100 was ordered from the Peloponnesian alliance, this being the greatest number it had actually managed to deploy in the Ten Years’ War (2.66.1). Of these one quarter was to be built in Lakonia, presumably at Gytheion. Athens in its turn fortified Sounion to give protection for grain-ships from the Black Sea (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.26) or Egypt (8.35.2), withdrew from its *epiteichismos* in the Malea peninsula (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.18) and concentrated on ensuring the loyalty of its wavering Aegean allies (8.4).

These energetic preparations recalled 431 (8.5.1), but the ensuing struggle was a far more patchy affair than the Ten Years’ War. Thucydides’ account breaks off in mid-flow in 411, although it ends appropriately with one of the

chief reasons why Sparta did not make more rapid headway (8.109.2). We shall return to this after a few brief remarks on Thucydides' main surviving continuator, Xenophon, on whom we must principally rely for the rest of the period treated in this book.

Another Athenian writing as a political exile, Xenophon was, however, a historian of a very different stamp from his predecessor, and judgment of his value has usually been passed in the form of a comparison between them. Since Niebuhr ('his history is worth nothing; it is untrue, written without care, and with perfect nonchalance') and Grote ('to pass from Thucydides to the *Hellenica* of Xenophon is a descent truly mournful') comparison has usually been greatly to Xenophon's disadvantage. But just as there has been something of a reaction against Thucydides of late, so there has been one in favour of Xenophon (see Higgins 1977). I agree with the revisionists that Xenophon should be read according to his own lights and not as a Thucydides *manqué*, but as a historian I am not yet convinced that his allegedly allusive, ironic manner and anti-imperialist message are sufficient compensations for his undoubted brevity, omissions and partisanship (whatever its higher motivation may have been). In particular, the discovery of fragments of the 'Oxyrhynchus historian' has damaged, perhaps irretrievably, Xenophon's reputation for accuracy (Bruce 1967; Koenen 1976). On balance, therefore, I regard the transition from Thucydides to Xenophon as a descent, though not perhaps a mournful one.

To return to Thuc. 8.109.2, we find there Tissaphernes, governor of the southern of the two Persian provinces in Asia Minor, hurrying to the Hellespont in summer 411 to patch up his relationship with the Peloponnesians and in particular to prevent them coming to an arrangement with his northern counterpart and rival, Pharnabazus. Both Persians had reason to support Sparta against Athens, since the latter by developing an Empire had dried up a source of Persian tribute and diminished the Great King's prestige (8.5.4f.; cf. Ste. Croix 1972, 313). Specifically, Athens had aroused Persian ire by reneging on its treaty of perpetual friendship with Darius II and backing the rebel Amorges, perhaps early in 414. On the other hand, it was not in the Persians' interest that a defeated Athens should simply be replaced by another Greek superpower with imperial and 'Panhellenic' ambitions. Sparta, in other words, should be supported, but rather in the way that a rope supports a hanging man. This was particularly the policy adopted by Tissaphernes (8.29; 46; 87.4; cf. Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.9), allegedly at the instigation of the resilient Alkibiades.

Sparta for its part was no stranger to dealings with Persia. To look no further back than 432, Archidamos, who laid such stress on Sparta's lack of cash, had envisaged receiving aid from this source (1.82.1), and in 431 and 430 Spartan embassies had been despatched to the Great King (2.7.1, with Diod. 12.41.1; 2.67.1, with Hdt. 7.137). In 428, however, the Spartan navarch Alkidas had shown himself remarkably timid and dilatory, even for

a Spartan, and failed to capitalize on Mytilene's revolt from Athens by co-operation with Tissaphernes' predecessor (3.31.1); a Spartan inscription of perhaps 427 (M/L no. 67), which records contributions to its war-fund in Persian darics and other media, suggests that more could have been achieved. Moreover, Spartan diplomacy perhaps fell short of its usual professional standards in dealing with Persia, as the Athenians discovered in 425 when they captured a Persian messenger on his way to Sparta. For his despatches (in Aramaic) revealed that the Great King was at a loss to know what the Spartans wanted of him: each embassy, he claimed, told a different story (4.50). That, however, is the last we hear of Spartano-Persian relations until 412, an instance of a general deficiency in Thucydides which presumably he would have remedied had he lived to complete his work (Andrewes 1961).

In 412 there began 'the most noteworthy example of foreign assistance' to a Greek state at war (Pritchett 1974, I, 47), the Persian subsidy of the Peloponnesian fleet from 412 to 404. Pritchett most helpfully tabulates this aid, with references to the ancient sources (apart from Andok. 3.29 and Isokr. 3.97, who overestimated the total at 5,000 talents or more). However, as Pritchett notes, it was not until Pharnabazus in 410 took over the role of chief provider from Tissaphernes that the aid made any real difference militarily. For Tissaphernes had been so far successful in his double dealing that in 412 the Spartans formally sold the Asia Minor Greeks to Persia for gold (8.58; cf. 84.5) and yet, although in 412–411 they mustered large fleets including a sizable number of Lakonian ships (8.42.4; 91.2), in 411 were defeated at Kynossema (8.104–6) and in 410 at Kyzikos (Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.17–23). Indeed, after this second defeat the Spartans were apparently so demoralized that they offered to call off the war: each side was to keep what it held, except that the Peloponnesians would withdraw from Dekeleia if the Athenians would abandon Pylos (Diod. 13.52f.; Philochoros 328F139).

The Athenians, despite just having experienced unprecedented political upheaval at home (8.47–98), looked this gift horse in the mouth and were never again presented with so favourable an opportunity to make peace with honour. For although the democracy of strategically pivotal Samos remained magnificently loyal to the bitter end (Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.6), Athens' other major Aegean allies one by one fell prey to oligarchic counter-revolutions and defected to Sparta (esp. Chios: 8.15.1;40; and Euboia: 8.95.2; 96.1). In 409 or 408 the Spartans at last recovered Pylos (Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.18; Diod. 13.64.6), and perhaps Kythera simultaneously; and in 407 the Persian prince Cyrus, then aged sixteen, was sent down from Susa with a general command of the Asia Minor provinces (Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.3; cf. *Anab.* 1.9.7). It was his friendship with the extraordinary Spartan Lysander that sealed Athens' fate (cf. Thuc. 2.65.12) and incidentally marked the final abandonment, despite the protests of the Spartan navarch Kallikratidas in 406, of Sparta's pretensions to 'liberating' the Greeks.

In 407 and above all 405 Lysander received from Cyrus the wherewithal to equip, train and maintain a fleet adequate to defeat Athens. Notwithstanding Athens' base at Sestos, occupied since 411 (8.62.2f.), Lysander gained the final victory at Aigospotamoi in the Hellespont in 405 (Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.20–30; contrast Diod. 13.106). This was a triumphant confirmation of the Mytilenaians' prediction of 428 that 'it is not in Attika, as some people think, that the war will be won or lost, but in the countries from which Attika draws its strength' (3.13.5). For Lysander was master of the narrows, and Athens, its Black Sea wheat-supply cut off, was starved into submission by spring 404. After fruitless negotiations Athens lost its walls, most of its fleet and its Empire and became a subject-ally of Sparta (Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.19–22; Plut. 'Lys.' 14).

One of the Peloponnesian admirals at Aigospotamoi may have been a Perioikos from Zarax or Tyros (M/L, p. 289). If so, he was a worthy successor to those Perioikoi who since 412 had been entrusted with important naval missions (8.6.4; 22.1) and an appropriate personage to end a chapter one of whose main themes has been the increasingly crucial military role of Sparta's Perioikic subjects.

Notes on further reading

The period covered by this chapter is perhaps the one to which most modern research in Greek history has been and is still directed, so these bibliographical notes may seem even more inadequate than the rest. A useful textbook on the fifth century is Will 1972, esp. 149–70 ('First' Peloponnesian War), 313–39 (Ten Years' War), 340–92 (421–404). Unfortunately, this was written before the publication of Ste. Croix 1972 and Meiggs 1972, which in their very different ways have between them created a new groundwork on which future scholarship must build. The former, unlike Kagan 1969, ranges far beyond its ostensible subject.

The commentary on Thucydides begun by A.W.Gomme and continued by A.Andrewes and K.J.Dover is presupposed throughout; commentary on Book 8 (by Andrewes) appeared in 1981. To the enormous secondary literature on Thucydides cited in Ste. Croix 1972, 295f., add now esp. Dover 1973 (an unorthodox and challenging pamphlet), Hunter 1973 (which perhaps overstates the reasonable case that Thucydides' literary artistry tends to turn not only the reader but the historian himself into the obedient servant of his own point of view), and Edmunds 1975 (esp. ch. 2 for Sparta). Thucydides' handling of prominent individuals is treated in Westlake 1968; the most relevant Spartans are Archidamos, Brasidas (whose name, incidentally, may be connected with Prasiai) and Gylippos. Ramou-Chapsiadi 1978 appeared too late to be considered in the present work.

For the 'First' Peloponnesian War in general see Kagan 1969, 75–130; on Sparta's role therein Holladay 1977b. The terms of the peace of 445, the essential background to 'international' diplomacy down to 421, if not 404,

are set out in Ste. Croix 1972, 293f., and, with extensive bibliography, in Piccirilli 1973, no. 21.

The Samian rebellion is discussed in detail by Kagan (1969, 170–8) and Meiggs (1972, 188–94).

On the Ten Years' War generally see Kagan 1974, which though detailed is perhaps insufficiently critical. Spartan strategy is admirably analysed in Brunt 1965; see also Cawkwell 1975.

Kagan (1974, 218–59) describes rather than analyses the Pylos/Sphacteria episode; more critical is Westlake 1974, but he underemphasizes the sharpness of the change in Spartan attitudes to the war after 425. A historical and topographical study of Thucydides' account of the Pylos campaign is J. Wilson (1979).

An interesting sidelight on the situation of Kythera in the late fifth century is thrown by Anglo-American excavations at Kastri; the Kytherians were using Attic and Corinthian as well as mainland Lakonian pottery (Coldstream and Huxley 1972, 159–65; 306f.). However, the Attic imports are not necessarily to be explained solely in terms of the Athenian occupation: Attic black-painted amphorai of the fifth century have been excavated at Gytheion too (AD 21B, 1966, 157).

For comments on Sparta's relations with central and north Greece in the fifth and early fourth centuries see Andrewes 1971, 217–26; I would only add that the father of Chalkideus ('the Chalkidian', frequently mentioned in Thuc. 8) was perhaps one of those who favoured expansion by land to the north.

Bibliography on the Peace of Nikias and other treaties projected or concluded may be found in Bengtson 1975; on those including provision for arbitration in Piccirilli 1973. On the authenticity and function of the documents inserted verbatim by Thucydides see Meyer 1970 (a photographic reproduction of the first edition of 1955). Particularly problematic are the alliance between Athens and Sparta in 421 and the Spartano-Persian treaties of 412–411 (below).

A wide range of modern theories on the origins and status of the Neodamodeis is well discussed in Oliva 1971, 166–70. But he fails to explain their title satisfactorily, as does Welwei 1974, 142–58, which in other respects supersedes previous treatments. The suggestion that regent Pausanias envisaged the creation of Neodamodeis in the 470s has been advanced by Cawkwell (1970, 52) and followed apparently by Lazenby (1975, 249f.). But Pausanias is said to have offered the Helots full citizenship, and an offer to transform them merely into Neodamodeis seems insufficient to have aroused such violent opposition and served as a pretext for his murder. Sparta was not of course alone in freeing slaves for war: a particularly interesting parallel is Chios, which is specifically compared to Sparta for the size of its slave population in relation to the free (Thuc. 8.40.2) and which apparently freed slaves for service in the fleet in the late fifth century (Welwei 1974, 4 n. 12; 93 n. 104; 179 n. 8).

The battle of Mantinea is discussed in relation to the army reform in Toynbee 1969, 396–401. Other discussions of the reform, in addition to those cited in the text, are Anderson 1970, 225–51; and Welwei 1974, 128–31, 138–40 (with most of whose conclusions I agree).

The most recent biography of Xenophon in English is Anderson 1974. Though dismissed by Higgins (1977, xiv) as unoriginal, Anderson does at least share Higgins' respect for Xenophon. The only full commentary in English on the *Hellenika* is Underhill 1900, which though thorough and sensible is naturally out of date, especially in the eyes of those who wish to argue that the *Hellenika* is a unity (Baden 1966) and that Xenophon's historiographical intentions have been misprised (Higgins 1977, 99–127). My own view coincides with that expressed in summary by G.L.Cawkwell (introduction to the 1972 reissue of the Penguin Classics *Anabasis*): the *Hellenika* is essentially the memoirs of an old man.

On the role of Lysander between 407 and 404 see Lotze 1964; this also discusses clearly the chronological problem of 410–406, on which see further Lotze 1974.

Lewis 1977 is an important contribution to Spartan history of the late fifth and early fourth centuries. We agree substantially on basics: a large subject population of Helots was 'the major determining fact about Sparta' (27); and 'the Athenians would have had no difficulty in winning the Peloponnesian War decisively, had they done a little more to promote helot revolt' (28). But we differ considerably in emphasis and detail. I cannot, for example, regard the first two Spartano-Persian accords of 412–411 (Thuc. 8.18, 37) as genuine treaties. Nor am I persuaded of the existence of a 'Treaty of Boiotios' of 408–407 between Sparta and Persia, as reconstructed by Lewis (123–34). For if Sparta made its peace overtures to Athens in 410 and 408–407 partly to recover Spartiate prisoners (126), this seems an unlikely time for Sparta to be concerning itself about the liberty and autonomy of the Asiatic Greeks. And as Lewis himself rightly remarks of Spartan 'panhellenism' (144), 'I would not argue that it took precedence in Spartan policy over her need to retain supremacy in the Peloponnese and internal stability in Laconia and Messenia.'

The reduction of Lakonia 404–362

The essential backdrop to this chapter is provided by Thucydides' comment on the *stasis* or civil strife at Kerkyra in the 420s (3.82.1): 'thereafter practically the whole Greek world was similarly convulsed, the democratic leaders calling in the Athenians, their oligarchic opponents the Spartans.' So far as 'the' Peloponnesian War is concerned, the comment applies particularly to its final phase, in which *stasis* was a major contributory cause of Athens' defeat. *Stasis*, however, did not subside with the conclusion of the war. Rather, it burst out anew, the rule of the 'Thirty Tyrants' at Athens being but the best-known instance. Indeed, the history of the whole period spanned by the long adult life of the Athenian publicist Isokrates (436–338) can be written largely in terms of what might be called the Greek disease (Fuks 1972).

Even Sparta, as we shall see, was three times on the verge of catching the infection. What makes this so remarkable and revealing is that it was precisely for its vaunted freedom from *stasis* within the citizen body that the Spartan political and social system had come to exercise such fascination over oligarchs in other states—men like Kritias, bloodstained leader of the 'Thirty Tyrants' who wrote both a verse and a prose 'Constitution of the Spartans' (we drew on the latter in Chapter 10). Another such 'Lakonizer', if a politically more moderate one, was Xenophon, whose unsatisfactory *Hellenika* is our main literary narrative source for the period under review here.* Occasionally our other literary sources—especially Diodorus, using Ephorus, and Plutarch, who drew on several fourth-century sources including Xenophon and Ephorus—provide correctives and supplements. But these, like the relevant epigraphical and archaeological evidence, rarely bear on our main theme, which is the way that Sparta's progressive failure to maintain its

* Where no other indication is given, all references in brackets in this chapter are to the *Hellenika*. It should be pointed out here that many of the dates given in this chapter are more or less controversial.

grip on Lakonia and Messenia and on the Peloponnesian League led to its demotion from a position of supremacy in the Greek world east of the Adriatic to the status of an irretrievably second-rank power.

Spartan might since the end of the seventh century had been based on the exploitation of Helot labour-power in Lakonia and Messenia, aided and abetted by a complex organization of Perioikic intermediaries (Chapter 10). From the mid-sixth century Sparta had extended its suzerainty to the greater part of the Peloponnese and, with the establishment of the Peloponnesian League in essentials by 500, had since then held sway through a combination of military muscle and diplomatic support for allied oligarchies (Thuc. 1.19, 76.1, 144.1).

Victory over Athens in 404 stimulated a temporary attempt to extend the system in a modified form to the members of the old Athenian Empire. Narrow oligarchies, frequently only of ten men ('dekarchies'), were established and propped up by garrisons under Spartan governors known as harmosts ('fixers'); tribute in military service, cash and kind was now payable to Sparta. The best documented and historically most decisive example of such counter-revolution is of course the reign of the 'Thirty' at Athens, but it is convenient first to consider the experience of Samos, since it reintroduces the victor of Aigospotamoi.

Lysander had done more than any other Spartan to win 'the' Peloponnesian War through his understanding with Cyrus. He also it was who most favoured the policy of imperialist expansion by means of puppet dekarchies, for the installation of which he had prepared the ground since 407. Following Athens' capitulation in 404, Lysander naturally turned his attention to Athens' staunchest democratic ally, Samos, whose control was besides of major strategic importance. After a siege lasting the whole summer Samos was taken, the democratic régime terminated, the oligarchs recalled. The Skionians in 423 had honoured their 'liberator', Brasidas, with a golden crown, and private individuals had garlanded him as if he were a victorious athlete (Thuc. 4.121.1). The restored Samian oligarchs honoured Lysander as if he were a god (Plut. *Lys.* 18), the first attested instance of divine worship of a living mortal in Greece. Undoubtedly Lysander's reputation has suffered from posthumous defamation (Prentice 1934); but such adulation in his lifetime tells us more about Samian politics than about Lysander's qualities.

For whatever we think of his Samian settlement, his treatment of Athens was hardly prudent. The terms of surrender imposed in April 404 had included no explicit constitutional provision beyond the requirement to recall exiles. Among the latter was Aristoteles, a creature of Lysander and later one of the 'Thirty' (2.2.18), spiritual kin to those among the 'Four Hundred' extreme oligarchs who in 411 had been prepared to sell Athens and its allies to Sparta in return for Spartan support for their rule (Thuc. 8.90.2). It was on behalf of such men that Lysander sailed from Samos to Athens and, using the threat of force and the pretext that the Long Walls had not been pulled down

as prescribed, had a decree passed establishing a board of thirty legislative commissioners (Lysias 12.44, 72, 77; 13.28; Plut. *Lys.* 15).

The pro-Spartan character of what soon degenerated into the tyranny of the 'Thirty' had been apparent from the start. It was not long before the new régime stole another leaf from the Lysandrian book and through his influence received from Sparta a 'Lakonian' garrison of 700 men (probably Neodamodeis: Anderson 1974, 50) under a Spartiate harmost (2.3.13f., 42; 4.4, 6, 10). In the event, however, at least in Xenophon's account (and he seems to have been present), the garrison was indirectly a major cause of a split within the ranks of the 'Thirty'. For Kritias used it to kill and rob the rich, whatever their political persuasion or social standing (2.3.14, 17, 21), and this alienated Theramenes (2.3. 38–40, 47–9), the very man responsible for negotiating with Lysander in 405–404 (2.2.16) and securing the subjection of Athens to Sparta (2.3.38).

Theramenes' impious execution particularly excited the sympathy of Xenophon (2.3.55f.), but more disturbing to thinking Spartans was the fact that not only their traditional enemy Argos (Diod. 14.6.2) but also their allies Corinth, Megara and Thebes were openly flouting a Spartan decree forbidding any state to harbour Athenian refugees (2.4.1, with Aesch. 2.148; Isokr. 7.67; Diod. 14.6, 32.1; Plut. *Lys.* 27.5–7). The disobedience of Corinth and Thebes was particularly alarming since they had opposed Sparta's treatment of Athens on its surrender and had advocated that Athens be totally destroyed (2.2.19f.; cf. 3.5.8). Sparta, on the other hand, had proposed its demilitarization and incorporation in the Peloponnesian League, partly perhaps in recognition of its past services to Greece, but surely also in order to undercut Thebes' growing influence north of the Isthmus. The relations between Sparta, Athens and Thebes shaped Greek interstate politics down to the 360s.

Immediately, it was very largely due to Theban aid that a mere seventy or so democratic exiles under Thrasyboulos were able to seize the Athenian frontier fort of Phyle in winter 404–403 (2.4.2–7) and then to collect a sufficient force, composed chiefly of 'the men in the Peiraeus', to defeat the 'Thirty' in an urban encounter (2.4.10–19). The survivors of the 'Thirty' fled to Eleusis, where they set up a separate polity, and were replaced by the 'Ten'. Both sets of oligarchs scurried to Sparta for further help (2.4.28; *Ath. Pol.* 38.1). The Spartans replied by loaning 100 talents to the oligarchs 'from the city' for the hire of mercenaries and by despatching Lysander by land as harmost and his brother Libys by sea as navarch to Attika. Lysander went straight to his friends at Eleusis and began to raise a large force of Peloponnesian mercenaries; Libys blockaded the Peiraeus according to plan. But then there occurred one of those startling reversals of Spartan foreign policy whose causes, despite recent attempts to analyse Spartan decision-making in terms of 'factions' (Hamilton 1970; *contra* Thompson 1973), can only be surmised.

Agis had by now (403) returned to Sparta from Dekeleia and was presumably in broad agreement with the line Sparta had taken towards Athens since April 404. His Agiad co-king Pausanias, however, having first convinced a majority of the five Ephors, led out two *morai* of 'Lakedaimonians' at the head of a Peloponnesian League force. There was some fighting between the Peloponnesians and the Peiraieus democrats, in which the two Spartiate polemarchs and other Spartiates were killed; but Pausanias entered none the less into secret negotiations with his opponents, and the deputation they sent to Sparta had the blessing of the two Ephors on the campaign, both of whom supported Pausanias' conciliatory policy.

Faced with a rival deputation from the 'city' oligarchs, the Spartan Assembly instructed a fifteen-man commission to come to an agreement with Pausanias over the settlement of Athens. The upshot was the restoration of full democracy and the proclamation of a general amnesty (2.4.43), the first known in history, followed two years later by the political reunification of Attika. One small way in which the democrats thanked their Spartan liberators was by erecting in the Kerameikos a fine tomb for those Spartans they had killed in the Peiraieus (Willemsen 1977).

The tomb, Xenophon notes (2.4.33), lay outside the city gates—in fact on the road to the Academy in what has been called the Westminster Abbey of Athens. There were fourteen burials in all, the corpses being laid out with their heads resting on stone 'pillows' and pointing towards the street. In the approved 'Lykourgan' manner the burials lacked grave-goods, apart from one which contained merely a strigil. The tomb was originally marked by an inscribed marble block over twelve metres long and by three stelai. The stelai and most of the block are now lost, but the names of the two polemarchs cited by Xenophon are wholly preserved.

Reaction to Pausanias' settlement extended along a spectrum from democratic jubilation at Athens (Lysias 13.80) through mixed feelings at Thebes and Corinth (neither of which had sent forces for Pausanias' army, probably because they feared a Spartan take-over of Attika) to outright hostility from Pausanias' enemies at Sparta. The latter succeeded in having him put on trial for retreating from Athens after an indecisive battle (Paus. 3.5.2), but despite the fact that even Agis voted for condemnation he was acquitted. More important, the Lysandrean form of imperialism through narrow oligarchies was definitively abandoned (Andrewes 1971, 206–16).

The following year (402) Sparta took two decisions with vital long-run consequences. The first was to 'bring the Eleians to their senses', as Xenophon (3.2.23) paraphrases the resolution of the Ephors and Assembly. The immediate issue was the one that had divided the two states since the Persian Wars, namely how far Elis should be allowed to extend its direct political control over what it took to be its own 'perioikic cities' in Eleia and Triphylia. But the Spartans and particularly Agis were also anxious to punish Elis for its defection from the Peloponnesian League in 420 and subsequent

failure to meet its League obligations in the war, and for two insults delivered in virtue of its custodianship of the panhellenic sanctuary of Zeus at Olympia.

The 'liberation propaganda' which the Spartans now officially resuscitated was therefore so much window-dressing, and the undeceived Boiotians and Corinthians significantly refused again to contribute contingents to the League force (3.2.25). A weak and cautious Athens, however, did follow the Spartans' lead, and the campaign, which extended over two years, was brutally successful. In economic terms it provided a veritable 'harvest for the Peloponnese' (3.2.26; cf. Pritchett 1974, I, 78). Politically, Elis was stripped of all its dependencies apart from Olympia and compelled to conclude a treaty of peace and alliance on those terms (3.2.30f.).

After this, according to Diodorus (14.34.2f.), the Spartans took the opportunity of tidying up some loose ends from the great Helot revolt of the 460s. The Messenians settled by the Athenians at Naupaktos and on Kephallenia were now expelled and sailed away, some to Sicily (ironically to become mercenaries in the service of Sparta's ally Dionysios I, tyrant of Syracuse since 405), some to Cyrenaica.

The second major decision taken by the Spartans in 402 was to send official support to Cyrus in his bid to oust his elder brother Artaxerxes II, who had succeeded to the Persian throne some two years earlier (3.1.1; cf. Diod. 14.19.2). The Spartans were of course deeply indebted to Cyrus (1.5.2–9; 6.18; 2.1.11–14; 3.1.2), but we may suspect that they also hoped to repair the damage done to their credibility as liberators by the treaty of 412–411 and Lysander's dekararchies. For the Greek cities of Asia had revolted from Tissaphernes to Cyrus (Xen. *Anab.* 1.1.6). Be that as it may, the aid they sent was slight, thirty-five Peloponnesian ships under the navarch Samios or Pythagoras (Sealey 1976, 349f.) and 700 hoplites under the Spartiate Cheirisophos (Xen. *Anab.* 1.4.2f.). These hoplites were not Spartan citizens, Perioikoi or even Neodamodeis but probably Peloponnesian mercenaries (Roy 1967, 300), and they formed a small proportion of the 12,000–13,000 or so hired altogether, more than half from overpopulated Arkadia and Achaia.

This was not the first time Greek mercenaries had been extensively used in a Persian dynastic struggle, but the 'Ten Thousand' were the largest body of Greek mercenaries yet recruited for a single mission. As such their significance can tend to be overrated, especially since our information on their vicissitudes comes chiefly from Xenophon's *Anabasis*, a first-hand account but written up several decades later. None the less this work does reveal that Sparta had sent out as Cheirisophos' understudy a Perioikos, Neon, an 'Ulsterman' from Messenian Asine (*Anab.* 5.3.4; 6.36 etc.); it provides a wealth of detail on conditions in the western extremities of the Persian Empire; and, above all, it supplies the essential linking material omitted from the *Hellenika* in the abrupt transition from the restoration of democracy at Athens in 403 (2.4.43) to Sparta's declaration of war on Tissaphernes in the autumn of 400 (3.1.4).

Cyrus had been unnecessarily killed and so defeated at Cunaxa in Mesopotamia in 401. Six out of the eight Greek generals of the ‘Ten Thousand’, including their supreme commander Klearchos (a Spartan exile), had been treacherously murdered by Tissaphernes, who had wisely chosen the path of loyalty to Artaxerxes. Only with great hardship did the 8,000 or so survivors struggle back to the Black Sea and Greek civilization in 400.

Their reception here, however, was not all they might have hoped. In particular, the navarch Anaxibios and Aristarchos, harmost of Byzantium, did not shrink even from selling 400 of them into slavery (*Anab.* 7.1.36; 2.6). One would therefore be forgiven for thinking that the official attitude of Sparta towards the sizeable remnant of the ‘Ten Thousand’ in the summer of 400 was at best negative, at worst actively hostile; and that Sparta wished thereby to make some amends to Artaxerxes for supporting Cyrus. However, three chapters and a few months later another extraordinary *volte-face* in Spartan foreign policy is reported (*Anab.* 7.6.1): two Spartiates arrive from Thibron to announce that the Spartans have decided to fight Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus. Thibron himself arrives in the spring of 399 with 1,000 Neodamodeis and 4,000 other Peloponnesian troops (3.1.4) and promptly absorbs the remainder of Cyrus’ Greek mercenaries into his own force (3.1.6; *Anab.* 7.8.24).

Xenophon’s account of the background to this change of heart is plausible enough so far as it goes, but his order of narration has obscured a vital connection. Tissaphernes, in high favour with Artaxerxes, was given command of Asia west of the Halys river (3.1.3; 2.13). His demand that the Ionian cities should be subject exclusively to him and his attack on Kyme provoked two Ionian embassies to Sparta (3.1.3; 2.12), whose aid was sought in its capacity as ‘leader of all Greece’ (cf. *Anab.* 6.6.9, 12, 13; 7.1.28). The Spartans replied first with a diplomatic note (Diod. 14.35.6) reminiscent of their response to Cyrus the Great on behalf of Croesus in c.550 (Hdt. 1.152) and then by despatching Thibron (above). What Xenophon fails to do, however, is link this aggressive anti-Persian policy with the death of Agis and the role played by Lysander in the unexpected accession of Agis’ brother Agesilaos (3.3.1–4). Perhaps Xenophon was unwilling to admit any evidence that might detract from his picture of Agesilaos the ‘panhellenist’ fervently seeking the liberation of the Asiatic Greeks, an image which the king himself was anxious to foster. At any rate, the most economical explanation of this turn of events is that Lysander hoped to use Agesilaos and the new policy to regain the ground he had lost to Pausanias since 403.

Instead of spelling this out, Xenophon follows his description of Agis’ funeral (‘more awful than befits the mortal estate’) and Agesilaos’ elevation with what is perhaps the most remarkable episode in all Lakonian history, the conspiracy of Kinadon (3.3.4–11; cf. Arist. *Pol.* 1306b34–6). I am still unclear why Xenophon mentions this incident, which at least in his account had no serious or obvious consequences,

while he omits others that are blatantly material to his chief interests. But, whatever his intention, he has certainly succeeded in exhibiting in a brief compass the variegated social structure of Lakonian society at the turn of the fourth century. For this reason discussion of the conspiracy's social implications has been postponed to the next chapter. Here follows just an annotated summary.

The conspiracy was uncovered within a year of Agesilaos' accession. This timing is not likely to be fortuitous. For apart from the succession crisis provoked by Agis' death, his funeral would have provided a marvellous opportunity for a prospective revolutionary to test the political temperature, since the elaborate ritual prescribed by Spartan custom involved the congregation at Sparta of not only the Spartiates but Perioikoi and Helots too, presumably heads of households, and their wives (Tyrtaios fr. 7; Hdt. 6.58.2f.). It was then, I suggest, that Kinadon began to plot.

Exactly what Kinadon hoped to achieve by his revolution and how extensive and advanced the plot was when it was betrayed to the Ephors—these are unclear. What is certain is that his prime target was the Spartiates, citizens of full status. The conspiracy was to begin in Sparta, presumably with the murder of suitably prominent Spartiates, perhaps even of Agesilaos (from whom Xenophon may have heard the story, which begins with Agesilaos' ill-omened sacrifices). The Ephors were allegedly terrified by what they considered a potent plan, but their smooth and instant response suggests the existence of a well-oiled counter-insurgency machine. In fact, it was precisely because Kinadon had himself been employed on similar missions in the past that the Ephors could now send him, without arousing his suspicions, to Perioikic Aulon in north-west Messenia to arrest some named Aulonites and Helots.

The significance of this tactic, however, is unfortunately ambiguous (see Chapter 14), and the status of these Helots at Aulon is problematical. Some like Welwei (1974, 109 n. 5) think that, exceptionally, the Aulonite Perioikoi could have Helots working for them. This I find intrinsically improbable and suggest that it was precisely because these named Helots were at Aulon and not working their masters' *kleroi* in, say, the adjacent Soulima valley that they were detailed for arrest. The site of Aulon too is uncertain; indeed, it may have been a region rather than a town, as its name meaning 'Hollow' suggests. But Xenophon provides a strong hint that there was a Spartan garrison here, perhaps under a harmost. For Kinadon is ordered to bring back also a lady, presumably a prostitute, whose physical charms were corrupting older and younger 'Lakedaimonians' alike. By this I think we should understand Spartiates or at least Neodamodeis as well as Perioikoi. The presence of a garrison on the Triphylian border is easily explicable in terms of the recent troubles with Elis, and there is besides archaeological evidence, which may go back to the fourth century, for a fort in just about the right place—at modern Vounaki (*MME* no. 601).

Ostensibly to accompany, but in fact to arrest, Kinadon the Ephors sent six or seven ‘younger’ or ‘young’ men (Xenophon uses both words). Since the selection of this squad was by pre-arrangement entrusted to the eldest of the (three) Hippagretai (cf. Xen. *Lak. Pol.* 4.3), we may assume that these men were Hippeis. We should not, however, simply infer from this that Hippeis were regularly used to arrest Helots and Perioikoi, let alone that they were the mainstay of the Krypteia. Rather, the choice of members of the royal bodyguard is an index of the Ephors’ apprehension and may even imply that Agesilaos himself was actively involved in the counter-measures, although Xenophon only says vaguely that the Ephors had consulted some Gerontes. In case of trouble, however, the Ephors also detailed a *mora* of cavalry as a back-up force. This is our first evidence that the cavalry, which had first been regularly raised in 424, was also organized in *morai*.

All went according to the Ephors’ plan. Kinadon was arrested outside Sparta and confessed the names of his closest confederates. The latter were then arrested too. Intriguingly, they included a seer, Teisamenos, whom it is tempting to see as a descendant of the Teisamenos who gained Spartan citizenship before the Battle of Plataia (Chapter 11); perhaps this citizenship was somehow of an inferior kind. All those detained had their hands bound and their necks put in dog-collars and were thus dragged around Sparta under the whip and the goad. ‘So they met their punishment’ is Xenophon’s laconic coda. We may suspect, however, that they were executed, though perhaps only after due process.

Xenophon’s account continues with Sparta’s response in 396 to the news of a Persian naval build-up in the Aegean (3.4.1). By this time Sparta had been fighting in Asia Minor for three years. Thibron had been replaced in the autumn of 399 by Derkylidas (3.1.8), a skilful diplomatist and general, typically Spartan in his religiosity (3.1.17; 2.16) but ostentatiously unSpartan in his Sisyphos-like cunning (cf. Ephorus 70F71) and bachelor status (to which we shall return in Chapter 14). He raised the number of his troops to about 12,000, some 4,000 of whom were allocated to garrison-duty in the cities which he and Thibron had liberated from Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus. In winter 399–398 he concluded a truce with Pharnabazus to avoid billeting his troops on the liberated cities (3.2.1; Diod. 14.38.3), and this was renewed in spring 398 after ratification by a three-man commission sent out by the Ephors (3.2.6, 9).

By 397, however, Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes had overcome their mutual suspicion (3.1.9) and were actively cooperating (3.2.13). In particular, Pharnabazus had secured money from Artaxerxes to put in commission a fleet of 300 Phoenician ships under the Athenian Konon (Diod. 14.39; cf. Isokr. 9.55; Plut. *Ages.* 6.1; Nepos, *Con.* 2; Paus. 1.3.1). This important development is omitted by Xenophon, although he does give us the name of the Spartan navarch for 398–397, Pharax (3.2.12, 14). In summer 397 a further truce was concluded by Derkylidas, this time with Tissaphernes as

well as Pharnabazus (3.2.20); but Xenophon does not make it clear whether the Spartans formally accepted the Persian terms for peace (abandonment of Asia, withdrawal of harmosts and garrisons from the Greek cities), and Diodorus (14.39.6) merely says that after the truce both sides disbanded their armies.

Thus Xenophon contrives to omit the naval, and obscure the diplomatic, background to the Spartan decision to send out Agesilaos to Asia in 396 (3.4.2; cf. Xen. 'Ages.' 1.7). He does, however, stress the vigorous support for the expedition expressed by Lysander (cf. Plut. *Lys.* 23.1), who is said to have wished to re-establish dekarhies. According to Xenophon, indeed, it was actually Lysander who suggested the composition of Agesilaos' force: thirty Spartiate advisers, including himself, 2,000 of the Neodamodeis and 6,000 allied troops (3.4.8).

We note the omission of Spartiate or Perioikic hoplites and, second, the large number of Neodamodeis (3,000 in all were employed in Asia). Xenophon's partitive genitive 'of the Neodamodeis' and Plutarch's description of the 2,000 as 'picked men' ('Ages.' 6.4) confirm that Sparta had enormously increased its reserve of Neodamodeis since 413, doubtless because the huge influx of wealth in the form of Persian subsidy (Lysander was said to have brought back 470 talents in 405–404) and imperial tribute made such an increase financially feasible (Welwei 1974, 149 n. 44, 151, 157, 159). They were perhaps recruited from Helots who had seen active service as batmen and armour-bearers. As far as the allies are concerned, Xenophon crucially fails to mention here that Corinth, Athens and Thebes on various pretexts refused to contribute troops (cf. Paus. 3.9.1–3). He does, on the other hand, record that the leaders of the Boiotian League prevented Agesilaos from sacrificing at Aulis, like a second Agamemnon, prior to sailing (3.4.4).

Agesilaos' programme was nothing less than to make the Greek cities of Asia autonomous like those in mainland Greece (3.4.5). Such a provision for the autonomy of mainland cities, great and small, had been written into the treaty of 418–417 between Sparta and Argos after Mantinea (Thuc. 5.77, 79), but the Eleians would not have been alone in suspecting that in practice 'autonomy' would be interpreted to coincide with the Spartans' conception of their own best interests. It was at the least a flexible notion, as many mainland Greeks were to learn to their cost. In 396, however, Agesilaos gave no hint that less than ten years later he would preside over the resale of the Asiatic Greeks to Persia. Rather, he seems to have aimed to surpass the 'Ten Thousand' in taking the war deep into the Great King's territory.

At least this is the picture presented by Xenophon; less committed sources like the 'Oxyrhynchos historian' (12.1) gave a more restricted interpretation. Once the personal rivalry between Agesilaos and Lysander had been resolved by the despatch of the latter to the Hellespont (3.4.7–10; cf. Plut. *Lys.* 24.1), Agesilaos made Ephesos his base for a highly successful campaign first

against Pharnabazus' Phrygia in 396 and then against Tissaphernes' Lydia in 395 (3.4.12–15, 21–4). Tissaphernes was beheaded on Artaxerxes' orders; his successor, Tithraustes, offered Agesilaos a financial inducement to quit Asia, backed by a guarantee of autonomy for the cities if they would pay the 'old tribute' to Persia.

The 'Oxyrhynchos historian' (12.1) and Diodorus (14.80.8) speak of a truce between Agesilaos and Tithraustes, but in Xenophon Agesilaos stalls by saying that he must wait for instructions from Sparta and moves north again into Pharnabazus' territory (3.4.26). Here his instructions from Sparta arrived, perhaps no more unexpected than they were welcome. For he was put in charge of both land and sea operations, the first time a king had been given such a joint command (Plut. *Ages.* 10.9f.). Xenophon does not explain why Agesilaos put such energy into raising a fleet of 120 triremes, which he placed under his brother-in-law Peisandros (3.4.28f.). The answer is provided by the 'Oxyrhynchos historian' (15): Konon had caused the key base of Rhodes to revolt from Sparta.

It can hardly have been coincidental that Tithraustes in 395 should have decided to emulate Artaxerxes' grandfather and namesake (Thuc. 1.109.2) by distributing cash to potentially friendly Greeks on the mainland. Only this time the boot was on the other foot, and it was against rather than to the Spartans that the money was disbursed. For it was distributed to politicians in Thebes, Corinth and Argos on condition that they persuaded their cities to make war on Sparta. Xenophon (3.5.1) naively or disingenuously implies that it was this money that indirectly brought about the grand coalition of these three with Athens. But the wiser or less biased 'Oxyrhynchos historian', who also provides the essential background for Athens' decision, expressly rebuts this view by pointing out that anti-Spartan Athenians had long been awaiting a suitable opportunity to bring about such a conjuncture (7; cf. 18; Lehmann 1978).

The immediate occasion of the alliance and the ensuing 'Corinthian War' was Sparta's intervention on the side of Phokis in its struggle with East or perhaps West Lokris, which had allegedly been instigated by Thebes (3.5.2; cf. *Hell. Ox.* 16–18). According to Xenophon's one-sided account, the Spartans actually welcomed the occasion or pretext (*prophasis*) to campaign against Thebes: the timing was convenient, and they (and Agesilaos above all) wished to punish Thebes for its disloyalty and constant opposition since 405–404 (3.5.5). The Ephors therefore proclaimed a levy, and, as in 403, Lysander was sent ahead, with king Pausanias commanding the Lakedaimonian and Peloponnesian League force to follow and liaise with him (3.5.6f.). Lysander was immediately successful in detaching Orchomenos from the Boiotian League, and the Thebans responded by seeking an alliance with Athens.

At this point in his narrative Xenophon rises above his usual level to write for the Theban ambassadors collectively a thoroughly Thucydidean speech nicely conveying the diplomatic and military realities (3.5.8–15).

Not every detail, however, can be trusted, and the Thebans' misrepresentations should perhaps be put down to Xenophon's hostility towards Thebes. They begin by explaining away their state's desire for the destruction of Athens in 405–404. They stress the hatred of Sparta felt by the Argives, Eleians, Corinthians, Arkadians and Achaians and by the cities tyrannized by harmosts (including Helot harmosts), garrisons and dekachies. (In fact, the dekachies had been abolished nearly a decade earlier and, despite Lysander, not reimposed; and if there is any truth in the allegation that Helots became harmosts, these would have been strictly *nothoi*, sons of Helot mothers, rather than Helots in the full sense: Welwei 1974, 132. Demosthenes, 18.96, however, does list a string of places under harmosts and garrisons.) The Thebans then try to excite those Athenians, probably a majority (cf. Seager 1967, 115), who dreamed of restoring their empire (cf. 3.5.2); and they conclude optimistically by noting a contrast between Spartan and Athenian imperialism: whereas Athens had had a navy to control its shipless subjects, the Spartans are themselves few and rule men who are not only many times more numerous but also no worse armed than they. The significance of this closing reference to the small number of the Spartiates (they alone are meant) is that it ties in with one of the main points in Xenophon's account of Kinadon's conspiracy.

The Athenians found the Thebans' arguments cogent and in or about August 395 concluded defensive alliances for ever with Boiotia and Lokris (Tod 1948, nos 101–2). The alliances soon bore fruit. Lysander, who had not waited for Pausanias, was killed at Haliartos (3.5.17–21; cf. Plut. *Lys.* 29; Paus. 3.5.4f.), and Pausanias rather than continue the battle asked for a truce to pick up the dead (3.5.21–4). For arriving too late, for arranging a truce instead of fighting (contrast 6.4.15; 7.4.25!) and for allowing the Athenian democrats to escape (in 403!) Pausanias was arraigned on a capital charge (Ste. Croix 1972, 351). Anticipating condemnation, he fled, like Latychidas before him, to Tegea, where he lived for at least another fifteen years as a suppliant within the sanctuary of Athena Alea and devoted part of his leisure to the composition of an anti-Lykourgan tract. After the death of Lysander it was 'discovered' that he too had wished to modify the 'Lykourgan' constitution. Perhaps it was not so surprising that Agesilaos, faced with political revolution from above as well as below within five years of his accession, should have been such a stickler for unquestioning obedience to 'the laws'—at least so far as they were conformable to his own inclinations.

Meanwhile back in Phrygia Agesilaos in autumn 395 resumed his onslaught on Pharnabazus' domain (4.1.1ff., but see *Hell. Ox.* 18.33–20.38). Much booty was taken and sold (4.1.1, 26), more cities were won over, until in 394 Pharnabazus consented to a conference with Agesilaos (4.1.31–9). Xenophon artistically points up the contrast between the simplicity of the Spartan king and the pomp of the oriental potentate, but cannot disguise the

pointlessness of the exercise, whose only positive result was that Agesilaos became the guest-friend of Pharnabazus' son. But Xenophon does at least permit the judicious reader to pass a critical judgment on Agesilaos' conduct by juxtaposing the king's visionary design of detaching a large chunk from the Persian Empire (4.1.41) with the fear of the Spartans at home for the safety of their own city, threatened as it was by the coalition of Boiotia, Athens, Corinth and Argos (4.2.1).

By this fear I think we should understand Xenophon to mean that the Spartans dreaded an invasion of Lakonia. For this is precisely what he makes a Corinthian speaker advocate a few sections later (4.2.11f.), using a vivid entomological simile. The Spartans, says Timolaos (one of those in receipt of Persian money in 395), should be fought in their own territory or as near to it as possible, just like wasps, who cause no trouble when they are smoked out of their nest but sting if allowed to swarm. Moreover, like the Theban ambassadors at Athens, Timolaos emphasizes the small number of the Spartans, whom he compares to rivers—small at their source but swollen by tributaries as they proceed away from it. His implication, incidentally, that it will be possible to pass through Arkadia unhindered also ties in with what the Thebans had said and is a valuable corroboration of Arkadian dissatisfaction with Spartan hegemony.

The Spartans, however, had other ideas. 'Slow to war unless compelled to it', they had sent a message to Agesilaos ordering his instant return from Asia (4.2.2; cf. Plut. *Ages.* 15.2) and now proclaimed a levy under Aristodamos, guardian of Pausanias' under-age son Agesipolis (4.2.9). Aristodamos speedily marched out to north-east Peloponnese, picking up some Tegean and Mantineian troops *en route* but failing to receive any from Phleious (4.2.16), which pleaded exemption legitimately enough on religious grounds but had other reasons for neutrality (Legon 1967, 329f.). The ensuing battle at the Nemea River, the largest inter-Greek battle yet, resulted in a convincing victory for the Spartan side. We need not linger over the tactics, revealing though they are of the changed military conditions of the fourth century (Anderson 1970, 144–7, 181–4). However, scarcely less of a battleground is the interpretation of the 'about 6,000 Lakedaimonian hoplites' (4.2.16) who were engaged, and this problem is relevant to our main concerns. For what we want to know is how many of these were Spartiates.

It is as well to make clear at once that certainty is impossible. To begin with, Xenophon's description of the 'Lakedaimonian' contingent draws no other distinction than that between the 6,000 or so hoplites and the 600 or so cavalry. Welwei (1974, 152), mainly following Busolt, allows for the 300 Hippeis (cf. Thuc. 5.72), some 600 Skiritai (cf. Thuc. 5.68.3), about 1,500 Neodamodeis and five *morai* of about 3,300–3,500 men in all. (The sixth *mora* was in garrison at Boiotian Orchomenos: 4.3.15; cf. 2.17.) I agree with him (140 n. 75) against Toynbee (1969, 380) and Andrewes (in Gomme 1970, 113) that there could have been a sizeable number of Neodamodeis present,

since not all of them had been sent to Asia in 399 and 396. But I would prefer to increase his estimate for the number of Spartiates and Perioikoi in the five *morai* by about 1,000, to give a *mora* of about 900 men. Such a figure is attested in Polybius (fr. 60 B-W) and other sources and is appropriate to an emergency for which Sparta probably mobilized thirty-five of the forty active-service age-classes (Toynbee 1969, 379); in any case we should expect the *morai* at the Nemea River to have been significantly larger than the one of about 600 which was performing only garrison duty at Lechaion in 390 (4.5.12: below). Of these putative 4,500 or so hoplites in the *morai* perhaps 2,500 were Perioikoi, 2,000 Spartiates. This may represent a drop of about one third on the number of Spartiates at Mantinea (in a possibly greater levy).

It was perhaps fortunate that of 'their own men' (not necessarily just Spartiates) the Spartans lost a mere eight in the battle (4.3.1; cf. Xen. *Ages.* 7.5). This cheerful information was conveyed by Derkyllidas (perhaps Xenophon's source) to Agesilaos, who had promptly obeyed the summons from Asia, crossed the Hellespont from Abydos to Sestos and followed Xerxes' route through Thrace to Amphipolis (4.2.3–8). His other news was less heartening: most of Thessaly had revolted from Sparta to Thebes after the battle of Haliartos (Diod. 14.82.5f.). Agesilaos succeeded none the less in forcing a passage by defeating the Thessalians in an engagement in which his cavalry did particularly well (4.3.9: this was not of course Spartan cavalry, but horsemen hired in Asia—3.4.2, 16, 20; 4.2. 5).

Agesilaos' pride, however, was soon humbled. On 14 August 394 he learned of Peisandros' disastrous defeat at sea off Knidos by Konon and Pharnabazus (4.3.10–14). For background and descriptive details we must turn to other sources than Xenophon (*Hell. Ox.* 19ff.; Diod. 14.79, 81, 83; cf. Underhill 1900, 129f.). From these we learn that, apart from the admiral's inexperience, the Spartan defeat was due to the vast superiority in numbers of the Phoenician fleet which Konon had raised by at last securing adequate finance from Artaxerxes.

Xenophon's silence on the Knidos sea-battle is to this extent understandable, that he had left Asia with Agesilaos and was personally involved in the third major battle of 394, at Koroneia in Boiotia (4.3.15–22; Polyain. 2.1.23). The 'Lakedaimonians' under Agesilaos' command comprised a *mora* which had crossed over from the Corinthia after the Nemea River battle by sea (the passage through the Isthmus, as in the 'First' Peloponnesian War, being blocked), half of the *mora* stationed at Orchomenos, and those of the 3,000 Neodamodeis sent to Asia who had not either been killed or left behind there on garrison duty. Xenophon twice describes the battle as 'unlike any other in my time' (4.3.16; *Ages.* 2.9). He probably had in mind the nature of its progress, and especially Agesilaos' heroic response to the manoeuvres, rather than its magnitude or importance. For although it was another victory for the Spartan side, it no more decided

the Corinthian War than the Nemea River battle. Phokis and Orchomenos were secured, but no strategic position for effective action in central Greece. The rest of the land actions in the war centred about Corinth.

In the late 390s *stasis* produced one of the most interesting political experiments in the history of the independent Greek city-states, the ‘union of Corinth and Argos’—or rather perhaps the conclusion of an isopolity (mutual citizenship) agreement between them (4.4.6; 8.34; Diod. 14.92.1). Xenophon sees this entirely from the side of the Corinthian oligarchs, and one suspects that Pasimelos (4.4.4; 7.3.2) was one of the ‘Lakonizers’ from whom he gathered much of his information when he was living at Corinth after 371. But bloody though the circumstances of the ‘union’ perhaps were (4.4.3–5), the mass of the Corinthians are unlikely to have shared the view of their oligarchic opponents that for the next seven years their status was no better than that of resident aliens. From the Spartan standpoint the ‘union’ was a disaster. It meant the breakdown of a policy dating at least from 494, whereby an isolated and hostile Argos should serve to keep Corinth loyal and the Isthmus passage secure.

Xenophon’s chronology for the next few years of the war is confused and confusing, since he treats land-operations from 393 to 388 in one piece without clear divisions between years before returning to the war at sea from 394 to 387. Diodorus is, as usual in this respect, of little or no help. Not even Xenophon and Diodorus, however, can completely obscure a vital connection. In 393 the war was for the first time brought to Sparta’s own territory. In 392 Sparta through Antalkidas reversed its policy of the past seven years and once more sought to ingratiate itself with Persia at the expense of the Asiatic Greeks.

Following the Knidos sea-battle Konon and Pharnabazus ‘sailed around’ the Aegean, driving out Spartan harmosts and giving the cities the twofold assurance that their citadels would no longer be garrisoned and that their autonomy would be respected (4.8.1f., 5). Sparta in fact lost much of its Aegean empire, as we learn also from Diodorus (14.84.3f.) and Pausanias (6.3.16). A decree of Erythrai honouring Konon (Tod 1948, no. 106) will not have been unique; and Athens was quick to begin the process of restoring its power in the Aegean (Tod 1948, no. 110: a decree of perhaps 393 honouring Karpathos) and to attempt to win over Dionysios of Syracuse from the Spartans (Tod 1948, no. 108). The coinage bearing the superscription SYN and linking cities from Byzantion to Rhodes is perhaps the token of an anti-Spartan league based on Thebes (Cawkwell 1963).

In spring 393 Pharnabazus and Konon sailed through the Aegean to Melos, which they planned to use as a base for ravaging Lakonia (4.8.7). In Xenophon’s account the idea was conceived by Pharnabazus as a means of retaliation against the Spartans for the losses Derkylidias (3.1.9ff.) and Agesilaos (3.4.12ff.; 4.1.1ff.) had inflicted on his province. It is, however, worth considering the possibility that the plan was suggested to Konon by the

Messenian exiles in his entourage (cf. *Hell.Ox.* 20.3); Konon would then be in a direct line of descent from Demosthenes (Chapter 12).

However this may be, Pharnabazus and Konon attacked Pharai (modern Kalamata) at the head of the Messenian Gulf and ravaged its land, the first attack on Sparta's home territory since the Athenians' unsuccessful attempt to recapture Pylos in 409–408. They then made landings at various points on the coast (presumably of Lakonia as well as Messenia) and did as much damage as possible. This was not, however, as much or as serious as they would have liked, for they were hampered by the lack of suitable harbours to use as bases (cf. Chapter 10), by the defence forces sent by the Spartans (presumably mobile detachments like that commanded by Brasidas at Mothone in 431), and by the shortage of cereals (it was the time of year when, as Alkman fr. 20.3–5 had noted, hunger was never far away). So, following the example of Nikias in 424, they sensibly decided to conduct an *epiteichismos* on Kythera.

A landing was made at Phoinikous (probably modern Avlemonas Bay). The citadel of Kythera town was captured, allegedly at the first assault, and the Kytherians or some of them were sent away under a truce to the Lakonian mainland (4.8.8; Diod. 14.84.5). The absence of the Spartan harmost and a Lakedaimonian garrison is, as in 424, remarkable and probably to be explained on the same lines. Konon then repaired the fortifications, left behind a garrison of his mercenaries under an Athenian harmost (so described by Xenophon) and sailed for the Isthmus, which the anti-Spartan coalition had made its GHQ.

What Xenophon and Diodorus may have omitted as relatively insignificant is an attack by Konon on Antikythera (known by various names in antiquity). This small island (Chapter 2) lies equidistant from Kythera and Crete and could be reached from the former before the first meal of the day was taken, according to the fourth-century 'Periplous' of Pseudo-Skylax. Its main town, Aigilia, was fortified in the fifth century, either by the Spartans or possibly by Nikias. The reasons for thinking that Konon took an interest in the site are twofold. First, sling-bullets inscribed 'of the king' have been found here (Foss 1975, 42), together with spearheads and many black-painted sherds. Second, at some time between 400 and 350 the akropolis walls were reconstructed and an enceinte-wall added, enclosing an area of some 300,000m². The presence of walling of such quality demands an explanation in the absence of evidence for ancient occupation from the rest of the island, and Konon, as we have seen, had the men and equipment to repair the walls of Kythera.

Konon's arrival first at Corinth and then, after an absence of twelve years, at his native Athens raised the war on to a new plane. For the Persian money he brought enabled the anti-Spartan coalition temporarily to gain the mastery of the Corinthian Gulf (4.8.10) and for the next four years to maintain a permanent force of mercenaries in the Corinthia, while at home the Athenians

could now fully rebuild the walls they had been compelled to dismantle in 404 (4.8.10; cf. Tod 1948, no. 107; Pritchett 1974, II, 121 n. 22). The Spartans were nevertheless far from incapable of responding. In 392 they won the Battle of the Long Walls of Corinth (4.4.6–13) and in 391 they actually captured Lechaion, Corinth's Peiraeus on the Corinthian Gulf, and garrisoned it (4.4.17, with Underhill 1900, 139f. on the chronology).

In the interval between these military successes, however, they had undertaken a drastically new diplomatic initiative, compelled to do so, as suggested earlier, by the *epiteichismos* on Kythera (which had followed so soon after Kinadon's abortive rising and the machinations of Pausanias and Lysander). In Xenophon (4.8.12–17) the Spartans apparently intended to enter into purely bilateral negotiations with Tiribazus, who seems to have succeeded Tithraustes (cf. 5.1.28). In the event they found themselves attending at Sardis an international conference that included representatives of their Greek enemies, the Athenians, Boiotians, Corinthians and Argives. Antalkidas proposed peace with Persia on condition that all Greek cities and islands should be autonomous, but on the understanding that the Spartans would not dispute ownership of the cities of Asia with the Great King—a return, in other words, to their position of exactly twenty years previously. Not surprisingly, the other Greek representatives demurred, partly because these terms involved the abandonment of the Asiatic Greeks to Persia, but mainly because the 'autonomy' clause threatened their own vital interests—Athens' control of Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros, crucial for its wheaten lifeline; Thebes' control of Boiotia; and the 'union' of Corinth and Argos. Tiribazus, on the other hand, was impressed, secretly gave Antalkidas some money and publicly arrested Konon. Artaxerxes, however, was not yet ready to settle.

A few months later, early in 391, the Spartans tried again to make peace and convened a conference at Sparta, this time not only without involving Persia but also seeking to meet the other Greeks' objections halfway. Andokides (3), our only source, is the earliest surviving writer to use the expression 'Common Peace' to describe 'a general treaty based on the principle of autonomy' (Ryder 1965, 33). But it was precisely the 'autonomy' clause which once again proved to be the stumbling-block.

The attitude of Agesilaos to the initiative spearheaded by Antalkidas is unclear. Plutarch (*Ages.* 23.2) says that the two were personal and political enemies, but the difference between them may only have been one of emphasis. For Agesilaos the application of the 'autonomy principle' in Sparta's favour throughout mainland Greece seems to have been the paramount consideration. Ideally perhaps he would have preferred not to renege on the Asiatic Greeks; but, as the events of 387–386 and following were to demonstrate, if they had to be sacrificed on the altar of mainland Greek 'autonomy', then Agesilaos would not shrink from applying the knife—indirectly, through Antalkidas, for whom peace was a commodity to

be bought at this price. It is tempting to link the latter's fervour with a curious piece of information in Plutarch (*Ages.* 32.1), that in 370 he sent away his children for safety to Kythera. Perhaps he had friends there whose property and lives were menaced by the *epiteichismos*.

The fluctuating fortunes of the remainder of the Corinthian War by land and sea from 391 to 387 (4.4.15–7.7; 4. 8.17–5.1.24) need not long delay us, since, despite the occupation of Kythera, Lakonia as such played little or no role, at least in our preserved accounts. Indeed, Xenophon refers to Lakonia just once (4.7.6), in the context of an Argive counter-raid presumably against Kynouria during an expedition against the Argolis led by Agesipolis in 388. For the rest, apart from a Peloponnesian League campaign against the Akarnanians led by Agesilaos on behalf of the Achaians in 389 (4.6.1–12), regular fighting on the mainland was confined to the Corinthia. Here one famous episode requires our attention.

In May/June 390 Agesilaos commanded the first major Spartan offensive of the war, an attack on Corinth itself (4.5.1). The Corinthians feared that the city would be betrayed to Agesilaos, who was accompanied by Corinthian oligarchic exiles, and so summoned to their aid Iphikrates and his mercenaries, who were in garrison at nearby Peiraion protecting Corinth's communications with Boiotia and Athens (4.5.3; *Xen. Ages.* 2.19). Iphikrates had been despatched to the Corinthia by the Athenians in 393 and placed in command of a 'Foreign Legion' of mercenaries (Androtion 324F48; Philochoros 328F150). Thanks to Persian money he was able to keep a more or less stable force in commission for four years, but it was his brains rather than Persian gold that welded this force into a powerful tactical unit. Not only did he introduce significant modifications of equipment, blending the hoplite with the light-armed infantryman to produce a new, improved peltast, but he also proved an excellent disciplinarian and field commander. His finest hour came in 390.

Agesilaos' expedition against Corinth coincided with the Hyakinthia festival, and it was customary for Amyklaian Spartans to return to celebrate it wherever or for whatever purpose they happened to be away from home (4.5.11). They were therefore granted the usual dispensation and were escorted by the *mora* of about 600 hoplites on guard at Lechaion and by a small contingent of cavalry to within four or five kilometres of Sikyon. Here the commander of the *mora* entrusted the Amyklaians to the cavalry commander and set out back to Lechaion; but *en route* he was ambushed by Iphikrates, and the *mora* was cut to pieces (4.5.12–17). Xenophon's account of the number killed is not self-explanatory: although a few, he says, escaped to Lechaion, yet only about 250 were killed. Perhaps he means to refer only to the Spartiate casualties. At any rate, the Spartans could no longer afford to be scornful of peltasts, as they had been the previous year (4.4.17). For this destruction was a 'disaster of a kind unusual for the Spartans' (4.5.10), and Xenophon highlights its magnitude by remarking that the sons, brothers and

fathers of the dead men rejoiced at the news. This response presages the reaction to the far greater disaster at Leuktra in 371.

Agesilaos, one minute receiving a Boiotian embassy treating for peace, next minute is leading back the remains of the destroyed *mora* to Sparta, shamefacedly taking care not to pass by Mantinea in daylight and so present the Mantineians with a chance to mock (4.5.18). Thereafter there was a stalemate on land, and Iphikrates next turns up in the Hellespont in 389–388, commanding eight ships and about 1,200 peltasts, with which he defeats the Spartan harmost Anaxibios (4.8.34–9). He had been sent there because the Athenians were afraid of losing the control of the northern side of the Hellespont won for them in 389 by Thrasyboulos, the resistance leader of 403. In fact, Thrasyboulos had gone some considerable way towards laying the basis for a renewal of the fifth-century Athenian Empire (4.8.25). However, the Athenians' naval resurgence since 393 had led them to overplay their hand. In 390 they entered into a treaty with a revolted vassal of Persia, King Evagoras of Cyprus (Bengtson 1975, no. 234); in 389 they intervened on the side of democracy at Klazomenai (Tod 1948, no. 114). The Great King therefore was more sympathetic to the Spartans when in 387 Antalkidas (navarch since 388) once again brought proposals for a Common Peace.

Antalkidas first obtained an alliance with Persia, a necessary precaution in case the Athenians should refuse to accept the peace (5.1.25). To make doubly sure of Athenian compliance, Antalkidas with Syracusan and Persian help gathered the largest fleet in service since 394 (eighty or more ships) and regained control of the Hellespont; the Athenians were thereby threatened with a repetition of the aftermath of Aigospotamoi (5.1.28f.). The complaisant attitude of Argos was secured by the threat of a full-scale Spartan invasion (5.1.29). The Thebans, concerned as ever for their hegemony of the Boiotian League, attempted to resist the 'autonomy principle', but Agesilaos had war declared on them too, and they tamely submitted to the dismemberment of the League (5.1.32f.). The Corinthians at first refused to withdraw the garrison sent by Argos (cf. 4.4.6; 5.1), but like the Argives and Thebans yielded to Agesilaos' threat of force; the 'union' of Corinth and Argos was terminated, the Corinthian exiles restored (5.1.34).

The peace to which all Greeks from 386 were formally party contained three clauses: the Greek cities of Asia were to be the King's, as were Klazomenai and Cyprus; all other Greek cities, great or small, were to be free and autonomous and to keep their own territory, except Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros; any state refusing to accept these terms would be liable to attack by the King. Officially, these terms had been 'sent down' by Artaxerxes to be rubberstamped by the Greeks meeting at Sardis, and so one name for the peace was the 'King's Peace'. Informally, and more informatively, it was known as the 'Peace of Antalkidas' (5.1.35). For as Agesilaos reportedly remarked in its defence (Plut. *Ages.* 23.4; *Artax.* 22.4; *Mor.* 213B), the Spartans were not 'medizing' so much as the Persians were 'lakonizing'.

In other words, this was an arrangement sponsored by the Spartans mainly in their own selfish interests. The past three years of fighting had brought them no advantage over the Greeks, and the anti-Persian policy of the 390s had merely contributed to the resurgence of Athens. Hence the abandonment of the Asiatic Greeks in favour of concentrating first on re-establishing Spartan suzerainty in the Peloponnese and then on extending it north of the Isthmus. As Ryder (1965, 39) well puts it, ‘the King’s Peace had been devised by the Spartans as an acceptable basis for Persian intervention.... It was, then, naturally suited primarily to the interests of the Spartans and Persians.’

The new Spartan policy was at first triumphantly successful, although its success should not be put down to the peace as such, whose direct influence, as Seager (1974) has demonstrated, was intermittent and superficial. Rather it was because Sparta was still the single greatest military power in mainland Greece that by 379 the Spartans could seem to have ‘at length established their empire in all respects well and securely’ (5.3.27). Isokrates in his *Panegyrikos* of c.380 (4.126) summarized the main events leading to this happy position. Mantinea had been destroyed (385), the Kadmeia (akropolis) of Thebes had been occupied and garrisoned (382), Olynthos and Phleious were being besieged (from 382; both submitted in 379), Amyntas (III) of Macedon, Dionysios of Syracuse and the Great King were being aided. Diodorus (15.23.3f.), amplifying Xenophon and Isokrates, adds a curious explanation: ‘the Spartans had constantly applied themselves to securing an abundance of population and practice in the use of arms, and so were become an object of terror to all because of the strength of their following.’ If Diodorus (or his source) meant an abundance of population in Lakonia and Messenia, this can only refer to Helots and Perioikoi. Moreover, as we shall see in the next chapter, a far greater thinker than he rightly attributed Sparta’s eventual eclipse precisely to its lack of manpower, meaning of course citizen manpower.

We need not, however, confine ourselves to the matter of Spartiate manpower to detect signs of Spartan weakness. For the above summaries of Sparta’s position in 380–379 present a one-sided picture of the period 386–379. For example, in 384 Athens concluded a perpetual alliance with the important island of Chios (Tod 1948, no. 118); six years later this alliance could serve as a model for the series of alliances comprising the Second Athenian Confederacy, a new improved version of the fifth-century Empire. In 383 Athens allied itself with the Chalkidian League headed by Olynthos (Tod 1948, no. 119). The possibility of such a compact was one of the chief arguments used by the Akanthian delegate at a Spartan assembly of that year to win Peloponnesian support against Olynthian encroachment (5.2.15f.). By 382 the first certain innovation in the ‘constitution’ of the Peloponnesian League had been made (5.2.21f.; cf. 5.3.10, 17; 6.2.16): in lieu of men an ally might now contribute a fixed amount of cash. The measure would of

course have benefited Sparta by providing the money to hire the now obligatory mercenaries; but the very fact that mercenaries were necessary is an indication of the war-weariness of the allies. Nor was it only they, it seems, who found the repeated demands on their manpower excessive. In 381, according to Diodorus (15.21.2), more than 1,200 ‘Lakedaimonians’ were killed at Olynthos. This figure is probably exaggerated, but it cannot be coincidental that in 380 Sparta, for the first and only time on record, was forced to rely on volunteers to make up the ‘Lakedaimonian’ force (5.3.9). Apart from men of inferior Spartan status (Chapter 14), the volunteers also included ‘men of quality’ from the Perioikoi, men, in other words, whom one would have expected to be called up rather than able to volunteer.

Over and above these difficulties, there is evidence that Agesilaos’ policy—for such it surely was—was far from unanimously popular in Sparta. Diodorus (15.19.4) speaks of principled disagreement between Agesilaos and Agesipolis, but since Agesipolis cheerfully executed Agesilaos’ policy towards both Mantinea and Olynthos (cf. generally 5.3.20) it is better to think of Agesipolis as the figurehead around whom opposition to so strong a king as Agesilaos naturally tended to crystallize (cf. Carlier 1977 on the position of Damaratos *vis-à-vis* Kleomenes). This opposition surfaced most noticeably in 382 after Phoibidas’ seizure of the Theban akropolis (5.2.32) and in 381 over the forcible restoration of a handful of oligarchic exiles to democratic Phleious (5.3.16). In both cases—as indeed in all cases down to the end of Agesilaos’ reign—the opposition was either won over or silenced. But Sparta’s internal and external enemies can only have been heartened by such discord.

Already before 379, then, there were hints that the feet of the Spartan colossus might be of ceramic composition. Within a decade the feet had crumbled, and the giant had been toppled from its pedestal. At the beginning of the process of disintegration stands the liberation of the Kadmeia, which provoked from Xenophon the nearest he could muster to a direct criticism of Agesilaos. Its seizure in 382 by Phoibidas, he now says (5.4.1), was an act of impiety. The Spartans had broken their oath of 386 to leave the cities autonomous, and it was for this that they were punished by the Thebans, who inflicted on them (in 371) their first-ever defeat. Xenophon does not actually say that Agesilaos ordered or suggested the seizure; rather he casts a slur on Phoibidas’ character (5.2.28). But he does make it clear that Agesilaos virulently hated Thebes (5.1.33) and that he condoned the action on narrowly utilitarian grounds (5.2.32); and he records that in 378 Agesilaos installed Phoibidas as harmost of Boiotian Thespias (5.4.41). It may not therefore be accidental or irrelevant that Xenophon reports the following message sent by Agesilaos in 396 (3.4.11): ‘he (Tissaphernes) by his perjury has made the gods enemies to himself but allies to the Greeks.’

We, however, may beg to differ from Xenophon’s pious interpretation of Spartan history after 382. A more obvious secular reason for the ‘retribution’

Sparta suffered through the Thebans is Agesilaos' unreasoning hostility towards them. According to a *post eventum* rationalization of a familiar type, one of the *rhetrai* of Lykourgos forbade the Spartans to make war continuously on the same enemy (Plut. *Lyk.* 13.10; *Pelop.* 15.3; *Mor.* 189E, 213E, 217D, 227D). Had the law-abiding constitutionalist Agesilaos known of the *rhetra*, no doubt he would have avoided this particular error; but as it was from 379 until 366 apart from short breaks in 375–374 and 371–370 Sparta waged war constantly against Thebes.

Since Agesipolis had died at Olynthos in 380 (5.3.19; cf. Tod 1948, no. 120), only the second Spartan king known to have died on campaign, and since Agesilaos speciously pleaded to be excused from the command on the grounds that he was beyond military age (5.4.13), the war-effort was at first led by Agesipolis' younger brother and successor Kleombrotos. His campaign of 379–378 effectively strengthened Sparta's hold on Boiotia and so served to keep the Athenians neutral, as they were as yet unwilling to take the Thebans' side in a war that might spill over into Attika (5.4.14–19).

All this good work, however, was undone by Sphodrias, harmost of Thespiiai (5.4.15), who in 378 made an abortive attempt to capture the Peiraieus (5.4.20). Precisely what Sphodrias' thinking was and who conceived the scheme will always be uncertain, but the consequences were clear cut and instructive. Sphodrias was put on trial at Sparta but, remarkably, was acquitted, thanks to Agesilaos (esp. 5.4.26), on the highly revealing ground that Sparta needed soldiers like him (5.4.32). The Athenians, no longer so impressed by their latter-day 'dual hegemony' theorists like Kallistratos (cf. 6.3.10–17), voted that the Spartans had broken the King's Peace (Diod. 15.29.7) and initiated moves resulting in alliance with Thebes and other states prior to the foundation in mid-378 of the Second Athenian Confederacy (Tod 1948, no. 123; cf. 121–2).

The geriatric Agesilaos was once more galvanized into activity. Both in 378 (5.4.35–41; Diod. 15.32) and in 377 (5.4.47–55; Diod. 15.34) he led Peloponnesian League forces into Boiotia. Presumably he too was responsible for a major reorganization of the League designed perhaps to emphasize the burden carried by the Spartans and so to restore their prestige as leader when their harshness was pushing the allies in the direction of Athens (Diod. 15.31.1f.). Neither invasion, however, was a startling success. Indeed, the retreat in 377 may have been hastened by allied discontent (Plut. *Ages.* 26.6; Polyain. 2.1.7, 18, 20, 21); and Diodorus (15.34.2) portentously comments that the Thebans for the first time found themselves not inferior to the Spartans. In 376 Kleombrotos fared even worse, ostensibly because he felt unable to force the passes of Kithairon (5.4.59; cf. Ste. Croix 1972, 194). Thwarted by land, the Spartans and their Peloponnesian League allies decided to try their luck at sea and, as in 404 and 387, starve Athens into submission (5.4.60). Yet again, their luck was out, and the Athenians won their first solo naval victory since 'the' Peloponnesian War, off Naxos in 376 (5.4.61).

The reminiscence of ‘the’ Peloponnesian War does not end there. For the Athenians in 375 complied with a Theban request to ‘sail round’ the Peloponnese in order to forestall another invasion of Boiotia by the Spartans, who would be unable both to guard their own country and that of their neighbouring allies and to attack Thebes in sufficient force (5.4.62f.). The ploy succeeded, and the Thebans used the breathing space first to win the Battle of Tegyra against 1,000 ‘Lakedaimonians’ from the Orchomenos garrison (Diod. 15.37.1; 81.2; Plut. *Pelop.* 16f.; with Anderson 1970, 162–4) and then to reconstitute the Boiotian League, on harsher lines (6.1.1; cf. Isokr. 14.8).

Plutarch’s comment on the Tegyra battle, which is chiefly remarkable for Pelopidas’ use of the Theban ‘Sacred Band’, deserves quotation: ‘this battle was the first to reveal to the other Greeks the secret that it was not only the Eurotas or the country between Babyka and Knakion (*sc.* the place where the Spartan Assembly met) which produced martial and bellicose men.’ Soon after, Sparta rebuffed the request of their Thessalian proxenos to amputate the rising power of Jason of Pherai in Thessaly, on the grounds that they lacked a sufficient reserve of forces (6.1.2–17). They also participated in the second Common Peace, of 375–374 (Bengtson 1975, no. 265). This time it was the Athenians, alarmed by the growth of Theban power and finding the cost of war excessive, who were gratified to have their hegemony of the sea recognized by Sparta (Nepos, *Timoth.* 2.3). As for the Thebans, they had their control of Boiotia acknowledged, if only *de facto* (Diod. 15.38.1–4).

However, the peace soon broke down, with Athens and Sparta fighting over Kerkyra (6.2.3–26), and Diodorus’ ‘common anarchy’ (15.45.1) seems a more appropriate label for the situation than Common Peace. The chief significance of the Kerkyra struggle from our standpoint is that in 373 the democrats lured their Athenian allies to aid them with the bait of their island’s geographical situation, pointing out that it was strategically placed for operations not only against the Corinthian Gulf but also against the ‘Lakonian land’, i.e. Messenia (6.2.9). In 372 Iphikrates, having swallowed the bait, made preparations to use his large fleet precisely for the latter purpose (6.2.38). Xenophon maddeningly gives no details of his successful operations, but it may plausibly be suggested that there was a connection between his raids on Lakonia (or at least the imminent threat of them) and the next Common Peace, sworn at Sparta early in 371 (Bengtson 1975, no. 269).

The initiative for this peace came either from Athens (6.3.2) or from Persia (Diod. 15.50.4), or perhaps from Persia prompted by Sparta, if Antalkidas really was again ‘with the King’ in 371 (6.3.12). Xenophon underlines the importance of the occasion by writing speeches for three of the Athenian ambassadors. Kallias, the Spartans’ proxenos, orotundly but unconvincingly argues that the common heritage of Athens and Sparta demands common action (6.3. 4–6). Autokles seeks to split from Sparta its Peloponnesian

League allies (whose representatives were present) by delivering a concerted attack on Sparta's one-sided and self-seeking interpretation of the 'autonomy principle' (6.3.7–9). Finally, Kallistratos bluntly advocates the 'dual hegemony' thesis as a way of reconciling the pro-Athenian and pro-Spartan factions at loggerheads in each Greek city (6.3.10–17).

The Spartans voted to accept a peace whose main difference from that of 386 was that Sparta was no longer to be its unofficial guarantor. In fact, there was to be no guarantor at all. Thus although Sparta as heretofore swore to the peace on behalf of its allies, its hold on them was appreciably enfeebled. None the less, when the Thebans as in 386 and 375–374 claimed the same prerogative of swearing in relation to Boiotia, Agesilaos as in 386 refused to permit it (6.3.19). This time, however, there were no second Theban thoughts, and the Thebans remained isolated outside the diplomatic framework.

This was a considerable coup, welcomed by the anxious Athenians (6.3.20). But Xenophon has omitted what is for us perhaps the most interesting detail of all, the heated exchange between Agesilaos and one of the Theban representatives, Epameinondas, which is recorded by Plutarch (*Ages.* 27.5–28.3; cf. Nepos, 'Epam.' 6.4; Paus. 9.13.2). The context is no doubt Agesilaos' refusal to allow the Thebans to swear on behalf of Boiotia. Epameinondas counters with the demand that all cities must be of equal status. Agesilaos, ignoring Epameinondas' appeal to universally applicable standards, repeats his demand that Boiotia be autonomous. Epameinondas replies with a telling question: is it not just for Lakonike to be autonomous too? Agesilaos doggedly reiterates his previous demand, to which Epameinondas answers that the Thebans will allow Boiotia to be autonomous—if Agesilaos will do the same for Lakonike. The reference unmistakably is to the status within Lakonia of the Perioikic *poleis*. Agesilaos was incensed, but yet at the same time delighted to have a pretext for declaring war on Thebes.

This anecdote, in so far as it redounds to the credit of Epameinondas, is perhaps *ben trovato*, but a more humdrum variant of it appears in Diodorus (15.51.3f.). Here the same question about Boiotian autonomy is put to the Thebans rather later, just before the invasion leading to the Battle of Leuktra, and the Thebans reply that they never meddle in Lakonike. The essential point is the same in both accounts and one which suggests to me that some Perioikoi had seen how to turn Sparta's cherished 'autonomy principle' against its principal champions uncomfortably close to home. Perhaps they were the same Perioikoi who, as we shall see, played a crucial role in bringing a Theban army into Lakonia in 370.

The 'Spartano-Boiotian War' (Diod. 15.76.3) which followed the exclusion of Thebes from the (first) peace of 371 was largely Agesilaos' idea. This we learn from Plutarch (*Ages.* 28.6), not Xenophon, who merely says that 'the Assembly' of the Spartans dismissed as rubbish a call for Kleombrotos' army in Phokis to be disbanded (6.4.2f.). If Xenophon (6.1.1) is right, Kleombrotos

had been in Phokis with four *morai* since 375, but it is perhaps more likely that he was only sent out to aid Phokis against Thebes early in 371. Anyway, in the summer of that year, acting on the Spartan Assembly's decision, he invaded Boiotia and led his army on a circuitous route (designed to secure his communications with the Peloponnese) to Leuktra in the territory of Thespiiai (6.4.3f.). According to Diodorus (15.1.2; 50.2), everyone expected the Spartans to defeat the Thebans. This statement, however, is no less suspect than that of Thucydides on attitudes to Sparta and Athens in 431. For Diodorus' account of the preliminaries to the decisive battle is wholly incompatible with that of Xenophon and is based on pro-Theban sources concerned to magnify the Theban victory.

As for the battle itself, the best account from the Theban side is given in Plutarch (*Pelop.* 23); Xenophon's is patchy and written from the Spartan side only (6.4.13–15), while that of Diodorus (15.50–5) is largely a rhetorical set-piece. To be brief, the outcome was decided on the Spartan right, where the only real fighting occurred, between the 6,000 or so Theban hoplites under Epameinondas (Diod. 15.52.2), massed at least fifty deep (6.4.12), and the 2,250 or so 'Lakedaimonians', who were drawn up twelve deep. The figure for the 'Lakedaimonians' is computed as follows: thirty-five year classes were called out (6.4.17), giving an *enomotia* of thirty-five, each of which was drawn up in three files abreast to give a depth of twelve (6.4.12). Since there were sixteen *enomotiai* to a *mora* (according to the scheme accepted in Chapter 12), the four *morai* at Leuktra comprised 2,240 men.

Now we know that there were about 700 Spartiates present (6.4.15), few or none of whom except the commander of cavalry were cavalrymen (6.4.10f.). So, if 300 of them were the Hippeis (restored in the text of 6.4.14), and if (as I believe) the Hippeis were drawn up separately from the 'morai', then only 400 of the *c.*2,250 in the *morai* were Spartiates, the rest being Perioikoi and perhaps men of inferior Spartan status. In other words, the proportion of Spartiates in the *morai* had fallen catastrophically since the Battle of the Nemea River in 394, and before the Battle of Leuktra the total number of Spartiates cannot have exceeded 1,500 compared to the 8,000 of a century earlier. No doubt poor generalship and inferior tactics contributed largely to the Spartan defeat. But the adverse effect on morale of this tiny and shrinking handful of Spartiates dominating a League force of perhaps 10,000 hoplites (Plut. *Pelop.* 20.1) should not be overlooked. Even Xenophon does not hide the fact that some of the allied troops were actually pleased with the result (6.4.15).

Diodorus in line with his pro-Theban stance put the 'Lakedaimonian' casualties impossibly at 4,000. Xenophon (6.4.15) more plausibly estimates the 'total Lakedaimonian' deaths to be 1,000. Of these about 400 were Spartiates, including Kleombrotos (Plut. *Ages.* 28.8; Diod. 15.55.5) and a polemarch (6.4.14). Rather than fight to recover the corpses, as some Spartans wished, the surviving polemarchs wisely decided to ask for a truce.

The news of the disaster was brought to Sparta on the last day of the Gymnopaïdai festival, which the Ephors ordered to be completed as usual (6.4.16). The relatives of the dead, at least the male relatives, were reportedly cheerful, those of the survivors miserable—in some cases with more than usually good reason, since, as Plutarch (*Ages.* 30.2–6) tells us in his considerably more detailed account, there had been many ‘tremblers’ (cowards) at Leuktra, including some ‘top people’. With legalistic nicety Agesilaos ordained that the rigorous law affecting ‘tremblers’ should be suspended for a day (*Ages.* 30.6; *Mor.* 191C, 214B), giving the same reason as he had for urging the acquittal of Sphodrias. Presumably therefore these men were included in the second Spartan force which was hastily despatched under Agesilaos’ son Archidamos to unite with the remnant of the Leuktra army (6.4.18).

We do not know how many died on the Theban side, although at least one of their leaders was killed (Tod 1948, no. 130). We do, however, know that the Thebans were not quick to capitalize on their stunning victory. ‘If the battle of Leuctra marks a revolution in the art of generalship, it is because of the way it was won, not the way that it was followed up’ (Anderson 1970, 205). One reason was that Sparta’s control of Lakonia and the Peloponnesian League did not at first appear to have been shaken (6.4.18; 5.1); another was the continuing Athenian suspicion of Thebes (6.4.19f.); a third was the ambiguous attitude of Thebes’ northern ally Jason (6.4.20–32). The immediate upshot was that the Spartans and their allies were permitted to withdraw from Boiotia and a conference was convened at Athens, where the representatives swore a fourth Common Peace (6.5.1–3).

There are considerable problems over what this peace was and whether Sparta was involved. Xenophon, our only source, is inadequate. If it was a renewal of the King’s Peace of 386, Theban adherence would be surprising. On the other hand, if Athens was aiming to use the conference to entice the Peloponnesian League allies away from Sparta, then Spartan adherence would be somewhat odd. Whatever the truth (cf. Ryder 1965, 71–3), Elis at least refused to swear the oath, since this would have implied support for the autonomy of the Triphylian towns of whose control they had been deprived by Sparta in 400 (6.5.2; cf. 3.2.30f.). This is the first spark of what in 370 became a forest-fire of disaffection with Spartan rule, fuelled as usual by *stasis*.

‘The cities’, says Diodorus (15.40.1), ‘fell into great disturbance and civil strife, especially in the Peloponnese.’ He gives five concrete examples: Phigaleia, Sikyon, Megara, Phleious and Corinth. To these we may add Mantinea (6.5.3–5), Tegea (6.5.6–10; Diod. 15.59) and Argos (Diod. 15.58; with Tomlinson 1972, 139f.). Isokrates in his *Archidamos* of c.366 (a speech put in the mouth of Agesilaos’ son) refers to this farflung revolutionary upheaval at length and with horror (6.64–9). From the Spartan viewpoint by far the most important defections were those of Mantinea and

Tegea. For as a result of their joint action Arkadia, which had been ‘not much more than a geographical expression’ (Jones 1967, 131), now became (with a couple of exceptions) a political unit, the Arkadian League (cf. Tod 1948, no. 132). What the ‘Quadruple Alliance’ of 420 had hoped for had become a reality. Sparta was now faced by enemies all along its northern frontier.

Clearly a show of such strength as Sparta could muster was obligatory, and Agesilaos once more emerges to command an almost entirely Lakonian force in Arkadia well after the end of the normal campaigning season (6.5.10). He captured Eutaia, a small town on the Arkadian side of the Lakonian border (6.5.12; cf. Paus. 8.27.3) and then advanced through Tegeate territory to Mantinea, only to be forced to retire in the face of overwhelmingly large numbers of Tegeans, Mantineians, Argives and Eleians. Diodorus (15.62.3–5) adds the vital information that the Argives and Eleians, rebuffed by the Athenians, had secured an alliance with Thebes (cf. Xen. *Ages.* 2.24).

Following Agesilaos’ withdrawal, the states bordering on Lakonia and Messenia urged on the Thebans an immediate invasion by land of Lakonia, the first time such a tactic had been proposed since 394 (4.2.12) and the first time ever that it had really been feasible. All stressed the size of the forces at the Thebans’ disposal, but the Arkadians added that Lakonia was short on military manpower (6.5.23). The Thebans, however, remained reluctant. Lakonia, it seemed to them, was extremely hard to penetrate (cf. Eur. fr. 1083; Diod. 15.63.4), and its frontiers were garrisoned at Oion in the Skiritis and Leuktron (or Leuktra) above Maleatis (for its probable location see Andrewes in Gomme 1970, 31–4). They also thought that their allies were exaggerating the Spartans’ weakness and that nowhere would they fight better than in their own territory (6.5.24). At this critical juncture some people arrived from Karyai, supporting the Arkadians’ argument from the Spartans’ lack of manpower and offering to act as guides (6.5.25). Since Xenophon says ‘there were also present some of the Perioikoi’, I infer that Karyai had already defected from Sparta. We recall its alleged ‘medism’ in 480 (Chapter 11). Their urging, together with their allegation that their fellows were already refusing to obey the Spartiates’ summons to aid, finally convinced the Thebans to invade Lakonia.

The main sources for this—the first, as it turned out—invasion of Lakonia by Epameinondas are Xenophon (6.5.25–32), Diodorus (15.63.3–65.5) and Plutarch (*Ages.* 31f.; *Pelop.* 24). As usual, their accounts diverge considerably in detail, and I present a conflated version with some critical or exegetical supplements. The invasion was mounted on four fronts. The Argives entered through the Thyreatis (already perhaps in the Arkadian League: cf. Tod 1948, p. 99), presumably along the Astros-Karyai road (Chapter 10; Figure 17). Somewhere *en route* they stormed a garrison under the Spartiate Alexandros. The Boiotians took a road that led to Sellasia, no doubt along the River

Sarandapotamos to Karyai and thence through the waterless Kleissoura pass (hence the need for guides). The Arkadians crossed the frontier further west and confronted the garrison of Neodamodeis (their last mention) and Tegean exiles stationed at Oion under the Spartiate Ischolaos. He and most of his troops were killed, and the Arkadians advanced to join up with the Thebans (and presumably the Argives) at Karyai. Thence they proceeded to Sellasia, which they burned, looted and probably (cf. 7.4.12) captured from Spartans. Finally, the Eleians crossed into Lakonia through the Belminatis (cf. Plut. *Kleom.* 4.1) and followed the easiest route to Sellasia along the Eurotas valley. Perhaps therefore Belmina, like Karyai, had already been liberated from Spartan control; at any rate, a few months later, as we shall see, Pellana, not Belmina, was garrisoned to hold the line at this point of entry into Lakonia.

The reunited invaders made camp in the plain north of Sparta in the sanctuary of Apollo at Thornax on the left bank of the Eurotas. Some hoplites had been posted to oppose them on the right bank, so the invaders proceeded south through the Menelaion area to a point on the other side of the river from Amyklai, on the way burning and plundering houses full of valuables (a hint of the relaxation or evasion of the 'Lykourgan' discipline). They then with difficulty forded a Eurotas swollen with melted snow (the invasion had begun at the winter solstice of 370) and reached Amyklai, which had presumably been evacuated. Here the Arkadians occupied themselves with looting the houses, whereas the Thebans cut down many trees (cf. Polyb. 5.19.2), presumably olives, to build a palisade. It was while the invaders were thus engaged that allies from Phleious slipped past them and made their way to Sparta. Prevented by the Arkadians and Argives from entering Lakonia by land, the Phleiasians—like the allies from Pellene, Sikyon, Corinth, Epidauros, Troizen, Hermione and Halieis before them—had been forced to take ship to Prasiai and then make the difficult crossing over Parnon to the Eurotas valley (7.2.2f.).

Sparta itself was in turmoil. Agesilaos had at his disposal only a few hundred Spartiates, whom he stationed at various points to guard the unwalled city. (The wall of which good traces survive to this day was not completed until 184.) The Spartan women, already unbalanced by the deaths of their men at Leuktra, were now running amuck at the sight of the smoke caused by the invaders. The Perioikoi had not contributed to the full extent of their manpower, and some of those who had been enlisted were deserting. An extraordinary proclamation was therefore made inviting Helots to join the ranks on the understanding that they would be liberated. More than 6,000 of them—presumably only Lakonian Helots (below)—accepted the offer with alacrity, indeed with alarming alacrity, since they swamped the Spartiates and probably the Perioikoi too. Worst of all, there was disaffection within the Spartan ranks, and two conspiracies had to be suppressed. Certainly some of those involved were Spartiates, since we hear that for the first time ever

Spartiates were put to death without trial (Plut. *Ages.* 32.11). But perhaps the majority were men of inferior Spartan status, following the trail blazed by Kinadon.

Despite its dire situation, however, Sparta was not taken, and Epameinondas turned his attention to the southern part of the Eurotas valley. It seems that by no means all the Perioikoi had deserted Sparta, for any of their towns that were unwalled were looted and put to the torch. Gytheion, however, which presumably was fortified, was besieged for three days and perhaps taken. If so, Sparta was temporarily without a convenient outlet to the sea. But this was a trifling inconvenience compared with the immediate sequel, a sequel which Xenophon could not nerve himself to record, although he could not completely conceal its occurrence. I refer of course to the liberation of the Messenian Helots.

They had naturally revolted *en masse* some time after Leuktra (7.2.2; Xen. *Ages.* 2.24), in company, I assume, with the Perioikoi of Thouria and Aithaia as in c.465. In 369, however, Epameinondas took the step essential for transforming the former Helots and the expatriates who flooded back to their homeland into ‘the Messenians’. He supervised the (re)founding of the city of Messene (perhaps at first called Ithome) on the west side of Mount Ithome, drew up the citizen-register and divided up the land (Diod. 15.66.1, 6; Plut. *Ages.* 34.1; *Pelop.* 24.9; Paus. 4.26.5–27). The remains of the magnificent enceinte walling are to this day a massive testimonial to his achievement.

The loss of the Messenian Helots was the greatest blow the Spartans had ever suffered. It meant the definitive end of their status as a first-rate power. Not unnaturally therefore they were angry, chiefly with Agesilaos, at losing a territory which was as populous as Lakonia and which they had exploited for some three and a half centuries (Plut. *Ages.* 34.1). Perhaps no less difficult to stomach was the blow to their pride. For as Isokrates’ Archidamos (6.28) nicely put it, what was most painful was not being unjustly robbed of Messenia but seeing their own slaves becoming masters of it.

In fact, by no means all Messenia was removed at a stroke from Spartan control; nor did the citizens of Ithome/Messene immediately control all that was so removed. For the ‘plantation’ towns of Mothone and Asine (Paus. 4.27.8), together with Koryphasion (Pylos) and Kyparissia (Diod. 15.77.4), remained Perioikic, while the other Perioikic towns became independent cities in their own right. None the less, the Spartans had lost the most fertile and directly controlled portion; and the crucial strategic link between Messenia and Arkadia, hemming in Lakonia, had been forged. The men of New Messene also took out diplomatic insurance by allying themselves to the Arkadian League and probably to the Thebans too.

In this nadir of their fortunes the Spartans went crawling to the Athenians for help. This they received—but too little, too late (6.5.33–51). Soon after, in the spring of 369, they revived the precedent of 421 and sought an alliance with the Athenians (7.1.1–14: it is here that we get our only certain reference

to Helot sailors; cf. Welwei 1974, 158f.). Again, however, although the alliance was concluded, its practical effect was minimal. The Thebans once more penetrated the Peloponnese, despite an attempt to block them at the Isthmus, in which 1,000 of the 6,000 or more Helots enlisted for the defence of Sparta took part (Diod. 15.65.6).

Moreover, the Arkadians were able to make two raids against Spartan territory, probably in the spring and autumn of 369. First, Lykomedes of Mantinea, the guiding spirit of the Arkadian League, led 5,000 elite troops against Pellana, which was garrisoned by 300 or more 'Lakedaimonians' (Diod. 15.67.2). The town was taken by storm, the garrison killed, the land ravaged; perhaps the fourth-century tombstone of Olbiadas (*IG* V.1.1591) is to be associated with this raid. Second, the Arkadians made an expedition against Asine 'in the Lakonian land' (7.1.25). Some have thought Xenophon was referring here to Lakonian Asine, but whether or not we consider it possible or likely that the Arkadians could have marched past Sparta, Lakonian Asine was too petty a prize. Messenian Asine, on the other hand, had remained loyal to Sparta and was the nearest enemy town to New Messene. That Xenophon meant this Asine is corroborated by the presence there of a garrison commanded by a Spartiate—or rather a man who had somehow 'become a Spartiate'. (Perhaps he was by origin a *nothos* or *trophimos* foreigner: cf. Chapter 14.) The garrison was defeated, its commander slain and the suburbs of Asine ravaged. But the town itself seems to have remained intact and loyal, and perhaps it was in response to this failure that the buffer-towns of Kolonides (near Longa) and Korone (modern Petalidhi) were built (Figure 18).

In 368 the fortunes of the Spartans revived somewhat. Despite their refusal to countenance the 'autonomy' of New Messene, Persian money was deployed on their behalf to raise a large force of mercenaries (7.1.27). They also received a supporting band of mercenaries from Dionysios of Syracuse, which Archidamos used to recapture Karyai (7.1.28). Emboldened by this success, he then made inroads into south-west Arkadia, laying waste the land of the Parrhasioi and Eutresioi (7.1.29). When the Arkadians finally gave battle, they were defeated (7.1.30–2), and the Spartan losses were so slight that the encounter became known as the 'Tearless Battle' (Diod. 15.72; Plut. *Ages.* 33.5–8). The sequel, however, was considerably lachrymose. For the Arkadians, no doubt at the urging of their Messenian allies (cf. 7.1.29), decided to block Sparta's access to south-west Arkadia for good by founding Megalopolis (Diod. 15.72.4; Paus. 8.27.1–8; Moggi 1976, no. 45). In the process, according to a plausible emendation of Paus. 8.27.4 (cf. Andrewes in Gomme 1970, 34), the Arkadians deprived Sparta of part if not the whole of Aigyitis and Skiritis: Oion, Malaia, Kromoi (Kromnos), Belmina and Leuktron were among the forty communities incorporated in Megalopolis.

The period 369–362 somewhat recalls 421–418, in that it was one of kaleidoscopically shifting alliances, intermittent warfare and periodic

revolutions rounded off by a major but indecisive pitched battle. The difference was that Thebes, not Sparta, was calling the tune. Of Sparta's allies in 369 only the Phleisians remained consistently loyal. Elis, however, rejoined the fold to oppose the common enemy, the Arkadians (7.4.19). On the other hand, in 366 Corinth took the initiative in opposing Sparta, as in c.504, 440, 432, 404 and 395—but this time with decisively deleterious effect. For in leading the movement to make a separate peace with Thebes, it brought about the effective end of the Peloponnesian League (7.4. 7–9). If Thebes had been diplomatically isolated in 371, how much more true was this of Sparta from 366. The irony was that Sparta found itself in this position because it had abandoned the 'autonomy principle' and refused to recognize either New Messene or Megalopolis.

The year 365 was one of mixed luck for Sparta: Sellasia (7.4.12) and perhaps Pellana too (cf. 7.5.9) were recovered, but Koryphasion and Kyparissia were liberated by the Arkadians (Diod. 15.77.4). In reprisal Archidamos in 364 apparently sought to re-establish Sparta's position in Aigytis and maybe also Skiritis. At the request of the now allied Eleians he took the field with 'the citizen troops' (7.4.20)—in fact with a force that included Perioikoi as well as Spartiates (7.4.27).

Having captured Kromnos, he left three of the twelve *lochoi* there as a garrison and returned to Sparta. Scholars like Anderson (1970, 226) believe that this way of describing a quarter of the Lakedaimonian hoplite army (cf. 7.5.10), taken with the fact that in the *Hellenika* Xenophon does not speak of *morai* after Leuktra, indicates a further reorganization of the army in the 360s. However, Polybius (fr. 60 B-W) mentioned the *mora* in a passage probably describing the army of Kleomenes III (236–22) or Nabis (206–192); and Xenophon's *Lak. Pol.*, which portrays the organization by *morai*, was probably written in the 350s. Whatever the truth, the Kromnos garrison was besieged by the Arkadians, and in an attempt to relieve it Archidamos was wounded and at least thirty 'Lakedaimonians' were killed. The latter included 'almost their most distinguished men', presumably Spartiates. A truce was made, but the siege was raised only by a third expedition, this time by night. Even so more than 100 Spartiates and Perioikoi were captured—and then either ransomed or killed, Xenophon does not say.

In 364–363 the simmering tension between democrats and oligarchs and between Mantinea and Tegea boiled over into open conflict within the Arkadian League. The attitude of the Thebans was crucial, and Epameinondas prepared the ground for Theban intervention by condemning a truce made between the Arkadians and Eleians and supporting the action of the Theban governor at Tegea in violating it (7.4.33–40). Rival deputations were sent—by the Tegeans to Thebes, by the Mantineians, Eleians and Achaians to Athens and Sparta—and in 362 Epameinondas for the fourth time brought an army across the Isthmus.

Both Athens and Sparta responded positively too; indeed, the Athenians planned to go by sea to Lakonia and join forces with the Spartans there before marching north to Arkadia (7.5.7). But Epameinondas learned of the plan and pre-empted it by a rapid advance to Tegea. His opponents meanwhile decided to take their stand at Mantinea. Remarkably, Agesilaos (now over eighty) was given command of the Spartan force, but when he reached Pellana he heard that Epameinondas had for a second time invaded Lakonia (7.5.9), no doubt by the route he had taken in 370–369. So he sent on to Mantinea his cavalry and three of the twelve *lochoi* (7.5.10) and managed to regain Sparta before Epameinondas arrived. Thwarted here, Epameinondas too proceeded to Mantinea, where he decided to risk all on a big battle. The Theban side won, but Epameinondas himself was killed (7.5.22–5), and the outcome, in Xenophon’s famous concluding words, was even greater disturbance in Greece than before (7.5.27).

Our story, however, does not end there. The two sides concluded a Common Peace on the battlefield, for the first time without Persian intervention (Bengtson 1975, no. 292). But it was an entente from which Sparta deliberately excluded itself, since participation would have entailed the formal recognition of an independent Messene (Diod. 15.89.1f.; Polyb. 4.33.8f.; Plut. *Ages.* 35.4). This futile gesture of defiance, for which Agesilaos deserves a large measure of the blame, is an appropriate symbol of Spartan weakness in 362.

Notes on further reading

Bibliography on Xenophon is given in the notes to Chapter 12. The *Lak. Pol.* has been discussed by Higgins (1977, 65–75). I agree that the essay was composed in one piece in the 350s, but I cannot accept Higgins’ view that it is a consistent and subtle critique of the Spartan polity. For modern work on the notoriously problematic fourteenth chapter, which I believe was provoked by Sparta’s downfall after 371, see Tigerstedt 1965, 462–4 n. 530.

The development of the ‘Second Spartan Empire’ from 404 is discussed in Parke 1930. Bockisch 1965 is a full treatment of Sparta’s use of harmosts down to 386 but contains several inaccuracies of interpretation and detail. The same is true of her more recent and again fully documented study of the Spartan crisis (1974) whose principal merit is to bring out the universally decisive importance of *stasis*. On Lysander see the literature in Tigerstedt 1965, 407 n. 17; add Habicht 1970, 6–9, on his apotheosis at Samos.

The downfall of the ‘Thirty Tyrants’ at Athens is exhaustively discussed in Cloché 1915.

On the composition and terms of service of the ‘Ten Thousand’ see Roy 1967. The increasing use of mercenaries in Greek inter-state warfare from the late fifth century is documented and analysed in Parke 1933.

Sparta's relations with Persia from the support given to Cyrus down to the King's Peace have been acutely discussed by Lewis (1977). I cannot, however, agree with his view, even in its relatively weak form (144), that Sparta's 'Panhellenism' was substantially genuine and altruistic.

The reign of Agesilaos has been challengingly reviewed by Cawkwell (1976), but I find myself unable to follow him in exonerating Agesilaos from responsibility for Sparta's downfall (see further Chapter 14). Most of the factors which I feel he has not sufficiently accounted for are conveniently listed in Coleman-Norton 1941, 72 n. 10; but add the internal opposition to Agesilaos' foreign policy discussed by Smith (1953/4).

The outbreak of the Corinthian War is discussed in Perlman 1964. For all set-piece battles in this and subsequent wars down to 362 see Anderson 1970, although I cannot follow his account of the reorganization(s) of the Spartan army (229–51). On the career of Iphikrates see Pritchett 1974, II, 62–72.

On 'Common Peace' in general see Ryder 1965; bibliography on the individual peaces may be conveniently found in Bengtson 1975. The connection between the occupation of Kythera and Antalkidas' abortive negotiations in 392 was noticed independently by Lewis (1977, 144).

Spartan politics from 386 to 379 are analysed, not wholly convincingly, in terms of three factions by Rice (1974, 1975). See rather Ste. Croix 1972, 133–6, an admirable treatment of the trials of Phoibidas and Sphodrias.

Concerning the revolutionary upheavals after Leuktra, I am not convinced by the attempt of Roy (1973) to retain Diodorus' date of 374 for those listed at 15.40. See rather Fuks 1972, 35–7 n. 66. However, for the confused chronology of 370–362 I follow Roy 1971 rather than Wiseman 1969.

For the status of Messenia following the liberation of the Helots see Roebuck 1941; and briefly Lazenby in *MME* 89ff. The extent of the territory controlled by New Messene and the related economic questions are considered in Roebuck 1945 (relevant also to the period before 370).

IV

Results and prospects

The decline of Spartiate manpower

In the second book of his great work entitled ‘Matters relating to the *polis*’ (our *Politics*) Aristotle first examines and rejects the ideal states of Plato, Phaleas and Hippodamos and then turns to consider the three polities which had commonly been accounted the best of those actually existing: Sparta, Crete and Carthage. He prefaces his detailed discussion of Sparta with the general observation that any law shall be adjudged good or bad according as it is or is not consonant first with the laws of the truly ideal state (as conceived by Aristotle) and second with the idea and character of the polity proposed to the citizens by their lawgiver.

In relation to his ideal state Aristotle finds Sparta defective on the grounds that the lawgiver (meaning Lykourgos) concerned himself with only a part of virtue, the military part, and neglected the arts of peace. But no less harsh are his criticisms of the failure of Spartan laws to bring about even the defective kind of polity the lawgiver had proposed. These criticisms are directed especially to seven aspects of Spartan social and political organization: the Helots, the women, the Ephorate, the Gerousia, the common meals, the system of naval command and public finance. We have glanced earlier at those concerning the Helots. Relevant here are those directed against the organization of the common meals and more especially the position of women. For under the general heading of the women he produces his most damning criticism of all (*Pol.* 1270a29–32). In a country capable of supporting 1,500 cavalymen and 30,000 hoplites the militarily active citizen-body shrank to fewer than 1,000; and, as events showed, the state was not capable of withstanding a single blow but was destroyed through lack of manpower (*oliganthropia*).

Clearly, Aristotle’s estimate of Sparta’s citizen military potential is appropriate only to the period before the loss of the Pamisos valley, and the ‘single blow’ is the defeat at Leuktra in 371. Probably too the figure of less than 1,000 militarily active citizens was borrowed from Xenophon’s evidence for the Spartiate effective at Leuktra. Aristotle therefore expressly linked Sparta’s defeat at Leuktra and consequent ‘destruction’ with its deficiency in

citizens. He is in fact the only surviving source to make this theoretical connection and, if that was all there was to it, his explanation would be vulnerable to the objection that it was not a shortage of Spartiate warriors but inadequate generalship, military conservatism and poor morale that brought about the Leuktra débâcle. However, the strength of Aristotle's analysis is that, in shining contrast to all our other ancient sources, he does not merely note or explain away Spartiate oliganthropy but interprets it squarely as a function of the Spartan system of land-tenure and inheritance. As we shall see, this sociological rather than moralizing approach saved him from the error of Xenophon and others who ascribed Sparta's downfall to a random 'exogenous variable'. For Aristotle the failure lay within the system itself, which necessarily produced the historically decisive oliganthropy. In this penultimate chapter I shall try to demonstrate that Aristotle was right both in fact and in interpretation and to explain why official measures to combat oliganthropy proved in the end a failure.

It must be stressed at once that the oliganthropy for which we have evidence concerns only the adult male citizens of full status. We have no figures for the categories of men, below the status of 'Homoioi', who, like the Roman *capite censi* or *proletarii*, did not originally form part of the regular army. Even for the Spartiates, however, we have at most four texts which give, or can be made to yield, concrete, if hardly cast-iron, totals. The 8,000 of 480 (Hdt. 7.234.2), which is corroborated by the 5,000 of 479 (9.10.1, 11.3, 28.2, 29.1), had become about 3,500 by 418 (Thuc. 5.68, as interpreted in Chapter 12). The 2,500 or so of 394 (extrapolated from Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.16) had fallen by nearly a half to a maximum of about 1,500 in 371 (*Hell.* 6.1.1; 4.15, 17). This then is the scale and pace of Spartiate oliganthropy in the last 100 years of Spartan greatness. Can we say when and why it became first critical and then apparently irreversible?

The tying of citizenship and so membership of the hoplite army to land ownership and minimum contributions to a common mess (Arist. *Pol.* 1271a27–38) will possibly have encouraged a general 'malthusianism' from the seventh century, especially if I am right in thinking that the *kleroi* then distributed became to all intents and purposes private property and so subject to the normal Greek practice of partible inheritance. In particular, though, rich Spartiates, like rich men elsewhere in Greece, will probably have tried harder than most to limit their male offspring, so as to bequeath their considerable property intact. A further inducement to this end will have been the fact that in Sparta daughters as well as sons were entitled to a share of the paternal inheritance.

However, we lack relevant evidence to substantiate these hypotheses before the mid-sixth century, when the Ephors intervened to force the Agiad king Anaxandridas to divorce a loved but barren wife—or rather to take a second, bigamously (Hdt. 5.39f.). This could of course be explained by reason of state, but it was also around 550 that Sparta abandoned its aggressively

imperialistic policy of expansion by land in the Peloponnese, and there may have been a demographic factor in this change of course (Toynbee 1969, 314). Even if we do not believe Cicero's report (*De Div.* 1.112; cf. Pliny *NH* 2.191) of a serious earthquake at Sparta about this time, the Spartans may already have been alarmed by the disparity in numbers between themselves and the Helots.

In the late sixth and early fifth centuries the Agiads Kleomenes I, Dorieus and Pleistarchos all failed to leave a son—or at least, in Dorieus' case, a legitimate one (White 1964, 149–51). By the same general period, we happen to hear, the line of one Glaukos had become extinct (Hdt. 6.86). An inscription of about 500 (*IG* V.1.713) suggests that women who died in childbirth were by then exempt *de facto* from the prohibition on named tombstones (Plut. *Lyk.* 27.2). In 480 the 300 Spartans selected to fight with Leonidas at Thermopylai had already produced male issue (Hdt. 7.205.2). A decade later the authorities moved most circumspectly against the regent Pausanias, because 'it was the custom of the Spartans not to act hastily in the case of a male Spartiate' (Thuc. 1.132.5). This formulation, though softened at the edges, recalls Agesilaos' reason for supporting the acquittal of Sphodrias in 378 (Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.32) and for exonerating the 'tremblers' at Leuktra (Plut. *Ages.* 30.6; *Mor.* 191C, 214B).

Taken together, these scraps of evidence fully support the brilliant suggestion of Daube (1977, 11) that around 500 Sparta, in common with other Greek states, took legal steps to stimulate the procreation of embryonic warriors. Daube explains this development in terms of the military threat to Greece from the Persian empire, and this is no doubt partly right. But since the measures taken at Sparta were more extreme than elsewhere, it seems necessary to postulate that the Helots rather than, or in addition to, the Persians prompted their passage. If we were to assign them to a specific date, 490 comes to mind.

The measures in question involved above all the legal obligation on men to get married (Plut. *Lys.* 30.7; cf. *Lyk.* 15.1; Stob. *Flor.* 67.16; Pollux 3.48; 8.40). Under the law bachelors suffered a diminution of full civic rights and a fine, together with public disgrace and ridicule. They were excluded from the Gymnopaidiai festival (Plut. *Lyk.* 15.2) and so, I assume, from the holding of offices connected with its celebration. On public occasions not only would younger men not rise to offer them their seats, but the bachelors were obliged to surrender theirs to their juniors, a terrible humiliation in gerontolatrous Sparta (Xen. *Lak. Pol.* 9.5; Plut. *Lyk.* 15.3; *Mor.* 227EF; cf. Hdt. 2.80.1). Each winter they had to walk naked around the Agora, compounding the agonies of the cold (-6.3°C has been recorded in Sparta) by singing a song to the effect that they were being justly punished for breaking the law. But perhaps the most powerful evidence for the strength of the opprobrium heaped on bachelors is the assimilation of their social status to that of the 'tremblers' (Xen. *Lak. Pol.* 9.4f.). Laws in Sparta were

of course unwritten, but, other things being equal, we should expect the force of example and the pressure of peer-group conformism in such a disciplinarian and public culture to have been at least as efficacious as any written law. Thus the fact that we do hear of confirmed bachelors—including, as we shall see, a man occupying high public office—suggests that other things were not always equal.

The whole point of this elaborate legal, ritual and customary apparatus was of course to force adult male citizens to procreate within the accepted framework of marriage. But monogamy within what we call the nuclear family is only one among many possible variants of pairing relationship contrived for the procreation of legitimate offspring and so for the transmission of hereditary private property; and Sparta was notorious in antiquity for its seemingly lax attitude to monogamy (Oliva 1971, 9).

It might happen, says Xenophon (*Lak. Pol.* 1.7–9; cf. *Plut. Lyk.* 15.11–18), that an old man had a young wife. Such a husband was permitted to introduce into his house a younger man to beget children for him by his wife (a kind of anticipation of our AID system). Conversely, a man who did not wish to marry (perhaps a bachelor, but presumably a widower) might have children by a married woman, if he could secure her husband's consent. Xenophon claimed to know of many similar pairing arrangements. One of these may have been what Polybius (12.6b.8) calls the honourable custom whereby a man who had produced enough children might pass his fertile wife on to a friend.

It is unclear whether such marital practices had legal as well as customary sanction. However, since Plutarch (*Lyk.* 15.16; *Mor.* 228BC) denies the possibility of adultery (between citizens, that is: contrast *Hdt.* 6.68.3; 69.5) in Sparta, and since Xenophon does not mention adultery at all, it is tempting to connect this in Greek terms extraordinary state of affairs with the legal crackdown on bachelors. It may also have been in the early fifth century that fathers of three sons were exempted from military service, fathers of four or more from all state burdens (*Arist. Pol.* 1270a40–b7; cf. *Aelian VH* 6.6).

Be that as it may, the measures certainly failed to produce the desired effect. In 425 the eagerness of Sparta to sue for peace to recover the mere 120 or so Spartiates captured on Sphakteria (*Thuc.* 4.38.5) unambiguously signifies extreme concern over manpower-shortage. For even if some or all of these captives were leading men or related to leading men, as a scholiast believed, and even if there had been a peace movement in Sparta well before the Sphakteria disaster, the change of official attitude compared to that of implacable hostility towards the survivors of Thermopylai is starkly apparent. Some scholars, notably Ziehen (1933, esp. 231–5), would attribute the change largely to the great earthquake of c.465. But, as I have suggested in Chapter 11, the demographic effects of such a natural disaster should have worked themselves out by 425. Far more important, as should emerge, was one of the penalties imposed on the returned Sphakteria

hostages in 421, deprivation of their right to buy and sell real property (Thuc. 5.34.2, with Gomme 1970, 36).

By 425, then, Spartiate oliganthropy had become critical. It cannot be merely coincidental that immediately thereafter ‘Brasideioi’ and Neodamodeis appear in the ancient sources, that in 418 these ex-Helots fight as hoplites at Mantinea and that by the same date (at the very latest) Perioikoi are brigaded with Spartiates in the regular hoplite phalanx. Between 418 and 394, however, if our estimates are approximately correct, there apparently supervened a generation or so in which the pace of oliganthropy slackened somewhat. Appearances, though, may be misleading, since the number of Spartiates at the Nemea River may have been artificially bolstered by a determined resort to ‘Homoioi by adoption’ (the *mothakes*) and/or by enlisting Hypomeiones (‘Inferiors’). For what is meant by these terms we must now return to Xenophon’s remarkable account of Kinadon’s conspiracy in c.399 (*Hell.* 3.3.4–11) and consider its social implications.

The informer, so he told the Ephors, was taken by Kinadon to the edge of the Agora in Sparta and asked to count the Spartiates, who numbered only about forty all told (one king, the five Ephors, the twenty-eight Gerontes and five or six others). Those, Kinadon pointed out, were the enemies, whereas the other 4,000 or more persons in the Agora were to be considered allies. Kinadon then took the informer on a guided tour of the streets of Sparta, where again the Spartiates in their ones and twos were contrasted with the many ‘allies’, and then of the country estates, where it was noted that on each there was but one enemy, the Spartiate master, and many ‘allies’ (i.e. the Helots and any private slaves there may have been).

The Ephors then asked how many people Kinadon had said were implicated with him. The answer was, a few but trustworthy individuals, who themselves added, however, that the ensemble of Helots, Neodamodeis, Hypomeiones and Perioikoi were potential accomplices. For whenever among these groups any mention was made of Spartiates, no one could hide the fact that he would gladly devour them—even raw.

This obviously tendentious account—neither the informer nor Xenophon’s source (if they were different persons) nor Xenophon himself supported Kinadon’s cause—poses three main difficulties. First, were Kinadon and his intimates right to imply that all the subordinate classes of population within the Spartan state were bitterly hostile to the ruling Spartiates? Second, did Kinadon’s plan embrace Messenia as well as Lakonia or did his plot have ‘an essentially Laconian character’, as suggested by Vidal-Naquet (in Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977, 258)? Third, who are these Hypomeiones—a group explicitly attested only in this one passage of Xenophon and in no other author?

In the first place, it was clearly in the interests of Kinadon and his confidants to exaggerate the extent of the hatred for the Spartiates. Thus we surely need not accept that even a majority, let alone all, of the Neodamodeis

and Perioikoi were so cannibalistically inclined. This does not of course mean that there were not some Neodamodeis who were disenchanted with their semi-liberated status and some Perioikoi who desired full citizen rights at, or (more likely) independence from, Sparta. But most of the Neodamodeis and at least the hoplites among the Perioikoi (like Eualkes of Geronthrai: Chapter 12) presumably regarded it as a privilege to be counted as ‘Lakedaimonian’ warriors. To the Hypomeiones we shall return presently. The attitude of the Helots is linked to the second of the problems under discussion.

A priori, perhaps, we would expect most Helots to be at least ill-disposed towards the Spartiates, although we must draw a distinction between the domestic and the agricultural Helots. Again *a priori* we might imagine that the Messenian Helots would be more hostile than the Lakonians. However, in favour of Vidal-Naquet’s interesting suggestion (above) is the geographical consideration that the country estates nearest to Sparta were of course in Lakonia, and that it was in Lakonia too that the vast majority of the Perioikoi lived. Moreover, Kinadon was sent by the Ephors, after they had learned of the plot, to arrest some named Helots at a Perioikic town in Messenia, a dangerous tactic, one would have thought, if there had been a serious risk of a rising of the Messenian Helots and Perioikoi. On the other hand, however, it might also be argued, as Vidal-Naquet himself notes, that the Ephors were seeking to divide the potential enemy’s front by setting Lakonian and Messenian Helots and Perioikoi at each other’s throats; and we might add that, if Kinadon did have purely Lakonian aims, he was apparently depriving himself of one of his most potent levers against the Spartiates, Messenian ‘nationalism’. It is best therefore to leave open the question of the intended geographical application of Kinadon’s plans.

This leaves for consideration the identity and status of the ‘Inferiors’ and a possible motive for Kinadon’s behaviour. We may begin with Kinadon himself. Xenophon does not expressly say that he was an ‘Inferior’, but he implies this in two ways. First, he notes that he was not one of the Homoioi or ‘Peers’, the citizens of full status. Second, he reports Kinadon’s alleged reason for plotting as his wish to be inferior to no one in Lakedaimon. In fact, unless Kinadon wished to make himself tyrant or institute an egalitarian democracy, what he probably said was that he did not want to be one of the ‘Inferiors’ or perhaps that he wished to abolish the status of ‘Inferiors’ altogether.

Now we know that Kinadon was not consigned to ‘Inferior’ status for want of physical robustness or moral fibre, since Xenophon emphasizes that he was suitably endowed in both these respects and yet was not one of the Homoioi. On the other hand, it appears from another passage of the *Hellenika* (6.4.10f.) that physical and moral debility were grounds for degradation. For the men enrolled specially for cavalry, not hoplite, service in the emergency of 371 were ‘the most physically incapable and the least ambitious’. In other words, men who had failed to pass through the *agoge* or had not subsequently been

elected to a common mess and so were automatically ineligible for regular hoplite service became 'Inferiors'.

Some of the plotters, however, as Kinadon revealed to the informer, were enlisted men (I prefer this translation of *syntetagmenoi* to Underhill's 'definitely organized conspirators') and had hoplite weapons. Kinadon could of course have been referring to Neodamodeis and Perioikoi, but as leader he must surely have had arms of his own. Thus, if he was in fact an 'Inferior', as I believe, then some 'Inferiors' at least could be enlisted for hoplite service. This will have been less hard to arrange if the state anyway provided weapons and armour to Spartiates (Chapter 10). The enlisted men, however, would have comprised relatively few of the revolutionaries: the 'masses', Kinadon said, would seize their weapons from the 'iron store'. This, I think, must be a reference to the central military arsenal in Sparta. For the great quantities it contained of daggers, swords, spits (for cooking), axes, adzes and sickles (for cutting down the enemy's crops) are explicitly contrasted by Kinadon with the civilian tools used in agriculture, carpentry and stonemasonry.

To return to the enlisted men among the 'Inferiors', these would have acquired their degraded status solely by reason of their poverty, being men of Spartan birth on both sides who had perhaps completed the *agoge* and even been elected to a common mess but then found themselves unable to maintain the stipulated mess contribution. Also to be assigned to the 'Inferiors' are those who had been temporarily or permanently deprived at law of their full citizen rights, whether for cowardice in battle (the 'tremblers'), alleged revolutionary designs (the returned 'men from the island' in 421) or other misdemeanours.

More problematic, however, are the two or possibly three other categories whose names are attested but whose status as 'Inferiors' is uncertain. Xenophon (*Hell.* 5.3.9) refers once to foreigners of the category *trophimoi* and to the *nothoi* of the Spartiates, some of whom volunteered, apparently as hoplites, for the Chalkidian campaign of 380. The latter are described as 'exceedingly fine-looking men not without experience of the good things of the city', which perhaps means that, like such *trophimoi* foreigners as Xenophon's own sons, they had gone through the *agoge*. Phylarchos (81F43), Plutarch (*Kleom.* 8.1) and Aelian (*VH* 12.43) mention also the category *mothakes*, possibly to be identified with the *mothones* cited by lexicographers and scholiasts.

If these disparate sources can be reconciled, it may be that the *nothoi* were bastards of Spartiate fathers and Helot or Perioikic mothers and that they, like the *trophimoi* foreigners, formed part of the wider category of *mothakes*/*mothones*. The shared characteristic of the latter was perhaps that, regardless of their status at birth, they had been raised with and put through the *agoge* with the sons of men of full status. Since such distinguished figures as Lysander and Gylippos were believed to have been *mothakes*, clearly *mothax*

origin was not necessarily incompatible either with Spartiate birth on both sides (Lysander indeed was a Heraklid) or with adult Spartiate status. The *nothoi* and *trophimoi* foreigners, however, were presumably disqualified from Spartiate status by their illegitimate or foreign birth and so remained 'Inferiors' for life.

However this may be, we have no positive indication whatsoever of the size of the 'Inferior' group in 399 (or any other time of course). Still, if 'Inferiors' could on occasion be enlisted as hoplites, the continuing drastic fall in the size of the 'Lakedaimonian' army in the fourth century must mean either that they did not then form an abundant reservoir of military manpower or that the Spartiates were unwilling to draw upon it extensively. Whatever the true number of 'Inferiors' may have been, by 371 there were not many more than 1,000 Spartiates all told. Since this was presumably a matter of no small concern to the Spartan authorities, or at least Aristotle clearly thought it ought to have been so, we must ask what were the countervailing factors over which they had insufficient control.

First, those of demography. The incidence of exclusive homosexuality and bachelorhood, and their effect on the birthrate, are not quantifiable, but the ability of a confirmed bachelor like Derkyllidas to shrug off the potent sanctions of civic disgrace and reach the political heights suggests that this factor may not have been negligible. Habitual intermarriage among a small group of families, without replenishment from outside or below (Herodotus, 9.35, was struck by the small number of outsiders to acquire Spartan citizenship), should also have tended to diminish the citizen population. So too would contraception, abortion, infant mortality and the exposure of neonates; but only for the latter do we have any solid, though again not quantifiable, evidence (Roussel 1943). On the other hand, it seems certain that Spartan girls married relatively late by Greek standards (Plut. *Lyk.* 15.4), and this would perhaps have reduced total female fertility. Such also would have been the effect, and was perhaps the object, of the polyandry, especially adelphic polyandry, attested by Polybius (12.6b.8): for the multiple husbands were restricting the number of their legitimate offspring to the childbearing potential of a single shared wife.

However, no matter how great we suppose the effects of these demographic factors to have been, they should have been partly if not wholly offset by the measures to encourage procreation discussed earlier. We must therefore look for an explanation of the drastic oliganthropy to broader and deeper socio-economic conditions. This after all is the general direction in which the ancient sources pointed the finger.

We should not, however, follow Xenophon (*Lak. Pol.* 14.3) and Plutarch (*Lyk.* 30.1 etc.) in inflating the significance of the wealth, especially coined wealth, that flowed into Sparta following Lysander's successful imperialism (Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.8f.; Diod. 13.106.8; 14.10.2; Polyb. 6.49.10). For it was a commonplace from at least Herodotus (9.122) onwards that military might

was gained through personal abstinence; and anyway wealth, even if in less liquid forms, had been passing between the same kind of few Spartan hands long before the end of the fifth century. Nor, I think, should we follow Phylarchos and Plutarch in attributing a decisive causal importance to the probably inauthentic *rhētra* of Epitadeus (Chapter 10), even if the injection of foreign cash may have stimulated the market in Lakonian land in the fourth century, as it certainly affected Spartan lifestyles.

On the other hand, we are, I believe, bound to respect the sources' unanimous association of Sparta's downfall with materialistic greed. By this I suggest we should understand not so much greed for cash and movables as greed for land and the resultant anxiety of the ever fewer rich Spartiates to keep their ever increasing property intact. Aristotle tells us that most of the land in Lakonia in his day, the third quarter of the fourth century, had fallen into a few hands (*Pol.* 1307a36) and that almost two fifths of it were in the hands of women (*Pol.* 1270a23f.). This was but the culmination of a process extending over at least a century and a half, in which the rich had grown richer through bequests, adoptions and marriage-alliances, while the impoverished majority found themselves increasingly unable to maintain the stipulated contribution to a common mess and so were degraded to the status of 'Inferiors' (above).

There was of course nothing peculiarly Spartan about this anxiety over the transmission of property, any more than there was in the widening gulf between rich and poor Spartans, in the fifth and fourth centuries. What seemed to demand some exceptional explanation and so prompted the misplaced recourse to the 'exogenous variable' was the suddenness and distance of Sparta's fall, from the leadership of the Greek world to the status of a second-rate power in less than a decade. In reality, though, the fall exemplifies the rule enunciated by Montesquieu in 1734 in his *Considerations on the Causes of the Greatness of the Romans and of their Decline*: 'if the chance of a battle, that is to say, a particular cause, has ruined a state, there was a general cause ensuring that this state had to perish by a single battle.' The battle was Leuktra, and the 'general cause' was the acquisitiveness of the famous *vaticinatio post eventum* (cited in Arist. fr. 544 and Diod. 7.12.5) that 'acquisitiveness alone will destroy Sparta'. For acquisitiveness in the matter of landed property entailed the oliganthropy through which, as Aristotle laconically put it, Sparta was destroyed and for which, as Aristotle also saw, the remedy would have been to keep landownership more evenly distributed, as was done for example in the state in which he was himself resident, Athens.

The destruction was not, however, a simple quantitative process. The Spartiates had always been a minority in the total Lakonian population and greatly outnumbered by their allies in all major battles since the second half of the sixth century. It was rather the effects of Sparta's progressively shrinking citizen numbers first in Lakonia and Messenia on the 'Inferiors',

Perioikoi and Helots, then in the Peloponnese on its Peloponnesian League allies, and finally on its enemies, especially the Thebans, that brought the destruction about.

In short, if I were to single out any one group of Spartans as chiefly responsible for Sparta's downfall, that group would consist of the few rich Spartiates, personified precisely by those like Agesilaos for whom Xenophon and Plutarch evinced such warm admiration. It was perhaps fitting that Agesilaos should meet his end in Libya at the age of about eighty-four, returning home from fighting as a mercenary in Egypt.

Notes on further reading

The evidence for Spartiate oliganthropy is conveniently brought together in Ste. Croix 1972, 331f.; it is well discussed in Toynbee 1969, 297ff., less convincingly in Christien 1974 (in particular, I disagree with her interpretation of Epitadeus' *rhetra* as a response to a debt-crisis).

On social differentiation at Sparta in the fifth to fourth centuries see Oliva 1971, 163–79. There is as yet no wholly satisfactory account of the status of Spartan citizen wives in any period. I hope to publish shortly a discussion dealing with among other things their property-rights during the sixth to fourth centuries.

For Aristotle as an interpreter of Sparta see Ollier 1933, 164–88; Tigerstedt 1965, 155f.; Laix 1974.

Epilogue

The history of Lakonia in the late Classical, Hellenistic and Roman periods deserves a book to itself. Here I shall give only a chronological sketch of the years from 362 BC to AD 78, in order to indicate how Sparta lost its remaining Helots and Perioikoi, how what we have for convenience labelled 'Lakonia' shrank in size correspondingly, and how the Spartans by the first century AD had become exhibits in a museum of their past.

After the losses of manpower and territory in the wake of Leuktra, Sparta next suffered such losses in 338 at the hands of Philip II of Macedon. The Spartans had not fought with the Greeks he defeated at Chaironeia, but neither would they join his League of Corinth. In return, perhaps after a fruitless attempt at negotiation, Philip laid Lakonia waste as far south as Gytheion and formally deprived Sparta of Dentheliatis (and apparently the territory on the Messenian Gulf as far as the Little Pamisos river), Belminatis, the territory of Karyai and the east Parnon foreland (Roebuck 1948, 86–9, 91f.). The principal beneficiaries were respectively Messene, Megalopolis, Tegea and Argos; but the latter at least seems to have been unable to reap the full benefit of Philip's largesse, since in the early third century Tyros and Zarax were still in Spartan control (Charneux 1958, 9–12).

By the time Agis IV ascended the Eurypontid throne in c.244, the number of Spartiates had further declined from Aristotle's 'not even 1,000' (in the 360s?) to 'not more than 700' (Plut. *Agis* 5.6). Of the latter, Plutarch says, perhaps only 100 possessed a *kleros* as well as real property. How Plutarch understood the distinction between these two kinds of land is unclear, although I suspect that he wrongly believed the *kleros* to have been inalienable and somehow publicly owned before the *rhetra* of Epitadeus (cf. Chapter 10). What is clear, however, is that by the mid-third century the 'Lykourgan' system of social organization, with its strict nexus between *agoge*, *kleros*, common mess, army and citizenship, had completely broken down. Most of the non-Perioikic land in Lakonia was in the hands of women (Agis' mother and grandmother were the two richest women in Sparta), while the majority of those who were not either Perioikoi or Helots were

Hypomeiones or what Plutarch describes as ‘an indigent and disenfranchised mob’.

To remedy this drastic situation, Agis proposed to realize the twin revolutionary slogan of all oppressed Greek peasantries, cancellation of debts and redistribution of the land. He, however, was executed in 241, and it was left for the Agiad king Kleomenes III to carry out Agis’ plans in a modified form in 227. The propaganda of Agis and Kleomenes, preserved in Plutarch, and the counter-propaganda of the recently established and hostile Achaian League, preserved in Polybius, have made a sorry mess of the evidence for the original ‘Lykourgan’ régime, as we saw in Chapter 10. We are no more in a position to say whether the programme of Agis and Kleomenes ‘was devised by them for the greater good of the world at large, of Spartans, of Sparta, or of themselves’ (Forrest 1968, 144). Clearly, however, the essence of the programme was an attempt to increase the numbers of the Spartiates, resubmit this enlarged body to the ‘Lykourgan’ régime and so restore Sparta’s military and political status to what it had been before 371. The new Spartiates, making a total of about 4,000, were drawn from the Hypomeiones, Perioikoi and foreigners. The Helots, on the other hand, were to remain the economic basis of Spartan power.

This revolution was certainly a step in the right direction, but it is, I think, an exaggeration to say that ‘now for the first time the Spartan State utilised to the full the resources of the country and its population’ (Toynbee 1913, 274). For a few years, though, Kleomenes did achieve remarkable success both at home and abroad, until his unremitting hostility to the Achaian League served as the occasion for a second Macedonian intervention in Lakonia in 223 or 222. Kleomenes’ new army was hastily reinforced by some 6,000 emancipated Helots, who unlike the 6,000 or more enlisted in 370 were required to purchase their freedom with cash (Plut. *Kleom.* 23.1). Even so the fewer than 20,000 men on Kleomenes’ side were no match for the 30,000 troops under king Antigonos Dason, who won a crushing victory at Sellasia and then proceeded to take Sparta itself, the first time the site had been occupied by outsiders since the Dorian ‘invasion’ of the tenth century (Chapter 7). Sparta was forcibly enrolled in the Hellenic League and subjected to a Macedonian governor. Moreover, as in 338, Macedonian intervention had unfavourable implications for the size of Lakonia. For Dason either confirmed or renewed the dispensations of Philip II, as far as Dentheliatis and the east Parnon foreland were concerned, and he seems also to have deprived Sparta of (presumably Perioikic) Leukai, which is perhaps to be associated with the Hyperteleton sanctuary.

The immediate aftermath of Sellasia was fifteen years of political and social chaos in Lakonia, complicated internationally by the intervention of Rome in Greece against Macedon and the Achaian League. By 206 Sparta naturally enough found itself on the Roman side, but in that year the central direction of Spartan affairs was assumed by a third revolutionary leader,

Nabis, allegedly a direct descendant of the deposed Damaratos. His overriding aim (savagely misrepresented of course by our uniformly hostile sources) was no doubt the same as that of Agis and Kleomenes; but his methods were significantly different in two crucial respects. First, whereas Kleomenes had freed Helots purely for military reasons, Nabis emancipated them in order to prop up his rule. Logically, therefore, he made them beneficiaries of his land redistribution and incorporated them in the Spartan citizen body. (It is possible too that under Nabis the state, as in Crete, was made responsible for financing the common messes.) Second, whereas Kleomenes had put all his military eggs into one land-orientated basket, Nabis also built up Sparta's first-ever navy of any value and used the Perioikoi of the coastal towns of Lakonia as his elite troops (though apparently without giving them citizenship).

For about a decade Nabis (and Sparta) prospered remarkably, but in 197 he made the twofold mistake, in Roman eyes, of accepting Argos from Philip V of Macedon (by then deserted by the Achaian League) and extending his social programme to that city. In 196 Philip was defeated by the Romans, whose representative, T. Quinctius Flamininus, then invaded Lakonia. Nabis was not in fact eradicated, since, as Briscoe (1967, 9) has rightly pointed out, the aim of Flamininus was 'a balance of power, not upper-class constitutional government, and he preferred to tolerate the continued existence of a revolutionary government in Sparta rather than allow the Achaean League excessive power in the Peloponnese'. The importance of Nabis and Sparta, however, was irretrievably reduced by the liberation of the remaining Perioikic dependencies and their transfer either to the direct control of Argos (in the case of Prasiai to Zarax inclusive) or to the general protection of the Achaian League. Perhaps it was between 195 and the death of Nabis in 192 that the liberated Perioikic towns went over to the Roman side and were formally recognized as the 'Koinon (League) of the Lakedaimonians'. Sparta, however, retained its 'Lykourgan' socio-economic institutions, including the by now severely reduced Helot base, until 188, when all were violently abrogated by the Achaian League (of which Sparta had been a member perforce since 192).

In 146, however, the Achaian League was itself disbanded, greatly to the benefit of Sparta, which had opposed the League's attempt to shake off the Roman yoke. Under the aegis of Rome Sparta seems to have recovered Belminatis and Aigytiis from Megalopolis, but Dentheliatis remained Messenian. It was perhaps now that the few remaining Helots exchanged their anomalous status for another. Thereafter the Spartan propertied class derived its surplus from the exploitation of chattel slaves or tenants.

The struggle for control of the Roman world between Antony and Octavian/Augustus also redounded to the advantage of the Spartans, since they had taken the winning side. According to the Augustan settlement, presumably of 27, Lakonia was divided into two separate political entities,

Sparta (with enlarged territory: below) and the ‘Koinon of the Free Lakonians’ (the Eleutherolakonian League). The League originally comprised twenty-four members, but of these only eighteen remained by *c.*AD 150, the time of Pausanias (3.21.7): Gytheion, Teuthrone, Las, Pyrrhichos, Kainepolis (the successor to Tainaron, established at modern Kyparissi on the opposite, western, flank of south Mani), Oitylos, Leuktra (in north-west Mani), Thalamai, Alagonia, Gerenia, Asopos, Akriai, Boiai, Zarax, Epidauros Limerá, Prasiai, Geronthrai and Marios. The six communities which had left the League or disappeared between 27 BC and *c.*AD 150 may have been Kotyrta, Hippola, Pharai, Kyphanta, Leukai and Pephnos. The original total of twenty-four corresponds roughly to the thirty or so ‘polichnai’ referred to by the contemporary Strabo (8.4.11, C362), and the decrease from the conventionally 100 (actually perhaps eighty) of the fourth century has been plausibly explained as the result of political amalgamations by the smaller communities after 195. The process of amalgamation may have been furthered by an absolute decline in the former Perioikic population from the mid-second century.

