A HISTORY OF THE POPES FROM THE GREAT SCHISM TO THE SACK OF ROME. A.D. 1378-1525

Mandell Creighton
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By M. CREIGHTON
My aim in this book is to bring together materials for a judgment of the change which came over Europe in the sixteenth century, to which the name of “The Reformation” is loosely given. I have attempted to do this from a strictly historical point of view,—by which I mean that I have contented myself with watching events and noting the gradual development of affairs. I have taken the history of the Papacy as the central point for my investigation, because it gives the largest opportunity for a survey of European affairs as a whole. I have not begun with the actual crisis itself, but have gone back to trace the gradual formation of opinions which were long simmering below the surface before they found actual expression. I purpose, if opportunity should be given me, to continue my survey in succeeding volumes to the dissolution of the Council of Trent.

I have begun with a period of general helplessness, when men felt that the old landmarks were passing away, but did not see what was to take their place. The period of the Great Schism in the Papacy was but a reflection of similar crises in the history of the chief states of Europe. Dreary as the history of the Schism may be, its records show that it gave a great impulse to European thought. The existence of two Papal Courts doubled Papal taxation and produced a deep-seated feeling of the need for some readjustment in the relations of the Papacy towards national churches. The attempts to heal the Schism led to a serious criticism of the Papal system by orthodox theologians, and to an examination of primitive usage which was fruitful for later times. The difficulties experienced in finding any way out of the dilemma called the attention of statesmen to the anomaly of the existence of an irresponsible and indeterminable power. The theological and political basis of the Papacy was discussed, and Europe did not forget the results of the discussion. The power of the State, which at least rested on intelligible grounds, interfered somewhat rudely to heal the breaches of an institution whose pretensions were so lofty that its mechanism, once disordered, could not be amended from within.

The result of many experiments and much discussion was the establishment of a General Council as the ultimate court of appeal. Unsuccessful through its crudity at Pisa, the conciliar system asserted itself at Constance, and was strong enough to answer its immediate purpose, and end the Schism. But when it had done this, it could do nothing more. The abolition of ecclesiastical grievances was beyond its power. Men could not discover the interests of Christendom, because they were overlaid by conflicting interests of classes and nations. The Council, which expressed in the fullest manner the unity of Christendom, showed that that unity was illusory. The conciliar principle was set up as a permanent factor in the organization of the Church, and men hoped that it might be more fortunate in the future.

The condition of Europe and the fortunes of the Papacy offered a brilliant opportunity to the Council of Basel. In some things it succeeded; but it was helpless to reorganize the Church. It attacked, instead of reforming, the Papacy: it proposed to hand over the Church to a self-constituted parliament. The Council of Constance failed because it represented Christendom too faithfully, even to its national dissensions. The Council of Basel failed because, in its endeavor to avoid that danger, it represented nothing save the pretensions of a self-elected, self-seeking body of ecclesiastics.
The failure of the Council of Basel showed the impossibility of reforming the Church from within. But though the General Councils could not carry out a conservative scheme of reform, they succeeded in checking movements which, in their attempts to remedy abuses, set up new theories of the Church and of its government. Ideas originated by Wycliffe in England afforded a basis for a national movement in Bohemia, which in political as well as in ecclesiastical matters filled Europe with alarm. Bohemia, victorious but exhausted, was drawn to a compromise, and the flame was reduced to smoldering embers.

The pacification of Bohemia and the failure of the conciliar movement gave the opportunity for a Papal restoration, which was conducted with great ability by two remarkable Popes, Nicolas V and Pius II. They succeeded in rooting out the remnants of opposition, in re-establishing the Papal monarchy, and in opening out new paths for its activity. As the patron of the New Learning, and the leader of Christendom against the Turks, the Papacy was influential and respected. But the condition of European affairs was not hopeful for any great enterprise. The death of Pius II left the exact sphere of the future action of the Papacy still doubtful.

Such is the thread of connection which runs through these volumes. The vastness of the undertaking is a bar to anything like completeness in its execution. I cannot claim to have done more than given a specimen of European history, even in its relations to my subject. Much that is interesting has been omitted, much that is dull has been told at length. My omissions and my details are intentional. I have enlarged on points, not because they are interesting to the modern observer, but because they formed part of the political experience of those who molded the immediate future. I have dwelt at greatest length upon the relations of the Papacy with Germany and Italy. German affairs are important as showing the experience of the German reformers of the past dealings of the Papacy with the German Church and State. On the other hand, the intricacies of Italian politics explain the secularization of the Papacy to which the reformers pointed as their justification.

The circumstances of my life have not allowed me to make much research for new authorities, which in so large a field would have been almost impossible. What I have found in MS. was not of much importance. Respecting the main points which I have treated, the amount of material available is very large.

My work has been written under the difficulties which necessarily attend one who lives far from great libraries, and to whom study is the occupation of leisure hours, not the main object of life. I am conscious of many deficiencies, yet I thought it better to commit my volumes to the press rather than wait for opportunities which might never occur.

On the difficult question of the spelling of proper names I am afraid that I have not been so consistent as I hoped to be. I have tried to use the name by which I thought a man was called by his contemporaries; but I see, when it is too late, that I have occasionally called a man by different titles without explanation, and have sometimes wavered in my spelling. In the case of Cardinals especially, who went by many names amongst their contemporaries, it is difficult always to maintain consistency.

I have to thank many friends for their assistance. Professor Stubbs was an unfailing refuge in case of difficulties. Professor Mayor of Cambridge gave me valuable advice. Mr. Hodgkin’s friendly sympathy has constantly cheered me. But my greatest debt of
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Embleton Vicarage,

Chathill,

Northumberland: July 12, 1882
INTRODUCTION
I. THE RISE OF THE PAPAL POWER 10
II. THE POPES AT AVIGNON. 26

BOOK I
THE GREAT SCHISM. 1378-1414

I. URBAN VI, CLEMENT VII, AND THE AFFAIRS OF NAPLES. 39
II. CLEMENT VII & BONIFACE IX. RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS IN OXFORD AND PARIS. 1389-1394. 62
III. BONIFACE IX & BENEDICT XIII. ATTEMPTS OF FRANCE TO HEAL THE SCHISM. 1394-1404. 82
IV. INNOCENT VII & BENEDICT XIII. TROUBLES IN ITALY AND FRANCE. 1404-1406. 101
V. GREGORY XII & BENEDICT XIII. NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE RIVAL POPES. 1406-1409. 108
VI. THE COUNCIL OF PISA. 1409. 122
VII. ALEXANDER V. 1409-1410. 136
VIII. JOHN XXIII. 1410-1414. 141

BOOK II
THE COUNCIL OF CONSTANCE. 1414-1418.

I. THE COUNCIL OF CONSTANCE AND JOHN XXIII. 1414-1415. 155
II. DEPOSITION OF JOHN XXIII. 1415-1415. 169
III. RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS IN ENGLAND AND BOHEMIA 178
IV. JOHN HUSS IN BOHEMIA 1398—1414 185
V. THE COUNCIL OF CONSTANCE AND THE BOHEMIAN REFORMERS 1414—1416 196
VI. SIGISMUND’S JOURNEY, AND THE COUNCIL DURING HIS ABSENCE. 1415-1416. 213
VII. THE COUNCIL OF CONSTANCE AND THE ELECTION OF MARTIN V. 1417. 222
VIII. MARTIN V AND THE REFORMATION AT CONSTANCE—END OF THE COUNCIL. 1417-1418. 234
BOOK III
THE COUNCIL OF BASEL. 1419-1447.

I. MARTIN V AND ITALIAN AFFAIRS. 1418-1425. 246
II. MARTIN V AND THE PAPAL RESTORATION. BEGINNINGS OF EUGENIUS IV. 425-1432. 258
III. BOHEMIA AND THE HUSSITE WARS . 1418-1431 265
IV. FIRST ATTEMPT OF EUGENIUS IV TO DISSOLVE THE COUNCIL OF BASEL. 1431—1434. 279
V. THE COUNCIL OF BASEL AND THE HUSSITES . 1432-1434. 297
VI. EUGENIUS IV AND THE COUNCIL OF BASEL. NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE GREEKS AND THE BOHEMIANS . 1434—1436. 312
VII. WAR BETWEEN THE POPE and THE COUNCIL. 1436—1438. 327
VIII. EUGENIUS IV IN FLORENCE AND THE UNION OF THE GREEK CHURCH. 1434—1439. 341
IX. THE GERMAN DECLARATION OF NEUTRALITY AND THE ELECTION OF FELIX V. 1438—1439. 357
X. EUGENIUS IV. AND FELIX V. 1440-1444. 369

BOOK IV.
THE PAPAL RESTORATION. 1444—1464.

I. AENEAS SYLVIUS PICCOLOMINI AND THE RESTORATION OF THE OBEEDIENCE OF GERMANY. 1444-1447. 380
II. NICOLAS V AND THE AFFAIRS OF GERMANY . 1447-1453 402
III. NICHOLAS Y AND THE FALL OF CONSTANTINOPLE . 1453-1455 422
IV. NICOLAS V AND THE REVIVAL OF LEARNING 434
V. CALIXTUS III, 1455—1458 444
VI. PIUS II AND THE CONGRESS OF MANTUA. 1458-1460. 456
VII. PIUS II . AFFAIRS OF NAPLES AND GERMANY. 1460—1461. 476
VIII. PIUS II . FRANCE AND BOHEMIA. 1461—1464 490
IX. CRUSADE AND DEATH OF PIUS II. 1464. 509
BOOK V.

THE ITALIAN PRINCES.

1464—1518.

I. PAUL II. A.D. 1464—1471.
II. PAUL II AND HIS RELATIONS TO LITERATURE AND ART.
III. SIXTUS IV AND THE REPUBLIC OF FLORENCE. 1471—1480.
IV. ITALIAN WARS OF SIXTUS IV. 1481—1484.
V. INNOCENT VIII. 1484—1492.
VI. BEGINNINGS OF ALEXANDER VI. 1492—1494.
VII. CHARLES VIII IN ITALY. 1494—1495.
VIII. ALEXANDER VI AND SAVONAROLA. 1495—1498.
IX. ALEXANDER VI AND THE PAPAL STATES. 1495—1499.
X. ALEXANDER VI AND CESARE BORGIA. 1500-1502.
XI. DEATH OF ALEXANDER VI. 1503
XII. THE FALL OF CESARE BORGIA. PIUS III—JULIUS II. 1503-1504.
XIII. FIRST PLANS OF JULIUS II. 1504—1506.
XIV. THE LEAGUE OF CAMBRAI. 1506-1510.
XV. THE WARS OF JULIUS II. 1510-1511.
XVI. THE HOLY LEAGUE. 1511-1513.
XVII. ROME UNDER JULIUS II.
XVIII. CONTEST OP BISHOPS AND MONKS. 1513—1515
XIX. FRANCIS I IN ITALY. 1515—1516.
XX. CLOSE OF THE LATERAN COUNCIL. 1517.

BOOK VI.

THE GERMAN REVOLT. 1517—1527.

I. HUMANISM IN GERMANY
II. THE REUCHLIN STRUGGLE
III. THE RISE OF LUTHER
IV. THE IMPERIAL ELECTION
V. THE DIET OF WORMS 888
VI. THE DEATH OF LEO X 909
VII. ADRIAN VI 921
VIII. THE BEGINNINGS OF CLEMENT VII 950
IX. JUNE-JULY, 1525. THE SACK OF ROME 971
INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I
THE RISE OF THE PAPAL POWER

The change that passed over Europe in the sixteenth century was due to the development of new conceptions, political, intellectual, and religious, which found their expression in a period of bitter conflict. The state-system of Europe was remodeled, and the mediaeval ideal of a united Christendom was replaced by a struggle of warring nationalities. The Papal monarchy over the Western Church was attacked and overthrown. The traditional basis of the ecclesiastical system was impugned, and in some countries rejected, in favor of the authority of Scripture. The study of classical antiquity engendered new forms of thought and created an enquiring criticism which gave a new tendency to the mental activity of Europe.

The processes by which these results were achieved were not isolated but influenced one another. However important each may be in itself; it cannot be profitably studied when considered apart from the reaction of the rest. The object of the following pages is to trace, within a limited sphere, the working of the causes which brought about the change from mediaeval to modern times. The history of the Papacy affords the widest field for such an investigation; for the Papacy was a chief element in the political system and was supreme over the ecclesiastical system of the Middle Ages, while round it gathered much that was most characteristic of the changing intellectual life of Europe.

The period which we propose to traverse may be defined as that of the decline of the Papal monarchy over Western Europe. The abasement of the Papacy by the Great Schism of the fourteenth century intensified Papal aggression and wrought havoc in the organization of the Church. The schemes of reform which consequently agitated Christendom showed a widespread desire for change. Some of these movements were held to pass beyond reform to revolution, and were consequently suppressed, while the plans of the conservative reformers failed through national jealousies and want of statesmanship. After the failure of these attempts at organic reform the chief European kingdoms redressed their most crying grievances by separate legislation or by agreements with the Pope. A reaction, that was skillfully used, restored the Papacy to much of its old supremacy; but, instead of profiting by the lessons of adversity, the Papacy only sought to minimize or abolish the concessions which had been wrung from its weakness. Impelled by the growing feeling of nationality, it sought a firm basis for itself as a political power in Italy, whereby it regained prestige in Europe, and identified itself with the Italian mind at its most fertile epoch. But by its close identification with Italy, the Papacy, both in national and intellectual matters, drifted apart from Germany; and the result was a Teutonic and national rebellion against the Papal monarchy — a rebellion so far successful that it divided Europe into two opposing camps, and brought to light differences of national character, of political aim and intellectual ideas, which had grown up unnoticed till conflict forced them into conscious expression.
Important as this period may be, it deals only with one or two phases of the history of the Papacy. Before we trace the steps in the decline of the Papal monarchy, it will be useful to recall briefly the means by which it rose and the way in which it was interwoven with the state-system of Europe.

The history of the early Church shows that even in Apostolic times the Christian congregations felt a need of organization. Deacons were chosen by popular election to provide for the due ministration of Christian benevolence, and elders were appointed to be rulers and instructors of the congregation. As the apostles passed away, the need of presidency over meetings of the representatives of congregations developed the order of bishops and led to the formation of districts within which their authority was exercised. The political life which had been extinguished under the Roman Imperial system began reviving in the organization of the Church, and the old feeling of civic government found in the regulation of ecclesiastical affairs a new field for its exercise. A line of separation was gradually drawn between the clergy and the laity, and the settlement of controversies concerning the Christian faith gave ample scope for the activity of the clerical order. Frequent assemblies were held for the discussion of disputed points, and the preeminence of the bishops of the chief cities was gradually established over other bishops. The clergy claimed authority over the laity; the control of the bishop over the inferior clergy grew more definite; and the bishop in turn recognized the superiority of his metropolitan. In the third century the Christian Churches formed a powerful and active confederacy with an organized and graduated body of officials.

The State looked on this new power with suspicion, which at times passed into persecution. Persecution only strengthened the organization of the Church and brought into prominence the depth of its influence. As soon as it became clear that, in spite of persecution, Christianity had made good its claim to be ranked as a power amongst men, the Empire turned from persecution to patronage. Constantine aimed at restoring the Imperial power by removing its seat to a new capital, where it might rise above the traditions of its past. In the new Rome by the Bosphorus the old memories of freedom and of paganism were alike discarded. The gratitude of a Christian people to a Christian Emperor, combined with the servile ideas of the East to form a new foundation for the Imperial power on a ground cleared from those restraints which the past history of the city of Rome seemed to impose on claims to irresponsible sway. The plan of Constantine so far succeeded as to erect a compact power in the East, which withstood for centuries the onslaughts of the barbarian invaders who swept over Western Europe. But though Rome was left widowed of her Imperial splendor, the memories of empire still hung around her walls, and her barbarian conquerors bowed before the awe inspired by the glories of her mighty past. In the rise of the Papacy on the spot left desolate by the Empire, the mysterious power of the old city claimed the future as her own by breathing her stern spirit of aggression into the power of love and brotherhood which had begun to bind the world into a vaster system than even the Roman Empire had created.

Moreover, in the East the Imperial system had no intention of conferring on the new religion which it adopted a different position from that held by the old referred religion which it had laid aside. Christianity was still to be a State religion, and the Emperor was still to be supreme. The internal development of Oriental Christianity strengthened these Imperial claims. The subtlety of the Oriental mind busied itself with speculations as to the exact relationships involved in the doctrine of the Trinity, and the exact connection between the two natures of Christ. A feverish passion for logical
definition seized clergy and laity alike, and these abstruse questions were argued with unseemly heat. Patriarchs hurried into rash assertions, which calmer enquiry showed to be dangerous: and the patriarchates of the East lost respect among the orthodox because their holders had been at times associated with some shallow or over-hardy doctrine. As the struggles waxed fiercer in the East, men’s eyes turned with greater reverence to the one patriarch of the West, the Bishop of Rome, who was but slightly troubled by the conflicts that rent asunder the Eastern Church. The practical tendency of the Latin mind was comparatively free from the temptations to over-speculation which beset the subtle Greek.

The barbarian settlements in the West called out a missionary zeal which was concerned with enforcing the great moral principles of religion on the consciences of men rather than attempting to commend its details to their intelligence by acuteness of definition. The Western Church, which recognized the precedence of the Bishop of Rome, enjoyed the blessings of inward peace, and more and more frequently were questions referred from the troubled East to the decision of the Roman bishop.

The precedence of the Bishop of Rome over other bishops was a natural growth of the conditions of the times. The need of organization was forced upon the Church by internal discords and the hardships of stormy days: the traditions of organization were a bequest from the Imperial system. It was natural that the Council of Sardica (A.D. 347) should entrust Bishop Julius of Rome with the duty of receiving appeals from bishops who had been condemned by synods, and ordering, if he thought fit, a fresh trial. It was natural that the Council of Chalcedon (A.D. 451) should accept the letter brought by the legates of Leo the Great as an orthodox settlement of the weary contests about the union of the divine and human natures in the person of Christ. The prestige of the Imperial city, combined with the integrity, impartiality, and practical sagacity of its bishops, won for them a general recognition of precedence.

The fall of the shadowy Empire of the West, and the union of the Imperial power in the person of the ruler of Constantinople, brought a fresh accession of dignity and importance to the Bishop of Rome. The distant Emperor could exercise no real power over the West. The Ostrogothic kingdom in Italy scarcely lasted beyond the life-time of its great founder, Theodoric. The wars of Justinian only served to show how scanty were the benefits of the Imperial rule. The invasion of the Lombards united all dwellers in Italy in an endeavor to escape the lot of servitude and save their land from barbarism. In this crisis it was found that the Imperial system had crumbled away, and that the Church alone possessed a strong organization. In the decay of the old municipal aristocracy the people of the towns gathered round their bishops, whose sacred character inspired some respect in the barbarians, and whose active charity lightened the calamities of their flocks.

In such a state of things Pope Gregory the Great (AD 590-604) raised the Papacy to a position of decisive eminence and makes the marked out the course of its future policy. The piety of emperors and nobles had conferred lands on the Roman Church, not only in Italy, but in Sicily, Corsica, Gaul, and even in Asia and Africa, until the Bishop of Rome had become the largest landholder in Italy. To defend his Italian lands against the incursions of the Lombards was a course suggested to Gregory by self-interest; to use the resources which came to him from abroad as a means of relieving the distress of the suffering people in Rome and Southern Italy was a natural prompting of his charity. In contrast to this, the distant Emperor was too feeble to send any effective help against
the Lombards, while the fiscal oppression of his representatives added to the miseries of the starving people.

The practical wisdom, administrative capacity, and Christian zeal of Gregory I led the people of Rome and the neighboring regions to look upon the Pope as their head in temporal as well as in spiritual matters. The Papacy became a national center to the Italians, and the attitude of the Popes towards the Emperor showed a spirit of independence which rapidly passed into antagonism and revolt.

Gregory I was not daunted by the difficulties nor absorbed by the cares of his position at home. When he saw Christianity threatened in Italy by the heathen Lombards, he boldly pursued a system of religious colonization. While dangers were rife at Rome, a band of Roman missionaries carried Christianity to the distant English, and in England first was founded a Church which owed its existence to the zeal of the Roman bishop. Success beyond all that he could have hoped for attended Gregory’s pious enterprise. The English Church spread and flourished, a dutiful daughter of her mother-church of Rome. England sent forth missionaries in her turn, and before the preaching of Willibrod and Winifred heathenism died away in Friesland, Franconia, and Thuringia. Under the new name of Boniface, given him by Pope Gregory II, Winifred, as Archbishop of Mainz, organized a German Church, subject to the successor of S. Peter.

The course of events in the East also tended to increase the importance of the See of Rome. The Muhammadan conquests destroyed the Patriarchates of Antioch and Jerusalem, which alone could boast of an apostolical foundation. Only Constantinople remained as a rival to Rome; but under the shadow of the Imperial despotism it was impossible for the Patriarch of Constantinople to lay claim to spiritual independence. The settlement of Islam in its eastern provinces involved the Empire in a desperate struggle for existence. Henceforth its object no longer was to reassert its supremacy over the West, but to hold its ground against watchful foes in the East. Italy could hope for no help from the Emperor, and the Pope saw that a breach with the Empire would give greater independence to his own position, and enable him to seek new allies elsewhere.

An opportunity was not long in coming. The great Emperor, Leo the Isaurian, in his endeavor to organize afresh the shattered mechanism of the Imperial system, saw the need of rescuing Oriental Christianity from an effeminate sentimentalism which sapped its strength. A spirit of ecstatic and transient devotion had taken the place of a serious sense of the hard duties of practical life. By ordering the restriction of images to the purpose of architectural ornaments, Leo hoped to infuse into his degenerate people some of the severe puritanism which marked the followers of Mohammed. He hoped, moreover, by enforcing his decree, to assert the power of the Emperor over the Church, and so to strengthen the Imperial authority. In the East his edict met with serious opposition; in the West it was regarded as a needless and unauthorized interference of the Imperial power in the realms of Church government. Combining political and ecclesiastical animosity, Pope Gregory II loudly protested against the execution in Italy of the imperial decree. The Romans drove from the walls the imperial governor, and the Pope was left undisputed head of the Imperial city of the West.

In this abeyance of the Empire the Lombard King naturally aspired to seize the vacant dignity, and the only possible help for Italy was to be found in the Frankish kingdom, which, under the strong rule of kingdom, the house of Pippin of Landen (A.D.
740-756), had renewed its early vigor. In consolidating his power Pippin the Short saw the usefulness of ecclesiastical organization as a means of binding to the Frankish monarchy the German tribes across the Rhine. Through the labors of Boniface, the apostle of the Germans, the Papacy reaped a rich return for Gregory I’s gift of Christianity to the English by the formation of an alliance between the Pope and the ruler of the Franks. There were more ways than one in which these two vigorous powers could help each other. Pippin wished to set aside in name, as he had done in deed, the Merovingian line, which still held the titular sovereignty of the Franks. Relieved from their scruples by the supreme priestly authority of the Pope, the Franks elected Pippin, who had hitherto been Mayor of the Palace, as their king; and the bishops gave peculiar solemnity to this transfer of national allegiance by the ceremony of anointing the new sovereign with holy oil. Soon Pope Stephen III asked for help in his turn, and fled to Pippin before the triumphant advance against Rome of the Lombard King.

Pippin recognized his obligations to the Pope. In two campaigns he beat back the Lombard King and made him relinquish his conquests. Wishing, moreover, to give a signal token of his gratitude, he bestowed on the Pope the territory which the Lombards had won from the Emperor, the district reaching along the eastern coast from the mouth of the Po to Ancona. Thus the possessions of the Emperor passed into the hands of the Pope, and their acquisition gave definiteness to the temporal power which circumstances had gradually forced upon the Papacy. On the other hand, the Imperial suzerainty over Italy devolved on the Frankish King, and the vague title of Patrician of Rome, bestowed on Pippin by the Pope as representative of the Roman people, paved the way for the bestowal of the full Imperial title of the West upon Pippin’s more famous son.

Charles the Great, son of Pippin, extended still further the power and renown of the Frankish monarchy, till he won for himself a position which was in Papacy and truth imperial over Western Europe. He crushed the last remains of the Lombard power in Italy, and extended over the Papacy his protecting arm. Leo III fled across the Alps to beg for protection against his foes, who had attempted a murderous outrage upon him. Charles led back the Pope in triumph to the rebellious city, where on Christmas Day, 800, as he knelt in S. Peter’s Church in the garb of a Roman Patrician, the Pope advanced and placed upon his head a golden crown, while the Church rang with the shout of the assembled Romans, “Long life and victory to Charles Augustus, crowned by God, great and pacific Emperor!” In such strange fashion did the city of Rome assume once more its right of setting up an emperor, a right which, since the time of Romulus Augustulus, it had been content to leave to the new Rome in the East.

Everything tended to make this step both easy and natural. The Eastern Empire was in the hands of a woman, and was sunk for the time both in feebleness and moral decay. The Germans, on the contrary, were united for the first time into a strong power, and were ruled by a vigorous hand. No longer was there any antagonism between Germans and Latins: they had found the need in which each stood of the other, and were joined in firm alliance. The coronation of Charles corresponded to the ambition of Latins and Germans alike. To the Latins it seemed to be the restoration to Rome and to Italy of their former glory; to the Germans it was the realization of the dream which had floated before the eyes of the earliest conquerors of their race. To Latins and Germans alike it was at once the recognition of their past achievements and the earnest of their future greatness. No one could have foreseen that the power which would reap the greatest benefit was that represented by him who, in his twofold capacity of chief magistrate of
the city of Rome and chief priest of Christendom, placed the crown on the head of the kneeling Charles, and then fell prostrate before him in recognition of his high Imperial dignity.

The coronation of Charles may be explained on grounds of temporal expediency; but it also had its root in the ideal aspirations of men’s hearts, an ideal which was partly a memory of the world-wide organization of the old Roman Empire, and partly an expression of the yearning for universal brotherhood which Christianity had taught mankind. It put into definite form the belief in the unity of Christendom, which was the leading principle in mediaeval politics till it was shattered by the movement which ended in the Reformation. It was natural to express this theory in the form of outward organization, and to set up by the side of a Catholic Church, which was to care for the souls of all Christian people, a universal empire, which was to rule their bodies. No disappointment was rude enough to show men that this theory was but a dream. They were not so much concerned with actual practice: it was enough for them that the theory was lofty and noble.

The establishment of this great symbol of a united Christendom could not but produce ultimately an accession to the Papal dignity, though under Charles himself the Pope held the position of a grateful subordinate. The Empire was the representation of God’s kingdom on earth; the Emperor, not the Pope, was the vicegerent of the Most High; the Pope was his chief minister in ecclesiastical affairs, standing in the same relation towards him as did the high priest towards the divinely-appointed king of the Jewish theocracy. But the strong hand of Charles was needed to keep his Empire together. Under his feeble successors local feeling again made head against the tendencies towards centralization. The name of Emperor became merely an ornamental title of him who, in the partition of the dominions of Charles, obtained the kingdom of Italy. Under the degenerate rulers of the line of Charles, it was impossible to look upon the Empire as the representation on earth of the kingdom of God.

It was at this time that the Papacy first stood forward as the center of the state-system of Europe. The Empire had fallen after having given an expression, as emphatic as it was brief, to the political ideas that lay deep in the minds of men. The unity embodied in the Empire of Charles had been broken up into separate states; but it still was possible to combine these states into a theocracy under the rule of the Pope. The theory of the Papal monarchy over the Church was not the result merely of grasping ambition and intrigue on the part of individual Popes; it corresponded rather to the deep-seated belief of Western Christendom. This desire to unite Christendom under the Pope gave meaning and significance to the Forged Decretals bearing the name of Isidore, which formed the legal basis of the Papal monarchy. This forgery did not come from Rome, but from the land of the Western Franks. It set forth a collection of pretended decrees of early councils and letters of early Popes, which exalted the power of the bishops, and at the same time subjected them to the supervision of the Pope. The Pope was set forth as universal bishop of the Church whose confirmation was needed for the decrees of any council. The importance of the forgery lay in the fact that it represented the ideal of the future as a fact of the past, and displayed the Papal primacy as an original institution of the Church of Christ.

The Papacy did not originate this forgery; but it made Pope haste to use it. Pope Nicolas I (AD 858-867) claimed and exercised the powers of supreme ecclesiastical authority, and was happy in being able to exercise them in the cause of moral right. The
Frankish Church was willing to allow the profligate king Lothar II to put away his wife that he might marry his mistress. The Pope interfered, sent delegates to enquire into the matter, deposed the Archbishops of Koln and Trier, and forced Lothar into an unwilling submission. In like manner he interposed in the affairs of the Eastern Church, withstood the Emperor, and sided with the deposed Patriarch of Constantinople. On all sides he claimed for his office a decisive supremacy.

Meanwhile the Empire fell still lower in prestige and power. The Papacy, allying with the feudal feeling of the great vassals who were striving to make the Frankish kingship elective, declared the Empire to be elective also. Charles the Bald in 875 received the Imperial title from the hands of John VIII as a gift of the Pope, not as a hereditary dignity. If the decay of the Frankish monarchy had not involved the destruction of order throughout Europe, the Papacy might have won its way rapidly to supreme temporal as well as spiritual power. But the end of the ninth century was a time of wild confusion. Saracens, Normans, Slavs plundered and conquered almost at will, and the Frankish kings and the Popes were equally powerless to maintain their position. The great vassals among the Franks destroyed the power of the monarchy. The fall of the Imperial power in Italy deprived the Popes of their protector, and left them helpless instruments in the hands of the Italian nobles, who were called their vassals. Yet, even from its degradation the Papacy had something to gain, as the claims put forth by Nicolas I gained in validity by not being exercised. When Empire and Papacy at last revived, two centuries of disorder threw a halo of immemorial antiquity over the Forged Decretals and the bold assertions of Nicolas I.

From this common abasement the temporal power was the first to rise. The German peoples within the Empire of Charles the Great were at length united the by the urgent necessity of protecting themselves against barbarous foes. They formed a strong elective monarchy, and shook themselves loose from their Romanized brethren, the Western Franks, amongst whom the power of the vassals was still to maintain disunion for centuries. The German kingdom was the inheritor of the ideas and policy of Charles the Great, and the restoration of the Imperial power was a natural and worthy object of the Saxon line of kings. The restoration of the Empire involved a restoration also of the Papacy. But this was not left solely to political considerations. A revival of Christian feeling found a center in the great monastery of Cluny, and the monastic reformers, thoroughly imbued with the ideas of the Forged Decretals, aimed at uniting Christendom under the headship of the Pope. Their immediate objects were to bring back the clergy to purer and more spiritual lives, and to check the secularization of the clerical office which the growing wealth of the Church and the lax discipline of stormy times had gradually wrought. Their cry was for the strict enforcement of the celibacy of the clergy and the suppression of simony. They felt, however, that reform must begin with the head, and that no one could restore the Papacy except the Emperor. Henry III was hailed as a second David, when at the Synod of Sutri he superintended the deposition of three simoniacl or profligate Popes who were struggling for the chair of S. Peter. Then under a noble line of German popes the Papacy was again identified with the highest spiritual life of Christendom, and learned to borrow the strength of the Imperial system, under whose shadow it grew to power.

This condition of tutelage to the Empire could not long continue. The German bishop might be filled with the deepest loyalty to the Emperor; but his ideas and aspirations became enlarged when he was raised to the lofty position of Head of the Church. So soon as the Papacy was re-established it aimed at independence. The next
objects of the reformers were to make Rome the center of the new ideas, to secure for the Papacy a safe position in Rome itself, and to free it from its dependence on the Empire. Their leading spirit was an Italian monk, Hildebrand of Saona, who, both at Rome and Cluny, had studied the reforming policy, and then, with keen and sober appreciation of the task that lay before him, set himself to give it effect. Hildebrand combined the resoluteness that came from monkish discipline with the versatility and clear judgment that mark a statesman. He labored patiently at the task of enforcing ideas which might provide a basis for the Papal power. His aim was to make clear the principles on which the Papal monarchy was to rest, and he trusted to the future to fill in the outline which he was careful to trace distinctly. He had the greatest mark of political genius — he knew how to wait till the full time had come. He maintained the German power in Rome till it had crushed the factious party among the Roman nobles. Then, by entrusting the Papal election to the Cardinal-bishops, priests and deacons, a step was taken which professed to check the turbulence of the Roman people, but which also stopped Imperial interference. An alliance with the Norman settlers in South Italy won to the Papal cause soldiers who had a direct interest in opposing the Imperial claims. The Papacy slowly prepared to assert its independence of Imperial protection.

When at length the time was ripe, Hildebrand ascended the Papal throne as Gregory VII (A.D. 1073-1085). Full of zeal and enthusiasm, he was desirous of carrying out the grandest schemes. He wished to summon an army from the whole of Christendom, which under his leadership should conquer Byzantium, unite the Eastern and Western Churches under one head, and then march triumphantly against the Saracens and expel them from the lands where they had usurped an unlawful sway. A worthy domain was to be secured for the Papal monarchy by the restoration of the old limits of Christendom, and the glories of the brightest age of the Church were to be brought back once more. It was a splendid dream — fruitful, like all that Gregory did, for later times; but with a sigh Gregory renounced his dream for the harsh realities of his actual condition. Men were lukewarm; the Church at home was corrupt; kings and rulers were profligate, careless, and unworthy of a lofty aim. The reforming principles must sink deeper before Western Christendom was fitted for a noble mission. So Gregory VII turned to enforce immediate reforms.

The celibacy of the clergy had long floated before the eyes of Christians as an ideal; Gregory VII called on the laity to make it a reality, and bade them abstain from the ministrations of a married priest, “because his blessing was turned into a curse, his prayer into sin”. In the midst of the storm which this severity aroused, he went on to take rigorous measures against simony, and struck at the root of the evil by forbidding all investiture by laymen to any spiritual office. Gregory VII put forward his ideas in their most pronounced and decided form: he claimed for the Church an entire independence from the temporal power. Nor was this all; as the struggle advanced, he did not hesitate to declare that the independence of the Church was to be found solely in the assertion of its supremacy over the State. We read with wonder the claims which he put forward for the Papacy; but our wonder is changed into admiration when we consider how many of them were realized by his successors. Gregory VII did not aim at securing the Papal monarchy over the Church; that had been established since the days of Nicolas I. He aimed at asserting the freedom of the Church from the worldly influences which benumbed it, by setting up the Papacy as a power strong enough to restrain Church and State alike. In ecclesiastical matters Gregory enunciated the infallibility of the Pope, his power of deposing bishops and restoring them at his own
will, the necessity of his consent to give universal validity to synodal decrees, his supreme and irresponsible jurisdiction, the precedence of his legates over all bishops.

In political matters he asserted that the name of Pope was incomparable with any other, that he alone could use the insignia of empire, that he could depose emperors, that all princes ought to kiss his feet, that he could release from their allegiance the subjects of wicked rulers. Such were the magnificent claims which Gregory VII bequeathed to the mediaeval Papacy, and pointed out the way towards their realization.

Such views as these necessarily led to a struggle between the temporal and spiritual power. The conflict was first with the Empire, which was connected in the most vital way with the Papacy. Gregory VII was happy in his adversary, the profligate and careless Henry IV. Strong as were the opponents whom the rigorous policy of Gregory raised up, the opponents of the misgovernment of Henry were still stronger. The Saxons rose in revolt against a ruler of the house of Franconia; the enemies of the King combined with the Pope, and Henry’s moral weakness gave Gregory the opportunity of impressing by a striking dramatic act his view of the Papal power upon the imagination of Europe. Three days did the humbled monarch in the courtyard of the castle of Canossa sue for absolution from the triumphant Pope. Gregory as priest could not refuse absolution to a penitent, and by obtaining absolution Henry could overthrow the plans of his opponents; but Gregory, as a politician, resolved that the absolution so reluctantly extorted, which frustrated his designs for the present, should work for the future furtherance of his aims. The humiliation of Henry IV was made a type to posterity of the relations between the temporal and spiritual power.

Gregory VII boldly plunged the Papacy into an interminable strife. He was not daunted by the horrors which followed, when Rome was plundered by the Normans whom he summoned to his aid. He died in exile from his capital, still confident in the justice of his aims, and left the fruits of his labors for others to reap.

The course of events in Europe carried away men’s interests to a field where the Papacy came into prominence which there was none to dispute. The outburst of crusading zeal united Christendom for common action, in which the unity of the Church, which had before been a conception of the mind, became a reality, and Europe seemed one vast army under the leadership of the Pope. But, in the pious enthusiasm of Urban II at Clermont, we miss the political wisdom of Gregory VII. Urban could animate but could not guide the zeal with which men’s hearts were full; and, instead of the scheme of organized conquest which Gregory VII had mapped out, he kindled a wild outburst of fanaticism which led only to disillusionment. Yet the movement corresponded too closely to men’s desires for any failure to extinguish it. The old roving spirit of the Teutons was turned into a new channel by its alliance with revived zeal for the Church. The materialism of the Middle Ages long sought to find the spirit of Christ in local habitation of those fields which His feet had trodden. So long as the crusading movement lasted, the Papacy necessarily occupied the chief place in the politics of Europe.

Other influences were also at work which tended to strengthen the building which Gregory VII had raised. Gregory had gathered around him a school of canonists whose labors put into legal form the pretensions which he had advanced. The University of Bologna, which became the great center of legal teaching throughout Western Europe, imbibed and extended the ideas of the Isidorian Decretals, and of the Hildebrandine Canonists. From Bologna issued in the middle of the twelfth century the Decretum of
Gratian, which was accepted throughout the Middle Ages as the recognized code of canon law. It embodied all the forgeries which had been made in the interests of the Papacy, and carried to its logical consequences the Hildebrandine system. Moreover, the University of Paris, the center of mediaeval theology, developed a system of theology and philosophy which gave full recognition to the Papal claims. In law and philosophy alike men’s minds were led up to the acknowledgment of the Papal supremacy as the necessary foundation both of Christian society and thought.

The struggle about investiture ended, as was to be expected, in a compromise but it was a compromise in which all the glory went to the Papacy. Men saw that the Papal claims had been excessive, even impossible; but the object at which they aimed, the freedom of the Church from the secularizing tendencies of feudalism, was in the main obtained. The conflict aroused by Gregory VII deepened in men’s minds the sense of spiritual freedom; and if it did not set up the Church as independent of the State, at least it saved it from sinking into a passive instrument of royal or aristocratic oppression. But the contest with the Empire still went on. One of the firmest supporters of Gregory VII had been Matilda, Countess of Tuscany, over whose fervent piety Gregory had thrown the spell of his powerful mind. At her death, she bequeathed her possessions, which embraced nearly a quarter of Italy, to the Holy See. Some of the lands which she had held were allodial, some were fiefs of the Empire; and the inheritance of Matilda was a fruitful source of contention to two powers already jealous of one another. The constant struggle that lasted for two centuries gave full scope for the development of the Italian towns. Courted first by one side, and then by the other, they learned how to wring privileges from the Emperor in return for the help they gave him; and when the Imperial pretensions became irksome, they sided with the Pope against their common foe. The old Italian notion of establishing municipal freedom by an equilibrium of two contending powers was stamped still more deeply on Italian politics by the wars of Guelfs and Ghibellins.

The union between the Papacy and the Lombard Republics was strong enough to humble the mightiest of the Emperors. Frederick Barbarossa, who held the strongest views of the Imperial prerogative, had to confess himself vanquished by Pope Alexander III, and the meeting of Pope and Emperor at Venice was a memorable ending to the long struggle; that the great Emperor should kiss the feet of the Pope whom he had so long refused to acknowledge, was an act which stamped itself with dramatic effect on the imagination of men, and gave rise to fables of a still more lowly submission. The length of the strife, the renown of Frederick, the unswerving tenacity of purpose with which Alexander had maintained his cause, all lent luster to this triumph of the Papacy. The consistent policy of Alexander III, even in adverse circumstances, the calm dignity with which he asserted the Papal claims, and the wisdom with which he used his opportunities, made him a worthy successor of Gregory VII at a great crisis in the fortunes of the Papacy.

It was reserved, however, for Innocent III to realize most fully the ideas of Hildebrand. If Hildebrand was the Julius, Innocent was the Augustus, of the Papal Empire. He had not the creative genius nor the fiery energy of his great forerunner; but his clear intellect never missed an opportunity, and his calculating spirit rarely erred from its mark. A man of severe and lofty character, which inspired universal respect, he possessed all the qualities of an astute political intriguer. He was lucky in his opportunities, as he had no formidable antagonist; among the rulers of Europe his was the master mind. In every land he made the Papal power decisively felt. In Germany,
France, and England, he dictated the conduct of the Kings. His very success, however, was fraught with danger for the future. In England, the Pope might treat the kingdom as a fief of the Holy See; but when he attempted to use the Papal power in his vassal’s aid against the old liberties of the land, he awakened a distrust of the Papacy which quickly grew in English hearts. On all sides Innocent III enjoyed successes beyond his hopes. In the East, the crusading zeal of Europe was turned by Venice to the conquest of Constantinople, and Innocent could rejoice for a brief space in the subjection of the Eastern Church. In the West, Innocent turned the crusading impulse to the interest of the Papal power, by diverting it against heretical sects which, in Northern Italy and the South of France, attacked the system of the Church. These sectaries consisted of men opposed partly to the rigidity of sacerdotalism, partly to the intellectual narrowness of the Church doctrine, partly to the immoral and unspiritual lives of the clergy; others again had absorbed Manichaean heresies and vague Oriental mysticism; while others used these sects as a cover for antinomian views, for religious heedlessness, and profligacy of life. Looked at from the point of view of our own day, they seem a strange mixture of good and evil; but from the point of view of the Middle Ages they were a spectacle which could only be regarded with horror. They destroyed the unity of religious belief and practice; and, without the visible unity of the Church Christianity became in men’s eyes a mockery. It was in vain to hope for God’s blessing on their arms against the infidels in the Holy Land, if they allowed unbelievers within the pale of Christendom to rend asunder Christ’s seamless coat. Innocent III did not speak in vain when he proclaimed a crusade against the Count of Toulouse, whose dominions afforded the chief shelter to these heretics. Political jealousy and a desire for booty strengthened religious fanaticism; the storm of war swept over the smiling fields of Languedoc, and the taint of heresy was washed away in blood. From this time forward the duty of seeking out heretics and bringing them to punishment became a prominent part of the episcopal office.

Moreover Innocent saw the beginning, though he did not perceive the full importance, of a movement which the reaction against heresy produced within the Church. The Crusades had quickened men’s activity, and the heretical sects had aimed at kindling greater fervor of spiritual life. The old ideal of Christian duty, which had grown up among the miseries of the downfall of the Roman world, gave way to an impulse towards more active zeal. By the side of the monastic aim of averting, by the prayers and penitence of a few, God’s anger from a wicked world, there grew up a desire for self-devotion to missionary labor. Innocent III was wise enough not to repulse this new enthusiasm, but find a place for it within the ecclesiastical system. Francis of Assisi gathered round him a crusade against the infidels in the Holy Land, if they allowed unbelievers within the pale of Christendom to rend asunder Christ’s seamless coat. Innocent III did not speak in vain when he proclaimed a crusade against the Count of Toulouse, whose dominions afforded the chief shelter to these heretics. Political jealousy and a desire for booty strengthened religious fanaticism; the storm of war swept over the smiling fields of Languedoc, and the taint of heresy was washed away in blood. From this time forward the duty of seeking out heretics and bringing them to punishment became a prominent part of the episcopal office.
supersede the old ecclesiastical order. Not only amongst the common people, but in the universities as well, did their influence become supreme. They were a vast army devoted to the service of the Pope, and overran Europe in his name. They preached Papal indulgences, they stirred up men to crusades in behalf of the Papacy, they gathered money for the Papal use. Nowhere could the Pope have found more effective servants.

Innocent III did not realize the full importance of these new helpers; and even without them he raised the Papacy to its highest level of power and respect. The change which he wrought in the attitude of the Papacy may be judged from the fact that, whereas his predecessors had contented themselves with the title of Vicar of Peter, Innocent assumed the name of Vicar of Christ. Europe was to form a great theocracy under the direction of the Pope.

If Innocent III thus realized the Hildebrandine ideal of the Papacy, he at the same time opened up a dangerous field for its immediate activity. Innocent III may be called the founder of the States of the Church. The lands with which Pippin and Charles had invested the Popes were held subject to the suzerainty of the Frankish sovereign and owned his jurisdiction. On the downfall of the Carolingian Empire the neighboring nobles, calling themselves Papal vassals, seized on these lands; and when they were ousted in the Pope’s name by the Normans, the Pope did not gain by the change of neighbors. Innocent III, was the first Pope who claimed and exercised the rights of an Italian prince. He exacted from the Imperial Prefect in Rome the oath of allegiance to himself; he drove the Imperial vassals from the Matildan domain, and compelled Constance, the widowed queen of Sicily, to recognize the Papal suzerainty over her ancestral kingdom. He obtained from the Emperor Otto IV (1201) the cession of all the lands which the Papacy claimed, and so established for the first time an undisputed title to the Papal States.

Innocent was an Italian as well as a Churchman. As a Churchman he wished to bring all the kings and princes of Europe into submission to the Papal power; as an Italian he aimed at freeing Italy from foreign rulers, and uniting it into one State under the Papal sway. In this new sphere which Innocent opened up lay the great danger of Innocent’s successors. The Papal monarchy over the Church had won its way to universal recognition, and the claim of the Papacy to interfere in the internal affairs of European States had been established. It was natural for the Papacy at the height of its power to strive after a firm territorial basis on which to rest secure; what had been gained by moral superiority must be kept by political force. However distant nations might tremble before the Papal decrees, it often happened that the Pope himself was exiled from his capital by the turbulent rabble of the city, or was fleeing before foes whom his Imperial antagonist could raise against him at his very gates. The Papacy was only obeying a natural instinct of self-preservation in aiming at a temporal sovereignty which would secure it against temporal mishaps.

Yet the whole significance of the Papacy was altered when this desire to secure a temporal sovereignty in Italy became a leading feature of the Papal policy. The Papacy still held the same position in the eyes of the of men, and its existence was still held necessary to maintain the fabric of Christendom; but a Pope straining every nerve to defend his Italian possessions did not appeal to men’s sympathies. So long as the Papacy had been fighting for ecclesiastical privileges, or for the establishment of its own dignity and importance, it had been fighting for an idea which in the days of feudal
oppression awakened as much enthusiasm as does a struggle for freedom in our own day. When the Papacy entered into a war to extend its own possessions, it might win glorious victories, but they were won at a ruinous cost.

The Emperor Frederick II, who had been brought up under Innocent’s guardianship, proved the greatest enemy of the newly-won sovereignty of the Pope. King of Sicily and Naples, Frederick was resolved to assert again the Imperial pretensions over Italy, and then win back the Papal acquisitions in the center; if his plan had succeeded, the Pope would have lost his independence and sunk to be the instrument of the house of Hohenstaufen. Two Popes of inflexible determination and consummate political ability were the opponents of Frederick. Gregory IX and Innocent IV flung themselves with ardor into the struggle, and strained every nerve till the whole Papal policy was absorbed by the necessities of this strife. Europe groaned under the exactions of Papal tax-gatherers, who, under the old pretense of a crusade, wrung money from the ecclesiastics of every land. The great interests of Christendom were forgotten in the struggle for self-preservation, and the temporal and spiritual power changed places in Europe. Instead of the Pope, the pious King of France, Louis IX, led the last crusading expeditions against the infidels, and in his saintly deeds, rather than in the by-ways of Papal policy, men found the highest Christian ideal of their age. The Papacy baffled the plans of Frederick II, but Europe had to pay the costs of a struggle with which it felt no sympathy, and the moral prestige of the triumphant Papacy was irrevocably lowered.

Frederick II died, but the Popes pursued with their hostility his remotest descendants, and were resolved to sweep the very remembrance of him out of Italy. To accomplish their purpose, they did not hesitate to summon the aid of the stranger. Charles of Anjou appeared as their champion, and in the Pope’s name took possession of the Sicilian kingdom. By his help the last remnants of the Hohenstaufen house were crushed, and the claims of the Empire to rule over Italy were destroyed for ever. But the Papacy got rid of an open enemy only to introduce a covert and more deadly foe. The Angevin influence became superior to that of the Papacy, and French popes were elected that they might carry out the wishes of the Sicilian king. By its resolute efforts to escape from the power of the Empire, the Papacy only paved the way for a connection that ended in its enslavement to the influence of France.

Immersed in narrow schemes of self-interest, the Popes lost their real strength in the respect and sympathies of Europe. Instead of being the upholders moral of ecclesiastical independence, they became the oppressors of the clergy and the infringers of ecclesiastical rights. Hence, in France, lawyers developed a fruitful conception of the liberties of the Gallican Church — freedom of patrons from Papal interference, freedom of election to chapters, and a prohibition of Papal taxation except with the consent of the Church and the Crown. Instead of being the upholders of civil liberty, the Popes ranked with the princes of Europe and had no sympathy with the cause of the people. In England, during the Barons’ War the Papacy was on the side of its pliant ally, Henry III, and steadily opposed all efforts to check his feeble misgovernment The great English Churchmen, on the other hand, sided with the Barons, and the English Church was the strongest element in the struggle against royal oppression. Similarly, in Italy, the Popes deserted the party which in each city was striving to maintain municipal freedom against foreign aggressors, or too powerful nobles at home. When the Empire had been reduced to feebleness, the Popes had no more need of their republican allies, but were intolerant of civic liberties. Hence they were so short-sighted as to permit the suppression of republican constitutions by powerful lords, and to allow dynasties to
establish, within the Papal States, a sway which proved to be the greatest hindrance to the assertion of the Papal sovereignty.

In this career of purely political enterprise the Papacy again became associated with the factions of contending families in Rome, till in 1202 the assembled Cardinals were so equally divided between the parties that they found it impossible to elect. At last, in utter weariness, they chose a holy hermit of the Abruzzi, Piero da Morrone, whose fame for piety was in the mouths of men. The Pontificate of Celestine V, for such was the name Morrone assumed, might seem to be a caricature on the existing state of the Papacy. A man had been elected Pope by a sudden impulse solely for his holiness: no sooner was he elected than the Cardinals felt that holiness was not the quality most requisite for the high office of Head of the Church. Never did election awaken more enthusiasm among the people, yet never was Pope more powerless for good. Ignorant of politics, of business, of the ways of the world, Celestine V became a helpless instrument in the hands of the King of Naples. He gave up the government of the Church to others, and bestowed his favors with reckless prodigality. The crowd thronged around him whenever he went abroad to crave his blessing; a new order, the Celestinians, was founded by those who were eager to model their life on his; but the Cardinals groaned in secret dismay over the perils with which his incompetence threatened the Papacy. After a pontificate of five months he abdicated, to the joy of the Cardinals, and to the grief of the people, which showed itself in hatred for his successor. Henceforth it was clear that the Papacy had become a great political institution: its spiritual significance had been merged in its worldly importance. It needed a statesman to baffle princes by his astuteness, not a saint to kindle by his holiness spiritual aspirations among the masses.

Celestine’s successor, Boniface VIII, attempted, when it was too late, to launch the Papacy upon a new career. Though endowed with all the fire of Gregory VII, and with the keen political instincts of Innocent IV, he failed to understand either the disastrous results of the policy of his predecessors, or the hidden strength of the opposition which it had kindled. The Papacy had destroyed the Empire, but in its victory had fallen with its foe. In overthrowing the Empire it had weakened the outward expression of the idea on which its own power was founded, and had first used, and then betrayed, the growing feeling of nationality, which was the rising enemy of the mediaeval system. When Boniface VIII aimed at absorbing into the Papacy the Imperial power, when he strove to weld together Europe into a great confederacy, over which the Pope was to preside, at once the head of its religion and the administrator of a system of international law, he only brought to light the gulf which had been slowly widening between the aims of the Papacy and the aspirations of Europe. His weapons were the weapons of this world, and though his utterances might assume the cover of religious phrases, his arts were those of an adventurous politician. First he resolved to secure himself in Rome, which he did by the remorseless overthrow of the Colonna family. In the rest of Italy he aimed at bringing about order by crushing the Ghibellins and putting the Guelfs in power. He called in French help to restore the unity of the Sicilian kingdom, which had been broken by the rebellion of 1282, and Charles of Valois overthrew the Ghibellins in Florence, and drove Dante into exile; but, beyond drawing on himself and the Pope the hatred of the Italian people, he accomplished nothing.

While these were his measures in Italy, Boniface VIII advanced with no less boldness and decision elsewhere. He demanded that the Kings of England and France should submit their differences to his arbitration. When they refused he tried to make
war impossible without his consent by cutting off one great source of supplies, and
issued a bull, forbidding the taxation of the clergy, except by the consent of the Pope. But in England Boniface was repelled by the vigorous measures of Edward I, who taught the clergy that, if they would not contribute to the maintenance of civil government, they should not have the advantages of its protection. In France, Philip IV retaliated by forbidding the export of gold or silver from his realm without the royal consent. Boniface was thus cut off from the supplies which the Papacy raised for itself by taxation of the clergy. Even while professing to fight the battle of clerical privilege, Boniface could not carry with him the staunch support of the clergy themselves. They had experienced the fiscal oppression of Pope and King equally, and found that the Pope was the more intolerable of the two. If they had to submit to the tender mercies of one or the other, the King was at least more amenable to reason. For a time Boniface had to give way; but circumstances soon seemed to favor him. A quarrel arose between Edward I and Philip IV, from which both wished to withdraw with credit. Boniface, not in his Papal, but in his individual capacity, was appointed arbitrator. In giving his award he assumed the character of a Pope, and pronounced the penalty of excommunication against those who infringed its conditions. Moreover, he took up the position of an absolute superior in the affairs of the German kingdom, where he disallowed the election of Albert of Austria. In England he claimed to interfere in the settlement of Edward’s relations towards Scotland. Edward submitted the Pope’s letter to Parliament, which replied to Boniface that the English kings had never answered, nor ought to answer, about their rights to any judge, ecclesiastical or civil. The spirit of national resistance to the claims of the Papacy to exercise supremacy in temporal matters was first developed under the wise government and patriotic care of Edward I.

Yet Boniface could not read the signs of the times. He was misled by the outburst of popular enthusiasm and religious zeal which followed the establishment of a year of jubilee in 1300. The crusading age was past and gone; but the spirit that animated the Crusades still survived in Europe. The restless desire to visit a holy place and see with their bodily eyes some guarantee of the reality of their devotion, drove crowds of pilgrims to Rome to earn by prayers and offerings the promised absolution for their sins. Others since the days of Boniface have been misled as to the real strength of a system, by taking as their measure the outbursts of feverish enthusiasm which it could at times call forth. Men trampled one another to death in their eagerness to reach the tombs of the Apostles; yet in three short years the Vicar of S. Peter found no one to rescue him from insult and outrage.

The breach between Boniface VIII and Philip IV went on widening. As the Pope grew more resolute in asserting his pretensions, the King gathered the French clergy and people more closely around him. The growth of legal studies had raised up a class of lawyers who could meet the Pope on his own ground. As he fortified himself by the principles of the canon law, the French legists rested on the principles of the old civil law of Rome. The canon law, in setting up the Pope as supreme over the Church, had but followed the example of the civil law, which traced its own origin to the Imperial pleasure. The two systems now met in collision, and their fundamental identity rendered compromise impossible. Angry bulls and letters followed one another. The Pope furbished up all the weapons in his armory. On doctrinal grounds he asserted that, “as God made two lights, the greater light to rule the day, and the lesser light to rule the night”, so He set up two jurisdictions, the temporal and the spiritual, of which the spiritual is greater, and involves the temporal in point of right, though not necessarily in
point of use. On historical grounds he asserted: “Our predecessors have deposed three Kings of France, and if any King did the wrong which they did, we would depose him like a servant”. Against this was set up the intelligible principle, that in things temporal the King held his power subject to God alone. Both sides prepared for extremities. Philip’s lawyers accused the Pope of heresy, of crime, of simony, and appealed to a General Council of the Church. Boniface excommunicated Philip, and prepared to pronounce against him the sentence of dethronement, releasing his subjects from their allegiance. But Philip’s plans were cunningly laid, and he had Italian craft to help him. The day before the bull of deposition was to have been published, Boniface was made prisoner by a band of Philip’s adherents. The exiled Italian, Sciarra Colonna, planned the attack, and the acuteness of the Tolosan, Guillaume de Nogaret, one of Philip’s lawyers, helped to make its success complete. As he sat, unsuspecting of evil, in the retirement of his native Anagni, Boniface was suddenly surprised and maltreated, without a blow being struck in his behalf. It is true that on the third day of his captivity he was rescued; but his prestige was gone. Frenzied, or heart-broken, we know not which, he died a month after his release.

With Boniface VIII fell the mediaeval Papacy. He had striven to develop the idea of the Papal monarchy into a definite system. He had claimed for it the noble position of arbiter amongst the nations of Europe. Had he succeeded, the power which, according to the mediaeval theory of Christendom, was vested in the Empire, would have passed over to the Papacy no longer as a theoretical right, but as an actual possession; and the Papacy would have asserted its supremacy over the rising state-system of Europe. His failure showed that with the destruction of the Empire the Papacy had fallen likewise. Both continued to exist in name, and set forth their old pretensions; but the Empire, in its old aspect of head of Christendom, had become a name of the past or a dream of the future since the failure of Frederick II. The failure of Boniface VIII showed that a like fate had overtaken the Papacy likewise. The suddenness and abruptness of the calamity which befell Boniface impressed this indelibly on the minds of men. The Papacy had first shown its power by a great dramatic act; its decline was manifested in the same way. The drama of Anagni is to be set against the drama of Canossa.
CHAPTER II.
THE POPES AT AVIGNON.

We speak loosely of the Reformation as though it were a definite event; we ought rather to regard the fall of the Papal autocracy as the result of a number of political causes which had slowly gathered strength. The victory of the Papacy over Frederick II marked the highest point of its power: the beginning of the fourteenth century saw the rise of new ideas which gradually led to its fall. The struggle of Philip IV against Boniface VIII was carried on by new weapons — by appeals to political principles. The rights of the State were asserted against the claims of the Papal monarchy, and the assertion was made good. The Papacy had advanced to power partly by religious, partly by political means; and the Papal claims rested on principles which were drawn partly from texts of Scripture, partly from historical events in the past. To overthrow the Papal monarchy both of these bases had to be upset.

The ideas of the Middle Ages had to make way for the ideas of the Renaissance before it was possible for men to grasp the meaning of Scripture as a whole, and found their political as well as their social life upon a wide conception of its spirit. But this was the second part of the process, for which the first part was necessary. Before men advanced to the criticism of Scripture they undertook the criticism of history. Against the Papal view of the political facts and principles of the past, the men of the fourteenth century advanced new principles and interpreted the facts afresh.

The mediaeval conception of the Papal power was set forth by Thomas of Aquino. His ideal of government was a constitutional monarchy, strong enough to keep order, not strong enough to become tyrannical. The object of Christian society is to lead men to eternal salvation, and this work is done by the priests under the rule of the Pope. Under the Old Testament dispensation priests had been subject to kings; under the New Testament dispensation kings are subject to priests in matters pertaining to Christ's law. The king must see that such things as are necessary for the salvation of his people are cared for, and that things contrary thereto are forbidden. If a king is heretical or schismatic, the Church must deprive him of his power, and by excommunicating him release his subjects from their allegiance. The Church which is thus to lead the State must be ruled by a monarchy strong enough to preserve the unity of the faith, and decide in matters that arise what is to be believed and what condemned (nova editio symboli). In the Pope is vested the authority of the universal Church, and he cannot err; according to Christ's words to Peter, "I have prayed for thee that thy faith fail not". Against such ideas the struggle of Boniface VIII and Philip IV produced a reaction, which may be seen in the De Monarchia of Dante, who in behalf of the Empire asserted the claims of the temporal against the spiritual power. Dante's Empire was the ideal creation of unity, peace, and order, which floated before the mediaeval mind. The empire, he argues, is necessary for the good of mankind, since the end of society is unity, and unity is only possible through obedience to one head. This empire belongs of right to the Roman people who won it, and what they won Christ sanctioned by being born into it; further He recognized its legitimacy by receiving at the hands of a Roman judge the sentence by which He bore our sorrows. The assertions of those who maintain
that the Empire does not come immediately from God, but mediately through the Pope, are not to be received; they are founded on the Decretals and other traditions which came after the Church, and could not therefore confer on the Church any rights which it did not previously possess. The foundation of the Church is Christ; the Empire existed before the Church, which received from Christ no authority over the Empire, and therefore possesses none; “yet”, he ends, “let Caesar be reverent to Peter, as the first-born son should be reverent to his father”. Dante’s arguments are scholastic and obscure, resting frequently on merely verbal grounds; but the importance of the De Monarchia lies in the fact that, against the Decretals and against the current interpretation of Scripture, it founds a political system on the basis of reason and of historical fact. The form of the book is mediaeval, but a modern spirit of political dignity breathes through its pages.

Dante’s De Monarchia is but a specimen of the writings which the conflict of Boniface III and Philip IV called forth. Aegidius Colonna, who became Archbishop of Bourges, and John of Paris, a Dominican monk, asserted the independent existence of the temporal and the spiritual power, since both alike came from God, and each has its own sphere of action; in many points the priesthood must be subject to the monarchy, and in no way could it be shown that the Papacy had any jurisdiction over the realm of France. John of Paris went further and argued that, as Christ exercised no dominion in temporal matters, no priest could, on the ground of being Christ’s vicar, exercise a power which his Master never claimed. In these and such like arguments there is an attempt to reach the facts of primitive Christianity, and use them as a means of criticizing the Papal claims to universal monarchy.

These attacks upon the Papal position were not the only mischief which the assertion of Boniface VIII brought upon the Papacy. The Papacy had destroyed the Empire, but failed in its attempt to establish itself in the place of the Empire as the undoubted head over the rising nationalities of Europe. It was worsted by France, and as a consequence fell under French influence. When Philip IV pursued his victory and devised the scheme of getting the Papal power into the hands of a nominee of his own, he met with little difficulty. Clement V, an Aquitanian by birth, shrank before the troubles which Philip IV easily contrived to stir up in Italy, and for greater safety took up his abode at Avignon — a city held by Charles II of Naples as Count of Provence. It was, however, so near the boundaries of the French King as to be practically under his influence; and it marked a mighty breach with the tradition of the past when the seat of the Papacy was removed from the world-city of its ancient glories.

It is at first a cause of some surprise that the Papacy did not suffer more than it did from the transference of its seat to Avignon. But, though deprived of strength, it still had the prestige of past importance, and could exercise considerable influence when opportunity offered. Clement V was powerless against Philip IV: he had to consent to recognize the validity of everything that Philip IV had done against his predecessor; he had to revoke the obnoxious bulls of Boniface VIII, and even to authorize an enquiry into his life and character; he had to lend himself as a tool to the royal avarice in suppressing the order of the Knights Templars. But, in spite of their disasters, the Papacy and the Empire were still the centers of European politics. No one ventured to think it possible to diminish their claims to greatness; it was rather a struggle which nation should succeed in using them for its own purposes. France had secured a strong hold upon the Papacy, and wished to become master also of the Empire. Philip IV strove to procure the election of his brother, Charles of Valois, and so gave the Pope a
new means of asserting his importance. Charles was not elected, and the King found it wise not to press the Pope too far. At Avignon the Pope was subject to the influence of the French King; but he was at least personally secure, and could afford to adopt a haughty tone in dealing with other powers. There was no abatement in the lofty language of the Papacy; and when Clement V died, he might have boasted that he handed down the Papal power undiminished to his successors. His position might be ignoble; but he acted with policy and prudence in difficult and dangerous circumstances, and made up for his humility towards the King of France by the arrogance of his attitude towards the Empire.

The success of Henry VII in Italy alarmed King Robert of Naples, and Clement V warmly espoused the cause of his vassal, in whose dominions lay the protecting city of Avignon. The death of Henry VII prevented the quarrel from becoming serious; but on Henry’s death Clement V published a bull declaring that the oath taken by the Kings of the Romans to the Pope was an oath of vassalage, and involved the Papal suzerainty over the Empire. At the same time, during the vacancy of the Empire, the Pope, acting as over-lord, did away with the Ban of the Empire which Henry VII had pronounced against Robert of Naples, and also appointed Robert as Imperial Vicar in Italy. Clement V followed the example of his predecessors in endeavoring to turn into a legal claim the vague talk of former Popes. His death, within a month of the publication of his bull, left the struggle to his successor.

John XXII (1313-1322) entered readily into the struggle, and the disputed election to the Empire, between Lewis of Bavaria and Frederick of Austria, gave him a lucky opportunity of asserting these new claims of the Papacy over the Empire. As an obsequious dependent of the Kings of France and Naples, the Pope was encouraged to put forward against the Empire claims much more arrogant than those which Boniface VIII had ventured to make to Philip IV. The French King hoped to lay hands upon the Empire; the King of Naples wished to pursue his plans in Italy without fear of Imperial intervention. So long as the Pope furthered their purposes, he might advance any arguments or pretensions that he pleased. It was this selfish policy on the part of the princes of Europe that maintained so long the Papal power, and gave the Papacy the means of rising after many falls and degradations. The Papal power and the Papal claims were inextricably interwoven in the state-system of Europe, and the Papacy was a political instrument which any monarch who could command was anxious to uphold.

John XXII claimed to be the rightful ruler of the Empire during the vacancy, and so long as the contest between Lewis and Frederick occupied all the energies of the rival claimants, there was no one to gainsay the Pope. When the Battle of Mühldorf in 1322 gave the victory to Lewis, John resented his assumption of the title of King of the Romans without Papal confirmation, and soon proceeded to his excommunication. In the contest that ensued there was nothing heroic. Papacy and Empire alike seemed the shadows of their former selves. John XXII was an austere and narrow-minded pedant, with no political insight; Lewis was destitute of any intellectual greatness, and knew not how to control the forces which he had at his command. The attack of the Pope upon the Empire was a desperate attempt to gain consideration for the Papacy at the expense of a foe who was supposed to be too weak to make any formidable resistance. But the national feeling of the German people gathered round their King, when it became manifest that the onslaught upon him was made in the interest of France. The lawyers, as before, mustered in defense of the civil power; and unexpected allies came to its
succor, whose help made the contest memorable in the history of the progress of human thought.

Since the abdication of Celestine V the Papacy had drifted further away from its connection with the spiritual side of the life of the Church. The monkish and the ascetism of Celestine and his followers was not a robust form of Christian life, but it was the only one which set itself before the imagination of men. The doctrine of absolute poverty, as held by S. Francis and his followers, was hard to reconcile with the actual facts of life and the Franciscan Order had become divided into two parties, one of which insisted on the rigid observance of the rules of their founder, while the other modified them into accordance with the growing wealth, learning, and importance of their Order. The Pope had striven by judicious measures to hold together these contending parties. But the obvious worldliness of the Papacy estranged from it the more rigid party, the Spiritual Franciscans or Fraticelli, as they were called. In their enthusiastic desire to lead the higher life, they found in Christ and His Apostles the patterns of the lives of Mendicant Friars; and at last the Papacy was brought into open collision with the Franciscan Order. A Dominican Inquisitor at Narbonne condemned for heresy a fanatic who, amongst other things, had asserted that Christ and the Apostles had no possessions, either individually or in common. A Franciscan who was present maintained the orthodoxy of this opinion against the Inquisitor, and the question was taken up by the entire Order. Two General Chapters were held in 1322, which accepted this doctrine as their own, and rested upon a Papal Bull of Nicolas III, 1279. This brought the matter before John XXII; but the luxury and quiet of Avignon made the doctrine of apostolic poverty more intolerable to John than it had been to his predecessors. They had contented themselves with trying to explain it away and evade it; John XXII denounced the opinion as heretical. The more pronounced of the Franciscan body refused to admit the justice of the Papal decision, and clamored against John himself as a heretic.

The question itself may seem of little moment; but the struggle brought to light opinions which in after times were to become of deep importance. As Boniface VIII had developed a temporal, so did John XXII develop a spiritual, antagonism to the Papacy. The Pope was regarded as the head of a carnal Church, degraded by worldliness, wealth and wickedness, against which was set a spiritual Church adorned by simplicity, poverty and godliness. The Spiritual Franciscans gathered round Lewis in his contest with the Pope, and lent a religious significance to the struggle. It was not the doings of either party, but the bold expression of opinions, which made the conflict memorable.

Against the Pope were arrayed men who attacked him in the interests both of the Church and of the State.

From the ecclesiastical side, the General of the Franciscan Order, Michael of Cesena, maintained against the Pope the principles on which his order was founded. In his Tractate against the Errors of the Pope he criticized the Papal utterances, denounced portions of them as erroneous, and appealed against him, as against a heretic, “to the Universal Church and a General Council, which in faith and morals is superior to the Pope, since a Pope can err in faith and morals, as many Roman pontiffs have fallen from the faith; but the Universal Church cannot err, and a Council representing the Universal Church is likewise free from error”. In like manner the Englishman, William of Occam, who had exercised his powers as a disputant in the University of Paris till he won the title of “the Invincible Doctor”, brought his pen to attack the Pope. In a series of Dialogues and Tractates he poured forth a flood of erudition in which scholastic
arguments are strangely mingled with keen criticism of the Papal claims. At one time he is immersed in details of the passing conflict, at another he enunciates general principles of far-reaching importance. Against the plenitude of the Papal power he asserts the freedom of the law of Christ; men are not by Christ’s ordinance the slaves of the Pope, nor can the Pope dispose of temporal affairs. Christ gave to Peter spiritual jurisdiction over the Church, and in temporal matters the right only of seeking his own maintenance and enough to enable him to fulfill his office. Peter could confer no more on his successors; if they have more, it comes from human grant or human indolence. It is not necessary that there should be one primate over the Church, for the Head of the Church is Christ, and by its union with Him the Church has unity. This unity would not be lessened if there were different rulers over different ecclesiastical provinces, as there are kings over different nations; an aristocratic government maintains the unity of a state as well as does a monarchy. Occam discusses many questions, and the conclusions which he establishes do not form a consistent system; but we see certain principles which he stoutly maintains. He is opposed to the Papal claims to temporal monarchy and spiritual infallibility. Moreover, he shows a remarkable tendency to assert the authority of Scripture as the supreme arbiter of all questions in the Church. The Pope may err; a General Council may err; the Fathers and Doctors of the Church are not entirely exempt from error. Only Holy Scripture and the beliefs of the Universal Church are of absolute validity. Occam seems to be groping after what is eternal in the faith of the Church, that he may mark it clearly off from what is of human ordinance and concerns only the temporary needs of the ecclesiastical system.

If this is a sample of the ecclesiastical opposition raised against John XXII, the attack was still stronger from the political side, where Marsiglio of Padua and John of Jandun examined with boldness and acuteness the relations between Church and State. Marsiglio was an Italian, who, in the politics of his own city, had gained a comprehensive grasp of principles, and whose mind had matured by the study of Aristotle. John of Jandun, a Frenchman, was Marsiglio’s friend, and both held high positions in the University of Paris, which they suddenly quitted in 1327, sought out Lewis, and placed their learning at his disposal for an attack upon the Pope. It was strange that scholars and theorists should come forward merely on theoretical grounds to enter into a contest which in no way affected themselves. They proposed to Lewis a serious undertaking — that the Empire, as such, should enter into a controversy on abstract questions with the Pope. The Papacy was the source of orthodoxy, the center of learning; rude soldiers before this had answered its claims by deeds, but Lewis was asked to meet the Pope with his own weapons. Marsiglio urged that John XXII had already laid himself open to the charge of heresy; his decision about the friars was in contradiction to the opinion of his predecessors; unless the Papal autocracy were to be absolutely admitted, it was the Emperor’s duty to check an erring Pope. For a time Lewis hesitated; then he accepted Marsiglio’s proposal, and appealed to Christendom to support him in his position.

The great work of Marsiglio, the Defensor Pacis, was already written, when first he sought Lewis, and was at once published in explanation of the principles on which Lewis acted. The title of the work was skillfully chosen; it marked out the Pope as the originator of the troubles, discords, and wars which a pacific Emperor wished to check. The work itself is a keen, bold, and clear assertion of the rights of the State as against the Church. Following in the steps of Aristotle’s Politics, Marsiglio traces the origin of government and of law. Civil society is a community for the purpose of common life; in
such community there are various classes with various occupations; the occupation of
the priestly class is “to teach and discipline men in things which, according to the
Gospel, ought to be believed, done, or omitted to obtain eternal salvation”. The
regulator of the community is the judicial or governing class, whose object is to enforce
the laws. Law is defined as “knowledge of what is just or useful, concerning the
observance of which a coercive precept has been issued”. The legislator is “the people
or community of the citizens, or the majority of them, determining, by their choice or
will, expressed by word in a general assembly, that anything should be done or omitted
regarding man’s civil acts under pain of temporal punishment”. This legislative power
is the source of the authority of the prince or ruler, whose duty it is to observe the laws
and compel others to observe them. If the prince set himself above the laws, he ought to
be corrected by the legislative power which he represents.

This system of civil life is disturbed by the interference of the spiritual authority,
especially of the Pope, with the due execution of the laws, and with the authority of the
prince. The Papal claims rest on the supposed descent to Christ’s representatives of the
plenitude of Christ’s power; but this carries with it no coercive jurisdiction (jurisdictio
coactiva) by which they may exact penalties or interfere in temporal affairs. It is their
claim to this coercive jurisdiction that destroys civil government and causes universal
disorder.

To trace this point more fully Marsiglio proceeds to examine the relations of the
priesthood towards the community. The Church is the community of all who believe in
Christ; for all, priests and laity alike, are “Churchmen”, because Christ redeemed them
with His Blood. So far as a priest possesses worldly goods or engages in worldly
matters, he is under the same laws as the rest of the community. The priesthood can
have no authority except what was given by Christ, and the question to be considered is
not what power Christ could have given them, but what He actually gave. We find that
Christ did not Himself exercise coercive jurisdiction, and did not confer it on the
Apostles, but warned them by example, advice and precept to abstain from using it;
moreover, Christ submitted Himself to the coercive jurisdiction of temporal princes.
Hence no priest has any judicial or coercive power unless it be given him by the
legislator; his priestly authority, which he derives from Christ, is to preach the doctrine
and administer the sacraments of Christ. To pronounce excommunication does not
belong to an individual priest, but to the community of believers or their representatives.
The priest is the minister of God’s law, but has no power to compel men to accept or
obey it; only as physicians care for the health of the body, so do priests, by wise advice
and warning, operate on the soul. It may be objected that, at least in question of heresy,
the priesthood has to judge and punish: really, however, the judge of heresy is Christ,
and the punishment is inflicted in another world; the priest judges in Christ’s stead in
this world, and must warn and terrify offenders by the thoughts of future punishment.
The civil power punishes heresy only so far as heresy subverts the law.

Marsiglio next subjects to criticism the doctrine of the Papal supremacy. Priests as
such are all equal: S. Peter had no authority over the other Apostles, no power of
punishment or jurisdiction. Moreover, the legend that S. Peter was the first Bishop of
Rome rests on no Scriptural authority, and has no historical evidence. The appointment
and deprivation of ecclesiastics belong to the community of the faithful, as is shown by
the appointment of the first deacons recorded in the Acts of the Apostles. This authority
of the community is now vested in the princes, and the appointment of good priests is a
matter which concerns the well-being of the State.
The Catholic faith is one, and rests on Scripture only, so that decretals and decrees of Popes and Cardinals are not necessary for salvation. When doubts arise about the meaning of Scripture, they can be settled only by a general council of the faithful, in which laity and clergy alike have seats. The summoning of such a council belongs to the supreme legislative power, and only a council can pronounce excommunication or interdict upon princes or peoples. The authority of the Roman bishop over other bishops is necessary to give a head to the Church and a president to its councils; but the Roman bishop has no power of coercion beyond what a council confers.

The existing theory of the primacy of the Pope sprang from the respect originally paid to the Bishop of Rome, which has been extended, partly by unfounded claims of scriptural right, partly by the grants of princes, especially by the donation of Constantine. The Papal primacy has corrupted the Church; for the Pope, through the plenitude of his power, interferes with elections, sets aside the rights of chapters, and appoints bishops who cannot speak the language of the people over whom they are set as shepherds, and who simply aim at gathering money from their flocks. Generally speaking, the bishops cannot preach, nor have they knowledge to refute heresies; and the inferior clergy are as ignorant as their superiors. Lawyers, not theologians, fill the Papal Court; ecclesiastical order is everywhere overthrown by the dispensations from episcopal control which the Pope readily grants to monks and friars. Simony abounds, and on all sides may be seen the proofs that the plenitude of the Papal power is the root of corruption in the Church.

Moreover the Papacy has put forth claims against the temporal power, especially against the Empire. This arises from the fact that the Pope crowned the Emperor, and a reverence at first voluntary has gradually been regarded as a right. Papal recognition has been considered necessary to complete the authority bestowed on the Emperor by election. But this is entirely unfounded; the right conferred by election needs no supplement, and the claims of the Papacy have simply been advanced owing to the frequency of disputed elections and vacancies in the Empire. The Papal claims and the exercise of Papal power in temporal matters have plunged Italy and Germany into discord, and it is the duty of all men, especially of kings and rulers, to check the abuse of this usurped authority.

This remarkable work of Marsiglio stands on the very threshold of modern history as a clear forecast of ideas which were to regulate the future progress of Europe. The conceptions of the Sovereignty of the people, and of the official position of the ruler, mark the development of European politics up to our own day. The general relations between Church and State, which Marsiglio foreshadowed, were those which the Reformation established in countries where it prevailed. In the clear definition of the limits of ecclesiastical authority, and in his assertion of the dignity of the individual believer, Marsiglio’s ideas still remained unrealized. It is a wonderful testimony to the vigor of Italian civic life that the political experience gleaned at Padua ran so readily into the form provided by a study of Aristotle’s Politics, and produced results so clear, so bold, and so systematic. It is the scientific character of the Defensor Pacis that marks it as especially important, and sets it far beyond the other political writings of the next two centuries. It was calculated to produce a powerful impression on men’s minds, and remained as a great store-house for the writers of the next century. The ease with which the conciliar movement won its way to general acceptance throughout Christendom must be attributed in great measure to the dissemination of Marsiglio’s principles. Pope Clement VI declared that he had never read a more pestilent heretic; and Gregory XI
found that the opinions of Wycliffe were only slightly changed from those of Marsiglio. If Wycliffe had been as clear and as systematic as Marsiglio, his influence on his contemporaries would have been far greater and his teaching would not have lent itself to so much misunderstanding.

It was Marsiglio’s misfortune that he was allied to a cause which had not a leader strong enough to give adequate expression to the principles which the crowned genius of Marsiglio supplied. The traditions of the past still determined the steps of Lewis; in 1327 he marched into Italy and was elected Emperor by the people of Rome. The old rights of the Roman Republic were set up against those of the Pope, and the Imperial crown was placed on the head of Lewis by Sciarra Colonna, who struck the deadly blow against Boniface VIII at Anagni. Nor was this enough. The Minorites from the pulpits denounced John XXII as a heretic, and Rome, which had made an Emperor, was willing to go further and also make a Pope. John XXII was deposed; a friar was elected Pope by the clergy and laity of Rome, and took the name of Nicolas V. Lewis had no means of combating the fictions on which the Papal power was founded save by setting against them a fiction still more ludicrous. The claim of the citizens of Rome to appoint the temporal and spiritual heads of Christendom was more monstrous than that of the Pope to determine the election of the Emperor. The mediaeval theory might be untenable, but the attempt to overthrow it by a revival of classical usage was absurd. The last struggle which had so long raged between Empire and Papacy ended in an empty theatrical display.

Lewis was soon made to feel his real powerlessness. He failed an attempt to reduce Robert of Naples, and his Italian supporters dropped away from him. He discovered at last that the Italians welcomed an Emperor only so long as he was useful for the purposes of their own factions; when their disputes were settled, they were anxious to get rid of their troublesome guest. Lewis slowly abandoned Italy; the Ghibellin party was everywhere put down; the anti-Pope Nicolas was driven to make humiliating submission to John XXII. Lewis’s prestige was gone, and the Pope was triumphant. In vain Lewis tried to be reconciled with the Holy See; John XXII was inexorable; but the end of John’s pontificate gave Lewis some gleam of triumph. John had made many enemies, who were ready to use any handle against him, and his own pedantic and scholastic mind made him anxious to win theological triumphs. He ventured on an opinion, contrary to the general views of theologians, that the souls of the blessed departed do not see God, and are not perfectly happy, until after the general resurrection. The University of Paris strongly opposed this view, as did popular sentiment. King Philip VI of France sided with the University, and in a peremptory tone advised the Pope to alter his opinion. The cry of heresy was raised against John, and Lewis was preparing to summon a General Council to enquire into this Papal heterodoxy, when John died in December 1334.

His successor, Benedict XII, an upright but feeble-minded monk, would willingly have made peace with Lewis, but he was too much under the power of King Philip VI to follow his own inclinations. It was to little purpose that he told Philip VI that, if he had possessed two souls, he would willingly sacrifice one to do him service, but as he had only one soul, he could not go beyond what he thought right. Philip still demanded that Germany should be kept distracted. Benedict XII had to dismiss the ambassadors of Lewis, with tears over his own powerlessness. The national feeling of Germany declared itself more strongly than before in behalf of Lewis. The States affirmed that Lewis had done all that he ought, and that justice was wrongfully denied him; they
pronounced the Papal sentence of no effect, and threatened with punishment any of the clergy who ventured to observe the Papal interdict. Moreover, the Electoral princes declared at Rense that, on a vacancy in the empire, he who was elected by a majority of votes was straightway to be regarded as King of the Romans, and stood in no need of Papal confirmation before assuming the title of King and beginning the exercise of the Imperial rights. This declaration passed into a law; and whatever success the Pope might meet with afterwards, he could win no victory in a struggle which had occasioned such an outbreak of decided national feeling. Benedict’s successor might humble Lewis before him; but Germany had made good its assertion of national independence, and had rescued its kingship from the difficulties into which its connection with the Empire had so long involved it. It is true that the kingship was weak and infirm, and that the Empire had dwindled to a shadow; but this only made the German protest against Papal interference more emphatic in its historical importance.

Lewis, however, did not know how to use his advantages; he had not the firmness to carry on a protracted contest, but wavered between rash defiance of the Papal power and abject attempts at reconciliation. After striving for absolution in 1341, he made in 1342 an invasion upon ecclesiastical authority at which Europe stood aghast. By the plenitude of the Imperial power he dissolved the marriage of Margaret Maultasch, heiress of the Tyrol, with John, son of the King of Bohemia, and also granted a dispensation on the ground of consanguinity for her marriage to his own son Lewis, Markgraf of Brandenburg. Such an act was the logical result of the theories of Marsiglio of Padua and William of Occam; and was suggested, or at least defended, by them. They argued, keenly enough, that, if a marriage or a divorce was opposed to the law of God, no one, not even an angel from heaven, could make it lawful; but, if the impediment can be removed by human law, the dispensation ought to proceed from the civil power, and not from the ecclesiastical — from the Emperor, and not the Pope. They forgot that it was an unfortunate case for the assertion of newly claimed powers when personal interest and dynastic aggrandizement were so clearly the ruling motives. The moral as well as the religious sentiment of Europe was shocked, and the political jealousy of the German nobles was aroused by this accession of power to the Bavarian house. The sympathy which had been on the side of Lewis was now transferred to the Pope, and the views of Marsiglio and Occam were looked upon with increased dread. A reaction set in against the rashness of the reforming party, a reaction which explains the timidity and caution of those who revived its principles when the Great Schism of the Papacy called for some revision of the government of the Church.

The Papacy, on its side also, knew not how to use to real opportunity which had just been offered. If the piety of Benedict XI could not overcome the difficulties attendant on a reconciliation with Lewis, the luxurious and worldly Clement VI was resolved to press Lewis to the uttermost. He would not content himself with the most humiliating submission, but made demands which the Diet set aside as destructive to the Empire; he set up Charles of Bohemia against Lewis, who, however, in spite of his unpopularity in Germany, maintained his position against the Pope’s nominee till his death (1347). Even then, Charles was so entirely regarded as a tool of the Pope, that he had some difficulty in establishing his position.

It would seem that the victory in this long and dreary conflict remained with the Pope. Certainly his opponents showed their incapacity for organizing a definite political resistance. Resistance to the Pope had not yet become a political idea; at times it burst forth, but soon fell back before other considerations of political expediency. Yet the
conflict did much towards educating popular opinion. The flood of political writings awakened a spirit of discussion, which tended gradually to spread downwards. The Papacy was no longer accepted without question as a divine institution; men began to criticize it and examine the origin and limits of its power. It was no longer looked upon as supreme over the other powers of Europe, but rather as an independent power with interests of its own, which were opposed to the national interests of the States of Europe. The Pope could no longer command public opinion, and feel that it would give force to his decrees. The conflict with Lewis of Bavaria ends the mediaeval period of the history of the Papacy.

In one way this struggle inflicted serious injury on the Papacy; it gave it a delusive sense of power. It well might seem to Clement VI that Boniface VIII had been avenged, and that the majesty and dignity of the Papal power had been amply vindicated. Princes might learn, from the example of Lewis, that rebellions against the Papacy were doomed to failure. Moreover, the Papal position was secure at Avignon, which place Clement VI in 1348 bought from Giovanna of Naples. At Avignon the voice of public opinion did not make itself heard by the Pope’s ear so readily as in the turbulent city of Rome. The luxury, vice, and iniquity of Avignon during the Papal residence became proverbial throughout Europe; and the corruption of the Church was most clearly visible in the immediate neighborhood of its princely head. Luxury and vice, however, are costly, and during the Pope’s absence from Italy the Papal States were in confusion and yielded scanty revenues. Money had to be raised from ecclesiastical property throughout Europe, and the Popes at Avignon carried extortion and oppression of the Church to an extent which it had never reached before.

As the Church had grown wealthy in every land Kings and Popes competed with one another to have a share in its revenues. Gregory VII had labored to deliver the Church from the power of the temporal rulers, and his attempt was so far successful as to establish a compromise. The Church was to have the show of independence, the State was to have the practical right of nominating to important offices. The claims of the Chapters to elect to bishoprics were nominally unimpaired; but the royal influence was generally supreme. Still the Chapters were equally amenable to the Pope and to the King, and might exercise their right according to the dictation of either. Gradually the King and the Pope arrived at a practical understanding as to the division of spoil. If the offices of the Church were to furnish salaries for the King’s ministers, they must also supply revenues to the head of the Church. At times the Pope’s authority was exercised to order a rebellious Chapter to accept the King’s nominee; at times the Royal authority supported the Pope’s request that the Chapter in their election should provide for one of the Pope’s officials. Thus the Chapters, placed between two fires, tended to lose even the semblance of independence; while in this alliance with the Crown, the Papacy soon gained the upper hand. Armed with spiritual power and claiming obedience as the head of the Church, the Pope cloaked his usurpations under the show of right, and extended his claims to smaller benefices, which were in the gift of the King or private patrons. It was but a further extension of this principle when John XXII reserved to himself all benefices vacated by promotion made by the Pope, and afterwards extended his reservation to the most lucrative posts in chapters, monasteries, and collegiate Churches. Monstrous as were these claims, they met with no decided opposition. The frequency of disputes about elections, and the consequent appeals to the Pope, had practically given him the decision of the validity of ecclesiastical appointments. His assumed power of granting dispensations from canonical disabilities made him a useful
means of overstepping inconvenient barriers. The Pope had been allowed so much authority to act as the instrument of the selfish interest of kings, that they had nothing to urge when he began to use his powers shamelessly in his own behalf. Clement VI provided for his nephews and his Court at the expense of Christendom, and said, with a laugh, that his predecessors had not known how to be Popes.

Besides provisions, reservations, and dispensations, he demanded large fees for the confirmation of all episcopal elections, and succeeded in wresting from the bishops many of their rights over the inferior clergy. Chief of these were the revenues of benefices during a vacancy, which arose from the extension of feudal reliefs to ecclesiastical holdings. Bishops, as protectors of benefices, disposed of their revenues when they were vacant, and this claim tended to become a regular tax of half a year’s revenue paid by the presentee on his succession. The Papacy in its turn took this right from the bishops and claimed it for itself. Moreover, the Pope imposed tithes from time to time on clerical revenues; sometimes for his own use, sometimes granting them to princes on the specious pretext of a crusade. A vast system of Papal extortion was gradually developed, partly from the fault of church-men, who too readily brought their quarrels to the Pope’s tribunals, partly from the short-sighted policy of kings and princes, who found in an alliance with the Pope an easy means of helping themselves to ecclesiastical revenues. Papal aggression could not have grown unless it had been welcomed in its beginnings; and those who used the Pope’s interference to serve their own ends had no strong ground for repelling the Pope when he used his powers in his own behalf. Cries went up throughout Christendom, but it was long before the cries were more than utterances of despair.

England was the first country which showed a spirit of national resistance to Papal extortion. The alliance of the Papacy with John and with Henry III had awakened a feeling of political antagonism amongst the barons, when they found the Pope supporting royal misgovernment. Under Edward I the nation and the King were at one, and the claims of Boniface VIII were met by dignified assertion of national rights. The French war of Edward III gave an increased meaning to the national resistance to the Papal extortions. The Popes at Avignon were the avowed partisans of the French King, and England would not submit to pay them taxes. In 1343 a stand was made against the agents of two Cardinals whom Clement VI had appointed to offices in England, and they were ignominiously driven from the land. When the Pope remonstrated, Edward III laid before him a complaint against the army of provisors which has invaded our realm, and drew a picture of the evils which they wrought on the Church. The King was warmly supported by Parliament, which demanded the expulsion of provisors from the country; and in 1351 was passed the Statute of Provisors, enacting that, if the Pope appointed to a benefice, the presentation was to be for that turn in the hands of the King, and the provisors or their representatives were to be imprisoned till they had renounced their claim or promised not to attempt to enforce it. This statute led to a collision of jurisdictions: the royal presentee defended his rights in the King’s courts, the Papal provisor supported himself by Bulls from Rome. To prevent this conflict was passed in 1353 the Statute of Praemunire, which forbade the withdrawal of suits from the King’s courts to any foreign court under penalty of outlawry and forfeiture. These laws did not at once arrest the evils complained of; but they served as a menace to the Pope, and impressed on him the need of greater moderation in his dealings with England. They armed the King with powers which he might use if the Pope did not observe fair terms of partnership.
Under the pontificate of Innocent VI (1352-1362) the advantages reaped by the Papal See from its sojourn at Avignon seemed to have come to an end. The disturbed condition of France no longer offered security and repose. In 1361 a company of freebooters scoured the country up to the gates of Avignon, defeated the Papal troops, and were only bought off by a large ransom. Innocent VI found it desirable to increase the fortifications of the city. Moreover, the state of affairs in Italy called loudly for the Pope’s intervention. The wondrous attempt of Rienzi to recall the old grandeur of Rome showed the power that still attached to the old traditions of the mistress of the world. The desperate condition of the states of the Church, which had fallen into the hands of small princes, called for energetic measures, unless the Popes were prepared to see them entirely lost to their authority. Innocent VI sent into Italy a Spanish Cardinal, Gil Albornoz, who had already shown his military skill in fighting against the Moors. The fiery energy of Albornoz was crowned with success, and the smaller nobles were subdued in a series of hard-fought battles. In 1367 Urban V saw the States of the Church once more reduced into obedience to the Pope.

Meanwhile France was brought by its war with England to a state of anarchy, and the French King was powerless to keep the Popes at Avignon or to protect them if they stayed. Urban V was a man of sincere and earnest piety, who looked with disgust upon the pomp and luxury of the Avignonese court: and he judged that a reform would be more easily worked if it were transferred to another place. In Rome there was a longing for the presence of the Pope, who had not been seen for two generations. The inconvenience of the Papal residence at Avignon was strongly brought out in the repudiation by England (1365) of the Papal claim to the tribute of 1000 marks which John had agreed to pay in token of submission to Papal suzerainty. These motives combined to urge Urban V, in 1367, to return to Rome amid the cries of his agonized Cardinals who shuddered to leave the luxury of Avignon for a land which they held to be barbarous. A brief stay in Rome was sufficient to convince Urban V that the fears of his Cardinals were not unfounded. The death of Albornoz, soon after the Pope’s landing in Italy, deprived him of the one man who could hold together the turbulent elements contained in the States of the Church. Rome was in ruins, its people were sunk in poverty and degradation. It was to no purpose that the Pope once more received in Rome the homage of the Emperors of the East and West: Charles IV displayed in Italy the helplessness of the Imperial name; John Paleologus came as a beggar to seek for help in his extremity. Urban V was clear-sighted enough to see that his position in Rome was precarious, and that he had not the knowledge or the gifts to adventure in the troubled sea of Italian politics: his moral force was not strong enough to urge him to become a martyr to duty. The voices of his Cardinals prevailed, and after a visit of three years Urban returned to Avignon. His death, which happened three months after his return, was regarded by many as a judgment of God upon his desertion of Rome.

Urban V had returned to Rome because the States of the Church were reduced to obedience: his successor, Gregory XI, was driven to return through dread of losing all hold upon Italy. The French Popes awakened a strong feeling of national antipathy among their Italian subjects, and their policy was not associated with any of the elements of state life existing in Italy. Their desire to bring the States of the Church immediately under their power involved the destruction of the small dynasties of princes, and the suppression of the democratic liberties of the people. Albornoz had been wise enough to leave the popular governments untouched, and to content himself with bringing the towns under the Papal obedience. But Urban V and Gregory XI set up
French governors, whose rule was galling and oppressive; and a revolt against them was organized by Florence, who, true to her old traditions, unfurled a banner inscribed only with the word “Liberty”. The movement spread through all the towns in the Papal States, and in a few months the conquests of Albornoz had been lost. The temporal dominion of the Papacy might have been swept away if Florence could have brought about the Italian league which she desired. But Rome hung back from the alliance, and listened to Gregory XI, who promised to return if Rome would remain faithful. The Papal excommunication handed over the Florentines to be the slaves of their captors in every land; and the Kings of England and France did not scruple to use the opportunity offered to their cupidities. Gregory XI felt that only the Pope’s presence could save Rome for the Papacy. In spite of evil omens — for his horse refused to let him mount when he set out on his journey — he left Avignon; in spite of the entreaties of the Florentines Rome again joyfully welcomed the entry of its Pope in 1377. But the Pope found his position in Italy to be surrounded with difficulties. His troops met with some small successes, but he was practically powerless, and aimed only at settling terms of peace with the Florentines. A congress was called for this purpose, and Gregory XI was anxiously awaiting its termination that he might return to Avignon, when death seized him, and his last hours were embittered by the thoughts of the crisis that was now inevitable.

Rome had made many sacrifices to win back the Pope, and on the occurrence of a vacancy which necessitated an election within the walls of Rome, it was likely that the wishes of the city would make themselves felt. The remonstrances of Christendom had been raised against the continuance of the Papacy at Avignon, and its consequent subordination to French influence. Moreover, national feeling had been quickened in Italy, and the loss of the Papacy seemed to be a deprivation of one of her immemorial privileges. To this national feeling was added a spirit of religious enthusiasm, which found its supreme expression in the utterances of the saintly Catharine of Siena. She had exhorted Gregory XI to leave Avignon, to return to Italy, to restore peace, and then turn to the reformation of the distracted Church. On all sides there was a desire that the Pope should shake off the political traditions which at Avignon had hampered his free action, should recover his Italian lands and live of his own in Rome at peace with all men, and should stop the crying abuses which the needs of a troubled time and of exceptional circumstances had brought into the government of the Church.

The Papacy had been strong in the past when it was allied with the reforming party in remedying disorder. The question was — would the Papacy again renew its strength by taking up an independent position and redressing the ecclesiastical grievances under which Europe groaned? The first step was its restoration to its ancient capital, where it might again be regarded as the representative of Christendom.
BOOK I.
THE GREAT SCHISM.
1378-1414

CHAPTER I.
URBAN VI, CLEMENT VII AND THE AFFAIRS OF NAPLES.
1378—1389.

When Gregory XI laid upon his death-bed all men in Rome felt that a great crisis was at hand. Among the citizens the ideas of the days of Rienzi and the aspirations of Catharine of Siena passed from mouth to mouth, and the Cardinals were busy consulting on the steps which they could possibly take. The government of Rome was at that time vested in a Senator and thirteen Banderisi, or Bannerets, who commanded the thirteen levies of the thirteen regions into which the city was divided. Already, before Gregory XI’s eyes were closed in death, the Romans urged upon the Cardinals the election of a Roman Pope who might introduce order into the States of the Church; and during the funeral rites of Gregory their representations were renewed with increasing persistency. The Banderisi watched the Cardinals to prevent them fleeing from the city, and at the same time took measures to show that they were able and willing to maintain order within the walls. The gates were strictly guarded; the Roman barons were ordered to withdraw; and bands of armed militia were summoned from the country to protect the city against the danger of surprise by the soldier hordes who were prowling in the neighborhood. A marble column was erected in the middle of the Piazza of S. Peter’s, bearing an axe and a block; and three times a day proclamation was made that anyone who injured the Cardinals or their attendants would instantly be beheaded. The Cardinals could find no pretext for refusing to proceed to an election at Rome; but they took such precautions as they could on their own account. They sent their valuables and all the Papal jewels for safe keeping into the Castle of S. Angelo, where the Papal Chamberlain, the Archbishop of Arles, went to secure the governor and the garrison. They accepted the Banderisi as guardians of the Conclave, but added to them two Frenchmen, and the Bishops of Marseilles, Todi, and Tivoli.

Of the twenty-three Cardinals who at that time represented the Church, six had remained in Avignon, and one was absent as legate in Tuscany. Of the sixteen who were in Rome, one was a Spaniard, four were Italians, and eleven were French. The great question to be decided at the coming election was, whether by choosing an Italian the Cardinals would assure the return of the Papacy to Rome; or by choosing a French-man they would strive to perpetuate its residence at Avignon. The French Cardinals looked upon Rome with disgust as squalid and barbarous; they sighed to return to the luxurious ease of Avignon. If they had been united, they would have secured the majority of two-
thirds which was necessary for the election of a Pope. But the French were divided amongst themselves on grounds which awakened amongst them feelings as intense as could inspire the Italians. Clement VI and his nephew Gregory XI were both Limousins, and had shown marked preference for their fellow-countrymen. Of the eleven French Cardinals, six belonged to a Limousin party, four were pitted against them as a Gallican party, and one seems to have been doubtful. Rather than submit to the election of another Limousin, the Gallican Cardinals were ready to join with the Italians.

In this state of things it was clearly necessary to try and arrange a compromise, and conferences were held before entering into the Conclave. At first the Limousins tried to take advantage of their numerical majority over any other party, and boldly put forward Jean du Cros, Cardinal of Limoges; when told that he was impossible, they proposed Pierre de Bernier, Cardinal of Viviers, who was a native of Cahors, and therefore slightly removed from the dreaded neighborhood of Limoges. The four Gallican Cardinals, joined by the Spaniard Peter de Luna, declared that they would never agree to this. The Italians meanwhile held by themselves, and demanded the election of an Italian. The Gallican party affirmed that they would make common cause with the Italians rather than give way to the Limousins; and the Limousins, before they entered the Conclave, were prepared to propose a compromise if they found it impossible to carry the Cardinal of Viviers. For this purpose they thought of an Italian outside the College, whose election would not be a decisive triumph to any party, and would leave open all the questions which were involved in their struggle. They fixed on Bartolommeo Prignano, Archbishop of Bari, a man of humble origin, who had risen to eminence through the patronage of Pierre de Monterac, Cardinal of Pampeluna, a Limousin, who had remained at Avignon. Prignano had come to Rome as his deputy and exercised in his stead the office of Vice-Chancellor in the Curia. He seems to have acquired considerable influence in Rome, was in the confidence of the Banderisi, and had shown much skill in arranging with them the measures for the security of the Conclave. Thus he was likely to be acceptable as an escape from the jealousies within the College, while he would satisfy the demands of the Roman people. The Limousins determined that, if a compromise were necessary, it had better proceed from their side. They fixed on a man already connected with their own party, and trusted that gratitude for their good offices would bind him still more securely to their interests. Under ordinary circumstances the idea of a compromise would not so soon have taken shape, and a long vacancy would have been the most probable consequence of the divided condition of the College. But under the novel circumstances of an election in Rome, especially in the ferment of popular excitement, long delay was impossible, and a compromise to be effective must be put forward at once.

When the time came for the Cardinals to enter the Conclave an excited crowd accompanied them to the chamber in the Vatican. It might well be that, after so many years of disuse, the Romans had forgotten the general decorum which was supposed to attend the solemn ceremony. The crowd pressed into the room with the Cardinals, and peered into every corner to convince themselves that the Cardinals were really to be left alone. It was with difficulty that the room was cleared by the Banderisi, who before withdrawing addressed another exhortation to the Cardinals to elect a Roman Pope. It was late in the evening of April 7 when the Conclave was closed, and the repose of the Cardinals was troubled all night by the shouts of the mob, who stood around the palace exclaiming, “A Roman, a Roman, we want a Roman for Pope, or at least an Italian”. As the morning drew near the tumult outside increased; the campanile of S. Peter’s was
broken open, and its bells clanged out a summons to a greater crowd. The Cardinals saw that it would be well to lose no time, and the compromise projected by the Limousins began to assume a very definite shape.

On the morning of April 8, after mass had been said, the Cardinals proceeded to vote. The Cardinal of Florence, as the senior, voted first, and expressing his real desire, gave his voice in favor of Tebaldeschi, Cardinal of S. Peter’s, a Roman. Next followed the Cardinal of Limoges, who expressed the general opinion of the French party when he said that there were two objections to the Cardinal of S. Peter’s: first, that he was a Roman, and it was undesirable to elect a Roman, lest they should seem to have done so through fear; secondly, that he was too infirm for the labors of the Papacy. “The Cardinal of Florence”, he proceeded, “belongs to a people who are enemies to the Church; the Cardinal of Milan comes from a land of tyrants who oppose the Church; Cardinal Orsini is a Roman, and also is too young and inexperienced. I give my voice for the Archbishop of Bari”. It was found that there was a general consent; two demurred on the ground that the election was being hurried through fear, and Cardinal Orsini is even said to have proposed that the College should pretend to elect some obscure friar, invest him with the Papal robes to deceive the people, and in the confusion make their escape and proceed to a real election. This proposal was at once rejected. It would seem that there was some sense of popular pressure, but not enough to influence the conduct of the Cardinals.

The election of the Archbishop of Bari had been determined, but before proceeding to the formal act the Cardinals retired to breakfast. The tumult outside was raging furiously; the mob had broken into the Pope’s cellars, and the Papal wine had increased their patriotism. The Cardinals hesitated to face them with the news that they had not elected a Roman Pope; the man whom they had chosen was not a member of the Sacred College; he was not there, and they had no one to present for the reverence of the crowd. They sent a messenger to summon the Archbishop of Bari and some other ecclesiastics; they also used this opportunity of sending to the Castle of S. Angelo the plate and jewels which they had with them, as they feared that the Conclave chamber would be sacked according to old custom. When the mob saw the prelates arrive, they suspected that an election had been made, and clamored to be informed. When they found that the vessels of the Cardinals were being carried away, they grew still more suspicious and indignant. No longer able to endure suspense, they rushed to the door which had been already broken down to admit the prelates, and the Cardinals were now genuinely terrified at the prospect of facing the mob with the tidings that they had not elected a Roman. Already steps were heard along the passages, and as the crowd burst in, terror inspired one of the Cardinals to deceive them. “The Cardinal of S. Peter’s is Pope”, was exclaimed by someone; and as the eager throng rushed to do reverence to the old Tebaldeschi, the Cardinals hastened to make their escape. As the rude artisans seized Tebaldeschi’s gouty hands to kiss them, it was in vain that the agonized old man screamed out, “I am not the Pope, but a better man than me”. Few heard him, and those who heard thought it was his humility that spoke. The Cardinals succeeded in getting away before the cries of Tebaldeschi at length convinced his persecutors of the truth. Then a wild search was made for Prignano throughout the palace. If the disappointed mob could have found him, they would have torn him in pieces; but he hid himself in the Pope’s most private chamber till the search was abandoned as useless.

Meanwhile the Cardinals who had escaped, when they saw the excitement of the people whom they had deceived, dreaded the consequences to themselves when the
truth was known. Some fled from Rome in fright; some took refuge in the Castle of S. Angelo; five only dared to remain in their own palaces; the Cardinal of S. Peter’s alone remained with Prignano in the Vatican. Next day the tumult had ceased. The Roman people magnanimously forgave their disappointment, and the Banderisi loyally accepted the election of the Archbishop of Bari. The new Pope summoned the Cardinals to his side, and the five who were in the city ventured to return to the Vatican; it needed, however, repeated messages, even the entreaties of the Banderisi, before those who were in the castle dared to come forth. At last they assembled, went through the customary formalities, and on Easter Sunday, April 18, crowned the new Pope, who took the name of Urban VI. Next day they wrote to the Cardinals at Avignon announcing their election, and saying that their votes had been given “freely and unanimously”.

The Cardinals had elected Prignano as a respectable figure-head, who would prove amenable to their wishes. He had a reputation for theological and legal learning; he was well versed in the business of the Curia; he knew the charms of Avignon, and was likely to find a good excuse for returning there and carrying on the traditions of the Avignonese Papacy. Great was their disappointment when they found that one whom they regarded as insignificant was resolved to make himself their master. Urban VI had never been a Cardinal, and so was untouched by the traditions of the order. Like many men whose presumed insignificance has raised them unexpectedly to high position, he longed to assert his authority roundly over his former superiors. He had long held his tongue and allowed others to lord it over him; now that his turn was come he was resolved to use his opportunity to the full. He was a short, stout man, with a swarthy face, full of Neapolitan fire and savagery. His monkish piety burned to distinguish itself by some striking measures of reform; but he was without knowledge of himself or of the world, and knew nothing of the many steps to be taken between good intentions and their practical execution. He thought that he could enforce his will by self-assertion, and that the Cardinals could be reduced to absolute obedience by mere rudeness. Already on Easter Monday he began to inveigh against the conduct of the bishops, and said that they were perjured because they deserted their sees and followed the Curia. He tried to enforce sumptuary regulations upon the Cardinals, and ordered that they should make their meals of one dish only. He had no tact, no sense of dignity or decorum. He sat in the consistory and interrupted speakers with remarks of “Rubbish”, “Hold your tongue, you have said enough”. His anger found vent in unmeasured language. One day he called Cardinal Orsini a fool. Seeing the Cardinal of Limoges turn away his head and make a face at something that he said, he bade him hold up his head and look him in the face. Another day he grew so angry with the same Cardinal that he rushed at him to strike him, but Robert of Geneva pulled him back to his seat, exclaiming, “Holy Father, Holy Father, what are you doing?”

These were personal matters, intensely galling to the Cardinals, who, under the last Popes, had been richly endowed with ecclesiastical revenues, had lived in luxury, accustomed to treat kings as their equals, and to meet with nothing but consideration and respect. Still Urban VI’s personal conduct gave them no ground for action, till they found to their dismay that the Pope had no intention of returning to Avignon; he openly told the Banderisi that he purposed to remain at Rome and make a new creation of Roman and Italian Cardinals. The College felt itself seriously menaced; the Frenchmen saw that they would be reduced to a minority, and then would be entirely neglected. Before this common danger all differences disappeared. Galileans and Limousins were
reconciled and prepared to resist the Pope, whom their dissensions had set over them. One day after the Pope had furiously attacked the Cardinal of Amiens, Robert of Geneva said to him openly, “You have not treated us Cardinals with the honor due to us, as your predecessors used to do, and you are lessening our dignity. I tell you truly that the Cardinals on their side will try to lessen your dignity also”. Urban VI found that this was no empty menace, and that the hostility of his Cardinals had power even in Rome. The French governor of the Castle of S. Angelo refused to surrender it to the Pope, who, consequently, could not make himself master of the city. The Cardinals knew that they could rely on the support of the King of France against a Pope who avowed his intention of rescuing the Papacy from French influence. Urban’s conduct gave them an unexpected ally in Queen Giovanna I of Naples, who had at first hailed with delight the election of one of her subjects to the Papacy. Counting on the pliancy of the new Pope, her fourth husband, Otto, Duke of Brunswick, hastened to Rome to receive at the Pope’s hands his coronation as King of Naples. But Giovanna I was childless, and Urban VI did not choose that at her death Naples should pass into the hands of Germans; he refused Otto’s request, and even treated him with haughty insolence. One day Otto acted as the Pope’s cup-bearer at a banquet, and, as the custom was, presented the cup on bended knee. Urban for some time pretended not to see him, till one of the Cardinals called out, “Holy Father, it is time to drink”. Giovanna’s ambassadors, who were sent to congratulate Urban on his election, were treated to a scolding on the evil state of Naples, which the Pope threatened to amend. After this it was but natural that Giovanna I, who had been a firm ally of the Avignonese Popes, should be willing to join a party which aimed at the restoration of the old state of things.

The shouldering discontent was not long in breaking out. At the end of May the Cardinals obtained leave from the Pope to retire before the heats of Rome to Anagni, which had been the summer residence of Gregory XI, where they had houses and stores of provisions. At Anagni the Cardinals found a new ally, whom the Pope’s conduct had estranged. Onorato, Count of Fondi, who was Lord of Anagni, had been appointed by Gregory XI Governor of Campania, and had lent the Pope 20,000 florins. The headstrong Urban refused to pay his predecessor’s debts, and after offending Onorato by his refusal, judged it safer to deprive him of his office and confer it upon his enemy, Tommaso of San Severino. After this he grew suspicious of the intercourse of the Cardinals with Onorato; he determined to go to Tivoli for the summer, and ordered the Cardinals to join him there. The Cardinals raised difficulties about leaving their houses, which they had provisioned for the season. The Archbishop of Arles, Gregory XI’s chamberlain, joined them at Anagni, bringing with him the Papal jewels; the Pope ordered his arrest, and the Cardinals feigned to comply with the Pope’s order. The Cardinals at Anagni and the Pope at Tivoli each professed to invite the other, and feigned to wonder at the delay to accept the invitation.

At last the Cardinals let their intentions be seen. They summoned to their aid a band of Bretons and Gascons which had been taken into the service of the Church by Gregory XI, and had served under Robert of Geneva in the year before. These adventurers advanced, plundering the Roman territory, and defeated by Ponte Salaro the Romans who went out against them. The Breton company pursued its way to Anagni, and Urban, at Tivoli, begged for help from the Queen of Naples, who had not yet declared herself against him, and sent Duke Otto, with 200 lances and 100 foot, to guard his person. Otto, who was a shrewd observer, gave it as his opinion that the Pope’s name should be
“Turbanus” instead of “Urbanus”, as he seemed likely to upset everything, and bring himself into many difficulties.

The Cardinals at Anagni now found themselves strong enough to proceed to open measures against Urban. On July 20 they wrote to the four Italian Cardinals, who were still with Urban, setting forth that his election had been forced upon them by the Roman mob, and so had not been made freely; they required them to appear at Anagni within five days, to deliberate upon the steps to be taken to obviate this scandal. They wrote also to the University of Paris and to the King of France demanding their assistance. Urban on his part showed himself alive to the importance of the crisis. He sent the three Italian Cardinals who were with him (the Cardinal of S. Peter was ill, and died in August, declaring the validity of Urban’s election), to negotiate at Palestrina with those at Anagni; he empowered them to offer to submit the question to the decision of a General Council. The Ultramontanes refused this offer, and urged the Italian Cardinals to join them at Anagni; the Italians wavered, and retired to Genazzano to wait the turn of affairs. The King of France, Louis of Anjou, and Giovanna of Naples, openly declared themselves in behalf of the rebels, who on August 9 issued an encyclical letter to the whole of Christendom. They declared that the election had been made under violence; through fear of death they had elected the Archbishop of Bari, in the expectation that his conscience would not allow him to accept an election made in such a way; he had been ensnared by ambition to the destruction of his soul; he was an intruder and deceiver; they called upon him to give up his delusive dignity, and they summoned all Christians to reject his authority.

War was now declared; but it was at first a war of pamphlets. Learned legists gave their opinions, and Legal universities examined the question. There were two nice points to be determined, and arguments could readily be obtained on either side, (1) Did the tumult of the Romans amount to actual violence sufficient to do away with the freedom of the electors? (2) If so, did not the subsequent recognition of Urban by the Cardinals, a recognition which lasted for three months, supply any defect which might have been in the original election? It is clear that these questions might be settled according as prejudice or interest directed. There had been enough irregularity in the election to give the Cardinals a fair plea for their proceedings; but the formal plea was a mere cloak to political motives. The significance of Urban’s election lay in the fact that it restored the Papacy to Rome, and freed it from the influence of France. It was not to be expected that the traditions of the seventy years’ captivity could be set aside at once; it was not natural that France should let go her hold without a desperate effort. The rebellion of the irritated Cardinals against a Pope who paid no heed to their privileges combined with deep-seated motives of political interest and produced a schism.

The Cardinals at Anagni found that their soldiers consumed all the provisions, so that they were driven to change their abode. They therefore transferred themselves to Fondi, where they were safer under the protection of Count Onorato. The Italian Cardinals went from Palestrina to Sessa, that they might continue their negotiations; soon, however, they were persuaded to join the other rebels at Fondi. It is said that they were won over by a promise that one of them should be elected Pope in Urban’s stead. The Cardinals could now point to Urban’s helplessness; the whole body of his electors was united in opposition to him. In truth, Urban found himself almost entirely deserted, and when it was too late he repented bitterly of his first rashness. For a time his spirit was crushed, and his secretary, Dietrich of Niem, tells us that he often found him in tears. But he soon plucked up courage, and on September 18 created twenty-eight new
Cardinals. This resolute step of Urban’s hastened the proceedings of the rebels at Fondi, who, on September 20, elected as their Pope, Robert of Geneva, who took the name of Clement VII. The Italian Cardinals took no part in this election, nor did they repudiate it. They returned to Sessa, and thence retired to a castle of the Orsini at Tagliacozzo. There Cardinal Orsini died in 1380, and the two others, feeling that it was too late for reconciliation with Urban, joined the party of Clement.

In their election of Robert of Geneva, the Cardinals had previously chosen the man whom they thought best fitted to fight a hard battle. Robert was brother to the Count of Geneva, and so was allied with many noble houses. He was in the vigor of manhood, at the age of thirty-six, and had already shown great force of character, and practical skill in business. His fierce determination had been seen in his conduct as Legate in North Italy in 1377, where a rising of Cesena against his soldiers was avenged by a pitiless massacre of the whole city. Even the hardened leader of the savage mercenary band shrank at first from fulfilling Robert’s orders, but was urged by the imperative command, “Blood, blood, and justice”. For three days and three nights the carnage raged inside the devoted city; the gates were shut and no one could escape; at last despair lent strength to feeble arms and the gates were forced open, but the unhappy victims only found another band of soldiers waiting outside to receive them. Five thousand perished in the slaughter, and the name of Cesena would have been destroyed if the barbarous general, Hawkwood, had not been better than his orders, saved a thousand women, and allowed some of the men to escape. This exploit had awakened in Italy the deepest detestation against Robert, but now seems to have stood him in good stead, as convincing his electors of the promptitude and decision which he possessed in emergencies. Moreover, Robert had all the qualities which Urban VI lacked. He was tall and of commanding presence; his manner was agreeable; he was a favorite with princes and nobles, and knew how to conciliate them to his interests; he had all the suavity and knowledge of the world which were so conspicuously wanting in Urban VI. The Cardinals could not have chosen a better leader of revolt.

When the schism was declared and the two parties stood in avowed opposition, allies began to gather round each from motives which were purely political. Italy took the side of the Italian Pope, except the two kingdom of Naples, which had been closely connected with the Papacy at Avignon, and so maintained its old position. France labored for Clement VII, to assert its former hold upon the Papacy. England, through hostility to France, became a staunch partisan of Urban, when Scotland declared itself on the side of Clement. If Urban, by his unyielding behavior to Giovanna, had estranged Naples, he had by his complacency secured Germany. One of his first acts had been to accede to the request of the Emperor Charles IV that he would recognize his son Wenzel as King of the Romans: the death of Charles IV on November 29, 1378, set Wenzel on the throne of Germany. Hungary took the side opposed to Naples; the northern kingdoms went with Germany; Flanders followed England through its hostility to France; the Count of Savoy adhered to Clement, whose kinsman he was. The Spanish kingdoms alone remained neutral, though in the end they fell into the allegiance of Clement.

In Italy Urban’s position was certainly the strongest. He had in July made peace with Florence and Perugia; but he had not entire possession of Rome; as the French captain of the Castle of S. Angelo resisted all the onslaughts of the Romans. They broke down the bridge and erected earthworks and palisades, but the castle was well supplied with provisions and guns; for the first time the Romans heard the sound of cannon from
its ramparts, and saw the balls shatter their houses. The Borgo of San Pietro was set on fire and destroyed; everywhere in the city was confusion. Outside the walls the Orsini and the Count of Fondi laid waste the Roman territory and cut off their supplies. The position of Urban at the end of 1378 was gloomy enough. He was endeavoring to gather round him the Cardinals whom he had nominated, though some of them declined to accept the dignity at his hands. He found also some satisfaction in excommunicating Clement and his supporters, and in gathering testimonies and writing letters in support of the validity of his own election.

But he did not disregard the measures necessary to secure his safety. Against the Breton band, which was now under the command of Clement VII’s nephew, Count Montjoie, Urban summoned the aid of a band of adventurers under the leadership of a young Italian general, Alberigo da Barbiano. In the course of the thirteenth century in Italy the old communal militia had declined. The war of the Papacy against Frederick II and his house made Italy the battlefield of foreign forces, and foreign mercenaries had taken the place of the civic levies. During the fourteenth century Italy had been the prey of German, Hungarian, Provençal, English, and Breton bands, who preyed upon the country and perpetuated the anarchy on which they prospered. But the spirit of adventure had at last awakened among the Italians themselves; and to Alberigo da Barbiano belongs the fame of having first gathered together the company of S. George, composed of soldiers who were almost entirely Italian. The growing national feeling which had drawn such a band together found a worthy object for its first exploit in upholding the cause of the Italian Pope against his French opponents. Italian piety, as embodied in the mystic maid, Catharine of Siena, sent forth its imploring cry to Italian patriotism. “Now”, she exclaims, “is the time for new martyrs. You are the first who have given your blood; how great is the fruit that you will receive! It is eternal life ... We will do like Moses, for while the people fought Moses prayed, and while Moses prayed the people conquered”. It is significant to note how round this war of the rival Popes gathered the first enthusiasm of a new national feeling in Italy.

No sooner had Alberigo arrived in Rome and received the Papal benediction than he set out against the enemy, who were besieging Marino, only twelve miles distant from Rome, April 29, 1379. He drew up his forces in two squadrons, while Montjoie arranged his in three. Alberigo sent out his first squadron under one of his captains, but it was discomfited by the opposing squadron of the foe. Then Alberigo himself charged, drove back the pursuers in disorder upon their second squadron, routed that also, and charged the third division, which was commanded by Montjoie. The battle was long and desperate, but the Italians won the day. Great was the joy in Rome; Urban dubbed Alberigo knight, and presented him with a banner emblazoned with a red cross, and bearing the inscription, “Italia liberata dai barbari”. It was a national as well as a Papal victory.

On the same day the Castle of S. Angelo capitulated, and the Roman people, in their hatred of this terrible fortress, which had so often held them in subjection, set themselves to work to destroy it. But this mighty structure of Roman masonry, the tomb of Hadrian, which had been transformed into a castle, and was bound up with the most glorious memories of the city, withstood even the fury of the people. They tore off its marble covering, but the mass of the interior buildings still resisted their efforts. It remains to this day a mutilated monument of its former greatness.
In the first flush of his victory at Marino, Alberigo had not bethought himself of pressing on to Anagni. But Clement VII found it no longer a safe place of residence. He hastily retreated to Sperlonga, and thence to Gaeta, where he took ship to Naples, and was received with royal pomp by Queen Giovanna I. But the people viewed his presence with dislike: their sympathies naturally went with their fellow-countryman Urban. A tumult arose in the city; the mob rushed through the streets with cries of “Viva Papa Urbano!” and pillaged the houses of the Ultramontanes. Clement VII saw that there was no safe resting-place for him in Italy. He took ship for Avignon, where he arrived on June 10, and was received with reverence by the five Cardinals who, during these stormy scenes, had remained there in peace. Avignon was the only place outside Rome where a Pope could find a resting-place, and there Clement VII was secure in the allegiance of France. It is true that at first the University Paris held aloof; some were for Urban, the majority were in favor of neutrality. But Charles V paid little heed to the scruples of canonists or theologians in a matter that involved the national dignity. He urged on the University the recognition of Clement VII; it was forced to give way, and reported that a majority of the faculties assented to the decree in Clement VII’s favor.

Urban VI was not so free as Clement VII from dangerous neighbors. He bitterly resented the defection of the kingdom of Naples, his native country, and the condition of the land soon gave him grounds to interfere in its affairs. Since the fall of the Roman Empire, Southern Italy had been the battlefield of contending powers. Greeks, Lombards, and Saracens in turns prevailed, until a band of Norman adventurers brought order into those fair provinces, gradually founded a kingdom of the two Sicilies, and obtained from Papal recognition a title to legitimacy. The Norman dynasty handed on its claims by marriage to the Swabian Emperors, whose line died out in war against the Papacy, which transferred the kingdom to Charles of Anjou. But before his death Charles lost Sicily, which went to the house of Aragon; and in Naples itself the house of Anjou fell into disunion. Charles II of Naples gained by marriage the dowry of Hungary, which passed to his eldest son, Charles Martel, while his second son, Robert, ruled in Naples. But Robert survived his only son, and left as heiress of the kingdom his grand-daughter Giovanna. The attempt to give stability to the rule of a female by marriage with her cousin, Andrew of Hungary, only aroused the jealousy of the Neapolitan nobles and raised up a strong party in opposition to Hungarian influence. Charles II of Naples, Giovanna’s great-grand-father, had left many sons and daughters, whose descendants of the great houses of Durazzo and Tarento, like those of the sons of Edward III in England, hoped to exercise the royal power. When, in 1345, Pope Clement VI was on the point of recognizing Andrew as King of Naples, a conspiracy was formed against him, and he was murdered, with the connivance, as it was currently believed, of the Queen. Hereon the feuds in the kingdom blazed forth more violently than before; the party of Durazzo ranged itself against that of Tarento, and demanded punishment of the murderers. Giovanna, to protect herself, married Lewis of Tarento in 1347. King Lewis of Hungary, aided by the party of Durazzo, entered Naples to avenge his brother’s death, and for a while all was confusion. On the death of Lewis of Tarento (1362), Giovanna married James, King of Majorca, and on his death (1374), Otto, Duke of Brunswick. Giovanna was childless, and the slight lull which in the last years had come over the war of factions in Naples was only owing to the fact that all were preparing for the inevitable conflict which her death would bring.

It was easy for Urban VI to awaken confusion in Naples, and precipitate the outbreak of war. At first Giovanna seems to have been alarmed after the departure of
Clement VII; she made overtures to Urban and promised to send ambassadors to arrange the terms of her submission. Soon, however, she changed her mind, recalled her ambassadors, and is said to have set on foot a conspiracy to poison Urban. The Roman people, free from the dread of Clement’s neighborhood, found themselves more at leisure to criticize Urban’s behavior, and began to assert their freedom by seditious outcries. So alarming were their threats, that the holy maiden, Catharine of Siena, who stood by the Pope with enthusiastic devotion, betook herself to earnest prayer as a means of averting from him impending calamity. She saw the whole city filled with demons who were inciting the people to crime, and who gathered with loud clamor round the praying saint to terrify her from her pious work, which was baffling their endeavors. Urban VI showed his courage by ordering the doors of the Vatican to be thrown open to the clamorous mob. When they rushed in they found the Pope seated on his throne in full pontificals. He calmly asked them what they wanted, and they, abashed by his display of dignity, retired in peace. After this the tumult in Rome settled quietly down; and when Giovanna I stirred up Rainaldo degli Orsini to lead a troop against Rome, the Romans repulsed them, and left their captives bound to trees to perish with hunger.

The legend goes on to say that some of those who called on Catharine of Siena were miraculously released. It was the last miracle wrought by the saint in the flesh, as she died on April 29, 1380. In the dismal history of these gloomy times, she presents a picture of purity, devotion, and self-sacrifice, to which we turn with feelings of relief. In her intense and passionate desire for personal communion with Jesus, Catharine resembled the fervent nature of S. Francis of Assisi. But her lot was cast in times when zeal had grown cold in high places, and she spent her energy in agonized attempts to heal the breaches of the Papal system. A simple maiden of Siena, she ventured in her Master’s name to try and redress the evils which were so open and avowed. She saw Italy widowed of its Pope: she saw the Church venal and corrupt; and though she was inspired by mystic enthusiasm, she worked with practical force and courage to restore the Papacy to Italy and to inaugurate an era of reform. In urgent tones she summoned the Popes from Avignon, and Urban V answered to her call. She went from city to city pleading for peace, and in the discharge of her mission shrank neither from the fierce brawls of civic passion nor the coarse brutality of the condottiere camp. Before her eyes floated the vision of a purified and reformed Church, of which the restoration of the Papacy to its original seat was to be at once the symbol and the beginning. Blinded by her enthusiasm, she hailed with delight the accession of Urban VI, and by the side of the violent and vindictive Pope, her pure and gentle spirit seems to stand as an angel of light. She did not long survive the disappointment of the Schism, and though she remained constant in her allegiance to Urban VI, his character and actions must have been a perpetual trial to her faith. She died at the age of thirty-three, and the removal of her influence for mercy is seen in the increased vindictiveness of Urban’s measures. Canonized by Pius II, Catharine of Siena has a claim upon our reverence higher than that of a saint of the mediaeval Church. A low-born maiden, without education or culture, she gave the only possible expression in her age and generation to the aspiration for national unity and for the restoration of ecclesiastical purity.

Urban VI, finding himself menaced by Giovanna of Naples, did not hesitate to accept the challenge, and on April 21 declared her deposed from her throne as a heretic, schismatic, and traitor to the Pope. He looked for help in carrying out his decree to King Lewis of Hungary, who had for a time laid aside his desire for vengeance against
Giovanna, but was ready to resume his plans of aggrandizement when a favorable opportunity offered. He had brought into subjection his powerful nobles, and had consolidated Hungary into a strong and aggressive power: when Urban’s messengers reached him he was at war with Venice for the possession!, of Dalmatia. Lewis was not himself disposed to leave his kingdom; but he had at his court the son of his relative, Lewis of Durazzo, whom he had put to death in his Neapolitan campaign for complicity in Andrew’s murder. After his father’s death the young Charles was brought to Hungary, and educated at court. As Giovanna was childless, Charles of Durazzo, or Carlo della Pace, as he was called in Italy, had a strong claim to the Neapolitan throne at her death. Lewis, who had only a daughter to succeed him in Hungary, was not sorry to rid himself of one who was conspicuous for military and princely qualities. He furnished Charles with Hungarian troops for an expedition against Naples, after exacting from him a promise that he would put forward no claim to the thrones of Hungary and Poland. In November Charles made his entry into Rome. He was a little man, with fair hair, of princely bearing, well qualified to win men’s goodwill by his geniality, and by his courage to make the most of his opportunities. He was also a friend of learning and a man of keen political intelligence. He was one of the earliest of Italian rulers who combined a love for culture with a spirit of reckless adventure.

Clement VII on his side bestirred himself in behalf of his ally Giovanna, and for this purpose could count on the help of France. Failing the house of Durazzo, the house of Valois could put forward a claim to the Neapolitan throne, as being descended from the daughter of Charles II. The helpless Giovanna in her need adopted as her heir and successor Louis, Duke of Anjou, brother of the French king, and called him to her aid. Clement VII hastened to confer on Louis everything that he could. He even formed the States of the Church into a kingdom of Adria, and bestowed them on Louis; only Rome itself, and the adjacent lands in Tuscany, Campania Maritima, and Sabina were reserved for the Pope. The Avignonese pretender was resolved to show how little he cared for Italy or for the old traditions of the Italian greatness of his office.

Charles of Durazzo was first in the field, for Louis of Anjou was detained in France by the death of Charles V in September, 1380. The accession of Charles VI at the age of twelve threw the government of the kingdom upon the Council of Regency, of which Louis of Anjou was the chief member. He used his position to gratify his chief failing, avarice, and gathered large sums of money for his Neapolitan campaign. Meanwhile Charles of Durazzo was in Rome, where Urban VI equipped him for his undertaking. He made Charles Senator of Rome, that he might call out the levies of the Roman people; he exhausted the Papal treasury, and even laid hands on the sacred vessels and images of the Roman churches, to supply pay for the troops of Alberigo da Barbiano, which were summoned to swell the ranks of Charles. But the Pope’s zeal for Charles was tempered by attention to his own interests, and though willing to invest Charles with the kingdom, he demanded a high price for his services. Charles found the Pope’s terms exorbitant, and the differences between them were only settled by an arbitration, conducted on the Pope’s side by five Cardinals, and on the part of Charles by a learned Florentine lawyer, Lapo da Castiglionchio. Ultimately Charles agreed to confirm grants which the Pope claimed to have made in the vacancy that, according to him, followed on Giovanna’s deposition. The grants were all in favor of Urban’s nephew, Francesco Prignano, nicknamed Butillo, and conferred on him Capua, Amalfi, Caserta, Fondi, Gaeta, Sorrento, and other towns, all the richest part of the Neapolitan kingdom. This unblushing nepotism of Urban VI was not justified by anything in the capacities or
character of his nephew, who was a rude and profligate ruffian, with no ability to redeem his vices from infamy. When this matter had been arranged to Urban’s satisfaction, he conferred on Charles the investiture of Naples, in June, 1381. He was proud of his triumph over Charles, and was determined to read him a lesson on the necessity of obedience. He sent for Lapo da Castiglionchio in the presence of the Cardinals and of the King’s attendants, and as he knelt before him, proudly said, “King Charles, King Charles, make much of Lapo, for it is he who has made you king”. The coronation of Charles was performed with due pomp and ceremony. Urban, in a sermon of two hours’ length, praised his virtues and published a crusade in his favor; with his own hands he fastened the red cross on Charles’s breast.

Charles, who had been fretting under his long delay, hastened to leave Rome on June 8, and marched against Naples, where he had not many difficulties to encounter. The Neapolitan barons were for the most part on his side; they preferred a native ruler to a foreigner who would bring with him a train of French followers. Moreover, Urban VI, as a Neapolitan, had the popular sympathies in his favor; he had raised many Neapolitans to the Cardinalate, while Clement VII had chosen only Frenchmen. The cause of Charles and Urban was the national side, and Giovanna found herself in great straits. Yet her husband Otto was a brave soldier and went out to meet the foe. His first effort to check him on the frontier was unsuccessful; he was repulsed from San Germano on June 28, and Charles pressed on to Naples. Otto hurried after him, and the armies were face to face outside the walls; but a rising within the city opened the gates to Charles on July 16, and Giovanna was driven to take refuge in the Castel Nuovo while Otto retreated to Aversa. Charles vigorously pressed the siege of the castle, which was ill supplied with provisions; he neglected no means of bombardment to terrify the garrison, for he was anxious to get the Queen into his hands before reinforcements could arrive from Provence. It was to no purpose that Giovanna scanned the waters to catch sight of the sails of Provençal galleys; provisions failed, and on August 20 she was driven to open negotiations with Charles. A truce was made for five days, at the end of which the Queen was to surrender if no help came. On the morning of the 24th, Otto resolved to make a last desperate effort; gathering his forces, he advanced against Charles. But his troops were half-hearted, and when Otto rushed upon the foe they did not follow him; he was surrounded and made prisoner. Giovanna’s last hopes were gone, and on August 26 she surrendered the castle to Charles, who in a few days received the submission of the whole kingdom. No sooner was Charles in possession of Naples than Urban’s legate, Cardinal de Sangro, proceeded to treat the clergy as a barbarous conqueror dealing with defeated rebels. The unhappy prelates, who had only obeyed their Queen in recognizing Clement VII, were deprived of their possessions, imprisoned, and tortured without regard to their rank or dignity. Urban is said to have appointed on one day thirty-two archbishops and bishops for the Neapolitan kingdom.

Louis of Anjou had delayed to help Giovanna I while she was still in possession of the kingdom; his help when she was in captivity only hastened her death, May 12, 1382. At first Charles hoped to obtain from Giovanna the adoption of himself and a revocation of her previous adoption of Louis, so as to secure for himself a legitimate title. He treated the Queen with respect till he found that nothing could overcome her indomitable spirit; then he changed his policy, imprisoned her closely, and in view of the approaching invasion of Louis, judged it wise to remove her from his path. She was strangled in her prison on May 12, 1382, and her corpse was exposed for six days before burial, that the certainty of her death might be known to all. Thenceforth the
question between Charles III and Louis was not complicated by any considerations of Giovanna’s rights. It was a struggle of two dynasties for the Neapolitan crown, a struggle which was to continue for the next century.

Crowned King of Naples by Clement VII, Louis of Anjou quitted Avignon at the end of May, accompanied Louis of by a brilliant array of French barons and knights. He hastened through North Italy, and disappointed the hopes of the fervent partisans of Clement VII by pursuing his course over Aquila, through the Abruzzi, and refusing to turn aside to Rome, which, they said, he might have occupied, seized Urban VI, and so ended the Schism. When he entered the territory of Naples he soon received large accessions to his forces from discontented barons, while twenty-two galleys from Provence occupied Ischia and threatened Naples. Charles was unable to meet his adversary in the field, as his forces were far inferior in number to those of Louis, which were estimated by contemporaries at 40,000 horse. He was compelled to act on the defensive, but showed such tactical skill that Louis, in Maddaloni, could obtain no fodder for his horses, which died miserably, while his men suffered from the hardships of a severe winter, and no decisive blow could be struck. Throughout the winter and the following spring Charles acted strictly on the defensive, cutting off supplies, and harassing his enemy by unexpected sallies. The French troops perished from the effects of the climate; the Count of Savoy died of dysentery, on March 1, 1383; Louis saw his splendid army rapidly dwindling away.

But Urban VI was already discontented with Charles. His fiery temper wished to see the invaders swept away from the land, and he resolved to give his cautious vassal a lesson in generalship. Moreover, Charles already showed signs of ingratitude, and took no steps to hand over to the nephew Butillo his share of the spoil. Urban resolved to go in person to Naples, and there settle everything that was amiss. In vain the six Cardinals who were with him protested against the dangers of such a course; in vain some of them pleaded poverty as a reason why they should remain behind. Urban threatened them with immediate deposition unless they followed him, and they were compelled to obey. Taking advantage of a pestilence which was raging in Rome, Urban withdrew to Tivoli in April without exciting the suspicion of the people; thence he advanced to Valmontone, through Ferentino and San Germano to Suessa, and so to Aversa.

Charles was naturally disturbed at the news of the Pope’s arrival in his territory. He was sufficiently employed by his contest with Louis, without being exposed to the complications which might arise from the presence of the suzerain in a kingdom whose possession was yet ill assured. He resolved at once to give the Pope a lesson, and show him his real powerlessness. He accordingly went to meet the Pope at his entry into Aversa. Urban VI attired himself in full pontificals; but Charles came dressed in a simple suit of black, and, instead of advancing in state along the road, came across country, so as to give the meeting an accidental appearance. Still he showed all signs of dutiful respect. But, as he was leading the Pope’s palfrey towards the castle of Aversa, Urban expressed his desire to take up his quarters in the Bishop’s palace. Charles at once gave way; but Urban’s followers observed with terror that the city gates were shut after they entered. The following night Charles sent orders to Urban to come to the castle. The Pope replied that it was the same hour as that in which the Jews had seized Christ; he was hurried away by armed men, passionately declaring them excommunicated as he went, and assuring them of the certainty of their damnation. After three days spent with Charles in Aversa, the King and the Pope journeyed amicably together to Naples, where they made their solemn entry on November 9.
Again the Pope wished to take refuge in the Archbishop’s palace. “Nay, Holy Father”, exclaimed the King, “let us go to the castle”. There for five days the Pope was kept in honorable custody till an agreement was made between him and the King, that the nephew Butillo was to have Capua, Amalfi, Nocera, and other places, as well as a revenue of 5000 florins; and the Pope, on his part, was not to interfere in the affairs of the kingdom. This compact, made by the intervention of the Cardinals, was celebrated by rejoicings, and the Pope took up his residence in the Archbishop’s palace in peace. Yet his desire to enrich his relatives was insatiable, and two of his nieces were married with great pomp to Neapolitan nobles. The parade of Papal ceremonial was welcomed by the Neapolitans, though the religious impression produced by the Pope’s ecclesiastical solemnities was somewhat marred by the misconduct of his nephew. On Christmas Eve, as the Pope was present at vespers in the cathedral, a rumor was suddenly brought that Butillo had forcibly entered a nunnery and violated a sister of noble birth, remarkable for her beauty. Charles was glad to make use of this scandal, and called Butillo to trial. Urban VI excused his nephew on the ground of youth (he was forty years old), and urged his rights as suzerain of Naples to stop the proceedings. Charles gave way, after remodeling his agreement with the Pope, and as a punishment for his offence Butillo was condemned to matrimony. He wedded a lady related to the King, and received in dowry the castle of Nocera, and a promise of a revenue of 7000 florins, so long as the domains which Charles had granted him remained in the possession of Louis. After this settlement of affairs, Urban, on January 1, 1384, proclaimed a crusade against Louis as a heretic and schismatic, and Charles unfurled the banner of the Cross.

The presence of the Pope gave fresh vigor to the efforts of Charles, for it made him anxious to rid himself of Louis before turning against Urban VI, whose presence in his kingdom was intolerable to him. He followed up the Papal proclamation of a crusade by a royal edict (January 15), summoning all his counts and barons to prepare for an expedition in the spring. Meanwhile he raised supplies from every quarter; the finest horses of the Cardinals disappeared from their stables, and men said that the King knew where they had gone. The cloths of the Florentine, Pisan, and Genoese merchants, which were in the custom-house, were seized and appropriated to the royal service. On April 4 Charles led out his army to Barletta, whither Louis advanced, and offered battle. Charles took counsel of his prisoner, Otto of Brunswick, who advised him not to risk battle, but to act on the defensive, as Louis would not long be able to keep the field. His advice proved wise; after a few skirmishes Louis was compelled to fall back upon Bari. As a token of his gratitude, Charles set Otto at liberty, and remained at Barletta watching Louis.

Meanwhile, Urban had determined to withdraw himself from the power of Charles, and take up a strong to Nocera position against him. In spite of the King’s promises, Capua had not yet been handed over to the Pope’s nephew, and Nocera was the only place which Butillo could call his own. Hither Urban retired during the King’s absence from Naples. The castle of Nocera was strong, and Urban caused it to be well provisioned; but the town that gathered round it did not contain seventy habitable houses, and the Curia found Nocera a most uncomfortable residence when Urban, in the middle of May, transferred his court thither. He was resolved to make Nocera the capital of the Papacy till he had settled at his will the affairs of Naples, and he conferred upon the town the title of “Luceria Christianorum”. The Cardinals shuddered at the horrors of the life they led in Nocera, and longed for an opportunity to escape. In the middle of
August some smoke in the distance caused an alarm that the enemy was advancing against the city. There was a general flight, in which some of the Cardinals took refuge in Naples, and showed no disposition to listen to the Pope’s summons to return. Strengthened by their presence Queen Margaret, who was Regent in Naples, forbade the supply of provisions to the Pope, on which Urban retaliated by asserting his claims as suzerain to interfere in the affairs of the kingdom. He abolished the impost on wines, and forbade its payment to the royal officers, under pain of excommunication.

It was clear to Charles that Urban was a more serious adversary than Louis; but Charles lay helpless, his army was attacked by the plague, and he himself was stricken down by it. It spread to the army of Louis, which was already worn out by hardships and by want of food, and proved more fatal than in the camp of Charles. In September Louis himself died, leaving behind him a will by which he bequeathed his claims on Naples to his eldest son. Louis was a brave and skillful general and a sensible politician; in France he might have played a useful part: as it was he wasted his own life and that of many noble followers in the useless pursuit of a kingdom. Naples was to prove hereafter the destruction of his race, and his own fortunes were but a symbol of the fate of those who were to follow in his steps.

On the death of Louis the remnant of his army dispersed, and Charles was free from one antagonist. Still suffering from the effects of the plague, he returned to Naples on November 10, and at once proceeded to bring matters to a crisis with the Pope. He sent to enquire courteously the reason why the Pope had quitted Naples, and invited him to return thither. Urban haughtily answered that kings were wont to come to the feet of popes, not popes at the command of kings. He went on to assert his right as suzerain to interfere in the affairs of Naples. “Let the King”, he said, “if he wishes for my friendship, free his kingdom from oppressive imposts”. He seems to have wished to gather round himself a popular party, and it was believed that he had formed the wild idea of setting his worthless nephew Butillo on the throne of Naples. The answer of Charles was equally clear and decided. The kingdom, he said, was his own; he had won it by his own arms and labors. As to taxation, he would impose as many taxes as he chose; let the Pope busy himself with his clergy, and not meddle with things that did not concern him. War was now declared between the Pope and the King; and both sides prepared for the conflict.

Charles found adherents amongst Urban’s Cardinals, who repined at the discomforts of Nocera, and there were few who could sympathize with Urban’s schemes. He had been elected Pope that the Papacy might be restored to its old seat at Rome. It was more intolerable that Nocera should be the head-quarters of the Papacy than Avignon. Urban’s designs to establish his nephew in Naples interested no one but himself; and the Cardinals stood aghast at the stubbornness and recklessness of the intractable Pope. It was monstrous that they should submit to be dragged helplessly from place to place as the whim of the passionate old man might dictate. It was natural that they should take counsel together how they could rid themselves from this intolerable yoke. They consulted a learned lawyer, Bartolino of Piacenza, and submitted a case for his opinion. They wished to know if a Pope who was imperiling the Church, and ruling at his own will without paying any heed to the Cardinals, might be compelled to accept a council elected by the Cardinals to regulate his doings. Their plan was to set up a body of commissioners by the side of an incapable Pope; the Papal monarchy as exercised by a mad despot was to be limited by a permanent council of the ecclesiastical aristocracy. The plan was ingenious, and the constitutional question which it raised was
of great importance for the future of the Papacy. But the Cardinal Orsini of Manupello revealed it to Urban before it had been brought to maturity, and the Pope lost no time in crushing it. On January 2, 1385, he called to a consistory the six Cardinals whom he most suspected; his nephew Butillo seized them, and cast them into a loathsome dungeon made in a broken cistern. The Pope accused them of a plot to seize his person, compel him to confess himself to be a heretic, and then burn him. They were left in their horrible dungeon to suffer from cold, hunger, and loathsome reptiles. Dietrich of Niem, who was sent to examine them, gives us an account of their sufferings and of the Pope’s vindictive fury. It was in vain that the unhappy men pleaded their innocence; in vain Dietrich of Niem entreated the Pope to be merciful. Urban’s face glowed with anger like a lamp, and his throat grew hoarse with furious maledictions. The accused were dragged before a consistory and were urged to confess; when they still pleaded innocence, they were again plunged into their dungeon. Three days afterwards they were submitted to torture, elderly and infirm as many of them were. The brutal Butillo stood by and laughed at their sufferings, while the Pope himself walked in a garden outside, listening with satisfaction to their shrieks of agony, and reading his hours from the Breviary in a loud voice that the torturer might display more diligence when he knew the Pope was at hand. After this the unhappy Cardinals were again carried back to their prisons. With his College of Cardinals thus crippled Urban proceeded to strengthen it by new nominations, amongst whom were many Germans. We are not surprised to find that they all refused the dangerous honor, and only a few Neapolitans could be found to accept it. Five of his Cardinals left him, and wrote to the Roman clergy declaring that they could no longer recognize Urban as Pope; they told the story of his recent cruelty; they complained of his stubborn, intractable, perverse and haughty character, which reached almost to the pitch of madness; his conduct was ruining the Church; his orthodoxy was doubtful; they declared their intention of coming to Rome and there summoning a General Council to consider how the dangers which threatened the Church might be averted.

Urban VI, however, was undaunted. His arrogance and recklessness were thorough, and admitted as little consideration for the future as for the present. He excommunicated the Abbot of Monte Casino, who showed signs of following in the line suggested by the letter of the Cardinals, and was accused of stirring up a disturbance in Rome. He excommunicated the King and Queen of Naples, and laid their land under an interdict. It is needless to say that the Neapolitan clergy stood in greater awe of Charles than of Urban, and the Papal thunders produced no effect beyond raising a persecution against such of the clergy as were suspected of being partisans of Urban; they were tortured, imprisoned, and some were even thrown into the sea. It was one horrible feature of the Schism that it called forth the spirit of persecution and intolerance as much as if some great principle had been at stake.

Charles III had no longer any compunctions about proceeding against the Pope, and sent to the siege of Nocera the Constable of Naples, Alberigo da Barbiano, the condottiere general who six years before had secured Urban VI in the Papacy by his victory at San Marino; since then his fidelity to Charles had won for him nobility and high office in the kingdom. Alberigo had no more scruples in attacking the Pope than if he had been a Saracen. The town of Nocera was soon taken, but the castle was on a steep rock and was well fortified; its outer wall was thrown down by bombardment, but the citadel remained impregnable. Three or four times a day the dauntless Pope appeared at a window, and with bell and torch cursed and excommunicated the
besieging army. He issued a Bull freeing from ecclesiastical penalties all clergy who might kill or mutilate the partisans of Charles. Alberigo replied by a proclamation offering a reward of 10,000 florins to anyone who would bring the Pope alive or dead into the camp. Never had Pope used his ecclesiastical authority so profusely; never had Pope been treated with such contumelious contempt.

Yet Urban VI still had friends, and Charles III had foes. A fleet of ten Genoese vessels lay off the coast, to aid Urban if they saw an opportunity. Raimondello Orsini, son of the Count of Nola, who had been an adherent of Clement VII and Louis of Anjou, was willing to sink his ecclesiastical in his political quarrel, and to help Urban against Charles. Taking under his command a band of mercenaries, he hastened to Nocera; but his mercenaries thought that they would gain more from Charles than from Urban. When the royal troops came out to meet them they fled in pretended fear. Raimondello, finding himself deserted, dashed with furious courage through his enemies, and with a few followers escaped into the castle. Meanwhile his traitorous soldiers succeeded in capturing the Pope’s nephew, Butillo, who had unsuspectingly given them shelter in their flight. He was carried off a prisoner to Charles. Raimondello remained only long enough to concert measures with the Pope. By night he again made his escape through the besieging army, and went to summon the remnants of the army of Louis, which still remained under the leadership of Tommaso of Sanseverino. After this the blockade of Nocera was made more rigid. The arrival of the Abbot of Monte Casino in the royal camp inspired greater savagery into the war. All who were discovered approaching the castle, or trying to introduce supplies or letters, were cruelly tortured. A messenger of the Pope, who was taken prisoner, was hurled from a catapult and was dashed to pieces against the castle walls. Yet, even in his extremities, Urban VI showed a touching solicitude for his successors; and framed a Bull for future occasions of Papal captivity, denouncing penalties on all resident within ten days’ journey who did not hasten to succor a Pope, and promising to those who aided him the same indulgences as if they had gone on a crusade to the Holy Land.

Urban’s troops were sorely pressed by famine, when at length, on July 5, Raimondello Orsini and Tommaso of Sanseverino broke through the camp of the besiegers and carried provisions into the castle. Two days afterwards they rescued the Pope with all his baggage, and the captive Cardinals, whom he refused to let go even in his flight. The horse on which one of them, the Bishop of Aquila, was mounted went lame; whereon Urban ordered the Bishop to be put to death, and his corpse was left unburied by the roadside. The royalist troops, who were not strong enough to prevent the escape, hung on the rear and harassed the retreat. The confusion that arose gave the Pope’s deliverers an opportunity of pillaging his baggage, for the majority of the motley army consisted of Breton adventurers and the French soldiers of Louis, who looked with contempt on Urban as the anti-Pope, and had no motive for rescuing him but a desire for gain. As they drew near to Salerno, a proposal was made to carry off Urban to Avignon, and hand him over to Clement, unless he gave them money enough. The Germans and Italians had some difficulty in defeating this project, and Urban had to pay down 11,000 florins, and give his bond for 24,000 more. After this, it was thought wise to get rid of the French soldiers, and Urban, with 300 Germans and Italians, hurried on to Benevento.

During this retreat we feel that Urban VI was in his proper sphere. Surrounded by a band of reckless ruffians, himself as reckless and as ruffianly as the worst of them, Urban showed courage equal to any danger, and his spirit was undaunted amidst all
hardships. He made for Benevento, and when the inhabitants refused to receive him, he professed to lay aside his intention of going there, and then suddenly appeared before the gates and forced an entrance. Thither he summoned the captains of the Genoese galleys which were still anchored off Naples, and arranged with them that they should convey him to Genoa. He exacted from the Beneventans 1,000 florins, bestowed the rule of the city on Raimondello as a reward for his services, and then commenced his journey to the eastern coast, which still held for the Angevin party, where the Genoese galleys were to meet him. Gobelin of Paderborn, who accompanied Urban in his flight, gives a vivid account of the sufferings experienced in crossing the Apennines in the full blaze of the fierce summer sun. For three months there had been no rain, so that the ground was parched up, and water was scarcely to be found; from before sunrise till after sunset the resolute Urban pressed on, with only an hour’s rest at midday. When at length the sea came in view, not far from Barletta, the sight was hailed by joyous blasts of the trumpets. But the galleys were not visible, and Barletta held for Charles III. They were obliged to make a circuit, and direct their weary steps towards Trani, with many an anxious glance over the waters. At length the longed-for sails were seen; with shouts of joy they hastened to the shore, and were picked up by the galleys on August 21. Their voyage was not without perils, but at last they landed in Genoa on September 23. The Genoese had not served Urban for nothing; they sent in a bill for their kind protection — the cost of ten galleys for four months, which amounted to 80,000 florins. Urban made over to them as payment the seaport town of Cometo, which lay in the Patrimony.

Though Urban VI was in safety at Genoa, his haughty spirit did not relish a residence in a city where opinion was so freely expressed. The Doge, Antoniotto Adorno, was a man of large views and enterprising character, who soon showed the Pope that he was by no means ready to obey his behests. He wrote to the Emperor and to other princes, inviting them to co-operate with him in taking measures to end the Schism. The people of Genoa did not show the Pope the respect which he considered his due, and during his residence in Genoa, Urban never went beyond the precincts of the Hospital of S. John, where he had taken up his abode on landing. Yet the ferocity of his temper was in no way abated. One day there appeared before him a crazy hermit — for crazy indeed he must have been to come on such an errand to such a man — a Frenchman who claimed to have had a revelation from heaven that Clement was the true Pope; he charged Urban, as he loved the Church and valued his own salvation, to lay aside his office. Urban was so amazed at this audacity, that he was driven to account for it by the supposition of diabolical instigation. Seeing a ring on the hermit’s finger, an unwonted ornament, he assumed that it was the abode of the evil spirit. He asked, jokingly, to be allowed to look at it; and as soon as it was in his hand, ordered his attendants to seize the hermit and put him to torture. The poor wretch, of course, confessed that his pretended revelation was diabolic and not divine. The Pope wished to put him to death; but his Cardinals pleaded that the French King might take an unpleasant revenge on several of their relatives who were still in France. The hermit’s head was shaved in mockery; he was compelled to take an oath of allegiance to Urban, and publicly to recant his words; at length he was allowed to go back to France.

After a residence of rather more than a year in Genoa, Urban received a courteous but decided hint from the Doge that he had better seek another place of sojourn; the Genoese did not like his presence, and there were frequent tumults between them and the followers of the Pope. Before his departure the captive Cardinals were put to death, and buried in a stable, because the Pope no longer wished to be troubled by the custody
of prisoners. One only was released — an Englishman, Adam Easton, who owed his safety to the special entreaties of King Richard II.

At the end of his stay in Genoa Urban saw a new opportunity for prosecuting his designs on Naples by the untimely death of King Charles III. No sooner Charles had that adventurous prince freed himself from Urban than he plunged into new schemes of aggrandizement. The death of King Lewis of Hungary in 1382 left his kingdom to his daughter Mary, a girl of twelve years old, who was betrothed to Sigismund, second son of the Emperor Charles IV, a boy of fifteen. The regency was in the hands of the widowed Queen Elizabeth, whose preference for Nicolas Gara, one of the ministers of the late King, awoke the jealousy of the Hungarian barons. Wishing for a leader of revolt, they sent to Charles of Naples and offered him the Hungarian crown; and the ambition of Charles outweighed the promises which he had made to Lewis and prevailed over the entreaties of his wife. It would almost seem that Charles ordered his general to connive at Urban’s escape from Nocera as being the simplest means of freeing himself from difficulties at home. No sooner was Urban fairly embarked on the Genoese galleys than Charles, with a few followers, hurried off to Hungary, where he found much dissatisfaction with the rule of women, and had no difficulty in gathering a strong party round him. At first he declared that he only came to pacify Hungary: but gradually he assumed to himself a kingly position. Elizabeth deemed it wisest to yield: in behalf of herself and her daughter she resigned the crown and besought Charles to take it. But a reaction soon set in, and popular sympathy arose for the dispossessed queens, who attended the coronation of Charles with tears streaming down their cheeks and eyes fixed on the tomb of the great Lewis, whose favors had been so soon forgotten, and whose wife and daughter had been so traitorously abandoned. Charles was naturally of a mild disposition, and every motive of policy combined to lead him to treat with kindness Elizabeth and her daughter, in the hopes of uniting the contending factions in the kingdom. Elizabeth used her opportunity, and plotted the death of Charles. She invited him to a conference, and managed that it lasted so long as to weary out the patience of Charles’s Italian followers, who gradually dispersed. When Charles was thus left alone, Nicolas Gara drew near as though to take leave of the Queen; a man followed him, who, suddenly drawing his sword, aimed a blow at the head of the unsuspecting Charles. Though sorely wounded, Charles could still stagger from the room, but his attendants fled. He was a prisoner in the hands of Elizabeth and Nicolas Gara, and when his wounds showed signs of healing, he was put to death in prison on February 24, 1386.

The death of Charles III again plunged the kingdom of Naples into confusion. The Angevin party, which had been powerless against Charles, raised against his son Ladislas, a boy of twelve years old, the claims of Louis II of Anjou. The exactions of the Queen Regent Margaret awoke dissatisfaction, and led to the appointment in Naples of a new civic magistracy, called the Otto di Buono Stato, who were at variance with Margaret. The Angevins rallied under Tommaso of Sanseverino, and were reinforced by the arrival of Otto of Brunswick. The cause of Louis was still identified with that of Clement VII, who, in May, 1385, had solemnly invested him with the kingdom of Naples. Urban, however, refused to recognize the claims of the son of Charles, though Margaret tried to propitiate him by releasing Butillo from prison, and though Florence warmly supported her prayers for help. Ordinary motives of expediency did not weigh with Urban, who still hoped to bring Naples immediately under himself by setting
Butillo upon the throne. When he left Genoa he resolved to move southwards towards Naples, where he had hopes of acceptance from the Otto di Buono Stato.

Urban could not leave Genoa hurriedly, for it was difficult for him to find anywhere else to go. The Italian cities were not anxious for the expensive honor of entertaining a Pope of Urban’s overbearing disposition. At last, after meeting with many refusals from other cities, he prevailed on Lucca to receive him. On December 16, accompanied by twelve Cardinals, he left Genoa by sea and journeyed to Lucca; though he had promised the citizens of Lucca not to stay longer than fifteen days, he remained there till the following September. Things in Naples went badly for his plans; his refusal to recognize Ladislas necessarily tended to strengthen the party of Louis, which found in Otto of Brunswick a skillful general; the dissensions in the city of Naples between the Queen and the magistracy gave an opportunity for a successful attack. On July 8, Margaret was driven out of Naples, which fell into the hands of the Angevin party, and she had to take refuge in the impregnable Castle of Gaeta. Fierce vengeance was wreaked by the conquerors, who had personal, political, and religious differences to settle. Clement VII gave the Papal permission to sell the gold and silver vessels of the Neapolitan churches as a means of providing pay for the soldiers. Though Urban might not wish to see Ladislas established in Naples, still less could he wish to see there a king who owed his title to Clement. On August 30 he issued an encyclical letter, calling on the faithful to follow the banner of the Church in driving out the schismatics from Naples. But he had no notion of drawing nearer to Ladislas. On September 6 he appointed the Archbishop of Patras guardian of Achaia on behalf of the Church; Ladislas, through his father, had some claim to the succession, and Urban took, in the name of the Church, the heritage of an excommunicated heretic. Both these letters of Urban’s were equally without effect. No army gathered at the Pope’s command to invade Naples; the Church got no hold of Achaia.

The proceedings of Urban VI created uneasiness in Florence. The Republic, in its wish for peace, strove to reconcile Urban with the party of Ladislas: when Urban showed himself inexorable, the Florentines tried to make peace by other means. They sent an embassy to France, and proposed a reconciliation of the two factions in Naples by a marriage of Louis of Anjou with Giovanna, the sister of Ladislas. Their proposal came to nothing; but on their way home the ambassadors paid a visit to Clement VII at Avignon, and were by him received with great respect. Urban’s conduct, especially his execution of the captive Cardinals, awakened disgust throughout Europe. Clement was anxious, when he saw his rival’s unpopularity, to submit his claims to a General Council. He sent an embassy to Florence to urge them to take a leading part in summoning a Council. But the Florentines were too entirely Italian to wish to help a Pope at Avignon: they answered that it was for kings and princes to summon Councils, not for them. They contented themselves with trying to neutralize the ill effects of Urban’s presence in their neighborhood; party spirit waxed high at Bologna, and a faction was desirous of calling in the Pope to their aid. Florence was afraid of the power of Gian Galeazzo Visconti of Milan, and feared lest the Pope should add another to the disturbing causes which were already at work.

Events near Rome tended to call Urban southwards. On May 8 a powerful foe of Urban and of the Roman people, Francesco da Vico, was put to death at Viterbo. He was one of the most powerful and of the most cruel and oppressive amongst the tyrants who had made themselves masters of the States of the Church, and his death was the cause of great rejoicing to the Roman citizens. His relatives, however, were powerful;
and the people of Viterbo, after slaying their tyrant, were driven to put themselves under
the Papal protection, and receive as Papal legate Cardinal Orsini of Manupello. Encouraged by his success, Urban began to draw nearer Rome, and on September 23
left Lucca for Perugia. The Florentines tried to persuade the Perugians not to receive
him; and the Perugian magistrates so far listened to them that, when they met the Pope
on his entry into their city, they urged on him a pacific policy, particularly towards
Florence. Urban briefly answered that peace no doubt was good thing, but he wanted
the lands of the Church; it was not for them to dictate to him in his dealings with
Florence. He hoped to have brought Perugia under his rule; but the Perugians showed
no signs of submission, nor did they pay fitting respect to the nephew Butillo, who had
grown no wiser by previous experience, and conducted his amours with a Perugian lady
in such a way as to awaken the anger of her brothers, who laid in wait for the imprudent
lover by light and ignominiously flogged him. The Pope was full of wrath at this insult
to his favorite, but his wrath was directed to another quarter. On some trivial cause he
called Cardinal Orsini from Viterbo; but the people held by the Cardinal, and refused to
admit the new legate whom Urban sent in his place. Furious at this insult Urban
summoned Cardinal Orsini to Perugia, and could not await his arrival, but sent soldiers to
arrest him on the way. This aroused the anger of the Cardinal’s brother, Cola Orsini,
who sized upon the towns of Narni and Terni. Urban was driven to liberate the Cardinal
and end this unprofitable quarrel.

But all this while the Pope’s eyes were fixed on Naples, and he saw in the varying
successes of the two contending parties and in the miseries of the land a means of
asserting his own claims. He declared that the kingdom had lapsed to the Holy See, and
even wrote from Perugia, on May 1, appointing a governor of Calabria. He labored to
gather together troops for an expedition into Naples, and called upon Sicily to provide
him with ships and men in accordance with an old treaty which bound Sicily to furnish
aid to Naples when it was in extreme peril; as rightful lord of Naples, Urban declared its
peril to be extreme. All the army that Urban could raise was a band of mercenaries,
who, under the command of an Englishman, Beltot, had been ravaging Tuscany. On
August 8, 1388, Urban put himself at the head of this lawless company and departed
from Perugia. He had not gone far before his mule stumbled and he fell. Though so
severely shaken that he had to be carried in a litter, he still refused to go to Rome, and
continued his course to Naples. A hermit came to meet him on his way, and
prophesied: “Whether you will or no, you will go to Rome and there die”. The prophecy
came true. At Narni his reckless soldiers began to doubt about their chances of receiving
pay, the Florentines, anxious to avert war, had made them tempting offers if they would
enter their service, and they began to think that the money of Florence was surer than
that of the Pope. Two thousand of them left him and went back to Tuscany. Though
Urban was left with only two hundred men, he still went on his way to Ferentino. There
he waited for reinforcements, but only a thousand men gathered round him. He saw that
his expedition was useless, and gloomily retired to Rome, which he had not seen for
five years. He was received by the Romans on September 1 with outward respect, but
with suspicion and dislike. They insisted that he should send away the soldiers whom he
had brought with him, and he was obliged to dismiss them to Viterbo.

Yet Urban’s mind was still set upon an expedition to Naples, and for that purpose
money must be raised. He hit upon the happy expedient of hastening on the year of
jubilee, which had been established by Boniface VIII, in 1300, as an anniversary to be
held every hundred years, when pilgrims might visit Rome and gain indulgences by
prayers at the graves of the Apostles. This jubilee had been found so profitable that Clement VI enacted that it should be held every fiftieth year. Urban VI went further, and ordered that the year 1390 should be a year of jubilee, and that henceforth it should be held every thirty-third year. Of course there were excellent reasons for this change. Thirty-three was the number of years of the Redeemer’s life on this earth; it was also the duration of a generation of men, and gave all who wished it a fair chance of obtaining inestimable privileges. The proclamation of a jubilee was Urban’s last desperate step to obtain supplies for his projected invasion of Naples. Meanwhile it gave him a powerful means of keeping in order the refractory Romans. Their city was desolate; they had suffered from the incursions of bands of plunderers of every sort; poverty, beggary, and famine were rife. Urban found it even necessary to issue a decree forbidding the people to dismantle the empty palaces of the Cardinals that they might use the materials for building. Rome hailed with joy the promise of a jubilee, which would again bring crowds of pilgrims and make money flow into their beggared city. Urban saw and used his opportunity to strike a blow at the power of the magistracy, who, since his departure, had ruled the city. He appointed a senator by his own powers: the people rose in uproar and rushed clamorous to the Vatican. But the Papal excommunication again had power in Rome when anything was to be gained from the Papacy. In a few days the Roman Magistrates, barefooted, in the garb of penitence, with ropes round their necks and candles in their hands, sought the Pope’s absolution. Urban’s indomitable spirit had still some ground to triumph before it passed away. He reduced to obedience the people of Rome, and he heard of the failure of an attempt made by his foe, Cardinal Pileo of Ravenna, to create a diversion in favor of Clement in North Italy. On August 25 Urban fulminated is anathemas against him as a child of wickedness. On October 15 he died in the Vatican, and was buried in the chapel of S. Andrew, whence his bones were afterwards transferred into the main church.

Urban VI’s pontificate is one of the most disastrous in the whole history of the Papacy. Many other Popes have been more vicious, but none showed less appreciation of the difficulties, the duties, the traditions of his office. The private vices of a man are known for certain only to a few, and entire incompetence, if a dignified exterior be preserved, may escape detection. But at a most critical moment in the history of the Papacy, when tact, discretion, and conciliatory prudence were above all things necessary. Urban showed to his astonished adherents nothing save furious self-will, unreasoning ambition, and a wild savageness of disposition, which removed his actions from all possibility of calculation. He excited bitter hatred, all the more bitter because his followers could not choose but submit. Urban was at the head of a party bound together by many different interests; but he was a necessary head, and men could not dispense with him if they would. Revolt against Urban meant acceptance of Clement, and all the political consequences which a Pope under French influence necessarily involved. Men followed Urban in helpless terror and disgust, for his wild energy and ferocity prevented them from regarding him with contempt; only a man like Charles of Naples, strong and unscrupulous as himself, could beat him back. Men said that he was mad, that his head had been turned by his unexpected elevation to the Papacy. In truth, Urban is an example of the wild excesses of an adventurous spirit, which had been in early years repressed, but not trained by discipline. When he became Pope he wished to compress into a few years the gratification of the desires of a lifetime. He fancied that his office in itself afforded him the means of giving effect to his personal schemes and caprices. The traditions of the Papacy, the policy of his predecessors, the advice and the entreaties of his Cardinals, weighed equally little with him. His very virtues only lent
intensity to the evil which he wrought; his personal uprightness, straightforwardness, and piety only tended to give strength to his pride and obstinacy. He was so confident in the rightness of his own opinion, that he regarded all advice with contempt; he was so determined to move directly to his end, that he never reasonably considered the difficulties in the way. He was so convinced that his cause was the cause of heaven, that he had no place for the hesitation or the wisdom of humility. He formed no large plans; he can scarcely be said to have had a policy at all. Being a Neapolitan by birth, he seems to have burned with desire to make his power felt in his native land. This he hoped to do by the mere assertion of the old claims of the Papacy, which he wished to use solely in the interests of his own family. His attempt would have been ludicrous if it had not been carried on with a fiery and passionate persistency that made it tragic. Still even in this attempt, unreflecting as it was, we see the beginnings of the obvious policy which the conditions of Italy forced upon the restored Papacy — the policy of founding itself upon a basis of temporal sovereignty, and taking place among the vigorous rulers who had sprung up in every part of Italy. Urban saw the need of this, and saw also that the end could only be reached by employing the Papal power to promote the Pope’s relatives. The rash endeavors of Urban VI are but a grotesque forecast of the subtler and more far-seeing policy of his successors in the fifteenth century.
CHAPTER II.
CLEMENT VII. BONIFACE IX.
RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS IN OXFORD AND PARIS.
1389—1394

In following the wild career of Urban VI we have seen but little of his rival Clement VII. It would seem as if their elevation to the Papacy had transformed the characters of the two men. The high-born Robert of Geneva laid aside the reckless blood-thirstiness which marked him as a condottiere general, and adopted the stately decorum of the Papal office. The lowly Neapolitan bishop, Bartolommeo Prignano, disregarded the traditions of the Curia in which he had been trained, and plunged furiously into a career of military enterprise. In the peaceful retirement of Avignon, Clement VII was free from the complications of Italian politics, and had none of the temptations to adventurous exploits which led Urban VI astray. He could listen unmoved to the fulminations of his rival, and was concerned only with the ceremonial side of the Neapolitan contest—the investiture and coronation of the Angevin pretenders. Instead of struggling to win a kingdom for himself, he pursued the less adventurous task of gaining over to his obedience the kingdoms of the Spanish peninsula. At first they had stood aloof from the strife of rival Pontiffs; but in 1380 the necessities of a close alliance with France urged John I of Castile, who had come to the throne in 1379, to recognize Clement VII.

John I was the son of Henry of Trastamara, who, in spite of the arms of the Black Prince, had ousted Peter the Cruel from the Castilian throne. But Peter’s daughter Constance had been married to John of Gaunt, Duke of Lancaster, who, in right of his wife, claimed Castile for himself. This struggle was necessarily part of the great struggle between France and England which occupies so much of the history of the fourteenth century. While English troops were ready to fight against John’s throne, it was the interest of France to help him, and he was bound to draw near to France in all political matters. Yet the recognition of Clement was done with all due decorum, so as to be impressive to the rest of Europe.

In November, 1380, John ordered a council to be held at Medina del Campo, in the diocese of Salamanca, for the purpose of enquiring into the claims of the two Popes. Urban’s cause was pleaded by the Bishops of Faenza and Pavia; Clement’s by a Spanish Cardinal, Peter de Luna, a keen and shrewd man of the world, whose Spanish birth gave him many advantages in the discussion. Many were the sittings of the Council, lengthy the speeches of the advocates, bulky the statements sent by the two Popes, and enormous the mass of depositions by which they each substantiated their claims. The Council sat from November, 1380, till March, 1381, and then declared for Clement, who by this adhesion of Castile won a decided triumph over his rival. Urban had submitted his claims to a tribunal which professed to weigh the matter carefully, and then gave judgment against him. So far as conciliar action had gone, it had been in favor of Clement. Of course Urban declared John of Castile deposed, and handed over his kingdom to the Duke of Lancaster, who more than once led an English army into Castile; but, though helped by Portugal, he found the strife hopeless, and in 1390 made
peace with John, and gave his daughter Katharine in marriage to the heir to the Castilian throne.

In Aragon the ambitious and grasping Peter IV was willing to recognize Urban, if the Pope would invest him with Sicily, where he was trying to assert his claims to the throne, and would gratify his cupidity by further concessions. It is to Urban’s credit that he refused the terms offered: indeed, Urban’s haughtiness and self-confidence were too great to purchase recognition by unworthy means. Peter accordingly acknowledged neither Pope; but his successor, John I, listened to the persuasions of Peter de Luna, followed the example of Castile, and immediately on his accession in 1387 acknowledged Clement. Three years later, in 1390, Charles III of Navarre, again at the instigation of the indefatigable Peter de Luna, joined the Kings of Castile and Aragon in their recognition of Clement. Following on the stormy and disastrous reign of Charles the Bad, he pursued a peaceful policy of alliance with his neighbors, and so wished to avoid the difficulties of ecclesiastical differences.

In the peace of Avignon, however, Clement VII had to face a theological power, from whose influence his rival was free. One of the results of the Papal residence at Avignon had been an increase of the reputation of the University of Paris as the fountain of theological learning. The University, by becoming the seat of philosophical teaching, had in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries given organized expression to the beliefs and opinions on which the Papal power was based, and in close alliance with the Papacy had grown in importance. Many of its sons became Popes, and showed due gratitude to their nursing mother by increasing her privileges and extolling her glory. Alexander IV spoke of the University of Paris as the “tree of life in Paradise, the lamp of the house of God, a well of wisdom ever flowing for souls that thirsted after righteousness”. With such a reputation, and supported by the national pride of the French people, it was but natural that this powerful corporation of learned theologians should be reckoned as superior in theological matters to the Popes at Avignon, who were content to register rather than mold its decrees. When John XXII held a different opinion from the University about the condition of departed souls after death, he narrowly escaped being branded as a heretic. On the outbreak of the Schism, motives of political interest had outweighed the scruples of the canonists, and the French King had acknowledged Clement VII without heeding the hesitation of the University. Yet a slight experience of the evils of the Schism revived the power of the University, and gave practical emphasis to its warnings. Clement had to procure revenues for himself and his Cardinals chiefly at the expense of the French Church. Thirty-six proctors of the Cardinals ranged like harpies through the land, enquiring into the value of abbeys and benefices, and ready on a vacancy to pounce upon them for their masters. Every post of any value was reserved for the Papal officials, and the goods of prelates were seized at their death for the Pope’s use. The native clergy saw that they would soon be reduced to hard straits; the University dreaded the loss of its share of ecclesiastical patronage; and thoughtful men saw with sorrow the neglect of all spiritual functions which such a state of affairs must necessarily produce in the Church. Already, on the death of Charles V, in September, 1380, there were hopes that under the new rule something might be done to heal the schism, and the University laid before the Regent, Louis of Anjou, a proposal for summoning a General Council. But Louis was bound to Clement VII by the exigencies of his Neapolitan policy, and answered the petition of the University by throwing its representatives into prison, whence they were not released till they had promised to lay
aside their proposal of a Council. Still the University did not give up its project, though political necessities hindered it for a time.

In the course of a few years a conflict arose within the University itself which led it to submit to the Pope’s decision a disputed question of doctrine. Its orthodoxy received a shock in 1387 by the opinions of a Dominican, Jean de Montson, who asserted the view held by his Order that the Virgin Mary was conceived in original sin. The reverence paid to Mary had led to attempts to define and determine the exact limits of her holiness. S. Bernard had declared that she had been free from sin during her lifetime; but popular devotion demanded more than this, and S. Thomas Aquinas had found it necessary to argue against the notion of an immaculate conception. The Dominican Order had followed their great teacher; but the opinion of Duns Scotus, which was followed by the Franciscans, was more popular, and asserted the fitness and possibility of the belief that the Virgin had not been conceived in sin. The question had gradually developed into importance, and the two parties were in decided opposition to one another. The University as a body sided with the Franciscan view, and Montson’s teaching was regarded as a challenge. A commission was appointed to look into his opinions, which were unanimously condemned. Montson appealed to Clement, and a deputation headed by Peter of Ailly, who was accompanied by his pupil Jean Gerson, was sent to plead the views of the University at Avignon. Clement’s position towards this question was uncomfortable; on the side of Montson was the authority of Aquinas, who had been recognized by Pope Urban V as an authoritative teacher of Christian truth. Clement must either set aside the declaration of a previous Pope, and so give his rival the opportunity of impeaching his own orthodoxy, or he must oppose the favorite doctrine of the University, and run counter to the popular opinion of France. Clement did not immediately pronounce on the matter; but Montson’s flight into Aragon and adhesion to Urban decided Clement against him, and in January, 1389, he condemned Montson’s opinions, to the delight of the University and the people of France. Clement VII thus took an important step in the formation of the opinion of the Church, though it was not till 1854 that the views of Ailly and of the University of Paris were raised to the dignity of a necessary dogma. Still the quarrel lasted within the University. No one was admitted to a degree who did not assent to the condemnation of Montson’s propositions; the Dominicans were for a time forbidden to lecture, and it was not till 1403 that a reconciliation was brought about and the Dominicans reluctantly submitted.

Urban VI died on October 15, 1389. On October 30, in the Court of Avignon, Clement VII, with great Election pomp, crowned Louis II of Anjou as King of Naples. The French King lent his presence to the ceremony, which was thus a declaration of the political strength of the Pope at Avignon. There were hopes that with the death of Urban VI the Schism might be ended by the universal recognition of Clement VII. Such, however, was not the idea of the fourteen Cardinals of Urban VI who were at Rome. They lost no time in going into Conclave, and elected a Neapolitan Cardinal, Piero Tomacelli, who was enthroned on November 2, 1389, and took the title of Boniface IX.

Tomacelli was tall and of commanding appearance, in the prime of life, being only thirty-three years old. He was not a scholar, nor a student, nor was he even versed in the ordinary routine of the business of the Curia. His secretary, Dietrich of Niem, sighs over his ignorance and heedlessness of the formalities in which the official mind especially delights. The College of Cardinals was not strong, and it was clear that he who was elected Pope would have no easy task before him. Tomacelli’s vigor and prudence were well known, and his life was free from reproach; contemporaries tell us, with wonder,
that no suspicion of unchastity ever attached to him. The Cardinals, smarting under the indignities of the rule of Urban VI, chose a successor of whose affability they were sure, and whom they believed to possess the force of character necessary to rescue the Papacy from the disastrous results of Urban’s wrongheadedness. On his return from his enthronization, Boniface IX’s answer to those who congratulated him was, “My joy is your joy”.

Boniface lost no time in showing that his spirit was different from that of Urban. He restored to his position as Cardinal the luckless Englishman Adam Easton, the sole surviving victim of Urban’s tyranny. This conciliatory act bore its fruit in the return of the runaway Pileo of Ravenna, who after being first a Cardinal of Urban VI and then of Clement VII, was again received by Boniface IX. The Italians made merry over the turncoat, and gave him the nickname of the Cardinal di Tricapelli — the “Cardinal of three hats”. A pious adherent of Clement expresses a devout hope that his ambition and wantonness might be rewarded hereafter by a fourth hat of red-hot iron.

If Boniface IX thus wished to show his freedom from the personal quarrels of his predecessor, he was equally anxious to reverse his political measures. He saw the hopelessness of Urban’s opposition to Ladislas of Naples; he saw that a powerful vassal king in Naples was the necessary support of the Papacy at Rome. Accordingly he made haste to recognize Ladislas, who, in May, 1390, was solemnly crowned King of Naples by the Florentine bishop, Angelo Acciaiuoli, who was sent as Papal Legate for the purpose. Boniface had the political wisdom to perceive at once that the first object of Papal policy must be to secure a firm territorial basis in Italy itself. He exchanged the wild schemes of Urban for a statesmanlike plan of establishing the Pope’s power in Rome, and of gathering together again the scattered States of the Church.

But this was no easy task, and it required above all things money for its accomplishment. The whole nature of Boniface seems to have been devoted to attempts to gather money, and to this he turned all the power and privileges of his ecclesiastical position. Urban VI had grievous faults, but he was not extortionate: his determination to root out the abuses of the Curia was the chief cause which provoked against him the hatred of the seceding Cardinals. Yet Urban had felt the pressing need of money, and had proclaimed the Jubilee for 1390; and it was the luck of Boniface to enter at once into the enjoyment of the revenues which this source of income provided. Pilgrims flocked from Germany, Hungary, Poland, Bohemia, and England, and the Papal treasury was enriched by their pious offerings. So satisfied was Boniface with the results, that he was unwilling to deprive any one of the indulgences which were so precious both to himself and them. He extended the privileges of the jubilee to those who visited the churches of many cities in Germany, provided they extended helping hands to the Papal needs. Köln, Magdeburg, Meissen, Prague, and Paderborn, were in turns the objects of the Papal generosity, and to each of them Papal collectors were sent who received the tribute of the faithful. So lucrative was this proceeding found, that unaccredited agents of the Pope took on themselves to sell indulgences, and the scandal was so great that the Pope was obliged to appoint commissioners to restrain these impostors.

The money which Boniface raised by the Jubilee was needed for the help of Ladislas in Naples, where Louis of Anjou landed in August, 1390. The party of Ladislas was feeble, and all the Pope’s aid was necessary to supply him with resources sufficient to enable him to make head against his more wealthy rival. Boniface did not scruple to
alienate or mortgage Church lands to raise supplies. He took also an important step by selling to the nobles who had risen to power in various cities of the Patrimony the title of Vicar of the Roman Church. In this Boniface showed his wisdom. He recognized the existing state of things, which he had no power of preventing; and he was paid for his recognition. Moreover, his recognition was in the nature of a limitation. The authority which had been gained by the nobles was irregular and indefinite; it had grown up of its own accord, and might have developed unchecked. The Pope conferred upon them a title and an authority for a limited period, from ten to twelve years, and received in return a sum of money paid down, and a small yearly tribute. When the authority of these Papal Vicars had once been defined, it could be altered or suspended according as the Pope was powerful. It was a wise act on the part of Boniface, in the midst of all the difficulties and necessities of his position, to adopt a scheme which filled his coffers, diminished the number of his foes, and gave him a standing ground from which to proceed against them when opportunity offered. Yet the tendency towards dismemberment of the Papal States was strong; and the dynasties whose rights were now recognized remained for more than a century to disturb the Popes. Antonio of Montefeltro was made Vicar, of Urbino and Cagli, and Astorgio Manfredi of Faenza. The Alidosi ruled at Imola; the Ordelaffi at Forlì; the Malatesta at Rimini, Fano, and Fossombrone; Albert of Este at Ferrara. Bologna, Fermo, and Ascoli bought similar privileges for their municipal bodies. Not since the days of Albornoz had the Papal lordship been so widely acknowledged in the States of the Church.

Boniface could raise money in Germany and Italy, but he found it more difficult to do so in England, where neither religious nor political feeling was strong on the side of the Pope. The old resistance to Papal exactions had gained additional weight when the Pope at Avignon was clearly on the side of the national foes. At the outbreak of the Schism, England had set herself on the side opposite to France, but had no interest in specially maintaining the cause of the Pope of Rome. The policy of national opposition to the extortions of the Papacy gathered still greater strength after the enactment of the Statutes of Provisors and Praemunire: and this national spirit soon found an exponent who raised the question of resistance to Rome above the level of a mere struggle against extortion. The destruction of the ecclesiastical system by the Popes, and the disastrous results of the Schism, gave rise to a movement within the University of Oxford, which went deeper than the corresponding movement in the University of Paris. While the theologians of Paris, accepting the Papal system, set themselves to find a practical method of healing its breaches and restoring its unity, there arose in Oxford a follower of William of Occam, who advanced to a criticism of the foundations of the ecclesiastical system itself.

From a little village near Richmond, in Yorkshire, John Wycliffe went as a student to Oxford, where his learning and ability met with their reward in a Fellowship at Merton, the Mastership of Balliol, and the Wardenship of Archbishop Islip's new foundation of Canterbury Hall in 1365. In this last position, Wycliffe was engaged in the struggle that continually was waged between the monks and the secular clergy; each party strove to possess themselves of the endowments of the Hall, and the monks, aided by Archbishop Langham, Islip’s successor, and by the Pope, succeeded in dispossessing Wycliffe and the secular clergy.

In 1366 Wycliffe first was brought into relation with public affairs. Pope Urban V was unwise enough to add another to the causes of England’s discontent by demanding payment of the 1000 marks which John had agreed to pay yearly as tribute to the Pope.
Since the accession of Edward I, this tribute had not been paid; and when Urban V demanded arrears for the past thirty-three years, Edward III referred the matter to Parliament. Lords, prelates, and Commons unanimously answered that John had not the power to bind the people without their consent, and that his compact with the Pope had been a breach of his coronation oath; they placed at the King’s disposal all the power and resources of the nation to protect his throne and the national honor against such a demand. Urban V withdrew his claim in silence, and no mention was ever made again by the Papacy of suzerainty over England. On this occasion Wycliffe first used his pen, by recording in a pamphlet the arguments used in Parliament by seven lords, who, on the grounds of national interest, positive law, feudal obligation, and the nullity of the compact made by John, combated the Papal claims.

In the later years of Edward III, England was impoverished by the long war with France, and discontented at the management of affairs. In 1371 laymen were substituted for ecclesiastics in the high offices of state; and hope was strong that the lay ministry, headed by John of Gaunt, besides bringing the French war to a speedy end, would protect the nation against the extortions of the Roman Curia.

But the Ministry soon showed its feebleness by its dealings with Arnold Garnier, who, in February, 1372, presented himself in England as the accredited agent of Gregory XI. The Council did not venture to forbid his presence, but contented themselves with administering to him an oath that he would do nothing injurious to the King, the realm, or the laws. We do not find that Garnier, in consequence of his oath, behaved in any way differently from other Papal collectors, and Wycliffe afterwards pointed out that he must necessarily commit perjury, as no diminution of the country’s wealth could fail to be pernicious to the kingdom. But Wycliffe soon had an opportunity of seeing close at hand the management of affairs by the Curia. In 1374 he was appointed one of seven commissioners, who were to confer with Papal nuncios about the redress of England’s grievances at Bruges, where a conference was being held to arrange terms of peace with France. The commission arrived at no results, except that the Chief Commissioner, the Bishop of Bangor, soon after his return home, was translated by Papal provision to the more lucrative see of Hereford, as a recompense for his readiness to do nothing. Gregory XI issued, it is true, six lengthy Bulls which dealt only with existing circumstances, and laid down no principles for the future. The rule of John of Gaunt did nothing for England, and the “Good Parliament” of 1376 set aside his power, and again committed the government to William of Wykeham, Bishop of Winchester, an experienced official.

The antagonism of political parties waxed high in these last years of Edward III, when his glory and his power alike had passed away. John of Gaunt was unscrupulous in his desire for power, and was opposed to the prelates whose political influence stood in his way. He sought allies against them on all sides, alike in the Roman Curia and in the energetic party which gathered round Wycliffe’s aspirations for a reformed Church. The prelates were not slow to retaliate, and aimed a blow at John of Gaunt by striking Wycliffe, who in February, 1377, was summoned to appear before Convocation, in the Lady Chapel of S. Paul’s, and answer for his opinions. He came, but the Duke of Lancaster stood by his side, and the assembly ended in a faction fight between the Londoners and the adherents of John of Gaunt. But the prelates were prepared to move against Wycliffe under cover of the Papal authority, if their own power was thus defied. In May, 7, Pope Gregory XI issued five Bulls against the errors of Wycliffe, who was accused of following in the steps of Marsiglio of Padua and John
of Jandun, whose writings had already been condemned. Wycliffe was already famous as a philosopher and a theologian. Nineteen propositions taken from his writings were condemned by the Pope as erroneous, and two prelates were appointed to examine if the condemned propositions were rightly assigned to Wycliffe.

The propositions in question were concerned with theories of civil and ecclesiastical polity. They asserted that the rights of property and of inheritance were not unconditionally valid, but depended on obedience to the will of God; that the property of the Church might be secularized if the Church fell into error, or the clergy misused their possessions, on which points temporal princes might judge; that the Pope’s power to bind and loose was only valid when used in accordance with the Gospel. Wycliffe’s teaching on the relations between Church and State lacked the precision as well as the political knowledge which characterized Marsiglio of Padua. Marsiglio was a political philosopher who started from Aristotle and from the experience of a self-governing civic community. Wycliffe was a schoolman who limited his analysis to the particular discussion of the foundation of dominium, or lordship, and his political and religious conceptions were obscured by being expressed in the language of feudalism. He regarded God as the lord of the world who apportioned to all in authority their power, which was held under Him; dominion in things temporal and spiritual alike was held of God, and popes and kings were bound to recognize that their sovereignty depended upon its exercise in accordance with the law of God. Mortal sin was a breach of the tie of allegiance, and in itself destroyed the basis of power: in Wycliffe’s phraseology, “dominion was founded on grace”. This theory was no doubt an ideal theory, intended to set forth the spiritual independence of the righteous man, who was lord over the world, in spite of appearances to the contrary. Wycliffe did not wish to apply this doctrine to the subversion of social order; and to remedy its abstractness, he enunciated in a paradoxical form the duty of obedience to existing authority; “God”, he said, “ought to obey the devil”. God has permitted evil in the world; a Christian ought to obey the commands of a wicked ruler, in the same sense as Christ obeyed the devil, by submitting to his temptations. In these statements Wycliffe was neither clear in his analogies nor happy in his phraseology, and we can scarcely wonder that he was misunderstood and misrepresented. His political teaching easily lent itself to anarchical movements, and his followers in later times labored under the disadvantage of having no clear basis on which to bring their ideas into relation with the actual facts of political life.

Before the arrival of the Pope’s Bulls ordering Wycliffe’s trial, Edward III died, and the first parliament of Richard II was strongly opposed to Papal exactions. It raised the question whether in time of need the king might prohibit the exportation of money in spite of the Pope’s admonitions. Wycliffe’s opinion was asked, and on the three grounds of the law of nature, the law of scripture, and the law of conscience, he replied in the affirmative. The prelates could not take action on the Pope’s Bull before the end of 1377, and when Wycliffe was summoned before Archbishop Sudbury and Courtenay, Bishop of London, the Council did not think it wise that the trial should proceed. A message was sent by the Princess of Wales, mother of the young King Richard II, ordering the trial to be broken off; and the cries of the people round the Court admonished the prelates to obey the command. The proceedings against Wycliffe were suspended, but for form’s sake he was forbidden to promote or teach any of the doctrines condemned by the Pope. The death of Gregory XI and the Schism that ensued put aside the question of Wycliffe’s further trial.
But the Papal prosecution and the events of the Schism had an important influence on the mind of Wycliffe. At first he had been chiefly an Oxford student, of keen critical intellect, ready to give expression with remorseless logic to the national dislike of Papal extortion. But his political experience at Bruges, his riper study and reflection, his deeper knowledge as vicar of Lutterworth of the spiritual needs of simple folk — all these combined to lead him on to investigate the inner working, as well as the political aspect, of the ecclesiastical system, the mechanism and doctrines of the Church as well as the relations between Church and State. To this temper the outbreak of the Schism gave an additional impulse. The spiritual earnestness of Wycliffe was shocked at the sight of two men each claiming to be head of the Church, and each devoting his entire energies to the destruction of his rival, seeking only his own triumph, and doing nothing for the flock which he professed to guard. Moreover, the Schism dealt a heavy blow at the influence exercised on the imagination of the Middle Ages by the unity of the Church. Instead of unity Wycliffe saw division — saw the Pope whom England professed to follow sinking to the level of a robber chieflain. Gradually his mind became dissatisfied with the doctrine of the Papal primacy. At a time when two Popes were fulminating excommunications against each other, and each called the other “Antichrist”, it was not such a very long step for Wycliffe to take when he asserted that the institution of the Papacy itself was the poison of the Church; that it was not Urban or Clement who was antichrist, but the Pope, be he who he might, who claimed to rule the universal Church. As Wycliffe’s opinion led him more and more, oppose the Papal system his zeal increased. Disciples gathered round him, and, like another S. Dominic, Wycliffe sent forth preachers into the evil world; but, unlike the reformers of the thirteenth century who went forth as missionaries of the Papal power, those of the fourteenth denounced a corrupt hierarchy and the enslavement of the Church by an antichristian Pope. Moreover, to supply all men the means of judging for themselves, Wycliffe, and his chief disciples, with dauntless energy, undertook the noble work of translating the Bible into English, a work which was finished in the year 1382.

Wycliffe was at all times of his career a fertile writer, and may in this respect be compared with Luther. It was natural for him to cast into a literary form the thoughts that passed through his mind, and his works are alternately those of a scholastic disputant, a patriotic Churchman, and a mission priest. In all things he was equally earnest, whether it was to maintain the constitutional rights of the English Church and the English Ruler against the extortions of Rome, to expose the assumptions of the Papal monarchy, to show the corruptions of the ecclesiastical system, or to kindle the spiritual life of simple folk. His treatises are numerous, and many of them exist only in manuscript. It is difficult to reduce into a system the multitudinous utterances of one who was at once a profound theologian, a publicist, and a popular preacher. In matters of ecclesiastical polity, as in political speculations, Wycliffe laid down a basis which was too abstract and too ideal to admit of application to actual affairs. He defined the Church as the corporate body of the chosen, consisting of three parts; one triumphant in heaven, another sleeping in purgatory, and a third militant on earth. This view, which in itself accords with the Augustinian doctrine of predestination, Wycliffe applied to determine the basis of ecclesiastical polity. Against the corrupt Church which he saw around him, he set up the mystical body of the predestinated; against a degenerate hierarchy, he asserted the priesthood of all faithful Christians, and did not clearly determine the relations between the visible Church on earth and the great company of the saved.
From the basis of this ideal conception of the Church Wycliffe attacks the Papal primacy. There ought, he says, to be unity in the Church militant, if it is to be at unity with the Church triumphant; but unity is disturbed by new sects of monks, friars, and clergy, who have set over the Church another head than Christ. The primacy of S. Peter, on which they rest their theory of the Papacy, is set forth in Scripture only as depending on his superior humility; he exercised no authority over the other Apostles, but was only endowed with special grace. Whatever power Peter had, there is no ground for assuming that it passed to the Bishop of Rome, whose authority was derived from Caesar, and is not mentioned in the Scriptures, save in irony, where it is written, “The Kings of the Gentiles exercise lordship over them, but ye shall not be so”.

It must have been at the instigation of a malignant spirit that the popes chose as the seat of the Curia the profane city of Rome, steeped in the blood of martyrs; by continuing in their secular life, and in the pride of Lucifer, they wrong Christ and continue in error. They claim to grant indulgences and privileges beyond what was done by Christ or the Apostles, and their pretensions can only be explained as the work of the devil, the power of antichrist. A pope is only to be followed so far as he follows Christ; if he ceases to be a good shepherd, he becomes antichrist; and reverence paid to antichrist as though he were Christ is a manifest snare of the devil to beguile unwary souls: and the belief in Papal infallibility is contrary to Scripture, and is a blasphemy suggested by the devil. If we take Scripture as our guide, and compare the Pope with Christ, we shall see many differences. Christ is truth, the Popes is the origin of falsehood. Christ lived in poverty, the Pope labors for worldly wealth. Christ was humble and gentle, the Pope is proud and cruel; Christ forbade that anything be added to His law, the Pope makes many laws which distract men from the knowledge of Christ; Christ bade His disciples go into all the world and preach the Gospel, the Pope lives in his palace and pays no heed to such command; Christ refused temporary dominion, the Pope seeks it; Christ obeyed the temporal power, the Pope strives to weaken it; Christ chose for His apostles twelve simple men, the Pope chooses as cardinals many more than twelve, worldly and crafty; Christ forbade to smite with the sword and preferred Himself to suffer, the Pope seizes the goods of the poor to hire soldiers; Christ limited His mission to Judea, the Pope extends his jurisdiction everywhere for the sake of gain; Christ was lowly; the Pope is magnificent and demands outward honor; Christ refused money, the Pope is entirely given up to pride and simony. Whoso considers these things will see that he must imitate Christ and flee from the example of antichrist.

These are the words of a man who has been driven by the actual facts around him to take refuge in the plain words of Scripture, and flee from the corruption of the ecclesiastical system to the purity and simplicity of the Divine Head of the Church. But Wycliffe was not content only with this endeavor to bring back the organization of the Church to its original purity; his keen critical intellect pressed on into the region of doctrine, and attacked the central position of the sacerdotal system. He busied himself with an examination of the sacraments, and convinced himself in 1380 that the doctrine of Transubstantiation, or the change in substance of the elements of the Eucharist after consecration, was not according to Scripture. He lost no time in publishing his convictions. In the summer of 1381 he put forth twelve propositions about the Eucharist, which he offered to defend in disputation against gainsayers. The upshot of these propositions was the assertion that bread and wine remained after consecration bread and wine as they were before, yet by virtue of the words of consecration
contained the true body and blood of Christ, which were really present at every point of the host.

Wycliffe did not deny the real presence of Christ in the elements; he denied only the change of substance in the elements after consecration. Christ’s body was still miraculously present, but the miracle was wrought by Christ Himself, not by the words of the priest. “Thou that art an earthly man”, he exclaims to the priest, “by what reason mayest thou say that thou makest thy Maker?”. “Antichrist by this heresy destroys grammar, logic, and natural science; but, what is more to be regretted, does away with the sense of the Gospel”. “The truth and the faith of the Church is that, as Christ is at once God and man, so the Sacrament is at once the body of Christ and bread — bread naturally and the body sacramentally”. He rebelled against the idolatry of the mass, against the popular materialism, against the miraculous powers claimed by the priesthood; and his propositions were aimed against the root of these abuses, not against the conception of the Sacrament of the Altar in itself. He attacked the prevalent materialism without pursuing the other aspects of the question.

The propositions of Wycliffe about the Sacrament of the Altar at once attracted much attention, and gave a shock to many who had hitherto sympathized with him in his opposition to Papal aggression and clerical corruption. He had advanced beyond the discussion of ecclesiastical polity to the more dangerous ground of doctrine; and the professed theologians, especially those of the mendicant orders, who had hitherto looked on Wycliffe with approval, felt themselves bound to oppose him. The Chancellor of the University of Oxford summoned a council of doctors, who concurred in declaring the doctrines contained in these theses to be unorthodox, and a decree was published forbidding them to be taught within the University. This was entirely unexpected by Wycliffe, who was sitting in his doctor’s chair in the school of the Augustinians lecturing on the very subjects when an official entered and read the decree. Wycliffe at once protested against its justice, and appealed from the Chancellor to the King. John of Gaunt interfered to impose silence on Wycliffe, and events themselves declared against him. The peasants’ rising under Watt Tyler, the murder of Archbishop Sudbury, and the hatred against wealth displayed by the insurgents, filled the well-to-do classes with terror and provoked a reaction. Though Wycliffe’s teaching had no necessary connection with the revolt, it was natural that all novelties should be suspected, and that men shrank before the discussion of dangerous questions. It was not difficult for Wycliffe’s opponents to raise a feeling against him, connect the Wycliffite teachers with antisocial movements, and find the root of all political dangers in the new doctrines which Wycliffe taught.

The Archbishop of Canterbury, William Courtenay, held in London, in May, 1382, a Council which condemned as heretical the propositions drawn from Wycliffe’s writings which dealt with the doctrine of the Sacraments, and condemned as erroneous fourteen others which dealt with points of ecclesiastical polity. Only the opinions were condemned, and no mention was made of their author by name. This Council was called by Wycliffe the “Earthquake Council”, because a slight shock of an earthquake was felt while it was sitting. Both sides explained the portent in their own favor. Wycliffe asserted that God spoke in behalf of His saints because men were silent; the orthodox party answered that the earth expelled its noisome vapors in sympathy with the Church which drove out pestilent heresy.
Armed with a condemnation of the dangerous opinions, the Archbishop at once proceeded against the teachers. He appointed a Carmelite, Peter Stokys, well known for his zeal against Wycliffe, as his Commissary in Oxford, and bade him publish the decrees of the Council, and prohibit the teaching within the University of the condemned conclusions. He also wrote to the Chancellor bidding him assist the Commissary in this matter. For a while the Chancellor and a strong academical party resisted this interference with the privileges of the University. Wycliffe might be a heretic or not, but the intervention of Stokys by the Archbishop’s authority was a slight on the officials, and the dictation of the Archbishop even on points of heresy was unlawful. But theological feeling was stronger than academic patriotism, and the opponents of Wycliffe’s views were ready to use any means to suppress them; nor was it possible for those who wished to fight only for the rights of the University to disentangle that issue from a supposed sympathy with Wycliffe’s opinions. Party feeling ran high, and the Archbishop used the opportunity so afforded him of striking a blow at the independent position of the University. When the Chancellor did not at once obey the Archbishop’s mandate, the authority of the Crown was invoked on the Archbishop’s side, and the Chancellor was forced to submit and to apologies. Within five months the rebellious teachers recanted or were reduced to silence, and the University of Oxford was brought back to an outward appearance of orthodoxy. The triumph of the Archbishop marks a decisive period in the history of the University of Oxford. Hitherto it had been a center of independent opinion; henceforth its freedom was gone. While the undisputed orthodoxy of the University of Paris set it above bishops and synods, and gave it influence enough even to organize a general council, the prestige of Oxford was lost through its support of Wycliffe, and it became the handmaid of the episcopacy.

With his success in silencing the University the Archbishop’s triumph ceased. When Parliament met in November, 1382, Wycliffe presented to it a memorial defending some of his opinions. The Commons so far sided with Wycliffe that they demanded and obtained the withdrawal from the statute book of a bill, which had been passed by the Lords only, in the last session, ordering the sheriffs to arrest Wycliffite teachers. Wycliffe himself was summoned before a provincial synod at Oxford; but it would seem that the Archbishop judged it wise to rest content with some slight explanations on Wycliffe’s part, and allowed him to retire in peace to his living of Lutterworth.

Next year, 1383, England had brought home to her the meaning of the Schism in the Papacy. Henry le Despenser, Bishop of Norwich, had displayed the spirit of a determined and remorseless soldier in putting down the villeins’ rising. Thirsting for a new field for military glory, he obtained from Urban VI a Bull appointing him leader of a crusade against Clement VII; all who went on this crusade, or aided with their money, were to receive the spiritual benefits of a crusade in the Holy Land. The Bishop of Norwich made every use he could of the sale of Papal indulgences as a means of raising money. The other bishops aided him with all their might; and the patriotic feelings of the English were awakened in behalf of an expedition which was to be directed against their national foe, the French. Again Wycliffe’s warning voice was heard; he pointed out that the Schism was a natural consequence of the moral decay of the Church, which was to be cured, not by crusades against Christian brethren, but by bringing back the Church to apostolic poverty and simplicity. The rival Popes, he added, are two dogs snarling over a bone; take away the bone of contention, and the strife will cease.
Despenser’s expedition, though at first successful in Flanders, ended in disaster; in six
months he returned to England empty-handed, without having accomplished anything.
So great was the anger against him that he was called to account by Parliament, and his
temporalities were sequestrated for two years to the Crown.

Wycliffe’s days were drawing to a close, but one of his last utterances was a keenly
ironical statement of his attitude towards the Papacy, thrown into the literary form of a
confession of faith made to the Pope. “I infer”, he says, “from the heart of God’s law
that Christ in the state of His earthly pilgrimage was a very poor man, and rejected all
earthly dominion”. The Pope, if he is Christ’s vicar, is bound above all others to follow
his Master’s example; let him lay aside his temporal dominion, and then he would
become a pattern to Christian men, for he would be following in the steps of the
Apostles. Not long after writing these words, Wycliffe was stricken by paralysis in his
own church of Lutterworth, and died on the last day of 1384.

The teaching of Wycliffe marks an important crisis in the history of the Christian
Church. He expressed the animating motives of previous endeavors for the teaching,
 amendment of the Church, and gave them a new direction and significance. He began as
a follower of William of Occam, and labored to set forward an ideal of Christian
society, dependent immediately upon God as its lord. To this he added the earnest
longing after simplicity and spirituality of life and practice which had animated such
men as S. Bernard and S. Francis of Assisi, and had made them look with regret upon
the riches and temporal importance of the Church. It would seem that in Wycliffe a
deeply religious feeling of the moral evils of the existing Church-system, united with
the keen intellect of the dialectician and the publicist, led him to a criticism of the
doctrines on which the existing system of the Church was founded. As the basis for this
criticism he set up the authority of Scripture as higher than the authority of Pope or
Church. He laid his finger upon the central doctrine of the existing ecclesiastic system,
and maintained that the material belief in Transubstantiation was contrary alike to
reason and Scripture. The question which he thus raised remained the prominent one in
the controversies of the Reformation movement, and it was more and more clearly seen
that the only way to overthrow sacerdotal domination was to purify the doctrine of the
Sacrament of the Altar from the superstition by which it had been converted into a
miraculous act depending on human intervention. It was a question which the Lollards
handed on to the Hussites and the Hussites to Luther. Wycliffe challenged the belief in a
miraculous change in the nature of the elements; the Hussites attacked the denial of the
cup to the laity; and Luther warred against the doctrine of the sacrifice of the mass. But
Wycliffe did more than simply enunciate opinions, he expressed in his own life a
conviction that the existing state of the Church was radically wrong, and needed entire
revision. His own method was defective, and his ideas were frequently put forward in
ambiguous or misleading phraseology; but they served as a basis to earnest minds in
later times, and their echo never entirely died away.

Wycliffe’s opinions, though persecuted by the English prelates, were spread among
the people by the “poor priests” whom Wycliffe had instituted, and found and many
followers. They strengthened the spirit of resistance to Papal aggression, which we find
Parliament ever ready to profess. The old question of Provisors was fruitful of disputes
and disturbances. The statute was often passed and often broken, because it was as
much the interest of the King as of the Pope to set aside the rights of other patrons and
nominate to vacant benefices. Thus, in 1379, Urban VI conferred on the King the right
to appoint to the two next vacant prebends in every cathedral church, setting aside the
rights of bishops and chapters. It was not natural that the King should be very anxious to enforce the Statutes of Provisors and Praemunire, when he might use them to his own advantage. Yet Parliament returned again and again to this grievance, and tried to make the statutes more and more peremptory. In 1390 a more vigorous Statute of Provisors was passed, and Boniface IX saw with disgust the obstacles which the English Parliament placed in the way of his rapacity. Yet he was determined not to give way without a struggle, and in February, 1391, he issued a Bull in which, after expressing his pain and grief that so good and pious a King as Richard II should allow such statutes to be passed, he boldly declared them to be null and void, ordered all records of them to be destroyed, forbade any one to revive them, and commanded all who held benefices in virtue of such statutes, to vacate their benefices within two months. He at once began to grant provisions in England, and, amongst others, conferred on Cardinal Brancacio a prebend at Wells. A suit arose in the King’s court between the King’s nominee and the Cardinal, in which the court held to the statutes. But there was some fear of the possible effects of a Papal excommunication; and in the next Parliament the Commons petitioned the King to enquire of the Estates what course they would adopt if the Pope were to excommunicate a bishop for instituting the King’s nominee. To this question the Lords and Commons answered that they would regard such proceedings as against the law of the land, and would resist them to the death, if need were; the clergy answered that, though they recognized the Pope’s power of excommunication, yet in the case proposed the rights of the Crown would be attacked, and it would be their duty to uphold them. After this display of determination on the part of all the Estates, the final Statutes of Provisors and Praemunire were passed, which put out of the protection of the law and forfeited to the King the goods of any man who obtained provisions or introduced bulls into the kingdom contrary to the royal rights. These statutes were not enforced much more than the previous ones; but the result of the struggle was an increase of power to the Crown. The Papacy saw that it was useless to claim the right of provisions in England; the right could only be used with the royal consent and sanction. The clergy did not regain the rights of which the Pope had deprived them, but the gain went to the Crown. Here, as in many other matters, the Papal despotism had overthrown the rights of the clergy, who had to turn for support to the Crown; what the Crown recovered from the Pope it appropriated to itself. Hence it was that, when the Papal yoke was at length thrown off, the Crown was found to be guardian of the Church in so many matters that the step to the recognition of its supremacy was but small.

England escaped by its firmness the insatiable rapacity of Boniface IX, which fell with relentless violence on the other countries that owned his obedience. Throughout his pontificate the cries against extortion and simony rise louder and louder. At first Boniface stood in awe of some of the Cardinals, and at least preserved a decent appearance of secrecy in his scandalous sales of Church preferment. As the old Cardinals died, he became more open in his mercantile transactions. It was soon understood that it was useless for a poor man to prefer a request to the Papal court. Favors were granted only on payment, and if a better offer were made afterwards, the Pope did not scruple to make a second grant dated previously to the first. In time a shameless system of repeated sales of presentations was recognized. The next presentation to a benefice was sold two or three times over; then a new class of grant was constituted marked “Preference”; in time yet another class was created marked “Pre-preference”, which gave the happy possessor a higher claim than his rivals; though even then, when the vacancy actually occurred, the Pope would often sell it again, despite all previous grants of reservation. If any disappointed candidate instituted a suit
on the ground of a previous grant, the Pope inhibited his courts from trying it, so that there was no possibility of redress. Boniface, with grim humor, maintained that this procedure was only just, for those who had offered little had wished to deceive him. Every possible right and privilege was sold, even exemptions from canonical restrictions, and permissions to hold pluralities to the number of ten or twelve at once. Monks bought the right to change from one order to another; for a hundred florins a mendicant might transfer himself to a non-mendicant order. “It was a wonder”, says the Pope’s secretary, Gobelin, “how the Pope could expect a man to pay so much who possessed nothing, or at least ought to have possessed nothing”. Friars bought the right of hearing confessions and preaching in parish churches, even against the will of the rector. Ecclesiastical agents scoured the whole of Italy to watch the state of health of the owners of rich benefices, and to give speedy intelligence to anxious expectants at Rome, who might judge thereby how much it was wise to offer. Many were too poor to pay in money, but the Pope was not above receiving even swine, horses, corn, and other payments in kind. So great was the demand for money in Rome that usury, which was regarded as an impious trade, flourished to an extraordinary degree, and the money-lenders were regarded as a natural and necessary addition to the Curia. No one was safe from the Pope’s rapacity; like a crow hovering round a dying animal, he would send to gather the books, apparel, plate, and money of bishops or members of the Curia as they lay dying. The members of the Curia had a ready defence for these practices: they affirmed that they must all be lawful, as in such matters the Pope could not err.

Boniface IX had enough to do with his money, however it was obtained. First he had to maintain the cause of Ladislas in Naples, where the party of Louis II was gaining ground. In October, 1390, Boniface sent 600 horse and took into his pay Alberigo da Barbiano. But in spite of these reinforcements, Ladislas lost one place after another, till in March, 1391, the Castel Nuovo, the only part of the city of Naples which had remained faithful to him, was driven by famine to capitulate to the troops of Louis. In June, however, Pozzuoli rebelled against Louis and returned to its allegiance to Ladislas. Matters were now pretty evenly balanced between the two competitors, and the Neapolitan barons began to hold aloof from the strife and prepare themselves to join decorously the side of the victor. Next year, 1392, a blow was aimed by the party of Ladislas against the powerful house of the Sanseverini, who held great possessions in Calabria. Troops were collected for a sudden expedition against them; but news reached the Sanseverini, who determined to turn their own tactics against their assailants. Gathering 550 horse and 2000 foot, they made a forced march of seventy miles in a day and a night, and fell at early dawn upon the unsuspecting army of Ladislas. Its rout was complete; the chiefs, amongst whom was Alberigo da Barbiano, were taken prisoners in their tents. The Sanseverini enriched themselves by the ransoms which they exacted, and Alberigo, besides paying his ransom, promised not to serve against them for ten years. A crushing blow had been inflicted upon the fortunes of Ladislas, who more than ever felt the need of the Pope’s protection. He had no resources of his own, and a plan for gaining help from Sicily, which at first seemed successful, ended in nothing.

The fortunes of Sicily were indeed a matter of some concern to the Papacy. The death of King Frederick II in 1377 had left the crown of Sicily to an infant daughter, Mary, with the usual results of a regency among a body of turbulent nobles. There was an Aragonese party and a native party, headed by the powerful baron, Manfredo di Chiaramonte. The Aragonese succeeded in getting possession of the young queen Mary, who was sent to Aragon and married to Martin, the King’s grandson. The Sicilian
nobles, threatened at once by the Aragonese and the Saracens, who took advantage of
the disturbed state of the island to make plundering raids on the coast, submitted
themselves in 1388 to Urban VI, who regarded Sicily as a fief of the Holy See. An
alliance with Sicily was an important means of gaining supplies for the shattered
fortunes of the house of Durazzo in Naples; in 1389 the young Ladislas was married to
Costanza, daughter of Manfredo di Chiaramonte, and her rich dowry served for a while
to support his cause. But Manfredo died, and Martin of Aragon prepared to make good
by force of arms his claim and that of his wife Mary to the Sicilian crown. The cause of
Boniface IX was one with that of the Sicilian nobles, for Aragon had joined the side of
Clement VII, and Boniface saw himself doubly threatened in Naples and Sicily. He
accordingly declared Mary’s marriage with Martin, which was within the prohibited
degrees, and had been contracted in accordance with a dispensation from Clement VII,
to be null and void: so long as Mary remained a schismatic her title was to continue in
abeyance.

Boniface, as suzerain of Sicily, divided it into tetrarchies, and appointed four of the
Sicilian nobles as governors. As soon, however, as the Aragonese forces landed in 1392,
the union of the Sicilian nobles began to break up. Palermo fell before Martin, and the
fortunes of the Chiaramonte family were at an end. Boniface sent legates to
acknowledge the title of Mary, provided that she would recognize him as Pope. Every
one wished to save himself from the dangers which the Aragonese occupation of
Sicily threatened. Ladislas had spent his wife's dowry, and had nothing more to hope
from the marriage now that her family was ruined. It was rumored that Martin, father of
the young King of Sicily, had made Manfredo’s widow his mistress. Ladislas was
bidden by his mother to profess the greatest horror at this stain cast upon his wife by her
mother’s unlawful connection with an Aragonese schismatic. He hastened to Rome,
where he was received with due honors by Boniface, who gave him a Bull of divorce.
The luckless Constanza was sacrificed without a feeling of pity or a plea of justice to the
political necessities of her husband. It was, perhaps, hardly to be expected that
Boniface, who had no scruples in selling the rights of the Church to raise money for
Naples, should allow any compassion for a wretched woman to stand in the way of
getting more money for Ladislas. Another lucrative marriage might be made if
Constanza were only set aside. Ladislas returned to Gaeta, where Constanza was publicly
divorced. Ignorant of her fate, she went to hear mass with her husband; the Bishop of
Gaeta read the Pope’s Bull, and then, advancing to Constanza, took from her finger the
wedding-ring, which he returned to Ladislas. From the cathedral Constanza was taken
to a small house, where, with only three attendants, she continued to live on the alms of
the court, till she was given in marriage to a Sicilian baron. But her high spirit was not
subdued: as she left the church with her new husband, she proudly said that he was
lucky in being allowed to commit adultery with a queen.

Help in the way of a divorce was not all that Boniface IX gave to Ladislas. In 1393
he sent fresh reinforcements under the command of his brother, Giovanni Tomacelli.
Ladislas was but a youth, scarce eighteen years of age; but his mother Margaret saw that
a decided effort must be made. She sent forth her son into the field like a Spartan
mother. Coming before the barons, “Know” she said, “that I give into your hands my
soul, the breath of my life, my only treasure: here it is”; — and she flung her arms
round her son’s neck — “I commend him to you”. The shouts of the soldiers greeted her
appeal. The army marched against the important town of Aquila, in the Abruzzi, and
took it. This was the beginning of the military exploits of Ladislas, whose energy never
flagged, and whose cause from this time forward prospered. He had all his father’s activity and force, and these qualities contrasted strongly with the feebleness and indolence of his rival Louis. Martin of Sicily was kept busy in his own land, for the Sicilian towns were true to their allegiance to Boniface, and rebelled against the rule of a schismatic. It required all his forces for the next two years to reduce the rebels to submission. Henceforth Boniface was free from threatening dangers in the south of Italy, and could devote his energies to the task of securing his power in the Papal states.

Rome had been submissive to the Pope so long as there was hope of gain from the pilgrims who flocked to the Jubilee; but when this harvest was over, difficulties soon arose, and the Papal court was at variance with the magistracy. On September 11, 1391, an agreement was made between the Pope and the Republic of Rome, which promised to respect the immunities of the clergy, to free the members of the Curia from tolls, to keep in repair walls and bridges, to help in the recovery of the Papal possessions in Tuscany, and to urge the barons to ally with the Pope and the city. On March 5, 1392, a further agreement was made to raise forces to put down the nobles who had seized the towns in the Patrimony, and whose plundering raids made them as much the enemies of the city as of the Pope. It was agreed that all places wrested from them should belong to the Roman people, with the exceptions of Viterbo, Civita Vecchia, and Orchio. The fact that these formal agreements were necessary is sufficient in itself to show that things did not go smoothly.

In the war against Giovanni Sciarra da Vico, who held Viterbo, the Romans found that they were contributing the lion’s share. The Pope, in straits for money, had pledged all the lands of the Roman Churches; but the people did not get the money quickly enough. One day they rose in arms, and, headed by the Banderisi, rushed to the palace and dragged from the Papal presence the canons of S. Peter’s who refused to part with the possessions of their church for the purposes of war. No wonder that the Pope did not feel himself secure in Rome, and gladly embraced an opportunity of quitting it.

Perugia had long been a prey to civil discords. The Tuscan league against the Pope in 1377 had awakened the activity of the old Ghibellin party within the city, and the nobles were glad to rise against the traders who had possessed themselves of the government. The war that arose in 1390 between Florence and Giovanni Galeazzo Visconti of Milan, drew all contending parties into its sphere. The restless ambition of the crafty Duke of Milan threatened the liberties of the free cities of North Italy, and Florence had boldly stepped forward to meet the danger before it came too near. The Ghibellin nobles of Perugia, headed by Pandolfo de’ Baglioni, placed their city under the protection of Giovanni Galeazzo, and expelled the opposing Guelfs, who took refuge in Florence. Both sides suffered severely in the war without gaining any decisive results, and were at last willing to listen to Boniface IX. The Pope strove to make peace: and with a view of freeing himself from the troubles of a residence at Rome, at the end of September, 1392, set out to Perugia, where the guardianship of the citadel and of the city was entrusted to the Papal legate, Pileo, Archbishop of Ravenna. Perugia put itself in the hands of the Pope, and owned his suzerainty. Bologna, Imola, and Massa Lombarda, which had suffered severely in the war, submitted themselves in like manner. In Perugia Boniface abode for a year, recalled the Guelfic exiles, and tried to maintain peace within the city.

During his residence at Perugia he met with many successes. The Romans were successful in their war against Giovanni Sciarra da Vico; he renounced Clement VII and
submitted to Boniface, who, with the consent of the Romans, took to himself the office
of prefect of Viterbo. Similarly, in La Marca the cities of Ancona, Camerino, Fabriano,
Jesi, and Matelica submitted to him. But the peace which the Pope had made at Perugia
was not of long duration; the feud which he had striven to pacify was too deep-seated
for the rival parties to live in unity within the same city walls. In July, 1393, one of the
returned exiles was murdered in the street; when the Podestà was about to pass sentence
on the assassins, the chief of the nobles, Pandolfo de' Baglioni, interfered on their
behalf. The other party vowed vengeance; Pandolfo was assassinated, and all his family,
whom the eager crowd could reach, were put to death. Butchery reigned in the city, and
the Pope with a few followers fled by night from the scene of carnage and took refuge
in Assisi. The Ghibellin party were exiled from Perugia in their turn, and the city had
now to unite itself closely to Florence. A Perugian general of condottieri, Biordo de'
Michelotti, made himself chief of the people, and the city was lost to the Pope.

In Assisi Boniface IX abode in quietness; but the Romans grew alarmed at the
absence of the Pope, and feared that he intended to fix his seat in Umbria. Then, as
always, the Papacy cast a blight over the municipal institutions of Rome, and prevented
them from developing into strength. The Romans could neither obey nor resist the Pope
according to any persistent plan; his presence and his absence were alike intolerable to
them. They could not make up their minds either to forego the advantage which their
city reaped as capital of the Papacy, nor to endure the inconvenience of the Papal
residence among them. They sent ambassadors to Boniface at Assisi beseeching him to
return to Rome. Boniface assented on his own conditions. The Romans were to send
1000 knights to escort him on his way, and were to lend him 10,000 florins of gold for
the expenses of the journey. They were, moreover, to agree that the Pope should, if he
chose, appoint a senator of Rome; if he did not do so, the Conservators who exercised
the senatorial authority were to take an oath of fidelity to him; his senators were not to
be interfered with by the Banderisi or other magistrates of the city. The Romans were to
keep the roads to Narni and Rieti free and open, and were to maintain a galley to guard
the approach by sea. The clergy and members of the Curia were to be amenable only to
the Papal courts, and were to be free from tolls and taxes. The goods of the churches
and hospitals were to be similarly free from taxes. The markets of the city were to be
under the charge of two officers, one appointed by the Pope, the other by the people.
These conditions were accepted by the Romans on August 8, 1393, and Boniface again
took up his residence in Rome in the beginning of December. This agreement bears a
strong testimony to the political shrewdness of Boniface. He knew the advantage of
striking a blow at the right time; he knew the importance of privileges once granted.
The conditions to which the Romans so lightly agreed under the impulse of a passing
panic, laid the foundations of the Papal sovereignty over the city of Rome; Boniface IX
himself lived to broaden and extend them, and his successors inherited his claims as
their lawful prerogatives. But Boniface was not to reap immediately the fruits of his
policy and of the short-sightedness of the Roman people. The rule of the Pope was soon
found to be galling, and the Romans regretted that they had sold their liberties for such a
doubtful boon as the presence of the Pope. Disagreements soon arose between the Pope
and the Banderisi; the Roman people rose in arms in May, 1394, and the position of
Boniface in Rome became precarious— even his life was threatened. But his alliance
with Naples had not been made in vain, and Ladislas was ready to help his protector. In
October, 1394, the young King of Naples came to the rescue of the Pope, and repressed
the rebellion of the people; after a few days’ stay in Rome he returned to Gaeta laden
with substantial tokens of the Pope’s gratitude.
At the same time that Boniface was freed from this danger he also was relieved from another foe: on September 16 died the anti-Pope Clement VII. His end was probably hastened by the humiliations to which he was subjected by the remonstrances of the University of Paris. It is the great glory of that learned body that it did not cease to labor to restore the shattered unity of the Church. It was, indeed, necessary that this question should be discussed by a learned body of professed theologians; for the principles of Papal jurisprudence had been so successfully applied to the system of ecclesiastical government that they had destroyed all traces of a more primitive organization. The Pope was recognized as God’s Vicar, as superior to General Councils, and there was no jurisdiction which could claim to call him to account. Yet now the organization of the Papacy, which owed its power to the fact that it was a symbol of the unity of the Church, had brought about the destruction of that unity, and was an insuperable obstacle in the way of its restoration. Christendom groaned under the expense of two Papal establishments, but was helpless to find any lawful method of redressing its grievances and setting at one the distracted Church. It was the work of the University of Paris to revive the more ancient polity of the Church before the days of the establishment of the Papal monarchy, and by a ceaseless literary agitation familiarize Christendom with ideas which at first seemed little better than heretical.

So great were the difficulties which beset any endeavor to escape from the legal principles of the canon law, that the conciliar theory was advanced with great caution, and only on the ground of absolute necessity. In 1381 a German doctor at Paris, Henry Langestein of Hesse, wrote his “Concilium Pacis”, in which he argued in favor of the summons of a General Council. Necessity, he urged, makes things lawful which are otherwise unlawful; where human law fails recourse must be had to natural or divine law: the spirit of ecclesiastical rules must take precedence of the letter; equity, as Aristotle says, must be called in to redress the wrongs of strict justice; in time of necessity the Church must have recourse to the authority of Christ, the infallible Head of the Church, whose authority is resident in the whole body. To decide the question whether the election made by the Cardinals, as commissaries of the Church, was lawful or not, recourse must be had to the assemblage of bishops which represents the Church. This theory of Langestein had much to commend it, but no one could ignore the difficulties in the way of assembling or constituting a General Council.

The threat of a Council was an effective weapon in reserve for the case of extreme need; but, instead of summoning a Council to decide between two claimants, was it not possible to induce the rival claimants to resign their positions? This idea of voluntary abdication of the two Popes found favor in Paris; but it was open to the obvious objection that it was difficult to induce men to resign lucrative and important posts. It might, however, be possible to compel them to do so by a withdrawal of the allegiance of the faithful. This proposed withdrawal the theologians of the University set to work to justify; schism was as bad as heresy; and if a Pope condemned for heresy ceased to be Pope, the case of Popes openly and notoriously persisting in schism fell under the same law. By this theory the principles of feudalism were carried into the Church. The Pope held his power of Christ; if he used it to the separation of his Lord’s kingdom, the inferior vassals might defy him. It was an attempt to legitimatize rebellion as the ultimate appeal in case of difficulty.

As opinion was slowly formed within the University, it was from time to time laid before the French King; but the madness which fell upon him in 1392, and disturbed the state of France through the struggle for power between the King’s uncles and his
brother, made any practical measures hopeless. Yet in the King’s lucid moments the
entreaties of the University were renewed; and, strangely enough, they were seconded
by Boniface IX, who at the end of 1392 sent two Carthusian monks with a letter to the
King reminding him of his duties to Christendom, and offering his co-operation in any
steps which might be thought necessary to heal the Schism. Boniface IX hoped by a
show of humility to detach France from his rival; but the royal councilors wrote back an
answer carefully framed to contain no word of recognition of Boniface, while
conveying a general assurance of the King’s zeal. At the end of 1393 the University met
with a favorable answer from the King’s brother, the Duke of Berri; it showed its
gratitude by a solemn procession to S. Martin des Champs, and at once appointed a
commission to consider means for attaining its end. A chest was placed in the Convent
of the Maturins, into which each member of the University cast his written opinion: and
after duly inspecting the votes, the commissioners reported that three possible courses
had been submitted — an abdication by both Popes; an arbitration by an equal number
of judges appointed by both sides; or a General Council. Clement VII was alarmed at
these revolutionary proposals; he summoned the chiefs of the University to Avignon,
but they refused to go. He then tried the more effectual means of sending a legate with
rich presents to the King’s counsellors; and the crafty Cardinal, Peter de Luna, who was
then resident in Paris, helped with his ready intrigues. Hence when the University first
brought its report to the King, the Duke of Berri refused an audience, and threatened its
chief men with imprisonment; it was only after some delay, by the influence of the
Duke of Burgundy, that the representatives of the University came, on June 29, 1394,
before the King. They laid before him in an address the three methods proposed for
ending the Schism; they stated the arguments in favor of each, and combated the
objections which might be raised. “Why should not the Pope”, they pleaded, “submit
himself to the authority of others? Is he greater than Christ, who in the Gospel was
subject to His mother and Joseph? Surely the Pope is subject to his mother, the Church,
who is the mother of all faithful people”. Charles VI listened with interest, and ordered
the address of the University to be translated into French, that it might serve as the
declaration of a new policy. Great hopes were entertained that he would act decisively;
but again the intrigues of Peter de Luna prevailed with the Duke of Berri, and the
University was forbidden to approach the King or meddle with the matter of the Schism.
The University knew of Clement’s machinations, and was prepared for the check; for its
deputies at once replied that all lectures, sermons, and other academic acts would cease
until it obtained its just demands.

The King, however, had ordered a copy of the address of the University to be
forwarded to Clement, and the University itself sent him a representation against the
conduct of Peter de Luna, and an exhortation to unity. Clement was both wounded and
alarmed at their plain speaking, and angrily denounced the letter of the University
as “wicked and venomous”; but his Cardinals gave it as their opinion that one of the
ways recommended by the University would have to be followed to restore peace to the
Church. In the state of depression which these humiliations caused to the haughty spirit
of Clement VII he was stricken suddenly by apoplexy, and died on September 16, 1394.

Robert of Geneva, like many others, found that a lofty position stifled rather than
kindled his energies. In his earlier days he had enjoyed the work of a soldier, and felt
keen pleasure at being at the head of the strongest party among the Cardinals. His
aristocratic sentiments made him delight in being in a position of command, and he did
not discover, till after his elevation to the dangerous dignity of an anti-pope, how much
sweeter is power when it is exercised without the oppressive load of responsibility. Robert of Geneva was not the man for an equivocal position, for his nature was too sensitive to grapple with the difficulties which beset him. By feeling, as well as by birth, he belonged to the class of feudal nobles, not of adventurers; and the daring which he showed when his course was clear deserted him when he felt that his position was doubtful. He soon discovered that the greater part of Christendom repudiated him, and that he was maintained as Pope solely by the French King — a fact which the French courtiers did not scruple to throw in his teeth. His adherents in other lands were ousted from their offices, and fled in poverty to Avignon, clamoring for help, which Clement had no means of giving; he could not afford to maintain a crowd of needy dependents, and his natural taste for grandeur suffered from the sight of misery which fidelity to his cause had brought upon others. His sensitiveness was also wounded by the calls which constantly reached his ears that he should restore peace to the distracted Church. His pride prevented him alike from abandoning and from enjoying his position. He could not find satisfaction in the petty intrigues and the small victories which would have satisfied a coarser nature. Tall, handsome, and of commanding aspect, he always cherished those gifts which had won him popularity; he was always genial, affable, and decorous. But he shrank from everything that reminded him of his powerlessness; and such power as he had he was determined to exercise by himself. He was morose to his Cardinals, and rarely asked their advice or held consistories; when he did so, they were summoned at a late hour, and were rapidly dismissed. Such business as he had he dallied with, and it was hard to get him to take a decided step. When at last he saw that the representations of the University of Paris had begun to prevail even with the French King, Clement’s humiliation was complete. He was not great enough to submit for the good of Christendom, nor was he small enough to fight solely for himself. Overcome by the dilemma, he died.
CHAPTER III.

BONIFACE IX. BENEDICT XIII.

ATTEMPTS OF FRANCE TO HEAL THE SCHISM.

1394—1404.

When, on September 22, 1394, the news of the death of Clement VII reached Paris, it was felt that a great opportunity was offered for ending the Schism. A meeting of the Royal Council was held immediately, and a messenger was dispatched, post haste, to Avignon bearing a royal missive to the Cardinals, requiring them to make no new election till they had received an embassy which the King was about to send. In this the royal zeal outspeed the monitions of the University; but that body sent a letter to the Cardinals by the hands of the royal ambassadors. “Never could there be again such an opportunity of healing the Schism; it was as though the Holy Ghost stood at the door and knocked”. No time was lost by the King: on the 24th a royal embassy was sent off to Avignon, but heard on the way the news of the election of Peter de Luna.

It was, in fact, too much to expect that the Cardinals at Avignon should trust themselves to the tender mercies of the King of France. They had advised Clement VII to take steps towards ending the Schism, and had been ready to second the advice of the University of Paris. But in any measures taken by a Pope, their dignity could at least be spared, and their interests respected. The extinction of the Schism, by preventing the election of another Pope, meant the extinction of the Cardinals themselves. The one unmistakable right of Cardinals was the election of a Pope: if they did not proceed to the election, they cast a doubt on the validity of their own office, which they could not expect that others would esteem more highly than they did themselves. They lost no time in entering into Conclave, and the King’s first letter reached Avignon just as the doors were being closed, on the evening of September 26. But the Cardinals suspected its contents, and resolved to read it after the election, which was the business on which they were at present engaged. At the same time, wishing to free themselves from the charge of promoting the Schism, they drew out a solemn form of oath binding themselves to do all in their power to end the Schism, and binding him who should be elected to resign the Papacy, if a majority of the Cardinals called on him to do so in the interests of the Church. Of the twenty-four Cardinals who then composed the College, three were absent, and of those present only three refused to sign this declaration. The eighteen Cardinals who signed proceeded at once to deliberate: one Cardinal was proposed, but he cried out, “I am feeble, and perhaps would not abdicate, I prefer not to be exposed to the temptation!” “I, on the other hand”, said Peter de Luna, “would abdicate as easily as I take off my hat”. All eyes were turned on him; his political skill was well established, and his zeal for the reunion of the Church was credited. On September 28, Peter de Luna was elected Pope, and took the title of Benedict XIII.

The election of Peter de Luna was, in itself, unexceptionable. Sprung from an old Aragonese house, he had devoted himself to the study of canon law, of which he became professor in the University of Montpellier. Gregory XI made him a cardinal on account of his learning, and his ability had always made him a man of mark in the Curia. He was a man of blameless life, and his enemies could bring no charge against him save that of fostering the Schism. His cleverness, however, verged on craft and
subtlety, and in his dealings with Spain and with the court of France he had shown an ingrained love of intrigue and a delight in managing complicated affairs which augured ill for his pliability. His short and spare frame contained a restless and resolute mind, and the Cardinals who had voted for him on the ground of his repeated protestations of his desire to end the unhappy Schism of the Church, found that he meant the end to come only in the way which he pleased.

At first, however, all went smoothly, and so delighted was the University of Paris with the new Pope’s expressions of readiness to adopt any measures for appeasing the Schism, that they hailed him as indeed Benedict — one blessed indeed if he spread on all sides the blessing of peace. The letter in which he announced his election to the French King assured him that he had only accepted the office of Pope as a means of ending the Schism, and reminded him how entirely their views had agreed on this point when they had discussed the matter together at Paris. No one could speak more fairly than Benedict. The envoys of the University in their first interview met him as he was going to table; as he took off his hat before sitting down he repeated his remark that he could lay aside his office as easily as his cap. Promises and fair words were easily uttered, but the year came to an end and nothing further had been done.

In February, 1395, a synod of bishops met in Paris, and after considering the three methods proposed by the University, gave its opinion in favor of abdication as the best way of ending the Schism. Benedict could suggest any better way, let him do so: if not, let him place himself in the King’s hands, who would then confer with the princes of the obedience of Boniface, and take steps to compel him to do likewise. Armed with this opinion, a royal embassy was sent to Benedict, headed by the Dukes of Burgundy and Berri, the King’s uncles, and the Duke of Orleans, his brother. They arrived at Avignon on May 22, and lost no time in urging their business. The Pope met them by raising difficulties at every step. First, there was a discussion whether they might see the document which the Cardinals had signed before the election: when at last they obtained a copy, Benedict warned them that it did not follow that those who had signed it before would sign it now, and as for himself his position had been entirely changed since his election. When the proposal for abdication was made, Benedict met it by the impossible suggestion of a conference between the two Popes, under the protection of the French King, for the purpose of discussing their respective pretensions. When this was naturally rejected by the royal ambassadors, Benedict asked that their propositions should be reduced to writing and submitted to him in due form. He was answered that the King’s proposal was contained in one word, “abdication”. At this he was offended, and complained of scant courtesy; he was ready to receive advice, not commands, as he was not bound to obey any one save Christ. When the Pope was thus found to be unyielding, the Duke of Burgundy resolved to bring the opinion of the College of Cardinals to bear on his obstinacy. He summoned the Cardinals to his house, and demanded the private opinion of each upon the course to be pursued. Nineteen agreed more or less decidedly with the proposition of the King: one, the Cardinal of Pampeluna, the only Spanish member of the College, advocated the martial method of ending the Schism by forcibly expelling Boniface IX from Rome; if this were impossible, he preferred a conference to abdication.

The attempt to exercise pressure on Benedict XIII was a mistake, and the negotiations were conducted in an overbearing manner that was sure to provoke his resentment. Benedict before his election was well aware of the schemes of the University, and had gauged the capacity of the men who advocated them. Now that he
was Pope, he was responsible for maintaining the rights of his office, and the crude proposals of the University theologians were scarcely likely to commend themselves to one who was well versed in canon law. Benedict may be pardoned for feeling it his duty to resist a scheme which was founded on the use of compulsion towards the two claimants of a disputed succession. It was a clumsy attempt to cut the knot instead of untying it. One of the claimants was clearly the rightful Pope: it might be difficult to find any legal means of settling on which side the right lay, but the proposal to over-ride the question of right by compelling both claimants to abdicate was a rude abolition of law in favor of violence. Moreover, Benedict saw clearly enough the practical difficulties which lay in the way of the plans of the University. If he were to abdicate, what guarantee was there that his rival could be compelled to do likewise? He was asked to place himself unreservedly in the hands of the King of France, who probably after a few years of unsuccessful negotiations would set up a pope of his own, entirely subservient to the French Crown. Benedict’s obedience comprised other kingdoms besides France; he was himself a Spaniard, and resented the interference of France as though it were the only power concerned in this matter, which affected the whole of Christendom. He said, with some truth, that if he had been a Frenchman, he would not have been treated with such arrogance; there were other kings besides the King of France, other Universities besides that of Paris: he could not answer the King’s proposals till he had consulted with the doctors of the University of Avignon, for no clerks were more learned than they, and many came from Paris to consult them.

On June 20, Benedict, in the presence of two Cardinals only, gave his answer, in the shape of a Bull, to the ambassadors; he repeated his proposal of a conference, and reiterated his objections to the procedure by abdication. It was to no purpose that the ambassadors tried to bring pressure to bear upon him through the Cardinals, who declared themselves on the King’s side. Benedict met them with tact and prudence, and overwhelmed them with formal objections. The ambassadors lived in Villeneuve, on the opposite side of the Rhône from Avignon; whether it was a measure to speed their departure or not cannot be said, but one night the wooden bridge across the Rhone caught fire, and thenceforth the ambassadors’ interviews with Pope or Cardinals were checked by the fact that they had to cross the turbulent Rhône in an open boat. They could obtain nothing from Benedict XIII but more Bulls expressing his willingness to do what he had suggested: with these they returned to Paris on August 24. Their mission had proved entirely fruitless.

Both sides now prepared for war. The University of Paris, stung by the attack of Benedict, at once presented a memorial to the King, desiring him to call a synod, and by its authority deprive Benedict of the right of presentation to benefices; and cut him off from his ecclesiastical revenues. The royal advisers were not, however, prepared to take such a decisive step; and the University contented itself with sending circular letters to all the princes and universities in Europe, urging them to join in enforcing their policy upon the contending Popes. On his side Benedict drew nearer to Spain, and the King of Castile wrote angrily to the Cardinals, complaining that they took counsel with the French King, and did not consult him; “yet I think that among Christian princes I ought to be consulted as much as any other King whatever”. Moreover, the University of Toulouse espoused his cause, and began to attack the theological position of the University of Paris. Already, while the French ambassadors were at Avignon, the representatives of the University of Paris had laid before them eight conclusions put forward by an English Dominican, John Hayton, which were entirely subversive of their
position. Hayton asserted the rights of the one Head of the Church, the Pope, and denounced the use of coercion to make him abandon them: he did not hesitate to call the University “a daughter of Satan, mother of error, nurse of sedition, defamer of the Pope”. The envoys of the University urged the royal ambassadors to procure the Papal condemnation of these conclusions of Hayton, and the Pope faintly condemned them. But Benedict XIII showed considerable tact in detaching from the side of the University some of its most distinguished men. Benedict was himself a scholar, and as such had an attraction for other scholars; while the practical steps, which the University recommended as the means of carrying their opinions into effect, naturally awakened repugnance in many thoughtful minds. The simple scholar would feel little interest in urging on the King the use of forcible means to bring Benedict to abdicate: he would see that it was impossible to restore spiritual authority by means of compulsion applied in such a way. Hence we find Nicolas de Clemanges, who had been rector of the University in 1393, invited by Benedict to be his secretary and librarian in 1394; and early in 1395 the learned Peter d'Ailly resigned his offices in the University, and accepted from Benedict the rich bishopric of Cambrai.

This retirement of the more moderate men only made the action of the University more vehement. It submitted, in the form of questions, nine definite points which had been in their opinion raised by the refusal of Benedict to accept the proposed abdication. Has the Pope by his refusal fallen into heresy and mortal sin? Are the Cardinals bound any longer to obey him? Ought he to be compelled to abdicate, and if so, by whom? Is he subject to a General Council? Are his censures against those who proceed in this matter to be heeded? These were the questions raised by the University, and their bare statement caused a reaction in favor of the Pope. They were revolutionary, and struck at the root of the existing organization of the Church, and the Papal headship altogether. The most eminent of the University theologians, Jean Gerson, who had done much to mold its opinion, raised his voice in favor of milder measures. An answer to these questions on the part of the University would, he pleaded, only lead to a counter argument on the side of the Pope, and when once dogmatic opinions had been put forward on either side, obstinacy would take the place of reason, as no one would willingly confess that he had been a heretic. Matters were stayed for a time, but the ill-feeling between Benedict and the University increased. Benedict harassed the University in small points, and the University appealed from Benedict to a future Pope, “one, true, orthodox and universal”. Benedict replied that an appeal from the Roman pontiff was unlawful. The University retorted that, in that case, S. Peter's chair must be assumed to make its possessors impeccable. The pride of the University was more and more involved in the struggle, which had become almost a personal one, and its representations to the French King were redoubled.

At the end of 1396, embassies were sent to Germany, England and Spain to gain co-operation in carrying out the ecclesiastical policy of France. After a little wavering the King of Castile gave in his adhesion; and Richard II of England, who had married a daughter of Charles VI, and hoped for French help in carrying out his high-handed policy at home, was also willing to acquiesce. In June, 1397, a joint embassy from the Kings of England, France and Castile was sent to Rome and Avignon. When Benedict XIII declined to give a definite answer to their proposals, he was informed that the French King required him to take steps before February 2, 1398; that the Schism must be healed by that date, otherwise the King would himself proceed to remove its causes.
Charles VI was now pledged to proceed to extremities, but wished first to engage on his side Wenzel, King of the Romans. Wenzel was personally on good terms with Boniface IX, who had good-naturedly overlooked his wild violations of ecclesiastical privileges; but the University of Prague had followed the lead of the University of Paris, and the Bohemian King felt himself called upon to seem to do something. A conference was held between the two monarchs at Rheims, on March 23, 1398, to decide the future of Christendom. They were a strange pair for such a purpose — a madman and a drunkard. Charles VI enjoyed intervals of reason, and, though feeble in mind at all times, was still beloved by his people for his personal kindliness. Wenzel day by day grew more besotted in his vices, and was only able to do business in the morning before he had time to get drunk. The two Kings agreed that between them they would restore the peace of the Church. Charles VI undertook to force Benedict XIII to abdicate, and Wenzel vaguely promised to compel Boniface IX to do likewise, if it could be done without prejudice to his own honor. On this understanding, Charles VI returned to Paris, and did his utmost to fulfill his promise; it would have been well for Wenzel if he had acted with like determination.

On May 22, 1398, a synod of French bishops and representatives of the Universities assembled in Paris in obedience to the royal summons. The King himself was unable to attend through illness, but the Dukes of Berri, Burgundy, and Orleans were present. Simon Cramaud, Patriarch of Alexandria, the chief ecclesiastic in France, and a staunch supporter of the royal policy, was president of the synod; he laid before it as the question for discussion how the abdication of Benedict XIII was to be procured — whether for that purpose a total or partial withdrawal of obedience was necessary. It was agreed that six disputants on either side should put forth the arguments for and against Benedict XIII. On the side of Benedict was urged, first, the theoretical unlawfulness of a withdrawal of allegiance, since the supremacy of the Pope was absolute, and nothing save heresy could impair it; next the practical inconveniences, as it would be the cause of great disorders, and would probably harden the resistance of Benedict rather than subdue it; if he were to abdicate after such withdrawal of allegiance, his adherents would declare it had been done under compulsion; if he were not to abdicate, it was impossible to see what might happen; moreover such a step was fatal also to the foundations of civil government, for it gave an example of rebellion. On the side of the clergy and University it was urged that the life of the Church lay in unity, and schism was its death; only when the Pope cares for the unity of the Church is he Christ’s vicar, when he opposes unity he is Christ’s adversary; as to the argument about the danger to civil governments of the example of withdrawing allegiance from the Pope, there was no analogy between the two; for Christ said “the Kings of the Gentiles exercise lordship over them, but whosoever amongst you would be greatest, let him be your servant”; the temporal power is not subject to the people, but the Pope is the servant of the Church, and must act for its good; his abdication is necessary to heal the Schism, and the withdrawal of allegiance is necessary to cut off his resources and reduce him to submit.

After this disputation the votes of the assembly were taken; two hundred and forty-seven voted in favor of immediate withdrawal of obedience; twenty voted for postponing the question at present and summoning the Pope afresh; sixteen voted for holding a council of the entire obedience of Benedict, and submitting the matter to its consideration. After this vote the royal order was signed on July 27, 1398, for the withdrawal of allegiance, which cut off from Benedict all power over the French Church, and all means of raising money out of the ecclesiastical revenues of France.
The University of Paris had worked its will at last, and could certainly claim the credit or blame of all that had been done. It had succeeded in awakening men’s minds a desire to end the Schism, and had asserted, as the basis for all action, the superiority of the interests of the Church as a whole over the interests of its contending rulers. But the doctors of the University were still under the power of the ideas of the Middle Ages. They took their stand upon the necessity of a formal unity of the Church, which was to be represented by the outward unity of its government. Many minds, amid the jangle of contending assertions, tended towards neutrality, and looked, upon both Popes with suspicion; many advocated a national government for each national Church; but the University maintained stoutly the mediaeval desire for outward unity, and carried its theories no farther than was necessary under existing circumstances for its restoration. But there was an inherent weakness in the policy of the University, for it resorted to extraordinary measures, while it could not be sure that they would gain their end. The withdrawal of allegiance from Benedict was an act entirely opposed to the ecclesiastical constitution, and no reasons except those of expediency could be urged in its favor. Moreover, that measure in itself was only a dubious step towards gaining the end proposed. The University argued that the withdrawal of the allegiance of France would probably lead to the abdication of Benedict; and then the example of France would probably be followed by the Empire towards Boniface, who would also probably be compelled to abdicate; and then the united Church could again choose a head. The chance of ultimate success in this elaborate scheme was too far distant to justify the revolutionary step which was to set all in motion. Revolutionary measures are dangerous unless they are likely to effect their end at once; in this case the inevitable reaction in favor of legality set in before the first step could be accomplished.

France counted on forcing Benedict into perfect submission. Immediately after the Council, D'Ailly, Bishop of Cambrai, who had previously been mission employed in negotiation with the Pope, set out together with Marshal Boucicaut for Avignon. If persuasions failed, Boucicaut, who stayed behind at Lyons, was to proceed to force. When D'Ailly in his first interview with Benedict expressed the King’s wish that he should resign his office, Benedict changed color and angrily exclaimed, “I will never do so as long as I live, and I wish the King of France to know that I will pay no heed to his ordinances, but will keep my name and Papacy till death”. D'Ailly replied that he could accept no answer which was not made after counsel with the Cardinals; two who were present joined in urging the summoning of a consistory. Next morning D'Ailly spoke before the assembled Cardinals and then left them to their deliberations, which were stormy. Many of them urged the Pope to yield, and when he refused they left the consistory in anger. D'Ailly, who was waiting outside, entered the room, and asked for Benedict’s answer. The Pope, still sitting on his throne, with one or two Cardinals around him, answered with indomitable spirit that he had been duly elected Pope, and would remain so as long as he lived. “Tell our son of France”, he added, “that until now we have held him for a good Catholic; but if from ill advice he is about to enter into error, he will repent it; but I pray you tell him from me to take good advice, and not incline to anything which may trouble his conscience”. Saying this the Pope left his throne, and D'Ailly mounted his horse to carry the news of his ill success to Boucicaut, who had already advanced to the Fort of St. Andre, twenty-seven miles from Avignon.

D'Ailly’s mission had failed, and Boucicaut’s was now to begin. He rapidly raised a body of troops, for many were eager to share in the plunder of Avignon. On September 1 the withdrawal of allegiance was proclaimed at Villeneuve, and Benedict’s French
supporters left him; eighteen of his twenty-three Cardinals went to Villeneuve and wrote to the French King proclaiming their renunciation of the stubborn Pope. The citizens of Avignon were not desirous of suffering a siege for the Pope’s sake, and welcomed Boucicaut’s soldiers into the city. Benedict was besieged in his palace, where he made a stubborn defense. Victuals, however, began to fail, and all the store of fuel was set on fire and burnt. The two Cardinals who adhered to Benedict were captured in an attempt to escape, and were put in prison. Everywhere Benedict seemed to be deserted. Flanders, Sicily, Castile, and Navarre joined with France in the withdrawal of allegiance; only Scotland and Aragon still held by Benedict. The King of Aragon, in spite of Benedict’s summons to him as gonfalonier of the Church, hesitated to enter into war with France for the sake of a priest. Still Benedict held out stubbornly, and his brother, Rodrigo de Luna, was energetic in introducing supplies. The besiegers attempted to enter the castle through a sewer which communicated with the kitchen, but were discovered, and were captured one by one as they slowly crawled out of their subterranean passage. This led to an exchange of prisoners, and the blockade was more strictly pressed. But the troubled state of France itself brought Benedict help.

Among the numerous intriguers who gathered round the unhappy Charles VI, there were some who hoped to find Benedict useful for their own purposes, and who secretly exerted their influence with the King to save the Pope from being reduced to extremities. Orders were sent to Marshal Boucicaut that he was not to pursue the siege too vigorously, and the experienced general must have felt ashamed of the pitiful duty assigned to him. Ambassadors from the King of Aragon urged Charles VI to a reconciliation. After much negotiation it was agreed that Charles should withdraw his troops and guarantee Benedict’s safety at Avignon, provided Benedict promised that he would abdicate in case Boniface abdicated, died, or was ejected; that he would not hinder any plans for the union of the Church, and would be willing to attend any Council held for that purpose; that meanwhile he would not leave Avignon without the King’s permission, and would receive guardians of his person appointed by the King. Benedict’s resources were at an end, and he was obliged to accept these terms, which at all events gave him time.

On April 10, 1399, the King nominated as the Pope’s guardians the College of Cardinals; but Benedict placed himself under the protection of the Duke of Orleans, who had already discovered how useful a Pope might be for his ambitious schemes. This matter was not decided for the present, but became of importance in the future. Already the French Court found that the reaction in favor of Benedict had set in, and that their course was full of difficulties. Three of the Cardinals, who in January, 1399, had come to Paris to accuse Benedict of heresy and urge sterner measures against him, were hooted by the people in the streets. The clergy also found, as was always the case, that the yoke of the Crown was heavier than the yoke of the Pope; they groaned over the impositions of the royal treasury, and began to regard the enthusiasm for the peace of the Church as a convenient means of fiscal exaction from ecclesiastical revenues. In this state of public feeling the Court was glad of a truce with Benedict, who remained for the next four years a prisoner in his palace at Avignon eagerly watching the current of events.

Meanwhile Boniface IX at Rome had been feeling the pressure of this movement in behalf of unity; but his greater independence of his political position enabled him more safely to resist. Boniface was a clear-sighted statesman, and after his return to Rome in 1394 kept steadily in view the importance of strengthening his hold upon the city. The
States of the Church were ravaged by the old opponents of the Pope — Biordo de Michelotti, who had seized upon Assisi, Malatesta de’ Malatesta, who had made himself lord of Todi, and Onorato of Fundi, who was always on the watch to attack the Pope, and who strove to raise among the Romans a party in favor of Benedict XIII.

Boniface saw that his only hope of success against these foes lay in close alliance with Ladislas, who, in 1395, after capturing Aversa and Capua, laid siege to Naples. But the siege was broken by some Provençal galleys, which routed the Papal fleet, and the final triumph of Ladislas was delayed for some years longer. Yet Boniface did not serve Ladislas for nothing; he obtained from him the investiture of the Duchy of Sora for his brother Giovanni Tomacelli. Boniface, like all other Popes who aimed at temporal sovereignty, felt the need of helpers whom he could trust. He carried on the nepotism of which Urban VI had set the example; but he was more fortunate in his relatives. His brother Andrea, invested by him with the Duchy of Spoleto and the marquisate of Ancona, was an experienced soldier, and on him and Giovanni, Boniface mainly relied for counsel and aid. With the rise of a new Pope the relatives of his predecessor were swept away. The end of Francesco Prignano, the nephew of Urban VI, was tragic enough. Neglected by all on his uncle’s death, and fearful for the future, he took refuge with Raimondello Orsini in one of his castles in the Abruzzi. There he grew day by day more melancholy at the thought of his fall, till at last one day, after a ball given by his host, he returned to his room and attempted suicide with a knife. On his recovery Raimondello feared to keep any longer so unpleasant a guest, and it was agreed that Francesco should hand over to him all that was left of his once vast possessions, the county of Altamura, in return for 12,000 florins, and an annual pension. When this was settled, Francesco set sail with his wife and mother to Venice; but on the way the ship was lost, and all that remained of the lineage of Urban VI were swallowed in the waves.

In all things Boniface IX, pursued with firmness and prudence his policy of establishing his hold over Rome and the dominions of the Church, and it is surprising to see how he succeeded amid the many difficulties by which he was beset. In 1396 was another rising of the Romans against him; some of the nobles of the city, in league with the Count of Fondi, conspired to put him to death. Again King Ladislas lent his aid, and the rising was with difficulty put down. Thirteen ringleaders, in whose houses were found banners to wave before the rebel army, were executed, and the people of Trastevere were deprived of their franchises. Boniface determined to rule the Romans with a strong hand. Yet day by day his position became more insecure, as the steps taken by France to bring about a union of the Church grew more decisive. The blows leveled at Benedict fell upon Boniface as well; the enforced abdication of one was regarded as the preliminary to the enforced abdication of the other. So soon as Charles VI reduced Benedict to submission, it would be the duty of Wenzel to deal with Boniface. Hence Boniface saw with alarm the spread of French influence in Italy. Genoa, worn out with intestine discords, handed over to the King of France its signiory in October, 1396. In vain Boniface tried to awaken the national jealousy of the English and enlist their sympathy. He appointed the King’s half-brother, John Holland, Earl of Huntingdon, leader of a crusade in his behalf. But Richard II adhered to his plan of a close alliance between himself and the French King. Nothing was done by the Earl of Huntingdon, and the internal troubles of the last years of Richard’s reign rendered English intervention impossible. Yet Boniface was pestered with embassies and advice in the same way as Benedict. To the ambassadors of France and Spain he answered haughtily that he was the true and undoubted Pope, and had no intentions of resigning
his office. A worthy hermit of the name of Robert, who at the end of 1396 undertook the
task of visiting Rome and Avignon in the interests of peace, could get no better answer
from Boniface than a declaration that he would not consent to place the justice of his
cause in another man’s hands. After the conference at Rheims between Charles VI and
Wenzel, Peter d'Ailly, the Bishop of Cambrai, was sent as joint-ambassador of King and
Emperor to the two Popes. He visited Boniface first, and found him at Fondi, where he
met with an honorable reception. Boniface refused to answer him till he had consulted
his Cardinals at Rome; then he replied that so soon as Benedict had resigned he was
willing to submit to the advice of the Kings of England, Germany and Hungary, and
would attend a General Council if they thought fit to summon one. When this answer
was brought back to Wenzel, he said to D'Ailly, “You will carry this to the King of
France; according as he shall act, so will I and the Empire; but he must begin first, and
when he has deposed his Pope, we will depose ours”.

The Roman people meanwhile looked upon these embassies with suspicion. They
might not like Boniface face, but they were anxious to have a Pope at Rome. The year
1400 was drawing near, and they were looking forward to the rich harvest which they
were likely to reap from the pilgrims who would flock to the Jubilee. A number of the
leading citizens hastened to Boniface after his interview with D'Ailly to assure
themselves that he had no intention of leaving Rome. “Whatever the Emperor or the
King of France may do, I will not submit to their will”, was the answer of Boniface.

Indeed, the position of Boniface in Rome was gradually growing stronger. In
February, 1397, Onorato of Fondi found it expedient to make peace with the Pope, and
several of the Roman nobles also submitted. The affairs of Ladislas in Naples were at a
standstill, owing to the defection of some of his chief adherents; but after many
negotiations, their differences were referred to the mediation of Boniface, who arranged
matters in June, 1398. From this time the party of Ladislas was united, and the hopes of
Louis began to fade away. One by one the chief barons of the Angevin faction began to
reconcile themselves with Ladislas; and the power of the Pope over the States of the
Church grew in proportion to the success of Ladislas in Naples. Aided by this and by
the pliancy of the Romans, who had set their hopes on the Jubilee, Boniface in 1398
proceeded more vigorously to establish his power over the city of Rome and appointed
a vice-senator responsible only to himself. The Republican party amongst the Romans,
headed by three of the former magistrates, formed a plot to throw off the Papal yoke,
and allied themselves to the restless Count of Fondi, who promised to support their
rising in the city by an attack on the gate of S. John Lateran. The vigilance of the vice-
senator discovered the plot, and the ringleaders were beheaded; but Onorato of Fondi
seized Ostia, and carried on a piratical war against the city, cutting off its supplies and
hindering free communication with it. Boniface used the opportunity given by this
unsuccessful rising to assert his supremacy over Rome, and the year 1398 was
remembered as the epoch of the loss of the liberties of the city. As other Italian cities let
their municipal liberties fall into abeyance and submitted to the power of a despot, so
the city of Rome fell under the sway of the Pope. Henceforth the old magistrates
disappeared, and Rome was governed by a senator appointed by the Pope every six
months. Moreover Boniface IX took the same steps as other despots to secure his
power. The Vatican palace was strongly fortified; the Castle of S. Angelo, which had
been dismantled in the time of Urban VI, was restored and surmounted by a strong
tower; the palace of the Senator on the Capitol was built up and fortified. Many poor
priests labored at this work, carrying stones and cement in the vain hope of winning by
their manual labor some ecclesiastical preferment from the Pope. The Papal fleet was again revived, and Gaspar Cossa, of Ischia, was made admiral. Ostia was taken directly under the Pope’s rule, and was repaired for purposes of defence. Boniface IX shows in all his doings the keen practical sense which Urban VI so entirely lacked.

Secure in Rome, Boniface at once turned against his enemies. In May, 1399, a solemn Bull of excommunication was issued against Onorato of Fondi, and the Papal troops, under Andrea Tomacelli, the Pope’s brother, marched against him. Anagni fell at once before him, and the success of Ladislas in Naples made Onorato’s position desperate. The barons of the Neapolitan kingdom continued to abandon the side of Louis and join themselves to Ladislas, till at last the adhesion of the powerful family of the Sanseverini left Ladislas conqueror.

In July, 1399, he sailed to Naples while Louis was absent at Taranto, and was quickly admitted by the citizens within the walls. Charles of Anjou, the brother of Louis, was besieged in the Castel Nuovo; and when Louis returned he found Naples in the hands of his rival. Feeling that his chances were lost, he made terms with Ladislas, surrendered the Castel Nuovo, ransomed his brother, and sailed away to Provence, leaving Ladislas in undisturbed possession of Naples. Onorato of Fondi now saw that his cause was hopeless, and was driven to make terms with the Pope, by which he gave up almost the whole of his possessions. Unable to bear the humiliation, he died in April, 1400, and by his death Boniface became lord of Campania.

In October, 1399, another of the Pope’s enemies, Giovanni da Vico, who had so long ravaged the Patrimony of S. Peter, was driven to submit. Freed from his most pressing foes, Boniface IX could look forward to celebrate the Jubilee in triumph.

THE FLAGELLANTS

The end of the fourteenth century witnessed a profound outburst of popular devotion. The miserable condition of the Church, distracted by schism, and the disturbed state of every country in Europe, awoke a spirit of penitence and contrition at the prospect of another great Jubilee, and the opening of a new century. Bands of penitents wandered from place to place, clad in white garments: their faces, except the eyes, were covered with hoods, and on their backs they wore a red cross. They walked two and two, in solemn procession, old and young, men and women together, singing hymns of penitence, amongst which the sad strains of the “Stabat Mater” held the chief place. At times they paused and flung themselves on the ground, exclaiming “Mercy”, or “Peace”, and continued in silent prayer. All was done with order and decorum; the processions generally lasted for nine days, and the penitents during this time fasted rigorously. The movement seems to have originated in Provence, but rapidly spread through Italy. Enemies were reconciled, restitution was made for wrongs, the churches were crowded wherever the penitents, or “Bianchi”, as they were called from their dress, made their appearance. The inhabitants of one city made a pilgrimage to another and stirred up their devotion. The people of Modena went to Bologna; the Bolognese suspended all business for nine days, and walked to Imola, whence the contagion rapidly spread southwards. For the last three months of 1399 this enthusiasm lasted, and wrought marked results upon morals and religion for a time. Yet enthusiasm tended to create imposture. Crucifixes were made to sweat blood; a fanatic declared that he was the Prophet Elias, and foretold the impending destruction of the world. Crowds of men and women wandering about, and spending the night together in the open air, gave
reason for suspicion of grave disorders. Boniface, like the Duke of Milan and the
Venetians, as a cautious statesman in troubled times, doubted the results that might
occur from any great gatherings of people for a common purpose. He was afraid lest his
enemies might seize the opportunity and hatch some new plot against him. When the
bands of the Bianchi reached Rome in the year of Jubilee, he disapproved and
finally dissolved them. The movement passed away; but it has left its dress as a
distinctive badge to the confraternities of mercy which are familiar to the traveller in the
streets of many cities of Italy.

In the Jubilee of 1400, crowds of pilgrims flocked to Rome. Although it was but ten
years since the last Jubilee was celebrated, still to many pious minds the original
intention of granting these indulgences at intervals of a hundred years gave a solemnity
to this Jubilee which had been possessed by none since the first institution in 1300.
From France especially pilgrims are said to have come in crowds. But the results of
their crowding into Rome were disastrous. The plague broke out among them and
spread rapidly throughout Italy. In Florence alone from 600 to 800 died daily; in Naples
the loss was computed at 1600. It is said that in some places two-thirds of the
population was destroyed. But, though Rome was stricken by the plague, Boniface did
not dare to leave it, lest he should lose his hold upon the city which he had won with
such difficulty.

The resistance was indeed stubborn, and needed a strong hand prompt to repress.
The powerful house of the Colonna of Palestrina saw with resentment the danger which
overtook their relative, the Count of Fondi. Their hereditary antagonism to the political
power of the Papacy made them join the side of the anti-pope in the Schism, and they
looked with alarm at the spread of the papal authority in Rome. They allied themselves
with the discontented republicans in Rome: and on dark night in January, Niccolò and
Giovanni Colonna, with a troop of 4000 horse and 4000 foot, dashed through le Porta
del Popolo and made for the Capitol, raising their, “Long live the people! death to the
tyrant Boniface!” The Pope in alarm took refuge in the Castle of S. Angelo, but the
senator, Zaccaria Trevisano, a Venetian, manfully defended the Capitol, and the Roman
conspirators shrank back when they found that the mass of the people refused rise at the
Colonna cry. When morning dawned, the Colonna found it wise to retire: thirty-one
were made prisoners in the retreat, and were promptly hanged. As the public
executioner could not be found, one of the captives was promised his life on condition
that he would put the others to death; with face streaming with tears, he hanged his
comrades, amongst whom were his own father and brother. Boniface IX showed his
gratitude to the senator by the grant of a yearly pension of 500 florins of gold.

In May, after the death of the Count of Fondi, he judged himself strong enough to
proceed against the Colonna. Their possessions were laid under an interdict, themselves
were excommunicated, and a holy war was proclaimed against them. The Papal forces
were reinforced by Ladislas, and several of the Colonna castles were captured; but
Palestrina defied the Papal arms, till in January, 1401, the Colonna found it wise to
come to terms. Boniface IX had learned from the example of his predecessor Boniface
VIII the unwisdom of driving this powerful family to extremities. On receiving their
submission, he confirmed them in their possessions; even Jacobello Gaetani, the son of
Count Onorato of Fondi, was allowed to retain some part of his father’s lands. Boniface
was sufficiently prudent not to raise up implacable enemies by advancing lofty
pretensions which he could not maintain. On November 18 in the same year Viterbo
also, worn out by internal discords, acknowledged the Papal sway. Thus Boniface by his
persistent skill established his rule over Rome, and reduced to submission the enemies around him.

AFFAIRS IN GERMANY, 1396-1400

In Germany also his policy met with triumph. King Wenzel had so far agreed with the policy of Charles VI of France that he promised to compel Boniface to abdicate if Charles was successful in his endeavor to force Benedict to this step. But Wenzel’s position in Germany did not allow him to do anything decided, even if he had the will. His father, Charles IV, had transferred to the eastern provinces the supremacy over Germany; and he had cautiously maintained his position by a close union with the Bohemian people. Wenzel had to face the natural jealousy of the purely Germanic states at the Slavonic policy of the house of Luxemburg; and he had not his father’s wisdom in dealing with Bohemia. Profligate and drunken, with all a drunkard’s capriciousness and savagery, he set the clergy against him by his open mockery of their weaknesses, and made himself many enemies amongst the Bohemian barons. Germany, neglected by the King, was in a state of anarchy, and the prevailing discontent found expression in plots against Wenzel. The Pfalzgraf Rupert was the natural leader of opposition, and found a strong supporter in John, Archbishop of Mainz, a count of the house of Nassau, who, in spite of another election by the chapter and the opposition of Wenzel, managed in 1396 to obtain his archbishopric by the payment of large sums of money to Boniface IX. The Archbishops of Trier and Koln followed John of Mainz, and the league of the Rhenish electors sought the help of Boniface to support them in the deposition of Wenzel. Boniface was dissatisfied with Wenzel’s attitude towards him since his conference with Charles VI at Rheims in 1398. Before Wenzel went to Rheims, Rupert wrote him a long letter of remonstrance, in which he warned him that, if he withdrew from obedience to the Pope, who had confirmed him as King of the Romans, it was possible that the electors might withdraw their allegiance from himself. Still Boniface was too cautious to declare himself openly on the side of the discontented electors. So late as August 26, 1400, he wrote to Wenzel assuring him that he was prepared to uphold his cause even to the point of shedding his own blood. Yet two years later he took credit to himself that it was his support and authority that emboldened the electors to proceed to Wenzel’s deposition. The attitude of Boniface towards Germany was astute rather than straightforward; he was prepared to be on the winning side, whichever that might be.

At length, in 1400, the plans of the Rhenish electors were ripe. Wenzel was involved in troubles in Bohemia, and his brother Sigismund was equally busy with his kingdom of Hungary. The four Rhenish electors met at Lahnstein on August 11, and decreed the deposition of Wenzel. It was a bare majority of the Electoral College that proceeded to carry matters with so high a hand; the electors of Saxony and Brandenburg stood aloof. On August 20, the decree of deposition was read by John of Mainz to the assembled people. It set forth that Wenzel had not striven to end the Schism and promote the unity of the Church; that he had not established peace and order in Germany; and that he had diminished the rights of the Empire in Italy.

The first two charges against Wenzel demanded of him tasks which were beyond his power: but on the third head of accusation there was a strong case against him. Since the accession of Giovanni Galeazzo Visconti to the lordship of Milan, in 1378, the peace of Northern Italy had been disturbed by his struggles for self-aggrandizement. He added to his dominions Verona, Vicenza, Padua, and Siena, and pressed hard upon
Florence, which was the bulwark of the remaining liberties of Italian cities. But Giovanni Galeazzo was not content with possession; he wished also for a semblance of legitimacy to his conquests. At first he called himself Count of Vertus, from the small French county which he inherited from his wife Isabella, daughter of John of France; but in 1395 he bought from the needy Wenzel, for 100,000 gulden, the title of Duke of Milan, and agreed to hold his lands as fiefs of the Empire. In 1397 Wenzel conferred on him the further title of Duke of Lombardy, and the right of bearing in his arms the Imperial eagle. Wenzel made this new creation without consulting the princes of the Empire, who were indignant at this addition to their number. He also sold for money a title over cities which had been forcibly seized, and so used the Imperial mantle as a cloak to deeds of violence and oppression. His recognition of Giovanni Galeazzo awakened the alarm of the Florentines, who lent their powerful aid to help the electors and bring about Wenzel’s fall.

Such were the formal grounds for Wenzel’s deposition. The real grounds were the private grievances of the electors, and the fact that the vices, incompetence, and indolence of Wenzel had so weakened his hold upon Germany that it was safe to act against him. On the day following the declaration of Wenzel’s deposition the electors chose the Pfalzgraf Rupert to be King of the Romans. Rupert possessed all the qualities of a ruler. He was surnamed “the mild” from his gentleness, and was just, upright, devout and learned, so that in all points he was a contrast to the luckless Wenzel. Still he was not recognized at first by any but the states along the Rhine; and Boniface IX, afraid of alienating Bohemia, Hungary, and Poland, refused to commit himself to his cause. Wenzel, however, failed to receive even his brother’s support; for Sigismund was too cautious to help him without securities which Wenzel declined to give. Dissension broke out between the two brothers. Wenzel did not move and his adherents fell away. Disturbances arose in Hungary, and Sigismund was imprisoned by his rebellious subjects. Rupert on his side had small resources at his command, and despaired of making much way in Germany by force of arms, but judged the opportunity favorable for an expedition into Italy, by which he might overcome the hesitation of the Pope, vindicate the rights of the Empire over Milan, and return with the prestige of the Papal approbation and the dignity of the Imperial crown. He accordingly negotiated with Boniface for his coronation, which Boniface agreed to perform on condition that Rupert undertook to make no treaty with the King of France, to take no part in measures for ending the Schism without the Pope’s consent, and to do his utmost to reconcile France and other schismatic countries with himself as the one true Pope. Boniface IX was resolved to drive a hard bargain, and Rupert’s troubles would be great before he accepted it.

The Florentines hailed Rupert’s coming as a means of striking a blow against the alarming power of the Duke of Milan, and promised money and supplies. But Rupert’s Italian expedition was even more inglorious than those of his predecessors. He marched from Trent against Brescia (October 24, 1401), where his army was attacked by Gian Galeazzo’s condottiere general, Facino Cane. The Duke of Austria was taken prisoner and released in three days without ransom; stories of treachery were spread, and the Duke of Austria angrily withdrew. Rupert’s army began to diminish, and he found that supplies did not flow in as he had hoped from the Pope or the Florentines. Without these he was helpless: and after a few ceremonial receptions at Padua and Venice, he retired ingloriously to Germany in April, 1402.
No sooner had Rupert departed from Italy than Gian Galeazzo Visconti prepared for new aggressions. His troops, under Alberigo da Barbiano, marched upon Bologna, inflicted a severe defeat upon the Florentines, and took the city. Florence was reduced to the lowest ebb. She saw herself surrounded by the arms of the Duke of Milan, her supplies threatened, and her trade ruined. But, in September, 1402, Gian Galeazzo died suddenly of the plague, and Italy began to breathe anew. Gian Galeazzo Visconti was a man of great force and determination, who had gone far to establish his power as supreme over North Italy; but his conquests were made by force, and rested on force only. He was skillful in making acquisitions, but he had neither the talents nor the time to weld them together into a state. His rapid advance spread universal terror; but his power died away with the strong hand that created it. The most lasting impress that he left in Italy are the two mighty monuments of the Cathedral of Milan and the Certosa at Pavia. In their luxuriant magnificence and wild splendor we can still trace the restless ambition and undisciplined desires of the passionate spirit of him who designed them as memorials of his glory.

On the death of Gian Galeazzo his dominions were divided amongst his three young sons, who were helpless to protect them. The Florentines and the Pope entered into an alliance. Alberigo da Barbiano left the side of the Visconti and took service under the Florentines. Boniface sent as his legate Cardinal Baldassare Cossa, who knew how to promote his master’s interests. There were commotions in all the cities under the rule of the Visconti; and when the joint army of the Pope and the Florentines entered the Bolognese territory, in June, 1403, it was a signal for universal revolt. The Visconti thought it wise to detach the Pope from the Florentines, and entered into a secret treaty with the legate, giving up to the Pope Bologna, Perugia, Assisi, and other towns which had been taken from the States of the Church. On August 25 this treaty was published, to the mortification of the Florentines, who found that no mention was made of their interests, and that they were abandoned by their ally. On September 2, Cardinal Cossa entered Bologna. In October, Perugia opened its gates to the Pope’s brother, Gianello Tomacelli. It was in vain that the Florentines sent ambassadors to the Pope to beseech him not to ratify the treaty made by his legate, and not to abandon the league disgracefully. Boniface eluded their remonstrances by delays, and confirmed the treaty. He had reason to be satisfied with the success that attended his efforts to restore the Papal sovereignty over the States of the Church.

As regards German affairs, the death of Gian Galeazzo was of some moment. Rupert returned from his Italian expedition with ruined prestige: and Wenzel’s cause rose in proportion. It was now Wenzel’s turn to plan an expedition to Rome, that he might obtain the glory of the Imperial crown. But troubles arose in Bohemia, and Wenzel was entirely dependent on the help of his brother Sigismund, who so managed matters as to get Wenzel entirely into his own hands. He kept him prisoner, and intended to use him as a tool. Wenzel’s health was broken by debauchery, his life was uncertain, and he had no children; at his death Sigismund would inherit Bohemia, and thought it well to begin in good time to arrange its affairs. He therefore proposed to take Wenzel to Rome, and have him crowned Emperor by the help of the Duke of Milan, who was not sorry to have an opportunity of using his power under the guise of the Emperor’s orders. This dangerous threat to Rupert and the Pope was dispelled by Gian Galeazzo’s death; but it set Boniface IX to discover a means of keeping Sigismund employed at home.
Sigismund’s position in his Hungarian kingdom had always been a difficult one. He held his title by virtue of his marriage with the Queen Maria, and, after the murder of Charles of Naples, had been crowned king in 1387. But he quarreled with his wife, offended the Hungarian people, and suffered a crushing defeat in an expedition against the Turks at Nicopolis, in 1396. On his inglorious return there were disturbance in Hungary, and Sigismund was imprisoned by his rebellious subjects, who turned their eyes to the old house of Durazzo for a leader, and called Ladislas to assert his father’s claims on Hungary. At that time Ladislas had enough to do in Naples to make head against Louis of Anjou; Sigismund was freed from prison, and there was a temporary peace. But when Sigismund began to threaten an expedition into Italy for the crowning of his puppet Wenzel, it was easy for Boniface to find him work at home, now that the hands of Ladislas were free. Early in 1402, when Sigismund first began to talk of his expedition, Ladislas sent five galleys to Dalmatia and the rebels in Hungary again began to raise their heads. At the end of May, Boniface in a secret consistory declared Ladislas king of Hungary, and on June appointed Cardinal Angelo Acciaiuoli Papal legate in the Hungarian kingdom. In July Ladislas landed at Zara, and on August 5 was crowned king of Hungary in the presence of the Papal legate. Sigismund retaliated on the Pope with vigor; he forbade both in Bohemia and Hungary the payment of any money to the Papal treasury; he prohibited the publication of any Bulls, Papal letters, or ordinances, and threatened imprisonment to anyone who corresponded with the Roman Court. Boniface retaliated by a formal decree of deposition against Wenzel, in which he asserted that the proceedings of the electors had been taken with his sanction, and confirmed the election of Rupert, without requiring the conditions which he had previously attempted to exact. He judged it prudent to secure Rupert’s allegiance, lest he should make common cause with France and England, and join them in withdrawing from obedience to both Popes alike. When Ladislas advanced into Hungary, he received a severe defeat near Raab, and was driven back into Dalmatia. The fate of his father Charles seemed to him an evil omen; he felt that his Hungarian partisans could not be trusted; and he wisely decided that a secure kingdom in Naples was better than the uncertainties of a tedious war waged for a precarious throne in Hungary. Sigismund showed his wisdom by offering amnesty to the rebels. Ladislas saw that his chance was gone, and at the end of October returned to Naples. The Pope’s schemes upon Hungary had failed disastrously, as Sigismund held to his edict, forbidding Papal intervention in his kingdom, and thenceforth disposed of ecclesiastical offices at his pleasure.

As regards the Schism, Boniface IX’s position was too purely that of an Italian prince for him to make any real head against his rival. In France it was found that no good results had followed from the withdrawal of allegiance from Benedict. The French clergy groaned under the taxation of the royal officers. They discovered that the liberties of their Church were more respected by the Pope than they were by the King, who, on the ground that his efforts to end the Schism involved him in great expense, demanded large grants of clerical revenues. Even the University of Paris saw its privileges set aside, as the bishops, to whom passed the collation of benefices hitherto reserved by the Pope, paid little heed to the claims of learned theologians, and conferred preferment on officials who were useful to themselves. It was natural that a reaction should set in, and the state of parties at the French Court gave it a leader. In the madness of Charles VI France became the prey of contending factions, headed by the King’s brother, the Duke of Orleans, and the King’s uncle, the Duke of Burgundy; — Orleans represented the side of aristocratic culture against the feudal chivalry which gathered round Burgundy. It was natural that Orleans should find his strength in the South of France, and Burgundy
in the North: that Orleans should advocate the restoration of Benedict, and that
Burgundy should maintain the existing attitude of affairs. The Duke of Orleans openly
threatened, in the King’s presence, to take up arms in behalf of Benedict, who was
consequently more closely watched in his captivity at Avignon. The ambassadors of
Aragon urged the release of Benedict. The University of Toulouse, moved by jealousy
of the University of Paris, addressed to the King a long letter controverting the grounds
on which the University of Paris had advocated the withdrawal of allegiance. Louis of
Anjou, on his return from his unsuccessful attempt on Naples, determined to support the
Pope on whose sanction his claims on Naples were founded. He visited Benedict at
Avignon on August 31, 1402, and restored obedience to him within his county of
Provence, on the ground that he had never given his consent to the withdrawal, which
had been proved to be useless in restoring the unity of the Church, and was founded
neither on human nor divine law. Opinion was so divided in France that the King’s
counselors thought it wise to summon the nobles and prelates of the realm to a
Council, to be held in Paris on May 15, 1403.

But before this assembly could meet, Benedict XIII and the Duke of Orleans had
settled matters for themselves. The nobles round Avignon all belonged to the party of
Orleans, and were ready to help the Pope, who secretly gathered together a body of four
hundred men-at-arms who awaited him outside the city; he himself only awaited a
favorable moment to evade the vigilance of the Cardinals and the citizens of Avignon.
A Norman baron, Robert de Braquemond, who was in the service of the Duke of
Orleans, devised means for his escape. On the evening of March 12, Benedict, in
disguise, accompanied by three attendants, managed to pass the guards and quit the
palace. He took nothing with him save a pyx containing the Host, and an autograph
letter of the French King, in which he promised to the Pope filial obedience. Once free
from prison, Benedict found himself in the midst of adherents. He took refuge in a
house in Avignon where a company of French gentlemen awaited him. They kissed his
feet, and paid him again the honors of which for five years he had been deprived. A
band of troops were waiting outside the gates, and Benedict was hurried away under
their care to Chateau Renard, a few miles from Avignon. There he could feel secure,
and laid aside the outward sign of his humiliation — his beard, which had grown long,
as he had made an oath never to shave it while he was a prisoner. He could afford to
laugh good-humoredly at those who had shown him the greatest insolence; he asked the
barber what county he came from, and on hearing that he was a Picard, he merrily
exclaimed, “Then I have proved the Normans liars, for they declared that they
would shave my beard for me”.

At Chateau Renard, Benedict could rely on the protection of Louis of Anjou, and he
knew what he had to expect from the Duke of Orleans. In Avignon all was terror when
the Pope’s flight was discovered. The burghers at once saw their powerlessness, and
offered no opposition to the departure of the Pope’s attendants and of the Cardinals who
had remained faithful to him. The Cardinals who had been opposed to him sought all
means to be restored to his favor; the nobles who had been against him vied in
declarations of the necessity of restoring obedience. Benedict addressed a letter to the
King, his counselors, and the University, setting forth that he had been willing for some
years to endure privations for the good of the Church, but finding that they were useless,
he had left Avignon and gone to Chateau Renard, that he might labor more usefully to
restore the union of the Church. To the repentant Cardinals he showed himself merciful.
On April 29 they presented themselves before him, and on their knees, with sobs,
begged his forgiveness, and swore to be faithful for the future. Benedict was not
revengeful; his determined temper was united with buoyancy, and a keen sense of
humor. He assured them of his forgiveness and invited them to dinner. When they were
seated, they saw with terror that the other places were occupied by men in arms.
Trembling, they expected punishment, but were grimly assured that these were the
Pope’s body-guard, who never left his side even when he said mass. It was a significant
hint that Benedict henceforth was determined to protect himself even against those who
ought naturally to be his supporters. Nor were the Cardinals the only ones who were
alarmed at the Pope’s military bearing. The citizens of Avignon, in terror, besought his
pardon, which was accorded on condition that they repaired the walls of the Papal
palace, which had been overthrown during the siege. Long time they labored at this
ungrateful task. But Benedict refused again to take up his abode at Avignon; he
garrisoned it with Aragonese soldiers, and provisioned it to withstand a lengthy siege.
The men of Avignon were left to the tender mercies of the Pope’s mercenaries.

On May 25 two of the repentant Cardinals appeared before Charles VI to plead for
a restoration of obedience to Benedict. The Universities of Orleans, Angers,
Montpellier, and Toulouse all supported them. There were great differences of opinion,
and the discussions might have gone on interminably if the Duke of Orleans had not
hastened to bring the matter to a conclusion. He ordered the metropolitans to enquire
secretly the opinions of their suffragans; when he found that a majority was in favor of
renewing obedience, he presented himself, on May 28, before the King, whom he found
in his oratory, and laid before him the result of his canvass. It was one of the lucid
intervals of the unhappy Charles. Moved by the representations of Orleans, and by his
own respect for the Pope’s character and learning, he gave his adhesion to the plan of
renewing obedience. The Duke took the crucifix from the altar and prayed the King to
confirm his words by an oath. Laying his trembling hands upon the crucifix, the King
declared, “I restore full obedience to our lord Pope Benedict, declaring, by the holy
cross of Christ, that I will maintain so long as I live inviolate obedience to him, as the
true Vicar of Jesus Christ on earth, and I will cause obedience to him to be restored in
all parts of my kingdom”. Then kneeling at the altar with clasped hands, the King
chanted the “Te Deum”, in which those present joined with tears of joy. The churches in
Paris re-echoed the “Te Deum”, and their bells rang joyous peals for the restoration of
their Pope.

The Dukes of Berri and Burgundy were at first indignant, as was the University of
Paris. After a time they gave way, and professed to hope that the lesson which Benedict
had received might make him more eager to bring about the union of the Church than he
had been before. On May 29 a solemn service of thanksgiving was held in Notre Dame,
at which the Bishop of Cambrai preached, and read an undertaking made by the Duke of
Orleans, in behalf of Benedict, that he would forgive all that had passed, and would
recognize all ecclesiastical appointments made during the withdrawal of obedience; that
he was still ready to resign if his rival should resign or die; that he would summon a
General Council to discuss measures for the reform of the Church. No promises could
be fairer. The reforming party rejoiced to think that they would get more, after all, from
the Pope than they could hope to gain by rebellion against him.

But all hopes founded on Benedict’s moderation were soon dashed to the ground.
He received most graciously the two royal ambassadors who were sent to announce to
him the restoration of obedience. But immediately after giving them audience he sent a
commission of Cardinals to call to account one of them, the Abbot of St. Denys, who
had been appointed during the period of withdrawal of obedience. His election was declared null: an enquiry was made into his life and character; and he was then formally reappointed to his office. Benedict fell back upon the full rights of the Papacy. He was willing to overlook the rebellion against his authority, but he could not recognize as valid what had been done during his imprisonment. The rights of the Papacy stood in antagonism to the honor of the French monarchy. The French King had taken an untenable position, from which he was driven to withdraw. Benedict did not wish to put any needless difficulties in the way, nor to make any demand for humiliating submission; but he could not be expected to admit the principle that a king might withdraw at pleasure from obedience to the Head of the Church, might arrange at his will matters ecclesiastical in his own dominions, and might then demand the ratification of his measures as a reward for the restitution of obedience. On the other hand, the proceedings of the French King had been taken in a period of emergency to remedy a pressing evil. It was sufficiently humiliating that they had failed in their end; it was too much to expect that they should also be admitted to have been illegal in their means. Benedict saw the difficulty and acted wisely. He asserted his own rights quietly in individual cases without putting forward any principles which might offend the feeling of the French nation. Yet his attitude made any good understanding between himself and the Court impossible. It was to no purpose that, in October, the Duke of Orleans paid a visit to Benedict, who owed him so much, and tried to bend his stubbornness. Benedict was grateful and polite, but would not confirm the promises which the Duke had made in his name. The King met the difficulty by an edict (December 19), which declared that all ecclesiastical appointments made during the withdrawal of obedience were valid; and that no payments should be made to the Pope of any moneys which he might claim as due to him during that period. Benedict on his part gave way a little, and the Duke of Orleans was able to take back to Paris a few delusive Bulls which announced forgiveness of all wrongs during the withdrawal of obedience, announced also a General Council, and promised that, through paternal care for the honor of France, no mention of the withdrawal should there be made. Another Bull declared Benedict’s intention to labor in all ways to bring about the union of the Church. Benedict found it necessary to make some show of taking steps towards restoring unity.

He secretly negotiated with Boniface that he should receive his envoys, and in June, 1404, obtained a safe-conduct for them, through the mediation of the Florentines. The Bishops of S. Pons and Ilerda appeared, on September 22, before Boniface IX and his Cardinals. They brought from Benedict proposals for a conference between the two Popes in some neutral place to be agreed upon between them, and suggested the appointment of a committee to be chosen equally from both sides, who should report upon the questions in dispute. It was the old proposal of Benedict to the French King, and was clearly useless and delusive. Boniface was suffering agonies from the disease of which he died — the stone. He sternly answered the proposals of the ambassadors in the negative. “I am Pope”, he proudly said, “and Peter de Luna is antipope”. “At least”, answered the envoys, “our master is not simoniacl”. Boniface angrily bade them leave the city at once. It was his last effort: he returned to his bed and died in the tortures of his terrible disease on October 1.

Boniface IX was a skillful ruler, who knew how to use for his own interest the fluctuations of Italian politics. Among the Italian princes of his time he would deservedly hold a high position for wisdom in gathering his states together, and skill in repressing their disorders. He made good his hold upon Rome, destroyed its old
municipal liberties, and established himself in a security which his predecessors had never gained. Rome found in him a stern and powerful ruler, and the unruly city quailed before a master. He brought together again the States of the Church, and established the Papacy as a territorial power in Italy. Tall, stalwart, and handsome, with kindly and courteous manner, he was well fitted to be a ruler of men. Yet he was destitute of any elevation of mind, either on the side of religion or of culture. His ends were purely temporal, and he had no care for the higher interests of the Church. The Schism seems to have affected him in no way save as a diminution of his revenues. To gain the sovereignty which he aimed at, he saw that money was above all things necessary, and no sense of reverence prevented him from gaining money in every possible way. His shameless simony filled with horror contemporaries who were by no means scrupulous; and his greed was strong even in death. When asked, in his last hours, how he was, he answered, “If I had more money, I should be well enough”. “Even amid the intolerable agonies of the stone”, says Gobelin, “he did not cease to thirst after gold”. At all periods of his life his spirits rose on receiving money, for he was eminently a man of business, and took a practical view of his position and its immediate needs. Even when mass was being celebrated in his presence, he could not disengage his mind from worldly affairs, but would beckon cardinals to him or send for his secretaries to give them instructions which flashed through his mind. He was entirely engrossed in secular matters, and managed the Church as though it were merely a temporal lordship. Yet his worst enemies could bring no worse charge against him he was free from private vices, and was respected as much as he was feared. In another age the statesmanlike qualities of Piero Tomacelli would have deserved admiration; as it was, his rapacity and extortion warned the growing party in favor of reform of the dangers to which the ecclesiastical system was exposed from the absolute monarchy of the Pope.
CHAPTER IV.
INNOCENT VII. — BENEDICT XIII.
TROUBLES IN ITALY AND FRANCE.
1404 — 1406.

The career of Boniface IX was that of an aspiring Italian prince, and the fortunes of his dominions corresponded to the means by which they had been won. No sooner was the news of his death spread through the city than the people rose to assert their old liberties. The streets were barricaded; the nobles hurried their retainers from the country; and the old cries of “Guelf”, “Ghibellin”, “Colonna”, “Orsini”, were again heard in the city. The Capitol was held by the two brothers of Boniface and by the Senator. The people, led by the Colonna, hastened to attack it; but the Orsini gathered their partisans, and advancing by night to its relief, defeated the Colonna in a fight in the streets. The defeated party turned for help to Ladislas of Naples, who had already shown a desire to mix in the affairs of Rome.

It was in this wild confusion, and with the knowledge of the rapid advance of Ladislas, that the nine Cardinals present in Rome entered the Conclave on October 12. The ambassadors of Benedict, who had been imprisoned during the tumult by the Castellan of S. Angelo, and only obtained their liberty after payment of a ransom of 5000 ducats, besought them to defer the election. They were asked if they were commissioned to offer Benedict’s resignation; when they answered that they had no power to proceed so far, the Cardinals went on to their election. The public opinion of Europe so far weighed with them that they followed the example of the Cardinals at Avignon, before the election of Peter de Luna. They signed a solemn undertaking that each of them would use all diligence to bring about the unity of the Church, and that he who might be chosen Pope would resign his office at any time, if need were, to promote that object. It is said that they had some difficulty in coming to an agreement; but the approach of Ladislas did not permit them to delay. On October 17 they elected Cosimo dei Migliorati, a Neapolitan, who, they hoped, would be alike well pleasing to Ladislas and to the Romans, and whose pacific character held out hopes of a settlement of the discords of the Church.

Migliorati was sprung from a middle-class family of Sulmona, in the Abruzzi. He was learned both in canon and in civil law, and entered the Curia under Urban VI, where his capacity for business won him speedy advancement. He was for some time Papal collector in England, then was made Archbishop of Ravenna in the room of Pileo, and afterwards Bishop of Bologna. Boniface IX recognized his merits by appointing him Cardinal, and confided to his care the chief part of the business of the Curia. He was popular in Rome through his conciliatory manner and gentle nature; he was, moreover, universally respected for his learning and his blameless life. He was, however, old, and the Romans felt that in him they had not got another master like Boniface.

Cardinal Migliorati took the Papal title of Innocent VII, but it was some time before he could openly assume the Papal crown. He possessed nothing except the Vatican and the Castle of S. Angelo, which a brother of Boniface still held securely. In the city itself
only the Capitol resisted the people, who declared that they would only let the Pope be free when he had given them back their freedom. In this state of things Ladislas arrived at Rome, and was received in triumph by the people. He entered by the gate of S. Giovanni in Laterano, on October 19, and spent the night in the Lateran Palace, whence, on the morning of the 21st, he went in state to the Vatican to offer his services as mediator to the luckless Pope.

Ladislas had a deep-laid scheme to make himself master of Rome. As soon as he was secure in Naples, his restless and ambitious spirit looked out for a new sphere, and he determined to increase his dominions at the expense of the States of the Church. Boniface in his later days had looked upon him with growing suspicion, and so long as Boniface lived he did not venture to move; but he hastened to take advantage of the disturbance which broke out on the death of Boniface, and there is good ground for thinking that he fomented it. His plan was to set the Pope and the Roman people against one another, and by helping now one and now the other to get them both into his power; by this policy he hoped that Rome itself would soon fall into his hands. He trusted that the rebellious Romans would drive the Pope from the city, and would then be compelled to submit to himself.

Against such a foe Innocent VII was powerless. He had no option save to allow Ladislas to settle matters between himself and the Romans. An agreement was accordingly made, on October 27, which was cleverly constructed to restore to the Romans much of their old freedom, to secure to Ladislas a decisive position in the affairs of Rome, and to reserve to the Pope a decent semblance of power. The Senator was still to be appointed by the Pope; the people were to elect seven governors of the city treasury, who were to hold office for two months, and were to take oath of office before the Senator; to these seven three were to be added by the appointment of the Pope or of King Ladislas, and the ten together were to manage the finances of the city. All magistrates were to be responsible at the end of their office to two syndics, one appointed by the Pope and one elected by the people. The Capitol was to be surrendered to King Ladislas, and was to be turned into a public palace or law courts; Ladislas might, if he choose, assign it as the official residence of the ten governors. It is obvious that by this agreement all that the strong hand of Boniface IX had won was lost to his successor; and that opportunities were carefully left for differences between the contracting parties which Ladislas must necessarily be called in to settle.

Ladislas had given perfidious aid to the Pope, but had the audacity to claim a reward for it. Innocent gave him for five years the Maritima and Campania, by which he commanded free approach to Rome. Moreover, Ladislas obtained from the Pope a decree declaring that, in any steps he might take towards restoring the unity of the Church, the title of Ladislas to Naples should be secured as a preliminary. This promise was sure to render all his measures useless, as France could not be expected expressly to abandon the claims of the house of Anjou. The unscrupulous Ladislas was bent on turning the indolent Innocent into a pliant tool. He still remained for a few days the Pope’s guest, so long as it suited him to continue his intrigues with Rome. Finally he determined before his departure to impress the people by his splendor. Leaving the Vatican on November 14, he crossed the Ponte Molle and entered Rome by the Porta del Popolo. He rode in triumph through the street of Torre del Conte to the Lateran, and on his way asserted his rights in Rome by dubbing knight one Galeotto Normanni, who afterwards assumed the significant title of the “Knight of Liberty”. After spending the evening of November 4 at the Lateran, he departed next day for Naples. Not till he was
gone did Innocent VII venture to be crowned, on November 2, and after his coronation rode, amid the cheers of the people, to take possession of the Lateran.

It was not long, however, before matters turned out as Ladislas had designed. The Romans had gained enough liberty to make them wish for more; and the easy good-nature of the Pope emboldened them the set him at defiance. The new constitution was wrested to their own purposes, and the seven governors elected by the Romans seem to have acted independently of the three appointed by the Pope. Giovanni Colonna kept a body of troops in the neighborhood of Rome ready to support the Romans. The Pope with difficulty maintained himself in the Leonine city by the help of his troops under the condottiere-general Mustarda. The state of things in Rome is described by Leonardo Bruni of Arezzo, who came at this time as Papal Secretary: “The Roman people were making an extravagant use of the freedom which they had lately gained. Amongst the nobles the Colonna and Savelli were the most powerful: the Orsini had sunk, and were suspected by the people as partisans of the Pope. The Curia was brilliant and wealthy. There were many cardinals, and they men of worth. The Pope lived in the Vatican desirous of ease, and content with the existing state of things, had he only been allowed to enjoy it; but such was the perversity of the leaders of the Roman people, that there was no chance of quiet”. The Romans pestered the Pope with requests, and the more he granted, the more readily were new petitions preferred. They even begged for the office of cardinal for their relatives. One day the Pope’s patience was worn out. “I have given you all you wished”, he exclaimed;” what more can I give you except this mantle?”

Matters went on becoming more and more difficult. In March, 1405, the Romans, led by Giovanni Colonna, made an expedition against Molara, a castle of the Annibaldi, a few miles distant from Rome. The siege caused much damage, and in the end of April the Pope sent the Prior of S. Maria on the Aventine to make peace between the contending parties. His efforts were successful, and the Roman soldiers returned with him to the city. No sooner had he entered Rome than he was seized and executed as a traitor by the seven governors (April 25). But this was felt even by the Romans to be excessive, and Innocent threatened to leave the city. On May 10, the governors appeared before Innocent in the guise of penitents, with candles in their hands, to ask his forgiveness. After this submission there seemed for a time to be peace. On June 12, Innocent created eleven new cardinals, of whom five were Romans and one was Oddo Colonna. He wished to do everything that he could to convince the Romans of his good intentions, and induce them to let him live in peace.

Peace, however, was not what Ladislas desired, and his adherents were active in Rome. It was notorious that he had in pay a number of the chief citizens, whose actions he guided at his pleasure. It was easy, therefore, to incite the Romans to another act of aggression. By the agreement made between Pope and people, the care of the bridges of Rome was to belong to the citizens, except the Ponte Molle, which commanded the approach to the Vatican on one side, while the Castle of S. Angelo defended it from the other. The Romans professed to consider the possession of the Ponte Molle as necessary for the protection of the Latin hills. The Pope refused to give it up to them, and it was guarded by Papal soldiers. On the night of August 2 a body of Romans attempted to take it by surprise, but were driven back with considerable loss. It was a festival morning when they returned, and the people had nothing to do. The bells of the Capitol rung out a summons to arms, and the excited crowd rushed to besiege the Castle of S. Angelo, which was vigorously defended by its garrison, who cast up earthworks. The night was spent by both sides under arms, but the morning brought reflections, and
negotiations were begun; both parties at last agreed that the Ponte Molle should be broken down in the middle, and so rendered useless. On August 6 a deputation of the Romans waited on the Pope and treated him to a long speech, in which they expressed their general views about his conduct. As they were riding back unsuspiciously, they were seized by the Pope’s nephew, Ludovico Migliorati, and were dragged into the Hospital of S. Spirito, where he had his quarters. Eleven of them were put to death, of whom two were magistrates, and eight were friends of the Pope; their dead bodies were flung out of the windows. This sanguinary deed awoke the passionate resentment of the people. The relatives of the murdered men thronged the Ponte di S. Angelo clamoring for vengeance. In the city itself the wildest excitement prevailed, and the whole populace were assembling in arms.

Meanwhile the luckless Innocent sat tearfully in the Vatican calling heaven to witness his innocence and bewailing his sad fortune. He was incapable of forming any plan of action, and those around him differed in opinion; some urged immediate flight and some advocated delay. But the troops of Naples might be expected to advance to the aid of the Romans. The fidelity of Antonello Tomacelli, who held the Castle of S. Angelo, was doubtful, and it was believed that he was in the pay of Ladislas. The walls of the Leonine city had fallen in many places, and were ill fitted to stand a siege; above all, supplies of food were wanting. It was hopeless to think of resistance; flight alone was possible. Short time was given to the terrified Cardinals to gather together their valuables, as on the evening of the same day the retreat began. First went a squadron of horse, then the baggage, next the Pope and his attendants, and another squadron of horse brought up the rear to ward off attacks. They made all possible haste to escape, for the Romans were in pursuit. That night they reached Cesano, a distance of twelve miles; next day they pressed on to Sutri, through the blazing heat of an Italian August; the third day they reached Viterbo. Thirty of Innocent’s attendants died on the way through heat and thirst, or died soon afterwards through immoderate draughts of water. Innocent himself was more dead than alive.

No sooner had the Pope left Rome than Giovanni Colonna at the head of his troops, burst into the Vatican, where he took up his quarters. The people laughed at his airs of importance, and called him John XXIII. The Vatican was sacked; even the Papal archives were pillaged; and Bulls, letters and registers were scattered about the streets. Many of these were afterwards restored, but the loss of historic documents must have been great. Everywhere in the city the arms of Innocent were destroyed or filled up with mud; the Romans loudly declared that they would no longer recognize him as Pope, but would take measures for restoring the unity of the Church.

The talk of the Romans was vain, and they were soon to find that Innocent was necessary to them. Ladislas judged that his time had now come: the waters were sufficiently troubled for one to fish who knew the art. He had a strong party among the Roman nobles, and sent, on August 20, the Count of Troia with 5000 horse, and two men already appointed to be governors of Rome in his name. This reinforcement was welcomed by Giovanni Colonna; but the Roman people had not striven to recover their liberties from the Pope that they might put them in the hands of the King of Naples. They besieged their traiterous magistrates in the Capitol, and barred the Ponte di S. Angelo against the Neapolitans, in spite of the fire opened upon them from the Castle. The Neapolitans could not force the barricades and obtain admission into the city. The Capitol surrendered on August 23 to the citizens, who set up three new magistrates called “buon uomini”. In their new peril, the minds of the Romans went back to the
Pope whom they had driven away. The members of the Curia who had been imprisoned in the tumult were released, and much of the goods of ecclesiastics which had been sacked was restored by the magistrates. When men’s minds grew calmer, they recognized that Innocent was blameless of his nephew’s crime; and when submission to the rule of Ladislas drew near, the Romans looked back with regret on the good-natured, indolent Pope.

Envoys were at once dispatched to Viterbo, to beg for aid; and on August 26 the Papal troops, under Paolo Orsini and Mustarda, advanced. The Neapolitans thought it wise to withdraw; they had missed their opportunity of seizing Rome, and it was not worthwhile to stay longer. Giovanni Colonna abandoned the Vatican and retreated. Only the Castle of S. Angelo still held out for Ladislas. On October 30 Innocent appointed as Senator of Rome, Francesco dei Panciatici of Pistoia. The attempt of Ladislas only ended in reestablishing in Rome the Papal power, which he had managed insidiously to sap. In January, 1406, a deputation of the Romans begged Innocent VII to return to his capital; and on March 13 he entered Rome amid shouts of triumph and festivities of rejoicing which rarely greeted a Papal return. His nephew Ludovico accompanied him, having undergone no severer punishment than a penance inflicted by the Pope. The passions of the Romans were quick, but were easily appeased. A horrible crime had driven them to rebellion; but when their rebellion threatened to bring with it unpleasant consequences, they laid aside their thoughts of vengeance, and condoned the offence. We cannot blame them, for they had to choose between two evils: but Innocent’s sense of justice and of right must have been very dim before he could ride through the streets of Rome by the side of the man who had wrought a treacherous deed of slaughter. How little Innocent counted the crimes of his nephew may be seen by the fact that he made him Lord of Ancona and Forli.

The career of Innocent had been so eventful that he might safely plead inability to grapple with the great question of the Schism. Each Pope wished to seem to be doing something, and to do nothing; to have a case sufficient to enable him to abuse his adversary, if not to defend himself. Innocent VII began by summoning a Synod to assemble at Rome on November 1, 1405; the disturbed state of the city gave him an excuse for deferring it to May 1, 1406. Benedict XIII, on his side, continued his plan of professing to negotiate for a meeting between the two Popes, and sent to ask for a safe-conduct for his envoys. Innocent thought that the last envoys of Benedict had been troublesome enough; for compensation was demanded from him for the ransom they had to pay during the disturbances that preceded his election: he accordingly refused a safe-conduct to Viterbo. Benedict was now in a position to write letters declaiming against the obstinacy of Innocent; while Innocent answered by still longer letters denouncing the conduct of Benedict. No advance was made to a settlement; but public opinion turned more and more against both popes alike and the petulant squabbling of two obstinate old men on small technical points awoke general disgust. Benedict XIII felt that his hold on France was insecure, and he was accordingly careful to have the palace of Avignon enlarged and fortified; for this purpose he even had the church of Notre Dame pulled down, though it was the burying-place of his predecessors. To avoid bringing matters to a crisis, he announced his intention of proceeding towards Italy and endeavoring himself to come to some agreement with Innocent VII. In 1404 he removed from Pont de Sorgues to Nice. There he was enabled to win a triumph over his rival, as Genoa, under the influence of its French governor, Marshal Boucicaut, deserted the obedience of Innocent, and recognized Benedict. Pisa soon afterwards, under French
influence, followed its example. The Genoese Cardinal de Flisco, who was Papal legate, joined his fellow-citizens, and transferred himself to the side of Benedict, by whom his dignity was recognized. Early in 1405, Benedict announced his intention of going to Genoa, and imposed a tax of a tenth on the French clergy to provide money for his journey. The nobles supported the Pope, and the unhappy clergy were compelled to pay for what everyone knew to be a mere pretext. On May 16, 1405, Benedict landed at Genoa, and was received with due pomp by the authorities, but without any enthusiasm from the people, who still believed in the title of the Roman Pope. The Genoese were, moreover, suspicious, and made Benedict understand that they could not admit his large armed escort into the city. They courteously assigned as the reason their national habit of jealousy, saying that the Genoese husbands could not endure the thought of possible rivalry the affections of their wives.

Benedict did not stay long in Genoa; on October 8 he was driven to leave it by an outbreak of the plague, and took up his residence at Savona, on the Riviera. Things did not prosper with him in France: everyone was dissatisfied with his promises, and the king of Castile sent an embassy to urge again that both Popes should be compelled to resign. Benedict only embittered his adversaries by trying to set the Duke of Berri against the University of Paris, which he denounced “as a nest of tumult which sent forth a headstrong brood”. In France generally all was in confusion. The King’s madness increased, and he sank almost to the condition of a wild beast, devouring food with insatiable rapidity, and refusing to change his clothes or allow himself to be kept clean. The antagonism between the Dukes of Burgundy and Orleans was daily becoming more intense, and it was with difficulty that peace was kept between them. But, in spite of political disturbances, the University of Paris returned to the charge against Benedict XIII in January, 1406. The stream of public opinion again ran strongly against him; and on May 17, the University succeeded in obtaining from the Royal Council an audience, in which they once more urged the withdrawal of the obedience of France. The Council had too much on hand, in consequence of the disturbed state of the kingdom, to venture on the troubled sea of ecclesiastical discussion, and they referred the University to the Parliament. The pleadings began on June 7, and Pierre Plaon and Jean Petit refuted the arguments which had been put forward by the University of Toulouse against withdrawal from Benedict; they pointed out that he had not kept his promises, and they denounced his exactions. The King’s advocate, Jean Juvenal des Ursins, followed on the same side, and complained against Benedict’s conduct as injurious to the honor of France. Benedict’s friends tried to get the matter deferred, but the University pressed for a decision. At the end of July the letter of the University of Toulouse was condemned as “scandalous and pernicious, defaming the honor of the King and his subjects”, and was ordered to be burned at the gates of Toulouse. On September 11, a further decision was given that the Gallican Church should be free “thenceforth and for ever from all services, tithes, procurations, and other subventions unduly introduced by the Roman Church”. This was a withdrawal from Benedict XIII of the important power of raising ecclesiastical revenues, and contained also an assertion of the right of the national Church to manage its own affairs under royal protection. The University had so far changed its tactics that it rested its complaint against Benedict XIII no longer solely on technical grounds, but on grounds of national utility. Still it had no other remedy to suggest than the old plan, which had already been tried and failed — that of trying to force Benedict to resign by withdrawing from his obedience. It pressed for a decision on this point also; but Benedict’s friends sought to gain time, and this question was deferred to a synod of prelates summoned for November 1. Before this
synod, however, met for the dispatch of business (November 18), the news of the death of Innocent VII somewhat altered the aspect of affairs.

Innocent did not live long after his return to Rome to enjoy his triumph. At first the Colonna and other barons of the party of Ladislas held out against him, and Antonello Tomacelli maintained his position in the Castle of S. Angelo. On June 18, Innocent issued Bulls against the Colonna, the Count of Troja, and other barons of the Neapolitan faction; and on June 20, he deprived Ladislas of his vicariate of Campania and the Maritima. Ladislas was not in a position to have the Pope for his declared enemy. His hold on Naples was not so secure that the Angevin faction might not again become troublesome if they were emboldened by the Pope’s help. He thought it wise to make peace, and the Pope’s nephew Ludovico was sent to settle terms. On August 6, peace was agreed to; the past was to be forgiven; the Castle of S. Angelo was to be given up to the Pope; Ladislas was confirmed in all his rights, and was, moreover, made Proctor and Standard-bearer of the Church. Innocent was certainly trustful and forgiving: he did not profess to seek anything beyond the means of leading a quiet life in Rome, and was prepared to take any steps which might secure that end. But he was not long to enjoy the tranquility which he sought; he had already had two slight attacks of apoplexy, and a third proved fatal to him on November 6.

Innocent VII possessed the negative virtues which accompany an indolent disposition. The writers of the time speak more highly of him than he deserved, because his good-natured carelessness contrasted favorably with the rapacious ambition of his predecessor. Personally he was courteous, affable, and gentle; he liked giving audiences, listening to grievances, and granting little favors; and he had not the strength of character to offend anyone if he could avoid it. He was averse from the simoniacal practices of Boniface, and is praised by the ecclesiastical writers for the doubtful virtue of abstinence from their grosser forms. But the indolent old man fell under the influence of his nephew, and allowed violations of civil and moral law to pass unpunished. Moreover, he exercised no control over the Romans or even over his own soldiers, who in irreverence surpassed their opponents. “On S. Paul’s day, June 30”, says an eyewitness, “I went to S. Paul’s Church, and found it a stable for the horses of the Pope’s soldiers. No place was empty, save the Chapel of the High Altar and the tribune; the palace and the entire space round the church were full of the horses of Paolo Orsini and other commanders of Holy Mother Church”. As regards healing the Schism, Innocent did nothing. Like his rival Benedict, he gained a reputation as a Cardinal by expressing strong opinions on the subject; but after he became Pope, his indolence made him averse from any decided steps, and the only thing which disturbed his equanimity and made him peevish was a mention of the Schism in his presence. In quiet times Innocent VII might have made a respectable Pope; as it was he was feeble and incompetent.
CHAPTER V.
GREGORY XII. — BENEDICT XIII.
NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE RIVAL POPES.
1406 — 1409.

THE death of Innocent VII again kindled in France delusive hopes of a peaceable ending of the Schism. In a short tractate Gerson set forth four possible courses: the recognition of Benedict XIII by the Roman Cardinals; a General Council of the adherents of both parties to decide on the steps to be taken; recognition by Benedict’s obedience of the rights of the Roman Cardinals; or a union of both Colleges for a new election. On their side the Roman Cardinals hesitated what course to pursue. If France succeeded in forcing Benedict to resign, a new election by the united Colleges was the surest means of settling a dispute between two powers which recognized no superior; but the procedure would be long, and meanwhile what was to become of Rome, the Papal dominions, and the Cardinals themselves? They shrank before the dangers of a doubtful future, and tried to discover a middle course by which they would at least be secure. The fourteen Cardinals who were in Rome entered the Conclave on November 18; after the doors were closed, there arrived an envoy from Florence, and a window was broken in the wall to allow him to address the Cardinals, who announced that they were not going to elect a Pope, but a commissioner to restore the unity of the Church. They acted in the same spirit, and resolved on November 23, after some discussion, to elect a Pope who was solemnly bound to make the restoration of unity his chief duty. They set their hands to a document, and took oaths upon the Gospels, that he who was elected should resign his office whenever the antipope did so, or died; that this promise should be announced to all the princes and prelates of Christendom within a month of the Pope’s enthronement; and that ambassadors should be sent within three months of that date to try and arrange for ending the Schism; meanwhile no new cardinals were to be created until after an interval of fifteen months, in case negotiations failed through the obstinacy of the antipope. The Cardinals showed their sincerity by the election which they made. They chose a man renowned for uprightness and sincerity rather than for intelligence and cleverness, Angelo Correr, Cardinal of S. Mark, a Venetian, whose character and age seemed to guarantee him as free from the promptings of ambition and self-seeking. He was nearly eighty years old, a man of old-fashioned severity and piety. The very appearance of Cardinal Correr seemed to carry conviction; he was tall, but so thin and worn, that he seemed to be but skin and bones. The only objection to him was that he was scarcely likely to live long enough to accomplish his object.

Correr had not been remarkable in his early years, but had acted as legate under Boniface IX, and had been made Cardinal by Innocent VII, of whom he was a special favorite. His first steps were in accordance with his previous character. He took the name of Gregory XII, and was enthroned on December 5, when he preached a sermon from the text, “Prepare ye the way of the Lord”, and exhorted everyone to labor for unity. Before his coronation he publicly repeated the oath which he had taken in common with the other Cardinals. His talk was of nothing but unity; he eagerly declared that no small hindrances should stand in his way; if there was not a galley to take him to
the place of conference with his rival, he would go in a fishing-boat; if horses failed
him, he would take his staff in his hand and go on foot. In the same spirit, on December
11, he sent letters, written by Leonardo Bruni, to Benedict and to all the princes of
Christendom. To Benedict he wrote in a tone of kindly remonstrance. “Let us both
arise”, he said, “and come together into one desire for unity: let us bring health to the
Church that has been so long diseased”. He declared himself ready to resign if Benedict
would, and proposed to send ambassadors to settle the place and manner in which the
Cardinals on both sides should meet for a new election.

These steps of the Roman Cardinals and their Pope produced a deep impression in
Paris, where the French prelates were sitting to decide on the demand of the University
that France should withdraw from the obedience of Benedict. The synod set to work on
November 18; but so bitter was the University against Benedict, that Peter d'Ailly and
others were with difficulty allowed to plead in his behalf. The violence of the University
damaged its cause; some did not scruple to lay to Benedict’s charge foul accusations for
which there was not a shadow of proof. Peter d'Ailly spoke with weight against such
rash and violent procedure, and advocated the summons of a Council of Benedict’s
obedience. There was much heat in discussion and much difference of opinion.
Benedict’s friends wished to approach him by way of filial remonstrance; his opponents
declared that many efforts had been made in vain to vanquish his obstinacy, and that
nothing remained but to withdraw from his obedience.

It was not, indeed, easy to discover a way of getting rid of Benedict without
diminishing the rights of the Church. Gradually a compromise was made; and it was
agreed to leave Benedict’s spiritual power untouched, but to deprive him of his
revenues. A decree was prepared for withdrawing from the Pope the collation to all
benefices in France until a General Council should decide otherwise. It was signed by
the King on January 7, 1407, but was not immediately published, as the Duke of
Orleans wished to see the results of the proceedings of the Roman Pope: an edict was,
however, signed forbidding the payment of annates and other dues.

When Gregory XII’s letters were known in Paris there was great rejoicing, and
some even talked of recognizing Gregory if Benedict still remained obstinate. But
Benedict surprised all by the cordiality of his reply; he assured Gregory that his desire
for union was sincere, and that he was ready to agree to the proposal of a common
resignation. “We cannot dissemble our surprise”, he adds, “that your letter insinuates
that you cannot come to the establishment of union by the way of justice; it never has
been, is, or will be our doing that the justice and truth of this matter, so far as concerns
us, be not seen and recognized”. Some of the Professors of the University looked
suspiciously at the last sentence, which was capable of two interpretations, and might
mean that Benedict was ready for discussion, not for resignation, of his claims.

Accordingly the King wrote, on March 1, to Benedict XIII, saying that, as some
expressions in his letter might mean that he wished to waste time in discussing the
justice of his position, he besought him to lay aside all subterfuges and state openly his
willingness to resign. At the same time, influential ambassadors, headed by Simon
Cramaud, Patriarch of Alexandria, were appointed to confer with both Popes; and a
twentieth was levied on the French clergy to provide for the expenses of their journey.

There was no lack of letters, of ambassadors, and of talk. Before the French
ambassadors reached Marseilles, where Benedict XIII had taken up his abode in the
autumn of 1406, an embassy from Gregory XII had already been there. The
appointment of this embassy gave the first reason to Gregory’s Cardinals for doubting the sincerity of the Pope. According to the promise made on his election, he was bound to send an embassy within three months. Malatesta, Lord of Pesaro, offered to go as ambassador at his own expense; but Gregory declined his offer, and waited till the day before the expiration of the term of three months, when he appointed as his envoys his nephew, Antonio Correr, Bishop of Modon, the Bishop of Todi, and Antonio de Butrio, a learned jurist of Bologna. It was not a good augury that one who had a strong personal interest in keeping his uncle on the Papal seat should be appointed to negotiate for his abdication. The Cardinals urged Gregory to waste no time, but finish the great cause he had in hand: Gregory humbly asked them to help him to do so; “as if”, says Niem, indignantly, “they had anything to do with the matter”. The Cardinals began to suspect the Pope of being a wolf in sheep’s clothing.

When Gregory’s ambassadors reached Marseilles there was much fierce discussion about the place where the two Popes were to meet, the number of attendants each was to bring, the securities to be taken on each side, and such-like points. The question of the place of meeting was of course the most important, as each Pope demanded a place in his own obedience. At last matters were referred, on Benedict’s part, to a small committee, which proposed Savona, near Genoa, on the Riviera. To every one’s surprise Antonio Correr at once agreed, and drew from his pocket a paper in Gregory’s hand writing, in which he declared himself ready to accept Ghent or Avignon rather than let any difficulty about place stand in the way of peace. The acceptance of Savona was greatly in favor of Benedict; he was close to it, could go and return readily to a town which, being in the hands of France, was in his obedience. To Gregory, on the other hand, Savona was difficult to reach; the journey was costly, and the dangers in the way were considerable. We are driven to the conclusion that Antonio Correr was acting slyly in his own interests. By accepting Savona he gave a touching proof of his uncle’s readiness to do what was demanded of him, while the real chance of a conference at Savona was very slight. Still an elaborate series of regulations as to arrangements for the conference was drawn up and signed on April 21; and September 29, or at the latest November 1, was fixed as the day of meeting.

The agreement just made between the two Popes can scarcely have been regarded as satisfactory by anyone outside France. If both Popes ceded at Savona, and a new election were there made, France would have an overwhelming influence upon the choice of the Cardinals. This would be hazardous to England, to Naples, and to Venice, who would be sure to take steps to prevent it. France, while professing its zeal for the union of the Church, aimed at a return to the principles of the French Papacy at Avignon. Europe might lament a Schism, but would not consent to end the Schism by restoring the French predominance over the Papacy. Antonio Correr looked forward with a light heart to the failure of all expectations built on this plan. He left Marseilles for Paris, and on his way, at Aix, met the French ambassadors, who besought him to return to Rome at once and prepare his uncle for the journey. They regarded with suspicion the agreement, which had just been signed, as it was over-plausible, and left room for doubtful interpretations on many points. Correr did his best to reassure them: he repeated to them words which his uncle had spoken to him in private. “Do you think, my dear nephew, that it is the obligation of my oath which makes me labor for peace? It is love, rather than my oath, which leads me to resign; day by day my zeal for peace increases. When shall I see the happy day on which I shall have restored the unity of the Church?” At the same time he warned the ambassadors that Benedict was a hard man,
who ought not to be irritated, but rather allured by kindness. He begged them to treat him gently, or they would spoil all. Antonio’s zeal was truly touching; plausible hypocrisy could go no further.

On May 10, Benedict XIII received the ambassadors of France; and at the audience the Patriarch of Alexandria besought him to go to the conference without any view of discussion, but to resolve on abdicating, and to express himself on this point without any ambiguity. The Pope answered at once with great fluency and at great length, but divided his answer into so many heads, and spoke with such obscurity, that the ambassadors gazed at one another in silent hope that someone else might be more acute than himself at understanding the Pope’s meaning. The next day they came before him with a demand that he would issue a Bull declaring his intention of proceeding by way of abdicating, and of putting all other ways aside. To this Benedict replied with considerable dignity, and also with much political wisdom. To settle this difficult matter, he said, confidence and freedom were necessary; every mark of want of confidence in him would strengthen the hands of his adversary, and tend to bring about the very discussion of trifles which they I wished to avoid; he must go to the conference free and trusted above all things. The ambassadors felt that they had gone too far in allowing their distrust to be so clearly seen. The Pope perceived the impression that he had made, and determined to improve his opportunity. After the public audience he called aside the Patriarch of Alexandria and some other members of the embassy, and gently spoke to them about the accusations which were rife in Paris against himself. All were moved with some sort of remorse and many broke into tears; the Patriarch threw himself at the Pope’s feet and humbly asked pardon for his doubts and for his rash utterances in former days. Benedict generously forgave them all, and dismissed them with his blessing. He had adroitly managed by a moral appeal to assert his superiority, and had won a diplomatic victory which left the ambassadors of France in his hands.

The ambassadors turned next to the Cardinals, who promised to do all they could to prevail on Benedict to issue a Bull declaratory of his intentions; and they were also aided by envoys from the Duke of Orleans. But nothing could alter Benedict’s determination. He still refused to issue a Bull; and in the final audience of the ambassadors, on May 18, the Patriarch of Alexandria thanked him for his declaration of good intentions, but added: “As ambassadors of the King of France we cannot say that we are content, for our instructions bade us insist with all humility to obtain your Bulls on this matter”. Benedict angrily answered that every Christian man ought to be content, the King of France among the rest; if he were not, he did not love the Church. The ambassadors retired to Aix, and deliberated whether to publish the withdrawal of allegiance from Benedict, according to their instructions in case he refused to grant the Bulls. The moderate men, however, were in majority, and judged that such a step would only hinder the progress of union. They resolved to hold their hand and the embassy was divided into three bodies, one of which returned to Paris to tell the King of their success, a second body went to Marseilles to keep watch over Benedict, and a third detachment proceeded to Rome to strengthen the good resolutions of Gregory. Charles VI professed himself satisfied with what had been done, but the University was loud in its complaints, and urged on the King to carry out the withdrawal; when the King refused they threatened to shut up their schools and suspend their lectures, and were with difficulty pacified. The ambassadors of Gregory entered Paris on June 10, headed by the nephew Antonio, who, in spite of the request that he would return to Rome, was unable to give up his desire to visit Paris and experience the liberality of the French
King. The ambassadors were received with great pomp and rejoicing, which they repaid with fair words and cheap promises.

Other news, however, awaited the French envoys who were dispatched to Rome. As they advanced through Italy they heard much that made them doubt of Gregory’s sincerity. His old age had led the Cardinals to suppose that he was free from personal ambition, but they forgot that it made him liable to fall under the influence of others. Gregory’s relatives gathered round him, and when once they had tasted the sweets of power, did all they could to make the poor old man forget his promises and cling to office. His nephews and their dependents took up their abode in the Vatican and spent the contents of the Papal treasury in foolish extravagances. They had vast trains of horses and servants, and indulged in childish luxuries. It is a satire on the old man’s tastes that his household spent more in sugar than had sufficed to feed and clothe his predecessors. Moreover, he treated the relatives of his patron Innocent VII with ingratitude, and drove them from the Curia; he dispossessed Ludovico Migiiorati of the March; he dismissed Innocent’s chamberlain, and appointed his own nephew Antonio in his stead. Such money as he had was squandered; and then an appeal was made throughout his obedience for means to provide the expenses of his journey to Savona.

Nor were they only personal motives at work to shake the old man’s constancy. Ladislas of Naples saw with alarm the progress of negotiations towards unity of the Church; so long as the Schism lasted, the Roman Pope was necessarily bound to the party of Durazzo in Naples, whereas a new Pope over a united Christendom, elected at Savona, would fall under French influence, and lend his weight to the party of Anjou. Rome had quietly accepted the rule of Gregory, and had submitted to the Senator whom he had appointed; but Ladislas still had his friends amongst the Roman barons. On the night of June 17 a body of soldiers, headed by the Colonna, entered the city through the broken wall near the gate of San Lorenzo and tried to raise the people. Gregory XII, followed by his nephews, fled trembling into the Castle of S. Angelo. The plot, however, failed, owing to the energy of the Pope’s general, Paolo Orsini, who on the next day hastened with his soldiers from Castel Valcha to Rome, joined the forces under the command of the Pope’s nephew, and drove the conspirators out of the Porta di San Lorenzo with great slaughter. Many of the rebellious barons and citizens were made prisoners, and some were put to death, amongst them Galeotto Normanni, Ladislas’s unlucky “Knight of Freedom”. The attempt of Ladislas had again failed. He had aimed at throwing Rome into confusion, besieging Gregory in the Castle of S. Angelo, and so preventing his journey to Savona. Dietrich of Niem, in his hatred of Gregory XII (whom he calls “Errorius” — a bad pun upon “Gregorius”), does not scruple to say that i: the Pope’s hasty flight into the castle was owing to confederacy in the plot. But Leonardo Bruni, a more impartial and discriminating authority, refuses to believe this of the Pope, but significantly adds that he has no doubt such a charge is true against the Papal nephews. The feeble old man was used by his relatives as the material for every sort of intrigue.

After the failure of this plot Rome rapidly quieted down. On July 11 arrived the ambassadors of Benedict, and on July 5 those of the French King, who had travelled by land; their colleagues, who came by Benedict sea, joined them on July 16. They were told that Gregory was in a state of doubt; the sight of the letters withdrawing obedience from Benedict, of which he had received copies from Paris, made him, quail before this method of dealing with Popes; he had received warnings not to trust himself to strangers; his relatives plied him with suggestions that his departure from Rome would
mean the seizure of the Patrimony by Ladislas. In an audience given to Benedict’s ambassadors on July 8 he first began to raise difficulties. He said he did not see how he was to go to Savona: it was true the Genoese had offered to lend their galleys, but he dared not trust himself to them; he could not afford to equip six or eight galleys himself; he had applied to the Venetians for ships, and they had refused them. He added also his dread of Ladislas in case of his absence. On July 17 the French ambassadors offered him themselves as hostages for his security, besides other hostages from Genoa; they reminded him that the Genoese galleys had been sent at the request of his own nephew. Gregory, in answering, disavowed his nephew, pleaded his poverty, and suggested that the French King should supply him with ships and money. At the request of the ambassadors the Cardinals endeavored to reason with Gregory; but the old man’s mind kept vacillating from one point to another, and the Cardinals could make nothing of him. The French ambassadors, to cut matters short, offered him, on the part of the French King, six galleys, with pay for six months: the Pope might put among their crews men of his own for more security, and the captain of these galleys agreed to leave as hostages his wife and children; a hundred of the chief Genoese citizens and fifty from Savona should likewise be given as hostages. No fairer offer could have been made. It is a proof how anxiously France desired the conference at Savona, and the consequent advantage to herself in the new election. To gain that result she was prepared to lay aside all punctilious feelings of dignity and pride. Gregory was sorely put to it for a means of refusing this offer; he quibbled about the exact wording of the treaty, which had stipulated the disarming of the Genoese vessels during the conference; he rebuked his nephew for imprudence, and disavowed what he had done; he said that he would willingly accept the offer if he himself only were concerned, but the honor of all his obedience would be compromised if he were to accept it. The Patriarch then offered, if the Pope preferred to go by land, to supply means for the journey, and put all the castles in the power of the French into Gregory’s hands for the time, reserving the Genoese garrisons at present in them. Gregory evasively answered that he intended to approach by land nearer to Benedict.

The French ambassadors, in an interview with the Senator and magistrates of Rome, besought their assistance with the Pope, and assured them that France had no wish to remove the Papacy from Rome. So fairly did they speak, that one of the Romans said privately that it was well the people did not hear them, or they would settle the matter by a sudden rising against Gregory. Jean Petit pointed out that the extinction of the Schism would restore to Rome its old prosperity, from the increase of pilgrims for indulgences, and would secure it protection from Ladislas. Still neither Cardinals nor citizens had any against Gregory’s greedy relatives; and the old man, now that he was sure of political support, clutched at everything which might keep him in office. On July 21, the ambassadors of Benedict asked for a definite answer. Gregory pleaded the difficulties of going to Savona, and asked that the place might be changed. The royal ambassadors suggested that Gregory might send commissioners to the conference, or that the two Colleges of Cardinals should be allowed to settle the matter. Gregory sent for D’Ailly, Gerson, and others on July 28, and went through the weary round of equivocations and excuses which he had been so long in practicing. D’Ailly answered him point by point. At last the Pope burst into tears, and exclaimed: “Oh, I will give you union, do not doubt it, and I will satisfy your King; but I pray you do not leave me, and let some of your number accompany me on my way and comfort me”. It seemed as though for the moment he recognized his weakness, and begged to be rescued from his nephews’ clutches. But the nephews soon regained their power. On July 31, Benedict’s
ambassadors took their leave, with an uncertain answer that Gregory objected to go to Savona, but would try to be there by November 1. Soon after the envoys of the French King followed, feeling that nothing had been decidedly settled.

Soon Gregory himself found it advisable to leave Rome. Not only his nephews, but also the Papal general Departure Paolo Orsini, played upon the old man’s timidity and feebleness. Since the repulse of the Neapolitans, Paolo Orsini had been too powerful in Rome. He obtained from the Pope the vicariate of Narni and pressed him with demands for money to pay his troops. Troubles within and without oppressed the luckless Pope, and he adopted a course which he hoped would for a time rid him from both. By removing from Rome, he would be free from the importunities of his greedy general, and would also be able to make some show of proceeding towards the promised congress. Leaving Cardinal Pietro Stefaneschi as his legate in Rome, he set out on August 9 for Viterbo. Thence, on August 17, he wrote to the King of France urging the need of a change of the place of congress from Savona, and complaining of the haughty tone of the French ambassadors, who, on their part, wrote to Gregory from Genoa, repeating their assurances about his personal safety at Savona, and expressing their objections to reopening the question of the place of congress as likely to lead into an endless labyrinth of negotiations. From Genoa the French ambassadors passed on to S. Honorat, whither Benedict had retired before an outbreak of the plague. Benedict received them with the utmost affability. In proportion as he saw Gregory raise difficulties he expressed eagerness on his own part; he was too skilful a diplomatist not to see the advantage of throwing the blame of failure on Gregory when an opportunity was offered. “We are both old men”, he said to a messenger of Gregory’s; “God has given us a great opportunity; let us accept it, when offered, before we die. We must die soon, and another will obtain the glory if we protract the matter by delays”. He assured the King’s ambassadors that he meant punctually to abide by the treaty. Meanwhile Gregory moved from Viterbo to Siena at the beginning of September. He succeeded in winning from the Cardinals permission to enrich his three lay nephews without breaking his oath at election; in reply to a memorial setting forth the sacrifices made and the losses sustained by them through their labors for union, and the prospect which faced them of being rapidly reduced to a private position, the Pope allowed them to hold various lands and castles belonging to the Church.

The nephews seem also to have joined with Ladislas in a scheme to terrify the already frightened Pope. Ladislas, on Gregory’s departure from Rome, took into his pay Ludovico Migliorati, whom Gregory had dispossessed of the March; by his aid, Ascolo and Firmo were captured, and Ladislas showed himself ready to strike a blow at Rome. Gregory wrote to remonstrate against the seizure of Ascolo and Firmo. Ladislas replied, in a taunting letter, that he was keeping those cities for the Church. He reminded Gregory of his objections to Savona as a place of congress, and sneeringly suggested Paris as a fitter place. The nephews filled the Pope’s mind with suspicions about his personal safety; fresh ambassadors were sent to press for a change of place, and on November 1, the day fixed for the congress, Gregory was still at Siena, and Benedict, with triumph in his heart, professed to await him at Savona. Gregory, by way of doing something, issued indulgences to all who should pray for the peace of the Church, and from the pulpit in Siena had his reasons for not going to Savona set forth at length. His Cardinals urged him to abdicate without going to Savona; and solemn agreements were made what bishoprics he was to have, and what principalities were to be assigned to his nephews, as the price of his retirement. More ambassadors passed between the Popes.
Benedict offered to advance to Porto Venere, at the end of the Gulf of Spezzia, the southernmost extremity of the Genoese territory, if Gregory would advance to Petra Santa, the furthest point of the Luccese. The negotiations were endless and wearisome, and their general result is summed up by Leonardo Bruni: “One Pope, like a land animal, refused to approach the shore; the other, like a water beast, refused to leave the sea”. All who were anxious for the union of the Church were weary of these perpetual hesitations. Cardinal Valentine of Hungary had dragged his aged frame to Siena, in hopes of being present at the extinction of the long Schism he was soon disillusioned, and as he felt his strength failing him, and caught the hungry eye of Antonio Correr cast upon his plate and horses, the old man rose in wrath from his sick bed. “You shall have neither me nor my goods”, he said, and in the depth of winter had himself conveyed to Venice, and thence home, where he died in peace. Still, grievous as the delay might be from the ecclesiastical point of view, it was the inevitable result of the over-reaching policy of France in urging the conference at Savona. Germany, England, Venice, and Naples all looked on with suspicion, and the vacillation of Gregory was increased by the feeling that he had powerful support.

In January, 1408, Gregory moved to Lucca, where, under pressure of the Florentines and Venetians, he wrote to Benedict, on April 1, proposing Pisa as a place of meeting; he could approach it by land and Benedict by sea, each in a day’s journey; it was well supplied with all necessaries, and was preferable to the small fortress which had been talked of before. It was now Benedict’s turn to raise difficulties, and he refused to give a decisive answer. On April 16, the French ambassadors informed him that a personal conference, on which he seemed to set so much value, was not necessary for the purpose of a common abdication; if he considered it to be so, let him accept the guarantees offered and go to Pisa. Before, however, this point could be settled, Gregory took advantage of the disturbances in Rome to withdraw from his offer and enter upon a new course of policy.

Matters in Rome had been growing worse and worse since the Pope’s departure. The designs of Ladislas were plain, and there was no one in Rome to offer much resistance. Power was divided between the Legate, the city magistrates, and Paolo Orsini, the leader of the troops. None knew how far the other was in the pay or in the interests of Ladislas. Disturbances and troubles of every kind came upon the city. On January 1, 1408, the Legate imposed a heavy tax upon the Roman clergy, who met together and determined not to pay it; meanwhile they determined not to ring their church bells or celebrate mass. The magistrates put down this clerical rebellion by imprisonment; mass was again said, and the tax had to be paid. But the treasures of the churches were taken for that purpose; statues of the saints and precious reliquaries were melted down into money. It was a hard winter, and there was great scarcity of bread in Rome, which the Legate in vain tried to ward off by processions, and the display of the handkerchief of S. Veronica. As was natural, outrages became common; pilgrims were robbed and killed on their way to the city. Everything was in confusion, and the only desire of the chief men seems to have been to prepare the way for Ladislas. On April 11 the Cardinal Legate, as a means of shaking off his own responsibility, called into existence the old municipal organization of the Banderisi, who took an oath of fidelity to the Church before the Legate, and received from his hands the banners made after the ancient fashion. The restored officials had the satisfaction of a few ceremonials, “to the great joy of the people”; but their rule was brief. The old Roman Republic had been galvanized into existence for a few days that it might endure the ignominy of surrender
to the King of Naples. On April 16, Ladislas, with an army of 12,000 horse and as many foot, appeared before the walls of Ostia, which was traitorously surrendered to him on April 18. On the 20th he appeared before Rome, and pitched his camp by the church of S. Paolo. The city was still strong enough to resist a siege, but supplies had been neglected, and everywhere were helplessness and suspicion. Paolo Orsini began to negotiate with Ladislas, and the Banderisi thought it wise to be beforehand with him. On April 21, Rome gave up to Ladislas all her fortresses; the Cardinal Legate hastened to leave the city; the luckless Banderisi resigned their office; and the government was placed in the hands of a senator named by the King of Naples. On April 25, Ladislas entered Rome in triumph and there was much shouting and magnificence. Ladislas had at length obtained his end and made himself master of Rome. He stayed in the city for some time arranging its affairs; he appointed new magistrates, received the obedience of the neighboring towns, Velletri, Tivoli and Cori, and welcomed also the ambassadors of Florence, Siena and Lucca, congratulating him on his triumph. His troops advanced into Umbria, where Perugia, Orte, Assisi and other towns at once recognized his sway. The craft of Ladislas had gained its end, and the temporal power of the Papacy had passed into his hands. Many of his predecessors on the throne of Naples had striven to enrich themselves at the expense of the States of the Church, and to obtain influence in the city of Rome. Ladislas had succeeded not through any wisdom of his own policy, but through the hopeless weakness of his antagonists. The papacy was crippled and discredited; the freedom of the city of Rome had died away. There was no dauntless pope, backed by the public opinion of Europe, to oppose the spoiler; there was no sturdy body of burghers to man the walls in defense of the civic liberties. So utterly had the prestige of Rome and the memories of her glories passed away from men’s minds, that her sister republic of Florence could send and congratulate Ladislas on the triumphal victory which God and his own manhood had given him in the city of Rome.

It would seem that the knowledge of the intentions of Ladislas against Rome had stirred up the crafty change of mind of Benedict to a scheme on his own behalf. Benedict had always had some adherents in Rome, and is said to have spent large sums of money in raising up a party in his favor. He managed to gain the favor of Marshal Boucicaut, the French governor of Genoa, who sent out eleven Genoese galleys to forestall Ladislas and make a dash upon Rome in Benedict’s behalf. The attempt, however, was too late, for the galleys only sailed from Genoa on April 25, the day on which Ladislas entered Rome. The knowledge of this bold design gave Gregory XII just grounds for distrusting his rival; and he could rejoice that Rome had fallen before Ladislas rather than Benedict. He could now plead Benedict’s perfidy, and the momentous events which had happened in Rome, as reasons why he could not at present proceed to a conference at Pisa. Political reasons had entirely overshadowed ecclesiastical obligations; his nephews had completely succeeded in dispelling from the old man’s mind any further thoughts of his solemn oath to promote the union of the Church by his abdication. When a preacher at Lucca urged upon Gregory, in a discourse before the Cardinals, his duty to labor for the restoration of unity, the nephew Paolo Correr seized the indiscreet orator even in the church, flung him into prison, and only released him on a promise never to preach again. The legate Steffaneschi who had fled from Rome was received at Lucca without reproof. Every one believed that Gregory had done with his connivance, as a means of averting any further talk of a conference. Ladislas expressed his intention of being present to assert his rights at any conference that might be held. He urged on Gregory the further step of nominating new Cardinals.
Gregory XII again plucked up his courage and prepared to enter upon a new career, no longer as a “commissioner for unity”, but as a Pope who was a political necessity to resist the policy of France. He spoke of the proposal for his abdication as “a damnable and diabolical suggestion”; he wrote to his envoy in France to desist from further negotiations; and resolved to follow the advice of Ladislas, and strengthen himself for his new position by the creation of a batch of Cardinals on whose support he might rely. This raised the entire question whether Gregory XII was to be held bound by his oath made at election; and the Cardinals, who still held by their former policy, were strengthened by the advice of Florentine envoys in their determination to resist the Pope. On May 4, Gregory XII announced to the nine Cardinals who were with him his intention of proceeding to a new creation; he declared that the events which had occurred gave him a just reason for supposing that the term mentioned in his oath at election had been reached; he ended by naming four Cardinals, two of them his nephews, one of whom, Gabriele Condulmier, afterwards became Pope Eugenius IV. Wishing to cut off from the Cardinals all opportunity of protest, the Pope ended by saying, “I order you all to keep your seats”. They gazed in speechless indignation on one another. “What is the meaning of such an order?” asked the Cardinal of Tusculum. “I cannot act rightly with you”, replied the Pope, “I wish to provide for the Church”. “Rather you wish to destroy the Church”, was the retort. By this time others had recovered their courage. “Let us die first”, said the boldest of them, and rose to his feet to protest. There followed a scene of anger and expostulation which afforded Leonardo Bruni, who was present, an opportunity for psychological study which the men of the early Renaissance keenly enjoyed. Some grew pale, others turned red; some strove to bend the Pope by entreaties, others assailed him with their wrath. One fell at his feet and besought him to change his mind; another assailed him with menaces; a third alternated between soothing his colleagues and supplicating the Pope. All was of no avail. “Whatever I do, you oppose”, was the wail of the querulous old man. At last Gregory dismissed the Cardinals with a prohibition to quit Lucca, to meet together without his leave, or to have any dealings with the ambassadors of Benedict XIII.

In vain the Lord of Lucca, with the chief citizens, tried to make peace; and the Bishop of Lucca, who had been one of the newly nominated Cardinals, was compelled to declare that, under the existing circumstances, he would never accept the office.

Gregory XII persevered in his intention, and summoned the Cardinals to a consistory, in which he was to publish his new creations; when they refused to come, he performed the ceremony in the presence of a few bishops and officials. The old Cardinals declared that they would never recognize these intruders: they determined to leave Lucca, where they could not be sure of their personal safety. On May 11, the Cardinal of Liege set the example of flight. Paolo Correr sent soldiers to pursue him, while he himself turned his attention to the seizure of his goods: when his men returned without the fugitives, Paolo vented his anger on the Cardinal’s servants, till he was checked by the city magistrates, through fear of the Florentines. Next day six more of the Cardinals fled, and all assembled at Pisa, whence they sent Gregory XII an appeal from himself to a General Council, and addressed an encyclical letter to all Christian princes, declaring their zeal for the union of the Church, the failure of Gregory to keep his promises, and their hopes that all princes would aid them to establish the union which they desired. Gregory XII replied by accusing them of sacrilegious intrigues against his person, and constant hindrance to his endeavors after union. The breach was thenceforth irreparable, and a war of pamphlets on both sides embittered the hostility.
Benedict meanwhile was not in a position to enjoy a triumph over his rival. The assassination of the Duke of Orleans (November 23, 1407) deprived of his chief supporter in France, and the University of Paris lost no time in urging the King to carry out the long threatened withdrawal of obedience. The King wrote on January 12, 1408, to Benedict saying that he was afraid the Schism tended to grow worse instead of better, and unless a union had been brought about before Ascension Day next, France would declare her neutrality until one true and undoubted Pope should be elected. Benedict had long foreseen this step and was prepared for it. He wrote the King that the threat of neutrality was equally opposed to the King’s honor and to the will of God; he could not pass it over in silence; let the King revoke his decision, or he would fall under the censures of a Bull which had been prepared some time ago, though not yet published, and which he now enclosed. The Bull was dated May 19, 1407, from Marseilles, and pronounced excommunication against all who should hinder the union of the Church by measures against the Pope and Cardinals, by withdrawal of obedience, or appeal against the Papal decisions; the excommunication, if not heeded, was to be followed by an interdict.

On May 14, 1408, this Bull was delivered to the King. It was Benedict’s last move, and Benedict had miscalculated its efficacy. He hoped, no doubt, that the feeble-minded King, who, throughout all this matter, had merely been the mouth-piece of others, would shrink before the terrors of excommunication. He hoped that the disturbed state of the kingdom might make politicians pause before they added to its other troubles a contest with the Pope. But Benedict did not realize how the prevarications of the last few years had destroyed his moral hold upon men’s minds; and he had not yet learned the strength of the University of Paris. The Bull contained nothing contrary to custom or to canon law, and the politicians in the King’s Council doubted what to do; but the University had no hesitation. It boldly pronounced those who had brought the Bull to be guilty of high treason, and demanded a public examination of its contents. This took place on May 21, when a Professor of Theology, Jean Courtecuisse, impeached the Bull as an attack upon the royal dignity and the national honor, accused Benedict of promoting the Schism, and declared him deserving of deposition. The University then presented their conclusions, which denounced Benedict as a schismatic and a heretic, to whom obedience was no longer due; his Bull should be torn in pieces, and all who had brought or suggested it should be punished. The royal secretary cut the Bull in two, and handed it to the Rector of the University, who tore it into shreds before the assembly. Some of Benedict’s friends were imprisoned on the suspicion of being previously acquainted with the contents of the Bull; even Peter d’Ailly only escaped by prudently absenting himself from Paris. The University again behaved with the same violence as it had shown in 1398, and even treated with injustice some of its most eminent sons. Nicholas de Clemanges, as Benedict’s secretary, was suspected of having written the Bulls, and though he persistently denied it, he dared not enter France for some years, and when at length he returned, it was only to end his days in obscurity.

Urged on by the University, the King proclaimed the neutrality of France, and wrote on May 22 to Cardinals of both parties, exhorting them to leave these Popes, who had not been able to find any place in the world suitable for the discharge of their solemn oaths and for the relief of the afflicted Church. Four of the Cardinals of Benedict XIII were sent to Livorno to confer with four of Gregory XII’s Cardinals; the result of their joint deliberations was that it was best to summon a General Council, before which both Popes might resign. Benedict’s Cardinals affirmed that they were
commissioned by their master to accept this course; but Benedict denied that he had
given them any such power. He felt, however, that he was not safe from personal danger
in any land where French influence prevailed. He knew that Boucicaut was again
commissioned to seize him; and on June 15 he sailed away from Porto Venere,
accompanied by four Cardinals, and took refuge in his own land at Perpignan, in the
county of Roussillon. Still he retained his dignity and his resolute will. Before his flight
he wrote in a tone of lofty remonstrance to Gregory; and as the cry of Christendom was
now for a Council, he issued a summons to a General Council to be held at Perpignan
on November 1.

Gregory XII could do nothing but follow this example. He proclaimed a Council to
be held at Whitsuntide, 1409, in the province of Aquileia or the exarchate of Ravenna.
He could not be more precise, for he was uncertain where he could find shelter. On July
12 he issued an appeal to his rebellious Cardinals, offering them forgiveness if they
appeared and asked for pardon within the month of July. He did not, however, think it
worthwhile to stay at Lucca and await them. On July 14 he quit the city; and two of
the Cardinals who were still with him took advantage of the opportunity to join their
colleagues at Pisa. Gregory went forth on his journey with a scanty band of followers;
only one of his old Cardinals still remained with him. He did not know where it was
safe for him to go, as disquieting rumors reached him that the Cardinal Baldassare
Cossa, legate in Bologna, had publicly burned his Bulls and was raising troops against
him. Finally he took refuge in Siena, which was in close alliance with Ladislas. From
Siena (September 17) he issued a Bull revoking the legatine powers of Cardinal Cossa;
it was a useless measure, as Cossa had already sent in his adhesion to the Cardinals at
Pisa. In September Gregory created ten new Cardinals, and early in November left
Siena for Rimini, where he put himself under the protection of the powerful Carlo
Malatesta.

Meanwhile the Cardinals at Livorno were agreed in maintaining their policy, and
on June 29 they entered into a solemn agreement to establish the unity of the Church by
a General Council, after the abdication, death, or deposition of the two Popes. On July
1, Gregory’s Cardinals issued a letter to his entire obedience, calling upon all to
withdraw from him and pay him no more of the dues of the Church, so that his
obstinacy might be conquered. When Gregory issued his summons to a Council, they
declared that under existing circumstances he had no right to do so, as the unity of the
Church could not be established by means of a Council held by either Pope. Benedict’s
Cardinals wrote in a similar strain. And finally, on July 14, the united Cardinals issued
to all bishops an invitation to a Council to be held at Pisa, on May 29, 1409; and sent to
all courts a request that they would take part in it. The Venetians, Florentines, and
Sienese sent ambassadors to attempt a reconciliation between Gregory and his
Cardinals. Gregory asserted that he alone had the right to summon a Council. The
Cardinals replied that he could in any case only summon a Council of his own
obedience, and not of the Universal Church; yet, to show their desire for peace, they
would receive him with all honor. On October 11 they issued an address to all prelates
who still adhered to the Pope, calling on them to leave him and share in their pious
undertaking. Benedict’s Cardinals wrote, on September 24, and besought him to join
with them in summoning the Council at Pisa, and to recall his summons for a Council at
Perpignan. Benedict’s reply was characteristic of his legal mind: he wondered at the
steps they had taken without him; if they could show that their proceedings were in
accordance with the canons, he would, through love for peace, agree with their wishes:
meanwhile he could not revoke his Council, as already many prelates were assembled; but, with the help of God and his synod, he would soon frame a decree for ending the Schism.

Benedict’s Council met at Perpignan on November 1, and was attended by about 120 prelates. The opening ceremonies went smoothly enough. All listened with sympathy to Benedict’s justification of himself, and account of all his labors to bring about the unity which he so much desired. A commission of sixty, which afterwards was reduced to thirty, and again to ten, was appointed to discuss this question. The Council dwindled away before the commission had reported in favor of the abdication of Benedict, and the sending of envoys to lay this proposal before the Council of Pisa. Benedict received this report on February 12, 1409, and agreed to act upon it. Envoys were nominated accordingly; but, through the misjudging zeal of the French, they were imprisoned at Nimes, and were deprived of their instructions. Benedict’s conciliatory temper passed away, and on March 5 he answered the Cardinals’ summons to the Council of Pisa by a solemn excommunication of them and their adherents.

The course, however, of the two rival Popes was run. They had wearied out the patience of Christendom with illusory promises and endless delays, till men had ceased to pay much heed to them, and their obedience had dwindled away to the few who had a direct interest in maintaining their power.

It is impossible not to feel sympathy for them both as victims of circumstances which they had no part in creating. They lamented the Schism, as did others, and would gladly have seen its end; but they were bound to consider the dignity and rights of the office which they claimed to hold. It was easy for those who framed crude plans for the solution of the difficulty to lay all the blame of failure on the obstinacy of the Pope.

Gregory XII had been elected Pope on the ground of his integrity of character and the senile weakness which was rapidly growing upon him. The Cardinals sought to protect their own interests by the choice of a Pope who would retain office only long enough to enable them to make a good bargain for themselves; they forgot that the weakness, which rendered their creature amenable to themselves, made him equally subject to the influence of others who had more exclusive interests at stake. Gregory XII soon fell into the hands of his nephews, who adroitly managed to identify his cause with that of opposition to the influence of France. For a time Gregory XII had a position in the affairs of Europe. But when once the plan of a congress at Savona had been defeated and the Cardinals in despair undertook a revolutionary scheme to restore unity to the Church, Gregory’s cause was abandoned and his position was gone. In public matters Gregory XII was merely a puppet in the hands of others, his Cardinals, his nephews, the King of Naples in turn; and his actions were merely a series of subterfuges and pretenses; yet he himself retained his simplicity and uprightness of character, so that many who disapproved his conduct still reverenced the man. “I followed the Pope from Lucca”, says Leonardo Bruni, “rather through affection than because I approved his course. Yet Gregory had great integrity of life and character; moreover, he was learned in the Scriptures and had subtle and true power of investigation. In short, he satisfied me in all things save in the matter of the union of the Church”. We feel pity, rather than contempt, for one of simple character who was set in a position beset with difficulties and temptations which he had neither skill to grapple with nor strength to resist.

Far different was the character of Benedict XIII. A man of trained and vigorous intellect, strong character and indomitable resoluteness, he failed through intellectual
rather than moral faults. His mind was too abstract and his point of view too technical; he dealt in a dry legal spirit with a problem which concerned the very life of Christendom. He felt from the beginning that, as a foreigner, he had scant justice dealt him in France. He knew that he had no strong power to back him, no nation deeply interested in maintaining him. He was keenly alive to the personal element in all the proceedings of the University and Court of France, and he resented the thought that the dignity of the Papal office should be impaired while in his hands. His position was legally as rightful as had been that of Clement VII; why should language be used towards himself that had never been addressed to his predecessor? why should he be treated as a criminal and be subjected to threats and persecutions? With dignity and astuteness he carried on an unequal struggle. He was always ready with an answer; it was impossible to take him at a disadvantage in argument. Wise and moderate men like D'Ailly and Clemanges were on his side so long as it was possible, and regretted the violence of the University, which gave Benedict no loophole whence to escape with dignity. Moreover Benedict himself never showed obstinacy till the last, when his cause was hopeless. While a prisoner at Avignon he issued no excommunications against his foes, but bided his time patiently. He bore no ill will or rancour, and his equanimity never gave way under the strain of the conflict. He was kindly to those around him and inspired strong personal attachment. He was a genuine student, a lover of books and of learned men, and was scrupulous in the discharge of his ecclesiastical duties. His many good qualities are worthy of admiration, and he had all the elements of a great ecclesiastical statesman. Unfortunately the problem with which he had to deal was one which statesmanship alone could not solve. Europe was weary of the Schism and France had no interest in maintaining a Spanish Pope. Benedict XIII contented himself with upholding the technical legality of his position against what he rightly thought an ill-considered attempt on the part of the University of Paris to solve a difficult problem by recourse to violent measures. The fault of Benedict XIII was that he had no plan of his own for meeting the growing desire for a union of the Church. It is his merit that he made a dignified resistance; he maintained an unequal struggle, which prevented the settlement of the affairs of the Church from falling into the hands of the unstable government of France. A revolution headed by the Cardinals was preferable to the political intervention of the French Court.
CHAPTER VI.
THE COUNCIL OF PISA.
1409.

Christendom had fallen away from the two refractory Popes, and the Cardinals had undertaken to heal the Schism of the Church. All plans had failed which rested on either the voluntary or compulsory withdrawal of one or both of the contending Popes. It was impossible to get rid of these two claimants to the Papal dignity and yet leave the foundations of that dignity itself unmoved. The bold theory of an appeal from the Vicar of Christ on earth to Christ Himself residing in the whole body of the Church was to be tried, and the long-forgotten name of a General Council was again revived. The Cardinals, however, knew that the weight of such a Council would depend upon the fullness of its representation; and they did all they could to win the recognition of the princes of Europe. France, of course, was anxious for a Council. Henry IV of England accepted it willingly, and even wrote to Rupert, King of the Romans, urging him to take part in it. The difficulty lay with Germany, where Rupert and Wenzel both claimed the Imperial title. Wenzel offered to send ambassadors to the Council if they were received as the ambassadors of the King of the Romans. When this was agreed to, he published, on January 22, 1409, a declaration of neutrality throughout his dominions. This, however, had the effect of rendering Rupert uneasy. He was uncertain what view a new Pope might take of his claims, which had been recognized by Boniface IX, and were bound up in the recognition of Gregory XII. At a Diet held at Frankfort, in January, 1409, Cardinal Landulf of Bari maintained the cause of the Cardinals, and Gregory’s nephew Antonio the cause of the Pope. The majority of the princes were in favor of the Cardinals, but Rupert still held to Gregory; and it was finally resolved that both parties should send envoys to the Council to represent their views.

Nor was it only in high political matters that the Cardinals pursued their efforts for Gregory’s overthrow. Pisa itself was a manufactory of satires and invectives against him. One may be quoted as a remarkable instance of the mediaeval notions of reverence and of wit. Two of the Cardinals died in Pisa, in July, 1408, and a letter purporting to give their experiences of the politics of the other world was found one morning affixed to the gates of the Cathedral of Pisa. It describes with rhetorical realism a consistory held by Christ in Heaven, in which one of the saints rises and calls attention to the distracted state of the Church on earth. He is made to describe the two Popes and their followers with the vilest scurrility of personal spite. After hearing this speech, the Cardinals meet with a friend, who tells them that, on his road to Paradise, he happened to miss his way and peep into the regions of punishment, where he saw a fiery chariot being prepared for Gregory, to which were harnessed the chief persecutors of the Church. He saw Urban VI and Clement VII made objects of mockery even by their fellow-sufferers in the abode of heretics; while Innocent VII was condemned to menial work in Heaven, where he hid himself from shame at the thought that he had made Gregory a Cardinal. Finally, the two Cardinals are welcomed by the Almighty into the heavenly assemblage, and are assured that a blessing will rest on the labors which they have begun. There were many such pamphlets, and much coarse wit was mingled with theological discussion. In one, which issued from the University of Paris, Peter de Luna is reminded that, if he were true to his name, he would be shining like the moon in a
clear sky; as it is, he is eclipsed by clouds of vanity. Angelo Correr is informed that his name means “angel”, but he seems to be Satan transforming himself into an angel of light.

The great question, however, for the Cardinals was to strengthen themselves in Italy. It was clear that Ladislas would maintain the cause of Gregory; and such was the power of Ladislas in Italy, that he might render insecure the position of the Cardinals in Pisa, and bring their Council to naught. The Cardinals looked for help to one of their own number, Baldassare Cossa, who in the days of Boniface IX had been made legate in Bologna, over which he established himself supreme. Cossa was a Neapolitan, who began his career as a piratical adventurer in the naval war between Ladislas and Louis of Anjou. When peace was made, his occupation was gone, and he determined to seek advancement in other ways, though his old habits never entirely left him, and he had a robber’s custom of working all night, and sleeping only when dawn appeared. He entered as a student in the University of Bologna, which he quitted for Rome, where Boniface IX soon recognized and esteemed his practical sagacity. He was made by Boniface one of his chamberlains, and his ingenuity in extorting money won the Pope’s admiration. Cossa would write to absent bishops, warning them with all friendly concern that the Pope was indignant with them, and intended to transfer them from their present posts to some unknown regions or districts in the hands of the Saracens; after thus exciting their fears, he proffered himself for the office of treasurer of the gifts which they eagerly sent to propitiate the Pope. Besides this, he organized and superintended the vast army of Papal officials who went out for the sale of Indulgences. Boniface rewarded these merits by making him Cardinal in 1402; and when, on the death of Gian Galeazzo Visconti, there was an opportunity of extending the power of the Church in Aemilia, Cardinal Cossa was sent as legate, and established the Pope’s power in Bologna. Thenceforth he ruled the city and the district with firmness and severity. He knew how far to allow a plot to proceed before bringing it to light and punishing its authors; he knew how to involve in charges of treason those who stood in his way; and, while carefully strengthening the fortifications, he pleased the citizens by beautifying their city. He managed to turn to his own purposes the schemes of Alberigo da Barbiano, who was striving to win a principality in the Romagna. When Alberigo pressed on Faenza, Cardinal Cossa bought the signiory for the Church from the terrified Ettore de’ Manfreddi, and occupied the territory. He borrowed the money from the city of Bologna, but did not pay it to Manfreddi, whom in November, 1405, he invited to Faenza, and put to death on the charge of attempted treason. At the same time died Cecco degli Ordelaffi, lord of Forli, leaving a young son to succeed him. Cossa claimed Forli for the Church, on the ground that the grant of Boniface IX had been a personal grant to Cecco. The people of Forli rose and set up their old municipal government. For a while there was war; but in 1406 peace was made, and the Republic of Forli recognized their allegiance to the Roman Church by accepting a Podestà and Legate from Rome. These triumphs abroad improved Cossa’s hold upon Bologna, which he ruled as an independent prince. Complaints were made against him to Innocent VII, but Cossa imprisoned the complainants, and Innocent was too feeble to do more than express his distrust. Cossa openly defied Gregory XII, and refused to admit his nephew Antonio to the possessions of the bishopric of Bologna, which the Pope conferred upon him; he pleaded that he needed them for his own expenses. It was not as a Cardinal, but rather as an Italian prince, that he declared himself in favor of the Council of Pisa, and took the Cardinals under his protection. It was said that he bore a deadly hatred to Ladislas, who had captured and put to death two of his brothers, who had not been so
wise as himself in desisting from piracy in good time. Without this motive of
vindictiveness Cossa had motives of self-interest to induce him to side with the
Cardinals. He became at once the most powerful man amongst them, and his support
was necessary to enable them to carry out their Council. Cossa saw the Papacy
henceforth dependent on himself.

Cossa’s first step was to secure Florence for the side of the Cardinals; and Florence,
which had always been on good terms with the Popes at Avignon, was easily won over.
Early in 1409 a Council of Florentine ecclesiastics determined that they were in
conscience bound to withdraw from allegiance to Gregory; and this determination was
announced to take effect from March 26, in case he did not appear or send
commissioners with full power to the Council of Pisa. Moreover, Cossa succeeded in
establishing firmly a league between Florence and Siena, so as to secure the safety of
the Council against an attack of Ladislas. Had it not been for Cossa’s skill, the Council
might easily have been disturbed by the hostile demonstrations of Ladislas, who was
determined to uphold Gregory as long as possible, and meanwhile to get all he could
from a Pope who had no other refuge than himself. Gregory had sunk to the lowest pitch
of degradation: he sold to Ladislas for the small sum of 25,000 florins the entire States
of the Church, and even Rome itself. After this bargain Ladislas set out for Rome,
intending to proceed into Tuscany and break up the Council. He entered Rome on
March 12, and took up his abode in the Vatican, where he lived in regal state, and
appointed new magistrates for the city. On March 28 he left Rome for Viterbo, but was
driven back by a violent tempest, and again set out on April 2. His standard bore a
doggerel rhyme:

Io son un povero Re, amico della Saccomanni,
Amatore del Popoli, e destruttore della Tiranni.

With this assuring promise he marched northwards and threatened Siena, which
was too strong for assault, having been reinforced by a Florentine garrison. Florence,
true to her policy of opposing the overweening might of any power, resolved to hold by
the Cardinals and further the election of a new Pope, so as to have a barrier against the
outright intentions of Ladislas to seize the States of the Church. Already they had
warned Ladislas that they could not recognize his sovereignty over the States of the
Church; and when he scornfully asked with what troops they would defend themselves,
the Florentine ambassador, Bartolommeo Valori, answered, “With yours”. Ladislas
checked himself, for he knew that the wealth of the Florentine citizens could allure his
followers from his ranks. It was lucky for Cossa’s plans that on April 26 died Alberigo
da Barbiano near Perugia, when on his way to join Ladislas at Rome. Alberigo was full
of indignation against Cossa, who had seized his castles in Romagna, and his death
robbed Ladislas of an important ally. To check the progress of Ladislas, the Florentines
engaged Malatesta de’ Malatesti, lord of Pesaro, who, being far outnumbered by
Ladislas, could only pursue a cautious policy of cutting off supplies and harassing the
advance of the army. When Ladislas found that he could not take Siena, he pressed on
to Arezzo, which also closed its gates against him; thence he made an attempt on
Cortona, which was also unsuccessful. Though master of the country, he could not
capture any fortified place, but only laid waste the fields. The peasants began to mock at
him, and gave him the nickname “Re Guastagrano”, King Waste-the-Corn. A second
attempt on Cortona was more successful, as the citizens, through hatred to their lord,
plotted with Ladislas and opened the gates to his troops on June 3.
Meanwhile the Council was sitting peaceably at Pisa, and the attempt of Ladislas to prevent its assembling had entirely failed. The luckless city of Pisa greeted with joy the meeting of the Council within her walls. Once mistress of the trade in the Mediterranean, and chief in wealth and importance among the Italian cities, she had sunk from her lofty position overshadowed first by Genoa and then by Florence. Internal dissensions accomplished the work of her downfall; she passed from one lord to another till, in 1405, the once haughty city was sold as a chattel to Florence. Florentine rule was not established without a desperate struggle, in which the Pisans were reduced only by famine, and in the hour of their uttermost despair were betrayed by him whom they had chosen leader of their last desperate defence. But, though reduced, the Pisans were not subdued, and their old spirit of independence was still strong within them. Pisa in this condition of enforced quietude, with its many memories of departed glories, was well fitted to be the meeting-place of the Council which was to restore the peace of Christendom.

The building, moreover, in which the Council was held, is the noblest monument which Christendom contains of the aspirations and activity of the mediaeval Church. Nowhere is a more vivid impression gained of the magnificent sobriety and earnestness of the Italian citizen than when first the Cathedral of Pisa strikes upon the eye. Away from the Arno, with its throng of ships and noise of sailors, away from the Exchange where merchants congregate, away from the Piazza where the people meet to manage the affairs of their city, away at the extremest verge of the city, where there is nought that can hinder the full force of their impressiveness, the Pisans raised the noble buildings which tell the sincerity of their piety and the greatness of their municipal life. The stately simplicity of the vast basilica, which was consecrated in 1118, shows how the rich fancy of the Lombards enriched without destroying the purity and severity of the Roman forms. The graceful proportions of the Baptistry, which was begun in 1153, testify the increased freedom of handling among the Pisan architects; and the Campanile is a memorial of their determined spirit and joyous resoluteness in facing unforeseen difficulties. The exquisite Gothic cloister of Giovanni Pisano surrounding the peaceful burying-ground of their forefathers tells of the poetic seriousness of the Pisan people and the freshness of their great architects to receive new impulses. Nor was this all; inside these splendid buildings were stored the treasures of Italy’s earliest and most reflective art. The Pisan school of sculpture put forth all its strength and grace in decorating the great church of the city; the most thoughtful and earnest of the flourishing school of painters at Siena unfolded in allegory on the walls of the Campo Santo the great realities of human life. Such was the place, so full of many and varied associations, to which the assembled Cardinals summoned the representatives of every land in Christendom.

The Council was opened on the Festival of the Annunciation, March 25. The long procession of its members formed in the monastery of S. Michele, and wound slowly through the streets to the cathedral. The number of those who attended the Council was imposing, though all had not arrived at first. There were present twenty-two Cardinals of both obediences, four patriarchs, ten archbishops, and sixty-nine bishops; besides these, thirteen archbishops and eighty-two bishops sent their representatives. Seventy-one abbots were present, a hundred and eighteen sent proctors; there were also sixty priors, the Generals of the great orders of the Dominicans, Franciscans, Carmelites, Augustinians, the Grandmaster of the Knights of S. John, and the prior of the Teutonic Knights; besides a hundred and nine representatives of cathedral and collegiate
Chapters. Ambassadors were sent by Wenzel, King of the Romans; the Kings of England, France, Sicily, Poland, Cyprus; the Dukes of Burgundy and Brabant, Cleves, Bavaria, Pomerania; the Landgraf of Thuringia; the Markgraf of Brandenburg; the Universities of Paris, Toulouse, Angers, Montpellier, Vienna, Prague, Koln, Cracow, Bologna, Cambridge, and Oxford. One hundred and twenty-three doctors of theology and more than two hundred doctors of law are said to have been there. It was computed that altogether ten thousand strangers visited Pisa during the period of the Council.

The first day of the Council, March 25, was devoted to the procession, and opening service. Next day the Council assembled in the long nave of the cathedral. After mass a sermon was preached by the Cardinal of Milan; then all knelt in silent prayer, which was followed by a Litany, and then the assembly on their knees raised through the vaulted roof the strain of the hymn “Veni Creator”. The business of the Council then began, under the presidency of Guy Malésec, Cardinal of Poitiers, who was both venerable from his age and from the fact that he was the only Cardinal who had been created before the outbreak of the Schism. The Archbishop of Pisa, in behalf of the Council, read a solemn profession of faith, and, the better to assert its orthodoxy, ended with a declaration that it firmly held “that every heretic or schismatic must share with the devil and his angels the burning of eternal fire, unless before the end of this life he be restored to the Catholic Church”. The Council then elected its officials — marshals, auditors, advocates, promoters, notaries — who took the oaths of office. Immediately one of the advocates, Simon of Perugia, demanded that the letters of summons addressed to the two rival Popes be read. When this ceremony had been gone through, he asked that steps be taken to discover whether these men, whom he nicknamed Benefictus and Errorius, had been guilty of contumacy. With a ridiculous imitation of the forms of a law-court, which had no relevancy to the present matter, two of the Cardinals, accompanied by an archbishop, a bishop, and several officials, advanced to the great doors of the cathedral, which were thrown open. Standing on the steps, they summoned the two Popes, and enquired of the gaping crowd if they had seen in the city any of the household of either of them. Then they solemnly returned, and informed the Council that no one had answered to their summons. The advocate thereupon demanded that they should be declared contumacious. The proposition was submitted by the President to the other Cardinals, who gave their voices for delay until the morrow. The other members signified their assent by cries of “Placet, placet”, and the session came to an end. Next day the same formalities were repeated with the same result, and the third session was fixed for March 30. After a third fruitless summons, the rival Popes were declared contumacious; the one Cardinal still adhering to Gregory and the three who remained with Benedict were called upon to be present at the next session, when further steps were to be taken against Gregory and Benedict if they still refused to appear. To give them time to do so, the day of meeting was fixed for April 15.

It was well for the Council to delay that its members might confer privately and assure themselves of the basis upon which their proceedings were to rest. It was one thing to wish to remedy the evils of the Schism; it was another thing to settle the nature of the authority by which the Schism was to be brought to an end. The Papal monarchy had so entirely absorbed all the powers of the Church that its old mechanism had disappeared; and the very principles upon which it had rested were a matter of uncertainty. Opinions were eagerly sought upon this point. Pamphlets were freely published, and different views were set forward which enable us to judge of the
difficulties in the way of obtaining the unanimity which was necessary before active steps could be taken.

It is worthwhile to notice some of the principal views by which the freedom of conciliar action was vindicated. Cossa caused the University of Bologna to express its opinion, which it did with the cautious proviso that, if it said anything deviating from the traditions of the Church, it was to be counted as unsaid. It took for its starting-point the proposition that schism of long duration passes into heresy. A Pope elected under an oath to do away with the Schism, if he fail, nourishes heresy; and those subject to him are therefore bound to withdraw their allegiance, and seek a true Pope who will extirpate the Schism. If the Cardinals, whose chief duty it is, do not call a Council for that purpose, provincial synods and princes may take such steps as they think wise in the matter. This opinion, founded on canon law, was technical and formal, and admitted of technical and formal answer. It seems to have been supplemented at the time of its publication by a statement of more general principles deduced from the nature of the Church itself, such as had been insisted upon by the University of Paris. True Cardinals represent the Universal Church, in electing a Pope, and in all questions that concern the unity of the Church; for the object of the election of a Pope is to embody that unity; all obligations that they imposed in making an election they imposed in the name of the Universal Church, and are bound to see them carried out, otherwise they incur the guilt of heresy. This additional opinion, which is compelled to fall back upon general principles, still does so with caution, and shows an unwillingness to go further than was necessary to justify technically the summons of a Council under existing circumstances. Its object is to show the existence of a legal obligation on the Cardinals to proceed in the way which they had chosen. The Italian mind was clearly not much interested in the question. It was from France that the conciliar movement came, and it was French intellect which advocated General Councils as a recurrence to primitive antiquity.

Peter d'Ailly and Jean Gerson codified their opinions for the good of the Pisan fathers, and in their utterances we see the advance of opposition to the principles of the Papal monarchy which the Schism had brought about. D'Ailly was loth to cut himself entirely off from obedience of Peter to Benedict, but he set the unity of the Church above personal feeling. The Head of the Church, he writes, is Christ; and in unity with Him, not necessarily with the Pope, does the unity of the Church consist. From Christ its Head the Church has the authority to come together or summon a Council to preserve its unity; for Christ said, “Where two or three are gathered together in My name, there am I in the midst”; He said not “in the name of Peter”, or “in the name of the Pope”, but “in My name”. Moreover, the law of nature prompts every living body to gather together its members and resist its own division or destruction. The primitive Church, as may be seen in the Acts of the Apostles, used this power of assembling Councils; and in the Council of Jerusalem it was not Peter, but James, who presided. With the growth of the Church this power was reasonably limited for the sake of order, so that Councils were not called without the Pope's authority; but this limitation did not abolish the power which was inherent in the Church itself, and which in cases of necessity it was bound to use. It is true that positive laws of the Church are opposed to this conclusion; but in the present necessity they must be broadly construed, without affecting the rights of the Pope when there is one canonical Pope universally recognized. To get over the existing difficulty a General Council may be called, not only by the Cardinals, but by any faithful men who have the power. Before this Council the rival Popes are bound to appear, or, better, to send their proctors, and, if necessary, abdicate their position to
promote the unity of the Church. If they refuse, the Council can take action against them as promoters of schism, and proceed to a new election, which, however, would not be expedient unless the whole of Christendom were likely to agree to it.

These conclusions of D'Ailly were still further strengthened by a tractate of Gerson on the “Unity of the Church”, which he sent from Paris before he was able personally to join the Council. In this he examines all the objections on the ground of canon law which can be raised against the Council. He asserts that the unity of the Church to one Vicar of Christ need not be procured by a literal observance of the terms or ceremonies of positive law, but by the wider equity of a Council, in which resides the power of interpreting positive law and adapting it to the great end of promoting unity. The unity of the Church depends on divine law, natural law, canon law, and municipal law; but the last two must in cases of emergency be interpreted by the first two. A case has now arisen in which neither canon law nor municipal law can avail. The Council, therefore, must use divine law and natural law to interpret them, but must do so with discretion and moderation, so as not to injure their stability. Gerson agrees with D'Ailly in urging that, unless the Council be unanimous about proceeding to a new election, such a course be deferred. Moreover, as the search for unity must be undertaken with prayers and penance, since the Schism has its origin in sin, so must unity itself be established by a reformation of the Church in head and members, lest worse befall.

In these utterances of D'Ailly and Gerson we see the root of all the efforts after reform which formed the ideal of thinking men for the next century and a half. We find ideas of the nature of the Church and the position of the Papacy which are founded on broad principles of historical fact and natural right. These ideas might long have been discussed as abstract problems in a few learned circles; but the Schism made them articles of popular belief in every country. One great result of the Schism was that it forced men to enquire into matters which otherwise would never have been investigated. Every Christian was driven to form an opinion on a subject of vital interest to Christendom. The letters of the rival Popes and the statements of their opponents were widely circulated and eagerly discussed. All parties appealed to the people, and felt that their claims must rest finally on popular assent. Abstruse questions, that ordinarily were discussed by scholars in the closet, were now noised abroad on the housetop.

Schoolmen and legists might discuss; but it was clear that the Pisan Council must owe its power to the universality of its acceptance. It was true that the greater part of the Christian world had declared its allegiance, but some powers still held aloof. The Spanish kingdoms were true to the obedience of Benedict. Ladislas would not give up so useful an instrument as Gregory. The Northern nations stood aloof, as did Sigismund of Hungary. Venice maintained an attitude of cautious neutrality; and Carlo Malatesta, lord of Romagna, still upheld Gregory. In Germany Rupert opposed the Council which his rival Wenzel supported. When the Council met for its fourth session, on April 15, it had to face the existence of opposition to its authority. Four ambassadors from Rupert, the German King, attended the Council; but, though all were ecclesiastics, they did not appear in their vestments, nor did they take their seats among the others. As soon as the opening ceremonies were over, one of them, the Bishop of Verdun, rose, and in a lengthy speech propounded twenty-two objections to the Council, all of which were of a narrow and technical character, mostly founded on an acute criticism of the terms of the summons to the Council, and difficulties concerning its dates. The ambassadors were requested to put their objections in writing, which they did the next day; and April 24
was fixed for the next session, when an answer would be given them. But the ambassadors did not think it worthwhile to await an answer. On April 21, which was a Sunday, they attended mass in the cathedral, and heard a sermon preached in refutation of their statements; the same evening they hurriedly left Pisa, after lodging an appeal from the Council to a future Council to be convoked by Gregory.

In the same week there came to Pisa, Carlo Malatesta, lord of Rimini, in whose dominions Gregory had taken shelter. Carlo had already sought to make terms between Gregory and the Council, and had proposed a change of the place of the Council to Bologna, Mantua, or Forli, to any of which Gregory would promise to come. The Cardinals had answered that, having summoned the Council to Pisa, they were no longer free to change the place. Now Carlo came to Pisa to try and make peace. The Cardinals suggested that, if Gregory would not abdicate, Carlo should seize his person as a schismatic and heretic. But Carlo was too honorable to entertain the suggestion; he was himself a learned and eloquent man of upright character, and answered that, what he could do lawfully, he was ready to do, but he could use no violence. He returned to Rimini on April 26, and informed Gregory of the state of affairs at Pisa; he added that, unless the Pope’s righteousness exceeded the righteousness of the Pharisees, the Church would never have peace. Gregory answered that difficulties beset him on every side — if he abdicated, what was to become of his Cardinals and of King Ladislas? if he did not, great danger beset the Church; his only practical step was to hasten the meeting of the Council which he had summoned.

At Pisa the fifth session of the Council was held on April 24. An advocate read a long statement, which lasted for three hours, of the charges against the two Popes, and demanded that they should be adjudged heretical, and deprived of their office. This document, which was drawn up by the Cardinals, glided gently over the blame which they themselves had incurred by making their elections. It insisted on the pains which they had taken to induce the Popes to yield, the bodily terror in which they stood of the violent temper of the Popes, and the persistent obstinacy shown in neglecting their advice. The Council appointed commissioners to examine witnesses as to the truth of the statements contained in the thirty-eight charges so preferred. The same day arrived in Pisa the ambassadors of the King of France, headed by Simon Cramaud, Patriarch of Alexandria, and soon after came the English ambassadors, headed by Robert Hallam, Bishop of Salisbury. The next session, on April 30, seems to have been spent in welcoming them. Cramaud presided, and Hallam addressed the Council, urging them to united action, and assuring them of the goodwill of the English King towards their efforts to restore unity. The Bishop’s speech lasted so long that nothing else could be done that day.

At the seventh session, May 4, a learned legist of Bologna, Piero d'Anchorano, rose to answer the objections made by Rupert’s ambassadors. This he did with much legal skill and acuteness; but his argument was founded on the assumption that, by the Schism, the Church was without a head, and that in the vacancy the Cardinals were the rightful administrators of the Papacy. The legal mind could not advance beyond the basis of law, which only opened up interminable questions of dispute. We see, as we look through the objections of Rupert’s ambassadors and the answers of D’Anchorano, that the controversy on legal grounds might be protracted endlessly. Only by an adoption of the theoretical grounds of D’Ailly and Gerson — that the supreme power vested in the Church itself, which must act according to the laws of God and nature in cases of emergency — could the Council be justified. It is not to be wondered at that the
legal mind of the canonists, which saw in the Papal monarchy over the Church the only foundation of law and order, shrank from any assertion that might affect the basis of this authority. Yet without some such assertion the authority of the Council could not be established, and the Schism could not be brought to an end.

The eighth session, on May 10, brought one of these technical difficulties to light. The advocate demanded a decree that the union of the two Colleges had been duly and canonically effected. On this the Bishop of Salisbury remarked that he did not understand how the two Colleges were on the same footing, seeing that Gregory’s had formally withdrawn their obedience, while Benedict’s had not. It was suggested that a decree be passed, that it was lawful, and also was a duty, for everyone to withdraw from both Popes since the time when it became clear that they had no intention of promoting the unity of the Church by common abdication. To this some of the Cardinals, especially those of Poitiers and Albano, demurred; but the Council affirmed it by cries of “Placet”. Then the President — the Patriarch of Alexandria — read out a decree of the Council according to the advocate’s demand, declaring approval of the union of the two Colleges, and affirming the Council to be duly assembled as representative of the Universal Church, and to have authority to decide all questions concerning the Schism and the restoration of unity.

Before the next session, on May 17, the Cardinals had been won over to accept the decree brought forward at the last session declaring the withdrawal of allegiance from both Popes: and the powers of the commissioners who had been appointed to examine witnesses about the charges against the Popes were extended, to allow them to get through their work more quickly. In the tenth and eleventh sessions, May 22 and 23, the articles against the two Popes were read, and their truth was attested by the Archbishop of Pisa, who declared each of them to be true and notorious, and mentioned in the case of each the number of witnesses by whose testimony was established. On the same day Bulls from Benedict were brought to his Cardinals, who at first refused to receive them; but the Cardinal of Milan at length opened them, at the instigation of Simon Cramaud. The Bulls contained an inhibition to proceed to a fresh election, and pronounced excommunication against all who should withdraw from obedience to the Roman See. These Bulls of Benedict, in the existing temper of the Council, were regarded as more convincing than many witnesses of his stubbornness and incapacity. At last, in the twelfth session, on May 25, Gregory and Benedict were declared contumacious, and the charges against them were pronounced notoriously true.

On May 28 the doctors of theology who were present at the Council, to the number of a hundred and twenty, gave their opinions that the two Popes were schismatics and heretics, and might be excommunicated and deprived of their rights. At the session next day, Dr. Pierre Plaoul spoke in the name of the University of Paris, which, he said, was not only a representative of the French kingdom, but had scholars from England, Germany, and Italy by whose co-operation its opinions were formed. He declared its view to be, that the Church stood above the two claimants of the Papal throne, who were both heretical and schismatic; the same opinion was held by the Universities of Angers, Toulouse, and Orleans. Similar opinions were also expressed on behalf of the Universities of Bologna and Florence. On June 1 the Archbishop of Pisa read a summary of the articles against the two Popes and the evidence on which they were founded. Finally, on June 5, the Patriarch of Alexandria read the sentence of deposition against the two Popes as schismatics and heretics; all the faithful were absolved from allegiance to them and their censures were declared of no effect. The sentence was read
before the open doors to the assembled crowd, and was received with rejoicing. The magistrates proclaimed it with the sound of trumpets and ordered a universal holiday. The bells of the cathedral pealed out joyously, and each church took up the peal, which spread from village to village, so that in four hours’ time the news was carried in this way to Florence.

The Council was not, however, very sure of its own position in spite of its lofty pretensions, if we may judge from the fact that, in the same session, it prohibited any of its members to depart till they had signed the decree of deposition. It seems to have felt that its authority, after all, would depend upon its numerical strength and unanimity. In the same spirit, at the next session, on June 10, letters were sent to the communities and lords of the patriarchate of Aquileia, where Gregory had taken refuge, requiring them to use all diligence to restrain Gregory from holding a council. At the same time the Cardinal of Chalant, who had at length departed from Benedict, was, on the intercession of the Cardinal of Albano, allowed in silence to take his seat in the Council.

The existing Popes had been set aside by the authority of the Council; there remained the important question how a new Pope was to be obtained. The proceedings of the Council really rested on popular assent; a disputed succession to the Papal monarchy had led to the assembling of an ecclesiastical parliament to end the miseries of civil war. The authority of this parliament was necessary to put down the two claimants to the Papal throne; but the ecclesiastical hierarchy was anxious to check any movement towards democracy. The Cardinals could elect a Pope, but could not depose one. They were driven to have recourse to a Council, as the only means of getting rid of the two claimants for the Headship of the Church; but they were anxious that the pretensions of the Council should extend no further. Now that the rival Popes were gone, the Cardinals were prepared to revive the old custom, and proceed quietly to the election of a new Pope. With a view of giving assurance to the Council, and preventing any interference in the election to the Papacy, the Cardinals, in the session on June 10, caused a paper to be read by the Archbishop of Pisa, in which they bound themselves, in case any one of them should be elected Pope, not to dissolve the Council until a “due, reasonable, and sufficient reform of the Church, in head and members, had been brought about”. There were, in fact, different opinions about the procedure in the election of a new Pope. Some were of opinion that, as the Cardinals had been created during the Schism, an election by the Council would be the best way of restoring legitimacy. But this seemed too revolutionary; and as a compromise, the representatives of the University of Paris urged that the Council should authorize the Cardinals to proceed to an election, and should provide that a two-thirds majority of each College should be required. On the necessity of such an authorization there was a difference of opinion even among the French prelates; nevertheless, at the next session, on June 14, the Patriarch of Alexandria read an authorization of the Council without submitting the question to a vote. An oath was administered to the city magistrates that they would secure peace and order during the election.

Ambassadors from the King of Aragon, who had just arrived, with difficulty obtained a hearing from the Council, whose interest now lay entirely in the election of a new Pope. They demanded that the envoys from Benedict’s Council of Perpignan should be heard by the Council; and received answer that it was now late in the day, and was the eve of the Conclave. Commissioners were, however, appointed to confer with them, before whom they appeared next day, in the church of S. Martin, but were received with scant courtesy. The Bull of deposition was read to them, and when the
Archbishop of Tarragona persisted in calling himself the envoy of Pope Benedict, there was a cry, “You are an envoy of a heretic and a schismatic”. A tumult arose, and the declaration of the city magistrates that they could not, in accordance with their oath, allow anything which might disturb the Council, rendered it useless for the envoys to stay longer. They asked for a safe-conduct to go and confer with Gregory about peace; but were told by Cardinal Cossa that, if they entered the district where he was legate, he would have them burned, safe-conduct or no. The envoys in fear left the city. In this matter the Council failed to act either with dignity or fairness. It is true that they were wearied with fruitless embassies to the recalcitrant Popes; it is true that this embassy came late, and that the Council had already decided on a course of conduct which no embassy could affect. Still the restoration of unity to the Church could only be brought about by tact, by conciliation, by imposing dignity; it was necessary to prove the two Popes hopelessly in the wrong, and leave them nothing to which they could appeal in their own defence. The ambassador of the King of Aragon informed the Patriarch afterwards that they had come with powers to tender Benedict’s resignation, even though Gregory did not resign. A chance of reconciliation had been thrown away by the precipitate action of the Cardinals just at the last.

The Cardinals were bent on the new election, and on June 15 they entered into Conclave in the Archbishop’s palace. There were ten Cardinals of Benedict’s obedience, fourteen of Gregory’s. There was a controversy whether a term should be set, within which the Cardinals should make an election, or the right of election should pass to the Council; but it was agreed to leave the Cardinals full liberty. Fears were entertained lest the election should be long deferred; but on June 26 it was announced that the unanimous choice of the Cardinals had fallen on Peter Philargi, Cardinal of Milan. Of the proceedings in the Conclave we know nothing for certain. The Cardinals must have felt that they had a difficult task before them: it was necessary to elect someone who would awaken no national jealousy, and who would be capable of dealing energetically with the disturbances in the Papal States. It is said that at first their thoughts turned upon the vigorous Legate of Bologna, Baldassare Cossa. But Cossa was alive to the difficulties which one so deeply concerned in Italian politics would have to face. He besought them to choose Philargi instead of himself, as being a man of learning and of stainless character, a Greek by birth, who would be a compromise between contending nationalities, and who had no relatives whom he could wish to aggrandize at the expense of the Church. He promised that he himself would do all in his power to recover from usurpers the possessions of the Holy See. The Cardinals agreed, and elected Philargi, who was over seventy years of age, and seemed to promise only a short tenure of office.

Philargi’s election was hailed with joy. The bells were rung, the new Pope was carried to the cathedral and there enthroned. He took the name of Alexander V. Everyone was fairly satisfied with his election, as being a judicious compromise which could offend no one. Born of a humble family in Crete, Peter Philargi knew neither father nor mother. As a beggar-boy in the street, he was taken and educated by a friar minor. After his admission into the Franciscan order, he went into Italy, and thence proceeded as a student to the Universities of Oxford and Paris, where he gained great reputation for his theological knowledge. Returning into Lombardy, he won the confidence of Giovanni Visconti, lord of Milan, and was by him made tutor of his sons. Promotion rapidly followed; he was made Bishop of Vicenza, then of Novara, next Archbishop of Milan; Innocent VII created him Cardinal, and his authority in North
Italy had been of great service in arranging the preliminaries of the Council. He was universally popular for his affability, kindliness, and munificence; to the benefits of which everyone hastened at once to put in a claim.

On July 1 the new Pope preached before the Council, and then the Cardinal of Bologna (Cossa) read in his behalf decrees approving of everything that had been done by the Cardinals from May, 1408, up to the beginning of the Council, and also uniting the two Colleges into one, so that there should be no more question who were true Cardinals and who were not. Whichever was the true College, as all had been unanimously in Alexander’s election, he was indisputably a true Pope, and could supply all defects either of law or fact. On July 7, was the solemn coronation of the Pope, and, on July 10, came ambassadors from Florence and Siena, who delivered complimentary speeches. The Sienese envoy urged the Pope to hasten his return to Rome, whither the way now lay open by the retreat of Ladislas.

In fact, now that a Pope was elected, political motives rapidly began to outweigh ecclesiastical. Cossa, who was the Pope’s chief adviser, pined to find a field for his adventurous spirit in the recovery of the States of the Church. Louis of Anjou hastened to Pisa in hopes that this change in the Papacy might bring again into prominence his claims on the Neapolitan crown. It was true that the Cardinals had bound themselves before the election that the Pope should proceed at once to a reform of the Church; but this was a vague undertaking, and it was hard to know how to begin to carry it out. The times were stirring, and the Pope, if he were to establish himself, must show a power of vigorous action.

The session which was to begin the reform of the Church had been fixed for July 15; but the Cardinals wavered, and on the excuse of the Pope's illness it was put off till the 20th, the 24th, and finally the 27th. Then, as the result of many conferences between the Cardinals and the Council, the Archbishop of Pisa declared, in the Pope’s name, that he renounced all pecuniary claims that had been accruing during the vacancy up to the day of his election, and gave up reservations of the goods of deceased prelates, and claims to the revenues of vacant benefices. The Cardinals were asked to do the same as regarded their claims, and all, except the Cardinals of Albano and Naples, assented. A series of decrees were passed securing in their benefices and possessions all who adhered to the Council, confirming all their acts, and declaring that a General Council was to be summoned by the Pope or his successor in three years — that is, in the month of April, 1412. In the last session, on August 7, a few trivial decrees were promulgated directing the holding of diocesan and provincial synods and chapters of monks. Plenary absolution, which was to avail even in the hour of death, was given to all who had attended the Council, and to their attendants. Finally the Pope declared his intention of reforming the Church in head and members. Much had already been done, but more remained, which, owing to the departure of prelates and ambassadors, could not now be undertaken. The Pope therefore deferred further reforms to the future Council, which was to be regarded as a continuation of the present one.

There were some members of the Council who wished to make their voice heard on the question of reform. The prelates and proctors of England, France, Germany, Poland, Bohemia, and Provence presented to the Pope a list of grievances to which they called his attention, as deviating from the old laws and customs of the Church. They enumerated translations of bishops against their will, Papal reservations and provisions, destruction of the rights of patronage of bishops and chapters, the exaction of first-fruits
and tenths, grants of exemptions from the visitatorial power of bishops, the excessive liberty of appeal to the Pope in cases which had not been heard in the inferior courts. They petitioned for a remission of debts to the Papal Camera, by which many churches were entirely overwhelmed, and for a simplification of the rules of the Papal Chancery, which were opposed to the common law, and baffled even the learned. They prayed that the Pope would not rashly alienate nor mortgage the possessions of the Roman See. To these requests Alexander V returned fair answers, except in the matter of appeals, about which he only said that he would consider further. The promise of a future Council enabled the Pope to put aside for the present the question of reform; and the greed of the chief members of the Council to seek their own promotion from a Pope whose liberality and kindliness were well known, made them indifferent to anything beyond their own interest. The Patriarch of Alexandria, who had been the leader of the Council, was busily engaged in seeking to obtain his own nomination to the archbishopric of Rheims, which had just fallen vacant.

The members of the Council of Pisa returned home convinced that they had at length given peace to the Church, and had healed the long Schism. They had no doubt that their Pope would prevail, and that the others would sink into oblivion. Benedict XIII had never been very warmly supported by Aragon: after protesting against the Council of Pisa and its proceedings, he retired to the rocky fortress of Peñiscola, on the coast, and there shut himself up for safety. Gregory XII held a council in opposition to that at Pisa at Cividale, which was but scantily attended. However, it declared the election of Alexander V to be null and void (August 22), and before its dissolution, Gregory, on September 5, made a magnanimous offer to abdicate provided Benedict and Alexander would do the same; he offered to meet them for this purpose at any place which might be agreed upon by Rupert, Sigismund, and Ladislas. Such an offer might be specious, but was clearly illusory; Rupert, Sigismund, and Ladislas were not at all likely to agree in the choice of a place, and if they did, there was no reason to suppose that Gregory’s rivals would abide by their decision. But Gregory himself was in sore straits where to turn when his shadowy council was dissolved. The Patriarch of Aquileia was hostile to him, and he had difficulty in escaping safely from Cividale; at last, in disguise, he managed to make his way to the coast, and take refuge in two galleys of Ladislas, which conveyed him to Gaeta, where he settled for a time.

The adherents of Benedict and Gregory might be few, but so long as there were any the object of the Council had failed. It had met to restore unity to the Church, but did not succeed in doing so. In fact, we are driven to admit that the Council scarcely proceeded with the care, discretion, or singleness of purpose which were necessary to enable it to perform the duty which it had undertaken. Its intention from the beginning seems to have been to over-ride, not to conciliate, the contending Popes. In the first session the advocate of the Council was allowed to call them by the derisive names of Benefictus and Errorius. The Council entirely identified itself with the Cardinals, and accepted their procedure as its own. It did not enter into negotiations with the Popes, nor send to invite their presence; but it assumed at once that the summons of the Cardinals was one which the Popes were bound to obey, and declared them contumacious for their refusal. It could hardly have been expected that the Popes would submit themselves at once to the behest of their rebellious Cardinals. If the Council had taken up a position of its own, which could have been supported by all moderate men, it might have exerted such influence on the Popes themselves or their supporters as to have reduced them to submission. Even if this had failed, the Council should have remembered that its
avowed object was the restoration of the outward unity of the Church; and it was not possible that the authority of a Council irregularly convoked should meet with such universal acceptance, that its sentence of deposition would be received with entire unanimity by the whole Church. Both the Popes were old; a new election could not be far removed. Judicious negotiations might have provided satisfactory measures to be taken when a vacancy occurred: it would have been safer to have ended the Schism surely than to have aimed at ending it speedily.

Moreover the Council did not sit long enough nor discuss matters with sufficient freedom to make its basis sure. The teaching of D'Ailly and Gerson had done much to justify the assembly of a Council as an extraordinary step due to necessity. But the Council proceeded to depose the Popes without making out very clearly its right to do so. D'Anchorano had grounded its right on the assertion that the two Popes, having failed to fulfill their promises to resign for the sake of promoting unity, had become schismatics and heretics. But this view was by no means universally accepted, nor did any very definite view prevail. We find next year that the Cardinal of Bari, before going on an embassy to Spain, submitted to Alexander V's successor thirty-four objections which might be taken to the proceedings of the Council, and requested that he might be provided beforehand by the University of Bologna with answers wherewith to meet them. The Council of Constance, by accepting Gregory's resignation and negotiating for that of Benedict, tacitly confessed that their deposition by the Council of Pisa could not be regarded as lawful. The Council of Pisa has been regarded as of dubious authority, very greatly, no doubt, owing to its want of success. We cannot wonder that an assembly which dealt so hastily and so precipitately with difficult and dangerous questions should fail to obtain a permanent solution. The theory of the sovereignty of the Church, as against the sovereignty of the Pope, had been so ardently advocated by French theologians, that it was accepted at Pisa as sufficient for all purposes without due explanation or consideration. The Council forgot that the decisions of canonists and theologians are not at once universally accepted. If all Europe had been unanimous in withdrawing from the obedience of the rival Popes, the decision of the Council might have been acted upon as a means of obtaining a new settlement. As it was, there were too many political motives involved in upholding the existing claimants to make it possible that the Council's Pope should receive that universal acceptance which alone could bring the Schism to an end.
CHAPTER VII.
ALEXANDER V.
1409-1410.

It is not often that, amidst the scanty records from which mediaeval history has to be laboriously pieced together, we find anything that brings before us the more intimate facts of mediaeval life. Someone, however, of the Fathers assembled at Pisa luckily employed his spare time after the election of Alexander V in drawing out an account of the Papal household — perhaps he thought that Alexander was inexperienced and might err through want of knowledge, as he could not inherit the establishment of a predecessor, but would have to form his own anew. It is worthwhile to turn from more lofty matters, and consider the composition of a household at this time.

First amongst the officers of the household come the Chamberlains, who are of three classes; some honorary; some prelates, generally four, who are intimate with the Pope, read the Hours with him, and serve at Mass; some domestics, generally two, who sleep in his chamber and wait upon him. Of the prelates one has charge of the Pope’s private letters and receives his instructions about the answers to be given; another has the care of the Pope’s jewels; a third of the wardrobe; a fourth of the medicines and drugs. The prelates discharge the duties of their office without salary except in cases when they are poor. The domestic chamberlains have board for themselves and two servants, and have an underling to sweep the rooms and do the dirty work. Besides these, two Doorkeepers have charge of the Audience Chamber, where they generally sleep.

Next in importance is the Controller of the Household, who receives the Pope’s orders about his meals and entertainments, issues invitations, and orders the service of the banquet. Every night he receives the keys of the palace when the gates are shut, and lays them on the table at the Pope’s supper hour. Every night also he receives and examines the accounts of all subordinate officials, which, after receiving his signature, are presented weekly at the Treasury. He is generally responsible for the order and decorum of the household, and has under him a clerk and one or two servants. The Pope’s personal attendants are Squires of Honor, generally eight or ten in number, who receive pay or allowances, and frequently hold some other office. For each article consumed in the household there is a separate department. Two ecclesiastics, each with two servants under him, hold office over the Bakery, and provide bread and fruit, have the care of the table linen, knives, forks, and salt-cellars, and have the duty of laying the table. In like manner two ecclesiastics, each with two inferiors, discharge the office of Butler, provide the wines, keep the cellar books, and take charge of the drinking-vessels. One ecclesiastic is enough to have charge over the water, and the number of his subordinates varies according to the difficulties of obtaining it; his office extends to the care of wells and their cleansing. Another ecclesiastic, with two inferiors, has charge of the candles and candlesticks and all that concerns the lighting of the palace. Another officer has care of the beds and tapestries; he has to arrange seats at consistories, and see to the proper covering of the Pope’s chair at church and elsewhere. The Keeper of the Plate has the arduous duty of seeing that the plates and dishes are kept clean and are
not stolen; every day after dinner the gates of the palace are kept closed until he has
counted the dishes and has certified that all are there. The Master of the Kitchen
supervises all the cooking arrangements; the Steward does the marketing and hands
over the produce to the Keeper of the Larder, who also receives all presents of game and
such like that are made to the Pope. The Master of the Hall arranges the tables, places
the guests in order, and sees that they are properly served.

Besides these officers the Papal household contains a Master of the Works to see
after the repairs of the palace; a Confessor, whose duty it is to regulate the services in
the chapel and to vest the Pope; a Master of the Palace, generally a Dominican Friar,
who lectures on Theology and proposes questions at the Pope’s bidding; an Almoner;
and a Choir-master for the chapel services. Cooks, door-keepers, physicians, registrars,
messengers, and grooms make up the remainder of the Pope’s retinue. We do not find in
these details any trace of undue luxury or extravagance. Many of these officials were
without salaries; and although the cost of the household must have been considerable,
yet it was not larger than any noble of the period would have felt requisite.

The regulation of his household may have employed Alexander V for some little
time at Pisa; but he was soon reminded of his political duties by the arrival of Louis of
Anjou, whose claims on Naples he at once sanctioned. Cossa saw that the vital matter
for the new Pope was the possession of the city of Rome; it was also the great question
of Italian politics. The overweening power of Ladislas awoke universal alarm, and the
political feebleness of Gregory XII had been the chief reason why Italy had so readily
abandoned him. The cause of the Council’s Pope meant opposition to Neapolitan
domination, and a strong party gathered round Alexander V.

Cossa strengthened his league with Florence and Siena by the admission of Louis
of Anjou, and the confederates proposed to march at once against Ladislas, who had
retired from Cortona to Naples, leaving Paolo Orsini to guard the places which he had
seized. In September, the allied army under the command of the Florentine general,
Malatesta dei Malatesti, marched towards Rome. The prophecy of the Florentine
ambassador to Ladislas that they would overcome him with his own troops proved true.
Paolo Orsini deserted from Ladislas, and his defection opened the road into the States of
the Church. Orvieto, Montefiascone, Viterbo, and other places opened their gates, and
the allied army appeared before Rome on October 1. But Ladislas had taken measures to
keep down the Romans; many citizens opposed to his interests had been exiled, and the
Neapolitan faction was strong in the city. The allies gained possession of the Vatican,
and the Castle of S. Angelo hoisted the flag of Alexander V; but Rome itself, where the
Count of Troja was in command, offered a vigorous resistance. On October 10, the
allies found themselves forced to quit the Leonine city and take up their position at
Monte Rotondo. Louis of Anjou and Cossa returned to Pisa, leaving the siege in the
hands of Malatesta. After a conference with the Pope Louis went off hurriedly to
Provence to raise more money. The fortune of Ladislas was still in the ascendant, and if
he had boldly marched to Rome with reinforcements he might have maintained his hold
upon the city.

On December 28, Malatesta advanced with a portion of his army to S. Lorenzo
outside the walls; his men advanced to the gate calling to the people, “Men of Rome,
how is it that you do not cry: The Church and the People?”. At the same time Paolo
Orsini advanced again into the Leonine city. Attacked on both sides, the Count of Troja
determined to cut off his assailants when thus divided. On December 29, he fell upon
Paolo Orsini, but was defeated at the Porta Septimiana. Malatesta had been plotting with a party inside the walls in favor of Alexander; at the first failure of the Neapolitans they rose against them with cries of “Viva lo Popolo e la Chiesa”. On January 1, 1410, Paolo Orsini entered the city by the Ponte dei Judei, and was hailed by the people, who were glad to free themselves from the Neapolitan rule, and asserted their liberties by electing their own magistrates. On January 5, the Capitol also surrendered; but the strong towers by the gates still held out for Ladislas, and were only taken after a regular siege. The tower by the Porta Maggiore fell on February 15; and the capture of the Ponte Molle, on May 1, destroyed the last remnant of the Neapolitan dominion.

Meanwhile Alexander V stayed for some time at Pisa, where, on November 1, 1409, he issued a summons to Ladislas to appear and answer all the charges made against him of faithlessness to his duty as a vassal of the Church. Driven to leave Pisa by the outbreak of a pestilence he retired to Prato, and thence to Pistoia. On the news of the capture of Rome the Florentines at once sent an embassy begging the Pope to hasten to Rome, and so assure the wavering allegiance of the neighboring cities in the States of the Church. The Sienese also offered their city as a residence for the Pope on his way. But Alexander V was entirely in the hands of Cossa, who ruled Pope and Cardinals alike. The Florentines and Sienese seem to have been afraid of the growing power of Cossa, and wished to see the Pope emancipated from his hands. But their efforts were useless. Alexander answered that he would go to Rome when things were more settled; meanwhile, Cossa would go there in his stead, and he himself would reside at Bologna for the present. Cossa succeeded in making himself the most important man in Rome, and kept the Pope in his power by settling the Curia at Bologna, whither Alexander went on January 12, 1410, and took up his abode in the Palace of the Anziani. On February 12, came an embassy from the Romans, headed by the Count of Tagliacozzo, bringing the keys and banner of the city to the Pope, and praying him to take up his residence in Rome. The Florentines added their entreaties to those of the Romans; but the influence of Cossa, and perhaps the Pope's own sense of growing physical weakness, kept him still at Bologna. He received from the Roman envoys the symbols of his dominion over Rome, and confirmed the liberties of the city in a charter granted on March 1. But he was never to take possession of Rome itself; at the end of April he sickened, and it was clear that his end Death was near.

On his death-bed he told the Cardinals the touching story of the poverty of his early life, and laid before them the results of his mature wisdom. It was the usual lesson which life always teaches the old, and which the young never learn save by experience — the lesson, “Seek peace and ensue it”. He addressed his Cardinals on the text, “Peace I leave with you, my peace I give unto you”; he declared his belief in the canonicity of the Council of Pisa, and in his own position as Pope; he besought them by pacific measures to bring about the unity of the Church. The Cardinals wept at the touching words of the dying Pope, but their conduct shows that they did not look forward to gain peace save by the sword. On May 3, Alexander V died, and was buried in the Church of S. Francesco at Bologna, the church of the Order to which he owed so much, and which he loved so well.

The one thing which Alexander V did in the matters of the Church was to issue a Bull in favor of the Friars, who had hailed with joy his elevation to the Papacy, and lost no time in besieging him with their requests. The Mendicant Orders had been growing in importance and power since the days of Francis and Dominic. The Papacy, grateful for their aid, had constantly increased their privileges at the expense of the old
machinery of the ecclesiastical system. The Friars, supported by the Papal authority, infringed the rights of parish priests, and were exempt from any Episcopal supervision. They preached, heard confessions, administered the sacraments, performed funerals wherever they chose, and threatened entirely to supersede the old parochial system. Naturally men preferred to confess to a wandering Friar whom they had never seen before and hoped never to see again, rather than to their parish priest whose rebukes and admonitions might follow them at times when the spirit of contrition was not so strong within them. It was natural that bishops and clergy should fight for their very existence against the usurping Friars. A truce was made by Boniface VIII in 1300, on the conditions that the Friars were not to preach in parish churches without the consent of the parish priest; that bishops were to have a veto over the individual Friars who were to hear confessions within their dioceses; and that the Friars were to hand over to the parish church a quarter of all the funeral and other dues and offerings which came to them from the district. The Universities also saw themselves invaded by the Friars, who by their learning and energy rose to eminence, possessed themselves of theological chairs, and promulgated their own doctrines. In the University of Paris, the conflict against the Mendicants was vigorously carried on in the middle of the thirteenth century by Guillaume de Saint Amour, who not only protested against their exceptional privileges, but attacked their rule of life. An able-bodied man, he asserted, who can work for his livelihood commits nothing less than sacrilege if he lives on the alms of the poor; for S. Paul says, “if a man will not work, neither let him eat”. If it be urged that it is a counsel of perfection to live like Christ, it ought to be remembered that Christ’s example teaches us to do good works, not to beg; if any man wishes to be perfect, let him work or enter a monastery. Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventura took up the defence of the Mendicants; and, with the help of the Papacy, the Friars maintained their position, though they were regarded with aversion and suspicion by the University. In 1321, a doctor of the Sorbonne, Jean de Poilly, was summoned before Pope John XXII for having taught that those who confessed to Friars were bound to confess the same sins again to their own parish priest, and no Pope had the power to absolve them from this duty. His opinions were condemned, and he was compelled to retract them. In Oxford the controversy was renewed later by Richard Fitz Ralph, Archbishop of Armagh, who went to Avignon to answer for his opinions to Innocent IV, but no judgment was given against him. In both Universities the opposition to the Friars was manfully maintained in spite of the Papal censures.

In January, 1409, the Sorbonne was strong enough to carry the war into the enemies’ quarters, and a Franciscan, Jean de Gorel, was compelled to retract his assertion that Friars, as being of the institution of the primitive Church, had a more essential right to preach and hear confessions than had parish priests, who were of a later origin. On the accession of Alexander V the Mendicants judged that their hour of triumph was come. They hastened to procure from him a Bull, “Regnans in Ecclesia”, dated from Pisa, October 12, 1409, in which the Pope condemned the chief propositions of the Doctors of the University, and affirmed most emphatically the condemnation issued by John XXII. The Friars themselves seem to have been afraid to use this Bull when they had obtained it. Rumors of its existence reached Paris, and messengers were sent to enquire if rumor spoke truly; the Cardinals denied that it had been issued with their counsel or consent, but the messengers saw the Bull and its leaden seal. The University at once proceeded to vigorous measures; they expelled all the Mendicants, and prohibited them from preaching in Paris till they had produced the original Bull and had renounced it. Gerson raised his powerful voice against it, and the Government
entirely sided with the University. The Dominicans and the Carmelites judged submission to be the wisest course. On March 1, 1410, the University went in solemn procession to the Church of S. Martin des Champs, where one of the Dominicans preached a sermon in which he declared that the Bull had been obtained without the consent of his Order, nor did they approve of it, but were content with their former privileges. The Franciscans refused to submit, and proclamation was made in front of their doors by a herald, prohibiting the clergy in the king’s name, from allowing them to preach, hear confessions, or administer the sacraments. Alexander’s successor found it wise to revoke the Bull, and put an end to this fruitless conflict with the University.

From his conduct in this matter we may judge the character of Alexander V. Owing everything to his Order, he was ready to befriend it in any way, and at once complied with the requests which its advocates preferred, without any consideration of their wisdom or expediency. His weakness was that he knew too little of the world, and was too ready to gain praise by unreasoning liberality and munificence. He used to say of himself that he had been rich as a Bishop, poor as a Cardinal, but as Pope a beggar. He was generally under the rule of the Cardinals; only in granting this Bull to his beloved Order did he venture to act without their advice, and then he foolishly endeavored to act secretly, because he had not the courage to face and overcome opposition. In his brief pontificate he had not time to show what he might have become. Some were won by his simple character to regard him as a saint. Others were misled, by the extravagance which his known liberality encouraged in his household, to mistake him for a luxurious sybarite. It would seem that both of these judgments were equally removed from the truth. Alexander V, like many men who rise to eminence from a humble origin, owed his good fortune to his negative qualities, and was conscious to himself that he enjoyed a reputation beyond his deserts. Cossa rightly judged that, when elevated to the Papacy, Philargi would of his own nature cling to one whose strength of character he recognized, and would be the best of tools, for he would wish to submit to a stronger mind as a means of concealing his own incompetence. So entirely dependent on Cossa does he show himself by coming to Bologna, that on his death, the story rapidly spread that he had been poisoned by Cossa, who wished to have the new election in a place where his power was supreme.
CHAPTER VIII.
JOHN XXIII.
1410-1414

Alexander V died on May 3; and before the eighteen Cardinals who were in Bologna entered the Conclave, their minds were made up as to his successor. Louis of Anjou, who was preparing an expedition against Ladislas, hoped that the energy of Cossa, which he had experienced in the previous year, would secure his success against Naples. He sent pressing admonitions to the French Cardinals to procure Cossa’s election, which indeed the political aspect of affairs seemed to render almost necessary. It was to no purpose that Carlo Malatesta sent envoys to beg the Cardinals to defer their election in the hope of procuring the peace of the Church. Cossa answered that Gregory was entirely in the hands of Ladislas, and nothing could be expected from him; that the Cardinals could not abandon the cause of Louis of Anjou after encouraging him to proceed so far; and that in the present condition of affairs in Rome a Pope was absolutely necessary to keep the city from again falling into the hands of Ladislas; moreover the Cardinals themselves, if they did not elect a Pope, would be without the necessaries of life and the Curia would be dissolved. The envoys tried to alarm Cossa with the fear of a rival for the Papacy. Cossa replied that he knew not how the votes might go; for his own part, though he was not a man of great knowledge, he had done for the Church more than the rest: if a friend were elected, he would be satisfied; if a foe, it might be better for his own soul. Carlo’s envoys were worsted in the encounter with Cossa, and could do no more than beseech the Cardinals, on the eve of the Conclave, to bind him who might be elected to abdicate if his rivals abdicated, or to unite with them in summoning a General Council. No heed was paid to Malatesta’s entreaties; the place, the political situation, made Cossa for the time omnipotent. The Cardinals entered the Conclave on the evening of May 14, and Cossa’s election was announced on the 17th. He was enthroned in state in the Church of S. Petronio on May 25, and took the title of John XXIII.

The Cardinals cannot have hid from themselves that the election of Cossa was not likely to be approved on any but political grounds. No one could look upon Cossa as an ecclesiastic, or as having any real interest in the spiritual affairs of the Church. He was a man of vigor, possessing all the qualities of a successful condottiere general. He had kept down the city of Bologna, had extended his power over neighboring States, had protected the Council of Pisa from Ladislas, and was the firm ally of Louis of Anjou. But he was more at home in a camp than in a church; his private life exceeded even the bounds of military licence; it was a grotesque and blasphemous incongruity to look upon such a man as the Vicar of Christ.

John XXIII soon found that his lofty position was a hindrance rather than a help; his character was more fitted for decisive and energetic action as occasion offered than for pursuing with astuteness a careful and deliberate policy. From the first, things went contrary to him and his ally Louis of Anjou. The loss of Genoa by the French threw a great hindrance in the way of Louis. Genoa since 1396 had submitted to its French governor, Jean le Maingre, Marshal Boucicaut, but gradually grew more and more discontented with his rule. As taxes weighed heavily commerce did not prosper; and the
Genoese felt themselves involved in a policy which was alien to their old traditions, and which might be in the interests of Boucicaut or of France, but was not in the interests of Genoa. Boucicaut’s interference in the affairs of Milan especially angered the Genoese, till the Marquis of Montferrat in Boucicaut’s absence marched to Genoa, and was welcomed by the citizens, who, on September 6, threw off the French rule, declared themselves free, and chose the Marquis of Montferrat to be captain of their Republic with all the powers of the old Doges. When Genoa had thus thrown off the French yoke, it warmly espoused the cause of Ladislas against Louis, and from its commanding position at sea rendered difficult to Louis the transport of soldiers. As was to be expected, John XXIII hastened to identify his cause with that of Louis.

On May 25, the day on which were dated the encyclical letters announcing his election, he issued also letters commending the cause of Louis to all archbishops, princes, and magistrates, exhorting them to receive him with all respect and lend him all the aid that he required. The Pope’s admonition came too late so far as the Genoese were concerned; for on May 16, they had intercepted and destroyed five of the galleys in which Louis was bringing his forces for a new expedition. Louis with the rest of his squadron landed at Pisa, whence he went to Bologna, which he entered somewhat crestfallen on June 6. Still his army was powerful, and great things were to be expected from the Pope’s help. But John soon found that he was less powerful as Pope than he had been as Legate. No sooner did the cities which he had subdued feel that the hand of their master was slackened by his elevation to a higher office, than they hastened to throw off the yoke to which they had unwillingly submitted. On June 12, came the news that Giorgio degli Ordelaffi had recovered Forlì; and on June 18, that Faenza had thrown off the Papal rule and had taken Giovanni dei Manfredi for its lord. These revolts were clearly due to the influence of Carlo Malatesta, who, after protesting against John’s election, declared against him and sided with Ladislas. John felt that for the present he was over-mastered; he saw that he could not trust his mercenaries, nor, when revolt was so near, did he venture to leave Bologna, which he knew that he only held by force. On June 23, Louis set out for Rome without his friend and adviser, and the Pope, with rage in his heart, was compelled, sorely against his will, to stay behind.

John’s first endeavor was to win over Carlo Malatesta to his side, promising that if he would recognize him and he would exert all his influence on his behalf. Malatesta replied that, though he had esteemed him as Legate of Bologna, he could not in conscience recognize him as Pope, for which post he was unfit; he besought him to join with Gregory in a renunciation of the Papacy; in that case he promised to help him with all his power. John endeavored to protract the negotiations; but in Carlo Malatesta he had to deal with as strong a character as his own, and a keener wit. In spite of his efforts he could gain nothing.

In Germany also John had to watch events eagerly, and struggle to hold his own against his rival Gregory. The schism in the Papacy had been reproduced in the Empire; and Rupert, who owed his position to the help of Boniface IX, refused to acknowledge the Conciliar Pope. This made Rupert’s enemies more eager in the support of Alexander V, and a civil war seemed imminent in Germany when Rupert suddenly died on May 18, 1410. Wenzel’s party was now anxious that no new election should be made, and that Wenzel should be universally recognized as King of the Romans. His opponents, though determined to proceed to a new election, were divided between the rival Popes. Rupert’s son, the Elector Palatine, and the Archbishop of Trier were in favor of Gregory XII; the Archbishop of Mainz was on the side of John XXIII. Four only out of the seven...
electors met at Frankfurt on September 1, for a new election. Wenzel, who as King of Bohemia was an elector, of course kept aloof, as did also Rudolf of Saxony: it was doubtful who had the right to vote as Elector of Brandenburg, which Sigismund, King of Hungary, had mortgaged to his cousin Jobst, Markgraf of Moravia. It soon became clear that the four electors differed too deeply on the ecclesiastical question to agree in the choice of a new king. On September 12, the Archbishops of Mainz and Koln made preparations for departure. But the Archbishop of Trier and the Elector Palatine proceeded to an election; they recognized Sigismund as Elector of Brandenburg, and accepted his representative Frederick, Burggraf of Nurnberg, as his proxy. Though the Archbishop of Mainz laid the city under an interdict, and closed all the churches against them, they went through the accustomed ceremonies in the churchyard of the Cathedral, and, on September 20, announced that they had elected Sigismund King of the Romans. At this elevation of his younger brother, Wenzel felt himself doubly aggrieved, and Jobst of Moravia wished to assert his claims to Brandenburg. They hastened to send representatives to support the recalcitrant Archbishops of Mainz and Koln, who thereon proceeded, on October 1, to elect Jobst of Moravia, reserving to Wenzel, as the price of his submission, the title, though not the authority, of King of the Romans.

There were now three claimants to the Empire as there were three claimants to the Papacy. It was said that three kings were again come to adore Christ, but they were not like the three wise men of old. John XXIII was anxious to secure Sigismund to his side; for Sigismund had remained neutral towards the Council of Pisa, and since then had shown signs of a reconciliation with Gregory XII. John issued Bulls declaring his affection for Sigismund; but still Sigismund’s attitude remained ambiguous, till the death of Jobst on January 8, 1411, made his position more sure. There was now no one to stand in his way if he could manage to reconcile his personal differences with the electors who had opposed him. The besotted Wenzel was won over by hopes of obtaining for himself the Imperial Crown, and by Sigismund’s promise to content himself during Wenzel’s lifetime with the title of King of the Romans. The Archbishop of Mainz made his own terms with Sigismund; among them was a stipulation for the recognition of John. Finally on July 21, 1411, Sigismund was unanimously elected King of the Romans. Thenceforth the doubtful allegiance of Germany was at an end, and the recognition of John XXIII as rightful Pope was at once carried out.

In Naples John’s cause was not so successful. The expedition of Louis in 1410 came to nothing. He entered Rome and displayed himself to the citizens, who always liked to have a distinguished guest within their walls; but he had no money for his soldiers and could not keep together the different elements of which his army was composed. After waiting helpless in Rome till the end of the year, he set out for Bologna to beg the Pope to come to Rome and help him — a request which was echoed by the Roman people. John by this time saw that Carlo Malatesta could only be reduced to obedience if he were deprived of his ally Ladislas. He determined to leave Bologna to its fate, and help Louis to prosecute the war against Ladislas with vigor. On March 31, 1411, John left Bologna and moved towards Rome, accompanied by his Cardinals and attended by a brilliant escort of French and Italian nobles. On April 11, he reached San Pancrazio, and, on April 12, entered the city amid the acclamations of the people. On April 14, the city magistrates, to the number of forty-six, appeared before him with lighted torches in their hands and did him obeisance.

On April 23, the banners of the Pope, King Louis, and Paolo Orsini were blessed with great pomp and ceremony, and, on April 28, John had the proud satisfaction of
seeing the strongest force that Italy could raise set forth to drive Ladislas from the throne of Naples. The chief leaders of condottieri had all been won over by John to the side of Louis; and the Neapolitans heard with terror that the four best generals in the world — Braccio da Montone, Sforza da Cotignola, Paolo Orsini, and Gentile da Monterno — were marching against them. Ladislas advanced to Rocca Secca and took up a strong position on the heights above the little river Melfa. Louis pitched his camp opposite, and for eight days the two armies faced one another. At last, on the evening of May 19, the troops of Louis crossed the river in the evening and fell upon the enemy unexpectedly as they were at supper. The rout was complete; many of the chiefs were taken prisoners in their tents; Ladislas with difficulty escaped to San Germano; all his possessions fell into the enemy’s hands.

John received with joy the news of this victory, which was soon followed by trophies from the battle-field — the standards of Ladislas and Gregory; he caused them to be hung from the Campanile of S. Peter in derision. Nor was this enough to gratify his pride; on May 25, he rode with his Cardinals, followed by all the clergy and people, to the Church of San Giovanni in Laterano. Four archbishops and bishops bore the holy relic of the head of S. John Baptist; and with strange incongruity the procession was brought up by the banners of Ladislas and Gregory trailed in the dust. The wiser members of the Curia looked with disgust on this premature display of insolent triumph, which was neither judicious nor befitting the Head of the Church. Their feeling was well founded, for it soon appeared that though Louis’ victory was complete, he did not know how to use it. After the battle his generals differed; Sforza urged the immediate pursuit of Ladislas; Orsini exclaimed that enough had been done for one day; the soldiers meanwhile betook themselves to plunder the camp. Delay was fatal, as the prisoners were enabled to negotiate their ransoms and even buy back their arms from the victors. Ladislas himself said that on the day of the battle the enemy were masters both of his person and of his kingdom; the next day, though they had missed him, they might have seized his kingdom; the third day they could neither take him nor his kingdom. In fact, Ladislas bought back his army from the needy soldiers of Louis, and again manned the defiles which led towards Naples. In the camp of Louis there were contentions between the generals, want of food, sickness, and clamors for pay. On July 12, Louis returned with his victorious army to Rome, having gained nothing. Men began to see that his cause was hopeless; and when, on August 3, he took ship on the Ripa Grande to return to Provence, none of the Roman nobles, who had been so obsequious to him on his arrival, thought it worthwhile to escort him on his departure. They were right in their judgment: Louis died in 1417, without making any further attempts on the Neapolitan kingdom.

John XXIII had been entirely disappointed of his hopes when they seemed on the very verge of attainment. Moreover by moving to Rome to help Louis, he lost Bologna. Scarcely had he left it when, on May 12, the cry was raised “Viva il popolo e le Arti”; the Cardinal of Naples, who had been left as legate, was driven out; the people elected their own magistrates, set up again their old republican form of government, and vigorously repulsed Carlo Malatesta, who had fomented the rising in hopes of gaining possession of the city. Before this also Ladislas had managed to detach Florence and Siena from their league with the Pope, by selling to the Florentines Cortona, and saving their honor by the easy promise that he would not occupy Rome nor any other place in the direction of Tuscany. John found himself left alone to face Ladislas, who was smarting under the sense of his late defeat. Of course he excommunicated him, deprived
him of his kingdom and proclaimed a crusade against him; but these did Ladislas little harm. John’s only hope was in the fidelity of the condottieri generals who were in his pay, and he soon found how slender were his grounds for trusting them. In May, 1412, Sforza, who was carrying on the war in Naples, deserted the side of the Pope and took service with Ladislas.

From this time forward Sforza becomes one of the chief figures in Italian history. We have seen how Alberigo da Barbiano was the first to form a soldier band of his countrymen to take the place of the lawless companies of foreign mercenaries who had, since the decay of the citizen militia, made Italy their prey. The last and greatest of the foreign captains was an English-man, Sir John Hawkwood, whose adventurous career was closed at Florence in 1394. The Florentines paid due honor to the great general, whose equestrian portrait, painted by the hand of Paolo Uccelli and one of the masterpieces of early realism in art, still adorns the wall of the Florentine Cathedral. Though a skillful soldier, Hawkwood, as might be expected, was merely an adventurer whose trade was plunder. His tenor of mind is well illustrated by a tale of the old Florentine story-teller, Franco Sacchetti. One day, when Hawkwood was at his castle of Montecchio, two friars approached him with the usual greeting, “God give you peace”. “God take away your alms,” was Hawkwood’s reply. The astonished friars asked why he answered thus. “Why spoke you as you did?” was the question. “Sire, we thought that we said well”. “How thought you that you said well”, exclaimed Hawkwood, “when you wished that God might make me die of hunger? Know you not that I live on war and that peace would undo me? I live on war as you live on alms, and so I returned your greeting in like sort as you gave it”. Sacchetti adds that Hawkwood knew well how to cause that there should be no peace in Italy in his days. With the formation of native companies, warfare became more humane and pillage less terrible. The Italian soldiers were connected with their leaders by other ties than those simply of pillage. They were gradually brought under more systematic discipline, and became trained armies rather than troops of plundering adventurers. Alberigo da Barbiano did much to bring about this result, and the two great generals of the generation that followed his death in 1409 had both been trained under his command.

The early life of Sforza is characteristic both of the man and of the times. Muzio Attendolo was born in Early Cotignola, a little town in the Romagna, in 1369. He was of a peasant stock, and worked in the fields, when one day there passed a band of soldiers and enquired the way. Struck by his stalwart aspect, one of them asked why he did not follow their example instead of pursuing his dreary toil. The peasant waited before replying, then, seeking for an augury, threw his hoe into a tree, resolving that if it fell to the ground he would take it again, if it remained in the tree he would follow the soldiers. The hoe stuck, and the peasant joined the army in the humble position of follower to one of the soldiers. After four years of camp life he returned to his native place, and there raised a number of men like-minded with himself, with whom he joined the company of Alberigo da Barbiano. In the lawless life of a camp he was the most lawless; and one day a quarrel in which he was engaged about the division of plunder attracted the attention of Alberigo, who interposed to settle the dispute. But the fiery peasant did not lay aside his threatening attitude even at his captain’s presence. “You look”, said Alberigo, “as if you would use violence (sforzare) to me also. Have then the name of violent”. From this time the peasant was known among his comrades as Sforza, a name which was to descend to a princely house. He was a man rather above the ordinary height, with broad shoulders, though his figure narrowed at the flanks. His
swarthy face had a bluish hue, which, with his deep-sunk restless eyes, gave him rather a sinister aspect.

For some time Sforza served under Alberigo da Barbiano; then he led a band of his own, and fought for Florence in its war against Pisa. John XXIII took him into his pay for the war against Naples, and conferred on him in the lordship of his native town of Cotignola. But Sforza quarreled with Paolo Orsini, who he saw was likely to get more from the Pope than himself. He listened to the overtures of Ladislas, and when, in the beginning of May, 1412, John summoned his generals to Rome, that he might consult with them about future operations, Sforza abruptly retired from the city, and took up a position at Colonna. The Pope in alarm sent a Cardinal with 36,000 ducats to urge him to return. Sforza enquired whether he was to look upon this sum as arrears of old pay or earnest for new service. When the Cardinal answered that it was prepayment for a fresh engagement, Sforza replied, “Then I will not take it. I left Rome because I could not trust Paolo Orsini”. On May 19 he quitted the Pope’s service, declared himself on the side of Ladislas, and, after making a hostile demonstration against Ostia, rode off to Naples. John took his revenge by hanging Sforza in effigy from all the bridges and gates of the city; the figure was suspended by the right foot, and in one hand held a hoe, in the other a paper, with the legend —

“I am Sforza, peasant of Cotignola, traitor,
Who twelve times have betrayed the Church against my honor:
Promises, compacts, agreements have I broken”.

The Pope’s humor was coarse, but he knew the manners of the camp, and could answer condottieri after their own fashion. He had his own reasons for thinking that he might do so with safety, for already he had advanced far in negotiations for peace with King Ladislas. Both had something to gain, as Ladislas wished to be free from the claims of Louis, John from those of Gregory XII. Ladislas had no object in maintaining Gregory any longer; in fact his support of Gregory only gave his enemies a plausible handle against him, and isolated him from the other European kingdoms. Moreover, the breach between John XXIII and Louis, if once made, would be irreparable, while Ladislas, who needed breathing-space, could prosecute his designs against the States of the Church whenever occasion offered. John was at his wits’ end to raise money; the Cardinals and the Senator alike were used to extort benevolences from the wealthy; the imposts were so heavy that corn was sold in the city at nine times its ordinary price; the coinage was debased, and there was almost a famine, till John was driven to withdraw his most oppressive taxes through fear of a rebellion. The Prefect of Vico attacked the city; John was helpless, and peace was necessary at any price.

Already, on June 18, the news spread in Rome that the Neapolitan Cardinal Brancacci had arranged a compact between John and Ladislas. On June 30 its terms were known in Venice. They were, that John recognized Ladislas as King, not only of Naples, but of Sicily, which was in the hands of an Aragonese prince; that he appointed him gonfaloniere of the Church and engaged to pay him 120,000 ducats within two years, giving him meanwhile Ascoli, Viterbo, Perugia and Benevento to hold in pledge, and to remit all arrears due from Naples to the Church. Ladislas on his part engaged to keep 1000 lances for the service of the Church, and undertook to treat with Gregory XII that he should renounce the Papacy within three months on condition of being appointed Legate of the March of Ancona, receiving 50,000 ducats, and having three of his Cardinals confirmed in their office. If Gregory refused to accept these terms, Ladislas
has to send him prisoner to Provence. The position of both parties in this compact was equally disgraceful: each of them gave up an ally to whom he was bound by the most solemn engagements, and who had endured much for his sake; each threw to the winds all considerations of honor. Ladislas for his part tried to make his change of attitude towards Gregory as little ignominious as might be; he called a synod of Bishops and theologians at Naples, before whom he laid a statement of the doubts which beset him about the validity of supporting Gregory when other princes had accepted John. The synod of course declared its willingness to abandon Gregory, and on October 16 Ladislas wrote to John XXIII announcing that by the "grace of the Holy Spirit" he recognized him a lawful pontiff. He sent a message to Gregory at Gaeta, ordering him to leave his dominions in a few days. Gregory, whose suspicions had been quieted by the express assurance of Ladislas that they were unfounded, had taken no measures to provide himself with a refuge. The chance arrival of two Venetian merchantmen on their homeward voyage gave him the means to flee. The citizens, who loved the Pope, bought up the cargoes of the ships that they might be at liberty to take him on board. He embarked on October 31, with the three Cardinals who still clung to him, of whom One was his nephew Gabriele Condulmiero, who afterwards became Pope Eugenius IV. In dread of enemies and pirates he sailed round Italy and reached the Slavonian coast; thence five small boats brought him and his attendants to Cesena, where he was met by Carlo Malatesta and was conducted with all respect to Rimini. Carlo Malatesta was too high-minded to follow the example of Ladislas and abandon an ally in adversity. Though he knew that so long as Gregory was in his territory, he would be exposed to the incessant hostility of John, he still did not hesitate to declare himself the sole supporter of the helpless wanderer. Carlo Malatesta is the only Italian who awakens our admiration by his honesty and integrity of purpose in endeavoring to end the Schism of the Church.

Meanwhile John XXIII felt himself so far bound by the promise of his predecessor to summon a Council for the purpose of carrying on the work of reforming the Church begun at Pisa, that he issued a summons on April 29, 1411, for a Council to be held at Rome on April 1 in the following year. The summons, however, bore on the face of it marks that it was not meant to be taken in earnest. The Pope narrated the necessity under which he was placed of coming to Rome, abused Ladislas, praised the advantages of Rome as the place for a Council, and excommunicated anyone who hindered prelates from coming. With a view of strengthening his hands, John, in June, 1411, created fourteen new Cardinals, who were wisely chosen from the most influential men in every kingdom; amongst them were Peter d'Ailly, Bishop of Cambray, and two Englishmen — Thomas Langley, Bishop of Durham, and Robert Hallam, Bishop of Salisbury. In the hazardous position of affairs at the beginning of 1412 the Council was deferred, and finally met on February 10, 1413. It was but scantily attended, as was natural, for no one believed that anything would be done, and nothing could be done in Rome at such a troubled time. It is said that the Pope used his soldiers to prevent those whom he did not trust from coming to the Council at all. The only thing which the Council did was to condemn the writings of Wycliffe, which were solemnly burned on the top of the steps of S. Peter’s. When some proposals were made to go further than this in the work of reforming the Church, Cardinal Zabarella rose and talked the matter out. A ludicrous incident is chronicled about this Council, and the fact that it is recorded shows the horror with which the Pope’s character was regarded. One evening, while the Pope was at vespers in his chapel, as the hymn “Veni Creator Spiritus” was begun, came a screech-owl and settled on the Pope’s head. “A strange shape for the Holy Ghost”, said
a Cardinal, and tittered; but John was dismayed. “It is an evil omen”, said he, and those present agreed with him. The Council was soon dissolved on account of its numerical insignificance; but John did not dare to let all mention of a Council drop. The University of Paris was too strong to be offended, and it still clung to the hope of a genuine reformation of the Church by means of a General Council. Moreover, Sigismund, the King of the Romans, who had begun to take an interest in Italian affairs, listened to the representations of Carlo Malatesta and urged on John the summoning of a Council. Accordingly, in dismissing the few prelates who ventured to come to Rome John issued a summons, on March 3, for a Council to be held in December in some fitting and suitable place of which notice was to be given in three months’ time. He little thought that events would force him to keep his hypocritical promise.

Ladislas of Naples had only made peace with John to gain a short breathing-time for himself and drive Ladislas out of Rome with greater ease. In the beginning of May his preparations were made, and he found adherents in plenty amongst the Romans themselves, who were groaning under John’s exactions. The opportunity had come for wiping away the disgrace of the defeat of Rocca Secca, and for advancing once more his pretensions over the city of Rome. The scheme of forming an Italian kingdom floated before the eyes of Ladislas, as it had done before so many other Italian princes; he, like the rest, found the States of the Church thrust like a wedge between North and South Italy. But the Papacy was less formidable than it had been in former times; it no longer had its roots so deep in the politics of Europe as to be able to raise armies for its defense. Ladislas might hope to succeed where others had failed, and by repeated assaults on Rome, when occasion offered, destroy the prestige of the Papal power, and habituate the citizens to the idea of Neapolitan rule. When Rome had fallen, the only opposition which he need dread was that of Florence. In May, Ladislas detached Sforza against Paolo Orsini, who was in the March of Ancona. Sforza, eager to pursue his hated rival, took Paolo Orsini by surprise and shut him up in Rocca Contratta. It was believed that the Pope was dissatisfied with Orsini, and had secretly betrayed him to Ladislas. If so, Ladislas caught the Pope in his own toils. He entered the Roman territory with an army (May 3) on the ground that, as the Pope proposed to leave the city for the purpose of holding a Council, it was necessary that he should provide for its protection during his absence. John was helpless; he could not trust his mercenaries; the people hated him on account of his oppressive imposts; the very members of the Curia were so suspicious of him that they were not sure whether the movements of Ladislas were made in concert with the Pope or not. At every step in John’s career we find the same impression of distrust produced even on those who saw him most.

As Ladislas drew nearer, John tried when it was too late to win the Roman people to his side. On June 4, he abolished his detested tax on wine: next day he tried to galvanize into life the old Roman Republic, and solemnly restored to the citizens their old liberties and their old form of government. A comedy of exalted patriotism was performed between the Pope and the people. John pompously addressed them: “I place you once more upon your feet, I entreat you to do what is for the good of the Church, and to be faithful now if ever. Fear not King Ladislas, nor any man in the world, for I am ready to die with you in defense of the Church and the Roman people”. The citizens were not to be outdone in theatrical declamation: “Holy Father”, they answered: “doubt not that the Roman people is prepared to die with you in defense of the Church and your Holiness”. Next day (June 6) they held a council in the Capitol and unanimously resolved, “We Romans are determined to feed on our own children rather than submit to
the dragon of Ladislas!”. A crowd of enthusiastic patriots announced this valiant resolution to the delighted Pope. Next day John left the Vatican and rode with his Cardinals to the palace of Count Orsini of Manupello on the other side of the river; he wished to take up his abode in the city to declare his confidence in the people. But on the night of June 8, the troops of Ladislas broke down part of the wall of the Church of S. Croce in Gerusalemme, and, led by the condottiere Tartaglia, entered the city. They did not venture to advance in the night; and in the morning the citizens did not venture to attack them. Patriotism and enthusiasm were too precious in word to be rudely expressed in deed. The cry was raised, “King Ladislas and Peace!”. No opposition was made, and Tartaglia was in possession of Rome.

John XXIII did not think it wise to expose his patriotism to a ruder shock than did the Romans. As soon as the news of Tartaglia’s entry reached him, he hastened to leave Rome with his Cardinals by the gate of S. Angelo, and hurried towards Sutri. The horsemen of Ladislas pursued the unhappy fugitives, whose age and luxurious habits made them unfit for a hasty flight in the mid heat of summer. Many were plundered and ill-treated; even the Pope’s mercenaries took part in plundering instead of protecting them; many died on the way of thirst. Old men, who could rarely endure to ride even for exercise before, were seen running on foot to save their lives. Even in Sutri John did not think himself safe, but pressed on in the night to Viterbo, and, after a rest of two days, to Montefiascone. It was harvest time, and the peasants were fearful for their crops if Ladislas was to march in pursuit of the Pope. John did not think it wise to trust to their loyalty, but passed to Siena on June 17, and thence, on June 21, to Florence. Even Florence was not prepared to quarrel with Ladislas without due deliberation; the Pope was not admitted inside the city at first, but was lodged in the monastery of S. Antonio outside the Porta San Gallo. There he abode till the beginning of November, hearing the news of the entire subjugation of Rome by Ladislas, whose triumphant army advanced northwards through the States of the Church. In vain John wrote melancholy letters to the princes of Christendom detailing the enormities of Ladislas, and imploring their help. The only one who lent an ear to his complaints was Sigismund, King of the Romans.

Sigismund had reached this dignity at the age of forty-three, after an adventurous life, in which he had generally played an ignominious part. He plunged while still a youth, into the troubles of Hungary, of which he claimed the kingdom through his wife; to raise money for Hungarian adventures he pledged Brandenburg to his cousin Jobst; he led a Hungarian army in the ill-fated expedition against the Turks, which ended in the disastrous defeat of Nicopolis; his Hungarian subjects rebelled against him and even made him prisoner; his attitude towards his worthless elder brother Wenzel was one of cautious self-seeking which had nothing heroic. The circumstances which preceded his election as King of the Romans were not such as to redound to his credit. He was a needy, shifty man, always busy, but whose schemes seemed to lack the elements of greatness and decision which are necessary for success.

On his accession to the dignity of King of the Romans, Sigismund recognized that an opportunity was offered of making a fresh start. The teaching of experience had not been thrown away upon him. He had learned that the cruelty by which he had alienated his Hungarian subjects was unprofitable; he had learned to restrain his immoderate sensual appetites; he had learned that a policy of peace was better than one of continual war. He set himself to realize the duties of his new position, to vindicate the old glories of the Imperial dignity, to seek the peace and well-being of Christendom, to labor for
the unity of the Church. With many failings, with a ludicrous incongruity between his pretensions and his resources, Sigismund nevertheless nourished a lofty ideal, which he perseveringly and conscientiously labored to carry out. When he was elected King of the Romans, Sigismund was involved in a dispute with Venice about the possession of Zara on the Dalmatian coast; the republic had bought it from Ladislas, as King of Hungary, without enquiring into his title to sell it to them. As King of the Romans, Sigismund complained of the infringement of the Imperial rights by the Venetian conquests on the mainland. If he were to go to Rome for coronation as Emperor, he must command an entrance into Italy through Friuli, which Venice had seized. War against Venice was undertaken in 1411. Sigismund’s forces were at first successful; but Carlo Malatesta, fighting for the Venetians, checked their advance and the war lingered on without any decisive results. John XXIII in vain attempted to mediate. At last exhaustion caused both parties to wish for a truce, which was concluded on April 17, 1413. Sigismund then proceeded into Lombardy, in hopes of gaining back from Milan some of the lost possessions of the Empire. But he came too late; Lombardy, after a disastrous period of disunion which followed on the death of Gian Galeazzo Visconti in 1402, had again become united in 1412, under Filippo Maria Visconti, after the violent death of his two brothers. So strong was Filippo Maria’s position that Sigismund found it impossible to gain enough allies to attack him. But if he was disappointed in his hopes of winning glory by an attack on Milan, fortune threw in his way the more lofty undertaking of directing the fortunes of the Church. The Empire, which had fallen from its great pretensions and saw its old claims one by one ignored, was yet to find itself in the hands of Sigismund hailed once more by Christendom as the restorer of the Church and arbiter of the Papacy.

As Sigismund abode at Como, John XXIII, terrified by the success of Ladislas, the coldness of Florence, and the sense of his own helplessness, at last resolved to trust himself to the King of the Romans, and submit to his condition of summoning a General Council. John saw the dangers of such a course, but trusted to his own capacity to overcome them; it would be easy for a quick-witted Italian to find some means of eluding a promise made to a clumsy Teuton like Sigismund. His secretary, Leonardo Bruni, tells us how the Pope talked the question over with him. “The whole point of the Council”, he said, “lies in the place, and I will take care that it is not held where the Emperor will be more powerful than myself. I will give my ambassadors the most ample powers, which they may openly show for the sake of appearances, but secretly I will restrict my commission to certain places”. Such was John’s intention, and when the time came for the departure of his ambassadors, the Cardinals Challant and Zabarella, the Pope took them apart and discoursed with them long upon the momentous nature of their mission. He assured them how entirely he trusted their wisdom and fidelity; he said that they knew better than himself what ought to be done. Like many strong and eager natures, John’s feelings were easily roused and he was easily carried away by them. Persuaded by his own eloquence, he abandoned all precaution: “See”, he exclaimed, “I had determined to name certain places to which you should be bound, but I have changed my opinion and leave all to your prudence. Do you consider on my behalf what would be safe and what dangerous”. So saying, he tore in pieces the secret instructions which he had prepared, and dismissed his ambassadors to carry on their negotiations unfettered. “This”, says Leonardo Bruni, “was the beginning of the Pope’s ruin”.
When the Pope’s ambassadors, accompanied by the learned Greek scholar, Emmanuel Chrysolaras, met Sigismund at Como, he at once proposed to them Constance as the place for the meeting of the Council. In spite of their endeavors to fix some place in Italy he stood firm. He urged that Constance was admirably adapted for the purpose, being an imperial city, where he could guarantee peace and order; in a central position for France, Germany, and Italy; easy of access to the northern nations; in a healthy situation on the shores of a lake; roomy and commodious for the accommodation of crowds of visitors; situated in the midst of a fertile region whence provisions could easily be obtained. These arguments admitted of no objection: the ambassadors were unprepared to find Sigismund so decided. As he would not give way, they hesitated to break off negotiations, considering the helpless condition of the Pope and the hopes which he placed in Sigismund’s protection. Perhaps they had also a lingering wish for a Council which should be a reality, and were not sorry to find themselves in a position to commit the Pope to a decided step. At all events, in the Pope’s name they accepted Constance as the place of a Council to be held in a year’s time, on November 1, 1414.

Sigismund lost no time in making his triumph known. Before the Pope could hear of the agreement that had been made, Sigismund, on October 30, issued a letter announcing the time and place of the Council, summoning to it all princes and prelates, and promising that he would be there himself to provide for its full security and liberty.

John was thunderstruck when he heard what his legates had done; he cursed his own folly for having trusted their discretion. He was keenly alive to the danger of putting himself in Sigismund’s hands; but he had been irrevocably committed, and his destitute condition gave him no hopes of escape. He soon, however, recovered his courage and trusted to his own skill to win over Sigismund and prevail upon him to change the place fixed for the Council. For this purpose he sought a personal interview, and early in November left Florence for Bologna, where he arrived on November 12. Bologna had soon grown tired of its republican rule; the nobles had risen and put down the popular party, and the city returned to its allegiance to the Pope in August, 1412. It was not, however, a safe place of refuge for him, as Carlo Malatesta, acting again in conjunction with Ladislas, advanced into the Bolognese territory and threatened the city. John left Bologna, on November 25, for Lodi. Sigismund advanced to Piacenza to meet him, and they entered Lodi together, where they were entertained in royal state. John, however, found that all his artifices were of no avail to overcome Sigismund’s intention; he resisted all proposals to change the seat of the Council from Constance to some Lombard city. John was obliged to stand by the luckless undertaking of his legates, and with a heavy heart issued from Lodi, on December 9, his summons to the Council to be held at Constance in the next November. Sigismund sent also summonses to Gregory XII, Benedict XIII, and the Kings of France and Aragon. Once more the old Imperial pretensions were revived, and the rule of Christendom, by the joint action of the temporal and spiritual power, was set forward.

At Lodi, John and Sigismund stayed for a month in amicable relations, and celebrated with royal and Papal pomp the festival of Christmas. From Lodi they passed together to Cremona, then under the lordship of Gabrino Fondolo, a man characteristic of the political condition of Italy in that age. He had won his way to the lordship of Cremona by the murder of his masters, the brothers Cavalcabo, whom he had instigated previously to assassinate their uncle, so as to accelerate their own accession to power. Now that he had the Pope and King of the Romans in his city, his heart swelled with
pride and he wished to immortalize himself. The thought flashed through his mind that he might do a deed which would make his name more renowned than that of Empedocles: he had in his power the two heads of Christendom, and if he put them to death the exploit would give his name an undying memory. One day, when he had taken his distinguished guests to the top of the Torrazzo, the campanile of the Duomo of Cremona, famous as being the loftiest tower in Italy of that date, he felt a powerful temptation to hurl them down as they were unsuspiciously feasting their eyes on the splendid panorama of the fruitful plain of Lombardy watered by the Po and closed in by the mountain chains of the Alps and Apennines. The news that the Venetian ambassador Tommaso Mocenigo, who had come to Cremona to greet the Pope, had been elected Doge of Venice, put a third noble victim in Fondolo’s hands. Though he resisted the temptation at the time, so strongly had the idea impressed itself on his imagination that, eleven years later, when his blood-stained career was cut short, and he was put to death by the Duke of Milan, he looked back regretfully on the opportunity which he had missed. When he reflected on the barren results of his adventurous life, he confessed the project which he had once entertained of gaining immortality, and grieved that he had not had the courage to carry it into execution.

So powerful a motive was the desire for fame, however acquired, to the wild and soaring characters which the plastic nature and adventurous politics of the Italian States had developed. Though neither John nor Sigismund knew the extent of the danger which they had run, yet they did not feel comfortable in the hands of Fondolo. John passed on to Mantua on January 16, to see if any help could be gained from Giovanni Francesco Gonzaga. There he stayed for a month, and went to Ferrara on February 16, where he won over to his side the Marquis Niccolo d’Este, whom Ladislas had tried to bribe. On February 26, he arrived in Bologna, where he intended to make his position secure; he restored the castle of Porta Galliera, and raised round it an earthwork surmounted by a palisade. There was need of John’s precautions, for the implacable Ladislas was moved to anger at the news of John’s negotiations with Sigismund. He declared in wrath that he would drive him out of Bologna as he had driven him out of Rome. On March 14, Ladislas entered Rome with his army, and showed his haughty contempt for all things human and divine by riding into the Church of S. Giovanni in Laterano, where the priests brought forth their holiest relics — the heads of S. Peter and S. Paul — and humbly displayed them to the King, who remained seated on his war-horse. After a month’s stay in Rome he moved northwards. Florence, terrified at this advance, negotiated for peace, which was concluded at Perugia on June 22, on condition that Ladislas proceeded no further. The interposition of Florence, which dreaded a disturbance so near her own territory, saved John for the time.

Ladislas slowly retired towards Rome, smitten with a mortal disease, the results of his own debauchery. He was borne in a litter to S. Paolo outside the walls, and thence to the sea, where a galley carried him to Naples. With him he took in chains Paolo Orsini, against whom he had conceived some suspicion. He purposed to have him put to death at Naples, but did not live long enough to carry his purpose into effect. His sister Giovanna, who was his successor, judged it better to spare so useful a general, and Ladislas was soothed in his last hours by the false belief that his sanguinary commands had been executed. He died on August 6, and the body of this mighty King was hurriedly buried by night, unhonored and ungraced, in the Church of S. Giovanni Carbonara, which he had himself restored and enlarged. The monument of Ladislas raised by his sister, Queen Giovanna II, is one of the grandest monumental works of
Italian sculpture, and gives a powerful impression of the desire felt by Italian princes to commemorate their name and their achievements. Striving after massive grandeur, the sculptors who worked in Naples created no new form of monument, but magnified into a vast piece of architecture the simple conception of the effigy of the dead reclining on a slab, which for convenience was raised from the ground and received an ornamental base. The whole east end of the Church behind the high altar is filled with the tomb of Ladislas. Colossal figures of virtues support an architrave which holds the inscription; above that are seated in a niche figures of Ladislas and Giovanna II, with crown, scepter, and imperial eagle, in royal state dispensing justice. Above that rises another tier holding the sarcophagus of Ladislas, from before whose sculptured figure two angels, in the Tuscan fashion, are softly drawing the curtains which shroud the dead. On the top of the arch which closes the sarcophagus stands an equestrian statue of Ladislas, drawn sword in hand, in such guise as often he led his men to battle.

The barbaric vastness and luxuriance of the tomb of Ladislas, with its inscriptions, “Divus Ladislas”, “Libera sidereum mens alta petivit Olympum”, is characteristic of the man and of the time. Ladislas had the strong will and the strong arm of a born ruler. He reduced to order and obedience the turbulent barons of Naples by playing off against one another the rival factions of Anjou and Durazzo. His plan of secularizing the States of the Church, as the first step towards forming a great Italian kingdom, was one which long floated before the eyes of the more adventurous politicians of Italy. He was an excellent general, a man of unfailing resolution and boundless daring. But his character was barbarous and brutal; he was alike destitute of religion and morality; neither in public nor private life was he guided by any consideration of honor, and no means were too base or treacherous for him to employ. So long as he lived, all Italy was in terror of his ambitious schemes; when he died and his power passed into the hands of his foolish and profligate sister Giovanna II, the Italian cities began to breathe again with a new sense of freedom.

On the news of the death of Ladislas, Rome rose against the Neapolitan senator and raised the old cry, “Viva Rome lo popolo!” Sforza hastened to put down the rising; but the people raised barricades in the streets and Sforza was compelled to retire. John XXIII’s hopes had revived on the death of his dreaded foe, and he sent to Rome as his legate Cardinal Isolani of Bologna. The old republican feeling of Rome had been too far weakened to be sure of its own position; on the legate’s approach the cry was raised, “Viva lo popolo e la Chiesa!” and, on October 19, Isolani without a battle took possession of the city in the name of the Pope. Had this success occurred a month sooner John would have returned to Rome instead of going to Constance. As it was, it came too late; for his course had been determined before he was sure of possessing Rome. For some time he hesitated to begin his journey to Constance; but the Cardinals urged that his word was pledged, the summons was issued, and it was too late to go back. He spoke of sending representatives to the Council and going himself to Rome; the Cardinals reminded him that a Pope should settle spiritual matters in person and temporal matters by deputy. Meanness and fear of danger were not amongst John’s faults; he still believed in his own power to cope successfully with difficulties, and he was attracted by the prospect of presiding over a Council gathered from the whole of Christendom. Before beginning his journey he obtained through Sigismund an undertaking from the magistrates of Constance that he should be received with honor and recognized as the one true Pope; that the Curia should be respected and the Papal jurisdiction be freely exercised; that he should be at liberty to remain in Constance, or
withdraw at pleasure. His intention was to preside a few months over the Council and then return to Rome.

On October 1, John set out for Constance, travelling through Verona and Trent. There he met Frederick of Austria, lord of the Tyrol, who was no friend of Sigismund, and saw many advantages to be gained by an alliance with the Pope. John was eager to form a party of his own; and at Meran, on October 15, appointed Frederick Captain-General of his forces, and honorary chamberlain, with a yearly pension of 6600 ducats. Frederick was lord of much of the territory that lay round Constance; and John had the caution to assure himself of an ally who could afford him refuge or give him means of escape if need should be. Moreover, Frederick was related by marriage to the Duke of Burgundy, who had a strong motive for preventing the Council from sitting long, as he knew that the Galilean party intended to press a question which closely concerned his own honor. From Meran the journey was tedious and perilous. On the Arlberg the Pope’s carriage broke down and he was tumbled in the snow; when his attendants anxiously enquired if he was hurt he made the unchristian answer, “Here I lie in the devil’s name”. When he reached the summit of the pass and looked down upon the Lake of Constance girt in by mountains and hills, he exclaimed with a shudder, “A trap for foxes!”. At last the perils of the journey were over and its sweets begun; but, true to his policy of making useful friends, John conferred on the Abbot of Kreuzlingen, a monastery just outside the walls of Constance, the privilege of wearing a mitre. On October 28, he made his entry into Constance attended by nine Cardinals and followed by six hundred attendants; he was received by the city magistrates with all due pomp and reverence.
BOOK II.
THE COUNCIL OF CONSTANCE
1414 — 1418.

CHAPTER I.
THE COUNCIL OF CONSTANCE AND JOHN XXIII.
1414—1415.

At the time of the assembling of the Council of Constance there was a widespread and serious desire throughout Europe for a reformation of the ecclesiastical desire for abuses which the Schism had forced into such luxuriant growth; not only was unity to be restored to the headship of the Church, but a remedy must also be found for the evils which beset the entire body. The gross extortions of the Pope and Curia must be checked and their occasion done away. The Papal invasion of ecclesiastical patronage all over Christendom must be stopped. The ordinary machinery of Church government, which had been weakened by the constant interference of the Pope, must be again restored. The clergy, whose knowledge, morality and zeal had all declined, must be brought back to discipline, so that their waning influence over earnest men might be re-established.

If we would understand aright the force of the feelings that made the Papacy hateful, till the hatred broke out into open revolt, it is worthwhile to gather a few of the impassioned utterances of this time. Dietrich Vrie, a German monk who went to Constance, in a Latin poem more remarkable for its vigor than its grace, puts the following language into the mouth of the disconsolate Church: — “The Pope, once the wonder of the world, has fallen, and with him fell the heavenly temples, my members. Now is the reign of Simon Magus, and the riches of this world prevent just judgment. The Papal Court nourishes every kind of scandal, and turns God’s houses into a market. The sacraments are basely sold; the rich is honored, the poor is despised, he who gives most is best received. Golden was the first age of the Papal Court; then came the baser age of silver; next the iron age long set its yoke on the stubborn neck. Then came the age of clay. Could aught be worse? Aye, dung; and in dung sits the Papal Court. All things are degenerate; the Papal Court is rotten; the Pope himself, head of all wickedness, plots every kind of disgraceful scheme, and, while absolving others, hurries himself to death”.

Vrie’s History of the Council of Constance begins with a denunciation of the simony, the avarice, the ambition, and the luxury of the Pope, the bishops, and the entire clergy: “What shall I say of their luxury when the facts themselves cry out most openly on the shameless life of prelates and priests! They spare neither condition nor sex; maidens and married men and those living in the world are all alike to them”. “Benefices”, he complains, “which ought to provide alms for the poor have become the patrimony of the rich. One holds eighteen, another twenty, a third twenty-four; while
the poor man is despised, his knowledge and his holy life are of no account. An infant newly born is provided by his careful parents with ecclesiastical benefices. We will hand him over, say they, to such a bishop who is our friend, or whom we have served, that we may be enriched from the goods of the Lord, and our inheritance be not divided amongst so many children”. Another is nurtured with more than fatherly affection by some dean or provost, that he may succeed him — is nurtured in luxury and sin. Another, perhaps the son of a prince, is worthy of an archdeaconry, much more so if he be a bishop’s nephew. Another eagerly seeks a place on every side, flatters, cringes, dissembles, nay, does not blush to beg, crawling on hands and knees, provided that by any guile he may creep into the patrimony of the Crucified One”.

If these utterances of Vrie be thought rhetorical, the more sober spirit of Nicolas de Clemanges, Doctor of the University of Paris, and Secretary to Benedict XIII, gives no very different account. “Now-a-days in undertaking a cure of souls no mention is made of Divine services, of the salvation or edification of those entrusted to the priest’s care; the only question is about the revenue. Nor do men count the revenue to be the value of the benefice to one who is resident and serves the Church, but what it will yield to one who is far away and perhaps never intends to visit it. No one obtains a benefice however great his merit without constant and repeated asking for it. The Popes in their desire for money have drawn all manner of elections into their own hands, and appoint ignorant and useless men, provided they are rich and can afford to pay large sums. The rights of bishops and patrons are set at naught; grants of benefices in expectancy are given to men who come from the plough and do not know A from B. The claims of the Popes for first-fruits, or the first year’s revenue on presentation to a benefice, and other dues have become intolerable. Papal collectors devastate the land, and excommunicate or suspend those who do not satisfy their demands; hence churches fall into ruins, and the church plate is sold; priests leave their benefices and take to secular occupations. Ecclesiastical causes are drawn into the Papal Court on every kind of pretext, and judgment is given in favor of those who pay the most. The Papal Curia alone is rich, and benefices are heaped on Cardinals who devour their revenues in luxury and neglect their duties”.

“In this state of things”, Clemanges proceeds, “the chief care of the clergy is of their pockets, not of their flocks. They strive, scold, litigate, and would endure with greater calmness the loss of ten thousand souls than of ten thousand shillings. If by chance there arise a pastor who does not walk in this way, who despises money, or condemns avarice, or does not wring gold justly or unjustly from his people, but strives by wholesome exhortation to benefit their souls, and meditates on the law of God more than the laws of men, forthwith the teeth of all are whetted against him. They cry out that he is entirely senseless and unworthy of the priesthood; he is ignorant of the law and does not know how to defend his rights, or rule his people, or restrain them by canonical censures; he knows nothing save idle preaching which is more fitting for friars who have none of the cares of temporal administration. The study of Holy Writ and its professors are openly turned to ridicule, especially by the Popes, who set up their traditions far above the Divine commands. The sacred and noble duty of preaching is held so cheap among them that they count nothing less befitting their dignity. Episcopal jurisdiction is useless. Priests condemned for theft, homicide, rape, sacrilege, or any other serious offence are only condemned to imprisonment on a diet of bread and water, and are imprisoned only till they have paid enough money, when they walk away scot free. On the other hand, the Episcopal jurisdiction is eagerly extended over harmless rustics, and summoners scour the land to pry out offences against canon law, for which
the luckless victims are harassed by a protracted process and are driven to pay heavy fines to escape. Bishops do not hesitate to sell to priests licences to keep concubines. No care is taken to ordain proper persons to the priesthood. Men who are lazy and do not choose to work, but who wish to live in idleness, fly to the priesthood; as priests, they frequent brothels and taverns, and spend their time in drinking, reveling, and gambling, fight and brawl in their cups, and with their polluted lips blaspheme the name of God and the saints, and from the embraces of prostitutes hurry to the altar. Bishops are rarely resident in their sees and are generally engaged in political or temporal pursuits; yet they are of such a character that their absence is better than their presence. Chapters and their canons are no better than bishops. Monks are undisciplined and dissolute, idle and good for nothing. The Friars, on the other hand, are active enough, but active only in rapacity and voluptuousness. Nunneries are so sunk in shame, so openly given up to evil, that it is scarcely possible to speak of them”.

Clemanges admits that there are some good men among the clergy, but “scarcely one in a thousand sincerely does what his profession requires”. The Schism is the scourge of God on these abuses, and unless a reformation be wrought worse ills will follow and the Church will be destroyed. Denunciations to the same effect might be quoted from writers of almost every land. Lamentations over the corruptions of the Church were not confined to a few enthusiasts; men of high ecclesiastical position and of undoubted orthodoxy spoke openly of the abuses which everywhere prevailed. It was not wonderful that heresy spread, that the doctrines of Wycliffe and Huss made many converts. Men went to Constance with three aims in view — to restore the unity of the Church; to reform it in head and members; and to purge it of erroneous doctrines. These objects were to be attained by means of a General Council, though the exact scope of its power was yet to be determined.

The foundation of the Council’s authority was the theory that the plenitude of ecclesiastical power vested in the universal Church, whose Head was Christ, and of which the Pope was the chief minister. The executive power in the Church rested generally with the Pope; but a Council had a concurrent jurisdiction in all important matters, a corrective power in case of abuses, and a power of removing the Pope in case of necessity. For these purposes a Council had a power of compulsion and of punishment against a Pope. Such was the general result of the teaching of the Parisian theologians which had been turned into practice by the Council of Pisa.

But the Parisian theologians did not wish to push these principles too far. In practice they only aimed at rescuing the Papal primacy from the evils of the Schism, restoring its unity, regulating its powers, and then reinstating it in its former position. There was a school of German reformers who had a more ideal system before their eyes, who aimed at diminishing the plenitude of the Papal primacy, and making it depend on the recognition of the Church. Their views are fully expressed in a treatise written in 1410, most probably the work of Deitrich of Niem, who well knew the ways of the Roman Curia: “About the means of unity and reforming the Church”. Beginning from the Creed, the writer asserts his belief in “one Catholic and Apostolic Church”. The Catholic Church consists of all who believe in Christ, who is its only Head, and it can never err; the Apostolic Church is a particular and private Church, consisting of Pope, Cardinals, and prelates; its head is supposed to be the Pope, and it can err. The Catholic Church cannot be divided; but for the sake of its members we must labor for the unity of the Apostolic Church, which stands to the Catholic Church as a genus to a species. As the object of all society is the common good, a Pope can have no rights as against the
well-being of the Church. The Papal primacy has been won by guile and fraud, and usurpation; but the idea that a Pope cannot be judged by any is contrary alike to reason and Scripture. The Pope is a man, born of man, subject to sin, a few days ago a peasant’s son; how is he to become impeccable and infallible? He is bound to resign or even to die if the common good should require it. The unity of the Church must be secured by the abdication of two of the three Popes, or, if it be necessary, by the compulsory abdication of all of them. Union with a particular Pope is no part of the faith of the Catholic Church, nor is it necessary for salvation; rather, Popes contending for their private goods are in mortal sin, and have no claim on the allegiance of Christians. A General Council represents the universal Church; and when the question to be settled is the resignation of a Pope, it does not belong to the Pope to summon the Council, but to prelates and princes who represent the community. The Pope is bound to obey such a Council, which can make new laws and rescind old ones. The Council must make a general reform in the Church, must sweep away simony, and amend the ways of Pope, Cardinals, prelates, and other clergy. For this purpose it must limit the power of the Pope who has invaded the rights of bishops, drawn all matters to the Curia, and overthrown the original constitution of the Church. The authority of the Pope must be reduced to its ancient limits, the abuses of the Cardinals must be checked, and the prelates and clergy purified”. The writer of this treatise admits that there are many difficulties in the way — difficulties arising from self-interest and conservative prejudice. A Council can only succeed if supported by the Emperor who holds from God a power over the bodies of all men. The work concludes with defining the business of the Council to be: (1) the reincorporation of the members of the universal Church, (2) the establishment of one undoubted and good Pope, (3) limitation of the Papal power, (4) restoration of the ancient rights of the primitive Church, (5) provisions concerning Pope and Cardinals which may prevent future schism, and finally (6) the removal of all abuses in the government of the Church.

Such was the large plan of the reforming party in Germany. It was to be decided in the Council assembled at Constance how much of it should be carried into actual effect.

The quiet city of Constance was now to be the center of European politics; for the Council held in it was looked upon as a congress rather than a synod. Every nation in Europe felt itself more or less helpless and in need of assistance. Italy was in a condition of hopeless confusion; the Greek Empire was in its decrepitude menaced by the Turks, whom Hungary also had just reason to dread; Bohemia was torn by civil and religious discord; the Empire was feeble and divided; in France, the madness of King Charles VI gave an opportunity to the bloody feuds of the Burgundians and Armagnacs; England had gathered strength a little under Henry IV, but was disturbed by the Lollards, and was on the brink of war with France. Europe was hopelessly distracted, and longed to realize its unity in some worthy work. The disunion of the ecclesiastical system was a symbol of the civil discord which everywhere prevailed. Men looked back longingly upon a more peaceful past, and Sigismund’s appeal to old traditions met with a ready answer. The Council of Pisa had been an assemblage of prelates; through Sigismund’s participation the Council of Constance became the meeting place of all the national interests of Christendom. Slowly but sincerely all the wisest in Europe prepared to set their faces towards Constance.

Men did not assemble at once. Till the last there had been doubts whether the Pope would come. In June came the Bishop of Augsburg and the Count of the of Nellenburg to make preparations on Sigismund’s part; it was not till August 12 that the Cardinal of
Viviers arrived on behalf of the Pope, and preparations were made in earnest. The magistrates and citizens of Constance set themselves diligently to work to provide lodgings, lay up stores of provisions, take measures for the safety and order of the city, and make all the numerous changes which were necessary to enable them to fulfill the honorable duty which had fallen upon them. At first, however, prelates arrived slowly, chiefly from Italy, in obedience to the Pope. On November 1, owing to the scanty attendance, John deferred the opening of the Council till the 3rd, and in so doing pronounced the Council to be a continuation of the Council of Pisa. On November 3, the opening was again deferred till the 5th, when the Pope with fifteen Cardinals, two Patriarchs, twenty-three Archbishops, and a good number of other prelates, solemnly opened the Council by a service in the cathedral, after which the first session was fixed for the 16th.

Now that the Council had begun, arrivals became more frequent, still chiefly from Italy, whence the good news of the recovery of Rome filled the Pope’s heart with joy. Meanwhile the theologians were busy in drawing up proposals for the procedure of the Council. They suggested that proctors and promoters be appointed as at Pisa, who should lay matters before the Council; besides them was to be chosen a number of doctors who between the sessions should receive suggestions and determine the form in which business should be brought forward. It was generally agreed that the first question should be the restoration of the unity of the Church by procuring, if possible, the abdication of Gregory XII and Benedict XIII. At the first session on November 16, John XXIII preached a sermon on the text, “Speak ye every man the truth”; after which a Bull was read detailing the circumstances of the summoning of the Council, and its connection with the Councils of Pisa and Rome, exhorting the members to root out the errors of Wycliffe and reform the Church, and promising to all entire freedom of consultation and action. Nothing more was done that day. As yet the Pope and the Council were watching each other, and no one was ready to take a decided step. Those amongst the Germans and Italians who wished something to be done were waiting for the French and English prelates to lead them.

With the arrival of Peter d'Ailly, Bishop of Cambrai, on November 17, begins the first formation of an opposition to the Pope, which a trivial incident soon brought to light. On November 18, lodgings were prepared in the Augustinian monastery for the Cardinal of Ragusa, legate of Gregory XII. According to custom the legate’s arms were put up above the door and with them the arms of Gregory XII. On the following night the arms were ignominiously torn down, without doubt by the orders of John XXIII. This overt action awoke at once a feeling among the members of the Council, and a congregation was called to consider the matter. It was urged that Gregory, having been deposed by the Council of Pisa, could not have any claim to be acknowledged as Pope; but the general opinion was against any decision on this broad ground; and merely agreed that the arms should not be replaced because Gregory XII was not himself present, but only his legates. Soon after this, on November 28, came a letter from Sigismund telling of his coronation at Aachen, and announcing his speedy arrival at the Council. John was compelled in courtesy to answer by a letter urging him to come as soon as possible; but he was ill at ease. His plans for managing the Council did not seem to prosper. He had hoped to overbear opposition by the multitude of Italian bishops dependent on himself; but this intention was so openly displayed that the Council, in spite of John’s efforts to the contrary, began to talk of organizing itself by nations, so as to do away with the numerical preponderance of the Italians, and allow
each separate kingdom to bring forward its own special grievances. Indeed, John was not a skillful diplomat; he could not disguise his uneasiness, and was too transparent in his intrigues. He gained secret information from his partisans of everything that was being talked about, and then was not discreet enough to keep his own counsel. The opposition between the Pope and the Council was day by day increasing, and he was anxious to have a secure position before Sigismund came.

Accordingly in a congregation of Cardinals and prelates held in the Pope’s Palace, though in the Pope’s absence, on December 7, the Italian or Papal party brought forward a schedule to regulate the business of the Council. This schedule laid down that matters concerning the faith were to take precedence over other matters; that the first step should be to confirm the acts of the Council of Pisa, and empower the Pope to proceed against Gregory XII and Benedict XIII if possible by compact, if not by force; that the Pope should summon a General Council every ten years, should abolish simony, and agree to a few obvious regulations. The object of this proposal was to recognize the acts of the Council of Pisa, so far as the deposition of Gregory and Benedict was concerned, but to give the Council of Constance an independent existence so far as regarded the reformation of the Church. Questions relating to faith the opinions of Wycliffe and Huss, were first to be discussed, and no doubt they would take up time enough till the Council dissolved, and all discussions of reforms, except on a few trivial points, might be again put off. This proposal of the Italians was opposed by Peter d’Ailly and other French prelates, who objected that the present Council was a continuation of the Council of Pisa for the purpose of proceeding with the union and reformation of the Church; until that had been accomplished it must rest on the basis of the Pisan Council, and could not confirm it: whoever spoke of dissolving or proroguing this Council was a favorer of schism and heresy.

A third proposal was made by four of the old Cardinals, which was directly aimed against the Pope. It set forth bluntly and straightforwardly the reforms which were needed in the Pope’s household and personal conduct. The Pope, it laid down, ought to have fixed hours in the day for religious duties, which ought not to be slurred over nor neglected; he must show diligence in business, and avoid simony; he should appear in public in Papal attire, and should conduct himself with gravity in word and gesture; he must take care that the Papal dignity be not counted cheap in the eyes of the nations flocking to the Council, and must remember the saying that “careless masters make lazy servants”; he should not waste his time in idle talk with irresponsible persons, but should act with proper advice, regulate everything that goes on in the Council, and honestly work with it. There was certainly no want of plain speaking; and John might have perceived, had he been wise, how dangerous was his position between those who, like Peter d’Ailly, wished to set to work at the reformation of the Church, and those who were convinced that no reformation of the Church was possible till there had been a very decided reformation in the Pope.

No conclusion was arrived at from this discussion; but few days later, D’Ailly, in a general congregation in the Pope’s presence, read a memoir in favor of proceeding mildly against Gregory and Benedict as the surest way of promoting the cause of union. Resignation ought to be made easy to them in every way; a committee might be appointed by the Council chosen from the different nations to confer with them and arrange terms for their resignation. This view of D’Ailly’s was vehemently attacked both by those who were partisans of John XXIII and by those who wished to maintain to the letter the authority of the Pisan Council. D’Ailly answered the arguments of both parties,
and in so doing laid down a principle which was fruitful in later times. “Although the Pisan Council”, he said, “is believed with probability to have represented the universal Church which is ruled by the Holy Spirit and cannot err; still, every Christian is not bound to believe that that Council could not err, seeing that there have been many former Councils, accounted general, which, we read, have erred. For according to some great doctors a General Council can err not only in deed but also in law, and, what is more, in faith; for it is only the universal Church which has the privilege that it cannot err in faith”. To meet the general suspicion with which the proceedings of the Council of Pisa were regarded, D'Ailly laid down the weighty principle that the faith of Christendom was to be found graven on the heart of Christendom; and the infallibility of Councils was to depend on their decrees embodying the universal consciousness of the truth.

These differences of opinion prevented any definite conclusion, and further proceedings were deferred till the arrival of Sigismund. The second session, which John had announced for December 17, was not held till March 2, 1415. On the morning of Christmas Day, amid the glare of torches, Sigismund arrived in Constance with his Queen, Barbara of Cilly, Queen Elizabeth of Hungary, the Countess of Wurtemberg, and Rudolph of Saxony. He scarcely had time to change his raiment before he made his first public appearance at early mass on Christmas morning. The Markgraf of Brandenburg bore the royal scepter; the Elector of Saxony the drawn sword, and the Count of Cilly the golden apple of the Empire. Sigismund acted as deacon at the mass, and read with majesty the Gospel, “There went out a decree from Caesar Augustus”. The Pope, after the mass was over, handed the King a sword, with a charge to use it in protection of the Church, which Sigismund swore to do. Sigismund had a love of pomp and outward magnificence, and had timed his arrival at the Council so as to gratify it to the full. Once having secured his position, he was sure to receive due respect afterwards; the staunch adherents of the Council offered extravagant incense to the Imperial dignity. He was addressed as a second Messiah come to ransom and restore the desolate Church.

Sigismund's arrival was the signal to all who had yet delayed to hasten their journey to Constance. Day by princes and prelates, nobles and theologians from every court and every nation of Europe, had been streaming into the little town on the borders of the Boden See. From Italy, France, and Germany; from England, Sweden, Denmark, Poland, Hungary, Bohemia, even from Constantinople, flocked the representatives of power and learning. In their train came a motley crew of sightseers and adventurers of every kind. The novels of the next generation show us how Constance was regarded as the metropolis of every kind of enjoyment, gallantry, and intrigue. The number of strangers present in Constance during the Council seems to have varied between 50,000 and 100,000, amongst whom were counted 1500 prostitutes and 1400 flute players, mountebanks, and such like. Thirty thousand horses were stalled in the city; beds were provided for 36,000 men; and boys made fortunes by raking up the hay that fell from the carts which thronged the streets with fodder. Excellent precautions were taken under the direction of the Pfalzgraf Lewis for the supply of provisions and the maintenance of order. In spite of the crowd there was no lack of food, nor did the prices rise owing to the pressure. Two thousand men sufficed to preserve order, and the utmost decorum marked all the proceedings of the Council, though we read that during the session of the Council 500 men disappeared by drowning in the lake. This vast number of attendants lent splendor and magnificence to all the proceedings, and gave an overpowering sense
of their importance. The number of prelates was twenty-nine cardinals, three patriarchs, thirty-three archbishops, about 150 bishops, 100 abbots, 50 provosts, 300 doctors of theology, and 1800 priests. More than 100 dukes and earls and 2400 knights are recorded as present, together with 116 representatives of cities. The Pope’s suite alone consisted of 600 horsemen, and a simple priest like Huss had eight attendants. The enumeration of such details shows both the pomp and luxury of the age, and also the surprising power of organization which enabled a little city like Constance, whose ordinary population cannot have exceeded 7000, to accommodate so vast a multitude.

The Council awaited Sigismund’s arrival before deciding what business was first to be taken in hand. John and the Italians wished to begin with the policy of condemnation of Wycliffe’s opinions and the trial of Huss; the French, headed by Peter d'Ailly, wished to take in hand first the restoration of unity to the Church. In an Advent sermon, preached before Sigismund’s arrival, on the text, “There shall be signs in the sun, and in the moon, and in the stars”, D’Ailly defined clearly the position of the Council. The sun, he explained, represents the Papal majesty, the moon the Imperial power, the stars the different orders of ecclesiastics: in this Council all come together to represent the Universal Church. There must be one good Pope who lives rightly and governs well, not three in impious mockery of the Trinity. The Emperor with clemency and justice must carry out the decrees of the Council; the clergy, summoned by the Pope, must assist him with their wisdom. Three things are to be done. The past must be amended — that is, the Church must be reformed — the present must be duly ordered by attaining unity, and provision must be made for the future by wise precautions. Such was the policy which D’Ailly advocated with all his zeal and learning. He laid it down that there could be no real union without reformation, and no real reformation without union. Sigismund at once fell in with D’Ailly’s policy, and his first steps showed that he wished to proceed first with the restoration of unity. On December 29 he laid before the Council a statement of his embassies to Gregory XII, to Benedict XIII, and to the King of Aragon, and asked the Council to wait for the arrival of their of the ambassadors envoy.

On January 4, 1415, the question was discussed whether the envoys of the anti-popes were to be received as cardinals or no. John’s faction strongly opposed the concession by the Council of any such distinction to the envoys of those who had been deposed at the Council of Pisa. Peter d'Ailly, true to his principle of proceeding with all possible gentleness, and throwing no hindrances in the way of a union, succeeded in carrying his point that they should be received in their cardinals’ acts. This was a severe blow to John, and showed him that he had not much to expect from Sigismund’s help. On January 12 the ambassadors of Benedict and Aragon proposed that Sigismund should advance to Nice, and there confer with Benedict and the King of Aragon about means to end the Schism; to this request no answer was given at the time. On January 25 Gregory’s ambassadors were honorably received by Sigismund and the Council, as they were under the protection of Lewis of Bavaria, who next day presented a memoir undertaking, on behalf of himself and Gregory’s adherents, to procure Gregory’s abdication, and themselves join the Council, provided John did not preside, and Gregory was invited to attend. To this John’s partisans answered that the abdication of Gregory and Benedict, according to the provisions of the Council of Pisa, was desirable, but that the question of John’s presidency could not be discussed, as he was the lawful Pope whom all were bound to obey, and he was willing to labor with all his power for the reformation of the Church.
John XXIII felt that the toils were closing round him. He had not been present at the assemblies for some time, but he was carefully informed of everything that passed. He was glad to find an opportunity of making a public appearance, and preside at the solemn ceremony of the canonization of a saint. A Swedish lady, Briget, who instituted a new monastic order and died at Rome in 1373, had been canonized already by Boniface IX. But as this had occurred during the time of the Schism, the representatives of the northern nations were desirous of having the authenticity of their countrywoman’s title placed beyond dispute. The canonization took place on February I. A Danish archbishop, after mass was over, raised a silver image of the saint to popular adoration: the Te Deum was raised by those present, and the day closed with splendid festivities.

But ceremonies and festivities did not prevent the expression of what everyone had in his mind. It was clear that the union of the Church could only be accomplished by the resignation of all the three Popes, and the offer of Gregory’s abdication brought forward prominently the desirability of John’s resignation as well. The first to break the ice and venture to express the general idea was Guillaume Filastre, a learned French prelate whom John had made cardinal. Filastre circulated a memoir in which he pointed out that the surest and quickest means of procuring union was the mutual abdication of all three Popes; if this were so, John was bound to adopt that method; for if the Good Shepherd would lay down His life for His sheep, much more ought the Pope to lay down his dignities. If he was bound to do so, the Council might compel him to do so; but he should first be asked humbly to adopt this course, and should be assured of an honorable position in the Church if he complied. Sigismund expressed his approval of this memoir, which was largely circulated, and soon reached the Pope, who had not expected to be attacked by his own Cardinals, and was greatly enraged. Filastre, however, put on a bold face, visited the Pope, and assured him that he had acted to the best of his knowledge for the good of the Church. Filastre’s memoir drew forth several answers, urging that the course which he proposed destroyed the validity of the Council of Pisa, and that it was unjust to rank a legitimate Pope with men who had been condemned as schismatics and heretics. In a matter of so great delicacy it was judged wise to proceed by means of written memoirs, and not to enter upon a public discussion till considerable unanimity had been obtained.

Peter d’Ailly again came forward to defend the original scheme of the University of Paris and remove by subtle arguments founded on expediency the formal objections urged against John’s resignation. He recognized John as the lawful Pope, and allowed the validity of all that had been done at Pisa; but, he argued, the adherents of Benedict and Gregory do not agree, and all the arguments in favor of promoting union by voluntary abdication, which were urged at Pisa, apply with still greater force when there are three Popes instead of two. In the proposal for John’s abdication he is not ranked with the Popes who were deposed, but is set above these by being summoned to perform an “act which is for the good of the Church. If he refuse, the Council, as representing the Church, may compel him to lay aside his office, though no charge be made against him, simply as a means of effecting the unity which the Church longs for”.

John now clearly saw the issue which lay before him, but he still had hopes of escaping. Memoirs might be circulated and discussions carried on amongst the right of theologians assembled in Constance, but when the matters came to voting he would be safe. He had spent money freely to secure votes: the crowd of needy Italian prelates was all dependent on him; he had created fifty new bishops with a view to their votes in the
Council. John’s adversaries saw this also, and boldly raised the question who had the right to vote. According to old custom there was no doubt that this right had been exercised only by bishops and abbots, and John’s adherents demanded that the old custom should be followed. But D’Ailly answered, with his usual learning and clearness of judgment, “that in the most ancient times, as may be found in the Acts of the Apostles and Eusebius, the object was to represent in councils the Christian community; only bishops and abbots voted because they were thoroughly representative. At present priors and heads of congregations had a greater right to vote than titular abbots who represented no one. Moreover doctors of theology and law were not heard of in old times, because there were no universities; they ought now to be admitted, as they had been at Pisa, on account of their position as teachers and representatives of learning. Also, as the question under discussion was the unity of the Church, it was absurd to exclude kings and princes, or their ambassadors, since they were especially affected”. Filastre went further than D’Ailly. He demanded that all the clergy should be allowed to vote. “An ignorant king or bishop”, he said, “is no better than a crowned ass”. He urged that the status of all priests was the same, though their rank might differ. This extremely democratic view did not meet with much favor, and D’Ailly’s suggestions were practically adopted by the Council.

Moreover the large crowd of Italians, dependent on the Pope, possessed a numerical superiority which was out of proportion to the interests which they represented. There had been some discussion of this point amongst the Germans; but the arrival of the English representatives on January 21 gave the question new prominence. The English were few in number; their voting power, if votes were to be counted by heads, was insignificant. The chief of the English prelates, Robert Hallam, Bishop of Salisbury, faced this fact and proposed to the Germans a scheme for solving the difficulty. He suggested that it would be well for the Council to adopt the same system as prevailed in the universities and organize itself by nations. A session of the Council had been fixed for February 6; but the English and Germans rose and protested against procedure by individual voting: they demanded that an equal number of deputies from each nation should have the ultimate decision on all important matters. Next day the French gave in their adhesion to the plan, and the Italians were powerless to resist. Thus without any definite decree of the Council a new form of constitution was established, which made the prospect of uniting the Church much more hopeful. Henceforth every matter was first discussed by each nation separately, and their conclusions were communicated to one another. When by this means an agreement had been reached, a general congregation of the four nations was held, and the conclusions were put into a final shape. A general session of the Council then gave formal validity to the decree.

John XXIII’s hopes of being able to lead the Council were now entirely frustrated; he had to consider how he might best escape destruction. The plan of a common abdication of all three Popes was proposed in a congregation of the English, Germans, and French on February 15, and was by them laid before the Italians, who gave a reluctant assent. John’s courage was entirely upset by hearing that a memoir had been circulated by some Italian, containing a list of his crimes and vices, and demanding that an enquiry be instituted into the truth of the charges. Doubtless John’s life had not been such that he would wish its details to be exposed in the eyes of assembled Christendom. He had done many things that ill befitted a priestly character, and enough could be substantiated against him to make the blackest charges seem credible on very slight evidence. John was entirely unnerved at the prospect; he consulted with his Cardinals
whether he had not better at once confess to the Council the frailties from which, as a man, he had not been exempt. They advised him to wait awhile and think over it before committing himself. John’s relief was great when he heard that many of the English and Germans opposed an enquiry into his character from a wish to spare the reputation of the Papacy, and advocated that he be urged to abdicate.

This plan had now received such unanimous assent, that it was impossible for John to oppose it openly. He professed to accept it readily; but he hoped to do so in terms so vague as to lead to no results. His first schedule was rejected as too dubious in meaning. The second met with no better success, as it indulged in needless condemnation of Gregory and Benedict as heretics. The Germans passed a series of strong resolutions which pressed hard upon John. They declared that the Council had supreme authority to end the Schism, and that John was bound under the penalty of mortal sin to accept a formula of resignation offered by the three nations. On February 28 the formula was drawn up. In it John was made to “undertake and promise” to resign, if, and as far as, Gregory and Benedict did the same. The representatives of the University of Paris suggested that this only imposed a civil obligation, which it would be well to strengthen by a religious one; they proposed the addition of the words “swear and vow”, which were unanimously accepted. On March 1 this formula was presented to the Pope in the presence of Sigismund and deputies from the nations. John received it with a good grace. First he read it to himself, and then, remarking that he had only come to Constance for the purpose of giving peace to the Church, read it aloud with a clear voice. Tears of joy streamed down many faces at the accomplishment of this first step towards the union of the Church; the assembled prelates raised the Te Deum, but more wept than sang and many did both. In the city the bells rang joyously, and the utmost delight prevailed at this first result of the Council, which had sat four months and had achieved nothing. Next day John read the same formula publicly in the cathedral; at the solemn words of promise he bowed before the altar and laid his hand upon his breast. Sigismund rose from his throne, laid aside his crown, and kneeling before the Pope kissed his foot in token of gratitude. The Patriarch of Alexandria thanked him in the name of the Council.

The unanimity between John and the Council seemed to be complete; but, when the first outburst of joy was over, John’s resignation seemed to be too good news to be true. There was a wish to bind him more completely, and it was suggested that he should embody his resignation in a Bull. At first he refused; but Sigismund’s influence obtained the Bull on March 7. The Council was anxious to be quite sure of its own position, as it was now in a position to authorize the interview which Benedict’s ambassadors had suggested between their master and Sigismund at Nice. When preparations were being made for this purpose it was suggested that John should name as his proctors, with full power to resign in his behalf, Sigismund and the prelates who were to accompany him. This was a vital point, on which John could not give way: if he did, his chances were entirely lost and his resignation, which was at present only conditional, would be irrevocably accomplished. He adroitly proposed that he should go himself to meet Benedict; but the Council remembered the innumerable obstacles which had been found to prevent the meeting of Gregory and Benedict; nor did they desire to let John leave Constance lest he should at once dissolve the Council. Mutual distrust blazed up in an instant. Frederick of Austria had come to Constance on February 18, and though he studiously avoided the Pope, rumors were rife of an understanding between them, and suspicions were keen. John made a last attempt to soften Sigismund
by presenting him, on March 10, with the golden rose, which, according to old custom, the Popes consecrated, when they chose, three weeks before Easter, and presented to kings whom they delighted to honor. Sigismund received the gift with due respect, and bore it in solemn procession through the city; but it was significant that he did not keep it for himself, but offered it to the Virgin in the cathedral.

Sigismund soon showed that he was not moved by this touching mark of Papal affection. Next day, March II, he presided at a congregation, in which some members spoke of electing a new Pope, after securing the abdication of the three claimants. Archbishop of Mainz rose and protested that he could obey no one except John XXIII. Words ran high; the old accusations against John were again brought up, and the assembly dispersed in confusion. It was clear that there was war between Sigismund and the Pope. John did not mean to take any steps to accomplish his resignation; Sigismund was resolved to hold him to his promise. As John would not give way, it was clear that he must be purposing to leave Constance. Sigismund gave orders that the gates should be closely guarded. When one of the Cardinals attempted to pass he was turned back. John summoned the great lords and magistrates of the city, and loudly complained to the Council, with good reason, of this violation of the safe-conduct under which they were all assembled. The burgomaster of Constance pleaded Sigismund’s orders; Frederick of Austria stood forward and declared that, for his part, he intended to keep the safe-conduct which he had promised. Next day, March 14, Sigismund summoned a congregation of the French, Germans, and English, who sent to the Pope a renewed demand that he would appoint proctors to carry out his abdication; they added a request that he would promise not to dissolve the Council or allow anyone to leave Constance till union had been achieved. With these demands Sigismund sent his excuse about the watch over the gate; he said that he had set it at the request of some of the Cardinals, who feared lest the Council should melt away; he wished, however, in all things to stand by his safe-conduct. John agreed not to dissolve the Council, but suggested its transference to some place in the neighborhood of Nice, where he might more conveniently meet Benedict and perform his resignation in person.

Matters were now in a very awkward position. Sigismund and the three Transalpine nations stood opposed to the Pope and the Italians. John’s resistance clearly indicated an intention of quitting Constance; this made his opponents more eager to deprive him by any means of the power of harming them. In a congregation on March 17 the Germans and English were for insisting on the appointment of proctors by the Pope; but the French were opposed to driving matters to extremities, and voted for adjournment. The French already had had experience of the difficulties in the way of using violence to a Pope; they had also a stronger sense of decorum than the Teutons, and seem to have resented the high-handed way in which Sigismund managed matters. The close alliance between the English and the Germans somewhat annoyed them; for, though the mission of the Council was a peaceful one, national animosity could not be entirely silenced, and the French knew that England was on the brink of waging an unjust war of invasion against their country. No sooner was there the faintest sign of a breach in the serried front of the Transalpine nations than the Italians hastened to take advantage of it. They sent five Cardinals to detach the French from the English and Germans. Amongst them was Peter d’Ailly, for the Cardinals as Italian prelates formed part of the Italian nation. D’Ailly, who had been the most prominent man in the beginning of the Council, disapproved of the violent and revolutionary spirit which had been developed since Sigismund’s arrival. He now used his influence with the French to induce them not to
join with the Germans and English in their scheme of forcing the Pope to appoint proctors; he also begged them to withdraw from the method of voting by nations, and advocate the old method of personal voting. Though D’Ailly had argued strongly in favor of extending the franchise, he was not prepared to admit an entire change in the method of voting.

The prospect of a union between the French and the Italians enraged still more the Germans and English. At a Congregation on March 19 the English proposed that John be seized and made prisoner. Sigismund, followed by the English and Germans, proceeded with this demand to an assembly where the French were sitting in conference with the five Cardinals deputed by the Italians. If the French had before resented Sigismund’s conduct, they now blazed up at this unwarrantable interference, and angrily demanded that their deliberations should be left undisturbed. The English and Germans withdrew, but Sigismund and his lords remained. The French demanded that the lords also should withdraw. Sigismund lost his temper, for the majority of those who sat amongst the French were his subjects. He angrily exclaimed, “Now it will be seen who is for union and faithful to the Roman Empire”. Peter d’Ailly, indignant at this attempted coercion, rose and left the room; the other four Cardinals protested that they were not free to deliberate. On the King’s departure messengers were sent to ask if the French were to consider themselves free. Sigismund had now recovered his equanimity, and answered that they were perfectly free; he had spoken in haste. At the same time he ordered all who did not belong to the French nation to quit their assembly on pain of imprisonment. The quarrel seemed to have become serious; but the ambassadors of the French King, who had arrived on March 5, entered the French assembly, and said that the French King wished that the Pope should appoint proctors, and should not leave Constance nor dissolve the Council. This calmed the wrath of the French, who now separated themselves again from the Italians and joined the Germans and English.

There now seemed to be no hope for John XXIII, but the sense of his danger at length spurred him to Frederick take the desperate step of fleeing from Constance. He had bound to himself Frederick of Austria, a young and adventurous prince, who hated Sigismund, feared the Council, and hoped to gain much from the Pope. He had come to Constance, and there found his pride outraged by the commanding position assigned to Sigismund. He had been called upon by Sigismund to do homage for his lands, and, though at first he refused, was driven to do so by the good terms on which the King stood with the Swiss cantons, the hereditary foes of the Austrian House. He strove to detach Sigismund from the Swiss by offering aid for a war against them. But Sigismund was too wily for him, and gave the Swiss information of his proposals; when the Swiss envoys arrived in Constance, Sigismund confronted them with Frederick, and offered his services to settle any disputes which might exist between them. Outwitted and filled with shame and rage, Frederick stammered out excuses, and had to arrange matters with the Swiss by pleading that he had been misinformed. But Frederick’s humiliation made him burn with desire to upset Sigismund’s triumphal progress at the Council. He knew that he would not stand alone, and that John still had powerful friends. The Duke of Burgundy wished by all means to dissolve the Council; the Archbishop of Mainz was Sigismund’s foe and a staunch adherent of John; the Markgraf of Baden had been won over to John’s side by the substantial argument of a gift of 16,000 florins.

John and Frederick laid their plans cautiously and skillfully, yet not without awakening some suspicion. Sigismund thought it well to visit the Pope and reassure him. He found him in the evening lying on his bed, and enquired about his health; John
answered that the air of Constance did not agree with him. Sigismund said that there were many pleasant residences near Constance where he might go for change of air, and offered to accompany him; he begged him not to think of leaving Constance secretly. John answered that he had no intention of leaving till the Council was dissolved. Men afterwards regarded this answer as framed like an oracle of old; John meant that by his departure he would dissolve the Council. No sooner was the King gone than John, in the hearing of his attendants, called him a “beggar, a drunkard, a fool, and a barbarian”. He accused Sigismund of sending to demand a bribe for keeping him in his Papal office. Most likely John here laid his finger on Sigismund’s weak point; Sigismund was poor, and may have demanded money for the expenses of the Council from the Pope, whom he was laboring to drive from his office. John’s attendants wondered to hear such plain speaking: their master’s tongue was loosened by the thought that he would soon be rid of the necessity of the intolerable self-restraint under which he had been lately living.

Next day, March 20, a tournament was held outside the walls, in which Frederick of Austria had challenged the son of the Count of Cilly to break a lance with him. The town was emptied of the throng, which flocked to the spectacle. In the general confusion the Pope, disguised as a groom, mounted on a sorry nag, covered by a grey cloak and a hat slouched over his face, with a bow hanging from his saddle, passed out unperceived. He slowly made his way to Ermatingen, on the Unter See, where a boat was waiting to convey him to Schaffhausen, a town belonging to Frederick. In the midst of the tourney a servant whispered the news into Frederick’s ear. He continued the joust for a while, and gracefully allowed his adversary to win the prize; then he took horse and rode off the same evening to join the Pope at Schaffhausen.
CHAPTER II.
DEPOSITION OF JOHN XXIII.
1415

Great was the tumult in Constance when at nightfall the flight of the Pope became known. The mob rushed to plunder the Pope’s palace; merchants began to pack their goods and prepare to defend themselves against a riot; most men thought that the Council had come to an end. The prelates who had spoken against John looked on themselves as ruined; those who were zealous for the reform of the Church saw their hopes entirely overthrown. But Sigismund showed energy and determination in this crisis. He ordered the burgomaster to call the citizens under arms and maintain order, and the Italian merchants saw with wonder the ease with which quiet was restored. Next day Sigismund, accompanied by Lewis of Bavaria, rode through the city, and with his own mouth exhorted all men to quietness and courage; he made proclamation that if John were fled he knew how to bring him back; meanwhile any one was free to follow him who chose. In a general congregation he held the same language, affirming that he would protect the Council and would labor for union even to death: he accused Frederick of Austria of abetting the Pope’s flight, and cited him to appear and answer for his deeds. The College of Cardinals chose three of their number as a deputation to John to beg him not to dissolve the Council, but appoint proctors to carry out his resignation. The same day brought a letter from John to Sigismund. “By the grace of God we are free and in agreeable atmosphere at Schaffhausen, where we came unknown to our son Frederick of Austria, with no intention of going back from our promise of abdicating to promote the peace of the Church, but that we may carry it out in freedom and with regard to our health”. The needless lie about Frederick of Austria was not calculated to carry much conviction of the truth of the Pope’s promises.

Before the departure of the Cardinals, the Council wishing to have a clear definition of their authority, so as not to depend entirely on the influence of Sigismund, requested Gerson, as the most learned theologian present, to preach upon the subject. Gerson’s sermon on March 23 laid down the general principles that the Church is united to its one Head, Christ, and that a General Council, representing the Church, is the authority or rule, guided by the Holy Ghost, ordained by Christ, which all, even the Pope, are bound to obey; the Pope is not so far above positive law as to set aside the decrees of a Council which can limit, though not abolish, the Pope’s power. The representatives of the University of Paris extended these principles of Gerson, and asserted that the Council could not be dissolved, but might continue itself and invoke the secular arm against all who refused to obey it; some went further than the majority would admit, and asserted that the Council was in all points above the Pope, and was not bound to obey him.

The Cardinals now found themselves in a difficult position; they did not wish to break with the Council, yet so long as John professed his willingness to abdicate they had not sufficient grounds for shaking off their allegiance to him. They thought it wiser not to be present at Gerson’s sermon, though they were informed by Sigismund of its purport, which the three Cardinal deputies, accompanied by the Archbishop of Rheims, communicated to the Pope at Schaffhausen. Meanwhile John had written letters to the University of Paris, the King of France, and the Duke of Orleans, explaining the reasons
of his flight. In them he artfully tried to play upon the hatred of the French to the English, and on the French King’s jealousy of Sigismund. He complained that the English and Germans had leagued themselves together to carry matters with a high hand, and that Sigismund had tried to make himself master of the Council; for these reasons he had retired to Schaffhausen, but was ready to accomplish his abdication, and wished to journey through France on his way to meet Benedict. These letters were written to no purpose, as they were only referred back to the Council. On the same day John sent to Constance a peremptory order to all the officers of the Curia to join him at Schaffhausen within six days, under pain of excommunication. Seven Cardinals left Constance next day, and went to Schaffhausen, as did the greater part of the Curia.

On March 25 the Archbishop of Rheims returned with letters from the Pope to Sigismund, saying that he had gone to Schaffhausen merely for change of air, not through any fear of danger. He offered to appoint as proctors to accomplish his resignation, in case Gregory and Benedict also resigned, the whole body of Cardinals, or three of them, and four prelates, one out of each nation, of whom three should be empowered to act. But the Council was full of suspicion of John and of his Cardinals; it resolved to go its own way according to the principles laid down by Gerson, and to pay no further heed to the Pope. So strong was the Council that it refused to consider the reasonable difficulties of the Cardinals, who felt themselves bound to hold by John until he openly set himself in opposition to the Council. The Cardinals, like all moderate men who try to guide their conduct by ordinary rules in extraordinary crises, were regarded with suspicion by both sides. They were not summoned to the assembly of nations held on March 26 to prepare decrees which were to be submitted to a session of the Council on the same day; the resolutions were only handed to them to read over before the session of the Council opened. They demanded that the session be deferred till the return of their envoys from the Pope; they were told that Sigismund and the Council were weary of subterfuges.

They were in sore perplexity; a wave of revolutionary spirit threatened to sweep away Pope and Cardinals at the same time. It seemed to some sufficiently dreadful that a session of the Council should be held without the Pope; though for this at least the precedent of the Council of Pisa could be claimed. But it was an unheard-of innovation that the Council should meet in spite of Pope and Cardinals; the exclusive aristocracy which had been willing to weaken the monarchical system of the Church found that its own position was almost lost as well. Some of the Cardinals at once retired to John; many thought it wise to pretend illness and watch how events turned out; only two determined to make a last effort to save the dignity of the Cardinals from the violence of the Council. Peter d’Ailly and Zabarella presented themselves at the session and succeeded in obtaining the respect due to their rank. D’Ailly celebrated the mass and presided; Zabarella read the decrees, which affirmed that the Council had been duly summoned to Constance, was not dissolved by the Pope’s flight, and ought not to be dissolved till the Schism was ended and the Church reformed; meanwhile the Council would not be transferred to another place without its own assent, nor should prelates leave the Council till its work was done. A loud cry of “Placet” followed the reading of these decrees. Then Zabarella went on to read a protest in behalf of himself and D’Ailly, saying that so long as John labored for the peace of the Church they must hold by him; they could have wished that this session had been deferred, but, as the Council determined otherwise, they thought it right to be present, in the hope that what was done would be confirmed by the Pope. The skillful and courageous behavior of the two
Cardinals saved the prestige of the Sacred College, and prevented an irrevocable breach between the Council and the old traditions of the Church, which would have strengthened the hands of John XXIII.

On the same evening the envoys of the Cardinals returned from Schaffhausen, and next day, March 27, before a general congregation, reported the Pope’s offer to appoint the Cardinals as his proctors, so that two of them could carry out his resignation, even against his will; he promised not to dissolve the Council till there was a perfect union of the Church; he demanded security for his own person and indemnity for the Duke of Austria. But the Council was too suspicious of John to trust to any fair promises, nor did the attitude of the Cardinals who had come from Schaffhausen tend to confirm their confidence. In the discussion that followed some of them ventured to hint that the Pope’s withdrawal had dissolved the Council; they were angrily answered that the Pope was not above the Council, but subject to it. The suspicions entertained against the Cardinals were increased by the fact that a copy of John’s summons to his Curia to attend him at Schaffhausen had been posted on the doors of the Cathedral of Constance, clearly at the instigation of some of the Cardinals who had returned from visiting the Pope. The publication next day, March 25, of a prolongation of the period within which they were bound to leave Constance, only increased the irritation of the Council. Congregations of the nations set to work busily to frame decrees establishing the authority of the Council without the Pope; and the Cardinals, in alarm, saw the opinions of the most advanced advocates of the reforming party being adopted with enthusiasm by the entire Council. In vain they endeavored to arrest the current of opinion by offering new concessions on behalf of the Pope; Sigismund should be joined as proctor to the Cardinals, and the summons to the Curia to leave Constance should be entirely withdrawn. It was too late; the distrust of John XXIII and the Cardinals was too deep-seated and had been too well deserved. Under the excitement of the last few days the Council had risen to a sense of its own importance, and was determined to assert itself in spite of Pope or Cardinals.

John XXIII, who was kept well informed of what was passing, grew alarmed at the turn which affairs were john taking. Before the Council had asserted its power he thought it wise to remove himself to a more secure spot than Schaffhausen. The position of Frederick of Austria seemed precarious. The Swiss Confederates were preparing to attack him; many of his own vassals renounced their allegiance; Schaffhausen would not be safe against an attack. So on March 29, on a rainy day, John left Schaffhausen. Outside the gate he paused, and caused a notary to draw up a protest that all his oaths, vows, and promises made at Constance had been drawn from him through fear of violence; then he galloped off to the strong castle of Lauffenberg, some thirty miles higher up the Rhine. He did not take with him even the Cardinals who were at Schaffhausen, and they returned ignominiously to Constance, where they were received with decorous contempt. John had now thrown off the veil and justified the suspicions of his adversaries. His policy of chicanery and prevarication had been baffled by the resolute attitude of the Council, and he was driven at last to try the chances of open war.

The Cardinals still desperately strove to check the alarming advance of the pretensions of the Council. They saw, and saw rightly, that an unmodified assertion of the supremacy of a General Council over the Pope meant the introduction of a new principle into the existing government of the Church. They threatened to absent themselves from the session to be held on March 30, unless the articles to be proposed were modified. Sigismund offered to lay their views before the nations, and gave them
vague hopes that some slight changes might be made. They prevailed on the French ambassadors and the deputys of the University to join with them in begging Sigismund to lay aside his intention of making war on Frederick of Austria; but Sigismund was inexorable. After much anxious deliberation all the Cardinals who were in Constance, except Peter d'Ailly and the Cardinal of Viviers, presented themselves at the session held on March 30. Cardinal Orsini presided; Sigismund appeared in royal robes, accompanied by several lords and about two hundred fathers. The decrees were given to the Cardinal Zabarella to read. They set forth that “This Synod, lawfully assembled in the Holy Ghost, forming a General Council representing the Catholic Church Militant, has its power immediately from Christ, and all men, of every rank and dignity, even the Pope, are bound to obey it in matters pertaining to the faith and the extirpation of the present schism”. — So far Zabarella read, but seeing that the words went on, — “and general reformation of the Church of God in head and members”, he paused, and saying that they were contrary to general opinion, omitted them, and passed on to the next decrees, declaring that the Pope could not dissolve the Council, and that all acts done by him to the detriment of the Council should be null and void. The Cardinals were willing to admit the supremacy of the Council over the Pope for the immediate purpose of ending the Schism, but they were not willing that it should extend to the matter which more closely concerned themselves, that of the reformation of the Church. In the tumult that followed his omission of the words of the decree it was not sure how much he read afterwards. The session broke up in confusion, and the wrath of the Council against the Cardinals blazed higher. A pamphlet, written by some German prelate, attacked them in no measured language. They had been in league with the Pope against the Council; many of them had followed him to Schaffhausen, and had only returned because they were not satisfied with the cookery there. Their character might be seen by that of the Pope whom they elected — a tyrant, a homicide, a Simoniac, steeped in unmentionable vices. If they chose him as being the best among their number, what was to be thought of the rest?

Yet the Council behaved with dignity. It named deputies to confer with Zabarella, but it refused to reconsider the decrees themselves. On April 6 another session was held, in which the former decrees were again submitted and approved, on being read by the Bishop of Posen, with two additions — that any one refusing to obey the decrees of the Council might be punished, and that John XXIII had enjoyed full liberty while at Constance. This last decree was an answer to John’s plea on leaving Schaffhausen, that he had fled from Constance through fear of violence. On this point his cunning had overreached itself, as the moral force which a plea of coercion might have possessed was lost by his first excuse that he left for the sake of change of air. He published a further allegation on April 7 that he fled lest the obvious violence to which he was exposed at Constance might afford a pretext to Gregory and Benedict for withdrawing their offers of resignation. John was much too plausible, and failed entirely to see that he could not establish his moral character in the face of Europe by putting forward pleas which no one could profess to believe.

John was soon driven to feel his helplessness. On April 6 the Council besought Sigismund to bring back the Pope to Constance. On April 7 the ban of the Empire was issued against Frederick of Austria, and the excommunication of the Council was pronounced against the disturber of its peace. The hope of booty made many willing to carry out the behests of the King and the Council. Frederick, Burkgraf of Nurnberg, led an army into Swabia, where strong towns fell before him. Schaffhausen, too weak to
endure a siege, at once submitted to Sigismund. Another army was gathered from
Bavaria and overran the Tyrol. Still Frederick of Austria might have held out securely if
the Swiss had maintained neutrality, as at first they intended to do in accordance with a
fifty years’ peace which they had made with Austria in 1412. But Sigismund urged that
an engagement was not binding in the case of an excommunicated man; he held before
them the prospect of increase of territory at Frederick’s expense; he promised to make
no peace with Frederick that did not guarantee their safety. The fathers of the Council
added a threat of excommunication if they did not lend their aid to the cause of the
Church. Then the scruples of the Swiss were overcome; they poured their levies into the
Austrian possessions and advanced victoriously to the walls of Baden. On another side
the Pfalzgraf Lewis overran Alsace; Frederick of Austria, in Freiburg, where he had fled
for safety, received nothing but messages of calamity. John XXIII himself went to
Freiburg on April 10, and was convinced that he could gain aid from the Duke of
Burgundy. He strove in vain to encourage Frederick to hold out till succors came; he
placed all his treasure at Frederick’s disposal, promised him the aid of Italian
condottieri, held out hopes of help from Venice and Milan, if Frederick would but resist
for a time. But Frederick’s spirit was broken; he thought only of making his peace on
any terms with Sigismund, and regarded John’s person as a valuable pledge by which he
might appease the storm which he had drawn upon his own head.

Meanwhile the Council went its way with stately decorum. On April 17 a general
session approved a letter addressed to all the kings and princes of Europe, recounting
the circumstances of the Pope’s flight, dwelling upon his entire freedom of action at
Constance, lamenting the fortunes of the Church under such an unworthy shepherd,
announcing the intention of the Council to send envoys to demand John’s return. The
Council appointed as its envoys Cardinals Filastre and Zabarella, and drew up a
document for John to sign, appointing proctors to carry out his resignation; John was to
be required within two days to return to Constance, or take up his abode at Ulm,
Ravensburg, or Basel, till his resignation was accomplished. In this session also the ill-
concealed hatred against the Cardinals found expression in a proposal to exclude them
from the sittings of the Council. A memoir, probably written by Dietrich of Niem, was
read, arguing that if the object of the Council were the reformation of its head and
members — i.e., the Pope and the Cardinals — the Cardinals ought not to be judges in
their own cause; by their election of John XXIII they had sufficiently scandalized the
Church, and had shown themselves ready to aid him in thwarting the Council. No
conclusion was come to on this point, but we see how high feeling must have run by the
fact that the Council found it necessary to forbid the publication of libelous or
defamatory documents under pain of excommunication.

Next day, April 18, the Cardinals presented a series of propositions affirming the
authority and headship of the Roman Church over a General Council. Even over the
Universal Church the Roman Church, or the Pope, has authority immediately from God
as much as a General Council; indeed, the Roman Church forms the principal part of a
General Council, over which the Pope presides, and in his absence the Cardinals;
without the assent of the Roman Church, nothing could be decided by a Council. The
theologians set themselves to answer this document clause by clause, but we see that
they were hard pressed in doing so. Throughout the discussions of the last thirty years
the arguments in favor of a Council had owed their force to the Schism and its evils had
been founded on a plea of present necessity. But the arguments against schismatic
Popes lost much of their power when applied to the united College of Cardinals. The
advocates of the Council had been enabled to set up the claims of the Universal Church against those of the Roman Church, because the unity of the Roman Church was destroyed by the doubt as to its head. But no one ventured to impugn the validity of the position of the College of Cardinals; and when they asserted themselves as the rightful representatives of the Roman Church, and took their stand upon its privileges, the theologians of the Council were in a strait. They answered the pleas of the Cardinals hesitatingly, rather carping at the expressions used than venturing to attack the conclusions. The Church of Rome, they admit, is head of all the Churches, yet not for the sake of nourishing schism; there is a difference between a Council summoned to decide matters of faith and one summoned to extinguish a schism caused by the Cardinals themselves; whatever power the Cardinals might have in the first case, they ought not in the second case to judge their own cause. We see in this the weakness of the Conciliar argument. Taking advantage of a disputed succession in the Papal monarchy, it attempted to raise, in a time of anarchy, a cry for a representative system in the government of the Church. Against the distracted monarchy it could make good its position; but when the nobles of the Court asserted in their own defence the principles on which the monarchy was founded, the advocates of the representative system did not dare directly to dispute them. The Council did not decree the exclusion of the Cardinals; but practically they were rendered powerless by the fact that the conclusions of the assemblies of the nations were only handed to them a short while before the sessions of the Council, so that they had no time to influence the final decisions. On May 2 they demanded the power to organize themselves like the nations, urging that the English nation was only represented by twenty. The Council, however, refused, and bade them each join their own nation. Finally, at the session on May 25, we find the College of Cardinals ranking by the side of the nations, though the understanding between them was never cordial.

On April 19 the Cardinals Filastre and Zabarella left Constance to bear the Council’s proposals to John XXIII. They found that he had left Freiburg for Breisach, still holding to his plan of drawing nearer to the territory of the Duke of Burgundy, who he hoped would send an escort to conduct him to Avignon. But, with the fate of Frederick of Austria before his eyes, John of Burgundy hesitated to incur the hostility of the Council. John XXIII remained at Breisach, where the envoys found him on April 23, and laid before him the Council’s demands. John promised to answer them next day; but next day they learned with astonishment that he had fled in the early dawn to Neuenburg. The envoys accordingly retraced their steps to Freiburg, where, to their surprise, they again found the Pope on April 27.

John XXIII’s course was now run. Frederick of Austria had taken the first steps towards reconciliation with Sigismund, and knew that for this purpose he must be prepared to deliver over John to his foes. John was accordingly summoned by Frederick to take refuge in Freiburg for greater safety, and with a heavy heart was compelled to obey. There he had to listen again to the demands of the envoys of the Council, and sullenly answered that he would send his proctors in a few days. On the return of the legates to Constance, April 29, it was resolved to cite John to appear. Next day Frederick of Austria came humbly to Constance to beg Sigismund’s forgiveness, and John’s proctor, bearing his demands and reservations, was not thought worthy of notice.

The Council was now omnipotent, and determined to give John XXIII no quarter. In a session on May 2 a citation was issued summoning him to answer charges of heresy, schism, simony, maladministration, waste of Church property, and scandals
caused to the Church by his life and character. On May 4 the citation was affixed to the
gates of Constance, and next day the humiliation of Frederick of Austria before
Sigismund gave the Council a foretaste of its triumph. In the refectory of the Franciscan
monastery Sigismund sat on his throne surrounded by deputies of the four nations and
the ambassadors of the Italian States who were present in Constance. The Duke of
Austria was introduced as a humble suppliant by Frederick of Nurnberg and Lewis of
Bavaria, who, in his behalf, supplicated for pardon, and submitted his lands and person
to the royal grace. Sigismund asked Frederick if he assented to this prayer; on bended
knee, with broken voice, Frederick repeated his request for mercy. Sigismund raised
him from his knees, saying, “I am sorry that you have brought this upon yourself”. Then
Frederick swore fealty to Sigismund, resigned his lands into Sigismund’s hands to hold
at his good pleasure, promised to bring back Pope John to Constance and to remain as
hostage till his promises were fulfilled. The heart of Sigismund swelled with pride at his
triumph; turning to the Italian ambassadors, he exclaimed, “You know what mighty
men the Dukes of Austria are; see now what a German King can do”. It was a
pardonable boast, and Sigismund deserved a triumph for his skill in seizing the
opportunity of raising the dignity of the Empire on the weakness of the Church.

The Council did not entirely trust to Frederick’s power of bringing John to
Constance. On May 9 the Burggraf Nurnberg, with 300 armed men, escorted to
Freiburg envoys of the Council who begged John to return. John put a good face on the
matter, and professed his readiness, but took no steps beyond sending a secret
commission to the Cardinals d’Ailly, Filastre, and Zabarella to act as proctors in his
defense. After some hesitation they refused to act on his behalf; and the Council, in
session on May 13, ruled that the citation had been addressed to him in person, and that
he was bound to appear himself. Next day he was condemned for contumacy, and was
declared suspended from the Papal office. Commissioners were appointed to examine
witnesses and draw up charges against John, and they were not long in discharging their
office. A terrible list of seventy articles was drawn out against John, though these were
for very shame reduced to fifty-four before they were laid before the Council. They
covered John’s whole life and left him no shred of virtue, no vestige of reputation. From
the days of his youth he was steeped in vice, of evil disposition, lying, disobedient to his
parents; each step in his career had been gained by underhand means; he had poisoned
his predecessor, had despised the rites of religion like a pagan, was an oppressor of the
poor, a robber of churches, stained by carnal indulgences, a vessel of every kind of sin.
Besides these general terms of abuse the specific charges against him range from incest
to an offer to sell the Florentines the sacred relic of the head of John the Baptist,
belonging to the Monastery of S. Silvestro at Rome. Amidst this overwhelming mass of
accusations there is only one thing of which we feel convinced, that John certainly had
the power of inspiring deep animosity.

Meanwhile John himself was brought by Frederick of Nurnberg to Radolfszell,
eight miles from Constance. He refused to go any further; his spirit was broken, and he
was only anxious to escape the shame of a personal humiliation. He was accordingly
left at Radolfszell strictly guarded. On May 20 envoys of the Council announced to him
his suspension from the Papacy, and demanded the insignia of his office, the seal and
the fisherman’s ring. John submitted with tears and expressions of contrition. On May
25 the articles against him were laid before the Council, with a statement of the number
and nature of the witnesses on each head. They received the solemn approval of a
proctor nominated by each nation. The Council was terribly unanimous; even the
contest with the Cardinals was laid aside, and the College at last was allowed to
organize itself as a nation, for we find the Cardinal of Viviers acting as proctor to
convey the assent of the College. Five Cardinals were sent to announce to John that his
deposition was imminent. John did not trust himself to reply in words, but handed them
a writing, in which he declared that he was willing to submit to the Council in all things,
and would not object to its decision, whatever it might be; he only asked them to respect
his honor and person.

The Council was gratified by this unqualified submission, but thought it well to
take all precautions. Next day five commissioners were sent to carry to John the articles
on which he was accused, and summon him to answer in person if he thought fit. John
refused to read the articles, and repeated his previous answer, that he submitted to the
Council, which could not err; in its infallibility was his one defense; he only asked that
his honor be spared as much as possible. He sent a letter to Sigismund, “his only hope
after God”, reminding him of their past relations, begging him “by the bowels of
compassion of Jesus Christ to be mindful of your plighted word, by which you gave us
hope”, and entreatyng him to use his influence with the Council on the side of mercy.
John’s submission disarmed the extreme bitterness felt against him, and the sentence of
deprivation pronounced against him on May 29 was couched in much milder terms than
the articles would have warranted. It set forth the evils with which John’s flight from
Constance had threatened the unity of the Church,

and then proceeded, “Our Lord Pope
John was moreover a notorious simoniac, a waster of the goods and rights not only of
the Roman Church but others, an evil administrator both of the spiritualities and
temporalities of the Church, causing notorious scandal to the Church of God and
Christian people by his detestable and unseemly life and manners, both before and since
his accession to the Papacy”. In spite of frequent monitions he persisted in his evil
course, and therefore is now deposed as “unworthy, useless, and harmful”; all Christians
are freed from their allegiance, and are forbidden to recognize him any longer as Pope.
After the deposition of John, care was taken for the future by a decree that no new
election should be made, in case of vacancy, without the express consent of the Council,
and that none of the three contending claimants should be re-elected. A solemn
procession of the whole Council round the city of Constance celebrated this final
assurance of their triumph. The deposed Pope, now called once more by his former
name of Baldassare Cossa, was brought for safe keeping into the strong castle of
Gottlieben, close to Constance. But there was a suspicion that some discontented spirits
had again opened correspondence with him; and Sigismund handed him over to the
custody of the Pfalzgraf Lewis, who held the office of Protector of the Council. Lewis
sent him to the Castle of Heidelberg, where he remained so long as the Council sat,
attended only by Germans, whose language he did not understand and with whom he
communicated only by signs.

Thus fell John XXIII: undefended and, it would seem, unpitied; nor has posterity
reversed the verdict of the Council. Yet it is difficult not to reel that John had hard
measure dealt to him in the exceptional obloquy which has been his lot. Elected to the
Papacy in return for his signal services in the Council of Pisa, he was ignominiously
deposed by the Council which claimed to be a continuation of that of Pisa. Here, as
elsewhere, the revolution swallowed up its own child, and John’s character has met with
the fate which always befalls those whom everyone is interested to malign and no one is
interested to defend. In his early career he established his reputation for courage and
political sagacity by his administration of Bologna; but his capacities were those of a
soldier of fortune and few looked upon him seriously as a priest. As the chief man in North Italy he had it in his power to dispose of the fortunes of the Council of Pisa, and the Cardinals could scarcely help rewarding him for his services by the gift of the Papacy. But in his exalted position everything went amiss with John, and his entire want of success in Italian affairs compelled him, sorely against his will, to appeal to the sympathies of Christendom. His previous training in a life of military adventure made him light-hearted in running into danger; his entire ignorance of the religious feeling of Europe made him utterly unable to cope with his danger when once it gathered round him. It was one thing to play off against one another condottieri generals and win by trickery the towns of Forli and Faenza; it was another thing to guide the deliberations of an assembly of theologians profoundly convinced of their own powers. John had neither learning nor moral character to enable him to hold his own in the face of the Council. He had nothing but intrigue, which he managed so ill as to make it impossible for anyone to hold by him through respect for the Papal dignity. Betrayed first by Sigismund and then by Frederick of Austria, he lost all self-command and self-confidence. When force of character rests neither upon moral nor intellectual principles, it rapidly decays under adverse circumstances. When John found that his first endeavors to manage the Council were unsuccessful he began to lose his nerve and then blundered more and more lamentably. The Council took advantage of each of his mistakes, and drove him remorselessly from point to point; John contested each point in detail with the weapons of mean subterfuge, and thus entirely ruined his prestige in the eyes of Europe. Everything went against him, and when he fell there was no one interested to save him or even to give him shelter. Everyone felt that such a man never ought to have been elected Pope. He was nothing more nor less than an Italian military adventurer, and his camp life had been scandalous enough to make any stories against him sound credible.

Yet it was not to the moral indignation caused by his character that John XXIII owed his fall, but to the policy of Sigismund and the Council, who were bent upon restoring unmistakably the outward unity of the Church. When John threw difficulties in the way of their plan of a common abdication of the three contending claimants of the Papacy, a civil war followed, in which victory declared against John. His rebellion was signally punished, and it was necessary not only to depose him, but to render it impossible for anyone to revive his claims. John had few friends, and they could do nothing for him. The Council was omnipotent, and suddenly applied to him a moral standard which would have condemned many of his predecessors; at Constance every tongue and pen was turned against John. A calm Italian observer blamed John for trusting himself to a Council composed of turbulent spirits who wished to turn the world upside down. He admired his versatility and capacity; in his youth a student, he afterwards distinguished himself greatly as a general and administrator; unfortunately he meddled in ecclesiastical matters which he did not understand; and his ability was forgotten in the contemplation of his misfortunes. This seems to have been the prevailing opinion in Italy. Cosimo dei Medici, who was not likely to befriend an utterly worthless man, retained both affection and respect for the deposed Baldassare Cossa, and gave him shelter in his last days. Still it must be admitted that, whatever good qualities John possessed, they were useless to him as Pope, and his ignorance and heedlessness of the spiritual duties of his sacred office gave the Council a handle against him. No remorse was felt in making him a victim to the zeal for the union of the distracted Church.
CHAPTER III.

RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS IN ENGLAND AND BOHEMIA.

When the dispossessed Baldassare Cossa was taken as prisoner to the Castle of Gottlieben, there was another prisoner of the Council within its walls, a Bohemian priest, John Huss, who was accused of heresy. At the beginning of the Council it had been a question keenly disputed whether the motion of the unity or the purification of the faith, of the Church should take precedence. Both matters had in some degree progressed, and the two prisoners at Gottlieben, Cossa and Huss, were witnesses of the two sides of the Council’s energy.

The form of heresy which engaged its attention was one with which the Council might have been expected to feel some sympathy, for it had its root in a deep-seated moral repugnance to the existing abuses in the ecclesiastical system and a longing for their reform. It had the same aim as the Council itself. But though men were all convinced of the need of reform, they differed widely in the basis which they were ready to adopt. Abuses were so widespread that everyone wished to remedy them; but some merely wished to remove the abuses of the existing system, others wished to remodel the system itself. The system of the Church had grown with the life of Christendom, and the individual Christian recognized his religious life as forming part of the corporate life of the Church. So far as the ecclesiastical system, under the political exigencies of the Papal monarchy, had strayed from its original purpose, and threw stumbling-blocks in the way of the spiritual power of the Church itself, so far were the fathers of the Council of Constance anxious for reform. But the troubled times of the Schism and the misuse of the Papal power drove others to criticize the nature and basis of the ecclesiastical system itself, and had led them to the conclusion that it was inadequate to the needs of the individual soul, and ought to be reorganized on a new basis. The leading spirits at Constance were anxious to reform the Church system; but they looked with horror on those who wished to create it afresh. Part of the work which they had before them was the extirpation of the errors of Wycliffe and Huss, and the purification of the faith of England and Bohemia.

We have spoken of Wycliffe in the three phases of his career, as an upholder of the rights of the kingdom against Papal aggression, as a reformer of the morals of the clergy, and as a critic of the system and doctrine of the Church. In the first phase all Englishmen went with him in the second he was in accord not only with the best minds amongst his own countrymen, but with the best minds in Europe; but when he attacked in unmeasured terms the foundations of the Papal monarchy, had strayed from its original purpose, and threw stumbling-blocks in the way of the spiritual power of the Church itself, so far were the fathers of the Council of Constance anxious for reform. But the troubled times of the Schism and the misuse of the Papal power drove others to criticize the nature and basis of the ecclesiastical system itself, and had led them to the conclusion that it was inadequate to the needs of the individual soul, and ought to be reorganized on a new basis. The leading spirits at Constance were anxious to reform the Church system; but they looked with horror on those who wished to create it afresh. Part of the work which they had before them was the extirpation of the errors of Wycliffe and Huss, and the purification of the faith of England and Bohemia.
Church, in which they expressed themselves with astonishing boldness. They set forth the decay of the Church, owing to its temporal grandeur and the consequent corruption of the clergy.

The ordinary Roman priesthood, it set forth, is no longer the true priesthood ordained by Christ; the pretended miracle of the mass leads men to idolatry; the enforced celibacy of the clergy causes immoral living; the use of needless benedictions and exorcisms savors of necromancy rather than theology; prayers for the dead are merely means of gaining alms; auricular confession only exalts the pride of the priest; pilgrimages to deaf images and relics are akin to idol worship; monastic vows lead to much social disorder; war and homicide are contrary to the law of Christ, and occupations serving only for luxury are sinful. Inasmuch as the Church of England has gone astray in these matters, following its stepmother, the Church of Rome, the petitioners pray for its reformation and restoration to primitive perfection. We have here a plan of social as well as ecclesiastical reform, founded upon Wycliffe’s principles and expressed for the most part in Wycliffe’s language. So important did Richard II consider this movement to be that he hastily returned from Ireland, and demanded from the chiefs of the Lollard party an oath of abjuration of their opinions. They seem to have given way at once, a proof that the movement had amongst its most influential followers no real meaning, but expressed rather general discontent than any scheme which they seriously hoped to realize.

The petition of the Lollards naturally awakened the indignation of the leaders of the clergy. In 1396 Archbishop Courtenay, who had shown little or no disposition for repression, was succeeded by Thomas Arundel, who resolved to take vigorous measures against the insolence of the Lollards. At a provincial synod held in February, 1397, eighteen propositions of Wycliffe were condemned. They were drawn from the Trialogus by some learned member of the University of Oxford, which was now anxious to restore its reputation for orthodoxy. The condemned propositions consist of ten which tend to weaken the sacramental system of the Church, five which disparage the clerical order and the legitimacy of temporal possessions by the Church; the other three assert the superiority of Scripture over ecclesiastical tradition, the moral basis of authority, and the philosophic doctrine of necessity. Not only did the ecclesiastical synod condemn these doctrines, but a trained controversialist, a Franciscan friar, William Woodford, wrote a refutation of them, at the Archbishop’s bidding.

Archbishop Arundel had thus prepared the way for stringent measures against the Lollards: the clergy condemned them, the learned refuted them. But before he could strike a blow he was himself stricken. Political questions swallowed up ecclesiastical disputes: the nation was too busy with other things to attend either to the Lollards or to the clergy. The Earls of Arundel and Gloucester were put to death; the Archbishop himself was impeached by the submissive Commons, and was condemned to banishment. Pope Boniface IX did not choose to quarrel with the King about an Archbishop, and translated Arundel to the see of St. Andrews. But Richard II’s triumph was short-lived, and Arundel took a leading part in the events which set Henry of Lancaster upon the English throne. Under Henry IV Arundel was more powerful than ever, and was resolute in his hostility to the Lollards. Public opinion seems to have turned decidedly against them, for many of their chief supporters had been staunch adherents of the fallen tyrant. Henry IV was greatly indebted to the help of the clergy for his easy accession to the throne, and had many promises to fulfill. He was poor and needed money; he was weak and needed political support. He was, moreover, fervently
orthodox, and may not have been sorry to dissociate himself at once from his father’s
unworthy intrigues with the Lollard party.

Accordingly, in 1401, a petition was addressed to the King by the clergy, praying
for legislative measures against the Lollards who escaped ecclesiastical jurisdiction. The
petition received the assent of King, Lords, and Commons, and a clause was inserted in
the statute for the year enacting that a heretic convicted in a spiritual court was to be
handed over to the secular arm to be burnt. Immediately after this a Lollard preacher,
William Sautre, met his doom as a heretic. The country as a whole had now pronounced
its opinion against Lollardism, which henceforth became more and more an expression
of political and social discontent, and lost much of its religious meaning.

In 1406 another petition was presented to Parliament setting forth that the Lollards
were dangerous to public order in matters temporal and spiritual alike; they
disseminated disquieting rumors and aimed at upsetting the peace of the kingdom. No
fresh steps were taken, but the revolutionary attempt of the Lollard leader, Sir John
Oldcastle, at the beginning of the reign of Henry V, led to a more severe act against
Lollardism in 1414; by it the secular power was empowered to enquire after heretics,
and on suspicion hand them over for trial to the spiritual courts. From this time
Lollardism disappeared. The French war found employment for adventurous minds :
political parties afterwards had many grounds for contention without sheltering
themselves behind religious factions; the thirst for free enquiry died away in the
Universities; England entered upon a career of administrative helplessness and personal
selfishness in high places which left no room for discussion of abstract principles. The
smoldering discontent with society, into which Lollardism passed away, still lingered
and at times blazed forth; but it had none of the elements of a serious religious
movement.

The teaching of Wycliffe produced no deep impression in England. Partly this was
due to his own character. Wycliffe was a keen, acute dialectician; but his spirit was too
critical, his teaching too negative, to inspire deep enthusiasm or supply a position round
which men would rally to the death. Wycliffe himself had none of the spirit of a martyr,
and his followers were ready to recant rather than to suffer. The movement was in its
origin academic rather than popular, and was used at once for party purposes, from the
traces of which it never quite escaped. It lent colorable countenance to socialist
doctrines and awakened hostility as being subversive to society. In short, its force was
frittered away in various directions; there was no great national interest with which it
was decidedly identified. Perhaps the condition of English politics was unfavorable to a
great religious movement; there was no decided popular party, no place for political
action founded upon broad principles. Still, though Wycliffe set in motion no great
movement and left no lasting impression of his definite opinions, he did much to
awaken controversy, and, by his translation of the Bible, he spread among the people
knowledge of the Scriptures. He thus prepared the way for the testing and reception of
new opinions in the sixteenth century, and it is not an exaggeration to date from the time
of Wycliffe that reverence for the exact words of Scripture, which has always been the
special characteristic of English religious life.

The immediate importance of Wycliffe in the history of the world lies in the fact
that in the remote country of Bohemia his writings became one element of the first great
national movement towards a new religious system.
There was much in the early traditions of the Bohemian kingdom to dispose it to revolt from the Papal dominion. The history of Bohemia was that of a history of Slavonic tribe thrown into the midst of German peoples. The wave of German conquest flowed around it, and it saw in the Holy Roman Empire merely a means of extending the power of the invading Germans. Christianity came to Bohemia from two sides— from Germany and Byzantium; but the Slavs listened to the preaching of the Greek monks, Cyril and Methodius, though the Papacy reaped the fruit of these conversions, and behaved wisely in humoring the prejudices of the new converts. Moravia was made into a separate diocese, and the use of a Slavonic liturgy was allowed. The German Church resented this ecclesiastical organization of the Slavonic peoples, and the cohesion of the Slavs was soon destroyed by the terrible invasion of Magyars, which severed the Slavic peoples and left Bohemia a helpless prey to German influences. The liturgy of Cyril and Methodius was suppressed, and gradually disappeared, though it lingered in some obscure places till the middle of the fourteenth century. In its very origin Latin Christianity in Bohemia was forced upon the unwilling Czechs, and was a badge of Teutonic supremacy. The soil was ready to receive opinions contrary to the ecclesiastical system, and nowhere did the heretical sects of the thirteenth century, the Bogomilians and Waldenses, take deeper root than in Bohemia.

The reign of Charles IV (1346-1378) forms a decisive epoch in Bohemian history. The Přemyslids, raised to the Empire by the influence of the Church, was bound to use his power in the Church’s behalf. Charles IV has been differently judged according to different conceptions of his duty. To the political theorist or reformer, who looked to the Emperor to inspire Europe with a new spirit, Charles IV seemed an indolent and self-indulgent ruler. To the Germans Charles IV seemed destitute of dignity, weak and incapable—a king who did not care to maintain his prerogatives against the encroachments of his nobles, but regarded Germany as a province annexed to Bohemia. It is true that Charles IV paid no heed to the Empire, and allowed Germany to go its own way; but he devoted himself to the interests of his Bohemian subjects, so that his reign is the golden age of their national annals. “A model of a father to Bohemia and a model of a stepfather to Germany”, the Emperor Maximilian called him in later years. “He made Prague”, said an admirer, “what Rome and Constantinople had been”. He adorned his capital, elevated it into the seat of an archbishopric, and founded a university which soon took its place by the side of the great Universities of Paris, Oxford and Bologna.

These steps of Charles IV, so far as they strengthened the organization of the Church, increased the influence of the Germans. But, besides increasing the power of the Church, Charles IV’s zeal led him to wish for a reform in the clergy, and round the cry for reform which Charles IV fostered the national spirit of the Czechs slowly and unconsciously rallied. The Church in Bohemia was wealthy and powerful; the Archbishop of Prague was lord of 329 towns and villages; the Cathedral of Prague maintained 300 ecclesiastics; there were at least no convents in the land. Simony was rife, and, as a consequence, negligence of duty, exaction, and corruption of manners prevailed among the clergy. A visitation held in 1379 convicted of immorality sixteen clergymen out of thirty who were visited.

Charles IV and the Archbishop Ernest of Pardubic were anxious to restore the zeal and morality of the Bohemian clergy. Charles’s reforming zeal led him to summon from Austria an earnest preacher, Conrad of Waldhausen, who came to Prague in 1360, and began to denounce pride, luxury, and avarice, with such effect that crowds thronged to
his preaching, and showed the power of his words by returning to simplicity of life. Conrad was led to ask himself how it was that he succeeded where the ordinary ministrations of the clergy failed. His meditations led him to attack the simony and other vices of the clergy, and especially of the friars. It was in vain that the clergy accused Conrad of heresy. The King and the Archbishop upheld him against their attacks, and it is by the irony of fate that in his zeal for the purity of the Bohemian Church the orthodox King set on foot a movement which involved his son in bloody war against his people and made Bohemia a hotbed of heresy.

The earnestness of Conrad of Waldhausen raised up followers, chief of whom was Milicz of Kremsier, in Moravia, who in 1363 laid aside his canonry at Prague to devote himself to the work of preaching to the poor. The teaching of Conrad had only been addressed to the Germans; but Milicz preached in the Bohemian language, and by his fiery mysticism appealed to the imagination of the people. He expounded prophecy and terrified, his hearers by his denunciations. The tone of his preaching became more mystical, and the visions of the Apocalypse filled his imagination. One day his zeal carried him so far that, preaching before Charles IV, he denounced him as antichrist. But the Emperor forgave him, and when he was accused of heresy and appealed to Pope Urban V in 1367, Charles warmly recommended him to the Pope. Milicz went to Rome, but while waiting for the Pope’s return affixed a notice to the door of S. Peter’s that he was ready to prove in a sermon the speedy coming of antichrist. For this he was imprisoned; but Urban V on his arrival released him and treated him kindly. Milicz returned to Prague, justified against his accusers, but ceased afterwards to preach about antichrist. His saintly character impressed all who came near him, and he was the consoler of many troubled hearts. The wonders wrought by his preaching and the growing number of converts, who laid aside their evil courses and submitted themselves to his guidance, soon kindled the jealousy of the clergy, who again denounced him as a heretic to the Pope. The charges against him were chiefly his preaching of antichrist, his abuse of the clergy, disregard of excommunication, and excessive puritanism in several points. He was summoned to Avignon by Gregory XI, and died there in 1374.

Milicz had succeeded in kindling the imagination and awakening the religious enthusiasm of the Bohemians. By his words and by his actions he had set before them a lofty idea of personal holiness and purity. “He was”, says one of his followers, “the image and son of our Lord Jesus Christ, the express similitude of His apostles”. He quickened religious zeal, deepened men’s grasp on spiritual truth, and left behind him a band of devoted followers bent on walking in his steps. But what he had expressed in the form of mysticism, in stirring appeals to men’s feelings, his followers, chief amongst whom Mathias of Janow and Thomas Stitny, worked out in their writings into dogmatic forms. Mathias of Janow was not so much a preacher as a theologian, and in his work “De regulis veteris et novi Testamenti” drew out from the Bible alone, disregarding the works of the fathers and the traditions of the Church, the rules of a holy and Christian life. He insisted upon the sufficiency of the Scriptures; he urged the need of having Christ in the heart, and not merely on the lips; he dwelt upon the danger of ceremonies in hiding from men’s eyes the sufficiency of Christ as the sole Redeemer who suffices for the salvation of all who believe in Him. In urging these conclusions Mathias had no consciousness of a breach with the existing ecclesiastical system, but he none the less struck blows against it which sapped its hold upon the minds of men. Mathias, however, wrote in Latin, and so addressed himself only to the more educated and intelligent. Thomas of Stitny, a Bohemian nobleman, followed in the steps of
Milicz and wrote for the Bohemian people. In clear and simple language he carried home to men’s minds the same truths as Mathias insisted upon, the need of faith founded on the Word of God, showing itself in good works and not resting on ceremonial observances. This spiritual movement in Bohemia would have died away, as so many others had done, if it had not found in the University of Prague an organized body which gave it stability and force.

Founded in 1348, the University of Prague, under the fostering care of Charles IV, rapidly increased in importance, so that in 1372 it counted 4000 students. Its constitution was a matter of some difficulty, and the faculties of theology and jurisprudence strove for supremacy till, in 1372, the jurists formed themselves into a separate university. Following the example of Paris, the University of Prague divided itself into four nations, Bohemian, Bavarian, Saxon, and Polish. At the end of the fourteenth century the foundation of universities at Cracow, Vienna, Heidelberg, Koln, and Erfurt in some degree diminished the importance of Prague, but it still remained the chief center of intellectual life among the German and Slavonic peoples. The Poles, however, were few in number, and their vote was practically exercised by the Germans of Silesia. The Czechs found themselves in a minority in the university which had been founded in their behalf, and the struggle of nationalities, which prevailed throughout Bohemia, raged fiercely in academic matters. The Czechs claimed exclusive possession of the colleges, which, as elsewhere, were foundations to encourage research. Their claims were supported by King Wenzel, who with all his failings was true to the Bohemian people and by their help maintained himself upon his throne.

We may gather from Wenzel’s conduct to the Archbishop, John of Jenstein, how slight was the hold which the Wenzel had upon popular favor, how deep was the impression produced by the reforming preachers. John of Jenstein was made Archbishop of Prague in 1378 because he had won Wenzel’s favor by his pleasant manners and skill in the chase. The story of Becket and Henry II was almost reproduced. A change came over the Archbishop; he became a rigid ascetic, and his new sense of duty brought him into frequent collisions with the King. The quarrel came to a crisis in 1393, when John of Jenstein hastened to fill up the vacant abbacy of Kladruby, though he knew that the King was applying to the Pope to suppress it for the purpose of founding a new bishopric. Wenzel’s wrath was ungovernable; he summoned John to Prague, and passionately ordered him and three of his followers to be seized and imprisoned. Two of them were tortured, and Wenzel ordered all of them to be drowned; but when his rage passed away he betook himself of the consequences which might follow from drowning an archbishop, and reluctantly ordered his prisoners to be released. One of them, John of Pomuc, was so severely injured by the torture that his life was hopeless, and Wenzel ordered him to be thrown into the Moldau. Archbishop John was driven to humble himself before Wenzel; he met with no support from the clergy or the people, and at last fled to Rome, where Boniface IX refused to take any steps that might lead to a quarrel with Wenzel, from whom at that time he looked for help in Italy. John was driven to resign his archbishopric and died in Rome in 1400.

That Wenzel should with impunity and success offer such violence to the metropolitan of the Bohemian Church is a striking evidence that the clergy were looked upon with indifference, if not with dislike. The death of John of Pomuc caused no commotion in Bohemia. The University of Prague showed no desire to interfere in the quarrel between Wenzel and the Archbishop. Huss was accused afterwards of openly expressing his approval of the murder of John of Pomuc; his answer, that he only said
that the drowning or imprisoning of a priest was no reason for putting the kingdom under an interdict, shows that he certainly made no protest nor raised his voice against Wenzel’s conduct. It is a curious point in later history that this John of Pomuc was chosen by the Jesuits to supplant the memory of Huss as a martyr in the minds of the Bohemians. But legend gathered round John’s history; he was confused with a confessor of Wenzel’s queen, and was said to have been thrown into the Moldau because he refused to violate the secrets of the confessional at the bidding of a jealous and tyrannical husband. The legend took root in Bohemia in the dark days of the Catholic reaction, and the imaginary confessor was canonized in 1729 under the name of S. John Nepomucen. He answered his purpose in providing Bohemia with a national saint and in substituting a more poetical martyr for John Huss, who was only burnt at the stake for his theological opinions.

There were in Bohemia, at the end of the fourteenth century, many political elements which favored a revolutionary movement. There was an ill-concealed jealousy of the Czechs against the German middle classes, which tended to combine with the puritan movement against the abuses of the clergy. The rising of the German nobles against Wenzel, and the pretensions of Rupert to replace him in the Empire, identified his cause still more strongly with that of the Czech nationality. In the University of Prague the reforming party became similarly identified with the Czechs, who were striving to maintain their privileges against the Germans. Soon a new impulse and a more definite form was given to the energies of the reformers by the spread in the University of Prague of the writings of Wycliffe. The keen, clear criticisms of ecclesiastical dogmas, which had not taken root in England because they were associated with no national or political interest, supplied a form to the religious aspirations which were in Bohemia associated with a widespread popular movement. The connection between Bohemia and England, which followed on Richard II’s marriage with Wenzel’s sister Anne, increased the natural intercourse which existed in those days between universities.

From Oxford the writings of Wycliffe were brought to Prague, as early as 1385, by Jerome of Prague, who was himself a student at Oxford. The questions which they raised, especially the question of Transubstantiation, were eagerly discussed by an increasing party in the University, of whom John Hus became the chief representative.
CHAPTER IV.

JOHN HUSS IN BOHEMIA

1398—1414.

John Huss was born of humble parents in the little village of Husinec in 1369, and rose by his talents and his industry to high fame in the University of Prague. There he began to teach in 1398, and with his friend Nicolas of Leitomysl founded a philosophic school on the basis of the philosophical writings of Wycliffe. From Wycliffe’s philosophy he advanced to Wycliffe’s theology, which seemed to find an echo in his own moral nature. From the first, however, he saw the dangers to which the acceptance of Wycliffe’s teaching was likely to lead. “Oh, Wycliffe, Wycliffe”, he exclaimed in a sermon, “you will trouble the heads of many!” Nor was the influence of Huss confined only to academic circles. One of the marks of the religious activity produced by the preaching of Milicz was the foundation in Prague by a wealthy burgher of a chapel called Bethlehem, for the purpose of procuring for the Czechs sermons in their native tongue. The nomination of Huss as priest of the Chapel of Bethlehem in 1402 gave him the means of appealing forcibly to the popular mind.

Huss summed up in his own person all the political and religious aspirations of the Czechs, and gave them dear, forcible expression in his sermons. Sprung from the people, he maintained that Bohemia ought to be for the Bohemians, as Germany was for the Germans, and France for the French. Of pure and austere life, his countenance bore the traces of constant self-denial, and his loftiness of purpose lent force to his words. From the time that he undertook the Chapel of Bethlehem he devoted himself to the work of popular preaching, and his penetrating intelligence, his clearness of expression, his splendid eloquence, made his sermons produce a more lasting impression than the more impassioned harangues of Conrad or the more mystical and imaginative discourses of Milicz. He exactly expressed the thoughts that were surging in the minds of the people, and gave them definiteness and form. It was clear that Huss was not merely a popular preacher; he threatened to become the founder of a new school of religious thought.

At first Huss followed in the same lines as his predecessors strove to bring about a moral reformation of the Church by means of the existing authorities. The feebleness of the Archbishop of Prague, his death, and a long vacancy in the see left the ground open for the Wycliffite teachers; but in 1403 a reaction set in. The office of rector of the University passed by rotation from the Bohemians to the Germans, and it was proposed to affirm in Bohemia the acts of the Council of London in 1382, which condemned the writings of Wycliffe. It was a great matter for the opponents of the reforming party to be able to identify their teaching with that of one who had been already condemned for heresy. Though the reforming movement in Bohemia had an independent existence, it borrowed its principles from England with remarkable docility. Wycliffe’s writings supplied the philosophical basis which was wanting in Bohemia, and Huss was willing to be judged as a pupil of the great English philosopher and divine. A German master of the University, John Hubner, laid before the Chapter of Prague the twenty-four articles of Wycliffe’s teaching condemned by the Synod of London, and added twenty-one of his own discovery. These forty-five articles were submitted to the University on May
28, 1403. Wycliffe’s followers contented themselves with protesting that the articles were not to be found in Wycliffe’s writings; but after some warm discussion the majority condemned the articles laid before them, and a decree was passed that no member of the University was to teach them either in public or in private.

This decree of the University, however, produced no effect. The new Archbishop of Prague, Zbynek, was no theologian, and was attracted by the earnestness of Huss. The clerical party had no hope of help from him, and applied directly to Innocent VII, who, in 1405, addressed to the Archbishop a monition to greater diligence in rooting out the errors and heresy of Wycliffe. Little, however, was done in this direction, perhaps owing to the influence of Huss, who was so trusted by the Archbishop that he requested him to bring before his notice any defects of ecclesiastical discipline which, in his opinion, needed correction. Moreover, the position of Huss as confessor to Queen Sophia gave him considerable influence at Court, and Wenzel was so indignant at the refusal of Innocent VII, and afterwards of Gregory XII, to recognize him as Emperor, that he had no objection to see a more independent ecclesiastical party establishing itself in his kingdom.

But affairs soon destroyed this agreement between Huss and the Archbishop and Court. Zbynek was beginning to be exercised in his mind at the frequent discussions about the Eucharist, and in 1406 published a pastoral defining what he considered to be the true doctrine. The preparations for the Council of Pisa exercised great influence over Wenzel, who hoped to secure from the Council, or the Council’s Pope, a recognition of his Imperial title, but saw that for this end he must be ready to purge his kingdom of its reputation for heresy. In May, 1408, the condemned opinions of Wycliffe were read over to a congregation of the Bohemian nation of the University, and lectures or disputations on the works of Wycliffe were forbidden. Some of the Bohemian masters were tried for heresy before the Archbishop’s court, and a letter of Huss to the Archbishop, couched in lofty tones of moral remonstrance, besought him not to punish the lowly priests who were striving to do their duty in preaching the Gospel, when there were so many of their accusers who were given up to avarice and luxury. From this time a breach was made between Hus and the Archbishop, which went on increasing. The Archbishop, however, satisfied with his victory for the present, declared in a provincial synod on July 17, 1408, that no heretics were to be found in his diocese: he ordered all the books of Wycliffe to be burned, and enjoined on the clergy to preach transubstantiation to the people.

The questions raised by the Schism of the Papacy gave Huss and his party unexpected help. Wenzel was desirous to have his kingdom cleared of the charge of heresy, that he might more decidedly take part in the negotiations about the summons of the Council of Pisa. He was ill-disposed to Gregory XII, who carried out his predecessor’s policy, and continued to recognize Rupert as King of the Romans. Wenzel was urged by the French Court to join in the Council of Pisa, and, on November 24, wrote to the Cardinals that he was willing to do so, provided his ambassadors were received as those of the King of the Romans. Meanwhile he wished to withdraw from the allegiance of Gregory XII and declare neutrality within his kingdom. The reforming party naturally hoped for some changes in their favor from a Council, and supported the King’s desire. Archbishop Zbynek and the orthodox party opposed it. When the King appealed to the University of Prague, the Bohemians were on his side; the Germans sided with the Archbishop. The question of the neutrality drew together the Bohemian masters in the University. Many who had combated Huss as a heretic were now with
him. The King’s anger gave the Bohemian academic party an opportunity of gaining a triumph over their German adversaries. A deputation, of whom Huss was one, represented to the King the grievances of the Bohemians, who had only one vote in the University, while the Germans had three. They urged that the Bohemian masters had increased in number, while the Germans had diminished; in learning, as well as in numbers, the Bohemians were at least equal to the Germans. While they were young they were content to be in bondage; but now the fulness of time was come, when they need no more be regarded as servants, but heirs of all that the original foundation of Charles IV had meant to bestow upon them. The cause of the Bohemian masters was warmly applauded by some of Wenzel’s favorites, and also by the ambassadors of France. On January 18, 1409, the King issued an angry decree that it was unjust that the Germans, who were foreigners, should have three votes and the true heirs of the kingdom only one: he ordered that henceforth the Bohemians should have three votes and the Germans one. On January 22 he published a decree renouncing the obedience of Gregory XII.

The Czechs were triumphant. Huss in a sermon openly thanked God for this victory over the Germans. Popular excitement ran high, and the Germans in vain strove to resist. They declared that they would leave the University rather than obey. They refused to elect any officials, and when the King nominated them by royal authority the German masters carried their threat into execution and left Prague. According to the most moderate computation, two thousand are said to have departed, leaving but scanty remnants behind.

This hasty, passionate step of Wenzel was the destruction of the European importance of the University of Prague, and was a decisive moment in the intellectual development of Germany. The emigrant masters formed a new university at Leipzig, and many of them went to the young universities of Germany. Henceforth there was no great centre of learning in Germany, and a powerful bond of national union was lost. But the loss was counterbalanced by the vigorous growth of scattered universities, which leavened more thoroughly with the traditions of learning the mass of the German people. The importance of Prague as one of the great cities of the world began to decline, and the strife of Germans and Czechs was no longer to be contested, when it could most surely have been healed, in the bloodless sphere of academic disputation. More immediate consequences followed on this decree of Wenzel. He had wished only to pave the way to his adhesion to the Council of Pisa; he kindled into a flame the smoldering spirit of the Bohemian people, and did much to identify the nation with the cause of ecclesiastical reform. This great national victory was also a victory for the reformers. But it was won at a heavy cost; the enemy was baffled, not crushed. The emigrant masters were dispersed throughout Germany filled with hatred of their victorious rivals. They spread far and wide the story of their woes; they painted in the blackest colors the wickedness, the impiety of the Bohemians. When we seek afterwards for the causes which led Germany to pour its crusading bands upon the Bohemian land, we may find it in the bitterness which the woes of the emigrant students carried into all quarters.

Meanwhile Wenzel was satisfied with the results of his measure, and its meaning was clearly shown by the election of Huss as the first rector of the mutilated University. The Cardinals and the Council of Pisa received Wenzel’s ambassadors, disavowed Rupert, and restored to Wenzel in the eyes of Christendom his lofty position as King of the Romans. When the Council’s Pope had been duly elected, on Wenzel
would naturally devolve the duty of securing his universal recognition. But Wenzel found with shame that he was powerless even in his own land. Archbishop Zbynek refused to recognize Alexander V, and was supported by the clergy; he even laid Prague under an interdict. Wenzel replied by confiscating the goods of those clergy who joined the Archbishop in withdrawing from Prague. Zbynek was driven to submit, and reluctantly acknowledged Alexander V in September, 1409. These events, however, kindled anew the animosity of the Bohemians against the clergy, and arrayed the Court, the reformers, and the Bohemian people against the Germans and the clergy. The Archbishop’s mind became more and more exasperated against Huss, who had preached loudly in the King’s behalf, and he prepared to wipe away in a conflict with Huss the discomfiture which he had undergone. Articles against Huss had already, before the end of 1408, been presented to the Archbishop, complaining that he defamed the clergy in his sermons and brought them into contempt with the people. In 1409 new articles were presented, and Huss was summoned to answer before the Archbishop’s inquisitor to charges of defaming the clergy, speaking in praise of Wycliffe, and kindling contention between Germans and Bohemians. Huss does not seem to have appeared to answer to these charges: indeed, a counter charge was raised against the Archbishop in the Papal court, and Alexander V, who can have felt little goodwill to Zbynek, summoned him to answer to these charges. The summons, however, was soon countermanded, as the Archbishop’s envoys laid before the Pope an account of ecclesiastical matters in Bohemia, and Alexander V became impressed with the gravity of the situation. He issued a Bull from Pistoia on December 20, bidding the Archbishop appoint a commission of six doctors, who were to purge his diocese from heresy, forbid the spread of Wycliffe’s doctrines, and remove from the eyes of the faithful the books of Wycliffe. Appeals to the Pope by those accused on any of these points were disallowed beforehand by the Bull.

When this Bull was published in Prague the reformers felt that for a time they must bow before the storm. Huss himself brought to the Archbishop the books of Wycliffe which he possessed, with a request that Zbynek would point out the errors which they contained, and he was ready to combat them in public. Zbynek’s commissioners contented themselves with reporting that Wycliffe’s writings, which they specified by name, contained manifest heresy and error, and were to be condemned. Whereupon, on June 16, the Archbishop ordered the books to be burned, denounced Wycliffe’s opinions and prohibited all teaching in private places and chapels. Already, on June 14, the University had met and protested against the condemnation of the books of Wycliffe, asserting, as was true, that the Archbishop and his commissioners had not had time to examine their contents. On June 20 they renewed their protest, and Huss, seeing himself pushed to extremities, proceeded to a bold step in defiance of ecclesiastical authority. Alexander V was dead, and there was a chance that his successor might be disposed to reconsider the Bohemian question. Disregarding the Archbishop’s decree, Huss again ascended the pulpit in his Chapel of Bethlehem; disregarding the Bull of Alexander V, he appealed from a Pope wrongly informed to a Pope better informed. He called upon the people, he called upon his congregation, to support him in the line which he resolved to pursue. He read the Pope’s Bull, the Archbishop’s decree: he recalled the previous declaration of Zbynek that there were no heretics in Bohemia; he declared the charges contained in the Bull to be untrue.

“They are lies, they are lies”, exclaimed with one voice the congregation.
“I have appealed, I do appeal”, continued Huss, against the Archbishop’s decrees. “Will you be on my side?”

“We will, we will”, was the enthusiastic answer.

“Know, then”, he went on, “that, since it is my duty to preach, my purpose stands to do so, or be driven beyond the earth or die in prison; for man may lie, but God lies not. Think of this, ye who purpose to stand by me, and have no fear of excommunication for joining in my appeal”.

The language of the appeal itself was equally resolute. The Bull of Alexander V, it affirms, was surreptitiously obtained by Zbynek on false grounds; its authority came to an end with Alexander’s death, and Zbynek’s decrees were therefore invalid. As for Wycliffe’s books, even if they contained some errors, theological students ought not to be prohibited from reading them. The Archbishop’s decree closing the chapels was an attempt to hinder the preaching of the Gospel and could not be obeyed, for “we must obey God rather than men in things which are necessary for salvation”. The decisive step of a breach with the ecclesiastical system had now been taken. Huss asserted, as against authority, the sanction of the individual conscience, and he called on those who thought with him to array themselves on his side. Huss had stepped from the position of a reformer to that of a revolutionist.

Zbynek was not slow to take up the challenge. Wenzel in vain strove to arrange a compromise. On July 16 the Archbishop gathered the clergy round him, and in solemn state burned two hundred volumes of Wycliffe’s writings which had been surrendered to him. The *Te Deum* was chanted during the ceremony, and all the church bells in Prague rang out a joyous peal in honor of the event. Two days afterwards Zbynek excommunicated Huss and all who had joined in his appeal, as disobedient and impugners of the Catholic faith.

If by these strong measures Zbynek hoped to overawe the people he was entirely mistaken. Epigrams on the man who burned the books he had not read passed from mouth to mouth; songs declared that it was done to spite the Czechs. When the Archbishop came in state to the cathedral door, accompanied by forty clergy, to pronounce the excommunication against Huss, the uproar of the people forced him to retire for safety into the church. Wenzel, though hostile to the Archbishop, found it necessary to interfere, and in a high-handed way devised a compromise. Libelous songs were prohibited on pain of death; the Archbishop was ordered to pay back to the owners of the books he had burned their value, and to withdraw his excommunication. When he hesitated his revenues were seized for the purpose. Wenzel also wrote to Pope John XXIII, asserting that Bohemia was free from heresy, and begging him to revoke the Bull of Alexander V, which had produced nothing but mischief and ill-feeling. But the Archbishop had forestalled the King at the Papal Court; he had sent Huss’s appeal and a statement of his own case. John XXIII referred the matter to Cardinal Oddo Colonna, afterwards Pope Martin V, who lost no time in making his decision. In a letter dated from Bologna, August 24, he enjoined the Archbishop to proceed according to the Bull of Alexander V, and if necessary to call in the secular arm to his aid; Huss was summoned to appear personally at the Papal Court to answer for himself.

This letter reached Prague soon after Wenzel’s letter to the Pope had been dispatched. The Archbishop triumphed, but Wenzel felt himself personally aggrieved, and wrote again to the Pope, asserting that there was no ground of fear for the religious condition of his kingdom; he took Huss under his personal protection, begged the Pope
to withdraw his summons, confirm the privileges of the Chapel of Bethlehem, and allow Huss to continue in peace his useful ministrations. The friends of Huss gathered round him and loudly declared that they would not suffer him to be exposed to the perils of a journey to Rome through lands that were filled with his bitter enemies. But John XXIII naturally thought that opinions reflecting on the luxury, worldly lives, and evil living of the clergy ought not to be allowed free scope. In spite of Wenzel’s remonstrances, Huss was declared by Cardinal Colonna contumacious for not appearing, and was pronounced excommunicated (February, 1411).

Political considerations, however, soon admonished John XXIII to pay more heed to Wenzel’s requests. The death of Jobst of Moravia (January 17, 1411) left the title of King of the Romans in the hands of one or other of the brothers, Wenzel or Sigismund. Sigismund was still an adherent of Gregory XII; and John XXIII felt that it would not be wise to drive Wenzel to join his brother; moreover, he hoped for Wenzel’s aid in bringing over Sigismund to his own obedience. He therefore resolved to procrastinate in the matter of Huss, and transferred the cause from the hands of Cardinal Colonna to those of a new commission, which allowed the matter to stand over. The sentence of excommunication against Huss was not rescinded, and the Archbishop ordered it to be promulgated in Prague. Little attention was paid to it, and Zbynec, already infuriated by the seizure of his goods to pay for the books which he had burnt, laid Prague under an interdict. Wenzel in great wrath drove out the priests, who, in obedience to the Archbishop, refused to perform the services, and seized their goods. The nobles were always ready to stand by the King when they could lay hands on the property of the clergy, whose riches they looked upon with a jealous eye. Zbynec, who hoped by his extreme measure to strike terror into Wenzel and the people found himself entirely mistaken. With the example of John of Jenstein before his eyes, he did not think it wise to exasperate the King further or to trust to the Pope for help in extremities. Most probably John XXIII privately advised him to make peace with the King. At all events he agreed to submit his disputes with Huss and the University to arbiters appointed by Wenzel, who gave their decision (July 6) that the Archbishop should submit to the King, should write to the Pope saying that there were no heresies in Bohemia, and that the disputes between himself and the University were at an end, that all excommunications should be recalled and all suits suspended. The King on his side was to do all he could to check the growth of error, and was to restore all benefices taken from the clergy. To this Zbynec was forced to consent. But the letter to the Pope, though written, was never sent. Before the disputed points could be practically arranged, Zbynec died, on September 28. He was a man of blameless life and high character. Hus sincerely regretted his death and honored him for his attempts to reform the lives and morals of the clergy. He had been his friend in the early part of his episcopate, and Huss considered the persecution of himself as due to the Archbishop’s advisers, not to himself. The new Archbishop, Albik, was an old man, who knew and cared little about theology. He was Wenzel’s physician, and was of an easy disposition, rich and avaricious; nothing but the dread of Wenzel’s displeasure drove him to accept the office of Archbishop. Under him it seemed as though peace would be again restored, and there was quiet for a while.

Huss, however, had, unknown to himself, drifted far away from the old ecclesiastical system. His conscience had become more sensitive, and his feeling that he must guard against offending the conscience of others had become more intense. Hitherto he had raised the voice of moral reproach against the abuses of the clergy;
occasion soon drove him to raise the same protest against the abuses of the Papacy itself. John XXIII, in his struggle against Ladislas, appealed to Christendom for help. He issued Bulls of excommunication, proclaimed a crusade, promised indulgences to the faithful who took part in it, and sent commissioners to stir up their zeal. The Papal legate in Bohemia for this purpose, Wenzel Tiem, Dean of Passau, was not wanting in energy. Three chests were put up in public places to receive contributions; indulgences were preached in the market-place, and those who had no money might pay in kind. The parish clergy were enlisted in the legate’s service, and used the confessional as a means of extorting money.

There was nothing new in this, nothing exceptionally scandalous. Yet it set the whole nature of Huss in revolt. He denounced the crusade as opposed to Christian charity; he vehemently attacked the methods by which money was being raised. In vain the theological faculty of the University dissented from him, pointing out that it was, and had been for centuries, the belief of Christendom that the Pope could give remission of sins, and that he was justified in calling on the faithful to help him in time of need. In spite of the efforts of the University to prevent it, Huss held a public disputation against the Pope’s Bull on June 7, 1412. Huss in his argument discussed the two questions of the validity of indulgences and the justice of a crusade. While admitting the priestly power of absolution, he urged that its efficacy depended on the true repentance of him who received it, and that God only knew who were predestinated to salvation. Neither priest nor Pope could grant privileges contrary to the law of Christ; in following the example of Christ could salvation most surely be obtained. Huss’s subtle arguments met with many answers, but his fiery scholar Jerome of Prague by a storm of eloquence so carried away the younger scholars that they escorted him in triumph home. In the general excitement the noisiest and least thoughtful spirits, as usual, took the lead. One of the King’s favorites, Wok of Waldstein, organized a piece of buffoonery which was meant to be a reprisal for the burning of Wycliffe’s books two years before. A student, dressed as a courtesan, was seated in a car with the Pope’s Bull fastened round his neck; surrounded by a motley throng, the car was drawn through the city to the Neustadt, where the Bull was burnt (June 24).

Wenzel was naturally indignant at this uproar, and ordered the magistrates of the city to punish with death those who spoke against the indulgences. On Sunday, July 10, three young men of the lower orders were apprehended for having cried out in churches that the indulgences were a lie. In vain Huss, accompanied by two thousand students, pleaded before the magistrates in behalf of the prisoners. Their fault, he said, was his: if anyone ought to suffer, it was himself. The magistrates gave him a fair answer, but a few hours afterwards, on Monday afternoon, the three prisoners were brought out for execution, surrounded by armed men. A vast crowd followed the procession in solemn silence. When the executioner proclaimed, “All who do like them must expect their punishment”, many voices exclaimed that they were ready to do and suffer the same. A band of students took possession of the three corpses, and, chanting the martyr’s psalm, “Isti sunt sancti”, bore them to the Chapel of Bethlehem, where they were solemnly buried. The first blood had been shed in the religious strife in Bohemia; the reformation had won its first martyrs. Huss declared in a sermon that he would not part with their bodies for thousands of gold and silver.

The opponents of Huss felt that he could not be silenced by means of the University, where a large majority was on his side. They accordingly had recourse to the royal authority, and asked Wenzel to forbid the teaching of the forty-five articles taken
from the writings of Wycliffe, which had been condemned in 1408. To these were added six new articles bearing on the present disturbance, condemning the opinion that priestly absolution was not in itself effectual but merely declaratory, and the opinion that the Pope might not ask for subsidies in his temporal needs. Wenzel forbade under pain of banishment the teaching of any of these condemned articles, but refused to go further and prohibit from preaching those who were accused as prime causes of the late disturbance. Not content with the aid of the King, the clergy of Prague also complained to the Pope. John XXIII, naturally incensed at the news of this defiance offered in Bohemia to his authority, handed over the trial of Huss to Cardinal Annibaldi, who lost no time in pronouncing against Huss the greater excommunication: if within twenty days he did not submit to the Church, none were to speak to him or receive him into their houses; the offices of the Church were to cease when he was present, and the sentence against him was to be solemnly read in all churches in Bohemia every Sunday. Nor was this all. By a second decree all the faithful were required to seize the person of Huss and deliver him to the Archbishop of Prague or the Bishop of Leitomysl to be burned; his Chapel of Bethlehem was to be leveled with the ground.

The denunciations of the Papacy have never been lacking in severity, but they have rarely been carried at once into effect. Huss appealed from the Pope to Jesus Christ, the true head of the Church; it was a curious piece of formalism to maintain himself still within the communion into the Church. His foes were ready to proceed against him: so long as he was in Prague the interdict was rigidly observed by the clergy. But the resolute attitude of his friends portended a bloody conflict. Wenzel interfered to prevent it, and prevailed on Huss, for the sake of keeping the peace, to leave Prague for a time; he promised to do his utmost to reconcile him with the clergy. Huss obeyed the royal request, though with a feeling that he was forsaking his post, and left Prague in December, 1412.

Wenzel was genuinely anxious to have things amicably settled, and appointed a Commission, with the Archbishop at its head, to draw up the terms of a reconciliation. But when once theological disputes arise, every step towards a formal agreement is keenly criticized. The representatives of the University theologians objected to be called in the preamble “a party”; they declared that they expressed the opinions of the Church; they defined the Church as that “whose present head was Pope John XXIII, and whose body was the Cardinals, and the opinions of that Church must be obeyed in all concerning the Catholic faith”. The friends of Huss were willing to accept this with the addition “as far as a good and faithful Christian ought”. The four doctors who represented the University objected, and protested against the Commissioners. Wenzel regarded them as throwing willful hindrances in the way of his project of peace, and angrily banished them from his kingdom.

This victory of the followers of Huss was followed by a political triumph that was of still greater importance. The strength of Huss’s party in Prague lay in the Bohemians, and the strength of the orthodox party lay in the German middle class. Prague consisted of three separate municipalities. On the left bank of the Moldau lay the Old Town and the New Town; on the right bank of the Moldau the Little Town nestled round the cathedral and the royal palace of the Hradschin. In the New Town the Czechs were in a majority; but in the Old Town the municipal council was chiefly in the hands of the well-to-do Germans, which accounts for the vigor displayed by the magistracy in suppressing all objections to the sale of indulgences. In late years the struggle of Germans and Czechs had been bitter within the Old Town; and Wenzel, in pursuit of his
pacific policy, ordered, on October 21, 1413, that henceforth the names of twenty-five Germans and twenty-five Bohemians be submitted to him, from whom he would choose eighteen, nine from each nation, who should constitute the Council. From this time the superiority of the Germans was broken, and they no longer had the government of the Old Town in their hands.

Wenzel’s repressive measures produced external peace for a time. Hus in his exile spread his opinions still more widely throughout the land. Tractates addresses to the people flowed unceasingly from his pen, as well as his great treatise “De Ecclesia”. Freed from the excitement which had constantly attended his last six years in Prague, the literary activity of Huss was now unimpeaded. Nor must Huss be regarded only as a controversialist; he was the great framer of the Bohemian tongue. He adapted the Roman alphabet more fully to the expression of the Czech sounds; and the orthography which Huss introduced exists up to this day in Bohemia. He was, moreover, anxious for the purity of the Czech language, reproved the citizens of Prague for their combination of German and Czech, and was in his own writings and speech a linguistic purist.

In the treatise “De Ecclesia” Huss expresses most clearly his opinions, though it is not as a thinker that Huss owes his chief claim to the consideration of after times. His strength lay in his moral rather than in his intellectual qualities. His opinions were not logically developed, as were those of Wycliffe, but for that very reason they awakened a louder echo amongst his hearers. Huss was deeply impressed with the abuses of the ecclesiastical system, which were everywhere apparent. He was above all things a preacher, bent upon awakening men to a new spiritual life, and keenly sensitive of the difficulties thrown in his way by the failings and vices of the clergy. Huss had no wish to attack the system of the Roman Church, no wish to act in opposition to its established rules; he maintained conscientiously to the last that he was a faithful son of the Roman Church. But the necessity of attacking abuses led him on step by step to set up the law of Christ as superior to all other enactments, as sufficient in itself for the regulation of the Church; and this law of Christ he defined as the law of the Gospel as laid down by Christ during the sojourn on earth of Himself and the Apostles. His adversaries at once pointed out that, starting from this principle, he maintained the right of each individual to interpret Scripture according to his own pleasure, and so introduced disorder into the Church.

Besides this claim for the sufficiency of Scripture instead of ecclesiastical tradition Huss, from his deep moral earnestness, adopted the Augustinian view of predestination, and defined the true Church as the body of the elect. There were true Christians and false Christians; it was one thing to be in the Church and another thing to be of the Church. Those only were of the Church who by the grace of predestination were made members of Christ. The Pope was not the head of the Church, but was only the Vicar of Peter, chief of the Apostles; and the Pope was only Vicar of Peter so far as he followed in the steps of Peter. Spiritual power was given that those who exercised it might lead the people to imitate Christ; it is to be resisted if it hinders them in that duty. The Pope cannot claim an absolute obedience; his commands are to be obeyed only as being founded on the law of Christ, and if contrary thereto ought to be resisted. No ecclesiastical censures ought to prevent a priest from fulfilling the commands of Christ, for he can reach the kingdom of heaven under the leadership of his Master, Christ. We find in this much that reminds us of Wycliffe; but what Wycliffe reasoned out calmly, with a full sense of the difficulties involved in his view, Huss asserts with passionate earnestness, applying only so much of his principles as covers his own position at the
time. The ideas of Huss were drawn from Wycliffe; and the conception of the Church as a purely spiritual body corresponded in many ways with the general tendencies of current opinion. The language of Huss might be paralleled on some points by the language of Gerson and D'Ailly. All who were anxious for reform, and saw that reform was hopeless through the Papacy, tended to criticize the Papal power in the same strain. It is the strong personality of the writer that attracts us in the case of Huss. Everything he writes is the result of his own soul’s experience, is penetrated with a deep moral earnestness, illumined by a boldness and a self-forgetfulness that breathe the spirit of the cry, “Let God be true and every man a liar”.

In this literary activity Huss spent his exile from Prague. He was in constant communication with his followers there, and his letters of encouragement to them in their trials, and of exhortation to approve their opinions by goodness of life, give us a touching picture of simple, earnest piety rooted on a deep consciousness of God’s abiding presence. These letters show us neither a fanatic nor a passionate party-leader, but a man of childlike spirit, whose one desire was to discharge faithfully his pastoral duties and do all things as in the sight of God and not of man.

Thus passed the year 1413. There was truce between the two parties in Bohemia, but both were eagerly expecting what the future might bring. John XXIII’s Council in Rome at the beginning of the year had condemned the writings of Wycliffe, but the proceedings of the Council were too trivial to awaken much attention. But when the Council of Constance was first announced, both sides felt that it must have a decisive influence on the state of affairs in Bohemia. John was anxious to bring into prominence the Bohemian dispute; it was the one question that might stave off for a while any discussion of the reform of the Church. In fact, the Bohemian movement rested entirely upon a desire for reform: it put before Christendom one set of principles, one way of procedure which would make a thorough reform of the Church possible. Though John did not know much about theology, he knew enough about human nature to feel convinced that the principles of the Bohemian reformers would not commend themselves to the ecclesiastical hierarchy assembled in the Council. He trusted that the difficulties which their discussion might raise would blunt the earnestness of the reformers in the Council, by identifying their cause with principles that were clearly subversive of the order of the Church. Sigismund on his side was urged by his vanity as well as his self-interest to use the prestige of a united Christendom to reduce into order Bohemia, of which, as his brother Wenzel was childless, he was the heir. Accordingly he lost no time in negotiating with Huss that he should appear before the Council and plead his own cause. He offered Huss his safe-conduct, promised to procure him an audience before the Council and to afford him a safe return in case his matter was not decided to his satisfaction. Huss’s friends besought him not to go. “Assuredly you will be condemned”, they pleaded. They warned him not to trust too much to Sigismund’s safe-conduct. But Huss considered it to be his duty to go and make profession of his faith, in spite of all dangers: he had not considered that he was called upon to risk his life in going before the Pope two years ago, but now he had a safe-conduct against the perils of the journey, and had hopes of appearing before a competent and impartial tribunal. He set out on his journey to Constance on October 11, amidst the sad forebodings of his friends. “God be with you”, said a good shoemaker as he bade him farewell; “God be with you: I fear you will never come back”.

Huss was anxious to be in good time at the Council, so he left Prague before he had received the promised safe-conduct from Sigismund. He was escorted by two Bohemian
barons, Wenzel of Duba and John of Chlum, who were afterwards joined by a third, Henry of Latzenborck. On his journey Huss sent before him, into the various towns through which he passed, public notices that he was going to Constance to clear himself of heresy, and that those who had any accusation against him should prepare to present it before the Council. Everywhere he was received with respectful curiosity by the people, and in many cases by the clergy. The Germans no longer saw in Huss a national antagonist, but rather a religious reformer. They were willing to stand neutral until the Council had pronounced its decision on his doctrines.

On November 3, Huss entered Constance and took up his abode in the house of a good widow close by the Schnetzthor. His arrival was announced by John of Chlum and Henry of Latzenborck to the Pope, who assured them that he wished to do nothing by violence. In the true style of a condottiere general he said that, even if Huss had killed his own brother, he should be safe in Constance. On November 3, Wenzel of Duba, who had ridden from Nurnberg to Sigismund, returned with the royal safe-conduct, which ordered all men to give Huss free passage and allow him to stay or return at pleasure. In full confidence for the future, in the simple belief that a plain statement of his real opinions would suffice to clear away all misrepresentations, and that the truth would prevail, Huss awaited the opening of the Council. He expected that Sigismund would arrive at Christmas, and that the Council, if not dissolved before, would have finished all its business by Easter.
CHAPTER V.
THE COUNCIL OF CONSTANCE AND THE BOHEMIAN REFORMERS
1414—1416

From his lodging by the city wall Huss looked out with surprise on the assembling of the Council, on the pomp that signified the arrival of princes of the Church; but he had no enthusiasm in his heart. He saw only the vice and luxury that accompanied this gathering of the faithful. “Would that you could see this Council”, he wrote afterwards to his Bohemian friends, “which is called most holy and infallible; truly you would see great wickedness, so that I have been told by Swabians that Constance could not in thirty years be purged of the sins which the Council has committed in the city”. Huss stayed quietly in his house, for he was still excommunicated, and the place where he was lay under an interdict. The Pope sent him a message saying that the interdict was suspended, and that he was at liberty to visit the churches of Constance; but, to avoid scandal, he was not to be present at High Mass. Huss seems to have made no use of this permission; he was busily employed at home in preparing for his defence.

Meanwhile his enemies were actively engaged in poisoning the Council against him. Chief amongst his opponents were the Bishop of Leitomysl and Michael of Nemecky Brod, who had formerly been a priest in Prague, but had been appointed by the Pope “procurator de causis fidei”, and from his office was generally called Michael de Causis. There too was Wenzel Tiem, anxious to avenge himself upon the man who had done such harm to his financing operations in the sale of indulgences. From the University of Prague came Stephen Palecz, who had formerly been a friend of Huss; but, alarmed at Huss’s action against the preaching of indulgences, had changed sides, and afterwards showed all a renegade’s bitterness against his former leader. Huss complains that the Bohemians were his bitterest foes; they gave their own account of what had happened in Bohemia, brought Huss’s writings to Constance and interpreted his Bohemian works, as they alone knew the language. Through the activity of these powerful opponents Huss’s cause was judged beforehand, and the only question which the Council had before it was the method of his condemnation.

It is difficult to see where Huss expected to find partisans in the Council. The Pope and the Cardinals had already declared themselves against him. England had abandoned Wycliffe, and was not likely to raise its voice in favor of Hus. France in its distracted condition brought its political animosities to the Council, and was not likely to lend help to one whose principles were subversive of political order. Already the ecclesiastical reformers of the University of Paris had taken steps to cut themselves off from all connection with those of Prague. In May, 1414, Gerson wrote to Conrad, the new Archbishop of Prague, exhorting him to root out the Wycliffite errors. On September 24, he sent the Archbishop twenty articles taken from the writings of Huss, which the theological faculty of the University of Paris had condemned as erroneous. These articles mostly dealt with Huss’s conception of the Church as the body of those predestinated to salvation, and the consequent inference that the commands of those predestinated to damnation were not binding on the faithful. Gerson was horrified at such a theory of the Church; he regarded it as subversive of all law and order. He and the conservative reformers of Paris were willing to reform the existing abuses in the
ecclesiastical system, and for that purpose admitted a power residing in the whole body of
the Church which was superior on emergencies to that of its ordinary ruler; but they
shrank from a new conception of the Church which would allow the private judgment of
the predestinated to override all authority. Gerson regarded Huss as a dangerous
revolutionist; he wrote to the Archbishop on September 24, “The most dangerous error,
destructive of all political order and quiet, is this—that one predestined to damnation or
living in mortal sin, has no rule, jurisdiction, or power over others in a Christian people.
Against such an error it seems to my humility that all power, spiritual and temporal,
ought to rise and exterminate it by fire and sword rather than by curious reasoning. For
political power is not founded on the title of predestination or grace, since that would be
most uncertain, but is established according to laws ecclesiastical and civil”. The
antagonism between the two schools of thought was profound. Huss, in his desire to
depen the consciousness of spiritual life, and bind together the faithful by an invisible
bond of union with Christianity, was willing to sacrifice all outward organization.
Gerson regarded the Church as a religious polity whose laws and constitution needed
reform; but the most fatal enemy to that reform was the spirit of revolution which
threatened the whole fabric with destruction. As a statesman and as a logician Gerson
regarded Huss’s views as extremely dangerous. Hus, stirred only by his desire for
greater holiness in the Church, believed that he could move the Council as he moved his
congregation of Bethlehem. He wished only for an opportunity of setting forth his
opinions before assembled Christendom, and thought that their manifest truth could not
fail to carry conviction. There was a childlike simplicity about his character, and an
ignorance of the world which some writers of modern times have mistaken for vanity.

Feeling that the Council was entirely on their side, the enemies of Huss were
anxious to proceed against him before Sigismund’s arrival. John XXIII on his part was
equally willing that the Council should find some occupation for its activity. The first
step was to seize the person of Huss. Ungrounded rumors were spread that he had made
an attempt to leave the city in a hay cart; it was urged that he said mass every day in his
own house, and that many went to visit him and hear his false doctrines. Accordingly,
on November 28, the Bishops of Augsburg and Trent, together with the burgomaster of
Constance, came to Hus’s house while he was at dinner with John of Chlum, and
informed him that the Pope and the Cardinals were ready to hear him. John of Chlum
angrily answered that Huss had come at Sigismund’s request to speak before the
Council; it was Sigismund’s will that he should not speak before his arrival. The Bishop
of Trent answered that they had come on an errand of peace. On this Huss rose from the
table and said that he had not come to Constance to confer with the Cardinals but to
speak before the Council; nevertheless he was willing to go and answer anywhere for
the truth. He bade adieu to his weeping landlady, who had seen the armed men with
whom these messengers of peace had surrounded her house, and as Huss mounted his
horse she begged his blessing, as from one who never would return.

When Huss appeared, at twelve o’clock, before the Cardinals in the Pope’s palace,
he was told that there were many grievous charges against him of soweing errors in
Bohemia. He answered, “Most reverend fathers, know that I would rather die than hold
a single error. I came of my own accord to this Council, and if it be proved that I have
erred in anything I am willing humbly to be corrected and amend”. The Cardinals said
that his words were fair, and then rose, leaving Hus and John of Chlum under the guard
of the soldiers who had escorted them there. A subtle theologian, in the guise of a
simple friar in quest for truth, came meanwhile to talk with Huss on the doctrine of the
Eucharist and the two natures of Christ. Hus, however, discovered him, and guarded against his desire for religious confidences.

At four o'clock the Cardinals again assembled to consider Huss’s case. The articles prepared by Michael de Causis were laid before them. They accused Huss (1) of teaching the necessity of receiving the Eucharist under both kinds and of attacking transubstantiation; (2) of making the validity of the sacraments depend on the moral character of the priest; (3) of erroneous doctrine concerning the nature of the Church, its possessions, its discipline, and its organization. Huss’s opponents were there, and urged the necessity for putting him in prison; if he were to escape from Constance he would boast that he had been tried and acquitted, and would do more harm than any heretic since the times of Constantine the Great. It was evening when the master of the Pope’s household came to announce to John of Chlum that he was free to depart if he chose, but Huss must remain in the palace. The fiery Bohemian forced his way into the Pope’s chamber. “Holy Father”, he exclaimed, “this is not what you promised. I told you that Master Huss came here under the safe-conduct of my master the King of the Romans; and you answered that if he ‘had killed your brother he should be safe’. I wish to raise my voice and warn those who have violated my master’s safe-conduct”. The Pope called the Cardinals to witness that he had never sent to take Huss prisoner. He afterwards called John of Chlum aside, and said to him: “You know how matters stand between me and the Cardinals; they have brought me Huss as a prisoner, and I am bound to receive him”. John XXIII cared little about his promise, or about Huss; he frankly admitted that he was thinking only how to save himself. Huss was led to the house of one of the Canons of Constance, where he was guarded for eight days. On December 6 he was taken to the Convent of the Dominicans, on a small island close to the shore of the lake. There he was cast into a dark and narrow dungeon, damp with the waters of the lake, and close to the mouth of a sewer. In this noisome spot he was attacked by fever, so that his life was despaired of, and John sent his own physicians to attend him.

The anger of John of Chlum at the imprisonment of Huss gave a sample of the spirit which afterwards animated the whole Bohemian nation. He did not cease to complain in Constance of the Pope and his Cardinals; he showed Sigismund’s safe-conduct to all whom he met; he even fixed on the doors of the cathedral a solemn protest against the Papal perfidy. Sigismund himself was equally indignant at the dishonor done to his promise; he requested that Huss be immediately released from prison, otherwise he would come and break down the doors himself. But the enemies of Huss were more powerful than the remonstrances of Sigismund. Perhaps John XXIII was not sorry to find a subject about which he might try to create a quarrel between Sigismund and the Council. Proceedings against Huss were begun; on December 4 the Pope appointed a commission of three, headed by the Patriarch of Constantinople, to receive testimonies against Huss. Huss asked in vain for an advocate to take exception to the witnesses, of whom many were his personal foes. He was answered that it was contrary to law for anyone to defend a suspected heretic.

When Sigismund arrived in Constance on December 25, the first question that engaged his attention was that of Huss’s imprisonment. He demanded of the Pope that Huss should be released. John XXIII gave him the same answer as he had given to John of Chlum; he referred him to the Cardinals and the Council, whose work it was. Discussion went on sharply for some time. Sigismund urged that he was bound to see his safe-conduct respected; the fathers of the Council answered that they were bound to
judge according to the law one suspected of heresy. When Sigismund urged the indignation which was rising in Bohemia at Huss’s imprisonment, he was answered that there would be serious danger to all authority, ecclesiastical and civil, if Huss were to escape to Bohemia and again commence his mischievous preaching. Sigismund threatened to leave Constance if Hus were not released; the Council answered that it also must dissolve itself if he wished to hinder it in the performance of its duty.

We are so far removed from a state of opinion in which a king could be urged to break his word, on the ground that it was only plighted to a heretic, that it is difficult for us to appreciate the arguments by which such conduct could be justified. The Council maintained that one of its chief objects was to put down heresy. Huss was certainly a heretic, and must be tried as such; he was now in their power, and if he were to escape the evil would be greatly increased. It was not their business to consider how he had put himself in their power. The existence of the Council was independent of Sigismund’s help, and it must not allow its independence to be fettered at the outset by Sigismund’s interference. Moreover, the terrible conception of heresy in the Middle Ages put the heretic outside the limits of a king’s protection. He was a plague-spot in the body of a State, and must be cut out at once, lest the contagion spread. Heresy in a land was a blot on the national honor, which kings were bound to preserve intact; the heretic was a traitor against God, much more a traitor against his own sovereign. It was the clear duty of all in authority to protect themselves and the community against the risks which the spread of heresy inevitably brought. Nor could a promise of safe-conduct rashly made override the higher duties of a king. No promise was binding if its observance proved to be prejudicial to the Catholic faith. Rash and wicked promises are not binding, and the goodness of a promise must in some cases be judged by its result. “Call to mind”, urged the Bishop of Arras, “the oath of Herod, which the result proved to be an evil one; so in the case of a heretic with a safe-conduct, his obstinacy makes it necessary that the decree be changed; for that promise is impious which is fulfilled by a crime”. Such is a sample of the reasons which led the wisest and best men of Christendom to urge Sigismund to a shameless breach of faith. Their arguments were enforced by Sigismund’s fear lest the Council dissolve if he refused to listen, and so all the glory which he hoped to gain be lost to himself, and all the benefits of a reunion of Christendom be lost to mankind. King Ferdinand of Aragon wrote to Sigismund, expressing his surprise at any hesitation about punishing Huss. It was impossible, he said, to break faith with one who had already broken faith with God. This letter must have produced a great impression on Sigismund; if the Council were to succeed, Aragon must be brought to acknowledge its authority, and no pretext must be given which might cover a refusal. Overborne by these considerations, Sigismund abandoned Huss to his fate.

We cannot resist a feeling of moral indignation at such sentiments and at such conduct. It is true that freedom of opinion has been established among us at the present day by the teaching of experience: we have learned that duty has an existence amongst men independent of the law of the Church. Such a conception did not exist in the Middle Ages. The belief that rightness of conduct depended on rightness of religious opinion was universal, and the spirit of persecution was but the logical expression of this belief. Yet, as a matter of fact, the spirit of persecution solely for matters of opinion had largely died away, and only existed where political or personal interests were involved in its maintenance. The treatment of Wycliffe in England was an example which the Council might well have followed. It preferred to fall back upon the
procedure of the Inquisition. It revived persecution for the purpose of showing its own orthodoxy under exceptional circumstances, and it won Sigismund’s consent by the offer of political advantage in quieting his Bohemian kingdom. Huss was made a victim of the need felt by a revolutionary party for some opportunity of defining the limits of its revolutionary zeal.

The question of the abdication of John XXIII threw the cause of Huss for a time into the background. John’s flight on March 20 put the responsibility of Huss’s imprisonment in the hands of Sigismund and the Council. For a moment the friends of Huss hoped that Sigismund would use this opportunity and set Huss at liberty. He might have done so with safety, for the Council was now too far dependent upon him to take much umbrage at his doings. But Sigismund had entirely identified himself with the Council, and had no further qualms of conscience about his treatment of Huss; he is even said to have taken credit to himself for his firmness of purpose. There were great fears that the friends of Huss might attempt a rescue; so on March 24 Sigismund handed over the custody of Huss to the Bishop of Constance, who removed him by night, under a strong escort, to the Castle of Gottlieben, two miles above Constance, on the Rhine, where he was kept in chains. On April 6 a new commission, at the head of which were the Cardinals of Cambrai and St. Mark, was appointed to examine the heresies of Wycliffe and Huss. As the Council was anxious to have this matter ready to hand when it had finished its conflict with John XXIII, it again transferred, on April 17, the examination of Huss to another commission, whose members had more leisure than the Cardinals. No time was lost in inaugurating the Council’s activity against heresy. In the eighth session, on May 4, Wycliffe was condemned as the leader and chief of the heretics of the time. The forty-five articles taken from Wycliffe’s writings were condemned as heretical; two hundred and six others, which had been drawn up by the ingenuity of the University of Oxford, were declared heretical, erroneous, or scandalous; the writings of Wycliffe were ordered to be burnt; his memory was condemned, and it was decreed that his bones be exhumed and cast out of consecrated ground.

The friends of Huss saw that if they hoped to save him must act promptly. On May 16 a petition was presented to the Council, signed by Wenzel of Duba, John of Chlum, Henry of Latzenborck, and other Bohemian nobles in Constance, praying for Huss’s release from prison, on the ground that he had come voluntarily with a safe-conduct to plead on behalf of his opinions, and had been thrown into prison unheard, in violation of the safe-conduct, though heretics condemned by the Council of Pisa were allowed to come and go freely. There were replies and counter-replies, which only embittered the enemies of Huss. At last, on May 10, an answer was given by the Patriarch of Antioch, on behalf of the Council, that they would in no case release from prison a man who was not to be trusted, but that, in answer to the request for a public audience, the Council would hear him on June 5.

If Huss’s cause had been prejudged by the Council when he was put in prison, everything that had happened since then had only strengthened the conviction that Huss and his opinions were most dangerous to the peace of the Church. The news from Bohemia told that the revolt against ecclesiastical authority was rapidly spreading. After the departure of Huss the chief place amongst his followers was taken by one Jakubek of Mies, who attacked the custom of the Church by preaching the necessity of the reception of the Eucharist under both kinds. The question had previously been raised by Mathias of Janow, but in obedience to the Archbishop of Prague had been laid aside.
Jakubek, not content with holding a disputation before the University in defense of his views, proceeded to administer the Communion under both kinds in several churches in Prague, heedless of the Archbishop’s excommunication. There was some difference of opinion on this question amongst Huss’s followers in Bohemia, and the opinion of Huss was requested. Huss gave his opinion in favor of Jakubek, on the ground that the Communion under both kinds was more in accordance with the teaching of St. Paul and the custom of the primitive Church; but it is evident from his way of speaking that he did not consider the question as one of vital importance. However, a letter of his to Jakubek, and Jakubek’s answer, which was expressed in imprudent language, fell into the hands of the spies of Michael de Causis, and were used to prove still more clearly the dangerous character of Huss.

Moreover, the friends of Huss showed a zeal in his behalf which the Council regarded as unseemly, if not suspicious. Huss wrote to warn them to curb their desire to come and visit him. One of them, Christian of Prachatic, was imprisoned on the accusation of Michael de Causis, and was only released on Sigismund’s intervention, who had a special care for him as a learned astronomer. Huss’s warnings, however, did not prevent his fiery scholar, Jerome of Prague, from venturing secretly to Constance. Jerome was the knight-errant of the Hussite movement, whose restless activity spread its influence far and wide. Sprung from a noble family, he represented the alliance between Huss and the Bohemian aristocracy. He studied at Heidelberg, Koln, Paris, and Oxford, and wandered over Europe in quest of adventures. He had been imprisoned as a heretic at Pesth and at Vienna, and had only escaped through the intervention of his noble friends and of the University of Prague. He had dreamed of a reconciliation between the Bohemian reformers and the Greek Church. Violent and impetuous in all things, he hastened to Constance, where he kept himself hid, and on April 7 posted on the church doors a request for a safe-conduct, saying that he was willing to appear before the Council and answer for his opinions. On April 17 the Council cited him to appear within fifteen days, giving him a safe-conduct against violence, but announcing the intention of proceeding legally against him. Jerome already repented of his rashness; he judged it wiser to return to Prague, but was recognized when close on the Bohemian frontier, at Hirschau, was made prisoner and was sent back to Constance, where he arrived on May 23. He was led in chains by his captor to the Franciscan monastery, where a general congregation of the Council was sitting. Jerome was asked why he had not appeared in answer to the citation, and answered that he had not received it in time to do so; he had waited for some time, but had turned his face homewards in despair before it was issued. Angry cries arose on every side, for Jerome’s keen tongue and fiery temper had raised him enemies wherever he had gone. Academic hatred blazed up; the hostility of the Nominalists against the Realistic philosophy was proved to be no inconsiderable element in the opposition to the tenets of Wycliffe and Huss. Gerson exclaimed, “When you were at Paris, you disturbed the University with false positions, especially in the matter of universals and ideas and other scandalous doctrines”. A doctor from Heidelberg cried out, “When you were at Heidelberg you painted up a shield comparing the Trinity to water, snow, and ice”. He alluded to a diagram which Jerome had drawn out to illustrate his philosophic views, in which water, snow, and ice, as three forms of one substance, were paralleled with the three Persons co-existing in the Trinity. Jerome demanded that his opinions be proved erroneous; if so, he was willing humbly to recall them. There were loud cries, “Burn him, burn him”. “If you wish my death”, he exclaimed, “so be it in God’s name”. “Nay”, said the chivalrous Robert Hallam, Bishop of Salisbury, “Nay, Jerome; for it is written, I will not the death
of a sinner, but rather that he be converted and live”. In the midst of general confusion Jerome was hurried off to prison in the tower of S. Paul’s Church—a dark and narrow dungeon where he could not see to read, and was treated with the utmost rigor.

The hopes of Huss and his friends fell lower and lower, as the months of his imprisonment went on. The Commissioners of the Council plied Huss with questions and framed their indictment against him. Huss labored hard to prepare his defense, and still found time to write little tractates for the use of his friends and even of his guards. His own desire was that he might have the opportunity of defending his opinions openly. So entirely were they the expression of his whole moral nature, that he could not imagine it possible for anyone to consider that the frank expression of such opinions was really culpable.

But the Council saw no reason for listening to Huss’s explanations. In their mind his guilt was clear; his writings contained opinions contrary to the system of the Church; he had openly acted in defiance of ecclesiastical authority, and had taught others to do the same. It was useless to give one another such opportunity of raising his voice. The Council that had just been victorious over a Pope thought it beneath its dignity to waste time over a heretic. The very fact of the overthrow of John XXIII made the condemnation of Huss more necessary. If the Council had been compelled by the emergency to overstep the bounds of precedent in its dealings with the Pope, Huss afforded it an opportunity of showing Christendom how clearly it distinguished between reform and revolution; how its anxiety to amend the evils of the Church did not lead it to deviate from the old ecclesiastical traditions. The real state of affairs was accurately expressed in the advice given to Huss by a friend who was a man of the world, “If the Council were to assert that you have only one eye, though you have two, you ought to agree with the Council’s opinion”. Huss answered, “If the whole world were to tell me so, I could not, so long as I have the reason that I now enjoy, agree without doing violence to my conscience”. Huss had the spirit of a martyr, because he had the singleness of character which made life impossible if purchased by the overthrow of his moral and intellectual sincerity.

So when, on June 5, the Fathers of the Council assembled in the refectory of the Franciscan Convent, they came to condemn Huss, not to hear him. Before Huss was brought in, the report of the Commissioners appointed to examine his case was read. A Bohemian, looking over the reader’s shoulder, saw that it ended in a condemnation of various articles taken from Huss’s writings. When John of Chlum and Wenzel of Duba heard this they went to Sigismund, who was not present at the congregation, and besought him to interfere. Sigismund was moved to send Frederick of Nurnberg and the Pfalzgraf Lewis to request the Council not to condemn Huss unheard, but to give a careful hearing to his defense. The friends of Huss objected that the articles against Huss were taken from garbled copies of his writings, and they laid before the Council Huss’s original manuscript of the “De Ecclesia” and other works on condition that they should be safely returned.

After these preliminaries, Huss was brought in. He admitted that the manuscripts which he was shown were his; he added that if they were proved to contain any errors, he was ready to amend them. The first article of his accusation was then read, and Huss began to answer it. He had not proceeded far before he was stopped by cries on all sides. It was not the Council’s notion of a defence that the accused should discuss the standard of orthodoxy, or bring forward quotations from the Fathers in proof of each of
his opinions. To them the rule of faith was the Church, and the Church was represented by the Council. It was for them to say what opinions were heretical or erroneous. The only question in Huss’s case was whether or not he owned the opinions of which he was accused. “Have done with your sophistries”, was the cry, “and answer yes or no”. When he quoted from the writings of the early Fathers, he was told that was not to the point: when he was silent, his foes exclaimed: “Your silence shows assent to these errors”. The more sober members decided the Council to defer for two days the further hearing of Huss.

At the second audience, June 7, Sigismund was present, and there was greater order, owing to a proclamation, in the name of the King and the Council, that any one crying out in a disorderly way would be removed. The first point on which Huss was accused was his view of the Sacrament of the Altar, about which Huss denied, as he always had done, that he shared Wycliffe’s views. Peter d’Ailly, who was president at the session, tried to discuss the question on philosophical grounds, and to prove that Huss, as a realist who believed in universals, could not accept the true doctrine on the subject. The English, who had been experienced in this question since Wycliffe’s days, took a great share in the discussion. At last one of them brought it to an end by declaring that these philosophical points had nothing to do with the matter: he declared himself satisfied with the soundness of Huss’s opinion on this point. There was some warmth in the discussion, and many spoke at once, till Huss exclaimed, “I expected to find in the Council more piety, reverence, and order”. This exclamation produced silence, for it was a quiet appeal to the mandate against interruption: but D’Ailly resented the remark, and said, “When you were in your prison, you spoke more modestly”. “Yes”, retorted Hus, “for there at least I was not disturbed”.

The discussion then passed into an attempt to discover: what was the nature of the evidence by which a man’s opinions were to be determined. Cardinal Zabarella remarked to Huss that, according to Scripture, “In the mouth of two or three witnesses shall every word be established”: as on most points there were at least twenty witnesses who deposed against Huss, it was difficult to see what he could gain by denying the charges. Huss answered, “If God and my conscience witness for me that I never taught what I am accused of teaching, the testimony of my opponents hurts me not”. To this Cardinal d’Ailly observed with truth, “We cannot judge according to your conscience, but according to the testimony laid before us”. Here, in fact, lay the inevitable difference in point of view that made the trial of Huss seem, in his own eyes, to be a mere mockery of justice.

The discussion wandered on aimlessly. Hus was accused of defending Wycliffe and his doctrines, of causing disturbances in the University of Prague and in the kingdom of Bohemia. Cardinal d’Ailly quoted, in support of the charge of sedition, a remark by Huss when he was first brought before the Cardinals, that he had come to Constance of his own free will, and if he had not wished to do so, neither the King of Bohemia nor the King of the Romans could have compelled him. Hus answered, “Yes, there are many lords in Bohemia who love me, in whose castles I could have been hid, so that neither King could have compelled me”. D’Ailly cried out on such audacity; but John of Chlum rose and said sturdily, “What he speaks is true. I am but a poor knight in our kingdom, yet I would willingly keep him for a year, whomsoever it pleased or displeased, so that no one could take him. There are many great lords who love him and would keep him in their castles as long as they chose, even against both Kings together”.
John’s remark was noble and brave and true, but it was not politic. The King of the Romans, the disposer of Christendom, the idol of the Council, sat by with wrath and heard the bitter truth about his mightiness, and was publicly braved for the sake of an obscure heretic. President d’Ailly saw an opportunity for closing triumphantly this unprofitable wrangle. Turning to Huss, he said, “You declared in prison that you were willing to submit to the judgment of the Council: I advise you to do so, and the Council will deal mercifully with you”. Sigismund, smarting under the affront of John of Chlum, publicly abandoned Huss. He told him that he had given him a safe-conduct for the purpose of procuring him a hearing before the Council. He had now been heard: there was nothing to be done but submit to the Council, which, for the sake of Wenzel and himself, would deal mercifully with him. “If, however”, he continued, “you persist in your errors, it is for the Council to determine what it will do. I have said that I will not defend a heretic; nay, if any one remained obstinate in heresy, I would, with my own hands, burn him. I advise you to submit entirely to the Council’s grace, and the sooner the better, lest you be involved in deeper error”. Huss thanked Sigismund—it must have been ironically—for his safe-conduct, repeated his vague statement that he was willing to abandon any errors about which he was better informed, and was conducted back to his prison.

The audience was continued next day, June 8, when thirty-nine articles against Huss were laid before the Council: twenty-six of them were taken from the treatise “De Ecclesia”, the remainder from his controversial writings. Huss’s manuscript was before the Council, and each article was compared with the passages on which it was founded: D’Ailly observed on several articles that they were milder than Huss’s words justified. The articles chiefly turned on Huss’s conception of the Church as the body of the predestinated, and the consequent dependence of ecclesiastical power on the worthiness of him who exercised it. Huss objected to several of the articles, that they did not properly express his meaning, were taken out of connection with the context, and paid no attention to the limitations which had accompanied his statements. To the article that “a wicked pope or prelate is not truly a pastor”, Huss put in a limitation that he meant they were not priests so far as their merits went, but he admitted that they were priests so far as their office was concerned. To back up this fine distinction, he urged the case of John XXIII, and asked whether he were really a pope, or really a robber. The Cardinals looked at one another and smiled, but answered, “Oh, he was a true pope”. The whole proceeding was wearisome and profitless, for the Council had no doubt that Huss’s teaching as a whole was opposed to all order, and they had in their favor the practical argument of the Bohemian disturbances. It was useless for Huss to palliate each separate article and urge that there was a sense in which it might have an orthodox meaning.

In spite of his attempts to be cautious, Huss occasionally betrayed the revolutionary nature of his views if pushed to the extreme. When the article was read, “If a pope, bishop, or prelate be in mortal sin, he is not a true pope, bishop, or prelate”, Huss urged the words of Samuel to Saul, “Because thou hast rejected the word of the Lord, He hath rejected thee from being king”. Sigismund at the time was talking in a window with Frederick of Nurnberg and the Pfalzgraf Lewis; there was a cry, “Call the King, for this affects him”. When Sigismund had returned to his place, Huss was asked to repeat his remark. Sigismund with truth and pertinence remarked, “Huss, no one is without sin”. Peter d’Ailly was resolved not to let slip the opportunity of showing the danger attending Huss’s opinions if they were extended to political as well as religious matters.
“It was not enough for you”, he exclaimed, “by your writings and teaching to throw down the spiritual power; you wish also to oust kings from their places”.

At length the reading of the articles and their attestation was ended. D’Ailly, as president, addressed Huss: “There are two ways open for your choice. Either submit yourself entirely to the mercy of the Council, which, for the sake of the King of the Romans and the King of Bohemia, will deal kindly with you; or, if you wish further to maintain your opinions, an opportunity will be given you. Know, however, that there are here many learned men, who have such strong reasons against your articles that I fear if you attempt to defend them further you will be involved in graver errors. I speak as an adviser, not as a judge”. There were cries on all sides urging Huss to submit. He answered, “I came here freely, not to defend anything obstinately, but to submit to better information if I was wrong. I crave another audience to explain my meaning, and if my arguments do not prevail, I am willing to submit humbly to the information of the Council”. His words awakened the anger of many. “The Council is not here to inform, but to judge; he is equivocating”, was cried out on all sides. Huss amended his words: he was willing to submit to their correction and decision. On this D’Ailly at once rose, and said that sixty doctors had unanimously decided on the steps which Huss must take: “He must humbly recognize his errors, abjure and revoke the articles against him, promise never to teach them again, but henceforth to preach and teach the opposite”. Huss answered that he could not lie and abjure doctrines which he had never held, as was the case with some of the articles brought against him. Hereon a verbal dispute arose about the meaning of abjuration, which Sigismund tried to settle by the remark that he was ready to abjure all errors, but this did not imply that he had previously held them. Cardinal Zabarella at last told Huss that a written form of abjuration would be submitted to him, and he could make up his mind at leisure. Huss demanded another chance of explaining his doctrines; but Sigismund warned him that two courses only were open—either he must abjure and submit to the Council’s mercy, or the Council would proceed to assert its rights. A desultory conversation followed. At last Palecz, moved in some way by the solemnity of the occasion, rose and protested that in promoting the cause against Huss he had been actuated by no personal motive, but solely by zeal for the truth. Michael de Causis said the same. Huss answered, “I stand before the judgment seat of God, who will judge both you and me after our deserts”. He was then taken back to his prison.

The laymen quickly left the Council chamber, and Sigismund remained talking in the window with some of the chief prelates. The Bohemians, John of Chlum, Wenzel of Duba, and Peter Mladenowic, remained sadly behind the rest, and so heard Sigismund’s conversation. With indignation and dismay they heard him urge on the Fathers Huss’s condemnation. There was more than enough evidence, he said; if Huss would not abjure, let him be burned. Even if he did abjure, it would be well to inhibit him from preaching again, as he could not be trusted; they must make an end of the matter, and root out all Huss’s followers, beginning with Jerome, whom they had in their hands. “It was only in my boyhood”, ended Sigismund, “that this sect arose in Bohemia, and see how it has grown and multiplied”. The prelates agreed with the King’s opinion, and Sigismund retired satisfied with his acuteness in turning things to his own advantage. He thought that vigorous measures on the part of the Council would overawe the turbulent spirits in Bohemia, and would spare him much trouble when the time came that he inherited the Bohemian crown. The unguarded words that he spoke lost him his Bohemian kingdom forever. Sigismund might have been forgiven for refusing to come
into collision with the rights of the Council by insisting on the observance of his safe-conduct; he could never be forgiven for joining the ranks of Huss’s foes and hounding on the Council to condemn him. As King of the Romans he might have duties which brought him into conflict with the wishes of the Bohemians; he was discovered secretly using his influence against them, and striving to crush what the Bohemians longed to assert. The insult to the nation, of inciting the Council to root out errors from Bohemia, was deeply felt and bitterly resented. The people steeled their hearts to assert that they would not have this man to rule over them.

An attempt was made to bring Huss to retract. Some member of the Council, whom Huss knew and respected, was chosen to submit to him a formula of retractation, setting forth, “though many things are laid to my charge which I never thought, yet I submit myself concerning all such points, either drawn from my books or from the depositions of witnesses, to the order, definition, and correction of the Holy Council”. Huss answered that he could not condemn many truths which seemed to the Council scandalous; he could not perjure himself by renouncing errors which he did not hold, and so scandalizing Christian people who had heard him preach the contrary. “I stand”, he ended, “at the judgment-seat of Christ, to whom I have appealed, knowing that He will judge every man, not according to false or erroneous witness, but according to the truth and each one’s deserts”. There was no longer any attempt at special pleading. Huss asserted against authority the rights of the individual conscience, and removed his cause from the tribunal of man to the judgment-seat of God. A new spirit had arisen in Christendom when a man felt that his life and character had been so definitely built up round opinions which the Church condemned, that it was easier for him to die than to resign the truths which made him what he was.

There was but one course open to the Council, yet it hesitated to proceed to the condemnation of Hus. On June 15 it turned its attention again to the innovations introduced into Bohemia by Jakubek of Mies, in the administration of the Eucharist. It issued a decree declaring the administration under both kinds to be heretical, because opposed to the custom and ordinance of the Church, which had been made to prevent irregularities. Huss, in his letters to his friends, did not scruple to call this decree mere madness, in that it set the custom of the Roman Church against the plain words of Christ and of S. Paul. He wrote also to Havlik, who had taken his place as preacher in the Bethlehem Chapel, exhorting him not to withstand Jakubek’s teaching in this matter, and so cause a schism among the faithful by paying heed to this decree of the Council. Huss set himself more and more decidedly against the Council, and all efforts to induce him to submit were unavailing.

Even Palecz, the friend of Huss’s youth and now his bitterest foe, visited him in prison and besought him to abjure. “What would you do”, said Huss, “if you were charged with errors which you knew for certain that you never held? Would you abjure?”

“It is a hard matter”, answered Palecz, and burst into tears.

It was characteristic of Huss that he asked to have Palecz as his confessor, for he was his chief adversary. Palecz shrank from the office, but paid his former friend another visit, and excused himself for the part that he had taken against him.

Huss resolutely prepared to die, and wrote to bid farewell to his various friends in Bohemia and at Constance. A tranquil yet determined spirit breathes through his letters; the charm of his personal character is seen in the tenderness and thoughtfulness of the messages which he sends. Repeated deputations from the Council vainly endeavored to
prove to him the duty, the easiness of recantation. At last, on July 1, a formal answer in writing was returned by Hus to the Council. He said that, fearing to offend God, and fearing to commit perjury, he was unwilling to retract any of the articles brought against him. On July 5, at Sigismund’s request, the Bohemian nobles, John of Chlum and Wenzel of Duba, accompanied the representatives of the Council on a last visit to Huss. John of Chlum manfully addressed him, and his words are a strong proof of the sturdy moral spirit which Hus had awakened in his followers: “We are laymen and cannot advise you; consider, however, and if you feel that you are guilty in any of the matters laid to your charge, have no shame in recanting. If, however, you do not feel yourself guilty, by no means act contrary to your conscience, and do not lie in the sight of God, but rather persevere unto death in the truth which you know”. Huss answered: “If I knew that I had written or preached anything erroneous, contrary to the law and the Church, God is my witness that I would in all humility retract. But my wish always has been that better doctrine be proved to me out of Scripture, and then I would be most ready to recant”. One of the Bishops said indignantly:

“Will you be wiser than the whole Council?”.

Huss answered, “Show me the least member of the Council who will inform me better out of the Scriptures, and I will forthwith retract”.

“He is obstinate in his heresy”, exclaimed the prelates, and Huss was led back to his prison.

Next day, July 6, was a general session of the Council in the Cathedral, which Sigismund attended in royal state. During the celebration of mass Huss was kept standing in the porch with an armed escort. He was brought in to listen to a sermon on the sin of heresy from the Bishop of Lodi. He was stationed before a raised platform, on which was a stand containing all the articles of a priest’s dress. During the sermon Huss knelt in prayer. When the sermon was over a proctor of the Council demanded sentence against Huss. A doctor mounted the pulpit and read a selection from the condemned articles of Wycliffe and the conclusions of the process against Huss. More than once Huss tried to answer to the charges, but he was ordered to keep silence. He pleaded that he wished to clear himself of error in the eyes of those who stood by; afterwards they might deal with him as they chose. When he was forbidden to speak, he again knelt in prayer. The number and rank, but not the names, of the witnesses to each charge, together with a summary of their testimony, was then read. Huss was aroused by hearing new charges brought against him, amongst others the monstrous assertion that he had declared himself to be the Fourth Person of the Trinity. He indignantly asked the name of the one doctor who was quoted as witness, but was answered that there was no need of naming him now. When he was charged with despising the Papal excommunication and refusing to answer the Pope’s summons, he again protested that he had desired nothing more than to prove his own innocence, and had for that purpose come to Constance of his own free will, trusting in the Imperial safe-conduct. As he said this he looked fixedly at Sigismund, who blushed through shame.

After this recital of his crimes, the sentence of the Council against Huss was read. First his writings, Latin and Bohemian, were condemned as heretical and ordered to be burnt. Huss asked how they could know that his Bohemian writings were heretical, seeing they had never read them. The sentence went on, that Huss himself as a pertinacious heretic be degraded from the priesthood. When the reading of the sentence was over, Huss prayed aloud: “O Lord Jesus Christ, pardon all my enemies, for Thy
great mercy’s sake, I beseech Thee. Thou know that they have falsely accused me, brought forward false witnesses and forged false articles against me. Pardon them through Thy immense mercy”. The Archbishop of Milan, with six other Bishops, proceeded to the formal degradation of Huss. He was set on the platform in the middle of the cathedral, and was invested in the full priestly dress, with the chalice in his hand. Again he was exhorted to retract. He turned to the people, and, with tears streaming down his face, said, “See how these Bishops expect me to abjure: yet I fear to do so, lest I be a liar in the sight of the Lord—lest I offend my conscience and the truth of God, since I never held these articles which witness falsely against me, but rather wrote and taught the opposite. I fear, too, to scandalize the multitude to which I preached”.

The Bishops then proceeded to his degradation. Each article of his priestly office was taken from him with solemn formality, and his tonsure was cut on four sides. Then it was pronounced, “The Church has taken from him all rights of the Church; and commits him to the secular arm”. The paper cap, painted over with fiends, was put on his head, with the words, “We commit your soul to the devil”. Sigismund gave him to the charge of Lewis of Bavaria, who handed him to the civic officers for execution. As the procession passed out of the church Huss saw his books being burned in the churchyard. He was led out of the town into a suburb called Brüel, where in a meadow the stake had been prepared. To the last he asserted to the bystanders that he had never taught the things laid to his charge. When he was bound to the stake and Lewis of Bavaria again begged him to recant, Huss answered that the charges against him were false: “I am prepared to die in that truth of the Gospel which I taught and wrote”. As the pile was kindled Huss began to sing from the Liturgy:—

“O Christ, Son of the living God, have mercy upon us;
O Christ, Son of the living God, have mercy upon me;
Thou who wast born of the Virgin Mary”.

The wind swept the flames upward into his face, and he remained speechless. His lips were seen to move for a few minutes and then his spirit passed away. The attendants took great care that his body was all reduced to ashes. His clothes, which, according to custom, belonged to the executioner, were bought from him by Lewis of Bavaria, and were also burned. The ashes were flung into the Rhine: it was determined that Bohemia should have no relics of her martyr.

Huss died protesting against the unfairness of his trial.

It is indeed impossible that a trial for opinions should ever be considered fair by the accused. He is charged with subverting the existing system of thought; he answers that some modification of the existing system is necessary, and that his opinions, if rightly understood, are not subversive, but amending. Into this issue his judges cannot follow him. It is as though a man accused of high treason were to urge that his treason is the noblest patriotism. There may be truth in his allegation, but it is a truth which human justice cannot take into account. The judge is appointed to execute existing laws, and till those laws are altered by the properly constituted authority, the best attempts to amend them by individual protest must be reckoned as rebellion. No doubt Huss’s Bohemian foes did their best to ruin him; but his opinions were judged by the Council to be subversive of the ecclesiastical system, and when he refused to submit to that decision, he was necessarily regarded as an obstinate heretic. It is useless to criticize particular points in his trial. The Council was anxious for his submission and gave him every
opportunity to make it. But it is the glory of Huss that he first deliberately asserted the rights of the individual conscience against ecclesiastical authority, and sealed his assertion by his own life-blood.

The Council still had Jerome in their hands, but they were in no haste to proceed against him. The news of the death of Huss kindled in Bohemia the bitterest wrath. It was a national insult, and branded Bohemia in the eyes of Christendom as the home of heresy. The clergy and monks were regarded with hatred as the causes of Huss’s persecution. In Prague there was a riot, in which the clergy were severely handled; a crowd of Bohemians ravaged the lands of the Bishop of Leitomysl, who had been especially active in the prosecution of Huss. The Council thought it desirable to try and calm the irritation in Bohemia, and on July 23 sent a letter to the Bohemian clergy exhorting them to persevere in the extirpation of heresy. This letter only had the effect of sharpening the antagonism of the two parties in Bohemia. One party drew more closely to the side of the Council and of Catholic orthodoxy; the other more pronouncedly, asserted the claims of Bohemia to settle its religious controversies without foreign interference. The Bishop of Leitomysl was sent by the Council to protect the interests of the Church; but so strong was the feeling against him in Bohemia that he felt it wise to stay indoors, and lived in fear of his personal safety.

On September 2 a meeting was held at Prague of sixty-two Bohemian and Moravian nobles, who drew up an angry reply to the Council’s letter. They asserted their respect for Huss and their belief in his innocence; they defended Bohemia from the charge of heresy; they branded as a liar and traitor anyone who maintained such a charge for the future; they declared themselves determined to defend with their blood the law of Christ and its devout preachers in Bohemia. This letter received as many as 450 signatures. On September 5 the Hussite lords entered into a formal bond, or covenant, to uphold freedom of preaching in Bohemia, and defend against episcopal prohibition or excommunication all faithful preachers; the University of Prague was recognized as the arbiter in doctrinal matters. On October 1 a similar covenant was entered into by the Catholic nobles to uphold the Church, the Council, and the worship of their forefathers. Wenzel took no steps to prevent these threatenings of disturbance. He was angry at the execution of Huss, which he regarded as a slight upon himself and his kingdom. He was especially angry that it had been done under Sigismund’s sanction; for he still regarded himself as King of the Romans, and was indignant at this intrusion of Sigismund into matters concerning the kingdom of Bohemia. Moreover, Queen Sophia grieved over the death of her confessor, whom she revered, and whose genuine piety she knew. Though Wenzel gave a verbal adhesion to the Catholic League, he was not thought to be in earnest.

The fathers of Constance had seen what little impression their severity produced on Huss; they learned that it produced equally little on his followers in Bohemia. Hence there was a general wish to win over Jerome if possible to the Council’s side, or, at least, to spare the Council the odium of making another martyr. Every method was used to induce Jerome to retract; till, overcome by the pleadings of men whose character he could not but respect, he consented on September 10 to make his submission to the Council. He wrote to his Bohemian friends that, on examination of the articles against Huss, he found many of them heretical, and on comparing them with Huss’s own manuscript writings he had been forced to own that the articles fairly represented Huss’s words: he consequently felt bound to admit that Huss had been justly dealt with by the Council; though he wished to defend Huss’s honor, he did not wish to be associated
with his errors. The Council was proud of its triumph, and caused Jerome to renew his retractation in a more formal manner in a public session on September 23. It also passed a decree against those who assailed Sigismund for violating his safe-conduct to Huss. The decree asserted that “neither by natural, divine, nor human law was any promise to be observed to the prejudice of the Catholic faith”.

Jerome’s recantation did not procure his freedom. He was taken back to prison, though his confinement was made much less rigid. The Commissioners who had examined him—Cardinals Zabarella, D'Ailly, Orsini and the Cardinal of Apulia—urged his release; but the Bohemian party dreaded the results of his return to Bohemia, and declared that his retractation was not sincere. Gerson wrote a pamphlet to examine the amount of evidence to be attached to the retractation of one accused of heresy. The fanaticism that had been aroused by antagonism to the Hussites won at Constance the victory which it could not win in Bohemia. The Council determined to proceed against Jerome, and on February 24, 1416, appointed fresh Commissioners to examine witnesses on the points laid to his charge. On April 27 the articles of accusation were laid before the Council. Jerome had not been a writer or preacher like Huss, and his works could not be quoted against him; but every act of his life was set forth as a separate charge. He had been to England, and had brought back the books of Wycliffe; he had been concerned in all the disturbances in Bohemia; he had rambled over Europe, carrying heresy in his train. Every daring act into which his impetuous temper had led him was now raked up against him. He had interfered to aid a citizen, whose servant was being carried off for some slight cause to a monastery prison, and when the monks attacked him, had snatched a sword from one of the citizens and put them to flight. He had been moved with pity for a young monk whose abbot denied him the necessaries of life, and had accompanied him into the abbot’s presence, where he flung off his cowl and rushed away from the monastery. He had slapped the face of a monk who publicly insulted him.

Jerome demanded a public audience in which to answer these charges, and on May 23 was brought before the Council. Amongst those present at his trial was Florentine scholar Poggio Bracciolini, who had come to Constance as secretary to John XXIII. On the dispersal of the Papal household he had wandered for a time in Germany, searching for manuscripts of the classics, and had again returned to Constance to seek his fortune from some patron of learning. Poggio was deeply impressed by the vigorous personality of Jerome, and communicated his impressions in a letter to his friend Leonardo Bruni. As a man of letters and of culture Poggio looked with some slight contempt on the theological disputes of the assembled fathers. As an Italian he found it hard to sympathize with men who thought it worthwhile to rebel against the system of the Church. To his mind theological questions were not of much importance. The established system must, of course, be maintained for the preservation of order; but, after a decent recognition of its outward authority, the cultivated individual might think or act as he pleased so long as he avoided open collision. Poggio had no fellow-feeling with a man who was prepared to die for his opinions: he thought him clumsy for reducing himself to such an unpleasant alternative. But he was attracted to Jerome by his force, his mental versatility, his fiery self-confidence, his keen wit, and, above all, his philosophic spirit. To Poggio Jerome was an interesting study of character, and he saw the permanent and human interest attaching to the religious martyr. From Poggio’s testimony we are able to bring vividly before our eyes the scene of Jerome’s trial.
When Jerome appeared he was called upon to answer to each of the articles brought against him. This he refused for a long time to do, and demanded that he should first state his own case, and then answer his adversaries’ allegations. When his claim was overruled he said, “What iniquity is this, that I, who have been kept in a foul prison for three hundred and forty days without means of preparing my defence, while my adversaries have always had your ears, am now refused an hour to defend myself? Your minds are prejudiced against me as a heretic; you judged me to be wicked before you had any means of knowing what manner of man I was. And yet you are men, not gods; mortals, not eternal; you are liable to error and mistake. The more you claim to be held as lights of the world, the more careful you ought to be to approve your justice to all men. I, whose cause you judge, am of no repute, nor do I speak for myself, for death comes to all; but I would not have so many wise men do an unjust act, which will do more harm by the precedent it gives than by the punishment it inflicts”.

He was heard with murmurs. The articles against him were read one by one from the pulpit. He put forth all his skill and eloquence to plead against their truth. Poggio was amazed at the dignity, openness, and vigor with which he spoke. “If he really believed what he said, not only could no cause of death be found in him, but not even of the slightest offence”. Sometimes with jest, sometimes with irony, sometimes with sarcasm, sometimes with fiery indignation, sometimes with fervid eloquence, he answered the charges brought against him. When he was pressed on the question of Transubstantiation, and was charged with having said that after consecration the bread remained bread, he dryly said, “At the baker’s it remains bread”. When a Dominican fiercely attacked him, he exclaimed, “Hypocrite, hold your tongue”. When another made oath on his conscience, he rejoined, “That is the surest way to deceive”. So numerous were the charges against him that his case had to be put off for three days, till May 26.

In the next audience the reading of the articles and testimony against him was ended, and Jerome with difficulty obtained leave to speak. Beginning with an humble prayer to God, he began a magnificent defence. Gifted with a sweet, clear, resonant voice, he sometimes poured forth torrents of fiery indignation and sometimes touched the chords of deepest pathos. He set forth the glorious fate of those who in old times had suffered wrongfully. Beginning with Socrates, he traced the persecutions of philosophers down to Boethius. Then he turned to the Scriptures, and from Joseph down to Stephen showed how goodness had met with calumny and persecution. Stephen, he urged, was put to death by an assembly of priests; the Apostles were persecuted as subverters of order and movers of sedition. He pleaded that no greater iniquity could be committed than that priests should be wrongfully condemned to death by priests; yet this had often occurred in the past. Then, turning to his own case, he showed that the witnesses against him were moved by personal animosity, and were not worthy of belief. He had come to the Council to clear his own character; he had hoped that men in these days might do as they had done of old, engage in amicable discussion with a view of investigating the truth. Augustine and Jerome had differed, nay, had asserted, on some points, contrary opinions, without any suspicion of heresy on either side.

His audience was moved by his eloquence, and sat expecting that he would urge his retractation and ask pardon for his errors. To their surprise and grief, he went on to say that he was conscious of no errors, and could not retract the false charges brought against him. He had recanted through fear and against his conscience, but now revoked the letter he had written to Bohemia. He had looked on Huss as a just and holy man,
whose fate he was prepared to share, leaving the lying witnesses against him to answer for their doings in the presence of God, whom they could not deceive. A cry arose from the Council, and many strove to induce Jerome to explain away his words. But his courage had returned, and he was resolved to tread in his master’s footsteps to the stake. He repeated his belief in the opinions of Huss and of Wycliffe, except in points concerning the Eucharist, where he held with the doctors of the Church. “Huss”, he exclaimed, “spoke not against the Church of God, but against the abuses of the clergy, the pride and pomp of the prelates. The patrimony of the Church should be spent on the poor, on strangers and on buildings; but it is spent on harlots and banquets, horses and dogs, splendid apparel, and other things unworthy of Christ’s religion”.

The Council still gave him a few days for consideration, but to no purpose. On May 30 he was brought before a general session in the cathedral. The eloquence of the Bishop of Lodi was again called into request to convince the obstinate heretic of the justice of his doom. When the sermon was over Jerome repeated the withdrawal of his former retraction. Sentence was passed against him, and he was led away to be burned in the same place as Huss. Like Huss, he went to die with calm and cheerful face. As he left the cathedral he began to chant the Creed and then the Litany. When he reached the place of execution he knelt before the stake, as though it had been an image of Huss, and prayed. As he was bound he again recited the Creed, and called the people to witness that in that faith he died. When the executioner was going to light the pile at his back he called to him. “Come in front, and light it before my face; if I had feared death, I would never have come here”. As the flames gathered round him he sang a hymn till his voice was choked by the smoke. As in the case of Huss, his clothes were burned, and his ashes were cast into the Rhine.

The Council had done all that lay in its power to restore peace in Bohemia.
CHAPTER VI.
SIGISMUND’S JOURNEY, AND THE COUNCIL DURING HIS ABSENCE.
1415-1416.

The Council had displayed its zeal for the promotion of the unity of the Church, both within and without, by deposing a Pope and burning two heretics. But there still remained other pretenders to the Papal dignity; and the trials of Hus and Jerome were only episodes in the more important question of the resignation of the contending Popes.

Gregory XII, weary of the conflict, and seeing himself abandoned on every side, submitted with good grace to abdicate. After a few negotiations about preliminaries, the abdication was formally carried out by Carlo Malatesta, acting as Gregory’s proctor, in a general session of the Council, on July 4, 1415. The two Colleges of Cardinals were united, Gregory’s acts in the Papacy were ratified, his officials were confirmed in their offices; he himself received the title of Cardinal of Porto and the legation in the March of Ancona for life; he was declared ineligible for re-election to the Papacy, but was to rank next to the future Pope. At the same time a decree was passed that the Council should not be dissolved till it had elected a new Pope.

There still remained Benedict XIII, who had agreed to be present at a conference at Nice between Ferdinand of Aragon and Sigismund, in June, 1415. But the exciting scenes which followed on the flight of John XXIII obliged Sigismund to defer his departure till July 18. Owing to the illness of the King of Aragon, the place of meeting was changed from Nice to Perpignan. Thither went Benedict XIII in June, and waited till the end of the month, when he declared Sigismund contumacious and retired to Valencia. Sigismund, in a speech to the Council before his departure, announced his intentions on a grand scale. He purposed first to appease the Schism, then to make peace between France and England, between Poland and the Teutonic knights; and after this general pacification of Europe, to undertake a crusade against the Turks. It was Sigismund’s merit that he formed great plans of European importance; it was his weakness that he never considered what means he had to carry them into execution. To obtain money for this journey, which was to have such mighty results, he was compelled to raise 250,000 marks by making over Brandenburg to the wealthy Frederick, Burggraf of Nurnberg. Frederick had already lent him 150,000 marks, and now, for the additional sum, obtained from the needy Emperor a grant of Brandenburg and the electoral dignity.

Sigismund set out in state with a train of 4000 knights, amid the good wishes of the fathers of the Council, who ordered a solemn procession to be made every Sunday, and mass to be said for his safety. He journeyed over Schaffhausen to Basel, and thence to Chambery and Narbonne, where he arrived on August 15. There he stayed for a month, waiting for the arrival at Perpignan of Ferdinand of Aragon, whose health scarcely permitted the journey. On September 18, he entered Perpignan, where Ferdinand awaited him. Benedict, who had raised objections about a safe-conduct, and had demanded that Sigismund should treat him as Pope, was at length driven by Ferdinand’s
pressure to appear also towards the end of September. The efforts of Ferdinand and Sigismund could do nothing to bend the obstinate spirit of Benedict to submit to the Council. He answered that to him the way of justice seemed better than the way of abdication. If, however, the kings thought otherwise, he was ready to abdicate, provided that the decrees of the Council of Pisa were revoked, the Council of Constance dissolved, and a new Council called in some free and impartial place—in the south of France or Aragon. As regarded the election of a new Pope, he claimed that he alone should nominate, as being the only Cardinal appointed by Gregory XI before the Schism. If that was not acceptable, he would appoint a committee of his Cardinals, and the Council might appoint an equal number of their Cardinals; the new election should be made by a majority in each committee agreeing to the same person. After such election he would abdicate, retaining his Cardinals, with full legatine power over all his present obedience.

Benedict was true to his old principles. He had been elected Pope by as good a title as his predecessors, and he saw no reason why he should abandon his legal rights. Threats were useless against his stubbornness. When the Kings of Aragon, Navarre, and Castile threatened him with a withdrawal of obedience if he did not give way, he only grew more determined in his refusal. Sigismund found himself unsafe at Perpignan; his enemies seemed resolved to attack him when he was in a foreign land. A fire suspiciously broke out in a house adjoining his own, and the Infante Alfonso rushed to his rescue with assurances of his father’s protection. Some of Sigismund’s German followers rode away and left him without giving any reason. A suspicious embassy came from Frederick of Austria, which was said to have two notorious poisoners in its train. Fearing for his personal safety, Sigismund withdrew to Narbonne in the beginning of November, where he was followed by the ambassadors of the Spanish princes and of Scotland. New negotiations were set on foot, and Benedict, seeing himself threatened with a withdrawal of obedience, fled to the neighboring fortress of Collioure, intending to take refuge in Sardinia; his galleys, however, were destroyed by the ships of the neighboring ports. Several of his Cardinals, at the request of the King of Aragon, returned to Perpignan; and Benedict, who scorned to yield, retired to the rocky fortress of Peñiscola, which belonged to his family. Popular feeling was everywhere turning against him; his staunch upholder—the great Dominican preacher, Vincent Ferrer—went as ambassador to urge Benedict to resign, and on his refusal raised his voice in favor of union with the Council of Constance.

Negotiations went on rapidly between Sigismund and the King of Aragon. At last, on December 13, twelve articles were drawn up at Narbonne between the representatives of the Council and those of Benedict’s obedience. It was agreed that the Council of Constance should issue a summons to the princes and prelates of Benedict’s obedience to come to Constance within three months and form a General Council; a similar summons was to be addressed by Benedict’s obedience to the Council of Constance. When in this way the dignity of both parties had been preserved, the General Council so formed was to proceed to the deposition of Benedict, the election of a new Pope, the reformation of the Church, and the destruction of heresy. Benedict’s acts till his first summons to withdraw on November 15 were to be ratified, his Cardinals and other officials recognized by the Council, and a safe-conduct given to himself if he chose to appear.

Great was the joy of the Council when, on the evening of December 29, the news of this compact was brought to Constance. Communications with Narbonne had been rare,
and rumors of every sort prevailed. The Council found their proceedings a little dull in Sigismund’s absence. Commissioners might sit and discuss various questions of Church reform, but it was clear that nothing would be done till Sigismund was back again. The expenses of a stay in Constance began to weigh heavily, and the representatives of universities and other corporations found it necessary to urge on their constituents the importance of the work on which the Council was engaged, and the need of their continued presence at Constance. The first joy of the Council at the good news from Narbonne was a little checked when it came to consider the formalities that had to be gone through before its real business could proceed any further. Sigismund had not obtained, as had been hoped, the resignation of Benedict XIII; the way was not yet open for ending the Schism; but the union of Spain with the Council would bring about again the union of Christendom. Hopes of ending the Council by Easter, 1415, were exchanged for expectations that it might be over in September, 1416. The good news that Ferdinand of Aragon had on January 6 ordered the publication throughout his dominions of the withdrawal of allegiance from Benedict XIII hardly compensated for the news that Sigismund proposed to make a journey to Paris and London to arrange for peace between France and England. The ambassadors of the Council, who returned on January 29, assured them of the great use of this step in procuring the unity of the Church, and brought Sigismund’s promise that he would return as soon as possible.

If Sigismund, before leaving Constance, had set forth as one of his objects the establishment of peace between France and England, events that had happened since then had increased the danger which the union of Christendom was likely to incur from the growth of national animosity. In August, 1415, Henry V had sailed to France, in September had taken Harfleur, and in October had inflicted on the French army the crushing defeat of Agincourt. The Council thought that Sigismund’s presence was consequently more than ever necessary at Constance to keep the peace and hasten on the business. But Sigismund had his own ends to serve while serving the Council. He had already succeeded in asserting anew the glories of the Imperial name in the affairs of the Church; he was equally resolved to assert it in the politics of Europe. His scheme of uniting Europe in a crusade against the Turk might be a dream; but at least it was a noble dream. In matters more immediately at hand—the full reunion and reform of the Church—Sigismund saw that nothing could be done on a satisfactory basis unless Europe were agreed. As bearing the Imperial name, Sigismund resolved to try and unite Europe for this purpose. It is true that he had little save the Imperial name to support him in his good intentions; yet, if his plan succeeded, he would work a lasting result for the good of Christendom, and would assert the old prestige of the Empire.

Full of hope, he entered Paris on March 1, 1416, and was received with splendid festivities. But the fierce antagonism of the Burgundian and Orleanist factions had been intensified by the national discomfiture, and Sigismund found that in the disturbed state of Paris he could obtain no definite understanding: what one party accepted the other refused. Yet Sigismund tried his utmost to win the French Court to his projects: he offered to wed his daughter Elizabeth with the second son of Charles VI, and so make him heir to the Hungarian throne, as he had no male offspring. When he found that he could do nothing in Paris, he pursued his way to England, and even on his journey was treated with contumely at Abbeville and Boulogne. It was clear that there was a strong party in France which had no wish for peace.

Sigismund arrived in London on May 3, and there also great festivities were held in his honor. He took with him William, Duke of Holland, an ally of England, a relative of
the French King, and consequently likely to be trusted by both parties. Henry V was willing to accept Sigismund’s offer of mediation and agree to a truce for three years, on condition of retaining Harfleur, a small compensation for the glorious campaign of Agincourt. Preliminaries were agreed to, and a conference between the three monarchs was arranged; but suddenly negotiations were broken off by the successful intrigues of the Count of Armagnac. William of Holland abruptly left England, and Sigismund found his mediation ignominiously disavowed. Sigismund was bitterly disappointed, and was placed in an awkward situation by this sudden change in the policy of France. Public opinion in England regarded him with grave suspicion, and he was entirely in the hands of Henry V. The Imperial honor had been sullied and the Imperial dignity outraged in this negotiation, from which Sigismund had hoped so much. He wrote angrily to the French King, and withdrew from further complicity in his affairs. He had indeed cause to be aggrieved, for he had not merely failed, but his failure threatened to be disastrous. He could not return to Constance crestfallen and discredited; he could not even leave England suspicious of his good intentions.

One course only remained open for him—to abandon his alliance with France, and draw nearer to England. Henry V, on his part, was ready enough to renew the policy of Edward I and Edward III, of forming an alliance with Germany against France. On August 15 Sigismund concluded at Canterbury an offensive and defensive alliance with Henry V, on the ground that the French favored the Schism of the Church, and opposed all efforts to make peace with England. It was an event of no small importance in European politics; it was a breach of the long-standing friendship between France and the house of Luxemburg—a friendship which Sigismund’s grandfather, John of Bohemia, had sealed with his blood on the field of Crecy. At the end of August Sigismund went to Calais, where Henry V soon joined him, and again a conference for peace was held; to it came the Duke of Burgundy, who, in his hatred against the Count of Armagnac, was ready to listen to Henry V’s proposals for a separate alliance. When the conference was over Sigismund be thought himself of returning to Constance. He was so short of money that he had to send his trusty servant, Eberard Windeck, to Bruges to pawn for 18,000 ducats the presents which he had received from Henry V and his Court. From Calais he went by sea to Dordrecht, and then made his way slowly up the Rhine to Constance, where he arrived on January 27, 1417, after an absence of nearly a year and a half.

Great was the delight of the Council at Sigismund’s return; he was met outside the wall, and was escorted in solemn procession to the cathedral. But the account of his reception shows us how strong an element of discord the national animosity between the French and English had introduced into the Council. The English observed with pride that Sigismund wore round his neck the Order of the Garter; and the Bishop of Salisbury, after meeting Sigismund, rode hastily away to the cathedral, that he might frustrate Peter d’Ailly, and get possession of the pulpit for the purpose of delivering a sermon of welcome. Sigismund, on his side, did not scruple to manifest in a marked way his wish for a good understanding with the English. On January 29 he received the English nation at a private audience, shook hands with each of its members, praised all that he had seen in England, and assured them of his wish to work with them for the reformation of the Church. On Sunday, January 31, he wore the robes of the Garter at high mass, and was afterwards entertained by the English at a magnificent banquet, which was enlivened by a miracle play representing the birth of Christ, the adoration of the Magi, and the massacre of the Innocents.
During Sigismund’s absence from Constance the Council had been unanimous only in condemning Jerome of Prague for heresy. The rest of its business had advanced but slowly. It is true that at the end of July a commission had been appointed to report upon the measures necessary for a reform of the Church in head and members. The commission consisted of thirty-five members, eight from each of the four nations, and three Cardinals, D'Ailly, Zabarella, and Adimari. There was no lack of material for the labours of the commissioners: sermons, memoirs, and tractates furnished them with copious lists of grievances. But the difficulty was to decide where to begin. All were anxious to do something; but each regarded as sacred the interests of his own order, and it was impossible to attack the fabric of abuses without endangering some of the props which supported the existing organization of the hierarchy. The general outline of the reforming scheme was clear and simple enough: it was a demand that the Pope should live on his own revenues, should abstain from interference in episcopal and capitular elections and presentations to benefices throughout Christendom, and should not unnecessarily interfere with episcopal or national jurisdictions. All these questions were really questions of finance, and the times were not favorable to serious financial reform. The Papal dominions in Italy were in the hands of the invader, and there was little revenue which could at that time be said to belong indisputably to the Pope. If the Pope were to be prohibited from making any demands on ecclesiastical revenues, he would be left almost penniless, and the Cardinals who depended on him would be destitute. Moreover, the Pope’s claims to raise money were the sign of the recognition of his supremacy, and it was difficult to forbid his extortion without impairing his necessary authority. The College of Cardinals during Sigismund’s absence regained its prestige and influence in the Council, and had a direct and personal interest in preventing any unreasonable diminution of the Papal revenues or of the Papal power. The reform commission found it necessary to proceed slowly and cautiously: they could only obtain unanimity on unimportant points; when they discussed matters of graver moment it was a question what was to be allowed to remain in the present necessity.

The tax which the French were most anxious to see reformed was the one called annates, which included French payments demanded by the Curia on the collation to a benefice. Such dues seem to have had their origin in the custom of making presents to those who officiated at ordinations, a custom which the Papacy had organized into a definite tax on all bishops and abbots, whose nomination passed through the Papal Consistory; the tax was levied upon a moderate assessment of the yearly value of their revenues in the books of the Consistory. During the Schism this sort of revenue was extended, it is said by the ingenuity of Boniface IX, to all benefices, and incoming incumbents were in every case required to pay half the revenues of the first year to the Pope, under a penalty of excommunication if they refused. The abolition of this oppressive impost was loudly demanded by the French deputies in the commission; but the Cardinals offered determined opposition to their pleadings, and urged that annates were the chief support of the Pope and the College of Cardinals, if they were abolished at present the Pope and Cardinals would be left penniless. Their opposition so far weighed with the representatives of the other nations that they agreed to allow this question to stand over. In truth, the question of annates affected France more closely than any other kingdom, as the necessity of supporting a Pope during the Schism had weighed most heavily on France. England had withstood the attempts of Boniface IX to extend the payment of annates to all benefices, and the old payment only was made by bishops. In Italy benefices were of small value, and the civic communities knew how to protect themselves against Papal aggression; in Germany the bishops were more
powerful than in France, and so could defend themselves. The French complained that they paid more than all the other nations put together, and bore the burden and heat of the day. This might be true; but when a proposal was made to substitute for annates a yearly tax of one-fiftieth of the value of all benefices above ten ducats for the maintenance of the Curia, we are not surprised that the more favored nations hesitated to adopt the new scheme.

The French were not so ready as the other nations to let the question of annates stand over. When they found that they were beaten in the commission, they tried to bring pressure to bear upon that body by taking action in their own nation. Accordingly, on October 15, 1415, the French nation discussed the question for themselves. Their debates were tumultuous, and extended over seven sittings, as each man gave his vote and stated his reasons separately. At last, on November 2, the majority was declared to be in favour of the abolition of annates, and the appointment of a commission to consider the means of making a fair provision for the Pope and Cardinals in their stead. This conclusion was communicated to the other nations, and their cooperation was invited to carry it out; but the Italians entirely rejected the proposal, and the Germans and English did not think it advisable to discuss the matter at that time. The Cardinals called on the Procurator Fiscal of the Apostolic See to lodge a protest against the proposal as an encroachment on the Papal rights. The French replied by setting forth at length their grievances; but nothing was done. The failure of this first attempt at common action in the matter of reform damped the ardor of the most advanced reformers, and showed the Cardinals their strength as a compact body when opposed to varying national interests.

After this effort of the French the Reform Commission was left to continue its labors in peace. On December 19 the German nation moved that the Council proceed to consider measures to put down simony, but no practical steps were taken. Even on the question of the reform of the Benedictine Order agreement was so difficult that, though the Council definitely appointed commissioners on February 19, 1416, the matter was allowed to stand over. On April 5 Sigismund wrote from Paris to the Council, begging them to suspend all important matters till his return, and meanwhile to employ themselves with considering the reform of the clergy, especially in Germany. He recommended for their consideration such points as the manners, dress, and bearing of the clergy, and the prevention of hereditary claims over the lands of the Church. He urged them also to reconsider their proceedings in the matter of Jean Petit.

This last question was, in fact, the only one in which the Council had shown any ardor, and it was simply a transference to Constance of the political animosity by which France was convulsed. As the struggle in Bohemia between the Czechs and Germans had made its way to the Council Chamber, so the struggle in France between Orléanistes and Burgundians penetrated into matters which craved for ecclesiastical decision. Louis of Orleans, brother of Charles VI of France, had been murdered in 1407, and there was no doubt that the murder had been instigated by his opponent, the Duke of Burgundy. It might have been expected that such an act would have met with reprobation at the hands of those who were the guardians of public morality. But Louis of Orleans had been the supporter of Benedict XIII, who was the opponent of the policy of the University of Paris, and had shown himself willing to diminish its privileges and importance. One of the doctors of the University, Jean Petit, made an apology for the Duke of Burgundy before the helpless King on March 8, 1408. He justified his patron by a series of ingenious sophistries which affected the very foundations of political
society. He set forth that any subject who plots against the welfare of his sovereign is worthy of death, and that his culpability is increased in proportion to his high degree. Hence it is lawful, nay, meritorious, for any one, without waiting for an express command, but relying on moral and divine law, to kill such traitor and tyrant, and the more meritorious in proportion to his high degree. Promises which are contrary to the welfare of the sovereign are not binding, and ought to be set aside; nay, dissimulation is justifiable if it renders easier the death of the traitor. Besides enunciating these propositions, Petit assailed the memory of the Duke of Orleans, and accused him of sorcery and evil practices to compass the King’s death. Arguments might serve for a time to justify, in the opinion of his partisans, one who was master of the situation. But the moderate party in the University, headed by Gerson, looked with alarm on the enunciation of principles which they considered subversive both of moral and political order. So long as the Duke of Burgundy was supreme they could do little to make their voices heard; but when in 1412 the Armagnac party succeeded in driving the Duke of Burgundy from Paris, they were eager to justify the memory of the murdered Duke of Orleans and fix a moral stigma on their opponents. In 1413 the Bishop of Paris summoned a Council to examine the doctrines of Petit, who had died two years before. After some deliberation nine propositions drawn from the writings of Petit were condemned in February, 1414, and his book was publicly burned. The Duke of Burgundy appealed against this decision to the Pope, and John XXIII deputed three Cardinals to examine the matter. Their deliberations were yet pending when the Council was summoned, and so this important controversy was transferred to Constance. The representatives of the University of Paris were chosen from those opposed to the views of Petit; the Burgundian ambassadors were ordered to prevent Petit’s official condemnation. It was this state of parties that led John XXIII to hope for help against the Council from the Duke of Burgundy, and the Council was by no means anxious to alienate so powerful a prince.

As soon, however, as the Council was rid of all fear from John XXIII, and by its proceedings against Hus had shown its zeal to maintain the purity of the faith, Gerson pressed for the condemnation of the doctrines of Petit. On June 15, 1415, a commission was appointed to examine the matter; and as Sigismund was anxious to have something decided before he went away, the Council on July 6, the same day on which it condemned Hus as a heretic, passed a decree which it hoped might be an acceptable compromise in the matter of Jean Petit. The decree set forth that the Council, in its desire to extirpate all erroneous opinions, declares heretical the assertion that any tyrant may be killed by any vassal or subject of his own, even by treachery, in despite of oaths, and without any judicial sentence being passed against him. The decree made no mention of France or of Petit; it was purely general, and did not go into the details of Petit’s arguments, but merely condemned an abstract proposition without any reference to the events which called it forth.

Gerson was indignant at this lenient treatment of Petit, especially when contrasted with the severity shown at the same time towards Hus. He asserted that if Hus had been allowed an advocate, he would never have been condemned. He went so far in his indignation as to say that he would rather be tried by Jews and heathens than by the Council. He entered with strong personal warmth into the controversy, and was not content to let it rest, although the prospect of a war with England made the French Court anxious that nothing should be done which could alienate the Duke of Burgundy. He pressed for a further decision on Petit’s propositions, and involved himself in a dispute
with the Bishop of Arras, who argued that they concerned points of philosophy and politics rather than theology. Gerson carried his zeal beyond the limits of discretion, and wearied the Council with his repeated expostulations. Naturally the Council did not like to be told that they, who had not spared a pope, ought not, through fear of a prince, to desert the defense of the truth. Taking advantage of this feeling, a Franciscan, Jean de Rocha, presented before the Commission for Matters of the Faith twenty-five articles drawn from Gerson’s writings, which he declared to be heretical. The Bishop of Arras similarly accused of heresy Peter d’Ailly. The Council which was the scene of such proceedings had entirely lost its moral force. When the learned fathers of the Church tried to brand as heretics those who took the opposite side in national politics, we cannot wonder that the condemnation of Jerome of Prague by such a tribunal did not at once carry conviction to the rebellious Bohemians. They had some grounds at least for arguing that the wisest of the Council, Gerson and D’Ailly, were eager for the condemnation of Hus, that it might pave the way for the condemnation of Petit,—that Gerson’s suspicions of the sincerity of Jerome’s recantation were sharpened by the feeling that his own orthodoxy was not above attack.

It would seem that the majority of the Council were heartily wearied of this question, and in the beginning of 1416 was a general request that the Commissioners on Matters of Faith should pronounce an opinion, one way or the other, on the nine propositions of Petit. But the matter was further complicated by the action of the Cardinals Orsini, Zabarella, and Pancerini, who had been deputed by John XXIII to consider the appeal of the Duke of Burgundy against the decision of the Council of Paris. They now gave their judgment on that appeal, and quashed the proceedings of the Parisian Council on grounds of informality. It had proceeded in a matter of faith of which only the Pope could take cognizance, and also had not summoned the accused parties, but had founded its judgment on passages which were not authentic writings of Petit. The Cardinals seem to have taken this step from a desire to reserve the whole question for the decision of a future Pope.

But in France the position of parties had again changed. After the defeat of Agincourt, the Orléanistes represented the national and patriotic party, and the Duke of Burgundy had to flee to Flanders. The Orléanistes possessed themselves of the royal authority, and in the King’s name pressed for the condemnation of Petit. On March 19 they appealed from the decision of the commissioners to that of the Council. The commissioners in their defense published the opinions of canonists which they had collected: twenty-six were in favour of condemning Petit, sixty-one were against the condemnation. It may seem to us monstrous that such should have been the result.

But the Council had already pronounced its decision against the general principle of the lawfulness of tyrannicide, and many thought that it was undesirable for political reasons to go farther. Many regarded the question as not properly a theological question, and objected to its decision on purely theological grounds; many regarded it as a mere party matter in which the Council would do well not to meddle. Moreover, the question in itself admitted of some doubt in a time when political institutions were in a rudimentary stage. Political assassinations wore a different aspect in days when the destinies of a nation might rest on the caprice of an individual. Classical and biblical antiquity supplied instances of tyrannicide which won the admiration of posterity. Many felt unwilling in their hearts that the Church should absolutely forbid conduct which it could not be denied was sometimes useful.
Still Gerson pursued his point, and the struggle between himself and the Bishop of Arras waxed warmer. Sigismund wrote from Paris urging that the decision of the three Cardinals against the proceedings of the Bishop of Paris should be recalled; but the Cardinals wrote back a justification of their own conduct. The weary controversy still went on and occupied the time and energies of the Council. It awakened such strong feeling that the Burgundian prelates separated themselves from the rest of the Gallican nation. Gerson flung himself entirely into this question, and so diminished the influence which his learning had previously gained him at Constance. The Council would not decide the matter, but preferred to leave it for the future Pope. Gerson exclaimed that no reformation could be wrought by the Council, unless it were under a wise and powerful head. When Sigismund returned to Constance, Gerson hoped that he would use his influence to have the matter settled. But the change which the English alliance had wrought in Sigismund’s political attitude made him unwilling to offend the Duke of Burgundy. The French prelates remained in a state of gloomy dissatisfaction, and the animosities which this dreary question had raised destroyed the unanimity of the Council and did much to hamper its future labors.

Nor was this the only cause of disunion in the Council. The assembled fathers were eagerly waiting the opportunity of finishing their greatest and most important task, the restoration of the unity of the Church. For this purpose they needed the incorporation of the Spanish kingdoms and the formal deposition of Benedict XIII. The death of Ferdinand of Aragon on April 2, 1416, caused some delay in sending ambassadors; and his successor, Alfonso V, though anxious to carry out his father’s plans, was not in a position to do so at once. Not till September 5 did the Aragonese envoys arrive, and they were at first unwilling to join the Council till they had been joined by the representatives of Castile. At length their scruples were overcome, and on October 15 a fifth nation, the Spanish, was constituted in the Council. But this process was not completed without difficulties which portended future troubles. First the Portuguese, who had joined the Council on June 1, protested against the formation of a Spanish nation as disparaging the honor of Portugal, which claimed to be a nation by itself. Next the Aragonese claimed precedence over the English, and the English protested against their claim. The French then allowed the Aragonese to sit alternately with themselves, protesting that they did so without prejudice to the dignity of the French nation.

The alliance thus made between the French and Aragonese was used by the French as a means of French annoying the English. The Aragonese raised the question of the right of the English to be considered a nation. Loud hissings were heard in the Council Chamber at this attempt to introduce a spirit of faction, and the Aragonese ambassadors left the room. The question was dismissed, but the ill-feeling created by it remained; the English and French wore arms in the streets, and there was constant fear of an open collision. So serious was the discord that, on December 23, a congregation continued wrangling till late at night, and then fell to blows, so that the Pfalzgraf Lewis and Frederick of Nurnberg had to be hastily summoned to preserve order.

This was the state of things that awaited Sigismund on his arrival at Constance, and his change of political attitude during his absence deprived him of the power to exercise any moderating influence upon the discord which wasted the energies of the Council.
CHAPTER VII.
THE COUNCIL OF CONSTANCE AND THE ELECTION OF MARTIN V.
1417.

We may feel that the conflicts which agitated the fathers at Constance displayed a petty spirit and an undue of attention to formal matters, yet they were more truly the signs of the growth of strong national feelings that were affecting European politics. The ideal unity of the Church when embodied in a European congress could not rise superior to the actual antagonisms of contending nations. Indeed the very question that called the Council together was in its origin political; the Schism in the Church had arisen through the desire of France to secure the Papacy on the side of her own national interests. The experience of the evils of the Schism had led Europe to wish to end it by the arbitration of a General Council. On the question of the union of the Church there had been at Constance practical unanimity; but when that point was on a fair way to solution the same unanimity was no longer to be expected in other matters. The very nature of the questions which the Council next took in hand shows the strength of national sentiment. The condemnation of Hus was not merely a matter of faith; it was a step towards suppressing the movement of the Czechs against the Germans in Eastern Europe. The question of Jean Petit was a transference to Constance of the struggle of parties which was rending France asunder. In like manner the deadly contest between France and England carried its national antagonism into the affairs of the Council.

It is true that there was no question of doctrine or of ecclesiastical practice round which this contest could rage; for that very reason it sought expression in trivial matters, and the point of the constitution of the Council opened up a wide field to technical ingenuity. It would have been a difficult matter to arrange with any definiteness a scheme for the representation of united Christendom, nor was this ever attempted at Constance. The constitution of the Council was established in a haphazard way at the beginning; the organization into four nations had been practically accepted at a time when the Council was anxious to proceed to business and assert its position against John XXIII. The incorporation with the Council of the Spanish kingdoms gave the French an opportunity of discussing the general organization of Christendom, and so aiming a blow at the pride and honor of England. The leader of the French in this attack was Peter d'Ailly, who probably had ulterior objects in view, and was glad of an opportunity for educating his nation to follow his lead. If feeling ran high between the French and the English during Sigismund's absence, it ran higher when on his return he showed signal marks of favor to his new allies.

Accordingly the French determined to open a formal attack upon the English; and on March 3, 1417, the ambassadors of the French King laid before the Council a protest, which set forth that England was not a nation that ought to rank as equal to Italy, France, Germany, or Spain, which all contain many nations within themselves.

The Constitutions of Benedict XII had recognized in Christendom four nations, and an ecclesiastical assembly ought to abide by the Papal Constitutions. Those four nations were the Italian, German, French, and Spanish; and now that the Spanish nation had joined the Council, the English should be added to the German nation, with which they were counted in the Bull of Benedict XII. Neither according to its political nor its...
ecclesiastical divisions was England equal to the other four nations. It had been allowed
to count as a nation before the coming of the Spaniards to keep up the number of
nations to four. But now that the Council became a new Council, it ought to revise its
former arrangements for the conduct of its business. The French therefore demanded
either that the English should be added to the German nation; or if it was considered
necessary to keep up a distinct English nation, then that the other nations should be
divided according to their respective governments; or else that the method of voting by
nations should be entirely done away.

While this protest was being read to the Council hisses and loud exclamations of
dissent were heard, Sigismund interposed to prevent the reading from being finished, on
the ground that it was entirely contrary to the customary procedure for anything to be
read in the Council which had not previously been approved by the nations. Moreover,
as Protector of the Council, he ordered that thenceforth nothing be brought forward in
public sessions to the prejudice of the Council, especially such things as might hinder
the union of the Church. But the English were not content with this vindication. They
put forth their learning to answer the arguments of the French, and on March 30 han
ded into the Council a written reply, in which they styled themselves “the ambassadors of
the King of England and France”, and called the French King “our adversary of
France”. They proved, first, that the Constitution of Benedict XII was not dealing with
division of Christendom into nations, but solely with a method of arranging episcopal
visitations and chapters of Benedictines. They retaliated with crushing statistics the
charges of the French about the smallness of the English kingdom compared with
France. Eight kingdoms were subject to the English crown, not counting the Orcades
and other islands to the number of sixty, which by themselves were as large as the
kingdom of France. The realm of the English King contained 110 dioceses, that of the
French King only 60. Britain was 800 miles long, or forty days’ journey, and France
was not generally supposed to have such a great extent. France had not more than 6000
parish churches, England had 52,000. England was converted by Joseph of Arimathea,
France only by Dionysius the Areopagite. The proposal to put England and Germany
together was entirely absurd, as these two nations comprised between them almost half
Christendom. The natural, as well as canonical, division of nations was into northern,
southern, eastern, and western; the English were at the head of the northern group, the
Germans of the eastern, the Italians of the southern, and the French and Spanish were
left to make up the western. The English on these grounds branded the arguments of the
French as empty and frivolous, and protested against any change being made which
might affect the position of the English nation. The protest was received by the Council,
and no attempt was made to change the constitution of the nations. Indeed the procedure
of the French can scarcely have been intended seriously, but was merely an affront to
the English, and a step in the education of the French party in opposition to Sigismund’s
influence.

By the side of these altercations the great business of the Council, the deposition of
Benedict XIII, was slowly proceeding. On November 5, 1416, after the arrival of the
Aragonese ambassadors, Commissioners were appointed to receive evidence against
Peter de Luna on the charges of breaking his promises and oaths, and throwing
obstacles in the way of the union of the Church. So quickly did the Commissioners do
their work that on November 28 a citation was issued to Benedict to appear personally
at Constance within seventy days after receiving the summons. Two Benedictine monks
were sent to serve the citation. They made their way to Peñiscola, and were received by
Benedict’s nephew with 200 armed men, who escorted them into Benedict’s presence on January 22, 1417. The old man looked at the black monks as they approached, and said, “Here come the crows of the Council”. “Yes”, was the muttered answer, “crows gather round a dead body”. Benedict listened to the reading of the citation, uttering from time to time indignant exclamations, “That is not true, they lie”. He repeated his old proposals—that a new Council should be summoned, and that he should elect the new Pope. He haughtily asserted that he was right and that the Council was wrong. Grasping the arm of his chair, he repeated, “This is the ark of Noah”. The determination of Benedict XIII was as unbroken as ever; the world might abandon him, but he would remain true to himself and his dignity.

On March 10 the Council received the account of their ambassadors to Benedict XIII, and on April 1 declared him guilty of contumacy. Commissioners were appointed to examine the charges against him and hear witnesses. But final sentence could not be passed till the union of the Spanish kingdoms had been accomplished, and this formal act was again made the occasion of raising serious questions. The ambassadors of Castile only arrived in Constance on March 29; but Castile was not very firm in its allegiance to the Council, and its envoys seem willingly to have lent themselves to the projects of the Curial party. The English suspected Peter d’Ailly of getting hold of them for his own purposes, and using the incorporation of Castile as the means of accomplishing his plan of identifying the French nation with the party of the Cardinals. At all events, the Castilians declared themselves on the side of the Curial party, and demanded as a condition of their incorporation with the Council that the preliminaries of a new Papal election should be settled.

This demand raised at once a question that had long been simmering. The Council had met for the threefold purpose of restoring the unity of the Church, purging it from heresy, and reforming it in head and members. In the deposition of the three contending Popes and the condemnation of the opinions of Wycliffe and Huss there had been practical unanimity; but the question of reform was likely to lead to greater differences of opinion, and the proceedings of the Reform Commission showed the difficulties which were in the way. Men were not agreed whether the reformation should be dealt with in a radical or a conservative spirit; if it were to be done radically, it must be done by the Council before the election of a new Pope; if it were to be done tenderly, a Pope must first be elected to look after the interests of the Papacy and the Curia. The circumstances attending the opening of the Council had created a precedent for approaching burning questions in the technical form of discussing which should be undertaken first. John XXIII was defeated on the question of precedence between the cause of union and the cause of faith; when the Council decided to undertake the union of the Church before discussing the heresies of Huss, the fate of John was practically decided. In the first flush of the Council’s triumph over the Pope the cause of reform seemed to have a promising future; but the absence of Sigismund, the long period of inactivity, and the growing heat of national jealousies afforded an opportunity to the Curial party which they were not slow to use. The proceedings relative to the deposition of John warned the Cardinals of their danger if a revolutionary spirit were to prevail, and during Sigismund’s absence the Cardinals drew closely together, and obtained a powerful influence over the Council. They knew that they could count on the allegiance of the Italian nation, and their policy was to take advantage of any disunion in the ranks of the other three nations. Such an opportunity had been afforded by the discontent of a section of the French nation at the proceedings about Jean Petit, and still more by the
national animosity between the French and English, which had been increased by Sigismund’s political change. The incorporation of the Spanish kingdoms afforded the Curial party a chance of trying their strength. On the incorporation of Aragon they raised the question of the constitution of the Council; next on the incorporation of Castile they raised the question of the Council’s business. This they did in the recognized form of a discussion about priority of procedure. Ought not one point to be finished before another was undertaken? Ought not the unity of the Church to be definitely restored by a new election before the more doubtful subject of reform was taken in hand? This was the point which the Castilians were induced to raise, and their request brought to a crisis a number of conflicting opinions which weighed differently with different nations and classes in the Council.

First of all, there were strong political differences which Sigismund’s alliance with England brought prominently into the foreground at Constance. The Council regarded Sigismund with suspicion after his political change. Yet during the vacancy of the Papacy Sigismund was sure to be the most powerful person in the Council: he was its Protector; it was in his hands; he could bring pressure to bear upon it at his will. The French began to doubt whether it was wise to help the English and Germans, whom they regarded as their national foes, to arrange the condition of the future Pope. The Schism had arisen from the influence exercised by France over the Papacy; and France had only laid aside her claims because they were a source of embarrassment rather than of profit. Yet France could not allow her influence to pass to Germany, and did not wish to prolong a Council which might again establish the Imperial supremacy in Christendom, especially when the Emperor was in close alliance with England. The forthcoming Papal election would be an event of considerable political importance, and Sigismund must not be allowed to influence it for his own purposes. To these political reasons were added considerations arising directly from the question of reform itself. Men discovered that it was not a matter to be undertaken lightly, and that declamations against abuses were not easily converted into schemes of redress. In the foreground of Papal abuses were the exaction of annates and the collation to benefices; but an attempt to abolish annates aroused the deepest apprehension of the Cardinals and Curia, who asked how they were to be maintained without them. Similarly the attack on the Papal collations to benefices alarmed the Universities, whose graduates found that the claims of learning were more liberally recognized by the Popes than by Ordinaries immersed in official business. The University of Paris had had experience of this truth during the period of withdrawal of obedience from Benedict XIII; it had complained, and had been met with desultory promises. Many members of the academic party thought that a reform would be more tenderly accomplished after the election of a Pope who would advocate his own cause.

Moreover, there was much plausibility in the cry that another matter ought not to be undertaken till the main object of the Council was accomplished. It had decided to undertake first the cause of unity. It had advanced so far as to get rid of the rival claimants; why should it hesitate to accomplish its work, and confer on the Church one undoubted head? Delay was fraught with danger; there was at present a unanimity which might soon be destroyed. The Council had already sat so long as to weary the patience of those who were still detained at Constance. Growing weariness and disputes about the reformation question might make the Council dwindle entirely away before the Papal elections were decided, and so all might still be left in doubt, and a schism worse than the first again desolate Christendom. In the disturbed state of Europe war
might break out in the neighborhood, and the Council be broken up by force, or be deprived suddenly of supplies. It was a serious risk to keep the important matter of the new election undecided in the face of all the contingencies that might happen.

There was a good deal of force in these arguments of temporary expediency—enough to impress the waverers; but the real question was whether the reformation of the Church was to be seriously undertaken or not. Sigismund sincerely desired it; the party of the Curia were determined to resist by all means in their power. All depended on the success of either side in gaining adherents. Sigismund was allied with Henry V of England, and was sure of the cooperation of the English nation. Henry V kept an observant watch on affairs at Constance, sent his instructions to the five bishops who were at the head of the English nation, and commanded that all his liegemen should follow the directions of the bishops, or else leave Constance under penalty of forfeiture of all their goods.

Perhaps this very resoluteness of the English and Germans made it easy for the Curial party to win over the French. The alliance of England and Germany was adverse to the interests of France; why should France support it in the Council? Under the name of a reform in the Church, the Papacy might be brought under German influence, might be turned into a political instrument against France. We can only guess at these causes for the adhesion of France to the Curial party, which we find an accomplished fact within a few months after the return of Sigismund. The records of the Council deal only with its sessions and its congregations; we know little of the proceedings within the separate nations, and have nothing save general considerations to guide us in this matter.

It is, however, noticeable that the most important man amongst the French was also the most important man amongst the Cardinals, and Peter d'Ailly seems to have been the means of winning over the French nation to the side of the Curial party. It is true that so late as November, 1416, D'Ailly had pressed for a reform of the Church, which he declared was a matter concerning the faith, and not to be considered separately. But D'Ailly had never been very famous for consistency, and had shown a capacity for turning with the tide, and conciliating opposing interests. He had accepted from Benedict XIII the bishopric of Cambrai, without deserting the party of the University of Paris; he had received from the Pope the Cardinal’s hat, without ceasing to be a royal ambassador in opposition to the Pope. He had been one of the most manful upholders of the right of the Council to proceed against John XXIII, yet had protested against the action of the Council in asserting its superiority to the Pope. He had pressed for reform before a Papal election, but had no difficulty in assuring himself that reform would be more safely accomplished under the Papal presidency. In the case of Germany and England the influence of their kings was strong enough to keep the nations united in their policy, whatever individual difference of opinion may have existed in their ranks, France had no such head; it would have been difficult for the king—even if his policy had been decided—to enforce unanimity on the representatives of the French nation; as it was, he had no interest to do so. The influence of the University of Paris, which had so long been predominant in matters ecclesiastical, was now broken. The affair of Jean Petit had ended in the defeat of Gerson and the purely academic party, and Gerson’s heat in this matter had ruined his influence. D'Ailly’s position as a Cardinal led him to grow more and more conservative in the matter of reform, and the national hostility of France against Germany and England enabled him to bring the French nation to join in opposition to their revolutionary schemes.
In this state of parties the Castilians were induced to raise the question which was to decide the scope of the future activity of the Council; and the Cardinals strained every nerve to give a decisive proof of their strength. Besides the demand for a settlement of the preliminaries of a new Papal election, the Castilians formally asked for a guarantee of freedom to the Council, and the French seized upon this as an occasion to harass Sigismund, by pressing for a more ample form of safe-conduct. The Cardinals made a formal declaration that they had enjoyed perfect freedom, save in their assent to the decree forbidding the election of a Pope without the consent of the Council; this they had accepted, not through any pressure from Sigismund, but through fear of being branded as schismatics if they objected. Men were greatly alarmed at this equivocal utterance; it was a covert threat that unless the Cardinals were respected in future, they might cast a doubt upon the legitimacy of what had been done in the past.

Accordingly, there was great confusion at Constance. Projects for the regulation of the new election were broached and rejected. Complaints were made about want of freedom; the city magistrates were asked to protect the Council; protests were lodged against unworthy treatment; and in the midst of the consequent confusion, the Cardinals urged the acceptance of their proposals about the new election as the one means of restoring peace. Sigismund, however, managed to avert the entire dissolution of the Council. The Castilians were somewhat alarmed at the violence of the storm which they had raised; they were not really desirous of the failure of the Council, and Sigismund prevailed on them, on June 16, to withdraw their conditions and unite themselves to the Council.

Peace, however, was not restored. The Cardinals took advantage of some complaint that the judges of the Council had overstepped their powers. The French, Italian, and Spanish nations joined them in another attack upon Sigismund. They protested that they were not in full enjoyment of their liberty, and would take no further part in the Council, till they had ample guarantees for freedom. Sigismund naturally objected to grant a demand which cast a reflection upon the past proceedings of the Council. Again discord raged for some weeks, till both parties were weary, and agreed on July 11 to a compromise, which was proposed by the ambassadors of Savoy. Sigismund granted an ample assurance of the freedom of the Council on condition that the order of procedure was fixed to be, first, the deposition of Benedict XIII; next, the reform of the Church in its head and in the Curia; thirdly, a new Papal election. The Cardinals had so far triumphed as to reserve for the new Pope the reformation of the Church in its general features; Sigismund retained the important point that the reformation of the Papacy and of the Curia should precede the appointment of an undoubted Pope. The struggle ended for the time; but the compromise was of the nature of a truce, not of a lasting peace. Sigismund’s position had been forced, and after giving way so far he might be driven to give way still more.

When in this way agreement had been again restored, the Council proceeded to the deposition of Benedict XIII. On July 26 he was again cited, declared contumacious, and sentence was passed against him. It declared that, after examining witnesses, the Council pronounced him to be perjured and the cause of scandal to the universal Church, a favorer of inveterate schism, a hinderer of the union of the Church, a heretic who had wandered from the faith; as such he was pronounced unworthy of all rank and dignity, deprived of all right in the Papacy and in the Roman Church, and lopped off like a dry bough from the Catholic Church. This sentence was published throughout
Constance amid general rejoicings. The bells were rung, the citizens kept holiday, and Sigismund’s heralds rode through the streets proclaiming the sentence.

Now that the union of the Church had been established, there remained for the Council only the question of reform, in accordance with the agreement made between Sigismund and the Cardinals. For this purpose the report of the Reform Commission was ready as a basis for discussion. The Commission had continued its labors till October 8, 1416, and had drawn up its conclusions in a tentative form. First came six chapters dealing with the reformation of the Curia, providing for the holding of future Councils with power to depose wicked and mischievous Popes, defining the duties of the Pope and his relations to the Cardinals, fixing the number of Cardinals at eighteen and prescribing their qualifications. On these points the Commissioners seem to have been agreed, as their conclusions were drawn up in the shape of decrees for the Council to pass. Then came a number of petitions for reform which were put into a shape that might admit of discussion. The report ended with a number of protocols which seem to contain a summary of suggestions and questions raised before the Commissioners. But the points, taken all together, touch only on the removal of crying and obvious abuses — dispensations, exemptions, pluralities, appeals to Rome, simony, clerical concubinage, non-residence of bishops and the like. None of them affect the basis of the Papal system or try to alter the constitution of the Church where it was proved to be defective. They contain little which a provincial synod might not have decreed, nothing which was worthy of the labors of a General Council.

Even this report, harmless as it was, was not taken into the Council’s consideration. Such was the respect paid to technicalities, that a report drawn up before the incorporation of the Spanish kingdoms was not considered to be of sufficient authority for the newly-constituted assembly to discuss. It would have been possible to continue the Commission with the addition of Spanish representatives; but the Council wanted to gain time, and there was some plausibility in the objection that such a Commission would be unwieldy through its numbers. Accordingly, a new Commission of twenty-five doctors and prelates, five from each nation, was appointed to revise the work of their predecessors. This they proceeded to do; and while they were busy with their labors, the Curial party had leisure to renew their attack upon the compromise which had so lately been accepted.

When once the prospect of a new Papal election was in view, it was natural that men should wish for its accomplishment. Many must have felt shocked in their inmost hearts at the anomalous state of things that existed in the Church. Many more were swayed by motives of self-interest, and felt that promotion was to be gained from a Pope, but nothing from the Council. All were wearied with their long stay in Constance, and wished to see a definite end to their labors. Moreover, the talk about a new election intensified national jealousy and suspicion. It was easy to raise an outcry that Sigismund was using the Council for his own purposes and meant to finish his design by securing his hold upon the Papacy, when he and the victorious Henry V would be arbiters of the destinies of Europe. The Cardinals had formed their party and had already made trial of their strength. They were sure of the allegiance of three of the five nations and determined to attack the position of the Germans and English by pressing for an immediate election to the Papacy. Accordingly, on September 9, the Cardinals presented to a general congregation a protest setting forth their readiness to proceed to the election of a Pope, lest harm ensue to the Church through their negligence; they professed that this should be done without prejudice to the cause of reformation.
The reading of this protest was interrupted by loud cries, and Sigismund rose and left the cathedral, followed by the Patriarch of Antioch. Someone called out, “Let the heretics go”, which galled Sigismund to the quick. When he showed his anger some of the members of the Council professed fear for their personal safety. Rumors were spread that Sigismund was preparing to overawe the Council by armed force. The Castilians, who had never shown themselves much in earnest, and who were in strife with the Aragonese about precedence, took the opportunity of this alarm to leave Constance, but they had not proceeded farther than Steckborn when they were brought back by Sigismund’s troops. So great was Sigismund’s anger that he ordered the cathedral and the Bishop’s palace to be closed against the Cardinals, so as to prevent their further deliberations. They held a meeting next day, sitting on the steps in the courtyard of the palace, and sent to the city magistrates and Frederick of Brandenburg to demand security and freedom. After some mediation the Cardinals were allowed to be present at a general congregation held the next day (September 11).

In this congregation the Cardinals presented and read a second protest against the action of the German nation couched in stronger language than the first. They said that they and three nations wished to proceed to the election of a Pope, and were hindered by the German nation and a few others. They washed their hands of all responsibility for the evils which might happen in consequence to the Church. They insisted that they had a majority of the nations, and that those who opposed them were merely the adherents of Sigismund, who were of no individual weight, as they had no weight apart from their own nation. They declared that they desired a reformation as much as did the Germans, but the first reformation needed was the remedy of the monstrous condition of a headless Church. It is noticeable that the protest makes no mention of the English nation. Robert Hallam, Bishop of Salisbury, who had been their leader and who stood high in Sigismund’s confidence, died on September 7; and the English seem at once to have fallen away from Sigismund’s policy through sheer feebleness. They at once appointed deputies to confer with the Cardinals about the method to be pursued in a new election, and Sigismund was left to learn the fact from the Cardinals. When he refused to believe them, the Bishop of Lichfield was driven to confess the truth, but lamely added that nevertheless the English wished to follow the German nation. Sigismund was not unnaturally indignant with his traitorous allies, and loaded them with abuse.

After the reading of this protest there was renewed confusion. Again rumors were spread of the fierceness of Sigismund’s wrath. At one time it was said that he intended to imprison all the Cardinals; then that he had consented to limit his fury to six of the ringleaders. Next day the Cardinals appeared wearing their red hats, in token that they were ready, if need be, to suffer martyrdom. But they were well aware that they would not be put to that test, and knew that their organization was everywhere working conversions. The Cardinals protested against the breach of national organization caused by the existence of a party devoted to Sigismund; the Archbishop of Milan, the Cardinals Correr and Condulmier, returned to their national allegiance. All who did not belong to the English and German nations were now on the side of the Cardinals.

September 13 was devoted to the funeral rites of Robert Hallam, who had won respect by his boldness and straightforwardness, and all were desirous to do him honor. But on the next day the Germans appeared with an answer to the protest of the Cardinals; they indignantly cleared themselves of the charges of schism and heresy which their opponents had brought against them. If future schism was to be avoided, it could only be by a genuine reformation of the Roman Curia. The chair of the Pope
needed cleansing before it was fit for a new occupant. The cause of the Schism was to be found in the self-seeking and carnal minds of the Cardinals, who could be no otherwise, so long as reservations, commendams, usurpations of ecclesiastical patronage, annates, simony, and all the abuses of the Papal law courts were allowed to go unchecked.

The Germans had said their say, and Sigismund was still prepared to hold his own; but the ranks of his followers sensibly decreased, for his position had rendered untenable by the desertion of the English. English nation had a policy: his colleagues were opportunists. But it is difficult to suppose that they acted without permission from the English King. Probably Hallam was entrusted with a discretionary power, which he saw no reason for using, but which his colleagues were only too ready to employ. They offered themselves to the Cardinals as mediators with Sigismund and their offer was accepted. The possible need of mediation suggested to Henry V a policy which he hoped would be creditable to England and would establish a claim upon the gratitude of a new Pope. Sigismund might have the glory of struggling for reform; Henry V would enjoy the credit of proposing a compromise. So Henry Beaufort, his uncle, was judiciously sent on a mission which brought him into the neighborhood of Constance. We are justified in assuming that he left England to bring the news of Henry's change of policy, to explain its reasons to Sigismund, and to cooperate with him for the purpose of giving a new direction to the joint policy of England and Germany. Henry V was an ideal politician, as much as Sigismund, and had a project of a Crusade against the Turks as soon as the conquest of France had been achieved. Probably he was convinced that the dangers of continuing to demand an immediate reformation of the Church were too great to render a dogged obstinacy any longer desirable. He was profoundly orthodox, and may have, become convinced that Sigismund’s policy was dangerous. Anyhow, the question of reform did not affect England as closely as it affected Germany. The laws of England gave the Crown means of defending the rights of the English Church, which a strong king could use at his pleasure. The Council of Constance had now sat so long that little was to be hoped from its future activity. The treaty of Canterbury had brought no political advantage to England, for Sigismund pleaded the pressure of business at Constance as a reason why he could not help his English ally in the field. Probably Henry thought it expedient that he and Sigismund should use their influence to secure a satisfactory election to the Papacy, rather than embitter ecclesiastical questions by a longer resistance to a majority who could not be quelled. Whatever were Henry’s motives, the English nation deserted the cause of Sigismund, and the death of Robert Hallam hastened a change of front, which was being kept in reserve as a last maneuver.

As soon as the German nation was left alone desertions gradually took place. Sigismund’s party gradually dissolved; all who had been his personal adherents abandoned him and united themselves to their own nations. Even the German nation was no longer united. The Bishops of Riga and Chur, who stood high in Sigismund’s confidence, promised their adhesion to the Cardinals on condition that the Pope when elected should stay at Constance with the Council till the work of reformation had been accomplished. It is said that they were won over by the promise of rich benefices, and they certainly were afterwards promoted. Sigismund could hold out no longer, and early in October gave his consent to the election of a Pope, provided that an undertaking were given by the Council, that immediately after his election and before his coronation the work of reformation should be set on foot. But the Cardinals hesitated to give this guarantee and raised technical difficulties regarding its form. Meanwhile, as a sop to the
reforming party, a decree was passed on October 9, embodying some few of the reforms on which there was a general agreement.

The decree of October 9 was the first fruits of the reform wrought at Constance. It begins with the famous decree *Frequens*, which provided for the recurrence of General Councils. The next Council was to be held in seven years’ time, and after that they were to follow at intervals of five years. This was the result of all the movement which the Schism had set on foot. The exceptional measure necessary to heal the Schism became established on the foundation of ancient usage; its revival was to prevent for the future the growth of evil customs in the Church and was to supply a sure means of slowly remedying those which already existed. Henceforth General Councils were to be restored to their primitive position in the organization of the Church, and the Papal despotism was to be curbed by the creation of an ecclesiastical parliament. As a corollary to this proposition, it was decreed that in case of schism a Council might convocate itself at any time. A few of the most crying grievances of the clergy were redressed by enactments that the Pope should not translate prelates against their will, nor reserve to his own use the possessions of clergy on their death, nor the procurations due at visitations.

The passing of this decree did not do much to clear the way for a settlement of Sigismund’s demand of a guarantee for future reform. After much negotiation about the form which such a guarantee should take, the Cardinals finally said that they could not bind the future Pope. The Cardinals were anxious to know what part they were to have in the election. Though they could not hope to have the exclusive right, yet they were resolved not to be reduced to the level of deputies of their respective nations, and before giving any guarantee they wished to secure their own position. Again everything was in confusion at Constance till it was suggested by the English to the Cardinals that there was close at hand an influential prelate who might be called in to mediate. Henry Beaufort, Bishop of Winchester, half-brother of Henry IV of England, and powerful in English politics, was at that time at Ulm, ostensibly on his way as a pilgrim to the Holy Land. He was accordingly summoned to Constance, where he was welcomed by the King and Cardinals, and by his mediation an agreement was at last arranged between the contending parties. It provided that a guarantee for carrying out the reformation after the election of the Pope should be embodied in a decree of the Council; that those points contained in the report of the Reform Commissioners concerning which all the nations were agreed, should be laid before the Council for its approval; and that Commissioners should be appointed to determine the method of the new Papal election. The influence of England was used to make the best terms possible between the Germans, who were driven to give way, and the victorious Cardinals, whose obstinacy increased with their success.

The Commissioners were appointed on October 11, and had some difficulty in agreeing on a mode of election, which should regard the claims of the Cardinals and at the same time satisfy the national feeling in the Council. The Germans proposed that each nation should appoint fifteen electors; and as there were fifteen Italian Cardinals they should represent the Italian nation. The scheme proposed by the French was ultimately adopted.

On October 30 the final result of this protracted struggle was embodied in decrees. It was enacted that the future Pope, with the Council or with deputies of the several nations, should reform the Church in its head and in the Roman Curia, dealing with
eighteen specified points which had been agreed to by the Reform Commission; after the election of deputies for this object, the other members of the Council might retire. It was further decreed that the election of the Pope be made by the Cardinals and six deputies to be elected by each nation within ten days: two-thirds of the Cardinals and two-thirds of the deputies of each nation were to agree before an election could be made.

These decrees show at a glance how completely the reforming party had been worsted, and the enthusiasm for reform was spent. Step by step the Cardinals had succeeded in limiting the sphere of the Council’s activity. In July the aim of the Council had been defined as the reformation of the Pope and Curia before a Papal election, and after it the general reformation of the Church. By the end of October the reformation of the Church was dropped entirely, and all that the Council wished to do was to help the new Pope to reform his office and Curia, and that not unreservedly, but simply in eighteen specified points to which the zeal of the Council and the labors of the Reform Commission had ultimately dwindled.

In fact, as soon as a Papal election became possible, it swallowed up all other considerations and absorbed all attention. Men who had spent three long years at Constance wished to see the outward and visible sign of the work that they had done to reunite the Church; they wished to see a Pope appointed who might recognize and requite their zeal. No sooner were the decrees passed than preparations for the election were busily pressed. In the Kaufhaus of Constance chambers were constructed for the fifty-three members of the Conclave—twenty-three Cardinals and thirty electors chosen by the five nations. Sigismund took oath to protect the Conclave; guards and officers were appointed to provide for its safety, and every customary formality was carefully observed. On the afternoon of November 8, the Cardinals and electors assembled in the Bishop’s palace. They were met outside by Sigismund, who dismounted from his horse, took each by the hand and greeted him kindly. The solemnity of the occasion wiped out all traces of former rivalries, and tears were shed at the sight of this restored unanimity. The Munsterplatz was filled with a kneeling crowd, amongst whom knelt Sigismund. The doors of the cathedral were thrown open, and the Patriarch of Antioch surrounded by the clergy advanced and prayed and gave the benediction. All rose from their knees and a procession of the electors was formed. Sigismund rode first, and when all had entered the Conclave, they laid their hands in his and swore to make a true and honest choice. With a few words of friendly exhortation, Sigismund left them, and the Conclave was closed.

Next day, November 9, was spent in settling the method of voting, about which there was some difference of opinion. The Cardinals wished to retain the customary method of voting by means of papers which were placed on the altar, and then submitted to scrutiny; others were desirous of adopting more open, and, as they thought, simpler methods. At last, however, the Cardinals prevailed; but it was not till the morning of November 10 that any votes were taken. The first scrutiny was indecisive, and nothing was done on that day. But next morning when the votes were counted it was found that four Cardinals stood distinctly ahead of all others—the Cardinals of Ostia, Venice, Saluzzo, and Colonna. Of these Colonna alone received votes from every nation, and in two nations, the Italian and English, possessed the requisite majority. Indeed the English voted for him alone, and doubtless their example produced a great impression.
Among the Cardinals, Oddo Colonna was marked out as a Roman of noble family, a man who had remained neutral during the struggles which rent the Council, unobjectionable on every ground, and personally acceptable both to Henry V and Sigismund. He was not, however, the candidate most favored by the Cardinals themselves, though many hastened to accede to him when they saw that opinion was strongly inclining in his favor. On a second scrutiny he received fifteen votes from the Cardinals, and had a two-thirds majority in every nation. For a time there was a pause. Then several Cardinals left the room so as to delay the election. Only the Cardinals of S. Marco and De Foix remained talking with one another. They were not sure what their absent colleagues might do; they feared lest they might return in a body and accede to Colonna. At last the Cardinal of S. Marco spoke out, “To finish this matter and unite the Church we two accede to Cardinal Colonna”. The necessary majority was now secured. The electors, according to custom, placed Colonna on the altar, kissed his feet, and chanted the Te Deum. The cry was raised to those outside, “We have a Pope, Oddo Colonna”, and the news spread fast through the city. It was not yet midday when it reached Sigismund, who, forgetful of all dignity, hastened in his joy to the Conclave, thanked the electors for their worthy choice, and, prostrating himself before the new Pope, humbly kissed his feet. A solemn procession was formed to the cathedral. The new Pope, who took the name of Martin V because it was S. Martin’s day, mounted on horseback, while Sigismund held his bridle on the right, Frederick of Brandenburg on the left. Again he was placed on the altar in the cathedral, amid a solemn service of thanksgiving. Then he retired to the Bishop’s palace, which was thenceforward his abode.

The election of Oddo Colonna was one which gave universal satisfaction, and Sigismund’s unrestrained manifestations of delight show that he regarded it with unfeigned self-congratulation. Politically, he had gained an adherent where he feared that he might have elevated a foe. Colonna was not the candidate of the French party, and there was nothing more to fear from their influence over the Council, on grounds that affected the Papacy, its position in Italy, and the recovery of the patrimony of the Church, Colonna, as a member of the most powerful Roman family, seemed likely to restore the Papal prestige. Moreover, he gave hopes of favoring the cause of the reformation. He was known as the poorest and simplest among the Cardinals, and was a man of genial kindly nature, who had never shown any capacity for intrigue. No one could object to his election; for he had held himself aloof from all the quarrels which had convulsed the Council, had made no enemies, and was regarded as a moderate and sensible man. He was the choice of the nations, not of the Cardinals; and his election was a testimony to the general desire to reunite the Church under a Pope who could not be claimed as a partisan by any of the factions which had arisen in the Council.
CHAPTER VIII.
MARTIN V AND THE REFORMATION AT CONSTANCE—END OF THE COUNCIL.
1417-1418.

Whatever hopes had been entertained that Martin V might favor the work of reformation received a shock from his first pontifical act. Instead of regarding his position as somewhat exceptional, of instead of awaiting the results of further deliberation of the Council, he followed the custom of his predecessor, and on the day after his election approved and edited the rules of the Papal Chancery. The moment that the officials of the Curia had obtained a head, they felt themselves strong enough to fight for the abuses on which they thrived. The Vice-Chancellor, the Cardinal of Ostia, who had published the Chancery regulations of John XXIII, hastened to lay them before Martin V, with a demand that he should maintain the rights of his office; and the new Pope at once complied. This act of Martin V struck at the root of the reforming efforts of the Council. The abuses which after long deliberation had been selected as the most crying were organized and protected in the rules of the Papal Chancery.

The Chancery itself was a necessary branch of the administrative department of the Papacy, and was concerned with the care of the Papal archives, and the Papal the preparation and execution of all the official documents of the Pope. Such a department necessarily had rules, and these rules were revised and republished by each Pope on his accession. They regulated the dispatch of business by the Chancery, and during the period of the Avignonese Papacy had been largely increased so as to cover the growth of the system of Papal reservations and the extension of the Papal jurisdiction. John XXII and Benedict XII greatly enlarged their scope, but the earliest edition of them that we possess is that of John XXIII, which Martin V now confirmed in its integrity. The rules thus established as part of the constitution of the Church reserved to the Pope all the chief dignities in cathedral, collegiate and conventual churches provided for the issue of expectative graces, or promises of next appointment to benefices, and fixed the payments due for such grants. They regulated Papal dispensations from ecclesiastical disqualifications, from residence at benefices, from the need of ordination by holders of benefices who were employed in the service of the Curia or in study. They provided for pluralities, indulgences, and the conduct of appeals before the Curia. In short, they set forth the system by which the Papacy had managed to divert to itself the revenues of the Church; they were the code on which rested the abuses of the Papal power which the Council hoped to eradicate.

Perhaps this act of Martin V was not at once divulged, Corona as the Chancery regulations were not formally published till February 26, 1418. If it was known, men did not in their first flush of joy appreciate its full significance. It might be urged that the act was merely formal, that a Pope must have a Chancery, and the Chancery must have its rules; their publication in no way hindered their subsequent reformation. However that might be, nothing disturbed the harmony at Constance. On November 13 Martin V, who was only a Cardinal-deacon, was ordained priest, and next day was consecrated bishop. The next few days were spent in receiving homage from all the clergy and nobles in Constance. On November 21 all was ready for the Pope’s
coronation, which was carried out with great splendor. At midnight he was anointed in
the cathedral. At eight in the morning the coronation took place on a raised platform in
the courtyard of the Bishop’s palace. The tow was burned before the Pope, with the
admonition, “Sic transit gloria mundi”. Then Martin V mounted a horse and went in
stately procession through the town, Sigismund and Frederick of Brandenburg holding
the reins of his steed. The Jews met him, according to custom, bearing the volume of the
law, and begging him to confirm their privileges. Martin, perhaps not at once
understanding the ceremony, refused the volume; but Sigismund took it and said:

“The law of Moses is just and good, nor do we reject it, but you do not keep it as
you ought”. Then he gave them back the volume, and Martin, who had now his cue,
said: “Almighty God remove the veil from your eyes, and make you see the light of
everlasting life”. It is impossible not to feel that Sigismund was excellently fitted to
discharge the duties of a Pope with punctilious decorum.

It would seem that Sigismund was so satisfied with the election of Martin V that he
did not raise the question of proceeding with the reformation before the coronation of
the Pope, according to the agreement which he had made with the Cardinals. But
immediately after the coronation, a new Reform Commission was formed of six
Cardinals and as many deputies from each nation. The Commissioners did not,
however, proceed rapidly with their work. The old difficulties at once revived. The
Germans and the French prelates wished to abolish Papal provisions; the representatives
of the French Universities joined with the Italians and Spaniards to maintain in their
own interests the rights of the Pope. The English, who by the statutes against Provisors
had settled the matter for themselves, were indifferent. The previous quarrels of the
nations in the Council were a hindrance to joint action. The French besought Sigismund
to use his influence to further the reformation. Sigismund answered: “When I was
urgent that the reformation should be undertaken before the election of a Pope, you
would not consent. Now we have a Pope; go to him, for I no longer have the same
interest in the matter as I had before”. Indeed, Sigismund seems to have given up reform
as hopeless, and resolved to make the best terms he could for himself. On January 23,
1418, he publicly received at the hands of the Pope a formal recognition of his position
as King of the Romans, and a few days afterwards obtained a grant of a tenth of the
ecclesiastical revenues of three German provinces, as a recompense for the expenses
which he had incurred in the Council’s behalf.

In this state of collision of interests and general lethargy and weariness, it became
clear that nothing could be done in the way of a common scheme of reform. The
Germans were the first to recognize this and presented to the Pope in January, 1418, a
series of articles of reformation founded on the labors of the previous Commission. A
clamor for reform was directed to the Pope; and a squib published by a Spaniard,
headed “A Mass for Simony”, helped to warn Martin V that he must in some way
declare himself, for Benedict XIII still had adherents. So far Martin V had refused to
state his intentions. He saw that his wisest policy was to allow the reforming party to
involve themselves in difficulties and to bide his time. When asked to declare his
opinion, he answered with the utmost courtesy that if the nations agreed on any point,
he was desirous to do what he could for the reformation. At last he judged it prudent to
speak, and on January 18, 1418, put forward the Papal idea of reform in the shape of an
answer to the points set forward in the decree of October 30, which had been the
guarantee on which the Germans consented to the election of a Pope. On all the points
therein contained the Pope agreed to some slight surrender of his prerogatives in favor
of the Ordinaries; but one point, the definition of the “causes for which a Pope could be admonished or deposed”, was dismissed with the remark, “It does not seem good to us, as it did not to several nations, that on this point anything new should be determined or decreed”. The programme of the Pope was referred to the nations for their opinion. Again there were the old difficulties. The nations could not agree on the amendments which they wished to make. Martin V could now urge that he had done his part, and that the obstacles arose from the want of concord among the several nations. He kept pressing them to quicken their deliberations; and while he awaited their decision he continued to exercise the old powers of the Papacy, and made numerous grants in expectancy, which no doubt gave a practical proof to many that the Papal system after all had its advantages.

It was natural that the Council, which was before enfeebled by its own divisions, should find itself growing still feeble before a Pope. The influence of the Papal office was strong over men’s imaginations. The joy felt throughout Europe at the termination of the Schism was reflected among the Fathers at Constance. The ambassadors who came to congratulate the new Pope on his accession could not fail to deepen the impression of his importance. The death of Gregory XII on October 18, 1417, was an additional security for Martin V’s position. Moreover, the prestige of the Pope was increased by the arrival in Constance on February 19 of an embassy from the Greek Emperor, headed by the Archbishop of Kiev, to negotiate for the union of the Eastern and Western Churches. The luckless Greeks saw themselves day by day more and more helpless to resist the invading Turks, and their leaders deemed it politic to remove by union with the Latin Church the religious differences which had done much to sunder the East and West. During the Schism it had been hopeless to prosecute their scheme, as reconciliation with one Pope would only have won for them the hostility of the obedience of his rival. But their desire was known; and soon after the Council of Pisa, Gerson, preaching before the French King, urged the convocation of another Council in three years’ time, that the Greeks might then appear and negotiate for their union with Western Christendom. So soon as the Council of Constance had succeeded in establishing internal unity in the Latin Church, the Greek envoys made their appearance. They were honorably received by Sigismund, who rode out to meet them. With wondering eyes the Latin prelates gazed on the Greek ecclesiastics, whose long black hair flowed down their shoulders, who wore long beards, and had nothing but the tonsure to mark their priestly office. During their stay in Constance the Greeks practiced their own ritual, and were courteously treated by the Council; but it does not appear that much was done towards the object which they had in view. The distracted state of opinion in Constance was not calculated to inspire them with much confidence. The Council did not last long enough for the question to be seriously discussed. We find, however, that friendly relations were established between Martin V and the Greek Emperor, for Martin gave his consent to a project of intermarriage between the Emperor’s sons and Latin ladies.

It was natural for Martin V to urge the rapid dissolution of the Council. So long as it remained sitting unpleasant questions were sure to be forced upon him. The condemnation of Jean Petit, which had been deferred by the Council, was now laid before the Pope for his decision, and there was added to it another question of like character. A Dominican friar, John of Falkenberg, had written a libel against the King of Poland at the instigation of his enemies, the Teutonic Knights. This libel asserted that the King of Poland and his people were only worthy of the hatred of all Christian men,
and ought to be exterminated like pagans. It was brought before the Commissioners in Matters of Faith early in 1417, was by them condemned and ordered to be burned; but its formal condemnation was left for the new Pope. Thus the Poles and the French alike called on Martin to condemn their enemies; but Martin was too politic to wish to offend either the Duke of Burgundy or the Teutonic Knights. The French and the Poles published a protest setting forth the scandals that would be caused by any refusal of justice. When this produced no effect, the Poles intimated their intention of appealing to a future Council. Martin V thought it desirable to check, if possible, this dangerous privilege, and in a consistory on March 10 promulgated a constitution which asserted: “No one may appeal from the supreme judge, that is, the apostolic seat or the Roman Pontiff, Vicar on earth of Jesus Christ, or may decline his authority in matters of faith”. To this constitution the Poles determined to pay no heed, and Gerson pointed out that it was destructive to the whole theory on which the Councils of Pisa and Constance rested their authority. It was indeed clear that if the Council remained sitting and this question were discussed, a collision between the Pope and the Council would be inevitable.

But Martin V knew before he took this step that the days of the Council were numbered, and that the majority of those in Constance were anxiously awaiting its end. He had made an agreement to accept a few general reforms in the Church, and to remedy for each nation some of the abuses of which they complained. He also endorsed the proceedings of the Council by issuing on Feb. 22 a Bull against the errors of Wycliffe and Huss, and drew up twenty-four articles, which were sent to Bohemia as the Council’s prescription for ending the religious strife. They were not couched in conciliatory language, and matters had gone too far for reconciliation; but they expressed Martin’s acquiescence in what had been done.

The settlement of the reformation question expresses the weariness and incompetence of the Council. There was no sufficient statesmanship to unite contending elements of which it was composed, and direct them to a common end. The desire for reformation with which the Council opened had so lost its force in the collision of national interests that even the restricted programme embodied in the decree of October 30, 1417, was found to be more than could be accomplished. After much aimless discussion, it was finally agreed that a synodal decree should be passed about a few of these eighteen points on which there was tolerable unanimity, and that all other questions should be left for the Pope to settle with the several nations according to their grievances. On March 21 the Council approved of statutes in which the Pope withdrew exemptions and incorporations granted since the death of Gregory XI abandoned the Papal claims to ecclesiastical revenues during vacancies; condemned simony; withdrew dispensations from discharging the duties of ecclesiastical offices while receiving their revenues; promised not to impose tenths except for a real necessity, nor specially in any kingdom or province without consulting its bishops; and enjoined greater regularity in clerical dress and demeanor.

The rest of the eighteen points raised by the decree of October 30, 1417, were settled by separate agreements or concordats with the different nations. In the session of March 21, 1418, the Council gave its separate approbation to these concordats, and solemnly declared that the synodal decrees then passed, together with the concordats, fulfilled the requirements of the decree of October 30. The Council as a whole accepted the decrees, the nations separately accepted the concordats; then the Council declared that these two together fulfilled the guarantee on the strength of which a Papal election had been agreed to. It is true that the concordats themselves had not yet been definitely
accepted, but it would seem that they had been substantially agreed to. The difficulties in the way of their publication lay rather in the fact that the nations could not agree in themselves than that the Curia raised any objections. The German and French concordats were signed on April 15, the English not till July 12. It is remarkable that, while England and Germany made concordats each for themselves, dealing with special points in their relations towards the Roman Church, the three Romance peoples held together; and what is known as the French concordat represents the alliance which the last days of the Council had brought about, and which was the cause of the triumph of the Curia. The Spanish and Italian nations had asked for reforms which did not materially affect the Papal primacy; by answering their requests in common with those of the French, the special grant of certain remissions of annates to the French nation only would be regarded as a more signal mark of favor.

The questions dealt with in the concordats were not of much importance. They consisted chiefly of such of the points of the reform programme of Martin V as each nation thought to be necessary or desirable for its own good. The English concordat was very short, and provided only for the proper organization of the Cardinal College, the due admission of Englishmen to office in the Curia, the check of Papal indulgences, of unions of benefices and dispensations from canonical disabilities, and the somewhat curious revocation of permissions granted to bishops of wearing any part of the pontifical attire. It is clear that on all essential points the English preferred to rest on their own national laws rather than entrust themselves to grants and privileges given by the Pope. The English concordat is entirely trivial, but is in the form of a perpetual grant or charter. The other two were only a temporary compromise, restricted in their operation to five years. The payment of annates was reluctantly submitted to, with some restrictions, by the Germans and the French as a necessary means, under existing circumstances, of supplying the Pope with revenues. But in a few years’ time, when he was established in Rome and had won back the possessions of the Roman Church, he might fairly be required to live off his own. They bargained that in five years the question of annates should be again considered; and the Pope, being obliged to give way, did so on condition that the grants which he was making on other points should be similarly limited in time. As several of these grants concerned questions of organic reform, such as the reorganization of the College of Cardinals, a limitation of time was absurd in their case. Still more absurd was it that the articles about the Cardinals were established in perpetuity by the English Concordat and only for five years by the French and German concordats. That such conditions should have been admitted as satisfactory by the Council is only a sign how entirely its members were overcome by weariness, and how helpless they felt to grapple with the practical questions raised by the cry for reform.

In fact, everyone wanted to get away from Constance, and the most sanguine hoped that, after a few years of rest, the next General Council would find greater unanimity among the nations. As soon as the decree of March 21 had been passed the reforming work of the Council of Constance was virtually at an end; but before it separated a trivial matter was brought forward which involved principles more important for future reform than any contained in the concordats. A complaint was made to the Pope of the irregular institution within the Church of a new ideal of Christian life.

A spirit of refined pietism had for some time prevailed in the Netherlands, till it received a definite organization from the fervor of Gerhard Groot, a mission preacher whose eloquence produced great results in the province of Utrecht. But Gerhard Groot
was not merely a preacher; he was also a theological student, and a man whose beautiful character attracted a number of young men to follow him. Some were his friends, some his scholars, and others were employed by him to copy manuscripts, which he was fond of collecting and disseminating. From these various elements a small society gradually sprang up around him, which took an organized shape under the name of the Brotherhood of Common Life. The Brethren lived in common, devoted to good works, and especially to the cause of popular education. Gerhard Groot died at Deventer, which was the centre of his labors, in 1384; but his system lived under the guidance of Florentius Radewins, and the spirit which inspired the Brotherhood is still vocal to Christendom in the pages of Thomas a Kempis.

It was, however, only natural that the old monastic orders should look with suspicion on the rise of a rival. The Brethren of the Common Life were fiercely attacked by the Friars, and at last the question of the legality of their position was brought before the decision of assembled Christendom. Matthias Grabow, a Dominican of Groningen, wrote a book against the Brotherhood, and when reproved by the Bishop of Utrecht, appealed to the Pope. His position was that worldly possessions are inseparable from a life in the world, and that those only who enter an established religious order can meritoriously practice the three ascetic duties of poverty, chastity, and obedience. The monastic life claimed for itself, not only an unquestioned superiority, but also the exclusive right of practicing its fundamental virtues. The recognized monastic orders would allow no extension of their principles, and would admit of no middle term between themselves and the ordinary life of man.

Martin V submitted the question to a commission of theologians. D'Ailly and Gerson had a last opportunity of showing that their reforming views still had a meaning. D'Ailly attacked the phrase “verae religions”, and Grabow declared it to be heresy to assert that there was no true religion, save amongst monks. Gerson, on April 3, 1418, presented an examination of Grabow’s propositions. He laid down that there was one religion only, the religion of Christ, which can be practiced without vows and needs nothing to add to its perfection. The monastic orders are wrongly called “states of perfection”; they are only assemblies of those striving towards perfection. The opinions of Grabow would exclude from true religion popes and prelates, who had not taken monastic vows—nay, even Christ Himself. The obligations undertaken by monks were many of them equally adapted for laymen also, and ought to be brought home to them. He pronounced the opinions of Grabow to be erroneous, even heretical and worthy of condemnation. His opinion was followed, and Grabow retracted. The Brethren of the Common Life were thenceforth unmolested and enjoyed papal recognition. The mediaeval notion of the perfection of monastic life received a severe blow; and though the reformers of Constance could not agree to sweep away the abuses of the existing system of the Church, they resisted an attempt to check the free development of Christian zeal.

Nothing now remained for the Council except formally to separate. Martin V celebrated with great ecclesiastical pomp the festivities of Easter, while the Council prepared for its dissolution. On April 19 he fixed Pavia as the seat of the next Council, which was to be held in seven years’ time. On April 22 was held the last general session; but the Council did not part in peace, as the ambassadors of Poland rose and demanded from Pope and Council the condemnation of the writings of Falkenberg, otherwise they would appeal to the future Council. There was some confusion, and Martin V answered that all the decrees passed by the Council in matters of faith he
would ratify, but nothing more. The Polish envoy would have proceeded to read his protest and appeal, but Martin forbade him. The Bishop of Catania preached a farewell sermon on the text, “Now ye have sorrow, but I shall see you again and your heart shall rejoice”. The decree of the dissolution of the Council was read, and indulgences were granted to those who had been present at it. Then rose Doctor Ardecin of Novara, and in the name of Sigismund declared the trouble and expense which the Council had caused him, which, however, he did not regret, seeing that it had wrought the unity of the Church; if anything had been done amiss it had not been by his fault. He thanked all the members of the Council for their presence, and declared himself ready to support the Church until death.

The Council was now over; but Sigismund was anxious to keep Martin V in Germany. It was not entirely beyond his hopes that the Papacy might now for a time be in the hands of Germany, as before it had been in the hands of France. He besought Martin to remain at least till the next Easter, and offered him Basel, Strasburg, or Mainz as his place of residence; but Martin answered that the miserable condition of the States of the Church needed a ruler’s hand, and that his place was in Rome. Sigismund had already had reason to discover that Martin was not likely to be a tool in his hands. He reluctantly saw his preparations for departure, and at last, on May 16, escorted him to Gottlieben, where Martin took ship to Schaffhausen, whence he journeyed to Geneva.

Sigismund did not find it so easy to leave Constance. The attendants of the needy monarch received scanty pay from their master, and were most of them deeply indebted to the burghers of Constance, who were not willing to let them go till they had paid their debts. In vain Sigismund tried to negotiate through the city magistrates for an extension of credit. He was forced as a last resource to call a meeting of creditors in the Exchange of the city and trust to his own eloquence. He spoke at length of his good offices to the citizens of Constance in summoning the Council to their city and maintaining it there so long; he dwelt upon the profit they had made thereby, and the glory they had gained throughout the world; then he turned to pleasing flattery and praised them for the way in which they had more than justified by their behavior all his anticipations. “With such words”, says Reichenthal, “he caused the poor folk to think that all he said was true, and rested on good grounds”. When he saw that he had gained the people’s hearts, he proposed to leave in pledge for the debt his gold and silver plate. The creditors relented and accepted his offer. Then Sigismund thanked them warmly for their confidence, and went on to say that it would be a great disgrace to him if he robbed his table of its plate; he begged them instead to take his fine linen and hangings, which he could more easily dispense with for a time. The luckless creditors could not avoid consenting. The linen was handed over, and no pains were spared in entering the various debts in ledgers. Then, on May 21, Sigismund and his needy followers rode away; but the pledges were never redeemed, and when the creditors came to examine them they found them to be unsalable, as they were all embroidered with Sigismund’s arms. Many of the citizens of Constance were reduced to poverty through their trust in Sigismund’s words; and the plausible and shifty king left behind him a mixed legacy of misery and grandeur as the record of his long sojourn in the walls of Constance.

The members of the Council quickly dispersed to their homes. During the long period of the session many eminent men had died in Constance. Manuel Gerson. Chrysoloras, a learned Greek who by his teaching had done much to further the knowledge of Greek letters in Italy, died in April, 1415, to the grief of all his learned friends. That such a man as John XXIII should have brought a Greek scholar in his train
is a curious testimony of the advance of the new learning to political importance. The death of Robert Hallam, Bishop of Salisbury, in September, 1417, was followed by that of Cardinal Zabarella, and the Council lost thereby two of its most distinguished members. With the dissolution of the Council the other men who had been eminent at its beginning sank into insignificance. Peter d'Ailly went back to France as Papal legate, and died in 1420. Gerson's attitude in the affair of Jean Petit had raised him such determined enemies in France that he dared not return, but found shelter first in Bavaria and afterwards at Vienna. After the murder of the Duke of Burgundy in September, 1419, he went back to Lyons, where in the monastery of S. Paul he ended his days in works of piety and devotion, and died in 1429. We can best picture the disastrous results of the Council of Constance when we see how entirely it destroyed the great reforming party of the University of Paris, and condemned its learned and eloquent leader to end his days in banishment and obscurity.