The new, separate Sparta appears to have controlled the Eurotas furrow as far south as Aigiái, together with Skiritis and the territory of Karyai. In addition, Augustus ceded to the Spartans Kardamyle, Thouria and Kythera, the two former giving them respectively an outlet to the sea and a foothold in the south-east Pamisos valley, the latter becoming more or less the personal property of the Spartan C.Julius Eurycles (Bowersock 1961). The chief losers by the Augustan dispensation were of course the Messenians, who had improvidently sided with Antony at Actium. Their southern boundary with the Free Lakonians was fixed at the Choireios Nape (modern Sandava gorge) towards Alagonia and Gerenia, but to the north they lost among other territory the psychologically important Dentheliatis (in dispute since the eighth century).

Under Tiberius, however, in AD 25 the Dentheliatis was returned to the Messenians by the Senate (*Tac. Ann.* 4.42), and in AD 78 a boundary commission under the auspices of Vespasian confirmed the award. The official record of the AD 78 boundary between Messenian and Spartan territory has been found at ancient Messene (*IG* V.1.1431), and the discovery of boundary-marks helps us to trace the frontier from the sanctuary of Artemis Limnatis in the south (where the whole trouble may have begun: Chapter 8) to a point not far east of ancient Asea (Chrimes 1949, 60–70; Kahrstedt 1950, 232–42; Giannokopoulos 1953).

It is also with the Flavian period that there commences in earnest the mass of epigraphical material bearing on the Spartan social system. This material was first comprehensively studied by Chrimes (1949, 84–168) and, whatever errors of fact and interpretation she may have committed, her overall conclusion—that in their social organization the Spartans were monumentally conservative—is cogent and indeed unsurprising. It was, however, an empty

and fetishistic conservatism. ‘The keeping up of ancient appearances was no more than a colourful stage setting for the benefit of visitors, particularly wealthy Romans, who would come to Sparta as to one of the most famous cities of Greek history’ (Oliva 1971, 318)—partly, we might add, to witness the floggings in the sanctuary of Artemis Orthia (Appendix 5). Perhaps as good an indication as any of Lakonian decadence is conveyed by the suggestion of Rawson (1969, 107f.) that ‘the ordinary Roman... would seem to have thought, when he heard the word Laconia, primarily of the hunting dogs, fine marble, and purple dye that she exported, and perhaps also of the hot-air chamber in the baths called the “laconicum”.’ *Sic transit gloria.*

Notes on further reading

For the main outlines of the changes in Sparta’s former dominions I have mostly followed Toynbee 1969, 405–13; other modern work has been cited in the text.

Will 1966 covers thoroughly, and with helpful bibliographical notes, the political history of the Greek world in the last three centuries BC; for Hellenistic Sparta as a whole add now Oliva 1971, 201–318; and for the century prior to the Roman conquest Shimron 1972.

The revolutions of Agis, Kleomenes and Nabis are considered from the standpoint of the treatment of the Helots by Welwei (1974, 161–74). Tarn 1925 remains a stimulating essay on the wider socio-economic situation in Greece in the third century.

Appendix 1

Gazetteer of sites in Lakonia and Messenia

For the purposes of this gazetteer Lakonia is taken to embrace the entire Mani, up to and including Kalamata. Listed under Lakonia are all sites for which there is archaeological evidence for any period from the Neolithic (N) to the Classical (C), taking in on the way Early, Middle and Late Helladic (EH, MH, LH), Protogeometric (PG), Geometric (G) and Archaic (A). Under Messenia are listed only those sites for which there is archaeological evidence for the G, A or C periods. Ancient names, where certain or possible, are given in brackets.

A. **Lakonia** (numbers in brackets indicate the site-numbers in Hope Simpson 1965, of which a second edition is forthcoming)

ALEPOTRYPA: N EH

AAA 1971, 12ff., 149ff., 289ff.; AAA 1972, 199ff.; *BCH* 1972, 845ff.; *AD* 1972B, 251–5.

ALMYROS: C

MME, no. 543.

AMYKLAI

Amyklaion (97): EH MH LH II LH IIIA-C PG G A C

AE 1892, 1ff.; *JdI* 1918, 107ff.; AA 1922, 6ff.; *AM* 1927, 1ff.; *BSA* 1960, 74ff.

Ay. Paraskevi (sanctuary of Alexandra/Kassandra): G A C

BCH 1957, 548ff.; *AD* 1960B, 102f.; *PAAH* 1961, 177f.

Sklavochoi (Amyklai?): C

BSA 1960, 82, no. 3.

ANALIPSIS (Iasos/Iasaia?) (135): EH LH I-III B G A C

PAAH 1950, 234f.; 1954, 270ff.; 1955, 241f.; 1956, 185f.; 1957, 110f.; 1958, 165f.; 1961, 167f.; *BSA* 1961, 131; *BSA* 1970, 95f., no. 36.

ANEMOMYLO (149): EH LH III

BSA 1961, 138.

ANGELONA (148): EH LH III? A C

- BSA 1905, 81ff.; Kahrstedt 1954, 216 n. 1; BSA 1961, 138.
 ANOYIA (Dereion?): A C
 AM 1904, 13; BSA 1910, 65f., 70f.; Kahrstedt 1954, 199f.; BSA 1960, 82, no. 5.
 ANTHOCHORION (100): LH IIIB-C PG G A C
 PAAH 1962, 113ff.
 ANTIKYTHERA (Aigilia): C
 Kahrstedt 1954, 214; BSA 1961, 160ff.; AR 1975, 42, no. 10.
 APIDIA (Palaia/Pleiai?) (106): N EH MH LH II-IIIC PG C
 BSA 1908, 162; BSA 1921, 146; Kahrstedt 1954, 215; BSA 1960, 86f.
 ARACHOVA (Karyai): not certainly located
 JHS 1895, 54ff., 61; RE s.v. Karyai; IG V.1, p.172; *Peloponnisiaka* 1958–9, 376ff.
 ARCHASADES: see XIROKAMBI (Spartan plain)
 ARKINES (101): LH III C?
 AE 1889, 132ff.; BSA 1910, 67; Philippson 1959, 434; BSA 1961, 128ff.
 ARNA: C?
 AE 1889, 132f.; BSA 1910, 67.
 ARVANITO-KERASIA (Oion): C
 JHS 1895, 61f.; Kahrstedt 1954, 202; A.Andrewes in Gomme 1970, 33.
 ASTROS (137): MH LH PG? A C
 Frazer 1898, 307; AA 1927, 365; *RhM* 1950, 227ff.; Kahrstedt 1954, 171; BSA 1961, 131; *BCH* 1974, 604.
 AY. ANDREAS: C?
 Frazer 1898, 307f.; AA 1927, 365; *RhM* 1950, 229; *BCH* 1963, 759.
 AY. EFSTRATIOS (110): N EH MH LH II-IIIB C
 BSA 1960, 87ff. ('Ay. Strategos' is a slip.)
 AY. GEORGIOS (155): LH A C
BCH 1958, 714; BSA 1961, 145; AD 1971B, 122.
 AY. GEORGIOS (Spartan plain): C
 AM 1904, 6f.
 AY. IOANNIS (147): EH LH III
 BSA 1908, 179; BSA 1961, 137.
 AY. IOANNIS (Bryseiai?): C
 PAAH 1909, 295f.; Bölte 1929, 1330f.; Kahrstedt 1954, 199f.
 AY. IOANNIS (lower Eurotas valley): LH III C
 BSA 1960, 95.
 AY. IOANNIS (west Parnon foreland): C
BCH 1961, 691.
 AY. NIKOLAOS (116): MH LH IIIB
 BSA 1960, 94f.
 AY. PETROS: C
 Frazer 1898, 310; AM 1905, 415f.; AM 1908, 177ff.
 AY. STEPHANOS (120): EH MH LH I-IIIC C

BSA 1960, 97ff.; *BSA* 1972, 205ff.; *AR* 1975, 15ff.

AY. TRIADA (Thyrea?): C?

Frazer 1898, 307. See also ASTROS.

AY. TRIADA (Malea peninsula): LH

BSA 1961, 145.

AY. VASILIOS (99): EH MH LH IIIB C

AE 1936B, 1f.; *BSA* 1960, 79ff.

BRINDA: C

MME, no. 548.

CHAROUDA: not certainly occupied.

AM 1876, 162f.; *AM* 1904, 44ff.; Kahrstedt 1954, 209; Fermor 1958, 71ff.;

Giannokopoulos 1966, 45f.

CHASANAGA (Hyperteleton sanctuary): PG? G? A C

PAAH 1885, 31ff.; *BSA* 1908, 165f.; *IG* V.1, pp.187ff.; *BSA* 1921, 147f.;

Kahrstedt 1954, 211; *AD* 1969B, 138f.; *BCH* 1971, 888.

CHELMOS (Belmina): G A? C

JHS 1895, 36ff., 71ff.; Kahrstedt 1954, 201f.; *BSA* 1961, 125; *BCH* 1961,

686; *BSA* 1970, 101, no. 53; *AD* 1973B, 175.

CHERSONISI (138): EH MH LH III

AA 1927, 365; *BCH* 1963, 759.

CHOSIARO (Las) (127): LH? A C

BSA 1906, 274f.; *BSA* 1907, 232ff.; Kahrstedt 1954, 209f.; *BSA* 1961, 118;

Giannokopoulos 1966, 52ff.

CHRYSAPHA (102): EH LH? A C

BSA 1910, 65; *BSA* 1921, 144f.; *BSA* 1960, 82ff.

DAIMONIA (Kotyrtá) (152): EH? MH LH I-IIIB PG A C

BSA 1908, 166; *BSA* 1921, 148f.; *BSA* 1961, 141.

DICHOVA: A

BSA 1907, 233f.; *AD* 1968B, 153.

DRAGATSOULA (111): EH MH LH III

BSA 1960, 89.

ELAPHONISOS (Onougnathos) (157–8): EH LH III

RE s.v. Onou gnathos (1); Kahrstedt 1954, 213; *BSA* 1961, 145ff.; Arvanitis 1971, 55–9.

ELEA (Biandina?) (150): EH MH? LH III C

BSA 1908, 162; *BSA* 1921, 149; *BSA* 1961, 139.

EPIDAUROS LIMERA (Epidauros Limerá) (146): N? LH I-IIIC A C

RE s.v. Epidauros (2); *BSA* 1908, 176ff.; *BSA* 1961, 136f.; *AD* 1968A, 145ff.

GANGANIA (107): EH MH LH IIIB

BSA 1961, 139.

GERAKI (Geronthrai) (105): N EH MH LH III (IIIC?) A C

BSA 1905, 91ff.; BSA 1910, 72ff.; BSA 1960, 85f.; Le Roy 1974, 220–2.

GIANNITSA (Kalamai?): C

MME, no. 537; Meyer 1978, 178, 180f.

GORITSA (103): N EH MH LH I-II LH IIIB

BSA 1960, 83.

GOULES: see PLYTRA

GOUVES: A? C

BSA 1909, 163; BSA 1921, 146; BSA 1960, 87 n. 101.

GYTHEION (Gytheion): A C

RE s.v. Gytheion; BSA 1907, 220ff.; Giannokopoulos 1966; AAA 1972, 202ff.; JNA 1975, 103ff.

HELLENIKO (Eua): G

Frazer 1898, 306; AA 1927, 365; RhM 1950, 230.

IERAKA (Zarax): C?

BSA 1909, 167ff.; RE s.v. Zarax; BSA 1961, 136 n. 147.

KALAMATA (Pharai) (166): EH? LH IIIA-B G A C

BSA 1957, 242f.; BCH 1961, 697; MME, nos 141–2, 540.

KALYVIA GEORGITSI (Pellana) (133): EH? LH IIIA-C C

AD 1926, Parart., 41ff.; RE s.v. Pellana (1); BSA 1961, 125ff.

KALYVIA TIS SOCHAS (Eleusinion sanctuary): A? C

BSA 1910, 12ff.; BSA 1950, 261ff.; BSA 1960, 82, no. 4.

KAMBOS (169): N? LH II-III A-B C

MME, no. 146.

KARAOUSI (112): N EH MH LH I-IIIC PG? G? C

BSA 1960, 89ff.; AR 1960, 9; BSA 1972, 262f.

KARDAMYLI (Kardamyle) (170): N? EH? MH? LH A C

BSA 1904, 163; MME, no. 147; AD 1972B, 265; Meyer 1978, 176f.

KARYAI: see ARACHOVA

KAstri (164): see KYTHERA

KIPOULA (Hippola) (130): LH? A C

BSA 1907, 244f.; IG V.1, p.237; BSA 1961, 123; Rogan 1973, 68f.

KOKKINIA (Akriai) (108): LH? C

BSA 1908, 162; BSA 1961, 138f.

KOKKINOCOMATA: see PIGADIA

KOSMAS (Glympeis/Glyppia?) (144): LH? A C

BSA 1909, 165; PAAH 1911, 277f.; RE s.v. Glympeis, Glyppia; BSA 1961, 135; BCH 1963, 759.

KOTRONAS (Teuthrone) (128): EH MH? LH? C

BSA 1907, 256f.; BSA 1961, 119; BCH 1961, 215ff.; BCH 1965, 358ff.

KOTRONI (141): LH IIIA-B

BSA 1961, 132f.

KOUPHOVOUNO (96): N EH LH IIIB

BSA 1960, 74.

KOUTIPHARI (Thalamai) (173): LH G? A C

BSA 1904, 161f.; *MME*, no. 150.

KRANAI (Kranai) (124): EH? LH IIIA-C

BSA 1907, 223; *BSA* 1961, 114; Giannokopoulos 1966, 25, 185.

KROKEAI (Krokeai) (121): MH? LH II-IIIC C

BSA 1910, 68f.; Kahrstedt 1954, 200f.; *BSA* 1960, 103ff.; *BCH* 1961, 206ff.

KYPARISSI (Kyphanta): C

BSA 1909, 173f.; *RE* s.v. Kyphanta.

KYPRIANON (129): LH? C

BSA 1961, 119ff.; *BSA* 1968, 333ff.

KYTHERA (Kythera) (159–65): N EH EM MM I-LM IB LH II LH M IIIA-B G A C

RE s.v. Kythera; Kahrstedt 1954, 213f.; *BSA* 1961, 148ff.; Coldstream/Huxley 1972.

LAGIO (122): EH LH III

BSA 1960, 105; Giannokopoulos 1966, 26.

LEKAS (119): EH MH LH IIIB C

BSA 1960, 97.

LEONIDHION (Prasiai) (140): LH III A C

BSA 1908, 167, 174f.; *PAAH* 1911, 278f.; *RE* s.v. Prasiai; *BSA* 1961, 131.

LEVTRIO (Leuktra) (171): MH? LH III C

BSA 1904, 162; *MME*, no. 548; Meyer 1978, 176.

LIONI (161): see KYTHERA

LYMBIADA (Glyppia?) (143): EH LH III C?

BSA 1909, 165; *BSA* 1961, 135.

MARI (Marios) (145): LH? A C

BSA 1909, 166f.; *RE* s.v. Marios; *BSA* 1961, 136.

MAVROVOUNI (125): EH LH IIIB-C PG C

BSA 1961, 114ff.

MELATHRIA: LH IIIA-B C

BCH 1960, 693; *AD* 1967B, 197ff.; *AAA* 1968, 32ff.

MELIGOU (Anthana?): A

Frazer 1898, 308; *RhM* 1950, 230; *AM* 1968, 182f.

MENELAION (sanctuary of Menelaos and Helen) (95): MH III

LH II-IIIB G A C

PAAH 1900, 74ff.; *BSA* 1909, 108ff.; *BSA* 1910, 4ff.; *BSA* 1960, 72, 82; *AR* 1977, 24ff.

MEZAPOS (Messe?) (131): LH III?

BSA 1907, 243f.; BSA 1961, 122f.

MIKRA MANDINIA: LH? C

MME, no. 144.

MONEMVASIA: see EPIDAUROS LIMERA

NEAPOLIS (Boiai) (154): EH LH IIIA-B A C

RE s.v. Boiai; BSA 1908, 168ff.; BSA 1961, 142ff.; Arvanitis 1971.

NEROTRIVI (Selinous?): C?

BSA 1909, 164f.; BSA 1921, 145.

OITYLON (Oitylos) (132): LH? C

BSA 1904, 160f.; BSA 1961, 121.

PAIZOULIA (123): EH MH LH II-III B C

BSA 1960, 105; Giannokopoulos 1966, 26.

PALAIIOCHORA (Abia): C?

BSA 1904, 164f.; *MME*, no. 545; Meyer 1978, 178.

PALAIIOCHORA (Aigiai) (126): LH? A C

BSA 1907, 231f.; BSA 1961, 114, 173ff.

PALAIIOCHORI (142): EH MH LH I-III B

BSA 1961, 132ff.

PALAIIOGULAS (Sellasia): A C

RE s.v. Sellasia; *PAAH* 1910, 277f.; Pritchett 1965, ch. 4.

PALAIOPOLIS (164): see KYTHERA

PALAIOPYRGI: see VAPHEIO

PANAYIOTIS (118): EH MH LH IIIA-B C

BSA 1960, 95ff.

PAPPAGENIES DAPHNI: C

BSA 1961, 141 n. 181.

PAVLOPETRI: EH MH? LH III B

BSA 1969, 113ff.; *Archaeology* 1970, 242ff.

PEPHNOS (Pephnos) (172): LH III

BSA 1904, 162; *RE* s.v. Pephnos; *MME*, no. 149.

PERIVOLAKIA (Kalamai?): LH III

MME, no. 140; Meyer 1978, 178, 180f.

PHARAI: A? C

MME, no. 542.

PHLOMOCHORI: A (but not certainly occupied)

BCH 1965, 366, 371ff.

PHONEMENOI (Hermai?): A C

BSA 1905, 137f.; *Athena* 1908, 383ff.; *PAAH* 1950, 235f.

PIGADIA (168): N? EH? MH? LH I-II-III A-C PG?

MME, no. 145.

PLYTRA (Asopos) (151): N EH MH LH III C

Frazer 1898, 382f.; *BSA* 1908, 163ff.; *BSA* 1961, 139ff.; *Archeologia: trésors des âges*, Nov.-Dec. 1968, 42f.

PORTO TON ASOMATON (Tainaron): C

BSA 1907, 249ff.; *AM* 1915, 100ff.; *RE* s.v. Tainaron; *BSA* 1961, 123f.; *AAA* 1975, 160ff.

POULITHRA (Polichna): C?

BSA 1909, 176; *PAAH* 1911, 276f.; *RE* s.v. Polichna.

PYRRHICHOS (Pyrrhichos): C?

BSA 1904, 160; *BCH* 1965, 378ff.

SKOUTARI (Asine): C?

BSA 1907, 235; *CR* 1909, 221f.; Kahrstedt 1954, 209.

SPARTA

Akropolis: LH III PG G A C

BSA 1907, 137ff.; *BSA* 1908, 142ff.; *BSA* 1925, 240ff.; *BSA* 1927, 37ff.

Limnai (Artemis Orthia sanctuary): PG G A C

AO; Boardman 1963.

Pitana (tile-stamps, Hellenistic): *BSA* 1907, 42.

Pitana (A settlement): *BSA* 1960, 82.

Mesoa (A graves): *AD* 1964A, 123ff.

Kynosoura? (A sanctuary at modern Kalogonia): *PAAH* 1962, 115ff.; *BCH* 1963, 759f.

City-wall (Hellenistic): *BSA* 1907, 5ff.

Thornax?: *BSA* 1960, 82, no. 1.

STENA (153): EH LH II-III B

BSA 1961, 141f.

STENA (near Gytheion): see MAVROVOUNI

STRO TSA: A?

BSA 1907, 226f.; *BSA* 1910, 67f.

TRINASA (Trinasos): C?

Frazer 1898, 380; *BSA* 1907, 230f.; Kahrstedt 1954, 206.

TSASI (115): EH LH IIIA-B A? C

BSA 1960, 92ff.

TSERAMEIO (Alesiai?): C

BSA 1960, 82, no. 2.

TYROS (Tyros) (139): EH LH? A C

PAAH 1911, 253ff.; *PAAH* 1953, 251ff.; *BSA* 1961, 131.

VAPHEIO (98): EH MH LH II-III B

AE 1889, 132ff.; *BSA* 1960, 76ff.

VERGA: LH

BSA 1966, 116; *MME*, no. 143.

VEZANI (Helos) (109): MH LH? C

BSA 1909, 161f.; Kahrstedt 1954, 212; BSA 1960, 87ff.

VLACHIOTI (114): EH LH III C

BSA 1909, 162; BSA 1921, 150; BSA 1960, 92.

VRONDAMA (104): LH III C

BSA 1960, 83ff.

XERONISI (117): EH MH LH IIIA-C C

BSA 1960, 95.

XIROKAMBI (136): LH?

AA 1927, 365; BSA 1961, 131.

XIROKAMBI (Spartan plain): A? C?

BSA 1960, 81.

B. Messenia (spelling and site-numbers are those of *MME*, where references to earlier work may be found; see also Meyer 1978, 169–212)

AETOS: AY. DHIMITRIOS (226): C

AITHAIA: ELLINIKA (Thouria) (137): G? A? C

AKOVITIKA (151): G A C

ANO KOPANAKI: AKOURTHI (234): C

ANO KOPANAKI: STILARI (Polichne) (233): C

ARTEMISIA: VOLIMNOS (sanctuary of Artemis Limnatis) (138): G A C

AY. FLOROS (temple of Pamisos) (530): A C

AY. ANDHREAS (temple of Apollo Korynthos) (504): A C

BALIRA (525): C?

CHANDRINOI: PLATANIA (33): A C

CHAROKOPIO: DEMOTIC SCHOOL (109): C

CHAROKOPIO: GARGAROU (509): C

CHATZI: BARBERI (26): C

CHORA: ANO ENGLIANOS (Mycenaean Pylos) (1): G

CHORA: VOLIMIDHIA (20): G

CHRISOKELLARIA: AY. ATHANASIOS (111): C?

CHRISTIANI (410): C?

DHIODHIA: AY. IOANNIS (518): C

EVA: NEKROTAFION (125): C

FINIKOUS: AYIANALIPSI (79): G C

GARGALIANI: KANALOS (15): C

HELLENIKA: see AITHAIA

ITHOME: see MAVROMATI

KAFIRIO: see LONGA

KAKALETRI: AY. ATHANASIOS (Hira?) (611): A C

KALOYERAKI: SAMARINA (522): C?

KASTELIA-VOUNARIA (Kolonides?) (507): C

KASTRO TOU MILA: CHAMOUSA (604): C

KATO KREMMIDHIA: FOURTZOVRISI (34): C

KATO MELPIA: KREBENI (216): A? C

KONSTANDINI: AY. ATHANASIOS (Andania?) (607): C

KORIFASION: PORTES (3): C

KORONI: BOURGO (Asine) (512): A C

KORONI: KAMINAKIA (514): C

KORONI: ZANGA (513): C

KOUKOUNARA (35): C

KYPARISSIA (Kyparissia) (70): A C

LAMBAINA: TOURKOKIVOURO (122): C

LAMBAINA (523): C?

LONGA: KAFIRIO (107): G? A? C

LOUTRO: KOKKALA (Amphelia?) (211): G?

MALTHI: GOUVES (Dorion?) (223): G A (*AE* 1972B, 12–20)

MAVROMATI (Messene, Ithome) (529): G A (*BSA* 1926, 138, no. 9) C
RE Supp. XV, 136–55.

METHONI (Mothone) (412): A C

MILITSI: G A C

AD 1970B, 181f.

MIROU: PERISTERIA (200): C

MONI VOULKANOU (526): C?

NEDON VALLEY: A

Valmin 1930, 46, 48ff., 207ff.; *RE* s.v. Nedon; Jeffery 1961, 206, no. 5.

NEROMILOS: PANAYITSA (517): A

NICHORIA: see RIZOMILO

PALIO NERO: VOUNAKI (Aulon?) (601): C?

PAPOULIA (53): A

PERISTERIA: see MIROU

PETALIDHI (Korone) (502): C

PETROCHORI: CAVE OF NESTOR (10): C

PETROCHORI: PALIOKASTRO (Koryphasion/Pylos) (9): C

PIDHIMA: AY. IOANNIS (136): A? C

PILA (402): A

PLATI (524): C?

POLIANI: PALIOCHORA (535): C

POLICHNI: AY. TAXIARCHOS (Andania?) (212): C

PROTI (Prote, Prokonnesos) (407): A (Jeffery 1961, 206, no. 2) C?

RIZOMILO: NICHORIA (Aipeia?) (100): G A C

Hesperia 1972, 218–73; 1975, 69–141.

ROMANOU: VIGLITSA (400): A C

SPERCHOYIA (533): C?

SPILIA: PRINDZIPA (69): C?

TRIKORFO: KAKO KATARACHI (121): C

VALTA: AY. PANDELEIMONAS (58): C?

VASILIKO: FILAKION (605): A C?

VELIKA: SKORDHAKIS (112): C?

VOLIMIDHIA: see CHORA

VOLIMNOS: see ARTEMISIA

VOURNAZI: BAROUTOSPILIA (127): C

YIALOVA: DHIVARI (401): A C

Appendix 2

The Homeric poems as history

Concerning Homer everything, not excluding the name, has been the subject of immemorial debate. For my limited purposes, however, I shall accept without discussion that the Homeric poems, our *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, are traditional oral formulaic poems, which reached approximately the form in which we have them, perhaps with the aid of writing, somewhere in the eighth or early seventh centuries. Their formulaic diction is characterized by the mixture of scope and economy diagnostic of the epic genre, and their language is an artificial amalgam of dialectal forms of diverse origin and date, never spoken outside the context of an epic recital.

The crucial period for the formation of the tradition was probably the early Dark Age (second half of the eleventh and tenth centuries) rather than the tail-end of the Mycenaean era, and the process took place among the Ionian and Aiolian Greeks of the Asiatic diaspora, although the precise nature of ‘colonial’ society and in particular the social milieu in which the Homeric poems were created and developed are still obscure. The great advance in our knowledge of the epic genre and the relevant archaeological data makes it necessary to pose the overall problem of historicity as follows: ‘is the Homeric world Mycenaean with a few anachronisms, or eighth century with a few garbled survivals, or something intermediary, or a synthesis of them all, or a fictional world of the imagination?’ (D.H.F.Gray in Myres 1958, 293). I shall concentrate on two facets of the problem, the historicity of the Trojan War as it is envisaged in the *Iliad* and the historical status of the ‘Catalogue of Ships’ (*Il.* 2.484–760), with special reference to the ‘Kingdom of Menelaos’.

In the absence of contemporary and directly relevant written documents, on either the Greek or Trojan side, the suggested solutions must depend on evaluation of Homer as traditional oral poetry and interpretation of the archaeological evidence. It is generally agreed today that there is a profound discontinuity between the world in which the events described in the *Iliad* could have occurred, the thirteenth century, and the world in which ‘Homer’ lived and thought. ‘The world of the (*sc.* Linear B) tablets is one of which the Homeric poems retain only the faintest conception’ (Page 1959, 202).

Thereafter, however, scholars are divided between those who believe that there is a historical basis to the poem, overlaid and distorted no doubt in the course of transmission but none the less still recoverable; those who believe that there is a historical basis but one that is no longer recoverable, at least not with any certainty or precision; and those who believe that there is no or only a very slight historical basis. In relation to the two problems isolated for discussion in this Appendix I belong with the intermediary group. Space forbids much more than a skeletal justification of this stance, and I would stress that I am concerned only with the historical basis of the essential plot, not with all the elaborations and incidentals, apart from those of the 'Kingdom of Menelaos'.

Comparative studies of heroic poetry, of which the *Iliad* is no doubt in several respects an exceptional representative, indicate that such poetry takes its origin in a historical event but that in the final version historical matter may be very scanty or even entirely absent. To take an extreme case, a defeat may be transformed into a victory, although this is of course by no means a prerogative of heroic poetry. The likeliest occasion for the creation of oral epic poetry is an impoverished era which stands self-consciously in the shadow of a more expansive predecessor. To simplify, 'saga presupposes ruins' (Lesky 1971, 27). Too much reliance should not perhaps be placed on comparative evidence, which cannot replace the direct evidence we lack. But it is not unreasonable to postulate that a Trojan War may have taken place during LH IIIB and that the epic commemorating it originated perhaps in the eleventh century.

The evidence from the excavations at Hissarlik, if—as it surely is—this is Homer's Troy, suggests that there were two destructions around the LH IIIB period, the first (c.1300) due to natural agency, probably an earthquake, the second later in the thirteenth century due to man. However, the dispute about the relative chronology of LH IIIB pottery (Chapter 6) and a controversy over the stylistic identification of the sherds associated with the second, man-made, destruction have led to confusion over both its relative and its absolute dating. What is undisputed, or should be, is that excavation has not disclosed the identity of the destroyers. If we suppose them to have been Greeks, and Homer is the sole unambiguous support for this hypothesis, it is still open to question whether they fought and were organized in the manner described in the *Iliad*. For many scholars the 'Catalogue of Ships' has seemed to offer certain answers.

Any satisfactory explanation of the 'Catalogue', however, must account for at least the following four facts: it contains elements which descend ultimately from the Mycenaean period; it contains elements which could only have been incorporated after the Mycenaean era; it was not sung originally for the place in which we now—and *ex hypothesi* the Greeks from the eighth century on—read it; and finally there are discrepancies between it and the rest of the *Iliad*. In the light of these facts it is perhaps understandable that the 'Catalogue' is still among the most controversial passages of the entire *Iliad*. My own view in summary is that it is basically a composition of either

the latest (LH IIIC) phase of Mycenaean civilization or the immediate post-Mycenaean period, which has subsequently undergone a process of amplification, omission and conflation; and, second, that it is in no sense a documentary record of an actual warfleet muster.

Specifically, the kingdom ascribed to Menelaos (*Il.* 2.581–7, below) has resisted more successfully than most of the others all attempts to prove on archaeological grounds the hypothesis that it corresponds to the political geography of a particular historical epoch:

those who held hollow Lakedaimon full of ravines,
Pharis and Sparte and many-doved Messe,
and dwelt in Bryseiai and lovely Augeiai,
and held Amyklai and Helos a city on the sea,
and who held Laas and dwelt around Oitylos,
these his brother led, Menelaos of the loud wacry,
sixty ships in all.

Of the ten place-names listed, the first, Lakedaimon, to judge from its epithets probably applies to the kingdom as a whole, just as it certainly applied to the whole Spartan state in historical times, rather than to an individual site (but see below). Of the remainder only four (Amyklai, Laas, Oitylos and Messe) can be identified at all confidently with actual sites, and this only if two further hypotheses are well grounded, namely that the names remained unchanged from the time at which they were first incorporated in the ‘Catalogue’ to the time of their first use by a post-Homeric literary source; and, second, that the sites identified on the ground have been correctly so identified from the indications of the written sources. Neither hypothesis is unassailable.

Of the four plausibly identified on this basis only Amyklai has so far yielded material remains earlier than the Archaic period. Of the rest Sparte (also mentioned in the *Odyssey*: below) may refer either to classical Sparta or to an earlier counterpart of that name, for which the site on the Menelaion ridge is the only real candidate. If it is the former, then in view of the dearth of Mycenaean remains here Sparte at least would be a post-Mycenaean insertion. If on the other hand there was a Mycenaean Sparte on the Menelaion ridge, then what is to be done with the ‘well-towered Therapne’ of Alkman (fr. 14b), which was clearly a settlement rather than an area whatever Pausanias (3.19.9) may have thought when he described the Menelaion sanctuary ambiguously as ‘in Therapne’? This difficulty might be resolved if Homer’s Lakedaimon could be equated with Alkman’s Therapne, but I do not think it would be justifiable to adopt the less likely interpretation of Lakedaimon as an individual site in order to effect this equation. So *non liquet*. Pharis, however, may well be the Palaiopyrgi site, and Helos may be Ay. Stephanos. But Bryseiai, whose historical homonym is itself not surely

located, is not identifiable with any Mycenaean site, despite attempts to preserve the pristine Mycenaean purity of the 'Catalogue' by identifying it alternatively with Anthochorion or Ay. Vasilios in the Spartan basin. Finally, Augeiai, if it is not simply a doublet of the Lokrian Augeiai (*Il.* 2.532), could be a forerunner of Perioikic Aigiai, but the latter, if correctly identified, has nothing to show for itself archaeologically before the sixth century. In short, it is impossible to decide on archaeological grounds either when this section of the 'Catalogue' was composed or to what period if any it ostensibly refers. We may add in conclusion that the two post-Mycenaean linguistic forms used here are not of course unambiguous proof that the whole section was originally a post-Mycenaean composition.

This leaves the problems of the role and status of Menelaos. In the first place, there seems to be nothing in the *Iliad* which could be due to a poet's desire to flatter a Spartan audience. Second, the number of ships attributed to him in the 'Catalogue' seems appropriate to his status as brother of the overall commander, Agamemnon, and in proportion to his relative importance in the rest of the *Iliad* by comparison to, say, Nestor, who brought ninety ships. Whether these absolute figures bear any relation to Mycenaean reality of any period is impossible to say, but, if we interpret them along the lines of Thucydides (1.10), then perhaps they do roughly correspond to our current archaeological pictures of thirteenth-century Lakonia and Messenia.

On the other hand, I am not persuaded that Agamemnon's overall command at Troy necessarily tells us anything about the political organization of Mycenaean Greece under less exceptional conditions, and I tend to see it as mainly due to the exigencies of the plot. Moreover, no palace fit for a Menelaos has yet been located in Lakonia to match the 'Palace of Nestor' at Pylos and the other known palatial establishments of the thirteenth century. There is therefore nothing to disprove the suggestion that the description of Menelaos' palace in the fourth book of the *Odyssey* is as fictional as the alleged chariot-route over Taygetos taken there by Odysseus' son Telemachos when he came to visit Menelaos at Sparte. Indeed, it is even possible on present evidence to argue that Lakedaimon (or whatever the name of Menelaos' supposed realm was) did not in fact exist as an independent kingdom in the thirteenth century but was controlled from the Argolis or even Messenia; the latter situation after all would only be the converse of the historical relationship between the two areas from c.700 to 362.

However that may be, I hope I have brought forward sufficient arguments to show why I do not believe it to be sound method to use the *Iliad* as part of an explanation of the last centuries of the Mycenaean era. Thus I cannot, for example, accept that an enterprise of this Homeric magnitude weakened Mycenaean Greece and acted as a prelude to the destructions and desertions evident in the material record for the latter part of the thirteenth and for the twelfth centuries. Nor can I agree that it was the prolonged absence of Mycenaean rulers which encouraged factional strife and internecine war on

their return from Troy. In the present state of our evidence the only respectable intellectual position is honest agnosticism.

Notes on further reading

The bibliography on Homer, following the ‘Homeric question’ have let loose by F.A.Wolf at the end of the eighteenth century, is vast. The best brief guides are perhaps Hainsworth 1969 and Lesky 1968. Of the longer treatments Kirk 1962 is still useful.

The demonstration of the traditional formulaic nature of the Homeric poems is due to Milman Parry, whose *oeuvre* has been collected by his son as Parry 1971. That the poems were also oral was a hypothesis Parry set out to test in Yugoslavia; it is now generally accepted as proved, with important doubts about the role of writing in the closing stages of the living tradition. On the ‘Parry-Lord thesis’ see the bibliography Haymes 1973. According to Hainsworth (1969, 9), ‘the real question, as yet unattempted, is whether the dramatic quality could have been orally conceived’; but this is not wholly fair to Thomson 1961, 433–582, where an attempt is made and the possibility strongly indicated.

For the language of the epics see Meister 1921; Hiersche 1970, 80–106; Shipp 1972. The dispute over the existence and character of Mycenaean poetry is usefully reviewed in Kirk 1960, esp. sections 18–25.

The archaeological background to Homer is considered in Lorimer 1950 (now very outdated); in various contributions to *Archaeologia Homérica* (uneven in quality); and in Bouzek 1969.

Kirk 1975 is a helpful short discussion of the historical value of the poems. Of the longer treatments Page 1959 is still stimulating, but Adam Parry (in Parry 1971, xlv) perhaps understates the case when he says that Page ‘takes the argument for the historicity of the Homeric epics as far as it can reasonably go’. On the question whether there was a unified ‘Homeric world’ identifiable in space and time I agree with the negative conclusion of Snodgrass 1974.

For the ‘Catalogue’ see e.g. Burr 1944; Jachmann 1958; and Hope Simpson and Lazenby 1970. All these have powerful axes to grind.

The archaeological aspect of the Trojan War controversy is well summarized by Wiseman (1965). On the hegemony allegedly exercised by Mycenae I agree with Thomas 1970 against the cautiously positive view of Desborough (1972, 18).

Appendix 3

The Spartan king-lists

The purposes of this Appendix are twofold: to discuss the source and significance of the lists of Agiads and Eurypontids preserved in Herodotus (Table 1) and to illustrate briefly the cardinal role that the upper reaches of these and comparable lists appear to have played in the elaboration of a chronology for early Greek history.

TABLE 1

Agiads (7.204)		Eurypontids (8.131.2)
	Herakles	
	Hyllos	
	Kleodaios	
	Aristomachos	
	Aristodamos	
Eurysthenes		Prokles
Agis (I)		Euryp(h)on
Echestratos		Prytanis
Labotas		Polydektes
Doryssos		Eunomos
Agésilaos (I)		Charillos
Archelaos		Nikandros
Teleklos		Theopompos
Alkamenes		Anaxandridas (I)
Polydoros		Archidamos (I)
Eurykrates		Anaxilaos
Anaxandros		Latychidas (I)
Eurykratidas		Hippokratidas
Leon		Agésilaos*
Anaxandridas (II)		Menares*
Leonidas (I)		Latychidas (II)

* Did not reign

We must first decide what these lists represent. Are they, as the ancients believed (although, as we shall see, they differed in detail), king-lists? Or are they, as Henige (1974, 207–13) has now argued in a fundamental study of oral tradition, merely the pedigrees of Leonidas I (reigned *c.*490–480) and Latychidas II (*c.*491–469)? The way in which Herodotus introduces the lists suggests the latter, and this view is apparently supported both by the omission of otherwise recognized kings (from the Agiads Kleomenes I; from the Eurypontids Agasikles, Ariston and Damaratos) and by his cross-reference at 9.64.2, where he points out that regent Pausanias had the same ascendants (*progonoi*) as Leonidas. On the other hand, Herodotus states explicitly (8.131.3) that ‘all except the two named immediately after Latychidas (*viz* his father and grandfather) became kings of Sparta’, and this may indeed imply that he believed all Leonidas’ ascendants had done so too. At any rate, this was how he was understood by all later writers.

Neither interpretation is entirely cogent, but on balance I think Herodotus did indeed mean the lists for king-lists. The major obstacle in the way of this interpretation is the omission of recognized kings from both lists, but this has been adroitly circumvented by Prakken (1940) with the suggestion that Herodotus was adapting lists compiled, perhaps by Hekataios (below), in the joint reign of Kleomenes I and Damaratos, neither of whom was succeeded by a son. Whether or not Hekataios (or whoever) was the first to produce and publish written king-lists we cannot of course say.

A minor objection, that not even the Spartans believed Leonidas’ and Latychidas’ ascendants before Aristodamos to have been kings of Sparta, has been proven groundless by Huxley (1975b), who rightly distinguishes between kings ‘of’ Sparta and kings ‘in’ Sparta; we may add that in 371 the Dioskouroi, ‘the model and divine guarantee of the Spartan dyarchy’ (Carlier 1977, 76 n. 42), could be referred to as ‘fellow citizens’ of the Spartans (Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.6). Moreover Herodotus’ confusion over the name of Latychidas II’s grandfather—Agesilaos in Table 1, but Agis at 6.65.1—seems most easily explicable if, as Herodotus himself states, Agesilaos/Agis did not in fact reign. Thus, since Latychidas II and Damaratos were coevals (they fell out over the girl they both wanted to marry: 6.65.2), Latychidas’ grandfather could have been a younger brother of Damaratos’ grandfather, Agasikles, the co-king of Leon. This would make Latychidas and Damaratos second cousins, closely enough related for Kleomenes I to use the former as an acceptable replacement for the latter.

To these negative arguments in favour of the interpretation of the lists as king-lists we may add the evidence of two papyri from Oxyrhynchos published after Prakken’s important paper. One of these (2390, with Harvey 1967) proves that Latychidas I did indeed reign—probably *c.*600, since Alkman sang of him. The other (2623.1, a choral lyric fragment attributable to Simonides or Bacchylides) mentions a Zeuxidamos (see Table 2, below) and perhaps a Hippokratidas (cf. Table 1), apparently in a royal context. We

know that Stesichoros sang before a Spartan prince in Sparta c.550 and that he lent his voice to Heraklid propaganda (West 1969, 148). Perhaps the poet of this fragment was doing the same for a Eurypontid prince in the early fifth century.

Granted then that we have access to Spartan king-lists in Herodotus, two further and related questions arise. How far may we accept them as true records of the dyarchy? Second, what role or roles might the lists have played in forming the Spartans' view of their past and in determining the way that past was presented to or used against outsiders?

We may start with the connection of the eponyms Agis (I) and Euryp(h)on through the twin sons of Aristodamos to Herakles. The Heraklid connection is first explicitly attested in Tyrtaios (fr. 2.12–15W), but it should go back to the dissemination of the Homeric or similar poems in Sparta and the foundation of the Menelaion sanctuary in the late eighth century, if not to the incorporation of 'Achaean' Amyklai c.750. Indeed, it is likely enough to have been forged at the same time as the dyarchy itself, which perhaps began with Archelaos and Charillos (Chapter 8). From Tyrtaios the assertion of the connection can be traced in an almost unbroken chain of poetical references through the Lakonians Kinaithon and Alkman in the seventh century, Stesichoros and the Delphic Oracle in the sixth to Pindar, the contemporary of Leonidas I and Latychidas II.

As far as the outside world was concerned, the function of the Heraklid connection was to legitimate Spartan supremacy in Lakonia and indirectly, the Peloponnese. Within Sparta itself, however, it had other functions. All 'Heraklids' were Spartans, but not all Spartans were 'Heraklids' (Hdt. 8.114.2). Moreover, within the Spartan aristocracy there were other 'Heraklid' families besides the Agiads and Eurypontids, and families like the Aigeidai (Hdt. 4.149.1) who were not Heraklid at all. The king-lists therefore were a very special kind of genealogical charter (Malinowski's expression) or 'mnemonic of social relationships' (Goody and Watt 1963, 309), serving to affirm the superior blue-bloodedness of the Agiads and Eurypontids against the claims of other aristocratic families and to distinguish the aristocracy from the commons.

So much for the roles of the lists. Now for their accuracy. We must at once admit the depth of our ignorance. We do not know when, if ever, after the introduction of writing the lists were committed to script at Sparta; nor, if and when the transmission was purely oral, how that transmission was effected; nor how much circumstantial detail was passed on in association with any particular name. However, we do know that by the time of Pausanias (3.2.1–7; 3.1–8; 7.1–10) Herodotus' lists were regarded as king-lists and were taken to imply both that each Agiad king had had his one Eurypontid counterpart and that succession had been hereditary from father to son over fifteen generations within each house. Why then do the Eurypontid lists of the two authors differ (Table 2)?

TABLE 2 Eurypontids

Herodotus	Pausanias
Prokles	Prokles
Euryp(h)on	Soos
Prytanis	Eurypon
Polydektes	Prytanis
Eunomos	Eunomos
Charillos	Polydektes
Nikandros	Charillos
Theopompos	Nikandros
Anaxandridas (I)	Theopompos
Archidamos (I)	Zeuxidamos
Anaxilaos	Anaxidamos
Latychidas (I)	Archidamos (I)
Hippokratidas	Agasikles
Agesilaos*	Ariston
Menares*	Damaratos
Latychidas (II)	Latychidas (II)

* Did not reign

The introduction of Soos is easy to explain: the Eurypontid list in Herodotus was one shorter than the Agiad, and he was probably inserted in the fourth century (Kiechle 1959, 90–101). The discrepancies after Theopompos are more difficult. In effect Pausanias has Zeuxidamos and Anaxidamos for Herodotus' Anaxandridas (I) and Anaxilaos, and he has omitted Herodotus' Latychidas (I) and Hippokratidas. Of these Latychidas I was certainly a king and Hippokratidas may have been referred to as such in the choral lyric fragment of the early fifth century (above). On the other hand, Pausanias' Zeuxidamos may be the man who appears in the same fragment and so may also have some claim to have ruled; alternatively, he could be the son of Latychidas II (Hdt. 6.71). Either way, it is possible that Pausanias had independent access to genuine Eurypontid tradition, perhaps ultimately through Charon of Lampsakos (262T1 Jacoby). If therefore we accept that both Herodotus and Pausanias may preserve the truth about the ruling members of the Eurypontid house, the most economical hypothesis to explain the discrepancies between their lists is that both lists are selective king-lists, the one confined to Latychidas II's direct ascendants, the other recording those of Damaratos.

This hypothesis has many merits, of which two may be singled out here. First, as we shall see in the second part of this Appendix, it helps to solve a puzzle in early Greek chronography. Second, it does away with the glaring contradiction between the allegedly unbroken father/son succession down to

Kleomenes I and Damaratos and the situation thereafter. For between c.491 and 219 lineal succession broke down in no fewer than twelve out of the twenty-six instances; of the remaining fourteen successions the largest number, five, were consobrinial—brother succeeding brother. We must make some allowance for changed political conditions after c.491, which saw the first attested deposition of a Spartan king (Ste. Croix 1972, 350–3). But as Henige (1974, 210) rightly says, it ‘beggars the imagination’ to postulate two series of unbroken father/son succession in a single state over the same sixteen generations from Eurysthenes and Prokles. In other words, even if Herodotus’ lists are adaptations of king-lists drawn up in the joint reign of Kleomenes I and Damaratos, we should make allowance for an unknowable number of collateral successions.

By a still more opaque process than those of their creation and transmission the Spartan king-lists transcended their local political significance to occupy a unique niche in the chronography of early Greek history. The first exponent of ‘scientific’ chronography, a byproduct of the shift in emphasis of Ionian *historia* from nature to man (Chapter 5), was probably Hekataios. It could then have been he who drew up the king-lists which Herodotus adapted (Jacoby 1949, 306 n. 25, 323 n. 28, 357 n. 26). He too it may have been who interpreted the fifteen kings in each line from Agis and Eurypon to Kleomenes I and Damaratos as fifteen generations and, making allowance for the Heraklid connection, gave to each generation the notional value of forty years (Meyer 1892, 153–88, esp. 169ff., 179–82). However, since ‘it is impossible to accept a generation average as high as forty years over a period of fifteen generations, no matter what contingencies are postulated’ (Henige 1974, 208), the hypothesis about collateral, and especially perhaps consobrinial, succession may again be invoked to account for it, if indeed it is felt that the forty-year generation has any basis in fact.

However that may be, exact lengths were subsequently attached to the reigns at least down to those of Alkamenes and Theopompos. Various candidates for the role of first calculator have been proposed, of whom the third-century Lakonian Sosibios (595 Jacoby) has possibly the strongest claim. Eratosthenes of Cyrene, also in the third century, brought the lists into an acceptable relationship with the First Olympiad, which was for him the dividing line between ‘mythical’ and ‘historical’ Greece (Fraser 1970, esp. 190, 196f.). From Eratosthenes descends the ‘vulgate’ chronology of early Greek history through Apollodoros (c.100) and Diodorus to Eusebius (AD 263–339).

It goes without saying that the absolute dates arrived at by these erudite men have no truly scientific foundation, and that differences between their dating and ours are to be expected. On the other hand, to tamper with their relative chronology is hazardous. In general, their absolute dates are too high, a natural consequence of the Heraklid distortion. If we substitute the more plausible allowance of thirty years per generation for the ‘Hekataian’ forty,

we achieve a satisfying congruence between potsherds and pedigrees, at least for the Agiads: Agis I could have been on the throne around the last third of the tenth century (Forrest 1968, 21). At the same time, however, we cannot pretend that in the present state of our knowledge this is much more than a happy coincidence.

Note

I was greatly helped in the preparation of the original version of this Appendix by my late friend Richard Ball, although the responsibility for any remaining errors is of course entirely mine.

Appendix 4

The Helots: some ancient sources in translation

A. General

1 Thucydides (5c.)

- (a) 4.80.2: Most Spartan institutions have always been designed with a view to security against the Helots. (**OR** As far as the Helots are concerned, most Spartan institutions have always been designed with a view to security.) (b) 8.40.2: The Chians possessed many slaves (*oiketai*), the most in fact of any one state apart from Sparta.

2 Plato (4c.)

- (a) *Laws* 776C (quoted, with minor verbal differences, ap. Athen. 6.264DE): The Helot-system (**OR** The Helots) of Sparta is (are) practically the most discussed and controversial subject in Greece, some approving the institution, others criticizing it. (**OR** The condition of the Helots among the Spartans is of all Greek forms of servitude the most controversial and disputed about, some approving it and some condemning it.)
- (b) *Laws* 777BC: (Man) is a troublesome piece of goods, as has often been shown by the frequent revolts of the Messenians, and the great mischiefs which happen in states having many slaves (*oiketai*) who speak the same language.... Two remedies alone remain to us,—not to have the slaves of the same country, nor, if possible, speaking the same language (Jowett).

- (c) *Alk.* I.122D: No one could doubt that their land in Lakonia and Messenia is superior to our [Athenian] land, both in extent and quality, not to mention the number of their slaves (*andrapoda*) and especially the Helots.

3 Aristotle (4c.)

Pol. 1330a25–8: The very best thing of all would be that the farmers should be slaves, not all of the same people and not spirited; for if they have no spirit, they will be better suited for their work and there will be no danger of their making a revolution.

4 Strabo (1c. BC/1c. AD)

8.5.4: Helotage lasted right up to the Roman conquest.

B. Origins

1 Hellanikos (5c.)

FGrHist 4F188: The Helots are those who were not by birth the slaves (*douloi*) of the Spartans but those occupying the city of Helos who were the first to be defeated.

2 Antiochos (5c.)

FGrHist 555F13: After the [First] Messenian War the Spartans who did not participate in the expedition were adjudged slaves (*douloi*) and called Helots, while all those who had been born during the campaign were called Partheniai and deprived of full citizen rights. (**OR**...while all those to whom children had been born during the campaign (had to accept that their sons) were called Partheniai, etc.)

3 Thucydides

1.101.2: The majority of the Helots were descended from the Messenians who were enslaved (*doulothenton*) of old. Hence all were called Messenians.

4 Ephorus (4c.)

FGrHist 70F117: Agis [I] son of Eurysthenes robbed (the Perioikoi) of their equal political status and compelled them to pay contributions to Sparta. They obeyed, but the Heleioi, those who

held Helos, revolted and were conquered by force of arms and adjudged slaves (*douloi*) on fixed conditions.

5 Theopompos (4c.) *FGrHist* 115

- (a) F13: They are those who have been enslaved (*katadedoulomenoi*) for a very long time by the Spartiates, some of them being from Messenia, while the Heleatai formerly inhabited Helos in Lakonike.
- (b) F122: The Chians were the first Greeks after the Thessalians and Spartans to make use of slaves (*douloi*), but they did not acquire them in the same way as these. For the Spartans and Thessalians...recruited their slave populations from the Greeks who previously inhabited the country they now control, the Spartans from the Achaeans, the Thessalians from the Perrhaiboi and Magnetes; and they called those whom they had enslaved respectively Helots and Penestai.

6 Plutarch (1–2c. AD)

Lyk. 2.1: Of these ancestors (of Lykourgos) the most distinguished was Soos, in whose reign the Spartans made the Helots their slaves (*douloi*).

7 Pausanias (2c. AD)

- (a) 3.2.7: (In the reign of Alkamenos) the Achaeans of Helos by the sea revolted too, and (the Spartans) defeated the Argives who came to the aid of the Helots.
- (b) 3.20.6: (The inhabitants of Helos) were the first to become slaves of the community (*douloi tou koinou*) and the first to be called Helots.

8 Anecdota Graeca

(ed. Bekker) I.246, s.v. ‘Heilotes’: The slaves (*douloi*) of the Spartans ...so called because they were first defeated in Helos and enslaved.

9 Stephanos of Byzantion (6c. AD)

s.v. ‘Chioi’: (The Chians) were the first to use servants (*therapontes*), just as the Spartans used Helots, the Argives Gymnesioi, the Sikyonians Korynephoroi, the Italians Pelasgoi, and the Cretans Dmoitai (*sic*).

C. Status (see also A.1b, 2b-c, B)

1 Kritias (5c.)

88B37 D-K: In Lakedaimon are to be found those who are the most enslaved (*douloi*) and those who are the most free.

2 Thucydides

- (a) 4.118.7 (armistice of 423): Neither side is to receive deserters during this period, whether free or slave (*doulos*).
- (b) 5.23.3 (alliance between Sparta and Athens, 421): If the slave class (*douleia*) revolts, the Athenians are to come to the aid of the Spartans in full strength in accordance with their ability.

3 Xenophon (4c.)

- (a) *Hell.* 7.1.13: You [Athenians] become leaders merely of their slaves (*douloi*, i.e. Helot rowers) and men of least account.
- (b) *Lak. Pol.* 6.3: They are able to use even the slaves (*oiketai*) of another (Spartiate), if they so request.
- (c) *Lak. Pol.* 7.5: (Lykourgos made Spartan money valueless so that a man should not be able to conceal it from his slaves (*oiketai*) if he dragged it home.
- (d) *Lak. Pol.* 12.4: They keep the slaves (*douloi*) away from the arms-dumps (in camp).

4 Isokrates (4c.)

12 (*Panath.*) 178: The souls (of the Perioikoi) are reduced to slavery no less than those of (the Spartans') slaves (*oiketai*).

5 Ephorus

(continuation of B.4): Their master was permitted neither to manumit them nor to sell them beyond the frontier.

6 Theopompos

F40: The Ardiaioi (of Illyria) possess 30,000 dependent labourers (*prospelatai*) on the same conditions as (the Spartans) possess Helots.

7 Aristotle

- (a) *Pol.* 1264a32–6: Again (Sokrates) makes the Farmers the masters of the estates, for which they pay a rent (*apophora*). But in that

case they are likely to be much more unmanageable and rebellious than the Helots, Penestai or slaves in general.

- (b) fr. 586: (The Kallikyrioi at Syracuse) are like the Spartans' Helots, the Thessalians' Penestai and the Cretans' Klarotai.

8 Myron (3c.)

FGrHist 106F1: The Spartans often freed their slaves (*douloi*) calling some Aphetai (released?), some Adespotoi (masterless?), some Erykteres (curbers?), others again Desposionautai (master-seamen?); the last they assigned to naval expeditions.

9 Kallistratos (3c.)

FGrHist 348F4: They called the Mariandynoi (of Herakleia Pontika) Dorophoroi (gift-bearers) to take away the sting in the word 'slaves' (*oiketai*), just as the Spartans did for the Helots, the Thessalians for the Penestai, and the Cretans for the Klarotai.

10 Phylarchos (3c.)

FGrHist 81F8: The Byzantines rule over the Bithynoi in the same way as the Spartans rule over the Helots.

11 Strabo

8.5.4: The Spartans held (the Helots) as slaves (*douloi*) as it were of the community (*tropon tina demosious*).

12 Livy (1c. BC/1c. AD)

- (a) 34.27.9: Next some of the Helots—these had been 'castellani' (farm- or fort-dwellers) from remotest times, a rural people—were accused of wishing to desert and were lashed to death in all the villages (*vici*).
- (b) 34.31.11: But the name of 'tyrant' and my actions are held against me (Nabis), because I liberate slaves (*servi*).

13 Pollux (2c. AD)

3.83: Between free men and slaves (*douloi*) (are) the Lakonian Helots, the Thessalian Penestai, the Mariandynian Dorophoroi, the Argive Gymnetes and the Sikyonian Korynephoroi.

D. Treatment (see also C.1, 3b, 4, 8; F.i.2b)

1 Tyrtaios (7c.)

- (a) fr. 6: Like asses exhausted under great loads: under painful necessity to bring their masters full half the fruit their ploughed land produced.
- (b) fr. 7: They and their wives too must put on mourning and bewail their lords whenever death should carry them away.

2 Kritias

(following C.1): Through distrust of these Helots a Spartiate at home removes the arm-band from his shield. Since the frequent need for speed prevents him taking this precaution on campaign, he always carries his spear with him, in the belief that he will be stronger than the Helot who tries to revolt with a shield alone. They have also devised keys which they think are strong enough to resist any Helot attempt on their lives.

3 Thucydides

- (a) 1.128.1: The Spartans had once dragged some Helot suppliants from the sanctuary of Poseidon and led them away to be killed, as a result of which, so they believed, the great earthquake had hit Sparta.
- (b) 4.80.3 (following A.1a): (The Spartans) made a proclamation that the Helots should choose from their number as many as claimed to have done the best service in the war. They implied that these Helots would be freed, but in fact it was a test conducted in the belief that those who thought themselves best qualified for freedom would also be the most likely to revolt. About 2,000 were selected, who put garlands on their heads and did the rounds of the sanctuaries as if they had been freed. But not much later the Spartans did away with them, and no one knew how each of them was killed.

4 Isokrates

12.181: The Ephors have the right to choose as many (Perioikoi) as they wish and put them to death, and this when for all Greeks the murder of even the most nefarious slaves (*oiketai*) is considered impious.

5 Theopompos

F13: The Helot population is in an altogether cruel and bitter condition.

6 Aristotle

- (a) *Pol* 1269b7–12: Apart from other drawbacks, the mere necessity of policing (the Helots) is a troublesome matter—the problem of how contact with them is to be managed. If allowed freedom, they grow insolent and think themselves as good as their masters; if made to live a hard life, they plot against and hate them. It is clear therefore that those whose Helot-system works out like this have not discovered the best way of managing it.
- (b) fr. 538 (ap. Plut. *Lyk.* 28): The so-called ‘Krypteia’ of the Spartans, if this really is one of Lykourgos’ institutions, as Aristotle says, may have given Plato (*Laws* 630D) too this idea of (Lykourgos) and his polity. The Krypteia was like this. The magistrates from time to time sent out into the country those who appeared the most resourceful of the youth, equipped only with daggers and minimum provisions. In the daytime they dispersed into obscure places, where they hid and lay low. By night they came down into the highways and despatched any Helot they caught. Often too they went into the fields and did away with the sturdiest and most powerful Helots. (Here Plutarch retails D.3b.) And Aristotle specifically says also that the Ephors upon entering office declared war on the Helots, so that their murder might not bring with it ritual pollution.
- (c) *Lak. Pol.* (excerpted by Herakleides Lembos 373.10 Dilts): It is said that (Lykourgos) also introduced the Krypteia. In accordance with this institution even now they go out by day and conceal themselves, but by night they use weapons to kill as many of the Helots as is expedient.

7 Myron

F2: They assign to the Helots every shameful task leading to disgrace. For they ordained that each one of them must wear a dogskin cap and wrap himself in skins and receive a stipulated number of beatings every year regardless of any wrongdoing, so that they would never forget they were slaves (*douleuein*). Moreover, if any exceeded the vigour proper to a slave’s condition, they made death the penalty; and they allotted a punishment to those controlling them if they failed to rebuke those who were growing fat. And in giving the land over to them they set them a portion (of produce) which they were constantly to hand over.

8 Plutarch

- (a) (following D.6b): And in other ways too they treated the Helots harshly and cruelly. For example, they would compel them to drink

a lot of unmixed wine and then bring them into the common messes to show the young men what drunkenness was like. They would also order them to sing songs and perform dances that were ignoble and ridiculous but to refrain from those appropriate to free men. However, such cruelties were, I believe, inflicted by the Spartans only relatively late, especially after the great earthquake....

- (b) *Comp. Lyk. et Num.* 1.5: (Helotage was) the cruellest and most lawless system.

E. Attitude of Helots (see also D.2, 6a)

1 Xenophon

Hell. 3.3.6: The secret (of the Helots, Neodamodeis, Hypomeiones and Perioikoi) (was that), whenever among these mention was made of Spartiates, none was able to conceal that he would gladly eat them—even raw.

2 Aristotle

- (a) *Pol.* 1269a37–b5: The Penestai of the Thessalians repeatedly revolted, as did the Helots—who are like an enemy constantly sitting in wait for the disasters of the Spartans. Nothing of this kind has yet happened in Crete, the reason perhaps being that the neighbouring cities, even when at war with one another, never ally themselves with the (servile) rebels. For since they themselves possess a subject population (perioikoi), this would not be in their interest. The Spartans, on the other hand, were surrounded by hostile neighbours, Argives, Messenians and Arkadians.
- (b) *Pol.* 1272b17–20: (Crete) is saved by its geographical situation; for distance has had the same effect as the expulsion of aliens (from Sparta). A result of this is that, whereas the Cretan perioikoi stay loyal, the Helots frequently revolt.

F. Functions

i Agriculture (see also D.7)

1 Aristotle

Pol. 1271b40–72a2: The Cretan institutions resemble the Spartan. The Helots are the farmers of the latter, the perioikoi of the former.

2 Plutarch

- (a) *Lyk.* 8.7: The kleros was large enough to yield seventy medimnoi of barley for a man and twelve for a woman, and the corresponding amount of fresh fruits.
- (b) *Mor.* 239DE: A curse was decreed to fall upon (the Spartan) who exacted more than the long-established rent (*apophora*), so that (the Helots) might serve gladly because gainfully, and (the Spartans) might not exceed the fixed amount.
- (c) *Mor.* 223A: Kleomenes [I] son of Anaxandridas said that Homer was the poet of the Spartans, Hesiod of the Helots; for Homer had given the necessary directions for warfare, Hesiod for agriculture.

ii Warfare

Hdt. 6.80f. (batmen, etc.); 9.28f., 80.1, 85 (auxiliary personnel); Thuc. 4.80 (hoplites); Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.27 (batmen), 6.5.28f. (hoplites), 7.1.12f. (rowers).

iii Miscellaneous

Hdt. 6.52.5–7, 63.1; Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.28; *Lak. Pol.* 7.5; Plut. *Agis* 3.2 (all household servants); Hdt. 6.68.2 (groom); 6.75.2 (armed guard); Kritias 88B33 D-K (cup-bearer at mess).

Appendix 5

The sanctuary of (Artemis) Orthia

By the beginning of the twentieth century the British School of Archaeology at Athens could look back on striking successes in the excavation of prehistoric sites but lacked for a classical counterpart to Delphi and Olympia, secured respectively by the French and German Schools. Somewhat boldly, in view of the weight of ancient literary evidence suggesting artefactual sterility, the School selected Sparta for its operations. Sensibly, however, they spread the risks by simultaneously conducting smaller excavations in other parts of Lakonia, on both prehistoric and classical sites, and by undertaking invaluable and unrepeatable topographical surveys of the southern portion of the region. The groundwork was laid by M.N.Tod and A.J.B. Wace in their still serviceable *Catalogue of the Sparta Museum*, which was published in the same year, 1906, as the School began excavations in Sparta itself.

The most significant ancient landmark at that time, in a landscape undistinguished for its ancient remains, was a Roman theatre on the right (west) bank of the Eurotas. Even this, though, had been extensively looted and largely denuded since the foundation of the modern town in 1834 and was being slowly encroached upon by the river. It was, however, precisely the Greek remains dislocated by the ingress of the Eurotas which gave hope of important early finds—a hope that was to be fulfilled far beyond the expectations even of those responsible for the decision to concentrate the digging here. As the main director of excavations, R.M.Dawkins, later wrote (*AO* 50): ‘The Roman theatre had done its work thoroughly in preserving untouched...the great wealth of archaic objects which by their fresh light on early Sparta have given this excavation its chief importance.’

The stone theatre, it emerged, had been constructed in the third century AD. Its function was to enable blood-thirsty spectators to watch Spartan youths being flogged, preferably to death, in a painful simulacrum of what had once been an initiation-rite integral to the Spartan social system. The deity in whose honour this gory performance was staged was then known as Artemis Orthia, but her original title, attested by inscriptions from the late seventh century onwards, had been simply Orthia. (I retain this conventional




Figure 19 The sanctuary of Orthia at Sparta

spelling for convenience; in fact, several variants are recorded epigraphically.) The literary evidence for her cult was such that it was ‘one of the most puzzling and vehemently discussed in the Greek world’ (Rose in *AO* 399), but it appeared to have been more intimately linked to the routine of Spartan life than that of the state’s patron deity Athena Poliachos (later known also as Chalkioikos). The excavation of Orthia’s sanctuary was therefore thought the more likely to illuminate the nature and development of Spartan taste and religio-political observance.

So indeed it proved, and such were the richness and complexity of the deposits that the School initially devoted five seasons to unearthing and reconstructing them. Dawkins, reporting in 1910 that no further excavation was contemplated, stitched together the results into a ‘History of the

Sanctuary', which was reprinted almost unchanged in the supposedly definitive publication of the site nineteen years later (*AO* ch. 1). Yet in the interim the School had spent another five seasons on Sparta (1924–8), including a cleaning operation at Orthia in 1928 which yielded important new results. Since these results made no impression on the 'final' 1929 publication, they have been largely neglected hitherto. But this neglect has been more than made up for by the attention lavished since 1919 on the reports of the main series of excavations.

To some extent the participants in this dig were pioneers in their attempt to apply consistently the stratigraphical method to a classical Greek site, and like all pioneers they quickly excited over-warm approval—or acrimonious disparagement. Now that the dust has settled, there is still the need for a full discussion both of the excavators' view of their objectives, methods and achievements and of the course of subsequent revaluations (the most important to date being Boardman 1963). Here, however, there is space only to attempt answers to the two major questions arising from a study of the Orthia stratigraphy. First, what is the most likely reconstruction of the history of the sanctuary before the laying of the sand? Second, in what way and to what extent may we use the stratigraphical evidence to establish the sequence and absolute dates of Lakonian artefacts of the Geometric and Archaic periods (*c.*750–500)? (After *c.*500 the archaeological evidence from Lakonia as a whole declines markedly in quantity and quality, and the stratigraphy of Orthia becomes correspondingly less significant.)

Taking the history of the sanctuary first, we find that the construction of a cobble pavement *c.*700 provides the stratigraphical *terminus ante quem* for the beginnings of cult in this natural hollow by the Eurotas. Since this was a new Dorian cult on an uninhabited and not previously used site, topography offers a major clue to the nature of the deity—vegetational and chthonic. The earliest portion of the deposit contained PG pottery, which cannot be more closely dated than between *c.*950–900 and 750. As the depth of the deposit is no guide to the length of time required for its formation, the origin of the cult may be placed on grounds of general probability alone in the ninth century, perhaps in its first half.

Worship, consisting of animal-sacrifice and presumably also the pouring of libations, took place on and around an earthen altar in what later became the eastern rectangle of the delimited sacred area. For *c.*700 the sanctuary was enclosed by a wall and paved with river-cobbles, upon which were set a part-stone altar and temple, the former close to the circuit wall, the latter at an angle of about 90° on the west and also hard by the wall. The sanctuary retained this format until the second quarter of the sixth century, when the whole area was raised and levelled with a layer of river sand, perhaps in response to a devastating Eurotas flood. Upon the sand were erected an all-limestone altar and temple, with the same general orientations as their predecessors, and a new enlarged enclosure wall. This second temple was

rebuilt in the second century BC, but the altar remained substantially unchanged until the third century AD, when its Roman successor was built to accompany the new stone theatre.

The second question posed above is considerably more problematic, the answer more tentative. In the first place, the excavators' chronology, both relative and absolute, must be scrapped, since it was based on an untestable assumption of regular deposition (involving an unreasonably mechanical translation of depth of deposit into period of years) and a now superseded dating of PC pottery. Second, although four pre-sand Lakonian pottery styles were distinguished, only two pre-sand strata were eventually recognized. Third, the earlier ('Geometric') stratum was not sealed by a floor or pit: the cobble pavement was built actually in it, towards its close. Since, therefore, there is no clearcut stratigraphical evidence to help date the pottery styles, and since the pottery cannot be used to date the cobble pavement precisely, there must be an element of subjectivity in interpreting the pottery associations and/or findspots of particular artefacts. Fourth, as Dawkins rightly stressed, the strata were thin and partly disturbed by subsequent building or natural agencies, so objects could easily have been displaced from their original place in the earth. Finally, in a votive deposit the original position of an artefact can anyway never indicate more than the relative date at which it was discarded.

Extreme caution is therefore obligatory when using the Orthia stratigraphy. However, as long as it is treated just as a general guide, there seems to be no compelling reason not to place some faith in it. As for the pottery, not only is its sub-division into styles somewhat arbitrary but its dating by reference to its association with PC and to the development of other Greek fabrics is also uncertain. None the less, a workable chronological framework can be and has been devised, subjective though it inevitably is. The extent to which the results obtained for the Orthia sanctuary hold good for other sites in Sparta and Lakonia is problematic, not least because of the absolute dearth of excavated and stratified settlement deposits. However, in Sparta and Amyklai at least, where the evidence is fullest, there seems to be scarcely any aspect of the material record which does not have its correlate on one or other of the sites. For most purposes, therefore, Orthia may be taken as a typical, if generally more informative, sample.

Notes on further reading

Preliminary reports of the Orthia excavations: *BSA* 1906–10 (with the *Annual Reports*); *JHS* 1907–10 ('Archaeology in Greece', by Dawkins). Cleaning dig of May 1928: *BSA* 1928, 1, 306 (with the *Annual Report*); *JHS* 1928, 185. Process of digging: *BSA* 1907, 71; 1908, 14.

The most important discussions of the excavators' methods and conclusions are: Rodenwalt 1919, 182; V.Wade-Gery 1930; Droop 1932;

Hartley 1932; Kunze 1933; Yavis 1949, 108–10; Benton 1950, 17f.; Kirsten 1958; Boardman 1963; Bergquist 1967, esp. 47–9.

For the cult of Orthia see Rose in *AO* ch. 12; a new study is promised by G.Kipp. The temple of c.700 is discussed by Drerup (1969, 19–21); the Archaic temple of c.570–560 was not distinguished and has attracted little art-historical attention.

Abbreviations

AA	<i>Archaeologischer Anzeiger</i> (until 1961 with JdI, thereafter published separately)
AAA	<i>Athens Annals of Archaeology</i>
AC	<i>L'Antiquité Classique</i>
AD	<i>Archaiologikon Deltion</i>
AE	<i>Archaiologiki Ephemeris</i> (earlier <i>Ephemeris Archaiologiki</i>)
AHR	<i>American Historical Review</i>
AJA	<i>American Journal of Archaeology</i>
AJP	<i>American Journal of Philology</i>
AK	<i>Antike Kunst</i>
AM	<i>Mitteilungen des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts (Athenische Abteilung)</i>
<i>Annales (ESC)</i>	<i>Annales (Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations)</i>
AO	<i>Artemis Orthia, JHS Supp. 5</i> , ed. R.M.Dawkins, London, 1929
AR	<i>Archaeological Reports</i> (supplement to <i>JHS</i>)
AS	<i>Ancient Society</i>
ASAA	<i>Annuario della Scuola Archeologica di Atene</i>
BAMA	<i>Bronze Age Migrations in the Aegean. Archaeological and Linguistic Problems in Greek Prehistory</i> , ed. R.A. Crossland and A.Birchall, London, 1973
BCH	<i>Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique</i>
BICS	<i>Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies</i>
BJ	<i>Bonner Jahrbücher des Rheinischen Landesmuseums in Bonn und des Vereins von Altertumsfreunden im Rheinlande</i>
BRL	<i>Bulletin of the John Rylands Library</i>
BSA	<i>Annual of the British School at Athens</i>
CAH	<i>The Cambridge Ancient History</i>
CP	<i>Classical Philology</i>
CQ	<i>Classical Quarterly</i>
CR	<i>Classical Review</i>

<i>CSSH</i>	<i>Comparative Studies in Society and History</i>
<i>EHR</i>	<i>Economic History Review</i>
<i>ESAG</i>	<i>Economic and Social Atlas of Greece</i> , ed. B.Kayser et al., Athens, 1964
<i>GR</i>	<i>Greece and Rome</i>
<i>HT</i>	<i>History and Theory</i>
<i>IG</i>	<i>Inscriptiones Graecae</i>
<i>IJNA</i>	<i>International Journal of Nautical Archaeology and Underwater Exploration</i>
<i>JdI</i>	<i>Jahrbuch des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts</i>
<i>JHS</i>	<i>Journal of Hellenic Studies</i>
<i>JRS</i>	<i>Journal of Roman Studies</i>
<i>JWG</i>	<i>Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte</i>
<i>LCM</i>	<i>Liverpool Classical Monthly</i>
<i>MH</i>	<i>Museum Helveticum</i>
<i>M/L</i>	<i>A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century B.C.</i> , ed. R.Meiggs and D.M.Lewis, Oxford, 1969
<i>MME</i>	<i>The Minnesota Messenia Expedition: Reconstructing a Bronze Age Regional Environment</i> , ed. W.A.McDonald and G.R.Rapp, Jr, Minneapolis, 1972
<i>OA</i>	<i>Opuscula Atheniensi</i>
<i>PAAH</i>	<i>Praktika tis en Athenais Archaïologikis Hetaireias</i>
<i>PBA</i>	<i>Proceedings of the British Academy</i>
<i>PCPhS</i>	<i>Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society</i>
<i>PP</i>	<i>La Parola del Passato</i>
<i>RD</i>	<i>Revue Historique de Droit français et étranger</i>
<i>RE</i>	<i>Paulys Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft</i>
<i>REA</i>	<i>Revue des Etudes Anciennes</i>
<i>REG</i>	<i>Revue des Etudes Grecques</i>
<i>RhM</i>	<i>Rheinisches Museum</i>
<i>RSA</i>	<i>Rivista Storica dell'Antichità</i>
<i>SEG</i>	<i>Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum</i>
<i>SMEA</i>	<i>Studi Micenei ed Egeo-Anatolici</i>
<i>TAPA</i>	<i>Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association</i>
<i>TLS</i>	<i>The Times Literary Supplement</i>
<i>WA</i>	<i>World Archaeology</i>
<i>YCS</i>	<i>Yale Classical Studies</i>
<i>ZPE</i>	<i>Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik</i>

Bibliographical appendix to the second edition

The original edition of *Sparta and Lakonia: A Regional History 1300–362 BC* appeared over twenty years ago, that is, for me, more than half a scholarly lifetime in the past. It was widely reviewed and generally well received—full if not quite complete details are available in the relevant volumes of the classicists’ bible, *L’Année Philologique*. One particularly acute reviewer (Michael Jameson) observed, perhaps a touch ambiguously, that ‘Cartledge gives a good deal more than his title promises or the reader may have bargained for’ (*The Bookshelf*, May/June 1981, 75). On the other hand, one exception to the generally favourable reception may be noted: Franz Kiechle in *Classical Review*. But he unfortunately laboured under the misapprehension that I was a pupil of Moses Finley and used my book to try to settle a few scores with his (properly, in my view) severe critic. Actually, as I was careful to state in the very first sentence of my Preface, the book was largely based on a doctoral dissertation completed under John (now ‘Professor Sir John’, but then just plain ‘Mr’) Boardman: ‘Early Sparta c. 950–650 BC: an Archaeological and Historical Study’ (University of Oxford, 1975); cf. Cartledge 2000.

The following bibliographical addenda are necessarily selective. A fuller bibliography, on pretty well all matters Spartan, may be found in Cartledge 2001 (collected essays, written over the same period, concentrating on the Archaic and Classical periods).

1. Sparta, General

A book on Sparta or some aspect of Sparta, Russell Meiggs once observed, is to be expected (if not necessarily welcomed) every two years. In the past three years (1998–2000) there have been no fewer than six: Baltrusch 1998, Birgalias 1999 (cf. Cartledge 1992a, Kennell 1995), Hodkinson 2000, Hodkinson & Powell eds 1999, Meier 1998, and Richer 1998. Other books wholly or importantly on Sparta published since 1979 include Cartledge & Spawforth 1989 (to be reprinted in 2001), Christ ed. 1986 (a collection of reprinted papers, with an important introductory survey of Spartan scholarship by the distinguished editor), Clauss 1983 (bibliographical), Hooker 1980, Kennell 1995, Lazenby 1985, Link 1994, MacDowell 1986, Malkin 1994, Nafissi 1991, Poralla & Bradford 1985 (prosopographical), Pomeroy 1997, Powell ed. 1989, Powell & Hodkinson eds 1994, Shipley, D.R. 1997, Stibbe 1996 (archaeological) and Thommen 1996. Further bibliography in Cartledge 2001 (see above).

Three scholars have made disproportionately important contributions to Spartan studies, in various aspects, since 1979; it is a pleasure to mention in dispatches

Ephraim David (1979, 1981, 1982/3, 1985, 1989a, 1989b, 1992, 1993, 1999), Jean Ducat (1983 [bibliographical], 1990, 1998, 1999a, 1999b, 1999c), and Stephen Hodkinson (1986, 1989, 1996, 1997a, 1997b, 1998, 1999a, 1999b, 2000).

2. Landscape and Geography

General: Alcock & Osborne eds 1994 (with my review Cartledge 1996b), Cavanagh 1991 (intensive field-survey), Daviero-Rocchi 1988, Hordern & Purcell 2000, Jameson et al. 1994/1995, Kirsten 1984, Osborne 1987, 1996, de Polignac 1994, 1995, Pritchett 1989–91, Rackham & Moody 1996, Rich & Wallace-Hadrill eds 1991, Sallares 1991, Shipley 1996, Shipley & Salmon eds 1996 (with my review, *AJA* 101, 1997, 789–90), and Snodgrass 1986, 1987.

Sparta and Lakonia (including Messenia): Cartledge 1998, Cavanagh & Crowel 1988, Cavanagh et al. 1996, forthcoming (the BSA/University of Amsterdam Lakonia survey), Davis et al. 1997 (the Pylos Regional Archeological Project); Barmijo et al. 1991 (464 BC earthquake at Sparta).

Comparative: Hirsch & O’Hanlon eds 1995, Hordern & Purcell 2000.

3. Archaeology and History

General: Finley 1986: ch. 5, Morris 1998, Salmon 1984 (successfully doing for Corinth to 338 BC something like what I have here attempted for Sparta to 362).

Spartan archaeology: Cartledge 2000, Cartledge 2001: ch. 12, Fitzhardinge 1980, Förtsch 1994, Hodkinson 1998, 1999a, 2000, Sanders ed. 1992, and Stibbe 1996.

4. Sparta, Early Historic

Dark Age: Cartledge 1992b, Coulson 1985, Eder ed. 1990, 1998, Margreiter 1988; cf. for Greece generally, Morris & Powell eds 1997, and Hölkeskamp 2000.

Archaic: Hodkinson 1997b.

5. Sparta, Classical

Politics: Berent 1994 (Greek *polis* seen as ‘a stateless political community’, Spartan *polis* as the most ‘state-like’), Bringmann 1980, and Cartledge 1980, 1998.

Public finance: Loomis 1992.

Religion: Catling 1990a, 1990b, and Pettersson 1992.

Society and culture: Bryant 1996, Calame 1977/1997, Cartledge 1981a, 1981b, 1996a, Ducat 1998, 1999a, 1999b, 1999c, Figueira 1984, Hodkinson 1999a, and Millender 1999.

Analysis and narrative, c.445–360 BC: Cartledge 1987, *passim*.

6. Helots

Ducat 1990 is now the basic work, if controversial in important parts; cf. Hodkinson 1997a. In *Sparta and Lakonia* (esp. ch. 10) and Cartledge 1987 (esp. ch. 10) I have

urged that the Helots should be regarded as the absolutely fundamental causal factor in Spartan history and social structure. This is not a universally shared view: see Talbert 1989 (with my rejoinder 1991) and Whitby 1994. In Cartledge 2001: ch. 11 (an updated reprint, with new introduction, of Cartledge 1985) I have tried to restate my case.

7. Perioikoi

One review of *Sparta and Lakonia* (by Simon Hornblower in the *TLS*) was published under the title ‘Promoting the Perioikoi’. If the book (esp. ch. 10) did its bit towards making their indispensable contribution to Spartan and Lakonian history a little less obscure, I would be content. Since 1979 we have learned much more about some of them through the work of the Lakonia survey (see § 2, above), and also from Hall 2000, Lotze 1994, Mertens 1999, Pritchett 1989, 1991, and (especially) Shipley, G. 1992, 1997. For Messenia, as opposed to Lakonia, see Bauslaugh 1990, Davis et al. 1997, and Figueira 1999.

8. The Spartan Crisis

I have myself devoted a whole book to this important subject, by the indirect means of a quasi-biography of King Agesilaos II (r.c.400–360): Cartledge 1987 (repr. 2000). For fullscale, head-on approaches, the assiduous and sophisticated work of Hodkinson (esp. 1983, 1989, 1996, and 2000) stands out. See also Christien 1998, and Cartledge & Spawforth 1989: ch. 1 (repr. with addenda 2001).

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Index

Toponyms are listed under their ancient form, where this is known, with the modern name in brackets where the identification is secure. For an alphabetical listing of the modern names of archaeological sites in Lakonia and Messenia readers are referred to the Appendix.

- Achaean (pre-Dorians), 51, 84, 87, 92, 301; Dorian Spartans represented as, 46, 65–66, 97, 120, 295
- Achaia/Achaians: historical, 75, 79, 104, 100, 232; and Sparta, 197, 220, 238, 244, 257; *see also* Leagues; prehistoric, 61, 62
- adzes, iron, 269
- Aelian, 110, 269
- Aetos (on Ithaka), 75
- Agamemnon: Agesilaos as a second, 236; cult at Amyklai, 97, 120; Homeric, 35, 104, 291
- Agasikles (Eurypontid king), 103, 118, 294
- Ageladas (Argive), 132
- Agesilaos II (Eurypontid king), 123–4, 142, 154, 233, 234, 236–7, 252, 265; campaigns: Akarnania, 243–4, Arkadia, 252–3, Asia, 236–7, 238–9, 240–1, Boiotia, 240, 248, Corinthia, 244, Lakonia, 254, 258; conservatism, 238; hatred of Thebes, 247–8, 250; panhellenism; 233, 236, 243, 246; political opponents, 247, 255; responsibility for Spartan decline, 259, 272; *see also* Lysander; mercenaries
- Agesipolis I (Agiad king), 239, 244, 247
- Agiads (Spartan royal house), 89, 90, 292–8
- Agis I (eponym of Agiads), 89, 295, 297; and Helots, 84, 300
- Agis II (Eurypontid king), 144, 179, 202, 233; campaigns: Argolis, 217, Arkadia, *see* Mantinea, battles of (418), Attika, 202, 206, 222, 230; opposition to Pausanias (Agiad king), 231
- Agis IV (Eurypontid king), 273; revolutionary proposals, 146, 274, 275, 277; and Spartan mirage, 142, 146, 167
- agriculture: Mediterranean dietary triad, 32; ‘Neolithic Revolution’, 26, 40; *see also* Lakonia
- Aigaleon ridge, 100
- Aigeidai (Spartan aristocratic clan), 295
- Aigiai (Palaiochora), 276; in Catalogue of Ships, 291; site, 164
- Aigilia (Antikythera), 242; geology, 15
- Aigina/Aiginetans: ally of Sparta, 125, 127, 129–30, 194, 209; and Athens, 194, 197, 203, 209; coinage, 147, 148–9; and Helots, 180, 188; medism, 129, 189
- Aigospotamoi, battle of (405), 225, 229
- Aigys/Aigyis, 216; conquest by Sparta, 86, 89, 92, 109; disputed control, 256, 257, 275; geology, 6, 11, 18
- Aipytds, 102
- Aithaia, 187, 255
- Aitolia/Aitolians, 75, 80, 205; *see also* Leagues
- Akanthians/Akanthos, 229, 246
- Akarnania, 244
- Akovitika: historical, 83, 87, 104, 165, *see also* Pohoidan, cults, Thouria; prehistoric, 32

- Akriai (Kokkinia), 276
 alabaster, 36
 Alagonia, 276
 Alepotrypa cave, 28, 29, 30
 Alesiai, 147
 Alexandros (Spartiate), 253
 Alkamenes (Agiad king), 297; alleged conquest of Helos, 92, 301
 Alkibiades, 216, 220–21, 223; family connections with Sparta, 216; in Sparta, 221
 Alkidas (Spartiate), 224
 Alkman, 46–7, 133, 136, 294–5; on birthplace of Dioskouroi, 161; maritime interest, 118; poems cited, 22, 116, 147, 148, 150, 242, 290
 alluviation, recent, 10, 16, 17, 100–1
 Al Mina (in Syria), 117
 alphabet, Greek invention of, 44, 88; *see also* inscriptions
 Alpeios, river, 15, 80; as frontier of Lakonia, 5–6, 119
 amber: historical, 104; prehistoric, 36, 39
 Ambrakiots, Doric speech of, 205
 amethyst, 36
 amnesty, general, at Athens (403), 231
 Amorges (Persian), 223
 amphiktyonies:
 Delphic, 182; Kalaureian, 105, 121
 Amphipolis, 240; Brasidas and, 211–12, 214
 Ampurias (in Spain), 119
 Amyklai: in Catalogue of Ships, 289–90; historical, absorption by Sparta, 81, 90–3, 295, cult of Apollo/ Hyakinthos, 57, 68–70, 83, 87, 93, 97, 104, 119, 121, 134, 158, 244, *see also* Hyakinthia, as obe (village) of Sparta, 69, 92–3, 111, Protogeometric, 69–71, 71–3, 76, 79–80; prehistoric, 33, 56, 57, 59, 61
 Amyntas III (King of Macedon), 246
 Analipsis, 6; historical, 97, 156, identification, 162; prehistoric, 36, 58
 Anaxandridas I (Eurypontid king), 296
 Anaxandridas II (Agiad king), 123; and bigamy, 123, 264; and Chilon, 120, 136
 Anaxandros (Agiad king), 110
 Anaxibios (Spartiate), 233, 245
 Anaxilaos (Eurypontid king), 296
 Anaxilas (tyrant of Rhegion), 132–3
 Anchimolios (Spartiate), 126, 177
 Andania, 6, 110
 Andokides (Athenian), 243
 Androtion (Athenian), 84, 159
 Angelona, 164
 Anoyia, 149
 Antalkidas (Spartiate), 243; and Agesilaos, 243–4; and Persia, 241, 243–4, 245–6, 249; *see also* Peaces, King's
 Anthana, 125; identification, 162
 Anthochorion: historical, 72, 76, 85, 156, 164, identification, 291; prehistoric, 291
 Antigonos Doson (King of Macedon), 274
 Antiochos of Syracuse (historian), 300
 antiquarianism, 44, 51
 Antirhion, 80
 Antony (M. Antonius), 276
 Aphrodite, cults of: at Dichova, 165; on Kythera, 105–6, 122
 Aphroditia, 209
 Apollo, 79; cults: at Geronthrai, 163, Hyakinthios (at Taras), 107, Karneios (at Las), 165, Korynthos (at Ay. Andreas), 166, Maleatas (at Kosmas), 162, at Thornax, 254, Tyritas (at Tyros), 122, *see also* Amyklai; Delphi/Delphic Oracle; Hyakinthia; Hyperteleton; Karneia; and 'Great Rhetra', 116–17
 Apollodoros, 65, 297
 archaeological evidence: and Dorian settlement of Lakonia, 70; historicalinterpretation of, 7–8, 50, 122, 133, pottery, 31, 33, 53–4, 79–80, 87, 96, 106; from surface survey, 28–9, 31, 39, 54, 56; and 'tradition', 66, 81, 133
 Archelaos (Agiad king): and conquest of Aigys, 89, 92; and origins of joint monarchy, 89–90
 Archidamian War, title, 202
 Archidamos II (Eurypontid king), 223–4, 225; campaigns: Dipaieis, 186, 'the' Peloponnesian War, 202, Third Messenian War, 186, 187, 190; guest-friend of Perikles, 202
 Archidamos III (Eurypontid king), 252, 255, 256, 257
 Argive Heraion, 104, 129; Lakonian artefacts at, 72, 85, 117
 Argives/Argos, 5, 13, 85, 96, 109, 112, 131, 191, 216, 243; neutrality in Persian Wars, 129, 174, 175; and Sparta: alliance (418–417), 220, alliances with Sparta's enemies, 176, 185, 189, 193, 194, 214, 216, 237, 239, battles, *see* Hysiai;

- Oinoe; Sepeia; Thyreatis; disputed control of E.Parnon foreland, 5, 13, 106, 107, 109, 118, 121–2, 125, 194, 215–16, 273, 274, invasion of Lakonia (370), 253, thirty years' truce (450), 196, 199, 214; 'union' with Corinth, 241, 244, 245
- Argolis, 31–2, 36, 59, 68, 69, 74–5, 76, 94, 96, 99, 122, 182, 194, 203; climate, 21–2, 23; Spartan attacks on: in Corinthian War, 244, in 'the' Peloponnesian War, 217, 220, 221
- Arion, 123
- Ariontia (Spartan festival), 200
- Aristagoras (tyrant of Miletos), 128, 131, 132
- Aristarchos (Spartiate), 233
- aristocratic attitudes, 96, 135, 157
- Aristodamos (great-great-grandson of Herakles), 90, 293, 294, 295; *see also* Herakleidai, myth of Return
- Aristodamos (guardian of Agesipolis I), 239
- Aristomenes (Messenian), 98, 110, 132
- Ariston (Eurypontid king), 119, 294
- Aristophanes, cited, 148, 203, 213
- Aristotle, 7, 88, 134, 140; on Sparta, 263, 272, army, 218–19, Helots, 138, 152–3, 184, 263, 302, 304–5, 306, land-tenure, 109, 142–3, 146, 263–4, 271, number of citizens, 145, 270, 271, Partheniai, 107, 115, *stasis*, 115
- Arkadia/Arkadians, 68, 83, 104, 175, 182, 232; and Messenia, 103, 110, 119, 255, and Sparta, 47, 110, 118, 130–1, 136, 137, 161, 184, 186, 214, 238, 239, 256; *see also* Leagues
- Artaxerxes I (King of Persia), 237
- Artaxerxes II (King of Persia), 232–3, 235, 237, 240, 243, 245–6; *see also* Peaces, King's
- Artemis, cults of: Karyatis (at Karyai), 176; Limnatis (at Volimnos), 72, 86, 97, 276–7; Orthia (at Sparta), 57, 77, 91, 93, 96, 103, 104, 111, 118, 277, history of sanctuary, 308–12
- Artemision, battle of (480), 123, 177
- Asea (in Arkadia), 97, 161, 276
- Asia, Greeks of, 180, 223–4, 227, 232, 233, 236, 243, 245–6, 288; *see also* Ionia/Ionians; Persia/Persian Empire
- Asine (in Argolis), 59, 84, 109
- Asine (Koroni in Messenia), 84, 123, 166, 188, 206, 207, 221, 232, 255, 256; 'planting' of by Sparta, 84, 103, 109
- Asine (Skoutari in Lakonia), 156, 165, 209, 255, 256
- Asopos (Plytra), 15, 163, 276
- Astros, 11, 85, 128–9, 156, 162, 253
- Athenaia (Spartan festival), 200
- Athenaios (Spartiate), 158, 189
- Athenaios (writer), 138, 299
- Athenians/Athens, 6, 62, 111, 117, 124, 125, 189–90, 192–225; climate, 22, 24; corn-supply, 181, 201, 222, 225, 243, 245; democracy, 48, 103, 124, 126–7, 157, 231, 232; empire/imperialism, 183, 201, 209–10, 223, 225, 229, 238, 241, 245, 248, *see also* 'dual hegemony' thesis; Leagues, Delian; Second Athenian Confederacy; navy, 123, 166, 200–1, 202, 203–4, 238, 248, 249, *see also* Peiraieus; and Persia, 129, 177, 236–7, 242; and Sicily, 200, 221–2; and Sparta, 183, 187, 188, 189–90, 193–4, 213–14, 215–16, 224–5, 230–2, 239, 255–6, 257–8; and Thebes, 237–8, 239, 248, 258; 'Thirty' at (404–403), 228, 229–31, 258; walls, 181, 242–3
- Attika, 74–5, 76, 99, 104, 130, 176, 213; Spartan invasions of, 197, 202–3, 206, 222, 230–1
- Augeiai, Homeric, 290–1
- Augustus, Emperor, 275–6
- Aulis (in Boiotia), 236
- Aulon, 154, 234
- Autokles (Athenian envoy), 249–50
- Autokles (Athenian general), 208
- autonomy principle, 154, 236, 241–2, 243; Spartan conception of, 236, 247, 250, 256, 257
- axes, iron, 78, 269
- Ay. Efstratios, 29
- Ay. Ioannis (in Thyreatis), 128
- Ay. Pelayia, 164, 209
- Ay. Petros, 128
- Ay. Stephanos: identification with Homeric Helos, 291; prehistoric, 31, 33, 35–6, 37, 39, 40, 43, 56, 59, 156
- Ay. Triada (in Thyreatis), 129
- Ay. Vasilios, 291
- Babyka (bridge at Sparta), 116, 249
- Bacchylides, 294
- Bahima/Bahuma (of Uganda), 82, 84
- barley, 16, 18, 29–30, 147, 207; contributed to Spartan messes, 145, 147, 306

- Bassai (in Arkadia), 122
 Bathykles of Magnesia, 134, 158
 bee, 150
 Belmina/Belminatis, disputed control, 6, 131, 161, 254, 256, 273, 275
 Bithynoi (of Byzantion), compared to Helots, 303
 Black Sea, *see* Athenians/Athens, corn-supply
 boar, wild, 149, 158; *see also* Sparta/Spartans, hunting
 Boiai (Neapolis), 54, 105, 156, 159, 164, 196, 276; iron ore, 14, 78, 155, 164
 Boiotia/Boiotians, 78, 99, 100, 104, 125, 126, 131, 178, 195, 196; *see also* Leagues; Thebans/Thebes
 bone, carvings in, 117
 Boupbras, 212
 Brasidas (Spartiate), 203, 204, 225, 242; Thracian expedition, 210–212, 214, 218, 229, 267; *see also* Helots, manumission, Brasideioi
 bronze, *see* Lakonia
 Bronze Age, 30–40, 57–64
 Bryseiai, 290, 291
 burials, *see* dead, disposal of
 Byzantion, 183, 233, 241; *see also* Bithynoi

 Caria, 237
 Carthage, 263
 Catalogue of Ships, Homeric, 56, 85, 92, 289–91, 292
 cauldrons, bronze, 79, 104
 Cavafy, C.P., 171
 cereals, 22, 23, 29–30, 81–2, 167, 200–1, 217, 242; *see also* barley; Lakonia, agriculture
 Chaironeia, battle of (338), 273
 Chalkideus (Spartiate), 158, 226
 Chalkidian League, *see* Leagues
 Chalkis, 126
 Chandrinou, 165, 166
 charcoal-burning, 13
 Charillos (Eurypontid king), co-king of Archelaos, *q.v.*
 chariot-racing, 135; *see also* Sparta/Spartans
 Charmis (Spartiate), 148
 Charon of Lampsakos, 182, 296
 Chateaubriand, 162
 cheese, 147, 148,
 Cheirisophos (Spartiate), 232
 Chelmos, Mount, 6, 161
 Chersonisi, 97
 Chians/Chios, 117, 224, 246; and slavery, 226–7, 299, 301
 Chileos (Tegean), 178
 Chilon (Spartiate), 105, 120, 125, 133, 177; *see also* Anaxandridas II
 Choireios Nape (Sandava gorge), 276
 Chrysapha, 155, 162–3
 Cicero, cited, 182, 265
 civil war, *see stasis*
 climate/climatic change, 8–10, 16, 21–5, 61; *see also* Lakonia
 coinage, *see* Perioikoi; Sparta/Spartans, money
 colonization, western, 88, 89, 94, 99, 107, 112; *see also* Taras
 copper, 30, 78, 156, 157, 158
 Corcyra, *see* Kerkyra
 Corinth/Corinthians, 8, 96, 99, 175, 194, 198–200, 252; and Argos, *see* Argives/Argos; and Athens, 193–4, 197, 198–9, 230; and Persia, 236, 237–8, 242–3; and Sparta: Peloponnesian League ally, 127–8, 213, 214, 216, 230, 231–2, 236, 254, 257, Samian expedition (525), 120, 123, in Second Messenian War, 110, 120, strategic importance, 120
 Corinthia, 94, 208, 242–3
 Corinthian Gulf, 80, 193–4, 195
 Corinthian War (395–386), 237–45, 259
 Croesus (King of Lydia), 233; alliance with Sparta, 119, 123
 Cretans/Crete: historical, 75, 111, 263, mercenaries in First Messenian War, 102, social system, 140, 275, 301, 302–3, 306, *see also* Klarotai; prehistoric, 33, 37, 58, 59, 61, colony on Kythera, 32–3
 Cunaxa, battle of (401), 233
 Cyprus, 54, 61, 87, 94, 104, 245
 Cyrenaica, 232
 Cyrus (Persian prince): friendship with Lysander, 140, 224–5, 229; revolt, 232, 233, 259

 daggers, iron, 78, 131, 269
 Daimachos, cited, 77–8
 Damaratos (Eurypontid king), 177–8, 196, 209, 274, 296–7; Herodotus and, 124, 171–3; medism, 124, 130, 171, 173, 176, 185; rivalry with and deposition by

- Kleomenes I, 124, 126, 129–30, 171, 173, 247, 294
- Damonon (Spartiate), victory stele of, 141, 199–200
- Darius I (King of Persia), 171, 173, 180
- Darius II (King of Persia), 223
- Dark Age, 9, 45, 70, 80, 82, 85, 87, 89–90, 102, 131, 288
- dead, disposal of, historical: Archaic graves in Sparta, 149, 158, burial grounds and funerals of Spartan kings, 90, 199, 234, tomb of Spartans in Kerameikos of Athens (403), 231, warrior-graves, 102, 110; prehistoric: chamber tombs, 36–7, 39, 54, 57–8, 97, 102, cist-graves, 31, 54, 58, 62–3, cremation, 68, tholos tombs, 36–7, 39, 58
- dekarchies, *see* Lysander
- Dekeleia, Spartan *epiteichismos* at (413–404), 222, 224, 231
- Dekeleian War, title, 222
- Delian League, *see* Leagues
- Delion, battle of (424), 212
- Delos, 117
- Delphi/Delphic Oracle: bribery of by Kleomenes I, 126, 129; dedications at, 97, 129, 132, 205; international importance of, 89; medium of, 128, 173; Sparta and, 65–6, 89, 90, 107, 116–17, 118, 184, 194, 195, 196, 197, 295; *see also* amphiktyonies; Pythioi
- democracy, 124, 126–7, 157, 185, 209, 214, 220, 228, 229, 245, 247; *see also* Athenians/Athens; Sparta/Spartans, support for oligarchies
- Demosthenes (Athenian general), and *epiteichismos*: at Pylos, 205–6, in Lakonia, 221–2; and Naupaktos Messenians, 196, 205–6, 241–2
- Denteliatis, 11, 18, 72, 148; conquest of by Sparta, 98; disputed control, 97, 273, 274, 275, 276
- Dereion, 149
- Derkyllidas (Spartiate), 235, 240, 241; bachelor status, 235, 270
- Derveni (in Achaia), 75
- Dholiana (in Arkadia), 155
- Dichova, 165
- Dikaiarchos, cited, 147, 148–9
- Diodorus Siculus: cited, 186, 203, 228–58, *passim*; as historian, 152, 183, 187, 190, 192, 195–6, 196, 248, 251, 297
- Dionysios I (tyrant of Syracuse), 232, 241, 246, 256
- Dionysios of Halikarnassos, 192
- Dioskouroi, 105, 294; birthplace of disputed, 105, 187
- Dipaieis (or Dipaia), battle of (c.465), 184, 186
- dogs, hunting (Lakonian hounds), *see* Sparta/Spartans
- Dorians, 85, 92, 96, 99, 104, 109, 120, 176, 197, 310; character, 66, 86–7; dialect, 20, 66–9, 83, 88, 205, 208; migration, 49, 65, 66–76, 80–2, 86, 87, 90, 102, 115, 131, 145, 274; tribes, 80; *see also* Doris; Herakleidai; Karneia
- Dorieus (Agiad prince), 124, 125, 178, 265
- Doris, supposed Dorian homeland, 80, 194
- drought, annual summer, 22–3
- ‘dual hegemony’ thesis, 189, 190, 193, 197, 202, 207, 249
- Dymanes, *see* Dorians, tribes
- earthquakes, 15, 289; *see also* Lakonia
- Egypt, 52–3, 62, 104, 119, 209, 222, 272
- Einstein, Albert, 219
- Eleians/Elis: democracy, 185; and Sparta: ally, 110, 119, 120, 220–1, 257; hostile to, 173, 176, 213, 214, 216, 231–2, 234, 236, 252, 254; *see also* Triphylia
- Eleusinion (Kalyvia tis Sochas), 164, 200
- Eleusis (in Attika), 43, 230
- Eleutherolakonian League, *see* Leagues
- environment, possibilities of, 10, 19, 21
- Epameinondas (Theban): invasions of Lakonia, 128, 131, 253–5, 257–8; liberation of Messenians, 110, 255; victories, 251, 257–8
- Ephesos, 236
- Ephors, at Thera, 93; *see also* Sparta/Spartans, Ephorate/Ephors
- Ephorus of Kyme, 49, 66, 98, 112, 120, 143; and Helots, 300–1, 302; *see also* Diodorus Siculus, as historian
- Epic Cycle, 46
- Epidauros (in Argolis), Spartan ally, 203, 208, 216, 220, 254
- Epidauros Limera (Epidauros Limera): historical, 13, 74, 122, 156, 163, 164, 209, 221, 276; prehistoric, 36, 37, 39, 58, 59, 61
- Epirus, 54, 80

- Epitadeus (Spartiate), alleged *rhetra* of, 144, 271, 272, 273
- epiteichismos*, 196, 204, 208, 213, 220, 221; Kythera, 208–10, 212, 213, 220, 224, 242, 244, 259; near Onougnathos, 221; Pylos, 205–8, 224; *see also* Dekeleia
- Erasinos, river (in Argolis), 128, 165
- Eratosthenes of Cyrene, 47, 49, 51, 88, 297
- Eretria, 130, 180
- Erythrai, 241
- Eua (Helleniko), 97, 162
- Euagoras (Spartiate), 199
- Euaiphnos (Spartan), 99
- Eualkes (Perioikos), 220, 268
- Euboia/Euboians, 164, 203; and Athens, 126, 196, 224; and western colonization, 88, 89, 99
- Eunomos (alleged Eurypontid king), 90
- Eupolis, 133
- Euripides, 21, 101
- Eurotas (Eurotas): river, 6, 16, 23, 24, 254–5, 308, 310; furrow/valley, 3, 13, 15–18, 23, 31, 39, 58, 61, 80, 86, 98, 99, 100, 122, 134, 145, 146, 162, 203, 254, 255
- Eurybiadas (Spartiate), 177, 180
- Eurycles, C.Julius (Spartan), 276
- Eurymedon, battle of (c.469), 189
- Euryp(h)on (eponym of Eurypontids), 89–90, 295, 296–7
- Eurypontids (Spartan royal house), 89, 90, 293–8
- Eurysthenes (alleged founder of Agiads), 90, 297, 300
- Eusebius, 125, 297
- Eutaia (in Arkadia), 253
- Eutresioi, 256
- Evagoras (Cypriot king), 245
- evidence, 7–10, 98, 110; ‘tradition’, 65, 66, 70, 80, 81, 84, 85, 92, 93, 102, 110; *see also* archaeological evidence
- faience, 104
- fibulae (safety-pins), 57
- fir, 13
- First Peloponnesian War, 194–7, 226, 240
- fish/fishing, 156; bronze votive, 83; in Lakonia, 118, 149, 156
- Flamininus, T.Quinctius, liberation of Perioikoi by, 153, 275
- flautists, 158
- forest, 18, 21, 149
- fortifications, *see* walls
- fowl, domestic, 150, 162
- Franchthi cave (in Argolis), 26, 28, 29
- frost, 24
- Gelon (tyrant of Syracuse), 174
- geography: ancient Greek, 6, 10; and history, 3, 4
- Geraneia, Mount (in Megarid), 194
- Gerania, 19, 276
- Geronthrai (Geraki): geology, 14; historical, 92, 97, 105, 162, 163, 276, as Spartan colony, 153; prehistoric, 29, 33, 59
- Gibbon, Edward, 44, 48, 49, 50, 51, 65
- Gitiadas (Lakonian), 132
- Gla (in Boiotia), 61
- glass, 104
- Glaukos (Spartiate) extinction of line of, 265
- Glympeis (or Glyppia), *see* Kosmas, identification
- Gnosstas (Perioikos), 185, 216
- goats, 148
- gold, 31, 37, 104, 119, 180; Persian bribes in, 237, 243
- Gonies, 164
- Goranoi, 155
- Gorgo (Agiad queen), 124, 128
- Goritsa, 29, 163
- Gortyn, Code of, 140
- Goules, 29
- Gouves, 29
- graves, *see* dead, disposal of
- Greek, language, 32, 66–7; *see also* Dorians, dialect; Linear B
- Grote, George, 48, 50, 51, 88, 151, 154, 223
- Gylippos (Spartiate), 221, 225, 269–70
- Gymnesioi/Gymnetes (of Argos) compared to Helots, 301, 303
- Gymnopaidiai (Spartan festival), 109, 121, 182, 252, 265
- Gytheion (Gytheion), 18, 23, 98, 164, 255, 273, 276; dockyards, 195, 222; port, 76–7, 85, 105, 123, 156–7, 182, 207, 226; slaves at, 154
- hail, 23–4
- Haliartos, battle of (395), 238, 240
- Halieis (in Argolis), 203, 254
- hare, 149
- harmosts, *see* Sparta/Spartans
- Hegesistratos (Eleian), 179

- Hekataios of Miletos, 47, 48, 51; and Spartan king-lists, 294, 297
- Helen, cult of, 97, 104, 112, 150; *see also* Menelaion
- Hellanikos of Lesbos, 49, 193; and Helots, 300; and Karneia at Sparta, 111
- Hellenic Leagues, *see* Leagues
- Hellespont, 181, 183, 222, 223, 225, 236, 240, 245
- Helos: Achaean, 85, 92, 300, 301; classical, 83, 92, 141, 163, 199, 209; Homeric, 56, 290; plain of, 16–17, 29, 33, 83, 147, 163
- Helots, 113, 124, 134, 138–53, 166–7, 299–307; as Achilles heel of Spartans, 189, 208, 210, 212, 213, 227, 265; attitude to Spartans, 133, 183–4, 196, 199, 267, 268, 272, 305; as basis of Spartan society, 3, 83, 100, 103, 117, 138, 152, 157, 184, 227, 229, 255; end of, 275, 300; family life, 140–1, 152, 171, 234; functions: batmen/baggage-carriers, 128, 129, 167, 176, 179, 210, 217, 236, 306, cup-bearers at mess, 307, farmers, 146–51, 267, 306, grooms, 307, guard, 131, harmosts, alleged, 238, herdsman, 148, hoplites, 159, 167, 210, 214, 221, 254, 256, household servants, 151, 307, miscellaneous, 129, 133, 180, mourners at royal funerals, 234, sailors, 177, 256, 306; Lakonian, distinguished from Messenian, 152, 187, 188, 215, 222, 254–5; manumission, 142, 154, 208, 211, 226–7, 274, 275, Brasideioi, 215, 218, 267, Neodamodeis, 159, 215, 217, 218, 221, 226, 230, 233, 236, 239, 240, 254, 267–8, 269, 305; Messenian: liberation of, 98, 102, 131, 142, 152, 255, 259, as majority of Helot population, 83, 187, 300, political aspirations, 139, 152, 189–90; numbers, 83, 151, 178, 265; origins, 81, 83–4, 86–7, 139, 300–2, *see also* Messenian Wars; property rights, 144, 152; religious rights, 141, 166, 167, 184, 190; revolts, 116, 132, 151, 152, 167, 177–8, 184, 186–90, 191, 194, 195, 227, 232, 299, 306–7, *see also* Messenian Wars; status, 139–42, 301–3, ‘between free men and slaves’, 139, 141, 303, as serfs, 83, 142, 221; treatment by Spartans, 127, 151–2, 210–11, 212, 303–5, Ephors’ annual declaration of war, 141–2, 305, Krypteia, 151, 211, 235, 304; *see also* Kinadon, Kleomenes III; Nabis; Pausanias (Agiad regent)
- Heraia/Heraians, 131, 217
- Herakleia Trachinia, 195, 204, 210
- Herakleidai: myth of Return, 49, 65–6, 68–9, 81, 102, 115; rulers of Dorian states, 68, 81, 105, 270, 295
- Herakleides Lembos, 143
- Herakles, 46, 68, 107
- heralds, 158, 173
- Hermai, 5, 162
- Hermione (in Argolis), 203, 254
- hero-cults, *see* Lakonia
- Herodotus: as historian, 44, 48, 49, 51, 123–4, 130, 153, 171–3, 191, 218; on Sparta, 103, 115, 118–32, *passim*, 133, 134, 151, 153, 171–82, *passim*, 199, 270–1, 293–8
- Heroön (Spartan sanctuary), 76
- Hesiod, 46, 78, 88, 100, 107, 306
- Hesychius, 155
- Hippeis, *see* Sparta/Spartans, army organization
- Hippias of Elis, 49, 88
- Hippias (tyrant of Athens), 126, 127; *see also* Peisistratids
- Hippodamos (Milesian), 263
- Hippokratidas (Eurypontid king), 296
- Hippola (Kipoula), 111, 165, 276
- Hira, Mount, 5, 6, 110
- Histiaios (tyrant of Miletos), 173, 180
- historiography, ancient: Greek invention, 6–7, 44, 45; and myth, 47, 49, 88; and oral tradition, 43–51, 294
- historiography, modern, *see* antiquarianism; evidence; geography, and history; illiteracy; regional history
- Hittites, 52–3, 62
- Hobbes, Thomas, 192
- Homer/Homeric poems, 79, 88–9, 104, 105, 295, 306; as history, 43, 45, 48, 49, 288–92; *see also* Catalogue of Ships
- hoplite warfare/hoplites: amateurism of, 202; introduction, 109, 135; Lakonian representations of, 111, 123, 136, 163, 165, 166; *see also* Helots, functions; Perioikoi, functions; Sparta/Spartans, army organization
- horses, 32, 96, 104, 142, 149–50, 158, 163; *see also* chariot-racing

- Hume, David, 141, 190
 Hyakinthia (Amyklaian festival), 70, 92, 178, 244
 Hyakinthian Way, 163
 Hyakinthos, *see* Amyklai, cult of Apollo/
 Hyakinthos
 Hylleis, *see* Dorians, tribes
 Hyperteateon (sanctuary of Apollo
 Hyperteateas at Phoiniki), 72, 85–6,
 158, 164, 274; *see also* Leukai/Leuke
 Hysiai (in Argolis), 220; battle of (669
 trad.), 109, 116, 118, 121
- Iapygians, 107
 Iasaia/Iasos (in Lakonia), 97, 162
 Iasos, 201
 illiteracy, 44, 48, 49
 Illyria, 80
 Imbros, 243, 245
 Ino-Pasiphaë, oracular shrine of (at
 Thalamai), 165
 inscriptions, 88, 162, 185, 194, 205, 208,
 238, 241; Lakonian, 93, 104, 154, 158,
 164, 165, 199–200, 220, 256, 265
 Iolkos (in Thessaly), 61
 Ionia/Ionians, 182; revolts, 128, 129, 173,
 180
 Ionian War, title, 222
 Iphikrates (Athenian), 244–5, 249, 259; *see*
also peltasts
 iron/iron-working, 68, 88; *see also* Lakonia
 Iron Age, 77–9, 106
 Isagoras (Athenian), 126
 Ischolaos (Spartiate), 254
 Isokrates, 81, 145, 151, 228, 246, 252, 255;
 on Perioikoi, 154, 302, 304
 Isthmus of Corinth: congress at (481), 171,
 174; in Corinthian War, 242–3; in
 Persian Wars, 174; strategic importance,
 194, 195, 196, 212, 240–1; walls across:
 historical, 177, 178, prehistoric, 62
 Ithaka, 61, 73–4, 75
 Ithome: Mount, 100, 102, 187, 188, 189,
 190, 193–4, 255, sanctuary of Zeus on,
 166; as original name of Messene, 255
 ivory, 104, 111, 117, 133, 135
- Jason (tyrant of Pherai), 149, 252
- Kadmeia (akropolis of Thebes), Spartan
 occupation of, 246, 247
 Kainepolis (Kyparissi), 276
- Kallias (Athenian), 249
 Kallikratidas (Spartiate), 225
 Kallikyrioi (of Syracuse), compared to
 Helots, 302
 Kallisthenes, 143
 Kallistratos (Athenian), 250
 Kallistratos (writer), 303
 Kallon (Aiginetan), 132
 Kambos, 29, 36, 58
 Kaphirio, 72, 75, 97
 Karaousi, 29, 56, 59
 Kardamyle (Kardamyli): historical, 98, 111,
 155, 156, 165, 276; prehistoric, 18, 29
 Karneia (festival): Dorians and, 176; at
 Sparta, 80, 111, 176, 178
 Karnion (Xerillos), river, 6, 18
 Karpathos, 241
 Karyai/Karyatis: disputed control, 131, 253,
 256, 273, 276; medism, 176, 185, 253;
 site, 5, 162, 216; strategic importance,
 176; *see also* Artemis, Karyatis
 Karystos (in Lakonia): wine of, 148
 Kastri, *see* Skandeia
 Kephallenia, 61, 79, 232
 Kerkyra (Corfu), 8, 99, 178, 198, 206, 209;
stasis, 205, 228, 249
 Kimon (Athenian), 189, 193
 Kinadon (Spartan), conspiracy of, 152, 205,
 233–5, 238, 243, 255, 267–9
 Kinaithon (Spartan), 46, 47, 51, 295
 Kitries, 19
 Klarotai (of Crete), compared to Helots,
 301, 302
 Klazomenai, 245
 Klearchos (Spartiate), 233
 Kleissoura pass, 128, 162, 254
 Kleisthenes (Athenian), 126
 Kleombrotos I (Agiad king), 248, 251; *see*
also Leuktra, battle of
 Kleombrotos (Agiad regent), 124, 177, 178
 Kleomenes I (Agiad king), 123–33, 136–7,
 265, 294, 296–7, 306; and Argos, 128–9,
 175; and Arkadia, 130–1, 183; and
 Athens, 126–7; Herodotus and, 123–4,
 171–3; religious outlook, 126, 130, 165;
see also Damaratos, rivalry with and
 deposition by Kleomenes I; Latychidas
 II
 Kleomenes III (Agiad king), 257; and
 Helots, 141, 274; revolution of, 142,
 144, 274–5, 277; *see also* Agis IV
 Kleon (Athenian), 212; and Pylos, 207–8

- Knakion, river (at Sparta), 116, 249
- Knidos: battle of (394), 240, 241: as Spartan colony, 93–4
- Knossos, 39, 43, 50, 54
- Kokkinochomata, 29
- Kollinai, 155–6
- Kolonides, 166, 256
- Konon (Athenian), 235, 237, 240, 241–2, 243; and *epiteichismos* on Kythera, 242
- Korone (Petalidhi), 256
- Koroneia, battles of: (447), 196; (394), 240
- Korynephoroi (of Sikyon), compared to Helots, 301, 303
- Koryphasion, *see* Pylos, historical
- Kosmas, 13, 121, 166; identification, 13, 162; *see also* Apollo, Maleatas
- Kotroni, 58
- Kotyrtá (Daimonia), 72, 86, 164, 209, 276
- Kouphouvouno, 28, 29, 30
- Kratinos, 133
- Kratippos, 192
- Kresphontes, 102; *see also* Herakleidai, myth of Return
- Kreusis, 43
- Kritias (Athenian): and Sparta, 139, 140, 228, 301, 304; *see also* Athenians/ Athens, ‘Thirty’ at
- Krokeai (Krokeai), 37, 58, 59
- Kromnos/Kromoi, 256, 257
- Kydonia (Chania), 43
- Kyme (in Asia), 233
- Kyniska (Eurypontid princess), 142
- Kynosoura, *see* Sparta (town), obes/ villages
- Kynossema, battle of (411), 224
- Kynouria, *see* Thyreatis
- Kyparissia (Kyparissia), 166, 206, 255, 257
- Kyphanta (Kyparissi), 156, 185, 221, 276
- Kyranaios (Lakonian), 158
- Kythera (Kythera): geology, 14–15; historical, 97, 105–6, 121, 122, 123, 156–7, 196, 209–10, 222, 226, 276, as Spartan colony, 94, 153, strategic importance, 105, 177, *see also* *epiteichismos*; prehistoric, 31, 32, 35–6, 39, 58, 156–7
- Kyzikos, battle of (410), 136, 224
- Labotas (Agiad king), 85
- Laina, 31
- Lakedaimonios (Athenian), 189
- Lakonia: agriculture, 16, 140, 147–51, 156, 269; ancient names for, 5; bronze artefacts: historical, 71, 78, 79, 83, 88, 89, 104, 111, 117, 119, 121, 123, 132, 134, 135, 149, 154, 157, 158, 163, 164, 165, 166, prehistoric, 31; central place of, 4, 36, 57, 68, 80–1, 102; climate, 21–5, 117, 265; communications, 6, 13, 16, 18, 24, 56, 81, 85, 97, 102, 122, 128–9, 156, 159–66, 179, 203, 206, 209, 216, 253, 256, 258, 291; conquest of for Sparta, 13, 92, 121, 122; definition of for purposes of book, 4–5; earthquakes, 37, 265, great (c.465), 151, 183–4, 186–7, 189, 190–1, 194–5, 219, 266, 304, 305; figs, 147, 148; frontiers, 5–6, 19, 85, 109, 119–20, 131, 216, 253, 273–77; geology, 11, 20, 83, 100, 145, 155–6, 167; harbours, 105, 123, 156, 164, 178, 206, 242; hero-cults, 97, 104, 120, 163, 164; Homeric, 289–91; iron/iron-working, 36, 78, 87, 89, 134, 149, 158–9, 161, 163, 164, 269, *see also* Boiai; lead, 111, 156, 162, 164, 165; limestone, 155; marble, 15, 18, 58, 122, 155, 277; oak, 13, 161, 206; population: historical, 81, 99, 100, 139, 151, 179, 219, 264, 275–6, prehistoric, 28–9, 40, 53–4, 56, 58, 59, 62; settlement pattern: historical, 61, 79–80, 84–6, 94, 96, 141, 159–65, 220, 268, prehistoric, 28–40, 58–9, 59–61; vegetables, 150; writing, *see* inscriptions
- lamps, 36, 82
- Langadha pass, 16, 18
- Las (Chosiaro), 123, 164–5, 276; in Catalogue of Ships, 290
- Latychidas I (Eurypontid king), 294, 296
- Latychidas II (Eurypontid king), 171, 183, 184–5, 295, 296; and Damaratos, 124, 130, 171, 173, 294; and Kleomenes I, 184–5; in Persian Wars, 174, 180–1; Tegean exile of, 184, 238
- Leagues: Achaian, 274, 275; Aitolian, 154; Arkadian, 131, 137, 184, 253, 255, 256, 257; Boiotian, 213, 214, 232, 236, 237, 239, 243, 245, 249, 250, 253; Chalkidian, 246; of Corinth, 273; Delian, 174, 182, 183, 191; Eleutherolakonian, 86, 275–6; Hellenic (Greek), 174, 180–1, 191; Hellenic (Macedonian), 274; Peloponnesian, 137, armies, 175–6, 178–9, 194–5, 197, 237, 244, 248, constitution, 127, 153–4, 194,

- 198–9, 216, 239, 246, 249, end of, 257, fleets, 201, 222, 224, foundation, 124, 127, secessions from, 193, 199, 214, 220, 232, Sparta and, 127, 176, 188, 194, 196, 197, 198, 200–1, 212, 213, 216, 228–9, 252, 257, 272; *see also* Corinth/Corinthians, and Sparta
- Lechaion (port of Corinth), 240, 243, 244
- Lekas, 39
- Lemnos, 243, 245
- Leon (Agiad king), 103, 118
- Leonidas I (Agiad king), 124, 265, 294, 295; *see also* Thermopylai, battle of
- Lepreon (in Triphylia), 110, 213, 215
- Lerna (in Argolis), 32
- Leukai/Leuke, 86, 164, 274, 276
- Leuktra (in Boiotia), battle of (371), 131, 245, 248, 250–2, 263, 265, 271, 273
- Leuktra (in Mani), 155, 276
- Leuktron/Leuktra (in Aigyti), 216, 253, 256
- Libya, 209, 272
- Libys (Spartiate), 230
- Lichas (Spartiate), 159
- lime-burning, 13
- Limnai, *see* Sparta (town), obes/villages
- Linear B, script, 32, 43–4, 50, 52, 62, 66–7, 83, 131, 288
- Lioni, 39
- Little Pamisos (Milia), river, 19, 273
- liturgies, 103
- Lokris, 237, 238
- Lucian of Samosata, 192
- Lydia, 119
- Lydgamis (tyrant of Naxos), 125
- Lykaion, Mount (in Arkadia), 216
- Lykomedes (Mantineian), 256
- Lykourgos (Spartan), 90, 301; date, 81, 142–3; and Olympic Games, 88; Spartan political and social system ascribed to, 113, 133, 135, 142–3, 146, 151, 210, 219, 238, 248, 254, 263, 273–4, 275, 302, 304
- Lysander (Spartiate), 230; and Agesilaos, 233, 236; apotheosis at Samos, 229; and dearchies, 229, 232, 238, 270; Heraklid birth, 269–70; proposed reform of Spartan kingship, 238, 243; *see also* Cyrus
- Macedon/Macedonia, 104, 246, 273, 274
- Maiandrios (tyrant of Samos), 124, 125
- Mainalia/Mainalians, 179, 217
- Makaria, 101, 103, 188
- Malaia (in Aigyti), 256
- Malea: Cape, 14, 178, 200, 204, 208, 209; peninsula, 14, 15, 121, 122, 147, 150
- Mani, 20; historical, 4, 18, 85, 87, 105, 111, 161, 165, 276; prehistoric, 29, 30, 58
- Mantineia/Mantineians, 97; battles of, 152 (418), 179, 217, 227, 240, (362), 257–8; democracy, 185; and Sparta, 176, 184, 188, 189, 212–3, 214, 215, 216–20, 239, 245, 246, 247; *stasis*, 252; and Tegea, 213, 214, 257–8
- Marathon, battle of (490), 171; Spartan absence from, 132, 178
- Mardonius (Persian), 179, 188
- Mariandynoi (of Herakleia Pontika), compared to Helots, 303
- Marios (Mari), 17, 165, 276
- Mavrovouni, 58
- Medeon (in Phokis), 75
- medism/medizers, 126, 128, 129, 171, 173, 174, 175, 176, 180, 183, 184, 185, 189; Sparta and, 183, 246
- Megalopolis (in Arkadia): city, 6, 131, 179, 256, 273, 275, Spartan refusal to recognize, 257; plain of, 5, 102, 118, 161
- Megara: and Sparta, 125, 127, 193, 194, 197, 213, 214, 230; *stasis*, 252; *see also* Minoa, Nisaia
- Megarid, 124–5, 194, 203
- Melathria, 39, 57
- Melos, 30, 241; as Spartan colony, 93, 94; *see also* obsidian, Melian
- Menelaion (sanctuary of Menelaos and Helen), 89, 97, 104, 112, 134, 136, 254, 290, 295; prehistoric settlement at, 37, 39, 43, 56–7, 61, 105, 148, 290
- Menelaos (Homeric king of Lakedaimon), 27, 97, 104, 112, 120, 288, 289, 290–2
- mercenaries, 230, 232, 242, 244, 258; Agesilaos as, 272; Spartan employment of, 102, 210, 240, 247, 256; ‘Ten Thousand’, 232, 233, 236
- Mesoa, *see* Sparta (town), obes/villages
- Messa/Messe, 85, 165, 290
- Messene/Messenians, 256, 273, 276; foundation of (369), 98, 110, 255; Spartan refusal to recognize, 257, 258; *see also* Ithome

- Messenia: conquest by Sparta, *see*
 Messenian Wars; definition of, 4, 138,
 205–6; diaspora Messenians, 98, 103,
 232, 241–2, 255, *see also* Naupaktos,
 Messenians at; Dorian occupation, 102;
 flax, 150; frontiers, 5, 6, 86, 131, 276,
see also Arkadia/ Arkadians; geology,
 100–1, 112, 145, 167; Irish analogy for
 Spartan treatment of, 100, 103, 232;
kleroi, *see* Sparta/Spartans, land-tenure;
 liberation, 5, 255, 259; mirage,
 Messenian, 98, 110, 112; pasturage, 148;
 population, prehistoric, 40, 56, 61, 101;
 pottery, PG, 75; settlement pattern:
 historical, 101–2, 159, 165–6, 268,
 prehistoric, 31, 36, 58; slave at Athens,
 221; viticulture, 148; *see also* Helots;
 Perioikoi
- Messenian Wars, 112; First, 78, 84, 86, 97–
 100, 102–3, 107, 300; Second, 6, 109–
 10, 117, 132–3; Third, 132, 184, 187–
 90; *see also* Teleklos
- Methana (in Argolis), 208, 209
- Milesians/Miletos, 128, 180
- Minoa (off Megara), 204, 209
- Minyans, 93
- Mistra, 147
- Monemvasia, 13, 122
- Montesquieu, 271
- mothakes, *see* Sparta/Spartans, citizenship,
 Hypomeiones
- Mothone (Methoni), 148, 166, 188, 196,
 203, 206, 210, 242, 255; ‘planting’ of by
 Sparta, 103, 121; *see also* Pedasos
- Mouriatadha, 56
- murex, purple dye from, 106, 155–6, 277
- Mycenae (prehistoric), 35, 37, 39, 40, 43,
 53–63
- Mycenaean civilization, downfall of, 9, 58–
 9, 61–4, 66, 68–9, 291–2
- Mykale, battle of (479), 180
- Mykenai (historical), 129, 175
- Myron of Priene, 98, 151, 302–3, 305
- Myronides (Athenian), 196
- myths, 69, 110, 119; *see also* Herakleidai,
 myth of Return; historiography, ancient
- Mytilenaians/Mytilene, 224, 225
- Nabis (Eurypontid ruler of Sparta), 130,
 257; and Helots, 275, 303; revolution of,
 144, 274, 277
- Naukratis (in Egypt), 119
- Naupaktos: Athens and, 196, 197, 203, 204,
 209; Messenians at, 132, 190, 193–4,
 196, 203, 205–6, 232, and *epiteichismos*
 at Pylos, 205, 206, 208, 215
- Nauplia (in Argolis), 121, 129
- Naxos, 59, 125; battle of (376), 248
- Neda (Nedha), river, 5, 6, 100, 110
- Nedon (Nedhon), river, 18, 165
- Nemea River, battle of (394), 239, 240, 251,
 267
- Neodamodeis, *see* Helots, manumission
- Neon (Perioikos), 232
- Nestor, Homeric, 291
- Nichoria: historical, 75, 97, 102, 166;
 prehistoric, 39, 53
- Niebuhr, B.G., 112, 223
- Nikias (Athenian), 204, 208, 242; and
epiteichismos on Kythera, 208–10, 242;
see also Peaces
- Nisaia (in Megarid), 209, 213
- obsidian, Melian, 30
- Oinoe (in Argolis), battle of (c.460), 194
- Oinophyta (in Boiotia), battle of (457), 196
- Oinous, 148, 185, 216
- Oinous (Kelephina), river, 6, 16, 161
- Oion (Arvanito-Kerasia), 6, 254, 256
- Oitylos (Oitylon), 85, 98, 165, 276; in
 Catalogue of Ships, 290
- Olbia (in S. Russia), 119
- Olbiadas (Perioikos), 256
- oliganthropy, *see* Sparta/Spartans,
 citizenship
- oligarchies, *see* Sparta/Spartans, support for
 olives, 16, 32, 87, 149, 167, 254; and
 Dorian settlement of Lakonia, 82–3,
 149; oil, 82, 149; press, 82
- Olympia, 88, 104, 119, 122, 134, 205, 232;
 Sparta and, 88–9, 119, 132, 195
- Olympic Games, 88, 175; Spartan victors at,
 130, 135, 142, 148, 199; victor-lists, 88,
 99
- Olynthos (in Chalkidike), 246, 247, 248; *see*
also Leagues
- onions, 14
- Onoglos, wine of, 148
- Onougnathos (Elaphonisos), 14–15, 222
- oracles, *see* Delphi/Delphic Oracle; Ino-
 Pasiphaë
- oral tradition, *see* historiography, ancient
- Orchomenos (in Boiotia): historical, 237,
 239, 240, 249; prehistoric, 43

- Orestes, 47; 'Bones of Orestes' policy, 119, 120, 136
- Oresthasion/Orestheion (in Arkadia), 179, 206
- Orthia, *see* Artemis
- ovens, Neolithic, 30
- Oxyrhynchos historian, 192, 223, 236–7
- palaces, Mycenaean: destruction of, 61, 68, *see also* Mycenaean civilization, downfall of; lack of evidence for in Lakonia, 37, 57, 291
- Palaia/Pleiai (Apidia): historical, 72, 85, 163; prehistoric, 28, 30, 59
- Palaiochori, 37, 39
- Palaiokastro, 29
- Palaiopyrgi, 31, 39, 56, 291; *see also* Vapheio
- Pamisos (Pamisos): river/valley, 3, 83, 99, 102, 103, 104, 134, 145, 188, 263, 276; temple of (at Ay. Floros), 165
- Pamphyloi, *see* Dorians, tribes
- Panakton (in Attika), 213
- Panayiotis, 57
- panhellenism, 227, 259; *see also* Agesilaos
- Parnon (Parnon), Mount, 5, 11, 13, 14, 16, 85, 121, 122, 128, 163, 254
- Parparonia (festival in Thyreatis), 200
- Parrhasia, 213, 215, 216, 256
- Partheniai, 107, 109, 115, 158, 300; *see also* Taras
- Parthenion, Mount, 5, 6
- Pasimelos (Corinthian), 241
- pastoralism; Bahima/Bahuma, 81–2, 84; Dorians, 80, 81–2; transhumance, 81, 98; Vlachs, 81
- pasturage, 148, 167
- Pausanias (Agiad king), 231, 233, 237, 239, 243; trials of, 231, 238
- Pausanias (Agiad regent), 178–80, 183–4, 185–6, 187, 195, 265, 294; and Helots, 132, 183–4, 226
- Pausanias (writer): cited, 5, 97, 102, 105, 107, 109, 110, 118, 129, 132, 164, 236, 241, 276, 290; description of Helots, 142, 301; as historical source, 84, 92, 98, 112; and Spartan king-lists, 255–6
- Pavlopetri, 14, 31, 56, 58, 59
- Peaces: common, 243, 249, 250, 252, 258, 259; King's (387–6), 154, 245, 248; of Nikias (421), 212–13, 215, 216, 221, 226; Thirty Years' (445), 197, 198, 207, 213, 226
- Pedastos, Homeric, 148
- Peiraieus (port of Athens), 181, 195, 201, 221, 222, 230–1, 248
- Peiraion (Perachora in Corinthia), 244; sanctuary of Hera at, 104, 117
- Peisandros (Spartiate), 237, 240
- Peisistratids (tyrants of Athens), 125–6
- Pellana (Kalyvia Georgitsi): historical, 86, 105, 161, 254, 256, 257, 258, *see also* Dioskouroi, birthplace of disputed; prehistoric, 39, 58, 59
- Pellene (in Achaia), 195, 254
- Peloponnesians, 11, 26, 30, 104, 213; hegemony of disputed, 119, 120, 125, 128, 138, 215–16, 220, 229; occupation by Dorians, 65, 68, 80
- Peloponnesian League, *see* Leagues
- Peloponnesian War, the (431–404), 127, 180–1, 197–225, 228, 229, 248–9; causes, 197–8, 221; strategy, 200–2, 226; Thucydides and, 45, 192–3; title, 192; *see also* Archidamian War; Dekeleian War; Ionian War; Ten Years' War
- peltasts, 244, 245
- Penestai (of Thessaly), compared to Helots, 84, 301, 302, 306
- Pentekontaëtia (478–431), 181, 186–7, 191, 194, 198
- Pephnos (Pephnos), 105, 276, *see also* Dioskouroi, birthplace of disputed
- Perachora, *see* Peiraion
- Perati (in Attika), 59
- Perikleidas (Spartiate), 189
- Perikles (Athenian), 201–2, 203, 204, 207; guest-friend of Archidamos II, 202
- Perioikoi, 153–65, 167–8; attitudes to Spartans, 267–8, 305; coinage, 157; colonists of Herakleia Trachinia, 195; as essential complement of Spartan power, 3, 229; forts, 163, 222, 234; functions: admiral, 225, craftsmen, 154, 157–9, 168, fishermen, 156, hoplites, 154, 159, 162, 165, 166, 175, 176, 178, 188, 195, 206, 217, 218, 219, 225, 240, 247, 251, 267, 268, *see also* Sparta/Spartans, army organization, Spartiates brigaded with Perioikoi, sailors, 123, 126, 129, 177, 275, territorial reserve against Helots, 155, traders, 155, 157, 168; Kleomenes


- III and, 274; as 'Lakedaimonians', 153, 175, 185, 217, 257, 268; Lakonian, 159–65, 220, 268; land-ownership, 143, 146, 155, 157, 159; liberation, 86, 153, 275, *see also* Leagues, Eleutherolakonian; Messenian, 97, 103, 159, 165–6; Nabis and, 275; origins, 81, 84, 87, 153, 300; revolts, 131, 187, 250, 253, 255; settlements, 19, 84, 86, 87, 97, 105, 121, 125, 129, 130, 159–66, 185, 204, 207, 209, 210, 212–13, 220, 268, 276; slaves owned by, 154–5, 179, Helots not owned by, 159, 234; social differentiation, 154–5, 168, 247; Spartan control of, 105, 113, 134, 153–4, 209, 235; Spartan participation in cults of, 165, 176; status, 81, 84, 100, 153–4, 216, 234, 250, 268, 302, 304; viticulture, 148
- Peristeria, 35
- Persia/Persian Empire, 124, 126, 189, 222, 223, 224, 242, 258; invasions of Greece, 127, 129, 130, 138, 171–81; Sparta and, 126, 127, 136, 138, 223–4, 229, 236, 242–3, 245–6, 256, 259; *see also* gold, Persian bribes in; medism/ medizers; panhellenism; Peaces, King's
- Persian Wars, 171–81; strategy, 173–4, 177
- Phalanthos (Spartan), oikist of Taras, 107
- Phaeas, 263
- Pharai (Kalamata), 19, 98, 156, 165, 242, 276; as Spartan colony, 153
- Pharax (Spartiate), 235
- Pharis, 92; in Catalogue of Ships, 92, 290, 291
- Pharnabazus (Persian): and Agesilaos, 236–7, 238–9; and Konon, 235, 240, 241–2; and Sparta, 223, 224, 233, 241–2
- Pheidon (King of Argos), 109, 112, 118
- Pherai (in Thessaly), 117, 249
- Phigaleia (in Arkadia), 6, 118, 252
- Philip II (King of Macedon), 273, 274
- Philip V (King of Macedon), 275
- Phleiasians/Phleious: democracy, 247; and Sparta, 239, 246, 254, 257; *stasis*, 252
- Phoenicia/Phoenicians, 117, 156, 180; alphabet, 44; fleet, 128, 235; and Kythera, 105–6
- Phoibidas (Spartiate), 247, 259
- Phoinikous (Avlemonas bay), 106, 242
- Phokians/Phokis, 104, 175, 176, 194, 195, 196, 237, 240, 250–1
- Phormion (Athenian), 204, 205
- phrygana, 13
- Phrygia, 104, 236, 238
- Phylarchos, 144, 269, 271; on Helots, 303
- Phyle (in Attika), 230
- pigs, 149
- Pindar, 154, 295
- Pitana, *see* Sparta (town), obes/villages
- Pithekoussai, 88
- Plataia/Plataians: and Athens, 124–5, 188–9; battle of (479), 129, 150–1, 175, 176, 178–80, 184, 185, 188, 189, 218, 235; and Sparta, 124, 188, 189, 204, 207
- Plato, 107, 134, 143, 157, 263, 304; on Helots, 132, 138, 299
- Pleistarchos (Agiad king), 178, 186, 265
- Pleistoanax (Agiad king), 197
- Pliocene (geological age), 11, 14, 15, 16
- plough, 78, 88
- Plutarch, cited, 115, 119, 120, 143–4, 145–6, 147, 150, 189, 244, 249, 250, 266, 269, 270–1, 272, 273; and 'Great Rhetra', 113, 116–7; on Helots, 151, 305, 306
- Pohoidaia (festival of Poseidon), 200
- Pohoidan (Lakonian form of Poseidon), 87; cults: Amyklai, 83, Helos, 83, 200, Sparta, 200, Tainaron, 83, 141, 154, 183, 304, Thouria (at Akovitika), 83, 87, 165–6, 200
- polis* ('city-state'), creation of, 107
- pollen analysis, 9, 82
- Pollux, and definition of Helots, 139, 303
- Polybius of Megalopolis, 93, 143, 145, 240, 266, 270, 274
- Polychares (Messenian), 99
- Polydoros (Agiad king), 99, 109, 115, 116, 123, 143; and 'Great Rhetra', 116–17
- Polykrates (tyrant of Samos), 120
- pomegranate, 163
- Poseidon, 97, 105; and earthquakes, 183–4, 190; *see also* Pohoidan
- Potamos, 15
- Poteidaia (in Chalkidike), 198, 203
- pottery: and Bronze Age chronology, 30, 53; Lakonian, 311, black-figure, 117, 118, 123, 134, 136, 164, 165, LG (Late Geometric), 68, 71, 94–6, 107, 110, 112, PG (Protogeometric), 68, 70, 71–6, 79–80, 85–6, 87, 92, 94, 97; Mycenaean, 53–4, 63, 64, 289; Neolithic, 30; stylistic change, 76, 77, 94; *see also* archaeological evidence

- Prasiai (Leonidhion), 12, 23, 105, 121–3, 156, 157, 162, 203, 221, 225, 254, 275, 276
- Prokles (alleged founder of Eurypontids), 90, 297
- Prote (Proti), 166, 206
- Protogeometric: period, 70–87; pottery, 71–2, 77, Lakonian, *see* pottery, West Greek, 75, 79
- Prytanis (alleged Eurypontid king), 90
- Psamathous (Porto Kayio), 19, 155–6
- purple dye, *see* murex
- Pyla (or Pila), 110
- Pylos: historical, 58, 85, 102, 156, 166, 178, 255, 257, in ‘the’ Peloponnesian War, 190, 205–8, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 215, 220, 221–2, 224, 226, 242; prehistoric, 37, 43, 58, 61, 62, 291
- Pyrrhichos (Pyrrhichos), 276
- Pythioi, 111
- Qadesh, battle of (c. 1300), 52
- quail, 19, 150
- rainfall, 18, 22, 23
- Ranke, Leopold von, 192
- regional history, 4
- religion, Mycenaean, 57, 64, 69–70, 83
- rhetra*, *see* Sparta/Spartans
- Rhianos of Bene, 98, 132
- Rhion, 80
- Rhodes, 117; and Sparta, 237, 241
- Romans/Rome, 274–5, 276–7
- Salamis, battle of (480), 177–8, 180
- Samios (Spartiate), 232
- Samos, 117, 119, 134, 180, 198, 226; democracy, 224, 229; and Sparta, 110, 120, 123, 124, 136, 198; *see also* Lysander
- Sarandapotamos, river, 6, 128, 161, 254
- Sardis, peace conferences at, 243, 245–6
- Satyriion (in S. Italy), 107
- schist, 13, 16, 17
- Scoglio del Tonno, 54, 107
- sea-level, change of, 15
- Sea Peoples, 52, 62, 63
- Second Athenian Confederacy, 246, 248
- Sellasia, 86, 130, 150, 254, 257; battle of (223 or 222), 274; identification, 161
- Sepeia, battle of (494), 129, 137, 162, 191
- serfs, *see* Helots, status of
- sesame, 150
- Sestos, 181, 225, 240
- sheep, 148
- Sicily, 132, 205, 215, 232; Athenian expedition to (415–413), 200, 221–2, sickles, iron, 269
- Sikyon, 195, 244; and Sparta, 120, 129, 220, 254; *stasis*, 252
- silver, 29, 30, 31, 37, 104, 134, 180
- Simonides of Keos, 133, 176, 294
- Siphnos, 117
- Skala ridge, 101, 188
- Skandeia (Kastri/Palaiopolis): historical, 97, 209; Homeric, 105; prehistoric, 32–3, 39, 156
- Skiritai/Skiritis, 13, 16; hoplites, 218, 220, 239; Spartan control, 6, 109, 131, 212–13, 253, 256, 257, 276
- Skyros, 243, 245
- slavery/slaves, 138–9, 140–1; chattel, 83–4, 100, 138–9, 140, 142, 152, 154–5, 166–7, 179, 221, 233, 267, 275
- Slavs, invasion of Greece, 59, 61, 69
- snow, 24, 254
- Soös (alleged Eurypontid king), 84, 90, 296, 301
- Sophokles, 157
- Sosibios (Lakonian), 297
- Soulima valley, 101, 234
- Sparta/Spartans: age-classes, 82, 176, 219, 240, 251; agoge, 144, 151, 215, 273, 275; army organization: archers, 210, cavalry, 210, 235, 268–9, Hippeis, 176, 218, 235, 239, 251, hoplite reform, 117, 123, 178, 219, Spartiates brigaded with Perioikoi, 178–9, 186, 190, 206, 217–20, 226, 239–40, 251, 257, state supply of equipment, 159, 269, *see also* mercenaries; Assembly/damos, 116, 133, 173–4, 197–8, 231, 249; Athena Chalkioikos/Poliachos, patron deity, 77, 91–2, 97, 104, 199–200, 309; attitude to manual crafts, 140, 157, 199; chariot-racing, 130, 135, 142, 157, 199–200; citizenship: criteria of, 107, 117, 140, 144, 146, 158, 159, 214–15, 273, decline of citizen numbers (oliganthropy), 135, 139, 141, 144, 176, 184, 190–1, 199, 206, 215, 219–20, 238, 239–10, 246, 248, 251, 253, 263–72, 273, 274, grants of, 179, Homoiioi/Spartiates, 117, 128, 140, 153, 195, 208, 219–20, 234, 263–4,

- 269, Hypomeiones/Inferiors (including mothakes, nothoi, tresantes), 238, 247, 252, 256, 265–6, 267–70, 271–2, 274, 305; culture, 111, 118, 133–5, 199; Ephorate/Ephors, 117, 120, 135, 154, 178, 215, 231, 234, 235, 237, 252, 263, 264, 304–5, creation, 115, and Helots, 141–2, 304–5, and Perioikoi, 153–4, 304; foreign policy, *passim*, esp. 109, 110, 118, 119, 120, 126–8, 131, 138, 173, 174, 182, 184–5, 196, 198, 200–1, 214, 223–4, 231, 233, 237, 240–1, 243; *see also* autonomy principle, Spartan conception of; ‘dual hegemony’ thesis; Leagues, Peloponnesian, Sparta and; panhellenism; Gerontes/Gerousia, 116, 165, 183, 235, 263, 267; hair, 79, 140; harmosts, 105, 154, 209, 211, 229, 230, 233, 234, 236, 238, 241, 242, 245, 248, 258; hunting, 18, 142, 149, 158, 167, 277; kingship, joint, 89–90, 115, 116–17, king-lists, 49, 51, 66, 81, 90, 293–8, prerogatives, 127, 145, 147, 149, 200, 234; land-tenure (including *kleroi*), 81, 109, 116, 117, 142–6, 150–1, 167, 264–5, 271, 273–4, 306; marriage, 123–4, 235, 264, 266, 270; messes, 140, 142, 146–7, 150, 159, 163, 215, 263, 264, 273, 275; militarism, 134, 140, 178, 199, 200, 239, 263; mirage, Spartan, 45, 51, 66, 81, 98, 111, 113–15, 133, 142, 157, 167; ‘mixed constitution’, 113, 115; money, 134, 147, 148–9, 270–1, 302; naval matters, 118, 123, 125, 126, 128–9, 177, 178, 200–1, 222, 224, 237, 238, navarchs, 126, 136, 224, 230, 233, 263; religiosity/superstition, 126, 129, 132, 142, 174, 175, 178, 184, 190, 194, 206, 248, *see also* Delphi/Delphic Oracle; *rhetra*, 49, 248, ‘Great’, 113, 115–17, 135, *see also* Epitadeus; secretiveness, 115, 184, 210, 211; social differentiation: by birth, 94–5, 104, 116, 173, 199, 295, by wealth, 100, 103, 134–5, 142, 147, 150, 264, 270–1; *stasis*, 115, 210, 215, 228, 254; support for oligarchies, 126–7, 214, 220, 224, 228, 229, 230–1, 247, *see also* Lysander, and dekachies; territory, 6, 138, 205–6, 273–7; tribes, Dorian, 80–1, 117, 144; women, 254, 263, 265, 271, 272, 273
- Sparta (town): Agora, 267; arsenal, 269; burial permitted within, 90; festivals at, *see* Ariontia, Athenaia, Gynmopaidial, Karneia, Pohoidaia; messes, location of, 163; obes/villages, 90, 92–3, 96–7, 112, 117, 158, 179, regiments of, 178, 218–19, synoecism incomplete, 112, *see also* Amyklai; occupation: by Dorians, 68, 80–1, 90, 297, prehistoric, 28, 58, 80; sanctuaries, *see* Artemis, Orthia; Heroön; Sparta/Spartans, Athena Chalkioikos/Poliachos; site, 16, 80; wall, 254–5
- spearheads: bronze, 79; iron, 78, 79, 242
- Sphakteria, 147, 206–8, 209–10, 211, 219, 222, 226, 266; *see also* Pylos, historical
- Sphodrias (Spartiate) 252, 265; trial of, 248, 259
- spits, iron, 134, 148–9, 269
- stasis* (civil strife/war), 205, 209, 228, 241, 244, 247, 249, 252, 257, 258–9; *see also* Sparta/Spartans
- Stathmis, wine of, 148
- Stena (near Gytheion), 72, 73, 76–7, 79, 85
- Stenyklaros, plain of, 101, 102, 166, 188; conquest by Sparta, 103
- Stephanos of Byzantium: and Helots, 301; and Perioikoi, 153, 159
- Stesichoros of Himera, 47, 51, 120, 133, 295
- Strabo, 5, 97, 105, 155, 195, 276; on Helots, 142, 300
- sunshine, 24
- swords, iron, 78, 79, 269
- Syracusans/Syracuse, 200, 221, 232, 246
- Tainaron (Matapan), Cape, 17, 18, 81
- Tainaron (Porto ton Asomaton), 123, 178, 276; *see also* Pohoidan, cults
- Tanagra, battle of (458 or 457), 184, 186, 194, 195
- Taras, Spartan colony, 8, 54, 100, 106–7, 107, 112, 117–8, 119, 135
- Taucheira (in Cyrenaica), 117, 119
- Taygetos (Taygetos), Mount, 14, 16, 23, 24, 85, 93, 98, 100, 101, 188, 291; geology, 17–18, 156
- Tearless Battle (368), 256
- Technarchos (Lakonian), 158
- Tegea/Tegeans, 13, 72, 85, 96, 97, 117, 128, 159, 161–2, 179, 216; and Sparta, 110, 118–20, 136, 176, 178, 183, 184–5, 214, 217, 220, 238, 239, 273; *stasis*, 252;

- synoecism, 185; *see also* Mantinea/
Mantineians
- Tegyra, battle of (375), 249
- Teisamenos (Eleian): gains Spartan
citizenship, 179, 184, 235; 'victories',
184, 188
- Teisamenos (son of Orestes), bones of, 120
- Teisamenos (Spartan), 235
- Teleklos (Agiad king), 94, 105; alleged
conquest of Amyklai, 92–3;
assassination, 86, 98, 99; intervention in
Messenia, 84, 92, 97, 102, 164, 166
- Telemachos, Homeric, 291
- Tempe, pass of, 174–5
- temple-building, 103; at Orthia sanctuary,
103, 118, 310–11, 312
- Ten Years' War, 204, 209, 226; title, 202
- Terpander of Lesbos, 111
- terracottas, 39, 111, 166
- Teuthrone (Kotronas), 276
- Thalamai (Koutiphari), 155, 176; *see also*
Ino-Pasiphaë
- Thasos, 189
- Thebans/Thebes, 100, 177; and Boiotia,
125, 243, 249, 250, *see also* Leagues;
and Sparta, 228–58, *passim*, ally, 126,
alliances with Sparta's enemies, 237–8,
240, 248, 255, battles, *see* Leuktra,
Mantinea (362), Tegyra, invasions of
Lakonia, 253, 257–8; *see also* Kadmeia
- Themistokles (Athenian), 123, 171, 176,
181–2; alleged decree of, 175, 176; and
Argos, 185; and Sparta, 180, 181–2,
185, 216
- Theodoros of Samos, 134
- Theophrastos, 7, 22, 147, 148, 150, 161
- Theopompos (Eurypontid king), 115, 296,
297; and Argos, 109; and Ephorate, 116;
and First Messenian War, 102, 115, 189;
and 'Great Rhetra', 116–17
- Theopomos (historian), 300, 302, 304
- Thera: prehistoric, 39; settlement by
Lakonians, 89, 93
- Therai, 149
- Theramenes (Athenian), 230
- Therapne, 104, 163, 290
- Thermopylai, battle of (480), 175–7, 178,
179, 191, 219, 265
- Thespiai/Thespians, 177, 248, 251
- Thessalians/Thessaly: historical, 74, 175,
183, 240, 249, 301, 302, 303;
prehistoric, 30, 54, 67
- Thibron (Spartiate), 235
- Thornax, *see* Apollo, cults
- Thouria (Hellenika), 72, 75, 97, 165–6, 276,
revolts, 187, 255; *see also* Pohoidan,
cults
- Thrace/Thracians, 129, 204, 213, 240; *see*
also Brasidas, Thracian expedition
- Thrasyloulos (Athenian), 230, 245
- Thucydides, 93, 124, 141, 178, 186–7, 192–
226, *passim*, 228, 291, 306, career, 192,
211–12; as historian, 44, 48–9, 153,
181–2, 187, 191, 192–3, 197–8, 199–
200, 202, 207, 218, 223, 224, 225–6,
237, 251; on Sparta, 68, 83, 115, 133,
149, 152, 217–18, 299, 300, 301–2, 304
- thunderstorms, 23
- Thyrea, 154, 162, 209; identification, 5, 129
- Thyreatis (or Kynouria), 5, 13, 85, 109, 129,
131, 162, 221, 244, 253, 'Battle of the
Champions' (c.545), 5, 121, 136, 216,
see also Argives/Argos, and Sparta,
disputed control of E. Parnon foreland,
Parparonia; geology, 11–12; prehistoric,
31
- Tiberius, Emperor, 276
- Timolaos (Corinthian), 239
- Timomachos (Theban), 93
- tin, 30, 78, 157, 158
- Tiribazus (Persian), 243
- Tissaphernes (Persian), 223, 224, 233, 235,
237, 247, and Sparta, 224, 233
- Tithraustes (Persian), 237, 243
- Tolmides (Athenian), periplus of, 177,
195–6, 205, 208
- Tomeus, 212
- trade, 103–4, 155–6, 157, 209
- Tragana, 75
- transhumance, *see* pastoralism
- transport, 161
- Trinasos (Trinasa), 222
- Triphylia, 5, 10, 215; disputed control, 6,
213, 231, 234, 252
- Troizen (in Argolis), 175, 197, 203, 254
- Trojan War, 66, 81, 102, 288–92
- Tsakonia, 122; dialect, 20
- Tsasi, 58, 163
- tyranny/tyrants, Archaic, 89, 113, 116, 118,
120, 125, 126, 127, 132, 135; Sparta
and, 120, 127
- Tyros (Tyros), 122, 136, 156, 162, 225, 273
- Tyrtaios, 46–7, 142, 295; on Helots, 103,
140, 234, 303; as historical source, 98,

- 110, 112; poems cited, 68, 80, 101, 102, 109, 116, 117, 154
- Ugarit, 53–4, 62
- Vapheio, 31, 36–7, 39, 58
- Vardhounia, 16, 37, 58, 59, 72, 98, 155
- vasepainting, *see* pottery
- Vespasian, Emperor, 276
- Vithoulas, 164
- viticulture, *see* wine
- Vitruvius, 176
- Vix (in France), 119
- Vlachs, *see* pastoralism
- Volimidhia, 97
- Volimnos, *see* Artemis, Limnatis
- Vounaki, 154
- Vresthena, 155
- Vrondama, 16, 163
- waggons, 161, 179
- walls: historical, 177, 178, 181, 242, 243, 254–5, *see also* Sparta (town); prehistoric, 33, 53, 56, 62
- warfare, 79, 103, 106–7, 134, 140; *see also* hoplite warfare/hoplites; peltasts
- wheat, 16, 18, 30, 147, 148; contributed to Spartan messes, 147
- wheel, potter's, 32, 72
- winds, 13, 23–4, 208
- wine, 32, 57, 64, 147–8, 207; Helots and, 148, 305; Kleomenes I and, 130, 148
- winter, 22, 265
- wood, 82, 117, 210; *see also* forest
- Xenophon, 106, 127, 140, 141, 150, 157, 228–58, *passim*; career, 230, 232, 240, 241; as historian, 153, 192, 223, 227, 237; and Sparta, 115, 134, 142, 143, 149, 151, 218, 219, 228, 247, 258, 263–4, 266, 267, 269, 270, 272, 302, 305, 306–7
- Xerxes (King of Persia), 209, 240; invasion of Greece, 110, 171–81
- Xirokambi (in Spartan plain), 18, 98
- Xirokambi (in Thyreatis), 128
- ‘Younger Fill’, *see* alluviation, recent
- Zakynthos, 206, 209
- Zankle, 132
- Zarax (Ieraka), 221, 225, 273, 275, 276
- Zavitsa, Mount, 5, 11, 162
- Zeus, 79, 132; cults: at Aigiiai, 164, Ithomatas, 166, 190, Kappotas (at Gytheion), 164, Olympics (at Olympia), 232
- Zeuxidamos (Eurypontid), 296

A decorative border at the top of the cover featuring a mosaic pattern of dark, irregular shapes on a lighter background.

HELLENISTIC AND ROMAN SPARTA

A TALE OF TWO CITIES



PAUL CARTLEDGE AND ANTONY SPAWFORTH

SECOND EDITION

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Antony Spawforth



London and New York

This book is dedicated to The Ephoria of Arkadia—
Lakonia and The British School at Athens with
affection and gratitude.

First published 1989

First published in 1992
by Routledge

11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Routledge

29 West 35th Street, New York NY 10001

Second edition first published 2002

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group

This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005.

“To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.”

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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

A catalog record for this book has been requested

ISBN 0-203-48218-2 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-203-63164-1 (Adobe eReader Format)

ISBN 0-415-26277-1 (Print Edition)

Contents

Preface	viii
Maps	xiii
PART I HELLENISTIC SPARTA (BY PAUL CARTLEDGE)	
1 In the shadow of empire: Mantinea to Chaeronea	2
2 Resistance to Macedon: the revolt of Agis III	14
3 The new Hellenism of Areus I	25
4 Reform—or revolution? Agis IV and Cleomenes III	35
5 Sparta between Achaea and Rome: the rule of Nabis	54
6 Sparta from Achaea to Rome (188–146 BC)	73
PART II ROMAN SPARTA (BY ANTONY SPAWFORTH)	
7 Sparta between sympolity and municipality	85
8 Sparta in the Greek renaissance	96
9 Pagans and Christians: Sparta in late antiquity	110
10 The Roman city and its territory	117
11 Local government I: machinery and functions	132
12 Local government II: the social and economic base	148
13 High culture and agonistic festivals	163
14 The image of tradition	176
15 Epilogue: Sparta from late antiquity to the Middle Ages	196
APPENDICES	199
I The monuments of Roman Sparta	199
II Catalogues of magistrates	208

III	Hereditary tendencies in the Curial Class	212
IV	Foreign <i>agōnistai</i> at Sparta	214
	Notes	217
	Bibliographical appendix	253
	Bibliographicals addenda to the second edition	258
	Bibliography	262
	Abbreviations	284
	General index	285

Preface

The aim of this book is to offer an account of Sparta over the eight centuries or so between her loss of 'great power' status in the second quarter of the fourth century BC and the temporary occupation of the late antique city by the Gothic chieftain Alaric in AD 396. Books on Sparta are hardly rare. One of the chief novelties of this one is that it sets out to give full weight to the Roman phase in Sparta's story, rather than making of it the usual epilogue or (at best) final chapter in a study preoccupied with the earlier periods. We thereby hope to provide a book which will interest, not only students of Sparta *tout court*, but also those concerned with the life of Greece and other Greek-speaking provinces under Roman rule.

Hellenistic Sparta, however, had entered the Roman Empire by no mundane route. In line with her age-old and deeply-entrenched particularism, and indeed by revivifying her esoteric traditions of political and socio-economic organization under the slogan of a return to the 'constitution of Lycurgus', Sparta resisted Roman incorporation right up to the last possible moment. And before Rome, Macedon and the Achaean League had been treated to a similarly defiant denial. For although old Greece ('old' by comparison with the post-Alexander Hellenic diaspora) as a whole was *de facto* subjugated by Macedon in 338 BC, Sparta persisted in ploughing an isolationist and oppositionist furrow, remaining *de jure* independent not just of Macedon but also of all Greek multi-state organizations (not excluding their anti-Macedonian manifestations), until she was formally and forcibly incorporated in the by then Rome-dominated Achaean League in 192 BC. This was the culmination, or nadir, of an extraordinary *pentekontaëtia* during which a succession of Spartan kings (*alias* 'tyrants' to their articulate enemies) sought with surprising success to maintain the traditional freedom and self-determination of the Greek *polis*. This they achieved in spite or because of the most extreme measures of domestic reform, measures that some observers then and now would controversially label 'revolutionary', notwithstanding the ideological appeal to supposedly ancestral 'Lycurgan' precedent and inspiration. Sparta, in short, in the Hellenistic era retains an interest, an importance and a distinctiveness that merit and demand historical enquiry no less insistently than her hitherto more illustrious Archaic and Classical predecessors.

What of the Roman period? The time now seems ripe for taking a fresh look at Roman Sparta. In the last half-century the Greek world under Roman rule has become relatively well-mapped territory, not least as a result of the stupendous scholarship of the late Louis Robert, whose meticulous studies of the post-Classical *polis* through its epigraphy and numismatics to a greater or lesser extent underpin all modern work on the subject, including the Roman section of this volume. The only major study of Roman Sparta to date, that of Chrimes (1949), neglected this larger perspective, adopting instead a retrospective stance and using the evidence for the Roman city merely as ‘the starting point for a fresh examination of the evidence about the earlier period’. Her approach was partly a response to that aspect of the Roman city which has most struck modern observers: its tenacious attachment to ancestral tradition—or, in V. Ehrenberg’s less flattering formulation, ‘the tragi-comedy of Spartan conservatism’. Part Two of the present volume offers, in effect, a reappraisal of the approach of Chrimes. It aims, firstly, to bring Roman Sparta firmly down to earth: to show that the Roman city resembled other provincial Greek communities in its political, cultural and socioeconomic organization, displaying the characteristic features of the age from emperor-worship and benefactor-politicians to colonnaded streets and hot baths. As we hope to show, some of the changes arising from Sparta’s enforced transition from ‘city-state to provincial town’ were prefigured by the domestic reforms of Sparta’s Hellenistic kings, Nabis in particular; to view Sparta under Roman rule (from 146 BC onwards, that is) without reference to the immediately preceding period would be to lose an essential historical perspective.

Part Two then re-examines Spartan archaism in the Roman era, with a view to showing that this aspect of local civic life likewise had its larger context, that of the archaeomania which, with Roman encouragement, gripped the Greek-speaking provinces during the last century BC and the first three AD; in this period the recreation—or invention—of the past is best viewed as a form of cultural activity in its own right. The likelihood of real ‘continuity’ is diminished by this acknowledgement of the extent of Greek antiquarianism under Roman rule. On the other hand, the overshadowing of Greek culture in this period by the achievements of the past gave provincial Sparta, home of the widely admired Spartan myth, the opportunity to acquire a new international prominence, above all during the cultural flowering in the second and third centuries sometimes called the Greek renaissance. Part Two aims, finally, to document for the first time Sparta’s unforeseen evolution during these two centuries into a touristic, agonistic and even an intellectual centre. Although the Graeco Roman cultural outlook which permitted this development had its banal side, the development itself is of some interest. It confirms that rumours of the death of Sparta, which buzzed around the corridors of power in antiquity from the late 370s BC onwards and have been too hastily believed in more recent days, are in fact seriously exaggerated. If we stand further back, we can see it as a startling manifestation of the cultural cohesiveness which Greek civilization in

its 'Roman summer' drew from the recollection of past glories and which, in turn, contributed to the survival of a unitary Roman state in the east into the Middle Ages in the form of the Byzantine Empire.

* * * * *

As well as modern discussions, we have cited the ancient evidence as fully as we can. For the Roman period some of it is gathered (for the first time) in the four appendices which, it is hoped, will enhance the utility of the book and not merely add to its bulk. Spelling of names has caused even more of a problem than usual in a book that treats both Greek and Roman phases of Sparta's history. To avoid such barbarous hybrids as 'C. Iulius Eurykles', we have, not without some misgivings and inconsistencies, Latinized throughout. Modern work is cited according to the 'Harvard' system, so that most publications cited find their place in the general bibliography at the back of the book.

Many debts have been incurred in the writing of this book. We are grateful to our respective institutions, the Universities of Cambridge and Newcastle upon Tyne, for financial support enabling us to visit Laconia in 1982 and for awards of leave of absence in respectively 1987 and 1988, during which much of the book in its final form was written. Financial support was also forthcoming from Clare College, Cambridge, and from the Leverhulme Research Awards Committee. So far as institutional support is concerned, it remains to thank the staff in the libraries of the Hellenic and Roman Societies, London, and the Faculty of Classics, Cambridge.

The first part of the book (by P.A.C.) continues, both chronologically and thematically, the author's *Sparta and Lakonia. A regional history 1300–362 BC* (1979). That work too appeared in the same 'States and Cities of Ancient Greece' series, and the authors are aware of their debt to Norman Franklin of Routledge and Professor Ron Willetts, general editor of the series, for agreeing to include this companion volume therein. The book's second part (by A.J.S.S.) has as its (completely reworked) kernel the author's Birmingham University PhD thesis, *Studies in the History of Roman Sparta*, examined in 1982 by Martin Goodman and Fergus Millar, from whose comments the present work has sought to profit. Individual chapters in both parts have been read at varying stages of readiness by Ewen Bowie, Riet van Bremen, Simon Hornblower, John Lazenby, Ricardo Martinez-Lacy, Stephen Mitchell, Frank Walbank, Susan Walker and John Wilkes. As a result of their generously offered and unfailingly perceptive criticisms the end-product has been much improved, although its remaining shortcomings are of course entirely the responsibility of the authors. Thanks to the kindness of well over a decade ago of George Steinhauer, formerly Acting Ephor of ArkadiaLakonia, the book has been written with an awareness of some of the many unpublished inscriptions, mostly of Roman date, in the Sparta Museum. We also wish to thank Nigel Kennell for generously making available the text of his unpublished PhD thesis (Kennell 1985). For other valued help

provided in ways too varied to itemize we are grateful to Bob Bridges, Bill Cavanagh, and Graham Shipley. The maps were drawn by Liz Lazenby.

P.A.C
A.J.S.S.
June 1988

Preface to the second edition

The first edition of this book was completed in 1988 and published in 1989. Two years later a corrected but not updated edition was issued in paperback. A dozen years on from the writing of the first edition we are delighted to welcome this opportunity to include some bibliographical addenda which will somehow reflect the progress of scholarship in this important area of ancient Greek historical studies.

Much, however, that applies to the development of regional and especially geographical approaches to ancient Greek—and in our case Graeco-Roman—history has been said, and duly referenced, in the Addenda to the new edition of Cartledge's *Sparta and Lakonia*. We shall aim to avoid undue overlap and repetition here, but must make mention at least of the important work of Susan Alcock in Hellenistic and Roman Greece generally (1993, 1994a, 1994b), of her and her associates on the Pylos survey (Davis et al. 1997) and of the British School at Athens/University of Amsterdam Laconia survey (Cavanagh & Crouwel 1988; Cavanagh et al. 1996; Cavanagh et al. 2001; Mee & Cavanagh 1998; cf. Cavanagh 1991).

It is our fervent hope that an outpost of the British School at Athens may yet be founded in Sparta, where the School and its members have been so fruitfully active for almost a century (Hodkinson 1999: ix–x; Cartledge 1998). We therefore wish to repeat with redoubled vigour, as well as affection and gratitude, our original dedication of the first edition of this book:

To the Ephoreia of Arkadia-Lakonia and to the British School at Athens.

P.A.C.
A.J.S.S.
February 2001

Maps


1 ROMAN LACONIA

xiv

2 SPARTA: ANCIENT SITES IN RELATION TO THE STREET-
GRID OF THE MODERN TOWN

196

ROMAN LACONIA



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KEY
 THALAMAE = ancient name
 Xerokambi = modern name

I

Hellenistic Sparta

Chapter one

In the shadow of empire: Mantinea to Chaeronea

History, in the objective sense of 'what actually happened', is a seamless web. All historiographical starting-points must be in some degree arbitrary. Contemporaries as well as modern authors saw 362 BC as signifying something of a historical as well as historiographical caesura.¹ Yet to grasp its full import one must track back almost a decade, to the battle that marked the beginning of the end of Classical Sparta.

In July 371 the Boeotian confederacy under the inspired guidance of the Thebans Epaminondas and Pelopidas soundly trounced the Spartan, allied, and mercenary army led by King Cleombrotus at Leuctra in the territory of Boeotian Thespieae.² Opinions differ today, as they did then, regarding the wisdom, legality and competence of Sparta's anti-Theban offensive. But there is no ambiguity, at least in retrospect, about the decisive importance of this historic defeat, the first suffered by Sparta in a major pitched encounter between hoplite infantrymen for some three centuries.³ For it signalled the declension of Classical Sparta from the status of a great Greek power to that of a second-rate provincial squabblor.

Pausanias, antiquarian travel-writer and commentator of the second century AD, looked back to Leuctra with (for him) uncharacteristic triumphalism as 'the most splendid victory ever, to our knowledge, won by Greek over Greek'.⁴ This sentiment would have been cheered to the echo by the many thousands of European and Asiatic Greeks who had experienced the effects of Spartan imperialism since 404, when Sparta with critical Persian aid eventually defeated Athens in the great Peloponnesian War.⁵ Indeed, so unpopular had Sparta become by 371 that even some of her inner circle of Peloponnesian League allies 'were not displeased by the way things had gone' at Leuctra and were quick to open negotiations with their Boeotian conquerors.⁶

Prominent among these latter allies, it must be assumed, were men of Arcadia. Towards this ruggedly upland region of central Peloponnesian Sparta had long anticipated Rome in the most efficient practice of a policy of divide and rule. As a major result, the Arcadians had not hithertomanaged to translate their inchoate pan-Arcadian consciousness into pan-Arcadian political institutions. The Leuctra battle radically altered the geopolitical situation in their

favour. Encouraged by the discovery of Spartan military debility and by the disaffection among Sparta's Perioecic subjects situated along their mutual border, Tegea now at last united with her traditional north Arcadian rival Mantinea to forge an (almost) pan-Arcadian political and military federation on democratic lines within a year of Sparta's great defeat. Joining forces next with Elis, another long-dissident former Peloponnesian League ally of Sparta, and with Argos, Sparta's hereditary rival for the hegemony of the Peloponnese, the newly politicized Arcadians conveyed a charged appeal for an invasion of Sparta's home territory to the two most formidable powers of central Greece north of the Isthmus of Corinth, Athens and Thebes.⁷

Athens in 370 led a large and potentially powerful naval alliance, the so-called Second Athenian League. This was a politically more acceptable revival of the fifth-century 'Delian League' that had brought Athens an Aegean empire under cover of an offensive and defensive alliance directed against Persia. The Second League had been formed in 378 against Sparta, yet in 370 it was not a weakened and vulnerable Sparta that most Athenians hated and feared but rather their uncomfortably near neighbours in Thebes.⁸

Ironically, Athens had herself helped liberate Thebes in 379/8 from Spartan military occupation, and Thebes had reciprocated by becoming one of the half-dozen founder members of the Second Athenian League. But the Thebans' overriding strategic and political interests were engaged in central and northern mainland Greece, not the Aegean, and they were quick to refound, on moderately democratic lines, the Boeotian confederacy that Sparta had dismembered in 386 at the behest of King Agesilaus II and under the aegis of the Peace of the Persian Great King Artaxerxes II. This was the confederacy, strengthened (if only negatively) in 373 by the demilitarization of Thespieae and destruction of Athens' ally Plataea, that won Leuctra.⁹

The Athenians therefore rebuffed the Arcadian, Elean and Argive request. The Boeotians at Epaminondas' urging received it warmly and responded to it positively at their earliest convenience. Towards the very end of 370, at the head of the large Boeotian alliance and crucially assisted by Sparta's external and internal Peloponnesian enemies, Epaminondas thus succeeded in invading Sparta's own *polis* territory by land. This unprecedented feat presupposed not only that Sparta's traditional alliance system had collapsed but also that she had lost control of her borderland, a symbolically as well as pragmatically potent space, the crossing of which by a Spartan army required performance of the *diabatēria* ritual. In fact, the Perioecic peoples of both Sciritis and Caryae, whose territories marched with that of Tegea, had revolted to Epaminondas at the critical moment. So apparently had the Perioeci of the Belminatis area at the headwaters of the Eurotas to the west.¹⁰

Worse, much worse, was to follow, though not immediately. For the remaining Perioeci of Laconia's eastern and southern coasts stayed loyal, not least those of Gytheum, Sparta's chief port, who withstood a short siege behind their city walls. So too the Laconian segment of the Helots, Sparta's serf-like

population of primary agricultural producers, stood firm behind the Spartan colours. Such indeed was their loyalty or indoctrination that in return for a promise of freedom more than 6,000 volunteered to fight as hoplites to compensate for the extreme shrinkage of the Spartiate military effective. The town of Sparta, moreover, remained inviolate, though not because of its artificial defences (which the Spartans still disdained to erect) but because the Eurotas river was seasonably swollen with midwinter snow and Epaminondas had anyway not made its capture his top strategic or political priority.¹¹

Yet these bright spots were soon obfuscated by a thick smog of deep gloom for Sparta, as Epaminondas turned to the liberation of the more numerous, more politically motivated, more ethnically self-conscious Helots of the Pamisus valley in neighbouring Messenia. These 'Messenians', as they liked to call themselves in anticipation of their political as well as personal rebirth, had predictably taken advantage of Sparta's immediately local difficulties and of their own remoteness from the masters' central place to rise in revolt as soon as Epaminondas entered Laconia. It was on his return from Gytheum up the Eurotas furrow and along the easiest route into the Pamisus valley *via* the south-west Arcadian plain that the Theban planted the foundations of the new *polis* of Messene. Expatriate Messenians flocked back from points as distant as Sicily and north Africa to stake their claim to land and citizenship in a state whose central space about Mt Ithome was endowed with the finest enceinte walling then known in the entire Greek world.¹²

At a stroke the political geography of the Peloponnese as it had been for some three centuries had been altered dramatically. To make doubly sure that Sparta should not easily rise again to prepotence, Epaminondas also had a hand in a second entirely new Peloponnesian city-foundation. In the south-west Arcadian plain that he had traversed in 370/69 there arose between 369 and 368 'The Great City', known conventionally as Megalopolis. The strategic implications of its very location are transparent. No less significant were its political implications. The double city of Megalopolis was designed both to institutionalize the Arcadians' 'national' consciousness by becoming the capital of the Arcadian federal state and to be a new state in its own right that drew its citizen body from no less than forty existing communities including some former Laconian Perioeci. The post-Peloponnesian War era in Greek history is sometimes labelled 'the crisis of the *polis*'. However much truth there may be in the view that many or most existing *poleis* were undergoing some sort of political, social or economic crisis at this time, these two brand new creations of Messene and Megalopolis must be set boldly on the other side of the ledger. To claim that 'the *polis*' *tout court* was in the grip of a terminal malaise is at best a gross simplification.¹³

In regard to Sparta specifically, however, there can be no question but that 'crisis' is the correct term for her historical experience during the second quarter of the fourth century and probably a lot earlier. By 369 she had been stripped of something like a half of her *polis* territory, including the most fertile soil and

some strategically and symbolically sensitive border country. In terms of dependent manpower, she had lost the most important portion of her servile agricultural workforce as well as sizeable numbers of free but politically subject Perioecic soldiers. In 365 what was left of her Peloponnesian League alliance melted into oblivion. Perhaps most serious of all, though, was the catastrophic shrinkage of the Spartiate, full citizen population. Nothing like accurate demographic statistics are available for any Classical Greek city, but it is tolerably clear that in the century or so between the Persian Wars of 480–479 and the Battle of Leuctra the Spartan citizen body (adult male) contracted by more than eighty per cent. No less clearly, this phenomenon lay at the heart of Sparta's decline and fall as a great power.

Why precisely it occurred is and always will be a matter of huge controversy, but that lies outside the scope of the present work. What is relevant and, arguably, correct is Aristotle's laconic judgment that Sparta 'was destroyed through dearth of manpower' (*oliganthrōpia*). It was, that is to say, on account of the dearth of civic military manpower that Sparta was unable to recover from Aristotle's 'single blow', the decisive defeat at Leuctra. That this was indeed a decisive defeat—notwithstanding some territorial retrenchment and possible land- and army-reform in the 360s—was broadcast by the general Hellenic settlement of 362 following the (second) Battle of Mantinea.¹⁴

This was the largest inter-Greek battle ever fought, involving up to 60,000 men in all. It was an attempt to settle the question of Hellenic hegemony first raised in acute form in the fifth century: could any one Greek state create the military and political framework to exercise a stable control over the pale of Greek settlement around the Aegean basin and up into the Bosphorus? The Peloponnesian War had delivered a negative response to Athens, the one postulant with pretensions to a naval hegemony that did not involve co-operation with any external power. Sparta, fundamentally a land-oriented power, had briefly succeeded to Athens' hegemony; but in 386 she abandoned the Greeks of Asia to the Persian Great King, and under the terms of the King's Peace (or Peace of Antalcidas) her suzerainty in mainland Greece and the islands was importantly dependent on that monarch's goodwill. After Leuctra, and after the assassination of the Thessalian dynast Jason in 370, a Thebes-dominated Boeotia was the greatest Greek power, but in 367 she too sought the Great King's blessing for what was proving an all too labile ascendancy, rather than a stable hegemony, in just mainland Greece. But even Artaxerxes' backing could not bring Thebes' enemies into line. Prolonged engagement on two widely separated fronts, Thessaly and the Peloponnese, not alleviated by a unique naval campaign in the Aegean, exhausted Boeotia's resources and gave heart to Athens and Sparta (allied since early 369) and to the Mantinea-led fraction of the already fissile Arcadian federation. For the fourth time, therefore, in the summer of 362, Epaminondas led an army south across the isthmus of Corinth.

Affairs in Tegea were the immediate and ostensible cause of this intervention. Epaminondas proceeded there post-haste to reassert Boeotian

control and issue instructions to Boeotia's Peloponnesian allies to foregather at the appointed battleground of Mantinea. He himself, however, first executed a lightning raid on Sparta by way, as in 370/69, of Caryae. No more than on that occasion did his intentions now include the capture, let alone destruction, of Sparta town. It was enough to demonstrate again the fragility of Sparta's hold over her remaining north Laconian territory and the vulnerability of a wall-less town deprived both of natural protection (in June the Eurotas was no torrent) and of copious manpower. Nevertheless this was the first time on record that the collocation of villages constituting Sparta's 'urban' centre was penetrated by a hostile force; and by his manoeuvre Epaminondas did prevent Sparta from fighting at Mantinea in what had now to count as 'full force', besides gaining time for his allies in Argos and Messene to do so.¹⁵

As at Leuctra, the issue was decided chiefly by the fighting quality and spirit of the Theban hoplites and cavalry under the inspired generalship of Epaminondas. Only the latter's death, at the hands perhaps of the Spartan Anticrates, robbed the Boeotian victory of its full savour, although it is hard to see how it could have been forcefully exploited in any event. Rather, victors and vanquished met again on the battlefield to swear a general peace. Like the Peace of 386 and its successive renewals, the foundation of the verbal agreement was a pledge mutually to respect the sovereign autonomy and guarantee the independence from external interference of all Greek states both great and small. Like its predecessors, too, the Peace of 362 was supposed to apply to all Greek states, whether or not they had participated directly in the swearing of the oaths. However, in one certainly and perhaps two important respects this Peace broke new ground.

First, this is the first Peace we know for sure to have been actually called a 'Common Peace' (*koinē eirēnē*). The title by itself betrays a yearning for Hellenic unity and a more positive evaluation of peace than as a mere absence of overt martial conflict. Second, this was unquestionably the first of the general peaces concluded since 386 that did not involve foreign, that is non-Greek, dictation or even participation. That point was rammed home by the united Greeks themselves in a document suitably couched in Attic dialect (which was to be the basis of the *koinē* dialect of the Hellenistic Greek world) but found at Dorian Argos. This surely belongs to the immediate post-Mantineia period, when revolted vassals of the Persian Great King were seeking Greek military aid and were politely but firmly rebuffed by the 'sharers in the Peace' who claimed to have no quarrel with the King so long as he 'does not set the Hellenes against each other and does not, in the case of the Peace that we now have, attempt to dissolve it by any device at all or by stratagem'.¹⁶

One Greek state, however, which had fought at Mantinea, deliberately and ostentatiously excluded itself from this Common Peace. No prizes for guessing that this was Sparta, governed in this decision—as in most matters of policy over the past three decades—by Agesilaus. For Agesilaus, like his son and virtual co-regent Archidamus, could never countenance the loss of that portion

of Messenia which now constituted the *polis* of Messene, let alone acknowledge its existence formally, openly, and under oath. The Athenian conservative pamphleteer Isocrates had nicely captured the emotional wellspring of this irredentist passion for Messenia when he made his 'Archidamus' say (in a dramatic context of 366/5): 'the most painful thing is the prospect not of being deprived unjustly of our own territory but of seeing our own slaves become masters of it'. Agesilaus, therefore, unlike the Greeks who rebuffed the satraps, did take up arms against the Persian Great King—in Egypt. His aim was to gain the funds with which to pay the mercenaries Sparta now depended on to fight the good fight for Messenia.¹⁷

It was on his return from Egypt, amply rewarded, that Agesilaus finally died at the age of about 84. Archidamus, by then in his forties, succeeded his father on the Eurypontid throne, probably early in 359. That happened also to be the year in which a certain Philip son of Amyntas succeeded his brother as *de facto*, and perhaps also *de jure*, king of Macedon. Theopompus of Chios, a dyspeptic historian of oligarchic and so generally pro-Spartan bent, later opined that Europe had never before produced such a man as Philip. The remark was not intended to be altogether flattering, but it does neatly capture Philip's extraordinary impact on the history of, first, northern mainland Greece, and then the whole Aegean Greek world. It was only the chance of an assassination, probably (see the next chapter), that prevented his having a comparable impact on the history of the Middle East, a rôle fulfilled by his son Alexander in his stead.

The history of Sparta during the reign of Archidamus, which forms the subject of the rest of this chapter, has to be written in the interstices and under the cloud of the dominant history of the rise of Macedon. (If I say nothing of Archidamus' Agiad co-king Cleomenes II, who had reigned since 370 and was to continue in post until 309, that is because there is nothing to say.) So too does all Aegean Greek history, in stark contrast to that of the preceding epoch, for which Agesilaus' friend Xenophon was quite justified in taking the histories of Sparta and Thebes as his guiding threads. The lack of good sources for Macedon and of a competent narrative account of Spartan and Greek history between 359 and 338 is therefore lamentable. Diodorus, a Sicilian Greek who wrote a wholly derivative and oddly named 'Library of History' in the first century BC, makes even Xenophon, for all his prejudices and omissions, seem a diligent and competent historian.¹⁸

It was, however, at least partly due to pro-Spartan prejudice and nostalgia that Xenophon concluded his history on a melancholy note: after Mantinea, he wrote, 'there was more unsettlement and disorder in Hellas than before the battle'. For, looked at in another way, as by the anti-Spartan Demosthenes in 330, that battle had the positively beneficial consequence that the Peloponnese was divided and Sparta could no longer domineer over her neighbours in her accustomed manner. Casting aside all prejudices, Demosthenes' is surely the correct perspective to adopt on Sparta's external history under Archidamus. The

way in which Sparta participated, or did not participate at all, in the major enterprises of his day is eloquent supporting testimony. As for Sparta's internal history, we as usual lack the account of an insider, a participant observer who was also a Spartan citizen. But we do possess a very acceptable second-best substitute in the *Politics* of Aristotle. For he and his pupils had conducted what then passed for primary historical research on Spartan institutions, and the philosophic Stagirite brought to his studies the understanding of a properly sociological imagination.¹⁹

For the first years of Archidamus the annals of Sparta are a virtual blank. But in 356, as is implied by Isocrates' no doubt misplaced appeal to Archidamus to assume the rôle of panhellenic leader against Persia, Sparta was again active on two widely separated fronts, Sicily and central Greece. We shall return briefly to Sicily and the Greek west in connection with the end of Archidamus' career and life. His and Sparta's involvement with Phocis and thereby with the so-called Third Sacred War (356/5–346) was of far greater moment. For it was this prolonged conflict that constituted the introit to Philip's consecration as director of mainland Greek affairs.

The title of the war must not mislead. This was no more a crusade or *jihad* than the Corinthian War of 395–386, which had also arisen from a dispute between Phocians and Locrians fanned by Thebes. Rather, it was a thoroughly secular struggle that found expression through the manipulation, physical occupation and monetarization of the panhellenic sanctuary of Delphi with its oracle and treasures. From of old, the management of this holiest of Greek shrines had lain with an Amphictyony or sacred council, the majority of whose members were provided by Thessalian communities. Tradition had it that control of Delphi had been fought over in the literal sense on two previous occasions, but the first may be a fiction and the second was a brief episode without major ramifications. The Third Sacred War was an altogether larger affair of central significance for all mainland Greek political, military and diplomatic history.²⁰

Sparta was an active member of the Delphic Amphictyony with exceedingly ancient, intimate and binding ties to the oracle. Following the earthquake and fire that had wrecked the Temple of Apollo in 373 both individual Spartans (of both sexes) and the Spartan state officially had helped finance and administer its reconstruction. It was partly therefore for reasons of sentiment that Sparta was so quick to get involved in the Third Sacred War. But sentiment was outweighed by yet more pressing pragmatic reasons. First, Thebes had exploited her post-Leuctra predominance to manipulate the Amphictyony into fining Sparta the enormous sum of 500 talents for the sacrilegious seizure and occupation of the acropolis of Thebes in 382. Sparta had not paid, indeed could not afford to pay, but the insult rankled. Second, a major and possibly prolonged war in central Greece was seen by Archidamus as the best chance of halting Theban intervention in Sparta's Peloponnesian sphere on the side of her enemies in Messene, Megalopolis (most recently in 361) and Argos. So when in

356 at the instigation of Thebes the Amphictyony doubled the Spartans' unpaid fine and at the same time inflicted a severe penalty on Phocis for another alleged religious misdemeanour, Archidamus did not need to be bribed to renew the Spartan co-operation with Phocis that had lapsed in 371 and was happy to entrust the Phocian leader Philomelus with fifteen talents.²¹

Diodorus says this transaction was effected 'secretly' and perhaps means that Archidamus had not gone through the formal channels of approval by the Gerousia and Spartan Assembly. But since there is no doubt that they would have consented, the secrecy must have been for the benefit of Philomelus rather than Sparta, unless there is a hint here of the controversial use to which Philomelus put the money. In any case, the form of the Spartan aid is revealing. For even if Archidamus had wanted and been able to give open support, he could not have spared any of Sparta's by now fewer than one thousand citizen hoplites for an extra-Peloponnesian enterprise of doubtful outcome. Money therefore was his only resort, but the Spartan treasury had never been flush at the best of times, not least because the Spartans were reputedly reluctant taxpayers and Sparta anyway was not a very monetized society. For liquid cash it had always depended on sources from outside the economy, like the enormous booty Agesilaus captured in Asia in the 390s or the 'gift' he received from an Egyptian ruler in 360/59. Nor in 356 could Archidamus any longer call on cash contributions from Sparta's allies in the defunct Peloponnesian League. The fifteen talents must therefore have come either from the residue of his father's Egyptian donation or possibly even from his own considerable personal fortune.²²

Their purpose was to purchase the services of mercenaries, of whom there was a ready supply and on whom most Greek states, not excluding Sparta, had come to depend since the 390s. With his Phocians and mercenaries Philomelus reasserted the Phocians' ancient claim to (geographically Phocian) Delphi in the most tangible way, by seizing and occupying it. The anathema pronounced on this move at the autumn 356 meeting of the Amphictyony formally inaugurated the Sacred War. Philomelus himself was defeated and killed in 354, but his successor Onomarchus proved to have even fewer religious scruples. The real charge of sacrilege against Phocis arose from his decision to monetize the sanctuary's accumulated multinational treasures for the purpose of recruiting yet more mercenaries. This he did to such effect that in 353 he inflicted on the Thessalians' champion Philip of Macedon the only two defeats that monarch suffered in pitched battle during more than twenty years of active campaigning.²³

By 353 Philip had not merely secured his throne and kingdom from internal and external threats but actually enlarged and enriched the fissile domain he had inherited half a dozen years before, by a subtle combination of more or less veiled bribery and brute force. The rich plains and profitable port facilities of neighbouring Thessaly to his south offered a tempting sphere for expansion as well as a source of legitimate strategic concern. Philip was not the first

Macedonian king to involve himself in the politics of this antiquated and not quite Greek region, which only once—under the dynamic Jason in the later 370s—had threatened to become a major power-unit in its own right. But he was the first to dominate them, and the first non-Thessalian to rule the loose-hung Thessalian federation. The military leadership of Thessaly that he had acquired before the Battle of the Crocus Field in 352 was translated after his decisive victory over the Phocians there into formal election as *arkhōn* of the federation. Philip's writ now ran as far south as the pass of Thermopylae. The Phocians, together with their Spartan and Athenian allies, were therefore rightly prompt to occupy it in advance, the Spartans contributing a thousand troops of whom most were of course Perioeci. Philip 'came, saw and retired' (Griffith), but the menace he posed was merely postponed.²⁴

In the short breathing-space afforded by this impasse Sparta was active against two of her three main Peloponnesian enemies. In 351 Archidamus and his son Agis (the future Agis III) attacked Megalopolis with 3000 mercenaries provided by Phocis. There was also a campaign against Argos that involved Theban troops. The propagandistic ground for these assaults had been prepared by Archidamus in autumn 353, when he had proposed a far-reaching series of restorations of 'ancestral' territories to their 'legitimate' owners. He had chiefly in mind of course the restitution of Messene to Sparta, together with those northern Laconian Perioecic communities that had been incorporated in Megalopolis. But he couched the proposal in much wider terms with a view to winning the support of Athens, Elis, Phlius, some Boeotian cities hostile to Thebes and some Arcadian ones opposed to the Arcadian federation. The proposal predictably fell flat, though at least Athens stayed neutral rather than fight on the side of Megalopolis as Demosthenes advocated. Hence Sparta's very limited outside succour in 351 and her complete lack of success. The death of the octogenarian Spartiate Hippodamus is notable if only because it reminds us that this campaign came too soon for the crippling loss of 400 Spartiates at Leuctra to have been made good by natural increase. Gastron and Lamius were probably not the only Spartans who now preferred lucrative mercenary service in Egypt to the great patriotic war of irredentist recuperation nearer home.²⁵

Non-literary sources cast interesting sidelights on the condition of Sparta at the nadir of her fortunes in the mid-century. First, a proxenydecree of about 360 BC from the Cycladic island of Ceus (Keos). Among others, men from no less than four Laconian Perioecic communities (Pellana in the northwest, Cyphanta and Epidaurus Limera on the east coast, and one whose name is lost) were honoured with the status of official diplomatic representative of Ceus in their home towns. This must have something to do with Ceus' current disaffection from Athens, which was shared by other members of the Second Athenian League, even if it is hard to see exactly how Pellana and the others could have been of much practical help. For the honorands, on the other hand, it must have been as flattering as it had been for Gnosstas of Oenus (made *proxenos* of Argos a century earlier) to be treated as representatives of autonomous political

entities. The influence of Epaminondas is faintly detectable, perhaps, but the political weakness of Sparta is palpable.²⁶

Secondly, a perhaps slightly later inscription from the healing shrine of Asclepius at Epidaurus tells on the face of it a heartwarming tale. One Arata, a Spartan female of indeterminate age, was sick of the dropsy, whereupon her mother incubated in the Asclepieum and dreamed an impossible dream in which Asclepius decapitated the daughter and then rejoined the severed head to her neck. Arata, needless to say, was cured when her loving mother returned to Sparta. The growing popularity of Asclepius in the fourth century was by no means peculiar to Sparta, or Spartan women, and dropsy could be fatal. Yet there is something symbolically apt in Spartan women behaving just like any other Greek women for once, rather than as the viragos of laconizing mythology. On the other hand, should Arata have been suffering from dropsy of the womb, there might have been a particular local significance in her mother's incubating at a time of acute Spartan civic *oliganthrōpia*.²⁷

However that may be, Sparta's limited manpower was in no position to affect the outcome of the Sacred War, which rested, on appeal from Thebes, in the lap of Philip. The most Archidamus could do was attempt ineffectually to oust the deposed and Philippizing Phocian general Phalaecus from Thermopylae in 347/6 and send a Spartan delegation to the Macedonian capital Pella in early summer 346 when the fates of Phocis and Thebes were in the balance. The reported flare-up between the Spartan and Theban delegations occasions little surprise, especially as Philip in the end made it clear that he had decided for Thebes. With Amphictyonic authorization Philip duly pulverized the Phocians both militarily and politically and then took their place and two votes on the council, the first individual to be so represented. The Philip-dominated Amphictyony imposed a heavy fine on Phocis and appointed him to preside over the Pythian Games of 346. His Hellenic and indeed panhellenic credentials were being securely established with a view, surely, to fulfilling ambitions beyond the bounds of Hellas.²⁸

The Delphic Amphictyony, however, prestigious though it was, was not geared to be the choice instrument of power-politics in all Aegean Greece. This fact Philip recognised duly by not pressing for the expulsion of Sparta (who might reasonably have been held guilty of blasphemy by association with Phocis) or for the admission of Sparta's enemies Messene and Megalopolis. On the other hand, since he could not please all Greeks all of the time, he did decide that Sparta, which was anyway very weak, was also the most dispensable state. In 344 he therefore backed up the cash he habitually provided to the leading politicians of cities he wished to woo with mercenary troops for Messene and Argos in their war with Sparta. It was perhaps in this fighting that the seven sons of Iphicratidas and Alexippa fell. Philip's *Geldpolitik* paid off handsomely in 343 when Argos, Messene and Megalopolis allied with him, and Elis was lost by Sparta to Messene and so to Philip. True, none of these fought with him at the definitive Battle of Chaeronea in 338, but at least they did not contribute to the

considerable alliance of Greek states mustered against him by Athens and Thebes.²⁹

Nor, despite their unappeasable enmity towards Philip, did the Spartans. Indeed, so far removed were they from the centre of political gravity in mainland Greece after the Sacred War that in 342, when Demosthenes was beginning to cobble together a common Greek resistance to Macedon, their only active king preferred to concern himself with the affairs of Lyctus in Crete and Tarentum in southern Italy. Sentiment no doubt had something to do with Archidamus' decision, since Sparta was the real founder of the latter and honorary metropolis of the former city. And it will have flattered Sparta's lingering self-image as a Greek superpower to play the rôle of Hellenic policeman in the West, since her last showing on the wider Greek stage had been a walk-on part in the dynastic squabbles of Syracuse in the mid-350s. Yet more weighty than either of those considerations was Archidamus' need to recoup his own lost prestige and Sparta's depleted finances. The tradition that Archidamus died fighting at Mandonium (?=Manduria, south-east of Tarentum) on the very day of Chaeronea is too true to be good for Sparta's reputation, but it is of a piece with Diodorus' view that his death was divine retribution for sacrilege—an uncomfortable echo of Xenophon's explanation of the Leuctra *débâcle* in which Archidamus had narrowly missed taking part.³⁰

The Battle of Chaeronea, as contemporary and subsequent historians have for the most part recognized, sealed the political fate of all Aegean Greece. Philip's allies Messene, Megalopolis and Argos, like most of the Peloponnese, had not taken part in the fighting. But although they had yet to reciprocate Philip's benefactions, they still had more to offer him in propagandistic as well as pragmatic terms. For in face of a notionally independent and irreducibly hostile Sparta they would always need to look to their Macedonian suzerain for reinforcement or protection, while Sparta's very independence could be represented as proving that the union of supposedly free and autonomous states through which Philip intended to rule mainland Greece was voluntary in fact as well as name. (Similar considerations were to guide the Hellenic diplomacy of the Roman T. Quinctius Flaminus a century and a half later: see [chapter 5](#), below.) Hence, late in 338, Philip took to the road in the footsteps of Epaminondas in order to invade Laconia—ostensibly on behalf of his Peloponnesian adherents, in reality in pursuit of his own geopolitical interests. Elis alone is known to have supplied him with troops, but presumably Argos, Arcadia and Messene did too.³¹

This, the third invasion of Laconia within the lifetime of Sparta's new Eurypontid king Agis III, proved definitive in the most literal sense. There were no risings of Helots or Perioeci to assist him, no plots by disaffected 'inferior' Spartans as in 370/69. Nor did Philip capture Sparta itself—because, like Epaminondas, he did not want or need to, not because he could not have done so, let alone because (as the pious and patriotic Epidaurian Isyllus believed) Asclepius prevented him. Yet he was none the less able to effect his sole aim of

redrawing the frontiers of the Spartan *polis*. Thus by early 337 he had stripped Sparta of all her former northern Laconian borderlands (Aegythis, Belminatis, Sciritis, Caryatis and Thyreatis), together with the western borderland of Dentheliatis lying between Laconia and Messenia, the east Laconian coastland as far south as Perioecic Prasiae, and the Perioecic communities of the northeast shore of the Messenian Gulf. It is an intriguing possibility that for the finer points of topographical and historical detail he may have utilized Aristotle's work entitled 'Just Claims of the Greek Cities'. It seems certain that the arrangements Philip made on the spot were later ratified by the united Greeks—barring of course Sparta—of what moderns call the 'League of Corinth' (see the next chapter). But, as the Spartans could not but be aware, power not legality was the real arbiter now of their—and indeed all the mainland Greeks'—destiny.³²

In short, Sparta retained, apart from the Eurotas valley with its invaluable alluvium worked by the Laconian Helots, only the bulk of the Mani peninsula (very unproductive with the exception of the port and territory of Gytheum) and the eastern, Malea peninsula (most important for its iron ores) out of a civic domain formerly more than twice as extensive and populous. So profound was the noiseless social upheaval in Sparta's domestic arrangements consequent upon the loss of Messenia and of chunks of Perioecic land that we now hear for the first time of Spartans turning their own hands perforce to the plough. The dictum attributed to King Cleomenes I (c. 520–490) that Homer, not Hesiod, was the poet of the Spartans had acquired a very hollow ring.³³

Chapter two

Resistance to Macedon: the revolt of Agis III

Scholars cannot agree whether Philip's son Alexander III the Great was the first Hellenistic king or whether the Hellenistic epoch properly so called began rather with the struggles for supremacy of the 'Successors' after his premature death in June 323. In a sense the dispute is fruitless, since all periodization of the past is more or less arbitrary (as was noted at the start of the last chapter). In a yet more relevant sense, though, this dispute is also beside the point, as the history of Sparta cannot be slotted conveniently into the conventional 'Classical' to 'Hellenistic' transition, wherever the point of transition may be fixed. For as she had done since 362, so under Alexander and his immediate successors Sparta continued to cut a lone furrow in soil that was generally thin and stony. This is why the present chapter does not end with either of the two traditional clausulae of the Greek Classical period, Alexander's death or the defeat of the Greek rebellion of 323–2, but with the decease of the prodigious nonentity Cleomenes II. It focuses, moreover, on Sparta's self-centred war of resistance against Greece's new suzerain as a symbol of her continued exclusion from the mainstream of Greek political, economic and cultural life.¹

On the other hand, the chapter begins with what most contemporaries would have recognized as a turning-point in their internal and external histories, the foundation by Philip of the organization known to us as the League of Corinth. 'From the impasse of fourth-century politics', it has been well said, 'with the crisis of interstate relations after Mantinea, the revived impact of Macedon, and the social and economic problems of the Greek mainland, sprang Macedonian hegemony, the plan to conquer Persia, and the Hellenistic Age with its new values'. One of those values, though not exactly brand new, was the idea of Hellenic unification on the political as well as the cultural or ethnic plane. To quote Walbank again, 'The idea of a Greek nation is alien to the thought of most Greeks at most periods throughout Greek history... Yet...we can clearly trace a movement towards integration in larger units...possible because ultimately the Greeks felt themselves to be a single people'. *Prima facie*, the League of Corinth as a self-styled 'Hellenic' body qualifies as strong evidence of this movement at the very threshold of the Hellenistic Age. Closer inspection, however, reveals that the evidence should be sought elsewhere, in the rebellion of 323–2. For despite its geographical comprehensiveness, the League of Corinth

was a sectarian move in the interests of the few, propertied Greeks and, above all, was merely a means to a larger end in Philip's and Alexander's scheme of things.²

Much scholarly ink has been spilt, unnecessarily, over the technical question whether the Greeks who were united under the umbrella of the League were sharers in a Common Peace only or were also members of a military alliance. The distinction is in both senses academic, since the League's first decision in summer 337 was to appoint Philip *hēgemōn* or military leader of an expedition dressed up as a crusade against Persia. Even if the Greeks were not formally subordinate allies of Philip, that was how they were voting to be treated. The relationship between the *sunedrion* (council) of the allies and their Athenian *hēgemōn* in the Second Athenian League may have served Philip as something of a precedent and example; but Philip's League, whose headquarters lay at strategically nodal Corinth, was not in permanent session, and Philip was careful to ensure that Corinth, like Ambracia, Thebes and Chalcis, was equipped with a permanent Macedonian garrison.³

Moreover, representatives (not delegates, probably, to use the Burkeian distinction) of the Greek states who constituted the council of the League were virtually hand-picked by Philip. Brief reference was made in the first chapter to Philip's *Geldpolitik*, the way he used his enormous gold and silver reserves to buy adherents in the Greek cities or lubricate existing relations of clientship. These men were non—or anti-democrats of varying hues, members of the propertied classes who believed that, since they contributed most financially and militarily to their states, they should wield political power and that it was actually unjust for the more or less propertyless poor majority of citizens to be in a position to tell them what to do.⁴ Once established in control with Philip's backing, they were understandably wholehearted in their support of the Peace-term elements of the League's charter. Two of these may usefully be isolated, since they have a wider bearing on the entire Hellenistic portion (Part One) of the present work.

First, under the by now inescapable 'freedom and autonomy' formula, currently existing constitutions were officially guaranteed against alteration. The majority of Thebans, who until Chaeronea had enjoyed a moderately democratic constitution, will not have been impressed or persuaded by a slogan that legitimated after the fact what they counted as an oligarchic counter-revolution. Nor would the irony of an autonomy that was underwritten by a foreign garrison have been lost on them. The Theban case was extreme, but it was an extreme version of a not untypical *statusquo post* Chaeronea.

Secondly, and reinforcing the preceding item, a clause of the Common Peace outlawed the cancellation of debts, redistribution of (expropriated) land, and the liberation of slaves with a view to effecting the sort of political revolution that the two former actions implied. The evidence for the *stasis* (civil strife or outright civil war) that underlay such revolutionary manifestations is much richer for the fourth than for any preceding century, and this is regularly cited by proponents of the view that 'the Greek *polis*' was in terminal crisis at this time.

In this instance, if Athens is excepted, the case seems quite sound, although it cannot be determined whether the rich were growing richer at the expense of the poor or the economic ‘cake’ as a whole was shrinking, with rich and poor maintaining their relative slices but the poor being forced below the margin of decent or assured subsistence. Whatever the explanation of aggravated *stasis*, the marked increase in the pool of men available for mercenary service is clearly a causally related phenomenon. These clauses of the settlement, in short, aimed to freeze the Aegean Greek world in the mould set by Philip’s victory at Chaeronea.⁵

Sparta, we saw, had not been defeated at Chaeronea—but only because she had not fought there. Nor had she actually been defeated by Philip during his subsequent invasion of Laconia in winter 338/7—but only because he chose not to fight or even to bribe the notoriously dorophagous Spartans. For it suited him to leave Sparta alone as the sole Greek ‘holdout’ from the League of Corinth, which of course duly ratified Philip’s frontier-redrawing at Sparta’s expense. As such Sparta was living testimony to the ostensibly voluntary character of that organization and a constant cause for concern to her Peloponnesian neighbours and enemies in Messene, Megalopolis and Argos. In this position of inglorious and enfeebled isolation the Spartans were permitted to languish for a further half dozen years. Had they been given to reflection, they could have pondered long the irony of fate and vocabulary that left both them and their old enemies in Thebes ‘free and autonomous’ under such radically different conditions. Had it not been for the autonomy of Messene, Sparta would have been a far more comfortable member of the strictly reactionary League than Thebes, let alone a still democratic and ungarrisoned Athens.⁶

In other circumstances, too, Sparta, whose oldest citizens knew all about supposed anti-Persian crusades, would have been a natural supporter of Philip’s campaign of retribution (for the sacrileges of 480–79) against Artaxerxes IV (murdered 336) and his eventual successor Darius III. Philip himself, though, was not destined to assume the command in Asia. After the advance force under Parmenion had established a beachhead in north-western Anatolia Philip was publicly assassinated at his kingdom’s ceremonial capital in what appears to have been a sordid personal vendetta. Those Greek states which took his murder as a sign that the good old days of Macedonian infighting had returned were quickly disabused by Philip’s son and heir, the twenty-year-old Alexander.⁷

Sparta made no overt move to join the abortive resistance. It is, however, possible that she put out feelers in that direction. At any rate, surely it was more than a coincidence that the one known occasion on which Cleomenes II crawled out of his shell should have been the immediate aftermath of Philip’s assassination, when he both won a victory at the Pythian Games (vicariously, through his chariot-team) and at the autumn Pylaea of 336 joined four of his fellow-countrymen in donating money towards the outstanding cost of rebuilding Apollo’s temple at Delphi. What has been written of the ceremonial embassies to Delphi by Athens at this time applies equally, *mutatis mutandis*, to a

personal intervention by a Spartan king: 'Such ceremonial embassies maintained the city's position on the Panhellenic stage both in formal and informal ways; besides making an impressive show by their presence, members of the delegation could engage in informal negotiations with envoys from other states and sound out feeling about Macedonian rule'. Since it was through the Delphic Amphictyony that Philip had first emerged as a great power in mainland Greece and within the Greek world at large, and since his Persian campaign had been tricked out in the plumage of Panhellenism, this was the obvious forum in which to challenge Macedonian rule by non-military means.⁸

Non-military, because contrary to expectations the 'boy' Alexander proved to be very much his father's son and compelled his instant election as *hēgemōn* of the League of Corinth's—or rather Philip's—Persian venture. Military resistance would have to wait on his departure from the Greek mainland. In 335, while Alexander was campaigning on his north-western frontiers, rumour reached Greece that he had been killed. This was enough to ignite a more determined and extensive rebellion than the previous year's, but again, not least because Thebes was the ringleader and Sparta's principal Peloponnesian enemies were sympathetic, without Spartan assistance or concurrence. Alexander's response was as ruthless as it was rapid. Formally by vote of the League *sunedrion*, in reality at Alexander's behest, Thebes was annihilated—an object-lesson in terror recalling his father's obliteration of Olynthus in 348. The freedom of the Greeks, plainly, hung by a slender thread which the Macedonian suzerain might sever at his pleasure.

Spartan feelings will have been mixed. Exultation at Thebes' demise can only have been dampened by this demonstration of Macedonian power and tempered still more by the way that Alexander could intervene with impunity in the internal affairs of neighbouring Messene contrary to the League charter by bringing to power the sons of Philiades.⁹ Since Sparta could not bear to co-operate against Macedon with Messene-recognizing Greeks, who anyway apart from Athens were financially and militarily debilitated, she turned to an old friend from her glory days: Achaemenid Persia.

Sixty years earlier, in 394, Agesilaus had been recalled to Greece to face a fearsome combination of Sparta's many Greek enemies. After campaigning in western Asia Minor for two years he had been planning, so his loyal supporters claimed, a new Anabasis into the heart of the Persian Empire with the idea of detaching from the Great King all the nations through which he should pass. Now in 335/4, when Alexander was on the point of putting such an aim into far more realistic operation, Sparta was negotiating with his Persian adversary. Yet this too had a precedent. For in 392 Sparta had begun the negotiations with Persia that were to lead in 387/6 to the pro-Spartan King's Peace, whereby the Greeks of Asia had been consigned to the suzerainty of Persia. It was therefore by no means an outrageous suggestion of Artaxerxes II in 362 that Agesilaus should help him quell his rebellious western viceroys (a suggestion rejected because the king had committed the unpardonable sin of recognizing Messene in

367) or of his successor Artaxerxes III in 344 that Sparta should aid his (finally successful) attempt to reconquer Egypt which had been in revolt since 404 (also rejected, because Sparta was then otherwise engaged in the Peloponnese). In the event, renewed co-operation between Sparta and Persia did not materialize before 333.¹⁰

Darius III or rather his western satraps had by then lost the first of the three major pitched battles Alexander won. This was the Battle of the River Granicus, after which Alexander had deliberately drawn attention for propaganda purposes to Sparta's self-exclusion from the 'Hellenic' crusade. In response to Alexander's southward progress of liberation through Anatolia Darius tardily and less than wholeheartedly embraced the one strategy that might have halted Alexander before his invasion had gathered great momentum. Persian land-forces were detailed to operate in Alexander's rear to hinder communications and prevent supplies and reinforcements reaching him, while a fleet based as ever on Phoenicia (though only recently it had been in revolt) was to cruise through the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean cutting links between Anatolia and the Greek mainland with a view to stirring rebellion again there against Alexander's regent Antipater. Sparta had never been a naval force of any note, although an individual Spartan like Lysander might show surprising aptitude for naval warfare; but her reputation as a land-power, tarnished though it was, and her undimmed yearning for hegemony of the Peloponnese combined to recommend Sparta to Darius' Persian and Greek advisers as potential leader of an anti-Macedonian resistance on the Greek mainland. It was for this reason, so Alexander reportedly was to claim in a bitter letter addressed to Darius himself, that 'You sent... money to the Spartans and some other Greeks, which none of the other cities would accept apart from the Spartans'.¹¹

That letter was supposedly sent after the second of Alexander's major set-piece victories over Darius, at Issus in Cilicia in late autumn or early winter 333. By rights it was a battle that Alexander ought to have lost—which presumably is what those many Greeks had calculated who signed up in droves as mercenaries for Darius, as they continued to do in larger numbers than for Alexander right up to the ultimately decisive encounter at Gaugamela. At all events, Issus was certainly a close-run affair, and many of Darius' Greek mercenaries lived to fight another day. Some of them, indeed, were transferred from the direct command of Darius to that of his Spartan lieutenant in the West—King Agis III.¹²

In 335 or 334 Agis had been indirectly involved, we may be sure, in negotiations with Memnon, the Rhodian Greek who commanded Darius' navy. In 333 Sparta's Persian expert Euthycles had been sent as envoy to Darius himself at Susa. Finally, late in 333 or early in 332, after the Issus battle, Agis in person met the successors of the now dead Memnon on the island of Siphnos to co-ordinate Sparta's part in the continuing Persian grand strategy that was aimed 'not only at cutting Alexander's communications but at drawing him off from Asia by threatening Macedonia' (Burn 1952, 83). Thirty silver talents and

ten triremes were despatched on Agis' instructions to his brother Agesilaus in Laconia, who was to pay the crews in full and set sail forthwith for Crete. Agesilaus' base was Taenarum at the foot of the Mani peninsula, which here makes the first of its several appearances as a 'huge man-market', that is one of the major mercenary-marts of the eastern Mediterranean. Formerly, Taenarum had been noted chiefly for its sanctuary of Poseidon (Pohoidan in the local dialect), which could serve as an official asylum for fugitive Helot suppliants. The new development of military function is worthy of remark: it 'could not have happened without the co-operation of the Spartan government, and suggests that it found it convenient to have a pool of mercenaries handy to draw on, and also that mercenaries found the place convenient, perhaps because it was easy to get employment locally'.¹³

Agis proceeded as far east as Halicarnassus on the Asiatic coast before joining his brother for the campaigning season of 332 on Crete. Operations here were important as part of the grand strategy outlined above, both because of Crete's location and because it was a ready source of fresh mercenaries. But although Agis is credited with securing the whole island for the Persian interest, this was a minor success compared with the disaster of the defection to Alexander of the Persian fleet which gave him mastery of the sea. Agis therefore returned to the Peloponnese, probably late in 332, and spent the winter of 332/1 in trying to arouse support, especially in Athens, for his projected Greek rising against Macedon.¹⁴

There is no doubt that Agis was at this moment the protagonist of the anti-Macedonian movement in Greece and that the revolt he led—or, more exactly, the war he initiated, since unlike her Greek allies Sparta was technically not a subject of Macedon—was a serious affair. The sources for it, however, are such that the extensive body of recent scholarship remains divided over fundamental interpretative issues of chronology, purpose and significance. The summary account that follows is necessarily eclectic and opinionated, but the picture it presents is at least consistent with the pattern of Sparta's internal and external history in the earlier part of the fourth century, in so far as that can be reconstructed from fuller and more reliable evidence.¹⁵

Whether through co-ordination or, more likely, coincidence, Agis began his outbreak in spring or early summer when Antipater was unexpectedly diverted by a domestic revolt in neighbouring Thrace. At this opportune conjuncture Agis attacked and massacred a Macedonian force stationed in the Peloponnese under Corrhagus; a victory dedication to Apollo at Amyclae by an [Agis] is perhaps to be associated with this success. Next, he turned to what may reasonably be accounted his principal objective, the siege and eventual destruction of Megalopolis. The stages of his campaign cannot be precisely reconstructed, but it is possible that initially Agis had only Laconian troops (Spartan and Perioecic) and mercenaries at his disposal. The mercenaries could have numbered as many as 10,000, as later alleged by an Athenian orator, and included men who had fought with Darius at Issus (though hardly the '8,000'

stated by Diodorus). It may then have been the success over Corrhagus which persuaded some members of the League of Corinth to revolt to Agis. For he was still pretty much an unknown quantity, and his state's proven record of aloofness from earlier Greek resistance to Macedon and collaboration with Persia will not have encouraged those Greeks who regarded both Persia and Macedon as equally enemies of Greek freedom. Such Greeks were to be found especially in democratic Athens, which was further constrained from overt anti-Macedonian action by the fact that Alexander was in effect holding hostage up to 4,000 Athenian citizens. In the event, therefore, despite rumours of support from north of the Isthmus, Agis' official Greek allies turned out to be exclusively Peloponnesian. Indeed, *pace* Diodorus, Agis could not muster even the majority of the Peloponnesians. In numbers both of states involved and of troops supplied the Peloponnesians who fought with Agis were greatly outweighed by those who fought with Antipater at the decisive Battle of Megalopolis in (I believe) late autumn or early winter 331.¹⁶

Precise numbers are as usual unknowable. On the most optimistic interpretation (Badian's) of the figures given by the ancient sources Agis commanded somewhat in excess of 30,000 men. Of these, 10,000 may have been mercenaries, 22,000 (at least 20,000 infantry, about 2,000 cavalry) specially selected civic troops supplied by Arcadia (excepting obviously Megalopolis but including, surprisingly, Tegea as well as Mantinea), Achaea (barring Pellene), and Elis as well as Sparta herself. Against these, after much preparation, Antipater could put more than 40,000 soldiers into the field. If the two totals are even approximately correct, this was a massive confrontation, the largest battle on Greek soil since Plataea (479). But no less important than the totals is the composition of the respective forces.

Agis' Laconian complement of Spartiates, inferior Spartans and Perioeci cannot have exceeded 6,000, barely half the number of his mercenary contingent. His Peloponnesian allies therefore numbered at most 16,000 (assuming charitably that Diodorus' 22,000 does not include Dinarchus' 10,000 mercenaries). On Antipater's side the equivalent Greek troops, that is those supplied by the still overtly loyal members of the League of Corinth, amounted to upwards of 23,000 (allowing 12,000 for his Macedonian complement and 5,000 for his Thracians and Illyrians). Regardless, therefore, of generalship, fighting methods or morale, Antipater's crushing victory was virtually assured in advance by sheer disparity of numbers. But the political significance of his victory is greater than the military. Clearly, the Athenians were far from the only Greeks who saw in Agis with his Persian backing merely a deuter-Agesilaus, 'another Spartan monarch who was prepared to sink to any depths to secure domination over Greece'.¹⁷

Alexander on receiving the news of Megalopolis is said to have dismissed it as a *muomakhia*, a 'battle of mice'. Numerically speaking, this was of course monstrously unfair, but politically it suggests that he saw the affair, rightly, as essentially a struggle between Greeks. Strategically, moreover, he had not

allowed Agis' rising to deflect him from his Persian campaign, and by despatching a large fleet and a large sum of money to Antipater he had done all that was possible and necessary to help counter it or prevent a recurrence of Greek resistance. Agis too, perhaps, had done the best he could in unfavourable circumstances, but that, as Alexander seemingly predicted, was not good enough. Besides, whatever one may think of its motives and conduct, the result of his campaign was an unmitigated disaster for his state. If after Leuctra Sparta had been reduced to the status of a second-rank Greek power, after Megalopolis she became simply a third-rate and inconsiderable Peloponnesian community.¹⁸

The sources agree that 5,300 Laonians and allies, including their commander-in-chief, fell at Megalopolis. The majority of these casualties, if Antipater had learned anything from Epaminondas, will have been Laonians, the great majority of them doubtless Perioeci rather than Spartans. Less than a dozen Perioeci are known to us individually from the latter part of the fourth century, but surface finds of pottery probably indicate continued Perioecic settlement throughout what remained of Sparta's *polis* territory in Laconia after 338/7.¹⁹

Far more serious were the multiple effects of the defeat on Sparta's citizen population. First, the death of Agis deprived Sparta of her only active and effective king between the Eurypontid Archidamus III (d. 338) and the Agiad Areus (r. 309–265). Second, even though citizen numbers could again have been approaching their pre-Leuctra level of 1,200–1,500 in 331, that small number would still have condemned a Sparta lacking a permanent alliance to the status of a small state even without the further losses sustained at Megalopolis. With these casualties disappeared the prospect of recovering 'great power' status in the foreseeable future. Finally, as at Leuctra, too many Spartan citizen soldiers had not thought it sweet and decorous to die for their fatherland at Megalopolis. Cleomenes II's older son, Acrotatus, who presumably for some reason had not participated in the battle, advocated that the full rigour of Spartan law and custom should be brought to bear on these 'tremblers' (*tresantes*), not excluding their partial disfranchisement. As after Leuctra, and for the same reasons, this iron law was again bent to avoid increasing the number of malcontent 'inferior' Spartans. Yet, if Diodorus is to be believed, the tremblers long harboured deep resentment against the Agiad crown prince.²⁰

This was only one of the lastingly dismal legacies of Agis' failure. With due respect for constitutionality Antipater referred the punishment of the rebels to the League council, which imposed a heavy fine on the Achaeans and Elis and somehow chastised the Tegean ringleaders among the Arcadians (Mantineia had possibly withdrawn from the anti-Macedonian axis before the final battle). Sparta, however, was not a member of the League of Corinth; and since Antipater was not prepared to settle the matter himself, Sparta's fate was quite properly—if only after heated debate—referred to Alexander in Asia. But in order to humiliate and hamstring Sparta comprehensively, Antipater did take the precaution of extracting fifty hostages drawn from 'the most distinguished' of

the Spartans. Given Spartiate *oliganthrōpia*, this was no small number. It would seem, though the sources are ambiguous, that these men were still in Antipater's possession in July or August 330, and perhaps for long after that. Alternatively, they may have been sent on to Alexander, from whom they would have suffered the same fate of imprisonment (and death?) as the various Spartan ambassadors to Darius whom he captured during 331/0. Either way, Sparta following Megalopolis was temporarily or permanently deprived of a sizeable chunk of her élite citizenry.²¹

In these circumstances of enfeeblement it is almost idle to ask whether Sparta was now at last required to join the League of Corinth and so swear oaths recognizing the legitimate existence of Messene and Megalopolis. The poverty of our sources forbids an unequivocal answer, but on balance I am inclined to credit in this case the assertion of the Plutarchan *Instituta Laconica* that Sparta was not ever a member of any Macedon-created League. Support, however, can be brought for both this assertion and for the opposite hypothesis. On the one hand, for example, Sparta did not receive grain from Cyrene in the early 320s, when the still presumably Perioecic island of Cythera did. Since there was an acute dearth of grain throughout mainland Greece, affecting even the breadbasket of Thessaly, Sparta is unlikely to have been untouched, so that a political explanation for Sparta's exclusion seems required. Exemplary punishment of an enemy would fit the bill. On the other hand, there is *prima facie* evidence that Sparta, like the members of the League, received orders (*ta epistalenta*) from Alexander to deify him in 324. However, whether or not Sparta was a member, some special explanation(s) would seem to be necessary to account for Sparta's nonparticipation in the great revolt against Macedon that had its immediate origins in 324 and culminated in the so-called Lamian War of 323–2 after confirmation of Alexander's death at Babylon in June 323. This abstention was the more glaring for the crucial rôle played in the revolt by the Taenarum mercenary mart, which lay in Spartan territory and had been exploited by Agis for his war. Sparta, moreover, not only did not participate in the revolt but made a conspicuous gesture in support of the return from exile of some Samian refugees—a move ordered by Alexander but resisted by Athens, which had occupied Samos since 365.²²

One inhibiting factor could have been the hostages, if indeed they were still being held in 323. As these will have included the more warlike supporters of Agis III, their absence will have strengthened the hand of his brother and successor Eudamidas I. He apparently once spoke against war with Macedon in opposition to the wishes of most Spartans (foremost among them, no doubt, being the Megalopolis *tresantes*), and this is the most likely occasion. The joint opposition of the two kings, if we may assume the compliance of the supine Cleomenes II, will have been well-nigh irresistible. The internal decay of Sparta is doubtless also relevant, not least because the increasing gulf between rich and poor Spartans will have inclined the former to favour a Macedonian settlement of Greece that was weighted heavily towards *bien pensant* oligarchs. Finally,

there was the fact that the revolt was led by Athens, which had abstained from Agis' war, and supported by Sparta's sworn enemies Messene and Argos. The principle 'my enemy's enemy is my friend', especially when one's enemy was a neighbour, was all too powerful a motive for (in)action in all Greek interstate relations.²³

Anyway, whatever the reasons, Sparta stood idly by as Athens and her more than twenty Greek allies fought a genuinely 'Hellenic War' against Macedon. For Macedon's character as imperial suzerain had become ever clearer since Alexander cashiered all Greek troops in 330, and its unconcern for the freedom and independence of the Greek cities had prompted orders not only for Alexander's deification but, yet more oppressively illegal, the restoration of all exiles in 324. Even most of the Thessalians joined the revolt, and it was the critical siege of Antipater at Lamia in Thessaly that has given the revolt its name. At the outset the united Greeks had a far better hope of eventual success than Agis. But that siege was lifted, and Macedonian victories by land at Crannon and by sea off Amorgus in 322 made the Lamian War seem in retrospect 'a faltering and self-deluded step on the road to self-destruction'. Athens, stripped once more of her naval power and her democracy, was reduced almost to the level of Sparta *vis-à-vis* Antipater.²⁴

He, however, was just one of half a dozen Macedonian warlords contending for the succession to Alexander's ephemeral European and Asiatic empire. Only once, though, in the next half century did it even briefly look as if one of them might actually grab the lot. The debilitating effect of this almost incessant warfare on Macedon and its control of Greece is most strikingly expressed in the irruption from the north of barbarian Gauls. Their most famous feat was to raid Delphi, navel of the earth and symbolic heartland of Hellas. By the same token, however, this intestine inter-Macedonian strife did afford some Greek polities, most notably the federal states of Aetolia and Achaëa, the space to develop into much more than pawns in a larger, Macedonian game. Even Sparta, as we shall see in the next chapter, again raised her head sufficiently to claim a place in the Hellenistic sun. But in the first main phase of the Successors' struggles, which ended with the Battle of Ipsus in 301, Sparta was conspicuous by her near-total absence.²⁵

The lack of interest taken in Sparta by the rival dynasts was not (*pace* Ehrenberg) a mark of their respect for her ancient reputation but a backhanded acknowledgement of her present triviality. For the demands of neither political nor military strategy required any interest on their part. The nearest Sparta came to involvement in the main action was in or shortly after 319. The League of Corinth had been a dead letter since Alexander's decease, and Sparta was too remote and unimportant to receive a Macedonian garrison, the technique of rule favoured by Antipater's son and successor Cassander. Yet Sparta was sufficiently conscious of her loss of real autonomy to welcome the proclamation by Polyperchon (acting supposedly on behalf of 'Philip III') of freedom and independence for the Greeks. Cassander, it was feared, meditated an attack on

Sparta. Hardly surprisingly, this did not materialize (when Cassander did intervene in the Peloponnese in 315, it was to gain control of Messenia, not Laconia). But the threat did provoke the Spartans' first known attempt at fortifying their central place, that is the four villages of Sparta proper as opposed to Amyclae several kilometres distant to the south. This was not a solid, permanent fortification of mudbrick on a stone footing, but a basic ditch-and-palisade affair. All the same, it constituted the first hesitant public recognition by the Spartans that the Spartiate hoplite militia of citizens reared under the Lycurgan *agōgē* no longer provided adequate self-defence. The irony was that such a fortification should have been thrown up in the age of the great Macedonian besiegers, Philip, Alexander and Demetrius 'the Besieger' (son of Antigonus the One-eyed), against whom only enceinte walling like that of Messene offered sure protection.²⁶

If Sparta had lost both an empire and all real independence, she yet had one rôle left to play: that of a supplier of mercenaries. Shortly before Alexander's death a certain Thibron, perhaps grandson of a distinguished homonym of the 390s, emerged as friend and mercenary commander of the renegade Macedonian Harpalus, a former treasurer of Alexander, who bolted to Athens with vast treasure in 324 and thereby sowed one of the seeds of the Lamian War. When Harpalus was forced to flee Athens and went to Crete, Thibron killed him, seized his funds and sailed for Cyrene, where his attempt to establish a robber-barony soon led to his own murder.²⁷

In 315, when he was at war with Ptolemy of Egypt and Cassander, Antigonus at Tyre emulated Polyperchon's proclamation of Greek freedom. A lieutenant was despatched to the Peloponnese to capitalize on the goodwill that was expected to accrue from the proclamation. He landed in Laconia, presumably at Gytheum, and requested mercenaries from Sparta. At about the same time another request arrived at the same address from three Sicilian Greek cities, not for mercenaries in general but for a single Spartan mercenary commander to lead their struggle against Agathocles of Syracuse. Acrotatus, allegedly still at odds with the Megalopolis tremblers and otherwise motivated in much the same way as the kings Agesilaus and Archidamus before him, answered the call in defiance of the Ephors.²⁸

In vigour Acrotatus showed himself the equal of his royal predecessors. But he unfortunately also displayed the old proneness of Spartan commanders abroad to high-handed vindictiveness and cruelty. Forrest has professed to find 'something sympathetic' in the picture of Spartan royals thus earning a livelihood in the only way open to them. But Acrotatus' mission also neatly symbolizes how Sparta had lost her way at home and was unable to find an exit overseas. Expelled from Sicily, Acrotatus returned to Sparta in about 314 but predeceased his father, who finally brought his inglorious life to a suitably inglorious close after a 'reign' of sixty years in 309.²⁹

Chapter three

The new Hellenism of Areus I

Periodization, as we have had on more than one occasion to observe, is a bane as well as a boon for the historian. The ‘Hellenistic’ epoch of Greek history is both dubiously named and chronologically imprecise, its fluctuating limits depending on its contested definitions. Yet some individuating term is required to pick out the era between the reign of Alexander the Great of Macedon (336–323 BC) and the engorging by Rome of a Greek-speaking world that had been hugely expanded by and following Alexander’s conquests. ‘Hellenistic’ will have to do, subject to two major caveats. First, the Greek word *hellēnizō* after which J.G. Droysen coined the modern label in the last century did not carry in its own time the universal cultural significance that Droysen wished to impute to it. Secondly, Droysen’s conception of the era as essentially characterized by a fusion of Greek and oriental civilizations is viciously anachronistic—Plutarch poured into a Hegelian mould, in Claire Préaux’s apt phrase.¹

In any case, an alternative conception is needed for the history of a state in Old Greece like Sparta, which was largely immune from oriental contacts let alone deep cultural penetration in the Hellenistic era (here taken to end in 146). An alternative, fortunately, is ready to hand. If the pre-Hellenistic or Classical Greek world was above all the world of the *polis*, the Hellenistic universe was at bottom one of territorial states ruled—at first *de facto*, by 300 *de jure*—by more or less absolute monarchs. Even Sparta, which largely for negative reasons retained the actuality as well as the mentality of an old-style *polis* for longer than almost any other Greek polity, could not altogether escape the forces exerted by the gravitational fields of the major monarchies between which she found herself variously pulled and squeezed. Indeed, in the reign and person of King Areus I (309/8–265) Sparta dropped tantalising hints that, in response to the humiliations of the second and third quarters of the fourth century, she was beginning to exchange her traditionally exceptionalist political profile for one of ‘Hellenistic’ normality.²

The reign of Areus, however, is very poorly documented. Even if technically he acceded to the Agiad throne in 309/8, he cannot be said to have ruled before the late 280s. Nor did he attract the attention of biographers, like his Eurypontid predecessor Agesilaus II, or historians (of sorts) in the way that his Agiad successor Cleomenes III did. The surviving narrative sources for 309–265

are scrappy and jejune, the epigraphical texts few and rarely precise in detail or date, the archaeological record patchy and not unambiguous. In these circumstances the appearance of a new kind of source, coinage, is in itself welcome, however slight its contribution.³

For two generations after Alexander's premature death his so-called 'Successors' (Diadochi) and their 'Epigones' slugged it out in a ceaseless struggle for position. The last of the Successors to mount a real challenge for most of Alexander's hypertrophied and evanescent empire was Antigonus Monophthalmus, but he was defeated and killed in battle in his ninth decade at Ipsus in 301 by a combination of Lysimachus and Seleucus. Thereafter it was a question rather of delimiting spheres of power and influence than of monopolizing a single empire, and the next round was terminated more or less at Corupedium, also in Asia Minor, in 281 with the victory of Seleucus over Lysimachus. By 275 Alexander's Graeco-Macedonian and oriental empire was split into three major dynastic blocs: Egypt under the Ptolemies (who for long also laid successful claim to control territories in the Greek Aegean and in the Levant), Asia under the Seleucids (who were later forced to yield part of Asia Minor to the Attalids of Pergamum), and European Greece and Thrace under the Antigonids of Macedon. The latter dynasty by a combination of direct rule (*via* garrisons, the 'Fetters of Greece'), indirect rule through friendly oligarchies or despots, and diplomatic and military alliances exercised a palpable, if far from unchallenged, sway for the better part of the ensuing century.⁴

Sparta's rôle in the first main phase of the post-Alexander struggle was, as we saw in the last chapter, nugatory. Her negligible significance was reconfirmed in 302, when Monophthalmus and his son Demetrius (nicknamed Poliorcetes, 'the Besieger', for his famous though unsuccessful siege of Rhodes in 304) emulated Philip and Alexander in ostentatiously tolerating the refusal of Sparta to join their refounded League of Corinth. By then Areus had nominally occupied the Agiad throne, in succession to his ineffectual grandfather Cleomenes II, for half a dozen years—nominally, since he had been a minor at his accession and even now was barely of age (if that). Earlier Spartan kings had succeeded in their minority, for example the Agiads Pleistoanax and Agesipolis I; and in their cases regents had been entrusted with the supreme command of Spartan and allied armies in major battles. Yet even Regent Pausanias, who eventually paid with his life for his untraditionally egotistical political posturing after his Plataea victory, is not known to have disputed the Agiad succession. In 309/8, however, Cleonymus, younger brother of Areus' dead father Acrotatus (see end of [chapter 2](#)), reckoned he had a better claim to succeed his father Cleomenes II than did his nephew. The Gerousia, which was in effect determining which Agiad to co-opt to the ranks of the supreme governing body of the Spartan state, thought differently and upheld the rule of linear succession. In light of Cleonymus' erratic and ultimately treasonous behaviour in the course of the next four decades, this was probably a wise decision from the standpoint of the Spartan oligarchy. For Areus, although he was to take the Spartan kingship into

uncharted ideological waters, did not apparently wish to cut it entirely adrift from its traditional moorings within the framework of the *polis*. For the time being Cleonymus had to be content with the regency.⁵

However, at the earliest opportunity the disappointed Cleonymus, like the disappointed Dorieus a couple of centuries before, left Sparta for greener, western pastures. In 303 Sparta's colony Tarentum again (cf. [chapter 2](#)) applied to the mother-city for aid against its hostile non-Greek neighbours in southern Italy. The Spartan authorities typically but reasonably preferred to involve Sparta in this distant but potentially lucrative enterprise rather than have anything to do with Antigonos' anti-Cassander Hellenic League. Thus Cleonymus, unlike Acrotatus a decade earlier, sailed for the west with official blessing, taking with him 5,000 mercenaries bought with Tarentine funds in the still teeming mart at Laconian Taenarum. The venture has been described as 'the only important undertaking of the Spartans during the age of the Diadochi' (Marasco 1980b, 38), but its importance was still rather restricted, both from the narrowly Spartan point of view and in terms of its lasting impact on the broader history of south Italy in the early Hellenistic period. For although Cleonymus did compel the Lucanians to come to terms with Tarentum and may also have had something to do with the treaty of 303 between Tarentum and the Romans (then, it seems, in formal alliance with the Lucanians), he proceeded to act as a true *condottiero* instead of Sparta's obedient servant by seizing Corcyra for his own ends and thoroughly alienating the Tarentines. There is a certain fascination in noting that Cleonymus might have been the first Spartan to fight the Romans, but in the longer run the most lasting result of his western mission would seem to have been the favourable impression he made on King Pyrrhus of Epirus.⁶

More immediately, his behaviour abroad appears to have promoted the career of the Eurypontid king Archidamus IV, who may have succeeded his pacific father Eudamidas I in about 300. Anyway, in 294 he achieved his only recorded public exploit when in preference to Cleonymus (or Areus, if he was of age) he was chosen to lead a Spartan force against the Peloponnesian invasion of Demetrius Poliorcetes. Perhaps also to be connected with this brief emergence from obscurity is the hypothetical restoration to Sparta at about this time of Demaratus son of Gorgion, a Greek from north-west Asia Minor. An agent of Lysimachus, Demaratus was quite properly favoured with an honorific dedication by the Delians in about 295. This was just the sort of thing Greek communities felt regularly obliged to do in the new Hellenistic world of Macedonian dynasts. But Demaratus had mainland Greek as well as Asiatic connections; more specifically, he had Spartan connections, since he was descended, as his name was perhaps intended to recall, from the exiled Eurypontid king Demaratus, who had ended his days in the early fifth century as a pensioner of the Persian Great King. It would therefore have suited the book of Lysimachus, one of the *Ipsus* victors, if Demaratus had been restored to Sparta soon after the death of

Cassander in 298/7. That in turn would have strengthened the Eurypontid cause of Archidamus IV.⁷

However that may be, Archidamus proved an incompetent and unlucky commander in what was Sparta's first real direct involvement in the wars of the Alexandrine succession. Poliorcetes' ultimate objectives were the throne of Macedon and revenge for his defeat at Ipsus; the Peloponnese was merely a stepping-stone. But its control or quiescence was at least a necessary preliminary. At Mantinea he was met by Archidamus. The encounter was a disaster for the latter, who may even have lost his life along with those of (allegedly) as many as 700 Spartans and others. The Besieger pressed on into Laconia itself, where the Spartans anxiously and pathetically refurbished the ditch-and-palisade defence they had first placed around Sparta against Cassander some twenty-three years before. Happily, they were not in the event needed, since Poliorcetes was diverted by more urgent business in the north. Thus after the fourth invasion of Laconia in eighty years Sparta town remained yet inviolate.⁸

Even supposing Archidamus had not been killed at Mantinea, he had certainly been disgraced, and in 293 or 292 Cleonymus was again entrusted with an official command, this time in Boeotia. There is no little irony in Sparta's co-operating with Boeotia against Macedon, given the history of Spartan-Boeotian antagonism since the end of the fifth century. Moreover, Cleonymus' very presence in Boeotia implies co-operation, perhaps even formal alliance, between Sparta and a relatively new force in Greek interstate politics, the Aetolian League. By pursuing a policy of armed neutrality, supporting now one or other Greek state or coalition, now one or another Macedonian dynast, this federal state had become increasingly prominent since the late fourth century. But in 293 or 292 neither Aetolian nor Boeotian support availed Cleonymus against Poliorcetes, and he returned to Sparta empty-handed.⁹

Apart from a handful of straws in the wind, there is little or nothing to clutch at of Sparta's dealings in Laconia or anywhere else between 292 and the very end of the next decade.¹⁰ Then in about 281 Areus made his *début*, so far as the sources are concerned, at the head not merely of a Spartan and mercenary army but of an army which for the first time since Agis' war of 331 represented something that could be called a Spartan alliance. This has been hailed hyperbolically as a re-creation of the Peloponnesian League alliance that had melted away in the mid-360s. Perhaps that was what Areus intended, but he did not come seriously near achieving such a goal until a decade or more later. Nevertheless, in view of Sparta's near-total impotence for the past half century, this was quite an impressive array.

The immediate background of this minor Spartan renaissance was the last major gasp of the Succession wars, in which Seleucus defeated Lysimachus at Corupedium and Ptolemy Ceraunus, a son of the founding Ptolemy I of Egypt, won a naval victory over Antigonus Gonatas, son of the now deceased Besieger. Of all the post-Alexander kingdoms that of Macedon paradoxically had always been

the weakest. It had now reached the nadir. Areus therefore sought to exploit Macedon's difficulties like Agis before him, but it was a telltale sign of his own weakness that he chose to confront, not Gonatas himself, but the Aetolians who were now in alliance with the Macedonian throne. Philip II had played the Delphic card from strength (chapter 1). Areus' holy war for the liberation of Delphi from growing Aetolian control was principally a mark of Sparta's and Sparta's allies' decrepitude—though this is not of course to deny Sparta's genuine regard for Delphic autonomy and continued involvement in Delphic administration. Moreover, notwithstanding the support of four Achaean towns (the nucleus of the Achaean League founded in 280), of Boeotia, of Megara, of a large part of Arcadia (excepting, of course, Megalopolis), and of some towns in the Argolid, the major achievement of Areus—as of Cleonymus in 293 or 292—seems to have been to penetrate central Greece at all in defiance of the Macedonian garrison at Corinth. In the actual fighting the Aetolians inflicted on Sparta a humiliating disaster greater even than that suffered under Archidamus IV. Losses were heavy, as a Spartan *poluandrion* at Delphi indicates, and allied confidence in Spartan leadership was again severely dented. In fact, it was probably only because Macedon had other things on its mind, above all the temporary ousting of Gonatas by Ceraunus in 280 and the famous Gallic incursion of 279 in which Ceraunus was killed, that Sparta's home territory was not once more penetrated.¹¹

If Areus did not suffer permanent political eclipse for this defeat in the manner of his co-king Archidamus, he had chiefly his uncle's egregious behaviour to thank. For despite the successful accomplishment of missions in Messenia, Troezen and Crete in the early 270s, Cleonymus in 275 defected to Pyrrhus. The latter in turn used the restoration of his protégé as his pretext for mounting in 272 the fifth invasion of Laconia. In reality, he aimed thereby to shore up his recent seizure of much of Macedon and ensure 'great power' status among the big Hellenistic dynasts. Cleonymus was but a pawn in this greater game.¹²

The true story behind the defection of Cleonymus will never be known. His old connection with the Epirote warlord will have counted for something, and resentment of his nephew's rise to full military command, however disastrous, may have counted for more. But the most relevant precipitating factor seems to have been sexual politics. In the 270s Cleonymus the Agiad, by then in his late fifties, married a young Eurypontid heiress, Chilonis, who, however, responded all too warmly to the attentions of Areus' son Acrotatus (later to be king). Now Sparta was a society in which daughters could inherit property in their own right, even when there was a legitimate male heir available; and in such societies endogamy and other forms of in-marriage are often practised to a high degree 'as a means of restricting diffusion of property outside the kin' (Hodkinson 1986, 404). The near-contemporary marriage of the Eurypontid Eudamidas II to his paternal aunt Agesistrata is a nice case in point. Cleonymus, however, was not marrying within the Agiad patriline but across the line

dividing the two royal houses and into the Eurypontid *oikos*. The struggle for wealth and power within the shrinking Spartan élite had now reached such a pitch that the two royal houses were actively competing for eligible, property-bearing heiresses. As for Acrotatus' sexual relations with Cleonymus' young bride, these were surely not the outcome of mere passion but of his father's political calculation.¹³

Pyrrhus in 275 had returned to Greece from Italy after a series of punishing, hence 'Pyrrhic' victories. In 274, with the help of Cleonymus, he had secured a large slice of greater Macedon to add to his ancestral Epirote domain. To consolidate his hold, he invaded Laconia by land with the co-operation of the Aetolians, who clearly now regarded Gonatas as a loser. Pyrrhus' armament was reportedly immense: 25,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry, and—a typical post-Alexander touch—two dozen elephants. The incursion was unexpected, since Areus was at the time absent in Crete pursuing Sparta's usual policy of headhunting potential mercenaries. And it was facilitated by Sparta's Peloponnesian neighbours in Elis, Megalopolis, and Argos, together probably with some Achaeans. A diplomatically isolated, mentally unprepared and still physically inadequately defended Sparta must have looked an easy prize. Further tactical advantage was gained by his claim, in response to a Spartan embassy that met him at Megalopolis, that he had come to liberate the Greeks from Macedon and by his avowed intention to put his sons through the Spartan *agōgē*, which Pyrrhus at least seems to have believed was still in good working order. Spartan fears were allayed, the edge of their preparedness dulled.¹⁴

Areus was thus recalled from Crete too late to be able to help defend Sparta, to which Pyrrhus laid siege after devastating northern Laconia. The account of Plutarch, based as ever on Phylarchus, privileges the heroic rôle in the defence played by the Spartan women led by Archidamia, widow of Eudamidas I and mother of Agesistrata. The contrast with their ancestresses' utter demoralization in 370 is too dramatically complete to carry full conviction; but rich women like Archidamia would certainly have had a great deal to lose from a Pyrrhic victory, and the demonstrable weakness of their once invincible menfolk will have given them their opportunity to intervene publicly at the highest political level. The behaviour of Acrotatus is also painted in glorious colours, but that too may owe as much to literary art as to military reality. For quite clearly what really saved Sparta from occupation by Pyrrhus was the despatch by Gonatas of some of his mercenaries from their garrison at Corinth. As in south Italy so now in south Greece Pyrrhus had displayed his regrettable talent for throwing sworn enemies together at his expense. The Spartans, further reinforced by the return of Areus with 2,000 men, and the Macedonian mercenaries between them deterred Pyrrhus from further action against Sparta town. Dedications to Athena by Spartan men and women perhaps reflect this seemingly miraculous preservation.¹⁵

Instead, Pyrrhus' forces, like those of Epaminondas in 369, moved on south down the Eurotas valley and into what remained of Sparta's Perioecic domains. It was most likely in this context that Cleonymus overwhelmed Zarax on the

east Laconian coast. Against the background of Sparta's many losses of Perioecic dependencies, the loyalty of those in the east Parnon foreland both before and after Argos was awarded the Thyreatis in 338/7 ([chapter 2](#)) stands out in high relief. Just three years earlier Tyros too, in dedicating half a hecatomb of bulls at Delphi, had made her dependence on Sparta quite plain. The fine walling of Zarax's inaccessible citadel, which must postdate Cleonymus' sack, is perhaps to be interpreted as Sparta's token of gratitude.¹⁶

Pyrrhus thereafter beat a tactical retreat to Argos, where both he and Gonatas enjoyed some rival support. But there he was killed in fighting against Gonatas' mercenaries and Areus, who commanded Spartan troops as well as hired Cretans. So this was in a real sense a Spartan victory, demonstrating a resurgence of Spartan military efficiency and renewing Sparta's claim to leadership of free Greece. A competent bronze statuette of an armed Aphrodite dedicated on the Spartan acropolis witnesses at once to the continued skills of Perioecic craftsmen and this regained military *élan*. However, the most strikingly visible effects of Pyrrhus' defeat are to be seen in the self-perception and self-presentation of King Areus, who had taken on and conquered one Hellenistic dynast with the aid of another and was soon to take Sparta into formal alliance with a third.¹⁷

Historiographically speaking, the year 272 marks an era for Sparta as for Greece generally: the end of the competent history of Hieronymus of Cardia (as preserved through Diodorus), the formal beginning of the greatly inferior account of Phylarchus. It also marks a transformation in Sparta's social and political profile under Areus, the basic documentation for which is not literary but numismatic and epigraphic. Phylarchus' accusation that Areus introduced luxury to Sparta need not be taken too seriously, since this was a time-honoured complaint among Hellenistic writers and Phylarchus was tendentiously concerned to maximize the contrast between his reforming hero Agis IV and his morally lapsed royal predecessors. On the other hand, the fact that Areus sponsored Sparta's first silver coinage, bearing his own image and superscription ('Of King Areus') on the obverse, has to be taken very seriously indeed.¹⁸

There were many good reasons why Sparta had not coined previously. The metal would have had to be imported, whereas the iron used in Sparta's traditional spit-money was present locally in abundant supply. Spartan social organization and administration did not demand the simplification of economic and fiscal transactions that a universally recognized monetary instrument could bring. Sparta's foreign trade was relatively unimportant and anyway not in Spartan hands. Sparta did not employ mercenaries on any scale before the late fifth century and could in any case use the currency of other states for that purpose. And so on. Moreover, absence of pragmatic requirement had been hallowed by ancient custom and legitimated in terms of a supposedly Lycurgan prohibition (reaffirmed or invented at the end of the fifth century). In short, to strike a coinage of silver tetradrachms was truly breaking one mould in order to

create another. Our ignorance of Spartan domestic politics at this juncture is deeply regrettable.

No less interesting than the fact of coinage is Areus' choice of the types of Alexander the Great to represent his image, despite the consistent and pertinacious opposition of Sparta to Macedon. The only plausible explanation of this apparent paradox is that Areus was seeking to present himself as, if not the equal of, then at least the same sort of ruler as Poliorcetes (the first to issue royal coinage after Alexander) and the other Hellenistic dynasts. This, too, is the clue to the function Areus intended for these coins, which were not minted in Sparta and will have had a very limited circulation there. They were meant to sell an image of Areus on the open market of Hellenistic conceptual and dynastic exchange. More precisely, it was at Ptolemy II of Egypt that the message was aimed, with a view to convincing him that Areus was a suitable partner in his anti-Macedonian foreign policy. The 'Chremonides Decree' (below) was the pay-off for an intensive campaign of diplomacy between 272 and 268 in which the coins of Areus played their important rôle of visual propaganda.¹⁹

Equally impressive in its own way is the Athenian decree passed probably in 268/7 on the proposal of the leading anti-Macedonian politician Chremonides.²⁰ The following extract suggests by its language no less than its content that under Areus Sparta was experiencing something of a cultural as well as diplomatic transformation:

Previously the Athenians and Spartans and the allies of each, having established friendship and alliance in common with each other, struggled often and nobly together against those attempting to enslave the cities... Now again crises of a similar kind have overtaken all Greece...and King Ptolemaeus, in accordance with his ancestors' and his sister's policy, is openly concerned for the common freedom of the Greeks; and the Athenian People, having made an alliance with him, also voted to urge the other Greeks to adopt this policy. Likewise also the Spartans, being friends and allies of King Ptolemaeus, have voted to be allies with the Athenian People together with the Eleans and the Achaeans and the Tegeans and the Mantineans and the Orchomenians and the Phigaleans and the Caphyans and the Cretans, as many as are in the alliance of the Spartans *and of Areus* and of the other allies....

(my emphasis)

The range of Sparta's allies, far wider than that of 281, is particularly noticeable, even if it still fell well short of the old pre-365 Peloponnesian League. The Athenians might reasonably recall their joint resistance with Sparta to Persia in 480–479 and renew the alliance last concluded between them (in very different circumstances) in 369. Yet more remarkable is the way that on two occasions in

the decree, once in the above extract and once elsewhere, Areus is named separately from and in addition to the civic corporation of the Spartan state.

This was not done to make a merely chronological point—in that event both kings' names would have been given in order of priority of accession, as in a Spartan document from Delos of c.400 BC.²¹ Nor is Areus' singular prominence to be explained simply in terms of the Spartan law (Hdt. v.75) that only one king might command any one Spartan-led army abroad. Rather, as in the near-contemporary dedications of statues to Areus by Elis, Arcadian Orchomenus, two Cretan communities and—most extraordinarily—Ptolemy II himself, it was Areus' kingship that was being celebrated as a self-sufficient force. In light of such documents it is less surprising to find the Delphians hailing Areus' homonymous grandson as 'son of King Acrotatus and Queen Chilonis' in a text enshrining the grant of a whole barrel of Delphic privileges including proxeny, even though Areus II was not yet ten years of age. Nor, given Areus I's alliance with Ptolemy II, who had strong Levantine interests, is it beyond the bounds of intrinsic probability that Areus should have corresponded, as the author of *IMaccabees* claimed, with the High Priest of the Jerusalem Temple. At any rate, it would have been wholly in character for the Spartan to style himself 'King Areus', and the kinship between the Spartans and the Jews which Areus professed to have been able to authenticate was a characteristically Hellenistic—and indeed later—medium of diplomatic intercourse between Greeks and non-Greeks.²²

All the same, the so-called 'Chremonidean War' of c.261–262 turned out a disaster for the Spartan-Athenian-Ptolemaic axis. Despite perhaps three attempts, the last of which (in 265?) proved fatal to Areus himself, Sparta's Peloponnesian and Cretan alliance failed to break through the Isthmus dominated by Gonatas' Acrocorinth garrison and link with their Athenian and Egyptian partners.²³ In the light of this dismal performance it is tempting to dismiss the propaganda of Areus as that of a man who was 'something of a megalomaniac' (Will 1979, 107=1984, 116). But an alternative, and preferable, view is that it was only through 'Hellenistic bigtalk' of this kind that a mere Spartan king could hope to make the required impact on potential anti-Antigonid allies among the superpowers of the day. Where Areus can be more legitimately faulted, surely, is for failing to undertake structural, especially socio-economic and military, reform at home. The necessity for such reform can only have become more apparent in perhaps 262, when Acrotatus was defeated by Megalopolis alone. For although Sparta remained technically 'free' from direct Antigonid rule, this external freedom was more than overbalanced by mounting social tension within an increasingly polarized and again visibly shrinking citizen body and between citizens and non-citizens within the reduced Spartan *polis* as a whole.²⁴

Yet it would be inappropriate to end this chapter on an entirely negative note. In about 270 a Spartan comic actor, Nicon son of Eumathidas, won a prize at the Soteria festival recently established by the Aetolians at Delphi to

commemorate their famous repulse of the Gauls in 279. In Sparta's high Classical epoch the very idea of a Spartan professional actor would have been laughable. Several Plutarchan anecdotes illustrate proper Spartan contempt for such a useless calling, and Classical Sparta's 'theatre' was the scene of paramilitary exercises rather than an architecturally elaborated space for the staging of plays. However, at some time in the third century Sparta acquired its first built theatre of normal Hellenistic type. It would not, I think, be entirely fanciful to associate this development with the new Hellenism of Areus I and the influx of funds from his potent ally Ptolemy II. Where actors lead, philosophers follow. Such was the lesson of fifth-century Athens, and such was to be the experience of third-century BC Sparta, lagging a mere two centuries behind the city that Pericles had called, not without justification, 'an education for Hellas'.²⁵

Chapter four

Reform—or revolution? Agis IV and Cleomenes III

The lives of Agis IV (Eurypontid, r. c.244–1) and Cleomenes III (Agiad, r. c. 235–222) are the stuff of novels, ancient as well as modern. After Lycurgus the lawgiver, Leonidas, and Agesilaus II, they are the most famous exemplars of Laconism, bulking largest in the tortuous annals of the ‘Spartan mirage’. Their achievements and significance, on the other hand, are the stuff of history. But these will always remain desperately elusive. For against the martyrology of the contemporary historian Phylarchus, prime source of Plutarch’s biographical ‘novels’, we have to pit only the *Memoirs* of Aratus, enemy of Cleomenes, as mediated by Plutarch’s life of the Achaean statesman and by Polybius, and of course the latter’s *Histories*, itself composed more than a generation later.

The *Histories* is a work of monumental scholarship, no doubt, but the reigns of Agis and Cleomenes fell before Polybius’ real starting date of 220 BC and outside the scope of his major theme, the rise of Rome to ‘world’ dominion. More gravely, the Spartan kings’ careers were calculated to arouse two of Polybius’ most passionately held personal and historiographical prejudices: a hatred of any socioeconomic change that seemed to tilt the balance of power and wealth unduly in the favour of the more or less impoverished Greek masses, and a hatred of Sparta—contemporary, Hellenistic Sparta, that is, as opposed to the ‘Lycurgan’ Sparta of myth and political theorizing. These twin passions, which in other circumstances need not have coincided, were engendered by Polybius’ high birth in about 200 BC into a leading political family of Megalopolis and were nourished by his remarkable exemption of patriotic prejudice from the usual canons of authorial objectivity.¹

Written, documentary texts that might correct or supplement the opposed tendencies of the two principal literary sources are very thin on the ground. Numismatic and other material testimony tends in this case to illustrate and sometimes illuminate the literary picture rather than form the basis for an alternative account. This is partly because of the selective nature of the data we have. For example, the absence of archaeological corroboration of the literary picture of private affluence cannot be used to overthrow it, given the lack of finds from graves or private dwellings in Sparta. In short, the evidentiary situation is such that too often we cannot say for certain what events actually occurred or in what order, and usually we can only attempt to guess why. The

immense modern bibliography on Agis and Cleomenes may suitably reflect the objective and symbolic importance of their reigns but it is inversely proportional to our sure knowledge of them.²

It is the objective significance of the reigns for the history of Sparta, of the Peloponnese and of Greece in the second half of the third century that will be this chapter's major theme. But they do also raise, in a peculiarly sharp way, a prime theoretical problem of characterization or definition. It is straightforward enough, perhaps, to dismiss outright such anachronistic modernizing fantasies (or spectres) as Beloch's notion of a struggle between Spartan capitalists and landlords, or von Pöhlmann's view of the two kings as socialists wreaking havoc in the name of the unwashed masses, or Wason's picture of artisans and Helots following the lead given by traders in demanding reforms and of Cleomenes as the champion of the bourgeoisie.³ It is far harder to decide, as one eventually must, whether Agis and Cleomenes were in any valid ancient or modern sense revolutionaries, as distinct from patriotic reformers and restorers of a presumed *status quo ante* (as they themselves and their propagandists claimed they were).

If properly revolutionary consciousness must necessarily connote the 'idea of a forward-looking, progressive change in the political or social structure' (Finley 1986, 50), and if the achievement of revolution must necessarily entail the initiative or at least the active participation of all or most of the oppressed masses, then it is unquestionably inappropriate and seriously misleading to speak of the 'revolution' of Agis and Cleomenes. If, on the other hand, fundamental change in either the political or the social structure, however it be effected or within whatever framework of ideas or ideology, be a sufficient criterion, then a case can be made, subject to the evidentiary constraints already outlined, that Agis and Cleomenes did, no doubt transiently and inadequately, revolutionize Sparta. That, at all events, was how both adherents and enemies of the kings preferred to view their measures; although it has to be added that the Greeks' political vocabulary (*metabolē, metastasis, neōterismos, neōtera pragmata*) suggests their line between 'innovation' or even 'change' and 'revolution' was much thinner than ours between 'revolution' and 'reform, and that some such apparently self-contradictory construct as 'revolutionary reaction' may be required to capture the full flavour of the projects of Agis and Cleomenes.

On the whole, therefore, it would seem to make better sense of their reigns to see the kings as revolutionaries rather than (merely) reformists. However, the crucial point too often overlooked or blurred in modern discussions is that revolution of the type envisaged or effected by Agis and Cleomenes could not possibly have had the same meaning or consequences in Sparta as the formally identical slogans or measures of 'debt-cancellation' (*khreōn apokopē*) and land-redistribution' (*gēsanadasmos, khōras nomē*) had or would have had in other Greek cities of the period. For, notwithstanding the considerable 'normalization' of Sparta's social, economic and political institutions since the later fifth century, the retention of peculiarities like the Helots and Perioeci and, no less determinative, the ideological incubus of the Spartan myth with the Lycurgus

legend at its kernel inevitably gave a peculiarly Spartan twist to the kings' superficially 'Hellenistic' programmes.⁴

This does not of course mean, however, that these cannot or should not be viewed within their wider, extra-Laonian context. At its broadest, this wider frame of reference is provided by the continuing balance of power—or weakness—between the big three dynasts of Macedon, Egypt and nearer Asia. Indeed, it was this stalemate and, particularly, the enfeebled suzerainty over Greece of Macedon as represented successively by Antigonos II Gonatas (276–240/39) and Demetrius (c.239–29) that allowed the Aetolian League, the Achaean League, and then Sparta under Cleomenes the space for internal consolidation or transformation and external expansion. Conversely, it was the resurgence of Macedon under Antigonos III Doson in the 220s, ironically precipitated by Cleomenes, that fully exposed the unbreachable limitations of the single Greek city as a power-unit and put paid to Sparta's illusory independence and ephemeral social renewal.⁵

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The Chremonidean War of Greek resistance to Macedon with Ptolemaic aid had ended fruitlessly for Sparta with the death of Areus I near Corinth; yet more depressing were the defeat and death of his son Acrotatus in one more attempt to obliterate the humiliation and strategic blockage constituted by Megalopolis (see [chapter 3](#)). About a decade later, perhaps c.250, if Pausanias' account be given any credence, Sparta turned her attention to Mantinea rather than Megalopolis. The attack was led by an Agis, perhaps regent for the future Agis IV (then aged about 15), and is virtually the only recorded event in what has aptly been called the 'dark age' of Spartan history between the late 260s and Agis' accession in c.244.⁶

This expedition, too, was a failure. Sparta's native army was undermanned and demoralized, and the state lacked the funds for an adequate complement of mercenaries. But the expedition commands attention for another reason. To the aid of Mantinea, an ancient state whose destiny had long marched with Sparta's, came not only Megalopolis but the even newer and generically distinct federal state of Achaia. The latter had just begun to feel the ultimately dominating influence of Aratus of Sicyon. Indeed, it was chiefly because in 251/0 Aratus had induced his native Dorian state to join the culturally and politically alien Achaean federation (refounded in 280: [chapter 3](#)) that this originally loosely-knit ethnic organization started to acquire more than local political and military significance.⁷

Within Aratus' ambitiously expansionist programme for the unification of the Peloponnese under Achaia Megalopolis was naturally a key objective. But in c. 250 it had only recently been liberated, like Sicyon, from a domestic tyranny and was not yet prepared to surrender the external and internal independence, however attenuated, that all Greek cities emotionally prized. Fifteen years later Achaia did acquire Megalopolis as a member-state, since by then it had amply demonstrated its ability to control its own northern Peloponnesian bailiwick.

The crucial advance was made in 243. In a surprise manoeuvre more daring even than the *coup* which brought him to power at Sicyon in 251 Aratus relieved Acrocorinth of its Macedonian garrison and Greece of its most potent 'Fetter'. This blow was followed up by an alliance with Ptolemy III Euergetes I, who was tactfully accorded titular *hēgemonia* of the Achaean League. This was most likely also the occasion for Sparta to renew the alignment of 281 and ally with the new-model Achaëa.⁸

Achaëa, however, had no monopoly on novelty. In the preceding year (probably) the Eurypontid royal house at Sparta had produced its first significant exemplar since the death of Agis III almost eighty years before at (where else?) Megalopolis. Agis IV, eldest son of Eudamidas II, would not have been obliged as heir-apparent to go through the distinctively Spartan educational curriculum known as the *agōgē* even if it had still existed in its full rigour by 250. As it was, that system had apparently lapsed at some point after the late 270s. It was thus a doubly remarkable gesture, an earnest of his future intentions as king, that when still not yet of age he had 'sloughed off and shunned every form of extravagance (*poluteleia*)' and prided himself instead on wearing the traditional but now old-fashioned short cloak, bathing in the Eurotas, taking frugal meals and in general 'assiduously observing the Spartan mode of life' (Plut. Ag. 4.2)⁹

No doubt Agis and the writers who endorsed and disseminated his political line, most importantly for us Phylarchus, had the same interest as the Roman emperor Augustus in exaggerating the decay and decrepitude of the old ways so as to heighten the contrast between their degeneracy and his moral rearmament. For instance, differentiation within and between the public messes (*suskania* and other terms) was not after all an innovation of the mid-third century, since already a century earlier Xenophon (*Lac. Pol.* 5.3) had noted that the rich were contributing wheaten bread (*artos*) in preference to the traditional kneaded barley-cake (*maza*). Still, propagandistic embellishment notwithstanding, the sorry picture of Spartan mores in c.244 painted by Phylarchus is surely correct in its principal lineaments. The *agōgē*, once the foundation of Sparta's military allure and a condition of the attainment of full Spartan citizenship, had fallen into desuetude. The messes, election to which was the other major condition of becoming a Spartiate, still apparently existed, but more as forums for luxurious display by the sympotic rich than as arenas of political as well as corporeal refreshment and solidarity for the citizenry as a whole. The very meaning of citizenship (*politeia*), in other words, had altered.¹⁰

The main reason for this decadence, as for the poor military showing at Megalopolis and Mantinea, was the persistent or rather accelerating *oliganthrōpia*, shortage of citizen military manpower. This in turn was predicated upon an ever more grossly unequal distribution of landed property within the civic territory of Laconia, that is the Spartan plain and Helos basin in the furrow of the River Eurotas. Neither *oliganthrōpia* nor property-concentration was a new, third-century phenomenon. On the contrary, Aristotle had quite rightly laid his finger on these in the 330s to account for Sparta's inability to recover from her

defeat at Leuctra in 371. But the problem may have been aggravated by the increased circulation of coined money within Spartan society, due in part at least to lucrative mercenary service by Spartans in Egypt and elsewhere. At all events, by 244 the situation had reached a point at which further advance by the Achaean League might have seemed likely to jeopardize not only Sparta's precarious independence but even her very existence. Aratus' seizure of Acrocorinth prompted one obvious kind of temporizing response from Sparta, an alliance. But it was on radical domestic restructuring that Agis pinned his main hopes for a Spartan political and military renaissance, even if he took care to accommodate the expectations of his deeply traditionalistic society to the extent of presenting himself as a Lycurgus *redivivus*.¹¹

The exact nature of the social, economic and political crisis that Agis sought to remedy, already obscure by reason of Sparta's admittedly esoteric character, is further obfuscated by the sensationalist literary posturing of our main source. What seems to have been the case is that an adult male citizen body numbering about 1,000 in 370 had shrunk by 244 to a mere 700. Of these one hundred were agro-plutocrats, while the remainder were more or less heavily indebted to the rich landowners and in many cases had had to mortgage even the ancestral lot of land (*klaros*) on which presumably their continued claim to full Spartan citizenship ultimately rested. Below these 700 Spartiates (to use the proper term for the Homoioi or 'Peers' of full status) there lived in Sparta itself a mass of what in the technical parlance of the previous century may helpfully be labelled 'Inferiors' (*Hupomeiones*). Many, perhaps most of these were degraded ex-Spartiates or their descendants, men who had found themselves unable to meet their mess-bills by contributing the prescribed minima of natural produce from their *klaros*. Others had maybe lost their full rights as a penalty for some civic crime or misdemeanour, although these will have been few enough if reports of the total abandonment of the old discipline (*diata*, *kosmos*) are not wildly exaggerated. Some, finally, owed their inferior status to an accident of birth, having a Helot or other non-Spartan mother. In all, to judge from Agis' projected citizenry of 4,500, there may have been as many as 2,000 of these 'Inferiors', an indigestible and ornery lump three times the size of the citizen estate. They, it would appear, were intended to be the principal group of beneficiaries of Agis' programme.¹²

The constituents of the above-mentioned categories are of course male. Never once to my knowledge does an ancient source for any period or place of Graeco-Roman antiquity attach an absolute figure to any female category of an ancient population. The cautious Aristotle, for example, would commit himself no further than the generalizing assertion that women constituted about half the population of a *polis*. What he was prepared to believe and assert of Spartan women, however, was that in his day almost two fifths of Spartan land—privately-held civic territory, Polybius' *politikē gē*—were in their hands. This specific reference to the economic status of (some of) the feminine half of a Greek *polis* is unique in the *Politics* and eloquent testimony to the widely-

perceived importance of women in Spartan political life. Aristotle, in fact, was inclined to speak of gynecocracy or womanly power at Sparta. But whereas there are good reasons for rejecting that biased judgment, there are none for doubting that women were significant owners of landed property at Sparta in the third quarter of the fourth century. By the same token it is reasonable to credit the asseveration of Plutarch (Ag. 7.3–4) that by 244 the absolute majority of Spartan private land was owned by women and that Agis' mother (Agesistrata) and grandmother (Archidamia) were not just the richest of their sex but the richest of all Spartans. It was therefore merely prudent of Agis to attempt first to convert the two most important female members of his family to his ideas of communitarian change. In this he succeeded.¹³

Formal politics in Sparta, however, as elsewhere in the Greek world, was an exclusively masculine domain, and in keeping with his constitutionalist pretensions Agis sought to implement his programme through the usual channels of political decision-taking: Ephorate, Gerousia and Ecclesia (Assembly). He thus required supporters in high places, since the Spartan kingship lacked sovereign authority and the political system as a whole is best understood as a peculiar form of oligarchy. Lysander son of Libys, a descendant of the great Lysander, was Agis' chosen instrument, and despite his youth and inexperience Agis was able to see to Lysander's popular election as one of the five Ephors for 243/2 (i.e. October 243 to October 242, roughly speaking). Supported by one Mandroclidas and by Agis' maternal uncle Agesilaus, Lysander duly promulgated a bill (*rhētra*) which, to become law, had first to be predeliberated by the thirty-man Gerousia (twenty-eight elected members, aged sixty or over and of aristocratic birth, together with the two kings *ex officio*) and then put before the Assembly of Peers for final approval. By a majority of one—mathematically impossible, unless there were abstentions or absentees—Lysander's *rhētra* was rejected by the Gerousia and so could not be submitted to the Assembly's vote of acclamation. The kinsmen, clients and supporters of Agis (or his mother) had been outvoted by those of the Agiad king, Leonidas II, who for personal as well as political reasons spearheaded the opposition. To this Agis responded, as Cleomenes I had reacted to the effective opposition of Demaratus in 491, by procuring his fellow-king's deposition—not on the grounds of his illegitimate birth, as in Demaratus' case, but on the grounds of an allegedly illegal marriage (which had not prevented Leonidas' accession in c.254). For although Leonidas was a genuine 'descendant of Heracles' (as a grandson of Cleomenes II, and son of Cleonymus), his first wife had been a non-Spartan and possibly non-Greek lady at the court of Seleucus (I?) where Leonidas had spent much of his early adult life as a glorified mercenary.¹⁴

Again like Cleomenes I, Agis found it necessary to invoke higher than human sanction for the deposition of a fellow-king. But whereas Cleomenes by hook or by crook had been able to call in aid the Delphic Oracle, believed by many to be the *fons et origo* of the entire Spartan polity, Agis relied rather on a putatively antique but not thitherto securely attested skywatching ritual which produced

the required unfavourable sign of heavenly displeasure with Leonidas' illegal behaviour. Nor, curiously, had Agis attributed the initiative for his programme to Delphic Apollo. Instead, he had cited the oracular authority of Ino-Pasiphaë at Thalamae (a Perioecic community on the east shore of the Messenian Gulf just inside Laconia's redrawn frontier of 338/7), consultation of which by means of incubation was conducted, like the skywatching, by Ephors. 'The oracles delivered by her ordained that the Spartiates should all be exactly equal in accordance with the original law of Lycurgus' (Plut. *Ag.* 9.3). It cannot be determined whether Agis' choice of Ino-Pasiphaë was conditioned chiefly by Aetolian control of Delphi, a different view of Delphi's role in the foundation of Sparta's constitution, or a desire to promote the Perioeci. Whatever his motivation, the combination of divine backing and a pro-Agis majority on the Spartan Supreme Court that would adjudicate the charge of illegitimacy (Gerosia *plus* Ephors) ensured the deposition and exile of Leonidas. He was replaced by Cleombrotus, a relative of his both by birth and by marriage (to Leonidas' daughter Chilonis), and Lysander's *rhētra* was finally passed.¹⁵

Even so, the path to implementation was not yet clear, since the Ephors elected for 242/1 inclined more to the outlook of Leonidas than that of Agis. Unable now to invoke divine authority, Agis cited or invented the doctrine of Conjoint Regal Supremacy. This held that, no matter how restricted were the formal powers of an individual Spartan king at home in Sparta (on campaign they differed markedly), 'the Crown' was not limited. The joint and unanimous will of both kings, it was claimed, overrode all other constitutional forces and had the power even to depose a board of Ephors should they deem it to be obstructing the public good. On this ground was the elected board of 242/1 sacked by Agis and Cleombrotus, who nominated the five replacements. Of these Agis' uncle Agesilaus was obviously intended to carry on where Lysander had left off and implement the *rhētra* in its entirety. But either for personal reasons of perceived self-interest or for prudential political ones he carried into effect only one part of it. To comprehend why that should have been so, regardless of Agesilaus' individual comportment, the package as a whole must be unwrapped.¹⁶

The top layer was a cancellation of debts. Given that the second layer was a redistribution of land in equal allotments, the debts in question must have been exclusively or chiefly the mortgages taken out by poor Spartiates or ex-Spartiates on what remained of their *klaroi*—hence the term *klaria* for the written mortgage-deeds; hence the burning of those same deeds in the Spartan agora. However, some few of the indebted Spartiates were characters like Agesilaus, men of property whose extensive estates had been mortgaged not for the sake of mere survival as a Spartiate but in order to raise the liquid capital needed for the good life of relative ease and luxury. For such men *klaria* were the combustible equipment of the stone *horoi* that dotted the Attic countryside.

The middle layer of the package was central in more ways than one. The by then unencumbered civic land was to be communally pooled and then

redistributed in equal shares, not only to existing Spartiates of full status in order to eliminate the disparity between the super-rich and the more or less poor, nor just to them and to those of the Inferiors who had been degraded solely for lack of sufficient land to pay their mess-contributions, but also to those of the Perioeci who were deemed suitably qualified by education, age and physical fitness, and even to comparably qualified rank outsiders, resident or non-resident non-Laconians (*xenoi*), who were presumably for the most part mercenaries (also called *xenoi*; an issue of Spartan silver tetradrachms has recently been plausibly reattributed to Agis and would well suit this context). It was calculated that there would be 4,500 such equal *klaroi* in all, so that by this method of *anaplērōsis* or refilling the number of full Spartan citizens would be multiplied some six and a half times.