Those who returned home from the Council could not, with any feeling of satisfaction, contrast the results which they brought home with the anticipations with which they had set out for Constance. It is true that they had restored the unity of the Church by the election of a Pope, and that they had purged the Church of heresy by their dealings with Hus; but the state of affairs in Bohemia was not such as to assure them that their high-handed procedure had been entirely successful. Many must have been inclined to admit with Gerson that there had been a strange contrast between the determined condemnation of Hus and the indifference shown to the more pernicious doctrines of Jean Petit and Falkenberg. They must have admitted that the Bohemians had some grounds for dissatisfaction, some reason for complaining of respect of persons. As regards the reformation of the Church, the most determined optimists could not say more than that the question remained open, and that they looked to a future Council to carry on the work which they had begun. The representatives of the various nations could not flatter themselves that the concordats which they took back with them were of much importance. In France the Government determined not to recognize the concordat; they thought it better to curb the Papal exactions by the use of the royal power, and uphold the legislation which the pressure of the Schism had called forth in 1406, forbidding the prelates to observe Papal reservations and the clergy to pay undue exactions to the Pope. Before the concordat reached France, at the end of March, 1418, royal decrees again established the old liberties of the Gallican Church against Papal reservations and exactions. France preferred to follow the example of England, and assert the liberties of its Church on the basis of the royal sovereignty rather than on the ecclesiastical basis of a Papal grant. When the concordat was presented, on June 10, 1418, to the Parliament of Paris, to be registered among the laws of the land, it was rejected as being contrary to the laws just enacted by the royal authority. It is true that a few months later the Duke of Burgundy became supreme in Paris, abolished the decrees of March, and recognized the concordat; but a new convention was made with Martin V by the Duke of Bedford as regent of France in 1425, and this took the place of the agreement made at Constance. In England no notice was taken of the concordat, which indeed was sufficiently insignificant. In Germany it was not laid before the Diet, nor was any attempt made to secure for it legislative authority; it remained as a compact between the Pope and the ecclesiastical authorities, and seems to have been fairly well observed during the five years for which it was originally granted.

Before leaving the Council of Constance it is worthwhile to take a general view of the actual points for reform which were there brought forward. The original desire of
the reforming party for a general reorganization of the ecclesiastical system rapidly faded away before the difficulties of the task, and the practical proposals that were made represent the actual grievances felt by the bishops and clergy in consequence of Papal aggression. The aspirations of the Council did not ultimately go farther than the defence of the power of the Ordinary against Papal interference. The proposals of the Council afford an opportunity for noting the extent to which the Papal headship had broken down the machinery of the Church, had destroyed its political independence, and had introduced abuses into its system.

The first point to which naturally the Council attached great importance was the revival of the synodal system of the Church, a primitive institution suppressed by the Papal absolutism, but which the pressure of the Schism had again brought into prominence. The authority of a General Council to decide in cases of a disputed election to the Papacy was asserted as the means of avoiding the possibility of another schism, and the periodical recurrence of General Councils was to be the future panacea for all ills which the present was powerless to cure. An attempt was made to limit the plenitude of the Papal absolutism, by converting the profession of faith made by the Pope on his election into an oath to maintain the established constitutions of the Church: but the attempt was unavailing, and the formula drawn up by Boniface VIII remained unaltered.

The reorganization of the College of Cardinals was regarded as necessary both for the stability of the Papacy and the relief of the Church. It was agreed that Cardinals ought to be chosen from every nation, so as to prevent the Papacy from falling into the hands of any one Power, to the risk of another schism. The number of the College was fixed at eighteen, or twenty-four at the outside, so as to lighten the burden of maintaining Cardinals out of the revenues of the Church; amongst them was to be a good proportion of doctors of theology, so as to deal satisfactorily with theological questions. These points of detail were accepted by Martin V in the concordats, which rapidly became a dead letter. But the desire on the part of many to convert the College of Cardinals into a Council, without whose advice and consent the Pope was not to act, found no expression in any of the acts of the Council.

The great practical questions, however, concerned the heavy taxation which the Papacy had gradually imposed on the Church. The political enterprises of the Papacy in the thirteenth century, and its loss of territorial revenues during the Avignonese captivity, had grievously embarrassed Papal finance. The Popes set themselves to raise money by extending their old privilege of providing for their own agents and officials by presenting them to rich benefices. For this purpose they issued Bulls, reserving for their own appointment certain benefices, and setting aside the rights of the Ordinary as patron. Round this custom grew up every kind of financial extortion. Dues were exacted from the Papal nominees, which soon rose to the amount of the revenues of the first year on all benefices conferred in the Consistory, and under Boniface IX to a half of the revenues of the first year on all other benefices to which the Pope presented. To obtain these annates, which were the chief source of Papal revenue, the power of reservation and provision was pushed to its utmost extent, and John XXIII exacted the payment of these dues before issuing letters of institution. The patronage of all important posts was taken away from the bishops; the Papal nominees, being heavily taxed themselves, were driven to raise money by every means from their benefices; churches and ecclesiastical buildings were allowed to fall into decay.
Moreover, the Popes exercised most unscrupulously this power of reservation and collation to all benefices. Bishops and clergy found themselves translated against their will from one post to another, which they were compelled to accept, and pay fresh dues for their collation. This point touched all the higher clergy so closely that the Council’s decree of October 9, 1417, provided that bishops should not be translated against their will, save for a grave reason to be approved by a majority of the Cardinals. An extension of the power of reservation was that of making grants in expectancy—that is, of the next presentation to a benefice already occupied. John XXIII exacted the payment of dues on installation before issuing his grants in expectancy, and would grant the same benefice to several candidates at once; each would be induced to pay, though only one could obtain the prize. Although the abuses of such a system are manifest enough, yet the Reform Commission could not agree how to deal with them, and the matter propped out of the deliberations of the Council. The whole question of Papal reservations was so complicated by the jealousy of the Universities against the Ordinaries that nothing was done to affect the Pope's power in this matter, though the French and German concordats prescribed certain limitations.

The reform of the Papal law courts was another point on which much was said but little was decided. The Papal law extension of the jurisdiction of ecclesiastical courts in civil matters was felt to be an increasing grievance, and a desire was expressed at Constance to see the limits of the two jurisdictions more clearly established. The ease with which appeals even on trivial matters were received by the Roman courts was destructive of the power of the ordinary courts, afforded a screen to wealthy and powerful wrongdoers, and was an intolerable hardship to poor suitors. Closely connected with this were the exemptions from episcopal or metropolitan jurisdiction which were largely granted to monasteries and chapters. The poor man, when wronged by one who enjoyed such an exemption, had practically no redress, for he could not carry his complaint before the Pope. Martin V, by the decrees of March 21, 1418, cancelled all exemptions granted during the Schism, and undertook that for the future they should only be made on good reasons.

Other points were given up by Martin V, such as the incorporation of benefices with monasteries, and the reservation to the Pope of the revenues of benefices during the time of vacancy. This last had been a right of the bishops which the Popes during the fourteenth century had wrested from them, and which Martin V was willing to resign to save the more important privilege of annates. The custom also of granting offices in commendam to one who drew their revenues without discharging their duties weighed heavily on many monasteries, and was provided against in the French and German concordats. The freedom of the clergy from taxation had been broken through by the crusading movement, and during the Schism Popes had used the right of exacting tenth of ecclesiastical revenues, partly to recruit their own finances, partly to grant them as bribes to princes whom they wished to win over to their obedience. The decrees of March 21, 1418, enacted that for the future tenths should only be imposed in case of special necessity, with the consent of the Cardinals and of the prelates of every land on which they were imposed. Before the passing of this decree Martin V had granted to Sigismund a tenth of the ecclesiastical revenues of Germany, to which the Germans offered a determined resistance, and which was probably the cause of the Council’s persistence on this point.

Other abuses of the Papal power were those of dispensations and indulgences. Dispensations were readily given by the Popes in matrimonial cases, as well as in cases
of ecclesiastical disability. An outcry was early raised against them on the grounds of their interference with social relationships, the injury which they did to the Church by allowing unfit persons to hold office, and the handle which they gave to simony. The Council, however, went no farther than to enact that Papal dispensations should not be given to persons who were unfit to discharge the duties of benefices of which they enjoyed the revenues. On the question of indulgences the Council did nothing, and even the concordats did not aim at doing more than giving the bishops a suspensory power in gross cases. Simony had been too notorious under Boniface IX and John XXIII not to engage the attention of the Council; and the decree of March 21, 1418, enacted that those who obtained ecclesiastical offices by simony should be ipso facto suspended. It was easy to denounce simony; but it is obvious that it could only be seriously attacked by showing more decision than the Council was prepared to show in cutting off every abuse which gave an opportunity for its exercise.

Other points which appeared in the programme of the reformers concerned the position of the Pope, and were meant to enforce on him the necessity of living on his own revenues. The definition of the circumstances under which a Pope might be admonished or deposed was set aside by Martin, and the Papacy retired from the Council with its supremacy unimpaired. Enactments, which had been proposed, forbidding the alienation of the States of the Church, and suppressing nepotism by providing for the government of the Papal territories by ecclesiastical vicars, were all allowed to drop in the final settlement. Proposals to limit the grants made to Cardinals of offices which they never visited were also laid aside till the future of the States of the Church was more clearly seen.

This brief survey of the aspirations and achievements of the Council in the way of reform will suffice to show how entire was its failure to accomplish any permanent results. During the abeyance of the Papacy, while Europe was smarting under the exactions which the maintenance of two Papal courts had involved, while everyone had before his eyes the ruin wrought in the ecclesiastical system by Papal usurpations, a splendid opportunity was offered for a temperate and conservative reformation. The collective wisdom of Europe after nearly four years’ labour and discussion was found unequal to the task. The Council shrank from a consideration of the basis of the Christian life, and mercilessly condemned Hus as a rebel because he advocated the reformation of the Church with a view to the needs of the individual soul. When it had thus dismissed one possible form of reformation, it showed no capacity for devising a reformation of its own. The decisive correction of abuses required more statesmanship and more disinterestedness than were to be found among the fathers of Constance. There were men of keen penetration and intelligence, men who were able to criticize and suggest points of view, but there were none who united firmness of character, strong moral purpose, and large patriotism to the interests of Christendom. Gerson and D'Ailly could write and speak with fervor about the need of reform: they came to Constance as the leaders of a powerful academic party, which had many adherents in every land. But, when it came to the point, D'Ailly could not prefer the interests of the Church to the privileges of the Cardinals’ College, and was found in the hour of need to be fighting on behalf of the rights of the Curia. Gerson threw himself into a small political dispute, and frittered away his influence in contending bitterly for things of no moment. The academic party grew alarmed at the prospect of an increase in the power of the bishops, and held by the Pope as likely to do more for learning. No uniform
policy could be obtained from the Council even in matters of detail; unanimity was only possible on the most trivial points.

The failure of the Council is partly to be attributed to the difficulties of its composition and organization. An ecclesiastical parliament, representative of the whole of Europe, was indeed a difficult thing to call into being and reduce to order. The organization of the Council was settled in a haphazard way. The qualification necessary for those who were to take part in its deliberations was determined with a view to the existing emergency. The conciliar division into nations, adopted with a view of lessening the influence of the Pope, became in the end a hindrance to united action. The nations deliberating apart had just enough contact with one another to intensify national jealousies, and not enough to eliminate national selfishness. Instead of uniting to reform the Papacy before electing a new Pope, national parties were ready to struggle for the possession of the Papacy and the consequent influence in the politics of Europe. But while the Council thus suffered from all the evils of national and political antagonism, it was unwilling to receive any of the benefits which it might have obtained from the same source. It acted as a purely ecclesiastical assembly, and made no effort to obtain the help of the State to secure effect to its decisions on Church matters. Sigismund was useful as Protector of the Council, but when he wished to protect Hus, when he ventured to press the question of reformation, the Council complained loudly of undue interference, and threatened to dissolve. Sigismund left Constance in October, 1417, that the freedom of the assembled fathers might be secured, that they might be left to decide for themselves the conditions on which they would proceed to the election of a Pope.

While the Council stood on this purely ecclesiastical basis, its nations in no sense expressed the national desires of Europe. The points brought forward for reform show clearly enough that the real question in the Council was the struggle of the bishops to make good their position against the Pope. The ecclesiastical aristocracy took advantage of the temporary abasement of the Papal monarchy to increase its own powers and importance. So soon as it was seem that this was the general upshot of the schemes of the Reform Commissioners other interests began to cool in the matter, and difficulties began to be felt. The Universities had no wish to see the Papacy curbed for the benefit of the Episcopate. The increase of the power of the ecclesiastical aristocracy was not an end which any of the reformers desired. It were better to leave things alone rather than only secure so doubtful a gain.

On all sides difficulties and disunion prevailed, so that men were wearied and hopeless. The most sanguine, as he left Constance, could only hope that at least a beginning had been made for conciliar action in the future, and that the new Council which was to meet in five years’ time would have the experience of the past to guide it to a more successful issue.

On his part also Martin V left Constance thankful that the Papal power had suffered so little at the hands of the Council, and with the reflection that he had five years before him in which to devise means for saving the Papacy from further interference.
BOOK III
THE COUNCIL OF BASEL.
1419-1444.

CHAPTER I.
MARTIN V AND ITALIAN AFFAIRS.
1418-1425.

ON leaving Constance Martin V felt himself for the first time free. He had been taught by the events of the last four years that freedom was only possible for a Pope in Italy, in spite of all the temporary inconveniences which might arise from Italian politics. But much as he might desire to find himself in his native city, and revive the glories of the Papacy in its old historic seat, he could not immediately proceed to Rome. John XXIII had abandoned Rome, and had been driven even to flee from Bologna, owing to his political helplessness and the power of his opponent Ladislas. The death of Ladislas and the abeyance of the Papacy had only plunged Italian affairs into deeper confusion, and Martin V had to pause a while and consider how he could best return to Italy.

Through the Swiss cantons Martin made a triumphal progress, and had no reason to complain of want of respect or lack of generosity. On June 11 he reached Geneva, and in the city of the prince bishop he stayed for three months; there he had the satisfaction of receiving the allegiance of the citizens of Avignon. He seems to have wished to display himself as much as possible, and exert the prestige of the restored Papacy to secure his position. At the end of September he moved slowly from Geneva through Savoy to Turin, and thence through Pavia to Milan, where he was received with great honor by Filippo Maria Visconti on October 12. So great was the popular curiosity to see the Pope that when he went to consecrate a new altar in the cathedral several people were trampled to death in the throng. At Milan Martin showed his desire for the pacification of Italy by making terms between Filippo Maria and Pandolfo Malatesta, who had seized on Brescia. There too, he received ambassadors from the Florentines, who in their capacity of peacemakers, were anxious to arrange matters so as to enable the Pope to return quietly to Rome. They offered him a refuge in their city and also their service as mediators. On October 19 Martin left Milan for Brescia and on October 25 he entered Mantua. There he stayed till the end of the year seeking for some means to make the Papal influence a real power in Italian affairs. At length he resolved to accept the services of the Florentines, and set out for their city, avoiding on his way the
rebellious Bologna, which had cast off the Papal rule. On February 26, 1419, he entered Florence, where he was honorably received, and took up his abode in the monastery of Santa Maria Novella.

The condition of Italy was indeed sufficiently disturbed to need all the efforts of the Pope and of Florence to reduce it to order and peace. In Lombardy, Filippo Maria, Duke of Milan, was bent on winning back the lands of his father Giangaleazzo, which had fallen into the hands of petty tyrants. Southern Italy was thrown into confusion by the death of Ladislas, who was succeeded in the kingdom of Naples by his sister Giovanna II, a woman with none of the qualities of a ruler, who used her position solely as a means of personal gratification. The death of Louis of Anjou gave every hope of a peaceful reign to the distracted Neapolitan kingdom; but Giovanna’s ungovernable passions soon made it a sphere of personal intrigue. At first the Queen, a widow of forty-seven years old, was under the control of a lover, Pandolfello Alapo, whom she made Chamberlain and covered with her favors. To maintain his position against the discontented barons, Alapo formed an alliance with Sforza, who was made Grand Constable of Naples. But the barons insisted that the Queen should marry, and in 1415 she chose for her husband Jacques de Bourbon, Count of La Marche. The barons sided with the Count of La Marche, who, by their help, imprisoned Sforza, put Alapo to death, and exercised the power of King. The favor, however, which he showed to his own countrymen the French disgusted the Neapolitan nobles, and in 1416 Giovanna was able again to assert her own power. By this time she had a new favorite to direct her, Giovanni Caraccioli, who drove the King to leave Naples, and thought it wise also to find an occupation for Sforza which would keep him at a distance. For this purpose he sent him on an expedition against Braccio, who had attacked the States of the Church and had advanced against Rome.

Andrea Braccio, of the family of the Counts of Montone, was a noble Perugian who, in his youth, had been driven by party struggles to leave his native city, had embraced the calling of a condottiere under Alberigo da Barbiano. He served on many sides in the Italian wars, and finally was in the pay of Ladislas, who played him false in an attack upon Perugia; whereon Braccio joined the side of John XXIII, who left him governor of Bologna when he set out for Constance. Braccio was possessed with a desire to make himself master of his native city of Perugia, and in 1416 sold the Bolognese their liberty and hired soldiers on every side. He defeated Carlo Malatesta, whom the Perugians called to their aid, and in July, 1416, made himself master of the city. Soon, desirous of enlarging his territory, he advanced into the States of the Church. Todi, Rieti, and Narni soon fell before him, and he pressed on to the neighborhood of Rome. But Braccio, to win Perugia, had drawn to his side the condottiere general Tartaglia, who stipulated, in return for his services, that Braccio should not oppose him in attacking the dominions of Sforza. From that time Sforza conceived a deadly hatred against Braccio, and for the next few years the history of Italy is an account of the desperate rivalry of these two rival condottieri.

Rome during the abeyance of the Papacy was left in an anomalous condition. The Castle of S. Angelo, which had been taken by Ladislas, was still held by a Neapolitan governor. John XXIII on departing for Constance had appointed Cardinal Isolani his legate in Rome; and he was assisted, or hindered, by the presence of the Cardinal of S. Angelo, Pietro degli Stefanacci, who found Rome preferable to Constance. The legate Isolani managed to retain considerable influence over the Romans, and induced them to carry on the government of the city according to the constitution established before the
interference of Ladislas. But Rome was in no condition to offer resistance to Braccio when he advanced against it, and on June 9, 1417, took up his position by St. Agnese. In vain the legate tried to negotiate for his departure. Braccio harried the adjacent country, and reduced the Romans to capitulate through hunger. He had an ally in the Cardinal Stefanacci, who welcomed him on his triumphal entry on June 16 and helped him to form a new magistracy. The legate fled into the Castle of St. Angelo, and begged for help from Naples. His entreaties were heard, as Sforza was burning for revenge against Braccio, and Giovanna's new favorite, Caraccioli, was looking about for some means of getting rid of Sforza, whose manly frame might soon prove too attractive to the susceptible Queen. Braccio was engaged in besieging the Castle of St. Angelo when the arrival of Sforza on August 10 warned him of his danger. Sforza, seeing how matters stood, went to Ostia, and crossed the Tiber without hindrance. When Braccio heard that he was advancing against him he judged it unwise to risk the loss of his newly-won possessions, and on August 26 withdrew to Perugia. Sforza entered Rome in triumph with the banners of Naples and of the Church. He restored the legate Isolani to power, appointed new magistrates, and imprisoned the traitorous Cardinal of St. Angelo, who died soon afterwards.

Such was the condition of affairs which Martin V had to face on his election. It was natural that his first movement should be towards alliance with Giovanna II of Naples, seeing that the Neapolitan influence seemed most powerful in Rome. He welcomed Giovanna's ambassadors and sent a cardinal to arrange matters with the Queen as early as May, 1418. Giovanna agreed to restore all the possessions of the Church and make a perpetual alliance with the Pope, who was to crown her Queen of Naples. She gave a pledge of her sincerity by the usual means of enriching the Pope's relations. Martin's brother, Giordano Colonna, was made Duke of Amalfi and Venosa, his nephew Antonio was made Grand Chamberlain of Naples; and, on August 21, appeared with a Bull announcing the Pope's alliance with Giovanna. Antonio at first attached himself to the favorite Caraccioli; but before the end of the year Sforza was strong enough to organize a popular rising against the favorite, who was forced to leave Naples, and was sent as ambassador to Martin V at Mantua. There the surrender of the fortresses which the Neapolitans occupied in the States of the Church and the coronation of Giovanna were finally arranged. Early in 1419 a Papal Legate was sent to Naples to perform the coronation.

Thus matters stood when Martin took refuge in Florence. He could do nothing better than await the course of events in Naples and the results of the Florentine mediation. Return to Rome with Braccio hostile was impossible. If Braccio were to be overthrown, it could only be by the arms of Sforza; but the Pope's first steps had been to ally with Giovanna and Caraccioli, with whom Sforza was now at enmity. At Florence Martin's prestige was increased by the arrival of four of Benedict XIII's cardinals, who were solemnly received on March 17. So far as Italy was concerned, Martin V had nothing to fear from Peter de Luna. But the deposed Baldassare Cossa was still an object of his dread, for Braccio had threatened to espouse Cossa's cause, and might again raise him to the position of a dangerous rival. Accordingly, Martin was very anxious to get Cossa into his hands, and the Florentines, in the interests of peace, were desirous that this matter should be arranged. John XXIII, when legate of Bologna, had always been on good terms with the Florentines, and had stood in friendly relations with several of the richest citizens, amongst whom were Giovanni dei Medici and Niccolò da Uzzano, who were now ready to interfere on his behalf. They procured from
Martin V a promise that he would deal gently with his deposed predecessor, and advanced the sum of 38,500 Rhenish ducats to buy the release of Cossa from Lewis of Bavaria, in whose custody he was. On his way to Florence Cossa was escorted by the Bishop of Lubeck, who was charged by Martin V to keep a sharp eye upon him. At Parma he lodged with an old friend, who alarmed him with rumours that Martin V meant to have him imprisoned for life at Mantua. He fled by night to Genoa, where he found protection from the Doge, Tommaso di Campo Fregoso. Friends quickly gathered round him, urging him once more to try his fortunes and assert his claims to the Papacy. For a brief space there was a thrill of horror lest the miseries of the Schism should again begin. But the wise counsels of Giovanni dei Medici and his Florentine friends seem to have prevailed with Cossa; they assured him of his safety, and urged him to fulfill his promise. John XXIII no longer possessed his former vigour or felt his old confidence in himself and his fortunes. The helplessness which had overtaken him at Constance still haunted him, and though the old spirit might rekindle for a moment, it was soon chilled by doubt and hesitation. He judged it wisest to trust his friends, proceed to Florence, and submit to the mercy of Martin V. On June 14 he entered Florence, and was received with respectful pity by the entire body of the citizens. The sight of one who had fallen from a high degree kindled their sympathy, and Cossa’s poor apparel and miserable look impressed more vividly the sense of his changed fortunes. On June 27 he appeared before Martin in full consistory, and kneeling before him made his submission. “I alone”, he said, “assembled the Council; I always labored for the good of the Church; you know the truth. I come to your Holiness and rejoice as much as I can at your elevation and my own freedom”. Here his voice was broken with passion; his haughty nature could ill brook his humiliation. Martin received him graciously, and placed on his head the cardinal’s hat. But Cossa did not long live under the shadow of his successor. He died in the same year on December 23, and his Florentine friends were faithful to his memory. In the stately Baptistery of Florence the Medici erected to him a splendid tomb. The recumbent figure cast in bronze was the work of Donatello, and the marble pedestal which supports it was wrought by Michelozzo. It bears the simple inscription, Johannes quondam Papa XXIII obiit Florentiae.

Martin V’s attention was meanwhile directed to the kingdom of Naples and he urged on Giovanna II the duty of restoring to his obedience the States of the Church. Giovanna was not sorry to rid herself of Sforza, for she longed to recall her favorite Caraccioli. Sforza was despatched to war against Braccio, but on June 20 was defeated at Montefiasone, near Viterbo. But Martin was enabled to detach Tartaglia from Braccio’s side, and Sforza could again set an army in the field in the name of Naples and the Pope. He was not, however, supported from Naples; for Giovanna had recalled Caraccioli, and the favorite thought it better to leave Sforza to his fate. Martin saw that nothing was to be gained from a further alliance with Giovanna II and Caraccioli. Moreover the question of the Neapolitan succession was again imminent, for Giovanna was over fifty years of age, and was childless. Louis III of Anjou had already begged Martin to procure from Giovanna II a formal recognition of his claim, and the Pope judged that the opportunity was favorable for action. Sforza was weary of the selfish policy of Caraccioli, and the Neapolitan barons resented the rule of the insolent favorite. The Florentines offered Martin V their aid to mediate between him and Braccio. The Pope saw an opportunity of making himself the central figure in the politics of Southern Italy. At peace with Braccio, and allied with Sforza, he might settle the succession to Naples in favour of Louis of Anjou, and end the Neapolitan difficulty which had so long harassed his predecessors.
In January, 1420, Sforza paid Martin V a visit in Florence, and the Pope broached his views, to which, with some reluctance, Sforza gave his adhesion. Scarcely had Sforza departed before Braccio, at the end of February, made a triumphal entry into Florence, there to celebrate his reconciliation with the Pope. With a splendid escort of four hundred horsemen and forty foot, with deputies from the various cities under his rule, Braccio entered the city in grandeur that awoke the enthusiastic acclamations of the Florentines. In the middle of the bands of horsemen, gleaming in gold and silver armour, mounted on splendid steeds richly caparisoned, rode Braccio, clad in purple and gold, on a steed whose trappings were of gold. He was a man rather above the middle height, with an oval face that seemed too full of blood, yet with a look of dignity and power that, in spite of his limbs maimed with wounds, marked him as a ruler of men. Amid the shouts of the thronging citizens Braccio visited the Pope, and paid him haughty reverence. After a few days spent in negotiations, an alliance was made between Martin V and Braccio, by which Braccio was left in possession of Perugia, Assisi, and other towns which he had won, on condition of reducing Bologna to obedience to the Pope.

Martin V’s pride was sorely hurt by the avowed preference which the Florentines showed to the condottiere over the Pope. The Florentine boys expressed the common feeling by a doggerel rhyme which they sang in the streets, and which soon reached the ears of the sensitive Pope:

Braccio the Great
Conquers every state:
Poor Pope Martin
Is not worth a farthing.

He was glad to see Braccio leave Florence, and hoped that the task of reducing Bologna would occupy him long enough to enable Sforza to make his attack on Giovanna unimpeded by Braccio’s hostility. Braccio, however, rapidly gathered his forces, and conducted matters with such skill that on July 22 the Pope’s legate took possession of Bologna.

Meanwhile Sforza hastened the preparations against Giovanna II. On June 18 he suddenly raised the standard of the Duke of Anjou, and began to make war against Naples: on August 19 ten Angevin galleys made their appearance off the Neapolitan coast. Louis of Anjou eagerly caught at Martin V’s offer of protection; he did not scruple to leave France in the hands of the English, and abandon his land of Provence to the hostile attacks of the Duke of Savoy, that he might pursue the phantom kingdom of Naples, which had proved disastrous to his father and his grandfather alike. Giovanna II, seeing herself thus threatened, cast about on Alliance of her part also for allies. She sent an ambassador to the Pope whose hostility was not yet declared; but the subtle Neapolitan easily saw through the Pope's equivocal answers to his demands. There was in Florence at the Papal Court an ambassador of Alfonso V of Aragon. To him in his strait the Neapolitan turned. He reminded him that the House of Aragon had as good a claim to Naples as the House of Anjou. Giovanna II was childless, and could dispose of her kingdom as she chose; if Alfonso succored her in her strait, he might count upon her gratitude. This proposal was very acceptable to Alfonso V, a young and ambitious king. By the death of Martin of Sicily without children in 1409 the kingdom of Sicily had been attached to that of Aragon, and Alfonso was keenly alive to the advantage of
annexing Naples also. At the time that Giovanna's offer reached him he was engaged in prosecuting against the Genoese his claims on the island of Corsica, where, after a long siege, the desperate efforts of the Genoese threatened to render his undertaking hopeless. His ambassador at Florence was endeavoring to obtain from Martin V a recognition of Alfonso’s claim to Corsica; but Alfonso V at once saw the policy of abandoning a doubtful attempt upon a barren island for the more alluring prize of the Neapolitan kingdom. He despatched from Corsica to the relief of Giovanna II fifteen galleys, which arrived off Naples on September 6, and Giovanna II showed her gratitude by adopting him as her son.

War was now let loose upon Naples. Alfonso and Giovanna sought to strengthen themselves by an alliance with Braccio. Martin V’s policy had succeeded in providing occupation for all whom he had most to dread. He was now in a position to take advantage of the general confusion, and amid the weakness of all parties raise once more the prestige of the Papal name. He had gained all that was to be gained from a stay in Florence, and might now with safety venture to Rome. Moreover Martin V was not over-satisfied with the impression which he had produced on the Florentines. The common-sense of the quick-witted commercial city was not taken in by high-sounding claims or magnificent ecclesiastical processions. The Florentines had shown for Braccio an admiration which they refused to Martin V. However much Martin might wrap himself in his dignity, and affect to despise popular opinion, he yet felt that in Florence nothing succeeded like success, and that a fortunate freebooter ranked above a landless Pope. The bustling, pushing spirit of a prosperous commercial city was alien to the Papacy, which could only flourish amongst the traditions and aspirations of the past. A few days before his departure from Rome Martin V could not refrain from showing his wounded pride to Leonardo Bruni, who was present in the library of S. Maria Novella. For some time Martin V walked gloomily up and down the room, gazing out of the window upon the garden below. At last he stopped before Leonardo, and in a voice quivering with scorn repeated the doggerel of the Florentine mob, “Poor Pope Martin isn’t worth a farthing”. Leonardo tried to appease him by saying that such trifles were not worthy of notice; but the Pope again repeated the lines in the same tone. Anxious for the fair fame of Florence, Leonardo at once undertook its defense, and pointed out to the Pope the practical advantages which he had derived from his stay the recovery of some of the States of the Church, and especially of Bologna, the submission of John XXIII, the reconciliation with Braccio. Where else, he asked, could such advantages have been so easily obtained? The Pope’s gloomy brow grew clearer before the words of the Florentine secretary. Martin departed with goodwill from Florence; thanked its magistrates for their kind offices, and marked his gratitude to the city by erecting the bishopric of Florence to the dignity of an archbishopric.

On September 9 Martin V journeyed from Florence with due respect from the citizens. On September 20 he was honorably received in Siena, and used his opportunity to borrow 15,000 florins, for which he gave Spoleto as a pledge. From Siena he proceeded through Viterbo to Rome, which he entered on September 28, and took up his abode by S. Maria del Popolo. Next day he was escorted to the Vatican by the city magistrates and the people, bearing lighted torches and clamorous with joy. The Romans had indeed occasion to hail any change that might restore their shattered fortunes. Everything that had happened in late years had tended to plunge them deeper and deeper in misery and ruin. The havoc wrought by the invasions of Ladislas, of Sforza, and of Braccio, the absence of the Pope, and consequent loss of traffic, the want
of all authority in the Papal States, the pillage that wasted up to the walls of Rome all
these combined to reduce the city to wretchedness and desolation. Martin V found
Rome so devastated that it hardly looked like a city. Houses were in decay, churches in
ruins, the streets were empty, filth and dirt were everywhere, food was so scarce and
dear that men could barely keep themselves alive. Civilization seemed almost extinct.
The Romans looked like the scum of the earth. Martin V had a hard task before him to
bring back order and decency into the ruined city. It was his great merit that he set
himself diligently to put matters straight, and that he succeeded in reclaiming its capital
for the restored Papacy. His first care was to provide for the administration of justice,
and put down the robbers who infested Rome and its neighborhood, for the purpose of
pillaging the pious pilgrims who visited the tombs of the Apostles. But much had to be
done to repair the ravages of preceding years, and new disasters rendered the task more
difficult. In November, 1422, the town was overwhelmed by a flood in the Tiber,
occaisioned by Braccio’s destruction of the wall of the Lago di Pie di Luco, the old
Veline Lake. The water rose to the height of the high altar in the Pantheon, and as it
subsided carried away the flocks from the fields and caused great destruction of
property.

In Naples little was done worthy of the great efforts which were made. Alfonso's
reinforcements checked the victorious career of Louis of Anjou and Sforza, till in June,
1421, Braccio brought his forces to Giovanna's aid, Alfonso himself arrived in Naples,
and the Pope despatched Tartaglia to the aid of Louis. Alfonso and Braccio engaged in a
fruitless siege of Acerra. Nothing serious was done, as the condottieri generals were
engaged in a series of intrigues against one another. Sforza accused Tartaglia of
treachery, seized him, and put him to death. Tartaglia’s soldiers, indignant at the
treatment of their leader, joined Braccio, who was anxious only to secure his own
principality of Capua. Martin V was weary of finding supplies, and was embarrassed by
Alfonso’s threats that he would again recognize Benedict XIII.

Caraccioli was afraid of Alfonso’s resolute character, and sowed discord between
him and Giovanna: Alfonso on his part was perplexed by the Queen’s doubtful attitude
towards him. As everyone had his own reasons for desiring peace, the Pope's mediation
was accepted for that purpose in March, 1422. Aversa and Castellamare, the only two
places which Louis held, were surrendered to the Papal Legate, who soon afterwards
gave them over to the Queen. Braccio and Sforza were outwardly reconciled, and Sforza
joined the side of Giovanna, only with the purpose of favoring more surely the party of
Louis. Louis himself withdrew to Rome, where he lived for two years at the Pope's
expense, awaiting the results of Sforza's machinations. But this peace and its
reconciliations were alike hollow. The mutual suspicions of Alfonso and Giovanna II
went on increasing till in May, 1423, Alfonso determined on a decisive blow. He
suddenly imprisoned Caraccioli, and made a dash to obtain the person of the Queen,
who was in the Castel Capuano at Naples. The attempt to surprise the Queen failed, and
Alfonso besieged the Castle. But Sforza hastened to the Queen’s aid, and, though his
army was smaller than Alfonso’s, he gave his men fresh courage by pointing to the
splendid equipments of the Aragonese; raising the battle-cry, “Fine clothes and good
horses”, he led his men to the charge. His inducement proved to be sufficiently strong;
he won the day, and Alfonso in his turn was besieged in the Castel Nuovo. After this
failure the fortunes of Louis of Anjou began to revive. Caraccioli was ransomed from
prison, and he and Sforza urged Giovanna to cancel the adoption of the ungrateful
Alfonso and accept Louis as her successor. At the end of June Louis arrived in Naples,
and his adoption as Giovanna’s heir was formally accomplished with the Pope’s sanction.

Alfonso’s hopes now rested on the prompt aid of Braccio; but Braccio entered the Neapolitan kingdom through the Abruzzi, and set himself to besiege the wealthy city of Aquila that he might obtain booty for his soldiers. The defence was obstinate, and the siege slowly dragged on. In vain Alfonso besought Braccio to quit it; the stubborn condottiere refused. Meanwhile Filippo Maria Visconti who had by this time secured his possessions in Lombardy, and had moreover made himself master of Genoa offered help to Giovanna. He did not wish that an active King like Alfonso should establish himself in Naples and urge troublesome claims to the Genoese possessions. Alfonso was afraid lest he might lose his command of the sea before the attack of the Genoese galleys; he also received disquieting news from Aragon. Weary with waiting for Braccio, who never came, he sailed away on October 15, and revenged himself on Louis by sacking Marseilles on his homeward voyage.

The departure of Alfonso relieved Martin V of a troublesome enemy; but his attention in this year, 1423, had to be directed to an equally troublesome matter. It was now five years since the dissolution of the Council of Constance, and the period for holding the next Council had arrived. Already in 1422 the University of Paris sent ambassadors to urge Martin V to fulfill his promise. Among the envoys of the University was a learned Dominican, John Stoikovic, a native of Ragusa in Dalmatia, who stayed at Rome to watch Martin’s proceedings, and be ready for the Council as soon as it was summoned. Pavia had been fixed at Constance for its place of meeting; but in his letters of summons Martin V was careful to express his fervour in behalf of the Council by saying that if Pavia was found unsuitable, he was resolved to call it to a more convenient place rather than it should dissolve. The transalpine prelates were not inspirited by this kindly assurance; they felt that a Council in an Italian city was as good as useless. Martin V had taken no steps in the way of reforming the abuses of the Church. The state of Christendom was not favorable for a Council. In England Henry V was dead, and the minority of Henry VI had already begun to open up intrigues and jealousies. France was exhausted by its war with England. In Germany Sigismund was engaged in war with the Hussites in Bohemia, and had no time to spend in talk. There was nothing to encourage men to undertake the costly journey to Italy, where Martin V was likely to employ them on the barren subject of a proposed union between the Eastern and Western Churches.

When the Council was opened, on April 23, by the four prelates whom the Pope had nominated as presidents it was not largely attended. Few came from beyond the Alps, and the absence of Italians showed that the pope's influence was used against the Council from the beginning. Scarcely were the opening formalities at an end when the outbreak of the plague gave a reason for removing elsewhere, and the Council decided to go to Siena, where, on July 2, it resumed its labours.

The first step of the Council was to organize itself according to nations, and to determine who should have the right of voting. All prelates, abbots, graduates of universities who were in orders, rectors, ambassadors of kings, barons, and universities were to be admitted freely: other ecclesiastics were to be judged of by the nation to which they belonged. Each nation was to have a president elected every month, who, together with chosen deputies, was to prepare the business to be discussed by the nation according to the wishes of the majority. While making these arrangements the Council
repeatedly sent to the Pope urging him to come to Siena, and their request was confirmed by the city magistrates, who showed themselves amenable to the Pope's will by granting a safe-conduct in the terms which he demanded.

But when the safe-conduct was known at Siena, the Fathers saw their liberty directly menaced by it. All magistrates and officials in the Sienese territory were to take oath of allegiance to the Pope, a proceeding which left the Council entirely at the Pope's mercy. Moreover, the members of the Council were to be subject to the jurisdiction of the Pope's officers. The whole tenor of the articles of agreement was insulting to the Council, and gave manifest signs of the Pope's ill-will. In its formal language the officials of the Curia were named before the members of the Council. The energy of the Council was forthwith turned to negotiate with the Sienese for a safe-conduct which would give them greater security from the Pope. Meanwhile Martin V showed himself more decidedly hostile, and his presidents used all efforts to weaken the Conciliar party. Letters from Rome poured in to Siena; tempting promises of promotion were held out to those who showed signs of wavering.

The reforming party felt that something must be done. They settled the matter of the safe-conduct, and agreed to pass some decrees on which there could be no difference of opinion. On November 6 a session of the Council was held, which declared that the work of reform must begin from the foundation of the faith, and consequently condemned the errors of Wycliffe and Huss, denounced the partisans of Peter de Luna, approved of negotiations for union with the Greek Church, and exhorted all Christian men to root out heresy wherever they found it. After this the reforming party urged that the work left unachieved at Constance should be resumed, and the French nation put forward a memorandum sketching a plan of reform according to the lines laid down at Constance. The Curial party resolved on resistance, and the small numbers present at Siena rendered personal pressure tolerably easy. John of Ragusa, though wishing to make the Council seem as numerous as possible, can only count two cardinals and twenty-five mitred prelates, as representatives of the higher clergy, at the session on November 6. The Curial party thought it best to throw the machinery of the nations into confusion. They managed to cause disputed elections to the office of president both in the French and in the Italian nation in the month of January, 1424. The Papal legates offered their services to the French to judge in this dispute. The French answered that, on matters concerning a nation in the Council, no one, not even the Pope, could judge but the Council itself: they asked the presidents to summon a congregation for the purpose. The presidents refused, whereupon the French called the other nations together on January 10, and afterwards drew up their grievances in the shape of a protest, which they lodged with the legates. Meanwhile the legates were busily engaged in strengthening their party within each nation, so as to prevent any possibility of unanimity. While thus the nations were divided, the legates steadily pursued the dissolution of the Council, and, as a first step towards this, urged the appointment of deputies to fix the meeting place of the next Council. This question in itself aroused antagonism. The French wished the future Council to be held in France. This excited the national jealousy of the Germans and English. The Curial party openly avowed that they never wished to see another Council at all, and opposed the decrees of Constance.

There were hopes, however, of renewed concord when, on February 12, the Archbishop of Rouen and the ambassadors of the University of Paris arrived at Siena. They interposed to heal the dissension among the French, and the Archbishop of Rouen was by a compromise elected to the office of president of the French nation. The
compromise was, however, fatal. The Archbishop of Rouen had been already won over by the legates, and the ambassadors of the University had a greater desire to go to Rome and seek favors for themselves than stay at Siena and watch over the reformation of the Church. On February 19 deputies from all the nations agreed in choosing Basel as the meeting place for the next Council to be held in seven years.

The dissolution of the Council was now felt to be imminent. Only a few zealous reformers had hopes of further business, and they were aided by the citizens of Siena, who did not see why they should not enjoy the same luck as Constance and reap a golden harvest for some years to come. But Martin V knew how to address rebellious citizens. He sternly bade them “not to put their sickle into another’s sheaves, nor think that General Councils were held or dissolved to please them or fill their pockets”. Still the Sienese were resolved to make a last attempt, and on February 20 laid the Pope’s letters before the nations, and shut their gates to prevent the desertions which were thinning the Council’s ranks. But the reformers were not strong enough to accept the citizens’ help; the Council sent to request the gates to be opened.

Meanwhile the legates were ready to dissolve the Council, the reformers were anxious to continue their work. At last, on March 7, the legates, taking advantage of the solitude produced by the festivities of the Carnival, posted on the door of the cathedral decree of the dissolution of the Council, which had been secretly drawn up on February 26, and prohibited all from attempting to continue it. On the same day they hastily left Siena for Florence. Those who remained were too few to hope to accomplish anything. Thomas, Abbot of Paisley, who was a member of the French nation, published an energetic protest against the dissolution, which was joined by a few other zealous reformers. Then on March 8 they held a meeting in which they decided that, to avoid scandal to the Church, and danger to themselves on account of the nearness of the Papal power, it was better to depart quietly. The Council of Siena came rapidly to an end, and Martin V could plead the smallness of its numbers, its seditious conduct with the Sienese burghers, and its own internal disorders, as reasons for its dissolution. Really the Council of Siena followed too soon upon that of Constance. The position of affairs had not materially changed. The Pope had not yet recovered his normal position in Italy, and those who had been at Constance were not prepared to undertake the labors of a second Council, when they had nothing to give them any hopes of success. What was impossible with the help of Sigismund was not likely to be more possible in the face of Martin V’s determined resistance.

Martin V judged it wise, however, to make some promises of reform. As the Council had been too full of disturbance to admit of any progress in the matter, he promised to undertake a reform of the Curia, and nominated two Cardinals as commissioners to gather evidence. The results of Martin V’s deliberations were embodied in a constitution, published on May 16, 1425. It reads as though it were the Pope’s retaliation on the attempt made at Constance to constitute the Cardinals as an official aristocracy which was to direct the Pope’s actions. Martin V provided for decorous and good living on the part of the Cardinals, forbade them to exercise the position of protectors of the interests of kings or princes at the Papal Court, or to receive money as protectors for monastic orders; they were not to appear in the streets with a larger retinue than twenty attendants; they were, if possible, to live near the churches whence they took their titles, and were to restore the dilapidated buildings and see to the proper performance of divine service. Similarly the duties of the protonotaries and abbreviators of the Papal chancery were defined and regulated. Archbishops, bishops,
and abbots were ordered to keep strict residence, and hold provincial synods three times each year for the redress of abuses; all oppressive exactions on the part of ordinaries were forbidden, and propriety of life was enjoined. Finally the Pope withdrew many of his rights of reservation as a favor to the ordinaries as patrons.

Martin considered that he had now amply fulfilled all that reformers could require at his hands, and could look around him with greater assurance. He was free for seven years from the troubles of a Council, and could turn his attention to the object he had most at heart, the recovery of the States of the Church, which Alfonso’s withdrawal from Naples had rendered a practicable measure. Fortune favoured him in this respect beyond his hopes. The desperate resistance which Aquila continued to offer to Braccio encouraged Sforza to march to its relief. On his way there, in January, 1424, finding some difficulty in crossing the river Pescara, which was swollen by the wind and tide, he rode into the water to encourage his men. Seeing one of his squires swept off his horse, Sforza hastened to his assistance; but, losing his balance in attempting to save the drowning man, he was weighed down by his heavy armour: twice his hands were seen to wave above the flood, then he disappeared. His body was swept out to sea, and was never found. Thus died Sforza at the age of fifty-four, one of the most notable men in Italian history. His death tells us the secret of his power. He died in the performance of an act of chivalrous generosity to a comrade. However tortuous he might be in political relations, to his soldiers he was frank and genial; they loved him, and knew that their lives and fortunes were as dear to Sforza as his own.

Nor did the more accomplished Braccio long survive his sturdy rival. In spite of the withdrawal of Sforza’s troops after their leader’s death, Aquila still held out. As its possession was regarded as the key to the possession of Naples, Martin V was eager to raise troops for its relief. He found it as easy to arouse the jealousy of the Duke of Milan against Braccio as against Alfonso; and in May a joint army of Naples, Milan, and Pope advanced to the relief of Aquila. Braccio scorned to take advantage of his enemies as they crossed the mountain ridge that led to the town; though their forces were superior to his own, he preferred to meet them in the open field. An unexpected sortie of the Aquilans threw Braccio’s army into confusion. As he rode around exhorting his men to form afresh and renew the fight, a Perugian exile forced his way through the throng, and with the cry, “Down with the oppressor of his country!” wounded Braccio in the throat. On the fall of their leader the soldiers of Braccio gave way, and the siege of Aquila was raised, June 2. Braccio’s haughty spirit would not survive defeat; for three days he lay without eating or speaking till he died. Unlike Sforza, he had no grown-up son to inherit his glory. His shattered army rapidly dispersed upon his death. His body was carried to Rome, and was buried as that of an excommunicated man in unconsecrated ground before the Church of S. Lorenzo.

Martin V reaped the full benefit of Braccio’s death. On July 29 Perugia opened its gates to the Pope, and the other cities in Braccio’s dominions soon followed its example. Martin found himself in undisputed possession of the Papal States. This was a great point to have gained, and Martin had won his triumph by his astute and cautious, if unscrupulous, policy. He had not hesitated to plunge Naples into war, and had trusted to his own acuteness to fish in troubled waters. Fortune had favoured him beyond what he could expect, and the only further difficulty that beset him was a rising of Bologna in 1429, which was put down, though not without a stubborn struggle, by Carlo Malatesta. From that time he set himself with renewed zeal and statesmanlike care to organize the restoration of law and order in the Roman territory and the rest of the Papal possessions.
When we look back upon the wild confusion that he found at his accession we must recognize in Martin V’s pontificate traces of energy and administrative capacity which have been left unrecorded by the annals of the time. The slow and steady enforcement of order and justice is passed by unnoticed, while discord and anarchy are rarely without a chronicler. It is the great merit of Martin V that he won back from confusion, and reduced to obedience and order, the disorganized States of the Church.

The policy of Martin V was to bring under one jurisdiction separate communities, with their existing rights and privileges, and so to establish a central monarchy on which they all peaceably depended. It was the misfortune of Martin that his work was thrown away by the wrongheadedness of his successor, and so left no lasting results. Still, Martin V deserves high praise as a successful statesman, though even here he displayed the spirit of a Roman noble rather than of the Head of the Church. The elevation of the Colonna family was his constant aim, and he left to his successors a conspicuous example of nepotism. His brothers and sisters were enriched at the expense of the Church, and their aggrandizement had the disastrous result that it intensified the long-standing feud between the Colonna and the Orsini, and led to a reaction upon Martin's death. So far did Martin V identify himself with his family that, in defiance of the traditions of his office, he took up his abode in the Colonna Palace by the Church of SS. Apostoli, regarding himself as more secure amongst the retainers of his house.

The same year that saw the deaths of Sforza and Braccio freed Martin V from another enemy. In November 1424 died Benedict XIII, worn out by extreme old age. In his retirement at Peñiscola he had been powerless either for good or ill. Yet the existence of an anti-Pope was hurtful to the Papal dignity, and Alfonso’s hostility to Martin V threatened to give him troublesome importance. Benedict’s death might seem to end the Schism, but one of the last acts of the obstinate old man was the creation of four new cardinals. For a time his death was kept secret till Alfonso’s desires were known; at length in June, 1425, three of Benedict’s cardinals elected a new Pope, Gil de Munion, canon of Barcelona, who took the title of Clement VIII. But schism when once it begins is contagious. Another of Benedict’s cardinals, a Frenchman, Jean Carrer, who was absent at the time and received no notice, elected for himself another Pope, who took the title of Benedict XIV. Martin was desirous of getting rid of these pretenders, and sent one of his cardinals, brother of the Count de Foix, to negotiate with Alfonso. But Alfonso refused him entrance into his kingdom, and ordered Clement VIII to be crowned in Peñiscola. Martin summoned Alfonso to Rome to answer for his conduct. Alfonso saw that nothing was to be gained by isolation from the rest of Europe. Time mollified his wrath at the loss of Naples, and in his hopes for the future it was better to have the Pope for his friend than for his foe. The Cardinal de Foix carried on his negotiations with wise moderation, and was helped by one of the King’s counsellors, Alfonso Borgia. In the autumn of 1427 Alfonso V received the Pope’s legate, agreed to recognise Martin, and accept his good offices to settle disputes between himself and Giovanna II. In July, 1429, Munion laid aside his papal trappings, submitted to Martin, and received the melancholy post of Bishop of Majorca. The good offices of Alfonso Borgia were warmly recognized both by Alfonso V and Martin V, and this ending of the Schism had for its abiding consequence in the future the introduction of the Borgia family to the Papal Court, where they were destined to play an important part. The Pope of Jean Carrer was of course a ridiculous phantom, and in 1432 the Count of Armagnac ordered Carrer, who was still obstinate, to be made prisoner and handed over to Martin V.
CHAPTER II.
MARTIN V AND THE PAPAL RESTORATION. BEGINNINGS OF EUGENIUS IV.
1425-1432.

As Martin V felt more sure of his position in Italy, and saw the traces of the Schism disappear in the outward organization of the Church, he was anxious also to wipe away the anti-papal legislation which in France and England had followed on the confusion caused by the Schism of the Papacy.

In France Martin V easily succeeded in overthrowing the attempt to establish the liberties of the national Church on the basis of royal edicts. Charles VI had issued in 1418 ordinances forbidding money to be exported from the kingdom for the payment of annates or other demands of the Court of Rome, and had confirmed the ancient liberties of the Gallican Church as regarded freedom of election to ecclesiastical offices. In February, 1422, he had further forbidden appeals to Rome in contempt of the ordinances. But before the end of the year Charles VI was dead, and the confusion in France was still further increased by the English claims to the succession. The youthful Charles VII was hard pressed, and wished to gain the Pope's support. In February, 1425, he issued a decree re-establishing the Papal power, as regarded the collation to benefices and all exercise of jurisdiction, on the same footing as it had been in the days of Clement VII and Benedict XIII. The Parliament, it is true, protested and refused to register the decree. The Pope, on his part, granted an indemnity for what had been done in the past. All the reforming efforts of the University of Paris and its followers were for the time undone.

In England Martin V was not so successful. In 1421 he wrote to Henry V and exhorted him to lose no time in abolishing the prohibitions of his predecessors (the Statutes of Provisors and Praemunire) on the due exercise of the Papal rights. Next year, on the accession of King Henry VI, he wrote still more pressingly to the Council of Regency. When nothing was done, he directed his anger against Henry Chichele, the Archbishop of Canterbury. Chichele in 1423 proclaimed indulgences to all who in that year made pilgrimage to Canterbury. Martin indignantly forbade this assumption of Papal rights by a subordinate; as the fallen angels wished to set up in the earth their seat against the Creator, so have these presumptuous men endeavored to raise a false tabernacle of salvation against the apostolic seat and the authority of the Roman Pontiff, to whom only has God granted this power. It was long since an English archbishop had heard such language from a Pope; but Chichele was not a man of sufficient courage to remonstrate. He withdrew his proclamation, and Martin V had struck a decided blow against the independence of the English episcopate.

The restored Papacy owed a debt of gratitude to Henry of Winchester for his good offices as mediator at Constance, and immediately after his election, Martin V nominated him Cardinal. Chichele protested against this step as likely to lead to inconveniences; and Henry V, declaring that he would rather see his uncle invested with the crown than with a cardinal’s hat, forbade his acceptance of the proffered
dignity. When the strong hand of Henry V was gone, Beaufort was again nominated Cardinal on May 24, 1426, no longer from motives of gratitude, but because the Pope needed his help. In February, 1427, he was further appointed Papal legate for the purpose of carrying on war against the Hussites. But the Pope still pursued his main object, and in a letter to the Bishop of Winchester denounced still more strongly the execrable statute of Praemunire by which the King of England disposed of the affairs of the Church as though himself, and not the Pope, were the divinely appointed Vicar of Christ. He bade him remember the glorious example of S. Thomas of Canterbury, who did not hesitate to offer himself as a sacrifice on behalf of the liberties of the Church. He bade him urge the abolition of this statute on the Council, on Parliament, and on the clergy, that they may preach about it to the people; and he asked to be informed what steps were taken in compliance with his commands. He wrote also in the same strain to the University of Oxford. Indeed, so deeply did Martin V resent the ecclesiastical attitude of England that he said in a consistory, “Amongst Christians no States have made ordinances contrary to the liberties of the Church save England and Venice”. Martin’s instincts taught him truly, and he did his utmost to blunt the edge of the weapon that a century later was to sever the connection between the English Church and the Papacy.

Again Martin V wrote haughtily to Chichele, bidding him and the Archbishop of York set aside the Statutes of Provisors and recognize the Papal right to dispose benefices in England. Chichele humbly replied 1427-28 that he was the only person in England who was willing to broach the subject; and it was hard that he should be specially visited by the Pope’s displeasure for what he could not help. Martin V retorted by issuing letters to suspend Chichele from his office as legate—a blow against the privileges and independence of the Archbishops of Canterbury, who since the days of Stephen Langton had been recognized as the Pope’s ordinary legate (legatus natus) in England. Chichele so far roused himself as to appeal to a future Council against this encroachment. The Pope’s letters were seized by royal authority, and the suspension did not take effect. But Chichele was a timid man, and the condition of affairs in England made him shrink from a breach with the Pope. The Lollards were suppressed but not subdued, and a strong antihierarchical feeling simmered amongst the people. In the distracted state of the kingdom, little help was to be gained from the royal power, and Chichele feared the consequences of an interdict. He called to his help the bishops, the University of Oxford, and several temporal lords, who addressed letters to the Pope, bearing testimony to Chichele’s zeal for the Church, and begging the Pope to be reconciled to him. To Chichele’s letters pleading his excuses, the Pope still answered that the only excuse that he could make was active resistance to the obnoxious statutes. At length Chichele, in 1428, appeared before the Commons, accompanied by the Archbishop of York and other bishops, and with tears in his eyes pointed out the dangers in which the Church and kingdom were placed by their opposition to the Pope’s demands. Parliament was unmoved either by Martin’s letters or by Chichele’s half-hearted pleadings. They only petitioned the Pope to restore the Archbishop to his favor. The King wrote in the same sense, and the matter was allowed to drop. Martin V might console himself with the reflection that, if he had failed to carry his point and abolish the hateful statutes, he had at least succeeded in humiliating the English episcopate by treating them as creatures of his own.

In September, 1428, Beaufort made his first appearance in England since his elevation to the Cardinalate, and a protest in the King's name was issued against his
exercise of any legatine authority within the realm. Next year the question was raised whether Beaufort, being a Cardinal, was justified in officiating as Bishop of Winchester and prelate of the Order of the Garter: the King’s council advised Beaufort to waive his right. Meanwhile Beaufort was allowed to gather troops for a crusade against the Hussites. But the English statesman and the Papal councillor came into collision; and the troops which Beaufort had gathered for a crusade in Bohemia were turned against France. Beaufort pleaded to the Pope the lame excuse that he had not ventured to disobey the King’s commands in this matter; nor would the soldiers have obeyed him if he had done so. Though treacherous, the action of Beaufort was popular. He was allowed, though a Cardinal, to take his seat at the King’s council, except only when matters were under discussion which concerned the Church of Rome. Really, Beaufort was too much absorbed in deadly personal rivalry with Gloucester to be of any service to the Pope in furthering his attempt to overthrow the liberties of the English Church.

But the Papacy has never in its history gained so much by definite victories as it has by steady persistency. It was always prepared to take advantage of the internal weakness of any kingdom, and to advance pretensions at times when they were not likely to be resolutely disavowed. In time they might be heard of again, and when reasserted could at least claim the prestige of some antiquity. By his treatment of Archbishop Chichele, and by his grant of legatine powers to Beaufort, Martin V exercised a more direct authority over the machinery of the English Church than had been permitted to any Pope since the days of Innocent III. The Church was weak in its hold on the affections of the people, and when the kingly office was in abeyance, the Church, robbed of its protector, was too feeble to offer any serious resistance to the Papacy. Martin V used his opportunity dexterously, and his successors had no reason to complain of the independent spirit of English bishops.

But besides being an ecclesiastic, Martin V had the sentiments of a Roman noble. He wished to restore his native city to some part of her old glory, and labored so assiduously at the work of restoration that a grateful people hailed him as “Father of his country”. He rebuilt the tottering portico of S. Peter’s and proceeded to adorn and repair the ruined basilicas of the city. In the Church of S. John Lateran, which had been destroyed by fire in 1308, and was slowly rising from its ruins, he laid down the mosaic pavement which still exists, and built up the roof. He restored the Basilica of the SS. Apostoli. His example told upon the Cardinals, and he urged on them to undertake the care of the churches from which they took their titles. His pontificate marks the beginning of an era of architectural adornment of the City of Rome.

The only part of the work of the reformation of the Church which Martin V showed any wish to carry into effect was that concerning the Cardinals. The Papal absolutism over all bishops, which Martin V desired to establish, aimed at the reduction of the power of the ecclesiastical aristocracy which surrounded the Pope’s person, and the rules for the conduct of the Cardinals issued in 1424 were not meant to be mere waste paper. Martin V succeeded in reducing the power of the Cardinals; he paid little heed to their advice, and they were so afraid of him that they stammered like awkward children in his presence. Sometimes he even excluded them altogether. In 1429 he retired from Rome to Ferentino before a pestilence, and forbade any of the Cardinals to follow him. Yet all Martin V’s injunctions could not purge the Curia from the charge of corruption. Money was necessary for the Pope; and Martin, if he laid aside the grosser forms of extortion, still demanded money on all fair pretexts. The ambassadors at the
Papal Court found it necessary for the conduct of the business to propitiate the Pope by handsome presents on the great festivals of the Church. If any business was to be done, the attention of the Pope and his officials had to be arrested by some valuable gift. Yet Martin showed a care in making ecclesiastical appointments which had not been seen in the Popes for the last half-century. He did not make his appointments rashly, but inquired about the capacities of the different candidates and the special needs of the districts which they aspired to serve. Even so, Martin V was not always to be trusted. He seemed to delight in humbling bishops before him. He deposed Bishop Anselm of Augsburg simply because the civic authorities quarreled with him. In England he conferred on a nephew of his own, aged fourteen, the rich archdeaconry of Canterbury. Yet Martin was never weary of uttering noble sentiments to the Cardinals and those around him: no word was so often on his lips as “justice”. He would often exclaim to his Cardinals, “Love justice, ye who judge the earth”.

In these peaceful works of internal reform and organization Martin V passed his last years, disturbed only by the thought that the time was drawing near for summoning the promised Council at Basel. Moreover, there was little hope of avoiding it, for the religious conflict in Bohemia had waxed so fierce that it had long been the subject of greatest interest in the politics of Europe. Army after army of the orthodox had been routed by the Bohemian heretics. Papal legates had in vain raised troops and conducted them to battle. Germany was hopelessly exhausted, and when force had failed, men looked anxiously to see if deliberation could again avail. Martin V ordered the legate in Bohemia, Giuliano Cesarini, to convoke a Council at Basel in 1431. But he was not to see its beginning: he was suddenly struck by apoplexy, and died on February 20, 1431. He was buried in the Church of S. John Lateran, where his recumbent effigy in brass still adorns his tomb.

Martin V was a wise, cautious, and prudent Pope. He received the Papacy discredited and homeless: he succeeded in establishing it firmly in its old capital, recovering its lost possessions, and restoring some of its old prestige in Europe. This he did by moderation and common sense, combined with a genuine administrative capacity. He was not a brilliant man, but the times did not require brilliancy. He was not personally popular, for he did not much care for the regard or sympathy of those around him, but kept his own counsel and went his own way. He was reserved, and had great self-command. When the news of a brother’s unexpected death was brought to him early one morning, he composed himself and said mass as usual. He did not care for men’s good opinion, but devoted himself energetically to the details of business. He did not care to do anything splendid, so much as to do all things securely. Yet he rescued the Papacy from its fallen condition and laid the foundations for its future power. His strong-willed and arbitrary dealings with other bishops did much to break down the strength of national feeling in ecclesiastical matters which had been displayed at Constance. He was resolved to make the bishops feel their impotence before the Pope; and the political weakness of European States enabled him to go far in breaking down the machinery of the national Churches, and asserting for the Papacy a supreme control in all ecclesiastical matters.

In this way he may be regarded as the founder of the theory of Papal omnipotence which is embodied in modern Ultramontanism. Yet Martin V succeeded rather through the weakness of Europe than through his own strength. He did not awaken suspicion by large schemes, but pursued a quiet policy which was dictated by the existing needs of the Papacy, and was capable of great extension in the future. Without being a great man,
he was an extremely sagacious statesman. He had none of the noble and heroic qualities which would have enabled him to set up the Papacy once more as the exponent of the religious aspirations of Europe; but he brought it into accordance with the politics of his time and made it again powerful and respected.

There were two opinions in his own days respecting the character of Martin V. Those who had waited anxiously for a thorough reformation of the Church looked sadly on Martin’s shortcomings and accused him of avarice and self-seeking. Those who regarded his career as a temporal ruler, extolled him for his practical virtues, and the epitaph on his tomb called him with some truth, “Temporum suorum felicitas”, “the happiness of his times”. At the present day we may be permitted to combine these two opposite judgments, and may praise him for what he did while regretting that he lacked the elevation of mind necessary to enable him to seize the splendid opportunity offered him of doing more.

After the funeral of Martin V, the fourteen Cardinals who were in Rome lost no time in entering into conclave in the Church of S. Maria sopra Minerva. They were still smarting at the recollection of the hard yoke of Martin V, and their one desire was to give themselves an easy master and escape the indignities which they had so long endured. To secure this end they had recourse to the method, which the Schism had introduced, of drawing up rules for the conduct of the future Pope, which every Cardinal signed before proceeding to the election. Each promised, if he were elected Pope, to issue a Bull within three days of his coronation, declaring that he would reform the Roman Curia, would further the work of the approaching Council, would appoint Cardinals according to the decrees of Constance, would allow his Cardinals freedom of speech, and would respect their advice, give them their accustomed revenues, abstain from seizing their goods at death, and consult them about the disposal of the government of the Papal States. We see from these provisions how the Cardinals resented the insignificance to which Martin V had consigned them. To reverse his treatment of themselves they were willing to reverse his entire policy and bind the future Pope to accept in some form the Council and the cause of ecclesiastical reform. They entered the Conclave on March 1, and spent the next day in drawing up this instrument for their own protection. On March 3 they proceeded to vote, and on the first scrutiny Gabriel Condulmier, a Venetian, was unanimously elected. Others had been mentioned, such as Giuliano Cesarini, the energetic legate in Bohemia, and Antonio Casino, Bishop of Siena. But in their prevailing temper, the Cardinals determined that it was best to have a harmless nonentity, and all were unanimous that Condulmier answered best to that description.

Gabriel Condulmier, who took the name of Eugenius IV, was a Venetian, sprung from a wealthy but not noble family. His father died when he was young. And Gabriel, seized with religious enthusiasm, distributed his wealth, 20,000 ducats, among the poor, and resolved to seek his riches in another world. So great was his ardor that he infected with it his cousin, Antonio Correr, and both entered the monastery of S. Giorgio d'Alga in Venice. There the two friends remained simple brothers of the order, till Antonio’s uncle was unexpectedly elected Pope Gregory XII. As usual, the Papal uncle wished to promote his nephew; but Antonio refused to leave his monastery unless he were accompanied by his friend Condulmier. Gregory XII made his nephew Bishop of Bologna, and Condulmier Bishop of Siena. He afterwards prepared the way for his own downfall by insisting on elevating both to the dignity of Cardinals. But the diminution of Gregory’s obedience gave them small scope for their activity; they both went to
Constance and were ranked among the Cardinals of the united Church. Their long friendship was at last interrupted by jealousy. Correr could not endure his friend’s elevation to the Papacy; he left him, and at the Council of Basel was one of his bitterest opponents. Martin V appointed Condulmier to be legate in Bologna, where he showed his capacity by putting down a rebellion of the city. When elected to the Papacy at the early age of forty-seven he was regarded as a man of high religious character, without much knowledge of the world or political capacity. The Cardinals considered him to be an excellent appointment for their purpose. Tall and of a commanding figure and pleasant face, he would be admirably suited for public appearances. His reputation for piety would satisfy the reforming party; his known liberality to the poor would make him popular in Rome; his assumed lack of strong character and of personal ambition would assure to the Cardinals the freedom and consideration after which they pined. He was in no way a distinguished man, and in an age when learning was becoming more and more respected, he was singularly uncultivated.

His early years were spent in the performance of formal acts of piety, and his one literary achievement was that he wrote with his own hand a breviary, which he always continued to use when he became Pope, the absence of any decided qualities in Eugenius IV seems to have been so marked that miraculous agency was called in to explain his unexpected elevation. A story, which he himself was fond of telling in later years, found ready credence. When he was a simple monk at Venice, he took his turn to act as porter at the monastery gate. One day a hermit came and was kindly welcomed by Condulmier, who accompanied him into the church and joined in his devotions. As they returned, the hermit said, “You will be made Cardinal, and then Pope; in your pontificate you will suffer much adversity”, Then he departed, and was seen no more.

Eugenius IV was faithful to his promise before election, and on the day of his coronation, March 11, confirmed the document which he had signed in conclave. He also showed signs of a desire to reform the abuses of the Papal Court. His first act was to cut off a source of exaction. The customary letters announcing his election were given for transmission to the ambassadors of the various states, instead of being sent by Papal nuncios, who expected large donations for their service.

But the first steps of Eugenius IV in the conduct of affairs showed an absence of wisdom and an unreasoning ferocity. Martin V had been careful to secure the interests of his own relatives. His brother Lorenzo had been made Count of Alba and Celano in the Abruzzi, and his brother Giordano Duke of Amalfi and Venosa, Prince of Salerno. Both of them died before the Pope, but their places were taken by the sons of Lorenzo—Antonio, who became Prince of Salerno; Odoardo, who inherited Celano and Marsi; and Prospero, who was Cardinal at the early age of twenty-two. Martin V had lived by the Church of SS. Apostoli in a house of moderate pretensions, as the Vatican was too ruinous for occupation; his nephews had a palace hard by. It was natural for a new Pope to look with some suspicion on the favorites of his predecessor. But at first all went well between the Colonna and Eugenius IV. The Castle of S. Angelo was given up to the Pope and a considerable amount of treasure which Martin V had left behind him. But Eugenius IV soon became suspicious. The towns in the Papal States grew rebellious when they felt that Martin V’s strong hand was relaxed, and Eugenius needed money and soldiers to reduce them to obedience. He suspected that the Papal nephews had vast stores of treasure secreted, and resolved by a bold stroke to seize it for himself. Stefano Colonna, head of the Palestrina branch of the family and at variance with the elder branch, was sent to seize the Bishop of Tivoli, Martin’s Vice-Chamberlain, whom he
dragged ignominiously through the streets. Eugenius IV angrily rebuked him for his unnecessary violence, and so alienated his wavering loyalty. At the same time Eugenius demanded of Antonio Colonna that he should give up all the possessions in the Papal States with which his uncle had endowed him, Genzano, Soriano, S. Marino, and other fortresses were Eugenius imagined that the Papal treasures lay hid. Antonio loudly declared that this was a plot of the Orsini in their hereditary hatred of the Colonna; he denounced the Pope as lending himself to their schemes, and left Rome hastily to raise forces. He was soon followed by Stefano Colonna, by the Cardinal Prospero, and the other adherents of the family. Gathering their troops, the Colonna attacked the possessions of the Orsini and laid waste the country up to the walls of Rome.

Eugenius IV, like Urban VI, had been unexpectedly raised to a position for which his narrowness and inexperience rendered him unfit. Trusting to the general excellence of his intentions and exulting in the plenitude of his new authority, he acted on the first impulse, and only grew more determined when he met with opposition. He tortured the luckless Bishop of Tivoli almost to death in his prison. He ordered the partisans of the Colonna in Rome to be arrested, and over two hundred Roman citizens were put to death on various charges. Stefano Colonna advanced against Rome, seized the Porta Appia, on April 23, and fought his way through the streets as far as the Piazza of S. Marco. But the people did not rise on his side as he had expected; the Pope’s troops were still strong enough to drive back their assailants. Stefano Colonna could not succeed in getting hold of the city; but he kept the Appian gate, laid waste the Campagna, and threatened the city with famine. Eugenius IV retaliated by ordering the destruction of the Colonna palaces, even that of Martin V, and the houses of their adherents, and on May 18 issued a decree depriving them of all their possessions. The old times of savage warfare between the Roman nobles were again brought back.

The contest might long have raged, to the destruction of the new-born prosperity of the Roman city, had not Florence, Venice, and Naples sent troops to aid the Pope. But the Neapolitan forces under Caldora proved a feeble help, for they took money from Antonio Colonna, and assumed an ambiguous attitude. In Rome the confession of a conspiracy to seize the Castle of S. Angelo and expel the Pope was extorted from a luckless friar, and gave rise to fresh prosecutions and imprisonments. Amid these agitations Eugenius IV was stricken by paralysis, which was put down to the results of poison administered in the interests of the Colonna. Sickness brought reflection; and the Colonnese on their side saw that the chances of war were going against them, since Venice and Florence were determined to support Eugenius, whose help they needed against the growing power of the Duke of Milan. Accordingly, on September 22 peace was made between the Pope and Antonio Colonna, who paid 75,000 ducats and resigned the castles which he held in the Papal States. Giovanna of Naples deprived him also of his principality of Salerno. The relatives of Martin V fell back to their former position. But Eugenius had gained by violence, disorder, bloodshed, and persecution an end which might have been reached equally well by a little patience and tact.

The disturbances in the States of the Church gradually settled down, and Eugenius in September was anxiously awaiting the coming of Sigismund to Italy for the purpose of assuming the Imperial crown. On his dealings with Sigismund depended his chance of freeing himself from the Council, which had begun to assemble at Basel, and whose proceedings were such as to cause him some anxiety.
CHAPTER III.

BOHEMIA AND THE HUSSITE WARS

1418-1431

The fortunes of Sigismund had not been prosperous since his departure from Constance. The glories of the revived empire which had floated before his eyes soon began to fade away. Troubles in his ancestral states occupied all his attention, and prevented him from aspiring to be the arbiter of the affairs of Europe. His dignified position at Constance as Protector of the Council that was to regulate the future of the Church entailed on him nothing but disappointment. It was easy for the Council to burn Hus and to condemn his doctrines; but the Bohemian people were not convinced by either of these proceedings, and cherished a bitter feeling of Sigismund’s perfidy. He had invited Hus to the Council, and then had abandoned him; he had inflicted a disgrace on their national honor which the Bohemians could never forgive. The decrees of the Council found little respect in Bohemia, and a league was formed among the Bohemian nobles to maintain freedom of preaching. The teaching of Jakubek of Mies, concerning the necessity of receiving the communion under both kinds, gave an outward symbol to the new beliefs, and the chalice became the distinctive badge of the Bohemian reformers. The Council in vain summoned Wenzel to answer for his neglect of its monitions; in vain it called on Sigismund to give effect to its decrees by force of arms. Sigismund knew the difficulties of such an attempt, and as heir to the Bohemian kingdom did not choose to draw upon himself any further hatred from the Bohemian people.

Before the election of a new Pope, the Bohemians could still denounce the arbitrary proceedings of the Council, and hope for fairer hearing in the future. But the election of Oddo Colonna, who as Papal commissioner had condemned Hus in 1411, dashed all further hopes to the ground. Martin V accepted all that the Council had done towards the Bohemian heretics, and urged Sigismund to interpose. He threatened to proclaim a crusade against Bohemia, which would then be conquered by some faithful prince, who might not be willing to hand it over to Sigismund. The threat alarmed Sigismund, who wrote urgently to his brother Wenzel; and the indolent Wenzel, who had allowed dim notions of impossible toleration to float before his eyes, at last roused himself to see the hopelessness of his attempt neither to favor nor discourage the new movement. At the end of 1418 he ordered that all the churches in Prague should be given up to the Catholics, who hastened to return and wreak their wrath on the heretics. Two churches only were left to the Utraquists, as the reformed party was now called, from its administration of the communion under both kinds. But the multitudes began to meet in the open air, on hill-tops, which they loved to call by Biblical names: Tabor and Horeb and the like. Peacefully these assemblies met and separated; but this condition of suppressed revolt could not long continue. On July 22, 1419, Wenzel’s wrath was kindled by hearing of a vast meeting of 40,000 worshippers, who had received the communion under both kinds, and had given it even to the children of their company.

These meetings at once awakened the enthusiasm of the Utraquists, and gave them confidence in their strength. On Sunday, July 30, a procession, headed by a former monk, John of Sulau, who had preached a fiery sermon to a large congregation,
marched through the streets of Prague, and took possession of the church of S. Stephen, where they celebrated their own rites. Thence they proceeded to the Town Hall of the Neustadt, and clamored that the magistrates should release some who had been made prisoners on religious grounds. The magistrates were the nominees of Wenzel to carry out his new policy; they barred the doors, and looked from the windows upon the crowd. Foremost in it stood the priest, John of Sulau, holding aloft the chalice. Someone from the windows threw a stone, and knocked it from his hands. The fury of the crowd blazed out in a moment. Headed by John Zizka, of Trocnow, a nobleman of Wenzel’s court, they burst open the doors, slew the burgomaster, and flung out of the windows all who did not succeed in making their escape. It was the beginning of a religious war more savage and more bloody than Europe had yet seen.

Wenzel’s rage was great when he heard of these proceedings. He threatened death to all the Hussites, and particularly the priests. But his helplessness obliged him to listen to proposals for reconciliation. The rebels humbled themselves, the King appointed new magistrates. Wenzel’s perplexities, however, were soon to end; on August 16 he was struck with apoplexy, and died with a great shout and roar as of a lion. He was buried secretly at night, for Prague was in an uproar at the news of his death. Wenzel’s faults as a ruler are obvious enough. He was devoid of wisdom and energy; he was arbitrary and capricious; he was alternately sunk in sloth, and a prey to fits of wild fury. He had none of the qualities of a statesman; yet with all his faults he was felt by the Bohemians to have a love for his people, to whom he was always kindly and familiar, and to whom in his way he strove to do justice. His own ambiguous position towards his brother Sigismund and European politics corresponded in some measure with the ambiguous attitude of Bohemia towards the Church, and for a time he was no unfitting representative of the land which he ruled. Just as events had reached the point when decision was rendered inevitable, Wenzel’s death handed over to Sigismund the responsibility of dealing with the future of Bohemia.

Sigismund did not judge it expedient to turn his attention immediately to Bohemia. His Hungarian subjects clamored for his aid against the Turks, who were pressing up the Danube valley. He was bound to help them first, and obtain their help against Bohemia. He trusted that conciliatory measures would disarm the Bohemian rebels, whom he would afterwards be able to deal with at leisure. Accordingly he appointed the widowed queen, Sophia, as regent in Bohemia, and round her gathered the nobles in the interests of public order. At the head of the Government stood Cenek of Wartenberg, who was leader of the Hussite league, and who strove to check excesses by a policy of toleration. But men needed guarantees for the future. The Diet which met in September, 1419, and in which the Hussites had a majority, demanded of Sigismund that he should grant full liberty for the Utraquist preaching and ceremonies, and should confer office in the State on the Czechs only. Sigismund returned the ambiguous answer that he hoped soon to come in person, and would govern according to the old customs of his father, Charles IV. No doubt the answer was pleasant to the patriotic aspirations which their request contained; but men significantly observed that there were no Hussites in Charles IV’s days.

Queen Sophia was obliged to write repeatedly to Sigismund, begging him to be more explicit; but only drew from him a proclamation recommending order and quiet, and promising to examine into the Utraquist question when he arrived. Sigismund hoped to gain time till he had an army ready; he hoped to win over the Hussite nobles
by a display of confidence meanwhile, and slowly gather round himself all the moderate party.

But Sigismund did not know the strength nor the political sagacity of the leaders of the extreme party, which had been slowly but surely forming itself since the death of Hus. The moderate party were men of the same views as Hus, who were faithful to an ideal of the Church, repelled the charge of heresy, and still hoped for tolerance, at least in time, for their own opinions. With men such as these Sigismund could easily deal. But the extreme party, who were called Taborites from their open-air meetings, recognized that the breach with Rome was irreparable, and were prepared to carry their opinions into all questions, religious, political, and social alike. Their position was one of open revolt against authority both in Church and State; they rested on the assertion of the rights of the individual, and appealed to the national sentiment of the masses of the people. At the head of this party stood two men of remarkable ability, Nicolas of Hus and John Zizka, both sprung from the smaller nobility, and both trained in affairs at Wenzel’s court. Of these, Nicolas had the eye of a statesman; Zizka the eloquence, the enthusiasm, and the generalship needed for a leader of men. Nicolas of Hus saw from the first the real bearing of the situation; he saw that if the extreme party of the reformers did not prepare for the inevitable conflict they would gradually be isolated, and would be crushed by main force. Zizka set himself to the task of organizing the enthusiasm of the Bohemian peasants into the stuff which would form a disciplined army. Like Cromwell in a later day, he used the seriousness that comes of deep religious convictions as the basis of a strong military organization, against which the chivalry of Germany should break itself in vain. While Sigismund was delaying, Zizka was drilling. On October 25 he seized the Wyssehrad, a fortress on the hill commanding the Neustadt of Prague, and began a struggle to obtain entire possession of the city. But the excesses of the Taborites, and the fair promises, of the Queen-regent, confirmed the party of order. Prague was not yet ready for the Taborites, and on November 11 Zizka and his troops fell back from the city.

In this state of things Sigismund advanced from Hungary into Moravia, and in December held a Diet at Brünn. Thither went Queen Sophia and the chief of the Bohemian nobles; thither, too, went the ambassadors of the city of Prague, to seek confirmation for their promised freedom of religion. Sigismund’s attitude was still ambiguous; he received them graciously, did not forbid them to celebrate the communion in their own fashion in their own houses, but ordered them to keep peace in their city, submit to the royal authority, lay aside their arms, and he would treat them gently. The burghers of Prague submitted, and destroyed the fortifications which menaced the royal castle. Sigismund could view the results of his policy with satisfaction. The submission of Prague spread terror on all sides; the power of Sigismund impressed men’s imagination; the Catholics began to rejoice in anticipation of a speedy triumph.

From Brünn Sigismund advanced into Silesia, where was received with loyal enthusiasm, and many of the German nobles met him at Breslau. Sigismund became convinced of his own power and importance and let drop the mask too soon. At Breslau he put down the Utraquists, inquired severely into a municipal revolt, which was insignificant compared to what had happened in Prague, caused twenty-three citizens to be executed for rebellion, and on March 17 allowed the Papal legate to proclaim a crusade against the Hussites. The result of this false step was to lose at once the support of the moderate party, and to alienate the national feeling of the Bohemians. The people
of Prague issued a manifesto calling all who loved the law of Christ and their country’s liberties to join in resisting Sigismund’s crusade. The nobles, headed by Cenek of Wartenberg, denounced Sigismund as their enemy and not their king. The country was at once in arms, and the pent-up fanaticism was let loose. Churches and monasteries were destroyed on every side. No country was so rich in splendid buildings and treasures of ecclesiastical ornament as was Bohemia; but a wave of ruthless devastation now swept across it which has left only faint traces of the former splendor. Again excesses awoke alarm among the modern nobles. Cenek of Wartenberg went back to Sigismund’s side; and the burghers of Prague saw themselves consequently in a dangerous plight, as the two castles between which their city lay, the Wyssehrad and the Hradschin, again declared for Sigismund. As they could not defend their city, they again turned to thoughts of submission, in return for an amnesty and permission to celebrate the communion under both kinds. But Sigismund had now advanced into Bohemia and proudly looked for a speedy triumph. He demanded that they should lay aside their arms and submit. This harshness was a fatal error on Sigismund’s part, as it drove the burghers of Prague into alliance with the extreme party of Zizka.

As yet this alliance had not been made; as yet Prague wished to proceed on the old constitutional lines. It wished to recognize the legitimate king, and obtain from him tolerance for the new religious beliefs. If this were impossible, there was nothing left save to throw in their lot with those who wished to create a new constitution and a new society. Zizka had been preparing for the contest. He remorselessly pursued a policy which would deprive the Catholics of their resources, and would compel Bohemia to follow the course in which it had engaged. Monasteries were everywhere pillaged and destroyed; Church property was seized; the lands of the orthodox party were ruthlessly devastated. Sigismund, if he entered Bohemia, would find no resources to help him. Zizka so acted as to make the breach at once irreparable; he wished to leave no chance of conciliation, except on condition of recognizing all that he had done. Moreover, he established a center for his authority. When he failed to seize Prague as a stronghold, he sought out a spot which would form a capital for the revolution. A chance movement made him master of the town of Austi, near which were the remains of an old fortified place. Zizka’s eye at once recognized its splendid military situation, lying on the top of a hill, which was formed into a peninsula by two rivers which flow round its rocky base. Zizka set to work to build up the old walls, and strengthen by art the strong natural position. The approach to the peninsula, which was only thirty feet wide, was rendered secure by a triple wall and a deep ditch. Towers and defenses crowned the whole line of the wall. It was not a city, but a permanent camp, which Zizka succeeded in making, and to which was given the characteristic name of Tabor. Henceforth the name of Taborites was confined to Zizka’s followers.

Before the danger which threatened them with entire destruction, as Sigismund’s army numbered at least 80,000 men from almost every nation in Europe, all parties in Bohemia drew together. The troops of Zizka entered Prague, and the burghers destroyed such parts of their city as were most open to attack from the Wyssehrad and the Hradschin, which were held by the Royalists. The hill of Witkow, on the north-east of the city, was still held by the Hussites, and against that Sigismund directed an attack on July 14. The attention of the enemy was distracted by assaults in different quarters, and Sigismund’s soldiers pressed up the hill. But a tower, defended by twenty-six Taborites, with two women and a girl who fought like heroes, kept the troops at bay till a band of Zizka’s soldiers came to their aid, and charged with such fury that the Germans fled in
dismay. Sigismund learned with shame and anger the powerlessness of his great host to contend against a people actuated by national and religious zeal. Their repulse kindled in the Germans a desire for vengeance, and they massacred the Bohemian inhabitants of the neighboring towns and villages. When the Bohemian nobles of the King’s party resented this display of hatred against the entire Bohemian race, Sigismund’s unwieldy army began to break up. There was again a talk of negotiation, and the people of Prague sent to Sigismund their demands, which are known as the Four Articles of Prague, and formed the charter of the Hussite creed. They asked for freedom of preaching, the communion under both kinds, the reduction of the clergy to apostolic poverty, and the severe repression of all open sins. These articles were a worthy exposition of the principles of the Reformation: the first asserted the freedom of man to search the Scriptures for himself; the second attacked one of the great outposts of sacerdotalism, the denial of the cup to the laity; the third cut at the root of the abuses of the ecclesiastical system; and the fourth claimed for Christianity the power to regenerate and regulate society. There was some semblance of discussion on these points but there could be no agreement between those who rested on the authority of the Church and those who entirely disregarded it.

These negotiations, however, gave still further pretext for many of Sigismund’s troops to leave his army. Resolving to do something, Sigismund on July 28 had himself crowned King of Bohemia, a step which gave greater appearance of legitimacy to his position. He strove to bind to his interests the Bohemian nobles by gifts of the royal domains and of the treasures of the churches. Meanwhile the Hussites besieged the Wyssehrad and succeeded in cutting off its supplies. It was reduced to extremities when Sigismund made an effort to relieve it. The chivalry of Moravia, Hungary, and Bohemia were checked, in their fiery charge by the steady organization of the Taborites, and more than four hundred of the bravest nobles were slaughtered by the flails of the peasants as they struggled in the vineyards and marsh at the bottom of the hill. Sigismund fled, and the Wyssehrad surrendered on November 1.

After this, Sigismund’s cause was lost, and he was regarded as the murderer of the nobles who fell in the disastrous battle of the Wyssehrad. The troops of Zizka overran Bohemia, and the Catholic inhabitants fled before them. Town after town submitted, and in March, 1421, Sigismund left Bohemia in despair. He had hopelessly mismanaged affairs. He had alternated between a policy of conciliation and one of repression. He had alienated the Bohemians through the cruelty of his German followers, and had lost the support of the Germans through his anxiety to win the Bohemian nobles. Finally his hope of overcoming the people by the help of the native nobles had ignominiously failed and had covered Sigismund with disgrace.

The Utraquists were now masters of Bohemia, and the whole land was banded together in resistance to the Catholicism and Sigismund. The nobles joined with the people, and Prague was triumphant; even the Archbishop Conrad accepted the Four Articles of Prague on April 21, 1421. The movement spread into Moravia, which joined with Bohemia in its revolution. The next step was the organization of the newly-won freedom. A Diet held at Caslau in June accepted the Four Articles of Prague, declared Sigismund an enemy of Bohemia and unworthy of the Crown, appointed a Committee of twenty representatives of the different estates and parties to undertake the government of the land until it had a king, and left the organization of religious matters to a synod of clergy which was soon to be convoked. Sigismund’s ambassadors offering toleration, scarcely obtained a hearing: the offer came a year too late.
Although Bohemia was united in opposition to Sigismund and Catholicism, it was but natural that the divergences of opinion within itself should grow wider as it felt itself more free from danger. The division between the Conservative and Radical party became more pronounced. The Conservatives, who were called Calixtins or Utraquists from their ceremonial, or Praguers from their chief seat, held by the position of Hus—a position of orthodoxy in belief, with a reformation of ecclesiastical practice carried out according to Scripture. They altered as little as possible in the old ecclesiastical arrangements, retained the mass service with the communion under both kinds, and observed the festivals of the Church. Against them were set the Radicals, the Taborites, amongst whom there were several parties. The most moderate, at the head of which stood Zizka, differed from the Praguers not so much in belief as in the determined spirit with which they were prepared to defend their opinions and carry them out in practice. The thorough Taborites cast aside all ecclesiastical authority and asserted the sufficiency of Scripture, for the right understanding of which the individual believer was directly illuminated by the Holy Ghost. They rejected Transubstantiation, and asserted that Christ was present in the elements only in a figurative way. Besides these were various extreme sects, who held that the Millennium had begun, that God existed only in the hearts of the believers, and the devil in the hearts of the wicked. Most notorious amongst these was the small sect of the Adamites, who took possession of a small island on the river Nezarka and gave themselves up to a life of communism which degenerated into shameless excesses. Against these extreme sectaries the Praguers and Zizka set up a standard of orthodoxy, and proceeded to measures of repression. Fifty of both sexes were burned by Zizka on the same day: they entered the flames with a smile, saying, “Today will we reign with Christ”. The island of the Adamites was stormed, and the entire body exterminated. Martinek Hauska, the chief teacher who opposed Transubstantiation, was burned as a heretic in Prague.

It was indeed needful that Bohemia should retain the appearance of unity if she were to succeed in maintaining her new religious freedom. Sigismund was disheartened by the failure of his first attempt, and was ready to wait and try the results of moderation. But the German electors and the Pope were by no means willing to give up Bohemia as lost. The four Rhenish Electors formed a league against the heretics: the Papal legate, Cardinal Branda, journeyed through Germany to kindle the zeal of the faithful. Sigismund was openly denounced as a favorer of heresy, and was compelled to bestir himself. It was agreed that the Electors should lead an army from Germany, and Sigismund should advance from Hungary through Moravia and unite with them. In September Germany poured an army of 200,000 men into Bohemia; but Sigismund tarried and deferred his coming. Loud accusations of treachery were brought against him by the angry princes, and disputes sprang up among them. The vast army wasted its energies in the siege of Saaz, and began gradually to disperse; the news of Zizka’s advance turned it to shameful flight. It was said ironically that such was the horror which the German princes felt against the heretics, that they could not even endure to see them. When Sigismund had finished his preparations, he also in December entered Bohemia with a formidable army of 90,000 men, well-armed, trained in warfare, led by Pipo of Florence, one of the most renowned generals of the age. Zizka put forth all his powers of generalship to save Bohemia from the impending danger.

Zizka, who had been one-eyed for years, had lost his remaining eye at the siege of the little castle of Rabi in August. He was now entirely blind, but his blindness only gave greater clearness to his mental vision, and he could direct the movements of a
campaign with greater precision than before. The very fact that he had to be dependent on others for information led him to impress more forcibly his own spirit on those around him, and so train up a school of great generals to succeed him. Under Zizka’s guidance the democratic feeling of the Bohemians had been made the basis of a new military organization which was now to try its strength against the chivalry of the Middle Ages. Strict discipline prevailed amongst Zizka’s troops, and he was able to meet the dash of the feudal forces with the coolness of a trained army which could perform complicated manoeuvres with unerring precision. He paid especial attention to artillery, and was the first great general to realize its importance. Moreover, he adapted the old war chariots to the purposes of defence. His line of march was protected on the flanks by wagons fastened to one another by iron chains. These wagons readily formed the fortifications of a camp or served as protection against an attack. In battle the soldiers, when repulsed, could retire behind their cover, and form again their scattered lines. The wagons were manned by the bravest troops, and their drivers were trained to form them according to letters of the alphabet; so that the Hussites, having the key, easily knew their way amongst the lines, while the enemy, if they forced their way, were lost in an inextricable labyrinth. At times the wagons, filled with heavy stones, were rolled downhill on the enemy’s ranks; when once those ranks were broken, the wagons were rapidly driven in, and cut in two the enemy’s line. It was a new kind of warfare, which spread terror and helplessness among the crusading hosts.

This new organization was sorely tried when, on December 21, Sigismund’s army advanced against Kuttenberg, and met Zizka’s forces hard by its walls. The wagons of the Bohemians proved an impregnable defence, and their artillery did great injury against the Hungarians. But treachery was at work in Kuttenberg, and opened the gates to Sigismund. Next day the Bohemians found themselves shut in on all sides, and their foes prepared to reduce them by hunger. But in the darkness of the night Zizka drew his troops together, and with a charge of his wagons broke through the enemy’s line and made good his retreat. Rapidly gathering reinforcements, Zizka returned to Kuttenberg on January 6, 1422, and fell suddenly upon the centre of the unsuspecting army. A panic seized the Germans; Sigismund fled ignominiously, and his example was followed by all. Zizka followed, and, aided by the wintry weather, inflicted severe losses on the invaders. More than 12,000 men are said to have perished. The second crusade against the Hussites failed even more signal than the first.

Bohemia had now beaten back both Sigismund, who came to assert his hereditary rights to the crown, and the German princes, who viewed with alarm the dismemberment of the empire. There remained the more difficult task of organizing its political position. The great statesman, Nicolas of Hus, was dead, and Zizka had the talents of a general rather than a politician. His own democratic ideas, were too strong for him to put himself at the head of the State, and bring about the necessary union between the Praguers and the Taborites. The Bohemian nobles and the Conservative party generally desired to take the management of affairs out of the hands of the Taborites, and reestablish a monarchy. Already they had offered the kingdom to Ladislas, King of Poland, who shrank from incurring the charge of heresy, which would hinder him in his constant warfare against the Teutonic Knights in Prussia. But Witold, Grand Duke of Lithuania, a man of high political sagacity, had before his eyes the possibility of a great Slavic confederacy which would beat back all German aggression. He saw in the Hussite movement a means of bridging over the religious differences between the Latin and Greek Churches, which were an obstacle to the union of Prussia
and Poland. These plans of Witold created great alarm in Germany, and many efforts were made to thwart them; but Witold took advantage of events, announced to the Pope that he wished to restore order in Bohemia, and in May, 1422, sent the nephew of Ladislas of Poland, Sigismund Korybut, with an army to Prague. Prague, torn with internal dissensions, accepted Korybut as a deliverer. Zizka recognized him as ruler of the land, and Korybut showed zeal and moderation in winning over all parties to his side.

This union of Bohemia and Poland was a standing menace to Germany, and a Diet held at Nurnberg in July appointed Frederick of Brandenburg to lead a new expedition into Bohemia. Frederick was keenly alive to the gravity of the situation, which indeed threatened himself in Brandenburg. He endeavored to gather together both an army for a crusade and a permanent army of occupation, which was to be left in Bohemia. But Germany’s internal weakness and constant dissensions prevented Frederick from accomplishing anything. He led a few soldiers into Bohemia, spent some time in negotiations, and then returned. Nor was Korybut’s position in Bohemia a strong one. He failed in his military undertakings; his attempts at conciliation alienated the extreme Taborites; Zizka maintained an attitude of neutrality towards him. Meanwhile Martin V was untiring in his endeavors to break down the alliance between Poland and Bohemia. He exhorted the Polish bishops to labor for that purpose. He wrote to Ladislas and Witold, pointing out the political dangers which beset them if they strayed from Catholicism. Sigismund, on his part, was willing to purchase an alliance with Poland by abandoning the cause of the Teutonic Knights. The combined efforts of Martin V and Sigismund were successful. Witold wrote to the Bohemians that his desire had been to reconcile them with the Roman Church; as they were obstinate, he was driven to abandon them to their fate. Korybut was recalled, and left Prague on December 24. The great idea of a Slavonic Empire and Church was at an end, and the future of Poland was decided by its cowardice at this great crisis. Henceforth it was condemned to the isolation which it had chosen through want of foresight.

The departure of Korybut and freedom from invasion awakened amongst the Bohemians the differences which danger made them forget. The Praguers and the Taborites stood in stronger opposition to one another. The Praguers were more disposed to negotiation, and hoped that they might still find room for their opinions under the shadow of the authority of the Church. Zizka had grown more convinced of the futility of compromise, and a stern spirit of resistance took possession of him and his followers. The year 1423 is full of the records of civil war and devastation in Bohemia, and Zizka spread fire and slaughter even in the neighboring lands of Moravia and Hungary. The year 1424 is known in Bohemian annals as “Zizka’s bloody year”. He swept like a storm over towns and villages of those who wished for compromise, and inflicted a sore defeat on the forces of the Praguers who were following on his track. The Praguers in dismay looked for a leader and found him in Korybut, who in June, 1424, returned to Prague, no longer as the deputy of Witold and the Governor of Bohemia, but as a personal adventurer at the head of the Moderate party. Zizka advanced against Prague; and the capital of Bohemia, the seat of Hus and his teaching, was in danger of a terrible siege. But moderate counsels prevailed at the last moment to avert this crowning calamity. Zizka withdrew and soon after died of the plague on October 11. His followers bewailed the loss of one who was to them both leader and father; they took the name of Orphans in sign of their bereavement.
Zizka was a man of profound, even fanatical, piety, with great decision and energy, who clearly saw the issue that lay before the Bohemians if they wished to maintain their religious freedom. But he was a man of action rather than reflection. He had the qualities necessary to head a party, but not those necessary to lead a people. He could solve the problem for himself by a rigorous determination to be watchful and to persist; but his range of ideas was not large enough to enable him to form any policy which would organize the nation to keep what it had won. Amid Bohemian parties he maintained a strong position, opposed to extremes but convinced of the hopelessness of conciliation. As a general he is almost unrivalled, for he knew how to train out of raw materials an invincible army, and he never lost a battle. He could drive back hosts of invaders and could maintain order within the limits of Bohemia; but he lacked the political sense that could bind a people together. His position became more and more a purely personal one; his resolute character degenerated into savagery; and his last energies were spent in trying to impress upon all his own personal convictions without any consideration of the exact issue to which they would lead. Without Zizka Bohemia would never have made good her resistance to the Church and to Sigismund. It was his misfortune rather than his fault that he had not also the political genius to organize that resistance on a secure basis for the future.

By Zizka’s death the party opposed to reconciliation with Rome lost its chief strength. The Taborites divided into two—the Orphans, who held by the opinions of Zizka, and were separated from the Praguers rather on social and political than on religious grounds; and the extreme Taborites, who denied Transubstantiation and were entirely opposed to the Church system. But both these parties were feeble, and spent their energies in conflicts with one another. The field was open for Korybut and the Praguers to continue negotiations for peace and reconciliation. Bohemia was growing weary of anarchy. The first fervor of religious zeal had worn away, the first enthusiasm had been disillusioned. Men were beginning to count the cost of their political isolation, of the devastation of their land by foes without and quarrels within, of the ruin of their commerce. Against this they had little to set as a counterpoise. The exactions of feudal lords were as easy to bear as the exactions of a plundering army; the equality which they had hoped to find through religion was not yet attained. Though victorious in the field, the great mass of the Bohemian people longed for peace almost on any terms.

During the year 1425 Korybut pursued his negotiations, engaged in paving the way for reconciliation with Rome. The people were not unwilling, but the army still remained true to its faith. As they felt that danger was menacing them, the Taborites again drew together, reasserted their principles and prepared to wage war. Besides the danger from half-heartedness at home, two active enemies harassed the Bohemian border. Albert of Austria attacked Moravia, and Frederick of Meissen, whom Sigismund had made Elector of Saxony, was winning back Silesia. A new leader arose to guide the renewed vigor of the Taborites, Procopius, called the Great to distinguish him from others of the same name. Procopius, like Zizka, was sprung from the lower nobility, and was a priest at the time when he first attached himself to the party of Hus. Without possessing the military genius of Zizka, he knew how to manage the army which Zizka had created; and he had a larger mind and was capable of greater plans than his predecessor. Procopius was averse from war, and as a priest never bore arms nor took part in the battles which he directed. He wished for peace, but an honorable and enduring peace, which would guarantee to Bohemia her religious freedom. Peace, he saw, could only be won by arms; it was not enough to repel the invaders, Bohemia must
secure its borders by acting on the offensive. He led his troops up the Elbe to the siege of Aussig. Frederick of Saxony was absent at a Diet at Nurnberg, but his wife Catharine called for succors and gathered an army of 70,000 men. The Bohemian troops, reinforced by Korybut, amounted only to 25,000, On June 16, 1426, was fought the battle under the walls of Aussig.

The Bohemians entrenched themselves behind their wagons, and the furious onslaught of the German knights forced the first line. But the artillery opened on their flank; the Bohemians from their wagons dragged the knights from their horses with long lances, and dashed them to the ground. The German lines were broken, and the Bohemians rushed in and turned them to flight. The slaughter that ensued was terrible; 10,000 Germans were left dead upon the field. Procopius wished to lead his victorious army farther, so as to teach the Germans a lesson; but the Moderates refused to follow, and the campaign came to an end without any other results.

As usual, a victory united Germany and disunited Bohemia. Korybut pursued his schemes for union with Rome, and wrote to Martin V asking him to receive Bohemian envoys for this purpose. Martin V expressed his willingness, provided they would abide by the decision of the Holy See, which was, however, ready to receive information of their desires. Korybut hoped that the Pope would abandon Sigismund and recognize himself as King of Bohemia in return for his services to the Church. But Korybut was not yet firm enough in his position to carry out his plan. The dissension between the Taborites and the Praguers was not yet so profound that the Moderates as a body were willing to submit unreservedly to Rome. Korybut’s plans were known in Prague, and a party formed itself, which, while in favor of reconciliation, stood firm by the Four Articles. On Maundy Thursday, April 17, 1427, an eloquent and popular priest, John Rokycana, denounced in a sermon the treachery of Korybut. The people flew to arms, drove out the Poles, and made Korybut a prisoner. His plans had entirely failed, and the victory of the Moderate party over him necessarily turned to the profit of Procopius and the Taborites.

Procopius was now ruler of Bohemia, and carried out his policy of terrifying his opponents by destructive raids into Austria, Lusatia, Moravia, and Silesia. Germany in alarm again began to raise forces; and Martin V hoped to gain greater importance for the expedition by appointing as Papal legate Henry Beaufort, Bishop of Winchester, whom he made Cardinal for the purpose. Beaufort’s experience of affairs and high political position made him a fit man to interest England and France in the cause of the Church. In July, 1427, a strong army entered Bohemia and laid siege to Mies; but the soldiers were undisciplined and the leaders were disunited. On the approach of Procopius a panic seized the army, and it fled in wild confusion to Tachau. There Henry of Winchester, who had stayed behind in Germany, met the fugitives. He was the only man of courage and resolution in the army. He implored them to stand and meet the foe; he unfolded the Papal banner and even set up a crucifix to shame the fugitives. They stayed and formed in battle order, but the appearance of the Bohemian troops again filled them with dread, and a second time they fled in panic terror. In vain Henry of Winchester tried to rally them. He seized the flag of the Empire, tore it in pieces and flung them before the princes; but at last was himself driven to flee, lest he should fall into the hands of the heretics.

This disgraceful retreat did not bring men’s minds nearer to peace. Martin V urged a new expedition, and Sigismund was not sorry to see the Electors in difficulties. In
Bohemia the party of peace made a vain effort to raise Prague in the name of Korybut; but the rising was put down without the help of Procopius, and Korybut was sent back to Poland in September, 1427. Procopius rallied round him the entire Hussite party, and, true to his policy of extorting an honorable peace, signalized the year 1428 by destructive raids into Austria, Bavaria, Silesia, and Saxony. After each expedition he returned home and waited to see if proposals for peace were likely to be made. In April, 1429, a conference was arranged between Sigismund and some of the Hussite leaders, headed by Procopius, at Pressburg in Hungary. Sigismund proposed a truce for two years till the assembling of the Council at Basel, before which the religious differences might be laid. The Hussites answered that their differences arose because the Church had departed from the example of Christ and the Apostles: the Council of Constance had shown them what they had to expect from Councils; they demanded an impartial judge between the Council and themselves, and this judge was the Holy Scripture and writings founded thereon. The proposal of Sigismund was referred to a Diet at Prague, and answer was made that the Bohemians were ready to submit their case to a Council, provided it contained representatives of the Greek and Armenian Churches, which received the Communion under both kinds, and provided it undertook to judge according to the Word of God, not the will of the Pope. Their request was equitable but impracticable. It was clearly impossible for them to submit to the decision of a Council composed entirely of their opponents; yet they could have little hope that their proposal to construct an impartial tribunal would be accepted.

The negotiations came to nothing. Indeed, Sigismund was busy at the same time in summoning the forces of the Empire to advance again Bohemia. Henry of Winchester had gathered a force of 5000 English horsemen, and in July, 1429, landed in Flanders on his way to Germany. But religious considerations were driven to give way to political. The unexpected successes of Jeanne d’Arc, the raising of the siege of Orleans, the coronation of Charles VII at Rheims, gave a sudden check to the English power in France. Winchester’s soldiers were ordered to the relief of their countrymen; the Cardinal’s influence could not persuade his men to prefer religious zeal to patriotic sentiment. The Catholics in Germany broke into a wail of lamentation when they saw the forces of the Papal legate diverted to a war with France.

Germany was feeble, and Bohemia was again agitated by a struggle. The peace party in Prague had for its quarters the Old Town, and the more pronounced Hussites the New Town. The two quarters of the city were on the point of open hostility when Procopius again united Bohemia for a war of invasion. The year 1430 was terrible in the annals of Germany, for the Hussite army carried devastation into the most flourishing provinces of the Empire. They advanced along the Elbe into Saxony, and penetrated as far as Meissen; they invaded Franconia, and threatened with siege the stately town of Nurnberg. Wherever they went the land was laid waste, and fire and slaughter were spread on every side.

The policy of Procopius was beginning to have its effect. The Hussite movement was the great question which attracted the attention of Europe. Hussite manifestoes were circulated in every land; the new opinions were discussed openly, and in many places met with considerable sympathy. The Hussites complained that their opponents attacked them without really knowing their beliefs, which were founded only on Holy Scripture; they invited all men to acquaint themselves with their opinions; they appealed to the success of their arms as a proof that God was on their side. The opinion began to prevail that, after all, argument and not arms was the proper mode of meeting heresy,
particularly when arms had proved a failure. Martin V, who hated the very name of a Council, was again haunted at the end of 1430 by the face of John of Ragusa, who had been negotiating with Sigismund that he should combine with the University of Paris to urge on the Pope a speedy summons of the Council to Basel. Soon after John’s arrival in Rome, on the morning of November 8, the day on which Martin V was to create three new Cardinals, a document was found affixed to the door of the Papal palace which caused a great sensation in Rome.

“Whereas it is notorious to all Christendom, that since the Council of Constance an untold number of Christians have wandered from the faith by means of the Hussites, and members are daily being lopped off from the body of the Church militant, nor is there any one of all the sons whom she begat to help or console her; now, therefore, two most serene princes direct to all Christian princes the following conclusions, approved by learned doctors both of canon and of civil law, which they have undertaken to defend in the Council to be celebrated according to the decree of Constance in March next”. Then followed the conclusions, which set forth that the Catholic faith must be preferred before man, whoever he be; that princes secular as well as ecclesiastical are bound to defend the faith; that as former heresies, the Novatian, Arian, Nestorian, and others, were extirpated by Councils, so must that of the Hussites; that every Christian under pain of mortal sin must strive for the celebration of a Council for this purpose; if Popes or Cardinals put hindrances in the way they must be reckoned as favorers of heresy; if the Pope does not summon the Council at the appointed time those present at it ought to withdraw from his obedience, and proceed against those who try to hinder it as against favorers of heresy. This startling document was currently supposed to be authorized by Frederick of Brandenburg, Albert of Austria, and Lewis of Brieg.

Several of the Cardinals, chief of whom was Condulmier, future Pope, urged on Martin V to comply with the prevailing wish. But Martin V wished again to try the chance of War, and awaited the results of a diet which Sigismund had summoned to Nurnberg. On January 11, 1431, he appointed a new legate for Germany, Giuliano Cesarini, whom he had just created Cardinal. Cesarini was sprung from a poor but noble family in Rome, and his talents attracted Martin V’s notice. He was a man of large mind, great personal holiness, and deep learning. His appearance and manner were singularly attractive, and all who came in contact with him were impressed by the genuineness and nobility of his character. If any man could succeed in awakening enthusiasm in Germany it was Cesarini.

Before Cesarini’s departure to Germany Martin V had been brought with difficulty to recognize the necessity of the assembly of the Council at Basel, and commissioned Cesarini to preside at its opening. The Bull authorizing this was dated February 1, and conferred full powers on Cesarini to change the place of the Council at his will, to confirm its decrees and do all things necessary for the honor and peace of the Church. This Bull reached Cesarini at Nurnberg, shortly after the news of Martin V’s death. The Diet of Nurnberg voted an expedition into Bohemia, and Cesarini eagerly travelled through Germany preaching the crusade. At the same time steps were taken to open the Council at Basel. On the last day of February a Burgundian abbot read before the assembled clergy of Basel the Bulls constituting the Council, and then solemnly pronounced that he was ready for conciliar business. In April representatives of the University of Paris and a few other prelates began to arrive; but Cesarini sent to them John of Ragusa on April 30 to explain that the Bohemian expedition was the object for which he had been primarily commissioned by the Pope, and was the great means of
extirpating heresy. He besought them to send envoys to help him in his dealings with the Bohemians, and meanwhile to use their best endeavors to assemble others to the Council. The envoys of the Council, at the head of whom was John of Ragusa, followed Sigismund to Eger, where he held a conference with the Hussites. The conference was only meant to divert the attention of the Bohemians, and it was speedily ended by a demand on the part of the envoys that the Bohemians should submit their case unconditionally to the Council’s decision. Sigismund returned to Nurnberg on May 22, and the German forces rapidly assembled. There were complaints at the legate’s absence; Cesarini’s zeal had led him as far as Koln, whence he hastened to Nurnberg on June 27. There he found a messenger from Eugenius IV, urging the prosecution of the Council, and bidding him, if it could be done without hindrance to the cause at heart, to leave the Bohemian expedition and proceed at once to Basel. But Cesarini’s heart and soul were now in the crusade. He determined to pursue his course, and on July 3 appointed John of Palomar, an auditor of the Papal court, and John of Ragusa, to preside over the Council as his deputies in his absence.

On July 5 Cesarini addressed an appeal to the Bohemians, protesting his wish to bring peace rather than a sword. Were they not all Christians? Why should they stray from their holy mother the Church? Could a handful of men pretend to know better than all the doctors of Christendom? Let them look upon their wasted land and the miseries they had endured; he earnestly and affectionately besought them to return while it was time to the bosom of the Church. The Bohemians were not slow to answer. They asserted the truth of the Four Articles of Prague, which they were prepared to prove by Scripture. They recounted the results of the conferences at Pressburg and Eger, where they had professed themselves willing to appear before any Council which would judge according to Scripture, and would work with them in bringing about the reformation of the Church according to the Word of God. They had been told that such limitations were contrary to the dignity of a General Council, which was above all law. This they could not admit, and trusting in God’s truth were prepared to resist to the utmost those who attacked them.

On July 7 Cesarini left Nurnberg with Frederick of Brandenburg, who had been appointed commander of the Crusade. Cesarini had done his utmost to pacify the German princes and unite them for this expedition. He was full of hope when he set out from Nurnberg. But when he reached Weiden, where the different contingents were to meet, his hopes were rudely dispelled. Instead of soldiers he found excuses; he heard tales of nobles needing their troops to war against one another rather than combine in defence of the Church. “We are many fewer”, he wrote to Basel on July 16, “than was said in Nurnberg, so that the leaders hesitate. Not only our victory but even our entry into Bohemia is doubtful. We are not so few that, if there were any courage amongst us, we need shrink from entering Bohemia. I am very anxious and above measure sad. For if the army retreats without doing anything, the Christian religion in these parts is undone; such terror would be felt by our side, and their boldness would increase”. However, on August 1, an army of 40,000 horse and 90,000 foot crossed the Bohemian border, and advanced against Tachau. Cesarini seeing it unprepared for attack urged an immediate onslaught: he was told that the soldiers were tired with their march, and must wait till tomorrow. In the night the inhabitants strengthened their walls and put their artillery into position, so that a storm was hopeless. The crusading host passed on, devastating and slaughtering with a ruthless cruelty that was a strange contrast to the charitable utterances of Cesarini’s manifesto. But their triumph was short-lived. On
August 14 the Bohemian army advanced against them at Tauss. Its approach was known, when it was yet some way off, by the noise of the rolling wagons. Cesarini, with the Duke of Saxony, ascended a hill to see the disposition of the army; there he saw with surprise the German wagons retreating. He sent to ask Frederick of Brandenburg the meaning of this movement, and was told that he had ordered the wagons to take up a secure position in the rear. But the movement was misunderstood by the Germans. A cry was raised that some were retreating. Panic seized the host, and in a few moments Cesarini saw the crusaders in wild confusion making for the Bohemian Forest in their rear. He was driven to join the fugitives, and all his efforts to rally them were vain. Procopius, seeing the flight, charged the fugitives, seized all their wagons and artillery, and inflicted upon them terrible slaughter. Cesarini escaped with difficulty in disguise, and had to endure the threats and reproaches of the Germans, who accused him as the author of all their calamities.

Cesarini was humbled by his experience. He reproached himself for his confidence in German arms; he had now seen enough, of the cowardice and feebleness of Germany. He had seen, too, the growing importance of the Hussite movement, and the force which their success was giving to the spread of their convictions throughout Germany. When he returned to Nurnberg Sigismund met him with due honor; the German princes gathered round him and protested their readiness for another campaign next year. But Cesarini answered that no other remedy remained for the check of the Hussite heresy than the Council of Basel. He besought them to do their utmost to strengthen the feeble and cheer the desponding in Germany, to exhort those whose faith was wavering to hold out in hope of succor from the Council. With this advice he hastened to Basel, where he arrived on September 9. To the Council were now transferred all men’s expectations of a peaceable settlement of the formidable difficulty which threatened Western Christendom.
CHAPTER IV.
FIRST ATTEMPT OF EUGENIUS IV TO DISSOLVE THE COUNCIL OF
BASEL, 1431—1434.

The ancient city of Basel was well fitted to be the seat of a great assemblage. High
above the rushing Rhine raised its stately minster on a rocky hill which seemed to brave
the river's force. Round the river and the minster clusters the city. It was surrounded by
a fertile plain, was easily accessible from Germany, France, and Italy, and as a free
Imperial city was a place of security and dignity for the Council. To the eye of an
Italian, accustomed to marbles and frescoes, the interior of the cathedral looked bald
and colorless; but its painted windows and the emblazoned shields of nobles hung round
the wall gave it a staid richness of its own. The Italians owned that it was a comfortable
place, and that the houses of the merchants of Basel equalled those of Florence. It was
well ordered by its magistrates, who administered strict justice and organized admirably
the supplies of food. The citizens of Basel were devout, but little given to literature;
they were luxurious and fond of wine, but were steadfast, truthful, sincere, and honest in
their dealings.

The Council was long in assembling. It was natural that, while the President was
absent in Bohemia, few should care to undertake the journey. If the crusade ended in a
victory, it was doubtful how long the Council would sit. Cesarini's deputies, John of
Palomar and John of Ragusa, opened the Council with due ceremonial on July 23. It
was only sparsely attended, and its first business was to increase its numbers, and obtain
some guarantees for its safety and freedom from the city magistrates and from
Sigismund. On August 29 came the news of the flight of the Crusaders from Tauss. It
produced a deep impression on the assembled fathers, and convinced them of the
seriousness and importance of the work which they had before them. They felt that the
chastisement which had befallen the Church was due to her shortcomings, and that
penitence and reformation alone could avert further disaster.

To this feeling the arrival of Cesarini on September 9 gave further force. Deeply
impressed with the importance of the crisis, he sent forth letters urging on the prelates
that they should lose no time in coming to the Council. Only three bishops, seven
abbits, and a few doctors were assembled, as the roads were unsafe, owing to a war
between the Dukes of Austria and Burgundy. He wrote also to the Pope to express his
own convictions and the common opinion of the work which the Council might do: it
might extirpate heresy, promote peace throughout Christendom, restore the Church to
its pristine glory, humble its enemies, treat of union with the Greeks, and finally set on
foot a crusade for the recovery of the Holy Land. An envoy was sent to the Pope to
explain to him how matters stood, and to urge the need of his presence at Basel.
Meanwhile there were many discussions relative to the constitution of the Council, who
were to take part in it, and what was to be the method of voting. There was a general
agreement that, as the great object of the Council was to arrange a union with the
Bohemians and the Greeks, it was desirable to admit men of learning, that is, doctors of
canon or civil law, as well as prelates. The question of the method of voting was left
until the Council became more numerous.
The Council, moreover, lost no time in trying to bring about its chief object. On October 10 a letter was sent to the Bohemians, begging them to join with the Council for the promotion of unity. Perhaps God has allowed discord so long that experience might teach the evils of dissension. Christ's disciples are bound to labour for unity and peace. The desolation of Bohemia must naturally incline it to wish for peace, and where can that be obtained more surely than in a Council assembled in the Holy Ghost? At Basel everything will be done with diligence and with freedom; every one may speak, and the Holy Ghost will lead men's hearts to the truth, if only they will have faith. The Bohemians have often complained that they could not get a free hearing; at Basel they may both speak and hear freely, and the prayers of the faithful will help both sides. The most ample safe-conduct was offered to their representatives, and the fullest appreciation given to their motives. “Send, we beseech you, men in whom you trust that the Spirit of the Lord rests, gentle, God-fearing, humble, desirous of peace, seeking not their own, but the things of Christ, whom we pray to give to us and you and all Christian people peace on earth, and in the world to come life everlasting”. This letter, which breathes profound sincerity and true Christian charity, was, no doubt, an expression of the views of Cesarini, and was most probably written by him. The greatest care was taken to make no allusion to the past, and to approach the matter entirely afresh. But it was impossible for the Bohemians to forget all that had gone before. The difficulty experienced in sending the letter to the Bohemians showed the existence of a state of things very different from what the Council wished to recognize. There was no intercourse between Bohemia and the rest of Christendom; the Bohemians were under the ban of the Council of Siena as heretics. It was finally agreed to send three copies by different ways, in hopes that one at least might arrive. One was sent to Sigismund for transmission, another to the magistrates of Nurnberg, and a third to the magistrates of Eger. All three copies arrived safely in Bohemia in the beginning of December.

This activity on the part of the Council necessarily aroused the suspicion of Eugenius IV. The zeal of Cesarini, which had been kindled by his Bohemian experiences, went far beyond the limits of Papal prudence. The Bohemian question did not seem so important at Rome as it did at Basel. A Council which under the pressure of necessity opened negotiations with heretics, might greatly imperil the faith of the Church, and might certainly be expected to do many things contrary to the Papal headship. A democratic spirit prevailed in Basel, which had shown itself in the admission of all doctors; and the discussion about the organization of the Council showed that it would be very slightly amenable to the influence of the Pope and the Curia. Eugenius IV resolved, therefore, at once to rid himself of the Council. He thought it wisest to overturn it at once, before it had time to strike its roots deeper. Accordingly, on November 12, he wrote to Cesarini, empowering him to dissolve the Council at Basel and proclaim another to be held at Bologna in a year and a half. The reasons given were the small attendance of prelates at Basel, the difficulties of access owing to the war between Austria and Burgundy, the distracted state of men's minds in that quarter owing to the spread of Hussite opinions; but especially the fact that negotiations were now pending with the Greek Emperor, who had promised to come to a Council which was to unite the Greek and Latin Churches on condition that the Pope paid the expenses of his journey and held the Council in some Italian city. As it would be useless to hold two Councils at the same time, the Pope thought it better that the Fathers of Basel should reassemble at Bologna when their business was ready.
A Bull dissolving the Council on these grounds was also secretly prepared, and was signed by ten Cardinals. The Council, in entire ignorance of the blow that was being aimed at it, was engaged in preparations for its first public session, which took place under the presidency of Cesarini on December 14. The Council declared itself to be duly constituted, and laid down three objects for its activity: the extirpation of heresy, the purification of Christendom, and the reformation of morals. It appointed its officials and guarded by decrees its safety and freedom. On December 23 arrived the Bishop of Parenzo, treasurer of Eugenius IV, and was honorably received; but the coldness of his manner showed the object of his mission. The Council was at once in a ferment of excitement. In a congregation on December 29, the citizens of Basel appeared in force, and protested against the dissolution. Various speakers of the Council laid before the Bishop of Parenzo four propositions; that the urgent needs of Christendom did not allow of the dissolution of the Council; that such a step would cause great scandal and offence to the Church; that if this Council were dissolved or prorogued, it was idle to talk of summoning another; that a General Council ought to proceed against all who tried to hinder it, and ought to call all Christian princes to its aid. The Bishop of Parenzo was not prepared for this firm attitude; he found things at Basel different from his expectations. He thought it wise to temporize, and declared that if he had any Papal Bulls he would not publish them. Meanwhile he tried to induce Cesarini to dissolve the Council. Cesarini was sorely divided between his allegiance to the Pope and his sense of what was due to the welfare of Christendom. It was agreed that two envoys should be sent to the Pope, one from Cesarini and one from the Council. The Bishop of Parenzo thought it wise to flee away on January 8, 1432, leaving his Bulls with John of Prato, who attempted to publish them on January 13, but was interrupted, and his Bulls and himself were taken in custody by the Council’s orders.

Cesarini was deeply moved by this attitude of the Pope. To his fervent mind it was inconceivable that the head of Christendom should behave with such levity at so grave a crisis. He wrote at once to Eugenius IV a letter, in which he expressed with the utmost frankness his bitter disappointment at the Pope’s conduct, his firm conviction of the need of straightforward measures on the part of the ecclesiastical authorities to restore the shattered confidence of Christian people. He began his letter by saying that he was driven to speak freely and fearlessly by the manifest peril of the faith, the danger of the loss of obedience to the Papacy, the obloquy with which Eugenius was everywhere assailed. He recapitulated the facts concerning his own mission to Bohemia and his presidency of the Council; detailed the hopes which he and every one in Germany entertained of the Council's mediation. “I was driven also to come here by observing the dissoluteness and disorder of the German clergy, by which the laity are sorely irritated against the Church—so much so, that there is reason to fear that, if the clergy do not amend their ways, the laity will attack them, as the Hussites do. If there had been no General Council, I should have thought it my duty as legate to summon a provincial synod for the reform of the clergy: for unless the clergy be reformed I fear that, even if the Bohemian heresy were extinguished, another would rise up in its place”. Having these opinions, he came to the Council and tried to conduct its business with diligence, thinking that such was the Pope’s desire. “I did not suppose that your holiness wished me to dissemble or act negligently; if you had bid me do so, I would have answered that you must lay that duty on another, for I have determined never to occupy the post of a dissembler”.
He then passed on to the question of the prorogation of the Council, and laid before the Pope the considerations which he would have urged if he had been in the Curia when the question was discussed.

(1) The Bohemians have been summoned to the Council; its prorogation will be a flight before them on the part of the Church as disgraceful as the flight of the German army. “By this flight we shall approve their errors and condemn the truth and justice of our own cause. Men will see in this thefinger of God, and will see that the Bohemians can neither be vanquished by arms nor by argument O luckless Christendom! O Catholic faith, abandoned by all; soldiers and priests alike desert thee; no one dares stand on thy side”.

(2) This flight will lose the allegiance of wavering Catholics, amongst whom are already rife opinions contrary to the Holy See.

(3) The ignominy of the flight will fall on the clergy, who will be universally attacked.

(4) “What will the world say when it hears of this? Will it not judge that the clergy is incorrigible and wishes to moulder in its abuses? So many Councils have been held in our time, but no reform has followed. Men were expecting some results from this Council; if it be dissolved they will say that we mock both God and men. The whole reproach, the whole shame and ignominy, will fall upon the Roman Curia as the cause and author of all these ills. Holy Father, may you never be the cause of such evils! At your hands will be required the blood of those that perish; about all things you will have to render a strict account at the judgment seat of God”,

(5 and 6) To promote the pacification of Christendom ambassadors have been sent to make peace between England and France, between Poland and the Teutonic Knights; the dissolution of the Council will stop their valuable labours.

(7) There are disturbances in Magdeburg and Passau, where the people have risen against their bishops and show signs of following the Hussites. The Council may arrange these matters; if it be dissolved discord will spread.

(8) The Duke of Burgundy has been asked by the Council to undertake the part of leader against the Hussites. If the Council be dissolved, he will be irritated against the Church, and his services will be lost.

(9) Many German nobles are preparing for another expedition into Bohemia if need be. If they are deluded by the Pope, they will turn against the Church. “I myself will rather die than live ignominiously. I will go perhaps to Nurnberg and place myself in the hands of these nobles that they may do with me what they will, even sell me to the heretics. All men shall know that I am innocent”.

(10) The Council sent envoys to confirm the wavering on the Bohemian borders: if the Council be dissolved, their work will be undone and there will be a large addition to the Hussites.

He then proceeded to answer the Pope’s objections. If he cannot conveniently come to Basel in person on account of his health, let him send a deputation of Cardinals and eminent persons. As to the safety of the place, it is as secure as Constance. It is said that the Pope fears lest the Council meddle with the temporalities of the Church. It is not reasonably to be expected that an ecclesiastical assembly will act to its own detriment. There have been many previous Councils with no such result. “I fear lest it happen to us
as it did to the Jews, who said: ‘If we let Him alone, the Romans will come and take away our place and nation’. So we say: If we let this Council alone, the laity will come and take away our temporalities. But by the just judgment of God the Jews lost their place because they would not let Christ alone; and by the just judgment of God, if we do not let this Council alone we shall lose our temporalities, and (God forbid) our lives and souls as well. Let the Pope, on the other hand, be friendly with the Council, reform his Curia, and be ready to act for the good of the Church”.

The Council is likely, if pressed to extremities, to refuse to dissolve, and there would be the danger of a schism. He begged to be relieved of his commission and complained of the want of straightforwardness. If he attempted to dissolve the Council, he would be stoned to death by the fathers; if he were to go away, the Council would be certain to appoint for itself another president.

This letter is remarkable for its clear exhibition of the state of affairs in Europe at this time, and as we read it now, it is still more remarkable for the political instinct which enabled its writer to make so true a forecast of the future. It would have been well for Eugenius IV if he had had the wisdom to appreciate its importance. It would have been well for the future of the Papacy if Cesarini’s words had awakened an echo in the Court of Rome. As it was, the politicians of the Curia only smiled at the exalted enthusiasm of Cesarini, and Eugenius IV was too narrow-minded and obstinate to reconsider the wisdom of a course of conduct which he had once adopted. He did not understand, nor did he care to understand, the sentiments of the Council. He had forgotten the current of feeling against the Papacy which had been so strong at Constance. The decrees of Constance were not among the Papal Archives; and one of the Cardinals who possessed a manuscript of Filastre was heard with astonishment by the Curia when he called attention to the decree which declared a General Council to be superior to the Pope. At Basel, on the other hand, there were many copies of the Acts of the Council of Constance, and it was held that the Pope could not dissolve a General Council without its own consent. The rash step of Eugenius forced the Council into an attitude of open hostility towards the Papacy, and a desperate struggle between the two powers was inevitable.

The first question for both parties was the attitude of Sigismund. His personal interest in the settlement of the Hussite rebellion naturally inclined him to favour in every way the assembling of the Council. In July, 1431, he took the Council under his Imperial protection, and in August wrote in its interest to make peace between the Dukes of Austria and Burgundy. But Sigismund felt that the years which had elapsed since the Council of Constance had not been glorious to his reputation. He had failed ignominiously in Bohemia and had exercised little influence in Germany, where he had quarrelled with Frederick of Brandenburg, who was the most distinguished amongst the electors. His early enthusiasm for acting with dignity the part of secular head of Christendom had been damped at Constance, and he did not care to appear at Basel without some accession to his dignity. With characteristic desire for outward show, he determined on an expedition to Italy, to assume the Imperial crown. He hoped to establish once more the Imperial claims, to check the power of Venice, which was the enemy of Hungary, and to induce the Pope to come to Basel. Yet to attain all these objects he had only a following of some 2000 Hungarian and German knights. His hopes were entirely built on the help of Filippo Maria Visconti, who was at war with Venice and Florence, and with whom Sigismund made a treaty in July. Before setting out for Italy he appointed William of Bavaria his vicegerent as Protector of the Council.
then early in November he crossed the Alps, and on November 21 arrived in Milan. But the jealous and suspicious character of Filippo Maria Visconti could not bear the presence of a superior; he was afraid that Sigismund's presence might be the occasion of a rising against himself. Accordingly he gave orders that Sigismund should be honorably received in Milan; but he himself withdrew from the city, and remained secluded in one of his castles. He refused to visit Sigismund, and gave the ridiculous excuse that his emotions were too strong; “if he saw Sigismund he would die of joy”. Disappointed of his host, Sigismund could only hasten his coronation with the iron crown of Lombardy, which took place in the church of S. Ambrogio on November 25. He did not stay long in Milan, where he was treated with much suspicion, but in December passed on to Piacenza, where, on January 10, 1432, he received news of the Papal Bull dissolving the Council of Basel.

Sigismund had left Germany as the avowed Protector of the Council: but it was felt that his desire to obtain the Imperial crown gave the Pope considerable power of affixing stipulations to the coronation. In fact, Sigismund’s relations with Eugenius IV were not fortunate for the object which he had in view. Not only did the question of the Council an obstacle to their good understand, but Sigismund’s alliance with the Duke of Milan was displeasing to Eugenius IV, who as a Venetian was on the side of his native city. When Sigismund discovered how little he could depend on Filippo Maria Visconti his political position in Italy was sufficiently helpless. There were grave fears in Basel that he might abandon the cause of the Council as a means of reconciling himself with the Pope.

At first, however, Sigismund's attitude seemed firm enough. Immediately on hearing of the proposed dissolution of the Council he wrote to Basel, exhorting the fathers to stand firm, and saying that he had written to beg the Pope to reconsider his decision. The Council, on its side, wrote to Sigismund, affecting to disbelieve the genuineness of the Bull brought by the Bishop of Parenzo, and begging Sigismund to send William of Bavaria at once to Basel. On receipt of this letter Sigismund wrote again, thanking them for their zeal, saying that he was going at once to Rome to arrange matters with the Pope, and exhorting them to persevere in their course.

Before it received the news of Sigismund’s constancy the Council on January 21 issued a summons to all Christendom, begging those who were coming to the Council not to be discouraged at the rumours of its dissolution, as it was improbable that the Vicar of Christ, if well informed, would set aside the decrees of Constance, and bring ruin on the Church by dissolving the Council which was to extirpate heresy and reform abuses. Congregations were continued as usual to arrange preliminaries, and on February 3 William of Bavaria arrived in Basel, and was solemnly received as Sigismund’s vicegerent. Prelates poured in to the Council, which daily became more numerous. The Dukes of Milan, Burgundy, and Savoy all wrote to express their cooperation with the Council. Cardinal Cesarini could not reconcile it with his allegiance to the Pope to continue as President of the Council in spite of the Pope’s wishes, and the breach with the Papacy was made more notorious by the election of a new President, Philibert, Bishop of Coutances. As a further sign of its determination the Council ordered a seal to be made for its documents. Its impress was God the Father sending down the Holy Spirit on the Pope and Emperor sitting in Council surrounded by Cardinals, prelates, and doctors.
On February 15 was held the second general session, in which was rehearsed the famous decree of Constance, that a General Council has its power immediately from Christ and that all of every rank, even the Papal, are bound to obey it in matters pertaining to the faith, the extirpation of heresy, and the reformation of the Church in head and members. It was decreed that the Council could not be dissolved against its will, and that all proceedings of the Pope against any of its members, or any who were coming to incorporate themselves with it, were null and void. This was the Council's answer to the Pope's Bull of dissolution. The two powers now stood in open antagonism, and each claimed the allegiance of Christendom. The movement against the Papal monarchy, which had been started by the Schism, found its full expression at Basel. The Council of Pisa had merely aided the Cardinals in their efforts to restore peace to the disturbed Church; the Council of Constance had been a more resolute endeavor for the same purpose of the temporal and spiritual authorities of Christendom. But the Council of Basel asserted against a legitimate Pope, who was universally recognized, the superiority of a General Council over the Papacy. It was a revolt of the ecclesiastical aristocracy against the Papal absolutism, and the fate of the revolt was a question of momentous consequences for the future of the Church.

After this declaration the Council busily sent envoys throughout Christendom, and set to work to organize itself for the transaction of business. The means for this purpose had been under discussion since September, 1431, and in the plan adopted we recognize the statesmanlike capacity of Cesarini. The fortunes of the Council of Constance showed the danger of national jealousies and political complications in an ecclesiastical synod. It was resolved at Basel to avoid the division by nations, and to work by means of four committees, which were to prepare business for the general sessions of the Council. As the objects of the Council were the suppression of heresy, the reform of the Church, and the pacification of Christendom, these objects were confided to the care of deputations of Faith, of Reformation, and of Peace, while a fourth was added for common and necessary business. The deputations were formed equally out of every nation and every rank of the hierarchy. They elected their own officers, and chose a new president every month. Every four months the deputations were dissolved and reconstituted, care being taken that a few of the old members remained. As a link between the four deputations was appointed monthly a committee of twelve, chosen equally from the four nations, who decided about the incorporation of new members with the Council, and their distribution among the deputations. They decided also the allotment of business to the several deputations, received their reports, and submitted them to a general congregation. At each election four of the old members were left to maintain the continuity of tradition; but the same men might not be reappointed twice. For the formal supervision of the Council's business was a small committee of four, one appointed by each deputation, through whom passed all the letters of the Council, which it was their duty to seal. If they were dissatisfied with the form of the contents, they remitted the letter, with a statement of their reasons, to the deputation from which it originated.

This system, which was conceived in the spirit of a liberal oligarchy, was calculated to promote freedom of discussion and to eliminate as much as possible political and national feeling. Secrecy in the conduct of business was forbidden, and members of one deputation were encouraged to discuss their affairs with members of the other deputations. The deputations met three times a week, and could only undertake the business laid before them by the president. When they were agreed about a matter, it
was laid before a general congregation; if three of the deputations, at least, were then in favour of it, it was brought before the Council in general session in the cathedral, and was finally adopted. Every precaution was taken to ensure full discussion and practical unanimity before the final settlement of any question. The organization of the Council was as democratic as anything at that time could be.

The first deputations were appointed on the last day of February. It was not long before cheering news reached the Council. The French clergy, in a synod held at Bourges on February 26, declared their adhesion to the objects set forth by the Council, and besought the King to send envoys to the Pope to beg him to recall his dissolution; and at the same time to send envoys to Sigismund to urge that nothing should be done by the Council against the ecclesiastical authority, lest thereby a plausible pretext for transferring the Council elsewhere be afforded to the Pope. The letters of Sigismund to the Council assured it of his fidelity; and his ambassadors to the Pope on March 17 affirmed that Sigismund's coming to Italy aimed only at a peaceful solution of the religious and political difficulties of Europe, and was prompted by no motives of personal ambition. He wished the Pope to understand that he was not prepared to win his coronation by a desertion of the Council's cause. From Bohemia also came the news that the Praguers had consented to negotiate with the Council on the basis of the Four Articles, and had desired a preliminary conference at Eger with the envoys of the Council, to which the Fathers at Basel readily assented.

Yet the success of the Council and the entreaties of Sigismund were alike unavailing to move the stubborn mind of the Pope. Envoys and letters passed between Sigismund and Eugenius IV, with the sole result of ultimately bringing the two into a position of avowed hostility. Sigismund said that no one could dissolve the Council, which had been duly summoned. Eugenius IV answered with savage sarcasm, “In what you write touching the celebration and continuation of the Council you have said several things contrary to the Gospel of Christ, the Holy Scripture, the sacred canons and the civil laws; although we know these assertions do not proceed from you, because you are unskilled in such matters and know better how to fight, as you do manfully, against the Turks and elsewhere, in which pursuit, I trust, you may prosper Sigismund must have felt keenly, the sneer at his failures in the field. He fancied himself mighty with the pen and with the tongue, but even his vanity could not claim the glory of a successful general”.

Sigismund had gone to Italy with the light-heartedness which characterized his doings. He hoped to indulge his love of display and at the same time fill his empty pockets. His coronation would give him the right of granting new privileges and would bring presents from the Jews. He was not sorry to send William of Bavaria to Basel in his stead, for he did not at first wish to commit himself too definitely to the Council’s side; if the Council could restore peace in Bohemia, he was ready to support it; otherwise its action might come into collision with the Imperial pretensions. So long as Sigismund was doubtful about the Bohemian acceptance of the Council’s invitation, and about the Pope’s pliancy, he wished not to commit himself too far. Hence William of Bavaria had a delicate part to play at Basel, where he distinguished himself at first by care for the Council’s decorum, and forbade dancing on fast days, to the indignation of the ladies of Basel. But soon William had more important work to do, as Sigismund found that he needed the Council’s help for his Italian projects. He had hoped, with the help of Milan, Savoy, and Ferrara, to overcome Florence and Venice, and so force the Pope to crown him. But when the Duke of Milan openly mocked him, Sigismund was
driven to make a desperate effort to retrieve his ignominious position. He could not leave Italy without the Imperial crown; if he set himself to win it by submission to the Pope, Bohemia would be lost for ever. He had tried to reconcile the Pope and the Council; but Eugenius IV scornfully refused his mediation. The only remaining course was to cast in his lot with the Council, and use it as a means to force the Pope to satisfy his demands. On April 1, 1432, he wrote to William begging him to keep the Council together, and not to allow it to dissolve before the threats of the Papal dissolution. He advised the Council to invite the Pope and Cardinals to appear at Basel; he even suggested that if the Council called him to its aid, its summons would afford him an honorable pretext for leaving Italy. Acting on these instructions, William prompted the Fathers at Basel to take steps to prevent Eugenius IV from holding his Council in Bologna as he proposed to do. Accordingly, on April 29, the Council in a general session called on Eugenius IV to revoke his Bull of dissolution, and summoned him and the Cardinals to appear at Basel within three months; in case Eugenius could not come personally he was to send representatives.

The support of Sigismund and the obvious necessity of endeavoring to find some peaceable settlement for the Bohemian question made Europe in general acquiesce in the proceedings of the Council. No nation openly espoused the Papal side or refused to recognize the Council, which gradually increased in numbers. In the beginning of April the deputations contained in all eighty-one members; and the hostility between the Pope and the Council became more decidedly pronounced, all who were on personal grounds opposed to Eugenius IV began to flock to Basel. Foremost amongst these was Domenico Capranica, Bishop of Fermo, who had been a favorite official of Martin, and had been by him created Cardinal, though the creation had not been published at the time of his death. This secrecy on the part of Martin V arose from a desire to abide as closely as possible by the decrees of Constance forbidding the excessive increase of the Cardinalate. He endeavored, however, to secure himself at the expense of his successor by binding the Cardinals to an undertaking that in case he died before the publication of such creations, they would, nevertheless, admit those so created to the Conclave. On Martin V’s death Capranica hastened to Rome and presented himself as a member of the Conclave: but the Cardinals were in violent reaction against Martin V and the Colonna, and refused to admit one of their adherents. The new Pope involved Capranica in his general hatred of the Colonna party, denied him the Cardinal’s hat, and showed the greatest animosity against him. Capranica for a time was driven to hide himself, and at last set off to Basel to obtain from the Council the justice which was refused him by the Pope. On his way through Siena he engaged as secretary a young man, aged twenty-six, Eneas Sylvius Piccolomini, sprung from an old but impoverished family. Eneas found the need of making his way in the world, and eagerly embraced this opportunity of finding a wider field for the talents which he had already begun to display in the University of Siena. No one suspected that this young Sienese secretary was destined to play a more important part in the history of the Council and of the Church than any of those already at Basel; when in May Capranica entered Basel, where he was received with distinction, and in time received full recognition of his rank, which Eugenius IV afterwards confirmed.

In Italy Eugenius IV found that things were going against him. In Rome the Cardinals were by no means satisfied with the aspect of affairs and many of them secretly left the city. The efforts of Eugenius IV to stop Sigismund’s progress and raise up enemies to him in Italy were not successful. From Piacenza Sigismund passed to
Parma and thence in May to Lucca, where he was threatened with siege by the Florentines. In July he advanced safely to Siena, where he fixed his abode till he could go to Rome. In Basel the Council pursued its course with firmness and discretion. The conference with the Bohemians at Eger resulted in the settlement of preliminaries about the appearance of Bohemian representatives at Basel. The Bohemians claimed that they should be received honorably, allowed a fair hearing, be regarded in the discussion as free from all ecclesiastical censures, be allowed to use their own worship, and be permitted to argue on the grounds of God’s law, the practice of Christ, the Apostles, and the primitive Church, as well as Councils and doctors founded on the same true and impartial judge. Their proposals were willingly received by the majority at Basel, and in the fourth session, on June 20, a safe-conduct to their representatives was issued. At the same time a blow was aimed against the Pope by a decree that, if a vacancy occurred in the Papacy, the new election should be made at Basel and not elsewhere. Another and still bolder proceeding was the appointment by the Council of the Cardinal of S. Eustachio as legate for Avignon and the Venaisin, on the ground that the city was dissatisfied with the Papal governor and the Council thought it right to interfere in the interests of peace.

Eugenius IV saw that unless he took some steps to prevent it another schism was imminent. He attempted to renew negotiations with Sigismund, and sent four envoys, headed by the Archbishops of Tarento and Colocza, to Basel, where they arrived on August 14. They proposed a future Council at Avignon, Mantua, or Ferrara. It was evident that the sole object of the Papal envoys was to shake the allegiance of waverters and spread discord in the Council. To repel this insidious attempt the promoters of the Council, in its sixth session, on September 6, accused the Pope and Cardinals of contumacy, for not appearing in answer to the summons, and demanded that sentence should be passed against them. The Papal envoys were driven to demand a prolongation of the term allowed, which was granted. After this, on September 6, Cesarini again resumed the presidency of the Council, judging, it would seem, that moderation was more than ever necessary.

Eugenius IV now turned his attention to Sigismund, whose position in Siena was sufficiently pitiabie. Deserted by the Duke of Milan and his Italian allies, he was cut off by the Florentine forces from advancing to Rome, and was, as he himself said, caged like a wild beast within the walls of Siena. It was natural that Sigismund should be anxious to catch at the Pope’s help to release him from such an ignominious position. When Eugenius IV promised to send two Cardinals to confer with him, Sigismund wrote to the Council urging it to suspend its process against the Pope, until he tried the result of negotiations, or of a personal interview. The Council was uneasy at this, and begged Sigismund to have no dealings with the Pope until he recognized its authority. Sigismund answered, on October 31, that such was his intention, but that he judged it wise to see the Pope personally, and so arrange things peaceably. The Council grew increasingly suspicious, and Sigismund did not find that his negotiations with the Pope were leading to any satisfactory conclusion. Again he swung round to the Council’s side, which, strengthened by his support, in its eighth session, on December 12, granted Eugenius IV and the Cardinals a further term of sixty days, within which they were to give in their adhesion to the Council, or the charge of contumacy against them would be proceeded with.

So far Sigismund and the Council were agreed; but their ends were not the same. Sigismund wished only for a pacification of Bohemia and his own coronation; so far as
the Council promoted these ends it was useful to him, and he was resolved to use it to the uttermost. Accordingly, on January 22, 1433, William of Bavaria prevailed on the Council to pass a decree taking the King under its protection. By this means Sigismund was helped both against the Pope and the Council; for if the Council made good its claim to elect a new Pope, it might proceed to elect a new King of the Romans as well. The reason of this decree was a rumour that Eugenius IV intended to excommunicate Sigismund. The Council pronounced all Papal proceedings against him to be null and void.

Eugenius IV at last felt himself beaten. The Council had taken precautions against every means of attack which the Papal authority possessed. The Pope had succeeded in driving Sigismund to espouse warmly the Council’s cause, and was alarmed to hear that he was engaged in negotiating peace with the Florentines. The arrival of the Bohemian envoys at Basel, on January 4, gave the Council a real importance in the eyes of Europe. The Council was conscious of its strength, and on February 18 appointed judges to examine the process against Eugenius IV. But Eugenius had been preparing to retreat step by step from a position which he felt to be untenable, and strove to discover the smallest amount of concession which would free him from his embarrassment. He sent envoys to Basel, who proposed that the Council should transfer itself to Bologna; when this was refused, they asked that it should select some place in Italy for a future Council. Next they offered that the question whether the Council should be held in Germany or Italy should be referred to a committee of twelve; finally they proposed that any city in Germany except Basel should be the seat of a new Council. When the Fathers at Basel would have none of these things, Eugenius IV at last issued a Bull announcing his willingness that the Council should be held at Basel, whither he proposed to send his legates; on March 1 he nominated four Cardinals to that office.

Sigismund rejoiced at this removal of the obstacles which stood in the way of his coronation; he was anxious that the Council should accept the Pope’s Bull and so do away with all hostility between himself and Eugenius IV. But the Fathers at Basel looked somewhat suspiciously on the concessions which had been wrung with such difficulty from the Pope. They observed that the Bull did not recognize the existing Council, but declared that a Council should be held by his legates. Moreover, he limited the scope of the Council to the two points of the reduction of heretics and the pacification of Christendom, omitting the reformation of the Church. It was argued that Eugenius IV had not complied with their demand that he should withdraw his dissolution; he refused to recognize anything done at Basel before the coming of his legates. Determined to affirm its authority before the arrival of the Papal legates, the Council passed a decree on April 27, renewing the decree of Constance about the celebration of General Councils at least every tenth year; asserting that the members of a Council might assemble of their own accord at the fixed period; and that a Pope who tried to impede or prorogue a Council should after four months' warning be suspended, and then after two months be deprived of office. It was decreed that the present Council could not be dissolved nor transferred without the consent of two-thirds of each deputation and the subsequent approbation of two-thirds of a general congregation. The Cardinals were henceforth to make oath before entering the Conclave that whoever was elected Pope would obey the Constance decrees. To give all possible notoriety to these decrees, all prelates were ordered to publish them in their synods or chapters. So far as a new constitution can be secured on paper, the Council of Basel made sure for the future the new principles of Church Government on which it claimed to act. It was a
transference to ecclesiastical matters of the parliamentary opposition to monarchy which was making itself felt in European politics.

When the Papal legates arrived and claimed to share with Cesarini the office of president, Cesarini answered that he was the officer of the Council and must obey their will in the matter. The Council, in a congregation on June 13, answered that they could not admit the claim of the Pope to influence their deliberations by means of his legates: not only the President, but the Pope himself, was bound to obey the Council's decrees. They were bent upon asserting most fully the supremacy of a General Council, and aimed at converting the Pope into its chief official. The concessions made by Eugenius IV had not ended the conflict between him and the Fathers at Basel. They had rather brought more clearly to light the full opposition that had arisen between the ecclesiastical hierarchy and the Papal monarchy.

But Eugenius IV had not so much aimed at a reconciliation with the Council as a reconciliation with Sigismund. He saw that for this purpose concessions must be made to the Council; but he hoped with Sigismund’s help to reduce the Council in course of time. Sigismund's position in Italy made him eager to catch at any concession on the part of Eugenius which would allow him to proceed to his coronation without abandoning the Council, from which he hoped for a settlement of his Bohemian difficulties. He received with joy the Pope’s advances; and Eugenius on his side felt the need of Sigismund’s protection even in Rome. Five Cardinals besides Capranica had already left him and joined the Council. The officials of the Curia grew doubtful in their allegiance, and began to think that their interests would be better served in Basel than in Rome. On March 2, the anniversary of the Pope’s coronation, as he went from the commemoration service he was beset by members of the Curia, who craved with tears leave to depart, and followed him with their cries to the door of the Consistory. A few had leave given them, and all were bent on departure.

In this state of affairs Eugenius IV saw the wisdom of gratifying Sigismund in the two matters which he had at heart, the pacification of Italy and his coronation as Emperor. There were not many difficulties in the way of peace. Florence, Venice, and the Duke of Milan were all equally weary of war; and the Pope had little difficulty in inducing them to submit their grievances to Niccolo of Este, Lord of Ferrara, who at that time played the honorable part of mediator in Italian affairs. By his help the preliminaries of peace were arranged at Ferrara on April 7; and on the same day Sigismund's envoys arranged with the Pope the preliminaries of the Imperial coronation. Sigismund acknowledged that “he had always held and holds Eugenius as the true and undoubted Pope, canonically elected; and with all reverence, diligence, care, and labour, among all kings and princes, all persons in the world ecclesiastical as well as secular, venerates, protests, and acts in defense of his holiness, and the Church of God, so long as he shall live, faithfully and with a true heart, according to his knowledge and power, without fraud or guile, so far as with God's help he may”. He agreed also to stay at Rome for a time after his coronation, and labour for the peace of Christendom and especially of Italy.

This alliance of the Pope and Sigismund was naturally regarded with growing suspicion at Basel. Sigismund's letters to the Council changed in tone, and dwelt upon the evils of scandal in the Church and the disastrous effects of a schism. On May 9 he urged the Council to treat the Papal legates with kindness, and to abstain from anything that might lead to an open rupture. The Council loudly exclaimed that the Pope had
beguiled the King under the pretence of a coronation, and meant to keep him in Rome as a protection to himself. Sigismund, however, hastened his coronation, and on May 21 entered Rome with an escort of 600 knights and 800 foot. Riding beneath a golden canopy he was met by the city magistrates and a crowd of people. The bystanders thought that his deportment showed a just mixture of affability and dignity; his smiling face wore an expression of refinement and geniality, while his long grizzly beard lent majesty to his appearance. On the steps of S. Peter’s, Eugenius in pontifical robes greeted Sigismund, who kissed his foot, his hand, his face. After mass was said Sigismund took up his abode in the palace of the Cardinal of Arles, close to S. Peter’s. On Whit Sunday, May 31, the coronation took place. Before the silver door of S. Peter’s, Sigismund swore to observe all the constitutions made by his predecessors, as far back as Constantine, in favour of the Church. Then the Pope proceeded to the high altar and Sigismund was conducted by three Cardinals to the Church of S. John Lateran, where before the altar of S. Maurice he was consecrated canon of the Church. He returned to S. Peter’s, and took his place by the side of the Pope, each seated under a tabernacle erected for the purpose. The mass was begun, and after the epistle the Pope and Sigismund advanced to the altar. The Pope set on Sigismund's head first the white mitre of a bishop and then the golden crown; he took from the altar, and gave into his hands, the sword, the sceptre, and the golden apple of the Empire. When the mass was ended the Pope and Emperor gave one another the kiss of peace. Then Sigismund took the sword in his hand, and Eugenius, holding the crucifix, gave him his solemn benediction. When this was over they walked side by side to the church door: the Pope mounted his mule, which Sigismund led by the bridle for a few paces and then mounted his horse. Eugenius accompanied him to the bridge of S. Angelo, where Sigismund kissed his hand and he returned to the Vatican. On the bridge Sigismund, according to custom, exercised his new authority by dubbing a number of knights, Romans and Germans, amongst others his chancellor Caspar Schlick. The Imperial procession went through the streets to the Lateran, where Sigismund dismounted.

The days that followed were spent in formal business such as Sigismund delighted in. Letters had to be written and all grants and diplomas given by the King of the Romans needed the Imperial confirmation, which was a source of no small profit to the Imperial chancery. It is worth noticing that after his coronation Sigismund engraved on his seal a double eagle, to mark the union of his dignities of Emperor and Roman King. From this time dates the use of the double-headed eagle as the Imperial ensign.

It soon, however, became obvious that Sigismund's coronation had affected his relations towards the Council. He was still anxious for its success in the important points of the reconciliation of the Bohemians; but he had no longer any interest in the constitutional question of the relations which ought to exist between Popes and General Councils. No doubt this question had been a useful means of bringing Eugenius IV to acknowledge the Council; now that he had done so, and Sigismund had obtained from the Pope what he wanted, his instincts as a practical statesman taught him that in the midst of the agitation of European politics it was hopeless for a Council to continue on abstract grounds a struggle against the Pope, which could only lead to another schism. On June 4 he wrote to the Council announcing his coronation, and saying that he found in the Pope the best intentions towards furthering all the objects which the Council had at heart. His envoys on their arrival at Basel found the Council preparing accusations against Eugenius, and the seven Cardinals present engaged in discussing the canonicity of his election. They had some difficulty in persuading the Council to moderation, but at
last obtained on July 13 a decree which, while denouncing in no measured terms the contumacy of Eugenius IV, extended again for sixty days the period for an unreserved withdrawal of his Bull of dissolution, and for a declaration of his entire adhesion to the Council. If he did not comply within that time the Council would at once proceed to his suspension. Eugenius, trusting to the help of Sigismund, showed a less conciliatory spirit; for he issued a Bull withdrawing from the Council all private questions, and limiting its activity to the three points of the extirpation of heresy, the pacification of Christendom, and the reform of manners. In the same sense Sigismund’s envoys on August 18 brought a message to the Council, exhorting to greater diligence in the matters of pacification and reform, for so far no fruits of its energies were apparent. He warned it against creating a schism, for after extinguishing one at Constance he would rather die than see another. He begged the Fathers to suspend all proceedings against the Pope till his arrival at Basel, when he hoped to remove all difficulties between them and the Pope. The Council answered that it was the Pope and not the Council that was causing a schism; the relations of the Pope to a General Council was a matter concerning the faith and the reformation of the Church, and nothing could be done on these points till the present scandal was removed. Sigismund, in fact, was asking the Council to desist from measures which he had formerly urged. The Council naturally demanded securities for the future. Its position was undoubtedly logical, though practically unwise. Eugenius IV, to strengthen Sigismund's hands, issued a Bull on August 1 expressing, at Sigismund's request, his willingness and acquiescence that the Council should be recognized as valid from its commencement. He declared that he entirely accepted the Council, and demanded that his legates should be admitted as presidents, and that all proceedings against his person and authority should be rescinded. The Fathers at Basel naturally looked closely into the language of the Bull. They were not satisfied that the validity of the Council from the beginning should merely be tolerated by the Pope. They wished for the Papal 'decree and declaration' that it had been valid all along. Every step towards conciliation only brought into greater prominence the fact that the Council claimed to be superior to the Pope, and that Eugenius was determined not to suffer any derogation from the Papal autocracy.

In this view of Eugenius IV Sigismund acquiesced. He wished the Council to engage in more practical business, and he dreaded as a statesman the consequences of another schism. In this he was joined by the Kings of England and France, the German Electors, and the Duke of Burgundy. All of them urged upon the Council the inexpediency of provoking a schism. Eugenius IV’s repeated attempts at compromise at length created a feeling of sympathy in his favour. He had given way, it was urged, on the practical points at issue. The Council did not meet with much attention when it answered that he had not conceded the principle which was at stake in the conflict. The great majority were in favour of proceeding to the suspension of Eugenius IV when the term expired; but the remonstrances of the Imperial ambassadors, and the consideration that an open breach with Sigismund would render Basel an insecure place for the Council, so far prevailed that in the session of September 11 a further term of thirty days was granted to Eugenius IV, on the understanding that within that time Sigismund would appear in Basel.

Sigismund meanwhile at Rome had been employing his versatile mind in studying the antiquities of the city, and drinking in the enthusiasm of the Renaissance under the guidance of the famous antiquary Ciriaco of Ancona. He lived in familiar intercourse with Eugenius IV, and a story is told which illustrates the mixture of penetration and
levity which marked Sigismund's character. One day he said to the Pope, “Holy Father, there are three things in which we are alike, and three in which we are different. You sleep in the morning, I rise before daybreak; you drink water, I wine; you shun women, I pursue them. But in some things we agree: you distribute the treasures of the Church, I keep nothing for myself; you have gouty hands, I gouty feet; you are bringing the Church and I the Empire to the ground”. But these days of peaceful enjoyment were disturbed by the news from Basel, where it was clear that Sigismund’s presence was needed. On August 21 he left Rome, and journeyed through Perugia, Rimini, and Ferrara to Mantua. He would not go through the territories of the Duke of Milan, against whom he nourished the deepest anger. Venice took occasion of his wrath to make an alliance with him for five years, in return for which they gave the needy Emperor ten thousand ducats to pay the expenses of his journey from Rome to Germany. From Mantua Sigismund hastened to Basel, so as to reach it at the end of the term granted to the Pope. He arrived unexpectedly on October 11, having come through the Tyrol to the Lake of Constance, and thence by boat to Basel. So hasty had been his journey that he brought little baggage with him, and before entering Basel the Imperial beggar had to send to the magistrates for a pair of shoes.

The Fathers of the Council hastily assembled to show Sigismund such honor as they could. He was escorted to the cathedral, where he took his place on the raised seat generally occupied by the Cardinals, who now sat on lower benches. There he addressed the congregation, setting forth his zeal for the Council’s cause, as his hasty journey testified; he asked for further delay in the proceedings against the Pope, that he might carry out successfully the work of pacification on which he was engaged. To this the Council did not at once assent, but urged that the Pope’s suspension might help on Sigismund’s endeavors. Murmurs were heard on all sides, and it was clear that Sigismund’s authority was not omnipotent at Basel. The Council was filled with the enemies of Eugenius IV, and was convinced of its own power and importance. Sigismund reminded the Fathers that the Emperor was guardian of the temporalities of the Church. He was answered that it was also his duty to execute the decrees of the Church. He angrily asserted that neither he nor any of the kings and princes of Christendom would permit the horrors of another schism. In his vehemence he forgot his Latin, and gave schisma the feminine gender. It was maliciously said that he wished to show the Council how dear the matter was to his heart. At last the Council, which was not really in a position to resist, reluctantly granted a prolongation of the term to Eugenius IV for eight days.

Sigismund found it necessary to change his tactics and listen to the Council’s side of the quarrel, as at Rome he had listened to the Pope. He conferred with the ambassadors and with the chiefs of the Council, and was present at a public disputation on October 16 between the president, Cesarini, and the Papal envoys. Cesarini spoke for three hours in behalf of a Council’s superiority over a Pope. He argued that the Bulls of Eugenius IV refused to admit this proposition, and that without securing the means of a reformation of the head of the Church it was useless to reform the members; as to the Pope’s demand that all proceedings against himself should be revoked, there were no proceedings if only he did his duty. On behalf of Eugenius IV the Archbishop of Spoleto urged the sufficiency and reasonableness of his proposal, to revoke his decrees against the Council if the Council would revoke its proceedings against himself. There were replies and counter-replies, but both parties were equally far from an agreement. A second prolongation of eight days to Eugenius IV was obtained by Sigismund by a
repetition of his former assertion, that he could not endure a schism. This was succeeded by a third, on which Sigismund repeated an old doggerel about the three Emperors Otto, which afforded him a pun on the eight days of the prolongation.

Sigismund and the ambassadors of France united in urging the Council to give Eugenius IV a security that no proceedings would be taken affecting his title to the Papacy. Words ran high on this proposal, and at length, on November 7, Sigismund'spersistency succeeded in extorting from the Council a further term of ninety days, within which the Pope was to explain the ambiguities in his decrees by revoking anything which could be construed to the derogation or prejudice of the Council.

In the interval Sigismund urged the Council to proceed with the question of reform, a matter which had been making little progress during the excitement of this conflict with the Pope. The only point inwhich the Council had taken up reform was to use it as a Weapon against the Pope. On July 13 a decree had been passed abolishing reservations and provisions except in the domain of the Holy See, and enacting that elections should be made only by those to whom the right belonged, and that no dues be paid for Papal confirmation. This was merely an onslaught on the Pope's revenues, and was scarcely meant seriously. In answer to Sigismund's exhortations the Council embodied, in a decree on November 26, the only point on which there was agreement, the revival of the synodal system of the Church. The Council's scheme of reform was to extend the conciliar system to all parts of the ecclesiastical organization. By means of diocesan synods the bishops were to put down heresies and remedy scandals in their respective dioceses, and were to be themselves restrained by provincial synods, whose activity was to be in turn ensured by the recurrence of General Councils. It was on all grounds easier to agree on machinery which was to deal with questions in the future than to amend abuses in the present.

Even this measure of reform was secondary to a violent dispute which convulsed the Council concerning precedence in seats at the sessions between the ambassadors of the Imperial Electors and those of the Duke of Burgundy. So keen was the contention that it almost prevented the solemn celebration of the Christmas services, and was only ended in July, 1434, by assigning a separate bench to the representatives of the Electors immediately below the Cardinals, and arranging that the Burgundian envoys should sit next to those of kings. This burning question was further complicated by the claims of the envoys of the Duke of Brittany to be as good as those of the Duke of Burgundy; at last it was arranged that the Burgundians should sit on the right, the Bretons on the left.

In the middle of the controversy came envoys from Eugenius IV, on January 30, 1434, announcing that he had at last given way. They brought a Bull revoking all previous Bulls against the Council, acknowledging its legitimacy from its beginning, and declaring fully the Pope's adhesion to it. Great was Sigismund's joy at this triumph of his mediatorial policy. Great was the relief of all parties at Basel when, in the sixteenth session on February 3, the Council decreed that Eugenius IV had fully satisfied their admonition and summons. It was under the pressure of necessity that Eugenius IV had given way. His impetuous rashness had raised up enemies against him on every side. He had begun his pontificate by attacking the powerful family of the Colonna. He had plunged into Italian politics as a strong friend of Venice, and thereby had drawn upon himself the animosity of the wily Duke of Milan. With these elements of disturbance at his doors he had not hesitated to bid defiance to a Council which had the support of the whole of Christendom. Basel had become in consequence the resort
of the personal and political enemies of the Pope, and on Sigismund's departure from Rome Eugenius was threatened in his own city. The Duke of Milan sent against him the condottiere Niccolo de Fortebracchio, nephew of Braccio da Montone, who on August 25, 1433, captured Ponte Molle. The Pope fled for safety to the Church of S. Lorenzo in Damaso, and in vain called for help. Fortebracchio, aided by the Colonna party, took possession of Tivoli and styled himself 'the General of the Holy Council'. Francesco Sforza, won over to the side of the Duke of Milan by the promise of the hand of his natural daughter Bianca, invaded the March of Ancona, and scornfully dated his letters 'invito Petro at Paulo', 'against the will of Peter and Paul'. The Duke of Milan was supported by the Council, which Sigismund in vain tried to interest in the pacification of Italy. The name of the Council lent a colourable pretext to all acts of aggression. Eugenius IV found himself destitute of allies. Never had the Papacy been in a more helpless condition. No course was possible except submission.

Accordingly Eugenius IV made his peace with the Council, and then proceeded to face his enemies at home. He detached Francesco Sforza from the side of Milan by appointing him, on March 25, Vicar of the March of Ancona which he had overrun. Sforza willingly exchanged the dubious promises of Filippo Maria Visconti for an assured position. But the Duke of Milan sent to the aid of Fortebracchio the condottiere Niccolo Piccinino; before their superior forces Sforza was driven to retire, and the blockade of Rome was continued. The sufferings of a siege were more than the Romans cared to endure for the sake of an unpopular Pope. It was easy for the foes of Eugenius IV to raise the people in rebellion.

A crowd flocked to S. Maria in Trastevere, whither Eugenius had retired for safety, to lay their grievances before the Pope. They were referred to his nephew, the Cardinal Francesco Correr, who listened to them with haughty indifference. When they complained of the loss of their cattle, he answered that they busied themselves too much about cattle; the Venetians who had none led a much more refined and civilized life. The remark might be true, but it was not consoling. The people resolved to take matters into their own hands, and on the evening of May 29 raised the old cry of "The people and freedom!", stormed the Capitol, and set up once more their old republic under seven governors. Next day they demanded of the Pope that he should hand over to them the castles of S. Angelo and Ostia, give them his nephew as a hostage, and come himself to take up his abode in the palace of his predecessor by the Church of SS. Apostoli. When Eugenius refused, his nephew was dragged away by force in spite of his entreaties, and he was threatened with imprisonment. Eugenius heard that the palace of SS. Apostoli was being prepared for his custody, and he knew that there he would be the prisoner of the Council and the Duke of Milan.

'There was no escape except by flight, which was difficult, as his abode was closely guarded. At last a pirate of Ischia, Vitellio, who had a ship at Ostia, was prevailed upon to help the Pope in his need. His Florence, aid was secured just in time, as on the evening of June 4 the Pope was to be removed to the palace of SS. Apostoli. At midday, when everyone was taking his siesta, Eugenius and one of his attendants, disguised as Benedictine monks, escaped the vigilance of the sleepy guards, mounted a couple of mules and rode to the Tiber bank, where a small dirty boat was prepared for them. A few bishops professed to be waiting for an audience with the Pope, so as to lull the suspicion of his guards. But the two mules left riderless on the bank, and the unwonted energy of the rowers, made the spectators give the alarm. The people of Trastevere gave chase along the bank, hurling stones and shooting arrows at the boat. The wind was
contrary, the bark was crazy, the crowd of pursuers increased along both banks; Eugenius lay at the bottom of the boat covered by a shield. When the Church of S. Paolo was passed, and the river became broader, the fugitives hoped that their danger was over; but the Romans ran on before, and seized a fishing boat, which, filled with armed men, they laid across the stream. Luckily for Eugenius his boat was commanded by one of the pirate’s crew whose courage was equal to the occasion. In vain the Romans hurled their darts, and promised him large sums of money if he would deliver up the Pope. He ordered his boat to charge the enemy. Their boat was old and rotten, and they feared the encounter. The prow turned aside and the Pope’s boat shot safely past. Eugenius could now rise from his covering of shields, and sit upright with a sigh of thankfulness. He reached Ostia in safety and went on board the pirate's ship. There he was joined by a few members of the Curia who had succeeded in fleeing. He sailed to Pisa and thence made his way to Florence, where he was honorably received on June 23, and like his predecessor, Martin V, took up his abode in the cloister of S. Maria Novella. There he could reflect that his inconsiderate obstinacy had endangered at Basel his spiritual supremacy, and handed over his temporal possessions to the condottieri of the Duke of Milan.
CHAPTER V.
The Council of Basel and the Hussites
1432-1434.

If the downfall of Eugenius IV was due to his obstinacy, the prestige of the Council, which enabled it to reap the advantage of his weakness, was due to the Bohemia hopes which were conceived of a peaceable ending of the Bohemian revolt. It was much easier for a Council than for a Pope to open negotiations with victorious heretics, and the Bohemians on their side were not averse from an honorable peace. Bohemia, with a population of four or five millions, had suffered much during its ten years' struggle against the rest of Europe. Its victories were ruinous to the conquerors; its plundering raids brought no real wealth. The commerce of Bohemia was annihilated; its lands were uncultivated; the nation was at the mercy of the Taborite army, which no longer consisted solely of the God-fearing peasants, but was recruited by adventurers from the neighboring lands. The policy of Procopius the Great was, by striking terror, to prepare the way for peace, that so Bohemia, with its religious liberty assured, might again enter the confederacy of European States. When the Council of Basel held out hopes of peace he was ready to try what could be won; and Bohemia consented to send representatives to Basel for the purpose of discussion.

Accordingly the Council proceeded to prepare for its great undertaking. In November, 1432, it appointed four doctors, John of Ragusa, a Slav; Giles Carlier, a Frenchman; Heinrich Kalteisen, a German; and John of Palomar, a Spaniard, to undertake the defense of the Church doctrine against the Four Articles of Prague. These doctors zealously studied their case with the aid of all the theologians present at Basel. As the time of the advent of the Bohemians drew near, strict orders were given to the citizens to abstain from everything that might shock the Puritanism of their expected guests. Prostitutes were not to walk the streets; gambling and dancing were forbidden; the members of the Council were enjoined to maintain strict sobriety, and beware of following the example of the Pharisees of old, who taught well and lived ill. At the same time guards were set to see that the Bohemians did not spread their errors in the seat of the Council. On the part of the Bohemians seven nobles and eight priests, headed by Procopius the Great, were chosen by a Diet as their representatives at Basel. They rode with their attendants through Germany, a stately cavalcade of fifty horsemen, with a banner bearing their device of a chalice, under which was the inscription, ‘Veritas omnia vincit’ (Truth conquers all). In alarm lest their entry into Basel might seem like a demonstration and cause scandal, Cesarini sent to beg them to lay aside their banner. Before his messenger reached them they had taken boat at Schaffhausen, and entered Basel, quietly and unexpectedly, on the evening of January 4, 1433. The citizens flocked to gaze on them, wondering at their strange dress, the resolute faces, and fierce eyes of the men who had wrought such terrible deeds of valour. They were conducted to their hotels, where several members of the Council visited them, and Cesarini sent them presents of food. On January 6, the festival of the Epiphany, they celebrated the Communion in their lodgings, and curiosity drew many to attend their services.
They noticed that the Praguers used vestments and observed the customary ritual, with the sole exception that they communicated under both kinds. Procopius and the Taborites, on the other hand, used neither vestments nor altar, and discarded the mass service. After consecration of the elements they said the Lord’s Prayer and communicated round a table. A sermon was preached in German, at which many Catholics were present. This scandalized Cesarini, who sent for the Bohemians, and requested them to discontinue preaching in German. They answered that many of their followers were Germans, and the sermons were for their benefit; they had the right of performing their services as they thought fit, and meant to use it; they invited no one to come, but they were not bound to prevent them from doing so. Cesarini sent to the magistrates of the city a request that they would prevent the people from attending their preachings. The magistrates took no measures for this end; but after a few days the crowd grew weary of the novelty, and ceased of its own accord to attend. John of Ragusa makes a sage remark, which the advocates of religious protection would do well to remember: “Freedom and neglect succeeded where restraint and prohibition would have failed, for human frailty is always eager after what is forbidden”. The Bohemians, on their side, asked to be present at the sermons preached before the Council; permission was given on condition that they entered the cathedral after the reading of the Gospel, and left when the sermon was ended, so as not to be present at any part of the mass service.

Next day, January 7, Procopius invited John of Ragusa and others to dine; they had a general theological discussion, in which the predestinarian views of the Hussites came prominently forward. Most skilful among their controversialists was an Englishman, Peter Payne, an Oxford Lollard, who had fled to Bohemia, whom John of Ragusa found to be as slippery as a snake.

On January 9 the Council ordained that Wednesdays and Fridays should be strictly kept as fast days and prayers for union be said during the period of the negotiations with the Bohemians. A solemn procession was made for success in this arduous matter; forty-nine mitred prelates and about eight hundred other members of the Council took part in it. The Bohemians asked when and where they were to have an audience. Cesarini fixed the next day in the ordinary meeting-place of congregations, the Dominican monastery. The Bohemians objected to the place as being too small and out of the way; but Cesarini was firm in refusing to depart from the usage of the Council.

On January 10 the congregation assembled, and seats were assigned to the Bohemians on two rows of benches opposite the Cardinals. Cesarini opened the proceedings with a long and eloquent oration, in which, speaking in the person of the Church, he exhorted all to unity and peace, and addressed the Bohemians as sons whom their mother yearned to welcome back to her bosom. On the part of the Bohemians, John of Rokycana arose and took for his text, “Where is He that is born King of the Jews? We have seen His star in the east, and are come to worship Him”. He said that the Bohemians were seeking after Christ, and, like their Master, had been evil spoken of; he asked the Council not to be astonished if they said strange things, for truth was often found in strange ways; he praised the primitive Church and denounced the vices of the clergy of the present day. Finally, he thanked the Council for its courtesy, and asked for a day to be fixed for a full hearing. Cesarini answered that the Council was ready at any time; after a private conference the Bohemians fixed the next Friday, January 16.
The Bohemians brought with them to the Council the same spirit of reckless daring which had characterized them on the field of battle. Only on January 13 did they arrange finally their spokesmen, whereas the theologians of the Council had been for two months preparing their separate points. Each day the Bohemians paid visits to the Cardinals and prelates; they were received as a rule with great friendliness. At first some of the Cardinals tended to be cold, if not discourteous: but Cesarini’s anxious efforts to promote conciliatory conduct were in the end successful, and free social intercourse was established between the two parties. In a few days’ time a Cardinal discovered at least one bond of union between himself and the Bohemians; he laughingly said to Procopius: “If the Pope had us in his power he would hang us both”.

On January 16 the proceedings began with a ratification of the safe-conduct, and a formal verification of the powers of the Bohemian representatives. Then John of Rokycana began the controversy by a defense of the First Article of Prague, concerning the Communion under both kinds. He argued from the nature of the rite, from the words of the Gospel, the custom of the primitive Church, the decrees of the General Councils and the testimonies of the Fathers, that it was not only permissible but necessary. His speech extended over three days, and was listened to with great attention. When he ended Procopius sprang to his feet—a man of middle height, of stalwart frame, with a swarthy face, large flashing eyes, and a fierce expression of countenance. He passionately exhorted them to open their ears to the Gospel truth; Communion was a heavenly banquet, to which all were invited; let them beware lest they incurred punishment by despising it, for God could vindicate His own. The Fathers heard with amazement these expressions of a fervent conviction that right could be on the side opposed to the Church. Cesarini, with his wonted tact, interposed to prevent an untimely outbreak of zeal on the part of the Council. He suggested that the Bohemians should first speak, and then submit their arguments in writing, so that they might be fully answered on the side of the Council. This was agreed to, and the assembly dispersed.

On January 20 Nicolas of Pilgram began the defense of the Second Article of Prague—the suppression of public sins. He spoke for two days, but on the second day did not imitate the moderation of Rokycana. He attacked the vices of the clergy, their simony, their hindrance of the Word of God; he reproached them with the deaths of Hus and Jerome, whose saintly lives he defended. A murmur arose in the Council; some laughed scornfully, others gnashed their teeth; Cesarini, with folded hands, looked up to heaven. The speaker asked if he was to have a fair hearing according to promise. Cesarini ironically answered: “Yes, but pause sometimes to let us clear our throats”. Nicolas went on with his speech. Afterwards Rokycana blamed him for the bitterness of his invective, and expressed a wish to speak himself on the Third Article. He was overruled by the other ambassadors, and only at the last moment was it definitely settled that Ulrich of Zynaim was to be their spokesman.

On January 23 Ulrich began his arguments for the freedom of preaching, and also spoke for two days, urging the supremacy of the Word of God over the word of man, the danger of the substitution of the one for the other, the dignity of the true priest, and his duty to preach God’s Word in spite of all endeavours to prevent him. At the end of his first day’s speech Rokycana rose and said that he had heard that the Bohemians were accused of throwing snow at a crucifix on the bridge; they wished to deny it, and if it could be proved that any of their attendants had done so he should be punished. Cesarini answered that many tales were told about their doings, which, however, the Council had resolved to endure as well as their speeches. He wished, however, that they would
restrain their servants from going into the neighboring villages to spread their doctrines. He was answered that the servants only went to get fodder for the horses, and if the curious Germans asked them questions, such as, whether they held the Virgin Mary to be a virgin, no great harm was done if they answered, “Yes”. They promised, however, to see to the matter.

On January 26 Peter Payne began a three days’ speech on the temporal possessions of the clergy. He admitted that worldly goods were not to be entirely denied them, but, in the words of S. Paul, having food and raiment, therewith they should be content; all superfluities should be cut off from them, and they should in no case exercise temporal lordship. When he had finished his argument, he said that this doctrine was commonly supposed to originate from Wycliffe; he referred the Council, however, to the writings of Richard, Bishop of Armagh, and went on to give an account of Wycliffe’s teaching at Oxford, his own struggles in defense of Wycliffite opinions, and his flight into Bohemia. When he had ended, Rokycana thanked the Council for their patient and kindly hearing: if anything that they had said could be proved to be erroneous, they were willing to amend it. He asked that those who answered in the Council’s behalf should follow their example and reduce the heads of their arguments to writing. One of the Bohemian nobles, speaking in German, thanked William of Bavaria for his presence at the discussion. William assured them of his protection, and promised to procure for them as free and complete a hearing as they wished. Cesarini then proceeded to settle the preliminaries of the Council’s reply. First he asked if all the Bohemians were unanimous in their adherence to the arguments set forth by their speakers: he was answered, “Yes”. Cesarini then commented on the various points in the Bohemian speeches which gave him hopes of reconciliation. He said that the Council was resolved not to be offended at anything which was said contrary to the orthodox belief: but if any concord was to be obtained they must have everything under discussion. Besides the Four Articles, which had been put forward, he believed there were other points in which the Bohemians differed from the Church. One of their speakers had called Wycliffe “the evangelical doctor”; with a view to discover how far they held with Wycliffe he handed to them twenty-eight propositions taken from Wycliffe’s writings and six other questions, opposite to each of which he asked that they would write whether they held it or no. The Bohemians asked to deliberate before answering. It was the first attempt of the Council to break the ranks of the Bohemians by bringing to light the differences which existed amongst them.

On January 31 the reply on the part of the Council was begun. First came a sermon from a Cistercian abbot, which gave offence to the Bohemians by exhorting them to submit to the Council. Then John of Ragusa began his proof that the reception of the Communion under both kinds was not necessary and, when forbidden by the Church, was unlawful. His speech, which was a tissue of scholastic explanations of texts and types and passages from the Fathers, last till February 12. He angered the Bohemians by his tediousness and by the assumptions, which underlaid his speech, that they were heretics. Some stormy interruptions took place in consequence. On February 4 Procopius rose and protested against the tone adopted by the Cistercian abbot and John of Ragusa. “We are not heretics”, he exclaimed; “if you say that we ought to return to the Church, I answer that we have not departed from it, but hope to bring others to it, you amongst the rest”. There was a shout of laughter. “Is the speaker going to continue rambling over impertinent matter? Does he speak in his own name or in that of the Council? If in his own, let him be stopped: we did not take the trouble to come here to
listen to three or four doctors”. The Cistercian abbot and John of Ragusa both excused
themselves from any intention of violating the compact under which the Bohemians had
come to Basel. Rokycana asked: “You talk of the Church: what is the Church? We
know what Pope Eugenius says about you; your head does not recognize you as the
Universal Church. But we care little for that and hope only for peace and concord”.
Cesarini exhorted both sides to patience; he reminded the Bohemians that if they had
answered the twenty-eight articles proposed to them there would be less doubt about
their opinions, and it would be easier to decide what was pertinent and what was not.

On February 10 there was another outburst of feeling. John of Ragusa, in pursuing
his argument respecting the authority of the Church, was examining the objections that
might be raised to his positions. He introduced them by such phrases as “a heretic might
object”. This enraged the Bohemians; Rokycana rose and exclaimed: “I abhor heresy,
and if any one suspects me of heresy let him prove it”. Procopius, his eyes flashing with
rage, cried out: “We are not heretics, nor has any one proved us to be such; yet that
monk has stood and called us so repeatedly. If I had known this in Bohemia I would
never have come here”. John of Ragusa excused himself, saying, “May God show no
mercy to me if I had any intention of casting a slur on you”. Peter Payne ironically
exclaimed: “We are not afraid of you; even if you had been speaking for the Council
your words would have had no weight”. Again Cesarini cast oil on the waters,
beseeching them to take all things in good part. “There must be altercations”, he truly
said, “before we come to an agreement; a woman when she is in travail has sorrow”.
Next day the Archbishop of Lyons came to ask pardon for John of Ragusa. The
Bohemians demanded that the other three speakers should be more brief and should
speak in the name of the Council. During the remainder of John’s address Procopius
and another of the Bohemians refused to attend the conference.

It was agreed by the Council that the other three orators should speak in the
Council's name, reserving, however, the right of amending or adding to what they said.
Matters now went more peaceably. The speeches of Carlier, Kalteisen, and John of
Palomar, which were studiously moderate, extended till February 28. Meanwhile the
Bohemians, on being pressed to answer the twenty-eight articles submitted to them,
showed signs of their dissensions by standing on the treaty of Eger. They said that they
had only been commissioned to discuss the Four Articles of Prague, and they did not
think it right to complicate the business by introducing other topics.

The disputation had now come to an end; but Rokycana claimed to be allowed to
answer some of the statements of John of Ragusa, who demanded that, in that case, he
should also have the right of further reply. It was obvious that this procedure might go
on endlessly; and Cesarini suggested that a committee of four on each side should be
nominated for private conference. However, on March 2, Rokycana began his reply,
which lasted till March 10. When he had ended, John of Ragusa rose and urged that the
Bohemians were bound to hear him in reply. The Bohemians announced that they
would hear him if they thought fit, but they were not bound to do so. “

We will put you to shame throughout the world”, said John angrily, “if you go
away without hearing our answers”.

Rokycana sarcastically said that John of Ragusa scarcely maintained the dignity of
a doctor.

“And yet”, he added, “before we came here, we had never heard that there was such
a person in the world. Still, I have proved that his sayings are erroneous; for is it not
erroneous”, and he raised his voice with passionate earnestness, “to say that either man or council can change the precepts of Christ, who said: Heaven and earth shall pass away, but ‘My words shall not pass away’?”

It was clear that such war of orators was preventing rather than furthering the union which both parties professed to seek. William of Bavaria interposed his mediation; and the Council deputed fifteen members, chief of whom was Cesarini, to arrange matters in private with the fifteen Bohemian representatives. Their meetings, which began on March 11, were opened with prayer by Cesarini, who exerted all his persuasive eloquence and tact to induce the Bohemians to incorporate themselves with the Council, which would then proceed to settle the differences existing between them. The discussions on this point were at last summed up by Peter Payne:

“You say: ‘Be incorporated, return, be united’; we answer: ‘Return with us to the primitive Church; be united with us in the Gospel’. We know what power our voice has, so long as we are one party and you another; what power it would have after our incorporation experience has abundantly shown”.

The Bohemians began to speak of departing; but a learned German theologian, Nicolas of Cusa, raised the question—if the Council allowed the Bohemians the Communion under both kinds, which they regarded as a matter of faith, would they agree to incorporation? if so, the other questions, which only concerned morals, might be subjected to discussion. At first the Bohemians suspected a snare; but William of Bavaria assured them of his sincerity. After deliberating, the Bohemians refused incorporation, as being beyond the powers given them as representatives; moreover, if they were incorporated and the Council decided against them, they could not accept its decision. An attempt was made to advance further by means of a smaller committee of four on each side; but it only became obvious that nothing more could be done in Basel, that the Bohemian representatives were not disposed to take any decided step, and that, if the Council intended to proceed with the negotiations, they must send envoys to Bohemia to treat with the Diet and the people.

Meanwhile disputations continued before the Council, in which Rokycana, Peter Payne, and Procopius showed themselves formidable controversialists. They had been formed in a ruder and more outspoken school than that of the theological professors who were pitted against them. John of Ragusa especially met with no mercy. One day he was so pedantic as to say that he did not wish to derogate from the dignity of his university.

“How so?” asked Rokycana.

“According to the statutes”, said John of Ragusa, “a doctor is not bound to answer a master; nevertheless, as it concerns the faith, I will answer you”.

“Certainly”, was the retort; “John of Ragusa is not better than Christ; nor John of Rokycana worse than the devil; yet Christ answered the devil”.

Another time, when John of Ragusa had been speaking at great length, Rokycana remarked: “He is one of the preaching friars, and is bound to say a great deal”.

Kalteisen, in his reply to Ulrich of Zynaim, reproved him for having said that monks were introduced by the devil.

“I never said so”, interrupted Ulrich.
Procopius rose: “I said one day to the President: If bishops have succeeded to the place of the Apostles, and priests to the place of the seventy-two disciples, to whom except the devil have the rest succeeded?”

There was loud laughter, amid which Rokycana called out: “Doctor, you should make Procopius Provincial of your Order”.

It was at length arranged that on April 14 the Bohemians should return to their own land, whither the Council undertook to send ten ambassadors who should treat with the Diet in Prague. Procopius wrote to inform the Bohemians of this, and urged them to assemble in numbers at the Diet on June 7, for great things might be done. On April 13 the Bohemians took farewell of the Council. Rokycana in the name of all expressed their thanks for the kindness they had received. Then Procopius rose and said that he had often wished to speak, but had never had an opportunity. He spoke earnestly about the great work before the Council, the reformation of the Church, which all men longed for with sighs and groans. He spoke of the worldliness of the clergy, the vices of the people, the intrusion into the Church of the traditions of men, the general neglect of preaching. Cesarini, on the part of the Council, recapitulated all that had been done, and begged them to continue in Bohemia the work that he trusted had been begun in Basel. He thanked Rokycana for his kindly words: turning to Procopius, he called him his personal friend and thanked him for what he had said about the reformation of the Church, which the Council would have been engaged in, if they had not been employed in conference with the Bohemians. Finally he gave them his benediction and shook them each by the hand. Rokycana also raised his hand, and in a loud voice said: “May the Lord bless and preserve this place in peace and quiet”. Then they took their leave; as they were going, a fat Italian archbishop ran after them and with tears in his eyes shook them by the hand. On April 14 they left Basel, accompanied by the ambassadors of the Council.

The conference at Basel was most honorable to all who were concerned in it; it showed a spirit of straightforwardness, charity and mutual forbearance. It was no slight matter in those days for a Council of theologians to endure to listen to the arguments of heretics already condemned by the Church. It was no small thing for the Bohemians, who were already masters in the field, to curb their high spirit to a war of words. Yet, in spite of occasional outbursts, the general result of the conference at Basel was to promote a good feeling between the two parties. Free and friendly intercourse existed between the Bohemians and the leading members of the Council, chiefly owing to the exertions of Cesarini, whose nobility and generosity of character produced a deep impression on all around him. But in spite of the friendliness with which they were received, and the personal affection which in some cases they inspired, the Bohemians could not help being a little disappointed at the general results of their visit to Basel. They had been somewhat disillusioned. They came with the same moral earnestness and childlike simplicity which had marked Hus at Constance. They hoped that their words would prevail, that their arguments would convince the Council that they were not heretics, but rested on the Gospel of Christ. They were chilled by the attitude of superiority which showed itself in all the Council’s proceedings, and which was the more irritating because they could not formulate it in any definitely offensive words or acts. The assumption of an infallible Church, to which all the faithful were bound to be united, was one which the Bohemians could neither deny nor accept. In Bohemia the preachers had been wont to denounce those who departed from the Gospel; in Basel they found themselves the objects of kindly reprobation because they had
departed from the Church. It gradually became clear that they were not likely to induce the Council to reform the Church in accordance with their principles: the utmost that would be granted was a Concordat with Bohemia which would allow it to retain some of its peculiar usages and opinions without separation from the Catholic Church. The Bohemian representatives had failed to convince the Council; it remained to be seen if the good feeling which had grown up between the two contending parties would enable the Council to extend, and the Bohemian people to accept, a sufficient measure of toleration to prevent the breach of the outward unity of the Church.

The ten ambassadors of the Council, chief amongst whom were the Bishops of Coutances and Augsburg, Giles Carlier, John of Palomar, Thomas Ebendorfer of Haselbach, Canon of Vienna, John of Geilhausen, and Alexander, an Englishman, Archdeacon of Salisbury, travelled peaceably to Prague, where they were received with every show of respect and rejoicing on May 8. They spent the time till the assembling of the Diet in interchanging courtesies with the Bohemian leaders. On May 24 a Bohemian preacher, Jacob Ulk, inveighed in a sermon against the Council's envoys, and bade the people beware of Basel as of a basilisk which endeavored to shed its venom on every side. He attempted to raise a riot, but it was put down by Procopius, and the magistrates issued an edict that no one under pain of death was to offend the Council's ambassadors. On June 13 the Diet assembled, and after preliminary addresses John of Palomar submitted the Council's proposal for the incorporation of the Bohemians and the common settlement of their differences in the Council. He was answered that the Council of Constance was the origin of all the wars and troubles that had beset Bohemia; the Bohemians had always wished for peace, but they were firm in their adhesion to the Four Articles of Prague:

1.- Freedom to preach the Word of God.

2.- Celebration of the Lord’s Supper in both kinds, bread and wine to priests and laity alike.

3.- No secular power for the clergy.

4.- Punishment for the mortal sins,

and they wished to hear the Council’s decision respecting them. John of Palomar at once answered that the Four Articles seemed to be held in different senses by different parties among the Bohemians; before he could give the Council’s opinion, he wished them to be defined in writing in the sense in which they were universally believed. It was the first step towards bringing to light the dissensions of the Bohemian parties. A definition drawn up by the University of Prague was repudiated by the Taborites as containing treacherous concessions. Rokycana gave a verbal answer, and a committee of eight deputies of the Diet was appointed to confer on this point with the ambassadors of the Council. A definition was then drawn up in which the Council’s side gained nothing. They saw that by this procedure they would merely drift back to the disputation which they had in Basel.

Accordingly on June 25 the Council’s ambassadors took the decided step of negotiating secretly with some of the Calixtin nobles, to whom they said that the Council would most probably allow to the Bohemians the Communion under both kinds, if they would incorporate themselves for the discussion of the other points. This was received with joy by some of the nobles, amongst whom a party in favour of this course was gradually organized. The Diet inquired under what form such privilege
would be granted, and a proposed form was presented by the ambassadors. The Diet, in answer, drew up on January 29 a form of their own, which, if the Council accepted, they were willing to unite with it. As the form contained the full acceptance of the Four Articles of Prague, the ambassadors refused to entertain it. On July 1 they again had a meeting in Rokycana’s house with some of the Calixtin nobles, who agreed to moderate the form into such a shape that another Bohemian deputation might take it to Basel. In the discussion that ensued in the Diet some sharp things were said. When the Council's ambassadors begged the Bohemians to forget the past and be as they had been twenty years ago, Procopius scornfully exclaimed, “In the same way you might argue that we ought to be as we were a thousand years ago when we were pagans”. A statement, however, was drawn up that the Bohemians agreed to unite with the Council and obey “according to God’s Word”. Three ambassadors, Mathias Landa, Procopius of Bilsen, and Martin Lupak, were appointed to take this, together with an exposition of the Four Articles, to the Council. They, with the Council’s envoys, left Prague on July 11 and reached Basel on August 2, where they were received with joy.

The object of this first embassy of the Council was to survey the ground and report the position of affairs in Bohemia. On July 31 one of the envoys, who was sent on before, announced to the Council that everywhere in Bohemia they had found a great desire for peace, and had been listened to by the Diet with a courtesy and decorum which the Council would do well to imitate. He urged that conciliation be tried to the utmost. The other envoys on their arrival gave a full report of their proceedings to the Council, which appointed a committee of six to be elected from each deputation who, together with the Cardinals, were to confer on future proceedings. Before this committee John of Palomar on August 13 made a secret report of the general aspect of affairs in Bohemia. He said that neither the nobles nor the people were free, but were tyrannized over by a small but vigorous party, which feared to lose its power if any reconciliation with the Church took place; the strength of this party lay in the hatred of the Bohemians to German domination, and their willingness to carry on war to escape it. He sketched the position of the three chief sects, the Calixtins, Orphans, and Taborites; the only point on which they all agreed was the reception of the Communion under both kinds. The first party wished to obtain the use of their rite by peaceable means and desired union with the Church; the second party desired to be in the bosom of the Church, but would take up arms and fight desperately to defend what they believed to be necessary; the third party was entirely opposed to the Church, and was not to be won over by any concessions, for the confiscation of the goods of the clergy was their chief desire.

The commission then proceeded to deliberate whether the Communion under both kinds could be conceded to the Bohemians, and what answer the Council should return to the other three articles, of which the Bohemian envoys brought a definition to the Council. The discussions lasted for a fortnight, and on August 26 an extraordinary congregation was held, which was attended by the prelates at Basel and 160 doctors, who were all bound by oath of secrecy. John of Palomar put before them, on behalf of the commission, the pressing need of settling the Bohemian question, and the desirability of making some concession for that purpose. He argued that the Church might lawfully do so, and follow the example of Paul in his dealings with the Corinthians; for he “caught them by guile”. The Bohemian people was intractable and would not enter the fold of the Church like other Christians; they must treat it gently as one treats a mule or horse to induce it to submit to the halter. When once the Bohemians
had returned to union with the Church, their experience of the miseries of a separation from it would lead them to submit to the common rites of Christendom rather than run new risks in the future. Cesarini followed in the same strain; and next day William of Bavaria, on behalf of Sigismund, urged the interest of the Emperor in securing his recognition, by means of the Council, as King of Bohemia. After three days’ deliberation it was agreed to concede the reception of the Communion under both kinds, and an answer to the other three articles was framed. But the secret was still kept from the Bohemian envoys, as the Council did not wish their decision to be known too soon in Bohemia, and they were also afraid lest Eugenius IV might interpose. On September 2 the Bohemians were dismissed with kindly words and the assurance of the dispatch of four envoys from the Council to Prague. Four of the previous embassy—the Bishop of Coutances, John of Palomar, Henry Toh, and Martin Verruer—set out on September 11.

The second embassy from Basel did not meet with such a peaceable entrance into Bohemia as had the first. War had again broken out, a war in which were involved the contending interests of the Council and the Hussites. In the very middle of Bohemia there still remained a city which held fast by the cause of Catholicism and Sigismund. In the reaction which ensued after the first successes of the commencement of the Hussite movement, the strong city of Pilsen in the south-west of Bohemia had swung back to Catholicism, and from its numerous outlying fortresses had defied all efforts to reduce it. Year by year their sufferings from Hussite attacks made the inhabitants grow firmer in their resistance; and when the Council’s envoys first came as spies into the land the Bohemians keenly felt the disadvantage under which they lay in their negotiations when they could not offer a decided front to their foe. Messengers from Pilsen visited the Basel ambassadors and prayed for help from the Council. As the Bohemians began to see that all that the Council would grant them was a recognition of their exceptional position, they felt the need of absolute internal unity if they were to secure or maintain it. The Diet decreed a vigorous siege of Pilsen; the Council’s ambassadors protracted their negotiations to allow the men of Pilsen to gather in their harvest; and later the Fathers of Basel sent a contribution of money to the aid of Pilsen, and used their influence to prevail on Nurnberg to do the same. On July 14 the Bohemian army began the siege of Pilsen, and in the beginning of September the besieging host had grown to 36,000 men. The might of the Hussites was directed to secure religious unity within their land.

Pilsen was strongly defended, and the besiegers began to suffer from hunger. Foraging parties were sent to greater distances, and on September 16 a detachment of 1400 foot and 500 horse was sent by Procopius under the command of John Pardus to harry Bavaria. As Pardus was returning laden with spoil, he was suddenly attacked by the Bavarians; his troops were almost entirely cut to pieces, and he himself, with a few followers, made his escape with difficulty to the camp at Pilsen. Great was the wrath of the Bohemian warriors at this disgrace to their arms. They rushed upon Pardus as a traitor, and even hurled a stool at Procopius, who tried to protect him; the stool hit Procopius on the head with such violence that the blood streamed down his face. The wrath of the chiefs was turned against him; he was imprisoned, and the man who had thrown the stool was made general in his stead. This excitement lasted only a few days. Procopius was released and restored to his former position, but his proud spirit had been deeply wounded by the sense of his powerlessness in an emergency. He refused the command, and left the camp never to return.
This was the news which greeted the Council's envoys when they reached Eger on September 27. They feared to advance farther in the present excited condition of men's minds. The Bohemians in vain tried to discover what message they brought from the Council. The leaders of the army before Pilsen at length sent two of their number to conduct them safely to Prague, where they said that the Diet could not assemble: before S. Martin's Day, November 11. The fears of the envoys were entirely dispelled by the cordial welcome which they received in Prague on their arrival, October 22. A plague was ravaging the city, and the physicians vied with one another in precautions for ensuring the safety of their city's guests. The preacher still raised his voice against them; they had honey on their lips but venom in their heart, they wished to bring back Sigismond, who would cut off the people's heads for their rebellion.

The proceedings of the Diet, which opened on November 17 resolved themselves into a diplomatic contest between the Council's envoys and the Bohemians. The Council was trying to make the smallest concessions possible, the Bohemians were anxious to get all they could. But the four envoys of Basel had the advantage in contending with an assembly like the Diet. They could gauge the effect produced by each concession; they could see when they had gone far enough to have hopes of success. Moreover, they knew definitely the limits of concession which the Council would grant, while the Bohemians were too much at variance amongst themselves to know definitely what they were prepared to accept. Accordingly, after the preliminary formalities were over, the Council's envoys began to practise economy in their concessions. John of Palomar, after a speech in which he lauded General Councils and recapitulated all that the Fathers at Basel had done to promote unity, proceeded to give the limitations under which the Council was prepared to admit three of the Articles; about the fourth, the Communion under both kinds, he said that the envoys had powers to treat if the declaration which he had made about the other three was satisfactory to the Bohemians. The Diet demanded to have the Council's decision on this also put before them. The envoys pressed to have an answer on the three Articles first. For two days the struggle on this point continued; then the envoys asked, before speaking about the Communion, for an answer to the question whether, if an agreement could be come to on the Four Articles, the Bohemians would consent to union. John of Rokycana answered on behalf of all, “We would consent”; and all the Diet cried “Yes, yes”. Only Peter Payne rose and said: “We understand by a good end one in which we are all agreed”; but those around him admonished him to hold his tongue, and he was not allowed to continue. Then John of Palomar read a declaration setting forth that the Communion under one kind had been introduced into the Church, partly to correct the Nestorian error that in the bread was contained only the body of Christ, and in the wine only His blood, partly to guard against irreverence and mishap in the reception of the elements; nevertheless, as the Bohemian use was to administer under both kinds, the Council was willing that they should continue to do so till the matter had been fully discussed. If they still continued in their belief, permission would be given to their priests so to administer it to those who, having reached years of discretion, asked for it. The Bohemians were dissatisfied with this. They complained that the Council said nothing which could satisfy the honor of Bohemia. They demanded that their words, that the reception under both kinds was “useful and wholesome”, should be adopted, and that the permission be extended to children.

On November 26 an amended form was submitted to the Diet, which became the basis of an agreement. Bohemia and Moravia were to make peace with all men. The
Council would accept this declaration and release them from all ecclesiastical censures. As regarded the Four Articles:—

1.-If in all other points the Bohemians and Moravians received the faith and ritual of the Universal Church, those who had the use of communicating under both kinds should continue to do so, “with the authority of Jesus Christ and the Church His true spouse”. The question as a whole should be further discussed in the Council; but the priests of Bohemia and Moravia should have permission to administer under both kinds to those who, being of the age of discretion, reverently demanded it, at the same time telling them that under each kind was the whole body of Christ.

2.- As regarded the correction and punishment of open sins, the Council agreed that, as far as could reasonably be done, they should be repressed according to the law of God and the institutes of the Fathers. The phrase used by the Bohemians, “by those whose duty it was”, was too vague; the duty did not devolve on private persons, but on those who had jurisdiction in such matters.

3.- About freedom of preaching, the word of God ought to be freely preached by priests who were commissioned by their superiors: “freely” did not mean indiscriminately, for order was necessary.

4.- As regarded the temporalities of the clergy, individual priests, who were not bound by a vow of poverty, might inherit or receive gifts; and similarly the Church might possess temporalities and exercise over them civil lordship. But the clergy ought to administer faithfully the goods of the Church according to the institutes of the Fathers; and the goods of the Church cannot be occupied by others.

As abuses may have gathered round these last three points, the Diet could send deputies to the Council, which intended to proceed with the question of reform, and the envoys promised to aid them in all possible ways.

The basis of an agreement was now prepared, and a large party in Prague was willing to accept it. Procopius, however, rose in the Diet and read proposals of his own, which John of Palomar dismissed, observing that their object was concord, and it was better to clear away difficulties than to raise them. On November 28 the legates judged it prudent to lay before the Diet an explanation of some points in the previous document. The rites of the Church, which the Bohemians were to accept, they explained to mean those rites which were commonly observed throughout Christendom. If all the Bohemians did not at once follow them, that would not be a hindrance to the peace; those who dissent on any points should have a full and fair hearing in the Council. The law of God and the practice of Christ and the Apostles would be recognized by the Council, according to the treaty of Eger, as the judge in all such matters. Finally, on November 30, after a long discussion and many verbal explanations given by the envoys, the moderate party among the Bohemians succeeded in extorting from the Diet a reluctant acceptance of the proposed agreement.

The success of the Council was due chiefly to the fact that the negotiations, once begun, awakened hopes among the moderate party in Bohemia and so widened the differences between them and the extreme party. There were both plague and famine in the land. More than 100,000 are said to have died in Bohemia during the year, and men had good grounds for feeling sadly the desolate condition of their country and counting the cost of their prolonged resistance. Moreover, the appearance of the Council’s envoys had emboldened those who wished for a restoration of the old state of things to lift up
their heads. There were still some adherents of Sigismund, chief of whom was Meinhard of Neuhaus; there were still formidable adherents of Catholicism, as the continued ill-success of the siege of Pilsen showed. As soon as doubt and wavering was apparent among the Hussites the party of the restoration declared itself more openly. Further, the events of the siege of Pilsen brought to light the disorganization that had spread among the army. The old religious real had waxed dim; adventurers abounded in the ranks of the Lord's soldiers; the sternness of Zizka’s discipline had been relaxed, and the mutiny against Procopius bowed the spirit of the great leader and made him doubtful of the future. The Bohemian nobles were weary of the ascendency of the Taborites, whose democratic ideas they had always borne with difficulty. The country was weary of military rule; and the party which was aiming at Sigismund's restoration determined to use the conciliatory spirit of the Diet for their own purposes. On December 1 a Bohemian noble, Ales of Riesenberg, was elected governor of the land, with a council of twelve to assist him; he took oath to promote the welfare of the people and defend the Four Articles. The moderate party, which had sought to find a constitutional king in Korybut in 1427, now succeeded in setting up a president over the Bohemian republic. The peace negotiations with the Council had already led to a political reaction.

The Compact had been agreed to, but the difficulties in the way of its full acceptance were by no means removed. The envoys demanded that, as Bohemia had agreed to a general peace, the siege of Pilsen should cease. The Bohemians demanded that the men of Pilsen should first unite with the Bohemian government, and that all Bohemians should be required by the Council to accept the Communion under both kinds. Other questions also arose. The Bohemians complained that, in treating of the temporalities of the clergy, the Council used language which seemed to accuse them of sacrilege. They demanded also that the Communion under both kinds should be declared 'useful and wholesome' for the whole of Christendom, and that their custom of administering the Communion to infants should be recognized. The discussion on these points only led to further disagreement. The envoys had convinced themselves that a large party in Bohemia was prepared to accept peace on the terms which they had already offered. As nothing more was to be done, they asked to be told definitely whether the Compact was accepted or not; otherwise they wished to depart on January 15, 1434. The Diet answered that it would be more convenient if they went on January 14; a Bohemian envoy would be sent to Basel to announce their intentions. Accordingly the Council's ambassadors left Prague on January 15, and arrived at Basel on February 15.

The result of this second embassy had been to rally the moderate party in Bohemia, and break the bond that had hitherto held the Bohemians together. The envoys had laid the foundations of a league in favour of the Church. Ten of the masters of the University of Prague subscribed a statement that they were willing to stand by the Compacts and had been reconciled to the Church; even when the envoys were at Eger two nobles followed them seeking reconciliation. When the ambassador of the Diet, Martin Lupak, joined them at Eger, it is not wonderful that they warned him that it was useless for him to journey to Basel if he went with fresh demands. The Council, after hearing the report of their envoys, gave Martin audience at once on February 16. He asked that the Council should order all the inhabitants of Bohemia to receive the Communion under both kinds; if all did not conform, there would be different churches and different rites, and no real peace in the land, for each party would claim to be better than the other, the terms “catholic” and “heretic” would again be bandied about, and there would be
perpetual dissension. This was no doubt true; but the Council listened to Martin with murmurs of dissent. It was clearly impossible for them to abandon the Bohemian Catholics, and to turn the concession which they had granted to the Hussites into an order to those who had remained faithful to the Church. Still Sigismund besought them to take time over their answer and to avoid any threats. The answer was drawn up in concert with Sigismund, and on February 26 Cesarini addressed Martin Lupak, saying that the Council wondered the Bohemians did not keep their promises, as even Jews and heathens respected good faith. He besought him to urge his countrymen to fulfill the Compacts; then the Council would consider their new demands, and would do all they could consistently with the glory of God and the dignity of the Church. Martin defended his demands, and there was some altercation. At last he taunted Cesarini with the remark that the Church had not always wished for peace, but had preached a crusade against Bohemia. “Peace is now in your hands, if you will stand by the agreement”, said Cesarini. “Rather it is in the hands of the Council, if they will grant what is asked”, retorted Martin. He refused to receive a letter from the Council unless he were informed of its contents, and after briefly thanking the Fathers for hearing him, he left the congregation and departed.

A breach seemed again imminent; but the Council knew that it would not be with Bohemia, but only with a party in it, which they trusted to overcome by the help of their fellow-countrymen. The first envoys had reported that there was a number of irreconcilables who must be subdued by force; the second negotiations had brought to light internal dissensions and had founded a strong party in Bohemia in favour of union with the Council. Everything was done to strengthen that party and gain the means of putting down the radicals. On February 8 the Council ordered a tax of 5 per cent, on ecclesiastical revenues to be levied throughout Christendom for their needs in the matter of Bohemia. John of Palomar was sent to carry supplies from the Council and from Sigismund to aid the besieged in Pilsen, where the besieging army was suffering from plague, hunger and despondency. In Bohemia Meinhard of Neuhaus was indefatigable in carrying on the work of the restoration. In April a league was formed by the barons of Bohemia and Moravia and the Old Town of Prague for the purpose of securing peace and order in the land; all armed bands were ordered to disperse and an amnesty was promised if they obeyed.

Procopius was roused from his retirement in the New Town of Prague by these machinations, and once more put himself at the head of the Taborites and the Orphans. But the barons had already gathered their forces. The New Town of Prague was summoned to enter the league, and on its refusal was stormed; on May 6 Procopius and a few others succeeded with difficulty in escaping. At this news the army before Pilsen raised the siege and retired. Bohemia merged its minor religious differences, and prepared to settle by the sword a political question that was bound to press some day for solution. On one side were the nobles ready to fight for their ancient privileges; on the other side stood the towns as champions of democracy. On May 30 was fought the decisive battle at Lipan. The nobles, under the command of Borek of Militinek, a companion-in-arms of Zizka, had an army of 25,000 men; against them stood Procopius with 18,000. Both armies were entrenched behind their wagons, and for some time fired at one another. The Taborites had the better artillery, but their adversaries turned their superiority to their ruin. One wing feigned to be greatly distressed by their fire; then, as if goaded to exasperation, rushed from behind its entrenchment, and charged. When they thought that the foe had exhausted their fire, they feigned to flee, and the
Taborites, thinking their ranks were broken, rushed from their waggons in pursuit. But the seeming broken ranks skillfully reformed and faced their pursuers, who had meanwhile been cut off from their waggons by the other wing of the nobles' army. Shut in on every side, Procopius and his men prepared to die like heroes. All day and night the battle raged, till in the morning 13,000 of the warriors who had been so long the terror of Europe lay dead on the ground. Procopius and all the chief men of the extreme party were among the slain. The military power of Bohemia, which had so long defied the invader, fell because it was divided against itself.

The fight of Lipan was a decided victory for the Council. It is true that among the conquerors the large majority was Hussite, and would require some management before it could be safely penned within the fold of the Church. But the Taborites had lost the control of affairs. The irreconcilables were swept away, and the Council would henceforth have to deal with men of more moderate opinions.
CHAPTER VI.
EUGENIUS IV AND THE COUNCIL OF BASEL.
NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE GREEKS AND THE BOHEMIANS
1434—1436.

At the beginning of the year 1434 the Council of Basel had reached its highest point of importance in the Position affairs of Christendom and of the Church. It had compelled the Pope to accept, without reserve, the conciliar principle for which it strove; it had gone so far in pacifying Bohemia that its final triumph seemed secure. It looked to further employment for its energies in negotiating a union between the Greek and the Latin Churches. Yet the Council’s success had been largely due to accidental circumstances. Eugenius IV had been subdued, not by the Council’s strength, but by his own weakness; he fell because he had so acted as to raise up a number of determined enemies, without gaining any friends in return. The Council’s policy towards him was tolerated rather than approved by the European Powers; if no one helped Eugenius IV, it was because no one had anything to gain by so doing. Sigismund, whose interest was greatest in the matter, was kept on the Council’s side by his personal interest in the Bohemian question; but he, with the German electors and the King of France, was resolute in resisting any steps which might lead to a schism of the Church. If the Council were to keep what it had won, it must gain new hold upon the sympathies of Christendom, which were not touched by the struggle against the Pope.

Sigismund gave the Fathers at Basel the advice of a statesman when he exhorted them to leave their quarrel with the Pope and busy themselves with the reform of the Church. But to contend for abstract principles is always easy, to reform abuses is difficult. The Council found it more interesting to war with the Pope than to labour through the obstacles which lay in the way of a reformation of abuses by those who benefited by them. Each rank of the hierarchy was willing to reform its neighbors, but had a great deal to urge in its own defense. In this collision of interests there was a general agreement that it was good to begin with a reform in the Papacy, as the Pope was not at Basel to speak for himself. Moreover, the Council had grown inveterate in its hostility to the Pope. The personal enemies of Eugenius IV flocked to Basel, and were not to be satisfied with anything short of his entire humiliation. In this they were aided by the pride of authority which among less responsible members of the assembly grew in strength every day, and made them desirous to assert in every way the superiority of the Council over the Pope.

The first question that arose was concerning the presidency. Eugenius IV, after his recognition by the Council, issued a Bull nominating four Papal deputies to share that office with Cesarini. The first decision of the Council was that they could not admit this claim of the Pope, since it was derogatory to the dignity of the Council, but they were willing themselves to appoint two of the Cardinals. Again Sigismund had to interpose, and with some difficulty prevailed on the Council to receive the Papal presidents. They were not, however, admitted till they had bound themselves by an oath to labour for the Council, to maintain the decrees of Constance, to declare that even the Pope, if he refused to obey the Council, might be punished, and to observe strict secrecy about all its proceedings. On these terms the Papal presidents, Cardinal Albergata, the
Archbishop of Tarento, the Bishop of Padua, and the Abbot of S. Justin of Padua, were admitted to their office on April 26, 1434, at a solemn session at which Sigismund in his Imperial robes was present.

The pretensions of the Council went on increasing. On May 2 Cardinal Lusignan, who was sent on an embassy to pacify France, received from the Council the title of legatus a latere, in spite of the protest of the five presidents against conferring a dignity which only the Pope could grant. Sigismund also felt aggrieved by the small heed which the Council paid to his monitions. Few German prelates were present; the large majority were French, Italians, and Spaniards. The democratic constitution of the Council prevented Sigismund from receiving the deference which was his due; he was not even consulted about the appointment of ambassadors. He felt that a slight had been offered to himself by the dealings of the Council with his enemy, the Duke of Milan. He complained bitterly of the irregular conduct of the Council in granting a commission to the Duke of Milan as its vicar, and so abetting him in his designs on the States of the Church. The Council at first denied, then defended, and finally refused to withdraw from, its connection with the Duke of Milan. Sigismund saw with indignation that the Council adopted a policy of its own, and refused to identify its interests with his. He sadly contrasted the purely ecclesiastical organization at Basel with the strong national spirit that had prevailed at Constance. He determined to leave a place where he had so little weight that, as he himself said, he was like a fifth wheel to a carriage, which did no good, but only impeded its progress.

Before departing he seems to have resolved to give a stimulus to the Council. He sent the Bishop of Lübeck to the several deputations to lay before them a suggestion that the marriage of the clergy should be permitted. “It was in vain”, he pleaded, “that priests were deprived of wives; scarcely among a thousand could one continent priest be found. By clerical celibacy the bond of friendship between the clergy and laity was broken, and the freedom of confession was rendered suspicious. There was no fear that a married clergy would appropriate the goods of the Church for their wives and families; the permission to marry would rather bring those of the highest ranks into the clergy, and the nobles would be less desirous of secularizing ecclesiastical property if it was in the hands of their relations and friends”. The fathers listened; but “the old”, says Aeneas Sylvius, “condemned what had no charms for them. The monks, bound by a vow of chastity, grudged that secular priests should have a privilege denied to themselves”. The majority ruled that the time was not yet ripe for such a change; they feared that it would be too great a shock to popular prejudice.

Before his departure Sigismund addressed the Council, and urged that it would be better to follow the example set at Constance, and organize themselves by nations. He wisely remarked that the reformation of the Church would be better carried out if each nation dealt with its own customs and rites. Moreover, decisions arrived at by a national organization would have greater chance of being accepted by the States so represented. He was answered that the deputations would take his suggestion under consideration. Finally, on May 19, he departed in no amiable mood from Basel, saying that he left behind him a sink of iniquity.

After Sigismund’s departure Cesarini besought the Council to turn its attention to the question of reformation; he said that already they were evil spoken of throughout Christendom for their delay. The basis of the questions raised at Constance was adopted, and the extirpation of simony first attracted the attention of the fathers. But
there was great difficulty in keeping to the point, and little progress was made. Insignificant quarrels between prelates were referred to the Council as a court of appeal, and the Council took greater interest in such personal matters than in abstract questions of reform. The question of union between the Eastern and Western Churches was hailed with delight as a relief. This question, which had been mooted at Constance, slumbered under Martin V, but had been renewed by Eugenius IV. The Council, in its struggle with the Pope, thought it well to deprive him of the opportunity of increasing his importance, and at the same time to add to its own. In January, 1433, it sent ambassadors to Greece to inaugurate steps for the proposed union. In consequence of these negotiations the Greek ambassadors arrived at Basel on July 12, 1434. They were graciously received by the Council; and Cesarini expressed the general wish for a conference on their differences, which he said that discussion would probably show to be verbal rather than real. The Greeks demanded that they should have their expenses paid in coming to the conference, and named as the place Ancona, or some port on the Calabrian coast, then Bologna, Milan, or some other town in Italy, next Pesth or Vienna, and finally some place in Savoy. The Council was anxious that the Greeks should come to Basel; but when the Greeks declared that they had no power to assent to this, their other conditions were accepted. Ambassadors were to go to Constantinople to urge the choice of Basel as a place for the conference. The Greeks also demanded that Eugenius IV should give his assent to the Council's proposals, and envoys were accordingly sent to lay them before him.

But Eugenius IV, on his side, had made proposals to the Greeks for the same purpose; and the Greeks, with their usual shiftiness, were carrying on a double negotiation, in hopes of making a better bargain for themselves by playing off against one another the rival competitors for their goodwill. Eugenius IV sent to Constantinople in July, 1433, his secretary, Cristoforo Garatoni, who proposed that a Council should be held at Constantinople, to which the Pope should send a legate and a number of prelates and doctors. When the Council’s proposals were laid before him, Eugenius wrote on November 15, 1434, and gently warned it of the dangers that might arise from too great precipitancy in this important matter. He mildly complained that he had not been consulted earlier. He added, however, that he was willing to assent to the simplest and speediest plan for accomplishing the object in view. The question of the place of conference with the Greeks was sure to open up the dispute between the Pope and Council. The chief reason which Eugenius IV had given for dissolving the Council was his belief that the Greeks would never go so far as Basel. He was now content to wait and see how far the Council would succeed. He already began to see in their probable failure a means of reasserting his authority, and either transferring the Council to Italy, as he had wished at first, or setting up against it another Council, which from its object would have in the eyes of Europe an equal, if not a greater, prestige.

On the departure of the Greek ambassadors the Council again turned to its wearisome task of reformation, and on January 22, 1435, succeeded in issuing four decrees, limiting the penalties of interdict and excommunication to the persons or places which had incurred them by their own fault, forbidding frivolous appeals to the Church, and enforcing stricter measures to prevent the concubinage of the clergy. Offenders whose guilt was notorious were to be mulcted of the revenues for three months, and admonished under pain of deprivation to put away their concubines; fines paid to bishops for connivance at this irregularity were forbidden. The Council felt that it was at
least safe in denouncing an open breach of ecclesiastical discipline, one which in those days was constantly condemned and constantly permitted.

From this peaceful work of reform the Council was soon drawn away by a letter from Eugenius IV, announcing the hopes he entertained of effecting a union with the Greeks by means of a Council at Constantinople. The letter was brought by Garatoni, who, on April 5, gave the Council an account of his embassy to the Greeks, and urged in favour of the Pope's plan, that it involved little expense, and was preferable to the Greeks, who did not wish to impose on their Emperor and the aged Patriarch a journey across the sea. The Council, however, by no means took this view of the matter; it was resolved not to lose the glory of a reunion of the two Churches. On May 3 an angry letter was written to the Pope, saying that a synod at Constantinople could have no claims to be a General Council, and would only raise fresh discord; such a proposal could not be entertained. Eugenius IV gave way in outward appearance, and sent Garatoni again to Constantinople to express his readiness to accept the proposals of the Council. He was contented to bide his time. But the Council was in a feverish haste to arrange preliminaries, and in June sent envoys, amongst whom was John of Ragusa, to Constantinople for this purpose. It also began to consider means for raising money, and the sale of indulgences was suggested. This suggestion raised a storm of disaffection amongst the adherents of the Pope, and seemed to all moderate men to be a serious encroachment on the Papal prerogative.

It was not long, however, before a still more deadly blow was aimed at the Pope’s authority. The reforming spirit of the Basel fathers was stirred to deal vigorously with Papal exactions. The subject of annates, which had been raised in vain at Constance, was peremptorily decided at Basel. On June 9 a decree was passed abolishing annates, and all dues on presentations, on receiving the pallium, and on all such occasions. It was declared to be simoniacal to demand or to pay them, and a Pope who attempted to exact them was to be judged by a General Council. Two of the Papal presidents, the Archbishop of Tarento and the Bishop of Padua, protested against this decree, and their protest was warmly backed by the English and by many other members of the Council. There were only present at its publication four Cardinals and forty-eight prelates. Cesarini only assented to it on condition that the Council should undertake no other business till it had made, by other means, a suitable provision for the Pope and Cardinals. The abolition of annates was, indeed, a startling measure of reform. It deprived the Pope at once of all means of maintaining his Curia, and to Eugenius IV, a refugee in Florence, left no source of supplies. No doubt the question of annates was one that needed reform; but the reform ought to have been well considered and moderately introduced. As it was, the Council showed itself to be moved chiefly by a desire to deprive the Pope of means to continue his negotiations with the Greeks.

The decree abolishing annates was a renewed declaration of war against the Pope. It marked the rise into power of the extreme party in the Council—the party whose object was the entire reduction of the Papacy under a conciliar oligarchy. At the time, Eugenius was too helpless to accept the challenge. Two of his legates at Basel protested against the annates decree, and absented themselves from the business of the Council. The Council answered by instituting proceedings against them for contumacy. But the matter was stayed for the time by the arrival, on August 20, of two Papal envoys who had been sent expressly to deal with the Council on this vexed question—Antonio de San Vitio, one of the auditors of the Curia, and the learned Florentine, Ambrogio Traversari, Abbot of Camaldoli. The feeling of the Italian Churchmen was turning
strongly in favour of Eugenius IV; they saw in the proceedings of the Council a menace to the glory of the Papacy, which Italy was proud to call its own. Reformation, as carried out by the Council, seemed to them to be merely an attempt to overthrow the Pope, and carry off beyond the Alps the management of ecclesiastical affairs which had so long centred in Italy. Traversari, who had been zealous for a reform, and had sent to Eugenius on his election a copy of S. Bernard’s *De Consideratione*, now placed himself on the Pope's side, and went to Basel to defeat the machinations of what he considered a lawless mob.

The answers which Traversari brought from the Pope were ambiguous: he was willing that the union with the Greek Church should be conducted in the best way; when the preliminaries had advanced further he would be willing to consider whether the expenses had better be met by indulgences or in some other way as to the abolition of annates, he thought that the Council had acted precipitately, and wished to know how they proposed to provide for the Pope and Cardinals, There was, in this, no basis for negotiation; and Traversari in vain endeavored to get further instructions from Eugenius IV. He stayed three months in Basel, and was convinced that Cesarini’s influence was waning, and that it was a matter of vital importance to the Pope to win him over to his side; he urged Eugenius IV to leave no means untried for this end. Traversari was shrewd enough in surveying the situation for the future, but for the present could obtain nothing save an empty promise that the question of a provision for the Pope should be taken into immediate consideration.

Pending this consideration, the Council showed its determination to carry its decrees into effect. When customary dues for the reception of the pallium demanded by the Papal Curia from the newly elected Archbishop of Rouen, the Council interposed and itself bestowed the pallium on December 11. In January, 1436, it resolved to admonish the Pope to withdraw all that he had done or said against the authority of the Council, and accept fully its decrees. An embassy was nominated to carry to Eugenius IV a form of decree which he was to issue for this purpose. The reason for this peremptory proceeding was a desire to cut away from the Pope the means of frustrating the Council’s projects as regards the Greeks. Its envoys at Constantinople could not report very brilliant success in their negotiations. They could not at first even establish the basis which had been laid down at Basel in the previous year. The Greeks took exception to the wording of the decree which was submitted to them; they complained that the Council spoke of itself as the mother of all Christendom, and coupled them with the Bohemians as schismatics. When the ambassadors attempted to defend the Council’s wording they were met by cries, “Either amend your decree or get you gone”. They undertook that it should be changed, and one of them, Henry Menger, was sent back to Basel, where, on February 3, 1436, he reported that all other matters had been arranged with the Greeks, on condition that the decree were altered, and that a guarantee were given for the payment of their expenses to and from the conference, whether they agreed to union or no. He brought letters from the Emperor and the Patriarch, urging that the place of conference should be on the sea-coast, and that the Pope, as the head of Western Christendom, should be present. The envoys attributed these demands to the machinations of the Papal ambassador Garatoni.

More and more irritated by this news, the Council proceeded with its plan of crushing the Pope, and on March 22 issued a decree for the full reformation of the head of the Church. It began with a reorganization of the method of Papal election; the Cardinals on entering the Conclave were to swear that they would not recognize him
whom they elected till he had sworn to summon General Councils and observe the decrees of Basel. The form of the Papal oath was specified, and it was enacted that on each anniversary of the Papal election the oath, and an exhortation to observe it, should be read to the Pope in the midst of the mass service. The number of Cardinals was not to exceed twenty-six, of whom twenty-four were to be at least thirty years old, graduates in civil or canon law, or in theology, none of them related to the Pope or any living Cardinal; the other two might be elected for some great need or usefulness to the Church, although they were not graduates. It was further enacted that all elections were to be freely made by the chapters, and that all reservations were to be abolished.

At the end of the month appeared the Pope’s ambassadors, the Cardinals of S. Peter’s and S. Crose. They brought as before evasive answers from the Pope, who urged the Council to choose a place for conference with the Greeks which would be convenient both for them and for himself; he did not approve of the plan of raising money by granting indulgences, but was willing to issue them with the approval of the Council. This was not what the Council wanted. It demanded that Eugenius IV should recognize its right to grant indulgences. On April 14 it issued a decree granting to all who contributed to the expenses of the conference with the Greeks the plenary indulgence given to crusaders and to those who made a pilgrimage to Rome in the year of Jubilee. On May 11 an answer was given to the Pope's legates, complaining that Eugenius IV did not act up to the Council’s decrees, but raised continual difficulties; he did not join with them in their endeavors to promote union with the Greeks, but spoke of transferring the Council elsewhere; he did not accept the decree abolishing annates, except on the condition that provision was made for the Pope, although he ought to welcome gladly all efforts at reformation, and ought to consider that the question of provision in the future required great discussion in each nation; he did not recognize, as he ought to do, the supremacy of the Council, which, with the presidents who represented the Pope, had full power to grant indulgences. On receiving this answer, the Archbishop of Tarento and the Bishop of Padua resigned their office of presidents on behalf of the Pope and left the Council. It was a declaration of open war.

Eugenius IV on his side prepared for the contest. He drew up a long defense of his own conduct, and a statement of the wrongs which he had received from the Council since his recognition of its authority. He set forth the Council’s refusal to accept the Papal presidents as the representatives of the Pope, its decrees diminishing the Papal revenues and the Papal power, interfering with the old customs of election, granting indulgences, exercising Papal prerogatives, and doing everything most likely to lead to an open schism. He commented on the turbulent procedure of the Council, its democratic organization, its mode of voting by deputations which gave the preponderance to a numerical minority, its avowed partisanship which gave its proceedings the appearance of a conspiracy rather than of a deliberate judgment. For six years it had labored with scanty results, and had only destroyed the prestige and respect which a General Council ought to command. He commented on the turbulent procedure of the Council, its democratic organization, its mode of voting by deputations which gave the preponderance to a numerical minority, its avowed partisanship which gave its proceedings the appearance of a conspiracy rather than of a deliberate judgment. For six years it had labored with scanty results, and had only destroyed the prestige and respect which a General Council ought to command. He recapitulated his own proposals to the Council about the place of a conference with the Greeks, and the repulse which his ambassadors had met with. He stated his resolve to call upon all the princes of Christendom to withdraw their support from the Council, which, he significantly added, not only spoke evil of the Pope, but of all princes, when once it had free course to its insolence. He promised reformation of abuses in the Curia, with the help of a Council to be summoned in some city of Italy, where the condition of his health would allow his
personal presence. He called upon the princes to withdraw their ambassadors and prelates from Basel.

This document of Eugenius IV contained nothing which was likely to induce the princes of Europe to put more confidence in him, alleged no arguments which could lead them to alter their previous position so far as the Papacy was concerned. But there was much in his accusations against the Council, where the extreme party had been gradually gaining power. Cesarini was no longer listened to, and his position in Basel became daily more unsatisfactory to himself. He had earnestly striven for a settlement of the Bohemian difficulty, and for the pacification of France, which had been begun at the Congress of Arras. He was desirous for reformation of the Church and so had agreed to the decree abolishing annates. But he could not forget that he was a Cardinal and a Papal legate, and was opposed to the recent proceedings of the Council against the Pope. Round him gathered the great body of Italian prelates, except the Milanese and the chief theologians. But the majority of the Council consisted of Frenchmen, who were led by Cardinal Louis d'Allemand, generally known as the Cardinal of Arles, a man of great learning and high character, but a violent partisan, who belonged to the Colonna faction, and intrigued with the Duke of Milan. He had no hesitation in taking up an attitude of strong political hostility against Eugenius IV. The French followed him, as did the Spaniards, so long as Alfonso of Aragon was the political enemy of Eugenius IV. The Milanese and South Italians were also on his side. The English and Germans who came to the Council were animated by a desire to extend its influence, and so were opposed to the Pope.

The organization of the Council gave the Pope a just ground for complaint. It had been decided at the beginning that the lower ranks of the clergy should have seats and votes. The Council was to be fully representative of the Church, and so was entirely democratic. All who satisfied the scrutineers, and were incorporated as members, took equal part in the proceedings. At first the dangers of this course had not shown themselves; but as the proceedings of the Council were protracted, the prelates who took a leading part in its business became fewer. The constitution of the Council was shifting from week to week. Only those were permanent who had some personal interest to gain, or who were strong partisans. The enemies of Eugenius IV clung to the Council as the justification of their past conduct as well as of their hope in the future. Adventurers who had everything to gain, and little to lose, flocked to Basel, and cast in their lot with the Council as affording them a better chance of promotion than did the Curia. Thus the Council became more and more democratic and revolutionary in its tendencies. The prelates drew to the side of Cesarini, and found themselves more and more in a minority, opposed to a majority which was bent on the entire humiliation of the Papacy.

It was natural that the violence of the French radical party should cause a reaction in favour of the Pope. Many had been in favour of the Council against the Pope, when the Council wished for reform, which the Pope tried to check. They were shaken in their allegiance when the Council, under the name of reform, was pursuing mainly the depression of the Papal power, and the transference of its old authority into the hands of a self-elected and non-representative oligarchy. The cry was raised that the Council was in the French interest; that it simply continued the old struggle of Avignon against Rome. The friends of Eugenius IV began to raise their heads, and attacked the Council on political grounds, so as to detach from it the princes of Christendom. Their arguments may be gathered from a letter of Ambrogio Traversari to Sigismund, in
January, 1436: “The Council of Basel has found time for nothing but the subversion of Catholic peace and the depression of the Pope. They have now been assembled for five years; and see on how wrongful a basis their business proceeds. In old days bishops, full of the fear of God, the zeal of religion, and the fervour of faith, used to settle the affairs of the Church. Now the matter is in the hands of the common herd; for scarcely out of five hundred members, as I saw with my own eyes, were there twenty bishops; the rest were either the lower orders of the clergy, or were laymen; and all consult their private feelings rather than the good of the Church. No wonder that the Council drags on for years, and produces nothing but scandal and danger of schism. The good men are lost in the ignorant and turbulent multitude. The French, led by the Cardinal of Arles and the Archbishop of Lyons, want to transfer the Papacy into France. Where every one seeks his own interest, and the vote of a cook is as good as that of a legate or an archbishop, it is shameless blasphemy to claim for their resolutions the authority of the Holy Ghost. They aim only at a disruption of the Church. They have set up a tribunal on the model of the Papal court; they exercise jurisdiction, and draw causes before them. They confer the pallium on archbishops, and claim to grant indulgences. They aim at nothing less than the perpetuation of the Council, in opposition to the Pope”.

There was enough truth in this view of the situation to incline the statesmen of Europe to take a more languid interest in the proceedings of the Council. Moreover, the Council had lost its political importance by the gradual subsidence of the Bohemian question. The Council had done its work when it succeeded in bringing to a head the divergence of opinion which had always existed between Bohemian parties. The negotiations with the Council had given strength to the party which wished to recognize authority, and was not prepared to break entirely with the traditions of the past. Round it gathered the various elements of political discontent arising from the long domination of the democratic and revolutionary party. At the battle of Lipan the Taborites met with such a defeat that they could no longer offer a determined resistance to the plan for a reconciliation with Sigismund.

But the hopes of immediate success which the fight of Lipan awakened in Basel were by no means realized at once. The spirit of the Bohemian Reformation was still strong; and though the Calixtins were on the whole in favour of reconciliation with the Church, they had no intention of abandoning their original position. The Bohemian Diet in June, 1434, proclaimed a general peace with all Utraquists, and a truce for a year with all Catholics. It took measures for the pacification of the land and the restoration of order. To Sigismund's envoys, who had come to procure his recognition as King of Bohemia, the Diet answered by appointing deputies to confer with Sigismund at Regensburg. Thither the Council was requested by Sigismund to send its former envoys. On August 16 its embassy, headed by Philibert, Bishop of Coutances, but of which John of Palomar was the most active member, entered Regensburg an hour after the Bohemians, chief amongst whom were John of Rokycana, Martin Lupak, and Meinhard of Neuhaus. As usual, Sigismund kept them waiting, and did not arrive till August 21. Meanwhile the Council’s envoys and the Bohemians had several conferences, which did not show that their differences were disappearing. The Bohemians were requested to do as they had done at previous conferences, and not attend mass in the churches. They consented; but John of Rokycana remarked that it would be better if the Council were to drive out of the churches evil priests rather than faithful laymen, who only wished to receive the Communion under both kinds. John of Palomar had to apologize for the
Council’s delay in its work of reform; the English and Spanish representatives, he said, had not yet arrived, and everything could not be done at once.

When negotiations began on August 22 Sigismund and the Council's envoys found that the Bohemians were firm in their old position. They were willing to recognize Sigismund on condition that he restored peace in Bohemia, which could only be done by upholding the Four Articles of Prague, and binding all the people of Bohemia and Moravia to receive the Communion under both kinds. Sigismund appealed to the national feelings of the Bohemians by a speech in their own tongue, in which he recalled the connection of his house with Bohemia. About the questions in dispute John of Rokycana and John of Palomar again indulged in the old arguments, till the Bohemians declared that they were sent to the Emperor, not to the Council's envoys. They submitted their request to Sigismund in writing, and Sigismund in writing gave answer, begging them to stand by the Compacts of Prague. The Bohemians declared their intention of doing so, but said that the Compacts must be understood to apply to the whole of Bohemia and Moravia. John of Palomar declared that the Council could not compel faithful Catholics to adopt a new rite, though they were prepared to allow it to those who desired it. The conclusion of the conference was that the Bohemian envoys should report to the Diet, soon to be held at Prague, the difficulties which had arisen, and should send its answer to the Emperor and to the Council. Matters had advanced no further than they were at the time of accepting the Compacts. In some ways the tone of the conference at Regensburg was less conciliatory than that of the previous ones. One of the Bohemian envoys fell from a window and was killed. The Council’s ambassadors objected to his burial with the rites of the Church, on the ground that he was not received into the Church’s communion. This caused great indignation among the Bohemians, who resented this attempt to terrorize over them. Still they submitted to the Council’s envoys a series of questions about the election of an archbishop of Prague, and the views of the Council about the regulation of ecclesiastical discipline in accordance with the Compacts. Sigismund besought the Council for money to act against Bohemia, and some of the Bohemian nobles asserted that with money enough Bohemia could soon be reduced to obedience. Yet Sigismund did not hesitate to express to the Council's envoys his many grounds for grievance at the Council’s procedure. The parties in the conference at Regensburg were at cross purposes. Sigismund, dissatisfied with the Council, wished to make it useful for himself. The Council wished to show Sigismund that its help was indispensable for the settlement of the Bohemian question. Bohemia wished for peace, but on condition of retaining in matters ecclesiastical a basis of national unity, without which it felt that peace would be illusory. On September 3 the conference came to an end without arriving at any conclusion. All parties separated mutually dissatisfied.

Still these repeated negotiations strengthened the peace party in Bohemia. Of the proceedings of the Diet held at Prague on October 23 we know little; but they ended in an abandonment by the Bohemians of the position which they had taken up at Regensburg. There they had maintained that, as the people of Bohemia and Moravia were of one language and under one rule, so ought they to be of one rite and in the most solemn act of Christian worship. They now decided to seek a basis of religious unity which would respect the rights of the minority, and on November 8 wrote, not to the Council, but to the Council's envoys, proposing that in those places where the Communion under both kinds had been accepted it should be recognized; in those places where the Communion under one kind had been retained it should remain.
Mutual toleration was to be enjoined, and an archbishop and bishops were to be elected by the clergy, with the consent of the Diet, who were to be subject to the Council and to the Pope in matters agreeable to the law of God, but no further, and who were to regulate the discipline of the Church in Bohemia and Moravia. It was a proposal for the organization of the Bohemian Church on a national basis, so as to obtain security against the danger of a Catholic reaction.

The Council’s answer to the Bohemians was, that they would again send their former envoys to confer with them and with the Emperor. The Bohemians, seeing that little was to be hoped for from the Council, resolved to see if they could obtain from Sigismund the securities which they wished. A Diet held in Prague in March, 1435, sent Sigismund its demands: the Four Articles were to be accepted; the Emperor, his court, his chaplain, and all State officers were to communicate under both kinds; complete amnesty was to be given for the past, and a genuinely national Government was to exist for the future. The envoys who brought these demands to Sigismund inquired if the Council's ambassadors, who were already with Sigismund in Posen, were prepared to accept the offer made by the Diet in the previous November; otherwise it was useless for the Bohemians to trouble themselves further or incur more expense. But the Council's ambassadors had come armed with secret instructions, and refused to have their hand forced. They answered that their mission was to the Emperor in Council of the Bohemians assembled, and then only could they speak.

Many preliminaries had to be arranged before the Conference finally took place at Brunn. There the Council’s envoys arrived on May 20, and were received with ringing of bells and all manifestations of joy by the people. On June 18 came the Bohemian representatives; but Sigismund did not appear till July 1. Meanwhile the Bohemians and the Council's envoys had several sharp discussions. Those of the Bohemians who had been reconciled to the Church were allowed to attend the mass; but the others were forbidden to enter the churches, and were refused a chapel where they might celebrate mass after their own fashion. On June 28 some of the Bohemians, on being requested to withdraw from a church where they had come with their comrades, were so indignant that they were on the point of leaving Brün, and were only appeased by the intervention of Albert of Austria, who had luckily arrived a few days before.

The day after Sigismund’s arrival, on July 2, John of Rokycana brought forward three demands on the part of the Bohemians: that the Four Articles be accepted throughout the whole of Bohemia and Moravia; that those countries be freed from all charge of heresy, and that the Council of Basel proceed with the reformation of the Church in life, morals and faith. He asked also for an answer to the demands sent to Eger by the Bohemian Diet in the previous November. The Council’s envoys answered by justifying the procedure of the Council and blaming the Bohemians for not keeping to the Compacts but raising new difficulties. There was much disputation. The Bohemians professed their willingness to abide by the Compacts as interpreted by their demands sent to Eger; the legates answered that these demands were contrary to the Compacts themselves. Sigismund urged the legates to give way, but they refused. On July 8 the legates demanded that the Bohemians should declare their adhesion to the Compacts, as they had promised; no promise had been made by the Council about the Eger articles, otherwise it would have been fulfilled. It was clear to the Bohemians that the Council regarded the Compacts as the ultimate point of their concessions, whereas the Bohemians looked on them only as a starting-point for further arrangements. John of Rokycana angrily answered the legates, “We are willing to stand by the Compacts; but
they cannot be fulfilled till they are completed. Much must be added to them; for instance, as regards obedience to bishops, we will not obey them if they order what is contrary to God’s word. How do you ask us to fulfill our promises when you will not fulfill yours? It seems to us that you aim at nothing save to sow division amongst us, for since your coming we are worse off than before, and will take heed that it be so no longer. We ask no difficult things. We ask for an archbishop to be elected by the clergy and people or appointed by the King. We ask that causes be not transferred out of the realm. We ask that the Communion be celebrated under both kinds in those places where the use exists. These are not difficult matters; grant them and we will fulfill the Compacts. We do not ask these things through fear, or through doubt of their lawfulness; we ask them for the sake of peace and unity. If you do not grant them, the Lord be with you, for I trust He is with us”. While John of Palomar was preparing a reply, the Bohemians left the room and thenceforth conferred only with the legates through Sigismund.

The Bohemian envoys had, in fact, begun to negotiate directly with Sigismund, who showed himself much more ready to give way than did the legates of the Council. On July 6 a proposal was made to Sigismund that he should grant in his own name what the Council refused. Under the pretext of removing difficulties and providing for some things omitted in the Compacts, Sigismund promised that benefices should not be conferred by strangers outside Bohemia and Moravia, but only by the king; that no Bohemian or Moravian should be cited or be judged outside the kingdom; that those who preferred to communicate under one kind only should, to avoid confusion, be tolerated only in those places which had always maintained the old ritual; that the archbishops and bishops should be elected by the Bohemian clergy and people. These articles Sigismund promised to uphold “before the Council, the Pope, and all men”. The legates of the Council strongly deprecated any secret negotiations on the part of Sigismund; the Bohemians, relying on the promises they had received, showed themselves more conciliatory. On July 14 they offered to sign the Compacts with the addition of a clause, “Saving the liberties and privileges of the kingdom and of the margravate of Moravia”. This the legates would not accept, as it clearly carried the election of the archbishop by the people and clergy. Sigismund answered the legates privately, and besought them to consent, lest they should be the cause of a rupture, and woe to them through whom that came. When the legates again refused, he angrily said, "You of the Council have granted articles to the Bohemians, and have held conferences without my knowledge, but I acquiesced. Why, then, will you not acquiesce for my sake in this small matter? If you wish me to lose my kingdom, I do not". He exclaimed in German to those around him, “Those of Basel wish to do nothing except diminish the power of the Pope and Emperor”. He showed his indignation by abruptly dismissing the legates.

Sigismund’s anger cooled down, and the clause was withdrawn. The Bohemians demanded the acceptance of various explanations of the Compacts, which the legates steadily refused. At last the signing of the Compacts was again deferred because the legates would not substitute, in the article which declared that "the goods of the Church cannot be possessed without guilt of sacrilege", the words “unjustly detained” (injuste deteneri) for “possessed” (usurpari). On August 3 the Bohemians departed, and the legates undertook to lay their demands before the Council and meet them again at Prague in the end of September.
The Council’s envoys had acted faithfully by the letter of their instructions; they had stood upon the Compacts, and had refused to make any further concessions or even admit any material explanations. The negotiations had therefore passed out of their hands into those of Sigismund. The Compacts had laid the foundations of an agreement. The Council had opened the door to concessions; and Sigismund was justified in declaring that the Council could not claim to have the sole right of interpreting the concessions so made or regulating the exact method of their application. The proceedings at Brünn led the Bohemians to think that the Council had dealt with them unfairly, and after begging them to accept the Compacts as a means to further agreement, was now bent on doing its utmost to make the Compacts illusory. The Bohemians therefore turned to Sigismund and resolved to seek first for political unity, and then to maintain their own interpretation of the Compacts by securing the organization of a national Church according to their wishes. In this state of things the interests of the Council and of Sigismund were no longer identical. The Council wished to minimize the effect of the concessions which it had made—concessions which were indeed necessary, yet might form a dangerous precedent in the Church. Sigismund wished to obtain peaceable possession of Bohemia, and trusted to his own cleverness afterwards to restore orthodoxy. The one thing that was rendered tolerably certain by the conference at Brünn was the recognition of Sigismund as King of Bohemia, and he was determined that the Council should not be an obstacle in the way. At the same time Sigismund was rigidly attached to the orthodox cause; but he was convinced that the reduction of Bohemia was a matter for himself rather than the Council.

The proceedings with Sigismund at Brünn satisfied the party in Bohemia, and the Diet, which met in Prague on September, ratified all that had been done. The submission of Bohemia to the Church and to Sigismund was finally agreed to on the strength of Sigismund's promises. A committee of two barons, two knights, three citizens, and nine priests was appointed to elect an archbishop and two suffragans. Their choice fell on John of Rokycana as archbishop, Martin Lupak and Wenzel of Hohenmaut as bishops. On December 21 the Bohemian envoys again met Sigismund and the legates of the Council at Stuhlweissenburg. The legates had heard of Rokycana’s election, though it was kept a secret pending Sigismund’s confirmation. They were perturbed by the understanding which seemed to exist between Sigismund and the Bohemians. They had come from Basel empowered to change the words in the Compacts as the Bohemians wished, and substitute “unjustly detained” for “possessed”; but before doing so they demanded that Sigismund should give them a written agreement for the strict observance of the Compacts on his part. This was really a demand that Sigismund should declare that he intended the promises which he had made to the Bohemians at Brünn to be illusory. Meinhard of Neuhaus, the chief of Sigismund’s partisans amongst the Bohemians, was consulted on this point. He answered, “If the Emperor publicly revoke his promises, all dealings with the Bohemians are at an end; if he revoke them secretly, it will some day be known, and then the Emperor, if he were in Bohemia, would be in great danger from the people”.

Accordingly Sigismund refused to sign the document which the legates laid before him, and submitted another, which declared generally his intention of abiding by the Compacts, but which did not satisfy the legates. Sigismund referred the legates to the Bohemians, and they accordingly demanded that the Bohemians should renounce all requests which they had made contrary to the Compacts. This the Bohemians refused, and Sigismund endeavored to lead the legates to a more conciliatory frame of mind by
telling them that dissimulation on many points was needful with the Bohemians, that he might obtain the kingdom; when that was done, he would bring things back to their former condition. The legates answered that their instructions from the Council were to see that the Compacts were duly executed; when this was done, the king's power would remain as it had always been; if the Bohemians wanted more than the king could grant, they could seek further favours from the Council. The question of the Emperor's agreement with the Council again raised much discussion. The Bohemians refused any responsibility in the matter.

“If there is ought between you and the legates”, they said to Sigismund, “it is nothing to us, we neither give assent nor dissent”.

The agreement was at last drawn up in general terms. The legates contented themselves with Sigismund's verbal promise as to his general intentions, and a written statement that he accepted the Compacts sincerely according to their plain meaning, and would not permit that any one be compelled to communicate under both kinds nor anything else to be done in contradiction to the Compacts. Iglau was fixed by the Bohemians as a frontier town in which the final signing of the Compacts might be quietly accomplished, and the ambassadors departed on January 31, 1436, to reassemble at Iglau in the end of May.

In all these negotiations the result had been to put difficulties out of sight rather than to make any agreement. Since the conference at Prague in 1433 no nearer approach had been made by the Bohemians to the orthodoxy of the Council. They had rather strengthened themselves in a policy by which they might obtain the advantages of peace and union with the Church, and yet might retain the greatest possible measure of ecclesiastical independence. This they hoped to secure by a strong national organization, while Sigismund trusted that once in power he would be able to direct the Catholic reaction; and the Council, after taking all possible steps to save its dignity, was reluctantly compelled to trust to Sigismund's assurance.

Sigismund appeared at Iglau on June 6; but the Bohemians were on the point of departing in anger when they found that the legates had come only with powers to sign the Compacts, not to confirm the election of the Bohemian bishops. With some difficulty the Bohemians were prevailed upon to accept Sigismund's promise that he would do his utmost to obtain from the Council and the Pope a ratification of the election of the bishops whom they had chosen. At last, on July 5, the Emperor, in his robes of state, took his place on a throne in the market-place of Iglau. The Duke of Austria bore the golden apple, the Count of Cilly the sceptre, and another count the sword. Before Sigismund went the legates of the Council, and by them took their places the Bohemian envoys. The signing of the Compacts was solemnly ratified by both parties. John Walwar, a citizen of Prague, gave to the legates a copy of the Compacts duly signed and sealed, together with a promise that the Bohemians would accept peace and unity with the Church. Four Bohemian priests, previously chosen for the purpose, took oath of obedience, shaking hands with the legates and afterwards with Rokycana, to show that they held him as their archbishop. Then the legates on their part handed a copy of the Compacts to the Bohemians, admitting them to peace and unity with the Church, relieving them from all ecclesiastical censures, and ordering all men to be at peace with them and hold them clear of all reproach. Proclamation was made in Sigismund's name that next day the Bohemians should enter the Church and the Compacts be read in the Bohemian tongue. Then the Bishop of Coutances, in a loud
clear voice, began to sing the *Te Deum*, in which all joined with fervour. When it was done, Sigismund and the legates entered the church for mass; the Bohemians, raising a hymn, marched to their inn, where they held their service. Both parties wept for joy at the ending of their long strife.

The next day showed that difficulties were not at an end, that the peace was hollow, and that the main points of disagreement still remained unsettled. In the parish church, the Bishop of Coutances celebrated mass at the high altar, and John of Rokycana at a side altar. The Compacts were read by Rokycana from the pulpit in the Bohemian tongue, then he added, “Let those of the Bohemians who have the grace of communicating under both kinds come to this altar”. The legates protested to the Emperor. John of Palomar cried out, “Master John, observe the canons; do not administer the sacraments in a church of which you are not priest”. Rokycana paid no heed, but administered to seven persons. The legates were indignant at this violation of ecclesiastical regulations, and said, “Yesterday you vowed canonical obedience; today you break it. What is this?”. Rokycana answered that he was acting in accordance with the Compacts, and paid little heed to the technical objection raised by the legates. Sigismund urged the legates to grant a church, or at least an altar, where the Bohemians might practise their own ritual. The legates, who were irritated still more by hearing that Martin Lupak had carried through the streets the sacrament under both kinds to a dying man, refused their consent. The Bohemians bitterly exclaimed that they had been deceived, and that the Compacts were illusory. They threatened to depart at once, and it required all Sigismund’s skill in the management of men to prevail on the Bohemians to stay till they had arranged the preliminaries about his reception as King of Bohemia. The utmost concession that he could obtain from the legates was that one priest might celebrate mass after the Bohemian ritual. They refused to commission for this purpose either Rokycana or Martin Lupak, and accepted Wenzel of Drachow, on condition that they should first examine him to be sure of his orthodoxy. This Wenzel refused, and the Bohemians continued to celebrate their own rites in their houses, as they had done previously.

Thus the long negotiations with the Council had led to no real agreement. The signing of the Compacts was rather an expression on both sides of the desire for peace, and for the outward unity of the Church, than any settlement of the points at issue. The conception of a united Christendom had not yet been destroyed, and both parties were willing to make concessions to maintain it. But neither side abandoned their convictions, and the peace which had been proclaimed affected only the outward aspect of affairs. The Bohemians remained the victors. They had re-entered the Church on condition that they were allowed an exceptional position. It remained for them to make good the position which they had won, and use wisely and soberly the means which they had at their disposal for this purpose.

In political matters also they saw the necessity of abandoning their attitude of revolt, and entering again the State system of Europe. They were willing to recognize Sigismund, but on condition that he ensured the Bohemian nationality against German influences. On July 20 Sigismund agreed to ratify the rights and privileges of the Bohemians, to be guided by the advice of a Bohemian Council, to uphold the University of Prague, to admit none but Bohemians to office in the land, and to grant a full amnesty for all that had happened during the revolt. On August 20 the Governor of Bohemia, Ales of Riesenburg, laid down his office in Sigismund’s presence, and the Bohemian nobles swore fidelity to their king. On August 23 Sigismund entered Prague in state,
and was received with joyous acclamations by the people. The pacification of Bohemia was completed. The great work which Europe had demanded of the Council was actually accomplished.

If we consider the deserts of the Council in this matter, we see that its real importance lay in the fact that it could admit the Bohemians to a conference without injuring the prestige of the Church. A Pope could adopt no other attitude towards heretics than one of resolute resistance. A Council could invite discussion, in which each party might engage with a firm belief that it would succeed in convincing the other. The decree for reunion with the Church arose from the exhaustion of Bohemia and its internal dissensions; it found that it could no longer endure to pay the heavy price which isolation from the rest of Europe involved on a small state. The temper of the Bohemians was met with admirable tact and moderation by the Council under the influence of Cesarini. Moral sympathy and not intellectual agreement tended to bring the parties together. The impulse given at first was strong enough to resist the reaction, when both parties found that they were not likely to convince each other. But the religious motives tended to become secondary to political considerations. The basis of conciliation afforded by the negotiations with Basel was used by the peace party in Bohemia and by Sigismund to establish an agreement between themselves. When this had been done, the position of the Council was limited to one of resistance to the extension of concessions to the Bohemians. The Council was thenceforth a hindrance rather than a help to the unscrupulous policy of illusory promises, which Sigismund had determined to adopt towards Bohemia till his power was fully established. From this time the Council lost all political significance for the Emperor, who was no longer interested in maintaining it against the Pope, and felt aggrieved by its treatment of himself, as well as by its democratic tendencies, which threatened the whole State system of Europe.
CHAPTER VII.
WAR BETWEEN THE POPE AND THE COUNCIL.
1436—1438.

If Sigismund’s interest in the Council had faded away, the interest of France had equally begun to wane. At the opening of the Council, France, in her misery and distress, the legacy of the long war with England, felt a keen sympathy with one of the Council’s objects, the general pacification of Christendom. The Council’s zeal in this matter stirred up the Pope to emulation, and Eugenius IV busied himself to prevent the Council from gaining any additional prestige. In 1431 Cardinal Albergata was sent by the Pope to arrange peace between England, Burgundy, and France. His negotiations were fruitless for a time; but the ill-success of the English induced them in 1435 to consent to a congress to be held at Arras. Thither went Albergata as Papal legate, and on the side of the Council was sent Cardinal Lusignan. Representatives of the chief States of Europe were present; and 9000 strangers, amongst whom were 500 knights, thronged the streets of Arras. In the conference which began in August the rival legates vied with one another in splendor and in loftiness of pretension. But though Lusignan was of higher lineage, Albergata was the more skillful diplomat, and exercised greater influence over the negotiations. England, foreseeing the desertion of Burgundy, refused the proposed terms, and withdrew from the congress on September 6. Philip of Burgundy's scruples were skillfully combated by Albergata.

Philip wished for peace, but wished also to save his honor. The legate’s absolution from his oath, not to make a separate peace from England, afforded him the means of retreating from an obligation which had begun to be burdensome. On the interposition of the Church Philip laid aside his vengeance for his father’s murder, and was reconciled to Charles VII of France on September 21. The treaty was made under the joint auspices of the Pope and the Council. Both claimed the credit of this pacification. Cesarini, when the news reached Basel, said that if the Council had sat for twenty years, and had done nothing more than this, it would have done enough to satisfy all gainsayers. But in spite of the Council’s claims it had won less prestige in France than had Eugenius IV, and France had no further hopes of political aid from its activity.

Thus the chief States of Europe had little to gain either from Pop or Council, and had no reason to take either side, when the struggle again broke out about the union with the Eastern Church. The letter of Eugenius IV, asking the princes of Europe to withdraw their countenance from the Council, met with no answer; but the Council had no zealous protector on whose help it could rely. The conflict that ensued was petty and ignoble.

The policy of Eugenius IV was to allure the Council to some Italian city where he could more easily manage to bring about its dissolution. In this he was helped by the desire of the Greeks to avoid a long journey overland, and his envoy Garatoni had continued to confirm them in their objection to go to Basel or to cross the Alps. The Council was fully alive to the Pope’s project, and hoped to prevail upon the Greeks, when once their journey was begun, to give way to their wishes. But the great practical
difficulty which the Council had to face was one of finance. The cost of bringing the Greeks to Basel was computed at 71,000 ducats and their maintenance, which could not be reckoned at less than 200,000 ducats. Moreover, it would be needful that the Western Church should not be outdone by the Eastern in the number of prelates present at the Council. At least a hundred bishops must be summoned to Basel, and it might not be an easy matter to induce them to come. The sale of indulgences had not been productive of so rich a harvest as the Council had hoped. In Constantinople the Bull was not allowed to be published, and the Greeks were by no means favorably impressed by this proof of the Council's zeal. In Europe, generally, it had awakened dissatisfaction; it was a sign that the reforming Council was ready to use for its own purposes the abuses which it condemned in the Pope. Altogether, the Council had before it a difficult task to raise the necessary supplies and celebrate its conference with due magnificence in the face of the Pope’s opposition.

As a preliminary step towards raising money and settling the place of the conference, envoys were sent in May, 1436, to negotiate for loans in the various cities which had been mentioned. They were required to promise 70,000 ducats at once, and to undertake to make further advances it necessary. The envoys Greeks visited Milan, Venice, Florence, Siena, Buda, Vienna, Avignon, as well as France and Savoy. In August Venice offered any town in the patriarchate of Aquileia, the Duke of Milan any town in his dominions; both guaranteed the loan. Florence also offered herself. Siena was willing to receive the Council, but could not lend more than 30,000 ducats. The Duke of Austria was so impoverished by the Bohemian wars that he could not offer any money but would welcome the Council in Vienna. The citizens of Avignon were ready to promise all that the Council wished. During the month of November the representatives of Venice, Florence, Pavia, and Avignon harangued the Council in favour of their respective cities. Venice and Florence were clearly in favour of the Pope, and so were not acceptable to the Council. In Pavia the Council would be sure enough of the Duke of Milan's hostility to the Pope, but could not feel so confident of its own freedom from his interference. If the Greeks would not come to Basel, Avignon was, in the eyes of the majority, the most eligible place.

But though the majority might be of this opinion, there had been growing up in the Council a strong opposition. The undisguised hostility of the extreme party to the Pope had driven moderate men to acquiesce in the pretensions of Eugenius IV, and this question of the place of conference with the Greeks was fiercely contested on both sides. Cesarini had for some time felt that he was losing his influence over the Council, which followed the more democratic Cardinal d'Allemand. He now began to speak decidedly on the Pope's side. He argued with justice that Avignon was not specified in the agreement made with the Greeks; that the Pope's presence at the conference was necessary, if for no other reason, at least as a means of providing money; that if any help was to be given to the Greeks against the Turks the Pope alone could summon Europe to the work; finally, he urged that if the Pope and Council were in antagonism, union with the Greeks was rendered ridiculous. On these grounds he besought the Council to choose a place which was convenient for the Pope. There were angry replies, till on November 10 Cesarini took the step of openly ranging himself on the Pope's side. He warned the Council that henceforth they were to regard him as a Papal legate, and sent a paper to all the deputations demanding that in future no conclusions be arrived at respecting the Roman See until he had first been heard at length on the matter.
But the dominant party was determined to have its own way and took measures to out-vote its opponents. It summoned the priests from the neighborhood and flooded the Council with its own creatures. On December 5 the votes were taken, and it was found that more than two-thirds of the Council, 242 out of 355, voted at the bidding of the Cardinal d'Allemand for Basel in the first instance; failing that, Avignon, and failing that, some place in Savoy. Basel had been already refused by the Greeks. The Duke of Savoy had not offered to provide money for the Council. The vote was really given for Avignon alone. Cesarini, in the Pope's name and in his own, protested against Avignon as not contained in the treaty made with the Greeks; if the Council refused to go to Italy there remained only Buda, Vienna, and Savoy as eligible; if the Council decided on Savoy, he would accept it as according to the agreement; beyond this he could not go. In spite of his written protest, the majority confirmed their vote by a decree in favour of Avignon.

At the beginning of February, 1437, the Greek ambassador, John Dissipatus, arrived in Basel, and was surprised to find that the Council had fixed on Avignon. He vainly pleaded that Avignon was not included in the decree which the Greeks had accepted, and when the Council paid no heed he handed in a protest on February 15. The Council requested him to accompany their envoys to Constantinople. He refused, declaring his intention of visiting the Pope and renewing his protest before him: if no remedy could be found he would publish to the world that the Council could not keep its promises. The majority at Basel was little moved by these complaints, save so far as they tended to strengthen the position of the minority which was working in favour of the Pope. Through fear of playing into their hands, a compromise was made on February 23. The Council decreed that the citizens of Avignon were to be required, within thirty days, to pay the 70,000 ducats which they had promised; a further term of twelve days was allowed them to bring proof of their payment to Basel; if this were not done in the appointed time the Council "could, and was bound" to proceed to the election of another place.

During the period of this truce arrived, on April 1, the Archbishop of Taranto, as a new Papal legate, accompanied by the Greeks who had visited the Pope at Bologna. His arrival gave a new turn to affairs. Cesarini was opposed, on grounds of practical wisdom, to the proceedings of the Council rather than decidedly in favour of the Pope; the Archbishop of Taranto entered the lists as a violent partisan, as energetic and as unscrupulous as was the Cardinal d'Allemand. He set to work to organize the Papal party and to devise a policy of resistance. Opportunity soon befriended him. As the term allowed to Avignon to pay its money drew near its close there was no news of any payment. Parties in favour of the Pope and the Council were formed amongst the burghers, and the disunion awakened the fears of the cautious merchants, who doubted whether the Council's presence within their walls would prove a profitable investment; they proposed to defer the full payment of the money till the actual arrival of the Greeks. On this the Papal party insisted that the agreement with Avignon was forfeited, and on April 12, the day on which the term expired, Cesarini exhorted the Council to proceed to the choice of another place. In his speech he used the words "the authority of the Apostolic See"; there was at once a shout of indignation, as it was thought that he hinted at the dissolution of the Council. The discussion was warm, and the sitting broke up in confusion.

The position assumed by the Archbishop of Taranto was that the decree of February 23 was rigidly binding; the contingency contemplated in it had actually occurred, and
the Council was bound to make a new election. Nay, if some members of the Council refused to do so, he argued, from the analogy of a capitular election, that the power of the Council devolved on those who were ready to act—a numerical minority, if acting according to the law, could override a majority which acted illegally. The Papal party numbered about seventy votes, their opponents about two hundred; but the Archbishop of Taranto’s policy was to create a schism in the Council and destroy the power of the majority by the prestige of the ‘saner part’. Accordingly on April 17, when the deputations voted on the question of adhering to Avignon or choosing another place, the presidents in three of the deputations, being on the Papal side, refused the votes in favour of Avignon as technically incorrect, and returned the result of the voting as in favour of a new election. When the majority protested with shouts and execrations, the minority withdrew and allowed them to declare their vote in favour of Avignon. There was now a hopeless deadlock; the two parties sat separately, and the efforts of the German ambassadors and of the citizens of Basel were alike unavailing to restore concord.

When agreement proved to be impossible, both sides prepared to fight out their contention to the end. On April 26 the majority published its decree abiding by Avignon; the minority published its choice of Florence or Udine, and asserted that henceforth the power of the Council, as regarded this question, was vested in those who were willing to keep their promise. In the wild excitement that prevailed suspicions were rife and violence was easily provoked. On the following Sunday, when the Cardinal of Arles proceeded to the Minster to celebrate mass, he found the altar already occupied by the Archbishop of Taranto, who suspected that the opportunity might be used of publishing the decree of the majority in the name of the Council, and who had resolved in that case to be beforehand. Loud cries and altercations were heard on all sides; only the crowded state of the cathedral, which prevented men from raising their arms, saved the scandal of open violence. The civic guards had to keep the peace between the combatants. Evening brought reflection, and both parties dreaded a new schism, and were appalled at the result which seemed likely to follow from a Council assembled to promote the peace of Christendom. Congregations were suspended, and for six days the best men of both parties conferred together to see if an agreement were possible; but all was in vain, because men were swayed by personal passion and motives of self-interest, and the violence of party-spirit entirely obscured the actual subject under discussion. Every one acted regretfully and remorsefully, but with the feeling that he had now gone too far to go back. The die had already been cast; the defeat of the Council involved the ruin of every one who had till now upheld it; to retreat a hair’s breadth meant failure. Conferences brought to light no common grounds; matters must take their course, and the two divisions of the Council must find by experience which was the stronger.

On May 7, a day which many wished never to dawn, the rival parties strove in a solemn session to decree, in the name of the Council, their contradictory resolutions. In the early morning the Cardinal of Arles, clad in full pontificals, took possession of the altar, and the cathedral was filled with armed men. The legates arrived later, and even at the last moment both sides spoke of concord. It was proposed that, in case the Greeks would not come to Basel, the Council be held at Bologna, and the fortresses be put in the hands of two representatives of each side. Three times the Cardinals of Arles and of S. Peter's stood at the altar on the point of making peace; but they could not agree on the choice of the two who were to hold the fortresses. At twelve o’clock there were cries
that it was useless to waste more time. Mass was said, and the Bishop of Albienra mounted the pulpit to read the decree of the majority. The hymn *Veni Creator*, which was the formal opening of the session, had begun; but it was silenced that again there might be negotiations for peace. Ali was in vain. The session opened, and the Bishop of Albienza began to read the decree. On the part of the minority the Bishop of Porto seized a secretary's table and began to read their decree, surrounded by a serried band of stalwart youths. One bishop shouted against the other, and the Cardinal of Arles stormed vainly, calling for order. The decree of the minority was shorter, and took less time in reading; as soon as it was finished the Papal party commenced the *Te Deum*. When their decree was finished, the opposite party sang the *Te Deum*. It was a scene of wild confusion in which violent partisans might triumph, but which filled with dismay and terror all who had any care for the future of the Church. Both parties felt the gravity of the crisis: both felt powerless to avert it. With faces pale from excitement, they saw a new schism declared in the Church.

Next day there was a contention about the seal of the Council, which Cesarini was found to have in his possession, and at first declined to give up. But the citizens of Basel insisted that it was their duty to see that the seal was kept in the proper place. On May 14 a compromise was made. The seal was put in custody of a commission of three, on condition that both decrees be sealed in secret; the Bull of the conciliar party was to be sent to Avignon, but not to be delivered till the money was paid by the citizens; if this was not done within thirty days the Bull was to be brought back; meanwhile the Bull of the Papal party was to remain in secret custody. Again there was peace for a while, which was broken on June 16 by the discovery that the box containing the conciliar seal had been tampered with, and the seal used by some unauthorized person. The discovery was kept secret, and the roads were watched to intercept any messengers to Italy. A man was taken bearing letters from the Archbishop of Taranto, which were produced before a general congregation. There was an outcry on both sides, one protesting against the seizure of the letters, the other against the false use of the Council’s seal. Twelve judges were appointed to examine into the matter. The letters, which were partly in cipher, were read, and the case against the Archbishop of Taranto was made good. He was put under arrest, and when the matter was laid before the Council on June 21 there was an unseemly brawl, which ended in the use of violent means to prevent an appeal to the Pope being lodged by the Archbishop’s proctor. On July 19 the Archbishop, surrounded by an armed troop, made his escape from Basel and fled to the Pope.

The majority in the Council of Basel might pass what decrees they would, but they had reckoned too much on their power over the Greeks. The Papal legates won over the Greek ambassadors, and sent them to Eugenius IV at Bologna. The Pope at once ratified the decree of the minority, fixed Florence or Udine as the seat of a future Council, and on May 30 issued a Bull to this effect. He wrote to all the princes of Christendom announcing his action. But Sigismund raised a protest against a Council being held in Italy, and the Duke of Milan strongly opposed the choice of Florence. Apparently wishing to avoid discussion for the present, Eugenius IV prevailed on the Greeks to defer till their arrival on the Italian coast the exact choice of the place. The Greek ambassador, John Dissipatus, solemnly declared in the Emperor's name, that he recognized as the Council of Basel, to which he had formed obligations, only the party of the legates, and that he accepted the decree of the minority as being the true decree of the Council. Eugenius IV hired at his own expense four Venetian galleys to convey the Greeks to Italy. Preparations were made with all possible speed, and on September 3 the
Bishops of Digne and Porto, representing the minority of the Council, and Garatoni, now Bishop of Coron, on the part of the Pope, arrived in Constantinople. Claiming to speak in the name of the Pope and of the Council, they at once began to make preparations for the journey of the Greeks to Italy.

The assembly at Basel could not make its arrangements with Avignon quickly enough to compete on equal terms with the Pope. It had to face the usual disadvantages of a democracy when contending against a centralized power. Its hope of success with the Greeks lay in persuading them that the Council, and not the Pope, represented the Western Church, and was strong in the support of the princes of Western Europe. It determined again to proceed to the personal humiliation of Eugenius IV and so by assailing his power to render useless his dealings with the Greeks. On July 31 the Council issued a monition to Eugenius IV, setting forth that he did not loyally accept its decrees, that he endeavored to set at nought its labours for the reformation of the Church, that he wasted the patrimony of the Holy See, and would not work with the Council in the matter of union with the Greeks; it summoned him to appear at Basel within sixty days, personally or by proctor, to answer to these charges. This admonition was the first overt act towards a fresh schism. Sigismund and the German ambassadors strongly opposed it on that ground, and besought the Council to recall it. It was clear that the Council would meet with little support if it proceeded to extremities against the Pope. But in its existing temper it listened to the ambassadors of the King of Aragon and the Duke of Milan, the political adversaries of Eugenius IV, and paid little heed to moderate counsels; On September 26 it annulled the nomination to the cardinalate by Eugenius of the Patriarch of Alexandria, as being opposed to the decree that during the Council no Cardinal should be nominated elsewhere than at Basel. It also annulled the decree of the minority on May 7, by whatever authority it might be upheld, and took under its own protection the Papal city of Avignon.

In vain the Council tried to win over Sigismund to its side. Sigismund had gained by the submission of Bohemia all that he was likely to get from the Council. In Italian politics he had allied himself with Venice against his foe the Duke of Milan, and so was inclined to the Papal side. He wrote angrily to the Council on September 17, bidding them hold their hand in their process against the Pope. He reminded them that they had found the Church united by his long labour, and were acting in a way to cause a new schism. They had met to reform and pacify Christendom, and were on the way to do the very reverse; while wishing to unite the Greeks, they were engaged in dividing the Latins. If they did not cease from their seditious courses, he would be driven to undertake the defense of the Pope. The Council was somewhat dismayed at this letter; but the bolder spirits took advantage of current suspicions, and declared it to be a forgery, written in Basel, by the same hands as had forged the Council's Bulls. Passion outweighed prudence, and men felt that they had gone too far to withdraw; on October the Council declared Eugenius IV guilty of contumacy for not appearing to plead in answer to the charges brought against him.

On his side also Eugenius IV was not idle. He accepted the challenge of the Council, and on September 18 issued a Bull decreeing its dissolution. In the Bull he set forth his desire to work with the Council for union with the Greeks; in spite of all he could do they chose Avignon, though such a choice was null and void as not being included in the agreement previously made with the Greeks. Still, in spite of the default of Avignon to fulfill the conditions it had promised, the Council persevered in its choice. The legates, the great majority of prelates, royal ambassadors, and theologians,
who made up the saner part of the Council, protested against the legality of this choice, and chose Florence or Udine, and at the request of the Greeks he had accepted their choice. The turbulent spirits in the Council, consisting of a few prelates who were animated partly by personal ambition and partly were the political tools of the King of Aragon and the Duke of Milan, gathered a crowd of the lower clergy, and under the specious name of reformation resisted the Pope, in spite of the Emperor’s remonstrances. To prevent scandals and to avoid further dissension, the Pope transferred the Council from Basel to Ferrara, which he fixed as the seat of an Ecumenical Council for the purpose of union with the Greeks. He allowed the fathers to remain at Basel for thirty days to end their dealings with the Bohemians; but if the Bohemians preferred to come to Ferrara, they should there have a friendly reception and full hearing.

The Council on October 12 annulled the Bull of Eugenius, on the ground of the superiority of a General Council over a Pope, and prohibited all under pain of excommunication from attending the pretended Council at Ferrara. It warned Eugenius IV that if he did not make amends within four months he would be suspended from his office, and that the Council would proceed to his deprivation.

Both Pope and Council had now done all they could to assert their superiority over each other. The first question was which of the two contending parties should gain the adhesion of the Greeks. The Papal envoys had arrived first at Constantinople, and their offers were best adapted to the convenience of the Greeks. When on October 4 the Avignonese galleys arrived off Constantinople with the envoys of the Council, the captain of the Papal galleys was with difficulty prevented from putting out to sea to oppose their landing.

The Greek Emperor was perplexed by two embassies, each brandishing contradictory decrees, and each declaring that it alone represented the Council.

Each party had come with excommunications ready prepared to launch against the other. This scandalous exhibition of discord, in the face of those whom both parties wished to unite to the Church, was only prevented by the pacific counsels of John of Ragusa, who had been for three years resident envoy of the Council in Constantinople, and had not been swallowed up by the violent wave of party-feeling which had passed over Basel. The Council's ambassadors proceeded at once to attack the claims of their opponents to be considered as the Council. They succeeded in reducing to great perplexity the luckless Emperor, who wanted union with the Latin Church as the price of military help from Western Europe, and only wished to find out to whom or what he was to be united. The Greeks were puzzled to decide whether the Pope would succeed in dissolving the Council, or the Council in deposing the Pope: they could not clearly see which side would have the political preponderance in the West. The two parties plied the Emperor in turn with their pleadings for a space of fifteen days. The Council had the advantage that the Greeks were already committed to an agreement with them. But the Papal party had diplomats who were adroit in clearing away difficulties. The Greeks ultimately decided to go with them to Italy, and the Emperor exhorted the Council's envoys to peace and concord, and invited them to accompany him to Venice. They refused with cries of rage and loud protestations, and on November 2 departed for Basel.

Now that the breach between Pope and Council was irreparable, and the Pope had won a diplomatic victory in his negotiations, both parties looked to Sigismund, who, however, refused to identify himself decidedly with either. He disapproved of the Pope's
dissolution of the Council, from which he still expected some measures of ecclesiastical reform; on the other hand, he disapproved of the Council's proceedings against the Pope, which threatened a renewal of the schism. Eugenius IV had showed his willingness to conciliate Sigismund by allowing the Council in his Bull of dissolution to sit for thirty days to conclude its business with Bohemia; or, if the Bohemians wished, he was willing to receive their representatives at Ferrara. This was important to Sigismund and to the Bohemians, as it showed that the Pope accepted all that had been done in reference to the Bohemian question, and was ready to adopt the Council's policy in this matter.

Sigismund had indeed reason to be content with the result which he had won. His restoration to Bohemia had been accomplished, and he had organized a policy of reaction which seemed likely to be successful. On August 23, 1436, his entry into Prague had been like a triumphal procession. He lost no time in appointing new magistrates, all of them chosen from the extremely moderate party. The legates of the Council were always by his side to maintain the claims of the Church. Bishop Philibert of Coutances began a series of aggressions on the episcopal authority in Bohemia. He asserted his right to officiate in Rokycana's church without asking his permission; he held confirmations and consecrated altars and churches in virtue of his superior office as legate of the Council. The Bohemians, on their part, waited for the fulfillment of Sigismund's promises, and the knights refused to surrender the lands of the Church until they were satisfied. Sigismund was bound to write to the Council, urging the recognition of Rokycana as Archbishop of Prague; but he told the legates that he trusted the Council would find some good pretext for delay. “I have promised”, he said, “that till he dies I will hold no other than Rokycana as archbishop; but I believe that some of the Bohemians will kill him, and then I can have another archbishop”. It is clear that Sigismund knew how to manage a reaction, knew the inevitable loss of popularity which a party leader suffers if he makes concessions and does not immediately gain success. Rokycana was looked upon as a traitor by the extreme party, and as a dangerous man by the moderate party. We are not surprised to find that in October rumours were rife of a conspiracy organized in Rokycana’s house against the Emperor and the legates. Inquiries were made, and without being directly accused Rokycana was driven to defend himself, and then his defense was declared to be in itself suspicious.

Rokycana seems to have felt his position becoming daily more insecure. On October 24 he paid his first visit to the legates to try and find out their views about the confirmation of his title of archbishop. The legates received him haughtily, and talked about the restoration of various points of ritual which the Bohemians had cast aside. “You talk only about trifles”, said Rokycana impatiently; “more serious matters need your care”. “You say truly”, exclaimed John of Palomar, with passion; “there are more serious matters: for you deceive the people, and can no more give them absolution than this stick, for you have not the power of the keys, seeing you have no apostolic mission”. This bold onslaught staggered Rokycana, who repeated the words of Palomar in amazement, and said that the people would be indignant at hearing them; he would consult his fellow-priests. One of his followers warned the legates that they and the Emperor were becoming unpopular through their refusal to confirm Rokycana’s election as archbishop. Rokycana withdrew with a bitter feeling of helplessness.

The legates on November 8 pressed the Emperor to take further measures for the Catholic restoration. They had now been two months in Bohemia, they urged, and little had been done. The Communion was given to children, the Epistle and Gospel were
read in Bohemian and not in Latin, the use of holy water and the kiss of peace was not restored, and toleration was not given to those who communicated under one kind. All this was contrary to the observance of the Compacts, and the kingdom of Bohemia was still infected with the heresy of Wycliffe. Sigismund angrily answered, “I was once a prisoner in Hungary, and save then I never was so wearied as I am now; indeed, my present captivity seems likely to be longer”. He begged the legates to be patient till the meeting of the Diet. He was engaged in treating with Tabor and Koniggratz, which were still opposed to him and he needed time to overcome their resistance. Tabor agreed to submit its differences to arbitration; Koniggratz was reduced by arms.

On November 27 the legates and Rokycana came to a conference on the disputed points in the Emperor’s presence. Rokycana demanded the clear and undoubted Confirmation of the Compacts; the legates the reestablishment of the Catholic ritual. There were many difficulties raised and much discussion; but Rokycana found himself abandoned by the masters of the University, and opposed by the city magistrates and the nobles. He gave way unwillingly on all the points raised by the legates except the Communion of children and the reading of the Epistle and Gospel in Bohemian. On December 23 the Catholic ritual was restored in all the churches in Prague; the use of holy water and the kiss of peace was resumed, and images which had been cast down were again set up in their former places. Still, Bishop Philibert abode in Prague, and exercised the office of Bishop. On February II, 1437, the Empress Barbara was crowned Queen of Bohemia by Philibert, and Rokycana was not even bidden to the ceremony.

On February 13 the legates at last received from the Council the Bull of ratification of the Compacts of Iglau. Together with it came an admonition to the Emperor not to tolerate the Communion of children. He was urged also to restore the Catholic ritual throughout Bohemia, and to hand over to the Council Peter Payne, who maintained the Wycliffite doctrine that the substance of bread remained in the Eucharist. When the ratification was shown to Rokycana, he demanded that there should also be issued a letter to the princes of Christendom freeing Bohemia from all charge of heresy. He brought forward also the old complaint that many priests refused to give the sacrament under both kinds; he demanded that the legates should order them to do so, should enjoin the bishops to see that the clergy obeyed their command, and should request the Bishop of Olmutz himself to administer under both kinds. The legates answered that the letter clearing the Bohemians had already been issued at Iglau; for the future the Bohemians, by observing the Compacts, would purge themselves in the eyes of all men better than any letter could do it for them. To the other part of his request they answered that they would admonish any priest who was proved to have refused the Communion under both kinds to any one who desired it; they could not ask the Bishop of Olmutz to administer the Communion himself, but only to appoint priests who were ready to do so. This was the utmost that Rokycana could procure, in spite of repeated renewal of his complaints.

The reaction went on with increasing strength. The rest of Bohemia followed the example of Prague, and restored the Catholic ritual. Sigismund set up again in the Cathedral of Prague the old capitular foundation with all its splendor. The monks began to return to Prague; relics of the saints were again exposed for popular adoration. In this state of affairs representatives of Bohemia were summoned to Basel to discuss further the question of the necessity or expediency of receiving the Communion under both kinds. Sigismund, wishing to rid himself of Rokycana, urged him to go. Rokycana steadily refused, knowing that at Basel he would only meet with coldness, and that
during his absence from Prague the triumph of the reaction would be assured. On April 7, Procopius of Pilsen, in the Emperor's presence, bade Rokycana remember that he had been the leader in former negotiations with the Council. "You are experienced in the matter", he said; "you have no right to refuse"."Procopius", said Rokycana, forgetting where he was, "remember how our party fared at Constance; we might fare in like manner, for I know that I am accused and hated at Basel". "Think you", said Sigismund angrily, "that for you or for this city I would do anything against mine honour?". It was so long since Sigismund had broken his plighted word to Hus that he had forgotten that it was even possible for others to remember it.

Though Rokycana stayed in Prague, he was systematically set aside in ecclesiastical matters. On April 12 Bishop Philibert appointed rural deans throughout Bohemia, and charged them how to carry out their duties; Rokycana was not even consulted. The church in which Rokycana preached was given to the Rector of the University, who was inducted by the legate. Peter Payne was banished by Sigismund from Bohemia as a heretic, and an opportunity against Rokycana was eagerly looked for. This was given by a sermon preached on May 5, about the Communion of children, in which he said that to give up this practice would be a confession of previous error and of present instability of purpose. "Too many now condemn what once they praised. But you, poor children, lament. What have you done amiss that you should be deprived of the Communion? Who will answer for you? Who will defend you? Now no one heeds". Mothers lifted their voices, and wept over the wrongs of their children, and that was judged sufficient to establish against Rokycana a charge of inciting the people to sedition. The Diet demanded that some steps should be taken to administer the archbishopric of Prague; and Sigismund's influence with the moderate party was strong enough to obtain on June 11 the election of Christian of Prachatice to the office of Vicar of the Archbishopric. Rokycana on being asked to surrender the seal and submit to Christian as his spiritual superior, judged it wise to flee from Prague on June 16.

The exile of Rokycana was the triumph of the moderate party, the Utraquists pure and simple, who wished for entire union with the Church, but who were still staunch in upholding the principles of a reformed Church for Bohemia. Envoys were sent off to Basel to end the work of reconciliation and settle the points which still were disputed. On August 18 the envoys, chief amongst whom were the priests John Pribram and Procopius of Pilsen, entered Basel with great magnificence. Pribram in his first speech to the Council demanded that the Communion under both kinds should be fully granted, not only in Bohemia and Moravia, but universally, seeing that it was the truth of God's law. Pribram and John of Palomar argued learnedly for many days on the subject; but Pribram felt that he met with little attention from the Council. One day he angrily met the suspicious coolness which surrounded him by declaring that the Bohemians had never been heretical, but had always remained in the unity of the faith; if any one said otherwise, they were ready to answer with their steel as they had done in past. When Pribram had ended his disputation, Procopius of Pilsen advocated the Communion of children with no better success.

At last, on October 20, the Bohemians submitted nine demands to the Council, which deserve mention as Demand, showing the ultimate point arrived at by these long negotiations;

1) That the Communion under both kinds be granted to Bohemia and Moravia;
2) that the Council declare this concession to be more than a mere permission given for the purpose of avoiding further mischief;

3) that the Church of Prague be provided with an archbishop and two suffragans, who should be approved by the realm;

4) that the Council issue letters clearing the good name of Bohemia;

5) that in deciding whether the Communion under both kinds be of necessary precept or not, the Council adhere to the authorities mentioned in the Compact of Eger, the law of God, the practice of Christ and the Apostles, general councils and doctors founded on the law of God;

6) that the Communion of children be allowed;

7) that at least the Epistle, Gospel, and Creed in the mass service be said in the vulgar tongue;

8) that the University of Prague be reformed and have some prebends and benefices attached to it;

9) that the Council proceed to the effectual reformation of the Church in head and members.

Pribram besought that these be granted, especially the Gospel truth concerning the Sacrament. “The kingdom of Bohemia is ready”, he added, “as experience has shown, to defend and assert this even by thousands of deaths”. Great was the indignation of the Bohemians when, on November 6, Cesarini exhorted them to conform to the ritual of the universal Church as regarded the Communion of the laity under one kind only; still, he added, the Council was willing to stand by the Compacts. Cesarini had gone too far in thus openly showing the policy of the Council to reduce the Bohemians to accept again the Catholic ritual. It required some management on the part of other members of the Council to allay their indignation. On November 24 the Council gave a formal answer to the Bohemian requests. As regarded the necessity of the Communion under both kinds the point had now been argued fully; it only remained for them to join with the Council and accept its declaration on the subject as inspired by the Holy Ghost. Their other points had either been already settled by the Compacts or were favours which might afterwards be discussed by the Council. This was of course equivalent to a refusal to grant anything beyond the bare letter of the Compacts. The Bohemian moderates saw themselves entirely deceived in their hopes of obtaining universal tolerance for their beliefs. The Council would grant nothing more than a special favour to Bohemia and Moravia to continue to use the ritual which they had adopted, until such time as it could safely be prohibited. In vain the Bohemians asked that at least they should not be sent away entirely empty-handed, lest it be a cause of fresh disturbances. They could get no better answer, and left Basel on November 29. In spite of Cesarini’s remonstrance against the imprudence of such a step, the Council on December 23 issued a decree that the Communion under both kinds was not a precept of Christ, but the Church could order the method of its reception as reverence and the salvation of the faithful seemed to require. The custom of communicating under one kind only has been reasonably introduced by the Church and was to be regarded as the law, nor might it be changed without the Church's authority.

In Bohemia the disappointment of the expectations which the great mass of the people still retained caused growing irritation, and seemed likely to lead to afresh
outbreak. Moreover, Sigismund's declining health gave an occasion to the ambitious schemes of those of his own household. Sigismund had no son, but his only daughter was married to Albert of Austria; and the fondest wish of Sigismund's declining years was that Albert should succeed to all his dignities and possessions. But the Empress Barbara had already tasted the sweets of power and was unwilling to retire into obscurity. She and her relatives, the Counts of Cilly, raised up a party among the Bohemian barons with the object of elevating Ladislas of Poland to the thrones of Bohemia and Hungary, and marrying him, though still a youth, to Barbara, in her fifty-fourth year. Sigismund discovered this plot and felt the danger of his position. He was seized with erysipelas, and had to submit to the amputation of his big toe. His one desire was to quit Bohemia and secure Albert's succession in Hungary. Concealing his knowledge of what was passing around him, he left Prag on November, borne in an open litter and dressed in the imperial robes. He was accompanied by the Empress and the Count of Cilly, and on November 21 reached Znaym, where Albert and his wife Elizabeth awaited him. There he ordered Barbara to be imprisoned, but the Count of Cilly had timely warning and escaped. At Znaym Sigismund summoned to his presence several of the chief barons of Bohemia and Hungary, and urged on them the advantages to be gained by uniting both lands under one rule; he warmly recommended to their support the claims of Albert. This was his last effort. Feeling his malady grow worse, he was true to the last to that love of dramatic effect which was so strong a feature of his character. He wished to die like an emperor. Attired in the imperial robes, with his crown on his head, he heard mass on the morning of December 9. When mass was over he ordered grave clothes to be put on over the imperial vesture, and sitting on his throne awaited death, which overtook him in the evening. He was left seated for three days according to his command, “that men might see that the lord of all the world was dead and gone”. Then his corpse was carried to Grosswardein and buried in the resting-place of the Hungarian kings.

The facile pen of Eneas Sylvius gives us the following vigorous description of Sigismund: “He was tall, with bright eyes, broad forehead, pleasantly rosy cheeks, and a long thick beard. He had a large mind and formed many plans, but was changeable. He was witty in conversation, given to wine and women, and thousands of love intrigues are laid to his charge. He was prone to anger, but ready to forgive. He could not keep his money, but spent it lavishly. He made more promises than he kept, and often deceived”. These words are a fair representation of the impression produced on his contemporaries by this mighty lord of all the world. With all his faults, and they were many, on the whole men loved and esteemed him.

No doubt vanity was the leading feature of Sigismund's character; but it was the dignified vanity of always seeming to act worthily of his high position. He would have been ludicrous with his dramatic strut had not his geniality and keenness of wit imposed on those who came in his way, and so saved him from hopeless absurdity. It is easy to mock at Sigismund's undertakings, at his pretensions as compared with the results which he achieved; but it is impossible not to feel some sympathy even for the weaknesses of an Emperor who strove to realize the waning idea of the empire, and whose labours were honestly directed to the promotion of the peace and union of Christendom. Sigismund possessed in perfection all the lesser arts of sovereignty; kindly, affable, and ready in speech, he could hold his own amidst any surroundings. His schemes, however chimerical they might seem, were founded on a large sympathy with the desires and needs of Europe as a whole. He laboured for the unity of
Christendom, the restoration of European peace, and the reformation of the Church. Even when he spoke of combining Europe in a crusade against the Turks, his aim, however chimerical, was proved by the result to be right. But Sigismund had not the patience nor the wisdom to begin his work from the beginning. He had not the self-restraint to husband his resources; to undertake first the small questions which concerned the kingdoms under his immediate sway, to aim only at one object at a time, and secure each step before advancing to the next. Relying on his position, he caught at every occasion of displaying his own importance, and his vanity led him to trust that he would succeed by means of empty display. Hence his plans hampered one another. He destroyed his position at the Council of Constance by a change of political attitude resulting from a futile attempt to bring about peace between England and France. He induced Bohemia to think that its religious interests were safe in his keeping, and then trusted to repress its religious movement by the help of the Council of Constance. When he had driven Bohemia to revolt, he oscillated between a policy of conciliation and one of repression till matters had passed beyond his control. He lost his command of the Council of Basel because he entered into relations with the Pope, who was bent upon its overthrow. His schemes of ecclesiastical reform slipped from his grasp, and after spending his early years in extinguishing one schism, he lived to see the beginning of another. Few men with such wise plans and such good intentions have so conspicuously failed.

The death of Sigismund removed the only man who might averted an open outbreak between Eugenius IV and the Council of Basel. Both sides now proceeded to extremities. On December 30 Eugenius IV published a Bull declaring the Council to be transferred from Basel to Ferrara. At Basel Cesarini made one last attempt to bring back peace to the distracted Church. On December 20, in an eloquent speech breathing the true spirit of Christian statesmanship, he pointed out the evils that would follow from a schism. Farewell to all hopes of a real union with the Greeks, of real missionary enterprise against the Mohammedans, who were the serious danger to Christendom. He besought the Council, ere it was too late, to recall its admonition to the Pope, provided he would recall his translation of the Council: then let them send envoys to meet the Greeks on their arrival in Italy, and propose to them to come to Basel, Avignon, or Savoy—failing that, let them frankly join with the Pope and the Greeks in the choice of a place which would suit all parties. He offered himself as ready to do his utmost to mediate for such a result. But Cesarini spoke to deaf ears. The control of the Council had passed entirely into the hands of Cardinal d'Allemand, who was committed to a policy of war to the bitter end. A ponderous reply to Cesarini was prepared by the Archbishop of Palermo, a mass of juristic subtleties which dealt with everything except the great point at issue.

Cesarini saw the entire disappointment of the hopes which six years before had been so strong in his breast at the opening of the Council. He had longed for peace and reform; he saw, instead, discord and self-seeking. The Council, which ought to have promoted the welfare of Christendom, had become an engine of political attack upon the Papacy. The noble, generous, and large-minded aims of Cesarini had long been forgotten at Basel. The reformation which he projected had passed into revolution, which he could no longer control nor moderate. He shared the fate of many other reformers at many times of the world’s history. The movement which he had awakened passed into violent hands, and the end of his labours for peace and order was anarchy and discord. With a sad heart he confessed his failure, and on January 9, 1438, he left
Basel amid demonstrations of respect from his opponents. At the request of the Pope and all the Cardinals he went to Florence, where he was received with honour and lived for a time in quietness and study.

At Basel Cardinal d'Allemand was appointed president in Cesarini's stead. The Council on January 24 took the next step in its process against Eugenius IV. It decreed that, as he had not appeared to plead within the appointed time, he was thenceforth suspended from his office; meanwhile the administration of the Papacy belonged to the Council, and all acts done by Eugenius were null and void. Sixteen bishops were present at this session, of whom nine were Savoyards, six Aragonese, and one Frenchman. Of the eighteen abbots who were there, eleven were Aragonese and six were Savoyards. The Council was, in fact, supported only by the King of Aragon and the Dukes of Milan and Savoy. The Duke of Savoy hoped to use it for his personal aggrandizement. The King of Aragon and the Duke of Milan saw in it a means of forcing Eugenius IV into subserviency to their political schemes in Italy. Neither of them was prepared to support the deposition of the Pope, but they wished the process against him to be a perpetual threat hanging over his head. The rest of the European powers looked with disapproval, more or less strongly expressed, on the proceedings of the Council. Henry VI of England wrote a letter addressed to the Congregation (not the Council) of Basel, in which he reproved them for presuming to judge the Pope, denounced them for bringing back the times of Antichrist, and bade them desist from the process against Eugenius. Charles VII of France wrote to the Council to stay its measures against the Pope, and wrote to the Pope to withdraw his decrees against the Council; he forbade his bishops to attend the Council of Ferrara, but allowed individuals to act as they pleased at Basel. His purpose was to regulate ecclesiastical matters in France at his own pleasure. In Germany, Sigismund’s policy of mediation survived after his death; men wished to avoid a schism, but to obtain through the Council some measures of reform. The Kings of Castile and Portugal and the Duke of Burgundy all admonished the Council to withdraw from their proceedings against Eugenius.

The quarrel of the Pope and the Council now ceased to attract the attention of Europe; it had degenerated into a squabble in which both parties were regarded with something approaching contempt. But this condition of affairs was full of danger to the future of the organisation of the Church.
CHAPTER VIII.

EUGENIUS IV IN FLORENCE AND THE UNION OF THE GREEK

1434—1439.

Since his flight from Rome in 1434, Eugenius IV has merely appeared as offering such resistance as he could to the growing pretensions of the Council. During the four years that had passed from that time he had been quietly gaining strength and importance in Italy. True to her old traditions, Florence graciously received the exiled Pope; and under the shadow of her protection, Eugenius IV, like his predecessor Martin V, had been able to recruit his shattered forces and again reestablish his political position.

At first his evil genius seemed still to pursue Eugenius IV, and he played a somewhat ignominious part in Florentine affairs. The time when he arrived in Florence was a great crisis in Florentine history. The prudent conduct of Giovanni de’ Medici had preserved the internal peace of Florence by carefully maintaining a balance between the aristocratic and popular parties in the city. But between his son Cosimo and his political rival Rinaldo degli Albizzi a bitter hostility gradually grew up which could only end in the supremacy of the one or the other party. The first step was taken by Rinaldo, who, in September, 1433, filled the city with his adherents; Cosimo was taken unawares, was accused of treason, cast into prison, and only by a skillful use of his money succeeded in escaping death. He went as an exile to Venice; but his partisans were strong in Florence, the city was divided, and a reaction in his favour set in. It was clear that the new magistrates who came into office on September 1, 1434, would recall him from banishment, and Rinaldo and his party were prepared to offer forcible resistance. On September 26 Florence was in a ferment, and Rinaldo degli Albizzi, with 800 armed men, held the Palace of the Podesta and the streets which led to the Piazza. Eugenius IV in this condition of affairs offered his services as mediator. He sent Giovanni Vitelleschi, Bishop of Recanati, to Rinaldo, who, to the surprise of every one, was persuaded to leave his position and confer with the Pope at S. Maria Novella. It was one o’clock in the morning when he did so. What arguments the Pope may have used we do not know; but at five o’clock Rinaldo dismissed his armed men and remained peaceably with the Pope. Perhaps he was not sure of the fidelity of his adherents, and trusted that, by a show of submission, he might, with the Pope’s help, obtain better terms than the doubtful chances of a conflict seemed to promise.

His enemies at once pursued the advantage thus offered to them. The Signori sent some of their number to thank the Pope for his good offices, and whatever may have been the first intention of Eugenius IV, he was soon won over to abandon Rinaldo. On October 2 the party of the Medici filled the Piazza and decreed the recall of Cosimo. Next day Rinaldo and his son were banished. The Pope attempted to console Rinaldo, and protested the uprightness of his own intentions and the pain which he felt at the failure of his mediation.

“Holy Father”, answered Rinaldo, “I do not wonder at my ruin; I blame myself for believing that you, who have been driven out of your own country, could keep me in mine. He who trusts a priest's word is like a blind man without a guide”.

341
Sadly Rinaldo left Florence for ever, and on October 6, Cosimo de' Medici returned in triumph amid shouts that hailed him father of his country. From that day forward for three hundred years the fortunes of Florence were identified with those of the house of Medici.

In his abode at Florence things gradually began to take a better turn for Eugenius IV. The rebellious Romans, who had proudly sent their envoys to Basel announcing that they had recovered their liberties and that the days of Brutus had returned, began to find themselves in straits. The Papal troops still held the castle of S. Angelo and bombarded the town; their commander also by a stratagem took prisoners several of the Roman leaders. The people soon turned to thoughts of peace and submission, and on October 28 Giovanni Vitelleschi, at the head of the Pope's condottieri, took possession of the city in the Pope's name, and put to death the chief leaders of the rebellion. Moreover, Venice and the Pope renewed their league against the Duke of Milan, appointed Francesco Sforza as their general, and sent him against the Duke's condottiere general, Fortebraccio, who had occupied the neighborhood of Rome. Fortebraccio was routed and slain, whereon the Duke of Milan found it advisable to come to terms. On August 10, 1435, peace was made, leaving Eugenius IV master of the Patrimony of S. Peter and the Romagna, while Francesco Sforza obtained the lordship of the March of Ancona. The Duke of Milan also withdrew his aid from the rebellious Bologna, which on September 27 submitted to the Pope. Even in Florence Eugenius IV was not safe from the machinations of the Duke of Milan. A Roman adventurer, named Riccio, obtained the connivance of the Milanese ambassador at Florence, the Bishop of Novara, to a plot for seizing the person of Eugenius when he retired into the country before the summer heat. The city magistrates discovered the plot, and Riccio was tortured and put to death. The Bishop of Novara abjectly prayed for pardon from Eugenius; and the Pope granted his life to the entreaty of Cardinal Albergata, who was just setting out as Papal legate to the Congress of Arras. Albergata took the Bishop of Novara to Basel, where he remained as one of the bitterest opponents of Eugenius IV.

In another quarter the affairs of the kingdom of Naples afforded a scope for the activity of Eugenius IV. The feeble Queen Giovanna II continued to the end of her reign to be the puppet of those around her. Even her chief favorite, Caraccioli, could not retain his hold upon her changeful mind. He saw his influence fail before the intrigues of the Queen's cousin, the Duchess of Suessa, who at length succeeded in obtaining the Queen's permission to proceed against her overweening favourite. On August 17, 1432, Caraccioli celebrated magnificently his son's marriage; in the night a message was brought to him that the Queen was dying, and wished to see him. Hurriedly he rose, and opened his door to a band of conspirators, who rushed upon him and slew him on his bed. Giovanna wept over his death, and pardoned those who wrought it. His mighty tomb in the Church of San Giovanni Carbonara is worthy of a more heroic character. Three knightly figures of Strength, Skill, and Justice bear the sarcophagus on which stands Caraccioli as a warrior. The tomb is in the vast style of the old Neapolitan work; but in its execution we see the delicacy of Tuscan feeling and the hand of Florentine artists. The way is already prepared for the later flow of the Renaissance motives into the rude regions of Naples.

On Caraccioli's death Louis of Anjou prepared to return to Naples; but the imperious Duchess of Suessa preferred to exercise undivided sway over her feeble mistress. The death of Louis, in November, 1434, awakened the activity of Alfonso of Aragon; but Giovanna II would not recognize him as her heir, and made a will in favour
of René, Count of Provence, the younger brother of Louis of Anjou. On February 2, 1435, Giovanna II died, at the age of 65, worn out before her time; one of the worst and most incapable of rulers that ever disgraced a throne. On her death the inevitable strife of the parties of Anjou and Aragon again broke out. René claimed the throne by Giovanna’s will, Alfonso of Aragon put forward Giovanna’s previous adoption of himself, and the claims of the house of Aragon. But Eugenius IV put forth also the claims of the Papacy. The Angevin line had originally come to Sicily at the Papal summons, and had received the kingdom as a papal fief. Eugenius IV asserted that on the failure of the direct line in Giovanna II the kingdom of Sicily devolved to the Pope. He appointed as his legate to administer the affairs of the kingdom Giovanni Vitelleschi, who had been created Patriarch of Alexandria. Little heed was paid to the Pope's claims. Alfonso’s fleet vigorously besieged Gaeta, which was garrisoned by Genoese soldiers to protect their trade during the time of warfare. Genoa, at that time under the signory of the Duke of Milan, equipped a fleet to raise the siege of Gaeta, and on August 5 a battle was fought off the isle of Ponza, in which the Genoese were completely victorious. Alfonso and his two brothers, together with the chief barons of Aragon and Sicily, were taken prisoners.

Italy was shaken to its very foundations by the news of this victory, of which the Duke of Milan would reap the fruit. It seemed to give him the means of making himself supreme in Italian politics. But the jealous temper of Filippo Maria Visconti looked with distrust on this signal victory which Genoa had won. His first proceeding was to humble the pride of the city by depriving it of the glory of bringing home in triumph its illustrious captives. He ordered Alfonso and the rest to be sent from Savona to Milan, and on their arrival treated them with courtesy and respect. Alfonso’s adventurous and varied life had given him large views of politics and great experience of men. He recognized the gloomy and cautious spirit of Filippo Maria, who loved to form plans in secret, who trusted no one, but used his agents as checks one upon another. In the familiarity of friendly intercourse, Alfonso put before the Duke political considerations founded upon a foresight which was beyond the current conceptions of the day. “If René of Anjou”, he argued, “were to become King of Naples, he would do all he could to open communications with France, and for this purpose to establish the French power in Milan. If I were to become King of Naples I should have no enemies to dread save the French; and it would be my interest to live on good terms with Milan, which could at any moment open the way to my foes. The title of king would be mine, but the authority would be yours. With me at Naples you will remain a free prince; otherwise you will be between two strong powers, an object of suspicion and jealousy to both”.

The state system of Italy was already so highly organized that arguments such as these weighed with the Duke of Milan, and he determined to forego all thoughts of present glory for future safety. Instead of treating Alfonso as a captive, he entered into an alliance with him, gave him his liberty and ordered Genoa to restore his captured ships. Alfonso was sufficiently keen-sighted to perceive, and Filippo Maria was sufficiently prudent to recognize, the danger that would arise to Italian independence from the centralization of the French monarchy and the power of the house of Austria. They devised a scheme for neutralizing this danger. The idea of a balance of power in Italy, founded on identity of interest between Milan and Naples, which was to keep Italy in peace and exclude all interference from beyond the Alps, began from this time forward to be a central point in Italian politics.
The immediate result of this policy was that Genoa, indignant at the slight thus cast upon her, revolted from Milan, and joined the league of Florence, Venice, and the Pope. Eugenius IV, alarmed at the alliance between Alfonso and the Duke of Milan, withdrew his own claims on Naples, and espoused the cause of René, who was a prisoner of the Duke of Burgundy but was represented in Naples by his wife, Elizabeth of Lorraine. Neither she nor Alfonso had any resources at their command, and the war was carried on between the rival factions in the realm. We have seen that Alfonso was anxious to minimize the help which the Pope could give his rival, by supplying him with sufficient occupation in the affairs proceeding at Basel.

When Eugenius IV had recruited his shattered fortunes by an abode of nearly two years in Florence, he left it for his own city of Bologna, on April 18, 1436. Before his departure he consecrated the stately Duomo of Florence, which had just received its crowning ornament of Brunelleschi’s mighty dome, and was again ready for divine service. The city wished that the ceremonial should be befitting of its splendour. A scaffolding, adorned with carpets, was erected from S. Maria Novella to the Duomo, on which Eugenius IV walked in state, the gonfaloniere of the city bearing his train.

On April 22 Eugenius I entered Bologna with nine Cardinals, and was soon followed by two others from Basel. The Papal government of Bologna had not been such as to win the affections of the people. The legate, the Bishop of Concordia, had proclaimed a general pacification, on the strength of which Antonio de' Bentivogli, after fifteen years' exile, returned to the city which he had once ruled. He had not been there three weeks when he was seized as he left the chapel where the legate had been saying mass. He was gagged, and immediately beheaded by order of the Pope's Podesta, as was also Tommaso de' Zambeccari. The only reason assigned for this treacherous act was dread of the number of their followers. The cruelty and tyranny of the Podesta made the Papal rule hateful in the city. Nor did Eugenius IV do anything to mend this state of things. He was busied with his negotiations with the Council and with the Greeks. The only attention which he paid to the citizens of Bologna was to extort from them 30,000 ducats by holding out hopes of summoning his Council thither. When the citizens found themselves disappointed they looked with scarce concealed discontent on the Pope's departure for Ferrara on January 23, 1438. Scarcely had he gone when Niccoli Piccinino, the Duke of Milan's general, appeared before Bologna. On the night of May 20 the gates were opened to him by the citizens. Faenza, Imola, and Forli joined in the revolt, and the greater part of Romagna was again lost to the Pope.

This was, however, of small moment to Eugenius IV. His attention was entirely fixed on the Council of Ferrara, through which he hoped to win back all that of the he had lost. The union of the Greek Church was to reinstate the Papacy in its position in the eyes of Europe; the Pope was again to appear as the leader of Christendom in a great crusade for the protection of Constantinople. It is a melancholy spectacle that is offered to our view. The Eastern Empire, with its splendid traditions of past glories, has sunk to be a cat's-paw in the ecclesiastical squabbles of the West. The trembling Greeks are ready to disavow their religious convictions to obtain help from their Western brethren. The States of Europe are so rent by intestine struggles, or are so bent upon purely selfish ends, that they are incapable of understanding the menace to European civilization contained in the establishment of the Turks on this side of the Bosphorus. The Greeks cannot appeal to any feeling of European patriotism, or to any considerations of political wisdom. Only through the semblance of an ecclesiastical reconciliation can they hope to awaken any interest for their cause in Western Europe. At the last moment
they see the Western Church itself distracted by contending parties; they engage
desperately in a sacrifice of their convictions, which they half feel will avail them
nothing.

The causes of the separation between the Churches were national rather than
religious. The beliefs and rites of the two Churches did not materially differ. But the
political development of the East and West had been different. In East, the Imperial
autocracy had maintained and strengthened its power over the Church; in the West,
where the Teutons had weakened the fabric of the Imperial system, the Pope, as
supreme head of the Western Church, had won an independent position for his
authority. It is true that the Greek view of Purgatory differed somewhat from that of the
Latins, that they used leavened and not unleavened bread for the Host, and that they did
not adopt the addition of the words “and from the Son” (Filioque) to the clause of the
Nicene Creed which defines the procession of the Holy Ghost. But no vital point was
concerned in any of these differences. The real disagreement was that the Papacy strove
to assert over the Eastern Church a supremacy which that Church was unwilling to
admit. The ill-feeling created by the claim of Pope Nicolas I in 863, to interfere as
supreme judge in the question of the election of the Patriarch of Constantinople,
simmered on till it produced a formal rupture in 1053, when Leo IX at Hildebrand's
suggestion excommunicated the Greek Patriarch. Round its ecclesiastical establish-
mament the narrow spirit of Greek nationality centred, and the Greeks were ready in every
sphere to assert their superiority to the barbarous Latins. In the time of their distress
their pride was humbled if their minds were not convinced. They were ready to sacrifice
the traditions of the past, which they still held firmly in their hearts, to the pressing
need for present aid. It is sad to see the feeble representatives of an ancient civilization
lowering themselves before the Papacy in its abasement.

On November 24, 1437, the Greek Emperor, John Palaeologus, his brother, the
Patriarch, and twenty-two bishops, went on board the Papal galleys and set sail for Italy.
Though the Greeks journeyed at the Pope’s expense, yet the Emperor, in his anxiety to
display fitting magnificence, converted into money the treasures of the Church. An
earthquake, which occurred at the time of his departure, was looked upon as an evil
omen by the people who with heavy hearts saw the ships quit the harbour. After many
perils and discomforts on the way, the Greeks reached Venice on February 1438, and
were magnificently received by the Doge, who went out to meet them in the
Bucentaur; which was decked with red carpets and awnings wrought with gold
embroidery, while gold lions were standing on the prow. The rowers were clad in
uniforms richly wrought with gold, and on their caps was embroidered the image of S.
Mark. With the Doge came the Senate in twelve other splendid ships, and there was
such a multitude of boats that the sea could scarce be seen. Amid the clang of trumpets
the Emperor was escorted to the palace of the Marquis of Ferrara, near the Rialto, where
he abode. The amazement of the Greeks at the splendour of Venice is the most striking
testimony to the decay of their own noble city. “Venice splendid and great”, says
Phranza, “truly wonderful, yea most wonderful, rich, variegated and golden, trimly built
and adorned, worthy of a thousand praises, wise, yea most wise, so that one would not
be wrong in calling it the second land of promise”.

For twenty days the Greeks remained in Venice. The Doge offered them hospitality
as long as they chose, and advised them to see whether they could get better terms from
the Pope or from the Council. There was not much difference of opinion on this point.
Three only of the Greek prelates thought it desirable to wait; the Emperor’s doubts, if he
had any, were decided by the arrival of Cardinal Cesarini, who was the representative of that saner part of the Council to which the Greeks professed to adhere. The stay of the Greeks in Venice was not without melancholy reflections. Wherever they turned they were reminded that the glory of Venice was in a measure due to the spoils of Constantinople. In the rich jewels which bedecked the colossal statue on the high altar of S. Mark’s they saw the plunder of S. Sophia’s.

On February 28 the Emperor set sail for Ferrara. The Patriarch was sorely displeased at being left behind to follow in a few days. The Emperor disembarked at Francolino, where he was received by the Marquis of Ferrara and Cardinal Albergata as the Pope’s legate. He entered the city on March 4, riding on a magnificent black charger beneath a canopy held by his attendants. He advanced into the courtyard of the Papal palace, where Eugenius IV was seated with all his clergy. The Pope rose to greet the Emperor, who dismounted and advanced; Eugenius prevented him from kneeling and embraced him. Then he gave him his hand, which the Emperor kissed and took his seat on the Pope’s left; they continued some time in friendly conference. The Patriarch, who was particular to keep close to his luggage, followed grumbling, and reached Ferrara on March 7. His good humour was not increased by a message from the Emperor, telling him that the Pope expected him to kiss his foot on his reception. This the Patriarch stoutly refused to do. “I determined”, he said, “if the Pope were older than me, to treat him as a father; if of the same age, as a brother; if younger, as a son”. He added that he had hoped by the Pope’s aid to free his Church from the tyranny of the Emperor, and could not subject it to the Pope. The negotiations respecting this knotty question occupied the entire day. At last the Pope, for the sake of peace, consented to waive his rights, provided the reception was in private, and only six of the Greek prelates were admitted at one time. On the evening of March 8, the Patriarch Joseph, an old man of venerable aspect, with white hair and a long white beard, of dignified bearing, and considerable experience of affairs, greeted the Pope in his palace. The Pope rose and the Patriarch kissed his cheek, the inferior prelates his right hand. When the ceremony was over they were conducted to their lodgings.

The Council had been opened at Ferrara on January 5 by the Cardinal Albergata as Papal legate. Its first decree on January 10 was to confirm the translation of the Council from Basel to Ferrara, and to annul all that had been done at Basel since the Pope's Bull of translation. On January 27, the Pope entered Ferrara escorted by the Marquis Nicolas III of Este. He took up his abode in the palace of the Marquis; and as he suffered grievously from gout, the citizens of Ferrara consulted his infirmity by erecting a wooden scaffold, communicating between the palace and the cathedral, so as to spare him the inconvenience of mounting steps. On February 8 he presided over a congregation, and commended to its deliberation the work of union with the Greeks, and the repression of the excesses of those still remaining at Basel. The result of this deliberation was the issue of a Bull on February 15 annulling the proceedings of the Council of Basel, and declaring excommunicate all who did not quit it within thirty days. Eugenius IV had thus done all he could to affirm his dignity before the arrival of the Greeks.

In like manner the first point of importance with the Greeks was to affirm their own dignity at Ferrara. The question that first called for solution was the arrangement of seats in the Council. Cesarini suggested that the Greeks should sit on one side of the cathedral, the Latins on the other, and the Pope in the middle as a link between the two parties. The Greeks bluntly answered that they needed no such link; but if a link were
thought necessary it should be strengthened by the addition of the Greek Emperor and Patriarch to the Pope. Both sides fought to win prestige; but the Greeks were not fighting on equal terms. They were the Pope’s stipendiaries in Ferrara, and the arrangement for supplying them with the stipulated allowances went on side by side with the negotiations about the knotty question of seats. The Pope at first proposed to supply the Greeks with food; this they resisted, and demanded an allowance in money. Ultimately the Pope gave way; it was agreed that the Marquis of Ferrara should furnish them with lodgings, and the Pope give the Emperor thirty florins a month, the Patriarch twenty-five, the prelates four, and the other attendants three. The Greeks accepted a compromise about seats. The Latins were to sit on one side, the Greeks on the other. The Pope’s seat was highest, and was nearest the altar; next him was a vacant seat for the Western Emperor, opposite to which sat the Greek Emperor, and behind him the Patriarch. When the Patriarch wished to adorn his seat with curtains like the Papal throne, he was not allowed to do so. The Greeks murmured at this arrangement, but were obliged to submit. The Emperor exclaimed that the Latins were not aiming at order, but were gratifying their own pride.

Before appearing at the Council the Greek Emperor Insisted that it should not be merely an assembly of the prelates but also of the kings and princes of the West. The Pope was driven to admit that some time was necessary before the princes could arrive. It was agreed that a delay of four months should take place to allow them to be duly summoned. Meanwhile a general session should be held to proclaim that the Council was to be held at Ferrara, and nowhere else.

Some time was spent in settling these matters. At last on April 9 a solemn session was held in the cathedral, “a wonderful and awful sight”, says a Greek; “so that the Church looked like heaven”. The Pope and Papal retinue chanted the psalm, “Blessed be the Lord God of Israel”. The Patriarch was too ill to be present; but a declaration of his consent to the Council was read in his absence. Then the decree convoking all to Ferrara within four months was read in Latin and Greek, and received the formal approval of both parties. After a few thanksgivings, the synod was dismissed.

The festivities of Easter occupied some time, and the Greeks were annoyed that they could not get a church in Ferrara for the celebration of their own services. The Pope referred them to the Bishop of Ferrara, who answered that all his churches were so crowded that he could not find one large enough for their purposes. One of the Greeks said that he could not worship in the Latin churches, as they were full of saints whom he did not recognize; even the Christ bore an inscription which he did not understand; he could only make the sign of the cross and adore that. The tone of mind exhibited in these remarks did not augur well for any real Agreement, nor did the Emperor wish the discussions to go too far. His plan was to defer matters as long as possible, to insist upon the Council being representative of the powers of Europe, to obtain from them substantial help against the Turks, and to go back to Constantinople having made as few concessions as were possible.

The Latins, however, were anxious to make their triumph complete. They urged that it was a useless waste of time to do nothing while they waited for the appearance of the European princes. Cesarini displayed his wonted tact in inviting the Greeks to dinner, and overcoming the reserve which the Emperor wished them to maintain. He succeeded in inducing one of the most stubborn of the Greek prelates, Mark of Ephesus, to publish his views in writing, to the great wrath of the Emperor. The Papal officers
were remiss in the payment of allowances, and hinted that the Pope could not continue to pay men who would do nothing. By such means the Greeks were at last driven to agree to the appointment of ten commissioners on either side, who should engage in preliminary discussions upon the points of variance. Chief among the Greeks were Mark, Bishop of Ephesus, and Bessarion, Bishop of Nicaea; the Emperor ordered that they only should conduct the discussions. On the side of the Latins Cesarini took the leading part.

The conferences began on June 4. The first question discussed was that of Purgatory, on which the real difference of opinion was not important. The Latins held that sins, not repented of during life, are purged away by purgatorial fire, which at the Judgment is succeeded by everlasting fire for the reprobate. The Greeks admitted a Purgatory, but of pain and grief, not of fire, which they reserved as the means only of eternal punishment. Also the Greeks maintained that neither the punishment of the wicked nor the joy of the blessed was complete, till the general resurrection, seeing that before that time neither could receive their bodies. The Latins admitted that the punishment of the wicked could not be perfect till they had received their bodies, but held that the blessed, as souls, enjoy at present perfect happiness in heaven, though on receiving their bodies their happiness would become eternal. Even the most staunch upholder of the Greek doctrines, Mark of Ephesus, was driven to admit that there was not much difference between the Greek and the Latin opinions on this question. When the discussion was ended, the Latins handed in their opinion in writing. The Greeks were timid in committing themselves. Each wrote his opinion and submitted it to the Emperor, who combined those of Bessarion and Mark, to the effect that the souls of the happy departed, as souls, enjoy perfect felicity, but when in the resurrection they receive their bodies they will be capable of more perfect happiness and will shine like the sun. On July 17 this statement was submitted to the Latins. The only result of these conferences was to bring into prominence the differences existing amongst the Greeks themselves. The narrow and bigoted spirit of old Byzantine conservatism, expressed by the rough outspoken Mark of Ephesus, did not harmonize with the cosmopolitan feeling of the polished Platonist Bessarion, who saw the decadence of the Greeks, and wished to bring his own ability into a larger sphere of literary and theological activity. The Latins learned that there were some amongst the Greeks who would bow, and some who must be driven, to consent to union.

Then came a pause till the four months’ interval had elapsed for the fuller assembling of the Council. None of the European princes appeared, and the delay continued. Ferrara was attacked by the plague; some of the Greeks grew terrified or weary, and fled home. The Emperor requested the magistrates to keep guard over the gates, and forbade any of the Greeks to leave the city without his permission. The Emperor meanwhile spent his time in hunting in the woods round Ferrara, and paid no heed to the requests of the Marquis that he would spare his preserves, which had been stocked with great difficulty. The plague drove the Latins out of the city. Of a hundred and fifty prelates who were present at the first session, only five Cardinals and fifty bishops remained. The Greeks escaped the ravages of the plague, except only the household of the Russian archbishop.

It was some time before the Pope could obtain the Emperor’s consent to a second session of the Council. The Greeks were suspicious; they were indignant at a rumour which had been spread that they were guilty of fifty-four heresies; they were afraid that, if they allowed the Council to proceed, they might be outvoted. Their fears on this last
point were set at rest by an agreement that each party should vote separately. After that they could no longer resist the Pope's entreaties that the business of the Council should proceed.

On October 8 the second session was held in the Pope's chapel, as Eugenius was unable to move through attack of the gout. The Greeks had previously decided among themselves the question to be discussed. The more moderate party, headed by Bessarion, who was in favour of a real union if it were possible, wished to proceed at once to the important point which divided the two Churches, the double procession of the Holy Ghost. The Nicene Creed, which had been framed to define the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity, dealt chiefly with the relation between the Father and the Son, and contented itself with the statement that "the Holy Ghost proceeded from the Father". The continuance of controversy in the West led to the addition of the words "and from the Son" (Filioque), an addition which the Greeks never made. The Western Church argued that the procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father alone derogated from the dignity of the Son, who was equal with the Father in all points save only in His generation by the Father. The explanatory addition gradually became incorporated in the Creed. The greater metaphysical instinct of the Greeks led them to reject such an addition, which seemed to them dangerous, as tending to give a double origin to the Holy Ghost, and thereby to imperil the Unity in Trinity. There was no fundamental difference of opinion between the Greek and Latin fathers at first; but the genius of the Greek language admitted of finer distinctions than a Latin could comprehend. The Greeks were ready to allow that the Holy Ghost proceeded from the Father through the Son, not that He proceeded from the Father and the Son. The difference was of little moment till the resentment of the Greek Patriarch against the Papal claims to supremacy led in the ninth century to an open rupture between the two Churches, and every shadow of difference was at once brought into prominence. Tomes of learning had been amassed on either side in support of their opinions on this point, and a molehill had been piled to the height of a mountain. It was felt that this question presented the greatest difficulty in settlement. Bessarion and his followers wished to discuss it at once. Mark of Ephesus, and those who were opposed to the union, succeeded in overruling them, and proposed the more dangerous preliminary question, "Is it permissible to make any addition to a Creed?" Six disputants were chosen on either side: Bessarion, Mark, and Isidore of Russia were chief among the Greeks, Cardinals Cesarini and Albergata, and Andrea, Bishop of Rhodes, among the Latins.

The arguments were long and the speeches were many on both sides. The Fathers of Ferrara found, like the Fathers of Basel when dealing with the Bohemians, that a disputation led to little result. Speech was directed against speech; orator refuted orator. But amid the flow of words the central positions of the two parties remained the same. The Latins urged that the Filioque was an explanation of the Nicene Creed in accordance with the belief of most of the Latin and Greek Fathers, notably S. Basil; the Greeks urged that it was not derived from the text of the Creed itself, but was an unauthorized addition, which gave a careless explanation of a doctrine needing careful definition. Through October and November the discussion rolled on. The monotony was only broken by the arrival of ambassadors from the Duke of Burgundy, who aroused the deepest indignation in the Greek Emperor by paying reverence to the Pope and not to himself. When they urged that they were commissioned only to the Pope and had letters to him alone, the Emperor was still more enraged and threatened to leave the Council
where he was subject to such slights. He could only be appeased by the solemn and public presentation of a letter forged by the ambassadors.

The discussions were leading to no result. As a way of escaping from a mere strife of words, Cesarini besought that the real point of issue, the truth of the double procession of the Holy Ghost, be taken into consideration. If they were agreed that it was true, the addition of it to the Creed was of small moment. The majority of the Greek prelates were loth to enter upon a doctrinal discussion; but the rumours of a new Turkish attack on Constantinople made the Emperor more desirous for succours. He assembled his prelates and said that it was unworthy of them, after so many labours and so much trouble, to refuse to come to the point; their refusal in the present state of affairs would only give cause of triumph to the Latins. In vain the Patriarch urged that it was unwise to quit the safe position of the unlawfulness of an addition to the Creed. The Emperor succeeded in extorting from the discordant prelates a reluctant consent to the discussion of the doctrine.

The Pope meanwhile had been pressing on the Emperor the necessity of transferring the Council from Ferrara to Florence. He pleaded that at Ferrara he could fulfill his agreement with the Greeks. Niccolo Piccinino was ravaging the neighborhood so that no revenues could reach the Papal coffers; the plague had made Ferrara an unsafe place of residence; Florence had promised a large loan to the Pope, if he would again take refuge within its walls. Eugenius IV was anxious to remove the Greeks further from their own land, to a place where they would be more entirely dependent on himself. The Greeks murmured, but their necessities gave them little option; as the Pope's stipendiaries they were bound to go where he could best find them rations. On January 10, 1439, the last session was held at Ferrara and decreed the transference of the Council to Florence on the ground of the pestilence.

On January 16 Eugenius IV left Ferrara for Florence; his journey was more like a flight before the troops of Piccinino than a papal progress. The sedentary Greeks were greatly wearied by the discomforts of a long journey across the Apennines in winter. The aged Patriarch especially suffered from the journey; but his vanity was gratified by the splendor of his reception in Florence, where he was met by two Cardinals, and amidst a blare of trumpets and the shouts of a vast multitude he was escorted to his lodgings. Three days after, on February 16, arrived the Emperor; but a storm of rain spoiled the magnificence of his reception, and scattered the crowd which came to give him the welcome that the Florentines, better than, any others, could give to a distinguished guest.

In Florence the Pope was determined to proceed more speedily with business than had been done at Ferrara. The Greek Emperor had by this time seen the actual position of affairs. He was obliged to submit to the failure of the expectations with which he had come to Italy. He had hoped to play off the Council of Basel against the Pope, and so secure good terms for himself; he found Latins united and undisturbed by the proceedings of the fathers still remaining at Basel. He hoped that the Western princes would have assembled at the Council, and that he could have made the question of union secondary to a project for a crusade against the Turk; he found a purely ecclesiastical assembly which he could not divert from purely theological considerations. As he could not with dignity go back to Constantinople empty-handed, and as he sorely needed succors, he saw no other course open than to accept such terms of union as could be obtained, and trust afterwards to the generosity of Western
Christendom. At Florence he used his influence to expedite matters, and fell in with the Pope's suggestions for this purpose.

On February 26, a meeting took place at Florence in the Pope’s palace, confined to forty members on each side. It was agreed to hold public disputations three times a week for three hours at least, and also to appoint committees on each side, who might confer privately about the union. The public sessions, which began on March 2, were really a long theological duel between John of Montenegro, a famous Dominican theologian, and Mark of Ephesus. Day after day their strife went wearily on, diversified only by disputes about the authenticity of manuscripts of S. Basil against Eunomius, whose words Mark of Ephesus was convicted of quoting from a garbled manuscript. The argument turned on points verbal rather than real; each side could support its own opinion more easily than prove the error of its opponent. Even Mark of Ephesus was wearied of talking, and in a long speech on March 17 fired his last shot. John of Montenegro, on his part, made a statement which the partisans of union among the Greeks seized as a possible basis for future negotiation. He said explicitly that the Latins recognized the Father as the one cause of the Son and of the Holy Ghost. This was the only theological point involved in the two positions. The Emperor requested John to put his statement in writing, and laid it before his assembled prelates. He spoke of all his labours to bring about union, and he urged them to accept this basis. The Greeks in truth were weary of the controversy; they longed to return home. The Patriarch grew feebler day by day; the Emperor grew more determined to see some fruits of all his trouble. A passage of a letter of S. Maximus, a Greek writer of the seventh century, was discovered by the Greeks, which agreed with the language of John of Montenegro. “If the Latins will accept this”, exclaimed the partisans of the Union, “what hinders us from agreement?”. In an assembly of the Greek prelates the Emperor’s will overbore all opposition except that of Mark and the Bishop of Heraclea. The letter of Maximus was submitted to the Latins as the basis for an agreement; meanwhile the public sessions were suspended.

John of Montenegro, however, was anxious to have his reply to the last onslaught of Mark of Ephesus. Another session was held on March 21 to gratify the vanity of the Latins; but the Emperor took the precaution of ordering Mark to absent himself. When thus bereft of an adversary and listened to in solemn silence, John of Montenegro talked himself out in two days. An understanding had now been established between the Pope and the Emperor; but the susceptibilities of the Greeks were still hard to manage. Public sessions, which only awakened vanity, were stopped. Committees composed of ardent partisans of the Union were nominated on both sides for the purpose of minimizing the difficulties that still remained. Bessarion and Isidore of Russia among the Greeks strove their utmost to overcome the rigid conservatism of their fellow-countrymen. The Cardinals Cesarini and Capranica among the Latins laboured assiduously to secure the Papal triumph. Perpetual messages passed between the Pope and the Emperor. Documents were drawn up on both sides; proposals towards greater exactness of expression were put forward. Bessarion argued in a learned treatise that there was no real difference of meaning, when the Latins said that the Holy Ghost proceeded from the Son, and the Greek fathers wrote that He proceeded through (Σιά) the Son, if both agreed that there were not two causes, but one, of the procession, and that the Father and the Son formed one substance.

The Patriarch was lying on his death-bed. Bessarion and his party were resolute for the Union on large grounds of ecclesiastical statesmanship. Others of the Greeks,
following the Emperor, were convinced of its practical necessity. They had gone so far that they could not draw back. They were willing to seek out expressions of double meaning, which might serve for a compromise. Yet many of the Greeks held by the stubborn Mark of Ephesus, and would not give way. The discussion passed from being one between Greeks and Latins to one between two parties among the Greeks. Many were the fierce controversies, many the intrigues, great the anger of the Emperor, before an end was visible to these troublesome disputations. At last, on June 3, the Greeks agreed that, without departing from their ancient belief, they were ready to admit that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son as one cause and one substance, proceeds through the Son as the same nature and the same substance. Next day a schedule was drawn up, of which a copy was handed to the Emperor, the Pope, and the Patriarch: it ran: “We agree with you, and assent that your addition to the Creed comes from the Fathers; we agree with it and unite with you, and say that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son as from one origin and cause”.

Matters had proceeded so far that the Emperor turned to business, and asked the Pope what succours he would grant. Eugenius IV promised to supply 300 soldiers and two galleys for the constant defence of Constantinople; in time of need, twenty galleys for six months, or ten for a year.

He also undertook to preach a crusade and rouse the West for the defence of the Greeks. Satisfied with this promise, the Emperor hastened to bring matters to a conclusion. Mark of Ephesus was peremptorily ordered to hold his tongue, and he himself admits that he was not unwilling to be relieved from further responsibility in the matter.

But the sudden death of the Patriarch Joseph on the evening of June 10 seemed at first likely to put a stop to all further negotiations. The Greeks, bereft of their ecclesiastical head, might well urge that without his sanction all proceedings would be useless. Happily for Eugenius IV, there was found a paper subscribed by Joseph a few hours before his death, approving what seemed good to his spiritual sons, and acknowledging the supremacy of the Roman Church. The Patriarch was buried with due honours in the Church of S. Maria Novella, where the inscription on his tomb is the only memorial remaining to this day of the labours spent in uniting the Eastern and Western Churches.

Fortified by the Patriarch’s declaration, the Emperor urged on the completion of the work of union. The Pope submitted to the Greeks for their consideration the differences between the Churches, concerning the use of unleavened bread in the Eucharist, Purgatory, the Papal Primacy, the words used in consecration. The Pope had already laid before them a statement of the views which the Latins would be ready to accept. The only question was that those who were in favour of the Union should win over the rest to accept the proffered terms. The subject of Purgatory had already been threshed out at Ferrara, and the difference was seen to be slight. A satisfactory form of agreement was soon found. It was laid down that those who died in sin went to eternal punishment, those who had been purged by penitence went to heaven and beheld the face of God, those who died in penitence before they had produced worthy fruits of penitence for their omissions and commissions went to Purgatory for purification by pains, and for them the prayers and alms of the faithful availed, as the Church ordained. The use of leavened or unleavened bread was a small point of ritual, on which the Latins could urge that their own custom of using unleavened bread was more in accordance with the
facts of the institution of the Sacrament, as it was clear that at the time of the Passover Christ could only have unleavened bread. The Pope declared that, though the Latin Church used unleavened bread, the Sacrament might also be celebrated with leavened bread. The question was left open. As to the consecration of the elements, the Greeks were in the habit of using after the words of consecration a short prayer of S. Basil that the Spirit might make the bread and wine the Body and Blood of Christ. The Latins demanded that the Greeks should declare that the Sacrament was consecrated only by the words of Christ. The Greeks did not doubt the fact, but objected to the declaration as unnecessary. It was agreed that it should be made verbally, and not inserted in the Articles of Union.

So far all went smoothly enough; but the greatest difficulty arose about the Papal Supremacy. Up to this point the Greeks might flatter themselves that they had been making immaterial compromises or engaging in verbal explanations. Now they had to face the surrender of the independence of their Church. However true it might be that they must make some sacrifices to gain political consideration, the recognition of the Papal headship galled their pride to the quick. The Pope demanded that the Greeks should recognize him as the chief pontiff, successor of Peter, and vicar of Christ, and admit that he judged and ruled the Church as its teacher and shepherd. The Greeks requested that their own privileges should be reserved. There was a stormy discussion. At length the Greeks, on June 22, proposed to admit the Pope's Supremacy with two provisos:

1) That the Pope should not convocate a Council without the Emperor and Patriarch, though if they were summoned and did not come, the Council might still be held;

2) That in case an appeal were made to the Pope against a Patriarch, the Pope should send commissioners to investigate and decide on the spot without summoning the Patriarch to the Council.

Next day the Pope answered roundly that he intended to keep all his prerogatives, that he had the power of summoning a Council when it was necessary, and that all Patriarchs were subject to his will. On receiving this answer the Emperor angrily said, “See to our departure”. It seemed that the negotiations were to be broken off, and that the Greeks would not give way. But next day, June 24, being the festival of S. John Baptist, was given to religious ceremonies. The Greeks who had committed themselves to the Union, Bessarion, Isidore of Russia, and Dorotheus of Mitylene, spent the time in trying to arrange a compromise. Reflection brought greater calmness to the Emperor, and on June 26 Bessarion and his friends submitted a proposal couched in vaguer terms: “We recognize the Pope as sovereign pontiff, viceregent and vicar of Christ, shepherd and teacher of all Christians, ruler of the Church of God, saving the privileges and rights of the Patriarchs of the East”. This was accepted by the Pope. Nothing now remained save to draw up in a general decree the various conclusions which had been reached. For this purpose a committee of twelve was appointed, which laboured for eight days at the task.

On July 4 the decree was finished. When it was taken to the Emperor he objected to the fact that it ran in the Pope’s name, in the usual style of an ecclesiastical decree, and he insisted on the addition of the words—“with the consent of the most serene Emperor and Patriarch of Constantinople”. On July 5 it was signed separately by the Latins and the Greeks. It bears the signature of one hundred and fifteen Latin prelates and abbots, and of thirty-three Greek ecclesiastics, of whom eighteen were metropolitans. A great
majority of the Greeks signed it unwillingly. Syropulus tells us of many machinations which were used to win their assent. On the one hand, the declared will of the Emperor drove the compliant to submission; on the other hand, Papal largesses were doled out to the needy, and social cajoleries were heaped upon the vain. Mark of Ephesus, alone of those who were at Florence, had the courage of his opinions and refused to sign. He was too considerable a person to be intimidated by the Emperor, and too stubborn a conservative to be won over by the Pope. In spite, however, of the pathetic account of Syropulus, it is difficult to feel much sympathy with the reluctant Greeks. They knew, or they might have known, when they left their homes what they had to expect. It was a question of political expediency whether or not it was desirable in their imminent peril to abandon their attitude of isolation, and seek a place amid the nations of Western Christendom. If so, they must expect to make some sacrifice of their ancient independence, to overthrow some of the walls of partition which their conservatism had erected between themselves and the Latin Church. An acknowledgment of the Papal Supremacy was the necessary price for Papal aid. It was useless to appear as beggars and demand to retain all the privileges of independence. It was useless to advance so far on rational calculations of expediency, and to raise objections the moment that the actual pinch was felt by national vanity. The wisest heads among the Greeks confessed that since the Greek Church was no longer the centre of a vigorous national life, it must conform in some degree to the Latin Church if the Greeks looked for aid to the Latin nations. Moreover, the circumstances of the time were such that the Pope was as anxious for the Union as were the Greeks themselves. The Latins were willing to accept vague conditions and to agree readily to compromises. The Greeks could not complain that they were hardly pressed in matters of detail.

On July 6 the publication of the Decrees took place in the stately cathedral of Florence. The Greeks had at least the satisfaction of outdoing the Latins in the splendor of their vestments. The Pope sang the mass. The Latin choir sang hymns of praise; but the Greeks thought their Gregorian music barbarous and inharmonious. When they had ended the Greeks sang their hymns in turn. Cesarini read the Union Decree in Latin and Bessarion in Greek; then the two prelates embraced one another as a symbol of the act in which they had engaged. Next day the Greeks who had been spectators of the Latin mass asked that the Pope should in like manner be present at the celebration of their mass. They were told that the Pope was not certain what their mass was, and would like to see it performed privately before he committed himself to be present at a public ceremony. The Greeks refused to subject themselves to this supervision. The Emperor said indignantly that they had hoped to reform the Latins, but it seemed that the Latins only intended to reform them.

The Greeks were now anxious to depart, but waited to receive from the Pope five months' arrears of their allowance. The Pope tried to raise some other questions for discussion, chief of which was divorce, which the Greek Church allowed, while the Latin Church did not. He suggested that they should at once proceed to the election of a Patriarch. The Emperor refused any further discussion, and said that they would proceed to elect a Patriarch on their return, according to their own customs. The Pope requested that Mark of Ephesus should be punished for his contumacy, but this also the Emperor wisely refused. To make assurance doubly sure, the Pope demanded that five copies of the Union Decree should be signed by the original signatories, one for the Greeks, the rest to be sent to the princes of Europe. The Greeks objected that this was unnecessary; at last, however, they agreed to sign four duplicates, on the understanding that no
further difficulties were to be put in the way of their departure. On July 20 the Greek prelates began to quit Florence. The Emperor remained till August 26, when he made his way to Venice, and returned to Constantinople after an absence of two years.

“Have you won a triumph over the Latins?” was the Reception question eagerly asked of the returning prelates. “We have made a satisfactory compromise”, was the general answer. “We have become Azymites” (so the Latins were called by the Greeks because they used unleavened bread in the mass), “we have become Azymites, and have betrayed our Creed”, said Mark of Ephesus, and the Greek people took his view of the matter. They were profoundly conservative, and though their leaders might see the necessity of departing from their national isolation, the people could not be induced to follow the new policy. The Greek prelates who at Florence had unwillingly accepted the Union could not stand against the popular prejudice, and by their excuses for what they had done only tended to inflame the popular wrath. Mark of Ephesus became a hero; the prelates who had wished for the Union were treated with contumely. The Emperor was powerless. The Bishop of Cyzicum, whom he made Patriarch, was looked upon with aversion as a traitor. When he gave the people his blessing many of them turned away that they might not be defiled by one tainted with the leprosy of Latinism. The Emperor, finding that he could do nothing to abate the force of this popular feeling, adopted an attitude of indifference. The Pope supplied for the defence of Constantinople two galleys and 300 soldiers, as he had promised; but no great expedition was equipped by Europe against the Turks. The Emperor’s brother, Demetrius, despot of Epirus, who had been with him in Italy, and had been a spectator of all that had there been done, actually ventured to raise a rebellion. He combined Turkish aid with the fanatical feeling of the extreme Greek party against the Latins, and for some time troubled his brother. The three Patriarchs of Jerusalem, Antioch, and Alexandria issued in 1443 an encyclical letter, in which they condemned the Council of Florence as a council of robbers, and declared the Patriarch of Constantinople a matricide and heretic.

Thus the Council of Florence was productive of no direct fruits. The Popes did not succeed in establishing their supremacy over the Greek Church; the Greeks results got no substantial aid from Western Christendom to enable them to drive away their Turkish assailants. Yet the Council of Florence was not utterly useless. The meeting of two different civilizations and schools of thought gave a decided impulse to the literary world of Italy, and attracted thither some of the leaders of Greek letters. It was not long before Gemistus Pletho took up his abode at Florence, and Bessarion became a Cardinal of the Roman Church. Greek letters found a home in the West; and when the impending destruction at last fell upon Constantinople, the Greek exiles found a refuge prepared for them by their fellow-countrymen.

To Eugenius IV and to the Papacy the Council of Florence rendered a signal service. However slight its ultimate results might be, it was the first event since the outbreak of the Schism which restored the ruined prestige of the Papacy. Public opinion is naturally influenced chiefly by accomplished facts. No one could judge of the permanence of the work, but all were in some measure impressed by a new sense of the Papal dignity when they heard that, downcast as he was, Eugenius IV had still succeeded in healing the schism which had so long rent asunder the Christian Church. The Pope whose name was loaded with obloquy at Basel had been accepted as supreme at Constantinople. The power which was hard pressed at Rome still had sufficient vigour to win new conquests abroad. With lofty exultation Eugenius IV wrote to the
prince of Christendom, and announced the success of his efforts. He recapitulated his labours in this holy cause, carried on in spite of many discouragements, because he knew that only in Italy, and only in the presence of the Pope, could this great result be obtained. It was a home thrust which the fathers of Basel would find it hard to parry.

The Council of Florence was felt to be a triumph of Papal diplomacy. The prospect of it had drawn from Basel all men possessed of any moderation. The Italians saw in it the means of reasserting their hold on the headship of the Church, which the transalpine nations had begun to threaten. In union with the Greeks, they saw the beginning of a new epoch of crusades, in which the Papacy might again stand forth as the leader of the Latin race. The acute statesman and learned scholar, Francisco Barbaro, who was at that time Capitano of Brescia, wrote to the Archbishop of Florence at the beginning of the Council, pointing out the means to be employed. Learning and argument, he said, were useless; for the Greeks were too acute and too proud of their knowledge to be overcome by disputation. They must be treated with tact and with kindness; they must be led to see that in union lie their safety and glory. He urged the necessity of the greatest care. The union must be made to succeed; otherwise there was no chance for the Papacy, and Italian affairs would be plunged into hopeless confusion. The policy recommended by Barbaro was that pursued by the Pope’s advisers. Cesarini’s experience at Basel had fitted him admirably for the work to be done at Florence. The Papal diplomacy won a signal triumph, and followed up its first victory by others, less conspicuous indeed, but which added strength to the Papal cause. In December, 1439, the reconciliation of the Armenians to the Roman Church was announced to Europe, and Jacobites, Syrians, Chaldaeans, and Maronites in succeeding years made illusory submission, which served to present a dazzling display of Papal power.
CHAPTER IX.

THE GERMAN DECLARATION OF NEUTRALITY AND THE ELECTION OF FELIX V.

1438—1439.

Eugenius IV might triumph at Florence; but the fathers of Basel, weakened yet not dismayed, pursued their course with an appearance of lofty indifference. In the January, 1438, they suspended Eugenius IV from his office for venturing to summon a Council without their assent. The logical consequence of such a step was the deposition of Eugenius; and to this Cardinal d'Allemand and his followers were ready to proceed. But, although all who had any leaning towards Eugenius, or who had any scruples about the omnipotence of the Council, had already left Basel, there still remained many who did not wish to proceed at once to extremities. Motives of statesmanship and considerations of expediency landed them in a somewhat illogical position. Through their desire to support the Council without attacking the Pope they were nicknamed at Basel “the Greys”, as being neither black nor white. This party, though it had the weakness which in ecclesiastical matters always attaches to a party that is trimming through political pressure, was still strong enough to put off for some time the deposition of Eugenius. It raised technical points, disputed each step, and gave weight to the remonstrances against a new schism which came from the princes of Europe.

Accordingly, says Aeneas Sylvius, the question of procedure against Eugenius was discussed according to the Socratic method. Every possible suggestion was made, and every possible objection was raised against it. Was Eugenius to be dealt with simply as a heretic, or as a relapsed heretic, or was he a heretic at all? On such points the fathers differed; but they agreed on March 24 in fulminating against the Council of Ferrara, declaring all its procedure null and void, and summoning all, under pain of excommunication, to quit it and appear at Basel within thirty days.

It was, however, impossible that this war between the Pope and the Council could continue without exciting serious attention, on political grounds, amongst the European nations most nearly interested in the Papacy. Germany and France, about the same time, took measures to protect themselves against the dangers with which they were threatened by the impending outbreak of a schism. What Germany desired was a measure of ecclesiastical reform without the disruption of the unity of the Church. It felt no interest in the struggle of the Council against the Pope; rather the German princes looked with suspicion upon the avowed object of the Council, of exalting the ecclesiastical oligarchy at the expense of the Papacy. It bore too near a resemblance to their own policy towards the Empire, and they did not wish to be embarrassed in their own schemes by an access of independence to the bishops. Accordingly the Electors entered into correspondence with Cesarini in 1437, and lent their support to his efforts for a compromise between the Pope and the Council. When this failed, the Electors, under the guidance of Archbishop Raban of Trier, devised a plan of declaring the neutrality of Germany in the struggle between the Pope and the Council; by so doing they would neither abandon the reformation of the Church nor assist in creating a schism, but would be in a position to take advantage of any opportunity that offered. This scheme was, no doubt, suggested by the example of the withdrawal of the French
allegiance from Boniface XIII, and had much to be said in its favour. The Electors had sent to obtain the assent of Sigismund when the news of his death reached them.

In March, 1438, the Electors met for the purpose of choosing a new king at Frankfort, where they were beset by partisans of Eugenius IV and of the Council. They resolved that before proceeding to a new election they would secure a basis for their new policy. In a formal document they publicly declared on March 17 that they took no part in the differences between the Pope and the Council, nor would they recognize the punishments, processes, or excommunications of either, as of any validity within the Empire. They would maintain the rights of the Church till the new king found means to restore unity; if he had not done so within six months they would take counsel of the prelates and jurists of their land what course to adopt. Next day Albert, Duke of Austria and King of Hungary, Sigismund’s son-in-law, was elected king, as Sigismund had wished and planned.

This declaration of neutrality was a new step in ecclesiastical politics, and was equally offensive to Pope and Council, both of whom were loud in asserting that in such a matter neutrality was impossible. Both hastened to do all they could to win over Albert; but Albert was not easy to win over, nor indeed was he in a position to oppose the Electors. His hold on Hungary, threatened by the Turks, was but weak, and Bohemia was insecure. His personal character was not such as to afford much opportunity for intrigue. He was upright and honest, reserved in speech, a man who thought more of action than of diplomacy. Tall, with sunburnt face and flashing eyes, he took his pleasure in hunting when he could not take it in warfare, and was content to follow the advice of those whom he thought wiser than himself. Ambassadors could do nothing with him, and in July he joined the band of the Electors, and declared himself personally in favour of neutrality.

The example of Germany was followed by France. Germany had taken up the attitude most in accordance with its views; France proceeded to do likewise. For the large questions of Church government involved in the struggle between Council and Pope, France had little care. Since their failure at Constance the theologians of the University of Paris had sunk into lethargy. France, suffering from the miseries of its long war with England, took an entirely practical view of affairs. Its object was to retain for its own uses the wealth of the Church, and prevent Papal interference with matters of finance. Charles VII determined to adopt in his own kingdom such of the decrees of the Council as were for his advantage, seeing that no opposition could be made by the Pope. Accordingly, a Synod was summoned at Bourges on May 1, 1438. The ambassadors of Pope and Council urged their respective causes. It was agreed that the king should write to Pope and Council to stay their hands in proceeding against one another; meanwhile, that the reformation be not lost, some of the Basel decrees should be maintained in France by royal authority. The results of the Synod’s deliberation were laid before the king, and on July 7 were made binding as a pragmatic sanction on the French Church. The Pragmatic Sanction enacted that General Councils were to be held every ten years, and recognized the authority of the Council of Basel. The Pope was no longer to reserve any of the greater ecclesiastical appointments, but elections were to be duly made by the rightful patrons. Grants to benefices in expectancy, whence all agree that many evils arise, were to cease, as well as reservations. In all cathedral churches one prebend was to be given to a theologian who had studied for ten years in a university, and who was to lecture or preach at least once a week. Benefices were to be conferred in future, one-third on graduates, two-thirds on deserving clergy. Appeals to Rome, except for
important causes, were forbidden. The number of Cardinals was to be twenty-four, each of the age of thirty at least. Annates and first-fruits were no longer to be paid to the Pope, but only the necessary legal fees on institution. Regulations were made for greater reverence in the conduct of Divine service; prayers were to be said by the priest in an audible voice; mummeries in churches were forbidden, and clerical concubinage was to be punished by suspension for three months. Such were the chief reforms of its own special grievances, which France wished to establish. It was the first step in the assertion of the rights of national Churches to arrange for themselves the details of their own ecclesiastical organization. It went no further, however, than the amendment of existing grievances as far as the opportunity allowed. It rested upon no principles applicable to the well-being of Christendom. While Germany, true to its imperial traditions, was content to hold its hand till it discovered some means of bringing about a reformation without a schism, France entered upon a separatist policy to secure its own interests.

The issue of both these plans depended upon the struggle between the Pope and the Council. Charles VII besought the Council to suspend their proceedings against the Pope, and received an answer that it was doing so. On July 12, at a Diet held at between Nürnberg, the Electors offered to mediate between the Pope and Council, but were answered by the Council’s envoys that secular persons might not judge ecclesiastical matters, and that it would be a bad precedent if Popes and Councils were interfered with. The Electors, with Albert’s assent, extended the neutrality for four months. On October 16, at a second Diet at Nürnberg, appeared Cardinal Albergata, as the head of a Papal embassy; but the envoys of the Council, headed by the Patriarch of Aquileia, were received with greater marks of distinction. Eugenius IV never again subjected any of his Cardinals to such a slight, but chose less important and more skillful diplomatists. The Electors again offered to mediate, on the basis that the Councils of Ferrara and Basel should alike be dissolved, and a new one summoned at another place. The Basel envoys replied that they had no instructions on this matter; they asked if the Electors accepted the decrees of the Council, and were answered in turn that envoys should be sent to Basel to answer this question. At Basel accordingly there was much negotiation with the German envoys, who were joined by those of the other princes, but the fathers resolutely opposed a translation of the Council, and rejected all proposals tending to that end. When the third Diet met at Mainz on March 5, 1439, matters had advanced no farther than they were at first.

To Mainz Eugenius sent no envoys; but many of his adherents were there to plead his cause, chief amongst whom was Nicolas of Cusa, a learned theologian, who had been an admiring follower of Cesarini, “the Hercules of Eugenius’ party”, as Aeneas Sylvius calls him. But the Electors now wavered in their policy of mediation, and began to turn their eyes to the example of France. They tended towards using the opportunity for establishing the privileges of the German Church. The Council sent again the Patriarch of Aquileia. But the German princes had by this time seen that a reconciliation between Pope and Council was impossible. They had an adviser of keen sagacity in the legist John of Lysura, sprung, like Nicolas of Cusa, from a little village in the neighbourhood of Trier. He was the firm upholder, if not the originator, of the policy of neutrality. He now advised the Electors, if nothing were to be gained by mediation, to follow the example of France, and secure such of the work of the Council of Basel as satisfied them. On March 26 the Diet took the unwelcome step of publishing its acceptance of the Basel decrees concerning the superiority of General Councils, the
organization of provincial and diocesan synods, the abolition of reservations and expectancies, freedom of election to ecclesiastical benefices, and the abolition of annates and other oppressive exactions of the Curia. The Pope was not to refuse confirmation to the election of a bishop, except for some grave reason approved by the Cardinals. Appeals to Rome, until the cases had been heard in the bishops’ courts, were, with few exceptions, forbidden. Excommunications were not to be inflicted on a town for the fault of a few individuals. Such were the chief provisions of this pragmatic sanction of Germany.

The state of things which now existed in France and Germany was really a reversion to the system of concordats with which the Council of Constance Pope and had ended. The rights that had then been granted by the Papacy for five years, and had afterwards proved mere illusory concessions, were now extended and secured. The strife between the Pope and the Council enabled the State in both countries to assert, under the sanction of a General Council, liberties and privileges which needed no Papal approval. Such a policy of selection was opposed equally to the ideas of the Council and of the Pope. The Council wished for adhesion to its suspension of Eugenius IV; the Pope was not likely to acquiesce quietly in the loss of his prerogatives and of his revenues. Meanwhile, however, each was bent on using its opportunities. Eugenius IV hoped by the brilliancy of his success at Florence to establish himself again in a position to interfere in European affairs. The Council trusted that, if it carried to extremities its proceedings against the Pope, Germany and France, after establishing reforms by virtue of its authority, would be driven to approve of a decisive step when it was once taken.

Accordingly at Basel the process against Eugenius IV was prepared. The proctors of the Council gathered together a hundred and fifty articles against the Pope, swelling the number of charges to make matter look more terrible, though all converged to the one point, that Eugenius by dissolving the Council had made himself a schismatic and the author of a schism. It was clear that such a process might be protracted endlessly by a few determined opponents at every stage of the pleadings. The more resolute spirits, led by a Burgundian abbot Nicolas, carried the adoption of a more summary method of procedure. The Council was summoned to discuss the heresy of Eugenius and set forth the great points of Catholic doctrine which he had impugned. This discussion took place in the middle of April, and for six whole days, morning and afternoon, the dispute went on. First the theologians laid down eight conclusions:—

1) It is a truth of the Catholic faith that a General Council has power over a Pope or any other Christian man.

2) It is likewise a truth that the Pope cannot by his authority dissolve, transfer, or prorogue a General Council lawfully constituted.

3) Anyone who pertinaciously opposes these truths is to be accounted a heretic.

4) Eugenius IV opposed these truths when first he attempted by the plenitude of the Apostolic power to dissolve or transfer the Council of Basel.

5) When admonished by the Council he withdrew his errors opposed to these truths.

6) His second attempt at dissolution contains an inexcusable error concerning the faith.

7) In attempting to repeat his dissolution he lapses into the errors which he revoked.
8) By persisting in his contumacy, after admonition by the Council to recall his dissolution, and by calling a Council to Ferrara, he declares himself pertinacious.

The Archbishop of Palermo, who had formerly distinguished himself as an opponent of Eugenius IV, now at his King’s bidding counselled moderation. He argued with much acuteness that Eugenius had not contravened any article of the Creeds, nor the greater truths of Christianity, and could not be called heretical or relapsed. John of Segovia answered that the decrees of Constance were articles of faith, which it was heresy to impugn. The Bishop of Argos followed on the same side in a speech of much passion, which the Archbishop of Palermo indignantly interrupted. The Bishop of Argos called the Pope “the minister of the church”.

“No”, cried the Archbishop of Palermo, “he is its master”.

“Yet”, said John of Segovia, “his title is servant of the servants of God”.

The Archbishop of Palermo was reduced to silence.

The discussion went on; but really narrowed itself to two questions, “Has a General Council authority over a Pope? Is this an article of faith?”

The disputation at last ended, and the voting began. Three deputations at once voted for the conclusions of the theologians. The fourth deputation accepted the first three conclusions, but doubted about the last five; it hoped by delay to keep the whole question open. When the day came for a general congregation to be held, the Archbishops of Milan and Palermo prepared for resistance with the aid of the ambassadors of the princes. They pressed for delay, on the ground that the princes of Europe were not sufficiently represented. When they had finished their arguments, Cardinal d’Allemand made a splendid speech for a party leader. The princes of Europe, he said, were well enough represented by their prelates; the Archbishops of Milan, Palermo, and Lyons had said all that could be said. They had complained that the voice of the bishops was disregarded in the Council, and that the lower clergy carried everything against them. What Council had done so much to raise the condition of bishops, who till now had been mere shadows with staff and mitre, different only in dress and revenues from their clergy? The Archbishop of Palermo had said that his opinion ought to prevail because more bishops were on his side. The order of the Council could not be changed to suit his convenience; it had pleased him well enough so long as he was in the majority. Everybody knew that the prelates were only anxious to please their princes; they confessed to God in private, to their political superiors in public. He himself maintained that it was not the position, but the worth, of a man that was of importance. “I could not set the lie of the wealthiest prelate above the truth spoken by a simple priest. Do not, you bishops, despise your inferiors; the first martyr was not a bishop but a deacon”. The example of the early Church showed that Councils were not restricted to bishops. If it were so now, they would be at the mercy of the Italians, and there would be an end to all further reforms. The Archbishop of Palermo pressed for delay only as a means of wasting a favorable opportunity. He threatened them with the anger of princes, as if the Council was to obey princes, and not princes the Council. They must cleave to the truth at all hazards. He ended by urging them to affirm the first three conclusions, as a means of stopping the intrigues of Eugenius IV, and defer for the present the remainder in deference to the Archbishop of Palermo’s request.
All listened with admiration to the dashing onslaught of D'Allemand. But on the attempt to read the decree affirming the three conclusions a scene of wild clamour and confusion arose, as had happened two years before. The Patriarch of Aquileia turned to the Archbishop of Palermo and cried out, “You do not know the Germans; if you go on thus, you will not leave this land with your head on your shoulders”. There was a loud cry that the liberty of the Council was being attacked. Again the citizens of Basel had to interfere to keep the peace. The fathers were free to conduct their debates at pleasure, but a citizen guard was always present to see that arguments were not enforced by stronger than verbal means.

When silence was restored, the debate was resumed for a while, till Cardinal d'Allemand again rose to put the question. The Archbishop of Palermo interposed, saying, “You despise our entreaties, you despise the kings and princes of Europe, you despise the prelates; but beware lest, while you despise all, yourselves be despised by all. We have the majority of prelates on our side; we form the Council. In the name of the prelates I declare that the motion must not be carried”. There was a hubbub as of a battlefield, and all was again confusion. John of Segovia was sufficiently respected by both parties to obtain a hearing while he denounced the scandal of the day’s proceedings, urged the observance of the ordinary procedure of the Council, and defended the authority of the president. His speech made no impression on the Archbishop of Palermo, who declared that he and the prelates of his party constituted the Council and would not allow any decree to be published in the teeth of the protest he had just made. No one kept his seat; the rival partisans gathered round their leaders, the Cardinal of Arles and the Archbishop of Palermo, and looked like two armies drawn up for contest. It seemed that the Archbishop’s policy would prevail, that the congregation would be ended by the evening darkness without passing any vote, and thus a substantial triumph be gained for Eugenius IV. The followers of the Cardinal of Arles loudly upbraided him with his incompetency: “Why do you sleep? Where is now your courage and your skill?”

But the Cardinal was only waiting his time. When a slight lull prevailed he called out suddenly in a loud voice, “I have a letter just come from France which contains wonderful, almost incredible news, which I would like to lay before you”. There was at once silence, and D'Allemand began to read some trivialities; then the pretended letter went on to say that messengers of Eugenius IV filled France and preached that the Pope was above the Council; they were gaining credit, and the Council ought to take measures to check them.

“Fathers”, said the Cardinal, “the necessary measures are found in the eight propositions which you have examined, all of which, however, you do not intend at present to pass; but I declare the three first to be passed, in the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost”.

Thus saying, he hastily left his seat and was followed by his triumphant partisans. He had snatched a formal victory at a time when defeat seemed imminent. He had shown that French craft was a match for Italian subtlety.

A few days afterwards arrived from Mainz the ambassadors of the Electors, from whom the opponents of the decree expected help in their resistance. But the Electors at Mainz had practically forsaken their position of mediators. They had seen the hopelessness of mediation unless supported by a general agreement of European powers. Private interests prevailed too strongly for this to be possible. Portugal and
Castile were at variance. Milan and Aragon had their own ends in view in any settlement that might be made with the Pope.

The attitude of France was dubious; and the Germans suspected that France aimed at getting the Council into its own hands, and reviving the French hold upon the Papacy. The Electors had no settled policy, and were content with a watchful neutrality. The German ambassadors did nothing at Basel, though an attempt was made to revive the national divisions, and procure joint action on the part of the German nation. On May 9, the German ambassadors were present, though by an accident, at a general congregation which accepted the form of decree embodying the conclusions previously passed. Again there was a stormy scene. The Archbishop of Milan denounced the Cardinal of Aries as another Catiline, surrounded by a band of ruffians. When the Cardinal of Arles began to read the decree the Archbishop of Palermo thundered forth his protest. Each side shouted down the other, to prevent their proceedings from claiming conciliar validity. The Cardinal of Arles rose to leave the room. His opponents prepared to stay and enact their protest; but a sudden cry of one who declared that he would not be untrue to his oath, and allow the Council to degenerate into a conventicle, recalled all to a sense of the gravity of the situation. All felt that they were on the verge of disruption of the Council. The Cardinal resumed his seat; those who were departing were recalled. The Bishop of Albi read a protest to himself, for no one could hear him for the hubbub. The Lombards, Castilians, and Aragonese declared their adhesion to the protest, and left the congregation. The Cardinal of Arles then went on with the ordinary business, late though it was, and the form of decree was at last adopted. As the Archbishop of Palermo left the Council he turned to his followers and said with indignation, “Twice, twice”. It was the second time that the policy of the Cardinal of Arles had been too acute for him, and had baffled his attempts at obstruction.

For a few days the followers of the Archbishop of Palermo absented themselves from the meetings of the deputations; and on May 15 the ambassadors of the Electors feebly protested that they did not assent to any proceedings which were contrary to the conclusions of the Diet of Mainz. Next day they tried to make a compromise, but failed, as the opponents of the decree could not make up their minds what terms they were prepared to accept. A session was held on the same day, May 16, for the publication of the decree. The greater number of prelates refused to be present. None of the Aragonese bishops, none from any of the Spanish kingdoms, would attend. From Italy there was only one, and from the other kingdoms only twenty. But the Cardinal of Arles was not deterred by their absence. He had a large following of the inferior clergy, and had recourse to a strange expedient to cast greater ecclesiastical prestige over the assembly. He gathered from the churches of Basel the relics of the saints, which, borne by priests, were set in the vacant places of the bishops. When the proceedings began, the sense of the gravity of the situation moved all to tears. In the absence of opposition the decree was read peaceably, and was formally passed.

On May 22 the ambassadors of the princes appeared in a general congregation, and took part in the business, excusing themselves for their previous absence on the ground that it was not their duty as ambassadors to mix with such matters. It was clear from such vacillating conduct on the part of their representatives that the princes of Europe had little real interest in the struggle between Pope and Council. They had ceased to act as moderators, and had no large views about the need of ecclesiastical reforms. They were content to gain what they could for their separate interests, as they understood them at the moment, and to let the whole matter drift. They were incapable of
interposing to free the question of reform from the meshes of personal jealousy in which it had become entangled. So long as every power which could interfere with their own projects was enfeebled, they were content that things should take their own course. The only man at Basel with a settled policy was the Cardinal of Arles; and he was no more than a party leader, bent on using the democracy of the Council as a means of asserting the power of the ecclesiastical oligarchy against the Papal monarchy.

Emboldened by his first triumph, the Cardinal of Arles pursued his course. The German ambassadors still urged a suspension of the process against the Pope. On June 13 a solemn answer was made by the Council that the process had now been suspended for two years in deference to the wishes of princes. They must not take it amiss if the Council, whose business it was to regulate the affairs of the Church, declined to delay any longer. Faith, religion, and discipline would be alike destroyed if one man had the power to set himself against a General Council, and bear a tyrant’s sway over the Church; they would rather die than desert the cause of liberty. The ambassadors were silent when, on June 23, the remaining five of the eight conclusions were decreed by the Council, and Eugenius IV was cited to appear in two days and hear his sentence. The plague was at this time raging in Basel, and very little pressure would have sufficed to induce the fathers to transfer the Council elsewhere; but there was no real agreement amongst the powers of Europe. The session on June 25 was attended by thirty-nine bishops and abbots, and some 300 of the lower clergy. Eugenius IV was summoned by the bishops, and when he did not appear was declared contumacious. He was declared to be a notorious cause of scandal to the Church, a despiser of the decrees of the Holy Synods, a persistent heretic, and destroyer of the rights of the Church. As such he was deposed from his office; all were freed from his allegiance, and were forbidden to call him Pope any longer. The dominant party in the Council had everything to win and nothing to lose by pursuing to its end the quarrel with the Pope. In the divided state of political interests there was a chance that some of the European powers might be drawn to its side if once a decided step was taken. But it forgot, in the excitement of the conflict, that the Council’s hold upon men’s obedience was a moral hold, and rested upon hopes of ecclesiastical reform. When this had been sacrificed to the necessities of a party conflict, when a schism and not a reformation was the issue of the Council's activity, its authority was practically gone. It required only a little time to make this clearly manifest.

The Council, however, did not hesitate in its course. On the day of the deposition of Eugenius IV a consultation was held about future procedure; and the opinion of John of Segovia was adopted, to defer for sixty days the election to the vacant office of Pope. The position of the Council was discouraging. The plague, which since the spring had been raging in Basel, had grown fiercer in the summer heat. Five thousand of the inhabitants are said to have fallen before its ravages. Terror prevailed on every side, and it was hard to keep the Council together. The learned jurist Pontano and the Patriarch of Aquileia, two pillars of the Council, were amongst those who fell victims to the mortality. The streets were thronged with funerals and priests bearing the sacrament to the dying. The dead were buried in pits to save the trouble of digging single graves. Aeneas Sylvius was stricken by the plague, but recovered. Eight of his friends amongst the clerks of the Council died.

In spite of all danger and the repeated advice of his friends that he should flee before the pestilence, the Cardinal of Arles stood to his post, and so kept the Council together. At the beginning of October the business of the Council was resumed, and the
method of the new election was discussed. The College of Cardinals was represented in Basel only by Louis d’Allemand. It was clear that Electors must be appointed. After some discussion their number was fixed at thirty-two, but there were many opinions about the means of choosing them. At last William, Archdeacon of Metz, proposed the names of three men who should be trusted to co-opt the remaining twenty-nine. The three whose high character and impartiality were supposed to place them above suspicion were Thomas, Abbot of Dundrennan, in Scotland, John of Segovia, a Castilian, and Thomas of Corelles, Canon of Amiens. At first this plan met with great objections; but they gradually disappeared on discussion. The Germans urged that they were not represented, and it was agreed that the three should associate with themselves a German, Christian, Provost of S. Peter’s in Bruma, in the diocese of Olmutz. They took an oath that they would choose fitting men who had the fear of God before their, eyes and would not reveal the names of those they chose till the time of their publication in a general Congregation.

The triumvirs at once set about their business. They conferred with representative men of every nation: they did their best to acquaint themselves with the characters of those whom they had in view. Yet they displayed singular discretion in their inquiries; and when, on October 28, they met to make their election, no one knew their intentions. Next day the congregation was crowded to hear their decision. Everywhere speculation was rife. The more vain and more simple among the fathers displayed their own estimate of their deserts by appearing in fine clothes, with many attendants, ready to enter the conclave at once. Suspense was prolonged because the Cardinal of Arles was late. He appeared at last with a gloomy face, and took his seat, saying, “If the triumvirs have done well, I confess that I am rather late; if they have done ill, I am too soon”. He was afraid that their democratic sympathies might have outrun his own. His words were an evil omen; every one prepared for a dissension, which in the matter of a new election would work irreparable ruin to the Council.

The triumvirs behaved with singular prudence. First Thomas of Dundrennan, then John of Segovia, explained the principles on which they had acted. They had regarded national divisions, and had considered the representative character of those whom they chose; goodness, nobility, and learning had been the tests which they had used. The general result of their choice was that the electors would consist of twelve bishops, including the Cardinal of Arles, which was the number of the twelve apostles, seven abbots, five theologians, nine doctors and men of learning, all in priests’ orders. This announcement in some degree appeased the general dread. When the names were read, the position of the men chosen, and their distribution amongst nations, met with general approval. The Cardinal’s brow cleared; he praised the triumvirs for their wisdom and prudence, and the Congregation separated in contentment. On October 30, after the usual ceremonies, the electors entered the conclave in the house Zur Brücke.

The Cardinal of Arles was, of course, ready with a nominee for the papal office; naturally, he had not proceeded to extremities without making preparations for the result. If the cause of the Council was to succeed, it must again strike its roots into European politics, and must secure an influential protector. As other princes had grown cold towards the Council, the Duke of Savoy had declared himself its adherent. The greater part of the fathers now remaining at Basel were Savoyards. Amadeus VIII had ruled over Savoy since 1391. He was a prudent man, who knew how to take advantage of his neighbors’ straits, and had greatly increased the dominions and importance of Savoy till it embraced the lands that extended from the Upper Saone to the
Mediterranean, and was bounded by Provence, Dauphiné, the Swiss Confederacy, and the Duchy of Milan. Like many others, Amadeus VIII had drawn his profits from the necessities of Sigismund, who, in 1416, elevated Savoy to the dignity of a duchy. The Duke of Savoy refused to take any side in the internal struggles of France or in the war between France and England, but grew rich on his neighbors’ misfortunes. He married a daughter of Philip the Bold, Duke of Burgundy; his eldest daughter was married to Filippo Maria, Duke of Milan, his second was the widow of Louis of Anjou. From his wealth, his position, and his connections, the Duke of Savoy was a man of great political influence. But the death of his eldest son caused him deep grief and unhappiness. In 1431 he retired from active life, and built himself a luxurious retreat at Ripaille, whither he withdrew with seven companions to lead a life of religious seclusion. His abode was called the Temple of S. Maurice; he and his followers wore grey cloaks, like hermits, with gold crosses round their necks, and long staffs in their hands. Yet Amadeus, in his seclusion, took a keen interest in affairs, and, when the suspension of Eugenius IV was decreed by the Council, sent an embassy to the Pope excusing the Council, and offering to mediate. As matters went on his support was more openly declared, and he offered to send to Basel the prelates of his land. During the year 1439 Savoyards had largely reinforced the Council, and the scheme of electing Amadeus as the future Pope had taken definite form. Amadeus had consulted other princes on the subject, and from the Duke of Milan had received the warmest promises of support. The electors to the Papacy had been chosen equally from the nations represented at the Council—France, Italy, Germany, and Spain. But, from its geographical position, Savoy was reckoned both in France and Italy. Of the twelve bishops amongst the electors seven were Savoyards; the others were the Cardinal of Arles, two French and one Spanish bishop, and the Bishop of Basel. Without any accusation of false play in the choice of the electors, it fell out that quite half of them were either subjects of Amadeus or were bound to him by ties of gratitude.

The proceedings of the conclave were conducted with the utmost decorum. At its commencement the Cardinal of Arles reminded the electors that the situation of affairs needed a rich and powerful Pope, who could defend the Council against its adversaries. On the first scrutiny of votes it was found that seventeen candidates had been nominated, of whom Amadeus had the greatest number of votes—sixteen. On the next scrutiny he had nineteen votes, and on the third twenty-one. His merits and the objections that could be raised against him were keenly but temperately discussed, and in the final scrutiny on November 5 it was found that he had received twenty-six votes, and his election to the Papacy was solemnly announced by the Cardinal of Arles.

The Council published the election throughout Christendom, and named an embassy headed by the Cardinal of Arles, with seven bishops, three abbots, and fourteen doctors, to carry to Amadeus the news of his election. Probably from want of money, the embassy did not leave Basel till December 3, when it was accompanied by envoys of the citizens and several nobles. On reaching Ripaille they were met by the nobles of Savoy. Amadeus, with his hermit comrades, advanced to meet them with the cross borne before him. Amadeus entered into negotiations in a business-like spirit, and rather surprised the ambassadors of the Council by stipulating that a change should be made in the form of the oath administered to the Pope, that he should keep his hermit’s beard and his former name of Amadeus. The envoys replied that the oath must be left to the Council; they could not alter the custom of assuming a religious name; the beard might be left for the present. Amadeus also disappointed the Council’s envoys by
showing an unexpected care about his future financial position. “You have abolished annates”, he said; “what do you expect the Pope to live on? I cannot consume my patrimony and disinherit my sons”. They were driven to promise the cautious old man a grant of first-fruits of vacant benefices.

At last matters were arranged. Amadeus accepted his election, assumed the name of Felix V, and took the oath as prescribed by the Council. Then he left his solitude in Ripaille, and went in pontifical pomp to Tonon, where, amid the ecclesiastical solemnities of Christmastide, his friends were so struck by the incongruity of his bearded face that they persuaded him to shave. On the festival of the Epiphany he took the final step of separating himself from his worldly life by declaring his eldest son Louis Duke of Savoy, and his second son Philip Count of Geneva. By the Council’s advice he agreed not to fill up the offices of the Curia, lest by so doing he should hinder the reconciliation of those who held them under Eugenius IV; as a provisional measure they were put into commission. Felix V also submitted to the Council’s demand that, in the letters announcing his election, the Pope’s name should come after that of the Council. On the other hand, the Council allowed him to create new Cardinals, even in contradiction to their decrees on this point. Felix named four, but only one of those, the Bishop of Lausanne, as a dutiful subject, accepted the doubtful dignity, to which small hope of revenue was attached.

On February 26, the Council of Basel issued a decree commanding all to obey Felix V, and excommunicating those who refused. This was naturally followed by a similar decree of Eugenius IV from Florence on March 23. Neither of these decrees was very efficacious. Eugenius IV had strengthened himself in December by creating seventeen Cardinals, Bessarion and Isidore of Russia among the Greeks, two Spaniards, four Frenchmen, one Englishman (John Kemp, Archbishop of York), one Pole, one German, one Hungarian, and five Italians. Unlike the nominees of Felix, all accepted the office except the Bishop of Krakau, who refused the offers of both Popes alike. The news of the election of Amadeus at first caused some consternation in the court of Eugenius IV; but the sagacity of Cesarini restored their confidence. “Be not afraid”, he said, “for now you have conquered, since one has been elected by the Council whom flesh and blood has revealed to them, not their Heavenly Father. I was afraid lest they might elect some poor, learned and good man, whose virtues might be dangerous; as it is, they have chosen a worldling, unfit by his previous life for the office, one who has shed blood in war, has been married and has children, one who is unfit to stand by the altar of God”.

Felix V did not find matters easy to arrange with the Council. He stayed at Lausanne for some time, and did not comply with the repeated requests of the fathers that he would hasten to Basel. No steps were taken to provide for the support of the Papal dignity. The letter of Felix V, nominating the Cardinal of Arles as president of the Council, was ruled to be so informal that it was not inserted in the Council’s records. Questions concerning the Council’s dignity in the presence of the Pope gave rise to many discussions; it was agreed that the Pope and his officials should take an oath not to impede the jurisdiction of the Council over its own members. Not till June 24, 1440, did Felix enter Basel accompanied by his two sons, an unusual escort for a Pope, and all the nobility of Savoy. On July 24, he was crowned Pope by the Cardinal of Arles, the only Cardinal present. The ceremony was imposing, and more than 50,000 spectators are said to have been present. Felix V looked venerable and dignified, and excited universal admiration by the quickness with which he had mastered the minutiae of the mass service. No expense was spared to give grandeur to the proceedings; the tiara
placed on Felix’s head cost thirty thousand crowns. After this, Felix abode in Basel awaiting the adhesion of the princes of Europe.

The two Popes were now pitted one against the other; but their rivalry was unlike any that had existed in former times. Each had his pretensions, each represented a distinctive policy; but neither had any enthusiastic adherents. The politics of Europe were but little concerned with ecclesiastical matters; the different States pursued their course without much heed to the contending Popes. Germany was the least united State and had the least determined policy. To Germany both Eugenius IV and Felix V turned their attention; each strove to end its neutrality favorably to himself. The hopes of both parties were awakened by the death of Albert II, on October 27, 1439. He died in Hungary of dysentery, brought on by eating too much fruit when fatigued in hot weather. Albert in his short reign had not succeeded in restoring order in the Empire, in giving peace to the Church, or in protecting his ancestral kingdoms; but his noble and disinterested character, his firmness and constancy, had roused hopes in men’s minds, which were suddenly extinguished by his untimely death. It became at once a question what would be the policy of the Electors during the vacancy in the Empire.
CHAPTER X.
EUGENIUS IV AND FELIX V.
1440—1444.

The German Electors heard at the same time the news of the death of Albert II, and of the elevation of Amadeus to the Papal dignity. They refused to receive either the envoys of Eugenius IV or of Felix V, and renewed their declaration of neutrality. Everything urged them to hasten their election to the Empire, and on February 1, 1440, they unanimously chose Frederick, Duke of Styria, second cousin of the deceased king and head of the house of Austria. Frederick was a young man, twenty-five years of age, whose position was embarrassing and whose responsibilities in Germany were already heavy. He was guardian of the county of the Tyrol during the minority of Sigismund, son of that Frederick who had played so luckless a part at Constance. Moreover, Albert II died without male heir, but left his wife pregnant; when she gave birth to a son, Ladislas, Frederick became guardian also of Bohemia and Hungary. At his election Frederick was held to be sagacious and upright; but he was not likely to interfere with the plans of the electoral oligarchy. Representatives of the two Popes at once beset both Electors and King. Frederick III, unlike his predecessor, was not committed definitely to the policy of neutrality, and only said that he proposed at the first Diet to confer with the Electors about the means of amending the disorders of the Church. He took no steps to hasten the summoning of a Diet, which met at Mainz a year after his election, on February 2, 1441. Even then Frederick III did not appear in person.

Meanwhile Felix V had received the adhesion of a few of the German princes. In June, 1440, Albert of Munich recognized him, and in August Stephen of Zimmern and Zweibrücke came to Basel with his two sons, and did him reverence. Albert of Austria, brother of Frederick III, followed, as did also Elizabeth of Hungary, widow of the late king. On the other hand, Felix met with a decided rebuff in France, where a synod was held at Bourges to hear ambassadors of both Popes. On September 2 answer was made in the King’s name that he recognized Eugenius IV, and besought his relative, “the lord of Savoy” (as he called Felix), to display his wonted wisdom in aiming at peace. France had no reason to deviate from her old policy, especially as Eugenius IV maintained the cause of René of Anjou in Naples. The Universities, especially those of Vienna, Koln, Erfurt, and Krakau, declared themselves in favour of Felix. It was but natural that the academic ideas, from which the conciliar movement sprang, should accept the issue which followed from the application of their original principle. The Council was especially anxious to gain the adhesion of the Duke of Milan, and Felix consented to pay a large subsidy in return for his protection. But Filippo Maria Visconti merely played with the offers of Felix. He promised to send envoys, but nothing came of it. In like manner Alfonso of Aragon adopted an ambiguous attitude. Both these princes wished to play off Felix V against Eugenius IV in Italian affairs, but saw nothing to be gained by committing themselves too definitely.

Thus Felix V was supported by no great power, and the schism had little influence on the mind of Europe. Felix represented only the new-fangled ideas of the Council—ideas which had long deserted the sphere of practical utility, and so had lost their interest, Felix and the Council were indissolubly bound together. The Council, in
elected a Pope, had taken its last step. Felix could not dissolve the Council against its will, and was helpless without it. Yet, in spite of their close connection, it was difficult to regulate the relations between the two. There was at the outset a difficulty about money. The Council had elected the Duke of Savoy as a man who would spend his money in its behalf. Felix demanded that the Council should make due provision for its Pope and his Cardinals. This could only be done by granting to Felix V what had been taken away from Eugenius IV. The reforming Council must admit that it could not afford to carry out its own reforms; there was no escape from this admission. On August 4 a decree was passed giving the Pope for five years a fifth, and for the succeeding five years a tenth, of the first year’s revenues of all vacant benefices. It is true that the reason assigned for this special grant was to enable him to rescue from tyrants the patrimony of S. Peter. None the less it awakened opposition from the Germans in the Council, and was defended only by the fact that it was practically inoperative except in the dominions of Savoy. It brought little money; and when, on October 12, Felix, at the instance of the Council, nominated eight Cardinals, amongst whom were the Patriarch of Aquileia and John of Segovia, the question of their revenues again became pressing. On November 12 six Cardinals were created to conciliate France. It was necessary to have recourse to the old system of provisions of benefices to supply them with revenues. Felix chafed under the restraints which the Council laid upon him, and took advantage of the absence of the Cardinal of Arles in November to preside over the Council, and pass some decrees which awoke much comment. When he asked to have the same rights granted to him over ecclesiastical benefices in Savoy as the Pope exercised in the States of the Church, the Council refused the demand.

Meanwhile Frederick III gave no signs of his intention. This indecision, which was the result of indolence and infirmity of purpose, passed at first for statesman-like reserve. Both parties looked to the Diet at Mainz for an opportunity of achieving a signal victory. They were disappointed to hear that the King found himself too much engaged with difficult matters in his own States to undertake in person the affairs of Germany. He sent four commissioners to Mainz, who were to hear the arguments of the rival claimants. Eugenius IV had learned wisdom by former experience, and sent as his representatives two men skilled in affairs, but not of high dignity, Nicolas of Cusa, a deserter from the Council, who well knew the temper of Germany, and John of Carvajal, a Spaniard of great personal piety and worth, a trained official of the Papal court. The Council, on the other hand, sent its highest dignitaries, Cardinal d'Allemand and three of the new Cardinals, chief of whom was John of Segovia. John claimed to appear as Papal Legate; but when he was entering with pomp the Cathedral of Mainz the Chapter met him, and declined to admit his legatine authority, so that he was obliged to retire. The Diet decided to hear him as an ambassador of the Council, but not to recognize on either side the claims of any dignity which had been conferred since the declaration of neutrality. When the Council’s representatives tried to resist this decision, they were told by the citizens of Mainz that their safe-conduct would be revoked within eight days if they did not submit to the demands of the Diet. They were driven sullenly to give way, and only the Cardinal of Arles received the honor due to his office.

On March 24 d'Allemand appeared before the Diet, and pleaded the cause of the Council, while his colleagues remained sulkily at home. Next day Carvajal and Cusa answered him, and seemed to produce considerable effect upon those present, the Electors of Trier and Mainz, the king’s commissioners, the ambassadors of France, and a few German nobles. Stung by the success of Cusa, John of Segovia laid aside his
pride, assumed a doctor’s robes, and with great clearness and cogency restated the Council’s position. He produced a vast treatise, divided into twelve books, in which he had argued out at length the various points raised by his speech. Carvajal and Cusa replied. When John of Segovia wished to return to the charge the Diet ruled that it had heard enough. It is no wonder that it quailed before John of Segovia’s treatise, especially as the matter in dispute was one in which Germany took a political, not an ecclesiastical, interest. A paper was circulated amongst the members of the Diet, most probably the work of Jacob, Archbishop of Trier, urging the acceptance of whichever Pope would summon a new Council, to be organized by nations, and would guarantee to the German Church the reforms which it had claimed for itself. In accordance with this plan the Diet laid before the rival parties the old proposal that a new Council should be summoned in some neutral place with the concurrence of the kings of Europe. Six places in Germany and six in France were submitted for choice, and Frederick III was to negotiate with the two Popes further arrangements for this new Council, which was to meet on August 1, 1442.

Both parties retired from Mainz disappointed, and beset Frederik with embassies. Frederick, who was rapidly showing himself to be a master of the art of doing nothing, said that he proposed to hold another Diet at Frankfort next year, when the question might be again discussed. He was not altogether satisfied with the policy adopted by the Diet. The Diet was ready to recognize the Pope who would grant to the German Church such reforms as suited the Electors; Frederick III, was desirous to recognize the Pope who was generally held to be legitimate, especially if in so doing he could further his own interests.

Pending the next Diet, the fathers at Basel composed and disseminated statements of their cause. Their proceedings otherwise were not very harmonious. There was the old difficulty about money. Felix complained that he incurred great expenses in sending out embassies and the like, while he received little or nothing. The Cardinals clamoured for revenues, and the officials of the Curia claimed their share of such money as came in. The Council granted to Felix a bishopric, a monastery, and one benefice in Savoy till he should recover the States of the Church. An outcry was raised against the excessive fees of the Papal Chancery; the officers answered that they only exacted the dues recognized by John XXII. Want of money led to a strict inquiry into the conduct of the financial officers of the Council; and this caused great bitterness. Felix sent the captain of his guard to imprison some who were accused of malversation. The Council loudly complained that their liberty was infringed, and called on the citizens of Basel to maintain their safe-conduct. The magistrates interfered, restored peace, and fined the Pope’s captain. The Council urged on Felix to send embassies on all sides to set forth his cause. Felix answered that embassies were costly things, and as yet he had got little for his money spent on them. The Council, believing in the power of plausibility, commissioned the Archbishop of Palermo to draw up a letter to be presented to Frederick III. When he had done his work it did not satisfy them, and the facile pen of Aeneas Sylvius was employed to put it into a more seductive form. The time for the Diet of Frankfort was drawing near, and Felix was prevailed to send another embassy. His Cardinals at first pleaded their outraged dignity, and refused to go. Felix bade them disregard their clothes in the interests of truth and justice. The Cardinal of Aries, the Archbishop of Palermo, and John of Segovia accepted the office and set out in May, 1442.
Eugenius IV meanwhile had asserted his authority by decreeing, on April 26, 1441, the transference of his Council from Florence to Rome, on the ground that Rome was a better place to receive the ambassadors of the Ethiopian Church, who were conducting an illusory reconciliation with the Papacy. It was a proud assertion of Papal superiority over Councils. An attempt was made by the more decided of the Electors to obtain the assent of Eugenius IV to the policy which they had put forward at Mainz. A learned jurist, Gregory Heimburg, was sent to Florence with the proposals of the Electors, drawn out in the form of two bulls, one dealing with the new Council, the other with the liberties of the German Church. Eugenius gave no definite answer, as Heimburg brought with him no credentials. He deferred his answer to the Diet at Frankfort. But this negotiation showed a disposition on the part of the German princes at this time to take the matter into their own hands, without waiting for Frederick, whose dubious attitude was probably due to a hope of winning back from the Swiss cantons some of the Hapsburg possessions, with which view he did not choose to quarrel with Basel or with Savoy.

On May 27 Frederick arrived in Frankfort with the three ecclesiastical Electors, the Count Palatine, and the Duke of Saxony. The Council was represented by its three Cardinals; Eugenius IV by Carvajal and Cusa, as before. But they were not permitted to air their eloquence before the King. He decided, before entering the troubled sea of ecclesiastical disputes, to secure his position by the prestige of a coronation, and announced his intention of going to Aachen for that purpose. In his absence commissioners would hear the arguments of the rival envoys, that on his return he might not find them contending. The Cardinal of Arles, as a prince of the Empire, accompanied the King; but at Aachen he was shut out of the cathedral by the bishop as being excommunicated. At Frankfort the Archbishop of Palermo harangued the royal commissioners for three days, and Cusa, not to be outdone, did the same. The weary commissioners asked that the arguments might be reduced to writing, which was done. On Frederick’s return, July 8, they were laid before him, and the business of the Diet commenced. The plan of the five Electors for recognizing Eugenius was, under Frederick’s influence, laid aside. At Aachen he had signed a treaty with Zurich to help him to recover his ancestral domains. The Electors agreed to stand by their King, and leave in his hands the decision of the ecclesiastical question.

The policy adopted at Frankfort did not in its contents differ from that previously followed. Envoys were to be sent to Eugenius and to Basel, urging the envoys summons of an undoubted Council. But the object the two of this new embassy was the glorification of the new King of the Romans. Six places were proposed for the Council, all in Germany, because in Germany was greater liberty and security than in other kingdoms, where war prevailed and scarcity was felt. Punctilious orders were given to the ambassadors as to the manner in which they were to observe the neutrality. Eugenius IV was to be treated with the ordinary respect due to the rank which he had held before the declaration of neutrality. Felix V was not to be treated as Pope. Everything was done to convince both parties that they must submit their cause to the decision of the German King.

From Frankfort Frederick III made a kingly progress through Alsace and the Swiss Cantons, which received him with due respect. He was accompanied by the Cardinal of Arles, and proposals were made to him for a marriage with Margaret, the daughter of Felix V, and widow of Louis of Anjou. Frederick III does not seem to have rejected the proposal. It suited him to take no decisive steps. He promised to visit Basel, but
demanded that first his ambassadors should be heard, and an answer be returned by the Council, which, sorely against its will, was driven to consider the proposals of the Diet. After many discussions and many complaints, the Council answered that, though they were lawfully assembled and enjoyed full security at Basel, and would run many dangers in changing their place, still, in their desire for peace, they were willing to agree to the King’s proposal, provided the King and princes would promise obedience to all the decrees of the new Council, and also would agree to choose the place of its meeting from a list which the fathers in Basel would submit. It was clear that such reservations made their concession entirely futile.

On receiving this answer Frederick III entered Basel on November 11, and was honorably received by the Council. He maintained, however, an attitude of strict neutrality, and visited Felix V on the understanding that he was not to be expected to pay him reverence as Pope. The interview took place in the evening. Felix V appeared in Papal dress, with his nine Cardinals, and the cross carried before him. The Bishop of Chiemsee on Frederick’s behalf explained his master’s attitude, and was careful to address Felix as “your benignity”, not “your holiness”. Nothing was gained by the interview. Frederick was respectful, but nothing more. The marriage project did not progress, though Felix is said to have offered a dowry of 200,000 gold ducats provided he was recognized as Pope. Frederick left Basel on November 17, saying, “Other Popes have sold the rights of the Church; Felix would buy them, could he find a seller”.

The German envoys to Eugenius IV were referred to a commission, chief amongst whom was the canonist, John of Torquemada, who raised many technical objections to their proposals. But Eugenius IV refused to take advantage of the technicalities of the commission. On December 8 he gave a decided answer. He wondered at the demand for an undoubted Council, seeing that he was then holding a Council which had done great things for Christendom, and to call it doubtful was nothing less than to oppose the Catholic faith. He did not call Frederick by his title of King, but spoke only of “the Electors and him whom they had elected”. He was willing to summon more prelates to his Council at the Lateran, and leave them to decide whether any further steps were necessary. The answers of the Pope and the Council were formally reported to the envoys of the King and some of the princes at Nurnberg on February 1, 1443. They deferred their consideration to a Diet to be held in six months; but they fixed no place for its meeting. In fact, the German Electors were rapidly falling away from their mediatorial attitude, which had never been very genuine. No sooner had Frederick III succeeded in checking their league in favour of Eugenius IV than a new league was formed in behalf of Felix V. The personal and family relationships of the House of Savoy naturally began to tell upon the German princes. A man who had a dowry of 200,000 ducats at his disposal was not likely to be without friends. In December, 1442, negotiations were set on foot for a marriage between the son of the Elector of Saxony and a niece of Felix V. The Archbishop of Trier was busy in the matter, and stipulated for his reward at the expense of the Church. The Archbishop of Koln was a declared adherent of the Council. These Electors were indifferent which Pope was recognized; they only bargained that the victory should be won by their help, and that they should be rewarded by an increase of their power and importance. It was hopeless to attempt to secure for Felix V universal recognition; but it would answer their purpose if he obtained by their means a really important position. A league in favour of Felix V was definitely formed, and its success depended upon obtaining the support of Frederick III or of the French King.
The plan dearest to Frederick III was the recovery of the possessions of the House of Hapsburg from the Swiss Confederates. His alliance with Zürich and his march through the lands of the Cantons was regarded by Frederick III as an important step.

But the jealousy of the Confederates was easily aroused, and the quarrels which had urged Zürich to seek alliance with Frederick soon revived. Zürich was called upon to renounce her alliance with Austria, and on her refusal was attacked. The war was waged with savage determination. Zürich was overmatched in numbers, but trusted to Austrian help. Frederick III could raise no forces in his own dominions, where he had troubles on every side. The German princes refused to send troops to prosecute a private quarrel of their King. A crushing defeat on July 22, 1443, threatened Zürich with destruction, and Frederick III, in his desire for aid, turned to the French King, and begged to have the loan of some of the disbanded soldiers, who were the miserable legacy to France of the long English war. These Armagnacs, as they were called after their former leader, were a formidable element in the French kingdom, and Charles VII was willing enough to lend them to his neighbors. But he also was ready to fish in troubled waters; and the embarrassments of the Empire suggested to him that he might extend his frontier towards the Rhine. Instead of 5000 troops, as Frederick III demanded, he sent 30,000; instead of sending them to the Austrian general, he sent them under the command of the Dauphin. Eugenius IV tried to use this opportunity for his own purposes. He conferred on the Dauphin the title of gonfalonier of the Church, with a salary of 15,000 florins, in hopes that he would attack Basel and disperse the Council. In August, 1444, the French marched through Alsace, took Mümpelgard, and, spreading devastation in their way, advanced towards Basel. In a bloody battle on the little river Birs, by the cemetery of S. Jacob, not far from the trails of Basel, a body of 1500 Confederates fought for ten hours against the overwhelming forces of the French. They were cut to pieces almost to a man; but the victory was so dearly bought that the Dauphin made no further attempts to conquer Basel, or to fight another battle against the troops of the Cantons. He made peace with the Confederates through the mediation of the fathers of the Council, and retired into Alsace, where his troops pillaged at will.

This was the state of things when, at the beginning of August, 1444, Frederick III at last arrived at Nurnberg, to be present, as he had so often promised, at a Diet which was to settle the affairs of the Church. He had during the past year sent letters to the princes of Europe, begging them to consent to a General Council, which he, following the example of the Emperors Constantine and Theodosius, proposed to summon. He received dubious answers; it was clear that such a Council was impossible. The French King, in his answer, said that it would be better to drop the name of a Council, and bring about an assembly of secular princes; where were the princes there was also the Church. Aeneas Sylvius expresses the same opinion still more forcibly: “I do not see any clergy who would suffer martyrdom for one side or the other. We all have the same faith as our rulers, and if they were to turn idolaters we would do so too. We would abjure not only a Pope, but Christ Himself at their bidding. For love has waxed cold, and faith is dead”. Fortified by the proposition of the French King, Frederick III put off his presence at a Diet till the need had grown urgent. He went to Nurnberg more interested about Swiss affairs than about the position of the Church.

On August I Frederick III arrived in Nurnberg, where the Electors of Trier, Saxony, and Brandenburg awaited him, and were soon joined by the Archbishop of Mainz. Many of the chief German princes were also there. Frederick’s first desire was to get help from the Diet against the Swiss Confederates; but in this he was coldly listened to,
and when the news of the battle on the Birs reached Nurnberg the King was placed in a sorry predicament. The hungry bands of France had ravaged the possessions of the Empire, and the Dauphin was already negotiating peace with the enemies of Austria, whom he had been summoned to overthrow. Frederick, crimson with shame, had to listen to reproaches which he could not answer. The only lesson which he learned from them was not to face another Diet, a lesson which for the next twenty-seven years he steadfastly practised. The Diet appointed the Pfalzgraf Lewis general of the army of the Empire against the strangers from France. Frederick III, by his supineness, had lost his control over the German princes. A proposition which he put forward about ecclesiastical matters—to extend the neutrality for a year, and proclaim a Council to meet on October 1, 1445, at Constance, or, failing that, at Augsburg—was not accepted. The Diet separated without coming to any joint decision. The discord between the King and the Electors had at length become manifest.

Moreover, at Nurnberg the Pfalzgraf Lewis had been won over to the side of Felix V by a marriage contract with Margaret, the daughter of Felix, whom Frederik had refused. Four of the six Electors were now leagued together in favour of Felix. It was a question how far they would succeed. The dispute between the two Popes had passed into the region of mere political expediency and personal intrigue. The whole matter was felt to centre in Germany, and in the midst of these political intrigues the Council of Basel sunk to insignificance. Felix V had found that the Council was useless to him, as well as irksome. Towards the end of 1443 he quitted Basel on the ground of health, and took up his abode at Lausanne. There he might live in peace, and be rid of the expense which the Council perpetually caused him. Forsaken by the Pope of its own choice, the Council became a mere shadow. Its zeal and energy had been expended to little abiding purpose. After a glorious beginning, it had gone hopelessly astray, and had lost itself in a quagmire from which there was no escape.

The hopes of Felix V entirely rested on Germany. Eugenius IV relied upon the revival of his prestige as sure to tell upon Italian politics, in which the Papacy was a necessary element to maintain the balance of power. In Italy Eugenius IV had been slowly gaining ground. In 1434 the condottiere bishop, Giovanni Vitelleschi, had taken possession of Rome in the Pope’s name, and ruled it with severity. Francesco Sforza had, however, gained a firm hold of the March of Ancona. The Duke of Milan encouraged Bologna in 1438 to throw off the Papal yoke and declare itself independent; its example was followed by Faenza, Imola, and Forlì. The condottiere general, Niccolò Piccinino, in league with the Duke of Milan, beguiled Eugenius IV into a belief that he was going against Sforza in the March. Suddenly he showed himself in his true colours, and prepared to enrich himself at the Pope’s expense. Moreover, he planned an invasion of the Florentine territory, and was supposed to have drawn to his side the Papal general, Vitelleschi. Vitelleschi with a strong hand introduced order into Rome and the neighborhood; he even waged war against Alfonso in Naples. He enjoyed to the full the confidence of Eugenius IV, over whom he had greater influence than anyone else, and by whom he was created Cardinal in 1437. Vitelleschi was a condottiere influenced by the same ambitions as Sforza and Piccinino, and in Rome he held an independent position which tempted him to act on his own account. He was known to be bitterly hostile to Sforza, and was negotiating with Piccinino for the overthrow of their rival. When Eugenius IV summoned to the aid of the Florentines the Pontifical forces under the leadership of Vitelleschi, the cautious Florentine magistrates were alarmed lest the understanding between the two condottieri might prove stronger than Vitelleschi’s
obedience to the Pope. They laid before Eugenius IV intercepted letters of Vitelleschi to Piccinino. The favorite had many foes among the Cardinals, who succeeded in persuading the Pope that Vitelleschi was a traitor. But Eugenius IV dared not proceed openly against a powerful general. Secret orders were sent to Antonio Redo, captain of the Castle of S. Angelo, to take him prisoner. On the morning of his departure for Tuscany Vitelleschi came to give his last orders to the commander of the Castle. Suddenly the drawbridge was raised; Vitelleschi was attacked by soldiers and received three severe wounds. He was made prisoner, and resigned himself to his fate. When he was told that his captivity would be brief, as the Pope would soon be convinced of his innocence, he answered, “One who has done such deeds as mine ought either never to have been imprisoned, or can never be released”. He died on April 2, 1440, and the rumour spread that his death was due to poison, and not to his wounds.

At all events, the Florentines were glad to be rid of Vitelleschi, and managed to persuade the Pope to appoint as his successor a man whom they could trust, Ludovico Scarampo, who had formerly been Archbishop of Florence. In June, 1440, Eugenius IV conferred on Scarampo and his own nephew, Pietro Barbo, the dignity of Cardinal.

The fall of Vitelleschi freed Florence from the fear of Piccinino, for it restored the balance between him and his rival Sforza. But the Duke of Milan was growing weary of the indecisive war which he had been waging against the League of Venice, Florence, and the Pope. Sforza and Piccinino had won all that for a time they were likely to hold. All parties wished for peace, which was concluded at Cremona in November, 1441, on the usual terms that each should keep what they had won. Sforza also received in marriage the illegitimate daughter of the Duke of Milan, Bianca, whose hand had often been promised him, and often refused. Eugenius IV alone was discontented; for Sforza was left in possession of the March of Ancona and other conquests in the States of the Church.

In Naples also the Angevin party, which Eugenius IV, supported, was gradually giving way before the energy of Alfonso. In 1442 René was driven into enters Naples and there was besieged. His only hope June, was to gain assistance from Sforza; but the Duke of Milan, jealous of his powerful son-in-law, set Piccinino to keep him in check, and Eugenius IV, who now saw in Sforza his chief enemy, was only too glad to do his part of fulminating against him. Alfonso pressed the siege of Naples, which he entered on June 2, 1442. René was driven to flee from the Castel Nuovo, where the superb triumphal arch in the inner doorway still stands to commemorate the entrance of Alfonso. René fled on board a Genoese galley to Florence, where he received the Pope’s condolences, and afterwards betook himself to his county of Provence.

The fall of the Angevin party in Naples greatly affected the policy and position of Eugenius IV. He had little to expect from France, whose position towards the Papacy was now declared. On the other hand, he had much to gain from Alfonso, and Alfonso had shown by his dealings with the Council of Basel that his chief object was to bring the Pope to terms. By an alliance with Alfonso, Eugenius could obtain help against Sforza, and could also pave the way for a peaceful return to Rome. He had begun to feel that in a contest against a pretender the establishment of his Curia in Rome would add to his prestige. He had already decreed the adjournment of his Council from Florence to the Lateran, and it was worthwhile to make his hold on Rome secure. Moreover, he had gained little by his alliance with Florence and Venice; in the peace of 1441 they had regarded only their own interests and had paid no heed to his desires. Accordingly
Eugenius IV negotiated with Alfonso to recognize him in Naples, and legitimize his son Ferrante, on condition that Alfonso helped him against Sforza. As this was a step alienating himself from the League and from Florence, Eugenius IV found it desirable to leave Florence on March 7, 1443. The Venetians urged the Florentines to keep him prisoner, and only on the morning of his departure did the Florentines determine to let him go. Yet the final departure was courteous on both sides, and Eugenius IV thanked the magistracy for their hospitality. He betook himself to Siena, a city hostile to Florence, and, by so doing, gave a clear indication of his change of policy.

In Siena Eugenius IV was honorably received, and concluded his negotiations with Alfonso. He also had Eugenius an interview with Piccinino, and doubtless devised with him schemes against their common enemy Sforza. On September 13 he set out for Rome, where he arrived on September 28, after an absence of eight years. The Romans received their Pope with acquiescence, but without enthusiasm. Eugenius IV settled down quietly into his capital, and proceeded at once to open his Council in the Lateran. But the Council of the Lateran was an empty form maintained against the Council of Basel, which was now weakened by the defection of Scotland and Castile, as well as Aragon. Eugenius IV trusted to diplomacy to destroy the last hope of Felix V, by driving Frederick III to abandon the German neutrality. Meanwhile in Italy he had important work to do in using his new allies as a means of recovering from Sforza his possessions in the States of the Church.

In Italy circumstances favored the Pope’s policy. The suspicious Duke of Milan was always jealous of his powerful son-in-law, and wished to keep him in check. Alfonso of Naples was true to his agreement with the Pope, and in August, 1443, marched against Sforza. He was joined by Piccinino, and their combined army is said to have numbered 24,000 men, against which Sforza could only command 8000. Sforza resolved to act on the defensive and secure his chief cities by garrisons; but many of the leaders in whom he trusted betrayed his cause. His ruin seemed imminent, when suddenly the Duke of Milan interposed on his behalf. He wished to see his son-in-law humbled, but not destroyed, and so prevailed on Alfonso to withdraw his troops. Sforza was now a match for Piccinino, and succeeded in defeating him in battle on November 8. But Piccinino was rich in the resources of Eugenius IV, while Sforza suffered from want of money. Both sides retired into winter quarters, and as spring approached Piccinino had a superior force at his command. Again the Duke of Milan interposed, and invited Piccinino to a conference on important affairs. No sooner was Piccinino absent than Sforza hastened to seize the opportunity. He gathered together his starving troops, and told them that now was their last chance of wealth and victory. His skillful generalship outmatched Piccinino’s son, who, with the Papal legate, Cardinal Capranica, was left in charge of the troops of the Church. Piccinino, already an old man, had gone to Milan with sad forebodings; he was so overwhelmed with the news of this defeat, that he died of a broken heart on October 25, 1444. He was a marvelous instance of the power of genius over adverse circumstances. Small in stature, crippled through paralysis so that he could scarcely walk, he could direct campaigns with unerring skill; though devoid of eloquence or personal gifts, he could inspire his soldiers with confidence and enthusiasm. He was impetuous and daring, and showed to the greatest advantage in adversity. But he lacked the consistent policy of Sforza, and saw, in his last days, that he had founded no lasting power. With his death his army fell in pieces, and no captain was left in Italy to match the might of Sforza.
When the fortunes of war had begun to turn against the Pope, Venice and Florence joined with the Duke of Milan in urging peace, which was accepted on condition that each party should retain what it held on October 18. Sforza employed the eight days that intervened between the conclusion of the peace and the date for its operation in recovering most of the cities which had been won for the Pope. Eugenius IV only retained Ancona, Recanati, Osimo, and Fabriano, and they were to remain tributary to Sforza. His first attempt against the powerful condottiere had not met with much success. Next year, however, he was again prepared to take advantage of another quarrel which had arisen between Sforza and the Duke of Milan, and war again broke out. Bologna, which had been in the hands of Piccinino, proclaimed its independence under the leadership of Annibale Bentivoglio; but the Pope and the Duke of Milan both looked with suspicion on the independence of a city which each wished to bring under his own sway. In June, 1445, a band of conspirators, supported by the Duke of Milan, assassinated Annibale Bentivoglio after a baptism, where he had been invited to act as godfather to the son of their ringleader. But their plan of seizing the city failed. The people were true to the house of Bentivoglio, and slew the assassins of Annibale. Florence and Venice came to their help. There was again war in Italy with Sforza, Florence, and Venice on one side, the Pope, Naples, and Milan on the other. Again Sforza was hard pressed, and the Papal troops overran the March of Ancona. In June, 1446, Sforza made a raid in the direction of Rome, and penetrated as far as Viterbo. But the cities shut their gates against him, and he had no means of besieging them. Sforza’s ruin seemed certain; Jesi was the only town in the March which he held. But, luckily for him, the Venetians took this opportunity to attack the Duke of Milan, who, being ill provided with generals, needed the help of Sforza, whose ambition was henceforward turned to a nobler prize than the March of Ancona, which fell back peaceably into the hands of the Pope.

Thus Eugenius IV, by stubborn persistency, succeeded in repairing the mischief of his first political indiscretion, and obtained again a secure position in Italy, while the mistakes of the Council had done much to restore his ecclesiastical power, which had been so dangerously threatened. The leading theologians of the Council had been driven to quit it, and range themselves on the side of the Pope; only John of Segovia and John of Palomar remained true to the principles with which the Council opened. It is noticeable that the great advocate of the Council’s power, Nicolas of Cusa, was now the chief emissary of Eugenius IV. Cusa had been taught in the school of Deventer, and came to Basel deeply imbued with the mystic theology of the Brethren of the Common Life. His work, De Concordantia Catholica, written in 1433, represented the ideal of the reforming party, a united Church reformed in soul and body, in priesthood and laity, by the action of a Council which should represent on earth the eternal unity of Heaven. Cusa’s work was the text-book of the Council; yet its author was disillusioned, and found his theories fade away. He quitted Basel with Cesarini, and in common with others who felt that they had been led away by their enthusiasm, laboured to restore the Papal power which once he had striven to upset. The Council of Florence gathered round the Pope an extraordinary number of learned theologians, whose efforts were now devoted to the restoration of the Papacy. Again, after the interval of a century and a half, the pens of canonists were engaged in extolling the Papal supremacy. John of Torquemada, a Spanish Dominican, whom Eugenius IV raised to the Cardinalate, revived the doctrine of the plenitude of the Papal power, and combated the claims of a General Council to rank as superior to the Pope. Now, as in other times, the immediate result of an attack upon the Papal supremacy was to gather round the Papacy a serried
band of ardent supporters; if the outward sphere of the exercise of the Papal authority was limited, the theoretic basis of the authority itself was made stronger for those who still upheld it.

These labours of theologians were to bear their fruits in after times. The immediate question for Felix V and Eugenius IV was the attitude of Germany towards their conflicting claims. Germany was to be their battlefield, and diplomacy their arms.
BOOK IV.
THE PAPAL RESTORATION.
1444—1464.

CHAPTER I.
AENEAS SYLVIUS PICCOLOMINI AND THE RESTORATION OF THE OBEDIENCE OF GERMANY
1444-1447.

The man who played the chief part in settling the ecclesiastical affairs of Germany was Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini, whose life was closely connected with the fortunes of the Papacy in this crisis, and whose character reflects almost every tendency of the age in which he lived.

Aeneas Sylvius was born at Corsignano, a village near Montepulciano, in the year 1405, of the noble but decayed family of the Piccolomini. He was one of a family of eighteen, of whom only two daughters besides himself reached the age of maturity. As a youth Aeneas helped his father to work in the fields, and picked up such education as his native village afforded. At the age of eighteen he left home, and with scanty provision of money betook himself to the University of Siena. There he applied himself diligently to study. Mariano Sozzini taught him civil law; the preaching of S. Bernardino kindled in him for a brief space the fervour of monastic devotion. The fame of Francesco Filelfo as a lecturer in Greek literature drew him for two years to Florence. At last he settled in Siena as a teacher. But Siena was soon involved in war with Florence, and the prospects of literature seemed dark, when, in 1431, Domenico Capranica, on his way to Basel, needed a secretary, and offered the post to Aeneas. The journey to Basel was difficult, as North Italy was involved in war. Aeneas took ship at Piombino, and was nearly shipwrecked in a storm which suddenly arose. At last he reached Genoa in safety, and travelled through Milan and over the S. Gotthard to Basel, where he arrived in the spring of 1432.

Capranica received from the Council the dignity of Cardinal: but Eugenius IV refused him its revenues, and he could not long afford to keep a secretary. Aeneas found a new master in Nicodemo della Scala, Bishop of Freisingen, and when he left Basel transferred himself to the service of the Bishop of Novara, with whom he went to Milan,
and gained an insight into the policy of the crafty Visconti. The Bishop of Novara was one of the Duke’s confidential agents, and sent Aeneas to the camp of Niccolo Piccinino, while he himself at Florence plotted against the life of Eugenius IV, in 1435. When the plot was discovered, and the Bishop of Novara’s life was in danger, Aeneas took refuge with Cardinal Albergata, a man of strict monastic piety, whom Eugenius IV sent as one of his legates to preside over the Council of Basel. On his journey thither Albergata visited Amadeus of Savoy in Ripaille, and Aeneas was more impressed with the luxury than with the piety of Amadeus’ retreat. From Basel Aeneas accompanied Albergata to the Congress of Arras, where he had ample opportunities of learning the political condition of France and England. From Arras he was sent on a secret mission to the Scottish King, most probably for the purpose of instigating him to act as a check upon England in case the resentment of the English King were arouse by the pacification of Arras, which was detrimental to English interests.

The remarks on England and Scotland made by the keen-sighted Italian are interesting, not only in themselves but as showing the quickening power which the new learning had given to the faculty of observation. Men’s interests were rapidly enlarging, their curiosity was awakened, they looked on the world as their dwelling-place, and all things human had an attraction for their own sake. Aeneas writes in the spirit of a modern traveller, and his picture is vivid and precise. He went to Calais, but was suspected by the English, who would neither allow him to go on nor return. At length the interference of the Cardinal of Winchester enabled him to set sail for London. London struck him as the wealthiest and most populous city he had seen. He admired the grandeur of St. Paul’s Cathedral, and in the sacristy was shown a Latin translation of Thucydides, which, he says, dated from the ninth century. He was struck by the noble river Thames and the old London Bridge, covered with houses, like a city in itself. He heard and recorded the legend that the men of Strood were born with tails. But, above all else, he was amazed by the shrine of St. Thomas at Canterbury, covered with diamonds, pearls, and carbuncles, to which nothing less precious than silver was offered. He failed, however, in the object of his visit, as the English court was too suspicious of the secretary of Cardinal Albergata to give him a safe-conduct to Scotland. Aeneas was obliged to return to Bruges; but determined not to be baffled, he again took ship at Sluys and set sail for Scotland. A terrible storm drove the ship to Norway, and only after a voyage of twelve days did Aeneas land at Dunbar. He had made a vow in his peril to walk barefoot to the nearest shrine of Our Lady. A pilgrimage of ten miles to the shrine of Whitekirk, through the snow and ice, was the beginning of an attack of gout in the feet, from which he suffered for the rest of his life.

Aeneas describes Scotland as a cold, barren, treeless country. Its towns were unwalled; the houses were built without mortar, were roofed with turf, and had doors of ox-hide. The people were poor and rough; the men small but courageous, the women fair and amorously disposed. The Italian was surprised at the freedom of manners in the intercourse of the sexes. The Scots exported hides, wool, and salt fish to Flanders; they had better oysters than England. The Highland and the Lowland Scots spoke a different language; and the Highlanders lived on the bark of trees. They dug a sulphurous stone out of the ground which they used for fuel. In winter their daylight lasted scarcely more than four hours. There was nothing the Scots heard with greater pleasure than abuse of the English.

Aeneas was well received by the Scottish King, who gave him fifty nobles and two horses. When he had done his business, the captain of the ship, in which he had
come, offered him a passage back. But Aeneas had had enough experience of the North Sea, and determined to return through England. The ship set sails and was wrecked before his eyes in sight of land. The captain, who was going home to be married, and all the crew save four, were drowned. Thankful for his providential escape, Aeneas, disguised as a merchant, crossed the Tweed, and entered the wild border country. He spent a troubled night amid a throng of barbarous people who encamped, rather than lived, in the desolate plain of Northumberland. When night came on, the men departed to a tower of defense, fearing a possible raid of the Scots. They left the women, saying that the Scots would not injure them, and refused to take Aeneas with them. He and his three attendants stayed amid some hundred women who huddled round the watch fire. In the night an alarm was raised that the Scots were coming. The women fled; but Aeneas, fearing he might lose his way, took refuge in a stable. It was, however, a false alarm, as the approaching band turned out to be friends, not foes. At dawn he set out for Newcastle, and saw the mighty tower which Caesar had built. Here once more he was in a civilized country. At Durham he admired the tomb of the Venerable Bede. He found York a large and populous city, with a cathedral memorable throughout the world, with glass walls between slender pillars. He travelled to London with one of the Justices in Eyre, who, little suspecting the real character of his companion, denounced to Aeneas the wicked machinations of Cardinal Albergata at Arras. In London Aeneas found that a royal order forbade any foreigner to sail without the King’s permission. A judicious bribe overcame the guards of the harbor. Aeneas set sail from Dover, and made his way safely to Basel.

For a time Aeneas remained at Basel, where he led a jovial and careless life, making himself agreeable to men of all parties, and gaining a reputation for elegant Latinity. When the combat between Pope and Council broke out, he was driven to take a side; but he did so dispassionately, with a clear perception of the selfish motives of the various parties. He first came prominently forward in an eloquent speech in favor of Pavia as a meeting place with the Greeks; by this step he hoped to win the favor of the Duke of Milan, whose character he well knew. He was thanked by the Duke, and won the favor of the Archbishop of Milan, who presented him, though a layman, to a provostship in the Church of S. Lorenzo in Milan. To hold this as a layman, and without capitular election, he needed a dispensation from the Council, which had just prohibited the Pope from similar abuses in conferring patronage. There were many who grudged the young favorite his success, and the application met with some opposition in a general congregation. But the honeyed tongue of Aeneas won the day: “You will act, fathers, as you think fit; but, if you decide in my favor, I would prefer this token of your good-will without possession of the provostship to its possession by any capitular election”. After this the objectors were silenced by a shout of applause, and Aeneas obtained his dispensation. When he reached Milan, he found another in possession, by the nomination of the Duke and the election of the Chapter; but Aeneas won over the Duke, as he had won over the Council, and his rival was forced to give way. On his return to Basel he was nominated by the Archbishop of Milan to preach before the Council on the feast of S. Ambrose. The theologians were scandalized at this preference of a layman, but the Council enjoyed the polished rhetoric of Aeneas more than the ponderous and shapeless erudition of men like John of Segovia.

Aeneas was now bound to the Council by his provostship, and showed himself a keen partisan. His pen was busily employed in attacking Eugenius IV. In the Council he was a person of importance, and held high positions. He was often one of the
Committee of Twelve which regulated its affairs. He often presided over the Deputation of Faith. He went on several embassies into Germany, and accompanied the Bishop of Novara to Vienna in 1438, to congratulate Albert on his accession to the throne. On his return to Basel he narrowly escaped death from the plague; in fact, the rumor of his death was spread, and the Duke of Milan took advantage of it to confer his provostship of S. Lorenzo on a nominee of Eugenius IV. The policy of the Duke had changed; he was no longer on the side of the Council, and did not need the services of Aeneas. The Council was bound to recompense its adherent, and conferred on Aeneas a canonry in the Church of Trent. Again Aeneas found another in possession, and again he succeeded in ousting him.

Soon after this came the Papal election at Basel. So great was the reputation of Aeneas that he was urged to qualify for the post of an elector by taking orders; the Council offered him a dispensation to allow him to proceed on one day to the subdiaconate and diaconate. But Aeneas had no taste for the restrictions of clerical life, or, at least, did not consider the inducement to be sufficient to lead him to undertake them. He acted, however, as master of ceremonies to the Conclave, and on the election of Amadeus was one of those deputed by the Council to escort the new Pope to Basel. Felix V made Aeneas one of his secretaries, and it would now seem as though Aeneas had cast in his lot for life.

Aeneas, however, soon began to see that with the election of Felix V the Council had practically abdicated its position. He did not hope for much from the wisdom or generosity of the Council’s Pope. On all sides he saw that men who had any future before them were leaving the Council, and joining the side of Eugenius IV. For himself such a course of conduct was impossible. He was still a young man, and his reputation had been entirely made in the democratic surroundings of the Council. He had made himself remarkable in the eyes of Eugenius IV only by the keenness of his attacks upon the Curia. He had no previous services to plead, no weight to bring to Eugenius’ side, no position which he could use in Eugenius’ favor. It was useless for him to desert to Eugenius, and equally useless to stay with Felix. In this dilemma he resolved to identify himself with the neutral policy of Germany. He took advantage of the negotiations of Felix V to ingratiate himself with the Bishop of Chiemsee, one of Frederick’s chief counselors. The bishop was struck by the cleverness of the young Italian and his capacity for writing letters. He recommended him to his master, and persuaded Frederick III to confer on Aeneas the ridiculous honor of crowning him with the laurel wreath as Imperial poet. We cannot guess how Frederick was induced to revive this distinction, which had been bestowed on Petrarch; but Aeneas was proud of the title of “poet”, with which he afterwards adorned his name.

Aeneas was offered the post of secretary at Frederick’s court; but he did not deem it judicious to desert abruptly the service of Felix V. He went back to Basel, and endeavored to persuade Felix that he could serve his interests better at Vienna than at Basel. He so far prevailed that, when Frederick visited Basel in 1442, Felix reluctantly gave his consent to this arrangement, and Aeneas left Basel in Frederick’s train never to return. No sooner had Aeneas changed his masters than he changed his opinions also. Felix V was disappointed if he thought that the shrewd Italian would have any feeling of loyalty towards a losing cause. Aeneas tried to renew his connection with the Duke of Milan, and win back his Milanese provostship: he loudly proclaimed that under Frederick III he identified himself with the policy of neutrality.
At Vienna Aeneas found that he had to begin his career afresh. He was only one amongst a crowd of hungry secretaries, all aspirants for higher office, and all united in disliking the Italian intruder. In the small matters of their common life Aeneas was given the lowest place at table and the worst bed; he was the object of the sarcasms of his companions. But Aeneas bore all things with equanimity, and was content to bide his time. He attached himself to the Chancellor, Kaspar Schlick, a man whose career had many points in common with his own.

Kaspar Schlick was sprung from a good citizen family in Franconia, and in 1416 entered Sigismund’s chancery as a secretary. He had little learning; but his native shrewdness was developed by the teaching of experience, and his industry recommended him for employment. He went on many diplomatic missions, and followed Sigismund in his eventful journeys through Europe. He became Sigismund’s trusted adviser and friend, not only in matters of state, but in the many amorous intrigues in which Sigismund delighted to engage. Sigismund conferred on him riches and distinctions, and Sigismund’s successors found that Schlick’s intimate knowledge of affairs, especially in finance, rendered his services indispensable. He continued to be Chancellor under Albert II and Frederick III. To him Aeneas first turned as to a patron, and approached him with an elaborate eulogy in Latin verse. Schlick knew something of Aeneas, for during his stay at Siena with Sigismund he had been entertained by an aunt of Aeneas, and had acted as godfather for one of her children. He took Aeneas under his care, secured him a regular salary, gave him a place at his own table, and counted on his assistance in personal matters. Schlick was an ignoble politician; with much acuteness and great capacity for affairs, he had a narrow and sordid mind. He was greedy of small gains, and this greed grew upon him with increasing age; in all that he did he had some personal interest to serve. At first Aeneas wished to play the part of Horace to a second Maecenas; but he soon learned to change his strain, and adapt himself to the requirements of his patron’s practical nature. Verses disappeared, and political jobbery took their place. It was not long before Aeneas was required to exercise his ingenuity in the Chancellor’s behalf. The Bishop of Freising died in August, 1443, and the Chancellor wished to obtain the rich bishopric for his brother, Heinrich Schlick, a man who had nothing but his powerful relationship to recommend him. The chapter elected Johann Grünwalder, one of the Cardinals of Felix V, a natural son of the Duke of Baiern-München, and called on the Council of Basel to confirm the nomination. Aeneas wrote to the Cardinal d’Allemand, urging the impolicy of alienating so powerful a man as the Chancellor. The Council, however, confirmed the election of Grünwalder, and Schlick applied to Eugenius IV, who, after some skillful negotiations, confirmed his brother. The struggle between the rival claimants lasted for some years; but its immediate effect was to draw Kaspar Schlick towards the side of Eugenius IV, and Aeneas readily followed his master. After all his services to the Council, he had neither obtained any promotion for himself, nor could he help a friend by his arguments.

Moreover, at Vienna Aeneas met Cardinal Cesarini, who had been appointed by Eugenius IV legate in Hungary for the purpose of warring against the Turks. Hungarian affairs needed rather delicate management at the Court of Vienna. After the death of Albert II his wife bore a son, Ladislas, of whom Frederick III was guardian. But the Hungarian nobles did not think it wise to run the risks of a long minority in such perilous times. They chose as their king Wladislaf of Poland, and Eugenius IV approved their choice. Frederick III could not venture on war, and Kaspar Schlick, who owned lands in Hungary, used his influence on the side of peace. But it required all Cesarini’s
tact to reconcile the positions of the Pope and the King. He was ready to renew his acquaintance with Aeneas, treated him as a friend, and urged him to take the side of Eugenius IV. Aeneas was keen-sighted enough to use the opportunity. He saw at Frederick’s Court the immense superiority of the diplomacy of the Papal Curia over that of the Council. The strong character of Carvajal, the Papal envoy, produced a deep impression on him. Aeneas let it be understood that he was not indisposed to help the side of Eugenius IV when opportunity offered. He wrote to Carvajal, October, 1440, that he assumed an attitude of judicious expectancy:

“Here stands Aeneas in arms, and he shall be my Anchises whom the consent of the universal Church shall choose. So long as Germany, the greater part of the Christian world, still hesitates, I am in doubt; but I am ready to listen to the common judgment, nor in a matter of faith do I trust myself alone”.

In December of the same year he had so far advanced in his opinions as to advocate the ending of the schism by any means; he favored the proposal of the King of France to summon an assembly of princes. It matters not whether it be called a Council; so long as the schism be done away with, the means used may be called by any name. “Let it be called a conventicle or a meeting; I care not, provided it leads to peace”. He wrote a clever dialogue, the *Pentalogus*, in which he commended this plan to Frederick III. In May, 1444, he had already begun to consider how the neutrality of Germany could be brought to an end. He wrote to Cesarini:

“The neutrality will be hard to get rid of, because it is useful to many. There are few who seek the truth; almost all seek their own gain. The neutrality is a pleasing snare, because no one can be driven from a benefice, whether he holds it justly or not, and the ordinaries confer benefices as they please. It is a hard matter to rescue the prey from the wolf’s mouth. But, as far as I see, all Christendom follows Eugenius; only Germany is divided, and I would gladly see it united, because I attach great weight to this nation, for it is not led by fear, but by its own judgment and goodwill. I shall follow the lead of the King and the Electors”.

Soon after this Aeneas went to the Diet at Nurnberg, and there saw the feebleness of Frederick III, the divisions among the Electors, and the chances of success which lay open to enterprise. He was appointed by Frederick III a commissioner, to sit with others nominated by the Electors for the consideration of ecclesiastical affairs. “We parted in discord and division” is the only result which the letters of Aeneas chronicle.

On his way to Nurnberg Aeneas passed through Passau, where Schlick was courteously entertained by the bishop, Aeneas made himself agreeable to his host, and wrote to a friend in Rome a pleasant sketch of Passau and its bishop. Before sending it he requested the bishop to look it over and correct any inaccuracies which it might contain. This delightful means of letting the bishop know that the pen of Aeneas was employed to sing his praises secured its due reward. Aeneas was presented before the end of the year to a benefice in Aspach, in Bavaria. The bishop sent him his presentation free from all ecclesiastical or other dues.

The character of Aeneas at this time was not that of a Churchman. He had led a careless, adventurous, self-seeking life. He had lived amongst dissolute companions and had been as dissolute as the worst amongst them. He cannot be said to have had any principles; he trusted to nothing but his own cleverness, and his sole object was to make himself comfortable wherever he was. He flattered those who were in authority; he was willing to do anything required of him in hopes of obtaining a suitable reward. He never
lost an opportunity of ingratiating himself with any one, and would use any means for that purpose. His store of knowledge, his fluent pen, his subtle mind were at the command of any promising patron. One day he wrote to young Sigismund, Count of the Tyrol, a long and elegant letter in praise of learning, inviting him by numerous examples to fit himself by study for his high position. A little while after, he wrote him a love-letter to help him to overcome the resistance of a girl who shrank from his dishonorable proposals. With characteristic levity and plausibility he even provided the youth with excuses for his conduct. “I know human nature”, he says; “he who does not love in youth loves in old age, and makes himself ridiculous. I know too how love kindles in youth dormant virtues; a man strives to do what will please his mistress. Moreover, youths must not be held too tight, but must learn the ways of the world so as to distinguish between good and evil. I send you a letter on condition that you do not neglect literature for love; but as bees gather honey from flowers, so do you from the blandishments of love gather the virtues of Venus”.

The private life of Aeneas, as we learn plainly from his letters, was profligate enough; but it does not seem to have shocked men of his time, nor have fallen below the common standard. His irregularities were never made a reproach to him later, nor did he take any pains to hide them from posterity. Such as he was he would have himself known induced perhaps by literary vanity, more probably by a feeling that his character would not lose in the eyes of his contemporaries by sincerity on his part. In those days chastity was the mark of a saintly character, and Aeneas never professed to be a saint. His temperament was ardent, easily moved and soon satisfied. The pleasures of the flesh had strong dominion over him. His love affairs were many, and he did not regard constancy as a virtue. A son was born to him in Scotland after his visit there; but the child soon died. We know of another son, the offspring of an English woman whom Aeneas met at Strasburg when on an embassy from Basel. In a letter to his own father he shamelessly describes the pains that he took to overcome her virtue, and asks his father to bring up the child. His excuses for himself show an entire frivolity and absence of principle. “You will perhaps call me sinful; but I do not know what opinion you formed of me. Certainly you did not beget a son of stone or iron, seeing you yourself are flesh, I am not a hypocrite who wish to seem good rather than be so. I frankly confess my fault, that I am neither holier than David nor wiser than Solomon. It is an old and ingrained vice, and I do not know who is free from it. But you will say that there are certain limits, which lawful wedlock provides. There are limits to eating and drinking; but who observes them? Who is so upright as not to fall seven times a day? Let the hypocrite profess that he is conscious of no fault. I know no merit in myself, and only divine pity gives me any hope of mercy”.

In truth Aeneas took no other view of life than that of a selfish voluptuary, for whom the nobler side of things did not exist. He gave his experiences to his friend Piero da Noceto, who was in the chancery of Eugenius IV, and wrote to him that he had thoughts of marrying his concubine, who had already borne him several children. Aeneas advises the step: he will know all about his wife beforehand, and will not have to endure the disillusionment that often follows a honeymoon. “I have loved many women”, he says, “and after winning them have grown weary of them; if I were to marry I would not unite myself to any one whose habits I did not know beforehand”. Aeneas was the confidant of the amours of Kaspar Schlick, and took an adventure of Schlick’s with a Sienese lady as the subject for a novel in the style of Boccaccio. This
story, “Lucretia and Euryalus”, had great popularity and was translated into almost every European tongue.

Thus the life of Aeneas at Vienna was by no means edifying, nor was it satisfactory to himself. His associates in the Imperial Chancery were mostly younger than himself. Their manners were rude, their enjoyments coarse, and their vices wanting in that refinement which to a cultivated Italian gave them half their pleasure. Aeneas was never at home in Germany: he could not speak the language fluently: the country, the climate, the people, and the manners were all distasteful to him. He pinned at times to return to Italy, and urged his friends to deliver him from his exile in a foreign land. He began to feel that his life was somewhat wasted; he began to think that he ought to turn over a new leaf and enter upon a new career. He thought of taking holy orders; but if his cultivation did not keep him from vice, it at least prevented him from assuming a position the duties of which he could not with decency fulfill. “I do not intend to spend all my life outside Italy”, he writes in February, 1444. “As yet I have taken care not to involve myself in holy orders. I fear about my continency, which, though a laudable virtue, is more easily practiced in word than in deed, and befits philosophers better than poets”.

While this was the frame of Aeneas’s mind, the proceedings of the Diet of Nurnberg gave a new direction to his energies. The Diet did nothing except confirm the current witticism that “diets were indeed pregnant, for each carried another in its womb”. It revealed, however, to Aeneas the existence of the strong party among the Electors, which had formed a league in favor of Felix V. He saw that the contest between the two Popes was becoming important in German politics. It gave the Electors an opportunity of acting without the King, and if their league in favor of Felix succeeded, the royal power would have received a serious, if not a deadly blow. The weakness of the Electors lay in the fact that their ecclesiastical policy was not sincere. They did not venture to identify themselves with the national desire for reform, and, supported by the authority of the Council of Basel, set in order the affairs of the German Church. Their policy was oligarchical, not popular; they wished to strengthen their own hands against the King, not to work for what the nation desired. They looked for help, not to the national sentiment of Germany, but to the French King, and negotiated with him to support them in the old plan of demanding a new Council in a new place. But the French had just shown themselves to be the national enemies of Germany; and Charles VII, now freed from the pressure of the English war, was no longer willing to help the Electors, but reverted to the old desire of France to have a Pope at Avignon. The negotiations between him and the Electors led to no results.

This policy of the Electors naturally tended to bring the King and the Pope together. Frederick III on his part had from the beginning inclined in favor of Eugenius IV, and events had made the friendship of Eugenius more desirable. Eugenius had so far wished to fulfill his promises to the Greeks that he proclaimed a crusade against the Turks, and sent Cesarini as his legate into Hungary. Cesarini, whose lofty character was never displayed to better advantage than when acting as the leader of a forlorn hope, stirred the courage of the Hungarians, filled them with enthusiasm for the cause of Christendom against the infidel, and awakened a strong feeling of devotion towards Eugenius IV.

In 1443 Wladislaf, the Hungarian King, compelled the Turks to sue for peace on condition of restoring Serbia and quitting the Hungarian frontier. But next year the
expectations of a combined attack upon the Turks by Venice and the Greeks led Cesarini to urge Hungary again to war. The peace had not been approved by the Pope, and he absolved them from all obligations to observe it. His exhortations were obeyed, and Wladislaful again led forth his army to join his allies on the Hellespont. But at Varna he was startled by the news that the Turkish Sultan Murad was advancing with 60,000 men against his army of 20,000. Cesarini counseled a prudent policy of defense; but Wladislaful was resolved to try the issue of a battle. On the fatal field of Varna, November 10, 1444, the Christian army suffered a severe defeat, and Wladislaful fell fighting. The eventful life of Cesarini found on the battlefield a noble end. Chivalrous and high-minded, he had always devoted himself unsparingly to the loftiest and most difficult cause that was before him. He failed in war against the Bohemians; he failed to regulate the ecclesiastical violence of the Council of Basel; he failed to drive the Turks from Europe. Yet his efforts were always directed to a noble end, and the very singleness of his own purpose made him neglect the prudence which would have been familiar to a smaller man. Amid the self-seeking of the age Cesarini rises almost to the proportions of a hero; he is the only man whose character claims our entire respect and admiration.

The news of the defeat of Varna filled Europe with consternation but it was not without its advantages to Frederick III. The death of Wladislaful opened the way for the settlement of Hungarian affairs, and the recognition of Frederick’s ward, Ladislas. To gain this end more securely, Frederick needed the help of Eugenius IV. Negotiations began to take a more intimate and personal turn in relation to the affairs of Hungary. Yet still the affairs of the Church were the subject of formal embassies, in which the old plan of a new Council was ostensibly being pursued. In November, 1444, the Fathers of Basel answered this proposal by an entire refusal. They had already agreed to it in 1442, and the obstinacy of Eugenius IV had prevented it; on him rested the blame of its failure. An envoy had next to be sent to bear a similar proposition to Eugenius IV. This was not done till the beginning of 1445, and then the person chosen was Aeneas Sylvius.

Aeneas at once saw that in dealings between Frederick III and Eugenius IV there was scope for his cleverness and his powers of intrigue. He readily started on his journey, and rejoiced to see his native land once more. At Siena his kinsfolk were alarmed at his audacity in venturing into the presence of the Pope, whom he had so often attacked and so grievously offended. They represented to him that “Eugenius was cruel, mindful of wrongs, restrained by no conscience, no feeling of pity; he was surrounded by ministers of crime; Aeneas, if he went to Rome, would never return”. Aeneas, no doubt, enjoyed the simplicity of these good people, and acted with dignity the part of a possible martyr to duty. He tore himself from their weeping embrace, declaring that he must either fulfill his embassy or die in the attempt, and proceeded to Rome. Carvajal had already given Eugenius information of the usefulness of Aeneas. He was well received by several of the Cardinals for his literary or for his political merits. Amongst the officials of the Papal Curia he met several of his old friends at Basel. Before he could have an audience with the Pope it was necessary that he should be absolved from the ecclesiastical censure pronounced against the adherents of the Council. This duty was assigned to the Cardinals Landriano and Le Jeune, who afterwards introduced Aeneas to the Pope’s presence. Eugenius graciously allowed him to kiss not only his foot, but his hand and his cheek. Aeneas presented his credentials, and then began to speak as a penitent on his own behalf.
“Holy Father, before I discharge my errand for the King, I will say a little about myself; I know that you have heard much against me; and those who have told you have spoken truly. At Basel I spoke, wrote, and did many things, I do not deny it, not with the intent of injuring you, but of benefiting the Church I erred, but in the company of many others, men of high repute. I followed Cardinal Cesarini, the Archbishop of Palermo, the apostolic notary Pontano, men who were esteemed in the eyes of the law and teachers of the truth. I will not mention the universities which gave their opinions against you. In such company who would not have erred? But when I discovered the error of the Basilians, I confess that I did not at once flee to you. I was afraid lest I should fall from one error into another. I went to the neutral camp, that after mature deliberation I might shape my course. I remained three years with the German king, and there my study of the disputes between your legates and those of the Council left me no doubt that the right was on your side. Hence, when this embassy was offered me, I willingly accepted it, thinking that so I might regain your favor. Now I am in your presence, and ask your pardon because I erred in ignorance”.

Eugenius answered graciously: “We know that you erred with many; but to one who owns his fault we cannot refuse pardon, for the Church is a loving mother. Now that you hold the truth, see that you never let it go, and by good works seek the divine grace. You live in a place where you may defend the truth and benefit the Church. We, forgetting your former injuries, will love you well if you walk well”.

Thus Aeneas made his peace, and entered into a tacit agreement with the Pope that if he proved himself useful his services should be rewarded. Eugenius had gained an agent in Germany on whose devotion he might rely, because it was closely bound up with self-interest. The diplomacy of the Curia had again shown its astuteness.

After this reconciliation Aeneas was regarded as a person of some importance at Rome, and was well received by several of the Cardinals. But there was one person who was too blunt to disguise his contempt for this self-interested conversion. One day Aeneas met Tommaso Parentucelli, who had been a companion in the service of Cardinal Albergata, but who had followed his master and had been an uncompromising opponent of the Council. He was now Bishop of Bologna, and was respected for his character and his learning. Aeneas advanced to greet him with outstretched hand, but Parentucelli coldly turned away. Aeneas was piqued, and afterwards adopted a similar attitude of disdain towards Parentucelli. “How ignorant are we of the future” he remarks afterwards, when relating this incident; “if Aeneas had known that Parentucelli would be Pope, he would have condoned all things”. A reconciliation between the two was brought about by friends before Aeneas left Rome; but Parentucelli was never cordial to one whose sincerity he doubted.

On the particular matter of his embassy Aeneas does not seem to have done much. The party of Eugenius in Germany, headed by Schlick, saw no way of ending the neutrality except by summoning another Council. To this Eugenius was resolved not to consent, and Aeneas gave him the benefit of his advice. In April he left Rome with an announcement that Eugenius would send an embassy to bring his answer to the King. His envoys, Carvajal and Parentucelli, followed close upon Aeneas.

Eugenius IV had already entered upon a policy of attacking his enemies in Germany. On January 16, 1445, he issued a Bull cutting off the lands of the Duke of Cleves from the dioceses of Koln and Münster. In this matter he acted at the request of the Dukes of Burgundy and Cleves; but in the Bull he spoke of the Archbishop of Koln
as disobedient to the Roman See, and called the Bishop of Münster, “Henry, the son of wickedness, who styles himself Bishop of Münster”. The Electors had not fared so well as they hoped in their negotiations with France. They were afraid lest the King might get the better of them by his secret dealings with Eugenius IV, and were taken aback at this hostile display on the part of Eugenius. They judged it prudent to retire from their separate position, and once more make common cause with the King. At the Diet on June 24, 1445, the neutrality of Germany was renewed for eight months, at the end of which time the King was to summon an “assembly of the German Church or a national Council”, which was to be proclaimed to the various lands depending on the Empire, including England, Scotland and Denmark. Once more the ecclesiastical question was to be also a national question for Germany. The Electors were willing to abandon their separate negotiations with Felix V on the understanding that Frederick III abandoned his agreement with Eugenius IV.

But Frederick III, indolent and careless as he was, saw in an alliance with Eugenius IV the sole means of maintaining himself against the formidable alliance, which threatened him, of France with the House of Savoy and the German princes. If he was heedless himself, the envoys of Eugenius IV spared no pains to enlighten him. Schlick and Aeneas Sylvius were ever at his side, and Carvajal was busy at Vienna arranging an alliance between the King and the Pope. “The King hates the neutrality”, writes Aeneas Sylvius at the end of August, “and would willingly abandon it if the princes would only concur, to which end perhaps some means may be found”. In Rome Eugenius IV went on with his proceedings against the Archbishop of Koln. It was known in Vienna that the archbishop had been summoned to appear in Rome, and it was clear that further steps must follow; yet the King raised no word of protest. He was engaged in a secret treaty with the Pope; he was selling his neutrality, and was being bought cheap. On September 13 Carvajal left Vienna to carry to Rome Frederick III’s conditions. The terms which Carvajal had negotiated were accepted by Eugenius IV. A treaty between Pope and King was once more firmly established, and the end of the reform movement in Germany was rapidly approaching.

The terms on which Frederick III sold his aid to Eugenius IV are expressed in three Bulls issued in February, 1446. The Pope granted to the King the right during his lifetime to nominate to the six great bishoprics of Trent, Brixen, Chur, Gurk, Trieste and Piben; he granted the King and his successors the right to nominate for the Papal approval those who should have visitorial powers over the monasteries of Austria; the King should have the right of presentation to 100 small benefices in Austria. Besides this, the Papacy was also to pay the King the sum of 221,000 ducats, of which 121,000 were to be paid by Eugenius and the rest by his successors. The indolent and short-sighted Frederick, no doubt, thought that he had made a good bargain. He obtained a supply of money, of which he was always in need. He got into his own hands the chief bishoprics in his ancestral domains, and thereby greatly strengthened his power over Austria. By the nomination of visitors of the monasteries he lessened the influence of his enemy, the Archbishop of Salzburg, by exempting the monasteries from his jurisdiction. By the right of presentation to 100 benefices he secured the means of rewarding the hungry officials of his court. He thought only of his own personal interests; he cared only to secure his own position in his ancestral domains. For the rights of the Church, for his position in the Empire, he had no thought. All that can be urged in Frederick’s behalf is, that the German princes were equally ready to abandon the German Church and make terms with either Pope who would help them to secure
their own political power. On the other hand, Eugenius IV, though making great concessions, was careful not to impair the rights of the Papacy or take any irretrievable step. The Papal treasury was exhausted; but money was well spent in regaining the adhesion of Germany, and Eugenius IV felt amply justified in mortgaging for this purpose the revenues of his successors. The Pope granted the nomination to six bishoprics, but only for Frederick’s lifetime, after which the mischief, if any, might be repaired. The absolute appointment of visitors of monasteries was not granted to Frederick and his successors in Austria, but only the nomination of several from whom the Pope was to select. The benefits granted to the King were not important ones; they were to be between the annual value of sixty and forty marks, and did not include appointments to cathedral and collegiate churches. There was nothing in all this that materially affected the Papal position in Germany.

Moreover, Eugenius IV was anxious that the treaty between himself and Frederick III should be as soon as possible openly acknowledged. He promised Frederick 100,000 guilders for the expenses of his coronation. He invited him to Rome to receive the Imperial crown; in case Frederick could not come to Rome, Eugenius, old and gouty as he was, undertook to meet him at Bologna, Padua or Treviso. In the reunion of the Papacy and the Empire Eugenius IV saw the final overthrow of the Council of Basel and the restoration of the Papal monarchy.

Eugenius IV, however, did not trust only to his allurements to induce the indolent Frederick to declare himself. Knowing the feeble character of the King, he resolved to play a bold game, so as to attain his end more speedily. He had already succeeded in weakening, by his threat of ecclesiastical censures, the electoral league in favor of Felix V. As his negotiations with Frederick III advanced, he resolved to strike a decided blow against his enemies in Germany. On February 9 he issued a Bull deposing from their sees the Archbishops of Köln and Trier, and appointing in their places Adolf of Cleves and John, Bishop of Cambrai, the nephew and the natural brother of his powerful ally, the Duke of Burgundy. The German rebels were openly defied, and the allies of Eugenius IV must range themselves decidedly on his side.

If Eugenius IV acted boldly, the Electors answered the challenge with no less promptitude. On March 21 they met at Frankfort, and formed a league for mutual defense. The attack upon the electoral privileges combined the whole body in opposition to the high-handed procedure of the Pope. Undeterred by the alliance of Pope and King, the Electors united to assert the principles on which the neutrality of Germany had been founded. If the time had come when neutrality could no longer be maintained, it should, at least, be laid aside on the same grounds as those on which it had been asserted. The Electors again assumed the position of mediators between the rival Popes, but set forward a plan of mediation which should lead to decided results, and which should have for its object the security of the liberty of the German Church. They abandoned their scheme for the recognition of Felix V, and were willing to join with the King in recognizing Eugenius IV, but on condition that he confirmed the decrees of Constance about the authority of General Councils, accepted the reforming decrees of Basel as they were expressed in the declaration of neutrality, recalled all censures pronounced against neutrals, and agreed to assemble a Council on May 1, 1447, at Constance, Worms, Mainz, or Trier. They prepared Bulls for the Papal signature embodying these conditions: on the issue of these Bulls they were ready to restore their obedience and submit the formal settlement of Christendom to the future Council.
The attitude of the Electors was at once dignified and statesmanlike. It showed that the Bishops of Trier and Köln possessed political capacity hitherto unsuspected. No special mention was made of individual grievances, no direct answer was given to the attack made by Eugenius IV on the electoral privileges. By accepting their terms the Pope would tacitly recall his Bulls of deposition; if he refused to accept them, the Electors would be free to turn to Felix V and the fathers of Basel. They might summon in name a new Council; but it would consist of the members of the Council of Basel reinforced by Germans bound to the policy of the Electors. They resolved that envoys be sent to Frederick III and Eugenius IV, and unless a satisfactory answer were obtained by September, they would proceed further. These resolutions were the work, in the first instance, of the four Rhenish Electors; but within a month the Markgraf of Brandenburg and the Duke of Saxony had also given in their adhesion. The League of the Electoral Oligarchy, to act in despite of its nominal head, was now fully formed.

Strong as was the position of the Electors, they showed their weakness by not asserting it publicly. Their agreement was kept secret; and the embassy sent to demand the adhesion of Frederick III was instructed to lay the plan only before him and counselors, who were to be bound by an oath of secrecy. Decided as was the policy of the Electors in appearance, it was founded upon no large sentiment of earnestness or patriotism. It was merely a diplomatic semblance, and, as such, must be cloaked in diplomatic secrecy, that it might be exchanged, should expediency require, for a more conciliatory attitude. The envoys of the Electors were headed by Gregory Heimburg, who hoped against hope that he might use the opportunity of giving effect to his own reforming ideas, and trusted that he might work through the selfishness of the Electors towards a really national end. Frederick III received through him the proposals of the Electors, by which he was sorely embarrassed. At his Court were Carvajal and the Bishop of Bologna, who had just brought him the Bulls which ratified his treaty with the Pope; but his oath of secrecy to the Electors forbade him to take counsel with them. The separate articles of the proposals of the Electors were discussed in the presence of the six counselors sworn to secrecy. The King was ready to accept them in principle, but made reservations on points of detail. The envoys were instructed not to lay before the King the Bulls which they were to present to the Pope, unless he fully accepted the provisions of the Electors. Frederick, on his side, complained of this reserve as offensive to his dignity. “It is a new thing”, he said, “that an agreement should be made behind my back, and that I should be required to accept it without a full discussion of every article”. The ambassadors of the Electors declared that they had submitted everything to the King. But Frederick III was justified in refusing to join the Electors till they had shown him the written proposals which they were to submit to the Pope; and they refused to do this because they wished to keep in the background their final threat of making common cause with the Council of Basel. The sole result of these negotiations was that the King proclaimed a Diet at Frankfort on September 1, and let it be understood that he was then prepared to consider the termination of the neutrality.

In the beginning of July Heimburg and two companions reached Rome. Frederick III, anxious to give some hint to Eugenius IV, told the Pope’s envoys at Vienna that it would be well if one of them returned to Rome. Carvajal was ill of a fever; so the Bishop of Bologna set out, and with him went Aeneas Sylvius, to whom the King confided the secret of the Electors. Aeneas pleads, as a technical excuse for this double dealing, that the King himself had taken no oath of secrecy, but only his six counselors. It is, however, probable that Aeneas needed no special enlightenment, but as secretary
was privy to the whole matter, and was himself bound to secrecy, if not specially on that
occasion, yet by the nature of his office. However that may be, he went with Thomas of
Bologna, and on the way let drop enough to indicate to Thomas the advice which he
ought to give to the Pope. They made such haste on their journey that the ambassadors
of the Electors only entered Rome the day before them, and Thomas of Bologna was the
first to have an audience of the Pope. Aeneas expressly says, “The Bishop of Bologna,
though he could not know all that the ambassadors of the Electors brought with them,
still guessed and opined much”.

“Instructed by Aeneas, he warned the Pope about the matter, and advised him to
give the ambassadors a mild answer”. The duplicity of Aeneas was invaluable to the
cause of Eugenius IV: it averted the most pressing danger, that the Pope, by his
contemptuous behavior, should give the Electors an immediate pretext for turning to the
Council of Basel.

The presence of Aeneas was also useful in another way. Frederick III had not been
asked by the Electors to send an embassy to Rome; but Aeneas was there to speak in the
King’s name, and was called in to assist at the audience. By this means Eugenius IV had
a pretext for overlooking the fact that what were submitted to him were the demands of
the Electors; he could treat them as the joint representations of the King and the
Electors, and so return a vague answer. Every precaution had been taken by the Electors
to put their cause clearly before the Pope. When Eugenius raised an objection to
receiving an embassy from the men whom he had deposed, he was informed that the
credentials of the ambassadors were signed simply with the subscription of the whole
College— “The Electoral Princes of the Holy Roman Empire”

However definitely the Electors put their propositions before the Pope, he was
resolved not to give them a definite answer. When they were admitted to an audience,
Aeneas spoke first on behalf of the King. He recommended the ambassadors to the
Pope’s kindly attention, and vaguely said that the peace of the Church might be
promoted by entertaining their proposals. Then Heimburg, in a clear, incisive, and
dignified speech, set forward the objects of the Electors. There could not be a greater
contrast than between Aeneas and Heimburg; they may almost be taken as
representatives of the German and Italian character. Heimburg was tall and of
commanding presence, with flashing eyes and a genial face, honest, straightforward,
eminently national in his views and policy, holding steadfastly by the object which he
had in view. He was the very opposite of the shifty Italian adventurer, who recognized
in him a natural foe. Heimburg’s speech was respectful, but uncompromising. Eugenius
listened, and then, after a pause, shrewdly returned a vague answer. The deposition of
the archbishops, he said, had been decreed for weighty reasons; as to the authority of
General Councils, he had never refused to acknowledge it, but had only defended the
dignity of the Apostolic See; as to the German Church, he did not wish to oppress it, but
to act for its welfare. The proposals made to him were serious, and he must take time to
consider them.

Aeneas meanwhile unfolded to Eugenius the opinions of Frederick III. He advised
that the archbishops should be restored, without, however, annulling their deprivation;
that the Constance decree in favor of General Councils should be accepted. If this were
done, the recognition of Eugenius might be accomplished; if not, there was great danger
of a schism. Eugenius listened and seemed to assent. The Cardinals endeavored to
discover if the ambassadors had any further instructions; but Heimburg did not consider
himself justified by the Pope’s attitude to lay before him the Bulls that he had brought. The ambassadors were kept for three weeks awaiting the Pope’s answer, and Aeneas has drawn a spiteful picture of Heimburg sweltering in the summer heat, stalking indignantly on Monte Giordano in the evening with bare head and breast, denouncing the wickedness of Eugenius and the Curia. At length they were told that, as they had no powers to treat further, the Pope would send envoys with his answer to the Diet at Frankfort. The ambassadors left Rome without producing their Bulls. Heimburg regarded the Papal attitude as equivalent to a refusal to entertain his proposals. Meanwhile ambassadors had been sent also to Basel, and the Council had similarly deferred its answer till the assembling of the Diet.

The results of the Diet of Frankfort would clearly be of great importance both to Germany and to the Church at large. The policy of the Electors had not received the adhesion of the King the oligarchy had resolved to act in opposition to their head, and, if they were resolute, the deposition of Frederick III was imminent. In this emergency Frederick entrusted his interests to the care of the Markgraf Albert of Brandenburg and Jacob of Baden, the Bishops of Augsburg and Chiemsee, Kaspar Schlick and Aeneas Sylvius. At the head of this embassy stood Albert of Brandenburg, who had already shown his devotion to Frederick by taking the field against the Armagnacs, and who was bent upon overthrowing the intrigues of France with the Rhenish Electors. The representatives of the King were all convinced of the great importance of the crisis, and were not a little embarrassed to find at Frankfort no ambassadors of the Pope. The Bishop of Bologna had left Rome with Aeneas Sylvius, but had been delayed at Parma by sickness, and on his recovery had gone to confer with the Duke of Burgundy about the measures to be adopted towards the deposed Archbishops of Trier and Köln. John of Carvajal and Nicolas of Cusa had come from Vienna; but they had no special instructions about the answer to be returned by the Pope to the proposals of the Electors.

In spite of the gravity of the occasion, few of the German princes or prelates were personally present at Frankfort. The four Rhenish Electors were there; but the Electors of Brandenburg and Saxony only sent representatives, as did also the majority of the bishops and nobles. From Basel came the Cardinal of Arles, bearing a decree which approved of the transference of the Council to one of the places which might be approved by the King and the Electors, and generally accepting the proposals of the Electors without making any mention of Felix V. The Electors took up a position of friendliness to the Cardinal of Arles. When, on September 14, the proceedings of the Diet began with a solemn mass, the Cardinal appeared, as was his wont, in state as a Papal legate. The royal ambassadors made the usual protest that Germany was neutral and could not recognize the officials of either Pope. The Archbishop of Trier angrily denounced their conduct; they could admit the legates of Eugenius, the foes of the nation, and would exclude those of the Council. The majority agreed with him; but the citizens of Frankfort were still loyal, and their tumultuous interference compelled the Cardinal to lay aside the insignia of his office.

The proceedings began with the reading by Heimburg of the speech which he had made to Eugenius IV, and the written answer of the Pope. Heimburg further gave an account of his embassy, and the reasons which had led him to abstain from presenting to the Pope the Bulls which the Electors had drawn up; the question to be discussed was, whether the Pope’s answer gave ground for further deliberation. On the Pope’s side his envoys submitted an answer to the “prayers of the King and the Electors”. Eugenius was ready to summon a Council within a convenient time; he had never opposed the decrees
of the Council of Constance, which had been renewed in Basel while a universal and recognized Council was sitting; he was willing to do away with the old burdens of the German Church provided he were indemnified for the losses which he would thereby sustain. About the revocation of the deprivation of the archbishops he said nothing. The answer of Eugenius IV was mere mockery of his opponents. He granted nothing that they had asked; his concessions were merely apparent, and he reserved to himself full power to make them illusory. His attitude towards the Electors was practically the same as it had been towards the Council of Basel.

The regal and the Papal ambassadors would not have ventured to submit such an answer if they had not seen their way to effect a breach in the ranks of their opponents. On September 22 Albert of Brandenburg succeeded in inducing the representatives of his brother the Elector, the Archbishop of Mainz, two bishops, and one or two nobles, to agree that they had obtained an answer from the Pope, which afforded the basis for peace in the Church, and that they would stand by one another to maintain this opinion. The Archbishop of Mainz was won over by consideration of the assistance which he might obtain from Frederick III and Albert of Brandenburg in the affairs of his own dominions. Aeneas Sylvius is not ashamed to own that he was the instrument of bribing four of the archbishop’s counselors with 2000 florins to help in bringing him to this decision. The adhesion of Frederick of Brandenburg was due to the influence of his brother Albert. The others who joined in the step had all some personal interest to serve.

Round the basis thus secured adherents rapidly began to gather. But it was clear to the Papal envoys that they must make some concessions, and afford their new adherents a plausible pretext for withdrawing their support from the Electoral League. Aeneas Sylvius undertook the responsibility of playing a dubious part. He “squeezed the venom”, as he puts it, out of the proposals of the Electors, and composed a document in which the Pope undertook, if the princes of Europe agreed, to summon a General Council within ten months of the surrender of the neutrality, recognized the Constance decrees, confirmed the reforming decrees of Basel till the future Council decided otherwise, and, at the instance of the King, restored the deposed Archbishops of Trier and Köln, on condition that they returned to his obedience. The Bishop of Bologna and Nicolas of Cusa assented to these proposals; John of Carvajal was dubious, and hot words passed between him and Aeneas, who was afraid lest his obstinacy or honesty might spoil all. Aeneas skillfully mixed up his relations with the Pope and with the King, and managed to produce an impression that the Pope had commissioned him to make this offer. The sturdy Germans, Heimburg and Lysura, were annoyed at this activity of the renegade Italian in their national business. “Do you come from Siena”, said Lysura to Aeneas, “to give laws to Germany?” Aeneas thought it wiser to return no answer.

Aeneas may have exaggerated his own share in this matter; but early in October the Royal and Papal ambassadors agreed to submit to the Diet a project of sending a new embassy to Rome, to negotiate with Eugenius IV on this basis. Their demands were to go in the form of articles, not, as before, of Bulls ready prepared.

This seemed to the majority to be a salutary compromise. The Electors of Mainz and Brandenburg considered it better than a breach with the King. The Elector of Saxony and the Pfalzgraf thought that the new proposals contained all that was important in the old. The summons of a new Council would keep matters still open;
anyhow, negotiations would gain time. On October 5 the league that had been formed in favor of this compromise was openly avowed, and received many adherents. It was resolved that the articles be presented to Eugenius at Christmas; if he accept them, the neutrality should be ended; if not, the matter should be again considered. The answer was to be brought to a Diet at Nurnberg on March 19, 1447. The Archbishops of Trier and Koln found themselves deserted by the other Electors; all they could do was to join on October 11 in a final decree that the King should try to obtain from the Pope a confirmation of the Bulls prepared by the Electors; failing that, he should obtain Bulls framed according to the articles; these were to be laid before the Electors at the next Diet, and each should be free to accept or reject them. This reservation of their individual liberty was the utmost that the oligarchical leaders now hoped to obtain for themselves. Next day the Cardinal of Aries appeared before the Electors in behalf of the Council of Basel, which had been invited to support the policy of the Electors, and had issued Bulls accordingly. He proffered the Bulls, but no one would receive them. With heavy hearts the envoys of Basel left Frankfort. On their way to Basel they were attacked and plundered; only by the speed of his horse did the Cardinal of Arles succeed in taking refuge in Strasburg. He afterwards said in Basel, “Christ was sold for thirty pieces of silver, but Eugenius has offered sixty thousand for me”.

The league of the Electors had been overthrown at Frankfort, and with it also fell the cause of the Council of Basel. Germany was the Council’s last hope, and Germany had failed. The diplomacy of the Curia had helped Frederick III to overcome the oligarchical rising in Germany; but the Pope had won more than the King. The oligarchy might find new grounds on which to assert its privileges against the royal power; the conciliar movement was abandoned, and the summoning of another Council was vaguely left to the Pope’s good pleasure. The ecclesiastical reforms, which had been made by the Council of Basel, survived merely as a basis of further negotiations with the Pope. If the Papal diplomacy had withstood the full force of the conciliar movement, it was not likely that the last ebb of the falling tide would prevail against it.

There still remained, however, for the final settlement of the question, the assent of Eugenius IV to the undertaking of his ambassadors. Even at Frankfort Carvajal had been opposed to all concessions; at Rome, where the gravity of the situation in Germany and the importance of the victory won at Frankfort were not fully appreciated; there was still a chance that the Pope’s obstinacy might be the beginning of new difficulties. But the health of Eugenius IV was failing; he was weary of the long struggle, and desired before the end of his days to see peace restored to the distracted Church. The theologians in the Curia, headed by John of Torquemada, counseled no concession; the politicians were in favor of accepting the proffered terms. Eugenius showed his desire to increase the influence of those who were conversant with German affairs by raising to the Cardinalate in December Carvajal and the Bishop of Bologna. Frederick III, the Electors, and the princes of Germany all sent their envoys to Rome. On behalf of the King went Aeneas Sylvius and a Bohemian knight, Procopius of Rabstein; chief amongst the others was John of Lysura, Vicar of the Archbishop of Mainz. They all met at Siena, and rode into Rome, sixty horsemen. A mile outside the city they were welcomed by the inferior clergy, and were honorably conducted to their lodgings. A difficulty was first raised whether the Pope could receive the ambassadors of the Archbishops of Bremen and Magdeburg, seeing that those prelates had been confirmed by the Council of Basel; but this was overcome by a suggestion of Carvajal that they should appear as representatives of the sees, not of their present occupants. On the third
day after their arrival an audience was given to the German ambassadors in a secret consistory, where Eugenius was seated with fifteen Cardinals. In a clever speech Aeneas Sylvius laid the proposals before the Pope, and such was his plausibility that he managed to satisfy the Germans without offending the dignity of the Pope. He touched upon the evils of ecclesiastical dissension, spoke of the importance of Germany and its desire for peace, skillfully introduced the German proposals, and besought the Pope of his clemency to grant them as the means of unity. Eugenius answered by condemning the neutrality, complained of the conduct of the deposed archbishops, and finally said that he must deliberate.

On the same day Eugenius was seized by an attack of fever, which confined him to his bed. The German question was referred to a commission of Cardinals, and opinion was greatly divided. Only nine Cardinals were in favor of concession; the others declared that the Roman See was being sold to the Germans, and that they were being dragged by the nose like buffaloes. The German proposals were not treated as though they were meant for definite acceptance, but were regarded as the basis of further negotiation. The ambassadors were entertained and cajoled by the Cardinals, while the illness of Eugenius IV made every one anxious to have the matter settled speedily. Little by little the articles agreed on at Frankfort were pared down:

1) As regarded the summons of a new Council, the Pope agreed to it as a favor, without issuing a Bull, which might bind his successor, but merely making a personal promise to the King and the Electors.

2) Instead of the acceptance of the decrees of Constance and Basel, Eugenius agreed to recognize “the Council of Constance, and its decree *Frequens* and other of its decrees, and all the other Councils representing the Catholic Church”. All mention of the Council of Basel was studiously avoided, and, by the express mention of the decree *Frequens*, the omission of the more important decree *Sacrosancta* was in a measure emphasized.

3) On the third point, the acceptance of the Pragmatic Sanction of Germany as it had been established at the declaration of the neutrality in 1439, Eugenius IV was willing to follow the example of Martin V in granting the concordats of Constance. He recognized the existing possessors of benefices, and agreed to send a legate to Germany, who would arrange for the liberties of the German Church in the future, and the proper provision to be made for the Papacy in return. Meanwhile, the condition of the German Church was to remain as it was, “till an agreement had been made by our legate, or other orders given by a Council”. The Germans, who had at first taken the Basel decrees as the foundation of an ecclesiastical reformation, now accepted them as a limit—a limit, moreover, which might be narrowed.

4) In like manner the Papal diplomacy secured for the Pope a triumph in the matter of the deposed archbishops. Eugenius IV was asked to annul their deposition, if they were willing to concur in the declaration in his favor; he agreed, when they did so concur, to restore them to their office.

Moreover, to aid the progress of these negotiations, Aeneas Sylvius undertook, in Frederick’s name, that the King would solemnly declare, and publish throughout Germany, his recognition of Eugenius, would receive with due honor a Papal legate, would order the city of Basel to withdraw its safe-conduct from the Council, and, as regarded the provision to be made for the Pope out of the ecclesiastical revenues of Germany, would act not only as a mediator but as an ally of the Pope.
Thus diplomacy was busily spinning its web round the bed of the dying Pope. True till the last to his persistent character, Eugenius IV was resolved to see the restoration of the German obedience before he died. The theologians might make the best terms that they could; but Eugenius made them understand that he wished to see the end. He might well gaze with sadness on the desolation which his unyielding spirit had wrought in the fortunes of the Church. France was practically independent of the Papacy; Germany was estranged; a rival Pope diminished the prestige of the Holy See; in Italy, Bologna was lost to the domains of the Church, and the March of Ancona was still in the hands of Sforza. He would bequeath a disastrous legacy to his successor; but the recovery of Germany would at least improve the position. Eugenius longed to signalize his last days by a worthy achievement; on their side the envoys of the German King wished their mission to succeed. Now that a goal of some sort was in view, all were eager to reach it. If the Pope died before matters were decided, the powers of the envoys came to an end, for they were only commissioned to negotiate with Eugenius. The Germans did not wish to sacrifice the present opportunity, and see everything again reduced to doubt.

The physicians gave Eugenius ten days to live when the conclusions of the Commission of Cardinals were laid before him. The Pope was too feeble to examine them fully, much more to go through the labor of reducing them to the form of Bulls. Scrupulous and persistent to the last, he dreaded even the semblance of concession when the decisive moment came. When he finally decided to give way he devised a subterfuge to save his conscience. On February 5 he signed a secret protest setting forth that the German King and Electors had desired from him certain things “which the necessity and utility of the Church compel us in some way to grant, that we may allure them to the unity of the Church and our obedience. We, to avoid all scandal and danger which may follow, and being unwilling to say, confirm, or grant anything contrary to the doctrine of the Fathers or prejudicial to the Holy See, since through sickness we cannot examine and weigh the concessions with that thoroughness of judgment which their gravity requires, protest that by our concessions we do not intend to derogate from the doctrine of the Fathers or the authority and privileges of the Apostolic See”.

By this pitiful proceeding the dying Pope prepared to enter into engagements which his successor might repudiate. He was ready to receive the restitution of the German obedience; but the German envoys, on their side, began to hesitate. They did not, of course, know the secret protest of the Pope; but they doubted whether they ought to take a step which might divide Germany, when they had no guarantee that the successor of the death-stricken Eugenius would pursue his policy; John of Lysura, who was now as zealous for reconciliation as before he had been anxious for reform, plausibly argued that they were dealing with the Roman See, which never died; the Bulls of Eugenius would bind his successor. If they left Rome without declaring the obedience of Germany, the existing disposition of the Electors might change, and everything might again become doubtful. So long as Eugenius could stir his finger, it was enough. If they went away without accomplishing anything they would be ridiculous. Lysura and Aeneas prevailed on the other ambassadors of the King and of the Archbishop of Mainz to resolve on a restoration of obedience to Eugenius IV.

On February 7 the ambassadors were admitted into the Pope’s chamber. Eugenius still could greet them with dignity, but in a feeble voice requested that the proceedings should not be long. Aeneas read the declaration of obedience, and Eugenius handed him the Bulls, which he gave to the ambassadors of the Archbishop of Mainz as being the
primate of Germany. The envoys of the Pfalzgraf and of Saxony excused themselves from joining in the declaration; they were not empowered to do so, but they had no doubt that their princes would give their assent in the forthcoming Diet at Nurnberg. Eugenius thanked God for the work that had been accomplished, and dismissed, with his benediction, the ambassadors, who were moved to tears at the sight of the dying man. A public Consistory was held immediately afterwards before the whole Curia; over a thousand men were present. Aeneas spoke for the King, Lysura for the Archbishop of Mainz, the other ambassadors followed. The Vice-Chancellor, in the Pope’s behalf, spoke words of thankfulness, and the Consistory broke up amid the joyous peals of bells with which Rome celebrated its triumph. The city blazed with bonfires; the next day was a general holiday, and was devoted to a special service of thanksgiving.

The German envoys stayed in Rome, waiting for the necessary copies of the Bulls, and anxious about the new election. Day by day Eugenius grew visibly worse, and there were signs of disturbances to follow on his death. Alfonso of Naples advanced with an army within fifteen miles of Rome. There were troubles at Viterbo, and in Rome itself the people were anxious to be rid of the severe rule of Cardinal Scarampo, the favorite of Eugenius. Amidst this universal disquiet Eugenius died hard. When the Archbishop of Florence wished to administer supreme unction the Pope refused saying, “I am still strong; I know my time; when the hour is come I will send for you”. Alfonso of Naples, on hearing this, exclaimed, “What wonder that the Pope, who has warred against Sforza, the Colonna, myself, and all Italy, dares to fight against death also”

At length Eugenius felt that his last hour was approaching. Summoning the Cardinals, he addressed to them his last words. Many evils, he said, had befallen the Holy See during his pontificate, yet the ways of Providence were inscrutable, and he rejoiced, at last before he died, to see the Church reunited. “Now, before I appear in the presence of the Great Judge, I wish to leave with you my testament. I have created you all Cardinals save one, and him I have loved as a son. I beseech you, keep the bond of peace, and let there be no divisions among you. You know what sort of a Pope the Holy See requires; elect a successor in wisdom and character superior to me. If you listen to me, you will rather elect with unanimity a moderate man than a distinguished one with discord. We have reunited the Church, but the root of discord still remains; be careful that it does not grow up afresh. That there be no dispute about my funeral, bury me simply, and lay me in a lowly place by the side of Eugenius III”. All wept as they heard him. He received supreme unction, was placed in S. Peter’s chair, and there died on February 23, at the age of sixty-two. According to Vespasiano da Bisticci, he exclaimed shortly before his death: “O Gabrielle, how much better had it been for your soul’s health had you never become Pope or Cardinal, but died a simple monk! Poor creatures that we are, we know ourselves at last”. His body was exhibited to public view, and he was buried, according to his desire, in S. Peter’s, by the side of Eugenius III.

Amid the disastrous events of his pontificate, the personal character of Eugenius IV seems to play an insignificant part. At his accession he had to face a difficult problem, which would have tried the tact and patience of the largest and wisest mind. But Eugenius was a narrow-minded monk, with no experience of the world and a large fund of obstinacy. He quarreled with the Romans; he alarmed the politicians of Italy; he offended a strong party in the Curia, and finally proceeded to defy a Council which was supported by the moral approval of Europe. Such wisdom as Eugenius IV ever gained, he gained in the hard school of experience. After the mistakes of the first year of his
pontificate, the rest of his life was a desperate struggle for existence. The one quality that helped him in his misfortune was the same obstinacy as first led him astray. Where a more sensitive or a more timid man might have been disposed for compromise Eugenius stood firm, and in the long run won a tardy victory, not by his own skill, but through the faults of his opponents. Time was on the side of the representative of an old institution, and every mistake of the Council brought strength to the Pope. Those who at first attacked him through bitter personal animosity gradually found that he was the symbol of a system which they did not dare to destroy. The wisdom and skill of eminent men, which at first enabled the Council to attack the Pope, were gradually transferred to the Pope’s service. Every mistake committed by the Council lost it a few adherents, alarmed at the dangers which they foresaw, or anxious for their own personal interests, but all determined on the overthrow of that which they had forsaken. To them Eugenius IV was necessary; and they paid him greater reverence through remorse for the wrongs which they had formerly done him. No man is so zealous as one who has deliberately changed his convictions; and the success of Eugenius at the last was due to the zeal of those who had deserted the Council. Hence Eugenius IV was faithfully served in his latter days, though he inspired no enthusiasm. He was the Pope, the Italian Pope, and as such was the necessary leader of those who wished to maintain the prestige of the Papacy, and to keep it secure in its seat at Rome. But he was outside the chief interests, intellectual and political, which were moving Italy. Politically, he pursued a course of his own, and was not trusted by Venice, nor Florence, nor by the Duke of Milan, nor by Alfonso of Naples, while in Rome itself his rule was harsh and oppressive both to the barons and the people. He was a man of little culture, and such ideas as he had were framed upon his monastic training. Yet, though he was untouched by the classical revival, he was not opposed to it. Among his secretaries were Poggio Bracciolini, Flavio Biondo, Maffeo Vegio, Giovanni Aurispa, and Piero de Noceto. He welcomed at Rome the antiquary Ciriaco of Ancona and the humanist George of Trebizond, and employed in his affairs the learned Ambrogio Traversari. He pursued the plan of Martin V to restore the decayed buildings of Rome; and in his later days summoned Fra Angelico to decorate the Vatican Chapel. He also invited to Rome the great Florentine sculptor Donatello; but his plans were interrupted by the disturbances of 1434 and his flight from the city. While at Florence he so admired Ghiberti’s magnificent gates to the Baptistry that he resolved to decorate S. Peter’s by a like work, which he entrusted to a mediocre but eminently orthodox artist, Antonio Filarete. The gates of Eugenius IV still adorn the central doorway of S. Peter’s, and are a testimony of the Pope’s good intentions rather than of his artistic feelings. Large figures, stiffly and ungracefully executed, of Christ, the Virgin, SS. Peter and Paul, fill the chief panels; between them are small reliefs commemorating the glories of the Pontificate of Eugenius IV, the coming of the Greeks to Ferrara, the Council of Florence, the coronation of Sigismund, the envoys of the oriental Churches in Rome. On the lower panels are representations of martyrdoms of saints. The reliefs are destitute of expression and are architecturally ineffective. The imagination of the artist has been reserved for the arabesque work which frames them. There every possible subject seems to be blended in wild confusion—classical legends, medallions of Roman emperors, illustrations of Aesop’s fables, allegories of the seasons, representations of games and sports—all are interwoven amongst heavy wreaths of ungraceful foliage. Eugenius IV showed his respect for antiquity by restoring the Pantheon, but did not scruple to carry off for his other works the stones of the Coliseum. Though personally modest and retiring, he had all the Venetian love of public splendor; he caused Ghiberti to design a magnificent Papal tiara, which cost 30,000
golden ducats. Without possessing any taste of his own, Eugenius IV so far followed the fashion of his time that he prepared the way for the outburst of magnificence which Nicolas V made part of the Papal policy.

The object, however, which lay nearest the heart of Eugenius IV was the promotion of the Franciscan Order, to which he himself had belonged. The friars held a chief place at his court, and were admitted at once to the Papal presence, where their affairs had precedence over all others, to the great indignation of the humanists. Poggio rejoiced that under the successor of Eugenius the reign of hypocrisy was at an end, and friars would no longer swarm like rats in Rome. If the policy of Eugenius was to erect the friars once more into a powerful arm of the Holy See, the corrupt state of the body made such a restoration impossible. Yet Eugenius would give more attention to remodeling the rules of a religious order than to the great questions which surrounded him on every side. His notion of ecclesiastical reform was to turn monastic orders into orders of friars, and he met the demands of the Fathers of Basel by displaying great activity in this hopeless work.

In person Eugenius IV was tall, of a spare figure, and of imposing aspect. Though he drank nothing but water, he was a martyr to gout. He was attentive to all his religious duties, lived sparingly, and was liberal of alms. He slept little, and used to wake early and read devotional books. He was reserved and retiring, averse to public appearances, and so modest that in public he scarcely lifted his eyes from the ground. Though stubborn and self-willed, he bore no malice, and was ready to forgive those who had attacked him. He had few intimates; but when he once gave his confidence he gave it unreservedly, and Vitelleschi and Scarampo successively directed his affairs in Italy. A man of monastic and old-fashioned piety, he was destitute of political capacity, and was more fitted to be an abbot than a Pope. What might in a smaller sphere have been firmness of purpose, became narrow obstinacy in the ruler of the Universal Church. It is a proof of the firm foundation of Papacy in the political system of Europe, that it was too deeply rooted for the mismanagement of Eugenius IV, at a dangerous crisis of its history, to upset its stability.
CHAPTER II.
NICOLAS V AND THE AFFAIRS OF GERMANY.
1447-1453

On the death of Eugenius IV the troubled state of Rome made the Cardinals anxious about the future. It was of the utmost importance for the peace of the Church that the new election should be peaceable and orderly, that the new Pope should have an undoubted title; but the attitude of the Romans, who had endured with murmurs the rule of Eugenius IV, made the Cardinals dread a repetition of the tumults which had caused the Schism. The citizens of Rome held a meeting in the monastery of Araceli to draw up demands which should be submitted to the Cardinals. The Cardinals in dismay urged the Archbishop of Benevento, Cardinal Agnesi, to attend the meeting and confer with the citizens. The leader of the Romans was Stefano Porcaro, a man of considerable knowledge of affairs, sprung from an old burgher’s stock in Rome. Porcaro recommended himself by his capacity to Martin V, who obtained for him the post of Capitano del Popolo in Florence. There he became acquainted with many of the chief humanists, and on leaving Florence he travelled in France and Germany. By Eugenius IV he was made Podestà of Bologna, where his reputation increased, and he won the friendship of Ambrogio Traversari, who advised the Pope to employ Porcaro as mediator with the rebellious Romans in 1434. Eugenius refused all mediation, and his obstinacy was rewarded by success; but it alienated Porcaro from the Papal service, and his classical studies drifted him to the republicanism of ancient Rome. In the assembly at Araceli Porcaro rose, and in a fiery speech stirred the citizens to remember their ancient liberties. They ought, at least, to have an agreement with the Pope such as even the smallest towns in the States of the Church had managed to obtain. Many agreed with him, and the Archbishop of Benevento had some difficulty in reducing him to silence. The assembly broke up in confusion, and many citizens gathered round Porcaro. But the Republican party was afraid to move through fear of Alfonso of Naples, who lay at Tivoli with an army, with a view of influencing the new election. He had already sent a message to the Cardinals that he was there to secure for them a free election, and was at their commands. The Romans felt he would use any movement on their part as a pretext for seizing the city; and it was useless to escape from the rule of the Church only to fall under that of the King of Naples. Accordingly the Republican party held its hand. The keys of the city were given to the Cardinals, who made the Grand Master of the Teutonic Knights guardian of the Capitol, and published a decree ordering the barons to leave Rome. The bands who were flocking from the country into the city were excluded, the barons unwillingly departed, and all was quiet when, on March 4, the Cardinals went into conclave in the dormitory of S. Maria sopra Minerva.

Aeneas Sylvius gives a description of the preparations for the conclave. The dormitory was divided into eighteen Cardinals present; but on this occasion the partitions were of cloth, not of wood. Lots were drawn for the distribution of the cells, which each Cardinal adorned with hangings according to his taste. Each entered the conclave with his attendants, a chaplain and a cross-bearer; each had his own food sent
him every day in a wooden box, on which his arms were emblazoned. These boxes were carried through the streets in a way that made the city seem to be full of funerals; they were accompanied by a procession of the Cardinal’s household and all his dependents, who had so contracted the habit of flattery that, when their master was not there, they were fain to grovel for the box that contained his dinner.

When the eighteen Cardinals entered the conclave it was the general expectation that their choice would fall on Prospero Colonna, the nephew of Martin V. But the old Roman proverb, “He who goes into the conclave a Pope comes out a Cardinal”, was again proved true. Prospero Colonna was supported by the powerful Cardinals Scarampo and Le Jeune but the party of the Orsini was strongly opposed to an election from the house of their rivals, and many of the Cardinals thought that it would be bad policy to run the risk of kindling discord in the city. The opponents of Colonna were more anxious to prevent his election than careful who else was elected. On the first scrutiny Colonna had ten votes and Capranica eight. In the hopes of agreeing on another candidate, various names were suggested of those outside the college, such as the Archbishop of Benevento and Nicolas of Cusa. On the second scrutiny Colonna still had ten votes, but the votes of his opponents were more divided, and three were given for Thomas of Bologna. The election of Colonna now seemed secure. “Why do we waste time”, said Cardinal Le Jeune, “when delay is hurtful to the Church? The city is disturbed; King Alfonso is at the gates; the Duke of Savoy is plotting against us; Sforza is our foe. Why do we not elect a Pope? God has sent us a gentle lamb, the Cardinal Colonna: he only needs two votes; if one be given, the other will follow”. There was a brief silence; then Thomas of Bologna rose to give his vote for Colonna. The Cardinal of Taranto eagerly stopped him. “Pause”, he said, “and reflect that we are not electing a ruler of a city but of the Universal Church. Let us not be too hasty”. “You mean that you oppose Colonna”, exclaimed Scarampo; “if the election were going according to your wishes, you would not speak of haste. You wish to object, not to deliberate. Tell us whom you want for Pope”. To parry this homethrust, which was true, the Cardinal of Taranto found it necessary to mention someone definitely. “Thomas of Bologna”, he exclaimed. “I accept him”, said Scarampo, who was followed by Le Jeune, and soon Thomas had eleven votes in his favor. Finally, Torquemada said, “I, too, vote for Thomas, and make him Pope; today we celebrate the vigil of S. Thomas”. The others accepted the election that it might be unanimous, and Cardinal Colonna announced it to the people. The mob could not hear him, and a cry was raised that he was Pope. The Orsini roused themselves; the people, according to old custom, pillaged Colonna’s house. Their mistake was lucky for themselves, as Thomas was a poor man, and they found little booty in his house afterwards. The election was a universal surprise. The Cardinal of Portugal, as he limped out of the conclave, when asked if the Cardinals had elected a Pope, answered, “No, God has chosen a Pope, not the Cardinals”.

Tommaso Parentucelli sprang from an obscure family at Sarzana, a little town not far from Spezia, in the diocese of Lucca. His father, Bartolommeo, physician in Pisa or Lucca, it is not certain which. At the age of seven he lost his father, and his mother soon afterwards married again; but she was careful to give her son a good education, and at the age of twelve sent him to school at Bologna. As he had to make his own way in the world, he went to Florence at the age of nineteen, and acted as private tutor to the sons, first of Rinaldo degli Albizzi, and afterwards of Palla Strozzi. By this means he saved in three years enough money to enable him to return to Bologna and continue his studies at the University, where he attracted the notice of the bishop of the city, Niccolò
Albergata, who took him into his service. For twenty years Parentucelli continued to be at the head of Albergata’s household; he looked upon the Cardinal as a second father, and served him with zeal. But he was a genuine student, and employed his leisure in theological reading. He became famous for his large and varied knowledge, his great powers of memory, and his readiness and quickness as a disputant. In Albergata’s service he accompanied his master on many embassies, and obtained an insight into the politics of Europe, while at the same time, by his own reputation for learning, he made acquaintance with the chief scholars of Italy. No one had a greater knowledge of books, and Cosimo de’ Medici consulted him about the formation of the library of S. Marco. The only luxury in which Parentucelli indulged was in books, for which he had a student’s love. He was careful to have fair manuscripts made for his own use, and was himself famous for his beautiful handwriting.

On the death of Albergata in 1443 Parentucelli entered the service of Cardinal Landriani, and after his death in the same year was employed by Eugenius IV, who soon made him Bishop of Bologna. But Bologna was in revolt against the Pope, and Parentucelli gained, such scanty revenues either from his see or from the bounty of Eugenius IV, that he was driven to borrow money from Cosimo de’ Medici to enable him to discharge his legation in Germany. Such was Cosimo’s friendship that he gave him a general letter of credit to all his correspondents. The embassy in Germany led to important results, and Eugenius IV recognized the merits of Parentucelli by making him Cardinal in December, 1446. He had only enjoyed his new dignity a few months before his elevation to the Papacy. His first act was a sign of gratitude to his early patron and friend. He took the pontifical title of Nicolas V in remembrance of Niccolò Albergata.

If the election of Nicolas V was not very gratifying to any political party, it was at least objectionable to none. The Colonna, the Orsini, Venice, the Duke of Milan, the King of France, the King of Naples, all had hoped for an election in their own special interest. All were disappointed; but at least they had the satisfaction of considering that their opponents had gained as little as themselves. No one could object to the new Pope. He was a man of high character and tried capacity. He had made himself friends everywhere by his learning, and had made no enemies by his politics. Alfonso of Naples sent four ambassadors to congratulate him and be present at his coronation. Aeneas Sylvius waited on him to receive a confirmation of the agreement which Eugenius IV had made with Germany. “I will not only confirm but execute it”, was the answer of Nicolas. “In my opinion the Roman Pontiffs have too greatly extended their authority, and left the other bishops no jurisdiction. It is a just judgment that the Council of Basel has in turn shortened too much the hands of the Holy See. We intend to strengthen the bishops, and hope to maintain our own power most surely by not usurping that of others”. These words of Nicolas V express the entire situation of ecclesiastical affairs. If his policy could only have been carried out, the future of the Church might still have been assured. In the same sense he spoke about secular matters to his old friend the Florentine bookseller, Vespasiano da Bisticci. Vespasiano presented himself at a public audience, and Nicolas bade him wait till he was done. Then he took him into a private room, and said with a smile, “Would the people of Florence have believed that the simple priest who rang the bell would one day become Pope to the confusion of the proud?”. Vespasiano answered that his elevation was due to his merits, and that he now might pacify Italy. “I pray God” said Nicolas, “that He will give me grace to carry out my intention, which is to pacify Italy, and to use in my pontificate no other arms than those which Christ has given me, that is, His Cross”.

The pacific character of the new Pope made him generally acceptable. After his coronation on March 18, embassies from the various Italian States flowed into Rome, and the dexterity and precision with which Nicolas answered their harangues increased the opinion which men already had of his capacity. He received the embassies in open consistory, so that those who wished to regale themselves with a banquet of eloquence might be fully satisfied. Already in Italy a cultivated taste had begun to attach great importance to the neat and decorous performance of formal duties. Cities were anxious to have in their service men whose speeches on public occasions could win applause by the elegance of their style; and scholars rose to the rank of State officials by the reputation which they gained from these public appearances. Under Eugenius IV the Papacy had not given much encouragement to this display of eloquence; but Nicolas V, himself a scholar and the friend of scholars, was willing to fall in with the prevalent taste. His public audiences were crowded with critics, and reputations were made or unmade in a morning. The complimentary harangue began to hold the same relation to the new culture of the Renaissance as had the scholastic disputation to the erudition of the Middle Ages. In this arena of eloquence Nicolas V himself could hold his own with the best, not so much by elegance of style as by the readiness with which he could aptly reply, on the spur of the moment, to an elaborately prepared speech. The very graces of the orator who had preceded him lent a foil to the readiness of the Pope. Thus the Florentine embassy was headed by the learned Gianozzo Manetti, who spoke for an hour and a quarter. The Pope, with his hand before his face, seemed to be asleep, and one of his attendants touched his arm to wake him. But when Gianozzo had finished, Nicolas took each of his points in order, and gave a suitable answer to them all. The audience knew not which to admire most, the grace of the orator or the aptness of the Pope. The cleverness of Nicolas V soon won for him the respect of those who at first looked with disfavor on the insignificant appearance of the successor of the majestic Eugenius IV. Nicolas V had no outward graces to commend him. He was little, with weak legs disproportionately small for his body; a face of ashen complexion brought into still greater prominence his black flashing eyes; his voice was loud and harsh; his mouth small, with heavily protruding lips.

Nicolas V, however, had more serious work in hand than the reception of ambassadors. His first care, naturally, was to secure the restoration of the German obedience. Aeneas Sylvius, who had acted as cross-bearer at the Pope's coronation on March 18, set out on March 30 to carry to Frederick III the confirmation by Nicolas V of the engagements of his predecessor. Aeneas advised the King to renew his declaration of obedience, and order all men to receive honorably the Pope's legates; so would he end the schism, conciliate the Pope, win back Hungary, and prepare the way for his coronation as Emperor. Aeneas himself soon received a mark of the Pope's favor in the shape of a nomination to the vacant bishopric of Trieste. As Aeneas found himself rising in the world, and his age advanced beyond the temptations of youthful passion, his objections to take Holy Orders had died away. In 1446 he resolved to live more cleanly, "to abandon", as he said, "Venus for Bacchus". He was ordained, and "loved nothing so much as the priesthood". Only through ecclesiastical preferment could he hope for any recognition of his services. While he was at Rome there came a report of the death of the Bishop of Trieste, and Eugenius IV was ready to appoint Aeneas to the vacant see. The Bishop of Trieste outlived Eugenius; but Nicolas V carried out his predecessor's intention, disregarding the fact that, by the compact between Eugenius and Frederick, Trieste was one of the bishoprics granted to the King's nomination. No difficulty, however, arose on this head, as Frederick III,
independently of the Pope, had nominated Aeneas. It is true that the Chapter of Trieste tried to assert their rights, but were at once set aside by the King and Pope, and Aeneas won his first decided step in the way of preferment.

As affairs stood in Germany, the King, the Archbishop of Mainz, and the Elector of Brandenburg were ready to acknowledge Nicolas V; the other Electors had not yet declared themselves. Wishing to make the best terms for themselves, they turned to the King of France, who held a congress at Bourges in June. Jacob of Trier went there in person; the other Electors sent representatives. England, Scotland, Burgundy, and Castile were all ready to follow the French King, who thus asserted in the affairs of the Church the authority which had previously belonged to the Emperor. The conclusions signed at Bourges on June 28 were a little in advance of those accepted by Frederick III. The King of France and the Electors were ready to acknowledge Nicolas V if he recognized the existing condition of ecclesiastical affairs, agreed to summon a Council on September 1, 1448, in some place to be determined by the French King, accepted the Constance decrees, and agreed to provide for his rival, Felix V. There was in this a pretense of standing upon the conciliar basis, and maintaining the cause of reform more definitely than Frederick III had done; but it was done by an alliance with the French King, the enemy of the German nation. It was the expression of anarchy and self-interest rather than any care for the national welfare; it was merely a means of making better terms than could be obtained by joining Frederick III. The Congress then moved from Bourges to Lyons, that it might more easily negotiate with Felix V the terms of his abdication.

Meanwhile Frederick III summoned an assembly of the princes who had joined his party at Aschaffenburg on July 12, 1447. The Archbishop of Mainz presided, and the assembly confirmed what had been done at Rome. Frederick III withdrew his safe-conduct from the Council of Basel, and ordered it to disperse; but no immediate heed was paid to his command. On August 21 he published in Vienna a general edict announcing his adhesion to the conclusion of the assembly at Aschaffenburg, and forbade, under the ban of the Empire, any adhesion to Felix V or the Council of Basel. The proclamation was celebrated by festivities in Vienna and by a solemn procession. But this display of joy was fictitious, and the University was only driven to take part in the procession under threat of deprivation of its revenues and benefices. The academic feeling remained till the last true to the conciliar cause.

But the Papal diplomacy steadily pursued its course. Aeneas Sylvius found himself, as Bishop of Trieste, occupied in the same way as when he held the inferior office of royal secretary. He was sent to Köln to win over the archbishop, and succeeded in the object of his mission. But at Köln he found himself regarded by the University as an apostate; the sneers which had elsewhere been spoken behind his back were there expressed before his face. Aeneas found it necessary to justify himself in a letter addressed to the rector of the University, and his apology is full of characteristic shrewdness. He went to Basel, he said, an unfledged nestling from Siena; there he heard nothing but abuse of Eugenius, and was too inexperienced to disbelieve what he heard. Dazzled by the eminence of the Council’s leaders, he followed in their track, and his vanity led him to write against Eugenius. But God had mercy on him, and he went to Frankfort as Saul had gone to Damascus. If even Augustine had written confessions, why should not he? At Frederick’s Court he first began to hear both sides, and gradually became neutral, till the arguments of Cesarini convinced him that he ought to leave the Council’s party. His chief reasons for doing so were:
1) The wrongful proceedings against the Pope, who was neither heretical, schismatic, nor a cause of scandal, and therefore ought not justly to be deposed;

2) the nullity of the Council, which had been translated by the Pope, did not represent the Universal Church, and was not supported by any nation in Europe except Savoy;

3) the Council did not trust the justice of its own cause; was faith only to be found at Basel, as Apollo gave oracles only at Delphi?—by refusing to go elsewhere the Council showed disbelief in itself.

Thus Aeneas justified himself, and the cause of Nicolas V progressed, as the Electors saw that they could gain something from the Pope. Jacob of Trier began to make terms for himself. Dietrich of Koln used Carvajal to mediate in a troublesome dispute between himself and the Duke of Cleves. The Pfalzgraf, though the son-in-law of Felix V, was content with exacting a few concessions from Frederick III, and sent his ambassador to Rome. The Elector of Saxony obtained corresponding favors from the King. On no side was there any real care for Church reform; it merely served as a cry under cover of which the Electors sought to promote their own power and their own interests. Early in 1448 the whole of Germany had entered the obedience of Nicolas V.

In accordance with the undertaking of Eugenius IV, a legate was sent to Germany to arrange for the liberties of the German Church in the future, and the no less important question of the provision to be made for the Pope out of its revenues. Cardinal Carvajal was wisely chosen for this purpose, and the Concordat at Vienna on February 16, 1448, was the work of himself and the King. It was not submitted to a Diet, though no doubt many representatives of the Electors and the princes were at Vienna. It would seem that the assembly of Aschaffenburg was dexterously turned into a Diet; and the Concordat, made in the name of the German nation, was regarded as being a necessary consequence of that assembly.

The Concordat of Vienna and the Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges represent the net result of the reforming movement at Basel, and in their form, as well as their contents, go back to the system pursued at the end of the Council of Constance. The strength of the reforming party was its cry for the redress of grievances which each national Church experienced from Papal interference. Its weakness lay in the fact that it had not sufficient statesmanship to devise a means of redressing these grievances without destroying the constitution of the Church under the Papal monarchy. The Council of Constance fell in pieces before the difficulties of this task, and produced merely a temporary agreement between the Papacy and the national Churches concerning a few matters of complaint. The Council of Basel, in its desire to abolish abuses, threatened to sweep away also the basis of the Papal monarchy, and so became engaged in an irreconcilable contest with the Papacy, in which it was not supported by the public opinion of Europe. In this state of things France used the opportunity to regulate by royal authority the relations of the Gallican Church to Rome. Germany, after a vain endeavor to arbitrate as neutral between the rival Popes, fell back upon the old method of a Concordat, and aimed merely at extending the basis which had been established at Constance. The Concordat of Constance was made provisionally for five years only; the Concordat of Vienna was meant, on the Papal side, to be permanent. It was, of course, true that Eugenius IV had agreed in February, 1447, that another Council should be assembled within ten months. A year passed, and nothing was done towards summoning a Council. The Concordat of Vienna confirmed all that Eugenius IV had granted, ‘so far
as they do not go against this present agreement; it made no mention of a Council, and the promise of Eugenius IV lapsed through non-fulfillment.

Thus Germany was contented to accept as the settlement of its grievances a private agreement between the King and the Pope. The question arranged by the Concordat of Vienna was the relations henceforth to exist between the Papacy and the German Church. It was little more than a repetition of the Concordat of Constance; but such alterations as were made were in favor of the Pope.

It dealt only with the grievances caused by Papal reservations and Papal interference with elections. It admitted the right of Papal reservation to benefices whose holders died at the Roman Court or within two days' journey from Rome, to vacancies caused by Papal deprivation or translation, to benefices vacated by the deaths of Cardinals or other officials of the Curia, to offices held by any promoted by the Pope to a bishopric, monastery, or other office incompatible with residence. Moreover, Papal provisions were allowed to benefices, excepting the higher offices in cathedrals and collegiate churches, such as might fall vacant in the months of January, March, May, July, September, and November. The Concordat of Constance had given to the Pope alternate benefices. The Concordat of Vienna gave him alternate months, and it is noticeable that by this arrangement the Pope secured 184 out of the 365 days of the year.

The Papal right of confirmation of other elections was retained as before. In case the elections were canonical, the Pope was to confirm them, unless from some reasonable and evident cause, and with the consent of the Cardinals, the Pope thought that provision should be made for some more useful and more worthy person. If the elections were found to be uncanonical, the Pope was to provide. The dues to the Curia, annates, first-fruits, and the rest, were to be paid in two portions within two years. If the rates were thought excessive, the Pope was willing to have a revaluation; also he was ready to take into account any special circumstances which affected at any time the revenues of the office so taxed. Benefices below the annual value of twenty-four florins were to be exempt.

The Papal restoration was complete. The German Church gained nothing. The only points which showed any care for its interests were provisions that the Papal reservation should be exercised only in favor of Germans, and that the Papal months should be accepted by the Ordinaries. These advantages were, however, seeming rather than real. If so much were secured by the Papacy, it would be difficult to prevent it from overstepping these slight barriers.

No mention was made in the Concordat of the Council of Basel or of its decrees. The reforming movement had been a political failure, and the fruits of its labors were swept away by the reaction. The Council had not succeeded in accomplishing any of its objects. It had not even impressed the Curia with a sense of the gravity of the crisis from which it had escaped. The restored Papacy was only bent on going back to its old lines, and showed no desire to lay the foundations of a gradual reform of the abuses which had exposed it to so grave a peril. The Concordat was signed at Vienna on February 18; it was confirmed at Rome on March 19, after careful investigation by learned canonists and eminent Cardinals, though the intervening time barely allowed it to be carried from one place to another.

The reason why Frederick III submitted to terms, which were so manifestly in the Pope's favor, was the need which he felt of maintaining his alliance with the Pope as the
only means of checking the electoral oligarchy, and preventing their further connection with France. He had no ground for opposing the Papal power of reservation. His private agreement with Eugenius IV allowed the Pope to confer upon him privileges which were founded on the Papal right of reservation. The assent of the Electors was gained by bribes of different kinds; the Archbishops were won over, like the King, by grants of some of the Papal reservations. The Pope bought back the obedience of Germany by granting to the existing representatives of the German Church and nation some of the privileges which were restored to the Papacy. As the existing generation died out everything would again revert to the Pope.

The conclusion of the Concordat of Vienna ended the dwindling existence of the Council of Basel. On May 18 Frederick III forbade the city of Basel, under threat of the ban of the Empire, to harbor the Council within its walls. The citizens found it necessary at last to yield, and on July 7 five hundred of them honorably escorted the remnants of the Council on their way to Lausanne, whither they transferred themselves under the protection of the French King. Charles VII undertook the task of bringing the schism to an end, and played the same part in ecclesiastical affairs as Sigismund had done in the previous generation. Felix V was weary of his shadowy dignity. The conciliatory temper of Nicolas V towards him and Charles VII made the ultimate settlement tolerably easy. The ambassadors of England and of René of Anjou took part in the work, and Charles VII obtained a promise from Nicolas V that a new Council should be held in the dominions of France. On April 7, 1449, Felix V laid aside his Papal office; but he did so in language that still asserted the principle which he had been elected to maintain: “In this holy synod of Lausanne, representing the Universal Church, we lay aside the dignity and possession of the Papacy, hoping that the kings, princes, and prelates, to whom we judge that this our communication will be acceptable, will aid the authority of General Councils, will defend and support it; and that the Universal Church, for whose dignity and authority we have fought, will by its prayers commend our humility to the chief and eternal Shepherd”.

Well may the Papal chronicler remark that there is not a sentence, scarcely a word, in this which does not merit censure. But Nicolas V was not obstinate, like his predecessor; provided he won the substantial point, he was not careful about words. He had saved the Papal dignity by committing the conduct of the negotiation to Charles VII; Felix V might have his say provided he abdicated peaceably. The Council was also allowed to save its dignity. On April 19 it elected Nicolas V as Pope, and on April 25 conferred by a decree on Amadeus the office of Cardinal, which Nicolas V had agreed to grant him, together with the first place next to the Pope, the position of General Vicar within the dominions that had recognized him, and the outward honors of the Papal rank. The Council then decreed its own dissolution, and its members dispersed. True to his conciliatory policy, Nicolas V restored D’Allemand to his office of Cardinal, and recognized three of the creations of Felix V. John of Segovia received from the Pope a little bishopric in Spain, where, hidden among the hills, he spent the rest of his days in Arabic studies, translated the Koran into Latin, and exposed its errors. D’Allemand retired to his see of Arles, where he was famous for his personal piety and good works, and after his death, September 16, 1450, it was said that miracles were wrought at his tomb. So great was his fame for sanctity that Clement VII in 1527 pronounced him worthy of the imitation of the faithful. Amadeus did not long survive him; he died on January 7, 1451, more useful to the Church by his death than by his life, says Aeneas
Sylvius, though most of his contemporaries are willing to forgive his previous misdeeds in remembrance of his renunciation.

Thus Nicolas V had the satisfaction of seeing the schism brought to an end, its last remnants swept away, and the Papacy restored to a supremacy which it had not enjoyed for nearly a century. In Italy also Nicolas V had the satisfaction of bringing back order into the Papal States. He soothed the rebellious spirit of the Romans by ordaining that only Romans should hold magistrates and benefices within the city, and that the imposts should be spent only for the good of the city. He soothed the barons by his mildness, and did away with the grievances of the Colonna by allowing them to rebuild Palestrina, on condition that it should not be fortified. The knowledge which he had gained as Bishop of Bologna showed him that that city could be won by a compromise. He was content that it should recognize the sovereignty of the Holy See and admit a Papal legate, with certain powers of interference; otherwise it might retain the rule of the Bentivogli and appoint its own magistrates. The luckiest event, however, for Nicolas V was the death, on August 13, 1447, of Filippo Maria Visconti, which left the affairs of Milan in confusion, and turned elsewhere the ambition of Francesco Sforza, who withdrew his forces from the March of Ancona, and left the Pope in undisputed possession.

Filippo Maria Visconti is a typical character of the last members of the princely families who had made themselves lords of the cities of Italy. He succeeded by caution, prudence, and treachery in gathering together the broad dominions of his father, Gian Galeazzo; but the strain which the effort involved seems to have paralyzed his faculties. He had studied so carefully the mode by which a principality was won, that he had learned with fatal accuracy the ease with which it might be lost. His energies were entirely devoted to the security of his own person, the suppression of possible rivals, the maintenance of his own position. Though engaged in many wars to avert possible danger from his own dominions, he never personally took the field, and secured himself against his generals by playing off one against another. Thus he held the balance between Sforza and Piccinino; when one seemed likely to become too powerful his rival was pitted against him. Filippo Maria was assiduous in his attention to public matters, and regulated by minute ordinances the internal affairs of his state. He lived a lonely life in the castle of Milan and his country houses, to which he had canals constructed to convey him more secretly. He had no one around him whose character he had not tried by exposing them to temptations, while they did not suspect that he was watching. Access to him was difficult, and was only permitted after innumerable precautions. He was surrounded by spies, who were employed in checking one another. So afraid was he of assassination that he changed his bedroom two or three times in the night, and was never without a physician, whose advice he sought respecting the cause of every bodily sensation which he experienced. Yet he was a man of learning, and was especially interested in the heroes of past times and in the French romances of chivalry. He was careful in performing all religious offices, and never did anything without secret prayer. Even when he left his chamber and looked upon the sun, he uncovered his head and gave God thanks. Yet he was full of superstitions, consulted astrologers, and was terrified at a thunderstorm. He had such a horror of death that he would have no one ill within his palace, nor would he allow the death of any one to be mentioned in his presence. Yet when his own death drew nigh he faced it with fortitude, and even hastened its approach by ordering his physician to open an old wound in his leg. His aim in life was simply to live in quietness and security, and his tortuous policy in Italy
had no other object. He had a cynical contempt for mankind, and pursued none but purely selfish ends; yet he was neither cruel nor vicious, and possessed philosophic gravity and decorum.

If Filippo Maria Visconti had succeeded during his lifetime in maintaining order in his dominions, he produced confusion by his death. His only child was an illegitimate daughter, Bianca, whose hand had been for the bait which kept Francesco Sforza true to her father's service, till he at last succeeded in extorting a fulfillment of the promise so long delayed. The rule of the Visconti was not a recognized monarchy; and no rights of succession could pass through an illegitimate daughter. Yet Sforza aspired to the Duchy of Milan, and his claim rested on grounds as good as those of the other claimants. Alfonso of Naples asserted that Filippo Maria had named him as his successor by will; but the lordship of Milan was but the chief magistracy of the city, and could not pass by bequest. The Duke of Orleans, by his marriage with Valentina, sister of Filippo Maria, claimed to represent the Visconti house; but this was to regard Milan as a fief which passed through the female line. Finally, Frederick III claimed that on the extinction of the Visconti house Milan, as an Imperial fief, reverted to the Emperor; but this disregarded the fact that Milan, though nominally subject to the Empire, had been a free city for centuries before the Visconti made themselves its lords. The Milanese on their part did not consider themselves as belonging to any of these claimants. They had submitted to the rule of the great Visconti family, which had been closely connected with the past glories of their city. When that family came to an end they decided to go back to their position of an independent republic, and other cities in the dominions of the Visconti followed their example.

The new republics would clearly have enough to do to hold their own against these numerous claimants; but Venice, always jealous of its neighbors, saw in the difficulties of Milan its own opportunity. Engaged in war with Venice, Milan was driven to take into its service Francesco Sforza, who, with consummate sagacity, used the opportunity so offered. He raised up in Milan a party favorable to himself; he won back towns from the Venetians, and garrisoned them with his own soldiers. He defeated Venice so that she was driven to sue for peace; then he suddenly changed sides, allied himself with the Venetians and advanced against Milan, which was unsuspecting and unprepared for a siege. In vain Venice, when it was too late, saw her mistake, made peace with Milan, and dispatched an army against Sforza. Sforza, though suffering from famine almost as much as Milan, persisted in his blockade, and kept the Venetian troops at bay till the Milanese, in desperation, could endure no longer. Then, gathering all the food he could, he entered Milan, February 26, 1450, as the savior, rather than the conqueror, of the people. He arranged that supplies should rapidly be brought into the city, and managed to present himself to the people as their benefactor. Admiration of his cleverness and prudence overcame all resentment of his treachery. His first measures were wise and conciliatory, and promised good government for the future. The Milanese soon admitted that one who could plot so skillfully was likely to rule with success. The condottiere general, the son of the peasant of Cotignola, took his place amongst the princes of Europe.

Nicolas V was glad to see peace again restored in North Italy, and a power established which was strong enough to keep in check the ambition of Venice. He took no part in the operations of the war. His pursuits were those of peace. He was busy in organizing the Papal finances, and showed his gratitude for past favors to Cosimo de' Medici by making him his banker, a step which benefited the Papal treasury, and at the
same time increased the prestige and credit of the great banking-house of the Medici. Otherwise Nicolas was employed in planning the restoration of the buildings of Rome, and in increasing the treasures of the Vatican Library. His object was to make Rome once more a fit residence for the Papacy, to restore its former splendor, and make it the literary and artistic capital of Europe. In 1450 Nicolas V proclaimed a year of Jubilee. The schism was at an end, and since the first jubilee of Boniface VIII there had not been in Rome an undisputed Pope to lend solemnity to the pilgrimage. Italy was peaceful, and access to Rome was free. Crowds of pilgrims from every land flocked to Rome, to the number of 40,000 in one day. So great was the crowd returning one evening from S. Peter's that more than 200 persons were killed in the crush upon the bridge of S. Angelo, or were pushed into the water. Nicolas took care to prevent such an accident in the future by pulling down the houses which narrowed the approach to the bridge, and built a memorial chapel of marble to commemorate the calamity.

The arrangements for supplying food to this great multitude and for keeping order were excellent, and testified to the Pope's administrative skill. The offerings that flowed into the Papal treasury were large, and gave Nicolas V the means of carrying out still more splendidly his magnificent schemes of restoring the City of Rome—for which a new festival was in store, in the shape of an Imperial coronation. The peaceful settlement of North Italy promised Frederick III an easy access to Rome, which he could never have won by his own arms. He was now thirty-five years old, and bethought himself of marriage, which he had never contemplated since the offer which Felix V made him of his daughter. He sent two ambassadors to report on the ladies of royal birth who were eligible as wife of the King of the Romans, and finally fixed on Leonora, daughter of the King of Portugal and niece of Alfonso of Naples. Aeneas Sylvius was sent to Naples to negotiate the marriage; and on his way thither received the news that Nicolas V had conferred on him the bishopric of his native city of Siena. His business in Naples was successfully accomplished. Leonora, only fourteen years old, had other suitors, but she preferred Frederick III, for she rejoiced to be called Empress. “For the title of Emperor”, says Aeneas, “was held in more esteem abroad than at home”. It was agreed that Frederick should meet his bride at some port in Italy, whence they should proceed to Rome for the coronation.

When this had been arranged, Aeneas visited Rome at the end of 1450, and had an opportunity of conferring another service on the Pope. There was one shadow which still hung over Nicolas V—the shadow of a future Council, which he had promised to the French King. French ambassadors were at Rome urging the fulfillment of the promise, and Aeneas supplied the Pope with a means of shelving the matter. Nicolas V had promised to hold a Council in France, if the other princes of Europe were willing. Aeneas, in a speech before the Pope and Cardinals, announced the betrothal of Frederick and his approaching coronation. He then went on to demand, in Frederick's name, a Council in Germany, as being the fittest land for such a purpose. Nicolas V could answer the French ambassadors that the princes of Europe were not unanimous in consenting to a Council in France. Again the cleverness of Aeneas was found useful, and the unwelcome Council was dismissed for the present.

Aeneas also suggested to the Pope that it would be well if Germany felt the influence of the religious spirit of Italy. In the manifold productiveness of the fifteenth century in Italy, the fervor of religious feeling had found some noble exponents. Chief of these was Bernardino, born in 1380 of a good family in Siena. He gave to the poor his patrimony and entered the Franciscan Order. Bernardino was filled with an
enthusiasm for moral reform, and strove to bring back the Franciscan Order to original purity. He followed the example of its great founder, and, like Francis, went barefoot throughout Italy, preaching to the crowds who in every city thronged to hear him. Wherever he went he awakened the fervor of devotion, which at all times can be kindled among the masses into a transient flame. Aeneas Sylvius, in his youth, was almost stirred to become a friar by Bernardino's eloquence, though his after-life does not show that the impression lasted long. The Emperor Sigismund, during his stay at Siena, delighted to listen to Bernardino's preaching, though he made little effort to give it any practical result. Bernardino preached the gospel “of Christ and Him crucified”. He attracted the attention of the crowd by displaying a wooden tablet emblazoned with the name of Jesus in letters of gold, and with loud cries and exhortations set it before them for worship. His success raised many enemies, who besought the Pope to silence the unseemly fanatic. But the Papacy was wise enough to countenance every religious movement that was not hostile to itself. Bernardino’s teaching was examined and approved by Martin V and Eugenius IV. The popular devotion found his sanctity attested by miracles. Even Aeneas Sylvius saw him dispel by his prayers a storm that threatened to disturb his congregation. He died in 1444, and such was his reputation for holiness that he was canonized by Nicolas V during the year of jubilee.

Bernardino is said to have established by his exertions more than five hundred Franciscan monasteries in Italy. He had many followers, chief amongst whom was Giovanni of Capistrano, a village near Aquila. On him Bernardino’s mantle fell, and at the suggestion of Aeneas Sylvius he was sent by the Pope to evangelize Germany, and secure its allegiance to Rome. Great was the success of Capistrano in Vienna. From twenty to thirty thousand thronged daily to hear the preaching of the holy friar, though he spoke in Latin, and his words had to be translated into German by an interpreter. They revered him as though he were an Apostle, thronged round him to touch the hem of his garments, and brought their sick in multitudes that he might lay his hands upon them.

Capistrano’s mission had, however, another object than merely to preach to the people of Vienna and reform Franciscan houses. It was hoped that his prestige would have some influence on Bohemia, which had not ceased to be a trouble to the Papacy. It is true that the Catholic reaction had made huge strides under Sigismund, and great things were hoped from Albert II. But Albert’s death left Bohemia with an infant king, and the national feeling against German interference revived during the minority. Rokycana returned to Prague and resumed his office as archbishop. The nation that had raised heroes like Zizka and Procopius the Great found in George Podiebrad a leader who had the wisdom to unite the nobles into a patriotic league, and pursue a policy of moderation to all parties in Church and State alike. The religious question in Bohemia was left more vague than ever by the dissolution of the Council of Basel. Nothing had been said about the Compacts in the final agreement between the Pope and the Council. The Compacts themselves had never received Papal ratification. It suited Nicolas V to leave the matter open, behave with moderation, and neither accept nor repudiate the Compacts, but wait till an opportunity offered for ending the exceptional position which Bohemia still claimed for itself. Meanwhile, Capistrano tried the effects of his eloquence, Cusa of his learning, and Aeneas Sylvius of his cleverness.

Besides the religious object of winning back the Hussites from their heresy, there was also the political motive of strengthening in Bohemia the party of Frederick III, and allowing him to proceed at leisure with his Italian journey. The Bohemians murmured
against Frederick’s guardianship of Ladislas, and demanded that their king should be
given up to their own care. Frederick did not dare to leave his kingdom till he had taken
some steps to secure quietness in Bohemia. Aeneas Sylvius was sent as the head of a
royal embassy to a Bohemian Diet, and we have a vivid picture drawn by his pen. He
and his companions passed through Tabor, where they were hospitably received. As he
entered the city gate he saw on either side of the archway a shield: one bore the Hussite
symbol of an angel holding the cup, the other a picture of the blind general Zizka.
Aeneas found that the old spirit still survived amid the rude dwellers in the mountain
fastness. He was struck with holy horror at their disregard for ecclesiastical traditions.
He had expected to find them orthodox except in the matter of the Communion under
both kinds; he found them an entirely heretical and rebellious people. He left Tabor with
the feelings of one who had escaped from the companionship of the ungodly, and
advanced towards Prague. But the city was stricken by the plague, and the Diet
adjourned to Beneschau, where Aeneas discharged his mission. He besought the Diet to
await peacefully the return of Frederick III from Rome; Ladislas was yet too young to
rule. The Diet was not contented with this vague assurance, and the rhetoric of Aeneas
could not convince them. But Aeneas had better success in arranging matters with
George Podiebrad, the Governor of Bohemia, whom he judged to be ambitious rather
than misguided. He conferred with him about the religious troubles in Bohemia; each
complained that the Compacts were not observed. Podiebrad demanded the recognition
of Rokycana as archbishop; Aeneas asserted that it was a breach of ecclesiastical order
to compel the Pope to recognize as archbishop any one whom he deemed unfit. No
result came from the argument; but Aeneas was satisfied that he had gauged
Podiebrad’s character and found him to be a harmless man who could be easily
managed. On his return Aeneas again passed through Tabor, and on this occasion the
Bishop Niklas of Pilgram, with an attendant crowd of priests and scholars, came ready
for a disputation with one who had a fame for learning. They were all well versed in
Latin, and Aeneas owns that the one good point about this perfidious race was its love
for literature. The discussion was like most theological discussions—each side showed
much learning and readiness.

The Taborites urged the scriptural nature of their doctrine; Aeneas pleaded the
authority of the Church, and of the Pope, its earthly head. Yet Aeneas managed to
extract some humor out of the discussion. "Why do you extol to us the Apostolic See?"
said one of the disputants. “We know the Pope and his Cardinals to be slaves of avarice
and gluttony, whose god is their belly, and whose heaven is money”. The speaker was a
round fat man. Aeneas gently laid his hand upon his stomach, “Is this”, said he, “the
result of fasting and abstinence?”. There was a general laugh, and Aeneas withdrew
from the dispute. Not till he reached the Catholic city of Budweis did he breathe freely,
and feel as if he had emerged from the infernal regions to the light of heaven. If Aeneas
had not converted the Bohemian heretics, nor convinced the Bohemian Diet, he, at least,
obtained so much that Frederick III recognized Podiebrad as Governor of Bohemia, and
so procured peace with that realm during his Roman journey.

No sooner had Aeneas returned to Vienna than he was again sent off to Italy to
arrange for Frederick’s coming, and receive his intended bride on her landing. Frederick
prepared for his departure, and appointed regents during his absence. But when it was
known that he intended to take with him the young Ladislas, the discontent of the
barons of Austria broke out in revolt. Headed by Ulrich Eizinger, they formed a League,
and demanded that Ladislas, their rightful king, should be given up to them. When
Frederick refused, the League renounced allegiance to him, and took the government into its hands. Frederick’s position was ignominious: he had no forces to send against them, and judged it better to leave Austria in revolt, and proceed with his Italian expedition. He spent Christmas at S. Veit in Carinthia, and on the last day of December, 1451, he entered Italian ground.

Even in the person of the feeble Frederick III the glamour of the Imperial title retained some power. When it was known that he was actually coming to Italy, a certain amount of trepidation prevailed in the Italian cities. So evenly balanced was their constitutional mechanism that the slightest touch might incline it one way or another. Even Siena looked with suspicion on its bishop, Aeneas Sylvius, lest he might use his influence with Frederick to seize the lordship of his native town. Much as Nicolas V had desired an Imperial coronation at Rome, to give occasion for another festival, as well as to mark the close alliance between the Empire and the Papacy, he began to listen to the alarming hints which were poured into his ears. Frederick might plot against the peace of the Roman city; allied by his marriage with Alfonso of Naples, he might threaten the wealth of the Pope and Cardinals. If we are to believe Aeneas Sylvius, it needed all his cleverness to reassure the Pope.

Frederick advanced from Treviso through the Venetian territory. He did not think it wise, as Milan was in the hands of a usurper of the Imperial rights, to go to Milan to receive the iron crown of Lombardy. He was met near the Po by Borso, Marquis of Este, who received him on bended knees and escorted him to Ferrara. There Lodovico Gonzaga of Mantua came to welcome him, and Sforza's young son, Galeazzo Maria, brought a condescending invitation to Milan. From Ferrara Frederick journeyed to Bologna, where he was greeted by Cardinal Bessarion, the Papal legate. Thence he passed into Florence and saw with wonder the splendor of the city. Frederick was accompanied by his ward Ladislas, a boy of twelve, his brother Albert and a few bishops and smaller princes, with about 2000 horsemen. His advent in Italy had no political significance, but was merely an antiquarian pageant.

On February 2 came the news that Leonora, with her convoy had arrived at Livorno. Aeneas Sylvius was sent to meet her; but the punctilious ambassador of Portugal refused to give up his precious charge except to the Emperor himself. Aeneas, on his side, asserted the dignity of his mission. For fifteen days they wrangled, till the matter was submitted to Leonora, who professed herself obedient to the commands of her future lord. She was escorted, on February 24, to Siena, where Frederick was anxiously awaiting her. The Sieneese marked by a stone pillar the exact spot where the Emperor first embraced his bride. The elegant festivities of the Sieneese charmed Frederick as much as their scanty contribution of money displeased him. On March 1 he passed on to Viterbo, where some unruly spirits showed their contempt for dignities by trying to catch with hooks the baldachin held over the Emperor that they might make booty of the rich stuff; then growing bolder, they made a rush for the trappings of Frederick's horse. "We must repel force by force", he cried, and, seizing a lance from an attendant, he charged the mob. This was the beginning of an unseemly brawl, in the midst of which Frederick entered his lodging.

On March 8 the King and his attendants came in sight of Rome. Frederick turned to Aeneas, and said prophetically, "We are going to Rome—I seem to see you Cardinal and future Pope". The Cardinals and nobles of Rome advanced to welcome Frederick, who, according to custom, passed the night outside the walls. Nicolas V was still
perturbed at the thoughts of his coming. Aeneas went on before to assure him of the King’s goodwill. “I prefer the error of suspicion rather than of over-confidence” was the Pope’s answer. Next day Frederick and Leonora entered Rome with pomp, and were escorted to S. Peter’s, where the Pope awaited them in the porch seated in his chair. Frederick knelt and kissed the Pope’s foot; then Nicolas rose, offered him his hand to kiss, and kissed his cheek. The King presented a massive piece of gold, took the accustomed oath of fidelity, and was led by the Pope into the church. Never before had there been such friendly greeting between Pope and Emperor.

Nicolas V proposed to defer the coronation till March 19, as being the anniversary of his own coronation as Pope. Frederick acceded to the Pope’s wish; but he did not care, meanwhile, to remain indoors at the Vatican, and scandalized the Romans by rambling about the city before his coronation, which was contrary to usage. He was greatly impressed by the old buildings of Rome, as well as by the restorations on which Nicolas V was engaged. The Pope and the King conferred freely within the Vatican, and their alliance was confirmed by their mutual needs. Frederick wished the Pope to support him against the rebellious Austrians, and compel them to submit to his authority as guardian of the young Ladislas. Nicolas urged Frederick to use material weapons to bring into subjection a perfidious race which had favored the conciliar movement, and was yet far from showing a proper obedience to the Papal commands. The league between Pope and Emperor was strengthened by these conferences, and Frederick besought the Pope to give an additional proof of his favor by conferring on him in Rome the crown of Lombardy, which he had not been able to receive at Monza. In spite of the protest of the Milanese ambassadors, Nicolas V, on March 16, performed this unprecedented act, and crowned Frederick King of the Romans, with the crown of Aachen, which had been brought for the purpose. On the same day the marriage of Frederick and Leonora was performed by the Pope. It was noticed that Ladislas had a place assigned him below most of the Cardinals, and some of the Cardinals had precedence over Frederick, who as yet only ranked as the German King.

At length, on March 19, the Imperial coronation was performed with due pomp and ceremony. Frederick first took the oath of obedience to the Pope, was made a canon of S. Peter’s, and, with Leonora, received the unction at the hands of the Vice-Chancellor. The Pope said mass, and then placed in the Emperor's hands the golden sword, the apple, and the scepter, and on his head the crown. To make the ceremony more imposing, Frederick had fetched from Nurnberg the Imperial insignia of Charles the Great. Their venerable antiquity did not match the magnificent clothing of Frederick, and suggested the thought that his predecessor paid more attention to his actions than to his ornaments. The keen eye of Aeneas Sylvius detected on the sword-blade the outlines of the Lion of Bohemia, which showed him that these insignia dated only from the times of Charles IV. This spurious affectation of antiquity was an apt symbol of the Imperial claims and of the decrepitude of the Empire. It had grown in outward display in proportion as it had lost in real power. The Empire was but a reminiscence of the past; the Emperor was useful only as a figure in the pageant.

When the coronation was over, the Pope and the Emperor walked hand in hand to the door of S. Peter’s. The Pope mounted his horse, and the Emperor held the reins for a few paces. Then he too mounted his steed, and Pope and Emperor rode together as far as the Church of S. Maria in Cosmedin. Nicolas then returned to the Vatican, and Frederick, according to ancient custom, dubbed knights on the Bridge of S. Angelo. More than three hundred received this distinction, many of them men of little worth,
who excited the mockery even of Aeneas Sylvius. A splendid dinner at the Lateran brought the day's festivities to an end.

When this important matter had been happily accomplished the Pope issued a series of Bulls in Frederick’s favor. Some of the privileges so conferred were personal. He and a hundred persons, whom he might choose, were empowered to select their own confessor. He might have divine service performed for his benefit in a place which lay under an interdict; he might carry about with him an altar, at which a priest might say mass at any time; he and his guests might indulge in milk and eggs during times of fasting. Other rights of more importance were also conferred on Frederick, which tended to increase his power over the possessions of the Church in his own dominions. In case of need he might employ the services of unbelievers to help him in war; a provision which no doubt was meant to authorize him to use the troops of Bohemia against his Austrian subjects. To dower his daughters or for other grave necessities he might impose moderate taxes according to ancient custom on the clergy of Austria. He was empowered to imprison and confiscate the goods of all spiritual persons who had joined the rebellion against his wardship of Ladislas. He might exercise the right of visitation over all the monasteries of Austria. He received a grant of a tenth from all the clerical revenues in the Empire—a grant without precedent, as no reason of an ecclesiastical character was alleged as a colorable pretext. The Pope and the Emperor were bent upon pushing to the furthest point their victory over the party of reform. The German Church was helpless before them, and they saw no reason for sparing it.

All these advantages were prospective; but Frederick made money out of his coronation by selling at once patents of nobility. Titles of Imperial Count and Doctor were sold for moderate prices. The open and shameless greed of Frederick awoke the laughter of the wits of Rome.

From Rome Frederick III went to Naples at Alfonso's request. He was received with much magnificence; the roads were strewn with fragrant flowers, and troops of boys and girls with graceful dance and song welcomed the Emperor and his bride. Alfonso promised to help Frederick to recover Milan; but Frederick's character was not warlike, and the fulfillment of the promise was little likely to be required. During Frederick's visit to Naples Aeneas Sylvius stayed at Rome to keep watch over Ladislas. He was startled by a summons, in the dead of night, to visit the Pope, who had received intelligence of a plot to carry off Ladislas. Precautions were at once taken; so suspicious was the Pope even of the Cardinals that he forbade them to invite Ladislas to hunting parties outside the city walls; Frederick on his return found Ladislas still safe. He stayed three days in Rome, and in a public consistory thanked the Pope for his magnificent reception. Aeneas Sylvius delivered a speech in favor of a crusade against the Turks, and was pleased to think that his eloquence drew tears from his audience. On April 26 Frederick left Rome;

Frederick III returned through Siena to Florence, where he received a letter from the combined Austrians, Hungarians, and Moravians threatening him with war unless he gave up Ladislas. Their deputies made a scheme for the escape of Ladislas, and tried to enlist the Florentines on their side; but again the plan was discovered in good time. In Florence Frederick assumed the character of a mediator in Italian affairs. As matters stood, Florence and Sforza were banded together against Naples and Venice, while the Pope was neutral. Frederick urged on the Florentines peace and goodwill towards Alfonso, and received an assurance of their peaceable intentions. To Florence also came
an ambassador from Sforza, asking Frederick to invest him with the Duchy of Milan. Frederick did not refuse, but demanded a yearly tribute or the surrender of a part of the Milanese territory. Sforza, who had won his dominions by his sword, was not prepared to barter any part of them for a title, and the negotiations failed for the time.

At Ferrara, Frederick hoped to appear as arbiter of Italian affairs. Ambassadors from Florence, Venice, and Milan awaited him; but those of Naples tarried, and the scheme of a Congress came to nothing. The only display of his power which Frederick could make was the creation of Modena and Reggio into a duchy, and the investiture therewith of Borso of Este. On May 21 Frederick entered Venice, and again tried to interpose his good offices to mediate peace between Milan and the republic. “We know that we speak with the Emperor”, was the answer of the doge Foscarì, “and therefore we stated our intentions at first; our answer, once given, cannot be changed”. Frederick was reminded of his powerlessness in Italy. He showed his true character to the Venetians by wandering about privately in ordinary attire to the shops, that he might make better bargains for the articles of luxury which Venice temptingly displayed to the needy German. On June 2 he left Venice. His pleasant journey in Italy was at an end, and he had to prepare to face his rebellious people, whom he had so lightly left to their own devices.

The Roman journey of Frederick was indeed sufficiently ignoble. “Other emperors”, says a German chronicler, “won their crown by arms; Sigismund and Frederick seemed to have begged it”. “He had neither sense nor wisdom”, says the gentle Archbishop of Florence, “but all men saw the greed with which he looked for presents, and the joy with which he received them”. Poggio judged him to be only a doll of an emperor, before whom it was useless to make a speech, as he would neither understand it nor pay for it. Frederick was looked upon as a mere figure in an antiquated ceremony, and his personal qualities were not such as to win any respect from the cultivated Italians. The sole result of his expedition was to show clearly the selfish nature of the alliance between Pope and Emperor. Nicolas V was bent only on identifying the Papacy with the glories of Italian culture, and asserting Italian supremacy over the ruder peoples of Germany. Frederick III had no higher object than to extend his power over his ancestral dominions, and retain his influence over the kingdoms of Ladislas. The clear vision of real statesmanship was wanting to both. The danger from the Turkish inroads was a real question on which Europe might have been united. Union, however, is only possible under trustworthy leaders. The restored Papacy had done nothing to redress the grievances of which Germany complained; the Emperor, who trusted to the Pope’s help to maintain his position in Germany, was no fitting exponent of the national feeling.

When Frederick returned he found Austria under Eizinger, Hungary under Hunyadi, even Bohemia under Podiebrad, and the chief nobles of Moravia banded together against him. They demanded that their king, Ladislas, should be admitted to reign over his ancestral kingdoms; but this was only a demand for their own freedom from Frederick's control. No sooner had Frederick left Rome than an embassy from his rebellious subjects appeared to plead their cause before the Pope. The answer of Nicolas was that they must obey the Emperor. They requested that the excommunication, which had been threatened against their disobedience, should be withdrawn. “This is a temporal, not a spiritual matter”, said one of them; “it is not in your province”. Nicolas angrily answered that all causes were subject to the judgment of the Apostolic See; the Austrians must either obey, or they would be excommunicated. The envoys hastily left
Rome, and scarcely thought themselves safe till they were out of Italy. They brought back news that the Pope was altogether on Frederick’s side, and was opposed to the national cause. On April 4 Nicolas issued a threat of excommunication against Eizinger and his followers, and wrote to Hunyadi and Podiebrad, charging them to give the Austrians no help.

Frederick III, at the end of June, boldly entered Neustadt, and tried to gather around him his partisans. He trusted to the effects of the Pope's letter, which he sent for publication on all sides. But the Bishop of Salzburg would not allow it to be published; the Canons of Passau mocked at it; the Viennese threw the bearer of it into prison, and the theologians of the University drew up a formal protest, in which they appealed from an ill-instructed Pope to one better instructed, or to a General Council. They asserted that Nicolas V had usurped the place of Felix V, and professed themselves ready to join with the French to procure a future Council.

Frederick III was soon besieged in Neustadt, and had no stomach for the fight. When he saw that his adversaries paid no heed to the Pope, he turned to more pacific counsels. Aeneas Sylvius plausibly urged that, after all, Ladislas could not be kept in wardship for ever. Frederick was driven to hold a conference with Eizinger on September 2, and submit to conditions which the Markgraf of Baden and the bishops negotiated. He agreed to hand over Ladislas to the Count of Cilly, on condition that the Austrian troops were withdrawn; the other matters in dispute were to be decided in a Diet to be held at Vienna. On September 4 Ladislas was given up to the Count of Cilly, who, in spite of the previous understanding that nothing was to be done till the meeting of the Diet, took the youth to Vienna, where he was received with triumph. The Bohemians negotiated with him that, before acknowledging him for their king, he should ratify the Compacts and accept the nomination of Rokycana as archbishop.

The Diet was fixed for November 12, but it was not till Diet of Christmas that Frederick sent his three envoys, headed by Aeneas Sylvius. At Vienna were the Dukes Lewis and Otto of Bavaria, William of Saxony, Albert of Austria, Charles of Baden, and Albert of Brandenburg, with representatives of other princes, and deputies from Hungary, Bohemia, and Moravia. Albert of Brandenburg insisted that a dispute between himself and the city of Nurnberg, which had been long pending, should first be settled. He refused to accept any decision but the Emperor’s, and drew the princes after him to Neustadt. The Diet seemed likely to break up at once, as the Imperial envoys were driven to follow Albert. In vain Frederick endeavored to put off the decision: Albert was violent, and would not be refused. While Frederick was taking counsel with Cusa, the Pope’s legate, Aeneas, and the Bishop of Eichstadt, Albert burst into the room, and rated Aeneas and the rest, exclaiming loudly that he cared neither for Emperor nor Pope, Aeneas sadly remarks that princes, being brought up amongst their inferiors, rarely know how to behave towards their equals, but lose their temper and behave with violence. The Emperor was driven to hear the case. Gregory Heimburg, on behalf of the citizens of Nurnberg, spoke with warmth and justice of the wrong that would be done, if princes closely allied with Albert sat to judge a cause in which he was a party. The Emperor was in a sore strait. He did not wish to alienate the cities by assenting to a notoriously partial judgment against Nurnberg; but he was powerless to withstand Albert and his confederates. He bade one of his counselors collect the opinions of the princes; Albert took him by the coat and thrust him to the door, saying, “Are you a prince, that you mix with princes?”. Frederick did not even venture to raise his voice against this act of insolence. Still the pleading of Heimburg seems to have produced
some impression, and Aeneas managed to have the final decision of the case deferred to inquire into a technical point which Heimburg had raised. Albert was left in possession of the castles which he had seized, and the Emperor was spared the shame which would otherwise have fallen upon him.

This preliminary scene gave the Imperial envoys no hopes of any help from the German princes in the proceedings of the Diet at Vienna. The Austrians, who felt that they were masters of the situation as against the feeble Emperor, did not much wish for any settlement of the matters in dispute. They urged that the time fixed for the Diet was now past, and that their agreement had consequently lapsed. They raised every kind of difficulty, and negotiations proceeded slowly. In the course of these proceedings Aeneas Sylvius delivered his most effective speech Against the Austrians, in which he defended the conduct of the Emperor in his wardship of Ladislas, justified the interference of the Pope, and defended the Papal power against the attacks of the Viennese University.

“The Austrians”, he said, “exclaim with haughty mien, What have we to do with the Pope? Let him say his masses, we will handle arms; if he lays his commands on us we will appeal”. The Waldensian heretics, the Saracens themselves, could not say more. He proceeded to examine the grounds of an appeal to a future Council. The decrees of Constance recognize, as questions to be submitted to a Council, the case as of heresy, schism, or grievous scandal caused by the Pope to the Universal Church; such grievous scandal meant some change made by a Pope in ecclesiastical usage, such as allowing priests to marry, pronouncing judgment of death, or alteration of ritual against the wish of the community of the faithful, Aeneas had forgotten much that he had urged at Basel; he had nothing to say against simony, oppression of the Church, or refusal to accept the conciliar principle. He scoffed at the Councils of Constance and Basel—they were tumultuous and disorderly. “I saw at Basel cooks and grooms sitting side by side with bishops. Who would give their doings the force of law?”—“But the Austrians appeal from an uninstructed to an instructed Pope. What a wonderful thing is wisdom! What a splendid procedure they suggest! The person of the Pope is divided into him from whom an appeal is made and him to whom it is made! Such a scheme might suit Plato's ideal State, but could be found nowhere else. They add to this an appeal to a future Council, which, they say, is due according to the Constance decrees within ten years of the dissolution of that of Basel. I am afraid it will be twenty or a hundred years before a Council is held; since its summons depends on the judgment of the Pope as to its opportuneness. If they expect one from the Savoyards (so he calls the party of Basel), it is absurd for them to talk of Councils every ten years, when the last sat for nearly twenty. Would that the times were favorable to a Council, as the Pope wishes; it would soon dispel the folly of these dreams. But they appeal to the Universal Church, i.e., the congregation of all faithful people, high and low, men and women, clergy and lay. In early days, when the believers were few, such an assembly was possible; now it is impossible that it should come together, or appoint a judge to settle any cause. It were as wise to appeal to the judgment of the Last Great Day”.

The arguments of Aeneas represent the position of the restored Papacy; and it cannot be denied that the scorn of Aeneas was rightly exercised upon the unwieldy mechanism of the conciliar system, whose logical claims could scarcely be put fittingly into action. For his immediate purpose, the speech of Aeneas produced no result. The princes sided with the Austrians in refusing to open for discussion the general question of their relations to Frederick. The only points that the Diet would consider were those referring to details. It was taken for granted that Frederick’s wardship had actually come
to an end. The question for decision was the claims that arose in consequence. Frederick had to submit his accounts, and the points which the princes were prepared to settle were, how much he had spent, and how much was due. Austrian castles had been pledged by the Emperor: who was to be held responsible for redeeming them? There was much discussion, but at last the princes agreed on what they considered fair conditions. The Imperial envoys refused to accept them; whereon the princes again went to Frederick at Neustadt. Albert of Brandenburg told the Emperor that he would get nothing more: he must accept these conditions or prepare for war. The princes then departed and left Frederick to his fate. Frederick was obliged to give way; even then the conditions were not signed by his opponents, as the Count of Cilly, who was now master of Ladislas, preferred to keep the matter open.

Thus Frederick’s league with the Pope had not been able to save him from the direst humiliation. At the beginning of April, 1453, the Emperor, who had been received with such pomp in Rome, was left master only of his own land of Carinthia and Styria. His influence over Austria, Bohemia, Hungary, and Moravia was gone, and he was powerless in Germany. The Papacy, having allied itself with the Empire, shared its humiliation. The threat of excommunication had been openly defied, and Ladislas was willing to negotiate with the French King for the summons of a Council. At Frederick's request the Pope recalled his admonition to the Austrians. Germany had not been subdued by the first exercise which the Pope made of his newly-restored power.
CHAPTER III.
NICOLAS V AND THE FALL OF CONSTANTINOPLE
1453-1455.

If Nicolas V was humiliated at Vienna, he was about the same time profoundly afflicted by occurrences at Rome. He was sincere in his wish to promote peace in Italy; he was most desirous to gain the affection of the Roman people, whom he enriched by the jubilee and gratified by the imposing ceremony of an Imperial coronation. Above all, he had shown his desire to associate the city of Rome with the glories of the revived Papacy by the magnificence of the public works in which he was engaged. Others might have grievances to allege: surely the Roman citizens had no reason to look upon the Pope in any other light than a splendid benefactor. Yet, at the beginning of 1453, Nicolas V learned to his amazement that a dangerous plot against his personal safety was formed within the walls of Rome.

The revival of classical learning in Italy had developed a tendency towards republicanism; and though the movement of the Roman citizens had been checked by the neighborhood of the King of Naples at the time of the election of Nicolas V, the spirit that had then inspired it still survived. Nicolas V had not thought it wise to take any severe measures to assure the Papal Government. He trusted to his own good intentions to overcome the opposition that had been threatened. The republican ringleader, Stefano Porcaro, was sent into honorable exile, as Podestà of Anagni. But when his period of office expired, Porcaro returned to Rome to play the part of demagogue. Taking advantage of a tumult that arose at the carnival, he again raised the cry of 'Liberty' amongst the excited crowd. Nicolas V thought it better to remove such a firebrand from Rome, and Porcaro was exiled to Bologna, where he enjoyed perfect freedom on condition that he showed himself every day to the Legate, Cardinal Bessarion. But Porcaro's dreams had possessed his imagination too deeply to be dispelled by any show of clemency, and the desire to appear as the liberator of his country became more and more rooted in his mind. From Bologna he managed to contrive a plot against the Pope, and to assure himself of many confederates. His nephew, Sciarra Porcaro, gathered together a band of 300 armed men, who were to be the chief agents in the rising. Their scheme was to take advantage of the solemnity of the Festival of the Epiphany, and while the Pope and Cardinals were at mass in S. Peter's, set fire to the Papal stables, and, in the confusion, seize the Pope and his brother, who was captain of the Castle of S. Angelo. While one band seized the Castle, another, at the same time, was to occupy the Capitol. The booty of the Pope and Cardinals, which they estimated at 700,000 ducats, would give them means to carry out their plan of abolishing the Papal rule and securing a Roman Republic. The aspirations of Petrarch, the dreams of Rienzi, were at last to be real sed.

When all was ready, Porcaro left Bologna on the night of December 26, 1452, and four days after reached Rome, where he hid himself in the house of a kinsman. The conspirators were summoned to a banquet, in the midst of which Porcaro appeared, clad in a dress of gold brocade, and incited them to their great enterprise. Delay was fatal to the success of his plan. Messengers came from Bessarion bringing the news of
Porcaro’s flight from Bologna. The armed men of his nephew caused suspicion by an encounter with the police. Some of the conspirators gave information to the Senator and Cardinal Capranica. Porcaro’s house was watched by night, and the presence of the conspirators was detected. On the morning of January 4, the Senator, with fifty soldiers, surrounded the house. Sciarra Porcaro, with four comrades, cut his way through the soldiers and escaped from Rome. Stefano’s courage deserted him; he did not dare to follow his nephew, but abandoned his confederates, and, through a back door, made his escape to the house of a sister. Meanwhile, the Papal Vice-Chamberlain addressed the people in the Capitol, accused Porcaro of sedition and ingratitude, pronounced the ban against him, and offered a reward to any who should deliver him up, alive or dead. His sister’s house was no safe place of hiding, and by her advice he went with a friend by night to beg a refuge from the generosity of Cardinal Orsini. His friend, who went first to plead his cause, was made prisoner; when he did not return, Porcaro fled to the house of another sister, where he was followed. His sister hid him in a box, and tried to avoid detect on by seating herself on the lid; but it was in vain. His hiding-place was discovered; he was carried off to the Castle of S. Angelo, and after a summary trial was beheaded on the morning of January 9. He died bravely, and his last words were: “People, today dies the liberator of your country.” On the same day nine others followed him to the gallows. Nicholas V sent throughout Italy to discover those who had escaped, and Sciarra Porcaro was put to death at Città di Castello before the end of the month. If Nicolas had been gentle at first he showed himself relentless in his fright. One culprit's life was granted to the entreaties of the Cardinal of Metz; but next day Nicolas withdrew his promise, and the prisoner was put to death.

The Pope and the Curia were alike filled with alarm at the discovery of this determined scheme. They did not know how far it represented any plan concerted with the other powers of Italy. Naples, Florence, Milan, and Venice all might have some share in this desperate attempt to overthrow the Papacy and seize its revenues. Nicolas was full of suspicion, and fell into cruelty which was alien from his character. It was a bitter blow to him that enemies should rise up against him in his own city. The plot of Porcaro permanently disturbed his peace of mind. He grew morose and suspicious, denied access to his presence, and placed guards around his person. Porcaro’s plot revealed to him the incompatibility of the Papal rule with the aspirations after freedom which the Romans nourished.

The judgments of contemporaries differed as they fixed their eye on the glories of the Papacy or of the Roman city. “Porcaro”, says the Roman Infessura, “was a worthy man who loved his country, and sacrificed his life because, when banished without cause from the city, he wished to free her from slavery”. On the other hand, the men of letters whom the Pope’s liberality had gathered to Rome cannot find language strong enough to express their horror at the monstrosity of Porcaro’s plan, which seemed to them to be a rising of barbarism against culture, of Roman ruffians against the scholars who graced their city by their presence. Both judgments contain some truth; but the difference which underlies them is still irreconcilable. Rome had many advantages conferred upon it as the seat of the Papal power, the capital of Christendom; it had in the Pope a munificent lord, and shared the benefits of his greatness. But it had to pay the price of isolation from the political life of Italy. There were always those who felt that they were Citizens in the first place and churchmen afterwards, and who aspired to recover for their city the political independence of which the Papal rule deprived it.
Nicolas V was enfeebled in health by the pains of gout as well as by his disappointments. A still heavier blow fell on him when the news reached Rome that on May 29 Mahomet II had made himself master of Constantinople. It might seem that no one, who had noticed the rapid advance of the Turks, could doubt that the fall of Constantinople was imminent; yet Western Europe was entirely unprepared for such an event. Men looked round with shame and alarm when it actually took place. They felt shame that nothing had been done to save from the unbelievers the relics of an ancient and venerable civilization; they felt alarm when the bulwark was removed which had so long stood between Europe and the Eastern tribes. It was natural that they should ask themselves what had been done by the heads of Christendom, the Pope, and the Emperor, to avert this calamity. It was natural that Nicolas V should feel that the glories of his pontificate had been obscured by the mishap that in his days such a disaster had occurred. It was true that the Greeks had not maintained the union of the Churches which had been ratified at Florence. It was true that Nicolas had urged upon them the necessity of so doing as a first step towards obtaining help from Europe. It was true that the fanaticism of the Greeks refused to seek for help on the condition of submitting to the Azymites. Still the fact remained that Constantinople had fallen, and the Turks had gained a foothold in Europe.

Yet Nicolas V had not been entirely neglectful. In answer to the entreaties of Constantino Palaeologos, he had sent Cardinal Isidore of Russia to commemorate the reconciliation of the two Churches. In December, 1452, a solemn service was held in S. Sophia, and amid the muttered execrations of the Greeks the formality of a religious agreement was again performed. Nicolas prepared to send succors to his ally, and twenty-nine galleys were equipped for the purpose; but Mahomet II began the siege of the doomed city unexpectedly, and pressed it with appalling vigor. The Papal vessels arrived off Euboea two days after the fall of Constantinople, and through some mishap were captured unawares by the Turks. Cardinal Isidore with difficulty escaped in disguise, and made his way back to his own land, while the Greek Emperor Constantine Palaeologos fell boldly fighting against the invader.

If Nicolas V could plead that he had been willing to do what he could to avert this catastrophe, no such plea could be urged by the Emperor, who, says a German chronicler, sat idly at home planting his garden and catching birds. Yet Frederick III wept to hear the news, and wrote to the Pope urging him to rouse Europe to a crusade. Everywhere a wail of sorrow was raised. Not only was the sentiment of Europe outraged by the fall of Constantinople and the forcible entrance of a new religion into the domains of Christendom, but commercial communications with the East were checked, and there was an uneasy feeling of dread how far the Turkish power might push its borders in Europe. Moreover, the blow affected not only the political, but also the literary sentiment of Europe. Greece, which was the home of Thucydides and Aristotle—Greece, to whose literature men were turning with growing delight and admiration, was abandoned in her last hour by those who owed her so deep a debt of gratitude. The literary treasures of Constantinople were dispersed, and no man could say how great had been the loss. “How many names of mighty men will perish”, exclaims Aeneas Sylvius in a letter to the Pope. “It is a second death to Homer and to Plato. The fount of the Muses is stopped”.

In the same letter Aeneas goes on to depict truly enough the change which the fall of Constantinople had wrought in the historical portion of the Papacy of Nicolas V: “Historians of the Roman Pontiffs, when they reach your time, will write: ‘Nicolas V, a
Tuscan, was Pope for so many years. He recovered the patrimony of the Church from the hands of tyrants; he gave union to the divided Church he canonized Bernardino of Siena; he built the Vatican and splendidly restored S. Peter’s; he celebrated the Jubilee, and crowned Frederick III. All this will be glorious to your fame, but will be obscured by the doleful addition: ‘In his time Constantinople was taken and plundered (or, it may be, burnt and razed) by the Turks’. So your fame will suffer without any fault of yours. For, though you labored with all your might to aid the unhappy city, yet you could not persuade the princes of Christendom to join in a common enterprise in defense of the faith. They said that the danger was not so great as was reported, that the Greeks exaggerated and trumped up stories to help them in begging for money. Your Holiness did what you could, and no blame can justly attach to you. Yet the ignorance of posterity will blame you when it hears that in your time Constantinople was lost”.

Nor was Aeneas solitary in his utterances. Isidore of Russia, Bessarion, the Archbishop of Mitylene, and many others wrote in the same strain. There was no lack of writing either then or for many years later. But even without admonition from others the course of the Pope was clear. He must make amends for the past by putting himself at the head of Europe; and it was lucky for the Papacy to have a cry which might once more gather Christendom around it. On September 29 Nicolas issued a summons to a crusade, in which, after denouncing Mahomet II as the dragon of the Apocalypse, he called on all Christian princes, in virtue of their baptismal vow, to take up arms against the Turks. He declared remission of sins to all who, for six months from the 1st of February next, persevered in the work of the crusade or sent a soldier in their stead; he dedicated to the service of the crusade all the revenues which came to the Apostolic See, or to the Curia, from benefices of any kind; he exacted from all the clergy a tithe of their ecclesiastical revenues, and proclaimed universal peace, that all might devote themselves to this holy purpose.

The Pope’s words and promises were weighty enough; but there were grave difficulties in giving them any practical effect. The state of Europe was by no means peaceful, nor were men’s minds turned in the direction of a crusade. The old ideal of Christendom had grown antiquated; the Emperor was a poor representative of united Europe. The Holy Roman Empire had been the symbol of a central organization which was to keep in order the anarchic tendencies of feudalism. But feudalism, which was founded upon actual facts, had prevailed over a system which rested only upon an idea; and the anarchy caused by feudalism had made national monarchies a necessity. The fifteenth century was the period when national monarchies were engaged in making good their position against feudalism. In France Charles VII was asserting the power of the restored monarchy against the mighty Duke of Burgundy. England was intent on the desperate struggle of parties which ended in the Wars of the Roses. The Spanish kingdoms, zealous of one another, could urge their crusade against the Mussulman at home as a reason for not going abroad. In Germany each prince was engaged in consolidating his own dominions, and the feebleness of the Emperor made him more keen to use the opportunity offered. Poland was at enmity with the Teutonic Knights. Hungary and Bohemia were bent on maintaining their nationality against their German king. It was difficult to combine for united action this chaos of contending interests.

It was natural for the Pope to begin at home, and first to pacify Italy, an object which at his accession he had generally professed, but which on reflection he deferred till a more convenient season. He was anxious, above all things, to be at peace himself, to maintain tranquility in the States of the Church, and to gratify his passion for
restoring the buildings of Rome. He saw that he would be most powerful when the rest of Italy was weak, and that the States of the Church would be most secure when there were other objects for the ambition of the Italian powers. Even now the same motives weighed with him, and he was only half-hearted in his attempts to heal the breaches of Italy, where Alfonso of Naples, in alliance with Venice, still contested the duchy of Milan with Sforza, who was helped by Florence. He summoned ambassadors of these States to Rome, but in the discussions that arose was so careful to please everybody, and commit himself to nothing, that his sincerity was suspected, and after some months of conference the ambassadors left Rome without arriving at any conclusions. To the shame of Nicolas V, the work which he had been too half-hearted to undertake was accomplished by an Augustinian monk, Fra Simonetto of Camerino, who secretly negotiated peace between Sforza and Venice. The peace was published at Lodi on April 9, 1454, and in the following August Florence also accepted it. When matters had gone so far the Pope sent Cardinal Capranica to exhort Alfonso of Naples to join it also. After some difficulty Alfonso, on January 26, 1455, agreed to the pacification of Lodi, excepting only Genoa from its provisions, and a solemn peace for twenty-five years was established amongst all the Italian powers.

Meanwhile efforts were being made under the auspices of the feeble Frederick III for a demonstration of unanimity on the part of the powers of Europe. At the end of December, 1453, the Bishop of Pavia, as Papal legate, arrived at Neustadt, and the Emperor issued invitations for a European Congress to be held at Regensburg on April 23, 1454. He promised to be present in person unless hindered by some serious business.

But as the time drew nigh Frederick discovered that there were hindrances enough to keep him at home. He had no money; he was afraid lest Austria or Hungary might attack his domains if he left them unprotected; he did not wish to face the Electors, lest under the cover of reforms in the Empire they should still more diminish the Imperial power. “It is hard”, he said to his counselors, who urged him to go, “it is hard to take care of the common good at one's own cost. I do not see any one who will study the benefit of others more than his own”. So Frederick resolved to stay at home, and send in his stead an embassy, of which Aeneas Sylvius was a member. He nominated also as his representatives such of the Electors and princes as he thought friendly to himself, amongst others Lewis of Bavaria, whom Aeneas on his way met at Burghausen on the Inn. When Aeneas gave him the Emperor's commission, Lewis answered that, though sensible of the compliment, he feared that his own youth and inexperience rendered him unfit for the task; he would probably send representatives to Regensburg. While he spoke the dogs were barking, and a band of huntsmen were impatiently waiting for the Duke, and cursing the Imperial envoys for causing a delay. Lewis graciously invited the envoys to follow the hunt, and when they declined rode off with his friends. This was not the spirit of a crusader, and it was but a sample of the attitude of the German princes towards the great question which they professed to consider seriously.

At the period fixed for the Congress only the Imperial presidents and the Papal legate had arrived. Cardinal Cusa, one of those who had been appointed by Frederick III, advanced to the neighborhood of Regensburg, and then wrote to his colleagues to know if he should come any farther, and to ask who would pay his expenses. When this was the zeal displayed by a prince of the Church, we cannot wonder that the secular princes did not bestir themselves more eagerly. From Italy no one came except the Papal legate, the Bishop of Pavia. Venice sent ambassadors, but they only entered
Germany after the Congress was over. Florence and Lucca excused themselves as being engaged with other matters. Borso, the newly made Duke of Modena, was not sure enough of the peace of Lodi to think of anything save Italian complications. Siena did not receive the summons in time to attend to it. The letter to Lodovico of Mantua had been by mistake addressed to his brother Carlo. The other Italian States sent neither excuses nor representatives. The summons addressed to the Kings of France, England, Scotland, Hungary, Poland, and Denmark had been of the nature of a brotherly invitation; but none of them were inclined to show complaisance to the feeble Emperor. Charles VII of France did not wish to seem to act in concert with Frederick. He wrote to the Pope, and said that he was willing to take up arms if the German princes on their part agreed to do so. Christian of Denmark wrote to express his sorrow that the shortness of notice and an expedition in which he was engaged against Norway prevented him from sending ambassadors, but he was willing to do what he could when the time for action arrived. The Kings of England and Scotland paid no heed. Ladislas of Hungary and Bohemia was expected, but never came. Casimir of Poland alone sent representatives; but they came to complain of the Teutonic Knights.

It was no wonder that the foreign powers showed little zeal when Frederick himself stayed at home, and only three of the Electors sent ambassadors. Everyone was suspicious, and there was no real union. Frederick had urged the Pope to join with him in issuing a summons to the German princes; but Nicolas V was afraid to give any countenance to the Congress, lest it night be turned into a Council. The remembrance of Basel was still too vivid for the Pope to run any risk of its revival.

As the presidents sat at Regensburg, somewhat embarrassed how to proceed, a rumor reached them, which at first seemed like a dream, that the Duke of Burgundy was on his way and had reached Constance. When it was known that he had actually arrived at Ulm, they wrote to Frederick begging him to come in person and welcome one who was as powerful as a king. In truth, Philip of Burgundy, who, besides Burgundy and Franche Comté, ruled over the rich lands between the Somme and the Meuse, was one of the most powerful princes in Christendom, and was a thorn in the side of the French King. He was by birth connected with the crusading movement; for his father was taken prisoner by the Turks at the battle of Nicopolis where Sigismund was defeated. He was now the heir of his father’s policy, and had just succeeded in reducing under his sway the independence of the Flemish cities. Rich and magnificent, he put the French King to shame, and was the ideal of European chivalry. It was a gross and fantastic chivalry, much given to tournaments and festivals of every sort, yet not without its culture, as the paintings of Jan van Eyck still Witness. Philip’s proceedings in defense of Christendom are characteristic of the man and of the time. When he received the Pope’s letter proclaiming a crusade, he held high festival at Lille—a festival adorned with all the sumptuous grandeur of Flemish pageantry. After a banquet, in which figured a party containing twenty-eight men playing on musical instruments, an elephant was led into the hall by a Saracen giant. On its back was a tower, in which sat a captive nun, representing the Church, who wept and implored succor. Two lovely maidens advanced with a live pheasant, and the Duke, laying his hand upon it, swore on the pheasant that he would drive out the Turk from Europe. His guests followed his example, and a splendid ball was the appropriate exploit which immediately followed.

The news of Philip’s approach to Regensburg caused the utmost excitement. Everywhere he was received with honor, and rumor was rife with the causes of his coming. Some said that he washed to win over the Germans, and was ambitious of the
Imperial crown; others that he hoped to prevail on the Emperor to erect Brabant, Holland, and Zeeland into a kingdom, that he might bear a royal title. Anyhow, his coming brought prestige to the Congress. It impelled the Cardinal of S Peter’s to hasten to Regensburg without waiting to have the question of his expenses further settled. Lewis of Bavaria left his hunting, and went to meet Philip; he sent also four envoys to Regensburg, but declined to act personally as one of the Emperor's representatives.

The presidents now thought that it was time to open the Congress. The Bishop of Gurk excused the Emperor's absence, and inveighed against the Turks. Then Cardinal Cusa pointed out that the Greeks had drawn their ruin upon their own heads by their stubbornness in rejecting union with the Holy See. The Papal legate spoke a few words. Next the ambassadors of the Teutonic Knights inveighed against the King of Poland, and the session ended in a wrangle. The next session was spent in a strife about precedence between the Polish envoys and those of the Electors.

On May 9 Philip of Burgundy and Lewis of Bavaria entered Regensburg with pomp. The Imperial presidents offered to hold their sessions in Philip’s house if that would suit his convenience. Philip modestly declined; and it was agreed that the Congress should sit in the Town Hall. Indeed the proposal would hardly have suited the Duke’s habits: for Aeneas tells us that he rose at noon, did a little business, dined, had a nap, took some athletic exercise, supped till late at night, and finished his day with music and dancing. Such a man was not likely to sit very long over tedious deliberations. But before the business of the crusade was undertaken, the German princes declared their intentions. John of Lysura, the confidential adviser of the Archbishop of Trier, suggested that the Germans should meet separately at the house of Lewis of Bavaria. There he proposed that they should consider what strength they had to lead against the Turks. The Imperial representatives saw in this a means of exposing the poverty of the Emperor, and refused to enter upon the subject. Then Lysura spoke warmly of the distracted state of Germany, and its need of internal reform before it embarked on enterprises abroad; he insisted that the Emperor ought to meet the Electors, and deliberate on German affairs before he put forward a scheme for a crusade. The Imperial envoys admitted the truth of Lysura’s complaints, but urged the primary importance of the crusade: if it were to be deferred till Germany was reorganized, it would have long to wait.

The arrival of the Markgraf of Brandenburg increased the number of princes, but brought an ally of the Teutonic Knights against Poland, and threatened to divert the Congress from the question of the crusade. At length, however, the public proceedings were resumed. Aeneas Sylvius spoke against the Turks, and urged immediate action. Silence followed his speech, which, being in Latin, was probably understood by few, and was translated into German by the Bishop of Gurk. Then Cardinal Cusa gave an account of Constantinople, and of the Turks, from his personal knowledge; his speech was similarly translated into German by John of Lysura. The Bishop of Pavia spoke also, and the assembled princes separated to deliberate. Next day the Imperial envoys were asked to state the Emperor's proposals. This they did in writing, and demanded that by April, 1455, an army sufficient to overwhelm the Turks should be in readiness to serve for three years. They suggested that throughout Germany every sixty men should furnish one horseman and two foot duly equipped for the field; in this way an army of 200,000 men would be raised. Besides this, the cities were to provide all necessary ammunition and means of transport. The Pope, Naples, Venice, and the other maritime cities of Italy should prepare a fleet, while the land army, joined by the Bohemians and
Hungarians, was to cross the Danube. A peace for five years was to be proclaimed throughout Germany, beginning from next Christmas; whoever violated it should be under the ban of the Empire. To make further arrangements, another Diet was to meet on September 29 at Nurnberg, if the Emperor could come there; if he could not, at Frankfort.

It was a splendid scheme; but schemes on paper are not costly, and Frederick III was willing to be magnificent where no expense was involved. The Germans listened, but urged their own business. John of Lysura clung to his scheme of a reformation of the Empire. Albert of Brandenburg was busy with his quarrel against Poland. The Congress might have sat long had not the Duke of Burgundy grown impatient: his health suffered at Regensburg, and he was anxious to get away. Accordingly it was agreed that an answer should be given to the Emperor’s proposals. Albert of Brandenburg spoke on behalf of the Germans. He faintly praised the Emperor's zeal, but deferred all criticism of his scheme till the forthcoming Diet, when there would be a fuller assembly and fuller information. Nothing, however, could be done till Germany was at peace, and for this purpose the Emperor must meet the princes and fully discuss with them the state of affairs. After this lukewarm speech, which dealt rather with the affairs of Germany than the affairs of Christendom, the Bishop of Toul, in the name of the Duke of Burgundy, declared his master’s zeal for the crusade, and his willingness to take part in any expedition which might be agreed upon by the Emperor or any other Christian princes. Then Aeneas Sylvius, and afterwards the Bishop of Pavia, thanked the Duke of Burgundy and Albert of Brandenburg for their zeal, and the Congress separated at the end of May, with every outward appearance of satisfaction and hope.

Yet this empty talk deceived no one. Aeneas Sylvius wrote to a friend in Italy on June 5 the following strain: “My wishes differ from my hopes: I cannot persuade myself of any good result. You ask why? I answer, Why should I hope? Christendom has no head whom all will obey. Neither Pope nor Emperor receives what is his due. There is no reverence, no obedience. We look on Pope and Emperor alike as names in a story or heads in a picture. Each state has its own king; there are as many princes as there are houses. How will you persuade this multitude of rulers to take up arms? Suppose they do, who is to be leader? How is discipline to be maintained? How is the army to be fed? Who can understand the different tongues? Who will reconcile the English with the French, Genoa with Naples, the Germans with the Bohemians and Hungarians? If you lead a small army against the Turks, you will be defeated; if you lead a large one there will be confusion. Thus there are difficulties on every side”.

Having such opinions, Aeneas was desirous to escape further disappointment and leave the uncongenial Germany for his native country. He had gained all that he could from his sojourn at the Imperial court. Frederick’s position had now sunk so low as to be desperate, and important affairs no longer centered round him. Frederick, however, refused to part with Aeneas just then; he was determined not to go in person to the Diet, but to send again Aeneas and the Bishop of Gurk. Among the princes he nominated as his representatives the Markgrafs of Brandenburg and Baden. The Pope contented himself with again nominating as his legate the Bishop of Pavia. The Diet of Frankfort filled the month of October, 1454, and in its outward forms resembled that of Regensburg. Aeneas showed more than his wonted eloquence, and spoke for two hours; the Bishop of Toul asserted the zeal of the Duke of Burgundy, and the Bishop of Pavia, in the name of the Pope, tried to inflame the ardor of Christendom. The demand for a crusade had already become more serious, as was seen by the presence of ambassadors
from Hungary, who loudly called for help, and declared that if it were not given they would be driven to make peace with the Turks to protect their own frontier. With a view to awaken more enthusiasm, Fra Capistrano came and preached at Frankfort. The people heard him gladly; but the diplomats of the Congress were unmoved. Of the German princes there were present the Markgrafs of Brandenburg and Baden, and the Archbishops of Trier and Mainz. But they were all bent on their own schemes. Albert of Brandenburg, who was regarded as friendly to the Emperor, was the most conspicuous man among the German princes, and urged the reform of the Empire as a means of obtaining a wider sphere for his energy. Against him was secretly formed a party, at the head of which was the Pfalzgraf Frederick, but its moving spirit was Jacob of Trier. This party won over Albert of Austria, the Emperor’s brother, by holding out hopes of the deposition of Frederick and his own election in his stead. On the deposition of the Emperor would follow the summons of a new Council and the revival of the cry for ecclesiastical reform. Thus in Germany the princes were agreed that internal reform must precede any undertaking abroad; but they were not united in their conception of reform, and under the name of reform were pursuing private ends and separate intrigues.

In this state of things the Emperor’s ambassadors had to listen to nothing save complaints. When the time came for a definite promise, they were told that the crusade was merely a pretext used by the Pope and the Emperor to extort money; they would find that Germany would give them neither money nor soldiers. The zeal of the Burgundians was turned into ridicule; the Hungarians were bidden to defend their own kingdom, and not try to involve Germany in their calamities. It required all the diplomacy of the Imperial and Papal party to avert an absolute refusal of supplies for a crusade. It was only through the influence of Albert of Brandenburg that a decent semblance of zeal for the cause of Europe was expressed. It was agreed that an army of 10,000 horse and 30,000 foot be sent by Germany to the aid of the Hungarians, on condition that the Pope equip in Italy a fleet of twenty-five galleys to attack the Turks in Greece. This undertaking was made the more readily because of the belief that the conditions would never be fulfilled. “The princes say”, writes Capistrano to the Pope, “Why should we spend our zeal, our goods, the bread of our children, when the Pope consumes in building towers the revenues of S. Peter, which ought to be devoted to the defense of the Christian faith?”

The Diet might arrive at its own conclusions; but Jacob Trier was secretly pursuing his course. As it was clear that the Emperor would not come to meet the princes, it was resolved that the princes should go to him. Another Diet was proclaimed to be held at Neustadt on February 2, 1455, ostensibly for the purpose of arranging for the levy of the German forces, really for the purpose of bringing pressure to bear on the Emperor so as to strengthen the power of the princes. Jacob of Trier had skillfully drafted a scheme for the reform of the Empire, which was accepted by the Archbishops of Köln and Mainz.

It proposed that the Emperor should confer with the Electors about the pacification of the Empire, for which was needed a reorganization of judicature and finance. Moreover, the Emperor should be required to urge on the Pope the summons of a new Council, in accordance with the provisions of the decrees of Constance, and the Papal undertaking at the time of the restoration of the German obedience. It was a fair sounding scheme; but even while he penned it Jacob of Trier let it be seen that it was only meant to be a pretense. He recommended his proposal on the ground that “when the Pope sees us anxious to have a Council, he will be more willing to please us, and
will pay more heed to the requests made by us to the Curia in matters which he now refuses. Likewise the Emperor, when he sees that we wish to stir him up, will be more willing to please us, and follow our advice in all matters”. The plan was to bring pressure to bear both on the Emperor and the Pope, so as to establish still more surely the independence of the German princes, and win from both sides all the concessions which they wished to make their plan stronger, Albert of Austria was to be used as a rival to Frederick; and the threat of a Council was to be a means of separating the interests of the Pope from those of the Emperor.

Such were the schemes of Jacob of Trier, when, in February, 1455, he arrived at Neustadt. He was the only Elector present; but four others sent representatives, who were under Jacob’s orders. Ladislas of Hungary came to Vienna; but refused to advance to Neustadt, as he had no desire to meet his former guardian. Aeneas Sylvius invited Fra Capistrano to bring his eloquence to Neustadt. He promised him good sport. “Our amphitheater will be established, and there will be Circensian games grander than those of Julius Caesar or Pompeius. I do not know whether there will be foreign beasts or only those of Germany: but Germany has wild beasts of many kinds, and perhaps Bohemia will send the Beast of the Apocalypse. If our sport be only moderate, you will have a bag well filled with every kind of game, slain by the sword that proceeds from your mouth. If your valor comes victorious out of the amphitheater, we will have an army against our foes abroad, when our enemies at home have been dispersed”. Aeneas could jest even on the most serious matters, and Fra Capistrano was not so Simple a devotee that he could not understand the subtleties of the higher politics.

Albert of Brandenburg and Charles of Baden were the only other German princes who appeared. The Bishop of Toul again came from Burgundy, and the Bishop of Pavia again represented the Pope. The only foreign power who sent an envoy was the King of Naples. On February 26 the proceedings began with a wrangle about precedence of seats between Jacob of Trier and the Neapolitan ambassadors. Then Aeneas and the Bishop of Pavia spoke about the crusade: but neither of them had any assurance to offer of the Pope's activity. The Bishop of Pavia had not visited Rome during the interval between the Diets, and had no fresh instructions to communicate. The Neapolitan envoys declared that their King would be ready in May to sail against the Turks, if Germany sent its army for a land expedition at the same time. The Bishop of Toul again asserted the zeal of the Duke of Burgundy. Jacob of Trier declared that the Electors were ready to do all that befitted good Christians.

After these empty words Jacob of Trier pressed upon the Emperor his scheme of reform. He spoke in the name of all the Electors; and the representatives of the princes and Imperial cities were all on his side. Moreover, Jacob was in constant communication with Ladislas of Bohemia and Hungary, whose presence at Vienna was a perpetual threat to the Emperor. The Hungarian envoys pleaded for help from Germany; and the luckless Emperor sat helpless to answer. It seemed almost impossible for him to extricate himself with decency from the difficulties that beset him on every side. If he gave way to the Electors, the scanty remnants of his power were gone; if he refused, the Diet would not vote troops for the crusade, and the Emperor would be rendered ludicrous in the eyes of Christendom. From this perplexity he and his counselors were delivered by the news of the death of Nicolas V, which reached Neustadt on April 12. As this news threw into uncertainty the possibility of an expedition from Italy, it was useless to determine on a German expedition. The Pope's death also opened up other plans to Jacob of Trier and his confederates. It was agreed to
put off till next spring the levy of troops for the aid of Hungary, and meanwhile to proclaim throughout the Empire peace for two years. With this lame conclusion the Diet came to an end, to the Emperor’s great relief.

Nicolas V had been greatly affected by the capture of Constantinople, and by the new responsibilities which were consequently thrown upon his shoulders. The character of a statesman and a warrior, summoning Europe to a mighty enterprise, was not within the conceptions which Nicolas had set before himself. He regarded it as a cruel misfortune to his future fame that he should have to undertake a position for which he had in no way fitted himself. He had not the energy to reconstruct his plans; he was half-hearted in the conduct of the crusading movement, yet he keenly felt the ignoble position in which he was actually placed. He had dreamed of leaving a great reputation as the restorer of Rome, the patron of men of letters, the inaugurator of a new era, in which the Papacy at the head of European culture quietly reasserted its old prestige over the minds of men. This was not yet to be; and Nicolas, disappointed and enfeebled by the gout, grew daily more infirm. When he felt that his end was approaching he wished to justify his policy, and claim due recognition of his merits before he quitted the stage of life. He gathered the Cardinals round his bedside the day before his death, and addressed to them his last testament. First he spoke of the mercies of God as shown in the sacraments, and of his hope of a heavenly kingdom. Then he proceeded to defend himself for his expenditure of money in buildings in Rome, on which point the Cardinals listened with the most profound interest. Only the learned, he said, could understand the grounds of the Papal authority: the unlearned needed the testimony of their eyes, the sight of the magnificent memorials which embodied the history of Papal greatness. The buildings of Rome were the means of securing the devotion of Christendom, on which the Papal power rested. They were also the means of procuring for the Pope safety and peace at home. The records of the past, even the events of the pontificate of Eugenius IV, showed how needful were precautions for the personal safety of the Pope. “Wherefore”, said the dying Pope, “I have built fortresses at Gualdo, Fabriano, Assisi, Castellana, Narni, Orvieto, Spoleti, Viterbo, and other places: I have repaired and fortified the walls of Rome; I have restored the forty stations of the Cross, and the Basilicas founded by Gregory the Great: I have made this palace of the Vatican, and the adjacent Basilica of S. Peter, with the streets leading to it, fit for the use and dignity of the Holy See and the Curia”. He recalled the glories of his pontificate—the ending of the schism, the celebration of the Jubilee, the coronation of Frederick, his efforts for a crusade, the pacification of Italy. “The towns in the States of the Church”, he continued, “that were in ruins and in debt, I have restored to prosperity, and have adorned with pearls and precious stones, with buildings, books, tapestries, gold and silver vessels for the use of the churches. All this I have done, not by simony, by avarice, nor by parsimony—for I have been most liberal in gifts to learned men, in buying and transcribing manuscripts—but by God’s blessing of peace and tranquility in my days. The Roman Church, thus wealthy and thus peaceful, I leave to you, beseeching you to pray for God’s grace that you may preserve and extend it”. When he had ended his exhortation he dismissed the Cardinals with his benediction, and next day, March 24, he died.

The last words of Nicolas V sufficiently show the character of his pontificate. Himself a scholar and a man of letters, he strove to mould the Papacy into the shape of his own individual predilections, which indeed fitted well enough with the aspirations of Italy in his day. Thoroughly Italian, he aimed at adapting the Papacy to the best ideal of
Italy. He did not try to become powerful by arms or statesmanship, but rather withdrew from the current of Italian politics. In the midst of storm and strife, which raged in North and South Italy, the States of the Church were to be the abodes of peace, in which was to be realized the splendor of taste and learning which was the dream of Italian princes. Rome was to sum up all that was best in Italian life, and was to transmit it to the rest of Christendom. Revered in Italy as the capital of Italian thought, Rome was to be a missionary of culture to Europe, and so was to disarm suspicion and regain prestige. It was not exactly a Christian ideal that Nicolas V set before himself. But the more religious aspirations of the time ran in the direction of ecclesiastical reform; and after the proceedings at Basel it was not judicious for a Pope to interfere with that matter at the present. Nicolas V saw that reform was needed; but reform was too dangerous. If the Papacy could not venture on reform, the next best thing was to identify itself with art and learning. To the demand of Germany for reformation Nicolas V answered by offering culture. His policy was so far wise that it enabled the Papacy to exist for sixty years before the antagonism broke out into open rebellion.

In personal character Nicolas V was a student, with a student's irritability and vanity as well as a student's high-mindedness. He loved magnificence and outward splendor, and demanded the utmost decorum from those around him. To his household he was a kind master, but impatient, hard to satisfy, and of a sharp tongue. He was easily angered, but soon repented. He was straightforward and outspoken, and required that everyone else should be the same; he was remorseless to anyone who equivocated or expressed himself clumsily. He was staunch to his friends, though they all had to bear his anger. He did not pay attention to his health, but studied at all hours of the day and night, was irregular in his meals, and was too much given to the use of Wine as a stimulant to his energies. Aeneas Sylvius puts down as his greatest fault, he trusted too much in himself, and wished to do everything by himself; he thought that nothing was done well unless he were engaged in it.
CHAPTER IV.

NICOLAS V AND THE REVIVAL OF LEARNING

The great glory of Nicolas V was the splendor of the artistic revival, which he knew how to foster and direct. The restoration of the city of Rome had already occupied the attention of Martin V and Eugenius IV. But Martin V had to discharge the inglorious though useful work of arresting the decay of the buildings of Rome and making necessary repairs; Eugenius IV had neither opportunity nor money to proceed far with architectural works. Still they did so much that Nicolas V found the way prepared for great schemes of embellishing the city, and with unerring taste and judgment entered zealously upon the task. His successors, Julius II and Leo X, have left their mark more decidedly in the form of great monumental works; Nicolas V left his impress on the city as a whole. He wished not to associate his name with some particular work, but to transform the whole city according to a connected plan. He represents the simplicity, the simplicity, the freshness of the early Renaissance, when it was an impulse and not a study.

So Nicolas V was not content with one task only. His keen eye glanced over the whole field, his taste penetrated to the smallest details, and his practical sagacity kept pace with his architectural zeal. Besides building the Vatican palace and the basilica of S. Peter’s, he restored the walls of Rome, and erected fortresses throughout the Papal States. Besides adapting the Borgo to be the residence of the Cuna, he proposed to make straight the crooked streets of Rome, to widen the entrances to the piazzas, and connect them with one another by colonnades such as made civic life more commodious in Bologna or Padua. Nor was his care confined to the adornment of Rome only; he built at Civita Castellana, at Orvieto, and other places in the Papal States palaces fit for the residence of the Pope or his vicar. Whatever he did he did thoroughly; if he built a chapel, he provided for every kind of ornament down to the illumination of the missal for the altar.

The schemes of Nicolas V seem beyond the power of one man to achieve; but if his pontificate, instead of lasting eight years, had lasted for sixteen, his restless energy might have seen his plans far advanced towards completion. As it was, he began great works to which his successors gave a final shape. To carry out his designs he gathered round him a band of noble artists. Chief amongst his architects were the Florentines Bernardo Gamberelli, known as Rosellino, Antonio di Francesco, and the famous Leo Battista Alberti. As painters he had Fra Angelico, whose frescoes of the lives of S. Stephen and S. Laurence still adorn the Capella di S. Lorenzo in the Vatican, Benozzo Gozzoli and Andrea Castegno, from Florence; and from Perugia, Benedetto Bonfiglio, the master of Pietro Perugino. There were decorators, jewelers, workers in painted glass, in intarsia, and in embroidery. The city swarmed with an army of artisans, employed by the magnificent Pope to convert Rome into a strong and splendid city, of which the crowning glory was to be the Papal quarter beyond the Tiber, with its mighty palace and church, which were to be the wonder of the world. Blocks of travertine were quarried at Trivoli and brought by water down the Anio, or dragged by oxen to the city. Nor did Nicolas V spare the antiquities of Rome to minister to his new glories. The Colosseum was used as a quarry, and some of the smaller temples disappeared. The Renaissance
was to Nicolas V a new birth, sprung from his own magnificence and identified with his glory. Rome was to be the city of the Popes, not of the Emperors.

When Nicolas V died he had rebuilt the walls of Rome, strengthened, from Alberti’s plans, the Castle of S. Angelo, fortified the chief towns in the papal States, restored the churches of SS. Apostoli, S. Celso, S. Stefano Rotondo, and S. Maria Maggiore, rebuilt a great part of the Capitol, reorganized the water supply of Rome, and begun the fountain of Trevi. Besides all this, he had commenced from the foundation the rebuilding of the basilica of S. Peter's, and had begun the choir. In the Vatican palace he had finished the chapel of S. Lorenzo and had built and splendidly decorated many chambers round the Cortile del Belvedere, where he began the library. He might sigh that he could not finish all that he had undertaken; but he succeeded in marking out a plan which his successors carried out, the plan of erecting a mighty symbol of the Papal power, which should to all time appeal to the imagination, and kindle the enthusiastic admiration of Christendom.

This architectural revival of Nicolas V rested upon a new conception which had gradually been changing the thought of Europe. Literature can only be concerned with expressing and arranging the ideas which are actually moving the minds of men. At the downfall of the Roman Empire the old classical culture had to give way before the necessities of the struggle against the barbarians, and Christianity formed the common ground on which Roman and barbarian ideas could be assimilated in a new form. Christian literature was first engaged with the expression of Christian truth and the task of ecclesiastical organization. The work that occupied thinking men in the early Middle Ages was the reconstruction of society on a Christian basis. Their labor found its expression in the conception of the Empire and the Papacy, a conception which the genius of Gregory VII impressed upon the imagination of Europe, and the Crusades gave a practical exhibition of its force. It was natural that during a period of reconstruction there was little thought of style; the builder, not the artist, was needed for an edifice in which strength, not ornament, was required. To this the literature of classical antiquity could contribute nothing; it was known by some, perhaps by many, but there was no place for it in the world's work.

As soon, however, as Christendom was organized there was a possibility for the individual to find his own place in the new structure; there was room for the organization of individual thought, for expression of individual feeling. While society was struggling to assert itself against anarchy, the individual had no place. When the lines of social organization had once been traced the individual, having gained a foothold, could survey his lodging. Classical literature, which had been hitherto of little value, became precious as a model, both of individual feeling and of the means of giving it expression. Italy was naturally the first country to lead the way to this new literature. She was conscious of her antiquity while other European nations were only awakening to the consciousness of their youth. While the Teutons turned for literary inspiration to nature and to the legendary heroes of the early days, Italy turned to classical antiquity, to the memorials that surrounded her on every side. Her early literature was reflective, and displayed the workings of the individual soul. Teutonic literature was national, and aimed at expressing the rude aspirations of the present in the forms of a legendary past.

So it was that Dante summed up the first period of Italian literature, and gave an artistic form to the aspirations of Christian culture. To him classical antiquity and
Christianity went hand in hand. Virgil led him in his soul's pilgrimage to a spiritual emancipation which was the combined result of philosophic thought, the experience of life, and the guidance of heavenly illumination. To the large spirit of Christian culture, in which faith and reason were combined, and to which the mediaeval ideal of a cosmopolitan Christendom was still a reality, Dante gave an ultimate expression. It was the ideal of Gregory VII transformed by all the knowledge, all the sentiment, and all the reflection which the individual could acquire for himself.

But this ideal of Christendom was not to be realized. Dante, though he knew it not, lived through the period of the fall of Empire and Papacy alike. With the Pope at Avignon and the Empire in anarchy, it was no longer possible for the individual life to attach its aspirations to what was manifestly powerless. The individual was more and more driven to consider himself and the workings of his own mind. Dante had used his own personality as a symbol of universal man. Petrarch did not advance beyond the expression of phases of feeling. But the study of phases of feeling led to a larger conception of the variety of individual life, a conception which animates with reality the pages of Boccaccio. This distinctly human and individual literature brought with it a quickened sense of beauty, an appreciation of form, a desire for a more perfect style. When once this feeling was awakened the study of classical antiquity assumed a new importance: only through it could men attain to clear ideas, accurate expressions, beautiful forms. To discover these the Italian mind devoted itself with passionate enthusiasm to the revival of classical antiquity, the study of its records, the imitation of its modes of thought. Instead of striving to reconstruct the decaying ideal of a united Christendom, Italy devoted itself to the development of the individual life; instead of laboring for the reform of the Church, Italy was busy with the acquisition of literary and artistic style.

Hence it was that Italy played so small a part in the great movement of the fifteenth century for the reformation of the Church. France and Germany labored at Constance and Basel for the ending of the schism and the reorganization of Christendom in accordance with the consciences of men. Italy had passed beyond the sphere of the scholastic formulae which were in the mouths of conciliar theologians. She was inventing a new method, and had little interest in questions which concerned merely external organization. While the Fathers of Constance looked upon Huss as a rebel who would rend asunder the unity of Christendom, the cultivated Italian, Poggio, admired his originality and compared him with the great men of old time. While theologians were engaged in determining by appeals to Christian antiquity the authority of General Councils, Poggio was ransacking the adjacent monasteries in search of manuscripts of classical authors. The breach had begun between the Italian and the Teutonic spirit. The Italians were bent upon securing for the individual emancipation from outward systems by means of culture; the Teutons wished to adapt the system of Christendom to the requirements of the awakening individual. The Renaissance and the Reformation began to pursue different courses.

The Papacy, as having its seat in Italy, could not remain unaffected by the national impulse. Though Florence was the center of the early Renaissance, its influence quickly spread, and students of classical antiquity were rapidly attached to every Italian court. Manuscripts were collected, academies were formed, and public business was transacted with strict attention to the best models. The Papacy could not lag behind the prevailing fashion. Already, under Innocent VII, Leonardo Bruni and Poggio Bracciolini were attached to the Papal Curia as secretaries. The Greek scholar, Emmanuel Chrysoloras,
was employed by John XXIII, and followed him to Constance, where he died. Martin V was too busy with other matters to pay much heed to literature; but under Eugenius IV the Italian humanists found that their own interests were closely bound up with the Papacy. The struggle between the Pope and the Council of Basel brought into prominence the growing antagonism between the Italian and the Teutonic spirit, between the Renaissance and the Reformation. The opposition of the Council to the Pope was resented as an attempt to rob Italy of part of its old prestige. The new learning was animated on its side by a missionary spirit; its mission was to carry throughout Europe a new culture, and the Papacy was one of its means. Though Eugenius IV was in no way associated in character with the Italian spirit of culture, yet the humanists gathered round him, and Poggio, Aurispa, Vegio, Biondo, and Perotti were numbered amongst his secretaries.

Nicolas V was genuinely Italian, and was himself thoroughly penetrated with the spirit of the new learning. Before he became Pope he had been a great collector of manuscripts, which he delighted to transcribe with his own hand. He had arranged the Library of S. Marco for Cosimo de' Medici, and was eager to eclipse it at Rome. If the Papacy by its magnificence were to assert its power over Christendom, it must stand at the head of the mission of Italian culture. So Nicolas V declared himself the patron of all men of learning, and they were not slow in gathering round him. Rome had produced few scholars of its own; but Nicolas V was bent on making it a home of learning. He eagerly gathered manuscripts from every side, and employed a whole host of transcribers and translators within the Vatican, while his agents traversed Greece, Germany, and even Britain in search of hidden treasures. Even the fall of Constantinople could not be regarded as entirely a misfortune, for it brought to Italy the literary wealth of Greece. “Greece has not fallen”, said Filelfo, “but seems to have migrated to Italy, which in old days bore the name of Magna Graecia”. When Nicolas V died he left behind him a library of five thousand volumes, an enormous collection for the days before printing. When in 1450 the Jubilee brought with it a pestilence, occasioned by the crowded state of the city, and Nicolas fled before the plague to Fabiano, he took with him his host of transcribers, of whom he demanded as much zeal as he himself displayed. “You were the slave of Nicolas”, says Aeneas Sylvius to his friend Piero da Noceto, “and had no fixed time for eating or sleeping; you could not converse with your friends or go into the light of day, but were hidden in murky air, in dust, in heat, and in unpleasant smells”. The Pope’s passion was well known, and the world’s tribute flowed to Rome in the shape of manuscripts. For these literary treasures Nicolas V rebuilt the Vatican library, and appointed as its librarian Giovanni Tortelli, of Arezzo, the author of a grammatical work, “De Orthographia Dictionum a Graecis tractarum”.

Chief among the Pope’s assistants in his formation of a library was the good Florentine bookseller, Vespasi da Bisticci, whose love and respect for his patron may be read in his own simple language. From Florence also Nicolas V invited his more famous biographer, Gianozzo Manetti, whom he made a Papal secretary, and also conferred on him a pension of six hundred ducats. Manetti, a small man with a large head, who enjoyed robust health, was a rigorous student, and had generally spent five hours in reading before the greater part of his fellow-men had risen from bed. He was of great repute in his native city of Florence, and was a leading statesman, employed in many important embassies, where his eloquence always gained him a ready hearing. He obtained leave from the Florentines to transfer himself to the Pope's service, and was
engaged by Nicolas V, with characteristic impetuosity, on the two mighty works of writing an Apology for Christianity against Jews and Heathens, and translating into Latin the Old and New Testaments. Manetti had so far advanced in his task at the death of Nicolas V that he had written ten books against the Jews, and had translated the Psalms, the four Gospels, the Epistles, and the Revelation. Manetti’s life of his patron is the chief record of the greatness of the schemes of Nicolas V, which Manetti chronicled with enthusiasm, though his style is pompous and his panegyric labored.

Nicolas V found in the Curia an old acquaintance, the literary veteran Poggio Bracciolini, who in the days of Boniface IX took service in the Papal Chancery, and soon associated with himself his friend Leonardo Bruni. He went to Constance with John XXIII, and on his fall betook himself to the occupation of searching for manuscripts in the neighboring monasteries, while he surveyed the proceedings of the Council with quiet contempt. Poggio was a true explorer and warmed with his task; he rescued from the dust and dirt of oblivion Quintilian, several orations of Cicero, Ammianus Marcelinus, Lucretius, and many other works. His zeal carried him to Langres, Koln, and ultimately to England, where, however, he found scanty patronage in the turbulent times of Henry VI. Many were his endeavors to send explorers to Sweden in search of the lost books of Livy. Long were his negotiations to obtain from the Monastery of Fulda the complete manuscript of the Annals of Tacitus, which he edited in 1429. Under Eugenius IV he did not find himself and congenial surroundings; and he hailed with delight the accession to the Papacy of his friend Tommaso of Sarzana, to whom he had dedicated in 1449 a Dialogue on the Unhappiness of Princes. It was a species of composition then much in vogue, consisting of moral reflections illustrated by historical examples, founded on the model of Cicero’s Dialogues.

Following upon the same lines, Poggio went on to write and dedicate “to the same man, though not under the same name”, his most interesting work, a Dialogue on the Vicissitudes of Fortune. Poggio represents himself as reposing with a friend on the Capitol after an inspection of the ruins of Rome. He moralizes on the scanty remnants of her ancient grandeur, and in so doing gives the completest description we possess of the appearance of the city at that time. From this he goes on to quote great instances of the instability of fortune, which leads him to survey the changes of Europe from 1377 to the end of Martin V. The Pontificate of Eugenius IV illustrates his theme so pointedly, that a whole book is devoted to it. Then the writer takes a sudden leap, and tells us the travels of a Venetian, Niccolò Conti, who had told him the story of his adventures during a residence of twenty-five years in Persia and India. The whole work is a store of curious and interesting information, given with much sprightliness of style and keenness of observation. Poggio hailed Nicolas V as a second Maecenas, and expressed his joy at the downfall of the monkish favorites of Eugenius IV by a stinging Dialogue against Hypocrisy, in which he held up to ridicule the affected piety of self-seeking monks, and gathered a number of scandalous stories of the frauds and tricks practiced in the name of religion. Poggio himself made no pretense at the concealment of his own life and character, but published soon after his Facetiae, or jest-book, a collection of good stories which he and his friends in the Papal Chancery used to tell for one another’s amusement in their leisure moments. We are not surprised that men who indulged in such frankness as these stories betoken, found even the restraint of the neighborhood of a monk’s frock burdensome to their overflowing and unseemly wit. Poggio’s pen, like that of many of his contemporaries, was ready not only to copy the finer forms of classical expression, but also the licentiousness of paganism and the fertility of
vituperation which marked the decadence of classical literature. To please Nicolas V, Poggio composed a philippic against Amadeus of Savoy, and called to his aid all the wealth of Ciceronian invective to overwhelm the anti-Pope and the Council of Basel. He was, however, employed on more serious works of scholarship, and translated Xenophon’s *Cyropedia*, and at the request of Nicolas V, the *History of Diodorus Siculus*.

These scholars of the Papal Court were by no means free from literary jealousies and rivalries. Factions and disputes were rife amongst them, as was natural when each had to preserve a reputation for preeminence in his own subject. Chief amongst the Greek scholars whom Nicolas V welcomed in Rome was George of Trapezus, who translated for him many of the works of the Greek fathers, Eusebius of Caesarea, Chrysostom, Gregory of Nazianzum, and Basil. But the revival of Greek literature led to a deep interest in Greek philosophy, and Gemistos Plethon established at Florence a school of devoted students of Plato, who was almost a new discovery to the thought of the time. The doctrines of Aristotle and Plato were eagerly discussed; and Cardinal Bessarion, at the request of Nicolas V, translated Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, while Theodore Gaza translated the *History of Animals*, and Theophrastus’s *History of Plants*. George of Trapezus thought it due to his own importance to attack a work of Bessarion, which maintained the Platonic view that nature acts with design, which is the stamp of the Divine Intelligence. Bessarion answered him, and the controversy created great interest. George of Trapezus, in an evil moment, undertook to translate Plato’s *Laws*, which he did with great rapidity. Bessarion criticized his translation, a task of some moment, as George professed to give a specimen of Plato’s teaching; he convicted him of 259 errors, and concluded that his translation had almost as many mistakes as it had words. George certainly cannot have been an accurate translator, as Aeneas Sylvius says, that in one of his translations from Aristotle he found Cicero mentioned. Nicolas V felt his belief shattered; he withdrew his patronage from George, who in 1453 retired to Naples, where he was received by King Alfonso. He was an irritable man and took his revenge by general railing. Amongst other things he asserted that Poggio’s translations had been made by his assistance; that the merits were his, and the mistakes were Poggio’s.

No doubt Poggio would have answered this aspersion on scholarship; but probably it never came to his ears, as in 1453 he was appointed to the honorable office of Chancellor of his native city of Florence, where he took up his abode after spending fifty years in the Papal service. Moreover, he was engaged in a literary controversy with an opponent more formidable than George of Trapezus—the learned Lorenzo Valla. If Poggio is the most celebrated literary man of the Early Renaissance, Valla is undoubtedly the man of the keenest mind. Poggio might boast of a more limpid style, but Valla was the sounder scholar. Poggio founded himself on Cicero, Valla preferred Quintilian. Valla’s *Elegantiae* is a comprehensive attempt to deal with Latin grammar in a scientific spirit, and it was this that gave him a preeminence over men like Poggio, who were merely literary Latinists. Valla was born in Piacenza, but was educated in Rome under the care of Leonardo Bruni till he reached the age of twenty-four. Then he taught at Piacenza and Pavia, till he betook himself to Alfonso of Naples, at the time when he was bitterly opposed to Eugenius IV. The hate of a Roman against priestly domination joined with a desire to strike a blow in his patron's behalf. Valla turned his keen critical spirit, which had been trained in the methods of scientific inquiry, to an
examination of the grounds on which rested the story of the donation of Constantine of
the patrimony of S. Peter to Pope Sylvester.

In his work, *On the Donation of Constantine*, he set forth vividly the historical
aspect of such an event; he imagined Constantine wishing to make such an alienation of
the territory of the Empire; he pictured the remonstrance of the Senate, the humble
deprecation of the Pope. He examined the nature of the evidence for this donation, and
mocked at the claims of tradition to be credited when contemporary records were silent.
“If any one among the Greeks, the Hebrews, or the Barbarians were to say that such a
thing were handed down by tradition, would you not ask for the author's name or the
production of a record?” He criticized the wording of the forged decree (no difficult
task), and showed its gross inconsistency with the facts and forms of the time at which it
professed to be framed. He ended with a savage attack on the iniquities of the Papal
Government, and exhorted all Christian princes to deprive the Pope of his usurped
power, and so take away his means of disturbing the peace of Europe by interference in
temporal affairs.

Nor was this Valla’s only onslaught upon orthodox belief; he ventured to call in
question the tradition that the Apostles’ Creed was the joint composition of the Twelve,
who met in solemn conference and each contributed a clause. This brought him into
collision with the friars, and he was threatened with the Inquisition; but Alfonso
interposed on his behalf, and Alfonso's reconciliation with Eugenius IV carried Valla’s
reconciliation with it. Valla had no fanatical hatred to the Papacy, and was willing to
own that his attack had been of the nature of a literary exercise. He wrote an apology to
Eugenius IV, who did not, however, admit him to his favor; but Nicolas V cared little
for monastic orthodoxy, and was not prevented by Valla's free thinking from
summoning to his court so eminent a scholar. For him Valla translated Thucydides; and
so pleased was the Pope with his translation that he presented him with five hundred
ducats, and begged him to translate Herodotus also, a task which Valla began but did
not finish.

The keen critical spirit of Valla made him haughty and supercilious to his literary
companions; and meekness was in no sense their crowning virtue. As ill-luck would have
it, one of Valla’s pupils at Rome had a copy of Poggio’s Letters, in the margin of which
he had written criticisms on the style, pointing out and amending what he conceived to
be barbarisms. The book fell into the hands of Poggio, who was filled with wrath at this
attempt to improve perfection. He at once concluded that the criticisms proceeded from
Valla, and adopted his usual mode of chastising the offender. He wrote, in the most
approved Ciceronian style, a violent invective against Valla, in which he defended
himself against Valla’s supposed witicism, scourged his arrogance and vanity, and
impeached his orthodoxy. Valla replied by an *Antidote to Poggio*, which he addressed to
Nicolas V. Not content with repelling Poggio’s attacks or discussing his literary
character, he cast aspersions upon his private life. Poggio retorted by opening the flood
gates of abuse on Valla. Every scandalous story was raked up, every possible villainy
was laid to his charge; nay, even a picture was drawn of the final judgment of the Great
Day, and Valla was remorselessly condemned to perdition. Replies and counter-replies
followed, and the contest between these two eminent scholars was carried on by
clothing the lowest scurrility with classical language. The actual question in dispute
disappeared: the wrath alone remained. Rhetorical exercises in declamatory abuse were
poured forth in rapid succession. What fills us with surprise is the fact that Nicolas V
did not use his influence to stop this unseemly exhibition. He received the dedication of
Valla’s Antidote; and though other men of letters, who were by no means squeamish, remonstrated with the angry combatants, Nicolas V did not interfere. It would seem that an interest in style had already overpowered, even in the head of Christendom, any feeling of decorum, not to say morality, as regarded the subject-matter. Love for the forms of classical antiquity was already strong enough to override the spirit of Christianity. The criticisms of Valla on popular religion awakened no anxiety in the heart of Nicolas V for the stability of ecclesiastical tradition; the low scurrility of Poggio excited no care for Christian morality. An antagonism had begun which was to widen hereafter and produce disastrous results on the future of the Papacy.

FRANCESCO FILELFO.

The man who interposed his good offices to stop this fray between Poggio and Valla was Francesco Filelfo, the most adventurous and most reprobate of the literary men of the time. A native of Tolentino in the March of Ancona, Filelfo sought his fortune on every side. First he taught in Venice; then in 1420 went as secretary to an embassy to Constantinople. There he studied Greek under John Chrysolaras, whose daughter he married. He won the favor of the Greek Emperor, went as envoy to Murad II, and afterwards to Hungary, and returned to Venice in 1427 with a treasure of Greek manuscripts. As Venice would not pay him enough, he went to Bologna, and thence to Florence. He was a savage literary gladiator, openly seeking his fortune and restrained by no moral principles. His overweening vanity offended his literary contemporaries, whom he attacked in shameless satires. He and Poggio had a fierce war of words, and he raised up enemies on every side. At last he attacked even Cosimo de’ Medici, and found it necessary to flee to Siena, thence to Bologna, and afterwards to Milan. In 1453 he passed through Rome on his way to Naples; Nicolas V summoned him to his presence, presented him with five hundred ducats, and made him one of his secretaries. He read with pleasure Filelfo’s satires, and urged him to undertake a translation of the Iliad and Odyssey; for this task he offered to give him a house in Rome; an estate in the country, and to pay him ten thousand golden ducats. The death of Nicolas V prevented the bargain from being completed.

Many other scholars of less fame worked for Nicolas V. Niccolo Perotti translated Polybius; Guarino of Verona the geography of Strabo; Piero Candido Decembrio, who had been the chief scholar in the service of Giovanni Maria Visconti, took refuge in Rome from the disturbances that followed his patron’s death, and translated Appian for the Pope. Nor was it only in the sphere of Latin and Greek scholarship that Rome became the capital of literature. The sight of the monuments of Rome aroused an interest in an exact study of its past topography. Poggio looked on the ruins of Rome with the eye of a literary man who found in them food for his imagination. His contemporary, Fiavio Biondo, a native of Foni, who was made a Papal secretary by Eugenius IV, may be regarded as the founder of serious archaeology. His work, Roma Instaurata, which was finished just before the death of Eugenius IV, is a careful topographical description of the city of Rome and an attempt to restore its ancient monuments. When we consider the materials which Biondo had at his command, we are struck with the sense of order and accuracy which was growing up among the Italian scholars. The work of Biondo may be formless—it cannot be said that archaeology has yet advanced very far in style—but it is a careful and scholarly piece of work, such as had never been attempted before. His concluding words are an expression of the deal of
Nicolas V. After surveying the classical monuments of Rome he pauses. “Not”, he says, “that we despise the Rome of our own day, or think that its glories came to an end with its legions, consuls, and senate. Rome still exercises her sway over the world, not by arms and bloodshed, but by the power of religion. The Pope is still a perpetual dictator, the Cardinals a senate; the world still brings its tribute to Rome, still flocks to see its holy relics and its sacred places”. Though Biondo himself did not proceed to describe the Christian antiquities of Rome, he warmly appreciated them; and his contemporary, Maffeo Vegio of Lodi, also a Papal secretary, wrote a careful account of the antiquities of the basilica of S. Peter’s.

Such were a few of the scholars whom Nicolas V gathered round him. Their names are now almost forgotten, though in their own day they received a respect which has rarely fallen to the lot of literary men. Their works repose undisturbed in libraries; their fame, of which they were so careful, has vanished; they are remembered merely as literary curiosities. Yet we owe some debt of gratitude to those who cleared the way for European culture. They were not men of creative genius; their merits are scientific rather than literary. They rescued from destruction the treasures of antiquity, and prepared a way for a proper understanding of them. Their method was crude; their knowledge was imperfect; their attention to rhetorical forms ludicrously exaggerated. Yet they laid the foundation of classical philology, of the science of grammar, of intelligent criticism, of clear expression. They stood at the opening of a new era, and their labors only furnished the foundation for the labors of others. One generation of scholars succeeds another, and the past are soon forgotten, however great may have been their services to a better understanding of the classical spirit, however great may have been the impulse which that heightened knowledge gave to the thought of Europe.

We have spoken only of a few of the most famous scholars who gathered round Nicolas V. They are but samples of their kind, as the court of Nicolas V was but a brilliant sample of the literary and artistic movement that was pervading the whole of Italy. Of this movement Florence was its home; and Cosimo de Medici had seen the wisdom of identifying his power with all that was most eminently Florentine in the aspirations of his native city. He set the example of a literary patronage, which was splendidly followed by Nicolas V, and scarcely less so by Alfonso of Naples, who made himself more Italian than the Italians, and became the ideal of a cultivated prince. He was never tired of reading classical authors, and had them lead to him even at his meals. He was cured of an illness by hearing Quintus Curtius’ *Life of Alexander the Great* and received from the Venetians a bone of Livy with all the reverence due to the relic of a saint. He and Nicolas V carried on an honorable rivalry, which should do most for learning; and their example spread rapidly throughout the congenial soil of Italy. Almost every court had its literary circle, and literary interests held a prominent place in Italian politics of the ensuing time.

Amid these now forgotten scholars stood Nicolas V. Though not himself a man of letters, he was for that very reason better fitted to play the part of patron. He was not merely a collector of books, but was also an intelligent director of the studies of others. When we consider all that he did, we may well be amazed at the greatness of his plans and the energy with which he prosecuted them. The transformation of Rome into the undisputed capital of Europe, the attainment for the Papacy of an overpowering prestige which was to enthral men’s minds—these apparently chimerical objects were pursued with unerring precision and untiring labor. Nothing was overlooked in the great plan of Nicolas V: every part of the work was pressed on at the same time, and every
part of the work was regulated by the personal judgment of the Pope. Fortresses and libraries, churches and palaces, were alike rising under the Pope’s supervision; the fine arts, the literature and science of the time, all were welcomed to Rome, and found by the Pope’s care a congenial sphere. We cannot render too much praise to the thoroughness with which Nicolas V conceived and executed the plan which he had formed. But the plan was in itself a dream of almost superhuman magnificence, and Nicolas V expected too much when he hoped that the world’s commotions would stand still and respect the charming leisure of the Papacy. The fall of Constantinople dispelled the pacific vision of the Renaissance, and brought back the mediaeval dream of a crusade. Before Christendom could be rearranged under the peaceful sway of literature and theology going hand in hand, the enemies of her faith and of her civilization had stormed the bulwark that had stood for twelve centuries, and were threatening her with a new invasion.
CHAPTER V.  
CALIXTUS III. 14455—1458

After the funeral of Nicolas V fifteen of the twenty Cardinals entered the Conclave. They were greatly divided in opinion, and, in fact, had no clear policy to which they were desirous to commit themselves. The first scrutinies led to no result, and the Cardinals conferred privately with one another. At first Capranica seemed to be the favorite, being commended by his learning, his high character, and his political ability. But Capranica was a Roman and a friend of the Colonna; as such he was opposed by the party of the Orsini. He was therefore passed by in favor of Bessarion, who had no enemies and enjoyed a high reputation for learning. His election would have given a worthy successor to the policy of Nicolas V, and would also have shown the zeal of the Cardinals for the crusade. In Bessarion they would have chosen a Pope sprung from the Greek nation and keenly sympathizing with his conquered countrymen. For a night it seemed that Bessarion would be elected; but the morning brought reflection. He was an alien and a neophyte, a stranger to Italy and to the traditions of the Papacy. “Shall we go to Greece”, said Alain of Avignon, “for a head of the Latin Church? Bessarion has not yet shaved his beard, and shall we set him over us?”. There was a sudden revulsion of feeling. The Cardinals, weary with the debate, suddenly made a compromise, and an old Spanish Cardinal, Alfonso Borgia, was elected by accession on April 8. Borgia was seventy-seven years old, and owed his election to his age. As the Cardinals could not agree, they made a colorless election of one who by his speedy death would soon create another vacancy.

Alfonso Borgia was a native of Xativa in Valencia, who had distinguished himself in his youth at the University of Lerida. There he attracted the attention of his countryman, Benedict XIII, who conferred on him a canonry, and Alfonso of Aragon took him as his secretary. He did good service to the Papacy in winning for Martin V the allegiance of Spain, and in negotiating the renunciation of the Spanish anti-Pope, Clement VIII. In recognition of these services Martin V conferred on him the bishopric of Valentia. When the Council of Basel began its sessions Alfonso chose Borgia as his representative. Borgia refused the office, but visited Eugenius IV at Florence, and showed great skill in negotiating peace between Alfonso and the Pope. In return Eugenius IV in 1444 raised him to the Cardinalate, and by his wisdom and moderation Cardinal Borgia deservedly held a high place in the Curia. When the Conclave could not agree on a successor to Nicolas V, Borgia was an excellent person for the purposes of a compromise. His learning was profound, his character blameless, his political capacity stood high. His election was gratifying to Alfonso of Naples. As a Spaniard, he bore an hereditary hatred to the Turks, which would make him a fitting representative of the crusading movement.

On April 20 Alfonso Borgia was crowned Pope, and took the title of Calixtus III. The solemnity was disturbed by a riot arising from a quarrel between one of the followers of Count Averso of Anguillara and one of the Orsini. Napoleone Orsini raised his war-cry; 3000 men-at-arms gathered round him, prepared to storm the Lateran and drag the Count of Anguillara from the Pope’s presence. Only the intervention of
Cardinal Latino Orsini could appease his brother’s wrath and persuade him not to mar the festivities with bloodshed. The turbulent Roman barons began at once to reckon on the feebleness of the aged Pope.

In spite of his years Calixtus soon showed that he was filled with a devouring zeal for prosecuting the war against the Turks. He solemnly committed to writing his inflexible determination. “I, Pope Calixtus, vow to Almighty God and the Holy Trinity that by war, maledictions, interdicts, excommunications, and all other means in my power, I will pursue the Turks, the most cruel foes of the Christian name”.

With this object in view Calixtus III sent legates to every country to quicken the zeal of Christendom. The buildings which Nicolas V had begun were neglected; his swarms of workmen were dismissed; men of letters found themselves little regarded in the new court where severe simplicity reigned, and the old Pope rarely left his chamber. The revenues of the Papacy were no longer devoted to the erection of splendid buildings and the encouragement of letters; they were used for the equipment of the Papal fleet, and the peaceful city was full of warlike preparation.

The hopes of a European crusade were fixed on Germany; but the proceedings of the Diet of Neustadt were scarcely such as to inspire much confidence. The death of Nicolas V and the election of a new Pope gave an opportunity to the Electors to urge upon the Emperor their grievances against the Papacy. Jacob of Trier exclaimed that now was the time to vindicate the liberty of the German Church, which was treated as the Pope’s handmaid; before Calixtus III was recognized the observance of the Concordat made by Eugenius IV should be rigorously exacted, and the grievances of the German church should be reformed. Aeneas Sylvius confirmed the troubled Emperor, who had his own grievances, because the private agreement made by Eugenius IV had not been more strictly observed than the published Concordat. It was vain, said Aeneas, for a prince to please the people, seeing that the multitude was always inconstant, and it was dangerous to give it the rein. On the other hand, the interests of the Pope and Emperor were identical, and a new Pope only gave a new opportunity for receiving favors. After a little hesitation Aeneas prevailed, and he, with the jurist John Hagenbach, was sent to Rome to offer to Calixtus III the obedience of Germany, and to lay before him the Emperor’s demands.

Aeneas and his colleague did not reach Rome till August 10, when they asked for a private audience to lay Frederick’s requests before the Pope. Calixtus III stood in a more independent position towards the Emperor than his two predecessors. Eugenius IV had bought back the obedience of Germany by secret concessions and a promise of money. Nicolas V had been privy to this transaction, and felt himself bound by it; he had paid his share of the money promised to Frederick, but 25,000 ducats were still due. Calixtus had had no part in the negotiations with Frederick, and knew how hopeless it was to satisfy the feeble and needy Emperor. He refused to consider his requests until he had received the obedience of Germany. Aeneas Sylvius, who was anxious to reach the Cardinalate, had no objection to use his position of Imperial envoy as a means of showing his readiness to please the Pope. He professed to be confounded at this demand of the Pope; but to avoid scandal he gave way to it. He proffered the obedience of Germany in a public consistory, and made a speech, in which was no mention of the Emperor's demands, or of the stricter observance of the Concordat. This speech was merely a string of compliments to the Pope and the Emperor and declamation about war against the Turk. When, after this, the ambassadors returned, in several private audiences, to the matters entrusted to them by the Emperor, they could only appear as
petitioners, not as negotiators. Calixtus roundly declared that he had no money to pay the 25,000 ducats which Frederick claimed; his other requests for a share in the tenths to be raised for the crusade, and for the right of nomination to vacant bishoprics, were deferred for further consideration. Cardinal Carvajal should be sent to satisfy the Emperor so far as was consistent with the rights of the Church. Frederick III was no longer the necessary ally of the Pope: his cause was now so far identified with that of the Pope that he could not desert the Papacy, and he was too unimportant in Germany to be of much service. Aeneas Sylvius felt that he had now done all he could for the Papacy in Germany; his connection with the Emperor could be of no further profit to him. He had brought to Rome letters from Frederick III, and also from Ladislas of Hungary, recommending him for the Cardinalate. This honor had been long in coming. Nicolas V had almost promised it; but the outspoken and fiery Nicolas had never liked the subtle, shifty Sienese, and Aeneas had been passed over. He now stayed in Rome in the hopes that Calixtus, as everyone expected, would create him Cardinal in the coming Advent.

But the expectations of Aeneas were for a time doomed to disappointment. A consistory was held for the creation of Cardinals, and congratulations were brought to Aeneas, who lay bedridden with the gout. The congratulations, however, were premature. The sitting of the consistory was long and stormy; when it broke up the Cardinals were pledged to secrecy. Calixtus III went back to the policy of Martin V, and wished to elevate his family at the expense of the Church. He proposed as the new Cardinals two of his nephews, Rodrigo Lançol y Borgia and Luis Juan de Mila, both young men little over twenty years of age, remarkable for nothing except the personal strength and vigor. Together with them he nominated a third youth, Don Jayme, son of the Infante Pedro of Portugal. The Cardinals protested loudly against this creation of two nephews; they pointed out the scandal that was likely to arise. For a time the Pope paused; he did not venture to publish the creation till September, when most of the Cardinals had left Rome to avoid the heat. The Cardinals murmured, but were helpless against the stubborn old man.

The desire to aggrandize his nephews was the only object which shared with the war against the Turks the interest of Calixtus III. Legates and preaching friars swarmed throughout Europe. Calixtus had no belief in Congresses; he issued himself a proclamation of war, imposed a tax on all the clergy throughout Christendom, and fixed March 1, 1456, as the day on which a combined fleet and army was to set forth against the Turks. He appointed special priests to say mass daily in behalf of the holy war; he ordered processions to be made for its success; at midday each church bell was to be rung to summon the faithful to prayer, and they who said three Aves and Paternosters for victory against the Turk earned an indulgence for three years. All that was possible was done to kindle the zeal and gather the contributions of Christendom.

The princes, however, did not show the same zeal as the Pope. They made high-sounding promises and professions, and were ready enough to receive the money collected in their realms; but this was all. Alfonso of Naples equipped a fleet, but sent it against Genoa instead of the Turks. The Duke of Burgundy was content with the renown he had already won as a crusader, and was busy in watching the French King. Charles VII of France at first refused to allow the Pope's Bulls to be published; he was too busily engaged in watching England and Burgundy to have any care for foreign enterprises. At length Cardinal Alain of Avignon prevailed upon him to sanction the collection of tenths from the French clergy; but the money was spent in building galleys.
at Avignon, which were afterwards used against Naples. Germany, England, and the Spanish kingdoms did nothing; the Italian powers were too cautious to take any decided steps. Nowhere did the Papal summons meet with any real response.

In spite of the lukewarmness of Europe the Pope was not disheartened. From his sick chamber he urged the building of his galleys along the Ripa Grande. To obtain money he took the treasures of art which Nicolas V had lavished on the Roman churches; he even stripped the splendid bindings off the books which Nicolas V had stored in the Vatican Library. One day his eye fell on a salt-cellar of richly-chased gold work upon his table: “Take it away” he cried, “take it for the Turkish war; an earthenware salt-cellar is enough for me”. The result of these efforts was that in May, 1456, a fleet of some sixteen galleys was anchored at Ostia. Calixtus appointed as his admiral Cardinal Scarampo, and bade him sail at once against the Turks. Sorely against his will, Scarampo was driven to undertake this hopeless task. His position was indeed pitiable. Under Eugenius IV he had been the general of the Papal forces, and had ruled Rome at his will; under Nicolas V his power came to an end, and he indulged himself in ease and luxury. With a new Pope a new field was opened for his ambition, and he had been foremost in promoting the election of Calixtus III, believing that the old man would be a flexible instrument in his hands. But Calixtus fell under the power of his stalwart nephews, who looked with suspicion on Scarampo, and so poisoned the Pope’s mind against him that he was forbidden to approach the Vatican. In this strait Scarampo made a bid for a renewal of favor by professing the greatest zeal for the Turkish war. Calixtus was mollified, and hoped that Scarampo would devote his own wealth to this purpose; the nephews were not sorry for an excuse for removing him from Rome, and he was appointed admiral of the fleet. In vain Scarampo tried to evade this unpleasant duty; in vain he urged that thirty galleys at least were needful before anything could be done. The obstinate and fiery Pope ordered him to set out at once, and threatened him with a judicial inquiry into his past conduct if he refused. Scarampo set sail and won back a few unimportant islands in the Aegean which had been captured by the Turks. He carried succors to the knights of Rhodes, and might pride himself on a few trivial successes. But his forces were inadequate to any serious undertaking, and Scarampo was neither a hero nor an enthusiast who cared to risk his life in a rash attempt. His only desire was to cruise about and make a decent show of activity. So far as he gave the islands a notion that they were being aided, he filled them with false security and unfounded hopes, which only tended to make them less self-reliant.

The only country which urged war successfully against the Turks was Hungary, which was bravely fighting for its national existence. There Fra Capistrano showed the power of religious zeal to stir a nation to a deep consciousness of the principles at stake. There also Cardinal Carvajal, as Papal legate, brought wisdom as well as devotion to aid the cause of patriotism. Carvajal had gone in 1455 to aid the crusading movement, and to reconcile the Emperor with his former ward, Ladislas. The reconciliation Carvajal soon found to be hopeless; he turned his attention to the more important business of national defense, and helped the brave Governor of Hungary, John Hunyadi, who was resolved to withstand the Turkish onslaught. In April, 1456, came the news that the Sultan with a host of 150,000 was advancing along the Danube valley to the siege of Belgrad. Hunyadi gathered such troops as he could and hastened to the relief of the threatened city. He besought Carvajal to remain in Buda, and gather forces to send to his support. King Ladislas, who was in Buda, went out hunting one morning with the Count of Cilly, but thought it more prudent not to return to such dangerous quarters, and
made off to Vienna. The nobles and the King were alike afraid; the two churchmen, Carvajal and Capistrano, alone assisted the national hero.

When Hunyadi arrived the siege of Belgrad had already been carried on for some fourteen days, and the walls of the city were terribly shaken; but the sight of Hunyadi and Capistrano with their forces gave the defenders new courage. On the evening of July 21 Mahomet II gave the signal for a storm. All the night and all the next day the battle raged desperately. Hunyadi and Capistrano stood on the top of a tower and surveyed the fight. Capistrano, with uplifted hands, bore the banner of the cross and a picture of S. Bernardino; from time to time shouted aloud the name of 'Jesus'. Hunyadi, with a soldier's eye, saw where help was needed, and rushed to aid the wavering till the fight was restored. More than once the infidels forced their way into the town, and were repelled by the valour of Hunyadi. At last an unexpected sally was made by a troop of Capistrano's crusaders; the janissaries were preparing to attack them in the flank, when Hunyadi charged furiously to their aid, and the voice of Capistrano succeeded in rallying them. The janissaries amazed at the onslaught fled to their tents; the Sultan, who had been slightly wounded by an arrow, gave the signal for retreat, and Belgrad was saved.

There was a cry of triumph throughout Europe at the news, and Calixtus naturally expected that this success would rouse men’s minds, and fire the lagging princes of Europe for the holy cause. But after the first glow of enthusiasm no one was moved to any decided action. In Hungary itself the heroes of Belgrad passed away, and it was doubtful who would take their place. A month after his victory, on August 11, John Hunyadi died of the plague. When he felt that death was approaching and preparations were being made to administer to him the Eucharist, he exclaimed, “It is not fitting that the Lord should be brought to visit the servant”. He rose from his bed and prepared to seek the nearest church; his strength failed him, and he had to be carried. He confessed his sins, received the Eucharist, and died in the hands of the priests. Capistrano was not long in following him; he died of fever on October 23, 1456.

The death of Hunyadi might fill the Hungarians with woe, but it was a source of relief to King Ladislas, and more especially to his guardian the Count of Cilly. Now that the mighty Vaivod was removed, the Count of Cilly hoped that he would be supreme over the young King and would assert over Hungary the royal power, freed from the trammels which Hunyacy had imposed. Ladislas and the Count of Cilly returned to Hungary, and even went to Belgrad to see the battlefield whose glory they had so basely refused to share. There one morning while the King was at mass the Hungarian nobles, led by Ladislas Corvinus, Hunyady’s son, fell upon the Count of Cilly and slew him. The King for some time dissembled his wrath, and the sons of Hunyadi accompanied him unsuspiciously to Buda, where they were seized, and Ladislas Corvinus was publicly beheaded as a traitor. The King himself did not long enjoy his triumph; on November 23, 1457, he died suddenly in Prague, whither he had gone to prepare for his marriage with Margaret of France.

The question of the Hungarian succession added to the confusion in Germany, where things were already sufficiently confounded. The Electoral party was still aiming at its own objects as against the feeble Emperor, and the death of Jacob, Archbishop of Trier, in May, 1456, altered the state of parties and introduced a new subject of discord. The Pfalzgraf now stood at the head of the opposition, and both parties struggled to obtain the vacant archbishopric. John of Baden and Rupert of the Pfalz were the
candidates; but the power of the Pope was sufficiently strong to secure the victory for John of Baden, son of the Markgraf Jacob, who was the Emperor's friend. The opposition now consisted of the Pfalzgraf and the Archbishops of Mainz and Koln. The collection of the tenths imposed by the Pope gave an occasion to raise again the old grievances of the German Church and to recur to the old policy of reform. The victory of Belgrad gave an opportunity of attacking the indolence of the Emperor, and the Electors sent Frederick III an invitation to be present at a Diet to be held in Nurnberg on November 30, 1456, to consider the war against the Turk; if he did not come, the Electors would take such steps as they thought best.

It was noticeable that this Diet, which was forbidden by the Emperor, was attended by a Papal legate. It would seem that the Electoral opposition counted on having the Pope on their side, if only they joined in war against the Turk and laid aside their anti-Papal measures. However that might be, the question of the private interests of the Electors overrode both the Turkish war and the reform of the Church. The discussions were purely political, and the Diet adjourned till March, 1457, when it again met at Frankfort, and again adjourned. Meanwhile, Albert of Brandenburg succeeded in forming a strong party in the Emperor's favor, and the opposition was driven to fall back. When baffled in its political objects it bethought itself of the question of Church reform. The Papacy was threatened with what it dreaded even more than a General Council—the establishment of a Pragmatic Sanction for Germany.

Proceedings were begun in secrecy by the Electors; but, as usual, information early reached the Curia, and preparations were made to resist the attempt. To Aeneas Sylvius was left the organization of the defense. Aeneas had at length attained to the goal of his ambition. On December 18, 1456, the Pope had created him Cardinal with five others. It would seem that the College, steadfast in its opposition to the Pope and his nephews, resisted as long as it could this new creation. “No Cardinals”, writes Aeneas to one of the newly-elected dignitaries, “ever entered the College with greater difficulty than we; for rust had so spread over the hinges (cardines) that the door could not turn and open. Calixtus used battering rams and every kind of instrument to force it”. Aeneas wrote at once to Frederick III to thank him for his good offices. “All men shall know”, he said, “that I am a German rather than an Italian Cardinal”. He soon proceeded to show the sense in which he meant that promise, by using all his skill to baffle the aspirations of Germany for freedom from ecclesiastical oppression.

About the grievances of Germany there was no doubt; but there was little earnestness in the means taken to have them redressed. The cry for reform was raised by the Electors when they had something to gain from the Pope: it gradually died away when a sop was thrown to the personal interests of the leaders of the movement. The proceedings were insincere even on the part of those who saw most forcibly the evils. The present leader of the movement was the Archbishop of Mainz; and his Chancellor, Martin Mayr, sounded the note of war in a letter to Aeneas Sylvius, in which, after congratulating him on his Cardinalate, he put forth a powerful indictment of the Papal dealings with Germany. The Pope, he said, observed neither the decrees of Constance nor Basel, nor the agreements of his predecessors, but set at nought the German nation. Elections to bishoprics were arbitrarily annulled, and reservations of every kind were made in favor of Cardinals and Papal secretaries. “You yourself”, proceeded Mayr, “have a general reservation of benefices to the value of 2000 ducats yearly in the provinces of Mainz, Trier, and Koln, an unprecedented and unheard-of grant”. Grants of expectancies were habitually given, annates were rigorously exacted, nor was the Pope
content simply with the sum that was due. Bishoprics were given not to the most worthy, but to the man who offered most. Indulgences were granted; Turkish tenths were imposed without the consent of the bishops, and the money went to the Pope. Cases that ought to be decided by the bishops were transferred to the Papal Court. In every way the German nation, once so glorious, was treated as a handmaid by the Pope. For years she had groaned over her slavery; her nobles thought that the time was come for her to assert her freedom.

The letter reads as though it were genuinely meant; but Aeneas in his answer shows that he, at all events, he read between the lines. In answering Mayr he asserted the Papal supremacy, reacted the decrees of Basel, agreed that the Concordat should be observed, and suggested that if the Electors had any grievances on this point, they should at once send envoys to the Pope, who would be willing to grant redress. As regarded the Papal interference with elections, it was exercised in the way of judicial intervention, the need for which was caused by the ambition and greed of contending claimants, not by Papal rapacity. If money were paid to officers of the Curia, that was not the Pope’s doing, but was caused by the ambition of the claimants, who were willing to do anything which might further their cause. Men were not all angels at Rome any more than in Germany; they took money when it was offered, but the Pope in his chamber decided according to justice. The Pope's officials might be extortionate, and the Pope greatly wished to check them; but he himself received nothing save what was due. Everyone makes a grievance of parting with money, and always will do so. The complaint of the Bohemians against the Germans was the same as that of the Germans against the Papacy—that their money is taken out of the land. Yet Germany, from its connection with the Papacy, had steadily grown in wealth and importance, and, in spite of its complaints, was richer than at any previous time. Aeneas found it hard that Mayr complained of the provision made in his favor; he had lived and labored in Germany so long that he did not think he was regarded as a stranger. However, he thanked Mayr for his personal offer to help him in realizing his provision, and would be glad to know of any eligible benefices that might fall vacant. From the last sentence we see that Mayr in another letter had drawn a distinction between the German grievances and his own personal feelings; though theoretically he might regard his friend as an abuse, he was practically ready to help him.

Aeneas showed that he interpreted this letter of Martin Mayr to mean that the Archbishop of Mainz had some conditions to propose to the Pope. He was not wrong in his conjecture, for early in September came a secretary of the Archbishop, who was empowered to negotiate, through Aeneas Sylvius, for an alliance with Calixtus III; the Archbishop of Mainz was ready to desert to the Pope's side if he received the right of confirmation of episcopal elections throughout Germany. Aeneas answered in a letter to Mayr with a decided refusal, cleverly couched in courteous yet stinging language. He was glad to hear that the Archbishop no longer joined with the malignants against the Pope, but regretted to hear that he had been ill advised to ask for a right inherent in the Papacy, which none of his predecessors had enjoyed. No understanding was necessary between Christ's vicegerent and his subjects—all were bound to obey. He was sure that the modesty of the Archbishop had been improperly represented by this request, which he, for his part, could not venture to lay before a Pope so blameless, so wise, and so upright as was Calixtus III.

Aeneas might answer Mayr conclusively; yet the danger was threatening, and all the diplomatic power of Aeneas was set to work to avert it. He assured the Archbishop
of Mainz that the Pope was ready to grant all his smaller requests; he assured Mayr of his strong personal friendship, and of his desire to serve him in all ways. He wrote to Frederick III in the name of Calixtus III to supply him with an answer to the murmurs against the Papacy. He wrote to the King of Hungary, to the German Archbishops, to remind them of their duties to the Papacy. He stirred up the Cardinals Cusa and Carvajal to exert all their influence in Germany. Above all he wrote most confidentially to his former friends, the jurists and secretaries who occupied important posts at the different German Courts; Peter Knorr, the councilor of Albert of Brandenburg; Heinrich Leubing, Procopius of Rabstein, Heinrich Senftleben, and John Lysura, to whom he sent a cipher that communications might be carried on with greater secrecy. Moreover, a new envoy was sent into Germany, a skillful theologian and diplomatist, Lorenzo Rovarella, who was laden with Bulls to the Emperor and the Electors. Aeneas gave him instructions to warn the Archbishops of Magdeburg, Trier, Riga and Salzburg to abstain from joining in any measures against the Pope. He was to urge the Duke of Bavaria to use his influence with the Pfalzgraf in the same direction; and as soon as possible was to proceed from the Emperor's Court to the Rhenish provinces, which were the seat of the anti-Papal movement. The princes were reminded that capitular elections were rarely in favor of junior members of princely families, and that only through the Papal intervention could these meet with their due rewards. The bishops were asked to consider that any blow aimed at the Papal dignity would eventually be disastrous to all episcopal authority as well. It was frankly admitted that there were abuses in the Papal Curia which the Pope desired to remedy. The German princes were asked to send their complaints to Rome, and trust to the Pope's judgment. A judicious mixture of cajolery and fair promises was applied to soothe the discontent of Germany.

Moreover, Aeneas Sylvius took up his pen in defense of the Papacy, and expanded his letter to Mayr into a tractate 'On the Condition of Germany'. He represented the Concordat as depending on the goodwill of the Pope, and expressed the Pope's desire for a reform of all abuses which could be shown to attach to the proceedings of the Curia. He discussed the complaints of the Germans with sophistical skill. He condemned generally the abuses complained of, denied their existence, and then plausibly accounted for a few exceptional cases. Grants in expectancy, he said, had never been made by the Pope, except at the earnest request of princes, and solely for the purpose of raising money for war against the Turk. Capitular elections have never been annulled except on legal grounds, though he admitted that some legal ground had been discovered to annul every election brought before the Curia during the past two years. As to the complaints about indulgences, he said, pertinently enough, that the Papacy only offered indulgences to the faithful who showed their zeal for their religion by contributing to the expenses of the Turkish war. It was a free gift on their part; why should it be laid as an exaction to the Pope's charge? Germany had received from Rome more than she had given. Her complaint that money went from her to Rome was an old grievance, as old as human nature itself, and was never likely to disappear.

The pleadings of Aeneas and the diplomacy of Rovarella had the effect in Germany of staying any definite proceedings for a time; and in German politics to pause was to lose the day. If for a brief space a strong party of the princes was united for a common object, it needed only a few months for some change to occur in the position of affairs which led to a new combination. The death of Ladislas of Hungary in November, 1457, caused great excitement in Germany. The dominions of Austria, Hungary, and Bohemia were left in dispute, and most of the German princes were interested in the
settlement. It is true that a Diet met at Frankfort in June, 1458, and agreed to send an
embassy to the Pope; but this was felt to be a mere empty form. The Papacy gained its
object of putting off the enactment of a Pragmatic Sanction for Germany, and the death
of Calixtus III in September removed him from further threats.

All these disturbances in Germany promised little for the favorite design of
Calixtus III—a great expedition against the Turks. Nothing was done for this object.
Scarampo still cruised about the Aegean islands with the Papal fleet, and Scanderbeg in
Albania showed how strong national feeling could supply courage to a handful of men
contending against an invading host; but Europe did nothing. Calixtus III grew daily
more indignant at the remissness of Alfonso of Naples, his former friend, in whose
service he had entered Italy. His friendship rapidly turned to hostility when Alfonso sent
his fleet against Genoa instead of joining with Scarampo. He opposed Alfonso’s Italian
policy, and strove to prevent the alliance with Milan by which Alfonso wished to secure
the succession of his son to the Neapolitan kingdom. Alfonso had no child born in
lawful wedlock; but his illegitimate son, Ferrante, had been legitimatized and
recognized as successor to the Neapolitan kingdom by Eugenius IV and Nicolas V. In
spite of this, on Alfonso's death, on June 27, 1458, the impetuous Pope threatened to
plunge Italy into war by refusing to acknowledge Ferrante, and claiming Naples as a fief
of the Holy See.

It was not only anger at Alfonso's remissness to help in the Turkish war that
prompted Calixtus III to this step. The only object, which shared with crusading zeal the
Pope’s interest, was the enrichment of his nephews; and for this the vacancy of the
Neapolitan throne gave an opening which he hastened to use. Besides the two nephews
who had been elevated to the Cardinalate was a third, Don Pedro Luis de Borgia, on
whom Calixtus III was desirous to heap every worldly distinction. He made him
Gonfalonier of the Church and Prefect of Rome; he committed to his hands all the
castles in the neighborhood of the city. He conferred on him also the Duchy of Spoleto,
in spite of the protest of Capranica, who made himself the mouthpiece of the discontent
of the Cardinals. Calixtus tried to rid himself of Capranica by sending him on distant
embassies; when this failed he threatened to imprison him.

There was nothing that Calixtus would not do for his nephews, whom he
identified still further with himself by bestowing on them his own family name and
arms of Borgia. These three vigorous young men were all-powerful with the Pope, and
the Cardinals who maintained an independent footing were either sent on distant
embassies or compelled to leave the city. Carvajal and Cusa were at a safe distance in
Germany; Scarampo, against his will, was sent to sea; Cardinal Orsini in vain tried to
resist, and was driven to quit Rome. The other Cardinals of any importance,
Estouteville, head of the French party, Piero Barbo, the nephew of Eugenius IV, even
Prospero Colonna, thought it wise to be on good terms with the Borgia. Aeneas Sylvius
was too much accustomed to be on the winning side to find any difficulty in making
friends with the powerful. With his wonted amiability he was ready to help Cardinal
Borgia in his desire to enrich himself with Church preferment. He acted as his agent,
and informed him of eligible vacancies during his absence. “I keep an eye on
benefices”, he writes on April 1, 1457, “and will take care of you and myself. But we
are deceived by false rumors. He whose death was reported from Nurnberg was here a
few days ago, and dined with me. The Bishop of Toul, also, who was said to have died
at Neustadt, has returned safe and sound to Burgundy. I will, however, be watchful tor
any vacancy; but you have the best proctor in his Holiness”.

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Thus watchful and thus supported, the Borgia ruled Rome and filled the city with their creatures. Dependents of their house flocked from Spain to share the booty, and their party was known by the name of “the Catalans”. All the offices of the city were put in the hands of these strangers, who connived at robbery and murder by the members of their own faction. One day Capranica was asked for alms on the bridge of S. Angelo by a beggar, who pleaded that he had escaped from the Catalans. “You are better off than I am”, answered the Cardinal, “for you have escaped, while I am still in their hands”.

The death of Alfonso offered Calixtus III an opportunity of exalting his nephew Pedro still higher. By claiming the kingdom of Naples he might at least get hold of some portion which might be made into a fief for Pedro's benefit. On July 31 he conferred on him the Vicariate of Benevento and Terracina.

It was not, however, to be expected that Ferrante would flee before the Papal threats. He summoned a meeting of the Neapolitan nobles, who accepted him as their king; he appealed from the Pope to a future Council, and prepared to defend himself against an attack. He claimed only the kingdom of Naples; on Alfonso’s death without lawful issue Aragon and Sicily passed to his brother John of Navarre. Even without the Pope’s interference there were other claimants to the throne of Naples. John of Anjou revived the claims of his house; and Charles of Biana, son of John Navarre, was prepared to maintain his right of legitimate succession to Alfonso. Calixtus III might disturb the peace of Southern Italy; but he was by no means strong enough to secure his own success. His policy could only lead to the introduction of foreign invaders, and was in consequence strongly opposed by the far-seeing Duke of Milan, whom Calixtus III vainly tried to win over to his side. Sforza answered, that the settlement made under the auspices of Nicolas V had met with the approval of all the Italian Powers, and he for his part would fight in defence of Ferrante, rather than see the concord of Italy disturbed.

This answer of Sforza was a bitter disappointment to the old Pope. But the end of his plans was approaching. He was seized with a lever, and it was clear that his end was drawing near. The Orsini began to take up arms against the hated Catalans. The nephew Pedro grew more fearful for himself as he saw his uncle on his deathbed. He judged it better to beat a prudent retreat while there was yet time. He sold the castle of S. Angelo to the Cardinals for 20,000 ducats, and on August 5 left the city with his Catalan friends. The Orsini occupied the gates and watched the roads to prevent his escape; only by the friendly aid of Cardinal Barbo did he manage to flee, in the darkness of the night. Barbo led him to the Tiber, where he took boat and made his way to Civita Vecchia. Next day, August 6, Calixtus III died. The Orsini at once plundered the houses of the Catalans and all that bore the arms of the Borgia. Calixtus was buried with little respect in the vault of S. Peter's, and was followed to the grave only by four priests.

The pontificate of Calixtus III was a violent reaction against the policy of Nicolas V. The energy of Nicolas V and the greatness of his schemes had naturally caused some dismay among the Cardinals, who heard the murmurs of Germany and feared the results of localizing the Papacy too exclusively in Rome. Under the influence of this feeling they elected a stranger, whose advanced age was a guarantee that his pontificate would only be a temporary breathing space, in which they might recover from the impetuosity of Nicolas V. But the reaction of Calixtus III was too violent and too complete. He not only checked the works of his predecessor; he allowed them to fall into decay. Had he continued in any degree the buildings of his predecessor, the schemes of Nicolas V might have been slowly realized in the future side by side with other objects of Papal
But the entire suspension of the works by Calixtus III was fatal. The scheme of the Renaissance, instead of advancing to gradual completion, was laid aside to be superseded by the more splendid, though less thorough, plan of a later age. Rome, that might have borne the impress of the calm strength and simplicity of Nicolas V and Alberti, is stamped with the more passionate magnificence of Julius II and Bramante. No institution, least of all an institution like the Papacy, admits of a sudden change of policy, or can without loss direct its energies entirely into a different channel. While we may admire the zeal of Calixtus III for a crusade against the Turks, we must regret that it was so exclusive as to sacrifice with impatience all the labors of Nicolas V.

Even Calixtus III did not entirely abandon some care for the architecture of Rome; but his willfulness is shown in the works which he did, no less than in those which he left undone. He restored the Church and the palace of SS. Quattro Coronati, because from the Church he took his title as Cardinal, and the palace had served as his residence. He restored also the Church of S. Calixtus, in honor of his Papal name; and the Church of S. Sebastiano Fuori, because it was situated over the Catacombs of S. Calixtus. Besides these, he did some repairs to the Church of S. Prisca, and began a new ceiling in S. Maria Maggiore. The few painters who remained in Rome in the days of Calixtus III were employed for the purpose of painting standards to be borne against the Turks.

If Calixtus III was thus inconsiderate and narrow-minded in despising the work of his predecessor, the same qualities stood in the way of his success in the object which was foremost to himself. It must always be an honor to the Papacy that, in a great crisis of European affairs, it asserted the importance of a policy which was for the interest of Europe as a whole. Calixtus III and his successor deserve, as statesmen, credit which can be given to no others of the politicians of the time. The Papacy, by summoning Christendom to defend the ancient limits of Christian civilization against the assaults of heathenism, was worthily discharging the chief secular duty of its office. Of the zeal and earnestness of Calixtus III there was no question; but the lethargy of Europe prevented him accomplishing much. Moreover, the zeal of Calixtus was displayed by passionate impetuosity which disregarded the means in its desire to reach the end. All that Bulls, exhortations, and indulgences could do, Calixtus did; but he, trusted merely to words, and took no means to remedy the evils which kept Europe suspicious and divided and prevented the possibility of combination for a common object. He did not try to win the confidence of Germany by wise measures of ecclesiastical reform, which might have formed the beginning of a political reorganization. He did not even in Italy strive to maintain the pacific spirit which he found. Under the influence of his greedy nephews the Papacy again threatened to be a centre of territorial aggression.

The impetuosity of youth has passed into a common phrase. The history of the Papacy gives many examples of the no less dangerous impetuosity of old age. Men of decided opinions, who come to power late in life, expend on accomplishing their cherished desires the accumulated passion of a lifetime. Inflexible, overbearing, inconsiderate, Calixtus III pursued his own plans, and seemed to form no part of the life around him. He brooked no contradiction; he saw no one who was not prepared to re-echo his opinions; he had no care of anything outside the circle which he had marked for himself. The vow which he made on his election was one of the ornaments of his chamber; it was ever before his eyes and ever in his thoughts. He left at his death 150,000 ducats, which he had stored up for the Turkish war.
Personally Calixtus III was a man of rigid piety and of simple life. He was largely charitable and attentive to all religious duties. Little could be said against him save that he was obstinate and irritable; yet he inspired little affection and accomplished little. His weakness left more permanent results than did his strength. The ardor of his zeal for Christendom is forgotten; the evil deeds of his nephew Rodrigo and his race have made the name of Borgia a byword, and Calixtus III is remembered as the founder of a race whose actions marked the Papacy with irretrievable disgrace.
CHAPTER VI.
PIUS II AND THE CONGRESS OF MANTUA.
1458-1460.

On August 10 the eighteen Cardinals who were in Rome entered the Conclave in the Vatican Palace. The first day was spent in preliminaries. The next day was devoted to framing the solemn agreement, which since the death of Martin V had been subscribed by all the Cardinals before a Papal election. It contained the chief points to which the College wished to bind the future Pope, and so expressed the desire of the electors to limit, while there was yet time, the absolute power of the infallible ruler whom they were about to set over the Church. On the present occasion the points insisted on were the prosecution of the Turkish war, respect for the wishes of the Cardinals in new creations, proper provision for the Cardinals, due consultation of the College in all important matters, care for the States of the Church, and such like matters. On the third day the first scrutiny was taken, and it was found that Cardinals Piccolomini and Calandrini had each received five votes, while no other candidate received more than three. The first scrutiny, however, was generally of little consequence, and merely served as a means of opening private discussions among the Cardinals. It soon appeared that the French Cardinal Estouteville, by his wealth and magnificence, had gained a considerable following, and could count with certainty on six votes. A little private consultation showed that the real issue was the election of Estouteville or an Italian. Estouteville had many arguments to use in his own favor. “Will you take Aeneas”, he said, “who is both gouty and poor? How can one who is poor and infirm govern the Church? Perhaps he will transfer the Papacy to his beloved Germany, or introduce his heathenish poetry into the statutes of the Church. Calandrini is incapable even of governing himself. I am an older Cardinal than they; of the royal race of France, rich, and with many friends; my election will vacate many benefices which will be divided among you”. The adherents of Estouteville met in secrecy and bound themselves to secure his election. They counted on eleven votes, and regarded the election as won; already Estouteville had promised them the due rewards of their zeal in his cause.

But at midnight Calandrini visited the cell of Piccolomini. “Tomorrow”, he said, “Estouteville will be elected. I counsel you to rise and offer him your vote so as to win his favor. I know from my experience of Calixtus III how ill it is to have the Pope for one's enemy”. Aeneas answered that it was against his conscience to do so; he could not vote for one whom he considered unworthy. But Aeneas was disturbed in his mind, and early in the morning visited Cardinal Borgia to see if he was pledged. Borgia said that he did not wish to be on the losing side, and had received from Estouteville a document promising to confirm him in the office of Vice-Chancellor, which he had held under Calixtus III.

“Are you not rash in trusting to the promise of an enemy to your nation?”, said Aeneas. “Do you not know that the Chancery is also promised to the Cardinal of Avignon? Which promise is the new Pope most likely to keep?”. 
Next Aeneas sought Cardinal Castiglione and asked him if he had promised his vote to Estouteville. Castiglione made a like answer; he did not wish to stand alone, since the affair was as good as settled. Aeneas recalled the miseries of the Schism, the dangers of a French Papacy, and the disgrace which it would bring on Italy: had they escaped the Catalans only to fall before the French? Aeneas next met Cardinal Barbo, who was equally anxious that some decisive step should be taken to defeat the schemes of Estouteville’s party. Barbo was one of those who had entertained hopes of his own election; he determined to lay them aside, and try to gain a majority for the best candidate of an Italian party. He invited the Italian Cardinals to assemble in the cell of the Cardinal of Genoa, and six answered his summons. He laid before them the condition of affairs, appealed to their national sentiment, exhorted them to lay aside all personal feelings, and proposed Piccolomini as their candidate. All agreed except Aeneas, who modestly declared himself unworthy of the honor.

Soon after this the public proceedings of the Conclave began with the mass, which was followed by a scrutiny. Estouteville, pale with excitement, was one of the three Cardinals whose office it was to guard the chalice, while the rest advanced in order and dropped into it their votes. As Aeneas approached the altar Estouteville whispered, “Aeneas, I commend myself to you”. “Do you commend yourself to a poor creature like me?”, answered Aeneas, as he dropped his vote. Then the chalice was emptied on a table, and the scrutinizers read out the votes: when this had been done Estouteville announced that Aeneas had eight votes. “Count again”, said Aeneas, and Estouteville was obliged to confess that he had made a mistake; and Aeneas had nine votes, and he himself had six. It was clear that, with nine votes out of eighteen, Aeneas had won the day; only three votes were wanting, and the Cardinals remained seated to try the method of accession. “All sat”, says Aeneas, “pale and silent, as though rapt by the Holy Ghost. No one spoke or opened his mouth, or moved any part of his body save his eyes, which rolled from place to place. The silence was wonderful as all waited, the inferiors expecting their superiors to begin”. At last Borgia arose and said, “I accede to the Cardinal of Siena”. The conversation of Aeneas about the Vice-Chancellorship had no doubt shown Borgia which way his interest lay. Aeneas had now ten votes, and in a desperate attempt to prevent the election being made that day Isidore of Russia and Torquemada rose and left the Conclave. No one followed, and they soon returned. Then Cardinal Tebaldo rose and said, “I also accede to the Cardinal of Siena”. One vote only was wanting, which Prospero Colonna rose to give. Estouteville and Bessarion upbraided him for his desertion of their cause, and seizing his arms tried to lead him from the Conclave; but Colonna loudly called out, “I also accede to the Cardinal of Siena, and make him Pope”. The deed was done; the intrigues were at an end. In a moment the Cardinals were prostrate at the feet of the new Pope. Then they resumed their seats, and formally confirmed the election.

Bessarion, in the name of the adherents of Estouteville, addressed Aeneas. “We are pleased with your election, which we doubt not comes from God; we think you worthy of the office, and always held you so. Our only reason for not voting for you was your bodily infirmity: we thought that your gouty feet might be a hindrance to that activity which the perils from the Turks might require. It was this that led us to prefer the Cardinal of Rouen. Had you been strong in body there was no one whom we would have chosen before you. But the will of God is now our will”. “You have a better opinion of us”, answered Aeneas, “than we have of ourselves; for you only find us defective in the feet, we feel our imperfections to be more widely spread. We are
conscious of innumerable failings which might have excluded us from this office; we are conscious of no merits to justify our election. We would judge ourselves entirely unworthy, did we not know that the voice of two-thirds of the Sacred College is the voice of God, which we may not disobey. We approve your conduct in following your conscience and judging us insufficient. You will all be equally acceptable to us; for we ascribe our election, not to one or another, but to the whole College, and so to God Himself, from whom comes every good and perfect gift”.

Aeneas then put off his robes, and assumed the white tunic of the Pope. He was asked what name he would bear, and with a Virgilian reminiscence of Pius Aeneas, answered “Pius”. Then he swore to observe the agreement entered into by the Cardinals at the beginning of the Conclave. He was led to the altar, and there received the reverence of the Cardinals. Then the election was announced to the people from a window. The attendants of the Conclave plundered the cell of the newly-elected Pope, and the mob outside rushed to pillage his house, which they did with such completeness that they tore even the marble from the walls. Unfortunately, he was one of the poorest Cardinals; but part of the mob professed to mistake the cry of “Il Sianese” for “Il Genovese”, and plundered the house of Cardinal Flisco as well.

The election of Cardinal Piccolomini was popular with the Romans: the citizens laid aside their arms, with which they were provided in case of a tumult, and went to S. Peter's. Pius II was placed on the high altar, and received the adoration of the Cardinals, the clergy, and the people. At nightfall the magistrates of the city came on horseback, bearing blading torches, to pay their respects to the new Pope. On September 3, he was crowned in S. Peter's, and rode in solemn procession to the Lateran, where he experienced the unruliness of the Roman mob, who, according to old custom, seized the horse and trappings of the Pope. So eager were they for their booty that they made a rush too soon. Swords were drawn in the fight for the plunder, and the crippled Pope was in danger of his life in the confusion. He was, however, happily saved from hurt, and entertained the Cardinals, the foreign ambassadors, and chief citizens at a banquet.

The election of Pius II gave general satisfaction in Italy, where the new Pope was well known to most of the princes and republics. His reputation for learning and his diplomatic ability made every one look upon him with respect. The French, however, felt aggrieved at the rejection of Estouteville, and the opponents of the Emperor in Germany looked with suspicion on one whose cleverness they knew too well. To Pius II himself his elevation was a source of mingled joy and fear. True, he was ambitious, vain, desirous of glory; true, he had schemed and plotted for his own advancement, and had made success the great object of his life. But, when success came at last, he shrank from the responsibilities of which he well knew the extent. He was no inexperienced enthusiast who might dream that he had the future in his hands. Though only fifty-three years old, Pius II was already old in body, racked by the gout, suffering from gravel, afflicted by the beginnings of asthma. He knew full well how useless it was in the existing condition of Europe to hope for any great opportunities which he might use to leave his mark upon the world. He had reached the height of his ambition, and saw nothing but difficulties before him. When in the first moments after his election his friends thronged round him with joyful congratulations, he burst into tears. “You may rejoice”, he said, “because you think not of the toils and the dangers. Now must I show to others what I have so often demanded from them”. During all the festivities of his accession his face was careworn and melancholy.
When Pius II reviewed the condition of Europe he had no hesitation in deciding that the chief object of his policy must be the same as that of his predecessor, the prosecution of war against the Turk. What Calixtus III had urged with the unreflecting fanaticism of a recluse, Pius II would press with the wisdom of a statesman. Already Pius II had identified himself with the cause of the crusade; his speeches, his writings, had advocated it; his knowledge of European politics convinced him of its absolute necessity. But he saw that, to ensure success, the crusade must be undertaken by the whole of Christendom, and Christendom must be united for this purpose by wise management on the part of the Pope. Accordingly, Pius II determined to proceed with stately deliberation, and put the project on its proper footing. He lost no time in laying before the Cardinals a plan for a general conference of the princes of Europe, to be held under the Pope's presidency. But the Cardinals were half-hearted; the majority of them were content to stay in Rome and enjoy themselves, and shrank from the trouble of a serious undertaking. They raised difficulties about the place of the proposed conference; the princes of Europe could not well be summoned to Rome; there was a danger, if an assembly were held in France or Germany, that it might turn into a Council, whose very name was hateful. Pius II pointed out that the state of his health gave him an excuse for refusing to cross the Alps, while he was ready to show his zeal by going to some place in North Italy, so as to meet the European representatives half way: he proposed Udine or Mantua as suitable places for the Congress. The Cardinals reluctantly consented; and Pius II hastened to publish his resolution to an assembly of ambassadors and prelates in S. Peter's. There were present eleven Cardinals, three archbishops, twenty-nine bishops, and the ambassadors of Castile, Denmark, Portugal, Naples, Burgundy, Milan, Modena, Venice, Florence, Siena, and Lucca. To them Pius II announced his plan; though an old man and infirm, he would brave the dangers of crossing the Apennines to confer with the princes of Europe on the step to be taken to avert the ruin of Christendom: he asked for their opinion and advice. For a time there was silence. Then Bessarion begged the ambassadors to speak. One after another they praised the zeal of the Pope, and asserted the good intentions of their several states. Pius II was pleased with these expressions of assent, and invited all to a public consistory to be held in three days' time, on October 13. There a solemn summons to a Congress to be held on June 1, 1459, was read to the assembly, and a few days afterwards Pius II sent letters to the various kings of Christendom, urging their presence at this great undertaking.

But before he could proceed to a Congress, Pius II had a political question to settle nearer home. Calixtus III had refused to recognize the succession of Ferrante in Naples, and had claimed the kingdom as a fief of the Holy See. He had not conferred it on any claimant, and any scheme that he might have had of establishing his nephew in Naples was at once overthrown by his death. An envoy of Ferrante had been sent to the Cardinals during the vacancy; Pius II found the Neapolitan question pressing for his decision. Nor was the question one which could be decided easily on general grounds. The condottiere general, Jacopo Piccinino, had occupied in Ferrante's name Assisi, Gualdo, and Nocera. The States of the Church were in confusion, and in many cities Pius II had to buy off the Catalan governors, and assert his rule with difficulty, the presence of Piccinino was a continual menace.

Moreover, the general lines of the Papal policy towards Naples had been somewhat obscured by the predecessors of Pius II. The Papacy had, on the whole, favored the Angevin party. Eugenius IV had been the constant opponent of Alfonso, and Nicolas V had only recognized him for the sake of peace. The question which Calixtus
III had opened was full of difficulty. Pius II might well doubt the wisdom of supporting in Naples the line of Anjou, and introducing into the neighborhood of the Papacy the influence of the country of the Pragmatic Sanction. Pius II himself had known and liked the scholarly Alfonso, and his own sympathies were probably on the side of Ferrante. But the French party was strong among the Cardinals, and the envoys of the French King laid before the Pope the impolicy of offending a prince so powerful as their master. As the Archbishop of Marseilles pleaded in this strain, Pius II suddenly asked him if René of Anjou were ready to drive out Piccinino from the States of the Church. The Archbishop was driven to answer “No”. “Then what are we to expect from one who cannot help us in our straits?”, said the Pope. “We need a king in Naples who can protect both himself and us”.

So Pius II proceeded to make the best bargain he could with Ferrante. When Ferrante wished to negotiate, the Pope roundly answered that he was no merchant to barter with. On October 17 an agreement was made that Pius II should free Ferrante from all ecclesiastical censures, and invest him with the kingdom of Naples, without prejudice to another’s right. The Pope did not venture to decide entirely against the Angevin claims, but merely recognized Ferrante as the actual king. Ferrante undertook to pay the Pope a yearly tribute, and recall Piccinino from the States of the Church within a month. Benevento, which had been granted as a personal fief to Alfonso, was restored to the Church; but Terracina, which was held in the same way, was to be retained by Ferrante for ten years. The French Cardinals still opposed the agreement, and refused to sign the Bull in which it was embodied. Piccinino was driven to leave the States of the Church, and Pius II sent Cardinal Orsini to crown Ferrante in Naples.

When peace had thus been restored to some extent at home, Pius II proceeded with the preparations for his departure to the Congress. The Romans were ill pleased to see the Pope leave his city. Some exclaimed that he was going to take the Papacy to Germany; others declared that he would go no farther than Siena, and there would devote himself to the adornment of his native land. All joined in lamenting the loss which the city would sustain from the departure of the Curia. They deprecated the danger to which the Pope was about to expose his life, and foretold that his departure would be the signal for disturbances in the Papal States. To allay their anxiety Pius II left some Cardinals and officials of the Curia behind him, that Rome might not be entirely deprived of its glory; he appointed the Cardinal Nicolas of Cusa Vicar during his absence. He decreed that if he died away from Rome the election of his successor should still take place in that city after a due delay for the return of the absent Cardinals. He granted their ancient privileges to the cities in the Papal States, and remitted their tribute for three years. Finally, he summoned the Roman barons, and administered to them an oath that they would keep the peace during his absence. As a token of his zeal for the crusading cause, he founded a new military order, the order of S. Mary of Bethlehem. But the day for military orders was gone, and this revival existed only in name. After these precautions he set out from Rome on January 22, 1459, accompanied by six Cardinals—Calandrini, Borgia, Alain, Estouteville, Barbo, and Colonna.

The journey of Pius II was like a triumphal progress. It was long since a Pope had been seen by any of the dwellers in the Papal States. Throngs of people welcomed him wherever he went with shouts of rejoicing and expressions of goodwill, which afforded sincere enjoyment to Pius II, who fully appreciated the dignity of his office.
At Narni the crowd thronged round his horse, and strove to carry off the baldachino held over his head. Swords were drawn in the struggle, and Pius II thought it wiser in the future to be carried in a litter, so as to avoid such unseemly brawls. At Spoleto he was entertained for four days by his sister Catarina. Thence he passed through Assisi to Perugia, where he stayed three weeks. He was loth to pass by his native place, and leave Siena unvisited; but there was a conflict between the Pope and the government of Siena, where the popular party were in the ascendant, and had driven out the nobles. They had tried to pacify the Pope by admitting the Piccolomini to office, but Pius II demanded the restitution of the nobles. The popular party gave way a little at the Pope’s pressure, and relaxed the rigor of their proscription, but they regarded the Papal visit with undisguised suspicion. From Perugia Pius II crossed the lake Trasimene, and entered the Sienese territory at Chiusi. He turned aside to visit his native place, Corsignano, a little town perched among the hills, which he had left as a poor boy, and now entered as the head of Christendom. He experienced the same sad feelings that attend everyone who revisits the haunts of his youth. His father and mother were dead; those whom he had known were mostly confined to bed through sickness; faces which he remembered flushed with the pride of youth were unrecognizable in the deformity of old age. Here, in the little church, the Pope celebrated mass on February 22, the festival of S. Peter's installation. He resolved to honor his native place by elevating it to a bishopric under the name of Pienza. He ordered workmen to be collected to build there a cathedral and a bishop’s palace.

After a sojourn of three days Pius II left Corsignano for Siena. There he stayed nearly two months, and strove to propitiate the people by presenting the city with the golden rose on Palm Sunday. At last he brought before the magistrates his political object, and urged on them the restoration of the excluded nobles. After some opposition they agreed to admit them to a quarter of some offices and an eighth of others. Pius II was not satisfied with such a small concession, but thanked them for what they had done, and said that he hoped on his way back to hear that they had granted more. At Siena Pius II received the first ambassadors from the powers beyond Italy, who sent to offer their obedience to the new Pope. There came representatives of the Kings of Castile, Aragon, Portugal, and Matthias Corvinus, the new King of Hungary. All were received with due state, and were answered by Pius with his wonted eloquence. The Imperial ambassadors were at Florence, and when they heard that the envoys of Matthias Corvinus had been received by the Pope, raised difficulties about presenting themselves, as Frederick III still urged his own claims on Hungary and refused to recognize Matthias. But Pius II had himself given the Imperial envoys an example not to be too careful about their master's dignity in dealing with the Papacy. They were readily mollified by the assurance of the Pope that in such formal matters he only dealt with the existing state of things, and treated as king him who held the kingdom. They came to Siena, and gave to Pius II the obedience of the Emperor. Pius II, on his part, could not do less than confirm to the Emperor the provisions of the secret agreement which he himself had negotiated, and for which the German obedience had been sold to Eugenius IV.

To Siena came also the envoys of George Podiebrad, who had been elected King of Bohemia, and their coming brought before Pius II the chief difficulty which he had to face. Podiebrad, as governor of Bohemia under Ladislas, had pursued with firmness and sagacity a successful policy in uniting Bohemia and bringing back order into the distracted country. He was, above all things, a statesman who appreciated the exact
bearings of the situation. He saw that Bohemia must be united on a basis which would
allow the various factions to live peaceably together, and would also free the country
from its isolation from the rest of Christendom. He aimed at bringing about this union
on the basis of moderate utraquism. He overthrew the fanatical Taborites, and reduced
their stronghold. He wished to be on good terms with the Papacy; but he knew that
Bohemia would not be content with less than a faithful observance of the Compacts
made with the Council of Basel, and the recognition of Rokycana as Archbishop of
Prague. But the Compacts had been wrung out of the Council by necessity, and the
restored Papacy had no idea of frankly accepting them. They were in its eyes a
temporary compromise to be withdrawn as soon as possible. If Podiebrad hoped to draw
the Papacy to toleration, the Papacy hoped to bring back Bohemia to submission. Cusa,
Carvajal, Capistrano, and Aeneas Sylvius had tried all that diplomatic skill and religious
enthusiasm could do, and all had failed against the resolute determination of the
Bohemians. Rokycana was still unrecognised, the Compacts were still treated as
temporary provisions, while Bohemia under Podiebrad was again organizing itself into
the strongest kingdom in Eastern Europe.

So long as Ladislas lived the Papacy had hopes that his influence might grow with
years. But on his death the election of Podiebrad to the Bohemian crown made the
Bohemian question important both to the Papacy and to Germany. To Germany it meant
the destruction of German influence in Bohemia, and the rise of a power which might
become the arbiter in the affairs of Germany itself. Podiebrad, conscious of the
difficulties in his way, desired a legitimate position as King of Bohemia, accepted by
Utraquists and Catholics alike. Hence he shrank from receiving the crown at the hands
of Rokycana, and wished for recognition by the Pope. Calixtus III, in his crusading zeal,
was willing to put great confidence in one who could put an army in the field to war
against the Turk. Podiebrad led the Pope to suppose that he would make greater
concessions than he intended. He applied to Carvajal, the Papal legate in Hungary, to
send two bishops for his coronation. The request could not well be refused; nor could
Carvajal expect from Podiebrad an open abjuration, which would have alienated his
people. He charged the bishops, however, not to crown him before he had sworn to root
out heresy and establish the Catholic faith in Bohemia. King George managed to have
the oath couched in general terms, without any direct mention of the Compacts or of the
utraquist faith. He swore secretly before the bishops to bring back his people from their
errors to the faith and worship of the Catholic Church. Then he was crowned on May 7,
1458.

Carvajal and Calixtus III recognized in George a true, though secret, friend of the
Church, and believed in his sincerity and good intentions. George wrote to Calixtus
proffering his aid against the Turks, and Calixtus in reply addressed him not only as
king, but as his dear son. The letter of Calixtus was spread far and wide by George, and
cut away the ground from those who would have opposed him as a heretic. The German
and Catholic provinces of Silesia, Lusatia, and Moravia, which were ready to rebel,
returned to their obedience. When it was too late the eyes of Calixtus III were opened,
and he died with the knowledge that he had been deceived.

In this condition Pius II found the Bohemian question. He was not, like Calixtus
III, without experience of Bohemia or of George. He knew that the King's oath was not
meant by him to signify a withdrawal from the Compacts; but he knew that an open
quarrel with Bohemia would hinder his plan of a Congress, and he hoped through the
Congress to put the Papacy in a position which would enable it to deal with Bohemia in
the future. He judged it best to affect to look on George’s oath as a promise of complete submission. He sent him a summons to the Congress, and gave him the title of king; but sent the summons through the Emperor, saying that Bohemia was a fief of the Empire, and that the Pope recognized as king whoever the Emperor recognized. Frederick III, embarrassed by Hungary and Austria, began to look on George as a possible ally. He admitted him to a conference near Vienna in September, 1458, and so gave him moral support. As Pius had intended, the Emperor sent on the summons to George, who at once published it. The Silesian League, which still opposed George's accession, began slowly to melt away before this proof of his success. Breslau, animated by Catholic zeal, still held out, and sent envoys to Pius II at Siena, complaining of his recognition of George, as harmful to Catholicism. Thither came also the ambassadors of George, professing the obedience of their master to the Pope. Pius II was sorely embarrassed. He could not receive the obeisance of a King who had not yet disavowed his heresy: he could not refuse his support to those who were resisting him in the name of the Catholic faith. Accordingly, he attempted a compromise. In a secret consistory he received the personal obedience of George, but declined to give him the rank of a king till he had made public profession of Catholicism. The envoys of Breslau he praised for their zeal, and promised to find a remedy for their grievances; he hoped that George would show himself true to his oath to the Papacy, and prove himself a Christian king; otherwise he would have to take other measures. For a time the Pope's answer satisfied both parties. George used this period of truce to increase his prestige in Germany. In April he held a conference at Eger, to settle territorial disputes about the possessions of Bohemia, Brandenburg, and Saxony; by his conciliatory policy he gained recognition at the hands of his German neighbors, and also entered into a perpetual peace and alliance with Saxony and Brandenburg. On July 30 Frederick III met George, and in return for promises of help against Matthias of Hungary, conferred on him the Imperial investiture of the Bohemian kingdom. The policy of George had so far succeeded in establishing his power on a legitimate basis. It remained for Pius II to see if his Congress could exercise any influence on the restoration of Catholicism in Bohemia.

After a stay of nearly two months in Siena Pius II set out on April 23 for Florence, whither he was escorted by the young Galeazzo, son of Francesco Sforza, of Milan, as well as by several vassals of the Church. In Florence, where he stayed for eight days in the cloister of S. Maria Novella, the Pope received all honor and magnificent tokens of respect. But Cosimo de' Medici kept his bed on the plea of sickness, and the visit had no political fruit. From Florence he passed to Bologna, the rebellious vassal city of the Church. It is true Bologna was not in open rebellion: she admitted a Papal legate, but allowed him no authority, for the power was exercised by Xanto de' Bentivogli, supported by a council of sixteen. The rulers of Bologna doubted whether to admit the Pope within their walls. On the one hand, if he passed by the city such a mark of displeasure might encourage the Bolognese exiles to renew their attempts at revolution; on the other hand, the presence of the Pope within the walls might encourage a rising of the popular party. At last it was decided to invite the Pope to Bologna, but to summon a large body of cavalry from Milan to keep the city in order during his stay. Pius II was obliged to accept these conditions; but the Milanese leaders took an oath of fidelity to the Pope, and the whole body was put under the command of Galeazzo Sforza. The entry of Pius II into Bologna through lines of armed men was different from the peaceful procession which he had hitherto enjoyed. Bologna was sullen and suspicious. The orator who welcomed the Pope gave offence to the rulers by the way in which he...
spoke of the condition of the city. He was exiled for his outspokenness, and was restored only on the entreaties of Pius II.

Pius II was glad to leave the uncongenial city for Ferrara, where Borso of Este received him with open arms. Borso had many demands to make from the Pope; he wished for the title of Duke of Ferrara and the remission of his yearly tribute to the Papacy for the fief which he held. Though Pius II refused to go so far, yet he gave Borso many proofs of his friendliness, and his stay in Ferrara was one unceasing festivity.

When Pius II first announced his Congress, he mentioned as the place for its assembling Udine or Mantua. Udine was in the Venetian territory; and the Venetians, who had made a treaty with the Turks for commercial purposes, did not think it wise to lend their cities for a hostile demonstration against their ally. It had been, therefore, settled that the Congress was to meet at Mantua. Thither Pius II travelled by boat up the Po; he was welcomed by the Marquis Ludovico Gonzaga, and entered the city, on May 27, in solemn procession. First came his attendants and three of the Cardinals; then twelve white horses without riders, with gold reins and saddles. After these were borne, by three mounted nobles, the three banners of the Cross, the Church, and the Piccolomini. Then followed a rich baldachino, behind which walked the clergy of Mantua in their robes. Next were the royal ambassadors, then the officials of the Curia, preceded by a golden cross, and followed by a white horse bearing the Eucharist in a gold box, under a silken canopy, surrounded by lighted candles. Then came Galeazzo Sforza and Ludovico Gonzaga, followed by the Cardinals. After them the Pope, clad in full pontifical attire, and blazing with jewels, was borne in his litter by nobles, and was followed by a crowd of prelates. At the entry of the gate Gonzaga dismounted, and presented to the Pope the keys of the city.

Then the procession moved over carpets strewn with flowers to the cathedral. Next day Bianca, the wife of Sforza, with her four sons and her daughter Ippolita, visited the Pope. It is characteristic of the education of the age that the youthful Ippolita addressed the Pope in a Latin speech, which excited general admiration, and received from him an appropriate answer.

So far all things had smiled on Pius II. He had enjoyed to the full the pleasures of pomp and pageantry, and had received all the satisfaction that fair Mantua, speeches and ready promises could give. He was now anxious to reap the fruits of his journey in the results of the Congress. With laudable punctuality he arrived in Mantua three days before the appointed time, June 1; but he found no one there to meet him. The ambassadors who had been sent to him at Siena were not empowered to represent their masters at the Congress. On June 1 a service was held in the cathedral, after which the Pope addressed the prelates. He lamented the lukewarmness of Christendom, and his own disappointment. He asked them to pray that God would give men greater zeal for His cause. He would stay in Mantua till he had found what were the intentions of the princes: if they came, the Congress would proceed; if not, he would go back home, and bear the lot which Heaven assigned. They were brave words; and those who had heard them thought that they befitted the occasion. But as Pius II remained in Mantua week after week, the patience of the Cardinals became exhausted, and they longed to return to the pleasures of Rome. Mantua, they murmured, was marshy and unhealthy; did the Pope mean to destroy them by pestilence in that stifling spot, where the wine was poor, the food scarce, and nothing could be heard save the croaking of the frogs? “You have
satisfied your honor”, they pleaded to Pius. “No one imagines that you alone can conquer the Turks. The princes of Europe pay no heed to us: let us go home”. Bessarion and Torquemada were the only Cardinals who held by the Pope. Scarampo, who had left his fleet to come to Mantua, withdrew to Venice, where he openly ridiculed the Congress.

But Pius II hoped too much from the Congress to give it up so readily. Not only was he in earnest about the crusade, but he wished the Congress to give a practical overthrow to the Conciliar movement. At Constance the hierarchy under the presidency of the Emperor had decided the affairs of the Church; Pius II desired to establish a precedent of the primacies of Europe, under the presidency of the Pope, deciding the affairs of Christendom. If even partial success should follow such an attempt it would be the completion of the Papal restoration, the assertion of the Papal supremacy over the nationalities of Europe. Pius II hoped that the Papacy would show its superiority over the fruitless Diets of Germany, and would establish authority high above the Empire as the undisputed centre of the state system of Christendom.

The first envoys who came to Mantua were sent by Thomas, the despot of the Morea, a brother of the last Greek Emperor, Constantine Paleologus. Thomas and his brother Demetrus had maintained themselves in the Morea on condition of paying tribute to the Sultan. But they quarrelled with one another; the Turks advanced against them; they were incapable either of fighting or paying tribute. The envoys of Thomas brought as a present to the Pope sixteen turkish captives, and with the boastfulness of his race, represented himself as victorious; he did not want much help; with a handful of Italians he would clear the Morea of Turks. His request was discussed by the Cardinals, and at the earnest instance of Bessarion, against the better judgment of the Pope, it was resolved to send him three hundred men. They were rapidly equipped, and received the Pope's benediction before they departed for Ancona. Of course their services were of no real use, and they were little better than freebooters.

There was no lack of envoys clamoring for aid, though those who could offer aid were wanting. From Bosnia, Albania, Epirus, Illyria, Cyprus, Rhodes, and Lesbos, came messengers demanding help. At last came three ambassadors from the Emperor—the Bishop of Trieste, Heinrich Senflleben, and Johann Haderbach, who had been fellow-secretaries with Aeneas in the Emperor’s Chancery: they were men of no standing to represent the Emperor in a matter concerning the interests of Christendom. Pius II sent them back with a severe letter of remonstrance; he did not recognize them as ambassadors, and urged the Emperor to come himself, or send men of rank and position. Letter followed upon letter; but the Emperor tarried and the other German princes followed his example. At last, at the end of August, the envoys of the Duke of Burgundy—his nephew, John of Cleves, and Jean de Croy—drew near, the Pope wished that they should be received outside the walls by the Cardinals; but the Cardinals answered that they were the equals of kings, and ought not to pay honor to a duke. Pius II urged that all appearance of arrogance should be avoided, and finally the Cardinals Orsini and Colonna offered to go as a deputation from the Sacred College. The Burgundians were honorably received, and on the day after their arrival were welcomed by the Pope in a public consistory. The Bishop of Arras made a speech excusing the Duke of Burgundy’s absence on the ground of age. Pius II replied in praise of the Duke’s zeal. But when these ceremonies were over, and the Pope wished to turn to business, the Duke of Cleves brought forward a private question of his own. He had taken under his protection the town of Soest, which had rebelled against the Archbishop...
of Koln. The case had long been before the Papacy, and Pius II had issued an admonition to Soest to return to its rightful allegiance. The Duke of Cleves demanded that this admonition should be recalled, and refused to treat of the business of the Congress till the Pope had complied with his request. Pius II was in a strait: he could not abandon the possessions of the Church; he did not wish to draw down failure on the Congress. He adopted a dubious policy of delay. “The Roman Pontiffs”, he says, “have been accustomed, where justice cannot be done without public scandal, to dissemble till a convenient season. Nor do the lawgivers forbid such a course; for the greater evil must always be obviated”. So Pius II withdrew his admonition to Soest, to satisfy the Duke of Cleves, and promised the representatives of the Archbishop of Koln that he would renew it as soon as affairs allowed.

After this the Pope tried to bring the Burgundian envoys to business; but it soon became evident that the crusading zeal of their master had cooled. Their instructions simply empowered them to hear the Pope’s views and report them to the Duke of Burgundy. They added that the Duke considered an expedition against the Turks to be a matter that would tax the energies of united Christendom; in its present discordant state a crusade was hopeless. Pius II in reply pointed out the peril to Europe if the Turks were to become masters of Hungary. The pacification of Europe was no doubt desirable; but it would take some time to wipe out the hostilities of years. Meanwhile Hungary was in extremities. Though Europe was troubled, yet if every nation contributed equally to the crusade, the balance of power would be left unaltered. No vast expedition was needed; 50,000 or 60,000 men would be as many as could be fed and maintained in the field, and would be enough to keep the Turk in check. Surely that was not much to ask from Europe. So pleaded the Pope. Many conferences and many arguments were needed before the Burgundian envoys at length promised that the Duke would send into Hungary 2000 knights and 4000 foot, and would maintain them so long as the Christian army remained in the field. When this was settled the Duke of Cleves prepared to go. In vain Pius II strove to keep him at Mantua. He and his colleague departed, leaving a few of the humbler members of the embassy behind. Again Pius II and his Cardinals were left alone; again the murmurs of the Curia waxed loud against the useless sojourn in Mantua.

In the middle of September came Francesco Sforza, Duke of Milan, who again was welcomed by the Cardinals. Again was held a public consistory, and Francesco Filelfo, the celebrated scholar, delivered a long and eloquent speech in behalf of Sforza. The change of human affairs had brought about that the young Sienese lad, who had once scraped together money to go to Florence and attend the lectures of the famous Filelfo, now sat on the Papal throne and received the elegant adulation of his former teacher. Pius II listened and applauded; in his reply he called Filelfo the ‘Attic Muse’, and extolled Sforza as a model of Christendom. But Sforza had his own political ends to serve. He wished to agree with the Pope on an Italian policy which for the next thirty years gave Italy peace such as she had not enjoyed for centuries. He proposed to the Pope a league in defense of the throne of Ferrante in Naples. Sforza saw clearly enough that the success of the House of Anjou in Naples would make French interest predominant in Italy, and would bring upon Milan the claims of the House of Orleans. If Naples, Milan, and the Papacy were united, the danger of French intervention might be averted. Moreover, Sforza wanted the aid of the Pope to procure for him from the Emperor the investiture of the Duchy of Milan.
The coming of Sforza had, at least, the effect that it induced most of the Italian powers to send their envoys to Mantua; if the Congress did not become of great importance to Europe, it was, at least, a great conference of the Powers of Italy. It is true that Borso of Modena would not forgive the Pope for his refusal to make him Duke of Ferrara; he preferred his own amusements to the dull work of the Congress. But Florence, Siena, Lucca, Bologna, and Genoa sent envoys, as did Ferrante of Naples. An embassy came also from Casimir, King of Poland, and tardily from the Duke of Savoy. Even Venice, which had refused to give offence to the Turks, sent two envoys when the news of Sforza's arrival was received.

At last Pius II might claim that something which might called a Congress was assembled at Mantua. There was no time to wait any longer, as Sforza was already anxious to depart. So on September 26, the Congress was opened by a solemn service in the cathedral, after which the Cardinals and envoys assembled before the Pope. Then Pius II delivered a speech, which was regarded as a masterpiece of oratory. Copies were circulated throughout Europe; and if an appreciation of eloquence had borne any practical fruit the Turk would soon have been driven back into Asia. For three hours the rounded periods of Pius II rolled on: and, though he was affected by a cough, his excitement freed him during his speech from that troublesome enemy of rhetorical effect. After an invocation of divine assistance Pius II put forth the causes of war, the losses which Islam had inflicted on Christendom, both in the remote past and in more recent days. Even though the present might be endured, the worst had not yet been reached. The Turks were still pressing on, and if Hungary fell before them there was no further barrier for Europe. “But alas, Christians prefer to war against one another rather than against the Turks. The beating of a bailiff, even of a slave, is enough to draw kings into war; against the Turks, who blaspheme our God, destroy our churches, and strive to destroy the whole Christian name, no one dares take up arms”. Then he turned to his second point, the chances of success. The Turks had conquered only degenerate peoples, and were themselves an easy prey to the superior strength of Europeans, as the exploits of Hunyadi and Scanderbeg might show. Moreover, God was on the Christian side, for Islam denied the divinity of Christ. Here Pius II lowered the level of his rhetoric by turning aside to display his learning; he gave a summary of the arguments by which Christ's divinity was maintained. But he skillfully used this as the ground for an impassioned appeal to his hearers; he besought them to show the sincerity of their faith, the depth of their reverence for their divine Redeemer, by driving from Christendom the Turks who blaspheme His name. Then Pius II proceeded to his third point, the rewards which the war would bring. First there were kingdoms, booty, glory, all in abundance that usually stirred men to war. Besides this was the sure promise of the heavenly kingdom, and the plenary indulgence of sins which he had granted to all crusaders. “How short was life in comparison with eternity! How full were the joys of Paradise, where they would see God, and His angels, and all the company of the blessed, and would understand all things! Our soul freed from the chain of the body will, not as Plato says, recover, but, as Aristotle and our own doctors teach, attain to the knowledge of all things. It is a prospect which once stirred men to martyrdom. But we do not ask you to undergo the martyr’s tortures; heaven is promised you at a lesser price. Fight bravely for the law of God, and you will gain what eye never saw nor ear heard. O fools and slow to believe the promises of Scripture! Would that there were here today Godfrey or Baldwin, Eustace, Hugh the Great, Bohemund, Tancred, and the rest who in days gone by won back Jerusalem! They would not have suffered us to
speak so long, but rising from their seats, as once they did before our predecessor Urban II, they would have cried with ready voice, *Deus lo vult, Deus lo vult!*

“You silently await the end of our speech, nor seem to be moved by our exhortations. Perhaps there are among you those who think: This Pope says much, why should we go to war and expose ourselves to the enemy’s swords. Such is the way of priests; they bind on others heavy burdens which themselves will not touch with their finger.

“Think not so of us. No one was ever more ready than ourselves. We came here, weak as you see, risking our life, and the States of the Church. Our expenses have greatly increased, our revenues diminished. We do not speak boastfully, we only regret that it is not in our power to do more. Oh, if our youthful strength still remained, you should not go to the field without us. We would go before your standard, bearing the cross; we would hurl Christ’s banner amidst the foe, and would count ourselves happy to die for Jesus’ sake. Even now, if you think fit, we will not hesitate to vow to the war our pining body and our weary soul. We shall deem it noble to be borne in our litter through the camp, the battle, the midst of the foe. Decide as you think best. Our person, our resources, we place at your disposal; whatever weight you lay upon our shoulders we will bear”.

When the Pope had ended, Bessarion spoke on behalf of the Cardinals. Not to be outdone by Pius II, he also addressed the assembly for three hours. If Pius II showed his learning by a defense of the divinity of Christ, Bessarion made a display of scholarship by citing historical instances of those who had died for their country. He was at first tedious, but when he described the capture of Constantinople he grew eloquent, and when he spoke of the actual condition of the Turkish resources, which he estimated at 70,000 men, he was listened to with more attention. When he had ended, the envoys present praised the Pope’s speech and extolled his zeal. Sforza spoke in Italian, with a soldier's eloquence says the Pope. Last of all the Hungarian envoys addressed the assembly, and loudly complained of the Emperor's interference in Hungarian affairs, thus adding to their trouble when the Turk was at their gates. The Imperial envoy, the Bishop of Trieste, had not a word to say. Pius II himself had to defend his former master by saying that this was not the place for general political discussion; he knew that both the Emperor and the King of Hungary were just and upright, and he had sent a legate to heal their quarrels.

The Congress contented itself with decreeing war against the Turks in general terms, and Pius II saw that this was all that he could expect the Congress to do. Next day he summoned the envoys to a conference in his palace for the discussion of ways and means. He put before them the questions—Were the Turks to be attacked by land, or sea, or both? What soldiers were necessary, and how were they to be obtained? Sforza rose and gave his opinion as a soldier. The Turks should be attacked by land and sea; soldiers should be furnished by Hungary and the neighboring lands, as being best acquainted with the tactics to be employed in fighting the Turks; Italy and the rest of Christendom should furnish money. The Venetians agreed, and added that thirty galleys and eight barks would suffice to cause a diversion on the shores of Greece and the Hellespont, while 40,000 horsemen and 20,000 foot would be enough for war by land. Gismondo Malatesta, Lord of Rimini, seeing an opportunity of booty for himself, advocated that the war should be can led on by Italian forces. Pius II observed significantly, that Italian generals did not care to fight outside Italy, and in this war there
was little to gain except for their souls. Other countries offered troops, but would not offer money; their offer must be accepted or nothing would be got from them. The Turkish troops numbered about 200,000, of whom the only real soldiers, the Janissaries, were 40,000: to face them 50,000 European troops would suffice, and thirty galleys would also be required. To raise money he proposed that the clergy should pay a tenth, the lay a thirtieth of their revenues for three years, and the Jews a twentieth of all their possessions. The assembly approved the decree in general; but when the Pope proposed that all should sign it, there was much hesitation. Florence and Venice especially hung back. The Venetians at length declared that they would sign it if double the number of ships were provided, and they were paid for supplying them, and received all the conquests made by the crusaders. Matters began to wear a doubtful aspect when Pius II attempted to turn general promises into definite undertakings. Sforza had done his duty by joining the Congress, and left Mantua for Milan.

Pius II professed himself satisfied with the results which he obtained, and strove in public to maintain a semblance of contentment. His real feelings, however, are expressed in a letter to Carvajal, written on November 5. “We do not find, to confess the truth, such zeal in the minds of Christians as we hoped. We find few who have a greater care for public matters than for their own interests. Yet we have shown how false is that calumny so long cast against the Holy See; we have proved that no one is to be accused except themselves. We seem, however, to have disposed affairs in Italy for God’s service, since the princes and potentates have entered into obligations confirmed by their own signatures. But we hear that Genoa is sending a fleet to urge the French claims in Naples, and we fear that we shall lose not only help from those engaged in war, but that all the rest will be drawn into the struggle. Unless God help us, the first fruits of our labor will be lost in the calamities of Christian people”.

In truth everything depended for Pius II on the attitude assumed by France, whose ambassadors were announced as on their way to Mantua. They had halted at Lyons on receiving the news of the reception given to the Burgundians, and doubted whether it became the national dignity that they should advance farther. One of their number, the Bishop of Chartres, went on beforehand. He had a private end to serve; for having been appointed Bishop according to the Pragmatic Sanction, he had not been confirmed by the Pope. Pius II readily gave him his confirmation, and the Bishop returned to his colleagues, but never went back to Mantua. The French embassy was joined by the envoys of René of Anjou, and of the Duke of Brittany. At last on November 16 they entered Mantua. France was represented by the Archbishop of Tours and the Bishop of Paris; René by the Bishop of Marseilles; and the Duke of Brittany by the Bishop of S. Malo. Genoa also sent an embassy, and soon after arrived from the Emperor envoys more worthy to represent him—Charles of Baden and the Bishops of Eichstadt and Trent.

It was the general expectation that the French envoys would at the outset challenge the Pope’s proceedings in regard to the Neapolitan kingdom, and would refuse obedience or threaten a General Council. Some anxiety was felt when they were admitted before the consistory on November 21. The Bishop of Paris spoke for two hours in praise of the French King and his anxiety about the Neapolitan question. He said little about the Turks, less about any aid in a crusade. Finally, he offered to the Pope the obedience of the French Church as that of a son to a father; he said this pointedly to exclude any notion of dependence as on a master. The obedience of Rene and of Genoa was afterwards tendered by their envoys. Pius II in his answer dwelt on
the dignity of the Apostolic See, established by God, and not by councils or decrees, above all kingdoms and peoples. Twice he repeated this, with increased emphasis, and then passed on to say that he wished to receive with all favor “his dear son in Christ, René, the illustrious King of Sicily”, but would answer more privately his demands. Both sides were satisfied with the result of their first interview. The Pope was content that, after all their threats, the French had at least submitted formally to his obedience. The French flattered themselves that the Pope had recognized the power of the French King, and was willing to obey his will.

But these proceedings were merely formal; the real struggle began when the French envoys came to lay before the Pope their complaints about his Neapolitan policy. They were resolved to show no diplomatic reserve, and brought with them to the audience all the envoys who were present at Mantua. The Bailly of Rouen spoke in praise of France, “the nation of the Lilies”, as he persisted in calling it. He dwelt on the services rendered by France to the Papacy and on its connection with Naples; he complained that Alfonso had seized Naples by force, not by right; that Pius had acted wrongly in recognizing Ferrante, his bastard son, which even Calixtus III, though an Aragonese, had not ventured to do. He demanded that Pius should recall all that he had done for Ferrante, should invest King René, and help his forces to gain the kingdom; should recognize the French party in Genoa, and revoke all ecclesiastical censures against the city. The friends of France listened to the trenchant orator, and raised their crests in triumph: they thought the Pope would not venture to reply. Pius answered, that what he had done regarding Naples had been done with the advice of the Cardinals, whom he must consult before saying more. So saying he dismissed the assembly.

Next day Pius II was attacked by a cramp in the stomach, and a violent cough which confined him for some days to his bed. The French declared that this was a pretence to cover his confusion and escape from answering their attack. Perhaps the Pope made the most of his illness to gain time to prepare his answer, and render its delivery more effective. “Though I should die in the middle of my speech, I will answer them”, he said, and summoned all the ambassadors to a public audience. He dragged himself from his sick bed, and, with pale face and trembling limbs, seated himself on his throne. At first he could scarcely speak for weakness and excitement; soon gathering strength, he spoke for three hours, and his effort had such a beneficial effect that it entirely freed him from his cramp. In his speech the Pope complained of the charges brought against him by the French. He spoke of the glories of their nation in language which outdid even the renowned orator. He set forth their services to the Holy See and the benefits which they had in turn received. Then he traced the history of the Neapolitan succession under his immediate predecessors. “We did not exclude the French, we found them excluded”, he said; “we found Ferrante in possession of the kingdom, and recognized the actual state of things. If the French had been nearer we would have preferred them. We could not disturb the peace of Italy for those who were at a distance. In recognizing Ferrante we reserved the rights of the House of Anjou. The case is still open for our decision”. He urged the need of peace in Christendom and war against the Turks. Finally, as the French had spoken of the gratitude due to France from the Holy See, the Pope turned to the Pragmatic Sanction by which the power of the Pope in France had been reduced to such limits as pleased the Parlement of Paris. He admitted the good intentions of the French King but warned him that by its present course he was imperiling the souls of his people. The French ambassadors expressed their wish to answer some things that the Pope had said, as being contrary to the honor
of their King. Pius II replied that he was willing to hear them when, and as often as, they chose, and so retired. The Curia thronged round him with joy. “Never”, said they, “within the memory of our fathers have words been spoken so worthy of a Pope as those about the Pragmatic Sanction”. Pius II had won an oratorical triumph, and had given another proof that it was impossible to get the better of him in discussion. Next day the French appeared before him in private, in the presence only of eight Cardinals. The time for public displays, they felt, was past. There was some more discussion about the Pragmatic Sanction, and the envoys in their private capacity made their peace with the Pope. But this political wrangle had driven into the background the question of the crusade. When Pius II asked them what help he might expect from France, he was answered that France could do nothing till she was at peace with England. The Pope proposed that France and England should contribute an equal number of soldiers, so as to leave the balance unaltered: if they could not send troops, they might give money. The French said that they had no powers for any such undertaking, but assented to the Pope’s proposal for a conference to arrange peace with England.

England was too much involved in internal conflicts to pay much heed to the request of Pius that it should send envoys to Mantua. Henry VI had nominated an embassy, at the head of which was the Earl of Worcester, but it never set out for Mantua. Two priests arrived on the King’s behalf, proffering the Pope the obedience of England and bringing his excuses. Their credentials bore the usual endorsement, ”teste Rege”; and we are surprised to find Pius II so ignorant of the forms used in England that he thought that the King, bereft of all officials, had been compelled to act as his own witness in default of others. To England, however, was sent as Papal legate, to make peace, the bishop of Terni, who fell into the hands of the Earl of Warwick, identified himself with the cause of the House of York, excommunicated the Lancastrians, and gathered for himself large sums of money from the English Church. When the Pope heard of this he recalled his legate, degraded him from his priestly office, and confined him in a monastery for the rest of his life. However, no efforts of a Papal legate could have given peace to England or obtained from her aid for a crusade. France was offended by the Pope's dealings with Naples, and was more anxious to assert the claims of René than to attack the Turks. England and France alike were useless for any help to the Pope in his great endeavor.

It only remained for Pius II to see what promises he could get from Germany. There were in Mantua the ambassadors of the Emperor and of many German princes; chief amongst them was the old opponent of Aeneas Sylvius, Gregory Heimburg, who represented Albert of Austria. Pius II called them together, and wished to obtain a common understanding. The Imperial envoys were ready to accept his proposals; but those of the princes, led by Heimburg, refused. Heimburg was convinced that the Pope's proposal of levying a tenth and granting indulgences was merely a scheme for enriching himself and his Imperial ally. He would agree to no general proposal; and Pius II had to deal with each embassy separately. By means of private negotiations the Pope at length contrived to obtain a renewal of the promise made at the Diets of Frankfort and Neustadt to equip 10,000 horse and 32,000 foot. To arrange for general peace, and settle all preliminaries, a Diet was to be held at Nurnberg, and another in the Emperor's dominions, to make peace between him and Matthias of Hungary. The Pope was to send a legate to both. Pius II was compelled to accept the sterile procedure of a Diet, the futility of which he knew so well, and which Calixtus III had endeavored to escape without success. He appointed as his legate Bessarion, probably because he was the
only Cardinal whose zeal would induce him to undertake the thankless office. Moreover, Pius II attempted to give the agreement greater definiteness by appointing Frederick general of the crusading army, and empowering him, if he could not lead it himself, to nominate a prince in his stead.

While these negotiations were in progress Sigismund of Austria arrived in Mantua, on November 10, with a brilliant train of 400 knights. He was honorably received, and Heimburg, in a public audience, spoke in Sigismund’s behalf. He recounted the glories of the House of Austria and the virtues of Sigismund: he dwelt on the acquaintance that had existed in earlier days between Sigismund when a boy and Aeneas Sylvius, the Imperial secretary. Aeneas had indeed written for Sigismund love-letters, which were not edifying: and Heimburg, embittered by resentment against the Pope, mockingly recalled the past, which Pius II would fain have forgotten. The culture of Sigismund, he said, had been greatly formed by the delightful love-letters which his Holiness had transplanted from Italy to Germany. Pius II had to sit with a conviction that he was being laughed at, unable with any dignity to reply.

In truth neither Sigismund nor his orator Heimburg was friendly disposed towards the Papacy. Sigismund had on his hands an ecclesiastical quarrel which was destined to give a great deal of trouble, and which dated ten years back. In 1450 Nicolas V conferred on Nicolas of Cusa, whom he had just made Cardinal, the Bishopric of Brixen. Cusa was a poor man and needed the means of supporting his new dignity; but the provision of Nicolas V, made without waiting for a capitular election, was in direct contravention to the Concordat, and was also an infringement of the agreement made with Frederick III, as Brixen was one of the bishoprics to which the Emperor was allowed to appoint during his lifetime. The Chapter of Brixen made their election, and turned to Sigismund, as Count of the Tyrol, to help them to maintain their rights; but the Pope and the Emperor were too strong for them. Sigismund did not judge it expedient to prolong the contest, and Cusa was unwillingly admitted as Bishop of Brixen in 1451. Cusa was for a time employed as Papal legate, in selling to the Germans the benefits of the year of Jubilee without giving them the trouble of going to Rome, and in stirring up the crusading spirit. He was not in earnest with either of these tasks, and returned as soon as he could to his own diocese, which he proposed to make a model to the rest of Germany.

Cusa was a man of learning—not the learning of the Renaissance, but the technical theology of the schoolroom. Of humble extraction, he had nothing save his talents on which to rely. He had been a follower of Cesarini at Basel, he had abandoned with the other moderates the Council’s cause, and had made his reputation by his learned writings in favor of the Papacy. He was an able but narrow-minded man, whose bent was to abstractions and technical ties rather than to zeal or statesmanship. He did not abandon the reforming ideas he had held at Basel, but transferred them from one field to another. He had striven to reform the Church in its head; he was equally bent on reforming it in some of its members. A movement such as that expressed at Basel could not entirely die out; but it was easily diverted to trivialities. If the entire Church system could not be reformed, there was at least one part of it to which a mechanical rule might be applied. If the ecclesiastical organization was not to be revised, it might at least be more tightly strung and reduced to greater uniformity. There was a decided feeling that the monastic orders ought to be brought back to a straiter observance of their original rule. It was a cry which afforded some satisfaction to the technical mind of a man like
Cusa, who could point to success in this sphere as the proper beginning of a conservative reformation within the Church itself.

So Cusa began a strict visitation of the monasteries in his diocese. If its visitation had only aimed at restoring neglected observances and ceremonies in the cloisters, it would at least have been harmless. But a rigid visitation of monasteries, in the face of a strong opposition, raised many legal questions concerning the Bishop’s visitatorial power. It was hard to define the limits of the spiritual ties and the temporalities of the monasteries. It was difficult to determine what were the powers of the Bishop as visitor, and what were the rights of the Count of the Tyrol as protector of the temporalities of foundations within his dominions. The Benedictine nuns of Sonnenburg in the Pusterthal resisted the Bishop and appealed to Sigismund as protector of their monastery. Sigismund was loth to quarrel with Cusa, who laid the nuns under an interdict. He mediated with the Cardinal; but the Sonnenburg difficulty embittered the feelings of both parties and broadened into other and more important issues. Cusa turned the formal acuteness of his mind to determine the exact rights of the Bishopric of Brixen. He established to his own satisfaction that the protectorship over monastic foundations, exercised by the Counts of the Tyrol, was granted to them by the Bishop of Brixen, together with lands, for which they were vassals to the see. The Bishop of Brixen was a prince of the Empire, and the Emperor was in things temporal the protector of the see; the rights of the Counts of the Tyrol depended only on a grant from their Bishop. Sigismund naturally asserted that the Bishopric of Brixen was under the Counts of the Tyrol, to whom belonged the protectorate with all its rights, however much the formal investiture had been conferred on the Counts by the Bishops. The angry feelings on both sides waxed high; but Cusa had only the weapons of interdict and excommunication. As he was extremely unpopular through his harshness, the national sentiment was all on the side of Sigismund, and the excommunications were little heeded.

Attempts were made to bring about a peace, and Sigismund invited Cusa to an interview at Wilten in 1457. Whether Cusa lost his nerve, or whether he deliberately chose to set up a plea for further proceedings, cannot be determined. But he fled from Wilten, declaring that his life was in danger, though the evidence which he could afterwards produce for his terror was very slight. Still Cusa had the ear of the Curia, and Calixtus III laid Sigismund under an interdict till he had satisfied Cusa of his freedom and personal security. Sigismund, prompted by Gregory Heimburg, appealed to a better-informed Pope, but offered full security to Cusa, and declared himself ready to withdraw his appeal if friendly overtures were made. Cusa was inflexible, proceeded with the interdict, and showed his willingness to use forcible means. He forbade the peasants who held under the Sonnenburg nuns to pay their dues to the rebellious abbess. The convent employed a band of forty men to collect them; whereupon a captain in Cusa’s pay fell upon this luckless band and cut it to pieces.

Thus matters stood when Calixtus III died, and both the combatants turned with expectation to his successor. Cusa had been an old friend of Aeneas, and hastened to Rome to lay his case before him. Sigismund had been a pupil of Aeneas when he was at Frederick's Court. Pius II was in all things desirous of peace, and would fain have mediated in the quarrel. On setting out for Mantua he left Cardinal Cusa as his representative in Rome; but Cusa was afterwards summoned to Mantua, that the Pope might try to settle matters between him and Sigismund. It was for this purpose that Sigismund had come. Pius II offered his services as a mediator; he did not decide as a
judge. In the presence of the Cardinals and of the Imperial ambassadors, he listened to
the complaints of both parties. He had no desire to favor one rather than the other, and
at last patched up a temporary reconciliation, on the understanding that the legal
question of the relations between the Bishop and the Count was to be decided by a
process within two years, and the other points in dispute were to be arranged between
the two parties at a Diet to be held in Trent. Thus nothing was definitely decided, and
Sigismund departed from Mantua in indignation on November 29. Pius II had no feeling
against Sigismund as to the points in dispute; but he had seen enough to know that,
under Heimburg’s advice, Sigismund was ready to prosecute his cause in a manner most
offensive to the Papacy. The appeal to a future Council was a relic of the state of things
which Pius II hoped to obliterate forever; it was a revolutionary memory which must
never be again awakened in Germany. Pius II was ready to wait for a while and see if
Sigismund would pursue a more respectful course; if not, he must at least cut the ground
from under his feet before he pressed him further.

THE BULL “EXECRABILIS”

If one object of Pius II was to wage war against the Turk, the other was to wipe
out of the ecclesiastical system all traces of the conciliar movement. The two objects
were, moreover, closely connected. The Neapolitan question threatened to bring the
Papacy into collision with France, and France might use its old engine of a Council. If
Germany were to be useful for the crusade, if the Papal decrees for taming Germany
were to be effective, the Diets must be prevented from throwing hindrances in the way
by raising untoward questions of the rights of the German Church, clamoring for further
reform and appealing to future Councils. The example of Sigismund, the machinations
of Heimburg, must be checked from doing further mischief; the power of the restored
Papacy must be fully asserted in the person of one who had devoted the best energies of
his life to the cause of that restoration. It was pardonable that Pius II should wish to put
the crown to his life's work. If the Congress of Mantua had not been successful in
raising the prestige of the Papacy, and showing Europe the unwonted sight of a Pope
directing the activity of Christendom, it might at least be made memorable as the
occasion of a firm assertion of the Papal authority. Pius II, after Sigismund's departure,
unfolded his scheme to the Cardinals and prelates assembled in Mantua, who all gave
their cordial assent. A Papal Constitution was accordingly drawn up and published on
January 18, 1460, known, from its first words, as Execrabilis et priscis inauditus
temporibus. In it the Pope condemns, as an “execrable abuse, unheard of in former
times, any appeal to a future Council”. It is ridiculous to appeal to what does not exist
and whose future existence is indeterminate. Such a custom is only a means of escaping
just judgment, a cloak for iniquity, and a destruction of all discipline. All such appeals
are declared invalid; anyone who makes them is declared ipso facto excommunicated,
together with all who frame or witness any document containing them. The Bull was a
masterstroke on the part of one who well knew the dangers against which he had to
contend. If Bulls could have established the Papal authority, Pius II would have known
how to frame them. His precaution was wise; but it failed of effect. Both René of Anjou
and Sigismund of the Tyrol lodged appeals in spite of the Papal denunciation. Yet the
Bull of Pius II, though not immediately successful, worked its way into the
ecclesiastical system and became one of the pillars on which the Papal authority rested.
Only one other prince visited Mantua, Albert of Brandenburg, whom Pius II greeted warmly as “the German Achilles”. He made the usual protestations of zeal against the Turks, and received from the Pope, on the Festival of the Epiphany, a consecrated sword. But Albert had his own ends to serve; it suited his position in Germany to be on good terms with the Emperor and Pope. When Albert had gone there was nothing more to do at Mantua. On January 14 Pius II declared war against the Turks, and promised indulgences to all who took part in it. He issued, also, decrees imposing a subsidy of a tenth on the clergy and a thirtieth on the laity, especially in Italy. Then on January 19, after a speech in which he magnified the offers of help which had been made, Pius II enumerated his expectations. It was not all that he had hoped for, yet it was a fair show. The ambassadors present solemnly renewed their promises. Then Pius II knelt before the altar and chanted some appropriate psalms. The Congress was over, and next day the Pope left Mantua after a sojourn of eight months.

The Congress of Mantua could not be called a success, yet Pius II could urge, with some show of truth, that it could not be called an entire failure. It was true that the Papacy had not gathered round itself the enthusiasm of Christendom, and had not drawn the powers of Europe from their national jealousies to common action for the common weal. But at least the Congress had shown the sincerity of the Pope’s intentions, and had freed him from blame. Pius II had not disguised from himself the difficulties which beset the politics of Europe; he had hoped that a little enthusiasm might sweep some of them away. He had forgotten that the restored Papacy was scarcely in a position to appeal to the enthusiasm of Europe. He had forgotten his own antecedents, but others had not. He had been too closely connected with the questionable intrigues which brought about the Papal restoration to stand high in the estimation of Europe. The shifty diplomat was not likely to be trusted however cleverly he talked about common interests. The appeal of Pius II awoke no general response.

Yet the Congress of Mantua had its results. If it had not succeeded in raising Europe above its particular interests, it at least brought those interests clearly to light. Pius II was able to gauge the attitude of France towards Naples; he saw that Germany centred round the new power of Bohemia, and was able to consider how far he could cope with the Bohemian king; he saw in Sigismund of the Tyrol the strength of the remnants of the German neutrality. Above all things, the Congress of Mantua established the system of Italian politics, and gave the Pope a commanding influence. Pius II saw that his interests lay in opposite directions. As an Italian power he could not satisfy France; as head of the Church he could not satisfy Bohemia or pacify Sigismund. With the greatest desire for peace at home and war against the Turk, he saw the probability of the failure of his crusade before the threats of war at home. To pacify Europe he was asked to sacrifice Italy and the Church. It would need all his cleverness to avoid this dilemma. In preparation for the difficulties which he foresaw, he strengthened the Papal armoury by the Bull Execrabilis.
CHAPTER VII.
PIUS II AND THE AFFAIRS OF NAPLES AND GERMANY
1460—1461.

Before Pius II left Mantua war had broken out in Naples, and events soon made it necessary for the Pope to decide what part he was prepared to play. Alfonso had won the kingdom of Naples by his own sword, and ruled it with magnificence. His strong hand and statesmanlike wisdom had kept in subjection the barons, who had grown in power and turbulence during the long period of conflict to which the kingdom had become habituated. They had accepted Ferrante at first, but soon raised their heads in conspiracy against him; for civil war increased their power and suited their interests. They had been so long accustomed to play off one claimant against another that they hastened to seize the opportunity which was now offered to their spirit of lawlessness. The withdrawal of Piccinino from the States of the Church had alienated from Ferrante’s side that powerful condottiere general. Headed by the Prince of Taranto, the Neapolitan barons plotted against Ferrante, and invited René to prosecute his claims on Naples.

René himself had had enough of Neapolitan warfare, and preferred to lead an artist's life in Provence. But his son Jean assumed the title of Duke of Calabria, and received promises of help from the King of France, and from Genoa, which was then under French influence. Moreover, Jean took possession of twenty-four galleys, which had been built out of the proceeds of the Turkish tithe levied on France by Calixtus III, and which then lay at Marseilles. On October 4, 1459, Jean set sail from Genoa, and appeared before Naples. He landed at Castellamare, and the barons of Naples one by one flocked to his standard. Ferrante was confounded at this almost universal treachery, and scarcely knew where to turn. Only the coming of the winter saved him from disaster; he shut himself up in Naples, and summoned Pius II and Sforza to his aid. The first object of their endeavor was to prevent the Angevin party from receiving the aid of Jacopo Piccinino, who on withdrawing sulkily from the States of the Church had sought to enrich himself at the expense of Gismondo Malatesta, Lord of Rimini. Gismondo was a strange mixture of an unscrupulous condottiere and a munificent patron of art and letters. He adorned Rimini, held a splendid court, and cast longing eyes on the dominions of his neighbor Federigo da Montefeltro, Duke of Urbino. Federigo and Piccinino made common cause against him, and at Mantua he had called on the Pope to mediate. Pius II was in too great need of soldiers to refuse his favor even to one who, like Gismondo, openly avowed his contempt for all religion and lived in defiance of all law. Pius mediated between Gismondo and his enemies, but sold his mediation at a good price. He took into his hands, as security for a payment of 60,000 ducats due from Gismondo to the King of Naples, Sinigaglia and Fano, which he afterwards conferred on his favorite nephew. Piccinino, by this mediation of the Pope, saw himself a second time robbed of his prey and was more indignant than before against Pius II and Ferrante. The first object of Pius II and Sforza was to prevent Piccinino from making his way from Cesena, where he was posted, to Naples. They trusted to Federigo of Urbino; while Piccinino was aided by Malatesta, and secretly by Borso of Este.
When Pius II left Mantua he retraced his steps to Ferrara, where Borso perfidiously offered to treat with Piccinino in his behalf; but Pius II was not deluded by this offer. He pursued his way to Florence, where he conferred with Cosimo de' Medici about the condition of Italy, and urged on him the prudence of supporting Ferrante for the purpose of excluding the French from Italy. Florence had always been on the Angevin side in Naples, and Cosimo was not convinced. Nor did Pius II succeed in inducing the wary Florentines to accept his decree of a tax for the crusade; he might perhaps be permitted to tax the clergy, but the laity demurred. On January 31 Pius II entered Siena, where he took up his abode for some time. The archbishopric of the city had just become vacant, and Pius II conferred it on his nephew Francesco de' Todeschini, a youth of the age of twenty-three.

When the period in the Lenten season arrived at which creations of Cardinals were usually made, Pius II announced his intention of exercising his power. On March 5 he summoned the Cardinals to a consistory; they agreed to the creation of five new Cardinals, on condition that only one should be a nephew. “You will not”, said Pius II, “refuse a sixth whom I will name as above all controversy”. The Cardinals pressed that he should be named before they consented. Pius refused, and ultimately had his own way. He named Alessandro Oliva, General of the Augustinian Order, a man renowned for piety and theological learning. The others were the Bishops of Reati and Spoleto, men whom Pius II needed for the government of the States of the Church; the nephew Francesco, Archbishop of Siena; Niccolo di Fortiguerra, a relation of Pius II’s mother, and Burchard, Provost of Salzburg, whose nominat on was not announced till other Transalpine Cardinals were created. Pius II was of opinion that he had deserved well of Italy for creating five Italian Cardinals. He was also proud of the fact of having created two of his own relatives in the same consistory. It must be admitted that his two relatives both proved themselves worthy men. Fortiguerra was the chief adviser of the Pope in military matters and the nephew Francesco was himself raised to a brief tenure of the Papacy in 1503.

The ecclesiastical festivities consequent on this creation were disturbed by the news that Piccinino had succeeded in eluding Federigo of Urbino and the Papal Legate, who were watching him, and by forced marches had made his way along the coast into the Abruzzi. Men said that both Federigo and the Pope had connived at his escape, being glad to see their own territories free from the risk of a protracted war. The arrival of Piccinino was a new terror to Ferrante; but Pius II sent him reinforcements under his condottiere general Simonetto.

While awaiting news from Naples Pius II lingered in Siena, which he loved so well, under pretext of his health. It would seem that, after his long life of wandering and exile, Pius returned with deep satisfaction to the scenes of his youth, where only he could be genuinely happy and content with the simple enjoyments of country life, which are always dear to a man of real culture. Pius feasted his eyes on the lovely landscape which from the hills of Siena lay open to his view in all the freshness of fine spring weather. He made his health a reason for indulging his taste for country life by expeditions to Macereto and Petrioli in the neighborhood. The language of Pius II is interesting as showing his many-sidedness, his keen susceptibility to the pleasures of the eye.

“The pleasant springtime had begun; and round Siena all the valleys smiled in their dress of leafage and of flowers, and the crops were rising luxuriant in the fields. The
view from Siena was inexpressibly charming; hills of a merciful height, planted with fruit trees and vines, or ploughed for corn, overhang pleasant valleys, green with crops and grass, or watered with a constant stream. There are, moreover, many woods, resonant with the sweet song of birds, and every height is crowned by magnificent country houses of the citizens. On one side are splendid monasteries peopled with holy men, on the other the castellated houses of theburghers”.

The Pope passed with joy through this country, and found the baths equally delightful, lying in a valley about ten miles from the city. The land is watered by the river Mersa, which is full of eels, sweet in flavor though small. The valley at its entrance is cultivated, and full of castles and villas, but grows wilder as it approaches the baths, where it is shut in by a stone bridge of massive workmanship, and by cliffs covered thick with trees. The hills which circle the valley on the right are clad with evergreen ilex, on the left by oak and ash trees. Round the baths are small lodging-houses. Here the Pope stayed a month, and though he bathed twice a day, never neglected public business. Two hours before sunset he would go out into the meadows by the riverside, and in the greenest spot received embassies and petitions. The countrywomen came daily, bringing flowers, and strewing them in the way by which the Pope went to the bath, content with the reward of kissing his foot.

While leading this simple life at Petrioli the Pope was scandalized by hearing of the dissolute life of Cardinal Borgia, who already showed the qualities which were to render him infamous as Alexander VI. A story reached the Pope that an entertainment given by Borgia was the talk of Siena. The Cardinal had invited some Siennese ladies to a garden, from which their fathers, husbands, and brothers were carefully excluded; for five hours the Cardinal and his attendants had engaged in dances of questionable decorum. Pius II wrote him a letter of severe yet friendly remonstrance:

“If we were to say only that this conduct displeases us, we should be wrong. It displeases us more than we can say; for the clerical order and our ministry is brought into disrepute, and we seem to have been enriched and magnified, not for righteousness of life, but for an occasion to licentiousness. Hence the contempt of kings, hence the daily scoffs of the laity, hence blame on our own life when we wish to blame others. The Vicar of Christ, who is believed to permit such things, falls into the same contempt. Remember your various offices and dignities. We leave it for yourself to judge if it befits your station to toy with girls, to pelt them with fruits, to hand to her you favor the cup which you have sipped, to look with delight on every kind of pleasure, and to shut out husbands that you may do this with greater freedom. Think of the scandal you bring on us and on your uncle, Calixtus III. If you excuse yourself on the ground of youth, you are old enough (Borgia was twenty-nine) to understand the responsibility of your position. A Cardinal ought to be irreproachable, an example of conduct, good not only for the souls but for the eyes of all men. We are indignant if princes do not obey us; but we bring their blows upon ourselves by making vile the authority of the Church. Let your prudence, therefore, check this vain conduct; if it occurs again we shall be driven to show that it is against our will, and our rebuke must needs put you to open shame. We have always loved you, and regarded you as a model of gravity and decorum: it is for you to reestablish our good opinion. Your age, which gives hopes of reformation, is the cause why we admonish you as a father”.