The fourth and fifth layers of Agis' package comprised respectively the imposition or reimposition of the full rigours of the *agōgē* on the children of the new and old citizens, and for the citizens themselves enforced submission to the old Spartan lifestyle (*diaita*) centred upon communal living within the framework of the military-minded messes. Perhaps with a view to hastening the integration of the new, heterogeneous citizenry and precluding the particularism of the old mess-system Agis' messes were to have some 200 or 400 members apiece, making them many times larger in size and fewer in number than those of the *ancien régime*.¹⁷

With the confessed exception of the last detail and of the enfranchisement of men of non-Spartan origin, the *rhētra* was inscribed on the banner of Lycurgus in the sense that Agis claimed not to be creating a system *ex novo* but rather reinstating the ancestral *kosmos* credited to that omniprovident lawgiver. This was at least the fourth time since the seventh century that Lycurgus' name had been invoked or taken in vain to help resolve a major political crisis. Most relevantly, he had been at the centre of a debate in the early fourth century that had issued in the composition of written pamphlets including, for the first time, at least one by a Spartan author (the deposed and exiled King Pausanias). Between then and the mid-third century a herd of non-Spartan theorists trumpeted their conflicting and competing versions of Laconism, of which Aristotle's *Politics* preserves a confused echo. Finally, probably some time after 250, Sparta produced in Sosibius her first home-grown antiquary and local historian, thereby emulating Babylon, Egypt and Rome in this truly Hellenistic feat (cf. Hartog 1986, 961). The contribution made by all this learned speculation to Agis' 'Lycurgan' programme cannot be precisely identified, but there is little doubt that Agis was not the only Spartan of his day drenched in an atmosphere of atavistic restoration. One Spartan, indeed, made so bold as to name his son after the lawgiver, little guessing that one day he would become the Eurypontid king (chapter 5). Even Leonidas, who had not passed through even a degenerate *agōgē* and allegedly embodied the anti-Lycurgan corruption Agis set out to rectify, found himself obliged to oppose Agis on his own terms. Perfectly correctly, no doubt, he

pointed out that Lycurgus had neither cancelled debts nor admitted *xenoi* to Spartan citizenship.¹⁸

This pedantry, however, was not what inspired Leonidas to champion and focus the opposition to Agis that was concentrated among the great majority of the richest and many of the older Spartiates. For whatever else was at stake, this was also a class struggle within a class, a *stasis* that divided against themselves the 700 existing citizens, despite the fact that they all ultimately owed their civic status to the exploitation of the largest group within the Laconian population, the Helots. However, opposition to Agis' package was greatly eased by the emergence of Agesilaus as notional leader of the oppressed. Despite Phylarchus' picture of Agesilaus as the evil genius singlehandedly undermining the authority and subverting the idealism of his nephew, Agesilaus was far from alone in desiring a cancellation of debts very much more ardently than a redistribution of land, if the latter meant equal shares for variously alien persons. Once the former measure had been accomplished, probably late in 242, the initial enthusiasm of the younger and poorer of the old Spartiates and of those Inferiors who had been restored thereby to full civic status will palpably have waned. Nor did the antics of Agesilaus, who allegedly displayed very un-Lycurgan leanings towards personal autocracy, help the cause of Agis. But perhaps the greatest blow to the king's prestige and authority occurred outside Sparta, in the summer of 241.¹⁹

Summoned in accordance with the terms of Sparta's alliance with Achaëa, Agis led out to the Isthmus of Corinth a body of his younger, newly re-moralized hoplites to help Aratus resist a threatened Aetolian invasion of the Peloponnese. The threat was real enough, but before it materialized Aratus dismissed the Spartan contingent of allies. The effect on the standing of Agis with his troops and on the Spartans back home was scarcely less drastic than that of the Spartans' dismissal of Cimon and his Athenian hoplites from Ithome in 462. Aratus' motivation, too, may have been similar, namely fear of what seemed to him the excessively revolutionary zeal of Agis' 'Leveller' soldiers. For in spite of its overtly democratic features, the Achaëan League was thoroughly dominated by and run in the interests of *bien pensant* landowners like Aratus himself. Indeed, one wonders whether Aratus dismissed Agis precisely to interrupt the momentum for social change which, if established in Sparta, was all too likely to extend to the cities of the Achaëan League. However that may be, Agis returned to Sparta to find his cause lost. Leonidas, who (like Latychidas II in the 470s) had gone into exile at neighbouring Tegea, capitalized on the changed mood in Sparta and had himself restored to kingly office with the aid of mercenaries. The other two kings sought sanctuary, Agis in Sparta, Cleombrotus at Taenarum (well placed for overseas flight). New Ephors were installed, and amidst a welter of intrigue and double-dealing Agis was condemned to death illegally by a kangaroo court composed of the Ephors and those members of the Gerousia who toed Leonidas' line. Agis was then summarily executed, together with his mother and grandmother. An unknown but not inconsiderable number of Agis'

supporters joined Cleombrotus in exile, including of course Lysander, Agis' brother Archidamus, and Agesilaus' son Hippomedon (we shall return to the last two anon). Sparta thus acquired her first, but by no means last (see chapters 5 and 6), substantial exile-problem.²⁰

It was ostensibly to restore the bulk of these exiles that in 240 or 239 the Aetolian League invaded Laconia by way of the territory of the League's friends in Messenia. In reality, Aetolia had other ends in view, economic as well as political. Since their federal state was run on very much the same lines and for the differential benefit of the same social stratum as that of their Achaean rivals, there is no reason to suspect the Aetolians of partiality for Agis' social programme. Their aims, rather, were to forestall what seemed to be Achaea's impending control of the whole Peloponnese and to seize valuable plunder, a peculiarly Aetolian taste. In order, perhaps, to avoid antagonizing the Spartans unduly, they concentrated their attention on the Perioeci of southern Laconia rather than the Spartans' directly held civic territory. Some of these at least were wealthy men, although the figure of 50,000 reported as the number of slaves (*andrapoda*) carried off as booty is doubtless greatly inflated. There is no reason, however, to doubt that the Aetolians characteristically but imprudently despoiled the sanctuary of Pohoidan (Poseidon) at Taenarum. This Perioecic shrine, long an asylum for refugee Helots and in 241 for a fugitive of a very different kind (ex-King Cleombrotus), had been enriched by offerings from the many thousands of mercenaries who congregated here in the expectation of recruitment from the 330s on (chapter 2). Sacking it was not the best way to win anti-Achaean friends among the Perioeci—or indeed the Spartans, who since the massive earthquake of c.464 had treated Poseidon the Earth-Shaker with boundless reverence. It is to be noted that one of Sparta's sacred ambassadors of the third century bore the revealing name Taenarius.²¹

Thus the Aetolian raid on Laconia of c.239 did little or nothing to profit Aetolia politically or to shake what had become, in default of an adult Eurypontid, the *de facto* monarchy of Leonidas at Sparta. Our ignorance of Spartan domestic politics at this period is well-nigh total, but the one certain fact testifies at once to the importance of women property-holders in Sparta and to the ambition of Leonidas to provide himself with the economic and political means to compete in a world dominated by inordinately wealthy and more or less absolute monarchs. (The example of his cousin Areus I was perhaps his inspiration.) That fact is the theft by Leonidas, not of Agis' political clothes, but of his young widow Agiatis, whom he married illegally to his under-age son Cleomenes. We are told that he did so because Agiatis was heiress (*epiklēros* in Plutarch's Athenian terminology, *patroukhos* in Spartan parlance) to the patrimony of her father Gylippus; and certainly it was an antique prerogative of the Spartan kings to adjudicate the marriage of unbetrothed *patroukhai* (Hdt. vi. 57.4). But by marrying Agiatis to his son, despite his age, Leonidas was both ensuring a sensible increment of wealth for himself and his posterity and at the same time extinguishing Agis' patriline in favour of his own branch of the Agiad

house. In the normal way, Agiatis' infant son Eudamidas would have succeeded his father on attaining his majority, his position until then being represented by a regent. As it was, not only is there no mention in the sources of a regent (the obvious candidate, his uncle Archidamus, was in exile in Messene), but Eudamidas' legal guardian (*kurios*) was now the Agiad heir-apparent Cleomenes. The hagiographic tradition on the latter emphasizes the continuity, indeed the identity of ideology between Agis and Cleomenes, mediated romantically by their successively shared wife. Modern scholarship, however, is not wrong to stress also (or rather) the ideology of monarchic absolutism shared between Cleomenes and his father. Put another way, with the judicial murder of Agis there died also the legitimate dual kingship. Cleomenes may have been the last legitimate king of Sparta, in respect of his birth and succession to the Agiad throne, but, as we shall see, the manner of his kingship was scarcely traditional.²²

The date of his accession was probably 235. He could not have chosen a more pregnant moment. For in that year Aratus achieved the decisive gain for the Achaean League that imperilled Sparta's future in a way that Macedonian suzerainty of Greece so far had not. Megalopolis, led by its now ex-tyrant Lydiadas, threw in its lot with Achaea, whose foreign policy thereby took on a decidedly anti-Spartan flavour. Like all his royal predecessors since Agesilaus II, only more so, Cleomenes had always to keep one eye on Megalopolis no matter how preoccupied he might otherwise be with internal upheaval or other external threats from inside or outside the Peloponnese. Unlike all his predecessors, Cleomenes did not only recover from Megalopolis the perennially disputed borderland of Belminatis but actually destroyed the urban centre of the Great City itself. For this among much else he earned the deathless hatred of Polybius, even though the historian was born in a resurgent Megalopolis twenty years after the king's ignominious death in exile.²³

Cleomenes' destructive feat of 223 came towards the end of what has always been known, thanks to Aratus, as the 'Cleomenic War', the war *against* Cleomenes as seen from the Achaean standpoint. The weight of the combined prejudice of the two Achaean authors is not, unfortunately, relieved by the opposite prejudice of Phylarchus. Much will necessarily remain unclear about the Cleomenic War of 229/8–222, and the following, inevitably selective account will concentrate on processes, episodes, and events where tolerable agreement as to matters of fact is both conceivable and achievable. Interpretation is of course a different matter altogether.

Aratus' success of 235 was followed six years later, after an obscure passage of Achaean-Aetolian manoeuvring in the Peloponnese, by a second body-blow to Sparta. Argos, Sparta's age-old enemy and for that reason among others hitherto pretty staunchly pro-Macedonian, joined Megalopolis in the Achaean fold—also under the guidance of a self-deposed tyrant, Aristomachus. Soon Phlius, Hermione and Aegina joined too, and Sparta's external situation in the Peloponnese was coming to resemble worryingly that of late 370, when the

Boeotians under Epaminondas effected the first-ever hostile incursion of Laconia. On the other hand, by 229 the Aetolians had virtually renounced their lukewarm *entente* with Achaëa against Macedon (initiated in the early 230s), and in 229 they allowed Sparta to take over four Arcadian towns, including Mantinea, that earlier they had won away from Achaëa. They did not, though, go so far as to commit themselves to direct military aid to Sparta against Achaëa (and in practice remained neutral in the Cleomenic War). Elis, however, an Aetolian ally, did make that commitment by allying also with Sparta. As for Messene, another old enemy of Sparta but now a friend of Aetolia, she in 229 was at least not actively hostile towards Sparta and perhaps even somewhat reassured that Sparta entertained no aggressive designs by the presence in her midst of the exiled Archidamus.²⁴

So Cleomenes' external situation was not without its brighter spots when, probably early in 228, with characteristic boldness he took the fight to Megalopolis and seized the strategically nodal fort of Athenaëum near the summit of Mt Khelmos in the Belminatis. Aratus countered, unsuccessfully, by attacking Tegea and (Arcadian) Orchomenus by night, a Spartan trick, and the Cleomenic War had begun. In the summer of 228 it was extended by Cleomenes into the Argolis, but both in that year and the following one hostilities were naturally concentrated in Arcadia. Honours remained even, and Cleomenes was having difficulty in overcoming the cautious reluctance of successive boards of Ephors to authorize continued campaigning, until in an encounter at Ladocea near Megalopolis Lydiadas was killed and the Achaeans sustained heavy casualties. This gave Cleomenes the impetus he needed to embark on yet a third campaign in Arcadia in the one season of 227, employing the bulk of his still very few but perhaps now rather better drilled Spartan citizen troops as well as mercenaries. Leaving most of his force, including all the citizen soldiers, on exercises there, Cleomenes himself hastened back to Sparta with a picked band of mercenaries and executed a *coup d'état* of which not even Aratus would have been ashamed (so far as its technical accomplishment was concerned, that is).²⁵

The background to the *coup* of autumn 227 is obscure in the extreme, not least because we know nothing of Cleomenes between his accession (when he was aged about 25) and 229. Clearly, though, this radically unconstitutional move could not have been made on the spur of the moment but was rather the fruit of much intense planning and clever exploitation of the unique royal prerogative of military command with a view to establishing himself as a prestigious counterweight to the institutionalized power of the Ephorate. Equally clear is the connection between the *coup* and opposition to his military initiatives by different boards of Ephors. It may therefore be the case that the recall of Archidamus from his Messenian exile in 228, on the death of Agis' still under-age son, signalled Cleomenes' attempt to repeat with Archidamus Agis' manoeuvre with the pliant Cleombrotus against the elected Ephors of 242/1. On the other hand, the almost immediate assassination of Archidamus by persons unknown could also, as Polybius was only too ready to believe, have been

ordered by Cleomenes, in that case by Cleomenes the *de facto* monarch and true son of his father. All that is massively controversial.²⁶

Whatever the truth about its background, Cleomenes' seizure of the commanding heights of Spartan power could not have been effected without the calculatedly minimal use of violence involved in the killing of four Ephors (the fifth fled) and about ten of their supporters and the exiling of a further eighty. None the less, just like Agis Cleomenes advertised his programme as the restoration of constitutional propriety, a return to the 'ancestral constitution' (*patrios politeia*) of Lycurgus. It is not possible, as already noted, to link Agis positively with any of the many known researchers into that most conveniently plastic of imaginative artefacts. Cleomenes, however, was explicitly said to have been taught in Sparta by the Stoic Sphaerus of Borysthenes (on the northern shore of the Black Sea), and Sphaerus is known to have composed a 'Spartan Polity'. Was Cleomenes, then, a Stoic philosopher-in-arms burning to realize some Stoic principle of politics or morality on Spartan soil? It remains more than a little doubtful, although the confidence with which Cleomenes stood his Lycurgan ground may have owed something to the erudition of Sphaerus.²⁷

Of far greater immediate practical significance were the lessons he had learned from Agis' funereal failure. First, power, monarchical power, had to be grasped or rather usurped by force not persuasion: hence his employment of tried mercenaries of foreign nationality who would not be constrained by tender feelings towards fellow-citizens. This lesson he could have absorbed positively from his father, too. Second, merely to depose one obstructive board of Ephors and nominate a replacement panel in the hope that it would prove more amenable was not enough. The Ephorate as such—which, as he did not need Aristotle (*Pol.* 1270b13ff.) to tell him, had to be 'courted' (*dēmagōgein*) by kings—must go. It was merely fortuitous that there also existed a supposed 'Lycurgan' justification in the pseudo-erudite view that the Ephorate was a post-Lycurgan institution. Third, the Gerousia. So quintessentially Lycurgan was this body that it could not possibly be abolished, yet by its very nature it typically carried a built-in majority in favour of the social and political *status quo*. It had therefore to be reformed by attenuating or removing some of its individual powers, especially that of *probouleusis*, and by undermining its overall constitutional authority. The latter Cleomenes accomplished through the creation of a new annual office of the Patronomos (the title probably means 'Guardian of Ancestral Law and Order') and (probably) by making election to the Gerousia annual rather than for life (a major source of its enormous prestige). The former objective was taken care of by establishing virtually a personal autocracy. The fiction of installing as his co-king his own full brother Euclidas merely made it patently obvious that the days of the ancestral Agiad-Eurypontid dyarchy were over. Polybius (ii.47.3) was not wrong to call Cleomenes a tyrant, although most Spartans did not share his view of Cleomenes' tyranny. Fourth, Agis had erred in allowing his most diehard opponents, the great majority of the richest landowning creditors, to remain physically untouched by the first blast of his zeal

for change. The eighty men exiled by Cleomenes were precisely the survivors from those diehards and their heirs. Fifth, and finally, personal example was not enough. After converting his mother (Cratesiclea) to his point of view he married her willy-nilly to an extremely rich and influential man (Megistonous) so as to ensure that his two nearest male relatives could be relied upon implicitly. Leonidas would have understood, even if he might not have approved.²⁸

Thus armed, Cleomenes proceeded to implement his socio-political programme, which in essence seems identical to that of Agis and can more assuredly be said to have been prompted ultimately by the desire to restore Sparta's greatness as *hēgemōn* of the Peloponnese. Debts were again cancelled, no doubt mainly because the old creditors had simply redrawn the *klaria* burnt in 242 (perhaps adding in some interest for their trouble). Now at last civic land was pooled and redistributed in equal portions to some 4,000 (as opposed to Agis' projected 4,500) new and old citizens. Eighty of these portions were held in trust against the return (surely not genuinely expected) of the exiles; another 2,500 or so went to the existing full citizens (including some at least of the exiles of 241?) and reinstated Inferiors; the remaining 1,400-odd were allocated to deserving Perioeci and (if this may legitimately be inferred from Agis' proposal) assorted *xenoi*, mainly mercenaries like those who had enabled Cleomenes to effect his *coup*. This is the first, indeed the only recorded instance of an *anadasmus* not confined to the land belonging to opponents defeated in a *stasis*. Membership of a mess was again prescribed for all citizens, and minimum contributions again stipulated. But for the first time the amount of produce the Helots had to surrender to each *klaros*-holder was specified in absolute quantities rather than as a proportion of the annual yield. The citizens' children were required to pass through an *agōgē*, the reconstruction of which was perhaps Sphaerus' major contribution to his former pupil's work. Finally, the adult citizens were to practise anew the old austere *diata*. In short, only the majority of the Perioeci did not feel Cleomenes' new broom.²⁹

As over his supposed philosophical inclination, so there is a question-mark over Cleomenes' social idealism, as there is not to the same degree over that of Agis. It was at any rate entirely consonant with his far more hard-headed approach that, despite the restorationist Lycurgan rhetoric, his genuinely revolutionary package should have been less backward-looking than that of his Eurypontid predecessor. His land-reform was path-breaking. Equally so was the associated military reform. There is an unresolvable debate over the number of mercenaries granted Spartan citizenship in 227 (or later). But those who were will have found themselves in need of a new suit. For Cleomenes decreed that his new-model citizen army should be equipped *à la Macédoine*. Thus at long last the hoplite spear, the victor of Plataea and many another decisive encounter, yielded place in the ranks to the more than five-metre long *sarissa*, a mere century after the lesson of Chaeronea might have been absorbed. If the hypothesis is correct (as I think it is) that the sixth obe (residential district of Sparta town) of Neopolitae ('New Citizens') attested from late Hellenistic or

early Roman Imperial times was also a creation of Cleomenes, his idea may well have been to equate the number of residential units with the number of *morai* ('divisions', the largest army-units). He would thereby have restored the principle of army organization in force at the time of Plataea (though the largest units were then called *lokhoi*), which was altered c.450 in response to Spartiate *oliganthrōpia* and heavily increased reliance on Perioeci.³⁰

The new-model army performed wonderfully well over the next two campaigning seasons, fighting as only those can who aim for something much more inspiring than mere preservation of the *status quo*. Its success was owed in no small measure to the fact that Cleomenes 'was not only winning battles, he was also everywhere winning hearts' (Freeman 1893, 355). The Cleomenean revolution, that is to say, struck a chord in the cities of Sparta's Achaean opponents, where the sub-hoplite poor citizenry groaned for debt-cancellation and land-redistribution on the Spartan model, which they obviously regarded as exportable. That, however, was a grave misapprehension, both because Sparta's unique socio-political conditions could not simply be reproduced elsewhere and because Cleomenes had no intention of exporting social or economic revolution of any kind. Ideological preference may have had something to do with this refusal, but a more powerful factor was the pragmatic consideration that Spartan hegemony over an association of cities dominated by mass movements of genuinely democratic character was likely to be radically unstable and bound to attract the unwelcome attention of Macedon, which had made its views on popular social movements unequivocally clear from the very outset of its hegemony of Greece (the League of Corinth charter; see further below). If Cleomenes ever formulated a blueprint for a stable Spartan hegemony over the Peloponnese, it would surely have looked remarkably like the distinctly oligarchic Peloponnesian League of old.³¹

By the beginning of 224 Cleomenes' military-political drive had not only brought Argos (a truly astonishing turn-about) and most of Arcadia within the Spartan camp but had carried his victorious arms into and beyond the original Achaean heartland to the very gates of the Peloponnese at Corinth. The victory in the field at Hecatombaeum in western Achaea in 226 was matched in 225 by the diplomatic triumph of the adhesion of Argos, effected no doubt through collusion between Cleomenes and an opportunist Aristomachus. Even Aratus' own Sicyon trembled before the blast and had its loyalties severely strained, and but for illness it looked at one point as though Cleomenes was going to modulate his military domination of Achaea into some form of political hegemony. A few months into 224, however, the wily and perplexing Aratus, former liberator of Acrocorinth and unifier of much of the Peloponnese on an ostensibly anti-Macedonian ticket, deployed his recently acquired authority as General Plenipotentiary to lead a territorially leaner and socially and politically fissile Achaean League into alliance with none other than the old enemy Macedon.

This historic compromise has been debated assiduously and acidulously ever since, usually in the personal terms of apologia or denigration unfortunately laid down by Aratus and Phylarchus. In sober point of objective fact Aratus and the Achaeans found themselves in a situation of what Thucydides would readily have understood as *anankē*, confronting an unenviable choice between evils. Of course, other things being equal, Aratus would not have wished to summon Macedon to save his and Achaea's bacon on Macedon's rather than their own terms. But compelled as he was to choose between, on one hand, Spartan hegemony with the attendant likelihood of some social upheaval and letting of blood (not excluding his own) and, on the other, a Macedonian suzerainty that on past showing would be exercised fitfully, inefficiently and best of all from afar—in the circumstances his advocacy of the Macedonian option before the Achaean spring assembly of 224 is not altogether incomprehensible. However unexpected this *volte-face* may have been to many of his audience, his face had probably already started to turn as long ago as the winter of 227/6. When, therefore, Ptolemy III of Egypt redirected his subsidy from Aratus to Cleomenes, probably in the winter of 226/5, he was not so much taking out an insurance policy as acting on an insider tip-off. Another Spartan of royal lineage to benefit from Ptolemy's patronage was the exiled Eurypontid Hippomedon who at some time between 240 and 222 was appointed governor of the Hellespont and Thraceward district.³²

Some of Ptolemy's funding of Cleomenes may have taken the form of his own bronze coins, but the bulk of the subsidy presumably reached Sparta as silver bullion. Already, it would appear, Cleomenes had followed the example of Areus I and (possibly) Agis in striking a coinage of silver tetradrachms (Group III of Grunauer-von Hoerschelmann). On their obverse he placed his own beardless visage, in the manner of the Seleucids (the influence of his father lingering on?); but on the reverse he had depicted what has been convincingly reinterpreted as the ancient aniconic image of (Artemis) Orthia. This was an astute method of advertising his restoration of the *agōgē*, many of whose religious manifestations were closely associated with the cult of this nature-goddess. However, his second series of coins (Group IV) frankly echoed Ptolemaic symbols. Quite possibly, too, he diverted some of his Egyptian income, together with cash raised from the sale of assorted booty, towards the rebuilding of Orthia's temple (date uncertain); and it is tempting to associate the nearby 'Great Altar' (devoted to the heroized or deified Lycurgus?) with the same propaganda initiative. But the greatest part of his funds was of course spent on preparing his citizen troops and mercenaries for the climactic battle with Macedon that had been on the agenda as soon as Antigonos Doson had himself appointed commander-in-chief of a new, anti-Spartan alliance. That appointment had been made at the autumn 224 synod of the Achaean League, following the defection from Cleomenes of Argos and Corinth in the summer of that year.³³

A century before, the decisive battle between a still independent Greece and Macedon at Chaeronea had preceded the formation in 338/7 of Philip's Hellenic

League, usually known as the League of Corinth (chapter 2). In the 220s the decisive encounter between Macedon and a still technically independent Sparta succeeded the formation of a new Hellenic League conceived on significantly different lines. Not only was Doso's League directed specifically against Sparta and the generalized social revolution she was supposed to stand for, but this was an alliance of federations, not single *poleis*. This reflected alike the increased importance of the federal principle throughout mainland Greece and Doso's political skill in accommodating changed Greek perceptions to his none the less vigorous reassertion of Macedonian suzerainty. When he had assumed power in 229 (as regent: only later was he acclaimed king), Macedon was in desperate straits, threatened with disintegration from within and without. In just over five years he had virtually restored the happy strategic situation under Philip and Alexander. Aratus perhaps had thought to manipulate Doso, but even politically he found himself outmanoeuvred (the political geography of the League was calculated to take care of Aetolia no less than Sparta) and, unlike the Macedonian, the Sicyonian had never been a military man.³⁴

The season of 223 passed with credits and debits on both sides. Against Doso's capture of most, and garrisoning of part, of Arcadia Cleomenes could set the near-total destruction of Megalopolis, a temporary obliteration of 'the memorial and the pledge of Spartan humiliation' (Freeman 1893, 386). This was achieved after a brilliant feint march worthy of the pastmaster Agesilaus II and realized a huge haul of booty (at least 300 talents in cash, together with various movable loot including, we are told, a *paidiskē*, mistress, to compensate Cleomenes for his recent loss of Agiatis). Even so Cleomenes was always short of cash. And not only cash: manpower too. In 223/2, therefore, he resorted—*faute demieux* and not at all from ideological conviction—to the liberation of certain Helots. Unlike the 2,000 or so Helots of the 420s who selected themselves for manumission on the grounds of their contribution to Sparta's war-effort (only to be liquidated shortly thereafter), Cleomenes' manumittedes achieved their freedom if they could raise his asking price of five Attic minas (500 drachmas).

Some scholars have professed astonishment at the size of the manumission fee, others doubt that as many as 6,000 Helots (Plut. *Cleom.* 23.1; the even less reliable Macrobius, *Sat.* i.11.34, goes still higher) were reportedly able to pay it, and yet others amazement that Helots had any liquid capital at their disposal whatsoever. But 500 drachmas was within, if at the upper end of, the range of manumission fees attested contemporaneously in relatively infertile central Greece under less stringent conditions of liberation; the Helot population was not subject to the same socio-political or demographic restraints as the master class; and the increasing monetization of the Spartan economy meant that shrewd and industrious Helots, particularly those who had laboured on the *latifundia* of the old rich, might make a tidy profit from the sale of any produce surplus to political or dietary requirements. Two thousand of the ex-Helots were armed in the Macedonian fashion, with a view therefore to their eventual incorporation in the new-style phalanx (just as Neodamodeis had been

incorporated, in their own unit, in the regular hoplite phalanx at Mantinea in 418). The remainder—age and fitness permitting—were perhaps equipped as light-armed soldiers for future reference. Various explanations are possible of the fact that only one-third of the Helot manumitted were used to reinforce Cleomenes' principal fighting arm, but the most potent perhaps is the suggestion that he did not wish to spread alarm and despondency among his citizen phalangites (as the arming of, again, 6,000 Helots had done in 370/69). Most Helots, it has to be remembered, were not liberated in 223/2, and these had still—or again—to confront the institutionalized terror of the Crypteia. There could be no sharper illustration of the limits of Cleomenes'—and *a fortiori* Agis'—revolution than his treatment of Helots as the continuing basis of Sparta's entire political, social and military superstructure.³⁵

Early in 222 Cleomenes showed his habitual boldness in ravaging Argolis. But even if it was designed to provoke the Argive masses to revolt, it was a rather hollow gesture. In the high summer of 222, with all the relevant passes occupied in advance, Dason commenced his final descent into Laconia. Cleomenes sensibly determined to resist him at Sellasia. This was the nearest Perioecic community to Sparta, lying some 14 kilometres to the north and on the very fringe of the newly redivided civic land athwart the obvious route of invasion. However, as with almost all ancient and many modern battles, precise details of the battle-site and of the number, disposition and evolutions of the opposed forces are more or less controversial. In one sense this is immaterial. Cleomenes' cause was lost before even battle was joined, and Ptolemy acknowledged that he had become a poor investment by cutting off his subsidy just days in advance of the fighting. But, so far as can be ascertained, the decisive factor in Macedon's victory was superior numbers: Cleomenes was outmanned in a proportion of something like three to two. Thus the magnificent fighting spirit of the 6,000 'Lacedaemonians', their *eupsukhia* (high morale) as Polybius called it, and the efforts of their Perioecic, mercenary and allied fellow-soldiers merely delayed the inevitable outcome. According to Plutarch, all but 200 Spartans perished—an exaggeration, maybe, but if so not one calculated to polish the halo of the most famous Spartan survivor. For once again Cleomenes placed mundane prudence above slavish devotion to the good old 'Lycurgan' laws (under which he ought to have suffered partial disfranchisement as a *tresas*) and fled, by way of Gytheum, Cythera and Aegilia (modern Antikythera), to join his mother as a refugee in Ptolemy's Alexandria and—he vainly hoped—fight again another day. The fate of Echemedes, otherwise unknown to fame, affords an instructive contrast: his austere gravemarker, laconically inscribed 'Echemedes in war', was erected where he fell at Sellasia and eerily echoes the *éclat* of a bygone and now irretrievable era of Spartan history.³⁶

Dason next achieved what Philip II had scorned to attempt and Pyrrhus among others had failed to execute, the first ever capture of Sparta town. He remained in Sparta only for a couple of days, but long enough to instal Brachyllas as governor. It was a nice touch to appoint a Theban in return for

Sparta's notorious occupation of Thebes between 382 and 379/8. The added humiliation for Sparta of forcible incorporation in—or at any rate alliance to—Doson's Hellenic League is very likely but cannot be proven. Certainly, though, as in 338/7, a major Macedonian victory entailed territorial losses for the Spartan state: Dentheliatis (again?), Belminatis (again), and the east Parnon foreland (probably a repeat performance). As for the internal arrangement of the shrunken polity, Polybius (ii.70.1) ambiguously asserted that Doson restored Sparta's 'ancestral constitution', perhaps meaning only that he restored constitutional legality after the 'tyranny' of Cleomenes. Anyhow, the Cleomenean patronomate and sixth obe were apparently allowed to survive, and it is as likely as not that Doson refrained from interfering with the current, post-Sellasia occupancy of Spartan civic land. For then those few of Cleomenes' new citizens who had survived might feel gratitude to Macedon rather than undying loyalty to the Alexandrian 'government-in-exile' of their former king; and it was perhaps they who publicly hailed Doson—probably after his death in 221—as 'Saviour and Benefactor'. Alternatively, since the monument in question was found at Perioecic Geronthrae, it could have been erected by disgruntled Perioeci who relished the dethronement of Cleomenes and looked forward to their emancipation from Spartan rule under the aegis of some foreign power. What the eighty old citizens exiled by Cleomenes in 227 did now is not known; perhaps nothing.³⁷

As events were soon to show (see [chapter 5](#)), a vaguely Cleomenean political tendency at Sparta survived the Battle of Sellasia. But it was a broken-backed affair, and with hindsight the pathetic deaths of Cleomenes and his handful of supporters at Alexandria in spring 219 (in a futile rising against the new Ptolemy, IV Philopator) suggest he ought to have emulated Leonidas I and other kings who went down fighting the real enemy. The legend of Cleomenes, however, was in safe hands. He became one of the small pantheon of heroic exemplars offering a constant inducement to invent putatively antique 'traditions', as Sparta accommodated herself to alien worlds which it was beyond her power to control.³⁸

Chapter five

Sparta between Achaea and Rome: the rule of Nabis

In late summer or autumn 201 the Greek island-*polis* of Rhodes and the ruler of the Greek kingdom of Pergamum, Attalus I, jointly sent a deputation to Rome. Their request, that the Senate should authorize a second war against Philip V of Macedon, was later echoed by Athens. But it was the two newer eastern Mediterranean powers (the Pergamene kingdom, indeed, had not been carved out of the Seleucid empire until towards the mid-third century) to which Rome's governing body attached most weight. Moreover, Rome herself, thanks to control of Italy and Sicily and defeat of Carthage in the Second Punic War (218–201), was now the greatest Mediterranean power of all. Here, then, was a sea-change in the wider and ultimately determining international framework of Sparta's Hellenistic history. It meant that Nabis, unlike his most successful predecessor in the business of restoring somewhat his state's power and glory (Cleomenes III), had to contend not only with Sparta's neighbours and enemies of the Achaean League, her ambiguous and volatile friends and allies in Aetolia, and the mainland Greeks' notional suzerain in Macedon, but also with the coming of Rome. For by the time of his accession in some capacity to what then passed for power in Sparta, the 'clouds in the west' famously described by an Aetolian politician a decade earlier had risen above the political horizons of many Greeks and cast a looming shadow over all Greek interstate relations.¹

Nor would Sparta's domestic situation in 207 have appeared significantly more bright. The heavy loss of life and consequent social disequilibrium inflicted in 222 at Sellasia by Antigonos Doson had been repeated in a minor key at Mantinea in 207 by Macedon's faithful ally, the Achaean League. The interval between these two disastrous defeats had brought Sparta first a sustained bout of *stasis*, involving the usual massacres, exilings and socio-economic upheavals of course, but also repeated changes of government affecting institutions as well as individuals. This had been followed by several long years of exhausted impotence, before an inchoate revival under the umbrella of a tenuous friendship with Aetolia and Rome was cut brutally short on the field of Mantinea. The lure of power, it would appear, never ceases to fascinate. But on any sober estimate the urge to assume direction of Spartan affairs in 207 must be considered the reaction of a wine-sodden gambler. It says much for Nabis, therefore, that he not merely achieved a measure of domestic stability and

prosperity but also acquired an international standing which made him briefly the focus of 'big politics' in the entire eastern Mediterranean world.²

'Statesman', however, was not the first (or the last) description of Nabis that tripped off the tongue of the politician-turned-historian who, for better or worse, will remain our chief literary guide throughout this and the next chapter. To the Megalopolitan Polybius, as to the Paduan Livy (who in almost all essentials depended on Polybius for the eastern portions of his no less fervently patriotic Roman history and for large tracts of this period gives the only surviving narrative), and other lesser followers, Nabis was a 'tyrant'—and not in the relatively flattering sense in which Aristotle (*Pol.* 1310b26) could say of Pheidon of Argos that he was a king who became a tyrant, but with the wholly denigratory meaning that he was a non-responsible despot and the author of heinous secular and sacrilegious crimes. That Polybian view, not surprisingly, has imposed itself on most modern scholars, since it is the *fons et origo* of the entire ancient literary tradition on Nabis (who sadly lacks his Phylarchus). But there has also been a contrary tendency within modern scholarship which emphasises the easily detectable bias of Polybius the Megalopolitan and Achaean patriot, *bien pensant* spokesman of the Greek propertied class, and privileged and compromised champion of the Roman settlement of Greece, and which therefore dismisses the Polybian portrait as mere caricature. One of the principal aims of this chapter will be to steer a course somewhere between these two exaggerated extremes by using the 'news columns' as it were of Polybius and Livy to check and, where necessary correct, their editorial prejudices. The other major objective will be to provide a perspective on Nabis—a significantly new one, it is believed—which, by exploiting to the full all the available evidence (archaeological, numismatic and epigraphical as well as literary), may show how Nabis' fifteen-year rule (c. 207–192) laid the foundations of Roman Sparta. Differently put, the thesis of this chapter is that, if Sparta survived incorporation into the Achaean League and conquest by Rome with the social, economic and political potential to become a great deal more than just a museum of her desperately antiquated past, that consummation was owed above all to the success with which Nabis surpassed the irredentist vision of Agis, Cleomenes and their imitators to embrace and realize a truly contemporary conception of Spartan state and society.³

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Whatever may be thought of Polybius' representation of Nabis, there can be no doubt but that the starting-point of his *Histories*, 220 BC, was most happily chosen. For in 220 Rome, with much of Italy, Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica already under her belt and an interest staked in Illyria to the east, was about to renew her trial by combat with Carthage in the western Mediterranean; while in the eastern sector of the midland sea the thrones of the three major Hellenistic kingdoms were pregnantly occupied by newly acceded incumbents: Philip of Macedon (221–179), Ptolemy IV Philopator (221–204), and Antiochus III of Syria (223–187). Taking a more parochial view (the only sort Sparta was then in

a position to adopt), 220 BC also witnesses the outbreak in Greece of the inaptly named Social War (220–217).⁴

That war's immediate background was provided by the 'Cleomenic War' briefly discussed in [chapter four](#). Achaëa, guided by Aratus of Sicyon, had felt constrained to look to Macedon for salvation from Cleomenes, and in 224 Doson had skilfully availed himself of the chance both to amputate the renascent power of Sparta and to re-establish Macedon's socially conservative hegemony of Old Greece within the framework of a new-style, federation-based Hellenic League. The forces of the League crushed Cleomenes at Sellasia, and Doson imposed on Sparta what Polybius ambiguously labelled 'the ancestral constitution' but which, as we shall see, combined innovation with tradition in a volatile and explosive mixture. Sparta, however, was not the sole target of the Hellenic League, which simultaneously threw a sanitary cordon around Macedon's irritatingly near neighbours in Aetolia. It was to break this cordon, by severing Achaëa practically from Macedon, that early in 219 an Aetolian official visited Sparta and invited the Spartan Assembly to contribute as allies to the war the Aetolians had begun the previous year, by diverting Achaëa's attention from north of Acrocorinth (occupied by Macedon since 224) to strictly Peloponnesian matters. The Assembly consented and formally ended Sparta's notional association (probably of alliance rather than membership) with the Hellenic League. But it was an accurate reflection both of Sparta's internal political divisions on the Macedonian issue and of her military debility that she performed her role of Aetolian ally with signal lack of firmness and distinction.⁵

The sources of those divisions and debility are easy to see in outline. Their precise nature eludes us for lack of detailed and unambiguous information, above all regarding the overall size and internal composition of the post-Sellasia Spartan citizen-body. The existence of a 'Cleomenean party', for instance, is purely a modern speculation. Amid all the uncertainty just two facts are tolerably certain. First, the luxury of indulging high passion to the point of repeated assassinations was afforded by the removal by 220 of the Macedonian garrison under Brachyllas, which had been charged with the cleansing of Sparta of the Cleomenean virus. Secondly, the state thus detoxified was a 'State of the Ephors' (a label sometimes misapplied to Archaic Sparta) in the most literal sense. For after the overthrow of Cleomenes' *de facto* monarchy, neither Doson nor Philip had permitted the restoration of the genuinely ancestral Agiad-Eurypontid dyarchy, and the sanguinary struggles over power and policy centred on the restored Ephorate. Thus in the three succeeding ephoral years of 221/20, 220/19 and 219/18 variously pro-Macedonian, pro-Aetolian and non-aligned Ephors were either butchered or forced into exile. It was partly therefore to take the heat off the office and partly as a response to the genuine attachment to ancestral tradition of many ordinary Spartan citizens (especially, no doubt, the least established and youngest among them) that the (replacement) Ephors of 220/19 sanctioned the restoration of the dyarchy, probably after rather than before news reached Sparta of Cleomenes' death at Alexandria in spring 219.⁶

The situation was of course unprecedented, and in the light of Sparta's recent history it is highly unlikely that the old mechanism for resolving succession disputes (a vote of the Gerousia, probably taken in association with the Ephors and possibly formally ratified by the Assembly) was invoked to decide who should reign, not least because even the post-Cleomenean Gerousia makes almost no noticeable appearance between 227 and the Roman Imperial period (chapter 11). Perhaps the replacement Ephors of 220/19 simply nominated Agesipolis (III) and Lycurgus. Agesipolis was certainly an Agiad (his grandfather was the Cleombrotus who had briefly replaced Leonidas), but he was also unfortunately a minor, which necessitated a regency held by his uncle Cleomenes. This was not a good omen. As for Lycurgus, his name at least could not have been more auspicious; but if Polybius is to be believed, he was no Eurypontid and owed his elevation to bribery (one talent of silver for each Ephor). Polybius, though, is a tainted witness, the bribery story is suspicious, and it is possible to find room for Lycurgus in a collateral branch of the Eurypontids (cf. Latychidas II, plucked from obscurity to replace Demaratus in 491). In any event, legitimate or not, Lycurgus became in spring 219 effectively Sparta's only king and potentially her sole ruler. It was he who commanded Sparta's citizen and mercenary troops inside and outside Laconia during the Social War, and he too who suffered and survived at least one attempted coup and another enforced exile before ridding himself of Agesipolis and bequeathing such power as he retained to his no less propagandistically named son Pelops.⁷

Two military episodes of the Social War merit closer analysis, partly for the light they throw on Sparta's geopolitical situation in south-east Peloponnese and partly because they involved the personal intervention of the young (just 20), energetic and over-ambitious Philip V. In summer 219 Lycurgus launched an offensive into what modern writers habitually miscall 'Argolis' but is more accurately described in geomorphological terms as the east Parnon foreland. Cleomenes had briefly held Argos itself in 225–4, but not only had he failed to retain that city but in losing Sellasia had enabled Argos at last to lay effective hands on the string of formerly Perioecic towns situated on or near the Aegean coast from Prasiae in the north to Zarax. Lycurgus, using the remnants of Cleomenes' defeated army and the three or four newly-adult year-classes of citizens who had passed through the restored *agōgē*, together with a good sprinkling of mercenaries, succeeded in recapturing Polichna (modern Poulithra), Prasiae (Leonidhi Skala), Cyphanta (Kyparissi) and Leucæ (? Phoiniki, site of the Hypertealeum sanctuary), but failed to regain either Glympeis (probably Kosmas) or Zarax (Ieraka). From the east Parnon foreland he retraced his steps to the north Laconian border and underlined the incapacity of Achaea's independent military deterrent by recapturing the vital Athenaeum fort in Belminatis which Doson had returned to Megalopolis and Achaea. Philip had other things on his mind and hands north of the Isthmus, and it well indicates the gravity of the situation that he should have decided to initiate a Peloponnesian offensive in person in midwinter 219/8. This was not his first

visit to the Peloponnese or encounter with Spartans, but in 220 he had failed to persuade them to maintain their Hellenic League alignment and was now anxious to show the Macedonian flag. He achieved what seems to have been his limited objective of expelling Lycurgus' garrison from the Athenaeum and firming up Achaëa's southern frontier.

Six months later, in response to Lycurgus' invasion of Messenia, Philip embarked on his third spectacular campaign of 218. This time he did not stop at Megalopolis but burst through the north Laconian border, proceeded down the Eurotas valley and on into the Taenarum peninsula as far south as Taenarum itself, then doubled back to conduct the first ever invasion by land of the Malea peninsula, as far south as Boeae (modern Neapolis). The pride of Sparta was humiliated by Philip's capture of the Menelaëum sanctuary area (home of the Dioscuri, who had once symbolized and guaranteed the Agiad-Eurypontid dyarchy) and by his pointed sacrifice at the battle-site of Sellasia. No less hurtful was the economic and political damage caused by Philip's extensive ravaging of the rich Spartan and Helos plains and his unimpeded progress through what remained of Sparta's Perioecic dependencies. If Philip did not capture, or even try to capture, the still largely defenceless town of Sparta, that was both due to shortage of time and in line with considered Macedonian policy and practice since his namesake invaded Laconia in 338/7 ([chapter 2](#)).⁸

In the interval between Philip's two anti-Spartan interventions Lycurgus had sustained and temporarily succumbed to an attempted *coup*, the sole evidence for which is a retrospective passage of Polybius (iv.81) reflecting on Sparta's constitutional vicissitudes. The instigator of this temporarily successful manoeuvre was one Chilon, bearer of yet another poignantly 'ancestral' name. In the by now traditional manner he had the Ephors butchered and then apparently sought to legitimize and bolster his claim to regal power (he seems to have been a genuine Eurypontid) by raising the at least superficially Cleomenean slogan of land-redistribution. Lycurgus fled with his private slave-household (*idioioiketai*—see further below) to Perioecic Pellana to watch developments. Chilon's support was not negligible but insufficient to retain him in power, so he retired to somewhere in Achaëa and to oblivion. Much has been inferred from his choice of exile as to his political outlook and connections, but speculation is profitless. Lycurgus, in any event, returned and, somewhat in Cleomenes' manner, sought to rebuild his credibility as leader by attacking Tegea and Messenia in early summer 218. When these attacks proved inconclusive, and Philip's invasion of Laconia devastating, Lycurgus was again driven into exile, this time by the replacement Ephors of 219/18 who accused him of fomenting 'revolution' (*neōterismos*). After a brief sojourn in Aetolia, he returned under the new board of 218/17 and once more invaded Messenia. But this invasion was as ineffectual as his previous one and was in any event overtaken by the conclusion of the Social War. This occurred at the Naupactus conference of summer 217 that produced the 'clouds in the west' allusion already noted. It was perhaps in the wake of the peace treaty between Philip, Aetolia

and their respective allies that Lycurgus decided to rid himself of the boy-king Agesipolis. He thereby became the first sole king of Sparta, a natural extension of Cleomenes' *de facto* abolition of the ancestral dyarchy and a suitable comment on the weakness of the supposedly restored 'ancestral constitution'. The next years, almost a decade all told, are an era in Spartan history no less dark than the 250s.

On the international stage, however, Greek history as a whole was marching increasingly in step with developments further west. The Naupactus conference had been conditioned by Hannibal's victory over the Romans at Lake Trasimene in June 217. In 215 Rome's crushing defeat at Cannae (later to be celebrated by the Spartan historian Sosylus) encouraged Philip to hitch his wagon to Hannibal's apparently irresistibly rising star by concluding a treaty of alliance. Three or four years later the Senate was sufficiently alarmed by Philip to conclude a treaty with his principal Greek enemy, Aetolia, though it was careful to disclaim territorial ambitions in Greece: the Romans were to receive all movable booty, but all territorial gains were to be the property of the Aetolians. This was by no means Rome's first venture on the soil of the south Balkan peninsula. In 229–8 she had fought the 'First Illyrian War' chiefly, it seems, to discourage Illyrian piracy directed at Roman or Italian shipping in the Adriatic. But the war had resulted in the establishment of a Roman 'protectorate' over a coastal strip of Illyria. News of this *démarche* was transmitted by Roman ambassadors to various Greek states, including the Corinthians, who returned the diplomatic compliment by bestowing honorary Greek status on the Romans in the form of permission to participate in the panhellenic Isthmian Games of summer 228. This benefit was not forgotten. Almost a decade later, Rome intervened again in Illyria in response to territorial transgressions by Demetrius of Pharos, the Illyrian chief who had been charged with maintaining the protectorate. As a result of this 'Second Illyrian War' Demetrius found refuge with Philip and thereby perhaps implanted in that monarch's mind the seeds of larger and ultimately fatal territorial ambition. Philip's treaty with Hannibal and Rome's with Aetolia thus conform to a comprehensive pattern.¹⁰

Strengthened by their Roman alliance, the Aetolians sought to reanimate the military alignments of the Social War by involving their Peloponnesian allies in its terms. Polybius, recognizing that here was an important moment of decision, wrote up as a set-piece debate the diplomatic transactions in Sparta in which the Aetolian speaker was opposed by an Acarnanian (ix.28–39). The latter, as reported, advocated a 'panhellenist' line, casting the Romans in the role of 'barbarians' against whom all good Greeks should unite. But whatever the Spartans thought of the Romans (and their first-hand experience of them was presumably nugatory), they were clear that their interest lay in siding with the principal Greek enemy of their own principal enemy (Achaea). So in 210 (probably) they agreed to reactivate their Aetolian alliance and be in Latin parlance 'adscribed' to the Roman-Aetolian treaty of 212 or 211. It would be helpful, to say the least, if we had any certain knowledge of power-relations within

Sparta or indeed of Sparta's institutional machinery of decision-making at this time. The Assembly, for instance, is unlikely to have voted the alliance as an exercise in constitutional sovereignty. All we are told, however—in a speech written by Livy after Polybius for T. Quinctius Flamininus to deliver in a debate with Nabis outside Sparta in 195 (see further below)—is that from the Roman point of view the treaty of friendship and alliance was with 'Pelops, the rightful and legitimate king of Sparta' (L. xxxiv.32.1). Pelops' legitimacy may perhaps be allowed, in the limited sense that he was the son of (now dead) Lycurgus. But since Pelops, like the still exiled Agesipolis, was a minor, clearly he was not wielding regal power in his own right. The only known candidate for the role of Sparta's chief executive at this date is Machanidas; but it is only a modern hypothesis that he was Pelops' guardian and regent, and on the extremely tenuous evidence available Machanidas' career as Sparta's military and political leader cannot be documented before 209 at the earliest.¹¹

This is very regrettable. For Livy following Polybius pays Machanidas the backhanded compliment of calling him 'tyrant' of Sparta, and there is just enough evidence for his military, religious and perhaps constructional activity to suggest that he deserved to be bracketed thus with the energetic, innovative and effective Cleomenes and Nabis. So far as his building is concerned, there is little enough to go on: just a tantalising reference of the Roman Imperial period to a public structure called 'Machanidai', for which our Machanidas would seem to be the only plausible eponym (App. I, no. 22). The religious evidence is firm, but confined to a single inscription recording a dedication by him to Eleusia, the Spartan version of Eileithyia. Given that divinity's association with childbirth, Machanidas was probably expressing concern either over the continuity of his own *oikos* (and dynasty) or, a perhaps even more attractive hypothesis, over Sparta's endemic *oliganthrōpia* caused not only by losses in battle but also by a recrudescence of the pre-Agis socio-economic crisis. However that may be, Machanidas certainly wished to pursue an active military policy against Sparta's by now traditional enemies of the Achaean League. The timing was opportune, since Roman forces outdid even the savagery of Philip in their descents upon Achaean positions in the Peloponnese. Thus probably in 208 Machanidas not only recovered the perennially disputed Belminatis but actually captured Tegea, attacked Elis, and in 207 pushed on into the Argolis to threaten Argos. In other circumstances Machanidas might have extended his territorial gains, but in autumn 208 a certain Philopoemen was elected General-in-Chief of the Achaean League and in Philopoemen Machanidas was to meet his superior.¹²

In the 220s Achaean's military condition was ragged, and the rôle attributed to the young Philopoemen at Sellasia by his compatriot and ideological heir Polybius (whose lost eulogy was used by Plutarch) probably owes not a little to the exigencies of hagiography. There can be no doubt, however, but that after his return from an actively anti-Spartan decade on Crete (c. 221–11) and his election first to the Hipparchy (210/9) and then the Generalship of Achaean, he was the moving spirit behind Achaean's long overdue military reform. The army

that confronted Machanidas at Mantinea in 207, therefore, was not the same sort of army that Cleomenes had repeatedly beaten in the 220s, and the proximity of the Megalopolis that had risen with difficulty from the ashes of Cleomenes' destruction of 223 was an added source of martial inspiration for Philopoemen and his 20,000 or so re-equipped (in Macedonian style) Achaeans and Cretan mercenaries. The battle, which was fought during an interlude when Rome, Pergamum and even Macedon had withdrawn to the sidelines, has neatly been characterised as 'the last act of the long drama of internal Hellenic warfare' (Freeman 1893, 464–5). Machanidas may not have lost his head during the fray—though his unprecedented and indeed unique deployment of ballistic weapons designed for siegecraft in open battle does smack as much of recklessness as of ingenious invention. But after his army's trenchant defeat (with a reported loss of 4,000 Spartan lives, which must surely include mercenaries and perhaps even Helots) he did literally lose his head after being killed by Philopoemen in person. If even after this victory Achaëa was nevertheless still 'little more than a tool in the hands of the great powers' (Errington 1969, 26), Sparta's very existence as a state, let alone her nominal independence, was once again imminently jeopardized. It would be small wonder, therefore, if Sparta had been happy to be included in the separate peace Aetolia was compelled to conclude with Philip in 206. But her inclusion cannot be proved. On the other hand, it is morally certain that Sparta was 'adscribed' to the Peace of Phoenice, by which Rome terminated the First Macedonian War in 205.¹³

The Battle of Mantinea in 207 was obviously a decisive battle, like Sellasia. But whereas Sellasia had been decisive negatively, in that it was followed by the imposition of a foreign garrison and a miserable series of bloody intestine struggles not balanced by significant successes abroad, Mantinea had the positive effect of wiping the slate clean, bringing home to the Spartans the undeniable inefficacy of tried expedients and recommending irresistibly the need for further radical experiment of a novel kind. In terms of personality, the defeat had the effect of opening the door to one of the most remarkable individuals in all Sparta's public history, Nabis son of Demaratus. On the basis really of just one passage in 'his' contribution to the debate with Flamininus already mentioned, Nabis has usually been interpreted as a faithful follower of Agis and Cleomenes marching under the common banner of 'Lycurgan' reintegration. No doubt it would have suited Nabis to represent himself thus before his noble Roman interlocutor, as no less observant than he of his country's *mos maiorum*; and it is easy to believe that in front of Spartan audiences, too, especially those in which the majority were the newest of new citizens created by himself, he would have liked to parade himself as a Lycurgus *redivivus*. The reality, however, as I shall hope to demonstrate, was importantly different from the propaganda. Leaving aside the insoluble problem of what Lycurgus (or another of the same name) may or may not have enacted, there is enough certifiably factual material even in our wildly prejudiced sources to show that Nabis neither emulated nor

even imitated his putatively 'Lycurgan' predecessors Agis and Cleomenes. Just where and how his measures differed, and the extent to which his policies were both innovative and fruitful, it will be the purpose of the remainder of this chapter to determine.¹⁴

Nabis' own name, possibly an abbreviated form or even a Hellenized version of a Semitic original, is a singleton in attested Spartan nomenclature. The name of his father, however, is thoroughly Spartan, indeed regal; and by a plausible chain of inferential reasoning Nabis has been identified as a lineal descendant of the Eurypontid king Demaratus who went into exile as a Persian pensioner in the Troad in 491, by way of the Demaratus son of Gorgion (putatively Nabis' great-grandfather) who was honoured by the Delians in the early third century. It is at all events certain that Nabis drew attention to his connection with the Eurypontids' ultimate progenitor Heracles by having him depicted heroically nude on his coinage. Yet more important than this hypothetical filiation, though, is what it meant to Nabis and the Spartans that he had himself styled 'king' both on his coins and on official title-stamps. Since Nabis was born not later than 240, and perhaps more precisely c.250–45 (an inference from the fact that he had marriageable sons in 198), he was a younger contemporary of Cleomenes. If born a Eurypontid in Sparta, he must either have thrown in his lot openly with Cleomenes or kept his relationship with him to the minimum required to ensure his survival. Either way, he employed the long years of obscurity profitably to ruminate on the failure of Cleomenes, and from the very inception of his rule (whenever and however precisely that was obtained) he was able to set about implementing a coherent package of measures very much as Cleomenes had in 227. But those measures, as his rumination could not but have suggested to him, had to be crucially different, even if sealed with the hallmark of royalty.¹⁵

Cleomenes had had to abolish the Ephorate and hamstring the Gerousia. By 207 the briefly revived 'State of the Ephors' was again a thing of the past, the Gerousia merely a name and a shadow. Power such as it was had been concentrated in the hands of a sole ruler for as long as most adult Spartans still living in Sparta could recall. It would not, however, have been out of keeping with what we know of Nabis' persona and political profile later on if he had sought and received some public legitimation of his assumption of the title of 'king'. The parallel with Antigonid Macedon of the early 220s, where Doso had ruled first as regent and only after some years been formally acclaimed 'king', may not be wholly far-fetched, especially if Nabis was a genuine Eurypontid. (The allegation that he had Pelops murdered, Diod. xxvii, fr.1, looks like a familiar libel.) However that may be, since Nabis was resolved to do physical violence to considerable numbers of actual or potential opponents, he was careful also to surround himself with a bodyguard composed largely or entirely of mercenaries. Cleomenes, too, had employed mercenaries to effect his coup of 227, but apparently had not thereafter maintained a permanent bodyguard, and indeed strove to present himself publicly as a Spartan king in the

old austere *primus inter pares* mode. Nabis, however, not only kept a permanent bodyguard but did not shun the symbolic accoutrements of royalty. Whereas earlier Spartan kings and princesses had kept stables of racehorses (Demaratus, indeed, won an Olympic victory in the four-horse chariot-race) or warhorses (Agesilaus II), Nabis kept a stable of parade-horses, at least one of them white and all no doubt richly caparisoned like Machanidas' charger at Mantinea. Perhaps, too, Nabis, like Machanidas, draped himself in a purple robe. But quite certainly he lived in a palace, an un-Greek kind of edifice not seen in European Greece since the Mycenaean era until the late-fourth-century example at Aegae (Palatitsa) in Macedon. Such symbolic 'distancing' was of course typical of all the Hellenistic Successor kings, and the scholars who have rightly stressed the differences between Nabis and Cleomenes have usually looked in this direction for the source of his regalia. This is not the only possibility. Parallels may also be detected between Nabis and another sort of sole ruler, the wholly Greek 'tyrants' who, starting with Dionysius I of Syracuse (405–367), clothed the power they had usurped in quasi-regal forms that fell well short of oriental absolutism.¹⁶

At any rate, parallels between Nabis and Dionysius in particular are very striking indeed. Besides the ritual summoning of assemblies, the bodyguard of foreign mercenaries and such symbolic trappings as white parade-horses and (possibly) regal vestments, Nabis resembled Dionysius also in consolidating his rule on dynastic lines. His wife, like that of Leonidas II, was not Spartan; but whereas Leonidas' foreign marriage was made the pretext for his temporary deposition, Nabis' marriage to Apia of Argos (Wilhelm's convincing correction of Polybius' 'Apega') was one of the pillars of his reign. Almost certainly, Apia was niece of the one-time Argive tyrant Aristomachus who had briefly delivered his city to Cleomenes. This cross-*polis* intermarriage, like that of Dionysius, offered Nabis a useful potential source of foreign aid. It also provided him with a line of communication to the heart of a highly important Peloponnesian state ambiguously placed between the Achaean League (of which it was an inconstant member) and Macedon (towards which many Argives felt a sentimental attachment through a presumed tie of kinship). To cement this link, Nabis married one of his and Apia's daughters to Apia's brother Pythagoras, who, like Dionysius' brother-in-law, acted as Nabis' chief of staff.¹⁷

Nor does that exhaust the line of seeming parallels with Dionysius. Far and away the most controversial of Nabis' many controversial measures, then as now, was his freeing and enfranchisement of many thousands of 'slaves'. Unhappily, Livy's *servi* is as ambiguous as Polybius' *douloi*, and modern scholars are understandably enough in deep disagreement as to whether those whom Nabis liberated were old-style Helots (hereditary serf-like labourers, collectively enslaved to the Spartan state), new-style Helots (descendants of the old Helots but in practice at the free disposal of individual Spartan masters and mistresses), chattel slaves (private slaves bought on the market and/or captured as war-booty), or a combination of all three. There is no reason to doubt that there

were chattel slaves at Sparta at the end of the third century, as there had been at least since the early fourth century; Lycurgus' *idioi oiketai* were presumably slaves of this type. But equally there is no good reason for supposing that they were anything but a small minority compared to the hereditary, endogenously self-reproducing Helot population. The question rather is whether Nabis freed and enfranchised all the Helots or just a section of them, and, if so, which in particular. On balance the unsatisfactory evidence does just favour the belief that Helotage in some shape or form did survive the reign of Nabis (as Strabo seems to have said). If, then, one were to pick out a category of Helots whom Nabis might have found it particularly attractive to liberate, one might most readily think of the younger and fitter adult males among those who had worked the extensive estates confiscated from the Spartans 'distinguished for their wealth and lineage' (Plb. xiii.6.3) whom Nabis had allegedly tortured, exiled or killed. For in that case by a single stroke Nabis would have been enabled both to redistribute land to impoverished Spartans, as he did, and to make citizens of those liberated Helots whom he married to the wives and daughters (sometimes landowners in their own right) of the proscribed. That is almost entirely speculative, but the Dionysius comparison may be helpful in one respect at least. He too was said to have liberated and given Syracusan citizenship to 'slaves', and the status of the Kallikyrioi in question was plausibly likened by Aristotle to that of the Helots. In a sense, then, Nabis may have done in Sparta what Epaminondas had done at Messene in 369: restored Helots to ownership of the land of their ancestors and made some ex-Helots citizens.¹⁸

Whatever the true identity of Nabis' formerly servile enfranchisees, no one can fail to mark the difference between Nabis and Cleomenes in their treatment of Helots. Whereas Cleomenes' liberation of 6,000 Helots was a last-ditch, fundraising and purely military manoeuvre, Nabis liberated Helots as part of his total package; in this respect, Nabis was about as un-Lycurgan as it was possible to be. No doubt Nabis too had partly military ends in view; a larger citizenry meant a larger citizen army. But the death-blow he dealt to Helotage, a truly archaic form of servitude, was surely much more significant in the longer run. It was all of a piece with what for want of a better word I can only describe as Nabis' concerted 'modernizing' of Spartan society and economy as a whole. Like the boost his policies gave to artisanal and trading activities, it encouraged a more open, flexible, market-oriented social formation. By 189, indeed, Sparta could plausibly be depicted (L. xxxviii.30.7) as economically dependent on the outside world—something almost literally unimaginable before Nabis. No ancient source of course was concerned systematically to collect all the relevant evidence: Nabis' criminality was much more fascinating. So what follows is necessarily a composite picture, indicative rather than probative, made up from scraps of literary, papyrological and archaeological information that are not all certainly dated or datable to Nabis' reign but do all mark or reflect the shock of the new post-Nabian Sparta.

The first scrap of testimony is, paradoxically, negative: the absence of evidence that Nabis cancelled debts in Sparta, as he was said to have done at Argos. Since debt-cancellation was so obviously 'tyrannical', Polybius' failure to cite it against him strongly suggests that he did not in fact carry it out. The reason, I believe, is that Nabis wished to encourage debts—or rather loans, even if (like the Ptolemies) he may have prescribed maximum interest-rates. A passage of one Dioscorides (*FGrHist.* 594F5, not later than the second century BC) details the Spartan procedure for moneylending involving a primitive form of written contract. Far more sophisticated and far less parochial is the bottomry loan recorded on a papyrus of the first half of the second century BC. The loan was negotiated by a Roman (?) broker at Alexandria on behalf of a Greek lender; one of the five shipowners or traders in receipt of the loan was a Spartan, the son of a Lysimachus (good Hellenistic name), and the object of his trade was spice from Punt (modern Somalia on the Red Sea). No Spartan before Nabis' day could conceivably have found himself engaged in such a business. Most Laconian sea-traders, however, then as before, were doubtless Perioeci. By galvanizing the port of Gytheum, mainly but not exclusively for use as a naval arsenal and dockyard, Nabis gave a powerful lift to commercial trading too. The hostile sources present him exclusively as 'king' of the freebooters, friend of Cretan corsairs and organiser of pirate-lairs off the anyway notoriously treacherous Cape Malea. But, as has long been recognized, the handsomely set up honorific inscription from Delos (the major Aegean emporium) which hails Nabis not just as 'king' but as 'benefactor' (so putting him on a par with an Antigonid or Ptolemy) belies the notion that he merely preyed on peaceful commercial shipping rather than encouraging or even participating in it.¹⁹

Leaving the international scene for the moment, we find that Nabis presided over the first genuine urbanization of the hitherto archetypally non-urban town of Sparta. Probably not all at one go, but by 188 at the very latest, Sparta at last received a complete city-wall of the accepted kind: tile-capped mud-brick on a stone base with towers at regular intervals. This was a truly massive project, since the circuit around Sparta's four sprawling nuclear villages (and now also the new village of the Neopolitae?) measured no less than forty-eight stades and enclosed an area of some 200 hectares. Partly for self-advertisement but also to prevent theft for the very un-Lycurgan adornment of private dwellings, the roofing tiles were stamped officially 'Of King Nabis' (in Doric dialect) or (e.g.) 'Public Property: Of the Pitanaatae', Pitana being one of the four or five obes or villages. Another of them, Cynosura, in an inscription of c.200, publicly thanked its official water-commissioner (*hydragos*). Such concern for water-supply, like the building of the city-wall, naturally reflected preoccupation with sieges. But like the orientation of farms in north-eastern Laconia along routes leading into the market-centre of Sparta ([chapter 11](#)), it also marked the increased density of urban residence and the altered significance of the urban centre. Another economic spin-off of urbanization was an upsurge in artisanal production, especially in the pottery industry located in the southern sector of

Sparta. Not only tiles and water-pipes but domestic ceramics (notably the so-called ‘Megarian bowl’ moulded relief-ware) were fashioned in greatly enlarged quantities and, for the first time in Laconian history, signed by their makers. Nor were potters the sole beneficiaries of the modern movement. A group of monumental Hellenistic tombs excavated in the centre of Sparta, some of whose contents reach back to the first half of the second century, look very un-Lycurgan indeed: elaborate architecture, massive construction, and grave-goods including gold and silver jewellery as well as clay lamps and Megarian bowls. Similarly, Spartan marble sculptors showed that they were in touch with the latest artistic currents flowing from Pergamum and elsewhere, while monumental masons now for the first time began to produce grave reliefs of the usual Greek type, as opposed to the old series of ‘hero-reliefs’ or the starkly inscribed slabs accorded to the likes of Echemedes (chapter 4).²⁰

Not all of these changes occurred overnight, not all in the lifetime of Nabis even. But without the consciously new orientation of Spartan society and economy, the breakdown of the old rigid class- and status-distinctions and the positive encouragement to smash the antiquated, negatively autarkic economic mould, they are unlikely to have happened as fast as they did or have been as decisive as they were for Sparta’s future. Cinadon, the failed conspirator of 399, might have looked with envy on at least some aspects of Nabis’ achievement. By 204, anyway, after two to three years of innovation and consolidation at home, Nabis felt secure enough to turn his thoughts abroad; and for the next seven years or so, relying heavily on Cretan mercenaries, he engaged in a more or less constant, if at first undeclared, border-war of attrition with the Achaean League. At the same time he was building up Sparta’s first considerable fleet since the early fourth century, manned chiefly by Perioeci and based on Gytheum but reinforced by means of his contacts with and perhaps even possessions on Crete. It was the huge cost of this fleet, together with his standing mercenary force, that explains Nabis’ unscrupulous search for funds (though the alleged ‘iron maiden’ torture device in the guise of Apia, on which Polybius expatiates, is best ascribed to the overheated fantasies of embittered exiles). A murky incident of 201, which on the face of it involved Nabis in an unprovoked attack on an ally within the framework of the 205 Peace (Messene), has been variously explained, explained away or denied. What is undeniable is that in the following year, with Philopoemen again *stratēgos* of the Achaean League, Nabis suffered a significant defeat near Tegea and Laconia another destructive incursion (as far south as Sellasia). Still technically an ally of Rome, Nabis for one will not have been sorry when the Senate for its own reasons responded positively to the Rhodian-Pergamene deputation with which this chapter began. For Achaëa, the ally of Philip, would now have something to preoccupy it other than himself.²¹

Just what were the Senate’s reasons for responding positively and undertaking the Second Macedonian War (200–197) is a subject that has been massively, inconclusively, and not always calmly debated since at least the time of

Mommsen—scarcely surprisingly, as the issue is ‘one of the most delicate...in this crucial epoch of Hellenistic history—and even of all ancient history’ (Will 1982, 131). Using Thucydidean terminology, one might isolate three major schools of thought: those who assign the Senate’s decision overridingly to either ‘fear’ (that is, concern for security on the borders of Rome’s expanding empire or of what the Senate deemed to be Rome’s legitimate sphere of influence or concern), or ‘honour’ (the need constantly to maintain the image of power that called forth an appeal like that of Rhodes and Pergamum, and specifically to honour its announced commitment to the ‘freedom’ of Greeks from Philip), or ‘profit’ (desire for world conquest with a view above all to individual or collective material enrichment). It is beyond the scope of this chapter to adjudicate between the Holleaux, Gruen and Harris ‘schools’. What matters is that in 197 and more particularly 195 it was the presence of Roman legions in Greece that crucially affected the standing of Nabis and determined the nature and rôle of Sparta and Laconia thereafter. This is a nice illustration of Freeman’s (only slightly exaggerated) generalization (1893, 444): ‘From the moment that any independent state became either the friend or the enemy of Rome, from that moment the destiny of that state was fixed.’²²

Despite Rome’s proclamation that Philip should leave all Greek states in freedom, the Roman military presence in Greece met initially with an icy reception outside Aetolia, largely because memories of Roman brutality during the First Macedonian War died hard. However, as Roman military efficiency began to tell in northern Greece and Nabis exploited Philip’s difficulties there to renew his anti-Achaean and anti-Megalopolitan offensive, so Philip’s Achaean allies were faced with another (cf. Aratus in the 220s) momentous choice between evils. Should they continue to depend on Philip, who at least had a proven record of devastating hostility to Sparta but was increasingly impotent to aid them, or should they revolt into dependence on Rome, a potent but foreign and distant power which had treated them so roughly a decade earlier? The decision at Sicyon in autumn 198 just went in favour of Rome. This was a turning-point in the history of ‘free’ Greece, but also of Nabian Sparta. For although Achaea as a whole revolted from Philip and allied to Rome, Argos also revolted from Achaea to Philip, who, unable himself either to assure Argive independence from Achaea or to profit from its possession in his war with Rome, offered Argos on trust to the safekeeping of Nabis, with the deal to be sealed by a marriage-alliance. This, clearly, implied the end of the Hellenic League of 224, but controversy afflicts the alleged and implausible condition on which Philip is said to have made this remarkable offer, namely that Nabis should return Argos to Philip when and if he defeated Rome but otherwise keep hold of it. There is no dispute, though, over the consequences of Nabis’ acceptance of the gift in early 197. Employing a useful mixture of fraud and family-connections, Nabis—with Apia, Sparta’s first real queen—took complete political and military control of Argos, enacted and began to implement far-reaching political, social and economic measures both in Argos itself and in its

immediate dependencies such as Mycenae, and greatly enhanced thereby his personal power in Sparta and his influence throughout the Peloponnese. It was from this position of strength that he betrayed Philip and entered into negotiations at Mycenae in late winter or early spring 197 with Rome's representative Flamininus (cos. 198) and his Greek allies, the most prominent of whom was Attalus I of Pergamum.²³

The most significant upshot of this conference from Sparta's standpoint was that, although she had renewed directly her indirect alliances with Rome of 210 and 205, Nabis personally had now received formal diplomatic recognition from Rome, possibly as king of Sparta, certainly as possessor of Argos. The military aid that Nabis was bound as an ally to provide for Flamininus took the form of a mere token force of 600 Cretan mercenaries. This neither seriously weakened his own military capacity nor made any contribution to Rome's decisive victory over Philip, which was achieved rather with not insignificant Aetolian aid at Cynoscephalae in Thessaly in June 197. Nor, yet more revealingly, was Nabis' rule in Sparta and Argos allowed to hinder Flamininus' almost obligatory but brilliantly stage-managed declaration of Greek 'freedom' at the Isthmian festival of summer 196. Nabis was quite simply not at the top of the proconsul's agenda, or anywhere near it.²⁴

However, once the Isthmian hysteria had begun to abate, the horribly sobering question of how precisely the Roman settlement of mainland Greece was to be interpreted in practice presented itself ever more insistently to the major parties concerned: Aetolia, Achaëa, the Senatorial commission, and of course Flamininus himself. The latter's consulship of 198 had already been prorogued twice by the Senate and could not be indefinitely prolonged. Moreover, Rome's and his prestige as liberators was at risk so long as Roman garrisons continued to occupy Philip's three 'Fetters', Demetrias, Chalcis and Acrocorinth. These might be arguments for a swift withdrawal from Greece. On the other side, there was Aetolian and Thessalian unrest to take into account, not to mention the lurking threat of an intervention in Greece by an expansionist Antiochus III of Syria (to whose court Hannibal had retired). These might be arguments for retaining the legions in Greece, but how could that be decently reconciled with Greek 'freedom'? Out of this impasse Nabis offered a convenient exit for Flamininus, and he availed himself of the *carte blanche* and two legions thoughtfully granted him by the Senate to conduct a war of liberation against the Spartan tyrant whose occupation of Argos was a manifest contradiction of the Isthmian proclamation (and whose naval power might threaten Roman supply-ships). Cunningly, though, the formal declaration of war was entrusted by Flamininus to a panhellenic congress at Corinth at which Achaëa, Philip, Eumenes II (successor of Attalus) and Rhodes among others voted for Flamininus' proposal and only a resentful Aetolia did not. Thus in the summer of 195 Nabis found himself the exclusive focus of a virtually panhellenic army of invasion spearheaded by Roman legionaries. At some 50,000 strong this was the largest force ever brought into Laconia, and it was further swollen by a bevy of

Spartan exiles. In recognition of the importance of Nabis' naval arm, Flamininus also ordered up a Roman, Pergamene and Rhodian fleet against Sparta's maritime Perioecic dependencies.²⁵

Militarily speaking, the result was never in doubt. Initially, it is true, Argos stood firm, first under Pythagoras and then under one Timocrates from Perioecic Pellana (a new citizen?); and Nabis, thanks to Argive reinforcements, his new city-defences, some exemplary executions and a consequent absence of treachery from within, did manage defiantly to reject Flamininus' terms at first and barely to preserve Sparta from capture. But Argos soon forced Timocrates to withdraw, Gytheum and the Perioecic dependencies fell to the combined fleet, and, cut off by land and sea, Nabis wisely came to terms quickly with Flamininus to minimize at least his economic losses. It was the failed negotiations outside Sparta preceding the final victory of Rome that Livy chose to highlight in his set-piece debate between Nabis and Flamininus.²⁶

Whether or not Nabis in fact had the better arguments (and Livy almost certainly did not think that he had), Flamininus got the better of the argument and imposed the terms he wished in the end. Those terms, as we shall see, were harsh. But in the eyes of Achaea and the Spartan exiles they were not harsh enough, as they left Nabis still in control of an admittedly much pared-down Spartan state and the exiles still in exile. Much has been written on the nature and authenticity of Flamininus' philhellenism, but if there is any truth to the view that it significantly affected his settlement of Greece, it should perhaps be detected in his treatment of Nabis and Sparta between 198 and 192 (see further below) rather than in his Greek policy as a whole. (Is it conceivable that he was introduced to the Spartan *mirage* at Tarentum, Sparta's only true colony, and espoused the notion firmly attested later that Rome and Sparta were linked by kinship?) However that may be, there were undoubtedly also more potent considerations of *Realpolitik* at work in Flamininus' mind. As long as Sparta posed any threat to Achaea, Achaea's loyalty to Rome in face of the impending menace of Aetolia and Antiochus should be secure; and past experience suggested that to restore a large number of influential and embittered exiles would be a recipe for jeopardizing the stability of a satisfyingly tough treaty with Nabis. But the crushing argument in favour of a *Realpolitik* interpretation of the treaty is that, for all the 'panhellenism' of the declaration of war on Nabis, peace was concluded only by Flamininus, Eumenes and Rhodes. Achaea, which had contributed the majority of the Greek troops, was left out in the cold.²⁷

These, then, are the terms of the settlement in brief. Nabis was to withdraw from all his extra-Laonian possessions (chiefly Argos but also some Cretan cities) and restore to the rightful owners such movable plunder, animate or inanimate, as could be identified. His extreme socio-economic measures at Argos (debt-cancellation, land-redistribution, seizure of hostages) were to be reversed, and the wives of Spartan exiles now married to ex-Helots were to be allowed to join their husbands in exile should they so wish. He was to surrender his fleet to the control of the relevant maritime Perioeci, whose towns were to

be severed from Sparta and placed immediately under the tutelage of Achaea acting on Rome's behalf. Nabis was not to bear arms to recover these Perioecic towns or conduct warfare of any kind or even conclude any external alliance. He was to build no new fortifications either in what was left of his own or in anyone else's territory. He was to hand over five hostages, including his own son Armenas, and, finally, to pay an indemnity of 500 talents, one hundred down and the rest in eight annual instalments of fifty talents. On the other side, however, there were some not trivial concessions and compensations. He was spared the return of the exiles and indeed all interference with his internal socio-political arrangements in Sparta; and he was left remarkably with the Belminatis (minus the Athenaeum), two light cutters (implying an outlet to the sea somewhere—perhaps Cardamyle on the Messenian Gulf?), his city-wall and of course his rule over Sparta. But Sparta was now a state in which the uniquely fructifying identity between 'Sparta' and 'the city of the Lacedaemonians' had been sundered. There, in essence, lay the rub. This treaty was duly ratified by the Senate in the winter of 195/4.²⁸

However, despite the apparent finality and totality of Flamininus' settlement, Rome's Spartan war was not yet over, merely interrupted. It broke out anew in 193 within the territory of the former maritime *perioikis*—inevitably so, because the towns here and especially Gytheum were literally vital to Nabis' metamorphosed Sparta. In 195 the *damos* of Gytheum had erected a fulsome honorific dedication to Flamininus, describing him inaccurately as 'consul' and tendentiously as their 'saviour'. It was presumably also Gytheum, the most important town, which united the former Perioecic dependencies into some sort of federated 'League (*koinon*) of the Lacedaemonians'—if indeed 195 is the correct date of its formation. Nabis therefore did not need the alleged encouragement of the Aetolians to begin his war of recovery in 193, exploiting as he hoped the weakness of Achaea and Rome's preoccupation with Antiochus and undeterred by thoughts of his son in Rome. Again, however, as in 207 and 200, Philopoemen was able as Achaean *stratēgos* to upset a Spartan leader's risky calculation. Nabis did defeat Philopoemen at sea and recover Gytheum, but in early spring was himself defeated on land in northern Laconia and shut up behind his now complete city-wall while Philopoemen ravaged the Spartan plain for a month on end. However, before Philopoemen could bring Nabis to terms, Flamininus—who had returned to Greece after a theatrical withdrawal in 194, followed by a spectacular Roman triumph—intervened in person to make a truce with Nabis and so restore the *status quo* of 195, while a Roman and Pergamene fleet simultaneously recaptured Gytheum.²⁹

Nabis had now become in the eyes of the Aetolians an unreliable ally for the war in Greece between Antiochus and Rome that they were actively promoting. So it was that Nabis, who had survived all the attacks of his diehard Achaean foes, was ironically felled by a single blow from his notional Aetolian friends under Alexamenus. The Spartans responded to his assassination with a magnificent show of loyalty and solidarity, massacring the thousand or so

faithless Aetolians and even appointing as titular king a boy, possibly of royal descent, who had been raised with Nabis' own sons. This time, however, Philopoemen and Achaea were not to be circumvented. With the Romans otherwise occupied with Aetolia and Antiochus until well into 191, Philopoemen by a kind of *coup* worthy of Aratus effected the real capture of Sparta in summer 192. He entered the city with an armed force, secured a vote of confidence from some Spartan body (probably only the wealthiest citizens, possibly even the Gerousia), and thereby realized the Achaean dream of incorporating Sparta in the Achaean League. The terms of incorporation, by comparison with his treatment of Sparta four years later (see below), were quite lenient: no territorial losses (not even Belminatis), no imposition of Achaean-type institutions or any infringement of Sparta's laws and customs (*agōgē*, messes, etc.), and—yet again—no restoration of exiles. For most Spartans, however, incorporation was a shock and a humiliation. In international terms Sparta was now on a par with, say, Achaean Tritaea and in some ways worse off even than her former Perioecic dependencies. Her independent history was over.³⁰

The precise composition of the government of 'best men' that ruled Sparta after the Achaean *Anschluss* is unknown, but it certainly included at least one *xenos* of Philopoemen (Timolaus) and is probably fairly regarded as a Philopoemenist junta. (It was presumably this clique which offered to Philopoemen in person the sum of 120 talents raised from the sale of Nabis' household effects.) It was also, no doubt, an 'extreme oligarchic' régime (Golan 1974, 32), but as such it would by definition have lacked the broad basis of popular support so patently achieved by Nabis. Some time before autumn 191 the junta was therefore expelled to join the army of Spartan exiles, despite an informal demonstration on their behalf by Philopoemen. The new regime in a thoroughly Nabian spirit fired off an embassy to Rome with a twofold request for restitution—of the *perioikis* and of the five hostages surrendered in 195. The latter request, with the notable exclusion of Armenas (a potential resistance leader), was granted, if somewhat tardily. The former, unsurprisingly, was not, and within two years the political and economic problems caused by continued exclusion from the sea and the hostile proximity of exiles reached such a pitch that in autumn 189 the Spartans successfully attacked the exiles based at Las in the Taenarum peninsula. Philopoemen, who had been watching for just such an opportunity for further official intervention in Spartan affairs, demanded the surrender of the Spartans chiefly responsible for this breach of the 195 treaty. The same Spartans replied by murdering thirty pro-Achaeans, seceding from the Achaean League and requesting Roman tutelage. The Senate, however, adopting its usual policy of fostering divisions within the League and using ambiguous replies and veiled threats to keep the Achaeans mutually suspicious and dependent on Rome, responded evasively and did nothing. Philopoemen, on the contrary, did rather a lot. Arriving in northern Laconia with most of the exiles (on whose restoration he was now insisting), he first presided over the

massacre at Compasium of at least eighty leading anti-Achaeans, then ordered the demolition of Nabis' city-wall, the withdrawal of all Nabis' mercenaries (whether enfranchised or not), the expulsion or (if they resisted, as 3,000 did) sale into outright slavery of Nabis' ex-Helot citizens, the restoration of Belminatis to Megalopolis, and finally not just the reincorporation of Sparta into the Achaean League but the total abrogation of the existing Spartan constitution and mode of social organisation (*agōgē* and *messes* above all) in favour of the laws and institutions of Achaea. On these drastic terms the remodelled Spartan citizen-body duly sealed the treaty with oaths.³¹

The critical epitaph of Livy (xxxviii.34.9), who as a Roman could not approve Philopoemen's usurpation of Roman prerogatives, is worth quoting both for its rhetoric and as a testimony to the enduring power of the Spartan myth: The Spartan state, unmanned as it were by these measures, was for a long time at the mercy of the Achaeans, but nothing did that people so much harm as the abrogation of the discipline of Lycurgus, to which they had been accustomed for more than 800 years'. In fact, as will be seen in the next chapter, Philopoemen's 188 settlement was no more definitive than that of Flamininus in 195. Although Achaea had by now united the entire Peloponnese within its federation, an irredeemably eccentric Sparta none the less remained perversely central to Achaea's—and Rome's—preoccupation with preserving a solidly oligarchic order of stability. For whether or not Nabis was a principled revolutionary (a question the evidence does not permit us to decide), he had achieved all the points of the revolutionary programme outlawed by Philip II's original Hellenic League and anathematized no less fervently by Achaea and Rome. Indeed, in a sense Nabis had negated not just 'Lycurgan' Sparta (whatever that was) but the very model of the Classical *polis* as such, by accepting as full members slaves, foreigners and at least one woman. All that could not be overturned by a wave of Philopoemen's baton. Moreover, to offset the lingering devotion to that Nabian achievement there was precious little love lost in Sparta for either the Achaean *hēgemōn* or the Roman suzerain.³²

Chapter six

Sparta from Achaea to Rome (188–146 BC)

Philopoemen's drastic and brutal intervention at Sparta in 188 served among other things to restore the political unity of the Peloponnese that Achaea had at last achieved, with grudging Roman acquiescence, in 191. The original incorporation of Sparta in the Achaean League in 192 was described in the previous chapter as the realization of a dream. In the period currently under review the dream turned into, if not a nightmare, at least a persistent headache and sometimes an acute migraine. Fittingly, it was by way of a final paroxysm of enmity between Achaean federalism and the still stubbornly eccentric *polis* of Sparta that the Achaean League—and so European Greece—was stripped of its remaining tatters of 'freedom' by the fiercely conquering imperial might of Rome. This, then, is a sorry tale, a veritable declension, maybe even a nemesis; and it is not improved either by the theoretical preconceptions, ideological predilections and self-exculpating *arrière-pensée* of our main source, Polybius, or by the truncated condition of the relevant portions of his extant work (scattered through Books xxii–xxxix). Best, therefore, to keep the story as short as decently and comprehensibly possible.¹

These four decades began as they meant to continue, with an appeal and counter-appeal to the Roman Senate from the governing body of Sparta and the federal authorities of the Achaean League respectively. Within Sparta the propertied and reactionary exiles forcibly restored by Philopoemen naturally had their deep ideological and pragmatic differences with the remaining Nabian citizens and with the Nabians' less extreme opponents. But on one issue all the various Spartan fractions and groupings (including of course the Nabians newly exiled by Philopoemen) apparently were in more or less complete concord: that the 'independence' and 'sovereignty' proclaimed by Rome under the slogan of 'the freedom of the Greeks' were incompatible with Sparta's continued membership of the Achaean League, at any rate on Philopoemen's terms. Rome, according to their interpretation, had the duty as well as the power to alter Sparta's status appropriately, and they looked to Rome for 'championship' (*prostasia*: Plb. xxii.3.1) of their cause.²

Philopoemen, however, who dominated Achaean counsels until his death in 182, was not only an Achaean but a Megalopolitan. His native state had been founded on an explicitly anti-Spartan basis ([chapter 1](#)), and its incorporation in

the Achaean League in 235 (chapter 4) had given the League a special preoccupation with Sparta ever since. In the early 180s Philopoemen's as it were hereditary hostility towards Sparta, which thanks to Cleomenes and Nabis had gained wide currency throughout the League at least among the propertied class, was aggravated by two mutually reinforcing circumstances. First, in about 192/1 the Achaeans had been rewarded for their conspicuous loyalty to Rome since 198 (against Philip V of Macedon, the Aetolians and Antiochus III of Syria) with a formally equal treaty of alliance, a *foedus aequum*; it was not therefore for Rome, so the Philopoemenists held, to adjudicate between Sparta and Achaea as if Achaea were Rome's inferior—or, as Polybius' father Lycortas emotively put it in 184 (Livy xxxix.37.9), Rome's slave. Secondly, in 191 (as mentioned above) Achaea had unified the Peloponnese politically; in the Philopoemenists' view the Spartan question was therefore an internal Achaean matter in which Rome had no business to interfere let alone dictate orders.³

Unfortunately Livy, whose narrative of Roman annals survives in full only down to 167 and in inadequate epitome thereafter, was not concerned to record senatorial debates in detail.⁴ But in light of the *defacto* massive disparity between the two 'equal' allies, it is not hard to conceive the mingled astonishment and irritation that the Philopoemenists' arrogantly autonomist stance will have provoked in many senators. If the Senate nevertheless refrained from unambiguously humiliating Achaea until 167 and from taking up arms against her until 146, and otherwise contented itself with diplomatic notes and veiled oral responses, this was simply because Rome had much plumper fish to fry in the east—not to mention the south and west—than the relatively puny Achaean League.

Thus between 187 and 184 the Senate in Rome and its appointees on the spot in Greece heard complaints against Achaea from a variety of Spartan sources. Conspicuous among these were the so-called 'old exiles', that is, men banished at different times between 227 and, say, 195 and either restored by Philopoemen in 188 or, as was perhaps the case of the 'royalists' Alcibiades and Areus, still in exile. The burden of all complaints seems to have been laid against the abolition of the laws of 'Lycurgus' and, rather incongruously, the destruction of the Nabian city-wall (a manifestly un-Lycurgan structure which had afforded pride as well as physical protection to the by now more urbanized Spartan citizenry). But Areus and Alcibiades at least had a more personal grievance too: they had been condemned to death by an Achaean assembly presided over by Lycortas. The complaints were received with outward shows of sympathy, not least because it suited Rome to have a pretext for underlining Achaea's dependent status. But the practical effect of the Romans' hectoring and tactless admonitions to Achaea and declarations of support for at least some part of the Spartans' case was—apart from the quashing of the death-sentence on Areus and Alcibiades—nil. Not only did many Achaeans bitterly resent the Roman interventions as derogations from their putative equality of status, but Rome had no immediate intention of backing words with direct action.⁵

In adopting this posture the Romans were proved triumphantly correct—if proof were needed—by the extraordinary diplomatic flurry at Rome during the winter of 184/3, a ‘regular invasion of envoys’ (Werner 1972, 559n.187) from all over Greece. Among them were no less than four rival Spartan deputations. Clearly up till then the Spartans had been manipulating their mutual agreement on hostility to Achaea and the need to restore the wall and ‘Lycurgan’ laws in order to mask deep political fissures within the post-Nabian and post-188-settlement citizen-body. Now, before a bemused Senate the mask slipped. Given the state of the evidence, it would be rash to claim that we today can formulate a clearer picture than the Senate of the programmes and social composition of the four groups. But two groups of ‘old exiles’ are discernible, divided pragmatically if not ideologically, and two individual leaders, Serippus and Chaeron (one of the exiles of 188), who cherished different visions of Sparta’s status before Philopoemen’s second intervention. It would not have been remarkable if the Senate had preferred to leave the Spartan question up in the air—or rather to throw it back, like a dagger into the forum, for the Achaeans and Spartans to cut themselves to pieces on. Instead, the Senate so far shouldered its responsibility to champion and protect Greek ‘freedom’ as to appoint an arbitral commission of three Greece-experts. Their canny judgment carefully avoided the fraught issue of property-rights within Sparta but did unambiguously recommend the restoration of Sparta’s exiles, city-wall and ‘Lycurgan’ laws. On the other hand, they also recommended that Sparta continue to be a member of the Achaean League on the old basis, except that capital cases involving Spartans should be tried by ‘foreign tribunals’ rather than Achaean federal courts.⁶

Not altogether surprisingly, this judgment in its entirety pleased none of the interested parties, whether Spartan or Achaean, and remained largely notional. Chaeron’s group seems somehow to have been restored in 183, but only at the cost of the renewed banishment of at least some of the ‘old exiles’ (including perhaps the former boy-king Agesipolis III, who now at last met an ignominious death at the hands of pirates en route to Rome). When in the winter of 183/2 the Senate heard yet further representations from the rival Spartan groupings, it can hardly be blamed for affecting to wash its hands of the whole mess and even hinting that Sparta’s withdrawal from the Achaean League would not be intolerable. That hint, apparently, was taken at Sparta in the summer of 182, perhaps by Chaeron in the absence of the pro-Achaean Serippus, at a time when Achaea was preoccupied with the revolt of Messene. It was in attempting to quell this revolt that Philopoemen lost his life, but his principal successor Lycortas was quick to interpret Rome’s non-intervention over Messene as a sign of indifference to Peloponnesian affairs and to restore both Messene and Sparta to the League on his not Rome’s terms. What exactly those terms were is unclear, but the gratitude publicly expressed to him at Epidaurus by the self-styled ‘*polis* of the Lacedaemonians’ need not imply that he went all the way or even very far towards implementing the senatorial commission’s judgment.⁷

Anyhow, the renewed *sumpoliteia* with Achaea did not heal and may have exacerbated Sparta's internal divisions. A seeming *rapprochement* between Chaeron and Serippus proved ephemeral, and in 181 or 180 the former emulated Nabis—or at least Chilon ([chapter 5](#), n.9)—by announcing a redivision of land. This has prompted the belief that Sparta was again in the grip of a socio-economic crisis of the sort amply attested elsewhere in Greece at this date. But if the previous chapter's analysis was on the right lines, Sparta ought rather to have been garnering the first fruits of her socioeconomic transformation. Chaeron, in other words, may simply have been an opportunist seeking to make political capital out of the land newly vacated by the once more banished 'old exiles'. However that may be, political capital seems not to have been the only kind in which he was interested. For an Achaean-sounding board of Spartan auditors (*dokimastēres*) was set up to scrutinize his alleged peculation of public funds. Anticipating an unfavourable verdict, Chaeron had the senior auditor murdered as he left the public baths, but this merely provoked an ominously rapid intervention by the general of the Achaean League and his own condemnation to death. Chaeron's abortive *coup* does, however, seem to have had one positive effect. It concentrated Spartan minds wonderfully on the paramount need for internal harmony and stability in order to preclude for the future such direct Achaean interventions with their unpleasant echoes of 188. No more is heard ever again of *stasis* or even minor civil disturbance in the history of Hellenistic Sparta.⁸

From Sparta's viewpoint, then, the hour to terminate the exile question for good had finally struck. Rome's attitude to the restoration of Spartan exiles was clear in principle, but something or someone more was required to convince Rome that words were no longer sufficient and to persuade the Achaeans to adopt a more flexible, pragmatic and if need be submissive attitude towards Rome's increasingly impatient directives. The man of the hour was Callicrates, who was instrumental in effecting this twofold conversion. Callicrates, however, was the irreconcilable and victorious opponent of Polybius' father Lycortas, and the dominant view of Callicrates that has survived in literary form is that of Lycortas' son (especially *Plb.* xxiv.10.8: 'the instigator of great miseries for all the Greeks, but in particular for the Achaeans'). Not surprisingly, but still unfortunately, therefore, his epoch-making mission to Rome in 180 and frank admission of Rome's prepotence have usually been branded as the height—or rather the depth—of treachery. On a less committed estimation, Callicrates could be said to have espoused the only mode of approach to Rome that offered Achaea realistic prospects of longer-term co-operation and modest self-determination.⁹

Partly on the strength of his being Rome's acknowledged broker in all her Peloponnesian dealings, Callicrates was elected general of the Achaean League in autumn 180. During his *stratēgia* he finally brought the Spartan exile-problem to a satisfactory and definitive conclusion by restoring those 'old exiles' who were still out in the cold. For this good deed the immediate beneficiaries erected

a fulsome thank-offering in the accepted arena for such displays, the panhellenic shrine of the suppliants' patron Zeus at Olympia. It was perhaps also in or soon after 179 that Sparta rebuilt her city-wall, although naturally there was no question of her being allowed by Achaea, let alone Rome, to recover also the sort of military strength mustered by Cleomenes or even Nabis. On the other hand, it was probably not until after 146, with the defeat of Achaea by Rome and the consequent liberation of Sparta from the clutches of the Achaean League, that Sparta was able to restore the *agōgē* (in part), and the distinctive Spartan mode of life as a whole—or rather, some semblance of it: the metaphor of the museum (Shimron 1972, 134) does not seem wholly inapt. All that remained until then of the old Spartan ways were the peculiar mode of clothing and style of hair (Paus. vii.14.2), which constituted both literally and figuratively a mere keeping up of appearances. Only now, belatedly, can Sparta be said to have begun to conform to the 'increasing tendency of the [sc. Greek] city to act out a representation of *polis* life for her contemporaries in the Hellenistic world, rather than seek a role in the new configurations of power' (Humphreys 1985, 219).¹⁰

After 179 Sparta in any case sinks below the horizon of sources concerned only with 'big politics', not to rise again to view until the final cataclysm of the 140s. History, in this sense, 'passed Sparta by' (Shimron 1972, 130), most conspicuously during the epochal Third Macedonian War of 171–168. Polybius crookedly placed the blame for this war on King Perseus of Macedon inasmuch as he had inherited the aggressive designs of his father Philip V. In fact, the seeds of the war had been sown in the mid-180s by the Roman Senate, which treated Philip virtually as a prisoner at its bar and believed too readily the inflated accusations of disloyalty and claims about his menace to Rome's interests. Similarly, it was a charge levelled against Perseus by Eumenes II of Pergamum in winter 173/2 that occasioned Rome's devastatingly effective pre-emptive strike. The Battle of Pydna (168) was as decisive for Macedon's immediate future as had been the Battle of Cynoscephalae in 197. However, so far as the Greeks were concerned, there was a vital difference between the outcomes of the two encounters. Whereas the former had been followed by Flamininus' Isthmian proclamation, 'it is impossible not to agree with Polybius that the Greeks after 168 virtually were subjects of Rome' (Larsen 1935, 206).¹¹

Polybius, though, had a peculiarly personal reason for taking this view. Achaea had not sided with Perseus against Rome, but nor had she offered to Rome the kind of unconditional loyalty, respect and assistance she had come to expect and demand. Venting its frustration with the persistent autonomist current in Achaean politics, and with a view to damming it up for good, the Senate vindictively and without legal justification deported to Italy in 167 more than 1,000 leading Achaeans—including the future historian of Rome's rise to 'world' domination. This was an unjust punishment for Achaea. But no less was it an undeserved bonus for Sparta, who, having done nothing for Rome, found herself rid at a stroke of all her principal Achaean enemies. Just one Spartan is

known to have made any contribution to the Third Macedonian War, and he (Leonidas, a man of royal descent) had done so on the Macedonian side. Another leading Spartan, Menalcidas, perfectly symbolized his state's general lack of interest in the whole Macedonian episode by serving in a quite different war, the Sixth Syrian War between Antiochus IV and Ptolemy VI in Egypt, where in 168 he was sprung from an Alexandrian prison through the good offices of the powerful C. Popillius Laenas (cos. 172).¹²

In the following winter of 168/7 the victor of Pydna, L. Aemilius Paullus, called in at Sparta in the course of an extended progress through Greece. He is in a sense the first 'grand tourist' on record, since the ostensible purpose of his visit (according to Livy, anyway) was to pay his respects to Sparta's ancestral way of life. But his antiquarianism should not be exaggerated. The progress was chiefly in the nature of a triumphal and goodwill mission, not to mention the opportunity it afforded for some discreet fact-finding and the cementing of patron-client bonds. A comparable mixture of sentiment and pragmatism lay behind the visit to Sparta at about this time of another distinguished and Hellenizing 'barbarian'. But whereas Paullus had come in triumph, Jason the former High Priest of Jerusalem arrived as a refugee from a popular uprising, anxiously parading the fictive kinship-links between the Spartans and the Jews that may have been forged in the time of Areus I and Onias (chapter 3 and n. 22).¹³

These two visits are a salutary reminder that, despite her global insignificance, Sparta did not lack all international cachet. The same message is conveyed rather more quietly by a small cluster of epigraphic documents datable to the first half of the second century. These reveal that Spartans were in demand either as arbitrators of foreign disputes or as diplomatic representatives (*proxenoi*) of other Greek communities in Sparta itself. Perhaps the most interesting of these texts is the decree of Arcadian Orchomenus recording the appointment as *proxenos* of Cleoxenus son of Nicolas. Its interest lies not so much in the heap of honours and privileges that accompanied this award (though the right to cut wood is highly unusual) as in the very fact of the appointment. Clearly, their shared membership of the Achaean League was not thought to obviate the need for a diplomatic tie between Sparta and Orchomenus of a kind invented for a bygone era of atomized and jealously independent *poleis*. The limits of Greek federalism are here readily apparent.¹⁴

Or perhaps one should say, rather, the limitations of Achaean's hold, ideologically as well as practically speaking, over Sparta. For although Sparta did introduce Achaean-type institutions and issue coins of federal type, yet she persisted in displaying an irredentist *polis*-mentality on the fundamental issue of territory. Encouraged no doubt by Rome's hard line with Achaean in 167, Sparta in about 164 sought to re-open at Rome the question of her northern frontier with Megalopolis and perhaps also, if Pausanias (vii.11.1–3) is not merely confused, her north-eastern border with Argos. To recap briefly, Aegyptis and Sciritis had been lost to Megalopolis in the 360s, which loss had been confirmed

by Philip II in 338/7. So too Belminatis, but this had had a more chequered history thereafter. Recovered briefly by Cleomenes, it had been restored to Megalopolis by Doson in 222. Once more regained for Sparta by Machanidas, it had firmly been returned in 188 by Philopoemen to his home state. Naturally, therefore, ownership and control of Belminatis were on Sparta's Roman agenda in c.164, but so too were those of Aegyitis, Sciritis and perhaps (see above) some or all of the east Parnon foreland. Rome's response was cleverly contrived. Since the Senate was eager to maintain the Peloponnesian *status quo* of 167 without being seen as overtly snubbing their Spartan friends, its representative in Greece (C. Sulpicius Galus, cos. 166) appointed Callicrates to arbitrate the claim(s), knowing full well that he too would opt for the *status quo* for Achaean as well as personal reasons. The result was a foregone conclusion, but none the less bitterly resented by the Spartans, who resorted to force without success and received the additional humiliation of an Achaean fine.¹⁵

Foiled here, the Spartans tried another tack, in another place where they had deep interests and sentiments of long standing but where Rome had no *locus standi*. With Delphi Sparta had enjoyed something of a 'special relationship' since the eighth century, which had survived a temporary expulsion from the administering Amphictyony in the mid-fourth century. But from the mid-third century Aetolia had been careful to deny Sparta any prominence therein, and it was not before the demise of Aetolia as a power in 189 that the issue of Delphian management could be profitably reopened. In 168 Paullus had begun his progress through Greece with a symbolic sacrifice to Pythian Apollo at the navel of the earth. In the late 160s Sparta considered the moment opportune to claim a more prominent voice in Delphian affairs. However, it was a fair measure of Spartan impotence that so much energy should have been devoted to achieving a relatively paltry ambition (the right to provide one representative on the Amphictyonic council every other year in alternation with the representative for Dōris, the supposed motherland of the Dorians)—and that the effort failed. For Dōris objected, and the thirty-one Lamians appointed to arbitrate the dispute decided in favour of Dōris. *Sic transit gloria laconica*.¹⁶

Behind both these initiatives it would not be unreasonable to suspect the hand of Menalcidas, the one considerable Spartan of this era. However, as far as the jejune evidence goes, Menalcidas fades utterly from notice between his inglorious début at Alexandria in 168 and his remarkable election in autumn 151 as probably the first and certainly the last Spartan general of the Achaean League. His election was presumably a token of tolerably good relations between Sparta and Achaea, despite Sparta's territorial disappointments. But in Polybius' partisan terms it epitomized the time of troubles (*tarakhē kai kinēsis*: iii.4.12) between 152/1 and 146/5 that culminated in the Achaean War and ultimate loss of Greek independence, if not the end of Greek history. For Polybius (whose enforced sojourn as a hostage in Italy had ended in 151, but who had preferred to remain outside Achaea in the company of his noble Roman friends until just after the sack of Corinth) placed all the blame for that catastrophe squarely on

the shoulders of the increasingly demagogic and irresponsible Achaean leaders like Menalcidas.¹⁷

Pausanias, too, who was perhaps somehow dependent on Polybius and is unfortunately the only surviving author to offer a connected account of the origins and course of the Achaean War, assigned a decisive part in the causal chain to Menalcidas for his rôle in the Oropus affair. But although major conflagrations have often been ignited by minor sparks, it is hard to see how that obscure episode, so far removed from the direct interests of either Achaea or Sparta, can bear so much explanatory weight. Besides, Pausanias' account as a whole is riddled with contradictions and inconsequentialities. It would seem prudent, therefore, to look elsewhere for the issue that brought Achaea into renewed conflict with Sparta and thereby to final defeat by Rome.¹⁸

That issue was without doubt Spartan independence from Achaea. Either during or more probably before his generalship Menalcidas had been on a mission to Rome apparently to revive the Belminatis question with a still uninterested Senate. For this among other reasons the ageing Callicrates, who had now to compete for influence with the restored hostages, impeached Menalcidas for treason in 150, on the grounds that he had been agitating for Spartan independence. Menalcidas is said to have secured his acquittal by bribing his successor in the generalship, Diaeus of Megalopolis (probably one of the returned deportees). But the prosecution had inflamed Spartan 'nationalistic' or particularistic sentiments, both because of the disappointed territorial claim that lay behind it and because the trial of a Spartan citizen on a capital charge by an Achaean court seemed an unbearable infringement of Spartan autonomy. When Sparta again sent an embassy to Rome in 149, presumably over the same territorial issue as before, Diaeus treated this as a breach of the federal principle that member-states might not conduct separate missions to Rome. Invading Laconia, he forced into exile twenty-four leading Spartans, including Menalcidas. The double-game allegedly played by a prominent member of the Gerousia and the fact that the motion for the exile of the twenty-four went through the Gerousia suggest that Achaean intervention was having the unintended effect of galvanizing at least one moribund 'Lycurgan' political institution.¹⁹

The new exiles naturally appealed to Rome. Callicrates set out to state the Achaean case, but died on the way and was replaced as envoy by Diaeus. This was late in 149. Rome at that time was preoccupied with matters of far greater moment in both Macedon (the revolt of Andriscus) and Carthage. It suited the Senate therefore to give a temporizing reply, which Menalcidas and Diaeus could each interpret to his satisfaction. Thus in 148 Sparta seceded from the Achaean League, whose new general Damocritus waged war to coerce her back in, despite the advice of Rome's Macedonian governor to await the arrival of a senatorial commission. Damocritus' campaign dealt Sparta two mortal blows. A battle fought somewhere in northern Laconia allegedly cost Sparta a thousand lives; and the Spartans were now deprived of what would appear to be their last

remaining Perioecic dependencies—those that lay ‘in a circle round Sparta’ in northern Laconia and on the eastern flank of the Eurotas valley. Damocritus also prevented the late autumn/early winter sowing of cereals in what was left of Sparta’s nuclear territory in the Spartan basin. He did not, however, press his advantage to the point of attacking Sparta itself and instead made a truce, for which alleged dereliction of duty he was heavily fined by the Achaean authorities, forced into exile and replaced as general by Diaeus.²⁰

In 148/7 Diaeus consolidated Damocritus’ intrusion into Laconia by garrisoning the newly liberated ex-Perioecic towns. Sparta’s—or rather Menalcidas’—reponse in 147 was to recapture one of these (Iasus, perhaps to be located at modern Analipsis) and so break the truce. When the Spartans refused to support him, partly at least because they were experiencing severe hunger, he committed suicide to avoid judicial execution. But his death was not without pathos or irony. For in the summer of 147 a much delayed senatorial commission under L.Aurelius Orestes did at last arrive at Corinth and in effect confirmed Menalcidas’ interpretation of his mission to Rome in the winter of 149/8. The Senate had decided that Sparta—together with Corinth, Argos, Arcadian Orchomenus and Oetaean Heraclea—should no longer be part of the Achaean League. Depending on one’s view of the character of Roman imperialism in general and the Senate’s attitude to Greek affairs in the early 140s in particular, this was either a miscalculatedly over-severe warning to Achaea not to presume on Rome’s continued complaisance or an overt expression of Rome’s abiding long-term aim of breaking up the League (or at any rate cutting it down to size) by whatever means it saw fit, however morally or legally unjustifiable. There is no ambiguity, however, concerning the Achaean response to Orestes’ news. In a frenzied release of pent-up bitterness the Roman delegation was roundly abused, and any Spartans—or suspected Spartans—who had the misfortune to be in Corinth at that moment were lynched.²¹

In the following autumn the arrival of a second Roman mission under the consular Sex. Iulius Caesar coincided with the annual Achaean elections. No matter how emollient Caesar’s message was supposed to be, the important point is that he had not been authorized by the Senate to retract Rome’s support for the at least partial dissolution of the Achaean League. Critolaus was therefore elected general on the crest of a wave of anti-Roman feeling disguised, displaced or reinforced by hostility towards Sparta. Polybius’ condemnation of the Achaean leadership now rises to a crescendo of denunciation in the case of Critolaus. Not only did Critolaus display contempt for the majesty of Rome, but he also committed the heinous crime in Polybius’ eyes of inciting anti-Roman enthusiasm among the lower orders of Achaean society. Following Polybius’ lead, Critolaus’ measures of debt-relief for the poor combined with compulsory financial contributions by the rich have too often been interpreted as primarily expressions of social ideology, when their aim was doubtless to minimize domestic friction with a view to the coming war. It would not be surprising, though, if a by-product of these measures had been a surge of popular

resentment directed not only against the Romans' interference in Achaean affairs but also against their partiality for upper-class government. Anyhow, an unprecedentedly high percentage of peasant farmers and small craftsmen attended the fateful Achaean assembly at Corinth in the spring of 146, which appointed Critolaus general plenipotentiary for the war Achaea declared ostensibly on Sparta but in reality on Rome.²²

If there is room for argument over Rome's motives and methods in its diplomatic dealings with Achaea between 149 and 147, there is no question but that the Achaean decision for war with Rome, magnificent gesture though it may have been, was a vote for collective military and political suicide. The initial attempt to reclaim the revolted Heraclea for the League resulted in the defeat and death of Critolaus near Thermopylae. Despite his successor Diaeus' last-ditch liberation of some 12,000 slaves, Achaea was no match for the amphibious Roman and allied expeditionary force commanded by the consul L. Mummius, who in late summer 146 won a resounding victory at Leucopetra and then made of Corinth an exemplary desert.²³

Achaea's brave experiment in federalism—'the first attempt on a large scale to reconcile local independence with national strength' (Freeman 1893, 554)—was thus brutally terminated after a century and a third (280–146). An Achaean federation was probably soon re-formed, perhaps within half a dozen years, but this was confined to Achaea in the geographical sense and shorn of anything but (at most) municipal significance. That was chiefly to suit the administrative convenience of the suzerain. For Rome had decided to convert most of Greece, not into a full-blown province, but into a dependency of the province she had earlier made of Macedonia. Forbidden to possess a city-wall and obligated, if only informally, to satisfy Rome's constitutional and financial demands, the demilitarized and demoralized cities of old Achaea were unlikely to cause Rome a deal of concern. The most that could be said in favour of Rome's settlement from an Achaean point of view—that of the upper classes—was that matters could have been even worse: 'if we had not perished so quickly, we should never have been saved'.²⁴

Sparta, of course, fared much better under the new Roman dispensation, since she had played no active part in the Achaean War. Thus she kept the wall rebuilt (probably) in the early 170s and remained 'free' in the Roman sense. It was probably now, as mentioned above, that a limited restoration of 'Lycurgan' institutions occurred, affecting the *agōgē* above all, after more than four decades of Achaean influence. Formally, Sparta was exempt from the burden of tribute. On the other hand, Sparta's political impotence and dependence on Rome the suzerain cannot be gainsaid. The ex-Perioecic communities were not restored to her; twenty-four of them, indeed, were either now organized as 'the *koinon* of the Lacedaemonians' or, if (as suggested in [chapter 5](#)) they had been so organized since 195, gained their collective independence from Achaea as well as Sparta. Perhaps Sparta was permitted to recover Belminatis from Megalopolis, but she was quite certainly forbidden by Mummius to reclaim from Messene the disputed

frontier-land of Dentheiliatis. Since traditionally it was here that the seeds of Sparta's conquest of Messenia and consequent rise to the status of a great Greek power had been planted some six centuries earlier, there was a certain symbolic fittingness in Sparta's renewed claim being rejected by Greece's Roman conqueror.²⁵

II

Roman Sparta

Chapter seven

Sparta between sympolity and municipality

Conforming to their larger neglect of the period since Roman domination, writers of Greek history in the Imperial age by and large ceased to interest themselves in events at Sparta after (at the latest) 146 BC, looking instead for stirring historical narrative to the reassurances of the more distant Greek past. Even so, it took the passage of two centuries after 146 BC before we can readily recognize in Sparta Marrou's 'small and peaceful municipality in the unarmed province of Achaia'. In the intervening period local history—for such Sparta's had now become—was anything but tranquil. The Late Republic saw the Spartans drawn willy-nilly, like the rest of Greece, into the drama of the Roman civil wars. The aftermath of Actium then witnessed the unexpected establishment at Sparta of a Roman client-dynasty, that of Eurycles and his descendants, under whose stormy three-generation régime the Spartans experienced for the last time something of the glamour of Hellenistic monarchy¹.

Between 146 BC and the outbreak of the First Mithradatic War in 88 BC, a period during which Greece as a whole enjoyed peace and prosperity, Spartan affairs are largely a blank. As a friendly noncombatant on the side-lines of the Achaean War the city was treated favourably by Mummius and the Roman commissioners. Although the *ager Dentheliatis* remained Messenian, it was probably now that Sparta recovered the Belminatis region on her north-western frontier with Megalopolis (chapter 10). Much more significantly for Sparta's subsequent history, Rome now permitted the restoration of the ancestral Spartan polity, 'as far as was possible after so many misfortunes and such degradations' (Plut. *Philop.* 16.9); as a result, the decades after 146 BC were probably a time of intense antiquarian activity at Sparta, concentrated above all on the recreation—after a fashion—of the 'Lycurgan' *agōgē* (chapter 14). The Mummian settlement left the defeated members of the old Achaean League and their allies hovering uncertainly between surveillance by the proconsuls of Macedonia and full provincialization (a Roman governor of Greece is not attested until 46 BC). As a free city, however, Sparta retained full local autonomy and, as a scatter of epigraphic evidence shows, continued to engage in the familiar routines of Hellenistic inter-city diplomacy until well into the first century BC: Spartan

dikastai were honoured at Delphi c.100 BC, (chapter 14); in 81 BC the city was one of the long list of Greek communities recognizing the asylum-rights of the sanctuary of Hecate at Carian Lagina; and Spartan notables continued to cultivate overseas contacts with cities such as Thera—with which Sparta shared a tie of kinship—and Tralles.²

The period after 146 BC was also one of intensifying routine contact with Rome, reflected in the construction at Sparta of a special lodging for visiting Roman officials, which, as Kennell saw, must be later than the period of Achaean sympolity, since federal cities were not supposed to conduct independent diplomacy with Rome. The Late Republic was also a time in which Rome's subject-communities in the east became increasingly enmeshed in ties of patronage with the great families of the Roman aristocracy, a development echoes of which can be clearly heard at Sparta. A passage in Suetonius reveals that by 40 BC the Spartans were clients of the powerful patrician clan of the Claudii (below); this tie was at least as old as c.100 BC, when the Spartan philosopher Demetrius dedicated a work to a Claudius Nero (chapter 13), and perhaps should be traced back to Ap. Claudius Pulcher (cos. 185 BC), a zealous supporter of the Spartans in their dealings with the Achaean League. Looking ahead somewhat, the importance to Sparta of such patronal ties emerges in the case of Cicero, whose letter of 46 BC recommending the city to the first governor of Greece, Ser. Sulpicius Rufus, still survives. Cicero twice alludes here to his indebtedness to the Spartans, a reference which has baffled commentators; presumably it relates to the trial at Rome in 59 BC of L. Valerius Flaccus, a former governor of Asia, when the Spartans obliged Cicero by sending character-witnesses to appear on his client's behalf. The city's ties with the eminent orator can be traced back to 79–7 BC, when the young Cicero paid a tourist's visit to Sparta in the course of a period of study abroad. The letter reveals that his Spartan ties—conforming to a familiar pattern in this period—were dependent on a personal friendship with an otherwise unknown but no doubt eminent Spartan, one Philippus, at whose request he had undertaken to write the letter and in whose house at Sparta he perhaps had once stayed as a guest.³

From 88 BC until 31 BC Sparta found herself the reluctant participant in a succession of Roman wars using Greece as their theatre, the ensuing cost in Spartan lives and resources sounding a sombre note in local history during the last half-century of the Roman Republic. In this period the security of the Eurotas valley once more came under threat; not surprisingly, we now find evidence for repairs to the city's mud-brick fortification wall (App. I, 9). Warfare returned to Greece in 88 BC, when Pontic fleets appeared in Greek waters seeking allies for the ambitious Mithradates VI of Pontus in his offensive against Rome's eastern ascendancy. Spartan behaviour during the First Mithradatic War is obscure. If the Pontic local historian Memnon can be trusted, Pontic and Spartan troops clashed in battle—presumably following a sea-borne invasion of Laconia—and the Spartans suffered a defeat, after which the city 'came over' to Mithradates. Since there is no suggestion (in the

admittedly sparse evidence) of internal *stasis* at Sparta at this juncture of the kind which Mithradates took advantage of at Athens, Deininger's assumption of a formal treaty between Sparta and the king in 88 BC seems unlikely: Sparta did her best to remain loyal to Rome, as is suggested by the fact that the sources give no hint of meaningful Spartan support for Pontus after the city's reverse, although military aid from the Laconian towns is well-documented.⁴

In 49 BC Greece was the chief theatre of war in the struggle between Caesar and Pompey. As with the Greeks generally, for whom Caesar at this time was still an unknown quantity, the Spartans had little choice but to support Pompey, the conqueror of the east, obeying a request for military aid by sending a contingent to Pharsalus in 48 BC. In a curious statement the second-century historian Appian claimed that these Spartan troops fought under the command of 'their own *basileis*'. If this evidence has any weight presumably it means simply that the Spartan contingent was permitted its own commanders: Weil's notion, that Sparta at the time was monarchically governed, is now firmly disproved by the Spartan coinage recently redated to the forties and thirties BC, its legends signifying 'republican' forms of government at this time.⁵

When another round of civil war broke out in 42 BC between Caesar's assassins and the members of the Second Triumvirate, the Spartans showed a spark of their old independence, as they would do again in the Actium campaign, by giving their open support to the triumvirs Octavian and Antony. The decision was a courageous, even a foolhardy, one, taken at a time when Greece was under the authority of M. Brutus, the tyrannicide, whose harsh reaction was to promise Sparta to his soldiery as plunder in the event of victory; in so doing, Brutus revealed the limits of a Roman general's sentimental laconism, which had earlier led him to name parts of his Italian estates after famous Spartan sights. The city's decision was also a costly one: a Spartan contingent of 2,000 foot-soldiers was annihilated at the battle of Philippi—Sparta's worst military disaster since Sellasia in 222 BC ([chapter 4](#)). It brought signal benefits for the Spartans, however; as a reward for their support, the triumvirs now took the unusual step of reversing an earlier Roman decision and returned the *ager Dentheliatis* to Sparta ([chapter 10](#)). In hindsight, moreover, we can see Philippi as marking the beginning of a warm relationship between Sparta and Octavian, the future emperor Augustus, one given further momentum in 38 BC by Octavian's marriage to Livia: by both birth and her first marriage to Tib. Claudius Nero a member of the patrician Claudii, patrons of Sparta (above), Livia was personally indebted to the city for having given her a temporary asylum in 40 BC in the aftermath of the Perusine War. When civil war broke out nine years later, although Greece had meanwhile fallen to Antony's sphere, Sparta once more made a display of independence by actively backing Octavian—the only city in Greece, along with her old Arcadian ally, Mantinea, to do so. As a result, the Spartans and their leading citizen, Eurycles, were uniquely placed in Greece to benefit from the favour of the victor of Actium, now the first Roman emperor.⁶

Before turning to Sparta's fortunes in the aftermath of Actium, some estimate is required of the cost to local resources of a half-century of Roman warfare. Sparta's exposure to the exploitative practices of Roman imperialism in this period may otherwise have been relatively slight: although the burdensome presence of Roman businessmen on the Laconian coast is well attested, they have left few traces at inland Sparta. The city's heritage of artworks (see [chapter 14](#)) did not escape Roman attentions: we hear of a pair of Roman aediles (probably in 56 BC) 'borrowing' a Spartan painting to adorn their games at Rome. But the evidence chiefly concerns Roman demands for war-contributions in the form not only of men but also of supplies and cash—the 'friendly liturgies', as Strabo called them, from which Sparta's free status did not exempt her ([chapter 11](#)). The city is unlikely to have escaped the obligation to supply the campaigns of M.Antonius against the pirates in 73–1 BC, when neighbouring Gytheum served as a hard-pressed Roman base, or to have been left unscathed by the demands imposed on Greece during its inclusion in the Balkan *provincia* of L.Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus (58–5 BC), or those of Pompey in 49 BC, specifically said to have included the 'free peoples' of Greece, or those of the Republican admiral L.Staius Murcus, who in 42 BC 'collected as much booty as he could come upon from the Peloponnese'. Coins and an inscription add some precision to this picture. A fragmentary decree of Late Republican date preserves an urgent appeal to the wealthy by Spartan magistrates for help in meeting a series of demands—presumably Roman—for cash. Grunauer-von Hoerschelmann's study of Sparta's coinage has shown that the twenty-nine issues previously dated to the period from 146 to 30 BC all belong to its last two decades, with almost half of them clustering in the thirties. These last included coins which closely resemble in weight the bronze denominations minted by Antony and his subordinates in this period for military purposes. It looks as if the revival of the Spartan mint after the mid-century was largely a response to Roman requests for cash, one of which can be firmly identified: the issue of 39–7 BC bears the portrait of L.Sempronius Atratinus, one of Antony's legates.⁷

Because Sparta by now relied, like other Greek cities, on a system of euergetism to fund extraordinary expenditure ([chapter 11](#)), the immediate burden of these demands fell on the well-to-do, in the form either of civic requests for voluntary contributions, as in the decree noted above, or through the generosity of magistrates, as we learn from those Spartan coin-issues of the triumviral age inscribed with the titles of leading boards of civic officials (ephors, *gerontes* and *nomophulakes*) and presumably funded by them collectively. The immediate effect of these Roman demands will have been to divert the resources of the rich away from more routine civic needs, so that—for instance—civic cults would be celebrated on a reduced scale and public buildings might fall into disrepair, as seems to have happened at neighbouring Messene, where a wide-ranging programme of building-restoration was launched under Augustus. But the long-term impact of Roman levies on Greece in this period has perhaps been

exaggerated: in Crawford's view, 'their effect on an economy whose basis was subsistence agriculture...would have been negligible' (Crawford 1977). In Sparta's case, the resilience of the upper classes (who no doubt managed to pass on most of the burden to their inferiors) is suggested by the case of the future family of the Voluseni: although a triumviral member, Aristocrates, son of Damares, was a generous contributor in his city's time of need, funding more than one emission of bronze coinage, his great-grandchildren were to be found among Claudian Sparta's 'first families'.⁸

* * * * *

The remainder of this chapter is devoted to the most absorbing episode in the history of Sparta's first two centuries under Roman domination: the rise—and fall—of the house of Eurycles. Members of this Spartan family are first attested in the triumviral age, a time of unsettled conditions in which provincial protégés of powerful Romans could acquire local prominence in the service of their patrons. Lachares, the father of Eurycles, seems to have been a Caesarian partisan: prominent enough to be courted by the Athenians, who placed his statue on their hallowed Acropolis, he was executed by Antony on a charge of 'piracy'. As Chrimes saw, behind this episode perhaps lay his harassment of Antony's supply-ships from Egypt as they rounded the Peloponnese on the eve of Actium. Eurycles first appears in history as the commander of a warship on Octavian's side at Actium itself. How did a family from land-locked Sparta come to command ships in the triumviral age? The simplest explanation is that Antony's charge against Lachares had some foundation in fact. Laconian waters were notorious for piracy, which saw something of a revival in the eastern Mediterranean during the triumviral age; as Bowersock observed, Lachares and his son perhaps were based on Cythera, the island which Eurycles later was given by Augustus as a gift (see below).⁹

As we might expect of a privateer, the family origins of Eurycles and his father are veiled in a certain mystery. Like the bluest-blooded of Roman Sparta's 'first families', a Hadrianic descendant—the Spartan senator Eurycles Herculanus—grandly claimed the Dioscuri and (it seems) Heracles as ancestors (chapter 8). Eurycles himself, however, asserted a (by local standards) more *recherché* pedigree, naming a son after the demigod Rhadamanthys, whose mythical connections were with Crete, not Laconia: the impression given is of a social *parvenu*, a Spartan with aristocratic pretensions who did not quite dare, however, to claim one of the lineages deriving from figures of local myth and history with which the Roman city's old aristocracy bristled (chapter 12). Eurycles was an adventurer, for whom the habits of the buccaneer died hard: at Actium, although claiming to be present to avenge his father's execution, he was more interested in capturing one of Antony's treasure-ships.¹⁰

For Eurycles the reward for his own and his father's loyalty to Caesar was the gift of a personal *dunasteia* over the Spartans, the evidence for which was forcefully restated by Bowersock in 1961. This remarkable development is attested by Spartan coins bearing the legend '(issued) under Eurycles' and by the

Augustan geographer Strabo, who referred to his ‘rule’ (*epistasia*) over the Spartans and his position as their ‘leader’ (*hēgemōn*). This change from ‘republican’ to (effectively) monarchical government had occurred by 21 BC, when Eurycles celebrated the visit of Augustus (as Octavian had styled himself since 27 BC) and Livia with coin-issues portraying the Imperial couple; it makes best sense if seen as occurring soon after Actium, when the memory of the Spartan’s war-services was fresh in the victor’s mind. It is not easy to discern any ‘constitutional’ basis for the *dunasteia* of Eurycles. As far as is known he bore no official title; and the survival of the outward forms of local ‘republican’ government is suggested by the fact that in 21 BC Augustus dined in the company of the city’s magistrates (chapter 14). Like his Imperial patron, Eurycles seems to have exercised more or less arbitrary power behind a screen of constitutionalism. In doing so he was helped by prominent Spartan collaborators, among whom can be identified the priestly family which presided over the ancient civic cult of the Dioscuri at Phoebaeum and (perhaps) the mysterious Lysixenidas, named on one of his coin-issues. He also used his vast wealth (see below) to curry popular support with a programme of building (notably the theatre: see chapter 10) and shows (chapter 13). The ultimate sanction against any local opposition, however, was his friendship with the emperor, who heaped him with additional gifts: a grant of Roman citizenship, whereafter he became ‘C.Iulius Eurycles’, and the gift of Cythera—secured, it seems, through the intervention of Livia, whose powerful advocacy of her provincial *clientela* is well attested (could she have been the guest of Lachares during her Spartan visit in 40 BC?). In return, Eurycles made an assiduous display of his loyalty to the Imperial house. He was the founder and (almost certainly) the first priest of Sparta’s Imperial cult, the high-priesthood of which was later held by Eurycles Herculanus ‘by inheritance’. He also paid court to M.Agrippa, the son-in-law of Augustus, issuing coins in his honour when he visited Sparta in 16 BC during his tour of the east and (probably) instigating a Spartan association of ‘Agrippiastae’, of which his kinsman, C.Iulius Deximachus, is found as president.¹¹

To the obeisance of Eurycles to Rome can perhaps be attributed the local echoes, detectable in the inscriptions, of the Augustan programme of religious restoration. A revival under Eurycles of the outward forms of civic cult is suggested by three series of inscribed catalogues, all of them commencing early in the reign of Augustus. One series recorded the names of the three annual *hierothutai* and the personnel associated with them. These magistrates with priestly functions presided over the city’s ‘common hearth’ and—probably—the building in which it was housed; to judge from their title (literally ‘sacrificers’), along with their association with a seer and a ritual ‘cook-cum-butcher’ (*mageiros*), they were also responsible for performing sacrifices in Sparta’s name—a former royal prerogative which had evidently been transferred to civic magistrates after—at the latest—the fall of Nabis. The two other series of lists catalogue annual participants in the sacred banquets of two civic cults, those of

the Dioscuri at Phoebaeum (chapter 14) and of Taenarian Poseidon, whose Spartan cult was a 'branch' of the famous sanctuary on Cape Taenarum, once itself under Spartan control. The activities which these catalogues reflect presuppose sizeable outlays on ceremonial and consumption such as would suit a revival of cult following the lean years of the Late Republic. Eurycles was, at the least, involved in this revival: the priest and priestess of Helen and the Dioscuri were his relations and his own sons were among the well-born children who assisted at the ceremonies of the *hierothutai*.¹²

As the only city (with Mantinea) in mainland Greece to have supported Octavian at Actium, Sparta for a while was the cynosure of the newly created (in 27 BC) province of Achaia; for Strabo the city was 'especially favoured' by the Romans. The city's international prestige was augmented when Augustus entrusted it (in the early twenties BC) with the supervision of his victory-games, the quinquennial Actia, established at the newly-founded city of Nicopolis in Epirus, with which the Spartans went on to develop close ties. In this encouraging climate we can detect a last surge of Spartan irredentism in the Peloponnese (see chapter 5), instigated by the new ruler of Sparta, whose Peloponnesian pretensions were advertised in the names 'Laco' and 'Argolicus' borne by a son and grandson respectively. The extensive patronage of Eurycles and his descendants outside Sparta is discussed below: here we concentrate on the vexed question of Sparta's relationship with the Laconian cities at this time. The evidence of late Hellenistic inscriptions for a 'League of the Lacedaemonians', of which Sparta seems not to have been a member, can be taken to show that in 146 BC Rome had sought to ensure the continued separation from Sparta of the Laconian cities, previously guaranteed by the Achaean League, by permitting them a federal structure of their own. At some later date, however, they returned to Spartan control, since Pausanias records that Augustus freed them from their Spartan 'slavery'. Although the accuracy of this passage has been doubted, it is confirmed by inscriptions from Gytheum, which portray Augustus and Tiberius as the restorers of the city's 'ancient freedom' and posthumously hail the former as 'Eleutherius'. In the period after 146 BC Sparta could only have reasserted her old dominion over Laconia with Roman approval. Although Bernhardt proposed that the triumvirs took this remarkable step in 42 BC (above), it makes better sense to associate the return of Sparta's borders to (more or less) their Nabian extent with the *dunasteia* of Eurycles. That Augustus was prepared to favour Sparta to this degree is a measure of the city's strategic potential (in the first century BC it still retained a certain military—and now naval—muscle) in a province the rest of which, to paraphrase Bowersock, had 'entered his empire as a defeated nation'.¹³

The ambitions of Eurycles, however, were not confined to the Peloponnese. Writing under the Flavians, the Jewish historian Josephus preserves a blatantly hostile account of his visit to two fellow client-rulers in the near east, Archelaus of Cappadocia and Herod of Judaea. According to Josephus, Eurycles insinuated himself into the dynastic intrigues of Herod's court and played off different

parties against each other, so precipitating the trial and execution of one of Herod's sons, before returning to Greece with a small fortune in royal gifts. But there is little here to indicate—as Pani has suggested—anti-Roman activity. Josephus was probably right in claiming that the Spartan adventurer was motivated by financial opportunism: although clearly wealthy, he was spending heavily on public works at Sparta and—as we shall see—on benefaction in Peloponnesian cities and sanctuaries. In looking eastwards he surely sought to exploit prior connections: Josephus implies a pre-existing tie of friendship between Eurycles and Archelaus; and the kinship between the Spartans and the Jews was by now an accepted fiction (chapter 6), perhaps underlying the benevolence towards Sparta of the philhellene Herod on one of his visits to Greece.¹⁴

The ultimately fragile basis of Eurycles' *dunasteia* and its complete dependence on Imperial favour is shown by the circumstances of his fall from grace, which Bowersock has convincingly reconstructed in two important articles. A famous passage in Strabo, recently improved with new manuscript-readings, shows that Eurycles was dead by 2 BC or thereabouts, having returned from the east in about 7 BC. In the interim, he had fallen into disgrace: he was twice arraigned before Augustus, who, on the second occasion, deprived him of his *epistasia* and sent him into exile. The full story behind this reversal of fortune is impossible to recover. The allegation of the hostile Josephus, that Eurycles extorted money from the cities of Greece, is not supported by the epigraphic evidence, which presents him, on the contrary, as a benefactor of the Peloponnese (below). Domestic troubles there certainly were: Strabo refers vaguely to *tarakhē* or 'disturbance' at Sparta; and one of his accusers, Plutarch records, was a local aristocrat, a descendant of Brasidas. But the *arriviste* Eurycles had probably always had enemies (as well as friends) among the established Spartan families whose local hegemony his own had displaced. If so, some additional factor seems required to explain the withdrawal of the emperor's friendship. Bowersock has attractively suggested that his real undoing was to pay court too openly to Tiberius, Livia's son, at the time in semi-disgrace on Rhodes and a presence hard for Eurycles to ignore, given his patronal ties with his mother. It would then be the emperor Tiberius, not Augustus, to whom Laco owed the complete rehabilitation of his father's memory and his own installation as ruler of Sparta—both achieved, as a well-known inscription from Gytheum shows, within a year of the new emperor's accession. The fall of Eurycles was probably accompanied by the detachment of the Laconian cities from Sparta's control; in a passage written before 2 BC, Strabo refers to their organization into a new league, that of the Free Laconians or *Eleutherolakōnes*. It may have been now, as compensation for the loss of Gytheum, the best harbour on the Laconian gulf, that Augustus presented the Spartans with the inferior port of Cardamyle, on the Messenian side of Taygetus (chapter 10).¹⁵

It remains to deal briefly with the history, scarcely less turbulent, of the two successors of Eurycles as client-rulers at Sparta, beginning with his son Laco,

who, although ranked by Tacitus among the ‘first of the Achaians’ (*primores Achaiorum*), for us remains a hazy figure. In the lifetime of Eurycles we hear only of his sons Deximachus and Rhadamanthys; Laco perhaps was a younger half-brother, becoming his father’s eventual heir for dynastic reasons impossible now to recover. He makes his earliest appearance in the evidence at Athens, since he can be identified with an otherwise unknown Laco who held the eponymous archonship at the beginning of the first century. At the time he may have been living at Athens, a city with which his family had close ties. The only direct evidence for his eventual succession to his father’s position as Sparta’s ruler are the coin-issues in his name, although it is tempting to associate him with building activity at the theatre under Tiberius in the form of a monumental arch (?) on which the emperor’s name was inscribed in Latin script (App.I, 31). Close ties with the court of Tiberius can be inferred from the marriage of a son, Argolicus, to the daughter of the Mytilenean senator Pompeius Macer, an intimate of the emperor. This connection proved Laco’s undoing; when Macer was disgraced in 33, Laco fell with him. Although the language of Tacitus is vague, presumably he now lost his position at Sparta and was forced into exile; and confiscation of property is suggested by the appearance in the Imperial household of one of his slaves. The whole episode is obscure; but it is tempting to suppose that Macer and his connections were caught up in the prolonged witch-hunt which followed the fall in 31 of Seianus, the once all-powerful praetorian prefect.¹⁶

By the reign of Claudius, Laco, by now well into middle age, had been reinstated at Sparta. For this new twist in the family’s stormy relationship with Rome, revealed by coin-issues in which Laco’s name as eponym combines with the emperor’s portrait, Gaius rather than Claudius may have been responsible, since he too favoured client-dynasties and counted among his intimates one of Laco’s hereditary connections, the Jewish prince Herod Agrippa, grandson of Herod, the host of Eurycles. Laco’s second term in power was accompanied, it seems, by some clarification of his position, since he now acquired, as a Latin inscription from the Roman colony of Corinth reveals, the title ‘procurator of Claudius’. In this text Laco is called ‘C.Iulius C.f. Laco’—affiliation by *praenomen* being, of course, no more than normal Latin usage; so Bowersock’s attempt to deny that this Laco was the son of C.Iulius Eurycles does not convince. More problematic, however, is the significance of the procuratorial title. Since it attached Laco to the emperor personally, rather than the province, the regular procuratorship of Achaia is not in question; the title can only refer to Laco’s rule over the Spartans. Pflaum cites as a close parallel the case of C.Herennius Capito, who administered a private domain in Judaea, inherited by Claudius, as ‘procurator of C.Caesar Augustus Germanicus’. But it is difficult to see Sparta, a free city, as the personal property of the emperor in quite the same way. In West’s view, the title ‘was given to Laco to regularize his position as dynast’; by proclaiming him unequivocally as the emperor’s servant, it created a formal tie between Rome and Sparta’s ruler which, hitherto, had

been conspicuously lacking. Whether, however, its conferment amounted to a 'modification' of Laco's position—as Pflaum maintained—is arguable: by declaring him openly as the emperor's representative, the title is as likely to have strengthened Laco's local authority as to have constrained it.¹⁷

His family's close ties with Livia and the Claudii suggest that it was Laco who instituted the local worship of Livia, centred on annual games, either after her death in 29 or her official deification in 42 (chapter 14). The family's increasing romanization—as well as its renewed high standing in the capital—is shown by Claudius's grant of equestrian rank to Laco's son and heir, C. Julius Spartiaticus, whose public career began with service as an equestrian officer in the Roman army, before he went on to inherit his father's position at Sparta. His succession follows from another Latin inscription from Corinth in which he is described as 'procurator of Caesar and Augusta Agrippina', his title echoing the extraordinary prominence of Nero's mother between 54 and 59. As with Laco, this procuratorial title is best seen as designating a position of delegated authority at Sparta, although in the case of Spartiaticus for the first time there is no accompanying coinage. Of his 'reign' we know nothing: only that, like his father and grandfather, he too lost the emperor's favour. His fall seems to have been precipitated by a dynastic squabble, since he can be identified with some probability with one of two brothers, 'the most powerful Greeks of my time', whose extravagant rivalry, Plutarch relates, prompted Imperial intervention resulting in their exile and the confiscation of their property. The episode is not closely dated, but Plutarch's reference to 'the tyrant' would suit the reign of Nero, and Spartiaticus was known as a fellow-exile to the Epicurean philosopher Musonius, disgraced in 65; as we shall see (chapter 8), there are some grounds for placing his fall no later than 61. If an event of the fairly recent past, it might help to explain Nero's boycott of Sparta during his tour of Greece in 67, for which Cassius Dio gives the eccentric (but, admittedly, by no means incredible) explanation that the emperor disapproved of the Lycurgan customs. Once more, the family's fall from favour was of relatively short duration: the descendants of Eurycles were living at Sparta once again under Vespasian and recovered much of their ancestral property, since Eurycles Herculanus, probably the grandson of Spartiaticus, is found, like his Augustan namesake, in possession of Cythera (chapter 8). But the family did not regain its old position as a Roman client-dynasty; henceforth it had to remain content to be the richest and best-connected of Roman Sparta's 'first houses'.¹⁸

It remains to comment on the extensive patronage within Greece which forms a distinctive feature of this family of local dynasts. It was most marked, not surprisingly, in the neighbouring cities of Laconia. Eurycles was hailed as a benefactor (*euergētēs*) by the coastal towns of Asopus, Boeae and Gytheum; he also protected the interests of Laconia's numerous Roman businessmen. After his death the cities of the Eleutherolaconian League, although nominally independent, were in turn dominated by his son, whom they hailed as their *euergētēs* and the 'guardian' of their 'security and safety'. Further afield, Eurycles

was the ‘patron and *euergetēs*’ of the Asclepieum at Epidaurus, an interest inherited by his grandson; the family also had links with Megalopolis and the adjacent sanctuary of Despoena at Lycosura. Lachares, Eurycles and Spartiaticus were honoured successively at Athens, where Laco, as we have seen, held the archonship. Beyond Laconia, however, the chief beneficiary of the dynasty’s generosity was Corinth, the seat of the proconsul and, as the centre of *Romanitas* in Greece, a city with a strong gravitational pull for the province’s magnates. Although it now seems that the Eurycles who constructed public baths at Corinth should be identified with the Hadrianic senator (see [chapter 8](#)), both Laco and his son held a succession of colonial offices and liturgies. It was presumably as a citizen of Corinth, rather than Sparta, that Spartiaticus was chosen to be the first high-priest of the Achaean League’s Imperial cult. It was argued by Chrimes that Laco’s Corinthian career belonged to the period of his disgrace, under Tiberius. But, apart from the fact that he may not have been a wealthy man in those years, having lost the emperor’s favour he seems an improbable candidate for high office, including an Imperial priesthood (the flaminiate of Augustus), in a Roman colony; these offices are best assigned, as West believed, to the time of his reinstatement under Claudius.¹⁹

This extensive patronage was only made possible by the family’s huge wealth, as is clearly the case at Asopus, where benefaction by Eurycles took the form of a perpetual oil-supply. Some of the sources of this fortune can be identified. Part of it was probably based on his share in the booty at Actium. Presumably he drew revenues from his ownership of Cythera. He was also a large landowner: an estate at Asopus is attested, extensive enough to require management by three stewards, as well as landed property on the Spartan plain, the clay-beds of which were exploited for tile-manufacture ([chapter 12](#)).²⁰

With the suppression of this flamboyant but troubled dynasty, political power at Sparta reverted into the hands of the local class of *possédants*, a change reflected in Spartan epigraphy by the commencement, under the Flavians, of the long series of catalogues of magistrates inscribed at the theatre. Against this more stable political background, Sparta was set to enjoy a period of renewed prominence in the propitious conditions of the Greek renaissance.

Chapter eight

Sparta in the Greek renaissance

The Euryclid *dunasteia* lasted intermittently for almost a century, a period during which the evidence for internal conditions at Sparta is slight. In the later first century, however, the number of surviving inscriptions rises steeply (e.g. App. IIA, Table), illuminating the Roman city with some clarity for the first time. This epigraphic abundance partly reflects the re-establishment at Sparta of ‘republican’ government: the practice of inscribing catalogues of civic magistrates in the theatre begins under the Flavians, and to Trajan’s reign dates the earliest of the inscribed careers of municipal notables (chapter 11). Since inscriptions required skilled labour and a supply of suitable types of stone, fluctuations in the local attachment to the ‘epigraphic habit’ also have an economic significance. By the mid-first century, when ‘the marks of war and depression [in Achaia] had probably been largely effaced’ (Jones 1971b), parts of the province, Sparta included, were enjoying a modest prosperity. Indeed, under the Flavians and Trajan civic life at Sparta displays a distinct vitality, which to some extent was encouraged by the increasing paternalism in the provinces of the central government. Vespasian is attested as the donor of funds for building activity at Sparta’s theatre—one of the occasions, perhaps, when he responded to requests for aid from provincial cities damaged by earthquake; and benefaction of some kind by Trajan is suggested by the honorific title of ‘saviour’ (*sōtēr*) which he received from the Spartans. The Flavian and Trajanic age also saw an increase in the beneficent activities of local notables, whom the suppression of the Euryclid *dunasteia* now left free to acquire prominence as patrons of their community. Their competitive ‘love of honour’, essential if civic life and institutions were to receive adequate funding, received new encouragement under Trajan with the institution of the so-called contest for best citizen (chapter 11); mostly it took the routine form of discharging the city’s liturgical offices in a generous fashion, as with the Flavian gymnasiarch Tib. Claudius Harmonicus, praised by one of the Roman city’s tribes, the Cynosureis, for his ‘incomparable magnanimity’ towards them.¹

Under Nerva and Trajan a local benefactor on an altogether larger scale emerged in the person of C.Iulius Agesilaus, who held the city’s eponymous magistracy, the patronomate, in about 100. In his benefactions Agesilaus associated himself with a certain T.Flavius Charixenus, who seems to have been

a younger man, since he held the patronomate well over a decade later. These two Spartans are best seen as close kinsmen—perhaps father-in-law and son-in-law. Together they helped to finance a significant enlargement of Sparta's cycle of agonistic festivals, endowing with prize-money both the Urania, new games founded under Nerva (chapter 13), and the Leonidean games, which were refounded late in the reign of Trajan (chapter 14). Since both these festivals, as we shall see, had associations with the old dual kingship, it is just possible that Agesilaus—as his name might suggest—belonged to a lineage claiming descent from Spartan royalty. Members of the same family-group, now including a Flavius Agesilaus, also contributed to the architectural embellishment of their city with the gift of a building in the Corinthian order, its location and function uncertain, which they loyally dedicated to 'the deified *Sebastoi* and Lacedaemon' (App.I, 29).²

Both these agonistic benefactions made conscious reference to Spartan history. Other indicators of the prominent place of tradition in civic life under Trajan are the institution of the 'contest for best citizen', which seems to have been loosely based on the 'Lycurgan' mode of election to the old *gerousia*, and the revival of civic consultations of the oracle of Ino-Pasiphaë at Thalamae (chapter 14). Ephebic dedications from the sanctuary of Artemis Orthia also suggest that before the end of the Flavian age a restructuring had taken place—perhaps over a period of years—in the Roman city's 'Lycurgan' training, reflected in the reappearance late in Nero's reign of *kasen*-status (chapter 11) and the establishment by the reign of Domitian of the post of *boagos* (chapter 14). In the case of the former, Woodward suggested a possible link with the—historically somewhat dubious—tradition of a 'Lycurgan revival' at Neronian Sparta brought on by the visit of the itinerant sage and wonder-worker, Apollonius of Tyana. This tradition is found both in the ancient collection of letters allegedly preserving parts of the sage's correspondence and in the—probably later—'biography' of Apollonius by the Severan sophist Flavius Philostratus, a work which seems to have been completed after 217. The Philostratean account sets this revival in 61, when Apollonius—so it relates—was invited by Spartan ambassadors to visit their city. Instead, however, the sage wrote a letter to the ephors, condemning the embassy's luxurious dress and effeteness of manner, whereupon these magistrates restored the ancestral practices, so that 'wrestling grounds and exertion once more were popular with the young and the common messes were restored and Sparta became like herself. Although the historicity of this 'restoration' has found hardly any defenders, the need for caution before dismissing it altogether is suggested by the somewhat more credible picture emerging from recent research of the elusive Damis, allegedly the chief source behind the Philostratean 'life'. In the earlier part of Nero's reign Sparta was ruled by C.Iulius Spartiaticus (chapter 7), whose well-known fondness for luxury, even during his exile, makes him seem an unlikely advocate of 'Lycurgan' austerities at home. It is just possible that the training had been allowed to languish during his régime, to be reinvigorated

following his disgrace (no later than 61?) by Sparta's newly reinstalled 'republican' government. Here the influence of a charismatic philosopher-figure obviously cannot be discounted, although equally the developing Apollonius-tradition could have sought to credit its hero with a decisive rôle in a local episode with its own momentum.³

Even if there had been a minor revival of the training in the sixties, however, the attendant circumstances were localized in time and cannot be made to account for the pronounced allusions to the past in civic life under the later Flavians and Trajan. It is true that Spartan history and institutions were being written up in this period by Plutarch of Chaeronea, whose connections with contemporary Sparta were close (chapter 13). But it would be simplistic to see this rising mood of local archaism in terms of the stimulus provided by any one individual—whether man of letters or wandering philosopher. It is better linked with the larger cultural and political conditions of the Greek world under the Flavians and Trajan, a time which saw the early stirrings of the great renaissance of cultural activity in the Greek provinces under the principate, for which the peace and prosperity of the Roman Empire provided the necessary preconditions. The lineaments of this movement, which endured until well into the third century, are by now well-established. Its social setting was that of the educated élites which governed the Greek cities on Rome's behalf. In cultural life it produced a flowering of Greek letters and rhetoric, this last cast in the distinctive form of the show-oratory of the Second Sophistic. These activities were informed by a marked archaism or admiration for Greece's pre-Hellenistic past. Archaizing tastes, however, were not simply a matter of the preferences of individuals: since the educated minority who affected them also ran the affairs of their cities, they gave shape to the forms of civic life too. Increasing reference to the civic past from the later first century onwards also had a Roman dimension. It can be seen as an aspect of Rome's evolving relationship with the Greek élites, members of which, from the Flavians and Trajan onwards, were penetrating the Roman aristocracy in increasing numbers as knights and senators—the grandson of Spartiaticus, C. Iulius Eurycles Herculanus, was among the first intake of senators from old Greece (below). This changing political climate altered the historical status of the pasts of the constituent cities of Rome's Greek-speaking provinces, since they now formed part of the local heritage of a prestigious group of Greeks within the empire's governing class. Rome herself was directly implicated in this change through—above all—the Greek policies of Trajan's successor, the emperor Hadrian.⁴

Having succeeded in 117, Hadrian was to intervene constantly in the Greek provinces as administrator and benefactor. This concern for the Greeks should be seen as part of a fairly systematic Imperial attempt to reinforce the structures of civic life in the Roman east. Among Hadrian's more obvious concerns were the promotion within the Imperial system of old Greece, which hitherto had lagged behind Asia in its political and economic advancement. His well-known benefactions at Athens were echoed, albeit on a smaller scale, throughout the

province, with due attention being paid, in accordance with the cultural values of the time, to those cities distinguished—as Hadrian wrote of Delphi—for their ‘antiquity and nobility’. Signs of Hadrianic interest in the home of the Spartan myth, although they have not previously been treated in full, are not hard to find. The emperor was the most distinguished and—as far as we know—the first of a succession of foreigners who held the city’s eponymous magistracy, the patronomate, the duties of which were closely linked to Roman Sparta’s revived ‘Lycurgan customs’ (chapter 14). The date of his term, previously insecure, has now been assigned to 127/8. Shortly before, in 124/5, Hadrian visited the city personally, as he did again in 128/9 on the second of his two long sojourns in Greece as emperor. These visits may have had their burdensome side: Spartan grain-shortages in this period can perhaps be connected with the strain placed on the local food-supply by the presence of the omnivorous Imperial court (chapter 11). In a provincial city which had not seen a Roman emperor since 21 BC, however, the Imperial presence was also a mark of honour and a cause for official rejoicing; with the first visit can be associated a remarkable dedication *en masse* of small altars (at least twenty-eight are attested), probably signifying the celebration of a special civic festival at which Spartan householders were required to offer sacrifices in the streets on the emperor’s behalf.⁵

This civic rejoicing was more than merely dutiful, however, since Hadrian’s visits were also the occasion of major benefactions, as is suggested by the laudatory titles of ‘saviour’, ‘founder’ (*ktistēs*) and ‘benefactor’ which the city conferred on him in connection with his first visit. Among these benefactions can be counted grants of territory. In addition to Cythera (below), two other overseas possessions, for which the earliest evidence falls in the 120s, should probably be seen as Hadrianic gifts. One was Caudus, the modern Gavdos, a small island off the south-west coast of Crete, a Spartan *epimelētēs* or ‘supervisor’ of which is attested precisely in 124/5, the year of Hadrian’s first visit. In addition, four Spartans are found in the post of ‘*epimelētēs* of Coronea’, the earliest soon after 125, the latest under the emperor Marcus. Kahrstedt argued unconvincingly that ‘Coronea’ was an otherwise unknown location within Spartan territory. But it seems preferable to see here, as other scholars have done, a reference to the Messenian city of Corone, in the Imperial period a small but prosperous port with a fertile hinterland. According to Pausanias, the city’s correct style had once been ‘Coronea’; the archaizing use of this form at Hadrianic Sparta was of a piece with the city’s appointment in the 130s of a ‘Cytherodices’ (below).⁶

As when he presented part of the Ionian island of Cephallenia to Athens, Hadrian’s gifts of territory to Sparta were presumably meant to supplement the city’s revenues, although there is no evidence to suggest that these were in an especially parlous state at the time. Possibly the extra income was intended in part to contribute towards the cost of maintaining new civic amenities. Hadrianic building-activity at Sparta is suggested by the title of ‘founder’ (above), which was associated with construction-work in the vocabulary of

Greek civic honours; in particular, Hadrian is a strong candidate for identification as the donor of Sparta's long-distance aqueduct—a costly amenity and one requiring regular maintenance over its length of 12 kilometres or so (chapter 10).⁷

Hadrian's standing as a benefactor of Sparta is echoed in a flurry of civic diplomatic activity, including the ceremonial embassy which went to Nicopolis to greet him on one of his provincial arrivals or departures, and the long journey of two Spartan ambassadors to Pannonia in 136/7 to congratulate L.Aelius Caesar on his adoption as Hadrian's heir. A more substantial honour, hitherto overlooked by scholars, was the institution of a civic cult of Zeus Olympius in Hadrian's honour. It is well established that, for political as much as religious reasons, from 128/9 Hadrian associated himself closely with Zeus Olympius, supreme deity of the Greek pantheon. This assimilation is specifically attested at Sparta by an altar dedicated to 'Zeus Soter Olympius'. Pausanias also saw a Spartan temple of Zeus Olympius, a cult the only other clear reference to which comes in the career-inscription of the early Antonine magistrate, C.Iulius Theophrastus. This records the dedication by Theophrastus of statues of the late emperor Hadrian and the Spartan People during a term as priest of Zeus Olympius. Although his priesthood is listed before his agoranomate, which is firmly dated to 124/5, his posts do not seem to be consistently listed in chronological order, since the dedication of one of these statues, with Theophrastus in the rôle of 'supervisor' (*epistatēs*) of the operation, appears to be referred to in a fragmentary inscription from the mid-century. It rather looks as if he held the priesthood in the closing years of his distinguished career, the prestige of the post explaining its position near the head of the text. If this view is correct, nothing stands in the way of assuming that this civic cult, first heard of under Pius, was instituted by the Spartans in Hadrian's honour; the fact that its sanctuary was in a part of the city where Pausanias saw the temple of Sarapis, which he describes as Sparta's 'newest' sanctuary, lends some support to the impression of a recent foundation.⁸

Hadrianic benefaction at Sparta prompted emulation by members of the local élite. The last of the Euryclids, the senator Herculanius, deserves singling out by virtue of the scale of his patronage, which compares not unfavourably with that of the Athenian magnate Herodes Atticus, his younger contemporary and distant connection. Born in about 73, Herculanius entered the Roman Senate probably through the sponsorship of Trajan, climbing the *cursus honorum* at least as high as the praetorian posts. Although somewhat older than Trajan's successor, he had family connections at Hadrian's court through his first cousin, the poetess Iulia Balbilla, a companion of the empress Sabina. Like Herodes, he probably owed some of his wealth to his ties with the Corinthian clan of the Vibullii, the names of one of whom, L.Vibullius Pius, he added to his own following a testamentary adoption. Again like Herodes, Herculanius was the benefactor of Greek cities other than his own, including Mantinea, Corinth and

Eleutherolaconian Asopus, in the last of which, as at Corinth, he inherited ancestral ties.⁹

Like many eastern senators, Herculanius retained close links with his native city, where he died and was buried. Recent findings allow more to be said about his euergetic activity there. He probably funded the revival under Hadrian of Sparta's mint, die-types being employed in the Hadrianic issues which had once been used in the coinage of Eurycles, the senator's ancestor; in a display of genealogical pride characteristic of the Roman city's aristocracy (chapter 12), the choice of types—the mounted Dioscuri and the club of Heracles—made reference to the senator's 'Dioscurid' and 'Heraclid' pedigrees, of which the former is explicitly attested, while the latter can be inferred from the *agnomen* 'Herculanius'.¹⁰

Other benefactions by Herculanius seem to have been testamentary, following on his death, apparently without leaving a direct male heir, in about 136. On the basis of an important inscription in the Sparta Museum to be published by G. Steinhauer, it now seems clear that the city of Sparta was a major beneficiary of the senator's will, which provided funds—vidently the 'things from Eurycles', a civic administrator of which is attested a year or so after his death—for the endowment of new quinquennial games, the Euryclea. Their first celebration appears in the same year, late under Hadrian, as the emperor's gift to Sparta of Cythera, and the gift seems likewise to have been precipitated by the death of Herculanius, whose ancestor had been given the island by Augustus (chapter 8). That Cythera formed part of the paternal inheritance of Herculanius is suggested by a Cytheran inscription recording the dedication in 116–7 of a statue of Trajan 'in the time of (*epi*) the high-priest of the *Sebastoi* for life, the Emperor-loving and City-loving patron of the city, C.Iulius Eurycles Herculanius L.Vibullius Pius'. The name of the dedicating body is missing, but a reference (11.9–10) to 'the decree of the civic council' implies, given the stone's provenience, that it was the *polis* of Cythera; similarly the title 'patron (*kēdemōn*) of the city', otherwise unattested at Sparta, is best referred to Cythera. It might be argued that Eurycles appears here as eponym of a Cytheran document in his capacity as Spartan *patronomos*, a post which he held at about this time: Cythera's dependent status, that is, found expression in the use of Spartan *patronomos*-years for the dating of civic documents. But it is surely preferable to see here a reference to the position of Eurycles as hereditary proprietor of the island: his eponymate, that is, does not refer to a specific year, any more than did that of Eurycles and his son on their Spartan coin-issues. As he was in some sense Cythera's overlord, the dedication's fulsome record of the senator's polyonymy and Spartan titles makes sense. The best explanation for Hadrian's gift of Cythera to the Spartans seems to be that he was bequeathed the island by Herculanius, who had followed the common practice among the Roman aristocracy of including the emperor in wills. Perhaps as the testator hoped, Hadrian went on to give Cythera to the Spartans, thereby augmenting his earlier grants of territory to the city. The administration generated by the

island's change of status would account for Sparta's revival late under Hadrian, in an antiquarian gesture appropriate to the times, of the title of 'Cytherodices', formerly borne—according to Thucydides—by the Spartan governors of Cythera.¹¹

Remaining with Herculanus, it is tempting, in view of his testamentary gift of buildings at Mantinea and his close links with Corinth, to identify him, rather than his Augustan namesake, with the 'Eurycles, a Spartiate' whom Pausanias records as the donor of public baths at Corinth and a gymnasium at Sparta, the site of which is discussed in [chapter 10](#). The gift of a new gymnasium can be coupled with the foundation of the Euryclea, which included athletic contests ([chapter 13](#)); as an inducement to foreign athletes, the senator provided funds, not only for the payment of generous cash prizes, but also for the construction of up-to-date training facilities. The scale of his gifts to his native city explains the extraordinary honours conferred on him by the Spartans at his death. His inscribed epitaph shows that he was given a public burial—apparently in the city centre, to judge from the findspot of this and other blocks from his tomb, which are now built into a stretch of the Late Roman fortification-wall to the east of the theatre (App.I, 40). This central location, characteristic of the burials of Greeks worshipped as civic heroes, suggests that Herculanus's posthumous epithet 'hero' was more than just a conventional description for a dead man: the deceased senator seems to have been decreed 'heroic honours', a distinction once reserved by the Spartans for their kings, but one which they could now confer, as did other Greek cities of the time, on a local benefactor of unusual stature.¹²

By means of the benefactions of Hadrian, supplemented by those of a local magnate, Sparta's civic revenues were placed on a firmer footing and her urban amenities enhanced. Similar developments under Hadrian can be observed in other centres in Greece—at Athens, above all, where they took place on a far grander scale, but also—for instance—at Corinth and Argos. Together they can be seen as part of Hadrian's policy of raising the status of Achaia's cities—one pursued at the level, not only of individual cities, but also of collectivities of cities, the so-called *koina* or leagues. To Hadrianic Sparta's involvement with these we turn next.

Hadrianic encouragement of the pre-existing leagues of Greece is well-attested. The institution of the posts of Helladarch in, respectively, the Achaean and Amphictyonic Leagues can perhaps be seen as a Hadrianic initiative arising from a concern to increase the self-regulatory activities of the provincials and lighten the administrative load of Achaia's Roman officials. For historic reasons, the membership of both these leagues was regional rather than panhellenic. Hadrian, however, wished to foster a larger collectivity comparable to the *koina* or *concilia* of other provinces. This Imperial concern is implicit in a long Imperial letter to Delphi in 125, mooted an enlargement of the Amphictyony, on which Sparta had ceased to be represented in the mid-second century BC ([chapter 6](#)), by means of a redistribution of votes among 'the Athenians, the Spartans and

the other cities, so that the council [of the Amphictyons] may be common to all the Greeks'. Mention of Sparta is significant, since it suggests Hadrian's interest in the creation of a federal structure in Greece which would include major provincial cities at the time unaffiliated with any league. This was certainly true of Sparta at this date, since Kahrstedt's view, that the Roman city belonged to the reconstituted Achaean League, is unacceptable. In view of Sparta's old enmity towards the Achaeans, it seems unthinkable that the Roman city would have renewed its membership of the—reconstituted—league after 146 BC. The tenure of Achaean office by C. Julius Spartiaticus ([chapter 7](#)), on which Kahrstedt based this view, should be seen as deriving from his Corinthian, not his Spartan, citizenship.¹³

In fact, the recommendation in Hadrian's letter seems not to have been acted upon: Pausanias makes clear that in his time Sparta was excluded from the Amphictyony. The explanation with little doubt lies with the subsequent development in Hadrian's thinking in favour of an entirely new organization of Greek cities, the Panhellenion, Spartan membership of which, first attested under Pius and Marcus, should probably be retrojected to the Panhellenion's foundation in 131/2. Among the aims of this remarkable organization, that of promoting 'the ideal of panhellenic concord within the structure of the Roman Empire' is clear both from the scope of its membership, embracing cities from five Greek-speaking provinces, and from its association with the Plataean cult of Greek Concord, for long a symbol of the panhellenic ideal ([chapter 14](#)). That its function was not purely ceremonial, however, is suggested by the evidence for its involvement in civic administration. In the nature of the documentation this evidence is slight, but none the less significant in its echoing of other indications (above) of Hadrianic interest in Greek self-regulation. It is also likely that Hadrian saw the Panhellenion as a vehicle for the reassertion of old Greece's cultural primacy, to be achieved not only through the choice of Athens as its seat, but also through the conditions of membership, which required overseas cities to provide proof of their ethnic kinship with the peoples of Greece proper. Although Hadrian confirmed by his choice of capital city for the Panhellenion that this primacy rested above all on Athenian achievements, an inscription from Dorian Cyrene, an alleged Spartan colony at one remove and member-city of the Panhellenion, suggests that he also recognized the prestige of Sparta's distinctive contribution to Greek education in the form of the Lycurgan *agōgē* or training (see [chapter 14](#)). In the—now fragmentary—extracts from an Imperial edict or speech to the Cyrenaicans, dating to the 130s, the emperor made reference to things Spartan, including 'Laconian self-discipline (*sōphrosunē*) and training (*askēsis*)'. The context is far from clear, although it has been tentatively referred to Hadrian's legislative activity at Cyrene. The previous section, however, was concerned with local arrangements for the education of the young, which Hadrian had improved. It is tempting to suggest that he then went on to hold up as a model, not Spartan laws but Sparta's renowned *agōgē*, with which, in its (much altered) Roman form,

Hadrian himself had been closely connected through his earlier tenure of the patronomate.¹⁴

Hadrianic initiatives greatly enhanced Sparta's international standing, as is shown by the Antonine city's wide-ranging contacts with the overseas Greek world. Following Hadrian's example, in the three decades or so after 130 a succession of distinguished foreigners associated themselves with the Spartan training by holding the eponymous patronomate. The earliest of these *patronomoi*, in the 130s, was the aged Athenian ex-consul, Tib. Claudius Atticus, whose ties with Sparta had been exceptionally close ever since he spent part of his youth in exile there under Domitian; he had trained as a Spartan ephebe himself and later required his son Herodes, the future sophist, to do the same. Foreign *patronomoi* under Pius included the Ephesian senator C. Claudius Demonstratus Titianus; the Pergamene consular and historian, A. Claudius Charax; and a Cyrenaean notable, D. Cascellius Aristoteles. In the 150s and the early 160s Sparta was also invited to send festival-ambassadors (*sunthutai*) to Naples, Puteoli and Rhodes; a Spartan embassy to Tarentum is attested in the 140s; and in the same decade the city exchanged judges with Samos and Alabanda.

Sparta was linked to some of these overseas cities by claims of ethnic kinship. Such a claim emerges clearly in the case of the Phrygian city of Synnada in the hinterland of provincial Asia, which was actively promoting its ties with Hadrianic Greece in the 130s through the agency of a leading citizen, Tib. Claudius Attalus Andragathus. Evidently in connection with Synnada's application to join the Panhellenion, Attalus visited Sparta, where he set up a dedication making explicit reference to his native city's claim to be a Spartan colony. Tarentum, of course, was Archaic Sparta's one genuine colony; through their mother-city of Thera the Cyrenaeans had long claimed a Spartan ancestry; and in the third century the Alabandans also asserted that they were 'Spartans' (below). The Classical Spartans, who enjoyed, we are told, listening to stories about 'the ancient foundations of cities', would no doubt have relished their city's subsequent emergence as one of the most prestigious mother-cities of Greece, with whom not only the Jews (chapter 3) but also a string of cities in Asia Minor now claimed an antique kinship. Although literally interpreted by some as evidence for overseas settlements of Spartans, these claims to a Spartan ancestry are better understood as an aspect of cultural history, reflecting the desirability of Sparta as a mother-city—largely as the result of the fame of the Spartan myth and the recognition accorded to it by Rome—among Hellenised communities anxious to acquire an ethnic Greek pedigree. The vociferous—and competitive—assertion of these claims in the early Antonine age reveals the influence of the Panhellenion, with its requirement that member-cities showed 'proof' of a good Greek ancestry—one which had the effect of confirming Sparta's lately acquired and essentially fictitious status as a leading mother-city of old Greece.¹⁵

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During the peaceful reign of Antoninus Pius the Panhellenion flourished and post-Hadrianic Sparta's overseas diplomacy was at its busiest. Like his adoptive father, Pius was a benefactor of the Spartans, to judge from the mass dedication of altars at Sparta (41 are attested this time) to 'Zeus Eleutherius Antoninus Soter'. The titles 'Eleutherius' and 'Soter' suggest beneficent activity involving an act or acts of 'freeing'; there may be a connection here with the quarrel between Sparta and the Eleutherolacones, in which Pius found in favour of the former; conceivably, if disputed borders were in question, Spartan territory was now enlarged at the expense of her Free Laconian neighbours.¹⁶

By contrast, under the successor of Pius, the emperor Marcus Aurelius, Rome once more was placed on a war-footing. For appropriately archaizing reasons, the Spartans were directly involved in the earliest of these wars, the Parthian campaigns of 163–6, nominally conducted by the co-emperor L. Verus. Local inscriptions show that Sparta was requested, presumably as a 'friendly service' from a free city (chapter 11), to provide Rome with a contingent of auxiliary soldiers for this war. This levy comprised, or at any rate included, mounted troops, since one participant was described on his Spartan cenotaph as *dekatarkhēs*, the Greek equivalent of *decurio*, the name for the lowest rank of officer in an auxiliary unit of Roman cavalry. The background to this reactivation of Sparta's military tradition still needs elucidation. Arguing that the Spartan contingent included slaves and members of a local *gendarmérie*, von Premerstein claimed that it was levied by Rome in the face of a manpower-shortage, otherwise unknown but anticipating that of the late 160s, when Marcus was driven to recruiting civic police from Asia for his German wars. But the one public slave from Sparta known to have taken part, later claiming 'to have twice campaigned' against the Parthians, could have done so in an attendant capacity rather than as a combatant; and the lightly-armed M. Aurelius Alexys, taken by von Premerstein to be a Spartan *gendarme*, has now been assigned to the Spartan contingent recruited by Caracalla (below). This later contingent was recruited for antiquarian reasons: about to wage war on Parthia, Caracalla levied token forces from both the Macedonians and the Spartans. These were provincial communities especially renowned for their prowess in war against the Persians of old, whose equivalence to the Parthians had been fostered by Rome for propagandistic purposes at least since the time of Augustus (chapter 14); likewise for members of both Spartan contingents the enemy were not Parthians but 'Persians'. In 162, when no other Greek city is known to have provided Rome with troops, the request from Verus for a Spartan contingent should be seen in the same light as Caracalla's: an antiquarian gesture from an emperor attuned to Greek attitudes (Verus was the pupil of the sophist Herodes Atticus), one which acknowledged the patriotic enthusiasm aroused in Greece by the imminent war and which accorded with the enhanced mood of collaboration between Rome and the Greek world in the wake of Hadrian's initiatives. The work on military stratagems by the Macedonian Polyænus, dedicated to the co-emperors on the occasion of this war, was a product of

similar enthusiasm: 'I am a Macedonian', the author boasted in his introduction, 'with an ancestral tradition of military supremacy over the warring Persians'; it was probably no coincidence that Agesilaus—a Spartan general renowned for his invasion of the Persian Empire in the 390s BC—provided 'the central character' for the *exempla* which followed.¹⁷

After the eastern victories of Verus, the empire entered a more sombre decade. His troops came back carrying plague, to which Sparta would have become vulnerable on the arrival home of her contingent; the doctor hailed by the Spartans as their 'saviour' perhaps earned his civic honours at this time (chapter 13). In 167 the security of the empire was seriously threatened for the first time when German tribes overran the Danube frontier, preparing the way three years later for a raid on Greece by the Costoboci, who penetrated as far south as Eleusis. In the course of the military crisis brought about by these events, cities in Greece, as well as Asia, were called upon to provide Rome with troops. Thespieae sent a contingent of eighty 'volunteers' to Marcus, probably in 169; and a Spartan inscription records service by a veteran of the Parthian war in the campaign of Marcus against Avidius Cassius in 175/6, when the emperor was so hard-pressed for troops that he even accepted barbarian assistance. The economic burden of these wars was for the most part passed on to the provinces, and it is likely that the late 160s and the 170s saw an increase in Roman calls on Sparta for 'friendly services' of a financial kind. Local financial difficulties in this period are suggested by a sudden decrease in the numbers of inscribed catalogues of magistrates from the twenty-nine to thirty-three assignable to the reign of Pius to a mere four to eight under Marcus (App. IIA, Table). The same inference can be drawn from the debasement of metal-content first detectable in Sparta's coinage in issues of the period 172–5.¹⁸

Economic troubles perhaps provide a context for a mysterious Spartan episode of 'innovations' (*neōterismoi*) attested in two inscribed careers dated to 168–72. The better preserved of these records that its subject, one C. Iulius Arion, was 'ephor in the year of the innovations' or 'ephor in charge of them (the Greek word here, *epi*, admits of both meanings). Oliver, preferring the second sense, saw these 'innovations' as constitutional reforms, which he then associated with the (hypothetical) promotion of the interests of freedmen in Athens and other Greek cities by the emperor L. Verus. But the dating of the 'innovations' does not exactly support this view, since Verus left the east in 165 and was dead by 169. Nor did Oliver give sufficient weight to the negative connotations of the word *neōterismoi*, which, along with the verb *neōterizein*, was normally used by Greek writers in the sense of political 'revolution' (see the beginning of chapter 4). A preferable view is to see in these 'innovations' a reference to a local outburst of civil unrest or *stasis*. This conjectural unrest would be too late to be connected with the supposed revolt in Achaia under Pius, but perhaps reflected socio-economic tensions generated by the city's financial difficulties under Marcus, when the local upper class no doubt would have tried to pass on the impact of

increased Roman tax-demands to the lower classes (for instance, by raising rents or interest-rates on loans).¹⁹

Late in his reign, between 177 and 180, Marcus adjudicated a dispute between Sparta and the small Messenian city of Pherae. This dispute probably concerned boundaries—with the implication that the *agerDenteliatis* at the time was Spartan (see [chapter 10](#)). If so, it seems permissible to suggest that the Spartans—possibly in recognition of their military services to Rome in this period—had obtained a reversal from Marcus of the Senate’s award of the *ager* under Tiberius to Messene. Imperial benefaction of this kind would help to explain the extravagant Spartan honours for Commodus, the emperor’s son and heir. Uniquely in the succession of Roman emperors, Commodus was portrayed on Sparta’s coinage when still only Caesar or heir-designate (166–77). He was also honoured with an agonistic festival, the Commodian games, which could have been founded any time after 177, when Commodus became co-emperor with his father ([chapter 13](#)). His succession as sole emperor in 180 marked the cessation, for the time being, of major wars. The resumption of patterns of civic life familiar from the peaceful days of Hadrian and Pius is reflected in Commodan coin-issues of Smyrna celebrating ‘concord’ (*homonioia*) simultaneously with Athens and Sparta—a juxtaposition suggesting the overseas perception in this period of a certain symmetry between the two cities and the cultural traditions which they symbolized.²⁰

The murder of Commodus in 193 heralded four years of political instability and civil war—in which Greece was not directly implicated—before the founder of a new dynasty, the African P. Septimius Severus, by force of arms established himself securely as emperor. There are some grounds for thinking that Severus and Caracalla, his son and successor, were responsive to the Spartan myth. Caracalla’s recruitment of Spartan troops for his Parthian war, treated shortly, points most clearly in this direction; so too, perhaps, does the ‘biography’ of Apollonius commissioned from the sophist Philostratus by the wife of Severus, the empress Domna, in which Apollonius—an important figure to the Severan family—is portrayed as a zealous admirer of Lycurgan Sparta. Although the militarization of the empire under Severus has been exaggerated, it remains true that the importance of the army to the emperor’s rule was now more openly avowed than ever before. The martial brand of Hellenism symbolized by the Spartan tradition may have found more favour with Severus than the tradition of ‘high culture’ represented by Athens, a city whose privileges he reduced once he became emperor.²¹

At any rate, some such attitude on the new emperor’s part would be consistent with the fact that the Spartans were among the most demonstrative supporters of the Severan regime in Achaia. It has recently been established that the local Imperial cult was reorganized under Severus so as to place a new emphasis on the worship of the living emperor and on his descent from earlier *divi*—thus accommodating the dynastic propaganda of Severus, who claimed a fictive adoption into the family of Marcus Aurelius, thereby acquiring an

Imperial lineage stretching back to Nerva. Sparta has also yielded the most impressive monument to the Severan family yet to be found in Greece, comprising a massive base (over 7.5 metres long) on which stood statues of Severus, Domna, their elder son Caracalla and other members of the Imperial family. This (by local standards) lavish dedication can be dated to 202–5. Its occasion is unknown, although the local goodwill for the regime which it presupposes is consonant with Imperial benefaction. Either Severus or his son is the most likely candidate for identification with the unknown emperor who promoted a Spartan festival—probably the *Commodea*—to ‘iselastic’ rank (chapter 13). It is tempting to see a link between this benefaction and the dedication of 202–5.²²

In 212–13 the emperor Caracalla, the successor of Severus, enacted the ‘Antonine constitution’ whereby all free-born provincials became Roman citizens. At Sparta the impact of this measure emerges clearly in the preponderance of (M.) Aurelii in inscriptions of the later Severan period, the city’s newly-enfranchised Roman citizens adopting Caracalla’s *praenomen* and *nomen*. In the longer term, the value of Roman citizenship as a local status-indicator would now decline: it is perhaps symptomatic of this change that in the middle decades of the third century an honorific dedication for the aristocratic Heraclia, the daughter of Aurelii, no longer bothered to record her *nomen*. In 214, three years after his accession, Caracalla followed the precedent of L. Verus by recruiting Macedonian and Spartan auxiliaries for his offensive against the Parthians. The antiquarian context of these levies is explicit: the emperor, who strove to emulate Alexander the Great, armed the Macedonians in the manner of Alexander’s phalanx and organised the Spartan levy into a ‘Laconian and Pitanate *lokhos*’—perhaps so named, as Hertzberg suggested, because Caracalla (or rather his more scholarly advisors) wished to refute Thucydides in his disagreement with Herodotus over the existence at Classical Sparta of a ‘Pitanate *lokhos*’. The strength of this levy, as a Spartan inscription shows, was 500—perhaps by no coincidence the same order of magnitude as that of a *lokhos* in the old Spartan army after its reorganization around units called *morai*. The historian Herodian described this Spartan levy as a ‘phalanx’, implying a force of foot-soldiers. But they were not necessarily heavily-armed—after all, Alexander’s phalangites were not heavy infantry in any real sense. The sculptured tombstone of M. Aurelius Alexys, a member of the contingent, who died aged forty ‘having campaigned against the Persians’, shows a lightly-armed soldier wearing a cap resembling the old Laconian cap or *pilos* and armed with a wooden club. Caracalla’s operations against the Parthians were inconclusive and the Spartan contingent may never even have seen action before its presumed discharge in 217, following the emperor’s assassination.²³

With the fall of the Severan dynasty in 235 the Roman Empire moved into a period of rapidly increasing instability termed by some historians the ‘third-century crisis’. Until the 250s, however, the Aegean world, unlike some other parts of the empire, remained at peace, its communications and city-life yet to

be seriously disrupted by invasion. In the post-Severan period the persistence of familiar civic preoccupations is shown by the continued assertion in Asia Minor of claims to a Spartan ancestry. Under the emperor Maximinus (235–8) Tabae in Caria issued coins celebrating the ‘concord of the citizens of Tabae and Lacedaemon’, their obverse probably depicting the famous cult-statue of Apollo at Amyclae. Under Decius (249–50) Selge in Pisidia similarly celebrated ‘concord’ with the Spartans. Behind these agreements, evidently initiated by the minting cities, lay claims to a Spartan *sungeneia*: certain in the case of Selge, whose alleged kinship with Sparta was known to Polybius, and to be surmised in the case of Tabae, since a late tradition, found only in the Byzantine lexicographer Stephanus, records the city’s kinship with a neighbouring Spartan ‘colony’, the city of Cibyra. In the third century other Asian cities used their coinages to advertise, some for the first time, their claims to a Spartan *sungeneia*, including Pisidian Sagalassus under Caracalla and again under Macrinus (217–18), the Carian cities of Amblada and Alabanda under respectively Severus and Philip (244–9) and Synnada under Gordian III. This rash of issues shows that among the cities of Asia a Spartan foundation-legend remained as prestigious in the third century as it had been under Pius, in the heyday of the Panhellenion. In a third-century context, these and other assertions of the Roman world’s Greek inheritance, both in Asia and at Rome itself, can perhaps be seen as part of a search for ‘a greater, surer past’ in the face of the increasing troubles besetting the Roman Empire. To the impact of these troubles on Sparta we turn next.²⁴

Chapter nine

Pagans and Christians: Sparta in late antiquity

Under the authoritarian regimes of Diocletian and Constantine I the Roman Empire emerged territorially intact, if institutionally much changed, from the five decades of civil war, invasions and economic chaos which for historians constitute the third-century 'crisis'. Sparta had not been left unscathed by the violence of the times, in 268 enduring invasion for the first time since 88 BC (chapter 7). More seriously, the old vitality of civic life was sapped during this debilitating half-century in the face of increased Roman tax-demands and the administrative machinery developed to implement them. Moreover, although the city was to enjoy a limited economic recovery during the early fourth century, its prestigious position as a bulwark of old-world Hellenism was to be challenged and then marginalized by the progressive Christianization of the Roman world following Constantine's conversion.

We begin, however, by returning to the reigns of Severus and Caracalla, when the city still displayed signs of the prosperity which it enjoyed in the first half of the second century. After a lull in the 170s and 180s, catalogues of magistrates were once more being inscribed, albeit in nothing like the same numbers as under Trajan and Pius (App.IIA, Table). The city's festivals in this period continued to be celebrated and these and other cultural activities still attracted foreign visitors (chapters 13–14). But indications exist too of disturbing social developments. An increasing cleavage between the uppermost and lower ranks of the curial class is suggested by the appearance in Severan inscriptions of a new range of honorific epithets and titles, borne for the most part by members of a small number of leading families: 'the most worthy', 'the all-first', 'the best and from the best', and so on. A dominant interrelated clique of these families can be identified, centred on the descendants of Tib. Claudius Brasidas, a Spartan senator under Marcus Aurelius, and the old family of the Memmii, together with houses of more recent prominence such as the Pomponii and the Aelii. As some of them had done for generations, these families continued to produce civic benefactors, as with C.Pomponius Panthales Diogenes Aristreas, whose unstinting term as *agoranomos* in the early 220s earned him no fewer than twelve honorific statues, or his father-in-law P. Memmius Pratolaus *qui et* Aristocles, lavishly honoured a few years earlier for outstanding service in connection with the patronomate. In this period, however, reluctance to hold

office among Spartans of curial rank is also increasingly in evidence; the claim of the *ex-patronomos* Sex. Pompeius Spatalus to have undertaken his second term as gymnasiarch ‘voluntarily’ implies that compulsion was now in use to propel reluctant candidates into tenure of civic magistracies and liturgies. More remarkable as a pointer to the changing atmosphere of local politics are the repeated patronomates of the god Lycurgus. Having held the patronomate three times between about 140 and 221, this Spartan deity did so no fewer than eight times between 221 and about 240. These ‘divine’ patronomates were a financial stratagem, enabling the city to fund the expenses of the office in question from the revenues of the cult ([chapter 14](#)).¹

In the Greek-speaking provinces reluctance to hold civic office was not a new phenomenon in the Severan age. But in the early third century it undoubtedly increased as the Roman authorities sought to extract more of the local surplus in order to meet military needs, the added burden falling in the first instance on the shoulders of the curial class. It is surely no coincidence that interventions at Sparta by Roman officialdom, including financial officers, become more noticeable in the early third century ([chapter 11](#)). Significantly they included, towards the mid-century, the repair of a bridge across the Eurotas ([chapter 10](#)); this Roman interest in the maintenance of communications between the city and the surrounding countryside can perhaps be connected with the increased emphasis in this period on taxation in kind, for the collection and storage of which Sparta may have come to serve as a regional centre. The financial straits of Sparta’s curial class as the third century progressed emerge in other ways. It was normal practice in the Roman city for the cost of civic dedications to be funded by the families of the honorands. After about 230, an increasing fashion can be detected for portrait-herms, a cheaper alternative to the free-standing statue. By the mid-century, public inscriptions had become a rarity, whole series of texts disappearing for good: the most recent catalogue of magistrates can be placed no later than 250; likewise the last of the ephebic dedications at the sanctuary of Artemis Orthia, dated by Woodward to 226–40. Under the emperor Gallienus, finally, Sparta’s mint produced its last coin-issues. The funding of civic coinages in the Roman east was traditionally reliant on private munificence, as can be seen in Sparta’s case by the rôle of Eurycles Herculanus in the revival of the city’s mint under Hadrian ([chapter 8](#)); their cessation, among a complex of factors, certainly reflects the declining affluence of the curial class.²

The withering away of the ‘epigraphic habit’ also suggests insecurity—a failing in the sense of a future ‘audience’ without which the laborious carving of texts onto stone becomes a pointless activity. In the 250s and 260s the Aegean world became accustomed perforce to repeated sea-borne raids by barbarian groups from outside the empire’s northern frontier. In 268 one such group, a band of Herulian Goths, attacked Thessaly and southern Greece. At Sparta, rumours of imminent danger led to the burying of valuables, as is shown by a hoard of freshly minted coins of Gallienus unearthed on the acropolis. The most

notorious achievement of these raiders was the temporary capture of Athens; only one source, the much later Byzantine historian George the Syncellus (fl. 800), records that they also ‘fell upon’ Corinth, Argos and Sparta. At Athens the invaders had met with local resistance: 2,000 Athenians, led by the Athenian historian P. Herennius Dexippus, joined with Imperial troops in mounting a successful counter-attack. The new lease of life given to the legend of Spartan military prowess by Rome’s recruitment of Spartan troops for her Parthian wars conceivably led to a similar display of resistance to the Heruli by the Eurotas; if so, however, no local Dexippus was at hand to preserve the tale for posterity.³

Largely on the basis of the incorporation of ruined buildings of Imperial date into Sparta’s Late Roman fortification wall, archaeologists have assumed that the Heruli devastated the city and fired its public buildings. However, now that this defensive work has been dated to the early fifth century (below), little firm evidence at present exists to support this assumption of widespread damage (but cf. App.I, 57). Moreover, the availability for public works undertaken a generation later of architectural fragments from earlier buildings (or *spolia* in archaeological parlance) could as easily reflect the decay of civic amenities through an extended period of neglect as their deliberate destruction: the case of the repaired bridge over the Eurotas (above) shows that even before the Herulian raid, Sparta was experiencing difficulty in the upkeep of civic amenities; and the theatre seems to have known a period of disuse in the third century, probably to be placed in the aftermath of 268. The primary objective of the raiders was booty, and, although some damage no doubt occurred to the city’s fabric, how extensive or lasting this was remains at present an open question.⁴

Archaeology to date has been more successful in showing Sparta’s participation in the general economic recovery of the provinces by the reigns of Diocletian and Constantine I. Extensive building-activity at the theatre is attested at the turn of the third century, including the erection of a new marble *scaenae frons*, its architrave carrying a dedication to the tetrarchic Caesars Constantine and Maximian (293–305), and the construction of a fountain-house or nymphaeum, richly decorated with marble veneer and sculpture and replacing the Augustan scenery-store in front of the west-*parodos*, whose bricks it reused (App.I, 24). Perhaps as part of the same programme of public works, the theatral area of the sanctuary of Artemis Orthia, focus of the Roman city’s revived ‘Lycurgan’ training (chapter 14), was now given monumental form through the construction of a small amphitheatre (App.I, 38). The building of the nymphaeum indicates that the Roman aqueduct (chapter 10) was still kept in repair; a post-Herulian building-phase has also been detected in the complex identified in chapter 10 as the gymnasium of Eurycles (App.I, 19). Other archaeological evidence for the maintenance of civic amenities includes the recent discovery of a monumental urban thoroughfare flanked by colonnades (App.I, 7; cf. 6, 8). For all its reliance on *spolia* in the late-antique manner, a

building project such as this suggests that the appearance of their city continued to be a source of pride to the inhabitants of fourth-century Sparta. Alongside new or refurbished civic buildings, the evidence for private luxury at Sparta continues into late antiquity. Most of the finds of impressive figured mosaic-floors belong to the period after the Herulian raid; well-appointed houses continued to have their floors and walls faced with marble; one house had its own water-supply piped into a marble fountain (App.I, 65, 67–9, 73). As a whole, the archaeological evidence for Late Roman Sparta suggests some recovery in urban prosperity after the critical decades of the mid-third century, with the late-antique city continuing to provide a residential centre for a well-to-do class of local landowners (see [chapter 12](#)). There is some suggestion too, from the interim findings of the Laconia Survey, that the Spartan countryside saw the intensification of rural activity in the fourth and fifth centuries reported for other parts of Greece, notably the southern Argolid and Boeotia. Given the more optimistic note which has entered modern debate over the health of the Late Roman economy, one might cautiously concur with the archaeologists who have seen in this phenomenon evidence for an ‘economic recovery’ in Late Roman Greece.⁵

In the fourth century Achaia continued to be governed by senatorial proconsuls, now enjoying a higher rank than they had done under the principate—a gesture by Constantine I, it seems, in recognition of the revival of old Greece’s cultural prestige in the previous two centuries. Sparta’s diminished local autonomy in this period is reflected in the evidence for proconsular interventions, especially in the field of public works. Substantial benefaction of unknown character by a Constantinian governor, the poet Publilius Optatianus, is indicated by his honorific title of ‘benefactor in all things and saviour of Lacedaemon’. A generation later, in 359/60, the proconsul P.Ampelius sponsored building activity in the theatre and perhaps elsewhere, since the Bithynian sophist Himerius—in a well-schooled metaphor turning on the austerity of the ancient Spartans—credited him with having allowed Sparta to ‘exchange her filthy locks for blooming braids’. Somewhat later (between 382 and 384?) the governor Anatolius was responsible for ‘rebuilding ruined Sparta’—a reference, perhaps, to proconsular initiatives in the wake of the great earthquake in Greece of 375, when, according to the historian Zosimus, ‘many cities were destroyed’.⁶

Turning to cultural life, early fourth-century Sparta continued to enjoy a certain prominence in educated pagan circles as a ‘venerable metropolis of the past’ and a minor centre of higher studies ([chapter 13](#)). In the form of the Roman city’s ephebic training the ‘Lycurgan customs’ continued to play their part in civic life, as is shown by the tetrarchic refurbishment of the sanctuary of Artemis Orthia (above) and the visit of the sophist Libanius of Antioch in 336 or thereabouts to see the ‘festival of the whips’. Another famous Spartan sanctuary displaying a certain vitality in this period was that of Apollo at Amyclae, where the priest, in an elegiac inscription which seems to belong to

the fourth century, set up the portrait of a local benefactor. His description as a ‘donor of prizes’ (*athlothetēs*) seems to show that the ancient festival of the Hyacinthia and its accompanying contests ([chapter 14](#)) were still celebrated at the time of this text. For the continued existence at Sparta during the fourth century of a highly-educated pagan aristocracy we have the evidence of Libanius, whose broad acquaintance included a number of Spartans, among them the family of the grammarian Nicocles, the teacher of the emperor Julian; one Ausonius, a friend from shared student-days (in Athens?); and the well-travelled Euelpistius, a prominent local figure described by Libanius as the ‘leader’ of the Spartans. These Spartans, like their Athenian counterparts, belonged to a social stratum which included curial families with a history of local prominence spanning the troubled decades of the third century. A tetrarchic notable claiming to be ‘forty-fifth in descent from the Dioscuri’ must have belonged to one such lineage; M.Aurelius Stephanus, a Constantinian high-priest of Sparta’s Imperial cult, perhaps descended from an earlier homonym, a Spartan *equus* in the Severan age; and it is tempting to recognize a descendant of the *agoranomos* Panthales (above) in the Spartan of the same name mentioned in the rescript of the proconsul P.Ampelius.⁷

The brief reign of the apostate emperor Julian (361–3) saw renewed Imperial support for the pagan Hellenism with which Sparta, like Athens, was now chiefly associated. The city’s standing in Achaia, at least in Julian’s mind, is shown by its inclusion among those communities in the province to which he wrote for support at the time (361) of his revolt against the emperor Constans II. As emperor, Julian favoured the family of Nicocles, whose brother Sozomenus served as equestrian governor of Lycia in 363. In addition, a letter from Libanius to Euelpistius reveals that the addressee had taken part in Julian’s ill-fated Persian expedition in the same year. The presence of a Spartan on an Imperial campaign against Persians at once recalls the Spartan levies of 163–6 and 214–7 ([chapter 8](#)): given the antiquarian resonances of Julian’s expedition, it seems at least possible that Euelpistius was a member of another such Spartan contingent, raised by Julian for sentimental and propagandistic reasons in the tradition of earlier pagan emperors.⁸

Although a bastion of pagan Hellenism, fourth-century Sparta was far from being isolated from the religious controversies of the age. A Spartan community of Christians had existed at least since the reign of M. Aurelius ([chapter 14](#)). In the favourable circumstances of the post-Constantinian era this community can be assumed to have grown in numbers and local influence, although a bishop of Sparta is not attested, as it happens, before 457 ([chapter 15](#)). Open tensions between local Christians and the city’s pagan population are revealed by a letter from Libanius to his Spartan friend Ausonius, penned in 365 and of some importance for providing ‘one of the few instances in Greece where violent conflict between pagans and Christians can be confidently documented’. In this letter the writer raised the topic of the survival of cult-statues at Sparta. He had heard that those of Athena Chalcioecus, Aphrodite Enoplius, the Dioscuri ‘and

others' were still extant—probably, we can add, because the sanctuaries in question were under the protection of powerful priestly families within the pagan élite, as they are certainly known to have been in the third century. Libanius then alludes, however, to the rumoured destruction of two lesser statues in the sanctuary of Athena Chalcioecus on the acropolis at the instigation of the 'giants' (the author's pseudonym for Christians) acting in collaboration with 'the then rulers'. This last reference—presumably indicating Roman officials rather than local magistrates—suggests an episode which took place some time previously—perhaps under Constantius (337–61), when there is some other evidence for collusion between local clergy and Roman officialdom in attacks on pagan cults.⁹

After well over a hundred years of peace, at the close of the century the Balkans entered once more a prolonged period of insecurity, to which Greece was rudely introduced in 396 by an invasion of Goths led by Alaric, who captured Corinth, Argos and Sparta. Apart from allusions in the poetry of Claudian, of little or no use to the historian, the only account of Sparta's capture is given by the pagan historian Zosimus, writing probably in the later fifth century. According to Zosimus, on this occasion 'there was added to the ranks of captive Greece Sparta, no longer defended by either arms or valorous men; thanks to Roman avarice it had been handed over to magistrates who treasonably and eagerly served the pleasure of the conquerors in everything that looked to the common destruction'. This purplish passage, if at all reliable, suggests that in 396, rather than trying to organize any local resistance, the Spartan authorities attempted to negotiate with the Goths so as to avoid the horrors of a sack. In so doing they may have been influenced by the poor state of Sparta's defences, since, according to Zosimus, almost all the Peloponnesian cities were unwallled at the time. If the view taken below of the date of Sparta's Late Roman fortification wall is correct, Sparta's only protection would have been her old mud-brick city-wall of Hellenistic date (App.I, 9), which, even if still in good repair, the Spartans may no longer have had sufficient manpower to defend.

Clear signs of destruction attributable to the Gothic occupation of Sparta so far are slight. After Alaric's departure, however, the city's defences were rebuilt on new lines. This Late Roman fortification wall, much of it still standing, enclosed only a small central area of the old walled city: the acropolis and a small annexe to the east. Its dating is debatable: the British excavators distinguished an early phase of construction, which they assigned to the post-Herulian period; but it now seems likely, as Gregory has argued, that the whole circuit should be attributed to the early fifth century and associated with an Imperially-sponsored programme of defensive building in Greece, the chief purpose of which was to provide secure centres for local administration in the wake of the Gothic incursions (App.I, 10). The construction of this new defence incorporated on a large scale the remains of civic buildings, including parts of the stage from the theatre and blocks from the Hadrianic mausoleum of

Eurycles Herculanus (App.I, 40): the availability of these *spolia* need not reflect Gothic deprivations, however, so much as the deliberate dismantling of redundant buildings and monuments. Although the view of Chrimes, that Sparta was ‘finally’ abandoned after 396, is completely untenable, the construction of this new defence marked a break with the city’s classical layout and heralded the beginning of its medievalization—a transformation beyond the scope of this book.¹⁰

Chapter ten

The Roman city and its territory

Ancient Sparta might be said to resemble ancient Alexandria in that, although literary descriptions of both cities have survived, their urban topography remains difficult to reconstruct. In Sparta's case, the value of the detailed, if partial, account by Pausanias of the early Antonine city is offset by the slow progress of archaeological research, which has yet to locate firmly such cardinal points as the agora, the lines of most of the chief thoroughfares and the city-gates. It is not this chapter's purpose to offer a rehearsal of the evidence and an anthology of modern opinion regarding Spartan topography, present understanding of which remains based on the findings of the campaigns conducted by the British School at Athens before and after the Great War. Instead, it attempts to show what is significant for an archaeological understanding of the Roman city, beginning with a survey, in the light of recent research and personal observation, of the chief monuments of the Roman period, basing itself on the catalogue of sites presented as Appendix I.¹

Until the time of the Herulian raid at least, the hub of the Roman city remained the agora, the civic centre of Sparta since at least the fifth century BC. By the Antonine period, in a development paralleled elsewhere in old Greece, notably at Athens, this area had acquired the character almost of a museum, crowded with statues of deities and famous Spartans and old tombs and sanctuaries, and dominated by its showpiece, the Persian Stoa, originally built from the spoils of Plataea and famous for the figures of defeated Persians which supported the facade (Paus.iii.11.3). As well as offering attractions for cultural tourists, the agora served as the administrative centre of the Roman city, being flanked by the offices of the chief magistrates, the council-house of the *gerontes* and the so-called Old Ephoreia, the building which seems to have served as the Spartan *prutaneion* in late Hellenistic and Imperial times; nearby probably stood the civic archives or *grammatophylakeion* (App.I, 11 and 12). The religious importance of the agora, for long a centre of civic cult, was reinforced by the establishment under Augustus, probably on the initiative of Eurycles, the founder of Sparta's Imperial cult (chapter 7), of shrines (*naoi*) dedicated to Caesar and Augustus—a cultic assemblage of the kind dubbed a *Kaisareion* or *Sebasteion* in neighbouring Gytheum and Messene, although not, as far as we know, at Sparta. The chief public space of the Roman city, the agora provided

an obvious setting for honorific monuments: under Gaius or Claudius a portrait-painting of T. Statilius Lamprias was commissioned for display 'in the agora' (IG iv² 86.28–9); and the monumental public tomb of the senator Eurycles Herculanus lay in its vicinity (App.I, 40). Although the site of the agora has yet to be located, it probably lay to the east or south-east of the low hill which passed at Sparta for an acropolis in the vicinity of the 'Roman Stoa', a building 'most naturally accounted for in the Agora'.²

This stoa (App.I, 18), lying no more than 100 metres to the north of the modern football stadium, is a massive structure of Imperial date, constructed in Roman fashion in rubble concrete faced with brick (*opustestaceum*) and, at the time of writing, the object of renewed archaeological investigation aiming to clarify its date, plan and function. Some 320 metres to its west and on the same alignment lies the theatre (App.I, 14), the two linked in antiquity, as excavation has shown, by a thoroughfare running along the southern foot of the acropolis. The archaeological evidence for the theatre reaches no further back than the Hellenistic period, and as yet it remains unclear whether the site was already in use for theatrical purposes in Classical times; as Bölte saw, literary references to *theatra* at Classical Sparta may in fact denote theatrical settings for religious festivals in the agora and at the Amyclaeum. At any rate, the theatre which Pausanias described as 'worth seeing' (iii.14.1) was essentially a creation of the Augustan age, when the site was completely remodelled, massive earthworks and retaining walls allowing the enlargement on a new axis of the *cavea*, which was now given marble seating, apparently for the first time.³

Although the task cannot be undertaken here, the complex history of the stage arrangements requires fresh study in the light of recent doubts cast on the theory of H. Bulle that a wooden sliding-stage was introduced under Augustus; C. Buckler has shown that the grooved blocks identified by Bulle as tracks for the wheels of his hypothetical stage cannot have been used for this purpose; more probably they formed part of the arrangements for storing wooden scenery inside the *skānothēkā*, the brick-built shed erected in front of the west *parodos* as part of the Augustan remodelling. For the time being, we are left with the tentative reconstruction offered by the theatre's excavator, A.M. Woodward, for whom the Augustan period saw the demolition of the Hellenistic proscenium and its replacement with a colonnaded screen in the Doric order. A permanent raised stage (*pulpitum*), its wooden floor resting on a decorated marble facade, is not attested before the third century, although it was built before 268, since rubbish-pits dug behind the facade, apparently after its construction, have been associated with a period of disuse following the Herulian raid (chapter 9). Its predecessor, of which no trace has been found, seems to have been a temporary structure of wood. It has gone unremarked that such an arrangement for much of the principate is also implied by the statement of Lucian (*Anach.*38) that the annual ball-games of the *sphaireis-teams* took place in the theatre, the orchestra presumably being enlarged on these occasions by the dismantling of the wooden stage. As for the successive remodellings of the screen attested by the hundreds

of fragments of architectural marbles found on the site, these are problematic to reconstruct and date, although one, it seems, can be assigned to the reign of Vespasian, whom an inscribed epistyle-block from the theatre records as a patron of building (IG v. 1.691=SEG xi.848), and another to the tetrarchic period ([chapter 9](#)).⁴

Substantial remains of a large thermal complex lie in the flat land some 650 metres west of the theatre at the site known locally as Arapissa (App.I, 19). The incomplete excavations of the British School uncovered a large area, 155 by 135 metres, featuring rooms with hypocausts, a structure resembling a water-tower, wall-niches for statuary and traces of marble incrustation on floors and walls. The site also produced fragments of an inscribed architrave-block, together with five marble pilasters in the form of hip-herms depicting a bearded Heracles holding his club; these originally formed part of a colonnade, but were reused as building-material in a later remodelling; together with two others from the same series found elsewhere, they have been assigned by O.Palagia, on grounds of style, to the Severan period. The British excavators distinguished a total of three building phases in the (apparently long) history of this complex, placing the latest in the post-Herulian period and the earliest in the late second century, although a provisional reexamination of the brickwork—*opus testaceum* like that of the ‘Roman Stoa’—suggests that an original date of construction in the Hadrianic period should not be ruled out.⁵

This possibility invites a refinement to the identification of the complex, the civic character of which is suggested by its size, its expensive finish and its association with what may well have been an inscribed building-dedication. It lay in the area to the west of the theatre in which Pausanias (iii.14.6) saw a group of athletic facilities: the Dromos or race track, and two gymnasia, one of them the gift of ‘a Spartiate named Eurycles’. Thermal complexes on the Roman model were a feature of Greek gymnasia constructed or refurbished under the principate. The identification of the Arapissa complex as a gymnasium of this type is suggested by its association with the herms of Heracles, a traditional patron of Greek gymnasia, who was held in special reverence by sportsmen at Roman Sparta, where one of his statues stood in the vicinity of the Dromos, to which the *sphaireis*-teams sacrificed, and another flanked an entrance to the ephebic battle-ground at Platanistas (Paus.iii.14.6, 8). It is suggested here that the Arapissa-complex should be identified with the gymnasium of Eurycles, the donor to be understood as the opulent Eurycles Herculanus, himself allegedly a descendant of Heracles, whose other benefactions at Sparta and elsewhere, most of them posthumous, were discussed in [chapter 8](#). If the gymnasium was also a posthumous gift, construction would have begun at the end of Hadrian’s reign.⁶

If correctly identified, the gymnasium of Eurycles must be clearly distinguished from its neighbour, an older establishment presumably to be equated with the gymnasium in which the erection of a bronze portrait-statue was ordered under Gaius or Claudius (IG iv².86.28–9). This earlier gymnasium was probably at least as old as the Hellenistic period and presumably was the

lineal successor to the civic gymnasium destroyed by earthquake in 464 BC (Plut.*Cim.*16.5).⁷

A hundred metres north-west of the acropolis are the remains of some eight piers of an arched aqueduct, noted by earlier investigators but as yet unstudied (App.I, 3). Their construction, once more in *opus testaceum*, would suit a second-century date, their orientation suggesting that the aqueduct originally terminated on the summit of the acropolis above the theatre. The full course of this aqueduct has yet to be traced; but it seems to be part of a system, of which further stretches are attested, which brought water from the lower sources of the Eurotas at the copious springs of modern Vivari, some 12 kilometres north-west of the ancient site.

In addition to these structures inscriptions permit the identification of other public works of the Roman period. The inscribed career of C.Iulius Theophrastus, which dates from early in the reign of Pius, contains a unique reference to Spartan *thermai* (App.I, 23), which at this date ought to indicate a public bathing establishment organized on the model of the Roman *thermae*. In addition, two inscriptions of Antonine date attest—under the general supervision of the *agoranomos*—a *mukhos*, which here seems to have the sense of ‘granary’ (App.I, 17); this need not necessarily have been a building of Roman date, but it is tempting to think that it was, since the plentiful evidence for civic organization of the grain supply at Sparta belongs no earlier than the second century (see [chapter 11](#)).⁸

The same inscriptions mention a Spartan *makellon* (App.I, 16), a Greek loan-word from Latin signifying a *macellum* or alimentary market. This typically Roman amenity, which by the second century had acquired a characteristic architectural form, based on an open court framed by shop-units, is encountered elsewhere in Achaia from the reign of Augustus onwards. That Sparta’s *makellon* was some-what older is implied by the attempt of the Roman antiquary Varro, writing in the mid-first century BC, to link the etymology of the Latin *macellum* with the usage of the Spartans, who in his day—so he claimed—‘still’ employed the word *makellon* in the particular sense of a vegetable-market (*Ling.Lat.v.* 146–7). This etymology is probably a fantasy, owing much to the larger tendency in Greek and Roman scholarship of the Late Republic to laconize the origins of Roman customs; as de Ruyt saw, the linguistic influence is more likely to have gone in the reverse direction. Varro’s story, however, does suggest that the word *makellon* was already applied by the mid-first century BC to an alimentary market at Sparta, although its relationship to the Antonine *makellon* is not entirely clear.⁹

Another amenity inspired by Roman models was the stone bridge (App.I, 5) attested by a dedication in honour of a Roman official, the *corrector* Iulius Paulinus, who, towards the mid-third century, sponsored the repair of ‘the third arch of the bridge in the direction of the city and the openings (*parapulia*) on both sides, which had fallen into ruin both from the passage of time and the currents of the river and for a long while had been entirely destroyed and

collapsed' (lines 14–24). In a lucid study, A. Wilhelm showed that the design of this bridge was Roman, the *parapulia* to be understood as small openings between the arches for flood-waters of the kind first found in the bridges of Late Republican Rome. Hence its date cannot be earlier than the late first century BC, although its attribution by Wilhelm to the age of Eurycles remains no more than a guess, since similar openings continued to be a feature of Roman bridge-building at least as late as the reign of Hadrian. As for the river spanned by this bridge, it can only have been the Eurotas. The sites of two, possibly Roman, bridges across this river have been reported, one just above the modern bridge for the Tripoli road (although this site has also been claimed as mediaeval), another some three miles to the north; presumably the carriage-road for which the bridge was built would have provided the chief link between the Roman city and Spartan territory to the north-east.¹⁰

The Roman period also saw the construction of new sanctuaries at Sparta. As well as the shrines of the Imperial cult, mentioned earlier, Pausanias saw two sanctuaries in close proximity to each other, one dedicated to the fashionable Egyptian god Sarapis, which the periegete describes as the 'newest' in the city (iii.14.5), the other to Zeus Olympius, whose Spartan cult, it was argued in [chapter 8](#), was founded under Hadrian. That of Sarapis, by implication, would have been yet more recent; the priest of his attested in a mid-Antoine catalogue of *gerontes* (IG v.1.109.3–5) conceivably was the first.¹¹

The private sphere is considered next. Plutarch implies (*Mor.* 601b) that in his day the choicest residential area at Sparta was the ancient ward of Pitana, firmly located in the north-western angle of the intra-mural area, a neighbourhood little explored archaeologically, although it has produced the remains of a house with a mosaic floor, apparently in use at the time of the Herulian raid (App.I, 58). The site of a large house, its earliest building-phase assigned by the excavator to the Augustan period, suggests the presence of another residential agglomeration between the sanctuary of Artemis Orthia and the modern Eurotas bridge (App.I, 51), in the presumed vicinity of the ward of Limnae. But most of the evidence for Roman housing comes from the flat land to the west and south of the acropolis and the (probable) site of the agora, an area perhaps embracing another old ward, that of Mesoa. The impression gained by the British archaeologists, from the 'remains of numerous mosaic pavements, and of sculptures such as were used for the adornment of gardens', of a neighbourhood 'covered with houses of some size and comfort', has been amply borne out by the subsequent rescue-excavations of the Greek Archaeological Service in building-plots to the west and east of the football stadium. Although many of the structures discovered date to late antiquity, some six have been assigned to the pre-Herulian period, including a group of four rooms, featuring mosaic floors and walls encrusted with *marmor Lacedaemonium* from Croceae, and parts of four or five luxuriously equipped bath-suites. Although no distinction has been observed by excavators between private and public establishments, the existence of the former is implied in at least one case by the

discovery *insitu* of the base for a privately dedicated statue (App.I, 52–7 with IG v.1.518).¹²

The last two centuries BC have produced the earliest archaeological evidence for substantial built tombs at Sparta. A group of four was excavated to the south of the acropolis, one at least ('Tomb A') featuring an imposing facade of dressed stone crowned with a pediment and, probably, an *akrotērion* (App.I, 45). This burial-ground attests the survival as late as the Augustan period of the Spartan custom of burying the dead 'within the *polis*' (Plut.Lyc.27.1). Other cemeteries of Roman date, respecting the Roman prohibition of intra-mural burial (Cic. *DeLeg.* ii.22.56), are located on the periphery of the Roman city—one to the north of the acropolis, on the left bank of the Mousga torrent; another to its north-east, near the modern Eurotas bridge (presumably to be associated with the ward of Limnae), where an earlier burial-ground remained in use in the Roman period; and possibly a third to the south-east (App.I, 46–8). A thorough study of the forms of funerary monument at Roman Sparta cannot be attempted here, but a glance at the material reveals considerable variety of taste and purchasing power, ranging from simple *stēlai*, their epitaphs sometimes invoking passers-by and thereby indicating road-side locations (IG v. 1.731; 734), to the rock-cut chamber-tombs of the Mousga cemetery, in which the deceased were inhumed in 'troughs' and individually identified by inscribed slabs (cf. SEG xi.865), and the statuary and carved sarcophagi fashionable among the wealthy in the second and third centuries, these last either imported from Athenian workshops or manufactured locally to imitate Attic types.¹³

* * * * *

Roman Sparta has been characterized by one of its modern excavators as a 'large and prosperous Roman city'. This description needs some qualification. Although no accurate means exists of estimating the urban population, in the absence of any extenuating factor in what is known of local economy (see [chapter 12](#)) it is not easy to believe that it exceeded that of the modern town of Sparta, estimated at a modest 12,000 in 1961, 'well after Greece had been sucked into the orbit of international finance capital'. Compared even with Pompeii, whose urban population in 79 is thought to have been about 15,000, Roman Sparta remained relatively small. Moreover, with the space within the circuit of the Hellenistic city-wall estimated at rather less than 209 hectares (as opposed to Pompeii's 65 hectares), population-density at Roman Sparta must have been relatively low. This inference finds some archaeological support. One of the group of late Hellenistic stone-built tombs (App.I, 45), which were sited to the south of the acropolis in the centre of the intra-mural space, did not receive its latest burial before the Augustan period, to judge from the find of a coin of Eurycles. It looks as if the dispersed pattern of settlement in the Classical and Hellenistic periods, based on villages usually identified with the wards of Limnae, Mesoa, Pitana, Cynosura and the Neopolitae, persisted into the principate, with burial-grounds placed in the interstices of discrete residential areas. That the Hellenistic wall, its course primarily dictated by defensive

considerations, enclosed open land as well as built-up areas is confirmed by the evidence, first noted by Kahrstedt, for the construction of Roman buildings to the south and west of the acropolis—including the complex tentatively identified as the late-Hadrianic gymnasium of Eurycles—on archaeologically virgin soil. The impression is created of an urban habitat in Roman times which continued to comprise, alongside public buildings and private dwellings, a fair amount of vacant plots, perhaps to be imagined as under cultivation in the form of market-gardens, orchards or vineyards.¹⁴

In terms of public buildings, while it may never have rivalled Corinth or Athens, the chief cities of Achaia, by the late principate Roman Sparta, with its marble theatre, *macellum*, modern gymnasium, thermal establishments both public and private and long-distance aqueduct, had acquired most of the amenities which contemporaries thought of as characterizing urban life; by the standards of provincial Achaia, it was a well-appointed city. To be fair, the monumentalization of Sparta was not a purely Roman phenomenon. Not only was Classical Sparta less devoid of architectural pretensions than Thucydides (cf. i.10.2) would have us believe, but it is clear that the Hellenistic age saw an elaboration, if still relatively modest, of urban amenities. To this period belongs the earliest detected building-phase at the theatre, which included a stone proscenium, although the accompanying seating arrangements have left no trace and were probably temporary; also (probably) the structure known as the Machanidae, its name connecting it with the ‘tyrant’ Machanidas (chapter 5) and evidently having an athletic or balaneutic function, since, along with the gymnasium and the therms, it was one of the amenities for users of which C. Iulius Theophrastus made provision during his gymnasiarchy (App. I, 22). Another Hellenistic construction, hitherto unremarked, can be recognized in the ‘stoas in a tetragonal arrangement’ which once, but in the time of Pausanias no longer, had been used for the sale of *ῥῶπος* or petty wares (iii.13.6). This complex, to judge by its subsequent change of function, was already long-established when Pausanias saw it. A Hellenistic date is suggested, firstly, by its axial layout, closely resembling the peristylar courts which became common in Greek architecture and town-planning during the third and second centuries BC, and, secondly, by its original purpose, *ῥῶπος* being a term ‘particularly associated with the wares of travelling merchants’, for whom Sparta became much more accessible with the opening up of local economy in the Hellenistic period (see chapter 5). The later abandonment of this, Sparta’s first built market, suggests its replacement by the time of Pausanias with a more modern amenity (one thinks here, for instance, of the ‘Roman Stoa’ with its alleged shop-units).¹⁵

Under the principate, however, the pace of monumentalization quickened, with two periods emerging as especially dynamic ones: the Augustan age, when the theatre was rebuilt, and the second century, which saw *inter alia* the construction of the aqueduct and, as was suggested earlier, the gymnasium of Eurycles. The connection in the provincial Greek world, especially Asia Minor, between the upgrading of local water-supply and the construction of thermal

amenities is well-established; on Sparta's new aqueduct, in all likelihood, depended the Arapissa-complex and the *thermai* for their water-supply. If, like the Hellenistic aqueduct provided for the ward of Cynosura (App.I, 1), the Roman aqueduct supplied water to private users, it may well have stimulated the development into a residential area for the rich of the land to the south and west of the acropolis, of which private bath-suites, as was seen earlier, were a feature.¹⁶

If the aqueduct emerges as a stimulus to urbanization, establishment of its date is of some importance. Although the issue can be finally resolved only through further field-work, it should be emphasized that long-distance aqueducts of this type were costly engineering projects, beyond the resources of ordinary cities. In Achaia their appearance is associated with the emperor Hadrian, who is known to have funded their construction at Corinth, Athens (where Pius completed the project), Argos and, probably, Thebes. Since the honorific titulature conferred on him by the Spartans is consonant with Imperial gifts of buildings (see [chapter 8](#)), it is tempting to identify Hadrian as the donor of the Spartan system as well (one can add that its apparent termination in an elevated reservoir again resembles the Athenian and Argive arrangements).¹⁷

As for the prosperity of the Roman city, although this need not be doubted (see [chapter 12](#)), archaeologically it is suggested more by well-appointed private dwellings than by new public amenities, since, in a city which for cultural reasons attracted foreign benefactors, these cannot always be assumed to have been locally funded. In fact, hard evidence for Spartan citizens as patrons of civic building-activity is modest: two colonnaded structures, both of unknown location; a *peila* (see below for the meaning of this term) in the sanctuary of the Dioscuri at Phoebaeum, and an unlocated stoa, where the benefaction could have been a rebuilding rather than the original construction (App.I, 25, 29, 41). The exception, of course, is the Euryclid family, donors of a new gymnasium and (probably) the remodelled theatre, but it was precisely the unusually large fortune of Eurycles, based, when all is told, on his friendship with Augustus, which gave him and his descendants the means to fund such large-scale projects (see [chapter 7](#)).

An important final point arises from this survey of the archaeological evidence for Roman Sparta: it concerns the apparent openness of local society to material—and with it cultural—romanization. Roman methods of construction are attested as early as the reign of Augustus, when fired brick makes its first appearance at the theatre, where it was used for the fabric of the scenery-store; by the mid-second century, mortared rubble faced with brick—and in more costly structures encrusted with marble revetment too—was a staple feature of local architecture; worth noting too is the use in a Trajanic or Hadrianic inscription, apparently in its technical sense, of *peila*, a loan-word from the Latin here describing a partially-submerged structure by the river Eurotas (an embankment?) which had been built following Roman construction-methods. Romanization extended beyond such technical matters, however, to the

adoption of types of amenity characteristic of the Roman and Italian, rather than the Hellenistic Greek, way of life; particularly significant here is the appearance at Sparta of thermal installations, whose accompanying hydrotherapeutic practices, as Delorme stressed, heralded a transformation in Greek social customs. Private comfort on Italian lines was also a feature of the Roman city: to the evidence noted earlier in this chapter should be added the examples of typically Roman garden-sculpture in the Sparta Museum, of the sort which once would have adorned well-appointed private dwellings. This embracing of urban living *à la romaine*, in which respect Sparta does not seem to have differed significantly from other parts of the Greek world, underlines the artificiality of the marked archaism whose manifestations in the public life of the Roman city are followed in chapters to come.¹⁸

* * * * *

The last section of this chapter addresses the rural territory of Roman Sparta, beginning with frontiers. The problems here concern their precise course, where this is important for a proper understanding of the Roman city's resources, and the significance of adjustments to them during the centuries of Roman rule.

Taking the north frontier first, Bölte and Chrimes, the latter independently, claimed that Rome deliberately restored it, at the expense of Megalopolis and Tegea, to its old, fifth-century, course. The only explicit evidence, however, concerns the border-region of Belminatis, where the head-waters of the Eurotas rose; this had belonged to Megalopolis in 189 BC (Liv.xxxviii.34.8), but was Spartan when next heard of under the Antonines (Paus.iii.21.3). This transfer must have happened at a time when Sparta's stock with Rome stood high and that of Megalopolis correspondingly low—hence probably after the Achaean War, in which Megalopolis had fought against Rome. The political status of the Aegytis to the west and the Sciritis to the east is much less clear. The former, a mountainous zone in the north of Taygetus, had been Megalopolitan shortly before 146 BC (SIG³.665.34). But the comment of Polybius, that Spartan territory (*Lakōnikē*) lay between Messene and Tegea, cannot be confidently used to show its subsequent transfer to Sparta, as Chrimes believed, since, even if Polybius had had the Aegytis in mind, there is no pressing reason for believing that the passage was written after the date of the inscription. It is true that a 'bend' (*kam [pē]*) in Sparta's north-west frontier is epigraphically attested in 78 at a point—in the vicinity of Mt Malevo, to the north of the Langhada pass—which cannot have been far from the ancient Aegytis. But, since it is unknown whether the bend was eastwards or westwards, a bulge in Spartan territory at this point, so as to take in the district in question, is far from certain. As for the Sciritis, it too is last heard of, shortly before 146 BC, in Arcadian (in this case Tegean) hands (SIG³.665.34) and we simply do not know, in spite of the assumptions of Bölte and Chrimes, to whom it belonged under the principate. In the light of these uncertainties the temptation to speculate about a coherent Roman plan for Sparta's north frontier is best resisted.¹⁹

In the time of Pausanias the north-easternmost point in Spartan territory lay on the ancient route from Sparta to Argos over Mt Parnon, where the Antonine boundaries of Tegea, Sparta and Argos all met (ii.38.7). As for the eastern frontier, to the north of Eleutherolaconian Geronthrae it lay in the archaeologically little explored Parnon piedmont, a thinly-populated area in modern as probably in ancient times; its course cannot be recovered and may never have had to be precisely defined (Chrimes's unwavering *limes* at this point seems incredible). The frontier to the south-east deserves more attention. *Pace* Chrimes, it certainly embraced the village of Croceae on the right bank of the Eurotas, which, as Pausanias states explicitly, 'belonged to the Spartans'. It is important to establish whether it also took in the district of Helea to the east of the Eurotas estuary, since this, after the Spartan plain, was the most fertile pocket of land in Laconia—its 'finest and largest' territory, according to Polybius (v.19.7). Since in antiquity the modern Helos plain for the most part was either marsh or sea, ancient agriculture was presumably concentrated on the low hills and terraces fringing the plain. In the Classical period the Helea had formed part of Sparta's city-state, as opposed to perioecic, territory. Its marshy coastline probably unable to offer a 'practicable port' in antiquity, the area is not known to have been detached from Sparta in 195 BC, when Flamininus virtually cut Sparta off from the sea (chapter 5); if it had been, we should have to assume that Rome re-assigned it to one or more of the liberated perioecic towns in the immediate vicinity (Gytheum, Geronthrae and Acraiae), since its chief settlement, Helos itself, remained a dependent village (Strabo viii, 5, 2, 363). In the second and third centuries, however, there is good evidence for the Helea's close links, ostensibly ones of cult alone, with wealthy Spartan families: a grandson of the Roman senator Brasidas was hereditary priest of Demeter and Core 'in Helos', and this priest's great-niece, Pomponia Callistonice, was hereditary priestess both of Asclepius Schoenatas, also 'in Helos', and of Artemis Patriotis 'in Pleiae'. The obscure Pleiae was a dependent locality, although in whose territory is unclear, since its exact site is disputed, the question partly hingeing on whether Palaea, a village in the territory of Roman Geronthrae (Paus.iii.22.6), was the same place; if not, we are left with Livy's statement implying that Pleiae lay inland, to the east of the Helea, but within sight of coastal Acraiae (xxxvi.27.2). The site of Helos, on the other hand, can be located with some certainty on the eastern edge of the marsh. Although the place was said by Pausanias to be in ruins by his day (iii.22.3), plenty of Roman remains have been noted in the vicinity of the ancient site, showing that the neighbourhood was still inhabited and the land (no doubt) under cultivation, although the pattern of settlement was now a dispersed one. The priesthoods just cited indicate the continued maintenance of sanctuaries both there and at Pleiae, a point which Kahrstedt attempted to deny, although in the former's case we have the explicit evidence of Pausanias, who says that on 'stated days' the cult-statue of Core was carried in procession from Helos to the Spartan Eleusinium some 35 kilometres to the north-west (a sanctuary the

priesthood of which also turns up, assuredly by no coincidence, in the family of Brasidas). The hereditary cultic interests of the Spartan élite in this particular corner of Laconia are striking and demand an explanation. In the case of the Artemis sanctuary at Pleiae, Bölte proposed a simple act of benefaction whereby a rich Spartan family took over the financing of a cult in (on his view) Eleutherolaconian territory. But as settlements neither Helos nor Pleiae can be classed with the local urban centres which normally provided the setting and ‘audience’ for Spartan euergetism elsewhere in Laconia (see [chapter 7](#)); nor, moreover, was such euergetism altruistic; Eurycles, for example, benefactor of Asopus, also owned an estate there ([chapter 7](#)). It is suggested that the rich families of Brasidas and the Pomponii likewise possessed landed interests in the vicinity of Helos and Pleiae: the wealth of the Helea, that is, in Roman times continued to be exploited from Sparta. It remains an open question whether the region actually lay within the Roman city’s borders. The view taken here is that it did. Even if detached in 195 BC, it could have been restored to Sparta at a later date—in 146/5 BC, or else under Augustus.²⁰

Roman Sparta’s western frontier, much of it passing through the mountains of Taygetus, was conspicuous for its instability, caused largely by the continuing dispute between Sparta and Messene over possession of the *ager Dentheliatis*, a region astride the Langhada pass in the heart of Taygetus. The persistence of this quarrel is in itself remarkable, since the area, although inhabited and not unproductive in the Archaic period, can never have played more than a marginal role in Spartan economy. Although fuelled by religious sentiment, stemming from the presence within the *ager* of a venerable sanctuary of Artemis, with little doubt the dispute turned on the ancient enmity of Messenians and Spartans, which, like the antagonism between Athens and Megara (Philostr. VS 529), smouldered on under Roman domination. Thus we find the Messenians, having been confirmed in possession of the *ager* in 146 BC (see [chapter 6](#)), pointedly displaying the decision of the Milesian arbitrators at Olympia on the base of the Winged Victory of Paeonius, a monument celebrating a much earlier triumph (this time armed) of Messenians over Spartans in about 421 BC. The history of the dispute after 146 BC is not without problems, one of them hingeing on the *résumé* of the quarrel offered by Tacitus. The reassignment of the *ager* to Sparta ‘by the decision of C.Caesar and M.Antonius’ provides one crux, the view taken here being that Mommsen and Neubauer were right to link this reversal of an earlier Roman decision with triumviral gratitude for the stand of the 2000 Spartans at Philippi. Under Augustus or Tiberius the dispute was reopened, presumably by the Messenians, and in 25 the Senate confirmed a decision by a provincial governor, the otherwise unknown Atidius Geminus, returning the *ager* to Messene. This ruling comes as something of a surprise, since Laco, Sparta’s ruler at the time, was not to lose the favour of Tiberius for another eight years; apparently the Senate’s decision rested solely on its considered view of the arguments presented by both sides in 25 through their respective embassies. The permanence of this settlement is open to question. It

was still in force in 78, when the boundary between Sparta and Messene along the eastern edge of the *ager*, as we learn from a Messenian inscription and some of the original boundary-stones, was delineated afresh by an Imperial surveyor, no doubt acting on the orders of the governor; perhaps, as Kolbe suggested, he was taking part in a larger review of civic boundaries following Achaia's reversion to provincial status under Vespasian. However, an inscription from Messenian Pherae, sandwiched (along with Thuria) between the *ager* and the eastern frontier of Messene, shows that in 177/8 this town's relations with Sparta became the subject of an Imperial ruling from the co-emperors M. Aurelius and Commodus. The text is too fragmentary to tell us more, but Kolbe is likely to have been right in seeing here a dispute over boundaries, although he does not make the further inference that, for the two cities to have shared a frontier at this date, the *ager Dentheliatis* must once again have been Spartan. The point cannot be pressed, but a successful reopening of the Spartan case under Marcus would help to explain, not only the dispute with Pherae, but also the conspicuous Spartan honours for Commodus noted in [chapter 8](#).²¹

After Actium, as a reward to Sparta and a punishment to the Messenians, Augustus had deprived Thuria of its autonomy, giving the city to the Spartans (Paus.iv.31.1), and incorporated Messenian Pherae into *to Lakōnikon*—not a reference to Sparta, as Toynbee thought, but, as Kolbe realised in the light of Pausanias's usage elsewhere, to the Eleutherolacones. By Trajan's reign, as an inscription shows (IG v.1.1381), Messenian Thuria had regained its autonomy, although the circumstances are unknown. But the city retained close sentimental ties with Sparta, the first in the surprising form of a fictitious claim, appearing under Trajan and again under Severus, to be a Spartan colony, of a kind familiar in the milieu of Hadrian's Panhellenion (see [Chapter 8](#)), and in a Thuriate context presumably to be partly explained as a function of neighbourly rivalry with Messene.²²

Discussion of Roman Sparta's western frontier raises, finally, the question of the city's access to harbour-facilities. It was proposed earlier, against the usual view, that Spartan territory under the principate still included a strip of coastline to the south, although one bereft of a natural harbour. Gytheum, Classical Sparta's port, had an artificial harbour known to Strabo and, largely as a result, offered the best anchorage on the Laconian gulf; after the fall of Eurycles, however, it once more regained its autonomy from Sparta—this time, so far as we know, for good. It may well have been in compensation for this loss that Augustus gave the Messenian coastal city of Cardamyle, with its small but serviceable harbour, to the Spartans ([chapter 7](#)). However, as Kahrstedt saw, it is unlikely that Cardamyle came to supersede Gytheum as Roman Sparta's chief port; the direct overland route between the two, using a pass over Taygetus to the south of Langhada, is impassable in winter and anyway would have been quite impracticable for bulky imports such as grain or marble (see [chapter 12](#)); a much easier route to the south, nowadays used by the modern road from Gytheion to Areopolis, does indeed exist, although in Roman times it would

have lain in the territory of the Eleutherolacones, Sparta's relations with whom were by no means always cordial (see [chapter 8](#)). The natural assumption, as Baladié saw, is that autonomous Gytheum remained the port by which Roman Sparta communicated with the outside world, the relationship between the two resembling, for instance, that of inland Prusa and coastal Apamea in provincial Bithynia. This view gains support from the apparent importance in Imperial times of the overland route between Sparta and Gytheum. It is the only road from Sparta to the south to be marked on the so-called *Peutinger Table*, a mediaeval map ultimately reflecting the roads and posting-stations of the Imperial post in the third or fourth century. If Bölte and others were correct to see it as approaching Sparta from the south-west, having first skirted the western edge of the Spartan plain (where its path in places was engineered, to judge from the Hellenistic or Roman bridge at Xerokambi), we should perhaps see as part of its final stretch the Roman-period colonnaded street, its monumental treatment indicating a major urban thoroughfare, which heads away from the acropolis in a south-westerly direction (App.I, 7). There are signs, finally, of continued close ties between Sparta and Gytheum in the post-Augustan period. Thus in 42 the terms of an oil-endowment presented to the citizens of Gytheum by a well-to-do local resident, Phaenia Aromation, stipulated that the Spartan *dēmos* was to hear complaints of negligence against the local magistrates who administered her gift. The Spartan aristocracy also maintained close ties with Gytheum. As well as those of Eurycles and his descendants, touched on in [chapter 7](#), the Spartan Voluseni were related by marriage to a woman given official honours at Gytheum, and the affluent Xenarchidas son of Damippus, who combined tenure of the patronomate with the gymnasiarchy in the mid-second century, held office as senior ephor at Gytheum. It seems possible that commercial interests, based on Gytheum's port, played some part in the formation of these ties (see [chapter 12](#)).²³

From the foregoing survey it can safely be concluded that Roman Sparta, although no longer the territorial colossus of the Classical period, still retained one of the largest territories in provincial Achaia. This apparent advantage, however, was offset by the fact that most of the area comprised either rugged uplands or mountains; as earlier, the rural population of Roman times continued to be concentrated, along with the best of the city's agricultural land, in the Eurotas furrow, above all the Spartan plain itself. The only detailed discussion of Roman Sparta's countryside has been that of Kahrstedt, relying on the partial evidence of Pausanias, who traversed much of it but was chiefly interested in sanctuaries and antiquities, and archaeology (including inscriptions). Since no Spartan rural site of Roman (or indeed earlier) date has ever been excavated, this last category of evidence until recently has had to rely on the more or less unsystematic sightings of surface-remains by topographers and archaeologists. Since 1983, however, Dutch and British teams have been conducting an intensive archaeological survey (the Laconia Survey) of an area of about 90 square kilometres to the immediate east and north-east of Sparta, a project the

eventual findings of which may well modify significantly our understanding of the Spartan countryside. In the circumstances, the following comments are limited to a discussion of three interrelated problems only: demographic trends, changes in the pattern of settlement, and the appearance of large estates.²⁴

The literary sources have much to say about the general depopulation of Greece in the late Hellenistic and early Imperial periods. Although this theme verged on becoming a *topos* and was doubtless exaggerated by some authors for purely literary reasons, it presumably had a basis in reality at least for some parts of Greece for some of the time. In Sparta's case, however, the picture is less clear-cut than Kahrstedt claimed. Strabo's observation concerning the decline of Laconia's population expressly excludes 'Sparta' and anyway is of questionable value as a demographic insight, since it was based on an apparent reduction in the numbers of Laconian 'small towns' (*polikhnai*) during the Hellenistic period—for which amalgamation as well as depopulation offers an explanation. Pausanias notes the sites of three one-time *poleis*, as he calls them, in the Eurotas furrow; but two of these (Pharis and Bryseae) rested their claims to city-status on entries in the Homeric 'Catalogue of Ships'! Only in the case of Pellana, north-west of Sparta on the way to Megalopolis, could Pausanias have been reacting to a relatively recent depopulation. On the other hand, he notes a series of secondary settlements in Spartan territory, including the 'town' (*polisma*) of Aegiae on the border with Gytheum, the 'villages' (*kōmai*) of Amyclae and Croceae and five places (Alesiae and Therapne on the Spartan plain, Scotites and Caryae in the north-east highlands and Hypsoi to the west of Aegiae) designated by the term *khōrion*, signifying, in Baladié's definition, a 'small dispersed settlement in the middle of a farming area'; no doubt there were other settlements in his day too recent or lacking in noteworthy sights to merit his attention. For the Roman period the Laconia Survey, while admitting the difficulty of dating sites 'because the details of Roman pottery typology are as yet uncertain', provisionally reports that 'many farmsteads and villages of the previous period had been abandoned'. It is debatable, however, to what extent demographic decline was exclusively or even partly responsible for this change. An alternative is to posit a shift of residence from the surrounding countryside into the town during the late Hellenistic and Imperial periods, a process of centralization encouraged by belatedly acquired aspirations (they are scarcely in evidence before the reign of Nabis) to the urban life-style of other Hellenistic cities (chapter 5), a concomitant development of the urban market and the emergence, again in the last two centuries BC, of a town-based system of euergetism which ensured that even the less well-off had access to some of the pleasures and benefits of city-life (see chapter 11).²⁵

If the evidence for depopulation as yet remains less than conclusive, the same cannot be said for large estates. In spite of Kahrstedt's imaginative evocation of two 'villas' to the west of the Spartan plain, a villa-site—in the sense of an agricultural work-station at the centre of a landed property, perhaps but not invariably accompanied by a well-appointed residence for the owner (who might

sometimes be an absentee)—has yet to be firmly located in Spartan territory. Known instances are multiplying, however, of substantial Roman tombs on the Spartan plain, to be seen as the family-burials of well-to-do landowners. To the one case known to Kahrstedt, a further two can now be added: at modern Psychiko, just to the south-east of the modern town, where a Roman burial has been found within a monumental structure of some kind; and, most spectacularly, at Ktirakia, outside the modern village of Aphyssou, in the vicinity of ancient Therapne. Here a built chamber-tomb was excavated by the Greeks, with a colonnaded facade and a sculpted marble frieze, housing a group of four sarcophagi. The best-preserved of these, with lion's paws at its lower corners and curved fluting on its side, belongs to a class of Attic sarcophagi produced and exported in the first half of the third century. Whether or not this structure had an earlier life as a 'hero-shrine', as its excavator thought, its period of use as a mausoleum should be assigned to the Antonine and Severan age. If the existence of large estates by this time is indisputable, the absence of impressive villa-sites, at any rate on the Spartan plain, tends to bear out the view of the British excavators that the residential area at Sparta to the south and west of the acropolis was 'inhabited probably by the landowners of the surrounding districts'. The labour-force for these estates in part must have been distributed among the secondary settlements noted earlier, which (with the notable exception of Croceae, serving the nearby quarries) presumably were predominantly farming communities. As yet, however, it remains impossible to gauge the numbers of small farms existing alongside these large properties and the extent to which the latter were created at the former's expense.²⁶

Chapter eleven

Local government I: machinery and functions

In her book on Sparta Chrimis claimed ‘general evidence of continuity’ between the ‘constitution’ of the Roman city and that of earlier times. In doing so she echoed, unwittingly or not, an important facet of the Spartan myth in later antiquity, one which stressed the longevity of Spartan institutions. In 60 BC, for instance, Cicero could claim of the Spartans in a Roman court that ‘alone in the whole world they have now lived for more than 700 years with the same customs and unchanged laws’. However opposed the reality, the citizens of Roman Sparta had an interest in maintaining an archaizing veneer to the conduct of their affairs, since the Romans—at least in the Late Republic—were well-known admirers of the pristine Spartan polity, to the extent that the *gerousia* and other alleged institutions of Lycurgus were even claimed as political influences on the early kings of Rome. A cursory glance at the evidence does indeed suggest a certain absence of change: ephors and *gerontes* survived; local government still operated through *rhētraí*, and linguistic archaism lent an antique air to procedural language. The reality, it is argued below, was somewhat different: the reforms of Cleomenes III and Nabis, the abolition of the dual kingship, the legacy of a half-century of *sumpoliteia* with the Achaean League and the indirect but increasingly pervasive influence of Rome, all ensured that institutional continuity was more apparent than real.¹

The issue of continuity is best approached through an examination of the decision-making machinery of the Roman city as revealed—mostly—through inscriptions; here some discussion of technical problems cannot be avoided. The great bulk of these inscriptions belongs to the period between the Flavians and the later Severans—that is, between the re-establishment of ‘republican’ government following the fall of Spartiacus under Nero and the troubles of local government in the third century. The relevant texts fall into essentially four categories: decrees; honorific dedications; lists of magistrates (over 170); and texts which detail the local careers of individual Spartans (altogether some sixty-five persons are commemorated in this way). Pausanias (iii.11.2) provides a thumb-nail sketch of the Antonine city’s ‘constitution’ as he understood it. From the triumviral period local coin-issues with magistrates’ names and titles are also of interest.²

A start is made with IG v.1.4, a Spartan decree dating from the period of the city's union with the Achaean League and of particular importance because it shows the reality behind Sparta's unwilling acceptance of the 'laws and institutions of the Achaeans' in 188 BC. The decree had been passed by the Spartan assembly following an approach made by the honorand himself, not to the *gerousia*, but to a joint-body of chief magistrates calling themselves the *sunarkhiai* (literally 'the joint magistracies'). We have here a clear example of the Hellenistic tendency, in the words of J.K.Davies, for 'the various magisterial boards [of a Greek city] to coalesce into a single college with the power, or in some cases the exclusive right, to carry out probouleutic functions for the assembly'. In Greece itself, this tendency is particularly associated with memberships of the Achaean League, in which *sunarkhiai* were characteristic institutions with oligarchic overtones, since they lent themselves to the concentration of decision-making power into the hands of the 'persons of standing and substance' who usually held the chief magistracies in this period; as Touloumakos saw, the Spartan *sunarkhiai* were an Achaean-imposed institution. At the time of this decree Sparta must still have possessed a council; the absence of any mention of the *gerousia*, far from proving its suppression in 188 BC, as W.Kolbe, the editor of IG v.1, believed, may have resulted simply from compression in the preamble, as in IG v.1.5, a decree of the same period, where not even the *sunarkhiai* are mentioned; at any rate, the existence of the *gerontes* at the close of the Achaean period is expressly attested by Pausanias (vii.12.7; see [chapter 6](#)).

If we turn to the (invariably incompletely preserved) preambles of surviving Spartan decrees from the period after 146 BC, we find that the *gerontes* are regularly named, but the formulaic expression 'just as the *gerontes* judged as well' suggests that in the passage of these decrees their role was limited to deliberating for submission as preliminary resolutions to the assembly measures put to them on the initiative of others—presumably magistrates present at their meetings. That this power of initiative remained with a body of *sunarkhiai* in the Roman period is strongly suggested by the best-preserved preamble, in a decree of consolation from the reign of Gaius or Claudius. This is sufficiently complete to leave in little doubt that it is echoed precisely by the preamble of a decree passed by the Messenian city of Pherae in the middle decades of the first century BC, of which the first word alone needs restoration: '(?) Decision ([*dogm*]a) of the *sunarkhiai*, just as the *gerontes* judged as well'. Pherae's *sunarkhiai* were a legacy of the city's union with the Achaean League in the period before 146 BC; its claim, like that of neighbouring Thuria ([chapter 10](#)), to be a Spartan colony explains its imitation of Sparta's political machinery, including the use of *gerontes*. In the case of the Spartan decree, although only the last three letters of the word 'of the *sunarkhiai*' are preserved, its restoration by Peek therefore seems reasonably assured. It appears, then, that the *sunarkhiai* survived the city's secession from the Achaean League in 146 BC and that the recovery of formal

autonomy did nothing to change the oligarchic tenor which they gave to local government.³

It remains to identify the magistracies comprising the *sunarkhiai*. In the copious epigraphy of the post-Neronian period the institution does not reappear. Instead there are frequent references to a body of magistrates called the *sunarkhia* or 'joint-magistracy' in the singular. That the *sunarkhia* also comprised the city's chief executive is made more or less certain by two texts in which it appears as the body giving effect to the resolutions of other corporations: in one case the tribe of the Cynoureis, in the other the *gerontes* themselves (IG v. 1.480; 448). It can be concluded that the terms *sunarkhiai/sunarkhia*, between which no significant difference of meaning can be observed, describe the same joint-board of chief magistrates; conceivably the term *sunarkhiai* was dropped after 146 BC, as in some other former member-cities of the Achaean League, to be replaced at Sparta by the less 'Achaean'-sounding *sunarkhia*; the older form survived, however, in the stylized preambles of decrees.⁴

If the *sunarkhia* comprised the executive magistracies, its composition is left in little doubt. As Bradford observed, the 'sheer volume of lists of *gerontes*, ephors and *nomophulakes* demand that they be considered the three most important offices in Sparta'. This volume can be quantified: respectively fifty-four, forty-nine and forty-eight, whereas the next most often listed board of magistrates, the *bideoi*, has left a mere fourteen catalogues (App.IIA). The inference that ephors and *nomophulakes* comprised the *sunarkhia* is borne out by the way in which their membership is repeatedly listed consecutively on the same stone, indicating close collaboration between the two boards. A close administrative relationship with the *gerontes* is demonstrated, firstly, by the appending of the membership of all three to the Trajanic decree concerning the Leonidea and, secondly, by the relationship of the ephors and *nomophulakes* to the *boulē* of Roman Sparta, its council *parexcellence*. Normally this was the body in provincial Greek cities which, together with the executive of annually elected magistrates, provided the real management of affairs. A Spartan council of this type does not emerge clearly in the evidence until the Severan age, when its existence is left in no doubt by the acclamatory title 'mother of piety, the council (*boulē*) and the *dēmos*' borne by a Spartan matron and by the formulation 'chosen by the most brilliant council (*boulē*) and the most sacred *dēmos*', which appears in a dedication of about 221 with reference to the nomination of a Spartan *prokritos* or provincial juror. In the same period—the early third century—the title of 'councillor' (*bouleutēs*) appears for the first time in Spartan epigraphy, in all three cases borne by distinguished foreigners on whom it had been conferred as a mark of honour. Significantly, however, no Spartan is known to have borne this title. Since it seems inconceivable that the council did not exist in some form before the Severan period, this curious silence is best explained on the view that its membership was *ex officio*: the 'councillors' of Roman Sparta, that is, are hidden under the titles of other magistracies.

The simple answer, that these ‘councillors’ were the *gerontes*, as Bradford believed, is suggested by the fact that the secretary in attendance on the latter body is called the ‘secretary of the *boulē*’ in post-Neronian texts (formerly he was just styled ‘secretary’). But a Hadrianic catalogue of ephors and *nomophulakes*, its significance first seen by Kennell, also closes with the name of the secretary of the *boulē*, who evidently, at least in some circumstances, attended on these two boards of magistrates as well as the *gerontes*. That all three boards and not the *gerontes* alone exercised a deliberative function is confirmed by another Hadrianic text, in which the ephors and *nomophulakes* conjoined to make a dedication to Zeus Bulaeus and Hestia Bulaea. These divine inspirers of good counsel were associated with the council-houses of at least one other Greek city: at Athens the council-house contained a shrine of Zeus Bulaeus, where councillors sacrificed and prayed on entering the building, as well as a ‘hearth of the council’ (*boulaia hestia*) by which bouletic oaths were taken. That the ephors and *nomophulakes*, as well as the *gerontes*, performed similar rituals at Roman Sparta is suggested by the attachment to them of groups of youths or young men serving as libation-bearers (*spondophoroi* or *spondopoioi*). From all this the conclusion seems hard to resist that the *boulē* comprised those sessions of the *gerontes* which were joined by the *sunarkhiai/sunarkhia*—the ephors and *nomophulakes*, that is—in the exercise of their probouleutic functions. Not surprisingly, as the Roman city’s chief deliberative and legislative body, this composite *boulē* met at fixed times and frequently—in the mid-first century BC more than once a month, to judge from the fragmentary heading of a Spartan decree which, following Kolbe’s interpretation, refers to ‘decrees of the first session of the council of the month Artemisius’ (IG v.1.11.4).⁵

The picture which has emerged of the Roman city’s political machinery suggests some continuity, but also a marked discontinuity. The *gerontes* were now an annually elected body, a change first attested in the early principate, but usually thought, with reason, to go back to the reforms of Cleomenes III (chapter 4). The probouleutic powers of the old *gerousia* emerge in the Roman period considerably diluted, since now they regularly depended on collaboration with the *sunarkhiai/sunarkhia*, a relatively recent institution of Achaean origin. Hence the statement of Pausanias, that the *gerousia* of his day was the ‘sovereign council of the Lacedaemonian polity’ (iii.11.2) is misleading: this council in fact was the composite *boulē*, of which the *gerontes* formed only a part (albeit numerically the largest one—see below). As for the ephors, they maintained rather more of their old pre-eminence. In the second and first centuries BC diplomatic correspondence between Sparta and other cities was addressed to them or sent out in their name, a state of affairs hardly showing, as Chrimes asserted, that they had ‘sunk to the position of mere secretaries’; rather, as Touloumakos put it, it placed them at the ‘summit’ of local government, continuing to represent the city in official dealings with the outside world, as they had done in the Classical period. As members of the ‘joint-magistracy’, however, their probouleutic function was shared with the *nomophulakes*, so that

the statement of Pausanias, that they conducted ‘all the other important business’ apart from the supervision of the ephebic training (iii.11.2) cannot be accepted without some reservation. These *nomophulakes* make their first appearance in the triumviral period on coin-issues of the Spartan mint. The date of their institution is unknown. Chrimes supposed that they were at least as old as their counterparts at Dorian Cyrene, established towards the end of the fourth century BC. In the Classical period, however, the function of ‘guarding the laws’ (*nomophulakia*) was exercised by the old *gerousia*; if the institution of the *nomophulakes* represents the transfer of this function to another body, they perhaps are better seen as another innovation of Cleomenes III, as part of his systematic weakening of the old *gerousia*. Although their powers no doubt underwent a subsequent evolution, in the Imperial period their literal function as ‘guardians of the laws’ found an echo in their charge of the *grammatophulakeion* or public archives (App.I, 12), as indicated by their association with the official known as the *grammatophulax*.⁶

It remains to comment further on the oligarchic character of this machinery. The formal involvement of the citizen-assembly, in inscriptions of Roman date simply referred to as ‘the people’ (*ho dēmos*), is shown by the same decree of consolation from the reign of Gaius and Claudius, technically a ‘decision of the people’ (line 16). Pausanias knew of a historic building near the agora, the Scias, in which the assembly met in his day; and inscriptions show that it continued to be convened into the third century. A certain deference to its ideal supremacy is suggested by the dedication in the agora (under Pius) of a sculptured personification of the ‘Lacedaemonian People’, in the name of whom there is one example, from the Neronian period or shortly after, of a Spartan public dedication. But the absence of any tradition of popular politics at Sparta presupposes that the ‘democratic’ element in the Roman city’s decision-making machinery was no less exiguous—and quite possibly more so—than in other provincial Greek cities. The assembly’s essentially passive rôle as merely a ratifying body, echoing that of its Classical predecessor, seems to emerge clearly from the stipulation in the Trajanic dossier concerning the Leonidea that the income from certain fines was to be spent on ‘whatever the people wish and’—the text continues—‘the magistrates (*arkhontes*) decide’.

The chief magistracies, on the other hand, comprised a remarkably small number of Spartans. Five complete catalogues of *gerontes*, ranging in date from the reign of Augustus to that of Pius, repeatedly give their numbers, including the president but not the secretary, as twenty-three, evidently their normal strength in the Imperial period. Catalogues of ephors from the Flavian period onwards reveal that they still numbered the traditional five; the *nomophulakes* usually numbered the same, bringing the total strength of the Roman city’s composite council to thirty-four (including the secretary). As far as we know it was highly unusual for the council of a provincial Greek city to be so small: typically such bodies numbered from a hundred upwards, with councils of around 500 not uncommon. If the Spartan council were a larger body, the rest

of its membership might be expected to have left some trace in the hundreds of inscriptions from the Imperial period; as it is, before the Severan period there is nothing in the evidence of catalogues and careers to suggest the existence of a class of 'ordinary' councillors distinct from the *ex officio* members. Moreover, since Sparta had no tradition of a large council, we might expect the existence of such a body to have caught the attention of an outside observer such as Pausanias; but the literary sources are silent. As it is, the thirty-four 'councillors' represent an increase of only four over the full strength (including the two kings) of the old *gerousia*, Classical Sparta's equivalent of a council (Plut. *Lyc.* 6. 8).⁷

It is true that this *boulē* seems somewhat more open than its Classical counterpart. But, although election was now annual to all the magistracies involved, and the posts of ephor and *nomophulax* could be held only once, no such restriction attached to that of *gerōn*. As early as the Augustan age a Spartan is known to have served three times in this office; in the second century a second or third term was commonplace, four terms were not rare, and one Spartan under Trajan served six times in as many years. The situation revealed by another Trajanic catalogue, in which two-thirds of the *gerontes* had served at least once, must have been common. In addition, the catalogues of the post-Neronian period reveal a hereditary tendency among the three boards comprising the *boulē*, Appendix III presents the results of a prosopographical analysis of the council's personnel in two years under Trajan when lists of all three component boards happen to have survived, and in one year under Pius from which lists of two of the three (ephors and *gerontes*) are preserved. Taking the three years together, the average number of 'councillors' who may have (the degree of certainty varies) been ancestors, descendants or kinsmen of other 'councillors' works out at between a quarter and a third (27 per cent). The incompleteness of the data makes it likely that the hereditary tendency was even more marked than this figure suggests. It can be stated with some confidence that, although the machinery of government had undergone an evolution, the Roman city was scarcely less an oligarchy than Classical Sparta had been.⁸

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An attempt is made in this second section to characterize the chief preoccupations of local government at Roman Sparta. Before doing so the question of the extent and frequency of Rome's routine interventions in the city's internal politics needs addressing. Once Rome established a permanent administrative presence in Greece, for the first time in 46 BC and regularly from 27 BC, the Roman governor became a figure of great potential influence in Spartan affairs, as the Spartans themselves acknowledged in 46 BC in their attempt, through the good offices of Cicero, to secure the goodwill of Ser. Sulpicius Rufus (chapter 7). It is doubtless only the paucity of our evidence which leaves as the sole attested instance of proconsular intervention at Sparta before the third century the story in Philostratus, if it can be believed, of the

anonymous governor who brought to Nero's attention alleged abuses by Sparta of her free status (VA.iv.33).

None the less, day-to-day interference was probably less frequent than might be imagined. This follows partly from general considerations concerning the remoteness of Roman provincial administration, but partly from Sparta's privileged standing as a free city. First attested only under Augustus, when it came to be shared with the Eleutherolacones, this status had effectively obtained since 146 BC, when Sparta, as a friendly non-belligerent, had been left by Rome with her newly regained 'independence' intact (chapter 7). Inscriptions show that by the first century BC the privileges of free cities were regulated in considerable detail by Rome through treaties and senatorial decrees; no such formal agreement is attested in Sparta's case, although it remains possible that one was negotiated at some stage in the first century BC. The fiscal and judicial privileges of free status are returned to below; here we need only recall that Sparta would thereby have been excluded from the 'plan' of the province of Achaia and placed outside the routine jurisdiction of the proconsul. Formal scruple over Sparta's status can be detected as late as the reign of Marcus, who in about 174 required a judge hearing Spartan litigants in civil suits to hold court, not at Sparta itself, but in some nearby city—presumably one technically within the province. Such scruple (if only in small matters) was to some extent underpinned by Roman respect for Sparta's past, a factor emerging in Cicero's letter to the governor Sulpicius Rufus and the younger Pliny's to the *corrector* Maximus under Trajan (see below) as the basis for a plea of special forbearance in Rome's administrative dealings with the city.

The routine Roman interference for which there is increasing evidence in the second century was—at least partly—generated by the Spartans themselves. Imperial interventions, although irregular, were now not infrequent, as emerges from the evidence for Spartan embassies to the emperor or his representative. Their business is usually unstated: one certainly, the two-man embassy sent to congratulate L.Caesar in Pannonia following his adoption by Hadrian in 136, was ceremonial; but references to 'successful' embassies, including the one under Pius 'against the Eleutherolacones', show that weightier municipal matters could be in question. These embassies show Sparta fully engaged in the pattern of 'petition-and-response' characteristic of the emperor's routine relations with provincial communities: the initiative for these interventions, that is, by and large would have come from the Spartans themselves, no more able than others to resist the magnet of Imperial powers of arbitration and patronage.⁹

In the course of the third century the administrative distinction between Achaia's free and subject cities to a large extent was eroded away by the repeated dispatch to Greece of high-ranking (usually consular) officials called *correctores* or, in Greek, *epanorthōtai* or *diorthōtai*, with a brief specifically to regulate the affairs of the free cities. In the second century they are attested only sporadically; but inscriptions show that in the third century *correctores* frequently served simultaneously as proconsul. Spartan affairs are known to have

been the concern of four *correctores*. The earliest of them, Pliny's correspondent Maximus, seems to be referred to retrospectively in a dedication set up in 116/17 by the city of Cythera, at the time in the possession of the Spartan senator Eurycles Herculanus. The emperor Hadrian and the *corrector* L. Aemilius Iuncus together intervened in the Spartan 'contest for best citizen' (see below) to support the candidacy of a local notable, Tib. Claudius Harmonicus; the larger context is obscure, although it may have been the administrative aftermath to Hadrianic interventions at Sparta which brought Harmonicus to the attention of Roman officialdom; at any rate, Benjamin's attempt to link this episode with Sparta's Imperial cult is unconvincing, since at the time Eurycles Herculanus, not Harmonicus, was the high-priest. The three other instances belong to the third century: in about 221 the *corrector* Egnatius Proculus approved the city's nomination of another notable, P. Memmius Pratolaus *qui et* Aristocles, to jury-service in the Roman governor's court; towards the mid-century Iulius Paulinus sponsored the repair of a road-bridge over the Eurotas ([chapter 10](#)); and a fragmentary letter to the Spartans from an unknown *corrector* dates to the close of the century. These isolated items of evidence shed little light on the aims of the central government in sending *correctores* to Greece, which no doubt varied. But a link with Roman requests for 'services' (*munera*) from the free cities is suggested by the increased presence of *correctores* in the third century, a period which saw levels of Roman exaction in the provinces rise in response to incessant warfare. Since taxes at this time came increasingly to be paid in kind, it is tempting to suppose that in repairing a bridge across the Eurotas the *corrector* Paulinus was mainly concerned to improve communications between rural producers and urban storage-depots.¹⁰

Roman taxation brings us to the function of local government at Sparta which from the Roman point of view must have been the most essential: the administration of Roman demands. It is true that, as a free city, Sparta was fiscally privileged in the sense that she was exempt from regular payment of tribute; she was also permitted to collect her own customs-dues, as emerges from the Spartan decree concerning the Leonidea, in which the local authorities conferred 'immunity from import-tax' (*ateleia eisagōgimou*) on a group of traders whom they wished to favour. In observing that Sparta 'contributed nothing [to the Romans] but friendly liturgies', however, Strabo shows that the city was excluded from the tiny élite of free cities exempt from irregular liturgies or *munera* as well as regular tribute: presumably Rome considered Spartan resources (relatively ample by Peloponnesian standards) too valuable to be placed completely outside her grasp. As was seen in [chapter 7](#), liturgies imposed on Sparta in the Late Republic included the provision of troops, cash and possibly supplies for Roman wars. Under the principate, at least in peacetime, such demands no doubt eased off, although the evidence for the imposition on Messene between 35 and 44 of a special eight-obol tax warns against the assumption that in such conditions they ceased altogether. In the second and early third centuries Sparta continued on occasion to be asked to supply troops

(chapter 8); and financial demands in this period probably underlay the dealings with Sparta of a succession of Roman officials whom the city honoured in gratitude for favourable—or simply fair—treatment: a provincial procurator under Trajan; a Hadrianic scribe attached to the office of the quaestor, the chief finance-officer of the province; and two more procurators in the Severan period. As we might expect, such demands were dealt with in the first instance by the local executive: a Spartan decree from the mid-first century BC reveals the ‘magistrates’ (*arkhontes*), who—following Touloumakos—can be identified with the *sunarkhiai/sunarkhia*, taking action over arrears in payments to Rome.¹¹

There is some evidence to suggest that free cities were responsible for maintaining the public roads (*viae publicae*) in their territories used by the Imperial post. At Sparta, the chief of these—although it can rarely have been very busy—was the route from Megalopolis *via* Sparta, which is marked on the *Peutinger Table* (reflecting original documentation of the third or fourth century) as the site of a lodging-house (*mansio*), to Gytheum and then on to Boeae, the port for Cythera; Roman classification of this as a *via publica*, at any rate in late antiquity, is shown by a milestone recovered in the Helos region, recording repairs under various fourth-century emperors. A Spartan dedication from the late second century expressed the city’s gratitude to a wealthy notable of senatorial rank, Tib. Claudius Pratolaus, who had discharged with great generosity the post of ‘*agoranomos* in charge of the roads’; presumably these were roads in the civic domain requiring repair, the costs of which had been largely met by Pratolaus. One can only speculate, however, as to whether public roads in the Roman sense were in question here.¹²

Leaving aside the administration of cults and festivals and the ‘Lycurgan customs’ for consideration in chapters 13–14, the two other essential functions of local government, about which the texts permit some comment, were the food-supply and the administration of justice. In the second and third century, to judge from inscriptions, Sparta suffered not infrequently from grain-shortages. Although shortages were not unknown in earlier periods, other factors suggest late Sparta’s weakened ability to feed herself. Frontier-changes had effectively reduced the good arable land within the Spartan *polis* to the Eurotas-furrow (chapter 10); the advance of urbanization had enlarged the pool of townfolk not directly engaged in agricultural production; the Roman city’s emergence as a tourist-centre placed a further burden on the food-supply at times of major festivals; and changes in dietary fashion may have enlarged demand in the city for less easily obtainable wheat in place of locally produced barley, the staple cereal of Classical Sparta. Between the Flavian and the Severan periods nine occasions are attested when a failure in the grain-supply obliged the local authorities to appoint a grain-commissioner (*sitōnēs*) to purchase grain by means of what has aptly been named ‘search-purchasing’: the seeking out of a surplus for sale, either from the private stores of local landowners or from beyond the city’s frontiers. Sources of imported grain are discussed in chapter 12; that overseas purchases were not uncommon is shown by the boast of a Hadrianic *sitōnēs* that

in none of his three missions had rough seas obliged him to jettison any of his precious cargo.

On two occasions the missions of *sitōnai* are specifically linked to a ‘shortage’ (*spanis*). The earlier fell between Hadrian’s two visits to Sparta in 124/5 and 127/8 and may in part have resulted from the heavy demands on local supplies generated by the presence of the Imperial court; it may have been Hadrian himself on one of these occasions who gave the Spartans permission to buy wheat from Egypt. Given the endemic nature of ancient food-crises, however, unusual circumstances are not required to explain the crises behind the other attested grain-commissions, which could have been prompted by crop-failure or hoarding by local landowners or a combination of both. The aim of these grain-commissions, of course, was to provide, not free grain, but grain which could be offered for sale below the ‘emergency’ prices: thus C. Julius Theophrastus, a Hadrianic *sitōnēs*, bought grain at the ‘emergency’ price of 40 denarii per measure or *medimnos* and made it available at Sparta at 12 the *medimnos*. Concern for the grain supply in general was motivated less by philanthropy on the part of local government than by civic pride (apropos of visitors) and political expediency (apropos of the local populace, which might riot in times of shortage). By the Antonine period the city had its own granary. There may also have been a public fund to finance grain-purchases, since five grain-commissions, although they appear in career-inscriptions, which usually emphasise financial sacrifices by their subjects on the city’s behalf, are not linked to personal munificence. On the other hand, it is clear from the remaining three instances that it was not uncommon for *sitōnai* to make generous personal contributions to the costs of their missions: Theophrastus apart, two later grain-commissioners were publicly honoured for this reason. The case of Theophrastus is of special interest because it suggests the ambiguous rôle of local landowners, who sometimes could profit from, at other times help alleviate, shortage: in addition to his *sitōnia*, he boasted in his career-inscription of ‘often’ making sales below cost price to the city ‘in critical times’, where the term used (*paraprasis*) normally refers to sales of either grain or olive oil—in either case, here in all probability coming from the donor’s own land.¹³

As a free city, Sparta was entitled to retain her own jurisdiction, both criminal and civil, and, theoretically at least, lay outside that of the Roman governor. An inscription from Thuria strongly suggests that under Augustus capital cases were still heard by local courts. The text is a Thuriate decree in honour of a Spartan notable, Damocharis son of Timoxenus, an Augustan *patronomos* and inheritor of ancestral proxenyties with Thuria. At the time of the decree’s passage Damocharis was actually resident at Thuria, where he earned the city’s gratitude by successfully intervening in an outbreak of civil discord. As Bölte saw, the natural context of this decree is the period after the transfer of Thuria to Sparta (see [chapter 10](#)): Damocharis apparently had been sent to Thuria as his city’s official representative, the absence of an administrative title showing no more, *pace* Kahrstedt, than that Sparta was exercising her dominion with discretion.

The text reveals that under the new régime, understandably, there was much to-ing and fro-ing between Thuria and Sparta. An earlier service by Damocharis had been to use his personal standing in his home city to promote the interests of Thuriate ambassadors and Thuriate citizens with business in Spartan courts, here interceding, if the natural sense of the Greek is allowed, ‘even on behalf of murderers’. The inscription, hitherto ignored in scholarly discussion of the problem as to whether free cities retained capital jurisdiction, seems to show that the gift of Thuria to Sparta was accompanied by a transfer of jurisdiction over Thuriate capital cases to Sparta; on this view, the same courts would presumably have been able to pass capital sentences without reference to the Roman governor. Detailed information about the judicial function of Spartan magistrates in Roman times is lacking, although, for what it is worth, Philostratus set the Neronian trial of a well-born Spartan trader before the ephors (chapter 12); in the absence of a tradition of popular courts, however, it is likely that serious cases were heard, as in the Classical period, by the chief magistrates—that is, by some or all of the boards comprising the *boulē*. In addition, the Hellenistic practice of trying cases before a small court of judges sent on request by another city is well attested at Roman Sparta. By the first century BC the city already possessed a special lodging for these visiting judges and was itself the obliging recipient of requests for judges from other Greek cities, including Demetrias, Eretria and Delphi. In the milieu of the Panhellenion, the practice flourished again, with the post of *dikastagōgos*, the official who escorted visiting judges back to Sparta, attested some five times in the inscriptions.¹⁴

The relationship of local jurisdiction to that of the Roman governor is not entirely clear. In the second and third centuries the city was required to furnish judges for the governor’s court, in both attested instances nominating notables with Roman citizenship. But as yet there is no evidence that Sparta was ever the seat of a proconsular assize-court, although free status in itself was no obstacle to acquiring this function, which Greek cities saw as a privilege. Even if the governor, at any rate under the early principate, did not try Spartan cases as a matter of routine, appeals from Spartan to Roman courts were evidently frequent by the second century, since a fragmentary Imperial letter of that date, its authorship uncertain, attempted to limit them by instituting a screening process to be operated by local ‘councillors’ (*sunedroi*)—presumably the members of the composite *boulē*. Such appeals were encouraged by the gradual increase in the numbers of Spartans with Roman citizenship (chapter 12), a few of them of the highest standing—notables such as the senator Brasidas, an inheritance-dispute between whose family and that of his ex-wife was judged by Marcus Aurelius himself.

Increasing local knowledge of Roman law and of its advantages over Greek law also encouraged this trend, as is suggested by the succession of letters to the Spartans from the three Flavian emperors, which we happen to know about because they were cited by the younger Pliny in his administrative

correspondence with Trajan. They all dealt with the same problem, the status of free-born foundlings (*threptoi*) brought up as slaves. Probably they stemmed from disputes in local courts over the payment of compensation for the cost of upbringing in cases where the natural parents asserted the freedom of their offspring against the fosterers. Since Greek custom, which Spartan law probably followed, did not allow for such payments, it seems likely that fosterers familiar with Roman law, which did, were attempting to have the Roman usage applied at Sparta. These Imperial letters on the subject seem to have arisen from appeals to the emperor from local courts. The evidence should be noted, finally, for the frequent appointment in the second century of Spartan *sundikoi* or civic advocates to plead on the city's behalf in disputes with individuals or even other cities; some, perhaps a majority, of these advocates should be imagined as appearing before Roman, not local, courts.¹⁵

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The last section of this chapter considers the question of how the Roman city raised money for civic expenditure, one which, until addressed, leaves obscure the realities of the local political structure. To begin with, there were the 'civic revenues' (*politikoi prosodoi*), as they are described in an inscription from the mid-fourth century. For the early principate, if not for late antiquity, some of the sources of this revenue can be identified. Some of our best evidence comes from the Trajanic dossier concerning the Leonidea, attesting two kinds of indirect tax, customs-dues (*eisagōgimon*) and a licence-fee levied on tradesmen (*pratikē*), along with revenues from certain fines. More unusually, there is mention of a 'bank of exchange' (*ameiptikē trapezē*), which was a public concern, since it was regulated by a 'decree concerning the bank', although its running seems to have been entrusted to private entrepreneurs, referred to as 'those in charge of the bank'. From the city's point of view the function of this bank was to raise revenues: as in the case of the cash-endowment for the Leonidea, it accepted deposits of public funds from which loans were made to private individuals at interest; probably it also enjoyed a monopoly of money-changing operations. The Roman city's bronze coinage played its part here: as well as its symbolic function, as a manifestation of civic pride, its use in local transactions was probably assured by the practice of tariffing items for sale in the city-markets in bronze, rather than silver; customers would then be obliged to exchange their silver for local bronze at the public bank, with the city taking a percentage of the (probably modest) profits of the money-changers. The city also owned land, the administration of some of which formed the subject of part of the Imperial letter mentioned above. Finally, its foreign possessions would have provided some income: Messenian Thuria was presumably tributary to Sparta; and Hadrian's gifts of Caudus and Cythera were chiefly fiscal in purpose ([chapter 8](#)).¹⁶

Whatever the exact scale of its resources, it is clear that the Roman city was crucially dependent on the financial contributions of well-to-do citizens. In the last two centuries BC, that is, we see the emergence at Sparta of the widespread Hellenistic practice of euergetism, whereby the civic community was placed in a

position of financial dependence on a small group of citizen-benefactors publicly distanced from their fellows by an increasingly elaborate system of honours. This regime was embedded in the city's system of government, in the sense that magistrates regularly performed liturgies or financial services at their own expense; for this reason the term of Pratolaus as 'agoranomos in charge of the roads' could be described simultaneously as both a 'magistracy (*arkhē*) and liturgy'. The emergence of a class of politician-benefactors constitutes the other facet of the oligarchic arrangements for government described earlier in this chapter. This development was facilitated by the Roman preference for seeing local government in the hands of the well-to-do and by the absence, at Sparta as universally in the Greek world, of regular income-tax: the burden of financing civic services, in Sparta's case made heavier by the advance of urbanisation in the Hellenistic period, fell largely on the shoulders of the rich, who for the most part were willing to bear it, at least until the third century, as the price to pay for local political predominance.¹⁷

This dependence first emerges in the evidence with the appeal from the city-magistrates, contained in a decree from the mid-first century BC, for help from 'those [citizens] well supplied with ready money' with payments to Rome. The earliest evidence for the liturgical character of the chief magistracies appears in the triumviral period, when some local coin-issues were funded by the *gerontes*, ephors and *nomophulakes* respectively. But we find the Spartan system of euergetism most clearly revealed in the peaceful and relatively well-documented conditions of the post-Neronian period. To begin with, the practice of inscribing local political careers and the names of annual magistrates requires comment. Over 170 lists of magistrates are attested (App.IIA), some two-thirds of them inscribed under Trajan, Hadrian, and Pius, although the practice began in the first century BC, probably under Augustus, and endured well into the third century. The settings for these lists were places of public resort. Many seem to have been displayed in the vicinity of the agora by the offices of the magistrates whom they record, as with the lists inscribed on free-standing, sometimes double-sided, *stēlai*; also with those apparently inscribed on columns or other parts of public buildings. The other chief setting, where about a third of them were displayed, was the theatre, where they were inscribed on the walls of the east and west *parodoi*, the two chief approaches into the theatre from below the acropolis, and on the covering slabs of the drain which circled the orchestra.