On his return to Siena in June Pius II soon had graver matter of disquietude than the delinquencies of Cardinal Borgia. News reached him that on July 7 Ferrante of
Naples had been repulsed in an attempt to storm the city of Sarno, into which Jean of Anjou and the Prince of Taranto had retired; the Pope’s general, Simonetto, had been killed, and many horses and men had fallen into the enemies’ hands. Stirred to activity by the news, Piccinino, in the Abruzzo, attacked and defeated, after a stubborn battle, Alessandro Sforza and Federigo of Urbino. These battles, according to the custom of Italian warfare, were neither bloody nor decisive. The Prince of Taranto would not let Jean of Anjou pursue his victory by an attack on Naples, but led him into Campania, where he spent the summer in sieges of insignificant places. Still, the loss of these battles required additional men and money from Sforza and the Pope, and for a moment Pius II began to waver. The French party in the Curia did not hesitate to show its joy at the Angevin successes; it even went so far as to light bonfires in Siena and insult members of the Pope's household. But Sforza was well versed in Italian warfare, and knew that the ultimate success lay with him who held out longest. He was more than ever convinced that his own security lay in keeping the French out of Italy, and he managed to inspire the Pope with greater confidence. So Pius II put on a bold front to the Angevin envoys, who requested him to recognize René, or, at least, declare himself neutral. He took his stand on the peace of Lodi, declared that he was only recognizing the existing state of affairs, expressed his willingness to decide the question of right if René submitted it to his legal cognizance, and complained of René for disturbing by violence the peace which was so necessary for a crusade. Finally, he warned René against persisting in an appeal to a future Council, lest he incurred the penalties of the decree recently issued at Mantua. Pius II, however, used Ferrante’s distress as a means of obtaining grants for his own family. The town of Castiglione della Pescaia and the island of Giglio were given to Andrea, the Pope's nephew—not, as the Pope explains, for his own good, but for the good of the country, whose coast could now be made secure.

The pleasant sojourn of Pius II at Siena was brought to an end by bad news from Rome, where the Pope's absence was the signal for disorder. Cardinal Cusa, who had been left in charge of the city, soon left Rome for Mantua, and thence went to Brixen. The Sienese senator, whom Pius had put in office, was not strong enough to rule the turbulent city. The spirit which had been kindled by Stefano Porcaro still burned in the hearts of some of the Roman youth, but showed itself in a desire for licence rather than for liberty. A band of three hundred youths, many of respectable families, enrolled themselves under Tiburzio and Valeriano, the two sons of Angelo de Maso, who had been executed for his share in Porcaro’s plot. They levied blackmail on the citizens, committed outrages with impunity, and filled the city with alarm. The governor, afraid of a rebellion if he called the citizens to arms, judged it prudent to withdraw from his palace in the Campo dei Fiori to the more secure shelter of the Vatican. This open show of incompetence emboldened the rioters, till at last one of them, who went by the appropriate nickname of Inamorato, seized and carried off a girl on her way to her wedding. The magistrates, driven to action, imprisoned Inamorato; his comrades captured one of the senator's household in return, and entrenched themselves in the Pantheon, where they obtained supplies by raids on the neighboring houses, till at last, after nine days, the magistrates, fearing the end of such confusion, negotiated an exchange of prisoners, and Inamorato went free. The rioters in the city were supported by the barons of the Campagna, the Colonna, the Savelli, and Everso of Anguillara. The governor was afraid that, if he took strong measures against Roman citizens, he would not be supported by the citizens themselves, and might give occasion to an invasion from without.
The Pope’s nephew, Antonio, on his way to Naples, made an attempt to capture some of the rioters, but they retreated into the palace of Cardinal Capranica, and Antonio was afraid to commence a siege.

Tiburzio ruled Rome as a king, and did as he chose in all things. At last the chief citizens warned him that they could no longer endure this anarchy, and begged him to depart peaceably from the city. Tiburzio graciously consented, knowing that he could return when he pleased. He was escorted to the gates by the magistrates, as though he were some mighty prince, and the people thronged to witness his departure. Soon after this a band of rioters broke into the nunnery of S. Agnese, violated the nuns, and plundered the sacred vessels.

Pius II was not to be moved from his pleasant quarters in Siena by these disorders so long as they only affected the citizens of Rome. It became a different thing when they threatened to imperil the States of the Church. Piccinino thought the opportunity favorable for an inroad into the Roman territory, and marched to Rieti; he was joined by the Colonna and Savelli, and plundered far and wide. At the same time a messenger between the Colonna and the Prince of Taranto was seized in Rome, and confessed that he was negotiating a scheme for seizing Rome in the interests of Jean of Anjou, the Roman barons, and Tiburzio. Pius II wrote for help in great agitation to Francesco Sforza, who testily exclaimed that his alliance with the Pope gave him more trouble than all his enemies. However, he wrote to the Pope exhorting him to return to Rome, and all would still be well.

On September 10 Pius II left Siena with tears at the thought that he might never revisit it. He journeyed over Orvieto to Viterbo, where envoys from Rome greeted him. The Pope, in his reply, dwelt on his unwillingness to leave Rome, and his regret that his health had prevented him from returning sooner; he grieved over the disturbances during his absence, and praised the Romans for their loyalty. “What city”, he continued, “is freer than Rome? You pay no taxes, you sell your wine and corn at what price you choose, you fill the most honorable magistracies, and your houses bring you in good rents. Who also is your ruler? Is it count or marquis, duke, king, or emperor? Greater still is he whom you obey—the Roman Pontiff, successor of S. Peter, Vicar of Jesus Christ, whose feet all men desire to kiss. You show your wisdom in reverencing such a lord; for he enriches you and brings you the world’s wealth; you feed the Roman Curia, and it feeds you and brings you gold from every land”. They were fine words, but poor comfort for the absence of government from which Rome during the last year had been suffering.

As Piccinino was threatening Rome, many of the Cardinals counseled that they should go no farther; but Pius II proceeded, though he found scanty preparations made for his entertainment, and could only get rustic fare. When the governor and senator advanced to meet him, they found the Pope reclining beside a well, and trying by an early dinner to eke out the scanty supper of the previous night. Six miles from Rome he was greeted by the Conservators with a band of Roman youths, who had come to carry his litter. Many advised him to beware of these youths, who had belonged to the Tiburtian band. “I will walk on the asp and the basilisk”, said Pius II. with a smile, “and will trample on the lion and dragon”. The rebels carried bun safely, and on October 7 Pius II entered his capital.

The conspirators still continued their plots; but their rashness proved their ruin. One of them, Bonanno Specchio, entered the city secretly, and was there joined by
Valeriano and others. An informer warned the Pope, and an ambush was laid for them in the Colosseum, where Bonanno was taken prisoner, though Valeriano and the others escaped. Tiburzio heard of this at Palombaria, a castle of the Savelli, near Tivoli, where he had his head-quarters. Thinking that his brother also was a prisoner, he hurried to Rome to the rescue with a band of only fourteen men. He raised the cry of 'Liberty', and called on the citizens to rise. "It is too late", was the general answer. The Papal bodyguard advanced against the rebels, who fled outside the city and hid in the brushwood. They were hunted by dogs, and were trapped like pheasants among the grass. Tiburzio, with his hands tied behind his back, was led into the city, surrounded by a crowd, who mocked the king, the tribune, the restorer of ancient liberty. Tiburzio only asked for speedy death, and the Pope interfered to prevent him from being tortured. On October 31 Tiburzio, Bonanno, and six others were hanged in the Capitol. In the following March eleven others of his confederates shared the same fate.

The Roman plot thus ended in entire failure; but Pius II was helpless to reduce the rebellious barons or free himself from Piccinino at Rieti. He had brought with him to Rome only a small band of horsemen, and had no troops save those in Naples. He wrote in distress to Sforza, even to Florence, for aid; but Florence saw no reason to interfere, and Sforza was not sorry to give his troublesome ally a lesson, as Pius II had just given another instance of his readiness to take advantage of Ferrante. Terracina, which Pius II had granted to Ferrante for ten years, had been taken by the Angevins; but the people unwillingly endured the French yoke, and called for the protection of the Papal troops. The Pope’s nephew Antonio became master of the city; and the Pope, instead of restoring it to Ferrante, conferred it on Antonio, to the great wrath of Ferrante and the Duke of Molan. Still they could not entirely abandon their ally; and during the winter the troops of Sforza and Federigo of Urbino, feebly aided by Antorno Piccolomini, forced Piccinino to quit the Papal States, and reduced the Savelli to submit. Pius II, like most of his successors, trusted not so much to any definite organization or government to keep peace and order in his own dominions, as to foreign help rendered on grounds of political necessity. He spent the winter ill restoring order in Rome, haranguing the Romans on the advantage of the Papal Government, and receiving complaints against Gismondo Malatesta, which he appointed Cardinal Cusa as his commissioner to investigate.

In the spring of 1461 Ferrante showed great activity in recovering the castles near Naples, and some of the barons who had joined the Angevin side began to return to his allegiance. These signs of a reaction in his favor made him more anxious to hold his party together. He promised the Pope to confer on the nephew Antonio the hand of his illegitimate daughter Maria and the Duchy of Amalfi. Antonio at the head of the Papal forces went to justify these promises in the field, but was not very successful. The decision of the Neapolitan war was suddenly transferred from Naples to Genoa, where an attack of the exiled party of the Adorn and Fregosi on March 10 succeeded in raising the city on their side and drove the French into the citadel. Charles VII of France at once sent reinforcements to their succor, and René of Anjou set out himself for Genoa. But the Genoese, supported by Sforza, fell upon the French troops and nearly annihilated them. René, unfortunate as ever, had to withdraw hastily to Marseilles. The French garrison in the castle was driven to surrender. Genoa was again free from French influence; the Angevin party in Naples saw itself cut off from supplies, and deprived of its chief support. In Naples itself nothing of moment was done, save that the brave Albanian leader, Scanderbeg, brought to the aid of Ferrante a troop of 800 horse, who
distinguished themselves by a few plundering raids, and then departed to the worthier task of defending their own land against the Turk.

Pius II meanwhile saw his home troubles disappearing. Rome was quiet; Piccinino had gone: the rebellious barons were reduced: his nephew Anton was prospering in Naples. In June, 1461, the Pope gratified his love for Siena and his desire to exercise his oratory by canonizing Catherine of Siena, the Bull of whose canonization he tells us that he dictated himself. Anxious to escape the summer heat in Rome, he departed early in July for Tivoli, under the escort of Federigo of Urbino, with ten squadrons of horse. The Pope was pleased with the flash of arms, the trappings of men and horses, as the sun gleamed on shields, breast-plates, nodding plumes, and forests of lances. The youths galloped on all sides, and made their horses move in circles; they brandished their swords, levelled their spears, and engaged in mimic contests. Federigo, who was a well-read man, asked the Pope if the great heroes of antiquity had been armed like men of our day. The Pope answered that in Homer and Virgil mention was made of every arm now in use, and many that were used no longer. So they fell talking about the Trojan war, which Federigo wished to make little of; while the Pope asserted that it must have been great to leave such a memory behind. Then they talked about Asia Minor, and were not quite agreed about its boundaries. So the Pope afterwards used a little leisure at Tivoli to write a description of Asia Minor from Ptolemy, Strabo, Pliny, Q. Curtius, Solinus, and Pomponius Mela, and other ancient writers. So ready was Pius II to receive pleasure from outward impressions, so active was his mind to turn with unabated freshness to a new topic of interest. In Tivoli Pius II began the rebuilding of the citadel, so as to have a strong fortress of defence for the Papal territory, and busied himself in the reorganization of the monastery, from which he ejected the Conventuals and established Observants in their stead.

Eighteen months had now passed since the end of the Congress of Mantua, and nothing had been done in the matter of a crusade. The Neapolitan war had absorbed all the forces of the Pope and all the military resources of Italy; nor was Germany more free from political complications. Bessarion, in spite of the infirmities of age, hastened from Mantua in the winter storms to be present at the Diet of Nurnberg on March 2, 1460. Few princes appeared, and they paid no heed to Bessarion; for attention was all directed to the war which was imminent between Albert of Brandenburg, the friend of the Pope and Emperor, and Lewis of Bavaria, the leader of the opposition to the Emperor. Soon the war broke out and ended in the rapid discomfiture of Albert, who was obliged to surrender all that his opponent claimed. The Emperor suffered by this defeat of his chief partisan, and became more powerless than ever. Bessarion sorrowfully went to Vienna to hold there the second Diet, which had been resolved at Mantua. Not till the middle of September did the Diet meet; and then none of the princes appeared in person. In vain Bessarion reminded their representatives of the promises made at Mantua; in vain he asked them to agree to the levying of a tenth in Germany. They answered with many protestations of zeal, but said that they had no powers to do anything definite. The Germans were lukewarm, and Bessarion was not the man to conciliate them. In vain he employed his eloquence; his words seemed only to be twice-told tales. The only means that Pius II could devise for kindling the zeal of Germany was to offer the title of general of the crusading army to the Pfalzgraf Frederick, the military leader of the dominant party. Frederick refused the proffered honor, and Bessarion, early in 1461, left Germany, vexed and dispirited.
Yet the Pope was not entirely free from blame for the dissensions of Germany. There, as in Italy, the requirements of ecclesiastical politics were a disturbing cause. Pius II could not unreservedly put himself at the head of a united Christendom, because the needs of the papal policy led him to take a part in creating internal dissensions. The quarrel between Cardinal Cusa and Sigismund of the Tyrol had only been patched up at Mantua, and broke out afresh immediately upon Cusa’s departure to his bishopric. Neither party had any confidence in the legal termination of their disputes. Hostilities were carried on by both alike. At length Sigismund determined on making a bold stroke. In April, 1460, Cusa was at Bruneck negotiating with Sigismund, displaying his usual obstinacy, and threatening to betake himself again to the Pope. Sigismund sent him a formal defiance, as did also most of the vassals of the Church of Brixen. Gathering his forces, Sigismund closed round Bruneck, and Cusa found himself a prisoner in his hands. He granted all that Sigismund demanded, with the intent on of protesting that it was extorted by violence. As soon as he could escape he fled to the Pope at Siena and clamored for aid. Pius II would willingly have escaped a conflict; but he could not overlook violence offered to a Cardinal, and behind Sigismund stood the hated Gregory Heimburg, the representative of the German opposition to the Papacy. The Pope issued an admonition to Sigismund, in which he declared that his criminality was proved by its notoriety, and had involved him in the penalty of excommunication: he was willing, however, to hear him personally, and summoned him to a consistory to be held on August 4. Sigismund in reply assumed that the Pope was ignorant of Cusa’s encroachments on the rights of the Count of the Tyrol, which had made his capture at Bruneck a necessary step. He detailed his grievances, and appealed to a better instructed Pope. Sigismund's attitude was conciliatory, but decided; he stood on the ground of the conciliar movement against the arbitrary action of an individual Pope, and by so doing interposed a technical objection against the validity of the coming sentence, while he still left the dispute open to friendly settlement.

But Cusa would be satisfied with nothing but unconditional submission to his demands, and the Pope was determined to do away with every trace of the conciliar heresy. The Emperor also was glad to see Sigismund in trouble, as he had shown himself a dangerous neighbor. Accordingly, when August 4 arrived, and Dr. Blumenau, as Sigismund’s proctor, handed in the appeal, the Pope’s wrath broke out against him. He was seized and imprisoned as a heretic for drawing up and presenting an appeal contrary to the Bull Execrabilis. Blumenau escaped, and fled in terror across the Alps to his master. On August 8 the Pope declared that the penalty of excommunication had been incurred by Sigismund, all who had joined with him in defying Cusa, all who had been hostile to Cusa, and especially the inhabitants of Bruneck. He followed this by declaring the dominions of Sigismund under an interdict and took the see of Brixen under the Papal protection till its bishop could return.

Sigismund was prepared for this, and knew that excommunication and interdict had little force when directed against an entire people. The men of the Tyrol gathered round their Count, and so long they stood by him he had little to fear. On August 13 Heimburg drew up for Sigismund a second appeal, in which he said that, as all human judgment might err, the remedy of appeals had been devised by our forefathers as a help for the oppressed. As the Pope’s conduct showed that his ears were closed to justice, it was useless to appeal to him when better instructed: “We appeal, therefore, to a future Pope, who may revise the doings of his predecessor; further, to a General Council, to be held in accordance with the decrees of Constance and Basel. Nor is this
appeal a subterfuge, as we do not wish to avoid the course of natural justice. As the Pope has rendered himself notoriously suspected, we will accept any impartial judge whom he may name; we do not refuse his sentence as president of a General Council. If this be denied us, we appeal further to the whole people of our Saviour Jesus Christ; we appeal to all who love justice and favor innocency. If this be denied us, we call God to witness that it is not our fault that justice is not done, and that we are oppressed. This spirited document was meant for general publication; it was addressed directly to the public opinion of Christendom, and was fixed on the church doors even of Florence and Siena.

A war of writings now began. Pius justified himself and denounced Sigismund in letters addressed to all the Christian people. Cusa attacked the life and character of Sigismund. Heimburg, in moderate language, but with many cutting references to the early life of the Pope, detailed the grievances of his master. So indignant was the Pope against Heimburg that he did not scruple to write to the magistrates of Nurnberg and Wurzburg, ordering them to seize Heimburg's goods which were in their cities, and bidding them no longer harbor one whom he called a "child of the devil, the father of lies". Not content with this, the Pope called on all the powers of Germany to seize Heimburg, wherever he might be, and hand him over to the judgment of the Church.

Heimburg's reply breathed the scornful honesty which characterized his entire life. He is a noticeable figure in the history of these times as the representative of German as opposed to Italian culture, as the determined opponent of the subtlety by which Aeneas Sylvius had won back Germany for the Papacy, as the resolute supporter of ecclesiastical reform for his country. The personal antipathy of the two men lent a zest to the struggle between Heimburg and the Pope; and Heimburg never forgot in the Vicar of Christ the shiftypsy secretary of Frederick III. The dignity of the Pope would not allow him to answer Heimburg's personal thrusts; but he keenly felt that the laugh was turned against him by Heimburg's dexterous references to his past career. The answer of Heimburg to the Pope's proceedings against himself is the most powerful statement of the position of the German reformers in that day.

He begins by complaining that the Pope has condemned him unheard, unsummoned, by his own arbitrary power. He has given no grounds, except that Christ set S. Peter as ruler over His Church, and therefore that rebellion against the successor of S. Peter is heresy. But Christ gave commandment to all the Apostles to teach all nations; and the successors of the Apostles as a body are General Councils which ought, from time to time, to revise the actions of the Pope and correct his errors. The superstition which Pius II is trying to set up, that the Pope is greater than a Council, must be overthrown. The Pope appeals to the Congress of Mantua in support of his decree; but that Congress was not a Council, but an assembly of ambassadors. The decree was made by the Pope and Cardinals simply that they might pillage Germany under the pretext of a crusade, and might not be hindered by any threat of a Council. A Council, the fostering mother of liberty, the Pope shudders at as though it were an offspring of unlawful passion; by a monstrous decree he condemned it before its birth, and by his condemnation justified. His prohibition showed his fear; his condemnation has given life to what was almost obscured by long silence. He would have been more prudent if he had imitated Solon, who, when asked why he had enacted no special penalty against parricide, answered, "Lest by forbidding I might suggest". Wherefore, prelates of Germany, hold to this point of the Council as the strongest fortress of your freedom. If the Pope succeed in carrying it, he will tax you at his pleasure, will take
your money for a crusade, and send it to Ferrante of Naples. For the Pope is fond of bastards; for that reason he calls Heimburg “a child of the devil”, because he was born in lawful wedlock. He calls Heimburg also greedy, turbulent, lying. If he strove with blessings, he would be answered; as he strives with curses, he must find another to reply. I am not such a one. My goods are less than my deserts; I have done more work than I have received pay; I have always loved liberty more than flattery. These are no signs of greed. Let the Pope consider his own past and the life he once led.

“I leave these personal matters and go back to the Pope’s decree. If the whole body of the Apostles was above Peter, a Council is above the Pope. If an appeal can be made to the Pope during a vacancy, it can be made to a Council which is not summoned; for the power of the Church, like the Church itself, never dies. By forbidding such an appeal the Pope treats us like slaves, and wishes to take for his own pleasures all that we and our ancestors have gained by our honest labor. The Pope calls me a chatterer—the Pope, who is himself more talkative than a magpie. I own I have given some attention to the windiness of words, but I have never for that neglected the study of civil and canon law; the Pope has never even smelt at them, but has contented himself with sheer verbosity. I profess myself a member of the lawyer tribe; the Pope is one of those who think that everything can be managed by the force and artifice of a rhetorician. If the Pope excommunicates me for talking, who deserves the penalty more than himself, who has no merit save wordiness? The Pope declares me guilty of treason; he is using a fly net to catch an eagle. He calls me a heretic because I say a Council is above the Pope; I call him a heretic because he says that the Pope is above a Council. He orders my goods to be confiscated; I trust that I live amongst those who count my services as of more value than any gain they could expect from my possessions. He says that they who seize my goods will do a service to the Catholic Church; such a statement would be ridiculous if we had not seen at Mantua the Pope's folly when he, with a flow of words, praised adultery and illegitimacy”.

“So much for the Pope's charges. Yet all men may appeal from an inferior to a superior tribunal. Like the woman who appealed from Philip drunk to Philip sober, I appeal from the Pope angry to the Pope appeased, from the tropical orator to the same man when his fit of wind is over, when he has sent away the Muses and has turned to the canon law. In the second place, I appeal to him, if he will bind himself to judge according to the decision of a good man. In the third place, I appeal to any man above suspicion to whom the Pope may choose to delegate the matter. In the fourth place, I submit myself to the judgment of the Pope, if he will remove all cause for suspicion. Finally, if the Pope contemn all these, nothing remains save to appeal to the Universal Church, as men of old appealed from the Senate to the Roman people. Let not the Pope object that the Church is not assembled; that is not my fault, but his”.

This answer of Heimburg’s was largely circulated throughout Europe, and Pius II keenly felt its bitter sarcasm. By his attack on Heimburg the Pope had made a serious mistake: he had given a private person an opportunity of making an onslaught on personal grounds upon the Papacy. So long as Heimburg was writing in Sigismund’s name, he could only speak on general grounds of ecclesiastical grievances. By attempting to crush a private person, Pius II exposed himself to the indignity of a private attack, which it was beneath his lofty position to answer or even to recognize. One of his friends in the Curia, Teodoro de Lelli, Bishop of Feltre, answered in the Pope's behalf, and asserted in the strongest terms the principles of the restored Papacy—the necessity of a Papal monarchy over the Church, the divine institution of the rights of
S. Peter and his successors. He paid back the sneers of Heimburg with the contemptuous vituperation which the language of ecclesiastical controversy has always bestowed on one who can be branded with the name of heretic. This only gave Heimburg an opportunity of returning to the charge.

"Like a Molossian hound", he said, "I will track my prey even through the snow". He scoffed at Lelli as the Pope's stalking-horse, content to put his vanities into shape and bear blows on his behalf. The Pope himself will do nothing. "If you were to put before him the library of Ptolemy you would not call him away from his care for Corsignano and the Piccolomini. But if your other follies, Lelli, turn out as well as this you will get your reward, and your crown will soon be red with a Cardinal's hat".

He hit Cusa, calling him a hard and rigid man, stern, ungenial, inexorable, vehement in stirring up others, keen in discovering those who can help him or hurt his adversary, with no wisdom to help himself, and no restraint over his passion. He next considered the proceedings of the Congress of Mantua, whither he went himself to test the Pope’s sincerity. "I laid before him and the Cardinals obvious considerations of the difficulties in the way of a crusade. I urged that it must be a decided success, or it would do more harm than good. I showed that agreement amongst the soldiers was necessary for success, and pleaded that the establishment of peace between the Emperor and the King of Hungary was the first step to be taken. I spoke to the dead; I told my story to the deaf. All the juice of the Jubilee was exhausted, and the Pope and Cardinals were seeking something on which to fasten like leeches. You, Cardinal Cusa, answered my arguments for prudence by saying, : Let us lay all this aside, and put our trust only in God,—which was the same as saying that rashness and not wisdom ought to direct affairs. This is the heresy of Gregory Heimburg,—his constancy in resisting the Pope’s avarice, his persistency in giving wise advice. This is his sacrilege,—his plea for liberty, his support of the oppressed, his defence of General Councils, which the Mantuan decree aimed at overthrowing. This is his treason : he disturbed the Papal plot for taming Germany”. The defense of Lelli had only given Heimburg a chance of going further in his attack upon the whole policy of the Pope.

Pius II no doubt had been led by Cusa to think that a little determination on his part would raise the Tyrol in rebellion against Sigismund, and would bring upon him many foreign foes. The Pope was careful in his interdicts to save all the rights of the House of Austria: neither the Emperor nor his brother Albert was to be murder, and might, if they chose, seize the Tyrol for themselves. But no one stirred against Sigismund. The Pope vainly tried to incite the Swiss; but they preferred to use the opportunity to make a peace which satisfied their own interests. The Pope appealed on all sides for someone to punish Sigismund; but even his ally the Duke of Milan refused to move, and would not allow the excommunication to be published in his dominions. In this state of things Pius II felt himself bound, at least, to do something; and, by way of opening up a new stage in the proceedings, which might possibly lead to new negotiations, he issued on January 23, 1461, a citation to Sigismund and his associates to appear within sixty days and answer to a charge of heresy. The citation called Sigismund “a principal limb of Satan”, declared him suspected of the heresy which is above all other heresies, of not believing the article of the Creed, “I believe in one Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church”, seeing that he refused to heed the censures of the Pope, who was the head of that Church. Probably the Pope thought that by transferring the matter to a doctrinal ground he might open a way to reconciliation.
But Sigismund and Heimburg remained true to their policy of appeal, and answered by renewing it. Pope summoned Sigismund for despising his censures—he did not recognize the validity of those censures. The Pope summoned Sigismund's adherents to Rome, more than 100,000 men; who was to nurse the children and look after the country in their absence? Did he wish to drive a whole people into banishment? What had rustics to do with disputes about the Creed, which was the business of theologians? Sigismund believed in the Church of the Apostles' Creed and of the Nicene Creed; but the Creed did not ask him to believe in the Church in the same way as he believed in the persons of the Trinity. He could not say anything about the obedience required by the Pope and Cusa, lest he should be called to worship a creature instead of the Creator. He renewed his appeal to a future Council, which the Pope, contrary to the decrees of Constance, was striving to bind and fetter. The Pope took no notice of this appeal, but in the greater excommunication, issued on Maundy Thursday, Sigismund and Heimburg appeared in the same class as Wyclifites, Pirates, and Saracens.

As the next step in the controversy, Cardinal Cusa wrote an anonymous pamphlet, with the object of separating Sigismund from Heimburg. He besought Sigismund to return to the Christian faith and shake off the man who had so long misled him. Heimburg retorted, and at once exposed his anonymous foe. “Crab, Cusa, Nicolas”, he began, playing on Cusa's family name of Krebs, “who call yourself Cardinal of Brixen, why do you not come openly into the lists?”. In this strain he answered Cusa's statements one by one, and repeated his own arguments. It was clear that Heimburg was a dangerous controversialist, and that he and Sigismund stood firm in their position.

Nor was the quarrel with Sigismund the only one in which Pius II was engaged in Germany. In 1459 the Archbishop of Mainz died, and there were two candidates for the vacant office, Diether of Isenburg and Adolf of Nassau; each had three votes in the Chapter, and the seventh vote, which decided the election, was said to have been secured by bribery in favor of Diether. When the representative of Diether sought the pallium from the Pope in Mantua, Pius II wished to use the opportunity. First he required that Diether should assent to the levy of a Turkish tithe in Germany; then he summoned him to appear at Mantua. Diether sent his excuses and a proctor to arrange about the payment of annates, which were negotiated by bonds drawn on the bankers of the Curia. These obligations he afterwards repudiated, alleging that his proctor had been induced to promise more than the ordinary payment. He refused to go to Rome when summoned, brought his complaints before the Diet, spoke of a future Council, and welcomed Heimburg at his court. His object clearly was to frighten the Curia and escape the payment of the money which had been promised on his behalf. The judges of the Papal Camera pronounced an excommunication against Diether for not paying his debts. Diether replied that he had offered to pay all that his predecessors had paid; if that was refused, he appealed to a future Council.

The differences with Sigismund of the Tyrol and with the Archbishop of Mainz were troublesome enough scheme in themselves; but they began to wear a more serious aspect in the light of the movement in German politics, which agitated the end of the year 1460. It became clear that King George of Bohemia was scheming to depose Frederick and obtain the Imperial crown. Already the plan of setting aside the feeble Frederick had often been mooted; the defeat of Frederick's chief ally, the Markgraf of Brandenburg, and the power of the Bohemian king, gave a new impulse to the wish to have a reorganization of Germany under a competent head. In Church matters George of Bohemia purposéd to work for the summons of a Council, and sent Heimburg to secure
the co-operation of Charles VII of France. Secretly a scheme was formed between George of Bohemia and the Pfalzgraf: the Archbishop of Mainz was only too willing to join in anything that would overthrow the Emperor and the Pope. The Archbishop of Trier and the Elector of Saxony were both related to the Emperor, and could hardly be won over, unless the Markgraf of Brandenburg set them an example. A Diet at Nurnberg, March, 1461, called on the Emperor to reform the empire and war against the Turk; it invited him to appear personally at a Diet in Frankfort in June, when the conspirators hoped to proceed to a new election.

The Emperor and the Pope were now genuinely alarmed. Pius II wrote letters to all the German princes, defending his action in the matter of the Turkish tithe. The Emperor began to negotiate peace with Hungary, and forbade the meeting of the Diet at Frankfort. The citizens of Frankfort sided with the Emperor and closed their gates against the princes. Instead of a Diet in Frankfort an assembly was held in Mainz, at which the only Electors present were the Pfalzgraf and Diether of Mainz. The Pope sent representatives, and Heimburg came to plead the wrongs of Sigismund of the Tyrol. The discussions turned almost entirely on ecclesiastical matters; but Diether was only seeking his own interest, and was easily won over to withdraw his appeal to a Council and submit himself to the Pope's indulgence. Still he did not trust the Pope, nor could the Pope trust him. Pius II was secretly engaged in taking measures to overthrow Diether, and his emissaries were busy at Mainz. The assembly separated without any definite conclusion. Matters in Germany advanced into a new stage by the outbreak of a war between the Emperor and his brother Albert of Austria, who, in August, 1461, advanced with his forces against Vienna.

It was of great importance to cause a diversion in Germany, and Pius II was ready to do so by attacking Diether of Mainz. He had sent John of Flassland, Dean of Basel, as a confidential agent to Mainz, and John had succeeded in raising a party against Diether. It was agreed that the Pope should depose Diether, and set up in his stead Adolf of Nassau, whom the Archbishop of Trier, the Markgraf of Baden, the Count of Wurtemberg, and others, promised to support. Secretly John collected evidence against Diether and bore it back to Pius II in his summer retreat at Tivoli. There, with equal secrecy, Pius II laid the evidence before the five Cardinals who were with him. They agreed that the charges against Diether were matters of notoriety, and that a regular process against him was unnecessary. On August 21, Pius II issued a Bull deposing Diether; at the same time Adolf was appointed, by a Papal provision, archbishop in his stead. Armed with these documents, John of Flassland hurried back to Mainz. Adolf gathered his friends around him, took Diether by surprise, and was enthroned on October 2. Diether made his escape, called on the Pfalzgraf for help, and renewed his appeal to a future Council. Both sides gathered their forces round them and prepared for war.

Thus, in the middle of 1461 Pius II saw in Germany also his crusading policy rendered useless by the conflict between a large policy of European interest and a policy of small expediency. The Pope might preach a crusade, might exhort Europe to peace, but the question was, Where was peace to begin? The Pope did not see his way to set an example of patience. He could not afford to let himself be smitten on one cheek without resistance, for he was afraid lest he should be smitten also on the other. So far from pacifying Germany, he was a cause of dissension: in Mainz and in the Tyrol alike there was warfare in the name of the Holy See. We cannot wonder that the princes of Germany were equally jealous of their own rights, and were more eager to use every
opportunity of asserting their own interests than to promote the well-being of Christendom. Germany was distracted by intrigues and divided into parties. The war of Albert of Austria against the Emperor attracted all its attention.
CHAPTER VIII.
PIUS II AND HIS RELATIONS TO FRANCE AND BOHEMIA.
1461—1464.

If Pius II found nothing but disappointment and trouble in Germany, he had more cheering prospects in France. Charles VII died on July 22, 1461, and from his successor, Louis XI, the Papacy expected great things. The Dauphin Louis had been on bad terms with his father, had fled from France, and, for the last five years of his father's life, had been a refugee in the Court of the Duke of Burgundy. As an outcast and a dependent Louis thought it wise to make friends where he could. He had entered into friendly relations with the Pope, whose aid might stand him in good stead if any attempt were made to set him aside from the succession. On the death of Charles VII Louis returned in haste to France, and was surprised to find that he met with no opposition. But Pius II did not forget the promises made by the exile, and on August 20 sent Jean Geoffroy, Bishop of Arras, as his legate to France to urge the abolition of the Pragmatic Sanction.

It was natural that the Papacy should hate the Pragmatic Sanction with a bitter hatred. It was the standing memorial of the conciliar movement, and kept alive in Europe its principles and its endeavors. Moreover, it was a memorial of national opposition to the theory of the Universal Church: it expressed the claim of a temporal ruler to arrange at his pleasure the affairs of the Church within his realms. So long as France retained the Pragmatic Sanction she gave an example to which other countries might appeal, and was a standing threat to the Papal power. So long as the Pragmatic Sanction remained unrepealed, the restored Papacy could not claim to have entirely re-established its authority. The position of France was founded on the decrees of Constance and Basel, and France was bound to sympathize with any movement which had for its object the assertion of the supremacy of a Council over the Pope.

Not only was the theory of the Pragmatic Sanction opposed to the principles of the Papal monarchy, but its working was still more prejudicial to the Papal interests. Grants of benefices in expectancy were entirely lost to the Pope, and reservations were only allowed to the smaller posts. Annates were not paid, and appeals to Rome were only made in important matters. The power of raising money in France was largely forbidden to the Pope, and the Curia saw an important source of revenue removed from its grasp. It was not to be expected that the Papacy should endure without a struggle this diminution of its authority. Eugenius IV protested against the Pragmatic Sanction, and refused to recognize it. Nicolas V trusted to the growth of the Papal prestige to overcome the opposition of France. Calixtus III raised the question more decidedly by sending Cardinal Alain of Avignon as legatus a Latere to raise Turkish tithes in France. Charles VII, however, would not let him exercise his functions except by his permission, and made him execute a document that he would do nothing contrary to the royal pleasure, or against the liberties of the Gallican Church as secured by the Pragmatic Sanction. The King granted leave to collect tithes from the clergy, on the condition that the money was spent on building galleys at Avignon. He was true to the national principle that French gold was not to be taken to Rome, and he probably had
even then formed the plan of using the galleys against Genoa or Naples when occasion suited. Yet many of the French clergy, headed by the University of Paris, protested against this Papal taxation and appealed to a future Council. Calixtus III angrily bade his legate proceed to Paris, rebuke the insolence of the University, and demand the revocation of the appeal. The King had to interpose and settle the difference by a declaration that he had granted the Pope a tithe from reasons of public expediency; though this had been done without the formal assent of the clergy, the King did not thereby intend to derogate from the liberties of the Gallican Church. Charles VII was firm in his adhesion to the Pragmatic Sanction; and the attack upon it made by Pius II at Mantua awakened the determined resistance of the French, who regarded it as a political maneuver of the Pope to justify his support of Ferrante of Naples. When Pius II issued his Bull *Execrabilis* France at once accepted the challenge. A Master of the University, Jean Dauvet, as proctor for the King, registered a formal protest that nothing in the Bull should deprive the King of his right to press for the summoning of a Council according to the Constance decrees; if the Pope were to inflict any ecclesiastical censures in France, the King would call on a future Council to judge between him and the Pope; if the Pope refused to summon a Council, the King would instigate the princes of Europe to summon it themselves. Pius II judged it prudent to take no notice of this protest; but he did not cease in his letters to Charles VII to urge upon him gently and persuasively the abolition of the Pragmatic Sanction.

It must not be supposed that the Pragmatic Sanction was an unmixed good to the Gallican Church. The Papal supremacy had been accepted by the Church throughout Europe because it set up a barrier against royal and aristocratic oppression. As the Papal sovereignty grew more and more exacting, churchmen were willing to rid themselves of its taxation, which seemed to outweigh the advantages of its protection. The Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges adopted so much of the reforming decrees of Basel as seemed to suit the national needs, and gave them validity for France by a royal decree. Thus the French Church was exempt from the technicalities of the canon law: the decree itself could be explained by royal judges, and left no loophole for Papal interference. Its provisions sounded fair; but they did not in practice come up to all they promised. It enacted that elections to ecclesiastical benefices should be free according to the canons: but this was subject to many exceptions in practice. First, there was the royal right of the regale, by which the King enjoyed the revenues of vacant benefices and the disposal of them during vacancies. If disputes arose about the election, as only too often happened, the King had as great an interest in prolonging the vacancy so as to enjoy the revenues, as had the Curia in protracting the appeal that it might receive larger fees. Besides, the nobles used the rights of nomination in such a way as to override the Chapters. Moreover, the Pragmatic Sanction assigned to graduates of the Universities a third of all vacancies, on the ground of encouraging learning. The Universities were not slow to claim their privilege, and were skillful in extending its limits. The jurisdiction in ecclesiastical matters was exercised by the Parliament and the University of Paris; and these bodies did not show themselves more disinterested or more expeditious than the Curia had been. It is doubtful whether the Gallican Church was more free from practical abuses under the Pragmatic Sanction than it had been under the Papal rule; but it made all the difference that at least the oppressors were men of the same nation as the oppressed, that French gold stayed in the kingdom, and did not flow to Rome, where it might be used against the interests of France. There was no murmuring within France itself; the French clergy were all willing to stand by the Pragmatic, and the Pope had no opportunity afforded from within to justify his interference.
Still the position of France was anomalous, and there was some excuse for the view taken of it by Pius II. “The prelates of France”, he says, “who Pius II thought that they would be made free by the Pragmatic Sanction, were reduced to the most entire slavery and became the creatures of the laity. They were compelled to answer in all causes before the Parlement, to confer benefices at the will of the King, or other princes or nobles, and to ordain unfit persons. They were bidden to pardon men whom they condemned for their misdeeds, and to absolve excommunicated persons without satisfaction. No power was left them of inflicting ecclesiastical censures. Whoever brought into France letters from the Pope which were adverse to the Pragmatic, was liable to the punishment of death. Cognizance of episcopal causes, of metropolitan churches, of marriages, of heresy, was taken by the Parlement. Such was the presumption of the laity that even the most holy body of Christ, borne in procession for the veneration of the people, or being carried to the sick, was bidden to stand still by the mighty hand of the King. Bishops and other prelates, venerable priests, were hurried to the public prisons; estates belonging to the Church, and the goods of clergy, were seized on slight grounds by a decree of a secular judge. The Pragmatic Sanction gave rise to much impiety, sacrilege, heresy, and indecorum, which were either ordered or permitted by the ungrateful King”.

The accession of Louis XI opened up an alluring prospect to Pius II, who had already negotiated with him for the abolition of the Pragmatic. So bitterly was Louis XI opposed to his father, that the reversal of his father’s policy had in itself a charm for his mind. On his visit to his father’s grave he allowed the Bishop of Terni, who had so grossly misconducted himself as Papal legate in England, to pronounce an absolution over his father’s ashes, as though he had died excommunicated for his adhesion to the Pragmatic. The Bishop of Arras was sent by Pius II to take advantage of this favorable state of mind of the King; and his zeal was spurred by the understanding that a Cardinal’s hat was to be the reward of his success. Louis XI dismissed his father’s ministers, and looked coldly on the Parlement and the University by whose aid the Pragmatic Sanction had so long been maintained. His policy was to maintain the royal power in its existing privileges, by the help of the Pope, rather than by the help of the constitution of the realm. It was the task of the Bishop of Arras to negotiate skillfully the details of such an arrangement.

While awaiting the results of this negotiation Pius II spent the autumn in making an excursion from Tivoli to Subiaco, to visit the mighty monasteries that clustered round the cave of the great S. Benedict. As usual, he enjoyed a leisurely journey by the side of the Anio, and was pleased with the simple homage of the rustic. He would dine by a spring of water, with a crowd of peasants at a respectful distance. When he resumed his journey the peasants plunged into the water to fish, following the Pope in his course. When a fish was caught a loud shout called the Pope’s attention to the fact, and the trout were given as a friendly offering to the Pope’s attendants. From Subiaco Pius II paid a visit to Palestrina, and on October 6 returned to Rome.

Soon after his return Pius II was reminded of his crusading scheme, which the current of events had thrust into the background. The luckless Queen Charlotte of Cyprus came to demand help against the Turks. Cyprus had been handed over by Richard I of England to the House of Lusignan, under whose feeble and profligate rule it had been a medley of Greek and Latin civilization. It was further distracted by being a field for the commercial rivalry of Venice and Genoa, and was a helpless prey to Egyptian pirates. Queen Charlotte in 1459 had married Louis, son of the Duke of
Savoy; but her bastard brother, John, fled to Egypt, offered his homage to the Sultan, and, with the help of an Egyptian fleet, overran Cyprus, shut up Louis in the castle of Cerina, and drove Charlotte to seek for help in Western Europe. She was received at Ostia with royal honors. The Pope was favorably impressed with the Queen, a handsome woman of twenty, with merry eyes, a pleasant address, and stately carriage, who spoke in Greek manner like a torrent, but dressed in French fashion. She poured out her griefs to the Pope, who magnanimously promised that he would never desert her, but pointed out that her misfortunes were due to the lukewarmness of Savoy at the Congress of Mantua. All that he could do was to provide her with means to go to Savoy and plead with her father-in-law. She went to Savoy, but with no result; she could only return to Venice, and thence make her way back to Rhodes.

Meanwhile the Bishop of Arras was rapidly advancing the Pope's interests in France. Pius II knew well how the national opposition in Germany had been overcome by a secret understanding to the mutual advantage of the King and the Pope, and he practiced the same plan in France. The Bishop of Arras promised Louis XI that the Pope would send a legate to France, who would dispose of benefices at the King's pleasure. Pius II himself wrote to the king, commending his independent spirit, and urging him to abolish the Pragmatic without taking counsel with any. "You are wise", he said, "and show yourself a great king, who are not ruled, but rule; for he is the best prince who knows and does what is right by himself, as we trust is the case with you". He adds significantly, "If your prelates and the University desire anything from us let them use your mediation, for if any Pope was ever well disposed to France, we certainly will be found the chief to honor and love your race and nation, nor will we ever oppose your honorable requests". Pius II meant to imply that the King would find a close alliance with the Papacy to be the best way of making the French clergy dependent on himself. Louis XI kissed the Pope's letter, and ordered it to be placed in a gold box amongst his treasures. On November 27, 1461, he wrote to the Pope announcing the abolition of the Pragmatic Sanction, and sent the letter to the Parlement to be registered as a royal ordinance.

Thus Louis XI, by the plenitude of the royal power, swept away the bulwark of the liberties of the Gallican Church, and Pius II wept with joy to receive the news. Louis XI had abolished the obnoxious decree without making any conditions; but he expected his reward, and it was a question for the Pope how he could best meet his views. With characteristic astuteness Pius II used the opportunity first of all for his own advantage. He longed to use his power in the creation of Cardinals, and now laid before the College the necessity of pleasing the French King by creating some French Cardinals; the Ultramontanes had been omitted in the last creation, and their claims ought to be considered. The Cardinals, who were reluctant to see the College increased, were driven unwillingly to consent. Pius II seized his opportunity, and having secured a majority by private interviews, proposed six creations in a consistory on December 18. The Cardinals sat in silence, and looked at one another. Pius II at once declared his creations, and the publication was made on the same day, though the Pope was suffering so severely from an attack of the gout that he had to entrust the ceremony to Cardinal Bessarion. The Cardinals created at the request of the French King were the Bishop of Arras and Louis d'Albret, a prince of the blood royal. Besides these were Don Jayme de Cardona, a relative of the King of Aragon; Francesco Gonzaga, son of the Marquis of Mantua, a youth of seventeen; Bartolomineo Rovarella, Bishop of Ravenna, an old official, of great experience in the affairs of the Curia; and jacopo Ammannati, Bishop
of Pavia, the special favorite of Pius II, the only one of the new creations who was a scholar and a man of culture.

Pius II could now plume himself that he had done great things for Louis XI, “who had obtained two Cardinals from one litter”, as the Pope put it. He also sent him, on Christmas Day, a consecrated sword, with an inscription: “Let your right hand, Louis, draw me against the furious Turks, and I will be the avenger of the blood of the Greeks. The Empire of Mahomet will fall, and again will the renowned velour of the French, with you for leader, reach to heaven”. This was very pretty, no doubt; but Louis XI wished for something more substantial. He had been led to suppose that the Pope, in return for the abolition of the Pragmatic, would withdraw from his alliance with Ferrante of Naples, and would even espouse the Angevin side. Pius II had behaved as though he were wavering in this matter. His ally, Francesco Sforza, had been seriously ill of a fever during the summer, and Sforza’s death would have entirely changed the aspect of affairs. Pius II held himself ready for any contingency; he intimated to Louis XI that he was weary of the trouble of the Neapolitan war, and thought it better to rule the States of the Church in quietness. But when the abolition of the Pragmatic Sanction was completed, when Sforza’s recovery was assured, and above all the marriage of his nephew Antonio to Maria, the illegitimate daughter of Ferrante, solemnized, Pius II began to be more resolute, and bethought himself that his honor would not allow him to abandon Ferrante.

Pius II was disappointed to find that the new Cardinal of Arras, so soon as he had gained all that the Pope had to give, transferred his services to the King’s side, and became an ardent negotiator in favour of the Angevin claims. He besought the Pope to ensure the favour of Louis XI by withdrawing from the Neapolitan war. He offered, on the King’s behalf, that Ferrante should have Sardinia with the title of king, and the lands of the Prince of Taranto, and that the Pope's nephew, Antonio, should have a portion of Calabria; otherwise Louis XI would ally with Venice and pour his troops into Milan, so that the Pope would be left single-handed.

On March 13, 1462, a French embassy, headed by the Cardinals of Arras and Coutances, entered Rome to announce the abolition of the Pragmatic, and to receive the Pope's answer about Naples. In a public consistory the Cardinal of Arras presented the royal letters abolishing the Pragmatic, spoke much in praise of Louis, and said that so soon as Naples was secured for the Angevin dynasty, and Genoa had again submitted to France, Louis was ready to send 40,000 horse and 30,000 foot against the Turks, drive them from Europe, penetrate into Syria, and recover the Holy Sepulchre. Pius II was wearied with the pompous and mendacious speech, and anxiously awaited its end. He answered with equally high-sounding praises of Louis XI and of his predecessors on the French throne; about Naples he briefly said that he would speak privately. He placed the red hat on the Cardinal’s head, and proclaimed a general holiday for three days. Rome blazed with bonfires for joy at the Papal triumph in winning back the unconditional allegiance of France.

When the festivities were over the French ambassadors returned to the Pope, who offered to negotiate a truce, or to withdraw his troops, provided the Neapolitan question were referred to a judicial decision of the Curia. This was all that the Pope would promise: and the embassy returned with loud complaints of the Papal ingratitude. If, in France, the abolition of the Pragmatic had been hateful at first, it now seemed a positive indignity. The story was current that Pius II, on receiving the news, had waved his cap
and cried out, “Guerra, Guerra” (war, war), meaning that the increased revenues now secured to him would enable him to carry on more vigorously the Neapolitan war. Pius wrote to Louis XI to contradict this story, and it was even judged wise that Cardinal Ammannati should write in the name of the College and disclaim it. Louis XI wrote angrily to the Pope to this purport: “I thought to win your kindness by benefits. I abolished the Pragmatic Sanction; I gave you my free obedience; I promised help against the Turks; I gave a stern answer to innovators who talked about a Council; I could be persuaded to nothing that was contrary to your dignity. Who would not have thought that this would have softened your harshness? But the reverse has happened. You seek to drive from his kingdom my own flesh and blood. What am I to do if kindness will not win your unquiet spirit? Shall I try the opposite way? No, it is not my will to persecute the Vicar of Christ. I will pursue the way I have begun, though there is none of my counselors who does not advise me otherwise. Perhaps someday you will repent”.

This letter was followed by the Seneschal of Toulouse a man who knew neither Latin nor Italian, and delivered through an interpreter a message that if the Pope did not change his ways, he had orders from the King to bid the French prelates leave the Curia. At first this caused some alarm; but Pius II was shrewd enough to know that it was a mere threat. He answered that the French prelates might go if they chose; they made a pretense, but did not go. Louis XI felt that he had been outmaneuvered by the Pope; embassies passed between them fruitlessly, and the national feeling in France only grew more strong against the Papacy.

If Pius II could flatter himself that he had succeeded in sweeping away from France the memorials of the Council of Basel, he was obliged to confess that he had been deceived in his hopes of obtaining a like result in Bohemia. George Podiebrad had lulled the Pope into a false security while he needed time to secure himself on the Bohemian throne, and by the Pope's help had made a truce for three years with the Catholics of Breslau. But the men of Breslau were not so confiding as the Pope, and watched George with suspicion. When at last George began to intrigue for the Imperial crown, Pius II was driven to admit that his policy was opposed to the Papacy. As a claimant for the empire George was the leader of the anti-papal party, the upholder of a Council, the ally of Diether of Mainz. The failure of George’s scheme weakened his position: he had abandoned his attitude as mediator in the disputes of Germany; he had thrown off the mask, and had shown himself to be opposed to Pope and Emperor; he had alienated somewhat his Bohemian subjects, who suspected that in these schemes of higher policy their national interests might be betrayed. Pius II began to listen more heedfully to the reports that came from Breslau. He pressed for the embassy which was to declare at Rome the obedience of Bohemia, according to the promise which George, before his coronation, had made to the Pope. At length the embassy, which had been so long delayed, arrived in Rome on March 10, two days before the arrival of the French embassy which was to announce the abrogation of the Pragmatic Sanction.

The coincidence seemed auspicious for the Papal success; but Pius II was soon driven to admit that Bohemia was different from France. The Bohemian embassy was headed by Procopius of Rabstein, a Catholic, an old friend of Pius II, who had been his colleague in the chancery of Frederick III, and Sdenek Kostka of Postupic, an Utraquist baron who stood high in the King’s confidence; with them was Wenzel Coranda, burgomaster of Prague. Pius II adopted his usual plan of endeavoring to discover in a private interview the commission of the envoys, before he admitted them to a public
audience. On March 13 he summoned Procopius and Kostka, who said that they were sent to offer to the Pope the obedience of the Bohemian King as was customary and as his predecessors had offered it. The Pope answered that the realm of Bohemia did not stand like other realms in the unity of the Church: the King had promised at his coronation to bring back his people from the error of their ways; before his obedience could be accepted he must take oath to do so. The envoys answered that they could only do what they were commissioned to do. The question was referred to a committee of Cardinals, chief of whom were Carvajal, Cusa, and Bessarion. There were many conferences and a repetition of the arguments that had been used at Basel; but the Bohemians remained firm to their position, that by accepting the Compacts they remained in the unity and obedience of the Church, and that they stood by the Compacts. On March 21 a public audience was given. Kostka, after making excuses for the delay of the embassy in appearing at Rome, professed the obedience of his King.

“You only offer the obedience of the King”, said the Pope, “not of the kingdom”. Procopius whispered to Kostka, “What shall we do? I will offer the obedience of my party, of which I am sure; do you the same on behalf of yours”.

“Speak in the name of all”, answered Kostka;”what the King does all will accept”

Then Procopius repeated the declaration of obedience in the name of the King and the realm. “If you have anything else to say”, said the Pope, “say on’. Then Wenzel Coranda, with the loud voice and rapid speech which the Pope had so often heard from the Bohemians at Basel, set forth the origin of the Hussite movement, the troubles in Bohemia, the peace negotiations at Basel, and the Compacts; by holding fast to them King George had given peace to Bohemia; that peace was endangered by the open and secret attempts made in Bohemia and outside it, to do away with the Compacts; the Bohemians were called heretics and schismatics. He besought the Pope to free Bohemia from all suspicion, to give peace and enable it to turn its energies against the Turks, by confirming the Compacts so that there should be no misunderstanding in the future. The Pope answered in a long speech which gave a history of Bohemia, showed how prosperous it had been while it remained Catholic, complained that the Compacts, which were a conditional indulgence granted by the Council of Basel, had been so violated in every way by the Bohemians, that they had ceased to be binding. Finally he declared that the demand made of him was impossible, for it was contrary to the unity of the Church; yet he would consult further with the Cardinals.

More conferences were held and more arguments were advanced on both sides. Carvajal pointed out the weakness of the Bohemian position. They declared that only the recognition of the Compacts could give Bohemia peace; yet peace was impossible so long as there were two different rituals. The aim of the Utraquists was the abolition of the Catholic ritual and the union of Bohemia under their own views. As the Compacts would never bring peace, he urged that it was better to drop them. Kostka was not a disputant; but he was for that reason all the better fitted for his office. He answered that, the King were to attempt anything against the Compacts, the Hussites would rise and a more bloody war than had been seen before would devastate Bohemia; he trusted that the Pope would listen to the request that had been made; if not, Bohemia must maintain itself in the future as it had done in the past. It was clear that nothing could come of controversy, and on March 31 the Pope gave his answer to the envoys. He spoke words of warning about the obedience which had been offered on the King's behalf: “We praise the King, who seeks the door of the Lord, which is the Apostolic
seat, to which are entrusted the keys of the kingdom of heaven. The King is wise in seeking the true door, the true pasture, the true shepherd; ourselves, though undeserving, he honors as the Vicar of Christ. In virtue of that obedience just offered we bid him remove all novelties from his kingdom; obedience is shown not in words but in deeds”. Then the Pope turned to the request that he would confirm the Compacts. He repeated the familiar arguments used at Basel against the Communion under both kinds. The Compacts gave an indulgence in Bohemia and Moravia to those who united with the Church; they promised that the Council would give power to certain priests to administer the rite under both kinds to those who desired it in Bohemia. It did not appear that the Council had ever empowered any priest to do so, nor that Bohemia had returned to the unity of the Church. No argument in favor of their request could be founded on the Compacts themselves. If he was asked to grant them by his apostolic power, it would be impossible for him to grant what his predecessors had refused, what would scandalize Christendom, give offence to other nations and be harmful to themselves. As Christ said to the sons of Zebedee, so say I to you, “Ye know not what ye ask. We are the stewards of the mysteries of God; it is for us to feed the sheep and guide the flock of the Lord in the way of safety. Not all understand what is for their good”.

When the Pope had ended, his Procurator-fiscal rose and read a public protestation, “that our most holy Lord the Pope has extinguished and destroyed the Compacts granted by the Council of Basel to the Bohemians, and has said that the Communion under both kinds is nowise necessary to salvation, nor will he hold the obedience made to be real obedience, until the King, uprooting and extirpating all errors, has brought the kingdom of Bohemia to union with the Roman Church, and has conformed himself and his kingdom in all things and through all things to the Roman Church”.

There was now no doubt of the Pope’s meaning. Next day the Bohemian envoys took leave of the Pope, who received them in his garden and gave them his blessing. He bade them tell the king that he was willing to do all he could for Bohemia consistently with his honor and that of his office. Let the King himself communicate under one kind only, and the people would follow the example of a prince whom they loved. If he remained obstinate the Church would have to try other methods; it was better to have the glory of restoring his land to the union of the Church than to suffer compulsion. The Bohemians asked that someone should accompany them to carry the Pope’s instructions to the King. The Pope commissioned for this purpose Fantinus, a Dalmatian priest who had for two years acted as King George’s proctor at Rome. He was a Catholic who had discharged his mission with good faith in the King’s intentions. The Pope, who had been suspicious of him at first, was now secure of his integrity; and the nomination of the King’s own proctor seemed a conciliatory measure. On April 3 the Bohemians left Rome. Pius II had taken a decided step, and had forced George to declare himself. The Bohemian king had to consider whether he would face the difficulties of a breach with the Pope and with his Catholic subjects and neighbors, or whether he would abandon the Utraquists. Pius II awaited his opportunity in either case.

From the troublesome task of receiving refractory embassies Pius II turned gladly to the more congenial occupation of organizing an impressive display of ecclesiastical ceremonial. A holy relic, the head of the Apostle S. Andrew, had been carried away from Patras by the despot Thomas Palaeologus that it might be saved from the Turks; and Pius II offered it a secure refuge in Rome. It was received at Ancona by Cardinal
Oliva and safely conveyed to Narni. Now that times were peaceable, Pius II prepared for its reception at Rome. Three Cardinals were sent to bring it from Narni, and on Palm Sunday, April 11, carried their precious burden to Ponte Molle, where on the following day the Pope went out to meet it. The weather was wet and stormy, but Pius II tells us with great satisfaction that the rain ceased during the time of the procession. A lofty stage was erected in the meadows by the Ponte Molle, large enough to contain all the clergy in Rome, and in the middle was an altar. The Pope and prelates advanced carrying palms in their hands. As the Pope mounted the platform on one side Bessarion and two Cardinals advanced on the other side bearing the reliquary. The Pope received it with reverence, placed it on the altar, and kneeling, with pale face and tremulous voice broken by tears, poured forth a prayer of welcome. The people who thronged around wept tears of devout joy, and when the Pope, rising, exposed the relic to their gaze, the Te Deum burst from their lips. Then was sung a hymn in Sapphic verse specially composed by the Bishop of Ancona. Then the Pope bore the relic to the city and deposited it on the altar of S. Maria del Popolo, where he himself passed the night.

The ceremony of the next day seemed likely to be spoiled by the rain, which fell with violence during the night; but the prayers of the sightseers prevailed, and in the morning the sun shone again. Still the streets were covered with mud, and the Cardinals expressed a desire to take part in the procession on horseback. The Pope would not allow the effect to be marred by this incongruity; he ordered all who could to walk; those who were too old or feeble might go to S. Peter's and there welcome the procession on its arrival. “It was a great sight”, he tells us, “full of devotion, to see old men going on foot through the slippery streets, carrying palms in their hands, with mitres on their hoary heads, their eyes fixed on the ground, intent on prayer: many nurtured in luxury, who could scarce endure to go a hundred yards on horseback, on that day easily accomplished two miles on foot, through the mud and wet, carrying the weight of their priestly attire”. The Pope's eye was keen to see how many of the more corpulent managed to carry the burden of their flesh. “It was love”, he exclaims, “that bore the weight; nothing is difficult to one who loves”. Pius II was delighted with the devotional effect produced upon the people; he estimated that more than 30,000 wax candles were burned during the procession. The whole city was decorated, and boys dressed as angels sang hymns along the way. At last the Pope reached S. Peter's. Bessarion delivered an address, and Pius II followed with a few words: he gave his benediction, and indulgences were announced in his name. So pleased was the Pope with the success of his festival, that he gave notice that on Easter Sunday he would celebrate mass in S. Peter's, and would again display the head of S. Andrew. It was four years since the Romans had seen a Pope say mass. So crippled was Pius II with the gout that means had to be devised by which he might perform the office half-seated.

But ecclesiastical ceremonies could not satisfy the restlessness of the Pope. He longed for the delights of country life and for greater freedom; and on the pretext that his health required him to take baths, he set out in May for Viterbo. There he was carried into the fields in the fresh hours of early morning to catch the breeze and admire the green crops, and the flax in flower which imitated the hues of heaven, and filled beholders with delight.

In Viterbo also Pius II resolved to try the effect of a splendid ecclesiastical ceremonial in celebration of Corpus Christi Day. He caused to be erected a tent adorned with splendid hangings and tapestries; from this tent to the cathedral each Cardinal undertook the decoration of a portion of the way. The Arras tapestries of the French
Cardinals provoked great admiration. The Cardinal of S. Sisto contributed a representation of the Last Supper. Carvajal set forth a dragon surrounded by a herd of horrible demons; as the Pope passed by, S. Michael descended and cut off the dragon’s head, and all the demons fell headlong, barking as they fell. Bessarion had a hand of querying angels. But Cardinal Borgia outdid all others in splendor. He erected a large tent covering the road with purple trappings; as the Pope approached, two angels advanced and knelt in reverence to the Host which the Pope carried; then turning towards the tent they sang, “Lift up your heads, O ye gates, and King Pius, Lord of the world, will come in”. Five kings and a band of armed men tried to prevent the entrance, Crying out, “Who is the King Pius?”. “The lord strong and mighty”, replied the angels; the curtain fell, the kings and their troops knelt before the Pope and sang songs in his honor, to the accompaniment of a band of musicians. A wild man of the woods led in chains a lion, and strove with him from time to time, as a symbol of the Pope’s might. Next Cardinal Forteguerra showed his taste in the decoration of the chief piazza, which he roofed in with star-spangled cloth; on twelve columns sat twelve angels, who sang in alternate verses; in the middle of the piazza was a representation of the Holy Sepulchre, with the sleeping soldiers and the angels keeping watch around. An angel descended by a rope and sang in honor of the Resurrection. A gun was fired; the soldiers woke and rubbed their eyes; the tomb opened, one bearing the banner of the Resurrection stepped out, and in Italian verse announced to the crowd that their salvation had been won. In the piazza before the cathedral, Cardinal Milo had fitted up a representation of heaven; on the housetops were stars and angels and God in glory, while below was the tomb of the Virgin. Mass was said in the cathedral, and the Pope blessed the people. As he left the Church, the tomb of the Virgin opened, and a lady stepped out who was borne by angels to the housetops, dropping her girdle on the way. Then she was received into heaven amid the joy and songs of the angels. The Pope was so satisfied with all he saw that day, that he says, “Those who beheld these wonders thought that they had doubtless entered the realms above, and said that they had seen while alive in, the flesh the presentation of their heavenly country”.

The restless spirit of Pius II was not long content to remain at Viterbo. Taking occasion of an alarm of plague, he withdrew to Bolsena, and thence gradually made his way towards his native Corsignano, which had probably been his destination when he first left Rome. He wished to see the buildings with which he had adorned the little town. He strove still further to convert it into a memorial of himself by changing its name Corsignano into Pienza, and elevating it to the dignity of a bishopric. From Pienza Pius II went to the baths of Petrioli and thence to Todi : he did not return to Rome till December 18.

Meanwhile success attended the Papal policy in Italy. On August 18, Ferrante of Naples won a decided victory over Piccinino and Jean of Anjou at Troja. The effect of his success was to shake the confidence of the Angevin barons and incline them to sue privately for peace. In September the powerful Prince of Taranto abandoned the cause of Jean; and in October a French embassy came to propose a truce to the Pope. Pius II objected to include in it Gismondo Malatesta, an excommunicated heretic; and the negotiations were broken off. The Pope had no wish to make peace with Malatesta, who now seemed entirely in his hands. He had in the summer invaded the lands of the Pope's nephew, Antonio Piccolomini, but had been surprised by Federigo of Urbino, while attempting to withdraw from Sinigaglia which he had seized, and had been entirely defeated on August 12. His troops were scattered; his castles fell before Federigo; he
was driven to seek the good offices of Venice to escape entire destruction. In October, 1463, he had to accept the Pope’s terms. His proctors publicly abjured in his name the heresies with which he was charged, and the Pope freed him from the ban on condition that he fasted every Friday on bread and water. He was left only in possession of Rimini and the territory a few miles round. The power of the Malatesta was humbled, and Pius II could plume himself on having won a signal success. But it was a small thing that a Pope who wished to hurl Europe against the Infidel should triumph in overthrowing, after four years of warfare, one Italian baron.

In Germany Pius II was not so successful. Since 1461 that unhappy country had been plunged in war and confusion. Frederick III was attacked by his brother Albert of Austria, and peace was only made by the interposition of the Bohemian King. The opposing parties in the Empire had broken out into open war. On one side was the Pfalzgraf and Lewis of Bavaria, on the other Albert of Brandenburg and Charles of Baden, the Emperors friends. With this the struggle about the Archbishopric of Mainz was naturally connected, and the claims of Diether were supported by the party opposed to the Emperor. On July 2, 1462, the Emperor's friends were entirely defeated. Frederick III was afraid of an attack from his brother Albert, and was helpless; nor could the Pope do more than utter mild expostulations in behalf of peace.

This state of affairs in Germany reacted speedily on Bohemia, where Pius II had hoped by his resolute demeanor to strike terror into George, compel him to abandon the Compacts and reduce Bohemia to obedience to Rome. George was not in Prague on the arrival of the Pope’s envoys. When he received from Fantinus the Pope’s demands that he should publish through Bohemia the Papal sentence, should himself and his family receive the Communion under one kind only, and should dismiss all heretical priests, he did not give an immediate answer, but referred the matter to a Diet which was to meet in Prague on August 9. No doubt the part which the King then resolved to play was largely determined by the weakness of the Pope’s friends in Germany.

The Diet met on August 12 in large numbers. Catholics and Utraquists alike were doubtful about the King’s attitude; there was great uneasiness and great 1462 excitement. The King took his seat, with the Queen on his right hand, and briefly opened the proceedings. By their advice, he said, he had sent an embassy to Rome in confident expectation of securing thereby the peace of the realm: what obstacles had hindered this result he knew not. He asked the envoys to give their own account of what had befallen them, that common counsel might be taken about the future. Procopius and Kostka gave a plain and truthful statement of the facts. Then George rose and said, “We wonder what the Pope means: perhaps he wishes to plunge again into discord this kingdom which was united by the Compacts. How can he annul and take away what the Holy Council of Basel, which is more than he, and what his predecessor Eugenius, granted us? If every Pope is to abolish what his predecessor granted, who will feel justice secure? We are accused by the Pope of not fulfilling the oath made at our coronation. We will read the oath”. Then he read it in Bohemian, and continued: “You hear that we swore to do away with all heresy from our realm. Assuredly we have no love for heretics. But to do as the Pope wishes and make the reception of the Communion under both kinds a heresy was never our intention; for it is founded on Christ’s gospels, and on the institute of the primitive Church, and, moreover, was granted to us by the Council of Basel as a privilege for our devotion and virtue. The Pope says we swore to put this away. By no means; but know for certain that as we were born and bred in this Communion, and in it were raised to the royal dignity, we
promise to uphold it and live and die in its defense. So too our queen, our children and all who wish to do us pleasure, will live as we do in this matter. Nor do we think that there is any other way for the salvation of our souls than to die in this faith, and use the Communion under both kinds according to the Savior’s institution”.

The King hoped to produce an impression by this unexpected firmness, and he succeeded. The majority of the Diet burst into tears. George determined to use his opportunity: he ordered the confirmations of the Compacts of Sigismund, Albert and Ladislas to be read, and finally the Compacts themselves. Then he arose: “I ask you all severally”, he said, “if any one, whoever he be, wishes to defy and defame us and our kingdom on account of the Compacts, will you lend us your aid?”. The Utraquists, after a brief conference, deputed Kostka to answer. “Sire”, he said, “we hear with pleasure that you, your queen, and your children, are with us in the faith, and we give you thanks without measure; we promise severally to aid you with our goods and with our persons in upholding the Compacts”. The King turned to the Catholics, who were in a minority in the Diet: “Say openly what you will do”. The Bishops of Breslau and Olmutz were present amongst others. After a short conference amongst themselves, Sdenek of Sternberg answered : “Sire, you know that hitherto we have had nothing to do with the Compacts; but as we were born and have lived in the union and obedience of the Roman Church, so we wish to live and die. As you say that you must hold to the faith in which you were born, we argue that we must equally hold to ours. As to your request for help, you never asked our counsel, as is customary; as you have decided to maintain the Compacts, you will have the help of those by whose counsel you made your decision. We promise to do all that is according to justice for your honor and that of the kingdom”. The King, who had apparently expected that the Catholics would have been impressed by the scene which they had witnessed, was dissatisfied with this answer, and pressed for something more explicit. It was, however, now late; and the Catholics demanded an adjournment, which the King at last granted, saying that next day they would hear Fantinus as the Pope’s nuncio; “as my proctor”, he added, “I have some complaints against him”.

Fantinus was warned that the King was much displeased at him for his conduct as royal proctor at Rome; but he was resolved to discharge faithfully his mission from the Pope. When he appeared before the Diet he seemed to the Catholics like a lamb among wolves; and it was noticed that he had no special place assigned to him, but stood among the rest. He spoke in Latin, and his words were translated into Bohemian by an interpreter. He began by demanding the rights of an ambassador to speak freely according to the law of nations. When this was granted, he proceeded to attack the Compacts, denounced as heretical the Communion under both kinds, asserted the Papal power and defended the Pope's act on inannulling the Compacts. He insisted that the interpretation of George's oath was a matter for the superior, not the inferior; for him who received, not for him who gave the promise; for the Pope, not for the King. George angrily interrupted him. “In all and everything we have kept our oath as our conscience teaches us. If the Pope or any one wished us to interpret it against our conscience we would give him full satisfaction and support ourselves as best we could. We doubt not that we keep our oath as truly as the Pope or anyone else”.

Fantinus resumed his speech undaunted. He went on to say that, if he had believed that the King wished to act as protector of the Compacts and of the Communion under both kinds, he would never have acted as his proctor; he publicly renounced that office, and in the Pope's name declared the suspension from the priesthood of all clergy who
upheld the Compacts; he warned the King that he ran great risks in opposing the Pope's will. The King briefly said: “My lords, you have elected me your King and protector; you have the power of electing a lord, and you must stand by him”. In private his anger blazed forth; he bitterly complained of the indignities which Fantinus and the Pope heaped on him, and declared that he would be avenged. “You know”, he added, “that on the Apostolic seat have sat many renegades and wicked men; it is not the seat of holiness, but of pestilence. The holy seat is the union of all faithful people, and that is not Rome”.

If King George had hoped by his sudden display of firmness to kindle the enthusiasm of the Hussites, so that it should carry away the Catholics or fill them with terror, the boldness of Fantinus upset his plans. The grandeur of the King on the first day was overshadowed by the determined bravery of Fantinus on the second. The Catholic party at once plucked up courage and prepared for the contest, which began next day, when the King ordered Fantinus to be imprisoned for treacherous dealings as royal proctor, and also deprived Procopius of Rabstein of his office as Chancellor. The Bishops of Breslau and Olmutz at once fled from Prague, and it was clear that George’s hopes of a peaceable settlement of Bohemia had failed. Fantinus was kept in prison for a short time, and Pius II tells us that George visited him and said, “I can scarce restrain myself from strangling you with my own hands”. “I expected a common executioner”, said Fantinus, “but if a king puts his hands to the work I shall die more honorably; but you will grudge me the glory”. The mediation of Lewis of Bavaria persuaded George at length that it was unwise to imprison the Papal nuncio. In October Fantinus was released and returned to Rome, where Pius II rewarded his services with a bishopric.

If George had not succeeded in winning all the nobles to his side, he hoped that he might be more fortunate with the clergy. He ordered the administrator of the Archbishopric of Prague to summon all the clergy to an assembly on September 16, to hear what he intended for the good of peace. There came 714 clergy, of whom about 200 were Catholics. The Catholics assembled by themselves, and agreed who was to be their spokesman and what he should answer. Then they formed in procession, three abreast, and advanced to the royal presence, where the Utraquists under Rokycana were already assembled. The King spoke:

“We always seek the peace of our kingdom; but you priests quarrel amongst yourselves, accuse one another of heresy, refuse sepulture to the dead, exclude the living from the Churches; you pollute your priesthood by consorting with light women, play at dice, and commit many other disorders. Unless you change your manners we will proceed against you, as you have no spiritual judge. We bid you, however, observe faithfully the Compacts granted for the peace of the realm by the Council of Basel to our predecessors. If any one does otherwise he will provoke our anger”.

The Catholics listened in silence: after a short deliberation they made answer:

“We thank your Majesty for the peace which we enjoy, and pray that it may long continue. We do not deny that ill deeds are done by the clergy; in such a multitude there must be some who are evil. Yet we do not know who they are: if you would point them out they should be punished, for we still have authority among ourselves. As to the Compacts, we answer as did your nobles. We never wanted them; we do not want them; the Roman See never granted them, but the Council of Basel gave them as an indulgence. Whether or no those to whom the indulgence was given use it as it was granted, God must judge. The peace which you say the Compacts have brought we
gladly accept: that they bring any aid in gaining our salvation we do not see. We feel sure that your Majesty will not hinder the Church of Prague in her ceremonies, and will not impose on us any other ritual than that handed down to our ancestors by the Apostolic See—which is the gate of heaven”.

King George angrily declared that he was no heretic: he had never resisted the Apostolic See, but he would not abandon the Communion under both kinds: he must obey God rather than the Pope. He produced an intercepted letter from a Catholic priest, in which he was denounced as a heretic: he bitterly complained of such conduct. Next day the assembly met again; but George did not succeed in obtaining from the Catholic clergy more than he had obtained from the Catholic nobles. Yet he still strove to keep his position as a mediator. Rokycana brought before him a complaint against one of the clergy. “You wish that everyone should obey you”, was the King’s answer, “while you obey no one”. The assembly was dismissed in peace. George did not attempt to interfere with the Catholic services. In spite of the breach with the Papacy, men said that the peace of Bohemia had never been more secure.

Pius II was ready to proceed to extremities: on October 8 he issued a letter to the men of Breslau, releasing them from their allegiance to George, as he had not returned to the bosom of the Church, but held in his kingdom doctrines that had been condemned. The Pope was ready to plunge Bohemia into another civil war; George trusted that events might still be too powerful for Pius II, and might drive him to leave the Bohemian question alone, if not formally to ratify the Compacts.

The Bohemian King was soon able to claim the mediation of the Emperor. Austria was a prey to plundering bands of soldiers, whom Frederick III was helpless to repress. The people of Vienna rose in rebellion against their incompetent prince. They solemnly defied him on October 5, called in his brother Albert, and besieged Frederick in the citadel. George of Bohemia went to the Emperor’s aid. “As an Elector of the Empire”, he said, “he felt himself bound to support his lord”. By his means peace was made between the two brothers. Albert was to govern Austria for eight years, and Frederick was to be allowed to depart in safety. He left Vienna ignominiously and withdrew to Neustadt; but it was understood that he was to repay his Bohemian ally by interceding on his behalf with the Pope. Though Pius II was determined to continue his policy of opposition to the Compacts in Bohemia, he judged it wise to hold his hand for a time. He could not attack the King who held in his hands the peace of Germany.

Other struggles and other heresies claimed the Pope’s attention. It was as difficult to keep the peace between the monastic orders as between the Catholics and Utraquists in Bohemia. Contests as fierce raged within the bosom of the Church as those which distracted it from without; and the heresies of Bohemia were not the only ones which the Pope was called upon to decide. The reaction that produced the Papal restoration intensified also a movement within the Franciscan Order for the revival of the old rule of S. Francis in all its pristine simplicity. The Minorites of the Observance, as they called themselves, denounced as renegades their brethren who were content to dwell in settled abodes and hold the property which the piety of their predecessors had won. The strife waxed bitter between the Observantists and Conventuals; and each party strove to gain the favor of the Pope. Eugenius IV, whose highest deal was a monastic reformation, naturally favored the Observantists, and hoped to make of them a bulwark of the Papal power. He gave them the privilege of electing a Vicar of their own, exempt
from the authority of the General of the Order, and conferred on them other favors, which put them in a position of superiority over the Conventuals.

Nicolas V had no interest in these disputes, and to promote peace withdrew some of the special favors which had most irritated the Conventuals. This brought upon him the remonstrances—even the wrath—of the great leader of the Observantists, Fra Giovanni Capistrano; but Nicolas V was not the man to be moved from his determination by clamour. It was now the turn of the Conventuals to act on the aggressive. They demanded that the Observantists should either renounce their separate Vicar, or should leave the Franciscan Order altogether, and call themselves Brethren of the Bull, or The Privileged.

Calixtus III in vain strove to make peace. Peace was impossible; but as Calixtus saw that the Observantists were useful for his purpose by preaching a crusade and gathering Turkish tithes, he resolved to support them. Yet his Bull wore the appearance of a compromise. All Franciscans were to obey the General of the Order, and the Vicars of the Observantists were to attend the chapters; they were to submit to the General three names, from whom he should choose one to be Chief Vicar of the Observantists; the Vicar was to have over the Observantists all the authority of the General. The compromise only awoke new questions about the right of the Observantists to vote at the election of a General, to whom they did not owe obedience. Pius II revoked the Bull of Calixtus III, and restored that of Eugenius IV. The alternations of the Papal policy were admirably adapted to keep alive the spirit of rivalry which they professed to heal.

Under Pius II the conflict entered upon a new stage. Pius II favored the Observantists, because he needed them for his crusading projects; and they no doubt thought that the opportunity was favorable for gaining still higher privileges for themselves. One of their oldest and most respected members, Fra Giacomo della Marca, took occasion, in preaching at Brescia on Easter Sunday, 1462, to assert that “the Blood of Christ shed on the ground during the Passion was not an object of worship, since it was separated from the Divine Person”. It was an old question of dispute whether the Blood of Christ so shed had lost or not the hypostatic union of the Logos. By raising the question at Brescia, the seat of the Dominican Inquisitor, Fra Giacomo threw down the gauntlet, and showed his wish to provoke a trial of strength. The Inquisitor accepted the challenge, condemned the opinion as heretical, and ordered Fra Giacomo to recant. But Giacomo appeared in the pulpit, and after recounting his long services to the Church during his career of forty years as a preacher, proceeded to confirm his opinion by citing authorities.

This was the beginning of a furious strife; the people were divided between the two parties, and the hatred of rival theologians was let loose in all its fanaticism. The Bishop of Brescia in vain interposed. The matter was referred to the Pope, who proclaimed a truce, and summoned both sides to a disputation at Rome. Three eminent theologians appeared for either party; and the dispute began before the Pope and Cardinals on Christmas Day, 1462. For three whole days they argued, the Dominicans maintaining that the Blood of Christ, inasmuch as it returned to His body, never lost the hypostatic union: while the Minorites asserted that during the three days of the Passion this union ceased. Pius II has preserved in his 'Commentaries' a long record of the arguments; but he felt little real interest in the matter, and regarded the disputants with amusement. To him theological disputation seemed a form of athletic exercise, not merely mentally but physically.
“It was a pleasant and agreeable thing”, he says, “to hear the fine intellects of learned men contend with one another, and to see now one, now another, shoot ahead. They strove, as was fitting before the Pope's majesty, with modesty and fear; but so sharp was the contest that, though it was the middle of winter and the world was stiff with frost, the disputants were bathed with sweat; such was their zeal for victory”.

When all had been heard, the Pope conferred with the Cardinals for several days. The majority were on the side of the Dominicans; and Pius II agreed with the majority. But he determined not to publish his decision, lest the crowd of Minorites, whose help was necessary in preaching against the Turks, should be offended. He contented himself with accepting from the Dominicans, and entering in the Papal archives, a copy of a decision in their favor on this subject given by Pope Clement VI. In 1351 the Friars were contented not to have their doctrine condemned; and this momentous discussion was allowed to rest for a few years in peace.

Pius II had now established the custom of taking excursions for pleasure from Rome, and in May, 1463, accepted an invitation from Cardinal Estouteville to pay him a visit at Ostia. Pius II went, as a modern traveller would do, to inspect the antiquities and enjoy the natural beauties of the place. His enjoyment was slightly marred by a terrible storm of wind and rain, which rose suddenly in the night and wrought considerable havoc. As the Bishop's palace was not large enough to accommodate all the Cardinals and their attendants who had accompanied the Pope, many of them were sleeping in tents. The tents were blown away, and the occupants, in their attempts to gain shelter in the darkness of the night, suffered many misadventures. Even in the palace the Pope was afraid that the roof might fall, and was being wrapped up that he might sit outside in the rain rather than run the risk indoors, when the wind ceased, “as though fearing to incommode the Pope”, Pius complacently observes.

After his return from Ostia Pius II did not stay long in Rome. He again set out for an excursion to Albano; thence he went to Castle Gandolfo, rejoicing in the beauties of the Alban Lake; and finally to Rocca di Papa. As he journeyed along the Appian Road he was grieved to see the tombs being used as quarries for neighboring buildings, and gave orders that they should be taken under the protection of the Pope. He returned to Rome for Whit Sunday, but at the end of June, complaining of the heat, departed to Tivoli, where he remained till the middle of September.

The summer of 1463 saw the end of several of the Pope's little contests. It was decisive for the Neapolitan war, which, since the battle of Troja, had lingered on while the Angevin barons were avowedly seeking to find what were the best terms they could make for themselves. Jean of Anjou discovered that he had been from the beginning the tool of the Neapolitan barons, headed by the Prince of Taranto. When the Prince of Taranto found that he was no longer profitable, he did not scruple to abandon his cause. The condottiere Piccinino was Jean's only support, and Piccinino was also preparing to desert him. In August, 1463, Alessandro Sforza offered battle to Piccinino, which Piccinino did not find it convenient to accept. He came instead into Sforza's camp to talk matters over. His arguments, as given by Pius II, are extremely characteristic of the general condition of Italian politics.

“Why”, said he, “do you wish to conquer me? It is I who bring you glory, riches, pleasure—all that you enjoy. Because I took up arms and overthrew the peace of Italy, you, who were lying idle at home, were called to the field. Will you do any good by taking me prisoner? Who wants peace? No one, save priests and merchants, the Roman
Curia, and the traders of Venice and Florence. Peace in Italy brings them all they want, and leaves us nothing to scrape together. In peace we are despised, and sent to the plough; in war we become mighty, and may follow the example of Francesco Sforza, who has raised himself to a dukedom. Our policy is to refuse to conquer, and prolong the war, the end of which is the end of our gains.

Many of the captains agreed with Piccinino; but Alessandro Sforza answered: “Do not fear. Italy will never be free from war till she is under one rule, and that is a far distant prospect. Let us finish this war and betake ourselves to a greater. You need not boast, Piccinino, as if you only kept war on foot. Had not the Pope and the Duke of Milan sent us against you, you would have finished this war long ago in favor of the French, an unworthy undertaking for an Italian, for one who had borne arms for Aragon and for the Church”.

Piccinino replied: “I was driven to fight for the French because no one else wanted me. Bred in arms, I could not leave the field. I would rather have declared war against my own father than have disbanded my troops. I served the French because they gave me pay. Now I am free, and willing to negotiate with you if you will give me worthy terms”.

It was agreed that Piccinino should be made Ferrante’s commander-in-chief, with a salary of 90,000 ducats, and should keep his conquests in the Abruzzi. Ferrante and Pius II in vain protested against these terms; the military leaders were agreed, and all others had to submit. Piccinino changed sides, and Jean of Anjou retired to Ischia, awaiting ships and men from France, which never came. In April, 1464, he left Ischia and returned to France. Ferrante was now undisputed master of Naples; but he had learned how little confidence he could place in his barons, and waited quietly his opportunity to reduce their power.

To the very last Pius II kept his hold on Naples, and tried still further to enrich his nephews. The county of Celano, whose young Count had joined the Angevin party, was overrun by the Pope's troops in the name of the Church; Pius II succeeded in handing it over to Antonio Piccolomini. The Neapolitan policy of Pius II, no doubt, was sound as regarded Italian affairs: the success of Ferrante secured the peace of Italy so long as he lived. But the part which the Pope played had been a perpetual hindrance to his good understanding with France, and its most immediate result had been to make a good provision for two of the Pope's nephews.

This turn of affairs in Naples filled up the measure of the French King's wrath against the Pope. He had abolished the Pragmatic Sanction partly out of caprice, partly with an expectation of receiving an adequate reward. He was now conscious that he had acted contrary to his own interests, and that he had been beguiled by the Pope. He wrote to Pius II a letter, “unworthy of his dignity”, as Pius II plaintively remarks, “and as though he were the Pope’s superior, condemned his doings and gave him rules of life”. Unfortunately we have only the Pope's account of the contents of this letter: but that describes them as sufficiently severe.

The Pope’s policy was submitted to a damaging criticism: he had disturbed Naples, had ruined the Church of Mainz, had excommunicated the Pfalzgraf and Sigismund of Austria, had accused the Bohemian King of heresy — in short, would allow no one to live in peace; it would be much better if he would turn his attention to the Turks. At the same time Louis XI wrote also to the Cardinals asking if they could inform him what the Pope’s intentions really were. Pius II has not told us what the
French party said in the consistory when these letters were laid before them; but he felt that he was put on his trial before the College, and found it necessary to justify himself. The Cardinals affected to wonder at the tone of the letters and to doubt that they were really what the King had intended. Pius II did not answer in writing, but proposed that he should send one envoy and the Cardinals another, with instructions to excuse the Pope, to appease the King, and urge on him, as the supreme remedy for all differences of opinion, that he should wage war against the Turk.

The envoys were, however, unable either to stem the torrent of the royal displeasure or to gain from France any help for the crusade. Louis XI showed that he did not intend to leave the Pope much room for interference in France. A strife had been for some time raging between the Bishop of Nantes and the Duke of Brittany, in which the Bishop had called on the Pope for aid. Louis XI suddenly interfered in the matter, declared that Duke and Bishop were alike vassals of the crown of France, took prisoner the Pope's legate who was on his way to Brittany, and deprived him of his letters on the ground that in a dispute concerning a fief of the French crown he and not the Pope was the judge. Pius II calls this “a tyrannical and lying statement”. It was indeed an assertion of feudal rights for which Duke and Bishop were as little prepared as was the Pope. Not content with this, Louis XI deprived Cardinal Alain of Avignon of his temporalities for having advised the sending of the nuncio; he treated similarly two bishops, nephews of Alain, and even threatened Cardinal Estouteville. In vain the Pope expostulated. “Who”, he bitterly exclaims, “could persuade a king who takes his greed for law and listens only to those who tickle his ears?”

As soon as it was seen that Louis XI was willing to oppose the Pope the Galilean party at once revived. The Parlement and the University laid their grievances before the King, and the clergy who had felt the weight of the exactions of the Curia were ready to accept relief at the King’s hands. A series of royal ordinances were issued which took back almost all that had been granted to the Papacy by the abolition of the Pragmatic. “The King”, says Pius II sadly, “did not show himself so religious by the abolition of the Pragmatic Sanction as he showed himself sacrilegious by issuing such decrees”.

The first of these ordinances, dated February 17, 1463, set aside a Constitution of the Pope which took into the Papal Camera the goods of deceased prelates, together with half the benefices which they held in commendam. When the Papal officials tried to avoid this edict by threats of excommunication against those who refused to pay, a second edict was issued in June, 1464, forbidding all such exactions and punishing by confiscation of goods and banishment from the kingdom all collectors who strove to levy them.

Another edict (May, 1463) maintained the royal right of disposing of benefices during vacancies, as against those who came provided with Papal reservations and the like. All cases concerning such matters were declared to be under the Cognizance of the Parlement; in case of Papal censures being directed against this ordinance the Proctor-General was ordered to appeal to a future Council.

In June, 1464, another ordinance declared the sole right of the royal courts to determine causes concerning the claims of the crown; those who appealed to the Curia against them were banished from the kingdom; ecclesiastics who aided in such appeals were declared incapable of holding benefices in France. To protect the Parlement against Papal interference it was declared that its officials were responsible to no court outside the boundaries of Paris.
When Pius II regarded all these edicts he might well feel that if he had deluded Louis XI into the abolition of the Pragmatic Sanction by false hopes, Loins XI showed himself capable of retaliating. The extinction of the Pragmatic proved illusory in its turn, and the place of the legislation which had been abolished was rapidly filled up by a new series of laws still more markedly anti-papal in their spirit.

Germany in 1463 seemed tending towards peace. After the rescue of Frederick by George of Bohemia, Adolf of Nassau had surprised Mainz by night, had driven out Diether and his adherents, set parts of the town in flames, and ruined for his own quarrel the prosperity of his cathedral city. It was a happy stroke and did much to restore the balance of parties in Germany. Negotiation was again possible; the Pfalzgraf became reconciled with Albert of Brandenburg. Diether, after many conferences, agreed to renounce the Archbishopric of Mainz in return for a portion of its lands, over which he was to exercise ecclesiastical jurisdiction; Adolf succeeded to the title, the debts and the ruins of the greatest see in Germany. The death of Albert of Austria in December, 1463, paved the way also for a reconciliation between Frederick and Sigismund of the Tyrol, who renounced his claims in Austria, on the understanding that Frederick was to reconcile him with the Pope. Pius II and Cusa were weary of their long struggle; Sigismund made submission and was absolved in the beginning of 1464. The Pope might claim that he had vindicated the dignity of the Papacy; but assuredly he had lost more than he had gained in the long duel with Heimburg. Before the final agreement about the disputes concerning Brixen was made, Pius II and Cusa were both dead, and Heimburg had sought a refuge in the Court of the Bohemian King.

Pius II was a skillful diplomat, and no doubt expected great results from the energy which he had displayed on so many sides. Yet, after all, the general aspect of affairs remained much the same as it had been at the end of the Congress of Mantua. France was still hostile to the Papacy; Bohemia was still unsubdued. It is true that Naples had been won for Ferrante, Gismondo Malatesta had been overthrown, Pienza had been beautified, and the Pope's nephews had been well provided for. On the other hand, Mainz had been well-nigh ruined, Heimburg had dealt many crushing blows at the Pope's prestige, the Papacy had become more closely involved in the party struggles of Germany, and the German opposition had become more purely political.
CHAPTER IX.
CRUSADE AND DEATH OF PIUS II.
1464.

Since the end of the Congress of Mantua little has been said about the war against
the Turks; yet we should wrong Pius II if we did not admit the sincerity of his desire for
a crusade. But he had not the fanaticism of Calixtus III to drive him to do something,
however inadequate it might be, nor had he the resoluteness of a great statesman to
pursue constantly one supreme end. His early training had made him ready to catch at
advantages as they offered themselves. He did not try to mold European affairs into
accordance with his own plans; but he strove to make the Papal power prevail along the
whole line of its pretensions, and trusted in the long run to have his way. While
animated by a desire for the general interests of Christendom, he could not rise above
the particular interests of the Papacy. He failed to impress his contemporaries with his
sincerity; even had he done so, he seems to have felt it doubtful whether he could win
them to united action.

Pius II must have felt that the action of his predecessors had not been such as to
inspire Europe with much confidence. Nicolas V had gathered Turkish tithes, which he
had spent on the adornment of Rome. Calixtus III had squandered his treasure in
insignificant expeditions, which showed no sense of the work in which he was engaged.
Pius II might have expected that his protestations at Mantua would be subjected to the
calm criticism of observers. His leisurely and magnificent progress to the Congress
seemed a needless waste of money: his share in the Neapolitan war was opposed to his
expressed desire for universal peace. Italy hesitated to grant him the supplies which he
demanded. Europe saw in the Congress of Mantua a series of negotiations on matters
which concerned the Papal interests. When Pius sojourned at ease in his beloved Siena,
men said that the whole matter was merely an excuse to enable the Pope to leave Rome
and enjoy a visit to his native place. Few thought that the Pope was in earnest, or that
his future action would go beyond eloquent protestations from time to time.

We have seen enough of the Pope's activity to feel that there was some
justification for those who judged that he not the cause of a crusade so deeply at heart as
to forego for its sake any advantage to himself. He did not even interfere decidedly in
such matters as might have furthered it. Hungary had long been the bulwark of
Christendom against the Turk, and bravely had John Hunyad defended it. On John's
death the Hungarian nobles took as their king his young son Matthias Corvinus, in the
hopes that they would find him a powerless ruler under whom they might pursue their
own interests. When the young Matthias displayed the same resolute disposition as his
father, they began to pay more heed to the claims on Hungary of the Emperor Frederick,
whom in February, 1459, the discontented party solemnly elected as their king. Here
was a matter which clearly demanded the Pope's intervention as a mediator. The internal
peace of Hungary was of vital importance to Christendom, was of prime necessity if the
Turk was to be held at bay. But Pius II saw the political difficulties in the way of
quarrelling with the Emperor; the interests of Christendom could not outweigh in his
mind the advantages to be gained by the Curia through its Imperial ally. Pius II could
not bring himself to act with decision: he received the obedience of Matthias and called him king on the principle, which he wished to be allowed to apply to Naples, of recognizing things as they were. Beyond this he assumed an attitude of impartial neutrality, and kindly offered to judge the rival claims if they were submitted to his decision. Whatever other steps might be taken with advantage, there could be no doubt of the need of supplying Matthias with money to enable him to war against the Turks. Pius II had much good advice to give and many expressions of sympathy; but all the urgency of Carvajal, who was legate in Hungary, could not obtain supplies that were of any purpose.

Still Pius II had undertaken the cause of the crusade, and however much he might pursue more immediate objects, he did not entirely forget it. Some of the things that befell him as advocate for the Christian cause are ludicrous enough. A Franciscan Friar, Ludovico of Bologna, had gone to the East in the days of Calixtus III and brought back reports of Christians in Persia who were ready to submit to the Pope, and join an alliance against the Sultan. Soon after the return of Pius II to Rome from the Congress of Mantua, Fra Ludovico appeared, bringing with him envoys from potentates of the East, the Emperor of Trapezus, the King of Persia, the King of Mesopotamia, the Duke of Greater Iberia, and the Lord of Armenia Minor. They had come through Scythia over the Don and the Danube, through Hungary to Germany, where they had been welcomed by the Emperor; thence they had passed through Venice to Rome. They were received with honor as royal ambassadors, and had quarters and food assigned to them—which was indeed necessary, as some could eat as much as twenty pounds of meat a day. When admitted to an audience they set forth, through Fra Ludovico as interpreter, that their kings had heard from him of the Congress of Mantua, and were willing to attack the Turks in Asia, while the Christians attacked them in Europe: for this purpose they would raise an army of 120,000 men; they begged the Pope to make Ludovico Patriarch of the Eastern Christians.

The Pope assented to their request, and offered to pay the expenses of their journey to the Courts of France and Burgundy, on whose cooperation the proceedings in Europe mainly depended. They were coldly listened to in France and Burgundy; but no doubt they passed the time pleasantly. Meanwhile the Pope began to suspect Fra Ludovico, and on his return to Rome threatened to imprison him for having styled himself Patriarch on his travels, without having received consecration. He was, however, allowed to depart for his companions' sake. At Venice he prevailed on some unwary bishops to ordain him priest and patriarch. When Pius II heard this, he wrote to the Patriarch of Venice to imprison the impostor; but Ludovico was warned by the Doge, and made his escape. It was a cruel imposture, and was by no means the only one of which the Pope had to complain.

Still more extraordinary than this pretended embassy is the fact that Pius II actually attempted to convert the Sultan by his eloquence. As rhetoric was the only contribution to a crusade which the Pope saw his way towards making, he seems to have resolved to try its effects to the uttermost. It is a strong testimony to the tolerant spirit of the Turks that stories were rife of the Sultan's willingness to listen to Christian teaching. It is no less characteristic of the temper of the early Renaissance that Pius II should have thought that all subjects admitted of reasonable discussion. He wrote a long letter to the Sultan pointing out the advantages that would follow from his acceptance of Christianity. Already the spread of the Turkish arms had led Cardinal Cusa to write an elaborate examination of the Koran, from which Pius II borrowed many of his
theological arguments. His letter dwelt first upon the horrors of war, and his desire to avert them; he does not hate the Sultan, though his foe, but rather wishes him well. The conquest of Europe is not like that of Asia; it is impossible to the Turkish forces; yet Mahomet may obtain all the glory that he wishes without bloodshed by means simply of the little water needed for baptism. If he accepted that the Pope would recognize him as Emperor of Asia and of Greece; what he now possessed by violence would become lawfully his: by this means, and by this only, might the golden age be brought back to the world. The Sultan might object that the Turks would refuse to follow him if he abandoned his religion. The Pope reassured him by the examples of Clovis and Constantine. How great is the glory that he might so attain! All literature, Latin, Greek, and Barbarian alike, would extol his name. More than this, he would gain the heavenly promise, and would be able to add to the virtues of a philosopher the three theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity, without which no man can be perfect. The Pope then unfolded to him the Christian scheme, and discussed the points in which it differs from the Koran; he expatiated on the superiority of the law of Christ over that of Mahomet, and again exhorted the Sultan to consult his own interests, both here and hereafter, by accepting Christian baptism.

The letter forms a bulky pamphlet, and is written with great spirit and clearness: it abounds in historical allusions and quotations from classical poets and philosophers. It is to be regretted that we have no answer from the Sultan, nor do we read that any was returned. Still the Pope's letter was widely read in Europe, and produced a great effect on the imagination of Christendom. From this time forward forgeries of a similar correspondence formed part of the vast store of literature which gathered round the Turkish war.

While Europe was engaged in quarrelling, and the Pope was busy writing, the Turks pursued their conquests. The Morea fell into their hands, as did Rhodes, Cyprus, Lesbos, and the chief islands of the Aegean; Scanderbeg, in Albania, was driven to make peace, and Bosnia fell before the Turks' arms. Pius II was stirred to action, and in March, 1462, he summoned six Cardinals to a private meeting, and to them unfolded his schemes.

“You think, perhaps, my brothers”, he said, “as all the world does, that we think nought of the general interest, because since our departure from Mantua we have made no preparations, and uttered no words about the crusade, though day by day the foe presses nearer. We have, indeed, been silent, and have done nothing; but it was through lack of power, not through lack of will. We have often thought what could be done for Christendom. We have passed many sleepless nights, tossing from side to side, and were ashamed of our inaction. Our bosom swelled, our old blood boiled. To proclaim war by ourselves is useless, for the Holy See cannot, with its own resources, wage a war against the Turk; we need the help of the princes of Christendom. We considered all possible means to obtain this, but none seemed fitting. If we think of a congress, the experience of Mantua shows that it is vain. If we send legates, they are mocked. If we impose tithes on the clergy, an appeal is made to a future Council. If we promulgate indulgences, we are accused of avarice; everyone thinks that it is done to scrape up money; no one believes our words. Like bankrupt merchants, we have lost all credit. Whatever we do is construed for the worse; every one measures our character by his own. We turn our mind’s eye everywhere, and find nothing firm. Meditating day and night, we have hit upon one remedy, perhaps the only one, certainly the most efficacious”.
Then the Pope went on to unfold his scheme. Philip of Burgundy had vowed to go on the crusade if some other prince did so; he was bound by a solemn oath, which he would not venture to set aside. Old as he was, the Pope would offer to set out himself; Philip could not refuse to accompany one who was both Pope and King,—one who was greater than King or Emperor. If Burgundy set out, France would, for very shame, send some forces, and so would the other powers of Europe. It was, however, useless to propose this till Venice would provide a fleet. Venice must first be sounded, then France and Burgundy. When they agreed the Pope would proclaim a European truce for five years, call on the clergy for subsidies, under pain of excommunication, and by indulgences raise money from the laity.

“The noise of our plan”, he added, “will come like a crash of thunder, and rouse the minds of the faithful to the defense of their religion”.

The Cardinals heard the Pope's plan with amazement, and asked for some days to deliberate. All the difficulties that they could raise were foreseen and answered by the Pope. They at length pronounced the scheme worthy of the Vicar of Christ, and Pius II wrote at once to the Doge of Venice binding him to secrecy for the present. The Bishop of Ferrara was at the same time sent to Louis XI of France. But Louis was not on such terms with the Pope as to look on his proposals with a friendly eye He regarded them as a blind to draw his attention from the affairs of Naples; and the only answer that he would vouchsafe was, that he purposed sending an envoy to the Pope who would treat about Naples and the crusade together. Meanwhile, he added, he had on hand the business of restoring to his throne Henry VI of England, which he hoped to do within a year. “I will give you four years more for that”, said the legate as he took his leave.

On arriving at Brussels the Bishop of Ferrara found Philip of Burgundy dangerously ill of a fever. Philip had shown great lukewarmness at Mantua, and had been busied since then in attempting to consolidate the Burgundian dominions by obtaining from the Emperor the title of King, and so reviving the old middle kingdom of Lotharingia. But illness awoke again the old man’s zeal for the holy cause. The Bishop of Ferrara was admitted to an audience of the Duke, who was in bed. When he heard the Pope’s letter he exclaimed, “I thought that the fever would conquer and would carry me off; but you have brought me health by your message. Death seemed to me hard, because I would leave my father’s captivity unavenged on the Turks. Now I will live to avenge my father and benefit Christendom”. He began at once to arrange details with his counsellors, and promised to send an envoy to the Pope in October. Difficulties, however, arose with France. Louis XI summoned the Duke of Burgundy as his vassal to aid in an expedition against England, and a rebellion of the Liegois against their Bishop occupied the Duke's attention. As he recovered his health, the crusade was again forgotten, and a Papal nuncio, sent in the spring of 1463, to remind the Duke of his promises, found him engaged in festivals, dances, and sports. His counselors were all opposed to the crusade as both chimerical and dangerous, and they threw all possible hindrances in the way of its accomplishment. Suddenly the Duke took ill and became unconscious; his life was for a time despaired of; but he recovered, and with his recovery his good intentions returned. The Papal envoy was dismissed with a new promise that representatives of Burgundy would be at Rome on August 15.

Perhaps an additional stimulus was given to the determination of Pius II by a discovery which materially increased the Papal revenues. An Italian merchant who had been driven from Constantinople by the Turks, and who had experience of the alum
works of Asia Minor, discovered alum in the barren lulls of Tolfa, not far from Civita Vecchia. At first Pius II was incredulous; but the discoverer brought workmen from Genoa and established the truth of his surmise. The alum was speedily worked, and proved to be of excellent quality. In April, 1463, Pius II informed all the faithful of the compassion of Heaven in depriving the unbelievers of the revenues which they obtained from Christians by the sale of alum, which the Holy See was now prepared to supply; he warned them no longer to buy from the Turks. The alumines of Tolfa were, indeed, as profitable to the Pope as was the year of jubilee, and are said to have yielded a revenue of 100,000 ducats.

The first practical step towards opposing the Turks was the establishment of peace between Frederick III and Matthias of Hungary, a task which the Pope took earnestly in hand in the spring of 1463. It required two Papal legates to arrange the terms; but at last peace was made in July. Matthias was recognized as king, on condition of paying the Emperor 80,000 ducats and submitting to a rectification of frontier; in case Matthias died childless, Hungary was to go to the Emperor’s second son. When Hungary was thus freed from internal troubles, Matthias found no further difficulty in making an alliance with Venice, which had always shown more readiness to help Hungary than had the Pope. Venice was by this time thoroughly alarmed at the losses which the progress of the Turk was inflicting on her commerce, and on September 12 signed an alliance with Hungary for war against the Turks. Meanwhile the Burgundian envoys found Pius II at Tivoli, and brought him the assurance of their master’s zeal. The Pope set out for Rome, where he arrived on September 9, ready to welcome the Italian envoys whom he had summoned to consultation. The Congress at Rome was not so full as had been the Congress of Mantua; but it was more in earnest. The Bishop of Tournay, on the part of the Duke of Burgundy, promised 6000 men in the spring; the Duke himself would lead them if his health allowed. Pius II then asked the Italian envoys for money, according to the Mantuan decree; but all, save Venice, declared that they had no powers for the purpose, and must consult their States. The Florentine envoy privately approached the Pope and warned him that this war would be for the sole benefit of Venice, which, if the Turks were overcome, would turn its hand to the subjugation of Italy; it would be wise to leave the Venetians and the Turks to weaken one another. Pius II rejected this policy as shortsighted and unworthy of a Christian people, and the envoy referred the Pope's opinion to the Florentine Government.

While awaiting the return of the Italian envoys, Pius II judged it well to arrange matters with the Cardinals. He knew that his plan was opposed by the French party in the College, and was not popular with those who preferred a quiet life at Rome to a dangerous expedition abroad. Calling a consistory, the Pope addressed the Cardinals. For six years, he said, he had sat on the Papal seat, and the policy which by the advice of the Cardinals he had initiated at Mantua was yet unfulfilled: he had been most desirous to carry it out, but troubles at home prevented him. “We were bound either to give up Rome or fight against the French, who, despising our commands, contrary to all law occupied the kingdom of Naples and attacked our vassals. We fought for Christ when we defended Ferrante; we warred against the Turks when we smote the lands of Malatesta. At last victory has crowned the Papal arms, and Italy is at peace; at last the time has come for action. But what, it will be asked, can you do in war: an old man, a priest, a martyr to a thousand ailments? What use are the Cardinals in a camp? They spent their youth in pleasure; will you starve their old age with war? Better stay at home with your Cardinals, and send your fleet and your money to the Hungarians. It would be
sound advice if we had any money; but our treasury is exhausted. Our revenues never exceed 300,000 ducats, and half of that sum is required for the necessary expenses of the Papal rule. The Turkish war would need 1,000,000 ducats yearly for three years at least. You will say: If so much is required for the war, what hopes have you of obtaining it before you start? We answer: The war is necessary: if we do not undertake it we should be undeservedly infamous. Money is hard to raise, for the people do not trust us. They say that we live in pleasure, amass money, follow our ambition, have fatter mules and better horses than other folk, make broad the hems of our garments, walk through the city with cheeks puffed out beneath a red hat, keep dogs for hunting, give much to actors and parasites, nothing for the defense of the faith. These charges are not altogether false; there are many among the Cardinals and other members of the Curia of whom this is true. There is too much pride and luxury in the Curia; so that when we speak the truth to the people we are so hated that we are not heard. What, then, is to be done? Abstinence, chastity, zeal for the faith, religious fervor, the desire for martyrdom, these made the Roman Church preeminent over the world. We must imitate our predecessors, and show that we are willing to sacrifice our lives for the preservation of the flock committed to our charge. Our purpose is to go to war against the Turks, and invite the princes of Christendom to follow. Perchance, when they see their master, the Vicar of Jesus Christ, though old and Sick, advancing to the war, they will feel ashamed to stay at home. If this way does not rouse Christians to arms, we know no other. We know that we are going to meet certain death, but that does not deter us. We commit all to God, and will die happy if we end our days in His service. You, too, who advised us to begin the war against the Turks, cannot remain at home at ease. The members must follow their head; and what we do is done of necessity. We do not go to fight; but will imitate Moses, who, when Israel fought against Amalek, prayed on the mountain. We will stand on our ship’s prow, or on some hilltop, and having before our eyes the holy Eucharist, will ask from Jesus Christ safety and victory for our soldiers in the battle. God will not despise a contrite heart. You will be with us, and will join your prayers with ours; the old only will be left behind”.

Then the Pope explained that he would leave in Rome two legates, one for temporal and the other for spiritual affairs, and would make provisions for the discharge of the ordinary business of the Curia. The nephew Antonio, with 3000 horse and 2000 foot, would provide for the safety of the States of the Church.

The Pope’s voice was often broken by tears, in which the Cardinals also joined. When called upon to give their opinions, no one save the Cardinal of Arras spoke very decidedly against the scheme. Though the French party was opposed to it, even Estouteville did not raise any insuperable objections. Cardinal Erolo, though he was one of the six whom the Pope had first consulted, raised some objections, “to show himself cleverer than anyone else”, says the Pope. The objections were, however, overcome, except in the case of the Cardinal of Arras, who left Rome and returned to France.

The Italian envoy’s soon returned with their answers to the Pope’s request for money. Ferrante of Naples, the Duke of Milan, the Marquis of Modena, the Marquis of Mantua, the cities of Bologna and Lucca, all assented. Some states, however, held aloof. Genoa was too busy with her own factions to pay any heed to general matters; the Duke of Savoy and the Marquis of Monteferrate also sent no representatives. The Florentines refused to take any part till they had had time to withdraw their merchants from Constantinople. The Sienese, to the indignation of the Pope, pleaded poverty, and offered the paltry sum of 3000 ducats, which they afterwards increased to 10,000.
Pius II wrote most pressingly to the Duke of Milan, urging him to come in person and assume the command of the Papal forces. The letter of the Pope was a masterpiece of persuasive eloquence; the answer of the Duke was similarly a masterpiece of courteous prevarication. He deplored the woes of Christendom, professed his firm resolve to war against the Turk, his confidence in the Pope, and his desire to do everything that he required; but he added that his health was not yet restored, that the time allowed for preparation was not quite adequate, that the undertaking was difficult, and needed careful measures. The Pope understood that he was not coming in person, and soon learned that 3000 men was all the contingent which he proposed to send.

On October 22 was held a public consistory, in which was read the Pope's Bull proclaiming a crusade. Pius II recounted all his efforts for the holy cause, proclaimed his zeal, combated objections, called on all to help, and promised indulgences to those who either came in person or contributed their substance. The Bull took two hours to read, and the Pope was gratified with the effect which it produced. The sweetness of the composition, the novelty of the thing itself, and the readiness of the Pope offering his life for his sheep, drew tears from many bystanders. The Bishop of Tournay, on behalf of the Burgundians, warmly thanked the Pope for his zeal. But the Romans were touched by no sentimental enthusiasm for the weal of Christendom; they only saw that the Pope was going to leave Rome, and they feared that the hope of their gains was gone. Pius II answered their loud murmurs by the assurance that the officials of the Curia would be left behind. Then, racked with gout, till he could scarce restrain himself from showing his anguish, he was carried to his bed.

A few days before Pius II had signed an alliance with Venice and Hungary, by which they bound themselves to carry on the war for three years if necessary, and no one of the contracting powers was to withdraw without the rest. The Pope promised that, on the arrival of Philip of Burgundy in Italy, he would set out with him for Greece. Hungary and Venice were already engaged in warring against the Turk. Matthias invaded Bosnia with some success, and the Venetians sent a fleet to the Morea which rose against the Turkish yoke: Lemnos and several islands fell into the hands of the Venetians. Cardinal Bessarion was sent by the Pope to Venice, and enjoyed a success such as had never yet befallen him. He was received in state by the Doge on the Bucentaur, and preached the crusade to a people already convinced. A box was placed in the Piazza to receive the contributions of the faithful, and was soon found to contain 700,000 ducats. Pius II wrote to the Doge, Cristoforo Moro, urging him to come in person to the war, and join the Pope and Philip of Burgundy; if he appeared in ducal array on board the Bucentaur, not Greece only but Asia and all the East would be terrified.

“We shall be three old men”, he says, “and God rejoices in trinity. Our trinity will be aided by the Trinity of Heaven, and our foes will be trampled under our feet”.

The Great Council of Venice voted almost unanimously that the Doge should go; when the Doge, a few days afterwards, tried to excuse himself on the ground of age and incapacity before the Collegio, he was told by one of the Council, “If your highness will not go of goodwill, we will make you go by force, since the honor and welfare of this land is dearer to us than your person”. The Doge answered that if the land wished it he was content.

Before the end of the year news came that the Turks had forced the wall which guarded the entrance to the Peloponnesus, and had driven out the Venetians. This news
did not affect the zeal of Venice, which prepared at once to send out reinforcements; and it gave Philip of Burgundy an opportunity to write to the Pope and urge a delay in the expedition to enable Venice to recover her strength. Pius II refused to accede to this request; he had written, he said, throughout Europe, and must not now delay. In truth, the Pope's legates were busy in almost every land: everywhere they were received with enthusiasm by the people, everywhere they received from the princes fair words enough, but no definite promises of help.

It soon became obvious that the political intrigues of Europe were throwing hindrances in the way even of the accomplishment of such promises as the Pope had received. First of all, Italy received a shock which deeply stirred men's minds, by the news that Louis XI of France had made an alliance with the Duke of Milan, and had invested him with Genoa and Savona. We have seen that Florence looked with jealous eyes on the crusading project as likely to increase the power of Venice; she entered into a close alliance with Milan for their mutual protection, and did her utmost to reconcile Francesco Sforza with Louis's XI of France. Louis XI was embarrassed with the possession of Savona, in which the French garrison was entirely useless since the loss of Genoa to the French. He was not indisposed to rid himself of an encumbrance, and in doing so to gain an ally in North Italy. The Neapolitan war had taught him the power of Sforza, and Louis XI had a genuine admiration for a man whose success had been so brilliant. In February, 1464, Savona was given up to the Milanese, and the Italian Powers were astonished by a notification from Louis XI that he had made over to the Duke of Milan his rights over Genoa.

This news filled Italy with alarm. It was clearly a blow aimed by Florence and Milan against Venice. The Duke of Modena feared this increase of the power of Milan; Lucca and Siena were afraid of the designs of Florence; Ferrante of Naples thought himself betrayed to the French by his former ally. Sforza tried to restore confidence by protesting that he had entered into no engagements which could disturb the peace of Italy; by taking Genoa into his power he had removed the only ground for French interference in Italian affairs. The Archbishop of Genoa, Paolo Fregoso, who was at the head of the government of the city, clamored for help against Sforza; but Pius II advised him to submit rather than hinder the war against the Turks. The archbishop fled, and Sforza advanced against the city. It was at all events clear that neither Milan nor Genoa would send any forces to the crusade.

From Burgundy also the Pope received doubtful news. Duke Philip was not on good terms with his son Charles, who had left his court and gone to Holland. If Philip went to the Turkish war, Charles would naturally be regent during his absence, and this prospect was very distasteful to a strong party headed by the powerful family of the Croy. They strove to increase the feud between the Duke and his son so as to keep Philip at home. Philip, however, was resolute. Charles returned, and was reconciled to his father. Next the Croy represented to the Duke the dangers which might befall his land if he departed before the war between France and England was at an end; they besought him to remain, at least till a truce was arranged. Louis XI joined his entreaties to the same purpose; if a truce were made with England, France could join in the crusade with Burgundy. The Duke wavered, and asked the Pope to defer the expedition for the purpose of this pacification. Pius II knew that delay meant entire failure, and refused. Then the Croy managed to bring about an interview between Louis XI and the Duke at Lille in February, 1464. Louis XI repeated his desire that the Duke should stay till France was at peace with England: neither Venice nor the Pope was ready; in a
year's time he would send 10,000 men to the Turkish war. When the Duke pleaded his promise, Louis XI ordered him as his vassal to remain at home, and handed him a written injunction to obey. The Duke gave way, and announced to his people the King's commands: next year he would himself go against the Turk; meanwhile, not to disappoint the Pope, he would send his illegitimate son, the Bastard of Burgundy, With 2000 men. The tower, says Pius II, fell at last before the repeated strokes of the battering-ram, and the Croy triumphed.

Pius II had left Rome in February to recruit his health at the baths of Petrioli, and stayed at Siena during the month of March. On Thursday in Holy Week, the day on which excommunications were published, the Pope anathematized all heretics, and all, even kings, who strove to hinder the crusade. The anathema was aimed at those who were shaking the constancy of the Duke of Burgundy; but Pius II soon found that it had been delivered too late. On Good Friday, March 30, he received the letter of the Duke of Burgundy, “worthy”, he says, “of being read on the day of the Lord’s Passion”. Yet Pius II was not entirely unprepared for the blow; he had already consulted with eight Cardinals, who were present, what course he should adopt in case Philip refused to go. They were unanimous in their opinion that, though the Pope was in that case released from his engagement, he should solemnly renew it. This was also his opinion; and he communicated his resolution as a decree to the absent Cardinals, who murmured at his obstinacy.

Pius II was resolute in his determination in spite of all hindrances. Yet we cannot assign this resolution solely to zeal for the good of Christendom; there was mixed with it also a motive of utility for the interests of the Papacy. There was still a power in Europe which stood opposed to the Pope, and whose activity threatened danger. George of Bohemia was a formidable foe, and had devised a scheme which might lead to serious results if it were not baffled. Pius II had brought to an issue the question of the relations between Bohemia and the Holy See. George must either alienate the majority of his people by submitting to the Pope’s demands, or must expose himself, by refusing, to the hostility of a determined minority who looked for help outside Bohemia. The aim of George was to pacify Bohemia on the basis of toleration offered by the Compacts, and weld it into a powerful kingdom. The Pope was keenly alive to the danger which might ensue if a power at variance with the authority of the Church became predominant in Germany. Pius II and George were equally convinced of the magnitude of the issue at stake. Each was equally resolute and equally far-seeing; but the Pope had the advantage of being able to choose his time for the attack. George met it by attempting to inaugurate a new policy in European affairs. He had first hoped to cope with the Papacy by possessing himself of the Empire; when that failed, he stayed the Pope’s hand by binding the Emperor to his cause by conferring benefits upon him. This could only be a temporary check; he tried to find a permanent one in the establishment of a confederation of European States against the Papal aggression. According to his scheme the States of Christendom were to take back again into their hands the supremacy in matters temporal and spiritual which they had been content to delegate to the Emperor and the Pope; a Council of European States was to regulate the international relations of Christendom.

The agent of George in this matter was Anton Marini, a knight of Grenoble, who in August, 1462, proposed to Venice a league between France, Bohemia, Poland, Hungary, Burgundy and Saxony, for war against the Turk. Venice replied that notwithstanding Marini’s arguments the Pope’s cooperation was necessary; for the
presence of the head of Christendom was of great weight in such a plan. Louis XI, in his anger against the Pope, listened to Marini’s proposals, and sent him back to Venice with an expression of his readiness to join such a league. Venice, now engaged in war against the Turks, was ready to accept help from any side; and the league of the Pope with Venice and Hungary was no doubt hastened by a desire to cut away the ground from Marini’s feet. The crusade of the Pope was in part an appeal to the sympathies of Europe to defeat the machinations of the Bohemian King. He could not shrink from it without giving a dangerous handle to his foe. In March, 1464, Marini was at the Court of Hungary, offering Matthias a league against the Turks and a Council of European Powers to promote the peace and welfare of Christendom; in June he was at the Court of Louis XI.

Pius II, however, though determined to proceed on his expedition, had neither the physical vigor nor the qualities requisite for the organization of such a scheme. Money came in slowly from Italy, and the Burgundian envoys at Rome saw little to impress them with a sense of military stir; they reported that it was the poorest preparation they had ever seen, and that two galleys only were ready. The Pope vaguely trusted that soldiers would flock from different parts of Europe, prepared to serve for at least six months at their own expense, and that the Venetians would give them conveyances. The crusade was preached with zeal throughout Europe by the friars; but they were scarcely to be trusted to arrange in an intelligible shape definite instructions to the crusaders. Many flocked to Venice before the time, and met only with scoffs when they had not money to pay their passage. The clear-sighted Venetians did not want enthusiasm but capacity on the part of those engaged in the enterprise. Their cruelty was published throughout Europe; but wiser heads thought that they had exercised a justifiable discretion. Many crusaders returned with disappointed hopes; many died of hunger and pestilence; many came to Rome or Ancona, and found no signs of preparation.

Pius II returned to Rome early in May to prepare for his departure. Before going he aimed a blow at George of Bohemia, whom, in a consistory on June 6, he cited to appear in Rome within 180 days to answer to the many charges against him. Pacific as he might now feel towards other Powers, Pius II could make no truce with Bohemia. The beginning of his crusade was to him an earnest of his triumph over the heretical king. The time had come to lay the axe to the root of the tree that had threatened to overshadow the Holy See with its branches.

On June 18 he took the cross in S. Peter's, and after repeating his conviction of the necessity of his undertaking and deploring the hindrances which it had suffered, he prayed before the high altar and then set out in his litter accompanied by all the prelates. At Ponte Molle he took leave of them, and attended by the Cardinal of Pavia, the Bishop of Torcello, Tiferno, and Camertino, his secretary Goro Lolli, and his nephew Andrea, embarked on a barge on the Tiber. This method of conveyance was chosen to spare the Pope the fatigue of a land journey; he was already suffering from a slight fever, but forbade his physicians to mention it. The first night was spent by the Pope on the barge, as he was too weary to quit it. Navigation was difficult up the stream, and on the second night he had only advanced to Fiano. On the third day the Pope was grievously distressed by an accident which befell one of the rowers, who fell into the river and was drowned before his eyes. Pius II lay silent and with tears prayed for his soul. Cardinal Carvajal came to him from Rome with the news that a crowd of crusaders were assembled at Ancona vainly seeking for means of transport; the authorities of the city were afraid of a tumult and besought the Pope to take means to prevent it. Pius II
besought Carvajal in spite of his seventy years to undertake this difficult task, and the brave old man, already broken by his many labors, answered, 'My motto is, Go and I go: I cannot refuse to Christ's service the end of my life'. Next morning he set off for Ancona.

The Pope proceeded up the Tiber as far as Otricoli, whence he was carried in a litter by easy stages to Spoleto. There the Cardinal of Pavia was seized with a fever and had to be left behind. Already the Pope was distressed by the sight of crusaders returning from Ancona; to hide from his eyes this melancholy sight, the physicians pretended that the wind was injurious to him and closed the curtains of his litter. Slowly he proceeded under the blazing heat of an Italian summer through Foligno, Assisi, and Fahlriano, across the Apennines to Loreto; there he offered a golden cup and bowl to the Virgin, whose cottage had been borne by angels from Bethlehem to its resting place on a hill by the Adriatic. Finally on July 18 he entered Ancona and took up his abode in the Bishop's palace, on the hill by the Church of S. Ciriacio.

The first question was how to deal with the crowd of crusaders who disturbed the peace of the citizens of Ancona. Pius II had only asked for such as would and the serve for six months at their own cost; he found a miserable herd expecting him to supply them with pay and food. As this was impossible, the Pope rewarded their zeal by a plenary indulgence; and they sold their arms as a means of obtaining money to take them to their homes. Those who could afford to do so remained in expectation of the Venetian ships which were to give them transport. Day by day they waited; but the ships delayed. At last the crusaders gradually dispersed, so that when the ships came in sight there were no soldiers to embark. The Pope meanwhile lay helpless and saw his hopes fade away. Messengers moreover arrived from Ragusa that the Turkish army had advanced to the siege and demanded the immediate surrender of its vessels. Pius II called Carvajal to counsel.

“What must be done”, he asked, “if Ragusa is besieged?”

“I will go tonight”, answered the intrepid old man, “with the two galleys that are in the harbor and will either break the siege or give spirit to the disconsolate citizens”

“What hinders me from sailing with you?”, said the Pope, “the knowledge of my presence will either drive away the Turks or will incite Christendom to follow with help”

Cardinal Ammannati, who had recovered from his fever and had followed the Pope, cried out against this plan. “I, miserable”, he says, “savouring of the flesh rather than of the spirit, dissuaded him, not because I did not think that what he proposed would succeed, but because I saw that to his body wasted with fever the voyage would bring the end”.

Yet the Pope remained firm in his intentions; and preparations were being made, when in four days the news was brought that the Turks had retired from Ragusa.

Pius II was rapidly sinking: the fever raged fiercely and the burning heat of the weather denied him any relief. The physicians said that he had but a few 1 days to live, when at last on the morning of August 12 the Venetian fleet was seen in the offing. The Pope roused himself and ordered his galleys to advance to meet them. He was carried with difficulty to the window of his chamber whence he could see the stately entry of the fleet into the harbor. Next day he was too ill to receive a visit from the Doge. The day after was the eve of the Assumption of the Virgin, when it was customary for the
Pope to appear at Vespers. He could not go, but sent the Cardinals and afterwards summoned them to his bed. He told them that his last hour was at hand; he died in the faith of Christ and committed to their hands the work which he had begun. He admonished them to behave worthily of their high calling, and asked forgiveness if he had offended them in aught. Finally he commended to their good offices his household and his relatives. The Cardinals wept, and Bessarion as the spokesman said a few farewell words and begged for his blessing. All kissed his hand in tears, and he blessed them saying: “May the God of pity pardon you and confirm a right spirit within you!”.

Then he received the sacrament, and arranged to receive it again next morning from the hands of Cardinal Ammannati in special honor of the Virgin. But as the sun went down Pius II also began to sink. He received extreme unction and was left alone with Cardinal Ammannati, Goro Lolli, and his nephew, Andrea. He talked a little with Ammannati and again commended his nephews to his care. Ammannati asked him if he wished to be buried at Rome. “Who will take care of that?” , he answered with tears. When Ammannati undertook to do so he seemed relieved. Again he beckoned Ammannati to his bedside. “Pray for me, my son”, he said, “for I am a sinner”. Then after a pause he added, “Bid my brethren continue this holy expedition, and help it all you can; woe to you if you desert God’s work”. Ammannati could not speak for tears; the Pope put his arm round his neck, and said, “Do good, my son, and pray to God for me”. They were the last words he spoke. He listened to the prayers that were being read till his spirit passed away.

Next day the corpse of Pius II was borne into the cathedral, and the funeral mass was said. When the Cardinals assembled in the palace, and the Doge of Venice, in a long speech, bewailed the Pope’s death, praised his zeal and besought the Cardinals to elect a worthy successor. The Cardinals decided to show their good intentions by giving over to the Doge the Papal galleys which lay in the harbor, on condition that they should be restored to the new Pope if he purposed undertaking the expedition in person.

The money which Pius II left behind, 48,000 ducats, was sent by them to Matthias of Hungary. Next day, August 16, the Doge sailed back to Venice, and the crusade of Pius II was at an end. The body of the Pope was taken to Rome, and buried in S. Peter's, in the chapel of S. Andrea; thence it was transferred, when S. Peter's was restored by Paul V, in 1614, to the Church of S. Andrea della Valle, where a monument was erected in his honor.

Pius II was lucky in the moment of his death. He left behind him the touching memory of an old man who died in the attempt to do his duty. When the princes of Europe were heedless of the welfare of Christendom, the dying Pope painfully dragged his feeble body to martyrdom for the common weal. It was well that he died when he did; for his expedition had no elements of success, and was already doomed to failure. He died before its failure had become too manifest, before an inevitable retreat exposed to ridicule the Papal prestige. He died in time to bequeath to Christendom the memory of the greatness of his undertaking, unblurred by any feeling of its hopelessness. The feeling of his contemporaries is shown by a corn struck in his honor, which bore the impress of a pelican feeding its young with its own blood; underneath was the inscription—

“Like this bird I feed my children with my heart’s blood”.

Yet even at the last there were many who were incredulous of the Pope's intentions. It was the doom of Pius II, even on his deathbed, to be distrusted by those
who could not forget his previous career, who sought in all he did for some motive of self-interest or vain display. The Venetians did not think that he was in earnest. The Doge, on his arrival at Ancona, regarded the Pope's illness as a feint, and sent his own physician to see if it was real. He was of opinion that his arrival was a disappointment to the Pope, who never intended to go on the expedition, and hoped to escape by throwing the blame on Venice. Philip was still more ill-natured. He declared that Pius II had gone to Ancona to seize the citadel, and hand over the town to his nephew Andrea; then he intended to sail to Ragusa and await quietly the result of the Hungarian arms; if they were defeated he would at once retreat, if they succeeded he would go to Constantinople and seize it for a Piccolomini. The Milanese envoy did not credit the Pope with any loftier pretensions; he reported to Sforza that, if Pius II had lived, he meant to sail to Brindisi and stay there during the winter, return to Rome in the spring, and throw the blame of failure on the lukewarmness of the princes of Christendom. A Brescian chronicler imputes to him another design: he went to Ancona without any intention of proceeding farther, simply in consequence of a secret understanding with Florence and Milan for the purpose of seizing Ancona, and handing it over to the Florentine republic. Italy was so accustomed to look upon Pius II as an astute diplomatist that she could not credit him with purely disinterested motives.

It is the fate of a character like Pius II to lend itself to different interpretations, and to remain enigmatical. One who has changed his opinions is always liable to the charge of insincerity, which comes with double force when a policy of easy pliancy raises him to a lofty position. Such a judgment, however, is generally crude, and misses the real elements of character. The distinguishing feature of Pius II was his readiness to learn from events. He equipped himself with the panoply of the new learning, and went forth as a knight errant in quest of adventures. He had no prepossessions, no prejudices, no definite opinions. His object was to make the most of life, to learn from its experience, to win what it had to give, to reap its successes, to adapt himself to its requirements. Aeneas Sylvius was not an adventurer in the sense that he intended to prey upon the world; he was an explorer who set out bravely upon the stormy sea of life, resolved to make his voyage as prosperous as might be. He was ready to run before the wind, to make for any haven which he could reach with sails flying. His skill consisted in seeing how the wind was likely to blow, and steering his course accordingly. He cannot claim the praise of high resolve, of steady purpose, of great design, or laborious achievement. He was not a man to mold the world; but he frankly offered himself for the world to mold. He was not heroic; but he was not base. He cannot fairly be accused of self-seeking, for self was in him the product of the exigencies amongst which his lot was cast. He was content to do the thing which needed to be done, and to reap the fruits of his foresight in being the first to perceive its necessity.

Many, we might say the majority, of politicians have little better claims to respect than Pius II; but no man who rose to such distinction has left behind him so complete a record of his career. It is hard that Pius II should be treated with contempt because he was a man of letters as well as a man of action, because he has frankly told us his impressions of events as they arose. We know his inconsistencies chiefly from his own confessions, while for those who have been more reserved about themselves we are at liberty to frame an imaginary consistency. The very frankness of Pius II is a proof of his sincerity: he did not wish to make himself out to be nobler than he was. The record of his soul's progress might contain pages which he wished to forget; but he left all to the judgment of posterity, with the consciousness that in the end the verdict formed on the
fullest knowledge would be the truest and most lenient. He who fixes his attention upon a few passages of the life of Pius II tends to judge him with severity; he who follows him through his whole career forgives him much, and recognizes a steady growth in greatness and nobility. Weakness and strength are strangely blended; vanity and littleness mix with high purpose and far-reaching plans; but before the eyes of Pius II there floated fitfully a loftier ideal of Christendom than was visible to any of his contemporaries, and juster views than he was enabled to express in action.

It was the fate of Pius II to reap the fruit of his early inconsistencies. In 1440, while secretary of Felix V, he wrote some dialogues in favor of the conciliar system, which he sent to the University of Koln. During his Pontificate, a quarrel arose between the burgurers of Liege and their bishop; the bishop was upheld by the Pope, the burgurers applied to the University of Koln, which used the authority of Aeneas Sylvius for an appeal to a better-instructed Pope. This drew from Pius II a Bull addressed to the University, dated April 26, 1463, in which he gives his own defense of his early life. He erred, he says, “but what mortal does not err? Who is wise save the good; who is good save God alone? We walked in darkness; we erred not to ourselves alone but drew others with us; as blind leaders of the blind, we fell with them into the ditch. Our writings may have deceived many, whose blood of God require at our hands, we can only answer that as men we sinned, and our hope is placed in God's mercy only. Some would rather die than confess their error. Some go on in their error, that they may keep the reputation of constancy, and act with pride, wishing to seem gods rather than men, as did Hus and Jerome, who were burned at Constance. We are men, and confess that as men we sinned; not, however, like Arius and Nestorius, who deliberately chose the way that was condemned; we sinned like Paul, and ignorantly persecuted the Church and the Holy See. We are ashamed of our error, we repent of our writings and our deeds; but we did more hurt by writing than by deeds. What are we to do? The word once written and sent forth speeds on irrevocable; our writings are not now in our power, they have fallen into many hands and are generally read. Would that they were in obscurity, lest they cause scandal in the future, lest men say, He who wrote this sat at length in S. Peter’s seat. We fear lest the words of Aeneas be counted those of Pius”.

To avoid this, the Pope goes on to say, he will imitate the example of S. Augustine, and make full confession of his short-comings. He professes his belief in the commission given by Christ to S. Peter, in the supremacy of S. Peter's successors over the Universal Church. “If you find anything contrary to this doctrine either in our Dialogues, or in our Letters, or in our other works (for we wrote much in our youth), cast it forth and contemn it. Follow what we now say: believe the old man rather than the youth; esteem not the layman higher than the Pope; reject Aeneas, accept Pius; the Gentile name was given us by our parents at our birth, the Christian name we took on our Pontificate. Perhaps some may say that our opinion came to us with the Papacy, that our views were changed by our dignity. It was not so; far otherwise”.

Pius II goes on to plead his youth and inexperience when first he went to Basel. Great names supported the Council, and he heard nothing save abuse of Eugenius IV. The Pope himself at last recognized the Council, and when he attempted to transfer it the claims of the Council were zealously put forward. “We taught, therefore, what we heard, and after some years, thinking we were somebody, we exclaimed with Juvenal—

“Still shall I hear and never quit the score?”
We were ashamed always to be a pupil; we began to talk, and occupy the teacher's place; we wrote letters and pamphlets, and, like all poets, loved our own children and were pleased with the applause they won. When Cesarini and others left Basel, we believed that they acted through fear of losing their temporalities; as we had none to lose, we boldly stayed, and on the deposition of Eugenius IV accepted Felix as the true Vicar of Christ. But when Frederick, the future Emperor, came to Basel and refused to treat Felix as Pope, then first we began to think it possible that we were in error. As we would not willingly err, we accepted his invitation to join his household, and went over to the neutral side that we might learn the truth. At the Court of Frederick we discovered the falsity of much that had been said against Eugenius. In the Diets of Germany we heard both sides, and the darkness at last fell from our eyes; we recognized our error, we went to Rome, cast off the doctrines of Basel, submitted to Eugenius, and were reconciled to the Roman Church. Not till after that did we assume the priesthood. Such was our conversion, in which Thomas of Sarzana, afterwards Pope Nicolas V, had the chief share”.

Pius II is frank enough in his confession, and probably believed that he was actually frank. He might phrase it as he chose, but men credited him solely with a capacity for floating with the stream. His keen susceptibility to outward circumstances and impressions was the secret of his greatness, and was at the same time the source of his weakness. It brought him to the highest earthly dignity; but it robbed him of the strength to secure the lasting fame that his great gifts might otherwise have deserved. He aspired as Pope to be the leader of Christendom; but he had not the moral position to inspire the confidence necessary for this task. His equivocal past rose up against him at every turn, and the mental habits of his early life prevented him from rising to the greatness after which he longed. He could not resist the temptation of grasping the advantage which he saw to be immediately attainable. Though he saw clearly and declared resolutely that the expulsion of the Turks from Europe was the first duty of Christendom, he had not sufficient self-restraint to devote himself with singleness of purpose to the task which he recognized as supreme.

The conquest of the States of the Church, the aggrandizement of the Piccolomini, the restoration of the Papal prestige, the abolition of the last spark of the conciliar spirit—these he pursued when a tempting opportunity offered, and did not trust that if he was faithful to his first great duty all else would follow unsought. To him and to Nicolas V alike culture gave largeness of mind, and set a lofty imaginative ideal. But in Nicolas V the ideal subordinated to itself the strong practical sense which he possessed: he swept away all obstacles from his path, and devoted himself with unceasing energy to the one object that he had in view. In Pius II practical capacity was led away into any field which offered a tempting opportunity for its display; the imaginative ideal remained imaginative to the last. Pius II's energies were expended on a number of small matters in which success was possible at the time but little result remained for the future. He grew conscious that fame was slipping away from his grasp, and rallied his dying force to give a faint expression to the aspirations which he really felt, but was not strong enough to turn to shape.

Those who saw Pius II close at hand were impressed by his geniality, his mental quickness, and his unceasing energy in spite of bodily infirmities. Platina has left us a finished picture of the master whom he respected above all others whom he served.
“Pius II”, he says, “was a man of undoubted courage and remarkable foresight, born not for ease and idleness, but for conversance with great affairs. He so apportioned his time that he could not be accused of slothfulness. He rose with the dawn, and after divine service at once engaged in public business, then he was carried through the gardens for a little relaxation before breakfast. He was moderate in his use of food, and did not care for delicacies: he was very sparing of wine, which he drank greatly diluted. After breakfast he would talk for half an hour with his attendants, then enter his chamber for rest and devotion: after that he would read or write as long as his public duties permitted. After dinner he did the same, and read or dictated till late at night, lying in his bed; he never slept more than five or six hours. In appearance he was below middle height, slender in his youth, but gaining flesh in old age. His eyes were cheerful, but kindled easily with anger; his head was prematurely bald. His face was pallid, and fell with the slightest sign of illness. He was attacked almost every month by stone; he suffered from gout, so that he had almost lost the use of his legs; he was also troubled by a cough. So severe were his sufferings that often there seemed nothing but his voice to tell you that he was alive. He had such command over himself that, while racked with stone, he would continue a speech without giving any sign of his pain except by biting his lips. He could endure toil, hunger, thirst, and heat. He was always easy of access, sparing of words, and unwilling to refuse a petition. He was quick to anger, but quick to repress it. He readily pardoned insolence unless it injured the Apostolic seat, whose dignity he steadfastly upheld. Towards his household he was kind and genial: those who erred through ignorance or sloth he admonished with fatherly affection. He never put down those who spoke against him, for he wished all to speak freely in a free state. When someone complained one day of being maligned, ‘You will find plenty who abuse me, too’, said the Pope, ‘if you go into the Campo dei Fiori’. He had no love for luxury, saying that books were his sapphires and chrysolites. He did not care for grandeur at table, but preferred to picnic by a fountain or in a wood. When he was in the country he never dined indoors, save in winter, or when the weather was wet. One day a shepherd gave him a wooden cup full of milk, and his attendants smiled to see how dirty it was. ‘It is cleaner’, he said, ‘than the cup of Artaxerxes: he who is thirsty does not need a glass’. He loved the country, and inquired about everything he saw, connecting the history with the place, and expounding it to them around him.

“He was a man true, upright, open, without deceit or simulation. He was a devout and sincere Christian, frequent in confession and communion. He despised dreams, portents, and prodigies, and showed no sign of timidity. He was neither elated in prosperity nor depressed by adversity. ‘Misfortune’, he used to say, ‘could be cured by wisdom, if it were applied in time’. He was a master of proverbs, of which the following may be quoted:—

The nature of God can be better grasped by believing than by disputing.

Christianity, even if it were not approved by miracles, ought to be received for its own worth.

A miser cannot be satisfied with money, nor a wise man with knowledge.

He who knows most is most persecuted by doubt.

Serious matters are settled by arms, not by laws.

A cultivated man submits his own house to his city, his city to his country, his country to the world, and the world to God.
As rivers flow to the sea, so vices flow to courts.
A king who trusts no one is useless, and he is no better who believes all.
He who rules many ought to be ruled by many.
Fit men should be given to dignities, not dignities to men.
Bad physicians kill the body, unskillful priests the soul.
Their virtues enrich the clergy, their vices make them poor.
For weighty causes marriage was taken from the priests, for weighter it ought to be restored.
He who spoils his son nourishes an enemy.
A miser pleases men in nothing save his death.

These appreciative remarks of Platina show us that the personality of Pius II was deeply attractive to his associates. But the character which Platina has sketched is that of a cultivated man of letters, not of a statesman or a theologian. It indeed, as a man of letters that Pius II has the deepest claims on our attention. He is one of the earliest representatives of the man of letters pure and simple; he is, perhaps, the only man of letters who has been equally eminent in literature and in statesmanship. His capacity for affairs developed out of his literary instinct; the keen eye and the ready apprehension, which he gained from the study of the world around him, were the means by which he won his way to high position. When first he came to Basel, fresh from his university career, he had a young man's gift for writing verses, which he exercised in Ovidean love poems and Horatian epistles. He wrote a long poem, which he called 'Nymphiplexis,' in honor of the mistress of his Sienese friend Mariano de Sozini, and rejoiced that it was more than two thousand lines in length. It has not come down to us; but Campano pronounced it to be flowing rather than correct in versification. Aeneas prided himself on his poetry, and gladly received from Frederick III the laureate's crown. But he soon had the practical sense to see that Latin verse would not do much for him, and his attendance at the Council stimulated him to seek the reputation of an orator. The example of Cesarini fired his emulation. Night after night he spent in study, while his comrade, Piero da Noceto, who shared his room, would laugh and say, "Why thus exhaust yourself, Aeneas? fortune favors the unlearned as much as the learned". Still Aeneas studied, and seized the first opportunity to air his eloquence; but it is noticeable that he spoke in behalf of a hopeless proposal to transfer the Council to Pavia. He spoke merely to win the applause of the Fathers and to gain the good graces of the Duke of Milan. His oratory was artificial, and lacked depth of purpose and sincerity. Aeneas was never sufficiently in earnest to be a great speaker, nor was he a sufficiently polished master of words to satisfy the cultivated taste of the Italians. But the Fathers of Basel were wearied with the formless utterances of scholastic disputants, which might be logical in reasoning but were wearisome to hear. The neat, flowing, and ornate style of Aeneas pleased them, and he established his reputation as an orator.

The chief quality of the mind of Aeneas was a ready receptivity of outward impressions, which prompted him to narrative writing. He seems to have designed a history of the Council of Basel, and wrote a description of the city, which was to serve as an introduction. If his work had been carried out, he would have given us a precious memorial of the actual life at Basel, and of the intrigues in the Council; what knowledge we have on these points comes from his letters. Probably, however, Aeneas felt that
such a work would lead him into questions of controversy, in which he had no keen personal interest. He did not, therefore, write the history of the Council as a whole; but in 1440, when he was secretary of Felix V, he wrote three books of Commentaries on the Council of Basel, which dealt only with the circumstances leading to the deposition of Eugenius IV and the election of Felix V. The work was really a pamphlet in defense of his master Felix; only here and there do we find the vivid touches of personal interest attaching to its pages, which otherwise merely cast the cover of an historical narrative over the learned arguments adduced by theologians in the Council's favor. The preface is ingeniously adapted to beguile the reader, unawares, into a controversial pamphlet, and with an affected artlessness to beg promotion for the writer. “It is my misfortune”, says Aeneas, “to waste my energies on writing history when I ought to spend them in providing for my old age. My friends say to me, What are you doing, Aeneas? Are you not ashamed, at your age, of having no money? Do you not know that a man should be stalwart at twenty, cautious at thirty, rich at forty? He who has passed that limit will try in vain. I acknowledge the truth of this; time after time I have put aside poets and historians, but like a moth round a candle I flutter back to my ruin. Since fate wills it, so let it be. The poor as well as the rich can live till death calls him. Poverty is wretched in old age, but it is the more wretched to those who have no taste for literature. I will enjoy what heaven sends, content, in the words of Horace—

Nec turpem senectam

Degere nec cithara carentem”.

In this graceful way Aeneas announced that he was serving Felix in hopes of preferment; nor was the form of historical writing the only one which he was prepared to use for this purpose. He followed the example of Poggio in reviving the Ciceronian dialogue. The occasion of this production was a decision given by the University of Koln to some questions submitted to them by their Archbishop concerning the controversy between Eugenius and Felix. The University set forth their views in three propositions, which asserted the supremacy of general councils, condemned the German neutrality, and said that the Church was synodically assembled at Basel, if the Council had not been lawfully translated. The saving clause was, as Aeneas calls it, "the sting at the end of the serpent's tail"; and Aeneas generously offered the University of Koln to remove its venom. His interest really lay in stating the common-place arguments in favor of the Council with taste and grace. For this purpose he wrote his pamphlet in a series of dialogues.

He and his co-secretary, Martin Lefranc, a Frenchman, are returning from a day's ramble outside Basel, delighted with their holiday, expatiating on the blessings of a country life, and expanding the Virgilian idylls into very tolerable Latin prose. Another couple draws near them, Nicolas of Cusa and a Novarese legist, Stefano da Caccia, also in earnest converse. Aeneas and his friend retire behind the bushes and listen to their disputation. The literary skill of the dialogue consists in the alternation of the two pairs of interlocutors. When the scholastic arguments of Cusa and his friend may be supposed to have wearied the reader, Aeneas gives a little relief by discussions on classical archaeology, literature, history. When quotations from Fathers and decrees of Councils have palled, quotations from Virgil and Latin historians succeed. This reaches a climax when Cusa and Caccia pause at vespers to say their hours. Aeneas and Martin agree that literary discussion is more profitable than the repetition of canonical hours, which may be a useful solace in the cloister, but is a weariness to men of learning. The two pairs at
length show themselves to one another. Cusa, who had maintained the cause of Eugenius, confesses himself vanquished, and goes back to Basel to sup with Lefranc. Aeneas also invites himself on the ground that he is so poor he has nothing in his house.

We are tempted to think that the dialogues of Aeneas, like the propositions which he combats, were meant to carry their point in their tail. At Vienna Aeneas had increased reason to use his pen for the purpose of gaining fame. He turned again to frivolous subjects, wrote love poems, epigrams, epitaphs, whatever he thought would be read and admired. He wrote a Latin comedy in the style of Terence, called *Chrisis*, and a Latin novel in the style of Boccaccio, *Lucretia and Euryalus*, which was the most famous of his works, and had still greater circulation after its author became Pope. It was not a book which the Pope, could read without shame, and Pius II apologized for having written it. It contained, he said, two things—an indelicate story and an edifying moral; all read the first, but few heeded the last. They might indeed be forgiven for overlooking it, as it is by no means obvious: Aeneas wrote his tale without any desire for edification, merely to please Kaspar Schlick, whose amours it most probably describes.

In matters ecclesiastical he signalized his position as a neutral by writing a treatise, the *Pentalogus*, in which he put the arguments for neutrality as cogently as before he had advocated the cause of the Council. He wrote treatises on all subjects—on the favorite theme of *The Miseries of a Court Life*, on *Education* for the young Ladislas of Hungary, on *The Nature and Care of Horses*. Nothing came amiss to the pen of Aeneas; but the subjects in which he was most interested were history and geography, and it is his great merit that he saw the close connection between these two studies. To him curiosity supplied the spur as well as the method; to observe and to inquire were the first steps, and he was then content to arrange his knowledge as he obtained it. He is the Herodotus of the fifteenth century, without the simplicity and dignity of his forerunner; too much concerned himself in what he relates to be entirely trusted, yet with the same quickness of apprehension, the same vividness, and the same profound belief in the mighty movement of human affairs. His first account of the events at Basel was rather a polemical pamphlet than an historical work. But when the fate of the Council was decided, Aeneas in a second book set forth his new opinions, displayed the mischievous activity of the conciliar movement, and traced with precise brevity the steps of its rise and fall.

He followed this by a collection of short biographical sketches of illustrious contemporaries. In 1452 he began a history of Frederick III, which he continued up to the time when he left Germany. On his return to Italy he undertook to write for Alfonso of Naples a history of Bohemia, which he carried to the death of Ladislas. The picturesqueness of the Hussite wars attracted the fancy of Aeneas, and he describes them in his best Livian style. In 1458, while suffering from an attack of the gout, he was asked by a bookseller to revise a sketch of universal history and carry it down to his own times. This led Aeneas to put together the contents of his commonplace book in the form of a book about the condition of Europe, which is a mixture of geography and history, with little attention to style and no proportion in the events related. This was the beginning of a *Universal History and Geography* which he projected, and of which when Pope he found time to write the part dealing with Asia. He redacted also for popular use the *Decades* of Flavius Blondus, so far as the accession to the Papal throne of John XXIII.
In the preface to the Asia Pius II apologizes for the fact that a Pope should have any time to devote to literature. “There will be malign interpreters of our work who will say that we rob Christendom of our time and devote ourselves to what is useless. We answer that our writings ought to be read before they are blamed. If elegance of style has no charms for the reader, he will still find much useful information. Our time has not been taken from our duties; but we have robbed our old age of its rest that we might hand down to posterity all that we know to be memorable. We have given to writing the hours due to sleep. Some will say that we might have spent our vigils better. We know that many of our predecessors made better use of their leisure; but ours is not unfruitfully employed, for knowledge begets prudence, and prudence is the leader of life”.

The Pope’s critics might have been strengthened in their opinion, had they known that he was also engaged in writing a history of his own pontificate. The Commentaries of Pius II is his most important literary work, and contains a full account of all the events in which he was engaged. Platina in his Life of Pius II mentioned the existence of these Commentaries; but they were not published till 1584, by Francesco Bandini de' Piccolomini, Archbishop of Siena, who possessed a manuscript which had been copied by a German priest, Johannes Gobellinus. Archbishop Piccolomini assigned to the copyist the honor of being the author. The Commentaries of Pius II were published under the name of Gobellinus, and have continued to be quoted by his name. Campano, however, in a letter to Cardinal Piccolomini, tells us that Pius II wrote Commentaries, and handed over to him for correction the results of his hurried dictation; he pronounces that they need no other hand to increase their dignity, and are the despair of those who would wish to imitate them. Campano, however, divided them into twelve books, and probably made a few additions and alterations. Platina mentions the beginning of a thirteenth book which Gobellinus did not include in his manuscript.

In his Commentaries we have the best literary work of Aeneas. The study of history was to him the source of instruction in life, the basis for the format on of his character. He looked upon events with reference to their results in the future, and his actions were regulated by a strong sense of historical proportion. Similarly, the present was to him always the product of the past, and he shaped his motive by reference to historical antecedents. It was probably this historical point of view which made him engage in so many schemes, because he felt that, when once affairs were in movement, the skillful statesman might be able to reap some permanent advantage. He was not willing to let slip any opportunity which might afford an opening for his political dexterity. Had he been less of a student, had his mind been less fertile, he might have concentrated his energies more successfully on one supreme object.

We have made sufficient use of the writings of Pius II to illustrate his vividness of pictorial power, his insight into character, his statesmanlike analysis of political motives. But Pius II is not content only to record matters in which he was himself engaged. His Commentaries are full of digressions about European affairs generally. He never mentions anything without fully investigating its causes; he never sees a town which he does not describe with reference to its past. Pius II is the first writer who attempted to represent the present as it would look to posterity; who consciously applied a scientific conception of history to the explanation and arrangement of passing events.
In illustration of this genuine historical insight the judgment of Pius II on the life of Jeanne D'Arc may be quoted. Pius II tells the story with commendable accuracy, and then sums up:

“Thus died Joan, a wondrous and stupendous maid, who restored the fallen and almost ruined kingdom of France, and inflicted many serious disasters on the English. Making herself a leader of men, she preserved her modesty unharmed amid troops of soldiers, and nothing unseemly was ever heard about her. Whether her work were of God or of man I should find it difficult to affirm. Some think that when the French nobles were at variance, and one could not endure the leadership of another, the successes of the English drove one, who was wiser than the rest, to devise a scheme by which they might be induced to submit to the leadership of a maid who asserted that she was sent by Heaven; in this way the conduct of the war was entrusted to her, and a supreme command was assured. This, at all events, is most certain, that it was a maid by whose leadership the siege of Orleans was raised, by whose arms the territory between Bourges and Paris was conquered, by whose advice Rheims was recovered and the coronation there performed, by whose onslaught Talbot was routed and his army slain, by whose boldness the gate of Paris was burned, by whose care and zeal the fortunes of France were secured. It is a worthy matter to hand down to memory, although posterity may lend at admiration rather than belief”.

We seem to be reading the words of a modern critic who stands on a basis of assured fact, and though suggesting a rationalistic explanation of what is almost incredible, still prefers to keep a suspended judgment.

In spite of his literary gifts, Aeneas Sylvius did not enjoy a great reputation in Italy; nor was he famous before his elevation to the Cardinalate. Italian men of letters were very exclusive, and reigned within their own circles, absorbed in their own labors and their own jealousies: one who lived in Germany was regarded as outside the pale of culture. When Aeneas became Cardinal many were ready to flatter him; but Aeneas knew the trick of flattery too well to be deceived. In truth he had left Italy too young to be a finished scholar; he knew scarcely anything of Greek, and he was by nature a man of action rather than a student. He could not in respect of knowledge compete with the professed scholars of Italy, Guarino, Filelfo, and the like. Moreover, as a stylist he was imperfect and lacking in finish. His residence in Germany had infected his Latinity with barbarisms, and in Italy Latinity was nothing if it was not strictly classical.

Thus Pius II, though the most eminent man of letters of his age, and one who deserves a high position amongst literary men of all times, was not regarded as a member of the literary clique which prevailed in Italy. He was not a profound scholar, he was not an elegant stylist; his penetration, his ready sympathies, his knowledge of human nature, his largeness of view, were qualities which the literature of his time regarded as of little moment. Pius II, on his side, was not concerned to gain the applause of the famous scholars of his own day. No doubt he would have welcomed it, if it had been genuinely given; but he did not choose to beg the homage of a crowd of literary sycophants. He had too great a sense of his personal worth to accept flattery which was prompted only by an expectation of future favors. He had too keen a knowledge of men to confound genuine merit with a capacity for writing eulogy. He was too confident in himself to trust to the praises of others rather than his own record of his own actions, to commend him to the consideration of posterity. Hence the great Literary Pope proved to be but a poor patron. The hopes of the humanists, which had risen high on the accession
of Pius II to the pontificate, were rudely dashed. An army of copyists was not reestablished in Rome; there was no zeal for the collection of manuscripts, no orders for translations or compilations, no glad acceptance of dedications or of complimentary verses. Not that Pius II was heedless of such things; but he could do all that he wanted for himself, or with the assistance of a few trusted friends. He did not wish, like Nicolas V, to found his fame on the patronage of literature and art; he did not wish to narrow the sphere of his activity. The reputation of a man of letters he was sure to gain by his own writings; it was necessary for him to emphasize his practical energy rather than his care for literature, if his fame was to acquire its due proportion.

Great was the disappointment of the humanists when the sad truth dawned upon them. For a time they hoped by perseverance to overcome the pope and convince him of their usefulness. The older generation—Poggio, Guarino, Manetti, Valla—had almost died out when Pius II ascended the Papal throne. Filello was the one literary veteran who remained, and he resolutely pursued the siege of the Pope’s goodwill. Pius II treated him with courtesy rather than with honor, received his letters and compositions, listened to his speeches with good humor rather than with gratitude, and made him presents which were marks of recognition rather than of favor. It soon became known that the Pope behaved as a critic and not as a patron, that he pulled to pieces the poems presented to him, and that his motto was, “poets and orators ought to be supreme, or they are nothing”. He professed his contempt for mediocrity, and cared only for such compositions as were really excellent. He did not value the fashionable style of oratory in Italy, but declared that a needless use of words showed the indolence of the speaker. Sentiments more shocking to the views of the humanists of the fifteenth century could not have been expressed. We are not surprised that his biographer adds to his account of Pius II, “he incurred great odium”.

An epigram of the Pope’s, which he made during his sojourn at Mantua, was rapidly spread through literary circles, and excited the wildest wrath. Ammannati, who was then the Pope’s secretary, tells us how the epigram arose, and gives us a faithful picture of the Pope’s amusements. One day at Mantua, while weary with affairs, Pius II took his usual relaxation of a ramble in the country. With Ammannati, and three other of his friends, he took boat on the Mincio to visit a monastery about three miles distant. To beguile the journey, his secretary read aloud some of the congratulatory poems which had been addressed to the new Pope at his accession, and had been laid aside till a convenient season offered when they might be read. The sound of verses soon kindled the poetic flame, and impromptus began to fly about the company. Presently was read a poem by Campano, which said that gifts ought not to be given to those who asked, but to those who did not ask, and then insinuated that, as he had not asked, he ought to receive. On this the Pope produced the following repartee:

To your request you've made our duty plain,
Since he who asks ought nothing to obtain.

As all the poems asked for something, the Pope at last said with a smile, I will give you something for your poets, and then made the epigram:

Take, poets, for your verses, verse again;
My purpose is to mend, not buy your strain.

Ammannati capped this by another:
Learn, poets, to turn from your verses to gain,  
From the bounty of Pius you nought will obtain.  

But Pius II had had his joke, and altered Ammannati’s epigram into:—  
Hope, poets, hope on, from your verses for gain,  
From the bounty of Pius you much will obtain.  

At the same time he granted the petitions of the needy bards.  

This is Ammannati’s account of the jocular way in which the epigram of Pius II was thrown off; but was passed on from mouth to mouth in literary circles, and awoke the profoundest wrath. A stinging repartee was also current, which was attributed to Filelfo, but which Filelfo himself assigned to Angelo Pontano. It ran:—  
Verse for your verse if fate had given to you,  
The Papal crown had never decked your brow.  

Pius II was decidedly unpopular amongst the humanists. Filelfo, after long hoping against hope, at last attacked the Pope in an anonymous invective, which assigned to him the practice of every classic vice. After the death of Pius II the tongue of Filelfo was still more loosened. He wrote a poem of triumph on the death of Pius II, and set to work to blacken his memory. At first the friends of Pius were indignant at such scurrility, and used their influence to keep Filelfo from the good graces of the new Pope; but Filelfo managed to play upon the vanity of Cardinal Ammannati by offering him his literary homage. Ammannati demanded a faint retractation of the calumnies against Pius, and then extended the hand of friendship to Filelfo. So venal was the praise of the humanists, so interested the judgments which they offered to hand down to posterity. It was an additional testimony of the penetration and profound practical sense of Pius II that he disregarded their windy homage, and estimated at its due value their influence over posterity.  

No man could be more desirous of glory than Pius II; but he was shrewd enough to see that glory would be won by his own acts and by his own writings more surely than by the inflated eulogies of hired pedants. As was natural for a man of wide culture, Pius II had a keen sense of reality, and was not deceived by a display of the apparatus of learning, and by the false glitter of laborious style. He was a foe to pedantry and ostentation; he knew that mere verbiage had no genuine vitality. In this, as in most other points of his character, Pius II stands a little way outside the common current of his age. Himself a humanist, he saw the shallowness of many of the prevalent literary tricks. He strove to estimate at its real value everything by which he was surrounded. He was a critic of his own life as well as that of others; he knew the worth of the fashions which he followed, of the opinions which he heard and expressed; he could use all things, but would not surrender himself to any.  

But though Pius II refused to form a literary court and surround himself with humanists, dependent on his bounty, he had a small circle of scholars whom he chose as his intimates. The private life of Pius II was singularly simple. When occasion offered, his sense of decorum and his cultivated taste led him to display a becoming magnificence. He was careful to do all that beseeemed a Pope; but he was not prepared to sink his personality entirely in his office. His Papal duties were thoroughly performed: but he reserved to himself the right of using his leisure in literary pursuits. He gave
audience daily, and read and signed all documents presented to him; but he would not bind himself to do it always at Rome in the Vatican. If his taste so chose, those who needed him might find him beneath the chestnut trees of Petrioli, or by the side of a fountain at Tivoli. A magnificent court, the constant presence of a band of literary flatterers—such things would have been intolerable to him. Pius II was a genuine man, and would not lay aside his natural tastes. He needed a few trusty friends with whom he could unbend freely. Warmhearted and affectionate, he wished to feel the contact of a few congenial minds, chosen not because they were distinguished or might be useful, but because they were personally attractive to his character and tastes.

It was this strong personality that led him to seek the promotion of his nephews, and made him feel such a strong interest in men of Sienese extraction. He had two secretaries, to whom he dictated his writings, Goro Lolli and Agostino de' Patrizzi, were both Sienese. Francesco de' Patrizzi also, who was chancellor of the Sienese republic, and was obliged for political reasons to quit his country, received from Pius II the rich bishopric of Gaeta. The chief friend, however, of Pius II was Jacopo Ammannati, a man of lowly origin, born near Peschia, in the Lucchese territory, who had gone to Rome to seek his fortune as a scholar in the palmy days of Nicolas V. Calixtus III made him one of his secretaries, and Pius II found in him a literary nursling. He made him Bishop of Pavia and Cardinal; he adopted him into the family of the Piccolomini, and procured for him the citizenship of Siena. Ammannati took the Pope as his model both in character and in literary composition. He continued the Commentaries of Pius II for the five years following his death, and adopted the same style and method. During all the pontificate of Pius II Ammannat enjoyed his full confidence, and at the last closed his eyes in death. He was a true friend, and did not abuse the Pope’s confidence to enrich himself. He was acute rather than profound, a man of letters of the same type as Pius II, without his practical capacity or his loftiness of aim. He did not aspire to be a statesman, and his attempts at ambition did not rise higher than vanity. He had the same delight in life as Pius II; but in him it took the shape of an excessive devotion to the pleasures of the chase. He was an excellent and amiable man, but not a strong one, a sympathetic companion rather than a counselor to Pius II.

The other distinguished literary friend of Pius II was Gianantonio Campano. He was the son of a peasant of Campania, and his surname is merely taken from the province in which he was born. At the age of three he lost his father, and soon afterwards his mother; under the guardianship of his aunt he was sent into the fields as a shepherd boy. His precocious intelligence induced a neighboring priest to take him as a domestic servant, and give him some instruction in his leisure hours. Soon he advanced far enough to act as tutor to the sons of a nobleman in Naples. Here he attended the lectures of Lorenzo Valla, and in six years of persistent study gained a large fund of knowledge. From Naples he betook himself to Perugia, where at the age of twenty he began to soon acquire a considerable reputation. In Perugia he stayed for some time, wrote love poems of a questionable sort, and made speeches when speeches were needed. On the accession of Pius II he went with the Perugian embassy to congratulate the new Pope. He seems to have felt that the Curia was his sphere, for he followed Pius II to Mantua, ingratiated himself with Ammannati, then with the Pope, and was soon rewarded by the Bishopric of Croton, which was afterwards exchanged for the richer see of Teramo.

Campano was a sort of buffoon whose sallies amused the Pope. He was a genuine peasant and carried his character in his appearance. Short, thick-set, and clumsy, with an enormous paunch, he had a large face with a turned up nose and broad spreading
nostrils. His small, keen, twinkling eyes were deep set under a bushy and projecting brow. He was, as he tells us himself, covered all over with hair like a wild boar. It was clear that Pius II was not considering abstract decorum when he bestowed on such a man a bishopric. He needed Campano to amuse him with his ready geniality and his power of good-humored satire; moreover, the pen of Campano was always at the Pope’s command for an epigram, an Inscription, or whatever was needed. He was a master of a clear, flowing, incisive style, who won reputation as a historian by his Life of Bracchio, and as an essayist by a composition against ingratitude. When Pius II wished to unbend himself in private, the refinement of Ammannati and the sturdy joviality of Campano gave him the social elements which he required.

As in literature, so also in art, Pius II possessed too genuine a taste to indulge in indiscriminate patronage, and his strong individuality impelled him to seek a field where he might leave a record entirely his own. Pius II was catholic in his taste, and did not merely follow the prevailing fashion. Though a lover of antique art, he did not shut his eyes to the great artistic revival which was going on in Italy. He saw that art and literature went hand in hand. “After Petrarch”, he writes, “literature emerged. After Giotto rose a band of painters, and now we see both arts at their height”. He did not, like most of his contemporaries, draw all his artistic ideas from classical antiquity; but he admired the paintings of Giotto at Assisi, and boldly declared that the sculptors of the facade of the Cathedral at Orvieto were no way inferior to Phidias and Praxiteles. Nor was his admiration confined to Italian work only; he could appreciate the beauties of London, the splendor of York Minster, and the magnificence of the Sebaldskirche Nurnberg.

With these wide sympathies Pius II was as little likely to make his pontificate an epoch of architectural splendor as of literary activity. He collected manuscripts, but with discretion; he built, but it was in moderation. He respected the great schemes of Nicolas, without being carried away by them, and was content to contribute his share towards the projected splendors of the Vatican and S. Peter’s. He built a tower at the entrance of the Vatican palace and adorned several of its rooms. He restored the terrace winch led to S. Peter’s and ornamented it with colossal statues of S. Peter and S. Paul, while inside he erected a chapel of S. Andrew. But it was not Rome which stood first in the affections of Pius II; in the ‘loggia del Papa’ and the Piccolomini palace at Siena we find more enduring records of his architectural taste.

The abiding memorial, however, of Pius II is his birthplace, Corsignano, which he indissolubly associated with himself by giving it his name and elevating it to the seat of a bishopric under the title of Pienza. The little town lies high upon a spur of the volcanic hills that form the Sienese territory. It looks upon the old Etruscan seat of Radicofani and the lofty heights of Monte Cetona and Monte Amiata. There Pius II erected the full equipment of buildings necessary to give grandeur to an Italian city. On one side of a spacious piazza lies the cathedral; over against it the Palazzo Pubblico, a younger sister of the stately Palazzo dei Signori at Florence; the other sides of the piazza are enclosed by the Archbishop’s palace and the palace of the Piccolomini. The architect of these buildings was Bernardo of Florence, most probably Bernardo Rosellino. Yet in the building of the cathedral Pius II would not place himself entirely at the disposal of an Italian architect. He remembered some features that had struck him in the churches of Germany, and ordered that the aisles should be of the same height as the nave, while in the arrangement of the five chapels into which the apse is divided we trace still further the influence of the German Gothic. The building is impressive through its simplicity.
and elegance, but, unfortunately, has suffered through the crumbling of the tufa on which it is built, which offered from the first great difficulties in the way of laying a foundation.

The façade is divided into three equal parts, with three square-headed doorways, separated from one another by massive pilasters, flanked by pillars, which are continued to the second tier of the building, and there are symmetrically formed into an arcade. Above this rises a triangular architrave, in the centre of which is a lunette, containing the Papal arms, with the crossed keys above. The Piccolomini palace is an exquisite specimen of the domestic architecture of which Siena contains so many example; but its great feature is the second courtyard, which leads into a garden, descending with terraces along the precipitous hill-side. Here the Pope has emphasized his love of nature as part of the accompaniments of cultivated life—the two lower storeys of the house on this side are broken by arcades of delicate and graceful architecture, which extend along the whole length of the building, and afford a glorious prospect over the Etruscan hills.

The care of Pius II extended also to the details of his building. Two massive fountains still adorn his palace, and the cathedral is full of records of his taste. The choir books are enriched by illuminations; the sacristy contains a cope, which is a marvel of embroidery, adorned with the history of David and Solomon, on a ground wrought with birds and flowers. He also gave a series of tapestries to hang round the piazza on days of great festivals, a pastoral staff, a pax, a chalice, a mitre set with enamels, and a head of S. Andrew in gold. Nowhere can more characteristic specimens of the varied works of the early Renaissance be seen than at Pienza, which, from its remote situation, has many times escaped the spoiler’s hand.

Pius II hoped to make Pienza a considerable town; it still remains a village with about nine hundred inhabitants, the cathedral is sinking in its foundations; the Piccolomini palace is scarce better than a desolate ruin. The Pope’s scheme to give importance to his birthplace has proved a failure; the individuality that resolved to leave its mark upon the world has been baffled by the laws that regulate man's affairs. This is but a symbol of all that Pius II did. He coped successfully with the world in his own day, but his plans were founded on his individual powers or caprices, not on a large sympathy with the needs and aspirations of mankind. Yet still Pius II has the reward that ever attaches to the strong work of a genuine man. At Rome one building superseded another, and the traces of each man's energy have to be reconstructed in detail. Few may visit Pienza; but those who do so are at once brought into close communication with the mind of Pius II, which there speaks without contradiction from others. So with the rest of the achievements of Pius II. They did not leave any decisive mark upon the world's history; but they were founded on a higher and nobler conception of Christendom and of the Papal mission than prevailed for the next century.

We have lingered over Pius II partly because the records of his pontificate are so full that they serve to illustrate much that was common to all Popes, partly because Pius II is a character most illustrative of the changes that were slowly passing over Europe in his day. In him the modern and the mediaeval spirit meet and mingle. His life covers a great epoch in the history of the Church, the epoch in which reformation from within was pronounced impossible. His skill did much to sweep away from the ecclesiastical system all traces of the abortive attempt, and to make good the position of the Papal monarchy against the threatened revolution. He further strove to set the Papacy once more in the forefront of European politics, and although he was not entirely successful,
yet he did not entirely fail. He left the question still open, and it depended on his successors to determine the future direction of the Papal policy.
BOOK V.
THE ITALIAN PRINCES

CHAPTER I.
PAUL II.
1464—1471.

So long as the struggle against the conciliar movement continued, the objects of the papal policy were determined; it was only when the papal restoration had been practically achieved that the difficulties of the papal position became apparent. Nearly a hundred years had passed since there was an undoubted Pope who had his hands free for action of his own; and in those hundred years the central idea on which the Papacy rested—the idea of a Christian Commonwealth of Europe—had crumbled silently away. A dim consciousness of decay urged Pius II to attempt to give fresh life to the idea before it was too late. The expulsion of the Turks from Europe was clearly an object worthy of united effort, and the old associations of a crusade would set up the Papacy once more as supreme over the international relations of Europe. But Pius II’s well-meant effort for a crusade was a total failure, and only his death prevented the failure from being ludicrous. He left unsolved the difficult problem. In what shape was the Papacy to enter into the new political system which was slowly replacing that of the Middle Ages? A still more difficult problem, as yet scarcely suspected, lay behind. How was the ecclesiastical system which the Middle Ages had forged to meet the spirit of criticism which the New Learning had already called into vigorous lift?

Some sense of these problems was present to Pius II as he lay upon his deathbed, and the Cardinals dimly felt that a crisis was at hand. Pius II's corpse was brought to Rome, and his obsequies were performed with befitting splendor. Then on August 24 the twenty Cardinals who were in Rome entered the Conclave in the Vatican. The first day was spent in preliminaries. On the second day the electors made an effort to check the growth of papal autocracy by imposing constitutional restraints. They framed a series of regulations which each swore that he would observe in case he were elected. These regulations began with an undertaking to continue the war against the Turks, and summon a General Council within three years for the purpose of stirring up princes to greater enthusiasm for the faith. But this was only the formal prelude to promises which more nearly affected the interests of the College. The future Pope undertook to limit the number of Cardinals to twenty-four, who were to be created only after a public vote in a consistory. None were to be created who were not of the age of thirty at least, graduates
in law or theology, and not more than one relative of the Pope was to be amongst them. The Cardinals were to be consulted on appointments to the more important posts, and the wills of members of the Curia were to be respected on their death. As a guarantee for the observance of this agreement a clause was added empowering the Cardinals to meet twice a year and consider if it had been duly regarded; if not, they were to admonish the Pope, “with the charity of sons towards a father”, of his forgetfulness and transgression.

When this agreement had been drafted and signed by all, the Cardinals proceeded to a scrutiny. The majority seem to have made up their minds, for the first voting showed twelve votes in favour of Pietro Barbo, Cardinal of S. Marco. As soon as this was announced four Cardinals at the same moment declared their accession, and then to make the election unanimous Bessarion asked each, separately if they agreed. Cardinal Barbo was elected with a unanimity and a rapidity which were of rare occurrence in the annals of papal elections. Only the old Scarampo was opposed to one against whom he had a long-standing grudge, for Barbo had consistently opposed his influence over Eugenius IV.

Pietro Barbo was a nephew of Eugenius IV, by whom he had been made Cardinal. He was a man of handsome appearance, naturally suave and courteous, with all a Venetian’s love of splendor. He learned in the Curia how to use his natural gifts to good purpose. He could easily ingratiate himself into the favour of his superiors, and was a favorite of Nicolas V and Calixtus III. To the keen-sighted Pius II his supple manners were not so acceptable, and he did not so readily have his wishes satisfied. Yet he was an incorrigible beggar, and had recourse even to tears if entreaties failed, so that Pius II laughed at him and gave him the name of ‘Maria pientissima’. But the complacency of Barbo was not confined to his superiors. He was fond of popularity and was genuinely kindly. He never abandoned the cause of any whom he took under his protection. He visited members of the Curia when they were sick, tended them carefully, and supplied them with unguents and medicines which he obtained from Venice. His enemies attributed his kindliness to interested motives, and accused him of hunting legacies; but this could not be the reason of his affability to the Roman citizens, whom he delighted to entertain with refined magnificence. His first act in the Conclave after his election showed that his natural impulse was towards considerate courtesy. He advanced to embrace his old enemy Scarampo, who was so crippled with gout that he could not leave his chair: seeing a crestfallen look upon his face he consoled him and bade him be of good cheer, assuring him that the past was forgotten. To his personal popularity and his supposed sympathy with the reforming policy of the College, Barbo chiefly owed his election, though the political cause which brought him into prominence was the alliance with Venice against the Turks which Pius II bequeathed to the Papacy. Barbo was in the prime of life, of the age of forty-eight; when asked what name he would bear as Pope, he said ‘Formosus’. The Cardinals were afraid that this would be interpreted as his own estimate of his handsome appearance. At their request he chose another name; but his next choice of Mark did not please them better, for it was the Venetian war cry. Finally he took the title of Paul II, and was consecrated on September 16.

The Cardinals, who had counted on the complaisance of the new Pope, soon found themselves mistaken. In spite of his promises Paul intended to be as absolute as his predecessors. He had signed the agreement drawn up in the Conclave with the remark that, even if its provisions had not been drafted, he would have observed them for their
intrinsic usefulness. But his first act as Pope was to set aside this compact. He drew up
another of his own, which he said was better, but which was full of ambiguities. He
summoned the Cardinals one by one into his chamber and requested them to sign his
draft as preferable to their own. When they remonstrated he overwhelmed them with
reproaches; when they wished to read the document and discuss its contents, he covered
it with his hand and bade them sign. When Bessarion refused and tried to escape, the
Pope seized him, dragged him back, locked the door, and threatened him with
excommunication if he did not immediately obey. Dismayed and overborne the
Cardinals one by one complied, except the brave and upright Carvajal, who said, “I will
not do in my old age what I never did as a youth. I will not repent of my integrity; but I
will bear you no grudge”. When Paul II had extorted all the signatures except that of
Carvajal, he flung his document into a chest and locked it up; the Cardinals were not
allowed even to have a copy of the amended regulations which the Pope consented to
observe. It was a bitter disappointment to them. Under Nicolas V, Calixtus III, and Pius
II the College had not been able to mold the papal policy. Under Paul II it hoped for a
return to power; but the Pope burst its bonds as a lion breaks through a net. The
Cardinals were downcast; but at last a dim consciousness that probably each of them
would have behaved in a like manner found expression in a joke which the Cardinal of
Avignon made to the Pope: “You have made good use of your twenty-four years’ study
of the College to deceive us once”.

Thus Paul swept away the last remnants of the conciliar principles, and asserted that
nothing could bind a Pope. It is true that he could plead that such an attempt had been
distinctly forbidden by a Constitution of Innocent VI in 1353. He could urge that such a
scheme on the part of the electors to the Papacy to secure their own interests was
entirely contrary to the canonical conception of the plenitude of the papal power; that
the method adopted of signing a joint agreement was singularly unfortunate; that to
refuse to sign would have meant exclusion from office, while to fulfill the agreement
after election would have been an unlawful diminution of his authority, which the new
Pope was bound to maintain and hand down intact. But the fact remains that Paul broke
a solemn promise and so closed the door to the only possible means of guaranteeing
reform.

But though Paul did not intend to increase the power of the Cardinals, he had no
objection to increase their grandeur. He reserved to the Cardinals the privilege of
wearing red hats, and allowed them to use purple cloaks and trappings for their horses,
which had been formerly reserved for the Pope; he gave them also raised seats in
consistories and in churches. Moreover, he made a monthly allowance of 100 gold
florins to Cardinals whose yearly revenues were below 4,000 florins, and he showed a
like liberality to poor Bishops. All this was part of his policy to make his pontificate
remarkable by personal splendor. If Nicolas V aimed at making Rome the literary and
artistic capital of Christendom, Paul II aimed at making the grandeur of the papal court
a model to the princes of Europe. He loved magnificence, and claimed it as a special
prerogative of the Papacy. He delighted to walk in procession, where his tall figure
overtopped all others; his dignity and impressiveness in celebrating the mass enchanted
even his assistants in the ceremony. His love of ornaments was shown by his revival of
the use of the Regnum or triple crown, first worn by Urban V, but since abandoned he
had one made studded with jewels valued at 120,000 ducats. “When he appeared in
public it was”, says Platina, “like another Aaron, with form more august than man”.

Paul was a zealous collector of cameos and medals, lucky opportunity soon threw in his way a means of acquiring a large collection. Cardinal Scarampo died in March, 1465, and by his will left all his possessions to two nephews, who were by no means fit persons to enjoy the vast treasures which Scarampo had amassed at the expense of the Church. He was suspected of having appropriated the wealth of Eugenius IV, and when he carried his enmity against Paul so far as to make no restitution to the Church at his death, everyone thought that the Pope was amply justified in setting aside his will, and seizing his goods. Men even wondered at Paul's clemency towards Scarampo's nephews; when they attempted to flee with some of their uncle's treasures they were only imprisoned for a few days, and Paul made them a handsome allowance out of the money which he received.

Paul was not a practised politician like Pius II; he was averse from war, as was natural in one who loved the splendors of peace. He had no desire to meddle unnecessarily with the affairs of Europe, and the results of the journey to Ancona were not encouraging for a continuance of crusading schemes. Still Paul sent subsidies to Mathias of Hungary, and declared himself ready to contribute 100,000 ducats for the purpose of a crusade if other powers would contribute in proportion. But Europe was apathetic: North Italy was disturbed by the death of Cosimo de' Medici, and the Venetians hung back. Nothing was done, and the Turks continued to advance steadily, checked only by the brave resistance of Scanderbeg in Albania.

Perhaps Paul was not sorry to find that no heroic measures were expected from him. His interests lay in the arts of peace, and he took a large view of the obligations of the work that lay immediately at his doors. For a time, at the beginning of his pontificate, he seems to have seriously contemplated a reform of some of the worst abuses of the papal system. He consulted a consistory about the desirability of abandoning grants of benefices in expectancy. Different opinions were given, but that of Carvajal prevailed. He said that the Papacy had laboured long to break down the opposition of ordinaries to papal provisions; now that the prerogative had been established, it would be dangerous to let it fall into abeyance. It was an argument unfortunately only too plausible at all times. Abuses soon pass into rights, and the technical mind deprecates the surrender of claims which it cannot undertake to defend. Paul did not venture to decree the abolition of grants in expectancy; but for his own part he declined to make such grants. Though he loved magnificence, he was too high-minded to resort to unworthy means for raising money. He did his utmost to put down simony and repress the sale of indulgences; but personal efforts were unavailing on the part of one who had cut himself off from the cooperation of his natural advisers. All he could do by himself was to bequeath to his successors a fruitless example of personal purity.

So, while Paul refused to admit principles which might secure lasting reforms, he turned his attention to matters of detail in the organization of the Curia. The army of officials, who composed the administrative Staff of the papal court, were divided into several departments, chief of which was the Chancery, presided over by a Cardinal who took the title of Vice-Chancellor. The Chancery preserved the papal archives, and conducted the papal correspondence. For this last purpose there were two sets of officials, the papal secretaries and the abbreviators. Since the reorganization of the Curia by Martin V it had been recognized that the secretaries stood in confidential relations towards the Pope, and their office frequently ended with the death of their patron. The abbreviators, who were not concerned with the private correspondence of
the Pope, but only prepared formal documents, held office for life, and were appointed by the Vice-Chancellor. The lucrative post of Vice-Chancellor had been bestowed by Calixtus III on his nephew Cardinal Borgia. Pius II, had no friendly feelings towards Borgia, and liked to exercise patronage himself. Accordingly he formed the abbreviators into a College, fixed their number at seventy, and limited the nominations of the Vice-Chancellor to twelve. He filled the College so constituted with favorites of his own, Sienese friends and literary dependents. Paul, probably with justice, regarded the abbreviators as the ——source of much corruption and venality; perhaps he was not sorry to rid himself of the Sienese element which Pius II had so largely introduced into the Curia. He abolished the arrangements of Pius II, ejected his nominees from their posts, and did away with the order of abbreviators altogether. This again was a barren attempt at reform. Sixtus IV—restored the College, and Innocent VIII increased it that he might make money out of the sale of offices.

No step is more unpopular than one of administrative reform, and Paul’s reputation has suffered in consequence. Great was the dismay, bitter the indignation, and loud the cries of the dispossessed officials. Many of them were scholars and men of letters, and according to the temper of their class considered that they conferred more distinction on the Curia than they received from it. The Pope's action was resented as an insult to the entire literary fraternity, and the abbreviators were at first sure that if they raised their complaints the Pope would be forced by public opinion to give way. Moreover, as the office of abbreviator was frequently bought by candidates, they put in a legal claim to its possession as a freehold for life. Platina, the most distinguished of their number, urged their cause with warmth, and demanded that their claims should be submitted to the legal decision of the auditors of the Rota. He little knew the resoluteness of the Pope. Paul looked at him with a scowl; “Do you talk of bringing us before judges, as if you did not know that all law is seated in our breast? If you talk in that way, all shall be dismissed. I care not; I am Pope, and can at my good pleasure rescind or confirm the acts of others”. Platina found Paul as immovable as a rock, and when remonstrance failed he determined to have recourse to threats. He wrote a haughty letter to the Pope, saying that if he persisted in depriving the abbreviators of their legal rights, they would complain to the princes of Europe and entreat them to summon a Council which would call the Pope to account for his illegal conduct. It is a striking testimony to the power of the revived literature of Italy that such a threat should have been conveyed to such a Pope. The humanists must indeed have had a high sense of their own importance before they could dream of disturbing the peace of Europe by a question concerning their position in the papal court.

The answer of Paul was quick and decided. He ordered Platina to be put in prison on a charge of treason. In vain Platina justified his action by reference to censorial power in the Roman Republic; for four months he lay in his cell, bound by heavy chains, without a fire in the wintry weather. He was at length released through the entreaties of Cardinal Gonzaga, who warned him not to leave Rome, but to stay there quietly. “If you were to go to India”, he added, “Paul would find means to bring you back”. Platina was humbled, and on his release from prison lived quietly in Rome, till he again excited the Pope's anger and suffered still worse treatment at his hands.

With equal decision Paul applied himself to the practical details of the government of Rome. He inquired into the prices of provisions, and when the merchants pleaded scarcity as a reason for their high charges, the Pope sent envoys of his own to procure corn and meat for the Roman market. So successful was he in this undertaking that
prices fell more than a half. While he thus provided for the comfort of the people, he sternly repressed disorder and demanded obedience to the laws. He had a horror of violence and wished all men to live in peace. In carrying out his measures he showed a happy mixture of firmness and mercy. Turbulent spirits were cooled by a few days’ imprisonment; no malefactors were allowed to escape; but Paul was averse from severity, and above all from bloodshed. Though willing to remit the full penalty inflicted on smaller crimes, his sense of justice would not allow him to pardon homicide, while his clemency shrank from the infliction of capital punishment. The prisons were filled with culprits, and the magistrates clamored for their execution. “Do you think it a small thing”, said the Pope, “to put to death a man, so admirable a piece of God’s workmanship, and molded for use by human society through so many years of toil?” He devised a new punishment for grave offenders by sending them to serve in his galleys, with strict orders to the captains that they should be mercifully treated. Compassion was inherent in the temperament of Paul. He rescued birds from their captors and let them go free. He could not even endure to see a bullock being led to the shambles, but would stop and buy it from the butcher that its life might be spared.

In other matters which affected the well-being of the city, Paul showed equal sagacity. He cleansed the sewers and aqueducts, and repaired the bridges over the Tiber. He preferred to take part in the city life rather than enjoy the somewhat solitary grandeur of the Vatican. He lived chiefly in the Palazzo of S. Marco, which he had built as Cardinal, and which still stands as a memorial of his architectural taste. From its windows he could enjoy the sight of the Roman Carnival which he delighted to organize and encourage. There were races of all kinds in the long straight street which led to his palace, and which took from his day the well-known name of the Corso. All classes and all ages might enjoy themselves; there were foot races for the Jews, for youths, for adults and for old men. There were horse races, donkey races, and races for buffaloes. There were pageants of giants and cupids, Diana and her nymphs, Bacchus and his attendant fauns; there were processions of civic magistrates escorted by wagons laden with grotesque figures, while songs in honor of the Pope resounded on all sides. On the last day of the Carnival, Paul gave a magnificent banquet to the magistrates. The remnants, including all the furniture of the table, were distributed amongst the people, and the Pope himself threw small silver coins to be scrambled for by the crowd. Some shook their heads at these heathenish vanities as unbefitting a Pope; but Paul, while desirous to check abuses, had none of the spirit of asceticism, though he himself was most temperate in his pleasures, and seldom took more than one meal a day, and that a simple one. He possessed, however, the spirit of genuine charity, and besides showing liberality in cases of conspicuous need, chose almoners, men and women of high character, whom he supplied with money, which they expended secretly in the relief of the destitute.

In the States of the Church Paul did what he could to stop administrative corruption. He forbade the governors of cities to receive presents, except of provisions, and of these not more than a supply for two days. He gave the castles into the hands of prelates, thinking that they were more trustworthy than the neighboring barons. Moreover he was enabled to take an important step towards securing the peace of Rome, which since the days of Eugenius IV had been disturbed by the turbulent baron Everso, Count of Anguillara, who was little better than a bandit, and made the approaches to Rome dangerous by the robber hordes whom he encouraged. He held his power by virtue of opposition to the Popes: he intrigued with the discontented in Rome
and kept the city in constant disquiet. At his death, in September, 1464, he was master of most of the towns in the Patrimony. Paul resolved to recover the possessions of the Church from the two sons of Everso, who promised to restore the castles which their father had seized. The promise was not kept, and in June, 1465, Paul II sent his troops against them. There was a party in Rome which was in their favor, a party which wished to maintain any sort of check on the power of the Pope. Paul acted with the wisdom of a statesman. He summoned an assembly of the Roman people, and plainly put before them his policy and his aims. The opposition was at once overborne, and Rome was united in desiring to be rid of a horde of robbers at its gates. Not a blow was struck in behalf of Everso’s sons: one fled to Venice, the other was made prisoner. Thirteen castles were at once surrendered to the Church, and by the end of 1465 Paul was master of the Patrimony. Towards the general politics of Italy the attitude of Paul was at once wise and dignified. He studied above all things to maintain peace, and refused to join in any of the leagues, or countenance any of the plans, which the Italian States were so fertile in forming against their neighbors. He would not offend anyone, but he would seek no one’s favor. He had no objects of his own to pursue, but aimed at holding an independent position as arbiter amongst conflicting interests.

In the external relations of the Papacy, Pius II had left one important question for settlement, and when the need for action was clearly apparent Paul II could act with a resolution unknown to his predecessor. The last thing that Pius II had done before departing for Ancona was to summon to Rome the heretical King of Bohemia, George Podiebrad. It was reserved to Paul II to bring to an end the Bohemian difficulty, and the fact that he entertained no political projects of his own enabled him to concentrate his attention on the purely ecclesiastical side of George Podiebrad’s position. We have seen how George of Bohemia strove to emerge from the isolation in which as a Utraquist he stood amongst the powers of Europe. He tried every means, and even threatened to break down the hierarchical basis of the state system of Europe. First he endeavored to win the Imperial crown, and failing that, to reform the Empire according to his ideas; finally he set on foot a scheme for a new organization of international affairs, by means of a parliament of European princes. This last attempt had warned the Papacy of its danger, and Pius II resolved to crush George by every means in his power. The death of Pius II suspended for a time the process against George which the Pope had threatened. George had a short period of respite while Paul II paused to survey the ground.

Though George Podiebrad had done great things in restoring order into Bohemia and raising its credit abroad, he was still no nearer to a permanent settlement than he was at the beginning of his reign. The Catholics of Breslau refused to recognize him as their king, and were under the protection of the Pope. Bohemia was still distracted, and the key to the papal policy was to be found in the saying of the Archbishop of Crete to the complaint of the men of Breslau, that not the Rhine, the Danube, and the Tiber could quench the flame of heresy in Bohemia. “The Moldau alone will suffice”, was his answer. In truth, the Bohemian nobles looked with some suspicion on the king who had risen from their own ranks, and whose efforts were directed to increase the kingly power. They were gradually becoming more discontented; and though they would not venture to take up arms simply at the Pope’s bidding, for the large majority of the people was Utraquist, they were ready to seek a political pretext which might bring them into alliance with the Pope. Early in 1465 a baron who had been always hostile to King George, Hynek of Lichtenberg, rose against the King, and the States of Moravia declared war against him as a disturber of the peace. His castle of Zornstein was
besieged, whereupon Hynek fled to Rome and besought the Pope to take cognizance of his case. The Bishop of Lavant, who had been appointed legate for Bohemian affairs in Germany, wrote from Rome, forbidding all Catholics in Moravia and Bohemia to continue the siege of Zornstein; Hynek, as being a good Catholic, was under the protection of the Pope.

King George now knew what he had to expect from the new Pope. He wrote to Paul assuring him that Hynek was not persecuted on account of his faith, but was being punished for his rebellious conduct. The Bishop of Lavant from Neustadt threatened with interdict all who took part in the siege of Zornstein. Paul answered George's letter, not to himself, but to the Bohemian States, saying that he was sorry to hear charges against an orthodox man like Hynek; as he who ordered proceedings to be taken against Hynek had no power and authority, since he refused obedience to the Church, the Pope declared Hynek to be no rebel, and repeated his orders that the siege of Zornstein should be raised. Of course the papal letter did not carry conviction, and Zornstein fell before its besiegers in June, 1465.

The letter of Paul was meant to be a declaration of war; by his defence of Hynek he showed the means by which he intended to wage it, and invited allies. He did not act without knowledge; by his side stood the stubborn Carvajal, who since the days of Eugenius IV, had directed the papal diplomacy in Germany and Bohemia. George was not long in feeling the results of this policy. The discontented barons, who dreaded the steady growth of the royal power, gathered together secretly and formed themselves into a League under the guidance of Bishop Jost of Breslau. At the head of these nobles stood Zdenek of Sternberg, once the firm friend of King George, but who had gradually been estranged from him. It was agreed that the religious question was to be carefully excluded from their complaints, and that their action was to be founded on the grounds of national patriotism. A list of grievances was drawn up and presented to the King in a Diet held at Prague on September 25, 1465. The discontented barons absented themselves; but their written complaint contained twelve articles accusing the King of diminishing the rights of the nobles, employing foreigners rather than Bohemians, and allowing Rokycana and his priests to disturb the peace of the land. To these complaints the King returned a dignified answer; but it was clear that the grievances were merely a pretext, and that the object of the League was hostility against George. On November 28, the discontented barons, with the Bishops of Breslau and Olmütz, entered into a League for five years for the purpose of mutual defence.

Side by side with this action of the Bohemians the Pope proceeded on his way. Indignant at the fall of Zornstein, he nominated a commission of three Cardinals, amongst whom were Carvajal and Bessarion, to report on the process which Pius II had instituted against George. On receiving their report he renewed, on August 2, the citation to “George of Podiebrad, who calls himself King of Bohemia”, to appear within 180 days to answer to the charges of heresy, perjury, sacrilege, and other crimes. On August 6 the Pope further commissioned the Bishop of Lavant to loose all ties of allegiance or alliance between George and his subjects or allies. The Pope did not wait to give George a chance of appearing to his citation. The notoriety of his misdeeds was held to be apparent, and the legate was bidden to lodge complaints against him in all the courts of Germany.

King George at once realized the danger in which he stood. He saw that the papal policy tended to isolate him, not only in Europe, but in his own kingdom. He judged it
wise to make a movement of retreat, to try to renew the position in which he had first stood towards Pius II. He looked for mediators with the Pope. In the Emperor he could put little trust; from Mathias of Hungary, who stood high in the Pope’s favour, he hoped much; from Lewis of Bavaria he borrowed the pen of his chancellor, Dr. Martin Mayr. Acting on Mayr’s advice he pleaded his inability to come to Rome, and demanded a Council in the neighborhood of Bohemia before which he would willingly appear. Lewis of Bavaria sent an envoy to Rome in November, 1465, bearing George’s proposals for reconciliation. He offered to lead a crusade against the Turks, and drive them from Constantinople, on condition that he received as a reward the Imperial crown of the Eastern Empire; in Bohemia the existing condition of the religious question was to continue: the compacts were to rest on their own basis without any papal recognition: George’s son was to succeed him on the Bohemian throne, and another son was to receive the archbishopric of Prague, which he was to hold from the Pope: much of the possessions and privileges of the Church should be restored to the Catholic clergy.

Paul was not captivated by this fantastic proposal. He was of a practical turn of mind and had no taste for daring and adventurous schemes. His mind was made up about George, and he was resolved to give no quarter. He gave a decisive proof of his intractability by his treatment of a Bohemian envoy who brought him a letter from George in December. “Holy Father”, said the envoy, “this letter is sent by your faithful son the King of Bohemia”. The Pope took the letter and flung it on the ground. “How, you beast, can you be so bold as in our presence call him king whom you know to be a condemned heretic? To the gallows with you and your heretical ruffian”. Paul could be both plain-spoken and resolute when he chose; and we are not surprised to find that the envoy waited for three weeks for an answer, but none was given. Finally at Christmas the Pope, seeing him in the church of S. Maria Maggiore, sent a chamberlain to turn him out. Lewis of Bavaria, in answer to his mediation, received a sharp reproof, and a vigorous criticism of George’s proposals. A forsworn heretic, said the Pope, asks for further favours: let him first keep his promises: better the infidel who knows not the truth than a heretic and schismatic. Diplomacy was no longer possible between the Pope and the King.

Though a breach was now imminent, all parties hesitated. George had everything to gain by moderation and still hoped to escape the storm. The League of Bohemian nobles was not strong enough to attack him, and negotiated with the Pope for money and support. The Pope answered that they were not fighting for the Catholic cause, but only for their own interests; if they declared themselves on the side of Breslau and the Catholic faith he would help them, but not otherwise. The League hesitated and made a truce with George, who was constant in his desire for peace. The Pope meanwhile did not venture to proceed to extremities and declare George deposed till he saw some means of enforcing the sentence. George could not be overcome save by the arms of some foreign power, and it was not easy to find a prince who was ready to undertake the difficult task of attacking so powerful an adversary. The Emperor was of course hopeless, and the Princes of Germany were too busy with their own schemes of aggrandizement. There remained Mathias of Hungary and Casimir of Poland; but Mathias, though professing himself ready to obey the Pope in all matters, was occupied against the Turks in his own dominions, and Casimir maintained a doubtful attitude towards the Pope's proposals. The time passed by for George’s appearance in Rome to answer the charges against him, and still the Pope hesitated to proceed to extremities.
The question was discussed in a consistory on December 21, 1466, till Carvajal, true to his inflexible principles, confirmed the wavering minds of the Cardinals. “Why do we measure all things by human judgments? Must not something in difficulties be left to God? If the Emperor and the Kings of Poland and Hungary will not help us, God will help us from His holy seat and will bruise the head of the wicked. Let us do our duty; He will perform the rest.” His view prevailed, and on December 23, in an open consistory, sentence was given against George as a heretic; he was deprived of all his dignities, and his subjects were released from their allegiance.

The effect of this determined attitude of the Pope was at once felt in Germany, where the old antipathy against the Bohemians began in some measure to revive. The students of Leipzig and Erfurth sold their books and bought arms for a crusade against the heretic: the Emperor and the German princes began to draw further away from George. The Barons’ League formed itself definitely into a Catholic League, and elected as its leader Zdenek of Sternberg; but it was clear that the League would be powerless unless it found allies outside the kingdom. George had a wise adviser and a skillful diplomat in Gregory of Heimburg, whose skillful appeals to the German Princes did much to strengthen George's position. Acting under Heimburg’s advice, George on April 14, 1467, met the Pope's Bull by a formal appeal. On the grounds that the proceedings against him were contrary to justice, and were dictated merely by personal hatred, he appealed first to the Roman See itself, against which, George added, he had no grievances, but only against its present occupant, who was a mortal man, subject to mortal passions; secondly, he appealed to a General Council; and thirdly, to Paul's successor, and to all corporations in Christendom which loved right and justice. This appeal produced no results save that it gave a technical ground for Catholics to continue on the side of George without severing their allegiance to the Pope.

War now broke out between the Barons’ League and King George; but it was a war of plundering raids and sieges of castles in which George had the balance of success. Both sides grew weary of this fruitless seeks for devastation, and a truce was made in November. George behaved with singular moderation; he wished only for a lasting peace, and did not care to pursue a temporary advantage. The Pope fulminated against George, but that produced little effect; the real question was whether the Polish or Hungarian King would come to the help of the League. There were long negotiations with Casimir of Poland; but he shrank from the arduous task and offered his services as a mediator. Mathias of Hungary was more easily won over. Though bound by many ties to George Podiebrad, he had become gradually estranged from him and regarded him with feelings akin to jealousy. He had married George’s daughter, but her death in 1464 loosened his personal ties to the Bohemian King. In truth the attitude of Bohemia was a stumbling block in the way of the policy of Mathias. The existence of the Hungarian kingdom was threatened by the invasion of the Turks, and Mathias needed the help of Europe to repulse them. A close alliance with Bohemia was the most natural means of gaining help; but an alliance with Bohemia, in the existing condition of the papal policy, meant isolation from the rest of Europe. Mathias had to choose between an alliance with Bohemia against Rome and the Turk, or an alliance with Rome against Bohemia and the Turk. By identifying himself with the cause of the Church he saw a means of convincing Europe that his war against the Turk was waged in the cause of Christendom; he saw also a chance of obtaining for himself the crown of Bohemia, and thereby uniting the resources of the two countries. He resolved to cast in his lot with the Papacy, if it were necessary for him to take one side or the other.
The opportunity for which Mathias waited was not long in coming. King George had made a truce with the Catholic League that he might have his hands free to strike a blow against the Emperor. He regarded Frederick III with growing animosity, and saw in him a centre for papal intrigues which might unite Germany as well as Hungary against Bohemia.

Frederick had submitted to the German Diet at Nurnberg, in June, letters from the Pope demanding help against George, and the election of a new King of Bohemia. Though the Diet did not entertain these proposals, yet Frederick had shown his hostility towards George, who now resolved to meet it. He hoped by striking at Austria to raise up troubles within the Emperor's dominions, and convince Mathias of the need of an alliance with Bohemia against the Turk. In the beginning of 1468 George's son, Prince Victorin, defied Frederick III as Duke of Austria, and advanced into his territory. The stroke was not decisive, as the Austrians managed to make some sort of resistance, and Frederick III turned for help to Mathias. The decision of Mathias was at once taken. Summoned by the Pope, summoned by the Catholic League, and summoned by the Emperor to attack Bohemia, he saw himself supported on so many sides that victory would be sure to bring him the Bohemian crown. At the end of March he declared war against King George.

That Mathias Hunyadi should at the Pope's bidding turn his arms against George Podiebrad was the irony of history on the policy of the restored Papacy. As the Papal head of Christendom the Pope summoned Europe to war against the Turk; as head of the ecclesiastical system of Christendom the Pope strove to restore the outward unity of the Church; and these two objects proved to be contradictory. Pius II hoped to combine them by his crusade, which should again unite Europe under the Papal leadership, and sweep away the dangerous and revolutionary schemes of George Podiebrad. Events showed that Pius II had striven after what was unattainable, and Paul II had to consider which aim he should put foremost. If Europe as a whole would not advance against the Turk, the best chance of holding the Turk at bay was the maintenance in Eastern Europe of a strong power, such as might be formed by a close alliance between Bohemia and Hungary. Paul II cast to the winds all thought of the real interests of Europe, that he might secure the interests of the Church. To reduce Bohemia to obedience to the Papacy he did not scruple to plunge into warfare—which could only end in mutual destruction—the two most capable rulers in Europe, whose territories were the natural bulwarks against the advance of the Turk. When we deplore the selfish and grasping policy which prevailed universally in the succeeding age, we must regret that such a Pope as Paul did not bequeath an example of greater care for the general good.

The news of Mathias' decision awakened the wildest joy of Rome. Cardinal Ammannati wrote to the Pope, “On reading today copies of two letters of the truly most Christian King of Hungary, I raised my eyes and hands to heaven, and gave thanks to God’s goodness which at length has regarded us, and raised us to a hope of salvation, and kindled the spirit of Daniel who will tread down Satan under our feet ... The Lord has awakened, as it were, from sleep, like a giant refreshed with wine. The vengeance for the blood of His servants which has been shed, has entered into His sight. Our enemies, in the words of the Apostle, will be made a footstool under our feet ... The issue is grave; for nothing can be more joyous for the Catholic people, nothing more glorious for the Apostolic Seat, than victory, nothing more sorrowful than defeat. The torch is destructive which may spread a daily conflagration on our heads and those of all faithful people. Wherefore we must the more propitiate the God of Hosts, and aid the
pious King by the prayers of the Church, that while he fights there may rain over the Bohemian sinners snares, fire and sulphur, and the breath of storms may be the portion of their cup, for which they shed their own and others’ blood”.

With these aspirations of Ammannati it is worthwhile to compare the words of Gregory of Heimburg, who still remained a keen critic of the papal policy, convinced of the mischief which it had wrought in Germany, and prepared to withstand it to the last. Yet Heimburg had learned from his experiences with Sigismund of Tyrol that it was hard to fight against the Papacy; and though the keenness of his pen is the same as at first, his expressions are more moderate, and the joy in battle has cooled. Heimburg is no longer acting on the offensive, but uses all his skill to parry the blows of an adversary whom he feels to be too powerful for him. His last appeal in behalf of George was written in the middle of 1467; and in it Heimburg put forth all his skill. His object is to defend George against the Pope's procedure, and he carefully narrows the issue before him. Beginning with an apology for venturing to speak against dignitaries, he says that he is distracted between reverence and patriotism; if he speaks, it is after the example of S. Paul, who raised his voice even against the High Priest, when he behaved wrongly. He then declares George’s fervent desire to clear himself of the charge of heresy, and by giving an account of arguments used in George's Council, he skillfully manages to set George’s high-mindedness in contrast with the corruption of the Curia, representing him as combating the suggestions made by his advisers, who recommended him to take advantage of the venality and prevarication which prevailed at Rome. He enlarges on the injustice of the Pope’s procedure, and to explain the hatred of the Pope against George he tells once more the story of the means by which the Papacy overcame the German neutrality, and points out how it wishes to keep Germany in chains, by means of its alliance with the feeble Emperor. He dwells on the papal arrogance in German and Bohemian affairs, and then continues: “O Paul, bishop of bishops, who have received the sheep of Christ, not to shear, or milk, or slaughter, but to feed; would it not have become your office of Shepherd to have granted the King’s request for a fair trial, especially as he offered to bring into accordance with the Compacts anything that might be found contrary to the ritual of the Roman Church? Could you not have granted a certain latitude to Bohemia, as Gregory the Great did to Augustine of Canterbury when he wrote: If the same Christ is worshipped, variance of ritual matters not? But you were afraid that the authority of General Councils, which you and the Emperor had trampled underfoot, might again revive, and your filthiness be spread abroad throughout the world. You would have lacked also the delight that you have received from the slaughter of women great with child, whom your cutthroats, beneath the banner of the Cross of Christ, have massacred ... Remember, Holy Father, that as long as you are weighed down with the burden of the flesh, you are a man liable to sin, and therefore may reckon true what is other than the truth ... What gain do you hope to obtain if so much blood be shed in war that the Danube, red with the blood of the slain, dyes the Scythian sea? Will the Bohemians be heard at length even in your despite, and peace again be restored? God will provide what is best”.

Heimburg writes as though the time for the pen were past, and matters must be decided by the sword. Mathias entered Bohemia in April, 1468. Paul II supported him by issuing Bulls of extraordinary severity against those who in any way helped George, or had any commercial dealings with him; and by holding out extraordinary inducements to those who joined in the crusade against him. George was attacked by three enemies at once: Mathias of Hungary, the Catholic League, and the hosts of
crusaders who assembled at the Pope’s bidding. They naturally gained some advantage; but Mathias soon saw that the conquest of Bohemia was no easy matter. He tried to win over Casimir of Poland, but George offered to procure from the Estates of Bohemia the election of a son of Casimir for his successor, and the Polish King listened more readily to George than to Mathias. The war went on, and George was sorely pressed; but as the schemes of Mathias became more apparent, the Emperor grew terrified at his too mighty ally. He wished to rid of George Podiebrad, but he hoped to secure the crown of Bohemia for the Austrian house. Mathias, on his side, aimed not only at the throne of Bohemia, but at the dignity of King of the Romans, as a reward for his labors for the good of Christendom.

In his helplessness Frederick III resolved to try what could be gained from the old alliance which he had formed with the Papacy. Under the pretext of fulfilling a vow which he had made in his troubles of 1462, he started on a pilgrimage to Rome in November, 1468. He placed Austria under the protection of Mathias, whose interests he professed to have chiefly at heart in seeking an interview with the Pope. In fact, however, he regarded Mathias with terror, while Mathias looked on him with suspicion.

Paul II was not well pleased at the news of the Emperor’s coming. In spite of the Pope’s efforts for peace, Italy was not very quiet, and Imperial visits gave opportunities for disturbance. The death of Cosimo de’ Medici in 1464, and of Francesco Sforza in 1466, had placed the direction of affairs in North Italy in less experienced hands. In the South, Ferrante of Naples looked with a jealous eye on the success of the Pope in consolidating the possessions of the Church. It is true that in February, 1468, Paul II had succeeded in bringing about a general pacification of Italy; but the Italian League existed in name rather than in reality. A prudent counselor pointed out to the Pope that a general disarmament would only cast adrift a number of mercenary soldiers who would seek some occupation for their arms. “It is our duty”, said the Pope, “to be true to our pastoral office; God who rules all things will dispose matters according to His will”. Paul was personally averse from war. He kept only a few troops, enough to act as mounted police. He used to say that the only expense which he grudged was the pay of his soldiers.

But the more the Pope showed a pacific disposition, the more did Ferrante push his claims. He wished to recover the territory with which Pius II had enriched his nephew Antonio, and he made difficulties about the payment of the tribute due from Naples. Paul II, though peaceful, was firm, and refused to accept the merely formal tokens of the vassalage of Naples, the white horse and the hawk. When the Neapolitan envoy urged that this refusal would anger the King, who could not afford to pay the tribute, Paul answered, “We will wait: someday he will pay us”.

While matters were in this unstable condition, a small thing sufficed to create a disturbance. In October, 1468, died Gismondo Malatesta, lord of Rimini, who since his humiliation by Pius II had been warring against the Turks in the Morea. On his death Paul II claimed Rimini, as Gismondo died without any legitimate heir, and his possessions therefore reverted to their lord the Pope. Venice acted as protector of Rimini during the absence of Gismondo, who was fighting on their behalf; and Rimini itself was held by Gismondo’s famous wife Isotta. Paul had taken into his employment Roberto, a natural son of Gismondo, and Roberto offered to win the city for the Pope. He was successful in his conquest, but held Rimini for himself, and entered into alliance
with Ferrante of Naples. It seemed only too probable that round the walls of Rimini would rage a war into which all the Italian powers would be drawn.

When the time of Frederick III’s arrival at Rome drew near, Paul showed all a Venetian’s suspiciousness and foresight. He called his troops into the city, and awaited Frederick’s movements with some anxiety. But the feeble Frederick III was equally powerless for good or evil. Attended by 600 knights, he entered Rome on the evening of December 24, 1468, and was welcomed by the Cardinals, who, in a torchlight procession, conducted him to S. Peter’s, where the Pope was awaiting his arrival. Twice the Emperor knelt as he approached the Pope’s throne; then the Pope, slightly rising from his seat, gave him his hand and kissed him. The seat assigned to him was no higher than the Pope’s feet, and there Frederick sat while lauds were sung. He retired to the Vatican, and after a few hours’ rest attended mass on Christmas Day and read the Gospel attired as a deacon. In all the festivities that followed Frederick III showed himself desirous to pay all respect to the Pope, who treated him with patronizing condescension. In processions he took the Emperor’s right hand with his left, and with his right blessed the people. According to custom, the Emperor dubbed knights on the Bridge of S. Angelo, while the Pope looked on. Strict attention was paid to ceremonial usage, and the papal Master of Ceremonies, Agostino Patrizzi, drew up an elaborate account of all that was done, that it might serve as a precedent to future times.

The record of Patrizzi was of little use for this purpose, as the visit of Frederick III was the last appearance of an Emperor in Rome. Certainly the Empire had never sunk lower than in the hands of Frederick III. Patrizzi writes: “Great was the kindness which the Pope on all occasions showed the Emperor; and it was esteemed all the greater because the papal authority is no less than it was in old times, while its power and strength are much greater. For the Roman Church, by God’s will, through the diligence of the Popes, especially of Paul, has so grown in power and wealth that it is comparable with the greatest kingdoms. On the other hand the authority and strength of the Roman Empire have been so diminished and reduced that, save the name of Empire, scarcely anything remains. I do not forget that former Popes have shown themselves respectful to Emperors, and sometimes to Kings. The power of the Pope used to be what princes allowed; but now things are changed—a trifle at their hands, a mere act of courtesy, is held a very great matter”. Patrizzi tells us the abiding policy of the Curia—it advanced pretensions, and time turned them into realities. But precedents become dangerous after a certain point, and we are not surprised that Frederick III’s successors gave the Curia no chance of enforcing the precedent which it so triumphantly established.

Of course the Pope and the Emperor solemnly discussed the project of a crusade. The Pope asked the Emperor what he advised, and Frederick judiciously answered that he had come to receive, not to give counsel: but at last he proposed a conference of princes at Constance, where he promised that he and Mathias of Hungary would be present. Paul II doubted the expediency of this course, and nothing was decided. A crusade was indeed hopeless; but Frederick III wished to gain from the Pope a recognition of his claim to inherit the crowns of Bohemia and Hungary, and to transfer the Electoral dignity of Bohemia to Austria. But the papal cause was identified for the present with that of the Hungarian king, and Paul II would not displease so necessary an ally; as to Bohemia, he wished to strike it out of the number of kingdoms and divide it into a number of duchies. The Imperial visit was productive of no results to the Emperor, who on January 9, 1469, left Rome, to find on his return to his own dominions
that a revolt had broken out in Styria. Mathias of Hungary was not sorry to see his uneasy ally employed at home.

After Frederick’s departure from Rome Paul II turned his attention to the affairs of Rimini. Venice, equally with the Pope, resented the position of Roberto Malatesta, and in May, 1469, an alliance was made between them. Roberto was supported by Milan, Florence, and Naples; Federigo of Urbino, who saw with alarm the spread of the papal power over the neighboring barons, deserted the Pope’s service and put himself at the head of the army which marched to Roberto’s defence. In August the papal forces were defeated and obliged to retreat, and in face of the menacing attitude of Ferrante of Naples and the advance of the Turks upon Negroponte, Paul did not judge it wise to prolong the war. Negotiations were set on foot which ended, on December 22, 1470, in the renewal of the League of Lodi, made in 1454, and in a general pacification of Italy. Roberto Malatesta was left in quiet possession of Rimini, where he strengthened himself by marriage with a daughter of Federigo of Urbino.

Meanwhile Paul II pursued his design of organizing the government of the city of Rome. In 1469 he issued a commission for the revision of its statutes, which dated from 1363, on the grounds that some were of ancient and popular origin, others contrary to the liberty of the Church, others useless and obsolete, while others needed amendment. The reforms were made after consultation between the citizens and the Curia, between the magistrates and the prelates. The revised statutes were printed soon afterwards, probably in 1471, and their publication marked an epoch in the legislation of the Roman city. They are divided into three books, dealing with civil and criminal law and administration, Paul did not attempt to destroy the old liberties of the city: its political power had been merged in the Papacy, and the Pope did not limit its old right of self-government. Senators, conservators, and captains of regions remained as before, and formed a court whose decrees were laid before the general assembly, in which every male over the age of twenty had a place. The clergy were excluded from the government, and no Roman layman was to answer before an ecclesiastical court. To put down the murders which the blood feuds of the Romans made so frequent, a special court was established and special penalties prescribed. The only striking point in the administrative regulations is the sumptuary laws forbidding luxury in clothing and festivals. The magnificent Paul II wished to appropriate splendor and display as a prerogative of the papal office.

In Bohemia Mathias of Hungary found his task more difficult than he expected. Early in 1469 he entered the country and George gathered his forces to repel him. Owing to a heavy fall of snow Mathias was surprised in the narrow passes of Wilemow, where he could neither advance nor retreat. George was ready to listen to overtures for a truce: he wished for peace and determined to trust to the generosity of Mathias: he thought that a renewal of the old alliance with Hungary was still possible, and was more likely to be brought about by negotiation than by a victory in the field. Accordingly he allowed Mathias to withdraw after promising to make peace. Great was the dismay of the Papal Legate Rovarella, who threatened Mathias with excommunication if he carried his promise into effect. The possibility of a pacification ensuing from the meeting between George and Mathias, which took place in Olmütz on March 24, filled the nobles of the Catholic League with terror. They resolved to bind Mathias to the cause which he had undertaken, and on April 12 formally elected him King of Bohemia. Mathias had now a position to fight for; he informed George that he had agreed to the conditions of Wilemow on the understanding that George would abjure his heresy.
War again broke out; but George was now filled with personal hostility against Mathias. He saw that his scheme of forming a powerful Bohemian kingdom on a Utraquist basis had failed, and he saw that the failure prevented him from handing down to his sons the heritage of a kingdom. Resolved to secure Bohemia against the ambitious designs of Mathias, he suggested to the Diet, which met in June at Prague, the election of Ladislas, son of Casimir of Poland, as his successor. The election was accepted, and George renewed the war with a feeling that he had gained an ally. Everywhere was disturbance. There were troubles in the dominions of the Emperor as well as in Hungary, and a Turkish host invaded Bosnia and Croatia. The papal policy had plunged Eastern Europe into helpless confusion.

The King of Poland and Mathias both looked to the Pope for confirmation of their pretensions to the Bohemian throne; but Paul II's answers were ambiguous. He wished to use them both to crush George, and thought it best to leave both the claimants with much to hope from his decision. The war went on, and Mathias found Bohemia hard to subdue. The political interests of Germany again centered in Bohemia; there was even talk of an alliance between George and Charles of Burgundy. Even the Catholics of Silesia began to tire of war, and in Breslau there were preachers who spoke of the blessings of peace. But in March, 1471, George Podiebrad died: Rokycana died a month before him. With them the ideas that animated the policy of the Utraquist party passed away. The Bohemian question entered into a new phase; and Ladislas and Mathias were left to fight for the Bohemian crown.

Paul II did not long survive his great antagonist. On July 26 he was struck with apoplexy and was found dead in his bed. Men said that he had been strangled by a spirit which he kept imprisoned in one of his many rings. He had done nothing worthy of note in his last years, save that he decreed to lessen to twenty-five years the interval between the years of jubilee, and found a field for his magnificence in the reception of Borso of Este, on whom he conferred the title of Duke of Ferrara in April 1471.

It is impossible to suppress a feeling of regret that so strong a man as Paul II, who possessed many of the qualities of a statesman, did not succeed in giving a more decided impulse towards the settlement of the future policy of the Papacy. He saw the dangers that beset it, and for his own part he was resolved to escape them. He would not allow the Papacy to sink to the level of an Italian principality, nor would he adopt the dangerous plan of identifying it with the New Learning. He would not permit the abuses of the Curia to become stereotyped, but did what he could to repress their more flagrant forms. All these were tendencies difficult to resist, and by his resistance Paul exposed himself to much obloquy and misunderstanding. These negative merits would in ordinary times have constituted a high claim on our respect. Unfortunately the days of Paul II demanded in the Pope a constructive policy, and Paul was not sufficiently experienced in statesmanship to make his meaning clear and impress it upon others. The good that he did was rapidly swept away. His one great undertaking, the reduction of Bohemia, was of doubtful service to the Papacy.

As the nephew of Eugenius IV, Paul had been brought up amidst the traditions of the papal restoration. Amidst his search after other objects to pursue he seems to have clung to these traditions as founded on such certain wisdom that hesitation was impossible. Bohemia was the abiding memorial of the papal degradation, and he was resolved that that memorial should be obliterated. Of his force and resoluteness there can be no question; they are expressed even in the formal documents of his Chancery,
which discard the graces of style which Pius II loved, and speak with a directness that is rare in diplomatic records. Paul II died with a belief that he had reduced Bohemia. George and Rokycana were dead: Heimburg took refuge in Saxony, was reconciled with the Church under Paul’s successor, and died early in 1472. The loss of its leaders destroyed the political power of the Utraquist party in Bohemia, and again left free course to the current of the Catholic reaction. But the papal candidate did not succeed to the Bohemian throne; the Diet chose Ladislas of Poland, and in spite of all that Mathias could do, Ladislas made good his position. Eastern Europe was distracted by the contest, and the Turkish arms reaped the advantage of this disunion amongst their Christian opponents. Ladislas succeeded because his weakness compelled him to be tolerant; he needed the help of the Utraquists against the Hungarians. The Compacts were tacitly recognized; the existing condition of religious matters was maintained. All that the Papacy gained was the substitution of a Catholic for a Utraquist King of Bohemia, and the price which it paid was the advance of the Turkish arms. No doubt there was in this more gain than appears at first sight. A man with the political sagacity and wide aims of George Podiebrad threatened a dangerous revolution in the international organization of Europe.

Moreover, the papal policy had unexpected influence on the course of religious feeling in Bohemia; it did much to call into existence a new organization that was more decidedly opposed to the principles of the Roman Church. George Podiebrad in his desire for a strong national unity had done his utmost to put down the more fanatical sects which had been formed out of the remnants of the Taborites; he wished to stand simply but decidedly on the basis of the Compacts, and in this he was seconded by Rokycana. This position no doubt corresponded to the desires of the nation, but it was not in itself a strong one for opposition to the Roman Church. The religious movement in Bohemia was so closely united in its origin with political feeling, that it spread only amongst the Czechs and was powerless to influence the German element within Bohemia itself. The Compacts expressed the compromise which a general desire for peace rendered necessary; and the Council of Basel succeeded in paring down Utraquism to its lowest point. Still, however the actual details might be diminished, the fundamental position of Utraquism remained—it asserted the authority of the Scriptures against the authority of the Church. The weakness of Utraquism lay in the fact that after establishing this principle it limited the sphere of its application to the single question, of the reception of the Communion under both kinds. Rokycana, in his desire to save Bohemia from its isolation, adhered to the Catholic ritual and doctrine, discarded all that was adverse to the system of the Church, and retained only the cup for the laity. The probability was that such a symbol would become meaningless, and that a protest restricted within such narrow limits would lose all real power.

In this state of things we are not surprised to find that some earnest minds reverted to the principles from which the Hussite movement originally began, and in deep moral seriousness went back to the position assumed by Mathias of Janow and other precursors of Hus. Chief amongst such men was Peter Chelcicky, who was dissatisfied alike with the yielding attitude of Rokycana and with the savage spirit of the Taborites. He could not follow Rokycana in admitting Transubstantiation, the priestly power of Absolution, or the doctrine of Purgatory and Indulgences; about the Sacrament of the Altar he reverted to the position of Wycliffe, that by virtue of the words of consecration, the substance of bread and the Body of Christ were alike present in the hands of the priest.
But it was not doctrine so much as practice that occupied the mind of Peter Chelcicky; he thirsted for a moral reformation, which the fury of the Hussite wars had thrust far into the background. Chelcicky sought for the real basis of the life of the individual Christian, and found it in the love of God apart from all human ordinances. He defined Christianity as the kingdom of the spirit and of freedom, in which man pursues what is good, and in which war and contention are unknown. Heathenism is servitude to the flesh; from it spring dissension and wickedness, which must be compelled to order by means of temporal government. Thus temporal authority rests on no Christian basis, but is founded on heathenism—that is, on the wickedness of man’s carnal nature; it is in itself an evil, but a necessary evil. Historically, the Primitive Church was destroyed when under Constantine it became associated with the Empire. The union of the priesthood with the temporal power turned the priests into “satraps of the Emperor”, and made them forget their Christian duties. From this destruction of the idea of the state followed in Chelcicky’s teaching the unholiness of war and bloodshed; even defensive war was no better than murder.

The ideas of Chelcicky received an impulse from the progress of the Catholic reaction under Ladislas I, which filled Rokycana with dismay and led him to preach earnestly against the prevailing lukewarmness and sin. Amongst his hearers was one whose soul was deeply moved, and who is known only by the name of Brother Gregory. He was referred by Rokycana to the writings of Chelcicky, which so impressed him that he soon outstripped the zeal of Rokycana, which began to cool when the accession of George Podiebrad opened out better hopes for the moderate Utraquists. Rokycana prevailed on King George to give Gregory and his adherents a settlement at Kenwald in 1457. The colony rapidly increased, and counted amongst its members men of every class and occupation. They called themselves ‘Brothers’ and formed a community on a religious basis, according to the principles of Chelcicky. At first they employed the ministrations of a neighboring priest, but in 1467 they went so far as to ordain priests of their own; following the precedent of the Apostles in the choice of Matthias, they selected nine and then cast lots for three. This act marked a breach not only with the Roman Church, but also with the Utraquists, and Rokycana demanded that the Brotherhood should be suppressed. King George saw in these ‘Brethren of the Law of Christ’, as they now called themselves, the heretics whom the Pope called on him to root out of his kingdom. They defended themselves by offering to prove from Scripture “that men are right in laying aside obedience to the Roman Church, that the authority of the Pope is not grounded on the power of God’s Spirit, that his rule is an abomination before God, that Christ’s word gives him no power of blessing or of cursing, that he has not the keys to decide between right and wrong, nor the power to bind and to loose”. There could be no clearer expression of the difference between the new church and the old. King George prepared to put down these heretics in 1468, but the inroad of Mathias called him to employ his energy elsewhere. What George could have accomplished was too hazardous for his successor. The Bohemian Brothers were sometimes threatened and sometimes persecuted; but they continued to hold together, living a life of Christian socialism. At the end of the century their numbers were computed at 100,000, and they formed a compact body whose power of protest against the Roman Church was far more influential than that of the vacillating Utraquists whom the Papacy was so keen to destroy. By its violent proceedings against Bohemia the Papacy only intensified, by concentrating, the opposition which it strove to overcome.
However we regard the Bohemian policy of Paul II, we see that, if the gain was dubious, the loss was manifest.
CHAPTER II.
PAUL II AND HIS RELATIONS TO LITERATURE AND ART

While considering the pontificate of Nicolas V we saw one side of the revival of learning in Italy, when the movement retained its first freshness, when Papacy its tendencies were as yet undeveloped, and the Papacy hoped to use it as a means of spreading its new glories. Besides the prevailing fashion of the age, the struggle against the Council of Basel and the negotiations with the Greeks had led the Papacy to feel the need of learned and literary champions of the new school. While the Italian courts patronized literary adventurers who were ready, like Lorenzo Valla, to use their pens against the Pope, even a monk like Eugenius IV did not venture to repulse the new learning. While the Council of Basel was a field where ambitious scholars might flesh their pens in invective against the Pope, the Papacy could not afford to dispense with literary gladiators. The Council of Florence brought to the West a train of learned Greeks, whose help was useful to the Latin theologians in combating the metaphysics of the orthodox party among the Greeks. The Papacy was too much indebted to the Humanists to repudiate them. Nicolas V placed himself at their head, and was a patron of scholars, whom he employed in making known the records alike of classical and biblical antiquity. He was without fear of the results, and showed no consciousness of the antagonism between the traditions of the Church and the lore of the ancients.

The literary glories of the pontificate of Nicolas V were but an episode in the history of Rome. Nicolas V had been trained in Florence, and the literary men of his court had mostly been formed under the patronage of Cosimo de' Medici. Rome did not long contend with Florence as the centre of Humanism. The work of Nicolas V was short-lived, and Pius II did not attempt to carry it on. Perhaps he felt a little uneasy about the future. Perhaps he had a dim remembrance of his own attitude towards religious and moral questions in his early days. At all events, he stood aloof from the main current of the Renaissance, and did not try to enlist the Humanists in the service of the Papacy.

There were, indeed, manifold signs that the new learning was eating out the heart of the religious sentiment of Italy, and that in so assiduous a way that it was hard to see when and how the voice of protest should be raised. The Renaissance did not set before its votaries a definite system of thought, nor did it oppose any of the doctrines of the Church. It was an attitude of mind rather than a scheme of life. It did not attack Christianity, but it turned men’s eyes away from Christianity. It did not contradict ecclesiastical dogma, but it passed it by with a shrug as unworthy of the attention of a cultivated mind. The discovery of antiquity showed so much to be done in this world that it was needless to think much of the next. The Humanists were content to pursue their studies, to steep themselves in classical ideas, and to leave theology to those whose business it was. They were in no sense reformers of the world around them. So long as they were respected and patronized, they found the world a very pleasant place, and did not wish to change it. Their studies did not lead them to action, but supplied a mental emancipation. Outward affairs might go as they pleased: the man of culture had a safe refuge within himself. He lived in a world of beauty which was his own possession, won by his own learning. For him there were no fetters, no restraints; he regarded himself as privileged, and his claim was generally allowed. To him the aim of life was
to develop the powers of the individual, who was justified in using any means to find a sphere in which these powers could be fully exercised.

The danger of these tendencies must have been apparent to many minds, but it was not so obvious how the danger was to be met. A heresy might be condemned: an intellectual attitude could scarcely even be defined. Pius II did nothing more than refuse to patronize the Humanists, who repaid his neglect by insulting his memory. Meanwhile the new learning was making strides. It was raising up a new school of philosophy, whose bearing towards the Church at first seemed orthodox, and round the new philosophy it was attaining to a definite organization.

The new philosophy was a direct result of the Council of Florence, and the consequent introduction into Italy of Greek scholars, more numerous and more learned than had been known before. Amongst those who came to Italy with John Palaeologus in 1438 was a remarkable man who is known by the name of Gemistos Plethon;

Georgios Gemistos was born at Constantinople in 1355, and travelled in pursuit of occult knowledge in various quarters. He finally settled at Mistra, near the site of the ancient Sparta, in the Peloponnese. There he became famous as a teacher, and gathered round him many scholars, chief amongst whom was Bessarion. He was summoned, as the most learned of the Greeks, to take part in the disputes against the Latins. But though he came to Italy at the bidding of the Greek Church, theological questions had no interest for him. He was already convinced that the spirit of the Greeks was degenerate, and could only be restored by a new religion and a revived philosophy. He told his views to his scholars, though probably they only regarded them as the visions of a student. When he came to Florence, a venerable old man of eighty-three, with long flowing beard and calm dignified mien, he created an enthusiasm amongst the Florentine scholars. There was a general curiosity in Italy to know something of Plato, and Gemistos was well versed in Plato’s writings. Instead of attending the Council he poured forth his Platonic lore, and uttered dark sentences to a circle of eager Florentines. Cosimo de’ Medici was delighted with him, and hailed him as a second Plato. Gemistos modestly refused the title, but playfully added to his name, Gemistos, the equivalent, Plethon, which approached more nearly to his master’s name.

Amidst this admiring circle of Florentine scholars Gemistos uttered strange sayings for an orthodox theologian of the Greek Church. He spoke of a new universal religion, which was to absorb all existing systems, Christendom and Islam alike. He pointed for its source to the inspiration of classical antiquity. Most probably the Florentines did not pay much attention to these vague utterances. They were not in search of a religion, they aspired to no scheme of national regeneration; but they longed for a knowledge of Plato’s philosophy as the source of greater illumination.

Gemistos Plethon returned from Florence to his school at Mistra, and plunged still further into his scheme of a new religion. As his philosophical ideas awakened so much enthusiasm in Italy, it is worthwhile examining the religious conceptions to which they led. In 1448 Gemistos wrote a treatise on the question of the Procession of the Holy Ghost, defending the Greek view against that of the Latins. He wrote, however, not as a theologian but as a philosopher, not from the point of view of Scriptural evidence, but from the reasonableness of the thing in itself. He set up what he calls “the Hellenic theology”, by which he meant his own religious system, in opposition to that of the Church, and then proved the orthodox doctrine from this new theology. He argued that all difficulties about the Procession of the Holy Ghost vanished if, instead of the
doctrine of the Church that the Son was equal to the Father, the teaching of the Hellenic theology was accepted, whereby were recognized many children of the Supreme Being, differing in power and other attributes. He sent his book to the Patriarch Gennadios, himself a distinguished scholar under his former name of Georgios Scholarios. Gennadios was in a difficult position. The book supported the orthodox doctrine, and few would care to follow him in inquiring too closely into its method. Gemistos was an old man, of great reputation, and it was not worthwhile to risk a quarrel with him. Gennadios answered with much tact, approving the object of the treatise, but delicately rebuking its arguments. At the end, however, he uttered words of warning:

“After God’s revelation of Himself, how is it possible that there should be men willing to construct new gods, and attempt to rekindle the unreasoning theogonies that have long been quenched? How can they go back to Zoroaster, and Plato, and the Stoics, gathering a crowd of senseless words? If such like writings should ever fall into my hands, I will expose their emptiness, and many others will do likewise. I would subject them to arguments, not to the fire; the fire is more fitting for their authors”.

Yet Gennadios was not as good as his word. After the death of Plethon his Book of the Laws fell into the hands of Gennadios, who, after reading it, committed it to the flames, and ordered all copies to be burned. He found it “full of bitterness against Christians, mocking at our beliefs, not gainsaying them by argument, but setting forth his own”.

The efforts of Gennadios were successful, and only fragments of the treatise of Gemistos have survived; but they show a wondrous attempt to revive paganism on a philosophic basis. Gemistos represents himself as seeking the way of truth ignored by men. He took as his guides the law-givers and wise men of antiquity, especially Pythagoras and Plato, and by their help constructed a new theogony, in which Zeus was set up as the supreme god, whose attributes were being, will, activity, and power. From him sprang two orders of inferior deities, one legitimate, the other illegitimate children. The legitimate children of Zeus are the Olympian gods at whose head stands Poseidon; the bastard children are the Titans. This strange classification was due to Gemistos’ desire to construct a theogony which should harmonize with his system of logic. The Olympian gods were the eternal ideas; the Titans were the ideas expressed in form and matter. Below these supra-celestial gods were the legitimate and illegitimate children of Poseidon, who range from planets to demons; below them again were men and beasts and the material world.

This new religion Gemistos seriously elaborated into a system by drawing up a calendar, a liturgy, and a collection of hymns. He gathered round him a band of converts who looked upon their master as inspired by the spirit of Plato. It is a testimony to the influence of Gemistos on Italy that five years after his death his bones were brought from their resting place in the Peloponnesus by the impious Gismondo Malatesta, who placed them in a sarcophagus set in the side arcade of his wondrous church at Rimini. The inscription calls Gemistos “the chief philosopher of his time”.

The system of Gemistos was a fantastic revival of Neo-platonism; and never did philosophy make a more futile attempt to provide a religion than in the logical cosmogony of Gemistos, from which the religious element has entirely disappeared. A student of philosophy imperfectly understanding the system which he professed to follow, clothed his philosophic ideas in the incongruous garments of a religion with which he had long since ceased to sympathize. Gemistos saw that men seemed to need a
religion; he threw his opinions into what he supposed to be a religious shape. Yet crude as was his attempt, it pointed to an intellectual question which was of great moment in the future. The theology of the Schoolmen had been built up in accordance with the system of Aristotle, whose philosophy was regarded as entirely orthodox. The discovery of Plato threatened to overthrow the supremacy of Aristotle. How were the opinions of Plato likely to influence the movement of thought? Plato corresponded to the imaginative yearnings with which the new learning filled the minds of its nobler students. It is true that his writings were imperfectly known, and that his system was confounded with that of the later Alexandrian writers. Yet men seized upon the poetical side of his teaching, which they adapted to the dreams of an intellectual childhood. The more religious minds felt the charm of Plato's conception of linking together the material and the immaterial world, and they set themselves to examine how far the doctrines of Christianity were contained implicitly in Plato's teaching. In Italy this process led to a dangerous paring away of the edges of ecclesiastical dogma; in Germany it animated the rise of a new theology which sought after a direct consciousness of relationship between the soul and God.

The influence of Gemistos Plethon was carried to Rome by his distinguished scholar, Cardinal Bessarion, whose orthodoxy was above suspicion, but who nevertheless was in some degree imbued by his master's spirit. On the death of Gemistos, Bessarion wrote a letter of condolence to his sons. "I hear", he says, "that our common father and guide, laying aside all mortal garments, has removed to heaven and the unsullied land, to take his part in the mystic dance with the Olympian gods". This is strange language in a Cardinal's mouth, but does not show that Bessarion had any sympathy with the paganism of Gemistos. It shows, however, the double life which the Humanists led: they were ready to talk the language of the Bible or the language of classical antiquity, as occasion needed. They had ceased to be conscious of much antagonism between the two, each of which corresponded to different sides of their nature. The new learning had become an insidious solvent of any definiteness in religious beliefs.

Bessarion did much for the study of Plato. He freed himself from the extravagances of Gemistos, and in the controversy which raged between the partisans of Aristotle and those of Plato he held a moderating position. But George of Trapezus carried his attack upon Plato so far that he drew from Bessarion a work "Against the Calumniator of Plato" which raised the knowledge of Plato to a higher level than it had before reached, and established the claim of that philosopher to the attention of the orthodox. Bessarion, moreover, was the centre of a literary circle, and the Academy called by his name was famous throughout Italy. He formed a large library, which he bequeathed to Venice, where it formed the nucleus of the library of S. Marco.

POMPONIUS LAETUS.

The system of Academies rapidly spread throughout Italy, and gave the men of the new learning a definite organization whereby they became influential bodies with a corporate existence. In Rome Bessarion's example furnished a model to the Roman Academy, whose founder was another of those who owed something to the influence of Gemistos. He was a strange man, who loved to shroud his private life in mystery. He called himself Pomponius, as being a good old Roman name, and to this he added
Laetus, as a description of the joyousness of his temperament, though at times Laetus was exchanged for Infortunatus.

The real name of Pomponius Laetus was Piero: he was a native of Calabria, a bastard of the noble house of the Sanseverini. In early life he came to Rome and was a pupil of Lorenzo Valla, whom he succeeded as the chief teacher among the Roman Humanists. Whether he travelled in Greece or no we cannot say; but he seems to have come in the way of Gemistos, who probably quickened his taste for a revived paganism. Pomponius, however, was not a Platonist, and did not devote his attention to the study of Greek antiquity. He had no interest in inaugurating a new religion, but was content to imbibe the inspiration of the city of Rome, and gave himself unreservedly to its influence. “No one”, says his friend Sabellicus, “admired antiquity more; no one spent more pains in its investigation”. He explored every nook and corner of old Rome, and stood gazing with rapt attention on every relic of a bygone age: often, as he looked, his eyes filled with tears, and he wept at the thought of the grand old times. He despised the age in which he lived and did not conceal his contempt for its barbarism. He sneered at religion, openly expressed his dislike of the clergy, and inveighed bitterly amongst his friends against the pride and luxury of the Cardinals. A story is told that one day an enemy asked him publicly if he believed in the existence of God; “Yes”, he answered, “because I believe that there is nothing He hates more than you”. The deity which Pomponius adored was the Genius of the City of Rome. He set an example, which was long followed, of celebrating the city's birthday with high festivities amongst a circle of congenial spirits. In later times men dated from the festivals of Pomponius the beginning of the downfall of faith.

The temper of Pomponius, as shown in the affairs of life, was that of a Stoic. He was poor and sought none of the prizes which literary men in his day so keenly pursued. When his wealthy relatives wished to claim him after he had become famous, and invited him to come and live at Naples, he returned them an answer which has become famous as a model of terseness. “Pomponius Laetus to his relatives sends greeting. What you ask cannot be. Farewell”. He lived simply in a little house on the Esquiline, and hired a vineyard in the Quirinal, which he cultivated according to the precepts of Varro and Columella. His other amusement was to keep birds, whose habits he carefully observed. He always dressed in the same manner; though simple in all things, he was scrupulously clean and neat. His only interests were in exploring classical antiquity and teaching the students who flocked to his lectures. He rose early in the morning, and often needed the help of a lantern to guide him to his school, where there was scarcely room for the overflowing audience which had already assembled. There was nothing striking in his appearance. He was a small common-looking man, with short curly hair that turned grey before its time, and little eyes deep-set beneath beetling brows; only when he smiled did his face become expressive.

Pomponius was a genuine teacher, who was interested in his scholars. He did not try to make a name by writings, for he said that, like Socrates and Jesus, his scholars should be his books. He gave his attention to his lectures, and delighted in organizing revivals of the old Latin comedies. He trained the actors and superintended the smallest details of stage management when any great man opened his house for the representation of a play of Plautus or Terence. He took the young men of Rome under his fatherly care, and would reprove their misdoings by a shake of the head and a remark, “Your ancestors would not have behaved thus”.
The house of Pomponius was filled with relics of classical art, and the Academy which centered there was the home of very unorthodox opinions. After the Roman dissolution of the College of Abbreviators the Roman Academy became naturally the meeting place of the aggrieved scholars. There they abused the Pope to their hearts’ content, while Pomponius sat by and smiled. They vented their spleen by organizing a foolish protest against the Church and its ceremonies; and the example of Pomponius suggested to them a plan by which they bound themselves into an esoteric society. Instead of their baptismal names, given them from Christian saints, they chose new names from classical antiquity. Filippo Buonacursi called himself Callimachus Experiens, and we find besides Asclepiades, Glaucus, Petreius, and the like. The festival which Pomponius had instituted for the observance of the foundation day of the city suggested in like manner a parody of pagan rites. As a protest against Paul II, Pomponius Laetus was hailed as Pontifex Maximus, and many of the others took priestly titles. They held meetings in the catacombs, and parodied the beginnings of the Christian Church. It was an outburst of silly petulance on the part of men whose heads were turned by vanity, till they showed their spite against the Pope by threatening a revival of paganism.

Perhaps no one took these proceedings seriously except Paul II. He had condemned to do public penance some Fraticelli who had been sent for trial from Poli; how could he punish heresy and allow profanity to flaunt itself unashamed? Perhaps he was not much affected by the display of animosity towards himself, but he could not be indifferent to the dangers of a republican revival in Rome. The examples of Porcaro and Tiburzio were still warnings to a statesman that Brutus was a hero whom it was perilous to resuscitate. The follies of the Roman Academy might lead to political disturbances.

We cannot wonder that Paul II regarded the Roman Academy with suspicion. Its florid classicism, its hostility against the Church, its silly affectation of paganism, were enough to account for his disapproval. But sufficient ground for action was wanting till some vapouring talk of Callimachus Experiens was brought to the Pope’s ear. Then Paul II proceeded to act with promptitude. During the Carnival of 1468 several Roman youths were arrested, and Platina was dragged from the house of Cardinal Gonzaga to the Pope’s presence. Paul II looked on him with scorn, and said, “So you have conspired against us under the leadership of Callimachus”. In vain Platina pleaded his innocence; he was ordered to be taken to the Castle of S. Angelo and be examined by torture. A letter of Pomponius Laetus, who was absent in Venice, which addressed him as “Pater Sanctissime”, was regarded as proof of a conspiracy, and Platina was further accused of trying to urge the Emperor to summon a Council and create a new schism.

Pomponius was sent back from Venice, “dragged in chains”, says Platina, “through Italy like another Jugurtha”. When brought before his inquisitors he showed at first his accustomed spirit. When they asked his reason for assuming the name of Pomponius, he answered, “What would it matter to you or the Pope if I called myself Hayrick”? But his stoicism rapidly gave way before imprisonment. He set himself to win the good graces of the Castellan of S. Angelo, Rodrigo de Arevalo, a famous theologian, best known by his later title of Bishop of Zamora. At first Pomponius wrote to Rodrigo in terms of scarcely concealed sarcasm; he lauded Paul II in extravagant terms, and compared his magnanimity with that of Christ, who when He was smitten offered the other cheek: even so the Pope, in a crisis of unexampled danger, had pursued his course unmoved. Rodrigo showed himself a match for Pomponius in irony. He congratulated him on the lucky chance now offered to a philosopher of showing his constancy and
fortitude, which would otherwise have found no field for their display in the trivial
concerns of ordinary life. After receiving this answer, Pomponius began to view the
matter more seriously, and while admitting the greatness of the opportunity which he
enjoyed, pleaded his innocence of any offence, and asked for books to cheer his
solitude. Instead, however, of Lactantius and Macrobius, which were the captive’s
choice, Rodrigo sent a treatise of his own, *Against the Errors of the Council of Basel*,
which he doubtless considered to be a proper remedy for the deplorable unorthodoxy of
his prisoner. What Pomponius really said when condemned to this unwonted literary
diet we can only guess; what he wrote in reply was a fulsome eulogy of Rodrigo’s
elegance, which he preferred to the highest flights of Cicero, because it was animated
by a truly Christian spirit. By this letter Pomponius thought that he had cleared the way
for a petition. He wrote on the same day in an altered strain; he said that he had been
recalling all that the poets sang in praise of solitude; but their solitude, he found, was
the solitude of the woods and fields, where they were gladdened by the delights of
nature; he, pent in his prison walls, felt the need of kindly friends with whom he
might exchange his thoughts. Rodrigo’s turn had now come to triumph in this war of
wits, and he had an easy task in penetrating the flimsy armor of stoicism within which
Pomponius had professed to stand secure. He dwelt on the pure delights of inward
contemplation, treated the complaints of Pomponius as the result of a passing mood, and
affectionately besought him not to show himself unworthy of his philosophy. After
enjoying his discomfiture for a day or two he took compassion on his prisoners, and
allowed them to meet together for talk. Pomponius, in expressing their gratitude, throws
his philosophy to the winds. “Man”, he says, “always pines for what he does not
possess; when weary of society he praises solitude; when in captivity he longs for
freedom; if Diogenes had had bounds set, within which only he might roll his tub, he
would have neglected philosophy to devise some means of overcoming his limits”. In
this frame of mind Pomponius reconciled his former principles to actual conditions. He
longed for liberty, and sought it by writing an abject apology to the Pope, in which he
confessed his errors, threw the blame on others, and begged to be released. Paul perhaps
felt that such characters as these were scarcely deserving of serious consideration, and
might be trusted to profit by the lesson which they had received. Pomponius was soon
set free, and was allowed to continue his lectures as before.

Platina did not escape so easily. He was kept in prison for a year and was subjected
to many inquisitions. No definite proofs against him seem to have been forthcoming,
but Paul was resolved to teach the Roman Humanists a lesson. If he had any suspicions
of serious designs, Platina’s letters from prison must have convinced him of the futility
of any plots that could be devised by men of such poor spirit. In truth, there was nothing
heroic about Platina, and he wrote abjectly, once and again, beseeching the Pope to
release him. A prison did not at all suit the luxurious man of letters; he was ready to
promise anything, to gain his release. “I undertake”, he writes, “that if I hear anything,
even from the birds as they fly past, which is directed against your name and safety, I
will at once inform your Holiness by letter or messenger. I entirely approve your
proceedings for restraining and reproving the license of the scholars; it is the duty of the
chief shepherd to preserve his flock from all infection and disease”. He admits that in
his pecuniary straits when he was dismissed from office he lamented unworthily against
God and man; but he will never so far forget himself again. If only set at liberty and
freed from poverty he will celebrate with all his friends in prose and verse, the name of
Paul. Even when attempting to write seriously he cannot forget his literary vanity nor
his classical allusions. “Poets and orators are necessary in all states, that the memorials
of illustrious men may not perish through want of chroniclers”. He bids the Pope remember that Christ is known through the writings of the Evangelists, the deeds of Achilles through the verses of Homer. If the Pope will only release him he will promise to turn from his classical studies to theology, “where, as in a fertile and flowery meadow, I will gather herbs that are healthful both for body and soul. If he erred it was through academic licence, the freedom engendered by universal study”. In like strain he wrote to all whom he thought had any influence with the Pope, Cardinals Bessarion, Marco Barbo, Borgia, Gonzaga, Ammannati. He repeated to them all the same protestations; he was accused of irreligion; but he had always attended confession, gone to church, and observed God's laws as far as human frailty allowed. Yet in a letter to Pomponius he confessed that the proceedings of the Academicians had given ground for suspicion. “We ought to bear with equanimity that the Pope took heed for his own safety and for the Christian religion”. Platina groveled, but he did not enjoy the process. He took his revenge in later years by writing a life of Paul II. Few of those who read his biography have read his letters, or they would hesitate to give much credence to his ill-natured hints. It is a strong testimony in favor of Paul II that Platina has so little to say against him.

On his release from prison Platina hoped that his persistent groveling had softened the Pope’s heart, and that he would obtain some mark of favor in return for his sufferings. Paul pardoned him, but gave him no reward. It was enough for the Pope that he had satisfied himself that Platina and his friends were only foolish talkers, incapable of doing much mischief; but Platina was strangely mistaken in thinking that Paul had any need of his pen. He was allowed to go back to his former obscurity a little crestfallen, and with vengeance in his heart. Pomponius in like manner resumed his teaching in Rome, where he died in 1498, and was honored by a public funeral. Paul, however, dissolved the Roman Academy and declared that all who mentioned its name, even in jest, were guilty of heresy. Like most of Paul's doings, this decree was reversed by his successor. Sixtus IV allowed the Academy to revive, and it continued till it disappeared in the misery that followed the sack of Rome in 1527.

This persecution of the Roman Academy is a trivial matter in itself, but it has largely influenced the judgment of posterity. In Platina’s life of Paul II this incident is raised into the foremost place, and Paul is represented as hating and despising literature to such a degree that he branded literary men as heretics. From these words of Platina more recent writers have seen in Paul's proceedings a consciousness of the perils wherewith the Renaissance movement threatened the system of the Church.

In truth, however, Paul II was not hostile to literature, and was himself deeply imbued with the spirit of the Renaissance; nor did he foresee in the revival of learning the precursor of the Reformation. Platina has skillfully succeeded in making himself the type of a martyr to learning, instead of an offensive braggart who trusted that the privileged position of a man of letters would cover any insolence or folly. Paul did not persecute scholars, but he put down the Roman Academy as a nuisance, a centre of unseemly buffoonery and sedition, as well as irreligious talk. It would seem that at first the Pope was suspicious of a definite plot against himself. When no evidence was forthcoming on that charge he fell back upon the notorious character of the proceedings of the Academy and decreed its suppression. His precautions may have been exaggerated; his action was certainly high-handed. But the Humanists needed a reminder that they were required to observe the same rules as ordinary citizens, and that no ruler could permit their follies to pass beyond a certain limit.
However, Platina outlived Paul and had the opportunity of telling his story in his own fashion. He had tried conclusions with Paul and had been worsted: but no one thought very seriously of the matter. Sixtus IV made Platina his librarian, and in that dignified position Platina’s early misdoings were forgotten. He liked to tell the tale of his sufferings, and no doubt the tale grew darker every time that it was told, till Platina verily believed himself to have been a martyr to literature, and stamped this legend on the mind of the rising generation of scholars.

No doubt such a belief would not have taken root if Paul II had attached to himself any men of letters. This, however, he showed no desire to do, though Campanus offered to write a history of his pontificate, and Filelfo was desirous to take up his abode in Rome. Paul was civil to Filelfo, and received from him a translation of Xenophon’s *Cyropaedia*, for which he rewarded the needy old scholar by a present of 400 ducats; but he did not encourage his hope of becoming a regular dependent on the Papal bounty. In fact Paul II found literary men troublesome; they were foul-mouthed and slanderous, and Paul could not endure their license. Even the literary veteran, George of Trapezus, was sent to prison for a month to teach him not to speak evil of previous Popes who had been his patrons. Paul took a common-sense view of the venal literature of his age. He did not care for poetry or rhetorical panegyrics, but he was a student of the Scriptures, of canon law, and history. Both in public and private matters Paul loved directness. Though he was no orator he spoke for himself in public business, and did not heed the sneers at his lack of the finished style of Pius II. In private consistories he discarded Latin and spoke in Italian, which no doubt was a severe shock to official propriety.

Paul II was not only destitute of literary friends; he had few friends of any kind and no favorites. The Cardinals never forgave him for shaking himself loose from the shackles with which they endeavored to bind him at his accession, and Ammannati regarded his sudden death as a judgment upon him for his want of faith. Paul was too sensitive not to feel the breach that had so been created, and he had not the qualities which enabled him to repair it. He grew more and more reserved, and led a somewhat solitary life amidst his outward grandeur. “He is surrounded by darkness”, wrote Ammannati, “he is not wont to make rash assertions, but is more ready to hear than to speak”. This change in his disposition after his election corresponds to his mental attitude. He felt that things were amiss, but he did not see how to mend them, and the Cardinal College had no advice to give. The older Cardinals were the zealots of the Papal restoration; Carvajal could advocate warmly the reduction of Bohemia, but pronounced against any reform of the Church. The younger Cardinals were, like Ammannati, friends of Pius II, or, like Cardinal Gonzaga, men who had been created because their relatives were politically useful in re-establishing the position of the Papacy in Italy. Paul did not find among them any counselors after his own heart; they sufficed for the conduct of current business, but that was all.

In the course of his pontificate Paul created ten Cardinals. He did not, however, increase the College, but merely filled up the vacancies caused by death. In his selection of men for this dignity he showed the same mixed motives as are displayed in the rest of his policy. He did not entirely rise above personal considerations, as he created three of his nephews, the Venetians Marco Barbo, Battista Zeno, and Giovanni Michael; but they were all men of high character, who proved themselves not unworthy of their office. None of them became his favorite, or was especially influential with him, or was unduly enriched. Of the other Cardinals created by Paul II, two, the Neapolitan Caraffa
and Francesco of Savona, were chosen for their learning; and the others, amongst whom were Thomas Bouchier, Archbishop of Canterbury, and the Frenchman La Balue, were intended to add to the representative character of the College. When La Balue, in 1469, was imprisoned by Louis XI for his traitorous correspondence with the Duke of Burgundy, Paul did not take his stand on ecclesiastical privilege. La Balue was tried and condemned in France; the Pope contented himself with sending a few judges to assist at the trial.

In the creation of Cardinals Paul II showed his general impartiality and his good intentions. His fame has suffered because he was impartial and well-intentioned, because he identified himself with no party, and pursued no personal ends. Reserved and sensitive he went on his way, and where his mind was made up he made all bend to his will. With him, as with many men of a fine nature which has not been disciplined by experience, geniality in a private capacity gave way to coldness in the discharge of public duty. Naturally kindly and sympathetic, he shrank from responsibility, and only assumed it by an effort of self-repression, which he knew that any display of personal feeling would destroy. As a consequence his manner seemed abrupt, and he was misjudged and misrepresented. It pained him to refuse petitions which were presented to him, and he more and more withdrew himself from granting audiences, which was put down to heedlessness and neglect of his duties. It is characteristic of him that he received petitioners as he walked about, that he might not be obliged to see their imploring faces, and might be spared the sight of their disappointment. But when he detected imposture his anger was aroused. One day he turned round sternly and said to one who pleaded, “You are not speaking the truth”; whereupon a pet parrot who was perched in the room immediately flew upon the object of the Pope's anger, exclaiming, “Turn him out, turn him out, he is not speaking the truth”.

The same shrinking from causing pain made Paul II merciful as a ruler of Rome. Whenever he heard the bell of the Capitol toll for an execution he turned pale and clutched his breast to check the beating of his heart. This unwillingness to disappoint others led him to live by himself and shun interviews. He was apparently troubled by asthma and could not sleep at night; he took this as an excuse for turning night into day. Men naturally grumbled and accused him of capriciousness and arrogant disregard of others. Personally Paul II was not popular. His stately figure and dignified bearing commanded respect; but men feared rather than loved him. He felt this and was saddened by the feeling. One day a Cardinal asked him why, when he had all that he could desire, he was not content. “A little wormwood”, said the Pope, “can pollute a hive of honey”.

Even the points which Paul II had most in common with his age were not appreciated. He loved magnificence, and it was counted as vainglory. He was a patron of architecture; this was reckoned to be merely a desire to commemorate his name. He was an ardent collector of works of art; because his collection went beyond the prevailing fashion he was accused of simple avarice. Paul had as passionate a love for antique beauty as had Pomponius Laetus; because he had the temperament of an artist and not the pedantry of a scholar he was handed down to posterity as an uncultivated barbarian.

In his love for art Paul went far beyond his time, and may rank as a type of the high-minded and large-souled patron and collector. He knew his own tastes and did not follow the prevailing fashions. The mighty Palazzo di Venezia, as it is now called,
remains as a memorial of the great conceptions of Paul and marked the definite triumph of Renaissance architecture in Rome. It was begun while Paul was a Cardinal, and was finished during his pontificate. The adjoining basilica of S. Marco was restored, adorned with frescoes, and its windows were filled with stained glass. He built three rows of arcades in the first court of the Vatican, and erected a pulpit from which the Pope might give the benediction. He resumed the work of Nicolas V in building the tribune of S. Peter's. He preserved the ancient monuments of the city, and most of its churches owe something to his care. His chief architect was Giuliano di San Gallo, and he kept in constant employment a number of jewelers and embroiderers who made vestments and ornaments which he bestowed on the Churches in the Patrimony.

The distinguishing feature of the private life of Paul II was that he was an enthusiastic collector of objects of art. He began the habit in his youth, and when he died had brought together in his Palace of S. Marco the richest artistic collection that had been formed since the fall of the Roman Empire. As soon as he became Cardinal he commissioned agents to search for him throughout Italy; and many a struggle, such as collectors love, he waged for the possession of some prized object with the Medici, Alfonso of Naples, and Leonello of Este. How skillful he was may be gathered from a letter of Carlo de' Medici, who wrote that he had picked up in Rome from a servant of the great medalist, Pisanello, thirty silver medals. Cardinal Barbo heard of this find, met the unsuspecting Carlo one morning, took him graciously by the hand and walked with him to his house, here he contrived to get hold of Carlo’s purse containing the medals, relieved it of its treasures and refused to return them. No doubt he paid their full value; for he did not like to be under any obligation, and when he was Pope he wrote to the King of Portugal, who sent him a sapphire ring, “our custom, long and diligently observed, is not to receive gifts”. He showed the same temper about his manuscripts, for it was observed that he was always ready to lend and slow to borrow.

Before he became Pope his museum in the Palace of S. Marco was large and precious; during his pontificate he was always eager to increase it. Cardinal Ammannati wrote to a friend, Helianus Spinula, who was anxious to obtain the Pope’s good graces for his son, that he had spoken on his behalf. Paul II interrupted him, “I know the man; he has the same tastes as we have, and uses his eyes to discern things that are of excellent workmanship. He has treasures which he has gathered from Greece and Asia. He could do me a great favor by letting me have some things from his collection, not, however, as a gift, for our custom has always been to pay, and to pay liberally, for what pleases us”. Ammannati asked what the Pope chiefly desired. “Images of the saints”, answered Paul, “of old workmanship, which the Greeks call Icons, Byzantine tapestries, woven or embroidered, old pictures and sculptures, vases, especially of precious stones, ivory carvings, gold and silver coins, and such like”.

Paul’s tastes were catholic, and he was not merely content with collecting, but had excellent taste and a great knowledge of archaeology. It was remarked with wonder that he knew at a glance the busts of the various Roman Emperors. He caused his collection to be catalogued and every object carefully described. The descriptions show us that mythology was imperfectly understood, and that the knowledge of emblems was still in a rudimentary stage. From this catalogue we learn that Paul had gathered together forty-seven antique bronzes, two hundred and twenty-seven cameos, three hundred and twenty intaglios, ninety-seven ancient gold coins, and about a thousand silver coins and medals, besides Byzantine ivories, mosaics, enamels, embroideries, and paintings, as well as jewelry, goldsmith’s work, and tapestries of his own age, and a large number of
uncut precious stones. This splendid collection was appropriated by Paul’s successor. The precious stones were sold to Lorenzo de’ Medici, the bronzes probably formed the nucleus of the Capitoline Museum, the rest was gradually dispersed. Even in this point also the achievements of Paul II were remorselessly swept into oblivion.

The reason why Paul’s enjoyment of art was not understood by his contemporaries, was probably because it was merely sensuous and not antiquarian. He loved things for their own preciousness, not for the associations which hung around them. Men in those days had no sympathy with his habit of playing with precious stones and gazing with delight upon their luster; in such a simple source of pleasure they saw only the gloating of avarice. It must be owned that Paul carried his passion to the verge of childishness. He took jewels to bed with him; he kept them in hiding-places that he might refresh himself by the sight of them when he had a moment of solitude. After the death of Sixtus IV, Cardinal Barbo recognized in the Pope’s private room a writing-desk which had been a favorite piece of furniture of his uncle. On looking into it he found a secret drawer containing seven large sapphires and other stones to the value of 12,000 ducats.

Paul II was in all things a child of his age; but his fineness of character showed him that his age was in no good way. For himself, he strove to check its worst impulses, and uphold a standard of justice and honor. His only luxury was magnificence; in his private life he was simple and even abstemious. He lacked the force necessary to give decisive effect to his good intentions, and men saw only the outside of his life and character. The beginnings that he made towards better things were so entirely swept away by his impetuous successor that posterity gave him no credit for his fruitless efforts. His pontificate was a time of conscious perplexity in himself, which he was too reserved to confide to others. He acted tentatively, almost despondingly, and led a solitary life. Later times dated from him the decline of the Papacy. It must be admitted that he made organic reform impossible, and lowered the standard of honor amongst the Cardinals. He lived long enough to see the hopelessness of personal efforts to amend a system which refused all help from outside, and admitted no restraint upon its omnipotence. He learned the lesson that autocracy is practically dependent upon its officials, whom it is powerless to restrain.
CHAPTER III.
SIXTUS IV AND THE REPUBLIC OF FLORENCE
1471—1480.

The death of Paul II was so unexpected that only seven Cardinals out of the twenty-six were present at the Conclave on August 6. It would seem that there was no decided motive in choosing a new Pope, and the first voting was very scattered. In the second voting Cardinals Estouteville, Calandrini, Capranica, and Ammannati united in favor of Bessarion as the oldest member of the College, a man of note, and one whose election was likely to cause a speedy vacancy. But the old objection to Bessarion as a Greek again revived, and he would not be politically acceptable to France or to the Italian princes. Cardinals Borgia, Orsini, and Gonzaga set up against him Francesco of Savona, whose claims on the ground of learning and high character might fairly be opposed to those of Bessarion. It was urged against him that he had only been a Cardinal for four years, and that his election was a decided slight to many senior to himself; but his supporters managed to clear away objections, and Francesco was elected on August 9.

The election of Francesco di Savona awakened great surprise, and showed that the Cardinals still adhered to their policy of having a Pope who would extend their privileges and rule according to their will. At the same time it was a testimony to the influence of Paul II that they did not venture to choose an entirely obscure and weak man. Francesco had won his way to the Cardinalate solely by his reputation for theological knowledge and for a blameless life. He was of such lowly origin that he had not a name of his own. His father was a poor peasant in a little village near Savona, and at the age of nine Francesco was handed over to the Franciscans to be educated. He acted for a time as tutor with the family of Rovere in Piedmont, and from them he took the name by which he was afterwards known. His talents and industry were great, and he lectured on philosophy and theology at Bologna, Padua, Pavia, Florence, and Perugia. At Pavia Bessarion attended Francesco's lectures, and was struck by his learning. When he rose to the post of General of the Franciscan Order, and distinguished himself by his reforming zeal, the recommendations of Bessarion found an echo in the inclinations of Paul II, and Francesco was elevated to the Cardinalate. At Rome he was regarded as a profound scholar, and he increased his reputation by a treatise On the Blood of Christ, a contribution to the controversy between the Dominicans and the Franciscans, which Pius II had vainly striven to appease. At the time of his election he was fifty-seven years old.

A reputation for learning and a high character would not have been enough to secure Francesco's election to the Papacy. The Cardinals were entirely undecided, and there was a good opportunity for adventurous intrigue. It would seem that this was clear to a young Franciscan, Piero Riario, the nephew and favorite of Cardinal Francesco, who acted as his attendant in the Conclave. Piero, seeing the prevailing indecision, had no scruple in making a bargain with the most influential Cardinals; and its results were seen immediately after the election, when Cardinal Orsini was made Chamberlain, Cardinal Borgia received the rich abbey of Subiaco, and Cardinal Gonzaga that of S. Gregorio. The gratitude of the new Pope had been already discounted by the operations of his nephew Piero, and with the election of Sixtus I began a system of personal
intrigue which rapidly grew into a serious scandal. The beginning of his pontificate was tumultuous. Angered at a crush caused by a sudden stoppage of the cavalcade, the crowd threw stones at the Pope's litter, when, on August 25, he was crowned under the title of Sixtus IV.

The first steps of Sixtus IV promised a return of the Papacy to the region of European politics. The new Pope resumed the plans of Pius II, and again set forth to Christendom the duty of a crusade against the Turks. He issued an encyclical letter for this purpose, and negotiated with the Emperor for the summons of a Council to prepare for the Holy War. Frederick III proposed Udine for its meeting-place. Sixtus IV replied that the Italian powers would not consent to Udine, and he himself dared not go so far from the Papal States; he proposed Rome, but offered to go to Mantua or Ancona. The negotiations for a Council came to nothing; but Sixtus IV sent out legates, Bessarion to France, Borgia to Spain, Marco Barbo to Germany, and appointed Caraffa admiral of a fleet which, after the example of Calixtus III, he began eagerly to build on the Tiber.

The legates met with no better success than their predecessors in the same business. Bessarion found Louis XI too busied with his plans against England and the Duke of Burgundy to pay any attention to projects for a crusade. He succeeded in establishing better relations between the King and the Holy See, but returned without having furthered the object of his mission, and died of fever in Ravenna in November, 1472. Borgia went to Spain, delighted to display his magnificence in his native Valencia, where he met with a splendid reception; but the Spanish kingdoms had troubles of their own to occupy their attention, and Borgia was scarcely likely to kindle spiritual zeal by the exhibition of his vanity and self-seeking. It is not surprising that he also accomplished nothing. In Germany Barbo had a more difficult task. Sixtus IV espoused the cause of Mathias against Ladislas in Bohemia, and threatened the adherents of Ladislas with excommunication. The legate's energies were consumed in fruitless attempts to arrange the strife for Bohemia between the Kings of Poland and Hungary, and to bring about a good understanding between the Emperor and the Electors; he returned in 1474 empty-handed from Germany.

Meanwhile Sixtus IV had equipped twenty galleys against the Turks, and gave his solemn benediction to the admiral's ship before it set out to Brindisi to join the contingents of Venice and Naples. The combined fleet made a series of plundering raids on the Turkish coast, but caused more terror than damage to the foe. In January, 1473, Caraffa returned to Rome and made a triumphal entry with twelve camels and twenty-five Turkish prisoners. It was a novel spectacle, but a scanty return for the expenses of the armament.

Sixtus IV had now gained sufficient experience of the prospects of a crusading policy. It would seem that he had resolved to give a fair trial to the old political traditions of the Papacy before entering upon a new sphere of action. He paused to justify in his own eyes the transition from a Franciscan reformer to an Italian prince. He was not prepared to adopt the tentative attitude of Paul II, but was resolved to pursue some definite course of his own. If his energy could be employed in carrying out the plan already marked out by his predecessors, he was willing to devote himself to that work; but the results of the survey of Europe which was taken by his legates were not encouraging. Everywhere were struggles conducted for national aggrandizement. Religious principles were everywhere weak, morals were corrupt, spiritual agencies were feeble. Before a crusade was possible, years of conciliatory diplomacy and
ecclesiastical reform would be necessary to heal the breaches of Europe and revive the religious basis of its life.

Perhaps Sixtus IV saw that this was the issue which lay before him if so, he rapidly dismissed it as uncongenial to his character. Beneath the frock of the Franciscan, beneath the retiring habits of a student, was concealed the passionate nature of an Italian of the Renaissance. Sixtus IV was determined to leave his mark upon the events of his pontificate; he was strong in the strength of an individual character. Already the Italian spirit had invaded the traditions of the papal office; and since the days of Eugenius IV each Pope had thought more of signalizing his own pontificate than of upholding the continuity of the papal policy. In Sixtus IV the Italian spirit entirely triumphed, and the Papacy boldly adopted the current aims and methods of the Italian powers which hemmed it in.

If Europe in general was in an evil plight, Italy was even more corrupt than other countries. During the dark days of the Schism and the General Councils, when the papal power was practically in abeyance, Italian politics had developed with marvelous rapidity. Commerce had prospered; wealth and luxury had increased; the desire for material comfort had absorbed men's energies; the culture of the Renaissance had thrown a graceful veil of paganism over self-seeking. Popular liberty had everywhere disappeared before absolutism. The State centered round the person of its individual ruler, who contented his subjects by a display of outward magnificence, and condoned his tyranny by fostering commerce and affording full scope for the particular interests of his people. The stronger rulers made their power still more absolute; the condottieri strove to become independent princes; the smaller lords served the greater, and by their military activity protected themselves against the results of their reckless tyranny.

In the midst of this seething sea of intrigue lay the Papal States, a tempting prize to adventurers small and great. It might well be a question for a sagacious Pope how he was to preserve the temporal sovereignty of the Papacy in the existing movement of Italian politics. The state of Italian thought and feeling left no room for sentiment, and paid no heed to the lofty claims of the Papal office. Ladislas of Naples had aimed at secularizing the lands of the Church; his plans had been eagerly pursued by Braccio; and only a lucky accident had diverted Francesco Sforza from seeking his fortunes at the expense of the Papacy. Ferrante of Naples was not a neighbor who could be trusted to withstand the temptation of a favorable opportunity. Rome itself was turbulent and was exposed to the constant intrigues of petty tyrants in the neighborhood. The Counts of Anguillara had long defied the Pope; hordes of bandits made access to Rome difficult and pillaged pilgrims on their way to the tombs of the Apostles. Within Rome itself the Popes could not feel themselves secure. Eugenius IV had been driven out; the conspiracies of Porcaro and Tiburzia against Popes so excellent as Nicolas V and Pius II showed the presence of threatening elements of disaffection, and suggested suspicions of dangerous intrigues on the part of some of the Italian powers.

No doubt the Papacy, if it had been strong in its moral hold of Europe, could have disregarded the menacing condition of Italian affairs. But the repeated negotiations about the crusade showed the Papacy clearly enough that nothing was to be expected from a united Christendom. Italian politics only expressed with greater definiteness the prevalent condition of Europe. Everywhere men were busy with questions that concerned their own material well-being. The hold of the Church was slight over men's affections. The chief ecclesiastics were relatives of kings and princes and were engaged
in secular pursuits. The Papacy had not behaved towards Germany in a way to inspire respect; the French crown had laid a firm hand on the Church by means of the Pragmatic Sanction. The great allies of the Papacy in a former age, the Preaching Friars, had forfeited their hold upon the people; and the attempt of Eugenius IV to galvanize them into renewed vitality had proved a failure. Pius II had shown the hopelessness of uniting Europe for any common object. Paul II had swept away the last ecclesiastical problem which faced the Papacy by crushing George Podiebrad in Bohemia.

It is to the credit of Sixtus IV that he did not begin a new policy till he had convinced himself of the futility of the traditional policy of his office. When that was clearly hopeless he turned to the question which lay immediately at hand. If no loftier aim demanded his energies, they should at least be devoted to a useful purpose, to the organization of the papal dominions into a compact state. Previous Popes had trusted for the maintenance of their dominions to the respect generally felt towards the Papacy, and to the support of the powers of Europe; Sixtus felt that neither of these was secure. He resolved no longer to shelter himself behind the claims of the Papacy as an institution, but as a man to enter into Italian politics, and establish his temporal sovereignty by means of men, their weapons and their enterprise. When he looked around him he found the Papacy without friends in Italy. The pacific policy and the moderating position of Paul II had only been maintained by a resolute effort of self-restraint; it was not understood by other powers, and there was no guarantee that it could be safely continued. Sixtus did not think it worthwhile to give it a trial, but decided that he would use the resources and the authority of his office for the protection and extension of its temporal possessions.

For this purpose he combined natural affection with statecraft, and elevated nepotism into political principle. If the Pope were to act decisively, he must have lieutenants whom he could entirely trust, whose interests were bound up with his, and who could use for the furtherance of the papal rule the resources which the Pope could supply. Other Popes had been nepotists a little, but to Sixtus IV nepotism stood in the first place. The schemes of Urban VI for his nephews' aggrandizement had been wild and crude; Boniface IX had used his relatives as trusty henchmen; Martin V had employed the existing power of the Colonna family for his own purposes; Calixtus III had given his nephews a secure position in Rome; and Pius II had gratified his strong feeling of affection towards his native place by surrounding himself with Sienese relatives. Sixtus IV disregarded all considerations of decorum; he took his nephews, men of no position and little capacity, and placed at their disposal all the resources of the Roman See. They were to be magnificent puppets on the stage of Italian politics, moved by the Pope's hand, executing the Pope's schemes, and bringing back their spoils to the Pope's feet.

Sixtus had only taken possession of the papal throne, when in December 15, 1471, he raised to the Cardinalate two of his relatives, Giuliano della Rovere, son of his brother Raffaello, and Piero Riario, the orphan son of his sister, whom he had brought up from early years. Piero was aged twenty-five, and as yet unknown save for his dexterity in the Conclave; the other nephew, Giuliano, was also a Franciscan, of the age of twenty-eight, equally undistinguished. The Cardinals vainly opposed the creation of two youths, of obscure parentage and of no experience in affairs: they lamented the disregard shown by the Pope to the regulations laid down by the Conclave; they recognized sadly that supreme power meant supreme licence, and they said that Sixtus would heed them no more than Paul II.
On Cardinal Riario the Pope heaped preferment. He first made him Bishop of Treviso; then the bishoprics of Sinigaglia, Mende, Spalato, Florence, the patriarchate of Constantinople, the abbacy of S. Ambrose at Milan, and other dignities rapidly followed. His revenues exceeded 60,000 gold ducats. He was omnipotent in Rome and lived a life of luxury and splendor such as had never been seen before. “He gathered”, says a contemporary, “vessels of silver and gold, splendid raiment, tapestries and embroideries, and high-mettled horses; he was surrounded by a countless retinue, clad in silks, with curled hair, rising poets and painters: he delighted in celebrating games, not only the civic games, but tournaments”.

Another nephew, Leonardo della Rovere, brother of Giuliano, was made Prefect of Rome in February, 1472, and soon afterwards was married to a bastard daughter of Ferrante of Naples. He was a small man, and his mind corresponded to his person, says Infessura; but for his sake the Pope sacrificed the papal claims on Naples, remitted the yearly tribute, and restored the Duchy of Sora. Ferrante undertook to guard the shores from pirates, and to send a steed to Rome each year in recognition of the papal suzerainty. Many of the Cardinals murmured at this abandonment of the papal rights; but Sixtus IV was bent upon a close alliance with Naples as a means of securing himself against the powers of Northern Italy, while he carried out his plans against the aggressors in the neighborhood of Rome.

This new policy of the Papacy received a splendid, almost a dramatic, embodiment in June, 1473, when Leonora, another illegitimate daughter of Ferrante of Aragon passed through Rome on her way to Ferrara after her marriage with Duke Ercole d'Este. The magnificence of the papal nephews was employed to certify the firmness of the Pope's friendship to Naples in a way which startled even the luxurious princes of Italy. On Whitsun-eve, June 5, Leonora, with a magnificent suite, entered Rome, and was escorted by the two Cardinal nephews to Riario's palace next the Church of SS. Apostoli, while the streets were thronged with the Cardinal's retinue. The piazza in front of the palace was covered in, and turned into a vast theatre. The palace itself was adorned as though S. Peter were descended from heaven to earth again. The walls were entirely hung with the richest stuffs and tapestries; the splendid hangings of Nicolas V, representing the works of the Creation, formed the curtains of the doors which led into the banqueting-hall. Sideboards groaned with costly plate; couches and chairs were covered with the finest stuffs. Fourteen bedchambers were adorned with equal splendor, and in the most magnificent was an inscription, “Who would deny that this chamber is worthy of highest Jupiter? Who would deny that it is inferior to its prince?”. Even the smallest articles of use were made of gold and silver.

On Whitsunday the two Cardinals conducted the Duchess to S. Peter's, where the Pope celebrated mass and gave her his benediction. At midday a miracle play of Susanna and the Elders was performed by Florentine actors. Next day the splendour of the entertainment reached its height in a grand banquet at which the two nephews, the Duchess, and three of the most illustrious guests sat at one table; three other members of the Duchess's suite at another. The plate was constantly varied; the attendants were dressed in silk, and the seneschal four times changed his dress during the repast, appearing each time with richer collars of gold and pearls and precious stones. The tables groaned with an endless multitude of dishes, some so vast that they required four squires to bear the gold trays on which they were placed. There was a representation in viands of Atalanta's race, of Perseus, Andromeda, and the dragon. Peacocks were dressed with their feathers, and amongst them sat Orpheus with his lyre. The name of
the Duchess's husband gave occasion for confectioneries shaped to represent the labours of Hercules. During the banquet was a concert and masques. The famous lovers of antiquity, Hercules and Deianira, Jason and Medea, Theseus and Phaedra, danced in triumph: then centaurs entered and tried to carry off the ladies, and a mimic fight ensued. A mountain of sugar was carried in, from which emerged with gestures of amazement a wild man who recited a few verses. A roast bear in his skin, with a stick in his mouth, was one of the most wonderful dishes in this repast, for which every country had been ransacked. Next day was given a representation of the miracle of Corpus Christi, the day following another of the life of John the Baptist. Finally Leonora departed from Rome with rich presents from the all-powerful nephew, who seemed to be son, not brother, of the great Emperor Caesar, and was honored more than the real Pope. No doubt some beholders were struck with amazement at this splendid scene; but more must have exclaimed with Infessura, “See in what things the treasure of the Church is spent”.

Cardinal Riario was, in truth, the ruler of Rome, and the Pope sank into secondary importance. Suitors to the Pope first sought the powerful Cardinal, whose audiences thronged by a crowd of sycophants recalled the days of the Roman Empire. When Riario rode through the streets, he was attended by a troop of a hundred horsemen, and visited the Vatican like a prince. Though insolent he was not unkindly, and liked to distribute favors with a lordly hand. Not content with displaying his magnificence in Rome, he made a progress in the autumn of 1473, armed with extraordinary powers as legate of Umbria. He visited Florence, where he went to take possession of the archbishopric, Bologna, Ferrara, and Milan. Everywhere he was received with royal honors; everywhere were splendid festivities, and venal poets poured forth endless verses in the Cardinal's glory. In Milan, the aspiring Duke, Galeazzo Sforza, besought Cardinal Riario to obtain for him from the Pope the title of King of Lombardy; in return, he promised to aid him to the Papacy on the death of Sixtus IV, and even hinted that Sixtus might be compelled to resign in his nephew's favor. From Florence the Cardinal proceeded to Venice, and then retraced his steps to Rome. Soon after his return he died, early in 1474, worn out by his excesses at the age of twenty-eight, a warning that an upstart, ignorant of the virtue of moderation, secures his own destruction.

Cardinal Riario was a startling exhibition of the results of nepotism. A lavish expenditure of the wealth of the Church created a prince of the type which Italy could understand. The Pope himself could not enter the lists; but all that he was restrained from doing by virtue of his office, the Cardinal nephew could do in his behalf. The princes of Italy were eclipsed by his grandeur; the resources of the Church were openly exhibited; the political influence of the Papacy was exerted entirely for the glory and advancement of a family. It was clear that the Papacy was a power with which the rulers of Italy would have to reckon, Piero Riario himself had no qualities to commend him save his audacity, and he made no pretence to decorum. He was as profligate as he was luxurious, and flaunted his mistresses in attire of surpassing costliness; even their slippers were embroidered with pearls. So great was his extravagance that during the two years of his Cardinalate he spent 200,000 ducats, and left debts to the amount of 60,000 more. When he died, no one regretted him save the Pope and those who had battened on his follies. Sixtus IV commemorated his nephew by a tomb in the Church of SS. Apostoli; and the recumbent effigy of Piero Riario is one of the best portrait sculptures in Rome. The strongly marked features and aquiline nose give a sense of power, which is borne out by the thin compressed lips, the imperious expression,
the coarse sensual chin. The epitaph which Sixtus IV set over him records his grace, liberality, and high-mindedness; "he had conceived and gave promise of greater things", says the Pope, and we can only hope that his judgment was true.

Sixtus IV bewailed the loss of his nephew with a depth of grief that was thought unbecoming: he called him his son, his only hope. His first thought was one of regret that he had permitted unrestrained profligacy to cut short the life of his favorite, and with characteristic impetuosity he proceeded to frame rules for the regulation of the lives of the Cardinals. A series of articles was drawn up forbidding Cardinals, when they went abroad, to have more than thirty attendants, of whom twelve at least were to be clerical. It is a sign how all ecclesiastical discipline had been relaxed, that the Pope goes on to enjoin that these clerical attendants should wear garments reaching as far as the knee, and were not to dress in various colors. The Cardinals were to content themselves with two courses of meats at table, which, together with relishes, sweets, and dessert, was judged to be sufficient. They were not to keep dogs, indulge in hunting, or have gold trappings for their horses. They were also bidden to wear the tonsure and cut their hair so that the ears were visible. The Pope wished to warn others from the fate of Piero Riario, and thought that this could be done by regulations about outward things. It is needless to say that these sumptuary enactments were rapidly disregarded.

In fact Sixtus soon lost his interest in the good estate of the Cardinals. He soothed his grief for Piero’s death, and found comfort by transferring his affections to Piero’s brother Girolamo, who was a layman. For him he bought from the Duke of Milan the district of Imola; and the purchase included the hand of Caterina Sforza, the Duke's illegitimate daughter. By this transaction Girolamo Riario was fairly launched in Italy, and might be trusted to make his way. Besides him there was yet another nephew to be established, Giovanni della Rovere, brother of the Cardinal Giuliano. He was married to the infant daughter of Federigo of Urbino, who in August, 1474, was invested by the Pope with the title of duke. To give Giovanni a fair start in life, Sixtus conferred on him the district of Sinigaglia and Mondovi, part of the territory which Federigo had with difficulty won for Pius II from Gismondo Malatesta; in 1475 Leonardo della Rovere died, and the Pope further gave Giovanni his office of Prefect of Rome.

It was but natural that this openly avowed policy of family aggrandizement on the part of the Pope should awake a certain amount of uneasiness amongst Italian powers which felt that they might be its victims. Sixtus found Italy at peace in virtue of the pacification made in 1470 by Paul II: but that pacification recognized a separate league between Naples, Florence, and Milan, in reference to the affairs of Rimini. Sixtus was anxious to abolish this separate league as being a hindrance to his schemes. He pleaded that Italy should be entirely united and should offer a firm front against the Turk; he urged that the reasons for a separate league against Paul II did not apply to himself. The diplomacy of the Curia was, however, ineffectual. When Sixtus succeeded in detaching Ferrante of Naples from the league, the only result was that Venice took his place. In 1474 a league of the northern powers stood watching the Pope and the King of Naples.

So matters stood when the year of jubilee came round in 1475. Few pilgrims visited Rome, where there was indeed little to be found to attract the pious soul. Europe was still ringing with stories of the pagan luxury of Cardinal Riario, and Italy was full of uneasy suspicion. The chief pilgrim was Ferrante of Naples, who gave another proof of his good understanding with the Pope. His visit was interpreted only as a political conference of the two powers, who were bent on breaking up the northern league,
whose union prevented Girolamo Riario from extending his dominions towards Tuscany and Ferrante from winning back the towns which Venice held in his kingdom.

It was between the Pope and Florence that the rupture first took place; and the two foremost men in Italy, Sixtus IV and Lorenzo de' Medici, stood suddenly and the forward in bitter antagonism. Amidst the changes which had befallen the Italian republics, Florence still remained the most truly Italian. Personal government had taken the place of the civic community, and the prince everywhere represented the state. But in Florence the ruler still remained a Florentine burgher, and owed his position to the fact that his family was so closely connected with the fortunes of the city that it had become by mere force of events the city's representative in all that it held most dear. Other cities had been seized by treachery, had fallen before adventurers, or had passed into the hands of condottieri generals; in Florence the family of the Medici slowly absorbed the state by a complete identification of itself with the city's interests. This had not happened without struggles, and the dangerous ascendancy of the Medici had not been gained without craft; but affairs had gone so far that Cosimo de' Medici had no alternative save to rule or quit Florence forever. He made his ascendancy complete, but kept it closely veiled. To the outward seeming Florence was governed as before, and Cosimo was but its chiefest and wealthiest citizen; in reality the magistrates were his nominees, and he was counted as an equal by the princes of Europe. Cosimo was succeeded by a weaker son, Piero, whose death in 1469 left the chief position to his two sons Lorenzo and Giuliano. Lorenzo was only twenty-one when the chief men of the city requested him to take care of the state as his grandfather and father had done; and he accepted the task for the preservation of his friends and his substance.

At first the relations between the young Lorenzo and Sixtus were most cordial. Lorenzo went as ambassador of Florence to congratulate the Pope on his accession. He was received with great honor, and was given many valuable presents from the artistic treasures left by Paul II. Moreover, as Paul II left little ready money and a large collection of precious stones, Sixtus sold them to Lorenzo at a moderate price, and Lorenzo made a large profit in retailing them afterwards to other princes. He also made Lorenzo treasurer to the Papacy, and so gave the papal business to the Medici Bank which was managed in Rome by Giovanni Tornabuoni, Lorenzo's uncle. But Lorenzo expected still more from the Pope: his keen eye saw the advantage which would be gained by the Medici family if it could exercise a permanent influence on the Papacy, and he besought Sixtus to raise his brother Giuliano to the dignity of the Cardinalate. The Pope listened, but did not commit himself, though Lorenzo after his return repeatedly urged his wish. The first creation of two nephews gave no sign of the Pope's intention; but the creation in May, 1473, of eight Cardinals, amongst whom Giuliano de' Medici was not included, convinced Lorenzo that he reckoned vainly on any hope of influencing the papal policy.

Moreover the action of Sixtus grew decidedly antagonistic to the Medici. In 1474 he appointed as Archbishop of Pisa, Francesco Salviati, a man politically opposed to the Medici, who vainly tried to have L the nomination set aside. Still more did Florence feel aggrieved at the papal purchase of Imola, on which Florence itself had long had designs. Imola had been in the hands of the Manfredi; but dynastic quarrels had driven them to commit the town to the protection of the Duke of Milan, who had not ventured to sell it to Florence, but could with greater safety hand it over to Girolamo Riario. The Florentines watched with growing anxiety this advance of the papal nephews towards their frontiers, and another occurrence soon increased their suspicions. In the spring of
1474 civic factions in Todi led to a rising against the Pope which spread to Spoleto. Cardinal Giuliano della Rovere showed his military capacity by promptly reducing the rebellious cities; and Spoleto was savagely sacked by his ill-disciplined forces. Finding that Niccolo Vitelli, lord of Citta di Castello, had helped the insurgents, he was not sorry for a pretext to reduce a too powerful vassal of the Holy See. He laid siege to Citta di Castello, whereon the Florentines, alarmed at this disturbance so close to their frontiers, sent forces to Borgo San Sepolcro. Federigo of Urbino came to the camp of the legate, and by the terror of his name Vitelli was driven to make peace, though the terms were not so favorable as the Pope desired. Sixtus IV resented bitterly the attitude of Florence, and complained that it prevented him from becoming master in his own dominions.

At the end of the year 1476 an event occurred which created a profound sensation throughout Italy—the murder of Galeazzo Maria Sforza, Duke of Milan. The impression produced by this assassination was not so much due to the fact in itself as to the motives of the conspirators, which awakened an instinctive sympathy in Italian hearts. Galeazzo Sforza was a typical Italian ruler of his age—splendid in his court, liberal to his subjects, a patron of art and learning, an astute politician, yet oppressive in his taxation, arbitrary in his exactions, and in his private life a lustful tyrant, who behaved with capricious savagery to those who thwarted his will. There was a superfluity of naughtiness in the insolence with which he disregarded all restraints in gratifying his appetites and punishing those whom he suspected. He delighted in the sight of corpses in a tomb: he punished a poacher who had caught a hare by making him eat his capture, skin, entrails and all, till the unhappy man died. Many stories were told of his strange ways and reckless cruelty, and he outraged by his conduct the deepest sentiments of the human heart. Some Milanese youths who attended the lectures of one Cola de' Montani, a teacher of classics, were stirred by the examples of classical antiquity, which his teaching set before them, till they thirsted to follow in the steps of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, Brutus and the rest, who had freed their country from tyranny.

At last three of them, Olgiati, Lampognano, and Visconti, agreed to assassinate the duke according to the models of ancient tyrannicide. Yet reminiscences of Christianity strangely mingled with paganism; and the conspirators prayed at the shrine of S. Ambrose each time they met to practise the method of assassination by attacking one another with the sheaths of their daggers. On the morning of S. Stephen's Day the duke went to mass in the Church of S. Stefano: the three conspirators managed to draw near and slew him as he entered. They had taken no steps to secure any results from their deed; they supposed that liberty naturally followed on the death of a tyrant. Lampognano was cut down in the Church; Olgiati was refused shelter by his father, was made prisoner and condemned to death. In prison he wrote a Latin epitaph on the dead tyrant. On the scaffold he summoned up his courage, saying: “Collect yourself, Girolamo; the memory of your deed will endure; death is bitter, fame is everlasting”. The sole result in Milan of this assassination was that Galeazzo Maria was succeeded by his son Giovanni Galeazzo, a child of eight years old, under the guardianship of his mother Bona of Savoy, and a way was thereby opened to the intrigues of his uncle, Ludovico Sforza. When Sixtus IV heard of the death of Galeazzo Maria, he exclaimed with a truly prophetic spirit: “Today is dead the peace of Italy”.

The murder of the Duke of Milan excited much admiration in Italy. It was so entirely conceived in the antique spirit that it was applauded for its classical motive.
staid Florentine could say that it “was a worthy, manly, and laudable attempt, deserving of imitation by all who live under a tyrant or one like a tyrant”. The example of the Milanese conspirators found imitators in a case where the tyranny was not so manifest, and where the profits to those engaged in the assassination were likely to be larger. A scheme was planned for upsetting the rule of the Medici in Florence; and however the scheme was constructed to begin with, it ended in a poor imitation of the Milanese patriots, with the patriotism and the classical accessories omitted in favor of self-interested motives.

Florence seemed to rest peaceably under Lorenzo de’ Medici’s rule, which was exercised quietly, and allowed others to wear the appearance of power while the practical direction of affairs remained in Lorenzo’s hands. The government of the Medici secured to the Florentines all that they wished for: commercial prosperity, artistic and literary splendor, and a gay life for the people. Yet Lorenzo was always cautious, and never forgot that the power which his grandfather had secured by craft must be maintained in the same way as it had been acquired. He was careful to keep down possible rivals, and allowed no one’s influence to vie with his own. However much he might try to conceal this policy, it was impossible that its objects should not recognize and resent it. The wealthiest and most important family in Florence after the Medici was that of the Pazzi, with whom Cosimo had entered into a close alliance by giving his daughter Bianca in marriage to Guglielmo de’ Pazzi. Under Lorenzo the good relationship between the two families somewhat cooled; and the Pazzi Bank at Rome was an obstacle to the designs of Lorenzo, who in his anxiety to prevent the sale of Imola to the Pope’s nephew Girolamo, tried to avert it by putting financial difficulties in the Pope’s way. The Pope, however, obtained the money by applying to the Pazzi; and as the relations between the Pope and Lorenzo became more unfriendly, he transferred the office of Papal receiver from the Medici to the Pazzi Bank. Thenceforth the Pazzi were on the Pope’s side, and the coolness between them and the Medici increased.

It is, however, improbable that the difference would have been serious had not other interests been involved. Girolamo Riario felt his lordship of Imola endangered by the hostility of Florence, One who owed the position entirely to the Pope was only secure during the Pope’s lifetime; and the change of government at Milan left him at the mercy of Florence in case the Pope died. Girolamo was no short-sighted politician; he formed the bold scheme of overthrowing the power of the Medici, and used the Pazzi as his instruments for that purpose. Accordingly, he won over to his plan Francesco de’ Pazzi, the head of the Bank at Rome, and the Archbishop of Pisa, Francesco Salviati, who nourished his wrongs against Lorenzo, on account of his archbishopric. It soon became obvious to the conspirators that the Medici rule was too securely founded to be upset by any ordinary means; when Francesco de’ Pazzi mentioned the matter to his uncle Jacopo at Florence, he found him convinced of the impossibility of success. It was necessary to obtain the Pope’s sanction if adherents were to be secured; and Sixtus approved of the overthrow of the Medici if it could be accomplished without bloodshed.

Count Girolamo’s first scheme was to invite Lorenzo de’ Medici to Rome and there have him assassinated; he could then proceed against Giuliano in Florence. Lorenzo, however, did not show much zeal in accepting Girolamo’s invitation; and it was resolved to attack him in his own city. For this purpose confederates were needed, and an army must be in preparation to take advantage of the confusion in Florence. Count Girolamo chose as his agent a general in his employ, Giovan Battista da Montesecco. When the
matter was first confided to him, Montesecco remarked that it was a great and difficult undertaking:

“How will it please the Pope?”, he asked.

“The Pope”, answered the conspirators, “will do what we wish: moreover he wishes evil to Lorenzo and desires his fall above all things”.

“Have you spoken to him about it?”. 

“Yes”, was the answer, “and we will make him speak to you and tell you his intention”.

When the interview with the Pope took place, Sixtus IV said that he wished for a revolution in Florence, but without the death of any man.

“Holy Father”, said Montesecco, “it can hardly be done without the death of Lorenzo and Giuliano, and perhaps others”.

Sixtus answered, “I do not wish the death of any man on my account, since it fits not my office to consent to any one’s death; and though Lorenzo is a rascal, I would not have his death, but only a change of government”.

Count Girolamo interposed, “All will be done that is possible to prevent it; only when it has happened your Holiness will pardon him who has done it”.

Sixtus replied to the Count, “You are a beast: I tell you that I do not wish any man’s death, but a change of government”.

Count Girolamo and Archbishop Salviati returned to the charge.

“When you have Florence at your disposal you will dictate to half Italy, and all will wish to have you for their friend; therefore be content that everything be done to arrive at this end”.

The Pope ended the interview by saying, “I tell you I will not have it; go and do what you will, provided there be no killing”.

The Archbishop answered, “Holy Father, be content that we steer this ship, and that we will steer it well”.

The Pope answered, “I am content”.

The attitude of Sixtus in the matter was this: as a statesman he wished for the overthrow of the Medici and gave his countenance to a plan for that object; as Pope he could not be privy to any scheme of assassination. The plot was not of his making; he prudently abstained from asking for details; and the conspirators prudently abstained from confiding them to him. Sixtus cannot be convicted of being privy to an assassination; it may be urged that he expressly stated his objection to any such deed. But he did not demand any assurance that no such thing was contemplated; he heard it hinted and disavowed it, but he did not make his sanction conditional upon its entire withdrawal from the plan. The utmost that can be said in his behalf is that he saved the honor of his office, but he certainly did so in an ambiguous manner.

Armed with the Pope's sanction, Montesecco visited Florence, viewed the scene of action, and succeeded in winning over to the conspiracy Jacopo de' Pazzi, who was reluctantly persuaded. Troops were massed quietly at Imola and confederates were prepared in Florence. Archbishop Salviati found a pretext for visiting Florence, and
everything was ready. Count Girolamo thought it well to initiate a young relative into political life under auspicious circumstances, and made a tool of his young nephew, Raffaelle Sansoni, a lad of eighteen, studying at the University of Pisa, whom Sixtus had shamelessly made a Cardinal in December, 1477. Girolamo caused young Cardinal Raffaelle to pay a visit to Florence in April, 1478, as the entertainment of an illustrious guest would offer opportunities to the conspirators. The first plan was to assassinate the brothers at a banquet which was given to the Cardinal in the Medici villa that lies below Fiesole; but Giuliano was unable to be present through sickness and the attempt was put off. The Cardinal then proposed a visit to the Medici at their palace in Florence, and expressed a wish to attend mass in the cathedral on Sunday, April 26. Giuliano sent a message saying that he would not fail to be present in church: and this determined the conspirators to choose that sacred place for their murder. The change of place proved fatal to the success of the plan. The bluff soldier Montesecco, who had undertaken the death of Lorenzo, shrank from the profanation of a church and refused to "make Christ witness of a crime". Two priests, Antonio Maffei and Stefano da Bagnone, undertook the work from which the soldier recoiled in horror; but though less scrupulous, they also showed themselves to be less skillful.

On the morning of April 26, Cardinal Raffaelle arrived at Lorenzo's palace and robed himself for the mass. He was accompanied to the Duomo by Lorenzo. At the door Archbishop Salviati made an excuse for going away; he had undertaken to seize the Palazzo Pubblico during the tumult. The Cardinal entered the choir and took his place beside the altar. Mass was begun before the conspirators saw that Giuliano de' Medici was not there. Francesco de' Pazzi and Bernardo Bandini, the two who had undertaken his death, slipped away to bring him; and as they walked with him to the church, Francesco de' Pazzi familiarly put his arm round his victim to discover if he wore any armor of defence. Giuliano advanced into the choir; Lorenzo stood outside; and close by each were the appointed assassins. When the priest had taken the communion, a signal was given and Bandini stuck his dagger into the breast of Giuliano, who took a step backwards, tottered and fell; whereon Francesco de' Pazzi rushed upon him and stabbed him again and again with such fury that he wounded himself in the thigh.

The assassins of Lorenzo were not so successful. Maffei aimed at Lorenzo's throat, but only wounded him slightly in the neck. Lorenzo with instant self-possession pulled off his cloak, wrapped it round his left arm for a shield, and sprang into the choir. Bandini, satisfied with his work on Giuliano, dashed at Lorenzo, who was protected by a friend at the cost of his own life. The delay gave time for others of Lorenzo's friends to gather round him and hurry him away to the sacristy, where the doors were shut and bolted against assailants. All was confusion; but though the partisans of the Pazzi were armed, those of Lorenzo quickly assembled and escorted him safely to his palace. Cardinal Raffaelle was left crouching at the altar, and was with difficulty saved from the mob. So great was his terror, that his face wore an ashen hue to the end of his days.

Archbishop Salviati's attempt to seize the Palazzo Pubblico failed. His stammering speech aroused the suspicions of the Gonfaloniere, who had risen to greet his eminent visitor. The Archbishop's eye wandered to the door, and the Gonfaloniere, seeing that others were behind, loudly called the guards and made them prisoners. The cries in the street warned him of danger; the gates of the Palazzo were made fast, and the bands of the Pazzi could gain no entrance. The only man amongst the conspirators who showed any decision was the one who had been slowest to join the plot. Jacopo de' Pazzi boldly raised the cry of 'Liberty'; but the people did not rise; showers of stones were hurled at
him and his band, and he was driven to his house, where he found his nephew Francesco so severely wounded by his own hand that he could not flee. Francesco was seized by the crowd, dragged to the Palazzo Pubblico, and hanged. When the news of Giuliano’s death reached the magistrates, they hanged out of the palace window Jacopo Bracciolini, son of the famous Poggio, and after him Archbishop Salviati. It is said that Salviati in his death struggle fixed his teeth in a despairing clutch in Jacopo’s shoulder. In all the streets the conspirators were cut down by the people, and Florence was filled with slaughter.

Jacopo Pazzi was made prisoner outside Florence and was put to death. The Pazzi family was well-nigh annihilated. Montesecco was imprisoned and closely examined about the Pope’s complicity in the conspiracy: he was afterwards beheaded. All the chief conspirators were put to death. Bandini, who managed to escape to Constantinople, was delivered up by the Sultan Mohammed II. The failure of the plot was a splendid testimony to the devotion of Florence to Lorenzo, and completed its identification with the Medici family. Lorenzo had no need to take any action against his enemies; the spontaneous outburst of popular feeling wrought vengeance for him.

Lorenzo had escaped the danger which threatened him in Florence: but Count Girolamo’s troops were still at Imola. Florence was not prepared for a siege, and no one knew how widely the roots of the conspiracy were spread. Lorenzo was anxious to discover how far the Pope was committed, and hence the careful examination of Montesecco; Sixtus IV, if supported by powerful allies, might plunge Florence into troubles which might shake its allegiance to the Medici. Lorenzo waited eagerly for the first movements of the Pope.

When the news of the failure of his plot reached Rome, Girolamo Riario was beside himself with rage. With three hundred armed men he went to the house of the Florentine ambassador, Donato Acciaiuoli, and in spite of his remonstrances dragged him to the Pope’s presence. Sixtus IV disavowed this violence and dismissed him with an assurance of his safety. Acciaiuoli wrote to Florence urging the immediate release of Cardinal Raffaelle; when this was not immediately granted vengeance was taken on the Florentines resident in Rome, and the Bishop of Perugia was sent to bring back the Cardinal. There was some delay, and not till June 12 did the Cardinal begin his journey from Florence.

It would seem that at first Sixtus IV wished to exculpate himself from complicity in the attempt at assassination, and even wrote a letter of condolence to Florence. But the examination of Montesecco, the delay in releasing Cardinal Raffaelle, and the rumors of the menacing attitude of the Florentines, supplied Count Girolamo with means to kindle the Pope's wrath. On June 1, Sixtus IV issued a Bull against Lorenzo de' Medici and his adherents, the magistrates of Florence. He called Lorenzo a son of iniquity and a child of perdition. He declared him and his partisans to be anathematized, incapable thenceforth of holding any office ecclesiastical or civil, or of receiving legacies or performing any legal acts; their goods were to be confiscated, their houses thrown down and reduced to ruins for ever; if they were not condignly punished within a month, Florence was threatened with an interdict and the deprival of her episcopal dignity. The grounds for this severe sentence were set forth at length; they were the hostility of Lorenzo to the Holy See, as shown by his help to Niccolo Vitelli, his unjust dealings with the Archbishop of Pisa, his persistent ingratitude and ill-will towards the Pope, finally the violation of clerical rights by the execution of Archbishop Salviati and the
capture of Cardinal Raffaello. The Pope did not say a word about the murder of Giuliano de’ Medici; he merely mentioned scornfully “some civil and private dissensions amongst the citizens”. The Pope’s proceedings were indeed highhanded. He behaved as though the Holy See were so entirely above suspicion that it did not require even a shadow of vindication. His Bull of denunciation was followed by an interdict before the end of the month.

The proceedings of the Florentines are characteristic of the Italian method of dealing with the Papacy. Florence had men who could write as well as the entire papal secretaries, and who had the personal knowledge which enabled them to strike home. Papal thunders could no longer roll on unchecked; the culture of Humanism had provided weapons of sarcasm which were powerful against denunciation. On July 21 the Signoria of Florence sent an answer to the Pope. “You wish us”, it ran, “to cast out of the state Lorenzo de’ Medici on two grounds, because he is our tyrant, and because he opposes the welfare of the Christian religion. We do not see that by driving out Lorenzo we should recover our liberty, if we acted at your bidding. To save you trouble, we may say that we have learned how to get rid of tyrants and how to manage our state without the advice of others. Collect yourself, we pray you, Holy Father, and return to those sentiments which become the gravity of the Holy See. You call Lorenzo a tyrant: we, speaking in the name of all our citizens, regard him as the defender of our freedom, and are prepared to risk everything for his safety. Your invectives against him provoke our laughter by the emptiness, not to say malignity, of their invention. If Lorenzo had allowed himself to be slaughtered by your emissaries, if your traitors had succeeded in seizing our Palazzo Pubblico, if we had given ourselves up to you for slaughter, we would have had none of this controversy with you”. The letter defends the Medici family, tells of its good deeds towards Christendom and the Papacy, and ends by saying that Florence identified itself with the Medici, and was ready to fight for its religion and its liberty.

Florentine canonists framed an appeal to a future Council, and decided that the force of the interdict was not so great as to forbid public worship. The priests were ordered by the magistrates to perform the Church services as usual, and even if they felt scruples they judged it wiser to obey. It seems that the Archbishop of Florence held a synod, which gave occasion to the publication of a furious invective against the Pope. We cannot suppose that this document was the production of an ecclesiastical assembly: it bears too strongly the marks of being the work of one man. Probably Gentile, Bishop of Arezzo, a staunch friend of the Medici, used the opportunity to issue as a pamphlet an answer to the papal Bull. It was framed on the models of vituperation which the Humanists had employed in their private squabbles, but which had never yet been turned against a Pope. The relations of Sixtus to the Church were assailed in a series of choice metaphors; and the Pope was styled “minister of adulterers”, “vicar of the devil”, “pilot of the Church’s bark who steered it only to Circe’s island”. The writer of the document was in possession of information supplied by the magistrates, for he quoted the confession of Montesecco and gave an account of the conspiracy. Then he repelled one by one the charges of the Pope’s Bull against Lorenzo; the true cause of the papal interdict was that Florence might be punished for Count Girolamo, the victim for the assassin. “May God preserve you”, it ends, “from false shepherds, who come in sheep’s clothing, but inwardly are ravening wolves”.

Clerical denunciation overshot the mark on one side as much as on the other. The Florentine bishop met the Pope with insolent abuse. More weighty was the Apology for
the Florentines from the pen of the Chancellor Bartolommeo Scala, which was addressed to all and several whom it might meet. Scala strikes a note of true statesmanship by saying that he has an unheard-of thing to relate; “while the enemy of our religion hangs over our necks and threatens Rome, Pope Sixtus and his excellent advisers lend themselves to abandoned acts of treachery, plot against the life and liberty of peoples, harass with anathemas all good men, and wage war against Christians”. He gives in full the confession of Montesecco and a temperate statement of the facts of the assassination of Giuliano. Then he proceeds: “What treason has failed to do, ecclesiastical censures backed by arms now attempt. We are defending our liberty, which is dearer to us than life, while the troops of the Pope attack our territory. God, how long wilt Thou endure such iniquity? We turn to you. Emperor Frederick, believing that in us the welfare of Christendom is at stake. We turn to you, Louis of France, to succor the perils of Christendom. Unless Christian princes and peoples help us, we doubt about the commonwealth of Christ. Haste and consult for its welfare”.

Sixtus answered in a tone of lofty indignation which concealed a crafty policy. In a letter addressed to the Duke of Este he besought the Italian powers to join with him in restoring the peace of Italy by crushing the infamous policy of Lorenzo. He had no ill-will against Florence, but Lorenzo had shown himself persistently hostile to all that was right; taking advantage of an ill-judged conspiracy at Florence he had disregarded the holy canons, had put to death an Archbishop, had treated a Cardinal with indignity, and had bespattered with abuse the Holy See. In the interests of order, of Italian unity, of a crusade against the Turk, Florence must be rescued, by the joint endeavor of all Catholic princes, from the yoke of such an impious man.

This letter of Sixtus expressed the political issue which Lorenzo well understood. It was of little moment what literary triumphs each side might win. Sixtus had his troops in the field and was allied with the King of Naples. The time for the blow against Florence had been well chosen, as the northern league was dissolved by the death of the Duke of Milan, The attack of Sixtus was directed, not against Florence but against Lorenzo, and Venice had a good excuse for not interfering in a personal quarrel. Florence was not prepared to meet her enemies in the field, and only received slight help from her allies while the papal forces under Federigo of Urbino advanced along the Chiana valley.

Lorenzo’s greatest hope was in the friendship of Louis XI, who had always been on friendly terms with the Medici, and since his dealings with Pius II had looked with no great favor on the Papacy. Louis XI expressed his sympathy with Lorenzo and sent Philip de Commines as his ambassador to Italy. He had a scheme of reducing Florence to admit the suzerainty of France and then establishing the French power over Northern Italy; with this he combined a renewal of the old anti-papal policy of France. He published an ordinance on August 16, forbidding the execution of papal provisions and the export of money to Rome; he urged on Sixtus IV the summoning of a General Council to be held at Orleans, and sent envoys to the Pope to negotiate for that purpose.

But the papal diplomacy was superior to that of the French king. Sixtus had an answer ready to every proposal made to him, and showed much skill in throwing on the Florentines the blame of refusing to submit to a compromise, though the Emperor and the Kings of Hungary and England united with Louis XI in urging peace upon the Pope. The position of Sixtus was cleverly chosen; he dissociated Lorenzo de' Medici from Florence, and professed his readiness to make peace with the Republic if Lorenzo would
give satisfaction for the wrongs which he had done. Lorenzo, on his side, could not
humiliate himself before the Pope without sacrificing his position in Florence, where the
ill-success of the arms of the Republic caused growing uneasiness. While Lorenzo’s
allies threatened the Pope with a Council, the papal and Neapolitan forces ravaged the
Florentine territory, and in November, 1479, captured Poggibonsi and Certaldo. A truce
was made for the winter; but Lorenzo saw clearly that Florence could not endure much
longer, and that peace must be made in some more expeditious way than by the
negotiations of Louis XI.

Lorenzo had already considered the difficulties which beset him, and saw that if
peace was hopeless from the Pope, it might be obtained from the King of Naples. Though Ferrante was desirous of obtaining hold on Tuscany, he dreaded the schemes
of Louis XI, and saw the dangers that impended from a continuance of war in Italy.
Lorenzo gradually prepared the way for an understanding with Ferrante. On December
5 he called together the chief citizens of Florence and told them that he was resolved to
do what he could to procure peace for the city; the King of Naples professed himself the
friend of Florence, though the enemy of the Medici; he would put himself in the King's
hands and would himself go to Naples to negotiate. On December 18 Lorenzo landed in
Naples, and was honorably received by the King.

It was a bold stroke on Lorenzo’s part, and he had staked all on its success. No
doubt he had previously assured himself of Ferrante’s good intentions; but there were
many obstacles to be overcome before these intentions could be carried into effect, as it
was a serious matter for Ferrante to break from his league with the Pope. Negotiations
were slowly carried on while Ferrante waited to see if Lorenzo’s absence from Florence
produced any change in the temper of the Florentines. Sixtus IV objected to Ferrante’s
intercourse with Lorenzo, and tried by all means to break it off. When he found that
terms of peace were being discussed, he insisted that Lorenzo should first go to Rome
and make his personal submission. When Lorenzo refused, the Pope asserted that his
dignity and honor would not allow him to consent to peace on other terms. He reminded
Ferrante that he had spent a fountain of money in the war, and had the victory in his
own hands; Lorenzo was in the King’s power and might be compelled to act as he
chose. Lorenzo had many anxious moments during his stay at Naples, but he made his
way by his personal qualities which commended him to the King and won friends
amongst the King’s advisers. He succeeded in establishing a basis of peace, and at the
end of February, 1480, left Naples, and was received with joy in Florence. The
conditions of peace were published in March, and damped the popular rejoicing; they
were hard for Florence, but February were such as the vanquished might expect. The
towns taken in the war were to be restored at the King's pleasure, and the Duke of
Calabria was to receive a yearly payment as general of the Republic.

Peace was made with Naples, and Sixtus, as the ally of Naples, ratified it; but he
was bitterly enrag ed, and renewed his censures against Florence. Moreover, the alliance
with Naples alienated Venice from Florence, and in April Sixtus IV concluded a
separate treaty with Venice. Nor could Florence feel confident of the good intentions
of Naples. The Duke of Calabria took up his head-quarters at Siena and behaved as its
lord; he seemed to be nourishing a design of making himself master of Tuscany.

A sudden shock compelled the Italian powers to lay aside their ambitious schemes
and unite for common defence. While they were plotting against one another they were
startled by the news that the Crescent was waving on Italian ground. The Turkish fleet
which had been repulsed from Rhodes made a dash upon Italy and occupied Otranto on July 28. The inhabitants were massacred, the fortifications were strengthened, and the new settlers supplied themselves with provisions by ravaging the neighboring territory. Such was the mutual suspicion of Italian powers that the Venetians were accused of inviting the Turks as a means of avenging themselves on Ferrante, while Lorenzo was suspected of having had a share in an event which proved advantageous to him in more ways than one.

The news of this Turkish invasion called the Duke of Calabria homewards and ended his intrigues at Siena. It drove the Pope to proclaim a truce throughout Italy, and summon all to take up arms against the Infidel. Florence judged the opportunity favorable for making peace with the Pope, who could not with good grace refuse. Twelve of the chief citizens were sent to Rome, with instructions to preserve the honor of the city, but obtain a reconciliation if possible. On the evening of November 25 they entered Rome, but as they were still under excommunication they did not meet with the reception usually accorded to envoys. On the 27th they were admitted to a private consistory, where the Bishop of Volterra asked pardon for the excesses committed against the Pope and the Church. The Pope dismissed them with a few words, saying that he must consult his Cardinals; meanwhile, let them be of good courage and hope for the Pope's mercy. Conferences were held and terms were arranged. At last, on December 3, the formal reconciliation took place. It was the first Sunday in Advent, when the Pope was wont to be present at service in S. Peter's. The Florentine envoys were admitted to the portico where Sixtus IV, surrounded by his Cardinals, was seated on a purple litter in front of the middle door. The Florentines prostrated themselves, and humbly asked pardon for their offences. Luigi Guicciardini spoke on their behalf; but as he was seventy years old his voice was feeble and he was scarcely heard. The Pope ordered one of his notaries to read the terms of peace offered by the Florentines; they promised to obey the Pope, never to wage war against the Church, nor impose taxes on the clergy. The Pope as a penance for their offences ordered them to provide fifteen galleys against the Turks, and the envoys took oath that they would observe these conditions.

Then Sixtus addressed them: “You have sinned, my sons, grievously; first against our God and Savior by slaying the Archbishop of Pisa and other priests of God, for it is written, Touch not mine anointed”. You have sinned against the Roman pontiff, who holds on earth the place of our Savior Jesus Christ, by defaming him throughout the world. You have sinned against the sacred order of Cardinals by imprisoning a Cardinal legate of the Holy See. You have sinned against the whole clerical order, by exacting tribute from the clergy within your dominions against their will, and by your disobedience to our apostolical admonitions have caused rapine, fire, and slaughter. Would that at first you had come to us, your spiritual father; doubtless then we need not have tried arms to avenge the injuries done to the Church. We certainly have done what we have done against our will, but our apostolic office drove us to act. Now, my sons, when you come to us humbly, we receive you into the bosom of our favor; when you confess your errors and excesses, we forgive you. Sin no further. You have sufficiently experienced the power of the arm of the Church; you have found how hard it is to dash your heads against the shield of God and attempt to break His breastplate”.

Then taking a rod, as is customary in conferring absolution, the Pope struck on the head each of the envoys as he knelt humbly before him, while he and the Cardinals chanted the penitential strains of the Miserere. Again the Florentines kissed his feet and
received his benediction. The doors of S. Peter’s were opened and mass was said. After the ceremony the envoys, now free from excommunication, were escorted home with the honors due to their dignity. A few days afterwards they left Rome, somewhat heavy in heart on account of the fifteen galleys, which were a severe tax on the resources of Florence already drained by the war.

Sixtus IV might hide his discomfiture by a ceremonial humiliation of Florence, but the fact remained that his hand had been forced by Lorenzo de’ Medici. He had spent large sums of money in a war whose object was to overthrow the power of the Medici, and had not gained his object. He had shown himself a dangerous leader of Italian politics; and the only result of his policy had been a temporary change in the balance of power. Instead of the league of the Pope and Naples against Florence, Milan, and Venice, he had substituted a league of the Pope and Venice against Naples, Milan and Florence. Moreover, a change in the existing relationships of Italy was sure to lead to another war.
CHAPTER IV.
ITALIAN WARS OF SIXTUS IV.
1481—1484.

The peace which at length prevailed in Italy was not due to the pacific intentions of Sixtus IV, but to the terror caused by the Turkish occupation of Otranto. It was obviously a matter of importance to the whole of Italy that these aliens should be driven from the Italian soil. Sixtus proclaimed a crusade throughout Christendom, manned galleys for an expedition against Otranto, and gave them his solemn benediction previous to their departure. But it may be doubted whether the arms of the Pope and of Naples would have prevailed against the Turks, had not the death of the great Sultan Mohammed II released Europe from the dread which his name inspired. His death in May, 1481, was followed by a civil war between his sons Bajazet and Djem. In this confusion of the Turkish Empire the commander of Otranto judged it prudent to retire, and gave up the city in September to the Duke of Calabria, who had besieged it for some months. On this the papal galleys returned home, though the King of Naples wished to use the opportunity for further expeditions against the Turks; but the Pope's fleet had no supplies, and nothing further was done.

In truth the interest of Sixtus was centered solely in Italy, where his great object was to extend the possessions of Count Girolamo, who had not wasted the opportunities afforded by the Florentine war. He attempted to seize Pesaro, and when this failed succeeded in acquiring Forli, where the legitimate line of the Ordelaffi came to an end in 1480. The people of Forli, wearied of the tyranny of the Ordelaffi, put themselves under the protection of the Pope, who sent Girolamo as captain of his forces. Girolamo occupied the castle, seized and put to death an illegitimate son of the late Ordelaffi lord, and added Forli to his dominion of Imola. He looked out for fresh acquisitions, and the new alliance of Sixtus with Venice gave him grounds for hoping that with Venetian help more might be won. In September, 1481, he visited Venice, where he was received with great honors and was admitted into the role of Venetian nobles. The object of his visit was soon apparent; Venice had sundry grievances against Duke Ercole I of Ferrara, and Sixtus was willing to aid her in attacking a powerful vassal of the Church, whose dominions might further enrich the papal nephew.

Pretexts were not wanting for the war which began in May, 1482, and drew all Italy into its vortex. The King of Naples sent troops in defence of his son-in-law Duke Ercole; Florence and Milan joined him in opposing the schemes of the Pope; even Federigo of Urbino exclaimed that it was monstrous that the peace of Italy should be disturbed by the dark designs of a rash young man. He refused to serve Sixtus IV, and Roberto Malatesta of Rimini was made papal general in his stead.

The time which Sixtus had chosen for the declaration of war against Ferrara was not fortunate. Rome was disturbed by a bloody feud which divided it into two opposite factions, whose struggles gave ample opportunity to the Pope's enemies to interfere with effect. The Papacy had pursued a policy so fully in accordance with the traditions of the turbulent Roman barons, that they naturally hastened to follow the example which it set.
Paul II, by impartiality in Italian politics, was enabled to govern Rome with justice; the rash designs of Sixtus awakened the elements of civic discord, and revived a barbarous past which had only been thrust for a time into the background. The rise of a blood feud in Rome in the days of Sixtus stands in marked contrast to the culture of the Renaissance, and sounds like an echo from a bygone age.

In the tumultuous plundering of the palace of Sixtus after his election to the papal office, Francesco di Santa Croce was wounded by a member of the Valle family. He waited his time, and cut the tendon of his adversary's heel as he was walking one day in the Campo dei Fiori. The Valle in turn went in disguise to the house of Prospero di Santa Croce, his brother-in-law, where he knew that Francesco was at supper. With a stroke of his sword he cleft the head of the unsuspecting man, whose blood spurted over the table. It was now Prospero’s turn to take vengeance; but the feud was declared and the Valle were cautious. Prospero vainly sought his foe; at length his patience was exhausted, and he found another victim in Francesco’s father-in-law, Piero Margani, an old man of seventy, when he slew standing at his own door. Margani was a wealthy man and an adherent of Count Girolamo. The feud, intensified by this murder, soon spread through the city, as the Valle were supported by the Colonna, the Santa Croce by the Orsini. For a time the fear of the Turks found occupation for these turbulent spirits in the camp of Alfonso before Otranto; but when they returned to Rome the feud again blazed forth, and grew in violence under the influence of Naples. When Sixtus determined on war against Ferrara, he summoned the Roman barons from the camp of Alfonso. The Orsini obeyed the Pope’s summons; the Savelli and Colonna remained; and Alfonso was not sorry to have adherents who might create disturbances in Rome.

Disturbances were not long in arising. On the night of April 3 the Santa Croce, aided by some of the papal guards whom Count Girolamo despatched on this service, attacked the Valle palace and killed in the fray Girolamo Colonna, a natural son of Antonio, prefect of the city. On this Sixtus ordered the house of the Santa Croce to be razed to the ground. This did not much mend matters, as Prospero Colonna, enraged at his brother's death, withdrew from Rome and joined Alfonso, who appeared at the head of his troops and asked leave to pass through the papal dominions on his way to Ferrara. When the Pope refused, Alfonso advanced to the Latin Hills, and the Colonna and Savelli fortified themselves in the strong castle of Marino, whence they ravaged the Campagna and even dashed in a pillaging raid into the city itself. The Neapolitan galleys appeared off Ostia, and Rome was threatened with a siege.

Sixtus retaliated by imprisoning Cardinals Colonna and Savelli on the charge of treasonable correspondence with Naples. The Romans, meanwhile, murmured at the loss of their harvest from the Neapolitan troops, and Sixtus was so alarmed at their discontent that he dared not send his forces against the foe. He was afraid that if he were left unprotected in Rome the city would rise against him, and judged it more prudent to await the arrival of reinforcements from Venice. Meanwhile, the Vatican was guarded like a fortress, and the Pope's chamber was watched by night and day. Rome, which for some months had been turned into a manufactory of arms, now experienced all the forms of military licence. Even the churches were not spared; Count Girolamo took possession of the Lateran and turned the sacristy into a club-room, where he and his friends played cards and draughts upon the reliquaries.

At last, on July 23, Roberto Malatesta arrived before the walls of Rome and was received with the greatest joy by the people as their deliverer. His forces were not
numerous at first, and he had to wait for troops which were raised at the cost of Venice. On August 15 a large army was collected and defiled through the Piazza of S. Peter, where the Pope gave them his benediction from a window in the Vatican. On August 18 they marched from the gate of S. Giovanni against the foe, amidst the muttered curses of the Romans, whose vineyards had been destroyed and whose city had been rendered pestilential by the soldiers.

On the approach of the papal forces, which outnumbered his own, the Duke of Calabria withdrew from Civitâ Lavigna and took up a strong position in the desolate and unhealthy district of woods and marshes which reaches down to the sea. The spot where he entrenched himself bore the ill-omened name of Campo Morto, a little hill accessible only by two entrances from the neighboring marsh. According to the courtesies of Italian warfare Malatesta arranged with Duke Alfonso the day and time of battle, and on August 21 the fight began. After the capitulation of Otranto, Alfonso had taken into his pay some of the janissaries, who now appeared in Italian warfare; their valor and the strength of the position repulsed the first onslaught of the papal infantry; but Malatesta, with desperate bravery, reformed his broken lines and meanwhile a diversion in the rear threw the Neapolitan camp into confusion. A storm of rain damped their powder and prevented them from using their artillery. Alfonso, fearful for his safety, stole away and made to the sea-coast, whence he fled to Terracina; his army was completely routed. The battle was memorable amidst the bloodless contests of Italy; more than 1000 men were slain and many Neapolitans were made prisoners.

The news of this victory awakened the greatest delight in Rome, which was increased by the surrender of Marino and other strong places held in the neighborhood by the Neapolitans. The exertion of the battle amid the marshy ground proved fatal to Roberto Malatesta, who returned to Rome and died on September 10, after receiving supreme unction at the hands of Sixtus. He was honorably buried in S. Peter's, and the city mourned for its deliverer; but the death of Roberto freed the Pope from a friend who might have become too powerful. His wife received on the same day the news of the death of her husband, and of her father Federigo of Urbino, whose long military career was ended by a fever which he caught in the marshes of Ferrara while leading the troops of the league against Venice.

The victory of Campo Morto freed Rome from peril, but did not win anything for the Pope. The Neapolitans still held strong positions in the papal territory; Ferrara was not yet conquered; and Sixtus began to dread the overweening power of Venice. Moreover a still more serious danger invited Sixtus to greater caution in his rash designs. An attempt was made to raise again the cry for a reforming Council; and the attempt was fostered by foes whom the Italian policy of the Pope had embittered against him. That such a danger should terrify the Pope is a sign of the weakness of the new attitude assumed by the Papacy. If the papal position was to be chiefly political, it was but natural that the Pope's political opponents should attack him from the ecclesiastical side, and that the question of reformation should be reserved as a convenient weapon against a Pope who threatened to become too powerful. While the papal forces triumphed at Campo Morto the enemies of Sixtus retaliated by the menace of a renewal of the Council of Basel. The threat was empty and its instrument was insignificant, but it nevertheless fulfilled its purpose.

Andrea Zuccalmaglio, Archbishop of Krain, by birth a Slav, a member of the Dominican Order, was sent to Rome as ambassador by the Emperor Frederick III. He
seems to have been a simple-minded man, without much knowledge of the world or much experience of affairs. Not unnaturally he was shocked by much that he saw at Rome and ventured to speak his mind plainly to the Pope. Sixtus IV did not resent his remonstrances, but hinted to the Emperor that he had not chosen a discreet envoy. Frederick III accordingly recalled Andrea, who meanwhile had waxed bolder and had openly denounced the Pope and his relatives. On the withdrawal of the Emperor's commission he was imprisoned in June, 1481, in the Castle of S. Angelo, but was soon released and departed for Germany, smarting under a sense of wrong. He had come to Rome hoping for the Cardinalate, and had received imprisonment as the reward of his apostolic frankness. His vanity was wounded; and on his way homeward he published his wrongs till some wily politicians of Northern Italy confirmed him in the belief that he ought to take steps to redress them.

Accordingly the Archbishop of Krain used his dignity of imperial ambassador as a means of opening a formidable attack upon the Pope. Instead of returning to Vienna, he went to Basel with the intention of reviving the traditions of the last reforming Council. He gave himself the name of Cardinal and papal legate, and was lucky enough to find a clever secretary in Peter Numagen, a notary of Trier. On March 25, 1482, he entered the cathedral during the time of service, denounced Pope Sixtus and solemnly proclaimed a Council. He demanded of the city magistrates a safe-conduct in the Emperor's name, and the burghers of Basel had no objection to anything that was likely to bring strangers to their city.

The news of this strange proceeding awakened much anxiety in Rome: it seemed impossible that the Archbishop of Krain should proceed so far without being sure of powerful support. Sixtus IV suspected that the Emperor was secretly abetting him, and indeed Frederick III, when appealed to by the magistrates of Basel, gave ambiguous answers; he was willing to wait and see if there was anything to be gained from the phantom Council. Everyone laughed at the Archbishop of Krain, whom his own secretary held to be light-headed; but every one enjoyed the Pope's discomfiture, and no one was quite sure how matters might turn, whether or not the burlesque might become earnest.

Sixtus was alarmed at the attitude of the Archbishop of Krain, and even amidst the pressure of events in Rome, did not neglect any means to get him into his power. Envoy after envoy was sent to the Emperor and to the citizens of Basel: but Frederick III did not absolutely order the men of Basel to take the Archbishop prisoner, and without the Emperor’s orders the magistrates refused to seize him. Meanwhile Archbishop Andrea thundered forth invectives against the Pope, and summoned him to appear before a Council of which he himself was as yet the sole representative. On July 20 he placarded his summons in Basel: “Francesco of Savona, son of the devil, you entered your office not through the door but through the window of simony. You are of your father the devil, and labor to do your father’s will”.

Sixtus excommunicated him, and a Dominican inquisitor in Basel denounced him as a schismatic and heretic. The Archbishop answered by an invective against the Dominicans, though he himself belonged to the Order. It was an unwise step, for it set all the preachers against him: every church rang with their denunciations. The Pope laid Basel under an interdict, but it was not observed. The conciliar principle was not yet dead, and the Curia feared a revival of the Council of Basel. So late as September, an official of the Pope wrote a letter to the Provost of the Church of Basel in which he
combated the position that a Council might meet without the Pope’s summons. In so doing he did not venture to impugn the decrees of Constance, but only argued that they had not been carried out and therefore had lapsed by common consent. The Council of Basel had been transferred either to Lausanne or to the Lateran, according as men thought; but in either case it had separated without fixing a place for meeting again, and it was now impossible to revive the Council of Basel without a new summons. The treatise throughout is curious, as showing the dread which the threat of a Council still inspired, and the difficulties of canonists in arguing against it.

Matters were now so far serious that in September Florence and Milan sent envoys to see what was to be made out of this new movement. The Florentine envoy reported to Lorenzo de’ Medici that the Archbishop of Krain was a resolute and determined man, well adapted to harass the Pope and Count Girolamo. He promised the men of Basel that the Italian League would help them to reform the Church, and he rejoiced to find the Pope as much hated beyond the Alps as in Florence. But in spite of this intelligence, the Italian powers did not care to commit themselves; and the Emperor at last discovered that he had nothing to gain. On October 20 a letter arrived in Basel, bidding the magistrates imprison the rebellious Archbishop, who was acting contrary to his instructions. After this the papal legate demanded that the Archbishop be given up to him as a prisoner, but the magistrates refused for some time. At last, on December 18, a solemn assembly was held. Andrea protested his obedience to the Emperor and his fidelity to the Church, but asserted that he was justified in his attempt to hold a Council for the reformation of the Church, and declared that he had not calumniated the Pope, as he had said nothing but what was notoriously true. He was put in prison by the magistrates, who refused to give him up to the legate. Their city was laid under the greater excommunication, but they continued steadfast. Andrea remained in prison in Basel, till in November, 1484, he hanged himself in his cell. Then a papal legate was sent to seize his papers and give absolution to the city. The corpse of the unhappy man was thrown into the Rhine.

This attempt at a Council was ludicrous enough, and its significance lies only in its influence on the papal policy. If Sixtus had continued in his war against the Italian League, they might have found means to blow up a flame of opposition in Basel. The position of the Pope as Head of Christendom had sunk to be subsidiary to his position as an Italian prince, and was merely a source of weakness to his political plans. Sixtus IV recognized this fact, and the papal policy underwent a sudden change. The Spanish envoys in Rome negotiated a peace between the Pope and Naples; and on December 11 Sixtus wrote to his ally, the Doge of Venice, bidding him withdraw from the war against Ferrara which was being waged successfully. On December 13 Sixtus celebrated his peace in Rome by a solemn procession to the Church of S. Maria della Virtù, the name of which he changed to S. Maria della Pace, and resolved to rebuild the church in token of his thankfulness. A few days afterwards the Duke of Calabria paid Rome a visit and was welcomed by the Pope in the Vatican. On December 30 he set out to the aid of Ferrara with the Pope’s benediction on his arms. Sixtus suddenly altered his political attitude, but was only waiting to see what new object he might pursue. He had certainly gained nothing by the war in which he had engaged against Ferrara.

Moreover, the Pope’s change of attitude was as complete as it was sudden. Not content with leaving Venice in the lurch, he ordered her to make peace with Ferrara immediately. The Venetian senate answered with some dignity, “You might easily at the beginning have led us to forget our grievances; now, after we have spent more
money than Ferrara is worth, and when victory is in our grasp, your exhortation to peace is simply an attempt to wrest from us what we have won, and hold us up to the ridicule of the world. Why do you grudge us our success? We have not summoned a Council, nor promoted a schism*. Venice naturally did not see why her interests should be sacrificed to the Pope's panic. But Sixtus did not do things by halves; he joined the league of Naples, Milan, and Florence against his former ally, and on May 25, 1483, even excommunicated the Venetians for warring against Ferrara, disturbing the peace of Italy, and thereby preventing the pacification of Europe for a crusade against the Turks. The Venetians answered by appealing to a future Council. Sixtus pronounced their appeal to be ipso facto null and void; it could rest only on one of two grounds, either that Christ had not given power on earth to S. Peter and his successors, which was heretical, or that an appeal was possible from Christ's Vicar to Christ Himself, which was contrary to the canons, seeing that the two tribunals were identical. At the same time Sixtus IV was careful to assure himself of the support of Louis XI of France, the only king who was likely to help Venice in the matter of a Council. He sent an envoy to point out the dangers of Venetian aggression. As Louis XI had no friendly feeling towards Venice, he permitted the excommunication to be published in his kingdom.

The real reason of the change of the papal policy was a hope of wresting from Venice the towns of Cervia and Ravenna by means of his new allies. Venice was not successful in the campaign of 1483, and tried to make peace with the Pope. Cardinal Costa undertook the office of mediator, and Venice agreed that the papal flag should wave over the towns which she had captured and that papal governors should be admitted. Sixtus demanded that the Venetian garrisons should also be withdrawn, which was equivalent to claiming for himself the Venetian conquests. Cardinal Costa found that he was mocked in his attempts to negotiate, as Count Girolamo showed him a document signed by the Pope, that peace was not to be made till Venice had been driven from Cervia and Ravenna. No wonder men said that Sixtus preferred war to peace.

Meanwhile, in the city of Rome peace had not put an end to the disorderly spirit which prevailed. On January 22, 1483, died Cardinal Estouteville, at the age of eighty. He had been Cardinal for eight-and-thirty years and his possessions were enormous. His funeral was the occasion of an unseemly quarrel between the Monks of S. Agostino and the Canons of S. Maria Maggiore, who both claimed as their perquisites the rich trappings of the bier. In the tumult that arose the rings were torn off the fingers of the dead prelate, the disputants charged one another with their lighted torches, and swords were drawn by the bystanders. The corpse was only saved from further indignity by being hurried into the sacristy of S. Agostino till the fight was over. In February the Carnival was revived with great splendor after being for seven years in abeyance; but a disturbance arose which drove the magistrates to flee into the Capitol.

If Rome was turbulent, the papal policy did not tend to pacify it. Sixtus seems to have had an ungovernable liking for discord. In the peace which had been made with Naples nothing was said about the Roman allies of King Ferrante; so the Cardinals Colonna and Savelli were still kept in prison, and were not released till November 15. The Colonna grew more and more suspicious of the Pope, since Count Girolamo Riario was avowedly on the side of the Orsini, and on the same day as Cardinal Colonna was freed from prison, Gian Battista Orsini was raised to the Cardinalate. The avowed animosity of these two families kept Rome unquiet, and early in 1484 faction fights again burst out so that the festivities of the Carnival could not be celebrated. On April 28 the head of the Colonna, the protonotary Oddo, returned to Rome, and the Orsini at
once took up arms. The magistrates appealed to the Pope to save them from civil war, and Sixtus summoned Oddo to the Vatican. Oddo sent his excuses to the Pope, declaring that he was in arms not against the Church but against his personal foes. Sixtus repeated his summons, and Oddo mounted on horseback to obey; but on the way his friends surrounded him, pointed out the danger which he ran, warned him that he would never return alive, and that if he failed them they were all undone. At last some exclaimed that it were better for them to cut him in pieces than leave him to his enemies; his horse was seized and he was dragged back to his palace. Again the Pope repeated his summons; again Oddo was dragged back by his friends. Then Sixtus declared him to be guilty of treason and sent orders for his capture. The Orsini stormed and sacked the Colonna palace, till Oddo, slightly wounded, surrendered to Virginio Orsini, who carried him to the Pope, but had some difficulty in saving his prisoner from Count Girolamo Riario, who made several attempts to stab him by the way.

Oddo Colonna was examined by the Pope and then imprisoned in the Castle of S. Angelo. Meanwhile the Colonna palaces were being plundered; and though the Cardinals urged that they be spared, the Pope issued an order that they be razed to the ground. Pillage and slaughter raged in the city, and every man avenged his private grievances upon his foes. The papal forces were sent against the castle of Marino where Fabrizio Colonna maintained himself. The city magistrates in vain pleaded with Count Girolamo to make a truce—he would with difficulty allow them access to the Pope, who answered that he would neither have truce nor peace till he had the lands of the Colonna in his hands. Count Girolamo was implacable, and even attacked Cardinal Giuliano della Rovere in the Pope's presence for having given refuge in his palace to some barons of the Colonna party; Giuliano answered that the violence of the Count was enough to ruin Pope and Cardinals alike. The Colonna offered to give up to the College of Cardinals Marino, Rocca del Papa, and Ardea; but the Pope answered, at Girolamo's dictation, that he would have their castles by force in their despite. Count Girolamo was master of Rome, and in the Pope's name exacted money from the clergy, even from the papal secretaries, that he might provide artillery for the siege of Marino. On June 23 Sixtus went to inspect the guns before they set out for Marino; raising his eyes to heaven he made the sign of the cross and blessed them, praying that God would endow them with such virtue, that wherever they went they might turn to fight the enemies of the Church. It was a new form of warfare for the Christian faith that Sixtus invented and set forth with all the forms of ecclesiastical ritual.

To save the life of his brother, Fabrizio Colonna surrendered to the Pope, on June 25, Marino and Rocca del Papa; but he trusted to a broken reed if he put any confidence in the Pope's mercy. Oddo Colonna was subjected to the mockery of a trial and was sentenced to be executed on June 30. When he came to the block his confession was read: he turned to those standing by and protested that he had spoken under cruel tortures what was not true, that he wished to inculpate no man, but was content to die. Then he commended his spirit to God, and his head was severed from his body with the name of Jesus on his lips. His body was placed in a coffin and carried to the Church of S. Maria in Trastevere, thence to SS. Apostoli, where his luckless mother received it weeping. Opening the coffin she gazed on her son's mangled remains, and exclaimed: “See the head of my son and the faith of Pope Sixtus, who promised that if we gave up Marino he would give up my son. He has Marino and I have my son’s corpse; such is his faith”. A week after, the desolate mother died.
Still Sixtus found, as had several of his predecessors, that it was a hard matter to destroy a powerful family like the Colonna. The castle of Cavi held out for three weeks against Count Girolamo and his artillery. The Colonna then retired to Palliano, where they made such desperate resistance, and so harassed the besiegers by constant sallies, that Count Girolamo wrote mournfully to the Pope asking for reinforcements, and owning that he had little hopes of success. Sixtus was greatly depressed at this news: he had hoped for an easy victory over the Colonna, and was not prepared for their desperate resistance. In the middle of June he had been ill of a fever and his health began to give way. When envoys came on August 11 to announce that his allies had made peace with Venice, Sixtus could hardly speak to express his indignation. “You bring a peace”, said the dying man, “full of disgrace and confusion; I can never accept it”. The legates tried to mollify his wrath, and he dismissed them with a motion of his hand that might be taken either as a blessing or as a command to be gone. His attendants tried to console him, but he grew gradually weaker, and died early next morning, August 12.

Sixtus was a man of strongly marked character, who exercised a powerful influence, both on Italy in his own day and on the future of the Papacy. Machiavelli says of him with truth: “he was the first Pope who began to show the extent of the papal power, and how things that before were called errors could be hidden behind the papal authority”. The papal power which Machiavelli had before his eyes was not the moral authority of the Head of Christendom, but the power of an Italian prince who was engaged in consolidating his dominions into an important state.

However much the formation of the Papal States might be a lawful object of papal endeavor there remains the question of its importance. Sixtus pursued it passionately to the exclusion of the other duties of his office. He paid no heed to the pacification of Christendom, and though sometimes the talk of a crusade appears in his letters, it is mere hollow pretence. All thought of the policy of Pius II was entirely abandoned. The affairs of Bohemia and Hungary were left to settle themselves. The sphere of the Pope’s political activity was narrowed to Italy only, and Sixtus inaugurated a period of secularization of the Papacy which continued till the shock of the Reformation startled it again into spiritual activity. Under Sixtus the Papacy became an Italian power, which pursued its own political career with force and dexterity. What Sixtus began Alexander VI continued, and Julius II brought to a successful issue. The Papal States were won, but Italy fell under foreign domination, and the Papacy lost its hold on Northern Europe almost as soon as the work was accomplished.

The object which Sixtus set before himself was not a lofty one, nor fitted to absorb all the papal energies. But when Sixtus adopted it he pursued it with all the force and determination of a powerful and resolute character. His strongly marked personality produced a deep impression on Italy and left abiding traces on the Papacy. The vigorous nature that raised the low-born upstart to the papal throne finds its parallel in the condottieri generals who mounted from the cottage to the dukedom, who ruled with munificence and burned to hand down their glory to future ages. Sixtus had an upstart’s desire to raise his family and spread the glory of his name. Four of his relatives were made Cardinals, and others were enriched at the expense of the Church. Two were wedded to relations of the King of Naples, and were provided for in the Neapolitan domains. Another was married to the daughter of the Duke of Urbino, and his son substituted the name of Rovere for that of Montefeltro in the ducal seat. These all won their way by peaceful means, supported only by the Pope’s influence; but Girolamo
Riario was reserved to be the instrument of the Pope's policy in winning back and organizing the possessions of the Church. For him the Pope plunged into one war after another and lavished all the resources of his temporal and spiritual authority.

Yet Girolamo Riario had nothing to commend him except his readiness to accept the part which the Pope wished him to play. If Sixtus was resolute and unscrupulous, Girolamo surpassed him in his determination to let nothing slip that might promote his own advancement. We have seen how his zeal outsped that of Sixtus in his desire to overthrow Lorenzo de' Medici; and in all other matters he acted with equal disregard to morality. Arrogant, uncultivated, and brutal, he took pleasure in nothing but the chase, which he raised to a magnificence never equaled since the days of the Roman Circus. Under the shadow of the Pope's protection he carried all before him in Rome, and those who were not prepared to become his creatures were exposed to his vengeance. His violence shocked even his relatives, and Cardinal Giuliano openly reproved him. His cousin, Antonio Basso, on his deathbed denounced the crimes of Count Girolamo, who came to bid him farewell. “Whether his mind was deranged or he wished to ease himself of the venom which had long been retained”, says an eye-witness, “he inveighed vehemently against the Count. He told him of deeds of his that were everywhere condemned, of his character everywhere reprobated. We who stood by the bedside blushed for shame, and some quietly withdrew”. The dying man ventured to speak out the truth to the favorite who enjoyed the entire confidence of the Pope.

Indeed it is impossible not to feel that the low savagery and brutal resoluteness of Count Girolamo were echoes of the natural man of Sixtus which had been in some measure tempered by early training and the habits of self-restraint. The policy of Sixtus is marked by wild energy rather than by any greatness of conception. He set an object definitely before himself, and pursued it by any means that offered. The existing generation of Italian statesmen were polished and prudent diplomatists: they had won their position by fraud or force, but aimed at retaining it by wisdom and caution. Sixtus went back to the traditions of the more barbarous age of condottieri adventurers. Hence he spread dismay amongst the politicians of Italy, because he revived a past which they were striving to forget. The diplomatic webs of Lorenzo de' Medici and Ludovico Sforza were useless to enchain Sixtus, who remained an incoercible element in their schemes. It was through his restless energy, not through his wisdom, that Sixtus IV caused dread. His plans, such as they were, never succeeded; yet none the less he raised the Papacy to the level of a great power. He failed to overthrow Lorenzo de' Medici; he failed to win anything from Ferrara, or from Naples, or from Venice; he failed to overcome the Colonna faction in Rome. Yet all whom he attacked felt that he might have succeeded, and acknowledged the power of their foe.

Great as was the political energy of Sixtus it did not hinder his activity in other directions. He was a mighty organizer and builder, as well as a patron of art and literature. If his policy left an abiding impress on the Papacy, no less did his care leave a permanent mark on the outward aspect of the city of Rome. It is at first sight astonishing to find a violent politician like Sixtus busied with art and architecture; but Italy in that age was full of contradictions, and Sixtus was above all things an Italian. If he borrowed his policy from his neighbors, he borrowed with equal readiness their patronage of art; or rather in both points he developed the exclusively Italian elements which the Papacy, as an Italian power, necessarily contained. Yet here, as well as in politics, we see the traces of overpowering energy rather than of individual feeling or clear conception. Sixtus did not understand the splendid dream of Nicolas V, the conversion of Rome into
the literary and artistic capital of Christendom; still less had he the fine taste which made Paul II a passionate amateur, with all an amateur’s exclusiveness and selfish delight in amassing delicate treasures full of fascination to himself.

In spite of its apparent culture the period of the Renaissance was woefully one-sided in its interests and its appreciation. A student of ancient art cared nothing for the works of his own age; few could regard sculpture and painting as sister arts; builders made no scruple in pulling down the precious remains of antiquity to provide materials for their new edifices. Every man was engaged in some one pursuit to the exclusion of all others; and if the men of the Renaissance saved some of the treasures of antiquity with one hand, they destroyed almost as much with the other. Sixtus regarded Paul II's cameos and medals as baubles of little consequence; the larger objects he kept, and with them formed the nucleus of the Capitoline Museum. It is characteristic of Sixtus that he was heedless of things whose size did not fit them for public display.

The same want of appreciation was shown by Sixtus in his treatment of the remains of antiquity. He restored the celebrated equestrian statue of Marcus Aurelius which now stands in front of the Capitol, and he forbade the destruction of ancient monuments; but he empowered his architects to quarry where they pleased to obtain stones for his new works. The Sistine Bridge was built from the blocks of the Coliseum: the temple of Hercules was entirely swept away. In estimating what Sixtus did for the city of Rome we can appraise his achievements, but we can only guess what he destroyed.

Still the practical sense and energy of Sixtus enabled him to work more lasting results than were accomplished by the finer taste of his predecessors. He had no plan of transforming Rome into a magnificent city, but for that very reason he did much towards making it more habitable. Rome in the Middle Ages was far below other Italian cities in the outward accompaniments of civilized life. It was a wild, desolate, uncared-for place. The streets were crooked and narrow, destitute of pavement, and encumbered with porticoes which harbored dirt. Infessura says that Ferrante of Naples on his visit to the Pope in 1475 pointed out the strategical disadvantages of such irregular streets; he told Sixtus that he could never be master of a city where barricades could be so easily constructed, and where a few women from the top of the overhanging balconies could keep a troop of soldiers at bay. Whether in consequence of this advice or no cannot be said, but Sixtus took in hand the work of rearranging the chief streets of his capital. He straightened their labyrinthine turns, swept away the projecting porches, and paved the streets with tiles. The works were begun in 1480 under the direction of commissioners, and were carried out with promptitude. The Romans at first murmured, but gradually saw the advantages of the Pope's proceedings. Moreover, Sixtus had a summary manner of dealing with objectors. One day, when he went to view the works in progress, he found a burgher who refused to allow the papal workmen to widen the approach to the Bridge of S. Angelo by throwing down the booths which he had built to contain his wares. The Pope ordered the man to prison, and stood by till he saw his house as well as his booths demolished.

By such vigorous measures Sixtus succeeded in working some reforms in the Roman streets. He secured a clear communication between the Vatican and the Bridge of S. Angelo, thence through the Campus Martius to the Capitol. Moreover, in preparation for the Jubilee of 1475, he built the bridge across the Tiber which still bears his name, the Ponte Sisto. He was mindful of the disaster which had occurred in the Jubilee of 1450, through the crowding on the Bridge of S. Angelo, which was the only
available means of communication with S. Peter’s. The new bridge was strongly built of blocks of travertine, and its architect aimed at a solid rather than a graceful structure. In another matter Sixtus deserved well of the Romans: he cared for the water supply and brought down the Acqua Vergine from the Quirinal to the Trevi fountain. In everything that could improve and beautify Rome, Sixtus took a keen and active interest. He did much to give the city its modern aspect, and if he had lived long enough he would have transformed it entirely. He did his best to encourage others to follow his example by giving right of ownership to all who built houses in the district of Rome. The Cardinals, especially Estouteville, were incited to build, and many palaces owe their foundation to the energy of the Rovere family and their imitators.

The monumental works of Sixtus have borne the impress of his activity to the present day more distinctly than have the buildings of his predecessors. In the Vatican he erected a block, containing a library on the ground floor, and above it the famous Sistine Chapel which still bears the Pope’s name. The requirements of the Vatican library have long outsped the modest provision made by Sixtus, and this building now serves as offices. The Chapel owes its fame to the mighty pencil of Michael Angelo and not to any architectural merits. It is nothing more than a large room, coldly ornamented with pilasters along the sides, with a flatly vaulted roof. There is nothing in the construction of the Chapel that bespeaks its purposes, yet its very bareness and simplicity seem to have fitted it for papal ceremonies; its structure has remained unchanged, and it has owed its dignity to the master's hand which has made the blank walls vocal with his genius.

So was it with the other buildings of Sixtus. None of them are great architectural creations. Vasari assigns them to the Florentine Baccio Pontelli; but they seem to have been chiefly the work of smaller men, Meo del Caprina, Giacomo di Pietra Santa, and others whose names only survive. Sixtus wanted his work done, and cared more for its rapid execution than for its fine design. Moreover, his age was not distinguished by any great architect. The stars of Brunelleschi and of Leo Battista Alberti had set, and their great conceptions were reproduced by timid copyists. The works of Sixtus are interesting as showing the modest beginnings in Rome of the triumph of the Renaissance, opposed as it was to the sentiment of the city’s past, over the Gothic architecture. In S. Maria della Pace and S. Maria del Popolo we find traces of Gothic influence in the rose windows, the clustered pillars, and the vaulted nave; but the octagonal dome, the simple treatment of the façade, and the pilasters of the portico mark them as works of the Renaissance. Poor as they are in details, they form the link between Brunelleschi and Bramante. The ideas of Brunelleschi are being applied experimentally till the free hand of Bramantean give them full expression.

The Church of S. Maria del Popolo became the favorite Church of the Rovere family, and its monuments make it a museum of Renaissance art. The Church of S. Maria della Pace was not finished by Sixtus, but his successor continued the work. Besides these chief buildings of Sixtus, the Churches of S. Pietro in Vincoli, S. Balbina, SS. Nereo de Achilleo, S. Quirico, S. Susanna and others were restored; and the tribune of SS. Apostoli was rebuilt. Still more characteristic is the building of the great hospital of S. Spirito which Sixtus began immediately on his accession. The octagonal cupola with pointed windows and the tower of the neighboring Church of S. Spirito, are perhaps the happiest remains of the architecture of Sixtus. The restoration of this ruined hospital is a memorial that Sixtus was not so entirely engrossed in worldly schemes as to forget altogether his mission as a Christian priest.
In painting, Sixtus had a larger choice of artists, and summoned to Rome almost all the great masters of his day. The large room of the hospital of S. Spirito was adorned with a series of frescoes, now much ruined, representing the life of the Pope. They set forth the dream of her child's greatness which his mother dreamed; the miracles that accompanied his childhood; the foundation of the hospital; the restoration of the Roman churches; the ceremonial receptions given to sovereigns; the canonization of S. Bonaventura and the like. There is no mention of the wars of Sixtus: the only allusion to martial exploits is the victory of the papal fleet over the Turks. If the history of Sixtus were read by the aid of the record which he himself has left, we should picture a kindly and devout old man entirely devoted to the discharge of his spiritual duties.

For the decoration of his buildings Sixtus summoned to Rome Perugino, Sandro Botticelli, Domenico, Ghirlandaio, Cosimo Roselli, Melozzo da Forli, Filippino Lippi, Luca Signorelli, Piero da Cosimo, Fra Diamante, and others of less note. Even in his dealings with painters we see his practical spirit, for he united them into a confraternity under the patronage of S. Luke; and the confraternity was afterwards raised by Gregory XIII in 1577 to the dignity of a corporate academy for the painters of Rome. Yet though Sixtus protected artists, they had to be careful how they offended him. During the siege of Cavi, a young Roman painted the scene with such exactness that it filled Rome with admiration. The tents and standards of the besiegers, the guns, and the troops engaged in conflict were portrayed with spirit. The Pope sent for the picture and at first was pleased with it; but he grew angry as he saw that it represented the defeat of the soldiers of the Church, and the discovery of an episode which seemed to mock at Count Girolamo filled up the measure of his wrath. He ordered the luckless painter to be imprisoned, to receive ten stripes, and on the next day to be hanged and his house to be pulled down. The Pope's wrath was only mitigated by the plea that the man was light-headed; his life was spared but he was banished from Rome.

Perhaps the feeling that they served an uncertain master weighed on the spirits of the great painters who paintings came to Rome; perhaps they were fettered by the Pope's directions; perhaps the atmosphere of the place was still strange to their art, and there was nothing to inspire them. At all events, none of them produced a masterpiece in their decoration of the Sistine Chapel, and few rose to their ordinary level. Yet the conception of the twelve pictures which adorn the side walls is dignified. On one side are six episodes from the life of Moses; on the other side six corresponding events in the life of Jesus, showing His fulfillment of the types set forth by the lawgiver of the Old Dispensation. The art of the painter has been too much bound down by the didactic nature of the task assigned him. Each picture contains several distinct motives; thus Botticelli represents, in one picture, Moses staling the Egyptian, fleeing to Midian, driving away the shepherds from the fountain, watering Zipporah's sheep, kneeling before the burning bush, and finally returning to Egypt. The eye wanders vainly amid this multitude of details, which are not separated by any formal division; nor is the size of the picture large enough to admit of the treatment of any one of these subjects. Ghirlandaio and Perugino have succeeded best because their chief pictures, the call of S. Andrew and S. Peter, and the delivery of the keys to S. Peter, were naturally of sufficient importance to occupy the entire space. Most probably the great artists of the Sistine Chapel, Perugino, Botticelli, Roselli, Signorelli, and Ghirlandaio, had their subjects assigned by the Pope and were bound to put into their pictures as much as he wanted. We have seen that Sixtus took a quantitative view of artistic excellence, and there are traces of an opinion that the Pope's taste was sadly uncultivated. Vasari tells
the story that Sixtus offered a prize to the artist who should acquit himself best. Cosimo Roselli, feeling that he had no chance on other grounds, set himself to captivate the Pope by the brilliancy of his coloring. His rivals laughed at his gaudy colours, his profusion of gold and ultramarine; but Cosimo knew his man and turned the laugh against the scoffers; when Sixtus came to judge he was caught by Cosimo’s trap, and awarded him the prize.

Besides these great painters, Melozzo da Forli enjoyed the patronage of the Pope and his nephews. Much of his work in Rome has been destroyed; but the picture in the Vatican gallery is of great historical interest. Originally it was a fresco which adorned the walls of the library, but it has been transferred to canvas. It represents Sixtus founding the Vatican library. The Pope, with a face characterized by mingled strength and coarseness, his hands grasping the arms of his chair, sits looking at Platina, who kneels before him—a man whose face is that of a scholar, with square jaw, thin lips, finely cut mouth, and keen glancing eye. Cardinal Giuliano stands like an official who is about to give a message to the Pope, by whose side is Piero Riario, with aquiline nose and sensual chin, red-cheeked and supercilious. Behind Platina is Count Girolamo with a shock of black hair falling over large black eyes, his look contemptuous and his mien imperious.