These catalogues were inscribed by official act, as is shown by the abbreviation 'by decree of the *boulē*' which follows two lists of second-century *gerontes*. The career inscriptions (counting each entry individually) number some sixty-five. They first appear under Trajan and are most numerous, once more, in his and the following two reigns, although they are still attested in the later Severan period. Their setting was equally public: notably the theatre, where fifteen were inscribed. As for the purpose of the lists, Chrimes favoured a functional explanation, seeing them as public records, 'making possible the dating of all sorts of legal contracts'. If this was their purpose, however, it would

have been sufficient for an interested person to consult the city-archives, without the city having to go to the expense of inscription. Nor does her explanation take account of the fact that the same catalogue could be inscribed in duplicate (nine examples) or even triplicate (five examples; cf. App.IIB). As Beard has emphasized, ancient inscriptions, even when their content seems utilitarian to the modern reader, need not always have served primarily as a 'practical tool of reference'. The chief function of the catalogues—and the career-inscriptions too—was surely honorific and political: they were the visible demonstration of oligarchy. The variation in the frequency with which different magistracies had their membership inscribed may well be connected with the varying degree of personal expense involved. On this view, the fact that catalogues of *gerontes*, ephors and *nomophulakes*—posts whose liturgical character in the Late Republic was noted earlier—predominate so resoundingly (App.IIA) suggests that by the second century, as with provincial Greek city-councils elsewhere, membership of the composite *boulē* regularly carried with it the expectation of 'some *quid pro quo* for the honour of being elected'.¹⁸

The inscriptions define a further group of four offices, the patronomate, gymnasiarchy, *sitōnia* and agoranomate, incumbents of which were normally expected to subsidize the activities associated with their spheres of competence. Leaving aside the peculiarly Spartan office of *patronomos*, discussed in chapter 14, the other three posts have in common that they were all classified in Roman administrative law as liturgies, exemption from eligibility to them being a privilege conferred sparingly by second- and third-century emperors on favoured provincials only. Two of these three, the *sitōnia* (above) and the agoranomate, were associated with the food supply. The agoranomate is first heard of under Augustus and was probably a magistracy of relatively recent origin instituted in response to the elaboration of the city's market-facilities in the Hellenistic age (chapter 10). Assisted variously by five to eight colleagues, along with a staff of freedmen or slaves, the *agoranomos* in the second century was in charge of the *macellum* and the civic granary. In other cities the liturgical character of the office derived from local expectations that *agoranomoi* would themselves subsidize the cost of staples during times of scarcity. That Spartan *agoranomoi* faced similar expectations is suggested by the case of Pomponius Panthales Diogenes Aristetas, *agoranomos* in the early 220s, who received the unusual honour of no fewer than twelve public statues for 'the unsurpassed generosity of his *agoronomia* and the lavishness of his labours in office and of his entire term'.¹⁹

The Spartan gymnasiarchy makes its first appearance in the inscriptions under the later Flavian emperors (IG v. 1.480). That this post too was a relatively recent institution is suggested by the fact that its duties were regulated, not by custom, but by law; as late as the Augustan period, comparable functions may have been discharged, not by a gymnasiarch, but by a 'superintendent' (*epimelētēs*) of the gymnasium and his assistants. The importance of the gymnasiarchy in the life of Roman Sparta is underlined by the

fact that more incumbents (nineteen) were honoured with public dedications than any other category of local official (the next most frequently honoured group were the *agoranomoi*, of whom only four are known to have been honoured in this way). This importance reflects the central place of the gymnasia in the social and cultural life of Roman Sparta, their facilities now being used both by local participants in the revived training and also by increasing numbers of foreign athletes (chapters 13–14). Of the administrative duties of the gymnasiarch we know only that he was required to provide a daily supply of anointing-oil for festival contestants. No doubt it was this requirement to supply oil to the gymnasia and training-grounds which was chiefly responsible for the post's liturgical character. The munificent C.Julius Theophrastus under Hadrian gives an idea of the levels of generosity to which a public-spirited gymnasiarch could aspire: 'having bought at 30 denarii the *hudria*, I placed oil in the gymnasium, in the *thermai* (of the refined sort) and in the Machanidae, and I supplied linen towels (?) to all throughout the year'. This price per *hudria* no doubt was a high one, or else Theophrastus would not have bothered to record it; the probability that the oil in question came from his own olive-trees was noted earlier.²⁰

With the provision of funds competing with or even superseding any administrative duties, the endowment of a liturgical post became an alternative to the actual holding of office. This practice was frequent in the later second and third centuries, the donor being rewarded with the right to be styled a 'perpetual' (*aiōnios*) incumbent of the post in question. Offices known to have been endowed in this way were the *sitōnia* (once), the hipparchy, an ephobic post (once), the agoranomate (three times) and the gymnasiarchy (six times)—the last figure confirming the view taken above of the gymnasiarchy's pre-eminence.²¹

In the Roman period it was not unknown for wealthy citizens to confer apparently unsolicited benefaction on the city: in this respect the gifts of C.Julius Agesilaus under Trajan and the senator Eurycles Herculanus under Hadrian (chapter 8) stand out by virtue of their impressive scale. But the inscriptions suggest that the practice of euergetism was chiefly aimed at the routine maintenance of public services only. To keep the system going, the local authorities devised a range of honours to reward the more generous and *pour encourager les autres*. Honorific statues and the inscriptions which identified them show how fully the common language of euergetism, visual and written, had been absorbed into civic life by the second century. Honorific titles and epithets conferred by public acclamation included those of 'pious and patriotic', 'noble and just' and 'son of the city and council'. 'Magnanimity' (*megalopsukhia*) and 'zealous ambition' (*philotimia*) expressed through financial generosity were civic virtues repeatedly held up for praise in statue-dedications; the description of a term of office as 'incomparable' (*asunkritos*) invited the emulation of others, as did the claim that one honorand had 'outdone his peers in the zealous ambition of his gymnasiarchy'. Competitive *philotimia* was further encouraged by

the foundation under Trajan, within an archaising framework discussed in [chapter 14](#), of the ‘contest for best citizen’ (*agōn tēs aristopoliteias*). This contest was regulated by a law and victory was formally conferred by the citizen-assembly. Victors received ‘honours’ (*timai*), among them the title of *aristopoliteutēs* and the right to a public statue. We have no clear evidence for the criteria of victory. But that outstanding public service was gauged largely in financial terms is suggested by the fact that victors can usually be identified as well-to-do notables and by the later appearance of the honorific title ‘perpetual *aristopoliteutēs*’. This was taken by Wilhelm to indicate a victor ‘whose example stood for all time’. But it seems better understood, on analogy with his own definition of ‘eternal’ magistracies, as a title conferred in return for the gift of a civic endowment.²²

The language of the inscriptions conveys an ideal of civic service and does not necessarily reflect the true appetite among the wealthy for the burdens of public office. But it is only in the third century that clear evidence emerges for reluctance to hold office and the introduction of compulsion ([chapter 9](#)). Increasing pressure from Roman tax-demands seems to offer at least a partial explanation for these developments, since the burden of payment would have fallen in the first instance on local magistrates. At Athens, perhaps in about 230, the council of 500 was enlarged to 750 members so as to increase the pool of magistrates eligible for liturgies. It is just possible that the epigraphic references to a city-council and city-councillors of the common Greek type which appear at Sparta from about 200 onwards (see above) echo an enlargement for similar ends of the composite council of thirty-four—through the creation, for instance, of a new class of supernumerary councillors.²³

Chapter twelve

Local government II: the social and economic base

Among the free population of Sparta, until the Antonine constitution of 212 or 213 the chief formal status-division remained the one between citizen and non-citizen. Given the largely honorific function of Roman Sparta's 'epigraphic habit', the citizens (or *Lakedaimonioi*, as they were officially called) about whom we know most are those whose office-holding is so copiously documented in local inscriptions. That these Spartans formed an economically privileged group within the civic community is implied by the liturgical character of local politics, which, as we have seen (chapter 11), favoured men of property as candidates for office. As well as its pronounced aristocratic element (below), this same group was probably socially privileged in a broader sense, since it is now known from the letter of M.Aurelius to the Athenians that Greek cities in the second century, to guard against infiltration by persons of freedman descent, not uncommonly required proof of three generations of free birth (*trigonia*) from candidates for major magistracies (although at Sparta no less than at Athens, as we shall see, ambitious and well-connected persons of freedman stock were able to evade such restrictions). Under Roman influence Sparta's chief magistrates and their families also came to constitute a legally privileged group. From the reign of Hadrian, Roman law recognized as a status-group with special rights the so-called *honestiores* or 'more honourable', who included not only the Roman aristocracy but also the councillors (*decuriones* in the Latin west, *bouleutai* in the Greek east) of the provincial cities, together with their families. As was seen in chapter 11, the equivalent of a municipal *boulē* at Roman Sparta was the composite council of the *gerontes*, ephors, and *nomophulakes*. Like decurions elsewhere these magistrates enjoyed a special status locally. Under the principate, they possessed the privilege of *sitēsis* or meals at public expense (chapter 14). They also had special seats at civic festivals. That this was so in the sanctuary of Artemis Orthia, where the annual ephebic contests were held (chapter 14), is suggested by the marble bench dedicated in the late first century BC by two Spartans, one of them a former *gerōn*, the other almost certainly an ex-magistrate too: as Dawkins saw, this was an 'official seat', 'a less ostentatious predecessor of the magisterial tribune' built probably on the same spot during the tetrarchic remodelling of the sanctuary. Secondly, excavations in the theatre produced an inscribed *stēlē* (not *in situ*) with the one word 'boulēs' or

'belonging to the council'; although the text is not firmly dated, its letter-forms would best suit a date no earlier than the second century. Woodward made the attractive suggestion that this *stēlē* served to demarcate a zone of seating within the *cavea* set aside for 'councillors'—to be identified, in that case, with the *gerontes*, ephors and *nomophulakes*', if Woodward is right, it is likely that seating arrangements in the *cavea* as a whole were organised so as to mirror the local status-hierarchy, as in Graeco-Roman theatres elsewhere. In conclusion, given that Sparta's composite council was already marked in the first half of the second century by a strong hereditary element, it seems justified to refer, from this period onwards if no earlier, to a Spartan curial or bouletic class, comprising the pool of families which provided the city with its ephors, *nomophulakes* and *gerontes*, together with its chief liturgists.¹

This curial class should not be thought of as an altogether homogeneous body. A unique reference in the Spartan decree of consolation from the reign of Gaius or Claudius to 'the first houses of the city', to which the deceased T. Statilius Lamprias of Epidaurus was related, shows that, like other provincial Greek cities, Roman Sparta had its 'leading men' (*prōtoi* or *primores viri*), who were distinguished by their prestige from other magistrates. Variations of wealth certainly contributed to such inequalities of personal standing. That a few Spartans were much richer than their compatriots is indicated by the existence of local families (four are firmly attested) of senatorial and equestrian rank, able by definition to meet the census-requirements for those orders of 1,000,000 and 400,000 sesterces respectively. Other well-to-do Spartans can be recognised in C. Iulius Agesilaus, who endowed the Leonidea under Trajan with 10,500 denarii (44,000 sesterces) and the Urania with an unknown, but probably larger, amount and in C. Iulius Theophrastus, the total cost of whose grain-subsidy under Trajan amounted (on one calculation) to 560,000 sesterces. By contrast, C. Iulius Arion, a curial Spartan of the Antonine period, was evidently a man of more modest means, since he took pride in a relatively humble display of euergetism, boasting that he had waived his entitlement to overtime pay from public funds on returning from an embassy to Naples which had lasted longer than planned.²

Another highly valued (and unequally distributed) source of personal prestige was noble birth or *eugeneia*, public praise of which emerges as a persistent theme in Roman Sparta's honorific epigraphy. Thus a local notable from the early principate was lauded for 'having confirmed by his own excellence the glory of his descent', a matron of the later Antonine period for having 'served publicly in a manner worthy of the nobility of her house'. Perhaps the most striking testimony to the aristocratic values of local upper-class society comes in the decree of consolation for the Spartan and Epidaurian kin of T. Statilius Lamprias, which includes a six-line paean to his high birth, partly derived from his kinship with one of Sparta's 'first houses', the Voluseni. This inscription and others detail some of the lineages which inspired such praise and show that the Roman city's office-holding families included a hard core claiming descent from

the aristocracy of Classical Sparta. Among the pedigrees traced from deities and local heroes the most frequently encountered ancestors are Heracles and the divine twins or Dioscuri, the former the progenitor of the old Spartan royal houses and other families in the Dorian aristocracy of Classical times, the latter intimately linked with the institution of the dual kingship. Other lineages were traced back to historical figures, including unspecified 'kings' and the famous generals Brasidas ([chapter 7](#)) and Lysander. Careful maintenance of these genealogies is shown by the inscriptions which enumerate the precise number of generations separating some latter-day 'Heraclid', 'Dioscurid', or 'descendant of Poseidon' from his alleged forefather(s), as by the claim of a Hadrianic magistrate to be 'the most senior of the Heraclid race' (also indicating that the Classical Spartan notion of the Heraclids as a distinct descent-group was still alive under the principate). The generally oligarchic tenor of local government in provincial Greek cities meant that Sparta was by no means unusual in this public parading of noble birth, which the thinking of educated Greek *possédants* now integrated into the moral basis for the claims of their class to local political domination. Genealogical snobbery in the provinces was further stimulated by the attitude of the Roman aristocracy, which was prepared to be impressed by the claims of birth in its personal relations with provincials, as is shown in Sparta's case by the episode involving an anonymous descendant of Brasidas, whom Augustus released from prison on learning of his ancestry ([chapter 7](#)).³

A third source of personal prestige within Sparta's curial class rested with a family's standing with Rome. The network of personal ties between *bien pensant* Spartans and their Roman counterparts can only rarely be glimpsed, as with Philippus, Cicero's client ([chapter 7](#)), or the well-born Tyndares, whose playful *inamorato* was the Vespasianic consular L. Mestrius Florus ([chapter 13](#)). Under the principate, the one readily visible pointer to such connections lies with the evidence for virginate grants of Roman citizenship to individual Spartans and their families. Generally speaking these grants, which were in the emperor's gift, were only conferred on provincials in good standing with Rome; usually they seem to have been requested by the recipients themselves, who then assumed the *praenomen* and *nomen* either of the emperor in question or of the influential Roman 'broker' who had interceded at court on their behalfs. In Sparta's case, the occasional instance of a family which owed its *civitas* to the emperor's direct interest can be surmised, as with C. Iulius Eurycles, the friend of Augustus, or the athletic family of the (P.) Aelii, quite possibly enfranchised by Hadrian in person on one of his two visits to Sparta. The interventions of 'brokers', however, is indicated by those Roman names of Spartan *cives* which can be shown to derive from known governors of Achaia or other high-ranking Romans, as with the (P.) Memmii, who gained their Roman citizenship from P. Memmius Regulus, governor from 35 to 44. Although increasingly commonplace among the city's 'leading men', in the first half of the second century Roman citizenship was still a distinction within the larger pool of Sparta's curial families, to judge from two complete catalogues of *gerontes* from

the reigns of Trajan and Pius, in which no more than 13 per cent and 27 per cent respectively of the twenty-three magistrates were also *cives*.⁴

It should by now be apparent that—broadly speaking—Roman Sparta's social structure followed a pattern widespread in Greek cities under Roman rule. Once the fog of our ignorance begins to clear in the mid-first century BC, we can observe a society scarcely less sharply stratified than in the days before the reforming kings, its upper reaches occupied by a class of property-owners enjoying official Roman support, its apex by a small élite of aristocratic 'first houses'. The citizen-body of Roman times presumably included at least some descendants of those new citizens of Cleomenes III and Nabis who had survived the respective débâcles of 222 and 188 BC with their status and at least some of their property intact (chapters 4–6). But it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the existence of a self-consciously 'old' aristocracy in the Roman period to a large extent reflects the success of the various groups of Spartan exiles in regaining their patrimonies during the early years of Sparta's *sumpoliteia* with the Achaean League. The existence of self-styled 'descendants of Heracles' at Roman Sparta does not in itself, of course, demand this conclusion: pedigrees could be faked. But there are two reasons for thinking that some of these 'old' families were descended from the aristocracy of Classical Sparta (making due allowance for adoption and descent through the female line). Firstly, let us return to the pedigrees themselves, some of which were clearly intended to associate their scions with the heroic age of Greek myth. As Woodward observed, the lineages of different families claiming the same mythic ancestor(s) were not always synchronous. For example, if we allow the usual three generations per century, the pedigrees of P. Memmius Deximachus (Pius) and M. Aurelius Aristocrates (Severan), respectively forty-second and forty-fourth in descent from the Dioscuri, placed their divine progenitors c. 1250 BC, the other, Heraclid, pedigree of Aristocrates putting this hero four generations earlier, c. 1400 BC. These pedigrees actually reached back to the Bronze Age, 1250 BC coinciding with the Herodotean date for the Trojan war; they seem to depend on the Greek chronographic tradition and could as easily be Hellenistic or Roman as Classical inventions. But the pedigrees of Eurycles Herculanus (Trajan/Hadrian), thirty-sixth in descent from the Dioscuri, and the anonymous high-priest of Constantinian times, forty-fifth in descent from the same, reached no further back than the eleventh century, placing the divine twins c. 1100 and c. 1050 BC respectively. It is possible that these two at least are genuinely preserved lineages, reaching back to (say) the sixth or fifth century BC, since they share with other heroic pedigrees of that period the same curious inability 'to reach back to a plausible date for the Trojan War'—perhaps because their true origins lay in the unsettled conditions of the early 'Dark Ages'.⁵

Secondly, these heroic pedigrees were intimately linked, in a decidedly archaic manner, with priestly functions: out of thirty-four attested civic priesthoods at Roman Sparta, the succession to all but five was hereditary among some seven lineages. Of the cults in question, although some are first

attested in the Roman period (in itself no argument against their antiquity, given the paucity of evidence for Classical Spartan religion), others were demonstrably venerable and lay at the heart of the Roman city's official religious life—notably those of Artemis Orthia, Apollo at Amyclae, Helen and the Dioscuri at Phoebaeum and Demeter and Core at the Eleusinium. With cults of this stature, it is hard to believe that their priesthoods were once disposed of by lot or election, becoming hereditary only in later antiquity as a result of some putative 'decline' in traditional piety (nowadays a questionable notion anyway) and consequent melting away of willing candidates for priestly office. On the contrary, the instances of priestly functionaries at Roman Sparta claiming descent from the deities whom they served suggests that these cults were once (no later than the Archaic period?) aristocratic family- or clan-cults which subsequently became absorbed into the civic domain: thus Tib. Claudius Aristocrates, a Flavian member of a leading local family, was a 'priest and descendant of Poseidon'; and the Memmii, the Pomponii and the (Sex.) Pompeii, the aristocratic families which, under the principate, provided the priesthood at Phoebaeum, all claimed the Dioscuri as their ancestors. Aristocratic families of hereditary seers (*manteis*), prophesying at civic religious ceremonies, are also attested at Sparta from the Augustan age to the mid-third century; of the two mantic lineages which can be distinguished, one of them allegedly descended from Apollo *via* the mantic clan of the Elean Iamids, a branch of which had settled at Classical Sparta, their funerary monument still to be seen in the mid-second century. The existence of a priestly aristocracy at Classical Sparta is now recognized, one recalling its counterpart at Athens in the same period. There the survival of hereditary priesthoods into the Imperial age is well attested, notably at Eleusis, where the chief priesthoods were monopolised by leading Athenian families in the 'descent-groups' (*genē*) of the Eumolpids and Ceryces. The most economical explanation of the Spartan evidence is to posit a similar continuity, with any mid-Hellenistic disruption to traditional patterns of hereditary religious authority to a large extent being reversed by the aristocratic 'restoration' of the post-Nabian period.⁶

Moving down the social hierarchy, on the fringes of the Roman city's curial class can be detected a group of citizens pursuing professional careers in Sparta and neighbouring towns, including architects, one of whom served on the magisterial board of *hieromnēmones* in the mid-third century, presumably in his capacity as adviser on sacred building-works; doctors ([chapter 13](#)); and sports instructors ([chapter 14](#)). Lower on the scale of respectability could be found itinerant Spartan actors ([chapter 13](#)), and, not before the Flavian period, a Spartan gladiator, who died at Thessalonice. Inscriptions from the Augustan age attest a still humbler stratum of the citizen-population engaged in artisanal activity, the old ban on which for Spartan citizens is unlikely to have survived the reign of Nabis. At this occupational level, as the same inscriptions make clear, free men mixed with slaves and freedmen. Prosopography brings out clearly the links between this servile population and rich households, as with

the Tyndares, Eurybanassa, Ageta and Pantimia attested as Augustan slave-owners, all of whom seem to have belonged to leading local families. The size of this population is likely, therefore, to have been relatively small, although it was swollen by the limited use of slaves and freedmen in the civic services, where they appear under the principate as scribes, cooks (*mageiroi*) and magistrates' attendants. With the disappearance of Helotage (below) and opportunities to capture slaves as war-booty, the Roman city's chief source of supply was presumably the slave-market—a view finding corroboration in a Trajanic inscription which records a slave of Syrian origin, apparently sold into bondage from his home village, the otherwise obscure Thenae; 'Ctesiphon', the name of an Augustan slave, also suggests an oriental origin. A certain amount of home-breeding is perhaps indicated by the two public slaves called Nicocles in the reign of Marcus, one, presumably the other's son, distinguished as 'the younger'.⁷

Some form of Helotage seems to have survived the mass-enfranchisement of Helots by Nabis (chapter 5), since Strabo, living under Augustus, although he wrote of this institution in the past tense, believed that it had survived until the Roman 'domination' (*epikrateia*). From another passage, referring to the loyalty of Helots to Rome when Sparta was 'under a tyranny', Gitti tried to argue that Helotage survived until the time of Eurycles. It is reasonable to doubt, however, whether Strabo would have referred to the emperor's protégé as a 'tyrant'—a term which he scrupulously avoids in those passages where Eurycles is clearly in question (chapter 7): the reference is surely to the 'tyrant' Nabis. If so, by Roman 'domination' Strabo probably had in mind the watershed of 146/5 BC. But it remains questionable whether Helotage was ever formally suppressed, then or later; surviving families of Helot-status working the land as tenant-farmers may simply have slid into much the same status as that of the rural peasantries of Roman Bithynia and Egypt, who, although technically 'free', were without local political rights.⁸

It remains to consider the extent to which Roman Sparta's social structure showed signs of flexibility, allowing promotions in personal status and some replenishment of the curial class from below. Although Sparta under Roman rule was not a cosmopolitan city in the same sense as Corinth or Athens, it seems fairly clear that limited opportunities for social mobility did exist, at any rate in the second century. To begin with, prosopography suggests the infiltration into the curial class and the gymnasium of a trickle of freedmen and their descendants. A handful of magistrates with Roman citizenship can be discerned whose *cognomina* were certainly consonant with, even if they do not prove, servile origins: P.Memmius Melichrus ('Honey-coloured'), a Trajanic *nomophulax*; Iulius Lycus ('Wolf'), an early Antonine *gerōn*; and two late Antonine *sunagoranomoi* (junior colleagues of the *agoranomos*), the Memmii Anthus ('Flower') and Soterichus. All these names occur with varying frequency among the vast servile population of Imperial Rome, one of them, 'Lycus', being firmly attested as a slave's name at Sparta itself; they contrast markedly with the characteristic nomenclature of the Roman city's leading families, in which

names with epic ('Eurybanassa'), aristocratic ('Pratolaus', 'Damocratidas'), horsey ('Melesippus', 'Zeuxippus') and royal ('Agesilaus', 'Areus', and 'Cleombrotus') overtones are frequent. The combination of low-status *cognomina* with the possession of Roman citizenship strongly suggests that the magistrates in question owed their Roman status to manumission rather than viritane grants: in particular, the *nomen* 'Memmius' points fairly conclusively towards the slave-household of the aristocratic clan of the Memmii, enfranchised in the second quarter of the first century. The way in which such households could act as breeding-grounds for the socially ambitious slave is perhaps intimated by the dedication, couched in verse so as to display its donor's pretensions to cultivation, of one Aphrodisius, slave of Tib. Claudius Pratolaus, a son of the senator Brasidas. Their ties of clientship with such important families apparently allowed some favoured individuals of freedman stock to go on to overcome the juridical obstacles to their acquisition of local citizenship and candidacy for curial offices. The onomastic difficulties in the way of diagnosing servile origins of other Spartans of this type are demonstrated by the case of one C. Iulius Eurycles, who held the prestigious ephebic office of *boagos* in the early 130s. He is normally taken to be a kinsman of his distinguished older contemporary and namesake, the senator C. Iulius Eurycles Herculanus. If so, however, his existence is at odds with the other evidence that Herculanus died a few years later without leaving a direct male heir. An alternative is to see the younger Eurycles as the descendant of a Euryclid freedman, his *cognomen* a mark of deference to his family's powerful patron; the same onomastic practice has been observed among the clients of important families at second-century Athens.⁹

If the identification of the *boagos* along these lines is correct, it appears that by the second century the Roman city's ephebic training, which one would normally expect to have been the preserve of free-born youths, was open no less than its magistracies to infiltration by well-connected persons of freedman stock. There is other evidence to associate the milieu of the gymnasium with persons of varying social status, their presence partly reflecting civic measures to ensure that levels of recruitment into the showcase of the 'revived' Lycurgan customs—the ephebic training—remained acceptable. Chrimes claimed to distinguish two categories of Spartans for whom access to magistracies depended on passage through the ephebic training. However, one of these, that of the *sunephēboi*, can be set aside. The term *sunephēbos* first makes its appearance in the Flavian period to describe a member of an ephebic band led by a fellow-ephebe or 'herd-leader' (*boagos*); similar teams of 'synephebes' are attested at Roman Athens, there under the charge of an ephebic official called the *systemmatarch*. Although *boagoi* often (but by no means invariably, as the case of Eurycles suggests) belonged to prominent local families, it is also clear that some 'synephebes' could be well-born: a 'synephebe' of Herodes Atticus, Corinthas son of Nicephorus, served as a Spartan Panhellene, a post for which, at least at Athens and probably in all member-cities, three generations of good birth (*trigonia*) were normally required; and a mid-Antonine 'synephebe', the

aristocratic Callicrates, belonged to one of the Roman city's mantic lineages and may have been the hereditary priest of Apollo at Amyclae. If the term 'synephebe' had no juridical connotations, however, it remains possible that some 'synephebes' were helped through the training by the financial generosity of their *boagoi* (see [chapter 14](#)).¹⁰

The second, more problematic, category comprises the forty-seven or so Spartans described as '*kasēn* to so-and-so' in inscriptions ranging from the later second or early first century BC down to the years after 230. Although its etymology is obscure, *kasēn* is clearly a congener of *kasis* ('brother') and *kasioi* (plural), this last—according to the late lexicographer Hesychius—meaning 'brothers and cousins' in the same ephebic team, apparently referring to Sparta. Prosopography, however, does not support the view that the ties between Spartans of this category and the contemporaries to whom they were *kasēn* were ones of kinship. As Chrimes saw, foster-ties seem rather to be in question: persons in the *kasēn* category were apparently educated, or at any rate passed through the ephebic training, at the expense of the families to whose sons they were attached; for this reason it was possible for an individual to be *kasēn* to two or even three males within the same family. Foster-ties of a comparable kind, as a result of which youths of unequal standing became 'companions in education' (*suntrophoi*), were not uncommon in the Greek world—they can be detected too, for instance, among the ephebes of Roman Athens. At Sparta the archaic-sounding term *kasēn*, no doubt retained in the Imperial period in part for its antique resonances, seems to belong to a peculiarly Spartan foster-terminology, along with the earlier terms *mothax* and *mothōn*. However, the absence of strong ties between Spartans of *kasēn*-status and the families which 'fostered' them is suggested by the case of M. Antistius Philocrates son of Philocles, a *gerōnc*.¹⁰⁰ He can almost certainly be identified with Philocrates son of Philocles, *kasēn* to Agesilaus son of Neolaus, who made an ephebic dedication in the Flavian period; his son appears to be the 'Damion son of Antistius Philocrates', *kasēn* to Agis son of Cleander, who made an ephebic dedication under Trajan. But the two Spartans to whom the father and son stood in the relation of *kasēn* cannot be shown to have been closely related (manifestly they were not themselves father and son). As with the 'synephebes', Chrimes held the view that Spartans of this status were juridically barred from certain high offices. She correctly pointed out that no *kasēn* is known to have held the patronomate; one can go further, however, and clarify that none of the thirty-five who are attested in public life is known to have held any of the Roman city's chief liturgical magistracies (patronomate, gymnasiarchy and agoranomate), although one, Sosicrates son of Epaphroditus, held the junior tribal liturgy of *diabetēs*. Financial rather than legal disability seems a better explanation of this pattern; from a Roman point of view, magistrates of *kasēn*-status perhaps would have fitted into the class of the *inferiores* or decurions of lesser rank. Moreover, as Woodward saw, that at least some Spartans of *kasēn*-status were well-born is suggested by their names: 'Charixenus son of Damocratidas', 'Thrasylbulus son of Callicrates', 'Xenocles

son of Aristocritus' and so on. Apart from one instance dating from the century after 146 BC, all the evidence for this status belongs to the period after 50. Given that the *kasen*-relationship does not appear to have been embedded in the social matrix of the Roman city, it is tempting to suppose that the status was artificially revived in the later first century, essentially as a recruiting device for the ephobic training, this 'fostership' of appropriately archaising type allowing Spartans from less well-off backgrounds to be financially assisted through the training.¹¹

* * * * *

It remains to consider the economic base of the Roman city's propertied class. 'For the city of Sparta the literary tradition and the monuments exclude any thought of a decline in the Imperial period'. Three recent studies only add weight to Kahrstedt's judgement, which prefaced his economic survey of the Roman city and confirmed the briefly-stated impressions of earlier archaeologists. Roman Sparta's mint, producing a series of bronze issues at irregular intervals down to the reign of Gallienus, was one of the four most active in the Peloponnese, along with Corinth, Patrae and Argos. Long ago, Wace inferred from the sarcophagi in the Sparta Museum the existence of 'a considerable wealthy element in Laconia in the Imperial period'; in fact, Sparta can be classed among the only cities in provincial Achaia, along with Corinth, Patrae and Thespieae, from which finds of imported Attic sarcophagi so far exceed ten. The city has also emerged as one of two in the province affluent enough to support two senatorial families. This last figure keeps Sparta in perspective, however, since it somewhat pales behind the comparable figure of six for Pergamum. Levels of wealth at Roman Sparta, although they placed her among the most prosperous cities in Achaia, remained relatively modest when set beside those of the richest cities of Roman Asia.¹²

Although the resources of Roman Sparta were itemized in some detail by Chrimes, to whom the reader is referred, a consensus has yet to emerge as to the basis of the Roman city's prosperity. Kahrstedt saw the 'opening up' of local marble-sources as the great innovation of the Imperial period. The difficulty with this view is that, although the Roman city possessed plentiful supplies of stone for local purposes (below), the only quarries on home territory known to have produced marble for export are those of Croceae, source of *marmor Lacedaemonium*, a dark green 'porphyry' much in vogue in the Imperial period for the revetment of walls and floors. Strabo knew of the private development of these quarries under Augustus (it would be interesting to know by whom) to satisfy 'Roman luxury'; but a relief-dedication from Croceae, its Latin inscription re-edited with new readings in 1961, shows that by the reign of Domitian they were the property of the emperor, administered on the spot by an Imperial slave. It is unknown exactly when or how this change occurred, although it fits into a larger pattern of concentration into Imperial hands of important mineral resources in the provinces. But it is now clear that the period of local exploitation was relatively short-lived.¹³

Quarries, then, cannot be made to bear the weight of explanation placed on them by Kahrstedt. On the other hand, in the belief that Roman Sparta was famous for no one farming product, the same scholar certainly underestimated the contribution of agriculture (and pastoralism) to local prosperity. Land-ownership had always provided the chief source of private wealth at Sparta, as it continued to do in the Middle Ages. For the Imperial period, the link between the two is shown unequivocally by the impressive monument at Ktirakia; on the view taken in [chapter 10](#), the interests of Spartan families in the fertile region of the Helea make the same point. In this period we hear of or can infer cereal-production (wheat and barley), olive-cultivation and horse-raising. None of these unexceptionable strategies of production was new to the Spartan countryside; their profitability in the Roman period will have largely depended on the intensity with which they were pursued and the size of the available market. Regarding the former, we have the isolated notice in an unexpected source, the panegyric for the emperor Majorian (457–61) composed by Sidonius Apollinaris, revealing ‘Lacedaemon’ as one of the places which exported olive oil to Rome in late antiquity. In spite of its context, there is no need to doubt this evidence for an export-trade in olive oil at Late Roman Sparta. It points to the emergence under Roman influence of specialized olive-growing estates, relying for the necessary capital investment on wealthy individuals. Smaller neighbouring towns—Gytheum in particular—also offered an outlet for the agricultural products of the city controlling the largest and most fertile territory in Laconia. But the chief market was probably the city of Sparta itself. The increasing orientation of Spartan farming, at least within the immediate vicinity, to the needs of the city, is suggested by the observation of the Laconia Survey that ‘small farms of Roman date tend to cluster closely at the bottom of the valleys and along natural lines of communication’: evidently the Roman period saw a greater emphasis on the transport of agricultural produce to the city. Although its permanent population may have been relatively small, with the city’s emergence in the Imperial period ([chapters 13–14](#)) as a cultural and agonistic centre the regular influxes of visitors attracted by the cycle of civic festivals provided local producers with an additional market for their surplus, fluctuating but predictable.¹⁴

Among the products of the land in the larger sense can be included the stocks of wild animals on Taygetus, which in 400 were drawn on for the consular shows given in Milan and Rome by the Roman general Stilicho. On the basis of this (inaccurately reported) item of evidence, Chrimes conjured up an important trade in Spartan wild beasts and animal-skins. But Stilicho had special ties with the Peloponnese, having campaigned there against Alaric in 397, and may have drawn on these links with the area when arranging his games three years later; if his case cannot be regarded as typical, the export of animals from Taygetus may have been far more sporadic than Chrimes imagined. Another resource, easily overlooked, is the plentiful supply of building materials in the Spartan plain and its environs. As Livia’s narrow escape from a forest fire in 40 BC emphasizes,

parts of the Spartan countryside were still well-wooded in Roman times. The Roman city was also fortunate to possess a plentiful supply of stone suitable, not only for building, but also for inscribing and sculpting. Marble, varying greatly in colour and quality, but including the white variety admired by Pausanias (iii.14. 1) at the theatre, was obtained from the eastern side of Taygetus, where ancient workings have been reported; and ancient quarries for limestone building blocks have now been located just to the north of Sparta. Lastly, the Eurotas plain was well supplied with clay-beds for the manufacture of roof-tiles and bricks. Local demand for all these materials increased in the Imperial period, which saw an expansion, not only of public and private building activity, but also of inscriptional and sculptural production; in the case of the last, local workshops now received commissions for honorific statuary, funerary monuments and decorative pieces for public buildings and private homes. Exploitation of these rural resources, however exactly organized, provided income for the owners of the land on which they were located. We catch a glimpse of the owners only in the case of clay-beds. Roof-tiles and bricks commissioned for use in the public domain were normally stamped to discourage theft. For the most part, where these stamps preserve a name other than that of the eponymous official by whom they were dated, it belongs to the manufacturer, his relationship to the actual owner of the clay-source left in the dark. In one case, however, we have what is certainly an owner's name: 'Eurycles'. The dynast can be recognized here, perhaps as the donor of a public building for which he supplied the roof-tiles from his own clay-beds. Other proprietors in Sparta's vicinity, like the senatorial owners of clay-beds around Imperial Rome, probably also profited, if only indirectly, from the exploitation of this resource when available on their land. But Kahrstedt certainly overstated the case when he identified the contractor Callicrates of the Augustan age with the eponymous *patronomos* of the same name and period and claimed a case of profits from brick and tile manufacture 'smoothing the way' to a career in local politics; other considerations apart, this identification is extremely speculative, since the name in question is one of the commonest at Sparta (Bradford lists seventy instances!).¹⁵

If land-ownership constituted the basis of personal wealth at Roman Sparta, as is here believed to be the case, it remains to consider the ideologically thorny question of the economic rôle of manufacture and trade. It is probable that the Roman city served not only as a consumption centre for local landowners and their households but also as a regional centre of exchange, a function mediated both through permanent markets (see [chapter 10](#)) and seasonal fairs: thus, in a linkage of commerce and religion familiar in antiquity, we find the annual festival of the Leonidea accompanied by a fair, at which the city encouraged the presence of travelling merchants by waiving the usual local taxes on imports and sales. The demand for goods and services generated by townfolk and visitors sustained an urban artisanate: thus an Augustan inscription records among the tradesmen in attendance on a civic festival a sculptor, a gilder, a spinner, a dyer, a baker, a cook, a provisioner, a wreath-seller and a maker of palms. The

economic significance in aggregate of such craft-activity at Roman Sparta is hard to gauge; at any rate, although an imitator of the products of others (such as sarcophagi and, at a humbler level, clay lamps), the city was not famous for any manufactured product, once we accept that ‘Laconian’ was used as a trade-name in the Roman period (and earlier), both of craft-goods and natural products, with no implications for the place of manufacture. In the absence of good evidence to the contrary, the market for the craft-goods of the town is best seen as mainly local and regional (if tourists took away cheap souvenirs, as they seem to have done at Roman Corinth and may have done at Sparta, such a trade is of cultural rather than economic significance).¹⁶

As for imports, the little evidence which survives relates mostly to exotic objects: oriental slaves; sarcophagi from Athens; and precious marbles for the upper end of the local sculpting and building trades from Proconnesus, Carystus, Larissa and the Docimium quarries at Synnada. But petty wares, as we saw in [chapter 10](#), were reaching the Hellenistic city and continued to do so in the Roman period: among them we can recognise the imports of clay-lamps from Italy, Corinth and Athens which, presumably, gave rise to the attested manufacture of local imitations. The only specific evidence for the importing of staples relates to Egyptian grain under Hadrian (see [chapter 11](#)). But the not uncommon grain-shortages of the second century suggest that resort was had to imports on other occasions too; in this respect it may be significant that among the cities with which Sparta enjoyed friendly ties under Antoninus Pius ([chapter 8](#)) were Cyrene and Puteoli, the former an exporter of grain, the latter one of the grain-ports of Imperial Rome; and, for what it is worth, the destinations of the Spartan shipowner of Philostratus (below) included Sicily and Carthage, both grain-exporting areas under the principate.¹⁷

In sum, the impression given by the—admittedly sparse—evidence is that Sparta’s trade with the outside world, already marked by the early second century BC ([chapter 5](#)), increased in the early empire, a time when levels of trade surged throughout the Mediterranean. Before the third century, however, when Sparta’s status as a free city ceased to protect her against frequent Roman tax-demands, it is questionable to what extent fiscal pressure from outside played a part in this development; the stimulus may have come equally from increasing urbanization, the needs of visitors, and the conspicuous consumption, revealed through archaeology, of rich Spartans. In the absence of good evidence to the contrary, the volume of this trade, which was probably dominated, at least in value, by luxury goods, is best seen as relatively modest; nor should the numbers of associated personnel be exaggerated. Although the slight evidence for the presence of Roman businessmen at Sparta (a bilingual epitaph for one D.Livius Zeuxis) should not be overlooked, of the foreigners noted at Roman Sparta by Kahrstedt, the inscription attesting a group of resident *xenoi* at Amyclae has since been shown to be a forgery; and the presence at Sparta of overseas notables such as Flavius Asclepiades of Palestinian Caesarea should be understood in terms of cultural, not economic, activity (see [chapter 13](#)). It is

none the less possible that commercial activity, at least for a few Spartans, was a significant source of personal wealth. The only Spartan trader of whom we know for certain was one Troilus, whose inscribed epitaph (second or third century) commemorates the devotion of his life to 'labouring across much of man's unchanging earth and striving to sail the unremitting waves of the open sea, in order that sudden fortune might give him something good'. Clearly enough he was a small operator, the sort of person in whose hands seems to have lain immediate responsibility for most movements of merchandise throughout antiquity. But the indirect involvement of high status Spartans, whether as money-lenders or owners of ships, using their slaves or freedmen as middlemen, should not be excluded. It is difficult to know what to make of the tale told by Philostratus in his *Life of Apollonius* of a young Spartan shipowner of noble ancestry, the descendant of 'gymnasiarchs and ephors and *patronomoi*', who himself went on trading voyages to Sicily and Carthage (see above) in contravention of the Lycurgan customs, to be talked to his senses at the last moment by Apollonius during his visit to Sparta in 61. As they do over the *Life* in general, scholars differ as to the historicity of this episode; it was taken as evidence for the existence and status of commercial activity at Roman Sparta by as astute a historian as Victor Ehrenberg; but for Tigerstedt it was a piece of 'free invention'. On the one hand it seems incredible that any provincial Greek city would try a citizen for engaging in commerce; on the other, Philostratus was familiar with Severan Sparta, as the combination of magistracies which he uses to demonstrate the young man's good birth shows, and it is not impossible that he himself concocted this tale, which hinged on the unseemly directness of the young man's involvement in trade, from personal knowledge of Spartan notables with more discreetly managed commercial interests. At any rate, this view is not contradicted by the close ties of certain Spartan families with the port of Gytheum (chapter 10) nor by the evidence, discussed above, for the entry of descendants of freedmen into local politics.¹⁸

In assessing the resource-base of the Roman city, finally, we need to look beyond her frontiers. Within the south-eastern Peloponnese Sparta seems to have continued to exercise an economic predominance in spite of the nominal autonomy of the Eleutherolacones. The desire to shine on a larger stage attracted benefaction from at least one ambitious notable in a minor nearby town: in the Severan age M.Aurelius Pancratidas, a citizen of New Taenarum (Caenopolis), used his personal fortune, based on the resources of his native community, to display his *philotimia* at Sparta 'in the most serviceable ways' and was rewarded with Spartan citizenship and other honours. As the largest urban centre in the region, Sparta is found supplying specialist skills to neighbouring towns. Thus in the last century BC Gytheum had recourse to the services of a Spartan doctor and arms-trainer; in the next century a Spartan letter-cutter found employment at Cardamyle; and an epitaph from second-century Cythera reveals a local doctor who trained at Sparta (and, more surprisingly, at Eleutherolaconian Boeae). Spartan notables owned estates in adjacent towns,

although on what scale is hard to gauge: the clearest case, that of Eurycles in Asopus, may also have been one of the least typical. A second instance is recognizable at Calamae, a village in the territory of Thuria, where the city of Sparta set up a statue-dedication for a (deceased?) member of a resident-family of Spartan citizens. One city's setting up of an official dedication on the territory of another was not uncommon in the Roman period, requiring simply the permission of the civic authority concerned; at Sparta itself the city of Smyrna is found making a dedication under Trajan; hence the text from Calamae need not necessarily, as Kahrstedt asserted, belong to the period of Spartan possession of Thuria in the early principate; its overall tenor, in fact, would sit better in the second century. Its language, praising the honorand for his 'piety towards his parents, his moderation and his education (*paideia*)', shows that he was a youth; probably these qualities had emerged into civic view during service as a Spartan ephebe. As his family was clearly one of standing at Sparta, its residence at rural Calamae is best explained in terms of landed interests there, however acquired (see below). Thirdly, if we allow his identification or close kinship with the 'Tib. Claudius Menalcidas son of Eudamus' honoured at Sparta with a civic dedication early in the second century, another Spartan whose landed base lay outside Sparta can be recognised in the Tib. Claudius Menalcidas, fragments of whose family-tomb, decorated with sculpted reliefs, have been found in the little Eleutherolaconian town of Zarax.¹⁹

As for the ways in which Spartans acquired property in neighbouring towns, one was through conferment of 'the right to own land and a house', a privilege quite commonly granted to individual Spartans in the second and first centuries BC, to judge from a series of honorific decrees from Arcadian Orchomenus (see [chapter 6](#)), Cotyrta, Geronthrae, Gytheum, the Lacedaemonian League and (significantly) Thuria. In Gytheum's case, the Spartans were rewarded for professional services; but the others, including the aristocratic-sounding Pelops son of Laodamas (Geronthrae) and Damocharis son of Timoxenus, an Augustan *patronomos* (Thuria), were notables who used their standing at home to perform political services for the communities in question. The fact that in two cases the decrees are explicitly said to have been solicited by the honorands (Geronthrae and Cotyrta) suggests that these grants of property-rights were not purely empty honours but were sometimes sought after and subsequently exercised. A second route to land-ownership abroad was through intermarriage between the families of Spartan and foreign notables. Under the principate such unions were not uncommon within the Spartan élite; thus the Voluseni intermarried with the Statilii of Epidaurus and (it seems) a Megalopolitan house; the Memmii were doubly related to the same Statilii and also married into a hierophantic house of Messene; it has been argued that the sister of Herodes Atticus, Claudia Tisamenis, married a Spartan; and a Spartan *patronomos* married into the family of M.Aurelius Pancratidas of New Taenarum. Through dowries and inheritances these inter-family ties brought about a circulation of wealth within the provincial aristocracy: Eurycles Herculanus was a testamentary adoptee of a

Corinthian notable, L.Vibullius Pius (in this case no tie of kinship is as yet attested); and it is not unreasonable to suppose that through Claudia Tisamenis (one of whose testamentary dispositions, the erection of a family statue-group in her marital home-city, is actually on record) the Spartan relations of Herodes Atticus came to share in some of his family's vast wealth. The possession of Roman citizenship may well, at this social level, have facilitated the institution of heirs in another city, so helping to foster a supra-civic landowning class. A case in point from the mid-first century is the adoption by the Epidaurian T.Statilius Timocrates of his daughter's son, who, although a Spartan, was also a Roman citizen, his father being P.Memmius Pratolaus (III); in this way, the name and property of the Statilii passed to a branch of the Memmian clan.²⁰

Chapter thirteen

High culture and agonistic festivals

The cultural sterility of Classical Sparta was notorious in antiquity, as it remains today. Although there is a danger of exaggeration where the decorative arts are concerned, it remains clear that literacy was ‘very thinly spread’ and that the city as a whole played no part in the intellectual revolution of the fifth and fourth centuries BC. By contrast, there is a large amount of evidence, brought together in this chapter for the first time, to show that the ‘normalization’ of Spartan society in the course of the Hellenistic period brought with it the city’s reabsorption into the mainstream of Greek cultural life. Two major aspects of this process are charted here: firstly, the Roman city’s links with contemporary Greek ‘high’ culture, sufficiently developed by the fourth century for Sparta to emerge as a minor centre of higher studies; and, secondly, the foundation at Sparta by the third century of no fewer than three agonistic festivals of international status, as a consequence of which the city acquired a certain prominence on the Roman Empire’s agonistic circuit.¹

The first clear indication of a change in traditional Spartan attitudes to ‘cultivation’ (*paideia*) is to be found in the clutch of local authors writing works on Spartan antiquities in the last three centuries BC and under the early principate. The antiquarian bias of Hellenistic scholasticism provides this activity with its larger context; if more of these writers could be dated with any precision, it might be possible to link them with the archaizing movement at Sparta which began in earnest with the ‘restoration’ of the Lycurgan customs in the period after 146/5 BC (see [chapter 14](#)). The best known of them, Sosibius, was active at a somewhat earlier date, however: between the years 250–150 BC, ‘and probably closer to the lower date’. He wrote a series of works still consulted in the Byzantine age, their subject-matter including Spartan cults and customs, a rustic form of Laconian mime, and the Archaic lyric poet Alcman. As Jacoby emphasized, to judge from the surviving fragments Sosibius’ interest in the past was antiquarian rather than political, so that there is little reason to link him directly with the reinvention of ‘Lycurgan’ Sparta for statist ends by Cleomenes III ([chapter 4](#)). On the contrary, his philological and chronographic interests suggest a tie with intellectual centres abroad, Ptolemaic Alexandria in particular, with which Sparta enjoyed a close association for much of the third century BC ([chapters 3–4](#)). Of the other writers, all but one are little more than

names in the encyclopaedic work of the third-century sophist Athenaeus or in lexicographical entries (Molpis, Nicocles, Hippasus, Aristocles, Timocrates, Polycrates, Diophantus and Pausanias). The slightly better-known Aristocrates son of Hipparchus wrote a work on Spartan history which Plutarch used in his *Life of Lycurgus*. His name and patronymic suggest an aristocratic Spartan and his assignation by Jacoby to the early principate is confirmed by an unpublished inscription in the Sparta Museum.²

These authors show that a local literary tradition had taken firm root at Sparta by the Augustan period. The way to this development was paved by the cultural aspirations of the class of *possédants* reestablished in 188 BC under the aegis of the Achaean League, at least some of whom sought to emulate the ‘*education soignée*’ characteristic of their peers in Hellenistic cities elsewhere. The habit among wealthy Spartan families of sending their children abroad for their education was probably first formed in this period. Among the pupils of the famous Stoic philosopher Panaetius of Rhodes, who taught at Athens in the later second century BC, was a certain ‘Gorgus the Lacedaemonian’; like many other cultured Greeks in this period and later, Gorgus seems to have been sufficiently enamoured of Athens and its intellectual delights to become a naturalized Athenian citizen, since in all probability he can be recognised in the Gorgus ‘of the deme Sphettus’ who joined with other foreign students and their teachers to serve on an Athenian festival-commission in about 150 BC. Somewhat later (c. 100 BC) should be placed ‘Demetrius the Laconian’, a minor Epicurean philosopher known to Strabo as a student of Protarchus of Bargylia in Caria and now identified with the homonymous author of fragmentary Epicurean writings found at Herculaneum in the villa of the Calpurnii Pisones. An interesting light on the career and outlook of this Demetrius is shed by the dedication of one of his treatises to a Nero, member of the patrician Claudii, hereditary patrons of Sparta (chapter 7): it seems that Demetrius was one of an increasing number of Greek intellectuals in this period who sought patronage in the Hellenized circles of the Roman aristocracy. Three generations later a Spartan named Nicocrates, this time a rhetor, followed a similar path, since it was probably in Rome that his eloquence made a poor impression on the elder Seneca. The case of Nicocrates, although he was clearly a minor figure (more so than Demetrius), is of interest, because it suggests that by the first century BC the rhetorical branch of Greek higher studies, which was to become increasingly dominant under the principate, was now pursued by Spartans no less than other Greeks—for all that eloquence (at least of the wordy sophistic kind) was so foreign to the Spartan myth. Like Demetrius, Nicocrates presumably trained abroad.³

For further evidence concerning educational practice at Roman Sparta we have to wait until the works of Plutarch, to whom we are indebted for a unique glimpse of cultivated society in the Sparta of c. 100. Plutarch is as informative as he is in this respect largely because—following an established literary format—he framed his ethical dialogues in social settings taken from contemporary life and peopled with figures drawn from his wide spread of upper-class friends and

acquaintances, both Greek and Roman. Familiar with the Sparta of his day, where he had watched the ephebic contests and conducted research in the city-archives (chapter 14), Plutarch also knew a number of prominent Spartan citizens. One of these, the Herculanus to whom he dedicated a treatise on self-praise, can be confidently identified with the Euryclid senator of that name, who is now known to have been a first cousin of another senatorial friend of Plutarch, the Syrian prince C.Julius Antiochus Philopappus; it may well have been from Herculanus that Plutarch heard the anecdotal material concerning the Augustan Eurycles which he incorporated elsewhere in his work (chapter 7).⁴

In addition, three Spartans feature in Plutarch's dialogues. The best-known, one Cleombrotus, is an interlocutor in the treatise *On the Disappearance of Oracles*, which the author seems to have woven out of real-life discussions which took place under the Flavians during a celebration at Delphi of the Pythian games. If Cleombrotus was dead at the time of this work's composition, which may have fallen under Trajan, Plutarch's somewhat unflattering portrayal of his intellectual powers would appear less impolite. Cleombrotus is depicted as a rich and erudite, if credulous, dilettante, well versed in Greek philosophy, well travelled, and himself preparing a theosophical work. Although the point has been overlooked, epigraphy helps to dispel any doubts over his existence as more than a figment of Plutarch's literary imagination: given the rarity of his name, he can be confidently identified with the homonym to whom a Spartan ephor of Flavian date stood in the relationship of *kasen*.

The epigraphic evidence has similarly been neglected in discussions of Plutarch's other two Spartan friends, Zeuxippus and Tyndares. It shows that they were members of the same aristocratic family: a Zeuxippus son of Tyndares held office as *nomophylax* and *gerōn* under Pius; and, as Chrimes saw, a descendant of his can be recognized in M.Aurelius Zeuxippus *qui et* Cleander, an ephebic *boagos* in the early third century and (hereditary, it seems) priest of the 'daughters of Leucippus' and their mythical husbands, the 'sons of Tyndareus' (the Dioscuri, that is): apparently this Zeuxippus belonged to the Roman city's priestly aristocracy, his family's use of the name 'Tyndares' advertising a claim to descent from the deities whom it served as priests. Plutarch's text further clarifies the inter-relationships of members of this family. He describes the earlier Zeuxippus as his *xenos* (*Mor.* 749b), a by now somewhat old-fashioned term describing a form of 'ritualized friendship' between Greek aristocrats with its roots in the Archaic period. In the upper-class circles in which Plutarch moved *xenia*, its reciprocal obligations including the provision of hospitality, retained some of its old force; Zeuxippus is found staying at Chaeronea as Plutarch's guest, and, as Flacelière suggested, he may well have been the Chaeronean's host in Sparta. Their relative ages are of some relevance: that they were more or less coeval is shown by the dialogue *On Love*, the dramatic date of which fell just after Plutarch's marriage (probably in the seventies). Here Plutarch advised Zeuxippus apropos of the married state: 'While at first the feeling is a biting one, dear Zeuxippus, do not fear it as something wounding or painful' (*Mor.* 769e).

The intimate tenor of this—to a modern western ear somewhat disconcerting—advice points to a close friendship: at the dramatic date of the dialogue it seems that both were young men of marrying age, but, whereas Plutarch had taken the plunge (as evidently he saw it), Zeuxippus had yet to do so.

Tyndares, by contrast, belonged to a younger generation. In the *Table-Talk* Plutarch depicts him as his guest at Chaeronea, celebrating Plato's birthday in the company of—among others—L.Mestrius Florus, the Vespasianic consular, and Autobulus, one of Plutarch's sons, whose presence suggests a dramatic date not much before the nineties, when Florus was 'enjoying a sprightly old age in Greece'. That Tyndares was much younger than both Florus and his host is suggested by the fact that the former, presumably attracted by his boyish charms, liked to play at being his lover (*Mor.* 719a). Drawing the literary and epigraphic evidence together, Tyndares can now be identified as the son of Plutarch's Spartan *xenos* and the father of the Antonine magistrate Zeuxippus, who was named after his paternal grandfather according to widespread Greek onomastic practice.

Plutarch sheds some light on the education of these three Spartans. Like Cleombrotus, Zeuxippus and Tyndares are depicted as highly cultivated men: Zeuxippus is portrayed as an admirer of Euripides and in philosophy inclined towards Epicureanism, Tyndares as something of a Platonist (but perhaps no more so than any well-educated Greek of his time). The tie of *xenia* between Plutarch and his father, if it was not hereditary, might well have been initiated during shared student-days at Neronian Athens, where Plutarch was taught by the Alexandrian philosopher Ammonius. The presence of the youthful Tyndares in the house of the by then middle-aged Plutarch suggests that at the time he was attending the private 'academy' which Plutarch had established at Chaeronea, its students drawn from among the sons of his relations and friends. As for Cleombrotus, the fact that Plutarch calls him 'sainted' (*hieros*) implies that he was a good age at the dramatic date of the dialogue in question; if so, he was probably among those interlocutors who had studied in the thirties with the famous rhetor Aemilianus of Nicaea (*Mor.* 410a, 419b). In all three, Plutarch portrays upper-class Spartans who were at ease in highly cultivated company without themselves being culturally distinguished in any way (if Cleombrotus ever completed his theosophical work we know nothing of it): typical products, in fact, of the expensive 'gentleman's education' enjoyed by sons of leading provincial Greek families.⁵

Some two and a half centuries later, in the lifetime of Libanius, Sparta had developed into a minor centre of higher studies. The seeds of this somewhat unexpected development lay in the larger cultural rôle assumed by Sparta in the favourable milieu of the Greek renaissance (chapter 8). By the later second and early third centuries, with its tourism, its cycle of new festivals and its small circle of highly cultivated local families, Sparta offered foreigners a congenial setting for the pursuit of philosophy and rhetoric. Symptomatic of this changing atmosphere is the appearance of Spartan philosophers-in-residence. One, Iulius

Phileratidas son of Hippodamus, is named in a list of *gerontes* from between 165 and 170 as an *ensitos* or recipient of honorific dining-rights at the public meals of these magistrates. Like (probably) the first, the second, Q.Aufidenus Quintus, was a Spartan of curial rank, honoured with a public statue in—to judge from the letter-forms—the early Severan period, in recognition of his ‘magnanimity (*megalophrosūnē*) in public affairs’. Although his *nomen* is rare, his family had been settled at Sparta for at least two generations, to judge from the *cognomen* of his father, ‘Sidectas’—a good Spartan name. His philosophical interests were inherited, since his uncle, Q.Aufidenus Sextus, is styled ‘the most philosophical’; possibly he had been named after the celebrated philosopher Sextus, Plutarch’s nephew and teacher of the future emperor M.Aurelius. As philosophers, both Phileratidas and Quintus were minor figures, unattested elsewhere: ‘big fish in a small pond’, one might be tempted to say of their continued residence as adults in their home-city. But the evidence considered next shows that by the early third century professional teachers at Sparta could expect to attract an increasingly international clientele—as well, probably, as the local ephebes—to their lectures.⁶

This evidence comprises a group of four inscribed dedications set up by the city of Sparta which have in common that the honorands, high-ranking provincial Greeks, were all lauded for their ‘cultivation’ (*paideia*). One honorand, a citizen of Trapezus on the Black Sea, was a certain Tib. Claudius Montanus *qui et* Hesychius, the son of a Eupator; his name suggests kinship with Tib. Claudia Eupatoris Mandane Atticilla, a woman of consular rank honoured at Tralles. The name ‘Eupator’ recurs in the Mithradatid dynasty of Pontus, the rare Median name ‘Mandane’ in the Persian Achaemenid dynasty, from which the Mithradatids claimed descent; Montanus and Mandane may both have belonged to an old Pontic family with a royal pedigree. As for date, the Spartan notable who paid for the dedication, P.Ulpus Pyrrhus, had served as an Imperial high-priest under the Severi. A second honorand, one Flavius Asclepiades *qui et* Alexander, a Syrian Greek from Caesarea, likewise had his dedication paid for by an ex-Imperial high-priest, who this time was a grandson of the senator Brasidas, the early Severan Tib. Claudius Spartiaticus; he claimed Asclepiades as his ‘friend’ (*philos*). M. Aurelius Cleanor son of Rufus, who funded the dedication for a third honorand, Aelius Metrophanes, should probably be identified as the father of a mid-third century *hieromnēmōn*, M.Aurelius Cleanor son of Cleanor. In this case, the absence of an ethnic could be taken to show that Metrophanes was a native Spartan; if so, however, it is odd that the costs of his dedication were not defrayed by his family, the normal Spartan practice in this period, but by an apparently unrelated notable; like the previous two, Metrophanes, whose *cognomen* is otherwise unattested at Roman Sparta, was probably a foreigner. The fourth honorand, M.Ulpus Genealis, was honoured by a Spartan decree inscribed in his home town, the Hellenized Thracian city of Augusta Traiana in the province of Moesia. The date of this text fell after 161, to judge from the Aurelian citizenship of the compatriot who supervised

erection of the monument; in all probability he had been enfranchised by the Antonine constitution of 212–3.

The motives for these honours are not made explicit by the texts themselves. Seure saw them as ‘diplômes de fin d’études, délivrés par l’Université spartiate’; but the notion of a ‘university’ in the modern sense is anachronistic in this period, at Sparta or anywhere else. But it does seem possible that Montanus and Metrophanes, at any rate, were youths or young men when they received their Spartan honours. Montanus was praised for his ‘moderation’ (*sōphrosunē*) and cultivation’, the former a quality particularly associated with women and youngsters; both qualities recur in the Spartan eulogy for the seventeen-year-old T. Statilius Lamprias of Epidaurus. Metrophanes, who ‘outshone his fellows (*hēlikes*) in philosophic *ethos*, in cultivation and in eloquence (*logoi*)’, also sounds like a young man. One explanation would be to see both as furnishing the proofs of their cultivation—perhaps by declaiming in public—while pursuing rhetorical studies at Sparta; it then becomes tempting to identify Metrophanes with one of the two third-century sophists of that name, one from Eucarpia in Phrygia, the other a Boeotian from Lebadea; the Spartan dedication might be seen as a testimony to early promise. With the other two, their age is more in doubt. It is true that Spartaticus, the friend of Asclepiades, had already held the Imperial high-priesthood twice and won the ‘contest for best citizen’; as the son of a Roman senator, however, these civic honours may have come to him early in life. Genealis was praised for his ‘zeal for cultivation and eloquence (*logoi*)’ and thanked for his ‘goodwill’ (*eunoia*) towards Sparta; as Apostolides suggested, he might have been a practising rhetor or sophist, although perhaps not an established one, as the text gives him no professional title. This ‘goodwill’ suggests benefaction, possibly aimed at some appropriately ‘cultural’ institution, such as the Spartan ephebic training; Herodes Atticus, a benefactor of the Athenian ephebate, was likewise praised—this time by the emperor M. Aurelius—for his ‘renowned zeal for cultivation’. Some act of euergetism by Genealis would also provide an understandable context for the long-range diplomacy which Sparta was prepared to conduct in his honour.⁷

In sum, although these honours cannot all be explained in the same way, in a general sense they demonstrate clearly enough the cultural attractions of early third-century Sparta for rich provincials from the Greek diaspora; in two cases at least the honorands perhaps should be seen as foreign students. Against this background, it is not entirely surprising to find that Sparta went on to produce sophists and philosophers of some eminence in the later third and the fourth centuries. At least two members of a Spartan family using the name ‘Apsines’ taught at Athens in this period. The younger of these was involved in an academic *cause célèbre* in early fourth-century Greece when faction-fighting between his own pupils and those of another celebrated sophist teaching at Athens led to a trial before the proconsul. A series of confused entries in the Byzantine lexicon, the *Suda*, can be unravelled to identify this Apsines as the son of Onasimus, another Spartan sophist living under Constantine, and the

grandson of the elder Apsines, who is confused by the lexicon with a famous but somewhat earlier homonym, Valerius Apsines of Gadara, a Syrian Greek sophist teaching at Athens under the later Severi. Given that the name 'Apsines' is otherwise unknown at Sparta, a connection between the Spartan family and the Gadarene—presumably formed in Athens—seems not unlikely: the father of the Spartan Onasimus could have been born in the second quarter of the third century and named after Valerius Apsines either as an act of academic homage or because the two families were related by blood; on either view, this would not be the only case of personal ties in this period between the *pepaideumenoí* of Sparta and Syria, as is shown by the friendship between Spartiaticus and Asclepiades. A century later, Roman Sparta produced its most famous man of learning, the grammarian Nicocles, who was teaching in Constantinople in the years around 340, when the future emperor Julian was among his pupils (chapter 9). At the close of the century another Spartan, the pagan philosopher Epigonus, was one of the 'successors' to another former teacher of Julian, the eminent neoplatonist Chrysanthius of Sardis.⁸

Although none of these later Spartans is known to have taught at Sparta, it is quite possible that some had done so before going on to establish or develop their reputations in intellectual centres elsewhere. That Sparta was now a recognized home of higher studies is shown by the plaintive observation of Julian, in a eulogy of the empress Eusebia composed in the 350s, that, along with Athens and Corinth, it was among the cities in old Greece which 'philosophy had not yet abandoned'. Libanius, writing in 364 to a Spartan correspondent, implies much the same when he refers (no doubt with the intention to flatter) to 'Sparta the wise', a place 'full of much good instruction'. The city's intellectual prominence in this period should undoubtedly be attributed in large part to its—almost inevitable—position as a bastion of late-antique paganism: with its famous Classical past, ancient cults and priestly families Sparta, like Athens, was an old-world city well placed to accommodate the alliance in this period between Greek philosophy and pagan belief. In a Spartan context, the convergence of these two approaches to the ordering of human experience is nicely illustrated in the middle decades of the third century by inscriptions recording a learned and aristocratic family sprung from one of the city's mantic lineages: the 'oracular' Tisamenus, his wife Aurelia Oppia, and their daughter Heraclia, the last said to belong 'to the race of Heracles, Apollo and the Iamidae'. All three are described as 'most philosophical', indicating their pursuit of philosophical interests; in the case of Heraclia, her pagan piety earned her the honour of a portrait-statue set beside the cult-image of 'the most holy Orthia Artemis'. These texts provide further evidence for the close association in this period between pagan oracular activity and late Greek philosophy.⁹

Before finishing with high culture, 'the old nexus between philosophy, oratory and medicine' requires us to consider the neglected evidence for Spartan doctors. The earliest is met with in an inscription from Gytheum, dated to about 70 BC, recording the city's grant of proxeny to a Spartan citizen called

Damiadas, who practised as a doctor free of charge when Gytheum was gripped by a financial crisis and was praised as a ‘man of culture’ (*anēr...pepaideumenos*). Damiadas suggests the existence by his day of Spartan public doctors (*dēmosioi iatroi*) of the widespread Hellenistic kind—in contrast to Classical times, when Sparta had relied on the services of foreign doctors. We know of two local doctors in the second and third centuries, one of them an anonymous bearer of the titles *arkhiatros*, granted in this period to a class of civic doctors distinguished for their wealth and access to high local office, and ‘saviour of the city’, the last suggesting valued services at a time of epidemic. The impression that Sparta had developed by now into a regional medical centre is confirmed by an inscription from second-century Cythera, recording an islander who had trained at Sparta as a doctor. This local tradition of medicine evidently developed in the Hellenistic period and conceivably was encouraged by Spartan links with Ptolemaic Alexandria, the great medical centre of the time. In the Roman period it could claim a distinguished recruit to the international world of medicine in the person of Claudius Agathinus, a Spartan doctor who acquired fame as the founder of a Roman medical sect, the Eclectics. His reputation was made, not locally, but in the highly competitive medical circles of Imperial Rome, where he studied as a young man and remained to teach and practise under the Flavians. His social origins are unclear; his Roman citizenship permits him to have been the freedman of a leading Spartan family (such as the subsequently senatorial Tib. Claudii); alternatively he may have owed it to a virgane grant from Nero in recognition of his professional standing.¹⁰

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Until well into the third century, periodic games for itinerant (and local) athletes, musicians, actors and an ever greater variety of other types of performer formed one of the most vigorous and distinctive aspects of the culture of the Greek cities. Although by the Severan age games on the Greek model were celebrated as far afield as Damascus, Carthage and Rome, provincial Achaia maintained a privileged position in the agonistic world, a status deriving chiefly from the continuing renown of the ancient Olympic, Pythian, Isthmian and Nemean games, but enhanced by the emergence of new agonistic centres at Athens and Sparta. Although Sparta’s importance in this respect has been recognised before, this chapter brings together the relevant evidence for the first time.¹¹

In the last three centuries BC Spartan citizens are found competing in both athletic and dramatic contests abroad. Perhaps in part as a result of a lingering xenophobia, however, foreign *agōnistai* do not seem to have competed at Sparta on a regular basis before the Augustan age. To this period, almost certainly, belongs the foundation of Sparta’s Caesarean games. These are first mentioned in an inscription of Flavian date from Iasus in Asia Minor, which records the victory of a local athlete, T. Flavius Metrobius, at ‘the *Kaisarēa* in Lacedaemon’ (App.IV, 1). But the ‘Caesar’ whom they commemorated was presumably Augustus, since it is inconceivable that the Sparta of Eurycles would have lagged

behind the rash of other Achaian cities which founded new festivals or augmented the activities of existing ones in honour of the first *princeps*. As the construction of *naoi* of Caesar and Augustus shows (chapter 10), the reign of Augustus saw the establishment of a Spartan cult in honour of the ruling family. The foundation of the Caesarea belongs to this same local initiative, the festival, which would have incorporated civic sacrifices on the emperor's behalf as well as games, providing the new cult with its ceremonial focus. On other grounds Eurycles has been identified as the founder of Sparta's Imperial cult (chapter 7); that he instituted the Caesarea as well is suggested, as Moretti saw, by their association in the post-Hadrianic period, apparently as part of a single, prolonged, episode of festival, with the Euryclean games, which were founded and endowed by the dynast's descendant, the senator Herculanius (below). Although only athletic contests are certainly attested for the new festival, the costly refurbishment under Augustus of the civic theatre (chapter 10) suggests a new beginning, of a kind consonant with the institution for the first time of regular dramatic contests. These are not attested for Hellenistic Sparta, although the way for them was paved by the development of a local taste for theatrical spectacle, reflected in the initial phase of construction at the theatre (perhaps under Areus: see chapter 3) and in the iconography, apparently inspired by Athenian drama, of a Spartan mosaic floor dated to about 100 BC (App.I, 50). As we saw in chapter 10, Eurycles has also been identified as the donor of the new theatre.¹²

Although the Caesarea continued to be celebrated into the third century, by then they had long been overshadowed in importance by a succession of more recent foundations, which, to judge from the surviving evidence, were much more successful at attracting foreign competition (see App.IV, where the evidence for foreign *agōnistai* is gathered together). In chronological order of foundation these were the Uranian, Euryclean and Olympian Commodian games, which taken together point to a sustained effort by the Spartans to establish their city as a rival to the traditional agonistic centres of old Greece. Motivation probably lay partly in the realms of civic pride, partly in that of profit: games prestigious enough to attract champion-class contestants—as these did—also brought in the crowds, whose beneficial impact on urban economy was not lost on contemporary observers (see Dio Chrys. *or.* xxxv.15–16).

The Uranian games were founded in 97 or 98 with the financial help of a local notable, C.Iulius Agesilaus (chapter 8). Strictly speaking, they formed only an element (albeit the dominant one) in a festival (*panēguris*) founded in honour of Zeus Uranius, whose cult seems to have been revived for this purpose (chapter 14). Something is known of their organization. Like all games of any importance, they were celebrated quinquennially, festival-years being computed (in ultimate imitation of the famous 'Olympiads' and 'Pythiads') by a local era of 'Uranians'. The games were presided over by a civic official, the *agōnothetēs*, the festival as a whole by another magistrate, the panegyriarch. As for the programme, part of it may be preserved on a document discussed below. Even if this refers to

the Euryclea, the list of known victors in the Urania is sufficient to show that contests in athletics, music and drama were included, presumably staged in either the stadium (App.I, 21) or the theatre. One of these victors, the Hadrianic P.Aelius Aristomachus, a champion-wrestler from Magnesia-on-the-Maeander, boasted in a poem commemorating his achievements in the ring of how 'in venerable Sparta, by the tower of Lacedaemon, I was crowned with the illustrious prize at the Urania' (App.IV, 6). Apart from its reference to this unidentifiable 'tower' (conceivably a purely poetic conceit inspired by Alcman's 'well-towered Therapne'), the text is interesting for showing that victors at the Urania were crowned with a symbolic prize, the wreath, as well as receiving a cash prize—paid for (presumably) by an endowment given by Agesilaus, the original *athlothetēs*. Technically, then, the Urania fell into the agonistic category of 'sacred crown-games' (*agōnes hieroi kaistephaneitai*) or, more precisely, 'crowned prize-games' (*themateitastephaneitai agōnes*); they can presumably be identified with the anonymous 'sacred' festival at Sparta which conferred a Hadrianic victory on a Cilician wrestler (App.IV, 7). The generous size of the prizes no doubt lay behind the success of the Urania in attracting foreign competition, as revealed by the home cities of known victors, who include—in addition to Aristomachus—athletes from Corinth, Phocaea and Seleucia-on-the-Calycadnus (in Cilicia), a cithara-player from Thessalonice and a flautist from Gortyn (App.IV, 2–10).¹³

In 136/7, just over a generation later, the Euryclea games were celebrated at Sparta for the first time, as we learn from an important inscription in the Sparta Museum to be published by G. Steinhauer. This text clarifies that the Euryclea were named after, not the Augustan dynast, but the Hadrianic senator, Eurycles Herculanus, who died at about this time (chapter 8). Since the senator posthumously received heroic honours from the Spartans, it is possible that the Euryclea games had heroic overtones, providing the ceremonial focus for a civic hero-cult in much the same way as the periodic games founded privately a generation or so later by Herodes Atticus in memory of his heroized foster-son, Vibullius Polydeucio.

Since they did not commemorate a deity, the Euryclea fell technically into the less prestigious category of 'prize-games' (*agōnes themateitai* or *talantaioi*), as we learn from an inscription of early Severan date from Rome, recording the victory in the *pankratation-contest* of M.Aurelius Asclepiades of Alexandria (App.IV, 12). As it happens, the only other firmly attested victors were also athletes: an Alexandrian wrestler of the same name but earlier in date (M.Aurelius) and the celebrated pancratiast and boxer, M.Aurelius Demonstratus Damas of Sardis (App.IV, 10). These three show that the Euryclea, like the Urania, successfully established themselves as games of international stature; their prestige is suggested too by the fact that a leading Corinthian, L.Gellius Areto, probably identical with a homonym who held high office in the Achaean League in 138, is found among the six attested *agōnothetai*. Four of these presided over the combined 'Caesarea and Euryclea': it seems that by the mid-second century the

two sets of games were usually celebrated successively in the same year, the Imperial festival naturally taking precedence. Since the *agōnothētēs* received ‘agonothetic monies’ from the city for both festivals, the reasons for this association may have been financial—perhaps so as to allow the more recent endowment bequeathed by Herculanius to subsidize the (by now depleted?) funds given by his ancestor for the older festival. It is clear, however, since foreign victors name the Euryclea alone, that the two programmes remained distinct.¹⁴

The third and (so far as we know) the last of Roman Sparta’s major new games were the Olympia Commodea, the scattered inscriptional evidence for which has recently been recalled from near oblivion and requires only a brief summary here. Their titulature shows that they were founded as an Imperial festival in honour of Commodus, presumably including sacrifices on his behalf as well as a programme of contests. This extravagant gesture suggests local gratitude for some Imperial benefaction—conceivably the return of the *ager Dentheliatis* by the emperor Marcus, the father of Commodus (chapters 8, 10). Two inscriptions from respectively Delphi and Pisidian Adada, both from the Severan age, show that by then the festival was classed as ‘sacred’, or, more specifically, as ‘sacred and iselastic’, a highly prized status in the emperor’s gift alone and limited to an élite-group of agonistic festivals. Its distinguishing mark was that victors were entitled to highly honorific and lucrative prizes from their home cities (as well as any that the host city might confer), including the right to a triumphal procession (hence the term ‘iselastic’, from the Greek verb *eiselaunein*, ‘to enter in triumph’), a cash pension, and immunity from civic liturgies; because these honours (especially the last) represented a potentially heavy burden on civic resources, it was in the Imperial interest not to be over-generous with new grants of ‘iselastic’ status, which in Greece are otherwise attested only in one other case, that of the Panathenaea. It appears that the Commodea were not founded as ‘iselastic’ games, however, since they can probably be identified with the unnamed Spartan festival whose promotion to this rank by either Severus or Caracalla is recorded in an inscription from Sardis (for Sparta’s favourable relations with both these emperors see chapter 8). It was probably on this occasion that the festival received the epithet ‘Olympic’ and was reorganized, like many agonistic festivals under the principate, on the fashionable model of the famous Olympics; of this reorganization we only know that a local era of ‘Olympiads’ was now instituted, showing that the ‘iselastic’ festival was celebrated quinquennially. The international character of the Olympia Commodea is revealed by the three known victors: a poet from Argos, an athlete from Adada, and (probably) the Sardian celebrity, Demostratus Damas (App.IV, 14–16).¹⁵

That Roman Sparta provided an appreciative audience for poetry-readings is shown by the Spartan citizenship of another itinerant poet, one Claudius Avidienus of Nicopolis, who lived at the turn of the first century and perhaps had competed in an otherwise unattested poetry-contest at the Urania (App.IV, 5). The variety of cultural activities placed before spectators at these new festivals

is perhaps brought out most vividly by an important inscription on bronze, unfortunately incomplete, recording the accounts (*logismos*) of a Spartan *agōnothetēs*. The text can be dated more precisely than it was by Woodward, since the winner of the men's pentathlon, the Olympic champion Aelius Granianus of Sicyon, in spite of Moretti's doubts is surely the same as the Sicyonian 'Cranaus' listed by the third-century chronographer Africanus as victor in the men's stade-race at Olympia in 145; his victory at Sparta, and the date of the text, would then belong in about 143–8. Although the name of the games is not preserved, their international stature is shown by the home cities of the victors, including citizens from Tarsus, Sidon and Thyateira (App.IV, 17–23), and by the scale of the prizes, which add up to a total value (although the list of victors is incomplete) of HS 87,760; at this date, only the Urania or the Euryclea can be in question. As for the programme itself, it included not only contests for athletes, musicians, and tragic actors, but also ones for trumpeters, painters, and even rhetors. One is left with the impression of a determinedly up-to-date agonistic entertainment, attempting to cater for as many tastes as possible.¹⁶

At Sparta as elsewhere in this period, the extent to which agonistic contests provided truly popular entertainment is arguable. Certainly the musical, literary and rhetorical contests would have appealed most to a cultivated audience. Partly because they were associated with the socially-exclusive milieu of the gymnasium, athletics continued to have aristocratic associations in this period, as is clearly demonstrated in Sparta's case by the champion-runners P.Aelius Damocratidas and his son P.Aelius Alcandridas, twice an Olympic victor in the 220s, who both held high local office and were related to the family of the senator Brasidas; a number of other Spartan magistrates also bear agonistic titles obtained (probably) through athletic success, such as 'Victor in the Nemean Games' (*Nemeonikēs*), 'Sacred Victor' (*hieronikēs*), 'Victor in Very Many Contests' (*pleistonikēs*) and 'Astounding' (*paradoxos*). But theatrical spectacle seems to have had a wider appeal in this period; significantly, in the accounts just discussed, the highest prize (HS 12,000) went to a tragic actor. In the second century proletarian tastes were being catered for in other ways. Agonistic festivals now tended to attract all kinds of unscheduled acts by performing mountebanks, one of whom can be recognised in the Carthaginian muscleman (*iskhuropaiktēs*) whose performance earned him a grant of Spartan citizenship (a measure, incidentally, of the declining prestige of this once highly prized commodity). Sparta also provided an eager audience for the pantomime, a 'solo performance by one masked mimetic dancer with a singing chorus providing musical interludes'. In a lost piece of show-oratory the mid-second century sophist, Aelius Aristides, berated the Spartans for this 'immoral' and 'un-Lycurgan' enthusiasm. Whether his work was ever delivered before a Spartan audience is unknown; but if it was, it had no lasting effect, as we learn from an Ephesian dedication for a celebrated pantomime artist from the end of the

century, Tib. Iulius Apolaustus, whose performance at Sparta in the course of an Achaian tour earned him an honorific statue.¹⁷

As a final point it is worth underlining Sparta's links in the second and third centuries with the officialdom of professional athletics. A lost inscription, possibly a statue-dedication originally set up in one of the city's gymnasia, commemorates the champion-wrestler M.Ulpus Domesticus of Ephesus, a leading dignitary in the ecumenical federation of athletes based at Rome. In the second century we also encounter at Sparta the post of *xystarch*, an athlete nominated for life by the emperor to supervise the conduct of the athletes in a festival or in all the festivals of a city or region'. The known incumbents were both foreigners: a wrestler from Seleucia-on-the-Calycadnus, appointed—apparently by Hadrian—to the post of 'xystarch of the games in Lacedaemon'; and (once more) the champion boxer Demonstratus Damas of Sardis, who received from either M.Aurelius or his successor the xystarchy of the Euryclea. The internationalism of athletic officialdom at Sparta is perhaps best captured by an early third-century epitaph commemorating a Greek from Alexandria who died at Tarentum after serving at Sparta as clerk of the city's *xustos* or athletic association, where he received a grant of local citizenship for his services.¹⁸

Chapter fourteen

The image of tradition

The preceding chapters have attempted to show how the profound political, social, and economic changes undergone by Sparta in the last three centuries BC had the effect of levelling much of the city's old distinctiveness. In the Roman Empire's heyday, under the Antonines and the Severi, Sparta emerges as in many ways a typical provincial Greek city, with its comfortable urban amenities, its up-to-date entertainments and its society dominated by a wealthy educated élite but not impervious to one of the characteristic figures of the Imperial age, the successful parvenu of freedman stock. On first sight this picture seems at odds with perhaps the best known aspect of Roman Sparta today: the maintenance, until as late as the fourth century, of an archaizing 'Lycurgan' facade to civic life. In fact, the 'Lycurgan customs' of Classical Sparta (as they were remembered or reconstructed in the Roman age) formed only one element in a set of local traditions informing and shaping a wide range of civic activities. Moreover, modern perceptions of archaism at Roman Sparta have been distorted by a tendency to see it in isolation, without reference to its links with the political and cultural preoccupations of the larger Roman world in which Sparta was now embedded. In Rome's Greek-speaking provinces, where 'ancient tradition was the touchstone of civic life', archaism of one sort or another was a widespread civic phenomenon, above all in the age of the Greek renaissance, when it was encouraged by the Greek policies of Roman emperors such as Hadrian (chapter 8). From this larger provincial perspective Sparta is chiefly interesting because—for reasons to which we shall return—the dialogue between past and present was louder and more persistent there than in many other cities. This chapter explores three 'themes' in this dialogue, two major and one minor: the rôle of Sparta in the Persian wars on the one hand, on the other ancestral religion and the Lycurgan customs. An attempt will then be made to analyse, in Sparta's particular case, the dynamics of local archaism.¹

The recollection of the Persian wars at Roman Sparta has a particular interest, firstly, because it provides a clear example of an episode in the Classical city's history which remained to the fore of civic consciousness throughout the principate (and possibly until later) and, secondly, because here the broad link between local archaism and Imperial initiatives cannot be in doubt. Although the battles of Marathon, Thermopylae and Plataea were commonplace *topoi* in

the Greek and Roman schools of rhetoric, an often quoted passage in Plutarch shows that the memory of Greece's glorious repulse of the Persians between 490 and 479 BC still held a strong patriotic appeal for Greeks living under Roman domination. Complicating the resonances of the wars in the Imperial age, however, was the fact that Roman emperors from Augustus to Gordian III, recognizing their potency as national myth, followed Philip and Alexander in exploiting them for propagandistic purposes when representing Roman struggles against oriental 'barbarians' (now in the form of the Parthian and Sassanian Persian Empires) to a Greek audience. These larger attitudes help to explain the prominent part played by recollection of the Persian wars in those cities in Achaia which traditionally claimed decisive rôles in the repulse of the Persians and its commemoration: Athens and Sparta, but also Plataea, a city which, since the mid-third century BC, justified its existence largely through the hosting of cults and festivals celebrating the victory of 479 BC. In Sparta's case, the inhabitants of the Roman city were confronted in no uncertain terms with the ghosts of Thermopylae and Plataea when—for propagandistic as well as sentimental reasons—they were required by a succession of Roman emperors (L. Verus in 161, Caracalla in 214 and—quite possibly—Julian in 363) to send armed contingents on Imperial campaigns in the east (chapters 8–9). In a more peaceful vein, Roman Sparta played a prominent part in the four-yearly 'Freedom' festival or Eleutheria at Plataea, along with Athens being party to a ceremonial dispute over which city was to lead the procession, enacted as a recurrent contest in declamation between orators representing the two sides. This curious tradition, probably invented in the late second century BC, was evidently intended as a deliberate echo of the alleged quarrel between Athens and Sparta in 479 BC over the so-called meed of valour. In the second and third centuries, when the recreation of the past through the medium of rhetoric was a feature of the show-oratory of the Second Sophistic, the rhetorical 'duel' at Plataea became well known among educated Greeks and even formed the subject of a Greek rhetorical treatise.²

In this same period the Spartans were cultivating the claims of their own city as a 'shrine' to the Persian wars. In the mid-second century the city's tourist-itinerary embraced a group of civic monuments evoking Sparta's part in the wars, including the tomb of Eurybiadas, the Spartan admiral-in-chief at Salamis, the memorials for Leonidas, Pausanias, and the Spartan dead at Thermopylae, and the Persian Stoa in the agora. The second-century city also had its own commemorative ceremonies. Two of these formed part of the ritual at the annual ephebic festival for Artemis Orthia: the 'procession of the Lydians' and the so-called contest of endurance (below), both of which, according to Plutarch (our sole source for this tradition), were said to commemorate an incident on the eve of Plataea when the Spartan commander Pausanias was set upon by a band of Lydians as he performed a sacrifice. The allegedly commemorative function of these rites hints strongly of more recently invented tradition, however, especially in the case of the endurance-contest, the true precursor of which seems

to have been a ritual game in the Classical sanctuary of Orthia centred around the theft of cheeses.³

The Roman city also celebrated an annual festival, the Leonidea, in memory of Leonidas and Pausanias, the Spartan heroes of Thermopylae and Plataea respectively. It was known to Pausanias, who mentions declamations in memory of the dead and games in which only Spartans could compete. It was also the subject of a long and fragmentary inscription which once formed part of an honorific monument set up near the memorials for the two kings opposite the theatre. The text lays down detailed regulations for the conduct of the festival and clearly reflects its complete reorganization. In fact there is no earlier evidence for this festival, in spite of which its origin is usually attributed to the fifth century BC. Bulle's hypothesis of a sliding stage at the Spartan theatre depended on the assumption that the Leonidea were celebrated under Augustus; now that his theory has been placed in doubt on archaeological grounds, however, the accompanying premiss cannot be said to retain much weight. The only indication of the festival's existence earlier in the Roman period derives from the fact that on the occasion of its reorganisation the previous value of the cash prizes was said to have been 'doubled', the new endowment for the festival apparently totalling HS 120,000, just over a third of which (HS 42,000) had been given (or rather promised) by C. Julius Agesilaus so as to provide or increase the prize-money in specified events. As to date, the inscription belonged to a year in which the *gerontes* included one Nicippus son of Nicippus, *kasen* to Eurycles Herculanus, who was born in about 73. From this it follows that the minimum age for *gerontes* in the Imperial age can no longer have been sixty, as in the old *gerousia*, since the text cannot possibly be dated as late as 133; indeed, the fact that Agesilaus had been *athlothetēs* of the Urania in 97/8 seems an obstacle to placing it much later than the end of Trajan's reign. On the assumption that a minimum age as low as thirty must be excluded, if only because it seems too young for a body calling itself (literally) 'the old men', we are left with forty as perhaps the most likely age-threshold in the Roman period, placing the inscription late in the reign of Trajan. This dating, if correct, is of some interest, since it would consign the 'renewal' of the festival to the period (113–117) of Trajan's great eastern campaigns, in the preparations for which the Peloponnese had been actively involved. It is at least possible that the two events were connected: at a time when Greek memories of the Persian wars—not least in southern Greece—were being fanned by a major Roman initiative against the Parthians, Sparta chose to place on a firmer footing the old festival commemorating the city's famous exploits against the Persians at Thermopylae six centuries earlier.⁴

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An excellent study has done much to lay to rest the view of older scholarship that Greek paganism was in decline or 'crisis' during the first two and a half centuries AD; on the contrary, civic cults based around the Homeric and Hesiodic pantheon, as well as novelties of more exotic origin, were the object in

this period of a ‘lasting traditional “religiousness”’, in which respect for ancestral practice loomed large. An ancient community such as Roman Athens, where an array of venerable deities continued to be the object of rites and festivals, struck visitors as particularly pious (cf. Paus.iii.24.3). The impression that Sparta, a city well-known for its religiosity in Classical times, provided another focus of old-world piety in the Imperial age emerges clearly from the same author, who listed for the city an impressive array of twenty-one hero-tombs and as many as sixty-four temples or sanctuaries. The Roman city was open to newer ways of approaching the divine: we have already noted the Imperial cult, established under Augustus, and that of Sarapis, a second-century innovation (chapter 10); by the reign of Marcus the city was also host to a community of Christians in the pastoral care of the bishop of Corinth. The emphasis here, however, is on the evidence for the continued prominence of traditional cults in civic life, which a brief discussion of those of Apollo, the Eleusinians and the Dioscuri will hope to exemplify.⁵

The worship of Apollo, a deity particularly associated with the Dorian Greeks, lay at the heart of Classical Sparta’s three principal religious festivals: the Hyacinthia, the Carneia and the Gymnopaediae, all three of which were still celebrated in the Imperial age. The Carneia—as it happens—are only attested for the Augustan period, when their local prestige was such that a victor in the accompanying games or ‘Carneonics’ enjoyed, like an Olympic victor, the privilege of *sitēsis* or public maintenance. The other two are best attested in the Antonine and Severan ages, when they are mentioned by several contemporary Greek authors, including Pausanias, according to whom the Gymnopaediae were the most zealously maintained of Sparta’s traditional festivals, and Philostratus, who implies that, together with the ephebic festival of Artemis Orthia (below), these were the three religious gatherings at Sparta attracting the most foreign visitors in Imperial times. In the mid-second century the Gymnopaediae took place in a specially designated part of the agora, where ephebic choirs sang in Apollo’s honour; Lucian adds that there were traditional dances too. Rather less is known of the specifically Roman content of the Hyacinthia, which were celebrated at the Amyclaeum. A fragmentary dedication for an ‘instructor’ (*didaskalos*) suggests the maintenance of the old songs and dances of the Spartan youth; if organised on agonistic lines these activities perhaps constituted the Hyacinthian ‘games’ to which two Antonine inscriptions refer, although hippic or athletic contests, for which there is evidence from an earlier period, may also be in question. As for the Amyclaeum itself, its famous cult-statue appeared on the Roman city’s coinage, and, in part thanks to this and its other works of Archaic Greek art, it formed the chief tourist-attraction at Roman Sparta outside the urban centre. It is one of the few civic sanctuaries the continued existence of which is attested into the fourth century (chapter 9).⁶

The worship of Demeter and Core at the sanctuary of the Eleusinium, some seven kilometres south-west of the city on the edge of the Spartan plain, was certainly as old as the fifth century BC, when the goddesses, as a well-known

inscription records, were honoured with chariot-games. The flourishing state of this sanctuary in the Imperial period is brought out by a series of inscribed dedications found either near the ancient site or at the modern village of Amyklai (formerly Sklavokhori), to which they had been removed as building-material in more recent times. Like many Demeter-cults elsewhere, the Spartan Eleusinium was essentially a women's sanctuary, as is shown by the striking fact that these inscriptions are all dedications by or for females, the bulk of them recording the setting-up of statues of well-born Spartan matrons in the name of the city. In the Imperial age, to judge from repeated references to a female official called the 'mistress of the banquet' (*thoinarmostria*), the ritual (and social) focus of the cult was an annual feast, at which perhaps only women were present. The dependence of the cult on the generosity of individuals, in this case well-to-do women, is shown by the descriptions of the posts of *thoinarmostria* and *pōlos* as 'liturgies' and the scope for their incumbents to hold office 'magnificently' (*megaloprepōs*) or 'with high-minded generosity' (*megalopsukhōs*). For its more impressive dedications the sanctuary likewise relied on the piety of leading families, as with the two elaborate reliefs now in the British Museum, one of them given in the last decades of the second century by Claudia Ageta, a granddaughter of the senator Brasidas.⁷

In myth the Dioscuri were natives of Sparta and in the Classical age had enjoyed a special relationship to the dual kingship. In the Roman period, the continuing reverence in which these demigods were held is shown by the frequency with which they or their symbols were depicted on local coin-issues; as the numerous instances of 'Dioscurid' pedigrees suggest, the cult retained aristocratic, if no longer royal, overtones. Since the time of Herodotus the chief Spartan sanctuary of the Dioscuri lay to the south-east of the city at the cult-centre of Phoebaeum on the right bank of the Eurotas, below the bluff on which stood the sanctuary of Helen and Menelaus. Inscriptions point to the vigorous life of this sanctuary, where the Dioscuri had their temple or shrine (*naos*), until as late as the mid-third century. Sacred banquets are attested under Augustus by a series of inscribed *stēlai* which show the integration of the cult into civic life, since they record the participation of the senior members (*presbeis*) of the boards of *bideoi*, *gerontes*, ephors, and *nomophulakes*, along with the *gunaikonomos*. These *stēlai* are decorated with reliefs depicting the Dioscuri in the company of Helen. This iconography suggests that by the reign of Augustus the cult had been enlarged to include the worship of the sister of the Dioscuri, a development perhaps to be associated with the cessation of cult at the nearby sanctuary of Menelaus and Helen, which excavation dates to the late second or the first century BC. Although the site was now abandoned, it seems likely that the age-old worship of Helen was not, being merely transferred to the more accessible sanctuary on the plain below. By the mid-third century the sanctuary also celebrated games, grandly called the 'Great Dioscurea', although no foreign victors are attested and they perhaps were a local event only. From the reign of Augustus until the mid-third century a dual priesthood of Helen and the

Dioscuri can be traced as a hereditary perquisite within an inter-related group of leading local families, whose financial support did much to contribute to the cult's outward vitality: under Trajan or Hadrian P. Memmius Pratolaus and his priestly partner and kinswoman, Volusene Olympiche, funded building activity at the sanctuary; and the fact that in the mid-third century the hereditary priest was also hereditary president (*agōnothetēs*) of the Dioscurea suggests that a priestly ancestor had endowed the games earlier in the Roman period, their presidency then devolving by hereditary right to his descendants.⁸

The revival or re-invention of ancestral practice was another feature of Greek civic religion in the Roman period of which examples can be detected at Sparta. The festival of the Urania, founded in 97/8 (chapter 13), was celebrated in honour of Zeus Uranius, whose priesthood was one of two which the former Spartan kings held by hereditary right. In the Roman period the priesthood only emerges into view after the foundation of the Urania, now no longer a hereditary post but one to which the city made appointments for a fixed term. Its more or less complete dependence on the festival is shown by the fact that one incumbent (under Hadrian) served simultaneously as panegyriarch and that another (under Trajan) was baldly styled 'priest of the Urania'. It seems at least possible that this civic priesthood of Zeus Uranius was no older than the foundation of the games, the cult having been allowed to lapse following the demise of the dual kingship three centuries or so earlier, to be revived under Nerva as little more than a venerable-looking vehicle for the new festival. Ancestral piety would be one explanation for such a revival, but perhaps an insufficient one: those Spartans most closely involved in founding the new festival (including no doubt the *athlothetēs* C. Iulius Agesilaus) may have felt that its association with a historic (indeed a royal) cult would enhance the international prestige on which depended its agonistic success. It should be added that the initial titulature of the games, the 'Greatest Augustan Nervan Uranian Games', shows that the festival was also intended to honour the emperor, whose association with the worship of 'Heavenly Zeus' is attested elsewhere by this date.⁹

A second episode of revival concerns the oracular shrine of Ino-Pasiphaë in the formerly perioecic town of Thalamae on the western side of Taygetus. In the Hellenistic period this oracle used to be consulted by the ephors on Sparta's behalf (chapter 4). The practice seems to have lapsed by the time of Cicero, who writes of it in the past tense; the oracle may have ceased to speak; or Spartan access perhaps became problematic after the 'liberation' of the perioecic towns in 192 BC. But two inscriptions from the sanctuary, dating to the earlier second century, reflect once more a recurrent Spartan presence at Thalamae. One of them records three groups of Spartan visitors under Trajan, Hadrian and Pius respectively. Their size and make-up seem to have varied, but the first included representatives of the chief Spartan magistracies, the second four out of the five ephors in the year 127/8. The official, civic, character of these visits was understood by Bölte, who did not go on, however, to make the connection

with oracular consultation. With little doubt this inscription is a record of embassies of civic magistrates sent, as in the Hellenistic period, to consult Ino-Pasiphaë; the lapse of time between the date of each is well suited to an irregular pattern of consultation, taking place as the need arose; and the inclusion of a choral element recalls the choirs of boys and girls accompanying embassies sent from other Greek cities to the oracle at Clarus in this period. It is probably no coincidence that the evidence for this apparent renewal of ancestral Spartan practice coincides in date with the larger revival of oracular activity in the Roman east, in which the oracle at Thalamae evidently shared; when the sanctuary was visited by Pausanias, he found the cult-statue almost obscured under its weight of festive wreaths.¹⁰

Lastly, Sparta and Delphi. In Classical times Sparta 'placed a premium on maintaining a special relationship' with the sanctuary of Apollo. The force of tradition emerges strikingly in the inscriptional evidence for the perpetuation of these ties into the early third century. After 146 BC Sparta was no longer represented on the Amphictyonic Council (chapters 6 and 8). But the maintenance of cordial relations with the citizens of Delphi is shown by the despatch of Spartan judges to hear Delphian lawsuits in about 100 BC and by mutual grants of proxeny-privileges in the early principate. Those conferred by Sparta on a Delphian notable in about 29 BC were partly prompted by his services for Spartan visitors to Delphi. A Spartan who received this same honour from the Delphians in about 23, Alcimus son of Soclidas, bears the same rare name as a Spartan *naopoios* at Delphi in 360 BC, suggesting his membership of an old family with hereditary Delphian ties. After a silence of almost two centuries, Spartan interest in Delphi resurfaces in the Severan age, when Tib. Claudius Spartiaticus, grandson of the senator Brasidas and a leading figure in his city, received an honorific statue from the Delphians, installed within the sanctuary. More remarkably, to this period probably belongs the latest evidence for Spartan consultation of Apollo's oracle. The oracular ambassador (*theopropos*) despatched by Sparta on this occasion, one M. Aurelius Euamerus, was assigned by Bourguet to the mid-second century on prosopographical grounds which are less than compelling. It seems more likely that his Roman citizenship, like that of most Spartan M. Aurelii, derived from the Antonine constitution of 212 or 213. His mission would then provide the latest evidence for a relationship kept up over some eight centuries.¹¹

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Since at least the time of Herodotus the Spartans had attributed their distinctive form of polity to the prescriptions of Lycurgus, their semi-mythical lawgiver. From the first century BC until late antiquity we have good evidence for the restored position of Lycurgus at Sparta as the 'good genius' of civic life. Coin-issues of the triumviral age present us for the first time with an (imaginary, of course) portrait of Lycurgus, which was probably based on some sculpted prototype, now lost: he appears as a majestic, Zeus-like figure, wreathed and bearded. As at Classical Sparta, he was worshipped in the Roman city as a god.

The focus of this cult was a sanctuary on the right bank of the Eurotas not far from that of Artemis Orthia; its enormous masonry altar, showing signs of Roman-period repairs, has been tentatively identified by excavation (App.I, 37). In the Antonine and Severan ages, to judge from the god's repeated patronomates (chapter 9), his sanctuary was a wealthy one. As late as the fourth century, the Spartans could confer no higher honour on benefactors of the city than to set their portrait-statues beside one of Lycurgus which stood (it seems) in the vicinity of the theatre—a juxtaposition intended to convey a flattering 'equality' between the *'ethos and deeds'* of the honorands and those of the great sage.¹²

In the second and early third centuries, civic magistrates could claim to have discharged their duties 'according to the ancient customs' or were publicly praised for their 'protection of the Lycurgan customs': civic life in the Imperial age, that is, still claimed in some sense to be shaped by the lawgiver's prescriptions. Before assessing the content of these 'Lycurgan customs', however, the problem of the disputed date of their 'restoration' needs addressing. According to Livy, the Lycurgan institutions of the Hellenistic city had been suppressed by the Achaean League in 188 BC. They were then 'revived' under Roman patronage at a date left vague by Pausanias ('later'), but which Plutarch by implication assigns to the Roman settlement of 146/5 BC, since he explicitly couples the restoration of the 'ancestral polity' with Sparta's final secession from the Achaean League. Notwithstanding this last item of evidence, the 'Lycurgan' restoration is usually placed before 167 BC on the basis of another passage in Livy, who glossed the sight-seeing visit to Sparta of L. Aemilius Paullus in 167 BC (chapter 6) with the remark that the city was 'famous, not for the magnificence of its public works, but for its *disciplina* and its institutions'. A few scholars have rightly seen that Livy here is merely echoing the conventional Roman perception of Sparta: the passage cannot safely be used to show that by 167 BC the 'Lycurgan customs' had been restored—a reversal incompatible with Sparta's full sympolity at the time with the Achaeans. The point is an important one, since the later date leaves a gap of well over a generation between the suppression and the revival of the customs, increasing the likely rôle in this revival of antiquarian tradition over first-hand recollection.¹³

The extent and limits of this 'restoration' can now be assessed. The long-standing custom, whereby the ephors each year read the work of Dicaearchus of Messene on the Spartan constitution to the city's youth seems best referred to the Hellenistic, not the Roman, period. In fact, as was seen in chapter 11, local government at Roman Sparta, for all that its outward forms recalled famous features of the 'ancestral constitution' (*gerontes*, ephors and so on), in its day-to-day workings was shaped by far more recent influences (Cleomenean, Achaean and Roman). Nonetheless, there is some indication that the ancestral polity continued to supply at least a frame of reference for innovations in the administration of the Roman city, as with the institution of the 'contest for best citizen' (*agōn tēs aristopoliteias*). An apparently identical contest is found at

Roman Messene, the one probably copying the other, since no comparable civic institution is found outside this particular corner of the Greek world (conferment by cities elsewhere of the honorific title of ‘best citizen’ does not amount to the same thing). The Spartans seem to have taken the first step, since an inscription presents the establishment of their contest between about 110 and 120 as a ‘renewal’ of an older institution, although nothing is known in their more recent past which could be plausibly claimed as a model for this contest. Given that other Greek cities at this time employed the same idea of ‘renewal’ (*ananeōsis*) to allude to the distant, even mythical, past, Chrimes may well have been correct in proposing that the Spartan contest modelled itself on the method (allegedly instituted by Lycurgus) by which the Classical city elected *gerontes* from the citizen-body: according to Plutarch, success went to the candidate judged by the assembly to be ‘best’ (*aristos*) in respect of personal excellence, who was then crowned with a wreath like an agonistic victor: this last practice is not actually recorded for Roman Sparta, but the ‘best citizen’s wreath’ was a feature of neighbouring Messene’s contest; the involvement of the Roman city’s *dēmos* in the selection of the winner, however, is well attested. On this view, the ‘contest for best citizen’ was an antiquarian creation, giving a traditional guise to a newly invented institution which redefined the ‘Lycurgan’ ideal of civic virtue in contemporary, euergetic, terms.¹⁴

The ‘Lycurgan’ resonance of one further feature of the Roman city’s political life requires mention here, since it offers an indication of the limits of the post-146 BC ‘restoration’. When Augustus visited Sparta in 21 BC he was said by Cassius Dio to have ‘honoured the Spartans by messing together with them’: ‘paying homage to Lycurgan Sparta’, the *princeps* apparently took a meal in a setting represented to him and his entourage as an approximation of the famous common messes (*suskania*), participation in which had been compulsory for full citizens of the Classical age. There is no other evidence to suggest that this old Spartan institution, ‘so clearly...military in ethos and function’, survived into the Imperial age; on the other hand, from the early principate onwards the entitlement of certain boards of magistrates to meals at public expense (*sitēsis*) is well attested. The evidence concerns the *gerontes*, ephors and *nomophulakes*, the *hierothutai* (see [chapter 7](#)) and the *agoranomos* and his colleagues. It comes chiefly in the form of references to cooks (*mageiroi*) or dining guests (*ensittoi* or *sussittoi*) attached to these different groups of magistrates; in addition the ephors and *nomophulakes* are once described (*IG* v.1.51) as ‘those who enjoyed public maintenance’ (*hoi sitēthentes*); and in the mid-second century the junior colleagues of the *agoranomos* included an official called the ‘president of the common mess’ (*phidition*). The public meals of these magistrates, along with those of other citizens on the list of those entitled to *sitēsis*, probably took place in Roman Sparta’s equivalent of a civic *prutaneion* or *hôtel de ville*; this, as Kennell has argued, can be recognized in the so-called Old Ephoreia in the agora. Public maintenance of magistrates during their terms of office was a common feature of Greek civic life; at Sparta it is first attested (with reference to the ephors) under

Cleomenes III. In the Imperial age, the chief executive and bouletic magistrates shared the privilege with the *hierothutai*, whose duties included the provision of civic hospitality, and the *agoranomos*, whose responsibility for supervising Sparta's markets may have extended to the victualling of the public dining-rooms. When Augustus 'messed' with the Spartans, in fact he probably dined with the city's magistrates. The fact that his participation at Sparta in a routine feature of Greek civic life was considered remarkable suggests that the meals of the magistrates were thought of as somehow special—perhaps because foreigners were encouraged to assimilate them to the famous 'Lycurgan' institution which they (superficially) resembled.¹⁵

Other characteristic aspects of the 'Lycurgan' social organization are conspicuous at Roman Sparta by their absence. It was noted earlier (chapter 10) that in the Imperial age the inhabitants of Sparta enjoyed or aspired to the level of material comfort widespread among the urban communities of the time: no sign here of the well-known austerities of Classical Sparta. 'Lycurgan' eccentricities of personal appearance are difficult to document in the Imperial age. Plutarch, it is true, refers to the banning of moustaches by the ephors when they took office each year, but his use of the 'timeless' present tense here seems insufficient grounds for assuming a reference to the Sparta of his own day. Elsewhere he preserves an anecdote about a Spartan woman on visiting terms with the wife of a Galatian dynast in the first century BC, each of whom appalled the other by her smell—the Spartan reeking, not of perfume, but of butter! If anything, this passage may suggest that the rusticity of Spartan dress still observable in 148 BC (chapter 6) lingered on into the first century BC. However, although little weight can perhaps be put on the sartorial attachment to 'Sybaris' for which the Philostratean Apollonius berated a Spartan embassy under Nero, the draped statues of the senator Brasidas and his daughter Damosthenia suggest that the local upper classes—at least by the Antonine age—wore the usual dress of Greek provincials of their rank.¹⁶

Nor does the women's sphere at Roman Sparta display any of the licence for which it was notorious in Classical times. In honorific dedications for Spartan matrons from the second and third centuries the repetitive praise of their 'moderation' (*sōphrosunē*), 'husband-love' (*philandria*), 'dignity' (*semnotēs*) and 'decorum' (*kosmiotēs*) shows that local society, at least in its upper reaches, 'valued the same domestic virtues in women as those held up for praise by Plutarch of Chaeronea, in this period Greece's fullest surviving spokesman on the themes of love, women and marriage'. To judge from the evidence, the rôle of women in public life was largely confined to religious cult, where the matrons of leading families, society ladies such as Memmia Xenocratia in the mid-second century or Claudia Damosthenia a generation later, could obtain a genuine civic prominence through their pious (and generous) discharge of a range of priestly offices reserved for their sex. That the public deportment of free-born women was now the object of civic surveillance is shown by the existence of a *gunaikonomos*, a type of magistrate widespread in the Greek world by the first

century BC. At Sparta the post is attested from the Augustan until the later Severan age, its duties sufficiently weighty, it seems, to require the assistance of (usually) five junior colleagues (*sungunaikononoi*). The survival of the post throughout the principate may well reflect the importance which the Roman city attached to the decorous celebration of its traditional festivals, in which the wives and daughters of citizens played a prominent part, no doubt subject to strict regulations as to dress and behaviour.¹⁷

The literary and epigraphic evidence leaves in little doubt that the chief concern of the Spartans who guided the post-146 BC ‘revival’ was to reconstitute the most famous feature of their ancestral regime: the *agōgē* or public ‘rearing’ of Spartan boys and girls, from which, as we shall see, the ephebic training of the Roman city claimed direct descent. Like its Classical precursor, this training was a civic institution, supervised by annual magistrates. The best documented of these were the so-called *bideoi* (‘overseers’), numbered five by Pausanias, although inscriptions place their normal strength at six. According to Pausanias they organised the ephebic contests, especially the one at Platanistas (below); inscriptions associate them too with the ball-tournament of the *sphaireis*-teams and with an athletic contest (the ‘Dionysiades’: see below) for girls. The magistracy is first attested in the Augustan period and its antiquity, in spite of its archaic-sounding name, must be in doubt, since in the Classical age the *agōgē* was under the overall supervision of the ephors, aided by a specially appointed official, the *paidonomos*: conceivably the *bideoi* were another constitutional innovation of Cleomenes III, belonging to his larger assault on the powers of Sparta’s traditional magistracies (chapter 4). Whatever the case, Tod was surely wrong to see the *bideoi* as officials ‘of small importance’—a view which underestimates the rôle of the ephebic training in the public life of the Roman city. After the *gerontes*, ephors and *nomophulakes*, they were the magistrates most frequently commemorated by catalogues, of which fourteen are attested, the most recent belonging to the later Severan period (App.IIA); in the Augustan age, along with these other three boards and the *gunaikononoi*, they were represented at the sacred banquets at Phoebeum, the *bideos* actually taking precedence over the other civic magistrates present.¹⁸

The importance of the training in civic life is further underlined by its association—largely unnoticed so far—with the Roman city’s most honorific magistracy, the eponymous patronomate. The nature of this office, established by Cleomenes III (chapter 4), has been misunderstood by some scholars, at least as far as the Imperial age is concerned. An inscription from the reign of Marcus leaves in no doubt that at that date the patronomate was a singular office, the incumbent giving his name to the year and discharging his duties with the help of six junior colleagues (*sunarkhoi* or *sunpatronomoi*) and a secretariat of two. Chrimes argued that the *patronomos* played an important part in local government, although the surviving evidence, as Schaefer and Bradford independently concluded, suggests the contrary. That its organisational duties cannot have been burdensome is shown by the occasions in the second and third

centuries when the post was conferred on foreign notables or the god Lycurgus. On the other hand, they were not entirely negligible, to judge from the presence of junior colleagues and secretariat, and required a physical presence, since incumbents were replaced with a substitute (*hyperpatronomos*) if for some reason they were unable to discharge the duties of the post, or, in the case of the god Lycurgus, by a ‘supervisor (*epimelētēs*) of the patronomate’. Whatever evidence we have connects the post with the local gymnasia and the ephebic training. On five occasions, none earlier than the reign of Trajan, the post is found combined with that of gymnasiarch; and a Severan *patronomos*, P. Memmius Pratolaus *qui et Aristocles*, was honoured with public dedications ‘for his protection of the Lycurgan customs’, one of which was paid for by ephebic instructors and athletic trainers. Above all, the financial stratagem of conferring the post on the god Lycurgus (chapter 9), the mythical founder of the old *agōgē*, suggests—given Greek scruple about the sanctity of sacred property—some close relationship between the ‘Lycurgan customs’ and the patronomate’s sphere of competence. In the absence of evidence it is hard to be more precise about the duties of the post, although its founder, Cleomenes III, may from the outset have intended the ‘guardianship of law and order’ implicit in its title to extend to the training, which he had revived after an earlier period of decline (chapter 4). By the second century, in a typically Roman development, the office had acquired a liturgical character: this emerges clearly from the practice of conferring it on Lycurgus, as from the praise of an Antonine incumbent for his ‘goodwill and *philotimia* towards his fatherland’. It is likely, then, that in the Imperial age the annual *patronomos* assumed some of the expenses associated with the ephebic training: in the case of Pratolaus, since the ephebic instructors were public employees whose salaries could be threatened in times of financial stringency, his ‘protection of the Lycurgan customs’ may have taken the form (for instance) of paying them their arrears.¹⁹

Broadly speaking, this ‘revived’ training can be said to have comprised instruction in song, dance, and athletic and military exercises, prowess in which was tested in a series of contests attached to the Roman city’s cycle of religious festivals. As such, the training resembled in a number of respects—and in its activities was probably influenced by—the institution of the *ephēbia*, the civic training for adolescents widespread in the Greek world in Hellenistic and Roman times. Exploration of both similarities and differences will help to define the distinctive, ‘Lycurgan’, aspects of Roman Sparta’s training.²⁰

For the age-range of participants in the training the most detailed evidence is provided by the long series of ephebic dedications from the sanctuary of Artemis Orthia, which resume in the later second or first century BC and continue until well into the third century AD. These dedications, marking victories in the ephebic contests celebrated annually in honour of the goddess, show that the ‘revived’ training continued to be organised around age-sets, the archaic-sounding names of five of which are preserved (the *mikikhizomenoi*, *pratopampaidēs*, *hatropampaidēs*, *melleirenes* and *eirenes*). These five partially

correspond with the schemata for Spartan age-sets preserved in the glosses of ancient or Byzantine scholars on passages in Herodotus and Strabo, comparison with which indicates that they covered successively the six years from fourteen to nineteen. Participation in the revived training, that is, spanned the transitional years between two universally recognised, if loosely defined, Greek age-categories: those of the ephebes and the young men (*neoi*). Although these adolescent ephebes could refer to themselves as 'boys' (*paides*), just as the Greek agonistic age-class of the 'boys' embraced contestants from the age of fourteen to seventeen, there is no evidence to suggest that the 'revived' training still embraced small children: Greek writers of the Imperial age invariably describe participants as ephebes, or, in the case of the *sphaireis*-teams, 'those about to pass from the ephebes into the men'. In this respect the 'revived' training differed significantly from the old *agōgē*, which began to recruit at the age of seven: it looks as if this aspect of ancestral practice was dropped after 146 BC—a lapse conforming to the larger decline of Greek interest in public primary education during the Roman period. On the other hand, in the Roman age, when ephebic training normally lasted no longer than a year, it is striking that at Sparta youths could take part in the 'revived' training for a period of up to six years. This unusual state of affairs, reflecting the special claims of this training, will be returned to below.²¹

As for the internal organisation of the 'revived' training, we know that it was based around the Roman city's citizen-tribes, named after the city-wards of Mesoa, Pitana, Limnae, Cynosura and the Neopolitae. In the old *agōgē*, the age-sets were divided into 'herds' (*agelai*) under the leadership of older youths. In the period after 146 BC, a team-structure is not attested before the later first century, from when until the early third century the inscriptions indicate the division of the age-sets into bands led by a *boagos* or 'herd-leader', a youth of the same age as his charges, who described themselves as his 'fellow-ephebes' (*sunephēboi*). This post of *boagos* is attested no earlier than the Domitianic age, *boagoi* or their 'synephebes' then going on to account for thirty-five of the fifty ephebic dedications which Woodward assigned to the period c.80–240. As he saw, the appearance of the post seems to mark a change in the organization of the training, which he understood as involving the transfer of leadership of the teams from older youths to 'boys the same age as their fellow-members'. If the team-structure already existed, however, it is difficult to see why this change (departing, after all, from the 'Lycurgan' dispensation) should have been felt necessary at this particular date. The inscriptions make clear, moreover, that this team-structure gave continuing shape to the public life of ex-ephebes: that team-membership created a lasting sense of companionship is shown, for instance, by the boast of a board of *nomophulakes* of about 100 that it comprised an ex-*boagos* and four of his old 'synephebes'; and the fact that ex-*boagoi* retained their title into adult life shows that the position was thought of as highly honorific.

The evidently intense experience which team-membership constituted, however, has left no mark at all on the epigraphic material from the first century BC and the Julio-Claudian age—another reason for doubting whether a team structure existed earlier in the period of the ‘revived’ training. If a recreation of the Flavian age, its purpose may not have been solely antiquarian: at Roman Athens the ephebes were likewise divided into bands of ‘synephebes’ under the charge of one of their number, who was responsible for certain ephebic expenses. Were the post of *boagos* similarly a quasi-liturgy, this would help to explain both its honorific character and the marked tendency of incumbents to belong to established curial families: perhaps they helped with the training expenses of their team. If so, the institution of the post (and perhaps the concoction of an appropriately pastoral-sounding neologism, that of *boagos*, for its title) may be seen as part of a larger reorganization of the training in the later first century, aimed partly at placing recruitment on a firmer financial and numerical footing; *kasen*-status also reappears in the epigraphic evidence in the second half of the first century (late in Nero’s reign); likewise it seems best understood as a device (in archaizing guise) for helping the sons of less well-off families to pass through the training (chapter 12). At first it may seem odd, if these views are accepted, that the reorganization did not assign leadership of the teams to older youths—in line with ancestral practice—but to coevals. An explanation can perhaps be found in the fact that in the first century, at least where the sons of prominent families were concerned, the training had to compete with the demands of a conventional higher education abroad (see chapter 13). Higher studies in this period tended to begin precisely in the mid-teens—a fact which may help to explain why nineteen of the twenty-six ephebic dedications which record the age-sets of *boagoi* or ‘synephebes’ pertain to sixteen-year-olds (*mikikhizomenoi*).²²

Those activities of the ephebes and young men constituting the ‘revived training’ are briefly considered next. The inclusion of conventional gymnastic training and military drill is shown by the presence of athletic trainers (*aleiptai*) and drill-masters (*hoplomakhoi*) among the ephebic instructors and by the victories of a (?) Hadrianic ephebe in wrestling contests in local religious festivals. Intellectual training of the usual kind is not firmly attested, although its inclusion by the later second century can perhaps be inferred from the development of philosophical and rhetorical studies at Sparta in that period (chapter 13). Not least because they were of much greater interest to our literary sources, we hear rather more of the ‘traditional’ activities of the ephebes. Prominent among these were performances of old songs and dances, for which the Spartans of their time were well-known to Lucian and Athenaeus: the chief stages for such performances seem to have been the *Gymnopaediae* and the *Hyacinthia* (above) and the annual ephebic festival of Artemis Orthia, which included archaic-sounding contests in singing (*mōa* and *keloia*) and dancing (*kaththēration*—some sort of hunting dance?).²³

The 'revived' training also included three sporting activities which conformed less readily, and in one case scarcely at all, to conventional Greek gymnastic categories. One was the 'no holds barred' battle between two ephebic companies on an artificial island called Platanistas. As Patrucco noted, the description by Pausanias suggests a form of rough combat not unlike the widely-practised *pankration*, an 'all-in' contest in wrestling and boxing. The second, held in the theatre, was an annual tournament between five teams of twenty-year-old ball-players or *sphaireis*, each team being fourteen-strong, to judge from one fully-preserved catalogue of a victorious team. No parallel in Greek sport can be found for this ball-game, which was also rough, according to Lucian; Woodward's analogy with American football cannot be too wide of the mark. The third event was the 'contest of endurance' (*agōn tēs karterias*). Its exact nature is debated, since, although it was frequently referred to by contemporary writers, none of them has left a satisfactory account of what actually happened. It took place at the annual festival of Artemis Orthia and was undoubtedly a violent event, in which fatalities seem not to have been uncommon; Chrimes was right to stress, however, that it does indeed seem to have taken the form of a proper contest, with ephebes having 'to make some sort of attack upon the altar, which was defended by whip-bearers'; the Augustan writer Hyginus adds that the ephebe who endured the longest was declared the winner, receiving the title of 'altar-victor' or *bōmonikēs*, which is epigraphically attested under the Antonines and Severi.²⁴

A small scatter of evidence, not previously gathered together, shows that the Roman city organized contests for girls as well as youths. In the second century the traditional dances of Spartan girls at the sanctuary of Artemis at Caryae, on Sparta's north-east frontier, were well-known to contemporary Greek writers. Female athletes took part in the Livian games, instituted under Tiberius or Claudius (chapter 7); and in the second century a ritual race between girls called 'Dionysiades' formed part of the civic cult of Dionysus. That some girls received a training in wrestling is suggested by a scholiast's anecdote of a wrestling-match between a Spartan *virgo* and a Neronian senator, M. Palfurius Sura; as Moretti saw, this episode probably took place at the Neronia in Rome, the Greek-style games founded by Nero, which evidently included contests for girls (one of them apparently hijacked by Sura). That the training of the girls was a civic concern at Roman Sparta is shown by the fact that the 'Dionysiades' fell under the supervision of the *bideoi*; and civic promotion of feminine athletic prowess is reflected in the honour of a public statue conferred on the sole attested victrix at the Livia. It needs to be stressed, however, that if Roman Sparta encouraged athletics for girls, these were anyway no longer uncommon in the Graeco-Roman world: a text from Delphi, for instance, shows that in the first century girls' races (including one in armour) were staged at the Pythian and Isthmian games and in festivals at Athens, Sicyon and Epidaurus. Because such contests were no longer especially shocking, their existence at Roman Sparta need not

imply that local attitudes to women were out of step with the times; as we saw earlier, other evidence suggests the contrary.²⁵

The inclusion of contests for girls in the ‘revived’ training was certainly a deliberate allusion to a well-known feature of the ‘Lycurgan’ *agōgē*. It is equally clear that the whole ephebic system of Roman Sparta asserted continuity with this ‘ancestral’ régime—and never more so than in the archaizing age of the Greek renaissance. The foundation of both the ‘endurance-contest’ and the battle at Platanistas was attributed to Lycurgus; in the early third century the ephebic instructors apparently included ‘teachers of the Lycurgan customs’; and an ephebe in the same period was praised for his ‘moderation and manliness, together with his courage and obedience to the ancestral Lycurgan customs’. As we have seen, an archaic-sounding terminology was employed to describe the activities and organisation of the training; to the examples already cited can be added the formulaic expression whereby the victorious teams of ball-players were said to have ‘defeated the *ōbai*’—a reference to the old sub-divisions of Sparta’s citizen-body, by the Imperial age assimilated to *phulai* or tribes of the usual Greek civic type. In the Hadrianic age, at a time when linguistic archaism was fashionable among Greek litterati, Spartan ephebes suddenly adopted—and continued to use intermittently into the third century—a ‘hyper-Doricizing’ dialect in their dedications to Artemis Orthia, a piece of antiquarianism presumably intended to reinforce the claims of the training to represent ancestral practice.²⁶

The justice of these claims, however, is another matter. In a view which has not passed without challenge, Chrimes argued for a strong element of real continuity between the old *agōgē* and the ‘revived’ training of Roman times. But the old *agōgē* had already undergone one revival under Cleomenes III, about which nothing is known, although the possible involvement of the Stoic philosopher Sphaerus should warn us against assuming a straightforward return to old ways on this occasion (chapter 4). The artificiality of the second ‘revival’—after 146 BC—is suggested by the fact that it took place after a period of over forty years during which Sparta’s ephebic training had been—perforce—organized on the Achaean model; the lingering influence of this interlude can perhaps be detected in the more conventional activities of the Roman city’s ephebes. This ‘revival’ fell, moreover, in a period of intense antiquarian activity by local writers (see chapter 13), whose influence should not be underestimated, especially since their interests are known to have extended to sport, as is suggested by the lost work on ‘ball-playing’ (*peri sphairistikēs*) attributed to one Timocrates. The antiquity of the more distinctive sports of the revived training is more easily asserted than proved. The battle at Platanistas is first attested in Cicero’s day; and the earliest evidence for the ball-tournament is dated to 70–75. A Classical precursor can be identified with some confidence only in the case of the ‘endurance-contest’, the idea of which seems to have been based on the Xenophontic cheese-ritual around the altar of Orthia. Scholars are also agreed, however, that the contest in its Roman form was a recent reinvention (could it

have been the Stoic Sphaerus who first turned the old ritual with the cheeses into a test of physical endurance?). The revived training, moreover, as well as being an artificial construct when it was first recreated in the years after 146 BC, underwent further episodes of reinvention in the Roman period, as is indicated by the innovations of the Flavian period identified above. Given such multilayered archaism, it seems prudent to accept that any kernel of ancient practice around which the Roman training was built up is irretrievably concealed by a much more recent archaizing husk.²⁷

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In order to understand the prominence in civic life of this artificially-revived training we need to realize the extraordinary degree of outside interest which it generated. There can be no doubt, to begin with, that this training was the chief attraction of Roman Sparta's thriving cultural tourism, for which there is evidence from the first century BC to the fourth AD. Such tourism was a recognized cultural activity in the Hellenistic and Imperial ages, generating its own periegetic literature. Perhaps the first clear sign that Sparta had become a focus for visitors with antiquarian interests is the lost work on Spartan votive offerings composed by Polemo of Ilium (fl. c. 190 BC), evidently on the basis of autopsy. The fullest spokesman for Spartan tourism, of course, is Pausanias, who found so much to see in the city and its environs that he was compelled, as at Athens, to restrict himself, in the guide-book to Greece which he went on to write, to 'the most memorable things'. Contrary to the famous dictum of Thucydides, Sparta by now was crammed with ancient sanctuaries, historic monuments and archaic works of art. However, judging from Livy's remark, quoted above, the tourist of his day would not have come to Sparta primarily to see *objets d'art*. In fact, it is clear that visitors to the Roman city came chiefly to witness those civic activities which could be identified as vestiges of the 'Lycurgan customs': apart from the visit of Augustus to the magistrates' messes, foreign spectators are attested at the ball-tournament of the *sphaireis*, the battle at Platanistas, and the festivals of Artemis Orthia, the Gymnopaediae and the Hyacinthia. Pausanias himself drew attention to at least six different displays by the Antonine city's youth, although it is unclear whether he himself was a spectator at any of them. This evidence shows, moreover, that the 'endurance contest' was by no means the 'star' attraction for tourists: according to Philostratus, Greeks 'flocked' to the Hyacinthia and the Gymnopaediae just as much as they did to the sanctuary of Artemis Orthia.²⁸

At the risk of over-schematization, two distinct phases in this tourism can be detected. Down to the Augustan age the evidence concerns Romans only, present in Greece either on official business (as perhaps with the Augustan consular Laelius) or, as with Cicero, while studying at Athens, a popular centre of higher studies for well-born Romans in the first century BC. The second phase, for which the evidence by contrast concerns Greeks, can be linked to the great revival of Greek cultural life in the second and early third centuries, which brought with it a new Greek interest in Spartan antiquities. This development

was encouraged by the emperor Hadrian, who held up ‘Laconian moderation and training’ as a model to the Cyrenaeans and served as eponymous *patronomos* (chapter 8). His tenure of this post went some way to establishing it for a generation as a rival in prestige to the Athenian archonship, as is shown by the succession of rich and distinguished overseas *patronomoi* holding office in the emperor’s wake (chapter 8). Unlike the archonship, however, the patronomate could not claim a venerable origin: the attraction of the post for cultured foreigners like the historian A. Claudius Charax presumably lay in its association with the ephebic training, to the expenses of which he and these other foreign incumbents—along with Hadrian himself—no doubt made generous contributions.

In this second phase, Spartan tourism has as its most typical representative Pausanias, a citizen of Magnesia-ad-Sipyllum in Asia Minor, who visited Sparta probably under Pius. The background to his touristic activity was misunderstood by Habicht, who saw him as a ‘loner’: undoubtedly he should rather be viewed as part of an upsurge of visitors from overseas (Asia especially) drawn to Greece in the wake of Hadrianic initiatives and providing Pausanias with his envisaged readership. Lucian of Samosata was probably another early Antonine visitor during one of his visits to Greece, since his familiarity with the displays of Roman Sparta’s ephebes and *parthenoi* is most economically understood as deriving from autopsy. Spartan tourism continued to thrive in the Severan age, when the antiquarian enquiries of cultured visitors were probably the chief *raison d’être* of a uniquely attested civic official called the ‘expounder (*exēgētēs*) of the Lycurgan customs’. As well as the overseas visitors in this period discussed in chapter 13, another Severan tourist can probably be recognised in the sophist Flavius Philostratus, an Athenian citizen and resident, whose *Life of Apollonius* shows familiarity with Roman Sparta, including its ephebic spectacles—in particular, alone of all surviving writers, Philostratus knew the ‘endurance contest’ by its official title, as attested in a Trajanic inscription. Given that the historicity of the Philostratean Apollonius is open to doubt, this familiarity is perhaps best understood as reflecting the personal experience of the author himself.²⁹

Although the scale of this tourism is impossible to quantify, it was clearly more akin to that of the Grand Tour of eighteenth-century Europe than the mass-tourism of today: when individual sightseers can be identified, they almost invariably belong to the Roman and Greek upper classes, who alone enjoyed the leisure and wealth to travel for pleasure. Cultural tourism of this kind was best undertaken on the basis of an educated interest, moreover: the ephebic performances of traditional Spartan songs and dances seem unlikely to have appealed much to popular taste, although with the more violent sports of the ephebes, which are likely to have had a wider appeal, the Roman city may consciously have ‘played to the gallery’. Broadly speaking, however, this tourism bears witness to the enduring interest aroused by Spartan history and customs among the educated classes of the Graeco-Roman world—a topic exhaustively

examined by Tigerstedt. After the second century BC this interest focused more and more on Sparta's renowned contribution to Greek educational theory and practice—the 'Lycurgan' *agōgē*, with its distinctive emphasis on physical rather than intellectual training, an emphasis which the violent games of the Roman city's ephebes were clearly intended to evoke. The austerities of this training held a certain appeal for educated Romans in the Late Republic, as is suggested by the attitude of Cicero. In the age of the Greek renaissance, the Spartan tradition was seen as an aspect of that old-world Hellenism which educated Greeks laid hold of as their common cultural property. Writers such as Lucian and Philostratus produced debates on the merits of the 'Lycurgan' system of education, and the archaizing fantasies which the idea of Sparta now conjured up are echoed in the travels of the Philostratean Apollonius, who 'after crossing Taygetus...saw Sparta hard at work and the ancestral practices of Lycurgus thriving', or in the rhetorical claim of the Hadrianic sophist Favorinus to be worthy of a public statue at Sparta because he 'loved gymnastic exercises'. Like other guardians of the Greek cultural tradition, such as the Athenians or the Rhodians, the Spartans were open to literary or rhetorical castigation if they seemed to fail in their trust: hence the polemic of Aelius Aristides against the contemporary Spartan taste for the pantomime (chapter 13) and the alleged censure of Spartan effeminacy by the Philostratean Apollonius. In such a hot-house atmosphere, it is not surprising that Spartan archaism blossomed: to the age of the Greek renaissance belong the 'hyper-Doricizing' dialect of the ephebes, all the epigraphic references to the 'Lycurgan customs' and the elevation of ephebic athletics instructors to the status of civic celebrities, as in the case of one C. Rubrius Vianor (a foreigner?), who received a public statue 'for the sake of his seriousness concerning the Laconian *ēthos* and his excellence in the gymnasia'. In an age when the re-creation of the past was itself a valid form of cultural activity, any definition of Roman Sparta's place in the cultural life of the Greek renaissance must take account, not only of her newly-founded *agōnes* and her philosophical and rhetorical studies, but also of the shows provided by her ephebes and *parthenoi* and the audiences which they attracted.³⁰

Not only the respect for ancestral practice which marked all Greek civic life but also the fame of the 'Lycurgan customs' in particular explain the tenacity with which Sparta maintained its archaizing facade. The prestige of the 'revived' training and the tourism which it generated helped this otherwise fairly typical provincial Greek city to maintain a place in the world and allowed the Spartans to feel that they were still 'special'. In these circumstances it is perhaps easier to comprehend the whole-hearted attitude of both participants and their watching families in the 'endurance-contest': for all the irony of a Lucian (who satirized other objects of contemporary reverence too) we should assume that many visitors went away impressed with what they saw on such occasions. That an awareness of the benefits of this tourism to local economy, although no doubt a factor in Spartan archaism, was not the chief one, is suggested by the dependence of the ephebic training on the moral and financial support of

established curial families, whose vital role in maintaining the Roman city's ancestral cults has already been noted. That the training was financed largely through euergetism is suggested by the liturgical character of the patronomate, the post of *boagos* (as proposed above), and two other posts, those of *diabetēs* and hipparch. The former was a tribal liturgy which helped to fund each tribe's *sphaireis*-team; in the Antonine period a *diabetēs* of the Neopolitae boasted of having served 'of his own free will'. The duties of the latter, a post likewise linked with the training, are unknown, but their liturgical character is shown by the Severan evidence for an 'eternal hipparch', who evidently had given the office a cash-endowment. The patriotic attitude to the training of the Roman city's aristocracy is best demonstrated by the well-documented case of the Memmian clan, which is known to have produced—over a period of some two centuries—five *boagoi* and eleven *patronomoi*, including P. Memmius Pratolaus *qui et* Aristocles, 'champion' of the Lycurgan customs. Because the ephobic training was the source of such great civic prestige, in Sparta's case it was something more than simply a 'kind of university training for the sons of the well-to-do'. The unusual length of the training helps to explain civic efforts to encourage the recruitment of boys from less well-off families—the larger purpose, it was suggested earlier, of the reorganization of the Flavian period. That a certain tension at times developed between the maintenance of traditional status-distinctions within local society and the need to provide sufficient manpower for the ephobic training is suggested by the presence of two slaves and a freedman in *sphaireis*-teams from the early Flavian and Trajanic periods. For the local upper class at least, however, the expense and administrative burden of the training were clearly outweighed by an enhanced sense of civic pride. In the Antonine and Severan heyday of the Greek renaissance the Spartan aristocracy, like its Athenian counterpart, had the satisfying sense of living in a prestigious centre of Greek cultural activity, partly as a result of which civic service continued to provide a meaningful outlet for its wealth and political ambition.³¹


Chapter fifteen

Epilogue: Sparta from late antiquity to the Middle Ages


In the fifth century the pagan, classical, Sparta with which this book is concerned drops out of sight. In his apologetic work *The Cure of Hellenic Maladies*, composed early in the century, the Christian bishop Theodoret triumphantly referred to the complete demise of the Lycurgan regime at Sparta. Whether this text should be taken *au pied de la lettre* to prove the final disappearance of all vestiges of Roman Sparta's archaizing laconism is perhaps arguable. However, in spite of recent claims for 'the survival of paganism [in Greece] well into the Byzantine period', it is not easy to believe that a fully civic institution such as the Roman city's ephebic training, with its cycle of contests organized around pagan sanctuaries and festivals, could have long survived the law of Theodosius I, promulgated in 391 and upheld by later emperors, which banned pagan rites and closed temples for public use¹.

In the period after 400 the evidence for Christianity at Sparta also becomes more marked. The city's first attested bishop, one Hosius, appears in 457. Although local epigraphy has so far produced only a meagre crop of Christian epitaphs, the Christianization of Sparta can now be documented in archaeology far more clearly as a result of Greek excavations over the last half-century. An Early Christian cemetery and two buildings identified with varying degrees of confidence as Early Christian basilicas have been discovered in the area to the south and south-east of the acropolis (App.I, 42–3, 49). In addition, the large and well-built basilica on the acropolis itself is now assigned a date no later than the seventh century (App.I, 44). In a development paralleled at Athens, it looks as if the earliest Christian building-activity took place well away from the old civic centre with its strong pagan links. By the seventh century, however, local paganism was so weakened that a major church (the episcopal seat?) could be built only metres away from the old sanctuary of Athena Chalcoiecus, patron deity of Classical Sparta. The Spartan myth was now well on its way to becoming no more than a learned memory, although in Byzantine circles it would continue to provoke speculation and debate, as it does today.²

**SPARTA: ANCIENT SITES IN RELATION
TO THE STREET GRID OF THE
MODERN TOWN.**



Map 2



Appendix I

The monuments of Roman Sparta

The following catalogue briefly lists the principal archaeologically and epigraphically attested monuments of Roman Sparta, with some Hellenistic or earlier sites included, usually only where they retained their importance into the Roman period. Where possible a location is given by reference either to the British School (hereafter BSA) plan in *ABSA* 13, 1906–7, pl.1 or to this book's Map 2, showing the blocks of the modern town's municipal grid.

1. Aqueduct

Peek 1974, 295–303. Location unknown. Existence implied by a dedication set up by the ward of Cynosura in honour of a civic magistrate who 'brought down the water'. Date: third century BC.

2. Aqueduct

Le Roy 1974, 229–38. Location: unknown. Attested in a dedication by a residential group calling itself 'those who live under the aqueduct'. To be distinguished from No.1 (so Le Roy; Peek *contra*). Date: about 200 BC?.

3. Aqueduct

Blouet 1833, 46, 'LL'; Loring 1895, 43–4; *ABSA* 12, 1905–6, 425; A. Adamantiou, *PAE* 1931, 92. Location: remains of approach to acropolis marked on BSA plan, 11J-K and 9H-J; cf. Map 2. The brickwork of the piers nearest the acropolis is of a size and type commensurate with a Hadrianic date (pers.comm. S.Walker). See [chapter 10](#).

4. Vault

ABSA 12, 1905–6, 423. Location: Tower 'E' of the Late Roman fortification wall (below, No.10); BSA plan, K13. Vaulted chamber, constructed in *opus testaceum*, its original function unclear; later built into the line of the fortification wall.

5. Bridge

IG v.1.538=Wilhelm 1913, 858–63; Spawforth 1984, 274–7. See [chapter 10](#). Sites of two possible candidates for identification with this bridge: *ABSA* 12, 1905–6, 437 and 13, 1906–7, 9; Loring 1895, 42.

6. Thoroughfare

AD 28, 1973 (1977), B1 Chronika 172. Location: Map 2, Square 124. Unpaved road running north towards the acropolis. Date: tentatively placed around 300.

7. Thoroughfare

AD 30, 1975 (1983), B1 Chronika 74–5. Location: Map 2, Square 126. Broad (5.50m.) surfaced (but not paved) street flanked by colonnades and running NE towards the acropolis. Date: tentatively placed after 268.

8. Thoroughfare

AD 28–9, 1973 (1977), B1 Chronika 164–6 with figs.1–2. Location: NE of acropolis, junction of the Tripoli and Kastori roads. Unpaved road, 5.50m. wide, running towards the acropolis. Date: ‘fourth century’.

9. City-wall

ABSA 12, 1905–6, 284–8; 1906–7, 5–16. Location: Map 2. Tiled mud-brick on a masonry socle. Evidence from tile-stamps for repairs in the first century BC: Kahrstedt 1954, 195. For Roman repairs in a stretch on the right bank of the Eurotas: ABSA 12, 1905–6, 300–301. Date: after 184 BC.

10. Late Roman Fortification Wall

ABSA 12, 1905–6, 417–29; Gregory 1982, 20–21. Location: Map 2. See [chapter 9](#). Date: early fifth century.

11. ‘Old Ephoreia’

Kennell (1987). To this building may have belonged two architectural blocks of similar marble and dimensions, reused in the SE stretch of the Late Roman wall, inscribed with Augustan catalogues of *hierothutai*, the magistrates who tended the civic hearth and oversaw official hospitality ([chapter 7](#)): IG v. 1.141–2; ABSA 12, 1905–6, 433; Spawforth 1985, 195.

12. Public Archives

IG v.1.20a.3–4. Trajanic decree referring to a *grammatophylakeion*. Presumably identical to the Spartan archives (*Lakōnikai anagraphai*) personally inspected by Plutarch (*Ages*.19.10).

13. Sunodos

IG v.1.882–3; Woodward 1928–30, 236. Location: unknown. Evidently a roofed assembly-building, possibly to be identified with the Scias, meeting-place of the citizen-assembly (*Paus*.iii.12.10).

14. Theatre

Paus.iii.14.1; *Luc. Anach*.38; ABSA 12, 1905–6, 175–209; 26, 1923–5, 119–58; 27, 1925–6, 175–209, including (pp.204–5) a summary of Woodward’s view of the theatre’s history; 28, 1926–7, 3–36; 30, 1928–30, 151–240; Bulle 1937, 5–49; Buckler 1986, 431–6. Location: Map 2. See [chapters 9, 10](#) and [13](#).

15. Lodgings of the Romans and Dicasts

IG v.1.7. 5–6; 869. Location: unknown. Date: second or first century BC.

16. Makellon

Varr.Ling.Lat.v.146–7; IG v.1.149 (SEG xi.600) and 151 (SEG xi.598); de Ruyt 1983, 192, where the post of *epi tou makellou*, signifying a slave-overseer, is mistaken for that of a ‘marchand’; and, *pace* de Ruyt, the *mageiros* of 149.8 is a separate functionary, ministering to the dining mess of the *agoranomos*. See [chapter 10](#).

17. Granary

IG v.1. 149 (SEG xi.600) and 151 (SEG xi.598). See [chapter 14](#).

18. 'Roman Stoa'

Traquair 1905–6, 414–20; AA 1942, 155–8. Location: Map 2. The Augustan date for this building given by H.Dodge in Macready/Thompson 1987, 107 seems too early (and is unsupported by the reference which she cites at n.10); the measurements of the brickwork are close to those of the Arapissa-complex (Susan Walker, pers. comm.). At the time of writing (June 1988) the stoa is the object of renewed archaeological investigation by the Institute of Archaeology, London, under the supervision of J.J.Wilkes.

19. Gymnasium of Eurycles

ABSA 12, 1905–6, 407–14; Palagia, forthcoming. Location: Map 2. See [chapter 10](#).

20. Gymnasium

Paus.iii.14.6; IG iv².86, dated to 38–48 by Spawforth 1985, 254; IG v.1.20a.3 (Trajanic); 493 (Antonine); 529.9–12 (Severan); SEG xi.492.10–11 (reign of Pius). The older of Sparta's two gymnasia. See [chapter 10](#).

21. Stadium

IG v. 1.20.7. Trajanic dossier stipulating the provision of oil 'in the *st[adion]*' during the days of the athletic contests of the annual Leonidea. Location and date unknown. For the dubious evidence of early antiquaries for an ancient stadium on the right bank of the Eurotas see ABSA 12, 1905–6, 306–8 with earlier refs.

22. Machanidai

SEG xi.492.11–12 with Woodward 1925–6, 232.

23. Thermai

SEG xi.492.11. See [chapter 10](#). Conceivably to be sought at the partly excavated therms featuring two apsidal rooms of 'massive construction' in rubble-concrete faced with brick and stone, some 45m. south of the theatre: ABSA 12, 1905–6, 405–6; 26, 1923–5, 118. Location: BSA plan, K12.

24. Nymphaeum

Woodward 1926–7, 6–14 and 32–6; S. Walker, *The Architectural Development of Roman Nymphaea in Greece* (unpublished dissertation, London 1979) 211–17. Location: BSA plan, K12. Fountain-house, presumably fed by the Roman aqueduct, immediately in front of the *west-parodos* wall of the theatre, built with re-used bricks from the demolished scenery-store and other *spolia* and veneered with marble. Date: almost certainly after 268, since it re-uses a dedication set up in about 240: Spawforth 1985, 239–43; probably part of the building-programme at the theatre around 300.

25. Public Portico

Woodward 1928–30, 235–6; SEG xi.881. Finds of tiles for a pastas indicate a location near the theatre.

26. Public Stoa

IG v. 1.692. Location unknown. Built (or merely repaired?) by the *ex-boagos* M. Aurelius [—] son of Callicrates, not before 161.

27. Portico

IG v.1.884. Roof-tile stamped ‘Of the pastas in Alpeion’. For the location see Paus.iii.18.2 with Bölte 1929, col.1362.

28. Colonnaded Structure

Woodward 1928–30, 188 no.14 and 215–7 no.6 (SEG xi.847); Spawforth 1985, 198–9. Inscribed fragment from the entablature of a colonnaded structure, connected with the family of the Memmii. Date: first century?

29. Colonnaded Structure

IG v. 1.378. Incomplete inscription, now lost, copied by Cyriacus of Ancona in 1437; the original drawing is lost, but a copy is preserved in a sketchbook of the Florentine architect Giuliano di Sangallo (‘Giamberti’) now in the Vatican (Vaticanus Barberinus latinus 4424, folio 29r), illustrated by Kleiner 1983, pl.xxxv. Copied ‘in Lacedaemonia ad ingentia et ornamentissima columnarum epistilia (*sic*)’, according to Sangallo, who represents the inscription on three epistyle-blocks supported by three pairs of columns and superimposed on each other in an architectural conceit, although presumably preserving something (epistyle-blocks on a Corinthian colonnade?) of Cyriacus’ original drawing of an ancient ruin still standing as late as M.Fourmont’s visit (1729–30). Could the columns be the two ‘outside’ the Late Roman fortification wall in front of the theatre seen by Le Roy, *Les Ruines des plus beaux monuments de la Grèce*, Paris 1770, p.33 pl.xiii? Bulle 1937, 40–42 argued that it formed part of the Flavian remodelling of the theatre, on grounds, however, which now seem unconvincing in the light of criticisms of his reconstruction of the theatre’s history ([chapter 10](#)).

30. Public Building

Ergon 1964 (1965) 102–12. Location: BSA map, K13. Large masonry building associated with late Hellenistic stamped tiles; deliberately buried statue of the empress Fulvia Plautilla (?) found inside: Spawforth 1986, 326.

31. Monument

ABSA 28, 1926–7, 46–7. Fragments of an unpublished Latin inscription in monumental lettering apparently naming the emperor Tiberius. Found on the acropolis above the theatre; part of a massive base or conceivably a gateway.

32. Corinthian Building

ABSA 12, 1905–6, 426. Remains incorporated into the north line of the Late Roman fortification wall.

33. Public Buildings?

AD 17, 1961–2 (1963) B1 Chronika 83–4. Location: BSA plan, L14. Remains of two large buildings, one of ashlar masonry. Associated with a list of *gerontes* from the patronomate of P.Memmius Eudamus, Spawforth 1985, 212–3, and roof-tiles stamped ‘Belonging to the public lodgings’.

34. Public Building?

AD 20, 1965 (1966), Chronika B1 174–6; 1969 (1970), B1 Chronika 137–8. Location: east of the . Sparta-Tripoli road. Basilica-like building destroyed by fire or earthquake. Date: ‘early fourth century’.

35. Public Building

AD 28, 1973 (1977) B1 Chronika 168–70. Location: Map 2, Square 31. Large building with two apsidal rooms, a geometric floor-mosaic and producing fragments of columns and Corinthian and other capitals. Date: ‘Late Roman’.

36. Public Building?

AD 29, 1973–4 (1979), B2 Chronika 285. Location: Map 2, Square 138. Large apsidal building perhaps featuring a colonnade. Date: ‘last years of antiquity’.

37. Altar

ABSA 12, 1905–6, 295–302. Location: Map 2. Massive altar of ashlar masonry, 23.60m. (length)×6.60m. (width)×1.90m. (height), remodelled in the Roman period. Quite possibly the altar of Lycurgus, whose sanctuary stood in this general area (Paus.iii.16.1) and whose cult is well-attested as late as the third century. Date: Hellenistic?

38. Sanctuary of Artemis Orthia

Dawkins 1929. Location: Map 2. In the Roman period the sanctuary’s chief features were: (a) a Hellenistic, non-peripteral Doric temple *in antis*, replacing a late Archaic temple on the same site; (b) a masonry altar, rebuilt once and possibly twice in the Roman period on the foundations of a late Archaic predecessor; (c) a theatral area, first attested in the Augustan period, when its front row(s) included stone seating (IG v. 1.254), and remodelled on a monumental scale probably around 300, when a quasi-amphitheatre was built of rubble-concrete faced (probably) with marble, with a tribune for privileged spectators; (d) dedications, notably the ephebic *stēlai*, and honorific monuments, one a portrait-statue set up in the mid-third century beside the cult-statue: IG v.1.599; Woodward in Dawkins 1929, ch. 10.

39. ‘Round Building’

Frazer 1898, iii.325–7 (with earlier refs.); Ergon 1964 (1965), 102–12. Location: BSA plan, L13. Semi-circular ashlar wall of (?) Classical date retaining a level platform repaired and paved in the Roman period, when a massive statue-base was probably installed near the centre, perhaps supporting a colossal marble statue of which a thumb was found nearby, identified by N.E.Crosby, AJA 8, 1893, 342, 9, 1894, 212–3 (C.Waldstein, AJA 9, 1894, *contra*) with the ‘large statue’ of the Spartan *Dēmos* in the agora (Paus.iii.11.9), probably in turn to be identified with the dedication of C.Iulius Theophrastus when priest of Olympian Zeus under Pius (SEG xi.492.4–5; see [chapter 8](#) for date).

40. Heroön of Eurycles Herculanus

Spawforth 1978, 249–51. See [chapter 8](#).

41. Colonnaded Structure

Woodward 1928–30, 188 no.13 and 217 no. 7 (SEG xi.846). Inscribed block from the entablature of a colonnaded structure, probably once within a sanctuary, dedicated by the priest Polydamas son of Phoebidas. Date: first century BC?

42. Basilica?

AD 29, 1973–4 (1979) B2 Chronika 287–9. Location: Map 2, Square 117. Basilica-like building on an eastern orientation featuring a vast room (7.60×18m.) with a mosaic-floor with animal scenes. Date: ‘sixth century’.

43. Basilica

AD 24, 1969 (1970), B1 Chronika 138. Location: north of the Xenia Hotel. Date: ‘Early Christian’.

44. Basilica

P.Vokotopoulos, *Peloponnesiaka* suppl.vi.2, 1975, 270–85 with earlier refs. Location: acropolis, BSA plan, 12K-L and 13K-L. Date: most probably seventh century.

45. Cemetery

ABSA 13, 1906–7, 155–68. Location: BSA plan, K14–15. Four built chamber-tombs of dressed stone. Earliest burial dated to 200–150 BC, the latest, from a coin of Eurycles, to the Augustan age.

46. Cemetery

PAE 1931, 91–6; 1934, 123–9. Location: north of the acropolis, on the banks of the Mousga torrent. Cemetery of about ten rock-cut chamber-tombs, yielding about eighty inhumations set into the floor. Painted plaster walls, one depicting Apollo and the Nine Muses. One inscribed epitaph survived for a 12-year-old girl, Philumene. Date: first two centuries AD.

47. Cemetery

AD 27, 1972 (1976), B1 Chronika 242–6. Location: Tripoli road, immediately SW of the modern bridge. Roman tomb associated with a Geometric and Archaic cemetery.

48. Cemetery?

Tod/Wace 1906, 235 no.549 and 240 no.685. Location: BSA plan, O18. Two Roman tombs.

49. Cemetery

AD 24, 1969 (1970), B1 Chronika 135–7. Location: Map 2, Square 31. Date: ‘Early Christian’.

50. House

AD 4, 1918 (1921), 171–6; 19, 1964 (1965), B1 Chronika 136–7; Loukas 1983. Location: Magoula. House with mosaic floor depicting Triton framed by Dionysiac scene. Date: late second century BC.

51. House

AD 27, 1972 (1976), B1 Chronika 242–6. Location: Sparta-Tripoli road, SW of the modern bridge. Three rooms of a large house with plastered and painted walls. Date: ‘Augustan period’.

52. Baths

AD 20, 1965 (1966), B1 Chronika 173–4 and pl.155; 28, 1973 (1977), B1 Chronika 170–71. Location: Map 2, Square 126. Bath-complex of brick and concrete construction with floor mosaics and marble paving. Date: ‘most probably third century’.

53. Building

AD 29, 1973–4 (1979), B2 Chronika 290–91. Location: 59 Kon.Palaiologou St. Building of brick and concrete construction with two apsidal rooms and heating pipes in the walls. Date: ‘probably third century’.

54. House(s)?

AD 29, 1973–4 (1979), B2 Chronika 283–5. Location: Map 2, Square 137. Complex of rooms, three with hypocausts, two with geometric mosaics. Date: ‘late second or early third century’.

55. Baths

ABSA 12, 1905–6, 435. Location: BSA plan, J15. Quatrefoil building with plastered walls and a hypocaust; finds included a marble statue of Asclepius (‘second century’) and an apparently private statue-dedication set up by Claudius Apo[—] for his daughter Callistonice (IG v. 1.518). Date: second century.

56. House?

ABSA 45, 1950, 282–9; Waywell 1979, 303 no.50. Location: BSA plan, L14–15. Complex featuring four rooms with geometric mosaics and fragments of wall-revetment in *marmor Lacedaemonium*. Date: late second or early third century.

57. Building(s)

AD 19, 1964 (1965), B1 Chronika 144–5. Location: Paraskevopoulos plot, 500m. south of the theatre. Walls associated with storage-jars containing charred seeds and a *cache* of 200 Corinthian lamps. Date: first half of the third century. Traces of destruction by fire, tentatively linked by the excavator with the Herulian raid.

58. Buildings

AD 27, 1972 (1976), B1 Chronika 248–51. Location: Magoula. Building with a mosaic floor. Date: first half of the third century (coin of Gallienus). Later fourth-century building on same site.

59. Houses

ABSA 28, 1926–7, 46, Location: BSA plan, K12. Complex of houses, including a ‘small, domestic, bath’ incorporating a coin of Gordian III. Date: late third century?

60. Baths

Blouet 1833, 65 and pl.45, ‘E’, pl. 48, fig.3. Location: about 600 m. south-west of the sanctuary of Artemis Orthia.

61. Building

AD 29, 1973–4 (1979), B2 Chronika 285–6. Location: Map 2, Square 125. Date: ‘Roman’.

62. Workshop

ABSA 28, 1926–7, 47. Location: south slope of the acropolis. Finds of ‘terracotta figurines and votive limbs, and a few moulds for their manufacture—

apparently indicating a factory and shop for the supply of votive offerings in terracotta to those about to visit the shrines of the Acropolis'. Date: Roman.

63. Buildings

AD 16, 1960 (1962), B1 Chronika 102. Location: Map 2, Squares 112–4. Plentiful remains, mainly 'private houses', two producing mosaics. Date: 'Roman'.

64. 'Villa'

ABSA 26, 1923–5, 117–8. Location: east of the acropolis. 'Extensive Roman villa, with an elaborate system of hypocausts'.

65. Bath?

ABSA 12, 1905–6, 435. Location: south slope of the acropolis: 'a...house, or possibly a bath-building, with a well-preserved mosaic pavement exhibiting a polychrome design of geometric type, alongside which was a cement-built water-conduit with several pipes, apparently of Late Roman date'.

66. Buildings

AD 28, 1973 (1977), B1 Chronika 170–1. Location: Map 2, Square 119. (a) Large apsidal building, later incorporated into a Byzantine church. (b) A complex of four rooms with geometric mosaics. Date: 'Late Roman'.

67. House

AD 30, 1975 (1983), B1 Chronika 74–6. Location: Map 2, Square 126. House with a large central apartment (10×5.50 m.), with an internal marble fountain, a dining (?) apse, and a mosaic floor depicting Helios and Selene. Date: after 350 (coin-evidence).

68. House

AD 19, 1964 (1965), B1 Chronika 136; 30, 1975 (1983), B1 Chronika 76–7; Waywell 1979, 302–3. Location: Moustakakis plot, Brasidas St. House-complex with a polychrome mosaic floor overlying an earlier hypocaust. Date: early fourth century?

69. House

AD 29, 1973–4 (1979), B2 Chronika 285–6. Location: Map 2, Square 125. Building featuring a room with marble flooring and wall-revetment. Date: 'perhaps fourth century'.

70. House

Waywell 1979, 302 no.46 with earlier refs. House with two figured mosaic floors (Orpheus and the Abduction of Europa). Date: late third or early fourth century (grounds of style).

71. House

Waywell 1979, 302–3 no.48 with earlier refs. Several rooms, producing three figured mosaics as well as geometric ones, the former including the Surrender of Briseïs to Agamemnon. Date: 'late third century?' (grounds of style).

72. House?

Waywell 1979, 303 no.49 with earlier refs. Mosaic floor depicting the Nine Muses and portraits of famous poets and Alcibiades. Date: 'late third or early fourth century' (grounds of style).

73. House (?) and other remains

AD 20, 1965 (1966), B1 Chronika 170–3; Waywell 1979, 302 no.47. Location: Paraskevopoulos plot, 500 m. south of the theatre. ‘Villa’ with five rooms. Walls with polychrome painted plaster and marble revetment. Four polychrome marble floors, one depicting Dionysus in a theatrical scene. Date: 250–300 (grounds of style).

74. Bath?

AD 20, 1965 (1966), B1 Chronika 176–7; 22, 1967 (1968), B1 Chronika 200; 24, 1969 (1970), B1 Chronika 137. Location: Map 2, Square 100. Complex with a (?) colonnaded courtyard and a mosaic floor with marine imagery. Date: ‘third century’.

75. Building

AD 28, 1973 (1977), B1 Chronika 168. Location: Map 2, Square 117. Date: fourth century (coin-evidence).

76. Building

AD 29, 1973–4 (1979), B2 Chronika 289–90. Location: Map 2, Square 117. Courtyard building. Date: ‘fifth century’.

77. ‘Farm’

AD 27, 1972 (1976), B1 Chronika 246–8. Location: east of acropolis, building site of the Organismos Ergatikis Katoikias. Courtyard building producing a wine-press and storage-jars. Date: ‘sixth century’.

Appendix II

Catalogues of magistrates

A. Chronological summary.

Chronological Key: A=Augustus; A/T=Augustus/Tiberius; F=Flavians; F/T =Flavians/Trajan; T=Trajan; T/H=Trajan/Hadrian; H=Hadrian; H/P = Hadrian/Pius; P=Pius; P/M=Pius/Marcus; M=Marcus; C=Commodus; C/S =Commodus/Severus; LS=Later Severi; PS=Post-Severan.

References: numbers refer to IG v.1 or (when prefixed by Roman numerals) to SEG.

Gerontes:

A: 50? (xi.505); 92; 93; 95; 96?

A/T: 94

F/T: 162 (xi.580); xi.570; xi.558–60

T: 97 (xi.564b); 98; 99 (xi.566); 100 (xi.571); 103 (xi.568); 117 (xi.573); 121 (xi.574); 163?; 191 (xi.567); 193? (xi.637); xi.561; xi.563–5; xi.569; 572?

T/H: 101

H: 60; 61 (xi.547); xi.102 (xi.579); 104+166=xi.580; 114 (xi.576); xi.575; xxxi.340

H/P: 107; 112 (xi.577); xi.578 P: 105+106=xi.582; 108–9; 110 (xi.587); 111 (xi.584); 115 (xi.592); 120 (xi.583); 180?; 182 (xi.586); xi.585

P/M: 162 (xi.580)

M: 116 (xi.590); Spawforth 1985, 212–3

Second century: 118; 119 (xi.589); 122

Ephors and Nomophulakes:

F/T: 72; xi.557b

T: 51 (xi.506); 52 (xi.506); 57 (xi.509); xi.557a

T/H: 83?

H: 59 (xi.521; 548); 62

H/P: 91; xi.557c

P: 64–6; 68 (xi.525); 71a; 71b.1–39; 90 (xi.552)

C/S: 75+78+81=xi.554; 89 (xi.556)

Ephors:

A: 49

F: 79; xi.510–12

T: 158? (xi.631); xi.506; 513; 514?; 515–17; 533?

T/H: xi.518

H: xi.521b

P: 53; 55; 65; 66.13–19; 67; 70; 71b.40–59; 73; 157 (xi.547); xi.528–9

M: xi.530

Second century: 76?; 77

Nomophulakes:

F: 79; xi.539

F/T: 80; xi.534

T: 148 (xi.537b); xi.535–6; 537–8; 540–43; 546a–b

T/H: xi.544

H: 61 (xi.547a); 82 (xi.545); 157+187 (xi. 547c); 547b

P: 69; 71 b.iii.23–39; 85; 87 (xi.551); 88 (xi.553); xi.550; 554

P/M: 84?

Patronomosand colleagues:

A: 48

P: 74 (xi.527); 115? (xi.592)

C/S: xi.503

LS: xi.504?

Second century: 137 (xi.612)

Bideoi:

A: 136

F: xi.605; 608–9

F/T: xi.611

T: 137 (xi.612); 152 (xi.604); xi.606?; 607; xi.610

H: 139 (xi.614)

P: 113; 138 (xi.615)

LS: 140 (xi.616a)

Gunaikonomosand colleagues:

F/T: xi.628?

T: xi.626

M: xi.627

LS: 170

Agoranomosand colleagues:

A: 124–7

P: 128 (xi.597)

P/M: 151 (xi.598); 155 (xi.599)

C/S: 129 (xi.602); 150 (xi.601)

LS: 130 (xi.603)

Epimelētēsand colleagues:

A: 133–5

Hieromnēmones:

PS: 168+603=Spawforth 1984, 285–8

Hierothutai:

A: 141–2

Pedianomos:

A: 123?

Summary

	A	AIT	F	FIT	T	TIH	H	HIP	P	PIM	M	C	C/S	LS	PS	TOTAL
<i>Gerontes:</i>	5	1		5	16	1	7	3	10	1	2					51 (54)
<i>Ephors/ Nomophulakes:</i>				2	4	1	2	2	7				2			20
<i>Ephors:</i>	1		4		8	1	1		11		1					27 (29)
<i>Nomophulakes:</i>			2	2	11	1	4		7	1						28
<i>Patronomos:</i>	1								2				1	1		5(6)
<i>Bideoi:</i>	1		3	1	5		1		2					1		14
<i>Gunaikonomos:</i>				1	1						1			1		4
<i>Agoranomos:</i>	4								1	2			2	1		10
<i>Epimelētēs:</i>	3															3
<i>Hieromnēmones:</i>															1	1
<i>Hierothutai:</i>	2															2
<i>Pedianomos:</i>	1															1

B. Catalogues inscribed in duplicate and triplicate:

*Duplicates:***Nomophulakes:**

79 and xi.539 (late Flavian)

148 (xi.537b) and 537a (Trajan)

xi.546a-b (Trajan)

65 and xi.549 (Pius)

Ephors:

59 (xi.521a) and xi.521b (Hadrian)

66–7 (Pius)

65 and xi.523 (Pius)

Gerontes:

97 and xi.564 (Trajan)

182 (xi.586) and xi.585 (Pius)

*Triplicates:***Nomophulakes:**

61 (xi.547), 157 (xi.522; 547) and xi.547b (Hadrian)

69.30–35, 71b.23–39 and xi.554 (Pius)

Ephors:

69.23–9, 70 and 71b.23–39 (Pius)

Ephors and *Nomophulakes*:

51 (xi.506), 52 (xi.506), xi.506 and 538 (Trajan)

Appendix III

Hereditary tendencies in the Curial Class

Three groups of documents, representing (with a varying degree of completeness) the composition of the Spartan *boulē* as defined in [chapter 11](#) in three different years, are analysed here for signs of hereditary tendencies in the curial class.

A. *Nomophulakes*, ephors and gerontes in the year of the patronomos C. Iulius Philoclidas (Trajanic): IG v.1.51–2; 97; SEG xi.538; 564–5.

Ephors:

Euclidas son of Dinacon: ? ancestor of Damion son of Bellon, *nomophulax* and *agoranomos* (IG v.1.99; 129)

Gerontes:

Aristomenes son of Epictetus: father of Aristomenes son of Aristomenes son of Epictetus, *sunagoranomos* and ephor (IG v.1.66 [SEG xi.524]; 128 [SEG xi.597])

Tib. Claudius Harmonicus: probably father of the Tib. Claudii Plistoxenus and Xenophanes, *sussitoi*, latter a *nomophulax* (IG v.1.79; SEG xi.546)

Soander son of Tryphon: probably father of Soander son of Soander, *nomophulax* (IG v.1.57)

Agias son of Damocratidas: for the family see Woodward 1948, 215

Aristocles son of Callicrates and Aristocles son of Callicrates ‘the younger’: for the family see Spawforth 1985, 197

Damocles *qui et* Philocrates son of Damocles: for the family see Spawforth 1986, 324

Grammateus Boulēs:

Agippus son of Pollio: ? son of Pollio son of Rufus (Bradford 1977, s.v.)

Summary: out of a total of 34 magistrates, nine (26%) can be shown to have been definite or likely ancestors/descendants of other magistrates.

B. *Nomophulakes*, ephors and gerontes under the patronomos L. Volusenus Aristocrates (Trajanic): SEG xi.516; 542(?); 569.

Nomophulakes:

Sipompus son of Cleon: father of Cleon son of Sipompus, *nomophulax* (IG v.1.62)

Ephors:

Agippus son of Pollio: see above

Gerontes:

Melesippus son of Eucletus: father of Eucletus son of Melesippus, ephor (IG v. 1.20b)

Soander son of Tryphon: above

Agiadas son of Damocratidas: above

C.Iulius Damares: for the family see Spawforth 1980, 214–8

Pasicles son of Mnason: father of Mnason son of Pasicles, *agōnothetēs* (IG v. 1.667) and *nomophulax* (SEG xi.534); grandfather of Lysippus son of Mnason, *patronomos* 129/30 (Bradford 1986a for the date and refs.); great-grandfather of Mnason son of Lysippus, *gerōn* (SEG xi.528)

Onesiphorus son of Theon: father of Theon son of Onesiphorus, *nomophulax* (IG v.1.20b)

Callicratidas son of Agesinicus: probably descended from Agesinicus son of Call[—], *gerōn* (IG v.1.95)

T.Trebellenus Philostratus: uncle of T.Trebellenus Menecles, ephor (SEG xi.511)

Socratidas son of Eudamidas: father of Eudamidas son of Socratidas, *agoranomos* (IG v.1.128)

Summary: out of a total of 29 magistrates, nine (31%) are known (definitely/possibly) to have been ancestors/descendants of other magistrates.

C.Ephors and gerontes under the patronomos C.Avidius Biadas (Pius): SEG xi.528; 553.

Ephors:

Tib. Claudius Aristoteles: for these Claudii see Spawforth 1985, 224–44

Gerontes:

Philonidas son of Eucrines: father of Eucrines son of Philonidas, *sunagoranomos* (IG v. 1.155)

Nicippidas son of Menemachus: probably son of Menemachus son of Menemachus, *nomophulax* and *gerōn* (SEG xi.582; 543)

Antonius Ophelion, son of C.Antonius Ophelion son of Aglaus, *nomophulax* (SEG xi.546)

Marcus son of Nicephorus, son of Nicephorus son of Marcus, *nomophulax* and *protensiteuōn* (IG v.1.59 [SEG xi.548]; 1313)

Mnason son of Lysippus: for the family see above

Philonidas son of Agion: father of Agion son of Philonidas, *sunpatronomos* (SEG xi.503)

Grammateus Boulēs:

P.Memmius Damares: for the family see Spawforth 1985, 193–215

Summary: out of a total of 29 magistrates, eight (28%) definitely/probably were ancestors/descendants of other magistrates.

Appendix IV

Foreign *agōnistai* at Sparta

A. The Caesarea:

1. T.Flavius Metrobius of Iasus. Runner. Victor shortly before 86. Moretti 1953, no.66.

B. The Urania:

2. T.Flavius Attinas of Phocaea. Wrestler. Victor in the first celebration of 97/8. IG v. 1.667.
3. C.Heius Magio of Corinth. Wrestler. Victor in the third celebration of 105/6. IG v.1.659 (SEG xi.835).
4. C.Iulius Iulianus of Smyrna. Tragic actor. Victor in the third celebration of 105/6. IG v. 1.662.
5. Claudius Avidienus of Nicopolis. Poet and Spartan citizen. About 100. A victor at the Urania (see [chapter 13](#))? *FD* iii.1.no.542.
6. P.Aelius Aristomachus of Magnesia-on-the Maeander. Pancratiast. Victor in about 120. Moretti 1953, no.71.
7. P.Aelius Heliodorus of Seleucia-on-the-Calycadnus. Wrestler. Victor under Hadrian. Robert 1966, 100–105.
8. M.Ulpus Heliodorus of Thessalonice. Cithara-player. Victor in the Antonine period. IG iv¹ 591 with W. Vollgraff, *Mnemosyne* ser.2 47, 1919, 259–60.
9. Tib. Scandalianus Zosimus of Gortyn. Flautist. Twice victor in the second century. *CIG* i.1719 with G. Daux, *BCH* 68–9, 1944–5, 123–5.
10. M.Aurelius Demonstratus Damas of Sardis. Pancratiast and boxer. Three times victor. Late Antonine/early Severan. Moretti 1953, no.84 with Spawforth 1986, 331–2.

C. The Euryclea:

11. M.Aurelius Asclepiades of Alexandria. Wrestler. Victor in the reign of (?) Marcus. IG v. 1.666 with SEG xi.836, xv.217.

12. M.Aurelius Asclepiades of Alexandria. Pancratiast. Victor in about 200. Moretti 1953, no.79.
13. M.Aurelius Demonstratus Damas of Sardis. See no.10.

D. Olympia Commodea:

14. M.Aurelius Ptolemaeus of Argos. Poet. First victor in the contest for poets under (?) Severus. *FD* iii.1. no.89.
15. M.Aurelius Abas of Adada. Runner. Victor possibly in the 220s or 230s. Moretti 1953, no.75; Spawforth 1986, 328–9.
16. M.Aurelius Demonstratus Damas of Sardis. See no. 10.

E. Urania or Euryclea:

17. Socrates son of Migon of Thyateira. Herald. Victor about 143–8. *SEG* xi.838.
18. Theodotus son of Theodotus of Sidon. Tragic actor. Victor about 143–8. *SEG* xi.838.
19. Anonymous of Tarsus. Victor in about 143–8. *SEG* xi.838.
20. Apollonius son of Apollonius of Ni[—]. Victor in about 143–8. *SEG* xi.838.
21. T.Cornelius Dionysius of Sardis. Runner. Victor in about 143–8. *SEG* xi.838.
22. Aelius Granianus of Sicyon. Runner. Victor in about 143–8. *SEG* xi.838; see [chapter 13](#).
23. [—]onion son of [—]onion of Epidaurus. Runner. Victor in about 143–48. *SEG* xi.838.

F. Unknown:

24. SE[—]VATUS of Damascus. Encomiast and Spartan citizen. *FD* iii.4 no.118.
25. C.Antonius Septimius Publius of Pergamum. Cithara-player. Victor under Severus. *IGRR* iv.1432.
26. M.Aurelius [.....]lon of Ancyra. Flautist and Spartan citizen. About 200. *FD* iii.4. no.476.
27. [—] Polycrates of Cibra. Runner and Spartan citizen. Reign of Severus. Moretti 1953, no.82.
28. [—]us Glycon of Hypaepa. Pancratiast. Honoured (or buried?) at Sparta. Second or third century. *IG* v. 1.670.
29. Metrophanus *qui et* Sosinicus son of Metrophanus of Selge. Spartan citizen. Probably an *agōnistēs*. Antonines/early Severans. *SEG* xi.832.
30. [—] son of [—]ates of Athens. Honoured at Sparta. Probably an *agōnistēs*. Third century? *SEG* xi.833.

31. M.Aurelius Lucius of Smyrna. Athlete and Spartan citizen. Antonine period. L.Robert, *Hellenica* 7, 1949, 105–12.
32. L.Cornelius Corinthus of Corinth. Twice victor. Reign of Pius or slightly later. Clement 1974, 36–9.
33. Tib. Claudius Protogenes of Cypriote Salamis. Flautist. Buried at Sparta. Second or third century. IG v. 1.758.
34. C.[—] Inventus of Smyrna. Wrestler and Spartan citizen. Second or third century. CIG ii.2935 with Ph. Le Bas/W.H.Waddington, *Voyage archéologique en Grèce et en Asie Mineure* iii (1870 repr. Hildesheim 1972) no. 598.

Notes

Chapter 1

In the shadow of empire: Mantinea to Chaeronea

- 1 Most conspicuously Xenophon; cf. n.18, below. Among modern historians, see, e.g., Bengtson *et al.* 1969, 280.
- 2 Cartledge 1987, Index s.v. 'Leuktra'; date: *ibid.*, 'Chronological Table'.
- 3 Since the Battle of Hysiae (Argolis), trad. 669 BC: Cartledge 1979, 126, 134, 136, 140.
- 4 Paus. ix.6.4, with Habicht 1985, 113–14.
- 5 Spartan imperialism: Cartledge 1987, ch. 6. Sparta and Persia: *ibid.*, ch. 11.
- 6 Xen. *Hell.* vi.4.15, 24. Peloponnesian League: Cartledge 1987, ch. 13.
- 7 Arcadia: Cartledge 1979, Index, s.v., especially 152; 1987, 257–62. Elis: *ibid.*, 248–53. Argos: Tomlinson 1972; Cartledge 1987, especially 309.
- 8 Second Athenian League: Cargill 1981; cf. Cartledge 1987, 301–2.
- 9 Thebes and reformed Boeotian confederacy: Buckler 1980; cf. Cartledge 1987, ch. 14.
- 10 *Diabatēria* sacrifice: Cartledge 1977, 17 and n.53. Sciritis and Caryae: Xen. *Hell.* vi. 5.25–6 (misunderstood by Chrimes 1949, 378). Routes into Laconia: Loring 1895; Cartledge 1979, 187ff. Perioeci in general: Cartledge 1979, 178ff.; 1987, Index s.v. 'Perioikoi'.
- 11 Gytheum: Cartledge 1987, 47, 178, 385. Defence of Sparta: *ibid.*, 232–5.
- 12 Messenian Helots: Cartledge 1979, 1987, Index s.v. 'Helots...Messenian'. Foundation of (New) Messene: Roebuck 1941. Walls: Adam 1982, 171–5.
- 13 Arcadian federation: Larsen 1968, 180–95; Cartledge 1987, 261–2. Megalopolis: Bury 1898; the results of a recent B.S.A. survey are forthcoming. Crisis of 'the polis': e.g. Rostovtzeff 1941, 90–125, especially 94, 104; Welskopf 1974; but see e.g. Browning 1976.
- 14 Spartan crisis in general: G. Bockisch in Welskopf 1974, I.199–230; David 1981, ch. 2; Cartledge 1987, *passim*, especially ch. 21. Spartan land-lots in Messenia: Figueira 1984 (speculative). *Oliganthrōpia* as topos: Gallo 1980; as Spartan reality (variously explained): Figueira 1986; Hodkinson 1986; Cartledge 1987, Index s.v. 'Sparta/Spartans...citizenship'. Possible post-Leuctra land-reform (alleged '*rhētra* of Epitadeus'): Marasco 1980a; *contra* Cartledge 1979, 167–8; 1987, 167, 169, 401. Army-reform (?): Anderson 1970, 229–51.

- 15 Battle of Mantinea: Lazenby 1985, 168. Theban 'hegemony': Buckler 1980, *passim*. Invasion of Laconia: Cartledge 1987, 235–6.
- 16 Anticrates: Plut. *Ages.* 35; but see Poralla/Bradford 1985, no.99. 'Common Peace' in general: Ryder 1965. Peace of 362: *SV* 11.292. Reply to Satraps: *IG* IV. 556=Harding 1985, no.57.
- 17 *Isoc.* vi.28; cf. Buckler 1980, 314n.28. Early career of Archidamus: Hamilton 1982a. Agesilaus as mercenary: Cartledge 1987, ch. 15, esp. 327–9.
- 18 Philip: best modern account is G.T.Griffith's in Hammond and Griffith 1979, Pt. II (hereafter 'Griffith 1979'), with a useful chronological table at 722–6; see also Ellis 1976. Theopompus (*FGH* 115): Lane Fox 1986b. Diodorus: Hornblower 1981; cf. Cartledge 1987, 67–8. Xenophon: Cartledge 1987, ch. 5, *passim* (with bibliography). The most reliable and compendious modern narrative of Spartan history remains Ehrenberg 1929 (full references to ancient sources). Archidamus: Hamilton 1982b.
- 19 *Xen. Hell.* vii.5.27. *Dem.* xviii.231. Aristotle on Sparta: most recently David 1982–3; cf. Cartledge 1987, especially 403–4.
- 20 *Isoc. Ep.* ix (incomplete, authenticity disputed). Isocrates in general: Baynes 1955, 144–67; cf. Cartledge 1987, 67, 401–2. Third Sacred War: Kennedy 1908, 258–310. Delphic Amphictyony: Ellis 1976, 132–3 (table); Griffith 1979, 450–6.
- 21 Sparta and Amphictyony: Zeilhofer 1959; Daux 1957. Spartan *naopoioi* (building commissioners) and donors: Poralla/Bradford 1985, svv. Agias, Alcimus, Andocus, Antileon, Gorgopas, Diaecles, Erasis, Echeteles, Cleosimenes, Megyllias, Polypeithes, Philolaus, Philostratis (female, the earliest of series, 364/3). Amphictyonic fine: *Diod.* xvi.29.2–3. Sparta and Phocis in 370s: Cartledge 1987, 304ff. Alleged bribery of Archidamus and Deinicha: *Paus.* ii.10.3 (after Theop.); rightly doubted by Noethlichs 1987, 152–3, no.27.
- 22 Archidamus & Philomelus: *Diod.* xvi.24.2. Spartan public finance: *Arist. Pol.* 1271b10–17, with Rawson 1969, 76; David 1982–3, 91 and n.93; cf. Cartledge 1987, 49.
- 23 Sparta and mercenaries: Cartledge 1987, ch. 15. Seizure of Delphic sanctuary and treasure: Bury/Meiggs 1975, 424 (action defended).
- 24 Philip and Thessaly: Griffith 1979, chs VI.1, VII, XVI; quotation, *ibid.*, 279. Archidamus at Thermopylae: *Diod.* xvi.37.2–3.
- 25 Agis (later III), Hippodamus, Gastron, Lamius: Poralla/Bradford 1985, svv. 'Ancestral' restitutions: *Dem.* xvi.4, 11, 16; cf. Hamilton 1982b, 65 and n.16. Campaigns of 351: *Diod.* xvi.39.4–7; *Paus.* iv.28.2.
- 26 *IG* XII.5(i).542.18, 20, 21, 22=Poralla/Bradford 1985, nos 799–802. Gnosstas: Cartledge 1979, 215–16. Ceus and Athens: Cargill 1981, especially 134–40.
- 27 *IG* IV.952.1–6. Asclepius cult: Pollitt 1972, 166. Spartan women: Kunstler 1983 (seeking to modify Cartledge 1981).
- 28 Weakness of Sparta: *Isoc.* v.49–50. Archidamus and Phalaecus: *Diod.* xvi.59.1; *Aesch.* ii. 133–4. Flare-up at Pella: *Aesch.* ii.136. Ambitions of Philip: Ellis 1976, 92.
- 29 Despite *Paus.* x.8.2, Sparta probably was not expelled from Amphictyony: Ehrenberg 1929, 1416; Ellis 1976, 272n.157; or only briefly: Daux 1957, 107. Philip's *Geldpolitik*: *Dem.* xviii. 295; *Plb.* xviii.14; cf. Cargill 1985, 83–4. Mercenaries: Griffith 1979, 476–9. Iphicratidas, Alexippa and seven sons: *Anth. Pal.* VII.435. Battle of Chaeronea: Griffith 1979, 596–603.

- 30 Archidamus in Crete and southern Italy: Theop. 115F232; Diod. xvi.62–3; Strabo vi.280; Plut. *Ag.* 3; Paus. iii.10.5; and ?Stephanus' *Philolacon*, with Rawson 1969, 36n.3. Sparta and Syracuse, 356–5: Poralla/Bradford 1985, nos. 180, 718. Xen. on Leuctra: v.4.1.
- 31 Spartan exceptionalism: Arr. *Anab.* i.16.7; Just. ix.5.3; cf. Ellis 1976, 205 and nn. 125, 128; Hamilton 1982b, 83. Elis: Paus. v.4.9; cf. Griffith 1979, 617n.4.
- 32 Invasion: Griffith 1979, 616–19. Isyllus (IG IV².1.57ff.): Griffith 1979, 616–17; Marasco 1980b, 58–60 (unpersuasive attempt to redate Isyllus' hymn to c.280). Frontier-demarkations: Roebuck 1948; Ellis 1976, 204, 297nn.113, 115–19.
- 33 Spartans as would-be farmers: Arist. *Pol.* 1264a9–10; contrast Plut. *Mor.* 223a (Cleom.).

Chapter 2

Resistance to Macedon: the revolt of Agis III

- 1 'Hellenism' as concept: Bichler 1983 (includes discussion of periodization in general). Cleomenes II: Jones 1967, 148 (a slight exaggeration; see now Podlecki 1985, 237 and n.58, for two Theophrastan mentions, one referring to a trial of the otherwise unattested Cleolas, who should therefore be added to either Bradford 1977 or Poralla/Bradford 1985).
- 2 League of Corinth: Ryder 1965, 102–9, 150–62; Griffith 1979, 623–46. Quotation from Walbank 1985, 17–18 (originally 1951).
- 3 Crusade (idea already exploited by Philip in Third Sacred War: ch. 1): Hornblower 1983, 255. Garrisons (later called 'Fetters of Greece'): Griffith 1979, 611–13.
- 4 Aristotle's *Politics* for all its flaws is easily our best source for oligarchic and other Greek political thought: e.g. Mulgan 1977.
- 5 Peace-clauses: Ps.-Dem. xvii.8, 15. Fourth-century *stasis* (methods for forestalling which occupy the central books of the *Politics*): Huxley 1979, 40–50; Ste. Croix 1981, 283–300; Lintott 1982, chs 6–7; Gehrke 1985. Mercenaries: Parke 1933; Griffith 1935; cf. Ste. Croix 1981, 295; Cartledge 1987, ch. 15. On the 'social question' as oligarchically filtered by Isocrates and Plato: Fuks 1984, 52–79, 80–171. 'Crisis of the *polis*': ch. 1 and n.13, above.
- 6 Frontier-ratification: Plb. ix.33.12; Just. ix.5.1–3; cf. Walbank 1967, 172–3; Griffith 1979, 618 and n.2. Philip's calculatedly different treatment of respectively Athens and Thebes: Griffith 1979, 613.
- 7 Alexander: perhaps the best short summary in English is Hornblower 1983, ch. 18 (261–93, 314–22). Apart from documents and archaeology, Arrian is no doubt the most reliable source, but see Bosworth 1980; Brunt 1983, App. XXVIII (The date and character of Arrian's work').
- 8 Cleomenes: Poralla/Bradford 1985, p.182. Spartan envoys: Poralla/Bradford 1985, nos 178, 532, 697, 754 (as cited in *ibid.*, App. I). Athenian embassies: Humphreys 1985, 211. Delphic Amphictyony as (later) anti-Macedonian focus: Marchetti 1977.
- 9 Revolt of Thebes: Arr. i.7–9; cf. Brunt 1976 and Bosworth 1980, *ad loc.* Olynthus destruction: Griffith 1979, 324–8. Messene: Ps.-Dem. xvii.4.

- 10 Sparta and Persia in the time of Agesilaus II: Cartledge 1987, ch. 11; in 344: Diod. xvi.44.1–2; cf. Griffith 1979, 484. Persia and Egypt: Ray 1987.
- 11 Post-Granicus propaganda: Arr. i.16.7. Persian amphibious strategy, 334–2: Burn 1952, 81–4; Brunt 1976, App. II. Lysander: Cartledge 1987, ch. 6. Alexander's letter: Arr. ii.14.6.
- 12 Issus battle: e.g. Brunt 1976, App. III. Mercenaries: Diod. xvii.48.1, but see text and n.16, below.
- 13 Memnon (and all matters prosopographical): Berve 1926, no.497. Euthycles: Mosley 1972. Taenarum as 'man-market': Will 1984, 30; as Helot asylum: Cartledge 1979, Index s.v. 'Pohoidan...cults'; new military development: Jones 1967, 148–9 (quotation).
- 14 Agis on Crete, 332: Potter 1984 (speculative but plausible relocation of IG ii² 399).
- 15 Agis as anti-Macedonian protagonist: Ehrenberg 1929, 1418. Revolt (or War) of Agis: Niese 1893, 102–7; Badian 1967 (excessively pro-Agis); Cawkwell 1969 (dating); Lock 1972 (answering Cawkwell); Ste. Croix 1972, 164–6, 376–8 (opposing Badian on significance; open-minded on date); Bosworth 1975 (date of outbreak); Brunt 1976, App. VI; McQueen 1978 (absentees and participants, settlement, *tresantes*); Atkinson 1980, 482–5 (mainly chronological). Sources: especially Aesch. iii.165; Din. i.34; Diod. xvii.62–3; Q. Curt. vi. 1.1–21 (incompletely extant); admirably discussed by Lock 1972.
- 16 Amyclae victory-dedication: Poralla/Bradford 1985, no.27a. 10,000 mercenaries: Din. i.34. 8,000 ex-Issus: Diod. xvii.48.1; rightly rejected by Parke 1933, 199. Career of Agis: Poralla/Bradford 1985, no.27; Berve 1926, no.15. Date of Megalopolis battle: Badian 1967; Brunt 1976, 483–4.
- 17 Agis' numbers: Ste. Croix 1972, 164–6. Athenian view of Agis: Potter 1984, 234; cf. Ste. Croix 1972, 166n.202 (reading 'Antipater' for 'Antigonus' in Plut. *Mor.* 219ab).
- 18 'Battle of Mice': Plut. *Ages.* 15.4. Alexander's support: Bosworth 1975. Sparta's situation post-331, as reflected in her foreign policy: Cloché 1945, 219–22; cf. Ehrenberg 1929, 1421.
- 19 Perioecic settlement: Cartledge 1979, App. I; now confirmed by B.S.A./University of Amsterdam Laconia Survey (unpublished; information kindly supplied by Dr W.G.Cavanagh).
- 20 *Tresantes* in 331: Diod. xix.70.5; cf. McQueen 1978, 59; in 371: Plut. *Ages.* 30.6, with Cartledge 1987, 241,411–12; as legal status: Ehrenberg 1937; MacDowell 1986, 44.
- 21 Hostages: McQueen 1978, 53–6,60–4 (but these are unlikely to have been *paides*. as in the unreliable anecdote Plut. *Mor.* 235b(54)—Diod. xvii.73.5 has just 'the most distinguished of the Spartiates').
- 22 Sparta never in any Macedonian League: Plut. *Mor.* 240ab. Grain from Cyrene: Tod 196=Harding 1985, no.116 (Cythera at lines 48, 52); cf. Kingsley 1986 (political interpretation). Sparta ordered to deify Alexander: Plut. *Mor.* 219e (Damis); cf. Aelian *Var. hist.* ii.19, with Balsdon 1950; Badian 1981. Sparta's non-participation in Lamian War: Ehrenberg 1929, 1419–20. Taenarum: Lepore 1955, 163, 176, 180; Badian 1961, 25–8. Sparta's pro-Samian gesture (one-day fast): Ps.-Arist. *Oec.* ii, 1347b 16–20; cf. Shipley 1987, 168. Refusal of help to Athens: Habicht 1975a.

- 23 Apophthegm attributed to Eudamidas I: Plut. *Mor.* 220f (4); rightly dated to his reign by Griffith 1979, 617n.3. Powers of Spartan (dual) kingship: Cartledge 1987, ch. 7. 'My enemy's enemy...' principle: Hornblower 1983, ch. 2.
- 24 Lamian War: Will 1979, 29–33 (summary, sources and modern bibliography—as ever in this indispensable work); cf. Walbank 1985, 12. Quotation from Miller 1982, 100.
- 25 Succession down to Ipsus: Will 1984, 23–61; from Ipsus to re-establishment of Gonatas in Macedon (276): Will 1984, 101–17. Gauls at Delphi: Will 1984, 115. Aetolia and Achaea: bibliography in *CAH* VII.2.1, 542–3; cf. chs.3–6 in this volume.
- 26 Polyperchon's proclamation: Diod. xviii.56; cf. Hornblower 1981 (on Diod.'s main source for the Successors). Sparta fortification (317?): Diod. xviii.75.2, xix.35.1; Just. xiv.5.5–7; cf. Ehrenberg 1929, 1421–2; Oliva 1971, 201; Piper 1986, 175. Siege-warfare in general: Garlan 1974.
- 27 The mercenary option: Piper 1986, 2. Thibron: Poralla/Bradford 1985, no.376 (possibly occasioning Ptolemy I's interventions in Cyrene). Harpalus: Badian 1961.
- 28 Proclamation of Antigonos: Hope Simpson 1959, esp. 389–93. Mission of Antigonos' lieutenant (Aristodemus): Diod. xix.60. Acrotatus: Diod. xix.70–1; cf. David 1981, 117–19; Meister 1984, 391.
- 29 Quotation: Forrest 1968, 141. Length of Cleomenes II's reign: McQueen 1978, 60n.73 (with bibliography).

Chapter 3

The new Hellenism of Areus I

- 1 'Hellenismus': ch. 2, n.1, above; cf. Hornblower, *CR* 34 (1984), 245–7. Droysen: Momigliano 1977, 307–23 (stressing D.'s vision of the era as a *praeparatio evangelica* for the rise and dissemination of Christianity); Préaux 1965; cf. Préaux 1978, I.5–9, II.686–3; Walbank 1981, 60–78. Useful brief conspectuses: Badian 1962; Jones 1964a; Ehrenberg 1974, 64–106.
- 2 Monarchy and monarchic ideology: Walbank 1984, 62–100; cf. Gruen 1985 (stressing that Monophthalmus set rather than followed a precedent, in which he was aped by Ptolemy I, Seleucus I, Lysimachus and Cassander, by assuming the title 'King').
- 3 On all political and military matters relating to Areus and Spartan history of this epoch: Marasco 1980b; but for a less optimistic and more realistic assessment of Spartan foreign policy: Cloché 1945–46 (summary: 1946, 59–61). Sources for Hellenistic history: Walbank 1981, 13–28; 1984, 1–22 (coinage: 18–21).
- 4 Hellenistic political history: Will 1979–82; in English summary for 323–276: Will 1984. Tarn 1928 is still worth reading. Antigonids and Greek states: Briscoe 1978; Buraselis 1982.
- 5 Hellenic League of Monophthalmus and Poliorcetes, 302: *SV* III.446 (from Epidaurus). Accession of Areus: Diod. xx.29.1; Paus. iii.6.2; cf. Marasco 1980b, 31–8 (arguing that Cleonymus was officially designated Regent). Role of Gerousia: Cartledge 1987, 111–12. Age of Areus: Oliva 1971, 206n (rightly rejecting Beloch's birthdate of c.312; I would set it c.320).

- 6 Western venture of Cleonymus: Diod. xx. 104–5; Duris, *FGrHist.* 76F18; Livy x.2. 1; Trog. *Prol.* 15; cf. Cloché 1945, 221–2; Meloni 1950; Marasco 1980b, 38–48; David 1981, 120–1; Meister 1984, 406; Piper 1986, 193n.30 (Cleonymus might have fought Romans); Brauer 1986, ch. 5 (Cleonymus' coinage of gold).
- 7 Archidamus IV: Bradford 1977, s.v. Demaratus: SIG³ 381; Bradford 1977, s.v.; see further ch. 5 in this volume (ancestry of Nabis). 'Friends' of Hellenistic rulers: Herman 1980/1.
- 8 Invasion of Poliorcetes: Plut. *Demetr.* 35–6; Polyæn. iv.7.9–10; cf. Cloché 1945, 223–5; Marasco 1980b, 48–60. Perhaps the occasion of IG V. 1,704 ('Nicaicles in war'): Bradford 1977, 291.
- 9 Cleonymus in Boeotia: Plut. *Demetr.* 39; cf. Cloché 1945, 225–7; Marasco 1980b, 51–5 (over-optimistic). Aetolian League: briefly Walbank 1984, 232–6; see further chs. 4–5 in this volume.
- 10 Spartan embassy to Poliorcetes, ??289: Plut. *Demetr.* 42.2–4, *Mor.* 233e; cf. Marasco 1980b, 55 and n.91. Exile of Cleonymus' son (future Leonidas II) to court of Seleucus (I?): Plut. *Ag.* 3.9; cf. Marasco 1980b, 55–6 (after 275). Gonatas' alleged control of Sparta, 285/4: Eusebius *Chron.* II, p.118; rightly rejected by Marasco 1980b, 57n.97.
- 11 Gonatas in Aegean: Buraselis 1982, 152ff. Areus in Phocis: Plb. ii.41ff.; Paus. viii.6. 3; Just. xxiv.1.1–7; cf. Ehrenberg 1929, 1422–3 (exaggerated); Cloché 1945, 227–33; Marasco 1980b, 63–73 (*poluandrion*: 72n.28). Old Peloponnesian League: Cartledge 1987, ch. 13. Spartans at Delphi: Bradford 1977, svv. Aristoclidias, Cleosimenes (*naoipoioi*), Phabennas (*hieromnēmōn*), Ce(rc)id(as), Pratonicus. Achaean League: Urban 1979; Walbank 1984, 243–52. Gallic incursion: Walbank 1957, 51; Will 1984, 114–16.
- 12 Cleonymus in Messenia: Paus. iv.28.3; Marasco 1980b, 74–5 (?? recovered Dentheliatis); Habicht 1985, 106; at Troezen: Front. iii.6.7; Polyæn. ii.2.9; Cloché 1945, 239–40; Marasco 1980b, 77–9; on Crete: SV III.471; cf. Marasco 1980b, 84–5. Defection of Cleonymus: Plut. *Pyrrh.* 26.20ff., *Mor.* 219f; Polyæn. vi.6.2, viii.49; cf. Ehrenberg 1929, 1423–4; Marasco 1980b, 93–100. Invasion of Pyrrhus: n.14, below.
- 13 Spartan sexual politics: Cartledge 1981; Hodkinson 1986, especially 402–3 (Eudamidas and Agesistrata: Table, p. 402). Cleonymus, Chilonis and Acrotatus: Plut. *Pyrrh.* 26.16ff., 27.10 (after Phylarchus, *FGrHist.* 81F48); cf. Piper 1979, 7; Bradford 1986b, 14.
- 14 Pyrrhus: generally Lévêque 1957; Garoufalas 1979. Pyrrhus in Macedon (with Cleonymus): Polyæn. ii.29.2; cf. Oliva 1971, 204. Pyrrhus in Greece: Plb. v.19. 4ff.; Plut. *Pyrrh.* 26.8–29; Paus. i. 13.6–8, iv.29.6; Just. xxv.4.6–10; cf. Ehrenberg 1929, 1424–5; Cloché 1946, 29–42; Will 1979, 214–16; Marasco 1980b, 100–19. Areus in Crete: Plut. *Pyrrh.* 27.2. *Agōgē*: possibly relevant is Amphiareus' wrestling victory at the 296 Olympics; Bradford 1977, s.v.; see further ch. 4 in this volume.
- 15 Archidamia: Plut. *Pyrrh.* 27. Acrotatus: Plut. *Pyrrh.* 28 (there is no need to identify him with the 'Akrotatos kalos' celebrated in a graffito recently discovered at the Nemea Stadium). Dedications to Athena (sometimes 'Chalcioecus'): Bradford 1977, svv. Damar(is), (De?)xagoris, Etymocles, (Eury)stheneia, (Euth)ymia.

- 16 Cleonymus at Zarax: Paus. iii.24.1; cf. Cartledge 1979, 314; Marasco 1980b, 20n. 10. Walling: Wace/Hasluck 1907/8, 67ff. Tyros dedication: SIG3 407; cf. Ehrenberg 1929, 1424.
- 17 Bronze statuette: Dickens 1907/8, 145–6; Piper 1986, 184 (citing Paus. iii.17.5 for cult of Aphrodite Areia).
- 18 Hieronymus: Hornblower 1981. Phylarchus (*FGrHist.* 81): Gabba 1957; Africa 1961. ‘Luxury’ of Areus: Phyl. F44; as Hellenistic commonplace: Marasco 1980b, 42. Coinage of Areus: Bellinger 1963, 89–90; Kraay 1966, 345, no.520; Grunauer-von Hoerschelmann 1978, ch. 1; Marasco 1980b, 124–7. Spartan coinage debate, 404; Cartledge 1987, 88–90.
- 19 Ptolemaic coins later buried in Sparta: below, ch. 4 and n.33, ch. 5, n.2.
- 20 Chremonides Decree: SIG³ 434/6 (SV III.476)=Burstein 1985, no.56; cf. Ehrenberg 1929, 1426; Cloché 1946, 46–7; Will 1979, 223–4; Marasco 1980b, 119–23; Habicht 1985, 86 (cf. *ibid.*, 86n.76 for decree for Chremonides’ brother Glaucon at Plataea with reference to a *koimon* of the Greeks’).
- 21 *IDélos* 87; cf. Cartledge 1987, 94.
- 22 Dedications to Areus: Paus. vi.12.5 (Elis, at Olympia); ISE I.54 (Orchomenus); SIG³ 433=Oliva 1971, fig. 54 (Ptol. II, at Olympia). Delphic honours for Areus II: SIG³ 430, as interpreted by Tarn 1913, 303n.84; cf. Cloché 1946, 43n.1, 54n.4; Marasco 1980b, 96–7; Marek 1984, 129, 336. Letter of Areus to Jews: / *Macc.* 12.7, 19–23; cf. Cardauns 1967 (with bibliography, mostly condemning as forgery, at 317–18n.1); Janni 1984, 49–51. For authenticity: Ginsburg 1934; Forrest 1968, 142; Bernal 1987, 109–10 (though he wrongly retains Biblical misspelling ‘Areios’). Kinship as ‘ticket of admission to European culture’: Bickerman 1962, 154; cf. Davies 1984, 258, 305; in age of Paus.: Habicht 1985, 127; ch. 8 in this volume.
- 23 Chremonidean War: Paus. i.1.1, 7.3, iii.6.4–6; Just. xxvi.2.1–9; Trog. *Procl.* 26; Plut. *Ag.* 3.7; cf. Cloché 1946, 51–6; Heinen 1972, 199ff.; Will 1979, 224–8; Marasco 1980b, 139–53; David 1981, 132–9; Walbank 1984, 236–43.
- 24 Acrotatus at Megalopolis: Plut. *Ag.* 3.7; Paus. viii.27.11, 30.7; cf. Marasco 1980b, 153–6. Perhaps now (again? see above, n.12) Sparta had to cede Dentheliatis to Messene: Tac. *Ann.* iv.43.4; cf. Walbank 1957, 288. See further chs. 4–6 in this volume.
- 25 Nicon: Bradford 1977, s.v.; cf. Loukas 1984 (*SEG* XXXIV.320). Soteria: Walbank 1981, 70, 147. Anecdote: Plut. *Mor.* 212f. Spartan theatre: pre-Hellenistic—Hdt. vi.67.3; Plut. *Ages.* 29.2; Hellenistic—Dilke 1950, 48–51; Piper 1986, 185, 223n. 20. (Plut. *Cleom.* 12.3 perhaps illustrates the ‘traditionalist’ reaction against Areus.) Hellenistic theatrical performance in general: Davies 1984, 319.

Chapter 4

Reform—or revolution? Agis IV and Cleomenes III

- 1 Plut. *Ag.* and *Cleom.* (treated as a single work in the MSS) as novels: Bux 1925; comm.: Marasco 1981, with Martinez-Lacy 1985. Agis, Cleomenes and the ‘mirage’: Ollier 1943, Rawson 1969, and Tigerstedt 1974, svv. Plut.’s *Aratus*: Porter 1937, with Aymard 1967, 46–50. Phylarchus: Gabba 1957; Africa 1961; Shimron 1966b; David 1981, 145–8. Polybius (ii.56–63, anti-Phylarchus; xvi.14.6, xxxviii.4.2,

- patriotism): Walbank 1957–67–79; 1972. ‘Non-Phylarchean tradition’ (Teles fr. 3 Hense; *Plb.* iv.81.12–14; Cic. *Off.* ii.78–80): Fuks 1962b. Mitchison 1931 is a superb historical novel of the ‘New Times’ of Cleomenes.
- 2 Archaeology and literature, lack of fit: Siebert 1978, 88. Modern accounts of c. 244–222 in general: Niese 1899, 296–324; Tarn 1928, especially 739–44, 752–4; Will 1979, 315–401, especially 333–5, 371–401; Walbank 1984, especially 252–5, 458–9, 467–73. Agis, Cleomenes and Sparta: Ehrenberg 1929, 1427–35; Oliva 1971, 208–68; Shimron 1972, 9–52; Marasco 1981, 70–127; Piper 1986, 25–74.
 - 3 Against Beloch and von Pöhlmann: Kazarow 1907. Against Wason (1947, 195, 197): Ste. Croix 1981, 41 (general critique).
 - 4 Revolution as general concept: Porter/Teich 1986; cf. Martinez-Lacy 1985, 289–92. Revolution in Hellenistic Greece, especially the Sparta of Agis and Cleomenes: Fustel de Coulanges 1864, Book IV; Tarn 1923, especially 128–38; Ehrenberg 1929, 1428; Shimron 1972 (‘revolution’ in subtitle, but ‘revolution’ and ‘reform’ indiscriminately in text); Fuks 1974=1984, ch. 1, especially 29–34; Heuss 1973, especially 11–12, 37–46; Meier 1984, 1986, 509; Finley 1986, especially 59n. 18; Martinez-Lacy 1988, especially 71–105.
 - 5 Macedonian viewpoint: Briscoe 1978. Greek (federal) viewpoint: Freeman 1893; Larsen 1968. All matters of detail: Will 1979. Limitations of single city: Davies 1984, 291.
 - 6 Mantinea expedition: Paus. viii. 10.5–10; cf. Walbank 1984, 247n.68 (disbelieved); Jones 1967, 151 (accepted); Will 1979, 320 and Habicht 1985, 101–2 (agnostic). ‘Dark Age’: Ehrenberg 1929, 1429. Honours for Areus II at Delphi (ch. 3 and n.22) and service of Xanthippus with Carthage (below, n.11) belong to this obscure era.
 - 7 Plut. *Arat.* (n.1, above); cf. Walbank 1933.
 - 8 Alliance: Plut. *Ag.* 13.5. (Perhaps the fragmentary *IG* v.1, 3 is the record of this.) Character of Achaean League: below, n.20.
 - 9 Exemption from *agōgē* of heir-apparent: Cartledge 1987, 23–4. Lapse of *agōgē* post-late 270s: inference from Pyrrhus’ offer (ch. 3 and n.14, above); also from Xanthippus’ ‘having participated in the Spartan *agōgē*’ (*Plb.* i.32.1).
 - 10 Augustan exaggeration: Beard/Crawford 1985, 28–9. *Artos* contributed to mess by rich Spartans in early C4: Cartledge 1987, 131, 178, 410; noted for C3 by Persaeus, *FGrHist.* 584F2 (adding that in this respect the messes were a sort of microcosm of the polity as a whole); cf. Sphaerus, *FGrHist.* 585F2; and on Spartan decadence generally Phyl., *FGrHist.* 81F44; Plut. *Mor.* 240ab; *Cleom.* 16.1.
 - 11 Aristotle on *oliganthrōpia*: Cartledge 1979, 307–17 *passim*; 1987, 409–10. Spartan mercenaries: Tarn 1923, 129–30 (exaggerated); Bradford 1977, svv. Aristaeus, Aristei(das), Aristocles (6), Asclapiadas, Aphrodisius, Cleometus, Tetartidas (?), and most famously Xanthippus (especially *Plb.* i.32–36.4; 255 BC); generally Griffith 1935, 93–8. Invention of ‘traditions’ in conservative societies: Humphreys 1978, 249 (cf. Roman manipulation of ‘mos maiorum’).
 - 12 Citizen and sub-citizen numbers in c.244; Plut. *Ag.* 5, as interpreted by Fuks 1962c=1984, 230, 246–8 (Fuks, however, considers the ‘*rhētra* of Epitadeus’ genuine; *contra* ch. 1, n.14). Number of ‘Lycurgan’ *klaroi*: Cartledge 1979, 169–70 (invention); *contra* Marasco 1978, followed by Figueira 1986. *Hupomeiones* in C4: Cartledge 1987, Index s.v. ‘Sparta/Spartans... citizenship’, especially 170 (Xen. *Hell.* iii.3.6—sole attested use of term).

- 13 Sexual politics: ch. 3,n.13. Women of Agis' family: Bradford 1977, svv. Agesistrata, Archidamia; Piper 1979, 7. Women, cult (Hyacinthia) and literacy: Edmonson 1959. *Politikē gē*: Plb. vi.45.3; cf. Walbank 1957, 728–31; Cartledge 1979, 166–7; wrongly situated (on the basis of Plut. Ag. 8) by Chrimes 1949, 5, 286–7, 429–30.
- 14 Decision-taking: Cartledge 1987, ch. 8. Kingship: Cartledge 1987, ch. 7. (Will 1979, 334, following Beloch, cannot envisage Agis as other than a supporter of the faction of Agesilaus.) *Rhētra* of Lysander (?model for Epitadeus): Plut. Ag. 8. Named individuals: Bradford 1977, svv. Agesilaus (2), Lysandros (1), Mandrocleidas, Leonidas (1). Other alleged 'intimates' of Agis (Ag. 18.7): Bradford 1977, svv. Amphares, Arcesilaus, Damochares. Leonidas and Seleucus (? I): ch. 3, n.10; cf. Bernini 1978, 48n.82.
- 15 Cleomenes I and Demaratus: Noethlichs 1987, 155–6, no.30. Skywatching: Plut. Ag. 11.3; cf. Parke 1945; Cartledge 1987, 95. Ino-Pasiphaë: Plut. Ag. 9.2–3 (citing Phyl. F32), *Cleom.* 7.2; IG v.1, 1317 (C4); Sosib., *FGrHist.* 595F46, with Jacoby 1955 (Comm.), 665–7; also Cartledge 1975, 53–4, no.54 (site); see further ch. 14 in this volume. Comparable oracular manipulations in C16–17 England: Thomas 1971, ch. 13. Chilonis (not to be confused with homonym of ch. 3, n.13, above): Bradford 1977, s.v. Chilonis (2); ?dedicatrix of Dawkins 1929, 372–4, nos 61–3, 65.
- 16 Spartan 'Crown': Adcock 1953, 166.
- 17 Agis' programme in general: Fuks 1962a=1984, ch. 12; 1962b=1984, ch. 13; 1962c=1984, ch. 11; cf. David 1981, 148–62 (Spartan social structure). Debts as 'mortgages' only: Ehrenberg 1929, 1429. Attic *horoi*: Finley 1985 (new introduction by P. Millett; 'mortgage' is technically inaccurate, but it is hard to find an alternative). Tetradrachms of Agis (?): Furtwängler 1985, 639 (redating Grunauer-von Hoerschelmann 1978, Group IX. 1–15).
- 18 Early C4 pamphleteering (especially King Pausanias, *FGrHist.* 582): David 1979; Cartledge 1987, 163. Authors of a *Lac. Pol.* or other work on Sparta: (a) *Local*—*FGrHist.* 586–90, 595 (Sosibius, on whom see also Marasco 1978, 124n.35; Boring 1979, 55–8, 81–2; and further ch. 13 in this volume); (b) *Foreign*—Persaeus of Citium (*FGrHist.* 584: Stoic, commander of garrison of Acrocorinth surprised by Aratus, 243); Dioscorides (*FGrHist.* 594). Lycurgus (later king): Chrimes 1949, 23. Rejoinder of Leonidas: Plut. Ag. 10.
- 19 Helots as basis: below, n.35. Varieties of support for Agis: Cloché 1943, 53–70.
- 20 Corinth expedition: Plut. Ag. 13.10, 14–15; *Arat.* 31–2; Paus. ii.8.5. Cimon at Ithome: Cartledge 1979, 220–1. Aratus' motivation: Forrest 1968, 146; Will 1979, 336. Character of Achaean League: Aymard 1938, especially 32–3; Urban 1979; O'Neil 1984–1986, 33–44, 55–7. Hellenistic 'democracy' in general: Jones 1940, 168. Downfall of Agis: Cic. *Off.* ii.80. Exiles: Fuks 1962c =1984, 233 (numbers); Shimron 1972, 27n.43 (nature).
- 21 Aetolian raid: Plb. iv.34.9, ix.34.9; Plut. *Cleom.* 18.3. Aetolia and Messenia: SV III.472; cf. Tarn 1928, 733; Walbank 1984, 250. Nature of Aetolian League: Tarn 1928, 208–11; Oliva 1984, 7; Mendels 1984–1986; O'Neil 1984–1986, 45–54, 57–61. Agis and Perioeci: Plut. Ag. 8.2 (dubious). Mercenaries at Taenarum: Launey 1949, 105 and n.1; Walbank 1957, 568. Poseidon and earthquake of c.464: Cartledge 1979, 96, 214. Taenarius: Bradford 1977, s.v.
- 22 Leonidas' monarchy: Bernini 1978; cf. Tarn 1928, 742 (defending Leonidas). Marriage of Agiatis: Bradford 1986b, 16. *Patroukhoi*: Cartledge 1981. Agis' infant

- son: Paus. ii.9.1, iii.10.5 (Eurydamidas probably a mistake for Eudamidas: Oliva 1971, 240 and n.5). Continuity between Leonidas and Cleomenes: Bernini 1978.
- 23 Accession of Cleomenes: Plut. *Cleom.* 3.1, 38.1. Lydiadas and Achaea: Plut. *Arat.* 30.4, *Mor.* 552b; cf. Walbank 1957, 238. (The Thearidas who was willing to come to terms with Cleom. in 223—Plb. ii.56.8; Plut. *Cleom.* 24.2ff.—was probably Plb.'s grandfather: Walbank 1957, 259.)
- 24 'Cleomenic War': Plb. ii.37–70; cf. Fine 1940; Walbank 1957, 215–16; 1979, 740–1; Oliva 1968. Chronology (pegged to year of Sellasia battle, almost certainly 222): Walbank 1957, 272; 1967, 634; 1979, 763. Aristomachus: Plut. *Arat.* 27–29, 35.1ff.; cf. Walbank 1957, 238. Aetolia and four Arcadian towns: Plb. ii.46.2–3, 57.1–2; Plut. *Cleom.* 5.1, 14.5. Aetolian neutrality: Larsen 1966.
- 25 Athenaeum: Plb. ii.46.5; Plut. *Cleom.* 4.1–2; cf. Loring 1895, 38–41, 47, 71–4, figs. 2–3, pl. 1; Walbank 1957, 243–4 (but note correction, 1979, 762); Cartledge 1975, 61–2, no.70. Ladocea: Plut. *Cleom.* 6.3ff.; *Arat.* 36.4–37.5; Plb. ii.51.3. Mercenaries: Plut. *Cleom.* 7.5.
- 26 Cleomenes and Archidamus: Plb. v.37.2, viii.35.3–5, followed by e.g. Bernini 1981–82 (Cleomenes guilty); Plut. *Cleom.* 5.2–3, followed by e.g. Oliva 1971, 235–43 (not guilty).
- 27 Sphaerus (*FGrHist.* 585) in general: Boring 1979, 68–70; and *agōgē*: Plut. *Cleom.* 11.1–4. Influence (?) on Cleomenes: Ollier 1936; doubted by Rostovtzeff 1941, 1367n.34; Boren 1961, 368–9n.25; Oliva 1971, 232; David 1981, 166–8; Shaw 1985, 28; also Vatai 1984, 124, 126.
- 28 Ephorate: Plut. *Cleom.* 8–10; cf. Chrimes 1949, 9–10, 19–20, 405–6; Cartledge 1987, 125–6. Gerousia: Paus. ii.9.1; cf. Shebelew *ap.* Kazarow 1907, 51 (annual election?); Chrimes 1949, 19, 143–8 (Patronomos; cf. Andreotti 1935; Shimron 1965; but see also ch. 14 in this volume); Ste. Croix 1981, 527. Agiad dyarchy: Tod in Tod/Wace 1906, no.145. Cleomenes as 'tyrant' (in addition to Plb. ii.47.3): Plb. iv.81.14, ix.23.3, xxiii.11.4; Plut. *Cleom.* 7.1; Paus. ii.9.1; Livy xxxiv.26.14; cf. Boren 1961; Pozzi 1968; Shimron 1972, 44; Heuss 1973, 43–4; Walbank 1979, 224; Marasco 1980b, 28. (Note that, according to Xen. *Lak. Pol.* 15.9, 'Lycurgus' aimed to prevent 'tyrannical ambition' in kings.) 80 exiles: Plut. *Cleom.* 10.1 (proscribed), 11.1. Megistonous: Bradford 1977, s.v.
- 29 *Anadasmus*: Plut. *Cleom.* 11.1; cf. Pozzi 1968, 398 and n.18; Cartledge 1987, 167–74. Shimron (1972, 43, 151–5) argues for the creation of 5,000 citizens by Cleomenes: cf. Marasco 1979, 61 (next note). *Diaita*: Poralla/Bradford 1985, 177, s.v. Gnosippus (of whom an example was made).
- 30 'Lycurgan' rhetoric: Marasco 1980b, especially 7–23. Mercenaries and citizenship: Marasco 1979, 61 (unconvincing argument for 2,000 ex-mercenary citizens, making 6,000 citizens in all). Mercenaries typically equipped as peltasts: Griffith 1935, 95. Military reform (going Macedonian): Launey 1949, 361–2. Neopolitae IG v.1, 680: cf. Oliva 1971, 88 and n.6, 245n.3. Army-organization (N.B. Plb. fr. 60 B.-W. for size of *mora* in ?? Cleomenes' army): Cartledge 1987, 427–31 (on 'obal' army); 1979, 254–7 ('moral' army).
- 31 Fighting for more than *status quo*: the point is made forcefully in George Orwell's *Homage to Catalonia* (1938). Achaean socio-economic tensions: Walbank 1984, 253–4. Cleomenes' revolution 'not for export': Gabba 1957, 22; cf. Shimron 1966b, 459. Old, pre-Peloponnesian War Pel. League: Cartledge 1987, 9–13; post-Peloponnesian War: Cartledge 1987, ch. 13.

- 32 Hecatombaeum: Plut. *Cleom.* 14, *Arat.* 39.1; Plb. ii.51.3. Argos: Plut. *Cleom.* 17.5ff., *Arat.* 39.4–5; Plb. ii.52.1–2, 55.8–9, 60.6. *Volte-face* of Aratus: Freeman 1893, 359–61; Will 1979, 382–5. Ptolemy III and Cleomenes: Plb. ii.51.2; Plut. *Cleom.* 22.9; *IvO* 309 (dedication by Ptolemy in honour of Cleomenes at Olympia; cf. SIG³ 433, cited above ch. 3,n.22: Ptolemy II in honour of Areus). Hippomedon: IG xii.8.156=SIG³ 502, discussed fully (with L.Robert's new readings) by Gauthier 1979; cf. Herman 1987, 85, 86.
- 33 Ptolemaic coinage (bronze): Walbank 1984, 464n.44. Cleomenes' silver: Grunauer-von Hoerschelmann 1978, Group III (on Orthia statue: see also Pipili 1987, 97–8n.438), Groups IV-V (Ptolemaic models). Orthia temple: Grunauer-von Hoerschelmann 1978, 14–16. 'Great Altar': this volume, ch. 14 and App. I. Defection of Argos: Plb. ii.52.5ff.; Plut. *Cleom.* 20–1, *Arat.* 44.
- 34 Doso's Hellenic League: Walbank 1957, 256; 1981, 97. 'Triumph of federalism': Tarn 1928, 747–51; cf. Walbank 1976/7; Will 1979, 389–90. The League and social revolution: Tarn 1923, 128. Doso's accession: Will 1975, 389.
- 35 Destruction of Megalopolis: Plb. ii.54–5, 61–2 (booty: 62.1, with Rostovtzeff 1941, 205–6, 750–3, 1366n.31, 1507n.20, 1606–7n.85), 64, ix.18ff.; Plut. *Cleom.* 23–26, *Arat.* 45, *Philop.* 5; Paus. viii.8.11, 27.15, 49.4. Helots: Oliva 1971, 259–60 (too sceptical); Welwei 1974, 162–8; Noethlichs 1987, 167n.193 (in general discussion of money at Sparta, 165–9); cf. IG v.1, 1340 (1 mina of silver paid, but not certainly Helot manumission and possibly of Nabian date). Manumission fees elsewhere: Hopkins 1978a, 158–63; but cf. Duncan-Jones 1984. Helots as basis: Ehrenberg 1929, 1429; Oliva 1971, 229; Cartledge 1987, 13. Continued status-difference: Sosib. *FGrHist.* 595F4 (taking 'those from the country' as Helots, not Perioeci); Plut. *Cleom.* 28.4–5 (Crypteia commanded at Sellasia by Damoteles).
- 36 Ptolemy ends subsidy: Plb. ii.63.1; Plut. *Cleom.* 22.9, 27. Battle: Plb. ii.65–9 (based on lost account of Philopoemen, a participant); Plut. *Cleom.* 28 (after Phyl.); *Philop.* 6; cf. Walbank 1957, 272–87 (date, sources, numbers, arms); Pritchett 1965, ch. 4 (site); Oliva 1971, 262–3; Will 1979, 396–401; Lazenby 1985, 172; Noethlichs 1987, 153–4 (alleged bribery of Damoteles). *Tresantes*: ch. 2, n.20, above. Echemedes: Papanikolaou 1976–1977. Victory-dedication (Delos): SIG³ 518; cf. Aymard 1967, 109.
- 37 Doso at Sparta: Plb. ii.70.1 (meaning of *patrion politeuma* disputed—Walbank 1966 preferable to Shimron 1972, 53–63; cf. Welwei 1974, 168–9; Mendels 1981, 1982); Plut. *Cleom.* 30.1. Sparta's incorporation in Hellenic League (?): Plb. especially iv.24.4; cf. Walbank 1957, 470 (probable); Cartledge 1979, 321 (dogmatic); *contra* Shimron 1972, 66–8 (alliance only). Garrison: Plb. iv.22.4ff., xx.5.12; cf. Launey 1949, 155–6. Dentheliatis: Plb. iv.24.7–8; cf. Pozzi 1970, 391 and n.17. Belminatis: Walbank 1957, 247 (*ad* ii.48.1). East Parnon foreland: Chrimes 1949, 21–2; Walbank 1957, 485; see further ch. 5 in this volume. Doso as 'Saviour and Benefactor': Plb. v.9.9–10; cf. Walbank 1957, 290. Geronthrae inscription (IG v.1, 1122): Pozzi 1970, 392–3n.24. (Note, however, Will 1979, 397–8: Doso's treatment of Sparta *not* mild.) Exiles of 227: Shimron 1972, 62 and n.23, 136 (no return).
- 38 Death of Ptolemy III (late 222): Walbank 1979, 763. Deaths of Cleomenes and co.: Plb. ii.69.10–11, v.35–9; Plut. *Cleom.* 29–37; Just. xxviii.4; cf. Shimron 1972, 64–6; and the brilliantly fictionalized account in Mitchison 1931. Legend: above, n.1.

Chapter 5

Sparta between Achaëa and Rome: the rule of Nabis

- 1 Rhodian-Pergamene embassy: Plb. xvi.24.3; L(ivy) xxxi.2.1; cf. Holleaux 1957, 339–45; Badian 1964, 113; Walbank 1967, 530–1; Briscoe 1973, 55–6, 1978, 156–7; Will 1982, 13, 128–30. Athens' support: Will 1982, 129–30; Habicht 1985, 92–4, 99n.14, fig.30 (Cephisodorus). Rome's rise to empire: Errington 1971; Walbank 1981, 227–51; also below, n.22. 'Clouds in the west' (Plb. v. 104.10): Freeman 1893, 435–8; Colin, 1905, 50–1, 78; Walbank 1940, 66; Errington 1969, 24–5; Will 1982, 76.
- 2 Battle of Mantinea (207): below, n.13. Period between Sellasia and Nabis: Pozzi 1970; Shimron 1972, 53–78; Toneatto 1974/5; Texier 1975, 7–14; Martinez-Lacy 1983. Indicative of unsettled conditions is coin-hoard buried in Sparta c.220: Hackens 1968, 72–3; Davies 1984, 279. 'Big politics': Ehrenberg 1929, 1438=1935, 1475; cf. Gruen 1984, 437.
- 3 Chief literary sources for Nabis: Plb. xiii.6–8, xvi.13; L. xxxiv.31–2; Diod. xxvii, fr. 1; Plut. *Flam.* 13, *Mor.* 809e. Polybius: see ch. 4, n.1; add Mendels 1979, especially 330–3, 1982, 93–5; Walbank 1985, 280–97. Plb. as source of entire literary tradition on Nabis: Mundt 1903; cf. Shimron 1974, 40 and n.1; Mendels 1979. Livy: Walbank 1940, 282–3; 1971; Briscoe 1973, especially 1–12, 17–22, 1981; Taïphakos 1984. Comparison of Livy and Polybius, distinguishing Livy's debts respectively to Polybius (especially L. xxxiii.10.10) and the Latin annalists: Nissen 1863. Chief modern work on Nabis: Mundt 1903 (revisionist); Ehrenberg 1929, 1437–40; Hadas 1932, 74–6; Passerini 1933, 315–18; Ehrenberg 1935; Aymard 1938, 33–46, 184–255, 294–324; Chrimes 1949, 27–42; Mossé 1964; Jones 1967, 157–63; Mossé 1969, 179–92; Oliva 1971, 274–98; Shimron 1972, 79–100, 118–28; Taïphakos 1972; Texier 1975; Bradford 1977. S.v.; Fontana 1968; Forrest 1968, 148–50; Piper 1986, 95–116. See also relevant passages in general studies of period: Freeman 1893; Niese 1899, especially Bk. 10; Holleaux 1957; Will 1982.
- 4 Polybius' starting-point: Walbank 1940, 23; Will 1982, 70. Social War: Plb. iv.3–37, 57–87, v. 1–30, 91–106; cf. Freeman 1893, 395–438; Holleaux 1926, 201–7; Tarn 1928, 763–8; Walbank 1940, 24–67, 1984, 473–81; Will 1982, 71–7.
- 5 Spartan-Aetolian alliance: Plb. iv.34–35.5, ix.30.6, 31.3, 36.8; cf. Freeman 1893, 411,450–3; Walbank 1967, 169.
- 6 'Cleomenean party' or 'faction': alleged by (e.g.) Walbank 1957, 469; Shimron 1972, 69–78; denied by Martinez-Lacy 1983. Citizen-body 219/8: Shimron 1972, 153–4 (guesswork). Withdrawal of Brachyllas: Ehrenberg 1929, 1435. Murders of Ephors: Plb. iv.22.3–24.9, 34.3–7. Restoration of dyarchy: Plb. iv.2.9, 35.10ff., xxiii.6.1; cf. Walbank 1957, 484; Oliva 1971, 268 and n.5.
- 7 Succession-disputes under *ancien régime*: Cartledge 1987, 111–12. Post-227 Gerousia: ch. 4 and nn.28, 37; Plb. iv.35.5 (Gyridas, a *gerōn*, murdered 220). Agesipolis III: Bradford 1977, s.v. Lycurgus' alleged bribery: Plb. iv.35.14–15, 81.1; doubted by Noethlichs 1987, 162–3, no.86. Lycurgus as Eurypontid: Poralla/Bradford 1985, 163.
- 8 Lycurgus in east Parnon foreland: Plb. iv.36.5; cf. Chrimes 1949, 22,24; Walbank 1957, 485; Cartledge 1975, nos. 83 (Prasiae), 86 (Glympeis), 87A (Polichna), 88 (Cyphanta), 89 (Zarax), 99 (Hyperteleatum). Athenaeum: Plb. iv.37.6, 60.3; cf.

- ch. 4, n.25. Philip in Peloponnese, w.219/8: Plb. iv.81.11; cf. Walbank 1940, 42–4. Lycurgus in Messenia, s.218: Plb. v.1.4,17.1–2. Philip's invasion of Laconia, s. 218: Plb. v. 18–24; *IG* iv².1,590A (Epidaurus); ?*Anth.Pal.* vii.723; cf. Walbank 1940, 57–8, 1957, 553–8.
- 9 Chilon's *coup*: Plb. iv.81.1–10; cf. Ehrenberg 1929, 1436. Lycurgus' *idioioiketai*: Plb. v.29.8–9; cf. Ehrenberg 1929, 1436; Piper 1984–1986, 85. Lycurgus and Agesipolis: Plb. xxiii.6.1; L. xxxiii.26.14; cf. Walbank 1979, 224.
 - 10 Sosylus (*FGrHist.* 176): Rawson 1969, 101; Bradford 1977, s.v. Philip-Hannibal alliance: Plb. vii.9 (SV III.528); cf. Holleaux 1926, 209–10, 1957, 295–302; Walbank 1967, 42–56. Rome-Aetolia alliance (SV III.536): Walbank 1940, 83–4; Holleaux 1957, 302–7; Will 1982, 87–9. Rome and Illyria: Holleaux 1926, 47–66, 194–201; Walbank 1940, 12; Badian 1964, 1–33; Errington 1971, 34–40; Harris 1979, 195–7. Romans at Isthmia: Plb. ii.12.4–8; Zon. viii.19.7; cf. Holleaux 1926, 60–1,65; Aymard 1938, 70; Badian 1964, 10 and n.44; Errington 1971, 275n.30.
 - 11 Polybius' version of debate in Sparta, ? spring 210: Walbank 1967, 163, 1985, 255–9. Greek attitudes to Rome, including 'panhellenism': Plb. ix.37.6; L. xxxi.29.12, 15; cf. Walbank 1940, 87, 1967, 176; Deininger 1971. Spartan *adscriptio*: L. xxxiv. 32.2; cf. Wolters 1897, 144–5; Aymard 1938, 139 and n.23; Badian 1970, 52 and n. 79 (meaning of term); Briscoe 1981, 98–9. Nabis-Flamininus debate: below, n.26. Pelops: Aymard 1938, 192n.36; Bradford 1977, s.v. Machanidas: Plb. 11.18.7 etc.; L. xxvii.29.9 etc. ('tyrant'); cf. Freeman 1893, 451; Ehrenberg 1930; Pozzi 1970, 411–14; as Pelops' guardian?: Wolters 1897, 144.
 - 12 Dedication to Eleusia: *IG* v. 1,236=SIG³ 551; cf. Walbank 1967, 255. Eleusia/Eileithyia in Sparta (closely associated with Orthia): Dawkins 1929, 51. Machanidas 209–7: Plb. x.41.2, xi.11.2; L. xxviii.5.5, xxxviii.34.8 (with Ehrenberg 1929, 1437).
 - 13 Philopoemen, in general: Errington 1969; at Sellasia: Errington 1969, 20–3; in Crete (c.221–211,200–194): *ibid.*, 27–48; army-reforms: Holleaux 1957, 314; Anderson 1967; Errington 1969, 51, 62–5. Battle of Mantinea: Plb. xi.11–18; Plut. *Philop.* 10; Paus. viii.50.2; cf. Freeman 1893, 464–5; Holleaux 1957, 314–15; Walbank 1967, 282–94 (map p.284); Errington 1969, 65–7. Aetolia-Philip peace, 206: Plb. xvi.13,3; cf. Walbank 1940, 101; Holleaux 1957, 316–17. Peace of Phoenice: L. xxix. 12.13–14; cf. Holleaux 1926, 214–18, 1957, 317–18; Balsdon 1954; Walbank 1967, 516–17 (revising 1940, 103–4n.6); Will 1982, 94–9, especially 96.
 - 14 Nabis as follower of Cleomenes: Ehrenberg 1929, 1437; Hadas 1932, 76; Aymard 1938, 41, 138n.19; Holleaux 1957, 330; Mossé 1964, 319; Shimron 1974, 41,44; Forrest 1968, 149; *contra* Mendels 1979; as *aemulus Lycurgi* (L. xxxiv.31.18, 32.1): Asheri 1966, 101–5; Jones 1967, 161; *contra* Shimron 1972, 94, 1974; Mendels 1978, 43; as 'socialist' or 'communist': Rostovtzeff 1941, 56; Holleaux 1957, 329–30. See also below, n.32.
 - 15 Nabis' name: Ehrenberg 1935, 1471, 1482; Texier 1975, 17. Filiation: Homolle 1896, especially 503–4 (publication of SIG³ 584), 512–21. Coinage: Lambros 1891; Wolters 1897, 142; Head 1911, 435; Seltman 1933, 257; Kraay/Hirmer 1966, no. 522; Grunauer-von Hoerschelmann 1978, Group IX (but see Furtwängler 1985, 639, dating IX. 1–15 before Nabis). Tile-stamps: *IG* v. 1,885; cf. Wace 1906/7, especially 6,20–1. Nabis under Cleomenes: Hadas 1932, 75; Ehrenberg 1935, 1472; Shimron 1972, 96.

- 16 Doso as 'king': Walbank 1984, 453; cf. Fontana 1980, 928 (comparison with Nabis). Nabis' bodyguard and mercenaries: Plb. xiii.6.5, xvi.37.3; L. xxxii.40.4, xxxiv.27.2, 28.8, 29.14, 35.8, xxxv.27.15, 29.1ff.; IG v.1, 724 (Arcadian Botrichus); cf. Launey 1949, 113, 123–4; Walbank 1967, 293; Shimron 1972, 141–2; Welwei 1974, 174; Walbank 1979, 139. Demaratus' Olympic victory: Ste. Croix 1972, 355n.5. Agesilaus II's warhorses: Cartledge 1987, 149. Machanidas' richly caparisoned horse and purple robe: Plb. xi.18.1. Nabis' stable and white horse: Plb. xiii.8.3. Nabis' palace: L. xxxv.36.1. Palatitsa: Andronicos 1984, 38–46. Nabis as 'Hellenistic king': Mossé 1964, 320; Shimron 1972, 86n.21; Texier 1974, 192, 197; 1975, 24 and *passim*. Nabis as 'tyrant': Plb. iv.81.12; L. *passim* (above, n.3); cf. more neutrally Aymard 1938, 34n.12; Mossé 1961, 354, 357n.13 (Dionysius' *neopolitai*), 1964, 319–23; Fontana 1980, 921; Walbank 1981, 174.
- 17 Dionysius: Sanders 1987 (source-critical); cf. briefly Davies 1978, 201–11. Apia/ Apēga: Texier 1975, 18–19; Bradford 1977, s.v. Apēga. Pythagoras: Bradford 1977, s.v.
- 18 Nabis and the 'slaves': Plb. xvi.13.1; L. xxxiv.31.11, 14, xxxviii.34.6; Strabo viii.5. 4 (trans. Cartledge 1979, 348); Plut. *Philop.* 16.4; cf. Chrimes 1949, 37–42, followed by Robins 1958 (*neodamōdeis*), refuted by Shimron 1966a (perhaps the best account to date); also Mossé 1964, 317–18, 322; Texier 1974; Welwei 1974, 169–74; Mendels 1979, 322–4; Ste. Croix 1981, 149–50; Piper 1984–1986, 85–8. Nabis' land-distribution in Sparta: Passerini 1933, 316; Rostovtzeff 1941, 618; Asheri 1966, 98–100; Shimron 1972, 88n.26; Welwei 1974, 174n.56; Mendels 1979, 325n.92. Inter-marriage of Spartan women and ex-Helots: Plb. xiii.6.3–4; L. xxxiv.35.7; cf. Piper 1984–1986, 84; see also below, n.28. Dionysius and Kallikyrioi: Mossé 1961, 359; Shimron 1972, 90n.29. Kallikyrioi and Helots: Arist. fr. 586R (trans. Cartledge 1979, 351).
- 19 Nabis' debt-cancellation at Argos: L. xxxii.38; not at Sparta: Asheri 1969, 59. Bottomy papyrus (P. Berl. 5883+5853): Wilcken 1925; Bogaert 1965, 146–54; Ste. Croix 1974, 53. Gytheum and trade: L. xxxiv.29.2–3, xxxiv.36.3, xxxviii.30. 7; cf. Giannokopoulos 1966; Texier 1975, 76. Nabis as 'pirate' (by land as well as sea): Plb. xiii.6.5, 8.2; L. xxxiv.32.18, 35.9, 36.3, xxxv.12.7; cf. Rostovtzeff 1941, 608; Brulé 1978, 49, 159–60. Delian inscription (SIG³ 584, above n.15): Ehrenberg 1935, 1473–4; Aymard 1938, 37n.37; Brulé 1978, 18n.3, 49; Baslez/Vial 1987, 296.
- 20 Sparta's city-wall: Plb. ix.26a.2 (size of circuit); L. xxxiv.34.2–4, 38.2, xxxix.37.2; Paus. vii.8.5; cf. Wace 1906/7; Cartledge 1975, 28–9; Piper 1986, 174–6. 'Lycurgan' building regulations: Plut. *Lyc.* 13, *Mor.* 189e, 227b, 285a. Neopolitae: ch. 4, n.30. Cynosura *hydragos*: Peek 1974 (=App. I, no.1); cf. Le Roy 1974, 229–38 (another, more localized board of *hydragoi*, c.200). Pottery: Siebert 1978, 83–9. Tombs: Wace/Dickens 1906/7. Sculpture: Wace 1907/8. Grave-reliefs: Tod/Wace 1906, 127 (Cat. 257+294)=Bradford 1977, s.v. Paras; contrast ch. 4, n.36 (Echemedes).
- 21 Cinadon: Cartledge 1987, Index s.v. Nabis' war with Achaëa, 204ff.: Plb. xiii.8. 3ff., xvi.36–7, xxi.9.1; L. xxxi.25.3; Plut. *Philop.* 13; cf. Aymard 1938, 39–40n.51; Errington 1969, 77–81. Nabis' fleet: L. xxxiv.35.5, 36.3, xxxv.12.7, 26.2; cf. Ehrenberg 1935, 1473; Aymard 1938, 34–5n.20 (cost). Nabis' allies and (?) possessions on Crete: Plb. xiii.8.2; L. xxxiv.35.9; cf. Aymard 1938, 37n.39; Shimron 1972, 91n.31; Brulé 1978, 28–9, 47. 'Iron Maiden': Plb. xiii.7; cf. Aymard 1938, 36 and n.33. Nabis and Messene, 201: Plb. xvi.13.3, 16.17; L. xxxiv.32.16,

- 35.6; Plut. *Philop.* 12.4–6; Paus. iv.29.10; viii.50.5: SIG³ 595 (Eumenes); cf. Niese 1899, 566; Ehrenberg 1935, 1474–5; Aymard 1938, 38–41; Walbank 1940, 124; Chrimes 1949, 30–1 (disbelieves); Walbank 1957, 517; Oliva 1971, 283–4. Philopoemen in Laconia. 200: Plb. xvi.36–7; cf. Loring 1895, 57, 63.
- 22 Senate, imperialism and Second Macedonian War: Plb. xvi.27.2 (Philip to make war on no ‘Greeks’); cf. Colin 1905, 1–14, 53–96; Holleaux 1926 (Rome and Greece 229–05); Walbank 1940, 138–85; Wason 1947, ch. 10; Holleaux 1957, 320–86; Walbank 1967, 537; Errington 1971, 131–55; Briscoe 1973, 39–42; Crawford 1978b, 65–70; Nicolet 1978, 883–920. Harris 1979, especially 21 (triumph), 57, 92 (Senate), 212–18; Habicht 1982, 150–8; Will 1982, 131–78; Gruen 1984, especially 8; 343–51 (Plb.); 721–30; Harris 1984.
- 23 Achaea-Rome alliance: L. xxxii. 19–23; cf. Aymard 1938, x-xi, 83–97; Walbank 1940, 163. Nabis, Philip and Argos: Plb. xviii.16–17; L. xxxii.25, 38–40; xxxiv.25, 40–41.7; SIG³ 594 (Mycenae); cf. Freeman 1893, 481n.6; Aymard 1938, 109–11, 132–54, 185n.3; Walbank 1967, 570; Texier 1975, 45–65; Mendels 1977, 169–71; 1978, 39–42; Eckstein 1987, 227–8. Mycenae conference: L. xxxii.39–40; cf. Aymard 1938, 141–9; Walbank 1940, 166 and n.1, 323; Texier 1975, 64–6. Roman recognition of Nabis: L.xxxiv.31.5, 12–13; denied by Flamininus (L. xxxiv. 32.1); cf. Ehrenberg 1935, 1474, 1476.
- 24 Nabis’ 600 Cretans: Oliva 1971, 286–7n.4. Battle of Cynoscephalae: Walbank 1940, 167–72; Holleaux 1957, 359–65 (Macedon’s Jena); Badian 1970, 49; Will 1982, 159–60. ‘Freedom of the Greeks’: Plb. xviii.44–8; L. xxxii.32–3; cf. Freeman 1893, 473–5; Colin 1905 *passim*, especially 3, 81–2, 243, 253; Ehrenberg 1935, 1477; Aymard 1938, 284–6; Walbank 1940, 178–83; Holleaux 1957, 365–71; Badian 1964, 10, 123–4, 130; Errington 1969, 82; Badian 1970, 33–4; Errington 1971, 151–5, 180–1; Texier 1976–77, 154; Harris 1979, 140–2; Will 1982, 142, 145–6, 164–74; Gruen 1984, 132–57.
- 25 Flamininus’ war vs. Nabis: L. xxxiii.44.8–45.5, xxxiv.22–4, 26ff., 29.4; Just. xxxi.1. 5–6; Zon. ix.18.3; SIG³ 595; cf. Loring 1895, 64; Niese 1899, 655–65; Aymard 1938, 184–255; Walbank 1940, 187–9; Chrimes 1949, 29; Holleaux 1957, 375–8; Badian 1964, 121–2 and n.43; Oliva 1971, 288–93; Shimron 1972, 92–4; Will 1982, 174–6; Gruen 1984, 450–5.
- 26 Nabis-Flamininus debate: L. xxxiv.31–2; cf. Aymard 1938, 149–50n.55, 222–6; Shimron 1972, 82; Texier 1975, 69–89, at 77–87; Texier 1976–77; Mendels 1978; Eckstein 1987, especially 216–27, 228–33.
- 27 Flamininus’ ‘philhellenism’: especially L. xxxiv.48.1–2 (on Sp.); cf. Colin 1905, 97–172, at 133–4; Badian 1970, especially 14, 38, 47, 48, 53, 53–7; Briscoe 1973, 33–4; Will 1982, 153–5, 171. Tarentum as Spartan colony: Plb. viii.33.9; cf. Walbank 1967, 108. Roman-Spartan ‘kinship’: Rawson 1969, 99–106.
- 28 195 settlement: L. xxxiv.35.3–11, 43.1–2, 49.2; cf. Colin 1905, 166, 214, 216; Ehrenberg 1935, 1478–9; Aymard 1938, 229–36. Wives of exiles: L. xxxiv.35.7; cf. Aymard 1938, 35n.22; Shimron 1972, 142n.16; Seibert 1979, 191–3nn. 1505–10. Nabis’ outlet to sea: Aymard 1938, 234n.27; Cardamyle is my suggestion. Status of ‘maritime’ Perioeci: L. xxxiv.36.2, xxxv.13.2, xxxviii.31.2; cf. Aymard 1938, 243, 251–5, 333n.10; Briscoe 1981, 164. End of old ‘Lakedaimon’: Ehrenberg 1929, 1439=1935, 1479; Aymard 1938, 234n.25.
- 29 Gytheum’s dedication to Flamininus: SIG³ 592=SEGXI.923 (cf. worship of Flamininus in Imperial festival at Gytheum: Ehrenberg/Jones no.102a): Colin

- 1905, 142 and n.5, 245 and n.3; Aymard 1938, 255 and n.22; Walbank 1987, 382 and n.75. (Note possible pre-195 Spartan harmost at Oetylus: *IG* v.1, 1295.) 'Koinon of the Lacedaemonians': Strabo viii.5.5, C366; Paus. iii.21.7; *SEG* XI.938 (70s BC?); Le Roy 1974, 222–3, no.2; cf. Costanzi 1908, 56n.1; Accame 1946, 74, 124–9 (post-146); better Gitti 1939, especially 197–8; Giannokopoulos 1966, 79–86; Taïphakos 1973. Aetolia and Nabis: L. xxxiv. 12.4–6; cf. Aymard 1938, 189n.25, 296–7, 302n.42; Holleaux 1957, 391–6; Oliva 1971, 296–7n.5; Forrest 1968, 150. Achaea and Nabis: L. xxxv.27–30; Plut. *Philop.* 14; Paus. viii.50.8–9; Just. xxxi.3.2–3. Philopoemen's naval defeat: Walbank 1940, 195; Duggan 1952; Errington 1969, 102–3; Briscoe 1981, 183. Involvement of Eumenes: *SIG*³ 605; cf. Aymard 1967, 89n.5; Oliva 1971, 295n.4. Intervention of Flamininus: Plut. *Philop.* 15.3; Paus. viii.50.10; cf. Aymard 1938, 312–13; Walbank 1940, 196; Briscoe 1981, 189–90; Gruen 1984, 463–7.
- 30 Murder of Nabis: L. xxxv.35–6; cf. Costanzi 1908, especially 53, 57–8; Holleaux 1957, 395–6. Appointment of 'Laconicus' (real name, or L.'s misunderstanding?) as king: L. xxxv.36.8; cf. Aymard 1938, 192n.36; Bradford 1977, s.v. Philopoemen's *coup*: Mahaffy 1892, 189; Loring 1895, 64–6. Incorporation in Achaea: L. xxxv.37.1–3; Plut. *Philop.* 15.4; Paus. viii.51.1; cf. Freeman 1893, 492–3; Aymard 1938, 315–24; Errington 1969, 109–12.
- 31 Post-incorporation government of Sparta: Plut. *Philop.* 15.3; cf. Errington 1969, 110–1; Shimron 1972, 107, 111–12, 139n.11; Walbank 1979, 86. Nabis' household effects: Plb. xx.12.7; Plut. *Philop.* 15.4–6; Paus. viii.51.2; cf. Aymard 1938, 337–8; Walbank 1979, 86; Noethlichs 1987, 136, no.8. Nabis' popular support: Plut. *Fam.* 13.3; cf. Mossé 1964, 322 and n.40; Texier 1975, 101–2. Philopoemen's intervention, 191: Plut. *Philop.* 16.1–3; Paus. viii.51.1; cf. Aymard 1938, 330–8; Errington 1969, 121–2; Shimron 1972, 103–4, 143–4; Walbank 1979, 85; Gruen 1984, 467–8 and n.176. Spartan embassy to Rome, 191/0: Plb. xxi.1–4; cf. Aymard 1938, 331n.2, 336n.21, 355–72; Errington 1969, 133, 286–7; Walbank 1979, 88. Spartans attack Las, 189: L. xxxviii.30.6ff., 31; cf. Colin 1905, 215–18; Aymard 1938, 337n.22, 359n.7, 377–8. Compasium massacre: Plb. xxii.3.1; Plut. *Philop.* 16.3 (80 killed); *contra* the Spartan writer Aristocrates, *FGrHist.* 591F3 (350 killed); cf. Walbank 1979, 177. Philopoemen's settlement, 188: Plb. xxi.32c, xxii.3.1, 11.7, xxiii.4.14; L. xxxviii.33–4, xxxix.36.14, 37.1, 16; Plut. *Philop.* 16; Paus. vii.8.5, viii.51.3; cf. Colin 1905, 218; Aymard 1938, 321n.35; Chrimes 1949, 43ff.; Holleaux 1957, 428–9; Errington 1969, 146–7; Oliva 1971, 300–2; Shimron 1972, 106–7, 113; Golan 1974, especially 37–8; Seibert 1979, 199–200. Imposition of Achaean laws confirmed by Plb. xxii.12.3; L. xxxix.37.16; *IG* v.1, 4–5; cf. Jones 1967, 163; Walbank 1979, 138, 218; see further ch. 6 and especially ch. 11 in this volume.
- 32 Nabis as 'revolutionary': Tarn 1923, 139; Aymard 1938, 136–7n.16, 138n.19; Holleaux 1957, 329; Mossé 1964, 323; Jones 1967, 157; Texier 1975, 80, 83; Mendels 1979. Achaea unites Peloponnese (minus ex-Perioeci): Paus. viii.30.5; cf. Ehrenberg 1929, 1440; Aymard 1938, 378. Rome and the social order: especially L. xxxiv.51.6; cf. Colin 1905, 651–2; Aymard 1938, xii, 190; Holleaux 1957, 382, 386; Briscoe 1967; Errington 1971, 162; Briscoe 1981, 124, 128; Ste. Croix 1981, 307, 523–9. Nabis and the Classical *polis*: Texier 1975, 60–1; Vidal-Naquet 1986, 205.

Chapter 6

Sparta from Achaea to Rome (188–146 BC)

- 1 Philopomen's 188 settlement: ch. 5 and n.31. Unification of Peloponnese: ch. 5 and n.32. Spartan eccentricity: Larsen 1968, 44. 'Politische Vernichtung' of Greece: Münzer 1925, especially ch. 6 (ending, p. 69, with instructive letter from Bismarck to Ernst Curtius!). 'Nemesis': Toynbee 1965, 458. Polybius' motives for extending *Histories* from 168 to 146: Walbank 1985, 341–3.
- 2 Embassies of 188/7, 187/6: Plb. xxii.3.1–4, 7.5; cf. Niese 1903, 46–51, 56–61 (on diplomacy of 188–79); Larsen 1938, 286–8; Werner 1972, 558–9n.187 (list of known embassies to Rome, 188–71); Briscoe 1967; Walbank 1979, 9 (chronology). Spartan groupings: below, n.6. Rome's *prostasia*: Badian 1958, 91–2n.2; Larsen 1968, 448; Walbank 1979, 177 (important textual note, but different interpretation).
- 3 Achaean treaty with Rome: Walbank 1979, 219–20; Gruen 1984, 33–4. Lycortas' speech, 184: Walbank 1979, 200.
- 4 Livy: see ch. 5, n.3.
- 5 Complaints before Senate: above, n.2; Plb. xxii.11–12; L. xxxix.33.6. On the spot: Plb. xxii.7–10; L. xxxix.35.5–37; cf. Walbank 1979, 200. 'Old exiles': Plb. xxi.1.4, 9, 11.7; xxiii.4.2, 5.18, 17.10, 18.2; cf. Walbank 1979, 89. Alcibiades and Areus: Plb. xxii.11.7, xxiii.4.3; L. xxxix.35.5–8, 36.1–2; Paus. vii.9.2; cf. Errington 1969, 175–8; Bradford 1977, svv.; Walbank 1979, 195–6, 217–18. City-wall: ch. 5 and n. 20; Paus. vii.9.5 (suggests rebuilding began 183, but see below, n.10); cf. Ehrenberg 1929, 1441; Walbank 1979, 219.
- 6 Embassies of 184/3: Plb. xxiii.1.6; 4; L. xxxix.48.2–4; cf. Ehrenberg 1929, 1441; Walbank 1940, 238; Errington 1969, 179–83; Shimron 1972, 108–9. Spartan groupings: Errington 1969, 179n.3 ('old exiles'); Shimron 1972, 115–16, 146–50 (over-schematic). Senatorial commission (Flamininus, Q.Caecilius Metellus, Ap. Claudius Pulcher): Plb. xxiii.4.7; Paus. vii.9.5; cf. Errington 1969, 181–3. Property-rights: Walbank 1979, 217–18. 'Foreign tribunals' (*dikastēria xenika*): Paus. vii.9.5, 12.4.
- 7 183/2 deputations and senatorial reaction: Plb. xxiii.5.18, 6.1–2, 9.11–15, especially 9.14; cf. Walbank 1979, 223, 228. Serippus and Chaeron: Plb. xxiii.17.6–10; cf. Errington 1969, 188–9. Messene secession and death of Philopoemen: Plb. xxiii.9.8–9; 12–14, 17.1–4; L. xxxix.48.5; Paus. viii.52.3; cf. Ehrenberg 1929, 1442; Errington 1969, 189–94. Sparta's readmission to Achaean League, thank-offering to Lycortas: Plb. xxiii.17.5–18.2; Paus. vii.9.5; SIG³ 626; cf. De Sanctis 1923, 245–6n.19; Walbank 1979, 250–1.
- 8 Chaeron's coup: Plb. xxiv.7; cf. Freeman 1893, 507; Ehrenberg 1929, 1442; Benecke 1930, 299; Chrimes 1949, 48 ('socialist agitator'); Oliva 1971, 309; Shimron 1972, 110; Walbank 1979, 259; Piper 1986, 131–2 (preferable). Socio-economic crisis in Greece: Rostovtzeff 1941, 603–32. *Dokimastēres*: Plb. xxiv.7.5, with Walbank 1979, 260.
- 9 Callicrates in general: Walbank 1979, 559 (collects main Polybius passages); 263 (selection of modern judgements); add Toynbee 1965, 472 (con); Deininger 1971, 135–45 (pro); cf. Will 1982, 245, 284; Habicht 1985, 114. Callicrates' embassy to

- Rome, 180: Plb. xxiv.8–10; cf. Colin 1905, 233–4, 236–7; Errington 1969, 202–3; 1971, 190; Walbank 1979, 19 (chronology); Gruen 1984, 497–8.
- 10 Callicrates' election as *stratēgos*: Plb. xxiv.10.14; cf. Walbank 1979, 19 (chron.). Solution of exile-problem: Plb. xxiv.8–10; L. xl.20.2; Paus. vii.9.6–7; SIG3 634=Burstein 1985, no.74; cf. Larsen 1968, 459–60; Oliva 1971, 310–11 and fig. 59. Restoration of 'Lycurgan' regime?: L. xlv.28.4 (*disciplina, instituta*); cf. Ehrenberg 1929, 1442–3; Piper 1986, 145; *contra* Kennell 1985, 13–19; 1987, 422n. 17 (146/5); ch. 14, in this volume. Restored *agōgē*: Plut. *Philop.* 16.6; Paus. viii.51. 3; cf. Woodward 1907/8, 94–6, no.47=Dawkins 1929, 35, fig.19; cf. Chrimes 1949, 46–7. Sussitia: Bradford 1977, s.v. Pasicrates (3) (SEG ii.60). Clothing and hairstyle: Paus. vii.14.2; cf. Chrimes 1949, 50. Wall (restored now): Benecke 1930, 300; Shimron 1972, 117; Piper 1986, 134.
- 11 Third Macedonian War: Colin 1905, 373–446; De Sanctis 1923, 279–333; Larsen 1968, 461–75; Errington 1971, 213–26; Will 1982, 270–85; Gruen 1984, 505–14. Polybius' view of origins: xxii.18.11; but see Walbank 1979, 208–9; cf. 227–8 (references for alleged plans of Philip), 793; also Toynbee 1965, 455–7. Embassy of Eumenes II: Benecke 1930, 256; Walbank 1979, 207. Battle of Pydna: N.G.L. Hammond in Hammond and Walbank, *History of Macedonia III* (forthcoming); as Macedon's Leuctra: Adcock in Adcock/Mosley 1975, 83. Rome's attitude to Greece post-Pydna: Plb. iii.1.9 (original terminal point); cf. De Sanctis 1923, 347; Rostovtzeff 1941, 739, 741; Badian 1958, 96; Toynbee 1965, 444–5; Larsen 1968, 475; Errington 1971, 226; Adcock/Mosley 1975, 253.
- 12 Extradition of Achaeans (deportees, hostages): Plb. xxx.6.5–6, 13.11; L. xlv.31.4–5; Paus. vii.10.7–11; cf. Freeman 1893, 532–4; Colin 1905, 473–7; Badian 1958, 97; Errington 1971, 224–5 (exaggeration); Gruen 1976, 49–50; Will 1982, 284. Leonidas: L. xlii.51.8 (171 BC); cf. Niese 1903, 104–5; Gruen 1976, 55n.80; Bradford 1977, s.v. Menalcidas in Alexandria: Plb. xxx.16.2; cf. Gruen 1976, 54n. 62.
- 13 Paullus in Sparta: L. xlv.28.4; cf. Plb. xxx. 10.3–6; Plut. *Aem.* 28; Benecke 1930, 273; Errington 1971, 223; Will 1982, 282. Jason: *IIMacc.* 5.9; cf. Niese 1903, 231n. 3; Hadas 1959, ch. 8 (claims of kinship with Greeks); Tcherikover 1970, 160–5, 188; Schürer 1973, 184–5n.33; Momigliano 1975, 113–14.
- 14 Proxeny-decree for Cleoxenus: Woodward/Robert 1927/8, 57–62, no.84; cf. Bradford 1977, s.vv. Damaisidas, Pēdestratus, Peisidamus, Philomachus.
- 15 Achaean-type institutions: above, n.8 (*dokimastēres*); ch. 5, n.31 *ad fin.* Coinage: Seltman 1933, 257 ('ugly little Pheidonian triobols struck by Sparta as an unwilling member of the Achaean League'). Aegyitis, Sciritis, Belminatis: Plb. xxxi.1.7; L. xxxviii.34.8; Paus. vii.11.1–3; SIG³ 665; cf. De Sanctis 1964, 128–9; Oliva 1971, 312–13, fig. 61; Gruen 1976, 50–1 and nn.35, 37; Walbank 1979, 465; Cartledge 1979, especially 6–7.
- 16 Sparta, Dōris and Delphic Amphictyony: SIG3 668; cf. Daux 1957, especially 106–7, 119n.1; Bradford 1977, s.v. Aristocles. Earlier history: Cartledge 1987, 34 (but Pythii had presumably disappeared with the dual kingship); ch. 1 and nn.21, 29. Demise of Aetolia, 189: Plb. xxi.32.2; L. xxxviii.1 1.1–9; cf. Badian 1958, 85 and n. 1; Walbank 1979, 131–2.
- 17 Menalcidas as Achaean *stratēgos*: Paus. vii. 11.7–8, 12.2, 4–9; Just. xxxiv.1.3ff.; cf. Ehrenberg 1932, 703. Plb.'s *tarakhē kai kinēsis*: Walbank 1985, 325–43, especially 336–7. Liberation of (less than 300 surviving) Achaean hostages: Plb. xxxv.6;

- Plut. *Cat.* 9.2–3; Paus. vii.10.12; cf. Toynbee 1965, 482–4; Gruen 1976, 48 & n.22; Walbank 1979, 649–50.
- 18 Pausanias' narrative: vii. 11–16; cf. Gruen 1976, 51; Walbank 1979, 698 (? dependence on Polybius); Habicht 1985, 98 (Pausanias usually wrote from memory). Oropus affair: Plb. xxxii.11.5; Paus. vii.11.7–12.3; cf. Freeman 1893, 537–8; Colin 1905, 504–7, 611. Menalcidas' alleged part therein: Walbank 1979, 531–3; Noethlichs 1987, 154, no.29.
 - 19 Menalcidas in Rome, 151/0 or before: Paus. vii.12.2 cf. Gruen 1976, 54n.74; Walbank 1979, 698. 149 embassy: Paus. vii.12.4. Exile of the 24: Paus. vii.12.3–7; cf. Freeman 1893, 539 and n.1; Chrimes 1949, 50–1 (implausible); Oliva 1971, 313–14; Bradford 1977, s.v. Agasisthenes.
 - 20 Revolt of Andruscus: Freeman 1893, 539–40; De Sanctis 1964, 122–6; Walbank 1979, 682–3; Will 1982, 387–9. Third Punic War: Harris 1979, 234–40. Spartan secession: Plb. iii.5.6. Damocritus in Laconia: Paus. vii.13.1–5; cf. De Sanctis 1964, 134. 'Cities in a circle round Sparta': Paus. vii.13.5; as Perioecic: Ehrenberg 1929, 1444; Oliva 1971, 314.
 - 21 Iasus: Paus. vii.13.7 (?=Iasaea: Paus. viii.27.3); cf. Cartledge 1979, 188. Mission of Orestes: Plb. xxxviii.9.1; L. *Epit.* 51; Paus. vii.14.1–3; Dio xxi, fr.72; Just. xxxiv.1; cf. Colin 1905, 615–17; Larsen 1968, 494; Walbank 1979, 48 (chron.); Gruen 1984, 520–1 (mere bluster); *contra* Walbank 1986, 517.
 - 22 Mission of Caesar: Plb. xxxviii.9; cf. Colin 1905, 618; Harris 1979, 241n.5, 242; Will 1982, 392 (hypocrisy, Machiavellianism). Election of Critolaus: Plb. xxxviii.10.8; Paus. vii.14.3–4. Debt-measures of Critolaus (cf. Aeneas Tact. xiv.1–2, with Ste. Croix 1981, 298: C4 parallel): Plb. xxxviii.11.10; Diod. xxxii.26.3–4 (misrepresentation); cf. Freeman 1893, 544; De Sanctis 1964, 154; Asheri 1969, 68ff.; Fuks 1970, especially 79–81; Walbank 1979, 703–5. Corinth assembly, spring 146: Plb. xxxviii.12.2–11, 13.6–7; Diod. xxxii.26.5; Paus. vii.14.4; cf. Freeman 1893, 544–6; Fuks 1970, 84–5.
 - 23 Achaean War: Niese 1903, 337–52. Liberation of slaves: Plb. xxxviii.15.3–5, 10; Paus. vii.15.7, 16.8; cf. Fuks 1970, 81–2. Sack of Corinth: Freeman 1893, 550; Colin 1905, 634–5 (anachronistic); Benecke 1930, 304; Will 1982, 394, 395–6.
 - 24 Fate of old Achaean League: Paus. vii.16.6–7; cf. Freeman 1893, 550–2; Colin 1905, 628–30, 657–60; Ehrenberg 1929, 1444–5; Larsen 1938, 306–11; Accame 1946, chs 1–2; Larsen 1968, 498–504; Fuks 1970, 79; Schwertfeger 1974, especially ch. 3; Bernhardt 1977 (defending Accame *vs.* Schwertfeger); Harris 1979, 146, 240–4; Gruen 1984, 523–7. City-constitutions, role of Polybius: Plb. xxxviii.4.7, xxxix.4.1–5.6; Paus. vii.16.6, viii.30.9; cf. Colin 1905, 651–6; Rostovtzeff 1941, 54 and pl.VIII; Accame 1946, 9–10, 33ff.; Fuks 1970, 86; Walbank 1979, 734–5; Ste. Croix 1981, 525; Bernhardt 1985, II.1.B(b).
 - 25 Status of Sparta post-146/5: Strabo viii, 365; Pliny, *Nat. hist.* iv.16; cf. Niese 1903, 351, 357; Ehrenberg 1929, 1445; Accame 1946, 14–15, 73–4; De Sanctis 1964, 179, 180; Schwertfeger 1974, 51 and n.97; Bernhardt 1977, 71; ch.11 below. 'Lycurgan' restoration: above, n.10. Achaean influence: above, n.15. Lacedaemonian League: ch. 5 and n.29. Recovery of Belminatis now?: Paus. iii.21.3, viii.35.4; cf. Accame 1946, 130; Schwertfeger 1974, 49n.90; but note caution of Ehrenberg 1929, 1445; and see further below, ch. 10. Dentheliatid inscription (Milesian arbitrators decided 584:16 against Sparta in c.138; text carved on base of

Paeonius' 300-year-old Nike statue): SIG³ 683=Burstein 1985, no.80; cf. Colin 1905, 511–12, 636 and n.3, 658 and n.1; Tod 1932, 49–52.

Chapter 7

Sparta between sympolity and municipality

- 1 Marrou 1965, 60. Historiographical trends: Bowie 1974, 174–88. For the spelling 'Achaia' when the Roman province is meant see Oliver 1983, 152 n.6.
- 2 Status of Greece after 146 BC: Accame 1946, 2–7; Bernhardt 1977; Gruen 1984, 523–7 (controversial). Lagina: *Inscriptionen von Stratonicea* ii.1, no.507 line 30. Thera (c. 100 BC): IG xii.3.1299.25; cf. 1625. Tralles: SEG xi.471.
- 3 Lodging: IG v.1.7; 869. Kennell 1985, 23–4. Claudii: Suet. 776.6; Rawson 1973, 227, 229. Pulcher: ch. 6. Cic. *adfam.*xiii.28; *ProFlacc.*63; *Tusc.Disp.*v.27.77 (visit: cf. ch. 14). Rufus: Schwertfeger 1974, 77. Provincial Greek/Roman ties: Bowersock 1965, ch. 1; Quass 1984.
- 4 Memnon, *FGrHist* 434 F 32. Deininger 1971, 258. Athens: Bernhardt 1985, 39–49. Laconian towns: App. *Mithr.* 29.
- 5 App. BC.ii.70; Caes.BC.iii.4. Weil 1881, 16. Grunauer-von Hoerschelmann 1978, ch. 2.
- 6 Plunder: Plut. *Brut.* 46.1; App. BC iv.11.8. Laconism: Cic. *ad Att.* xv.4. Philippi: Plut. *Brut.* 41.4 Mantinea: note Paus.viii.9.6.
- 7 Businessmen: Le Roy 1978. Painting: Plin.NH.xxxv. 173; Vitruv.ii.8–9; H. Gundel, *RE* 9.A.1, 1961, col.357 (date); Pape 1975, 49–52 (aedilician shows). Gytheum: IG v.1.1146 (SIG3.748), transl. in Sherk 1984, no.74. Piso: Nisbet 1961, App.2. Pompey: Caes. BC.iii.3. Murcus: App. BC.iv.74. Decree: IG v.1.11. Coins: Grunauer-von Hoerschelmann 1978, 39–40, 51.
- 8 Messene: SEG xxiii.207; Migeotte 1985. Impact: Larsen 1938, 422; Crawford 1977, esp.45–6. Aristocrates: Spawforth 1985, 215–7.
- 9 Lachares: SIG³.786; Plut. *Ant.* 67.1–4; Chrimes 1949, 180 n.5; Baladié 1980, 291. Bowersock 1961, 116.
- 10 Rhadamanthys: IG v. 1.141.17; Spawforth 1985, 193–9. Treasure-ship: Plut. *Ant.* 67.4.
- 11 Coins: Grunauer-von Hoerschelmann 1978, 63–72. Strab.viii.5.1, 363; 5,5, 366. Phoebaeum family: Spawforth 1985, 197. Cythera: Cass. Dio liv, 7. Livia: cf. Reynolds 1982, no.13 with commentary. High-priesthood: IG v. 1.1172. 'Agrippiastae': *CIL* iii.499 (IG v.1.374); Spawforth 1978, 256–7 (Deximachus); Roddaz 1984, 445–9.
- 12 Texts: IG v. 1.141–2 (*hierothutai*); 206–9 (Phoebaeum: cf. ch. 14); 210–12 ('Taenarii'). *Hierothutai*: Kennell 1987; cf. Carlier 1984, 285–6 (royal prerogatives). Children of Eurycles: IG v.1.141.17–18.
- 13 Actia: Strab.vii.7.6, 325; Sarikakis 1965. Ties with Nicopolis: cf. IG v.1.474; 661; SEG xi.493.4–5; 828. Laconian towns: Paus.iii.21.6; IG v.1.1160; SEG xi.923.8. Bernhardt 1971, 116. Military rôle: note Kjellberg 1921, 52.
- 14 Jos. *BJ* i.425; 513–31; *Ant.Jud.*300–310; Pani 1984, 123–6.
- 15 Strab.viii.5.3, 366 with Bowersock 1961 (Piper 1986, 160, failed to give this 'variant reading' its full weight in her account of Eurycles). Plut. *Mor.*207f.

- Bowersock 1984, 176–8. Gytheum text: SEG xi.923. Eleutherolacones: Strab.viii.5. 3, 366 (Bowersock 1965, 92 n.2 for another view).
- 16 Tac. Ann.vi.18.2. Athens: IG ii².1069 and *Hesperia* 36, 1967, 68–71, no.13 with Jones 1978b, 227–8. Slave: CIL vi.27032. Macer: Bowersock 1984, 178–9.
- 17 Coins: Grunauer-von Hoerschelmann 1978, 73–77. Inscription: West 1931, no. 67; Bowersock 1961, 117; Pflaum 1960–61 i, 63–5.
- 18 Livia: SEG xi.830. Greek worship of Livia: refs. at *PIR*² L 301.Spartiaticus: West 1931. no.68; Plut. Mor.488f. with Groag 1939, cols.7–8 (overlooked by Piper 1986, 165–6). Muson. *ap.Slob.* xl.9. p.750 Hansl; Cass. Dio xlii.14.3.
- 19 IG v.1.970 (Asopus); *BCH* 95, 1971, 88 (Boeae); SEG xi. 923–4 (Sasel Kos 1979, no.40); Le Roy 1978 (Gytheum). Epidaurus: *IGiv*².592+662=Peek 1969, no.253; *IG iv*².663. Lycosura/Megalopolis: IG v.2.541–2 (Spawforth 1978, 253). Athens: *SIG*³.788; 790. Corinth: West 1931, nos 67–8; cf. Puech 1983, 40.
- 20 Cythera: Lane 1962.

Chapter 8

Sparta in the Greek renaissance

- 1 Prosperity: Jones 1971b, 8; Larsen 1938, 482. Vespasian: IG v. 1.691 (SEG xi. 848); cf. Suet. *Vesp.*17. Trajan: IG v.1.1381. Harmonicus: IG v.1.480.
- 2 Full refs. to Agesilaus and Charixenus: Bradford 1977, s.vv. 'Agesilaos (4)' and 'Charixenos (6)'. Their patronomates were dated by Chrimes 1949, 464–5, c.95/6 and 119/20 respectively.
- 3 Woodward 1950, 630–31. Visit to Sparta: Phil. VA iv.31–33. Historicity doubted: Chrimes 1949, 158–9; Tigerstedt 1965–78 ii, 218; Penella 1979, 25. Damis problem: Anderson 1986, ch. 9. Luxury: Muson. *ap.Stob.*xl.9, p.750 Hansl.
- 4 Archaism: Bowie 1974. Roman dimension: Andrei 1984, ch. 1.
- 5 Patronomate: Bradford 1986a. Delphi: *FD* iii.4. no. 301 1.5. Visits: IG v.1.32a.9–12; 486; SEG xi.492; 630. Altars: IG v.1.381–404; Evangelidis 1911, 198 nos. 4–5; SEG xi.763; Bingen 1953, 642–6. Generally: Price 1984, 112.
- 6 Caudus: SEG xi. 490; Robert 1940a. 'Coronea': IG v.1.34 (SEG xi.479).11; 36 (SEG xi.486).24–5; 44—SEG xi.486.7–8; SEG xi.495. Identification with Corone: Kolbe at IG v.1.p. 269; Ehrenberg 1929, col.1949; Woodward 1923–5, 186. Kahrstedt 1950a, 239–41 *contra*. Paus. iv.3.4–5.
- 7 Cephallenia: Cass. Dio lxix.16.1–3. *Ktistēs*: Strubbe 1984–6, 290–91.
- 8 Nicopolis: SEG xi.481. Pannonia: IG v.1.37; Millar 1977, 415. Hadrian and Zeus Olympius: Beaujeu 1955, 114–84. Spartan altar: IG v.1.406. Paus.iii.14.5. Theophrastus: SEG xi.492.2–5; IG v.1.167=SEG xi.623.
- 9 Herculanius: *PIR*² I 302; Halfmann 1979, no.29. Balbilla: *PIR*² 650; Spawforth 1978 (kinship with Herculanius). Vibullii: Spawforth 1980, 208 n.33 with refs.
- 10 Grunauer-von Hoerschelmann 1978, 81; cf. IG v. 1.971; 1172.
- 11 Inscription: Spawforth 1978, 251–2. Cytheran text: IG v.1.380. Things from Eurycles': SEG xi.494.2–3; cf. IG v.1.44=SEG xi.486.3–4 (restored). 'Cytherodices': Spawforth 1980, 207; Thuc. iv.53.
- 12 Paus.ii.3.5; iii.15.6. Heroön: Spawforth 1978, 251. 'Heroic honours': *FD* iii.1.no. 466 (a nearly contemporary example from Delphi); generally see Price 1984, 50. Spartan kings: Cartledge 1987, ch. 16; 1988.

- 13 Helladarchy: Oliver 1983, 110–14 with the reservations of Puech 1983, 20, 32–33. Delphi letter: *FD* iii.4.no.302, lines 1–6; Daux 1976, 73–7. Kahrstedt 1950b, 40.
- 14 Paus.x.8.4. Panhellenion: Spawforth/Walker 1985, 1986. Plataea: Sheppard 1984–6, 238. Cyrenaean inscription: Reynolds 1978, especially lines 39–40, 42–3; Spawforth/Walker 1986, 96–7; note too the unpublished inscription from Cyrene (*ibid.* n.81).
- 15 Atticus: Spawforth 1980. Herodes: ch. 12 in this volume. The evidence for these contacts is collected and discussed at some length in Spawforth/Walker 1986, 88–96, to which the reader is referred; see too Weiss 1984, Strubbe 1984–6 (foundation-legends); Müller 1980, 462–66 (Andragathus); Leschhorn 1984, 60–72 (foundation of Cyrene). Classical Sparta: Plat. *Hipp.* Ma.285d. More literal view of these Spartan ancestries: Woodward 1953 (but note Strubbe 1984–6, 264 n.59). A. Spawforth hopes to return to the subject elsewhere.
- 16 Altars: *IG* v.1.407–45; *SEG* xi.766–8. Dispute: *IG* v.1.37.7–9.
- 17 Inscriptions: *IG* v. 1.116.17–18; 44=*SEG* xi.486.4–6; 816; 818 (*dekatarkhēs*: see Mason 1974, 33–4). Enthusiasm: Luc. *Hist. Conscr.*2. Polyæn.i.1; cf. Cartledge 1987, 207.
- 18 Plague: Gilliam 1961. Thespiea: Jones 1971a. Sparta: *IG* v.1.44=*SEG* 486.12–13; Woodward 1948, 219–33. Debasement: Grunauer-von Hoerschelmann 1978, 87, 95–6.
- 19 *Neōterismoi*: *IG* v.1. 44=*SEG* xi.486.9–10; *SEG* xi.501.7. Woodward 1925–6, 236; 1948, 221–12. Oliver 1970a, 78–80. Pius: *HA*, V. *Ant.* P.5.4–5. For a well-known, but much earlier, outbreak of this type of *stasis* in Roman Greece see Sherk 1984, no.50 (*SIG*³ 684).
- 20 *IG* v. 1.1361. Coins: Grunauer-von Hoerschelmann 1978, 87–88. Smyrna: Spawforth/Walker 1986, 93–4.
- 21 Philostratus and the Spartan myth: Tigerstedt 1965–78 ii, 211–19. Militarisation: Campbell 1984, 401–14. Athens: Geagan 1979, 406.
- 22 Cult: Spawforth 1984, 277–83. Monument: Spawforth 1986, 313–27.
- 23 Antonine constitution: Spawforth 1984, 264–5; cf. *IG* v.1.599 (Heraclia), 598 (parents). Caracallan contingent: Herodian iv.8.3; 9.4; *IG* v.1.130 (*SEG* xi.603), 817 with Spawforth 1984, 267–9. Cf. Hertzberg 1887–90 iii, 26–7 n.4 (apropos of *Hdt.*ix.53; *Thuc.*i.20). ‘Moral’ army: Cartledge 1987, App.II.
- 24 Coins: refs. at Spawforth/Walker 1986, 89–90, 95 n.63. Quotation from MacMullen 1976, 41.

Chapter 9

Pagans and Christians: Sparta in Late Antiquity

- 1 Epithets/titles: e.g. *IG* v.1.501.4; 527.11; 558.1–2; 559.2–3; 534.2; 589.3–4; 590.2–3. Clique: Spawforth 1985. Panthales: *IG* v. 1.547; Spawforth 1984, 272–3 (date). Spatalus: *IG* v.1.535.11–12; Spawforth 1984, 285 no.19. ‘Divine’ patronomates: Spawforth 1985, 210.
- 2 Compulsion generally: Garnsey 1974. Spawforth 1984, 274–7 (portrait-herms). Catalogues: App.IIA, Table; Spawforth 1984, 285–8. Dedications: Woodward in Dawkins 1929, 293. Coinage: Grunauer-von Hoerschelmann 1978, 92–3; Howgego 1985, 98–9.

- 3 'Audience': MacMullen 1982, 246. Hoard: Karamesini-Oikonomidou 1966. Syncell. p. 717 (Bonn). Heruli generally: Millar 1969, 26–9; Bengtson 1977, 553–4; Wilkes forthcoming.
- 4 Devastation: Traquair 1905–6, 428; Woodward 1925–6, 208 (ibid. on the theatre).
- 5 Tetrarchic dedication: SEG xi.850. For later fourth-century repairs to the theatre see SEG xi.464–5, 851–2, 892=xxxii.400. Laconia Survey: *Annual Report of the British School at Athens* 1984–5, 23–4. Boeotia: Bintliff/Snodgrass 1985, 145–7. S. Argolid: Van Andel/Runnels/Pope 1986, esp. 120. Late Roman economy: Whittaker 1986, esp. 7–12.
- 6 Proconsuls: Groag 1946, 22. Optatianus: SEG xi.810; Groag 1946, 25–6. Ampelius: SEG xi.464, 465?, 851; Himer. *Ecl.* xiii, ch. 8; Groag 1946, 42–4; Robert 1948. Anatolius: SEG xi.773; Groag 1946, 57–8. Zosim. v.6.
- 7 *Lib.or.i.23*. Amyclaeum: IG v. 1.455 with Robert 1948, 27–8 n.6. Friends of Libanius: full references in Seeck 1906, 92, 132, 221–2. Tetrarchic notable: SEG xi.849 with Spawforth 1984, 280 n.14. Stephanus: SEG xi.810; cf.IG v. 1.596. Panthales: SEG xi.464.4: the three letters before the name perhaps can be read as an abbreviation of the *nomen* Pomponius: [*P(omp)*]ōn(*ios*) *velsim*.
- 8 Letter: Athanassiadi-Fowden 1981, 86. Sozomenus: Jones/Martindale/Morris 1971, s.v.. *Lib. Ep.* 1210 (Foerster). Note Tigerstedt 1965–78 ii, 268, 545–6 n.1245, rightly cautious of a modern notion that Julian actually visited Sparta.
- 9 Ausonius: *Lib. Ep.* 1518 (Foerster); Tigerstedt 1965–78 ii, 547–8 n.1264. For the statues in question see Thuc.i.134.4; Paus.iii.17.7. Cults: IG v. 1.559.15 with Spawforth 1984, 279–80, 282 (Athena); 602.9 with Spawforth 1985, 238 (Aphrodite); chapter 14 (Dioscuri). Attacks on pagan cults: Fowden 1978, esp. 58–61; Gregory 1986, 238.
- 10 Attack on Sparta: Claudian. *In Rufinum* ii.189; *de IV cos. Hon.* 471; *de bello Poll.* 192, 630; Zosim. v.6 (transl. Buchanan and Davis). Roman stage: Dickins 1905–6a, 397–8. Chrimes 1949, 83.

Chapter 10

The Roman city and its territory

- 1 Bölte 1929, cols. 1350–73 with earlier references; recent treatment in Greek (based on the text of Pausanias): Papachatzis 1974–80 ii, 329–405. For the Roman city Kahrstedt 1954, 192–8 remains important; note too Piper 1986, ch. 10 with the reservations of Spawforth 1987. On Pausanias see now Habicht 1985.
- 2 Persian Stoa: Paus.iii.11.3; Vitri.i.6; Plommer 1979, 100–101. Greek agoras as cultural centres: Shear 1981, esp.359–62 (Athens); Felten 1983. Imperial shrines: Paus.iii.2.4 with Hänlein-Schäfer 1985, 164, 263. *Kaisareia/Sebasteia*: Hänlein-Schäfer 1985, 10–11; nearby examples: SEG xiii.258 (Gytheum); xxiii.206.39 (Messene). Site of agora: Dickins 1905–6b, 432–4.
- 3 Bölte 1929, cols. 1365–6. Hellenistic theatre: Woodward 1925–6, 192–3; 1928–30, 152–6, 240. Thoroughfare: Dickins 1905–6a, 398; 1905–6b, 434.
- 4 Bulle 1937, 5–49; Buckler 1986, 431–6. Augustan and later stage-arrangements: Woodward 1925–6, 187–8 (rubbish-pits), 204–9; 1928–30, 156–60, 198–206. Inscribed epistyle-blocks: IG v.1.691 (SEG xi.848); SEG xi.849 with Spawforth 1984, 280; SEG xi.850, 852=SEG xxxii.400.