This picture of Melozzo represents Sixtus in his relation to literature, which also he prided himself on patronizing. The cloud which hung over men of letters in the days of Paul II was rolled away and they again basked in the sunshine of Papal patronage. The unlucky Platina was again taken into favor, the lectures of Pomponius Laetus were again thronged with students. The Vatican library, which was committed to Platina’s charge, contained 2500 volumes, of which the greater part were theological works and the remainder Greek and Latin classics. Platina had four assistants, with whose help he began the more important labour of cataloguing the papal archives, and had advanced so far as to fill three large volumes at the time of his death in 1481. Under Sixtus there was no doubt of the triumph of Humanism at the papal court. Greek literature had flourished under the protection of Bessarion; Theodore Gaza and George of Trebizond lived and quarreled in Rome. But these three scholars died soon after the accession of Sixtus, and their place was taken by John Argyropoulos, who counted among his hearers in his lectures on Thucydides the learned German, Johann Reuchlin. Sixtus endeavored to attract to Rome the Florentine, Marsiglio Ficino, but he was too closely bound to the Medici to quit Florence. Failing him, the Pope welcomed the veteran Filelfo, who after venting his spite against Pius II and Paul II for their want of appreciation of his merits, still hankered after the sweets of papal patronage. He came to Rome in 1475, with the promise of an annual salary of 600 florins; and though then seventy-seven years of age, lectured with vigor for four hours a day. Rome pleased him in many ways, especially for “the incredible liberty which there existed”. In this judgment Filelfo’s experience renders him a great authority; probably nowhere could a man who enjoyed the Pope's protection speak or behave more freely than in Rome; if the Pope was tolerant so was everyone else. Filelfo, however, did not stay long in Rome, where his only published work was a translation of a Greek treatise, “About the Priesthood of Christ amongst the Jews”, which showed by quotations from the Greek fathers, that Christ exercised amongst the Jews the office of priest. Even this was a work done many years before and hastily revised as suitable for dedication to the Pope. Filelfo did not stay long at Rome, where his salary was irregularly paid by the papal treasurer. Sixtus IV was better in promises than in the careful administration which is necessary to secure their
fulfillment. Filelfo, who was poor, began with supplications and remonstrances, which soon passed into violent abuse. He went to Milan to visit his ailing wife in 1476, and never returned to Rome, but died at Florence in 1481, at the age of eighty-three.

Sixtus himself had been in early days famous as a theologian, and had taken part in the controversies in which the Franciscans were engaged against the Dominicans. Besides his treatise, About the Blood of Christ, he wrote also a work in behalf of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin, and a logical work, De Futuris Contingentibus. Nor did he, in the midst of his political projects, forget his theological interests. At first sight it would seem that there was as little in common between Pope Sixtus and Fra Francesco di Savona as there was between the magnificent restorer of Rome and the poor friar who, when he came to Rome as Cardinal, had to borrow money to make his dwelling habitable. Yet the pontificate of Sixtus stands in marked contrast to that of his successors through the fact that it left a great impress on the doctrine and organization of the Church. Sixtus did not forget his debt to the Franciscan Order, and showed his wonted energy in repaying it. He confirmed and enlarged the privileges of the Mendicants, and he decisively favored those tenets of the Franciscans which were winning their way in popular theology.

Two Bulls issued in 1474 and 1479 mark the highest advance of the Mendicant Orders, which are termed the two rivers which flow from Paradise, the Seraphim raised on wings of heavenly contemplation above all earthly things. Their exemption from the jurisdiction of ordinaries, the privileges of their churches, their power of hearing confessions and administering the sacraments against the will of parish priests—all that they strove for and claimed was acknowledged in the most ample terms. Moreover, Sixtus strongly adhered to the favorite belief of the Franciscans in the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin, who was to him a special object of veneration. To her were dedicated his two great churches in Rome—S. Maria del Popolo and S. Maria della Pace. He issued in 1477 a special office for the festival of the Conception of the Virgin, and granted indulgences to those who used it. He carefully observed all the festivals of the Virgin, and prayed so fervently before her image that it was observed he never even moved his eyes for the space of an hour. When this avowed partisanship of the Pope gave rise to bitter controversies, he interfered in 1483 by a decree which recognized the belief in the Immaculate Conception as an open question not yet decided by the Apostolic See, and forbade the disputants on either side to accuse their adversaries of heresy.

Moreover, the pontificate of Sixtus was marked by the institution of the tribunal known as the Spanish Inquisition. Since the beginning of the thirteenth century the office of extirpating heresy had been committed to the Dominican Order, and their zeal had been sufficient to protect the purity of the Christian faith. But as the Spanish kingdoms gained in coherence, and could look forward to the day when the Moors would be driven out of the land, the old fervor of the crusading spirit grew strong among the people. There rose a national jealousy against the numerous Jews, some of whom had embraced Christianity, but their prosperity awakened cupidity, and their lives suspicion. To protect the Christian faith and maintain the purity of Spanish blood, Ferdinand and Isabella applied in 1478 for the Pope’s authority to appoint inquisitions for the suppression of heresy throughout their realms. Permission was granted; but the real work of the Spanish Inquisition was not begun till 1483 by Thomas of Torquemada, whom Sixtus empowered to constitute the Holy Office, and Spain unfortunately proved a fruitful soil for its activity. This institution, it is true, did not proceed from Rome, but
was of native growth. Still Sixtus apparently lightheartedly and with small sense of responsibility sanctioned in an age of enlightenment the erection of a rigorous system for the repression of opinion. He had no objection to regard the Christian faith as a test of loyalty; and so he made it possible for despotism to use it as a cloak for oppression.

It was not by neglect of his priestly duties, but by his frank acceptance of the world as it was, that Sixtus is to be regarded as the beginner of the secularization of the Papacy. Other Popes had been keen politicians; but none had openly ventured to play the same game as their neighbors and for the same stakes. Sixtus came forward as an Italian prince, who was relieved from ordinary considerations of decency, consistency, or prudence, because his position as Pope saved him from serious disaster. His theology was a survival of his early training; his new interest in politics stood in the foreground and was immediately influential. During his pontificate the Cardinal College was hopelessly debased and the whole course of life in Rome was changed for the worse. The old Cardinals who represented the traditions of Nicolas V and Pius II died out, and were succeeded by others who bore the impress of an age of luxury and intrigue unredeemed by serious effort. Sixtus IV created thirty-five new Cardinals, and at his death there were only five members of the College who did not owe their dignity to his choice. Amongst the creations of Sixtus there were some members of the Franciscan Order who were men of merit; but they were old and soon died. The Cardinals who lived at Rome and were the Pope's companions were either his relatives or men appointed solely on political grounds: Giovanni of Aragon, son of Ferrante of Naples, Ascanio Sforza, Cardinals Colonna, Orsini, Savelli, de' Conti, and the like. Few were chosen for learning or capacity. The papal court became a centre of luxury and magnificence: it represented and reflected the contemporary life of Italy. The older Cardinals looked with dismay on the beginnings of this new system, and strove to avert it. In June, 1473, Cardinal Ammannati wrote to Cardinal Borgia: “In May eight Cardinals were created; in June there would have been as many more had not God's mercy intervened. But the matter is only put off, not abandoned; and others will tell you what sort of men are prepared for our disgrace. Such was the violence of him who has the power, that how we escaped this peril I still wonder. His reputation established for so many years, the entreaties of many Cardinals, my testimony to the facts, had no weight with his impetuous mind”.

Sixtus changed the course of life in Rome because his outspoken recklessness was heedless of decorum. Hitherto the Roman court had worn a semblance of ecclesiastical gravity, which the extravagances of Cardinal Piero Riario overthrew in a moment. Conventional propriety is of slow growth; it is easily destroyed and is restored with difficulty. Perhaps Sixtus IV thought that the papal dignity might be maintained by himself and a few of the older Cardinals, while the young bloods might be of service by making a display in a world which was singularly impressionable. Perhaps he wished to make the papal court a microcosm in which men of all sorts might go their own way. The result was that the worse elements rose to the top, and Rome became more famous for pleasure than for piety. It is true that Paul II had advanced in this direction by encouraging the festivities of the Carnival; but Paul II’s attitude was that of a kindly patron who wished to promote the amusement of his people. The banquets, the hunting parties, the gambling bouts, the nightly revels of Cardinal Riario and Count Girolamo were a new departure in the social traditions of the court. Neither Pius II nor Paul II was overburdened with scruples; but conduct which they would not have tolerated for a
moment, became common in the days of Sixtus. It is true that he meant nothing by his
tolerance; but the Rovere stock was hard to civilize.

A stern, imperious, passionate, resolute man, Sixtus IV did not inspire much
attachment, and we hear of few traits of his personal life. Yet he inspired deep hatred;
and Infessura, who was an adherent of the Colonna family and had the spirit of a
republican, has blackened his memory with accusations of the foulest crimes. These
charges, made by a partisan who writes with undisguised animosity, must be dismissed
as unproved. Sixtus impressed his contemporaries as a great and vigorous personality,
as a skillful organizer, a munificent patron, and a man of indomitable resolution. On a
survey of the results of his doings we must admit that his energy was crude and
misdirected; that he was deficient in elevation of mind and largeness of view; that his
force too much resembled unreflecting brutality; and that in all his magnificence there
is the trace of a vulgar upstart.

The serious charge against Sixtus is that he hopelessly lowered the moral standard
of the Papacy. Other Popes had pursued secular ends; had fought for their temporal
dominions, and had pursued a purely selfish policy; but while doing so they regarded
the dignity of their office, and sought for decent pretexts for their actions. Sixtus had not
been Cardinal long enough for the traditions of the Curia to curb the violence of a
strong and coarse nature. His nepotism was unblushing, and he did not conceal the fact
that he meant to use his nephew as a means of establishing his temporal power while he
reserved himself for the functions of ecclesiastical head of Christendom. He allowed
himself to become an accomplice in a scheme for assassination which shocked even the
blunted conscience of Italy; when it failed he visited with the severest penalties of the
Church the irregularities which its victims not unnaturally committed. Hitherto the
Papacy had on the whole maintained a moral standard; for some time to come it tended
to sink even below the ordinary level. The loss that was thus inflicted upon Europe was
incalculable. In an age when faith was weak, when the old ideals had vanished and
nothing had taken their place, it was a serious matter that self-seeking, intrigue, and
effrontery should be too plainly visible to be overlooked in the acknowledged head of
Western Christendom. Under Sixtus IV the Papacy ceased to offer any resistance to the
corruption of the age. It was not a strong bulwark before; but at least it upheld the forms
of better things. Henceforth, not only do the lowest motives prevail, but they are
unblushingly avowed. Sixtus made possible the cynicism of Machiavelli; he debased the
moral tone of Europe and prepared the way for still unworthy successors in the chair
of S. Peter.
CHAPTER V.
INNOCENT VIII.
1484—1492.

The death of Sixtus IV plunged Rome into confusion. The barons armed themselves; the palace of Count Girolamo was attacked, its garden destroyed, its doors and windows broken; the corn magazines on the Ripa were sacked; the Genoese banks were plundered: everywhere were pillage and disorder. The camp before Palliano was broken up; and the besieged, hearing of the Pope's death, made a sally and seized the artillery which the besiegers were preparing to carry off. On August 14 Count Girolamo came hurriedly with his troops to Rome, where his wife, Caterina, held the Castle of S. Angelo and the Vatican. The Colonna followed Girolamo and took possession of their palace, whereon Girolamo withdrew to Isola. Barricades were erected in the streets, and Rome was turned upside down. The Orsini on Monte Giordano, the Colonna in the palace of SS. Apostoli, stood under arms. The citizens in alarm built up the entrances to the bridges so that horsemen might not pass; and the magistrates besought the Cardinals to hasten the election as the only means of averting civil war. Meanwhile the funeral rites of Sixtus IV were hastily performed. So quickly was the Vatican stripped of its furniture that Burchard could scarcely find the necessary vessels for washing the corpse. At the funeral many of the Cardinals of the Colonna party were not present, on the ground, that they did not think it safe to pass the Castle of S. Angelo.

At length a truce was arranged, and on August 25 the Castle of S. Angelo was surrendered to the Cardinals by Count Girolamo in exchange for 7000 ducats. Thereon the Orsini agreed to withdraw for a month to Viterbo, provided the Colonna also left the city. When this was done the Cardinals, on August 26, entered the Conclave.

During this period many negotiations had passed about the election, which was a very open question. Ferrante of Naples urged the claims of his son Giovanni, but this was too obviously a political Measure; and Cardinals Barbo and Costa were discussed as the two men of highest character amongst the Cardinals. On August 23 Ascanio Sforza entered Rome and laid down a principle which the other Cardinals accepted, that it was necessary to elect a Pope who would not be offensive to the League. When Giovanni of Aragon saw that his chance was thus destroyed, he approached Ascanio, and on the eve of the Conclave they agreed whom they would exclude, but could not determine whom they would elect; Ascanio favored the Novarese Arcimboldo; the Cardinal of Aragon wished for the Neapolitan Caraffa. Meanwhile Cardinal Borgia did his utmost to put himself forward; he offered money, benefices, offices, even his own palace, in return for votes. But corrupt as the Cardinals were, they still retained some prudence, and their fears of the pride and perfidy of Borgia outweighed their cupidity.

The first proceeding of the twenty-five Cardinals in Conclave was to repeat the useless formality of drawing up elaborate regulations to bind the future Pope. Their chief object was to secure the privileges of the Cardinals, but one of the provisions is noticeable as a protest against the nepotism of Sixtus IV; the new Pope was made to promise that he would not confer any important office or administration on any layman.
whatevver. In the matter of the election Cardinal Borgia was so confident of his own success that he had his palace barricaded to preserve it against the pillage that was sure to ensue. But the first scrutiny showed Borgia that his party was not so strong as he imagined. The candidate who obtained most votes was the Venetian Cardinal Barbo, for whom ten gave their voices, induced, it would seem, by a desire to return to the decorous days of his uncle Paul II. Cardinal Rovere now took the lead and worked for the election of a Pope under whom he might himself be powerful. The chief supporter of Borgia against Barbo was the Cardinal of Aragon; Rovere offered to negotiate with Barbo the transference of three additional votes to his side if he would give up to the Cardinal of Aragon the Palazzo of S. Marco. Barbo did not fall into the snare, but answered that it would destroy the peace of the city if so strong a fortress were in the hands of Naples. Cardinal Rovere had now set the Cardinal of Aragon against Barbo: he next turned to Borgia and proposed to him that they two should unite their parties against Barbo and so secure a Pope in their common interest; and Borgia consented to sink his own claims in order to prevent Barbo’s election. They agreed on the Genoese Cardinal Cibo; and during the night of August 28, after the Cardinals had retired to rest, Borgia and Rovere visited them privately and secured by promises of papal favours the necessary majority for their new candidate. Legations, rich abbeys, palaces, castles, were promised in Cibo’s behalf, and Cardinal Rovere despoiled, himself of some of his own possessions to win the necessary votes. Before the morning all the Cardinals, except six of the eldest and most respectable, had been won over and nineteen votes were secured. The six who had been deemed incorruptible were awakened.

“Come and let us make a Pope”.

“Whom?” they asked.

“Cardinal Cibo”.

“How is that?”, they inquired in amazement.

“While you slept”, they were told, “we gathered all the votes except those of you drowsy ones”.

They felt that nothing was to be done, and when the scrutiny was held they also gave their votes for Cardinal Cibo, whose unanimous election was announced on August 29.

Giovanni Battista Cibo was born in Genoa in 1432. His father was a statesman who held the office of Viceroy in Naples for René of Anjou, and was made Senator of Rome by Calixtus III in 1453. The son was a favorite of Cardinal Calandrini, who initiated him into the manners of the Curia. He was made Bishop of Savona by Paul II, and was elevated by Sixtus IV to the bishopric of Molfetta, and in 1473 to the Cardinalate. He was not remarkable in any way, save for kindliness and geniality. He had little experience of politics, and was not famous for learning. He was a tall, stalwart man, fifty-two years old, and was chiefly notorious for his open avowal of an illegitimate family. How many sons and daughters he had cannot be said with certainty; but a daughter, Teodorina, was married to a Genoese merchant, Gerardo Usodimare; and a son, Franceschetto Cibo, took his place at the papal court, where he was called the Pope’s nephew.

On September 12, Cardinal Cibo was crowned under the name of Innocent VIII. As he owed his election influence to the influence of Cardinal Rovere he was at first entirely in his hands. Rovere lived in the Vatican, Rovere dictated the Pope's actions,
and made him revoke things done without his consent. The Pope’s position was indeed a difficult one. The policy of Sixtus had been so entirely personal that it was impossible to gather together its threads. Cardinal Rovere was in the confidence of Sixtus, but had by no means unreservedly approved of his actions. He was the best man to unravel the tangled skein of confusion.

The power and greed of the Cardinals and the Curia had developed with great rapidity under the rule of Sixtus, and the new Pope was helpless, even if he had wished, to put any barrier to their demands. The city of Rome was the first to suffer. It strove to defend itself by exacting from the Pope a promise that all offices within the city, benefices, abbeys, and the like, should be conferred only on Roman citizens. But this was soon set aside; the Cardinals seized the chief dignities in the city; citizens who had bought posts for life from Sixtus were dismissed without receiving compensation, and Innocent maintained that Cardinals were reckoned amongst the citizens of Rome. He gave an office to his Genoese son-in-law, and when the magistrates objected that he was not a citizen, he ordered his name to be entered on the burgess-roll so as to do away with the technical objection. All expectations of reform from the new Pope were rapidly dashed to the ground. Men said that he would follow in the steps of Sixtus. “He was elected in darkness”, said the Augustinian general, “he lives in darkness, and in darkness he will die”.

The factions of the Roman nobles had been too successfully aroused Under Sixtus IV to sink at once into Roman quietness. In March, 1485, Innocent VIII was seriously ill, and there were rumors of his death. The Orsini attempted to seize the city gates. The Colonna at once took up arms, and there was war in the Campagna. The Colonna recovered the castles of Civitá Lavigna, Nemi, Genazzano, and Frascati. At last, in July, the Pope managed to interfere in this contest. He summoned both parties before him, and demanded that their quarrels should be submitted to his decision. The Colonna obeyed and agreed to place in the hands of the Pope the disputed castles: the Orsini refused the Pope's mediation.

But the quarrels of the Roman barons soon widened into a broader issue. Innocent VIII had inherited a dislike to the Aragonese power in Naples, and Cardinal Rovere considered that Sixtus had parted with the rights of the Church in his desire to win Ferrante to his side. The tribute due from the vassal kingdom of Naples had been commuted into the yearly gift of a white palfrey as a recognition of the papal suzerainty. Innocent refused to accept this commutation, and demanded the payment of the former tribute. He counted on the growing discontent of the Neapolitan barons against Ferrante’s strong rule. Ferrante had learned in his early days the dangerous power which the protracted struggle between the houses of Anjou and Aragon had given to the barons of Naples. He steadily pursued a policy of diminishing the baronial privileges; and as the barons became conscious of his meaning they were anxious to rise before it was too late. The changed attitude of the Papacy towards Naples gave them the encouragement which they required.

Ferrante, though a capable ruler, was oppressive in his financial exactions, and was regarded as false and treacherous. But his eldest son, Alfonso, Duke of the Calabria, threw his father’s unpopularity into the shade; violent, cruel and perfidious, he had all the instincts of a despot. He did not conceal his hatred of the barons, and his growing influence over his aged father increased their alarm. In the summer of 1485 a treacherous act of Alfonso fired the smoldering discontent. He managed to inveigle into
his hands the Count of Montorio, lord of Aquila, in the Abruzzi, a free city which recognized the supremacy of the Neapolitan crown. The imprisonment of the Count of Montorio and his family was a menace to the Neapolitan barons, and alarmed the Colonna, whose lands adjoined the territory of Aquila. On October 17 the men of Aquila put themselves under the Pope's protection. War was imminent, but neither side was ready. Ferrante strove to gain time and summoned his barons to a parliament, but only three obeyed his summons. He sent his son, the Cardinal of Aragon, to negotiate with the Pope; but on October 16 he died in Rome, immediately after his arrival. The first allies whom Ferrante succeeded in gaining were the Orsini, who ravaged the Campagna and threatened Rome with a famine.

The obvious form for war with Naples to assume was to set up an Angevin claimant to the crown. But the luckless René of Anjou outlived his son Jean, and on his death, in 1481, bequeathed to Louis XI, of France his lands and rights. The only representative of his line was the son of his daughter Yolante, wife of Count Frederick of Baudremont. Innocent offered to invest this son, René II, Duke of Lorraine, with the kingdom of Naples; but Charles VIII of France hesitated to recognize his claims on Naples or give him any support. Still the dread of French interference prompted Florence and Milan to side with Ferrante; while the Pope and the Neapolitan barons appealed for help to Venice. But Venice did not wish to involve itself in war, and did no more than detach for the Pope's service the condottiere general Roberto di Sanseverino, who proceeded leisurely to gather troops. Meanwhile Ferrante enlisted on his side the discontented barons of Rome; and Virginio Orsini was enough to reduce the Pope to great straits. He seized the Porta Nomentana and reduced the city to a state of siege. Innocent was terrified and sat barricaded within the Vatican. In his terror he ordered all malefactors banished for their offences to return to Rome and guard the city; they obeyed his summons, but only added crime and violence to the general confusion. Cardinals Rovere, Savelli, and Colonna took charge of affairs; they visited the walls and set the watch, and inflamed to the utmost the wrath of Virginio by ordering his palace on Monte Giordano to be burned down, Virginio retaliated by scattering in the city documents exhorting the people to rise against the Pope and drive him and his Cardinals from the city; he was no true Pope, for he was not canonically elected; it was unworthy of the Roman people to be ruled by a Genoese skipper; let them make a true Pope and true Cardinals. Especially did his anger blaze against Cardinal Rovere; he exhorted all men to destroy him as a man steeped in unnatural vices; he threatened, if God gave him the victory, to carry his head on a lance through the city. He even sent a message to the Pope that he would throw him into the Tiber. It was long since Rome and the Pope had suffered such indignities, and the arrival of Sanseverino with a force of thirty-three squadrons of horse on Christmas Day was hailed with heartfelt joy by all in Rome.

Sanseverino drove the Orsini from the Ponte Nomentano, but won no decisive victory. His soldiers plundered friend and foe alike, and the imperial ambassadors who wished to come to Rome under his escort were stripped to their shirts by his lawless troops. Rome was not much encouraged by his presence. On January 21, 1486, a rumor of the Pope's death threw the city into a panic. The members of the Curia gathered what they could and prepared to flee; the Cardinals fortified their houses. As regards the war, neither Alfonso of Calabria nor Roberto of Sanseverino showed any military capacity. Innocent VIII began to suspect the good faith of his general, and shrank before the dangers which beset him. In March he sent Cardinal Rovere to Genoa, that he might summon René and negotiate with the French king for help. On his part Ferrante had
nothing to gain from the war; he could not restore order within his kingdom till he had peace abroad. Florence and Milan were anxious to stop the Pope's dealings with France, which might bring a dangerous foe into Italy. Thus every one wished for peace, and the Florentines are said to have added to the Pope’s terrors by contriving that letters should be intercepted which spoke of Roberto of Sanseverino as intriguing with his enemies.

Dread of French intervention banded many of the Cardinals together. Ascanio Sforza expressed his opinions strongly against its dangers; and the Spanish party in the Curia, headed by Cardinal Borgia, seconded him. In the beginning of June a majority of the Cardinals besought the Pope to make peace; they offered on Ferrante’s part the payment of the accustomed tribute by Naples and the surrender of Aquila to the Church. The French Cardinal La Balue opposed the peace as dishonorable to the Church, and there was a stormy scene between him and Cardinal Borgia; Borgia called La Balue a drunkard, and La Balue answered with still coarser taunts; they almost came to blows in the Pope’s presence. Innocent, bereft of the counsel of Cardinal Rovere, was helpless. He had no money; he did not trust his general Sanseverino; Rome was in confusion; Cardinals Borgia and Sforza openly negotiated with the Orsini. In June the approach of the Duke of Calabria increased the Pope's alarm, and the pressure of the Cardinals soon prevailed over his feeble will. On August peace was made with Naples through the intervention of the Milanese general Gian Giacopo Trivulzio. Ferrante agreed to pay the tribute of 8000 ducats, to respect the rights of the Church, to leave Aquila at liberty, and pardon his rebellious barons.

This peace was dishonourable to the Pope, who abandoned his allies to the mercy of Ferrante, and gained no advantage from the war. Roberto Sanseverino was dismissed, but the Orsini did not lay down their arms and continued their raids against the Colonna. The city of Aquila was occupied by Neapolitan troops and the papal governor was put to death. Roberto di Sanseverino was pursued on his departure from Rome by the Duke of Calabria, and with difficulty managed to escape into the Venetian territory; the Neapolitan barons found themselves left at the mercy of Ferrante. The chief leader of the revolt, the Prince of Salerno, judged it wiser to flee to France than return to Naples; and the event proved that he judged rightly, as the other rebels were seized by Ferrante and thrown into prison, whence they never reappeared. Nor did the Pope gain even the purely ecclesiastical points which his treaty with Ferrante guaranteed. When he sent next year to ask for the promised tribute, Ferrante answered that he had spent so much money for the Church that he could not pay. When the Pope complained that Ferrante wrongfully conferred benefices within his kingdom, he was told that the king knew best who were worthy of office, and that it was enough for the Pope to confirm his nominations. When he complained of the imprisonment of the Neapolitan barons, he was referred to the example of Sixtus IV, who dealt with the Colonna as he thought fit. Having thus answered the Pope’s legate, Ferrante mounted his horse and went out hunting.

The peace with Naples covered Innocent with ridicule as a statesman. Yet it was welcomed gladly by the Roman people, whom the war had reduced to misery, while the lawless spirit which it encouraged led to entire anarchy within the city. Innocent issued Bulls against evil-doers; but law was powerless. Women were carried off by night: each morning brought its tale of murders and of riots; the wild justice of armed revenge was the only one which prevailed. Men did not even abstain from sacrilege; a piece of the true Cross, enshrined in silver, was stolen from the sacristy of S. Maria in Trastevere, and the holy relic was found denuded of its setting, thrown away.
in a vineyard. It was said that the Pope connived at the flight of malefactors who paid him money, and granted pardons for sins before their commission. No public executions testified to the power of the law; sometimes men were found hanged in the morning from the Torre del Nono, but their names and their crimes were unknown. Men imprisoned on the most fearful charges were released on payment. When the Vice-Chancellor Borgia was asked why justice was not done, he answered, “God desires not the death of a sinner, but rather that he should pay and live”.

The Cardinals were the chief abettors of this lawlessness. Their palaces were fortified and strengthened with towers. Their spacious courtyards housed great numbers of retainers, and each household maintained the quarrels of its members or interfered in a body in any passing fray. Such justice as there was powerless against these combinations. Often also these households came into collision. One day the captain of the court of Cardinal Savelli was arresting a debtor near the palace of Cardinal La Balue. There was a tumult, and Cardinal La Balue from a window forbade the arrest of any one within the precincts of his palace. The arrest, however, was made, whereon La Balue ordered his retainers to attack the Savelli, and Cardinals Savelli and Colonna called out their men to retaliate. The Pope summoned them all to the Vatican, where the Cardinals heaped abuse on one another in the Pope's presence, till a sulky reconciliation was brought about. These quarrels of the Cardinals descended amongst the people and were identified with the feuds of the Roman barons. The last days of the Roman Republic were restored, when the city was filled with magnates and their dependents. The example of Popes like Sixtus IV and Innocent VIII was easily followed, and the Cardinals imitated their master in a career of personal aggrandizement and the foundation of a princely family; they had sons or nephews whom they strove to enrich, and each surrounded himself with a court composed of parasites and bravoes.

Politically, Innocent showed all the waywardness of a weak and irresolute man. He had foolishly entered the Neapolitan war at the bidding of Cardinal Giuliano della Rovere, who at an early period of his career displayed his willingness to work his own ways by means of foreign help. But when Cardinal Rovere was gone to negotiate with France, Innocent VIII's resolution failed him and he could not await his return. When he came back he found the Pope wincing under his ignominious treatment by Ferrante, and tried to resume his former influence, and induce him to renew the war against Naples. But Innocent was afraid of his former master and wanted to try his own hand in politics. He found employment for Rovere by sending him to besiege Osimo, where a private citizen, Boccalino Gozzone, had made himself master of the city, driven out the papal governor, and when the peace with Naples left him helpless had even made overtures to the Turkish Sultan. In April, 1487, Rovere set out for Osimo; but the Pope mistrusted his zeal and recalled him in June, whereon he returned to Rome in disgrace. Cardinal La Balue succeeded him, and with help from Trivulzio reduced Boccalino to surrender on August 1. Even then the mediation of Lorenzo de' Medici was needed, and Boccalino received 7000 ducats, with which he took refuge in Florence.

Free from Cardinal Rovere, Innocent tried to discover a policy of his own. Venice had shown itself well-disposed towards the Pope in the Neapolitan war, and had a common interest in putting down a free-booter such as Boccalino at Osimo. Innocent accordingly formed a league with Venice, which was published early in 1487; he hoped that his new alliance would keep Ferrante of Naples in check, regardless of the fact that it awakened the distrust of Florence and Milan. When Lorenzo de' Medici heard of it, he poured out his wrath to the Ferrarese ambassador. “I can believe anything bad”, he said,
“of this Pope; the States of the Church have always been the ruin of Italy, for their rulers are ignorant of the art of government, and so bring danger on every side”. But Lorenzo set himself to guide the incapable ruler of the Church; he offered his help in the troublesome matter of Osimo, and insinuated that an alliance with Florence was preferable to an alliance with Venice. Lorenzo had personal aims to serve and personal advantages to offer. He felt that the power of his house was declining in Florence, and resolved to secure himself by family connections. He played upon the Pope’s parental feelings by proposing a marriage between his daughter Maddelena and the Pope’s son Franceschetto. The bait was too tempting for the political consistency of Innocent; his alliance with Venice was scarcely concluded before it gave way to an alliance with Florence. No wonder that such feeble self-seeking awakened the scorn of all. The bluff soldier Trivulzio; who went to Rome after the capture of Osimo, bluntly expressed his opinion of Innocent. “The Pope is full of greed, cowardice, and baseness, like a common knave; were there not men about him who inspired him with some spirit he would crawl away like a rabbit, and grovel like any dastard”. Perhaps Italy was not sorry when Innocent fell into the hands of Lorenzo de’ Medici.

The alliance of Lorenzo with the Pope gave him the position of mediator between Rome and Naples, and thereby secured for a time the peace of Italy, and averted the danger of foreign intervention. In Rome itself it altered the attitude of the Pope towards the baronial factions. Hitherto, under the influence of Cardinal Rovere, he had favored the Colonna; but the marriage of his Son Franceschetto brought him into alliance with the Orsini; for Maddelena de’ Medici’s mother was Clarice, sister of Virginio Orsini. Innocent at once accepted this result of his family arrangements, made peace with Virginio in June, 1487, and admitted him to his favour. This was a blow to Cardinal Rovere, whose brother the Prefect was imprisoned, and the Castellan of S. Angelo was removed as being a staunch adherent of the Rovere. On this the Cardinal withdrew for a while from Rome.

Thus the policy of Sixtus IV was entirely reversed. Lorenzo de’ Medici, whom he had labored to overthrow, was installed as the Pope's chief adviser; the persecuted Orsini were recalled to favor; the Rovere family lost its influence, and fortune still further declared against it. On April 14, 1488, Girolamo Riario, for whom Sixtus IV had labored so strenuously, was murdered by three of his bodyguard, who wished to rid the world of a second Nero. They entered the room where Girolamo was sitting after supper, and fell upon him unawares; his naked corpse was thrown out of the palace window, and the people at once rose with the cry of ‘Liberty’, sacked the palace, and took prisoner Girolamo’s wife, Caterina Sforza, who was far advanced in pregnancy. But the castle of Forli still held out and threatened to make a stubborn resistance. Caterina offered to negotiate for its surrender, and went to confer with the governor, leaving her children behind as hostages. When she reached the castle she caused the gates to be shut, and told the rebels that they might kill her children if they would; she had one son safe at Imola and bore another in her womb. Her courage inspired the garrison of the castle to resist. That Innocent VIII was privy to the plot is doubtful; but the rebels looked to him for help and their envoys were graciously received at Rome. Forli was taken under the protection of the Church, and the governor of Cesena went to its aid. But the Duke of Milan sent troops to defend his relative, Caterina; the papal garrison were made prisoners, the assassins were put to death, and Caterina's young son, Ottaviario Riario, was set up as lord of Forli. Caterina, regent, could wreak her vengeance upon the rebellious people, and Innocent did not attempt to interfere further.
Men said that he allowed his sheep to be devoured by wolves, and did to Forli as he did to Aquila.

Really Innocent was incapable of any policy, and could not persevere in any intention which disturbed his complacent indolence. He was incompetent, and his incompetence was hereditary. None of his relatives showed any taste for statesmanship, and there was no one at hand to direct the Pope. Early in 1488, Cardinal Rovere returned to Rome and began again to assume his former influence over the yielding Innocent VIII. The only matter that interested the Pope was the marriage of his granddaughter Peretta, daughter of the Genoese merchant Gerardo Usodimare, who had married the Pope's daughter Teodorina. The marriage feast of Peretta and Alfonso del Caretto, Marquis of Finale, was celebrated in the Vatican on November 16. It caused great stir in Rome; for it was contrary to all custom that women should sit at table with the Pope. Most men would at least have respected the traditional decorum of their office; but Innocent VIII aimed at nothing more than the pleasures of a father of a family.

One act of papal authority, however, Innocent was ready to perform: the creation of new Cardinals. Though he had promised at his election not to increase the number of Cardinals beyond twenty-four, he paid no heed to his promise. On March 9, 1489, he created five new Cardinals, and nominated three others secretly, reserving their actual appointment for the present. One of the Cardinals created was Lorenzo Cibo, a son of the Pope's brother, whose nomination caused some scandal as he was a bastard. One of those created in petto was Giovanni de' Medici, youngest son of Lorenzo, a boy of fourteen. Lorenzo thought it well to use his opportunity as a cautious Florentine merchant, and secure his son's accession to the Cardinalate while he had the power. But Innocent refused to publish the creation of so young a Cardinal till a period of three years had elapsed; and Lorenzo watched with anxiety the Pope's uncertain health, which threatened to throw obstacles in the way of his design of establishing the Medici in the Curia.

The remainder of the new Cardinals were insignificant men, save one who earned his creation by a service which marks a disgraceful episode in the history of Europe. This was Pierre d'Aubusson, Grand Master of the Knights of S. John, who had distinguished himself by his brave defence of Rhodes against the Turks in 1480. Mohammed II was preparing to renew the siege when his death, in 1481, was the signal for a civil war between his two sons, Bajazet and Djem. Djem was defeated at Broussa, and hopeless of his cause, sought refuge among the Knights of Rhodes, by whom he was courteously received in July, 1482. He soon found, however, that though he came as a guest he was detained as a prisoner. He was treated as a valuable hostage for the good behavior of Bajazet II, who trembled at the thought of a rival backed by Christian arms. The Sultan made peace with the Knights of S. John and agreed to pay them a yearly tribute of 45,000 ducats, ostensibly for the expenses of his brother's maintenance. The conduct of the Knights of Rhodes was bad enough, but they were not allowed to enjoy the fruits of their breach of faith. The sum of 45,000 ducats yearly awakened universal cupidity, and the Knights of S. John found it more prudent to remove their lucrative captive to the mainland for safer keeping. He was carried to the Commandery of Bourgneuf in Poitou, where he was under the protection of the King of France. There were many claimants for the honor and profit of entertaining him. The Sultan of Egypt was willing to make war in his behalf; the Spanish sovereigns were engaged in war against the infidel; Mathias of Hungary desired to have Djem's help to
drive the Turks from the Danube valley; Ferrante of Naples pleaded that he was the natural protector of the Mediterranean waters; Innocent claimed as Pope to be the proper head of all crusading movements. The Regent of France, Anne of Bourbon, put Djem up to auction amongst these eager competitors, and delayed any decision that she might reap a richer harvest.

The Pope, however, had means at his command which the others lacked. Djem could not be disposed of without the consent of the Knights of S. John, and Innocent promised their Grand Master a Cardinal's hat if Djem were handed over to himself. Moreover France had need of the Pope's good offices. The marriage of Anne, heiress of Brittany, was a matter of the greatest moment to the French monarchy. A strong party in Brittany wished to give Anne in marriage to Alain d'Albret of Beam, to whom she had been promised by her father. This marriage, however, required a papal dispensation on the ground of consanguinity, and the price of the Pope's refusal to grant it was the surrender of Djem. Feeble as Innocent might be in other ways, he showed himself clever at striking a bargain, and would not pay till the goods were ready for delivery; D'Aubusson was not made Cardinal till Djem was nearly at the walls of Rome. Nor did this miserable huckstering end here. Others felt that they might follow in the steps of Pope and Kings. Franceschetto Cibo, before Djem's arrival, tried to curry favour with Venice by promising to deliver over to the Republic the Turkish prince as soon as Innocent was dead. Some of those who stood closest to the Pope went further, and offered Sultan Bajazet to poison Djem if he would pay a sufficient price. No incident displays in a more lurid light the cynical corruption of the time in every nation.

The entry of Djem into Rome, on March 13, was a wondrous sight for the citizens. Djem, accompanied by the Prior of Auvergne, was escorted by Cardinal La Balue and Franceschetto Cibo. The other Cardinals sent their households to greet him, and a white horse, a present from the Pope, was waiting for him at the city gate. Djem showed the unmoved bearing of an Oriental; he wore a turban, and his face was shrouded by a veil. The ambassador of the Sultan of Egypt, who was in Rome at the time, came to meet him at the gate. He dismounted, and with profound reverences threw himself on the ground, kissed the horse's foot, then Djem's foot and knee, while tears filled his eyes. Djem in a word bade him mount his horse again, and the mingled cavalcade of Moslems and Christians swept onward through the chief streets of Rome to the Vatican. It was a strange spectacle, the coming of one who claimed to be the head of the Mohammedan world to the palace of the chief priest of Christendom.

The significance of such an event did not trouble Innocent. To him Djem was a princely guest, to be received with befitting ceremony. Charles VIII of France was too good a Christian to admit the infidel prince to an interview; but Innocent had no such scruples. Fanaticism had no place in Rome, nor did the papal court trouble itself about trifles. Next day Djem was received by the Pope in a consistory. He was carefully instructed in the proper ceremonial, but entirely declined to follow it. Short, corpulent and broad-chested, with an aquiline nose and blind in one eye, while the other flashed uneasy glances on every side, he strode up to the Pope, with his turban on his head, after making an almost imperceptible inclination of his body. He did not kneel nor kiss the Pope's foot, but standing upright kissed his shoulder; then by means of an interpreter conveyed his greetings to the Pope. The Pope assured him of his friendliness, and Djem at his departure wished to kiss the Pope on the face; but Innocent drew back his head and offered him his shoulder. He sent Djem many presents, but the haughty Turk did not even honor them with a look. He stayed in his rooms, watched by a few knights of
Rhodes, and treated like a prince. His only dread was lest he should be poisoned by some emissaries of his brother. Sometimes he indulged in sport, music, and banquets. He was a cultivated man, fond of literature; but he felt the hopelessness of his fortunes, and most of his time was passed in sleep or in apathetic indolence.

The captivity of Djem in Rome was a means of extending the relations between Christendom and Islam. Bajazet was willing to pay a large sum to have Djem put to death, or to pay a yearly tribute to have him kept safely in prison where he could do no mischief. Rome soon saw the testimony of the Sultan’s wishes in both these ways. In May, 1490, an attempt to poison Djem and the Pope was discovered. A baron of Castel Leone, Cristoforo Castanea, who had been dispossessed of his lands, went to Constantinople and offered himself as an agent to the Sultan. He came to Rome with a poison which he was to put into the well whence the water for the use of the Vatican was ordinarily drawn. When he was taken prisoner he breathed dark hints of a vast number of men engaged in the same design. He was dragged naked through the city and torn with pincers; finally he was killed with a blow from a wooden mallet and was quartered. At the end of November came an embassy from Bajazet bringing the Pope three years’ salary for the maintenance of Djem, and promising peace with Christendom so long as he was kept in security. The ambassador, however, was cautious enough to demand an interview with Djem to assure himself that he was really alive. Djem refused to receive the ambassador otherwise than as a sultan. The approach to the Vatican was hung with splendid tapestry, and Djem surrounded by his attendants and two prelates was seated on a lofty throne. Every precaution against poisoning was taken; before being admitted the ambassador was rubbed down with a towel and was made to kiss it. Thrice he prostrated himself before Djem and presented to him a letter from his brother; he was called upon to lick it all over before it was received. Then an attendant read it, and the ambassador proffered gifts on which Djem did not cast his eyes.

It is no wonder that men were startled at these heathenish doings in the Vatican, that they saw portents in the sky and listened to prophesyings. In 1491 a man of unknown nation, dressed in beggar’s rags, wandered through Rome and preached in the streets: “I tell you Romans, that in this year ye will weep much and suffer many tribulations. Next year the woe will extend through Italy. Florence, Milan, and the other states will be deprived of their liberty and placed under the yoke of another, while Venice will be deprived of her possessions on land. In the third year the clergy will lose their temporal power; there will be an Angelical Shepherd who will care only for the life of souls and spiritual things. I tell you the truth; believe me. The time will come when you will not call me foolish”. Then he passed on, bearing in his hands a wooden cross. We hear in Rome a forecast of the spirit which was growing in the breast of a Dominican friar, Girolamo Savonarola, in Florence. But Rome was hardened and few listened to the preacher’s words; he passed away unnoticed as he came. Yet there was an uneasy feeling of disquiet. Men sought a cause for the decay of faith, and found it in the corruption brought by foreign influences. There was a great influx into Italy of Jews and Moors from Spain who fled before the Inquisition and the conquering arms of Ferdinand and Isabella. They brought the plague, and it was thought that they also brought heresy in their train. An attempt was made to mend matters by an investigation into the orthodoxy of the members of the Curia, amongst whom was found a priest who in the mass service substituted words of derision for the solemn words of consecration. More than 1500 households in Rome were condemned to pay fines for heretical
opinions; and we cannot think that Roman inquisitors were likely to err on the side of severity.

Already the heedless secularity of the Papacy was beginning to afford a means of political attack. Innocent had good cause to be dissatisfied with Ferrante of Naples, who refused to pay the promised tribute and set at naught the papal authority. In vain the Pope remonstrated; Ferrante counted on the Pope’s weakness and entered upon the career of cynical indifference to others which precipitated the fall of his kingdom and of the independence of Italy. Innocent made some show of undertaking war against Naples; and in June, 1489, he invested Niccolo Orsini, Count of Pitigliano, as Captain General of the Church, as the negotiations with France about the surrender of Djem gave him hopes of foreign aid. On September, 1489, he declared in a consistory that the kingdom of Naples had lapsed to the Holy See through the non-payment of the tribute. The Neapolitan ambassador appealed to a future Council, and offered to prove that the tribute was not rightfully due. In this critical state of affairs Lorenzo de’ Medici interposed to keep the peace. With the genius of a true statesman he pointed out to the Pope that Naples could not be conquered unless Venice and Milan remained neutral and either France or Spain joined in the attack. He went on to consider the chances of effective help from France or Spain, and ended with the warning that whoever became king of Naples would settle his own accounts. Innocent hesitated before the dangers of either French or Spanish intervention, and satisfied himself with complaining of Ferrante’s conduct. Ferrante on his side thought that France was sufficiently occupied at home and paid no heed to the gathering storm. In May, 1490, on the occasion of one of the interminable disputes about precedence amongst ambassadors at the papal court, the Neapolitan envoy prepared to force his way by violence into the papal chapel; and to prevent a scandal the other envoys were requested to absent themselves till the matter was settled. Soon afterwards the Pope was disturbed by hearing that Ferrante had written Maximilian, King of the Romans, telling him of the life and morals of the Pope and Cardinals, their sons and daughters, their simony, luxury and avarice, beseeching him to provide according to God’s precept for the tottering Church. Italy was beginning to use the scandal of the papal court as a political engine of attack, and cried to Germany to undertake the task of reform which was beyond her own moral capacity.

The instability of the papal rule was soon exhibited with startling clearness. In September, 1490, Innocent was ill, and on the 27th there was a rumor that he was dead. Immediately the shops were shut and men armed themselves in expectation of a tumult. Franceschetto Cibo left his father’s deathbed to make a swoop on the papal treasury. When he was frustrated in his attempt, he tried to get hold of Djem as an opening for financial speculations. Next day the Cardinals thought it well to secure the Pope’s treasure against Franceschetto’s designs; they went in a body to the Vatican and proceeded to make an inventory, after which they left Cardinal Savelli in charge. Though it was suspected that much of the Pope’s treasure was already deposited in Florence, yet the Cardinals found in one chest 800,000 ducats, and in another 300,000. When Innocent recovered, he was very angry at this investigation into his possessions; he said that he hoped to outlive all the Cardinals, though they plotted against his life.

While Innocent sat inactively on the papal throne, engaged only in feeble bickerings with the King of Naples, events of momentous importance were occurring in Europe. The consolidation of the French kingdom, which had been skillfully pursued by Louis XI, became an accomplished fact; and the marriage of Charles VIII with Anne of Brittany was the last step in the incorporation of the provinces under the crown of
France. This marriage, however, was brought about in a way dishonorable to all concerned. Innocent VIII had been willing to prevent the marriage of Anne to Alain d’Albret; but another suitor came forward in the person of Maximilian. With the utmost secrecy Anne, a girl of thirteen, was affianced to the future emperor, who, however, took no steps to succor his bride against the arms of France. At last it seemed the shortest way to annex Brittany to the French crown by marrying Anne to Charles VIII, though she was betrothed to Maximilian and Charles VIII was betrothed to Margaret, Maximilian’s daughter, a child of ten years old already at the French court. The papal dispensation was required both on the ground of previous contracts and because Anne stood within the prohibited degrees to Charles. Anne’s consent was wrung from her by the dread of the French arms, and Charles VIII so far presumed on the Pope’s complaisance that he did not await his formal dispensation for an act which shocked even the low sense of decorum of the day. The marriage was celebrated on December 6, and the French ambassadors demanding the Bulls only entered Rome on December 5; the Bulls themselves were issued ten days after the marriage had taken place.

There could be no doubt of the political importance of this event. It warned Ferrante of Naples that France was likely to seek occupation for her energies abroad. The desire for a good understanding with the French king was the cause of the Pope's complaisance, and the effect of the good understanding was soon obvious on Neapolitan diplomacy. Ferrante listened more heedfully to the advice of Lorenzo de' Medici; he agreed to pay the tribute for Naples which the Pope demanded, and in the middle of February, 1492, peace was made between Ferrante and Innocent VIII.

A second great event occurred about the same time. On January 2, 1492, Grenada, the last stronghold of capture of the Moors in Spain, surrendered to King Ferdinand the Catholic. The union of the crowns of Aragon and Castile, by the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella, had led to a vigorous crusade which ended in the expulsion of the Moors from the peninsula. The effect of a great enterprise, founded on an appeal to Christian sentiment, was to weaken provincial jealousies and combine the Spanish peoples into a nation. The crusading spirit, which could not be kindled in Eastern Europe, was strong in the West, and Spain rose at once to be a great power in Europe. But Italy did not understand the mighty change that was being wrought by the creation of powerful kingdoms, and there was no statesman in the Roman court who could perceive the signs of the times. Rome, celebrated the triumph of Christian arms after her wonted fashion. There were processions and bonfires, races of men and boys and buffaloes. Bread and wine were distributed to the populace. The Spanish ambassadors gave a representation of the capture of Grenada by erecting a wooden tower in the Piazza Navona and offering prizes to those who could first climb up its walls. Cardinal Borgia entertained the people by a bull-fight in which five bulls were killed.

Rome was a city of festivals, and was enlivened on November 22 by the magnificent entry of the young Florentine Cardinal, Giovanni de' Medici. The three years' term which Innocent had imposed when first he secretly created Giovanni Cardinal was at an end, and Lorenzo at last enjoyed the realization of his most cherished scheme. Lorenzo had carefully prepared Giovanni to be an ecclesiastical personage. He used his influence with Louis XI of France to obtain for him in his childhood an abbey in France: the Pope declared him capable of holding benefices, and conferred on him the dignity of a protonotary. Shortly afterwards Louis XI made him Archbishop of Aix; but the Pope refused his confirmation to this monstrous nomination. Still, at the age of fourteen Giovanni was promised the Cardinalate, and at the age of seventeen was
thought of mature years to take his place amongst the Pope’s counsellors. He was
invested with the insignia of his dignity at Fiesole, and Florence celebrated with
unwonted rejoicings the honor conferred upon her chief family. When the young
Cardinal set out for Rome, he was escorted two miles out of Florence by the chief
citizens. At Siena he was received with as much honor as if he had been the Pope
himself. At Viterbo he was met by Franceschetto Cibo, who escorted him to Rome,
where the whole city came out to meet him in spite of torrents of rain. He went through
the ceremonial of presentation to the Pope with dignity and with address, and paid the
accustomed visits to his brother Cardinals. Amongst them was Raffaello Riario, who
had played such a suspicious part in the conspiracy of the Pazzi. He felt visit by the
presence of Cardinal Orsini. It is said that he and Giovanni de’ Medici turned deadly
pale at their meeting, and could scarcely stammer out a few formal sentences.

Soon after his arrival in Rome the young Cardinal received from his father a letter
of advice. The letter is honorable to Lorenzo, and shows that he was by letter of no
means destitute of principle. He urges upon Giovanni gratitude to God for His
mercies—gratitude to be shown by a holy, exemplary, and upright life. He beseeches
him not to forget the lessons of his early training, not to neglect the means of grace
afforded by Confession and Communion. “I know that by going to Rome, which is a
sink of all iniquities, you encounter greater difficulties than hitherto. Not only is there
the danger of bad example, but many will endeavor to allure and corrupt you. Your
elevation at your age to the Cardinalate caused much envy, and many who could not
prevent your dignity will endeavor to diminish it by blackening your life and casting
you into the ditch where they have fallen themselves. Your youth will encourage them
to hope for an easy, success. You must withstand these dangers with greater firmness, as
there is at present less virtue in the College of Cardinals. Yet there are some men in the
College learned and good and of holy life. Follow their example, and you will be the
more esteemed as you are the more distinguished from the rest”.

So far Lorenzo had spoken as a moralist; his concluding remarks are those of a
statesman and observer of life. He warns his son to avoid hypocrisy, to observe a mean
in all things, to shun austerity and severity, to give no offence. He dwells on the
difficulty of life amid men of different characters, and urges geniality, reasonableness,
and care not to make enemies. On this first visit to Rome it were better to use his ears
than his tongue. “You are devoted to God and the Church; yet you will find many ways
to help your city and your house. You are the chain that binds this city with the Church,
and your house goes with the city. You are the youngest Cardinal; be the most zealous
and the most humble. Let no one have to wait for you. Encourage as little intimacy as
may be with the less reputable of your brethren, but in public converse with all. In all
matters of display, be under rather than over the mean. Let your establishment be
refined and well ordered rather than rich and splendid. Silks and jewels are not
becoming; collect rather a few elegant antiques and rare books. Let your attendants be
well conducted and learned, rather than numerous. In entertainments, do nothing
superfluous, but invite more often than you are invited. Let your food be plain and take
plenty of exercise; for men of your cloth easily contract infirmities if they are not
careful. The dignity of Cardinal is as secure as it is great; let not this security beguile
you into negligence, as it has done many. Rise in good time in the morning; this habit is
not only good for your health but gives you time to arrange what you have to do in the
day. Every evening think over the morrow’s business, that you be not taken unawares.
In consistory, submit your opinion to that of the Pope on the ground of your youth.
Beware of carrying petitions to the Pope or of troubling him, for his character is to give most to those who ask him least”. Surely it was from Italy that Polonius learned his saws.

This letter of Lorenzo’s was his last testament to his son. He died at the age of forty-four, and Italy lost its one great statesman. Lorenzo had striven to identify the Medici family with Florence, and had been himself the representative and expression of the desires and aspirations of Florentine life and culture. He had also learned that the existence of Italy depended upon the maintenance of internal peace, and his efforts for that end had for the last ten years of his life been unceasing. His early experience had taught him how difficult was the position which he had to maintain, that of the chief citizen of a free city, whose fortunes and whose very existence depended on exercising absolute power without seeming to do so. It is easy to accuse him of insidiously destroying Florentine liberty; but the policy of Sixtus IV left him no choice between such a course and retirement from Florence, and he may be pardoned if he doubted whether his abdication would conduce to the welfare of the city. He has been accused of abetting the moral enervation and corruption of his people; but the causes of this corruption are to be found in the general character of Italian life, and Lorenzo did no more than follow the prevailing fashion in lending his refinement to give expression to the popular taste. Lorenzo did what all Italian statesmen were doing; he identified his city for good and ill with his own house. He worked craftily and insidiously, not by open violence, and in the midst of his self-seeking he retained the large views of a statesman and embodied the culture of his age.

Florence was the most eminently Italian of all Italian cities, and had long shown herself to be the brain of Italy. It was there that the culture of the Renaissance found its highest and most serious expression, and there the first attempt was made to bring the ideas of the new learning into relation with the old system of thought on which the life of Christendom was founded. The Aristotelian logic had furnished the phraseology and the method of the teaching of the Schoolmen; the scholars of the Renaissance sought in Plato a larger expression of their widening views. At Florence this was done deliberately by the patronage of Cosimo de’ Medici, who founded a Platonic Academy and chose as its first head the son of his physician Marsilio Ficino, who was carefully educated in the Greek language. Marsilio was a scholar of fine mind and keen susceptibilities, who entered with fervor upon the study of Plato, and established a religious cult of his great master. A shrine was built to Plato, and a lamp burned before it his bust was crowned with laurels, and his birthday was celebrated with a high festival. The Florentine Academy met and discussed the writings of Plato, and Marsilio spent his life in their translation and exposition. Though a philosopher, Marsilio was also a sincere Christian. At the age of forty he took orders after serious deliberation, but he did not seek high office or large revenues from the Church. He lived and died a poor man, and his works were published at the expense of Lorenzo de' Medici and other wealthy Florentines.

Ficino’s knowledge of Plato was neither accurate nor profound. He lacked the critical faculty which was necessary to understand the Platonic system. He did not distinguish between the writings of Plato and those of the Alexandrian mystics of later times; to him Plotinus was a true interpreter of his master. Ficino seized on the mystical side of Plato, and found in it a means of reconciling Christianity with the new philosophy. He saw in Plato an Attic-speaking Moses; he compared the life of Socrates with that of Jesus; he discovered in the doctrines of Plato a forecast of Christian dogma.
He did this with all sincerity and earnestness. It was the first attempt to unify the intellectual world, to weave into a system the old and new beliefs.

This intellectual movement, which Ficino expressed, was carried further by his scholar, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola. Son of the Count of Mirandola, he early devoted himself to study and at the age of twenty came to Florence, where he showed himself a zealous disciple of Ficino. He went to Paris in quest of more learning, and set himself to supplement Ficino’s system by researches into Jewish tradition. The teaching of the Alexandrian school had largely affected the Jews, and a body of tradition, called the Cabbalah, had gradually grown up which expanded the teaching of Moses into a theosophy. From the Cabbalah, from astrology, from magic, Pico obtained proofs of the truth of Christian doctrine, and carried into the more obscure regions of mediaeval knowledge the unifying process which Ficino had begun. In 1486 Pico visited Rome, and in a fit of youthful self-sufficiency promulgated nine hundred theses which he was ready to maintain in public disputation. His theses dealt with theology, philosophy, in fact all human knowledge down to magic and the Cabbalah. This audacity awakened enemies who were not slow in pointing out heresies which lay lurking in some of Pico’s propositions. Innocent VIII issued a brief against the more dangerous theses, and Pico, foreseeing a storm, left Rome, published an apology protesting his orthodoxy, and took refuge in France. Pico dreaded a citation to Rome and possible imprisonment; and the influence of Lorenzo de’ Medici was needed to induce the Pope to suspend proceedings. Pico returned to Florence after a while, but only Lorenzo’s exertions prevailed on the Pope to stay his hand.

The Florentine Neo-Platonism was an attempt to bring the new learning into connection with Christian doctrine. It aspired to a restoration of the unity of human thought, and was aimed against the prevalent materialism and indifference to religion. It was a protest against the ignorance of the clergy, who were rapidly being left stranded by the advance of men’s interest and the development of an intelligent and critical curiosity about all speculative matters. According to Ficino, the priest and the philosopher were identical; religion was to be rescued from ignorance and philosophy from godlessness. The soul came from God, and yearned after the consciousness of its union with Him. All religions were the expression of this desire; the Christian religion alone was true, and showed its truth by the completeness of the union between God and man which it revealed. Ficino and Pico alike aimed at a complete identification of wisdom and piety, as only being different aspects of the same quality. Hence they took up an attitude of large intellectual tolerance. The truth to them was one and indivisible; all that was good and noble was but a reflection of the complete truth which was fully revealed in Christ. Ficino and Pico were men of undoubted piety, but their teaching did not produce any deep impression. On the one side it did not prove an effective barrier against the growing materialism of the Aristotelian school; on the other side it easily passed into a vague philosophic theism which attracted a character like that of Lorenzo de’ Medici. In no way was it fitted to impress the mass of mankind and turn them back to piety.

Lorenzo was the centre of a literary circle which sometimes listened to the Platonic philosophy of Ficino and Pico, sometimes to the moral disputations of Cristoforo Landino, and sometimes to the burlesques of Luigi Pulci. The first force of the classical revival was spent, and men brought back the knowledge they had gained from the study of style to deck their native literature. Pulci’s Morgante Maggiore was the beginning of a revived romanticism. The legends of chivalry were again told in the vulgar tongue,
with no serious purpose and with a strong infusion of popular buffoonery. Pulci refined the literature of the market-place, and introduced it into cultivated society. His poem contains a strange mixture of piety and mocking skepticism. He jests with Scripture, with miracles, with sacred words, without any sense of incongruity. He is under the humor of the moment; his seriousness and his laughter are alike transient; his piety and his profanity rest equally on no basis of firm conviction.

The greatest man in this Florentine circle was Angelo Poliziano, so called from his birth-place of Monte Poliziano. He was the foremost scholar in Italy, and his lectures were thronged by an eager audience. He was so far master of Latin that he wrote Latin poems with an ease of style and mastery of expression which entitled him to rank as an original Latin poet. He stands, moreover, first among the poets of the revived Italian tongue. The passion, the fire of true poetry rings through his songs; but his greatest poems are only graceful trifles, and he wasted his powers on such themes as a tournament at which Giuliano de' Medici bore away the prize. There were mastery of language and gifts of genius, but there was no depth of feeling, no grasp of reality. Italy was enjoying a dream of beauty and lived only for the day.

Amongst these literary men Lorenzo moved, not merely as a patron, but as one who himself had won a foremost place. His Italian poems are careful and pleasing, though they lack the spontaneity of Poliziano. Florence was proud of its literary chief and Lorenzo gratified every taste; he wrote sonnets for the cultivated, a coarse satire on drunkenness for the rude, and a collection of sacred lauds for the pious. Moreover he turned his artistic gifts to the organization of the festivals which the Florentines loved so well. At Carnival time the young men used to ramble through the city in masques, singing and dancing. Lorenzo aimed at giving greater variety to these songs and dances. He wrote Canzoni a ballo, and had them set to music. He arranged costumes for the masqueraders, and designed for them chariots filled with mythological figures which they drew through the streets. They sallied forth after dinner, sometimes to the number of three hundred, and traversed the city with their songs and dance still the stars began to fade.

These Carnival songs give us a surprising insight into Lorenzo's mind and the tone of thought in his days. They openly incite to breaches of the moral law; they clothe profligacy with the veil of gallantry; they take the ordinary occupations of life and turn them into elaborate innuendoes of obscenity. The ruler of Florence himself devised and encouraged this means of corrupting what remained of moral sentiment among the Florentine youth. Lorenzo's example might not be edifying, his tone of thought might not be noble, but these only directly affected those who were in his immediate circle. By his Carnival songs, he carried to all ranks and classes the incitement to abandon self-restraint and adopt as a rule of life the pursuit of self-indulgence. He gave them as their motto:—

Quant' è bella giovinezza,
Che si fugge tuttavia!
Chi vuol esser lieto, sia;
Di doman non c' è certezza.

Even Poliziano was amazed at Lorenzo’s versatility, at the ease with which he changed his tone from his songs for the masquerades to his lauds for the pious penitents.
Amongst the memorials of the Medici in Florence, few are more interesting than the Convent of S. Marco, which Cosimo rebuilt with splendid magnificence. Michelozzo Michelozzi labored for six years to make a worthy monument of Cosimo’s liberality; and in it Cosimo established a branch of the Dominicans of Lombardy, to whose care he committed the first public library of Italy, of which the collection of Niccolò Niccoli formed the nucleus. Everything favored Cosimo’s desire to make the Convent of S. Marco a monumental building. Fra Angelico came from Fiesole and adorned its walls with fresco; the holy Archbishop of Florence, S. Antonino, shed round it the memories of his sanctity.

To this Convent of S. Marco, thus richly endowed by the patronage of the Medici, came in 1482 a young brother, Girolamo Savonarola. He was a native of Ferrara, born in 1452; his father wished to educate him as a classical scholar, but Girolamo showed a decided preference for the works of S. Thomas Aquinas. A disappointment in love is said to have done much to wean his mind from the world, but his own reading and reflection did more. At the age of twenty-two he left his parents and found a refuge for his weary soul amongst the Dominicans of Bologna. On his departure from home he left behind him, to console his father, a short treatise On Contempt of the World, which shows how deeply he felt the wickedness around him. “Everything is full of impiety, of usury and robbery, foul and wicked blasphemies, fornication, adultery, sodomy, and all uncleanness, murder and envy, ambition and pride, hypocrisy and falseness, crime and iniquity. Virtues are turned into vices and vices into virtues. There is none that doeth good, no not one. Men are summoned to penitence by disasters, earthquakes, hail stones, and storms of wind; but they do not hearken. They are summoned by floods, diseases, famines; but they do not hearken. They are summoned by the impious deeds of the overweening Turks; but they do not hearken. They are summoned by the affectionate voice of preachers and servants of God; but they do not hearken. All, in fine, are summoned by the natural pricks of conscience; but they do not hearken”.

With these feelings in his heart Savonarola quietly performed his noviciate at Bologna, whence in 1842 he was sent by order of his superiors to preach at Ferrara. He found that he had no honor in his own country; but the outbreak of the war into which Sixtus IV plunged Ferrara soon drove him to seek another refuge, and he entered the Convent of S. Marco at Florence. In 1483 he began to preach and testify against the prevalent corruptions. He was not, however, successful; his rugged oratory, his passionate appeals, did not attract the cultivated Florentines, who looked upon sermons as rhetorical exercises. Savonarola was left to preach to empty benches in S. Lorenzo while everybody flocked to S. Spirito to hear the favorite preacher of Lorenzo de’ Medici, Mariano de Genazzano. They admired his voice, his management of his breath, his graceful action. Their critical sense was satisfied by his periods, his dexterous transitions, his pathos, his command of his main argument while seemingly wandering at his pleasure. They were delighted at his artificial simplicity, entirely destitute of dignity. They applauded the orator all the more because he had not the bad taste to aim at convincing their minds or carrying truth to their hearts.

Savonarola grieved over his own want of success, but it only convinced him of the hardness of men’s hearts. He read with greater fervor the writings of the Hebrew prophets, till their spirit took possession of his soul. He felt that to him too had come a mission from on high, a mission to announce God’s coming judgment to an unrepentant world; and his fiery zeal made him realize the imminence of the impending doom. In his Lenten sermons, preached at S. Gemignano in 1484 and 1485, he foretold that the
scourge of God’s wrath would rapidly fall upon the Church, which should be purified and revived by punishment. These sermons were eagerly listened to, and Savonarola acquired confidence by seeing that his ideas could awaken the sympathy of others. He returned to Florence, strengthened in his own beliefs and with growing faith in his own mission. In 1486 he was ordered to preach at Brescia. There he expounded the Apocalypse with terrible vividness, so that his fame as a preacher of righteousness was spread abroad in Northern Italy, where he continued to preach till 1490, when he was ordered by his superiors to return to Florence.

In Florence he undertook the work of teaching the novices in S. Marco; but many people sought him out and besought him to give expository lectures on the Apocalypse. At first he spoke in the cloister, but his audience increased so rapidly that he had to transfer himself to the church. There he produced a marked impression on his hearers and became a ruling power in Florence. In the Lent of 1491 he preached to a crowded congregation in the cathedral, and his triumph as a preacher was assured.

The object of Savonarola’s teaching was to awaken men to a sense of righteousness, temperance, and judgment to come. He called them back from the study of Plato and Plotinus to the study of the Scriptures. He bade them renounce their life of pleasure for a life of communion with God. He besought them to turn their eyes from the newly discovered glories of this world to the eternal splendor of the world to come. In this he did not differ from the earnest spiritual teachers of all times. But he did not appeal to men only as a teacher; he warned them as a prophet. The prevailing corruption was so vividly present to his mind that he saw with equal vividness and certainty the scourge of God’s vengeance. He called upon his hearers not merely to flee from God’s wrath hereafter, but to prepare for a speedy manifestation of His judgment upon earth. The deep sense of universal wickedness was combined in his mind with an ideal of a pure and holy Church. He saw God’s hand already stretched out to work through suffering and woe a mighty process of purification, and he expressed the results of his insight with the imperiousness and certainty of the Hebrew prophets. He found the pleadings of reason, the arguments of experience, cold and inconclusive; overmastered by his sense of prophetic insight, he was driven to rest his admonitions on the certainty of immediate punishment. His preaching rested upon prophecy; and an age whose enlightenment had not advanced beyond the realm of unfettered imagination needed a prophet. Men who with all their culture believed in astrology and magic were riveted by the fire of Savonarola’s denunciations, though they would have paid little heed to his reasonings.

Between the spiritual movement set on foot by Savonarola and the ideas of Lorenzo de’ Medici there could be little sympathy. Savonarola justly regarded Lorenzo’s government as one great source of Florentine corruption; he held aloof from the Medicean circle, and assumed an independent attitude. Five of the chief citizens went to him and advised him to be more moderate in his language, “I see that you are sent to me by Lorenzo”, said Savonarola. “Tell him to repent of his sins, for the Lord spares no one and fears not the princes of the earth”. They spoke to him of the probability of exile. “I fear not your exile”, he answered, “for this city of yours is like a grain of lentil on the earth. Nevertheless, though I am a stranger and Lorenzo the first citizen in your city, I must remain and he must depart”. When in July, 1491, Savonarola was elected Prior of S, Marco, he refused to pay the usual visit of ceremony to Lorenzo. “I owe my election to God only”, he said, “and to Him will I pay my obedience”. Lorenzo, when this speech was told him, said in jest, “You see, a stranger has come into my house and does
not even think fit to visit me”. It was the passing rebuke of a statesman to what he considered the discourtesy of ecclesiastical pretentiousness.

Lorenzo on his part could not sympathize with the exalted enthusiasm of Savonarola’s preaching. He could not fail to recognize that it contained elements of political danger, and he looked to the popular Franciscan, Mariano of Genazzano, to outdo Savonarola’s eloquence. But Mariano overshot the mark in a sermon on the text, “It is not for you to know the times and seasons”. His invective was so violent that it failed to carry conviction, and Mariano’s failure left Savonarola more popular than before. Lorenzo treated Savonarola with kindly tolerance; he visited the Convent of S. Marco as before, though Savonarola studiously kept out of his way. In his behaviour towards Lorenzo, Savonarola’s zeal led him to take up the position of a partisan. As a preacher of repentance he might have labored to influence Lorenzo amongst other sinners. As it was, he did not strive to bring Lorenzo to better ways, but aimed at a reformation in his despite.

Lorenzo bore no animosity against Savonarola, but respected him for his good intentions and was willing that the florentines should enjoy a preacher of their own choice. In the beginning of 1492 he suffered greatly from gout; and already on the departure of his son Giovanni for Rome, there were but slight hopes of his recovery. His disease grew worse and he prepared to die like a Christian. On April 7 he sent for a priest to administer to him the Holy Communion. He dragged himself from his sick bed, supported by his attendants, to go and meet the host, before which he knelt with expressions of devout contrition. The priest, seeing his weakness, besought him to lie down in bed, where he received the last solemn rites of religion. He then summoned his son Piero and gave him his last advice. He looked with a smile on Poliziano, who was at his bedside; “Ah! Angelo”, he said, and pressed his old friend’s hands. He asked for Pico, and bade him farewell, saying pleasantly, “I wish that death had left me time to finish your library”. When Pico had gone another visitor appeared, Fra Girolamo Savonarola. He came at the request of Lorenzo, who wished to die in charity with all men. Savonarola addressed a few words of exhortation to the dying man. He admonished him to hold the faith; Lorenzo replied that he held it firmly. He exhorted him to amend his life, and Lorenzo promised to do so diligently. Finally he urged him to endure death, if need be, with constancy. “Nothing could please me more”, said Lorenzo, “if it were God’s will”. Savonarola prepared to depart. “Give me your blessing, father, before you go”, Lorenzo asked. He bowed his head and with pious mien joined in Savonarola’s prayers, while all around gave way to uncontrolled grief. After this Lorenzo rapidly sank. He bade farewell to his servants and asked their forgiveness if he had in aught offended them. He desired to have read to him the Passion of our Lord, and his lips moved as he followed the reader. A crucifix was held before him; he raised himself to kiss it, fell back and died.

The death of Lorenzo was of grave moment to the politics of Italy, and bereft Innocent of his adviser. Innocent did not survive Lorenzo many months, and their record is that of a succession of festivals. On May 27, Don Ferrantino, Prince of Capua, son of Alfonso of Calabria, entered Rome in pomp, to celebrate the reconciliation of Naples with the Pope. He was entertained by Cardinal Ascanio Sforza at a banquet of incredible splendor, so that the chronicler Infessura declares himself unequal to the task of describing it. His retinue of 900 horsemen and 260 mules laden with luggage proved troublesome guests; they sold in the market much of the food with which the Pope supplied them, and at their departure they despoiled their quarters of all their furniture.
The arrival of Ferrantino was rapidly succeeded by an imposing ecclesiastical ceremony. The Sultan Bajazet, in his desire to ingratiate himself with his brother’s gaoler, sent the Pope a valuable present, the head of the lance with which the Saviour was pierced. There was some discussion among the Cardinals about the reception of this holy relic. It was pointed out that already both Paris and Nurnberg claimed to possess the same thing; it was urged that the Sultan, an enemy of the Christian faith, might be sending this gift in derision. The majority of the Cardinals were in favor of receiving it without any solemnity and waiting to make inquiries about its genuineness. But the Pope thought otherwise, and sent a Cardinal to receive it at Ancona and bring it reverently to Rome. On May 29 the Sultan's ambassador arrived and was conducted in state to his lodgings. It was thought well that he should come in advance of the prelates who bore the relic, so as not to mix an incongruous figure in the solemnity, which was fixed for Ascension Day, May 31. Meanwhile the question was raised how the next day should be spent. The vigil of the Ascension was a fast day; but Burchard, the papal Master of Ceremonies, gave it as his opinion that under present circumstances a fast, instead of inspiring devotion, might cause many to blaspheme. He suggested as an amendment to the fast that fountains of wine should play in the street through which the procession was to pass. The Pope so far followed his opinion as to say nothing about the fast in his proclamation of the ceremonies.

On May 31 Innocent VIII advanced to the Porta del Popolo and received the Holy Lance, which was borne in procession to the Vatican. The Pope was too feeble to attend the mass, but gave his benediction to the people from the loggia of the portico, while Cardinal Borgia standing by his side held aloft the relic. He then received the Sultan's ambassador and returned to his room, leaving the Cardinals to finish the ecclesiastical part of the ceremony.

Yet the ailing Pope could still nerve himself for a family festival. Ferrante of Naples, in his desire to detach the Pope from France, was willing to cement his political alliance by a marriage. He asked the hand of the Pope's granddaughter, Battistina Cibo, daughter of Gerardo Usodimare, for his grandson Don Luigi, Marquis of Gerace; and the marriage took place on June 3 in the Vatican, amidst a brilliant throng of lords and ladies. After this token of friendship the Prince of Capua received the investiture of Naples, which Innocent in 1489 had declared to have reverted to the Holy See.

From this time the health of Innocent grew worse, till in the beginning of July there were small hopes of his recovery. The Cardinals began to prepare against any tumults that might arise on his death. They placed Djem in a safe place over the Sistine Chapel, as they were afraid that an attempt might be made to seize so lucrative a prisoner. They gathered troops to protect the Vatican, and proceeded to make an inventory of the property of the Church. The dying Pope asked their permission to distribute 48,000 ducats amongst his relatives; they acceded to his request, and he made provision for his grandchildren. A fever seized him, and he sank slowly. At the last, he became so feeble that he could take no nourishment except woman’s milk. It is said that a Jew doctor offered to cure the Pope by transfusion of blood. Three boys of ten years old were chosen for this purpose, and were paid a ducat each; they died in the experiment, and the Pope obtained no benefit. On the night of July 25 Innocent died; he was buried on August 5 in S. Peter's, where his grave is adorned by a brazen monument of Pollaiuolo, which represents the Pope seated, and in the act of giving the benediction.
The inscription on the tomb of Innocent, “the constant guardian of the peace of Italy”, records his one claim to respect. Coming between Sixtus IV and Alexander VI, Innocent VIII seemed to play a harmless part in Italian politics. His easy good nature was a quality which all men appreciated, and which made Innocent an involuntary benefactor to Italy. He was incapable of any great design and willingly yielded himself to others. At first he was in the hands of Giuliano della Rovere, who urged him to follow the bold career of Sixtus IV. But Innocent had no capacity for facing difficulties, and shrank back at the approach of danger. He withdrew from his fiery adviser and placed himself in the hands of Lorenzo de’ Medici, who skillfully used the Papacy as a great factor in the Italian balance of power which he strove to bring about. Moreover, Lorenzo used his opportunity to connect the interests of Rome and Florence, and establish the Medici family in the Curia, which thus became more widely representative of Italian politics.

In other matters also, he was helped by his incompetence. He enriched his family, but he had not the energy or capacity to do so by far-reaching schemes. He made his son Franceschetto, Count of Cervetri and Anguillara; but Franceschetto had no ambition beyond an easy life and on his father’s death he sold his territory to Virgilio Orsini. One of his nephews, Lorenzo Cibo, he created Cardinal; a dignity which Lorenzo worthily filled. But it was clear that the Cibo family was in no way remarkable. Innocent seems most at his ease when engaged in family festivals in the Vatican, which during his pontificate began to wear a homelike aspect. It was often graced with the presence of ladies, and Innocent VIII set the example of an estimable father of a family.

There were, however, affairs in which the easy good nature of Innocent did not stand him in such good stead. He was incapable of dealing with the turbulence of Rome, and his administration varied between outbursts of severity and periods of neglect. Generally the Vice-Chancellor Borgia and Franceschetto Cibo divided between them the fees that could be obtained from the administration of justice; and a lawless spirit of revenge prevailed amongst the dwellers in Rome. Innocent VIII was in sore need of money; he was not a good manager, and the troubles of the early part of his reign left him in great straits. To recruit his finances he followed the example of Sixtus IV and created new offices in the Curia, which he sold to aspiring candidates. He increased the number of papal secretaries to twenty-six, and sold these posts for 62,400 ducats. The new officials multiplied the general business of the Curia and exacted taxes on all appointments to offices in the Papal States; even from the officers who superintended the Roman markets. Moreover Innocent appointed fifty-two Plumbatores, whose duty was to seal the Bulls; each of them paid the Pope 2500 ducats on their appointment. This multiplication of needless offices as a means of raising money, not only increased the extortions of the Curia, but also lowered the character of its officials. In September, 1489, two papal secretaries and four subordinates were seized and imprisoned on the charge of forging papal Bulls. These two secretaries confessed that during the preceding two years they had forged and sold upwards of fifty Bulls, giving dispensations of various kinds. One of them adopted the ingenious process of obliterating portions of Bulls granted for small matters, and filling in the blank with matters of weightier moment. The Pope was naturally incensed at this discovery, and the criminals were burnt to death in spite of the efforts of wealthier relatives to buy them off. There were other irregularities in the Curia; many Jews and Marrani made their way to high places, and held the posts of scribes and protonotaries. But the general condition of the Curia was such that it was useless to be scrupulous about the lesser officials. The Cardinals
lived lives of luxury ill-befitting the princes of the Church. It was said that in two nights' gambling at the palace of Raffaele Riario, Franceschetto Cibo lost 14,000 ducats, and Cardinal La Balue 800. Riario was famous for his good luck, and Franceschetto, with characteristic feebleness, complained to the Pope of foul play. Innocent ordered Riario to restore the money, but was answered that it was already spent in paying for the new palace which he was engaged in building. It is no wonder that Cardinal Ardicino della Porta, a learned theologian, found Rome a dangerous place for one who had aspirations after a spiritual life. He laid aside his robes and left Rome secretly by night, with the intention of entering the monastery of Camaldoli. But he had only advanced to Roncilione when a messenger from the Pope commanded his return, as he had acted irregularly in laying aside his Cardinalate without the Pope's permission. The Cardinals objected to this bad example of seeking after saintliness; but Ardicino did not trouble them long; soon after his return to Rome he sickened and died.

Innocent was not a man of learning or of culture, though he welcomed Poliziano at Rome and received the dedication of his translation of Herodotus. Pomponius Laetus contrived to be the literary dictator of the city, and the classical revival took deeper and deeper hold of men's minds. In 1485 the Renaissance even discovered its saint. Some workmen engaged in excavations at the Via Appia found a marble sarcophagus, which when opened showed the body of a Roman girl who had been embalmed. Men's excited imaginations found in this mummy unsurpassed beauty; the maiden lay in all the loveliness of youth, her golden hair encircled with a fillet of gold; her eyes and mouth were partly open, and the roseate hue of health was on her cheek. Pilgrims from all parts of Italy flocked to Rome, amongst them many painters who wished to make sketches of this classic model. But the corpse gradually began to decompose through exposure to the air, and one night it was quietly buried on the Appian road in the tomb believed to be that of Cicero's Tullia: nothing save the empty sarcophagus was left for the disappointed votaries. Of course the body was identified, and the general opinion was in favor of Julia, daughter of Claudius; though others claimed her as Priscilla, wife of Abascantius, Domitian's minister, whose burial is sung by Statius.

Innocent continued the architectural decoration of Rome. He adorned the piazza of S. Peter's with a marble fountain, in the form of two vases one above the other, so finely wrought that it was reckoned to be the fairest work of the kind in Italy. He made some additions to the Vatican and to S. Peter's; but his chief work was the Villa Belvedere, designed by Antonio Pollaiuolo, which was erected in the Vatican gardens, and still stands joined by a cortile to the central block of buildings. A small chapel, dedicated to S. John, adjoined the Belvedere, and Andrea Mantegna was employed by the Pope to adorn it. This he did with so much care that the walls and ceiling seemed painted in miniature rather than fresco. A picture of the Baptism of Christ above the altar was remarkable for the realism shown in depicting the efforts of the crowd to divest themselves of their garments before entering the water. Innocent was an irregular paymaster, and one day when he visited the chapel he found Mantegna at work on an allegorical figure. He inquired the subject, and the painter with a meaning smile answered "Discretion". "Set Patience beside her", was Innocent's answer. When the works were finished the Pope paid Mantegna liberally and dismissed him contented. These works of Mantegna were destroyed by Pius VI, who pulled down the chapel that he might enlarge the Vatican Museum.

Eight miles out of Rome in the direction of the sea Innocent built a country house, La Magliana, which was a favorite resort of his successors; but the advance of the
malaria rendered it unhealthy and it now lies in ruins. It is still a massive pile of buildings and the name of Innocent may still be seen inscribed above the windows. In the city of Rome Innocent’s great work was the rebuilding of the ancient Church of S. Maria in Via Lata. For this purpose he removed the arch of Diocletian which stood on the site. Only the main building, as the church is at present, belongs to the time of Innocent; its façade and the decoration of the interior date from 1660.

The pontificate of Innocent was ignoble. He drifted with the stream, and his example was disastrous to the discipline of the Church. The general corruption of morals in Italy advanced unchecked during his pontificate. A Pope whose son and daughter were openly recognized in the Vatican could do nothing towards stemming the irregularity of the clergy. The Papacy under Innocent was merely a factor in Italian politics of which Lorenzo de’ Medici made a prudent use; in the affairs of Christendom its voice was scarcely heard. The best that can be said of Innocent VIII is that in politics he was too indolent to do anything mischievous, and he was pacific because he shrank from effort. In minor matters he was generally complaisant, and England owed him some gratitude for a Bull which helped to reestablish peace by securing the succession of the crown to the children born of Henry VII and Elizabeth of York or any future wife. Henry VII further obtained from him a Bull which diminished the rights of sanctuary, an important concession to a king who was troubled by persistent rebellions. Bacon gives a true picture of Innocent when he says that this Bull was granted in return for a complimentary oration delivered by the English ambassadors: “The Pope knowing himself to be lazy and unprofitable to the Christian world was wonderfully glad to hear that there were such echoes of him sounding in so distant parts. He was willing to barter ecclesiastical immunities for a little judicious flattery”.
CHAPTER VI.
BEGINNINGS OF ALEXANDER VI
1492—1494.

On August 6, 1492, the twenty-three Cardinals in Rome entered the Conclave. The death of Innocent VIII had been long foreseen, and the probabilities of the future election had been discussed. Innocent’s nephew, Lorenzo Cibo, was anxious for the election of someone bound to his house by ties of gratitude. His candidate was the Genoese Cardinal Pallavicini; but Cardinal Cibo shared the incompetence of his family, and when he saw that his first proposal was unacceptable he had no one else to propose. Charles VIII of France was anxious to secure the election of Cardinal Rovere, and sent 200,000 ducats to a Roman bank as a means of furthering his desire. A Pope in the French interest was dreaded by Milan; and Cardinal Ascanio Sforza was resolutely opposed to Rovere. Sforza did not judge it wise to put himself forward as a candidate; he rather wished to have a Pope who would owe everything to him, and he joined with Raffaello Riario in pressing the election of Cardinal Borgia. There were many reasons why Borgia should be acceptable. As a Spaniard he would hold a neutral position towards political parties in Italy, and the recent successes of the Spanish monarchs had turned men's eyes to Spain as a power which was rising to importance in the affairs of Christendom. Moreover Borgia was the richest Cardinal in Rome; his election would vacate many important offices, for which there were eager candidates. The former objections to his personal character disappeared in the low tone of morality which was now almost universal.

The first days of the Conclave were spent in the futile proceeding of making regulations to bind the future Pope. Ascanio Sforza, seconded by Orsini, was working hard to secure the election of Borgia, who debased himself to make the most humble entreaties. Borgia’s wealth was a useful argument to confirm the minds of waverers; Ascanio Sforza’s zeal was increased by the promise of the office of Vice-Chancellor and Borgia’s palace; Orsini, Colonna, Savelli, Sanseverino, Riario, Pallavicini, even the nonagenarian Gherardo of Venice, all received promises of benefices or gifts of money. So matters proceeded smoothly in the Conclave, and late in the evening of August 10 the election of Rodrigo Borgia was unanimously accomplished.

We are told that the first utterance of the newly-elected Pope was a cry of joy, “I am Pope and Vicar of Christ”. Cardinal Sforza said that the election was the work of God, and that “great things were expected of the new Pope for the good of the Church”. Borgia replied that he felt his own weakness, but trusted to God’s Holy Spirit. He showed great haste in clothing himself with the pontifical vestments, and ordered the Master of the Ceremonies to write the fact of his election on pieces of paper and throw them out of the window. It was late in the evening when the election was made, and not till the early dawn did the crowd assemble outside the Vatican and hear the customary proclamation from the window; then the bells rung and Rome was filled with rejoicing. When Borgia was asked what name he would take, and “Calixtus” was suggested in remembrance of his uncle, he answered, “We desire the name of the invincible Alexander”. Cardinal Medici, alarmed at the demeanor of the new Pope, whispered in
the ear of Cardinal Cibo, “We are in the jaws of a rapacious wolf; if we do not flee he will devour us”. Alexander VI was enthroned in S. Peter’s, where Cardinal Sanseverino, a man of huge stature, lifted the new Pope in his arms and placed him on the high altar.

Rodrigo Borgia was born at Xativa, in the diocese of Valencia, on January 1, 1431. His parents, Jofre and Isabella Borgia, were cousins, and belonged to a family which may have had far-off claims to nobility, but was poor and of small account. The young Rodrigo was early destined to a clerical career, in which his uncle Alfonso, Bishop of Valencia, could help him to preferment. The elevation of Alfonso Borgia to the pontificate brought Rodrigo a Cardinalate at the age of twenty-five, and soon afterwards the lucrative office of Vice-Chancellor. At the time of his election to the Papacy, he had had thirty-six years' experience of the Curia, and had served under five Popes. He went with Pius II to the Congress of Mantua, and had been the legate of Sixtus IV to Spain in the first fervor of his crusading zeal. He had seen the old ideals of the Papacy die away, and had gracefully accommodated himself to changes as they came. He was always influential but never powerful, and cultivated useful friends. He was capable in business and used his opportunities to amass money, so that no Cardinal, except Estouteville, ever established so great a reputation for wealth.

On great occasions he displayed a becoming magnificence, as at the festival of Pius II at Viterbo, and the celebration in Rome of the fall of Grenada; but he was not given to prodigality or luxury. He lived with careful economy, and when he was Pope preferred to make his meal of one dish only, so that lovers of good fare found it an infliction to dine with him. He built himself a splendid palace near the river; but in so doing he only followed the fashion of his time. He was kindly, and showed active benevolence to those who were in want. But the most striking thing about him was his fascinating appearance and attractive manners. “He is handsome”, says a contemporary, “with a pleasant look, and honeyed tongue; he attracts ladies to love him, and draws them to him in a wondrous way more than a magnet draws iron”.

Cardinal Borgia’s fascinations for women were not always kept in check by rigorous self-restraint. When he was at Siena in 1460, Pius II reproved him for unseemly gallantry. Cardinal Ammannati at a later date wrote and exhorted him to a change of life. Indeed, there were evidences enough that Cardinal Borgia was not true to his priestly vow of chastity. He had a daughter Girolama who was old enough to be married in 1482. A son, Pedro Luis, lived in Spain, and Cardinal Borgia used some of his wealth to buy for him the duchy of Gandia; he died, however, in 1488, before his father's accession to the Papacy. Besides these children, whose mother we do not know, Cardinal Borgia had four others, Giovanni, Cesare, Lucrezia, and Jofre, whose mother's name was Vanozza dei Catanei, a Roman. The testimonies that we have of Vanozza speak of her as an excellent woman, and the inscription on her tomb calls her upright, pious and charitable. Her youngest son Jofre was born in 1480 or 1481; and either immediately before or after his birth she was married to a scribe, Giorgio della Croce, and after his death in 1485, she married a second husband, Carlo Canale, a secretary of the Penitentiary. Vanozza lived a quiet and secluded life; we never hear of her presence at the Vatican, or of any recognition shown her by the Pope. She sighs a letter to her daughter Lucrezia “La Felice et Infelice Madre Vanozza Borgia”. “The happy and unhappy mother”—that was the summary of her chequered life. She was happy in her children, their worldly success, their splendid opportunities; she was unhappy because there was a bar between them and her, and she could only witness their triumphs from a distance. She lived to the age of seventy-six, and died respected in 1518.
These facts about the private life of Cardinal Borgia must have been known to the majority of his electors. But the election of Innocent VIII had already shown that the current feeling, even amongst Churchmen, was not rigorous in judging breaches of the priestly vow. Cardinal Borgia was a loving and tender father, who took care betimes for the advancement of his children. They were probably all brought up by relatives of his at Rome. Girolama was comfortably married at an early age; Giovanni succeeded to his brother's duchy of Gandia in Spain; Cesare was destined for a clerical career, and in 1488 Sixtus IV granted him a dispensation from proving the legality of his birth, and allowed him to receive minor orders at the age of seven. In 1482 another act of Sixtus IV appointed Cardinal Borgia administrator of the revenues of any ecclesiastical benefices which might be conferred upon this young clerk before he reached the age of fourteen. The tolerance of Sixtus IV and the example of Innocent VIII had relaxed the bonds of ecclesiastical discipline into accordance with prevalent morality. Cardinal Borgia was a kindly man and likely to make a capable ruler: his elevation to the Papacy suited the self-interest of the College of Cardinals. They looked no further into his private life; and Italy in general was quite satisfied with the choice which they made.

The Romans rejoiced in the election of Alexander VI, which opened to them the prospect of a splendid pontificate. On the night of his enthronement the magistrates rode in procession by torchlight to the Vatican to do him honor. For a mile the streets and squares gleamed with the brightness of midday. “Even Mark Antony”, exclaims a spectator, “did not receive Cleopatra with such splendor. I thought of the nocturnal sacrifices of the ancients, or the Bacchanals bearing torches in honor of their god”. The Pope received them graciously, and gave his benediction, from the top of the Vatican.

On August 26 the coronation of Alexander VI was celebrated with unwonted magnificence. The Cardinals vied with one another in the splendor of the dresses of their equipage for the procession which accompanied the Pope in his progress to the Lateran. The streets were adorned with triumphal arches, with tapestries, flowers and paintings which celebrated the glories of Cardinal Borgia in the past and foretold his successes in the future. There were processions of allegorical figures and addresses in profusion. The inscriptions in the streets were framed in terms of extravagant adulation; and the Borgia arms, a grazing bull on a gold field, lent itself to mythological interpretations of surpassing ingenuity. By the Palazzo of S. Marco was a gigantic figure of a bull, from whose horns, eyes, nostrils and ears flowed water, and from its forehead a stream of wine. The procession moved slowly, and the intense heat of an August sun was so oppressive to the Pope, who sweltered beneath the weight of his magnificent apparel, that when he reached the Lateran he could scarcely stand. He had to be propped up by two Cardinals; and when he sat down at last on the papal throne he fainted, and was supported by Cardinal Riario till he recovered consciousness.

Alexander repaid the loyalty of the Roman citizens by taking steps for the restoration of order within Rome. It was computed that in the interval between the death of Innocent VIII and the coronation of Alexander no fewer than 220 men had been assassinated in the streets. Alexander made an example of the first assassin whom he could discover. He sent the magistrates to pull down his house; he hanged the culprit and his brother. It was so long since Rome had seen such vigor in the administration of justice, that the citizens ascribed it to the direct disposition of God. Alexander further established commissioners for the trial of disputes, and appointed days of public audience in which he himself decided quarrels. He gave every sign of vigor and good intentions and even undertook to reform in the Curia. “He has promised”, wrote the
Ferrarese ambassador on August 17, “to make many reforms in the Curia, to dismiss the secretaries and many tyrannical officials, to keep his sons far from Rome, and make worthy appointments. It is said that he will be a glorious pontiff and will have no need of guardians”. We have no reason for thinking that Alexander's intentions were not sincere; but the love of his relatives was strong within him, and his good intentions fell before his regard for his own kin. On September 1 he raised to the Cardinalate a nephew, Juan Borgia, Bishop of Monreale, and issued a Bull in which, “by the consent of the Cardinals, and the plenitude of the Apostolic power”, he absolved himself from keeping the restrictions imposed by the regulations of the Conclave on the nomination of Cardinals.

If Rome was well content with the new Pope, so also were the Italian powers. Congratulatory embassies poured into the city, and vied with one another in praising the majestic appearance, the tried capacity, and large experience of Alexander. Italy was sincere in its good wishes; it felt the need of a guiding hand in its political perplexities. Men were enjoying prosperity to the full, and only longed for peace in which to reap the harvest of pleasure. But a vague presentiment of coming misfortune mingled with their satisfaction; and the prophecies of Savonarola owed their force to the fact that they corresponded to a concealed uneasiness. The death of Lorenzo de' Medici removed a powerful influence for peace; Italy looked for guidance to the new Pope.

The chief source of danger to the peace of Italy lay in the condition of affairs at Milan. The assassination of Galeazzo Maria Sforza, in 1476, left the duchy of Milan in the hands of his infant son, Gian Galeazzo. His mother, Bona of Savoy, undertook the regency, and managed to hold it in spite of the machinations of the four brothers of the deceased duke. But Bona’s government was feeble, and the eldest of these brothers, Ludovico Sforza, surnamed Il Moro, succeeded in 1479 in wresting the power from her hands. Ludovico ruled as regent of Milan, and was helped at Rome by his brother, the Cardinal Ascanio. In 1482 Bona appealed to King Louis XI of France, but the death of Louis XI delivered Ludovico from danger. The young Gian Galeazzo was kept in retirement at Pavia and Ludovico reigned supreme. But Gian Galeazzo had been affianced by his mother to Isabella, daughter of Alfonso, Duke of Calabria, and when in 1489 he reached the age of twenty, Ludovico had no pretext for refusing to fulfill the contract. Gian Galeazzo was married with all due festivity, and then returned with his wife to Pavia. In 1490 Isabella gave birth to a son, and it became increasingly difficult for Ludovico to keep his nephew any longer in tutelage. In 1491 Ludovico married Beatrice d'Este, daughter of the Duke of Ferrara, and the indignation of Isabella was increased by seeing another receive the homage and enjoy the splendor which she justly considered to be her own. She appealed to her father Alfonso for help to restore her husband to his rightful station, and Alfonso was willing to attend her summons. The old age of Ferrante made him cautious, and the influence of Lorenzo de' Medici had preserved peace hitherto; but war was imminent unless Ludovico Sforza withdrew from his usurped authority. Both sides waited anxiously to see the policy of the new Pope; and Italy generally hoped that he might play the part of mediator. The death of Innocent VIII left the Papacy at peace with Naples; but Alexander VI owed his election to Ascanio Sforza, brother of Ludovico Il Moro. The political position of the new Pope was delicate, and the consequences of his action were likely to be momentous.

On December 11, Don Federigo, Prince of Altamura, second son of Ferrante, arrived in Rome to congratulate the new Pope and offer him the obedience of Naples. He was magnificently entertained by Cardinal Giuliano della Rovere during his stay.
There was every outward manifestation of good-will between the Pope and Don Federigo; but difficulties had already begun to arise. Federigo besought the Pope to side with Naples in a family matter. Mathias Corvinus, King of Hungary, had married Beatrice, an illegitimate daughter of King Ferrante. On the death of Mathias in 1490, Beatrice lent her influence to procure the Hungarian succession for Wladislaf, King of Bohemia, on condition that he married her in return. Wladislaf succeeded to the Hungarian crown, but sought a dispensation from his promise of marriage. Don Federigo begged the Pope to refuse this dispensation, and when Alexander VI refused to make any promise in the matter, Federigo was aggrieved.

It is not surprising that Alexander was not over anxious to please the King of Naples. He had received the news of a transaction which he could not look upon without alarm, and which was clearly due to Neapolitan intrigues. On the death of Innocent VIII his son Franceschetto Cibo had withdrawn to Florence, to live under the protection of his brother-in-law, Piero de' Medici. Franceschetto had no ambition beyond that of leading a comfortable life, and did not care for the responsibilities attaching to a baron in the States of the Church. He had not aspired to found a principality, and at his father's death he hastened to dispose of lands which Innocent VIII had conferred upon him, the lordships of Cervetri and Anguillara. As early as September 3, he sold them for 40,000 ducats to Virginio Orsini; and Piero de' Medici negotiated the bargain between his two brothers-in-law. As Virginio Orsini was a firm adherent of Ferrante of Naples, it was clear that Ferrante had supplied the money for this purchase. Alexander was justified in objecting to this unauthorized transfer of lands held under the Pope; and Ludovico Il Moro regarded with suspicion a transaction which opened up the road from Naples to Tuscany, and which showed a good understanding between Piero de' Medici and Ferrante.

In the delicate equilibrium of Italian politics a small matter sufficed to bring powerful parties into antagonism. Alexander, urged by Cardinal Ascanio Sforza, protested against the transfer of Cervetri and Anguillara. The cause of Naples was espoused by Cardinal Giuliano della Rovere, who had been the Neapolitan candidate for the Papacy, and who was supported by the Colonna and the Orsini. Giuliano was opposed to Ascanio Sforza, and was resolved that one or other of them should quit the Curia. Hostile feeling went so far between them, and Alexander was so clearly allied with Ascanio, that Giuliano suspected the Pope of forging some plot to ruin his reputation and deprive him of his dignities, and did not consider Rome a safe place of residence. At the end of January, 1493, he withdrew to his bishopric of Ostia, where he surrounded himself with armed men. This was a direct menace, as Ostia commanded the mouth of the Tiber and might cut off supplies from Rome; and Alexander was alarmed at this hostile demonstration. One day, when he was going to picnic at Innocent VIII's villa of La Magliana, he was so terrified by the sound of some cannon which were fired in honor of his approach, that he returned in haste to Rome, amid the murmurs of his attendants, who were disappointed of their dinner. He suspected a landing of Neapolitan troops at Ostia, and an attempt to seize his person.

Ludovico II Moro, on his side, was alarmed at the alliance between Florence and Naples, and sought to meet it by a league between the Pope, Milan, and Venice. Ferrante of Naples saw, with the wisdom of long experience, the dangers which would follow a breach of the peace of Italy. He was willing to gather together a party which might make him formidable to the Pope; but he hastened to adopt the position of mediator and do away with all causes of dispute. He sent envoys to Alexander urging
the cause of peace. He sent envoys to Florence, even to Milan, to plead for pacific counsels, and to make proposals for a peaceful settlement of the question of Anguillara. Alexander so far listened to Ferrante as to propose a marriage of his young son Jofre with Donna Lucrezia, a granddaughter of Ferrante. But either Alexander did not trust Ferrante, or he wished to terrify him further, or the influence of Milan was still too strong in Rome. He gathered troops and prepared for war; he fortified the walls between the Vatican and the Castle of S. Angelo. Ludovico Sforza pursued his negotiations for a league; and Venice was won over by the dread of a predominance of the power of Naples in North Italy, if Ferrante succeeded in ousting Ludovico in favor of Gian Galeazzo, who would be entirely dependent on Naples. On April 25 Alexander, accompanied by an armed escort, celebrated mass in the church of S. Marco, and after mass published his league with Venice, the Duke of Milan, Siena, Mantua, and Ferrara. The bells of the Roman churches were rung in sign of joy, and Rome wore a military aspect.

When the news reached Naples, the king's eldest son, Alfonso, wished, to unite at once with Piero de' Medici, arouse the Orsini and Colonna, and attack Rome. The more cautious Ferrante checked a plan which would have plunged Italy into confusion. Yet he saw only too clearly the dangers of an alliance between Ludovico Sforza and France, and in his alarm he turned for help to the Spanish king. He wrote a long invective against the Pope, who so terrrified his Cardinals that they dared not speak the truth, and dreaded lest they should be driven away from Rome like Cardinal Rovere; Alexander had found Italy in profound peace, and had already created discord. Ferrante gave his own account of the Pope's policy and then proceeded, "He leads a life that is abhorred by all, without respect to the seat which he holds. He cares for nothing else save to aggrandize his children by fair means or foul. From the beginning of his pontificate he has done nothing else than plunge us into disquietude". Ferrante showed his foresight; he had penetrated the Pope's policy of regaining the possessions of the Holy See, and of promoting the interests of his children. He saw that Alexander was resolute and unscrupulous, and he found out the weak point in his position when he urged against him the disorders of his private life.

Spain was at this time connected with the Pope about a most momentous matter. The Genoese, Cristoforo Colombo, arrived at the Spanish court in March, 1493, with the astounding news of the discovery a new continent. The mediaeval love of adventure, which found its expression in the crusading spirit, had taken a new shape under the inspiration of the awakening curiosity of the Renaissance, and Colombo had gone forth in quest of new regions which might be added to Christendom. The ardor of the explorer, strengthened by the fervor of religious zeal, had led to a great discovery. The idea of the New World filled men's minds with strange excitement, and Colombo set out again to extend the field of knowledge.

Meanwhile Ferdinand and Isabella thought it wise to secure a title to all that might ensue from their new discovery. The Pope, as Vicar of Christ, was held to have authority to dispose of lands inhabited by the heathen; and by papal Bulls the discoveries of Portugal along the African coast had been secured. The Portuguese showed signs of urging claims to the New World, as being already conveyed to them by the papal grants previously issued in their favor. To remove all cause of dispute the Spanish monarchs at once had recourse to Alexander, who issued two Bulls on May 4 and 5 to determine the respective rights of Spain and Portugal. In the first, the Pope granted to the Spanish monarchs and their heirs all lands discovered or hereafter to be
discovered in the western ocean. In the second, he defined his grant to mean all lands that might be discovered west and south of an imaginary line, drawn from the North to the South Pole, at the distance of a hundred leagues westward of the Azores and Cape de Verde Islands. In the light of our present knowledge we are amazed at this simple means of disposing of a vast extent of the earth's surface. We have to remind ourselves that no one grasped the importance of the new impulse which Europe had received; and the Pope's solution of the difficulties likely to arise between Spain and Portugal was sufficiently accurate for the knowledge of his age.

A Pope who had shown himself so ready to reward the Christian zeal of Spain had no cause to dread any untoward results to himself from Spanish intervention, though the Spanish rulers looked on him with no good will. “They fear”, writes Peter Martyr, “lest his cupidity, his ambition, or, what is more serious, his tenderness towards his children, should expose the Christian religion to peril”. Their fears were not without good grounds. Alexander was occupied in using the position which he held in Italian politics as a means of furthering the interests of his children. He had already striven to provide for his daughter Lucrezia, by betrothing her in 1491, at the age of thirteen, to a Spaniard, Don Cherubin de Centelles. Scarcely was the betrothal accomplished before Cardinal Borgia found a better husband in another Spaniard, Don Gasparo da Procida, to whom she was contracted in the same year. But his elevation to the papal dignity enabled Alexander to look still higher for a son-in-law; the contract with Don Gasparo was dissolved, and Alexander used his alliance with the Sforza to wed his daughter to Giovanni Sforza, lord of Pesaro. The marriage was celebrated in the Vatican on June 12, in the presence of the Pope, ten Cardinals, and the chief nobles of Rome, whose wives, to the number of a hundred and fifty, were also invited. The marriage feast was magnificent; the Roman ladies were presented by the Pope with silver cups full of sweetmeats, which were in many cases thrown into their bosoms; magnificent gifts were offered to the bridal pair. After the banquet there was a ball, and the Pope and his companions spent the whole night in this splendid entertainment, which was varied by comedies of a questionable character. The Pope married his daughter with the splendor befitting his secular greatness; but he gave, at the same time, an open manifestation of disregard for ecclesiastical discipline, and certainly set the tongues of men wagging with hints of graver irregularities.

Three days after this festivity the Spanish envoy, Don Diego Lopez de Haro, arrived in Rome to offer the obedience of the Spanish monarchs. He had many questions to discuss with the Pope. There were points to be settled about the discovery of the New World and the steps to be taken for its evangelization; and Ferdinand the Catholic needed grants of Church revenues to enable him to carry on his crusading projects, which he hoped to extend as far as the recovery of the Holy Land. Moreover, Spain was aggrieved at the reception into the Papal States of the refugee Jews or Moors who were driven from Spain by the stringency of the Inquisition. The Spaniards, in the assertion of their nationality, were desirous to rid themselves of all foreign elements, and employed the Inquisition for that purpose. The crowds of luckless Marrani, as they were called, awakened the compassion of the Italians who saw them arrive on their coast; and many of them came to Rome, where they were subjected to no persecution. A crowd encamped outside the Appian Gate, and were the means of bringing an outbreak of plague into the city. The papal tolerance was displeasing to the Spanish rulers, and the ambassador expressed his wonder that the Pope, who was the head of the Christian faith, should receive into his city those who had been driven from Spain as enemies to
the Christian faith. We do not find that Alexander paid much heed to these remonstrances; the Papacy in its spirit of toleration was far in advance of public opinion.

The most important object, however, of the Spanish ambassador was to urge on Alexander the maintenance of the peace of Italy, as the means of preventing French interference. To make his intervention more powerful the envoy set forth ecclesiastical grievances which needed remedy at the hands of the Pope. He pointed out the extortions of the Curia, the abuse of dispensations for pluralities, the heedlessness shown in ecclesiastical appointments and such like matters, which since the days of the Council of Constance had been standing complaints against the Papacy, to be urged in all negotiations for other purposes. The real point which Spain wished to press on the Pope was peace with Naples. Ludovico Il Moro, though strong in his league with the Pope and Venice, did not trust much to the sincerity of his allies. He carried on a double policy, and negotiated with Charles VIII, whose fancy was so fired by the Milanese ambassador, Belgioso, that he entered into a secret agreement with Ludovico, who, though warned of the dangers of his course, trusted that a disturbance in Italian affairs would turn out to his own profit. He wished to be prepared against all risks.

The pleadings of the Spanish ambassador were enforced by a hostile demonstration on the part of Naples. Don Federigo of Altamura came to Ostia with eleven galleys, and was welcomed by Cardinal Rovere, Virginio Orsini, and the Colonna. Alexander VI agreed to negotiate, and a truce was made. Don Federigo came to Rome, and was followed on July 24 by Cardinal Rovere and Virginio Orsini. Rome rejoiced at the expectations of peace which the representations of the Spanish envoy at length succeeded in making. Virginio Orsini was allowed to keep the castles which he had bought from Franceschetto Cibo on condition that he again paid the purchase money, 40,000 ducats, to the Pope; and peace with Naples was cemented by a marriage between the Pope’s son Jofre and Sancia, a daughter of Alfonso. As Jofre was only thirteen years old, the marriage could not take place immediately; but it was agreed that he should go to Naples and receive his wife’s dowry, the principality of Squillace. This agreement with Naples was only concluded when the ambassador of Charles VIII, Perron de Basche, who had been sent to try the dispositions of the Italian powers towards the French invasion of Naples, arrived in Rome. He came too late to win over Alexander and was dismissed with vague admonitions.

Ferrante of Naples rejoiced that by his alliance with the Pope all difficulties were now at an end, and the schemes of France were baffled; but he wished to be sure of the Pope's good intentions, and urged the withdrawal of papal favour from Cardinal Ascanio Sforza. In this he was seconded by Cardinal Rovere, who showed all his uncle’s resoluteness in prosecuting his animosities. Alexander adopted a policy of conciliation; he did not dismiss Ascanio, but he showed signs of favor to Rovere. He wished to unite the Cardinal College that he might decorously accomplish a creation of new Cardinals. Accordingly he used his opportunity when both parties had much to hope from his favor in the future, and on September 20 created twelve new Cardinals without encountering any decided opposition to his choice, though it is said that only seven of the old Cardinals gave their assent.

The new Cardinals were fairly chosen from various parts of Christendom. Amongst them was an English-man, John Morton, Archbishop of Canterbury, a Frenchman, a Spaniard, Raymund Perrault, Bishop of Gurk, a favorite of Maximilian, Ippolito d'Este,
son of Duke Ercole of Ferrara and of Leonora, daughter of Ferrante of Naples; and the rest represented various Italian powers. But two of the new Cardinals owed their position to the personal favor of the Pope. One was the Pope’s son, Cesare Borgia, a youth of eighteen, who had been carefully educated at Rome, and afterwards had studied at the Universities of Perugia and Pisa. Innocent VIII conferred upon him the bishopric of Pampluna, and Alexander VI that of Valencia, which he had held himself before his pontificate. Cesare was regarded as a young man of great promise, the rising hope of the Borgia family.

Another creation which gave rise to greater scandal was that of Alessandro Farnese, who afterwards became Pope Paul III. The Farnese family had not hitherto been of much importance in Rome. They took their name from the Isola Farnese, a castle built on the ruins of the ancient Veii, but had not made themselves important amongst the dynasties of small barons who held the Tuscan Campagna. Alessandro Farnese was, however, a man of some capacity, and was Protonotary of the Church. He owed his good fortune under Alexander VI to his sister Giulia, who in 1489 married Orsino Orsini, whose mother Adriana was a relative of Alexander, and brought up his daughter Lucrezia. Giulia was a great favorite with the Pope, and her influence founded the fortunes of the Farnese family in Rome, so that Alessandro was mockingly called “Il Cardinale della gonella”, the petticoat Cardinal. The relations of Alexander to Giulia were a matter of common rumor, and men openly spoke of her as the Pope’s mistress.

We might hesitate to believe the voice of rumor on such a matter, in an age when men's tongues were unrestrained by any thoughts of decency. But a letter written by the Pope's own hand to his daughter Lucrezia, in July, 1494, expresses the greatest concern at Giulia's departure from Rome without his express permission, and rebukes Lucrezia for her want of consideration to himself in having allowed this departure to take place during his absence. Moreover, the new Cardinal Alessandro, and the Florentine Lorenzo Pucci, his brother-in-law, who also became a Cardinal later, certainly believed in the connection between Giulia and the Pope. They recognized a daughter of Giulia, born in 1492, as the Pope’s child, and speculated as early as 1493 on matrimonial projects for this infant. Pucci paid Giulia a visit and was struck by the resemblance which her daughter bore to the strongly-marked features of the Pope; Giulia’s husband was, in his opinion, amply compensated for his equivocal position by a few castles near Basanello.

It is difficult to doubt this evidence. Alexander, though now of the age of sixty-two, still possessed the power of “drawing women to him as a magnet draws iron”. Giulia Farnese lived under his protection, and used her influence to promote the interests of her family. It was regarded as natural by the Cardinals that such should be the case, and no one in Italy was particularly scandalized at this state of things. It was universally recognized that the Pope was an Italian prince, and that his policy largely depended on arrangements for his domestic comfort.

The political condition of Italy received a further shock by the death of Ferrante of Naples on January 25, 1494. He was seventy years old and had reigned Ferrante for thirty-five years. Cruel and treacherous as Ferrante had shown himself, he was not a harsh ruler to the people, though he ruthlessly crushed the barons. He had great political experience and had learned caution in his long and tortuous career; he was profoundly impressed with the evils likely to follow on French intervention in Italy, and his last efforts had been directed to prevent it. Since the death of Lorenzo de' Medici he was the only Italian who deserved the name of statesman. He died regretted not so much for any
merits of his own as from dread of his successor Alfonso II, whose violent and brutal character had created universal terror.

The death of Ferrante gave Charles VIII an opportunity to advance formally his claims on the Neapolitan kingdom, and Alexander at first made a show of drawing to the French side. On February 1, he issued a brief taking Charles VIII under his protection and authorizing him to come with an army to Rome on his way to a crusade against the Turks. No mention was made of Naples; but Charles VIII’s claims were notorious. The French ambassadors, supported by a strong party among the Cardinals, protested against Alfonso II’s investiture with the Neapolitan kingdom; but Alexander had much to gain from Alfonso’s gratitude, and perhaps saw the dangers of a French invasion, though he was willing to use it as a threat when his own purposes required. He agreed to recognize Alfonso II, and appointed a legate to confer on him the Neapolitan crown, whereon the French ambassador appealed to a future Council. Cardinal Rovere now abandoned the cause of Naples, when Naples was allied with the Pope; filled with distrust and hatred of Alexander he again retired to Ostia. In April he took ship to Genoa and thence made his way to the French king, who received him with respect. He bitterly complained of Alexander, and his personal animosity led him to aid the foreigners to enter Italy, a step the evil effects of which he afterwards vainly strove to counteract.

Alfonso II was crowned in Naples on May 7, and his daughter’s marriage with Jofre Borgia was celebrated with pomp and rejoicings. Jofre was made Prince of Squillace, with a revenue of 40,000 ducats; his eldest brother, the Duke of Gandia, was made Prince of Tricarico; and Cardinal Cesare was enriched by Neapolitan benefices. Ostia, the stronghold of the rebellious Cardinal Rovere, was captured by the papal forces. Thus Alexander had reduced his enemies and enriched his family. But his arrangements had no permanent foundation; while he developed his plans Charles VIII was gathering his army.

Alexander and Ludovico Sforza had been willing to use the French invasion as a threat; it was rapidly becoming a reality. Yet Alexander cannot fairly be accused of having caused this beginning of the ruin of Italy, and when it actually came to pass he did his best to stay it. But he was no wiser and no more disinterested than the other Italian princes of the time; he alternately invoked and dissuaded to suit his own purposes. A resolute attitude, a moderating spirit at the beginning of his pontificate, might have averted the impending disaster. Italy had been only too successful in enchaining the Papacy and bringing it entirely within the sphere of its moral and political ideas. The secularization of the Papacy had become so complete that at a crisis in the fate of Italy, the Pope had no higher ideas than the aggrandizement of his own family, and no greater political influence than a secondary Italian power.
CHAPTER VII.
CHARLES VIII IN ITALY
1494—1495.

The Italian expedition of Charles VIII marks a new epoch in the politics of Europe. While Italy was busied with the emancipation of men's minds and the organization of intellectual life, a great political change was passing over Europe. France and England, after a long period of destructive warfare and internal troubles, had attained a national unity which they had never known before. Spain, by united action against the Infidels, had gained the elements of a strong national life. Even in distracted Germany the long reign of Frederick III had made the Austrian House the centre of German affairs; and Frederick's son Maximilian was spreading into outlying regions the claims and influence of the House of Austria. Everywhere there were signs of new and powerful political organizations centring round a monarchy. As Italy found that the intellectual forms of the Middle Ages were no longer fit to contain the new wine of man's spirit, so other lands drifted away from the mediaeval conception of politics. Feudalism was crumbling; and the different classes in the State were being brought into more direct connection with the Crown. There was a growing consciousness of national unity, which was the sure forerunner of a wish for national aggrandizement.

France was the first nation which realized her new strength. Charles VII reconquered France from the English; but he owed his conquest greatly to the help of the Dukes of Brittany and Burgundy. Louis XI was aided by fortune as much as by his own cleverness in his endeavours to make himself really King of France. The Dukes of Berry, Burgundy, Anjou, and Brittany died without male heirs; Louis XI inherited Berry from his brother, and managed to gain from the Burgundian heritage the towns on the Somme and the Duchy of Burgundy. René of Anjou died in 1480 and left Anjou to the French Crown; his other possessions, Provence and the Angevin claim to Naples, he bequeathed to his nephew Charles of Maine, who died next year, after having instituted Louis XI his universal legatee. At the accession of Charles VIII Brittany only remained as a bulwark of feudalism against the might of the Crown. The young king's nearest relative, the Duke of Orleans, made common cause with the Duke of Brittany; but the royal army was successful; the Duke of Orleans was imprisoned, and the Duke of Brittany died of chagrin. There were still elements of discord, as England threatened to interfere in Brittany, and Maximilian was betrothed to its heiress. But the young king Charles VIII in 1491 assured the internal peace and accomplished the unity of France by freeing Louis of Orleans from his prison and treating him as a friend, while by marriage with Anne of Brittany he united the last great fief to the French Crown. France entered upon a period of prosperity unknown before, and its king was eager to find a field for his energies.

The assertion of the old claims of the House of Anjou on Naples opened up a prospect which might well have turned a wiser head than that of Charles VIII. With them was united the title to the kingdom of Jerusalem; Naples was the stepping-stone to a great crusading expedition, in which the French king, strong in his national forces, might stand at the head of Europe and strike a deadly blow at the common enemy of
Christendom. The old spirit of adventure joined with the new desire for national aggrandizement, and still strove to accommodate itself to the religious ideal of the past. The policy of France rested on a visionary basis.

Charles VIII, however, would never have been able to realize his dream if Italy had not invited him. The views of Italian statesmen were bounded by the artificial equilibrium of Italian politics. They were accustomed to a system of constantly changing combinations depending on the interests of the moment. They played a game of ceaseless check and counter check till they lost all sense of the reality of political forces. They had used the threat of French intervention as a weapon in extremities till they had forgotten its actual meaning. Ludovico Sforza regarded it as a means of producing new combinations of political forces in Italy, and did not scruple to use it for his own purposes. But none of the other powers offered any decided resistance when the project began to take definite form. Venice was coldly cautious; Alexander VI dallied with the idea as a means of driving Naples into close alliance; Cardinal Rovere, in his hatred of the Pope, fled to France, and added his entreaties to those of Ludovico Sforza. Italy was devoid of national feeling, and its statesmen, in spite of their boasted astuteness, knew nothing of the real forces which lay beyond the borders of Italy. The substitution of cleverness for principle was Italy’s ruin.

Before undertaking his expedition to Italy, Charles VIII was careful to protect himself against a coalition of enemies. In 1492 he made peace with Henry VII of England, and undertook to pay him for all his claims. In 1493 he made peace with Spain, and ceded the frontier provinces of Roussillon and Cerdagne which were matters of dispute. He even mollified Maximilian, whom he had robbed of his bride, by giving up the claims of France to parts of the Burgundian heritage. He made large sacrifices of the interests of France that he might feel himself free to prosecute the splendid enterprise on which his heart was set. In March, 1494, Charles went to Lyons, where he spent his money in festivities and lived a life of pleasure that seemed a strange prelude to a warlike expedition. His counselors strove to dissuade him from his purpose, and his envoys in Italy reported that the alliance between the Pope, Naples, and Piero de' Medici was firm; Venice remained neutral; only the Duke of Savoy, the Marquis of Montserrat, the Marquis of Saluzzo, and Duke Ercole of Ferrara, declared themselves friendly to France. The rest of Italy was cautiously waiting to join the winning side. Even Ludovico Sforza hesitated, till the military preparations of Alfonso II showed him that his ruin, was at hand unless he gained the help of France.

When the danger from France was imminent Alexander VI and Alfonso II cemented their alliance by an interview on July 14, at Vicovaro, where they resolved on the measures to be taken for their common protection. Alexander was anxious for the safety of his own dominions; and it was agreed that Alfonso II should wait with his troops on the border of the Abruzzi, while Virginio Orsini should defend the Papal States; Alfonso's son, Ferrantino, was to advance through the Romagna towards Milan, drive out Ludovico, and occupy the French in Lombardy; meanwhile the Neapolitan fleet was to surprise Genoa and command the northern coast. The plan was good enough in itself, but it ought to have been devised sooner and carried out with promptitude. As it was, the French fleet assembled to defend Genoa, and the French army crossed the Alps to succour Milan, before Naples had struck a blow.

Don Federigo, Alfonso’s brother, finding Genoa too strong to be surprised, began an onslaught on the towns along the Riviera. His first attempt on Porto Venere, which
commands the promontory of the Gulf of Spezia, was an entire failure. The inhabitants made a resolute resistance, hurled down stones on their assailants and repulsed them with great loss; so that Federigo was driven to retire to Livorno to repair his fleet. Charles VIII sent Louis Duke of Orleans with some Swiss troops to Genoa, where a French fleet was assembling. Not till September 8 did Federigo again advance. He took Rapallo, a little town about twenty miles from Genoa, where a body of Genoese exiles landed and took up a strong position. The Duke of Orleans attacked them by land and sea and completely routed them, while Federigo’s fleet lay idle at Sestri di Levante. A hundred of the vanquished were left dead on the field, and Rapallo was sacked and pillaged by the Swiss. Italy was amazed at warfare conducted on these bloodthirsty principles. The battles of condottieri had been exercises of strategy, in which prisoners were taken for ransom, and no one was slain unless he had the misfortune to be trampled to death as he lay on the ground. The sack of Rapallo convinced Italy that she had to do with assailants who meant to carry on war in earnest. The immediate result of this engagement was that Federigo returned with his fleet to Naples, leaving the sea open to the French.

On September 8 Charles crossed the Alps and next day arrived at Asti, where he was welcomed by Ludovico Sforza, and received the news of the victory at Rapallo. Charles was young, inexperienced, badly educated, and destitute of military talents. He scarcely knew what were his plans, and he had no money to pay his troops. Ludovico Sforza advised a rapid advance southwards as a means of withdrawing the Neapolitan forces from the Romagna, and furnished money to the King for this purpose. An attack of small-pox rendered Charles unable to move for a while; but early in October he advanced to Pavia and paid a visit to the luckless Duke Gian Galeazzo. The sight of his helplessness, his bodily weakness, and his entreaties that the King would take care of his infant son, moved the compassion of the French; and Ludovico Sforza saw with terror that he was regarded with little favor by the French nobles. He hurried the King from Pavia to Piacenza, whither, on October 21, came the news that Gian Galeazzo was dead. Every one accused Ludovico of having poisoned his nephew; he hurried to Milan, and by a packed assembly of his own partisans was requested to assume the ducal scepter. He had now gained all that he had schemed for; he was Duke of Milan, and Naples was occupied with France. So soon as France had terrified Naples sufficiently, Ludovico had no further interest in his ally.

The French successes soon found an echo in Rome, and troubled Alexander. The barons of the French party, the Colonna and Savelli, prompted by Ascanio Sforza, gathered their troops and threatened the city. On September 18 Fabrizio Colonna seized Ostia in the name of Cardinal Rovere and hoisted the French flag, while French galleys from Genoa brought reinforcements and anchored off the mouth of the Tiber. This was a serious menace to Rome, and crippled the Neapolitan forces in the Romagna, as they dared not advance against Milan through fear of leaving Rome unprotected. It was not long before Caterina, the widow of Girolamo Riario, declared for France at Imola, and so made the position of the army in the Romagna doubly insecure. Alexander was seriously alarmed, but tried to put on a bold face, and on October 6 issued a proclamation against those who had seized Ostia and demanded its restitution under pain of excommunication. However, he showed his terror by removing Djem into the Castle of S. Angelo for safe keeping, and sent Cardinal Piccolomini as an envoy to Charles VIII, who refused to receive him, saying that he hoped to meet the Pope himself in Rome.
If Alexander VI trembled at the occupation of Ostia, he was still more terrified at the unexpected movements of the French army. The Duke of Calabria had taken up a strong position at Cesena to check the French advance; but Charles by the advice of Ludovico Sforza, who wished that a blow should be struck against his enemy, Florence, chose the more difficult road over the Apennines in preference to the easier road by Bologna. By this means he kept near his fleet.

The state of affairs in Florence was critical, and Piero de' Medici showed none of his father's sagacity. He forgot Lorenzo's advice: "Remember that you are nothing more than a Florentine citizen, as I am". Lorenzo was conscious that he had created a position which was difficult for his successor to fill. He himself had concealed the extent of his power and wore the semblance of an influential citizen; but his marriage with Clarice Orsini, his connexion with the Roman nobles, the dignity of the Cardinalate which he had won for his son Giovanni, and his own far-reaching influence, combined to create in Piero's mind an undue sense of the greatness of the Medicean house; so that he pursued his own policy without identifying Florence with it. The alliance of Florence with France was of long standing and could not easily be set aside. When Piero refused to abandon the cause of Naples, Charles banished the Florentine merchants from his kingdom and thereby struck a blow at the material interests of the city. The old republican party began to revive; the enemies of the Medici held up their heads. Even Piero's cousins, Giovanni and Lorenzino de' Medici, made their way to Charles at Piacenza and besought him to free Florence from Piero's yoke; they affirmed that the Florentine people were on the side of France, and that Piero alone was the king's enemy.

Perhaps the strongest support of the French cause in Florence was to be found in the preaching of Fra Girolamo Savonarola. After Lorenzo's death Savonarola became more and more convinced that his mission lay in Florence; as the heart was the centre of man, so, he said, was Florence the centre of Italy, and in Florence he resolved to stay. The Convent of S. Marco was subject to the Dominican Congregation of Lombardy; and Savonarola, as its prior, was subordinate to the command of the superiors of the Congregation and so might easily be silenced. Wishing to obtain an independent position, he urged the separation of the Tuscan Congregation from that of Lombardy, and in this he was aided by Piero de' Medici. Piero did not foresee any evil results from Savonarola's preaching, and thought that the existence of a separate Congregation of Tuscany would add to the dignity of Florence; perhaps, too, he was willing to further any scheme which might mark his opposition to Ludovico Sforza. The question was referred to Alexander early in 1493, when the Pope was entirely on the side of Milan; and at first the application of Florence, being opposed by Ludovico Sforza, had little success. But it was warmly favoured by Cardinal Caraffa, who prevailed on Alexander to sign, on May 22, a Bull which accomplished the separation. Savonarola had himself transferred to the Tuscan Congregation, was reelected Prior of S. Marco, and was afterwards chosen Vicar-General of the Tuscan Congregation. By this means he was subject to no ecclesiastical authority save that of the Pope and the General of the Dominican Order. This free position Savonarola used to work a reform in the discipline of the Convent of S. Marco, so as to bring it back to the original rule of S. Dominic. In this reform he carried the brethren with him, and his convent became the centre of a genuine religious life.

In the Advent season of 1493 Savonarola resumed his preaching in Florence, with increased reputation amongst the people and increased confidence in his own mission.
In Lent, 1494, he continued a series of expository lectures on the Book of Genesis which he had begun in 1492. He reached the history of the building of the Ark by Noah, and lingered over it; each plank and nail had its mystic meaning; but the general purpose of his discourses was to urge all men to enter the Ark of the Lord, that they might save themselves from the coming tribulation. Already Florence was disturbed by the expectation of the army of Charles VIII, and Savonarola recognized in the French army the scourge of God which was to afflict but purify the Church.

In September he resumed his preaching. At first he put forth his visions as parables; then he tried to drop the subject, but was haunted by sleepless nights of remorse till he felt that he was bound to speak in obedience to God's commands. More and more he spoke like a prophet, and introduced his utterances with the phrase, “Thus saith the Lord”. On September 21, St. Matthew’s Day, he reached the text, “Behold I bring a flood of waters upon the earth”. His hearers, excited by the news that the French had entered Italy, recognized a miraculous guidance in the preacher's subject. Amazed they listened to the preacher's denunciations, and Savonarola himself was overpowered with the sense of his own inspiration. The congregation dispersed half dead with terror.

When it was too late, Piero de' Medici perceived the perilous position in which he stood. He had drawn upon his head the animosity of the French King; he had no forces to oppose him, and the Florentines were not united. Still there was an opportunity for a vigorous resistance, as the Florentine frontier was guarded by the strong castles of Sarzanella and Pietra Santa; and the road through Lunigiana was difficult, so that a few resolute men could have held the passes and checked the advance of the French. In the uncertain state of feeling that prevailed, a check to the French army would have ruined its prestige, and the elements of a strong opposition would rapidly have gathered. At first Piero thought of resistance, and sent his brother-in-law, Paolo Orsini, to reinforce Sarzana. But he was alarmed at the sullen discontent of the Florentines, and suddenly resolved to make peace with Charles VIII. He bethought himself of the example of his father, Lorenzo, who in the crisis of his life re-established his position by a bold journey to his chief foe, Ferrante of Naples. Piero determined to imitate his father's courage, without possessing his father's wisdom. He set out from Florence, and at Pietra Santa asked Charles for a safe-conduct to his presence. When he arrived in the French camp his courage entirely deserted him; he fell on his knees before the King and besought his pardon—he professed himself ready to make amends for his errors. He was asked to recall the Florentine troops from the army in Romagna; to give up to the King the fortresses of Sarzana, Sarzanella, Pietra Santa, Pisa, and Livorno, to be returned when the French were masters of Naples; and finally to lend the King 200,000 ducats. To these conditions Piero at once assented, though he saw before his eyes Sarzanella offering a stubborn resistance. The French in proposing these conditions never expected that they would be accepted, and were amazed at Piero’s ready agreement. Though the treaty was to be signed in Florence, they demanded that the fortresses should be given up at once. Sarzana and Sarzanella were delivered to the French, and the road was now open before them. It is no wonder that the French began to consider their success as miraculous, and looked upon themselves as the instruments of God.

In Florence the news of Piero’s proceedings filled the city with dismay. The Signori summoned the Florentine chief citizens to a consultation. Piero Capponi, a man whose political experience and sterling worth commanded universal esteem, rose and gave expression to the feeling which was in all men's minds. He was no orator, but went straight to the point, and one sentence in his speech became the motto of Florence. “It is
time”, he exclaimed, “to have done with the government of children, and to recover our liberty”. The Signori, moved by the popular feeling, agreed to send ambassadors to Charles to undo, if possible, the mischievous results of Piero’s activity. Amongst the five were Piero Capponi and Fra Girolamo Savonarola, who was chosen because he had all the love of the people. They set out on November 6 with instructions which left it to their discretion to modify in any way the conditions which Piero had so basely accepted. Next day they found Charles at Lucca, and followed him to Pisa, where with difficulty they obtained admittance to his presence; the King received them coldly and said that he would arrange the terms of peace in Florence. Savonarola stood forth, and spoke words of prophetic warning: “Know that you are an instrument in the hands of the Lord, who has sent you to heal the woes of Italy and to reform the prostrate Church. But if you do not show yourself just and pitiful, if you do not respect the city of Florence and its people, if you forget the work for which the Lord has sent you, He will choose another in your place, and will pour upon you His wrath. I speak in the name of the Lord”. These warnings harmonized with the prevailing temper of the French, who regarded their success as miraculous, and Charles was impressed by Savonarola’s words, though impressions did not produce any enduring, results on his feeble mind.

When Piero de’ Medici heard of the despatch of this embassy he thought that it was time for him to return and watch over affairs at Florence. He returned to the city on November 8, and men believed that he meant to summon the people and compel them by his armed forces to declare him absolute lord of Florence. It was known that Paolo Orsini had advanced with his troops and was close by the Porta di San Gallo; so Florence was full of suspicion, and when Piero next morning proceeded with a large company of attendants to the Palazzo of the Signori he found the door shut, and was told that he alone would be admitted by the postern gate. Piero replied by a gesture of contempt and turned away. One of his partisans among the Signori sent a messenger to recall him. Again Piero stood at the gate; but some of the Signori descended in anger, and after a scuffle took possession of the entrance. After a wordy altercation between the Signori and Piero, the door was shut in his face. These unwonted proceedings caused a crowd to gather rapidly; there were cries to Piero, “Go away and do not disturb the Signori”; hisses were heard, and stones began to fly. Piero stood irresolute with his drawn sword in his hand till his attendants hurried him away. He withdrew to his palace and armed himself; meanwhile his brother Cardinal Giovanni tried to raise the people with the Medicean cry of “Palle, Palle”; no one answered, and Giovanni was obliged to return home. Piero and his brother Giuliano meanwhile made their way to the Porta di San Gallo and tried to rally the people of that suburb, who had always been partisans of the Medici. Here, also, he was unsuccessful, and lost all courage. His terror infected the troops of Paolo Orsini and they began a rapid flight towards Bologna. Cardinal Giovanni, disguised as a Franciscan friar, managed to make his escape from Florence. The three Medici brothers were coldly received at Bologna, and passed on to Venice, the home of Italian exiles. In Florence the Medici palace was sacked by the mob; the Signori set a price on Piero and Giovanni, alive or dead; every trace of the Medicean rule was rapidly abolished, and Florence exulted in the recovery of its liberty.

The overthrow of the Medicean rule in Florence was an event of momentous importance to Italy; yet in the prevailing excitement it attracted little notice. For sixty years Florence had been identified with the Medici house, and they had been years of great prosperity and glory. Cosimo and Lorenzo had made Florence the centre of all that was most eminently Italian, and from Florence had radiated the artistic and literary
energy of Italy. Moreover, Lorenzo had established Florence as the mediating power in Italian politics, and had spread her influence in every Italian state. The overthrow of the Medicean house was a dislocation of the state-system of Italy, and the influences which produced it aimed at remodelling the Italian conceptions of life and action. The blundering of Piero was the occasion of the Florentine revolution; but the sentiment which caused it was the expression of the popular desire for a sounder and nobler life. The general uneasiness created a revival of the old republican feeling, and the preaching of Savonarola awakened moral aspirations which the rule of the Medici had lulled to sleep.

The new republic of Florence had soon to face the fact that revolutions do not come singly. The news was brought that, on the same day on which Florence expelled the Medici, Pisa had revolted from the Florentine yoke. The luckless city of Pisa since its conquest by Florence had seen its commerce decay and its glory disappear. With sullen resignation the Pisans submitted to the rule of Florence, but they regarded themselves as slaves rather than subjects. “The Florentines”, says Machiavelli, “were not wise enough to follow the example of the ancient Romans. They forgot that if they wished to hold Pisa they must either associate her with themselves or destroy her”. Pisa, plundered and humiliated, but neither reconciled nor destroyed, only longed for an opportunity to rise against her masters. On the evening of November 9 a deputation of Pisan citizens approached the French king. Their spokesman, who spoke in French, set forth with passionate energy the wrongs of Pisa; he flung himself before Charles and adjured him to remember his lofty calling of liberator of Italy. A sympathetic murmur arose from the French nobles who were present; Charles was moved, and answered that he was content. He spoke without much reflection, “understanding little what the word liberty signified”, says Commines. But the Pisans knew what they meant by liberty; raising the cry “Viva Francia!” they rushed through the city, cast into the Arno the Florentine emblem of the Marzocco, a lion on a marble column, killed the Florentine merchants who were not lucky enough to escape by flight, and seized the fortresses. The Pisan revolution was rapidly accomplished, before Charles had learned what liberty meant; he did not trouble himself about matters further, but left a garrison of 300 Frenchmen and passed on next day to Empoli.

The Florentines were too alarmed for themselves to pay much attention to the revolt of Pisa. They sent ambassadors to Charles to make terms with him; but Charles gave his usual answer that he would arrange matters in the ‘gran villa’, as he called Florence with a mixture of French and Italian. Florence, did her best to receive with fitting honor her dangerous visitor; with ill-concealed anxiety the magistrates went forth to meet a guest whom they feared to be a foe. On the evening of November 17 the French army entered the city, and created mixed feelings of wonder and terror. First came the musicians; then thirty-six cannon drawn by sturdy horses; next the Swiss infantry with short coats of different colors, carrying their halberts of hammered iron. The Gascons followed, small and active, armed with bows and swords, and dressed in white and violet. Then came the archers, followed by 800 men-at-arms, the flower of the French nobles, mounted on powerful horses, attired in rich cloaks of silk with collars of gold. The light cavalry came next; then the archers of the guard dressed in cloth of gold; and, finally, 100 bodyguards preceded the king.

Charles mounted on a war-horse, the gift of Ludovic6 Sforza, advanced beneath a rich baldachino. He was armed, save his helmet, in gilt armor enriched with precious stones; over this he wore a cloak of cloth of gold, and on a white cap he wore his crown. 
He bore himself in military fashion; carrying his lance in rest as a token that he came as conqueror. But Charles was not a man to adorn a triumph or inspire awe by the majesty of his presence. The liberator of Italy made but an insignificant figure; a little man, with a very large head, aquiline nose, big protruding eyes and huge mouth, he had little slender legs which ended in large and deformed feet. If he disappointed the Florentines when they saw him on horseback, they were still more amazed when they saw his full deformity, as he dismounted at the door of the cathedral, where he went to give thanks.

Now that Charles had entered the ‘gran villa’ the Florentine magistrates pressed for a definite understanding, and Charles considered that he had come as a conqueror; but the Florentines were not so much impressed by the exact position of his lance as to accept that view of the case. They were ready to accept Charles as a friend and ally of the Republic, but not to submit to his dictation. It soon became clear that the views of the king and the Florentine magistrates differed. Charles pressed for the restoration of Piero de’ Medici, who would thus be rendered absolutely dependent on France. The Signori summoned the chief citizens to deliberate. All answered that they would never consent to the return of the Medici; anything might be granted rather than that. The city was full of alarm and suspicion; shops were shut and a threatening crowd gathered in the Piazza. The sight of some Italian prisoners led in chains by their Swiss captors caused a riot which threatened to become serious. Houses were barricaded; stones were flung from windows and housetops; and peace was only restored by the intervention of many French nobles and of the magistrates. The French saw that warfare in the streets of Florence would be no easy matter. If the French army in Florence numbered 20,000 men, the Florentines could raise 50,000. Though the French could easily have defeated them in the open field, they might be excused for shrinking from a combat in a labyrinth of narrow lanes. Charles judged it wise to abandon his attitude of treating Florence as a conquered city to which he might dictate terms, and consented to make an alliance. Negotiations proceeded with difficulty; Charles wavered in his demands and the suspicions of the Florentines increased. The king’s request for money seemed to them unreasonable; his proposal to leave a deputy who should be present at all their discussions and whose assent should be necessary to their proceedings was an outrage to Florentine independence. The Florentine commissioners remonstrated; Charles insisted and bade his secretary read the conditions which he would accept. Again the commissioners refused; “Then we will blow our trumpets”, said the king in an angry voice. Piero Capponi seized the paper from the secretary’s hand and tore it in pieces, saying, “And we will ring our bells”. It was a rash act on Capponi’s part, and the next moment was decisive for the fate of Florence. But Charles knew and respected Capponi, who had been an ambassador in France; he was a resolute man, whose active mind had driven him to serve Lorenzo de’ Medici, but who was now leader of the Republican party in Florence. Charles felt that it was unwise to provoke a breach with Florence; he recalled the departing commissioners; “Ah, Capponi, Capponi”, he said; “you are a bad capon”. The king smiled at his poor joke and the conference was renewed. The daring act of Capponi was the only memory of the French invasion on which Italy could look back with pride. It was the sole display of the old Italian spirit, and its rashness was justified by its success. Capponi had beliefs and spoke out manfully; he and Savonarola are the only prominent Italians of the time of whom this can be said.

The terms of the agreement between Florence and Charles were at length drawn up in twenty-seven articles. Their general purport was that Florence recognized Charles as protector of its liberties, left in his hands till the end of the French expedition against
Naples the fortresses already occupied by the French, and undertook to pay him 120,000 ducats; Pisa was to be restored to Florence, which agreed to pardon the Pisans for their revolt; Piero de’ Medici and his brothers were to be exiled from Florence, but their goods were to be restored to them. The agreement was substantially the same as had been made by Piero de’ Medici. When it had been signed on November 24, the city rang its bells and lit bonfires in token of rejoicing. But the joy of the citizens was short-lived, when they saw that Charles gave no signs of departing. Again they feared that he meditated the sack of the city: again Florence wore a somber aspect of suspicion. Savonarola, true to his prophetic mission, approached the king with words of warning. "The people", he said, "are afflicted by your stay in Florence, and you waste your time. God has called you to renew His Church. Go forth to your high calling lest God visit you with His wrath and choose another instrument in your stead to carry out His designs". Charles received Savonarola with respect and listened to his admonitions. On November 28 the French army left Florence.

Alexander, meanwhile, was in sore perplexity, and appealed to Ascanio Sforza to come to his aid. He wrote to him with his own hand, beseeching him by his old friendship, and by his oath as a Cardinal, to come and put his shoulders as a pillar to support the tottering fabric of the papal power. Ascanio did not refuse to do his office as a good Cardinal, but demanded that, as hostage for his security, Cesare Borgia should go to Marino and be in the custody of the Colonna. When this was done Ascanio went to Rome with Prospero Colonna on November and had a long conference with the Pope, who told his Cardinals afterwards that Ascanio had advised him to make terms with the French king. “But”, he went on, “I am assured of the justice of my cause and would lose my mitre, my lands, and my life, rather than fail Alfonso in his need”. Ascanio, after receiving this answer, rode cheerfully away to Ostia; and men conjectured that the Pope, for all his brave words, had sent him to make overtures to Charles.

While Charles was at Florence a discovery was made which threw a still darker light upon the Pope’s Alexander character, and which was calculated to become a serious weapon against him in the hands of the French king. In his anxiety for his own safety Alexander determined to leave no stone unturned and besought even the Sultan to help him against France. The captivity of Djem and the payment of a yearly allowance to his gaoler had opened up diplomatic intercourse between Rome and Constantinople. Soon after his accession to the pontificate Alexander sent one of his secretaries, Giorgio Buzardo, to demand the customary payment; Buzardo returned in January, 1493, with the report that Bajazet II had refused to pay any more and had dismissed him with empty hands. The French invasion gave Alexander VI a reason for closer communication with the Sultan. In July, 1494, he again sent Buzardo to inform Bajazet that the French king was marching against Rome with the intention of seizing Djem, and using him as a pretext for making war against Constantinople; if he succeeded he would be joined by Spain, England, and Maximilian, and would give the Sultan much trouble. The Pope, therefore, begged Bajazet to pay him the money due, to use his influence to induce Venice to withstand the French, and further to make common cause with himself and Alfonso. Bajazet received Buzardo graciously, paid him the 40,000 ducats which the Pope demanded, and sent him back accompanied by an envoy of his own, who should confer further with the Pope. Unfortunately for Alexander Buzardo fell into the hands of Giovanni della Rovere, brother of the Cardinal, at Sinigaglia, on his homeward journey. The 40,000 ducats were taken from him, and what was still more serious, the Pope’s instructions and the Sultan’s letters in reply were discovered and
were forwarded at once to Cardinal Rovere at Florence. The Pope's instructions to Buzardo were sufficiently startling; but the Sultan's answer was still more amazing. It was contained in four letters written in Turkish characters and one written in Latin. The Turkish documents praised Buzardo, commended to the Pope the Turkish envoy, and, strangely enough, asked him to confer the Cardinalate on Niccolò Cibo, Archbishop of Arles, whom Bajazet II had known in the days of Innocent VIII. The Latin letter suggested to Alexander a short way of dealing with Djem: let the Pope put him to death and so defeat the plans of the French king: if the Pope would send his dead body to Constantinople, Bajazet would give in exchange for it 300,000 ducats, “wherewith your highness may buy some dominions for your children”. This monstrous proposal was made, the Sultan says, after full deliberation with the Pope's envoy Buzardo. It cannot, therefore, be dismissed as the wild dream of an oriental who did not know the insult which such a proposition contained. It is not surprising that Cardinal Rovere thought the contents of these letters to be “a stupendous matter, fraught with danger to Christendom”. He had the Turkish documents translated, and put copies of them into the hands of the chief counselors of the French king.

It was but natural that Alexander in later years should deny these dealings with the Sultan, and declare that they were inventions of his enemy, Giovanni della Rovere. He could not avoid the knowledge that his conduct had seriously shocked even the low sentiment of Europe, and he could not defend it. But it was not unnatural for a man like Alexander to seek for help where he could find it, and to recognize community of interest as the most binding tie. Venice and Naples had set the example of negotiating with the Turk; and Alexander was rather an Italian prince than the head of Christendom. He was free from prejudice and was not restrained by the traditions of his office. He and his family treated Djem with kindness. The Turkish prince rode out in public with the Pope, going in front of the cross which was carried in the procession. The Duke of Gandia was seen in Turkish attire riding by the side of Djem; he even took the Turkish prince into the Lateran Church and showed him its curiosities. There was no intolerance about the court of Alexander, and his tolerant spirit easily extended itself into politics. If the Emperor was unwilling or unable to come to his aid, it seemed natural to apply to the Sultan. When he disavowed the fact he probably disavowed the extreme inferences which his enemies drew from it. Alexander was eminently versatile and light-hearted; he probably wondered why people attached so much importance to a trifle; and after a little while Europe took his view of the matter.

At the time, however, the possession of these documents enabled the Pope's enemies to produce an impression on the mind of Charles VIII. On November 22, probably the very day on which the news of the capture of the Pope's envoy reached Florence, Charles issued a general statement of his intentions. In high-sounding language he announced his object to be war against the Turk and the restoration of Christendom: to carry out this design more surely he purposed first to assert his hereditary claim to the kingdom of Naples; he required Alexander to give him safe passage through the lands of the Church; if this were refused the blame of untoward consequences would rest on those who through perfidy and iniquity attempted to hinder this pious plan. He protested beforehand that he would lay all injuries which he might suffer before the universal Church and the princes of Europe, whom he purposed to summon for the accomplishment of his crusading scheme. It was a warning to Alexander that he might be impeached before a General Council as a traitor to the interests of Europe if he persisted in his opposition to the French king.
After this declaration the French army rapidly advanced, and on December 2 was at Siena. Alexander still hoped to defend the papal frontier, and sent troops to Viterbo, where they were refused admittance. He protested to the German ambassador at Rome and called the Emperor to his aid; he ordered the Romans to defend their city; he provisioned the Castle of S. Angelo, which shortly before had been connected by a covered corridor with the Vatican. Above all, he revoked his troops to Rome; now that Florence was lost, the army in the Romagna served no useful purpose. On December 9 the Duke of Calabria, at the head of 5000 infantry and 1500 cavalry, entered Rome.

Yet the Pope’s position was hopelessly insecure. Ostia was open to the French; there was a strong party in their favor among the Cardinals; the Colonna were ready to make common cause with them. Encouraged by the Neapolitan troops, Alexander determined to strike terror into his foes. On the evening of December 9 he ordered four of the Cardinals to be arrested as they left a Consistory. Ascanio Sforza, who had just returned to Rome, and Sanseverino were confined in the Vatican; Prospero Colonna and Estouteville were shut up in the Castle of S. Angelo.

This resolute attitude of the Pope did not long continue. Alexander was like a drowning man catching at a straw. He was encouraged for a moment by the Neapolitan forces, though those forces were quite inadequate to offer any real resistance to the French. On December 10 he told the French envoys that he would not give the king passage through his territories. On the same day Charles VIII entered Viterbo, and everywhere the towns opened their gates to him. The Pope was sorely perplexed, and on December 14 used the opportunity of Ascanio Sforza’s presence at mass to open up communications with his prisoner. “During the whole mass”, says Burchard, “the Pope talked with him, even after the elevation of the holy sacrament; when it was time for standing he sat, that he might talk more conveniently”. The colloquy with Ascanio did not reassure him, but he still hoped to hold out. He sent for some of the chief Germans resident in Rome and besought them to form a troop of their compatriots for the defence of the city. After some consultation amongst themselves, they answered that they were under the commands of the city’s magistrates and could not renounce their proper officers. The Pope’s allies saw that resistance was hopeless. On December 15 Charles was at Nepi, and Virginio Orsini sent to offer him admission to his castles, so that on December 19 Charles’ headquarters were in the Orsini castle of Bracciano. This defection of the Orsini was the last blow to the hopes of the Pope and of Naples alike; Virginio Orsini was Constable of Naples, was connected by marriage with the Neapolitan king, and his family had an hereditary alliance with the Aragonese house.

Alexander was now seriously alarmed. He released his captive Cardinals and sent his possessions into the Castle of S. Angelo, while his more precious goods were packed in readiness for flight; horses stood always ready for his departure. But flight meant almost certain ruin. If the French king came to Rome he needed a responsible ruler with whom he could treat. If Alexander were to flee he must for his own security take with him all his Cardinals; but already many had openly joined Charles; probably there were few who would follow the Pope of their own free will. There would certainly gather round the French king a large majority of the College, who would be willing to declare Alexander deposed and proceed to a new election. Alexander had not the moral character which alone enables a man to act resolutely in a crisis. He prepared to retreat from his position, and sent envoys to Charles at Bracciano. They besought the French king to remember his ancestors and do no hurt to Rome; the Pope had wished him to submit his claims on Naples to arbitration; since, however, he had seen fit to proceed by
arms, let him choose another road and not disturb the Pope; if he wished to visit the holy places of Rome let him come without his troops. Finally, the Pope exhorted him to pay no heed to his detractors, who were restless and unquiet men whom no kindness could satisfy. This was not a happy stroke of papal diplomacy, as it awakened the wrath of Cardinals Rovere, Sforza, Perraud, Savelli, and Sanseverino, who were with Charles. The envoys, by their advice, were dismissed with scanty courtesy; and the French advanced, uncertain whether they were to enter Rome as friends or foes. On December 23 Cardinal Perraud wrote to the Germans in Rome that their lives and goods would be respected in case of an attack on the city. At last, on December 24, the Pope assembled a Consistory and announced his intention of making terms with Charles. He sent his nephew, the Cardinal of Monreale, to the French camp at Bracciano. Charles demanded that the Pope should at least declare himself neutral, and give free passage to the French troops; in return he promised a safe-conduct to the Duke of Calabria, and professed his reverence for the Pope as the head of Christendom. Still Alexander wavered. Next day he made an agreement with the Duke of Calabria that he might be received in Naples in case of need; he stipulated that he should have possession of Gaeta and receive a yearly allowance during his stay; he celebrated mass in his chapel and gave his benediction to the Duke, saying, “God will help us”. On December 31 the Neapolitan troops retired from Rome, and Alexander sent Burchard, his Master of the Ceremonies, to meet Charles. Burchard was desirous of instructing Charles in matters of ceremonial; but the king answered that he meant to enter Rome without pomp. He kept Burchard by his side, and asked him many questions about the Pope's personal character and about Cesare Borgia; unfortunately Burchard has not told us his answers.

The same evening the French army entered Rome by the Porta del Poplo. From three o'clock till nine he procession lasted before the astonished eyes of the Romans, and the wavering light of torches added to the terrible aspect of the soldiers. As on entering Florence, Charles was clad in armor and bore his lance by his side. With him were the Cardinals della Rovere, Sforza, Savelli, and Colonna, who mixed strangely with the martial throng. The French artillery awakened the greatest wonder amongst the Romans, who had never seen such guns before. Amid cries of ‘Francia’, ‘Colonna’, and ‘Vincula’, the king moved along the Corso to the Palazzo of S. Marco, where he took up his abode. Cannon were posted round the Palazzo, and two thousand men were posted in the Campo dei Fiori, where they kept watch all night.

Only the Tiber separated the king from the Pope, and Alexander was ill at ease. Centuries had passed since a king with a hostile army had entered the walls of Rome, and a more sensitive mind than that of Alexander would have deeply felt his humiliating position. But Alexander had no thought of the dignity of his office: he cared only for his personal safety. Really the French king could ill afford to provoke the determined hostility of the Pope, as complications with the head of Christendom would have given an opportunity for the interference of Germany and Spain, which were watching with ill-concealed jealousy the astounding successes of France. Charles’ counselors were eager for the plunder of Naples, and wished to accomplish rapidly the main object of their expedition. His special favorite Briçonnet, Bishop of S. Malo, longed for the dignity of the Cardinalate, which would be endangered by an open breach with the Pope. On the other hand, Cardinals Rovere and Sforza urged Charles to call the Pope to account, to summon a Council and depose him as simoniacally elected. Ascanio Sforza had been the chief agent in this election, and had earned his share of the money spent in simony; but this did not restrain him from urging the charge against Alexander when it
suited his own purposes. Charles may be pardoned if he doubted his own fitness to superintend the work of reforming the Church. He had neither the intellectual nor the moral qualities for such a task. Feeble in mind, contemptible in appearance, sunk in profligacy, and incapable of serious purpose, he was wise in not undertaking a labor far beyond his strength. Alexander might be unfit to be Pope, but Charles was equally unfit to say so. Charles showed some political wisdom when he said that he wished for a reformation of the Church, but not the deposition of the Pope.

Charles, however, was in Rome, and Alexander was driven to come to terms. Quarrels between the French soldiers and the Roman citizens were inevitable. Frenchmen were murdered by night, and their comrades retaliated by plunder. The house of Vanozza, the mother of Alexander’s children, was sacked: the Bank was pillaged, and it required all the efforts of Cardinal Colonna to prevent graver disorders. On January 2 Alexander sent several of his Cardinals, amongst them Cesare Borgia, Carvajal, and Raffaelle Riario, to the king, who received them coldly. They addressed him in a speech of much cleverness, which took occasion to refute the charges brought against the Pope, and entreated Charles to follow the example of his predecessors, Pepin and Charles the Great. They regretted that he had shown ill-will towards the Pope, who was only laboring for the peace of Christendom. “What”, they proceeded significantly, “do you think that other Christian princes will say if it be bruited abroad that you besiege the Pope and claim to judge him, to whom God has committed the judgment of all men?” The Pope had urged that the French claim to Naples should be decided by arbitration, not by arms, because he feared lest Alfonso in his fear might call the Turk to his aid and so bring the Infidels into Italy. They retorted with crushing logic on the rebellious Cardinals: “Alexander VI has his detractors; but he knows that Jesus was accused as a wine-bibber and a friend of publicans and sinners. Let slanderers tell what tales they will, Alexander VI is holier, or at least as holy, as he was at the time of his election. He did not impose on his electors by hypocrisy, or win their good-will by any new pretence. For thirty-seven years he approved himself in high office, so that his doings and sayings were not hid from them. The very men who now withdraw their votes were the chief in procuring his election”. The argument was true and cogent. Alexander was no hypocrite; his electors had been rewarded for their trouble, and had no just ground for complaining of the man whom they had chosen.

This speech produced some effect, as Alexander had prepared the way by bribes judiciously administered to the French counselors of the king. The Italians did not sympathize with the move of Alexander’s enemies to use against him the irregularities of his private life. In their opinion it was a low trick; it was an attempt to throw dust in the eyes of the ignorant Frenchmen and apply to the Pope a standard of holiness which had long ago been pronounced impossible in Italy. “The French”, says Sigismondo de' Conti, “and those who dwell in the remoter parts of Christendom, think that the Pope is not made like other men, but is like one sent down from heaven, who cannot be moved by human feelings and has not, as S. Paul says, a law in his members contrary to the law in his mind”. Sigismondo pronounces the charges against the Pope to be trifling, and the French learned to take the Italian view of moral considerations. One of the results of the French invasion of Italy was that the nations beyond the Alps lost their superstitious respect for the Pope's sanctity. The counselors of Charles soon convinced him that Alexander's personal character had nothing to do with his own political ends.
So Charles dismissed his reforming schemes, and answered that he was ready to render obedience to the Pope and enter into strait alliance with him on three conditions: that the Castle of S. Angelo be occupied by a French garrison; that Cesare Borgia accompany the French army to Naples as Legate; and that Prince Djem be handed over to the king. Alexander objected strongly to these conditions, and Charles gave him six days for consideration. On January 5 so many French nobles came to kiss the Pope’s foot and receive his benediction, that Alexander fainted. After deliberating with his Cardinals he answered the French king that he could not consent to give up the Castle of S. Angelo for fear of Cardinal Rovere, who would occupy it and be master of Rome; if it were besieged he would expose on its walls the holiest relics. After sending this answer Alexander was seized with terror, and fled into the Castle of S. Angelo accompanied by six Cardinals. A piece of the wall of the castle had fallen on the day when Charles entered Rome. It was repaired hastily and fell again. Men looked on this as an evil omen; Alexander regarded it as a sign that the castle was not a secure refuge. Twice the French artillery was pointed against the walls; twice it was withdrawn. At last, on January 11, a compromise was made, and terms of peace were arranged. The Pope agreed to give up to the king Civitā Vecchia, to appoint governors whom the king chose in the cities of the Patrimony, to receive into his favor the Cardinals and nobles who had favored the French cause, to deliver up Prince Djem, and send Cardinal Cesare Borgia as legate with the French army for four months. Charles withdrew his demand for the Castle of S. Angelo.

When peace had thus been made, Charles ventured for the first time to traverse the streets of Rome and visit its churches and antiquities. On January 15 the treaty was signed by the king, and Rome rejoiced at being free from danger. Next day Charles took up his abode in the Vatican, and a meeting between him and the Pope was arranged. Charles was walking in the Vatican garden when Alexander issued from the corridor which led to the Castle of S. Angelo. Twice the king, uncovering his head, bowed to the Pope; but Alexander professed not to see him. On the third genuflexion Alexander also uncovered his head, and taking the king's hand prevented him from kissing his feet. Then he walked by his side and expressed his joy at this meeting. They passed together into the hall of the Consistory, where the king set forth his reverence for the Pope, and asked as a favor the elevation of the bishop of S. Malo to the Cardinalate. Alexander assented, and led the way to the room where the creation of Cardinals was declared. On the way he fainted; Burchard regarded it as a pretence that he might demand the attentions of the king. When he recovered he nominated Briçonnet a Cardinal, conferred on him the insignia of his dignity, and assigned him rooms in the Vatican. Alexander had now recovered his self-possession. So long as he had a serious political problem to solve, he was helpless and allowed matters to drift; now that it was a question of managing men, his subtlety and astuteness returned. He was ready to make the most of Charles, and lived with him on terms of the most complete friendliness. The Cardinals who had joined the party of Charles saw themselves entirely abandoned. Ascanio Sforza and Lunate fled from Rome; Prospero Colonna, Savelli, and Perraud reconciled themselves with the Pope. Perraud afterwards boasted that he had spoken his mind to Alexander and had reproved him for his evil life, his simony, and his dealings with the Turk. Probably the loquacious Cardinal told his friends what was in his mind rather than on his tongue. Cardinal Rovere alone remained steadfast in his hostility, and preferred to accompany Charles rather than remain in Rome.
On January 19 Alexander had the satisfaction of receiving from Charles the obedience of France. The conqueror of Italy entered the capital of the Pope who opposed him, and formally recognized his authority without obtaining a withdrawal of his opposition. It is true that he showed some signs of using pressure, and kept the Consistory waiting for an hour before he appeared. Then his orator demanded the investiture of Naples, which Alexander refused, saying that he could not prejudice the rights of another without due deliberation with the Cardinals; he vaguely added that he wished in all things to please his dear son, the King of France. If Charles’ advisers wished to overawe the Pope, the king threw away the opportunity; he rose at once and said in French, “Holy Father, I have come to do obedience and reverence in the same way as my predecessors”. During the ceremonial speeches which followed, the French who were present broke out into such loud expressions of disgust that the Cardinals crowded round the Pope's throne for protection. If Alexander showed his incapacity before Charles entered Rome, Charles showed still greater want of capacity when he was master of the situation. It might be unwise to attempt the Pope's overthrow; but to offer him the obedience of France was to strengthen the position of an enemy who had only been driven by superior force to dissemble his hostility for the moment.

A few more days were spent by Charles in Rome, and were largely given to ecclesiastical ceremonial, till at last Alexander saw with relief that Charles prepared to take his departure. Prince Djem was handed over to him and was received with courtesy and marks of respect. The Pope bestowed pardons on the numerous nobles who thronged to ask for them, and Cesare Borgia presented the king with six magnificent horses. Then, on January 28, Charles, with Djem on his left and Cesare Borgia on his right, rode out of Rome, in full confidence that he had won the lasting friendship of the Pope. But this belief was soon dispelled; on the evening of January 30, Cardinal Cesare, disguised as a groom, fled from the French quarters at Velletri. He rode rapidly to Rome and took refuge in the house of a papal official. The Roman magistrates came trembling to the Pope, and begged him to order Cesare’s departure, lest the king return to take vengeance. Cesare was safely conveyed to Spoleto, and Alexander was well contented to know that Charles no longer had in his power a hostage for his fidelity. When Charles sent to demand Cesare’s return, the Pope declared that he knew nothing of his flight nor of his hiding-place. Charles saw, when it was too late, that he had been the Pope's dupe.

The reason of Cesare’s bold step is not difficult to find. On the day of his flight two Spanish ambassadors presented themselves before Charles at Velletri, and demanded that he should desist from his attempt against Naples. Ferdinand of Spain considered that he had done enough to deserve the grant of Roussillon; he bethought himself of his old alliance with Naples, and his envoys urged that if Naples did not belong to Alfonso II, it belonged to Ferdinand of Aragon as the legitimate heir of Alfonso I. They proposed that the question be referred to the arbitration of the Pope; Charles answered, “Alexander VI is a Spaniard”, and dismissed them. Still he received an unpleasant intimation of the jealousy which his success was causing. Cesare Borgia saw that France had dangerous enemies, and that the Papacy was still a useful centre round which they might rally. Feeling satisfied that Charles would hesitate to return to Rome in search of new hostages, he judged that the time had come for flight.

Naples, however, itself offered no opposition to the French advance. Alfonso II was as cowardly as he was cruel, and saw expressed in the faces of his subjects the hatred which his conduct had inspired; men said that he was haunted at nights by the ghosts of the barons whom he had treacherously put to death. He had not the courage to defend
himself, and judged that the sole chance of saving his dynasty was to abdicate in favor of his innocent son Ferrantino. On January 23 he resigned his crown and prepared to flee to Sicily. The weather was too stormy to set sail at once and he spent some days in terror, crying out that he heard the French advancing, that the very trees and stones cried ‘France’; at last he escaped to Sicily, and took refuge in the Olivetan monastery of Mazara.

Ferrante II was crowned amidst ominous silence from the crowd. He did what he could to win the affections of his subjects. He implored help from Ludovico Sforza, even from the Sultan Bajazet; then he set out for the camp at San Germano, resolved to merit the glory of a worthy prince. But the news that the French had stormed Monte San Giovanni and massacred all its inhabitants filled the Neapolitan army with terror, so that it hastily abandoned the strong position of San Germano, which was the key to Naples, and fell back on Capua. Ferrante II hastened to Naples to gather reinforcements; during his absence his general, Trivulzio, made terms with Charles and Capua was opened to the French. Naples rose in tumultuous confusion and Ferrante bade his subjects a dignified farewell. “Fortune has declared against me, and I withdraw. I absolve you from your homage and counsel you by obedience to mitigate the natural pride of the French. If their barbarity awaken your hatred and make you wish for my return, I will be ready at your call to risk my life in your service. If you are satisfied with their rule I will never disturb the peace of the realm. I have wronged no man; the sins of my fathers, not my own, are visited on my head”. On February 21 he sailed for Ischla, and next day Charles entered Naples amidst the joyous greetings of the people, who had already sent to tell him that they awaited his coming as did the Jews that of the Messiah. Only the two castles of Naples held out for Ferrante, and they were reduced to submission on March 20.

The success of Charles was marvelous. The states of Italy had fallen before him at the first touch. They had no root of patriotism or national sentiment; each lived for itself and for the immediate present, and the expediency of the moment was the sole element in each man’s calculations. Those who had been most strongly attached to the House of Aragon in Naples, and who owed everything to its favor, were the first to prostrate themselves before the victorious King of France. A saying was put into the mouth of Alexander that “the French came into Italy with wooden spurs, carrying in their hands chalk to mark their billets”. Indeed, they scarcely needed any other appliances, for where they came to conquer they were welcomed as friends. It is no wonder that Charles struck a medal in Naples with the inscription Missus a Deo, “sent by God”.

Now that Charles was master of Naples it was in his power to carry out his great design of warring against the Turk. Bajazet II was a feeble ruler; Commines was of opinion that he might have been dispossessed of his throne as easily as Alfonso of Naples, since the Greeks were ready to rebel at the first news of the French advance. But Charles does not seem to have been much more in earnest about a crusade than those who had professed their zeal in previous days, and such intentions as he had were dispelled by the death of Prince Djem on February 25. On the journey Djem caught a cold which developed into bronchitis, under which he sank. Men said that the Pope had poisoned him before he left Rome; but we must doubt the operation of a poison which worked so slowly as to produce death only after a month’s interval. Yet this version of the cause of Djem’s death was believed on all sides by Alexander's contemporaries, who clearly thought that the Pope would shrink from no crime which might bring him advantage. Alexander throughout his whole career had to pay the penalty for the known
disorders of his life, and no accusation against him was incredible. However, the death of Djem seems to have arisen from natural causes. It was not singular that one who had led for many years a sedentary life should succumb before a winter journey, during which his regular habits of life were disregarded. Alexander may fairly be acquitted of the charge of poisoning Djem.

Djem’s death and the delights of Naples dispelled the crusading schemes of Charles. His vanity was in fully satisfied by his triumphal procession through Italy, and his inglorious campaign required its meed of enjoyment. Charles was contented to compare himself with Charles the Great without incurring any further risks. The French nobles were bent only on apportioning among themselves the spoils of the Neapolitan kingdom. There was no statesman to point out that the commanding position which Charles assumed could only be maintained by some further exploit which would silence jealousy. Charles revelled in the delights of the Neapolitan gardens, which seemed to him “a terrestrial paradise save for the absence of Adam and Eve”. His troops followed his example in their way, and indulged in the strong cheap wine of Naples till their drunken licentiousness filled the Neapolitans with hatred and terror. Commines admits that the French did not regard the Italians as men; they had had only too much justification for their contempt and did not scruple to show it. The offices of the state were all given to needy Frenchmen, and though Charles promised large remissions of taxation, the luxury of his court prevented his promises being carried into effect. The Neapolitans soon regretted their faithlessness to Ferrante II.

Meanwhile all the powers of Europe felt themselves menaced by this accession of power to France. Ferdinand of Spain feared for Sicily; Maximilian was alarmed at the preponderance which France had won in Europe; Ludovico Sforza saw that by opening Italy to France he had taken a dangerous step. The Duke of Orleans was the descendant of Valentina Visconti, the last representative of the Visconti line, and could produce as good a title to Milan as Charles had urged successfully on Naples. Venice and the Pope were both alarmed. There were many negotiations amongst these powers during the progress of the French invasion; the conquest of Naples led to decisive steps. On March 31 a league was concluded at Venice between Maximilian, Ferdinand, Ludovico Sforza, the Pope, and Venice. Its ostensible objects were, war against the Turks, the preservation of peace in Italy, and the mutual defence of the territories of the allies; its real object was the expulsion of the French from Naples.

Prudence dictated to Charles a speedy departure from Naples before his enemies had time to collect their forces; but vanity made him desirous of a formal coronation, and he wasted time in fruitless negotiations with the Pope. He still hoped by fair-promises to detach Alexander from the League, and obtain from him the investiture of the Neapolitan kingdom. But Alexander was promised help from Venice and refused the king's proposals. On May 12 Charles was crowned by the Archbishop of Naples, and on May 20 set out on his return to France. Alexander fled before his coming and took refuge in Orvieto; as Charles advanced and invited him to a conference, he removed for greater safety to Perugia.

Everywhere as Charles returned he was confronted by complications which his previous want of foresight had created. When he arrived at Poggibonsi he had to choose between the roads through Florence or through Pisa. He had given the Pisans freedom from Florence; he had promised the Florentines to restore Pisa to their rule; so that both regarded him with suspicion. Florence sent envoys to Poggibonsi, amongst whom was
Savonarola. Again Charles listened to the words of the prophet: “You have provoked the anger of the Lord because you have not kept faith with Florence, and have abandoned the reform of the Church, for which purpose you were sent”. Charles showed his usual inconsistency; he promised at first to restore Pisa to Florence, but afterwards said that his engagement to Pisa was made before that with Florence. Then he pursued his road to Pisa, where the citizens received him with joy, and next day with lamentable cries besought him not to hand them over to Florence. As usual he answered that he would do what they wished. Charles was incapable of forming any policy or deciding any question.

The French were not to leave Italy so easily as they entered it. The troops of the League were called into the field by Ludovico Sforza, who had been the chief agent in summoning the French into Italy, and was now the most eager to drive them from it. Louis Duke of Orleans had through sickness been left behind at Asti, where a small force was posted to keep open communications with France. The neighbourhood of Louis disquieted Ludovico. The Duke of Orleans claimed the title of Duke of Milan; Ludovico felt that his subjects were discontented with his rule, and feared that the presence of Louis might give the opportunity for a rising against himself. No sooner was the League concluded than he summoned the Duke of Orleans to evacuate Asti, and proceeded to gather troops. Contrary to the orders of Charles, Orleans obtained succours from France and resolved to act on the offensive. On June 13 he seized Novara, and this act of aggression was enough to absolve the Italian powers from their promises of neutrality to Charles. Venice gathered an army under the command of Francesco Gonzaga, Marquis of Mantua. Novara was besieged, and Gonzaga prepared to intercept Charles near Fornovo on the little river Taro.

The battle was fought on July 5, a battle big with the destinies of Italy. An invader had broken into her cities and had disturbed her peace. Internal dissensions had favored him, and men had not seen at first the danger his presence brought. But now Italy had recovered from her first stupor. She was united in a way that she had not been for centuries. It was too late to retrieve the past; but she might so chastise the rash intruder as to make his fate a warning for the future. Italian independence had been threatened of old, but had been nobly vindicated. Fornovo might be in the annals of Italy as glorious a memory as Legnano.

The army of the League had every advantage. It was twice as numerous as the French, which had been weakened by leaving garrisons in Naples and elsewhere. It was fresh and had plenty of provisions, while the French were wearied with a laborious march and were suffering from hunger. It had the choice of position, while the French emerging from the gorge amongst the mountains had perforce to cross the Taro and make their way towards Piacenza. Charles judged it wiser not to fight a battle, but to pursue his route. For this purpose he exposed his flank to the enemy and marched along the skirts of the mountains. Francesco Gonzaga endeavored to intercept him. There was some confused fighting and much bloodshed. But some of Gonzaga’s soldiers fell to plundering; he himself charged at the head of a division and left no orders for his reserves, who stood idly by their tents, passive spectators of the fight. Charles pursued his way, leaving much booty in the enemy’s hands. The Italians rejoiced over their victory; but the French had better reason for rejoicing. The battle of Fornovo displayed the military incapacity of Italy.
When Charles reached Asti he had to consider if he intended to pursue the war in Lombardy, where the Duke of Orleans was still besieged in Novara. Alexander, who had recovered from his fright and returned to Rome on June 27, issued on August 5 a papal admonition to Charles, bidding him cross the Alps and no longer disturb the peace of Italy; in case of disobedience he summoned the king to Rome to show cause why he should not be excommunicated. Even Charles had wit enough to reply: “I wonder that the Pope is so desirous to see me at Rome, as he did not wait for me when I was there last. I hope to obey him by opening the road again, and must beg him to wait a little while”. At first Charles thought of bringing Swiss soldiers and relieving Novara. But Ludovico Sforza was anxious to be rid of the French, and offered to make terms with the king. Novara was restored to him, and he undertook to give free passage through his territories to the French troops when they marched to Naples. Venice, aggrieved at this desertion of the League, regarded Ludovico as a traitor, and his own subjects joined in the same opinion. Ludovico, who had been the cause of the French invasion, was the man who most rejoiced to see the French safely out of Italy; like most clever schemers he had rid himself of one danger only to incur another.

Before he had returned to France Charles had lost Naples. Ferrante returned on July 7, aided by Spanish troops from Sicily under the command of Gonzalvo de Cordova. The Neapolitans rose against the French, and welcomed back their former king with frantic joy. Place after place was lost to the French, who still gallantly defended themselves. Charles talked of sending reinforcements and of making another expedition, but while he talked his troops in Calabria wasted away. In November, 1496, the last remnants of the French occupation had disappeared.

There is something fantastic, almost grotesque, in this French invasion of Italy. The rashness of the attempt, its instantaneous success, and its absence of result are equally amazing. Still more amazing is it to find in the contemporary records of Italy no sense of the importance of the events that were happening. The Italian had no sense of national unity; he regarded the French as 'barbarians', but felt no shame that the barbarians should dispose of Italy at their pleasure. He reckoned them to be only a temporary factor in the changing combinations of political parties to which he had been so long accustomed. The idea of national honor, the dread of national danger, never occurred to his mind. Even the most sincere man amongst the Italians of the time, Girolamo Savonarola, regarded the French king as the scourge of God who was to chastise and purify the Church. Italy, enervated by prosperity, corrupted by over-rapid mental enfranchisement, was limited by narrow conceptions of self-interest. The papal restoration had succeeded in checking the adventurous schemes of an Italian kingdom which had floated before the eyes of Giovanni Visconti, of Ladislas of Naples, of the condottiere Braccio. It had made possible the artificial balance of Italian states which had given Italy half a century of luxurious enjoyment and now left it helpless when danger was at hand. Never was a time when resoluteness was more required, and the only Italian capable of political courage was Giuliano della Rovere, whom passionate resentment carried into the camp of France.

Yet the Italian expedition of Charles was a turning-point of the intellectual and political life of Europe. It revealed at once the glory and the helplessness of Italy. The peoples of the North had just reached the point of intellectual development when they could understand, if they were incapable of creating, the beauties and the refinement of Italian life and thought. The earthly paradise once discovered was never again free from the foot of the invader. Charles pointed out the splendid prey which lay before the
strongest, and Italy became the battlefield of the newly-organized nations of Europe. From the beginning she enthralled her captors. The spoils of Naples were carried back to France, where Charles VIII began to remodel the Castle of Amboise. The French nobles, weary with their gloomy castles, which since the development of artillery had ceased to be impregnable, followed the fashion of Italy and changed their castles into luxurious country houses. The printing press gave a ready means for the multiplication of books. French literature, which was beginning to wear a courtly dress under Clement Marot, received a new impulse from Italy. Charles carried beyond the Alps a vague yet powerful fragrance of the spirit of the Italian Renaissance. The result was not entirely good. If French manners had been rude before, they rapidly became dissolute. The sojourn of the French in Naples called into existence a plague which went by the name of 'the French evil,' the product of the physical and moral uncleanness of the age.

In another way, also, Italy spread her influence over Europe. The League which was formed against Charles was an extension into European politics of the principles which had been developed in Italy. A deliberate check was planned against French aggrandizement, and the artificial balance which prevailed in Italian politics was introduced into a larger sphere. Round Italy gathered dynastic jealousies, which were strongly interwoven with national aspirations, and in the struggles for the possession of Italy a new system of European states slowly emerged.
CHAPTER VIII.
ALEXANDER VI AND FRA. GIROLAMO SAVONAROLA
1495—1498

The end of the year 1495 was most disastrous for the city of Rome. The waters of the Tiber rose suddenly to a height unknown before, and inflicted irreparable damage. The flood almost reached the top of the arches of the Ponti di Sisto. The waters spread through the streets, drowned many, ruined property, and undermined houses. The churches and public buildings especially suffered; tombs and altars were swept away, mosaic pavements were destroyed, and many precious memorials of the early Renaissance art were obliterated. The loss was estimated at 300,000 ducats, and it was computed that Rome would not recover from the damage for a quarter of a century.

Alexander was occupied at home by attempting to repair the ravages of this terrible inundation. But he was equally in earnest in his desire to strengthen the League against France, which was joined by Henry VII of England in the end of July. Though the League was imposing in appearance, Alexander found, it no easy matter to stir it to take any definite action. Negotiations were carried on with Maximilian to discuss the details of a joint expedition; and the Pope's legate made the modest request that all cities and castles taken by the French in the Neapolitan kingdom should be placed in the Pope's hands as supreme lord. There was much talk about the division of spoil, much flattering of his imperial majesty, and a sincere desire that Maximilian would do the bidding of Italy against the French king. But Germany felt no interest in Maximilian's imperial policy, and the Italian members of the League were not prepared for any great undertaking.

In truth Italy had been profoundly shaken by the French invasion, and her statesmen had not recovered their nerve. They felt that ruin had been terribly near; they dimly saw their individual mistakes, but each threw the greater part of the blame on his neighbor. Ludovico Sforza said to the Venetian Foscari: “I confess that I have done great mischief to Italy, but I did it to keep myself in my place, and I did it against my will. The fault lay with King Ferrante, and also in some degree with Venice, because it would not interpose. But afterwards, have you not seen my continuous efforts for the freedom of Italy? Rest assured that if I had delayed any longer in making the peace of Novara, Italy would have been undone, for our affairs were in the most desperate condition.” Ludovico was driven to admit his fault, but had no better policy for the future than a franker recognition by every one of the instability of Italian politics. Italy was to be protected by a cautious protection of her fragility, not by an endeavor to establish a sounder foundation. So the allies shrank from any definite action. The French were gone for the present, and it was better to wait. When Venice heard of continued reverses of the French in Naples she secretly tried to dissuade Maximilian from his expedition.

However, if something was to be done, there was one object which seemed to be within the power of the League.

The sole Italian state which still maintained its alliance with France was Florence. The French invasion had brought to Florence the expulsion of the Medici and the loss of
Pisa. The Florentines were bent on preventing a Medicean restoration and on recovering Pisa, and they thought that these objects could best be obtained by an alliance with France. The aim of the League was a pacification of Italy against France; and this principle, as applied to Florence, would have meant the restoration of the Medici and the recognition of the independence of Pisa. Florence on political grounds was not prepared to make such a sacrifice to secure the unity of Italy. The preaching of Savonarola had led a large number of her citizens to regard Charles as the scourge of God who should purify the Church; and Florentine vanity was gratified by the thought that she was to serve as a model to the regenerate world. The influence of Savonarola was a strange mixture of good and evil. It awakened a higher sense of Christian zeal and of moral effort; but it also rested on a definite scheme of politics, according to which Charles was a heaven-sent deliverer, and the rights which Florence recognized as inherent in her own citizens were denied to the citizens of Pisa. As a moral and religious teacher Savonarola deserves all praise; as a politician he taught Florence to take up a position adverse to the interests of Italy, to trust to France blindly in spite of all disappointments, and to war against Pisa for casting off the Florentine yoke in the same way as Florence herself had cast off the yoke of the Medici. We cannot wonder that this attitude awakened no sympathy in Italy, and that the efforts of the League were directed to the subjugation of Florence.

After the expulsion of the Medici the Florentines found some difficulty in arranging a new government. Some wished to keep the existing system, and to inspire it with the old vigor of the Florentine republic. Others wished to establish a more popular form, and turned their eyes to Venice for an example. Just as the Spartan constitution was the ideal of Athenian philosophers, so Venice was regarded by Italians as the state which had solved the problem of attaining political stability. The Consiglio Grande, of which every Venetian noble was a member, formed the basis of the Venetian constitution; the popular party at Florence demanded that a great council of the chiefest citizens should be set in a similar position in Florence. Feeling ran high, and men were sorely divided between these proposals when Savonarola interposed. He summoned to the Duomo the magistrates and all the citizens, excluding women and children. Before them he stood as a Christian teacher who believed that Christianity had power to regenerate society, and that its principles were applicable to political organization. The prophet who saw in Charles the instrument of God to deliver, yet chastise Florence, felt himself called to set the Government in a path where it might advance to the accomplishment of its mighty destiny. He spoke with the zeal of a Christian moralist, and enforced his words by the lofty assurance of a prophet. He defined the requisites of good government and applied his principles to the existing needs of Florence. He put before his hearers four great objects to be followed—the fear of God as the foundation of moral reform, love for the common welfare as superior to private interests, universal peace and amnesty to the partisans of the Medici, finally a form of government which should comprise all eligible citizens, so as to prevent factions and the consequent rise of individuals to domination. Savonarola's advice prevailed. On December 23 the Consiglio Grande was adopted by a large majority, and the democratic principle became the basis of the new constitution of Florence.

In thus venturing into the field of party politics, Savonarola took a step which drew upon him many enemies. Those who were opposed to the democratic constitution saw in Savonarola its great upholder, and worked to overthrow his influence. They found little difficulty in enlisting on their side the jealousy of the Franciscans against the
Dominicans, and an attempt was made to get rid of Savonarola from Florence, by an order from his superior that he should preach at Lucca. The Florentine magistrates with some difficulty obtained from Alexander VI a suspension of this order. It would, indeed, have been difficult to withdraw Savonarola from Florence, where he stood as the head of the dominant political party and was striving to direct the energies of the city towards a revival of religious and moral life. He professed that he did not meddle with the affairs of the state, and he believed that he was laboring to establish a kingdom of Christ on earth. But, to an outside view, he had encouraged Florence to set up an independent form of government, resting on principles difficult to understand, and to pursue a policy which was not in accordance with the interest of the rest of Italy. Moreover, however much he might desire a united Florence, it was inevitable that the new constitution should have some opponents. Savonarola linked his fortunes with those of a political party. His friends were contemptuously known as the Piagnoni, because they wept at the eloquence of their master; his foes were called the Arrabiati, because of the fury of their attacks upon him. Watching these two parties were the partisans of the Medici, who only awaited an opportunity to raise their heads.

Savonarola was not ignorant of the dangers which beset him. In a sermon preached on December 21, 1494, he compared himself to one who has gone out fishing, and has been carried from sight of the shore while intent on his occupation.

“Oh, my Florence, I am that man! I was in a safe haven, the life of a friar; I looked at the waves of the world and saw therein much fish; with my hook I caught some, that is, by my preaching I led a few into the way of salvation. As I took pleasure therein the Lord drove my bark into the open sea. Before me on the vast ocean I see terrible tempests brewing. Behind I have lost sight of my haven: the wind drives me forward, and the Lord forbids my return. On my right the elect of God demand my help; on my left demons and wicked men lie in ambush. On high I see eternal life, and my soul rising on the wings of desire seeks its heavenly home, but falls helpless and overwhelmed with sadness because it must yet wait a long time. Below I see hell, which fills me with terror. I communed last night with the Lord, and said, ‘Pity me, Lord; lead me back to my haven’. “It is impossible; see you not that the wind is contrary?’ “I will preach, if so I must; but why need I meddle with the government of Florence?”

“If thou wouldst make Florence a holy city thou must establish her on firm foundations, and give her a government which favors virtue”.

“But, Lord, I am not sufficient for these things”.

“Knowest thou not that God chooses the weak of this world to confound the mighty? Thou art the instrument, I am the doer”.

Then I was convinced, and cried, “Lord, I will do Thy will; but tell me, what shall be my reward?”

“Eye hath not seen nor ear heard”.

“But in this life, Lord?”.

“My son, the servant is not above his master. The Jews made Me die on the Cross: a like lot awaits thee”. “

Yea, Lord, let me die as Thou didst die for me”.

656
Then He said, “Wait yet a while; let that be done which must be done, then arm thyself with courage”.

These predictions of troubles were soon realized. It was inevitable that the political attitude of Florence should be challenged, and that Savonarola's responsibility should be brought to light. When the League against France was being formed Alexander VI strove to draw Florence into it, but his envoy reported that the city was entirely under the power of Savonarola.

In July, 1495, the Pope invited him to come to Rome and explain his claims to a divine commission. Savonarola excused himself on the ground of ill-health, and for a time his excuses were admitted. He referred the Pope to his book, *Compendium Revelationum*, which was just on the point of appearing, and which contained a simple account of the growth of his belief in his own mission. In this book he recognizes the arguments against this belief they had sorely tried his own mind till he saw in them temptations of the devil to lead him away from his duty. The tempter suggested to him that he was misled by his moral enthusiasm to seek a sanction for his words, and urged that prophets ought to prove their commission by performing miracles. Against him Savonarola quoted the examples of Jonah and John the Baptist, who were prophets sent from God to call men to repentance, but who had no power beyond that of their words. The book ends with a prediction of the Virgin that Florence after trials and tribulations would come forth more glorious than before.

We may doubt if Alexander VI read Savonarola’s book. He had no objection to Savonarola preaching or prophesying as he chose, but he could not understand the political attitude of Florence. Charles had left Italy without restoring Pisa, and the Florentines had nothing to hope from French help, yet they showed no disposition to enter the League. Alexander VI on September 8 addressed to them a letter, in which he professed his desire for peace, declared his intention of excommunicating Charles if he again attempted to invade Italy, and threatened all who aided him with like penalties. He exhorted the Florentines not to endure the reproach of being the only men who sought the ruin of Italy. Besides this general admonition the Pope issued a brief, specially addressed to Savonarola, declaring that he had been led astray by novel and perverse doctrine, had spoken rashly, and despite his warnings had published his sermons. Till the case was further investigated he suspended Savonarola from preaching.

Savonarola replied by entreating the Pope to inform himself better before deciding. Meanwhile, as an attempt at the restoration of the Medici caused a ferment in the popular mind at Florence, he again preached on October 11. On October 16 came a second letter from the Pope, reproaching him with disturbing the peace of the city and again ordering him to be silent.

Savonarola bowed to the Pope's command, and during Advent his voice was not heard in the pulpit. The Florentine people were discontented at his silence. In truth Savonarola occupied a position seldom gained by a preacher, for he was the centre of a great revival of religious zeal, of a moral reformation, and of a new system of government which strove to carry out his principles. The feverish ardor of his followers needed the stimulus of his exhortations. Florence believed in his prophetic gift and longed for his consolations to support her in the repeated disappointments of the recovery of Pisa. The magistrates were urgent that the Pope should recall his suspension, as the city had with difficulty endured Savonarola's silence during Advent. On February 11, 1496, the Signori decreed that Savonarola should preach in Lent, or
earlier if he chose, under pain of their severe displeasure. It would seem that Alexander, pressed to recall his suspension, made some vague remark that Savonarola might preach as he pleased provided he did not speak evil of the Pope or the Court of Rome. This remark was communicated to Savonarola by his friend Cardinal Caraffa, and Savonarola regarded it as sufficient permission.

The Carnival of 1496 gave a striking exhibition of Savonarola’s moral influence over the city. Instead of the licentious masques wherewith Lorenzo de' Medici had gratified the popular taste, Savonarola organized religious processions. Instead of the Carnival songs the streets of Florence echoed with the music of lauds. Savonarola had always attracted the young. He had raised seats for them in the cathedral where they might listen without disturbing the crowd below. He had enrolled them into guilds for the promotion of moral reform, and to the great consolation of sober citizens had checked the silly and brutal custom of stone-throwing, whereby the youth of the city disturbed the peace of respectable elders. He now produced a deep impression on the popular imagination by processions of children, varying in age from six to sixteen, who bore olive branches in their hands and chanted lauds with cries of “Viva Cristo e la Vergine Maria nostra regina”. Their parents were moved by the memory of Christ’s entry into Jerusalem, and felt the meaning of the words “out of the mouths of babes and sucklings hast thou perfected praise”. Such was the zeal of these youthful enthusiasts that their mothers could not keep them in bed on the mornings when the friar preached, so eager were they to be in their places in the cathedral. No wonder that this childish zeal was contagious. Pious hearts were deeply touched and said “This is the Lord’s doing”.

It was natural that Savonarola should be stirred by this testimony to his moral power. It is inevitable that the preacher and the social reformer should be nurtured on the enthusiasm which he excites, and should forget the strength of opposing forces which are hidden from his eyes. To Savonarola Italy was centered in Florence, and Florence was swayed by his words. The papal inhibition did not remind him that there were larger interests beyond, and that his conception of the mission of Florence was opposed to the current views of the stability of Italian affairs. He appeared before the Florentines with unabated confidence in his own prophetic mission, and declared his loyalty to the Catholic Church, by which he meant the Church of Rome; to its decision he was always ready to submit himself and his teaching. But, he went on to say, no papal prohibition could move him from the path of duty. “We are not bound to obey all commands. If they come through false information, they are not valid. If they contradict the law of love set forth in the Gospel, we must withstand them as S. Paul withstood S. Peter. We cannot suppose such a possibility; but if it were so, we must answer our superior, You err; you are not the Roman Church, you are a man and a sinner”.

These were bold words; but if they were reported to Alexander he does not seem to have paid any heed to them on personal or ecclesiastical grounds. He had suffered enough from one French invasion and was resolved to run no risk of a second. He was bent upon banding Italy against the invader, and Florence must be won over to the Italian League. He had no quarrel against Florence, no ill-will against Savonarola; but Florence must abandon its alliance with France, and Savonarola was the leader of the French party in Florence. Alexander wished to settle matters quietly, and, as a man of the world, was amazed at the infatuation of Florence for a “chattering friar”. He had allowed Savonarola to preach on the tacit understanding that he should keep away from politics and confine himself to religion. He was indignant when he heard that
Savonarola had shown himself more obstinate than before in his political ideas and even dared to brave the Pope's displeasure. So long as Savonarola confined himself to the things of the kingdom of Heaven, the Pope was content that he should go his own way; but he could not be allowed to interfere longer with the Pope's views about the affairs of his earthly kingdom.

Alexander VI was too much of a practical statesman to push matters to extremity. The words of Savonarola provoked a passing anger; but Alexander was not intolerant of plain speaking. He thought it beneath the papal dignity to quarrel with a friar. The enemies of Savonarola were numerous, and they filled the Pope's ear with complaints against him. They magnified his influence in Florence, they distorted his words, they forged letters from him to Charles urging a new French invasion of Italy. But Alexander was not greatly moved by any of these things. From time to time he warned Savonarola; but he had no wish to proceed severely against him. He bent all his efforts to induce Florence to break off its alliance with France and enter the Italian League. He knew that Savonarola was the chief obstacle to his wish; but he was willing to try all other means before attacking Savonarola himself.

So matters stood when Maximilian proposed to enter Italy. The League was powerful and Florence was weak. It was suffering from a long famine; its people were impoverished by the long war; its castles were badly fortified and ill prepared to endure a siege; help from France was no longer to be expected. The envoys of the Pope and of the League made fair promises of the restoration of Pisa, if only the French alliance were abandoned. Florence was in great straits and for a moment its citizens wavered. But they valued their newly won liberty; they dreaded that the triumph of the League would mean the restoration of the Medici; they could not put much faith in promises made by a body of allies whose separate interests were so diverse. They resolved that they would not try a new fortune, whatever risks their resolution might bring.

Maximilian and his allies came to teach Florence a lesson. They were joyously received at Pisa, and in the middle of October undertook the siege of Livorno. The Venetian ships blockaded it by sea and cut off supplies from the famished Florentines. Attempts to bring provisions were frustrated by a storm which scattered the ships laden with corn from Marseilles. Florence was in great distress and men turned to Savonarola for comfort. On October 28 he preached a stirring sermon and promised them speedy help. On October 30 the miraculous image of the Virgin of S. Maria della Impruneta was carried in procession through the city; and the strains of the penitential litany were suddenly broken by a shout of joy. A messenger came from Livorno bringing the news that some ships from Marseilles, taking advantage of a storm which scattered the Venetian squadron, had entered the harbor of Livorno with supplies.

This transient success would have availed the Florentines little if the allies had resolutely pushed the siege. But the Venetians and Milanese were suspicious of one another, and neither of them really wished to see Maximilian obtain a foothold in Italy. The storms of autumn wrecked the Venetian fleet, and Maximilian himself was in peril of his life. The ships were disabled, and Maximilian, weary of his profitless enterprise, left Pisa on November 21, and hastened into Lombardy. There he bitterly reproached the Milanese and Venetians for their conduct; then he returned ingloriously across the Alps. Savonarola's predictions were fulfilled; Florence was saved, and looked with greater confidence upon its prophet.
It would seem that Alexander had not put great confidence in the success of this expedition as a means of solving the Florentine difficulty. He negotiated privately with Savonarola that he might win him to his side. He sent to Florence the Proctor-General of the Dominicans, Luigi of Ferrara, who for three days reasoned with the prophet. At last, when he had exhausted his arguments, he said: “The Pope, confident in your virtue and wisdom, will raise you to the Cardinalate if you will cease to foretell the future”. “I cannot abandon the embassy of the King, my Master”, replied Savonarola. “Come to my sermon tomorrow, and I will answer you”. Next day Savonarola asserted anew his belief in his prophecies; then he went on: “I seek no earthly glory; far be it from me. It is enough, my God, that Thy blood was shed through love for me. I only wish to be glorified in Thee. I seek neither hat nor mitre, I desire only what Thou hast given to Thy saints—death. Give me a hat, a red hat, but red with blood; that is my desire”. Fra Luigi had his answer and returned to Rome.

Savonarola’s bitterest and most skillful enemies were those of the Dominican Order, who were jealous of his reputation and viewed his reforms with alarm. One of them, Francesco Mei, suggested to the Pope a plan by which this inconvenient politician might be silenced. Savonarola was strong in Florence by virtue of his independent position as head of the Tuscan Congregation of the Dominican Order. That position had been conferred on him by a papal brief; inasmuch as he misused his power, let the Pope take it away. This could easily be done by a redistribution of the Dominican convents. Savonarola had induced the Pope to separate the Tuscan Congregation from the Congregation of Lombardy. Plausible reasons could be adduced for a further change, for the formation of a new Congregation which should unite the Convent of Marco at Florence with some convents detached from the Congregations of Lombardy and of Rome. Grounds of convenience in ecclesiastical organization could easily be found for the creation of this Tusco-Roman Congregation, which would destroy Savonarola’s independent position and subject him to the orders of an ecclesiastical superior.

No doubt this was an unworthy maneuver; but it was a skillful one. Savonarola could not urge much against it; for he himself had used the Pope’s authority to arrange for his own purposes the distribution of the Dominican convents. It was true that his plan was founded upon a sound principle and had met with success. It was equally true that the new scheme set forth by the Pope’s brief was opposed to all sound principles, was almost impracticable, and had no other end than the removal of Savonarola from Florence. But men not versed in details could not so clearly see the issue. Even the Florentine envoy at Rome wrote home that Savonarola was bound to obey the Pope, whose plan was not directed against himself, but was solely for the honor of God.

The papal brief was issued on November 7, 1496, ordering the priors and monks of the convents named to join the new Congregation under penalty of excommunication. Savonarola did not disguise from himself the weight of the blow which had fallen upon him; “The children of my mother”, he exclaimed, “have fought against me”. He resolved to offer a resolute but moderate resistance. It would be unfair to say that he was moved thereto solely by personal considerations. Great as was his influence in Florence, much as he believed in his mission to the city, he was above all things true to his convent. He lived amongst his brethren; he fired them with his own zeal for righteousness; he cared for their souls. If the proposed change were made, his work in S. Marco would be undone, his reforms would be swept away, his devoted band of brethren would be dispersed. For their sake, for God’s sake, he felt it to be his duty to resist.
His first steps showed his straightforwardness. He gathered together the parents of his monks, who were mostly members of noble families, and asked their opinion. They answered unanimously that they were opposed to the new scheme, and if it were carried out, would remove their sons. Then Savonarola gathered together his brethren, who to the number of two hundred and fifty set their hands to a letter to the Pope in which they declared that they would suffer any hardship rather than consent to the proposed union.

Here this matter rested for a time. The failure of Maximilian and his allies at Livorno was hailed by the Florentines as a great deliverance. The republican party was strengthened, and Savonarola's influence in Florence was secure. But he felt that the plots against him were gradually producing an effect. Each attack might be repulsed, but it involved some loss. Savonarola was more and more driven to stand on the defensive, and a false step at any moment was sure to be fatal. He was more and more diligent in his work as a moral reformer, and found an enthusiastic helper in Fra Domenico da Pescia, to whom he especially committed the training of the young. The Carnival of 1497 was signalized by the puritan efforts of Savonarola's boys. They went from door to door asking for ‘vanities’, and gathered a huge pile of miscellaneous objects which the consciences of the people prompted them to give up. Immodest books, pictures, ornaments, frivolous articles of attire, whatever was thought to stand in the way of godliness, all were heaped up in the Piazza de' Signori and were solemnly burned. It was the most striking and the most dramatic testimony to Savonarola's influence over the luxurious and artistic Florentines.

Meanwhile Alexander was steadily pursuing his policy of detaching Florence from France. He appealed to the self-interest of the Florentines by offering on behalf of the Italian League to restore Pisa, provided the Florentines would show themselves ‘good Italians’ by breaking their alliance with France and joining the League. The promise was fair; but the Florentines asked themselves how it was to be fulfilled. If they could not win back Pisa for themselves, they doubted if the Pope and the League could win it for them. The Florentine envoy in Rome, Bracci, was instructed to tell the Pope that Florence would not abandon its French alliance. He did so, adding that nevertheless the Florentines were ‘excellent Italians’, and that their alliance with France involved no obligation to injure in any way any Italian power. Alexander's answer was characteristic of his resoluteness and plain speaking. “Sir secretary”, he said, “you are as fat as we are, but you have come with a thin commission; and if you have nothing else to say you may be gone. We see that your masters stand on their customary fair speeches and excuses; we tell you that if you do not wish our blessing, it shall be far from you. We shall be blameless before God and man if, after having done our duty as a good shepherd towards your city, you yourselves wish to be the cause of your own ill, which, we tell you, is closer than you think. You will find that, since you do not choose to come to our side through goodwill, you will have to come of necessity, through force and through means whereby we can make a great revolution in your affairs. We do not know whence springs this obstinacy of yours”. He paused and went on in a still more angry voice, “We believe that it has its root in the prophecies of your chattering friar”. Then he went on to complain that the government of Florence allowed Savonarola to speak evil of himself.

The immediate result of the Pope’s menace was an attempt by Piero de' Medici to surprise Florence. Piero was driven from its gates on April 28, and the Medicean party in Florence was consequently discredited. The Arrabbiati gained political ascendancy, and the new magistrates were not so warmly in Savonarola’s favor. This encouraged his
opponents, who seized the opportunity of his next appearance to make a demonstration against him. He was to preach on Ascension Day, May 4, and the previous night some young men managed to enter the Duomo and fill the pulpit with filth. The news of this outrage produced great excitement amongst Savonarola’s congregation. Men listened with excited feelings, and when during the sermon the chest for receiving alms was pushed over and fell with a clang, there was a general uproar. A body of Savonarola's friends gathered round the pulpit and drew their swords. Savonarola in vain tried to quiet the disturbance. He knelt a while in silent prayer; then he left the Duomo, and was escorted home by a band of armed adherents.

This scandalous scene caused much talk throughout Italy. The Florentine magistrates issued an order prohibiting friars of any order to preach without their permission, and the benches which had been erected in the Duomo for Savonarola's congregation were all removed. Though they hastened to inform the Pope what they had done, and at the same time spoke slightly of the disturbance which had taken place, their apologies came too late. On May 13 the Pope signed a brief excommunicating Savonarola, on the grounds that he was suspected of preaching dangerous doctrines, that he had refused the Pope’s summons to come to Rome and clear himself, had continued preaching in spite of the Pope’s prohibitions, and refused to obey the Pope's orders to unite the Convent of S. Marco to a newly-instituted Congregation.

Still, though the brief was signed, it was not published till June 18. Alexander did not wish to quarrel with the Florentine people, but wished to strike Savonarola only. The brief was not addressed to the people and clergy of Florence; but briefs were sent to the several convents, and were published by the brethren at their discretion. Savonarola replied by a letter addressed to all Christians, in which he argued that an unjust excommunication was invalid. He quoted Gerson as an authority for resisting a Pope who misused his power. He quoted the decrees of Constance and Basel as to the limitation of excommunications. But the arguments of a letter sounded cold to those who had hung on the prophet's lips. There was nothing to kindle the enthusiasm of Savonarola's followers, and they mourned that they were 'deprived of the Word of God'. A reaction against puritanism set in. The taverns were again filled with customers, and the games at the street corners were resumed. Savonarola's friends were put on the defensive. They were assailed with ridicule, and were driven to defend themselves by argument in which they did not always get the best.

Still the magistrates of Florence strove to induce the Pope to withdraw his brief of excommunication. Alexander was much grieved by the death of his son the Duke of Gandia, who was found murdered on June 15. He spoke of reforming the Church, and instituted a commission of six Cardinals to whom he committed Savonarola's case. Savonarola wrote a letter of condolence to the Pope, in which he urged that zeal for the faith was the one consolation for sorrow. Alexander VI was not displeased at this frankness, but he soon recovered from his distress and returned to his political interests. Letters expressing confidence in Savonarola were sent to the Pope, one signed by all the brethren of S. Marco, another signed by three hundred and seventy of the chief citizens of Florence. On June 27 Alexander VI told the Florentine envoy that the publication of the brief of excommunication was contrary to his wishes. But the zeal of Savonarola's friends stirred up a corresponding zeal on the part of his enemies, whose letters accusing Savonarola poured in upon the Pope; and Alexander took no steps to recall his excommunication.
Savonarola remained quietly in his cell at S. Marco, while Florence in the month of August was convulsed by a great strife. Evidence came to light which fixed the blame of the Medicean rising in April on five of the chief citizens of Florence, whose complicity had hitherto been unsuspected. There was great excitement and much discussion as to what was to be done. Ultimately the conspirators were put to death without the chance of appeal. The result of this firmness was the supremacy in Florence of Savonarola’s friends the Piagnoni. Savonarola himself took no part in this affair; he was engaged in publishing his great theological work, ‘Il Trionfo della Croce’. He had good hopes that the Pope would revoke his censure, and was content to wait quietly, and allow the arguments of his friends to sink into the minds of the people. He did not wish to scandalize his weaker brethren, though he did not hope to justify himself to his opponents. He was prepared to maintain that the excommunication was issued on erroneous grounds, and that the Pope had overstepped the limits of justice; but he waited for a time before taking any definite action.

At last Savonarola stood forward in opposition to the Pope’s excommunication. On Christmas Day he celebrated the mass in S. Marco. The Florentine magistrates declared themselves on his side by going on the Epiphany to make offerings in S. Marco, where they kissed Savonarola’s hand as he stood by the high altar. He was invited to resume his preaching, and the seats were again erected in the Duomo. The vicar of the Archbishop of Florence attempted to prevent this; but the Signori threatened to declare him a rebel unless he withdrew his opposition. On February 11, 1498, Savonarola again entered the pulpit and preached to an anxious crowd. Regarding the excommunication he said: “God governs the world by secondary agents, which are instruments in His hand. When the agent withdraws himself from God, he is no longer an instrument; he is a broken iron. But you will ask how I am to know when the agent fails. I answer: compare his commands with the root of all wisdom, that is, good living and charity: if they are contrary thereto the instrument is a broken iron, and you are no longer bound to obey. Those who by false reports have sought my excommunication wished to do away with good living and good government, to open the door to every vice”. Savonarola appealed from the Pope to the better informed conscience of his hearers. He explained his position more fully to the envoy of the Duke of Ferrara, to whom he said: “I could not take my commission to preach from the Signori, nor even from the Pope, seeing that he continues in his present manner of life. I await my commission from One superior to the Pope and to every other creature”.

When the envoy represented the possible scandal that might arise, Savonarola answered: “If I knew that the excommunication was justified I would have respected it. Moreover, I am more than certain that my preaching will cause no scandal nor disorder in the city”.

Savonarola overestimated the weight attaching to good intentions when they lead to a course opposed to recognized order. “Many”, says one of his Florentine followers, “refused to go to his preaching through fear of the excommunication, saying : Just or unjust, it is to be feared I myself was one of those who did not go”. Men of this cautious turn of mind did not make their voices heard, but their attitude was dangerous, Savonarola listened only to the eager disciples who crowded round him, saying, “When will you preach again? We are dying of hunger””. He satisfied their desires. His sermons followed thick and fast during the month of February. In the Carnival, on February 27, Savonarola said mass in S. Marco, and with his own hand communicated all the brethren of the convent and several thousands of men and women. Then he
advanced to a pulpit outside the church, bearing in his hand the consecrated host, and
adjured God to strike him dead if he had spoken anything false, if he deserved the
excommunication. Popular excitement ran high, and many expected to see signs and
wonders. There was another ‘ Burning of Vanities’ in the Piazza. His opponents mocked
and said, “He is excommunicated himself and communicates others”. Sober citizens
who believed in his commission thought that he was making a mistake, and abstained
from showing themselves on his side.

Savonarola’s first sermon was circulated throughout Italy and produced much
comment. Alexander could scarcely enjoy being called ‘a broken iron’; but he was not a
man to attach importance to hasty words. He showed no resentment against Savonarola,
and listened to the Florentine envoys who pleaded in his favor. He was anxious only for
the success of his political plans, and on February 22 again pressed the envoys to know
if Florence would lay aside its alliance with France. When they held out no hopes he
rose in anger and left the room. At the door he paused and said, “Go on and set Fra
Girolamo to preach. I could never have believed that you would have treated me thus”.
In vain the envoys tried to calm him. On February 25 he threatened to lay Florence
under an interdict. Next day he issued two briefs, one to the Canons of the Duomo
ordering them to prevent Savonarola from preaching in their church, the other to the
Signori bidding them send Savonarola to Rome. Still he showed himself placable to the
Florentine envoys. He was still ready to work for the restoration of Pisa, if Florence
would join the League: if Savonarola would cease from preaching he was willing to
absolve him. On March 1 he assembled the ambassadors of the League and proposed to
them the restitution of Pisa to Florence. All agreed except the Venetian envoy, who
expressed distrust of Florence and tried to irritate the Pope against her by quoting
Savonarola’s sermons and exaggerating their expressions against the Pope. Alexander
answered with calmness, exhorting the Venetians to agree to a step which was for the
common good of Italy: he himself would not allow any private injury to stand in the
way of that end.

But Alexander was now resolved to reduce Savonarola to silence. He
commissioned Savonarola’s old enemy, Fra Mariano da Genazzano, to preach against
his doctrines at Rome. Fra Mariano lost himself in unworthy and scurrilous abuse, to the
disgust of his audience. Yet the Florentine ambassador regarded his sermon as an
ominous sign of the Pope's displeasure. Piero de' Medici was frequently seen at the
Vatican, and the Pope showed him manifest signs of his favor. The Florentine
merchants in Rome were threatened with the withdrawal of the Pope's protection and
the confiscation of their goods; they petitioned the Florentine-magistrates to act in their
behalf. The scheme for the restoration of Pisa was held before the Florentine envoy, and
the Pope declared that he would no longer favor Florence unless Savonarola were
silenced. The envoy wrote anxious letters home. The majority of the magistrates who
had come into office did not belong to Savonarola’s party, but they would not at once
abandon him. They wrote, on March 3, a dignified defence of his wonderful influence
as a moral reformer; and said that they could not obey the Pope's commands without
causing serious disturbances in Florence. When this letter was laid before the Pope he
expressed his surprise. “No attention has been paid to my brief. If Savonarola is not
stayed from preaching, I will lay Florence under an interdict. I do not condemn him for
his good teaching, but because he preaches though excommunicated, and does not seek
absolution”. He looked at the letter of the magistrates and declared that he recognized it
as composed by Savonarola,
The Pope knew that the Florentine magistrates were beginning to give way. On March 9 he issued another brief which was written with great moderation. He could not suffer an excommunicated man to continue preaching, and he ordered the magistrates to prevent him. “As regards Fra Girolamo”, he continued, “we only demand that he should repent and come to us: we will receive him readily, and after restoring him to the Church by our absolution, we will send him back to save souls in your city by preaching the word of God”. Savonarola’s answer to the brief was that he could not free himself from embarrassment by trampling on his conscience; he was certain that his teaching came from God.

The Florentine magistrates, on March 14, summoned a council to deliberate. There were various opinions; but the majority was in favor of suspending Savonarola from preaching. Still the magistrates held their hands, and on March 17 again summoned some of the chief citizens to give their advice. The general conclusion was to persuade Savonarola to abstain from preaching, but to answer that the other demands of the Pope were unworthy of the city. On March 18 Savonarola preached his last sermon and took farewell of his congregation. For his own part, he said, he was glad to be relieved of the labor of preaching; he was glad to betake himself to study; he would carry on by his prayers the work which he had begun by his sermons; God would send another to take his place.

The letters of the Florentine magistrates telling of this resolution did not reach Rome till March 22. Alexander was angry at this long delay, and had uttered many threats to the Florentine envoy, who was relieved to have some answer to carry to the Pope. The answer fell far short of what Alexander VI desired; Savonarola was not commanded, but only persuaded, to abstain from preaching; he was not sent to Rome to ask for absolution. Moreover the Pope had addressed a brief to the Florentine magistrates; he received no direct answer from them, but only a communication through their envoy. However, Alexander received the answer in good part. He said, “If Fra Girolamo will obey for a time and then ask for absolution, I will willingly give it him and give him liberty to preach. I do not condemn his doctrine, but only his preaching without absolution, his evil speaking of us, and his despite of our censures. If we endured such things there would be an end of the apostolic authority”.

But though Alexander spoke fairly, he was resolved to act resolutely. He was angered at hearing that though Savonarola’s voice was silenced, his followers, chief of whom was Fra Domenico da Pescia, continued fervently to deliver their master's messages to the Florentine people. On March 31 he told the Florentine envoy that he purposed sending a prelate to Florence to demand that Savonarola should come to Rome and make his submission. The envoy saw in this a change from the Pope’s previous attitude of indifference; and Alexander VI had motives concerned with weightier matters than the political combinations of Italy, to urge him to deprive Savonarola of the power of attack.

Alexander had many enemies who were ready to use against him any weapon that could be found. Cardinal Rovere had urged Charles VIII. to summon a Council and inquire into the simoniacal election of the Pope. Charles had shrunk from a task of such magnitude, from which he had little to gain, and for which his own character rendered him unfit. But in the end of 1497 a change came over Charles. The death of his infant son had given him a shock, and he began to think more seriously of his duties. He laid before the Sorbonne a series of questions. Were the decrees of Constance for the
summoning of future Councils binding on the Pope? If the Pope did not summon a Council, could the scattered members of the Church gather together of themselves? If other princes refused, could the King of France call together a Council for the good of the Church? The Sorbonne replied in the affirmative to all these questions.

It was natural for Alexander to dread this possible revival of the conciliar spirit. He knew how Charles had been impressed by Savonarola. He knew that Savonarola’s prophetic claims, his moral earnestness, and his wonderful influence at Florence, made him an important personage. Savonarola had spoken boldly of the need of reform in the head of the Church and of the corruptions of the Roman Curia: in a General Council he would prove a dangerous adversary. Alexander had been willing to try and win him over; when once he had broken with him it was necessary to reduce him to silence. There is no reason to think that he wished for more than Savonarola’s submission; but that he must have. Savonarola had called him a ‘broken iron’, had rejected his excommunication as unjust, and when driven to extremities had approached the subject of a Council. On March 9 he said in his sermon, “Tell me, Florence, what is a Council? Men have forgotten; but how comes it that your sons know nothing of it, and there is no Council now? You answer, Father, it cannot be gathered together’. That is perhaps true. A Council is the Church, all good prelates, abbots, and scholars. But there is no Church without the grace of the Holy Spirit; and where is that to be found? Perhaps only in some obscure good man. And for this reason you may say that there can be no Council. A Council would have to make its own reformers. It would have to punish all the evil clergy, and perhaps there would be left none who were not deposed. This is why it is hard to summon a Council. Pray the Lord that it may one day be possible”.

On the arrival of the Pope’s last brief, Savonarola wrote a dignified letter with his own hand to Alexander. He said that he had labored for the salvation of souls and the restoration of Christian discipline; he had been assailed by many foes, and had hoped for help and comfort from the Pope, but the Pope had joined his enemies; he could only submit himself patiently to God, who sometimes “chose the weak things of this world to confound the mighty”. “May your Holiness”, he ended, “make haste to provide for your own salvation”. After this, there could only be avowed hostility between the Pope and the ardent apostle of righteousness.

Savonarola knew that many of the Cardinals were in favor of summoning a Council. He employed several of his friends in Florence, who had relatives amongst the Florentine envoys at foreign courts, to submit to them a memorandum on the motives for summoning a General Council. This was sent to the Emperor and the Kings of France, Spain, England and Hungary. Meanwhile Savonarola in his cell was preparing letters which would carry the matter farther.

Savonarola had been driven into a position where he was likely to create a movement in the ecclesiastical politics of Europe. His weakness was that he was too closely identified with the particular politics of Florence. He had begun as a moral reformer in the great centre of the life of Italy. He had aimed at regenerating Florence so that it should be a city set on a hill, whose light would spread far and wide. He had interpreted its political events as warnings from on high, and had led it to adopt a political attitude which seemed to him to have the sanction of God. This political attitude of Florence had many political opponents. When they could not move Savonarola as a politician, they attacked him as a prophet. With some difficulty they brought against him the authority of the head of the Church, and forced him into
collision with the ecclesiastical system. Savonarola set to work to enlist on his side the longings of the nations of Europe for ecclesiastical reform. Till this could be done he rested on the approval of his own conscience, on his individual sense of a divine guidance. His followers believed in him on the ground of his own assertions. His enemies hastened to take advantage of his isolation, and challenged him to bring to some clear and palpable test his claims to a divine mission.

Savonarola in his later sermons had expressed his inmost feelings of profound trust in God. Like the Hebrew Psalmist he saw God on the side of the just; he perceived the nothingness of the wicked; he believed that when troubles pressed most near the hour of God’s deliverance was close at hand. Now that he was put to silence his enemies gathered round him and cried, “There, there, so would we have it”. The deadly struggle of the world against the righteous man raged round Savonarola, and made him a hero of the eternal tragedy of the human soul.

The dealings of the Florentine magistrates with the Pope, the consultations of the citizens, the political intrigues, the flying rumors, had awakened a feverish excitement in the city. When Savonarola’s voice was silenced the voices of smaller men began to be heard. The enemies of Savonarola had always been well represented in the pulpit. The Franciscans of S. Croce had seen with jealousy the growing importance of the Dominicans of S. Marco. The Franciscan preachers had always been ready to point out the errors of Savonarola’s teaching; but hitherto their eloquence had met with little attention. There was no case to be made against Savonarola; nothing that could be offered as an equivalent to the interest attaching to his bold and fervent treatment of religious and social questions. But the papal excommunication and Savonarola’s refusal to heed it opened out a fertile field for polemics. Savonarola’s conduct might be justifiable, but it was certainly revolutionary. Many men were undecided and wished to hear both sides before making up their minds. The Franciscans had little to say that men cared to hear, so long as they attacked in Savonarola the moral reformer, the political regenerator of Florence; but now a controversy concerning the meanings and limits of the power of excommunication was one in which every Florentine was willing to take a part. Hence came the importance of silencing Savonarola. So long as the stream of his impassioned eloquence continued, he could confirm the waverers, and his adversaries were little heeded. When Savonarola’s voice was no longer heard his opponents redoubled their attacks, and the pulpit of S. Croce rang with denunciations of the false prophet, the heretic, the excommunicated monk.

Savonarola's friends waxed equally warm in his defence. Fra Domenico da Pescia was his chief champion, and on March 27, in an impassioned sermon, declared his readiness to enter into the fire to prove his belief in the truth of Savonarola’s teaching. Next day he repeated his offer, and declared that many others of the brethren of S. Marco were ready to do likewise. Turning to his congregation he added, “yes, and many of you would do so too”. Many women rose in their excitement and cried, “I too am ready”. The Franciscan preacher, Francesco da Puglia, at once took up the challenge. “I believe”, he said, “that I shall be burned; but I am ready to die to free this people. If Savonarola does not burn, you may believe him to be a true prophet”. He set aside the offer of Fra Domenico, and matched himself only with Savonarola.

In the prevailing excitement the rhetoric of two contending preachers was seized upon by Savonarola’s foes. The Compagnacci at a supper in the Pitti Palace resolved to use the opportunity. Their leader, Dolfo Spini, assured the Franciscans that they had
nothing to fear: the trial would be prevented and Savonarola would be ruined. He found it easy to stir up the populace to wild excitement about the proposal. He enlisted the magistrates on his side by showing them that it afforded a safe way out of their difficulties.

The trial by fire was a remnant of the old judicial system of the ordeal—a system which had been discountenanced by the Church, and had fallen out of use. But its memory still lingered in men's minds, and it seemed to them to apply to the exceptional case before them. Formal documents were drawn up and signed by the champions on either side. Savonarola refused to submit himself to the test. He had not challenged it; but if his champion failed, the consequences would fall upon him. He told his friends that he was sure that God was on his side and would work wonders for him; but He would do so in His own good time; he would not tempt God; the signs which he had already wrought by the results of his preaching were enough to convince those who were open to conviction.

When the news of the proposal reached Rome, Alexander expressed his disapproval. The revival of the ordeal was against the laws of the Church. Moreover, the intention to submit directly to the judgment of God a case which had been called before the Pope's tribunal was in itself a denial of the Pope's spiritual authority. Alexander protested against the ordeal to the Florentine envoy; but he did not send to Florence a formal prohibition. The envoy assured him that there was no means of stopping the trial by fire save by removing the excommunication of Savonarola. This Alexander refused to do, and left things to take their course.

On the morning of Saturday, April 7, the people of Florence thronged with eagerness to the Piazza de' Signori, where a platform, sixty yards long and ten yards broad, was erected and piled at either side with logs smeared with oil and pitch. At S. Marco Savonarola addressed his friends. Miracles, he said, were useless where reason could suffice; he went to the trial with a clear conscience, because he had been provoked and could not shrink back without betraying his cause. He committed himself to the hands of God, and besought his friends to stay and pray for him. The brethren of the convent, walking in procession two by two, advanced to the Piazza. Fra Domenico was vested in a chasuble, and by his side went Savonarola, in a white cope, bearing in his hand the consecrated host. As they went they sang the processional psalm, “Let God arise and let his enemies be scattered”, and the vast throng that followed joined in the strains. They entered the Piazza and took up their position in the Loggia de' Lanzi, of which half was assigned to them and half to the Franciscans.

Fra Domenico was ready, but the Franciscan champion was in the Palazzo. Presently a message was brought demanding that Fra Domenico should lay aside his chasuble, on the ground that it had been enchanted by Savonarola, to whom his enemies wished to ascribe magical arts. Fra Domenico at once assented. Then came a second demand, that he should change his other clothes for a similar reason. Again he agreed, saying that he was ready to wear the dress of any of his brethren. He retired into the Palazzo to change his garments, and when he returned was carefully kept from the neighborhood of Savonarola lest he should be enchanted afresh. The crowd meanwhile were weary of waiting. They had stood since the early morning and were fasting. A tumult arose, and a band of Compagnacci, who had been waiting their opportunity, made a rush for the Loggia. They were repulsed by the readiness of one of Savonarola's friends, who drew a line upon the ground and dared them to cross it. When order was
restored, a heavy thunderstorm burst over the city and the torrents of rain gave a new pretext for delay.

At last the storm was over and preparations were again begun. The Franciscans asked Fra Domenico to lay aside the crucifix which he held in his hand. He did so and took in its stead the consecrated host. To this the Franciscans raised great objections; would he dare to expose the host to fire? This time Savonarola stood firm. His adversaries had done their utmost to show that if he succeeded in the trial it was due to magic; he claimed to be allowed to have God's presence in the Sacrament as a sign that God, and God only, was his defence. He answered the objection to the possible desecration of the host, by saying that, in any case, only the accidents and not the substance of the Sacrament would be destroyed. The theological discussion occupied much time; at last the magistrates sent a message that the trial would not take place that day. The two bodies of monks retired to their convents.

The crowd angrily dispersed from the Piazza, and the Compagnacci used their opportunity of turning against Savonarola the popular disappointment. The bystanders had not understood what passed. Some of them had come to see a sight and had been disappointed. Many had come expecting to see the prophet, give a clear sign of his divine mission. He had spoken of signs and wonders; he had foretold the purposes of God; his followers had gone readily to the trial. The Franciscans, on the other hand, had claimed no divine mission. They had from the first declared that they expected to be burned, and were content to be burned for the sake of unmasking an impostor. It was not for them to show a sign: it was for Savonarola. In the eyes of the people he had failed, and they lost all faith in their prophet; disappointment led to bitterness and a keen sense of deception.

The Compagnacci were well organised and resolved to take advantage of this change of the popular feeling. Next day, Palm Sunday, a body of Compagnacci raised a crowd which rushed to S. Marco, killed such of Savonarola's followers as they met, and stormed the convent with fire and sword. For a time the brethren offered a stubborn resistance, till the magistrates sent a body of men to arrest Savonarola, Fra Domenico, and Fra Silvestro; who were led to the Palazzo amid the shouts of the angry crowd, who heaped upon them every indignity and insult.

When the news of these events reached Rome, Alexander VI was delighted. He had been long suffering toward Savonarola at first; but when once he declared against him he was resolved upon his humiliation. He had protested against the trial by fire—he could scarcely do otherwise—but when it ended in Savonarola's fall he was quite satisfied. He wrote to the Franciscans and praised their holy zeal, which he would ever hold in grateful memory. He wrote to Fra Francesco da Puglia and incited him to persevere in this good and pious work till the evil were entirely destroyed. He wrote to the Florentine magistrates and praised their action. He absolved the city from all censures which had been incurred through any irregularities committed in the late tumults. The Florentine magistrates used the opportunity of the Pope's graciousness to ask for a grant of a tenth of ecclesiastical revenues, as their exchequer sorely needed replenishing. Alexander VI replied by a request that Savonarola should be handed over to him for trial. Though the magistrates did not agree to this request, they were anxious in their conduct of the trial to gratify the Pope to the utmost.

The miserable story of Savonarola's trial may be briefly told. A commission of seventeen members was appointed to examine him. They put to the torture the nervous
sensitive monk already worn out by asceticism and toil. They questioned him and reduced his incoherent answers to such shape as they pleased. When this did not seem enough to ruin his character they falsified the deposition, and when he heard it read in silence, extorted his signature and announced that he had confessed to being a deceiver of the people. Everything was carefully arranged to ruin him in, popular estimation. It was the weakness of Savonarola’s career that his efforts sprang too exclusively from a belief in his own individual mission. When his followers saw their prophet in the hands of his enemies they had not the courage to stand alone. The so-called confession of Savonarola sufficed for the time to dispel their faith. “He confessed”, says one of them, “that he was not a prophet and had not from God the things that he preached. He confessed that many things which happened during the course of his preaching were contrary to what he had represented. When I heard this confession read I stood in stupor and amazement. My soul was grieved to see so grand an edifice fall to the ground because it was built on the sorry foundation of a lie. I was waiting to see Florence a new Jerusalem, whence would go forth the laws and example of a good life; I was waiting for the renewal of the Church, the conversion of unbelievers, the consolation of the just. I felt that it was all the contrary, and could only heal my woe by the cry, Lord, in Thy hands are all things”.

This sense of profound discouragement amongst Savonarola's followers was the result of the skillful way in which Savonarola’s enemies had placed the issue before them. “Savonarola”, they said, “is a prophet with a special mission from God. We do not profess to be prophets. We know that the fire will burn us, but we are willing to be burned if he burns too. We are willing to do anything that may convince you that your prophet is no true prophet, and has no special mission”. Savonarola’s entire position was made to depend exclusively on his prophetic claims. Amongst these claims was put, by the suggestion of his enemies and the excited feelings of his friends, the claim of working wonders which Savonarola himself had always repudiated. His entire faith in God's providence led him to face the trial so skillfully proposed. When he was found to be merely a man, like other men, his followers for the moment felt that they had been deceived. They did not stop to ask whether the deception was due to their own enthusiasm or to their master's assertions. Perplexed and disheartened, Savonarola's party melted away.

Even the brethren of S. Marco deserted their great leader, and wrote to the Pope begging his forgiveness. They pleaded that, in their simplicity, they had been beguiled by the commanding intellect and pretended sanctity of Savonarola. “Let it suffice your Holiness to punish the head and front of this offence; we like sheep who have gone astray return to the true shepherd”. No abasement could be more complete.

The fate of Savonarola was the subject of much negotiation between the Pope and the Florentine magistrates. The Pope wished that he should be delivered to him for punishment; the Florentines urged that such a course was injurious to the dignity of their city. At last Alexander VI agreed to send two commissaries to Florence who were to judge the spiritual offences of Savonarola, while he left the Florentines to judge his offences against the city. At the same time he granted them his permission to impose a tax of three-tenths upon ecclesiastical revenues. “Three times ten make thirty”, said some of those who still remained true to Savonarola; “our master is sold for thirty pieces like the Savior”.
On May 19 the papal commissioners arrived in Florence. They were Gioacchino Torriano, General of the Dominicans, and Francesco Remolino, Bishop of Ilerda. Concerning Remolino we have the testimony of Cesare Borgia that “he had no mind for ecclesiastical affairs”, but the qualifications of the commissaries was not an important matter, as they made no secret that they came to condemn Savonarola, not to judge him. Again Savonarola was put to the torture to see if any further information could be obtained about his plan of summoning a General Council. The commissaries were anxious to find out if he had any confederates amongst the Cardinals; but they discovered nothing. On May 22 they declared him and his two companions guilty of heresy and gave sentence against them. Then they were condemned to death by the magistrates, and Savonarola as a last favor was allowed to see his two friends and gave them his benediction. On the morning of May 23 they met to receive the viaticum, and Savonarola was permitted to communicate with his own hands. He knelt and professed his faith, asked pardon for his sins, and committed himself to God.

The scaffold had been erected in the Piazza de' Signori. The gibbet on its projecting arm bore three nooses and three chains, while underneath was a pile of wood to burn the bodies. When first the gibbet was erected it looked like a cross, and the Piagnoni murmured, “They are going to crucify him, like his Master”. One arm was sawn away to destroy the comparison.

The condemned descended the steps of the Palazzo, and were led to a tribunal where sat the Bishop who had been commissioned by the Pope to degrade them from their ecclesiastical rank. They were stripped of their vestments; their tonsures and their hands were scraped. The Bishop took Savonarola by the hand, and in the confusion of the moment made an error in the words of degradation. “I separate you”, he said, “from the Church militant and triumphant”. “Militant, not triumphant”, Savonarola corrected him; “that is not in your power”. “Amen”, said the Bishop; “may God lead you there”. Then they passed to the next tribunal where the papal commissioners read the sentence which condemned them as heretics, schismatics, and despisers of the Holy See. Remolino said, “His Holiness is pleased to deliver you from the pains of purgatory by granting you a plenary indulgence. Do you accept it?” They bowed their heads in token of assent.

Next they were handed over to the civil power and were led to the last tribunal, where sat the magistrates, who condemned them to be hanged and their bodies burned. They moved onwards to the scaffold in silent prayer. Savonarola had enjoined on his companions that they should say nothing; he did not wish to justify himself in the eyes of men, or say anything which might cause a tumult. When a friend murmured words of comfort, Savonarola gently answered, “God only can console men at their last hour”.

Fra Silvestro was the first to suffer, exclaiming, “Lord, into Thy hands I commend my spirit”. Then Fra Domenico, with a face of joy, seemed not so much to go to death as to a festival. Last of all Savonarola cast his eyes for a moment over the assembled crowd, who still held their breath in suspense, hoping for some miracle. His lips moved, but nothing was audible. Then a suppressed murmur ran through the crowd as they saw his body hanging in the air. The corpses were hung in chains, and the pile below was fired. The ashes were gathered and were thrown into the Arno. Yet faithful souls scraped together some precious relics of the charred fragments; and three days afterwards women so far forgot their fear as to kneel in passionate devotion on the spot where their great teacher had been burned. In spite of persecution there were many who
loved Savonarola because they knew what he had done for their souls. His books were eagerly read, biographies of him were written, his defence was passionately undertaken, the place of his execution was crowned with flowers on the anniversary of his death.

The last days of Savonarola’s life in prison were spent in writing a meditation on the fifty-first Psalm. This together with his other devotional writings enjoyed a wide popularity and went through many editions. It fell into the hands of Luther, who republished it in 1523, with a preface in which he claimed Savonarola as one of his predecessors in setting forth the doctrine of justification by faith only. He writes in his usual trenchant style: “Though the feet of this holy man are still soiled by theological mud, he nevertheless upheld justification by faith only without works, and therefore he was burned by the Pope. But he lives in blessedness and Christ canonises him by our means, even though Pope and Papists burst with rage”. It is not worthwhile to examine the grounds of Luther’s statement. Savonarola's words are full of ardent faith in Christ, but Luther’s position was far from his mind. He taught nothing which was opposed to the accepted doctrines of the Church; he never denied the papal headship, and he received submissively the plenary indulgence which Alexander VI granted him before his death. Savonarola was a great moral reformer, who was driven at the last to take up the position of an ecclesiastical reformer also; but he followed the lines of Gerson and Ailli, and wished to take up the work which the Council of Constance had failed to accomplish. His conception of moral reform led him into politics, and his political position brought him into collision with the Papacy. Rather than abandon his work he was prepared to face a conflict with the Papacy, but his enemies were too numerous and too watchful, and he fell before their combined force.

Savonarola's fate is a type of the dangers which beset a noble soul drawn by its Christian zeal into conflict with the world. More and more he was driven to fight the Lord’s battle with carnal weapons, till the prophet and the statesman became inextricably entangled, and the message of the new life was interwoven with the political attitude of the Florentine republic. Little by little he was driven into the open sea till his frail bark was swallowed by the tempest. He encouraged Florence to adhere to an untenable position till all who wished to bring Florence into union with Italian aspirations were driven to conspire for his downfall.

This great tragic interest of the lofty soul overborne in its struggle against the world has made Savonarola a favorite character for biography, romance, and devotional literature. But the historical importance of Savonarola goes deeper than the greatness of his personal character or his political importance. Savonarola made a last attempt to bring the New Learning into harmony with the Christian life. He strove to inspire the Florence of Lorenzo, Ficino, and Pico with the consciousness of a great spiritual mission to the world. He aimed at setting up a commonwealth of which Christ was the only king; animated by the zeal of a reformed Church, the State was to guide men’s aspirations towards a regenerate life. The individual force and passion of Savonarola was the offspring of the Renaissance, but it had to force its way to expression through the fetters of Scholasticism. Savonarola’s sermons present a strange contrast of the forcible utterance of personal feeling with the trivialities of an artificial method of exposition. He palpitates with the desire to reconcile conflicting tendencies and enter into a larger world. He falls back upon the mysterious utterances of prophecy to point men’s eyes to a larger future than he was able to define. His words are now vague to our ears, his political plans are seen to be dreams, his prophetic claims a delusion. But his
character lives and is powerful as of one who strove to restore the harmony of man’s distracted life.

It is unjust to represent Alexander as the chief author of Savonarola’s ruin; but he gave his sanction at the last to the schemes of Savonarola's foes. It is needless to discuss the technical points at issue between Savonarola and the Pope; it is enough that the papal policy in Italy demanded the destruction of a noble effort to make Christianity the animating principle of life. Even a Pope so purely secular as Alexander is said in later years to have regretted Savonarola’s death; Julius II ordered Raffaello to place him amongst the Doctors of the Church in his Disputa; and his claims to canonization were more than once discussed. The Church silently grieved over his loss when he was gone, when political difficulties had passed away, and the memory of the fervent preacher of righteousness alone remained.
CHAPTER IX.
ALEXANDER VI AND THE PAPAL STATES
1495—1499

In following the fate of Savonarola we have seen the reluteness with which Alexander pursued one great object of his policy, the union of Italy to resist French intervention. A second object which employed his care was the reduction of the Roman barons so as to secure the peace of the Papal States. Alexander had felt his helplessness before the advance of Charles, and had learned how many enemies he had to face at his own doors. The feeble rule of Innocent VIII had reversed the resolute measures of Sixtus IV. Ostia was held against the Pope; the Orsini castles threatened him on every side; Rome itself was a scene of constant feuds, and brawls and assassinations were common in its streets.

The first measure of Alexander was to strengthen the fortifications of the Castle of S. Angelo and connect it more readily with the Vatican. He first gave it the appearance of a mediaeval castle, with walls, towers, and ditches of defence. He caused the houses which had clustered round it to be pulled down, and laid out the street now called the Borgo Nuovo which leads from it to the Vatican. These works, which took some years to complete, were begun in 1495, and were a heavy drain on the papal treasury.

He next proceeded to strengthen himself in the College of Cardinals, where he had many enemies and where he encountered much opposition to his plans. On February 19, 1496, he announced the creation of four new Cardinals, all Spaniards, and one his nephew, Giovanni Borgia. As this raised the number of Spanish Cardinals to nine, much discontent was expressed, and many efforts were made to induce the Pope to create some Italian Cardinals. The Marquis of Mantua offered 16,000 ducats to have the dignity conferred upon his brother; but Alexander steadily refused. He had seen the dangers to which the Papacy was exposed from the introduction of the political jealousies of Italy into its councils. It was enough that the Sforza and the Medici were already powerful in Rome, and that Cardinal Rovere led a political party of his own. Alexander VI was ready to meet his enemies with their own weapons. He was willing to face the unpopularity of pursuing an independent line of action.

The downfall of the French power in Naples afforded Alexander an opportunity of striking a blow at the Roman barons who had sided with the French king. Ferrante II was aided in expelling the French by the troops of Spain under the leadership of the great general, Gonsalvo de Cordova. Gonsalvo’s military skill and the awakened patriotism of the Neapolitans rapidly prevailed against the French, who received no reinforcements from home. In August, 1496, their last stronghold, Atella, capitulated; its garrison undertook to depart from the kingdom, and a general amnesty was declared. Amongst those included in this capitulation was Virginio, the head of the Orsini house, who would fain have embarked with the French, but Ferrante, at the Pope’s request, kept him as prisoner. Alexander had prepared measures against the Orsini. On June 1 he declared them rebels against the Church and confiscated their goods; he summoned to his aid Guidubaldo, Duke of Urbino, proclaimed the young Duke of Gandia Gonfaloniere of the Church, and appointed the Cardinal of Lanate as his legate for the
war. On October 26 the Pope blessed the standard which he handed to his son, and next day the papal army set out from Rome.

At first the papal arms were successful, and ten castles of Orsini were captured within a month; but a determined resistance was offered by Bracciano, which was strong in its position on the lake. Bartolommea Orsini, Virginio’s sister, showed masculine daring in baffling the besiegers, who suffered from exposure to the winter weather. Moreover, she amused herself at their expense. One day a donkey was driven out of the castle bearing a placard, “Let me pass, for I go as ambassador to the Duke of Gandia”; underneath its tail was fastened a letter full of bitter mockery. The siege of Bracciano was raised in January, as the troops of the Orsini threatened Rome. At last, on January 23, 1497, a battle was fought by Soriano in which the Orsini were completely victorious. The Duke of Urbino was taken prisoner; the Duke of Gandia was wounded in the face; he and Cardinal Lanate with difficulty escaped to Rome.

The position of Alexander was now precarious. The troops of the Orsini laid waste the Campagna and cut off supplies from the city. Ostia, which commanded the approach by sea, was garrisoned by French troops. Alexander turned for help to Gonsalvo de Cordova, who was sitting idly in Naples; but the Venetian envoys urged upon him the need of peace with the Orsini, and on February 5 an agreement was made. Anguillara and Cervetri were given up to the Pope, and the Orsini were to retain the rest of their possessions on paying 50,000 ducats. Those who were in prison at Naples were to be released; but this stipulation did not affect Virginio, who had died in prison a few weeks before. The Pope paid no heed to his captive ally, the Duke of Urbino, who was left to negotiate his own ransom. The Pope was shameless enough to leave the Orsini a victim from whom they might extort the money which they were to pay to him. The Duke of Urbino was childless, and Alexander already coveted his domains for one of his own sons.

Alexander’s first attempt at recovering the Papal States had not been successful. He hoped for better things from his next enterprise. On February 19 Gonsalvo de Cordova came to Rome and undertook the reduction of Ostia, which was bravely defended by a Biscayan corsair, Menaldo de Guerra. Gonsalvo took with him 600 Spanish horse and 1000 foot, so badly armed and equipped that the Italians laughed at their poor appearance. Gonsalvo answered, “They are so naked that the enemy has nothing to gain from them”. Ostia capitulated, and on March 15 Gonsalvo was welcomed with a revival of the old Roman triumph. Before him rode Menaldo in chains; he himself was escorted by the Duke of Gandia and the Pope’s son-in-law, Giovanni of Pesaro. The procession swept along to the Vatican, where Alexander received them seated on his throne. Menaldo threw himself before the Pope and asked for pardon; Alexander made him no answer, but presently turning to Gonsalvo, left the fate of the captive in his hands. Gonsalvo was generous and gave him his liberty.

Alexander went the next day to Ostia to settle the affairs of his new possession. He bestowed on Gonsalvo every mark of his gratitude; but the haughty Spaniard refused on Palm Sunday to receive a palm from the Pope’s hand because it was offered to him after the Duke of Gandia.

The Romans, so soon as the fear of their foes at Ostia was removed, looked with displeasure on the Spanish Pope with his Spanish army, and the solemnities of Holy Week were marred by riots between the Spanish soldiers and the people, who even
threatened to stone the Pope as he went in procession through the streets. Gonsalvo did not care to stay long in the ungrateful city, and went back to Naples at the end of March.

The Neapolitan restoration and the capture of Ostia restored Alexander to power, and he was resolved to assert it. The Cardinals of the French party, Colonna and Savelli, returned to Rome; Orsini no longer dared to oppose the Pope; Rovere preferred exile to submission. The Cardinal of Gurk was ordered to return to Rome or confine himself to his diocese of Foligno; he stayed at Foligno, protesting to the Florentine ambassador that he was not bound to follow the Pope to do evil. “When I think”, he said, “on the life of the Pope and some of the Cardinals, I have a horror of the court of Rome, and have no wish to return till God reforms His Church”.

A bystander might indeed be pardoned for feeling some doubts about the Pope's intentions. The incidents of the life of his family gave rise to much scandal, and it was quite clear that the Pope was not careful of his own reputation or of the reputation of his office. In Holy Week men’s tongues were set wagging by the sudden flight from Rome of Giovanni Sforza, lord of Pesaro, Lucrezia Borgia’s husband. He went, on the pretext of performing his religious duties, to the Church of S. Onofrio, outside the Porta Romana. There a swift horse was ready for him; he mounted and rode in haste to Pesaro, leaving his wife at Rome. The reason for this strange departure was not at first known; presently it appeared that there was a question of Giovanni’s divorce from Lucrezia on the ground of impotence. Giovanni resisted the Pope’s proposals that he should consent to a divorce, and judged it wise to leave Rome before the pressure became irresistible. He was a weak man, and had not been of much use to the Pope's policy; Alexander was desirous of a more influential son-in-law. Giovanni Sforza gave out that he was in fear of his life, and trembled before the threats of Cardinal Cesare. What was Lucrezia’s attitude towards her husband we do not know; in the beginning of June she retired from Rome to the Convent of S. Sisto, preferring to remain in quiet till the matter was settled.

Meanwhile Alexander pursued his policy of aggrandizing his sons. Ferrante II of Naples died childless and was succeeded by his uncle, Federigo, Prince of Altamura. The Pope used the opportunity afforded by the demand for his coronation to revive some old claims of the Papacy; he erected Benevento into a duchy, comprising also Terracina and Pontecorvo, and conferred the duchy on the Duke of Gandia. None of the Cardinals dared to oppose him, save Cardinal Piccolomini, whose remonstrances were seconded by the Spanish ambassador. Even the opposition of all the Cardinals did not prevent the Pope from nominating his son Cesare as legate for the coronation. He resolutely sought the advancement of his children, and held everything else as secondary to that object.

The Pope’s schemes were doomed to a terrible disappointment, and Rome was suddenly startled by the news of the death of the Duke of Gandia by a mysterious murder. On the evening of June 14 he had gone to sup with his mother Vanozza in her house by the church of S. Pietro in Vincula. There was a large party, amongst whom were the Cardinals Cesare and Giovanni Borgia. It was night when the Duke of Gandia and Cesare mounted their horses, accompanied by a small retinue. When they arrived at the Palazzo Cesarini, where Cardinal Ascanio Sforza lived, the Duke of Gandia took leave of his brother, saying that he had some private business to transact. He dismissed all his attendants save one, and followed a masked figure, who had for the last month frequently visited him at the Vatican, and who had come to speak with him that night
during supper. He turned back to the Piazza Giudea, and there ordered his one attendant to wait for him; if he did not soon return he was to make his way back to the Vatican. Then he took the masked figure on his mule and rode away. The servant, as he waited for his master, was attacked by armed men, from whom he with difficulty escaped with his life and was left speechless. In the morning the Pope was uneasy at his son’s absence, but supposed that he had gone on some amorous intrigue and did not wish to leave the lady’s house in daylight. But when the night did not bring him back Alexander grew seriously alarmed, and sent the police to make inquiries. They found a Slavonian wood seller who gave them some information. He plied his trade on the Ripetta, near the Ospedale degli Sciaroni. He had unladen his cargo, and to protect his wares from theft was sleeping in the boat, which was moored by the bank. He saw two men, about one o’clock in the morning, peer cautiously from the street on the left of Ospedale. When they saw no one they returned, and were followed by two others who used equal caution. Seeing no one they made a sign. A horseman then came forward, riding on a white horse. Behind him was a corpse with the head hanging down on one side and the legs on the other; it was held in its place by the two men who had first appeared. They went to a spot where rubbish was shot into the Tiber, and there the horse was backed towards the river. The two men on foot seized the corpse and flung it into the water. The horseman asked if it had sunk, and was answered “Yes, sir”. He looked round and saw the mantle floating on the surface, and one of the men pelted it with stones till it sank; then they all went away.

When this story was told to the Pope, he asked why the wood seller had not informed the police. The answer was that he had seen in his days a hundred corpses thrown into the river in that spot, and no questions had been asked about them. It was a terrible testimony to the condition of Rome under the papal government.

The fishermen and sailors of the Tiber were set to work to search the river. They discovered the body of the Duke of Gandia, with the throat cut, and eight wounds upon the head, legs, and body. He was fully dressed, and in his pocket was his purse containing thirty ducats. The corpse was placed on a barge and was conveyed to the Castle of S. Angelo, and thence was carried to the Church of S. Maria del Popolo, where it lay in state.

When Alexander heard that his son was dead, and thrown like dirt into the river, he gave way to passionate grief. He shut himself up in his chamber, and would admit no one. His terrified attendants stood by the door and listened to his sobs; for three days he refused all food. Inquiries were made throughout Rome; but nothing was discovered which could throw any light upon the murderers. Rumours were rife and many were suspected. Some accused the Orsini, especially Bartolommeo de Alviano, others Giovanni Sforza of Pesaro, whose flight from Rome was explained on the most abominable grounds. Others again considered that Cardinal Ascanio Sforza was the author of this act of vengeance, being irritated against the Duke of Gandia for having caused the assassination of his chamberlain, whose free speaking had given offence. Ascanio was so much alarmed at the rumour about himself that he did not venture into the Pope’s presence.

On June 19 the Pope appeared in a Consistory, and received the condolences of all the Cardinals, except Ascanio Sforza. The Pope spoke with difficulty: "The Duke of Gandia is dead. Our grief is inexpressible because we loved him dearly. We no longer value the Papacy or anything else. If we had seven Papacies we would give them all to
restore him to life. Perhaps God has punished us for some sin; it is not because he deserved so cruel a death. It is said that the lord of Pesaro has killed him; we are sure that it is not so. Of the Prince of Squillace it is incredible. We are sure also of the Duke of Urbino. God pardon whoever it be. For ourselves we can attend to nothing, neither the Papacy nor our life. We think only of the Church and its government. For this purpose we institute a commission of six Cardinals, with two auditors of the Rota, to set to work for its reformation, to see that benefices are given solely by merit, and that you Cardinals have your share in the councils of the Church”.

Then the Spanish ambassador rose and explained the absence of Cardinal Ascanio; he was afraid of the rumours that he, as the head of the Orsini faction, had planned the Duke of Gandia’s murder. “God forbid”, said the Pope, “that I should suspect him, for I hold him as a brother”. Then the envoys in turn presented their condolences to the Pope, and all went away amazed at his good intentions.

Alexander wrote letters to all the princes of Europe, telling them of his loss and of his sorrow. He received letters of condolence from all sides, even from Savonarola and Cardinal Rovere, who expressed their sorrow and counselled Christian resignation to the Pope. For a time Alexander was sincere in his desire to act more worthily of his office. Men heard with astonishment of the proposals which the six commissioners for reform put forward. The sale of benefices was prohibited; they were to be conferred on worthy persons. The revenues of a Cardinal were not to exceed 6000 florins, nor their households to contain more than eighty persons. No Cardinal was to hold more than one bishopric; offenders against this rule were at once to choose which they would resign; pluralities were similarly forbidden to the inferior clergy. It was even proposed that the decrees of the Council of Constance should be made binding. There was also a noticeable provision that the Pope should maintain 500 foot and 3000 horse to chastise the subjects of the Church. These were admirable proposals, and would have been welcomed by Christendom with delight. But Alexander’s interest in ecclesiastical matters diminished with his sorrow. He was a man of quick and strong feelings. The blow at first crushed him, and he turned in his remorse to bethink himself of forgotten duties. But his natural disposition soon reasserted itself; he regained his self-control, and returned to his original plans. Reform of the Church meant loss of money, and money was above all things necessary for his political projects. The report of the reform commission was no sooner ready than it was set aside as derogatory to the privileges of the Papacy.

Every effort was made to discover the murderer of the Duke of Gandia, but without avail. The suspicions of the police were especially directed against Count Antonio della Mirandola, whose house was not far distant from the place where the body was found. He had a daughter who was famous for her beauty, and it was conjectured that she was the bait by which the mysterious visitor allured the duke to put himself unattended in his hands. But nothing definite was discovered, and it was agreed that the assassination was a masterpiece in its way. In the absence of any certainty, everyone was at liberty to form his own opinion about the murderer. Probably the most natural conjecture is the truest—that the Duke of Gandia fell a victim to the jealousy of some lover or husband whose honor he had attacked. The rumors current in Rome mentioned every one who might possibly have an interest in the Duke of Gandia’s death, amongst these his brother Jofre, Prince of Squillace, because he would presumably be his heir. When it appeared that Cardinal Cesare was to succeed to his place in the Pope’s affections, rumor transferred the guilt to him. As Cesare became an object of dread in Italy men repeated this charge
more constantly, and Guicciardini and Machiavelli have raised it to the dignity of an historical fact. But it was not preferred against Cesare till nearly nine months after the event, and it rests upon no better foundation than do the suspicions against the Orsini, Ascanio Sforza, Giovanni Sforza, Antonio della Mirandola, or Jofre Borgia. When so many rumors were afloat it is clear that they all rested on mere conjecture, and that it is impossible to pronounce any certain opinion.

In spite of the Pope’s assurance that he entirely acquitted Ascanio Sforza of any share in the murder, Ascanio judged it prudent to retire from Rome to Grottaferrata, and when on July 22 Cardinal Cesare Borgia set out for Naples to crown Federigo, all Rome was convinced of Ascanio’s guilt. Cesare performed with splendor his duties of legate, and crowned the last Aragonese King of Naples at Capua on August 10. His stay in the kingdom was a source of expense to the impoverished treasury, and Federigo was glad to see his costly guest depart. On September 6 Cesare was received by all the Cardinals and was escorted to the Vatican. Alexander was still so little master of himself that he could not trust himself to speak to his son, but greeted him in silence.

Perhaps it was due to Cesare’s influence that Alexander rapidly recovered his spirits and returned to his old plans, foremost amongst them the overthrow of the Orsini. He gathered troops, allied himself with the Colonna, and assumed such a threatening attitude that the Orsini sought the good offices of Venice. Venice warned the Pope that it took the Orsini under its protection, and Alexander sullenly gave way to its remonstrances. The Romans changed their opinion about the murderer of the Duke of Gandia, and now were sure that his death was the work of the Orsini.

Alexander at the same time steadily pursued his family policy. He enriched Cardinal Cesare with the benefices of Cardinals who died, while he matured a plan for releasing him from ecclesiastical obligations and opening to him the career which the Duke of Gandia’s death had left vacant. Similarly he prosecuted the divorce of Lucrezia from Giovanni of Pesaro, which had been referred to a commission presided over by two Cardinals. The alleged cause was Giovanni Sforza's impotence. Giovanni protested against it with all his might, as besides the ridicule which it threw upon him, it involved the restoration of Lucrezia’s dowry, 31,000 ducats. He went to Milan and implored Ludovico Il Moro to use his influence to prevent it. But Ludovico and his brother Ascanio had no wish to quarrel with the Pope; they rather urged Giovanni to give way and resign himself to what was inevitable. He was at last driven to sign a paper in which he owned that Lucrezia was still a virgin. But he revenged himself for his discomfiture by imputing to Alexander the most abominable motives for his conduct. The divorce was in itself a sufficiently scandalous proceeding, and everything concerning it was rapidly spread throughout Italy. Men made merry over the matter after the manner of the time. Alexander's family affairs had already become a subject of considerable amusement to the wits of the day. A refined, scurrilous, and profligate society could not have had a subject for conversation which suited them better. The accusations of Giovanni Sforza had an immediate success; they passed from mouth to mouth and lost nothing in the telling. Alexander was neither liked nor respected, but he was dreaded. He was exactly the man against whom scandalous stories were the only weapon available for his victims. From this time forward stories of incest and unnatural crime were rife about the Pope and his family. Alexander had done enough to make anything seem credible about him. He had outraged public opinion in every way, and the tongue of slander took its revenge. The death of the Duke of Gandia, the divorce of Lucrezia, the proposed dispensation of Cesare from the Cardinalate—all these following one
another in a few months filled men with bewilderment and made them ready to catch at any explanation however monstrous it might be. In September these rumors had reached Rome and set men’s tongues wagging freely. We may agree with the sagacious judgment of the Venetian envoy in Rome. “Whatever may be the truth, one thing is certain: this Pope behaves in an outrageous and intolerable way”. It is bad enough that Alexander gave a colorable pretext to such slanders. The slanders themselves rest on no evidence that justifies an impartial mind in believing them.

The corruption of the papal court was notorious, and was deplored on all sides. Not only Savonarola, but a churchman like Petrus Delfinus, General of the Camaldolensians, longed for reform and hailed Alexander's temporary repentance with joyful expectancy. On every side were murmurs. Charles of France expressed his regret that he had not used his opportunity and summoned a Council. The Spanish princes sent envoys to remonstrate with the Pope on his disorderly life. The disorganization of the Curia was shown by the sudden arrest on September 14 of the Pope's secretary, Bartolommeo Florido, Archbishop of Cosenza, on the charge of forging papal briefs. He had trafficked in dispensations and exemptions, and was said to have issued as many as 3000 briefs on his own authority. One of them was issued in favor of a nun of the royal race of Portugal, and allowed her to leave the convent and marry a natural son of the late king. This act of audacity seems to have led to detection of the fraud, and Florido was induced to confess his crimes. He was degraded from his ecclesiastical offices and was condemned to perpetual imprisonment in a subterranean dungeon in the Castle of S. Angelo, where he was fed on bread and water, was supplied with oil for a lamp, and was allowed to have his breviary and a bible. He died after a few months' confinement.

Another mysterious death in Alexander's household again set men’s tongues wagging. On February 14, 1498, the Pope’s favourite chamberlain, Piero Caldes, known as Perotto, was found drowned in the Tiber. Together with him, it was said, was the corpse of a maid in the service of Lucrezia. Again men darkly hinted that the drowned girl was a mistress of the Pope. In later times the death of Perotto was put down to Cesare Borgia, who is said to have killed with his own hand the wretched man, who clung to the Pope's mantle, while his blood spurted into the Pope’s face. Again we can trace the growth of an incredible story.

These frequent murders and the insecurity of life in Rome to some degree justify Alexander’s desire for a strong position, where he might put down disorder and feel secure. Rome was in utter anarchy and the Pope was helpless in his own city. The feud between the Orsini and the Colonna raged violently, and the Pope was powerless to keep the peace. Federigo of Naples had confiscated the Orsini fiefs in his kingdom and conferred them on the Colonna. The Orsini could not brook to see their rivals increase in power; both sides gathered armed men, and the Pope was driven at times to take refuge before their tumults in the Castle of S. Angelo. A desultory warfare was carried on in the Campagna, till on April 12, 1498, the Orsini met with a crushing defeat at Palombara. Both parties saw that a continuance of the struggle would only weaken themselves and benefit the Pope.' They refused his offers of mediation and made peace in July, on the understanding that they would both unite against the Pope, would ally with the King of Naples, and submit their disputes to his decision. The union of these rival houses was felt to be a severe blow against Alexander. Mocking verses were found attached to a column of the Vatican, bidding the Pope prepare to find another victim offered to the Tiber, as the rest of the Borgia family were to share the fate of the Duke of Gandia. The wits of Rome were certainly cruel.
Alexander frankly accepted the situation, and resolutely set himself to meet his enemies with their own weapons. In the precarious condition of Italian politics allies were not to be trusted unless their fidelity was secured by interested motives; so Alexander used the marriage connections of his family as a means to secure for himself a strong political party. He had no one whom he could trust save his own children, whom he regarded as instruments for his own plans. If Italian politics changed rapidly he was ready to change as rapidly as they. The spiritual office of the Papacy afforded him a safe mooring; he would use every opportunity that offered for increasing its temporal power. He was the first Pope who deliberately and consciously recognized the advantages to be reaped in politics from the papal office, and set himself to make the most of them. For this reason he inspired dread in the minds of Italian statesmen like Machiavelli. He was an incalculable force in politics; he was engaged in the same game as the rest of the players, but none of them knew the exact nature of his resources.

The nepotism of Alexander was not merely a passionate and unreasoning desire for the advancement of his family, but was founded on calculation and pursued with resoluteness. Marriage projects for Lucrezia were eagerly sought, and there were many rumors about their progress. The death of the Duke of Gandia made the Pope anxious to have another general whom he could trust; but Cesare’s resignation of the Cardinalate involved a considerable sacrifice. His ecclesiastical revenues amounted to 35,000 ducats yearly, and it was not easy to find an equally valuable position for a layman. Alexander's first thoughts turned to Naples. A firm alliance with Federigo would make him secure in Rome, and would enable him to deal with the overweening power of the Roman barons. He proposed Neapolitan marriages both for Lucrezia and Cesare; but Federigo had no love for the Pope and dreaded his interference in the affairs of his kingdom. However, after much pressure from the Duke of Milan he consented to the marriage of Lucrezia with Don Alfonso, Duke of Biseglia, a natural son of Alfonso II; and the marriage was quietly celebrated in the Vatican in August, 1498. But he steadfastly resisted the further proposal of the Pope that he should give his daughter Carlotta to Cesare Borgia. He said at last: "It does not seem to me that a Pope's son, who is a Cardinal, is in a position to marry my daughter, though he is the son of a Pope. Let him marry as a Cardinal and keep his hat; then I will give him my daughter".

While these negotiations were pending a change came over European politics owing to the death of Charles VIII of France. He died suddenly in April from striking his head against a low doorway in his new castle of Amboise, which he was erecting as a reminiscence of the splendor he had seen in Italy. He was succeeded by his distant cousin Louis, Duke of Orleans, who had so persistently urged his own claims to the duchy of Milan, as representing the old Visconti house. Louis XII was of mature years, and was likely to act more energetically than the feeble Charles. He showed a pacific temper in France, and said, "the king does not remember the wrongs done to the duke". He was careful and thrifty and showed from the beginning a resoluteness to assert his rights which filled Ludovico Sforza with alarm.

The downfall of Savonarola seemed to have secured the success of the Italian League against France. But the League held loosely together, and it needed very little to dissolve it. The Venetians and Ludovico II Moro were mutually jealous, and each suspected the other of designs on Pisa; the Pope had little confidence in his Italian allies; Federigo of Naples was helpless; Maximilian had his grievances both against Milan and Venice. It was a question which of the allies should be first to use a new combination for his advantage.
Fortune favored Alexander. Louis XII had been married to Jeanne, youngest daughter of Louis XI, when she was a child of nine years old. She bore her husband no children, and there was nothing in common between them. On the other hand, Charles left a young widow of twenty-one, Anne of Brittany, whose hand carried with it the last great fief which was not yet consolidated with the French crown. Louis XII wished to put away his wife and marry Anne in her stead; and if ever the dissolution of a marriage could be justified on grounds of political expediency, the justification might be urged in this case. Alexander used the opportunity offered by the application for a divorce. He proposed a close alliance with France, and offered to send his son Cesare to negotiate further. He left Cesare’s marriage projects in the hands of Louis XII, and employed Cardinal Rovere, who was at Avignon, to prepare the way for his proposals. It is a sign of the astuteness of Alexander's policy that his determined enemy found it useless any longer to oppose him. Cardinal Rovere had urged Charles VIII to invade Italy, to summon a Council and depose the Pope; he had garrisoned Ostia to be a thorn in Alexander's side, and had retired haughtily to France. Alexander had escaped all Cardinal Rovere’s designs against him; he had taken Ostia, and thereby diminished the Cardinal's income, though he made some restitution and offered to restore Ostia if the Cardinal would return to Rome. Rovere found himself neglected in France; he was weary of his hopeless isolation, and judged it well to seek reconciliation with the Pope while he might still have something to offer. Alexander was not vindictive. He agreed to restore Ostia and receive the Cardinal into his favor, provided that he acted as his agent at the French court.

The Pope entertained great hopes of the fruits of a French alliance, and gathered money to equip Cesare in splendor for his embassy. When he showed some care for ecclesiastical discipline, men said that he was moved by a desire to extort money from the culprits. The Marrani who were expelled from Spain flocked to Rome, and spread their heresies even in the papal court. In April, 1498, the aged Bishop of Calagorra, steward of the Pope’s household, was accused of heresy and was committed to prison. The charge against him was that he had relapsed into Judaism and denied the Christian revelation. In July 300 Marrani did public penance. Men laughed in Rome and said that all this was done to provide for Cesare’s outfit.

At last Cesare’s preparations were made. In a secret Consistory on August 17 he rose and said that from his earliest years he had been inclined to secular pursuits; at the Pope’s earnest wish he had become a churchman, had received deacon’s orders, and had been laden with benefices; as he still found that the bent of his mind was secular, he besought the Pope to dispense him from his ecclesiastical obligations, and asked the Cardinals to agree to his request. They readily consented to leave the matter in the Pope’s hands. The dispensation followed in due form, and Alexander declared that he granted it for the salvation of Cesare’s soul. It might be retorted that he should have considered that object before raising him to a position for which he was unfitted. On October 1, Cesare, magnificent in cloth of gold, set out from Rome on his journey to France. He took with him 200,000 ducats in money and in splendid attire.

Cesare’s progress was marked with royal state. On December 18 he entered Chinon, where was the French king, with grandeur which long lived in the memory of the French. His robe was stiff with jewels; his steed’s trappings were of finely wrought gold. Louis XII laughed at this vainglory and foolish boasting, and turned at once to business. The Pope's commissioners granted a dispensation from his marriage with Jeanne of France; and Cesare Borgia brought with him a Cardinal’s hat for the king’s
favourite, George of Amboise, Archbishop of Rouen, who received it on December 21 from the hands of Cardinal Rovere as the Pope's legate. Cesare had already received from the French king part of the reward of the Pope's compliance with his wishes. He had been invested with the counties of Valentinois and Diois, to which the Papacy had a long-standing claim on the ground of their bequest to the Church by the last Dauphin. There remained, however, the question of Cesare's marriage. He was still anxious to have for his wife Carlotta, daughter of Federigo of Naples, that thereby he might have a claim upon the Neapolitan throne. Federigo had refused; but Carlotta, who was the daughter of a French princess, was in France, and Cesare hoped to win her through the influence of the French king. Carlotta, however, remained firm in her refusal, sorely to the dismay of the Pope, who complained to Cardinal Rovere that he was made a laughing stock by this failure of his plans. In his disappointment he threatened to abandon the French alliance and join with Milan, Naples, and Spain. To pacify him, Louis offered Cesare a further choice of two French princesses, nieces of his own, the daughter of the Count of Foix or the sister of the King of Navarre. Cesare chose the beautiful Charlotte d'Albret, a girl of sixteen years. It was some time before the preliminaries of the marriage could be arranged, and Cesare had to undertake that a Cardinal's hat should be bestowed on Aimon d'Albret, Charlotte's brother. At last, on May 22, 1499, Alexander announced to the Cardinals that the marriage had been celebrated, and Rome blazed with bonfires at the news, "to the great scandal", says Burchard, "of the Church and the Apostolic seat".

The good understanding between Alexander and France was viewed with alarm by other powers, and led to remonstrance with the Pope. Ascanio Sforza saw his brother menaced in Milan, and feared for his own influence in Rome. Alexander never discouraged plain speaking, and was ready to answer with equal plainness. In a Consistory in December, 1498, Ascanio told the Pope that his French alliance would be the ruin of Italy. Alexander answered, "It was your brother who first summoned the French". Warm words passed between them, and Ascanio went away threatening to call on Maximilian and Spain to join in convoking a General Council. The threat of a Council was now a common device in Italian politics, and Alexander knew its futility. His ecclesiastical position was entirely secondary to his political importance, and so long as he had a place in the combinations of Italian affairs he was safe enough. He did not even show any resentment against Ascanio. He was not the man to strike one whose doom was being prepared by others.

The remonstrances of Spain were more serious than those of Cardinal Ascanio. The Spanish sovereigns were not strong enough to oppose the schemes of Louis XII in Italy, and judged it prudent to make a treaty of neutrality with France. But they hoped that the Italian powers would unite in resisting him, and were alarmed at his alliance with the Pope. The Spanish envoy, Garcilasso de la Vega, presented a letter from his sovereigns on December 18, in which they complained of the corruption of the papal court, and hinted at the summons of a Council. The Pope angrily answered that they were misled by false information sent by their ambassador from Rome. Garcilasso went on to refer to the promises held out by the Pope after the death of the Duke of Gandia, and their failure before his scheme for promoting Cesare. Alexander with increasing bitterness said: "Your royal house has been afflicted by God, who has deprived it of posterity; this is because they have laid impious hands on the possessions of the Church". In January, 1499, there was a still more stormy scene. Alexander tried to tear the paper from Garcilasso's hands, and threatened to have him thrown into the Tiber; he accused Queen
Isabella of unchastity. The envoys wished to make a formal protest in the Pope’s presence, but were not allowed.

Alexander knew himself to be strong enough to defy remonstrances. His league with France was joined by Venice, which wished to have a share of the dominions of Milan and to rid itself of a troublesome neighbor. Their alliance with France was secretly sworn on February 9, and was published on April 15. Cesare Borgia was present at the ceremony, and Cardinal Rovere held the missal on which the oath was taken. It was an eventful moment for Italy. The gates were opened by her own hand for foreign intervention, and the knell of Italian independence was sounded. The self-seeking of Venice and the desire of the Pope for a strong ally overpowered all larger considerations. There was no national feeling, no sense of patriotism or of consistency. Savonarola had been sacrificed that the French might be shut out of Italy; now the very men who worked for his overthrow adopted his politics which they had condemned. The Italian League had faded away. Old foes were reconciled by new motives of self-interest. Cardinal Rovere had sought French help to drive Alexander from his seat; when that failed, he aided Alexander to seek the help of France to establish himself more securely.

Alexander, however, did not openly declare his alliance with France, but watched the progress of Cesare’s marriage projects with uneasiness. Even after he was satisfied on that score, his attitude was so ambiguous that it was not till July 14 that Ascanio Sforza became certain of his hostility. He fled from Rome in the early morning, pretending to be going out hunting, and made his way to Milan, where his brother Ludovico was making preparations to resist his foes. Ludovico was cunning and vainglorious; but he mistook craft and self-assertion for statesmanship. After the retreat of Charles VIII he had exulted in the success of his schemes. He boasted that he had the Pope for his chaplain, the Venetians for his treasurers, Maximilian for his condottiere general, and the King of France for his messenger to come and go at his pleasure. Now in the hour of his peril Ludovico found himself without allies. Federigo of Naples was trembling for himself; Maximilian was engaged in war against the Swiss; Florence was still busied with Pisa. The only device that Ludovico could find was the dastardly plan of instigating the Turks to make a diversion in his favour. This helped him little. When the French troops advanced on the west, and the Venetians on the east, Ludovico could offer no resistance. The cities in his territory opened their gates to the invaders. Only the citadel of Milan professed to hold out, and that was betrayed by its commander. Ludovico fled into the Tyrol, and on October 6 Louis XII entered Milan amidst the joyous shouts of the crowd. With him rode the Duke of Valentinois and Cardinal Rovere, both prepared to reap what advantage they could from the success of France.

Alexander VI meanwhile was engaged in adjusting his plans to match the change of his political attitude. The Neapolitan marriage of Lucrezia was now of no use to him, and his son-in-law the Prince of Biseglia felt himself out of place in the Vatican. Early in August he secretly left Rome and went to Naples, whence he sent word to the Pope that he could not stay in the Vatican, which was filled with partisans of France who spoke ill of the Neapolitans. Federigo summoned also the Prince of Squillace and his Neapolitan wife to return to their possessions. The Pope sent away Dona Sancia and refused to give her any money for the journey; the Prince of Squillace stayed at Rome. The Neapolitan marriages were now a trouble to the Pope. Lucrezia needed her husband's care and wept over his absence; to distract her mind and make Alfonso's return more easy, Alexander on August 8 appointed his daughter regent of Spoleto.
Spoleto was one of the few cities in the Papal States which had not fallen under a tyranny, but was governed by a papal legate, generally a Cardinal. Alexander was so heedless of precedent or decorum that he did not scruple to send as its governor a girl of nineteen, his own daughter. He was absolutely unfettered by the traditions of his office; and others did not feel bound to be more careful of his reputation than he was himself.

Soon the Pope gave another sign of his affection for his daughter. Ascanio Sforza was driven to resign his office as regent of Nepi, and Nepi also was conferred on Lucrezia. Her husband rejoined her at Spoleto, and on September 25 Alexander left Rome to meet Alfonso and Lucrezia at Nepi, whither she went to take possession. In the middle of October Lucrezia returned to Rome, where she gave birth to a son on November 1. This event seems to have reconciled the Pope and his son-in-law; and the brilliant life of the papal household was happily resumed.
CHAPTER X
ALEXANDER VI AND CESARE BORGIA
1500-1502.

The plan which Alexander VI had most deeply at heart was the centralization of the States of the Church. It was no new scheme, but had forced itself on the attention of his predecessors. The States of the Church during the Middle Ages had shared the same fate as the lands of the rest of Europe; they had been granted out to vassals, who had tended to become independent rulers, and during the Avignonese Captivity, Cardinal Albormoz had seen no better way of maintaining the papal authority than by recognizing the position won by these vassal lords. The abasement of the Papacy, the Great Schism, and the Reforming Councils had still further strengthened the Pope’s vassals; and the restored Papacy enjoyed only a nominal sovereignty over the greater part of its dominions, as the power of the Malatesta hampered Pius II and Paul II. When Sixtus IV found no other object for the Papacy to pursue, he turned to the extension of the temporal power. But the entire result of his passionate endeavors was to form Imola and Forlì into a principality for his nephew Girolamo. The feeble pontificate of Innocent VIII let slip all that the Papacy had gained; and Alexander VI, in a time when the air was full of political changes, had to consider what object he had best pursue.

The French invasion had startled Italy, but had not kindled any spirit of national patriotism. The Italian League had fallen to pieces, and each state pursued its separate interests as keenly as before. The Papacy had to choose whether it would strive to centralize its power or would submit to see its vassals fall before their more powerful neighbors. The fertile district of the Romagna was a network of small principalities, on which Venice, Milan, and Florence all cast a hungry eye. So long as the balance of Italian politics was maintained, they were secure; but if, by any chance, Venice, Milan, and Florence were agreed upon a partition, the Papacy would be helpless to prevent it. Alexander VI was resolved to obviate this danger, to rid the Papacy of its troublesome vassals, and reduce the Romagna to one principality directly under the Church.

It was hopeless for a Pope to undertake this task himself, if, indeed, Alexander VI had wished to do so. We need not analyses his motives, or determine how much was due to policy, how much to a desire to aggrandize his family. Nepotism has a deservedly hateful name; but by no other means could a Pope accomplish his object. The Romagna must be won by one who had his heart in the work, and by one whom the Pope could entirely trust. Pius II had not done much with Antonio Piccolomini; Sixtus IV had only raised Girolamo Riario to a small position; the Cibo family had been altogether without resources. Alexander VI felt that he and Cesare were made of other stuff, and that the times were in his favor. There was nothing exceptional in his undertaking; he only pursued his end more entirely, more resolutely, and more successfully than his predecessors. The end and the means alike had become a recognized part of the papal policy; only when, in the hands of Alexander VI and Cesare Borgia, they seemed likely to be accomplished, did they awaken universal terror. Italy quailed at the prospect of a powerful state in the centre, which was backed by the far-reaching influence of the Papacy, and could thereby command foreign allies at any emergency. Churchmen were terrified at the danger of the Papacy being made
dependent on a powerful Duke of the Romagna. The fruitful and sturdy stock of the Borgia swarmed in Rome, and the Papacy might become hereditary in the Borgian family. Few were far-sighted enough to see at first the full meaning of Alexander VI's policy; but all were made uneasy, and every step in the development of that policy revealed its bearing more clearly and produced deeper-seated alarm and hatred.

So soon as the French success in Milan was rendered probable, Alexander VI proceeded to pave the way for his plans. He sent Cardinal Borgia as his legate to Florence and Venice, to see if they would consent to an attack on the duchy of Ferrara. Both gave guarded answers in the negative. The Pope saw that he had nothing to expect from the Italian powers, and proceeded to act more cautiously with the aid of France. After the fall of Ludovico Sforza, neither Florence nor Venice could object to the expulsion of his relatives from their possessions in the Romagna, where Cesena was the sole town which remained in the hands of the Church. Taking that as a centre, Cesare might extend his dominion over Imola, Forli, and Pesaro. The better to disarm opposition he accepted the title of Viceregent of the French king, and was supplied with French troops for his enterprise.

Little was as yet known of the character or capacity of Cesare Borgia. As a Cardinal he had led a tolerably profligate life; but that was no rare occurrence amongst the members of the Sacred College. His journey to France showed a pretentiousness which was somewhat wanting in taste; but Cardinal Rovere wrote to the Pope in January that his “modesty, prudence, dexterity, and excellence both of mind and body, had won the affections of all”. In Milan, so good an observer as Bernardo Castiglione, the author of II Cortegiano, described him as a gallant youth. It was yet to be seen what capacities he had for the political task which lay before him.

The first cities singled out for attack were Imola and Forli, which were held by Caterina Sforza, widow of Girolamo Riario, as regent for her young son. So entirely was Cardinal Rovere on the side of the Pope, that he became bond for Cesare to the city of Milan for a loan of 45,000 ducats; and this was to help Cesare to overthrow the son of his own cousin, for whom his uncle Sixtus IV had made such sacrifices. In addition to his Italian troops, Cesare had 300 French lances and 4000 Gascons and Swiss. Imola at once opened its gates, and the town of Forli surrendered; but Caterina Sforza bravely held out in the fortress till it was no longer tenable, and was stormed on January 12, 1500. Caterina Sforza was made prisoner, but was treated with leniency. She was sent to Rome, where she was lodged at first in the Belvedere of the Vatican. She refused to resign her claims to the lands of which she had been dispossessed, and attempted to escape. This led to her more rigorous confinement; but after eighteen months’ imprisonment she was set at liberty, and ended her days in a monastery in Florence. She had married as her second husband Giovanni de’ Medici, of the younger branch of that family, but became in 1498 a second time a widow. By her second husband she left a son, Giovanni de’ Medici, known as Giovanni delle Bande Nere, who was famous in later Florentine history.

Cesare’s joy at the capture of Forli was dashed by the news of the death of his cousin, Cardinal Borgia, on January 16. He was on his way to Rome and had reached Urbino, when he was attacked by a fever. His fever seemed to be mending, but when he heard the news of the fall of Forli he mounted his horse to go and congratulate Cesare in person. He reached Fossombrone, where he had a serious relapse of his fever and died. Suspicions were so rife that there were rumors of foul play, and in later times it was said
that Cesare had him poisoned because he feared his influence with the Pope. This also is one of the groundless rumors which were spread against the Borgia.

After his success at Forli Cesare prepared to set out against Pesaro; but his plans were overthrown by Return of a sudden change in the affairs of Milan. As usual the French could conquer but could not govern, and their arrogance disgusted their new subjects, who found that they had exchanged one tyranny for another that was less tolerable. Ludovico Sforza hired a body of Swiss mercenaries and advanced into his old dominions, where his arrival was greeted with joy by the fickle people. His duchy had been quickly lost and was as quickly won; in February he and Ascanio again entered Milan in triumph.

At the news of the advance of Ludovico the French troops were withdrawn from Cesare’s army, and he was left with only a small force. He vainly asked for help from the Venetians, who were not sorry to see the Pope’s ambitious schemes so rapidly checked. Cesare was driven to abandon all hopes of further conquest for the present, and on February 26 he returned to Rome, where the Pope ordered all the Cardinals to greet him with a triumphal entry. Clad in black velvet with a gold chain round his neck, and attended by 200 squires leading horses caparisoned in black velvet, amidst the blare of trumpets he rode to the Vatican, where the Pope received him with joy. Cesare addressed his father in Spanish and was answered in the same tongue, which perplexed the bystanders and made them feel that aliens were in the midst of Italy. The Pope was so overcome with joy that he laughed and cried at once. He loaded Cesare with honors, solemnly instituted him Gonfaloniere of the Church, and conferred on him the golden rose. The festivities of the Carnival were made splendid by a representation of the triumph of Julius Caesar in the Piazza Navona. Cesare was set side by side with the mighty founder of the Roman Empire.

The year 1500 was a year of jubilee. Alexander VI in due state had struck with a silver mallet the Golden Gate of S. Peter’s, which was only opened at those times. Its exact position could not be found with certainty, and a new gate was made by Alexander VI’s orders, with sculptured lintels, so that its place might be visible even when walled up. Alexander VI, with stately appearance and dignified bearing, delighted in ceremonies. Few Popes were more ready for public appearances, or more scrupulously performed the external duties of their office. Pilgrims from every land flocked to Rome, that they might earn the indulgences granted to those who visited the tombs of the Apostles. The disturbed state of Northern Italy and the insecurity of the roads deterred many; but the crowds who came testified to the deep hold which religion still had on Christendom, and to the veneration which still existed for the Holy See. On Holy Thursday it was computed that 100,000 were assembled for the public benediction. “I rejoice”, wrote Peter Delphinus, General of the Camaldolensians, “that the Christian religion does not lack the testimony of pious minds, especially in these times of failing faith and depravity of morals. ‘I have left’, saith the Lord, ‘7000 men who have not bowed the knee to Baal’.”

Yet the pious minds that went to Rome can hardly have been much edified, apart from their religious observances, by the stories they heard or the sights they saw. The Romans, no doubt, told them many scandalous tales about the Pope and his family. Those who saw the triumphal entry of Cesare Borgia would be reminded of the temporal ambition rather than of the spiritual zeal of the Papacy, Rome itself would not strike them as a well-ordered or as a moral city. Brawls were common in the streets, and
crimes of blood were frequent. One day in May eighteen corpses swung upon a gallows on the Bridge of S. Angelo. Thirteen of them were members of a robber band which had stripped the French envoy at Viterbo on his way to Rome. But a notable criminal was a doctor of the hospital of S. Giovanni in Laterano, who used in the early morning to shoot with arrows those who passed along the empty streets, and then rob their dead bodies. He further had an understanding with the confessor of the hospital, who told him which of the sick were wealthy; he poisoned them and shared their spoils with his confederate. Sights too of secular splendor were displayed to the pilgrims’ eyes. One day there was a duel on Monte Testaccio between a Burgundian and a Frenchman; the Princess of Squillace backed one of the combatants and Cesare Borgia backed the other. Another day the Piazza of S. Peter’s was enclosed with barriers; six bulls were let loose into the ring, and Cesare Borgia gave the Romans an exhibition of Spanish fashions. Mounted on horseback he slew five with his lance, and cleft off the head of the sixth with one stroke of his sword.

The figure of Cesare Borgia now dominated Rome. He was tall, handsome, well-made, full of energy and vigour. The Borgia nature pulsed with the joy of living. Cesare delighted in enjoying himself and was ready to contribute to the enjoyment of others. Himself magnificent, he was liberal in his gifts, and the Pope vainly strove to check his extravagance. Fortune again smiled upon his plans. No sooner was Ludovico Sforza in possession of Milan than he again lost it, and this time for ever. The French troops advanced against Milan, and on April 10 Ludovico’s Swiss mercenaries betrayed him into the hands of his enemies. His brother Ascanio was taken prisoner by the Venetians. Alexander VI demanded that he should be given up to him; but the Venetians preferred to hand him over to the French king. Ludovico was imprisoned in the Castle of Loches in Berry; Ascanio at Bourges. The Pope made some show of interceding on behalf of a Cardinal; but he allowed the man who made him Pope to linger in a French prison. The fate of the Sforza brothers awakens little sympathy. Crafty, unscrupulous, unprincipled, they plunged light-heartedly into intrigues which they mistook for statesmanship. Their combinations were short-sighted; their self-confidence was overweening; their selfishness was utter. They led Italy to destruction, and were the first victims of the storm which themselves had raised.

Alexander VI rejoiced over the entire downfall of the Sforza house, which opened out the career of Cesare; but Cesare was reminded that he must make haste to secure himself, as his prospects hung upon a thread. Alexander VI’s life was uncertain. His physical constitution, though robust, was exceptional, and his life was often in peril, as he was liable to fainting fits which might at any time lead to a serious accident. In April he had a severe attack of fever which threatened his life. On June 27 he had a miraculous escape from destruction. A violent thunderstorm burst over Rome, and the wind blew down a chimney in the Vatican, which fell through the roof, wrecked the room below, and burst through the floor, sweeping amid the ruins three attendants who were killed. The mass of masonry fell into the chamber where the Pope was sitting and overwhelmed his chair. The Cardinal of Capua and a secretary who were present saved themselves by springing into the aperture of the window. When they saw the Pope’s chair covered by the ruins they cried out, “The Pope is dead”. The news spread through Rome and men took up arms expecting a riot. But when the ruin was examined the Pope was found alive. The beam immediately above his head had been clamped with iron outside the wall of the room, so that, though broken in two, it had not fallen, but had
bent over the head of the Pope so as to make a screen. He escaped with a few trifling wounds on his head and arms.

The cloud of marvel and mystery was never long lifted from the Borgia family. Scarcely had Rome done talking about the Pope's escape before another and more terrible occurrence was noised abroad. On the evening of July 15, the Duke of Biseglia, the husband of Lucrezia Borgia, was attacked by assassins on the steps of St. Peter's as he was on his way from the Vatican. The assassins fled to a troop of horsemen, who were awaiting them, and rode off through the Porta Portese. The wounded man was carried into the house of the nearest Cardinal. At first he refused medical aid and seems to have shown great suspicion of those around him. He sent word to the King of Naples that his life was not safe in Rome, and the king dispatched his own physician to attend him.

Men said in Rome that this deed was wrought by the same hand as had slain the Duke of Gandia; no doubt they meant that it was the doing of Cesare Borgia. The position of the Duke of Biseglia in the Vatican had long been unpleasant. The Pope was allied with the enemy of Naples; Milan had fallen, and the turn of Naples was to come next. Alfonso dwelt amidst the active foes of his country and his father's house; he wandered disconsolate and helpless amidst aliens. The vigor, the brilliancy, the resolute daring of Cesare must have been hateful to him, and Cesare doubtless showed him scanty consideration. Moreover, there was another cause of ill-feeling between the two men. Alexander VI had dispossessed the Gaetani of their lands, and sold Sermoneta by a fictitious sale to his daughter Lucrezia. Sermoneta was a fief of Naples, and this was the easiest way of getting it into the hands of the Borgia; but Cesare is said to have grudged Lucrezia this possession on the ground that a woman was not strong enough to hold it. As the irritation increased, Cesare suspected that Alfonso was intriguing with the Colonna, who were allied with Naples, while Alfonso found another cause for anger in the divorce which Alexander VI pronounced, on April 5, between the King of Hungary and his wife Beatrice, daughter of Ferrante II of Naples. Every one said that the divorce was due to French influence, and Alfonso bitterly complained to the Neapolitan envoy. The suspicion of an understanding between Alfonso and the Colonna was enough to arouse the wrath of the Orsini; and possibly the attempted assassination was the work of the Orsini, but probably Cesare was privy to it. At all events he was afraid of some outbreak of violence, as he issued an order prohibiting any one to wear arms between St. Peter's and the Bridge of St. Angelo.

Alfonso’s wounds slowly healed, but he did not conceal his suspicions of Cesare, nor did Cesare show him any friendliness. The state of things is sufficiently explained by the Florentine envoy, who wrote, “There are in the Vatican so many causes of grudges, both old and new, so much envy and jealousy, both on public and private grounds, that scandals will necessarily arise”. Alfonso vowed revenge, and Cesare sullenly dared him. Their undisguised hostility awakened the alarm of Lucrezia and the Princess of Squillace, who vainly tried to mediate; but Alfonso accused Cesare of attempting his murder, and Cesare accused Alfonso of secretly plotting against him. Alexander VI set a guard of sixteen trusty attendants round Alfonso's chamber to try and keep the peace. Pacific counsels were, however, unavailing. One day Alfonso, seeing from his window Cesare walking in the garden, seized a bow and shot at him. Cesare’s wrath blazed up in a moment: he ordered his men to cut the duke in pieces. His orders were promptly obeyed, and the luckless Alfonso was murdered in his room.
Alexander VI was helpless before his imperious son. He listened to his excuses and tried to make the best of them. Some of Alfonso’s servants were imprisoned and tortured to extract confessions of their master's guilt, but it does not seem that much was discovered which would bear stating. Alexander VI told the Venetian ambassador at his court that the Duke of Biseglia had tried to murder Cesare, and had paid the penalty for his rashness. He promised to send a detailed account of the results of the process which he was instituting; but no report was ever sent, and the Pope considered it best to hush the matter up. Alfonso was privately buried in S. Peter's, and nothing more was said about his death.

This terrible deed was a testimony to Cesare’s resolute and unscrupulous character. Rome felt that it had a master who would spare no one who crossed his path. Men's imagination was stirred and their fears were awakened. The numerous assassinations, which were of common occurrence in the streets of Rome, were put down to Cesare’s mysterious designs. The Pope himself entertained for his son a mixture of affection, respect and fear. The Venetian ambassador, who looked calmly on, judged that Cesare had the requisite qualities for success in Italian political life; "This duke", he said, "if he lives, will be one of the first captains of Italy".

Alexander VI did not long distress himself about the Duke of Biseglia’s death, which he regarded as an unfortunate but trivial accident. “This Pope”, says the Venetian envoy, “is seventy years old, and grows younger every day. Cares never weigh on him more than a night; he loves life; he has a joyous nature, and does what may turn out useful to himself”. Alexander VI had the buoyant temperament of one fitted for practical life; he rose above troubles; he faced things as they were, he knew his own mind and used the means that offered themselves for the accomplishment of his purposes; he was free from scruples and rapidly forgot the past. The tearful face of Lucrezia, who was genuinely attached to her late husband, annoyed him. On August 31 he sent her to Nepi that she might overcome her grief and recover her spirits. He did not like to have around him any one who was not as joyous as himself.

During all these occurrences in his own family Alexander VI had been pursuing his plans for the conquest of the Romagna. It required much negotiation to overcome the opposition of Venice to his proposal of the conquest of Rimini and Faenza; and Venice only gave way before long pressure, because it needed the Pope’s help for a crusade against the Turks, who had alarmed the Republic by the capture of Modon. Not till September 16 did Venice at last send the Pope an answer that, although it considered the time inopportune for an attack on Faenza and Rimini, it would offer no opposition. Alexander VI was overjoyed at this news, and declared that he reckoned the friendship of Venice above that of France or Spain.

Alexander VI had already declared the vicars in the Romagna deposed from their offices, on the ground that they had not paid to the Holy See the dues which they owed; in the beginning of August he further declared the vicars of Pesaro, Rimini, and Faenza to be excommunicated. Preparations for an armament were made at Rome; and amongst them was a creation of twelve Cardinals, which was made on September 28. The creation was avowedly made in the interest of Cesare Borgia, who openly visited the old Cardinals and asked them to agree to the new nominations that he might be supplied with money for his enterprise against the Romagna. Of the new Cardinals, two were of the fruitful stock of the Borgia, and four others were Spaniards. Besides them were Cesare’s brother-in-law, d’Albret, a Venetian, Marco Correr, and the Pope's secretary
and chief minister, Gian Battista Ferrari. Immediately after their creation the new Cardinals were entertained by Cesare at a banquet, where they assured him of their fidelity and proceeded to settle their accounts. Cesare obtained from their gratitude the respectable sum of 120,000 ducats. To fulfill his undertaking with Venice, Alexander VI issued Bulls for a crusade, and appointed legates to kindle the zeal of the princes of Christendom. He even said that he would go on the crusade in person if the King of France would go also, an offer which might be made without much prospect of the fulfillment of its condition. As a further sign of the good will of Venice Cesare Borgia was on October 18 enrolled as a member of the Venetian nobility. The proud Venetians can scarcely have believed Cesare to be steeped in every crime, or they would not have conferred on him this special distinction. The Florentines were amazed at their condescension. “The time will come” said they, “when the Venetians will confess the truth of the proverb, Whatever the monk gets he gets for the monastery”.

Emboldened by this mark of favour from Venice, the Duke of Valentinois left Rome in October with an army of 10,000 men, French, Spaniards, and Italians. With him were Paolo Orsini, Gian Paolo Baglioni of Perugia, and Vitellozzo Vitelli, all famous captains. Pandolfo Malatesta at Rimini, and Giovanni Sforza at Pesaro, judged resistance to be hopeless; they abandoned their possessions, and their subjects hailed Cesare’s entrance with joy. Faenza offered a more determined resistance, in which it was supported by Florence and Giovanni Bentivoglio of Bologna, both of whom trembled for their own safety. It did not capitulate till April 20, 1501. Its young lord, Astorre Manfredi, was by the terms of the capitulation free to go where he chose; but he stayed or was detained in Cesare’s camp, whence he was taken to Rome. There he was confined in the Castle of S. Angelo, and was found drowned in the Tiber with a stone round his neck, on June 9, 1502.

When Cesare was master of Faenza he suddenly demanded the surrender of Castel Bolognese, which was in the territory of Bologna, and lay between Imola and Faenza; its possession was necessary to round off the dominions which Cesare had acquired. Giovanni Bentivoglio was unprepared for war, and ceded Castel Bolognese on condition that the Pope should confirm the ancient privileges of Bologna.

Cesare was now lord of a large territory, and Alexander VI conferred upon him indefinite rights by giving him the title of Duke of the Romagna. He prepared the way for future exploits by excommunicating Giulio Cesare Varano, lord of Camerino, as another rebellious vicar of the Holy See. But the Orsini, who were with Cesare, urged him to a more important enterprise, an attack upon Florence and the restoration of Piero de' Medici. Cesare asked leave to march to Rome through the Florentine territory. Florence was in a condition of great exhaustion through its long war with Pisa; its magistrates were timorous and were afraid to refuse. Cesare raised his demands, and the Florentines at last consented to buy him off by taking him into their service for three years with a salary of 36,000 florins. Cesare was glad to make such terms, because the French king showed that he would not allow an enterprise against Florence, and Alexander VI, alarmed at Cesare’s audacity, recalled him to Rome. He marched his disorderly army through the Florentine territory to Piombino, which he failed to carry by assault. Leaving some troops to carry on the siege, he hastened along the Maremma to Rome, where he was welcomed by the Pope on June 17, as though he had conquered the lands of the infidels and not of devoted subjects of the Holy See.
Cesare found Rome the scene of new intrigues which were of the most momentous importance for the future of Italy. Louis XII, after the success of his plans in Milan, resolved to pursue the conquest of Naples. But the French advance in Italy naturally provoked the jealousy of Spain. Louis XII was not strong enough to carry out his plan if Spain offered resolute opposition; Spain was not inclined to wage a war in behalf of a king on whose dominions Ferdinand of Aragon already cast a longing eye. Matters were arranged between the two powers, and a secret treaty was entered into at Granada on November 11, 1500, in which they agreed to divide the Neapolitan dominions. Their ostensible motive for this act of robbery was the alliance which the terrified Federigo of Naples had unluckily made with the Turks. The Kings of France and Aragon, to preserve the peace of Christendom against the aggressions of the Turks, generously resolved to merge their conflicting claims on Naples and divide it between them; France was to have the northern provinces; Spain would be content with Apulia and Calabria. This infamous treaty was the first open assertion in European politics of the principles of dynastic aggrandizement. It was the first of a series of partition treaties by which peoples were handed over from one government to another as appendages to family estates.

The preparations for the French expedition against Naples were openly made; but Federigo hoped, with the help of the Colonna, to offer determined resistance on the Neapolitan frontier. He trusted that Spain would interpose on his behalf; and Gonsalvo de Cordova, who had been assisting the Venetians in a campaign against the Turks, brought the Spanish fleet to anchor off Sicily. In June the French army under D'Aubigny reached the neighbourhood of Rome. Then Alexander VI was called upon to ratify the treaty which had hitherto been kept a profound secret. On June 25 he issued a Bull deposing Federigo as a traitor to Christendom by alliance with the Turks, approving of the partition of Naples between the Kings of France and Aragon, and investing them with the lands which they proposed to take. The act of spoliation received the sanction of the head of the Church because, with a friendly power in Naples, he saw his way to reduce the Roman barons to subjection. There was, of course, a fair-sounding pretext; France and Spain, after reducing the treacherous King of Naples, were to combine against the Turks. Meanwhile the money raised for a crusade was to be spent in the conquest of Naples; there was always some trifling preliminary business to be done before Christendom could unite to expel the Infidel.

Federigo found himself abandoned and betrayed on all sides. Cesare Borgia joined the French troops; Gonsalvo de Cordova advanced into Calabria. Capua, which offered resistance, was stormed by the French and sacked with horrible barbarity, and Federigo, wishing to spare his people from further massacres, withdrew to Ischia on August 2, and surrendered to the French. Louis XII conferred on him the duchy of Anjou and a yearly pension. He died in 1504, and unlike most fallen kings, was cheered to the last by friends who were faithful to him in his adversity, amongst them the poet Sannazaro. Federigo was a kindly man of gentle disposition, who in favourable times might have pacified and reorganized the Neapolitan kingdom; but the turbulent days in which his lot was cast left no place for gentleness or good intentions. The Nemesis which pursued his house struck down as its victim the most guileless of the race. The house of Aragon had come as strangers to Naples, but rapidly became more Italian than the Italians themselves. Alfonso I rivalled Cosimo de' Medici as a patron of art and letters; Ferrante developed the crafty statesmanship which was Italy's ruin; Alfonso II displayed the
refined savagery which was the sign of Italy's moral decadence; now the gentle Federigo saw Naples sink into bondage to alien domination.

The downfall of Naples brought with it the reduction of the Colonna faction, which could not venture to stand against a Pope supported by France, and helped by their hereditary foes, the Orsini. The Colonna thought it wise to prepare for what was inevitable, and tried to make terms by committing their castles to the custody of the College of Cardinals. This Alexander VI would not allow; and the Colonna and their friends the Savelli were driven to open their castles to the papal forces. Many of their vassals came to Rome and did homage to the Pope, who on July 27 left Rome to visit his new possessions. During his absence Lucrezia Borgia was left with power to act as his deputy. It was an unheard-of thing, and shocked official decorum, that a woman should be seated in the Vatican as the Pope’s representative. Lucrezia was commissioned to open the Pope’s letters, and in case of need, to consult Cardinal Costa. One day she sought the Cardinal’s advice. He answered that the custom was for the Vice-Chancellor to gather and record the votes of the Cardinals when the College was consulted. Lucrezia, impatient at this official reserve, exclaimed impetuously, “I can write well enough myself”. “Where is your pen?” said the Cardinal with a smile. They parted in laughter.

The Pope had a reason for giving Lucrezia an air of political importance, as he was diligently pursuing a plan for her marriage with Alfonso, son of Ercole, Duke of Ferrara. In the early part of Lucrezia’s widowhood her hand had been used as a lure to the Orsini and the Colonna in turn. Now that they were no longer formidable, an alliance with Ferrara commended itself to the Pope, both as honorable to Lucrezia and as politically useful, since it secured Cesare in the Romagna, and opened up the road to Tuscany. It was true that Duke Ercole did not show himself very desirous of this connection with the Borgia, and Alfonso was strongly opposed to it. But Alexander VI made use of Louis XII to overcome their reluctance. By a combination of threats and allurements he pursued his design, and nothing is a stronger proof of his resoluteness than the way in which he drove the proud house of Este to ally themselves with his family. He sacrificed the rights of the Church to his own projects, and remitted for three generations the tribute due from Ferrara to the Apostolic See. On September 4 the news was brought to Rome that the marriage contract was concluded, and Lucrezia rode in magnificent attire to offer thanks at the Church of S. Maria del Popolo, whither she was escorted by four bishops and 300 horsemen. She gave her robe, which had never been worn before, and was worth 300 ducats, to her court-buffoon, who afterwards put it on and rode in mock procession through the streets of Rome, crying “Hurrah for the most illustrious Duchess of Ferrara! Hurrah for Pope Alexander VI!” The delight of the Pope at his daughter’s good fortune was boundless. He always showed a frank satisfaction in his own success, and made no secret of his pleasure in his family. He was naturally expansive, and called upon others to share his joy. He gave splendid entertainments at the Vatican, and looked, as a delighted spectator, on the dances in which Lucrezia’s fine figure showed to advantage. He could not refrain from calling the Ferrarese envoy to admire her: “The new duchess, you see, is not lame”.

Before Lucrezia left Rome, Alexander VI made provision for her son by the Duke of Biseglia, Rodrigo, a child of two years old, and also for another Borgia infant of dubious parentage, by name Giovanni. This Giovanni was legitimatized by the Pope in two briefs dated September 1, 1501. In the first, he is said to be the offspring of Cesare unmarried, and an unmarried woman; in the second, he is called the son of Cesare
married and an unmarried woman. Then the brief proceeds to say that the defect in legitimacy does not come “from the aforesaid duke, but from us and the aforesaid unmarried woman, which for good reasons in the previous letter we did not wish specifically to express”. It is difficult to explain these two contradictory statements; but it is clear that the Pope wished to provide, as far as he could, against all contingencies. We may either suppose that, in his desire to secure Cesare's bastard son against the possible claims of legitimate children, he executed a second instrument in his favour, and took upon himself a guilt which was not his; or we must hold that this child of three years old was the son of the Pope at the age of sixty-eight, and that Cesare consented to recognize him as his own. In either case the Pope’s conduct was scandalous enough, and showed a shamelessness of inventive skill in molding legal forms to suit his purposes. Giovanni and Rodrigo were both endowed with the possessions of the Roman barons. Rodrigo was made Duke of Sermoneta; Giovanni, Duke of Nepi and Camerino. Later times accepted Giovanni’s parentage as dubious, and called him indifferently son of Cesare or of the Pope.

When these family affairs had been arranged, Lucrezia was ready to go to her third husband. But Ercole of Ferrara was a cautious man, and demanded that the Pope should obtain from the Cardinals a ratification of his promise to remit the tribute due from the Duke of Ferrara to the Holy See. This occupied a little time; but the Cardinals at last consented. A splendid escort for Lucrezia was sent from Ferrara, and was magnificently entertained at Rome. There were banquets and balls and bull-fights; there were pageants and theatrical performances—amongst other plays the Menaechmi of Plautus was represented before the Pope and Cardinals. The labours of Hercules, the deeds of Julius Caesar, and the glory of Lucrezia gave endless scope for the adaptive ingenuity of the masters of the revels. Vast sums of money were spent on these entertainments and on the outfit of Lucrezia, who left Rome in royal splendour on January 5, 1502, carrying a dowry of 100,000 ducats from the papal treasury. Her journey to Ferrara was a triumphal progress, and Ferrara strove to vie with Rome in the magnificence of her reception. Lucrezia, who was still only twenty-two years old, was personally popular through her beauty and her affability. Her long golden hair, her sweet childish face, her pleasant expression and her graceful ways, seem to have struck all who saw her. Much as her husband disliked the notion of his marriage, he was soon won over by his wife, and Lucrezia lived a blameless life at Ferrara. However unhappy she may have been in her early days as the puppet of her father's political schemes, she found in Ferrara a peaceful home. She seems to have inherited her father's frank and joyous nature, but she was in no way remarkable. If Alexander VI hoped that she would become a political personage, he was disappointed. She showed no aptitude in that direction; but she seems to have been a good wife to Alfonso. When the power of Alexander VI and Cesare came to an end, Alfonso of Ferrara did not try to rid himself of the wife who had been forced upon him. She died in 1519, regretted by her husband, and on her deathbed wrote to Pope Leo X, begging for his benediction before she died. The evil repute of her father and brother fell upon her in later days, and in her own time the tongue of scandal associated her name with shameless charges. But from the time that she left Rome no voice was raised against her; and there are no facts proved which tend to her discredit. Romance has busied itself with her life and has converted Lucrezia Borgia into a heroine of unmentionable wickedness.

It was at this period, when the power of the Borgia was seen to be rising, and filled men's minds with terror for the future, that some of the most savage libels against the
Pope were written. At the end of 1501 there appeared in Rome a pamphlet, in the form of a letter to Silvio Savelli, one of the dispossessed barons who had been driven to flee before the papal arms. It professed to be written from the camp of Gonsalvo before Tarento, on November 15, 1501, to Silvio in Germany, and besought him to stir up the Emperor against a Pope who was a disgrace to Christendom. It is clear that it was dictated through political terror, and is a set piece of declamation gathering together every possible charge against the Pope. He is a ‘new Mahomet’ and Antichrist; he gained his seat by simony, and uses his power solely for the good of his family. The Vatican is like the jaws of hell, guarded by a second Cerberus, the Cardinal of Modena, who sells everything to gain money which the Pope spends on his own pleasures and in buying jewels for Lucrezia. The Vatican is the scene of abominable orgies, in which all sense of shame is lost. In Rome there is a reign of terror; poison and the dagger of the assassin are directed against everyone who stands in the Pope’s way. In short the document is a summary of all the charges brought against Alexander VI, and seems to have furnished the basis for the statements of contemporary historians. If such a document were accepted as literally true, history would have to be rewritten. It is, however, a valuable testimony to the hatred which Alexander VI inspired, and to the dangerous weapons which his notorious irregularities furnished to his enemies.

Alexander VI had this libel read to him; but he knew Rome too well to feel much annoyance at it. He took no steps to discover its author or to prohibit its circulation; and Silvio Savelli, in whose interest it was written, returned to Rome in safety and was admitted to the Pope’s presence. Alexander VI was willing to face the chances of war and did not object to receive his share of knocks. Cesare Borgia, however, was not so patient, and this libel roused his wrath against evil-speakers. At the end of November a man wearing a mask, who in the Borgo had inveighed against the duke, was seized by his orders and was punished by having one hand and the tip of his tongue cut off. A Venetian who had translated some scandalous document from the Greek and sent it to Venice, was seized and put to death, in spite of the remonstrances of the Venetian ambassador. The Pope deplored the vindictiveness of his son. He said to the Ferrarese ambassador: “The duke is good-hearted, but he cannot bear injuries. I have often told him that Rome is a free country, where a man may say or write what he will; that much is said against me, but that I do not interfere. He answered: If Rome is accustomed to write and speak slanders, well and good; but I will teach them to repent. For my own part I have always been forgiving—witness the Cardinals who plotted against me when Charles VIII invaded Italy. I might have rid myself many times of Ascanio Sforza and Giuliano della Rovere, but I have not done so”. Alexander V. spoke truly; he was not revengeful nor did he bear ill-will. He was determined to go his own way, but he did not conceal from himself that his course was sure to awake violent opposition. He only struck at those who were dangerous; if they would withdraw their opposition he was ready to receive them back into his favor. He regarded it as only natural that envy should attend upon success.

The outspoken unscrupulousness of Alexander VI and Cesare Borgia made them, even during their life-time, the objects of exceptional reprobation. Other statesmen might be criminal, but their criminality was not so openly recognized or commented upon. Whether men be right or wrong, they thought that Alexander VI would hesitate at nothing. Two private letters written to Machiavelli by a friend in Rome express with cynical frankness the moral depravity of Roman society under a Pope whom every one regarded with dread. “His mind”, says the writer in 1501, “longs to play the part of
Sulla and enjoy proscriptions; he takes one man’s goods, another man's life, a third he
drives into exile, a fourth he condemns to the galleys, a fifth he deprives of his house
and puts therein some Spanish heretic; and all this for no reason or a slight one”. Men
certainly thought that Alexander VI poisoned his Cardinals when he was in want of
money, and almost every death of any member of the College was attributed to this
cause. Thus Machiavelli's correspondent speaks of the death of Cardinal Lopez, and
continues: “If you wish to know by what kind of death he died, it is commonly reputed
to be by poison, since the great Gonfaloniere (Cesare) was unfriendly to him, so that
such deaths are frequently heard of in Rome”. Such assertions can neither be proved nor
disproved: it is bad enough that the Pope’s conduct did not make them incredible. Men
saw the Pope greedily seizing on the goods of dying Cardinals, without any attempt to
conceal his pressing need of money and his readiness to receive it from every source.
They can hardly be blamed for not stopping to reflect that even Cardinals must die, and
that the number who died during Alexander's pontificate was not beyond the average.

The insatiable avidity of the Pope and Cesare, the pains they took to gain
information and devise new projects, and their astonishing good fortune, all combined
to fill men with a sense of helplessness as well as dread. Cesare’s troops disturbed the
peace of Rome, and Cesare’s mysterious habits of secrecy and silence threw an air of
To say nothing of domestic tragedies, never was sedition and bloodshed more rife in the
States of the Church; never were bandits more numerous; never was their more
wickedness in the city; never did informers and assassins more abound. Not in their
houses, in their chambers, or in their towers were men safe. Law of man and God alike
was set at naught. Gold, violence, and lust bore undisputed sway”. It would seem that
during the last two years of Alexander VI's pontificate Rome was filled with uneasy
suspicion. Everything was possible when so much was unintelligible; all sense of
security had gone, and men trembled at the thought of future horrors.

In the early part of 1502 Alexander VI and Cesare were watching their opportunity.
On February 17 the Pope Set out by sea to inspect the fortifications which Leonardo da
Vinci was erecting for Cesare at Piombino. Six galleys were manned by sailors pressed
for the Pope's service. At Piombino Alexander VI was entertained by dances of maidens
in the market-place, and it was observed that he and the Cardinals ate meat though it
was the season of Lent. On his return to Rome he had a stormy voyage. Though the
wind was contrary the Pope refused to put back, till at length the sailors were compelled
to try and make for Corneto, but found it impossible to gain the harbor. All were panic-
stricken save the Pope, who sat in the stern, and when a heavy sea washed over the ship
exclaimed "Jesus", and crossed himself. His peril did not destroy his appetite and he
asked for dinner; but was told that the winds and the waves together made it impossible
to kindle a fire. At last there was a slight lull, and it was possible to cook a few fishes.
As the wind fell the ship reached Porto d'Ercole in safety, and on March 11 Alexander
VI returned to Rome. There he set to work to strengthen the Castle of S. Angelo, which
he supplied with artillery at the expense of the Colonna. He heard that several guns had
been buried at Frascati, whither he went to explore. He compelled by torture some
peasants to discover the hiding-places, and brought the guns to Rome. He also bought
for 13,000 ducats the artillery of the dispossessed King of Naples. By this means he was
well supplied with means of defence, which he acquired at a cheap rate.

Meanwhile the position of affairs in Italy seemed to open out a fresh prospect for
the ambitious plans of Cesare Borgia. France and Spain began to quarrel about the
boundaries of their respective shares of the Neapolitan kingdom; war between the two powers was imminent, and each of them was anxious to have the Pope as an ally. Louis XII was preparing for an expedition against Naples, and Alexander VI knew that he might count upon his complaisance in the affairs of Central Italy. Venice was still engaged in war against the Turks, and adopted an attitude of watchful neutrality. It was important for Cesare to seize this moment of suspense and make the most of it. Rome was quiet; the barons of the Campagna were reduced; the greater part of the Romagna was in Cesare’s hands; Ferrara was his ally; Piombino afforded him a means of attacking Florence and Pisa. With these advantages much might be done.

Alexander VI could supply Cesare with money; but for troops he was largely dependent on condottieri generals. Chief amongst them were the Orsini, who hoped by Cesare's help to restore the Medici to Florence; and Vitellozzo Vitelli, who burned to revenge on the Florentines the death of his brother Paolo, who had been executed on the charge of treachery in his conduct of the war against Pisa. Another was Oliverotto Eufreducci, who, after serving under Vitellozzo, determined to increase his importance. Accordingly he returned in January, 1502, to his native town of Fermo, which was ruled by his uncle Giovanni Fogliani. One day he invited Giovanni and the chief citizens to dinner, and afterwards, saying that he wished to speak with them privately about the Pope and Cesare, withdrew with them to another room, where he had posted soldiers who sprang out and killed them all. Oliverotto mounted his horse and slaughtered all his uncle's friends in Fermo; then he sent word to the Pope that he held Fermo as Vicar of the Church.

Such instruments were necessary, but they were undoubtedly dangerous. They had, however, one useful quality, that they could be disavowed in case of need. Accordingly Vitellozzo Vitelli was allowed to encourage Arezzo to rebel against Florence, while Cesare in Rome was gathering troops, ostensibly for his long threatened expedition against Camerino. Arezzo rebelled on June 4, and Vitellozzo hastened thither with his forces. Alexander VI expressed his regret at this invasion of the Florentine territory, which was under the protection of the French king, and asserted that neither he nor Cesare was privy to it; but no one believed him.

Soon news was brought to Rome that Pisa had raised the banner of the Duke of the Romagna, and elected him her lord. Though Alexander VI declared that Cesare could not accept such an offer, still Florence felt herself attacked on two sides at once, and was thrown into great alarm. On June 12 Cesare left Rome with 700 horsemen and 6000 infantry, to go against Camerino. He advanced to Spoleto, then to Cagli in the dominions of Guidubaldo, Duke of Urbino. Suddenly the town was seized in Cesare’s name, and the unsuspecting Guidubaldo received the news just in time to flee before Cesare advanced to Urbino, which opened its gates to him on June 21. Cesare wrote to the Pope, saying that he was driven to this sudden action by the discovery that Guidubaldo was conspiring with the lord of Camerino, had sent him supplies, and was prepared to seize his artillery on its passage by Gubbio. It is not improbable that Guidubaldo was only half-hearted in his promises to help Cesare against Camerino, and that he did not relish the fall of so many of his neighbours before Cesare’s arms; but it is tolerably certain that Cesare intended this surprise of Urbino before he left Rome, and that Alexander VI expected the news.

Cesare treated his new conquest gently, and made few alterations in its government. While he stayed at Urbino he was revolting in his mind a scheme for rendering his
position more independent. This was only possible by securing an Italian alliance which would enable him to dispense with the support of the French king; and if this alliance could be gained by the sacrifice of his condottieri generals he would be free from another source of embarrassment. He had used the condottieri to terrify Florence, and Florence was the ally of France; if he could draw Florence into a close alliance with himself by sacrificing his condottieri, he might be in a position to hold the balance between France and Spain.

Accordingly Cesare demanded that Florence should send an envoy to Urbino; and Florence, which was sunk in deep despondency, sent the Bishop of Volterra, with Niccolò Machiavelli as his secretary. To him Cesare offered the alternative of close friendship or decided hostility; he was willing to serve Florence, to renew his old connection with her as her general, and to rid her of her assailants. “I am not here to play the tyrant”, he said, “but to extinguish tyrants”. He thus made an offer, the meaning of which was afterwards understood, that he would rid Florence of the Orsini and Vitellozzo. In return he demanded that Florence should establish a stable government, favorable to himself, that he might know with whom he had to do. The Bishop of Volterra was impressed by the sincerity with which he spoke, and Machiavelli admired a man who knew his own mind and successfully pursued his course. “This lord”, he wrote, “is splendid and magnificent, and is so bold that there is no enterprise so great that it does not seem to him small. To gain glory and win dominions he robs himself of repose and knows neither fatigue nor danger. He comes to a place before his intentions are understood. He makes himself well liked amongst his soldiers, and has chosen the best men in Italy. These things make him victorious and formidable, with the aid of perpetual good fortune”.

The Florentines may be pardoned for hesitating to enter into an alliance with so dubious a person as Cesare. The people were strongly opposed to it. “We did not fear the King of France”, they said, “with 30,000 soldiers; shall we fear a few ragamuffins led by the unfrocked bastard of a priest?”. The envoys were bidden to temporize, for news was brought that Louis XII was advancing into Northern Italy. Cesare saw at once what was the object of the Florentines. “I am no merchant”, he said to Soderini, “and I came prepared for frank dealing. You answer me with words, and I can see that you wish to beguile me. You trust in the French king; you forget that he cannot be always in Italy. You will find that he will help me. One day you will be sorry that you tried to abuse my goodness and simplicity”.

The sudden arrival of Louis XII at Asti caused a cessation of further scheming till the king’s intentions were known. Cesare made sure of Camerino, which fell before his troops on July 20. Louis XII sent some troops to aid the Florentines, and Cesare ordered the reluctant Vitellozzo to quit Arezzo and Città di Castello, which were again occupied in the name of Florence. Louis XII had come into Italy at an unfortunate time for Cesare, whose enemies flocked with complaints to the French king. The Florentines told their grievances; the dispossessed lords of Urbino and Camerino carried their tale of woe to Milan; Cardinal Orsini went to remind the king of the services rendered by his house to France, and of the losses it had consequently endured. There was a general hope that Louis XII would direct his arms against Cesare, and so restore Italian peace. But the Pope was busy in his negotiations with the French king, and Cesare offered to accompany him with 2500 men in an expedition against the Spaniards in Naples. They excused themselves of any privity to Vitellozzo’s attempt on the Florentine territory, and though Alexander VI expressed his wish to punish Gian Giordano Orsini and
Giovanni Bentivoglio of Bologna, he submitted himself to the pleasure of the French king. The Pope's diplomatic activity was incessant. Cesare judged it better to take the matter into his own hands; leaving Urbino he journeyed with a few attendants to Milan, and was honorably received by Louis XII on August 5.

Thus Cesare went to arrange matters with France, while Alexander VI made fair promises to the Spanish ambassadors. Their diplomacy was successful. In return for Cesare’s promises of help against Naples Louis XII. allowed him to proceed against Giovanni Bentivoglio of Bologna, and work his will on the Orsini, the Baglioni, and the Vitelli. Cesare stayed with Louis XII till September 2, when he returned to Asti; then he set off for Imola to prepare his attack on Bologna. But suddenly the terror which his schemes inspired found an expression, and Giovanni Bentivoglio succeeded in convincing his neighbors of their own danger. Cardinal Orsini had learned in Milan something of the plan for the destruction of his house. Vitellozzo and the Baglioni were indignant with Cesare for disavowing them in their attempt on Arezzo; he had cleared himself before Louis XII at their expense. Cesare’s government in the Romagna, which was creditable to his desire for order and justice, alarmed those who profited by lawlessness. A formidable league was formed against Cesare, and the confederates met at the Castle of Mugione on Lake Trasimene. Thither went Cardinal Orsini, Paolo and Franciotto Orsini, Francesco Orsini Duke of Gravina, Oliverotto of Fermo, Vitellozzo, Gian Paolo Baglioni, with representatives of Guidubaldo of Urbino, Petrucci and Bentivoglio. They swore to be true to one another; they discussed schemes for warring against Cesare; they arranged for common deliberation about their common affairs. This confederacy against Cesare soon brought him into difficulties. There was a rising in Urbino in favour of the old duke, and a body of Cesare’s forces was defeated by the rebels; Urbino was lost, and the lords who had been driven from the Romagna were all preparing to return. The schemes of Alexander VI and the labours of Cesare seemed likely to be destroyed in a moment.

In this emergency the Pope and Cesare exerted all their powers. Cesare’s first need was soldiers; his forces had been sorely diminished by the defection of his condottieri, and he made haste to reinforce them. For this purpose Alexander VI supplied him with money. He had had a stroke of good luck by the death of the wealthy Cardinal of Modena on July 20, to the great rejoicing of the Curia. Gian Battista Ferrari had been the Pope’s chief agent in matters of business, and had been created Cardinal in 1500 in recognition of his services in many matters of confidence. His death was attributed to poison, administered by his secretary, Sebastian Pinzone, who was believed to have acted as the Pope's executioner. Burchard, however, gives a circumstantial account of Cardinal Ferrari’s illness, which does not bear out that supposition. He was taken ill on July 3, of a fever, and refused to use the remedies which his physicians ordered; after five days' illness he prescribed for himself a diet of bread sopped in wine. His fever abated for a time and then returned with renewed violence; many physicians visited him, but he refused their medicine. In his delirium his mind was full of his business, and he complained of someone who had cheated him of ten ducats. The rumor of the Pope’s complicity in his death probably arose from the unseemly way in which, after a last visit to the dying man, he ordered an inventory to be taken of all his goods. The moment he was dead the Pope seized his possessions, which amounted to 50,000 ducats, and at once distributed his benefices. The bishopric of Modena was given to the Cardinal’s brother, and several of his smaller benefices to his secretary Pinzone. Perhaps the Pope wished to recompense them for the loss of legacies which they might have expected had
Ferrari made a will. However, the guilt of Pinzone and the Pope’s complicity were generally believed, so much so that Pinzone was called to account under Julius II in 1504. Perhaps Julius II was not sorry to use Pinzone’s unpopularity as a means of striking a blow at one of the creatures of Alexander VI and emphasizing his dissent from the actions of his predecessor. It can hardly be taken as an avowal of guilt that Pinzone did not submit himself to trial, but preferred to be deprived of his offices for contumacy.

It was not through any love for Cardinal Ferrari that so much attention was given to his death, for seldom was a man so universally hated. He was a hard man of business and added personal rudeness to his extortionate practices. A shower of epigrams followed him to his grave, the mildest of which gives a brief account of him: “Earth has his body, the Pope his goods, the Styx his soul”. His unquiet spirit is represented as calling on the passer-by: “Say not. Light lie the earth, nor scatter flowers: if you would give me rest, chink money on my tomb”.

The money of Cardinal Ferrari enabled Cesare to raise forces, and he was soon at the head of an army of 6000 men. But he did not seek to meet the confederates in the field; he looked for allies, and strove to separate his enemies. Alexander VI proposed to the Venetian envoy a close alliance with Venice. “Though we are Spanish by birth”, he said, “and though we sometimes show ourselves French in policy, we still are Italians. Our seat is in Italy; here we have to live, as also our duke”. On the other hand Venice was invited by Spain to unite in freeing Italy from the Borgia, “a disease which infects it all”. “God”, said the Spanish envoy, “has given you an opportunity which should not be lost”. Venice, however, true to its cautious policy, preserved a neutral attitude, and gave general answers to the Pope and Spain alike. Louis XII held to his alliance with the Pope, sent troops to Cesare, and expressed his anger against the rebel lords. Cesare pursued his request for an alliance with Florence, which in September had assumed a more stable government by electing Piero Soderini as Gonfaloniere for life; but the Florentine people distrusted Cesare, and Soderini thought it best to temporise. For this purpose he sent as envoy the secretary Niccolò Machiavelli, a man of no great distinction, but one whose acuteness might be trusted; and in the conduct of this negotiation with Cesare Machiavelli first showed his marvelous powers of political observation.

Cesare got no help save from France; but that was enough to prevent all Italy from turning against him and gave him time to manage the confederate lords. He and Alexander VI used all their adroitness to face the emergency; they well understood another and acted in admirable concert. Both were cool and resolute, and they soon showed themselves more than a match for their foes. The confederate lords were bold enough when they were together; but they had no leader, and each was seeking only his own interest. They were afraid of the power of France, and had no confidence in themselves. Cesare showed no signs of alarm; Alexander VI assured the Orsini of his good will towards them. Negotiations were carried on both by Cesare and the Pope with various members of the confederacy. The aged Paolo Orsini was soon won over by Cesare’s promises, and undertook the office of negotiator; Cardinal Orsini confided in the Pope’s fair speeches, though even children warned him of his folly. He smiled in the consciousness of superior wisdom, and said that all his differences with the Pope had only ended to his own advantage. On October 28 an accord was drawn up by which peace was restored between Cesare and the confederates. Urbino and Camerino were to be restored to Cesare, who undertook to protect the confederates against all enemies,
save the Pope and the King of France; the differences between the Pope and Giovanni Bentivoglio were referred to the arbitration of Cesare, Cardinal Orsini, and Pandolfo Petrucci. Paolo Orsini had some difficulty in persuading his allies to accept these terms; Vitellozzo especially demurred. It was indeed disgraceful to them that they abandoned Guidubaldo of Urbino, and left Giovanni Bentivoglio to the uncertainty of a commission. But Paolo Orsini was deaf to remonstrances; he carried his point and persuaded the rebels to accept the peace. Cardinal Orsini was so infatuated as to return to Rome and boast before the Pope of his services in saving Cesare from ruin.

Bystanders saw that the agreement was hollow, and that there was no real confidence on either side. The Pope called the confederates a “sorry company” to the Florentine envoy. “See”, he said, “how they accuse themselves of treason”. Machiavelli in the court of Cesare heard the duke’s secretary mutter about Vitellozzo: “This traitor has given us a blow with a dagger and hopes to heal it with words”. Alexander VI and Cesare quietly strengthened themselves and took advantage of the perfidy of the confederates. Giovanni Bentivoglio, who had been abandoned by his allies, entered into negotiations with the Pope, who agreed to confirm the privileges of Bologna, and leave Giovanni in possession of the city in return for troops for the service of Cesare. This agreement so irritated Cardinal Orsini that he reproached the Bolognese envoy in the Pope’s presence, and angry words passed between them. Alexander VI saw with amusement that he had succeeded in sowing discord between his opponents.

Cesare, meanwhile, showed no great haste to recover his lost possessions. Guidubaldo again fled from Urbino, but many of the castles of the duchy were still held by the troops of the Orsini. On December 10 Cesare marched from Imola to Cesena, prepared for some important expedition, and it was soon rumored that he intended to attack Sinigaglia, which since the days of Sixtus IV had been held by Giovanni della Rovere, Prefect of Rome. Giovanni married the sister of Guidubaldo of Urbino; and on his death, in 1501, his son was heir to the possessions of the Montefeltro. The boy and his mother were now in the castle of Sinigaglia, and despite the entreaties of Cardinal Rovere, Alexander VI resolved that Sinigaglia also should go to Cesare. The last of the family of Sixtus IV was to be sacrificed to the political emergencies of his successor.

Yet Cesare seemed slow in his movements, and tarried at Cesena to the growing impatience of the Pope. Alexander VI was eager for news; he could not contain his wrath at Cesare’s inactivity, and vented his anger in no measured terms. Cesare at Cesena weakened his forces by dismissing his French auxiliaries, to the amazement of all, so that there were rumors of a breach between him and the French king. At the same time he showed signs of a change of policy in his rule of the Romagna. His governor, a Spaniard, Don Ramiro de Lorqua, who had made himself feared by his severity, was suddenly committed to prison, and two days afterwards was beheaded in the Piazza of Cesena. No one knew the exact reason; some said that Cesare owed him a private grudge, others that he was suspected of intriguing with the rebels against the duke. Machiavelli contents himself with remarking, “So it pleased the prince, who shows that he can make and unmake men at his will according to their deserts”. Whatever Cesare’s motive may have been, the deed itself was acceptable to the condottieri generals, who saw themselves rid of a man whose severity they dreaded, and about whom they complained to Cesare. The execution of Don Ramiro was most probably ordered because it would be popular both with the people of the Romagna and with the condottieri.
While Cesare tarried at Cesena, his repentant generals showed their good will by attacking Sinigaglia. The town surrendered at once; but the castle held out, and its governor refused to give it up to any one save the duke in person. Cesare sent word that he was coming and would confer with the condottieri generals about future enterprises. There were at Sinigaglia, Oliverotto of Fermo, Paolo Orsini, the Duke of Gravina, and Vitellozzo Vitelli, each of whom had schemes of his own which he hoped to further. Preparations were made for Cesare's coming. Oliverotto's troops were quartered in Sinigaglia; those of the other generals were sent to some little distance to make room for Cesare's men. On December 31 Cesare advanced from Fano and was met outside Sinigaglia by Paolo Orsini, the Duke of Gravina and Vitellozzo. He showed great pleasure at meeting them, shook hands warmly and embraced them on the cheek. Not seeing Oliverotto with them, he gave a significant glance to his captain, Don Michele, who rode off into the town. There he found Oliverotto amongst his troops, and carelessly said that it was a pity to keep the men under arms, as their lodgings might be occupied by Cesare's troops through mistake; it would be better to go and meet the duke. Oliverotto accordingly went forward, and was greeted with every sign of affection. When they reached the palace where Cesare was to stay, the four generals prepared to take leave of him; but Cesare invited them to enter, as he had something to say. As soon as they were inside they were seized and made prisoners by the gentlemen of the guard. Then Cesare's troops were sent to disarm and disband the forces of Oliverotto in Sinigaglia, and those of the other generals in the neighboring castles. As they were entirely unsuspicious, this was easily accomplished; the victors on their return to Sinigaglia proceeded to sack the town, and were with difficulty checked by Cesare.

Cesare sent for Machiavelli and received him with the “best cheer in the world”. He reminded him that he had given him previous hints of his intentions, but added, “I did not tell you all”. He used the moment of his triumph to urge again on Machiavelli his desire for a firm alliance with Florence: he had undone the most powerful enemies of himself, the French king, and Florence, and expected the gratitude of Florence for having uprooted these tares in the garden of Italy. Cesare showed scant mercy to his captives. That same night Oliverotto and Vitellozzo were strangled, and both died abjectly. Oliverotto with tears accused Vitellozzo of being the instigator of his rebellion against the duke; Vitellozzo besought Cesare to beg the Pope to grant him a plenary indulgence for his sins.

The two Orsini captives were spared till Cesare learned how the Pope had sped in his part of the business. Alexander VI’s eagerness for news from Cesare was natural since he knew how large was the interest at stake. On January 1, 1503, he heard the news of the fall of Sinigaglia, and said significantly: “The duke’s nature is not to pardon injuries or leave vengeance to others. He has sworn to slay Oliverotto with his own hands if he can lay hold of him”. On the night of January 2 a messenger arrived from Cesare, and the Pope summoned armed men to the Vatican. He was resolved to strike a blow at the Orsini; and so terrified was the secretary, who had read Cesare’s letter, that he did not leave the Pope’s presence all night, lest, if the scheme failed, he should be suspected of giving information. Next morning Cardinal Orsini was summoned to the Vatican. He came without suspicion of evil, as he was on the best terms with the Pope, and two days before had celebrated Mass in his presence. When he alighted from his mule, it was taken to the Pope’s stable. When he entered the Pope’s chamber he found it full of armed men; he and several of his followers were at once arrested and imprisoned. Rome was filled with confusion at this news; but there was no leader and
nothing was done. Next day, the Pope summoned the ambassadors in Rome to give them an account of what had happened. He said that Don Ramiro de Lorqua, before his execution, had confessed to Cesare a conspiracy of Vitellozzo and Oliverotto against his life; they intended to have him shot on the march to Sinigaglia; to provide for his own safety Cesare imprisoned them; they confessed their guilt and had been put to death; their accomplices were still in prison, and as the Cardinal Orsini was suspected he had been imprisoned likewise. It was a plausible tale, but the Venetian envoy remarks: “As he told me this he seemed to be conscious himself that it was a fiction, but he went on coloring it as best he could”.

The Pope proceeded rapidly with his measures against the Orsini. The Cardinal’s palace was dismantled, and all his goods were seized by the Pope; his luckless mother, at the age of eighty, was turned into the streets, and begged in vain for shelter, as everyone was afraid to receive so dangerous a guest. The Prince of Squillace was sent with troops to seize the Orsini castles in the neighborhood, and they were all surrendered in terror. The Cardinals went to the Pope to plead the cause of their imprisoned colleague; the Pope only multiplied his accusations against Cardinal Orsini, and declared that he should have full justice. Other prelates of the Orsini faction were imprisoned likewise. There was a general panic in Rome, and many of the wealthiest men thought it wise to flee at once. The Pope was triumphant, and boastfully said: “What has been done is nothing to what will be done soon”. The Cardinals were terrified, especially those who had ever opposed the Pope. When the Pope spoke with unwonted kindness to Cardinal Medici every one regarded him as a doomed man. So great was the terror that Cardinal Piccolomini besought the Venetian envoy to advise his Republic to interpose and stay the general ruin.

It is amazing that this treacherous deed should have awakened no remonstrances, and should have been completely successful; but in the artificial politics of Italy everything depended on the skill of the players in the game. The condottieri represented only themselves, and when they were removed by any means, however treacherous, nothing remained. There was no party, no interest which was outraged by the fall of the Orsini and Vitellozzo. The armies of the condottieri were formidable so long as they followed their generals; when the generals were removed, the soldiers dispersed and entered into other engagements. Every one breathed more freely when Vitellozzo and the rest were out of the way. Florence and Venice, as well as Cesare and the Pope, were rid of troublesome neighbors and were glad of their destruction. The question of the means employed in their overthrow was quite of secondary importance. Most men admired Cesare’s consummate coolness in the matter; many had foreseen that he could never really forgive the rebels. Their fate awakened no sympathy; they deserved no mercy, for they were stained with every crime. Cesare crushed them as he would have crushed a noxious insect and did not think that any excuse was needed for the way in which he got them into his power. No outrage was done to current morality. Italy was in a state of transition in which it had lost old principles of conduct and was groping after new ones. Old political landmarks had disappeared; old states had vanished; everything was at hazard, and no one could even dimly foresee the future. Most men in Italy accepted as sufficient Cesare’s remark to Machiavelli: “It is well to beguile those who have shown themselves masters of treachery”. Cesare’s conduct was judged by its success, and that was sufficiently brilliant; but more than his ability Machiavelli admired his good fortune. The downfall of the Orsini was an immense step towards securing the permanence of Cesare’s power in the future. Now that the Colonna and the
Orsini were both crushed, a new Pope would not be under the influence of either of the old Roman factions, and Cesare might look forward to commanding the support of the Papacy even after his father's death.
CHAPTER XI
DEATH OF ALEXANDER VI.
1503

The immediate result of the massacre of Sinigaglia was to bring new territories to obedience to the Church. Città di Castello and Perugia at once submitted to Cesare, who next turned his arms against Siena. On January 18 Paolo Orsini and the Duke of Gravina were put to death, and Alexander VI, eager to complete the destruction of the Orsini family, summoned Cesare to reduce the castles which were too strong for the arms of the Prince of Squillace. But Cesare did not entirely show his father's eagerness; he needed friends near Rome to help him in the event of the Pope's death, and was willing to trust to the gratitude of those whom he spared. The chiefs of the Orsini were Giovanni Giordano, lord of Bracciano, who was serving in Naples under the French king, and the Count of Pitigliano, who was in the pay of Venice. They and their friends prepared for resistance, and Cesare thought it best to leave them alone; he contented himself with besieging Ceri. Alexander VI was impatient at the slow progress of the siege; “I wish to root out this house” he exclaimed; and for his own part he pursued his object steadfastly. On February 22 the Cardinal Orsini died in his prison, and the story of his last days is ghastly. His luckless mother did all she could to keep him alive; she paid the Pope 2000 ducats for the privilege of sending him a daily supply of food. She even sent a mistress of the Cardinal to present the Pope with a costly pearl which he had envied. The Pope received it graciously, and renewed his permission to send food to the Cardinal; but men believed that he had already drunk a draught of deadly wine mixed by the Pope's orders. After his death Alexander VI was anxious to show that he died from natural causes; but his fate had been so long foreseen that no one was curious to know how it was brought about.

At the end of February Cesare came to Rome, but went about masked and gave no public sign of his presence. He was always given to mystery, and envoys found it hard to approach him unless he wished to see them. He sat up late at night, slept during the day, and was careless of conventional formalities. It was clear that he did not agree with the Pope's desire to root out the Orsini, and was in favor of sparing Gian Giordano at the request of the French king. The Pope threatened to excommunicate him if he did not reduce Bracciano, and on March 14 Cesare unwillingly set out to the siege of Ceri, which surrendered on April 5. Giulio Orsini returned to Rome with Cesare and was well received by the Pope. He was sent to negotiate with Gian Giordano for the surrender of his possession; this was provisionally accomplished, and the Pope was now master of the Patrimony.

On April 11 Rome was startled by the news of the death of Cardinal Michiel, the nephew of Pope Paul II. There were strong suspicions of poisoning, which was very probable from the symptoms of the case. His death brought the Pope 150,000 ducats, and men did not hesitate to say that he had fallen a victim to the Pope's desire for money. However unwilling we may be to accuse a Pope of poisoning, there can be no doubt of the prevalence of the belief amongst Alexander VI's contemporaries; and the
deaths of Cardinals Orsini and Michiel were accompanied by such suspicious circumstances that we cannot dismiss the belief as entirely groundless in their cases.

On the fall of the Orsini, Alexander VI could look round with triumph on the work which he had accomplished. He had inherited a troubled and precarious seat; by his prudence and energy, Rome had been reduced to submission; the Papal States had been rescued from petty tyrants; the rival factions who disturbed the Papacy in Rome had been annihilated. But all this only offered to Alexander VI the opportunity for a new departure. Cesare had done much; but more might still be done. It was true that he had well-nigh accomplished all that was possible in the existing condition of Italian affairs; if his dominions were to be extended it must be in Tuscany, and there the French king forbade his advance. The advantages to be gained by the French alliance were nearly exhausted; but new combinations were possible, which might open up new fields for adventure. Cesare had expressed his wish for an alliance with Florence; Alexander VI urged repeatedly on Venice a proposal for a close alliance which might enable them to interfere in the affairs of Naples. The Venetian envoy Giustinian tells us of a characteristic interview with Alexander VI on April 11. The Pope pleaded the need of uniting ‘this poor Italy’; Giustinian answered that it would be well to unite not only Italy but all Christendom against the Turk. This was far beyond the sphere of Alexander VI’s political calculations; he laughed, and answered: “You are talking nonsense Considerations of the good of Christendom as a whole, had since the days of Sixtus IV vanished from the papal policy”.

The war between France and Spain for the possession of Naples meanwhile went on. All Italy rejoiced at the renewal of its military glory by the tournament at Barletta, in which thirteen Italians overcame their French opponents. Men boasted that Italians could now meet the French in the field; but they forgot that the Italian champions were not fighting for a national cause, but only to set one foreign conqueror in the place of another. Nothing shows more clearly the utter want of patriotism in Italy than its readiness to accept the tournament of Barletta as a great national exploit, to be celebrated in prose and verse. It was the military skill of Gonsalvo de Cordova, not the prowess of the Italians, which drove the French from Apulia. In May Gonsalvo entered Naples, and the French took refuge in Gaeta. Louis XII was no more successful in the Neapolitan kingdom than the former claimants of the Angevin house.

Alexander VI was prepared to readjust his position and ally himself with Spain if anything was to be gained. He made proposals to Venice, who betrayed them to France. On May 18 the Pope's confidential secretary, Trocchio, fled from Rome, most probably that he might carry to the French king proofs of the Pope’s machinations against France; he was, however, captured in Corsica, brought back to Rome and strangled by Cesare’s orders. To prepare himself for further activity Alexander VI raised a large sum of money by creating nine new Cardinals. Giustinian computes that the Pope received from 120,000 to 130,000 ducats from his new creations, and also raised 64,000 ducats by the sale of new offices of abbreviators, which he erected in the Curia, already overburdened with extortionate officials. He offered to help Louis XII in an expedition against Naples on condition that Sicily were given to Cesare; and he offered to help Spain if Cesare could thereby gain Siena, Bologna, and Pisa. Cardinal Piccolomini besought Venice to form an Italian League to free Italy from the foreigners; Spain offered Venice its alliance that they might join in settling Italian affairs without the interference of France or the Pope. Every diplomatic possibility was freely discussed, and no one could foresee what would happen. Cesare gathered troops, and at the end of
July was said to be preparing for a journey to Perugia; men thought that he meant to make an attack on Siena, perhaps on Tuscany. He showed his troops that he was not a man to be trifled with. Some Albanians quitted his service because they were offended at the captain whom he set over them; Cesare allowed them to leave Rome, but they were pursued and their two ringleaders were put to death, as a warning to the rest of Cesare’s mercenaries.

Still Cesare stayed at Rome, and the Pope's attitude towards France and Spain was still ambiguous. A French army was on its way to relieve Gaeta, and no one knew whether Cesare would join it or no. Meanwhile the weather became extremely hot, and the inhabitants of Rome sickened in great numbers. On August 1 died the Pope’s nephew, Giovanni Borgia, Cardinal of Monreale. Men said that he had “gone the way of the rest”, and that Cesare had poisoned him for his money. On August 13 both Alexander VI and Cesare were attacked by the fever. The Pope was bled, and his attendants remarked with wonder how vigorous was the flow of blood for a man of his age. The fever declared itself to be a tertian, and the exact condition of the Pope was kept as secret as possible; but on August 18 he received the Eucharist and soon after fell into a stupor. His physician was of opinion that the fever was complicated by apoplexy; he rapidly sank, and died on the evening of August 18. Cesare was too ill to visit him; but in the Pope's last moments sent his confidential officer, Michelotto, who with his dagger drawn extorted from the fears of the chamberlain the keys of the papal treasury, and carried off all the plate and some 100,000 ducats in gold.

There is no more striking illustration of the hatred which Alexander VI inspired than the rapid spread of the belief that he died of poison. So many strange things had happened during his pontificate that men could not suppose that it ended in a natural way. There was something wonderful in the fact that the Pope and Cesare were both taken ill at the same time. Their illness declared itself after a supper in the garden of Cardinal Hadrian of Corneto, who was also himself attacked by sickness. It is scarcely surprising that this coincidence should have suggested the idea of poison; and when once the idea was entertained, a story rapidly grew. It was said that a scheme was devised by the Pope and Cesare to poison a wealthy Cardinal, but owing to a mistake of the server the poisoned wine was given to themselves. This story was readily believed, and in some form or other is repeated by all the historians of that time; but it rests on no authentic basis. There is nothing to confirm it in the description of the Pope’s illness as given by eye-witnesses. Rome was in a pestilential condition, and a supper in the open air was not unlikely to lead to an attack of fever. It is not surprising that two men, living under the same conditions and in the same place, should suffer from fever at the same time. Contemporaries saw a proof of the effects of poison in the rapid decomposition of the Pope’s body, which grew black and swollen. This has been repeated by more modern writers, who ought to have known that it was evidence only of the condition of the atmosphere. There is no real reason for attributing the death of Alexander VI to other than natural causes.

The Borgia have become legendary as types of unrestrained wickedness, and it is difficult to judge them fairly without seeming to palliate iniquity. Yet justice demands a consideration how far they represented the tendencies of their age, and how far they went beyond them. The secularized Papacy and the immoral politics of Europe can excite nothing but disgust; but the secularization of the Papacy was begun by Sixtus IV, was as profound under Innocent VIII as under Alexander VI, and was not much mended under Julius II and Leo X. Political perfidy was universal in Italy; and Louis XII and
Ferdinand of Aragon were as perfidious as the Pope. The end of the fifteenth century shows the political and social corruption that followed on the decay of religious belief, just as the history of the sixteenth century shows how long a time was needed before a religious revival could re-establish morality or influence politics. The exceptional infamy that attaches to Alexander VI is largely due to the fact that he did not add hypocrisy to his other vices. But however much his own times may have forgotten that there was any meaning in the position of Head of the Christian Church, it is impossible for after times to adopt the same forgetfulness.

Though the career of Alexander VI was that of an active and unscrupulous statesman, yet he was not forgetful of the formal duties of his office. In the year of jubilee, Burchard asked for a remission of some of the obligations for an indulgence on the ground of his duties. Alexander VI did not treat the matter with levity; he considered the application and refused it. Few Popes appeared more frequently in public, or were more attentive to matters of ecclesiastical ceremonial. Alexander VI was a good man of business and was endowed with great activity; he never allowed pleasure to stand in the way of his occupations, and would work till late at night. The dispatches of the various envoys at Rome show us a man who was unsparing of himself, and whose mind was always active. He was not so entirely immersed in politics as to neglect little matters. He regulated the Curia, and saw that salaries were punctually paid, a point of which many Popes were negligent. In times of scarcity at Rome he organized a corn supply from Sicily, so that the city suffered little from want. He discharged the ecclesiastical duties of his office with the same diligence that he showed in other matters.

Yet Alexander VI was profoundly secular, and was so recognized by his contemporaries. The irregularities of his private life, his open disregard of public opinion, his avowed delight in his children, and his political unscrupulousness, all these combined to emphasize the secular character of his pontificate in a marked manner. It is true that the times in which Alexander VI lived required in a Pope the genius of a statesman. The Papacy as a temporal power was threatened; the political equilibrium of Italy had been shattered by the French invasion, and Alexander VI had been seriously menaced. He awaited his opportunity, and found means to realize the dream of many of his predecessors, by laying the foundation of a strong state in Central Italy. But he did this in a way that filled men with apprehension. In the eyes of churchmen, the lands of the Church were being recovered for Cesare Borgia, and the Borgia family was being set up as supreme disposers of the Papacy. The statesmen of Italy, who were alarmed about themselves, saw for the first time the nature of the papal power in politics, and were terrified at the prospect. Their own states were powerless before the armies of the stranger, and they found themselves suddenly in the presence of interests which their political craft was entirely unable to control. Their perplexity turned to terror when they saw that the Pope was the one Italian power which had a strong position outside Italy. The weakness of other Italian powers was his strength, and by watching his opportunity, he could dispose of them according to his will. Machiavelli’s words explain the hatred felt against Alexander VI; “he was the first who showed how much a Pope, with money and forces, could make his power prevail”.

Moreover, Alexander VI was the only man in Italy who clearly knew what he wanted to do, and who steadily pursued his purpose. Venice was watching affairs with an uneasy jealousy, which it tried to pass off as calculating caution. Florence was helplessly clinging to the French alliance, which it had already found to be worthless. The smaller states were desperately endeavouring to patch up a political system which
had been hopelessly shattered, and to form new political combinations which were
doomed to fall before the first shock. There was a dim consciousness that all these
attempts were futile, and no one ventured to predict the future. A childish belief in good
luck took the place of political wisdom, and all the luck seemed to fall to the lot of the
Borgia, who came into no misfortune like other folk, and whatever they did prospered.
They entered as strangers into the hazardous game of Italian politics, and soon showed
that they could play it better than those who thought that it was entirely in their own
hands. Alexander VI frankly accepted the principles of the game, but broke through its
flimsy conventions; whereon other players felt that their tricks were turned against them
by a player of superior skill, and loudly cried out that they were cheated. Alexander VI
dealt unscrupulously with unscrupulous men, and played for higher stakes than they had
dreamed of. Amongst the uncertain, hesitating, bewildered statesmen of Italy,
Alexander VI and Cesare boldly pursued a successful course.

The personal qualities of the Borgia family increased the terror which their success
inspired. Alexander VI was full of life and vigor; he was physically and mentally a
strong man. His children, Cesare and Lucrezia, showed the same marvelous capacity of
adapting themselves to circumstances, and winning from life all that it had to give.
Alexander VI combined great natural gifts with great power of self-restraint. He had a
large and strong nature, which he worked and directed to his purposes. His active brain
was always devising fresh schemes. His keen intelligence was trained by diligent
observation; but he was not naturally qualified to be a statesman, to intrigue, and to
calculate. Handsome, joyous, and genial, he was best fitted to attract ladies by his
winning ways, and cajole them by his honeyed speeches. He was amiable and pleasant,
a man who wished to enjoy life himself, and make others enjoy it. When he entered
upon a political career, he carried into it the same zest, the same eagerness, the same
clear purpose of getting all that was to be got. He had a boyish frankness in the pursuit
of his object which was taken for profound dissimulation. He was fertile in forming
schemes, which he discussed with an energy and sincerity which were almost
convincing at the time; if any practical difficulty occurred, he was equally ready the
next day with an entirely different plan, about which he was equally in earnest. He was
childishly delighted when his schemes succeeded; his extreme fertility of invention
made him almost unconscious when they failed. He was constantly talking, and found it
almost impossible to keep a secret. The ambassadors at his court were entirely baffled
by him, and took for duplicity this restlessness of a mind which retained in old age the
vigor of youth. Cesare Borgia did not inherit this openness of his father, which indeed
seems to have annoyed him. When he was at Rome he kept much to himself, and did his
best to avoid interviews with ambassadors, nor did he appear with the Pope in public
business. Giustinian tells of a scene which shows the characteristics of the two men. In
May, 1503, Alexander VI urged, as he had done before, a close alliance between
himself and Venice. He spoke with feeling, and showed on his face deep concern. He
sent for Cesare to take a walk in the vineyard, and when Cesare entered he casually
mentioned the subject of conversation, and repeated what he had said; whereon
Giustinian repeated his answer. Cesare stood immovable, and only muttered a few
words in Spanish to the Pope, who thereupon taxed Venice with betraying his counsels
to the French king—a charge which Giustinian denied, but which was nevertheless true.

We see the two men; Alexander VI impetuous, eager, full of great designs; Cesare
cold, cautious, keen-eyed, and suspicious. There was complete confidence and
sympathy between the two; but at times, Cesare was contemptuous of his father's
garrulity, and at times Alexander VI thought Cesare needlessly prudent and too much given to use the high hand. Men said in Rome that the Pope was afraid of his son.

The frankness and amiability of Alexander VI were not qualities which did him any service; they rather added to the terror which he inspired. Alexander VI genuinely wished people to agree with him, and tried his utmost to lead them as he would have them to go; unfortunately his way lay in a direction contrary to their interests, and it only added bitterness to their sense of helplessness that the Pope tried by his geniality to gain their assent to their own ruin. It is hard to combine entire resoluteness with kindliness; and sympathy which is not accompanied by concession is looked upon as hypocrisy. Alexander VI’s policy required that he should act tyrannically; it was no comfort to the sufferers to be assured that tyranny went against the Pope’s grain, and that he wished them to take a sensible view of the situation.

The desire of Alexander VI to do unpleasant things in a pleasant manner may be illustrated by Giustinian’s account of what happened in Rome after the imprisonment of Cardinal Orsini. The suddenness of the stroke threw the city into terror; there were rumors of impending punishments, and many sought safety by flight. The Pope sent for the city magistrates that he might restore confidence; he assured them that he had made all the arrests which he intended; they might live in peace and quietness under an equal rule, before which Colonna and Orsini would be both as one; if no new cause for complaint were given him he would forget all old grievances. Then he added with a laugh, “See that you make fine shows this Carnival time. Let men enjoy themselves, and they will forget all their suspicions”.

It is no wonder that this light-heartedness awakened terror and made the Pope seem almost inhuman. Yet it was quite natural to him to turn lightly from one thing to another. He was keen in politics and keen in enjoyment. He seems always to have lived at the highest pressure, and never to have felt the strain of life. He worked hard, but he was always buoyant; he never showed fear, and he was ready to enter into any form of amusement. He sat at his windows and laughed heartily at the buffooneries of the Carnival; he delighted to see handsome women engaging in the dance, and often had comedies acted in his presence. In all his enjoyments he was frank, and paid no heed to conventional decorum. In February, 1503, he gave a public festival in the Vatican, at which a comedy was performed. Many Cardinals were present, some in their robes, others in masquerade costumes. Fair ladies thronged round the Pope's seat, and some were seated on footstools at his feet. There was nothing wicked in this; but it was certainly indecorous, and such scenes were easily exaggerated into scandals.

In truth Alexander VI lived in the moment, and was thorough both in his pleasures and in his business. He was so interested in what he was doing that he lost all sense of its moral aspect, and he went beyond all his contemporaries in his disregard of social decorum and of diplomatic conventions. His reputation has suffered for his frankness. The larger elements of vigorous life, which made him greater than those around him, were looked upon as signs of more deliberate wickedness. His undisguised affection for his children, his natural impulsiveness, his geniality and good humour, were all put down to unnatural feelings or to sinister motives.

In his private life it is sufficiently clear that he was at little pains to repress a strongly sensual nature. Yet he was by no means universally self-indulgent, but was sparing in food and drink, was satisfied with little sleep, and was above the temptations of luxury and indolence. We may hesitate to believe the worst charges brought against
him, but the evidence is too strong to enable us to admit that even after his accession to
the papal office he discontinued the irregularities of his previous life. The Vatican was
frequently the scene of indecent orgies, at which the Pope did not scruple to be present.
Men shrugged their shoulders at these things, and few in Rome were seriously shocked.
The age was corrupt, and the Pope’s example sanctioned its corruption.

Alexander VI had no friends because his policy was manifestly a personal policy
and was carried on for the good of his own family. He was profuse in the creation of
Cardinals, but none of them were men of mark, or felt much gratitude towards their
patron. Alexander VI was genial and friendly; but after the fall of Ascanio Sforza no
one felt that they could trust to his favor. He wanted instruments not advisers, and made
use of men like Ferrari; but Cesare Borgia was the only man whom he trusted. The
Cardinals felt that they were helpless and had to give way; if they resisted, the Pope in a
business-like manner reduced them to obedience. Cardinal Rovere was an instance of
the uselessness of opposition: he resisted as long as he had any hope of French help:
then he became reconciled with the Pope, but was a doubtful friend and watched an
opportunity to oppose him. Alexander VI was afraid of his influence with the French
king, and in June, 1502, dispatched his secretary Trocchio and the Cardinal d’Albret to
 inveigle Giuliano at Savona; the plan was to invite him on board their galley and then
set sail for Rome, but Giuliano escaped by refusing the invitation. Alexander VI was not
vengeful and had no objection to opposition provided it was harmless for practical
purposes. Capello says that the Cardinal of Lisbon spoke openly against the Pope; but
the Pope only laughed and did not answer. He was satisfied to know that the Cardinals
could do nothing against his will.

There was not much moral sense in Europe to be shocked by the conduct of
Alexander VI. Men did not say much about it, for it was useless to talk when there was
no obvious method of mending matters. Now and then the old call for a Council was
renewed, and longings for reform were hidden in many hearts. But there was no
opening for any definite effort, and right-thinking men said little of the shame they felt.
We catch a glimpse, however, of the common talk of Europe in an ironical letter
addressed by some German knights to the Pope. They had been summoned to Rome, to
answer for wrongs done by them to the Abbey of Wesenberg near Speyer, and wrote to
excuse themselves for not appearing. They were not scholars, they pleaded, and could
do nothing in Rome; but they were good Christians, and served a good master, the
Pfalzgraf, “who worships God, adorns His temples, loves justice, hates vice, was never
accused of adultery, nor even of an indecent act or word, who is truthful and upright”.
They go on to make a profession of their faith:

“We believe in one Church and one Roman See, to which each Catholic head
ascends, not by bribery, but by just election; nor does he defile that highest dignity by
evil manners or bad example; nor does he cast stumbling-blocks in the way of the sheep
redeemed by Christ’s blood, but is the universal father and judge, whom all men are
bound to obey. We believe, too, in a just God, who will punish with eternal fire all sins,
such as robbery, sacrilege, pride, violence, vanity, abuse of Christ’s patrimony,
concubinage, simony, and other horrible crimes, through which the Christian religion
totters and Christians of every age are scandalized”.

The reference to the Pope’s manner of life was so clear, that Burchard has preserved
this letter as one of the many good stories current in the year of jubilee. The times were
indeed evil when a rehearsal of the rudiments of Christian morality became a witticism
by their manifest contrast to the life of the Head of the Church. It is not his contemporaries, but the writers of the next generation who have branded Alexander VI as a monster of iniquity. This fact is a sign of an awakening conscience in Italy, when it began to see the havoc which its corruption had wrought. Of this corruption the pontificate of Alexander VI marked the highest point. Before that time the degradation of the Papacy had been gradual; in Alexander VI the Papacy stood forth in all the strength of its emancipation from morality. Italy recognized how completely it was secularized when they saw it pursuing objects of its own outside the limits of Italian interests. The traditions of priestly life were gone, and the Papacy no longer represented Christian morality in the international relations of Europe. Its self-seeking was open and avowed: it joined with glee in the scramble for Italy which foreign invaders had begun. We cannot wonder that, in an after age, men detached Alexander VI and Cesare Borgia from their place in history and cloathed them with abnormal wickedness; that they pictured as monsters the men of alien race who, in a time of general helplessness, schemed to exalt themselves by erecting an Italian monarchy on the basis of a secularized Church.
CHAPTER XII.

THE FALL OF CESARE BORGIA. PIUS III—JULIUS II.

1503-1504.

The unexpected death of Alexander VI, at a time when Cesare was confined to bed by sickness, was a contingency for which Cesare was not prepared; still his position was a strong one, as Rome was filled with his troops. On the other hand, the Spanish army was close to Rome, while the French forces were still at some distance. Under any circumstances the Orsini were sure to rise and attempt the recovery of their possessions; as it was, Cesare could not take the field against them or secure himself from their machinations in Rome. He felt that he could not stand alone, and promptly made overtures to the Colonna party, whom he had only deprived of their castles, whereas he had shed the blood of the Orsini. His overtures were not rejected; the Colonna were willing to oppose the Orsini, but were not likely to lend Cesare effective help for his own purposes.

Cesare’s position was attacked on every side at once. Round Rome the Orsini gathered troops; in the Romagna the dispossessed lords prepared to return, and Venice was ready to help them, in hopes of sharing the spoil. Cesare could only resist them if he were supported by the Papacy, and his first object was to secure the election of a Pope who would be in his interest, or who at least would feel himself obliged to lean on his protection. Everything depended on Cesare’s power of managing the Conclave. He must exercise his influence decidedly, without giving any plausible ground for complaint of undue pressure. For this purpose, the attitude of a sick and helpless man had some advantages. If Cesare could not act openly with all the insolence of overbearing power, the next best thing was to make his enforced inactivity serve as a cloak for his schemes.