- 5 Pers. comm. Susan Walker; cf. Palagia forthcoming.
- 6 Provincial Greek gymnasia incorporating therms: Delorme 1960, 243–50; Farrington in Macready/Thompson 1987; elsewhere in Achaia note Aupert 1985, 156 (Argos). For an earlier suggestion that the Heracles-herms came from a gymnasium see Wace in Tod/Wace 1906, 129.
- 7 This evidence was rejected on unconvincing grounds by Delorme 1960, 73.
- 8 Theophrastus: SEG xi.492 with Woodward 1925–6, 227–34. *Thermai*: Ginouvès 1962, 220 with n.5. Greek granaries: see, most recently, Grace 1985, especially 26–30.
- 9 *Macellum*: de Ruyt 1983, esp.230–35 and 263–4. Laconizing explanations of Roman customs: cf. Varro himself *ap. Servium in Aen.* vii.176; Tigerstedt 1965–78, ii. ch. vi.
- 10 Spartan bridge: App.I, 5. For examples of these openings in bridges at Rome see Nash 1961–2 ii, s.v. ‘Pons Aemilius’ (from 179 BC), ‘Pons Milvius’, ‘Pons Fabricius’ (62 BC); Blake 1973, 55 (Pons Aelius).
- 11 For the possible identification of a vast Serapeum at Roman Argos see Aupert 1985.
- 12 Bosanquet 1905–6, 282–3.
- 13 Statuary: Wace in Tod/Wace 1906, 128, 130; the group briefly discussed by Spawforth 1985, 231–2, was probably of this type. The sarcophagi from Roman Sparta are largely unpublished: see, briefly, Wace in Tod/Wace 1906, 130; Koch/Sichtermann 1982, 361–2 with the distribution map at 462–3 and, for a local copy apparently using imported Proconnesian marble, Coleman/Walker 1979.
- 14 Bosanquet 1905–6, 282. Population: Kayser/Thompson 1964, 206 with Cartledge 1979, 23. Intra-mural space: Polyb.ix.26a.2 with Walbank 1957–79 ii.156. Pompeii: Duncan-Jones 1982, 276 with n.7 (citing H. Bloch’s population-estimate). Classical settlement: Osborne 1987, 121–3. ‘Virgin’ soil: Kahrstedt 1954, 194. Little is known of the extent and uses of open land within Greek walled cities; for the well-documented *rus in urbe* at Pompeii see Greene 1986, 94–7.
- 15 Athens: Shear 1981; Spawforth/Walker 1985, 92–100. Corinth: Wiseman 1979. Classical Sparta: note the remarks on the Persian Stoa of Plommer 1979. Hellenistic theatre: above, n.3.
- 16 Aqueducts and therms: J.Coulton in Macready/Thompson 1987. For private use of Roman civic aqueducts see Jones 1940, 214–5.
- 17 Corinth: Paus.viii.22.3 with Biers 1978. Athens: ILS 337 with Travlos 1971, 242–3. Argos: Spawforth/Walker 1986, 102 with refs. Thebes: Zahrnt 1979 ii, 104. Entry of aqueducts into Athens and Argos: S.Walker in Macready/Thompson 1987.
- 18 Scenery-store: Woodward 1926–7, 7; 1928–30, 226–31. For the use of brickwork at Augustan Athens (‘South-west Baths’) see Shear 1969, 398–9. *Peila*: IG v.1.233 with Spawforth 1985, 203–4; for fresh-water *peilai* at Hadrianic Antioch see Malalas, *Chronographia* 278.1 (ref. kindly provided by C.Le Roy). Delorme 1960, ch. 8. Garden-sculpture: Wace in Tod/Wace 1906, 130 (including pieces intended for fountains). For the appearance of Roman building-techniques in parts of Asia Minor by the mid-first century BC see M. Waelkens in Macready/Thompson 1987.
- 19 Roman Sparta’s frontiers: Bölte 1929, cols. 1303–28 *passim*; Chrimes 1949, 56–72; Kahrstedt 1950a, 227–42 (western frontier); Toynbee 1969, 405–13; Cartledge

- 1979, 5–7 (Classical Sparta). Polybius xvi.17 with Chrimes 1949, 67; see Walbank 1972, 17–19 for the different dates of composition of the *Histories*. Boundary-inscription: IG v. 1.1431.4–6; see further below. Date of transfer: Chrimes 1949, 67 (right but for the wrong reason); Bölte 1929, col.1309 (favouring Augustus).
- 20 Eastern frontier: Chrimes 1949, 70–71 with end-map. Croceae: Paus.iii.21.4. Priesthoods: IG v.1.497; 602; for the families in question see Spawforth 1985, 229–44. Helos, site and history: ABSA 15, 1908–9, 19–21; Bölte RE 18.1, 1912, 200–202; Hope Simpson/Waterhouse 1960, 100–103; Toynbee 1969, 191; Baladié 1980, 57–8. Pleiae: ABSA 15, 1908–9, 162–3; Bölte RE 18.2, 1942, cols.2444–5 (denying equation with Palaea) and 21.1, 1951, cols.189–91. Kahrstedt 1954, 212. Eleusinium: Paus.iii.20.7 with Spawforth 1985, 230, 235.
- 21 Tacitus, *Ann.* iv.43; Th. Mommsen *ap. R.* Neubauer, *Arch. Zeit.* 34, 1876, 138 n. 16; Accame 1946, 33; Baladié 1980, 311 n. 59 (preferring 43 BC without explanation); *contra*: Kolbe 1904, 376–7; Ehrenberg 1929, col.1446; Kahrstedt 1950a, 232 with n.2. Productivity: Alcman frg. 92d. Olympia: *IvO* no. 259 (Meiggs/Lewis 1969, no.74). Messenian text: IG v. 1.1431 with Kolbe 1904, 378. Pherae: IG v. 1.1361 with Kolbe *ad loc.* Toynbee 1969, 412.
- 22 Pherae: Paus. iv.31.1 with Kolbe 1904, 376–7. Foundation-legend: IG v. 1.1381; *British Museum Catalogue of Greek Coins* 10, 1887, 119–20; Kahrstedt 1950a, 235, rightly seeing, contrary to Bölte, RE 6A.1, 1936, col.637, that this kinship-claim is not evidence for Spartan control.
- 23 Artificial harbour: Strab.viii.5.2, 363; Baladié 1980, 236 with n.7; cf.242. Cardamyle: Kahrstedt 1954, 219; Bölte 1929, col.1340 with refs. (pass). Prusa: Dio *or.* xl.30 with Jones 1978a, 2. Sparta-Gytheum route: Bölte 1929, cols. 1342–3, 1346; Pritchett 1980, ch. 6 esp. 238–9 (*Peutinger Table*). Aromation: IG v. 1. 1208=SEG xiii.258 lines 25–38. Euryclids: ch. 7 and IG v. 1.1172 (Eurycles Herculanus). Voluseni: inscription in the Gytheion museum discussed by C. Le Roy in an unpublished paper (London 1986). Xenarchidas: IG v.1.39; 505; 1174.
- 24 Eurotas furrow: Cartledge 1979, ch. 2, especially 18–19. Kahrstedt 1954, 198–203. Laconia Survey: Cavanagh/Crouwel (forthcoming). Note too the important work of Hope Simpson/Waterhouse 1960.
- 25 Depopulation: Larsen 1938, 465–8; Baladié 1980, ch. 12, especially 301–11; Davies 1984, 268–9 (on Polyb.xxxvi.17.5–7). Strab.viii.4.11, 363 with Cartledge 1979, 322. Pharis and Bryseae: Paus.iii.20.3 with Hom.*Il.*ii.582–3; Hope Simpson/Lazenby 1970, 75, 77. Pellana: Paus.iii.21.2 with Bölte, RE 19.1, 1937, col.352. Other settlements: Paus.iii.21.5; 21.4; 19.6; 20.2; 19.9; 10.6; 10.7; 24.8; Baladié 1980, 58 (*khōrion*). Survey: Cavanagh/Crouwel (forthcoming).
- 26 Villa-definition: Greene 1986, 88–9. Kahrstedt 1954, 200. Psychiko: *Ergon* 1962 (1963), 137–44. Ktirakia: *Ergon* 1963 (1964), 102–15; sarcophagus-type: Koch/Sichtermann 1982, 446–50; Bosanquet 1905–6, 283.

Chapter 11

Local government I: machinery and functions

- 1 Chrimes 1949, ch. 4. Cic. *Pro Flacco* 63; Cicero's views on Sparta: Tigerstedt 1965–78 ii, 144–60. Roman admiration: Strab. ix.2.39, 414; cf. viii.5.5, 365; Dion. Hal.ii. 23.1–3, 61; Plut. *Num.*i.3. Roman laconism in general: Rawson 1969, 99–106;

- Tigerstedt 1965–78 ii, 95–160; Baladié 1980, 290–95. *Rhētrai*: cf. IG v.1.20a.2–3. Linguistic archaism: see Bradford 1980, 418 (on *phs(āphismati)b(oulās)*).
- 2 For a detailed study of Roman Sparta's political institutions see now Kennell 1985. Inscriptions: the great majority are collected in IG v.1 and SEG xi.455ff. (conveniently gathering together the new finds from the British School excavations of 1924–8 and the emendations to IG v.1 of Woodward 1948). Since the war little new relevant material has been published, although note Souris 1981 (SEG xxxi.340) and Spawforth 1985, 239–43. A *corpus* of the unpublished inscriptions in the Sparta Museum is being prepared by G. Steinhauer. Coins: Grunauer-von Hoerschelmann 1978, especially 35–62.
 - 3 For the Spartan *sunarkhiai/sunarkhia* see Kennell 1985, ch. 4, with which this chapter is in broad agreement. Davies 1984, 306 with refs. *Sunarkhiai* and the Achaean League: Touloumakos 1967, 12–18; cf. 102. Oligarchic overtones: Jones 1940, 164–66; cf. 178. Preambles: IG v.1.11.5; 18a.1; IG iv².86=Peek 1969, 29–31, line 1 (decree of consolation). Pherae text: IG v. 1.1370, which Touloumakos 1967, 105, in spite of its findspot, actually took to be Spartan; for an improved restoration of [*Dogm*]a see Kennell 1985, 119. Colony: Corn. Nep. *Conon* 1 with Kahrstedt 1950a, 237 n.20 (correctly).
 - 4 Other references to *sunarkhia*: IG v. 1.19.18; SEG xiii.256. Its president: IG v. 1.37.2–3; SEG xi.492.17; 495.1–2. Dropping of *sunarkhiai*: Touloumakos 1967, 16–18. Different views of *sunarkhia*: Chrimes 1949, 148–9; Bradford 1980.
 - 5 Bradford 1980, 418. Joint listing: e.g. IG v.1.50–72 *passim*; SEG xi.523; 533b. Leonidea decree: IG v.1.20b.: cf. SEG xi.565 (duplicate). Provincial Greek *boulai*: Jones 1940, 176ff.; Bowman 1971 (Roman Egypt). Spartan *boulē* in acclamatory titles: IG v.1.589.13–14 and 608.8–9 with Spawforth 1985, 232–5; 541.19–20; 542.12–13 with Spawforth 1984, 70–72 (date) and Veyne 1985 (*prokritos*); *bouleutai*: IG v.1.504.5–7 (see ch. 13); 530.4 with Spawforth 1984, 265–6; Moretti 1953 no. 18, 11.6–7. Bradford 1980, 419. Secretary of the council: earliest: IG v.1.92.11–12 (Augustan); latest: 479 with Spawforth 1986, 329–30 (Severan); cf. 97.25 with SEG xi.546b; 112.11; SEG xi.558.13–14; 563.4; 564.25; 569.24–5; 578.3–4; 585.13–14; xxxi.340. Hadrianic text: IG v.1.60 with Kennell 1985, 134. Dedication: IG v.1.62. Athens: see the references at Wycherley 1957, 128–37. *Spondophoroi*: IG v.1.53; 89 (SEG xi.556); 110 (SEG xi.587); 112 (called *spondopoi*); SEG xi.550.
 - 6 *Probouleusis* of old *gerousia*: Cartledge 1987, 123–5. Ephors: Chrimes 1949, 155; Touloumakos 1967, 102 with references; Michell 1952, 126–7; Cartledge 1987, 128. *Nomophulakes*: Grunauer-von Hoerschelmann 1978, 42, 54; Christophilopoulou 1968 (generally); Chrimes 1949, 138 citing SEG ix.1 line 32; Harding 1985, no.126 (translation). *Nomophulakia* of old *gerousia*: Cartledge 1987, 123. *Grammatophulax*: e.g. IG v.1.65.18; 59 (SEG xi.521) 13; 71 *passim*; 86.29.
 - 7 Personification: cf. App. I, 39; for the appearance of such statues note Erim 1986, 84–5 (Aphrodisian *Dēmos* in the guise of a young man). *IvO* no.316; note too Peppas-Delmouzou 1980, 434–9 (statue of the Spartan *Dēmos* dedicated on their Acropolis by the Athenians under Augustus). At Roman Athens by contrast dedications by the *dēmos* are somewhat more common: Geagan 1967, 82–3. *Scias*: Paus.iii.12.10 with Shatzman 1968, 388–9. Provincial Greek city-assemblies: Jones 1940, ch. xi; de Ste. Croix 1981, 300–326 and App. IV esp. 523–9. Leonidea: IG v. 1.18b.7. Twenty-three *gerontes*: IG v.1.93–4; 97 (SEG xi.564b); SEG xi.564; 585; for a new reading of IG v. 1.16.9, invalidating Wilhelm's restoration 'of the

- twenty-eight *gerontes*', see Kennell 1985, 127–8. Ephors and *nomophulakes*: e.g. SEG xi.510–56 *passim*. Size of *boulai*: Jones 1940, 176; Bowman 1971, 22.
- 8 Iterated terms as *gerōn*: e.g. IG v.1.254 (Augustan); 97 (SEG xi.564b) with SEG xi.564a; SEG xi.490.7; 495.3; 569.1 and 4.
 - 9 Philostr. VA iv.33; Groag 1939, cols.37–8. Possible proconsular letters: IG v.1.16; 21, SEG xi.466. Remoteness: Burton 1975, esp.105; Hopkins 1980, 120–21. Free status: Strab. viii.5.5, 365; Plin. NH iv.16. Privileges of free cities: Jones 1940, 117–120. Absence of a formal treaty: note Gruen 1984, 20–21, denying (controversially) that the *vetustissimum foedus* between Rome and Sparta of Liv.xxxiv.31.5 is evidence of a permanent alliance. Provincial 'plans': bibliography cited by Habicht 1975b, 69 n.22, to which add Reynolds 1982, 114–5. M. Aurelius and Sparta: Oliver 1970a, 8, lines 86–7; cf. Reynolds 1982, no.16 (similar display of formal scruple by Commodus towards Aphrodisias). Cicero *ad fam.*xiii.28a (ch. 7); Plin.Ep.vii.24. Embassies: IG v.1.36b.28–9; 37.5–7 (successful) (SEG xi.481); 485; 508; 545 (successful); 572; SEG xi.492.14; 493.15; 501.2–4 with the reading of Groag 1939, col.71 n.291 to be preferred. 'Petition and response': Millar 1977, especially 410–47.
 - 10 *Correctores*: von Premerstein 1901; Groag 1939, cols. 125–36 and 162–3; Oliver 1973; 1976. Frequency in the third century: see SIG3.877a.6–8. Maximus: IG v.1.380.9; Groag 1939, cols.125–8. Iuncus: Follet 1976, 32–4 citing an unpublished inscription from Delphi; Benjamin 1963, 76. Proculus: IG v.1. 541.21–2 with Spawforth 1984, 270–73. Paulinus: IG v.1.539 with Wilhelm 1913; see Spawforth 1984, 274–7. Letter: Woodward 1927–8, 53–4 no.80.
 - 11 Free cities and *munera*: Bernhardt 1980. Messene: IG v. 1.1432–3 with Giovannini 1978, 115–22 (date). Import-tax: IG v.1.18b.12; cf. Jones 1940, 245. Financial officials: SEG xi.778 (cf. Groag 1939, cols. 143–4); ILS 6953–4; IG v.1. 501 and 546. Decree: IG v.1.11; Touloumakos 1967, 105.
 - 12 Free cities and *viae publicae*: Pekary 1968, 155–9. Laconia and the *Peut. Table*: Pritchett 1980, 252–61; Pikoulas 1984. IG v. 1.1109; 497 with Spawforth 1985, 231–2.
 - 13 Early Sparta as an exporter of grain: Plut.Mor.64b with Cadoux 1938, 80. Early shortages: Theopompus FG^{GrH} 178 F115; ch. 2. Dietary change: Rathbone 1983, 46–7; cf. Cartledge 1979, 170–71. *Sitōniai* generally: Jones 1940, 217–8. At Sparta: IG v.1.44=SEG xi.486.4; 526; 551; SEG xi.490.1; 491.1–2, 6–8 with Woodward 1923–5, 180; 492.7–8. Hadrianic shortages and Egyptian grain: Wörrle 1971, 336; Halfmann 1986, 138–9; Garnsey and Saller 1987, 94; Garnsey 1988, 256. A reference to a 'supervisor of the grain-buying fund' conceivably can be restored in an early Antonine text: IG v. 1.495.3.4: *epimelētēn [tōn sitōnikō]n chrēmātōn*, instead of the [*thematikō]n* of Le Bas. Public honours: IG v. 1.526 and 551; for the significance of *aiōnios* in the former, misunderstood by Garnsey 1988, 15, see below. Theophrastus: SEG xi.492; Woodward 1925–6, 230–1; Rostovtzeff 1957 ii, 652. *Paraphrasis*: Triantaphyllopoulos 1971.
 - 14 Free cities and jurisdiction: Jones 1940, 119, 131; cf. Reynolds 1982, 136–9 no.22 (survival of Aphrodisian courts into the third century). Thuriate text: SEG xi.974; Bölte, *RE* viA1, 1936, col.637; Kahrstedt 1950a, 236. For the correct reading *kai huper authen[tōn]* see L. Robert *apud* Valmin 1929, 18 n.1; Valmin himself (21 n.2) admitted that this reading would be 'plus géniale et plus habile' than his preferred *huperauthen[tōn]* (followed without comment by the editors of SEG xi), a term

- 'compose loud et peu connu'—and here, one might add, making no clear sense. His objection that it would have been unseemly in an honorific decree to recall the existence of murderers at Sparta and the efforts of Damocharis on their behalf is hard to follow; these efforts are cited precisely so as to emphasize the extent of the honorand's *eunoia* towards the Thuriates. Free cities and capital jurisdiction: Colin 1965; Millar 1981, 70–71 (more cautiously). Jurisdiction of Classical *gerousia* and ephors: Cartledge 1987, 123 and 128–9. Provincial Greek magistrates as judges: Jones 1940, 123; de Ste Croix 1981, 315–7. Foreign judges: *Klio* 15, 1918, 33–4 no. 54; 18, 1923, 284–5 no.37; Daux 1936, 475–6 and 479 (Delphi); *SEG* xi. 461 (?); 468; 469; 473; *IG* v.1.14=*SEG* xi.472. *Dikastagōgoi*: Spawforth/Walker 1986, 94–5; see ch. 8.
- 15 Free city (Alabanda) as an assize-centre: *Plin.NH.109* with Habicht 1975b, 68–70. Privilege: Dio Chrys. *or.xxxv.15*. Assize-system in Greece: Burton 1975, 97. Jurors: Veyne 1985 citing *IG* v.1.467 (T. Flavius Charixenus) and (with improved readings) 541–2 (P. Memmius Pratolaus *qui et* Aristocles). Appeals: *IG* v.1.21 with Oliver 1970b and 1979, whose attribution of the letter to Hadrian was doubted by Millar 1977, 453 n.45. Brasidas: Spawforth 1985, 228–30 with Gardner 1987. *Plin. Ep.x.65* with Groag 1939, col.42; SherwinWhite 1966, 650–53. *Sundikoi*: *IG* v.1.36 (*SEG* xi.480); 37 (*SEG* xi.481); 45; 47; 65.20–24; 554; *SEG* xi.501. Athenian *sundikoi* and proconsular jurisdiction: *IG* ii².1100 (*SEG* xv.108) lines 55–7.
 - 16 Civic finance generally: Jones 1940, ch. 17; Migeotte 1984. *Poleitikoi prosodoi*: *SEG* xi.464. *IG* v.1.18b.12 (indirect taxes), 3 (fines); 14–15 with 18a.6 (bank); cf. Bogaert 1968, 99–100, 401–2. Coinage: cf. Howgego 1985, ch. 5. Land: *IG* v.1.21 col.i.
 - 17 Euergetism generally: Veyne 1976; de Ste. Croix 1981, 305–10; Gauthier 1985. Pratolaus: *IG* v. 1.496.
 - 18 Decree: *IG* v. 1.11.8–9. Coins: Grunauer-von Hoerschelmann, 1978, 52–5. *Stēlai*: e.g. *IG* v.1.48; 51; 55; 94; 97. Columns: *SEG* xi.503 with Woodward 1923–5, 225 and 1927, 236; *SEG* xi.499 with Woodward 1927–8, 239. *Anta*-block: *SEG* xi.620 with Woodward 1929, 29–30 no.52. Theatre: Woodward 1923–5, 158–205; 1925–6, 210–236; 1927–8, 2–20. Abbreviation: *SEG* xi.564 and 578 with Bradford 1980, 418. Other architectural blocks: App.I, 11. Chrimes 1949, 150. Beard 1985, esp. 129–40. *Honoraria* and entrance-fees: Jones 1940, 247; Garnsey 1974, 239–40.
 - 19 *Digest* 27.1.6. Agoranomate: *IG* v.1.32.5–6; 40; 1124–7; 128 (*SEG* xi.597); 129; 130 (Spawforth 1984, 267–8); 131–2; 149 (*SEG* xi.600); 150 (*SEG* xi.601); 151 (*SEG* xi.598); 155 (*SEG* xi.599); 473; 482; 497. Kolbe, *IG* v.1, p.48; Chrimes 1949, 138; Jones 1940, 216–7. Panthales: *IG* v. 1.547; cf. Spawforth 1984, 272–3 (date); 1985, 239–43 (family).
 - 20 Law: *IG* v.1.20a.5–6; cf. the late Hellenistic gymnasiarchy law from Beroea: Austin 1981, no.118 (translation). *Epimelētēs*: *IG* v.1.133–5. Dedications for gymnasiarchs: *IG* v.1.480 (Flavian: the earliest); 481; 486–7; 492; 494; 505–6; 528–9; 531; 535; 537; 539; 555b; 557; 560–61; *SEG* xi.803. Theophrastus: *SEG* xi.492. 9–12 with Woodward 1925–6, 231–2. Gymnasiarchy generally: Jones 1940, ch. 10.
 - 21 *IG* v.1.541.2–3 (hipparch; for the office see ch. 14); 526 (*sitōnēs*); 305; 504; 544; 547; 549; 553–4; 628; *SEG* xi.799; 802 (*agoranomos*); *IG* v.1.468; 528–9; 535; 547; 552; *SEG* xi.799 (gymnasiarch). *Aiōnios*: Jones 1940, 175.
 - 22 Honorific titles and epithets: e.g. *IG* v. 1.170.10–11; 464.6–7; 469.3–4; 480.3; 551. 14–15; 564.9. 'Incomparable': *IG* v.1.529; *SEG* xi.806a. *Philotimia*: *IG* v. 1.531;

- Panagopoulos 1977, 207–9; Whitehead 1986, 246–52. ‘Contest for best citizen’: IG v.1.65, SEG xi.780 (Imperial high-priest); 168+603=Spawforth 1984, 286 lines 15 and 18; 485; 498; 500 (Imperial high-priest); 523; 541–2; 590, SEG xi.800 (Imperial high-priests); 849 (Spawforth 1984, 280). ‘Perpetual’ *aristopoliteutai*: IG v. 1.504 (Imperial high-priest and ‘perpetual’ *agoranomos*); 528 (also ‘perpetual’ gymnasiarch); 537. Wilhelm in Wilhelm/Heberdey 1896, 154. Cf. Schwertfeger 1981 with Puech 1983, 31 with n.64 (Roman Messene).
23. Athens: Geagan 1979, 409–10 with refs. Supernumerary councillors: cf. Bowman 1971, 22–3. Reluctance/compulsion: Jones 1940, ch. 11; Garnsey 1974, esp.230–41; Mitchell 1984.

Chapter 12

Local government II: the social and economic base

- 1 Letter to the Athenians: Oliver 1970a, 7, lines 64–6 with pp.20–3. *Honestiores*: Jones 1940, 179–80; Garnsey 1970, especially chs. 9–12. Bench: IG v. 1.254; Dawkins and Woodward in Dawkins 1929, 36 and 355 no.141 respectively; cf. App.I, 38. *Stēlē*: Woodward 1928–30, 221 n.12 (SEG xi.855). Theatre-seating generally: Rawson 1987; D. Small in Macready/Thompson 1987 (unsatisfactory).
- 2 IG iv².86=Peek 1969 no.36 11.8–9. *Prōtoi/primores viri*: Oliver 1953, 953ff.; Garnsey 1974, 232–5. Senators: Halfmann 1979, nos.29 (Eurycles Herculanus), 111 (Brasidas; see now Spawforth 1985, 226–30). *Equites* (both third century): IG v. 1.596; Spawforth 1984, 275 (Spartan with the equestrian predicate *hokratistos*). Theophrastus: cf. Woodward 1925–6, 230–31; for the calculation see Gossage 1951, 238, basing himself on the assumption of one *medimnos* per head for a population of 5000. Arion: SEG xi. 501.5–6; L. Robert, *RPh* 1934, 282–3.
- 3 IG v.1.465; 584+604=SEG xi.812a (with Kourinou-Pikoula 1986, 68–9). IG iv². 86=Peek 1969, no.36 11. 3–9 with Spawforth 1985, 199–200, 216–19, 251–2. Pedigrees: IG v.1. 36.1–3 (‘senior Heraclid’); 469 (Tib. C1. Aristocrates); 471; 477; 488; 495.3; 528.8; 529.4–5 and 530.9–10 (M. A. Aristocrates); 537. 6–7 (P. M. Deximachus); 559.5–6; 562; 615.4 (‘kings’); 971 and 1172 (Herculanus); SEG xi. 847 (Spawforth 1985, 198–201); 849 (Spawforth 1984, 280) (Constantinian high-priest); IG iv². 86=Peek 1969, no. 36 1.8 (Lysander); Plut. Ages.35.1–2. Dioscuri: Carlier 1977, 76 n.42. *Eugeneia* as a ‘moral quality’: Panagopoulos 1977, 203–5.
- 4 Viritane grants: Sherwin-White 1973, ch. 13; Millar 1977, 479–83. ‘Brokerage’: Saller 1982, especially ch. 5. Spartan *cives*: Box 1931, 1932. Memmii and Aelii: Spawforth 1985, 198, 246–8. *Gerontes*: IG v.1.97 and SEG xi. 564; 585; although it is true that *tria nomina* are not consistently recorded in catalogues of magistrates (cf. IG v.1.20b.5; Woodward 1923–5, 168 I, C 7, line 7 [C. Iulius Menander]), for what it is worth, neither of the lists in question includes an apparently peregrine Spartan whose Roman citizenship is attested elsewhere.
- 5 Woodward 1928–30, 222–5. References to pedigrees: n.3. Classical genealogies: Snodgrass 1971, 11–12.
- 6 Hereditary priesthoods: IG v.1.259; 305; 497; 602; 607; SEG xi.679. Phoebaeum priesthood: Chrimes 1949, 471–4 *passim*; Spawforth 1985, 195–6, 203–4, 208. ‘Iamid’ *manteis*: Paus.iii.11. 5–8 and 12.8; IG v.1.141.5; 210.42–3; 212.53–4; 599; other lineage (‘Scopelids’): 60.1; 209.13; 259 with Woodward in Dawkins 1929,

- 299 no. 6; 488. Classical Sparta: Rahe 1980, 386. Athens: Clinton 1974 (Eleusinian priesthoods); Garland 1984. For the portrayal in a dynamic light of Greek civic religion in the first three centuries AD see Lane Fox 1986a, chs. 3–5.
- 7 Architects: IG v.1.5.17; 209.17; 168+603=Spawforth 1984, 285–8 1. 16. Gladiator: Robert 1940b, 79 no.12. Free and servile artisans: above all IG v.1.208. 3–9; 210.18–19. 22–34; 210.55–62; 211.51–4; 212.46.57–66. Spawforth 1985, 195–6 (family of Tyndares and Eurybanassa); 213–5, 228–31 ('Ageta'); IG v.2.542 with PIR² I 687 ('Pantimia' as a Euryclid name). Civic slaves: e.g. IG v.1.48.18–19; 112. 16; 141.7; 149=SEG xi.600.13–15; 151=SEG xi.503.26–7. Thenae: IG v.1.153.31–4 with Spawforth 1977. Ctesiphon: IG v.1.211.54; Nicocles: IG v. 1.116.16–18.
- 8 Strab.viii.5.4, 365; cf. 5.5. Gitti 1939; Shimron 1966a. Bithynia and Egypt: Jones 1940, 172–3.
- 9 Magistrates: IG v.1.129; 148 and SEG xi.537b; 585.6; cf. IG v.1.151=SEG xi.598.8 (Lycus). Rome: Solin 1982, s.v.. 'Aristocratic' names: Bradford 1977, s.vv.. Aphrodisius: Woodward 1923–5, 222–4 (SEG xi.683); cf. too KourinouPikoula 1986, 66–7 no.2. Eurycles: IG v. 1.287–8; Woodward in Dawkins 1929, 320; Chrimes 1949, 201–2; Bradford 1977, s.v.. Death of Herclulanus: Spawforth 1978, 254–5. Athens: Baslez forthcoming.
- 10 *Sunephēboi*: Woodward in Dawkins 1929, 291; Chrimes 1949, 95–117 (better), 459–60 (catalogue). Athens: Oliver 1971. Corinthas: IG v.1.45.7; identification of 'Herodes son of Attikos': Ameling 1983 ii, no.70, superseding Spawforth 1980, 208–10; Oliver 1970a, 54 (Panhellenes). Callicrates: IG v.1.259 with Woodward in Dawkins 1929, 299 no.6. Social status of *boagoi*: note the cautionary observations of Woodward 1950, 619.
- 11 *Kasen-status*: Hesychius s.v. '*kasioi*'; earliest and latest refs. respectively: IG v.1.256; Woodward in Dawkins 1929, 297–8 no.2, 330 no. 63 (SEG xi.740), dated by the patronimate of Aelius Alcandridas (Spawforth 1984, 279, 284). General discussions: Woodward in Dawkins 1929, 290–92; Chrimes 1949, 95–117, 442–60 (lists). Athens: Baslez forthcoming. 'Good' names: Woodward in Dawkins 1929, 297–8 no.2, 311–2 no. 29, 315–6 no.35 (IG v.1.256, 278, 298); cf. Woodward 1950, 619. Antistii: Woodward in Dawkins 1929, 310–11 no.27, 314–5 no.33 (IG v.1.278, 281); SEG xi.559.4; Chrimes 1949, 113–4 (speculative on origins of *nomen*), 456. Sosicrates: IG v.1.65, 19–20 (ch. 14 on *diabetes*). *Inferiores*: Garnsey 1974, 232–6.
- 12 Kahrstedt 1954, 192. Coins: Grunauer-von Hoerschelmann 1978, 107–9. Sarcophagi: Koch/Sichtermann 1982, 462–3; Wace in Tod/Wace 1906, 130. Senators: Halfmann 1979, 68.
- 13 Kahrstedt 1954, 197. *Marmor lacedaemonium*: Strabo viii.5.7, 367; Cartledge 1979, 66–7; cf. Baladié 1980, 197–210, rightly stressing that Strabo's 'in Taygetus' must refer to these quarries (Chrimes 1949, 74 *contra*); Kahrstedt's suggestion, *ibid.* n.3, that they were once owned by the family of Eurycles, is unsupported by any evidence. Inscription: CIL iii.493 with Le Roy 1961, 206–15. Emperors and quarries: Millar 1977, 181–5.
- 14 Kahrstedt 1954, 197. Middle Ages: Bon 1951, 123–4. Wheat and barley: IG v.1. 363.10.15; 364.9–10.14–15. Horses: note Paus.iii.20.4; cf. Baladié 1980, 192–3. Olives: Sid. Ap. *Carm.* v.44. Garnsey 1988, 72–3 (grain-exchange among neighbours). Survey: Cavanagh/Crouwel forthcoming.

- 15 Wild beasts: Paus. iii.20.5; Claudian, *De Cons. Stilich.* iii.259, 300; Chrimes 1949, 79–80 (speculative); O'Flynn 1983, 33–4 (Stilicho in Peloponnes). Wood: Paus.iii.10.6; Suet.*Tib.*6. Marble: Wace in Tod/Wace 1906, 102; Bölte 1929, col. 1347; Chrimes 1949, 72–3. Limestone: Cavanagh/Crowel forthcoming. Ancient clay-beds: ABSA 13, 1906–7, plate I, 19L. Sculpture: Wace in Tod/Wace 1906, 128–30 (The great majority of the sculpture in the Museum belongs so far as its actual date of execution is concerned to the imperial period'); Woodward 1926–7, 22–36. Quarrying in general: Osborne 1987, 81–92 (Classical period). Stamps: IG v. 1.850–91; SEG xi.873–85; Kahrstedt 1954, 195. Eurycles: SEG xi.883a; for the association of tile-kilns with villa-estates: Greene 1986, 10. Rome: Shatzman 1975, 305 no.93; Callicrates: Bradford 1977, s.v.
- 16 Economic functions of Roman towns: Hopkins 1978b; Millar 1981, 72–3 (town-country exchange). Leonidea: IG v.1.18b. 11–12 (cf. ch. 14); cf. Dunand 1978, 206. Local imitations of clay lamps (third century): Broneer 1977, 66 n.54. 'Laconian' as trade-mark: Chrimes 1949, 77–8; Kahrstedt 1954, 197 n.1; Bruneau 1976, 27–36; the 'Laconian' horses of CIL vi.33937 should probably be understood in this way. 'Souvenir-trade' at Corinth: Bruneau 1977, 262–5; cf. App.I, 62.
- 17 Slaves: n.7. Marble: Traquair 1905–6, 423; Coleman/Walker 1979. Cyrene: cf. Tod 1948, no. 196. Puteoli: Frederiksen 1980–81. Sicily and Africa: Garnsey 1988, 231–2.
- 18 Trade-surge: Hopkins 1980. IG v. 1.741 (Zeuxis); 728 (Troilus). Forgery: Spawforth 1976 (apropos of IG v.1.515). Phil. VA. iv.32 with Ehrenberg 1929, cols. 1451–2; Chrimes 1949, 79, 161; Kahrstedt 1954, 198; Tigerstedt 1965–78 ii, 455 n.54. Commercial interests of Greek provincial élites: Pleket 1983; 1984.
- 19 Pancratidas: Spawforth 1984, 265–6, 284 (stemma). Skills: IG v.1.1145, 1523; SEG xi.948.20–21; Forrest 1972. Calamae: IG v.1.1369; Kahrstedt 1950a, 236–7 (Smyrnaean dedication: IG v.1.662); Kolbe at IG v.1.p.258 unaccountably placed Calamae in the territory of Pherae. Menalcidas: SEG xi.782; Jameson 1953, 168–70.
- 20 Decrees: IG v.1.961, 1112, 1145, 1226, SEG xi.974 (cf. chapter 11). Voluseni and Memmii: Spawforth 1985, 193–224. Tisamenis: Spawforth 1980, especially 210–14 (Raepsaet-Charlier 1987, 226–7 no.251, prefers to see her as the aunt of Herodes, without saying why). Spawforth 1978, 258 (Herculanus); 1985, 254–5 (Timocrates).

Chapter 13

High culture and agonistic festivals

- 1 Decorative arts: cf. Dörig 1987, arguing a Spartan origin for the anonymous master-sculptor of the Olympia pediments. Cartledge 1978 (literacy).
- 2 Jacoby, *FGrHist* nos. 586–92, 595 (with commentaries); Boring 1979, ch. 3; Tigerstedt 1965–78 ii, 86–94 ('Sparta in Alexandria').
- 3 Gorgus: *Ind. St. Herc.* (ed. Traversa) col.76; IG ii².1938.55; Ferguson 1911, 369. Demetrius: de Falco 1923; cf. *Pap. Herc.* 1014 (dedication to a Nero) with Rawson 1973, 227. Nicocrates: Senec. *Contr.* vii.5.15; *Suas.* ii.22. Greek intellectuals at Rome: Crawford 1978a; Rawson 1985.

- 4 Herculanius: *Mor.* 539a; Jones 1971b, 41. Philopappus: Spawforth 1978; Kleiner 1983, ch. 1.
- 5 Cleombrotus: Flacelière 1947, 22–6; Ziegler 1951, col.677. Date of *De def.or.*: Ogilvie 1967. *Kasen*: SEG xi.513. Zeuxippus and Tyndares: Ziegler 1951, cols.686–7; Flacelière 1952, 18–19. *Nomophulax*: Bradford 1977, s.v. ‘Zeuxippos (4)’. *Xenia* at Classical Sparta: Cartledge 1987, 243–45. Priest: IG v. 1.305; Chrimes 1949, 450 n.88; Wide 1893, 304–32 (cults). Plutarch’s marriage: Ziegler 1951, col.648. Florus: Jones 1971b, 49; *PIR*² M 531. ‘Academy’: Ziegler 1951, cols.662–5. Zeuxippus and Tyndares can probably be recognized in the *kasen*-patrons of IG v. 1.60,4, and 97 (SEG xi.564b). 14; the former may be the *patronomos* of IG v.1.81.
- 6 Phileratidas: IG v. 1.116.14; the *cognomen* was needlessly emended by Woodward 1948, 238, following Boeckh at *CIG* ii.1253, to ‘Philocratidas’; for the kindred name ‘Phileratis’ see *AP* vi.347. Quintus: SEG xi.807 (following Woodward 1927–8, 33–4 no.56), where his *cognomen* has been bizarrely emended into a filiation and his patronymic read as his *cognomen*. Bradford 1977, s.v. saw Quintus as ‘undoubtedly not a native of Sparta’; for the recurrence of his distinctive Dorian patronymic in the family of the Memmii see Spawforth 1985, 193–7, 202.
- 7 Montanus: IG v. 1.504 with p. 303 *add. et corr.*. Pyrrhus: Spawforth 1984, 279 no. 9. Mandane: *PIR*²C 1092; cf. *Hdt.* i.107; *Diod. Sic.* xi.57. Mithradatids: Reinach 1890, 3–4. Asclepiades: IG v.1.525; Spawforth 1985, 235–8 (Spartiaticus). Metrophanes: IG v. 1.563; Spawforth 1984,286 line 12, 287 (*hierommēmōn*). Genealis: *IGB* iii.1573; Apostolides 1937, 80–81 no.17; Seure 1915, 204–8 no.17. On Greek culture in Roman Thrace see Bowie 1980. *Sōphrosunē*: cf. IG v.1.466.3–4 (youth); 566.4 (ephebe); 1369.6–7 (*sōphrosunē* and *paideia* of a youth); IG iv². 86=Peek 1969, no.36 lines 11–12 (Timocrates). Sophists called Metrophanes: *Suda* s.vv.; on the Lebedean note *PIR*² C 1303; Bowersock 1969, 54–5. Herodes: Ameling 1983 ii, 139.
- 8 Eunap. VS 482–5 (younger Apsines), 505 (Epigonus); *Suda* s.vv. ‘Apsines’, ‘Onasimos’: Jones/Martindale/Morris 1971, s.v. ‘Valerius Apsines’: Follet 1976, 42 (with earlier references).
- 9 Julian, or.ii.[iii] 119b-c. Libanius: *Ep.*1210 (Foerster). Athens: Millar 1969; cf. Athanassiadi-Fowden 1981, 46–51. Oracles and philosophy: Lane Fox 1986a, ch. 5.
- 10 Damiadas: IG v. 1.1174. Others: IG v. 1.730, 623 (on *arkhiatroi* see Nutton 1977); Forrest 1972 (Cytheran text). ‘Nexus’: Bowersock 1969, 66. Agathinus: Galen xix. 353; *IGUR* 1349; Korpela 1987, 186 no.181 and 192 no.216 (distinguishing two homonyms). Alexandrian medicine: Longrigg 1981.
- 11 Games in Achaia: Spawforth forthcoming. Sparta: cf. the remarks of Robert 1966, 104; also Ringwood 1927, 81–6, never very good on Spartan festivals and now outdated.
- 12 Actors: Loukas 1984; athletes: e.g. Moretti 1957, 653, 702; Bradford 1977 s.vv. Alkidas, Amphiareas, Aretippos, Aristokleidas (2), Armonikos (1), Nikodamos and Nikokles (3). Other Achaian festivals for Augustus and his family: e.g. IG v.2. 515. 31 (Megalopolis); iv². 652. 6–9 (Epidaurus); Clement 1974 (Corinth). Moretti 1953, no.60; cf. no.43 (‘Caesarea and Euryclea’); Kolbe at IG v.1. p.xvi, 34–6. Imperial festivals generally: Price 1984, ch. 8.

13. Agesilaus: IG v.1.667.3–4. ‘Uraniads’: IG v.1.659.4–5; 662.3–4. *Agōnothetēs*: IG v.1.32b.8–10. Panegyriarch: IG v.1.36a.6–9. Alcman frg.4 (Bergk). Different categories of ‘sacred’ games: Pleket 1974, 85 no.140.
14. Herodes Atticus: Ameling 1983 ii. no.172 with commentary. Prize-games: Jones 1940, 231–2. Areto: IG v.1.666; Woodward 1948, 255; *IvO* no.382; Moretti 1975, 182–6. Other *agōnothetai*: IG v.1.71 col.iii. 53–5; 550 (‘agonothetic monies’); 168 +603=Spawforth 1984, 285–8 line 19.
15. Olympia Commodea: Spawforth 1986. ‘Iselastic’ status: Jones 1940, 231–2; Robert 1984; Spawforth forthcoming.
16. *Logismos*: Woodward 1923–5, 213–19 (SEG xi.838). The (1.7) contest in encomium, *pace* Woodward, could have honoured Zeus Uranius as easily as the memory of Eurycles: cf. SEG iii.20–21; xxix.452. 10–12; xxxi. 514. 12 (Museum games, Thespieae). Granianus: lines 9–10; Paus.ii.11.8; Moretti 1957, 163 no.848 (‘Cranauus’). Itinerant poets at Greek festivals: Hardie 1983, especially ch. 2.
17. Popularity: Jones 1940, 285–6. Aelii: Spawforth 1984, 272–3; 1985, 246–8. Agonistic titles: IG v.1.114.2; 64.12; 539; SEG xi.499; *add. et corr.* 803a; Robert 1940b, 252 (on *paradoxos*). Tragic actor: SEG xi.838.6. Musclemann: *FD* iii.1 no. 216 with Robert 1928, 422–5. Aristides: *Lib. or.* lxiv (Foerster); Behr 1968, 88. Apolaustus: *Inchriften von Ephesos* vii.nos. 2070–71; Robert 1930, 113–4. Cf. Aylen 1985, 325–6.
18. Domesticus: IG v. 1.669; *IGRR* i.147, 150. Xystarchs: Robert 1966, 100–105; Moretti 1953, no.84; Gasperini 1984.

Chapter 14

The image of tradition

1. Disparaging comments on Spartan archaism: e.g. Bölte 1929, col. 1451; Marrou 1965, 59–60. Touchstone’: Lane Fox 1986a, 68–9. For the idea of ‘invented tradition’, coined by modern historians: E. Hobsbawm in Hobsbawm/ Ranger 1983, 1–1.4.
2. *Plut. Mor.*814b; cf. Jones 1971b, 113–4. Roman emperors: Bowersock 1984, 174–6 (Augustus); Lane Fox 1986a, 11–12 (Gordian III). Parthians as *barbaroi* in official Roman documents: e.g. SEG xxiii.206.11 (Augustan); Reynolds 1982, no.17 1.10 (Severan). Plataea: Sheppard 1984–6, 238; Strubbe 1984–6, 282–4; Robertson 1986 (dispute). Meed of valour: *Plut. Arist.*20.1. Historical themes in show-oratory: Bowie 1974, 170–3.
3. Monuments: Paus.iii.11; 14.1; 16.6. Artemis Orthia: *Plut. Arist.*17; *Xen. Lac. Pol.* ii.9; cf. H. Rose in Dawkins 1929, 405.
4. Leonidea: IG v. 1.18–20; Bogaert 1968, 99–100; Connor 1979 (Classical age). Nicippus: IG v.1.20b.3; Woodward 1923–5, 168, col.C6/C7, 9 (better). Birth of Herculanius: Spawforth 1978, 254. Minimum age of *gerontes*: Chrimes 1949, 139–40 (advocating fifty). Roman preparations: Baladié 1980, 273–7.
5. Greek paganism under the principate: Lane Fox 1986a, chs. 2–5. Pausanias: the computations are those of Kahrstedt 1954, 192. Christians: Euseb. *Ecc.Hist.*iv.23.1–2; cf. ch. 15 in this volume.
6. Carneonices: IG v. 1.209.20. Gymnopaediae/Hyacinthia: Paus.iii.11.9; *Luc. desalt.* 12; Philostr. *VA.*iii.11.9. IG v.1.586–7 (Hyacinthian ‘games’); SEG ii.88

- (*didaskalos*). Earlier contests: Mellink 1943, 22–3. Amyclaeum: Paus.iii.18. 7–19.6; Grunauer-von Hoerschelmann 1978, 97–106 (coins).
- 7 Inscription: IG v.1.213.31–4. Dedications: IG v.1.579–80; 581?; 592; 595; 605?; 607; SEG xi.676–7 and *add. et corr.* 677a–c. Demeter cults: Burkert 1985, 159–61. Eleusinium: Paus.iii.20.5; Cook/Nicholls 1950. Cult: Spawforth 1985, 206–8. Liturgies: IG v.1.583; 584+604 (SEG xi.812a) with Kourinou-Pikoula 1986, 68–9; 594; 596. Reliefs: IG v. 1.248–9; Spawforth 1985, 230–31 with pl.21a; Walker forthcoming.
 - 8 Dioscuri: Wide 1893, 304–23; Burkert 1985, 212–3. Pedigrees: ch. 12. Sanctuary: Hdt.vi.66; Paus.iii.14.10. Coins: Grunauer-von Hoerschelmann 1978, 38–9, 42–3, 45; 65–6; 100–101. Cult, sanctuary and priesthood: Spawforth 1985, 195–6, 203–4 (building activity), 207–8. *Stēlai*: IG v. 1.206–9, esp.209.6–10; cf. Bölte RE 5.A1, 1934, cols. 1190–1 (correctly seeing here a civic cult, not a private association). *Agōnothetēs*: IG v. 1.559, 6–11; cf. Jones 1940, 175.
 - 9 Priesthood: Hdt.vi.56; IG v.1.36a; 40. Titulature: IG v. 1.667.1–2; cf. I. Opelt in Wlosok 1978, 429–30.
 - 10 *Cic.de div.*i.95. IG v.1.1314–5 with Bölte RE v.1A, 1934, cols.1190–1 (rejecting the old view of a private *thiasos*). For the patronomates which date the three visits see Chrimes 1949, 464 (Charixenus I), 466 (Memmius Damares); Bradford 1986a (Hadrian). Claros: Lane Fox 1986a, chs. 4–5. Paus.iii.26.1.
 - 11 ‘Special relationship’: Cartledge 1987, 34. Judges: references at ch. 11, n.14. Proxeny-grants: FD iii.1.no.487 (IG v.1.1566); iii.2.no.160; SIG³ 239.iii.30 (*naopoiios*); Bradford 1977 s.v. Alkimos. FD iii.1.no 543 (Spartiaticus); 215 (Euamerus). Spartan Aurelii: Spawforth 1984, 263–5.
 - 12 Theatre-statue: SEG xi.773; 830 (cf. Paus.iii.14.8). Cult and sanctuary: Plut. Lyc. 31.3; Paus.iii.16.6. Coins: Grunauer-von Hoerschelmann 1978, 40–41 with pl.13. Cf. Richter 1984, 156–7.
 - 13 Magistrates: IG v.1.543.11–12; 560; SEG xi.626.2. Liv.xxxviii.34; xlv.28.4 (cf. Toynbee 1969, 410 n.3; Tigerstedt 1965–78 ii, 167, 344 n.30); Plut. Philop.16.6–7; Paus.vii.8.5; viii.51.3. Modern views: e.g. Ehrenberg 1929, cols.1442–3 (with earlier references); Chrimes 1949, 50; Shimron 1972, 117. The view taken here is also that of Kennell 1985, 13–19; 1987, 422 n.17.
 - 14 *Suda* s.v. ‘Dikaiarkhos’. ‘Contest’: references at ch. 11, n.22; cf. IG v.1.467 (‘renewal’), 485 (rôle of assembly). Chrimes 1949, 159 citing Plut. Lyc.26.1–3. Messene: Schwertfeger 1981; cf. *IvO* no.465 (‘wreath’). Cf. the ‘renewal’ of the mythical kinship between Aegeae and Argos c. 150: Spawforth/Walker 1986, 103–4.
 - 15 List of *ensitoi*: cf. IG v.1.1314.3; 1315, 21–2 (mention of a Spartan *protensiteuōn* or ‘first on the list of those receiving *sitēsis*’). Cass. Dio liv.7.2; Baladié 1980, 291–2; cf. Grunauer-von Hoerschelmann 1978, 68–9 n.30. Kennell 1987, giving the references at n.8 to dining magistrates, to which add IG v.1.149–151, 155 (SEG xi. 598–601) (*presbus* of *phidition*). Ancient *prutaneia* generally: Miller 1978.
 - 16 Plut.*Mor.*550b; 1109c. Philostr. VA iv.27. Statues: Tod/Wace 1906, 146, no. 85, 178, no.443 (not yet fully published).
 - 17 Old licence: Cartledge 1981. Spawforth 1985, 191–2 (domestic virtues), 206–8 (Xenocratia), 232–4 (Damosthenia). Political significance of civic praise for domestic virtues: van Bremen 1983. Spartan *gunaikonomos*: IG v.1. 209.10; other

- references at App.IIA; for the date of IG v.1.170 see Spawforth 1985, 245. Generally: Wehrli 1962; Vatin 1970, 254–61.
- 18 *Bideoi*: Paus.iii.11.2; Tod/Wace 1906, 18–19; App.IIA (catalogues). Ball-tournament: IG v. 1.676.2–4; 679.4; 680.5–6 etc. Banquets: IG v. 1.206.2; 209.6; cf. Spawforth 1985, 196 with n.14. Classical period: Cartledge 1987, 26, 128.
 - 19 Patronomate: Chrimes 1949, 143–54; Schaefer 1949; Bradford 1980. Singular office: SEG xi.503; the usual view of modern scholars that the patronomate comprised a board of six magistrates, based on a misunderstanding of IG v.1.48, is demolished by Kennell 1985, ch. 3. Pratolaus: IG v.1.543–4; Spawforth 1985, 209–10. Combination with gymnasiarchy: IG v.1.481; 505; 535; 539; SEG xi. 803. *Philotimia*: IG v. 1.534. *Huperpatronomos/epimelētai*: IG v.1.275; 311–12, 295 (SEG xi.715); 541–2; 683; SEG xi.541.
 - 20 *Ephēbia* generally: Jones 1940, ch. 14; Marrou 1965, 280–4.
 - 21 Ephebic dedications: IG v. 1.255–356 with the improved editions of Woodward in Dawkins 1929, ch. 10; cf. in particular nos. 31, 33 and 41 (Roman-period age-sets). *Paidēs/ephēboi*: cf. IG v. 1.493. Agonistic age-class: Robert 1939, 241–2. Greek writers: e.g. Plut. *Lyc.*16.4; Luc. *de salt.* 10; Paus.iii.14.6 (*sphaireis*-teams), 14.9, 16.10. Old *agōgē*: Plut. *Lyc.*16.4. Primary education: Jones 1940, 223.
 - 22 Tribal organization: Chrimes 1949, 163–8. Old *agōgē*: Plut. *Lyc.*17.2–4. Age of *boagoi*: Hesych. s.v.; Spawforth 1980, 209. Change in organization: Woodward 1950, 620. Earliest dedication by a *boagos*: Woodward in Dawkins 1929, no.33 (patronomate dated c.89/90 by Chrimes 1949, 464). *Nomophulakes*: SEG xi.536. Retention of title: e.g. IG v.1.62.6; 64.9–11, 14; 69; 551.16. Athens: Oliver 1971, especially 73–4. Higher education: Clarke 1971, 6. Sixteen-year-olds: Woodward in Dawkins 1929, nos. 36, 42–6, 49–50, 52–4, 56, 58–9, 64, 67–9, 71 (excluding the fragmentary texts). Reappearance of *kasēn*-status: Woodward 1950, 629–30; the earliest instance, Woodward in Dawkins 1929, no.310, can be placed late in Nero's reign (for the patronomate of Euclidas see Chrimes 1949, 463).
 - 23 Athletic *trainers/hoplomakhoi*: IG v.1.542.2–3, 543.2–4; Spawforth 1984, 270 n.34, 271, n.39; Luc. *de salt.* 10. (?) Hadrianic ephebe: Woodward in Dawkins 1929, no. 41; cf. IG v.1.663, 668 (boy-athletes). Old songs/dances: Luc. *desalt.* 10–12; Athen. *Deipn.* xiv.33. Artemis Orthia contests: Chrimes 1949, 119–24.
 - 24 Platanistas/*sphaireis*-teams: Cic. *Tusc.Disp.*v.27.77; Paus.iii.14.6, 8–10; Luc. *Anach.* 38; cf. Woodward 1951, Patrucco 1975, rejecting the view of Chrimes 1949, 132–3 that the *sphaireis*-teams were boxers. 'Endurance-contest': full refs. collected by Trieber 1866, 22–29; note in particular Cic. *Tusc.Disp.*ii. 14.34; Plut. *Arist.*17.8; *Lyc.* 18.1; Paus.iii. 16.9–11; Luc. *Anach.* 38; Hyg. *Fab.* 261. *Bōmonikai*: IG v.1.554.1–2; 652–3; 684?; Woodward in Dawkins 1929, nos. 142–44. Modern discussion: H. Rose in Dawkins 1929, 404–5; Chrimes 1949, 262–4. Cheese-ritual: Xen. *Lac.Pol.*ii.9.
 - 25 *Caryae*: Paus.iii.10.7; Luc. *de salt.*10–12. 'Dionysiades': Paus.iii.13.7; SEG xi.610.1–4 (the reference is to some signal achievement connected with the race in this particular year). Sura: *schol.* Iuv.iv.53; Moretti 1953, 168. *Victrix*: SEG xi.830 (honorand's name garbled). Delphi text: Moretti 1953, no.63.
 - 26 *Lycurgus*: Paus.iii.14.9; 16.10. 'Teachers': IG v. 1.500.1–2; cf.542.3. Ephebe: IG v. 1.527. *Obai*: e.g. IG v.1.674.2; 675.3–4; 676.6–7. Dialect: Woodward in Dawkins 1929, nos. 43–70 *passim*; Bourguet 1927, 25–9. Linguistic archaism elsewhere: e.g. Ameling 1983 ii, no.143; Bernard 1960, nos. 28, 30 ('Aeolic' poems of Balbilla).

- 27 Chrimes 1949, 124–6; Woodward 1950, 620. Timocrates: Athen. *Deipn.* i.15c. Ball-tournament: IG v. 1.674, dated by Woodward 1951, 193.
- 28 Tourism generally: Casson 1974, 229–99. Polemo: Deichgräber 1952, especially cols.1297–8, nos. 7–8. Paus.iii.11.1. Platanistas: Cic. *Tusc. Disp.*v.27.77; ‘endurance-contest’: Plut. *Arist.*17.8; Lib. *or.*i.23; ball-tournament: *schol. adOd.*viii.372 (ed. Dindorf), with ref. to the (?) second-century grammarian Pius/Eusebius. Other festivals. Philostr. VA vi.20.
- 29 Romans at Athens: Daly 1950. Laelius: Gow/Page 1968 i, no.xxi, ii 158–9. Pausanias: Habicht 1985, especially 26–7. Lucian in Greece: Hall 1981, 16–44 *passim*. *Exēgētēs*: IG v. 1.556, dated at Spawforth 1984, 283–4 and variously interpreted by Woodward 1907–8, 116–7, Chrimes 1949, 160, Tigerstedt 1965–78 ii, 452 n.34. For an official guide (*periēgētēs*) at Severan Athens see Oliver 1983, 153 n.10. Philostratus: VA vi.20 with Woodward in Dawkins 1929, no.36.
- 30 Cicero: cf. *Pro Flacco* 63. Philostr. VA iv.31. Favorinus: [Dio Chrys.] *or.* xxxvii.27. Castigation: cf. Bowie 1978, 1664–5. Vianor: IG v.1.569; cf. 491.
- 31 Whole-heartedness: Luc. *Anach.* 38. *Diabetai*: e.g. IG v.1.32a.2; 676.4–5; 680.5–9 (‘voluntarily’); SEG xi.493.2–3. Hipparch: Hesychius, s.v.; IG v.1.541.1–3. Memmii: Spawforth 1985, 193–213. ‘University-training’: Jones 1940, 224. *Sphaireis*-teams: IG v.1.675.7–8; 676.9.

Chapter 15

Epilogue: Sparta from Late Antiquity to the Middle Ages

- 1 Theod. ix, 18–19, p. 126 (Carnivet); cf. Hertzberg 1887–90 iii, 384. Theodosian law: *CTh* xvi.10, 11, 391, 12, 392; Jones 1964b, 938–43. Survival of paganism: Gregory 1986, especially 236.
- 2 Bishop: Bon 1951, 8–9. Epitaphs: IG v. 1.820–2; Feissel 1983, 615–7. Athens: Travlos 1960, ch. 7. Byzantium: Rawson 1969, ch. 9.

Bibliographical appendix to the second edition

Part I Hellenistic Sparta (by Paul Cartledge)

General

Since the first edition of this book was written, what is not altogether happily dubbed the 'Hellenistic' period (c. 323–30 BC) has at last been attracting something like its due attention. A few years ago the present writer presented an overview of some of the major results of this renewal of interest (Cartledge 1997; cf. Bilde et al. eds 1994; Bulloch et al. eds 1993; Green 1993a, Green ed. 1993b; Sirinelli 1993; Walbank 1991/2, 1992). Since then a major general study of the period as a whole has been published in English, and fortuitously enough by a distinguished scholar who is a major specialist in Spartan and Lakonian history (Shipley 2000, with invaluable bibliography at 475–536; cf. 1992, 1994, 1997).

All the same, it is clear that Hellenistic Sparta is not as well loved and well understood by the general public as it is by at least some scholars. An article in a British national newspaper of 15 October 2000 was headlined 'Sell our heritage and save it'; its author, Iain Pears, argued that the money to be raised from selling off pictures that lay mouldering in the basements of museums such as the Tate Gallery could be used to buy what those museums really needed. The specific illustration he chose was Benjamin West's 'Cleombrotus Ordered into Banishment by Leonidas II, King of Sparta' of 1770. I leave it to others to judge whether West's painting is in fact 'dreary', as Pears maintains. But I yield to no one in the belief that the history of which this painting is a dim reflection within the overall framework of the Spartan 'mirage' (cited specifically by Rawson 1969:355), merits continued attention and scrutiny. Cleombrotus happily returned from banishment to become King Cleombrotus II and crucially assist Agis IV in his radical reforms (above, 45, 51).

Chapter 1 Mantineia to Chaeronea

Discussions of sources, contemporary and non-contemporary: Powell & Hodkinson eds 1994. The Spartan crisis: Bernstein 1997; French 1997; Hodkinson 1989, 1996, 1998, 2000; cf. Christien 1998. Messenia: Figueira 1999. Dentheliatas arbitrations: Ager 1996.

Chapter 2
The Revolt of Agis III

Badian 1994 is typically incisive, trenchant and provocative.

Chapter 3
The New Hellenism of Areus I

General: Shipley 2000:142; Gruen 1996:261–2. The Aetolians and their League: Scholten 1997. Pyrrhus: Zodda 1997. Sparta and the Jews—or rather the Jews and Sparta: Gruen 1996; cf. Feldman 1993; Gruen 1990; Rajak 1994.

Chapter 4
Agis IV and Cleomenes III

General: Shipley 2000:143–7. Historiography: Martinez-Lacy 1994; Powell 1999; Pédech 1989 (Phylarchus). ‘Revolution’: Martinez-Lacy 1995; Erskine 1990: Part 6. Educational reforms: Kennell 1995. Role of women: French 1997; Mossé 1991; Pomeroy 1997:64–5. Ephors: Richer 1998: Index s.v. ‘Cléomène III’, esp. 105–8, 497 n.40, 517–18. Impact of Stoicism on Spartan revolution: Bryant 1996:427–55, at 441; Erskine 1990: Part 6; but contrast the caution of Schofield 1991:42.

Chapter 5
The Rule of Nabis

General: Shipley 2000:147–8. Polybius as source: Eckstein 1995; Hahm 1995. End of Helots and Helotage: Ducat 1990:193–9. Status of Perioikoi: Hall 2000; Shipley 1992, 1997; important archaeological site: Catling 1990a, 1990b. Sparta’s city-wall: Cartledge 1998. Material evidence for the new economy: Raftopoulou 1998; cf. Andreau 1989 (on Rostovtzeff).

Chapter 6
From Achaea to Rome 188–146 BC

General: Shipley 2000: 378–86. Condition of Greek poleis in Hellenistic world: Gauthier 1993; Gruen 1993a.

Part II
Roman Sparta (by Antony Spawforth)

Reviewers were, on the whole, kind to the second, Roman, part of this book on its first publication (George Huxley’s in *Hermathena* 148 (1990) 100–104 is of particular value for its factual observations). What follows is a (necessarily brief)

survey of the more important publications on Roman Sparta between 1989 and the time of writing (February 2001), beginning with new primary evidence.

Archaeology and topography New Roman-period finds from Greek rescue-excavations in modern Sparta (1991–1995), including a fifth Christian basilica and further evidence for private luxury in the Roman city (mosaics, gardens etc.), are summarised by Stella Raftopoulou, ‘New finds from Sparta’, in W. Cavanagh and S. Walker (ed.), *Sparta in Laconia. Proceedings of the 19th British Museum Classical Colloquium* (1998) 119–140, which also includes (112–118) a brief overview by Anastasia Panayotopoulou of Roman Sparta’s mosaic production. Major work in the acropolis area by the British School at Athens was initiated in 1989; the results have been published in preliminary reports in *BSA* for 1994, 1995, 1998 and 1999, with a useful summary by Geoffrey Waywell, ‘Sparta and its topography’, in *Bulletin of the Institute for Classical Studies* 43 (1999) 1–26. Key finds include apparent confirmation (128 above, contra) of the hypothesis of Bulle 1937 for a sliding, wooden stage in the Augustan phase of the theatre, probably the work of Eurycles, thus reopening the question of the need for such arrangements, which Bulle linked with the Leonidean games (above, 192); these could have been reinvented under Eurycles, protégé of the Augustan regime, well known for its propagandistic play with Classical Greece generally, and Persian-wars’ memories specifically (note now the Spartan ties of the Athenian Ti. Claudius Novius, Plataean high priest under Nero, identified in the writer’s ‘Symbol of unity? The Persian-wars tradition in the Roman empire,’ in S. Hornblower (ed.), *Greek Historiography* (Oxford 1994) 233–47). The British excavations have also revealed that the ‘Roman stoa’ was even larger and more elaborate than previously thought: 200 metres long, two-storeyed, and featuring a central nymphaeum. The find (unfortunately not in situ) of an archaizing Doric capital of second-century AD date (published by G.B. Waywell and J.J. Wilkes, ‘Excavations at Sparta: the Roman Stoa, 1988–91 Part 2’, *BSA* 89 (1994) 377–432 at 410) shows that at Roman Sparta, as at Roman Athens, recreation of the past was on the agenda of local architects too.

As well as the article by Waywell (above), a substantial study by C.M. Stibbe, ‘Beobachtungen zur Topographie des antiken Sparta’, *BABesch* 64 (1989) 61–99 is relevant for the topography of the Roman city. In the absence of new evidence, scholarly opinion continues to differ on the central problem of Roman Sparta’s urban archaeology, the whereabouts of the agora (see Waywell, art cit. 8–11), which has still to be precisely located. M. Torelli has suggested that the so-called Arapissa complex, identified here (above, 129–130) with the gymnasium of Eurycles Herculanus, should be linked, on the basis of its semi-circular plan, with the circular Platanistas (above, 201), which he intriguingly proposes as the inspiration for the (also circular) Teatro Marittimo’ in the villa of Hadrian (on whom see below) at Tivoli: ‘Da Sparta a Villa Adriana: le terme dell’Arapissa, il ginnasio del *Platanistas* e il Teatro Marittimo’, in M. Gnade (ed.), *Stips Votiva. Papers Presented to C.M. Stibbe* (Amsterdam 1991) 225–233.

Roman Sparta's territory is included in the useful catalogues of archaeological sites in Laconia by G.Shipley in W.Cavanagh and others (*The Laconia Survey II. Archaeological Data* (1996); volume I, with historical interpretations of the survey-data, at the time of writing has yet to appear). There is relevant topographical comment, specifically on routes and bridges, by G.Shipley, P.Armstrong and W. Cavanagh in *BSA* 87 (1992) 281–310, and by G.Steinbauer, *Horos* 10–12 (1992–98) 277–296, publishing two new milestones of third- and fourth-century date from Sparta's environs.

Epigraphy These are just two of a sizeable crop of new inscriptions from Laconia in the 1990s, those published up to 1996 being reported in *SEG* 40–46 (1990–1996), with later material surveyed in the *Bulletin épigraphique* of the annual *Revue des Études grecques*. Relations with Rome are evoked in two tantalisingly fragmentary inscriptions, one preserving remnants of imperial subscripts to the Spartans, tentatively identified as interventions by Claudius in support of C.Iulius Laco (G. Shipley and A. Spawforth, *BSA* 90 (1995) 429–34 (*SEG* 45 (1995) no. 282)), the other a letter from an unknown imperial official which may allude to the disgrace of Spartiaticus (N. Kennell, *Hesperia* 61 (1992) 193–204 (*SEG* 42 (1992) no.309), republishing *IG* v. 1. 16). Eurycles himself is the subject of a dissertation by G. Steinhauer, *Gaios Ioulios Eurukles, Sumbolē sten istoria tes romaiikes Spartes* (Athens 1989), not seen by the writer. Roman Sparta's prosopography is enriched by the sixteen new lists of *gerontes* and other magistrates published by G. Steinhauer, *BSA* 93 (1998) 427–47; also the inscriptions from the British excavations, published by the writer in *BSA* 89 (1994) 433–41 (*SEG* 45 (1995) nos 352–370), including an honorific inscription (*ibid.* no. 10) for one Octavia Agis (early second century), 'descendant of the founder gods of the city Heracles and Lycurgus'. Beyond Laconia, an inscription from Tega (*SEG* 41 (1991) no. 384: early third century) attests the terms of a spartan notables as *strategos* of the Achaean League, showing that Roman Sparta was indeed (above, p.112 *contra*) a member of the League.

Secondary studies Here the work of Nigel Kennell on Roman Sparta's institutions, with constant recourse to the epigraphy, must be singled out. As well as a series of articles dealing with the patronomate (*ZPE* 85 (1991) 131–137), *the gerontes* and the *boulē* (*Hesperia* 61 (1992) 193–202), and the *synarchia* (*Phoenix* 46 (1992) 342–51), his *The Gymnasium of Virtue. Education and Culture in Ancient Sparta* (Chapel Hill 1995) offers the first really thorough study of the ephebic training of the Roman period and documents fully the extent to which it sought to recreate the *agōgē* of Classical Sparta (as later Spartans chose to understand it). Spartan cults of the empire were sketched by the writer in J.M. Sanders (ed.), *Philolakon. Lakonian Studies in Honour of Hector Catling* (Oxford 1992) 227–238. The priesthoods of the Roman city are now exhaustively treated in a major study by Annette Hupfloher, *Kulte imkaiserzeitlichen Sparta. Eine Rekonstruktion anhand der Priesterämter* (Munich 2000), with full weight given to

the epigraphic evidence, and with various departures in the detail from interpretations employed in this work.

Of more general studies, two deserve singling out for their relevance to Roman Sparta. Susan Alcock's *Graecia capta: The Landscapes of Roman Greece* (Cambridge 1993) has put the study of Roman Greece on a new and firmer footing, and includes discussion *passim* of Sparta. Finally, Anthony Birley's authoritative *Hadrian. The Restless Emperor* (London 1997) does full justice to Hadrian's interest in Sparta (especially 180–1, 217–19) and its larger context. Roman Sparta now deserves at least a footnote in the larger history of the Roman relationship with contemporary cultural Hellenism, of which it was, at one and the same time, both a distinctive and a characteristic exemplar.

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Abbreviations

In addition to obvious or easily identified abbreviations of modern works, the following epigraphic abbreviations are used:

CIG	<i>Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum</i>
CIL	<i>Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum</i>
FD	<i>Fouilles de Delphes</i> , in progress
IDélos	<i>Inscriptions de Délos</i> , vols. by various authors
IG	<i>Inscriptiones Graecae</i>
IGB	G. Mihailov, <i>Inscriptiones Graecae in Bulgaria repertae</i> (1956–70)
IGRR	R. Cagnat, <i>Inscriptiones Graecae ad res Romanas pertinentes</i> (1906–27)
IGUR	<i>Inscriptiones Graecae Urbis Romae</i>
ISE	L. Moretti, <i>Iscrizioni storiche ellenistiche</i> (1967–75)
IvO	W. Dittenberger and K. Purgold, <i>Olympia: die Ergebnisse... der Ausgrabung. V. Die Inschriften</i> , 1896
SEG	<i>Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum</i>
SIG ³	W. Dittenberger, <i>Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum</i> , 3rd edition

Index

- acclamations, honorific
145 (of a Spartan
matron), 159
- Achaea/Achaean/
Achaean Leaguevii, 23,
24, 26, 32, 33, 36, 40, 40–
1, 47, 48, 49–50, 54, 55,
59, 61, 63, 66, 72, 73,
75, 80, 81, 86, 87, 93,
94, 100;
effect of *sumpoliteia* on
Sparta60, 77–8, 78–9,
83, 143–5 *passim*, 163,
188, 198;
post-146 BC League90,
104, 112
(Sparta not a member),
186;
see also Rome
- Achaean War87, 89–90
- Achaia (Roman province)
93, 99, 102, 123, 123,
124, 133, 139, 154, 169;
assize-system154;
economic recovery105;
festivals in184;
revolt under Pius116;
Roman officials of112,
149, 150–1, 163
- Acraie (Kokkinia)137
- acropolis, Spartan, *see*
Sparta (city)
- Acrotatus (Agiad king, son
of Areus I)3, 34, 36, 37,
40
- Acrotatus (son of
Cleomenes II)24, 27, 30
- Actia (festival at
Nicopolis)99
- Actium, battle of93, 95–8
passim, 104
- actors37, 165, 184, 188;
see also drama/dramatic
contests;
Sparta (city)...theatre
- Adada (Pisidia)187
- Aegiae141
- Aegilia (Antikythera)57
- Aegina50
- Aegyris14, 86, 136
- Aelii (Spartan élite family)
120, 163, 188
- Aelius Alcandridas, P. (C3
Spartan notable)188
- Aelius Aristides (sophist)
189, 210
- Aelius Aristomachus, P.
(from Magnesia-on-the-
Maeander)185–6
- Aelius Caesar, L. (adopted
heir of Hadrian)109
- Aelius Damocratidas, P.
(C3 Spartan notable)188
- Aelius Granianus (C2
Sicyonian)188
- Aelius Metrophanes (C3
intellectual)181
- Aemilius Paullus, L. (cos. II
168 BC)85, 87, 198;
see also Pydna, battle of
- Aetolia/Aetolians/
Aetolian League26, 31,
32, 33, 37, 40, 47, 48,
50, 5559, 61, 64, 65;
and Nabis77;
and Rome64, 65, 73,
74, 76
- Agathinus (Claudius; C1
Spartan doctor)184
- Agathocles27
- ager Dentheliatis, see*
Dentheliatis
- Agésilas II (Eurypontid
king)4, 8, 9, 10–11, 20,
27, 29, 38, 56, 89, 115
- Agésilas (Eurypontid,
brother of Agis III)21
- Agésilas (uncle of Agis
IV)44, 45, 46–7
- Agésipolis I (Agiad king)29
- Agésipolis III (Agiad king)
62;
death82;
exile64, 65
- Agésistrata (mother of
Agis IV)33, 34, 43, 47
- Agiads (royal house)33,
48–9, 62
- Agiatis (wife of [I] Agis IV
[2] Cleomenes III)48,
49, 56
- Agis (Eurypontid regent?)
40
- Agis III (Eurypontid king)
11–12, 14, 41;
on Crete21;

- revolt/war of 21–4, 32
 Agis IV (Eurypontid king)
 41–7 *passim*, 48, 51, 60,
 67;
 reforms 35, 43, 45–6
agōgē 33, 41;
 abolition by Achaean
 League 78;
 Classical 201;
 renewals by Agis IV
 and Cleomenes III 46,
 52, 201, 207;
 restoration post-146
 BC 84, 90, 93, 106–7,
 108, 113, 158, 167–8,
 201–7, 213;
see also boagoi;
kasen;
 Platanistas;
 tradition, invention of
 agonistic festivals, *see*
 festivals
agōnothetēs 185, 186, 188,
 195
 agora, *see* Sparta (city)
agoranomoi 124, 152, 166;
 and granary 130;
 as liturgy 157–8, 168;
 and messes 199–200
 agriculture 133, 137, 141–2,
 152, 169–70;
see also farms;
 land-tenure;
 Sparta (city)...grain-
 supply
 Agrippa (M. Vipsanius) 99
 Agrippina (mother of
 Nero) 103
 Alabanda 114;
 kinship with Sparta
 alleged 119
 Alaric (Goth) 125, 170;
 occupies Spartavii,
 125–6
 Alcibiades ('royalist' exile)
 81–2
 Alcimus (son of Soclidas,
 C1 Spartan notable) 197
 Alcman 176, 186
aleiptai, *see* athletes
 Alesiae 141
 Alexamenus (Aetolian),
 and murder of Nabis 77
 Alexander the Great vii, 8,
 16, 19, 20, 20–1, 23, 25,
 26, 27, 28, 29, 33, 35,
 55, 118, 191
 Alexandria/
 Alexandrians 71, 85, 87,
 127, 179, 186, 189;
 Cleomenes III at 57, 58,
 62;
 Spartan athletics
 and 186, 189;
 Spartan intellectuals
 and 177, 184
 Alexippa (C4 BC, wife of
 Iphicratidas) 13
 altar(s) of Artemis
 Orthia 205;
 of Lycurgus (?) 55, 197;
 mass dedications of 108,
 114, 221
 Amblada (Caria), kinship
 with Sparta alleged 119
 Ambracia 17
 Amorgus 26
 Ampelius, P. (C4 governor
 of Achaia) 123
 Amphictyony, *see* Delphi
 Amyclae 26, 141, 173;
 Apollo at 22, 119, 124,
 128, 164, 167, 194;
see also Hyacinthia
 Analipsis, *see* Iasus
 Anatolius (C4 governor of
 Achaia) 123–4
 Antalcidas, *see* Peaces
 Anticrates (slayer of
 Epaminondas?) 7
 Antigonus I
 Monophthalmus 27, 29,
 30
 Antigonus II Gonatas 32,
 33, 34, 40
 Antigonus III Doseon 40, 55,
 59, 68;
 and Cleomenes III 57–
 8, 61;
 and Hellenic League 55
 Antiochus III 61, 75, 76, 77
 Antipater 20, 23, 24, 26
 antiquarianism/archaism,
 as cultural phenomenon
 under Roman Empire
 generally 107–8, 115,
 190;
 at Sparta 93, 106–8,
 109, 111, 143, 136,
 159, 168, 176, 191;
see also tradition,
 invention of
 Antistius Philocrates, M.
 (C1/2 magistrate) 168
 Antonine constitution
 (212–13) 118, 181, 197
 Antoninus Pius (emperor),
see Pius
 Antonius, M., and
 pirates 96
 Antony (M. Antonius) 95,
 96, 97, 138
 Aphrodite Enoplius 34, 125
 Apia (Argive, wife of
 Nabis) 69, 72, 74, 79
 Apollo 10, 193–4;
 as ancestor of Iamid
 clan 183;
 Hyacinthus and, *see*
 Hyacinthia;
 Hyperteleatas, *see*
 Hyperteleatum;
 Carneus, *see* Carnea
see also Amyclae;
 Delphi;
 Gymnopaediae
 Apollonius of Tyana (sage)
 106–7, 117, 173, 174,
 209–10;
see also Philostratus
 Apsines (grandfather and
 grandson, Spartan
 sophists) 182

- Apsines (Valerius, C3
sophist)182
- aqueducts, *see* Sparta (city)
...water-supply
- Arata (C4 BC)12–13
- Aratus (Sicyonian)38, 41,
47, 49, 50, 54, 55, 77;
captures
Acrocorinth41, 42;
pro-Macedonian volte-
face54, 61
- Arcadia/Arcadians3–4, 5,
23, 32, 50, 54;
see also federalism
- archaeology, evidence
of24, 38–9, 60, 71, 122,
123, 170, 216–25 *passim*;
Laconia Survey, 141
- archaism, *see*
antiquarianism;
tradition, invention of
- Archelaus (Cappadocian
king)100
- Archidamia (grandmother
of Agis IV)34, 43, 47
- Archidamus III
(Eurypontid king)8, 9,
10;
as mercenary14, 27
- Archidamus IV
(Eurypontid king)30, 31
- Archidamus V (Eurypontid
king?)47, 49, 51;
murder of51
- architects165
- archives, *see* Sparta (city)
- Areus I (Agiad king)28–
37 *passim*, 40, 48;
on Crete33;
as Hellenistic
dynast35–7;
and Jews36–7, 85
- Areus II (Agiad king)36
- Areus ('royalist' exile)81–2
- Argives/Argos7, 8, 10, 12,
13, 14, 25, 33, 34, 49–
50, 54, 63, 66, 74, 89,
122, 125, 136, 169, 187;
see also Nabis
- Argolicus, *see* (Iulius)
Argolicus
- Argolis50, 56–7, 66
- aristocracy (at Roman
Sparta) commercial
interests140;
and noble birth161–2;
nomenclature of166;
origins163–4;
patriotism of211;
and priesthoods164–5,
178;
see also curials;
élite
- Aristocrates (son of
Damares, C1 BC
notable)97
- Aristocrates (son of
Hipparchus, C1 Spartan
writer)177
- Aristomachus (Argive
tyrant)49–50, 54, 69
- aristopoliteia* (civic contest)
106, 150, 182;
and euergetism159;
and invented
tradition198–9
- Aristotle14–15, 60;
on Sparta6, 9, 42, 43,
46, 70
- Armenas (son of Nabis)76,
78
- Artaxerxes II4, 7, 20
- Artaxerxes III20
- Artaxerxes IV18
- Artemis Caryatis205;
Limnatis (Dentheliatis)
138;
Patriotis (Pleiae)137
- Artemis Orthia55;
cult-statue183;
ephebic dedications
for120, 203–4, 206;
festival192–4 *passim*;
in late antiquity122–4
passim;
- official seats in
sanctuary160–1;
priesthood of164
- artisans165, 171–2
- Asclepieum (Epidauros)
12–13, 103
- Asclepius12, 14;
Schoenatas (Helos)137
- Asia3, 11, 18, 20, 21, 24
- Asopus (Plytra)103, 104,
110, 138, 174
- assembly, Spartan, *see*
Sparta/Spartans
- Athena34;
Chalcioecus125, 213
- Athenaeum (fort in
Belminatis)50, 63, 76
- Athenaeus (sophist)177,
205
- Athens18, 33, 59, 138,
167, 172, 177, 193, 210;
Acropolis of97;
as agonistic centre184;
archonship at101, 104,
208;
as centre of
learning179, 182, 183,
208;
and Christianity213;
and Euryclids101, 103–
4;
freedmen at116, 160;
and Hadrian108, 109,
112–13;
hereditary
priesthoods164–5;
and Heruli122;
and Mithradates VI95;
and Panhellenes167;
and Persian Wars
myth191;
and Sparta3, 4, 11, 21,
35–6;
see also Attica;
Chremonidean War;
Herodes Atticus;
Lamian War;

- Second Athenian League
 athletes/athletics at Sparta 129, 188–9; and aristocracy 188; contests 185, 187, 188, 194, 205; facilities 129–30; foreign 158, 184, 185, 232–3; instructors (*aleiptai*) 165, 202, 205, 210; as magistrates 188; professional 189; women as 205–6; *see also* festivals; gymnasia; gymnasiarchy
athlothetēs 124, 186, 192, 196
 Attalids of Pergamum 29
 Attalus 159, 74
 Attica 45
 Aufidenus Quintus, Q. (C3 Spartan philosopher) 180
 Augusta Traiana (Moesia) 181
 Augustus (emperor) 95–6, 97, 110, 162, 191; and Eurycles 98–101, 135, 163; and Caesarean festival 184; messes at Sparta, 98, 199–200, 208
 Aurelia Oppia (C3 Spartan intellectual) 183
 Aurelius Alexys, M. (C3 Spartan auxiliary) 115, 118
 Aurelius Aristocrates, M. (C3 Spartan notable) 163
 Aurelius Euamerus, M. (C3 Spartan ambassador) 197
 Aurelius Demostratus Damas M. (C3 Sardian athlete) 186, 187, 189
 Aurelius Orestes, L. 89
 Aurelius Pancratidas, M. (C3 Laconian notable) 174, 175
 Aurelius Stephanus, M. (C3 Spartan *eques*) 124
 Aurelius Zeuxippus *qui et* Cleander, M. (C3 Spartan *boagos*) 178
 Ausonius (Spartan friend of Libanius) 124
 Babylon 25, 46
 bank, public, *see* Sparta/
 Spartans...coinage
 banquets, sacred 194, 195, 201
 barley 152, 170
 baths, *see* Sparta (city)
 Belmina/Belminatis 5, 14, 49, 50, 57, 63, 66, 76, 77, 86, 87–8, 90, 93, 136
 benefactors, *see* euergetism
bideoi 145, 227; and cult 195; and ephebic training 201, 206
 Bithynia 140
boagoi 106, 166, 167, 178, 203–4, 210
 Boeae (Neapolis) 63, 103, 152, 174
 Boeotia/Boeotians 3, 31, 32; *see also* federalism
boulē, *see* council
 Brachyllas (Theban garrison commander) 57, 61–2
 Brasidas (C5 BC) 162; Augustan descendant of 101, 162
 Brasidas (senator), *see* Claudius Brasidas, Tib.
 bribery, by/of Spartans 10, 18, 62, 88
 brick 128, 129, 130, 135, 171
 bridges, *see* Eurotas
 burials, *see* dead, disposal of
 businessmen, Roman 96, 102, 173
 Brutus (M. Iunius), sentimental laconism of 95
 Caenepolis (New Taenarum, Kyparissi) 174, 175
 Caesar (C. Julius) 95, 138; sanctuary of at Sparta 184
 Caesarea (festival) 184–5, 186–7
 Caesarea (Palestine) 173, 181
 Calamae 174
 Callicrates (Achaean) 83–4, 88
 Callicrates (Bradford 1977, no. 11) 167
 Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus, L. (cos. 56 BC) 96
 capital jurisdiction, at Roman Sparta 153–4, 259 n. 14
 Cannae, battle of 64
 Caphyae 36
 Caracalla (emperor) 191; *see also* Antonine constitution
 Cardamyle 76, 101, 140, 174
 Carneia (festival) 193
 Carthage/Carthaginians 59, 61, 172, 188
 Caryae/Caryatis 4, 7, 14, 141, 205; *see also* Artemis... Caryatis
 Cascellius Aristoteles, D. (C2 Cyrenaean) 113
 Cassander (son of Antipater) 26, 27, 30, 31
 Cassius Dio 103, 199

- Caudus, Spartan epimelete of 108, 156
cemeteries, *see* dead, disposal of
Ceus (Keos) 12
Chaeron (Spartan exile) 82, 83
Chaeronea 107, 179; battle of 13, 14, 17–18, 18
Chalcis 17, 75
chariot-racing 68–9
Chilon (Spartan pretender) 64, 83
Chilonis (wife of Acrotatus the king) 36
Chilonis (wife of Cleombrotus II) 45
Chilonis (wife of Cleonymus) 33
choirs, sacred 194, 196
Chremonidean War 37, 40
Chremonides 35, 36
Christianity/
 Christianization 120, 193;
 and archaeology 213;
 attacks on paganism 125
Cibyra, kinship with Sparta alleged 119
Cicero (M. Tullius) 94, 143, 149, 162, 196, 207
Cinadon 72
citizenship, Roman 118, 154, 162–3, 166–7, 175, 184, 197;
 see also Antonine constitution;
 Sparta/Spartans... citizenship
civil strife, *see* Spartans/
 Sparta...stasis
Claudia Ageta (granddaughter of Brasidas) 194
Claudia Damosthenia (daughter of Brasidas) 200
Claudia Tisamenis (sister of Herodes Atticus) 175
Claudii (Roman patrician clan), as patrons of Sparta 94, 96, 102, 177
Claudii, Tib. (Spartan élite family) 120, 137–8, 184
Claudius (emperor) 102, 103
Claudius Aristocrates, Tib. (C1 Spartan priest) 165
Claudius Attalus Andragathus, Tib. (C2 Synnadan notable) 114
Claudius Atticus Herodes, Tib. (father of Herodes Atticus) 113
Claudius Brasidas, Tib. (C2 Spartan senator) 120, 137, 154, 166, 181, 188, 194, 197, 200
Claudius Charax, A. (C2 Pergamene consul and man of letters) 113, 208
Claudius Demonstratus Titianus, C. (C2 Pergamene senator), as *patronomos* 113
Claudius Harmonicus, Tib. (C1 Spartan gymnasiarch) 105
Claudius Harmonicus, Tib. (C2 Spartan notable) 150
Claudius Montanus *qui et* Hesychius, Tib. (C3 notable from Trapezus) 180–1
Claudius Nero, patron (?) of Demetrius 94
Claudius Nero, Tib. (Livia's husband) 96
Claudius Prato laus, Tib. (son of Brasidas) 152, 155, 166
Claudius Pulcher, Ap. (cos. 185 BC) 94
Claudius Spartiaticus, Tib. (grandson of Brasidas) 181–2, 197
clay-beds, on Spartan plain 171
Cleombrotus I (Agiad king) 3
Cleombrotus II (Agiad king) 45, 51
Cleombrotus (Spartan friend of Plutarch) 178–80
Cleomenes I (Agiad king) 15, 44
Cleomenes II (Agiad king) 9, 16, 19, 25, 27, 44
Cleomenes III (Agiad king) 29, 38, 40, 49–58 *passim*, 59, 60, 64, 66, 67, 69;
 and Agiatis 48–9;
 coup and reforms 50–3, 70, 143, 146, 147;
 death 58, 62;
 and Sphaerus 51, 207
Cleomenes (Agiad regent) 62
Cleomenic War 49, 50, 53–7
Cleonymus (son of Cleomenes II, Agiad pretender) 30, 32, 33, 34, 44;
 in Italy 30;
 and Pyrrhus 32–3
Cleoxenus (*proxenos* of Orchomenus) 86
clothing, Spartan 41, 84, 106, 200
coinage, *see* Sparta/
 Spartans
Commodea (festival) *see* Olympia Commodea
Commodus (emperor) 117, 139, 187
common hearth *see* Sparta (city)...*prutaneion*
communications, *see* roads

- Compasium (Laconia),
massacre at 78
- compulsion (and Spartan
liturgies) 121, 159
- Constantine (emperor)
122, 123
- Constantinople 182
- continuity, constitutional
and otherwise alleged,
see tradition, invention
of
- Corcyra 30
- Core, *see* Demeter
- Corinth/Corinthians 34,
40, 41, 61, 65, 75, 99,
102, 103, 133, 166, 169,
172, 183, 186;
capital of Achaia
province 104;
Euryclids and 104, 110,
111;
Goths and 125;
Hadrian and 112;
Heruli and 122;
Roman sack 87, 90;
see also L.Gellius
Areto;
Isthmus;
Leagues;
Vibullii
- Corinthian War 9
- 'Coronea', Spartan
epimelete of 108–9
- correctores (*epanorthōtai*)
150–1
- Corrhagus 22
- Corsica 61
- Corupedium, battle of 29,
32
- Cotyrra (Daimonia) 174
- council of Roman Sparta
(*boulē*) and curial
class 160–1;
hereditary tendencies
in 148–9;
identified as
composite 146–7;
jurisdiction of 154;
and liturgies 157;
privileges 160–1;
size 148, 159;
see also curials
- Crannon, battle of 26
- Cratesiclea (mother of
Cleomenes III) in
exile 57;
and Megistonus 52
- Crete/Cretans 27, 32, 66,
98;
Agis III and 21;
Aureus and 36;
Nabis and 71, 72, 74, 76;
see also Caudus;
Philopoemen;
Rhadamanthys
- Critolaus 89–90
- Croceae 137, 141, 142, 169;
source of *marmor*
Lacedaemonium 132,
142, 169
- Crypteia, *see* Helots...
treatment of
- cults, *see* religion
- curials (*bouleutai*) 166, 180,
204, 210;
as class 160–1;
and ephēbia 204, 210–
11;
financial crisis of 121;
freedmen as 166–7;
hereditary
tendency 148–9, 161,
230–1
- Cynoscephalae, battle of 74
- Cynosura/Cynosureis (obe/
village/ward of Sparta)
72, 105, 133, 145;
aqueduct 134;
as tribe 203
- Cynuria, *see* Thyreatis
- Cyphanta (Kyparissi,
Laconia) 12, 63
- Cyrenaica/Cyrene 25, 147;
grain from 172;
and Hadrian 113;
see also Cascellius
Aristoteles, C.
- Cyriac of Ancona (Ciriaco
de' Pizzicolli) 219
- Cythera 25, 57, 152;
doctor from 174, 183;
Eurycles and 97–8, 103,
104, 108;
Hadrian donates to
Sparta 109, 110–1, 156;
and Maximus 150;
Spartan governor of
(*Cythērodiēs*), 111
- Damascus 184, 188
- Damiadas (C1 BC Spartan
doctor) 174, 183
- Damion 168
- Damis, as source of
Philostratus, 107
- Damocharis (son of
Timoxenus, C1 BC
Spartan notable) 153–4,
175
- Damocritus (Achaean
general) 88
- dances, traditional 194,
205, 209
- Darius III 18, 20, 22, 24
- dead, disposal of 132–3;
named tombstones 57,
72;
rural mausolea 142;
see also sarcophagi;
sculpture;
Sparta (city)...burials
- debts, cancellation of 18,
40, 45, 46, 47, 52, 53,
71, 76, 89
- decrees, Spartan 144–5,
156, 161, 181;
see also rhētrai
- Delos 31, 36, 68;
Nabis and 71
- Delphi 9–10, 19, 26, 32, 87,
178;

- Amphictyony 10–11, 13, 19, 32, 86–7, 112, 196–7;
 dedications at 34, 187;
 Hadrian and 108, 112;
 oracle 44;
 and Plutarch 178;
 Pythian festival 184, 206;
 Spartan *dikastai* and 94;
 Spartan special relationship with 86, 196–7;
see also Sacred Wars
- Demaratus (Eurypontid king) 31, 44, 62, 68, 68–9
- Demaratus (father of Nabis) 67–8
- Demaratus (son of Gorgion) 31, 68
- Demeter and Core 194;
 Eleusinium (Kalyvia tis Sokhas) 137–8, 164;
 in Helos 137
- Demetrius II of Macedon 40
- Demetrius (Spartan philosopher) 94, 177–8
- Demetrius of Pharos 65
- Demetrius Poliorcetes 27, 29, 30, 35
- Dēmos*, Spartan, statues of 109, 147, 221 n.39, 258 n.7
- Demosthenes 9, 13
- Denteliatis 57;
 Philip II and 14;
 Roman adjudications 90, 95, 138–9, 187
- diabatēria* ritual 4
- diabetes* 168, 210–11
- Diaeus (Achaean general) 88–90
- Dicaearchus (C4/3 BC author) 198
- Dio Cassius, *see* Cassius Dio
- Diocletian (emperor) 122
- Diodorus Siculus 9, 10, 14, 22, 23, 24, 68
- Dionysiades 201, 206
- Dionysus 206
- Dionysius I of Syracuse 69, 70
- Dioscurea (festival) 195
- Dioscuri 63;
 cult at Phoebaeum 98, 99, 135, 164, 195, 201;
 Dioscurid
 pedigrees 110, 124, 162, 163, 195;
 on Spartan coins 110, 194–5;
 statues of 125;
see also Menelaem
- discipline, Spartan, *see agōgē*
- doctors 165, 174, 183–4
- Domitian (emperor) 106
- Domna, *see* Iulia Domna
- Dorians/Doric 8, 41, 71;
 ‘hyper-Doricizing’
 dialect, 208, 210
- Dorieus 30
- Dōris 87
- Doson, *see* Antigonos III
- drama/dramatic
 contests 185, 188;
see also actors;
 Sparta (city)...theatre
- Dromus (running-track), *see* athletes
- earthquakes 10, 105, 130;
see also Laconia
- Echemedes 57, 72
- education, higher 176–83, 210;
see also agōgē;
 philosophers;
 rhetors
- Egypt 8, 20, 27, 29, 46;
 grain from 153, 172
- Eileithyia/Eleusia 66
- Eleans/Elis, and Sparta, 4, 12, 13, 14, 23, 24, 33, 36, 50, 66
- Eleusinium, *see* Demeter
- Eleusis 164–5
- Eleutheria (‘Freedom’ festival) 191
- Eleutherolacones, *see* Leagues
- élite (at Roman Sparta) 190;
 definition 161–3;
 foreign marriages 175;
 priesthoods and 137–8;
see also aristocracy;
 curials
- embassies, *see* Sparta/
 Spartans...diplomacy
- emperors, Roman and
 Croceae 169;
 and iselastic games 187;
 Spartan appeals to 150;
 and Spartan
 jurisdiction 154–5;
see also Imperial cult
- empire/imperialism
 Athenian 4, 25;
 Roman 3, 28, 59, 73, 150–1, 169, 191
- Epaminondas 3, 5, 7, 12, 14, 23, 34, 50, 70
- ephēbia*, *see agōgē*
- Ephesians/Ephesus 113, 189
- ephorate/ephors 43, 62, 64;
 Agis IV and 43–4, 44, 45, 47;
 Cleomenes III and 50, 50–1, 199;
 Nabis;
 and 68;
 in Roman Sparta 97, 145–7, 148–9, 154, 156, 160, 173, 195, 199, 201;
see also sunarkhia
- Epicureanism 177, 179
- Epidaurus 14, 83, 160, 175;
see also Asclepium;
 Statilii
- Epidaurus Limer 12
- Epigonus (C4 Spartan philosopher) 182

- ‘epigraphic habit’104, 121–2, 143–4, 156–7, 160;
see also inscriptions
- Epirus33
- equites* (Spartan)124, 161
- Euclidas (Agiad king)52
- Eudamidas I (Eurypontid king)25, 30
- Eudamidas II (Eurypontid king)33, 41
- Eudamidas (son of Agis IV and Agiatis)49, 51
- Euelpistius (Spartan friend of Libanius)124–5
- euergesism97, 110, 138, 142, 156–9, 161, 182, 199;
see also liturgies, civic;
philotimia;
 titles, honorific
- Eumenes II of Pergamum75, 76, 85
- Eurotas (river/furrow/valley)5, 7, 15, 34, 41, 63, 94, 141, 171;
 bridges121, 122, 130, 131, 140, 150–1, 215
- Eurybiadas (C5 BC admiral), alleged tomb of191
- Euryclea (festival)110–11, 186, 188, 189
- Eurycles, *see* Iulius Eurycles, C.
- Euryclids, *dunasteia* of97–105*passim*
- Eurypontids (royal house) 31, 33, 62, 68
- Euthycles21
- exile/exiles25, 47, 50, 52, 77, 78;
 and Cleomenes III52;
 Cleomenes as52, 57, 58;
- Euryclids as100–1, 102, 103;
 and Nabis70, 72, 75, 76;
 ‘old’81, 82, 83, 84;
- Rome and163
- farms142, 169–70, 225 n. 77;
see also agriculture;
 land-tenure
- Favorinus of Arelate210
- federalism/federal states26, 55, 61, 90;
 Arcadia4, 7, 12;
 Boeotia3, 4, 7;
 Thessalian11;
see also Achaea: Aetolia
- festivals, agonistic160, 176, 184–9, 204, 205–6, 210;
 and agōgē202, 203;
- sunthutai* (festival-ambassadors)114;
see also Carneia;
 Dioscurea;
 Euryclea;
 Gymnopaediae;
 Hyacinthia;
 Leonidea;
 Livia;
 Olympia Commodea;
 Soteria;
 Urania
- Flamininus, *see* Quinctius Flamininus, T.
- Flavius Agesilaus (C1/2 notable)106
- Flavius Asclepiades *qui et* Alexander (from Caesarea)173, 181–2
- Flavius Charixenus, T. (C1/2 notable)105
- Flavius Philostratus, *see* Philostratus
- forest170
- foreigners (at Roman Sparta) and agōgē113, 210;
 as benefactors135, 182;
 as *bouleutai*146;
 and Spartan élite175;
 as tourists180–2;
- and trade173;
see also athletes;
 tourism
- fortifications, *see* Sparta (city)...walls
- fountain-house, *see* nymphaeum
- freedmen at Athens116, 160;
 at Sparta160, 165–7
passim, 173, 211
- Gaius (emperor)102
- Gallienus (emperor)121, 122
- games, *see* festivals
- Gastron (C4 BC mercenary)12
- Gauls26, 32;
see also Soteria
- Gellius Areto, L. (C2 Corinthian)186
- genealogies, *see* tradition, invention of
- Germans115
- Geronthrae (Yeraki)58, 137, 174, 175
- Gerousia (Classical/Hellenistic)10, 62, 68, 144, 147, 148, 198–9;
 Agis IV and43, 44, 47;
 Cleomenes III and51–2;
 and Menalcidas88
- gerontes/gerousia* (Roman) 106, 143, 144;
 coinage of97;
 council-house of127;
 and cult195;
 hereditary
 tendency148–9;
 and messes199–200;
 minimum age of192;
 powers143–7;
 privileges160–1
- gladiator, Spartan165

- Glympeis/Glyppia (Kosmas)63
 Gnosstas of Oenus (Perioecus)12
 gold17, 72
 Gonatas, *see* Antigonus II
 Gorgus (Spartan pupil of Panaetius)177
 Goths, Herulian122, 129; *see also* Alaric
 grain, *see* barley; Spartans/Sparta... grain-supply; wheat
*grammatophulax*147; *see also* Sparta (city)... archives
 Granicus, battle of20
 graves, *see* dead, disposal of *gunaikonomos*200–1; *see also* Sparta/Spartans...women
 gymnasia189, 210; of Eurycles111, 123, 129–30, 133–5 *passim*; freedmen and167; and gymnasiarchy158; and patronomate202
 gymnasiarchy140, 158–9, 168, 173, 202
 Gymnopaediae193–4, 205, 208
 Gytheum Classical/Hellenistic5, 15, 27, 57, 71, 72, 75, 76–7; Roman96, 100–1, 103, 128, 137, 139–40, 152, 170, 173, 174, 183
 Hadrian (emperor)115, 189; and Sparta108–10, 150, 152–3, 163, 208; and Greek Leagues112–13; *see also* Panhellenion
 Halicarnassus21
 Hannibal64, 75
 Harmonicus, *see* Claudius Harmonicus, Tib.
 Harpalus27
 Hecate, *see* Lagina
 Hecatombaeum (Achaea)54
 Helea/Helos42, 63, 137–8, 170
 Helen, cult of at Sparta99, 164, 195; *see also* Dioscuri
 Hellenic League, *see* Leagues
 ‘Hellenistic’ period defined16, 28
 Hellenization114
 Hellespont54
 Helotage/Helots5, 21, 43, 48; as basis of pre-Roman Sparta6, 46, 52, 56; in Roman Sparta165–6; Laconian5, 14, 15, 67; liberations of5, 56, 69–70, 76, 78; Messenian5; revolts of5; treatment of (by *Crypteia*)56
 Heraclaea Oetaea89, 90
 Heracles, statues of129–30;
 Heraclid pedigrees110, 130, 162, 163–4
 Heraclia (C3 Spartan intellectual)118, 183
 Herculaneum177
 Herculanus, *see* Iulius Eurycles H.
 Herennius Dexippus, P. (Athenian historian)122
 Hermae (at Laconian border)136–7
 Hermione50
 hero-cults/heroization111–12, 186, 193; *also* Iulius Eurycles Herculanus
 Herod the Great100
 Herod Agrippa (grandson of Herod the Great)102
 Herodes Atticus110, 115, 167, 175, 182, 185, 186; as Spartan ephebe113, 167; Spartan kin175
 Herodotus36, 118, 203
 Heruli, *see* Goths
 Hestia Bulaea146
*hieromnēmones*165, 181
 Hieronymus of Cardia35
*hierothutai*99, 199–200
 Himerius (Bithynian sophist)123
 hipparchy158, 210, 211
 Hippodamus12
 Hippomedon (cousin of Agis IV)47, 54
 historiographyvii–ix, 3, 8–9, 14, 22, 25, 28–9, 34–5, 38, 60, 70–1, 84, 93, 176–7; periodization3, 16, 28; *see also* tradition, invention of
 Homer/Homeric poems15, 141
 Homoioi (‘Peers’), *see* Sparta/Spartans... citizenship
homonoiā (concord)113, 117, 119
 hoplite warfare3, 7, 27, 47
*hoplomakhoi*174, 204
 horse-breeding (*hippotrophia*)68–9, 170; *see also* chariot-racing
 Hosius (C5 Spartan bishop)213
 hostages22, 24, 76, 77, 78, 85
hupomeiones, *see* ‘Inferiors’
 Hyacinthia124, 193, 194, 205, 208
 hydrotherapy, *see* Sparta (city)...baths

- Hyperteletum (sanctuary of Apollo Hyperteleatas, Phoiniki)63
 Hypsoi141
- Iamids (Spartan mantic clan)164, 183
 Iasus (=Iasaea?)88
 Illyria61, 64–5
 Imperial cult, Achaian108;
 Spartan,99, 117–18, 127–8, 150, 181–2, 184–5, 193, 196;
 see also altar(s), mass dedication;
 Caesarea;
 Livia;
 Olympia Commoda (festivals)
- imperialism, *see* empire
 imports (to Roman Sparta), clay lamps172;
 grain152;
 marble140;
 see also sarcophagi;
 trade
- 'Inferiors' (*hupomeiones*)14, 23, 42–3, 47, 52;
 see also Sparta/
 Spartans...citizenship
- Ino-Pasiphaë, oracle (at Thalamae)106, 196
- inscriptions, career143, 156–7;
 catalogues of magistrates104, 105, 116, 120, 121, 143, 145, 156–7;
 as economic indicator121;
 honorary143, 156–7, 159;
 stone for170–1;
 see also epigraphic habit
- Iphicratidas (C4 BC)13
 Ipus, battle of26, 29, 31
 iron15, 35
- Isocrates8, 9
 Issus, battle of21, 22
 Isthmian Games65;
 see also Quinctius Flamininus, T.
- Isthmus of Corinth4, 47, 63;
 in Chremonidean War, 37
- Ithome, Mt5, 47
 Iulia Balbilla (cousin of Iulius Eurycles H.)110
 Iulia Domna (wife of Severus)111–19
 *passim*18
 Iulius Agesilaus, C. (Trajanic notable)106, 158–9, 161, 185, 192, 196
 (Iulius) Argolicus (son of Laco)102
 Iulius Antiochus Philopappus, C. (cousin of Iulius Eurycles H.)178
 Iulius Arion, C. (C2 Spartan magistrate)116, 161
 Iulius Caesar, Sex.89
 Iulius Deximachus, C. (kinsman of Eurycles)99
 Iulius Deximachus, C. (son of Eurycles)101
 Iulius Eurycles, C.96, 178;
 clay-beds of171;
 coinage-types of110;
 *dunasteia of*98–101;
 family-origins97–8;
 and Gytheum140;
 and Helots165;
 and Imperial cult127–8, 184–5;
 as patron103–4;
 Roman citizenship of163;
 sources of wealth104, 174;
 see also Caesarea;
 Cythera;
 Euryclea;
 Euryclids
- Iulius Eurycles, C. (of freedman descent?)166–7
 Iulius Eurycles Herculanus L. Vibullius Pius, C. (senator)98, 99, 102, 107, 150, 159, 167, 192, 218;
 career110–12;
 Corinthian therms104;
 and Euryclea185–7
 passim;
 mausoleum of111–12, 126;
 pedigree164;
 and Plutarch178;
 and Spartan mint121;
 see also gymnasia
- Iulius Laco, C. (son of Eurycles)99–100, 139;
 *dunasteia of*101–2;
 patronage103–4
- Iulius Phileratidas (C2 Spartan philosopher)180
 Iulius Spartiaticus, C. (son of Laco)103, 104, 107, 143;
 Corinthian citizenship, 142
- Iulius Theophrastus, C. (C2 Spartan magistrate), and grain supply153, 161;
 as gymnasiarch134, 158;
 as priest of Zeus Olympius109–10
- Jason (dynast of Pherae)7, 11
 Jason (Jewish high-priest)85
 Jews, kinship with Spartans alleged,37, 85, 100, 114
 Josephus100, 101

- Julian (emperor)124–5,
182–3, 191;
see also Nicocles
- karteria* (endurance),
ephebic contest in205,
206, 208, 210
*kasen*106, 167–8, 178,
192, 204
kinship, Spartan,
claims to, and
Panhellenion113–14;
in C3119;
see also Alabanda;
Amblada;
Cibyra;
Jews;
Rome;
Sagalassus;
Synnada;
Thera;
Thuria
- klaroi*, *see* land-tenure
- Lachares (father of
Eurycles)97–9, *passim*,
103–4
- Laco, *see* Iulius Laco, C.
- Laconia, earthquakes48;
frontiers, *see* Sparta/
Spartans...territory;
invasions of5, 14, 18,
31, 32, 33, 48, 50, 57,
63, 73, 75, 77, 78, 88;
towns of95, 100, 101,
103, 141, 173–5;
see also Leagues...
Eleutherolaconian;
Perioeci
- 'Laconicus' (Spartan 'king')
77
- Ladocea, battle at,50
- Lagina (Caria), asylum-
rights at Hecate
sanctuary94
- Lamians87
- Lamian War25–6, 27
- Lamius (C4 BC mercenary)
12
- land-tenure, Spartan
(*klaroi*)40, 42–3, 45, 64;
Agis IV and45;
Cleomenes III and52;
Doson and57–8;
Roman period104, 123,
138–9, 142, 152–3,
155, 169–70, 174–5
- Langadha pass136, 138
- Las (Chosiario)78
- Latin language, loan words
at Sparta130–1, 135;
use of in
inscriptions102–3, 173
- Latychidas II (Eurypontid
king)47, 62
- Leagues, of Corinth15, 16–
18, 19, 22, 23, 24, 25,
53, 55, 79;
Eleutherolaconian
(*Eleutherolakōnes*)101,
113, 114, 138, 139,
149, 150, 173–4;
Hellenic17, 30, 55, 57,
61, 63;
'of the
Lacedaemonians'77,
90, 100;
see also Achaea;
Aetolia;
Delphi;
Peloponnesian League;
Second Athenian
League
- Leonidas I (Agiad king)38,
191, 192
- Leonidas II (Agiad king)
44, 44–5, 46, 47, 52, 55,
69;
as *de facto* monarch48,
49
- Leonidea (festival)106,
148, 155, 161;
fair at171;
'renewal' of192–3
- Leucae/Leucē63
- Leucippidae, cult of178
- Leuctra, battle of3, 4, 6,
10, 14, 23, 24, 42
- Libanius (sophist)124, 125,
180, 183
- Limnae (obe/village/ward
of Sparta)132, 133;
as tribe203
- Limnaeum, *see* Artemis...
Orthia
- liturgies187;
civic156–60*passim*, 168,
194, 210–11;
Roman115, 151;
see also military service
- Livia (wife of Augustus),
asylum at Sparta96, 170;
cult of at Sparta102–3,
205–6;
revisits Sparta with
Augustus98–9
- Livia (festival), *see* Livia,
cult
- Livy60, 65, 66, 69, 75, 78–
9, 85
- Locrians/Locris9
- Lucian of Samosata129,
205, 209, 210
- Lucius Verus (emperor), *see*
Verus, L.
- Lycortas (father of
Polybius)81, 83, 83–4
- Lycosura, sanctuary of
Despoena103
- Lyctus13
- Lycurgus (Eurypontid king)
46, 62–4, 65, 70
- Lycurgus (the lawgiver)38,
67;
and 'ancestral
constitution'vii–viii,
35, 46, 51, 57, 143,
197;
as god55, 197;
images of197;
- 'Lycurgan customs'
ascribed to40, 176, 190–
211*passim*;

- as *patronomos*, 121, 197, 202;
 see also tradition,
 invention of
- Lydiadas (Megalopolitan)
 49
- Lysander (C5 BC admiral)
 20, 43;
 alleged descendants
 of 162
- Lysander (C3 BC ephor) 43
- Lysimachus (dynast) 29, 31,
 32
- Lysimachus (C2 BC
 Spartan) 71
- Lysixenidas (associate of
 Eurycles?) 98
- Macedonia/
 Macedonians vii, 8, 13,
 16, 19, 25–6, 32, 53, 54,
 55, 69, 115;
 as Roman province 90;
 wars against Rome 59,
 67, 73, 84–5;
 see also Leagues...
 Hellenic
- macellum*, see Sparta (city)
 ...markets
- Machanidai* 66, 134, 158,
 217
- Machanidas* 65–7, 69, 134
- mageiros* 99, 165, 199
- magistrates of Roman
 Sparta 97, 98, 143–59
passim, 226–9;
 see also *agoranomoi*;
bideoi;
 ephors;
gerontes;
grammatophulax;
 gymnasiarchy;
hieromnēmones;
hierothutai;
 inscriptions;
mageiros;
nomophulakes;
- patronomate;
sunarkhia
- maintenance, public
 (*sitēsis*) 160, 180, 193,
 199, 200
- Malea (Cape/peninsula)
 15, 63, 71
- Mandonium 14
- Mandroclidas 44
- mantic families at
 Sparta 188;
 see also *Iamids*
- Mantineia/Mantineans 4, 7,
 23, 24, 36, 40, 42, 50,
 96, 99, 110, 111;
 battles at 6, 7, 8, 9, 16,
 31, 40, 56, 59, 66–7, 69
- Marathon, battle of 191
- marble 72;
 as import 140, 172;
 Spartan 169, 171;
 use of 123, 128, 129,
 135, 139;
 see also *Croceae*
- Marcus Aurelius (emperor)
 115–16, 118, 180;
 and *Denteliatis* 139,
 187;
 letter to Athens 160,
 182;
 and Sparta's 'free'
 status 149–50
- Maximinus (emperor) 119
- Maximus (C2 *corrector*) 150
- medicine, see doctors
- Megalopolis 14, 18, 24–5,
 103, 136, 152, 175;
 in Achaean League 41,
 49;
 battle of (331 BC) 22–4,
 25, 27, 41;
 Euryclids and 103;
 foundation of 5–6, 80;
 and Sparta 10, 11–12,
 13, 32, 33, 37, 40, 42,
 49, 55–6, 73, 86
- Megara/Megarians 32
- Megistonous (stepfather of
 Cleomenes III) 52
- Memmia Xenocratia (C2
 priestess) 200
- Memmii (Spartan élite
 family) 120;
 and *ephēbia* 211;
 freedmen of 166;
 marriages 175;
 priesthoods 164;
 Roman citizenship
 of 163
- Memmius Pratolaus *qui et*
 Aristocles, P. (C3
 notable) 121, 195;
 as *patronomos* 202, 211;
 as provincial juror 150
- Memnon (C4 BC Rhodian
 admiral) 21
- Menalcidas (Spartan
 general of Achaean
 League) 85, 87–8, 88–9
- Menelaëum 63, 195
- mercenaries 8, 11, 13, 18,
 21, 22, 22–3, 27, 30, 33,
 34, 35, 45, 50, 51, 52,
 62, 67, 68, 72, 74, 78;
 see also Archidamus III;
 Gastron;
 Lamius;
 Taenarum
- Mesoa (obe/village/ward of
 Sparta) 132, 133;
 as tribe 203
- Messene/Messenians 7, 8,
 10, 12, 13, 14, 18, 19–
 20, 20, 24–5, 25, 27, 32,
 50, 53, 63, 64, 83, 97,
 198;
 Archidamus in exile
 at 49, 50, 51;
aristopoliteia contest
 at 198–9;
 border with Sparta (see
 also *Denteliatis*) 136,
 138–9;
 building-programme
 at 97;

- foundation of 5–6, 70;
 and Imperial cult 128;
 Nabis and 72–3;
 see also Memmii
- messes, common, see
 Sparta/Spartans
- Mestrius Florus, L.
 (friend of Plutarch) 162,
 179
- military service, Sparta's
 obligation to provide 95,
 115–18 *passim*, 124–5,
 151
- mirage, Spartan, see
 tradition, invention of
- Mithradates VI Eupator of
 Pontus 95;
 see also Claudius
 Montanus *qui et*
 Hesychius, Tib.
- Mithradatic Wars 93
- mosaics, see Sparta (city)
- mothakes/mothōnes*, see
kasen
- moustaches, Spartan
 prohibition of 200
- Mummius, Lucius (cos. 146
 BC) 90, 93
- muscle-man
 (*iskhuropaiktēs*) 188–9
- Mycenae, conference at
 (197 BC) 74
- myth, Spartan, see
 tradition, invention of
- Nabis (Eurypontid [?]) king)
 viii, 59–79 *passim*, 99;
 ancestry 67–8;
 and Argos 71, 74, 75, 76;
 death 77;
 reforms 68–72, 80, 163,
 165;
 see also Quinctius
 Flaminius, T.
- Naples, Spartan embassy
 to 114
- Naupactus, treaty of (217
 BC) 64
- negotiatores*, see
 businessmen, Roman
- neodamōdeis*, 56;
 see also Helots...
- liberations of
- Neopolitae (obe/village/
 ward of Sparta) 71, 133,
 210;
 creation of, 53;
 as tribe 203, 210
- neōterismoi*, see Spartans/
 Sparta...*stasis*
- Nero (emperor) 149, 184;
 boycotts Sparta, 103
- Nerva (emperor) 105, 196
- Nicocles (*père et fils*, C2
 public slaves) 165
- Nicocles (Spartan
 grammarian, teacher of
 Julian) 124, 182–3
- Nicocrates (C1 BC
 Spartan rhetor) 177–8
- Nikon (C3 BC Spartan
 actor) 37
- Nicopolis (Epirus) 99, 109,
 189
- nomophulakes*, coinage
 of 195;
 and cult 195;
 and *ephēbia* 204;
 hereditary tendency
 of 148–9;
 and messes 199–200;
 powers of 145–7;
 seating for 161;
 see also *sunarkhia*
- nymphaeum 122, 218
- obes 206;
 see also Cynosura;
 Limnae;
 Mesoa;
 Neopolitae;
 Pitana
- Oenus, river 12
- oliganthrōpia* (dearth of
 citizens), see Sparta/
 Spartans
- oligarchy, at Roman
 Sparta 144, 145, 147–9,
 156, 157, 162
- oil, olive 142, 153, 158, 170;
 export to Rome, 170
- Olympia/Olympic
 Games 68–9, 84, 184,
 187, 188
- Olympia Commodea
 (Spartan festival) 117,
 118, 185, 187
- Olynthus 19
- Onasimus (C3 Spartan
 sophist) 182
- Onomarchus (Phocian) 11
- opus testaceum*, see brick
 oracles, see Delphi;
 Ino-Pasiphaë
- Orchomenus (Arcadia) 36,
 50, 86, 89, 174
- Oropus affair 87
- Orthia, see Artemis Orthia
- paidonomos*, see *agōgē*
- Paeonius (C5 BC
 Mendesian sculptor) 138
- paganism, Sparta as late-
 antique bastion of 124,
 183, 193–7
- painters/painting 96, 128,
 188
- palaces 69;
 of Nabis, 69
- Palaea, see Pleiae
- Pamisus (river/valley) 5
- panegyriarch, see Urania
- Panhellenion, organization
 of Greek cities 112–13,
 139;
 and civic
 jurisdiction 154;
 Spartan
 Panhellenes 167

- panhellenism9, 13, 16, 19, 20, 22, 65, 75
- Panthales, *see* Pomponius Panthales
- pantomime189
- Parnon, east foreland of34, 57, 63, 86, 136–7
- Parthia/Parthians191; Spartan contingents against115, 118–19 *passim*; *see also* Persia
- patronomate/patronomoi*106, 140, 153, 168, 171, 173, 175; and *agōgē*201–2; created by Cleomenes III51–2, 58, 201–2; foreigners as113, 208; of Hadrian,108, 113; as liturgy168; of Lycurgus121
- Pausanias (Agiad king)46
- Pausanias (Agiad regent) 29–30, 191, 192
- Pausanias (Antonine traveller and author)3, 100, 112, 127, 141, 171, 193, 196; his historical context208–9; and Spartan political system143–4, 147
- Peaces of Antalcidas/the King4, 6, 20; Common (*koinē eirēnē*) 7–8, 17, 18; of Phoenice67
- pedigrees *see* tradition, invention of
- Pellana*12, 64, 75, 141
- Pellene23
- Peloponnese7, 14, 19, 20, 21, 27, 30, 31, 48, 52, 80, 81, 96, 97, 101
- Peloponnesian League6, 11, 36, 54
- Pelopidas3
- Pelops (Eurypontid king), 62, 65, 68
- Pelops (son of Laodamas, C2 BC notable)174–5
- Pergamenes/
Pergamum29, 59, 72, 75, 77; *see also* Attalids
- Perioeci and Agis IV45; and Cleomenes III52, 57, 58; Laconian4, 4–5, 6, 12, 14, 22, 23, 23–4, 34, 48, 71, 72, 75, 76, 88, 90; Messenian14; slaves of48; *see also* Laconia; Leagues...
- Eleutherolaconian, 'of the Lacedaemonians'
- Perseus of Macedon84–5
- Persia/Persian empire4, 6, 18–19, 20, 31, 36, 68; Julian and124–5; satraps8, 20; Sparta and Persian Wars115, 118, 190–3; *see also* Parthia
- Persian Stoa127, 191
- Peutinger Table*140, 152
- Phaenicia Aromata (C1 resident of Gytheum)140
- Phalaeus (Phocian)13
- Pharsalus, battle of95
- Pherae (Kalamata, Messenia)117; C2 dispute with Sparta139; as Spartan colony144–5
- phiditia*, *see* Sparta/
Spartans...messes
- Phigalea36
- Philip II of Macedon8, 11, 13, 17, 18–19, 27, 32, 55; and Laconia14, 18, 57
- Philip V of Macedon59, 61, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 73, 74, 75; and Nabis74
- Philippi, battle of95, 138
- Philippus (Spartan client of Cicero)94, 162
- Philomelus (Phocian)10, 11
- Philopoemen (Megalopolitan)66–7, 83; on Crete66; and Sparta72, 77–8, 80
- philosophers/philosophy (at Roman Sparta)178–80 *passim*, 182–3, 205, 210
- Philostratus (Flavius)106–7, 149, 172, 173, 193, 200, 208, 209
- philotimia* (zealous ambition)105, 159, 174, 202
- Phliasians/Phlius12, 50
- Phocians/Phocis9, 10, 11, 12, 13
- Phoebaeum, *see* Dioscuri
- Phoenice, *see* Peaces
- Phoenicia/Phoenicians20
- Phylarchus (writer)34, 35, 38, 42, 47, 49, 54, 60
- piracy/pirates65, 71, 96, 97
- Pitana (obe/village/ward of Sparta)118, 131–2, 133; as tribe203
- 'Pitanate *lokhos*'118
- Pius (emperor)114
- plague, at C2 Sparta?116
- Plataea/Plateaans113, 127, 191, 192; battle of53, 191; *see also* Eleutheria; Persia
- Platanistas (ephebic battleground)130, 201, 205, 207
- Pleiae(=Palaea?)137–8

- Pleistoanax (Agiad king)29
 Pliny the younger150
 Plutarch25, 28, 34, 37, 48,
 57, 103, 177, 191, 192,
 200;
 and Sparta107, 178–
 180
 poetry/poets (at Roman
 Sparta)187–8
 Pohoidan/Poseidon,
 alleged descendants
 of164;
 Taenarius at Sparta99;
 at Taenarum21, 48
 Polichna (Poulithra)63
polis, alleged C4 BC ‘crisis’
 of5–6, 18
 Polyaeus (Macedonian
 strategist)115
 Polybius38, 49, 57, 60, 62,
 64, 65, 66, 69, 72, 80,
 84, 85, 87, 89, 136, 137
 Polyperchon26, 27
 Pompeii (Spartan élite
 family)164
 Pompeius Macer (C1
 Mytilenaeen senator)
 102
 Pompeius Spatalus, Sex.
 (C3 notable)121
 Pompey the Great95, 96
 Pomponia Callistonice
 (C3 hereditary priestess)
 137
 Pomponii (Spartan élite
 family)120;
 as landowners138;
 priesthoods and164
 Pomponius Panthales
 Diogenes Aristeas, C.
 (C3 notable)120–1, 124,
 158
 Pontus,180–1;
 see also Mithradates VI
 Popillius Laenas, C. (cos.
 172 BC)85
 population6;
 of Roman city133, 170;
 of territory141
 portrait-herms121;
 see also statues
 Poseidon, see Pohoidan
 pottery24, 72;
 Megarian bowls72
 Prasiae (Leonidhi Skala)
 14, 63
 priests/priestesses,
 hereditary Spartan137,
 164–5, 167, 178–9, 195
probouleusis, see Gerousia;
gerontes
 processions137–8
prokritos (provincial juror)
 146
*proxenia/proxenois*12, 86,
 153, 174–5, 183, 197
 Ptolemy I Soter27, 32
 Ptolemy II Philadelphus35,
 36, 37
 Ptolemy III Euergetes I41,
 54, 57
 Ptolemy IV Philopator58,
 61
 Ptolemy Ceraunus32
 Publius Optatianus (C4
 governor of Achaia)123
 Punt (Somalia), spice
 from71
 Puteoli114, 172
 Pydna, battle of85
 Pyrrhus (Epirote king)32–
 3, 33–4, 57
 Pythagoras (brother of
 Apia)69, 75
 Quinctius Flamininus, T.
 (cos. 198 BC)14;
 Isthmian
 proclamation74, 75, 85;
 and Macedon74–7;
 and Nabis65, 67, 74,
 75–6, 76–7
 religion, ancestral117, 190,
 193–7;
 revival of99, 164–5;
 women and200–1;
 see also altar(s);
 dead, disposal of;
 festivals;
 hero-cults;
 Imperial cult;
 paganism;
 priests;
 processions;
 sacrifice;
 temple-building
 renaissance, Greek, in
 Roman Empireviii, 107–
 8, 180, 190
 revolution, definitions
 ofvii, 39–40, 53, 64,
 79, 116;
 see also Spartans/
 Sparta...stasis
 Rhadamanthys (demigod)
 98
 Rhadamanthys (son of
 Eurycles)98
 rhetoric/rhetors176–7,
 181, 210;
 and *ephebia*205;
 at Plataea191;
 Spartan contest for188
rhētra of Lysander (C3 BC
 ephor)44, 45;
 in Roman Sparta143
 Rhodes/Rhodians29, 59,
 75, 101, 110, 210;
 Spartan festival-
 embassy to114
 roads, public140, 152;
 see also *Peutinger Table*;
 Sparta (city)...streets
 romanization (at Sparta),
 of Euryclids103;
 of jurisdiction154–5;
 material and
 cultural135–6;
 see also *equites*;
 Latin language;
 senators

- Romans/Rome 46, 59–211 *passim*;
 and Achaean League vii, 75–6, 78, 81, 84, 89;
 city of 184;
 demands on provinces 96–7, 116;
 and Greek intellectuals 177;
 kinship with Sparta alleged 76;
 Senate 59, 74, 75, 76, 80, 81, 84, 85, 86, 138–9;
 settlement of Greece 146/5 BC 93–4, 198;
 and Spartan myth 95, 114, 115, 143, 150, 208–9;
see also Achaia, province of; Aetolia; businessmen, Roman; citizenship, Roman; emperors; empire; liturgies; military service; taxation
- Sacred Wars 9–10, 11, 13
- Sagalassus (Pisidia), kinship with Sparta alleged 119
- Samos 25, 114
- Sarapis, cult of at Sparta, 110, 131, 193
- sarcophagi, Attic 132–3, 144, 169;
 Spartan imitations 133, 172
- Sardinia 61
- Sardis 186, 187, 189
- Sassanian Persia, *see* Persia
- Scias, *see* Sparta (city)
- Sciritis 4, 14, 86, 136
- Scotites 141
- scribes, public 165
- sculpture 171;
 architectural 129;
 for gardens 135;
 funerary 118, 132–3;
 reliefs from Amyclae 194;
see also sarcophagi; statues
- Second Athenian League 4, 12, 17
- Second Sophistic 107–8, 191;
see also rhetoric/rhetors; sophists
- seers 164, 183;
see also Iamids; mantic families
- Seleucia-on-the-Calycadnus (Pisidia) 186, 189
- Seleucus I 29, 32
- Selge (Pisidia), concord with Sparta 119
- Sellasia 57, 63, 73;
 battle of 57, 59, 61, 67, 95
- Sempronius Atratinus, L. (legate of Antony) 96
- Senate, *see* Romans
- senators, Spartan 161, 169
- Severus (emperor) 117–18, 187
- Sicilians/Sicily 5, 9, 27, 59, 61
- Sicyon 41, 54, 188, 206
- siege-warfare 22, 27, 29, 33–4, 66–7, 72
- silver 17, 21, 35, 55, 72
- sitēsis*, *see* maintenance, public
- sitōnai/sitōnia* 152–3, 157, 158
- slavery/slaves 18, 48, 56, 64, 69–70, 78, 90, 102, 165, 166, 172, 211;
 public 115;
threptoi 154–5
- Smyrna, concord with Athens and Sparta 117;
 dedication of at Sparta 174
 social conflict *see* Spartans/Sparta...*stasis*
- social mobility in Roman Sparta 166–7
- Social War (220–17 BC) 61, 62, 64
- songs, traditional 194, 195, 209
- sophists, Spartan 182;
see also Apsines; Onasimus
- Sosibius (Spartan antiquary) 176–7
- Sosylus (C3 BC Spartan historian) 64
- Soteria (Delphic festival) 37
- Sozomenus (brother of Nicocles the grammarian) 124
- Sparta/Spartans, age-sets 203;
 army 46, 50, 53, 62, 70;
 assembly 10, 43, 44, 61, 62, 65, 140, 144–8 *passim*, 159, 199;
 citizenship 24, 25, 42, 47, 52–3, 61, 75, 79, 160, 163–75, 188–9;
 coinage/ money/public finance 10, 35, 45, 54–5, 68, 71, 96–8 *passim*, 101, 102, 109, 111, 116, 117, 121, 144, 147, 155–6, 169, 193–5 *passim*, 197;
 constitution of Roman Sparta 143–59 *passim*, 162, 198;
 as cultural centre 176–89 *passim*;

- diplomacy13, 37, 65,
 82, 94, 109, 114, 150,
 171, 196, 197;
 economy70,
 Roman period97, 105,
 116, 120, 122–3, 134,
 169–75, 185, 210;
 fleet72;
 ‘free city’ status93–4,
 96, 102, 115, 149–55
passim, 172;
 frontiers (Roman
 period)100, 101, 114,
 136–40, 152;
 grain-supply108, 130,
 152–3, 172;
 harbour139–40;
 jurisdiction at153–5;
 kingship36, 43, 45, 51,
 62, 63, 64, 68, 95, 143;
 messes (*phiditia*,
suskania),41, 46, 52,
 78, 106, 199–200;
*oliganthrōpia*6, 13, 24,
 37, 43, 66;
 social structure
 (Roman period)160–8;
*stasis*18, 46, 59, 83,
 101, 116, 125;
 territory6, 8, 14, 24, 25,
 34, 44, 57, 76, 86, 88,
 114, 136–42;
 tribes203;
 women12–13, 33, 34,
 43, 48, 76, 200–1, 205–
 6;
see also agōgē;
 clothing;
 ephors;
 Gerousia;
 land-tenure;
 magistrates;
 pederasty;
 population
 Sparta (city)5, 127–38,
 214–25;
 acropolis216, 217, 220;
 agora127–8, 156, 191,
 194;
 archives
 (*grammatophulakion*)
 112, 127, 144, 147,
 157, 178, 217;
 baths83, 129, 132, 135,
 222–5;
 burials (intramural)72,
 132, 222;
 gates127;
 houses137, 222, 223,
 224, 225;
 invasions of,7, 33–4,
 57, 77;
 markets72, 130–1, 134,
 157–8, 217;
 mosaics123, 131–2,
 185;
 obes203, 206;
see also Cynosura,
 Limnae, Mesoia,
 Neopolitae;
prutaneion (Old
 Ephoreia)127, 199;
 ‘Roman stoa’218;
 Scias144, 147;
 size133;
 streets123, 140, 217;
 theatre37, 102, 105,
 128–9, 133, 156–7,
 161, 171, 185, 192,
 217–18;
 walls26–7, 31, 63, 71–
 2, 75, 76, 78, 82, 84,
 94, 111, 122, 126, 133,
 217;
 water-supply72, 109,
 122–3, 130, 216;
see also urbanization
 Spartiaticus, *see* Iulius
 Spartiaticus, C.
sphaereis (ballplayers),
 activities of205;
 age of203;
 and bideoi201;
 origins206–7;
 and sacrifice129–30;
 social status of211
 Sphaerus of Borysthenes51,
 52, 207
*spondophoroi*146
 Staius Murcus, L.
 (Republican admiral)96
 Statilii (Epidaurian family)
 175
 Statilius Lamprias, T. (C1
 Epidaurian)128, 161,
 162, 175, 181
 statues, cult119, 125, 183,
 194, 196;
 honorific121, 132, 158,
 159, 171, 180, 189,
 190, 194, 197, 206, 210
 Stephanus of Byzantium
 119 Stilicho (Roman
 general)170
 stoas218;
see also Persian Stoa;
 Sparta (city)...‘Roman
 stoa’
 Strabo70, 98, 99, 101, 139,
 141, 165, 169, 177, 203
 Suetonius94
 Sulpicius Galus, C. (cos.
 166 BC)86
 Sulpicius Rufus, Ser. (C1
 BC governor of Greece)
 94, 149
*sunarkhia/sunarkhiai*144–6,
 151
*sundikoi*155
*sunephēboi*167, 203;
see also agōgē;
kasen
sunthutai, *see* festivals
 Synnada, kinship with
 Sparta alleged114, 119
 Syracusans/Syracuse14, 27,
 69
 Syria/Syrians165, 178, 182
 Tabae (Caria), concord
 with Sparta119
 Tacitus101, 102, 138

- Taenarius48
 Taenarum47, 63;
 Cape99;
 mercenaries at21, 25,
 30;
 New, *see* Caenepolis;
 see also Pohoidan
 Tarentum189;
 as Spartan colony13–
 14, 30, 76, 114
 Taygetus, Mt101, 136, 138,
 170, 171
 taxation, Roman
 provincial116, 120, 121,
 151, 159, 172;
 see also liturgies
 Tegea/Tegeans4, 7, 23, 24,
 36, 47, 50, 64, 66, 73,
 136
 temple-building193
 Thalamae, *see* Ino-Pasiphaë
 theatre, *see* actors;
 drama/dramatic
 contests;
 Sparta (city)...theatre
 Thebans/Thebes4, 10, 13,
 17, 18, 19;
 see also federalism
 Theopompus (C4 BC
 historian)8
 Thera, kinship with Sparta,
 94, 114
 Therapne141, 142, 186;
 see also Menelaëum
thermai, *see* Sparta (city)...
 baths
 Thermopylae11, 90;
 battle of (480 BC)191,
 193
 Thespieae3, 4, 116, 169
 Thessalians/Thessaly7, 10,
 11, 25, 26
 Thessalonice165, 186
 Thibron27
 Thrace/Thracians22, 23,
 29, 54
threptoi (foundlings), *see*
 slavery
 Thucydides (historian)54,
 73, 134
 Thuria (Messenia)139,
 153–4, 156, 174;
 as Spartan colony139,
 144–5
 Thyreatis14, 34
 Tiberius (emperor), and
 Dentheliatris139;
 and Euryclids100, 139
 tiles68, 71–2, 104, 171
 Timocrates75
 Timolaus (Spartan *xenos* of
 Philopoemen)78
 Tisamenus (C3 *mantis*)183
 tourism, cultural94, 194,
 207–10;
 and agora127;
 and food supply170;
 and souvenirs172;
 see also L.Aemilius
 Paullus
 trade/traders35, 70, 71,
 134, 140, 151, 152, 155,
 170, 171–3;
 see also imports;
 Sparta (city)...markets
 tradition, invention ofviii–
 ix, 38, 58, 190–
 211*passim*;
 discontinuity masked
 by143;
 genealogies98, 110,
 162–4, 183, 195;
 Spartan mirage/
 myth40, 76, 78–9;
 see also antiquarianism;
 Lycurgus (the
 lawgiver);
 Romans/Rome
 Trajan (emperor)105, 110,
 193–4
 Tralles94
 Trapezus180
 Troezen32
 Troilus (C2/3 Spartan
 trader)173
 Tyndares (Spartan friend
 of Plutarch)162, 178–80
 Tyndaridae, cult of178
 Tyre27
 Tyros34
 Ulpius Genialis, M. (C3
 Thracian notable)181
 Urania (festival)106, 161,
 185–6, 188, 192, 195–6
 urbanization71, 133–4;
 and agriculture142,
 152;
 and trade172;
 and water-supply134;
 see also Sparta (city)
 Valerius Flaccus, L. (C1
 governor of Asia)94
 Varro (M. Terentius)130–1
 Verus, L. (emperor)115,
 116, 191
 Vespasian (emperor)105,
 129
 Vibullii (Corinthian
 family)110
 Vibullius Pius, L.
 (Corinthian notable)
 110, 175;
 see also Iulius Eurycles
 Herculanus, C.
 villas, on Spartan plain142
 vineyards/wine133, 225
 Volusene Olympiche (C2
 priestess)195
 Voluseni (Spartan élite
 family)97, 162;
 and Gytheum140;
 marriages175
 walls, *see* Sparta (city)
 wheat152, 153, 170
 wild animals170
 women, Spartan, *see*
 gunaikonomos;
 Sparta/Spartans
 wood,86;

- see also* forest
writers, Spartan 176–7
- Xenarchides (son of
 Damippus, C2 notable)
 140
xenia 78, 179
Xenophon 9, 14, 41
xystarchs 189;
 see also athletes
- Zarax (Ieraka) 34, 63, 174
Zeus, Bulaeus 146;
 at Olympia 84;
 Olympius at
 Sparta 109–10, 131;
 Uranius, *see* Urania
Zeuxippus (friend of
 Plutarch) 178–80
Zosimus (pagan historian)
 124, 125, 126