Amongst the Cardinals were seventeen Spaniards, on whose fidelity Cesare relied. The question was, if they were strong enough to carry their own candidate; and this depended on the number of Cardinals present at the election, and on the pressure which Cesare could indirectly bring to bear. Cesare could scarcely flatter himself that the College of Cardinals as a whole was devoted to his interests; but he might so manage matters that they would not venture to elect a Pope openly hostile to himself. The situation was very delicate and depended on small matters for its issue.

The first to move was Cardinal Caraffa, who immediately after Alexander VI's death summoned his brother Cardinals to meet in the Church of S. Maria sopra Minerva. They took precautions for guarding the city, and ordered an inventory to be made of the late Pope’s goods; luckily one room had escaped the scrutiny of Michelotto, and in it were found precious stones to the value of 25,000 ducats. Next day they met again and sent a message to Cesare, that they could not enter the Conclave in the Vatican till the Castle of S. Angelo was in their hands. On this Don Michele made an armed demonstration by riding with 200 horse into the Piazza of Minerva. The citizens were alarmed, and offered to protect the Cardinals, who answered they had no fear. That night barricades were erected in the streets, which made them impassable for horsemen. Cesare saw that it was useless to attempt any form of intimidation, and from his sick
bed he disavowed his agent. He ordered the governor of the Castle of S. Angelo to take
an oath of allegiance to the Cardinals; he explained that he only kept his troops in Rome
for his personal safety, till he was well enough to travel; he professed the most dutiful
obedience towards the College. Really he was seeking the political support of Spain; he
gathered round him the Spanish Cardinals, pursued his negotiations with the Colonna,
and professed himself entirely in the Spanish interest. Eleven Cardinals declared that
they would elect a Spanish Pope, or would cause a schism. Cesare sent galleys and
troops to prevent his chief enemy, Cardinal Rovere, from entering Rome.

The Cardinals who wished to make an independent election found it no easy matter.
On the one side they were exposed to the pressure of Spain, on the other side to the
pressure of France. They besought Venice to send troops for their protection; when
Venice cautiously refused they found that they could not dispense with Cesare, and
offered to confirm him in his office of Gonfaloniere of the Church provided that all his
captains took an oath of allegiance to the College. Cesare was not prepared to give way
so far. Probably at his instigation Prospero Colonna entered Rome with 100 horse on
August 23: he was followed next day by Fabio Orsini, and Rome was disturbed by
brawls between the rival factions. Cesare hoped that the Cardinals would turn to him for
help: they turned instead to the ambassadors present in Rome, and besought them to
guarantee the withdrawal of all troops to a distance of ten miles from the city; the
Colonna, the Orsini, and Cesare were alike to withdraw. This was agreed; but as soon as
the Orsini were gone Cesare found that the state of his health prevented him from
leaving Rome, and that he would not be safe outside the walls of the Vatican. He was
offered an abode in the Castle of S. Angelo, and long negotiations went on about the
number of his attendants.

At last it became clear to Cesare that it was dangerous to delay the election longer,
than he could not hope to stay in Rome and overawe the College, but must trust to the
activity of his adherents in the Conclave. On September 1 he agreed to retire and
withdraw his troops, on condition that the College took his person under their
protection, gave him full liberty of passing through the territory of the Church, and used
their influence to prevent Venice from helping his enemies in the Romagna. On
September 2, borne in a litter, he departed from Rome with his troops, his cannon, and
his goods; he went first to Tivoli, and thence to Nepi, and Civita Castellana

Cesare's departure was followed by the arrival in Rome of Cardinal Rovere, who at
once began to take a the leading part in the intrigues about the papal election. Louis XII
thought that he had a claim on one whom he had so long protected, and commended to
him his favorite, Georges d'Amboise, whose election he was anxious to secure. But
Rovere at once cast aside all his obligations to the French king. “I am here”, he said, “to
do my own business, not that of others. I will not vote for the Cardinal of Rouen unless
I see that he has so many votes that he will be elected without mine”. He put himself at
the head of the Italian party and wished to secure his own election. Besides him there
flocked to Rome the other Cardinals who had fled before Alexander VI, Colonna and
Raffaelle Riario. Finally on September 10 came the Cardinal Amboise, bringing with
him the Cardinal of Aragon, brother of the dispossessed Federigo of Naples, and
Ascanio Sforza, who was released from his long captivity in Bourges that he might give
his vote in the French interest. Ascanio, however, was no sooner in Rome than he began
to scheme in his own behalf.
When on September 16 the thirty-seven Cardinals entered the Conclave every one was doubtful about the issue of the election. At first each party put forward its own candidate. The Spaniards chose Cardinal of Castro, a native of Valencia; the French worked for the Cardinal of Rouen; the Italians were divided between Giuliano della Rovere and Ascanio Sforza. The first scrutiny on September 21 showed that the voting was very scattered, but Amboise, Rovere, and Castro were almost equal. It was not a time which admitted of delay, and all parties had already contemplated the probability of a compromise. The night was spent in private colloquies, till at last Amboise and Ascanio Sforza agreed on Cardinal Piccolomini, who proved to be generally acceptable. His election was at once accepted, and was formally made and announced on the morning of September 22.

Francesco Todeschini de' Piccolomini was sister's son of Pope Pius II, by whom he had been raised to the Cardinalate. He was a man of considerable learning and great personal amiability, who had lived a quiet and simple life. He had been employed in several legations and had discharged his public duties with tact. His character stood high in all men's estimation, though he was the father of a large family of children. He had held aloof from the political intrigues which had so largely occupied the activity of the Cardinals under the last three Popes, was not committed to any party and had offended no one. He had always been on good terms with Alexander VI, and Cesare Borgia expected to find in him a friend. His election awakened no animosity, but everyone foresaw that his pontificate would be brief, as he was sixty-four years old, and suffered from an abscess in his leg which threatened to be fatal before long.

The new Pope took the name of Pius III in memory of his uncle. He had at once to face the question of his relations with Cesare Borgia, whose dominions began at once to fall in pieces. Venice supplied troops to Guidubaldo, who advanced into his former duchy of Urbino; Jacopo d'Appiano returned to Piombino; Pandolfo Malatesta occupied Rimini; Giovanni Sforza entered Pesaro; even the nephews of Vitellozzo were welcomed in Città di Castello. There was a general restoration of those whom Cesare had ousted from their states. In the Romagna an attempt was made, with the aid of Venetian troops, against Cesena, but the governor was loyal to Cesare and Cesena still held out. The day after his election Pius III expressed to the Venetian envoy his surprise that Venice should have helped in disturbing the peace of Italy. Giustinian answered that it was natural for the dispossessed lords to seek their own. “God”, said the Pope, “has willed to chastise them for their sins, though it might be with a sorry instrument”. He added with a smile that perhaps God might restore them after they had done sufficient penance. The envoy gathered that the Pope was under obligations to the Spanish Cardinals, and could not take up a hostile attitude towards Cesare. When Cardinal Rovere petitioned for the restoration of his nephew Francesco to Sinigaglia, the Pope gently but firmly refused. On September 25 he issued a brief reproving the chiefs of the league against Cesare, and bidding them cease from their attacks upon the Church.

Pius III had no affection for Cesare, who had carried away from the Vatican everything that he could and had left the treasury laden with debts. But Pius III desired peace above all things. “We will not”, he said, “allow any one to bring war on Italy under pretence of helping us”. He spoke of reforming the Church, and thought that Cesare might be left to the judgment of heaven. Cesare for his part was anxious to secure himself in Rome before taking up arms, and his illness gave him a plausible pretext. On October 3 he returned to Rome, bringing with him only 150 men-at-arms,
500 infantry, and a few cavalry; still he spoke confidently, and said that he would soon enjoy his own again. His enemies pointed out the danger of a rising of the Orsini, and urged the Pope to order him to disarm. Pius III listened but did nothing, and Cesare had great hopes of winning his good will. But fortune was adverse to Cesare’s plans; on October 14 the Pope, who had been suffering much from his leg, was seized with fever, and the Orsini on this news set a watch to prevent Cesare from leaving Rome. He attempted to make his escape, but was so hotly pursued that he judged it wise to return, and took refuge in the Castle of S. Angelo, where he was regarded as a prisoner, and was only allowed two attendants.

The expectations which led to the election of Pius III were soon fulfilled. He died on October 18, to the regret of all those who wished for peace. No sooner was he dead than the Orsini demanded of the Cardinals that they should keep Cesare in ward till the election of a new Pope; but the death of Pius III made Cesare again a person of some importance. He commanded the votes of the Spanish Cardinals, which would be weighty in deciding the new election. The possible candidates were regarded as Caraffa, Rovere, and Riario; the chances of Georges d’Amboise had gone, those of Rovere had risen. It was not in Cesare’s power to procure the election of one of his own party, or of the Cardinal of Rouen; but it was still possible for him to prevent that of Rovere. It was still possible, if he was driven to desperation, that a disputed election might lead to another schism. The Cardinals would not provoke him; they declared him free to stay in the Castle of S. Angelo or go at his pleasure.

Cardinal Revere meanwhile pursued his candidature openly by promises and bribes. Giustinian, ordered by Venice to favor his election, wrote home that contracts were made in public, no expense was spared, the pontificate was put up to auction for the highest bidder. Cesare Borgia saw that he could do nothing better than make a good bargain with Cardinal Rovere. On October 29 there was a secret meeting between the two, and Rovere undertook to confirm Cesare as Gonfaloniere of the Church, to restore him in the Romagna, and give his nephew, with his claims on Sinigaglia, in marriage to Cesare’s daughter. He said, with a smile to the Venetian ambassador, that men in a strait were often driven to do what they did not wish; when they were freed they did otherwise. He was prepared to do anything to secure the Papacy, and his plans were so well laid that when the Cardinals entered the Conclave on October 31 no one had any doubt of the result. Even the name to be assumed by the new Pope was known, and had been engraved on the papal ring to be ready at once. The Conclave was almost held in public, as the window of the door was not closed. The proceedings were purely formal, and scarcely occupied an hour. On November 1 it was announced that Cardinal Rovere was elected Pope, and had assumed the name of Julius II.

The new Pope wished at first to be on good terms with everyone. He heaped dignities on the Cardinal of Rouen; he took Cesare Borgia under his protection and gave him rooms in the Vatican; at the same time he assured Venice of his good will and of his gratitude. But he let it be known that he had a policy of his own about the Romagna. “Our promise to Cesare”, he said, “extends to the safety of his life and goods; but his states must return to the Church, and we wish for the honor of recovering what our predecessors have wrongly alienated”. The Venetians by no means took this view of the situation. They had promoted the election of Julius II because they reckoned on his hostility to Cesare Borgia to help their plan of restoring the dispossessed lords of the Romagna in dependence upon themselves.
It is a noticeable feature of the times that the Pope’s coronation was deferred till November 26 because the “astrologers promised on that day a lucky conjunction of the stars”. The adventurous politics of Italy, being founded on no definite principles, were supposed to be influenced by luck. Cesare Borgia’s good fortune excited the admiration of Machiavelli, and Julius II was anxious to begin his pontificate under a lucky star. He had already formed his own plans, but he was in no haste to declare them. He did not intend to allow Venice to extend its dominion over the Romagna. He had no forces at his command to prevent them, and determined meanwhile to make use of the influence of Cesare Borgia for that end. Some castles in the Romagna were still held in Cesare’s name; he might be useful in resisting the Venetians. Accordingly, on November 19 Cesare with 130 horsemen was permitted to leave Rome for Ostia, whence he was to proceed by sea to some Florentine port. The Florentines, through fear of Venice, were willing to give him passage through their territory and help him to reach Imola.

Immediately after Cesare’s departure came the news that Faenza was on the point of falling before the Venetians. Julius II spent a sleepless night; he was afraid lest the appearance of Cesare should create such dread of his vengeance that the other cities of the Romagna would throw themselves into the hands of Venice. Next day he sent the Cardinal of Volterra to Ostia to make a new agreement with Cesare. He asked that Cesare should order his captains to surrender into the hands of the Pope the fortresses which they still held in the Romagna, on condition that they should be restored to Cesare when the danger from Venice was past. This plan had been previously discussed, but Julius II put it aside, saying that he would break faith with no man. He now resumed it; but Cesare, rejoicing in his newly acquired liberty, refused to consent. It was the last act in Cesare’s political career. Julius II instantly sent orders that his galley should not be allowed to set sail from Ostia, and commanded the troops to be disbanded which were being sent by land to aid him. On November 29 Cesare returned to Rome and was committed to the care of one of the Cardinals. His course was run; but he was still useful as a means of enabling Julius II to get into his hands the fortresses of the Romagna. Guidubaldo of Urbino came to Rome and Cesare Borgia had an interview with the man whom he had so greatly wronged. The result of this meeting was that Cesare gave up to Guidubaldo the watchword of his castles in the Romagna, and restored the books and tapestries which he had carried off from the palace of Urbino.

Julius II at once sent to take possession of the castles; but the Captain of Cesena refused to receive orders from a master who was kept a prisoner, and even hung the Pope's messenger. Julius II was angry at this failure of his schemes, and ordered Cesare to be confined in the Castle of S. Angelo. The Spanish Cardinals strove to procure his liberation. There was a plan that he should go to Cività Castellana under the guardianship of one of the Cardinals, and as soon as the castles were surrendered to the Pope, should be set at liberty; but the Cardinal chosen for the office of guardian found that his health did not permit him to undertake this perilous duty. Cesare still remained in Rome, and Julius II showed growing anger against Venice.

France and Spain were still engaged in war about Naples, but the defeat of the French on the Garigliano and the consequent surrender of Gaeta saw the Spaniards in entire possession of Naples in the beginning of 1504. Julius II was disappointed at this result, for he had more to hope from France than from Spain. He was, however, careful to preserve an appearance of neutrality, though he showed his humanity to the French fugitives, who in the depth of winter made their way almost naked to Rome. The Romans remembered too well what they had suffered from French arrogance, and left
the unhappy men to die in crowds upon the dung heaps where they sought shelter. The 
Pope clothed and fed as many as he could, and provided for their passage to France. In 
February a truce for three years was concluded between France and Spain, though every 
one knew that it was hollow.

Julius II had no better object to pursue than the possession of the castles which 
were still held for Cesare—Cesena, Forli and Bertinoro. The captains were faithful, and 
refused to give them up to the Pope till their master was at liberty. Long negotiations 
were carried on between Julius II, Cesare, and the castellans; negotiations which the 
Venetian envoy found “more intricate than the labyrinth”. Julius II could not obtain the 
castles without Cesare’s consent, and Cesare wished to secure his freedom before he 
consented. At last it was agreed that Cesare should go to Ostia under the charge of the 
Cardinal of S. Croce, who should set him at liberty as soon as he was satisfied with the 
arrangements for the surrender of the castles. When this was done the captains of 
Cesena and Bertinoro were ready to admit the Pope’s forces, but the captain of Forli 
demanded 15,000 ducats for payment of his troops. On this new difficulties arose, and 
Julius II was so ungenerous as to require Cesare to give security for this sum. Cesare at 
last agreed, and on April 19 the Cardinal of S. Croce declared that Cesare had done all 
that was in his power and allowed him to set out for Naples. Julius II was by no means 
pleased with the Cardinal of S. Croce, who acted on his own responsibility, because he 
was afraid that the Pope would raise fresh difficulties as a means for keeping Cesare in 
his power.

Cesare was welcomed in Naples by Gonsalvo de Cordova, who gave him an ample 
safe-conduct. His friends gathered round him, and he looked for some opportunity to 
restore himself to a position of importance in political affairs. He proposed to go to the 
help of Pisa against Florence; but a rising in Piombino gave him a more favourable 
opening. He was preparing to lead troops thither, and was on the point of setting out, 
when on May 26 he was made prisoner by Gonsalvo’s orders. This was done by the 
command of Ferdinand of Spain, moved thereto by the representations of Julius II that 
Cesare was bent on disturbing the peace of Italy. Anyhow it was a treacherous deed, and 
Gonsalvo felt it to be such. His first care after Cesare’s imprisonment was to recover the 
safe-conduct which he had given him and destroy it. Even prejudiced bystanders like 
the Venetian ambassadors judged the conduct of the Spanish king to be dishonorable. In 
his second captivity Cesare Borgia despaired of any further power in Italy. He wrote to 
the captain of Forli that “fortune had grown too angry with him” and ordered the 
surrender of the castle to the Pope. This was done on August 10, and ten days 
afterwards Cesare was released from prison in Naples and was sent to Spain. There he 
remained in close confinement for two years, though his brother-in-law, Jean d’Albret, 
King of Navarre, pleaded for his release. At length a plan of escape was contrived, and 
in November, 1506, Cesare fled from his prison and took refuge in Navarre. There he 
took arms in the service of the king against his rebellious vassal the Count of Lerin, and 
besieged the castle of Viana. The Count of Lerin made a sortie which was repulsed, and 
Cesare followed hotly in pursuit. The Count met with reinforcements and faced upon 
his pursuers, who fled in turn. Cesare, with only one companion, stood his ground till he 
was overwhelmed and slain on March 12, 1507.

Cesare Borgia’s fate was the same as that of his predecessors who had trusted to the 
favor of an individual Pope as a means of procuring a political position in Italy. He 
differed from them only because he was more resolutely supported by a Pope who was 
his father, and who was free from any restraints imposed by his office or by his
sympathy with the political feeling of Italy. Alexander VI had frankly set forward as the
great object of his policy the advancement of his son. Cesare had brought to his task
considerable capacity, and the state of Italian affairs had given scope to his cleverness.
Resolute and unscrupulous, this stranger had acted boldly on the principles which
Italian statesmen adopted without daring to admit. They had only to apply their
principles upon a small scale, to maintain or readjust what they already possessed;
Cesare had to begin his career from the beginning, and did so with a thoroughness and
precision which awakened the mingled terror and admiration of bystanders. He was
resolute to acquire and strong to maintain. He attacked his enemies with their own
weapons. He remorselessly swept all obstacles from his course, and used at every
moment the means which the vicissitudes of affairs placed at his disposal. But he aimed
at justifying his violent measures by his good government of his conquests. He brought
law and order into the Romagna, as it had never been before, and his subjects regretted
his downfall. He knew that his design was hazardous, and that he had but a short time in
which to work it out; in the supreme moment of his fortunes fate was against him
and his prosperity crumbled away.

The exceptional odium which Cesare Borgia inspired is due partly to the terror
caused by his rapid success, and partly to his personal character. It was not so much his
violent and treacherous deeds which horrified his contemporaries as his strange and
mysterious life. A man might smile and be a villain, and his villainy was easily
overlooked; but Cesare rarely smiled, and practised duplicity from mere love of the art.
He made no friends; he gathered no body of followers; he eschewed the intercourse of
his fellows except when his own designs required it. He affected darkness and
seclusion; he enshrouded even his licentiousness in mystery; he spoke to his father in
Spanish in the presence of others; he avoided all visitors, and refused to talk even with
his own followers. Perhaps he deliberately chose to act as a foil to his father's restless
garrulity; perhaps he thought that an affectation of secrecy was best calculated to help
his plans. At all events he succeeded in creating universal dread. In his misfortunes he
was pitied by few, and after his fall the sense of relief from the presence of one who
would not let himself be understood swept away all the admiration which his success
inspired.

Yet the career of Cesare Borgia was a great epoch in Italian politics. It made all
men dimly conscious of the direction in which they were tending. It showed them that
Italy had become the prey of adventurers, and they shuddered at the thought. The
ordinary man, who looked to the past, laid upon Cesare the blame of originating the
state of things which he used. A political thinker like Machiavelli strove to construct the
only possible ideal of the future, that a prince, endowed like Cesare, but with more than
Cesare’s good fortune, should follow in Cesare’s steps. The only hope that he saw for
Italy, divided and helpless, was the resolute brain and the strong hand of one who would
heal her breaches by the only means of which the times admitted.
CHAPTER XIII.
FIRST PLANS OF JULIUS II
1504—1506.

The removal of Cesare Borgia from Italy was of little service to Julius II, save that it cleared the way for his open hostility to Venice. Venice had been eager in promoting the election of Julius II to the Papacy, in the hope that his animosity against Cesare Borgia would lead him to acquiesce in a Venetian protectorate over the Romagna, and was disappointed when Julius II showed a resolute determination to recover the Romagna for the Church. But the Pope was powerless, and bitterly resented his impotence. So long as Cesare was still an object of dread he was driven to temporize; but when Cesare was imprisoned in Naples, he said with a smile to the Venetian envoy that now Venice had no excuse for keeping the lands of the Church. “Venice”, he added, “makes both herself and me the slaves of every one—herself that she may keep, me that I may win back. But for this we might have been united to find some way to free Italy from foreigners”. It was a remarkable confession that Julius II saw clearly whither the course of his policy would lead. Rather than endure the action of Venice he would be the “slave of every one”, and would try every possible combination to win back from Venice its ill-gotten gains. Yet at the bottom of his heart he was an Italian patriot, and longed for the freedom of his country from the yoke of foreigners. He regretted that Venice had thought fit to behave so as to compel him in self-defence to rivet more firmly his country’s chains. Italian patriotism was a distant ideal, which he was compelled to sacrifice to the needs of the present.

It was always so in Italian history. Large considerations of general utility were in the background awaiting a convenient season. The liberator was always preparing himself for the task. There was just one enemy to overcome by any means that could be found, and then a nobler policy would be possible. Italy was ruined beyond redemption by the selfishness of her rulers before the favorable opportunity arrived. The struggles of the Italian states against one another were justified by constant expectation of some general benefit which never was attained. Local patriotism dictated treachery to the common interest. Treason to Italy was committed with a sigh in vague hope of some splendid act of reparation. Patriotism was on all men’s lips, but no one dared to set an example of patriotic self-sacrifice. Men sinned with the knowledge that they were sinning, but were helpless to see how they could avoid sinning without running the risk of destruction.

Of all this Julius II was fully conscious. His experience of France enabled him to see whither Italy was tending. He had seen how cruel were the tender mercies of the foreigner; he had heard the jests of the invader, and had witnessed the havoc which he wrought. His position as Pope enabled him, had he wished, to act upon his knowledge and set an example of patriotic forbearance. The Papacy could afford to wait for the Romagna, and Julius II might well have hesitated to seize all that had been won by the crooked ways of Alexander VI. But Julius II was too entirely an Italian to escape from the unblushing self-seeking of his time: he was too obstinate, too self-willed, to sacrifice
anything to which he considered that he had a claim. He had invoked French help to do him right when he was Cardinal; as Pope he was ready “to be the slave of every one”, rather than sit down patiently under a sense of wrong. He desired to free Italy from the stranger, but first he would use the stranger to humble the pride of Venice. There was in this a cynical consciousness of political wrong-doing that is as revolting as the frank unscrupulousness of Alexander VI.

“We will do our duty, and will use all possible means for the preservation of our honour and the maintenance of the Church. The Venetians wish to treat us as their chaplain, but that they shall never do”. So spoke Julius II, and Venice would have been wise to give way. But the Venetians trusted that they would wear out the Pope’s firmness, and would not abandon their policy of cautiously grasping at every opportunity of aggrandizement. In this they had been so successful that they had awakened universal jealousy, and the Italian powers looked with dread on the advance of Venice towards universal rule in Italy. Maximilian complained of its aggressions on the imperial territory; Ferdinand of Spain grudged the towns which Venice held in the Neapolitan domains; Alexander VI had seen in Venice the great obstacle to his plans for Cesare, and had striven to raise up a coalition against her. The diplomatic intrigues of the rulers of Europe made it easy for Julius II to revive the idea of a dismemberment of Venice. He exhorted Maximilian to enter Italy, protect the Church, and come to Rome to receive the imperial crown. He sent envoys to France and Spain, begging them to unite and recover from Venice all that she had unjustly acquired; her spoil would pay the expenses of the war, and would be a rich recompense for the undertaking. His proposals were embodied in the treaty which was signed at Blois, on September 22, 1504, between Louis XII, Maximilian, and his son the Archduke Philip. This treaty expresses the desire of Louis XII to secure the alliance of Maximilian against Spain at any cost. He had no intention to carry out a plan for securing to the house of Austria an almost universal monarchy; yet the treaty provided that Philip's son Charles, who was heir to Maximilian on one side, and to Ferdinand and Isabella on the other, should marry Claude of France, and receive in dowry the French claims on Milan, Genoa, Burgundy, and the heritage of Brittany. To separate the Pope from Spain, and to prevent him from making any accord with Venice, another treaty provided for an alliance with him against Venice to win back the territories of which she had deprived the confederates.

If Julius II rejoiced when this treaty was concluded, he was doomed to speedy disappointment. Its immediate object in the eyes of Louis XII, a separation between the house of Austria and Spain, was achieved by other means. The death of Isabella of Castile on November 26 caused a more serious breach between Ferdinand and the Austrian house. The Archduke Philip claimed the regency of Castile by virtue of his wife Joanna, the daughter of Ferdinand and Isabella; but Ferdinand had been too long accustomed to rule in his wife’s name to give up his power without a struggle. He strove to win over Louis XII to his side, and a little reflection convinced Louis that the treaty of Blois was dangerous to the interests of France. The plan for the partition of the Venetian territories was suspended while Ferdinand negotiated with Louis XII. But Venice was well informed of what had been devised against her, and was somewhat alarmed. Both the Pope and Venice were keenly watchful of political possibilities. Venice thought it wise to abstain from awaking further animosity by attempting to extend her hold on the Romagna. The Pope, as he saw the chances of an attack on Venice grow more remote, was disposed to secure what he could obtain at present.
Negotiations were cautiously carried on by the mediation of the Duke of Urbino, and Venice undertook to restore all her conquests in the Romagna except Rimini and Faenza. Julius II, conducted his negotiations with consummate skill. He received all that Venice would give, but avoided any guarantee for her right to retain Rimini and Faenza. When pressed for a brief to confirm the accord with Venice, Julius II replied, “It is not in our power to alienate the lands of the Church. I have done enough in pledging my word”. It was clear that the papal accord was worth nothing; it was only a recognition that nothing better could be done at the present. Venice could only hope that the confederates who sought her ruin might find employment in other matters, or that the Pope might be involved in some difficulty.

The fixed idea of Julius II was to carry on the schemes of territorial aggrandizement which Sixtus IV had begun and which Alexander VI had so successfully continued; but Julius II had a horror of the doings of the Borgia, and wished to emphasize his desire to abolish all their traditions. What Alexander VI had done ignobly as a means of enriching his son, Julius II would do with persistent resoluteness for the glory of the Church. He had no other aim than his predecessors; he was not much more scrupulous in his choice of means than they had been; but his aim was clear and was not mixed with personal considerations, so that it gained in grandeur as it was made intelligible. Men feared and hated Julius II, but they respected him, and his fiery impetuosity lent him a dignity which was wanting to the supple Alexander VI. He did nothing to raise the Church from its purely secular course of policy, but he succeeded in making that policy respectable.

For this purpose he emphasized the difference between himself and Alexander VI; and in 1504 deprived Rodrigo Borgia of the Duchy of Sermoneta, which he restored to the Gaetani. In his Bull of restitution he openly gave as his reasons, “Our predecessor desiring to enrich his own kin, through no zeal for justice but by fraud and deceit, sought for causes of depriving the Gaetani of their possession”. Rarely had a Pope been so outspoken in condemning the man whom he succeeded in the Chair of S. Peter.

Though Julius II abandoned nepotism as a political weapon, he did not forget the claims of his relations. In his first creation of Cardinals there were two of the Rovere family; in his second creation there was another. His nephew Francesco Maria, son of the Prefect, was adopted by his childless uncle, Guidubaldo of Urbino, as heir to his duchy, so that he needed no special favor from the Pope. The marriage of another nephew, Niccolò della Rovere, was curious, and seemed to show a desire on the part of Julius II to quit old scores and live in charity with all men. In November, 1505, Niccolò was married in the Vatican to Laura, the reputed daughter of Orsino de’ Orsini, but whose parentage was generally attributed to Alexander VI. It was clear that the antipathy which Julius II felt to Alexander VI rested on personal and political grounds, not on moral reprobation. Julius II, like his predecessor, was a father, and his daughter Felice was welcomed in Rome; but his parental fondness gave rise to no scandals, and Felice was not raised to any great dignity. Her father proposed to marry her to Roberto Sanseverino, a nephew of Guidubaldo of Urbino, Prince of Salerno, but dispossessed of his principality by the Spaniards. Felice, however, showed some spirit and refused to marry a husband without territory and without revenues; so another husband was provided, Giangiordano Orsini, whom she married in 1506; and the unrestrained display of affection made by the bridegroom at the wedding sorely shocked many of the bystanders. Thus Julius II showed no undue partiality for his own relatives, and so did much to abate one of the most grievous scandals of the Papacy. Moreover, the marriages
with the Orsini were a surer way of turning the old Roman barons into nobles of the papal court than was the aggressive policy of Alexander VI.

The subject of the reformation of the Church was one to which every Pope felt bound to give a passing recognition. As Julius II, when Cardinal, had pressed for a Council, and had denounced the conduct of Alexander VI, it was natural that for the sake of consistency he should make a show of doing something. In November, 1504, he appointed a commission of six Cardinals to report; but commissions had so often been appointed that no one took the matter seriously, and we have no evidence that a report was ever presented. But Julius II felt that some step was necessary for a vindication of the papal dignity, and though he was not prepared to reform the Church, he tried to abate the scandals attaching to papal elections. He issued a protest—for it could be nothing more than a protest—against the simony which he had witnessed and even practised. A constitution published on January 19, 1505, declared that any gift, or promise, of money or benefices invalidated the election of him who had made it: even enthronization could not do away with the defect of title; all Cardinals, even those who had been guilty of receiving bribes, were bound to avoid the simoniacally elected Pope as a heathen and a heretic; it was their duty to depose him and call in the secular arm, if need were, to their aid. The publication of such a constitution was a bold measure, and showed a strong sense of the need of amendment. Perhaps Julius II was in some degree animated by a desire to separate himself from the misdoings of Alexander VI, to fasten upon him the obloquy of the past, and shake himself free from his own former self.

In several ways Julius II showed a desire for a better state of things in Rome, and endeavored to bring the Cardinals to a more decorous way of life. Thus on Whit Sunday, 1505, he sent Paris de Grassis, his Master of Ceremonies, with a message to the Cardinals forbidding them to be present at a comedy which was to be acted next day. “It was not fitting”, he said, “for Cardinals to be seen in public, looking at the amusements of boys”. Paris found some difficulty in delivering this unwonted message in an intelligible form.

The reform of the Curia was not, however, the object that was foremost in the thoughts of Julius II. He burned with desire to distinguish himself as a politician and to shed luster over the Church. He grieved over his enforced inaction, and prepared for the time when activity would be possible. He knew that pretensions were useless unless backed by force, and he knew that troops needed money; so he lived with careful frugality, and spent no more as Pope than he had done as Cardinal. He was even miserly, and tried to escape paying his debts. It is no wonder that the work of reform was not vigorously prosecuted; for reform meant the abandonment of the sale of ecclesiastical offices, and however much Julius II, might condemn simony from which the Papacy obtained no advantage, he regarded it in another light when it supplied the means of carrying on a spirited policy in behalf of the Church. But though the desire for money checked any attempts at reform, it did not lead the Pope into any acts of violence or extortion. Men said that at least the Pope did not seek money to enrich his family.

It was not, however, solely for warlike purposes that Julius II hoarded his money, nor was it only by the sword that he wished to increase the dignity of the Church. He inherited the traditions of Sixtus IV, and carried them out with greater nobility of aim. Sixtus IV had done much for the architectural restoration of Rome; Julius II was resolved to do still more. Even Alexander VI had felt the artistic impulse which swept over Italy, though he confined his work chiefly to the neighborhood of the Vatican. He
summoned Antonio di Sangallo to superintend the restoration of the Castle of S. Angelo, in which he fitted up rooms for his own use, and employed Pinturicchio to paint them. In the Vatican he built the rooms which he delighted to inhabit, and which still bear his name. The Torre di Borgia, or Appartimenti Borgia, form part of the present library, and were built along the court of the Belvedere which Innocent VIII had laid out. Nowhere is the beauty of Pinturicchio’s decorative work more delicately displayed than in the allegorical figures of the planets, the intellectual virtues, the saints, and sacred histories with which he has adorned the lunettes and wall spaces of these rooms. The story ran that Giulia Farnese served as model for the Madonna in a fresco over one of the doors, and that Alexander VI had his own portrait painted in an attitude of devout adoration of her beauty. This story is characteristic of the way in which the legends that grew round Alexander VI were repeated without verification even of the most obvious details. Giulia Farnese may, or may not, have been the model for Pinturicchio's Madonna; but the Madonna in his picture is adored only by cherubim, and the portrait of Alexander VI is in another room, as one of the shepherds who kneel before the infant Christ.

Perhaps the story may have owed its birth to the refusal of Julius II to inhabit the rooms occupied by the man whom he so profoundly hated. In 1507 he removed to another part of the Vatican, saying that he could not endure to look at the portrait of his enemy, whom he called a Jew, an apostate, and a circumcised wretch. When his attendants laughed at this last epithet, Julius II reduced them to silence by a scowl. When Paris de Grassis suggested that the walls might be cleared of the obnoxious pictures, the Pope answered, “That would not be decorous; moreover, I will not live in rooms that recall memories of crime”. In estimating the character of Alexander VI it should be remembered that no Pope had a successor who was so outspoken in his hostility.

Alexander VI was too much engaged in politics to be a great patron of art. It was in his early days as Cardinal that he left a more important memorial than any of his works as Pope, by building one of the most renowned palaces in Italy. It is now known as the Palazzo Sforza- Cesarini, and has undergone many alterations which have destroyed its former character, save in the inner court. This palace of Cardinal Borgia marked a new epoch in the architectural history of Rome, in which church building was laid aside, and Cardinals vied with one another in the splendor of their houses. The only ecclesiastical buildings during Alexander VI's pontificate were due to the liberality of foreigners. Charles VIII left a memorial of his abode in Rome in the Church of S. Trinità dei Monti, which was built at the cost of the Cardinal of S. Malo; and the Germans in 1500 began the Church of S. Maria dell' Anima in connection with their national hospital.

Still in the days of Alexander VI a new era in the architectural history of Rome was opened by the coming in Rome, of Bramante. Born in Urbino, he had worked in various places till he settled in Milan, where he left many traces of his industry. On the fall of Ludovico Sforza in 1499 he went to Rome, where his first work was the emblazonment of the Borgia arms over the Porta Santa at the Lateran, in honour of the Jubilee. The sight of the ancient monuments of Rome filled him with enthusiasm; he rambled as far as Naples in quest of Roman remains, and Hadrian's Villa at Tivoli especially attracted his careful study. Cardinal Caraffa was the first to see his merits, and for him Bramante planned the cloisters attached to the Church of S. Maria della Pace; but two mighty palaces, which he designed for two Cardinals, first revealed his genius.
There are still no buildings of the Renaissance time in Rome which can compare in beauty with the palaces which Bramante built for the Cardinals Raffaello Riario and Hadrian of Corneto. Cardinal Riario wished to have his palace attached, as was the custom, to the Church of S. Lorenzo in Damaso. Bramante altered the old basilica and connected it with the palace already in course of erection, for which he designed the noble façade and the arcades of the courtyard, which are the finest examples of the graceful and refined simplicity of his style. It is sad to say, that the granite pillars which support the arcade were taken from the basilica of S. Lorenzo; but the builder of the church, had in his day carried them off from the portico of the neighboring theatre of Pompeius. In every age architects have borrowed and destroyed, while they praised and studied, the work of those who went before.

More massive and severe in style was the palace which Bramante built for Cardinal Hadrian of Corneto in the Borgo Nuovo, which Alexander VI had laid out. Cardinal Hadrian stood high in the Pope’s favor, and wished to please him by decorating his new street. It was in Hadrian's garden that Alexander VI supped in the evening before his fatal illness. He had gone perhaps to see the progress of Bramante's work, which was there uninfluenced by any need of adaptation, and consequently conceived a simple but stately dwelling for a great noble. A plain basement of rustica work with square windows was surmounted by a floor more richly decorated for the habitation of the master. Round-headed windows are set within massive square cornices, and the wall space between them is adorned by two graceful pilasters. The upper story, designed for the use of dependents, has the same decoration of pilasters with smaller and simpler windows.

In the days of Alexander VI Cardinal Rovere had not seen much of Rome. He needed architects for practical purposes, and summoned from Florence Giuliano di San Gallo to fortify his castle at Ostia. He afterwards employed Giuliano to build a palace at his native place, Savona, and when he felt it wise to withdraw to France, Giuliano went with him. There Giuliano made a model of a palace which was presented to Charles VIII at Lyons, and was the astonishment and delight of the King and his Court. On the election of his patron to the Papacy, Giuliano di San Gallo hastened to Rome; but Julius II knew enough of architecture to discover the superiority of Bramante and he was determined that whatever he did should be done by the foremost men of his day. His views were magnificent, and were prompted not so much by a love for art as by a desire to perpetuate his own fame. He had none of that delight in beauty which led him to surround himself with lovely things. He was not a patron of jewelers or workers in embroidery—indeed he was the first man who drew a clear line of distinction between the lesser and the greater arts. He saw the permanent value of architecture, painting, and sculpture, and treated with respect the great men who pursued them. In this deliberate determination to patronize only what was great and lasting, Julius II has been amply justified by the result. He may be forgotten as a warrior or as a statesman, but he will live as the patron of Bramante, Raffael, and Michel Angelo.

Giuliano di San Gallo was disappointed to find that Julius II had made Bramante his architect in chief, and employed him busily at the Vatican. The Pope devised a great plan of connecting with the Vatican palace, by means of covered porticoes, the garden house of the Belvedere which Antonio Pollaiuolo had designed for Innocent VIII. The distance was about four hundred yards, but the inequality of the ground caused exceptional difficulties. A little valley lay between the two buildings, and the first floor of the Vatican was on a level with the ground floor of the Belvedere. Bramante designed
a double loggia with a flight of steps leading from the lower ground. The lower loggia was adapted from the Doric pillars of the Theatre of Marcellus; over it was a gallery adorned with Ionic pillars, but enclosed and furnished with windows. The upper part of the space contained within this courtyard was to be a terraced garden: the lower part, nearest the Vatican, an open-air theatre for games and tournaments, while the spectators could sit in the loggia, which commanded a view of Rome on the one side and of the wooded hills of the other. The Pope was delighted with this magnificent plan, and ordered Bramante to push on the work with feverish haste. The earth dug out during the day was carried away by night, so that there should be no hindrance to the progress of the work. Julius II wished his walls to grow rather than be built and the result of this over haste was that the foundations in aftertimes gave way, and the portico has needed continual repairs. Still, with all the haste that Bramante made, his work was not finished. At the death of Julius II the greater part of the corridor on the side towards Rome had been built, but on the opposite side only the foundations were laid. Nor did posterity respect Bramante's magnificent design. It is true that Pius IV carried on the corridor; but Sixtus V made impossible the execution of the original plan by building his library across the court. He walled up Bramante's arcades, and severed what might have been the most stately court in the world into two disconnected portions. The building of the Braccio Nuovo in 1817 still further filled up the space. There are now two courts and a garden on the ground where Bramante strove to present a striking picture of a mighty palace with all its dependencies for comfort and amusement blended into harmony by his architectural skill. Had his plan been carried out, Julius II would have left his successors a palace unrivalled for beauty and convenience.

If we are to believe Vasari, care for his future fame was amongst the first thoughts that occupied Julius II when he ascended the Papal throne. The design for his own tomb after death was a strange object of solicitude for one who was only at the beginning of his career; but the passionate desire for posthumous glory was a leading motive with the men of the Renaissance who were drunk with a new sense of power over their own lives and over the world around them. The assertion of their individuality was their chief delight; the sense of common life and common interests was weak. Society was necessary as the sphere of the individual's activity; but society had no rights against him. He strove to act so that his actions should stand out clearly and decidedly his own, distinct from those of his fellow-men. He wished his name to be frequent in the mouths of those who came after, and his memory to live associated with some great undertaking. Vanity suggested sepulchral monuments as a ready means of satisfying this desire for fame. Men vied with one another in elaborating great designs. Sculpture was encouraged in a way which at no other time has been possible, and the churches of Italy were filled with stately tombs which are still their chief ornaments.

In Rome this taste for monumental sculpture had grown strong. Perhaps the honor paid by Cosimo de' Medici to the deposed Baldassare Cossa, whose tomb adorns the Baptistery of Florence, awakened the emulation of the rightful Popes. At all events the tomb of Martin V in the Lateran Church is the first of a splendid series. It was the work of Antonio Filarete and was simple in its design; before the papal altar lies the recumbent figure of Martin V in papal robes, wrought in bronze. The tomb of Eugenius IV in the Church of S. Salvatore in Lauro was more in accordance with the ordinary design; on a white marble sarcophagus, enclosed by an architrave supported by pillars, lies the figure of the Pope; in the space above the sarcophagus is carved in relief the Madonna and an adoring angel. The tombs of Nicolas V, Calixtus III, and Paul II were
destroyed by the work of Julius II in S. Peter's, and only portions of the delicate figures which Mino da Fiesole made for Paul II now remain. Pius II was more fortunate; his monument was removed to the Church of S. Andrea della Valle, where it still remains, a vast architectural erection in four divisions, overladen with pillars, cornices, and reliefs. Happier were Sixtus IV and Innocent VIII, whose tombs by Antonio Pollaiuolo still adorn S. Peter's. On the bronze lid of a sarcophagus Sixtus IV is represented as reposing with folded hands; the face is strong and vigorous even in the quietness of death. The figure of the Pope is surrounded by an ornamental border in which are allegorical figures of Virtues in relief, while the beveled edge of the lid is adorned with figures representing the various branches of intellectual study. It is noticeable as a sign of the times that the figure of Theology has been studied from Diana; over her shoulders she carries a quiver and in her hand a bow; an angel holds an open book before the reclining figure, but her face is turned away as though she were on the watch for some more practical object of pursuit. Sixtus IV fared better at the hands of Pollaiuolo than did Innocent VIII, whose tomb is more pretentious, but fails in energy and in architectural arrangement. The Pope lies on a bronze sarcophagus, and above is again represented as in life; one hand is raised in benediction, the other holds the point of the Holy Lance which the Sultan Bajazet had sent as a precious relic. Over Alexander VI no tomb was erected. Julius II caused the coffin of his enemy to be taken from S. Peter's to the Church of S. Giacomo degli Spagnuoli, whence it was again transferred to the Spanish Church of S. Maria di Monferrato. No man ventured to raise a memorial to one whose name was hateful to his successor and whose pontificate every one wished to forget.

Nor was it only the Popes whose fame was thus perpetuated. All the chief churches of Rome are full of tombs of the Cardinals of this time. It would almost seem that the great ones among them were content to let their deeds speak for them, while the more obscure sought the assistance of the artist to perpetuate their name.

No great monuments remain of Torquemada, Bessarion, Carvajal, Ammannati, or Prospero Colonna; but the Church of S. Maria del Popolo abounds in tombs of the Rovere and other relatives of Sixtus IV, and there are others in the Church of SS. Apostoli. Everywhere throughout Rome are traces of the chisel of Mino da Fiesole, Paolo Romano, Andrea Sansovino, and other sculptors whose names have perished.

Julius II. was a complete representative of the Italian temper of his time, and resolved to be commemorated by a tomb which should tower above all others in its grandeur and magnificence. He was fortunate in his opportunity. As a new epoch in architecture had been opened by the genius of Bramante, so Julius II witnessed the beginning of a new epoch in sculpture. A young Florentine, Michel Angelo Buonarotti, came to Rome in 1496 in the service of Cardinal Raffaelle Riario. The study of the ancient sculptures in Rome rapidly developed his conceptions of the possibilities of his art, and the Pietà which he executed for the French Cardinal la Grolaye was at once recognized as a masterpiece. The mighty Mother bends her head in agony over the body of the Son, which lies in death upon her lap, as peaceful as when He slumbered as a babe. When some critics remarked that the Virgin was represented as too young, Michel Angelo answered that purity enjoyed eternal youth. We cannot fail to read on this statue the profound impression produced in his mind by the world around him. He expressed the helpless agony of the strong upright nature which had to endure in patience the outrages of those who were powerful only for evil; he portrayed the despair of hopeless disappointment, not the patience of resignation. But whether or no his contemporaries caught the grandeur of his conception, they admired his technical skill and truth in
modeling; and his fame, which this work raised high, was still further enhanced by the
statue of David which he made on his return to Florence. When Julius II bethought him
of his tomb, he had no doubt about entrusting the work to Michel Angelo as the
foremost sculptor in Italy.

The plan which Michel Angelo submitted was sufficiently magnificent to satisfy
even the aspirations of Julius II. Over the spot where the Pope lay buried was to rise a
mighty sculptured chapel. Its pillars were to be supported by figures in bonds,
representing the arts and sciences, which were so closely connected with the Pope that
at his death they also died. The pillars were so massive that each had two niches holding
statues of Victories with the cities and provinces captured by the Pope chained to their
feet. This huge pedestal was to contain altogether forty statues. At the four corners of
the cornice were to be placed figures of Moses and S. Paul representing the religious
life, and Rachel and Leah, whom Dante had taught men to regard as allegories of the
contemplative and the practical life. Above them were to tower two colossal figures
supporting the bier on which lay the sarcophagus of the Pope. One of these figures was
Heaven rejoicing to receive the soul of Julius II, the other was Earth bewailing her
irreparable loss.

Julius II was anxious to have this design carried out at once, and Michel Angelo set
to work with characteristic ardor. He superintended the quarrying of the marble, and
brought it to Rome by sea, till half the Piazza of S. Peter's was filled with unhewn
blocks. So eager was the Pope to see the progress of the work, that he had a drawbridge
made by which he might pass,

when he would, to Michel Angelo's studio from the
corridor which ran between the Vatican and the Castle of S. Angelo. At first all went
well; but misunderstandings soon arose between the Pope and the sculptor.

Michel Angelo thought only of his art; Julius II thought only of himself; both were
impetuous and exacting. As Julius II became more deeply involved in politics he cared
less about his tomb, and Michel Angelo could not get money to pay for his marble. His
fruitless visits to the Vatican galled his independent spirit, and he grew unduly sensitive.
One day, when he was waiting while the Pope at table was turning over the wares of a
jeweler, he heard Julius II say, “I will not spend another farthing on stones, either small
or great”. He looked on the remark as significant of a change of purpose; and when an
official told him, in answer to his application for money, that he need not come again
for some time, he left Rome in indignant despair at the end of 1505, after writing a letter
to the Pope:

“I was this morning driven from the palace by order of your Holiness; if
you require me further you must seek me elsewhere than in Rome”.

The tomb of Julius II was unlucky from the first; its work was often suspended, its
design altered, its fragments scattered; and Michel Angelo’s design fared worse than did
Bramante’s at the Vatican.

Julius II’s plans tripped up one another by their rapid succession. If we are to trust
Vasari, the discussion about the place where Michel Angelo’s monument was to stand
led to the rebuilding of S. Peter’s. The vast structure which Michel Angelo had designed
required an open space around it that it might be seen to advantage. While considering
this point the Pope went back to the scheme of Nicolas V for rebuilding the old basilica;
but the conservative restoration which Nicolas V had begun in the tribune made way for
a more splendid plan of Bramante. The old basilica was to be swept away, and a
building in the new classic style was to take its place. Bramante's design was a building
in the form of a Greek cross, with spacious tribunes at the ends of the three arms. The
middle was to be surmounted by a mighty dome, on either side of which rose a bell tower; the façade was adorned by a spacious vestibule supported by six pillars.

In vain the Cardinals murmured and remonstrated at this destruction. The Pope’s purpose was fixed. Even an age greedy of novelty and full of confidence in itself was startled at the demolition of the most venerable church in Christendom to make way for something new. The basilica of S. Peter's had been for ages the object of pilgrimages from every land. Outside, it gleamed with mosaics, of which the ship of Giotto is now the only survival; inside, its pavement was a marvel of mosaic art; its pillars dated from the days of Constantine; its monuments told the history of the Roman Church for centuries. Men may praise at the present day the magnificence of S. Peter's; they forget what was destroyed to make room for it. No more wanton or barbarous act of destruction was ever deliberately committed; no bishop was ever so untrue as was Julius II to his duty as keeper of the fabric of his church. His boundless vanity and self-assertion was accompanied by insolence to the past; a new era was to date from himself, and all that had gone before might be forgotten. Half of the old basilica was pulled down with ruthless haste. Mosaics were taken up; monuments were torn down; pillars, which might have been used elsewhere, were shattered. Michel Angelo's wrath was stirred by the ruthless havoc which Bramante wrought, and he indignantly but vainly pleaded for more respect to the precious relics of the past. A few fragments only were preserved and placed in the Grotte Vaticane, where they still keep some memory of what was lost. The tombs and inscriptions there remaining range from the sarcophagus which tells that Junius Bassus, Prefect of Rome, went to God in A.D. 359 to the remnants of the lovely tomb which Mino da Fiesole carved for Paul II, The tombs of other Popes were removed by their relations to smaller churches; Julius II himself had no care for the memory of any save his uncle Sixtus IV.

The Grotte Vaticane, as they are called, are the row of chapels which had been erected under the old basilica, where many burials had taken place. Julius II was driven to respect the bones of the dead, and gave orders that the burying-place should be as little as possible disturbed, and that the foundations of the pillars which were to bear the roof of the new church should be laid below the old chapels. On April 18, 1506, the ceremony of laying the foundation stone was performed by the Pope. It was the pillar against which is now erected the altar of S. Veronica. Here a deep pit had been excavated, and the bottom was full of water, which was being bailed out as fast as possible by workmen. The Pope courageously descended the ladder, accompanied by two Cardinals; but he was fearful lest the crowd above should cause the earth to slip, and shouted to them to stand further back. His courage in running the risk of an attack of giddiness was regarded as a sign of his trust in God and his boundless reverence for S. Peter.

On the same day Julius II wrote with pride to Henry VII of England to announce the fact; “in sure hope”, he says, “that our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, by whose monition we have undertaken to renew the old basilica, which is perishing through age, will, through the prayers of the Apostle, give us strength—so that what was begun with so much zeal may be finished to the praise and glory of God”. The hope of Julius II was not to be fulfilled, for when he died only a small part of his design had been executed. The building of S. Peter’s went through many changes, and was not finished for 150 years. Julius II demanded that Christendom should join in his pride at the greatness of his undertaking; but Christendom was ceasing to feel that the centre of its interests lay in the city of Rome, or that its affairs were directed by the Pope. The contributions
levied for the building of S. Peter's did much to make men feel the weight of the papal yoke and to criticize the grounds on which they were taxed by a foreign priest. The church which Julius II strove so diligently to raise never met with the reverence which had been paid to the venerable building which he overthrew; it was never to be the great central church of the Germanic peoples.
CHAPTER XIV.
THE LEAGUE OF CAMBRAI
1506-1510.

The care of architecture and sculpture did not divert the attention of Julius II from politics. His scheme against Venice had failed for the present. The league of Blois came formally to an end in October, 1505, when Louis XII entered into an alliance with Ferdinand of Spain; and the struggle between Ferdinand and his son-in-law Philip was the point of interest in the politics of Europe. Italy was at peace save for the war which still dragged on between Florence and Pisa. It needed little to break this peace, and Julius II determined to be the first to do so. He made preparations, but kept their object secret. He allowed the Venetian envoy to think that he intended an expedition against Naples, for which he refused to accept the homage of Spain. At last it became known that the Pope intended to reduce Perugia and Bologna under the obedience of the Roman See. It was an undertaking which Alexander VI had found too large to be contemplated; but Julius II calculated on the neutrality of all and the help of many. Venice remained still; Louis XII of France reluctantly promised help; Florence was ready to do anything which would annoy Venice; the Dukes of Mantua, Ferrara, and Urbino promised troops.

Gianpaolo Baglione of Perugia and Giovanni Bentivoglio of Bologna were, in name, papal vicars of their states: in reality they ruled as independent lords. The rule of the Baglioni had been tyrannical, and the city suffered from bloody feuds; so that Julius II was in some measure justified in declaring that he went to free Perugia from a tyrant. But he had on his accession confirmed the privileges of Bologna; and Giovanni Bentivoglio was an ally of Louis XII and was under French protection. A more cautious man might have doubted of the success of his enterprise against such foes; but Julius II trusted to his audacity. Machiavelli instances his success as a proof of the advantage of promptitude. Julius II, he says, ordered the Venetians to remain neutral, and ordered the French king to help him; had he given them time to deliberate they probably would not have obeyed him; but he took the field at once, and they saw nothing else to do but fall in with his wishes.

Julius II left Rome before sunrise on August 26, having committed the care of the city to Cardinal Cibò. He was mounted on horseback, and wore a rochet; before him was carried a cross, and a bishop bore the Host. But as the bishop's horse had to be led by an attendant on foot, the Pope on the second day sent him along the road, while he himself chose to ride through the woods; he seems to have wished to lay aside his ecclesiastical character as much as possible and adopt the manners of the camp. He set out with twenty-four Cardinals, but only with a force of 500 men. He advanced by way of Nepi and Viterbo to Orvieto, where he was joined by the Duke of Urbino, whose martial ardor was checked by an attack of the gout, and who was on that account better fitted for the office of mediator. Gianpaolo Baglione saw no one to help him and was afraid of the Pope's threat that he would expel him from Perugia. He thought it better to come to terms, and offered to put in the hands of the Pope all the castles in the territory of Perugia, and the gates of the city itself, and also to aid him with his forces in the expedition against Bologna. As Bologna was the chief object of Julius II he did not wish
to waste time over Perugia; on September 8, Gianpaolo Baglione came to Orvieto and made submission to the Pope, who, with the Cardinals, the Duke of Urbino, and Gianpaolo Baglione, entered Perugia in state on September 13. His troops had not yet taken possession of the city, and he was attended only by a small guard.

Machiavelli, who was in his train, wondered at the Pope’s rashness. “The Pope and the Cardinals”, he wrote comments the Same day to Florence, “are at the discretion of Gianpaolo, not he at theirs. If he does no mischief to the man who has come to upset his power it will be owing to his good nature and humanity”. He repeated the same remark after mature reflection. “Prudent men who were there noted the rashness of the Pope and the cowardice of Gianpaolo; they could not understand how it was that he did not, to his lasting fame, rid himself at one blow of his enemy and enrich himself with booty, as he had in his power the Pope and Cardinals with all their luxuries. It was not goodness nor conscience that restrained him, for he was incestuous and a parricide; but he did not dare to do a deed which would have left an eternal memory. He might have been the first to show priests how little a man is esteemed who lives and rules as they do. He would have done a deed whose greatness would have outweighed all its infamy and all the danger which might have followed”.

The passage is remarkable as showing the hatred against priests which the secular career of the Papacy had necessarily produced. The condition of Italian politics emboldened the Popes to pursue their own advantage as temporal princes, and by so doing they ran the risk of being treated as on the same footing as other Italian rulers. But Machiavelli’s judgment also shows the confusion which lay beneath his political subtlety. He thought it possible that selfish villains should pursue some ideal end, and did not see that in a crisis all great conceptions necessarily vanished from their minds and self-interested motives alone remained. Why should Gianpaolo, being what he was, care to bring upon himself the retribution which would surely follow any violence offered to the Pope? He could not even have been sure of Perugia, had he done so, and he had no allies to support him. As it was, he had made good terms for himself owing to his insignificance; Bologna was the Pope's object, and he himself was honorably saved. It is the weakness of Machiavelli’s political method that, while professing to deal with politics in a practical spirit, he is not practical enough.

Julius II was received in Perugia with due respect, and ordered mass to be celebrated in the Church of S. Francesco, where he had been ordained when a simple scholar. He restored the Perugian exiles and labored to promote peace within the city. The Marquis of Mantua joined him with forces, and on September 21 he set out for Bologna by way of Gubbio and Urbino; thence, to avoid the Venetian territory of Rimini, he traversed the rugged road over the Apennines by San Marino to Cesena. There he received a definite promise of the aid of France, for the powerful adviser of Louis XII, the Cardinal of Rouen, had been won over to the Pope’s side by the promise of the Cardinalate to three of his nephews. His influence prevailed with the king, and the French troops, which had marched out of Milan to aid Bologna, received orders to join the Pope. Julius II was triumphant, and on October 7 issued a bull of excommunication against Giovanni Bentivoglio and his adherents as rebels against the Church; their goods were given as prey to anyone who seized them, and plenary indulgence was offered to those who slew them. The Pope with pride enumerated his forces to Machiavelli, and said, “I have published a crusade against Messer Giovanni, that every one may understand that I will make no terms with him”. It was part of his policy to give others no chance of drawing back.
Giovanni Bentivoglio would not have feared either the Pope’s forces or the Pope’s ban; but the advance of 8000 French troops under Charles d'Amboise, the Marshal of Chaumont, filled the people of Bologna with dread of pillage. Giovanni wavered for a time, and then threw himself on the protection of France, which had already betrayed him; on November 2 he left Bologna and retired to Chaumont's camp. The Bolognese sent envoys making submission to the Pope. It was time that they did so: for the French troops were longing for the pillage of Bologna, and Julius II had to pacify Chaumont by giving him large sums of money. The Bolognese only kept the French army at a distance by opening the sluices of their canal and so flooding the neighborhood of the French camp.

Julius II hastened to take possession of Bologna. The astrologers tried to dissuade him from entering at once on his arrival, saying that the stars were unpropitious. But Julius II now cared not for astrologers, and answered, “Let us go on and enter in the name of the Lord”. The splendor of the Pope’s entrance might recompense the weary Cardinals for the hardships of their journey. The populous city, with 70,000 inhabitants, welcomed the Pope as the liberator of Italy, the expeller of tyrants. Julius II, borne in his litter upon men's shoulders, was hailed as a second Julius Caesar. The weather was exceptionally warm, and the roses, which blossomed in abundance, were strewn in his path; men said that he was lord even of the planets and the skies.

Julius II was master of Bologna, but he had exhausted the papal treasury to gain his object, and had bound himself by many engagements. Bologna was hard to regulate, and Julius II was obliged to guarantee the old privileges of the city and leave its government in the hands of a council of forty, over whom was set a papal legate. The Bentivogli had taken refuge with the French king, who refused to surrender them to the Pope. Julius II could not be secure against attempts at revolt, and he made a bad choice of his first legate, Cardinal Ferrari. Ferrari's extortion was so notorious that he was recalled in a few months and was imprisoned in S. Angelo. His successor, Cardinal Alidosi, was still more oppressive to the Bolognese, and Julius II soon felt that it was easier to conquer than to govern. It was an ominous sign that his first act was to lay the foundations of a fortress by the Porta Galera, a strange measure for the liberator of the land and the expeller of tyrants.

Julius II was resolved to perpetuate in Bologna the memory of his triumph. He had been vexed at the hasty departure of Michel Angelo from Rome, and wrote peremptory letters to Florence ordering his return. In vain Michel Angelo asked permission to execute his work at Florence and send it, as it was finished, to the Pope; the haughty artist was at last ordered by the Gonfaloniere Soderini to go to Bologna and make his peace. Julius II looked at him angrily. “It seems”, he said, “that you have waited for us to come to you, instead of coming to us”. Michel Angelo knelt and asked pardon; he had acted in anger, but he could not endure the treatment which he had met with in Rome. A bishop, who was a friend of Soderini’s, tried to calm the rising indignation of the Pope. Artists, he said, were men of no education; they only knew their art and did not know how they ought to behave. In a moment the Pope's wrath found a new object. “How do you dare”, he exclaimed, “to say what I would not have said? It is you who are ignorant, not he. Out of my sight with your impertinence”. The astonished bishop was hustled out of the room by the attendants. Then Julius II looked with an amused look at Michel Angelo, gave him pardon and bade him not leave Bologna. Soon afterwards Michel Angelo was ordered to execute a bronze statue of the Pope to adorn his new possession. When he said that he could not be sure of the success of his first
casting, the Pope answered, “You must cast till you succeed, and you shall have as much money as you need”. Michel Angelo modeled a seated statue, three times the size of life. The right hand was raised; the Pope was asked what should be done with the left. Michel Angelo suggested that it might hold a book. “Nay”, said the Pope, “give me a sword, for I am no scholar”. Then as he looked at the statue he caught the severe expression with which the sculptor had clothed his face. “What is my right hand doing?” he asked; “am I blessing or banning?”. “You are admonishing the Bolognese to be wise”, was Michel Angelo’s answer. The statue was placed over the portal of S. Petronio, and was unveiled in February, 1508. In its final form the Pope held neither book nor sword in his left hand, but the keys of S. Peter.

When Julius II had gained Bologna he felt that he had taken the first step towards the reduction of Venice and the conquest of the Romagna; his plan of a league against Venice revived and he was again hopeful. The death of the Archduke Philip at Burgos, in September, 1506, removed the great cause of European discord and left the French king more free to act. Julius II strove to reconcile Louis XII and Maximilian, and renew the undertaking which had been laid aside. In this he was doomed to disappointment, and events occurred which made him suspicious of France. The city of Genoa had long been under the suzerainty of France, as a free republic with a French governor. The party quarrels of the Genoese nobles favored the growth of a strong popular party, till, weary of the avarice of the French governor and the bloody deeds of the nobles, the Genoese rose in revolt. They expelled the nobles, besieged the French garrison, elected a dyer as their Doge, and abolished the suzerainty of France. Louis XII was indignant and vowed revenge; he entered Italy with a large army, and refused to hear the rebels, who could offer no resistance, punished them with great severity, imposed a heavy fine upon the city and abolished all its privileges.

Julius II vainly tried to interpose. As a native of the Genoese territory he loved his country; as a man sprung from the people he was inclined to the popular side; as an Italian he looked with alarm at the presence of a powerful army with no definite object in view; as Pope he feared the designs of the Cardinal of Amboise, who was known to hanker after the Papacy and was capable of devising a scheme for his deposition. His friendship with France gave place to alarm. He refused an interview with the French king, and quitted Bologna for the greater safety of Rome. There he arrived on March 27, and enjoyed a triumphal entry. On all sides was heard the clang of trumpets and the din of war as Julius, seated in his car, swept through the streets amidst the shouts of the people. It was Palm Sunday, and the Romans thought that they did honor to the day by welcoming Christ’s Vicar with the cry, “Blessed is he that cometh in the name of the Lord”. When the Pope reached S. Angelo he was met by a chariot containing a globe on which danced ten boys attired like angels. Suddenly the globe opened and another angel stepped forth and offered the Pope a palm, saying in neat Latin verses that the Pope had brought on Palm Sunday the palms of victory to Rome. No one thought it incongruous that this military parade should end with the Pope giving the benediction from S. Peter’s.

When Julius II looked around him he saw the political condition of Europe to be threatening on all sides. In Germany Maximilian was freer to work his will than he had been hitherto. Maximilian seemed a careless adventurer, but he had a fixed policy of opposition to France, and a desire to maintain the rights of the Empire and secure supremacy for his own house. The rivalry between France and the house of Austria had already begun and was the determining element in the politics of Europe. Maximilian
found himself strong enough to take up a decided position of resistance to the French advance in Italy. In June, 1507, he summoned a diet at Constance, and laid before it his grievances. The French king, he said, was endeavoring to rob the German nation of the Empire; he had made his plans for securing the Papacy for France, and for this end was plotting against the Pope; to prevent this Maximilian asked the Diet to help with men and money, that he might make an expedition into Italy, receive the imperial crown, and assert the rights of the Empire in the Milanese. The Diet decreed that it would help the Emperor, and Maximilian won the Swiss confederates by promising them territory in the Trentino.

Meanwhile Ferdinand of Spain had been visiting his Neapolitan kingdom, where he wished to make sure of the fidelity of Gonsalvo de Cordova, who was loyal to his own cost. Even after the death of Philip had freed Ferdinand from any immediate dread, the suspicious king removed Gonsalvo from Naples, which was afterwards governed by a viceroy. The attitude of Maximilian drew Ferdinand and Louis XII more closely together, and Ferdinand sailed from Naples to have an interview with the French king at Savona. Julius II wished to see him on his way, and went to Ostia for that purpose; but Ferdinand was ill-disposed to the Pope, who refused to grant him the investiture of Naples. He sailed past Ostia, and at the end of June confirmed the Franco-Spanish alliance by a conference with Louis XII.

The politics of Europe had now definitely settled down into a struggle for ascendency between France, Spain, and the house of Hapsburg, and it was recognized that Italy was the battlefield of their arms and their diplomacy alike. The Papacy had elected to enter Italian politics as a secular power, and as a consequence of that decision must be prepared to defend its own interests. Julius II had refused to cast himself unreservedly on any side, and was known to have plans of his own about Italian affairs. The three great Powers had therefore a common interest in getting rid of him, and in dealing with the States of the Church according to the requirements of their own policy. If a common agreement had been possible, the Papal States would have been secularized, and the Papacy, as an institution, would have been completely changed; but, as usual, the strength of the Papacy lay in the want of statesmanlike capacity in its opponents. The desirability of dealing with the Papacy was frankly recognized on all sides. In Spain the zeal of the clergy was fervent, and the party in favor of reform was strong. Ferdinand discussed with Louis XII a plan for convoking a General Council, and this plan was warmly seconded by the Cardinal of Rouen, who hoped that Julius II might be deposed in favor of himself. On the other hand Maximilian’s adventurous mind had conceived a scheme of uniting the Papacy with the Empire. On June 10 he wrote a mysterious letter to the Bishop of Trent in which he said that the fox (Louis XII) would find the cock or the hen (the Pope and the Empire) flown from the tree. His own plan was to go to Rome and become Pope and Emperor in one.

This astounding scheme shows the power of the ideas of the Renaissance even in Germany. Anything was considered possible. The ideas of Charles the Great had made way for the ideas of Augustus; the titles of Caesar and Pontifex Maximus might be again combined in the same person as they were when Augustus began the restoration of order in the distracted world. But if the ideas of the Renaissance fostered visionary plans, the Church did nothing to dispel them. The Popes were surrounded by none of the awe inspired by the sight of the duties of the priest's office discharged in the spirit of a priest. It was long since holiness or a care for the well-being of the Church as a spiritual power had been the leading features of the Papacy. Maximilian might truly plead that he
could carry on the work of Sixtus IV, Alexander VI, and Julius II with as pious a mind and as much priestly decorum as they themselves had shown. Moreover the reformers at Basel, by their choice of Amadeus of Savoy, had suggested the view that a reformation of the Church was only possible by a union of temporal and ecclesiastical power.

The plan of Maximilian was kept a profound secret amongst a few of his confidential advisers, to whom was added a discontented Cardinal, Hadrian of Castello. Cardinal Hadrian had been influential under Alexander VI, was a man of considerable experience in politics, and was a friend of Henry VII of England, by whose permission he held the bishopric of Bath and Wells. He bemoaned his exclusion from affairs under Julius II; even his verses about the Pope's expedition against Bologna had not advanced him in the papal favor. He seems to have striven to win the good graces of Henry VII of England by writing calumnious letters against the Pope, which Henry VII forwarded to Julius II. Fearing the Pope's wrath, Hadrian suddenly left Rome, to every one's astonishment. Then he wrote from Spoletto asking for pardon, and on September 10 returned to Rome. Those who wondered at his departure wondered still more at his inconstancy; and his conduct became still more inexplicable when, on October 6, he again fled in disguise from Rome. The Pope knew nothing of his reason, and could only suspect some conspiracy against himself. Hadrian made his way into the Tyrol, where he lived in obscurity, and nothing more was heard about him in Rome; but a letter of Maximilian's shows that Hadrian was his secret adviser in this scheme for securing the Papacy, and it was a plan which Maximilian never dismissed from his mind.

Julius II knew nothing of Maximilian's designs, but rumors were rife concerning those of Louis XII and Ferdinand. He was not, however, much disturbed about himself, but boldly entered into the game of diplomacy, in which he showed much dexterity. He was still bent on the overthrow of Venice, and for this purpose strove to reconcile France and the Emperor. When the dangers that might follow to Italy were pointed out to him he answered impatiently, “Let the world perish provided I obtain my wish”. He professed himself ready to ally with France and with the Emperor at the same time; he tried to reconcile the two foes, but he was trusted by neither.

Meanwhile the Venetians had to decide which party they would choose. As France already had possessions in Italy, while Germany lay outside, they thought that it was best to oppose the new invader, and answered Maximilian's request for passage through their territory by saying that, if he came peacefully with a small escort, like his father, they would admit him, but not if he came accompanied by an army. Maximilian could not shake this determination, and advanced against Venice as a foe. Early in 1508 he assembled his troops and passed on to Trent, where on February he took a step of which contemporaries did not appreciate the importance. Preceded by the imperial heralds and the naked sword, Maximilian went in solemn procession to the Cathedral, where the Bishop of Gurk announced to the people Maximilian's journey to Rome, and in so doing called him by the title of Emperor elect. No papal representative gave formality to this act, which was meant to be an assertion of the inherent authority of the Empire and its emancipation from the Church. It claimed that the German king became by his election Emperor, and needed no further confirmation. Herefofore the chosen of the electors had styled himself King of the Romans, and only took the title of Emperor after he had received his crown from the hands of the Pope in the imperial city of Rome. Maximilian swept away the claims of Rome to bestow the Empire when, without any direct authority from the Pope, he took the title of 'Emperor elect'. He asserted that the choice of Germany, not the choice of Rome, gave validity to the imperial dignity. In
former days this assertion would have been stoutly withstood; as it was, it was either unobserved or misunderstood.

Maximilian wished, before starting on his Italian expedition, to secure some memorial of his attempt; Julius II did not wish to see him in Rome, and was glad to satisfy him so far as titles went. He had already offered to send a legate for his coronation in Germany; and though he was not consulted by Maximilian before his assumption of the title, he at once recognized it and addressed Maximilian by the name which he had chosen. Maximilian's assumption of the imperial title was more enduring than any other of his exploits. None of his successors went to Rome for coronation. Charles V was crowned at Bologna; but afterwards the title of 'Emperor elect' was taken after coronation at Aachen or Frankfurt, and the word 'elect' was soon dropped by courtesy except in formal documents. The imperial title was vindicated for Germany and for Germany alone by Maximilian, who with his romantic policy thought that he had taken a great step by this assertion of the rights of the German folk; really, he had but recognized the fact that Rome had become the city of the Pope. While maintaining the universal rights of the Empire, he had associated it with the German nation. To make the Empire more powerful he called in to his aid the principle of nationality whose growth proved the Empire to be a dream.

From Trent Maximilian pursued his way into the Venetian territory, where he threatened Vicenza, while his generals attacked Rovereto and Cadore. But his troops fell away, and the Swiss did not come to his help. He was beaten back on all sides by the Venetian troops, who won victory after victory.

At the end of May Venice had captured Trieste and passed on into Friuli; and on June 6 Maximilian made a truce for three years with Venice, allowing her to keep all her conquests.

This triumph of Venice seemed to overthrow all the plans of Julius II, as Venice, which he wished to isolate, was negotiating for an alliance with France and Spain. Louis XII had secretly given help to the Venetians, and Maximilian was enraged against him. The Pope himself had reasons to be suspicious of the French king. There had been a rebellion at Bologna, instigated by the dispossessed Giovanni Bentivoglio, who lived under French protection in Milan, and was ready to take advantage of any disturbance at Bologna. The rising was put down; and Louis XII reluctantly withdrew his protection from the Bentivogli, who fled to Venice, where they took sanctuary. Julius II demanded their surrender, and the Doge pleaded against him the rights of asylum. On this the Pope issued a brief, withdrawing the right of sanctuary from homicides, incendiaries, and rebels against the Church; he empowered the Doge to use his discretion in seizing any who at the time were guilty of these crimes. Nothing was done, and the Pope’s anger against Venice grew more fierce. Soon another cause of quarrel arose, as Venice refused to allow him to nominate to the bishopric of Vicenza and exercised its own right of election. This was only according to custom; but Julius II was indignant and said”, Even if it cost me my mitre I will be Pope and maintain the jurisdiction of the Papacy”.

Julius II did not speak without some grounds of assurance. Already the scheme was drawn up which afterwards resulted in the formation of the League of Cambrai. The papal legate, Cardinal Carvajal, together with the Spanish envoy, the French Governor of Lombardy, Marshal Chaumont, some representative of the Emperor, and the Marquis of Mantua, had drafted proposals for the settlement of disputes in Italy. They set forward a league between Maximilian and Louis XII, by which all their differences
were to be arranged. A common expedition was to be undertaken against Venice, that Maximilian might recover all that Venice had usurped from the Empire and the house of Austria; while Louis XII was to recover all that Venice held to the detriment of his claims in the Milanese. The Pope and the Kings of Hungary and Aragon were to have the opportunity of entering the league also, to recover their rights from Venice.

If Maximilian had this plan seriously before him, it mattered little to him how the Venetian war was ended; indeed, it was all the better that Venice should gain important advantages, and thereby inspire greater animosity. Louis XII was offended by the haste with which Venice concluded its advantageous truce with Maximilian, without considering his interests or including in it the Duke of Gueldres, whom Louis XII, in the interest of Venice, had encouraged to attack Brabant. The triumph of Venice was on all sides regarded with sullen suspicion. Venice knew of the danger which threatened her, but took no steps to gain allies. Already the foreigner had set his foot in Italy, but this had not taught the Italian powers to draw more closely together. Separate interests were still as powerful as ever, and the growth of one Italian state was still regarded as a menace to the rest. They preferred the yoke of the stranger to the consolidation of Italy under any state save their own. Individual Italians might sympathize with Venice; the Italian states hailed her approaching ruin with glee.

The league for the partition of the possessions of Venice on the mainland was signed at Cambrai on December 10, 1508, by Margaret of Austria, Regent of Netherlands, on behalf of her father, Maximilian, and by Cardinal Amboise as representative of the French king. It provided that Padua, Verona, Brescia, Friuli, Aquileia, and the other territories claimed by Maximilian should be restored to him; France was to have all that was wanting to the duchy of Milan; the lands belonging to the Church were to be restored to the Pope; the King of Aragon was to have the cities occupied by Venice on the Neapolitan coast; Hungary was to have Dalmatia; the Duke of Savoy the island of Cyprus; while the Duke of Ferrara and the Marquis of Mantua were to recover all their losses.

The League of Cambrai was a great political crime. In a time of peace, without any provocation, the powers of Europe deliberately determined to combine for the purpose of international robbery. Old claims were revived: an arbitrary principle of legitimacy was assumed. Venice was singled out as the aggressor who had defrauded others of their rights, and Europe nobly determined to redress the wrong; it was of no consequence to the allies that every one of them was liable to similar claims against themselves. Separate interests converged for the overthrow of Venice, and the partition of the Venetian territory was recognized as an undertaking of European importance. No feeling of honor stood in the way; no treaty was recognized as binding. Maximilian had made a three years’ truce with Venice at the time when he was meditating an alliance against her; Louis XII professed himself her friend; Julius II had pledged his word not to disturb her in her possessions. All this went for nothing. Self-seeking, without any other end alleged, was recognized as the principle by which the newly formed nations of Europe were to guide their course. The man who above all others devised this plan, and the man who urged it persistently upon the rest, was the nominal head of European Christianity, Pope Julius II.

It was not merely the possession of a couple of cities in the Romagna that impelled Julius II. He wished to see Venice thoroughly humbled, so that she could no longer be a hindrance in his path. He was clear-sighted enough to perceive that a strong power in
Northern Italy was a hindrance to the growth of the States of the Church. With Spain in Naples, and France in Milan, it was possible for the Church to grow into a strong power in Central Italy. The Pope might hold the balance between two foreign powers jealous of one another; but a strong Italian power was an obstacle to his success in this design. Julius II wished to be rid forever of any such danger. His object was to reduce the threatening power of Venice into limits within which he was strong enough to cope with it. He had no love for France, for Germany, or for Spain; he was ready to attack them all, and to unite Italy under the Church, if that might be. His policy was intelligible, and in a measure it succeeded; Venice was reduced, and the States of the Church were created by Julius II. But this policy cannot claim to be regarded as patriotic. Julius II did his best to destroy the one state in Italy which might have made head against the foreigner; and he did so in the interest of the States of the Church. The Church as a temporal power was in consequence of his policy established in Central Italy; but this result was won by the sacrifice of any chance of Italian independence.

The subsequent action of Julius II led contemporaries to think that he sought only the restoration of the cities in the Romagna, and that the obstinacy of Venice turned him reluctantly against her. This opinion at once heightens and lowers our estimate of the Pope's policy. He pursued a plan which was more extensive than immediate gain; but the plan was more selfish, and was more disastrous to the interests of Italy as a whole. He did not at once give in his adhesion to the League of Cambrai, though it was the result of his own endeavor. He was not sure that it would succeed, or that the agreement made at Cambrai would lead to any better results than that previously made at Blois. He was not sure that the King of France was friendly to himself, and he would not commit himself till he saw that others were in earnest. In January, 1509, the Venetian envoy reported that the Pope was ill pleased with the league; in February he said that he wished to be neutral; in March, after France had proclaimed war against Venice, he said that he would not enter the league if it was directed specially against Venice. At last when he saw that France was in earnest, he entered the league on March 25, and agreed to furnish 500 men-at-arms, and 4000 infantry. When Venice wished to reduce the number of her foes, and offered on April 7 to restore Faenza and Rimini to the Pope, her offer was contemptuously refused, and the Pope said, “Do what you will with your lands”.

Moreover, the Pope was resolved to inflict on the Venetians all the harm that he could. Venice tried to engage the Orsini to fight on her side, and the Orsini received money from the Venetian envoys. Julius II forbade this engagement, and succeeded by threats and negotiations in prevailing on the Orsini to remain quiet. But he went further than this; he threatened to imprison the Venetian envoys, and he ordered the Orsini not to return the money which they had received. On April 27, when he saw that France had begun the war, he published a Bull of excommunication against Venice, couched in the strongest terms. He interpreted his Bull by telling the Orsini that he absolved them for keeping the money of Venice, because it was the money of excommunicated persons. “Holy Father”, said one of the Orsini, “we do not wish to blacken our good faith”. “Do not by any means restore the money”, was the Pope’s angry answer. It is some comfort to know that the Orsini had higher views of honor than the Pontiff and managed to give back 3000 ducats to the Venetian envoy.

When war was inevitable, Venice prepared to offer a firm resistance. The French army crossed her frontier, the papal troops under the Pope's nephew, Francesco della Rovere, now Duke of Urbino, attacked the Romagna. But Maximilian and Ferdinand of
Aragon were both quiet, and waited on events; if Venice could prolong the war it was possible that the confederacy against her would quickly dissolve. The French advanced, capturing cities on their way, and the Venetian troops were ordered to defend the passage of the river Adda; but there were divided counsels in the Venetian camp, and a mistake in tactics enabled the French to bring on a battle. At Ghiara d’Adda or Vaila, the Venetians were defeated on May 14, and the mercenary troops fell into hopeless disorder. The loss inflicted in the battle was not considerable, and Venice had still 25,000 men in the field, but the mercenaries could not be reorganized; they fled to Mestre, and lost all discipline. Venice was rendered practically helpless by a slight reverse. Her haughty nobles fell into abject terror, and the subject cities on the mainland rejoiced that they had escaped from Egyptian bondage. The Venetian oligarchy had never trusted the people whom it governed, and had never taught them to defend themselves. The insignificant defeat at Valla upset all the statecraft of Venice, its government fell into unreasoning despondency. Machiavelli utters a severe, yet truthful judgment. "If the Government of Venice had possessed any heroism, it could easily have repaired its loss, and showed a new face to fortune. It might in time either have conquered, or lost more gloriously, or made more honorable terms. But the cowardice caused by the want of good organization for war made them lose at once their courage and their dominions".

Venice could devise no policy save submission. Louis XII was allowed to conquer all that he claimed as belonging to the Milanese, and then he retired. Verona, Vicenza, and Padua admitted the representatives of the Emperor, who did not find it necessary even to appear in arms. The towns on the Neapolitan coast were restored to Ferdinand. Rimini, Faenza, Cervia, and even Ravenna were surrendered to the Pope’s legate, Cardinal Alidosi, on May 28. The Venetians wished first of all to make their peace with the Pope, as a step towards breaking up the formidable league against them; it was hopeless to turn to Louis XII or Maximilian. But they found that the tender mercies of the Pope were indeed cruel. The Venetian officials in the surrendered towns were imprisoned, contrary to the terms of the agreement. They were not allowed to remove their artillery from Rimini, on the ground that it belonged to the city, not to the Venetians. On June 5 the Doge wrote to the Pope in terms of the most abject submission: “Your Holiness knows the state to which Venice has been reduced. Let the bowels of your compassion be moved; remember that you are the earthly representative of Him who was gentle, and who never casts away suppliants who flee to His mercy”.

Julius II, however, was implacable. In his ordinary talk he called the Venetians heretics and schismatics; he would send his Bull of excommunication throughout the world, and make it impossible for them to live. The Cardinals murmured at this extreme ferocity. “He has his lands”, they said; “why should he wish to consummate the ruin of Venice, which would be his own ruin also, and that of all Italy?” So they thought, and with good reason. The overthrow of Venice had been accomplished too quickly and too entirely. The glory had all gone to Louis XII, and the French power seemed firmly established in Northern Italy. Maximilian had been reconciled to the French king, and had reaped the fruits of the French success. Julius II thought that the only policy for himself was to pursue his victory to the uttermost so as to secure firmly what he had won; meanwhile he could watch events and use them for his purposes.

Venice accordingly was allowed to negotiate with the Pope, but every hindrance was put in the way of an agreement. Julius II would not break up the League of Cambrai till he was sure that there was nothing more to be gained by it. Venice was led to think
that the Pope was ready to remove the excommunication, and appointed six envoys extraordinary to arrange matters. When the envoys arrived at Rome, on July 2, they were chilled by their reception; as excommunicated persons they were not permitted to enter the city till nightfall, and the Cardinals were forbidden to meet them in the way in which envoys were customarily received. They were bidden to occupy the same house; they were not allowed to hear mass, nor to go out together on diplomatic business; only one of them might go at once. On July 8 the Pope sent for one of the envoys, whom he had known previously, Hieronimo Donado. He gave him absolution first, that he might be able to speak to him; then he broke into an angry speech. The provisions of the League of Cambrai must first be fully carried out, then the Venetians might come with a halter round their necks and ask for pardon. He would have nothing to say to the proposals which the envoys were empowered to lay before him, but demanded that Udine and Treviso should be given to the Emperor, that Venice should resign all its possessions on the mainland, should no longer claim the Adriatic Gulf as Venetian waters, should make a money payment to Louis XII and Maximilian, and give up to the Pope the nomination to benefices and the right to tax the clergy. He ended by giving Donado a paper containing the terms on which he was prepared to give Venice absolution, a paper which Donado calls devilish and shameful.

When this letter of Donado was read before the Pregadi, there was a general exclamation that the Pope sought their utter ruin and wished to root out Venice from the earth. Lorenzo Loredan, son of the Doge, said loudly: "We will send fifty envoys to the Turk before we do what the Pope asks". There was no possibility of negotiating on these terms, as Julius II, who only wished to temporize, was well aware. On July 26 Antonio Grimani came from Rome to Venice, and reported that the Pope had said that the French and Germans wished to destroy Venice, but he had prevented them. Grimani gave it as his opinion that the Pope would never absolve Venice so long as Louis XII was in Italy; he wished to maintain his own position, and to be on the strongest side; the more he was entreated, the worse would be his demands.

Grimani's judgment was in a great measure true, as events had already proved. On July 17 Venice showed unexpected signs of vitality by recovering Padua from Maximilian's captain, and at the same time news was brought to Rome that Cardinal Amboise had died at Milan. Donado said to the Pope, "The dragon is dead who wished to devour this seat"; and the Pope laughed a sardonic laugh. The news of the death of Amboise was, however, premature. It is true that he was seized with an illness which proved mortal next year, but the Pope soon discovered that he was not entirely freed from his foe. Julius II wore an appearance of firmness when he really was perplexed; and the Venetian Cardinals wrote at the end of July that "the Pope was in a maze". He could not throw in his lot with France, for Louis XII was ill content with him; it was useless to hold by Maximilian, for Maximilian's constant demand was for money; he did not wish to join Venice, for he was afraid lest Venice might recover its strength, reconquer the Romagna, and even threaten Urbino. Hence he was greatly grieved at the recovery of Padua, which was soon followed by other conquests. Verona threatened to follow the example of Padua, and the Marquis of Mantua was marching to the aid of the imperial governor when he was made prisoner by the Venetian troops. Julius II was so wrathful when this news reached him, that he dashed his cap on the ground and blasphemed S. Peter. He was now driven to watch anxiously the result of Maximilian's attempt to recapture Padua, which would be a sign how things were likely to turn. To avoid the importunities of the Cardinals and ambassadors in Rome he wandered in the
end of August to Ostia, Civita Castellana, and Viterbo. There he led an easy joyous life which gave rise to ill-natured sayings.

Maximilian's attempt against Padua failed. He wearied the Pope with requests for money and was angry because they were not granted. Early in October he departed ingloriously from Italy; and about the same time Julius II was involved in a quarrel with Louis XII. The Bishop of Avignon died at Rome; and Julius II, according to the custom in the case of vacancies occurring in the Curia, appointed his successor. Louis XII objected to this on the strength of an agreement which he had made in July with Cardinal Alidosi, an agreement that the Pope should give up to the king the nomination to bishoprics within his dominions, while the king undertook that he would not extend the protection of France over any vassal or subject of the Church. It would seem that Julius II did not consider this agreement to override the old customary rights of the Pope, while Louis XII applied it without exception. Each was obstinate, but Louis XII used a practical argument; he stopped the payment of ecclesiastical revenues in the Milanese to all those who were in Rome attending on the Pope. Julius II threatened to withhold admission to the cardinalate from the Frenchmen whom he had lately nominated; but reflection brought prudence, and Julius II reluctantly gave way. The Venetians rejoiced that he should learn what French influence in Italy brought upon the Holy See.

The Pope had expressed himself dissatisfied with the terms in which the submission of Venice to his censures had been couched, in the powers which had been given to the Venetian envoys; and this was the ostensible ground of his refusal to negotiate further. In September a fuller form of submission was sent from Venice and was laid by Dunado before the Pope, who still regarded it as insufficient; so that Dunado could report no advance towards a settlement. Still the Venetian Signory were encouraged by their success in defending Padua, and by the Pope's quarrel with the French king. They resolved to use their advantage, and on October 26 wrote to their envoys that it was long since they had received any communication from them; they saw no use in all staying at Rome; five might return and Dunado alone remain. On the same day that this letter was written, Julius II had taken a step towards Venice. He was alarmed by the news of an interview between Maximilian and Chaumont, the Grand Master of Milan, and feared the revival of some plan against himself. He accordingly sent for the Venetian Cardinal Grimani and told him the terms which he was ready to accept from Venice—a thing which he had hitherto refused to do; and the envoys were allowed to discuss these terms with Cardinals Caraffa and Raffaello Riario. The Pope's demands were severe, and aimed at the complete subjection of Venice to the authority of the Church; they covered all the points, temporal and spiritual alike, which had ever been subjects of dispute between Venice and the Holy See. Venice was to give up its claim to nominate to bishoprics and benefices, was to allow appeals in ecclesiastical cases to go direct to the Roman Rota, and was not to try the clergy in its courts or impose taxes on them without the Pope's consent. In like manner it was not to meddle with the subjects of the Church in any way, was to recompense the Pope for his expenses in recovering his possessions and restore the revenues which had been unjustly received, was to open the navigation of the Adriatic Gulf, withdraw its official Visdomino from Ferrara, and be ready to supply galleys to the Pope on his request.

Just as these negotiations had begun came the revocation of the five Venetian envoys. Julius II was too wary a diplomatist to pay any heed to the hint which this step was meant to convey. “Not only five shall go”, he exclaimed to Cardinal Grimani, “but
all the six; I will have twelve before I remove the excommunication”. To this
determination he remained firm; either all of them should go or none. He showed no
signs of modifying his conditions; really he felt no desire that the matter should be
ended. In the middle of November the Venetian envoys flattered themselves that they
had gained a new friend. Christopher Bainbridge, who had been elected Archbishop of
York, in 1508, came as English ambassador to Rome. The new King of England, Henry
VIII, was already an object of curiosity. Henry VII had been content to hold aloof from
the great questions of European diplomacy; Henry VIII was young and warlike, and had
a well-filled coffer. Venice and Julius II alike hoped to make use of him as an enemy to
France. Bainbridge assured the Venetians that his master was warmly on their side.
Julius II gave him permission to sit with Cardinals Caraffa and Riario to hear the
Venetian answer to his proposals. When Bainbridge expressed himself satisfied, Julius
II said, “We will write to the King of England, and ask his opinion”. The Venetians
thought that this consultation would make the decision a very protracted matter.

The Venetians, whose hopes had risen after their success at Padua, suffered a
severe disaster at the end of the year. Their fleet, which blockaded the mouth of the Po
to punish the Duke of Ferrara, was severely injured by an unexpected fire from batteries
skillfully constructed on the land. Venice was again humbled; and on December 29 the
Signory, not being able to do otherwise, agreed to the Pope's conditions. They proposed
two modifications—that the Gulf of Venice should be open only to the subjects of the
Church, and that they should be allowed to substitute a Consul for a Visdomino at
Ferrara, who should protect their interests. As this agreement involved a cession of the
laws and jurisdiction of Venice, a majority of three-fourths was needed in the Senate.
On the first ballot this was not obtained; the question was again put to the vote, and was
only carried by the bare majority required. The pride of Venice was tried to the
uttermost; but it had to be tried still more severely before its business with the Pope was
finished. Julius II paid no heed to the modifications which Venice proposed, but rather
increased his demands. On January 9, 1510, he declared that the Gulf of Venice must be
free to all, and added a requirement that in case of war against the Turks Venice should
be obliged to furnish fifteen galleys. The abolition of all custom dues was a severe blow
to Venetian finance; war with the Turks meant the suspension of Venetian commerce.
At last the Pope consented to restrict his claim for free navigation of the Gulf of Venice
to the subjects of the States of the Church; while Venice accepted the obligation of
furnishing galleys for a crusade, stipulating only that it should not be expressly
mentioned in the written conditions, lest their relations with the Turks should be
needlessly embroiled.

At length, on February 4, Julius II laid the absolution of Venice before the
Consistory of Cardinals. Fifteen gave their opinions in favor, eleven were against it.
Only the French Cardinals were entirely opposed; the rest considered that it should be
defered for the present. Julius II had fortified himself by an opinion of the doctors of
the University of Bologna to the effect that he could not with justice do otherwise than
absolve Venice. Cardinal Carvajal thought that it would be well for the Pope to consult
his allies. “What have we to do”, exclaimed the Pope, “with the opinions of others about
the duties of our office?”. Before the Consistory separated all the Cardinals had, in
some form or other, given way to the Pope's will. Still the Venetian envoys were beset
with technical questions of procedure. Exception was taken to their powers as
insufficient for the purpose of seeking absolution. Cardinal Caraffa was commissioned
to draw up a proper document, in forma camerae, as it was put. The Venetians
wondered what was meant; if this *forma camerae* were used by princes, it were well; if not, they were obliged to conclude, “we must do sometimes as we can, not as we would”. It was soon made clear to them that the form required was one which contained a confession of the justice of their excommunication. It was almost too much that they should be called upon to endorse the language of Julius II, language such as might be used of street robbers and assassins. The Venetian Senate tried to modify the wording of the document which was sent for their acceptance; but the Pope would have his way to the uttermost. The final mandate to the envoys empowered them to confess and allow that the papal monitory had come to their knowledge, and had been lawfully issued on true and lawful grounds; and further to beg his Holiness humbly and devoutly for pardon and absolution from the censures therein contained. The submission of Venice was made complete; all that the luckless envoys could do was to entreat the Pope to deal with them as gently as he could, and to have regard to their honor.

Julius II was too wise a statesman to wish to inflict any personal humiliation, and showed himself willing to make the ceremony of absolution as little burdensome as possible. Paris de Grassis, the Master of Ceremonies, had been diligently seeking precedents for months, and laid his report before the Pope. The customary form of absolution was to strike the penitent on the shoulder with a rod; and in some cases the shoulders were bared. Julius II omitted the use of the rod altogether, and only required that the ceremonial should be such as to set forth his own power and greatness. On February 24 the portico of S. Peter's was hung with tapestries and strewn with carpets; in the middle was erected a throne for the Pope, who was borne thither in his litter. The Cardinals stood round him, but they met with little respect from the crowd of other prelates who mingled with them. The five Venetian envoys, dressed in scarlet, advanced and kissed the Pope's foot; then they retired and knelt upon the steps. Dunado in a few words begged for absolution; he was asked for his mandate, and produced it. When it had been accepted as sufficient, a papal secretary read the agreement made with the Pope. He read it in so low a voice that no one but the Pope could hear its contents; but this tedious process lasted for an hour, and the envoys had great difficulty in maintaining their kneeling posture. When the reading was over, the envoys rose, and placing their hands on a missal held by some Cardinals, swore to observe the terms. Then the Pope chanted the Miserere, and after a few prayers gave them absolution, imposing on them, as a penance, a visit to the seven basilicas of Rome, where they were to pray and give alms. Then the doors of S. Peter's were opened, and the penitentiary led the Venetians into the Church from which they had been outcasts. Mass was said in the Chapel of Sixtus IV; but the Pope retired to the Vatican, for he never was present at long services. He ordered his household to escort the envoys home, and they returned from S. Peter's in state, each riding between two prelates. So far as concerned the mode in which absolution was given the Venetians were well satisfied.

In spite of the splendid example which Julius II had given of the power of the Papacy, he was not in heart very proud of his triumph. He could scarcely hide from himself that his action was scarcely defensible on ecclesiastical grounds; and his utterances to the Venetian envoys show that he was somewhat ill at ease. When he absolved them he said a few words. He had wished before excommunicating them that they had come into the right way; as they would not give up their occupation of the patrimony of S. Peter he had acted promptly so as to recover it; following the example of Christ he now accepted their repentance. When the envoys took leave of him on February 25, he said, “Do not think it strange that we have been so long in removing the
interdict. The Signory was the cause; it ought to have satisfied our demands. We grieve over the censures we were driven to use. Be mindful to stand well with Popes; then it will be well with you, and you will not lack favors”. These were mere commonplaces, as everyone knew that the Pope had wrung all he could out of Venice, and was only anxious to prevent the gain of France and Germany from turning to his own loss. He absolved Venice as a step towards checking the progress of France: and he dared not absolve her till she had shown herself strong enough to beat back Maximilian from Padua. He had brought about the ruin of Venice to serve his own interests; he wished, in the defence of these interests, to prevent that ruin from being complete.

Julius II might indeed flatter himself that his policy was successful. He had set up the States of the Church in Central Italy; he had reduced the haughty power which seemed supreme in North Italy to a condition of vassalage to the Church. Venice had been forced to surrender her privileges, had been rendered harmless for the present, and was bound in the immediate future to look to the Papacy as her sole protection. But Venice had not given way so thoroughly as the Pope supposed; she bowed before the storm, but she did not mean to surrender any of her rights. The Council of Ten resolved to leave a record of their opinions to those who came after. They gave way before the necessity of an overwhelming crisis, but they did not consider that it was in their power to alienate to the Pope the rights of their civil government. On the same day that they sent the final powers to their envoys at Rome, they executed a legal protest against the validity of their deed. Their protest set forth that they had, contrary to justice, suffered intolerable wrongs; that the Pope, ill informed, refused them absolution save on unjust conditions and the renunciation of their rights. On these grounds the Doge protested that he acted, not voluntarily but through violence and fear; that his acts were null; that he reserved the right of revoking them, and presenting his rights before a better informed Pope. It was a clumsy way of asserting that self-preservation is the first law of states; that treaties are the recognition of existing necessity; that no generation of statesmen can alienate for ever the fundamental rights of a community.

Such a protest may be regarded as a mean subterfuge; the history of the Papacy, however, had supplied a precedent. Eugenius IV protested on his deathbed that his concessions to Germany were not to be understood by his successors to derogate from the privileges of the Holy See. If the Church claimed rights which could not be alienated, civil communities had also an inalienable right to existence. Julius II had used spiritual censures as a means of temporal warfare, and had compelled Venice to plead guilty to sins which it did not admit. Venice registered the fact that its admission was outward only, and did not express its real mind. It waited its opportunity to take back what it had been forced to abandon; and the papal grasp over the Venetian Church was not long permitted. Venice never recognized the agreement with Julius II as legal. In no long time it reasserted its independence, and devised means for its protection against papal encroachments. The next attempt to excommunicate Venice ended in signal failure.

Another protest against the Pope which proceeded from Venice deserves attention. It was a fly-sheer circulated amongst the people, criticizing, in moderate and dignified language, the conduct of Julius II, judged by the standard of his high office. It took the form of a letter, according to the custom of the times—a letter addressed by Christ to His unworthy Vicar. Christ died, so ran the contents, to redeem mankind; He chose His disciples to hand on the testimony of His gracious will; He committed to them the administration of all things which concerned men's salvation. This pastoral office was
well discharged by S. Peter; let Julius compare himself with that example. Has he shown Peter’s humility, gentleness, and love for souls? Has he not been the cause of deeds of blood and shame? “Numbers of souls”, so Christ is made to say, “have gone to perdition for whom We, who created heaven and earth, suffered such bitter passion; ay, and We would suffer it anew, to save one of the least of all those who through your fault have gone into eternal fire, and who call to Us for vengeance on your wicked deeds. All this evil comes from your desire for temporal rule; and the ill that has befallen is but a small part of what will follow if you do not amend. Think for a moment; if one of your servants withstood your designs about temporal things, how great would be your anger, how severe his punishment. What then shall We do, whose wishes for men’s salvation are being withstood by you? We use the rod of correction before We draw the sword of judgment”.

There is no mention of national loss in this document, and no appeal to national patriotism. The New Learning set before men’s minds the inherent dignity of man. On one side the overmastering sense of individual power led to moral recklessness: on another side it led to a deeper religious earnestness. The Middle Ages had been concerned chiefly with the outward organization of the Church and its doctrines; the Renaissance passionately emphasized the value of the individual soul. It is this yearning after a regenerate society, which shall encourage a noble life in the individual man, that makes Savonarola so attractive, so different from those who went before him. The same feeling is expressed in this Venetian broadside. Many things might have been said against Julius II; what the writer chose to emphasize was the pitiful sight of the loss of souls for whom Christ died—a sight sad enough under all circumstances, but made terrible by the thought that these horrors were the work of him who was Christ’s Vicar upon earth. The Papacy seemed to be in its most glorious days. It was carrying the strong organization which the Middle Ages had forged into the battlefield which the Renaissance had opened out. But the Renaissance was by no means wholly immoral or wholly irreligious; and the words of the Venetian clerk were but an echo of the sense of misery and sadness which filled many humble souls who looked out on the distracted world.
CHAPTER XV.
THE WARS OF JULIUS II
1510-1511.

When Julius II absolved Venice and thereby withdrew from the League of Cambrai, he boasted that he had stuck a dagger into the heart of the French king. It was a treacherous blow. The Pope had been foremost in urging the spoliation of Venice; and when he had despoiled her to his heart's content, he grudged France the share that she had won. As soon as Venice had been reduced to become the handmaid of the Pope, he was desirous to raise her up again sufficiently to be a check to the preponderance of France in North Italy. He had succeeded in isolating Venice; he was now anxious to isolate France. Having broken up one league as soon as he gained his own ends by it, he wished to form another directed against the instrument of his first success.

It was, however, useless to irritate France until he was sure of allies. He counted on reviving the old hostility of Maximilian against Louis XII; he expected that Henry VIII of England would be ready to seize a good opportunity for prosecuting the old claims of England against France: if a movement was once begun he knew that Ferdinand of Spain would join. Accordingly he began a series of negotiations which did not at first succeed. Maximilian refused the Pope's overtures with anger, and summoned the Diet, which promised him aid in carrying on the war against Venice. However, Julius II had not a great opinion of Maximilian; he looked on him as a 'naked child', and comforted himself with the assurance that before the year was over, Germany would be at war with France. But both Julius II and the Venetians received a severe blow when the news was brought in April that Henry VIII had renewed his father's league of amity with France. When Bainbridge, the English envoy, protested to the Pope that he knew nothing about the matter, Julius II answered in anger, "You are all villains".

But though Julius II found that the powers of Europe hung back from his proposed league against France, he still showed his own feelings. One day in April the French Cardinal of Albi read a letter from his brother, who was engaged in defending Verona against the Venetians. He told the Pope that the Venetians had almost made an entry, in which case the French and Germans would have been cut to pieces; but God willed otherwise. "The devil willed otherwise", was the Pope's angry exclamation. Julius II did not cease to prosecute his plans; he bribed Matthias Lang, Bishop of Gurk, the chief adviser of Maximilian. More important was an alliance which he made with the Swiss through the help of Matthias Schinner, Bishop of Sitten. The Swiss had been the mercenary allies of France, but their alliance for ten years was expired, and Louis XII refused to grant the terms which they demanded. Schinner had already been employed by Julius II to raise 200 Swiss as a bodyguard for the Pope. The Swiss guard of Julius II was retained by his successors, and still exists, wearing the picturesque uniform which Michel Angelo is said to have designed. Julius II recognized the cleverness of Schinner in discharging his first commission, and gave him legatine powers; through his persuasions the Swiss made an alliance for five years with the Pope and undertook to enter Lombardy with 15,000 men. When Julius II heard this news he could not repress his delight, and said to the Venetian envoy, "Now is the chance to drive the French out.
of Italy”. He could not rest for thinking over his designs. “These Frenchmen”, he said, “have taken away my appetite and I cannot sleep. Last night I spent in pacing my room, for I could not rest. My heart tells me all is well; I have hopes that all will be well after my troubles in the past. It is God’s will to chastise the Duke of Ferrara and free Italy from the French”.

The schemes of Julius II were directed to a new conquest for the Church. He had won Bologna and the Romagna; he now cast longing eyes on the duchy of Ferrara, which was a fief of the Roman See. The Duke of Ferrara was a member of the League of Cambrai and had extended his dominions at the expense of Venice. He had not followed the Pope in deserting the league, but remained a firm ally of Louis XII, under whose protection he was. An attack upon him was a declaration of war against France; and towards this Julius II resolutely advanced. Hitherto he had refused to recognize either Louis XII or Ferdinand as King of Naples, and had demanded that their claims should be submitted to his decision. On June 17 he invested Ferdinand with Naples, without, however, obtaining from him any definite promise of immediate help.

With the prospects of war the spirits of Julius II rose, and he talked ceaselessly of his assured triumph. The Frenchmen found Rome unpleasant for them; Cardinal Tremouille in July tried to escape, but was brought back and imprisoned in the Castle of S. Angelo, where he was not even allowed to see his chaplain. When he pleaded that the constitutions made in the Conclave provided that no Cardinal should be imprisoned without a trial in Consistory, the Pope answered, “By God’s body, if he makes me angry I will have his head cut off in the Campo de’ Fiori”. When some of the Cardinals tried to intercede, the Pope angrily asked if they wished to share his prison. He stormed at the French so that the Venetian envoy remarked with complacency that they were treated one half worse than they themselves had been the year before.

Julius II began his war in the manner, which had now become customary, of publishing a Bull of excommunication against Alfonso, Duke of Ferrara. He took a childish joy in preparing it, and said to the Venetian envoy, “It will be more terrible than the Bull against you; for you were not our subjects, but he is a rebel”. When the Bull was laid before a Consistory, all the Cardinals gave their assent save the Cardinal of S. Malo; it was of little use to remonstrate with a Pope who threatened imprisonment as a reward for counsel. The charges against Alfonso ranged from general complaints of ingratitude towards the Holy See to the specific crime of making salt at Comaccio to the prejudice of the papal mines at Cervia; and he was excommunicated as a son of iniquity and a root of perdition. The Pope ordered his Bull to be printed and sent everywhere, and men read with amazement the vigorous language of the Pope; it could not have been stronger if the existence of Christianity had been at stake.

The plan of the Pope’s campaign was skillfully devised. The Swiss detachment of the papal forces advanced by and to cooperate with the Venetian fleet in an attack upon Genoa; another marched into the territory of Ferrara, where it was joined by the Venetian troops; at the same time the Swiss entered Lombardy. But though the plan was well laid it was ill executed. The Genoese did not rise as was expected, and the French fleet brought reinforcements, so that the expedition against Genoa was a failure. The Swiss crossed the Alps to Varese and thence marched to Como; but they showed no eagerness to fight, and the French commander Chaumont bribed their leaders to return. The mercenary soldiers recrossed the mountains and left the French troops free to march to the aid of Ferrara. Their leaders wrote to the Pope saying that they had entered into an
agreement for the protection of the Pope’s person, but found that they were expected to
war against the King of France and the Emperor; this they were not willing to do, and
they offered their services to mediate for the settlement of differences between the Pope
and his adversaries.

Julius II wrathfully replied: “Your letter is arrogant and insolent. We did not want
your help for the defence of our person, but we hired you and called you into Italy to
recover the rights of the Roman Church from the rebellious Duke of Ferrara. Amongst
his helpers is certainly Louis, King of France, who in this and other things has greatly
injured us. Against the Emperor far be it from us to think or do anything, because we
know his filial reverence towards the Holy See. In writing to us to lay aside our plots
and make peace, you are not only impudent but impious and insulting. They are the true
plotters who by good words and deceitful promises seek to deceive us. In offering
yourselves as mediators you show yourselves arrogant and forgetful of your condition.
Princes of high dignity daily offer themselves, and we can make peace without you.
You ought not to desert our service after receiving our pay. We cannot bring ourselves
to believe that you purpose to make an agreement with the French king and fight against
the Roman Church. If you do, we will reconcile ourselves with the French king, will
league ourselves with him and the Emperor against you, and will use all our temporal
and spiritual arms against breakers of their faith and deserters of the Church. We will
send your letters and your sealed agreements throughout the world, that all men may
know that they can have no dealings with you or put trust in your words; so that you
may be in all nations hateful and infamous”.

These were brave words, and they show a resolute policy. In fact, resolute action
was the one redeeming quality of the statesmanship of Julius II; he knew what he
wanted, and his prompt action filled his opponents with alarm. Louis XII was
astonished, and supposed that the Pope had secured powerful allies. Instead of acting
promptly he was desirous of establishing an accord with other powers, and wished to
temporize till he was sure of Maximilian and Henry VIII. So instead of attacking the
Pope by armed force, he weakly decided to carry the struggle into the field of
ecclesiastical politics. He summoned a synod of French bishops, which met at Tours on
September 14. Eight questions were submitted, and were answered according to the
royal wishes. The prelates of France declared the wrongfulness of the Pope’s actions
and the right of the king to defend himself; they revived the decrees of the Council of
Basel and approved of the summons of a General Council which should inquie into the
conduct of the Pope.

In the eyes of a shrewd politician like Machiavelli, all this was sheer waste of time,
and proceeded from inability to grasp the facts of the case. “To put a bridle on the
Pope”, he wrote, “there is no need of so many emperors, or so much talking. Others
who made war upon the Pope either surprised him, as did Philip le Bel, or had him shut
up in the Castle of S. Angelo by his own barons, who are not so much extinguished that
they cannot be revived”. Machiavelli knew the real weakness of the Pope’s temporal
power, which would fall at once before a determined onslaught; but the French king
took matters seriously, and wished to give his opposition to the Pope an appearance of
ecclesiastical regularity. It was a grave mistake; for a General Council could not well
deal with questions which were purely political, nor was there any reasonable chance of
obtaining the assent of Europe to such a Council. Henry VIII of England was already
forming plans of using the embarrassment of France for his own advantage; Maximilian
still entertained the preposterous plan of making himself Pope as well as Emperor;
Ferdinand of Spain was quite content that the Pope should harass France as much as he pleased. The hesitation of Louis XII left the field open for Julius II’s plans.

Still Julius II found it more difficult than he had expected to conquer Ferrara. His troops, joined with the Venetians, took Modena, but were not strong enough to besiege Ferrara, which was well fortified. In the beginning of September the Pope set out from Rome to enjoy the triumph which he then thought secure; but as he drew near to Bologna he learned much that made him uneasy. The Bolognese were discontented with the government of Cardinal Alidosi, a worthless man for whom the Pope showed an unaccountable fondness. Already Alidosi had been charged with peculation, had been summoned to Rome to answer, and had been acquitted. He was hated by the people whom he governed; he was lukewarm in his conduct of the war against Ferrara; he was strongly suspected of intriguing with the French. In spite of all this Julius II persisted in trusting him, even when in Bologna he found nothing save disappointment. To the other causes of his grief was soon added the news that five Cardinals, amongst them Carvajal, had gone to Florence and thence made their way to the French camp. It was clear that they would lend their authority to Louis XII’s plan of summoning a Council, which might end in another schism.

The news of the withdrawal of the Swiss reached the Pope at Bologna, and he soon found out its serious effect. Chaumont, the Grand Master of Milan, turned his troops southwards and made a feint of attacking Modena; when the papal troops had gathered for its defence, he suddenly turned and marched against Bologna. By this movement he divided the papal forces, and Bologna was ill fitted to offer any resistance. Only 600 footmen and 300 horse were left for its defence; it was ill supplied with victuals; the people were discontented: the expelled Bentivogli were hovering near, and a rising might be expected at a favorable moment. Julius II was ill of a fever and was confined to his bed; he could not flee, as the country was beset by parties of French horsemen, and on October 19 Chaumont was within ten miles of Bologna.

Julius II did what he could. He promised many boons to the people of Bologna, who mustered under arms and received his message with applause. He dragged himself from his bed and, seated on the balcony, gave them his benediction; but he did not put much trust in the Bolognese. His courage left him and he gave himself up for lost; he told the Venetian envoy that if the Venetian army did not cross the Po within twenty-four hours he would make terms with the French; “Oh, what a fall is ours!” he exclaimed. Negotiations were already opened with Chaumont, and it was believed that Cardinal Alidosi was in a secret understanding with him. Chaumont's proposals were that the Pope should again join the League of Cambrai and abandon Venice; that the question of Ferrara should be left for settlement by the Kings of France, Spain, England, and the Emperor; that the Pope should give the French king the power of appointing to all benefices within his dominions. These demands were crushing to Julius II, but he saw no way of escape. All night he lay in restless misery, uttering delirious cries of despair; “I shall be taken by the French. Let me die. I will drink poison and end all”. Then he burst into passionate reproaches—every one had broken faith and deserted him. Then he uttered exclamations of revenge and swore that he would ruin them all. At last he made up his mind to sign the agreement with Chaumont; he ordered all to leave him and went to sleep. Every one thought that the agreement was actually signed; but suddenly Spanish and Venetian reinforcements made their appearance, and the Pope’s spirits revived. Chaumont had wasted his time and lost his opportunity by his negotiations. He shrank from seizing the Pope when he was defenceless; he did not
venture an attack now that Bologna was reinforced. The French forces sullenly withdrew, and the first use that the Pope made of his freedom was to publish an excommunication against Chaumont and all in the French camp.

It was some time before the Pope recovered from his fever. During his illness he allowed his beard to grow, and did not shave it on his recovery. He was the first Pope who wore a beard, and in this he adopted a fashion which, though not adopted by his successor, was followed by Clement VII and afterwards found favor with the Popes, Men said he grew his beard through rage against France; indeed, it was in keeping with the character of Julius II that he wished to wear the appearance of a warrior rather than a priest.

As soon as he was recovered of his illness he burned to wipe away the memory of his failure, which had indeed been signal. He had narrowly escaped a crushing disaster, and had escaped only by the incapacity of his foes. He had run into danger without due consideration; his action had been bold, but he had lacked the political foresight necessary for carrying out great plans. When he looked around him he found that his camp was in disorder, and he was disappointed in the number of his troops. He was no judge of men, and was ill served by those whom he most trusted. He still clung blindly to Cardinal Alidosi, and he prevailed on the Venetians to release from prison the Marquis of Mantua and appoint him commander of their forces. He seemed to think that previous imprisonment was a guarantee of fidelity; but both Alidosi and the Marquis of Mantua were untrustworthy. They did not believe in the Pope's schemes, and thought only of keeping on good terms with the French king. Julius II was resolute in the choice of ends; he lacked the sagacity needed for the choice of means.

The Pope's forces were insufficient for the siege of Ferrara; but he was determined not to end his campaigning ingloriously. He joined his troops with those of Venice and attacked an outpost of the dominions of Ferrara, the County of Mirandola, which was held by the widow of Count Ludovico, a daughter of Gian Giacomo Trivulzio, a Milanese general in the pay of France. The two castles of Concordia and Mirandola lay on the west of Ferrara, and by holding them the Pope could prevent the advance of the French troops to its aid. Concordia soon fell; but the widowed countess held Mirandola with stubbornness. The winter was severe and the ground lay deep in snow. It was contrary to the traditions of Italian warfare to carry on military operations in the winter, but Julius II overbore all opposition to his plans. He resolved to shame the lukewarmness of his generals by going in person to the camp. On January 2, 1511, he set out for Bologna, and reached Mirandola on January 6, borne in a litter through snow which was nearly three feet deep.

The Pope showed himself well fitted for military life. His generals trembled before him as he roundly abused them for their incapacity, and called them "thieves and villains", with a copious garniture of military oaths and coarse jests. He spared no one, not even his nephew, the Duke of Urbino. He threw off entirely the decorum of his priestly office and behaved as a general. Though old and just recovered from a long illness he walked about in the snow, showed himself to all, and created amusement by the vigorous energy with which he kept on repeating "Mirandola must be taken", till the words flowed with rhythmic cadence from his mouth. He presided at councils of war, arranged the position of the cannon, directed military operations, and inspected his troops. Still, in spite of all his efforts Mirandola held out; till the Pope, to encourage his soldiers and strike terror into his foes, gave out that if it did not surrender at once he
would give it up to pillage. This seemed to the Cardinals to be a strong measure, and the Cardinal of Reggio suggested that it would be better to exact a heavy ransom. The Pope replied, "I will not do that, for there will be no fair division; the poor soldiers will get nothing, and the ransom will all go to the Duke of Urbino; I know how these things are managed. If they choose to surrender at once I will deal gently with them; if not, I will give them up to pillage".

The Pope's threat did not reduce Mirandola, which bravely returned the fire of the cannon. One day the Pope's headquarters were struck by a ball, and one of his servants was killed. He removed to other quarters, and they likewise were struck; so in the evening the Pope came back to his first abode and ordered the damage to be repaired at once. His personal courage awakened the admiration of the soldiers; "Holy Father", said the Venetians, "we look upon you as our officer". Julius II delighted in such tokens of recognition; his spirits rose, and he lived as a boon companion with the Venetian generals and officials. "He sits and talks", wrote Lippomano, "of all sorts of things; how different people live, about different kinds of men, about the cold weather he had felt at Lyons, about his plans against Ferrara. There is no need for anyone else to speak".

At last, on January 19, Mirandola was driven to surrender. In the council held to decide on terms Julius II went back from his original menace; he proposed to spare the inhabitants of Mirandola, but exact them a sum of money which should be divided among his troops; all foreign soldiers were to be put to the sword. Fabrizio Colonna interposed, "Holy Father, for a hundred foreign soldiers will you raise this disturbance? Let them ransom themselves like the rest". The Pope angrily answered, "Begone, I know better than you". Luckily there were no French troops found in the little garrison of Mirandola, and the Pope was saved from an act of butchery. He entered Mirandola through a breach in the wall, as there was no other mode of entrance, for the gate had been walled up and the drawbridge destroyed. When once Mirandola was taken the Pope's anger passed away, and he did his utmost to restrain his troops from pillage and to protect the people. The countess was brought before him and knelt at his feet; he looked at her with a clouded face and said, "So you would not surrender? Get you gone, for I wish to give this land to Gian Francesco"—the brother of the late duke, who was in the Pope's camp. He ordered the countess to be honorably escorted to Reggio.

The capture of Mirandola had tasked the resources and the personal energy of Julius II; and he could not really exult in his triumph, for it only showed how difficult was the attainment of his ultimate end, the reduction of Ferrara. Julius II, in person, had taken Mirandola; he could not continue to exercise the office of general, and he had no capable general in his employ. He felt this and stormed at the Duke of Urbino and the rest; but he could devise no other way of mending matters than bursts of passionate language. When he had to design a plan of future action he was irresolute, and changed his opinion from day to day. He negotiated with the Duke of Ferrara that he should abandon his alliance with France, but the duke refused. To detach Maximilian from France the Pope gave up Modena, which was a fief of the empire, to the imperial general and advised him to demand Reggio also on the same ground. By this means Reggio and Modena would serve as a further barrier between Ferrara and the French troops at Milan; and if the surrender of Reggio was refused, Julius II hoped that the refusal might lead to a breach between France and Maximilian.

None of the Pope’s plans succeeded, as the Duke of Ferrara defeated the papal and Venetian forces on February 28. The Pope’s treasury was well-nigh exhausted; so he
listened to overtures for a general pacification, and meanwhile endeavored to strengthen himself by a new creation of the unwonted number of eight Cardinals. Amongst them was Christopher Bainbridge, Archbishop of York, and Matthias Schinner, Bishop of Sitten, his legate amongst the Swiss. The Venetian envoy calculated that the Pope obtained an average of about 10,000 ducats for each of his creations, and with his treasury thus enriched Julius II could keep his forces for some time longer in the field. To every one's surprise he chose Cardinal Bainbridge as legate in his army. "It is a great matter", wrote the Venetian envoy, "that an Englishman should hold such a post. He is capable enough and quite Italianate".

Meanwhile, in March, representatives of France, Germany, and Spain met for a conference at Mantua, and drew up proposals for the restoration of peace. The imperial minister, Matthias Lang, Bishop of Gurk, was deputed by them to carry their resolutions to the Pope, who had returned to Bologna. There Lang appeared on April 10, and astonished the Curia by his magnificence, his pride, and his disdain of the offers by which the Pope sought to win him to his side. Venice was ready to bribe a man who could bring about peace between herself and Maximilian; Julius II had reserved for him a Cardinal's hat, and promised him the rich patriarchate of Aquileia and other benefices to the annual value of 1,000,000 florins. But Lang showed no desire for these good things. He behaved like a king rather than an ambassador; he sat in the Pope's presence, and did not remove his biretta when he spoke to him. He proposed to the Pope schemes of pacification; when the Pope refused, he warned him that the Emperor and the Kings of France and Aragon would resist his unreasonable doings. On April 25 he left Bologna; and his escort as they rode out of the town raised the cries of 'The Empire!', 'France!' and even the rallying cry of the Bentivogli. Men marvelled at the magnanimity of the Bishop of Gurk, and said that the Pope would be deposed by a Council and another elected in his stead.

Julius II prepared for a renewal of war by an excommunication of the Duke of Ferrara and all who protected the enemies of the Church. He had, however, a new general to oppose him, one who understood the Pope's weakness, and was withheld by no scruples. Chaumont, the French commander in Lombardy, died in March, and on his deathbed sent to beg for the Pope's absolution; Louis XII appointed as his successor Gian Giacomo Trivulzio, who as the father of the dispossessed Countess of Mirandola had a personal reason of hostility against Julius II. When negotiations were broken off, Trivulzio repeated the plan of Chaumont and made a sudden dash on Bologna. Julius II had already had experience of what might befall him in that unlucky city, and hastily withdrew to Ravenna, leaving the care of Bologna to Cardinal Alidosi and the Duke of Urbino. The discord between the two prevented common action. Cardinal Alidosi was afraid of a rising of the Bolognese on behalf of the Bentivogli, and after a futile attempt to call out the city levies, fled by night from his post. The Duke of Urbino followed his example; his troops were pursued by Trivulzio, and suffered heavy losses. On May 23 Trivulzio entered Bologna, and the Bentivogli were restored. The people hailed with delight the return of their former lords; they pulled down the castle which Julius II had built; they overthrew his statue which Michel Angelo had cast; it was sold as for old bronze to the Duke of Ferrara, who recast it into a cannon which he mockingly christened 'Giulio'.

The loss of Bologna was followed in a few days by the loss of Mirandola, which surrendered to Trivulzio. All the Pope's conquests had vanished in a moment; his political plans seemed at an end, and he was helpless. Still Julius II, when the news was
brought him at Ravenna, showed no signs of discouragement. His first impulse was to defend himself where he knew that he was indefensible, for his confidence in the legate Alidosi. He summoned his Cardinals, and told them that Bologna had fallen, not through the fault of Alidosi, but through the treachery of the citizens; then he suddenly discharged his pent-up wrath against the Duke of Urbino, saying, “If the duke, my nephew, should come into my hands, I would have him drawn and quartered as he deserves”. He next turned his attention to the condition of his army, and heard to his grief that it had been attacked by the rustics during its retreat, and was almost entirely dispersed. After another fit of passion he set to work to devise means for the reconstitution of his forces, and sent for the Duke of Urbino to confer with him.

Cardinal Alidosi had shut himself up in the castle of Rivo for security; but when his friends in the Curia told him that the Pope’s anger was not directed against himself, but against the Duke of Urbino, he decided to come to Ravenna, and take measures for securing himself in his legation. Early next day he arrived in Ravenna, and after a short rest mounted his mule to visit the Pope. Julius II knew of his coming, and cut short a stormy interview with the Duke of Urbino, that he might be ready to receive his favorite. When the duke, beside himself with rage, was returning through the street, he met Alidosi, who uncovered his head and greeted him with a mocking smile. The duke leapt from his horse, and furiously seized the bridle of Alidosi’s mule. The Cardinal dismounted in alarm, and the duke, drawing his sword, struck him on the head, saying, “Take that, traitor, as you have deserved”. The Cardinal’s retinue, which had drawn up to salute the duke, uttered a cry, and some rushed forward; but the duke bade them be still, and as they paused, doubtful if he was executing the Pope’s vengeance or his own, he redoubled his blows till Alidosi fell to the ground, and was dispatched by two of the duke’s attendants. While all stood irresolute, the duke mounted his horse and rode off to Urbino.

The murder was horrible enough; but no one save the Pope regretted Alidosi’s death. With uplifted hands the Cardinals gave thanks that he was gone, while Julius II, gave way to an unrestrained display of grief. He wept passionate tears, beating his breast and refusing all food; he could not endure to stay in Ravenna, but left it next day for Rimini, whither he was carried in a litter, with drawn curtains through which were heard the lamentable cries of the Pope. He entered Rimini by night, that no one should see him in his broken state. Next day the Cardinals ventured to comfort him, and suggested that Alidosi’s death was not an unmixed loss. Julius II listened, and with the astounding capacity which he possessed for quick change of mood, soon began to rail at Alidosi as a villain. The vigor of Julius II rested on an acceptance of what the day might bring forth, and he wasted none of his energy on useless regrets.

It is hard to account for the infatuation of Julius II towards Cardinal Alidosi, and we cannot wonder that contemporary scandal attributed it to the vilest motives. It is certainly a blot upon his reputation as a statesman that he persisted in giving his confidence to a man who was entirely worthless, and whom every one suspected of betraying his interests. Alidosi only sought his own profit; his government of Bologna was as bad as possible; he was guilty of misappropriating the Pope's money, and when the charge was clear, he was nevertheless acquitted. Julius II had the capacity for forming great designs, and had the courage to carry them out; but he had no power of choosing fitting agents, or of inspiring others with his own zeal. He undertook an expedition of the utmost moment, with no better counselor than Alidosi and no better general than his own nephew the Duke of Urbino. Even then he did not care to enforce
unity of action between the two, but listened to Alidosi’s complaints against the duke, and so fomented jealousy which was sure to lead to political disaster and which ended in a brutal murder.

When Julius II arrived at Rimini there was fixed on the door of the Church of S. Francesco a document summoning a General Council to meet at Pisa on September 1. This citation rehearsed the decrees of the Council of Constance, set forth the Pope's neglect to summon a Council in accordance with their provisions, pointed out the difficulties of the Church, and assumed the adhesion of the Emperor and the French king to the proposed Council. It bore the signatures of nine Cardinals, all known to be discontented. Four of them, however, declared that they had given no authority for the use made of their names, and withdrew their signatures. The leader of this revolt of the Cardinals was the Spaniard, Carvajal; with him were Borgia and Sanseverino, and the French Cardinals Briçonnet and Brie. It is difficult to estimate fairly the motives which induced Carvajal to take this step. He was a man of high character, great learning, and much experience of affairs. In his early years he had distinguished himself by a book defending the authenticity of the donation of Constantine against the criticism of Lorenzo Valla. Sixtus IV summoned him to Rome and made him chamberlain; Alexander VI was delighted to find in the Curia a Spaniard on whom he could confer the dignity of Cardinal; and Carvajal was employed by him in many negotiations, so that he thoroughly understood the politics of Europe, and was well known in all the European courts. On Alexander VI's death he seemed the most likely man for his successor, and was aggrieved at the intrigues of Cardinal Rovere which led to the election of Pius III as a make-way for his own election. It would seem that Carvajal took Rovere’s early life for his model. As Rovere had opposed Alexander VI and tried to depose him by French help, so Carvajal used the same arts against Rovere when he became Pope. He waited till he saw him engaged in a perilous undertaking which raised against him many enemies; then he put himself at the head of a band of discontented Cardinals, and relying on the support of France, raised the old cry of a reforming Council. Perhaps Carvajal was sincere in his desire for reform; he was certainly sincere in a desire for his own advancement. He trusted to his large experience and to his personal knowledge of European sovereigns; and tried every means to form a strong party against Julius II by a judicious mixture of personal, political, and ecclesiastical grounds.

Julius II was well informed of Carvajal’s intrigues; indeed Henry VIII of England had forwarded to him Carvajal’s letters to himself. The summons of a schismatic Council was no surprise to the Curia; but when the citation appeared no one ventured to speak to the Pope about it. Julius II did not stay long at Rimini, but went southwards to Ancona, where he issued a terrible excommunication against the revolted Bologna. Then he made his way slowly to Rome, which he entered sadly on June 27.

Though he had suffered great reverses, Julius II did not regard himself defeated. He knew the weakness of his opponent, and pitted his own resolute spirit against the feeble mind of Louis XII. Louis XII did not wish to push the Pope to extremities and did not use his opportunities, but hoped to obtain peace by menaces. After the capture of Bologna, Trivulzio, who might easily have taken the Pope prisoner and entered Rome as a conqueror, was ordered to withdraw his troops to Milan. In like manner Louis XII encouraged the rebellious Cardinals to summon their Council at Pisa, and then entered into negotiations for peace with Julius II. The Pope at once saw the weakness of his adversary, and made use of the delay. He answered the rebellious Cardinals on July 18
by convoking a Council to be held at the Lateran on April 19, 1512. Moreover, in his letter of summons, he boldly met his opponents in the point where his own case was weakest. They might fairly urge against him that they were only following the example which he had set. As Cardinal he had besought the French king to call a Council and depose a Pope who was disturbing the peace of Christendom; where he had failed they were successful. Julius II accepted the position. The Cardinals, he said, accused him of neglecting to call a Council, Was it not his zeal for a Council that had drawn on him the hostility of Alexander VI? Had he not been tossed about by land and sea, had he not faced the perils of the Alps, solely that he might revive this laudable custom which had fallen into disuse? He lamented that the troubles of the times had prevented him from summoning a Council before. The times were still perilous; nevertheless he was prepared to undertake the holy work of extinguishing schism, reforming the Church, and arranging a crusade against the Turk. For these purposes he summoned a Council to Rome as the safest and fittest place. It was sagacious policy on the part of Julius II, and deprived the Council of Pisa of all claim to legitimacy. It was useless for a few Cardinals to hold a General Council against a contumacious Pope, when the Pope had declared his willingness to meet them, and had summoned a Council himself.

Meanwhile Julius II was engaged in carrying on meaningless negotiations with Louis XII. He had no wish for peace so long as he had any prospect of gaining allies, and he knew that allies were at hand. King Ferdinand of Spain had at length decided to abandon the League of Cambrai; he had recovered from Venice all that he could claim, and he did not wish to see the French arms making further progress in Italy. Already, in June, Ferdinand had offered to help the Pope in the recovery of Bologna, and held out hopes that Henry VIII of England might join the alliance. Even in his negotiations with England Julius II showed his incapacity to find trustworthy agents. He had sent from Bologna an envoy, Hieronimo Bonvixi, apparently recommended by Cardinal Alidosi, who made known to the French envoy in London all that passed between himself and the English king. Henry VIII suspected him and set spies to watch him. His treachery was discovered, and he confessed that he was acting in pursuance of Alidosi’s instructions. Henry VIII informed the Pope, who requested him to punish Bonvixi according to his deserts. This incident serves to show the weakness of Louis XII, who was content to negotiate with an enemy whom he knew to be devising an alliance against him. He was well acquainted with the Pope’s plan, which rapidly took shape. It was arranged that Ferdinand was to send troops to aid the Pope against Bologna and Ferrara: England was to attack France, while Venice by sea and land invaded the French possessions in Italy.

Before this treaty could be definitely arranged, Rome was thrown into alarm by the illness of the Pope. On August 17 Julius II was confined to his bed, and three days later his life was despaired of. There were fears that the Orsini would seize the city in the name of France, and the Colonna hastened to return. The Cardinals began to dispose of the succession of Julius II; even the renegades at Pisa prepared to return to Rome for the approaching Conclave. On August 21 Julius II was unconscious, and the city was full of excitement; an attempt was even made to revive the old republican spirit, and seize the opportunity of beginning a new epoch in the history of Rome. The leader was Pompeo Colonna, Bishop of Rieti, a man full of vigor and energy, whose youth had been spent in the camp. He had fought with bravery in the Neapolitan campaigns, but was driven by his uncles to take orders that he might inherit the ecclesiastical offices of Cardinal Giovanni Colonna. Against his will, Pompeo had entered the Cardinal’s household, and
on his death, in 1508, had been appointed to the rich bishopric of Rieti. Pompeo had watched with keen interest the stirring events in which he had no share; he longed for an active life, and scorned the atmosphere of clerical intrigue which surrounded Rome. As a Roman noble he looked down upon the strangers whom Julius II raised to the Cardinalate, and was indignant that no Roman was called to that dignity. At an assembly of the Roman people in the Capitol, Pompeo Colonna appeared and spoke with passionate energy. He exhorted the Romans to rise and recover the liberty of which they had been robbed by the deceitful arts of priests. It was for them to rule the city: it was for priests and Popes to take care of the Church, and if they did so rightly they would not fail to receive due respect. As it was, Rome lay at the mercy of the avarice and lusts of a handful of priests, and had lost all memory of its true position. The old Roman stock was well-nigh destroyed; half-barbarous strangers lorded it over the city. The Romans were stirred by this unwonted outburst of patriotic feeling, and agreed to arm and compel the Cardinals, before the approaching Conclave, to take oath that they would abolish the taxes and restore the old government of the Roman Republic. They arranged to guard the Conclave and extort from the new Pope a similar oath before they would allow him to proceed to his coronation.

The Cardinals who hankered after the succession of Julius II, and the Romans who girded themselves to recover their liberty, were alike doomed to disappointment. Julius II recovered consciousness on August 22, and rapidly showed his old energy. He asked for a drink of wine, which the doctors refused. The Pope sent for the captain of his guard and said, “If you do not give me wine, I will have you shut up in the Castle of S. Angelo”. He had his own way, and his willfulness did not prevent his recovery. He prepared for approaching death by pardoning his nephew the Duke of Urbino, who was in Rome awaiting his trial for Alidosi’s murder. Julius II was by this time convinced of Alidosi’s treachery, on which alone the duke rested his defence; he gave him absolution, and sent for 36,000 ducats from his treasury, which he distributed amongst his two nephews and his daughter Felice.

The Roman barons, who had been so brave at the Capitol, now found their position awkward. With a view of putting a good face on their action, they met on August 28 and signed an agreement of peace amongst themselves, undertaking to lay aside their private feuds and live in amity. At first no one ventured to tell the irascible Pope what had happened during his illness, and one of his first acts was to appoint Pompeo Colonna his legate in Lombardy. Pompeo was somewhat surprised at this mark of favor, but after a few days went to visit the Pope. By this time Julius II had been informed of Pompeo’s conduct; for once he was mindful of his dignity and sent him a message: “Tell him that I will not bandy angry words with an insolent rebel”. Pompeo left the Vatican and withdrew from Rome. He took refuge in Subiaco, and most of the Roman barons judged it wise to flee from the Pope’s wrath. Pompeo turned to martial ambition, and wished to raise forces and join the French army, but was restrained by the warm remonstrances of his uncle Prospero.
CHAPTER XVI.
THE HOLY LEAGUE. 1511-1513.

After his recovery Julius II hastened to arrange definitely his measures against France. On October 5 a league between the Papacy, Ferdinand, and Venice, for the recovery of Bologna and the defence of the Church, was published in Rome; Henry VIII of England and Maximilian were allowed time to join it, and on November 17 Henry VIII signified his adhesion. Julius II could now look proudly around him. He had succeeded in enlisting two of the kings of Europe and the powerful republic of Venice as supporters of his policy and defenders of the Holy See.

The first use which the Pope made of his secure position was to strike a blow against the schismatic Cardinals of Pisa. On October 24 he declared the policy of Cardinals Carvajal, René de Brie, Borgia, and Briçonnet to be deprived of their dignities, and he annulled their Council summoned at Pisa. They on their side were ready to carry on the ecclesiastical warfare against the Pope; but they were only faintly supported. Louis XII, engaged in fruitless negotiations with Julius II, was only half-hearted about the Council's business. Maximilian at first took the matter seriously in hand, and requested a learned professor at Heidelberg, Jacob Wimpheling, to draw up a list of the grievances of the German Church and to report on the means for their redress. He devised a Pragmatic Sanction for Germany after the model of that which had proved to be a failure in France. He wrote to the Florentines and commended the Council to their care, saying, “We intend to prosecute it, nor will we by any means desist, for we see that it is necessary for the whole commonwealth of Christendom”. But Maximilian’s good intentions were thwarted by his fantastic aim of having himself elected Pope, and his interest in ecclesiastical matters was bounded by this object. The illness of Julius II awakened his hopes, and he thought that the Cardinals would raise few difficulties. He wrote to his daughter that he was scheming “to have himself appointed coadjutor to the Pope, so that after his death we may be assured of having the Papacy and becoming priest, and afterwards a saint; so that you will be under the necessity of adoring me after my death, of which I shall be very proud”. With such childish aims before him, Maximilian was not likely to support the Council with vigor. He and Louis XII had different objects, though both wished to terrify the Pope. Julius II was not terrified, and met this clumsy artifice of a Council with a resolute bearing which condemned it at once to failure. No one could hope that the Council of Pisa would benefit the Church; Henry VIII of England only said what everyone felt when he wrote to Maximilian that the Council was the result of private animosity and would do more harm than good.

Moreover the Council met with but a cold welcome in the place which had been chosen for its session. Florence had not been able to resist the request of the French king that the Council should sit at Pisa; but as the time of its meeting drew near, the government of Florence feared to incur the manifest enmity of the Pope. The Gonfalonieri Soderini was conscious that he had many enemies, and that the faction of the Medici had been steadily growing in power. The Florentine Republic depended for its maintenance upon the French power in North Italy, and so was regarded with disfavor by the Pope. Soderini shrank from increasing the Pope's ill-will, and wished to
withdraw the permission for the Council to sit at Pisa. In September Machiavelli was
sent to the Cardinals to try and prevail upon them to abandon their Council; his efforts
were naturally useless, and he proceeded to France on the same errand. Louis XII
answered that he desired nothing better than peace with the Pope, but if he abandoned
the Council the Pope would be less disposed to peace than ever; if he were to change the
place of the Council he would offend the Cardinals; but he thought it possible that after
one or two sessions had been held at Pisa, the Council might be transferred to Vercelli
or some other place. It was clear that as the time drew nigh when the threatened Council
was on the point of becoming a reality, every one who had encouraged it was afraid.
Julius II showed an amount of caution which was scarcely to be expected from his rash
and impetuous nature, in his efforts to crush the Council. He was alive to its possible
importance, and neglected no means to deprive it of adherents.

The Cardinals at Pisa found themselves in a poor position but there was no way of
drawing back, and they advanced with uneasy dignity. On September 1, the day fixed
for the opening of the Council, three proctors appeared, and in an empty church went
through the formalities necessary to call the assembly into existence. On September 11
the schismatic Cardinals wrote to their brethren at Rome saying that they would wait for
a short time in hopes that the Pope would summon a Council to some neutral place: they
could not accept his summons to the Lateran, as Rome was not free and safe for all men.
They were answered that the Pope's intentions had been already declared. Accordingly
they proceeded on November 1 to begin the work of the Council at Pisa. There were
present the Cardinals Carvajal, Briçonnet, Brie, and d'Albret; commissioners claimed to
represent three other Cardinals—Borgia, Sanseverino, and Philip of Luxemburg.
Besides these there were only fifteen prelates and five abbots, representatives of Louis
XII, the Universities of Paris, Toulouse, and Poitou, with a few French doctors.

The Council was ill received in Pisa. The Florentine Government was thoroughly
alarmed by the Pope's menaces, though they feared his political rather than his
ecclesiastical action. He laid Florence under interdict for favoring schism; but this
produced little effect, for Soderini sent orders to the friars that they should perform
divine services in the churches under pain of expulsion from Florence. The friars were
not like the secular clergy, and had nothing to lose by the Pope's displeasure: they
obeyed Soderini's commands, and the Florentines did not suffer any inconvenience
from the interdict. More significant, however, was the appointment of Cardinal Medici
as legate in the Romagna. The party opposed to Soderini in Florence was thus provided
with a leader who was backed by all the power of the Church. Soderini felt his
weakness and was only desirous to escape the Pope's anger by ridding himself of the
Council as soon as possible. He refused to allow any large body of French troops to
enter Pisa for the defence of the Council, and only admitted an escort of 150 French
lances, commanded by Odet de Foix, Sieur de Lautrec, who was sent by Louis XII as
protector of the Council.

The people and the clergy of Pisa showed no respect to the fathers of the Council.
When on November 1 the procession advanced to the cathedral it found the doors
closed, and had to return to the Church of S. Michele for its opening ceremonies. There
was much point in the sermon, which dwelt on the small beginnings of the Christian
Church, and the great results which followed from the energies of a scanty band of
resolute men.
On November 5 the first session was held in the cathedral, which was now placed at the disposal of the Council, but the magistrates of Pisa refused to close the shops or give any sign of popular recognition. The Council proceeded with due regard to forms. It declared its own legitimacy, annulled all measures directed against it, summoned all prelates to attend, and took under its protection the persons and goods of all who came to Pisa. Cardinal Carvajal was appointed president, and Lautrec protector of the Council. Finally notaries and other officials were elected. On November 7 the second session recognized the decrees of the Council of Toledo as regulating the order to be observed in its proceedings, and declared that all causes concerning members of the Council were to be judged in the Council only and nowhere else; for which purpose four French bishops were appointed judges.

The third session was fixed for November 14; but it was never held. Soderini was only anxious to be rid of the Council; and the unfriendly attitude of the citizens of Pisa did not encourage the Cardinals to stay in a place where they were so coldly welcomed. On November 6 Machiavelli came to remind Cardinal Carvajal of the promise of Louis XII that the Council should be transferred as soon as was decorous. He pointed out that the Pope’s hostility would be less if the Council were removed further from his neighborhood; moreover in France or Germany the people would be more obedient, for the King or the Emperor could use compulsion which the Florentine magistrates had had no means of employing towards their subjects. Carvajal said that he would consider what was best. His consideration was quickened by the outbreak of riots between the servants of the Council and the Pisans. They quarreled in the market about buying food; they quarreled in the streets over their ignoble pleasures. At last a serious riot took place, and the rioters tried to storm the Church of S. Michele in which the Cardinals were deliberating. The officers who strove to quell the disturbance were wounded. There was much bloodshed and great excitement. It was clearly time for the Council to leave Pisa; so on November 12 a meeting of emergency was held in Carvajal’s house, at which the Council first decreed that it could not be dissolved till the Church had been reformed, and then decreed its translation to Milan.

The departure from Pisa was dignified. Carvajal thanked the city magistrates for their courtesy, and informed them that the transference of the Council was due to sufficient reasons. The Cardinals were honorably escorted as far as Lucca. “They all departed”, says Ammirato, “to the great delight of the Florentines, the Pisans, and the Council itself, so that on November 15 there remained in Pisa no vestige of this Council”.

This ignominious beginning of the Council was a decided triumph for Julius II. The ecclesiastical opposition was driven to admit that it could find no shelter save directly under the wing of France. It was now apparent to Europe generally that a few French Cardinals and a few French bishops were used as the tools of the French king to annoy the Pope. Carvajal seems to have felt that it was necessary to make a new departure. Before leaving Pisa the Council sent envoys to Julius II, proposing to unite with his Council if it were summoned to some convenient place, either in Italy or outside, provided it were not in the dominions of the Pope or of Venice; they were also to offer the intervention of the Cardinals in settling the affairs of Bologna and Ferrara. The Council's envoys sent from Florence to ask for a safe-conduct; but their messenger was so threatened in Rome that he fled for his life and the envoys advanced no further.
On December 7 the Cardinals entered Milan in state, but were obliged to defer the session which had been fixed for December 13. Milan was reduced to great straits by a formidable invasion of the Swiss, whom Julius II had again employed against his foes. The money of the Pope, the urgency of Cardinal Schinner, and growing ill-will towards France, combined to make the Swiss confederates ready for another expedition into Italy. In the middle of November a force of 20,000 footmen crossed the San Gothard. The French troops in vain tried to prevent them from emerging from the Alpine pass; in the end of November they were at Varese, and the French slowly retreated before them towards Milan. On December 14 the Swiss were in the neighborhood of Milan, where the French were preparing to stand a siege. But the Swiss had no artillery and no supplies; the cold was intense and food was scarce; no messengers came from the Pope or from the Venetians. The Swiss hesitated what to do; then they conferred with the French, and finally retreated across the Alps, marking their way with fire and slaughter.

Again the Pope was angered by the remissness of the Swiss: again his affairs were ill managed. The Holy League moved too slowly for the impatient Pope; the Papal forces were disorganized by the flight from Bologna, and only with Spanish troops could Julius II hope to win back the rebellious city. But the Spanish general, Raimondo de Cardona, Viceroy of Naples, showed no haste in moving; the Venetians were delighted at the advance of the Swiss, but did not join them. The opportunity of striking a decisive blow at the French power was lost by want of combined action amongst the allies.

Freed from the fear of the Swiss invasion, the Council proceeded with its business at Milan; but even when under the immediate protection of France, it received no popular support. The papal interdict was leveled against Milan, and many of the priests observed it, though the governor threatened them with deprivation of their benefices. The people mocked at the Cardinals when they appeared in public, and treated them with no respect. There was no accession to the members of the Council, as Maximilian still refused to send protors, and no prelates appeared from Germany. There were only five Cardinals and twenty-seven bishops and abbots at the session held on January 4, 1512. There the Cardinals related the ill success of their efforts to negotiate with the Pope, and a term of thirty days was allowed him to change the place of his Council summoned to the Lateran, and so render union possible.

The eyes of Julius II were fixed on the expedition which he had sent into Lombardy. Scarcely had the Swiss retired from Milan before the army of the League marched into the territory of Ferrara with a combined force of Spanish and papal troops of about 20,000 men, led by Raimondo de Cardona. The territory south of the Po fell at once into their hands, and they passed on to the siege of Bologna, where the Bentivogli were aided by Odet de Foix and Ivo d'Allegre.

The Pope already counted on the success of his arms, and wrote letter after letter to his legate, Cardinal Medici, urging prompt action and commissioning him to inflict summary punishment on the Bentivogli.

But the Pope's expectations were doomed to disappointment. France had a general in Italy who knew how to act with decision, Gaston de Foix, Duke of Nemours, a nephew of the French king. Though only twenty-two years old, Gaston de Foix was both a skillful general and a wise statesman. He saw the importance of preventing a junction between the Spanish and Venetian forces, and in the piercing cold of winter hurried across the snow-covered Apennines to the aid of Bologna, which he entered on
February 5. His rapid march disconcerted the plans of Cardona, who was driven to withdraw from Bologna into the Romagna. Scarcely had he gone before news was brought that Brescia, always averse to the French rule, had opened its gates to the Venetians. Gaston de Foix at once made a hurried march to Brescia, which he reached in nine days, and took by storm. He was resolved to suppress rebellion by severity. Brescia was given up to pillage, and for two days was ravaged by the fury of a horde of brutal soldiers; more than 8000 were slain, and many of the French were so laden with spoil that they returned home to enjoy it.

Julius II chafed at the ill success of his arms. He bitterly complained that he was entirely in the hands of the Spaniards, who robbed him of his money and did nothing in return. In fact Ferdinand of Spain was more bent upon diplomacy than on military exploits. He was stirring up Henry VIII of England to attack France, and was endeavoring to draw Maximilian into the League. He was not anxious to restore Bologna to the Pope, and ordered his general, Cardona, to avoid a battle; so that Julius II was left to fume and fret over the inactivity of the troops in the Romagna. His legate Cardinal Medici was overwhelmed with complaints, which he vainly tried to pass on to Cardona, who answered that priests knew nothing about war, and their ignorance led them to precipitate counsels. The Council of Pisa appointed Cardinal Sanseverino as its legate in Bologna; and Sanseverino, who was a man of war, was more readily listened to by Gaston de Foix. Moreover Sanseverino’s influence was powerful among the Roman barons, and he strove to stir up the Orsini against the Pope. Rome was so insecure that Julius II withdrew into the Castle of S. Angelo, and the city magistrates urged him to make peace with France; a French victory, they said, would lead to the loss of the Romagna and a tumult in Rome. Julius II answered that he was not opposed to peace, but he must first recover Bologna. Unsafe in Rome, and ill served by the Spanish general, Julius II felt that his position was one of serious danger.

His alarm was well founded, for Gaston de Foix was resolved to give his enemies no rest. Not contented with thwarting their plans and reducing them to inactivity, he wished to strike a decisive blow. Already Gaston’s energy had dazzled the Italians, and the veteran general, Trivulzio, said with a smile, “Fortune is like a woman, who favors the young and slights the old”. Gaston prepared to tempt fortune once more. From Brescia he returned to Milan to gather his troops, who numbered 7000 cavalry and 17,000 infantry—Germans, French, and Italians. With these he advanced into the Romagna, determined to force a battle; a decisive victory might end the war, might prevent Maximilian from joining the league, check Henry VIII’s projected invasion of Normandy and leave the Neapolitan kingdom an easy prey.

Cardona on his side did not wish to fight. His forces were somewhat smaller, 6000 cavalry and 16,000 of infantry, of whom the majority were Spaniards; but the fame of the Spanish infantry was great, and their fighting qualities might be held to make up for the slight inferiority of numbers. But the same reasons which made Gaston de Foix desire a battle, made Cardona wish to avoid one; Spain had everything to win by delay, while only a victory could save France from a powerful combination against her. As the French army advanced to Ravenna, Cardona withdrew to Faenza. Gaston de Foix on April 9 attacked Ravenna unsuccessfully; but it was clear that he would soon take it if it were not relieved. Cardona dared not abandon its garrison, and was reluctantly compelled to return. On April 11—it was Easter Day—the two armies met on the marshy plain between Ravenna and the sea. There was nothing in the ground to allow of tactics on either side; the day was decided not by strategy but by hard fighting. On the
side of the French was conspicuous the stalwart form of Cardinal Sanseverino, clad in full armor and eager for the fight; the papal legate, Cardinal Medici, was present in the rear of the army of the League, but wearing the garments of his office. The battle began with a heavy discharge of artillery on both sides; but the artillery of Ferrara was skillfully posted so as to play on the flank of the army of the League. The Spanish infantry lay flat upon the ground and escaped, while the Italian cavalry fell thick before the destructive fire. Fabrizio Colonna urged an immediate charge, but the Spanish general wished to act on the defensive. At last Fabrizio could endure no longer. “Shall we all be destroyed for nothing?”, he exclaimed, and dashed upon the foe. The Spaniards were bound to follow, and the fight raged along the banks of the Ronco. The cavalry of the League were the first to flee, and with them fled the Spanish general, Cardona. The Italian infantry were hard pressed by the Gascons, and were finally routed by an attack of the French cavalry under Ivo d'Allegre, who lost his life in the charge. The Spanish infantry still held their ground and hewed their way into the middle of the opposing square of German mercenaries who fought for France. Gaston de Foix, seeing the cavalry of the League in flight, ordered a body of horse to charge the Spaniards, who were driven backwards by the shock. Still they preserved their ranks unbroken, and protecting one flank by the river, prepared to retreat still fighting and in good order. Gaston de Foix burned to make his victory complete, and led his cavalry to drive the Spaniards into the river. His horse was killed and he fell to the ground; the Spaniards rushed upon him, and heedless of a cry, “He is our general, the brother of your queen”, slew him where he lay. There was no longer any opposition to their flight, and they retired in safety.

Rarely was a more bloody battle fought. Of the 45,000 men engaged, between 10,000 and 12,000 lay dead upon the field. The loss of generals was especially great on the French side, while the generals of the League showed their discretion by a speedy flight. Cardona never drew rein till he reached Ancona; the routed soldiers made their way to Cesena and then dispersed. Cardinal Medici was swept away by the crowd of fugitives, was made prisoner and handed over to his old friend Cardinal Sanseverino, who treated him with great respect.

The victors were left paralyzed by the death of Gaston de Foix, Lautrec, and Ivo d'Allegre. They sacked Ravenna, and under the leadership of La Palisse occupied the cities of the Romagna; then they paused, uncertain what to do. Had Gaston de Foix been left alive he would have pressed on to Rome and Naples, would have reduced the Pope to terms and annihilated the Spanish power in Italy; but Gaston was laid in his grave amidst the tears of his army.

The recumbent statue of the young warrior, a remnant of his broken tomb, still witnesses to the charm which he exercised as the type of all that was noblest and most beautiful in the chivalry of the Renaissance.

On April 14 a trembling fugitive brought to Rome the news of the battle of Ravenna. The Cardinals weakness gave themselves up as lost, and with tears besought the Pope to make peace with France on such terms as he could. Pompeo Colonna and many of the Orsini gathered troops and prepared to join the French army in its expected march on Rome, and Julius II thought of flight as the sole means to escape humiliation. But next day arrived Giulio de' Medici, cousin of the captive Cardinal, who had gained permission to send a messenger to the Pope. Cardinal Medici had seen enough to know that the French had suffered almost as severely as the League; their army was
demoralized; their counsels were divided. Cardinal Sanseverino disputed with La Palisse the office of General-in-chief; the Duke of Ferrara withdrew into his own territory; there was no danger of an immediate blow, as La Palisse had sent to Louis XII for further instructions, for he hesitated to march against Rome for fear of leaving Milan exposed to an attack of the Swiss. Julius II's spirits revived at this intelligence; he saw that if he could escape immediate danger he still had hopes. The increase of the power of France by the victory of Ravenna would bind the League more closely together. He only needed time to direct a stronger force against the French; and to gain time he again entered into negotiations with Louis XII, while he strained every nerve to gather money and reorganize his broken army. Again Louis XII weakly listened to the Pope, and allowed the opportunity won by the valor of Gaston de Foix to be aimlessly wasted.

The victory of Ravenna was also the triumph of the Council of Milan. In proportion as the French arms were successful, the boldness of the Council increased. On March 24 the Pope was accused of contumacy for not sending legates to the Council or listening to its admonitions; the Council which he had summoned to the Lateran was declared null, and he was admonished to withdraw all proceedings against the Council of Milan. On April 19, after the news of the battle had reached Milan, an accusation for contumacy was formally presented against Julius II. On April 21 he was cited to appear, and when no one was present to answer on his behalf he was declared contumacious and was suspended from his office. These were brave words; but the Council could not flatter itself that its decrees were of much value. Cardinal Carvajal was the object of popular ridicule in the streets, while the captive Cardinal Medici was welcomed with every token of respect. The people thronged round him and begged his blessing: many went to him for absolution for having been compelled to hold intercourse with the excommunicated Cardinals.

Julius II was busily engaged in preparing for war, and in bribing or flattering the Roman barons into quietness. Still he did not disregard the necessity of overthrowing the ecclesiastical opposition; he was anxious to set his Council of the Lateran against the schismatics at Milan. He was urgent in gathering members and in arranging for an imposing opening ceremony; and every care was taken that the Council of Milan should be entirely thrown into the shade. Eight Cardinals were appointed a commission to make necessary preparations, and regulate the Curia so that it should present an orderly appearance befitting the decorum of the papal office. The Master of the Ceremonies, Paris de Grassis, was bidden to search the records of the Council of Florence, and submit for due decision any obscure parts of ceremonial. The disturbed state of Italy after the battle of Ravenna rendered impossible the meeting of the Council on April 19, as had been originally fixed; but on May 3 Rome was so far quiet as to permit its assembling.

In the evening of May 2 Julius II was carried in his litter to the Lateran Palace. Before him rode opening armed troops of the Knights of Malta, who were guardians of the Pope and of the Council; behind him came fifteen Cardinals, and the members of the Council, twelve Patriarchs, ten Archbishops, fifty-seven Bishops, two Abbots, and three Generals of monastic orders, almost all Italians; a strong body of soldiers brought up the rear, and during the Council kept watch in the neighborhood to prevent a rising in the interest of France. An immense crowd thronged to witness the splendid ceremony with which the Council was opened on May 3. The sermon of the learned General of the Augustinians, Egidius of Viterbo, produced a profound impression on his hearers, and was long regarded as a masterpiece of oratory. In turns men marveled at his eloquence.
and were moved to tears by his passionate earnestness. He began by saying that he had long preached throughout Italy of the evils of the time and the need of reform; at length he saw the long-expected work begin; the winter was past, the summer was at hand; the light of the Council would again warm and make fertile the field of the Church. Distress might for a time wax great, but Jesus said, “A little time and ye shall see Me”. All the troubles of the Church in past times had been healed by Councils; this Council had its work to do, to restore the authority and order of the Church. Nine years had Julius II sat on the papal throne; he had done great things in Rome, he had warred for the recovery of the lands of the Church. Two things remained to do: to summon a Council, and lead Europe against the Turk.

All good men longed to see the Church reformed by a Council and the Turks expelled from Europe. Not by violence, in days of old, but by deeds of piety had the Church won Europe, Asia, and Africa; she lost Asia and Africa because she exchanged the golden panoply of an ardent spirit for the iron arms of Ajax in his fury. Unless true holiness of life were restored by the Council, religion would be lost and the commonwealth of Christendom would be undone. When was life more effeminate? When was sin less bridled? When was religion less esteemed? When was schism more dangerous? When was bloodshed more rife? When had dawned a more disastrous Easter Day than that which saw the slaughter on the field of Ravenna? All these things were warnings from on high; for the facts of the world's history were the voices of God. He ended by an earnest prayer for the purification of Christendom, the expulsion of the Turks, the revival of Christian love, and the restoration of the Church to her ancient purity.

They were noble words and finely spoken, and they expressed the opinions of a large party within the Church; but they had little connection with possibilities, and arraigned the conduct of Julius II while they professed to support him. Julius II deplored the battle of Ravenna because its issue had gone against himself; he was more concerned for the recovery of Bologna than of the Holy Land, and was more at his ease in the camp than in the Council. However, he curbed his natural restlessness and sat through the long ceremonial with a patience that astonished those who knew his ordinary ways. But he had forgotten to prepare a speech in which to state the business of the Council, and further procedure was put off till the first session on May 10; even then Julius II could only stammer through a few sentences, in which he said that it was needless to state the reasons for summoning the Council, as they were well known. At the second session, on May 17, the real business of the Council was done, by a decree which declared the proceedings of the Council of Pisa to be null and void and its adherents to be schismatics. The Council was then prorogued till November 3; it had served its immediate purpose of showing the strength of the Pope's ecclesiastical position, and of answering the schismatics at Milan.

In fact, Julius II had no time for Councils. On the same day on which this session was held he published anew the Holy League, which had now received the adhesion of Maximilian; and Rome blazed with bonfires in honor of this new triumph of the Pope. But Leagues were useless without soldiers, and Julius II knew that he again had forces in the field. He had brought about an agreement between Maximilian and the Venetians, and Venice had raised money to hire another army of the Swiss; Maximilian's consequent entrance into the League gave the Swiss an easy access into North Italy through the Tyrol. On May 25 the Swiss, who had mustered at Trent, descended to Verona; and the French general, La Palisse, who had wasted his time in the Romagna,
was suddenly recalled to the defence of Milan. The Swiss were joined by the Venetians, and their force was formidable; but a battle was made impossible by the publication of an order from Maximilian bidding the German mercenaries in the French army return home under pain of death. The greater part of the veterans who had won the battle of Ravenna obeyed, and La Palisse was unable to resist; he withdrew to Pavia, where he was followed by Trivulzio, who had no hope of holding Milan. The remnants of the French army retired across the Alps, and the French rule in North Italy disappeared with them. Even Genoa shook off the yoke of France and welcomed Giano Fregoso as its Doge.

The withdrawal of the French troops from Milan necessarily meant the suppression of the Council. The schismatic Cardinals retired to France with the intention of continuing their proceedings at Lyons; and in their train was the captive Cardinal Medici, who had the good fortune to escape on the way. When he reached Bassignana, on the bank of the Po, he counterfeited illness and asked to be allowed to rest for the night. Meanwhile his friends assembled secretly and roused the neighborhood in his behalf; were the Italians, they asked, going to allow the French to carry away a Cardinal as their prisoner? Next day, when half the French escort had crossed the river, a sudden rush was made upon those who were left behind. In the tumult Cardinal Medici was rescued, and after hiding for a few days made his way to Mantua, where he was safe from pursuit.

The Pope was not slow to reap the fruits of the French withdrawal from the Romagna. He had managed to gather together some forces, and he did not scruple to use for his own ends the lucky results of the treacherous conduct of the Duke of Urbino. Still sulking under the Pope's displeasure at the murder of Cardinal Alidosi, the Pope's nephew had refused to march with his forces to join the army of the League, and after the battle of Ravenna he was prepared to make common cause with the French; but the inactivity of La Palisse gave him no opportunity, and when the fortunes of France were desperate, the Duke of Urbino was again ready to join the winning side. Julius II readily forgave a want of zeal which events had proved to be true discretion. He made the Duke of Urbino general of his forces, with orders to march at once against Bologna. The Bentivogli fled, and the city opened its gates to receive again a papal legate as its governor, on June 13.

From Bologna the papal forces proceeded to Parma and Piacenza; but Ferrara was still the great object of the desire of Julius II. It was evident to Duke Alfonso that he could not hold out without allies against the force which was now directed against him. He resolved to throw himself on the Pope's magnanimity and seek a personal interview. Fabrizio Colonna, who had been captured in the battle of Ravenna, was in Duke Alfonso's hands. Alfonso earned his gratitude by refusing to give him up to Louis XII, who wished him to be sent as a prisoner to France. He released him without ransom, and by the mediation of the Duke of Mantua and the Spanish king, obtained from the Pope a safe-conduct to Rome, for the purpose of reconciling himself with the Pope and obtaining absolution from his excommunication. On July 4 he entered Rome with Fabrizio Colonna, attended by a troop of horse. Julius II received him kindly; he had no wish to humble his enemies, but only aimed at reducing them; he did not demand from Alfonso a public humiliation, but gave him absolution privately in the Vatican without the ceremony of striking him with a rod. But he said to the Venetian envoy, “I wish to deprive him of Ferrara; I have given him a safe-conduct for his person, not for his state”. After Alfonso’s personal reconciliation came the discussion of a lasting peace.
The negotiations were entrusted to a commission of six Cardinals; but it soon became obvious that the Pope would be satisfied with nothing but the immediate surrender of Ferrara. He offered to indemnify Alfonso with the principality of Asti, and while the matter was under discussion his troops under the Duke of Urbino pressed the siege of Reggio. He raked up old charges against Alfonso and declared that they rendered his safe-conduct invalid. He threatened imprisonment and death, hoping to terrify him into submission; but Alfonso was not cowed, and steadily argued against the Pope's charges and refused his terms. Julius II persisted in his policy of intimidation, angrily refused him permission to leave Rome, and ordered the guards at the gates to be increased. When Fabrizio Colonna heard this he felt his own honor to be at stake. After vainly pleading with the Pope, he took the matter into his own hands. Taking a retinue sufficient to overawe the guard at the Lateran Gate he escorted Alfonso to Marino, where he remained in safety till he could reach the sea and make his way back to Ferrara, which his brother, Cardinal Ippolito, still held against the papal forces.

The conduct of Julius II towards the Duke of Ferrara excited general alarm. Ferdinand of Spain expressed his disapproval, and praised the action of Fabrizio Colonna. “If”, said he, “the Pope meddles with Fabrizio or Prospero Colonna for what they have done, I will make him understand that they are my soldiers, and that I will not fail to protect them. As to Ferrara, let the Church recover its tribute and its jurisdiction; but I do not wish to see the Duke of Ferrara robbed of his lands. The Pope should be satisfied with the recovery of Bologna. No power in Italy should help him to take Ferrara and make of the Duke of Urbino a second Cesare Borgia. The Pope has warred against France in behalf of the liberty of Italy; Italy must not have another tyrant, nor must the Pope govern it at his will”.

Guicciardini, who was the Florentine ambassador at the Spanish court, saw that there were great dangers in the political condition of Italy. The downfall of the French power had been too rapid and too complete; the work of reorganization was fraught with difficulty; there were too many conflicting interests, and the balance of power was hard to establish. “Italy is already made into a new world”, wrote Guicciardini, “and it might easily happen that through the question of Ferrara it was made into another. The Pope demands too much; and when the League begins to fall in pieces, things may go in a strange fashion. But all will be to the loss of Italy, which is in a worse way than ever, if the Italians are not united, which will be difficult”.

Julius II soon began to weary of his alliance with Spain, and said that he hated the Spaniards as much as he had hated the French. He again talked of driving the foreigner out of Italy, and dreamed of ridding himself of Spain by means of the arms of the Swiss. His audacity knew no bounds; he believed in endless possibilities of skillful combinations, by means of which each power in turn was to have its own way for a little time as a reward for helping the Papacy. In the conflicts which he hoped to foment all in succession were to be ousted, while meanwhile the Papacy was steadily to gain, till in the end it would be strong enough to overcome its last ally, and then would bear undisputed sway in Italy. The policy of Julius II did not differ from that of Cesare Borgia which won the admiration of Machiavelli. But Cesare Borgia, as he advanced, would have consolidated his dominions and trained an Italian army; Julius II could neither weld together his conquests nor rekindle into patriotism the local feeling which he destroyed. Cesare Borgia governed as well as conquered the Romagna; Julius II had no capacity for organizing, and the papal government by Cardinal-legates could never awaken a national feeling, which alone could make Italy strong. Julius II was no far-
sighted statesman; his aims were dictated by the opportunities of the moment, and his patriotism throughout his career was an afterthought. He sought the help of the stranger to crush his Italian foes, and indulged in the vain hope that at his will he could give new life to Italy, which he had destroyed.

However much Julius II might wish to treat the Spaniards as he had treated the French, he still had work for them to do. The spoils of France must be divided, and the Pope and his allies assembled to decide the share of each. In August their representatives met at Mantua for discussion. Maximilian and Ferdinand wished to obtain the duchy of Milan for their grandson Charles, son of the Archduke Philip and Juana of Spain, who was to marry Renée of France, the second daughter of Louis XII, and so unite the conflicting claims; Julius II was opposed to the establishment of a foreign power in North Italy, and favored the restoration of the Sforza family. The son of Ludovico II Moro, Massimiliano Sforza, had been brought up at the court of Maximilian. He was now some thirty years old, and showed no marked capacity for affairs. His feeble character made him acceptable to the Swiss, who wished for a neighbor who would be dependent on them for help, and would be willing to pay for their good offices. The Venetians hoped that they might in time make conquests at the expense of an uncertain ruler. The settlement of the question lay with the Swiss, who were the real masters of Milan; and through their decision the restoration of Massimiliano Sforza as Duke of Milan was accepted by the allies. The Swiss took care that they were well paid for their past and future help; and Julius II demanded the towns of Parma and Piacenza, which he claimed for the Church on the ground of the bequest of the Countess Matilda of Tuscany, who had died in 1115, leaving all her lands to S. Peter.

Another question engaged the attention of the confederates at Mantua—the political position of Florence. Florence had never renounced its alliance with France, and during the last war had maintained an attitude of benevolent neutrality. The Gonfaloniere, Piero Soderini, was an upright man; but was not a strong statesman. The growing influence of Cardinal Medici encouraged the Medicean faction, so that Florence was distracted; and Soderini was not the man to heal its breaches. After the retreat of the French army from Italy, Julius II sent orders to the Archbishop of Florence to make processions and hold thanksgiving services for the deliverance of Italy. The government did not resent this needless insult, and the citizens looked on with indifference; but a studied affectation of indifference was not the way to meet approaching danger, or to avert the hostility of a man like Julius II. Soon afterwards the Pope sent Cardinal Pucci with a demand that the Gonfaloniere should lay down his office, that the exiles should be restored, and that Florence should enter the Holy League. Soderini gave a dignified refusal; but the time was past when words without deeds could avail. The papal project of restoring the Medici to Florence, and so separating the Republic from the French alliance, was secretly agreed to by the Congress of Mantua. The Florentine ambassador at the Congress, Giovan Vittorio Soderini, was carefully kept in the dark, and the Florentines were on all sides deluded into the belief that the divergent interests of the allies gave them practical security. Ferdinand of Spain said to Guicciardini that the Pope wished to treat Spain as he had treated France, and that Florence in the hands of the Medici would only give the Pope more power in Italy: Julius II told Cardinal Soderini that he would not see the influence of Spain increased, and that he did not wish to see Florence attacked by Spanish troops. While Florence hugged herself in false security, her doom was being sealed at Mantua, and she made no preparations to avert the danger.
On August 21 the Spanish viceroy, Raimondo de Cardona, entered Tuscany with 8000 infantry, 500 men-at-arms, and 600 light horse. It was not a formidable army for the reduction of a powerful state; and Florence, at the advice of Machiavelli, had reorganized its old force of citizen militia, and had 30,000 men whom she could set in the field. But by the side of the Spanish general rode Cardinal Medici and his brother Giuliano, who represented a powerful faction in Florence. The Florentines were divided in opinion; their successes since the expulsion of the Medici had not been striking; the downfall of the French power left them isolated in Italy, and many thought that their present government was clearly untenable and that its fall was only a question of time. When the demands of the viceroy for the abolition of the power of the Gonfaloniere and the restoration of the Medici were brought to Florence, Soderini called the Great Council together. He asked them to decide if they wished for the Medici; if so, he was ready at once to retire. The unanimous answer was given: “We wish for you, and not the Medici”. Many brave words were spoken, and troops were sent to hold Prato against the advance of the Spaniards.

The citizen forces of Machiavelli were not prepared for the terrible earnestness with which the Spaniards made war, and the peasants were terrified by the wholesale slaughter which followed any attempt at resistance. The Spaniards, however, found great difficulty in obtaining supplies, since the Florentine troops cut off their communications with Bologna. Raimondo de Cardona cared little for the restoration of the Medici, and was willing to withdraw from the Florentine territory if his troops were supplied with food. In an evil hour for Florence the proposal was rejected, and Cardona led his starving troops to Prato, and told them that within its walls were food and plunder. The Spaniards felt that they were fighting for their lives, and continued the assault with terrible earnestness till a breach was made in the wall; it was useless for the garrison to try and keep out the famished horde; on August 29 Prato was stormed and sacked. No records in history are more horrible than those that tell of the fiendish cruelty, the brutal lust, the insatiable thirst for gold, of the Spanish soldiers. It is said that 5000 of the inhabitants of Prato were slain; those who survived were tortured, mutilated, and dishonored. We may well believe the story that Pope Leo X was haunted on his deathbed by the remembrance of the horrors wherewith the greatness of the Medicean family was again established.

Men trembled in Florence at this awful news. Cardona triumphant offered them the choice of war or the Medici; and Soderini shrank from exposing Florence to the fate of Prato. While he hesitated a band of four young men, who were of the party of the Medici, forced their way into the Palazzo, and bade him lay down his office. Soderini had not the soul of a hero, and had already begun to despair; he asked that his life should be spared, and that he might quit Florence. Without any formal deposition, without any popular rising against him, without waiting to strike a blow for his country, he quitted Florence, and made his way to Siena. It is no wonder that Machiavelli sentenced the silly soul of Piero Soderini to the limbo of infants; it is no wonder that a Republic with so fainthearted a leader had no hopes of life.

The downfall of Florence was due to the feeling of political helplessness which had been growing in Italy in view of the rapid changes which baffled all attempts at calculation. The old idea of liberty had ceased to have any definite meaning, and political thinkers asked themselves vainly, “Where is freedom to be found?”. In the absence of any answer, they fell back upon incredulity; they abandoned any search for a principle on which to found political life, and accepted party struggles as rough
scrambles for the sweets of power. The Florentine Francesco Vettori frankly expresses the sentiments on which he acted. “The changes made by the Medici”, he says, “may be called tyrannical. It is true that in Plato’s Republic and in Thomas More’s Utopia there are examples of governments which are not tyrannical; but all the republics and states of which I have read in history or which I have seen smack of tyranny. We may say that all governments are tyrannical. In the case of Florence the city is populous; many citizens wish to share in its advantages, and the good things to be distributed are few. One party is driven to govern and enjoy honors and advantages; the other must look on and criticise the game”. Such were the cynical considerations whereby Florence was induced to submit to the imposition of its former yoke.

Next day, September 1, Giuliano de' Medici entered Florence and the Palleschi, as the partisans of the Medici were called, gathered round him. A Gonfaloniere was elected for a year, and the old government by means of the consiglio grande was still retained. The Palleschi wished for a more thorough change; they found Giuliano too gentle for their leader, and submitted their views to Cardinal Giovanni. He entered Florence in state accompanied by the viceroy, and by his advice the Palleschi, on September 16, took possession of the Palazzo and remodelled the constitution of Florence. The consiglio grande was abolished; the Gonfaloniere’s tenure of office was restricted to two months; the franchise was confined to men who could be trusted: in short the republican reforms of 1494 were swept away and Florence was brought back to the condition in which it had been under Lorenzo.

The impetuosity of Julius II carried away his judgment in permitting the restoration of the Medici to Florence by Spanish arms. He was pursuing an old design which altered circumstances had made dangerous rather than useful to his ends. So long as the French power was strong in Italy, the Pope had an interest in trying to separate Florence from its alliance with France, and the overthrow of the republican government by means of the Medici was the easiest course to pursue. When the French power had fallen the Republic of Florence was left isolated and feeble. It would have been wise policy for the Pope to have left Florence in this condition of weakness. The restoration of the Medici by Spanish help reproduced the state of things which Julius II had been striving to overthrow. Florence allied to Spain was just as dangerous to the Papacy as Florence allied to France; and the Pope, who aimed at driving the foreigner out of Italy, was ill-advised in helping the dominant foreign power to win an ally such as Florence. Florence under Soderini would have been powerless; Florence under the Medici was sure to be an obstacle in the way of the Pope's plans. Julius II did not foresee the extent of the disaster which he wrought for the Papacy. He could not foresee that the Medici would weave the fortunes of their house with the fortunes of the Papacy, and would inflict on both the direst disaster. But he did not use such foresight as he possessed, and was bent on satisfying an old grudge, heedless of all else; he could not forgive Soderini for harboring the schismatics at Pisa. Even when Soderini had fallen, Julius II strove to get him into his power, and Soderini only escaped from the Pope’s anger by fleeing to Ragusa.

Julius II looked round with satisfaction on the results achieved by the Holy League. The French were driven from Italy and were menaced by the forces of England and Spain; Ferdinand’s army occupied Navarre; the English forces threatened Guienne and the English fleet ravaged the Breton coast. France was hard pressed on every side and had no ally save Scotland; the Pope had nothing to fear from a revival of French influence in Italy. Moreover Julius II had won Parma and Piacenza for the Holy See. He
had not, it is true, succeeded in winning Ferrara; but Modena and Reggio were in the hands of his troops.

There were other members of the League who were not so well satisfied. Maximilian and the Venetians could not agree about the division of the territories won to the French. Julius II desired above all things to establish his authority beyond dispute by the splendor of his Council at the Lateran, whose sessions had been suspended during this interval of war. For this purpose he needed the accession of the Emperor: when that was gained, France with its schismatical Cardinals at Lyons would be as completely isolated in ecclesiastical as it was in temporal affairs. Again Julius II tried to win over Maximilian's adviser, the powerful Bishop of Gurk, of whom it was currently said, “Gurk is not the chief bishop in the Emperor’s court; but the chief king who dances attendance on Gurk is the Emperor”. Gurk came to Rome to confer with the Pope on November 5, and was received with all the honor shown to sovereigns. The Venetians soon found that Julius II was entirely on the Emperor's side. He was accustomed by this time to use his allies solely for his own purposes, and had no scruple in ordering them to submit to his dictation. Venice was bidden to make peace with Maximilian on the terms which he offered; they were to give up Verona and Vicenza, and hold Padua and Treviso as fiefs of the Empire subject to an annual payment. The Venetian envoys in Rome refused to accept these terms, whereon the Pope in anger cried out, “If you will not take them, we will all go against you”. He was ready to renew the League of Cambrai against Venice, and on November 19 signed an accord with the Emperor which was published on November 25. After this he hastened to enjoy his triumph. On December 3 was held the third session of the Lateran Council, in which the Bishop of Gurk declared the adhesion of the Emperor to the Council, pronounced in his name all the proceedings of the Council of Pisa null and void, and further asserted that the Emperor had given it no mandate. France was laid under an interdict for harbouring schismatics; and in the fourth session, held on December 10, proposals were made for the formal abolition of the Pragmatic Sanction of France, but the question was deferred for a time.

The Pope enjoyed his ecclesiastical triumph, but he paid a great price for it. It is the most remarkable feature in the policy of Julius II that he spared no pain to extinguish the beginnings of a schism. It might have been expected that the Pope, immersed in political schemes, would have disregarded the intrigues of a few discontented Cardinals or would have satisfied himself with defeating them on political grounds. But Julius II seems to have felt this ecclesiastical revolt more deeply than any interruption of his temporal plans, and never laid aside his efforts to establish his ecclesiastical authority in undisputed grandeur. For this purpose he curbed his fiery disposition; he grew cautious and patient; he made unexpected sacrifices. The adhesion of Maximilian to the Lateran Council was no great matter in itself: yet Julius II was determined to have it, though Ferdinand of Spain pointed out the danger of alienating the Venetians, who would be driven to ally themselves with France and so bring back French influence into Italy.

Maximilian urged the excommunication of Venice, but Julius II shrank from pressing Venice too hardly; he threatened, but did not excommunicate. Venice was anxious to avoid a rupture, and declared its adhesion to the Lateran Council. One motive of temporal policy led Julius II to unite with the Emperor. He was above all things desirous of the conquest of Ferrara, and urged the Emperor to recall the German mercenaries who were in the service of Duke Alfonso. He hoped that Alfonso's army would thereby fade away like the army of La Palisse. But no one was willing to further
the Pope's schemes: Maximilian refused to move; the Spanish forces abode at Milan and preferred to enjoy themselves in the festivities which followed on the restoration of Duke Massimiliano Sforza. Julius II saw with displeasure that operations against Ferrara were suspended for the winter months, that he had little to hope from his allies, and that the negotiations between Venice and France threatened new dangers for the future. The only success which the Pope could reckon was the occupation of Pesaro by the Duke of Urbino in the end of October.
CHAPTER XVII.
ROME UNDER JULIUS II

The sense of increasing difficulties weighed heavily on Julius II, whose health began to give way. At the end of January, 1513, he took to his bed, and in a few days his other ailments were complicated by an attack of fever. On February 4 he sent for Paris de Grassis, and told him that he had no hopes of recovery. He gave him orders about his funeral, saying that he knew how little attention was paid to a Pope after his death. He did not wish his illness to postpone the next session of the Lateran Council, which was accordingly held on February 16 under the presidency of Cardinal Raffaello Riario. At the Pope's wish the Council promulgated the decree which he had previously issued against simony in papal elections. Julius II was so far a reformer that he recognized the mischief which was wrought on the Papacy by the unblushing simony of which he had himself been a witness. The decree of Julius II against simony, and the care with which from his deathbed he urged it on the consciences of his Cardinals, are sufficient proofs of the scandals of the past.

Julius II felt his strength slowly ebbing away, and quietly prepared for death. On February 20 he received the sacrament from the hands of Cardinal Riario, and afterwards bade farewell to the Cardinals. Addressing them in Latin as a Pope, he asked for their prayers; he confessed himself a great sinner, who had not governed the Church as wisely as he ought: he besought them to stand fast in the fear of God and the observance of the laws of the Church. Then he implored them to observe in the election of his successor the Bull which had just received the approbation of the Council. The absent Cardinals should be admitted to the Conclave, all save the schismatics; to them as a man and a priest he gave his pardon and his blessing, as Pope he could not sanction their polluted presence within the city. Then changing his speech to the Italian tongue, he told them his last wishes as a man. He wished that the Duke of Urbino should be confirmed in the vicariate of Pesaro as some return for the services which he had rendered to the Church. Julius II felt the calls of nature strong at the last. He had avoided the fault of Alexander VI; he had even treated the Duke of Urbino with disdain; but he could not help expressing a wish that his nephew might secure an honorable but modest provision. The Cardinals assented, and the Pope dismissed them with his blessing. Afterwards he took leave of his household. His strength fast waned before this last effort, and on the following night he died.

The death of Julius II filled Rome with sorrow. It was long since there had been such unfeigned grief at the death of a Pope; the quietness of the city and the absence of deeds of violence during the vacancy bore unmistakable testimony to the impression which his character had produced. Men felt that a great man had passed away. Their thoughts rested on the things which he had accomplished, on the successes which he had obtained. They recalled those qualities of the departed which always fascinate the popular mind: his resoluteness, his activity, his great designs. He had wrought changes in Italy with a rapidity which baffled understanding. He had made the Papacy the centre of the politics of Europe. He had used great kings as his instruments, and when they had secured his purposes he had driven them ignominiously away. The ordinary Italian may
well be pardoned if he had no clear view of the future of Italy. He saw himself in a whirl of change and revolution, from which he could only hope for a favorable issue. He clung to the strong man who seemed to have a plan of his own, and who pursued it with untiring energy. Julius II gave himself out as the Liberator of Italy, and the average Italian was willing to believe him. He saw that Julius II was pursuing no merely personal ends, and was not trying to set up a dominion for his family; disinterested ambition seemed noble in his eyes, and the aspiration of Julius II to free Italy from the stranger seemed to be the utterance of lofty patriotism. Men saw that Julius II had done great things; they believed that his schemes, if fully carried out, would bring back order out of chaos.

The statesmen of Italy took a more sober view of Julius II. They regarded the means which he used, and discussed their wisdom; they estimated the immediate results which he produced, and doubted about his ideal aims. “He was a man”, says the Florentine Francesco Vettori, “fortunate rather than prudent, courageous rather than strong; but ambitious and beyond measure desirous of every kind of greatness. Alexander and Julius were so great that they may be called Emperors rather than Popes”. In the same strain wrote another Florentine, Francesco Guicciardini: “He was a prince of courage and boundless resolution, but impetuous and full of unmeasured schemes which would have brought him to ruin had he not been helped by the reverence felt for the Church, the discord of the princes, and the condition of the times, rather than by his own moderation and prudence. He would deserve the highest glory had he been a secular prince, or if he had used the same care and efforts to exalt the Church in spiritual things by peaceful arts, that he used to exalt her by war in temporal greatness”. Guicciardini goes on to say that Julius II was extolled above his predecessors “by those who, having lost the right use of words and confused the distinctions of accurate speech, judge that it is the office of the Popes to bring empire to the Apostolic seat by arms and by the shedding Christian blood, more than to trouble themselves by setting an example of holy life and correcting the decay of morals for the salvation of those souls for whose sake they boast that Christ set them as His Vicars on earth”.

The different judgments of which Guicciardini speaks are still possible. For good or for ill, Julius II was undoubtedly the founder of the Papal States. The nepotism of Sixtus IV was merely the extension of a tendency that already existed, and was not a system which could leave lasting results. Alexander VI set himself with relentless craft to establish for his son an independent principality in Central Italy. Such a plan might have been for the good of Italy, but would have destroyed the temporal sovereignty of the Papacy, which would have been left with only spiritual functions, and would have run great risks of being reduced to an appendage to a new and vigorous dynasty. From this danger it was rescued by Julius II, who entered upon the labors of Cesare Borgia and carried out the plans of Alexander VI. But the conquests of Julius II, were for the Church; and when he died he left the Church supreme over dominions of which Alexander VI had never dared to dream. Not only were the States of the Church recovered, but their enemies were crushed and their neighbors weakened. The Italian powers had been reduced; the political life of Italy, which before was tottering, had received from Julius II a fatal blow; only the Papal States rested on a sure foundation. When the crash came they alone were safe, for the Papacy as a temporal power was bound up with the politics of Southern Europe. It is easy to point out the dangers which the Papacy ran in bringing about this end. The head of Christendom leading his armies to attack an insignificant fortress in Italy, and hurling his anathemas against those who
crossed his path in politics, was not a figure to command the respect of Europe. It is easy to point to the great religious movement which followed, and find its origin in feelings of moral reprobation awakened by such-like conduct. But the success of the Reformation was due to intellectual, social, and political causes as well as moral. Christendom became conscious of differences which were sure to find expression sooner or later in religious matters. The Reformation would have taken place in some way or another, even if the Popes had stood aloof from Italian politics. The system of the mediaeval Church would have felt the attack of the modern spirit of criticism, whether the States of the Church had been ruled by the Pope or by his unruly vicars. A secularized Papacy may be a proof to after times that the days of the undisputed rule of the Pope over the Church were drawing to an end; but it is hard to see how the Papacy, organized as it had been for centuries, could have escaped the conflict.

If this be so, the foundation of the States of the Church was by no means an unworthy or unnecessary work. If the crash had come when the Papacy was politically insignificant, it might have been entirely swept away. As it was, the Papacy was preserved on political grounds till it had time to put forth new strength and re-establish its hold on the ecclesiastical system. Had not the Papacy possessed a strong foothold in the States of the Church, it might, in the rapid movement of the Reformation, have been reduced to its primitive condition of an Italian bishopric. The story of the founding of the States of the Church may be regarded as an episode, an ignoble episode, in the history of the Papacy, but it is none the less an integral part of its development. The beginning of the sixteenth century saw the states of Europe engaged in extending their boundaries and consolidating their power. The Papacy frankly accepted the political spirit of the time, and entered on the scramble as keenly as the rest and as sagaciously as the wisest. It must in all fairness be admitted that it received its reward.

It cannot be said of Julius II that he entirely disregarded for politics the higher duties of his office. He saw the dangers of the secularized Papacy, and did his utmost to rescue papal elections from simony and bring back the Cardinals to a sense of their responsibilities. He was not so venturous as to run the risk of a schism, nor so cowardly as to refuse to meet the opinion of Europe if Europe had anything to say. But the Churchmen who assembled at the Lateran Council were unconscious of any coming danger, and though they spoke of a coming time of peace, they agreed in praising the Pope's warlike bearing as needful in the present. Julius II sorely needed money; but he introduced no new exactions and was not personally oppressive. He received large sums from new Cardinals; but he probably thought that those who were honored by the Church should contribute to the Church's needs. His resources were due to personal frugality and careful management. Men thought that he was avaricious because he was slow in parting with his money and liked to keep a good sum in reserve. He was not generous or open-handed, and his service brought no rewards. Michel Angelo lived in poverty while he worked for the Pope, and found it hard to get money to enable him to pay for his marble or his colors.

Julius II stands high above Alexander VI because his policy was disinterested and was intelligible. Men could forgive much to a Pope who fought for the Church; they looked with dread on a Pope who used the authority of the Church to establish his own family in power. Julius II was an unscrupulous politician; but he played his game openly and men saw the reasons for his moves. He spoke out clearly and did not conceal his objects; the allies whom he used for his purposes were never deceived into thinking that he had any real love for them, and he never struck a blow in the dark. His rough,
resolute, impetuous, outspoken character gave him an appearance of dignity and high-mindedness. Alexander VI filled Italy with horror because he suddenly strode forward as master of that statecraft which had many dilettante admirers. In contrast to him, Julius II seemed to return to primitive virtues—to revive an heroic age. He set up steadfastness in the place of subtlety; he triumphed by rashness rather than by guile; he professed to talk of greater plans than he could compass rather than cloak his schemes under an affected geniality and good humor. In this Julius II corresponded to a movement of the Italian mind. The early Renaissance strove after delicacy and worked tentatively in points of detail; it gradually felt its way to a desire for largeness of design and boldness in execution. What Michel Angelo did for art, what Bramante did for architecture, Julius II did for politics. He conceived vast designs and worked at them with the fury of one overmastered by the grandeur of his own ideas.

Amid the tumult of political endeavor, Julius II little thought that his name would be borne through the ages chiefly by three workmen whom he employed: Bramante, Michel Angelo, and Raffaelle; yet it is mostly owing to their labors that the fiery personality which dominated his own contemporaries has never ceased to enthral men’s minds. Its great aspirations were expressed in stone by Bramante; its passionate force breathes through the frescoes of Michel Angelo; its triumphant energy is set forth by the pencil of Raffaelle. Julius II had the true mark of greatness, that he sympathized with all that was great. He was more than a mere patron of art; he provided great artists with great opportunities. He did not merely employ great artists; he impressed them with a sense of his own greatness, and called out all that was strongest and noblest in their own nature. They knew that they served a master who was in sympathy with themselves.

Julius II was a stern master, fitful and capricious; even Michel Angelo found that it was useless to rebel against his will. When he had finished his unlucky statue of Julius II at Bologna, he was ordered to return to Rome and continue his work at the Pope's tomb. When he arrived he found that Julius II had changed his mind: he thought that it was unlucky to have his tomb erected in his lifetime. Michel Angelo was bidden to lay aside his sculptor's chisel and betake himself to the art of the painter. The Pope had resolved to carry out the adornment of the Sistine Chapel, whose walls were enriched by the panels of the great artists of the previous generation. Julius II wished that the space above the windows, whence sprang the flat vaulted ceiling, should be adorned by the painter's skill. The task was not to Michel Angelo's taste, and he found it hard to produce a satisfactory design. He had difficulties in contriving a scaffold and in procuring colors. The work of his assistants did not please him, and he had sadly to dismiss them, destroy their painting, and carry on his labor single-handed. He made mistakes at first in his process of fresco painting, and his work was destroyed by damp. For months he was in despair; he lived in poverty, and dared not ask the Pope for money, for he had nothing to show. “I cannot get on with the work and have had no claim for pay” he wrote to his father. “I am wasting my time in vain; God help me”. Never was a work of art so entirely the result of the travail and agony of the artist's soul.

Michel Angelo began his work on May 10, 1508. As he labored on, sick at heart, the restless Pope often clambered up the ladder that led to the giddy platform where the painter lay. Had it not been for his persistency the painter's spirit would have flagged. “When will you have done?” asked the Pope. “When I can”, said Michel Angelo. “You seem to wish”, said Julius in a rage, “that I should have you thrown down from your scaffold”. At last, on November 1, 1509, half the work was done, and Julius II ordered the scaffolding to be removed that men might see and criticize. They came and gazed
with wonder and delight; none doubted that they stood before a masterpiece. The ceiling
had been by the painter's art gifted with new architectural forms. Its plain flat vault had
been laid out with cornice, arches and niches. The whole surface was a magnificent
delusion, in which architecture, sculpture, and painting seemed to combine. Gigantic
figures of prophets and sibyls rose between the windows from the wall; caryatids bore
the cornice; huge slaves with garlands were seated by the arches at its edge. In the
centre of the ceiling the painted panels told the story of the creation of the world and of
man; told what man was when God was by his side, and what man became when he lost
the light of the Divine presence. Never since the days of Phidias had the human form
been raised to such dignity; never did Italian art achieve a greater technical triumph;
ever has the painter's brush carried so profound a message to the minds and
consciences of men.

Julius II was satisfied with Michel Angelo’s work and urged him to finish it. The
scaffolding had been removed before the last touches had been given to the painting;
Julius II would have it again erected that the figures might be enriched with gilding.
Michel Angelo pleaded that this was needless. "But it looks so poor", said the Pope.
“Holy Father”, answered the painter, “they were but poor folk whom I have painted
there: they wore no gold upon their garments”. Julius II smiled and submitted. Michel
Angelo was allowed to go on with the other half of the ceiling. In vain he asked for
leave to go to Florence and visit his family; Julius II was inexorable, and Michel was
chained to his work till it was finished.

When Julius II was on his deathbed, he left instructions to his executors that Michel
Angelo should continue his work at the monument; and a contract was made for a
design on a somewhat smaller scale. The tomb was no longer to stand four-square, but
was to be placed against the wall, and have fewer figures.

For three years Michel Angelo labored; then he was sent by Leo X to other work at
Florence, and the tomb of Julius II was put aside during his absence. Its design was
again and again contracted from the mighty scale on which it had first been planned;
finally, in 1550, it was erected as we see it still, not beneath the dome of S. Peter’s, but
in the little Church of S. Piero in Vincoli, from which Julius II took his Cardinal title.
The unquiet spirit of Julius II haunted Michel Angelo, and the execution of the tomb
was a cause of constant trouble to the sculptor. Through the weariness of all concerned,
it assumed its present shape and was placed in its present position, for which its
proportions are much too vast. Huge pilasters of marble stand against the wall, and on
the upper story rests the sarcophagus of Julius II with his recumbent figure. In a niche
above the Pope stands the Madonna with the Holy Child; in the side niches are a
prophet and a sibyl; these were the work of Michel Angelo's pupils, Maso del Bosco
and Raffaello di Montelupo. In the lower story are three statues by Michel Angelo's own
hand. He had made others which were rendered useless by the change in the position of
the tomb; and two of his noblest works, two captive slaves originally designed for this
work, are now in the Louvre. Still, with all its losses and all its evil fortune, the tomb of
Julius II is the mightiest of sculptured memorials to the dead. The three figures by
Michel Angelo are masterpieces of Italian sculpture. A colossal figure of Moses is
seated in the middle of the lower story of the monument; on either side of him stand
Leah and Rachel, Dante's types of the practical and the contemplative life. Moses is not
set before us as the lawgiver, but as the great leader of his people. Holding the table of
the law in one hand, with the other he clutches his beard and looks out with a resolute
force upon a craven folk. So Michel Angelo idealized the fiery personality of Julius II;
the mighty frame of Moses, which seems to be with difficulty held in rest, sets forth the stormy spirit of the Pope who strove to mold states and kingdoms to his will, and owned no bounds to his furious impetuosity.

Besides Michel Angelo, Julius II summoned to Rome the other great artist of his day, Raffaello Santi. The son of a vigorous Umbrian painter, Raffaello after his father's death studied under Perugino, and had gained some fame when in 1508 he came to Rome at the age of twenty-five. Julius II at once set him to work to decorate the chambers in the Vatican in which he chose to live. After abandoning the rooms which Alexander VI had occupied, he selected for his own dwelling the rooms which Nicolas V had built. Their walls were covered by frescoes from the hands of Piero della Francesca, Luca Signorelli, Perugino, and Sodoma. At first Julius II intended that Raffaello should thoroughly finish the work that they had begun; and he first undertook the second of the four rooms, the Stanza della Segnatura, where the Pope used to receive the documents which required his signature. The first of Raffaello’s paintings was a female figure representing Theology, which occupied an unfinished panel in the ceiling. Julius II was so delighted with this work that he ordered the existing paintings to be destroyed, that Raffaello might have free scope for the harmonious decoration of the entire room. Raffaello allowed much of the merely decorative work, with its mythological medallions, to remain on the ceiling; but the wall paintings were swept away.

It seems most probable that Julius II suggested—he certainly approved—the noble series of designs which Raffaello executed. The room represents the whole field of human knowledge, sacred and profane. In the four divisions of the ceiling are allegorical figures of Theology, Poetry, Philosophy and Law; round them are grouped appropriate medallions. The four walls unfold the muster roll of the heroes of literature and science. Theology shows us the heavens opened. The Father blesses His Church on earth; the Son, seated amidst His Apostles, with outstretched hands pleads gently with mankind; the Holy Spirit is descending from heaven to shed Divine grace on the Sacrament which stands upon the altar beneath. Round the altar are grouped the fathers and great teachers of the Church, amongst them Dante and Savonarola; and in the foreground are figures which tell of the living power of Christian faith and Christian teaching in the painter's day. No less splendid in conception are the pictures which represent the triumphs of Poetry and Philosophy. Apollo crowned with laurels is seated on the hill of Parnassus, with the muses by his side, while the hill slope is filled with the great singers of all time, from Homer to Sannazaro. In the School of Athens, a stately hall modeled on Bramante’s design for Peter's, are gathered the great teachers of antiquity, whose writings seemed to the men of the Renaissance a fount of inexhaustible wisdom. The space allotted for the fourth picture, which represented Law, was divided into two by a window. Raffaello has shown two groups: Justinian promulgating the Digest, and Gregory IX promulgating the Decretals.

If Michel Angelo’s work in Rome testifies to the terrific side of the character of Julius II, the work of Raffaello testifies to the greatness of his mind. The decoration of a room was a small matter; but Julius II had his room converted into a mighty memorial of the dignity of man’s achievements. He had displayed before his eyes all that was best and noblest in the past. In the largest spirit of human sympathy he took possession of the entire heritage of human knowledge.
We need not speak of the grace, the beauty, the dignity of Raffaelle’s work, or the consummate skill shown in the composition of these large frescoes. Julius II was so delighted with the result, that he ordered Raffaelle to proceed with the other three rooms as well. Raffaelle had assigned him as the motive for his treatment of the next room, ‘God protecting His Church’. His first picture was the expulsion of Heliodorus from the Temple of Jerusalem, as told in the Second Book of Maccabees. Here dramatic movement takes the place of stately repose; heavenly messengers sweep through the Temple, and the overthrown tyrant crouches before them; in the background the high priest and his attendants are deep in prayer. We cannot doubt the influence of Julius II on this picture, for in the corner is a portrait of the Pope borne in his litter, and gazing calmly on the prostrate king; the picture was an unmistakable allegory of his success in expelling the French from Italy. A second picture in the same room was nearly finished when Julius II died; it represented the testimony of God against unbelief by the miracle of Bolsena, when a priest who doubted the Sacrament of the altar saw blood trickle from the consecrated host.

Besides his paintings in the Vatican, Raffaelle found time to work for other patrons. For his friend Sigismondo de’ Conti, one of the papal secretaries, he painted a Madonna as a votive offering to a church. This picture long rested at Sigismondo’s native town Foligno, and bears the name of the Madonna of Foligno. The portrait of the kneeling donor shows us the clear-cut features of the chief man of letters who served Julius II. Sigismondo came to Rome under Sixtus IV in 1476, and had a long experience of papal service. Julius II made him his private secretary, and employed him in many delicate negotiations. Sigismondo employed his leisure in writing a history of his own times, which is an excellent summary of the events; but his official reserve, and his striving after classical dignity of style, have prevented him from expressing his own judgments. The facts which he relates are known from other sources; we wish that one who saw so much close at hand had given us more personal details and more of his own opinions. Sigismondo strove to be a classical historian, but he has no conception of historical progress, and no criticism of the general tendency of his time. He misses the charm of a diarist or memoir writer: he does not attain to the rank of an historian.

Julius II was too much engaged in practical pursuits to pay much attention to literature. Occasionally he was pleased with a complimentary harangue, and recompensed the orator with a present, but he attracted no literary men to Rome. Once, indeed, he was led into the unwonted act of crowning a poet, more as an act of political complaisance than from any serious intention. It would seem that the Vatican librarian, Tommaso Inghirami, persuaded him to provide a literary entertainment for the Bishop of Gurk when he came as imperial ambassador in November, 1512. He consulted Paris de Grassis, who answered that there was no precedent for the coronation of a poet by the Pope; he added further that poets wrote about Jupiter and Pegasus, and such-like heathenish things, which it was indecorous for a Pope to recognize. Julius II seemed convinced, but a few days afterwards, at a dinner in the Belvedere given to the Bishop of Gurk, a young Roman, Vincenzo Pimpinello, attired as Orpheus, recited some verses in honor of the Pope’s victory over the French. He was followed by Francesco Grapaldi, secretary to the embassy of Parma, who similarly sang the glories of Italy freed from the barbarian yoke. Then Inghirami brought two laurel wreaths, which the Pope and the Bishop of Gurk held between them, while the Pope said, “We, by our apostolic authority, and the Bishop of Gurk by the authority of the Emperor, make you poet, ordering you to write of the exploits of the Church”. Neither Pimpinello nor Grapaldi
were of any merit as poets. Julius II was not fortunate in his solitary attempt at literary patronage.

The most precious memorial of Julius II is his portrait by Raffaelle, which is a veritable revelation of his character. Seated in an arm-chair, with head bent downwards, the Pope is in deep thought. His furrowed brow and his deep-sunk eyes tell of energy and decision. The down drawn corners of his mouth betoken constant dealings with the world. Raffaelle has caught the momentary repose of a restless and passionate spirit, and has shown all the grace and beauty which are to be found in the sense of force repressed and power at rest. He sets before us Julius II as a man resting from his labours, and strings out all the dignity of his rude, rugged features. The Pope is in repose; but repose to him was not idleness, it was deep meditation. A man who has done much and suffered much, he finds comfort in his retrospect and prepares for future conflicts.
CHAPTER XVIII.
CONTEST OF BISHOPS AND MONKS.
1513—1515

The death of Julius II plunged Rome into genuine grief, before which the voice of turbulence and faction conduct was silent. Never in the memory of man had the city remained so quiet on the death of the Pope. There was nothing to disturb the action of the Cardinals or prevent them from carrying out the funeral rites of Julius II and the preparations for the Conclave. They scarcely showed themselves deserving of this exceptional consideration; their behavior was not dignified, for their first care was to lay hands on the treasure which Julius II had left behind. In spite of his military expenditure Julius II had practiced strict economy; and the papal treasury contained upwards of 200,000 ducats, besides two tiaras with the triple crown, two simple tiaras, and jewels to the value of 50,000 ducats. The poor Cardinals thought sadly of the Bull which prohibited simony in the new election, and wished to use the opportunity which was in their power. They hunted out the constitution of Paul II which provided that every Cardinal whose revenues were below 4000 ducats should receive from the Pope 200 ducats monthly till he reached that amount; and as Julius II, had not made this payment, they proposed to pay themselves the arrears which were due. This plan was frustrated by the firmness of the Captain of the Castle of S. Angelo, who refused to give up to the Cardinals the keys of the treasury. He showed them a brief of Julius II forbidding him to deliver them save to the future Pope. The Cardinals declared him a rebel against the Sacred College; but the castellan was not to be moved, and they went away baffled.

When all was ready the twenty-five Cardinals who were in Rome entered the Conclave on the evening of March 4. They first attended mass in a chapel of S. Peter’s, where each man as he gazed upon the vast columns that rose amid the heaps of stones was reminded of the great task which awaited the future Pope. The wind howled through the chapel, and the altar lights could scarcely be protected from its violence. The great Church of Rome was a dreary and piteous ruin.

The result of the election was very doubtful; and popular opinion pointed to Raffaello Riario, Flisco, and the Hungarian Cardinal Archbishop of Strigov as the most likely men. The Cardinals did not hasten to proceed to any decisive step. They drew up regulations for the future Pope, and signed them with great ceremony, till the guardians of the Conclave grew impatient, and on the evening of March 7 reduced the food of the Cardinals to one dish at each meal. On March 9 they took more stringent measures and allowed them nothing but a vegetable diet. The Cardinals in reality felt a difficulty how to proceed. There was no one specially marked out for the office, and the obvious course would have been to choose the most respectable of the senior members of the College. This is what the older Cardinals wished to do; and if this view had prevailed there would have been a basis for discussion. But the younger members of the College wished for a new departure in the Papacy. They were weary of the excitement which the pontificates of Alexander VI and Julius II had so plentifully supplied. They wanted a kindly, genial, magnificent Pope, a man of high character and some repute, who would do credit to the office without the intolerable activity in political matters which had so
long prevailed. They were not satisfied with any of the older Cardinals; some were too old, others too feeble, others not sufficiently respectable in life and character. In this divided state of opinion each party was bound to put forward some candidate; the seniors named Raffaelle Riario, the juniors named Giovanni de' Medici. An attempt was made at a compromise; but there was no one on whom both parties could agree. It became a question of endurance, and nothing was to be gained by going through the form of holding a scrutiny.

In such a struggle the juniors had physical strength on their side, and showed greater resolution. The league of the seniors gradually began to waver. Cardinal Medici was especially helped by the support of Cardinal Soderini, who was clever enough to see which was the winning side. He thought it best to make terms, and his example of trusting to the generosity of his hereditary foe made a great impression on the others. Perhaps also the elder Cardinals were induced to give way because Cardinal Medici was known to suffer from an incurable ulcer, and needed a surgeon's care even in the Conclave; young though he was, he did not promise to be long-lived.

As last it was found necessary to take some definite step. On March 10 the Bull of Julius II against simony was read and the first scrutiny was held. It declared nothing, as the votes were scattered: Cardinal Serra, whom no one seriously thought of, received most votes. After this Cardinals Riario and Medici had a private conference, the result of which was that the election of Cardinal Medici was practically decided. The Cardinals went to him and greeted him as Pope; many of them escorted him to his cell, and asked him what name he had chosen. Next day a formal scrutiny was held, and Cardinal Medici was duly elected. The announcement caused universal surprise; no one had thought of him as a possible candidate, but every one was delighted as well as surprised. There was nothing known against the new Pope except his youth and his exceeding good nature.

Giovanni de' Medici had been made Cardinal when he was a boy and became Pope when he was still a young man. He was only in his thirty-eighth year, nothing to recommend him except the political importance which he had gained by the restoration of his family to Florence. He had shown great tact in the years that followed the exile of the Medici, and had done his utmost to be at peace with all men. Under the pontificate of Alexander V. he had found it wise to absent himself for a few years, during which he travelled in Germany and France, till Alexander VI ceased to suspect him and he returned to Rome. Julius II had no especial love for him; but when the restoration of the Medici became part of his political plans he made Giovanni his legate in Bologna and so raised him to a political personage. Giovanni showed considerable cleverness in managing the Florentine revolution. Every one felt that he was the real head of the Medici, and rather than his elder brother Giuliano, directed the measures of their party. He guided the steps by which the Florentine government was put into the hands of trusty men, and he knew how to throw a cloak of moderation over violent measures. Still the Florentine Republic did not pass away without a struggle against its destroyers. A conspiracy against the Medici was set on foot; but it was revealed by the incredible carelessness of a hot-headed youth, Pietro Paolo Boscoli, who let fall from his pocket a compromising document in the midst of the crowd that kept the Carnival. In consequence of real or pretended evidence, many of the chief Florentines were exiled, among them Niccolò Machiavelli. Boscoli was executed, and the account of his mental struggles to die as a Christian is one of the most striking illustrations of the religious feelings of the men of the Renaissance. To them the example of classical antiquity was
in the foreground, while the teaching of the Gospel was the abiding background of their moral being. In the time of action they turned to the memories of Rome for their examples; reflection brought before them the precepts of Christ. “Drive Brutus from my head”, exclaimed Boscoli, “that I may take the last step wholly as a Christian”. And the great question for the friends of the would-be penitent was the opinion of Thomas Aquinas on the sinfulness of tyrannicide. The good confessor who heard the account of his simple-hearted if mistaken patriotism could say afterwards, “I wept eight days almost without ceasing; such feelings of affection did that night inspire. I believe that his soul is in peace, and has not undergone purgatory”.

Boscoli and another conspirator were executed as Cardinal Giovanni was on his way to Rome for the papal election. The conspiracy awakened no feeling of bitterness or thirst for revenge in the Cardinal's mind. Already he was a statesman of a practical order, who saw that he could not get his own way without creating some opposition, and resolved that he would try by geniality and kindliness to make that opposition as little formidable as might be. He had some of the cultivated cynicism of his father. He wished to enjoy himself in his own way, and he wished every one else to share his enjoyment; it was their own fault if they were impracticable and refused to accept the offer; he pitied rather than hated those who were their own foes more than his. His only desire was that Florence should see what was her own advantage, and he judged it unreasonable of those who did not see that their advantage really agreed with his.

All men rejoiced at the accession of Giovanni de' Medici; and when he took the name of Leo X they smiled and said that he was more like a gentle lamb than a fierce lion. The Cardinals could not restrain their satisfaction at escaping from the stern rule of Julius II; they all behaved, says an observer, as if they had themselves become Popes. The story was widely believed that one of the first sayings of the new Pope to his brother Giuliano was, “Let us enjoy the Papacy, since God has given it to us”. It seemed in men’s eyes a worthy motto; and the Cardinals presented so many requests to the new Pope that he said with a smile, “Take my crown, and grant what you wish, as if you were Popes yourselves”.

The festivities of Leo X’s coronation showed that a reign of magnificence and peace was to begin. Men saw the Duke of Ferrara, who had been so long pursued by Julius II with relentless animosity, welcomed in Rome and invested once more with his ducal dignity; he even acted as the squire of the Pope, and helped him to mount the steed on which he rode through the streets. The pomp and splendor of the procession was famous even in those days of pageants. The Pope’s train was numerous, and the mixture of ecclesiastical, military, and civil dresses made a dazzling display of colors. Rome was unsparing of decorations. The streets were all ablaze with rich devices, triumphal arches, and allegorical figures of every sort, while the invention of the artist and the poet was alike strained to produce designs and mottoes. The rich banker, Agostino Chigi, showed his ingenuity by a brief summary of the past history of the Papacy and a forecast of its future; a mighty arch bore a living nymph attended by Moorish pages; on the frieze ran an inscription, “Once Venus reigned, then Mars, now comes the reign of Pallas”. A witty goldsmith, who lived near, showed greater knowledge of the times; he set up a statue of Venus, that bore the legend, “Mars reigned, Pallus reigns, I, Venus, will always reign”. Mythology and religion, history sacred and profane, were alike laid under contribution to supply motives for singing the praises of the new Pope. There was indeed no end to his greatness.
However much Leo X might be desirous of a life of peace, he soon had to face political questions of a disturbing kind. The treaty between Louis XII and the Venetians was the prelude to a new invasion of Milan by the French. Louis XII sent to Giuliano de' Medici that he might sound the intentions of the new Pope; but Leo X knew that the possession of Parma and Piacenza would only be allowed by Massimiliano Sforza, and that a French restoration would mean their loss to the Papacy. So he rejected the overtures of Louis XII and renewed the league which Julius II had made with Maximilian.

A greater plan, however, of political action was soon brought before the Pope. Henry VIII of England scheme of was so ill satisfied with his first ventures into foreign politics that he wished to compass some large design. He proposed to bring about a European confederacy against France, and divide her territories amongst the confederates. France was to be attacked on all sides at once; Ferdinand would invade Bearn; Henry VIII would enter Normandy; Maximilian would overrun the Burgundian provinces; it would be well if the Pope also undertook to pour his forces into Provence. The example of the League of Cambrai was to be followed on a large scale, and Europe was to be pacified by the destruction of the one power who was a constant menace to her neighbors. So dreamed Henry VIII, inspired no doubt by the magnificent genius of Wolsey, who wished to set England in the foremost place in the politics of Europe. It seemed an easy matter to revive the old claims of the English kings to the throne of France, and to summon others to take their share of the booty. But Ferdinand of Spain shook his head over the plan, and did not give it a very favorable ear; there was not much that he could hope to gain from the partition of France, which he saw would chiefly fall to the advantage of the house of Austria. So he listened to Henry VIII's plan, and meanwhile made a truce for a year with Louis XII; soon afterwards he entered into Henry VIII’s league as well. The crafty old man resolved to be on good terms with both parties, to do nothing himself, but be ready to take advantage if anything important happened. Maximilian was more bent on attacking the Venetians than on a war against France; he pleaded that he could not make an expedition without money, and Henry VIII undertook to pay him 125,000 crowns. The combination against France was not very strong when on April 5 the league between Henry VIII, Maximilian, and Ferdinand was signed at Mechlin. It was still called the Holy League; but the recovery or defence of the States of the Church no longer appears amongst its objects. It was solely directed to the partition of the territory of France, and the Pope was requested to cause all the annoyance that he could against the French king, to make no truce with him so long as the war lasted, to give temporal aid, and to fulminate ecclesiastical censures against all who opposed the league.

This was a good deal to demand from the Pope, and Leo X was not a man of far-reaching schemes. He was contented with things as they were, and only wished that the invasion of the Milanese, which the French King was projecting, might be repulsed. Louis XII for his part trusted to his alliance with Venice and his truce with Ferdinand, and resolved to conquer Milan before the English army was ready to take the field. The restoration of the French power in Italy would be a sure means of breaking up the league which had been formed against him, and would leave Henry VIII without allies in his invasion of France.

Accordingly, at the beginning of May, a large army under La Tremouille and Gian Giacomo Trivulzio crossed the Alps, and the Swiss troops of Massimiliano forza were not strong enough to oppose them. The people had no liking for their new duke, who
had been brought up in a foreign land, whose feeble character they had learned, and whose extravagance burdened them with heavy taxes. The exiles returned; the towns surrendered to the French or the Venetians; Novara and Como alone remained faithful to their duke, whose only hope was in the Swiss. The Swiss, however, had solid reasons for keeping him in Milan. He paid them an annual tribute, and they were willing to fight so long as they were paid. Leo X would not send any troops to the defence of Milan; but he sent 42,000 ducats. A body of 7000 Swiss infantry crossed the mountains and entered Novara, expecting reinforcements. The French, who were provided with artillery, besieged Novara, which could not hold out; but news that more Swiss troops were on the way induced the French army to retire to a little distance. The garrison of Novara resolved to risk a battle, and on June 6 silently advanced against the French camp and fell on them unawares. They had no horse and no artillery, yet they attacked an army three times as numerous as themselves, and well provided with guns and cavalry. For a time the battle raged fiercely; but the Swiss kept their ranks and fought their way to the enemy’s guns, which they seized and turned against them. The rout of the French was complete; they fled in panic, and scarcely stayed till they had crossed the Alps. All Italy was astounded at this exploit of the Swiss, which seemed to outdo the famous deeds of old.

The defeat of the French in Italy was rapidly followed by Henry VIII’s invasion of France. On June 30 he landed at Calais, and on August 1 advanced to the siege of Térouanne. There he was joined by Maximilian, in whose interest, rather than in that of England, the expedition was conducted; for its object was to secure the Netherlands against France by the capture of the chief fortress on the frontier. The French resistance was feeble and half-hearted; their best troops had been scattered at Novara, and those who took the field were demoralized. The army which came to the relief of Térouanne fled, almost without striking a blow; and the French themselves made merry over their defeat by calling it the Battle of Spurs. Térouanne surrendered and was given over to Maximilian, who razed its defences to the ground. The Scottish king vainly attempted to help his ally of France; he raised a gallant army and invaded England, only to fall in the fatal battle of Flodden Field. Henry VIII pursued his campaign undisturbed by the threats of Scotland. The strong town of Tournay was taken on September 24, and Maximilian was anxious to pursue a campaign in which he gained all the profit; but the season was late, and Henry VIII thought that enough had been done for the protection of the Low Countries, while Scottish affairs needed his presence at home. He made arrangements to renew the war in the spring; Ferdinand of Spain bound himself by a treaty signed at Lille on October 17, to invade Guienne, while Henry VIII entered Normandy.

Another invasion of the French territory had been at the same time undertaken by the Swiss, who advanced into Franche Comté, and besieged Dijon on September 7. Its commander, La Tremouille, saw that resistance was useless, and applied himself to bribe the Swiss generals. He made a treaty with them by which Louis XII renounced all claims on Milan and undertook to pay a large ransom. The Swiss received a small installment and withdrew but Louis XII refused to ratify the treaty, which is not surprising, and the Swiss felt themselves duped. They cherished an ill-will against France, which did France much harm in the future. For the present, however, the double dealing of La Tremouille saved France from imminent disaster. France had suffered severely at Novara, at Térouanne, and at Dijon; but no crushing blow had been struck. Practically Henry VIII had failed; he had gained glory, but no substantial results. He
had set England in a high place in European politics, but had not succeeded in overthrowing the position of France. The blow that he had meditated was one that must be struck swiftly and surely if it was to do its work.

Neither Ferdinand nor the Pope wished for the overthrow of France; both of them were content that things should stay as they were. The great object of Ferdinand was to prevent the growth of the power of the Austrian house. The only heirs to himself and Maximilian were their two grandsons; and Ferdinand wished to secure the division of the Austro-Spanish possessions between them, since he had grown jealous of his eldest grandson Charles, who might in a few years’ time revive his father's claims to the Regency of Castile. Ferdinand was far-sighted, and was afraid of any accession of power to the Austrian house; he wished to uphold France as the only safeguard, and so strove by intrigues and negotiations to sever the alliance between Henry VIII and Maximilian without causing any open rupture. His promises to Henry VIII were purely delusory.

Leo X had been elected Pope in the interests of peace, and peace was congenial to his own temper. One of his earliest acts was to appoint as his secretaries two of the most distinguished Latinists of the day, Pietro Bembo and Jacopo Sadoleto, who employed their pens in writing eloquent eulogies of peace to all the sovereigns of Europe. But though Leo X was unwilling to take any part in military efforts, he was none the less watchful of his own interests. First he secured Parma and Piacenza in return for a subsidy to the Duke of Milan; and he rejoiced over the issue of the battle of Novara, though he lamented the shedding of Christian blood. In like manner he sent an envoy to Venice that he might detach the Venetians from France and reconcile them with Maximilian. He congratulated Henry VIII on his victories over France and Scotland, but expressed his hope that the English king would soon bring his wars to an end, and turn his victorious arms against the Turks. The Pope in fact mildly approved of everything that was done, and at the same time gently urged counsels of peace.

Really Leo X did not wish for France to be pushed to extremities. He had his own plans about Italian affairs; and his plans could best be carried out by France and Spain against one another. His immediate object was that France should be so far humbled as to turn for help to the Papacy. He naturally wished to see the schism brought to an end and the unity of the Church reestablished, and for this purpose carried on the ecclesiastical policy of Julius II. He confirmed the summons of another session of the Lateran Council, which he attended in great pomp. It was a pardonable mark of vanity that on April 26, the anniversary of the battle of Ravenna, Leo X rode to the Lateran on the same horse which had borne him when he was made prisoner in the fight. The position was now reversed. No longer captive in the hands of the French, Giovanni de' Medici rode as Head of the Christian Church to prepare the way for receiving the submission of France to his authority.

The sixth session of the Lateran Council produced the wonted flow of eloquence about the corruption of the times, the need of peace, and of the union of Europe for a crusade against the Turks, and a commission of prelates was appointed to report on the steps to be taken for these laudable objects. But when a demand was made that a citation be issued to absent prelates, meaning the schismatic Cardinals, Leo X made no reply; nor did he assent to another proposal for continuing the proceedings for the abolition of the Pragmatic Sanction. He told his Master of Ceremonies, Paris de Grassis,
that he would not take any steps against the French king; he could say so with good
reason, for he knew that Louis XII was already desirous to make peace with the Papacy.

The Council of Lyons was quite useless as a political weapon, and its proceedings
attracted no attention. The death of Julius II removed the motives of personal hostility
which had caused the attempted schism. The Cardinals at Lyons found that they had lost
all consideration, and were only anxious to be reconciled to the new Pope. This was so
notorious that Henry VIII in April saw that the opening of negotiations between France
and the papal court threatened the success of his league. He wrote to Cardinal
Bainbridge bidding him oppose by all means the reconciliation of the schismatic
Cardinals: such an act of ill-judged mercy would endanger the Papacy in the future, and
would strengthen the French party in the Curia. Leo X, however, was not so enamoured
of the league as to sacrifice his own interests to its claims. He quietly pursued his
negotiations with the schismatic Cardinals, who sent to the seventh session of the
Council, June 17, a letter in which they made full submission. The learned Carvajal and
the imperious Sanseverino were driven to humble themselves entirely; they confessed
their error; they declared the Council of the Lateran to be legitimate; they accepted all
its decrees, and prayed for its continuance. The fathers of the Council thanked God for
such pious sentiments, and left the matter to the Pope.

The restoration of Carvajal and Sanseverino was strongly opposed by the
ambassadors of Spain and Germany, and by Cardinals Bainbridge and Schinner as
representatives of England and the Swiss. But Leo X urged many grounds for mercy;
the Cardinals had been his friends in his youth; he burned with zeal to sweep away all
memories of the schism. His real reason was, as Henry VIII had foreseen, a desire to
prepare the way for a reconciliation with Louis XII. So all remonstrances were
unheeded, and Leo X paid no heed to the taunt that he did not possess the constancy of
his great predecessor; he preferred to show that at all events he had a quiet obstinacy of
his own.

On June 26 Carvajal and Sanseverino were allowed to enter Rome secretly and
occupy rooms in the Vatican. Next day they were admitted to a Consistory, but were
ordered beforehand to lay aside their red hats and Cardinal's attire, and appear only in
the dress of simple priests. They knelt before the Pope and confessed that they had
erred. The Pope pointed out the greatness of their wrong doing, and went through the
long list of their offences. Then he gave them a document which contained a full
admission of their guilt and stringent promises of future obedience and submission.
Carvajal looked through it and said that he would observe its provisions. “Read it
aloud”, said the Pope. Carvajal in vain strove to obey: the words choked him and he
could only say, “I cannot read aloud, for I am hoarse”. “You cannot speak loud”, said
the Pope sternly, “because you have no good heart. You came here of your own free
will, you are free to depart. If you think that the contents of that document are severe we
will send you back to Florence. Take and read it, or begone”. Sanseverino came to his
friend's aid and read the schedule in a clear voice. Then they signed it and swore to
observe it, after which the Pope restored them to their offices and benefices. Their robes
were brought in, and they were vested and went through the ceremony of admission as
though they were newly created Cardinals. At last the Pope had pity on them and said to
Carvajal, “You are like the sheep in the Gospel that was lost and is found”.

Bembo announced to the princes of Europe that the schismatics, “breathed on by
the breath of a heavenly zephyr, had turned to penitence”, and that the schism was at an
end. The negotiations between the Pope and the French king went on briskly, ostensibly about ecclesiastical matters, till on October 26 Louis XII signed an agreement that the Gallican Church should send representatives to the Lateran Council and there discuss the Pragmatic Sanction. On December 19 the Council held its eighth session to receive the submission of France. Two French ambassadors spoke in the king’s name, saying that he had adhered to the Council of Pisa because he thought it a lawful Council; he saw that the mind of Julius II was poisoned against him, and when certain of the Cardinals summoned a Council he recognized it; now that he had been informed by Leo X that the Council was unlawful he submitted to his paternal admonitions, recognized the Council of the Lateran, and asked to be allowed to send proctors to attend its deliberations. His excuses were admitted and his request was granted. Leo X was content to condone the schism as arising from a personal quarrel between the French king and his predecessor. He did not take his stand on the ground of the ecclesiastical irregularity, but frankly admitted that the affairs of the Church were determined by personal and political considerations. Perhaps it would have been difficult to have done otherwise. But the reconciliation with the schismatic Cardinals and with the French king showed the easy complaisance of practical statesmanship rather than the dignified severity of the head of a great institution. Henry VIII judged more wisely than did Leo X when he warned him that his lenity, founded on expediency, would give a bad example in the future, would show how little it cost to create a schism and how useful a weapon against the Papacy the threat of a schism afforded. But Leo X did not judge Henry VIII to be a disinterested adviser. In the Pope’s eyes the schism had been a miserable failure, and he thought that he could afford to treat it lightly. Yet his conduct was a dangerous admission of the results of the papal policy—that the system of the Church no longer rested upon a purely ecclesiastical basis. The Pope could listen with an indulgent smile to excuses which rested on nothing save motives of political distrust; he saw nothing that demanded penitence in the recognition of the superiority of a Council over an intractable Pope; he regarded it as natural that a king, when hard pressed by a Pope, should use against him any weapon that came to hand. So he accepted the excuses of Louis XII with all lightness of heart; it was not in the nature of a Medici to take his stand upon principles, and the maxims of Medicean statecraft soon wrought irreparable mischief to the system of the Church.

The theologians of the Lateran Council may have thought that offences against the government of the Church might well be overlooked in an age which threatened to undermine the foundations of the Christian faith. So widely spread was the interest in philosophic speculation that theology had been driven into the background. Bessarion was the last great scholar who was also a theologian; and the impulse which he gave to the study of Plato turned men’s minds for a time into a direction where they were not conscious of any antagonism between philosophy and theology. The Florentine Platonists, Ficino and Pico, tried to establish the unity of thought and weave a vast if shadowy system which harmonized all truth. They ran the risk of explaining away the basis of theology, and their system disappeared before the teaching of Savonarola and the religious movement of which he was the leader. The influence of Plato gradually died away, and Aristotle became the oracle of the New Learning. His logical system attracted the Humanists as it had captivated the Schoolmen. But the Schoolmen applied Aristotle’s logic to the construction of an organized theology by the process of deduction from Scripture; the Humanists applied it to the solution of their own problems by deduction from Aristotle’s metaphysical system. They investigated the nature of the mind and its activity; they pressed into the region of psychology, and were not content
to observe the limits which theology had set. The Italian mind had long been accustomed to the distinction between the practical and speculative reason, and the Italian found no difficulty in dividing his life into two portions. His conception of political liberty was an equilibrium between two conflicting claims; by recognizing now one, and now another, he could best secure the freedom of doing what he thought most convenient. The principles of Italian politics sank deep; and in speculation also the Italian readily turned from the pursuit of truth as a harmonious whole to the definition of separate spheres for intellectual activity. He did not criticize the established system of theology, but pursued philosophy as an independent branch of knowledge. He was not deterred by conflicts, and did not shrink from contradictions; as a professing Christian he bowed to the authority of the Church, as a philosopher he claimed to pursue his investigations undisturbed. He combined outward submission with inward revolt, though he was probably sincere in saying that revolt was far from his intention. The Italian had no trouble in leading a detached life. It pleased him to understand all systems, though he was not necessarily under bondage to any. He preferred to be a philosopher in an ordinary way, though he reserved his claim to be a Christian in an emergency.

The ecclesiastical authorities had not raised any decided protest against this temper of mind, and the evil was of long standing. The revival of Greek learning had something towards procuring a better text of Aristotle and had made known his early commentators, chief of whom was Alexander of Aphrodisias. In earlier times Aristotle had been known chiefly through the commentaries of the Arabian Averroes, who taught that there was a universal intelligence of which all men partook equally, and from partaking in which man had a soul which was immortal. This doctrine of Averroes was combated by Thomas of Aquino, who refuted the opinion that the soul was one and the same in all the universe, and maintained the separate origin of every human soul. Alexander of Aphrodisias had extended the psychology of Aristotle and maintained that the soul was mortal like the body; and at the time of the Renaissance there was no second Thomas of Aquino to answer the newly discovered arguments; so that Alexander was the popular commentator whose views were put forward and whose arguments were readily adopted. Marsilio Ficino conceived that Platonism was the remedy for the heresies caused by the study of the Peripatetics. “We have labored”, he says, “at translating Plato and Plotinus, that by the appearance of this new theology poets may cease to count the mysteries of religion amongst their fables, and the crowds of Peripatetics who form almost the whole body of philosophers may be admonished that religion must not be reckoned as old wives’ stories. The world is occupied by the Peripatetics, and is divided between their sects, the Alexandrians and the Averroists. The Alexandrians opine that our intelligence is mortal; the Averroists that it is one only. Both equally destroy the foundation of all religion, chiefly because they seem to deny a divine providence over men. If anyone thinks that such widespread impiety, defended by such keen intellects, can be uprooted merely by the preaching of the faith, he errs greatly, as facts may prove. We need some greater power, either widespread miracles or the discovery of a philosophic religion which may persuade philosophers to give ear to it”.

So wrote Ficino, and came forward with his offering of a misty effort to set forth the image of Plato as closely resembling the truth of Christ; but his philosophic miracle did not work conviction, his system did not reduce all gain-sayers to silence. The
question of the immortality of the soul continued to be openly disputed in the schools of Italy, and few were shocked by the discussion.

We cannot feel surprised that the theologians in the Council determined to make a protest against the reduction of Christian life to a subject of philosophic doubt. They framed a decree which condemned those who assert that the intelligent soul is mortal or one in all men. Scripture requires the belief in an individual soul in each man; otherwise the Incarnation was useless and the Resurrection was of no effect. Philosophers teaching in Universities were bidden, if in their lectures they had to expound the opinions of the ancients, to teach as well the orthodox faith and resolve the arguments of those who lived without the light of Christianity. Further, no one in holy orders was henceforth to devote a longer space than five years to the study of poetry or philosophy, without undertaking also the study of theology or of the canon law. This decree was ordered to be published every year by the ordinaries of university towns and rectors of Universities. The protest of the Council was certainly couched in mild language. Theologians were content to assert the truth in the face of fashionable scepticism; they did not venture to engage in war in defence of the faith. The decree was hortatory rather than judicial; no means were prescribed for bringing to trial those who disobeyed. A barren protest was issued, nothing more. Theology was almost apologetic in the presence of the philosophic atheism which it denounced in half-hearted language. The decree is a significant testimony to the decay of dogmatic theology.

A second decree, providing for the pacification of Europe, was passed without debate. A third which published a papal constitution for the reformation of ecclesiastical officials was disappointing to the majority of the prelates. It was the first fruits of the labors of the commissioners who had been appointed in the previous session, and only enacted in general terms that all officials should observe the rules of ecclesiastical discipline. When this was put to the vote, one bishop said that it was useless to pass decrees unless abuses were actually removed. Others, amongst whom was Paris de Grassis, said that reform should not be confined to the Curia, but was needed in the whole Church. When the votes were taken, a considerable minority negatived the decree on the ground that they wished for a thorough reform in head and members. Paris de Grassis told the Pope that the reformers themselves needed reforming; Leo X smiled and said that he must have a little time to see how he could satisfy everyone, and would return to the subject in the next session. The Pope's smile was more significant than his promise. He knew too much of the world to have much interest in reform. His first creation of Cardinals showed only too clearly that his policy had more in common with that of Alexander VI than with that of Julius II. Of the four Cardinals created on September 23, two were literary favorites of Leo X, Lorenzo Pucci, and Bernardino Dovizi; the other two were near relatives of the Pope, and both of them were men whose appointment was somewhat scandalous. Innocenzo Cibò was the Pope's nephew, son of his sister Maddalena, who had married Francesco Cibò, son of Pope Innocent VIII. In a letter to Ferdinand of Spain, Leo X found it necessary to apologize for raising so young and untried a man to a lofty position. “About Innocenzo”, he writes, “we hope that he will realise our wishes; he has great natural gifts joined to excellent character, adorned by devotion to literature”. Innocenzo was only twenty-one years old; but Leo X reflected that he himself had gained the cardinalate at a still earlier age, and “what I received from Innocent, I repay to Innocent”, he said with his usual smile.

The creation of Giulio de' Medici was a still more serious matter. Giulio was the reputed son of the Pope's uncle Giuliano who had been assassinated in the conspiracy
of the Pazzi in 1478. After Giuliano’s death, his brother Lorenzo was told that he had left behind him an illegitimate son who was about a year old. Lorenzo undertook the care of the child, who in due time embraced an ecclesiastical career. Leo X had already nominated him Archbishop of Florence, as he placed much confidence in his political sagacity. Before creating him Cardinal, he appointed a secret commission to investigate the circumstances of Giulio’s birth. The commissioners duly reported that Giulio was the son of Giuliano and a Florentine woman by name Floreta, and that his parents had by mutual consent contracted lawful wedlock and were legally man and wife. On September 20 a papal decree pronounced Giulio legitimate, and removed all technical objections to his elevation to the cardinalate. Leo X was prepared to do for the Medici what Alexander VI had done for the Borgia; but Leo X knew Italy thoroughly, and instead of breaking with current prejudices meant to use them for his own ends while preserving the appearance of entire decorum.

The establishment of the Medicean family was steadily pursued. Leo X proved that his father Lorenzo judged rightly when he said, “I have three sons—one good, one wise, and one foolish”. The folly of Piero had ruined the Medici for a time; the wisdom of Leo X was to restore the fortunes of his house; meanwhile the goodness of Giuliano was an obstacle in the Pope’s way. Giuliano was too simple and gentle to carry out the organized corruption of Florence which was the foundation of the Medicean rule. He was summoned to Rome, and the oversight of affairs in Florence was entrusted to Lorenzo, the son of Piero, a youth of twenty-one, whose political career the Pope undertook to direct aright. A paper of instructions was prepared for the young man, ostensibly by Giuliano; but the hand which guided his pen was that of the Pope. Lorenzo is initiated into the mysteries of Medicean statecraft—the control of the elections to the magistracies, the choice of fit instruments, the employment of spies, the means for exercising a constant supervision without seeming to be prominent, the way to flatter the people and establish a despotic power while retaining the forms of a free commonwealth.

Giuliano, on his retirement to Rome, had next to be provided for. First he was made a citizen and baron of Rome, and the festivities which celebrated this honor showed the introduction into Rome of the finer artistic spirit of Florence. The Piazza in front of the Capitol was filled with a wooden theatre, which was covered outside with pictures telling of the old connection of the Tuscan city with Rome.

In the morning of September 13, Giuliano was escorted to the Capitol; mass was said, and the freedom of the city was presented. Then the guests went to a banquet—a formidable entertainment which lasted for six hours. When all were satisfied with food and drink, they listened to a pastoral eclogue which praised Leo X and his brother at the expense of Julius II, but was none the less conceived in the spirit of light comedy and awakened peals of laughter. Then came a lady dressed in cloth of gold and attended by two nymphs; she represented Rome, and sang some complimentary verses. She carried a basket of eggs, which at the end of her song she broke and threw among the company, who found them filled with rare perfumes. Next came a huge mountain of cardboard, from which issued a man of great stature who represented the Tarpeian Mount, and carried on his shoulders the lady who personified Rome. The man mountain thanked Giuliano for the honor he had done him, and made way for a car of gold drawn by two stalwart nymphs, who were yoked by golden chains and were driven by an old man. In the car sat Justice, Strength, and Fortitude, each of whom had much to say. Then came a second car drawn by lions; in it was seated Cibele, with a globe on her lap; the globe
was opened and let loose all manner of birds to the surprise of the beholders. Last came a car on which sat a lady plunged in woe. She was Florence weeping for her children, whom she vainly implored Cibele to restore. Cibele to console her proposed at last that Rome and Florence should confederate, nay should become one together and enjoy the same rule. Florence and Rome agreed to the proposal, and medals were scattered amongst the crowd to celebrate the happy union.

Even in pastimes the principles of the Medicean domination were expressed; Florence and Rome were to make one state, and by their union the power of the Medici was to be still further extended. Leo X had great schemes for his relatives; he wished to secure for Giuliano the kingdom of Naples, for Lorenzo the duchy of Milan. Under color of a desire for peace he negotiated with all the powers of Europe, watching eagerly for his own gain. He was every one's friend at once; but Ferdinand of Spain understood him well and suggested a comfortable settlement for Giuliano. He might marry a well-born Spanish lady, and might have in Naples the confiscated estates of the Duke of Urbino; the Emperor might be induced to give him Modena and Reggio, and the Pope could invest him with Ferrara. Leo X hoped for more than this, and continued his general amiability. He offered to reconcile the French king with the Swiss, the Emperor with Venice, and at the same time projected an Italian league, which would be opposed to both alike. It was one of the maxims of Leo X that when you have made a league with any prince you ought not on that account to cease from treating with his adversary.

So Leo X watched, but could not greatly influence the course of European affairs. The reconciliation of Louis XII with the Papacy deprived the Holy League of its ostensible object, and Ferdinand of Spain made use of that pretext to withdraw still further from the league against France. He first made a truce with France for a year, and then induced the unstable Maximilian to break his promises to Henry VIII, and do the same. The accord of Ferdinand and Maximilian with France was signed at Orleans on March 13, 1514, and Maximilian even went so far as to pledge himself that Henry VIII would ratify it. Henry VIII was indignant at this breach of faith; he was weary of the craft of his father-in-law Ferdinand, and of the shiftiness of Maximilian; if peace were to be made with France he would make it in his own way. Leo X sent an envoy to help in the reconciliation; he was always ready to take a friendly part in everything. But the peace between England and France was concluded without much consideration of the Pope. France and England entered into a close alliance, which was cemented by the marriage of Louis XII, who had become a widower in January, with Henry VIII’s sister Mary, a girl of sixteen. Mary had been betrothed by Henry VII to Charles, the grandson of Maximilian and Ferdinand, but Maximilian had shown no particular zeal to carry out the marriage. England now separated from its alliance with the Austro-Spanish house; France was no longer isolated, and the political equilibrium of Europe was again restored.

Secure by his alliance with England, Louis XII, again talked of an expedition into Italy for the recovery of Milan. True to his general policy, Leo X. made one compact with Louis XII and another with the Swiss; he further entered into a secret treaty with Ferdinand of Spain, and sent Bembo to Venice that he might try and detach the Republic from its league with France. These negotiations were conducted with great secrecy. The treaty with France was merely a schedule signed by the Pope and Louis XII; the treaty with Spain was a secret to be entrusted to not more than three advisers on each side. The vigorous policy of Julius II was abandoned for one more in keeping with
the temper of the age. Leo X with a genial smile upon his face pursued his ends by an elaborate system of mine and countermine. If Louis XII succeeded in his Italian plans, then Giuliano might secure the kingdom of Naples; if Louis XII failed, Spain, the Empire, and the Swiss might agree to carve out a new principality from parts of the Milanese and the duchy of Ferrara. Leo X had no prejudices about means; he was generally sympathetic to all parties, and was hopeful for himself.

While the Pope was engaged in this tortuous policy, it was scarcely to be expected that the Lateran Council should accomplish any useful results. The promised constitution for the reformation of the Prelates and Curia was long in appearing, and was the subject of much debate. The winter session of the Council was put off because the Prelates declared that they would vote against any measures which did not deal with the Cardinals as on an equal footing with themselves. The Pope interposed in the interests of peace, and was present at a meeting of Prelates when the privileges assumed by the Cardinals were loudly attacked. They claimed the right of presenting to benefices which became vacant by the death of any one in their service, and further assumed the power of reserving to themselves benefices. In the eyes of the Prelates one part of the reformation of the Church was a check upon the power of the Cardinals. It was enough that they paid tribute to the Pope; they no longer hoped to escape from that; they were, however, resolved to see that the privileges of the Pope were not extended to the Cardinals. Accordingly, when the Pope laid before them some of the provisions which were proposed for enactment the Prelates objected. The Pope, with his usual smile, turned to Paris de Grassis and said, “The Prelates are wiser than I am, for I am bound by the Cardinals”. He agreed to prorogue the session till the Prelates and Cardinals could agree. A compromise was soon arrived at, that nothing should be said in the reforming constitution which did not apply to Prelates and Cardinals alike. The Council was manifestly divided into two parties. The Cardinals wished to lord it over the Prelates; the Prelates were resolved not to admit that the Cardinals formed a different order from themselves.

On May 6, 1514, the ninth session of the Council was at last held. It received the submission of the French Prelates and freed them from the penalties of schism. It renewed its exhortations to general peace, and it listened to the papal constitution for the reform of the Curia, a lukewarm document which laid down general rules of conduct for Cardinals and all members of the Curia, and condemned pluralities and other flagrant abuses in such a way as to leave sufficient loopholes for their continuance. Then the Council was prorogued that the question of reform might be further considered. Leo X was growing weary of the Council; it had served its purpose of ending the schism, and the Pope only awaited a decent pretext for dissolving it.

The Prelates pursued their protest against the Cardinals, and declared that they would vote against every measure brought forward until their grievances were redressed. The Pope had to act as mediator between the conflicting parties, and at length produced a compromise. Even so the Prelates were not satisfied, but raised further complaints of the way in which episcopal jurisdiction was set at nought by the privileges granted to the friars. They demanded that these privileges should be revoked entirely, and put forward a formidable list of monastic aggressions on the episcopal authority, arranged under eighty heads.

The chief of their demands were, the payment by the monks of a fourth of what they held in possession, and the abolition of the liberty enjoyed by monks of hearing
confessions, performing funerals, and preaching where they would without the licence of the bishop. They further wished to restrain the absolute power of jurisdiction over its members possessed by the monastic orders; unless justice were done within a month the cause was to pass into the bishop’s court.

Naturally the monastic orders resented this attack. The complaints were of long standing; the feud between seculars and regulars lasted through the whole Middle Ages. In former times monks and friars had been strong in popular support; now they had become standing objects of ridicule, for their ignorance no less than for their irregular lives, and there was no chance that the quarrel at Rome should agitate Europe. The bishops were stronger than the monks, for they could refuse their votes at the Council, and Leo X did not wish to show to Europe discords within the Church. It was useless for the generals of the monastic orders to resist. The Pope advised them to give way and make terms while they had an opportunity; it was possible for the Council to deprive them of all their privileges. This controversy suspended the sessions of the Council for an entire year; at last the Pope besought the bishops to let the matter stand over and allow another session to be held for the purpose of dispatching such business as was ready; he promised that the matter should be settled in the following session.

The prelates gave way before this promise, and the Pope was able to hold the tenth session of the Council on May 4, 1515. The decrees passed in this session concern details which are scarcely worthy of a General Council. One question was curious. Amongst the charitable institutions of the Middle Ages were establishments for lending money on the security of articles which were put in pledge. These *montes pietatis*, as they were called, took no interest for the money lent, and the expenses of their management were at first defrayed by private charity. As the system spread it was found desirable to make a charge on each transaction for the purpose of covering the expenses of management. Since the religious sense of the Middle Ages was opposed to usury, “the barren breed of money”, some men’s consciences were stirred by a scruple if it were allowable to make any charge for lending money, which was in itself an act of Christian love. To assuage such scruples a decree of the Council declared that it was lawful for charitable institutions to receive payment for their management, and that such payment was not usurious in its character; however, the decrees went on to say, it was better that such institutions should be sufficiently endowed by pious people to enable them to dispense with the need of making any charge on those who benefited by their charity.

A second decree was passed to please the bishops and correct disorders which had arisen from the multitude of exemptions from the jurisdiction of ordinaries which had been granted by previous Popes. Those who had jurisdiction from the Pope over exempted persons were ordered to exercise it diligently; if they were remiss the ordinaries were empowered to interfere after giving due warning. The basis of the ecclesiastical jurisdiction was asserted against lay interference; and the regular holding of provincial synods was enforced. All this shows an uneasy sense of the decay of ecclesiastical discipline and a desire to revive it. There was a feeling that the evils of the present time were due to ecclesiastical lenity; but there was no recognition of the fact that papal interference had broken down the ecclesiastical system, and that the system could only be restored by a readjustment of the relations between the Papacy and the Episcopate.
A third decree showed a consciousness of the influence of the New Learning in sapping the foundations of the Christian faith. Books of every sort were being multiplied by the printing press; scurrilous and libelous pamphlets abounded; and many philosophic works paid little heed to the doctrines of the Christian faith. A decree was passed, enacting that henceforth no book should be printed which had not received the approval of the bishop and the inquisitor of the city or diocese in which it was published. It was an enactment in keeping with the ideas of the time in which it was passed, and was not likely to be applied with undue severity; in fact it had little binding power, as it could only be enforced by spiritual penalties. The literature of that age stood in great need of supervision, and prelates themselves were amongst the writers who offended by their moral laxity. We do not find that the decree produced any immediate effect. The ecclesiastical and moral disorders of the time were too deeply seated to be removed by well-intentioned decrees. The Lateran Council was not sufficiently strong nor sufficiently earnest to set on foot any real measures of reform, and Pope Leo X. was more interested in the politics of the Medicean house than in the well-being of Christendom.
CHAPTER XIX.
FRANCIS I IN ITALY.
1515—1516.

The beginning of the year 1515 brought a political change of great importance. Louis XII was fifty-two years old and infirm in health at the time of his marriage with Mary of England. He tried to suit his manner of life to the tastes of a vivacious girl of sixteen; the effort was too great for his strength, and he died on January 1, less than three months after his marriage. He left no male heir, and his successor, Francis Duke of Angouleme, his nephew, was a young man of twenty, who burned with a desire to win martial fame. France could only look with shame on the foreign policy of Louis XII, whose failure in Italy had been ignominious. He had shown himself unscrupulous and treacherous; he had sacrificed his allies; he had humiliated himself before the Pope; he had sent armies and had been responsible for brutal massacres; but the sum of his efforts, his treachery, and his humiliations, had been the loss of the French possessions in Italy and the disgrace of the French name. It is no wonder that Gaston de Foix had become the hero of the young nobles of France, and that Francis I longed to emulate his glorious career. Italy might hear with equanimity that Louis XII was preparing a new invasion; it was a more serious matter when the invasion was to be conducted by the young Francis I. in the first flush of his martial zeal.

At the same time as the accession of Francis I another prince began his career. The Archduke Charles of Austria was called by the Flemish Estates to enter upon the government of the Netherlands. Though he was only fifteen years old, his rule was more likely to secure peace for the Netherlands than was that of the Regent Margaret, the widowed daughter of Maximilian, who was devoted to the interests of the Austrian house. Cold, self-contained, industrious, but to all appearance dull, the young Charles undertook a difficult task. He had been brought up to regard France as his hereditary enemy; he had never forgotten that he was the heir of the Burgundian house, which France had robbed of its fairest possessions. But the ruler of the Netherlands was powerless against France, which could raise up enemies on its borders and attack it at will. Charles saw that he must bide his time, and Francis I, showed a condescending patronage. He wished to be at peace with his neighbors, that he might have his hands free for his Italian campaign, and proposed an alliance with Charles, which Charles was ready to accept. Francis I had married Claude, daughter of Louis XII; Charles was offered the hand of her younger sister Renée, a child of four years old. There were long negotiations about her dower, and the age when the marriage was to be celebrated. Neither party was in earnest in wishing for friendship, and it was agreed that Renée was to be handed over to her husband at the age of twelve; many things might happen in the interval of eight years.

For the same reason Francis I was anxious to maintain the peace with England, and Henry VIII had no reason for becoming his enemy. The treaty with Louis XII was renewed, though Henry VIII looked with a jealous eye on the prospect of French aggrandizement. At the same time Francis I renewed the league between France and Venice. On the other side Ferdinand of Aragon was especially, anxious to oppose the
French designs in Italy. He proposed a league between Spain, the Empire, the Swiss, the Duke of Milan, and the Pope. Leo X was the most difficult person to fix; he was engaged, as usual, in negotiating with both parties at once. He continued his dealings with France, where a matrimonial alliance had been proposed between Giuliano de' Medici and Filiberta of Savoy, sister of Louise, the mother of Francis I, who was all-powerful with her son. Leo X conferred on his brother Parma and Piacenza, as well as Modena, which he had bought from the needy Maximilian for 40,000 ducats. Giuliano's marriage with Filiberta took place in February, 1515, and Leo X was anxious to see what Francis I proposed to do for his new relative. On this depended the Pope's action, and till he saw his definite advantage on one side or the other he cautiously listened to both. His envoy in France was Ludovico Canossa, Bishop of Tricarico, who vainly endeavored to induce Francis I to offer as a bribe for the Pope's friendship the conquest of the kingdom of Naples for Giuliano. The peace with Flanders and with England left Francis tolerably free and made him hesitate to incur so heavy an obligation in the Pope's behalf. He expressed his wish to make the Pope the most powerful Pope that ever had been; but he said that the question of Naples was one of grave importance, which could not be decided at present.

Before Canossa had begun these negotiations the Pope was listening to proposals for a league with Maximilian, Ferdinand, the Duke of Milan, Florence, Genoa, and the Swiss. The league comprised also the family of the Medici, who were counted as having substantial interests of their own. Its ostensible objects were war against the Turk and the defence of the Pope. Leo X ratified it on February 22, and conferred on the Swiss the title of 'Protectors of Religious Liberty'; but he kept secret even from his trusty friends the part he took concerning it. Cardinal Bibbiena wrote to Giuliano that the Pope was not willing to accept this league, but thought that he himself ought to take the lead in all things that concerned Christendom and ought not to follow others. Really Leo X did not expect that Francis I would come to Italy that year, and wished to use the league as a means of obtaining his assent to the proposal about Naples.

Francis I secretly pushed on his preparations, which England viewed with increasing jealousy. Leo X was strengthened by the hostile attitude of England, and hoped that Henry VIII also would join the league. Henry VIII had no grounds for openly breaking off his alliance with France, but he nevertheless listened to the Pope's proposal. He had for some time been pressing the Pope to create his minister, Thomas Wolsey, a Cardinal, and though Leo X was reluctant to grant his request, circumstances favored the king. The English Cardinal Bainbridge, Archbishop of York, had died at Rome in July, 1514. There were signs of poisoning; the body was examined by the Pope's command, and the doctors' examination confirmed the belief that the Cardinal had been poisoned. Suspicion fell upon one Rinaldo of Modena, a priest who was in the Cardinal's employment in some inferior office. Rinaldo had formerly been attached to the household of Silvestro de' Gigli, the English agent in the Roman court, who was rewarded for his services by the bishopric of Worcester. Bainbridge was a hot-tempered, arrogant, and overbearing man, and there was no love lost between him and Gigli. It was suspected that Gigli had employed Rinaldo to poison Bainbridge. The accused was imprisoned and tortured. He confessed a long career of crime, thefts, and many other misdoings; he had put poison into the Cardinal's pottage at the desire of the Bishop of Worcester, who gave him fifteen ducats as a reward. This confession was made in the hopes of saving his life; when he was told that he should have pardon for all his other offences save the death of the Cardinal, he committed suicide in prison with a
knife which he had managed to conceal. It is not unlikely, as Gigli urged, that Rinaldo was mad, and committed the murder to escape detection of his thefts. Anyhow neither Henry VIII nor Wolsey believed in Gigli’s guilt, and Wolsey wrote to him confidentially at the time when he was laboring under this serious charge. Leo X after investigation solemnly acquitted him.

Wolsey’s support in this emergency laid Gigli under a deep obligation to his patron, and he strove to show gratitude by urging on the Pope Wolsey’s nomination to the cardinalate. Henry VIII wrote and expressed his strong sense of Wolsey’s merits, and his ardent desire to see him advanced to a dignity which he well deserved. But Leo X hesitated; English Cardinals were not very popular at Rome, and the overbearing conduct of Cardinal Bainbridge had not increased their popularity. Leo X did not wish to admit into the College so powerful a man as Wolsey: he wished to fill it with creatures of his own, and was not sorry to keep suspended before the great minister of the English king a tempting bait which might be a guarantee of his devotion to the Pope’s interests. But Wolsey was a stronger man than Leo X and knew how to force the Pope’s hand. When, in July, the French forces were actually on the march to Italy, Leo X felt somewhat alarmed, and Wolsey gave him a significant hint. He wrote to the Bishop of Worcester that Henry VIII marveled at the long delay in sending the Cardinal’s hat; the sooner he sent it the better the king would be pleased; if the king forsook the Pope at this time he would be in greater danger than was Pope Julius II years ago. This argument was weighty with the timorous Pope, and he agreed to make Wolsey Cardinal on condition that the King of England entered the league. Henry VIII could not as yet declare himself openly against France, but he joined the league for the ostensible purpose of an expedition against the Turk, and Wolsey’s cardinalate was secure. The Cardinals still objected, but they were powerless against the Pope’s will and the political necessities of the time. They murmured that the English were insolent, that Wolsey would not be content with the cardinalate, but would demand also the office of papal legate in England; in a spirit of prophecy they said, “If this be granted to him, the Roman court is undone”. On September 10 Wolsey was created Cardinal, and was the one person who received that distinction.

It was, indeed, time for the Pope to strengthen himself by new alliances, for the example of his double dealings began to affect those whom he trusted in Italy. Ottaviano Fregoso had been set up as Doge of Genoa in opposition to the French, and the Pope had supported him. But he also negotiated with both parties at once; and his open defection to the side of France secured the French army a basis on the coast which was of great importance to their military operations. Ottaviano Fregoso wrote to the Pope to justify his change of policy, and ended his defence by saying, “If I were writing to private persons or to a prince who measured state affairs by the same measure as private matters, I should find my justification more difficult. But writing to a prince who surpasses his contemporaries in wisdom, and who therefore knows that I have no other way to maintain my position, it is superfluous to excuse myself to one who is conversant with the lawful, or at least customary, action of princes, not only for the preservation but also for the increase of their states”. There could be no more crushing retort on the lessons of the political action of Leo X.

The French army assembled in Dauphiné in the course of July, and numbered nearly 60,000 footmen and 50,000 horsemen. Amongst its generals were August Trivulzio, Lautrec, and La Palisse, who were well experienced in Italian warfare, besides the Spaniard Pietro Navarro, who had been taken prisoner in the battle of
Ravenna, and whom the avaricious King of Spain refused to ransom. Against them were the troops of Spain under Cardona, the papal forces under Giuliano de' Medici, the Milanese army commanded by Prospero Colonna, and the Swiss commanded by Cardinal Schinner. The allies were all of them interested in protecting their own territories rather than in defending Milan. Cardona took up a position near Verona to prevent a junction of the Venetian army with the French; the papal forces advanced to the Po for the protection of Piacenza and Reggio; only the Swiss went to the front and took up positions guarding the passes of Mont Cenis and Monte Ginevra. Trivulzio, finding that the passes were closely watched, tried a new and difficult way across the Alps and descended the valley of the Stura. The Swiss, who were waiting at Susa, heard that the foe had passed by them and were safely posted at Cuneo. So unexpected was this rapid movement of the French, that Prospero Colonna, who was on his way to join the Swiss, was surprised and taken prisoner at Villafranca on August 15.

The Swiss were discouraged at the failure of their first designs. Francis I on his part was desirous of making peace with such dangerous foes and opened negotiations for that purpose; but the arrival of new adventurers, eager for booty, and the exertions of Cardinal Schinner, broke off the negotiations. The Swiss, who numbered about 35,000 men, retired to Milan and waited for their allies; but neither Cardona nor Lorenzo de' Medici, who had succeeded his uncle Giuliano in command of the papal troops, would come to their aid. Leo X had already begun to renew negotiations with Francis I, and his messenger, with all his dispatches, had fallen into Cardona's hands. When Cardona saw that the Pope did not mean to commit himself he hesitated in turn, and the Spanish and papal generals each tried to persuade the other to cross the Po. Meanwhile the French army took up a position at Marignano, between Milan and Piacenza, while the Venetians under Alviano made use of Cardona's withdrawal from Verona to cross the Adige and advance along the left bank of the Po to Lodi. By this movement the communications between the Swiss and their allies were completely intercepted, while the Venetian forces were so placed as to support the French.

On the night of September 13 an alarm was raised in Milan that the French were advancing. The Swiss were at once under arms, and the few horse who had come to reconnoiter rapidly withdrew. The Swiss assembled in the Piazza to discuss their plans, for the sturdy republicans maintained even in war their habits of federal council. Long time they debated, for they were much divided; some were in favor of a peace with France; some wished to withdraw quietly from the matter; but the majority were eager to fight. It was agreed that they should attack the French camp, and the Swiss army set out at once to fulfill their resolution. Some withdrew, but after they had gone a few miles some Milanese officers rode after them calling out that the French were already in flight; at this news they turned back, and when they reached the field of battle threw in their lot with their comrades.

It was late in the afternoon when the Swiss reached the French army, which was taken by surprise at this unexpected onslaught. The Swiss had no artillery and wore little armor for defence; they trusted to nothing save weight of their column, and their pikes for close quarters. The French cannon were posted on the right wing, guarded by 20,000 German lanzknechts; on the left wing were 12,000 Gascon bowmen. Artillery and crossbow alike played on the Swiss and wrought havoc on their unprotected line, but could not break their steady advance. They seized four pieces of artillery, and succeeded in coming to close quarters with their foes. A desperate fight went on in the gathering twilight, till both sides were wearied and overcome with thirst and hunger,
and each man lay down to sleep where he fought, scarcely a stone's cast from his foe. As soon as morning began to break the combat was renewed. The Swiss fought with desperate courage; each man died where he had set his foot. The French were well-nigh overborne by fatigue when Alviano appeared with reinforcements in their rear. Those of the Swiss who had doubted about the battle began to withdraw, and the retreat became general; but even in their flight the Swiss showed their heroic spirit. “It was a marvel”, says a Milanese, “to see the routed Swiss return to Milan—one had lost an arm, another a leg, a third was maimed by the cannon. They carried one another tenderly; and seemed like the sinners whom Dante pictures in the ninth circle of the Inferno. As fast as they came they were directed to the hospital, which was filled in half an hour, and all the neighboring porches were strewn with straw for the wounded, whom many Milanese, moved with compassion, tenderly succored”. In the records of the times we rarely find such heroism and such humanity. The Milanese had little cause to love the Swiss, who treated them brutally and exacted from them heavy taxes, and the mass of the Milanese were prepared to welcome the French as their deliverers; but in the hour of suffering and disaster they showed their respect for the valiant, and their charity to the suffering.

The battle of Marignano produced on all sides a profound impression. Trivulzio said that he had fought in eighteen battles, but they were mere child's play compared to this, which was a battle of giants. The Swiss left 10,000 dead upon the field; the French loss was about 7000, but it was severely felt, as there was scarcely a noble family in France which did not suffer. The battle of Marignano was a triumph of the old military organization over the republican army which had so long been invincible in Italy. As the Hussite army had been the terror of the German nobles, so the Swiss footmen seemed invincible, and boasted themselves to be the tamers and correctors of princes The battle of Marignano was a check to the spread of republican ideas, because it dispelled the charm of success which had hitherto accompanied the republican organisation in war. By this battle the way was cleared for the assertion in European affairs of the monarchical principle. The defeat of the Swiss at Marignano rendered possible the long warfare of Francis I and Charles V.

The repulse of the Swiss seemed at first almost incredible, and military experts accounted for it by the lack of fortunate circumstances. Had daylight lasted a little longer on the first day of the battle they would have routed the French; had they not suffered from previous dissensions, when Alviano appeared on the second day they would still have won; had Cardona made any movement to support them, their victory would have been secure. Leo X does not seem to have thought a defeat of the Swiss to be possible. The first news that reached Rome announced their victory, and Cardinal Bibbiena illuminated his house and gave a banquet; when contradictory rumors were brought, they were not believed. At last the Venetian envoy received despatches from his government. He went in the early morning to the Vatican, while the Pope was still in bed; at his urgent request the Pope was roused and came in half-dressed. “Holy Father”, said Giorgi, “yesterday you gave me bad news and false: today I will give you good news and true; the Swiss are defeated” The Pope took the letters and read them. “What will become of us, and what of you?”, he exclaimed. Giorgi tried to console him, though he felt little sympathy with his grief. “We will put ourselves in the hands of the Most Christian King”, said the Pope, “and will implore his mercy”.
Every one knew that it was the custom of Popes now-a-days to be always on the winning side. Leo X had already opened negotiations with Francis I, who did not wish to have the Pope for his open foe. It is true that after the battle of Marignano the conquest of Milan was easy; and on October 4 Massimiliano Sforza surrendered the castle and agreed to live in France on a pension allowed him by the French king. But the Emperor Maximilian still held to the imperial claims to Milan; the Swiss still talked of sending reinforcements; Henry VIII of England had complaints against France for its intervention in Scotland, and made naval preparations which betokened a descent on the French coast. Francis I did not see his way clear to a march upon Naples; and if he was not prepared for that step, an alliance with the Pope was the best means of securing what he had already won.

Accordingly, the Bishop of Tricarico again set to work to negotiate, and Leo X used his assumed terror of the French as a means of putting pressure upon his other allies. He told Ferdinand of Spain that he had thoughts of fleeing to Gaeta, and Ferdinand was moved to answer that the Church was always strongest when she seemed most feeble; for himself he would give a thousand lives and a thousand states, if he had them, to avert danger from such an excellent Pope as Leo X. Hypocrisy could go no further on either side; but such-like empty talk enabled Leo X to gain time in his dealings with France. He put a good face on the matter, bargained about the terms of the accord, and even recalled the Bishop of Tricarico to Rome for a personal conference. Finally the terms were signed on October 13. The Pope was bound to withdraw his troops from Parma and Piacenza, which he had gained at the expense of the duchy of Milan; on the other hand Francis I undertook to defend the Pope and the Medici in Florence, and give Giuliano and Lorenzo de' Medici revenues in France and military commands. At the same time Francis I expressed a desire for a conference with the Pope; he hoped to win him over to sanction his invasion of Naples. Leo X also had many schemes about which he wished to sound the French king; he did not, however, think that the presence of Francis in Rome was desirable, as the passage of French troops through Florentine territory might be dangerous; he prepared to advance to Bologna and there meet the king. Yet no sooner had Leo X made this agreement than he proceeded to make apologies for it. He was driven to take this step to escape from ruin; when he could gain an opportunity he would do all he could to rid Italy of the French. Leo X was nothing if he was not deceitful.

In the beginning of November Leo X set out from Viterbo on his way to Bologna. He left as his legate in Rome Cardinal Soderini, not because he loved him, but because he wished to find a pretence for not allowing him to visit Florence, where the Pope arrived on November 30. The Florentines had worked hard to give him a splendid reception, and the magnificent decorations which were erected along the streets were long a subject of wonder throughout Italy. Florence employed her architects, her sculptors, and her painters to devise and adorn these structures of a day. The city gate was transformed into a splendid entrance to a palace; the whole of the Piazza di S. Trinita was occupied by a wooden castle; the unfinished facade of the cathedral was supplied by a wooden covering devised by Jacopo Sansovino and painted in chiaroscuro, with bas-reliefs and sculptured figures, by the hand of Andrea del Sarto. Boccio Bandinelli, Antonio di San Gallo, Granacci, and many others were employed in these works, and the Florentines prided themselves not so much on the lavish gilding bestowed on their decorations as on their grace and beauty of design, all wrought by the hands of good masters. The Florentines were put upon their mettle, and were resolved
that no expense or labor should be spared. They had all the feelings of a mercantile community of the present day, and rejoiced in overcoming the difficulties which arose from the short notice of the papal visit. More than 2000 workmen were employed day and night; more than 70,000 florins were expended. Great space was required for workshops where such vast constructions could be put together, and they did not scruple to make use of their churches for this purpose. For more than a month before the Pope's visit, Divine service had to be performed in any remote corner that could be found. It was a strange way of showing honour to the head of the Christian Church.

Florence, which was under the yoke of the Medici, might show honor to a Medicean Pope; but Bologna was always rebellious to the papal rule and still resented the expulsion of the Bentivogli. The people showed no signs of joy at the Pope's entry; the magistrates sent only a paltry wooden cross for the Pope to kiss; and though they provided one baldachino of silk for the Pope himself, a second which was to be borne over the consecrated elements was only made of old cloth. When the Pope saw it he ordered the silken covering to be used for the Sacrament, while he himself had none. Paris de Grassis in his indignation begged the Pope to punish this ignorant and barbarous folk, but the Pope only smiled. Leo X was not a man to be much moved by a petty slight.

On December 11 Francis I entered Bologna and was met by all the Cardinals. In vain Paris de Grassis strove to inform him of his ceremonial duties and to organize his advance; the king horrified the Master of the Ceremonies by saying that he did not care about processions. He made his way good-humouredly through the crowd to the palace where the Pope sat awaiting him in full Consistory. He was formally received and made profession of his obedience; and when the formal ceremony was over the Pope and the king retired to their own rooms. Then Leo X went to pay a private visit to the king, not without a warning from Paris de Grassis that he was to beware of the example of Alexander VI and not remove his cap in the king's presence, “for the Vicar of Christ should show no sign of reverence to king or emperor”.

During the public ceremonies of this interview a noticeable incident took place. Leo X celebrated mass, and administered the Communion to some of the French nobles. That the Pope's labor might not be excessive the number was limited to forty. One of the French barons, who was not admitted to this privilege, cried out that at least he wished to confess to the Pope: he confessed that he had borne arms against Julius II and had not heeded his censures. The king exclaimed that he had been guilty of the like offence, and all the French lords followed his example. Leo X gave them absolution and his blessing. Then Francis I continued, "Holy Father, do not wonder that all these were the enemies of Pope Julius, because he was our chief enemy, and we have not known in our time a more terrible adversary in war than was Pope Julius; for he was in truth a most skillful captain and would have made a better general of an army than a Pope of Rome". Even in his religious acts a Pope was pursued by the secular policy of his predecessor, nay his religious acts themselves had become part of his own secular designs. Each Pope had plans of his own, and paid little heed to the reputation of those who had gone before him in his office. Excommunication and absolution were alike weapons of promoting worldly interests; the Pope felt no shame at being reminded of the fact, and laymen felt no scruple in avowing their knowledge of it.

One act of complaisance to Francis I was performed by Leo X; on December 14 Adrian de Boissy, brother of the king's tutor and secretary, was created Cardinal. What
were the real subjects of the secret conferences between Pope and king we do not know; the ostensible subject was the establishment of peace between France, Venice, and the emperor, with a view to an expedition against the Turks. But matters more directly concerning the interests of both parties were discussed. Francis I tried in vain to win the Pope’s assent to an expedition against Naples; that question had to stand over for the present. Leo X thought it hard that he should be required to abandon Parma and Piacenza; but Francis I was resolved to maintain intact the integrity of the Milanese state, and he further demanded that Leo X should resign Modena and Reggio to the Duke of Ferrara. Such a claim was reasonable, for Francis I could not fairly desert his ally, and the peace of Italy would be endangered if a grievance were left needlessly open. Leo X agreed to hand over these cities on condition that he received back the money which he had paid for them to Maximilian. In return for this sacrifice Francis I was driven to consent to the Pope's plan of indemnifying himself by seizing the lands of the Duke of Urbino. Leo X in fact wished to revert to the policy of Alexander VI, and was bent upon forming a principality for Lorenzo de' Medici. He could not get Naples; his attempt on Parma and Piacenza and Modena had failed; there remained Urbino as a possibility, and here Francis I was driven to promise that he would allow the Pope a free hand. Besides these questions concerning Italian politics there stood over for discussion the ecclesiastical affairs of France. The Lateran Council had denounced the old grievance of the Pragmatic Sanction; the king and the Pope, aided by the French chancellor, Duprat, discussed a project by which each of them should make his profit at the expense of the Gallican Church.

On December 15 Francis I left Bologna, and the Pope departed a few days later. Neither of them was much satisfied with the interview; neither had persuaded the other that his interests lay in a cordial understanding between them. Francis I already felt the difficulties of Italian politics. His success at Marignano had raised enemies against him on every side. He had not followed up his victory at once, and hesitation was fatal to future progress. Had he after the fight of Marignano marched against Cardona and Lorenzo de' Medici, he might have reduced the Pope to submission and advanced unhindered to Naples. He was not prepared for so bold a stroke, and his army rapidly dispersed. Henry VIII and Ferdinand drew closer together; the Swiss talked of another expedition; even Maximilian bestirred himself; the Pope recovered from his terror and again presented conditions to the conqueror. Francis I was content to keep what he had won, and early in 1516 returned to France, leaving the Duke of Bourbon Governor of Milan.

Leo X journeyed to Florence, where he again enjoyed the magnificence of his native city. But Florence was suffering from a bad harvest, and there was great scarcity of food, so that the Pope's followers could not afford to stay in the city. Leo X took no measures for importing corn, and the people saw with growing discontent the unthinking luxury of the Pope and Cardinals in a time of general distress. At last, on February 19, the Pope departed for Rome. He ordered Paris de Grassis, who was shocked by the command, to go a week earlier, escorting the Sacrament, which was generally carried before the Pope’s person; he preferred to make his way back to Rome without any signs of his pontifical dignity. Soon after his return he received the news of the death of his brother Giuliano at Fiesole on March 17. Giuliano had been ailing for some months, and his death was not unexpected. However much Leo X may have grieved, he was warned by his Master of Ceremonies that it was unbecoming for a Pope, who was not a mere man, but a demi-god, to show any outward sign of mourning.
Giuliano’s death was sincerely deplored in Florence. “He was a good man”, writes a Florentine, averse from bloodshed and from every vice. He may be called not only liberal, but prodigal, for he made gifts and incurred expenses without any consideration whence the money was to come. He surrounded himself with ingenious men and wished to make proof of every new thing. Painters, sculptors, architects, alchemists, mining engineers, were all hired by him at salaries which it was impossible to pay. He was the worthiest of the Medici family, and was too simple and sincere to share in his brother’s plans. His death removed an obstacle from the Pope's ways, for Giuliano was strongly opposed to the scheme for dispossessing the Duke of Urbino. When in exile he had taken refuge in the court of Urbino; he remembered with gratitude the kindness of Duke Guidubaldo, and would not have his daughter wronged. As he lay on his deathbed he besought the Pope not to do any ill to the Duke of Urbino, but remember the kindness which was shown to the house of Medici after they were driven from Florence. The Pope soothed him and said, “You must do your best to get well again, and then we can talk about such things”; but he refused to make any promise to his dying brother.

Before taking any definite steps in the matter of Urbino, Leo X waited to see the turn that events would take in Milan. While he was making professions of friendship to Francis I at Bologna, he was privy to a scheme for the reconquest of Milan by his foes. Francis wished to secure what he had won by making peace with the Swiss, and his emissaries were busy amongst the Cantons. This awakened the jealousy of Henry VIII, who did not wish to see Francis I with his hands free for further exploits; and an English envoy, Richard Pace, was sent with English gold to hire Swiss troops for the service of Maximilian. Henry VIII would not openly break the peace between England and France, but he offered to supply Maximilian with Swiss troops for an attack upon Milan. It was useless to send money to Maximilian, who would have spent it on himself, and Pace had a difficult task in discharging his secret mission so as to devote his supplies to their real purpose. He was helped by Cardinal Schinner, and the condottiere Galeazzo Visconti; so skillful was he, that at the beginning of March the joint army of Maximilian and the Swiss assembled at Trent. On March 24 they were within a few miles of Milan, and their success seemed sure, when suddenly Maximilian found that his resources were exhausted and refused to proceed; next day he withdrew his troops and abandoned his allies. Whether he was afraid of a determined resistance on the part of the French, who burnt the suburbs of Milan in preparation for a siege; whether he feared that his Swiss allies might refuse to fight against their comrades in the pay of France; whether he was himself bought off by French gold, we cannot tell. Most probably he only began to count the cost of his enterprise when he saw it close at hand. He bargained for an immediate victory, and when he saw signs of resistance he shrank before the risk of a possible failure. He was not prepared for anything heroic. “According to his wont”, says Vettori, “he executed a right-about-face”. The expedition was a total failure; yet English gold had not been spent in vain, as the Swiss were prevented from entirely joining the French, and Francis I was reminded that his position in Italy was by no means secure.

Leo X meanwhile, in the words of Pace, had played marvelously with both hands in this enterprise. He entered into a defensive alliance with Francis I, but sent no help to Milan; so that Francis I said to the papal envoy, “Agreements made with the Pope are to be observed only in time of peace, not in time of war”. But though the Pope would give no aid that cost him anything, he was willing to show his friendliness in dishonorable ways. He informed the French king of the intentions of Henry VIII with a barefaced
apology for his breach of faith: “Although it does not seem a pastor's duty to make such reports, still the love which his Holiness bears to the Most Christian King and the business now in hand drive him to give information of the truth; but he would not have it quoted for the world”. At the same time he wrote to the Swiss that the King of France was his ally, and that all who warred against him were enemies of the Church; and after Maximilian’s departure Lorenzo de' Medici furnished money to pay the Swiss who were in the French service.

On the other hand he remonstrated with the Venetian envoy in Rome on the danger which Venice was running by advancing to the aid of the French, and he even allowed Marcantonio Colonna to join Maximilian with 200 men. Afterwards he took credit with Maximilian for sending him, and at the same time protested to Francis I that he went against his will as a private person. But the supreme exhibition of Leo X’s diplomatic perfidy is to be found in the instructions given to Cardinal Dovizzi, who was sent as an envoy ostensibly to make peace between Maximilian and Francis I. Cardinal Medici wrote to him that the Pope, on the whole, would rather have the French in Milan than the Germans, because more pretexts could be found for opposing the French than the imperial claims; peace between France and Germany, though at first sight it might seem desirable, was not for the advantage of the Papacy, for it would establish in Italy the power of the Austro-Spanish house. Dovizzi was therefore ordered to act carefully in the face of the actual events; if the French were victorious, he was to plead a sudden indisposition, and not advance further; if the imperial army prospered, or seemed likely to prosper, he was to go on, but send a secret messenger to the Duke of Bourbon to assure him that he was going to act in the joint interests of France and the Papacy. No wonder that the Pope explained his own policy by saying that “it seemed good to him to proceed by temporizing and dissembling like the rest”. It was his modesty which prevented him from saying that he outstripped his competitors in those arts. He even had the effrontery afterwards to inform Francis I that he had sent no legate to Maximilian; while he demanded Maximilian's gratitude for having hastened to send one at once. Truly Leo X spared no pains to be on the winning side.

When the dread of disturbance in North Italy was over, Leo X. turned his attention to his schemes against the Duke of Urbino. He issued a monitory accusing him of his past misdeeds—his treachery towards Julius II and his murder of Cardinal Alidosi; especially his refusal to bear arms under Lorenzo de' Medici when the Papal troops advanced against the French. It is true that Francesco della Rovere gave the Pope some ground for complaint. He resented his deposition from the office of Gonfaloniere of the Church, and though he was willing to serve under Giuliano de' Medici, as being an old friend, he had declined to serve under Lorenzo, and had made overtures to Francis I. On these grounds Leo X summoned him to appear in Rome and answer the charges preferred against him; and when he paid no heed he was excommunicated and deprived of his states. The papal troops to the number of 20,000 were directed against the duchy of Urbino, and Francesco finding himself without allies fled to Mantua. On May 30 Lorenzo de' Medici entered Urbino, and in a few months all the fortresses surrendered to him. On August 18 Leo X solemnly created Lorenzo Duke of Urbino and Lord of Pesaro, with the assent of all the Cardinals, save the Venetian Grimani, Bishop of Urbino, who, however, so dreaded the Pope’s resentment that he removed from Rome and did not return during the Pope's lifetime.

So far Leo X had been enabled to work his will because the scheme of Francis I for the conquest of Naples had been made more possible by the death on January of
Ferdinand of Spain. The hand that had so long striven to maintain the balance of power in Europe was removed, and Francis I could count upon dealing with a youth whose counselors were incapable of any far-seeing objects. It was lucky for Charles V that his grandfather died at a time when the power of France had again become alarming to Europe. Ferdinand's care in his late years had been directed to prevent the growth of the Austrian house, and he had designed to divide his heritage between his two grandsons, Charles and Ferdinand; but after the battle of Marignano he changed his will and bequeathed all to Charles, who at the age of seventeen found himself ruler of Spain, the Netherlands, Naples, and the colonies of the New World. Yet with all these possessions the new king was almost destitute of resources; he had not even money to enable him to make a journey to Spain for his coronation. Had not Henry VIII stirred Maximilian to attack Milan, Francis I would have seized a favorable opportunity for the invasion of Naples.

England was now the chief opponent of the ambitious schemes of France, and aimed at bringing about a league with Maximilian, Charles, the Pope, and the Swiss. But Charles's ministers, chief of whom was Croy, Lord of Chièvres, had a care above all for the interests of Flanders, and so were greatly under the influence of France. Charles was at peace with France; they were of opinion that by maintaining that peace the young king would more surely assure himself of the succession to Spain. France and England entered into a diplomatic warfare over the alliance with Charles.

First, England on April 19 recognized Charles as King of Spain, Navarre, and the Two Sicilies; then Wolsey strove to make peace between Venice and Maximilian as a first step towards detaching Venice from its French alliance. Maximilian tried to fire the imagination of Henry VIII and draw money from him by making a fantastic proposal; he would make over to Henry VIII his claims on the duchy of Milan, would help him to conquer it, would then escort him to Rome, resign in his favor the imperial crown, and spend the rest of his days as Henry's subordinate. But English diplomacy was not attracted by such far-reaching schemes. “Whilst we looked for the crown imperial”, wrote Pace, “we might lose the crown of England, which is this day more esteemed than the emperor's crown and all his empire”. Pace regarded the proposal at its true value, “an inventive for to pluck money from the king craftily”.

Maximilian in fact had ceased to be a serious politician, and Charles and Chièvres paid little heed to him. They considered that under present circumstances an alliance with France was more secure than a league against her; it would at all events give them time. So negotiations were secretly carried on, and on August 13 the treaty of Noyon was concluded between Francis I and Charles. Charles was to marry Louise, the daughter of Francis I, an infant of one year old, and receive as her dower the French claims on Naples; Venice was to pay Maximilian 200,000 ducats for Brescia and Verona: in case he refused this offer and continued the war, Charles was at liberty to help his grandfather, and Francis I to help the Venetians, without any breach of the peace now made between them.

Henry VIII was chagrined at this result, and began to be suspicious of the constancy of Maximilian. He strove more ardently than before to make peace between Maximilian and Venice, and to win over the Swiss. The Pope’s help was necessary, but the Pope set a high price upon it. He would do what England wished if thereby he could gain the restoration of Parma and Piacenza; indeed he longed for English help to set Lorenzo de'
Medici in the duchy of Milan. As usual, he was cautious in undertaking any obligation, and steadily urged his own interests.

On October 29 an alliance was made between Henry VIII and Maximilian for the defence of the Church; and it was so framed that Charles could enter it also without breaking the treaty of Noyon. The Cardinal of Sion was active in winning over many of the Swiss; but Leo X professed to be afraid to commit himself. He knew, sooner than did Henry VIII, that Maximilian was preparing to join the treaty of Noyon, and consequently grew cooler in his relations to England, and more cordial towards France. On November II Cardinal Medici wrote that any misunderstanding or suspicion was alien to the Pope's nature and will, which wished to give itself without reserve and to meet with a like return. Such a message was rather a severe trial even for the experienced diplomatist Ludovico Canossa, now Bishop of Bayeux, who was to deliver it to the French king.

In spite of the efforts of England, Francis I was everywhere successful in settling his difficulties. On November 29 a perpetual peace was made at Friburg between France and the Swiss Cantons; on December 3 the treaty of Noyon was renewed, and Maximilian was included in its provisions. Peace was made between him and Venice by the provision that Maximilian was to hand over Verona to Charles, who in turn should give it up to the King of France, who delivered it to the Venetians; Maximilian in return received 100,000 ducats from Venice and as much from France. The compact was duly carried out: "On February 8, 1517", wrote the Cardinal of Sion, "Verona belonged to the emperor; on the 9th to the King Catholic; on the 15th to the French; on the 17th to the Venetians".

Such was the end of the wars that had arisen from the League of Cambrai. After a struggle of eight years the powers that had confederated to destroy Venice came together to restore her to her former place. Venice might well exult in this reward of her long constancy, her sacrifices, and her disasters. The war had drained her resources, but she had no thoughts of yielding, and emerged at last from the conflict safe and sound. Yet Venice was not what she had been before, and no longer threatened Italy, on which the stranger had made good his hold. The military power of Venice never recovered from the defeat of Valla. It was not so much that Venice had grown smaller as that the problems of Italian politics had grown larger. It was not her political difficulties but the altered state of Europe which prevented her from recovering her old position. Venice was the last great Italian state, and her decay was gradual; but already new roads had been opened for commerce, and she no longer commanded the trade with the East. So far as her courage and resolution were concerned she could boast that she had withstood the combined powers of Europe, and after a struggle which had lasted for eight years had come forth, weakened it is true, but not shorn of any of her possessions.
CHAPTER XX.
CLOSE OF THE LATERAN COUNCIL
1517.

During this period of incessant political intrigue it was natural that the Lateran Council should make much progress. The three objects which a Council Lateran was bound to profess, the peace of Christendom, war against the Turk, and the reformation of the Church, could not be pursued separately, for only a general agreement between European powers could supply the force necessary for a crusade or for ecclesiastical reform. The Lateran Council had owed its origin to the political necessities of the Papacy. It was not the Council but the Pope who had done away with an abortive attempt at schism; the Council simply registered the results of the papal diplomacy. Europe as a whole paid little heed to the Council or its proceedings; and amongst the mass of State papers preserved in every country, it is scarcely mentioned. Statesmen were not interested in ecclesiastical questions; the general tone of thought was national and practical. The New Learning employed the minds of thoughtful men; the spread of commerce attracted the trading classes; schemes of national aggrandizement filled the minds of statesmen. The Lateran Council would have come to an end had not the Pope still needed it to record a new triumph of papal diplomacy. While this was pending the Council was still kept alive.

Though the Council consisted only of Italian prelates, those prelates still remained constant to their plan of increasing the importance of their own order. They had succeeded in asserting their ecclesiastical equality with the Cardinals, and had struck a blow at the abuse of monastic exemptions from episcopal authority. They went on to make another demand, which aimed at the permanent organization of the episcopal order at the Roman court. They asked for permission to set up an episcopal college or confraternity, which should hold a recognized position at Rome, and should have power to communicate immediately with the Pope and lay before him such questions as from time to time interested the bishops as a class. At first the Pope assented to this proposal, but the Cardinals raised the strongest opposition. They were the standing council of the Pope, and in that capacity took charge of all business which it was necessary to lay before him. They acted as protectors of national interests, and were recognized and paid accordingly by kings. The bishops might quote for their proposal the precedent of monastic or other organizations, but these were scarcely parallel cases. A confraternity of prelates, with an organization of its own and the assured right of access to the Pope, would practically have superseded the College of Cardinals, and would have proved a serious limitation to the papal primacy; it would have wrought an entire revolution in the system of the Church.

The prelates who made this proposal were most probably ignorant of its real importance, and looked only to their present grievances. They resented the over-grown power of the Cardinals, they wished to reduce the monks to obedience, and to re-establish their own jurisdiction. They suffered from such constant encroachments that they saw no way of protecting themselves save that of setting up a chamber of their own with special delegates who should permanently represent their interests in the Roman court. Had the bishops throughout Europe bound themselves together in favour of this
scheme it might have been carried. But the movement was very partial, and was
confined to a few Italian bishops who were present in Rome; in fact it was little more
than a struggle of one party in the Curia against another. So unimportant did the matter
seem at first, that the Pope was inclined to accept it. Consideration and counsel showed
him its dangers, and he withdrew his approval. The more he was pressed, the more
stubborn he became. At last he told the unfortunate bishops that if they did not
withdraw their request he would hold no further sessions of the Council, but would
prorogue from year to year. Their demands for the reduction of the privileges of the
monastic orders had not yet been embodied in a decree; if they persisted, they would
lose what had been already promised. They made a last effort to obtain something in the
direction of their wishes, and asked that the prelates present from time to time in the
Curia should have the power of assembling separately, and discussing affairs
concerning their order, that they should be allowed to appoint deputies, and present
petitions to the Pope. They added that to make this scheme useful it was necessary that
the prelates in Rome should not be solely Italians, but chosen from different nations,
and that they should have leisure allowed them for this special service. Though this
proposal would have made the new council of the Pope dependent mainly on his own
selection, it still seemed dangerous, and was not allowed. The prelates were indignant
that the Cardinals had prevailed against them, and were the more determined to urge
their victory over the monastic orders. The Cardinals tried to modify their demands; but
the prelates were firm, and the Pope, who wished to hold a session of the Council, was
driven to let them have their way.

When all these difficulties had been overcome, the eleventh session of the Council
was at last held on December 19, in the presence of sixteen Cardinals and some seventy
prelates. The first decree bears traces of an uneasy consciousness that the Church was
decaying in general esteem, and that the teaching of its ordinary ministers was not in
sympathy with the great currents of thought. The growth of the New Learning had not
intellectually affected the bulk of the clergy; they did not understand it sufficiently
either to appreciate its good points, or to warn men against its dangerous tendencies.
They felt that many subjects of their teaching were openly or tacitly challenged, and
instead of meeting the challenge they fell back upon general denunciations or the
testimonies of miraculous stories. The Council rebuked these ignorant preachers,
warned them against employing threats of impending judgments, against perversion of
texts of Scripture, and against the use of fictitious miracles. For the future all preachers,
secular and regular alike, were to be examined by their superiors, and receive from them
a licence to preach. They were ordered to teach nothing save what was contained in the
words of Scripture, and the interpretations of those doctors whom the Church had
recognized; they were not to foretell the coming of Antichrist, or the time of the day of
judgment; if any one believed that he had the spirit of prophecy he was to submit his
prophecies to the judgment of the Pope, or if the need was urgent, to his ordinary. The
Council's decree was wise and moderate; the misfortune was that ignorance could not be
remedied by decrees.

The important work of the session was the registration of a triumph of the papal
policy in the abolition of the Pragmatic Sanction of France. However much in of the
other points the Popes since Pius II had differed from one another, they had been
unanimous in their endeavors to sweep away the separate legislation wherewith the
Gallican Church had withdrawn itself from the papal authority. Paul II, Sixtus IV,
Innocent VIII, had alike striven to procure the formal abolition of these special
privileges. They had all been able to win from the king some appearance of concession, but the Parlement refused to register any decree for the abolition of the Pragmatic Sanction, which was consequently observed so far as suited the convenience of the Crown or the interests of his ecclesiastical favorites. But the quarrel of Julius II and Louis XII led to the full establishment of the Pragmatic Sanction, and the renewal of the Conciliar movement. The schismatic Council had failed; France had withdrawn its opposition to the Papacy. The abolition of the Pragmatic Sanction was the natural termination to the struggle and the pledge of friendship for the future. This was one of the questions discussed by Leo X and Francis I when they met at Bologna, and the French chancellor Duprat declared himself on the Pope's side. A little consideration showed the Pope and the king how they could best secure their mutual advantage, and the terms of an agreement were left for negotiation. The king agreed to abolish the Pragmatic Sanction and take in its stead a concordat with the Pope. By this compact both parties were gainers. The Pragmatic Sanction rested on the basis of the power of General Councils, of an inherent right of self-government in the universal Church, which was independent of and superior to the papal monarchy. It had been the aim of the restored Papacy to root out these ideas; the Pragmatic Sanction was the last remnant of the Conciliar movement, and no price was too great to pay for its destruction. Leo X left it for diplomacy to settle what were the best terms which he could make with the French king; if the king would abolish the Pragmatic Sanction the Pope would grant him as a favour the most profitable of its privileges.

On the other side, Francis I aimed at establishing the supremacy of the royal power in France, and it was worth his while to establish it definitely over the French Church.

So long as the Church stood on the Pragmatic Sanction it rested upon something independent of the royal power. The Pragmatic had received the royal assent, but was valid because it claimed to declare the ancient and inherent rights of the universal Church. Other nations might forego those rights, but the Gallican Church proudly maintained them. Francis I felt as little sympathy with such a position as did Leo X. The Pope wished to root out all that was opposed to the papal supremacy; the king wished to be rid of everything that ran counter to the royal omnipotence. So the claims of the Gallican Church were contemptuously thrown aside, and the Pope and the king began to bargain over the fair division of the spoil.

Matters were finally settled, and the concordat was signed on August 18, 1516. Francis I agreed to the abolition of the Pragmatic Sanction, and obtained instead conventions which he asked the Gallican Church to accept as an equivalent. Leo X granted to the French king powers over the Gallican Church which it was hard to express in terms of ecclesiastical propriety. The French king was allowed to nominate to all bishoprics and abbeys in his kingdom, though the papal approval was reserved; reservations were abolished; in presentations to benefices graduates of the universities were to be appointed to vacancies occurring in four months of the year; a check was put to papal provisions; appeals to Rome were restricted; excommunications and interdicts were to be formally made known before their observance was required. Amongst these regulations we are surprised by a disciplinary enactment, which the existing condition of the Church rendered necessary. Bishops were ordered to proceed against clergy living in open concubinage; they were to be punished by a suspension for three months, and if they did not then put away their concubine, by deprivation of their benefice. Bishops were enjoined in the most solemn words to accept no composition for conniving at this irregularity.
The celibacy of the clergy was in such danger of breaking down that it had to be asserted however incongruously, and at the same time the laity were also exhorted to greater chastity and order in their lives.

The Council unanimously passed this decree, and the Pope expressed his satisfaction by the emphasis of his vote: "I not only assent, but assent greatly and entirely". The next business of the session was to approve the decree which had been the object of such prolonged struggles, the decree for diminishing monastic privileges. It was enacted that bishops should have full power of visiting parish churches which were served by monasteries, and should correct abuses in their curates; prelates and secular priests were to be allowed to celebrate the mass in monastic churches; monastic vicars were to be liable to examination by bishops as to their fitness for their office; friars were not to have the power of absolution from sentences passed by ecclesiastical authorities, and were not to administer the sacraments to those who had been refused them by their parish priests; they were not to give absolution to those who had not paid tithes and other ecclesiastical dues, and were in their preaching to urge this as a duty. Brothers and sisters of the third order, who lived in their own houses, and were only attached loosely to the friars, were to receive the sacraments, excepting that of penance, from their parish priest, and were not to be free from the penalties of an interdict by admission to the church of the friars. Generally the friars were admonished to pay due respect to the bishops as standing in the place of the Apostles.

This decree met with some opposition. Many were dissatisfied that it did not go far enough. But when the votes were taken it was declared to be carried. It was understood also that the reform of the mendicant orders was to be taken in hand in their chapters; but little result seems to have followed. The subjection of the friars to the authority of the bishops in matters concerning ecclesiastical order was not thoroughly established; and the exemptions which had been abolished were in some points renewed. Women of the tertiary order living in a college were first exempted from the jurisdiction of ordinaries; then the exemption was extended to virgins living at home, and afterwards to widows. The friars could not openly resist, but they soon recovered the ground that they had lost. The decrees of the Lateran Council do not seem to have produced much tangible result in the relation of the mendicant orders towards the bishops.

Now that the Pragmatic Sanction had been triumphantly abolished, the work of the Lateran Council was done, and it only remained for the Pope to get rid of it decorously. On March 16, 1517, its last session was held; and Paris de Grassis felt a malicious pleasure in selecting Cardinal Carvajal to say mass, so that the man who had called the Council into being by his attempt at schism, should grace its triumphant close. The Pope, with eighteen Cardinals, eighty-six prelates, and a few ambassadors represented the greatest number that had ever been present at the sessions of this ecumenical assembly. Letters were read from Maximilian, Francis I, Charles of Spain, and Henry VIII of England, declaring their zeal for the cause of a crusade; they were ornamental documents necessary to give color to the imposition of a tax of a tithe on all clerical revenues for the next three years. One little point remained to be settled. A decree was passed forbidding in future the pillaging of the house and goods of the Cardinal who was elected, or was supposed to be elected Pope. The custom was obviously a relic of troublesome times, and might well be abolished; but it seems a ludicrous object for the concern of a General Council at so momentous a period in the history of the Church.
Then was read the decree for the dissolution of the Council. It rehearsed all that had been done for the peace of the Church and of Christendom. Schism had been destroyed; all necessary reforms had been accomplished; the faith had been declared and established; the Pope had good hopes that the peace of Christendom would soon be secured, and that all Europe would unite in war against the Turk. With these cheering thoughts the Pope bade the bishops return home to their flocks, but this happy confidence was by no means universal. The decree could scarcely be heard amid the expressions of discontent. Many exclaimed that it was not a time for dissolving the Council, but rather for beginning its real business; others said that it was useless to impose tenths for a crusade, of which there was no real hope. The opposition to the dissolution was strong, and the Pope’s decree only secured a majority of two or three votes.

The Council of the Lateran is a convincing testimony of the helplessness of those who wished for reform in the Church. It was summoned in answer to an attempt to use a bygone movement as a political weapon against the secular policy of a Pope. No one believed in a Council; no one wanted a Council. There was no question stirring in the minds of churchmen; there was no special demand for reform; there were no men of mark who had any constructive schemes to propose; there was no real business to be done. The Kings of Europe did not trouble to send representatives to the Council; the national records of the time scarcely mention its existence. Leo X might smile contentedly and congratulate himself that his lot had fallen in pleasant places. His predecessors had trembled at the name of a Council; he had found it tolerably easy to manage with a little tact and a little of the spirit of compromise. It had recorded and emphasized his signal victory over the Gallican Church; he in turn had gratified its self-importance by allowing it to pass a few insignificant decrees. It did its work submissively and passed away quietly.

Yet the records of the Lateran Council show that there was a strong sense of the need of some reform, and that the reforming party sought a basis for future activity in the restoration of episcopal authority. If the Church was to be brought back to its former vigor a restoration of the episcopate was necessary above all things. But the protection of the episcopate from the aggressions of the Cardinals and from the exemptions of the monastic orders would not restore it to its primitive importance. The appointments of bishops were in the hands of kings or Pope; and Pope and kings alike sought for diplomatic agents rather than pastors of their flocks. There were earnest men in the Church, but it was hard to see how they were to be set in authority. It was useless to furbish up old machinery unless means were found that it should be worked by men of spiritual force. The objects of the Lateran Council were excellent, and its measures were wise as far as they went; but they were wholly inadequate to remove even the more crying evils which were universally condemned. The restoration of ecclesiastical discipline could not be effected by a few well-intentioned decrees. The reforming party was conscious of many evils, but it had no power behind it which was capable of working amendment. Its efforts awakened little interest, and it had no decided policy. The time was unfavorable for action; there was nothing to be done save to hope for the future.

It is the most astonishing instance of the irony of events that the Lateran Council should have been dissolved with promises of peace on the very verge of the greatest outbreak which had ever threatened the organization of the Church. It may be pleasant to be free from demands of reform, but it is assuredly dangerous. The quiet of
indifference wears the same aspect as the quiet of content; but it needs only a small impulse to convert indifference into antag onism. The man of foresight would have grieved that Europe paid no heed to the Lateran Council; it boded ill for the future that no one wished to hear the voice of the Church. The time is indeed out of joint which has no heart searchings, no difficulties for solution, no proposals for amendment, no great ideal to pursue. Europe, in fact, was sorely destitute of great ideals. Its princes were engaged in personal rivalry; its peoples were separating into conscious antagonism. It was a time of material well-being and eager striving after riches. The increase of knowledge had brought self- complacency, and the pride of superior wisdom separated each man from his fellow. Old objects of common effort had passed away, and none had taken their place. A crusade was chimical; the reform of the Church was not worth the trouble which it would cost. The wise man had his own opinions, which enabled him to lead his own life; as for the ignorant, it mattered little what they were taught. So men reasoned while each schemed for himself; and the Lateran Council was left to utter threadbare platitudes and raise worn out cries, while the world went on its way unheeding. Leo X was quite satisfied that so it should be; for the scheming selfishness of the time was nowhere more clearly embodied than in the Pope who had been brought up in the statecraft of the Medicean house.

Amongst the most important of the Council's decrees was that of 1513, which was aimed against philosophic skepticism on the question of the immortality of the soul. Yet while the Council was still sitting, the chief of the philosophic teachers of Italy did not hesitate to publish a book which put forward all the arguments against this article of the Christian faith. While Francis I and Leo X were conferring in Bologna, Pietro Pomponazzi of Mantua was lecturing in the city and was busy on his treatise On the Immortality of the Soul. He was an ardent Aristotelian, a fervent follower of Alexander of Aphrodisias, and was notorious for the freedom of his speculations. His book 'On the Immortality of the Soul' was published in Bologna on September 24, 1516. In the preface he represents himself as visiting a Dominican friar who was ill. The Dominican, who was a pupil of his, asked him, “Master, the other day in your lectures you said that the position of S. Thomas of Aquinas about the immortality of the soul, though you did not doubt of its truth, yet in no way agreed with the sayings of Aristotle. I should like to know, first, what is your opinion about this matter, setting miracles and revelations on one side; secondly, what you consider to be the opinion of Aristotle”. Pomponazzi, with God’s help, undertook to answer these questions. Following the Aristotelian method he discusses divers opinions and exposes the weakness of each. He concludes that the question of the immortality of the soul is a neutral problem like that of the eternity of the world; for no natural reasons can be brought forward which prove the soul to be immortal, still less which prove it to be mortal. In practice it makes a good deal of difference which opinion is followed; for if the soul is immortal men ought to despise earthly things and seek after heavenly things; if it is mortal, then they must follow the contrary course. Its immortality depends on revelation from God; but each art ought to follow its own method, and immortality should be proved by the method of faith, which depends on Scripture. Other methods are not to the point. Philosophers may differ; Christians may agree because they possess an infallible method, but they must not proceed according to the wisdom of this world.

It was impossible to mistake the covert sneer which lurked beneath such words. Many were offended, and preachers raised their voices against Pomponazzi’s teaching; but it is remarkable that Pomponazzi’s treatise contains no reference to the Lateran
decree, nor do we find that the decree was of much value to his opponents. Pomponazzi was not abashed by opposition, but continued the controversy with increased irony in a way which leaves no doubt of his meaning. He tells us that he was attacked by the cowled herd of the Dominicans, whose office it is to preach, and who preach that they themselves are omniscient. Brother Ambrose, an Augustinian of Naples, was especially zealous in denouncing Pomponazzi in North Italy. Pomponazzi represents himself as a secluded invalid who rarely heard of what was passing, and wondered with philosophic calm at the storm that was raised about nothing. When his friends told him of the preaching of Brother Ambrose, he exclaimed with an injured air, "He will not find that in any part of my little treatise I have affirmed that the soul is mortal. I have only said that Aristotle thought so, and that immortality cannot be proved by natural reason, but is to be held by sincere faith". He sent a humble message to the preachers who denounced him, begging that they would show him his error, "for nothing can be a greater misfortune to a philosopher than ignorance, especially in such a matter". Instead of doing him this favor Brother Ambrose continued to preach more violently than before, holding up his head and striking his broad chest and exclaiming, “Look here and see if I need fear that pigmy”—for Pomponazzi was a dwarf. Hearing this the dejected philosopher again sent to implore Brother Ambrose to show him his fault. “What!”, said Ambrose, “he has taken ten years to write the book, will he not give me four months to discover its errors?”. Quick came Pomponazzi’s retort: “When he condemned my book in the pulpit he either knew my errors or he did not If he did not, why did he condemn me? If he did, why does he need time to inform me of them? His excellent sermons have proved the immortality of the soul: why is he so anxious to overthrow its mortality? Both Aristotle and Averroes agree that the proof of the necessity of one of two opposites proves the impossibility of the other. Tell him that if he does not come within a month I will denounce him as a babbling preacher, a windy preacher, a man of no parts”. Presently Ambrose came to Bologna, but he came as a newly consecrated bishop; Pomponazzi went to see him and was received with kindness; he was told that Agostino Nifo of Naples had written a large treatise against him, which, when published, would show him his mistakes. “If he has proved me to be in error”, said Pomponazzi, “I give thanks first to God, then to Brother Agostino, for freeing me to be in error, then I shall have the greater praise; so that, however the matter ends, I shall be the gainer”.

The insolence of philosophic superiority could not be carried further than in this account which Pomponazzi gives of his controversy with the preachers; and he could not have written so if he had not known that he was safe. The Dominicans at Venice had taken strong measures against him. They reported on his book to the Patriarch, “a simple and most holy man”, Pomponazzi tells us, “but entirely ignorant of philosophy and theology”. The Patriarch laid the matter before the Doge, who forbade the sale of the book; and the Dominicans wrote to Rome to procure the Pope's condemnation. But Cardinal Bembo was a friend and patron of Pomponazzi. He read the accused book and gave his opinion that it contained nothing worthy of censure. The master of the palace, before whom the question formally came for decision, laughed and agreed with Bembo’s opinion; he added that there were many men whose orthodoxy was undisputed, who held Pomponazzi’s opinions. Rome was more tolerant than Venice, and in the papal court Pomponazzi’s book was read with a smile. Pomponazzi was told that if he went to Venice men would burn him or hand him over to the boys in the street to stone and pelt with dirt. He trembled at the thought of this menace, till he consoled himself by the thought of the saying of Socrates, “I would rather be put to
death unjustly than justly”. However, he stayed in the safety of the papal city of Bologna, where he lived unmolested, and on his death in 1525 was buried at the expense of Cardinal Gonzaga.

Those who find in the revolt against the Papacy the beginnings of an era of free thought and free inquiry, take no account of such cases as those of Pomponazzi. He was allowed to discuss with cynical frankness not merely outlying propositions, but the central ideas on which religious life was founded. He was held to be free from blame because he separated the region of philosophic speculation from the region of Christian belief, and was judged in the papal court with a judicial calmness and impartiality which the modern advocates of religious tolerance might well admire. He laid down a principle which was admitted at the papal court. “I do not firmly adhere to anything which I have said in my book, save in so far as the Apostolic See determines. Whatever, therefore, I may have said, whether it be true or false, whether it be in accordance with the faith or contrary to it, I ought not in any way to be held heretical”. Provided that he recognized the right of the Church to decide upon the true contents of Christian doctrine, he was at liberty to speculate freely upon the philosophic questions which those doctrines contained.

The position was an abstract one, and was not compatible with much zeal or enthusiasm on either side, but it recognized the difficulty of adjusting individual liberty and general order. The philosopher claimed to arrive at rational conclusions by rational methods; the Church claimed to set forth the Divine truth concerning the life of man. Provided that the philosopher recognized the paramount authority of the Church, he was at liberty to show within his own limits what he could discover without the Church's help. The Church, on her side, secure in the possession of truth, could afford to allow that man should freely follow his own intellectual methods: if they led him to conclusions contrary to her teaching, it was only an additional testimony to the weakness of the intellect unaided by revelation.

Such a compromise might be attractive to students and men of culture; it was too abstract for ordinary life. It demanded an impossible amount of self-restraint and of indifference to the practical issues of life. The scholar in his study might have his own searchings of heart, but when he stepped forward as a teacher he was bound to consider the issue of his teaching as a whole. Such lectures as those of Pomponazzi could not fail to have a disintegrating effect upon the basis of religious life. We are not uncharitable in supposing that Pomponazzi had this intention, and deliberately chose to attack Christian doctrine by the weapon of irony. However this may be, the Roman court treated him with leniency, and had no wish to enter into a war against philosophy. Pomponazzi was left to defend his position against attack on the side of orthodoxy, and the controversy was carried on by Agostino Nifo, and later by Contarini; but the Papacy refused to interfere. The Roman court was not in favor of repressive measures. It allowed free thought beyond the extremest limits of ecclesiastical prudence. The interest in dogmatic theology was slight; there was no recognition in Italy of the authority of the Church to restrain erroneous opinions, nor did the Church venture to claim it. No doubt Leo X and his Cardinals flattered themselves that the Church was more in accordance with the spirit of the age than it had ever been before. They were soon to learn that the real spirit of every age speaks not so much in what can be heard and reckoned with as in the yearnings of yet inarticulate souls.
Pomponazzi wrote also *On Incantations*, and *On Fate*. In both these works he criticized current conceptions on theological points, and substituted the Aristotelian view of the uniformity of nature for a world full of miracles, while he asserted man’s freedom as against any ideas of predestination, Divine providence, or even Divine grace. In all his writings Pomponazzi proceeds as a philosophic critic believing in religion as the root of virtue, but clearly distinguishing between what admitted of rational proof and what was the subject of faith. He is the first writer who gives complete expression to the modern spirit of criticism as opposed to the constructive theology of the Middle Ages. His attitude of intellectual abstraction from current problems marks the difference between the Italian and the German spirit. The Italian was content to notice the oppositions to which the New Learning gave rise; for himself a life in accordance with virtue was its own reward, and he was contented to live to himself. The German strove to reconstruct the crumbling structure of his intellectual conceptions, and gain a new system in which man might reconcile his difficulties by a quickened sense of his immediate relationship to God.

The Lateran Council had done all that it could do in the region of politics, and it was the region of politics that absorbed the attention of Leo X. The peace of Noyon had restored peace to Europe, but peace was by no means universally welcome. France was glad to have a breathing space; Charles congratulated himself that he was free from the tutelage of Maximilian and could leave Flanders in safety for the purpose of visiting his Spanish kingdoms, where his presence was sorely needed. On the other hand England saw herself outwitted in diplomacy, and was jealous of French aggrandizement; while Leo X, who had contrived by a judicious policy of wavering neutrality to promote his own interests in Italy, found himself in a strait. No doubt he ought to rejoice in peace, and work for an expedition against the Turk, whose advance was again a source of serious alarm to Europe; but Henry VIII spoke truly when he said to the Venetian envoy, "You are wise, and of your wisdom can understand that no general expedition against the Turk will ever be undertaken so long as such treachery prevails amongst the Christian powers that their sole thought is to destroy one another".

It is small blame to Leo X if he felt this as keenly as any other statesman, and was anxious to minimize the results of the treaty of Noyon. The contracting powers, Francis I, Maximilian, and Charles, had agreed to meet at Cambrai to confer on a common policy. However much a crusade against the Turk was put forward as a pretext, both Leo X and Henry VIII. were afraid of this conference and did their utmost to prevent it. "Popes", said the Venetian Giustinian, “are always disquieted by meetings of great princes, because the first thing dealt with is the reformation of the Church, that is of Popes and Cardinals”; he might have added that the reformation of the Church meant in those days the furtherance of political schemes for the partition of Italy. The conference at Cambrai was carried on by ambassadors, and agreed to a division of Northern and Central Italy into two states dependent on the Empire. One division, including Venice, Florence, and Siena, was to be held by Charles or his brother Ferdinand; the other added Piedmont, Mantua, Verona, and Lucca to the French possession of Milan. The scheme was a revival of the old League of Cambrai, and again aimed at the spoliation of Venice.

This proposal came to nothing; perhaps it was not seriously intended. Charles was preparing for a journey to Spain; Maximilian was helpless, and only caught at anything which still kept open his claims against Venice; Francis I was secretly listening to Wolsey, who saw in an alliance with France a means of restoring the position which England had lost by the peace of Noyon. Leo X was left destitute of allies, and soon felt
the dangers of his defenseless position. The cessation of war in Italy left a number of 
soldiers unemployed, and the dispossessed Duke of Urbino seized the opportunity to 
raise an army for the recovery of his possessions. With a body of Spanish, German, and 
Gascon mercenaries, he advanced in February into the territory of Urbino, where 
Lorenzo de' Medici could offer little resistance. In a few weeks Francesco della Rovere 
was restored to his old possessions.

Leo X saw in this the hostility of France. He begged for help from Francis I, who 
treated him with cold civility, and ordered the governor of Milan to send the Pope 
reinforcements; but he did not wish to drive him into the arms of Charles, and therefore 
entered into a league for mutual defence. Even when supported by French help the papal 
army was incapable of ousting Francesco della Rovere, who made the chivalrous 
proposal of deciding the dispute by a single combat between himself and Lorenzo de' 
Medici. This offer was naturally refused, and the war dragged on for eight months, to 
discomfort of Rome and the draining of the papal treasury. Men laughed that a 
'dukelet' should reduce the Church to such extremities, and Leo X was almost beside 
himself through vexation. The war went on till the resources of Francesco Maria were 
exhausted, and the Viceroy of Sicily interposed to prevent the extension of French 
influence. Leo X undertook to pay the arrears due to Francesco Maria's mercenaries, on 
condition that he withdrew from Urbino; and he was allowed to carry away to Mantua 
his artillery and the famous library which his uncle Federigo had collected. He went 
away in September, comforting his people with the hope that he would come back in 
better days, for Francis I had promised to restore him to Urbino when the Pope died or 
when he was at open enmity with the Pope. Francis I did not scruple to mock at the 
Pope's helplessness, and remind him of his dependence on the good will of France.

The war of Urbino not only drained the papal treasury, but also gave an opening to 
the expression of the discontent which the grasping policy of the Medici had created on 
many sides. The secular aspect of the Papacy was reproduced in the College of 
Cardinals, which mirrored only too accurately the dynastic interests of Europe, and 
especially of Italy. Alexander VI had found it necessary to reduce rebellious Cardinals 
by force; Julius II had suffered from an open revolt. Leo X hoped by an air of easy 
good-nature to spread general contentment; but it is hard to satisfy men whose interests 
are attacked; and Leo X, however cautious and plausible, could not escape making 
enemies. One of the Cardinals who had most keenly favored the election of Leo X was 
Alfonso, son of Pandolfo Petrucci, lord of Siena, who through his father's entreaties had 
been raised to the cardinalate by Julius II at the age of twenty. Pandolfo hoped that by 
this means he had secured Siena for his eldest son Borghese. Siena, however, was in a 
chronic state of political disturbance. The Sienese weary of Borghese's rule, and Leo 
X secretly helped a party who proposed to substitute for Borghese another member of 
the Petrucci family, Raffaello, who was governor of the Castle of S. Angelo. Raffaello 
Petrucci was an old friend of Leo X, and would rule Siena in the interest of the Medici; 
so by papal help Borghese was expelled and Raffaello ruled in his stead.

Cardinal Petrucci was indignant at his brother's wrongs, and when he saw the Pope 
hard pressed by Francesco della Rovere, thought that the time was come for a 
restoration at Siena. He withdrew from Rome and entered into negotiations with 
Francesco della Rovere. Apparently his action was notorious, for on March 4 Leo X 
wrote him a letter of kindly remonstrance, in which he warned him that he should 
regard any attempt on Siena as a conspiracy against his own person; but the Cardinal 
was moved rather by ill success than by the Pope's admonition to withdraw from Siena.
and seek reconciliation with Leo X. The Pope agreed to receive him in Rome, and give him a safe-conduct which was guaranteed to the ambassador of Spain. Cardinal Petrucci returned to Rome on May 19 with a numerous escort of armed men, and went first to the Vatican to pay his reverence to the Pope; he was met by his friend, the Genoese Cardinal Sauli, who went with him into the chamber of audience. There the two Cardinals were arrested by the Captain of the Pope's guard, and were carried away to the Castle of S. Angelo, where they were kept in solitary confinement. The Pope summoned the remaining Cardinals and the foreign ambassadors who were in Rome, that he might explain his reasons for his action. He assured them that he was not moved by any political motives, but was striking at two heinous criminals; he had proof that the imprisoned Cardinals had conspired to kill him by poison; he did not propose to judge his own cause, but would commit the matter to the decision of three Cardinals, Remolino, Accolti, and Farnese.

This news naturally created great surprise in Rome, and men did not know how to judge it. The Spanish ambassador entered his protest against the violation of the safe-conduct, which was indeed indefensible. The Pope, however, conceived that the enormity of the offence justified any means for its punishment. He behaved as though he were in great terror; the gates of the Vatican were kept closed, and armed men were posted everywhere. The Cardinals, when they heard of the severity of the imprisonment of their colleagues, went in a body to the Pope, and asked that out of respect for their office the prisoners might be allowed one attendant each. The Pope granted this request, but no one else was permitted to visit them. Leo X, in short, behaved as though he were conscious of a serious crisis; but Paris de Grassis, who saw him close at hand, doubted about his seriousness. He tells us that he thought it his duty to cheer his master by bidding him cast away his gnawing care and enjoy himself; Leo X answered with a laugh, that he had no other object in view.

The nature of the evidence before the Pope was scarcely sufficient to justify his arbitrary proceeding. He told the Venetian envoy that a letter of Cardinal Sauli had been found in the hands of a servant of Cardinal Petrucci; it contained the sentence, “I have not been able to accomplish what I promised”; when the servant was examined about the meaning of this suspicious remark, he confessed that there was a plot to poison the Pope. As soon as the Cardinals were in prison, further evidence was sought. The secretary of Petrucci confessed, under torture, that a plot had been made to introduce to the Pope as his physician a certain Battista da Vercelli, who was to poison him by means of an ointment applied to the Pope as a cure for fistula.

The imprisoned Cardinals were also urged to confess, and the immediate result of their confessions was the arrest of another Cardinal. On May 22 the Pope was preparing to hold a Consistory when Cardinal Accolti, one of the commissioners for the examination of the accused, came to a long interview. The Pope summoned Cardinals Farnese and Raffaello Riario; and no sooner did Riario appear than the Pope, trembling with rage and excitement, rushed out of the room, leaving Riario in charge of the guard. Again the Pope summoned the foreign ambassadors and told them that Petrucci had confessed everything about the plot to poison him, and had inculpated Cardinal Riario as an accomplice. “We were scarcely Pope four days”, exclaimed Leo X, “before these men began to plot our death”. Still, in spite of the Pope's declamation, men doubted about Riario's guilt. They remembered that a Medici had a grudge against the man who had been concerned in the Pazzi conspiracy, and they thought that Leo X was using his
opportunity to quit old scores; if Riario was conscious of guilt, they said, he was prudent enough to have fled when the first victims were seized.

The Pope, however, did not treat Riario with severity; he was not committed to prison, but was detained in a room in the Vatican; and his nephew the Patriarch of Alexandria paid the Pope 200,000 ducats to obtain his uncle's release. Riario confessed that Cardinal Petrucci had told him of his plan, while he had tried to dissuade him. Petrucci on the other hand seems to have asserted that Riario answered, “If you wish me to be with you, promise to elect me Pope”. Riario withdrew his confession and was committed to the Castle of S. Angelo; on his way he was in such an agony of terror that he could not walk and had to be carried. The luxurious Cardinals of Leo X's court were not fitted to endure solitude, imprisonment, and the threat of torture. It is hard to construct a credible narrative of their intentions from their confessions.

More surprises, however, were in store for the Cardinals. On June 8 they assembled in Consistory, when the Pope burst out into complaints. He had evidence, he said, that two other Cardinals whom he had trusted had joined in the conspiracy against him; if they would but come forward and confess he would pardon them freely; if they refused to confess he would have them carried to prison and would treat them like the other three. The Cardinals gazed on one another in alarm, and no one moved. The Pope asked them to speak, and each in turn denied. Then the Pope summoned Paris de Grassis, and in his presence said, “Before we carry out our intention, will you or will you not confess which of you are to blame?”. There was still no answer, and Leo X's dramatic stroke was a failure; he could not succeed in his unworthy attempt to induce some unsuspected person to criminate himself. Paris de Grassis withdrew, and the Pope had to bring his game to a decorous end.

Summoning the three Cardinals who were acting as commissioners in this case, he put into their hands the process as drawn up by the lawyers who had examined the prisoners and pointed out the names of the accused. The three commissioners returned to their seats and proposed that the Pope should interrogate each Cardinal on oath. When the turn came of Cardinal Soderini, he pleaded not guilty; whereupon the commissioners called out to him to change his pleading and throw himself at the Pope's feet. As no other course was open, Soderini fell in tears upon the ground and placed his life and goods at the Pope's mercy. Leo X scarcely seemed to hear him, but exclaimed, "There is another". The commissioners turned to Cardinal Hadrian de Castello and called on him to confess. Hadrian instantly denied the charge, but before the threats of imprisonment admitted that he had heard Petrucci vow the Pope's death, but thought that he was a mere boy indulging in rash talk. The Pope submitted to the other Cardinals the punishment due to Soderini and Hadrian; and it was agreed that they should jointly pay a fine of 25,000 ducats, and should not leave Rome till it was paid; on these condition they were free to go to their homes. Before dismissing the Cardinals the Pope hound them by the strictest charge to tell no one what had passed. None the less”, adds Paris de Grassis, “in two hours’ time it was all the talk of the town”.

This singular scene shows us Leo X at his worst. He was engaged in trading with low cunning on the fears of the Cardinals, and his sole object was to make money out of their terrors. It would seem that the two prisoners were repeatedly questioned if they had spoken of their plot to anyone. One of them at last mentioned Soderini, the other Hadrian, and the Pope acted on their combined information. The story current in Rome was that Hadrian's guilt was simply this. One day he passed Petrucci, who was talking
to the surgeon Battista, whom he pointed out to Hadrian, saying, “This fellow will get the College out of trouble”. This sort of talk did not betoken a serious conspiracy; it was the brutal joke of a thoughtless youth which a man of experience could scarcely be expected to take seriously. However, the Pope had got Soderini and Hadrian into his clutches, and soon tightened his grasp. Instead of 25,000 ducats from them jointly, he demanded that sum from each of them. Overwhelmed by the demand, they fled from Rome. Hadrian made his way through Calabria by sea to Zara and thence to Venice. Soderini went to Palestrina, where the Pope gave him leave to remain; he did not return to Rome in Leo X’s lifetime. Hadrian was degraded from the cardinalate, even from the priesthood, and was stripped of all his goods; he wandered in obscure places and died unknown.

It was now understood that the Pope wished to make money out of his prisoners. Cardinal Riario was rich, and had many relatives who could pay; so long negotiations were begun on his behalf. Genoa and Francis I interceded for Cardinal Sauli, but Petrucci had no friends. On Whit Sunday, before mass, the Pope told the Cardinals that he was full of compassion and forgiveness. He was so overcome by his feelings that he wept as he sat in church, and told Paris de Grassis that he suffered through pity for the criminals; but his tenderheartedness soon passed away, and he suddenly showed himself stern and inexorable. His relatives hungered for the preferments of the prisoners; and represented to the Pope his urgent need of money; so Leo X turned to harshness, and ordered the judges to do their worst. On June 20 a sitting of the Consistory was held which lasted for nine hours; so loud were the exclamations at the Pope’s proposals, that the sounds of the altercation were heard outside. At length the Pope pronounced sentence of deprivation of all goods, benefices, and the rank of Cardinal, and handed over the three prisoners to the secular courts.

On June 25 the Pope summoned the foreign ambassadors to listen to evidence in the trial. He was sufficiently thoughtful to warn them to make a good breakfast, of the as it would take some time. The warning was necessary, for the wearied ambassadors sat for seven hours and a half, during which they heard nothing that they did not know before. According to the evidence Cardinal Petrucci confessed his plot to murder the Pope by introducing Giovanni Battista da Vercelli as the Pope's surgeon: he had told his scheme to Sauli and Riario. The Venetian Marco Minio seems to have been convinced by the evidence, though he objected to the way in which the confessions of each of the accused were read to the others, so that the story was put into their mouths. Riario denied all knowledge of the matter till the confessions of the others were read to him; then he said: “Since they have said so, it must be true”. He added that he had spoken about it to Soderini and Hadrian, who laughed and said they would make him Pope.

After this the inferior criminals, Giovanni Battista and Petrucci’s secretary, were put to death with horrible barbarity. They were drawn through the streets and their flesh was dragged from their bones with red-hot pincers: then they were gibbeted on the bridge of S. Angelo. Petrucci was strangled in his prison; Riario and Sauli were allowed to buy their freedom. Riario agreed to pay the enormous sum of 150,000 ducats, Sauli 50,000. Leo X used his opportunity to good effect.

This conspiracy against the life of the Pope and Leo X’s behavior in the matter give us an unfavorable picture of the morals of the Roman court. The conspiracy, however, was not a very serious one, and certainly was not managed with the dexterity of hardened criminals. Petrucci, young and hot-headed, seems to have been beside himself
with rage at the political disaster of his house. He used incautious language and indulged in foolish threats. Perhaps the plan of poisoning the Pope was suggested to him by the villainous surgeon Battista, as a means of getting money from a dupe. Leo X does not seem to have believed in the guilt of the other Cardinals, though he used his chance of paying off old grudges and gaining money which he sorely needed. He did not scruple to debase the whole College of Cardinals by treating them as suspected criminals; but this was the cunning of a man who wished to gain a further end. He was enabled to overbear their opposition to a new creation of Cardinals, and he used his chance unmercifully. On July 1 he created thirty-one Cardinals, “wishing”, says Marco Minio, “to outdo Urban VI, who only created twenty-nine”. The new Cardinals were chosen from political reasons or because they were the Pope's creatures. Leo X wished to bind the Papacy, through the Cardinals, to the Medicean house.

That the Pope was rather pleased with the terror which he inspired we gather from a story of Paris de Grassis, who on July 24 brought Cardinal Riario into the Consistory that he might be formally restored to his dignity. On coming into the Pope's presence Riario began his speech: “The Master of the Ceremonies is to blame for not informing me beforehand that I had to speak before your Holiness”. Paris, after the speech was ended, whispered to the Pope that he was afraid, when Cardinal Riario mentioned his name, that he was going to denounce him as privy to the plot. The Pope burst into laughter and said that he had thought the same. It was too good a joke to be lost, and when the ceremony was over the Pope told it aloud, and all the Cardinals went away laughing. They clearly appreciated the practical use of a conspiracy as giving an opportunity for indiscriminate accusations.

The proceeds of the conspiracy and of the new creation of Cardinals enabled Leo X to bear the expenses of the war of Urbino. When that was ended he had time to look round upon the affairs of Christendom. Europe was at peace save for the differences between Maximilian and Venice, and the desire of France to recover Tournai from the English. The progress of the Turkish arms was the great danger of the future, for a warlike Sultan sat on the Turkish throne. Selim overran Syria and Egypt, and was building a fleet which menaced the Mediterranean coast. The time was certainly ripe for a European undertaking against the enemy of its civilization, and Leo X drew up a project for a crusade. A truce was to be proclaimed throughout Europe, and the Pope was to be arbiter of all disputes; the Emperor and the King of France were to lead the army; England, Spain, and Portugal were to furnish a fleet; the combined forces were to be directed against Constantinople.

The Pope sent this project to the princes of Europe. Francis I was quite willing to accept it, for he had the Pope sufficiently under his control to reap all the advantages of submitting European affairs to papal arbitration. For the purpose of drawing the Pope more entirely to his side, he proposed a marriage for his nephew, Lorenzo de' Medici. He offered him Madeleine de la Tour, daughter of a sister of Francis of Bourbon, Count of Vendome, and so connected with the royal house. In return he demanded the proceeds of the tithe to be raised for the crusade during the next three year; he would borrow it till it was actually needed. The Pope agreed, and the marriage of Lorenzo was solemnized in April, 1518. The Pope’s presents to the bride were magnificent; amongst them was a bed made of tortoise shell inlaid with pearl. Thirty-six horses were required to carry these presents to Paris, and their cost was estimated at 300,000 ducats. It was clear that the Pope’s ardor for a crusade did not involve any self-denial to himself or his relatives. The marriage of Lorenzo produced no lasting results; Madeleine died in
childbirth within a year, and Lorenzo followed her to the grave on April 29, 1519. Their infant daughter Catharine was destined to carry into French history the matured experience of Medicean statecraft.

Though Francis I might favor the Pope's project for a crusade, Maximilian's inventiveness prompted him papal to draft a scheme of his own, by which the invasion of the Turkish territory was to be conducted on a graduated plan, extending over three years. Perhaps no one heeded Maximilian, but England also showed little ardor for the Pope's plan. "If the Pope is in earnest", wrote Wolsey to his agent in Rome, "let him curb the ambition of those who make the peace of Europe impossible. Let him exhort the French king to moderate his cupidity, or the crusade will never be achieved". So wrote Wolsey at the time that he was carrying on negotiations with France. He wished for the peace of Europe, but that peace was to be the work of England and was to rest on England's guarantee; he had no confidence in the results of papal arbitration.

The negotiations between England and France were carried on with profound secrecy, that they might not awaken the alarm of Charles of Spain, who did not wish the frontier town of Tournai to fall again into the hands of France. So Wolsey worked by himself, and when, in March, 1518, Leo X appointed legates to visit the courts of Europe about the question of a crusade, England pleaded its rule against the admission of legates a latere. The legate chosen for England was one of the new Cardinals, Lorenzo Campeggio, a Bolognese who had done good service as a diplomatist in Germany. Campeggio was not allowed to visit England till Wolsey had been joined to him in the legateship, and when he came in July he was only useful to give greater splendor to Wolsey's triumph.

Wolsey had cautiously advanced with his negotiations, and the birth of a son to Francis I in February gave him the means of proposing a closer friendship between England and France. On July 9 two articles were signed for the restoration of Tournai and the marriage of the Dauphin to Henry VIII's daughter Mary, an infant of two years old. In September a splendid embassy from France visited England, and the ceremonies of betrothal between the royal children were performed. The peace between England and France was, by Wolsey's cleverness, turned into a universal peace under the guarantees of England and France; the great powers, the Pope, the Emperor, France, Spain, and England, were to ratify it within four months; the smaller states within eight months. This treaty was signed at London on October 3 by France and England. It meant that Francis I, to gain the alliance of England, was obliged to sacrifice the advantages which he might gain from setting up the Pope as arbiter in Europe; it meant that Wolsey had developed his design of using the national advantages of England in such a way as to make her the mediator of European politics. It marked another advance in the national organization of Europe, another step in the decay of the international position of the Papacy. Leo X had labored for a universal peace of which he was to be guardian; Wolsey had worked out a counter plan, by which peace rested on the mediation of England. Leo X had no other course open to him than to ratify the treaty of London; he did so in a half-hearted way, reserving all his existing obligations and all the rights of the Holy See.

Now that peace was made there remained the crusade against the Turk; but this cry had long lost all reality, and was merely a decent cloak for diplomacy and a means of raising money. Statesmen knew only too well that a question would soon have to be decided which would determine the future relations of Europe. The Emperor
Maximilian was in failing health, and the succession to the Empire, however decided, would be of momentous importance. The intentions of the German electors were the objects of keener interest than the successes of the Turk.

The efforts of the papal collectors to raise money for a crusade caused murmurings on every side. Men knew that Popes and kings liked to talk about crusades, because it suited them to impose new taxes on the people and arrange between themselves for a division of the spoil. Men murmured; but Popes and kings paid little heed to their murmurings. It chanced, however, that an Augustinian monk at Wittenberg raised a protest which grew into unexpected importance, and developed into a religious movement which shook the Papacy to its basis.

With the rise of the Lutheran movement the perspective of the history of the Papacy is entirely changed. Though Leo X did not know it, his secular policy ceased from that time to be of any interest. Thenceforth the Pope was not to be judged by his capacity to maintain himself in his Italian territories, but he was called to account as the head of the Christian Church. The historical dignity, which is wanting to the Papacy in the period which we have traversed, is restored in the period which now begins. At the time when its security seemed greatest, when it had its roots most firmly in material interests, when it was most in accordance with the spirit of the age, it was suddenly called upon to justify its immemorial position.
BOOK VI.
THE GERMAN REVOLT. 1517—1527

CHAPTER I
HUMANISM IN GERMANY

The religious revolt, originated by Luther, fell like a thunderbolt from a clear sky. Leo X had dismissed the Lateran Council after cleverly shelving all unpleasant questions. There seemed to be less effective demand for ecclesiastical reform than there had been at any time during the last two centuries. The Pope was surrounded by officials who assured him, with some truth, that the decrees of the Lateran Council were of no account; that no one heeded them; and that there was no binding restraint upon the papal power. The Papacy seemed to stand high in the estimation of sovereigns, and to exercise great political influence. Its claims to ecclesiastical authority had been steadily rising, and there was no body of opinion to protest against their further extension. Pope Leo had his difficulties in Italian politics, but he had no fear for his position as Head of the Church.

Yet these hopeful signs did not betoken acquiescence so much as indifference. The question of ecclesiastical reform, which had agitated the men of the beginning of the fifteenth century, was of little consequence to the men of the beginning of the sixteenth. Other problems had arisen; other questions occupied their minds. The failure of the Conciliar movement revealed both the decadence of the ideas of the Middle Ages and the growth of particular interests in their stead. Men had hoped, during a long period of embarrassment, that if only the Church could meet according to its old constitution, its voice would speak with unmistakable authority, and all would be well. The Church met; but its voice waivered amid the clash of national animosities and the jealousies of various classes of the hierarchy. The Conciliar movement failed, and men tacitly accepted the failure. Europe lacked the force for united action; each nation was engaged in solving particular problems which lay nearer home. England was plunged in civil warfare, which left a legacy of social readjustment. France and Spain were busied with internal consolidation under their kings. Germany, divided and distracted, vainly strove to organize its discordant members. The Church was useful as a factor in the political changes which were everywhere going on; and every monarch knew that, as he grew powerful, he could count on the complacency of the Pope. The leading ecclesiastics became increasingly secular, and no one had much interest in criticizing the ecclesiastical action of the papal court. So the principles of papal autocracy were
developed apace, and their enunciation awakened little comment. But danger lay in the very ease with which this process was accomplished. Monarchy was strong in Europe because it was the mouthpiece of powerful national interests. The papal monarchy failed to ally itself with any of the universal interests of the Church. It was inevitable that, when its claims came into collision with national tendencies, they should be challenged; and defence was difficult without some sacrifice of dignity.

Moreover, when the challenge came, it would be backed up by new arguments, which would appeal to a wider public than of old. If the political development of Europe had altered men's attitude towards old institutions, the intellectual development had altered their attitude towards old ideas. In no country was this more marked than in Germany, where the new movement of thought produced a class, of men of letters, who were powerful in molding public opinion, and who stood in strong contrast with the corresponding class in Italy.

In Italy, the revival of classical learning had occupied men's minds with the study of human character and the pursuit of beauty. It had produced a temper which was irreligious without being anti-religious, which was curious, observant, and critical without being constructive. Men lived and learned and enjoyed their lives; of course the Church and its services were part of general culture and were accepted as such. Few thought of attacking, and few aspired to reform them. Churchmen in Italy were as much affected by the new movement as were laymen. The New Learning was patronized by Popes, Cardinals, and Bishops, and influenced all classes of society alike. There was everywhere an atmosphere of cultivated toleration; if a man professed old-fashioned piety as a rule of life he was free to pursue it; if not, he might enjoy himself at his ease and think what he liked.

The influence of Italy made itself felt in other countries, as the new literary movement gradually spread beyond the Alps. But what Italy had gained was not so much a system, or a method, as a mental attitude; and it was impossible that a mental attitude should be transplanted and grow up in the same shape as before. Other nations received an impulse from Italy; but they applied that impulse to their own conditions, with the result of producing different types of thought and different views of life. The systematized and logical ideas of the Middle Ages had affected Europe equally, and were current universally. It was otherwise with the subtle suggestiveness of the New Learning, which was capable of many modifications and could be applied in various ways. At a time when the movement of external politics was awakening national consciousness, the movement of thought was supplying that consciousness with new modes of expression.

Germany was the first country which distinctly admitted the influence of Italy; but it did not, in so doing, absorb the Italian spirit. The New Learning won its way gradually through students, teachers, and universities; it was not carried home to the minds of the people by a great outburst of art and architecture, by the pomp and pageantry of princely and municipal life, such as dazzled the eyes of the Italians. It came from above, and won its way by conflict with old institutions and old modes of thought. The result was that it wore from the beginning the appearance of a reforming and progressive system, which proposed new modes of teaching and criticized existing methods. Moreover, in Germany there had been a quiet but steady current of conservative reform in ecclesiastical matters, which had created an amount of seriousness not to be found in Italy, and was too powerful to be neglected by the leaders
of a new movement. There had been a continuous attempt to deal by personal perseverance with the acknowledged evils of the times; there had been a succession of men who in their own ways labored to heighten the religious, moral, and social life of the people. The New Learning had to take account of these men, and at first wore the aspect of an aid to their endeavors. If it came as an impulse, it was valued as suggesting a method. What in Italy was frivolous and superficial, was esteemed in Germany for its practical utility. Culture did not remain as an individual possession; it must render its meed of service to social improvement.

Thus there was a breach between the Italian and German point of view, a breach which neither country clearly recognized, but which prevented them from understanding one another when the crisis came. The Germans had drifted farther than they knew from the sentiment of the traditions of the past, and showed themselves singularly open to the pleadings of homely common-sense. The Italians, as soon as they were challenged, abandoned their intellectual indifference and took refuge in the sentiment of the past. The conscientious endeavors of the Germans to amend the old system rendered them, as a matter of fact, more ready to revolt from it than did the contemptuous disregard of the Italians, which rested on moral indifference rather than on intellectual disapproval.

JOHANN WESSEL.

Of the earlier influences which were operative in Germany the most conspicuous was the educational movement which originated from the Brethren of the Common Life who had grown up round Gerhard Groot and his successor, Florenz Radewins, at Deventer. This community of pious and cultivated men, though assailed on the ground that it did not conform to any monastic pattern, was protected by the Council of Constance, and was approved by Eugenius IV and Sixtus IV. Indeed its main objects—care for the education of the young, and the copying and dissemination of devotional books—were such as it was difficult for any authority to condemn. Under the influence of the Brotherhood, schools were established in northern Germany and sent forth a number of distinguished scholars.

Foremost amongst these was Johann Wessel of Groningen (1420-1489), who began his studies in the Brothers’ School at Zwolle. His restless mind was not contented with the simple piety which was there taught. He had a devouring thirst for knowledge; and a spirit of inquiry led him first to Koln, where he was dissatisfied with the prevalent scholasticism, and then to Paris. There he studied for sixteen years and learned something of Plato. He visited Italy in quest of further information about Greek philosophy, and on his return taught for a year or two at Heidelberg. His interest was mainly in theology, and his liberal ideas were not to the mind of the Heidelberg doctors. Wessel was restricted to the less dangerous subject of philosophy, but even then he was conscious that he was looked upon with suspicion. He was too old for conflict and preferred to return to his native land, where he spent the last ten years of his life in the more congenial companionship of the canons of Mount S. Agnes and Adwert. With them he discussed many questions in friendly controversy, and put forward the results of his knowledge and his meditations in theological treatises. He encouraged the young to study Greek and Hebrew, and urged upon them the advantage of a more critical method than that furnished by the teaching of the schools. The temper of his mind is that of a practised dialectician, who brought all his learning to the service of a fervent piety implanted in him by early training. He pursued the truth to the disregard of established forms, and drew a line between the superstitions of the ignorant and the
intelligent faith of a man of learning. From this point of view he criticized especially the
current view of a purgatory of material fire, and the popular conception of Indulgences,
on which subject he expressed his opinions with such force that Luther wrote of him: “If
I had read his works before, my enemies might have thought that Luther had borrowed
everything from Wessel, so great is the agreement between our spirits. I feel my joy and
my strength increase, I have no doubt that I have taught aright, when I find that one who
wrote at a different time, in another clime, and with a different meaning, agrees so
entirely in my view and expresses it almost in the same words”.

NICOLAS OF CUSA.

Different in temper from Wessel, no less than in the outward circumstances of
life, was another pupil of the School of Deventer, Nicolas of Cusa (1401-1464). The son
of a fisher on the Mosel, he left Deventer for Padua, joined in the practical life of the
times, was one of the theologians of the Council of Basel, was created Cardinal, and
died as Bishop of Brixen in 1464. Cusa’s part in ecclesiastical politics has been already
described but his influence in Germany extended far beyond his episcopal activity. In
the domain of knowledge he was probably the most learned man of his times and had
the largest intellectual horizon. He held the balance between the New and the Old
Learning, seeing the defects of both and striving to combine their merits. In his treatise
‘On Learned Ignorance’ he strove to make clear the processes of the understanding, and
urged humility as the beginning and the end of knowledge. He was deeply versed in
classical authors as well as in the theologians and the mystics of the Middle Ages.
Further he was an excellent mathematician and astronomer; he discovered the
movement of the earth on its axis, and worked out a reform of the calendar. He collected
a large library which was always open for the use of students: at his death he
bequeathed it to his native village Cues on the Mosel, where it still remains. In the
administration of his diocese he showed himself a steadfast reformer of abuses. Though
he abandoned the Council of Basel through dread of its revolutionary procedure, he
remained firm in his belief of the necessity of reforms in accordance with the principles
which it laid down. He was the highest type of an enlightened and conservative scholar.

AGRICOLA

Another pupil of the School of Deventer, Rudolf Agricola (1442-1485),
approaches more nearly to the Italian type of humanists. After exhausting the resources
of the University of Louvain, he crossed the Alps and studied Greek at Ferrara under
Theodore Gaza. His fame became great in Italy, and Duke Ercole would fain have had
him stay at Ferrara; but Agricola's patriotism made him desirous that Germany should
outdo Latium in the pureness of its Latinity, and he returned home to do his part in
bringing about that result. He was not, however, so steeped in Latin that he could not
compose German songs, which his Italian experience enabled him to accompany on the
harp; and he built an organ for the town of Groningen. There for a time he stayed and
enjoyed many a dispute with John Wessel, till he was invited to succeed him as a
teacher at Heidelberg, where his literary polish found more favour than Wessel's liberal
theology. He was sent to Rome to deliver a congratulatory harangue on the accession of
Innocent VIII, and acquitted himself as well as the most eloquent Italian. Germany
rejoiced in the possession of an orator. He produced on his contemporaries an
impression which it is hard to justify from his works. It rested upon his personality as a
man of varied accomplishments and of cultivated taste, who was probably more
stimulating in conversation than conclusive in his writings. He was long regarded as the
standard-bearer of the New Learning in Germany, and was renowned as a great educational reformer. Yet his treatise on education, *De formando studio*, contains little but rhetorical praise of philosophy; and the only practical suggestions which he offers are carefulness in reading, so as to understand what is read, cultivation of the memory, so as to garner results, and assiduous practice, to save them from forgetfulness. Perhaps we find the secret of Agricola’s influence in the genial philosophy of his Horatian odes, which is summed up in an epigram:—

Best rule of living is not far to seek;

With cheerful mind, what’s right both do and speak.

ALEXANDER HEGIUS.

Agricola did much to assert for the classics the chief place as an instrument of education; but it was his friend, Alexander Hegius (1433-1498), who carried out the practical work of educational reform in the School of Deventer, which under his influence became the great centre of education in North Germany, and numbered at one time over 2000 scholars. Hegius abolished the old school books, and substituted for grammatical formularies an intelligent study of great authors. He was a born teacher, whose one interest was his scholars. Himself an example of steadfast piety, he strove not only to inform the mind, but to train the character of his pupils. He was tireless in the pursuit of knowledge, and continued his studies till late at night, holding his candle in his hand that, if he slumbered, its fall might awake him. At the same time he would warn his scholars that “all learning is harmful which is gained at the expense of piety”. The traditions of the Brethren of the Common Life were safe in the hands of such a man; and through him influenced the scholars of the younger and more daring generation which was springing up. In him the School of Deventer reached its highest point; there was no one to take his place, and after his death its glory passed away.

JACOB WIMPHELING.

The School of Deventer, however, sent out off-shoots on many sides. Chief amongst them was the school founded by the town of Schlettstadt in Elsass in 1450, which produced a scholar, Jacob Wimpheling (1450-1528), who was a characteristic representative of the qualities of purely German learning. After leaving Schlettstadt, Wimpheling studied at the universities of Freiburg, Erfurt, and Heidelberg, where he led the loose life of a student of the time, till the inscription on a church, 'Do not sin, for God sees you', recalled him to the pious teaching of his youth. For a time he was a canon of Spier, and afterwards a professor at Heidelberg. Then he thought of entering a monastery, but at last settled down at Strassburg with the intention of reforming education and establishing a university. In the last plan he did not succeed, and had to content himself with becoming the centre of a literary circle. But his work as an educational reformer was important, and he was hailed as the ‘Preceptor of Germany’. What Hegius had done in practice Wimpheling reduced to theory. He insisted that education should be primarily moral, and should affect the character alike of teacher and taught; and at the same time he suggested new methods and better text-books, which should appeal to the intelligence rather than burden the memory of the young. But Wimpheling, though in favor of reform, belonged to the old school of Gerson and Clemanges, and had no sympathy with the revolutionary reformers who troubled his declining years. His temper of mind was polemical; he wrote on many subjects and resented criticism, so that he was engaged in a series of literary conflicts. A poem in honor of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin drew upon him the wrath of the
Dominicans. In a patriotic pamphlet on Germany, directed against a party of the Alsacians who had leanings towards France, he asserted that no Emperor since Julius Caesar had ever been a Gaul; that the Empire belonged to the Germans, and that Elsass was German and not French. A Franciscan, Thomas Murner, mocked at Wimpheling’s history, and asserted that Charles the Great was a Gaul. The contest raged furiously; but neither disputant was clear about the various meanings of the adjective ‘Gallus’, and Wimpheling’s patriotism was greater than his knowledge of history. Sarcely was he free from this controversy before a treatise De Integritate drew upon him the wrath of the monks. His object was to advocate moral uprightness, and in the course of his argument he attacked monastic corruptions and monastic pretensions. In so doing he asserted that S. Augustin belonged to no monastic order; that S. Gregory the Great, Bede, and Alcuin, had never worn a cowl. So great was the uproar raised by the Augustinians that Wimpheling was summoned to Rome, but was excused on the ground of age and infirmities. These, however, did not prevent him from plunging into another controversy with Jacob Locher, an ardent humanist professor at Ingolstadt, who upheld the claims of poetry to be considered as an equal power with theology itself. Locher’s aesthetic view of life had no place in Wimpheling’s schemes for moral reform, and he defended theology with needless warmth and much personal bitterness. Many others took part in the controversy, which showed the opposition between two schools of scholars and was ominous of a wider breach in the future. In fact Wimpheling lived long enough to see the waves of the revolution surge around him, and sweep away the narrow basis on which he had striven to work out a reform of clerical abuses and heighten the moral and intellectual standard of the people. The arms which he had forged with stubborn courage were used for purposes which he condemned. When Maximilian was engaged in his struggle against Julius II he employed Wimpheling to restate the grievances of the German Church. Before Wimpheling had finished his draft Maximilian had changed his policy, and Wimpheling’s labours were not much regarded till they were used as the basis of the Hundred grievances of the German nation, which were laid before the papal legate in 1522.

SEBASTIAN BRANT

Chief amongst Wimpheling’s friends was Sebastian Brant (1457-1521), a native of Strassburg, who studied and taught at Basel, till in 1500 he returned as town clerk to his native city. Brant was associated with Wimpheling in his controversies in favour of the Immaculate Conception, and against Locher’s estimate of the classical poets. He shared Wimpheling’s stern morality, and sympathized with his aspirations after reform. But he was more of a humanist than Wimpheling, and found a solace from his legal labors in the cultivation of the muse. His Latin poems are of no high merit, save for the patriotic vein which runs through them. He celebrated, with justifiable pride, the German invention of printing, and took it as an omen of the coming time when the muses would desert Italy and make their abode on the banks of the Rhine. But Brant’s fame does not rest upon his Latin verses. Humanist as he was, his zeal as a patriotic reformer led him to write for the people a satire which every one could understand. The plan of the Narrenschiff was to apply the teaching of Ecclesiastes, and exhibit sin as folly. The main conception of sending out a fleet manned by fools to sail upon the troubled waters of life, was in itself a happy one. But Brant had neither the imagination nor the humor to carry it out. His fleet dwindles away to a single ship, and he is so busy with the description of his crew that the voyage itself is forgotten. Class after class of fools is brought before us, with appropriate examples; but as the long catalogue rolls on,
with an equal meed of reprobation, the sense of humor rapidly disappears, and we find ourselves listening to moral commonplaces set in a rapid, jingling rhyme. Still, the book met with an immediate success. It was published in 1494, beautifully printed by Brant’s friend, Johann Bergmann of Olpe, and adorned with woodcuts which carried its meaning directly to the eye of the most careless reader. It was translated into Latin in 1497 by Locher, and so passed current throughout in Europe. In 1509 it was translated into English by Alexander Barclay, and it further appeared in French and Flemish. This remarkable success was due to the fact that it expressed the prevalent feeling of dissatisfaction. The fifteenth century, despite its advance in knowledge, was barren of ideas and took refuge in the pessimism of satire. Moreover, Brant’s satire was founded upon homely common sense. It was written by a burgher, and appealed to his fellow-burghers, who had a keen sense of abuses both in Church and State, who wished for more directness and simplicity in religion, and better government, but had no suggestions to make for the attainment of these ends. Whereas in Italy Ariosto and Pulci had refined the wit of the market-place, and turned it into laughter at the outworn ideals of feudalism. Brant directed the more serious temper of the northern peoples to a savage recognition of their own helplessness, leading to an inarticulate belief in the power of piety and patriotism.

Another member of Wimpheling’s circle was Johann Geiler of Kaisersberg, a famous preacher at Strassburg, who lashed unsparingly the vices of his age, and did not abstain from open criticism of the conduct of the city magistrates. But this German Savonarola neither inspired as much enthusiasm, nor roused as much opposition as the Florentine prophet. He was heard with respect, and was treated with consideration; but his denunciations were not supported by any definite plan for the future. Still he did much to make preaching simple and popular; and by making Brant’s Narrenschiff the text for one of his courses of sermons popularized the ideas of reform which Brant and Wimpheling expressed. More important than Geiler was Johann of Trittenheim, best known by his Latinised name of Trithemius (1462-1516), for many years abbot of the Benedictine monastery of Sponheim near Kreuznach. Trithemius was a man devoted to study, and possessing a wider range of knowledge than any of his contemporaries. He rarely stirred beyond the limits of his own monastery, and refused an invitation to join the learned society of Nurnberg, saying: “I am born for literature; and its assiduous study abhors the tumult of a court; it loves solitude and detests the publicity of city life. I live here poor and needy, but I have no love for riches, for I cannot find the time both to study and grow rich”. Trithemius, in his intellectual voracity, had penetrated the mysteries of necromancy and boasted of a triumph over Doctor Faust. There was about him something of the intoxication of omniscience, but this did not prevent him from labouring at useful subjects. He gathered a large library, and wrote on many things. His Catalogue of Ecclesiastical Writers is the chief source of information about the authors of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and is a monument of patient industry. He is a curious and interesting example of the influence exercised by the New Learning on one who was trained and worked in the old method.

Enough has been said to show the tendencies of the strictly German school of humanists, men who sprung from previous movements of native growth, who held to the old notions of reform, and sought to realize them by working for the spread of education as a means of establishing a higher standard of duty. Though affected by the new ideas which came from classical literature, they kept them subordinate to the old
theology. They were not as a rule educated in Italy and owed little to the Italian temper, which indeed they viewed with growing suspicion.

CONRAD PEUTINGER.

Differing from these men alike in origin and in aims was the literary circle that grew up in the great towns of Augsburg and Nurnberg, the centres of German industry and commerce. There the impulse came immediately from Italy, and was directed by the patriotism of municipal life chiefly towards archaeology and history. In Augsburg a wealthy merchant, Sigismund Gossembrot, who was burgomaster in 1458, upheld the New Learning and defended Latin poetry against the objections of theologians. His place was taken by Conrad Peutinger (1465-1547), who returned from Italy to carry on business in Augsburg and serve in the government of his native town. There he attracted the attention of the Emperor Maximilian, by whom he was employed on embassies to England, Italy, Hungary, and the Netherlands. But Peutinger was most successful as a collector of antiquities; and his name is now best known from the chief treasure of his collection, a map of the Roman Empire, the *Tabula Peutingeriana*. He gathered together documents, coins, inscriptions, all the remains of classical and mediaeval antiquities, which he arranged into a museum. He superintended the publication of several old German chronicles, and was in fact the founder of the critical study of German history.

The literary activity of Nurnberg was inspired by the same secular spirit and took a similar direction towards historical studies. Hartmann Schedel (1440-1514), the nephew of a Nurnberg physician who had learned his art in Italy, wearied of the study of canon law at Leipzig, and preferred to follow his uncle’s steps. He brought back from Padua not only a store of medical knowledge, but a taste for classical literature and antiquities. Schedel condensed his knowledge into a universal history, which appeared in 1493, in Latin and German, adorned with woodcuts, a monument of the beauty of early printing. About the same time the magistrates of Nurnberg commissioned Sigmund Meisterlin, a Benedictine monk, to write a city chronicle, which shows a good deal of research, and is remarkable for the way in which the writer sought to combine the New Learning with theology, by exhibiting the hand of Providence in the disposition of human affairs.

WILIBALD PIRKHEIMER.

But the great figure among the scholars of Nurnberg was Wilibald Pirkheimer (1470-1528), sprung from an old burgher family, with hereditary traditions of culture. His father was employed in politics at the courts of Bavaria and Austria, and took Wilibald, while yet a boy, as his companion on his journeys. He was, further, a patron of the New Learning, and cared for the education of all his children. Two of Wilibald’s sisters, Charitas and Clara, were nuns in the Convent of S. Clara at Nurnberg, and Charitas was famous alike for her piety and her learning. Wilibald himself was sent to learn the manners of courtly life in the house of the Bishop of Eichstadt, whence at the age of twenty he went to Padua. There he showed great devotion to literary pursuits, especially the study of Greek, which his father thought needless, and transferred him from the humanists of Padua to the jurists of Pavia. After seven years spent in Italy he returned home, a true German at heart, and desirous only to serve his country. He was soon chosen a member of the Council of Nurnberg, went on many embassies, and led the troops of Nurnberg in Maximilian’s inglorious war against the Swiss Confederacy. His father’s death made him a wealthy man, and Maximilian used him as a trusty counselor.
Pirkheimer lived in scholarly luxury, adorned his house at Nurnberg with the beauty of the rising art of Germany, gathered a large library, and became the host, the friend, and the adviser of almost all the scholars of Germany. His chief influence lay in his dignified personality, his cultivated taste, his easy talk which combined learning and practical wisdom, and his recognized position as a patron of literature. Surrounded by admiring friends, he superintended translations of some of the Greek fathers, of Xenophon, Lucian, and other favorite authors. He wrote a history of Maximilian’s war against the Swiss, a satirical dialogue against Eck, and when the enemy of advancing years and good living attacked him, he wrote in praise of the gout, throwing his philosophic resignation into the form of a pleading made by the gout before its judges, in which it claims acquittal on the ground of services rendered in withdrawing the mind from the toils of the body. But Pirkheimer’s declining years were disturbed by worse evils than the gout. He saw with growing disappointment the discord of his time, and could not be a partisan of either side. As a man of practical sense and political experience, he opposed the stubborn conservatism of the old-fashioned theologians which gave force to Luther’s revolt; but when the revolt put forward its own basis, he found its revolutionary violence opposed to the cause of enlightenment, and sadly ranged himself with the defenders of the Church. The joy of his life was gone when he saw the national energy diverted from the quiet paths of intellectual progress; and he spoke with equal bitterness of both extremes which had brought about this result.

THE EMPEROR MAXIMILIAN AS A HUMANIST.

In close connection with this historical school of Augsburg and Nurnberg, stood the Emperor Maximilian, the friend of Peutinger and Pirkheimer, the hero of German humanists. Despite his repeated failures in politics, Maximilian never lost his hold on the affections of his people. Indeed his chivalrous spirit, his aimless energy, his great ideas, his restlessness, his consciousness of a great mission which was never realized, corresponded to the vague aspirations which stirred the Germans of his time. Personally genial, of quick sympathies, and interested in everything, he welcomed the society of learned men and was amply repaid by their praises. They were attracted by his dreams for the restoration of the Empire, and admired his good intentions for the reform of the German Kingdom. It is true that he lost much of the Burgundian possessions of his wife, that he had to retire ingloriously from his expedition against the Swiss, that his imperial intervention in Italy was fruitless, and that he was worsted by France. But when one undertaking failed he was ready with another, and men admired the fullness of life and physical vigor which never deserted him. It is also true that his internal reforms—the establishment of public peace, the division of Germany into circles for the exercise of imperial jurisdiction, the restoration of the administration by the creation of the Imperial Council of Regency—expressed ideal aspirations rather than a workable system. Still they drew Germany together and gave men hopes of a coming time of order; and they were none the less impressive because their realization was far off. Maximilian never lost confidence in himself, and his people never lost confidence in him. It seemed quite natural that such a man should wish to leave to posterity a worthy memorial, and Maximilian equaled any Italian prince in his care for his future fame. Humanists flocked around him; they saw the Augustan age revive, and exclaimed with Virgil, Jam regnat Apollo. The Emperor crowned poets with laurel crowns; but he did not leave to them the task of commemorating his deeds. This he resolved to undertake himself, and he began with a romantic poem, setting forth in allegory the motives that inspired his life. The epic of the adventurous knight Teuerdank tells of his marriage with Mary of Burgundy.
and of the dangers which beset him on his way, through the opposition of three wicked foes, Furwittig, Unfalo, and Neidelhard, who represent self-confidence, desire of adventure, and envious intrigue. After overcoming the difficulties which beset his quest, and securing his bride, Teuerdank undertakes an expedition against the Turks.

There is not much trace of the influence of humanistic culture in this strained allegory which weaves together the Emperor's outer and inner life; nor is there much poetry in its common-place situations. Maximilian wrote it in the intervals of business, and committed it to his secretary, Melchior Pfinzing, provost of Nurnberg, for revision. It was published in 1517, splendidly printed and adorned with woodcuts, and was received with patriotic acclamations. But this was only an installment of what the Emperor intended to write. He dictated to his secretaries a continuation of _Teuerdank_ which dealt more immediately with his actual achievements. This book, which bore the name of _Weisskunig_ (the White King), began with the marriage of Frederick III, gave an account of Maximilian's youth and education, and then drifted off into an ideal account of his life. As the ideal end was never reached, the book was never finished. It was handed over to another of the imperial secretaries, Marx Treitsauerwein, who employed Hans Burgkmaier to adorn it with woodcuts. But the book and its illustrations remained unpublished till 1775, and Maximilian’s estimate of himself did not immediately affect the judgment of posterity.

Moreover, Maximilian pressed into his service the art of Germany, which was then in its full bloom. Augsburg was the home of the Holbein family, and though Hans Holbein the younger moved to Basel in 1516, yet Augsburg possesses his earliest works. There too Hans Burgkmaier painted, and one of the finest and first of his works was a series of wood-engravings to display the “Triumph of the Emperor Maximilian”. On sheet after sheet the long procession of soldiers, court officials, and admiring people rolls on, while the Emperor, seated on his horse, is treated as the personification of political wisdom. Still more famous than Augsburg was Nurnberg, where Albrecht Durer, leaving the studio of Michael Wohlgemuth, carried German art to its highest point of imaginative expression. Durer was the close friend of Pirkheimer, and was animated by the same patriotic feelings, the same literary inspirations, and the same ideas of reform. He too was called upon to minister to Maximilian's desire for fame. Continually rambling through his dominions, the Emperor had no fixed capital where he could erect an architectural memorial to himself; so he preferred to employ the art of wood-engraving to express his conceptions of what was due to his greatness. The engraving at least could go from place to place, and appeal to the eyes of his subjects wherever he went. So Albrecht Durer devised and engraved a ‘Gate of Honour’, adapting the triumphal arch of the Roman Emperors to the conditions of their medieval successor, and telling the story of Maximilian's ancestry by figures ranged along its piers.

**GERMAN ART.**

While the arts of painting and engraving thus rapidly developed at Nurnberg, the other arts kept pace with their progress. The metal work of Peter Vischer still adorns the tomb of S. Sebald, at which the master and his five sons labored for eleven years (1508-1519). Vischer’s friend, Adam Krafft, the sculptor, worked in Nurnberg from 1490 to 1507, and left his mark upon the town by his seven reliefs of the Passion in the churchyard of S. John, and by his magnificent tabernacle in S. Lawrence Church. It was the sight of works like these that inspired Maximilian to devise the memorial which still
perpetuates his fame, by founding the church at Innsbruck, which is his mortuary chapel. Happier in his design than Julius II, Maximilian found a resting-place for his tomb where it need fear no rivals. Round the walls are ranged twenty-eight bronze statues of the Emperor’s ancestors; in the middle of the church is set the kneeling figure of the Emperor, upon a marble sarcophagus adorned with reliefs in white marble, which commemorate the episodes of his adventurous life. It is true that this work was due to the munificence of Maximilian’s successor, but during his lifetime Maximilian began to collect bronze for the statues, and the general design is his own.

This may suffice to show the fullness of life which prevailed in the great German towns, a life that was eminently national and patriotic, that strove after objects which it could not clearly define, but was full of hope in the vague possibilities of the future. Men were conscious of a widening of their intellectual horizon; the wisest strove to help on this process, and believed in a gradual growth in strength, earnestness and insight. In almost every town in Germany schools were established; the general average of intelligence was raised; books were widely circulated; current questions were discussed, gravely amongst the learned, with coarse humor amongst the crowd. Men’s minds were restless: they wanted a cause, a cry, and a leader.

Such were the general tendencies of the intellectual awakening of Germany: to trace its influence on the old ideas we must turn to the universities. At the beginning of the fifteenth century Germany could boast of seven universities, all founded within sixty years, Prague, Vienna, Heidelberg, Koln, Erfurt, Leipzig, and Rostock. In the middle of the fifteenth century the impulse given by the New Learning, the spread of education, the invention of printing, and the increasing demand for capable men in every profession led to many new foundations. In 1456 a wealthy burgher endowed at Greifswald a university in which jurists had the largest part. In 1460 Archduke Albert founded a university at Freiburg; and the citizens of Basel, who had been stirred by the presence of the Council within their walls, established a rival close by. In 1472 the Duke of Bavaria set up a university at Ingolstadt, and the Bull for its foundation contained a hitherto unknown stipulation that every graduate should take an oath of fidelity to the Holy See,—an oath which was well observed, for Ingolstadt remained a stronghold of papal orthodoxy. A few years afterwards the two Archbishops of Trier and Mainz followed the example which had been set by their brother of Koln, and the Rhineland was well supplied with seats of learning. These foundations were, for the most part, gatherings together of existing schools; but, in 1470, the Count of Wirtemberg set up an entirely new foundation at Tubingen, and was followed by the Elector of Saxony, who, in 1503, chose Wittenberg as the learned capital of his dominions. The last university which owed its origin to the spread of the New Learning was Frankfort in 1506.

These universities were frequented by students in numbers varying from 200 to 900, youths of all ages from twelve upwards, spending from eight to eighteen years in their studies for the degree of doctor. They lived for the most part a roystering life, and were the terror of the sober citizens. The majority of them were poor, and lived in hostels (called ‘Bursen’) with their teachers. Many of them came to learn what they could in a few years, without any intention of proceeding to a degree, and demanded that they should be taught the new studies and the new methods, disregarding the claim of the university to be the guardian of the traditions of learning and the director of a necessary course of study. There was a constant struggle between the partisans of the Academic New Learning and the old academic party; and where humanist teachers
prevailed, the university tended to drift from the old lines. The humanist wished to
substitute for the old text-books of the schools the study of the classical poets—whereas
the old method had been dialectical, the new method was rhetorical. Above all, under
the old system the studies in the faculty of arts had been regarded as preparatory to the
study of theology, which was enthroned as the master science. This preeminence of
theology was directly attacked by the New Learning, and men like Wimpheling strove
to defend its position by drawing a distinction between the spirit and the contents of
classical antiquity. In his controversy with Locher he selected certain authors who might
be read with profit by the orthodox theologian, while he excluded those whose
paganism was too pronounced. The contest, which he waged on general grounds, was
reproduced in the universities, where it was aggravated by reference to particular
interests. The theological professors saw their supremacy endangered. Not only was the
study of arts becoming an object in itself, but the faculty of law deserted canon law for
civil law; there was a tendency for each faculty to become independent, and the
constitution of the new universities was not so firmly settled as to oppose an
impenetrable barrier to the demand for change. The universities contained three parties:
the old-fashioned theologians, who viewed the new studies with alarm, and resisted any
amendment on the old methods; the literary humanists, who pressed for the study of
classical literature and philosophy as the basis of a purely literary culture; and, finally, a
body of scholars who held by the old conception of science, but were dissatisfied with
the old methods, and welcomed the new studies as enlarging the scope of previous
knowledge, and affording means for more intelligent advance. It was the existence of
these last that modified the excesses of both the other parties, and gave to German
humanism a serious turn which is wanting in the majority of Italian scholars. Their
views are expressed in a letter of Abbot Trithemius, who wrote to his brother: “This is
indeed the golden age in which literary studies have found new life. But do not be led to
absorb more of secular literature than is necessary to obtain a knowledge of Holy
Scripture, lest the saying of a wise man about the lover of vanity (of whom there are
many at present) be applied to you. They do not know things necessary, because they
have learned things superfluous”. True science is that which leads to the knowledge of
God, which corrects the character, subdues lusts, purges the emotions, illuminates the
intellect in things which pertain to the health of the soul, and influences the heart to love
of the Creator. This wholesome science fills the mind with the love of God, does not
puff up, does not make men proud, but makes them grieve for their shortcomings.

CONRAD CELTES.

Yet though these were the opinions of Trithemius, we find amongst the guests,
whom he entertained at Sponheim, a man who did more than any one else to spread
through the universities of Germany a taste for the purely literary side of classical
studies, the wandering scholar Conrad Celtes. Celtes (1459-1508) was the son of a
peasant born in the village of Wipfeld on the Main. His name was Pickel, which he
turned into the Latin form of Celtes, and sometimes into the Greek Protucius. He was
taught Latin in his youth by a relative who was a monk, and at the age of eighteen went
to the University of Koln, where he lived on alms. Then he went to Heidelberg, Erfurt,
Rostock, and Leipzig, maintaining himself by lecturing on the Platonic philosophy, the
rhetoric of Cicero, and the versification of Horace. He saved enough money to spend six
months in Italy, where he rejoiced in the congenial society of Pomponius Laetus. On his
return he was crowned poet of the Emperor Frederick at Nurnberg, and later he
prevailed on Maximilian to confer a like dignity on others, whom he strove to gather
into a College of Poets, which should become a corporation strong enough to oppose the professors. His wanderings were many, till in 1492 he settled down at Ingolstadt as professor of poetry and rhetoric. But he wearied of Ingolstadt after five years and transferred himself to Vienna, where Maximilian’s favor enabled him to obtain a secure position. There he finally realized his plan of rivaling the Roman Academy, by founding “The Danube Literary Society” for the spread of humanism within the universities. Celtes was indeed an apostle of the New Learning; he preached it everywhere and strove by all means to give it a visible form and make it a popular influence. Everywhere he urged the claims of Latin poetry, and taught the rules of Latin versification. He rejoiced in the title of Poet, and showed considerable skill in imitating the Latin Classics. He wrote odes like those of Horace, a Book of Loves like Ovid, and epigrams like Ausonius, in which he told the story of his transitory amours with more than Horatian or Ovidian frankness. He moralized, with pagan freedom from prejudice, on life, its problems and its destiny: “You wonder”, he exclaims, “that you seldom see my foot press the pavement of the temples of the gods. God is within us: there is no reason why I should strive to behold the Deities in painted shrines”. He asks Phoebus to tell him if his soul after death shall reach the circle of the blessed, or go to the waters of Lethe, or like a spark or vapor be lost in thin air. It may be that passages such as these are not intended to have any serious meaning, but are due to the imitation of approved models. Still the tendency of Celtes’ poetry was undoubtedly frivolous and immoral, and justified the suspicions of the orthodox. There was, however, a more serious side to Celtes’ work: he wrote several patriotic poems, and brought to light the poem of Gunther on the Emperor Frederick I, and also the curious dramas of the ninth century written by Roswitha, a nun of Gundersheim. When he finally settled at Vienna his teaching raised no remonstrance from the theologians, who seem to have pursued their own course and contented themselves with maintaining their own privileges.

HEINRICH BEBEL.

The new University of Tubingen had been founded mainly out of ecclesiastical endowments, and the preeminence of theology seemed secure. Yet here too the faculty of arts showed vigorous life, first under the influence of a humanist of the old school, Conrad Summenhart (1450-1502), a man of sound learning and philosophic mind, a reformer after the manner of Geiler of Kaisersberg; but he was rapidly superseded by the pronounced classicist Heinrich Bebel. Bebel (1472-1516) was the son of a poor peasant, and never forgot his origin. After studying at Krakau and Basel he settled in Tubingen in 1497, and carried all before him. He was a genuine enthusiast, and an excellent teacher through his quick sympathy with his audience and his homely common-sense. In a series of works he established the necessity of learning the Latin tongue, laid down the rules of Latin versification, and considered the limits of classical Latinity. But Bebel was not merely a teacher; he was also a patriot, and, like Wimpheling, allowed his patriotism to overcome his sense of historical truth. He proved to his own satisfaction that the Germans were indigenous in the lands they now inhabit. He praised the greatness of the Germans of old time, and wrote a refutation of an unwary Venetian who had asserted that the title 'Imperator' did not in classical times denote the highest dignity in the state, and that the Roman rulers underwent no imperial coronation. He turned his muse to sing the glories of Germany, “the sole mistress of the earth and ruler of the world”, and celebrated such victories of Maximilian as an ardent patriot could discover. But the work of Bebel which had the longest life was his Facetiae, or jest book, modeled on that of Poggio; but whereas Poggio collected the
current stories which beguiled the leisure hours of papal officials, Bebel went out among the people and gathered samples of the life of his times. Poggio and his friends embroidered old stories and played upon old motives for their own amusement; but Bebel has a purpose of exposing the ignorance of the priests, the arrogance of the nobles, the frauds of commercial life, the coarseness of the peasants, and the superstition of the people. He may have convinced himself that his object was moral; but his indecency is outspoken, and he has a delight in blasphemy which we do not find in the pages of Italian writers. Pagan licence has stimulated inborn coarseness to produce the depressing picture of human life and conduct which Bebel's pages put before us. They show us a man full of life and vigour, self-confident and aggressive, with a loud laugh and a cheerful view of life, a man of the people, whose sympathies were with the people, who was admirably fitted to carry his own boisterous love of classical culture to the large class of youths like-minded with himself.

JOHANN ECK

On the other hand, the new University of Ingolstadt held fast to the study of theology under the guidance of Johann Eck, renowned as a youthful prodigy, who had read his Bible through at the age of ten, and had never swerved from a persistent course of diligent study. At fifteen he could discourse for six hours together on philosophy, and at twenty-four became professor of theology. He visited the German universities, and even crossed the Alps to Bologna, for the purpose of holding theological disputations after the manner of the schools. His vast learning, his fluency, above all his remarkable power of memory, generally secured to him an easy victory over his opponents. Eck was eminently a man of whom a university would feel justly proud, and Ingolstadt rested quietly under his influence.

In like manner the University of Koln showed itself impregnable to the humanists. It was strong in the traditions of Albertus Magnus, and its schools could boast of an intimate connection with the University of Paris in olden times. The theological faculty reigned supreme, and the study of the classics was kept within reasonable limits. The wandering teachers of humanism from time to time made settlements at Koln, but they were routed by the theologians if they went too far, and had to retreat. Thus Rhagius Oesticampianus (as Johann Rack of Sommerfeld chose to transform his name) was driven from Koln, and found no rest save at Wittenberg. So too the more famous Hermann von dem Busch brought to Koln the treasures of his wandering years spent in the chief intellectual centres of Italy and Germany. He ventured to attack the theologians for neglecting the intelligent study of the Scriptures, and blamed them for paying more attention to gathering wealth than gathering knowledge. He was answered by Ortwin Gratius, a man of considerable learning, who put himself at the head of the defenders of the old studies, and whose fame has suffered undeservedly through the mockery of his opponents. For a time Busch was silenced, but presently he withdrew and joined a band of ardent humanists who had vowed to support the cause of the New Learning at all hazards.

This brilliant circle had its home at Erfurt, and its leader in Conrad Mutianus Rufus—his name was Muth and he added 'Rufus' because of the color of his hair. Mutian (1471-1526) is the most interesting personality among the German humanists, and approaches most nearly to the Italian type. Brought up first in the school of Hegius at Deventer, he studied at Erfurt, and then went to Italy, where he learned the pantheism of the new teachers of Plato. On his return to Germany he was invited by the Landgraf
of Hesse to his court, but soon wearied of a life in which there was no repose, and retired to a poor canonry at Gotha. There he set up over his door the motto *Beata tranquillitas*, and sought the inexpensive pleasures of a student’s life. He directed his thoughts, he says, to “God and the saints and the study of all antiquity”. He was of opinion that Christianity had existed from eternity, as Christ was the Word of God before His Incarnation, and consequently the Greeks and Romans, as possessors of a portion of God’s truth, could share in the joys of the redeemed. Such ideas, he admitted, were esoteric: historical Christianity must be taught to the multitude, but thinkers might rise to higher spiritual conceptions. Christ was a soul and a spirit; the truth about every man is not what is visible, but the spirit which is within him. The object of life is to have a clean heart and a right spirit, and forms and ceremonies must be judged as they promote this end. The true Eucharist was to fulfill the great commandments, love to God and love to your neighbor. Love was the one great law of life; out of this eternal law of love Popes and Emperors had framed edicts and constitutions, which were good enough in themselves, but were obscured by the perversity of false interpreters.

Such was the basis of Mutian’s philosophy, which he freely confided to his friends and applied in practice. Not till he had been Canon of Gotha for ten years could he bring himself to say Mass to please his brother canons, of whom he wrote, “I am more blameless than they, and yet think myself unworthy of the altar; but they for the sake of gain sacrifice to the god of their belly, and with polluted spirit do not so much consecrate as defile the genius of Christ”. He was opposed to the fasts of the Church, from which his health suffered, to auricular confession, to everything in the system of the Church which created scruples, and disturbed that sovereign serenity which it was his object to achieve. He had a keen sense of the shortcomings of his order, and their willingness to trade on popular superstition, of which he spoke with savage sarcasm, “By faith we mean, not the conformity of what we say with fact, but an opinion about divine things founded on credulity, and persuasion which seeks after profit. Such is its power that it is commonly believed that to us were given the keys of the kingdom of heaven. Whoever therefore despises our keys shall feel our nails and clubs. We have taken from the breast of Serapis a magical stamp, to which Jesus of Galilee has given authority. With that figure we put our foes to flight, we cozen money, we consecrate God, we shake hell, and we work miracles; whether we be heavenly minded or earthly minded makes no matter, provided we sit happily at the banquet of Jupiter”. But though Mutian was thus outspoken about the abuses of religion he deprecated frivolity, and the study of such classical writers as offended against decency. “I will turn”, he wrote, “my studies to piety, and will learn nothing from poets, philosophers, or historians, save what can promote a Christian life. He is impious who wishes to know more than the Church. We bear on our forehead the seal of the Cross, the standard of our King. Let us not be deserters, let nothing unseemly be found in our camp”. In accordance with this opinion Mutian sided with Wimpheling in his controversy with Locher. But it must be admitted that he was not consistent in upholding his own standard of right. He sometimes spoke with cynical indifference about the delinquencies of his friends, and in his own language was not free from the coarseness of his age.

Such a man as Mutian found little sympathy from his clerical brethren at Gotha; so he turned for companionship to young men. At first his chief friends were two Cistercians of a neighboring monastery, Georg Spalatin and Heinrich Fastnacht, who, because he came from Urb, near Gelnhausen, called himself Urbanus. With them he formed a little club, of which the members combined to procure from Italy all the best
books, which they read and discussed with eagerness. Soon there gathered round them all the young humanists of Erfurt, where Mutian’s name was still remembered. His attractive character, his wide sympathy, and his suggestiveness rapidly proved most winning, and Mutian became the centre of a band of fearless thinkers. Chief amongst them were Eobanus Hessius, Ulrich von Hutten, and Johann Jager of Dornheim, who called himself Crotus Rubianus. These youths learned from Mutian an earnest desire for the spread of classical literature, a hatred for the pedantry and formalism of the scholastic methods, and a keen critical spirit which felt little reverence for the past. Mutian himself wrote nothing of importance, and preferred that his scholars should be his books: he pointed to a glorious future, but he did not hasten to make it his own. We have nothing to recall him save his letters, which are full of originality, and show us the secret of his influence. He had a student's dislike to anything that would disturb his peace, and preferred to criticize with a smile of genial contempt. But the youths who drank his inspiration had not Mutian's self-restraint. They longed for the fray, and when the occasion came knew how to use it dexterously.
CHAPTER II.
THE REUCHLING STRUGGLE

The trial of strength between the party of the New Learning in Germany and the theologians took place on an Academic question which lay outside the immediate matters in dispute. But when antagonism exists, the party in possession is ready to find principles at stake and assert its power, without stopping to select its field of operations with due regard to prudence. The theological and academic party was unfortunate in its choice, both of the person whom it attacked, and the cause which it defended. It made its onslaught upon the most serious student in Germany, who was not engaged in any of the conflicts of academic life, and who enjoyed a European reputation. It asserted the authority of ecclesiastical supervision, not against the eccentricities of literary paganism, but against scientific criticism.

Johann Reuchlin (1455-1522) was a man of great learning and high character. Amid the occupations of a long life as a jurist and a man of affairs, he pursued the study of philology with exemplary thoroughness. “When barely twenty he compiled a Latin dictionary, *Vocabularius Breviloquus*, which showed a noticeable advance in clearness of arrangement. His knowledge of Greek and Hebrew exceeded that of his contemporaries, and he was known as the “Phoenix of Germany”. The younger scholars looked upon him with veneration as standing on a different level from themselves. They were only men of letters; he was a man of science. His scientific pursuit of philology suggested to them the conception of language as an instrument of thought, a patient study of which might furnish new principles for interpreting the ideas of the past. He was a pioneer in the study of Hebrew, by publishing a grammar and lexicon combined, *Rudimenta Hebraica*, a work not so remarkable for accurate knowledge as for the indications which it gives of the results of a critical method. Reuchlin treated the text of the Hebrew Scriptures as a philologist, not as a theologian. He was concerned with the meaning of words, and the construction of sentences; with the literal meaning of a passage, not with the theological interpretation which had been hitherto put upon it. He went behind patristic exposition and corrected S. Augustin. He pointed out mistakes in the version of S. Jerome, and wrote, “Our text reads so, but the meaning of the Hebrew is otherwise”; “we must more rightly translate”; “I do not know how our version has dreamed such a rendering”. He spoke of other commentators as misled by the authority of holy doctors, and said that truth must be sought above all things. He deplored the “innumerable defects” of the Vulgate, and prayed that God might give him time to correct them all.

This work of Reuchlin revealed for the first time the strength of the New Learning. Knowledge, pursued for its own sake, had brought the dim consciousness of a critical method, of an increasing command of the material of study. It had revealed laws of language, and taught a new sense of accuracy, with which came freedom from previous authority and a belief in the rightness of the conclusions of diligent investigation. Reuchlin was disturbing nothing, attacking nothing, proving nothing: he was merely engaged, to the best of his ability, in using all the knowledge which he possessed to get at the real meaning of the Hebrew text. But he unhesitatingly thought that his own work was capable of correcting errors, which had been made through haste or ignorance centuries ago, and had been repeated without verification ever since.
Though he had no doubts about the doctrine of the Church, he pointed out that the Old Testament Scriptures were by no means accurately understood; and by so doing was in a sense the founder of Biblical criticism and of all that followed from it.

Reuchlin was prepared to rest upon his laurels and enjoy his reputation, when suddenly circumstances arose which thrust him into a prominence he by no means wished, and involved him in a bitter controversy, which brought to light the antagonistic tendencies of German thought. The cause of this controversy was trivial in itself, but it involved the difference between the ideas of the Middle Ages and the broader opinion generated by the New Learning. Throughout the Middle Ages the persecution, or conversion, of the Jews had been an object of Christian zeal. The Jews were everywhere influential through their capacity for commerce, their thrift, and their industry. They were tolerated at times through necessity; but tolerance was always regarded as a sign of weakness, and it was considered a duty to rid Christian society of an intrusive element. From time to time measures were devised against the Jews, and their success depended upon popular fanaticism or popular hatred of the accumulation of wealth. In the fifteenth century the Jews had been allowed to rest in tolerable quietness; they were under the imperial protection and paid for the privilege of being allowed to exist. Their bitterest enemies sprung from their own body. Jews who had been converted to Christianity showed a natural anxiety for the conversion of those whom they had deserted, and frequently devoted their lives to that pursuit.

Such an one was Johann Pfefferkorn, who was baptized in Koln, a man of considerable learning but more fanaticism, who began his attack upon his brethren by literary argument. His first book, the Judenspiegel, after exhausting all other inducements to the Christian faith, proposed that the Jews should be weaned from their evil ways by forbidding them to practise usury, compelling them to listen to sermons, and depriving them of their Hebrew books which were the ground of their obduracy. This line of policy was recommended in a series of pamphlets, which do not seem to have drawn on Pfefferkorn so much sympathy from Christians as hatred from the Jews. Pfefferkorn felt that he could do nothing single-handed; so he betook himself to the Dominicans, that he might furbish up the somewhat rusty instruments of the Inquisition. His entire policy of suppression was difficult to carry out. The abolition of usury might be inexpedient; the efficacy of sermons might be doubtful; but the destruction of Jewish books was certainly practicable. So, armed with the approval of the heads of the Dominican order, Pfefferkorn sought the Emperor, and asked for permission to begin his crusade against Jewish literature. He obtained in 1509 an edict bidding the Jews throughout the Empire to deliver up all books written against the Christian religion or contrary to their own law; Pfefferkorn was empowered to confiscate all which seemed to him, after counsel with the priest and two of the municipal authorities of the place, to be objectionable.

Acting on this authority, Pfefferkorn made a visitation of Frankfort, Mainz, and other towns along the Rhine; but his procedure seemed so informal that the Archbishop of Mainz, without pronouncing any opinion about the desirability of the line of action, ordered his clergy to take no part in the matter. When Pfefferkorn remonstrated, the Archbishop objected to so important a decision resting in the hands of one man, and requested that others learned in Hebrew should be called in to advise. Pfefferkorn suggested Reuchlin; and the Archbishop added a converted Jew, Victor of Karben. Then Pfefferkorn again sought the Emperor to obtain his assent in the form of a mandate.
The imperial mandate went further, and gave the control of the matter to the Archbishop of Mainz, who was to consult the Universities of Mainz, Koln, Erfurt and Heidelberg, and the Inquisitor-General, Jakob Hochstraten, a Dominican of Koln, as well as Reuchlin and Victor of Karben. The Archbishop, however, did not summon his counsellors; the confiscated books still remained in the possession of the magistrates of Frankfort; and at last Maximilian, thinking that no great zeal was being manifested, ordered them to be restored to their owners. Pfefferkorn, in despair lest his labours should be wasted owing to the lukewarmness of the Archbishop, again sought the Emperor and obtained a renewal of his late mandate with this difference, that the referees were not required to meet, but to furnish their opinions in writing to Pfefferkorn, who was to submit them to the Emperor.

Reuchlin was the first to produce his opinion, which was ready in October, 1510. In it he treated the question before him with the abstract impartiality of a scholar, apart from any consideration of current controversy. Two Jewish books, he said, were avowedly directed against Christianity; these ought to be destroyed and their owners punished. The rest of the Jewish literature—the Talmud, the Cabbalah, commentaries on the Old Testament, sermons and hymns, philosophical and scientific works—was discussed under its various headings, with the general conclusion that, though it was not Christian, it was not written against Christianity. It had been tolerated for fourteen centuries, why should it now be suppressed? The Jews were German citizens, and as such were under the protection of the State. If they erred in their belief, they were subject to the judgment of God. Persecution would not alter their opinions: if their books were confiscated in Germany they would import them from other countries. The conversion of the Jews would best be achieved by a friendly bearing towards them, and by a careful study of their literature, from which learned men might gather their opinions and in time discover the arguments which would be useful in dealing with their obstinacy.

This wise and enlightened opinion was founded upon learned reasons, and was the result of a temper which had been trained by the discipline of independent study. The utterances of the other referees were founded on far different principles. The University of Mainz considered the Talmud to be the chief hindrance to the conversion of the Jews, and thought that the text of the Hebrew Scriptures had been so falsified in an anti-Christian direction that all Jewish books should be seized and examined. The University of Koln would leave the Jews the Bible, but nothing else. Hochstraten and Victor of Karben agreed with the doctors of Koln. The Archbishop of Mainz, after receiving these opinions, sent them to the Emperor with a statement of his own agreement with the universities. The Emperor resolved to submit the question to the Diet; but he never did so; and the question of confiscating Jewish books dropped out of practical politics.

However, it became a speculative question of supreme importance. The opinions expressed by Reuchlin, though written, as he thought, merely for the Emperor's advice, naturally became known to Pfefferkorn and his friends, and aroused their anger and suspicions. Pfefferkorn felt himself aggrieved at the small regard which Reuchlin had paid to his knowledge of Jewish literature, in which he naturally claimed to rank as a high authority. He carried on his attack upon the Jews in another book, called Handspiegel, in which he refuted Reuchlin's opinions, asserted that he understood nothing of the Talmud, and said that the books on Hebrew published under Reuchlin's name could not really be the work of a man who stood convicted of such
ignorance; he even hinted that Reuchlin had been bribed by the Jews to write in their behalf.

This was more than Reuchlin could endure, and he answered in a book called *Augenspiegel*, in which he gave an account of actual facts, printed his opinion sent to the Emperor, explained it more fully, and in some points explained away. Then he turned upon Pfefferkorn, accused him of making thirty-four mistakes in Hebrew, and treated him with considerable sharpness. Really, as a statement of the case in favour of the Jews, the *Augenspiegel* was not so strong as the previous memorandum. It abandoned somewhat of the dispassionate attitude of the scholar, and even opened the door to a reconciliation between Reuchlin's premises and the conclusions of Pfefferkorn and his friends at Koln. But there were many who thought it monstrous that, in a question which concerned religion, the opinion of a jurist should outweigh that of theologians. So long as Reuchlin’s statement was addressed only to the Emperor it was a privileged document. Now that Pfefferkorn’s attack had produced an answer from Reuchlin, he could be held responsible for what he had put into print. An outcry was raised against his heretical views, and a copy of his book was sent to the theological faculty of the University of Koln, that an opinion might be given about its orthodoxy.

Reuchlin tried to deprecate the inevitable condemnation, by pleading that he was not a theologian and had no wish to depart from the doctrine of the Church. But the doctors of Koln were determined to enjoy a complete triumph, and sent him a number of propositions, drawn from his book, which he was required to explain or withdraw. Reuchlin vainly endeavored to avoid unconditional submission. When he saw that nothing less would satisfy his foes, he appealed to public opinion by publishing a German translation of the memorandum which appeared in its original Latin in the *Augenspiegel*. The theologians of Koln were not yet prepared to proceed judicially against Reuchlin; they thought it wiser first to win popular acceptance for their views. So they also embarked in the sea of controversy. Arnold of Tungern was chosen to put forward the condemned propositions in Reuchlin's book and explain their enormities, while Hermann von dem Busch and Ortwin Gratius furnished an appendix of Latin verses. Gratius especially waxed eloquent over the tears of the Virgin, whom he styled *Jovis alma parens*, and deplored the reopening of the wounds of Christ by Reuchlin's heresy.

Reuchlin now saw that he must accept the issue of open war. He retorted by a *Defence* addressed to the Emperor, in which he showed that he was more than a match for his adversaries in vituperation. He ridiculed their pretensions to theological knowledge; he accused them of immoral conduct with Pfefferkorn’s wife; he declared that Gratius’ phrase, *Jovis alma parens*, was a rank heresy of the worst kind; he roundly denounced Arnold von Tungern as a calumniator, a forger, and a liar. Both parties appealed to the Emperor, who ordered the confiscation of the *Defence* as likely to create disturbances amongst the people. But the theologians did not so much care about this scurrilous pamphlet as about the suppression of the *Augenspiegel*, concerning which they collected the opinions of the German universities. It was condemned by Louvain, Mainz, Heidelberg, and Erfurt; but Erfurt, while convicting Reuchlin of error, pronounced him to be a man of profound learning and unquestioned orthodoxy, who had erred, but not of set purpose. To bring the matter to a decisive issue, the theologians of Koln sent the *Augenspiegel* to the University of Paris, which held the highest place as the home of theological learning; and after a prolonged investigation, Paris also condemned the book.
The matter now seemed ripe for judicial proceedings and Hochstraten as Inquisitor-General summoned Reuchlin to appear before him at Mainz in September, 1513. Reuchlin appealed to the Pope; and Leo X, in the very beginning of his pontificate, was troubled with a theological dispute in Germany—a foretaste of what was to come. He referred the question to the Bishops of Speyer and Worms; but while the matter was still under their consideration, the theologians of Koln, emboldened by the opinions of the other universities and the Emperor's mandate, committed the Augenspiegel to the flames. Their triumph, however, was premature; for in March, 1514, the Bishop of Speyer gave sentence in favour of Reuchlin. He declared that there was no ground for accusing him of heresy if his opinions were rightly understood, and he commanded that the controversy should cease and silence be observed for the future.

It was now Hochstraten's turn to appeal to the Pope, with a request that the matter should be decided in the Curia; and both parties set to work to besiege the Holy See with letters in their favour. Maximilian, who at first sided with the university, had discovered by this time that the opinion of scholars was with Reuchlin, and accordingly took him under his protection. In fact, the original dispute had now almost disappeared; it had merged into a contest between the New Learning and the upholders of scholasticism. As such it was regarded at Rome, where, after much delay, it was referred to a commission of twenty-two, all of whom, with the noticeable exception of Sylvester Prierias, Master of the Papal Palace, declared the Augenspiegel to be free from heresy. Their decision was communicated to the Pope in July, 1516; but Leo X was true to the papal tradition of doing nothing, and at the earnest entreaties of Hochstraten, prevented judgment being given, and issued a mandate deferring further action in the case.

Long before this, however, the matter had been practically settled by public opinion. When the theological faculties of the chief German universities combined to crush an individual, it was defeat to fail of immediate success. Even when the aid of the powerful University of Paris was called in, Reuchlin was able to hold his own; and a German tribunal acquitted him of the charges brought against him. The longer the contest lasted the more attention it attracted, till it became for a time the great question of the day. The appeal to Paris carried the matter beyond Germany, and gave it a European importance, till it was regarded as a decisive issue between the Old and the New Learning. Men who knew and cared nothing about Hebrew literature, and were incapable of judging of the justice of Reuchlin's opinions, felt themselves growing interested in the struggle between an independent scholar and a combination of the professional teachers of theology. The subject of the struggle was in itself a happy one, as it did not concern any doctrine of the Church, but only raised the question of the limits of theological interference with the conclusions of learning. The cry that the Church was in danger met with no response. Men saw that it was only the supremacy of theology over all other studies, or rather the right of theology to define at its will the nature of its supremacy, which was menaced.

This, however, was rapidly felt to be an important point, and it divided the scholars of Germany into two camps. Slumbering antagonism awakened into consciousness, and parties were formed of Reuchlinists and anti-Reuchlinists. It was obvious that the upholders of scholasticism and the maintainers of the old university system should draw together on one side; and that the band of wandering scholars, the poets, and the apostles of classical culture, should unite against them. But the asperity of the controversy needlessly widened the gulf between the two parties, and the flow of
pamphlets degenerated into personalities which caused bitter animosity. Moreover, as party feeling grew more intense, there was no place for the more thoughtful men of moderate opinions; and they were driven reluctantly to range themselves with partisans whose violence they disapproved, or stand aloof and so lose their influence. There were many curious revelations of character in consequence. Wimpheling, in spite of his love for controversy, kept a complete silence, as did his friend Brant. Hermann von dem Busch threw in his lot at first with the theologians, but deserted them when he found that it was safe to do so. On the other hand, Pirkheimer and Peutinger gave their ready sympathy to Reuchlin, on the ground that it was monstrous that a man of his character and reputation should be annoyed by so insignificant a personage as Pfefferkorn. But Mutian in his quiet study at Gotha saw further into the real importance of the principle at stake. As a freethinker who preserved his freedom of thought by cautiously holding his tongue in public, he saw in Reuchlin's case an opportunity for striking a blow at authority. He first tried to influence the University of Erfurt and obtain from its theologians an opinion in favour of Reuchlin. In this he was so far successful that, though Erfurt pronounced against the rightness of Reuchlin’s opinions, it acquitted him of heresy. “The theologians are raging dogs”, growled Mutianus when he heard of this, “but they can only bark, not bite”.

The man whose aid was most eagerly expected was Desiderius Erasmus, to whom German scholars looked as their future leader. Reuchlin was respected for his learning; but he had nearly reached the end of his career: while Erasmus stood forward in the height of his fame, and added to learning, which was considered equal to Reuchlin’s, elegance, wit, versatility, and culture, to which Reuchlin made no pretensions. Erasmus was not only the foremost scholar but the foremost man of letters in Europe; and the German humanists wished to claim him as the exponent of their ideas, and their chief in the intellectual warfare in which they were engaged. But the temper of Erasmus was not that of a martial leader; he preferred to gather laurels in peace, and believed in the silent progress of ideas as the best solution of the problems of the time. To him, and to others, the strife over Reuchlin’s writings brought the unwelcome tidings that war was declared and that sides must be taken.

The circumstances of Erasmus’ early life and training left his mind at once critical and receptive, and moulded a character which was at once independent and timid. He had pursued his career by himself, and so stood aloof from the exclusive influence of any one of the tendencies of German learning. But this very isolation made him responsive to all the intellectual influences around him. He did not, in his enthusiasm for the classics, forget the majesty of the old theology; nor did his erudition as a philologist lead him to neglect the elegance of a man of letters. He was thoroughly in earnest in the pursuit of knowledge, but he was anxious for fame, for recognition, and for an assured position in the world. Erasmus condensed with curious precision the aims of his predecessors, and gave them a finished expression. His *Adages*, a collection of proverbs from classical authors, applied the wisdom of antiquity to the problems of the modern world. His *Enchiridion Militis Christiani* was an exposition of the principles of cultivated piety, which is concerned not with ecclesiastical doctrine, but with the Christianity of common-sense which makes for virtue and loftiness of soul. With this standard before him he unsparingly criticized the defects of popular devotion. He denounced the substitution of outward practices for the struggle of inward self-conquest, the adoration of relics for meditation on the spirit of the saints, the veneration of images for the study of Scripture, the mechanical devotions of monks for saintly
lives, offerings at shrines for acts of Christian charity. “I wrote the Enchiridion”, is his own testimony, “not to display my genius, but to remedy the error which makes religion depend on ceremonies, and an observance of bodily acts, while neglecting true piety”. His object, in fact, was to call back religion to the sphere of good sense and practical usefulness.

But the book which won for Erasmus an unrivalled position as a man of letters was The Praise of Folly, which he wrote in England in 1509. It is the result of the knowledge of men, and of the evils of the time, gained by a rambling scholar, who had mixed with all classes and visited every country. The world was peopled with fools, and folly was the real source of happiness; so Folly addresses her votaries and bids them prick up their ears to listen, while she shows all ages of life that their pursuits and objects of endeavour are gifts of her own to struggling mortals. When she comes to speak of religion she claims credit for spreading the superstitious belief in the power of images, in indulgences from periods of purgatory, in the efficacy of a daily repetition of the psalter, and the like. Of all classes of her subjects. Folly is most proud of theologians and monks. The magnificent ingenuity of scholastic discussion affords a fair field for ridicule. “These great theologians exert their powers on such questions as—Did the Divine generation require an instant of time for its completion? Is there more than one filiation in Christ? Could God have taken upon Him the form of a woman, of the devil, of an ass, of a cucumber, or a flint? What could Peter have consecrated, had he celebrated the Eucharist while Christ's body was hanging on the cross?”. In like manner Folly rejoices in the monks who, by roaring out in church their daily tale of psalms, think they are charming the saints with heavenly music; and in the friars who by dirt, ignorance, and vulgarity profess to imitate the Apostles. Cardinals and Popes fare no better: there is a bold description of Julius II as a feeble old man, who is regardless of cost and trouble so long as he can turn the world upside down.

The success of such a book was immediate, for it contained the humour of the market-place refined by the taste of the scholar. Every one laughed to see his own crude thoughts expressed with subtlety and elegance. Instead of the brickbats which he had been accustomed to hurl, he was presented with a case of poisoned arrows. Erasmus spoke slightingly of a work which owed its origin to a pun on the Greek form of the name of his friend More; the coincidence set him thinking how closely wisdom and folly were connected, and the book was the work of a few days. It summed up, however, the existing tone of thought, and made Erasmus the idol of the young humanists and the great hope of the reforming party. They longed to enlist under his leadership in behalf of Reuchlin; but Erasmus did not wish to be involved in the squabbles of others, and contented himself with writing to two of the Cardinals in Reuchlin's behalf: it was ridiculous, he said, that so great a scholar should be harassed with a suit about a paltry matter. Erasmus claimed to stand aloof from petty controversies. The temper of the scholar was averse from the creation of burning questions, and took refuge in the lofty serenity engendered by the pursuit of principles.

Indeed he was engaged on two great literary works, an Erasmus' edition of S. Jerome, and an edition of the Greek Testament. Both were published in 1516, and formed an enduring memorial of Erasmus' scholarship. But they were much more than this; they were a powerful enunciation of the aims of Biblical criticism. Reuchlin had dealt only partially with the Old Testament; Erasmus revised the text and the received translation of the whole of the New Testament. It is true that his command of manuscripts was small, and his knowledge of their value was slight; but he collated such
as he could find and gave the results of his collation. By the side of the Greek was placed a new Latin translation, differing materially from the Vulgate; while notes explained perversions of the true sense, and misconceptions which had gathered around various passages. Though the book was dedicated to Leo X. Erasmus did not hesitate to say that the text “Upon this rock I will build My Church” did not refer only to the Pope, but to all Christians; and his notes abound in sarcastic references to prevailing superstitions. The object of the book was to apply to the New Testament the same standard of scholarship as was applied to the texts of other ancient writings. The very title of the first edition—Novum Instrumentum—was an attempt, afterwards abandoned, to reproduce the exact significance of the word Covenant.

A man occupied in these great objects thought himself absolved from the duty of taking part in the Reuchlin controversy; and his refusal left the leadership of the young scholars to the revolutionary spirit of Ulrich von Hutten. Sprung from a knightly family in Franconia, he had inherited traditions of political independence. Condemned by his father to a monastic life, he escaped by flight, and at the age of sixteen began the career of a penniless and wandering scholar. He gathered large experience of life in Germany and Italy. His pen had been directed against most men, including Pope Julius II, whose unpriestly life he attacked in Latin epigrams, while he satirized with equal severity the splendid corruption of the papal court. A stormy temper, such as his, was naturally attracted to Reuchlin’s contest, when it became a matter of general interest; and in 1514 he showed Erasmus a poem celebrating Reuchlin’s triumph over his ignoble foes. Erasmus cautiously advised him to keep his poem in reserve till the triumph was assured, and Hutten for a time followed the advice. But if he showed his poem to a stranger like Erasmus, there can be no doubt that it circulated widely amongst his friends, and that Hutten suggested, if he did not himself carry out, an onslaught of humanistic raillery upon the pedants of Koln.

When the idea was in the air the occasion was not far to seek. In March, 1514, Reuchlin met an attack of Ortwin Gratius by the publication of a volume of letters addressed to him by various learned friends—Clarorum Virorum Epistolae missae ad Joannem Reuchlin. Its object was to show that the weight of learned opinion was on his side, and that those whose studies had led them in the same direction did not think that anything which he had written exceeded the bounds of permissible criticism. The volume itself was remarkable as an attempt to organize a consensus of independent scholars, and set up a catholic republic of letters against the exclusive claims of the universities to decide on intellectual questions. But this was not the point which interested Hutten and his friends. The book suggested to them an opportunity of letting loose their wit by writing a volume which should profess to be a similar collection of letters addressed to Ortwin Gratius by sympathizing members of his university circle. They resolved to supplement Reuchlin’s ‘Letters from Illustrious Men’ by the Letters of Obscure Men who formed the bulk of the party opposed to him.

The authorship of the Epistolae Obscurorum Virorum cannot be exactly traced. It appeared at the end of 1515 when Hutten was in Italy; and how far he was responsible for the idea cannot be determined. But it seems certain that Crotus Rubianus was principally responsible for the first book. In the middle of 1516 the book was published with additions which bear traces of the hand of Hutten; and a second book which appeared early in 1517 seems to have been mainly his work.
The *Epistolae Obscurorum Virorum* was an application of popular wit, which had already been adapted by Brant, Bebel, and Erasmus to general satire, to a particular controversy, and to individual men. Its importance lay in the fact that it revealed, more clearly than could serious discussion, the breach between the men of the New Learning and the ideas and systems of the past. It was not the opinions nor the mental attitude of the theologians that was attacked, but their whole life and character; and this, not with serious invective or passionate scorn, but simply with boisterous mirth in the spirit of the broadest farce. It was useless to argue with such men, or even to feel indignant at their ignorance. They were scarcely worthy of contempt, for what else could be expected of those who were only acting according to the law of their nature? Let them tell their own story, wander round the narrow circle of antiquated prejudices which they mistook for ideas, display their grossness, their vulgarity, their absence of aim, their laborious indolence, their lives unrelieved by any touch of nobility. So thought Crotus Rubianus as he created his puppets and pulled their strings with all the heedlessness of rollicking and unchastened drollery.

The humour of the book is not refined and its tone is monotonous. It has few literary merits which can give it life apart from the circumstances in which it was produced. But it takes us into a world of its own, which is complete, symmetrical, and within the bounds of probability. This world is peopled by good, honest men, who have done all that their forefathers did, have learned what was expected of them, have taken their degrees in their university, and have gone to settle down comfortably in various clerical positions. They have a profound attachment to the Church, and unswerving loyalty to their university; their minds are troubled by no problems, and they are prepared to discharge their conventional duty. But they are dimly conscious that the intellectual and moral standard of the world is being raised, and that neither academic distinction nor clerical office meets with unquestioning respect. Secular poets lay claim to outlandish knowledge and pose them with hard questions: they hear that a certain John Reuchlin has defied even the collective wisdom of the great University of Koln, and is not immediately crushed by the Pope. In befogged bewilderment they bring their perplexities to their old master, Ortwin Gratius, that he, out of his unfathomable learning, may give them an answer which will be beyond the reach of dispute.

So they pour forth their confidences on many points. Sometimes it is a question of casuistry that disturbs a simple mind. Thus Master Henricus Schaffsmulius writes from Rome a melancholy story, how on a Friday he went to breakfast at an inn in the Campo dei Fiori and ordered an egg, which on being opened contained a chicken. His comrade said, “Eat it quickly, or else the host will charge you for the chicken, as it is the rule of the house that everything which is put on the table should be paid for”. To avoid expense he swallowed the chicken without reflection. Then his conscience smote him that he had eaten meat on a fast-day: would Ortwin tell him if he had committed a mortal sin which needed special absolution? In like manner Master John Pellifex, in the market-place at Frankfort, meeting two men clad in black robes, took off his hat to them under the belief that they were Masters of Arts. His comrade in holy horror pointed out that they were Jews, and that he had committed an act of idolatry; he himself had once been guilty of a like act of carelessness, for in a church he had done reverence to the figure of a Jew who was engaged in nailing Christ upon the Cross, mistaking him in his haste for S. Peter, and for this offence had difficulty in procuring absolution. Pellifex wishes to know whether his case is one which can be dealt with by an ordinary priest, or requires episcopal, or even papal, absolution.
As a rule, however, the questions are not about such serious matters as these. Many of them concern points of scholarship; as when Master Thomas Langschneider recounts an argument concerning the proper term to be applied to one who was about to proceed to the degree of Master of Arts: a full-blown Master was called *magister noster*; should a candidate be called *magister nostrandus*, or *nostre magistrandus*? Another raises a profounder question. He had heard one say that he was a member of ten universities: now a body may have many members, but can a member lay claim to many bodies? These, however, were academic questions which lay within the sphere of legitimate discussion. More frequently the Obscure Men were in difficulties how to answer the arguments of the noxious race of secular poets who constantly crossed their path. Master Bernard Plumilegus, in the course of a drunken brawl at a tavern, boasted that he knew all about poetry and thought little of it: would Gratius send him a letter and a poem, which he might show to his antagonist as a proof that he had a poet amongst his friends? Master Peter Hafenmusius was not much troubled by the nonsense which he heard the poets talk, because he knew that whatever is founded on sin is not good, but is against God, because God is the enemy of sin. But in poetry there are falsehoods; and therefore those who found their teaching on poetry cannot advance in goodness; for a bad root has bad sprouts, and a bad tree brings forth bad fruit, according to the Gospel. Consequently when he hears the fables of poets he makes the sign of the Cross; "as the other day one said that there is in a certain province a water which has golden sand and is called the Tagus; and I whistled under my breath, because it is impossible". Sometimes, however, the Obscure Men have triumphs to record. A humble licentiate in medicine, being invited to meet Erasmus, primed himself with a question connected with his own science. But the conversation turned on 'Poetry', namely, on the writings and deeds of Julius Caesar. The good physician could no longer contain himself, and said, "I do not believe that Caesar wrote those commentaries; and this is my argument. Whoever is busy with warfare and continued labours cannot learn Latin; but Caesar was always engaged in war and labours; therefore he could not be a man of learning or learn Latin. Therefore I think that Suetonius wrote those commentaries; because I never saw any one who had a style more resembling Caesar than Suetonius". Erasmus smiled and did not answer, being overcome by so subtle an argument; and the licentiate, being victor in the field of poetry, did not think it worth while to propound his medical problem.

Through all these letters runs an increasing wonder and disquietude about the process against Reuchlin. It seems impossible that the theologians, when they choose to put forth their learning and their influence, should not at once succeed. Who is Reuchlin, they ask, and why does he not make his submission? “Holy Mary”, says Peter Meyer, priest of Mainz, “Doctor Reuchlin is in theology like a boy,and a boy knows more in theology than Doctor Reuchlin. Holy Mary, believe me, because I have experience. Why, he knows nothing in the Books of the Sentences. Holy Mary, that is a subtle matter, and men cannot take it up as they do grammar and poetry. I could be a poet well enough, and I know how to write verses, because in Leipzig I attended lectures on Sulpitius on the quantities of syllables. But how is it? He ought to propound to me a question in theology, and ought to argue for and against. Then it would be seen that no one knows theology perfectly except by the Holy Spirit, while poetry is the devil's food, as Jerome says in his epistles”. All this was so plain to the minds of the Obscure Men that they could not understand why the Pope hesitated about Reuchlin's condemnation. “I would say that the Pope erred”, writes one, “if I did not fear excommunication”. For was it not clear to every one that the poets were no true friends
of the Church? Why, one of them said that he did not believe the Holy Coat of Trier to be the coat of our Lord; nor did he believe that there were any of the hairs of the Blessed Virgin left in the world. Another said that the Three Kings in Koln were most likely three Westphalian peasants; and added that he would like to show his contempt for the indulgences sold by the friars, who were mere buffoons deceiving women and country folk.

The Obscure Men were not behind the times: many of them could write verses, and sent to Gratius compositions of the most exeruciating doggerel. They also excelled in etymology, and derived the name of Gratius (who was so called from his native place Gracs), either from the supernal grace with which he was endowed, or from the Gracchi whom he equalled in eloquence. Similarly Mavors was so called quasi mares vorans. The derivation of ars, art, is a marvel of ingenuity: the word may come either from the Greek bread, because those who acquire an art can earn their bread; or from arcus, a bow, because art, especially that of logic, enables you to shoot at your adversary; or from arx, a citadel, because art towers above ignorance; or finally from artus, a limb, because it moves the mind as the limbs move the body.

Further, the Obscure Men are not wicked or vicious; they have their frailties and they fall before the temptations of the flesh; but they do not rejoice in wrong-doing, and they feel remorse for their sins. They tell with brutal frankness the tales of their commonplace amours; but they are not hypocrites, and do not conceal their weakness. “I am not wiser than Solomon, nor stronger than Samson, and ought sometimes to enjoy myself”. “We take care that no one sees; we make our confession and God is merciful: we must hope for pardon”. They sorrowfully admit that it is beyond their power to overcome the flesh; but their ideal of life is comfortable and respectable. “When I come back to Germany”, writes Peter Kalb from Rome, “I will go to my vicarage house and will have good days. For I will have there many ducks, geese, and hens; and I can have in my house five or six cows which will give milk, which I can make into cheese or butter; for I wish to have a cook who can make me such things. But she ought to be old; for if she was young she would cause me temptations of the flesh, so that I might sin. She ought also to be able to spin, for I will buy her flax. And I will have two or three pigs, and will fatten them so that they make me good bacon. For I will have, above all things, good victuals in my house. Also I will once a year kill an ox, and will sell half to the peasants and the other half I will hang in the smoke. And behind my house I will have a garden where I will sow onions, leeks, and parsley; and I will have pot-herbs and turnips and the like. And in the winter I will sit by my fireside and study the sermons which I shall preach to the peasants, and also study the Bible that I may be fit to preach. And in the summer I will go to fish, or work in my garden; and I will not care about wars, because I wish to be by myself and say my prayers and read Mass and not care for those worldly matters which bring destruction to the soul”.

Had this been all, the fun might have been considered fair: but running through the letters are gross personal attacks upon the characters of Gratius, Hochstraten, and Pfefferkorn. Not only is Gratius the confidant of the immoralities of others, but he is made to reply in a similar strain about himself; and the chastity of Pfefferkorn’s wife is impugned with cowardly brutality. Reuchlin’s chief opponents are bespattered with dirt, while their supporters are lampooned as a class. The book was received with roars of laughter on every side; but, when the mirth had subsided, it was seen that while the second part of the attack had succeeded, the first part had not only failed, but was disastrous. The real importance of the Epistolae Obscurorum Virorum lay in its success
in popularizing the conception of a stupid party which was opposed to the party of progress. The contents of the existing controversy were entirely ignored; its larger issues were skillfully concealed; the only point put forward was the absurdity of the claim, made by such men as these academic theologians and their friends, to control the opinions of scholars and men of learning. This point the pens of Crotus and Hutten brought forward with all the clearness and force which ridicule lends to views, already strongly felt, but waiting definite expression.

On the other hand, the coarseness of the attack on the personal character and motives of Gratius and Hochstraten could not be approved by any honorable man. Many shook their heads sadly over such virulence, and augured ill for the future success of a cause which was supported by such means. Erasmus disapproved of the attack on individuals; humour, he thought, should stop short of abuse. He was also aggrieved because his own name had been dragged into the Letters without his leave; and he thought that the progress of learning would be injured by this foolish controversy. He saw that mockery of Hochstraten was closely connected with mockery of other officers of the Church; and it did not escape him that a lampoon on Pope Julius II had just appeared, in which the warlike Pope was represented as being refused admittance into Paradise by S. Peter. On his side, Hutten had begun to feel that he would not get much help from Erasmus, of whom he wrote in the second part of the Epistolae Obscurorum Vivorum—Erasmus is a man for himself. It became clear that there were two parties amongst the humanists, and that those who hoped for progressive reform by the steady advance of enlightenment were alarmed at the rashness of the hot headed and outspoken party of which Hutten was the leader.

Of course the publication of the Epistolae Obscurorum Vivorum led to more writing on the part of Pfefferkorn and his friends, who induced the Pope to condemn the book and order its suppression as scurrilous and scandalous. On this Gratius celebrated the triumph of his party by turning against the humanists their own weapons. He published the Lamentationes Obscurorum Vivorum, the letters of the Reuchlinists, who were dismayed at the storm they had raised, who quailed before the papal censure and the disapproval of Erasmus, and confided to one another their misgivings. Gratius might have something to say in argument; but he was not a humorist, and his book did not succeed in turning the laugh against his foes. A poem of Hutten, The Triumph of Capnion (such was the Greek form given to Reuchlin’s name), made its meaning clear even to the unlearned, by a frontispiece which embodied the allegory of Hutten’s Latin lines. It represented Reuchlin seated in a triumphal car, holding a copy of the Augenspiegel in his hand. He is escorted by a band of poets, crowned with laurel; children strewn flowers in his path, and before him goes a band of musicians and singers who celebrate his exploits. In front are the trophies of his victory, the books of his opponents in baskets and chests, their conquered gods, allegorical figures of Barbarism, Superstition, Ignorance and Greed; after which follow the theologians in chains. In the foreground lies Pfefferkorn, with his tongue cut out and his hands tied behind his back, awaiting the fall of the executioner’s axe. The procession is sweeping on to the gate of Reuchlin’s native town of Pforzheim, whence the inhabitants are thronging to greet the victor. One enthusiastic citizen is significantly expressing his joy by throwing a monk out of the window.

While in Germany the matter of Reuchlin had broadened into a general contest between the Old and the New Learning, and the humanists fought for freedom from theological interference, and called to their aid the weapons of ridicule and invective—
in Italy on the other hand the question was more calmly discussed on its own merits. The Italian scholars had already won their freedom and had nothing to fear for themselves; but they were interested in a question which concerned the limits of the authority of learning, and they examined the original controversy respecting Jewish literature. Peter Galatin and Georgius Benignus, Archbishop of Nazareth, wrote in defence of Reuchlin, on the ground that the Talmud contained much that was useful in proving and defending Christian truth. This led to an answer by Hochstraten, conceived not in the tone of a disputant, but written with the authoritative spirit of an inquisitor, who had no doubt he was right and was determined to have the question settled in his favour.

Erasmus grew more and more dissatisfied with the long continuance of this profitless quarrel, and in 1519 wrote his opinion to Hochstraten: “I had a better opinion of you”, he says, “before I read your book. In many passages I looked in vain for the leniency and moderation which become a Christian, a theologian, or a Dominican. I read also some works of your opponents, Reuchlin, the Count of Neuenaar, Hermann von dem Busch, and Hutten. I could not have endured their bitterness unless I had previously read the writings which had provoked it. You will say that you are only discharging your duty; but remember you are only an inquisitor, not a judge. Yet how often have you pronounced sentence against Reuchlin, whilst his case is under judgment in a court whence there is no appeal? Had you not done enough by causing such a tumult about a book, which would long ago have been forgotten if you had not given it importance? Why continue to do so when the Pope, seeing that the case is of a kind which had better be dropped than kept alive, has ordered silence? Why do you fix your eyes only on the errors of Reuchlin? You speak of his heresies in such a way as to lead the common people to think him a heretic. Your followers denounce philology and literature, studies which illustrate theology and serve it. If theology will honour learning, it will be admired by it: if it calumniates learning, there is a danger that the two will destroy one another”.

Erasmus, however, pleaded in vain. It was true that when he wrote the question of Reuchlin had ceased to be of importance; but Hochstraten and the Dominicans were bent upon enjoying a formal triumph, and their persistency was at last rewarded. In June, 1520, a Papal brief annulled the decision given at Speyer, declared the Augenspiegel to be a book that gave offence to pious Christians, ordered its suppression, and condemned Reuchlin to silence.

This judgment had no practical importance. The theologians were satisfied, and persecuted Reuchlin no longer. He was an old man, and had long ago grown weary of a strife which was entirely uncongenial to him; he died in peace in 1522. But the judgment is important as marking a change of front on the part of the Papacy. In 1516 the matter in dispute between Reuchlin and his opponents was freely discussed in Rome, and was committed to a commission of experts, who with one exception were in Reuchlin’s favour. It was not unreasonable for Leo X to hesitate before he acted upon an opinion which would irritate the Dominicans, and the universities not only of Germany but of France. We may think him wise in deciding to allow the dispute to burn itself out and come to a natural end. But in 1520 there was another question raised in Germany in which the Papacy had a more direct interest. Sylvester Prierias, the one amongst Reuchlin’s judges who had deplored the untimely tolerance which allowed criticism, rather than policy, to decide ecclesiastical questions, had been permitted to direct the well-proved weapons of the Curia against the audacity of an Augustinian friar.
Strange to say the friar had not been destroyed by the onslaught. We can only wonder that the Papacy had not learned, by its experience of the temper of Germany, that questions were sure to be raised; that a large public was interested in their discussion; and that discussion was not likely to be checked by the mere demand for unquestioning obedience.
CHAPTER III
THE RISE OF LUTHER

The controversy about Reuchlin, which affected only the learned, was allowed to run its course for a time. But when a question was raised which threatened to derange Papal finance, there was no hesitation in ordering immediate silence. The subject which Luther first brought forward was fairly open to discussion; but the Pope declared himself so satisfied with the practical working of the system, that it was inexpedient to inquire into the exact principle on which it rested. By peremptorily disregarding the right of the individual to exercise his freedom within lawful limits, the Papacy outraged German opinion, and led to a new development of theology which, on the ground of Christian liberty, challenged the current claims of authority.

This great issue was raised by no distinguished scholar, but by a simple professor in the new University of Wittenberg, a man whose fame had not travelled beyond the limits of Saxony. Martin Luther, the son of a peasant, had been led by the promptings of his own nature to seek peace for his soul by entering the order of Augustinian friars at Erfurt. This order had been successfully reformed by the zeal of its Vicar, Andreas Proles, who was succeeded by a no less remarkable man, Johann von Staupitz, a Saxon noble, who had studied at Tubingen and had a distinguished reputation as a learned theologian. In his twofold capacity, as a scholar and as provincial head of the Augustinian order, his services were needed to aid in the organization of a new university in his native land.

The dominions of the old Duchy of Saxony had been divided in 1485 between the two sons of the Elector Frederick II, Ernest and Albert. Albert received the land of Meissen with Dresden and Leipzig. The electoral dignity with the remaining lands and Thuringia fell to the share of Ernest, whose son, Frederick the Wise, a man of culture and a friend of the chief scholars of Germany, was grieved that his dominions possessed no seat of learning. He obtained an imperial decree for the foundation of a new university at Wittenberg; and it is noticeable that the capital of the new theology was the first university which did not seek for Papal sanction. Wittenberg itself was a poor little place, more like a village than a town; but it was chosen for distinction as being the centre of the old electoral domains. It possessed a house of Augustinian friars, with which the new university was connected, and Staupitz was consequently called in to aid the Elector in the business of the new foundation and the choice of its teachers. Staupitz and Luther's former teacher at Erfurt, Jodocus Trutwetter, were the leading spirits in the new university, which rapidly began to justify the expectations of its founder.

In his visitation of the Augustinian houses Staupitz soon discovered Luther, and was drawn to the young man by his obvious sincerity. Luther had embraced a monastic life under a deep impression of his own sinfulness. He longed to learn the secret of holiness and hoped to discover it in the shelter of the cloister. He threw himself heart and soul into the religious life, but was disappointed with the result. He performed a series of observances, which were framed to discipline his soul into holiness; but they brought him no nearer to God. Repeated motions of sin required repeated penance. There was no progress in his spiritual life. God remained in his eyes an inexorable judge demanding obedience to an impossible law. From the despair which followed on this
experience Luther was delivered chiefly by the kindly wisdom of Staupitz, who strove to dispel the clouds created by ceaseless introspection, and appealed to common-sense against the delusions of religious sentimentalism. He besought the young man not to regard every blunder as a sin; “a fancied sinner”, he urged, “looks for an unreal Savior”. He led his thoughts from the fear of God to the love of God; from the dread of sin to the desire for righteousness. He recommended a closer study of the Bible, especially of the writings of S. Paul, of S. Augustin among the fathers, and of Tauler amongst more modern writers. Acting on this advice Luther gradually won his way to inward peace. The duty of penitence, which had been a cause of despair when it was extorted from his fear, became natural and spontaneous when it flowed from a sense of the greatness of redeeming love. The influence of Staupitz on Luther brought into his religion something of the sense of freedom and joyousness which the Renaissance had revealed.

The intensity and sincerity of this protracted struggle gave Luther’s character the force and directness which it always retained. His whole being depended on the consciousness of his relationship to a loving God, and his attitude towards life was determined solely by this. Strong in his belief he applied himself to theological study. He was not a scholar; indeed, he never was at home in Greek and knew no Hebrew. But he had a robust intelligence, an eager mind, and that originality which comes from a resolve to turn all knowledge to practical account. More and more he turned from the writings of the schoolmen to the study of S. Augustin and S. Paul. Staupitz kept a watchful eye upon his progress, and in 1508 summoned him to leave his cloister at Erfurt for that of Wittenberg, with the intention of appointing him a teacher at the university. The business of the order required that he should visit Rome in 1510; and Luther felt his devotion to the city of the martyrs pale before the religious indifference which he saw on every side. Soon after his return to Wittenberg he graduated in theology and began to lecture. He quickly gained a reputation as a teacher, more through his power of impressing his pupils than through any depth of scholarship. His teaching was practical and personal, and he was equally forcible in the pulpit and in the lecture-desk. He was a great personality in Wittenberg, where his geniality, frankness, sincerity, and homely common-sense made him universally popular. Like all earnest-minded men he was outspoken about the evils of the time, the cause of which he found in the low standard set up by the representatives of the ecclesiastical system. The past history of the Church showed that there had risen up against Christ's Gospel, first the power of the world, then the wisdom of the world; now it is the goodness of the world that opposes true religion. Men tried to make religion an easy thing; they substituted forms and observances for real penitence and seeking after God. “Such is the reign of slothfulness”, he exclaims, “that though the worship of God abounds, it is in the letter only, without affection and without the spirit, and very few are fervent. And all this happens because we think that we are something and do enough; and so we make no efforts and do no violence to ourselves, and make the way to heaven very easy, by Indulgences, by smooth teaching, so that a single sigh suffices”.

Against this slothfulness, this false peace, Luther exhorted his hearers to strive; for “prosperity is a twofold adversity and security a double danger: where there is no temptation, all is temptation; where there is no persecution, all is persecution. More souls perish through sloth than perish through persecution or heresy: we must train ourselves to war against this sloth, as the confessors and teachers of old warred against the evils of their own time. Our enemy is more difficult to attack because it is not an
outward power, which stirs us to good by the necessity of facing it: it is an inward principle which relaxes our courage and lulls us into fancied security”.

Such was the popular side of Luther's teaching, and the ideas on which it was founded were impressed by him on the theological teaching of Wittenberg, so that he wrote in May, 1517: “My theology and Augustin make great way, and reign in our university by God’s help: Aristotle is gradually declining towards perpetual oblivion: lectures on the Sentences are marvelously disregarded, and no one can hope for a class unless he teaches our theology, i.e., the Bible or S. Augustin or some other doctor of weight”. Thus Luther felt proud of his efforts: he was bringing to light doctrinal conceptions which had long been overlooked: he was creating a strong school of theology in a growing university: and he was impressing his own ideas upon the popular mind as a preacher. In his own sphere he regarded himself as a leader of men, and accepted the responsibilities of the position. He was not at liberty to put aside uncomfortable questions when they arose, but felt that he must face them and endeavor to find an answer.

Such a question was raised by the arrival on the confines of Saxony of a commissary of the Archbishop of Mainz, Johann Tetzel, a Dominican, who was entrusted with the power of granting Papal Indulgences in return for a contribution towards the building fund of S. Peter's in Rome. There were many points connected with Tetzel's activity which rendered it exceptionally questionable. First of all, Albert of Brandenburg had succeeded to the dignity of Archbishop of Mainz at the age of twenty-four, and was scarcely commended to his high office by his personal merits. But the succession to the See of Mainz had been rapid, as Albert was the third occupant within ten years. The payment to the Pope of annates, and the heavy fee of 24,000 florins for the pallium on each vacancy, had impoverished the See; and Albert had negotiated with the Pope that he should pay ready money, and be allowed to receive in return half the proceeds of the sale of Indulgences within his province. As he had borrowed the money from the bank of the Fuggers at Augsburg, the receipts of the sale of Indulgences were their security; and one of their clerks accompanied the preachers. Further, Germany was especially given over to Indulgence preachers: other sovereigns had refused them admission to their dominions, but Maximilian raised no objection. Moreover, the extension of Indulgences to such an object as the building of S. Peter's was of recent growth, and tended to make them a permanent and continuous part of ecclesiastical practice. If this was so, it was desirable that their exact meaning and value should be clearly understood. Tetzel had all the qualities of a revivalist preacher, and his eloquence was effective in awakening a sense of sin. Was this awakening to lead to nothing but an assurance of forgiveness in return for a gift of money? Educated men knew that this was not so; but what did the ignorant think? How was the matter put before them? How could it be put before them without exaggeration by one whose interest it was to raise all the money that he could?

Such thoughts rose in many minds, and found frequent expression. Sensible men shrugged their shoulders, and left the superstitious multitude to choose for themselves. But Luther could not pass the matter so lightly by. He did not doubt the lawfulness and usefulness of Indulgences, but he found in their indefinite extension one of the causes of religious sloth. “Popes and priests, like spendthrift heirs, squander the graces and Indulgences gathered by the blood of Christ and the martyrs, and do not try to increase the treasure. Yet no one can share in a common good who does not add his portion. But men think that this treasure is always ready for use at their will. They give themselves to
the world, because the world passes away and the treasure of Indulgences remains. As they aim at both, they seek the world first, lest it should escape them, and think that heaven is abundantly secured for them afterwards”. Such thoughts as these grew more vivid and distinct as Tetzel drew nearer to Saxony, as Luther heard the stories of his success,—how the clergy prepared the way before him by preaching on the great benefits to be obtained, how the people flocked from far and near to greet the commissary on his coming, how the Papal Bull was borne in solemn state escorted by the dignitaries of the town.

All this seemed to Luther to give an undue prominence to Indulgences, to confuse the minds of simple folk about their real meaning, and to promote that false sense of security which he regarded as the great enemy of true religion. It is true that he was not called upon to speak. Tetzel was not allowed by the Elector of Saxony to enter his dominions, and he did not advance farther than Jüterbock, which was the nearest spot to Wittenberg outside the Saxon frontier. But Luther was not a man to hold his tongue when he had made up his mind. He wished to have the question of Indulgences discussed, and a clearer understanding arrived at about the real doctrine of the Church on the subject. As a first step towards this end he proposed an academic disputation, and on October 31, 1517, fixed on the usual place for academic notices, the door of the Castle Church of Wittenberg, ninety-five theses on the subject of Indulgences, and announced his readiness to maintain them by argument against all comers. At the same time he wrote to his diocesan, the Bishop of Brandenburg, informing him what he had done, and also to the Archbishop of Mainz, before whom he laid a statement of the practical evils to which the vagueness of the existing system was liable.

Viewed in the light of its after results this step seems bolder than it really was. There was great latitude in academic disputations, and a disputant might argue in behalf of opinions which he was not prepared to maintain in the end. The question which Luther raised was a difficult one, and he was justified in reminding the Archbishop of Mainz that ecclesiastical opinion was doubtful. There had been a gradual development of practice and of teaching concerning Indulgences which had never received any authoritative definition; but of late years opinions had been put forward which were exceedingly repugnant to Luther's mind, and he wished to have the question discussed on its merits.

In the Early Church notorious sin cut off the sinner from the right of communion, until by penitence he had made his peace with God, and by a public display of penitence had made amends to the Christian community for the scandal which he had caused. The element of sin against God, which was forgiven through penitence, was distinguished from the wrong done to man, which required punishment before it could be remitted. The requirements of divine and human justice were both satisfied by the same temper of mind on the part of the penitent. The external signs demanded by the Church were only an exhibition of the requisite temper of mind, and a help towards its attainment. When the Church was satisfied of the reality of penitence, restoration to Church membership was given by the bishop. As the number of professing Christians increased, public confession and humiliation were no longer possible. Private confession to a priest became the sign of penitence; and the priest, as the officer of the Church, discharged the functions which had before been exercised by the community. A sinner proclaimed his penitence by confession; the priest helped him to a penitent mind by his advice and his prayers; then by absolution he restored him to Christian communion. But the outward satisfaction still remained; and a penitential system came into being, which followed the
example of legal penalties. Offences were classified, and a definite number of days to be passed in penitential discipline was assigned to each.

Indulgences first arose as a remission of penitential acts due to the Church. As the penitential system became more highly organized, they passed from a remission of outstanding debts to a commutation of them into money payments, following the analogy of the *wehrgeld* in the Germanic codes of law. The development of an organized belief in Purgatory extended the sphere within which satisfaction could be made. The spread of the Hildebrandine conception of the Papacy enabled the Pope, as the head of the Church, to determine the forms of commutation which were most efficacious; and Urban II recognized an expedition to the Holy Land as a full commutation for all penance.

The theologians of the twelfth century elevated penance to a sacrament, defining it as consisting of contrition, confession, and satisfaction. Confession brought contrition to the test, and judged its reality; the accompanying absolution remitted the eternal guilt of sin and restored the penitent to friendship with God, while the temporal penalty due for sin was reduced to reasonable proportions; satisfaction was the payment of the penalty which still remained, and must be paid here or in Purgatory. It was the compensation for the wrong done to God and man, and must be made by fasting, almsgiving, and prayers. Thus every step in the development of ecclesiastical practice tended to give greater prominence to satisfaction, actually though not in theory. It became disciplinary; it was left to be paid after absolution; it was an embarrassing remnant of a past transaction; until it was cleared off the soul was deprived of merit. It was natural that men should wish to substitute acts of special devotion for the dreariness of long terms of penitential observance. They went on pilgrimages, they thronged to ecclesiastical festivals on great occasions, such as the dedications of churches, till in 1215 Innocent III limited episcopal Indulgences at such times to the period of one year at the most.

Still the actual use of Indulgences went beyond ecclesiastical theory, and it was the work of the great theologians of the thirteenth century to provide a theoretical basis. S. Bonaventura laid down the main lines by an analysis of satisfaction into two parts, one remedial against future sin, another the penalty for the wrong done. The first must be borne by the offender, the second could be paid vicariously. To condone the penalties of sin there are three means: first, the contrition of the sinner, whereby the eternal penalty is changed into a temporal penalty by the remission of guilt; secondly, the merits of Christ working in the sacraments, through which the temporal penalty is commuted by priestly absolution into a measure proportionate to the sinner’s power to pay; thirdly, the merits of the Universal Church whereby this diminished penalty may be still further remitted. The spiritual treasure of the Church, out of which Indulgences might be given, was partly her dower as the bride of Christ, partly works of supererogation of which she was trustee. These could be dispensed by bishops, especially by the Pope, in return for alms, pilgrimages, visiting of relics, and other honors paid to the saints. To this S. Thomas added the logical conclusion that, as Indulgences were given out of the treasure of the Church, they were remissions, and not merely commutations; they did not depend upon the devotion, the work, or the gifts of the receiver.

The starting-point of both these theologians was prevailing practice. Indulgences existed, and therefore were right. It was their business to give a rational explanation of what the Church had thought fit to do. The acceptance of this principle enabled Papal
practice to find adequate employment for theological activity. The demand for Indulgences steadily increased. In proportion to the sincerity of his penitence, the sinner, who felt that he had been restored to grace by the sacrament of penance, longed to be released from the burden of satisfaction, and dreaded lest death should cut short his opportunity and leave his soul to the penalties of Purgatory. Men proclaimed their own helplessness and besought the Church to find a means of escape. This was provided by Boniface VIII in the form of a Jubilee Indulgence. Founding his action on ancient tradition, his desire for men’s salvation, and the consent of the Cardinals, he decreed that those who in the year 1300, and every hundredth year following, visited the Churches of S. Peter and S. Paul in Rome, being truly penitent and having made their confession, should have the fullest remission of all their sins. The success of the first Jubilee led Clement VI in 1350 to reduce the period from a hundred to fifty years; and in so doing he defined the source of Indulgences to be the treasure of the Church, acquired by Christ, and by Him committed to S. Peter and his successors, to be dispensed on reasonable grounds to those who were truly penitent and had confessed. It was to be applied for the total or partial remission of the temporal penalty due for sin; and the Pope thought fit to grant a total Indulgence to all who visited the Roman Churches in the year of Jubilee. He further granted to pilgrims the right to choose a confessor on the way, and extended the Indulgence to those who died on the journey.

After this, Urban VI in 1389 reduced the period to thirty-three years; and Nicolas V in 1450 extended to several dioceses in Germany the advantages of the Jubilee, so that those who could not undertake the journey to Rome might substitute pilgrimages to Churches in their own neighborhood.

Paul II reduced the term still further to twenty-five years, and defined the year of Jubilee as the year of plenary remission and grace, and of reconciliation of the human race with our most loving Redeemer.

Sixtus IV gave a great impulse to the growth of privileged altars, by declaring that Indulgences availed, by means of prayer, for souls in Purgatory, provided the Pope expressly extended them to this purpose. Innocent VIII in 1489 sent a commissary to Germany who offered, in return for help against the Turk, the Indulgences attached to a pilgrimage to Rome in the year of Jubilee, and also the privilege of choosing a confessor, who was empowered to grant plenary absolution once in life and at the point of death. The example was readily followed. In 1509 Julius II extended this Indulgence to all who contributed towards the rebuilding of S. Peter's. This was prolonged by Leo X. The Jubilee Indulgence had become a permanent institution.

When the growth of this system is considered, it is easy to see its importance in developing the Papal power. The Pope was sole master of an important part of ecclesiastical discipline, and could lighten the burden of penance to every sinner. He could confer privileges on churches, and could override the parochial system by his letters granting permission to choose a confessor. He was a minister of mercy and pardon. By his help the sacrament of penance could be made complete; he could remit all the temporal penalty that was due; his prayers prevailed in Purgatory; he could restore the penitent, who had received absolution, to his baptismal purity by relieving him of outstanding debts.

But all this system, though it existed and was powerful, was difficult of explanation. Indulgences, granted to those who were contrite and had confessed, had an intelligible meaning. But a grant of plenary Indulgence, accompanied by a permission to
choose a confessor, who was commissioned to give plenary absolution when necessary, and then apply the Indulgence so as to clear the score, was somewhat complicated. It certainly raised a presumption that such an Indulgence could do more than merely remit canonical penance. It seemed to imply that the Indulgence extended the scope of priestly absolution, or even availed to help the penitent to contrition. A member of Luther’s order, a German Augustinian, Johann von Palz, who died in 1511, expended much ingenuity in considering the virtue of confession for converting attrition, or imperfect repentance, into contrition. Palz was of opinion that the Jubilee Indulgence availed for the remission of guilt and penalty alike. It extended the virtue of the sacrament of penance, which it included, to all cases, and so provided for the remission of guilt, while the Indulgence itself remitted all penalties. It was on such grounds as these that Indulgence preachers could represent their office to be the exaltation of the Cross, the setting forth of the complete reconciliation of man with God.

Again, Indulgences originally availed only to the contrite. After guilt had been purged by true penitence the Indulgence diminished the load of penalty. But who could be sure of the reality of his contrition? The help given by the priest in confession towards gaining a contrite heart was not a sufficient security. Penance itself was clothed with a sacramental efficacy which could convert attrition into contrition, and so prepare the way for the reception of Indulgence. If faith in God was difficult, faith in the visible Church, as the dispenser of God’s gifts, was more within man’s reach. If he received the sacraments, without interposing any hindrance of disbelief or mortal sin, he might commit the rest to the grace of God dispensed by the Church. From this point of view the grant of Indulgences to souls in Purgatory became possible. It was true that the Pope claimed no jurisdiction over Purgatory, and could only offer his prayers; but there was no doubt that those prayers were effectual. Whatever question there might be about the need of contrition, if the Indulgence was to be gained for oneself, it was clear that the moral condition of one who sought an Indulgence for another was sufficiently shown by the charity which prompted the offering required.

On such points as these theological opinion was not unanimous, and many theologians protested against the undue extension of Indulgences. But their protests did not influence the commissaries who were entrusted with their sale. It was natural that they should magnify their office, and seize upon the highest views of the efficacy of Indulgences which had received any sanction from canonists. Thus Tetzel’s instructions came from Arcimboldi, Archbishop of Milan, and laid down the advantages to be obtained as (1) a plenary remission for all sins and a restoration of grace; (2) a confessionale or letter of penitential privilege, which gave the right of choosing a confessor who was empowered to give absolution, even in reserved cases, to commute vows, and to administer the sacrament; (3) a share in all the prayers and blessings of the Church; (4) permission to obtain Indulgences for souls in Purgatory, which availed not by virtue of the spiritual state of the living contributor, but by reference to the condition of the departed soul at the time of its departure.

It is obvious that a complicated system of this kind taxed a trained intelligence to understand and explain it. Doubtless it was capable of being used as a means of quickening in the contrite heart the sense of Divine forgiveness, and a desire to bring forth the fruit of good works. But if it was not properly understood; if its outward import was regarded rather than its inward meaning; if it was used as a substitute for true repentance, or as a means of relieving the soul from the pursuit of contrition, it was undoubtedly dangerous. The dangers attaching to such an elaborate system, built upon
such a slender basis, were sure to be apparent to the critical spirit developed by the New Learning; and we are not surprised to find that the restless mind of Johann Wessel had been turned towards this subject.

Wessel criticized the entire conception of penitence, and argued that the beginning of the restoration of the sinner was the renewed sense of love to God, which had been lost by sin. God demanded love, not sorrow, and sorrow was only acceptable as a sign of the love from which it flowed. Hence true contrition was the perfect detestation of sin, which could not precede the reconciliation wrought in the sacrament of penance, but followed it as a fruit of justification. Consequently confession did not operate by increasing contrition; it was not judicial but ministerial; the penitent stood at God's judgment seat; the priest pronounced God's forgiveness; confession was a guarantee of inward penitence, an outward sign of its reality, not a means of obtaining remission which was given by God only to the penitent heart; the priest could help the penitent by the example of his own life, not by the penalties which he inflicted. Further, he lays down that the exaction of satisfaction invalidates the virtue of the sacrament by putting off the time of its full operation. He instances the prodigal son as a proof that the joy of forgiveness is part of the heritage of the restored sinner.

With this view of penitence, Wessel regarded Purgatory not as a place of punishment, but as a place of cleansing from the defilement of sin, and as such necessary for all souls; so that not even apostles and martyrs were entirely exempt from a period of purgation before they enjoyed the Beatific Vision. It is obvious that, with these opinions about contrition and Purgatory, Wessel could find scanty room for Indulgences. If satisfaction could not supplement, but only guarantee, repentance; if the pains of Purgatory were not penal, but only purgative, what was the value of Indulgences? Wessel answered that they were the ministerial token of God's remission of the penalty due to sin, and were dependent on the sincerity and completeness of contrition. They were dangerous if they were a substitute for that inward humiliation which directed the heart towards the perfect love of God as the great end of all spiritual discipline. Wessel implied that Indulgences had much better be abandoned altogether.

His orthodox friends were shocked at such teaching, and asked if he entirely cast aside the authority of the Church and ecclesiastical tradition. Wessel answered by an examination of the historical basis of Indulgences. It is not to be found in Scripture, nor is it a custom that can be traced to apostolic tradition. It cannot claim to be part of the rule of faith; nor are the Bulls of Boniface VIII and Clement VI sufficient to exalt it to that position.

Wessel’s opinions had no immediate influence. They were the speculative views of a thinker who was not satisfied to begin from existing custom, but went back to the nature and origin of ecclesiastical institutions. This was not the point from which Luther started, nor were Wessel’s writings known to him. He was moved by a feeling that ignorant people attached to Indulgences an importance which did not really belong to them; they neglected the real requisites for repentance, and were lulled into a false sense of security. Had he chosen to write a treatise on the subject, he might have raised a theological controversy. But Luther did not approach the question from a theological, but from a practical, point of view. He was not concerned with the theory of Indulgences as a whole; but he had heard and read many opinions which seemed to him unsound. He wished to contradict these opinions, and discuss them with those who chose to maintain them by argument. So he threw together these disputable points in
such order as occurred to his mind. His theses are singularly wanting in the characteristics which might have been expected from a theological professor. They are not arranged in logical sequence, nor do they strive to define precisely the theological questions to be discussed. They are the utterances of one who was rather in contact with the popular consciousness than interested in intellectual ideas as such—one who did not pause to weigh exactly his words, but was more eager to express the conclusions of common-sense than to narrow the issue which he raised.

Luther's theses began with an assertion that the penitence required by Christ is a habit of mind, a constant sense of sinfulness, which demands a constant hatred of the old sinful self; and outward acts of penitence are necessary as they confess this inward feeling, and lead to a perpetual mortification of the flesh. Confession is a necessary part of penitence, for God will not forgive one who does not humble himself; but the penitence required by God is different from the satisfaction imposed by a priest in the sacrament of penance. Indulgences deal only with the latter, not with the former. The Pope can only remit penalties which have been imposed according to the canons of the Church; he can remit nothing of the guilt of sin, except so far as he ministerially declares God's forgiveness; and the penitential life which God requires is independent of, and outside, the duty of confession and satisfaction. The penalties imposed by the Church are imposed only on the living, and death dissolves them; canonical penances are not reserved for Purgatory, and all that the Pope can do for souls in Purgatory is done by prayer, not by any power of the keys.

As to the treasure of the Church, from which the Pope grants Indulgences, it has never been defined, nor is it understood by the people. It cannot be the merits of Christ and the Saints, for these without the Pope work grace in the inner man: it would seem that it is the power of the keys, by which the Pope can remit penalties imposed by way of satisfaction. This amount of efficacy Luther leaves to Indulgences, adding that they are not to be despised, for they are a declaration of God's remission of sins. But he is anxious to guard against a misunderstanding of the extent of their efficacy; they are useful if men do not trust in them, most harmful if they lead men to lose the fear of God; they are not to be put before good works proceeding from love. It is most difficult, even for acute theologians, to extol the value of Indulgences and yet keep a true sense of contrition before the people; the teaching of commissaries entrusted with selling them deceives the people through the largeness of the efficacy which it attributes to them, puts contributions to the building of S. Peter's before needful works of charity, shocks the consciences of many, and exposes the Pope to ridicule.

Luther was careful in these theses to draw a line between the teaching of the schoolmen and the doctrine of the Church. He distinguished between true wheat and tares which had been sown while the bishops slept, between Papal Bulls and vain dreams which were preached to the people. He expressed a reaction in favor of the theology of S. Augustin and S. Bernard against the developments of the thirteenth century. His contention was that much of the current teaching had never been formally accepted, and he wished to have an expression of the mind of the Pope, and an explanation of the definite opinion of the Church.

What Luther proposed in the first instance was an academical disputation on the points which he raised. No one seems to have accepted his challenge in Wittenberg; but his theses were printed, and created an amount of popular interest which was surprising to him. Still Luther had certainly no party in his favor. His former friends at Erfurt
accused him of pride; and he answered that without some appearance of pride, some suspicion of contentiousness, no new opinion could be brought forward. His ecclesiastical superior, the Bishop of Brandenburg, sent him a kindly message advising him to be silent for a time, and Luther promised to obey. The Archbishop of Mainz did not communicate with him, but sent his theses to the Pope.

The first answer to Luther came from Tetzel, who adapted Luther's method, and in the end of 1517 published at Frankfort a series of a hundred and six propositions, in which he stated anew all the theories which Luther had attacked. His basis was that the inner penitence of heart, which Luther had taken as the only essential in repentance, did not dispense with the need of satisfaction, for God would leave no sin unavenged. Starting from this, he denounced Luther's theses one by one as erroneous. He did not so much argue as contradict; but it is noticeable that what Luther had said generally about the Pope, Tetzel applied specifically, and inserted the name of ‘Leo’ instead of the generic title ‘the Pope’. To make more clear his meaning that he looked solely to the Papal power for the support of Indulgences, he issued a second series of propositions “in honor of the apostolic seat”, in which he asserted that the Pope alone could determine matters of faith and authoritatively interpret Scripture; that he could not err when pronouncing a judicial decision; that no man, nor even a General Council, could define the faith about Indulgences, but only the Pope; that the Church held many truths which were not to be found in Scripture or in the more ancient doctors; that it was heretical to call in question anything which had been approved by the Roman Church. It was understood at the time that these propositions, though appearing in Tetzel's name, were mainly the work of the Frankfort theologian, Conrad Wimpina. At all events they served to indicate the line of defence which Luther's opponents would adopt.

Meanwhile Leo X had received Luther’s theses from the Archbishop of Mainz, and at first regarded the controversy as a “monk’s quarrel”, a continuation of the strife which raged about Reuchlin. In February, 1518, he referred the matter to the general of the Augustinians, Gabriel Venetus, with orders to act promptly and extinguish the flame before it had time to burn up into a conflagration. Leo’s sympathies were with the New Learning, and he had no wish to face questions of principle; antagonism must be avoided and disputes patched up; it was only a question of skillful management. But the theologians in Rome did not take the matter so easily. The Dominican, Sylvester Mazzolini, called Prierias from his birthplace, Master of the Papal Palace, had already taken a decided part against Reuchlin, and was of opinion that the lenity shown in his case was encouraging ecclesiastical disorder. As a devoted disciple of S. Thomas, he felt bound to lay aside the important work of commenting on the Summa of his great master and devote three days to the refutation of Luther. His attitude towards Luther was one of lofty contempt for one who was at once so obstinate and so ignorant: he wished to see whether Luther had an iron nose or a brazen head, so hard that they could not be smashed in the encounter. In the first place Luther had laid no foundation for his position: Prierias was not going to follow his example, but would make it clear on what grounds his arguments rested.

(1) The Universal Church was in its essence the assembly of all Christians; virtually it was the Roman Church; and the Roman Church was virtually the Pope.

(2) As the Universal Church cannot err about faith and morals, so a Council presided over by the Pope cannot err in the long run, though it may err at first, but if it
seeks for the truth is sure to find it at last; in like manner the Pope cannot err when he
gives an official decision.

(3) He is a heretic who does not accept the doctrine of the Roman Church and the
Pope as the rule of faith.

(4) The Roman Church gives its decisions by acts as well as by words: so custom
has the force of law; and anyone who doubts the acts of the Church in faith or morals is
a heretic.

These positions obviously assumed the questions which Luther wished to discuss.
Luther contended that the people were taught views about penance which had never
received the formal sanction of the Church: he was answered that custom was the same
as law. He wished to discuss the exact value which the Church attached to Indulgences:
he was told that Popes granted them, and that it was heretical to go beyond that fact.
Further, so far as the question might be discussed, what the Popes meant by the grant of
Indulgences, Prierias contented himself with references to S. Thomas, whose writings
have been approved as the rule of faith of the Roman Church. Prierias even praised the
goodness of the Pope who was content with the voluntary offerings of his people in
return for Indulgences, whereas, as king endowed alike with spiritual and temporal
power, he might demand them of right. He was not bound to argue with men calling
themselves Christians who were ill-affected; he could leave them to be silenced by the
secular arm. Prierias, in fact, refused to discuss the question of Indulgences on its own
merits; it was to his mind only a particular case of the use of the Papal power.
Indulgences meant what the Pope declared them to mean; what that meaning was might
be gathered from the scholastic doctors: in what sense that meaning was explained to
the popular mind was apparently not worth considering. Prierias so completely ignored
Luther’s object that he called his book *A Dialogue about the Power of the Pope; against
the Presumptuous Conclusions of Martin Luther.*

Before answering the many clamors which Luther knew to be raised against him,
he set to work to explain more carefully the contents of his theses, and in May, 1518,
finished his *Resolutiones Disputationum de Virtute Indulgentiarum.* This was for the
most part a re-statement of his original positions, with citations of authorities and
arguments. He emphasized his central opinion, that the current theories about
Indulgences rested upon the teaching of a series of schoolmen, who started from the
writings of S. Thomas and S. Bonaventura, and expended their ingenuity in turning into
doctrines the speculations and opinions of those great teachers. He spoke out on these
subjects, because men had become desperate of any real reform in the Church, and
concerted action was impossible: he believed in the uprightness and erudition of Leo X,
but what could he do single-handed in the confusion of the present age, coming after
such Popes as Alexander VI and Julius II? But Luther felt bound to face the fact that
there was ground for thinking that some Popes had showed a disposition to favor the
opinion that they had power over Purgatory. “I am not moved”, he said, “by the thought
of what pleases or displeases the Pope. He is a man as I am. There have been many
Popes who have been guilty not only of errors but vices. I listen to the Pope as Pope—
that is, as he speaks in the Canons, or according to the Canons, or determines with a
Council—but not as he speaks according to his own head; lest I should be driven to say
with some that the horrid bloodshed of Julius II was a benefit conferred on Christ’s
sheep”.
The Pope, he continues, has no power to make new articles of faith; even if the greater part of Christendom agreed with the Pope, it would not be heretical to dissent till the matter had been decided by a General Council: thus the greater part of Christendom believed in the immaculate conception of the Virgin, but it was not heretical to gainsay it. The treasure of the Church, out of which it was said that Indulgences were given, could not be the merits of the Saints, for no one had entirely fulfilled the Law of God; nor the merits of Christ, for that was the treasure of the whole Church, not applicable to Indulgences only. In fact, though Luther did not speak out his full mind, and strove to retain Indulgences as a ministerial remission of temporal punishment, it is clear that he found some difficulty in vindicating for them any useful place. He wished to be as submissive as possible, but he had already come to the conclusion that Indulgences were only illusory, and stood in the way of genuine efforts after amendment of life. Still his general attitude was one of a seeker after truth, who was willing to submit to the voice of authority. He sent his book to his diocesan, with a letter in which he asked him to revise or destroy it if he thought fit. “I only dispute”, he said, “I do not assert”. He sent it to Staupitz, as the head of his order in Germany, asking him to forward it to the Pope. He wrote a letter to Leo X, in which he spoke of the scandals caused by the sale of Indulgences; pointed out that the difference between him and his opponents depended on the value attached to the scholastic philosophy and the authority of Aristotle; and ended by declaring himself to be prostrate before the Pope’s feet: “Do with me as you will: I will acknowledge your voice, the voice of Christ presiding and Speaking in you. If I have deserved death, I will not refuse to die”.

He still expressed himself in the language to which he had been accustomed, and spoke with all a monk's humility. He was prepared for a long and stubborn controversy; but there was room for this in the Church: if Thomists were divided against Scotists, if the schoolmen were divided into parties, why should not he dissent from S. Thomas on some points and have his differences discussed? He considered that he had cleared himself from any suspicion of heresy, by prefacing his 'Resolutions' with a statement that he wished to say nothing which was not contained in the Scriptures, the fathers recognized by the Roman Church, the canons, and decretals; as to the opinions of S. Thomas, S. Bonaventura, and the other schoolmen, he considered himself at liberty to criticize them, though he knew that some Thomists maintained that S. Thomas had been in all things approved by the Church.

This rejection of scholastic in favour of biblical theology was still further emphasized in a Reply to Prierias, which followed almost immediately after the publication of the 'Resolutions', and which Luther contemptuously says was the work of two days. In this reply Luther’s controversial temper certainly overshot the mark of modesty. He says, truly enough, that the Dialogue of Prierias was supercilious; but he adds, “and entirely Italian and Thomistic”. Throughout his Reply he jibes at S. Thomas, at Aristotle, and at scholastic learning. He denies the fundamental position of Prierias, that the Church is virtually the Pope. “I hold the Church to be virtually in Christ, and representatively only in a Council. If the virtual Church is the Pope, what horrors shall we have to reckon in the Church! The bloodshed of Julius II, the tyranny of Boniface VIII. You will not persuade us under the name of your virtual and representative Church to revere such things. Our Germans say that your book was not so much written to refute Luther as to flatter the Pope and the Cardinals”.

He was willing to allow that the Pope was the ministerial head of the Church; but the faith of the Church depended on the definitions of General Councils. “You call the
Roman Church the rule of faith: I have always believed that the faith was the rule of the Roman Church. The Roman Church has preserved the faith because it has held by the Scriptures and the fathers of the Church”. It appeared to Luther's mind inconceivable that the Pope, if once he faced the position, could accept as beyond dispute the theories of the schoolmen, or should be willing to declare them beyond the reach of challenge.

The theologian with whom Luther had most sympathy was Gerson, and in many of his utterances he approximated to the Conciliar theory of the Church. But even here he did not adopt any absolute view: “both a Pope and a Council may err”, he said. It would seem that he reserved the right of the Christian consciousness, resting on the Scriptures and primitive theology, to go behind modern practice and modern theory, and criticize the basis of ecclesiastical institutions, when they affected the development of the spiritual life of the individual.

LUTHER’S POSITION.

This last point, however, was only in the background. The practical issue raised by Luther was that of the meaning of Indulgences. The replies of Luther’s antagonists had led him to declare that the mere sanction of Papal usage was not enough to bind the Church, or at least was not enough to put the matter beyond discussion. Doubtless the eye of the experienced theologian saw many dangers that might arise from a protracted controversy, and wished in the interests of peace to avoid it. But the question before the Pope was whether or no such a controversy was legitimate. It was one thing to moderate it and keep it within limits; it was another thing to prohibit it altogether.

Luther had said many things which ran counter to the prevalent tendency of theological thought, and had asserted his individual opinions with undue emphasis. But he insisted that he was within a domain which was open for controversy; because the re had as yet been no authoritative expression of formulated opinion. He had said nothing that was manifestly contrary to decretales or canons; if sometimes he spoke rashly, his utterances were still capable of explanation.

Germany was in a condition of intellectual ebullience, as had been seen in the quarrel about Reuchlin. Would it not be wise to give Luther considerable latitude, to leave him to the theologians of Germany, and let the controversy die out? Perhaps this would have been Leo X’s inclination, if the matter had not been of practical importance. But if Indulgences were to be questioned, their marketable value would decline; and this was a serious matter.

The Archbishop of Mainz, as a man of business who found his interests menaced, had referred Luther’s theses to the Pope. Leo at first hoped that Luther would be admonished by the superior of his order to behave more discreetly; but it does not seem that any active steps were taken, and Luther's immediate superior in Germany, Staupitz, was too much of Luther's opinion to interfere with any effect. When the theological learning of Prieriaus only roused Luther’s combative temper, Leo seems to have been persuaded that he must take the matter in hand; and in July a citation was issued ordering Luther to appear within sixty days in Rome, and answer to the charge of heresy.

The commissioners appointed to examine him were Girolamo Ghinucci, Bishop of Asoli, auditor of the Camera, and Sylvester Prierias, whose opinion had been already declared. The appointment of Prierias is strange, and can best be accounted for by the supposition that it was intended to give Luther an opportunity for delay, by enabling
him to protest against one of his judges as a literary antagonist. Luther, however, did not take advantage of this point. His desire was that the cause should be decided in Germany; and he suggested that his prince, the Elector of Saxony, should afford him an excuse for not appearing in Rome, by refusing a safe-conduct through his territories. This subterfuge was, however, unnecessary; for Cardinal Rovere had already written to the Elector, who expressed himself neutral about the question in dispute, but demanded for Luther a fair trial. As the reputation of his new university was at stake, this was a reasonable demand; and the Pope agreed that Luther’s case should be examined by the Cardinal Legate, who was then in Germany, attending the Diet which was sitting at Augsburg

When Luther set out for Augsburg at the end of September, 1518, he was conscious that he did not stand alone. His cause had been espoused by the students of Wittenberg, who showed a somewhat boisterous loyalty to their teacher, by seizing all the copies of Tetzel’s Propositions which were in Wittenberg, and burning them in the marketplace. Further, Luther had spoken out in his letters to men like Staupitz, and Spalatin, the chaplain of the Elector Frederick; and he knew that he had their sympathy and support. He dreamed of a strong theological school at Wittenberg, which should war against the schoolmen and their great founder, Aristotle, and should revive the study of strictly Biblical theology. In this hope he was greatly encouraged by the arrival in Wittenberg, on August 25, of Melanchthon, who, though only twenty-one years old, had already won a considerable reputation for learning. Philip Schwarzerd, son of an armorer of Bretton in the Palatinate, was a great-nephew of Reuchlin, who encouraged him in his career. When the Elector Frederick asked Reuchlin’s advice about a professor of Greek for Wittenberg, Reuchlin did not hesitate to commend his nephew as the soundest scholar in Germany after Erasmus. Melanchthon’s first lecture at Wittenberg sufficed to do away with the unfavorable impression produced by his small stature, his physical feebleness, and his nervous manner. Luther was delighted with his new colleague; and when Melanchthon began to lecture on Homer and S. Paul’s Epistle to Titus side by side, Luther’s hopes of the future of Wittenberg rose higher and higher. “We are all learning Greek”, he wrote, “that we may understand the Bible”. German scholarship might yet win new triumphs. As Hutten was striving to beat the Italian humanists in mastery of Latin style, so Luther was ready to do his best to carry on the contest in the region of theology. “The Romans have too long mocked us as thickheads, with their twistings and subtleties”.

Thus Luther felt that he had a cause to maintain—his own honor and freedom, the good name of his university, the future of German theology, and the national aspiration to be rid of foreign influence. He went with many misgivings, but he went resolved to do his best. “I will never be a heretic”, he wrote to Spalatin; “I may err in disputing; but I do not wish to decide anything; at the same time I do not wish to be enslaved by the opinions of men”.

The ostensible cause of the meeting of the Diet of Augsburg in August was to devise means for a crusade against the Turk. Such an expedition was sorely needed in the interests of Christendom, and the Pope was justified in urging it warmly on the attention of all. Maximilian also was in search of adventure, and would gladly have seen himself at the head of a German army. But the German princes were too much engaged in their personal affairs to feel any practical sympathy with their brethren who were menaced on the Eastern borders. They answered the Legate’s appeal by rehearsing the grievances which Germany endured from the Papacy. It was the weakness of the Papal
position that no one trusted it; and it was easy to parry its exhortations to patriotic conduct, by showing that German patriotism held the Papacy to be as much its foe as the Turk, and had reforms to make at home before it turned its attention abroad. When the news of this refusal reached the Pope, he sent an angry answer to his Legate. There was no ground for complaints about his dealings with Germany; he did nothing save maintain the reasonable rights enjoyed by his predecessors. Anything that could be proved to be extraordinary he would abolish; but he would not resign the privileges of the Holy See to satisfy the clamor of the thoughtless mob. So wrote Leo, conscious of his political importance to the Emperor, who wished to procure the election of his grandson, Charles, as King of the Romans, and his own coronation as Emperor. The Diet had dispersed, after showing that it could be led by neither Pope nor Emperor, when Luther arrived at Augsburg on October 12.

Maximilian, in a letter to the Pope, had shown his accustomed shrewdness in estimating the gravity of the issue now submitted. He warned him that old principles were being called in question, and that the works of the doctors of the Church were left unread, or were even ridiculed: the Reuchlin controversy had stirred men’s minds; the controversy about Indulgences threatened to be still more dangerous: unless the Pope managed to put an end to these disputes they would lead to a widespread movement against authority. So wrote Maximilian; perhaps with a view of warning the Pope how much he needed the imperial support in Germany; anyhow he threw on Leo the responsibility of quieting the agitation; he did not profess that he himself was able or willing to deal with it.

But Leo and his advisers paid no heed to the Emperor’s hint. They could not plead ignorance of the intellectual temper of Germany; for they had before them the literature of the Reuchlin controversy. They could not refuse to admit the right of theological discussion; for they had condoned the hardy speculations of Pomponazzo. The question raised by Luther did not concern any fundamental doctrine of the Christian faith. It touched upon points of admitted difficulty, about which various opinions had been expressed by learned theologians. But it was a matter in which speculative opinions could not be indulged, without involving some practical changes in the conduct of the business of the Papal Court. Slowly and persistently the ever-increasing number of officials had found employment for their energies, and had built up a system on the basis of Papal autocracy. It was very inconvenient to have any part of this system challenged; it was undignified to explain it. Luther might raise abstract questions at pleasure; he might discuss the meaning of Scripture or the doctrines of the Church; but no man must dispute the plain meaning of a document, which bore the Pope's signature or proceeded from any of the Papal courts. If this were once allowed, there would be no end to the practical difficulties which would ensue. Germany showed an unpleasant tendency towards unprofitable talk, and it was time that this should be checked. It was only necessary to put on a bold front, and state in all its solidity the claim of the Papacy to unlimited obedience. The Lateran Council had accepted it without reserve. What the Church had accepted must be practically enforced. Prierias had stated the position of the Curia, and his principles must be upheld. The Papal policy towards Luther was the result of the triumph of officials over statesmen in the Papal Court.

So the task of dealing with Luther was entrusted to the Cardinal Legate in Germany, Tommaso de Vio, known as Cajetan from his birthplace near Gaeta. Prierias had demolished Luther's arguments; Cajetan must order him to be silent. No man could have been better fitted for the purpose. From his boyhood Tommaso had devoted
himself to the study of the writings of S. Thomas, whose name he took on entering the
Dominican Order. His fame as a theologian won for him a professorship at Rome,
where he made his reputation by organizing the Lateran Council, and forging the
weapons whereby the Council of Pisa was overthrown. His speech, delivered at the
opening of the Council, enforced with unwonted precision the position that the Papal
supremacy was of divine institution, and remained on record as the clearest statement of
the actual principles on which the government of the Church was founded. For this
signal service he was called by Leo X to the Cardinalate, and was sent to Germany as a
man of solid learning and great reputation. No man seemed better fitted to compose a
theological dispute, and overawe rebellion by the weight of his authority.

Unfortunately Cajetan’s training had not developed his intellectual sympathies.
He had made up his mind that Aristotle was the first among philosophers, by reason of
his perception of the divine order of the universe, and that S. Thomas was the first
among theologians, by reason of his perception of the divine order in the mind of man.
Order was the one object of his pursuit, and order required obedience to authority. In the
matter of Indulgences Cajetan was in many points in sympathy with Luther. He had
written on the subject, and his opinions were opposed to the current practice of
Indulgence preachers. He held that an Indulgence was only valid when granted for a
lawful cause, and that it required a penitent condition of mind in the receiver; even after
receiving Indulgences penitence was necessary as a medicine to the soul. So careful was
Cajetan to clear his mind on the points which Luther had raised, that he spent his leisure
moments at Augsburg in resolving questions concerning Indulgences after the approved
method employed by his master. It was his duty to tell Luther that he was wrong; so he
proved to his own satisfaction that Luther's error lay in the raw, hasty, and unscholarly
method which he had adopted, and his absence of respect for the limitations with which
all trained intelligences ought to express their conclusions.

Having come to this decision Cajetan, had he been wise, would have seen the
necessity of rapid and conciliatory action. Had he approached Luther, immediately on
his arrival, as a brother scholar, he might have prepared the way for an agreement. But
Cajetan would not descend from the dignity of a Papal Legate, and awaited Luther as a
judge awaits a culprit. Luther arrived in Augsburg on October 7, and was advised by his
friends not to place himself in Cajetan’s hands till he had received the imperial safe-
conduct. So for five days Luther listened to stories about Cajetan with growing
suspicion, while officious busy-bodies tendered him their advice. An Italian diplomatist,
the envoy of the Marquis of Montserrat, in an off-hand way recommended him to
submit to Cajetan, to withdraw all that he had said amiss, and not to expect a discussion.
This flippant way of treating religious convictions as though they were matters of
temporal expediency was very distasteful to Luther. “If”, he answered, “it can be shown
that I have spoken contrary to the Church, I will be my own judge and will sing a
palinode. But the difficulty lies here; if the Legate holds to the opinions of S. Thomas
beyond the decree and authority of the Church, I cannot yield till the Church has
revoked the decree on which I rely”. “Ha”, was the answer, “you wish for a tournament
after all”. The talk only ended by leaving Luther disgusted with Italian levity.

When Luther appeared before Cajetan on October 12, Cajetan’s first object was to
save his own dignity and maintain his judicial position. He would not hold a
disputation, either in public or in private, and he had no notion of a friendly talk. He at
once laid before Luther what was expected of him; the Pope demanded a revocation of
his errors, and future silence about them and everything which might disturb the peace
of the Church. Nothing could have been more ill-advised. Luther had raised a practical question on moral and spiritual grounds; he might have been led to see that he had made some intellectual mistakes, that he had used exaggerated language, and had not fully considered his points in their relations to the rest of the ecclesiastical system. But the first step towards this end was sympathy with his moral aims, an admission of the need of some reform, and a recognition that the system of Indulgences as a whole was beset with difficulties. Cajetan spoke of none of these things. He demanded silence, without a word of sympathy or the faintest promise of reform; and the sole ground for his demand was obedience to the Papal authority as represented by himself. If Cajetan’s method of proceeding was dictated by a desire to avoid anything like discussion, it was singularly ill-adapted to its purpose. Luther naturally asked to be informed what were the errors which he was called upon to revoke. Cajetan brought forward two points:

1. The proposition that “the merits of Christ were not the treasure of Indulgences” was contrary to the Extravagant of Clement

2. The proposition that “faith was necessary to one who approached the sacrament of penance, otherwise he approached it to his judgment” was erroneous, as no one knew whether he would obtain grace or not.

These points were carefully chosen so as to cover in an unobtrusive way the central conceptions of Luther's position. After some verbal fencing, Luther said that the Papal decretals sometimes twisted Scripture, and merely repeated the opinion of S. Thomas. Cajetan thereupon asserted that the Pope was above a Council, above Scripture, above all things in the Church; the Council of Basel had been swept away, the opinions of the Gersonists condemned. Opposed to this summary view Luther urged the appeal of the University of Paris against the abrogation of the Pragmatic Sanction, as a proof that the views of the Conciliar party were still alive. An aimless discussion followed in which no progress was made.

Next day Luther began by a protest that he followed the holy Roman Church in all things; that he was seeking after truth, and ought not to be compelled, unheard and unconvicted, to revoke; he was not conscious of having said anything contrary to Scripture, the fathers, the decretals of the Popes, or right reason; still being liable to error he was ready to submit to the lawful judgment of the Church: for this purpose he was ready to give account of his opinions in writing or in disputation, and to be judged by the Universities of Basel, Freiburg, Louvain, and Paris. This was not at all to Cajetan's mind; his object was not discussion but silence; and he again insisted on recantation without more dispute. Luther offered to put his answer into writing, and at the request of Staupitz this was allowed.

The document which Luther submitted to the Legate showed a strong desire to be conciliatory. It is true that he still maintained that Papal decretals sometimes twisted Scripture, and merely repeated the opinion of S. Peter, should be tested by Scripture and the consciousness of the faithful; for even S. Peter had erred, and his opinion did not prevail at the Council of Jerusalem till it had met with the consent of the Church. But he urged that the language of the Bull of Clement VI, if carefully interpreted, did not contradict his position. The term, “the merits of Christ”, may be used in two senses; strictly speaking, “the merits of Christ” are imparted by the Holy Spirit only to the faithful soul; but in a secondary sense “the merits of Christ” may signify the results which flowed from them, amongst which is the power of the keys entrusted to His Church. It may therefore be said that the merits of Christ are the treasure of Indulgences, meaning that
the power of the keys flows from the merits of Christ, and by the power of the keys the Pope can remit the satisfaction due for sin. A close examination of the words of the decretal shows that it will bear this meaning, for it does not say that the merits of Christ are the treasure of the Church, but that Christ acquired a treasure for the Church, thus distinguishing between the cause and its effects. Though Luther gave this interpretation he expressed himself willing to change it for a better, and submitted himself to the judgment of the Church.

On the second point to which Cajetan had taken exception, the necessity of faith for justification, Luther pleaded that his views were neither new nor erroneous. He brought forward texts of Scripture, and quoted S. Augustin and S. Bernard in his favor; unless it could be shown that he had misinterpreted these authorities, he must adhere to them and obey God rather than man. He ended by imploring Cajetan to intercede for him with the Pope “that he do not cast into darkness a soul which is only seeking the light of truth, and is most ready to give way, to change and revoke everything, when it has been taught how they are to be understood differently”.

Luther handed this document to Cajetan, who looked at it and said that it should be forwarded to the Pope; meanwhile he demanded a full revocation. Luther expected that his pleadings had at least shown cause why he should not be called upon to revoke at once, and was indignant. Further talk led to no result, and finally Cajetan testily exclaimed: “Unless you revoke, begone, and do not come into my sight again”.

Luther resented the attempt to override him without argument. Cajetan was a great theologian; why did he not speak accordingly? Why did he not grapple with the arguments laid before him? “He may be a distinguished Thomist”, wrote Luther, “but as a theologian and a Christian he is incoherent, obscure, and unintelligent, no more fit to judge this matter than a donkey is to play the harp”.

Cajetan made another attempt to influence Luther. He sent to him his old friends Staupitz and Wenzel Link, that they might represent in friendly fashion his duty of obedience. Staupitz frankly admitted that he was not equal to Luther in theological knowledge; he was rent asunder by his intellectual sympathy with Luther's opinions and his sense of monastic discipline. He said what he could, and ended by absolving Luther from his vow of obedience to himself as Vicar of the Augustinian congregation. Next day he left Augsburg, as no longer wishing to have any responsibility. Luther was touched by the obvious disquietude of his oldest friend, and on October 17 wrote again to Cajetan, acknowledging that he had spoken intemperately about the Pope, offering to express publicly his regret, and to keep silence about Indulgences, if silence were also imposed on his antagonists. He could not revoke his opinions until the Church had spoken; he begged that his case might be referred to the Pope.

In the light of the future we see that Luther had yielded a great deal; and had Cajetan been politic he would have accepted this basis of reconciliation. He had seen enough of the temper of Germany to show him that it was unwise to keep open this dangerous controversy, that it was hazardous to risk a conflict between the Papal claims and the spirit of theological inquiry. Maximilian had warned the Pope that he must find some way of quieting the growing excitement. It was clear that Frederick of Saxony had taken up an attitude of neutrality, and would not allow his university to be discredited without reason shown.

Cajetan’s interviews with Luther ought to have taught him that he was dealing with no ordinary man; that Luther had a powerful nature which was bound to find
utterance; that he had a genius for the expression of religious sentiment; that he was not an academician defending a thesis, but a teacher with a profound sense of the responsibility of his task.

It is true that a trained theologian might discern in Luther dangerous tendencies of which he himself was not conscious; but that foresight should have impressed him with the need of caution. It was clear that Luther had no wish to rebel, but was not to be reduced to silence by the mere command of authority. Friendly mediation had induced him to admit that in some things he had spoken unadvisedly, and to promise silence for a time. If Cajetan had seized upon this concession, if even now he had expressed any sympathy, if he had given him an assurance of kindly consideration at the Papal Court, if he had tried still further to narrow the issue which had been raised, much might have been averted; for Luther was not a man who had clearly formulated opinions, which were logically bound to lead to certain consequences. He only wished to impart to others the views on which his own soul's life was founded: they might be narrow, they might be too strongly expressed, they might be applied in an exaggerated way, they might be difficult to adjust with the current system. But the times admitted of a display of new enthusiasm: there was nothing absolutely new in Luther's opinions, nothing that might not be directed into a proper channel. The one thing to avoid was disputation in Germany; for Luther was a formidable controversialist, and his views were sure to develop before opposition. If he could have been made to feel that, at the Roman Court, he would meet with something like sympathy, he would have been content to wait.

But Cajetan was an official to whom obedience was the supreme duty. His orders had been to induce Luther to revoke; and when Luther refused to revoke as fully as he had demanded, he would have no further dealings with him. He had an intellectual contempt for novelty and enthusiasm. When Luther left his presence he said, with a smile, to his attendants, "This fellow wants fresher eggs than the market supplies". Disobedience must be put down; he did not stay to consider by what means. Luther thought that he had gone to the furthest limits of submission, and awaited an answer. When no answer came his melting mood passed away. He knew that he brought an honest soul to the service of the Church; he asked only for fair consideration, and he was treated with disdain. If such was the attitude of the Legate, what was to be expected from the Pope? He could look for nothing but that he would be condemned unheard; that the process already instituted before Prierias and Ghinucci would run its formal course; and that sentence would be pronounced on the simple issue that he had contradicted the language of a Papal decretal.

To Luther such a result seemed intolerable. He knew that there were many thoughtful men in Germany who shared his opinions. He had made many friends in Augsburg. Public sympathy was on his side, feeling that he had not been fairly dealt with. His mind passed through a sudden revulsion. He had done his best for peace, but he was not prepared for unconditional surrender; if there was to be war he must do his best to defend himself. So on October 16 he wrote to the Legate informing him that his friends urged him to lodge an appeal, framed according to precedent, from the Pope ill-informed to the Pope when he was better informed; he was unwilling to adopt this course; but it seemed to his friends to be the only alternative to a revocation, for which he was not prepared without an authoritative expression of the opinion of the Church. Again he gave Cajetan an opportunity of asking him to delay till he had consulted the Pope; but Cajetan had no doubt that Luther's obstinacy was not to be reasoned with but must be crushed. The Pope had already spoken definitely enough through his Legate;
and no question could be raised about the plenitude of the Papal power to decide all matters, even though, as Luther urged, they were “doubtful, full of contrary opinions, undetermined, open to discussion, and not concerned with matters necessary to salvation”. Luther received no answer; and after waiting two days at Augsburg rode off secretly to Wittenberg, leaving his appeal to be lodged by a notary with the Cardinal.

On his way back he received a letter from Spalatin enclosing a Papal brief addressed to Cajetan, and dated August 23, in which Luther was said to have been already pronounced a heretic by the Papal Commissioner, Ghinucci; Cajetan was ordered to take him into custody and bring him to Rome, unless he revoked; if he could not be captured, all his adherents were to be excommunicated. Luther regarded this brief as a forgery of his enemies for the purpose of terrifying him; but the possibility of its genuineness filled him with indignation, and anyhow he saw that he must take all precautions for his personal safety. At Augsburg he had measured the political opposition felt by patriotic Germans against Papal interference, and had learned that he would have considerable support in withstanding the Pope. He returned to Wittenberg “full of joy and peace”, and resolved, if need were, to appeal from the Pope to a Council.

Cajetan was convinced that he had done all that could be done, and thought that he had been ill-used by Staupitz and Luther. In a leisurely way he wrote his complaint to the Elector Frederick, begging him to send Luther to Rome, or at least to exile him from his dominions. Frederick's answer ought to have convinced Cajetan of the gravity of the situation. He did not approve of the attempt to extort from Luther a recantation while his cause was still pending; many learned men in Germany thought that there was nothing heretical in Luther's opinions; he would not expel from his dominions a man who had not been convicted of error; he had sent the Legate's letter to Luther, and enclosed his answer; it would be seen that Luther was ready to submit to the judgment of universities; finally he begged to be informed of the exact nature of Luther's heresy.

This decision of the Elector secured for the time Luther’s personal safety at Wittenberg; and he continued his teaching with such effect that the study of S. Thomas was entirely abandoned for that of Duns Scotus; and Luther looked forward to the time when that also would disappear, and a “pure philosophy and pure theology would draw all their principles from their own sources”.

The sense of a mission grew still stronger in his mind, and he was determined not to be overborne by the mere voice of Papal authority. He wrote an account of what had occurred at Augsburg, which was published early in December, against the wish of the Elector, who tried when it was too late to stop the publication. This was meant to prepare public opinion for a step which had been already taken, an appeal from the Pope to a future Council. In drawing up this appeal Luther closely followed the form used by the University of Paris against the abrogation of the Pragmatic Sanction; and his immediate object was to identify his cause with theirs, in case the Pope “out of the plenitude, not of his power, but of his tyranny”, should disregard his first appeal.

But Luther had really little in common with the remnants of the Conciliar ideas, which still showed some vitality amongst the Paris doctors. He had no belief in the infallibility of a Council any more than in the infallibility of the Pope. The step was merely taken as a precautionary measure against a hasty condemnation by the Papal judges. He had meant the appeal to be kept secret; he had it printed and intended to keep the copies by him for ready distribution if need arose. But Luther’s matter was now an
object of popular interest, and the printer would not lose the chance of gaining a market. The appeal was published soon after the *Acta Augustana*, to Luther’s great annoyance, though he soon regarded it as God’s will.

Luther’s reason for this step was uneasiness at the news of the approach of an envoy from the Pope to the Elector Frederick, bearing the Golden Rose, which the Pope had bestowed on the Elector as a mark of his special favor. The envoy was Karl von Miltitz, son of a Saxon nobleman, who after being educated at Köln went to Rome, where he was made a Papal chamberlain and acted as representative of the Saxon Court. Miltitz was thus likely to be acceptable to the Elector, and Luther dreaded the possible effects of Papal blandishments. It was rumored that Miltitz was the bearer of Papal briefs, addressed to all who were likely to help him, ordering that Luther should be seized and sent to Rome for trial; and as a matter of fact the Papal letters to the Elector of Saxony and his advisers called Luther “a son of Satan” and requested that his excessive rashness should be checked lest the fair fame of the Elector be tarnished by his protection of a heretic. Whatever might have been the instructions of Miltitz he used his own discretion in discharging them. He had not lived so long in Italy as to have lost the power of understanding his own countrymen. He saw at once that the views current in the Papal Court about Luther were founded upon no knowledge of the facts. He found that Luther was not an elderly professor, but a man in the prime of life, full of vigor, strong in the popular sympathy felt for one who was being unjustly persecuted by Italian priests for speaking out about their greediness, but still stronger in the favor with which his opinions were regarded by the educated classes. Miltitz was so impressed by what he saw and heard in confidential talks with old friends, that he resolved to appear before Frederick in his private capacity, before he presented the Papal letters. He determined to play the part of mediator and devise a means of reconciling Luther with the Pope.

As a first step he summoned Tetzel before him, reprimanded him for several unauthorized acts, and put him to such shame that Luther wrote to comfort him. Early in January, 1519, he had an interview with Luther at Altenburg in Spalatin’s presence. Luther’s friends urged upon him to be prudent and make such concessions as he could. Miltitz was kindly, and did not so much try to argue or prescribe terms as to ascertain how much Luther would yield. One of Luther's chief motives was a desire to spare the Elector further trouble, and he did his utmost to meet Miltitz’ advances. We see the traces of the common-sense of a man of the world, like Miltitz, reflected in Luther's undertaking to keep silence, provided his opponents did the same: so, he writes, “the matter will bleed itself to death, for if my writing had been left unanswered, the song would have been sung out long ago and every one would have been tired of it”. Further, Luther undertook to write an apologetic letter to the Pope, and write an admonition to all men to obey the Roman Church. Miltitz on his part undertook to make a full report to the Pope, and urge him to refer Luther's case to some learned German bishop, who should point out any articles which might be erroneous, and Luther would willingly recant if he was convinced of any error. Luther was so far hopeful of success that he proceeded to discuss the choice of a bishop who should be named as a judge.

Further, at the end of February he published in German *An Instruction* addressed to the people. In it he said that the invocation of Saints was to be used for spiritual blessings; that Purgatory was to be believed, but its nature and object were not clearly revealed; that Indulgences were useful as a release from satisfaction for sin; that the commands of the Church were to be obeyed, but God’s commands were to be esteemed
above them; that God's grace is the one source of holiness, and that good works spring from it; that the Roman Church is honored by God above others; the exact nature of its superiority and power is for learned men to discuss, but all should have regard to unity and not withstand the commands of the Pope.

On March 3 Luther wrote to the Pope and expressed his sorrow that what he had done to protect the honor of the Roman Church had brought upon him suspicion. To revoke his opinions would be of no use; for they had taken root in men’s minds, and a revocation without reason given would only increase men’s discontent. He confessed that the Roman Church was above all things in heaven and earth save only Jesus Christ, the Lord of all. He would say nothing more about Indulgences, and would be silent altogether if his adversaries would keep silence also.

There is no reason to accuse Luther of insincerity in these proposals. It is true that they do not harmonize with the opinions which he soon afterwards expressed; but Luther would never have been the leader of a great rebellion if he had clearly known whither he was tending. His only wish was for liberty to teach what he himself felt; he was conscious that discussion had reached the limits within which it was likely to be useful. If only controversy might cease for a time, knowledge would grow; and any attempt at a fair decision of the questions which had been raised would be fruitful of results. He was not anxious to speak out any further; indeed, he was not certain whither speech in the face of opposition might lead him. But he already felt that he was at the head of a party, that others depended upon him, and that he was not justified in entirely abandoning the ground which he had already occupied. He could not well retire amid the derision of his opponents; he could not allow his protest, whether well-timed or not, to be the means of securing the victory of the opinions which he had challenged. He did violence to himself for the sake of peace; but the first step in the negotiations must be the silence of his opponents; from that he could judge of the hopes of the future.

The Pope was doubtless informed by Miltitz of Luther’s promises; and it was in his power to have so far welcomed them as to impose silence on all in Germany until the question had been further considered. No word, however, was heard from Rome; and Luther while proposing peace was preparing for war. He could not well afford to do otherwise. Eck was determined to keep the matter open, and show how the champion of orthodoxy could dispose of innovators by the weapons of dialectic. Had Leo X been wise the disputation at Leipzig would never have taken place. Had he commanded silence and referred certain definite points to the judgment of a commission of German bishops, he might have obtained evidence of the need of some readjustment of the Papal system to meet the needs of Germany, which was awakening to a new life. It would have required open-mindedness to have achieved the task of reconciliation between the new and the old; but as yet the breach was not hopeless. Luther only asked that certain points should be left open for discussion: he himself admitted that if they were discussed, they might not come to much. It is noticeable that already he attached only slight importance to the question of Indulgences with which the controversy began. In his letter to the Elector of November 19, 1518, he professed his willingness to modify his statements on that point: “If the merits of Christ are the treasure of Indulgences, nothing is thereby added to them; if not, nothing is taken from them; Indulgences remain what they are, however they be puffed and magnified”; but he insisted that the necessity of faith for a right reception of the sacraments was so clearly laid down in Scripture that he could not withdraw from this opinion.
It is obvious that all he wished for was liberty to teach the primary necessity of faith. Hence he was not moved from his conciliatory attitude by the fact that Leo X sided against him on the question of Indulgences. Miltitz was the bearer of a decretal, addressed to Cardinal Cajetan, which defined the teaching of the Roman Church. By the power of the keys, committed to S. Peter and his successors, the guilt of sin could be remitted by the sacrament of penance; its temporal punishment by Indulgences, which proceeded from the superabundant merits of Christ and the Saints; the authority of the Pope could confer an Indulgence by means of absolution, and could transfer it to those in Purgatory by means of intercession. This was an authoritative summary of the broad lines of scholastic teaching, but it was carefully worded; it cited no previous authorities; it made no reference to Luther by name; it did not attack his arguments. Luther was not careful to make himself acquainted with the contents of the decretal. After all, men might please themselves whether or not they purchased Indulgences; and his protest had already done much to check the traffic in them. He was willing to accept the decretal.

If this was so, the Papacy had fairly vindicated its position. Luther had apologized for any disrespectful utterance and had professed obedience; he would submit to the judgment of a learned German bishop. There was an opportunity for reflection, a chance of a time of truce in which personal heat might subside and the points at issue be clearly discerned. Had Leo X commanded silence, and submitted some carefully chosen points for a report from a commission of German bishops, he would certainly have won a great measure of German sympathy to his side. Men did not object to the principle of the Papal supremacy, they had begun to criticize the way in which it was exercised. About the technical questions of theology which Luther raised few felt themselves qualified to judge. But all could see that a man of high character and great religious enthusiasm, whose opinions seemed tenable to many learned men in Germany, was not thought worthy even of a fair trial, but was simply ordered to revoke at the dictation of an Italian bishop. The Papal supremacy was well enough; but this was not the way to exercise it; and Luther knew that he would have many followers in a determined resistance to what he regarded as tyranny.

But the Roman Curia was incapable of taking such a view of the situation. The ingenuity of its canonists had been spent for years in building up a system of Papal omnipotence. Just because the Papacy was secular and no great spiritual movement had agitated men’s minds in Europe, it was the more easy to insert into Bulls and Briefs terms of exaggerated adulation. Just because the rulers of England, France, and Spain knew how to protect themselves from Papal aggression within their own dominions, they had no interest in criticizing the language of Papal documents. So long as the Pope was their political ally, the plenitude of his power might be as large as he pleased: when he was opposed to them, he could be reduced by diplomacy or force, on purely secular grounds. Meanwhile in ecclesiastical matters he was left at liberty; and the expression of his claims to absolute authority grew more and more exalted. The Council of the Lateran had been a recognition of all this industry; it had abolished the last remnants of the Conciliar movement, and in speeches and decrees alike had extolled the Papal power to the skies.

It is true that no one paid much attention to these decrees, that the Council attracted little notice, and that Germany especially took almost no part in its proceedings. Yet official conservatism was not willing to run the risk of an investigation of its labors. It had made the Papal power absolute, that it might supply the necessary basis for a highly centralized government of the Church. It was dangerous even to seem
to submit to a challenge—it was wiser to use the weapon which had been so diligently forged, and repress the first threatening of revolt. So the advisers of the Pope had no thought of concession, and were inspired by the temper of Cajetan rather than that of Miltitz. Their object was not to conciliate Luther, but to win over the Elector; their concern was not with the ideas of Germany, but with the rulers of Germany. They would work through the Emperor and the Princes, and would follow the same policy as had proved so successful in rooting out the Conciliar ideas two generations ago.

Everything seemed to favor this policy: for on January 12, 1519, Maximilian died, and an imperial election opened a splendid field for Papal diplomacy. The new Emperor would certainly be under such obligations to the Pope that he might be trusted to deal with Luther's obstinacy in a summary way.
Leo’s interest was only slight in the theological question which Cajetan tried to settle at Augsburg; but he was keenly interested in another question which was raised there, the election of Charles as King of the Romans. Maximilian was anxious to secure the imperial dignity to the Austrian house; his desire awakened the jealous opposition of Francis I, who saw that the combination in the same hands of the Netherlands, Spain, and the Empire would mean the reduction of France to secondary importance in the affairs of Europe. Maximilian and Francis both turned to the Electors, who found their position suddenly profitable. Francis believed that he had four of the seven on his side; but during the meeting at Augsburg five agreed to elect Charles formally in the following spring. This, however, could scarcely be done without reference to the Pope. First, there was the technical objection that Maximilian, never having been crowned, was only Emperor-elect, and there could not be two Kings of the Romans at the same time. Secondly, Charles held Naples as part of the Spanish dominions, and in accordance with the Bull of Clement IV, Naples as a Papal fief could not be held together with the Empire. Accordingly Maximilian proposed to Leo that he should send the imperial crown to Trent, as a means of removing the first difficulty. Francis also turned to the Pope, and promised him entire devotion if he would refuse Maximilian’s demand and show himself “to be Leo in deed as well as in name”.

The records of Leo’s diplomacy during the period that followed are dark and mysterious. They show a duplicity which so completely disguised any abiding purpose that it is impossible to resolve the Pope's policy into a consistent scheme. His action is like that of a weak animal that tries to baffle his pursuers by involving himself in obscurity. The question of the succession to the Empire raised a point of momentous importance for the future of Italy and of the Papacy. Hitherto Leo had carried on the policy of his predecessors, with Medicean dexterity, in accordance with principles recognized by Italian statesmen. All were agreed to maintain the balance of power in Italy; and the Papacy from time to time might pick up small advantages. But the annexation of the Empire, either to France or Spain, removed one of the elements on which the balance of power rested. Francis was powerful in North Italy; Charles was King of Naples; if either of these could also call himself Emperor how was Italy to escape in the struggle which would ensue? Leo did not deceive himself about the material resources of the Papacy; the war of Urbino had taught him on that point. He was too much of a Florentine and a Medici to think of an Italian combination. It only remained for him to act cautiously, to make himself seem necessary to both parties, to retain as long as possible the friendship of both, and be prepared in the long run to accept the inevitable. So Leo negotiated with both Francis and Charles. He hinted to Francis that, before he could declare himself on his side, he must have substantial proofs of his good-will, and suggested that Lorenzo de’ Medici would be glad to add to his possessions Parma, Piacenza, and Ferrara. Charles took advantage of the death of the Queen Dowager of Naples to promise the Pope an estate of 6000 ducats for one of his relatives. Leo represented to each of the kings the need in which he stood of the strongest assurance of support before he took any decided step. The consequence was
that at the beginning of 1519 Leo had made good terms for himself with Charles and Francis alike, and had signed a treaty of alliance with both of them, stipulating only that the treaty with Charles was to be kept secret.

It would seem that Leo felt that he could not withstand Maximilian’s demands, if they were endorsed by the Diet, and was prepared to give way after securing himself against the wrath of Francis. But the news of Maximilian’s death altered the position of affairs, and Leo thanked God that he was delivered from a perilous decision. The Electors were freed from their promises, which only concerned the choice of a King of the Romans; and the election of a new Emperor could be approached afresh. Leo at once displayed a bewildering fertility in issuing contradictory orders to his envoys. Cajetan in Germany was bidden to represent to the Electors that the Pope wished them to elect one of their own number, and hoped that they would unite for that end. Only the Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg were possible; the Pope did not care which was chosen, but thought that the Elector of Saxony was the better candidate. His Holiness did not wish on any account the election of Charles, who would thereby become too powerful; and the jealousy of the King of France would certainly give rise to a war, the end of which could not be foreseen. A second dispatch warned Cajetan that he was to adhere to these instructions, and not depart from them, even if a letter in the Pope's own handwriting commended Charles’ candidature.

It is probable that this represented what Leo would have preferred. A weak Emperor, constantly in need of Papal support, would have given him the means of maintaining in Italy the balance between France and Spain, and would have permitted him to traffic with both in his own interests. But Leo was too cautious to commit himself avowedly to this policy, or take any open steps to strengthen the hands of the Electors in carrying it out. He knew their selfishness and corruption, and did not put much trust in their action. Still if Leo had spoken out decidedly, the expression of his wishes might have afforded a rallying-point round which the public opinion of Germany could gather. But Leo was no believer in candor and straightforwardness, and he knew nothing of the sentiment of Germany. He did not intend so far to commit himself that he could not make terms with the winner whoever he might be, and he destroyed his possible influence by excessive caution. He ordered his envoy in France, Cardinal Bibbiena, to represent to Francis that the Pope was entirely on his side; but there was great need for circumspection; for if the Electors became afraid of the power of France they would naturally turn to Charles: he therefore besought Francis to consider how, if he could not win, he might at least avoid losing, and for this purpose should be prepared to support a third candidate. In giving this advice the Pope showed considerable dexterity. He hoped that in a little while Francis would discover his own candidature to be impossible, and would then work for some German prince so as to exclude Charles. But it was difficult to use Francis as a tool, to give him just enough encouragement and no more; and Leo had not the boldness nor persistency necessary for the success of this project. At first Francis engaged with ardor in the task of winning the Electors; then he suddenly cooled, and spoke of promoting the candidature of another. Though this was what Leo wished, the result came so soon that it filled him with alarm lest Francis was contemplating a private agreement with Charles. Under the influence of this terror he implored Francis to persevere. He even abandoned the profession of neutrality which he had made to Charles, and declared to the Spanish envoy that he did not consider his master's election to be for the good of Christendom.
Thus Leo was led to declare himself against Charles without finding any one else whom he could oppose to Francis. He was somewhat disturbed by the attitude of England, whose influence was on the side of Charles against Francis. He strove to induce Henry VIII to accept the post which he had first designed for Francis, and induce the Electors to think of a third candidate. As soon as he had recovered from the panic caused by the lukewarmness of Francis, he ordered Campeggi to represent to Wolsey that the dangers which would follow on the election of Charles were greater than those to be dreaded from Francis: could not England bring about the choice of one of the Electors, or some other Prince? Henry VIII was caught by this cautious suggestion that he himself should wrest the prize of the Empire from the other claimants; and it is probable that Henry’s active interposition might have caused a diversion in favor of some one else. But Wolsey was not attracted by the prospect, and pointed out that it was desirable to have a distinct promise of the Pope's help before any practical steps were taken. The letter empowering Gigli to sound the Pope and extract from him a definite promise was not written till March 25, and showed so little zeal that Leo could place no hopes on England, though Henry still cast lingering glances on the Imperial Crown.

Leo, however, remained for a time firm to his conviction that the election of Charles would be the greater evil than the election of Francis. He promised the Cardinalate to the Electors of Trier and Koln, and offered to nominate the Elector of Mainz Legate in Germany, if they would agree to vote against Charles. On March 13 he said to the Venetian envoy: “As for the Catholic king, on no account could we have him. Do you know how many miles distant are the borders of his dominions? Only forty. He cannot be King of the Romans, and I mean to let him know that he is ineligible”. If the Pope had published such a declaration at first, it might have produced an effect on the Electors; but Leo had trusted to his dexterity in the first instance, and the time was now past when he could interfere. The hope of a third candidate dwindled away, and German opinion was forming in favor of Charles. Leo’s attempts to influence the Electors were repulsed, and his envoy was coldly informed that there was no precedent for the Pope giving orders to the Electors. Early in April Leo made up his mind that Francis had no chance, and that the election of Charles was practically certain. Nothing remained for him save to come to terms with Charles; and this was rendered easier by the death on May 4 of his nephew Lorenzo, five days after the death of his wife, who died in giving birth to a daughter, Caterina. The outward bond between France and the Papacy was now removed. There was no legitimate member of his own branch of the Medici family for whom the Pope need scheme. The removal of the worthless Lorenzo was a source of secret joy to the better men in the Papal Court, who hoped to see the Pope renew the fair promise of his early years. Negotiations with Charles were carried on with the utmost secrecy, and on June 17 Leo gave Charles permission to hold Naples together with the Empire; while Charles agreed to pay the Pope 8000 ducats a year, and maintain two galleys for the defence of the Holy See.

It is impossible not to feel how little effect all this busy diplomacy had upon the actual issue of the election. Francis might be able to pay more money to the Electors than Charles, and the Pope might offer in his behalf all the ecclesiastical distinctions which he could bestow; but the very means which Francis used to urge his claims gave the Electors food for thought. Was it wise to set over themselves a ruler who had so much money at his disposal, and was already so powerful that he had contracted habits of command?
The Pope might offer a large bribe to the ecclesiastical Electors in behalf of Francis; what powers over the Church might he not be induced to grant to Francis when the possession of the Empire had still further increased his power? After all Francis was a Frenchman, and the French had long been the enemies of the Germans; while Charles came of a German stock, and knew German ways. The addition of the Empire would increase the power of Francis much more than the power of Charles, whose scattered dominions would be likely to give him ample occupation. Such were the considerations which began to force themselves upon the minds of the Electors, and they were emphasized by the loud expression of popular opinion.

When Pace went on his futile mission to canvass the Electors in behalf of the English king, he soon found the opinion of the people was made up. At Dusseldorf he was refused a guide because he was mistaken for a Frenchman; when he declared that he was English he was told that all the men of the town would go with him, for surely he was come to help Charles. He found the Electors in great perplexity, for the people would have no French Emperor, and hated the Pope’s Legate for his leaning to Francis. The popular feeling had been stirred by the insolence of one of Francis’ German pensioners, Duke Ulrich of Wurttemberg, and the Swabian League took up arms against him. Ulrich's troops, which were paid with French gold, were defeated; and the Swabian leader, Franz von Sickingen, with an army of 24,000 men, drew near to Frankfort, ostensibly to protect it from hostile incursions, but really to make a demonstration against the election of Francis. Pace found that Charles had become the national candidate, and that it was quite useless to work for Henry VIII, especially as he had no money to distribute.

When the Electors met for the election on June 18 the chances of Francis had dwindled away. At the last moment Francis became conscious of this, and sent orders to his agents to set up the Elector of Brandenburg or Saxony against Charles. When it was too late he came round to the plan which Leo X had at first advised, only to find that the Pope had now abandoned it. Already, on June ii, one of the Papal envoys had to flee from Frankfort in disguise through fear of the popular anger at his French partisanship; and Cajetan only stayed with trembling at his post. But his trials were soon to come to an end. As soon as Leo had made his agreement with Charles, he dispatched a courier ordering Cajetan to withdraw his opposition. Cajetan informed the Electors on June 24 that the Pope removed all bar to Charles' election, if the choice of the Electors should fall upon him. After this the election proceeded rapidly. An attempt was made by the Elector of Trier to urge at the last moment the election of a German; but Frederick of Saxony declined the dangerous honor. There was nothing more to be done: and at seven o'clock on the morning of June 28 Charles was elected.

One important result of the Imperial election was that it disclosed unmistakably the practical impotence of the Papacy in European politics. Leo had known this before, and strove to conceal it. It was certainly unpleasant to have it revealed; but he frankly confessed to the Venetian envoy that he had acted as he did because “it was no use to knock his head against a wall”. This, indeed, was the misery of Leo’s position. The Papacy, as a political power, was practically helpless; but Leo could not venture to say so, and could not free himself from the trammels of political complications. The Papacy had a right to exercise influence; it had abandoned its claim to influence and had exercised power. Now its power was gone; but Leo dared not admit the fact. It was impossible for him to revive a claim to influence, because he was steeped in political intrigues. The consequence was that he was placed in the ignominious position of trying
to behave as if he was possessed of power, whereas really his power was gone, and he was at the mercy of pressure from outside which he could not resist. There was little satisfaction in thinking that he had done his best, and had escaped without any practical injury. He felt keenly that the Papacy had suffered severely in the eyes of politicians, and was regarded as a puppet, the strings of which would be pulled by the strongest. Leo had never contemplated the possibility of rising above the political entanglements in which he was involved. He did not attempt to gauge the temper of Germany, or work in accordance with national feeling. He worked by means of subtle schemes, which failed because they had no basis of resolute action. Leo was so fearful of knocking his head against a wall that he forgot that walls might be scaled. The consequence of all his double-faced diplomacy was that everyone felt aggrieved. The Germans resented his intervention; Francis thought that he had been basely deserted; Charles owed him no thanks for help which was only given when it could not be refused; even Henry VIII professed to feel aggrieved at having been misled by false hopes. It is true that Henry’s grievance was merely a means of compelling Leo to extend Wolsey’s legatine authority in England; but it was expressed in language which was very galling to the Pope.

But if Wolsey’s letters were arrogant, the speech and actions of the French and Spanish ambassadors were more arrogant still. The Bishop of S. Malo spoke of Leo in such terms that the Pope lost his temper, and declared that he would never see that madman again. The Spaniards behaved as if Rome already belonged to them, and gave Leo an example of that forcible manner of dealing with the Papacy which soon became a part of their political practice. The matter was trivial in itself.

There was in Rome a Spaniard, who had a suit concerning the election to a priory pending before the Papal Court. It would seem that the litigant was striving to dispossess a nominee of the Government, and there was some ground for thinking that judgment might be given in his favor. So on the night of August 27 the Spaniard was dragged by armed men from the house where he was lodging; he was silenced effectually by a pellet of tallow which was forced into his mouth, and was hurried away to the Colonna Castle of Marino, whence he was sent to Gaeta. The Pope was naturally indignant at this outrage, which he discovered had been carried out by the order of the Spanish ambassador, whose son was the leader of the band of kidnappers. Leo ordered him to begone from Rome, and threatened to excommunicate all concerned in the affair, but consented to wait till he received letters from Charles. Charles expressed his regret, and the prisoner was restored to Rome: but probably the lesson had served its purpose both with him and the Pope. He did not prosecute his suit; and Leo learned that he had to do with men whose sense of decorum was defective. It is no wonder that the Pope felt the need of recovering his lost dignity. “We wish to be known for what we are”, he told the Venetian ambassador; “it is not fitting that any one should show himself our superior. All that we do is to preserve our position. We will not be spoken of as we were during the election, when the French went about saying that the Pope would do whatever they wished”.

All that Leo could do to restore his position was to go back again to his old policy of duplicity. He had made a league with Charles; but the investiture of Naples was still to be given, and negotiations might be protracted. Meanwhile, as Charles was now the more powerful, the maintenance of the balance of power required that the Pope should draw nearer to France. But Leo could not afford to break with Charles unless he was assured of a strong alliance; for that, as Cardinal Medici said, would be “putting the mouse before the cat”. He saw that the chief obstacle in his way was the attitude of
England, which still acted as mediator and arbiter between the rival kings. So he made a secret league with France in October; ‘a league in the spirit’ as the Venetian envoy Minio called it. At the same time he pursued his negotiations with Charles, but told Minio “They will mean nothing; do you understand me?”. Minio asked for a clearer explanation. “If we were to make promises to Charles”, said the Pope, “they would be lies: we should find some means to resolve them into smoke”.

While Leo thus prevaricated, both Charles and Francis were endeavoring to win the friendship of England. The spring of 1520 saw Charles the guest of the English king; and soon afterwards the splendors of the Field of the Cloth of Gold testified to the good understanding between England and France. In all this Leo had no part, and was terrified lest England might bring about an agreement between the two kings. He complained bitterly that he was not consulted and offered to send a nuncio; for nine months Wolsey sent him no letter, and Leo was sorely disquieted.

There was one outlet, however, possible for the Pope’s Leo and energy, the enlargement of the Papal States. By the death of his nephew Lorenzo, the Duchy of Urbino, together with Pesaro and Sinigaglia, reverted to the Pope. This increased Leo's desire to win Ferrara, on which Julius II had cast hungry eyes. Ferrara was to be the price which Francis I was to pay for the Pope's friendship. But Leo had other friends as well, and did not let slip any opportunity. In December, 1519, he invested 10,000 ducats in an attempt to seize Ferrara by surprise. Alessandro Fregoso, Bishop of Ventimiglia, was an exile from Genoa, living at Bologna, Leo furnished him with money to raise troops, ostensibly to aid him to return to Genoa; but really for a dash on Ferrara, where the duke was lying sick, and his city was ill defended. The plot was discovered by the Marquis of Mantua, and when Fregoso saw that his intention was suspected he disbanded his troops.

In the spring of 1520 Leo was more successful in dealing with Perugia, which the family of the Baglioni had for years rendered infamous by their crimes. It was at that time under the rule of Gian Paolo Baglione, whom Leo summoned to Rome to answer complaints which had been made against him. Baglione sent his son, Malatesta, who was received by the Pope with great kindness and returned with a safe-conduct for his father. As Gian Paolo was allied by marriage with the Orsini, he trusted to their assurance that there was nothing to fear, and came to Rome. When he went to visit the Pope in the Castle of S. Angelo, his followers were disarmed and he was seized and borne off to prison. Leo charged him with stirring up rebellion in the March; and one of his associates, the Lord of Fabriano, was summarily beheaded. It is said that Gian Paolo confessed in prison to many enormities—which may well have been the case; and Leo soothed his conscience with the thought that his treacherous conduct was ridding the world of a monster. Still Leo hesitated, and offered to spare Gian Paolo's life, if he could find good securities who would give substantial bail that he would not return to Perugia. No one was found hardy enough to accept the responsibility; so on June 13 Baglione was beheaded. Perugia was committed to a Papal Legate, and Leo sent troops to capture Fermo from Ludovico Freducci. The lords of other towns in the March, Recanati, Fabriano, and Benevento, came to Rome in terror. They were imprisoned, tortured, and put to death as malefactors. Leo had at least the satisfaction of thinking that he could combine with his higher policy some of the craft and vigor of the Rovere and the Borgia.
This, however, was an interlude. The great question which still perplexed the mind of the Pope was how to escape with safety from the clutches of Charles. Charles was weary of the Pope’s vacillations, and sent a new ambassador, Don Juan Manuel, a man of great political experience, with orders to bring matters to an issue. Manuel, who arrived in Rome in the middle of April, surveyed the situation, and gave his opinion that the Emperor must strike terror into his opponents, and so compel them to cease fencing.

There were two ways of terrifying the Pope: one was to support the Genoese exiles by a body of Spanish troops; the other was to strike at the Pope’s spiritual power. “If the Emperor goes to Germany he ought to show a little favor to a friar who is called Friar Martin, who stays with the Duke of Saxony. The Pope is very much afraid of him because he preaches and publishes great things against his power. They say that he is a great scholar and holds his own against the Pope with much mindfulness. I think that through him the Pope might be driven to make an alliance; but I say this in case he refuses or, after making it, strives to break it”.

The question which Don Juan Manuel thus raised was of greater importance than he imagined. The electors at Frankfort do not seem to have troubled themselves to consider the opinions of an insignificant friar; but these opinions had shown themselves capable of unexpected development, and the new Emperor would have to reckon with them as soon as he entered Germany. Both sides hoped much from the young Emperor, whose attitude was not yet declared. It is worth our while to consider how this was determined by his training, his experience, and the necessities of his position.

Charles, who was born on February 24, 1500, scarcely knew his father, after whose death, in 1506, his mother sank into a state of mental imbecility. He was brought up in Flanders by his Aunt Margaret, a woman well versed in the politics of the time. His education was entrusted to Adrian of Utrecht, Dean of Louvain, one of the most learned theologians of the time, a man of high character, deeply impressed with a desire to reform the abuses of the Church, but profoundly attached to its system. From him Charles imbibed a sincere piety and a respect for the Church, which deepened his natural gravity and earnestness of character. When, at the age of fifteen, Charles began to take part in the deliberations of the Council of the Netherlands, he was free from youthful levity and showed himself as serious as the oldest. When, at the age of seventeen, he first visited Spain as its king, his mind was capable of appreciating the meaning of what he saw.

He found a country, which had long been a scene of discord, united into a nation by the lucky marriage of two capable rulers, who had contrived to gather Spanish up the scattered elements of power and put themselves at the head of the most vigorous institutions of the land. The towns were set against the nobles till the royal jurisdiction was asserted against both. The Cortes were used to support the authority of the Crown by allying it with the aspirations of the people. The scanty revenues of the Crown were increased by a cautious resumption of all its forgotten claims. The powerful military orders, a relic of the crusading spirit, were annexed by the skill of Ferdinand in procuring his election as their Grand Master. The royal officials were chosen from the class of jurists and churchmen; and the nobles found that they could only obtain employment in the state by submission to the king. But most useful of all means to bring about this national organization was the Church, which in Spain assumed a character of its own. It would be unjust to say that Ferdinand and Isabella set themselves to use the Church for their own political ends. Isabella's strong character was molded and disciplined by genuine religion, and Ferdinand was a devout son of the
Church. But neither of them bowed in unquestioning obedience before the Pope; and the Papacy did not venture seriously to oppose the wishes of sovereigns so powerful and so orthodox. The attempts of Sixtus IV to appoint to Spanish bishoprics was steadfastly withstood, and in 1482 he agreed to grant provisions only to royal nominees. Isabella chose for high places in the Church men of blameless lives and resolute character, who, knowing that their efforts would be supported, set themselves diligently to the task of restoring ecclesiastical discipline. The zeal of these men unfortunately flowed in a narrow channel, and they were more desirous to obtain results than solicitous that their method should be in accordance with the principles of the truth which they professed.

Isabella’s confessor, the Dominican Thomas de Torquemada, urged upon the queen the creation of a stricter form of the Inquisition to deal with the mixed population of Jews and Moors, who accepted Christianity for motives of worldly convenience, without in reality abandoning their own beliefs. It was true that the evil spirit of constraint in matters which affected the inmost being of the soul was of long standing in the Church. But the Dominican Inquisition had well-nigh passed away when Torquemada galvanized the spirit of persecution into renewed life. The great reforming movement of the Spanish Church was stricken with the plague of unbelief in its very origin. It did not trust to the power of the Gospel, the love for righteousness, the appeal to the nobler instincts of man. It took a false view of man’s responsibility, and denied the right and power of conscience, and the work of the Holy Spirit. It forced the Gospel of the love of God into the terribly alien form of human tyranny, demanding not only obedience but acquiescence and belief, under the pain of horrible punishments. The renewed religious life of the Spanish nation was allied with the worst development of the mediaeval system, the desire for external unity at the price of freedom. Nor can we say that this was due merely to old custom or mistaken zeal. The political advantages of the Inquisition to the authority of the crown were obvious. The results of the confiscation of heretics' property were always a welcome addition to the royal revenues; and the procedure of the Inquisition could easily be applied to persons who were suspected on political grounds. It was a mighty arm against discontent of any kind, and the mere fact that it was in accordance with popular prejudice gave it a fatal vitality. Church and State went hand in hand for the maintenance of external order and the suppression of any threatening of revolt.

If the Spanish Inquisition was chiefly the work of Torquemada, the other great churchmen of Spain labored in their several ways to unite the various elements of population into a nation on the basis of the Christian faith. Fernando de Talavera, a friar who was raised to the rank of Archbishop of Granada, gave his attention to the conversion of the Moors, and for this purpose translated the liturgy and parts of the Gospels into Arabic. The Franciscan, Francisco Jimenez de Cisneros, who was made Archbishop of Toledo, proceeded with greater rigour. He burned the Mussulman books and insisted upon the Moors abjuring their old religion. Many complied, but many fled or were expelled from Spain; and the wandering Moriscos carried to Italy a testimony of the resolution of Ximenez. But Ximenez was not only concerned with the conversion of the Moors. A Franciscan devoted to the traditions of his order, he had grown up in the practice of severe asceticism, and regarded with abhorrence the laxity of monastic and clerical life. He carried out a high-handed reform of his diocese. Friars and monks fled like the Moriscos before his visitations. Appeals to the Pope were useless against a man who was supported by the Spanish monarchs. Ximenez overcame all opposition by his iron will and unswerving determination. The worldly clergy were removed and replaced.
by men of fervent zeal and enthusiastic piety. The system of the Church was displayed in all its dignity and authority.

Side by side with this reformation in religion went a rise of learning and of theological studies. The Universities of Salamanca and Valladolid became famous in Europe; and Ximenez established at Alcala a college with forty-two professors who were to teach the whole circle of the sciences. There he gathered a band of scholars, over whose labors he presided, for the purpose of editing a Polyglot version of the Scriptures. The famous Complutensian Polyglot is a memorial of Ximenez’s zeal for the collection and collation of manuscripts, and gave a great impulse to textual criticism of the Bible. Alcala became the home of exegetical study, while Salamanca pursued dogmatic theology. When the spread of Luther's opinions called for controversial learning, it was the Spanish theologians who came forward to wage the battle of orthodoxy.

When Charles went to Spain he was able at least to comprehend the broad outlines of the situation. He saw a country, with many elements of revolt, skillfully held in check by a system which owed its success to the identification of the monarchy with the chief tendencies of the people. He found the Church a devoted adherent to the Crown; and he found a Church revived and purified, strong in its own organization, and still stronger in its hold on the people. Charles soon found that there were many difficulties in his path, and that Spain with its strong national feeling was hard to rule as a part of widespread dominions. Ximenez, after the death of Ferdinand, held the regency of the Spanish kingdoms, and kept down disorder with a strong hand. After his death, which followed closely on Charles’ arrival in Spain in 1518, there were signs of gathering discontent, and soon the towns of Castile and Valencia rose in rebellion. It was obvious that Charles could not run counter to the ecclesiastical temper of Spain had he wished to do so. But indeed his own personal feelings and beliefs were more in accord with the temper of the Spanish reformation than with the ideas of Luther. He put as the foremost reason of his desire to gain the imperial crown, the hope of winning greater glory against the foes of the Holy Catholic Faith. This was a real aspiration in his mind when he was crowned King of Germany at Aachen on October 23, 1520. In the same spirit he opened the Diet at Worms, where it seemed that the future of Luther would be decided.
CHAPTER V.
THE DIET OF WORMS

We left Luther at the beginning of 1519, willing to submit to the judgment of the Church, and ready to keep silence if his adversaries would be silent also. Though he made this offer he had no hope that it would be accepted, and was prepared to resist all attacks. Hitherto the controversy against him had been conducted by the theologians of the Curia; but unless the Pope commanded silence it was sure to spread. Already the well-known controversialist, Eck of Ingolstadt, had marked suspicious utterances in Luther's theses, and had traced a resemblance between his opinions and those of Hus. Eck’s *Obelisci* was circulated only in manuscript, but a copy fell into Luther's hands, who promptly answered. The matter was not important, and Luther did not wish to pursue it; but one of his friends at Wittenberg was consumed with desire for a fray. Andreas Bodenstein of Carlstadt, a man of great learning and mental versatility, but deficient in judgment and discretion, had come to lecture at Wittenberg in 1507. When Luther issued his theses Carlstadt was absent in Rome, and on his return found Luther's influence supreme in the university. At first he strove to withstand Luther; then he turned round and tried to outdo him. He published a long array of theses against Tetzel and Eck at once; and he and Eck became involved in a controversy which grew more and more bitter. At Augsburg Luther met Eck and tried to arrange with him the preliminaries of the disputation for which Carlstadt clamored. They agreed on Leipzig as the place of meeting.

Eck at once published his theses; but when they appeared Luther saw that they were directed not against Carlstadt but against himself. The last of them was in answer to Luther's assertion that, before the days of Pope Gregory the Great, the Roman Church was not above other Churches. Against this Eck wrote: “We deny that the Roman Church was not superior to other Churches before the time of Sylvester; we recognize as Peter’s successor and Vicar of Christ him who sits in the chair, and holds the faith, of Peter”. Luther accepted the challenge, which was momentous, and prepared theses in answer to Eck. The last ran: “That the Roman Church is superior to all other Churches is proved only by most frigid decrees of Roman Pontiffs issued during the last four hundred years; against which stands the sure history of eleven hundred years, the text of Scripture, and the decrees of the most holy Council of Nicaea”. Luther's friends were alarmed at this audacity; and indeed Luther only imperfectly realized the bearing of his position. The fact that he was prepared to uphold this opinion did not prevent him from writing to the Pope that “the power of the Roman Church was above all things, and nothing other in heaven or earth was to be put before it, save only Jesus Christ our Lord”. But Luther’s brain was seething with half-formed ideas, and he yielded easily to contradictory impulses. At one time he longed for peace; at another he breathed forth war. He denied the historical basis of the Papal claims; but he did not wish to meddle with the Pope’s authority. “If only the Roman decrees will leave me the Divine Gospel let them take all else. I have no wish to revolt against the Papacy; let the Pope be called Lord; even the Turk, so long as he is the bearer of power, is to be honored; for no power exists without God’s will”. He scarcely regarded himself as responsible for what he said, and laid all the blame on Eck for provoking him. “God knows what will come out...
of this tragedy. Neither Eck nor I will do ourselves any good. It seems to me to be God's device. I often said that hitherto I was only playing, now at last the Roman Pope and his arrogance will be seriously dealt with”. The more he read and thought the more he was amazed at his own conclusions. “Let me whisper in your ear; I rather think the Pope is Antichrist or his apostle; so wretchedly is Christ corrupted, aye, crucified, in his decrees”. These are the utterances of a man intoxicated with a sudden rush of ideas which he could not control—a man reeling under their powerful influence, and waiting bewildered till he could express in coherent form the net result of their overwhelming impulse.

He was recalled to a sense of his peril by the alarm of his friend Spalatin, who anxiously asked him to define his position. Luther did not conceal his annoyance at being asked to be definite, and peevishly answered that God did not suffer His counsels to be revealed. He clearly could not endure to face the bearing of the tendencies of his opinions, as apart from the issue of his disputation with Eck. He was going to say as much, or as little, as was necessary; but he had come to the conclusion that the Papal supremacy was not founded on Scripture, and had been introduced into Germany on the strength of Papal decretals collected by Gregory IX, i.e., within four hundred years. He was not prepared to say that the Papal supremacy should not be recognized; but history showed that there were many Christians, especially the Greek Church, that did not recognize it. He counted it amongst indifferent matters, such as health and riches; he did not wish to attack it, but he could not have Scripture perverted to support it. In fact, Luther was engaged in studying with feverish haste and increasing amazement the Papal decretals, and he was not sure what shape his ultimate opinions would take. He looked to the disputation with Eck as a means of clearing up his own mind.

Meanwhile Miltitz saw the unfortunate results which were likely to follow from an empty display of dialectical skill, and summoned Luther to Coblenz to answer for himself before the Archbishop of Koln in the presence of Cajetan. As this step was taken on the sole authority of Miltitz himself Luther declined to obey. He pointed out that the Archbishop was engaged with the imperial election, and would not be present in person; that he had already conferred with Cajetan to no purpose; and that his opinions had now been so fully set forth in his writings that they could be judged without his personal appearance. His writings had set his case before the judgment of the whole world, and the Pope might submit it to the judgment of an assembly of bishops. He showed how little he heeded authority by expressing his doubts if Cajetan was a Catholic Christian. “If I had time”, he added with unpardonable insolence, “I would write to the Pope and Cardinals and show how fouly he errs, if he do not entirely amend. I grieve that legates of the Apostolic See are men who strive to make away with Christ”. In fact, Luther had by this time passed beyond all thought of submitting to authority. His mind was wholly set on the coming disputation, in which he hoped to vindicate himself and his teaching, not by reference to authority, but on the grounds of Scriptural truth. To authority itself he had no objection; but authority had its limits which it could not pass, and he was prepared to discuss the nature of these limits. Before going to Leipzig he put his opinions into shape. He admitted the Papal primacy as existing, and therefore allowed by God; not to be resisted without causing a serious breach of unity and charity; resting on universal consent; and deserving obedience even if sometimes, on account of men’s sins, it was wrongly exercised. He denied that the Papal primacy was founded on Scriptural warrant: Christ’s commission of the keys to Peter gave him no authority over the other Apostles, but simply treated him as the
representative of the Church, which was built upon the rock of faith. This was the teaching of the early fathers; tried by this standard, Papal decrees, which claimed that the Roman Church had Scriptural warrant for its supremacy, might justly be called ‘frigid’. Luther, in fact, here introduced the criticism of the Papal claims by the standard of Scripture; and his arguments have substantially been repeated ever since.

Luther had now reached a definite consciousness of his position. If the Papal primacy was not of Divine institution, it could not demand implicit obedience; and points of doctrine could not be decisively settled merely by reference to the Papal authority. It is characteristic of Luther’s method of thinking that he began his argument by reserving great power to the Papacy, as existing by God's permission, which declared itself in the organization of the existing order; but he ended with the statement: “Finally, I say that I do not know if the Christian faith can endure that any other head of the Universal Church on earth can be set up save Christ”. It was in vain that he tried to limit his conclusions; the barriers which he strove to erect were sure to be swept away.

The only result of the disputation at Leipzig (June 27 to July 15) was to bring Luther's deviation from current orthodoxy into clear prominence. The first question discussed was the Papal supremacy, and Eck was sufficiently skillful to see the advantage to be gained by bringing Luther's tenets into connection with recent controversy. He pointed out that one of the positions of Wycliffe and Hus, condemned at Constance and Basel, was “That it is not necessary for salvation to believe that the Roman Church is supreme over others”. Luther indignantly disclaimed all sympathy with the Bohemian heretics; he had no wish to create a schism, but held that charity was the supreme law. He tried to turn the question from the Bohemians to the Greeks; he could not admit that the saints and martyrs of the Eastern Church were to be regarded as heretics because they did not admit the Papal supremacy. But he felt that he could not rest on such an answer, and was driven to say: “Amongst the articles of John Hus and the Bohemians it is certain that many are entirely Christian and evangelical, and the Universal Church cannot condemn them”.

There was a movement of surprise amongst the hearers, and Duke George of Saxony exclaimed: “Pest take that!”. Indeed, theologians might well ask what Luther was prepared to admit if he disposed of decrees of Councils; and the national sentiment of the Germans was shocked at a justification of the Bohemians, whose savage deeds lived in popular recollection while their tenets were forgotten. Eck seized his advantage; Luther vainly protested that he had not spoken against the Council of Constance, and called Eck's assertion that he supported the Hussites “an impudent lie”. He afterwards explained that the decree of Constance said that the condemned articles of Hus were “some heretical, others erroneous, others blasphemous, others rash and seditious, others offensive to pious ears”.

Doubtless the statement that the Papal supremacy did not exist by Divine right was rash and offensive to some tender ears; but it had not been condemned as heretical or erroneous, and was indeed Catholic and true. But really this evasion was unnecessary; for Luther had already declared that Councils could err; and Eck admitted that a Council would not make Scripture other than it was, but pertinently said that he preferred to trust the interpretation of the sense of Scripture given by a Council of learned men, with the help of the Holy Spirit, rather than the interpretation given by Luther.
As is usual in discussion, each disputant made good his own position from his own point of view. Eck maintained that the Scriptures were to be interpreted by the Papal decretals, and the consensus of theological opinion; Luther maintained that the Scriptures were the test of all decrees of Pope or Council, so far that what could not be proved directly out of them was a matter open for discussion on its own merits. Having this fundamental difference the two disputants did not succeed in coming to close quarters. Eck’s substantial gain lay in identifying Luther's opinions with those of the Hussites.

The disputation was continued about Purgatory and Indulgences. Luther believed in Purgatory, but held that Scripture was silent on the subject; he confessed his ignorance, and refused to dogmatize on the condition of souls after death. His only contention against Eck was, that it was impossible to lay down any such definition of the state of departed souls as would justify decided assertions about the way in which they could be aided by the living. On the question of Indulgences, Eck was careful to distinguish between the abuses of them and their rightful use; he admitted that Indulgences could not supersede good works, nor remit guilt, and only maintained that personal satisfaction was a part of penitence, and that the nature of that satisfaction could be determined by the jurisdiction of the Pope which was exercised through Indulgences. Luther himself admitted “on this point we very nearly agree”. He allowed that Indulgences were not to be despised but were not to be entirely trusted in. If the preachers of Indulgences had preached this doctrine the name of Luther would not have been known today.

Luther left Leipzig somewhat disappointed. Hitherto he had supposed that all Germany was like Wittenberg; that he only needed an opportunity for speech to carry conviction. He found that old opinions were not so easily shaken; he felt the difference between addressing a sympathetic audience, which was swayed by his powerful personality, and arguing with an experienced disputant before a coldly critical assembly. Hitherto he had believed that learned opinion would be on his side when he had carefully explained his opinions; he found on the contrary that, so far from clearing himself of heresy, he had been to some extent identified with those whom he had himself denounced as heretics. It was true that the disputation ended in no formal decision. The records of its proceedings were to be submitted to the Universities of Paris and Erfurt; but neither party professed to attach much weight to their opinion. Luther was more and more resolved to appeal to public opinion: Eck was convinced that he had unmasked a dangerous heretic, Luther returned to Wittenberg prepared to trust in the future to the power of his pen. Eck wrote to Hochstraten, asking him to use his influence that the University of Paris might condemn Luther as soon as possible. The net result of the disputation was that Eck’s reputation was staked on crushing Luther; that two parties began to form in Germany; and that the time for conciliation was past.

Luther had to face the fact that his views were contrary to received opinion, and in a published defence of the conclusions discussed at Leipzig gave reasons for his position. If it was objected that he stood against the weight of theological authority, he answered that Duns Scotus and Occam had done so before him; God had once spoken through the mouth of an ass, and had revealed to the boy Samuel what He hid from the aged Eli; in the dangers of the present time let all remember that they are but men, that it is easy to err, difficult to be wise and do rightly; let them unite in zeal for the discovery of truth, and not attack one another through desire for vainglory or the maintenance of opinions because they are their own. Whatever objections may be urged
against him, he goes on to say: “I believe that I am a Christian theologian and live in the kingdom of the truth, and therefore am a debtor to the truth, not only to set it forth, but to defend it even to death. He spoke, not in the spirit of a revolutionist and dogmatist, but as an explorer and discoverer; one who in an age of discontent and inquiry felt that he had the clue to an answer to many problems. The system of the past, laboriously as it had been constructed, strong as it appeared to be, was on its trial, and must be tested by the documents from which it professed to derive its origin. Luther was convinced that the system had been overlaid with the results of human ingenuity till much of its original force had been frittered away by secondary contrivances, which were now used to prevent free discussion. Chief amongst these was the doctrine of the Papal supremacy, which was invoked to support the existing system in all its abuses. If free inquiry was to proceed, the claims of the Papacy to decide all questions must be abated”.

It was indeed this very point of the Papal authority which lay in the way of all Luther’s endeavors. He had raised the question of the meaning of Indulgences, and had been superciliously answered by the theologians of the Curia that he must not go behind Papal decrets. This led him to challenge the appeal to Papal decrets as ultimate; and his assertion that the Papal monarchy was not of Divine institution raised an opposition amongst German theologians. Luther was drawn into controversy, and saw himself menaced as heretic. He felt bound to maintain his title to orthodoxy, to raise up a party in Germany, and seek allies in the Impending struggle. Accordingly he engaged in a controversy with Eck, and another with Hieronymus Emser, a former secretary of Duke George of Saxony who irritated Luther by attacking him in an underhand manner, while professing to clear him of the charge of sympathizing with the Bohemians. In this controversy Luther showed a command of virulent invective, and a power of personal onslaught, which were unbefitting a zealous seeker after truth. Doubtless his skill as a literary gladiator increased his reputation at the time, and strengthened his claims as a party leader. But there is no doubt that his unmeasured language repelled many finer minds, needlessly embittered the inevitable conflict, and permanently lowered the moral dignity of his position. It was the misfortune of Luther that he rarely transcended the limits of his own surroundings. He wrote for immediate effect, and had a ready and conscious sympathy with the weakness, as well as with the strength, of his readers. He was a German, and a man of the people; he expressed the sentiments, and used the language, of his age.

As regards his party, Luther at first wished to identify his cause with that of the humanists. In December, 1518, he wrote to Reuchlin that their enemies were the same; but Reuchlin was weary of conflict, and made no movement to meet Luther’s advances. In March, 1519, he wrote to Erasmus in terms of fulsome flattery; but Erasmus, though civil, gave him little encouragement, and hinted that theological subjects were best discussed by the learned. Luther’s trust was in the benevolent neutrality of the Elector Frederick, and his own personal popularity at Wittenberg. But this was an unsure foundation on which to rest; and in September we find Luther desirous of connecting himself with the national opposition to the oppressive taxation imposed by the Papacy on the German Church. In his dedication to the first edition of his Commentary on the Epistle to Galatians he writes that while his adversaries are boasting of Papal decrets he will betake himself to Scripture. He has no quarrel with Papal decrets provided that they are in accordance with the Gospel. He reverences the Roman Church; but he sees that the Germans have been plundered and laughed at by Italians in the name of the
Roman Church; and he sees further that the German Diet, in refusing to pay tithes imposed by the Pope and sanctioned by the Lateran Council, has drawn a distinction between the decrees of the Roman Church and the glosses of the Roman Court. He is ready to follow the example of these lay theologians and submit himself to the Roman Church, while he opposes the Roman Court and commits his cause to the great head of the Church, Jesus Christ.

About the same time he wrote in a similar strain to one of his theological opponents: “You have nothing else in your mouth than: The Church, the Church; heretics, heretics. But when we ask for the Church you show us one man, the Pope, to whom you hand over everything without a ghost of a proof that he is of indefectible faith. We, however, find as many heresies in his decretals as in the works of any heretic. The one point that you have to prove you avoid by a perpetual petitio principii, which you know to be the most vicious form of argument. What you have to prove is that the Church of God is amongst you, and not also in other parts of the world”.

These ideas were not new, nor were they confined to Wittenberg. They were familiar to many ardent spirits in Germany, and they found an echo at Rome. In July, 1519, Crotus Rubianus wrote thence to Hutten: “There are some here who sincerely advise the Pope, first, to abolish the Alvari and Sylvester with all their Summulae, because by them the world is deceived since they do not thoroughly follow the Gospel of S. Paul; secondly, to publish a decree that for the future no one should trust to Scotus or Thomas or any of the writers of Sentences, unless supported by Scriptural proof; lastly, that the decretals should be compared with the Gospel and the teaching of S. Paul by some good men, who have in their hearts not syllogisms but Christ; for they say that some of the decretals stink of avarice, others of tyranny, others of arrogance”. We cannot suppose that these drastic reforms were really urged on the Pope; but the mention of them shows that the critical spirit of the New Learning had discovered the plain fact that the absolute claims of Papal monarchy rested on a basis which would not bear examination; that its creation was the work of an uncritical age; that it had grown to an unwieldy and intolerable form; and was supported by a host of interested officials who upheld with their pens a system which filled their pockets.

Crotus soon found that, however much his friends at Rome talked of reform, the Italians were not prepared to take any decided steps. In October came letters from Eck giving his own account of the disputation at Leipzig. Luther had been driven to confess himself a Hussite: it was necessary to take speedy measures, for his heresies were spreading round Wittenberg as a centre: let the Pope urge the Universities of Erfurt and Paris to condemn his opinions, and let him commit their further condemnation to the theologians of the Curia. Crotus found that the Italian scholars, who agreed with Luther in their heart, thought it wise to dissent with their tongues. Not a hundred S. Pauls, not all the Scriptures, would move them to withstand the Pope. Luther's arguments would have no weight, unless the Princes and Bishops of Germany judged it more holy to defend the Word of God than spend their money on Pallium, Indulgences, Bulls, and other trifles from the sale of which the members of the Curia gained the means of keeping their harlots. Luther was warned that no appeal to Scripture would help him against the necessity under which the Papacy lay of maintaining the system on which the Curia waxed fat. He must open the eyes of Germany to the enormities of the Roman frauds, and warn it against the poison wherewith Rome had infected the land.
Such utterances were doubtless encouraging to Luther, who saw a body of
humanists gather round him, as they had gathered for the defence of Reuchlin. The
conduct of Eck rendered this inevitable; for he considered the suppression of Luther a
personal duty, and if he were to succeed he would become the supreme arbiter of
orthodoxy in Germany. In a pamphlet, which he wrote in support of Emser, he said that
all the theologians in Germany were opposed to Luther's views, except a few unlearned
canons. This drew forth at the end of 1519, *The Answer of an Unlearned Canon*, which
was really the work of Oecolampadius, but was generally ascribed to Bernard
Adelmann, a canon of Augsburg, and a friend of Pirkheimer. This was shortly followed
by a gross attack on Eck in a dialogue written by Pirkheimer, *Eccius Dedolatus*, or *The
Corner Planed off*, a pun upon Eck's name, which in German signifies 'corner'. This
dialogue held up to ridicule Eck's personal character, and branded him as a drunken and
lustful sycophant, seeking only his own advancement, and so ignorant as to uphold the
scholastic theologians against 'heretics, Greeks, and poets such as Origen, Chrysostom,
and Jerome.

A still more important ally offered himself in the person of Hutten, whose fiery
patriotism was eager for any chance of a fray. Since his discovery of Valla's treatise *On
the Donation of Constantine*, Hutten had pursued his studies in the same direction. He
recalled the old glories of Germany when the Empire had been a reality; he meditated
on Germany's downfall before the hostility of the Papacy; he compared it with other
nations, and found it divided, distracted, and helpless before Papal extortion. He saw in
the Papal power the cause of Germany's abasement, and attacked the abuses of the
Papal Court, not with the sadness of an ecclesiastical reformer, but with the bitterness of
a patriot denouncing his country's foes. He hoped great things from the energy of the
young Emperor, and from a combination of the German princes. In the winter of 1519,
he wrote his most effective dialogue *Vadiscus*, in which he compressed into stinging
epigrams his hatred of the Roman Court. These epigrams took the form of triads on
which the dialogue itself was a commentary. Three things maintain the dignity of Rome
the authority of the Pope, the relics of saints, the sale of Indulgences. Three things are
brought back from Rome: a depressed conscience, a ruined digestion, empty pockets.
Three things are laughed at in Rome: the example of the past, the pontificate of Peter,
the last judgment. Three things are feared in Rome: a General Council, reform of the
Church, the opening of the eyes of the Germans. Three things are excommunicated in
Rome: indigence, the primitive Church, preaching of the truth. Three things are
despised in Rome: poverty, the fear of God, equity. So the dialogue moves on, from
one bitter jibe to another.

But Hutten was not contented merely with literary assaults; he wished to embody
his ideas in some substantial form, and call attention to them by deeds as well as words.
He was personally interested in German politics; for he had a family feud against the
Duke Ulrich of Wurtemberg, who during the interregnum in the Empire carried on his
depredations against his neighbors with the help of French gold. The Swabian League
took up arms against him and under the leadership of Franz von Sickingen won an easy
victory. Franz was the representative of the class of knights who built their castles along
the Rhine, and lived a life of lawless adventure, resembling that of the Italian condottieri
generals. He had been engaged in war against the city of Worms, and had made raids
upon Lorraine. He was laid under the ban of the Empire, was reconciled to Maximilian,
and taken into his service. On the Emperor's death he supported the claims of Charles to
the Empire, and his overthrow of the Duke of Wurtemberg produced a strong
impression upon the action of the Electors. Hutten addressed himself to Sickingen, who felt the need of guidance among the perplexities of the time. A strange alliance was formed between the two adventurers, and Sickingen became the military champion of oppressed scholars. He interposed in behalf of Reuchlin, and Koln was ready enough to leave Hochstraten and the Dominicans to his mercy; but the terms which Sickingen imposed on Reuchlin's adversary were rendered useless by the Papal decision, and he could only secure that the old scholar ended his days in peace. The cause of Luther was still more pressing than that of Reuchlin; and Hutten inspired Sickingen with a new interest in theology. This was important, as Sickingen stood high in the favour of the young Emperor. In January, 1520, Hutten offered Luther Sickingen’s protection, and a refuge in his castle, if he was obliged to flee from Saxony.

These assurances of support naturally gave Luther an increased sense of importance. For various reasons there was a strong party which objected to his suppression by the mere exercise of Papal authority. This was enough to encourage and strengthen him in his appeal to public opinion. Moreover, he had the true insight of a great party leader, and saw that he must never allow his adversaries to seem to have the advantage. In a sermon on the Holy Sacrament he had let fall the remark that it might be well for a General Council to restore to the laity the reception under both kinds. This was at once laid hold of as a proof of his leanings towards the Hussites; and the Bishop of Meissen thought the matter sufficiently important to prohibit the sale of Luther's sermon as contrary to the decree of the Lateran Council. Luther at once replied: the reception under both kinds had been allowed to the Bohemians by the Council of Basel, and this permission might therefore be extended universally by another Council; if all discussion is to be prohibited as scandalous and schismatical, there is an end to any hope of another Council, for free discussion is necessary to prepare subjects for its deliberations. Luther's tone was as confident as usual, and he showed little respect for dignities; but the Elector was alarmed at this summary manner of dealing with ecclesiastical authority. Doubtless he thought that the Bishop of Meissen was in his rights in dealing with his own diocese, and Spalatin urged Luther to moderate his language and sometimes hold his peace. Luther answered that silence was bad policy; his patience in putting up with five or six wagon loads of abuse from Eck and Emser had encouraged the bishop to proceed to his inhibition.

“Do not think”, he went on, “that this matter can be ended without tumult, scandal, and sedition. Out of a sword you cannot make a feather, nor out of war, peace. The Word of God is a sword, is war, is ruin, is scandal, is destruction, is poison”.

After this vision of the future Luther returned to himself: “I cannot deny that I am more vehement than I ought to be; and, as they know that, they ought not to vex the dog. How hard it is to restrain one's heat and moderate one's pen, you may learn in your own case. This is the reason why I have been annoyed at public appearances; but the more annoyed I am, the more I am driven to them against my will. And that, only by the most atrocious accusations leveled at myself and God's Word; whence it happens that, if I were not carried away by my heat and my pen, still even a heart of stone would be moved to arms by the indignity of the thing; how much more I, who am both hot, and have a pen not altogether blunt? These portents carry me beyond the decorum of modesty. Still I wonder whence has sprung this new religion, that anything spoken against an adversary is called abuse. What think you of Christ? Was He abusive when He called the Jews an adulterous and perverse generation, the offspring of vipers, hypocrites, children of the devil?”
We gather from this letter that Luther was by this time fully convinced that his opinions would not receive consideration from the authorities of the Church, and that he was prepared to face the inevitable struggle. He recognized the seriousness of that struggle, and unconsciously fitted himself for it. He saw the advantages of a powerful personality, and was annoyed at any outside criticism of his methods or his language. He firmly identified his own cause with the eternal truth, and did not wish to reflect overmuch upon the form in which it was expedient to clothe his convictions. He instinctively felt the value of violent language in intimidating opponents and winning the popular ear. The time for moderation was past; he must vigorously repel all assaults, must always have the last word, must stir up the prevailing excitement, and must carry the attack into the enemy's country. It was not for him to look too closely into the future: he must do his utmost in the present and leave the result with God.

When such was Luther’s temper of mind he readily found arguments to support him. Hutten's edition of Valla’s *On the Donation of Constantine* fell into his hands, and left him wondering whether to denounce the darkness, or the villainy, of the Roman Court; he ended by becoming almost sure that the Pope was Antichrist. But this development of his anti-papal opinions went on side by side with the reports that reached him of the proceedings at the Roman Court. In the middle of January Eck set out for Rome, giving out that he was summoned by the Pope; and Luther knew that if Eck was listened to, there was no further hope. Eck did not spare to chronicle the honor with which he was received, and his letters exaggerated his own importance. It was a grievous error of judgment that he should have been allowed to hang about the Papal Court, have interviews with the Pope and Cardinals, and pose as the representative of German opinion. In Luther's eyes this fact alone sufficed to rob the deliberations of the Roman theologians of any semblance of justice.

According to Eck’s own account, it was his prompting that urged the Pope to take action against Luther, and he discussed the matter for five hours with the Pope, two Cardinals, and a Spanish theologian. However that may be, a congregation of the generals of the Franciscan Order was appointed, on February 4, to proceed against Luther, and its presidents were Cardinals Cajetan and Accolti. It was again a mistake to place at the head of this body an avowed opponent of Luther like Cajetan. If the object in view was merely Luther's condemnation, it was a further mistake to have deferred that step so long. Luther was left alone in Germany. No measures tending towards conciliation had been taken for a year. It seemed as if the Papacy was entirely busied with the imperial election, and was only waiting to make sure of the support of the young Emperor before proceeding to extremities. Even when the case was at last taken in hand, there was no settled policy. On February 16, the first congregation was superseded by another on a broader basis, but presided over by the same two Cardinals. In the middle of March it was rumored that Luther’s errors were to be condemned without naming him, but he was to be privately admonished to recant. It does not seem that any attempt was made to gain information about the state of opinion in Germany, or the consequences likely to follow from repressive measures. Yet the attitude of the Elector Frederick might have given reason for speculation. He was himself a devout son of the Church, with a taste for collecting relics; he had not shown any sympathy with Luther’s opinions, but had refused to interfere on the side of repression. He was told that his ambiguous attitude was viewed with disfavor at Rome, and answered his friendly adviser that he neither approved nor disapproved of Luther’s teaching, but he knew that many learned men held it to be eminently Christian. Luther had offered to
appear before the Pope's commissioners and submit to correction if he was proved in error; he had been dragged by Eck into controversy which had better been avoided. He had been on the point of leaving Saxony, but Miltitz pointed out that he might take refuge in some place where he would, be less amenable to restraint, and therefore would be more dangerous.

“Germany”, continued Frederick, “is now full of educated and cultivated men; and the laity have begun to be intelligent, to love the Scriptures, and wish to understand them. The teaching of Luther has a great hold over the minds of many; if his conditions are refused and he is put down, without legal investigation, only by the censures and ban of the Church, the existing disturbance will be increased and there will be no hope of a peaceful settlement”.

If Leo X had cared to collect such opinions as these, he would have found food for reflection. Frederick was a man whose election to the Empire had been urged by the Pope; every one respected his uprightness, and every one admired his good sense. Frederick himself was satisfied with the religious ideas of his forefathers; but he saw that many men were not satisfied; and he came to the practical conclusion that differences of opinion must be left to settle themselves. There were, no doubt, dangers on every side: but the dangers of forcible interference seemed to him to be greatest. He came to the conclusion that it was his business to hold the balance straight; and such an opinion, entertained by such a man, ought to have been clearly before the Pope and his advisers. It was certainly a striking instance of the influence exercised by the new ideas upon those who lived within their sphere, and felt their force, without being in sympathy with them.

Meanwhile, as the rumors of Luther’s approaching condemnation were brought to Germany, his adversaries were more outspoken, and the need of defending himself seemed to him more pressing. In the end of 1519, the Universities of Louvain and Koln condemned his doctrine, on the ground that he infamed good works as though they were not meritorious. Their condemnations were published; and, Luther immediately answered by asserting liberty of opinion on such a point. If it was necessary to pronounce any judgment on his teaching, why did they not do so, either charitably admitting the difficulty of the subject and the possibility of error, or according to law, after summoning him to explain and listening to his arguments?

Soon afterwards a Franciscan of Leipzig, Augustin of Alfeld, issued a book on 'The Apostolic Seat,' which Luther answered in a pamphlet On the Papacy at Rome against the renowned Romanists at Leipzig. In this work Luther summarized his opinions in a significant manner. The Church, according to Scripture, was an assembly of all believers on earth—all, that is, who live in right faith, hope, and charity. This invisible Church is recognized by the outward signs of baptism, the sacrament of the altar, and the Gospel. It is a spiritual unity, and stands to any outward expression as the soul does to the body. The Roman Church can at best be but a symbol; for the one head of the Church is Christ. But in the outward Church one bishop may be set over others; and as the Pope holds that position he is to be respected within the limits of his authority and usefulness. He proceeds:

“I struggle for two points. First, I will not endure that men shall establish new articles of faith, and judge all other Christians in the world as heretics, schismatics, and unbelievers, only because they are not under the Pope. It is enough that we leave the Pope to be Pope; it is not necessary that for his sake God and His saints be abused.
Secondly, all that the Pope establishes and does I will accept, provided I may first judge it according to the Scriptures; he shall be to me under Christ, and shall submit himself to be judged by Holy Scripture”.

Luther was of opinion that in this work he had restrained himself so as not to be unmindful of the Pope. But scarcely was it published before he received a book issued from Rome which aroused his wildest indignation. It would seem that Sylvester Prierias considered himself in duty bound to carry on the controversy which he had begun, and show the ignorant Germans the extent of their errors. He had projected a complete vindication of the Papal Primacy; but as he had not time to finish it just then, he thought it worthwhile to issue a summary of his arguments. This Epitome was drawn up with all the complacency of a skilled official, who knew the intricacies of his subject, and felt a mixture of scorn and amazement at the clumsy attempts of a well-meaning man to deal with a matter which he did not understand. So Prierias marshaled in order all the most advanced opinions which had been expressed about the Papal power. The Pope, he said, was the source of all jurisdiction in the Church; jurisdiction descended from the Pope to bishops. Amongst men the Pope alone had power immediately from God; not all the world could take it away or limit it. The authority of a Council did not come from God: its decrees were of no force until confirmed by the Pope. An undoubted Pope could not rightfully be deprived or judged by a Council, even if he were so scandalous that he were leading mankind in crowds into hell; all that could be done was to pray to God. The Pope alone could interpret the laws of God and nature, and declare doubtful matters, not only in morals, but in faith. The Pope might err as a private person, but when he acted as Pope he was an infallible judge of truth.

Doubtless Prierias could give copious references to recent authorities for all these statements; and his work was a good sample of the theology which had passed current for the last half-century. But it was most unwise, at a time when the Papacy was known to be considering Luther's opinions, that such a work should have issued from a high official in the Pope’s household. It asserted in the most offensive manner all that Luther claimed to be open to discussion. It supplied him with a dangerous weapon, for he published it at once with mocking comments. It afforded him good ground for justifying a revolt against the Roman system, and he used his opportunity to the full:

“If these opinions and this teaching prevail at Rome, with the knowledge of the Pope and the Cardinals, I pronounce that Antichrist sits in the temple of God, and that the Roman Court is the synagogue of Satan. If the Pope and the Cardinals do not demand a retractation of these opinions, I declare that I dissent from the Roman Church, and cast it off as the abomination standing in the holy place”.

He saw that mere protest was useless, and boldly advocated practical measures against a system which was deliberately framed to make reform impossible, to check free thought, and to fasten for ever on Germany the grievances of which it complained. “When the Romanists see that they cannot prevent a Council, they feign that the Pope is above a Council, is the infallible rule of truth, and the author of all understanding of Scripture. There is no remedy, save that Emperor, Kings, and Princes should attack these pests and settle the matter, not by words but by the sword. If we punish thieves by the gallows, and heretics by fire, why not attack Pope, Cardinals, and the brood of the Roman Sodom with arms, and wash our hands in their blood?”

In this violent utterance Luther abandoned the position, which he had hitherto held, of a simple theologian who was Struggling only for liberty to express his opinions
and defend them when attacked. Indeed, he might urge that such a position had been rendered impossible. The sole result of the attempt to submit his opinions to the criticism of the learned had been that his opponent hastened to Rome to procure his official condemnation, and that his services had been welcomed for the purpose of drawing up the indictment. There was no hope from any recognized form of ecclesiastical authority, which was everywhere dependent, on the Papacy. If Luther himself did not pay much heed to the future, he had far-sighted friends who urged it upon his consideration. He had followers who were resolved that their master and his teaching should not be swept away. No man could be impervious to the warnings of such a disciple as Crotus Rubianus, who on his return from Rome wrote to Luther: “You have many comrades in your heresy, who would follow you to the stake. Let learned men dispute and condemn as they please, I shall never doubt that any one justified by faith has access to God. Let them glory in their theory of satisfaction; we, when we have done all that was commanded to us, are still unprofitable servants, having nothing save what we freely received. Let them take pleasure in their own deserts, and ask a reward for their deeds; we, who believe in Him who gives life to the sinner through faith, are more amply free both from punishment and guilt. Let who will set up the invention of a Pope: true religion knows only one founder. Let Scripture, according to your friend Sylvester, derive its force from the Church in its representative capacity; let heretics be permitted with uplifted heart to pray for light: Open Thou mine eyes and I will see the wonders of Thy law. Do you, Martin, most upright of theologians, undertake the protection of this light deserted and abandoned, and by the virtue which we venerate in you show the difference between the creation of the Pope and of God”.

The zeal of such men as Crotus provided material for the bold designs of Hutten, who burned with desire to free Germany from the Roman yoke and bring back the glories of the Empire. It was time that Germany under its young Emperor shook off the tyranny of Rome. For this purpose Hutten attempted to win to his side the Emperor's brother Ferdinand, and began a systematic endeavor to raise a party among the German Princes. In June, Cornelius Agrippa wrote: “Those hostile to the Pope are likely to raise sedition, unless God provide; for they exhort the Princes and Potentates of Germany to shake off the Roman yoke, and like the Israelites of old exclaim: What is our part amongst the Romans, or what our lot in the Bishop of Rome? Are there not Primates and Bishops in Germany, that we should be subject to the Bishop of Rome, even to kissing his feet? Let Germany leave the Romans and return to its own Primates, Bishops, and Pastors. You see whither all this tends, and already some Princes and cities lend their ears”.

The policy was not yet very definite; but the prospect of a united and national movement against Rome was alluring, and Luther gave it his sanction. His mind was made up for war before he had seen the Bull against him; and on July 10 he wrote to Spalatin: “The die is cast; I have despised alike the favor and the anger of the Romans. I will not be reconciled to them nor hold communication with them. Let them condemn and burn my writings. I, in my turn, if I can find a fire, will condemn and publicly burn all the Papal law, the mask of all heresies. Henceforth there shall be an end of the humility which I have hitherto shown in vain, for I will no longer puff’ up the enemies of the Gospel”.

With this intention Luther set to work to compose a manifesto which should propound the possibilities of future reorganization. There was no hope of action from the ecclesiastical authorities; it was time for the German nation to take the question in
hand for itself. So Luther resolved to arouse the Emperor and the German nobility against the tyranny and wickedness of the Roman Court. He did not appeal to the Princes nor to the people, but he addressed those who were likely to be the moving powers in giving practical effect to his suggestions. The pamphlet was finished on June 23, and soon issued from the press; by August 18, 4000 copies had been sold.

Luther's address *To the Christian nobility of the German Nation respecting the reformation of the Christian estate* was called by his friends a trumpet blast; and such indeed it was. It shows Luther at his best and bears the marks of those qualities which made him a great leader of men. His fervour is no less striking than his simplicity; his grasp of the situation, his strong common-sense, his directness, and his moral earnestness were well calculated to make his readers forget his audacity. He summed up all the grievances which Germany had long lamented, all the proposals of well-intentioned reformers, and gave them a clear meaning and a definite aim. He pointed out that reform in the past had been made impossible because the Romanists had entrenched themselves behind a triple wall. If reform was pressed by the temporal power, their answer was that the spiritual power was superior to the temporal. If reform was proposed on the basis of Scripture, men were told that the Pope was the only authorized interpreter of Scripture. If a Council was threatened, the threat was met by the assertion that no one could summon a Council save the Pope. It was time that these paper-walls were overthrown. The spiritual power falls before the assertion of the priesthood of all believers; so that the difference between clergy and laity is only a difference of office and function, not of estate. The Scriptures can be interpreted by every pious Christian, who holds the true faith and has the mind of Christ. When there is need of a Council, it is the duty of every member of the Christian community to struggle to bring about its meeting, and the temporal authorities are the natural executors of the general wish. Thus Luther prepares the way for a true and free Council, and has no difficulty in setting forth the business, which it would find to hand, in reforming the condition of the Church.

The striking feature in this document is the light-heartedness with which it contemplates a breach of the historical continuity of the ecclesiastical system. There is no sympathy expressed for old usages, which are treated as though they were stifling the true life of the Christian man. There is no attempt to separate their real meaning from the growths which had gathered round them. Luther shows a decided respect for everything that concerned the civil government—though the reformation of the Empire was as much needed as the reformation of the Church; but for the institutions of the Church he expresses little regard. The Church, as an outward organization, has little value in his eyes; indeed he does not trouble to explain what he conceives its future form to be. His immediate object is purely practical. Let but the holders of temporal power in Germany combine, and they are strong enough to sweep away the rubbish which has gathered round the Church. It had come to this: that the great institution which had fostered the early life of all European nations, and was interwoven with every stage of their history, was now regarded by the awakening aspirations of a new age as a worthless cumberer of the ground. Luther himself, and all those whom he was addressing, had been brought up under its institutions; but he felt, and could boldly ask all Germans to feel with him, that it was a mere hindrance to their true spiritual life. There is not a trace of sentimental attachment; let homely common-sense deal with the matter. If only a free Council can be assembled—and Luther does not stop to inquire how it is to be constituted—general intelligence, if once freed from the absurd prepossessions of the past, will easily bring order into the prevailing confusion.
The great ideal of the Mediaeval Church had disappeared, lost to sight among abuses, frittered away into oblivion before the complexity of details. Luther does not feel the need for any impressive representation of man’s spiritual life, or any anxious care for his soul’s welfare. Let men be taught their Bible, and be exhorted to do their duty; let them feel themselves responsible to God, and recognize themselves as members of a great spiritual community of faithful people, strong in communion with God through faith in Christ. He speaks to Germany, in the hope that Germany will be the first nation to take the decisive step. He has no doubt that every other nation will rapidly follow the example, and that a new and healthier Christendom will come into being. He is not concerned with ecclesiastical order; that is a matter of detail which may be left to settle itself. It is true that his principle of the universal priesthood of all baptized Christians, applied by itself, reduces ecclesiastical organization to a matter of expediency. Yet Luther did not seem to contemplate any violent change. The Pope even was to remain, not as the Vicar of Christ in heaven, but only of Christ on earth, to represent Him, “in the form of a servant”, by working, preaching, suffering, and dying; nay, he was still to be referred to, for if we took away ninety-nine parts of the Pope’s Court, it would still be large enough to answer questions on matters of belief. Germany was still to have a primate, archbishops, and bishops; though such officers were not of Scriptural institution, but were founded for convenience of rule. What were to be the functions of the Bishops is not so clear; for every town was to elect a pious and learned man from the congregation and charge him with the office of minister; the congregation was to support him, and he should be at liberty to marry; he was to have assistants, several priests, and deacons. These are but scattered hints. There is no attempt to work out a connected system, or show how it was possible. Luther’s purpose was to prove that resistance to the Papacy was not hopeless; there was another and a broader basis of ecclesiastical life, of which he merely sketched the general lines.

Luther was not dissatisfied with the reception of his bold address to the Christian nobility, and was encouraged to advance further. He had spoken as a practical statesman; he soon ventured to speak as a theologian. He had pointed out the means of reforming the Church and had sketched the outlines of a new ecclesiastical organization; he soon advanced to explain more fully the grounds of his objection to the existing Church. Starting from the position of justification by faith only, he had gained a conception of the Christian life which was in opposition to that of the Mediaeval Church. The notion of a mighty institution, founded by Christ and endowed with His gifts, which watched over the individual from the cradle to the grave, and by its observances disciplined him into saintliness,—this splendid ideal of Mediaeval Christendom dropped entirely away from Luther. If the individual soul was saved by flinging itself through faith into the arms of Christ’s mercy, it was clear that the institutions of the Church were to be criticized according as they helped or hindered this process. So Luther was not desirous to reform abuses in the institutions of the Church; he thought that the greater part of those institutions were entirely unnecessary. The system of the priesthood, of the sacraments, and of discipline had grown up to meet the actual wants of the ordinary man. It took human nature, with all its frailties, and set itself the task of training it by gradual processes, of bringing it under regulations, of setting before it a high ideal, of developing characters which impressed the world. It took all men under its care, admitted them into Christ’s earthly kingdom, and held before them an ideal of progressive sanctification, to be continued in Purgatory, over which the Church on earth still exercised some authority.
Reformers before Luther had for the most part contented themselves with lamenting that the authorities of the Church did not do their duty; that its mechanism had fallen out of order; that numerous abuses impaired its efficiency. But Luther questioned the need of the machinery at all. He did not begin from the Church at large but from the individual Christian. If a man believed in Christ he was justified before God by the act of faith; the important thing in God's eyes was the disposition of mind shown by faith in a Redeemer. This in itself made the Christian precious unto God; and his sanctification followed according to the fullness of grace vouchsafed to him. The Church was the collection of believing Christians, and its influence on the world depended on the fervor of the faith which it testified.

When Luther had made this clear to himself, he was free from all respect to the existing system of the Church, its sacraments, and its ordinances. He did not stop to ask how they had grown up, or what effect they had produced; all that he would consider was their Scriptural warrant, and their usefulness to produce, or cherish, a justifying faith. In his book *On the Babylonish Captivity of the Church* he set himself to sweep away the mediaeval doctrine of the sacraments. Instead of seven he only admitted three, Baptism, Penance, and the Eucharist. All of them had been brought into bondage by the Court of Rome. The cup had been denied to the laity, contrary to the example of the institution of the sacrament. The doctrine of transubstantiation had been needlessly borrowed from Aristotle, whereas the real bread and the real wine may just as well be held to co-exist with the real flesh and the real blood. The notion that the Mass is in itself a good work and a sacrifice destroyed the spiritual meaning of the sacrament. Penance had been perverted from its real use, the restoration of faith in the promise given at baptism. “Neither Pope nor bishop nor any man whatever has the right to make one syllable binding on a Christian save with his own consent. The prayers, almsgivings, fastings, the whole body of Papal ordinances, are contrary to Christian liberty”. Vows ought to be abolished; the whole system of discipline had become a tyranny. The extension of the sacraments beyond the ordinance of Christ was unjustifiable. The Church had no power to establish new promises of God's grace; for the Church was established by the promises of God—not the promises of God by the Church. The Word of God is incomparably above the Church, and the Church cannot establish the authority by which she exists. So Luther argued. “I hear a report”, he said, “that fresh Bulls are being forged against me: this is part of my recantation”. Luther was now in full revolt. He called on Germany to manage its own Church without the Pope; and he laid down a new conception of the Church and its relations to the individual believer.

Luther prepared with dignity to await the issue of the inevitable conflict. His book 'About the Liberty of a Christian Man' completed the full expression of his ideas. He had denounced the abuses of the Church, and had pointed the way to its reorganization on a basis of freedom; it still remained for him to show what that freedom was. He started with the paradox, “A Christian man is the most free lord of all, and subject to none : a Christian man is the most dutiful servant of all, and servant to every one”. The believer through faith is united to Christ, is sharer of His kingdom, and free from all outward observances; but this inward freedom leads him to self-discipline. Observances have a new meaning when dictated by an inward law; the service of others becomes a necessity of the regenerate nature. Luther in clear and fervent words set forth his conception of the position and duties of the individual Christian; and incidentally defended his system against the obvious objection, that it was founded upon a mere
appeal to the intellect, and left the individual a liberty which would degenerate into licence.

Perhaps the gravity of these objections was not immediately apparent. The system of the Church was so decrepit, that it was difficult to detach its principles from the abuses which overlaid them. Decrees of Popes, and quotations from theologians, were not a basis on which could stand a system that was not to be justified by its visible results. It was confronted by a rival system, which appealed alike to spiritual fervor, to mysticism, and to common-sense; which offered to free the individual from thralldom, and make him master of his own spiritual destiny. Luther spoke with all the confidence of one who possessed the future. In the strength of hope he bade his hearers hold experience cheap; and indeed the appeal to experience was not encouraging. Great aspirations after something better, conservative efforts after reform, had come to nothing time after time. Popular sentiment in Germany was ready to leave the old moorings and trust itself to the unknown possibilities of a voyage of discovery.

The treatise On Christian Liberty was sent to the Pope with the letter Luther had promised Miltitz to write. The letter was scarcely intended to reach the Pope; but it shows Luther's attitude to Leo X, and gives his own account of the development of his opinions. He reminds Leo that he has never spoken of him personally otherwise than in honorable terms. He regards him as a lamb in the midst of wolves, and has denounced only the evils of the Roman Court, which a Pope, be he ever so excellent, is unable by himself to reform. Nay, it had never been his intention to attack the Roman Court. He was engaged in the quiet study of the Scriptures, that he might be of use to his neighbors, when against his will he was engaged in controversy. Instead of imposing silence on both sides, Cajetan, as Papal Legate, demanded a complete recantation. When Miltitz tried to make peace, Luther was ready to submit to the decision of German bishops; but Eck interposed, and picking up a passing remark about the Papal Primacy, began a new discussion at Leipzig, and compelled him to speak out about the Roman Court. Again Miltitz interposed, and Luther at his request comes, with all humility, to explain himself to the Pope. Let Leo acquaint himself with facts, and refuse to listen to flatterers; Luther only asks that he should not unreasonably be called upon to recant, and that he should be free to interpret God's Word in Christian liberty. “Therefore, Leo, my father, beware of listening to these sirens, who make you out to be not a mere man, but partly a God, so that you may command what you will. You are the servant of servants, and placed more than any other man in a perilous position. Let not these deceive you, who pretend that you are lord of the world, that no man may be a Christian without your authority, that you have power over heaven, purgatory, and hell. They err who set you above Councils and the Universal Church, who give to you alone the power of interpreting the Scriptures”.

Luther had now laid his case before the audience whom he was addressing, the German people; and he was strong in their sympathy and support. The German national movement found in the cause of Luther a rallying-point for its energies. He had said a great many things that were true; his general principles appealed to men's consciousness of right; his denunciations of abuses were unanswerable. Luther wrote with boldness to save himself; for he knew that he was already condemned at Rome, and that he could only stand by popular support. It was the Pope's misfortune that the condemnation, which he pronounced, was not against Luther as he was then, but against a pre-existing Luther. He condemned Luther the reformer, whom the certainty of condemnation had driven to become Luther the rebel. When the Pope’s Bull, which was issued on June 15,
1520, reached Germany, it dealt with matters which were already ancient history. For this very reason the Bull has an additional interest. It is natural for us, looking back upon events, to assume that Luther’s breach with the Papacy was inevitable, and to discover in his theology from the first the germs of all that was afterwards developed. But, as a matter of fact, Luther’s opinions were evolved by the necessity of a conflict, which was by no means inevitable; and the Papal policy must be judged, not by its opposition to Lutheranism, but by its refusal to allow any discussion on the theological questions contained in the Bull *Exsurge Domine*.

So far as style was concerned the Bull was not unhappy. After the usual rhetorical address to God, to S. Peter, and S. Paul to defend the Church from the attacks of foes, the Pope went on to express his profound sorrow that the errors of the Greeks and Bohemians were being revived, and that too in Germany, which had hitherto borne such noble testimony against heresy. Forty-one propositions were then condemned as either heretical, or scandalous, or false, or offensive to pious ears, or seducing to simple minds, and standing in the way of the Catholic faith. As these errors, and many more, were contained in the books of Martin Luther, the faithful were ordered to burn all such books. As Luther himself had refused to come to Rome and submit to instruction, and had even appealed to a General Council, contrary to the decrees of Pius II and Julius II, he was inhibited from preaching; he and his followers were ordered to recant within sixty days; otherwise they were to be treated as heretics, were to be imprisoned by the magistrates, and the places in which they took refuge were laid under an interdict.

The propositions condemned in the Bull may be resolved into four heads, according to the subjects of which they treat:

(1) The theory of Indulgences. This might well have been allowed to rest. It was beset with difficulties which theologians found it difficult to decide. In the prevailing temper of Germany the retort was obvious, that the Pope was careful to maintain every source of revenue, even when it was wrongly founded upon the superstition of ignorant people, and condemned any discussion which might open their eyes.

(2) The theory of Purgatory. This also was a point on which freedom of speculation might well have been allowed.

(3) The relation of the sacraments to the spiritual condition of the receiver, the exact definition of penance, and the value of good works, were no doubt questions on which scholastic theology had produced a body of opinion which Luther tended to gainsay. But his opinions were not contrary to an earlier theology, which had never been condemned by the Church; and it was needless to treat them with premature condemnation.

(4) The theory of the Papal monarchy had been laboriously built up after the failure of the Conciliar movement. It was doubtless annoying to have it called in question, just when the Lateran Council seemed to have established it as a practical basis of the administration of the Church. But Luther had been led to question it by the way in which it had been exercised to prevent free inquiry. In a time of great mental activity it was obvious that the use of authority must be carefully considered. The mere assertion of the existence of authority was not a justification of its arbitrary exercise. When authority is challenged, it ought to display its right to rule by its wisdom in ruling.
Leo X did not attempt to show any capacity for meeting the questions which Luther had raised: he only demanded the recognition of his absolute right to judge. He allowed a controversy to become serious; he waited till men had become thoroughly in earnest, and the issue had broadened to the extent of becoming a national question; and then he peremptorily ordered that discussion should cease at his command.

It shows an entire want of statesmanship, that the Pope and his advisers should have been so eager to stake the Papal authority all at once. It was one thing for an official like Cajetan to demand submission to authority, or for a controversialist like Eck to seize upon the Papal power as a useful weapon in a disputation; it was another thing, after they had failed, for the Pope himself to take up a position which had been proved to be untenable, and hope for success from an official proclamation. In fact Leo displayed no sense of his responsibility in the issue of this Bull, but allowed himself to be the mouthpiece of Luther's theological opponents. Cajetan and Eck had the chief part in selecting the propositions to be condemned, and most of them were points which Eck had raised at Leipzig. The Bull, when issued, seemed in its contents to be an echo of Eck's position a year before. Moreover, its language, though explicit in condemning Luther, was not explicit in stating the grounds of his condemnation. The propositions selected from his works were condemned as being respectively heretical, erroneous, scandalous, or offensive to pious ears Luther asked, with some reason, for a clearer statement than this; if a doctrine was heretical, it ought to be proved so; if it was erroneous, the extent of its error ought to be defined; if it was offensive to the pious, or a cause of stumbling to the weak, the limits of expediency ought to be determined. The framers of the Bull had not taken into account the intellectual dexterity of their opponents. They had not aimed at convincing, but only at silencing, them by a command, which gave no reasons why it should be obeyed.

If it was a deplorable mistake to assume such a position, it was a further error to emphasize it in the eyes of the Germans by commissioning Eck to publish the Bull. Luther’s adversary was sufficiently unpopular already through his readiness to drag his own dispute before the tribunal of the Papacy. He was sent back as a conqueror to proclaim his triumph, and wreak his vengeance in the eyes of all people. It may be that he was chosen as a capable person to deal with the German bishops and universities, while two members of the Curia were sent to the Emperor. One, Marino Caraccioli, was deputed to attend the coronation at Aachen; another, Geronimo Aleander, was sent especially to stir up Charles against Luther, reduce his followers to silence, execute the office of inquisitor against all suspected persons, and burn all heretical books. Aleander, born in 1480, in Istria, won a reputation as a humanist in Venice at the age of twenty. He was a friend of Aldus Manutus, and was celebrated for his knowledge of Greek, Hebrew, and Arabic. At the age of twenty-eight he was invited to teach at the University of Paris, whence he was called by the Bishop of Liege to be secretary. An embassy at Rome made him known to Leo, who, in 1519, raised him to the dignity of Vatican Librarian. Such a man, famed for his scholarship, well versed in German affairs, and a friend of the chief scholars of Germany, seemed well fitted for the delicate task of reconciling its rebellious humanists.

There were some at Rome, if we may trust an anonymous correspondent of Pirkheimer, who did not think that opinion in he would find his work very easy. “There is no one in Rome”, says the writer, “who does not know that in many things Martin speaks truly; but all dissemble, the good through fear, the bad through rage at having to hear the truth”.
Many objected to the issue of the Bull, and thought that Martin should have been assailed by reasons rather than by curses, by kindness rather than by tyranny. But rage and fear carried the day. The leaders of the party of the Curia said that the Pope was not bound to reason with every wretched creature, but must use his power to prevent such audacity. The punishment of Hus and Jerome had served to deter other rebels for a century. The upholders of this opinion were Cajetan, angry at his ill success, Prierias, and the Dominicans; especially the old opponents of Reuchlin, who said that if Reuchlin had been promptly suppressed, Luther would never have been heard of. The theologians of Koln and Louvain joined them in pressing for the Bull, which they regarded as a token of their victory. They were helped by some princes of Germany, and were supported by the financial interest of the Fugger bank. Eck’s expenses were paid by the Fuggers. He was not a bad instrument, save for his drunkenness; perhaps it was thought right to treat the drunken Germans with a drunken legate. Aleander was a good match for Eck in impudence and evil living. Many men whispered against the Bull, saying that the Pope dared not submit his false system to the test of reason, but defended it only with the sword. Luther's friends wished that he had shown greater moderation, but they knew how he had been provoked. The Pope was determined to destroy Luther, not in the interests of Christianity, but of the Curia. His means were—first, by flattery and diplomacy, to win over the Emperor; failing that, to depose him, stir up war in Germany, and call in the help of France and England. To gain his ends he will have no care for charity, faith, piety, or honesty, provided only he may maintain his own tyranny.

Whatever doubts we may feel about the truth of this view of the facts, it is clear that this is the way in which they presented themselves to the mind of the average German, and did not dispose him to submission. Many, who had slight sympathy with Luther's opinions, did not approve of his suppression by a mere decree sent from Rome. Their objections were not removed when Eck appeared to publish the Bull, and by virtue of the powers entrusted to him inserted the names of six of his personal antagonists—Carlstadt, for his share in the Leipzig disputation; Pirkheimer, for the Eccius Deololatus; Bernard Adelmann, for the Canonici Indocti; and three other less renowned adherents of Luther. Eck was surprised to find that he was unpopular. Bishops showed no zeal about publishing the Bull, and even raised technical difficulties. The universities did not welcome him as the champion of orthodoxy, but stood upon their privileges. Doubts were raised about the authenticity of the Bull, and Eck became aware that he was an object of mockery and contempt.
CHAPTER VI.
THE DEATH OF LEO X.

Though the condemnation of Luther at Worms rested upon motives which went deeper than current politics, yet it was the outward sign of the establishment of friendly relationships between Leo and Charles. The new Emperor had a fixed purpose of destroying the French influence in Italy, and needed the Pope’s friendship. His envoy at Rome, Don Juan Manuel, was a man of considerable capacity, and set himself to bring steady pressure to bear on the hesitating Pope. Leo was plied with unwelcome demands which it was hard to resist. Sorely against his will he prolonged the legatine powers of Wolsey for ten years. Then Charles pressed him to nominate as Cardinal, Everard de la Mark, Bishop of Liege. Francis violently opposed the nomination of De la Mark, whom he regarded as a personal enemy. Leo, in September, 1520, thought that he had found a way out of the difficulty, by offering to create the Archbishop of Toulouse, and reserve the publication of the Bishop of Liege till Francis had withdrawn his objection. This compromise only increased the wrath of Francis, and Leo felt deeply hurt. From this time forward he seems to have determined on an alliance with Charles, provided that it contained guarantees for speedy and effective action against France.

He consequently drew nearer to Don Juan Manuel, and gave him some ludicrous assurances of his sincerity. On one occasion he even offered to hide one of Manuel’s secretaries under a bed in the room in which he received the French envoy, that he might be assured of his resoluteness in withstanding his demands; and he told Manuel, as a proof of his dexterity, that he had given the French envoy on his departure a large packet of blank paper for the nuncio in Paris, to make him think that he had gained something by his mission. When Leo tried to use his authority in purely spiritual matters against the will of Charles he was reduced to helplessness. The Cortes of Aragon and Castile recognized, that the Spanish Inquisition was one of the most powerful arms of royal despotism, and petitioned the Pope for some reduction of its powers. Leo was willing to listen to their prayers; but with the Lutheran question still unsettled he dared not run counter to the wishes of Charles. On October 21, he was obliged to write to the Inquisitor that he could make no changes without the Emperor’s consent. On December 21, he promised to withdraw all the briefs which he had issued to regulate the proceedings of the Inquisition; and early in January, 1521, he demanded that they should be returned to Rome, where they were annulled.

Ecclesiastical matters, however, of this kind were of little moment. Leo had come to the conclusion that it was impossible any longer to maintain the balance of power in Italy, and that the French were more dangerous than the Spaniards. Charles was doing his utmost to draw England into a triple league with himself and the Pope against France. But Leo feared lest Wolsey might succeed in his efforts as mediator, and pressed for a strict and offensive alliance between himself and Charles. That he might be in readiness, he took into his pay in February, 1521, 6000 Swiss, telling Charles that they were to be employed against the French, and telling Francis that they were to guard the Papal States against the insolence of the Spaniards. The time for hesitation was rapidly passing by. Francis at last was weary of waiting; and in March hostilities began
by an attack on Luxemburg by Robert de la Mark, brother of the Bishop of Liege. Charles hastened the Pope's decision by sending from Worms the draft of a treaty, whereby Parma, Piacenza, and Ferrara were promised to the Pope. Francis on his side made a league with the Swiss, including in it the Duke of Ferrara. Still Leo hesitated, and not till May 29 did he sign the treaty with Charles. Having thus secured the Pope, Charles turned with greater vigor to England, for which Wolsey still strove to maintain a position as mediator. Charles and Francis both professed themselves ready to submit their grievances to Wolsey as arbitrator; but the Conference at Calais only ended in convincing Wolsey that the cold resoluteness of Charles was beyond his power to bend. Leo at length had his revenge on Wolsey; for it was his action that rendered England's neutrality impassible. He would hear neither of truce nor armistice; and, sorely against his will, Wolsey saw England dragged from its peaceful position and enter into a league with the Emperor and Pope.

Leo was anxious to reap the fruits of his bravery at once, and strained every nerve to raise money, and procure soldiers from the Swiss cantons. Hostilities began in Italy in an underhand manner. In the middle of July, the Spanish and Papal galleys combined in an attack on Genoa, which failed. The next enterprise was an attempt to surprise Parma; but this only warned the Duke of Ferrara to gather his forces. In the beginning of October the allied army, commanded by Prospero Colonna, crossed the Po into the Milanese. With Colonna went Cardinal Medici as Papal legate. The nearer the field of action was carried to the Alps, the more important was the help of the Swiss, who were enrolled on both sides. But the Swiss received orders not to war against one another. Those in the French army withdrew; while those in the allied army remained to fight against the Venetians and the Duke of Ferrara. The French commander, Lautrec, finding himself deserted by the troops on which he had chiefly relied, retired on Milan and attempted to defend it, but was driven out by the allied army on November 19. The surrender of Parma and Piacenza soon followed.

This was great news for Leo X, who believed that the French would soon be expelled from Italy, and dreamed of winning the Emperor’s consent to an arrangement which would confer the Duchy of Milan on Cardinal Medici. The Pope was at his villa of Magliana when the tidings reached him on November 25, and exclaimed: “This pleases me more than the tiara”. He returned at once to Rome to greet Cardinal Medici on his arrival. Paris de Grassis tells us that he asked the Pope’s orders about a solemn thanksgiving, saying that it was not customary to celebrate the victory of one Christian prince over another, unless the Church had some direct interest at stake. Leo answered with a smile: “have in my hands great gains”. “Then”, said Paris, “you should give great thanks to God”. Leo referred the arrangements to a consistory and went into his chamber to take a little rest, as he had caught a slight cold while out hunting at Magliana, The cold developed into a fever, which rapidly increased. Not till November 30 did the illness seem serious; and on the evening of December 1 Leo died, to the consternation of all around him.

Leo X died in the forty-sixth year of his age, just when success seemed about to crown his plans for the extension of the Papal States. He flattered himself hat his skillful diplomacy was at last beginning to bear fruit. He had been assailed with difficulties such as had beset few of his predecessors; he had been compelled to bow his head before many storms: but he had waited his time, and the tide at last had turned. The expulsion of the French from Italy seemed tolerably certain, and Leo could boast that he had set the strangers in Italy to destroy one another. The religious troubles in Germany
had been put down by the resolute bearing of the Emperor; Luther had disappeared, and
in a year or two all traces of his revolutionary movement would have passed away. If
Leo had felt any terror lest Luther’s opinions should spread beyond the limits of
Germany, and afford a weapon to the enemies of the Church, he was reassured by the
determined attitude of the English king. Henry had made common cause with Charles.
Both princes had views of their own about the future of the Church; but they objected to
have their hands forced by a theological movement resting on an appeal to popular
judgment. Charles was of opinion that, if the Pope needed correction, the correction
should be undertaken by the Emperor; Henry and Wolsey were of opinion that the royal
power could introduce into the English Church such reforms as were necessary, and that
the Papacy would be helpless to oppose. It was therefore the interest of all who were in
authority to prevent the spread of Lutheran opinions, as merely tending to disturb
schemes which required delicate handling. Accordingly the Pope’s Bull against Luther
was published in England by the king’s command on May 12 at S. Paul’s. Bishop Fisher
preached a sermon to a vast concourse, computed at the incredible number of 30,000;
and Wolsey used the opportunity to give a significant indication of the source from
which England was to expect redress of ecclesiastical grievances. He was met by the
clergy at the door of S. Paul’s, with all the pomp and ceremony due to the Pope himself.
Bystanders understood that the Legate for England was capable of independent action.

But besides ecclesiastical ceremonies and bonfires of Luther’s books, Wolsey
discussed with his master the theological aspect of Luther’s teaching. Henry showed
such knowledge of the subject that Wolsey suggested he should express his views in
writing. The result was that the English king entered the lists of theological controversy,
and in a treatise, A defence of the Seven Sacraments, showed no little command of the
weapons of such warfare. In August the book was printed. Though it was not published
till it had been formally presented to the Pope, Aleander received an early copy, and
was filled with joy that Henry’s views so closely agreed with those which he had striven
to impress on Charles. He found the work to be a collection of precious gems. “If
kings”, he writes, “are of this strength, farewell to us philosophers; for if we were
little thought of before, now our credit will be still less”.

There was, however, some mixture of personal motive with Henry’s zeal for
orthodoxy. Henry had a high opinion of himself and of the dignity of the English crown.
If many of his predecessors had been content to hide their light, it was not so with him.
He felt aggrieved that, in the numerous documents which the development of diplomacy
showered upon him, the English king had no title to set by the side of Catholic, and
Most Christian, which were enjoyed by the Kings of Spain and France. Wolsey
represented to the Pope that the English king deserved some recognition of his piety;
and the claim engaged the serious attention of a consistory on June 10. There was no
lack of suggestions: Faithful, Orthodox, Apostolic, Ecclesiastical, Protector, are some
out of the number. But the Pope pointed out that care must be taken, that a new title did
not trespass on the ground covered by any existing titles; and he promised to circulate
the list of those proposed that they might be fully considered. It was while this weighty
matter was being pondered that the king’s book arrived at Rome; and on September 14
was presented to the Pope, who read it with avidity and extolled it to the skies. But this
was not enough to mark the importance of the occasion, and it was formally presented
in a consistory. After this the Pope proposed ‘Defender of the Faith’ as a suitable title;
some demurred on the ground that a title ought not to exceed a single word, and still
hankered after Orthodox, or Most Faithful; but the Pope decided in favour of Defender of the Faith, and all agreed.

This was a trivial matter in itself, but it denoted that on all general points of policy the Emperor and the English king were, for the time being, in complete agreement with the Pope. Leo on his deathbed felt that he handed on his office with powers unimpaired, and with fair prospects for the future. Posterity adopted his opinion, and looked back upon him as the last of the great Popes before the Schism rent their dominions in sunder. The golden age of Leo X shone with a luster which owed its glow to contrast with the time that followed; and Leo gained a reputation for wisdom, solely because he did not live long enough to reap the fruits of the seed which he had sown. What the days of Edward the Confessor were to our English forefathers when they groaned under the yoke of the Norman Conqueror, was the age of Leo X to the bewildered official who found his revenues dwindling away; to the impoverished citizen of Rome who beheld his city reduced to desolation; and above all to the man of letters who found his occupation gone, he knew not why nor how. The change that came over the fortunes of Italy in politics, in literature, in art, in society, in everything that made up life, was so sudden and so complete that men had no time to analyze its causes. They only looked back with sorrowful regret to the good old times before the crash had come, and treated Leo as the last representative of an age of heroes.

For, after all, Leo’s qualities were those of the epoch to which Italy long looked back as the period of its greatest glory. His father, Lorenzo, had combined the selfish audacity of the condottiere prince with the plausible hypocrisy of the cautious merchant, and had adorned the mixture with daubs of literary and artistic culture. Leo inherited his father’s characteristics, somewhat enfeebled by the Orsini strain of his mother. The spirit of adventure was weaker; the open-heartedness of the noble overcame the prudence of the merchant; the duplicity of the trader was reinforced by that of the court intriguer. The baser and more vulgar elements were intensified; the intellectual elements were diminished; but the greater development of the social and sympathetic qualities preserved the balance for practical purposes. Leo was a lower type of man than his father, but he awakened less antagonism; he was far inferior to him in intelligence, yet he seemed to form greater plans and pursue greater undertakings. This was because he always had a ready smile and a genial remark, and behaved with the dignity and assurance of one who was born to rule.

In one point Leo was preeminently successful; he converted Rome for a brief space into the real capital of Italy, and his reputation is chiefly founded on this achievement. Before his pontificate art and letters had been exotics in Rome; under him they were acclimatized. Julius II had been a grim employer of literary and artistic labor; Leo X was a sympathetic friend who provided congenial surroundings.

For Leo as a man wished to enjoy life, and as a statesman saw, like Charles II of England, the advantage to be gained from masking political activity under an appearance of geniality, indolence, and easy good nature. No one who saw the spare figure and preoccupied face of Julius II could doubt that he was absorbed in political projects. No one who saw the bulky form and heavy lethargic expression of Leo X would credit him with being more than he seemed—an accomplished man of society. Leo’s face lit up when any one approached him, and he always had a pleasant remark ready to address to his visitor. He studied his personal appearance; he was proud of his delicately formed hands, and called attention to them by wearing a profusion of
splendid rings. He chose to live in public, and surrounded himself with amusing companions; he enjoyed a laugh, and liked to turn the laugh against others, and his mirth was not always refined. He took pleasure in the vulgar witticism of buffoons, and found a cynical amusement in the sight of human nature reduced to the lowest level of animalism. He encouraged by his laughter portentous feats of gluttony, and though habitually temperate himself, he liked to see the eyes of his guests glisten with undisguised enjoyment at the dainty fare which his table set before them. Sometimes he played tricks upon their voracity, and served unclean animals, such as monkeys and crows, dressed with rich sauces which beguiled the palates of his guests, whose confusion was great when they discovered the truth. In the same way he encouraged the vanity of wretched poetasters, who improvised doggerel verses and were rewarded with cups of wine, mixed with water in proportion to the number of slips in versification which they made. One of these, Baraballa, a priest of Gaeta, was audacious enough to demand that he should be crowned poet in the Capitol like a second Petrarch. Leo was so cruel as to humor his folly. The old man—for he was of the age of sixty—dressed in the garb of an old Roman noble, declaimed his ridiculous verses to a mischievous mob of citizens outside the Vatican, and then mounted on the back of an elephant, which had recently been presented to the Pope, that he might ride in triumph to the Capitol. The fun was stopped, on reaching the bridge of S. Angelo, by the terrified elephant refusing to proceed further, and Baraballa had to return home amid the jeers of the crowd. This vulgar delight in practical joking was doubtless popular; but it hardly befitted the Pope to take an active part in gratifying such a taste. Leo, however, took life as it came, and made the best of it. “His chief object”, says a contemporary, “was to lead a cheerful life, and shut out care and grief of mind by every means. He spent all his leisure in sports, and games, and songs, either because he was a lover of pleasure, or he thought that recreation was the best way to prolong his life”. He wished every one to share his amusements, and was not ashamed of being considered frivolous. He would play cards openly with some of the Cardinals, and end by distributing money to the bystanders.

He gave largess daily to those who came to see him dine. Every morning his purse was filled anew with gold pieces to be used for any chance occasion of benevolence. Concerts and comedies were a common amusement for the festive evenings at the Vatican, where the guests frequently numbered two thousand. Moreover, Leo was a keen sportsman, and as soon as the summer heats began to abate, withdrew from Rome, and devoted a couple of months to field sports. He generally began at Viterbo, where the country was well stocked with quails, partridges, and pheasants. When the joy of hawking began to pall, he sought the lake of Bolsena, which abounded with fish. Thence he made his way northwards towards the sea at Civita Vecchia, where an amphitheater of hills gave a splendid opportunity for chasing deer and wild boars. Towards the end of November he returned to Rome, and after a few days' stay set out for his country house at Magliana, where the marshes of the Campagna afforded ample scope for stag hunting, which he pursued with serious enthusiasm. His placid temper was stirred to wrath by any breach of the discipline of the field. Suitors found that the best time to present petitions to the Pope was at the end of a good day’s sport.

Under the rule of such a Pope Rome naturally became the centre of Italian life and society. The Florentines flocked round their Medici patron, while the Romans grumbled over the Florentine invasion. But all parts of Italy sent their contingent of artists and men of letters, and the Pope's example made the office of patron fashionable. The rule of Alexander VI had struck a decisive blow at the power of the Roman nobles, and
Julius II had steadily depressed them. Under Leo X a new social order came definitely into existence, an order founded upon wealth, luxury, and art. Society, in fact, was ruled by purely social considerations. They were the foremost men who could afford to live in spacious palaces, give splendid entertainments, and gather round them a court of literary dependents.

Next to the Pope in profusion stood the Sienese banker, Agostino Chigi, who came to Rome in 1485, and amassed a colossal fortune. He had 100 branches to his bank, established not only in Europe but amongst the Turks. He owned a fleet of 100 merchantmen, and had 20,000 workmen in his employ. Chigi had little taste for letters, but in his patronage of decorative art was unequalled; and his villa in Trastevere, now known as the Farnesina, is a memorial of his greatness. We may still admire the grace of Raffaelle’s pencil, nowhere used with greater firmness than in the fresco of The Triumph of Galatea, and the lunettes of Cupid and Psyche which adorn the gallery of Chigi’s villa. But Chigi’s marvelous furniture has disappeared; his bed of ivory, inlaid with gold and silver, and embossed with jewels; his silver fountains, his tapestries, the huge vases of solid silver which he had designed by the most famous artists to adorn his rooms. His stables were planned by Raffaelle. They held 100 horses, whose harness was adorned with gold and silver. Before this magnificent building was dedicated to the object for which it was designed, Chigi used it as a banqueting hall, where he entertained the Pope. The walls were hung with silk, and the floor was covered with a rich carpet. Leo looked round with amazement: “Before this entertainment I was at my ease in your company”. “Do not change your attitude”, replied Chigi, “this place is humbler than you think”; and drawing aside the hangings he pointed to the mangers which they concealed. At another dinner given to the Pope in the loggia of his garden by the Tiber, the silver plates and dishes, as soon as they had been used, were thrown by the attendants into the Tiber. Never since the days of Cleopatra had been such poetry of profusion; but Chigi had some measure of the merchant’s prudence, and did not tell his astonished guests that the plate, so carelessly flung away, was caught in nets stretched beneath the water and could be drawn to land when the banquet was ended. Another dinner given by Chigi to the Pope was of a more intimate character. Its novelty consisted in the fact that each guest was served on plates which bore his own crest. The banquet was given to celebrate the marriage of Chigi, then fifty-four years old, with a concubine who had borne him several children. The Pope himself joined the hands of the contracting parties, and rejoiced to celebrate a tardy reparation to outraged morality. But he had to listen after dinner to the reading of Chigi’s will, which the cautious merchant strove to legalize by this curious process of registration before the chief magistrate of Rome.

Chigi so exhausted all the possibilities of luxury that he left his rival banker, Lorenzo Strozzi, no means of distinguishing himself except by grotesqueness. During the Carnival of 1519, Strozzi entertained four Cardinals, a number of his Florentine friends, two buffoons and three courtesans. They were ushered first into a small room hung with black and dimly lighted by a few candles. Four skeletons hung in the four corners; in the middle of the room was a table, draped with black, on which stood a death’s head and a few wooden cups. The astonished guests were bid to whet their appetites, and servants showed them some roast pheasants hidden under the skull. When they had recovered their composure, they were led into the dining-room, where stood an empty table. They were bid to seat themselves, and food suddenly appeared from below. When they began to eat, there was a shock as of an earthquake, and the food
disappeared. As they gazed around in terror, they saw two spectral forms, who were
doubles of two of the guests. After this series of surprises, appetite was gone, and the
Cardinals slunk away in terror.

The combined examples of Leo and Chigi reached all classes of Roman society,
ecclesiastical and secular alike, and set the fashion of a cultivation of literature and art.
Rome became the home of almost all the distinguished men of the day, and the history
of Leo's Court becomes a history of Italian literature in its most brilliant period. Many
scholars were in the Pope's service, and were rewarded for their literary merits by
ecclesiastical preferments.

Chief among these was Bernardo Dovizi, known as Bibbiena, from his birthplace
(1470-1520), who had been chosen by Lorenzo de' Medici to be his son's tutor in early
days. He showed himself faithful to the trust confided to him, and his tact and skill were
of great value in securing Giovanni's election to the Papacy. When his former pupil was
established in the Vatican, Bibbiena administered his household and was the general
purveyor of his amusements. He was well fitted for this purpose, as his reputation for
wit, and for all the gifts of an accomplished man of society, was spread throughout
Italy. Castiglione in the Cortegiano, the hand-book of the Italian gentleman, makes
Bibbiena one of the speakers in the dialogue which discusses the various branches of
the courtier's art. This reputation is largely due to his comedy La Calandra, which was
one of the earliest attempts to adapt the method of Plautus to the altered conditions of
society, which certainly did not rest upon a higher standard of morality than did the life
of imperial Rome. A brother and sister disguise their sexes; the bewildermment of their
mistaken lovers, and their dexterity in carrying on their several intrigues, provide a
framework for scenes in which considerations of decency have little place. Bibbiena's
private life was lived according to the morality of his play. His house was shared by a
concubine who bore him three children. Leo, who witnessed the performance of La
Calandra in the Vatican, was not shocked by this breach of ecclesiastical vows, but
satisfied his sense of decorum by not creating Bibbiena a Cardinal till after his
concubine's death.

More important than Bibbiena were the two men whom Leo, before leaving the
conclave after his election, nominated as his secretaries—Pietro Bembo and Jacopo
Sadoleto. Bembo (1470-1547) was a Venetian, born in and educated in Florence, who at
Ferrara sang the praises of Duchess Lucrezia, and then at Urbino joined with Bibbiena
in discussing the ideal courtier whom Castiglione portrayed. Thence he accompanied
Giuliano de' Medici to Rome, and Leo rejoiced that he could command the pen of one
who was famous as a master of Latin style. Bembo was one of those cultivated men
who readily absorb the ideas of their time and reflect the colour of their surroundings.
His early life was profligate; he had a beautiful Roman girl for his mistress, and sang
her praises in Latin elegies which celebrated the joys of sense. When that line was
worked out, he became a populariser of Platonism, and in his dialogue Gli
Asolani traced the power of ideal love to bridge the gulf between body and soul, and fit
that which was mortal to put on immortality. When Bembo became Leo's secretary, he
aimed at perfecting a Ciceronian style in the Papal correspondence, and his letters were
regarded as models of correct composition. In 1520, he withdrew from Rome, taking
with him a beautiful concubine. In her society he lived a secluded life in his villa near
Padua, where he applied on a small scale what he had learned at the Papal Court. He
lived in learned leisure, collected antiquities and manuscripts, and became the dictator
of Italian literature. In his later years the current of the time bore all men's minds
towards theology, and Bembo returned to Rome as a divine. He was made Cardinal in 1539, and was one of the band of humanistic theologians who vainly hoped that right reason might heal the woes of the Schism.

Of like career, but of nobler character, was the Modenese Jacopo Sadoleto (1477-1547), who, after studying at Ferrara, came to Rome in the days of Alexander VI. His verses on the discovery of the group of Laokoon made him famous, and Leo hastened to attach to himself a man of such eminence. His letters as Papal secretary competed with those of Bembo for elegance of style; and Leo rejoiced to think that his secretaries commanded the respect of all Europe. On Leo’s death, Sadoleto retired with pleasure to his diocese of Carpentras, where he diligently discharged the duties of bishop. He was summoned by Clement VII to resume the post of secretary, but in 1526 again retired to Carpentras. He was made Cardinal by Paul III, and in his later years was suspected for his liberal theology. Indeed, Sadoleto was more of a philosophic theologian than a man of letters, and though he accepted his position at Leo's Court and was dazzled by its splendor, yet he was never in sympathy with its tendencies.

It were long to tell of all the poets who strove by their verses to win the favour of Leo X. Jacopo Sannazaro (1451-1539), the glory of Naples, intended to dedicate to him his poem De Partu Virginis, but Leo’s untimely death caused the transference of that honor to Clement VII. However, Leo wrote to express his sense of the great benefit which the Church, vexed and assaulted by others, would derive from a new David suited to the needs of the time, whose graceful lyre was to reduce the most sacred mysteries of the Christian faith to the measure of Virgil’s Aeneid, and to the mode of representation required by the sentiments of paganism. In like manner Leo was so struck by the Latin poems of the Cremonese, Marco Girolamo Vida, that he invited him to undertake a great Christian epic, the Christias. It may be doubted if Vida’s previous productions, On the Art of Poetry, Bombyx, a poem on the cultivation of silk-worms, and another poetical treatise On the Game of Dice, exactly marked him out as fitted to cope with such a subject. But Leo read with pleasure the first part of Vida’s epic, and richly rewarded him. The poem did not appear till 1535, and it is only fair to say that, if it had not the poetical merits of Sannazaro, it was free from his exuberant paganism.

It is needless to pursue the record of poetic talent within the walls of Rome. One story only may be told to show how impossible it would be to exhaust the subject. Among the foreigners who had been attracted to Rome and felt the charms of its society, was a Luxemburger, Johann of Goritz, whose name was promptly Latinised into Janus Corycicius. He held the office of receiver of requests, and following the prevalent taste, gathered a literary circle round him. Wishing to add to the adornment of Rome, he built a chapel to his patron saint, S. Anna, in the church of S. Agostino, and there he placed a group of sculpture by Sansovino, representing the Virgin and Child with S. Ann. The dedication of this chapel afforded the literary friends of Corycicius an opportunity of repaying the obligations of hospitality. Each of them brought a votive offering in the shape of a copy of verses. These were laid upon the altar; but so formidable did the pile become that Corycicius was driven to shut the doors of the chapel that he might arrest the intolerable flow of poetry. This poetical chaplet was deemed to be of such importance that it was published by Blosius Palladius, afterwards Bishop of Foligno, in 1524. The volume of Coryciaria reveals to us the names of 120 poets resident in Rome, who were fortunate enough to be in time to make their offerings, and to perpetuate their names. Before such a multitude of bards criticism is reduced to respectful silence.
But poetry was not the only form of literature known in Rome, nor was Leo X regardless of the claims of sound learning. Cardinal Giovanni de' Medici was a member of the Roman Academy, which, after its suppression by Paul II, was revived in the days of Julius II. The leading spirit in this revival was Angelo Colocci of Jesi, whose art-collection was famous, and whose house afforded a pleasant meeting-place. It was only fitting that, when he became Pope, Leo X should recognize Colocci's merits by appointing him one of his secretaries. One of the first acts of Leo was to provide for education in Rome by restoring the 'Gymnasium', which had been founded by Eugenius IV, but Julius II had diverted its revenues to his military enterprises. Nearly 100 professors were provided for the education of students; and Leo could boast that he had brought together from all quarters men of renown in every branch of knowledge, “that so the city of Rome may be the capital of the world in literature, as it is in everything else”. The greatest object of the New Learning was a still more accurate knowledge of Greek; and Leo summoned to Rome the most distinguished Greek scholar in Italy, John Lascaris, whom he commissioned to bring to Rome a number of boys from Greece, who were educated at his expense. By his advice John’s distinguished pupil, Marcus Musurus, whose edition of Plato was just issuing from the press of Aldo Manuzio at Venice, was invited to join his master at Rome. Aldo dedicated the Plato to the Pope, who recognized his services to learning by granting him for fifty years a monopoly of all books which he had printed or should be first to print, and further forbade the imitation of his type by any other printer. For Musurus the Pope provided a spacious building which was to be dedicated to the use of students of Greek; and Musurus did not rest till he had established a Greek printing press of his own, from which issued in 1517 the Scholia on Homer, and in 1518 the Scholia on Sophocles. In this, however, the Papal bounty only followed the example set by the banker Agostino Chigi, who harboured the Cretan, Zaccharia Callergos, in his own house, while Cornelio Benigno of Viterbo passed through the press his editions 'Pindar' and 'Theocritus'. Nor should it be forgotten that Leo went to great expense in obtaining from the monastery of Corvei the unique manuscript of the first six books of the Annals of Tacitus, which enabled Fillipo Beroaldo to publish in 1518 the first complete edition of the surviving works of that historian.

While such an interest was felt in the publication of books, the formation of great libraries naturally flourished. Leo X was the possessor of the collection formed by his ancestors, Cosimo and Lorenzo, which he bought in 1508 from the friars of S. Marco in Florence, to whom it had been sold after the expulsion of the Medici. This collection reposed in the Vatican, but Leo intended that it should be returned to Florence. The project was carried out by Clement VII, and the Laurentian Library is the result. But although Leo did not think fit to merge this treasure into the Library of the Vatican, he sent emissaries throughout Europe to make purchases for the increase of that collection, which was presided over by Inghirami, Beroaldo, and Aleander, not to mention others of less note. The libraries of Cardinal Grimani, Bembo, Sadoletto, Aleander, Chigi, and many others, were famous; and the monastic libraries kept pace with those of private individuals. Leo could certainly boast that during his pontificate Rome was amply provided with all that was necessary for a scholar's equipment.

Historical writing at this period centred in Florence; and Rome could boast of no one to set beside Machiaell, Nardi, and Guicciardini. The worthy Augustinian General, Egidius Canisius of Viterbo (1470-1532), who was made Cardinal in 1517, wrote a History of Twenty Centuries, in which the historical notices are so mixed with
theology that the book has never been published. Egidius was a scholar, well versed in Oriental languages besides Latin and Greek; but he never sank the theologian in the scholar, nor was he deceived by the transient glories of the Renaissance. He was outspoken about the moral corruption of the Papacy, and took a just estimate of the needs of his time, and the urgency of a reform in the discipline of the Church.

But the Roman historian and biographer of Leo was Paolo Giovio of Como (1483-1552), in his younger days a physician, who took to literature and became a prolific writer. He went to Bologna in 1515, bringing with him the first chapters of his *History*, which was designed to narrate the affairs of Europe from 1494. Leo read what he had written and praised it highly; whereupon Giovio transferred himself to Rome, and continued to write in enjoyment of the Papal patronage. His biographical writings are of more importance than his *History*, and his *Life of Leo X* ranks amongst his most fortunate efforts. Though the style is bombastic, and the historical judgments of little value, the personal details are vivid, and the discrimination of character is just. The book was not published till 1550; but it is the only attempt to describe Leo as he appeared to those who lived around him. Though Giovio wrote to please patrons of the Medici family, still the experience of the years that had passed had revealed the weakness of Leo's character, and emphasized defects which could not be passed over in silence. A mere panegyric was impossible, and Giovio's judgment is valuable for what it omits as well as what it says.

But it is not literary judgments, or his patronage of scholars, which have made posterity lenient towards Leo, so much as the imperishable memorials of art which are still living testimonies to his fame. The age of Leo X was the age of Raffaello, and the man who was closely associated with the supreme products of a remarkable phase of human culture can never be forgotten. It is true that Leo inherited the designs of Julius II, who laid down a plan for employing the three great artists of his time, and assigned to Michel Angelo the decoration of the Sistine Chapel and the Papal mausoleum, to Bramante the building of S. Peter's, and to Raffaello the decoration of the Vatican. But Julius II was so eminently a statesman that his patronage of art seems only the result of political calculation; while Leo X enjoys the reputation of being a lover of art for art's sake. Leo certainly expressed the prevailing sentiment at Rome when he chose Raffaello as his favorite artist, and allowed full scope to his genius. But against this must be set the fact that Leo condemned Raffaello's great rival, Michel Angelo, to waste his precious years in fruitless toil. It would seem that Leo's mind could not admit of two conflicting tendencies, or tolerate anything that suggested artistic antagonism. He sent Michel Angelo to Florence, to build the façade of S. Lorenzo, and erect the monuments of his nephews; but he treated the great sculptor as though he were a craftsman, and bade him superintend the quarrying of his marble at Carrara. The façade of S. Lorenzo was never built, and the tombs of Medici are due to Clement VII, not to Leo X. Rome was left free to Raffaello, who there developed a marvellous versatility of creative power, though it must be admitted that his noblest and worthiest work was done under the severe dictation of Julius II. For him he painted that great series of designs, which are the fullest expression of the hopes and aspirations of Italian culture. The Sala della Segnatura set forth the glories of religion, philosophy, poetry, and jurisprudence, the four great pursuits by which the human mind had worked out civilized life. Raffaello's design embodies the spirit of his time, and shows how Italy had grasped the unity of human thought. In Parnassus the great poets of all ages look down upon their successors. The philosophers of classical antiquity discussed the problems of nature and
of man; Christian theologians took up their mission, and asserted that man had an eternal destiny, of which the indwelling presence of the Lord was at once the testimony and the source; on this basis was founded the structure of human law, whereby society was regulated and controlled.

The enthusiasm which greeted this great work led Julius II to command the decoration of another room, in which the subjects were to be adapted to the glorification of the Papacy. It was inevitable that in this field the spirit of the courtier should overcome the aspirations of the poet. If The Miracle of Bolsena displays the overthrow of unbelief, The Expulsion of Heliodorus from the Temple is a transparent allegory of the martial exploits of Julius II. The companion pictures dexterously transfer the artist's flattery to Leo X; and the ‘Deliverance of S. Peter’ commemorates the captivity of Cardinal Medici, while the Repulse of Attila represents Leo’s aspiration to drive the foreigner out of Italy. Leo X. was so charmed with this method of celebrating his own glory, that he ordered Raffaello to continue in the same strain; and the next room told of the great deeds of previous Popes of the name of Leo—the episodes being chosen in each case with careful reference to the existing Pontiff. But Leo's impatience did not realize the limitations of an artist’s powers, or the conditions under which great work can be produced. He commanded that the Loggia should be taken in hand at the same time as the room; and Raffaello could do little more than sketch out designs and supervise the work of his pupils, Giovanni da Udine, Giulio Romano, Francesco Penni, and the like. Moreover Leo chose Raffaello to succeed Bramante as architect for the building of S. Peter's, and further employed him to design a series of tapestries for the Sistine Chapel, representing the history of S. Peter and S. Paul. Nor could the Pope hope to reserve to himself entirely the services of one who was the popular favourite, as no artist had ever been before. Chigi carried him off to his villa, and to his chapel in the church of S. Maria del Popolo; and orders for easel pictures showered in from monasteries and private patrons. The work done by Raffaello between 1515 and his death in 1520 is prodigious.

Raffaello’s work as architect of S. Peter's occupied much of his attention without producing much result. He laboured to fit himself for the task, and a translation of Vitruvius’ Treaty on Architecture was made for his use by Fabio Calvo of Ravenna, who lived in Raffaello’s house while engaged in his labour. Fortified by Vitruvius, Raffaello studied the principles of Roman architecture, but unfortunately had not much opportunity of applying them to original work. Bramante’s choir was nearly finished, and Raffaello had to prepare the pillars for the dome, and carry on the transepts. Further, he prepared new plans, as Leo resolved to change Bramante's original design from the shape of a Greek cross to the shape of a Latin cross. His plans were unfavorably criticized by Antonio da San Gallo; and indeed the new design, while adding to the length, destroyed the proportions of the structure. Want of funds prevented the rapid progress of the building, and the appearance of the church was little changed during the period of Raffaello's presidency. But Raffaello had not read Vitruvius for nothing. He steeped himself in Roman antiquity, and obtained from the Pope full powers to protect ancient buildings which were daily being destroyed. He embodied the results of his studies in a letter to the Pope, in which he deplored the ravages to which Rome had been exposed, expressed his abhorrence of Gothic architecture, and pointed out the principles on which the various styles of ancient architecture might be determined. Further, he projected a careful survey of the city, and a conjectural restoration of its original conditions, accompanied with drawings of all existing memorials of antiquity.
At his death he had completed this work for one of the fourteen regions of Rome, but unfortunately his drawings have disappeared. The project, however, survived and was carried out by Buffalini in 1557.

The life of Raffaelle expresses the best quality of the spirit of the Italian Renaissance, its belief in the power of culture to restore unity to life and implant serenity in the soul. It is clear that Raffaelle did not live for mere enjoyment, but that his time was spent in ceaseless activity, animated by high hopes for the future. But his early death on April 6, 1520, was the end of the reign of art in Rome, and the reign of literature soon ceased as well. The foreboding soul of Michel Angelo was more far-seeing than Raffaelle’s joyous hopefulness. Not the peace of art, but the sword of controversy, was to usher in the new epoch. Italy was no longer to be the teacher of the world; nor was Rome to be the undisputed centre of Christendom, from which religion and learning were alike to radiate forth to other nations. The art of Raffaelle is the idealization of the aims of the Italian Renaissance, which in its highest form strove to improve man’s life by widening it, and was not concerned with the forms of existing institutions, but with the free spirit of the cultivated individual. It is a strange contrast that, as the star of Raffaelle set, that of Luther arose. Both were men of great ideas; both had a message, which has not Raffaelle ceased to be heard through the ages. Raffaelle Luther pointed to a future in which human enlightenment should reduce to harmony and proportion all that had been fruitful in the past; Luther claimed a present satisfaction for the imperious demands of conscience awakened to a sense of individual responsibility. Luther lived long enough to know that the power to which he appealed could not be confined within the limits which he had laid down for it, and that the future would be filled with discord. Raffaelle’s dream vanished into thin air, only to form again and float with new meaning before the eyes of coming generations. That Raffaelle’s pencil had just ceased to glorify the Papacy when Luther arose to bespatter it with abuse, is a symbol of the tendencies which long divided the minds of men.

The ideal of Raffaelle was not necessarily opposed to that of Luther. Only the human frailty of impatience, or the base promptings of self-interest, lead men to set futile limitations upon the elements for which they are willing to find a place in their harmony of the universe. Raffaelle took the Church as it was, and recognized its eternal mission to mankind—a mission which was to increase in meaning when interpreted by the increasing capacity of the human mind. The frescoes of the Sala della Segnatura are as much opposed to the exclusive domination, claimed by the Mediaeval Church, as is Luther's assertion of Christian freedom. But Raffaelle spoke in a pagan tongue, with which ecclesiastical authorities were familiar; and he asked for no immediate exertion on their part. Luther arose, like some prophet of old, and sternly demanded that they should set their house in order forthwith. It was inconvenient to do so; it was undesirable that authority should be reminded of its duties by individuals, however excellent. So at a time when liberty of thought and opinion was universally practised, the Church suddenly unfurished up weapons which had been long disused, and proceeded to crush the man who refused to unsay his convictions at her bidding. The liberality, the open-mindedness, the cultivated tolerance of Leo X’s Court did not go beyond the surface, and disappeared the instant self-interest was concerned. Men might say and think what they pleased, so long as their thoughts did not affect the Papal revenues.

As Luther’s meditations led to practical suggestions, he was peremptorily ordered to hold his tongue. Many had been treated in like manner before, and had obeyed through hopelessness. Luther showed unexpected courage and skill, and met with an
unexpected answer to his appeal to the popular conscience to judge between the Papacy and his right to speak. When once the revolt was declared, many questions were raised, about which opinions may differ. But the central fact remains that the authority which bade Raffaelle speak, bade Luther be silent. The Church which could find room for poets, philosophers and artists as joint exponents of the meaning of life, refused to permit a theologian to discuss the basis of a practice which had obviously degenerated into an abuse. Doubtless Leo X and his advisers saw nothing contradictory in this. The Pope wished to live peaceably and do his duty rather better than his immediate predecessors; the theologians of the Papal Court were willing that the theology of the past should be superseded, but not that it should be directly contradicted. In all the list of men of learning who graced the Papal Court, there was no one found to understand the issue raised by Luther, or suggest a basis for reconciliation.

So Leo, who flattered himself that he was the most liberal-minded and good-natured of men, found himself branded as an obscurantist. He could only bewail Luther’s perversity and listen to commonplace consolations founded on the fate of all heretics. It was indeed a hard fate for Leo to be troubled with theological questions, in which he had little interest. He wished all men to be happy, and did his best to make them so. His own personal character was good; he was chaste and temperate; he had banished violence from the Papal Court; he was careful in the discharge of his priestly duties. It was true that there were some abuses in the proceedings of Papal officials, and his very good nature led him to grant petitions preferred to him on insufficient grounds. The intricacies of canon law were beyond him, and he knew that the chief penitentiary, Cardinal Pucci, held all sources of revenue to be lawful; but Leo refused to traffic in dispensations, and would implore Pucci to be careful about the justice of the dispensations which he brought for him to sign. One day a secretary brought him a dispensation for uniting two benefices, which lay at a considerable distance from one another; Leo asked how much was paid for the dispensation; when he was told 200 ducats, he paid the money out of his own purse and tore up the paper. He was not strong enough to put down abuses, but he tried to discourage them.

It was, however, useless to condemn extortion and yet live splendidly upon its fruits. Kindliness, liberality, Leo’s luxury, and magnificence, are of necessity costly; and though the revenues of the Papal States reached the large sum of 420,000 ducats yearly, this did not suffice for Leo’s needs. Indeed, he spent in presents 8000 ducats a month; the expenses of his table amounted to 100,000 ducats a year and he assigned 60,000 ducats a year to the building of S. Peter’s. His gifts to his relatives and to Florentine friends were munificent, and no thought of economy ever crossed his mind. The cost of the war of Urbino reduced him to great straits; and it was currently thought that he made use of the conspiracy of Petrucci to extract money from the wealthiest Cardinals. He instituted an Order of Chivalry, with 400 members, who paid for the distinction; he multiplied offices in his Court till he had 60 chamberlains and 140 squires, who paid 80,000 and 120,000 ducats yearly for the privilege. He made the fortune of the Roman bankers by borrowing money at 20 per cent, for six months. His death spread ruin far and wide. He had borrowed large sums from all the Cardinals who would trust him, and there was none of his favorites or friends to whom he was not indebted for large sums.

This was the weak point of Leo’s policy. He was engaged in trying to conceal the real weakness of the Papacy at a crisis when it was dangerous to confess the truth. He outdid his predecessors in magnificence, and Roman society was never so splendid as
during his pontificate. He was conscious that his resources were not enough to give him any real influence over external affairs, and he trusted entirely to skillful diplomacy. He staked everything on the chance of ultimate success; but his untimely death, just when his plans had begun to succeed, revealed the fact that he had mortgaged the Papacy to such an extent that a successor would be powerless to continue his projects. His death was felt to be an irretrievable disaster. His friends and relatives gazed on one another with blank dismay. The Pope's debts to them amounted to 850,000 ducats, and the Papal treasury was empty. They laid hands on such things as they could carry away from the Vatican; but that was little to compensate for their loss. There was no money to provide for a magnificent funeral, and Leo was buried without any of the pomp which he loved. Even the wax candles were those which had been used a short time before at the funeral of Cardinal Riario. The tongue of the Roman people was unloosed, and Rome was full of pasquinades against Leo and his Florentine favorites. “Never died Pope in worse repute”, was the opinion of an eye-witness. Moreover, scarce was Leo in his grave before all the results of his political activity were lost. The dispossessed lords returned to their States, Francesco Maria Rovere to Urbino, the Baglioni to Perugia, Varano to Camerino, Malatesta to Rimini. The success of the League against Milan was of little moment, as the combined forces of the French, the Venetians, and the Duke of Ferrara were increasing, and Charles V. was not likely to wage war in Italy at his own cost. The future was on all sides uncertain; and few Popes left a more embarrassing heritage to their successor than did Leo X.
CHAPTER VII
ADRIAN VI.

The large additions made by Leo to the number of the Cardinals from every State in Europe left the College more amenable to political considerations than it had ever been before. The power of the old Roman families had been steadily put down by Alexander VI and Julius II, so the opinion of Rome itself had little weight. Strong in their numbers, the Cardinals felt themselves a powerful aristocracy; and their main object was to choose a Pope who would respect their privileges, while he secured the political importance of the Papacy. As things stood, the political balance in Italy inclined in favor of the League; and it seemed necessary to elect a Pope who would be acceptable to Charles V and Henry VIII. The most obvious man was Cardinal Giulio de' Medici, who had conducted affairs under Leo, and held in his hands the threads of Leo's plans. But there was a natural objection to the continuance of the Papacy in the same family, and the feeling was strong against Florentine domination. Moreover, Florentine factions were represented in the College. Cardinal Soderini, who had spent his days in honorable exile from Rome, could not forget the downfall of his brother, and headed an opposition to Medici. He pointed out that “he would be no new Pope, for they had had long experience what manner of man he was”; he attacked him on personal grounds, pointing out that he was by birth a bastard, by character a tyrant, and as a statesman had undone the Church. The determined opposition of Soderini was supported by Cardinal Colonna, who began to make a party for himself. Medici was aggrieved at the defection of one on whom he counted as a friend, and all negotiations to fix upon some one who would be an acceptable compromise entirely failed. The English envoy Clerk could only report to Wolsey: “Here is marvelous division, and we were never likelier to have a schism”.

Never had a Papal election been so publicly discussed, and the machinery exposed to view. Francis I sent a message to the Cardinals telling them that if they elected Medici, who was the cause of all the war, he protested that neither he nor any man in his kingdom would obey the Church of Rome. Henry VIII wished that the Emperor should join with him to procure the election of Wolsey. For this purpose he suggested that they should unite in seeming to favor Medici in the first instance; and when his election was hopeless, propose Wolsey’s, and secure Medici's votes in his favor. The ground for Wolsey’s election was his solemn declaration before the Imperial Ambassador that “he would not accept the dignity unless the Emperor and King deemed it expedient and necessary for their security and glory, and that his object was to exalt their majesties”. Henry added, “Then like father and son we will dispose of the Apostolic seat, its authority and power, as though they were our own, and we will give law to the whole world”. When Charles expressed his willingness to further this plan, Wolsey suggested that the imperial troops should march towards Rome and exercise pressure on the Cardinals; he further expressed his personal readiness to invest 100,000 ducats in his candidature. There was no illusion anywhere about the method or the motives of the coining election. Francis I said that it was not the fashion at Rome for Cardinals to give their voices as the Holy Ghost put into their minds. As we read the records it is hard to escape the conviction that the Catholic King, the Most Christian King, the Defender of
the Faith, and a great number of the Cardinals, did not entertain a much higher view of the Papacy than that expressed by Luther. The only reason why, as statesmen, they wished to preserve it was the hope of making it useful for their own schemes; but no one showed any practical belief in its spiritual contents. Its importance lay in its possibilities of usefulness; it had lost all independent power.

The Cardinals, however, thought of none of these things, but prepared for the struggle in the Conclave. Never had there been so many among them who were possible candidates, and each man meant to do the best for himself. First there was the question of the custody of the Conclave; and this gave rise to some difficulty. Cardinal Medici had his rooms in the Vatican, which was guarded by 500 Swiss. It was thought that they would be on Medici's side, so it was proposed to add to them 1000 footmen. When the Conclave actually began, the guards were increased to the portentous number of 3500, for whose pay the Cardinals had to borrow money from the Chigi bank. At first it was proposed by the Imperialists to hasten the election before the French Cardinals had time to arrive; and the Conclave was fixed for December 8. But this plan was thwarted by the excessive zeal of Prospero Colonna, who captured the Cardinal of Ivrea on his way through Lombardy. When this was reported in Rome, the College were obliged to demand his liberation and await his arrival. Finally, on December 27, the thirty-nine Cardinals who were in Rome entered the Conclave, after impressing the Imperial Ambassador with the conviction that “there cannot be so much hatred and so many devils in hell as among these Cardinals”.

Popular opinion thought that the election would lie between Medici, Fiesco, and Jacobazzi. Fiesco was a Genoese, and “it was hard to know what way he would take”; he therefore would represent a political compromise. On the other hand, Jacobazzi was a member of the Colonna party, was seventy-two years old, and was well skilled in the ways of the Curia, as he had long been Auditor of the Rota; but he had, from a former marriage, as many sons as Leo had nephews, and that was saying a good deal. Besides these, Campeggi, De Grassi, and Piccolomini were all spoken of. The first scrutiny, on December 30, resulted in scattered voting among those mentioned. But the Cardinals had other business to do than proceed to the election; side by side with conferences for the purpose of agreeing on a candidate went the preparation of capitulations, which all were to sign, and which were to bind the new Pope. He was to extirpate heresy, reform the Church, establish peace in Christendom, and expel the Turk. What was more to the point, he was to appoint no new Cardinals till the College was reduced below twenty-four, which was to be its normal number, though two additional members of Papal relatives were allowed. New Cardinals were not to be under thirty years of age, and were to receive the assent of two-thirds of the College voting secretly. Each Cardinal who did not enjoy ecclesiastical revenues to the amount of 6000 ducats yearly, was to receive from the Pope a monthly pension of 200 ducats till the Pope had given him benefices to the amount of 6000 ducats. When the Cardinals had thus provided generally for their order, they provided specifically for themselves by dividing the towns in the Papal States, and all the civil dues therefrom accruing, amongst those present in the Conclave. When everyone was thus prospectively enriched he could resume his duties as elector with greater equanimity.

These proceedings were too much for the Venetian Cardinal Grimani, who pleaded ill-health as a ground for withdrawing, and was allowed to depart on December 31. Perhaps he wished to escape from an election towards which the intrigues of the Conclave seemed tending, that of Cardinal Farnese, whom Medici cautiously favored.
Farnese owed his Cardinalate, to Alexander VI’s notorious intrigue with his sister Giulia, and had been called in consequence “the petticoat cardinal”. His own life corresponded to these antecedents; he had two sons, one engaged in the war against Milan, another of the age of twelve who was already a bishop, and two married daughters. But this was of little consequence, and he was now considered “a virtuous and well-disposed man, wise, and with a good tongue”, though rather hot-tempered and covetous. His name was on a list of candidates which had been agreed upon between Medici and the Imperial Ambassador; but as he had formerly been on the French side, he was required to send his second son to Naples, as a hostage for his adherence to the Emperor's interests; and he further agreed to pay Manuel 100,000 ducats for his good offices, if they were successful.

The struggle of political parties in the Conclave was complicated by that of the older and younger Cardinals; and Farnese, who was fifty-six years old, was probably put forward as a compromise on both the political and the personal question. But Farnese’s candidature did not make much way; and on January 2, 1522, the Cardinals were bidden to hasten their election by being restricted to one dish of meat only. On January 5 the younger Cardinals, under Medici's guidance, tried a bold device to carry a candidate of their own choice. Cibo, a nephew of Leo X, of the age of twenty-seven, was ill, and sent his voting paper from his chamber. He asked some of the older Cardinals to give him their votes as a consolation. To this they agreed, and Medici, who commanded fifteen votes, was waiting to accede with all his party, if he had an opportunity. Colonna spied the plot, and unmasked it just in time. When this failed, another attempt was made next day in favor of Farnese, who received twelve votes. Thereupon Pucci exclaimed: “We have a Pope”, and several rose to accede to him. Again Colonna raised his voice and implored that nothing should be done rashly. Cesarini withdrew his vote from Farnese, and acceded to Egidius; whereon a discussion arose if accession could withdraw a vote given in writing. The controversy was not decided; but Farnese's chance of election was destroyed, chiefly by Egidius, who denounced his private character.

Parties were now still more sharply divided, and even the rumour of the impending arrival of four French Cardinals produced no effect on the angry combatants. Medici proposed another candidate. Cardinal de Valle, who was accepted by Colonna; but the seniors deliberated for a time and then returned answer that they could not agree in his favor, but would prefer another of the elder Cardinals.

Medici had now tried every candidate on whose gratitude he could reckon, and was driven at last to take a leap in the dark. As they could not agree on any one present, why not, he asked, choose some experienced man out of the absent Cardinals? Every one's thoughts turned to Wolsey; but it seems clear that Charles V played him false, and took care that his formal letter, recommending Wolsey, should not reach his Ambassador till the private arrangement with Medici had been made. Moreover, Wolsey was too strong a man for the Cardinals to set over themselves as master, and he was still young. So Medici passed over Wolsey, and named another Cardinal of political eminence, Adrian of Utrecht, who had been the Emperor’s tutor, and was now acting as his Viceroy in Spain. It seems clear that Adrian’s name was not on the list which Manuel gave to Cardinal Medici, but that, in the improbable case of an election outside those present, his name had been mentioned as acceptable to the Emperor. Adrian was almost unknown in Rome, but was sixty-three years old, and had a reputation for piety. He was known to Carvajal, the head of the reforming party, who hailed his nomination...
with delight. In the scrutiny Adrian had fifteen votes from Medici’s party. Then Cajetan, who belonged to Colonna’s party, rose and said that in Germany he had heard much of Adrian as a good and learned man; he acceded to him and urged others to do likewise. Colonna, Jacobazzi, and others followed his example; while Orsini vainly cried out that they were ruining the French cause. Other accessions quickly followed; only De Grassis held back, saying that he did not know Adrian, who had never been in the Curia. The cry was raised: “We have a Pope”; and at length the election was unanimous, and was announced to the people (Jan. 9).

The announcement was heard with universal bewilderment, in which the Cardinals themselves shared. They had no reason to give for the election of an unknown foreigner, who had not even signed the capitulations, and on whose action they could not count. They stood dejected before the Roman mob, who screamed out curses upon their treachery for robbing Rome, nay even Italy, of its Pope, by electing one who would either remain in Spain or air his new-born dignity before his countrymen in Germany. Each slunk home followed by a howling crowd; but Cardinal Gonzaga plucked up his courage, and with a smile thanked his clamorous attendants for being content with abusive words. “We deserve the most rigorous punishment”, he said, “I am glad you do not avenge your wrongs with stones”. For some days the Cardinals dared now leave their houses, and Rome was filled with furious lampoons against them. An inscription was fixed on the Vatican, “To be Let” and a caricature represented Adrian as a schoolmaster, birching the Cardinals, who were hoisted over a horse for the purpose of receiving their chastisement. Never before had the personal motives and private characters of the College of Cardinals been matters of public concern. There was no illusion about the way in which Popes were elected.

However, the Cardinals soon recovered their equanimity and proceeded to make the best of their action. Medici retired to Florence, with the thought that at least he had earned a pension of 10,000 ducats from the Emperor for the service which he had rendered. The others took heart at the thought that it would be at least six months before the new Pope could appear in Rome, and meanwhile they might help themselves. So they took possession of the Vatican and plundered it of its jewels, tapestry, and furniture. The administration of the Papacy was entrusted to a Commission of three Cardinals, Carvajal, Schinner and Cornaro, who after holding office for a month were to be succeeded by the three seniors. It was proposed in the Conclave that Colonna and Cesarini should go as legates to Adrian and urge his speedy journey to Rome: even this nomination could not be agreed to without a wrangle, and Orsini was added to represent the Roman party opposed to Colonna. Meanwhile Rome looked like a city which had suffered a siege. The army of Leo’s officials and servants were thrown out of employment; many of them set off for Spain to curry favor with the new Pope; till the Cardinals, in their terror lest a second Avignon should be set up in some Spanish town, forbade any further departures. The succession of Leo X was at best a hard matter, but the election of one who was absent from Rome increased the difficulties ten-fold.

Adrian, upon whom all eyes were now turned, was a man whose career showed that the Church had not entirely lost its old spirit. He was born at Utrecht on March 2, 1459, the son of a ship carpenter of the name of Floris, and according to Netherlandish custom went by the name of Adrian Floriszoon. His father died when he was a child, but his mother, Gertrud, cared for his education, and his intellectual promise spurred her to make sacrifices for that purpose. He went to school first at Delft, then at Zwolle, and at the age of seventeen entered the University of Louvain, where he became a teacher of
philosophy in 1488. His studies were chiefly theological—humanism had not made much impression at Louvain. So Adrian followed the fashion of the time, and wrote a commentary on Peter Lombard, *Quaestiones de Sacramentis*, and afterwards some *Quaestiones Quod libeticae*, both of which works show that he was a theologian of the school of Gerson rather than of the Curial party. Margaret of England, Duchess of Burgundy, widow of Charles the Bold, was interested in the fortunes of the University of Louvain, and recognized Adrian’s ability. He was rewarded by several ecclesiastical appointments, and employed their revenues in founding a college; for he shared in the general hope that the spread of learning would be the means of solving the difficulties of the time. It was on the grounds of his merits only that the Emperor Maximilian chose him, in 1507, to be the associate of Chièvres in educating his fatherless grandson, Charles; and though Adrian was perhaps too much of a specialist, and too little of a man of the world for such a post, he conscientiously fulfilled his duties. Charles was not a very apt scholar, but he always respected Adrian's learning and uprightness. Indeed, the pupil was faithful to his tutors. So long as Chièvres lived he directed Charles’ policy; and Adrian was one of the first whom Charles as a ruler employed in his affairs. In 1515 he was sent to Spain to reconcile Ferdinand the Catholic to the prospect of his grandson’s succession to the Spanish kingdoms, and on Ferdinand's death, in January, 1516, was associated with Ximenez as regent of Castile till Charles’ arrival. He was made Bishop of Tortosa, and was one of the batch of thirty-nine Cardinals whom Leo created in 1517. When Charles left Spain in 1520 to receive the crown of Germany, Adrian was appointed Viceroy, and played a somewhat ignominious part during the rising of the Communeros against the financial oppression which Charles' Flemish admirers had introduced.

In ecclesiastical matters Adrian was connected with the party, both in Germany and Spain, which were desirous of disciplinary reform. But he had no sympathy either with the New Learning or the New Theology. In the Reuchlin controversy he had used his influence on the side of Hochstraten. Still more was he opposed to Luther; and when consulted by the theological faculty of Louvain before their condemnation of Luther's writings, he dryly answered that Luther's heresies were so palpable that not even a tyro in theology could make such mistakes, and only added the practical advice to quote Luther's words with scrupulous accuracy in their condemnation. When Luther’s cause was pending at Worms, Adrian wrote to Charles that it would be an act agreeable to God, and necessary for his good repute as Emperor, to send to Rome for condign punishment an heretic who had been condemned by the Holy See. Here Adrian spoke as Inquisitor-General in Spain, an office in which he succeeded Ximenez, and which he exercised with rigour. He was foremost in objecting to a reform of the Inquisition, and sharpened it to prevent the introduction of Lutheran doctrines. He was a zealous of the old school, and to German pedantry added the cold persistency of a Spaniard.

Adrian was at Vitoria when, on January 24, a private messenger, sent by the Bishop of Gerona, made his way with difficulty across the snow-bound mountains, and almost dead with exhaustion thrust a letter into Adrian's hands. Then, with the cry of 'Holy Father', he flung himself on the ground to kiss his feet. At first Adrian was incredulous; but the zeal of the townsmen could not be restrained, and he was compelled to receive their tokens of rejoicing and marks of reverence. More troublesome were the proffers of service and petitions for places which soon followed; but Adrian put them aside, saying that he would do nothing till he had received a letter from the Cardinals. This was long in coming, for, as usual, private enterprise far
surpassed official service. Not till February 9 did the Chamberlain of Cardinal Carvajal, Don Antonio de Studillo, arrive with the formal documents necessary to confirm the news. Even then Adrian did nothing more than thank the messenger for his pains. He continued to transact his business as Viceroy and Inquisitor; the only change that he made was to take up his abode in the Franciscan Convent, where he kept aloof from importunate petitions. Men did not know whether he would accept the Papacy or no, and murmured that he made light of so high a dignity. At last on February 16 his secret communing with his own heart came to an end, and summoning three of his attendants he announced to them his decision; much as he shrank from the responsibilities of the office, the danger that would arise to the Church from his refusal outweighed his personal objections, and trusting in God’s grace he accepted the Papacy. Then he ordered a notarial instrument of his acceptance to be drawn up and witnessed.

But Adrian’s decision had already been taken, and even the lines of his policy already laid down; for on February 2 he wrote to Henry VIII and Wolsey saying that, as one who had always longed for the peace of Christendom, he trusted that peace would be brought about by the firm union of Henry and the Emperor, so that all the world might know that he who broke it would be condignly punished. There is no reason to doubt that this is a sincere expression of Adrian’s desire; he would not enter the League for purposes of war against France, but he hoped to convert it into a powerful alliance pledged to maintain European peace. If such was his intention, he was speedily convinced of the difficulties which lay in the way of carrying it out.

Every one wished to use the new Pope for his own purposes; and the first step was to establish a hold upon his gratitude by proving that he had promoted his election to the Papacy. Studillo, as the first authoritative messenger, had the first chance. He came overland through France, where he had an interview with Francis I, who bade him say that it was not the Emperor but the French king who had made Adrian Pope, because he believed him to be a holy man. To this flattering message Studillo added, on behalf of his master Carvajal, that it was he who had refused the tiara for himself that he might place it on the head of Adrian. Neither of these statements was true, but Adrian eagerly caught at them. He had an uneasy consciousness that his election was entirely political and was due to the Emperor; it was a great relief to his mind that the first news he heard contradicted that suspicion, and put down his unexpected elevation to his personal character, and the devotion which it had inspired in those who knew him. Comforted by this reflection he received on February 15 the imperial envoy, Lope de Hurtado de Mendoza, who brought Charles’ assurance that he held Adrian as “his true father and protector, and would be always his obedient son ready to share his fortune”. Mendoza was able to assure the Emperor that Adrian spoke of him with the same affection as when he was Dean of Louvain. But Adrian did not show any inclination to enter upon political questions; he wrote to Charles that he would not take upon himself to perform any Papal acts till the three Legates had arrived, and he asked that ships should be sent from Naples to Barcelona to convey him to Rome. Charles hastened to comply with this request, and implored Adrian not to think of making the journey through France, “which would cause a great scandal to all Christendom”.

It soon became evident that Carvajal’s Chamberlain had impressed Adrian’s mind with a sense of his independence of the Emperor, which was highly inconvenient to Charles. Manuel wrote from Rome to Adrian that his election was due to the favor of God and the Emperor, and assumed that he would naturally conform to the will of his two creators, which was really identical. He assumed this as a matter of course, and
made suggestions about affairs in Rome as though he was Adrian's natural representative. This was a cruel blow to Adrian's self-complacency, and had not the merit of exact truth, as Cardinal Medici was the real cause of the election; Adrian was suspicious that he was being deceived, and clung tenaciously to his first belief, in spite of all that Manuel could say. He wearied of waiting for the Cardinal Legates, and at last he sent them a message that if they had not set sail, they need not come. On March 8, he executed a deed accepting the Papacy and sent it to Rome, where it was published on April 9.

This open assumption of authority on the part of the elect Pope, who decided to retain his name of Adrian, did something towards checking the intrigues of the Cardinals in Rome. Manuel was of opinion that “they were inspired by the Holy Ghost when they elected Adrian, but since the election the devil had taken possession of them”. Soderini, though ill in bed, directed the proceedings of the French party, who gave out that the Pope refused to come to Rome, and talked of making a new election. They paid no heed to the Pope’s letters, and he had to ask twice for a signet ring before it was sent him. They quarreled violently amongst themselves, and Rome was full of bloodshed. It was high time that the Pope appeared, to exercise his authority in his capital.

But this was no easy matter, as a Pope could not travel unobserved. The weather was stormy, and the galleys had to sail from Naples. Moreover, when the Pope once reached Rome, he would be less accessible than he was in Spain. Manuel proposed that Adrian should first visit England, and confer with Charles and Henry; then Charles should accompany him to Rome for his coronation as Emperor, and there all Italian questions should be settled. This proposal was impracticable; but Charles was looking forward to an interview with Henry VIII on his way to Spain, and he hoped that the results of that interview would furnish him with material for a conference with the Pope. So after Adrian had given up looking for his Cardinals, he was kept waiting for the arrival of an ambassador from Charles, Poupet de la Chaux, who visited England on his way, and did not land at Bilbao till April 20. Adrian meanwhile had moved to Saragossa, where La Chaux had many matters to discuss. First Adrian showed him a letter from Francis I addressed to the Cardinal of Tortosa, containing very plain language about Leo X, and his hopes of better treatment from his successor. Adrian showed him also his answer, in which he said that, though he was personally attached to the Emperor, there was no reason why he should do anything contrary to justice or prejudicial to the interests of Christendom. La Chaux could take no exception to this sentiment, though it did not augur well for the success of his mission, which was to induce the Pope to join the close alliance which Charles and Henry were at the time negotiating, and which was signed in London in June. Though this was modified to a defensive alliance only, Adrian refused to join it, saying that no treaty could make him more friendly to the Emperor and the English king, but that he ought not to offend the French king, as by doing so he would lose his influence as a mediator. He had already written to Charles: “My intention is to labor to procure peace among Christian princes that we may resist the Turks”; and to this end besought him to accept reasonable conditions of peace, with a view to at least a truce of a year or two in the first instance. From this opinion La Chaux was not able to move him, and Adrian soon reaped the fruits of his pacific attitude in a letter from Francis I, offering to receive him with due respect and escort him through his dominions, if he chose to take that way to Italy.
Adrian could now rejoice that he had succeeded in freeing himself from dependence on the Emperor; he had laid the foundation of an attitude of political neutrality.

However, he could not flatter himself that his persuasions were likely to be of much weight. His nuncio to England, the Bishop of Astorga, found Henry VIII in a very bellicose mood: he angrily said that he had received such injuries from the French that he would have neither peace nor truce, but would settle the dispute with the sword. Wolsey echoed his master’s empty boast, declared that the French were the real Turks, the enemies of Christendom, and said that they must be exterminated. Charles V repeated the same opinion in more measured language. Adrian had to content himself with the remark that, though the allies considered peace impossible till the wings of the French king had been clipped, he had to guard the interests of Christendom, to which the most pressing danger was the advance of the Turks. It was this discovery of his political powerlessness which determined Adrian to hasten his journey to Rome. The Emperor landed at Santander on July 16, and wished for an interview before Adrian went away; but Adrian from Tarragona pleaded the news from Italy as a reason for his early departure. He set sail on August 5, taking with him a retinue of 1000 attendants, and followed by as many others who were resolved to seek their fortunes in Rome. Even so it required considerable firmness to reduce the number within those limits. Many returned home in despair at their ill-luck; many others hoped till the last moment, and were left disconsolate on the shore watching the departing galleys.

The voyage was tedious round the north coast of the Mediterranean; and everywhere Adrian met with signs of political unrest. At Livorno he was met by Cardinals Medici, Petrucci, Colonna, Rudolfi, and Piccolomini, who besought him to continue his journey overland; but he declined to enter Rome under Medici's escort, and hurriedly resumed his voyage, landing at Civita Vecchia on the evening of August 27, and reaching Ostia the next morning. At Rome all was in confusion. The city was devastated by the plague. The Cardinals were squabbling amongst themselves, and had made no preparations for the Pope’s reception. The Master of the Ceremonies hastened to do his part; and Adrian advanced to S. Paul's without the Walls of Rome, where he was met by the Cardinals, who with some anxiety awaited the coming of their new master. Carvajal, as Dean of the College, addressed him in a speech which expressed the aspirations which filled the minds of the more serious men at Rome, who had long hoped for some measures of reform. He was to free the Church from all evils, reform it according to the canons, follow the good advice of the Cardinals, relieve their poverty, gather money for a crusade, build S. Peter’s, introduce law and order into Rome, and be generally beneficent. Not a word was said about German affairs; perhaps the Cardinals thought that there was enough to do nearer home. Adrian's answer pointedly reminded them that reform must begin among themselves. After excusing his absence from Rome, he said that, for the restoration of order in the city, they must give up the right of sheltering evil-doers in their palaces, and suffer the officers of the law to have free entry for the purpose of making necessary arrests. He spoke in Latin, and as the Cardinals looked upon his austere figure, his red face, and his ambiguous expression, they began to understand the meaning of their election of a barbarian who knew nothing of the traditions of Rome. It dawned upon them that the new Pope contemplated reforms which might not be in the interest of the Cardinals. When the Bishop of Pesaro came forward with one of those petitions which new Popes were in the habit of granting, a request for a canonry in S. Peter’s, and was refused, it became still more clear that a new order of things was likely to begin. Ascanio Colonna, a nephew of
the Cardinal, asked pardon for one guilty of homicide: “We cannot pardon”, was the
answer, “without hearing both sides. Our intention is that justice be done”. The hangers-
on of Leo’s Court felt their hearts sink within them. The traditions of the Papacy of the
Renaissance were to be swept away, and a new era was to begin. Sadly and silently the
Cardinals followed the procession, which the Roman people did their best to welcome
within their walls.

On August 31, Adrian was crowned in S. Peter’s, and entertained the Cardinals
and ambassadors at dinner. The Spanish attendants of the Pope wondered at the Roman
custom, according to which each Cardinal brought his own butler and his own wine, as
a precaution against a possibility of poison. But when the banquet was over, and Adrian
settled down to his ordinary life, it was the turn of the Romans to wonder at the foreign
habits of the Pope. He was surrounded by Spaniards and Flemings. His household was
of the simplest sort; an old Flemish woman presided over his kitchen; he was waited on
at table by two Spanish pages. Nor did he lose any time in making clear his intentions.
On September 1, he held a Consistory, in which he informed the Card inals of his wish
for the peace of Christendom and a joint undertaking against the Turk. This was a
disappointment to all those who were political partisans on either side. But their dismay
increased when the Pope went on to speak of measures necessary for the reformation of
manners in Rome. He pointed out that the Church needed money and zeal; he told the
Cardinals that a revenue of 6000 ducats was sufficient for them, and that they ought not
to hoard their money but devote it to the common needs; he bade them remember that
many of them were not men of learning, and that they ought to employ their time in
fitting themselves for their duties. After thus lecturing the Cardinals, he summoned the
ambassadors of all the powers to consult about the defence of Rhodes, which was
besieged by the Turks. The other ambassadors cast the obligation on Venice; she had
fifty galleys at sea; they were ready and were enough. Venice had made peace with the
Turks; and the Venetian envoy replied that Venice was not strong enough to act alone.
Adrian, resolved to take some step, ordered Cardinal Medici, as protector of the Order
of S. John, to set sail for Rhodes with two galleys and 1000 men. Medici made excuse
that the galleys were not ready for the sea, and their crews were wearied with the
voyage from Spain. Nothing was done, and Adrian felt his helplessness at every turn.

The position of the new Pope was, indeed, beset by difficulties on every side; and
the very fact that Adrian was seriously bent on facing these difficulties only made their
pressure more apparent. He wished to reform the Curia, free the Papacy from its
political complications, make peace in Europe, and unite Christendom against the Turk.
All these things were doubtless necessary; but Adrian had to undertake them single-
handed. From the beginning he treated the Cardinals like schoolboys, and insisted on
their conformity to trivial regulations. Thus he prescribed their dress, ordered them to
shave their beards, and dislodged from the Vatican eight who had taken up their abode
there. Similarly, while he reduced his personal expenses to the simplest limits, he
showed no sympathy for the crowd of officials who consequently lost their places; and
he carried out his domestic reforms in such a way that they seemed to be the economies
of a miser, who had no sense of the dignity of his position. Adrian had chosen to live in
Rome, and consequently had undertaken the responsibilities of a ruler of the Roman
people, who had been accustomed to magnificence on the part of their ruler; he changed
everything according to his own sense of the fitness of things, without making any
compensation. The ravages of the plague offered him an opportunity for spiritual
activity and useful beneficence. He might have impressed the Romans with the power
of holiness, and might have substituted for the worldly policy of his predecessors the ideal of a Christian bishop; but he shut himself up in the Vatican and led the retired life of a studious monk. Secure in his good intentions, absorbed in his plans for the future, he lacked that quick sympathy with actual human needs which alone can make abstract plans intelligible. He was content to make his purposes clear, without seeking how he could give them effective expression. He trusted in logic, and did not strive to awaken enthusiasm. He was more anxious to keep clear from doing evil than to do good. His attitude was negative rather than positive. He hoped, by living a life of seclusion, to spare himself the trouble of refusing to hear requests which he was not prepared to grant. He had a small circle of trusty officials, like minded with himself, and too much resembling himself in manner and method. Chief amongst them was an old friend, a Fleming, Peter Enkenvoert, of whom the Pope said that if all goodness and learning were lost in the world, and Enkenvoert alone preserved, everything would be found in him. Another Fleming, Peter of Rome, was made Master of Requests solely on the ground of his crabbed and intractable temper, that he might keep off suitors from the Pope. Besides these men, the Bishops of Feltre, Castellamare, and Burgos, and two Germans, Johann Winkler and Copis, made up the number of the Pope's advisers. There were no men of mark among them. Adrian made no effort to win allies by trustfulness or geniality. His main care was to defend himself and maintain his principles. His answer to all requests was "Videbimus", "We will see about it". His carefulness seemed to be feeble procrastination; he was counted to be small-minded and inexperienced in affairs. Instead of impressing men with his resoluteness and raising himself above the level of petty intrigue, he only led them to devise new means for capturing a Pope who had a turn for eccentricity, and was ignorant of the world.

We need only read the dispatches of the Spanish ambassadors to see how completely Adrian failed to put himself beyond the reach of scheming diplomatists, and how incapable he was of putting to shame their political cynicism. Juan Manuel was unable to convince the Pope that he had procured his election, and had no wish to stay in Rome longer than was necessary to take the measure of the man whom he proposed to punish for not swallowing his bait. He wrote to the Emperor that the Pope was so weak and irresolute that it was useless to give him advice; he was ignorant, not only of Italian affairs, but of European politics generally; his weakness and avarice made it impossible to count upon him; and his adviser Enkenvoert was a poor creature, both intellectually and morally. In October, Manuel was replaced by the Duke of Sessa, who at once assumed that Adrian could best be won through his servants, and proceeded to collect gossip about them. Enkenvoert, he reported, rules the Pope, and is himself ruled by Winkler and Peter of Rome, who act as his panders. These are all on the side of France, but may be bought, as they are exceedingly covetous. Other friends of the Pope are good Imperialists, but are feeble, ignorant, and timid. Adrian himself talked about politics with the angry petulance of a child; his only notion of conducting business was to discuss matters endlessly with Enkenvoert, Ghinucci, and the Bishop of Cosenza, without ever coming to any conclusion. For his own part, he declared that he would rather a hundred times expose his life daily on the field of battle than negotiate with such a Pope. From other sources we learn that Adrian was not discreet. Cardinal Carvajal had reason to suspect that he told the Emperor that he advised him to adopt political neutrality, and wrote to Charles to deny it. Further, Adrian had not the knowledge of character necessary to choose trustworthy men for confidential work. His envoy to the French king, the Archbishop of Bari, was secretly in communication with the Emperor's ambassador, and sent him private information of all that passed between
himself and the Pope. We have a more sympathetic picture of Adrian from the Venetian envoys, but it leaves the same impression of helplessness. "The Pope leads an exemplary and devout life. Every day he says his hours; rises from bed for matins and then returns to rest; rises at daybreak, says his mass, and then comes to give audience. He dines and sups very temperately, and it is said that he only spends a ducat a day, which he takes from his purse every evening and gives to his steward, saying: For tomorrow's expenses. He is a man of good and holy life, but he is slow in his doings and proceeds with great circumspection. He speaks little and loves solitude; none of the Cardinals is intimate with him, and he takes counsel with none of them, so that little is done and everyone is discontented".

The fact was that Adrian succeeded in asserting his independence, and having done so found that there was little else which he could definitely do. He freed himself from the Cardinals, only to become dependent on a small circle of officials who were incapable of advising him. He freed himself from the politics of the Emperor, only to find that he became thereby destitute of political influence at all. Charles V and Gattinara, Henry VIII and Wolsey, pursued their own plans, and gave meaningless answers to the Pope's pacific counsels. Adrian was compelled to act contrary to his principles: he continued Wolsey's legateship, and sent Bulls to enable him to take possession of the revenues of the See of Durham without discharging the duties of a bishop. He even wished to borrow money from Wolsey; but all these tokens of goodwill were useless to modify Wolsey's political action. The Pope received from both Spain and England the stereotyped answer, that the allied monarchs were ready to make peace, if Francis would agree to reasonable terms. Their only object was to compel the Pope to join the League against France; and Adrian winced under the steady pressure which he felt on every side. He complained bitterly to Charles V that Manuel tried to do all the harm he could to the Church, because he was disappointed of the 100,000 ducats which Cardinal Farnese had promised him if he were elected Pope; now that Manuel had left Rome, the Duke of Sessa was following his example. Manuel on his side was busy in Northern Italy, and wrote that a general League of all the Italian States must be formed without the Pope, who would at last be driven to join it.

In everything that Adrian tried to do he found himself surrounded by the meshes of Spanish diplomacy. With cold courtesy and persistent gravity, Charles V repeated the same advice: the Pope's attempt at neutrality only encouraged the insolence of the French king, who proposed impossible terms of peace: if the Pope would join the Emperor, he would most effectively prevent bloodshed amongst Christian powers and enable them to combine for the defence of Rhodes. Adrian's complaints about the Spanish ministers were answered with contemptuous pity: if they really bore him such ill-will as he supposed, he would long ago have been reduced to the position of a "curate of S. Peter's". Meanwhile Charles kindly offered to relieve the Pope of some part of his expenses by pensions to his servants. Adrian answered that he would dismiss any of them who received a single ducat. "Nonsense", is the comment of the Duke of Sessa; "the Pope may shut his eyes, but this kind of marketing goes on briskly at the palace". Even Enkenvoert gave hostages to the Emperor by succeeding to Adrian's Bishopric of Tortosa.

Still, though Adrian was disappointed in his attempts to restore European peace, he had good hopes of doing something towards reforming the Church. To support his activity in this direction, Adrian felt that he had a considerable weight of opinion behind him. What was happening in Germany had given force to the views of the party which
had been urging disciplinary reform after the Spanish model; and Adrian’s accession had been hailed by them with satisfaction. From the Netherlands came a curious document, written by an Augustinian canon of Hemsdonk, in the form of a dialogue between himself and Apollo, who was sent to reveal the glories of the future. After much outspokenness concerning the abuses in the Church and the evil lives of the clergy, Apollo and the canon agree that the only remedy is a General Council, and the strict enforcement of discipline. More valuable, because less rhetorical, was the advice of the Spanish humanist, Juan Vives, then resident in Louvain. He pointed out to the Pope that States could only be maintained by the same means as those by which they had been established. All previous troubles of the Church were appeased by a General Council, in which diseases were brought to light and proper remedies were applied. Publicity alone dispels misunderstandings. If some Popes had dreaded a Council, Adrian has a clear conscience. Fear is a bad guardian of power; and it is a poor proof of truth to flee from argument. A Council should deliberate about those things only which concern practical piety and morality. Points of doubtful interpretation may be left for discussion in the schools: religion suffers no loss however they are defined; let them be matters of free thought or party opinion. If the opinions of Vives had been held in the Curia of Leo there would have been no Lutheran revolt. But Adrian felt the difficulty of a sudden change of front, and so did other observers of the signs of the times.

Erasmus wrote cautiously to the new Pope that private animosities should not injure public business, and that no vindication of human authority should betray the authority of Jesus Christ. Adrian answered that he desired nothing more than to remove from his native land the evil which affected it, while it was yet curable: he invited Erasmus to Rome that he might profit further from his advice. Erasmus was not sure that he and the Pope meant the same thing, and was not so convinced of his own orthodoxy as to venture himself into the toils of the Roman theologians; but he proceeded to speak out more plainly. First he freed himself from any sympathy with Luther's violent language, and pleaded that his writings were wrongfully interpreted in the light of Luther’s extremest conclusions. He deprecated angry controversy, and warned the Pope not to trust to repressive measures. He recommended reform undertaken in a spirit of unselfishness, without consideration of class interests; meanwhile there should be a promise of amnesty and an end of bickering. The name of liberty is sweet; and the problem is how to give liberty to men’s consciences, and at the same time reserve the just claims of authority. This is only possible if popular liberty, and the claims of authority, be submitted to the same standard of truth and justice. He advised the Pope to call together grave, upright, peace-loving men to inquire: Whence came these troubles What change is necessary? Thus Erasmus was convinced of the need of conciliation, and dwelt upon the temper and attitude which the Pope ought to assume towards the innovators. He agreed with Vives in thinking that the time was past for exercising authority against the rebels.

From the practical side Adrian had the opinion of Aleander, who was not misled about the extent of the Papal victory at Worms. “The time is past”, he wrote, “when God will connive at our faults. The age is changed, and popular opinion no longer thinks that the charges brought against us are partly false, and partly capable of better interpretation. The axe is laid at the root of the tree, unless we choose to return to wisdom. There is no need of issuing new laws, or fulminating Bulls; we have the canons and institutes of the fathers, and if only they are observed, the evil may be arrested. Let the Pope and the Curia do away their errors by which God and man are justly offended;
let them bring the clergy once more under discipline. If the Germans see this done, there will be no further talk of Luther. The root and the cure of the evil are alike in ourselves”.

The liberalism of Vives and Erasmus was scarcely likely to be palatable to the Pope. To lay aside authority, and trust to reasonableness; to promise amnesty, and allow free discussion; to minimize differences, and leave all but essentials open to opinion—if Adrian could have given expression to these principles of action he might have changed the fortunes of Christendom. But he reserved the question of principles and turned to practice. Aleander’s advice was just, and reform must begin in the Curia. The Cardinals were nearest to the Pope, and were the first to experience Adrian's reforming zeal. “The Cardinals”, wrote Hannibal to Wolsey, “have now a master that can teach them their lesson, and ordereth them as a good Abbot doth his convent”. Those in the College who had wished for reforms had now an opportunity for raising their voices; and Egidius of Viterbo, General of the Augustinians, a man of genuine piety and much experience, submitted to the Pope a memorial which shows how profoundly the German revolt had influenced the opinions of thoughtful and sincere observers.

Egidius begins from the fact that the Papal authority is of little repute, and unless something is done to preserve it, will soon be of no repute at all. He suggests that a commission be appointed to determine the limits of the power of the keys, which has been applied in the past in an arbitrary way, and must be diminished in the future. Amongst the abuses of the Papal power he enumerates the interference with benefices; the excessive business of the datary, and of the other offices of the Curia, which all need overhauling; the whole body of concordats and concessions to princes, which have removed spiritual matters from the supervision of the Pope while they have given him temporal advantages; the entire system of Indulgences and privileges concerning confession, which Egidius denounces in language as vigorous as that used by Luther. Indulgences were preached with consummate impudence; they were given without investigation; they were an incentive to sin, and a source of danger to souls.

Egidius felt that these measures of reform would reduce the Papal revenue, and he knew that the building of S. Peter's was a favorite shelter for official conservatism. He therefore suggested that the princes of Europe should be asked to relieve the Pope of all necessity for sending his own collectors, by offering yearly contributions till the work was finished. But he was aware that the Papal treasury afforded slight guarantee that the money would be spent on the object for which it was given; and he proposed that it should be paid directly by the ambassadors to the architect, who should render hid accounts to them.

Had Luther been met in the spirit shown by the memorial of Egidius there would have been no German revolt. If the admissions now made by Egidius had been made by Prierias, Luther would have been satisfied. Unfortunately the hard lessons of experience were needed before the views of Egidius could be formulated. In the eyes of Prierias, it was heretical to criticize ecclesiastical practices, because they rested on the unlimited and illimitable power of the keys, committed to the Pope. In the eyes of Egidius, the power of the Pope can only be preserved if it carefully examines into old abuses and makes clear the limits to which it will submit in the future. So complete was the change which the events of the last five years had wrought in the attitude of the Curia. Yet though Luther had given Egidius the opportunity of speaking out his mind, he was not on that account forgiven. Everything must be done to root out the Lutheran pest; the
imperial edict must be diligently enforced till, if possible, the very name of such a monster be forgotten.

This was the line of action which commended itself to Adrian's mind. Europe must be convinced of the good intentions of the Pope: some reforms must be begun at once: and meanwhile the Emperor must stamp out Lutheranism. Reform and repression were to go hand in hand; and the Papal office, cleansed from the abuses of the past, would renew its hold upon the reverence of a reunited Christendom. To devise a practical means of procedure, Adrian called to his aid some trustworthy prelates, such as Giovanni Pietro Caraffa, Bishop of Chieti, and Tommaso Gazella, Bishop of Gaeta. The chief difficulty lay in determining the point from which reform was to begin; and Adrian resolved to follow the order of events in Germany and begin with Indulgences. He himself had never held the high doctrine of the Curialist theologians, and could therefore conscientiously endeavor to bring back Indulgences within the limits of the old system of ecclesiastical discipline. He apparently proposed a definition of Indulgences which should emphasize the necessity of a contrite heart in the recipient. Cardinal Cajetan expressed a doubt lest such a definition should, in the existing condition of the controversy, lessen the belief in the authority of the Church, and suggested a revival of the old penitential system in its entirety. The theological difficulties, however, were small compared with the practical difficulties. Cardinal Pucci, as datary, gave his opinion that the revival of the old discipline was impossible without the old zeal: to lay heavier burdens upon men at a time when the hold of the Church was weak, and the claims of free inquiry were strong, would only alienate Italy without recovering Germany; in the diversity of theological opinion it was better to leave the matter alone. Adrian had no answer to these objections, and tried to find another starting-point for reform. In his choice he showed his foresight, for he selected dispensations, especially in matrimonial cases. Had Adrian carried out his plan, his successor might have had some principle on which to decide his action towards Henry VIII, and would have been thankful to shelter himself behind some limitation of the Papal power. But here again the opposition of the officials was fatal. Many of them had bought their posts from Leo X and were dependent on fees for their livelihood; if their gains were taken away, they must be repaid the invested capital; and Adrian had no money for the purpose.

Thus the reforming schemes of Egidius and the desires of Adrian vanished slowly away. One part only of the memorial of Egidius met with unanimous consent—that Luther must be crushed. “Heresy”, said Cardinal Soderini, “has always been put down by force, not by attempts at reformation; such attempts can only be partial, and will seem to be extorted by terror; they will only confirm the heretics in the belief that they are right, and will not satisfy them. The danger of the Holy See is not in Germany but in Italy, where the Pope needs money to defend himself. No source of revenue can be abandoned. The princes of Germany must be taught that it is their own interest to put down the Lutheran heretics”. Such, unhappily, was a plausible summary of Papal policy in the past, and a plausible statement of its visible hope for the future.

Nowhere could Adrian move with safety. The Medicean statecraft of Leo X had involved the Papacy in a labyrinth from which there was no escape. All that Adrian could do was to charge his datary, Enkenvoert, to be careful in granting dispensations, and charge Chieregato, his legate to Germany, to inform the princes that he was resolved to act on his good intentions so soon as circumstances allowed. One practical step only was he able to take. On December 9, 1522, he declared all reservations and
expectations granted since the pontificate of Innocent VIII to be invalid. This and his own mode of life were the only guarantees which he could give to the aspirations of Christendom. The Papal absolutism was decidedly limited in its power of working reforms.

When Adrian turned his eyes to Germany he saw little to comfort him. Luther had been condemned at Worms, and had disappeared in consequence. Here and there by the Imperial command his books had affairs, been burned; but the number of his adherents had not diminished, and no vigorous measures were taken against them. Charles had other matters to occupy his attention; it was enough that he had set forth an ideal of the Papacy and the Empire as two coordinate powers ruling Europe; when this conception had clothed itself with reality by the conquest of Italy and the reduction of France, it would be easy to apply its authority to matters of opinion. But in the first place the Netherlands required Charles’ attention, next the English alliance, then Spanish affairs. So the Diet of Worms was scarcely at an end before Charles prepared to leave Germany. His brother, Ferdinand of Austria, was appointed Regent in his absence; but as Ferdinand had enough to do at home and was ignorant of Germany, the Pfalzgraf Frederick was the virtual head of the government of Germany. Such a regency was necessarily weak, and was more adapted for deliberation than for action. The presence of the Turks on the eastern frontier of Germany was a serious matter, and Charles hoped that the Regent might at least be able to make preparations for a military undertaking in the following year. Early in 1522 he issued a summons for a Diet to be held at Nurnberg, which on its meeting concerned itself solely with questions of finance. The Estates besought the Emperor to devote to his war against the Turk the annates which went to Rome, also ten per cent, of the income of Collegiate Churches, a proper sum levied from every monastery, and five gulden from every friary.

The Diet separated at the end of August and was summoned to meet again on September 1. Nothing had been said or done about Luther; indeed the only man who urged the necessity of taking action was Duke George of Saxony. The princes, ecclesiastical as well as temporal, were in no hurry to do more than publish the decree against Luther, and forbid the sale of his books. Germany had questions enough to settle; everything was insecure, and the one thing dreaded above all others was a popular rising. In the existing temper of men's minds any attempt to suppress Luther’s opinions by force would lead to disturbances; it was politic to wait for a more convenient season.

But if the upholders of the old Church were willing to stand still, it was not so with the reformers. Scholars Hocked to Wittenberg, partly from a love of adventure, partly from curiosity, partly attracted by the fame of Melanthon’s teaching. A greed for novelty was in the air, and there was one man at least who had a desire to satisfy it. In Luther's absence, Carlstadt aspired to be the leader of the new movement, and soon showed that Luther was moderate compared to some of his followers. In June, 1521, Carlstadt denounced not only the celibacy of the clergy, which had been already called in question, but the validity of monastic vows. When Luther heard of this he expressed his opinion that the clerical order was by God's institution free, and therefore ought not to be trammeled by human ordinances; but the monastic vows were voluntarily undertaken, and were therefore binding. However, after some hesitation Luther's opinions advanced, and he decided that monastic vows were unlawful, because they were generally taken in the belief that the observances of monastic life had a special desert in God's eyes, and further because they were opposed to the principles of
Christian freedom. Before Luther's views were finally declared, monks in Wittenberg began to leave their monasteries, and their example was followed in Erfurt.

The question now raised was one much more serious than mere theological speculation. After all, the opinions which a man entertained about the respective value of faith and good works did not immediately affect the outward organization of society. But if monastic vows were null and void, as contrary to the Gospel, if monks were exhorted to leave their monasteries and take up their position as ordinary citizens, a great social change would rapidly ensue. Not only were practical questions to be faced, the use to be made of monasteries and their revenues, the provision for monks and such-like points; but a shock was given to the entire system of the Church. Monasteries had been founded from motives of piety; their endowments had been granted in the expectation that mass would be said in them forever for the repose of the souls of worthy men, whose descendants were still living. There were almost no families of importance which were not connected with monasteries by some foundation, which gave them rights of burial within their walls. Further, the monastic system was an essential part of the current conception of the Christian life, and still appealed to men as the highest ideal. The reformation of the monastic orders, which had been steadily pursued in Germany for the last half century, had been the most powerful means of influencing the secular clergy, who could not afford to fall hopelessly behind the regulars. The abolition of monasteries would remove the agency which in times past had been most powerful for reform, and in which the conservative reformers most trusted for the future. It must lead to an entire reconstruction of the ecclesiastical system.

Indeed changes followed close upon one another. An Augustinian brother, Gabriel Zwilling, stepped into Luther's place as a preacher at Wittenberg, and in proposed a reform of the mass service. He demanded the restoration of the cup to the laity, the abolition of the mass as an offering to God, and its conversion into a communion, in which all took part. In October the Augustinians, under the influence of these opinions, ceased to say the daily mass; and the University petitioned Duke Frederick “as a Christian prince to abolish the misuse of the mass in his dominions”.

If the reforming party hoped that Frederick would ally himself with them they little knew his character, which is indeed still hard to understand. Perhaps it is safest to regard Frederick as a natural result of the general uncertainty of his time. Himself a devout Christian, personally satisfied with the existing ceremonies of the Church, and a diligent collector of relics of saints, he yet felt that there was something in what Luther said, and he saw that many men held with him. His personal pride led him to rejoice in the brilliant success which had attended his new University; his sense of the duties of a ruler made him indisposed to set himself against the wishes of his people. Theologians must settle their own disputes; the Pope must defend himself against Luther; it was his business to see that his subjects were fairly dealt with; into matters of speculative opinion he refused to enter, and he contented himself with advising moderation on all sides. Something might come of the new movement; the future must decide: his best policy was to meddle as little as possible. It is obvious that the longer he held this position, the more difficult it was for him to intervene; and all his efforts were directed to maintain an attitude of neutrality. So Frederick answered the University by reminding them that they were a very small part of Christendom, and had better wait till they had convinced others before they made any changes on their own authority. He himself had no knowledge when the apostolic custom was changed into the existing form of the
mass; but as a layman, who was not versed in the Scriptures, he counseled them to do nothing which might create division.

But it soon became clear that Frederick could do little to restrain the zeal of his impetuous subjects. In November, Luther was stirred by the news that the Archbishop of Mainz was again preaching on Indulgence, and he wrote a savage denunciation of *The Idol of Halle*, which Frederick in the interests of peace tried to prevent being published. "I will not endure such prohibition", wrote Luther to Spalatin, "I will rather lose you, and the prince, and all. For if I have withstood the archbishop's creator, the Pope, why shall I give way to the creature? It is all very well to talk about not disturbing the public peace, but will you endure the eternal peace of God to be disturbed by the impious works of perdition? You must not be moved by our bad repute among moderate men, for you know that Christ and His Apostles did not please men. We are not accused of wrong-doing, but only of despising impiety. The Gospel will not be overthrown if some of our party sin against moderation". Luther was resolved to avail himself of the feebleness of his adversaries, and the Archbishop of Mainz shrank before the prospect of a chastisement from his pen, and withdrew from the conflict.

In Wittenberg no heed was paid to Frederick's admonition that men should discuss theology but make no outward change. On Christmas Day, 1521, Carlstadt administered the sacrament under both kinds, without requiring confession and absolution. Soon afterwards he married a wife. The Augustinian friars renounced their rule, forsook their cloister, and pulled down the altars in their church. Prophets arose, unlearned zealots, who saw visions, foretold a general outpouring of the Holy Spirit, and declared baptism unnecessary. The scholarly mind of Melanchthon saw no logical reason why this should not be true. The cries of enthusiasm waxed louder: what was the need of human learning when all were taught of God? Schoolmasters dismissed their scholars; the university teaching was neglected; Wittenberg was sinking into an abode of fanatics. Then Luther could no longer endure to see his cause endangered. Leaving the Wartburg in March, 1522, he hastened to Wittenberg, resumed his old place in the pulpit, and for eight days in succession reasoned with the people, who submitted to the spell of his eloquence and the pleadings of his common-sense. He besought them to abstain from asserting their new-found liberty by rashly enacting the opposite to all that had been before. He advised that private masses, the offering of the mass, and the denial of the cup to the laity should be withstood as contrary to the Word of God, and the principle of Christian liberty; other matters must be left to the conscience of the community. No arbitrary changes should be made; let each man do as he thought fit, and the questions would settle themselves. “The sum”, he said, “of all is this: I will preach, I will speak, I will write; but I will not coerce or compel by force, for faith must be nourished willingly, without restraint”.

Luther was still true to his belief that all men would see things as he did, if only they had time for reflection. It was this hopefulness that gave him his power. He was busy on his translation of the Bible; and he was convinced that, when men had in their hands the standard of truth to which he appealed, they would be guided to judge aright. Already the little leaven had showed its germinating force: it would spread everywhere, as it had done in Wittenberg. Germany would be transformed by the quiet working of a natural process. The only danger lay in precipitate enthusiasm, which menaced social order. Luther's strong common-sense showed him the necessity of avoiding a political conflict, and he refused to contemplate the possibility of a collision with civil authority. It was true that he himself was under the ban of the Empire; but the imperial edict had
been extorted by misconception, and might be allowed to fall into abeyance. It was
natural that there should be some difficulty at first in severing the Empire from the
Papacy; but that process might be left to work itself out; it was enough for him to prove
that in domestic matters the new teaching contained no menace to existing institutions.

For immediate purposes Luther judged rightly. The Government took no notice of
his return to Wittenberg, but were content with the Elector's assurance that it was
against his will. They were somewhat disturbed when, in August, Duke George
forwarded a copy of Luther's answer to Henry VIII's *Defence of the Seven Sacraments.*
In that book Luther's violent character showed itself without moderation. He attacked
Henry with unrestrained abuse; called him a fool, an ass, an empty head: said that he
had waded to the throne through blood, and flattered the Pope, whose conscience was as
bad as his own. Further, his scorn for the English king is only a part of the scorn which
he poured on all existing authorities of the Church, and all the doings of the past
century, which he denounced as the work of the devil.

Luther's friends were annoyed and grieved at the violent language, and Luther
found it hard to apologize for it. "I have vainly tried moderation hitherto", he wrote to
one, "now I will use abuse". To another he quoted all the severe language of our Lord
and S. Paul, and said that the false heart of his enemies must be laid bare; time would
justify him. A little later he admitted: "I know that my writings are of a kind that, when
they are first seen, they seem written by the devil, and men think the heavens will fall;
but it soon seems otherwise. But the time has come that high heads should be stricken;
and what God intends time will show. Not that I excuse myself as free from human
frailty; but I can boast with S. Paul that, though I may have been too hard, I have spoken
the truth; and no man can accuse me of having been a hypocrite". So Luther wrote; and
he could doubtless justify himself by appealing to results. The violence of his language
accorded with the popular taste. The peasant and the artisan could understand hard
hitting, and were glad to follow a leader who was sure of himself and was no respecter
of persons.

Luther's opponents had tried to influence public opinion by calling in the
authority of a king, and Henry's book was translated and largely distributed. Luther
retorted by a strong assertion that the question was a question for Germans to settle by
themselves; and he set to work to show how little he cared for authority of any kind. He
abandoned the position of a religious teacher for that of a literary gladiator, and was
glad to use a foreign prince as an example of what his adversaries might expect. It was a
lesson to the princes of Germany, which was not without its result. No one likes to be
held up to ridicule, and Luther had shown himself an unsparing antagonist. The
Government expressed to Duke George their sorrow that the Emperor's ally should have
been treated with so little respect; but they meddled no further with the matter.

There were others, however, who were not so clear as Luther about the necessity
of keeping the peace. Franz von Sickingen combined a zeal for freedom of preaching
with a desire for raising the knights at the expense of the ecclesiastical princes, and
made war against the Archbishop of Trier. Sickingen was known as Luther's friend, and
Luther was loudly accused as being the cause of his highhanded proceedings. The
temper of the Government was strongly against Luther when the Diet opened its
proceedings at Nurnberg on November 16.

The Papal nuncio, Francesco Chieregato, Bishop of Teramo, came on a message
of conciliation, with instructions to prove to the Germans the willingness of the Pope to
remedy abuses, which could no longer be defended. Accordingly, in his first speech to
the Diet, on November 19, he avoided the Lutheran question, but detailed the Pope's
efforts for peace, and urged upon the princes the need of rescuing Hungary from the
Turk. On December 8 he had an interview with the Elector Frederick's Chancellor, Hans
von Planitz, in which he talked over matters quietly. The Pope, he said, was convinced
of Frederick's good intentions; Luther had done good service in bringing abuses to light,
for many Popes had done much that was ill-advised, and Leo X was not free from his
share of blame. But when Luther proceeded to attack the order of the Church, the
sacraments, the authority of Fathers and Council, he became absurd and intolerable.
Now that there was an upright and pious Pope, every one ought to help him in his good
endeavors for the repose of the Church, the peace of Christendom, and the expulsion of
the Turk. He expressed his hope that Planitz was of the same opinion.

The answer of Planitz expressed a very prevalent feeling amongst sensible men in
Germany. He was no theologian, and did not profess to judge whether Luther's opinions
were right or wrong. As for the Elector, he as a layman did not pretend to interfere with
ecclesiastical matters; he did not banish Luther, because, if he were gone, less
responsible men would take his place; indeed Luther's return to Wittenberg had
prevented worse mischief, and if he were driven elsewhere he would only speak more
strongly and spread his influence. One thing was clear, that force would be no remedy.
Luther relied on his learning and on the Scriptures, and could only be met on the same
grounds. Learned men must confer quietly with Luther, and the results of their
conference must be laid before a General Council.

Chieregato listened sympathetically and seemed to agree.

Doubtless the view expressed by Planitz suggested the only possible means of
restoring the peace of the Church. New ideas had arisen and had taken root in the minds
of the German people. Nothing but peaceful controversy, and free discussion between
theologians, could determine the full meaning and bearing of these ideas, and submit
them to the judgment of the universal Church. The attempt to put them down by the
mere exercise of authority had proved a failure; though condemned by the Pope, and
condemned by the Empire, they were more popular than ever. The Hussite wars had
shown that opinions could not be put down by arms; the Council of Basel had shown
that differences might be minimized by discussion. It was true that a change of front
was difficult, and that there was some loss of dignity to the Pope, who exchanged the
position of an absolute judge for that of a mediator. But Chieregato knew that Adrian
was prepared to make a large sacrifice of dignity for the sake of peace. Had he and
Adrian been wiser men, they might have known that the virtue of a sacrifice depended
upon the way in which it was made.

Unfortunately Adrian could not forget that he had already pronounced against
Luther's theology, nor could he free himself from the traditions of his office. The ideas
of the Papal Court were too strong to be resisted; and though he was prepared to
conciliate Germany, the conciliation must take the form which he thought fit, and not
the form which the facts of the case demanded. He would first put down Luther, and
then listen to the grievances of the German Church. Obedience must come first, and
then receive its reward from the Papal bounty. Germany must recognize the dangers of
the Lutheran reformation, and take instead the reforms which the Pope freely offered.
So Chieregato, a few days after his talk with Planitz, received a Papal brief dated
November 25, which he was to lay before the Diet. Being thus provided with his cue he
made a second speech (January 3, 1523) about the Lutheran question, which put an end to all hopes of conciliation. He had nothing now to say of Luther's services to Christianity, nor of the provocation which might have drawn him into unguarded language. There was nothing but denunciation. Germany was polluted by heresy, and Luther and his followers were worse foes to Christendom than the Turk. Nothing fouler, more disgraceful, and more obscene than Luther’s doctrine had ever been put forward; it overthrew the very basis of religion, and made Germany the laughingstock of Europe. The Diet of Worms had decreed its suppression: “let them carry out that decree and repress, correct, and punish, that fear might succeed where love of virtue failed”.

After this introduction the Pope’s letter was laid before the Diet. He assured them of his paternal zeal for all his flock: he told them his efforts after peace and their small success: then, turning from the successes of the Turks to troubles in Christendom, he lamented the errors of Luther, whom he grieved no longer to be able to call his son. But with this regret Adrian’s endurance came to an end, and the voice of outraged authority alone was heard. Luther had been condemned but not punished; his partisans were daily increasing, not only amongst the vulgar but amongst the princes. As a simple theologian Adrian had given his voice against Luther's teaching; he consoled himself at the time with the thought that the orthodoxy of his native land would soon assert its power. But tolerance, born of indolence, had allowed the evil seed to grow up. It was intolerable that one wretched friar should lead the whole of Germany astray, as though he alone had received the gift of the Holy Spirit. It was enough to see that his defence of evangelical truth was a mere cloak for robbery; his plea of liberty a summons to licence. Those who mocked at the canons and Councils of the Church would set all law at defiance. Hands stained with sacrilege would destroy all property. The cause of the Church was the cause of civil order and of self-protection. The Pope besought the princes to lay aside all jealousies and strifes, and make the reduction of Luther their chief object. God swallowed up Dathan and Abiram in the gulf; S. Peter denounced death to Ananias and Sapphira; holy Emperors removed by the sword Priscillian and Jovinian; the Fathers of Constance dealt with Hus and Jerome. Let them follow the example of these illustrious deeds, and win a glorious triumph and an eternal reward.

This was the conclusion arrived at by an enlightened Pope, zealous in his own way for the reformation of the Church, profoundly conscious of its deep-seated corruption and of his own powerlessness to remedy the abuses which he acknowledged. A German by birth, with ample opportunity of knowing the sentiments of Germany, Adrian was by training and by position unable to feel any sympathy for German aspirations. He had seen the downfall of a rising in Spain; he had known, as Inquisitor, the influence that could be exercised by coercion; he had experience of the results of a dexterous marshaling of the forces of resistance to change. He was a believer in power and could not brook any appearance of revolt. The very fact that he was desirous of reforms made him anxious to assert his authority in the first place. If the Papacy was to bestir itself for the purpose of checking abuses, its undoubted right must first be recognized. Adrian could only overcome gainsayers in the Curia by showing them the practical advantage which his reforms would bring. The restoration of order in Germany would be a recompense for the losses of the officials of the Curia. The Pope who impressed his will on Rome and Germany alike would hand on to his successors a splendid heritage. So menace and bribes were to go together. The German princes were to see that their real interest could best be secured from the Pope. He would give them lawfully what Luther promised as the result of a dangerous revolt. When this was clear,
they would no longer hesitate to put forth their strength, shake themselves free from rebellion, and rest securely under the protection of lawful authority.

So after Chieregato had prepared the way by his own exhortation, and by the Papal brief, he was to lay before the downcast princes the inmost utterances of the Papal mind, which were confided to him in his instructions. In this document Luther was still more unsparingly denounced as a second Mahomet; and the disgrace which he was bringing upon Germany was more strongly emphasized than in the Pope’s letter.

The authority of the Church was also put more prominently forward, in answer to the plea that Luther had been condemned unheard. Matters of faith must be believed, not proved: the question if books and utterances were really Luther’s admitted of judicial investigation; their contents were to be judged by their conformity with the doctrine of the Church. Nothing would be fixed or certain among men, if every presumptuous man were to claim the liberty of going back from what had been established by the assent of so many centuries, so many theologians and saints. The conclusions of the Church must be as readily obeyed as the laws of civil society. Thus Adrian laid down most decidedly principles which, if accepted, would have closed the door for ever to all free examination of current theology. He did not attempt to discriminate the different parts of Luther’s teaching, or give him credit for good intentions. He did not discuss the origin of the controversy, but declared all controversy to be unlawful. His solution for all difficulties was: “The authority of the Church must be obeyed”. He did not define exactly the seat of that authority, but with a magnificent contempt for details asserted that “almost all points in which Luther dissents from others have been condemned by sundry General Councils”. Above all, Adrian took an entirely external view of theological opinion, and treated belief solely as a matter of public order. If men differed they were sure to quarrel: “How can it be but that all will be full of confusion, unless what has been once, nay often, established by mature judgment be unshakenly observed by all?”

But while Adrian thus loftily upheld a standard of infallible authority, to be received with unquestioning obedience, he was driven to confess that its existence was ideal rather than real. With amazing frankness and simplicity he faced the actual facts, and proceeded to bewail the grievous shortcomings of that authority before which he claimed that all men should bow. “We confess that God permits this persecution to fall upon His Church on account of sins, especially the sins of priests and prelates. We know that in this holy seat for some years past there have been many abominations, abuses in spiritual matters, excesses in commands, and that all things have been changed to evil. Nor is it wonderful that the sickness has passed from the head to the members, from Pope to inferior prelates. Wherefore we promise to do all in our power to reform the Curia, whence perchance all this evil has proceeded: that as corruption flowed thence, so health and reformation should in time be derived”.

But Adrian was obliged to add that the process could not be rapid. “No one should wonder if he does not at once see all errors and abuses reformed by us. The disease is chronic, nor is it of one kind only but manifold: we must advance gradually lest we cause confusion”. All that he can definitely promise the Germans is that, during his pontificate, he will strictly observe the concordats, and will examine into complaints about the judgment of appeals, so soon as the auditors of the Rota, who have fled before the plague, shall return to Rome: further, he will use the Papal right of provision in favor of learned men who may be recommended to him by the princes.
Thus Adrian set up an infallible authority on one hand, and on the other hand admitted its practical failure. He called upon the Diet to uphold to the furthest possible extent the claims of that authority, and undertook in return to restore it to such a form that it would be worthy of obedience. But he did not disguise that it would be long before he was able to fulfill his promise; and it was obvious that his promise was only personal and could in no way bind his successor. We may applaud Adrian’s good intentions, but we cannot praise his statesmanship. He refused to conciliate Luther's partisans, or hold out any hopes to the new theology; while his attempt to rally moderate men round the Papacy was scarcely likely to raise enthusiasm through its lack of any substantial guarantee. The only practical step urged by the Pope was the forcible suppression of Luther and his adherents, which could not be attempted without a civil war, in which success was doubtful.

Still the strong measures advocated by the Pope found some support, especially from the Elector of Brandenburg, and Duke George of Saxony. On January 2, 1523, Planitz wrote to the Elector of Saxony that it would be wise to stop the printing of books at Wittenberg, and send Luther elsewhere for a time. Next day the Government discussed whether or not they should at once proceed against Luther, according to the decree of the Diet of Worms; but after a stormy debate it was agreed to refer the matter to the Estates. Chieregato asked leave to address them further, and was heard by the Government and the Diet. Emboldened by the support he now met with, he protested against the dissemination of Luther's heresy in Nurnberg, where the Diet was sitting, and asked that four Lutheran preachers should be imprisoned and sent to Rome for trial. This was supremely unwise, as it called attention to the fact that, however helpless the Pope might be to reform, he was powerful to repress.

The citizens of Nurberg declared that they would resist with arms any attempt to seize their preachers. Chieregato’s charges against them were examined, and declared to be untrue. Chieregato himself, who had been struggling to make himself popular as the champion of enlightenment and the friend of the German scholars, became the object of universal detestation. The Estates were not to be carried by storm, but cautiously appointed a committee to draft an answer to the Pope. Of the members of this committee only two jurists were on Luther’s side; but their dexterity as draftsmen enabled them to exercise considerable influence, and the resolute attitude of the burghers of Nurnberg backed up their suggestion for a compromise, which, while expressing agreement with the Pope’s objects, regretted that the condition of Germany did not admit of the rigorous enforcement of the Edict of Worms, and advised the Pope to carry out his projected reform and submit the Lutheran question to the decision of a Council. The drafting of this compromise fell into the hands of the Lutheran jurists, who skillfully managed to give a color in accordance with their own opinions, while they cautiously expressed in vague terms the general purport of the resolutions.

When this document was submitted to the Diet on January 19, it gave great offence to the Pope’s partisans, and caused much discussion both there and in the Council of Government. There was no alternative but to accept it substantially as it was, or to agree to the Pope's request, which the majority thought to be impossible. The draft was amended, and many clauses were omitted; but though each amendment seemed to be a triumph to the Papal party, they did not materially alter the tone of the document, which was at last adopted and given to Chieregato on February 5.
An answer was given in detail to the Pope’s letter. It expressed the joy of Germany in seeing a German Pope, and thanked Adrian for his labours for peace and the defence of Christendom against the Turk. They regretted the confusion caused in Germany by the Lutheran sect, but while admitting the duty of obedience to the Pope and the Emperor, had hitherto refrained from carrying out the sentence against Luther through fear that worse evils might ensue. For the German people had long been persuaded, and now by Luther's books and teaching were convinced, that the German nation was suffering from oppression by the Roman Court; and any attempt to put down Luther by force would seem to be an attack on the freedom of the Gospel, a defence of abuses and impurity, and would lead to civil war. The Pope himself had admitted the existence of evils in the Curia, and had undertaken to amend them; Germany hoped for peace from his success. It was impoverished by the payment of annates: if the sums collected under that name had been applied to the defence of Christendom, the Turk would not now be an object of dread; they trusted that the Pope would grant annates to the imperial treasury, for the purpose of restoring peace and order in Germany. Many matters required discussion beside Luther's opinions. They advised that the Pope, with the consent of the Emperor, should summon a free Christian Council at Strasbourg, Mainz, Koln, Metz, or some other convenient place in Germany, within a year at least; and that at such Council all who ought to be present, clerks and laymen alike, should be charged to speak their opinions freely, and say, not what was pleasant, but what was true. Meanwhile they would order the Elector of Saxony not to allow the publication of Lutheran books, and would command all preachers to refrain from saying anything which might stir the people to rebellion, and preach nothing save the pure Gospel and approved Scripture, according to the doctrine of the Christian Church. They would order all prelates to appoint learned men, who should correct and admonish erring preachers, and would establish a general censorship of the press. By this means quiet would be maintained till the Pope was able to formulate his reforms and summon a Council. Regarding the Pope's complaints that monks had left their monasteries and priests had taken wives, these were not matters which came under the cognizance of the civil laws; but they would order that no one should hinder ordinaries from dealing with such cases according to ecclesiastical law, and where necessary would help in punishing offenders.

Chieregato, on receiving this answer, expressed the dissatisfaction which the Pope and the Emperor would feel that their decrees were not to be executed. If Luther had erred before the Diet of Worms, much more had he erred since; and the suspension of his punishment would prove disastrous. After these general remarks he turned to the specific proposals of the Diet. The request for a grant of annates must be reserved for the Pope's decision. The proposal of a Council would not be displeasing to the Pope; but his hands ought not to be tied by limitations of place, or of the imperial concurrence, or the mode of conducting business. He gave it as his opinion that all preachers should be required to obtain an episcopal licence, that no books should be published unless they had episcopal sanction, and that clerical offenders against the discipline of the Church should be punished only by ecclesiastical, and not by temporal, authorities. The Diet declined to discuss the matter further; and on March 6 an edict was issued which embodied the conclusions expressed in the answer to the Pope.

Luther was satisfied with the proceedings of the Diet, which recognized that it was impossible to carry out the decree of Worms. It was true that the Diet still condemned his opinions, and showed no signs of breaking with the Pope. Its general
temper was shown by the fact that the lay Estates brought forward the 'Hundred Grievances of the German Nation' against the Papacy. They thought that the opportunity was ripe for redressing the wrongs which had been long acknowledged, and they sent to the reforming Pope a statement of German grievances. But this was no token of sympathy with Luther’s opinions, which were admitted to be dangerous. The real result of the Diet of Nurnberg was the admission that the Lutheran question had entered into a political stage. It could not be stamped out by authority, or suppressed by force: it must be recognized as a powerful element in the life of Germany, and some solution must be found for the issues which it had raised.

Luther was free from persecution, just because the religious question had ceased to be of prime importance in Germany. National unity scarcely existed in political life. The German kingdom had been dissolved into a confederacy of States and classes, which were each struggling for their separate interests. The Emperor was a mere titular head; and men became increasingly conscious that there was no real reason why the Pope should not share his fate. The German princes had ceased to adventure life or money for the preservation of the imperial rights; why should they trouble themselves to uphold the rights of the Pope? Other matters needed their immediate attention.

Sickingen was in arms, and his success would unite around him the whole body of the knights. The Pfalzgraf, the Elector of Trier, and the Landgraf of Hesse were engaged in planning a campaign against him, which led to his overthrow in May. There were mutterings of discontent amongst the peasantry; and it was clear that the old system of Germany was passing through a crisis. Every one's care was how to guard his own interests, and it was not yet manifest how they were to be protected by close alliance with the Pope. The German bishops were regarded as landholders rather than spiritual personages: who could say what might be gained by a readjustment of their domains?

Everyone was undecided, except the followers of Luther, who eagerly caught at their master's teaching of evangelical freedom, who studied the Scriptures in the translation which he provided for them, and put the clergy to silence by their superior knowledge of the groundwork of the Christian faith. As a practical matter their suppression would be the most difficult task to undertake. It were wisest to leave that to the Pope and wait for the result.

The proposal of a Council to discuss the affairs of Germany was in itself a fair one; and had Adrian lived long enough to disentangle himself from the political web in which he was enclosed, it might have been held, before the religious antagonism had become too pronounced. But Leo X had so hopelessly involved the Papacy in secular politics that Adrian, with the best intentions to apply himself to the religious duties of his office, found them in practice thrust into the second place. It was useless for him to negotiate with Charles about a Council while Charles saw in him only a necessary ally for his war against France, and was using all his energies to force him into a political league.

Adrian vainly hoped that the shock of a great disaster might unite Christendom against its common foe. In the middle of February, 1523, the news reached Rome that Rhodes had fallen before the Turkish arms. Adrian was greatly distressed, renewed his exhortations to peace, and proffered his services as a mediator. Charles V wrote that he would willingly shed his blood to recover Rhodes, but added that, if the Pope had granted him the favors which his predecessors had never refused, the danger might have been averted. This was tantamount to saying that no Christian prince would think of the
interests of Christendom, unless the Pope adopted his political plans and allowed him to tax his clergy at his will; if he refused, he must take the consequences and bear all the blame. It was hard for Adrian to withstand his former pupil, to whom he was bound by so many ties; still harder was it for him to feel that his struggle to do his duty was useless, and that his efforts to pacify Christendom were only used as an excuse for all disasters.

Moreover, Adrian suffered much from petty annoyances, due to the hostility of Juan Manuel, who, in violation of a safe-conduct, seized a ship containing the servants and baggage of the Cardinal of Auch, the ambassador of Francis I to the Pope. Still worse was it when Prospero Colonna, at his instigation, captured the Castle of S. Giovanni in the district of Piacenza, which was claimed as a possession of the States of the Church. The Pope sent for the Spanish ambassador, and told him with passionate gestures that he was only withheld from making a league with France by his personal affections for the Emperor: he threatened to excommunicate Manuel and Prospero Colonna. Charles found it necessary to apologize for the excessive zeal of his minister, but blamed the Pope's display of anger, and pleaded the necessity of his political position.

If Adrian hoped more from the pacific intentions of the French king, than of the Emperor, he soon was disappointed. At the end of March, Francis wrote that he could not war against the Turk till he had recovered Milan; war was imminent, and a truce was useless, as it would only give the belligerents time to make greater preparations. This answer to his entreaties plunged the Pope into grief and perplexity. He summoned the Cardinals Soderini, Fiesco, Monte, and Colonna, and asked their advice. Soderini and Fiesco recommended him to continue his policy of neutrality; Monte was doubtful: Colonna gave his vote for an alliance with the Emperor. Everything that passed in the Papal chamber was at once known to the Spanish ambassador, who made use of the opportunity to renew his proposals. But though Adrian might waver about the possibility of maintaining his neutrality, he was true to his principles, till an unexpected discovery showed him his danger. The watchful Spaniards carefully observed the smallest actions of the Pope and his advisers. They disliked the growing influence of Cardinal Soderini, who was known to hope for vengeance on the Medici through the help of France. His doings were spied, and it was discovered that he was carrying on correspondence with some friends in the realm of Naples. In the middle of April, a Sicilian noble was seized, when on the point of leaving Rome, and was found to be the bearer of letters from Soderini to the French king. They contained an account of a plot to raise a rebellion in Sicily; all was ready, if Francis would send some ships to help the insurgents. This rising would necessitate the withdrawal of the Spanish troops from North Italy; and Francis could then send his forces to occupy the unprotected territory of Milan.

When the Pope was informed of this discovery he summoned Cardinal Medici from Florence to aid him with his counsel, Adrian was deeply distressed. He had given his confidence to Soderini, and believed that he sympathized with his desire for peace. Now he found him concocting a scheme which would precipitate war and plunge all Italy into confusion. Medici's advice was soon given. On April 27, Soderini was summoned to the Pope, and was committed to the Castle of S. Angelo. His confederates in Sicily were pursued by the Viceroy, and suffered condign punishment. Charles V, pressed for Soderini’s execution, and could triumphantly point to this discovery of French intrigues as a justification of his own opinion, that European peace was
impossible so long as French ambition remained unchecked. Adrian vainly strove to escape from this conclusion. Francis I had grossly deceived him, and strove to cloak the detection of his perfidy by complaints against the Pope's partisanship for Spain. Henry VIII and Charles V made a closer alliance, and drew up the details of a joint attack upon France. Their ambassadors were busy at the Papal Court, There were alarming rumours of an impending invasion of Italy by the French, Francis wrote to the Pope an angry letter in which he recounted all his grievances. He had striven for peace, and was still willing for peace on reasonable terms; but a truce for three years and war against the Turk, as the Pope proposed, was only a pretext for helping his adversaries, to whom the Pope granted tenths of Church goods which he refused to himself. Adrian had no longer any room to doubt that, if Francis were successful in his invasion of Northern Italy, the Papal States would not be safe. There were many grave reasons which had weighed with him hitherto to keep on good terms with Francis—the fear of loss of revenues from France, the dread of driving Francis to make common cause with the Lutherans, and his own poverty. But these motives were not strong enough to withstand the possibility of a victorious army crossing the Papal frontier. Adrian bowed his head before the supposed necessities of his position. On July 29 he held a Consistory, in which a letter of Francis to the Cardinals was read. The French party found it difficult to justify their position; and when the Pope announced his intention to enter the league against France, only four of the twenty-eight Cardinals present voted against the proposal. Emboldened by the fact that Venice had entered the league, the Pope submitted to necessity, and on August 4 signed a defensive league with the Emperor, England, Milan, Florence, Genoa, Siena, and Lucca.

This event was celebrated by a solemn service in the Church of S. Maria Maggiore. Adrian, who was suffering from the oppressive heat of the summer, was much fatigued by the exertion. On his return to the Vatican he complained of feeling ill, and soon was attacked by rheumatism. Other complications followed, and early in September it became clear that his condition was precarious. On September 8, he summoned the Cardinals to his deathbed; but many of them did not even deign to obey the summons of a dying Pope. Adrian asked them to reward with benefices the clerical members of his household, and proposed to confer on his trusted friend, Enkenvoert, a Cardinal's hat; but many voices were raised in opposition.

There was now no reason for disguising the fact that Adrian and his Flemish favorites commanded no one's sympathy. The Pope sadly dismissed the Cardinals; and his last days were embittered with the thought that all his labors would soon be undone. On the 10th he so far rallied as to summon a Consistory, in which he created Enkenvoert a Cardinal, and conferred bishoprics upon a few of his friends. He took such precautions as he could for the future, by ordering the captain of the Castle of S. Angelo not to release Cardinal Soderini from prison. On the 14th it was obvious that his last hour had come. The Cardinals hastened to the dying man, not to receive his last charges about the welfare of the Church, but to demand where he had hidden his treasure. They were so ignorant of the true condition of the Papal finances that they imagined Adrian's simple life to be due to greed; and they urged him to reveal his hoard. It was in vain that he told them that all his possessions were a thousand ducats: with growing anger they returned to their examination, and treated the dying Pope as though he were a criminal on the rack. The Duke of Sessa had to interfere to put an end to this hideous scene. The Cardinals reluctantly withdrew; and at one o'clock in the afternoon Adrian passed away, un lamented save by Enkenvoert and the few servants of his household. The Cardinals
did not conceal their satisfaction to be rid of a severe master. The dispossessed officials rejoiced at the thought of the restoration of the good old times. The Roman people were glad to be rid of a morose foreigner, who showed them little sympathy, and with brutal frivolity expressed their feelings by hanging a wreath on the door of Adrian's physician, inscribed: "To the deliverer of his country". All that could be said of Adrian's pontificate was expressed in the inscription on his temporary tomb: “Here lies Adrian VI, who thought nothing in his life more unfortunate than that he became Pope”.

Nor did Adrian's misfortunes cease with his death. Ill-luck pursued his memory by depriving posterity of most of the materials for judging of his aims. One of his Flemish secretaries, Dietrich Hezius, grudged ungrateful Rome the possession of the records of one whom it so little understood. He bore away to Louvain all Adrian's papers. Clement VII vainly tried to recover them, and even offered Hezius a Cardinal's hat if he would take up his residence in Rome. But Hezius was not to be won, and Adrian’s papers were lost to the Papal archives. The records that remain give us, for the most part, the testimonies of men who were not sympathetic with Adrian’s aims; and we have not the means of learning from his own pen what were his exact intentions, while the shortness of his pontificate prevented him from giving them very definite expression in practice.

Adrian clearly saw that, if the Papacy was to renew its vigor and grapple with the difficulties that beset its path, it must rise above the political entanglement in which the secular aims of his predecessors for the last half-century had involved it. He strove to free himself of his previous relation to the Emperor, to take up a neutral position, and promote peace. At the same time he saw the absolute necessity for a reform of the Church, if Germany was to be pacified and the Papal allegiance was to be maintained. Either of these objects might have been pursued separately with some measure of success. The difficulty of Adrian’s position lay in the necessity of pursuing them both at once. It was to no purpose that he strove to put reform in the first place; political questions asserted their predominance. It is difficult at the present day to enter into the point of view of Adrian's contemporaries. To us the religious revolution is a matter of supreme importance, round which all else centres. In Adrian's day it was a mere episode; and the European question, which drew all else into its sphere, was the strife of Charles and Francis for supremacy. Adrian had the wisdom to see that contemporary opinion was wrong, that the advantages to be gained by either side in the combat, which both ardently longed for, would not be lasting or important. His only chance of diverting attention from a false issue was to raise in a peremptory way the true issue. This again Adrian decidedly felt; but he lacked the knowledge, the experience, and the sympathy with his time which were necessary for decisive action. His mind had not been influenced by the new ideas; and his course of life had habituated him to the prevalent conceptions of politics. It was something that he was still able to look beyond them, and see that they could not hope to possess the future. But he had not the boldness of a constructive genius; and he did not venture to act up to his beliefs, and put great projects in the first place. There was no way out of the political and religious difficulties which beset him except by a General Council; only by that means was it possible for the Papacy to make a new departure. If Adrian had at the beginning of his pontificate announced his intention to devote his energies entirely to that end, he would have greatly strengthened the moderate party in Germany, would have taken the only practical step to make good his political neutrality, and would have won for the Papacy a position outside the transient changes of current politics. Without this guarantee of sincerity, his interference in Germany, despite his well-meant promises, could only rest
on the old claims of authority and the old remedy of repression. Without some such alternative, his attempt at political neutrality could only wear the appearance of timidity and vacillation. Adrian went so far in his boldness, that it would have cost him little to have been bolder. As it was, he irritated and alarmed every interest, while he gained no allies and awakened no enthusiasm. He appealed for confidence on the strength of his good intentions, which he frankly admitted must await a convenient season for their execution. No one paid much heed to him; for it was clear that he was old and was wanting in energy, and that his successor would be animated by a different spirit.

Yet Adrian was undoubtedly sincere in his wish for a genuine reformation on conservative lines; and his pontificate serves to show the hopelessness of such an undertaking through the Papacy. With every desire to proceed, Adrian could not find a starting-point. A personal revival of simplicity of life was of little moment as an answer to complaints. The reduction of the Curia did not impress men's imagination, so much as did the magnificence of Wolsey or Albert of Mainz. No personal action of the Pope was likely to affect the Papal system, unless it was directed against the principles on which that system had been reared into theoretic absolutism and practical impotence. Adrian could only contemplate the powerlessness to which he was condemned by his lofty position; he had not the courage to break through the meshes in which he was entangled. He left the Papal office unchanged, doomed to face greater indignities, and meet with irreparable losses, before it could again gather round it the zeal of a remnant of its former adherents—a zeal inspired by the success of a revolt which menaced the very foundations of the Church.

Thus Adrian is a pathetic figure in the annals of the Papacy. A man whose very virtues were vain, because he had not the force to clothe his ideas with such a form that they appealed to men's imagination. He was incapable alike of a dramatic act and of an incisive utterance. He had no power to arrest attention. He did not know how to combine simplicity with dignity. He carried out his reforms in such a way that they seemed to be due to personal moroseness and avarice, rather than to high principle. He had no impressiveness, no fire, no attractiveness. The cynical diplomats, and self-seeking ecclesiastics, who were around him were never moved, even for a moment, by any consciousness that they stood before a man whose life was built higher than their own. Nay, they did not show any sense that they were dealing with one who was outside the reach of their calculations. To Juan Manuel and the Duke of Sessa, Adrian was only a tedious irresolute man, who had to be alternately humored and squeezed. They saw that, if he did act at all, he must act according to the wishes of the Emperor. The fatal defect of Adrian was his inability to put forward any positive policy. All that he could do was to raise a barren protest, which created no sympathy on any side.

Indeed the sight of an ailing Pope, who shut himself up in the Vatican with a few menial attendants, who was always immersed in business without ever coming to a definite conclusion, was not calculated to arouse enthusiasm. The Spaniards mocked at the Pope's Flemish counselors, and believed any stories against their characters. Enkenvoert was accused of secret profligacy, and was said to be in the hands of a Roman chamberlain who acted as his pander. Charles ordered his ambassador to bribe Adrian's advisers with promises of benefices, to warn them that the Pope was not likely to live long, and that if they displeased the Emperor he would assuredly punish them after the Pope's death. Other ambassadors were irritated at Adrian's vacillation. Hieronimo Balbo, who came from the Archduke Ferdinand, after listening to Adrian's
confused utterances before a Consistory, exclaimed: “Holy Father, Fabius Maximus saved Rome by delaying; but you by delaying will destroy both Rome and Europe”.

Nor was Adrian more fortunate in Rome itself, where he did nothing to mollify the people, who were naturally unable to understand the parsimony which was necessary after Leo's bankruptcy. The statue of Pasquill was covered with lampoons, and Adrian angrily ordered it to be thrown into the Tiber. It was only saved by the wit of an official who shook his head and said: “Pasquil, like a frog, will find his voice even in the water”. “Let him be burned then”, cried Adrian. “Nay”, was the answer, “a burned poet will not want adherents, who will crown the ashes of their patron with malicious songs and hold solemn commemorations on the place of his martyrdom”. Adrian saw that it was useless to contend against established custom. He made no attempt to understand his Roman subjects and remained in their eyes an alien.

Even his efforts to give emphasis to his desire to reform the Curia wore a ludicrous aspect. The dismissed officials of the Papal Court only laughed bitterly when they saw the Pope meting out the same measure to his German friends, many of whom came on foot to Rome, and were rewarded with a woolen cloak and a scanty allowance for their journey back. A young relative of the Pope, who was studying at Siena, received a reproof for interrupting his studies to come to Rome, and was sent back on a hired hackney. Men would have liked Adrian better if he had not seemed so cold and pedantic.

In fact Adrian did not understand the world in which his lot was cast, nor did he grasp the meaning of the problems which he attempted to solve. He thought that it was possible to sweep away the past in a moment, and restore the Papacy merely by his own action. His predecessors had been Italian princes: he would act as became the spiritual head of Christendom. He forgot that the old-fashioned conception of a Pope, which he strove to restore, had entirely faded from men's minds; and his revival was only a caricature. The Papacy had become a factor in European politics; he could not rescue it by asserting his desire for European peace and raising the old cry of a crusade. There was no way of escape except by retracing the steps of his predecessors. Similarly, he found that the assertion of Papal absolutism was no longer sufficient to stamp out the cry of reform. He tried to win back the German rebels by promising reform, without any revision of the system by which the old abuses had been fostered. An old and feeble man without resources, without a party, without a policy, he hoped to convince a stubborn and distracted world by the mere force of an example of primitive piety, to which he could give no other expression than a solitary life within the walls of the Vatican, and the canonization of two German bishops.
CHAPTER VIII.
BEGINNINGS OF CLEMENT VII.
1523-1526.

The election of Adrian’s successor in the Papacy was treated by every one as purely a question of politics. Charles V was prepared for the news of a vacancy, and had ordered the Duke of Sessa to promote the election of Cardinal Medici. It was true that he was pledged to Wolsey, who did not fail to remind him of the fact; but the Duke of Sessa knew how to make a public show of zeal in Wolsey’s behalf, while secretly acting for Medici. Indeed Wolsey’s election was out of the question. The Cardinals were only too conscious that they had made a mistake in electing a stranger two years ago, and were not likely to repeat the dangerous experiment; had they wished it, the temper of the Roman people was sufficient to deter them. No one in Rome doubted that the new Pope would be chosen from those present in the Conclave, and would be chosen because every one thought that he would be able to manage him. The French party, though not decided on their candidate, were resolute in opposing Medici; and a trial of strength took place on the question of releasing Soderini from prison, Adrian on his deathbed had ordered him to be kept in confinement; but neither the wishes of the dead Pope, nor the opposition of Medici, weighed with the Cardinals, and Soderini was released on September 21.

On October 1, the thirty-five Cardinals who were in Rome entered the Conclave. Their first business was to provide money for the Swiss guards, and to draw up the usual capitulations. On the 3rd came the news that the Duke of Ferrara had seized Reggio and was proceeding to attack Modena. Something must be done to prevent this loss to the Papal States; so a loan for the payment of troops was negotiated with the Roman bankers, standing on the threshold of the Conclave Chamber. On the 5th came letters announcing that the three French Cardinals had landed at Piombino; next day they arrived in Rome, and hastened to join their brethren, booted and spurred as they were, without changing their travelling dress for ecclesiastical attire. The Cardinals were glad to have these pretenses for delay. It was not till the 9th that the first scrutiny took place.

The state of parties in the Conclave made an election difficult. Nineteen Cardinals, headed by Colonna and Soderini, had bound themselves to oppose Medici; against them were some fourteen Cardinals of Leo’s creation who were equally resolute in his favor. As was usual, the political parties were traversed by the strife between juniors and seniors. The younger Cardinals had a definite candidate; while each of the seniors thought that, if Medici were worsted, he himself had a good chance of election. Accordingly at first there was no definite policy, and the Roman people were perturbed at the waste of time. On the 8th the food of the Cardinals was reduced to one dish. On the 10th the city magistrates exhorted the Cardinals not to delay. They were answered by Cardinal Armellino that the one wish of the Cardinals was to please the Roman people; if pressure were used, its result might be the election of an absentee. This threat was enough: the magistrates implored that one of those present should be elected, and withdrew. However, their representation had some weight, and on the 12th an attempt
was made to agree on Cardinal Monte. Medici promised that, if he obtained eighteen votes, he would give him three accessions from his party. On a scrutiny Monte received sixteen votes, and three others of the seniors immediately acceded to him. He turned to Medici to fulfill his promise; but Medici explained that he meant eighteen votes in the first instance, and could not count the accessions as coming within the bargain. This was regarded as sharp practice, and the seniors were greatly incensed against Medici. For some days no progress was made. Medici proposed a compromise, either that the seniors should elect a junior, or that the juniors should elect a senior; but the seniors refused to have any dealings with the juniors at all.

In this period of mutual irritation, Alberto Pio, Count of Carpi, who had come to Rome as ambassador of Francis I, undertook to mediate. Pio was an old friend of Medici and knew his yielding character; he was of opinion that Medici's election would be as much in the interest of France as that of any other possible candidate, and he advised accordingly. The Conclave was only in name secluded from the outer world. Communications were freely introduced, and Carpi's influence gradually began to tell; on October 29 he had an audience with the Cardinals and besought them to hasten their election.

On November 3 there was an attempt to reach a compromise. Eleven votes were given for Cardinal Fiesco, and ten for Jacobazzi. The imperialists were inclined to unite in favour of Jacobazzi, who received six accessions; but the French party refused to accept him. After this there was another pause; till on November 11 the magistrates threatened to reduce the Cardinals to a diet of bread and water. Next day the Cardinal of Ivrea, who had been detained by illness, was allowed to enter the Conclave, making the total number of voters thirty-nine.

Cardinal Farnese had been quietly waiting his time, and now made an offer to the Duke of Sessa. Medici, he pointed out, had been accepted by the Count of Carpi, and was not to be trusted; if Sessa would only transfer the imperialists' votes to himself, he offered 200,000 ducats and a Cardinalate for his brother. Some attention seems to have been given to this proposal; for on November 17 Colonna suddenly proposed Farnese, who was objected to by the seniors on moral, as well as on political, grounds. Probably Colonna wished for an occasion of breaking up his party; for he took offence at their decision and retired, exclaiming: “Let each one henceforth act for himself”. This was certainly his own policy; for he made an agreement to support Medici, in return for the office of Vice-Chancellor and the Riario Palace.

The night was spent in conferences with some of the wavering seniors, till twenty-one votes were secured, and a shout was raised: “Cardinal Medici is Pope!”. The final decision was delayed till the morning, when Colonna summoned the seniors to the chapel, while Medici and his party waited in another room. After three hours spent in stormy debate, Cardinal Pisano came out and embraced Medici, saying: “You are Pope; come into the chapel!”. When he entered with his friends the senior Cardinals rose to greet him, and Carvajal, as Dean, said: “All these Cardinals are content that you should be Pope, and calling on the name of the Holy Spirit we elect you”. Thus Medici was elected by inspiration, and accepted his election, promising to do his best to satisfy God, the Holy See, and the Cardinals, whom, as universal father, he would regard as his sons. He received the accustomed signs of homage and was placed in the Papal chair. He chose the name of Clement VII and exercised his new office by signing some petitions.
No sooner was the election made than some doubts were raised about its formality, as no mass had been said, and the hour was late. It was agreed that the election was valid, but that the customary formalities should be duly performed next morning, and that the new Pope should secure himself against any change of purpose by a formal protest. Notaries were summoned; the protest was duly drawn out, and read next morning before mass was celebrated. Then a scrutiny was held and Medici was unanimously elected. His first act was to subscribe the capitulations drawn up in the Conclave, with the reservation that, if they were contradictory or inconsistent, they might be interpreted or limited in a Consistory.

The election of Cardinal Medici was unexpected, as everyone thought that the long delay signified his exclusion. In fact the election was entirely due to Colonna's change of attitude, and Medici’s fair promises. He promised before the Cardinals to restore Soderini to all his possessions; and he divided by lot among the members of the College the benefices which he held; it was calculated that this division would yield a thousand ducats to each. The Roman people were delighted at the prospect of a restoration of the good old days of Leo X, “a flourishing Court and a brave pontificate”. Never had there been such a crowd, never such plaudits, as at the coronation of Clement VII.

The disconsolate scholars plucked up fresh courage when it was known that the new Pope had appointed Sadoleto as his principal secretary. The only discordant voices were those of some discerning diplomatists, who thought that his holiness was not of a very resolute character and trusted too much to Giberti. It was natural that they should closely scrutinize the chief advisers of the Pope; and it soon became clear that his counselors reflected only too well the discord of Europe. Clement listened to two men, Giovan Matteo Giberti and Nicolas Schomberg. Giberti was the son of a Genoese ship-captain who had been taken as a boy into Cardinal Medici's household, and was a man of learning and piety. Schomberg was a native of Saxony, who while travelling in Italy had been converted by Savonarola's preaching and entered his convent. He became an adherent of the Medici, was brought to Rome as professor of theology by Leo X, and was made Archbishop of Capua. Giberti's political sympathies were with France, while Schomberg was an imperialist. The Pope's household was divided.

These, however, were the reflections of far-seeing men. At first all seemed bright and hopeful. The election of Clement meant a return to the intelligible procedure of Leo X. Cardinal Medici had been his cousin's chief adviser, and held in his hands the clue to his tortuous policy. He was well known to the statesmen of Europe, and his cleverness might be trusted to extricate the Papacy from its embarrassments. It was clear that Adrian's heroic measures were impossible. The knot could not be cut, and no one was more fitted tountie it than Clement. Already he had shown his dexterity in the circumstances of his election. At first the imperialist candidate, he was supported in the end by the French ambassador; he was favored by Venice; he was the one man whom the English king did not object to see preferred to Wolsey. The course of the election had been such that none of the Powers could claim to have had a decisive influence. Clement was untrammeled by any promises, and everyone was more or less satisfied. The Duke of Sessa wrote to the Emperor that the new Pope was entirely his creature, and that the Emperor’s power was so great that he could turn stones into obedient sons. But these expectations were soon disappointed, and it became clear that Clement was not going to commit himself unreservedly to the Emperor's cause. The Duke of Sessa had made an attempt, while the Conclave was still deliberating, to induce the Cardinals
to recognize the league as still in existence by contributing to the imperial forces as protectors of the Holy See. He received answer that the Cardinals were intent solely on the election of a Pope they could not determine how far the political obligations of the late Pope were binding on them, but must leave that for the decision of his successor: it was, however, the duty of all Christian princes to protect the possessions of the Holy See against the attacks of the Duke of Ferrara, and they regretted that had not been done more effectually. The question which had thus been reserved for the Pope's decision was at once urgent, and Clement had to face his relations towards the league. He showed himself, to the disappointment of the Duke of Sessa, a true Medici, who sought every occasion for temporizing. John Clerk, Bishop of Bath and Wells, the English ambassador at Rome, soon gave it as his opinion that "there is as much craft and policy in him as in any man". Clement VII was not so good an imperialist as had been Cardinal Medici. He had scruples as Pope about ratifying the league which he had furthered as a Cardinal.

Of course Clement did not propose to withdraw from the league; he only pointed out that as Pope he ought not to take up a hostile attitude to any Christian neutrality. Power without good cause; indeed the capitulations which he had signed in the Conclave bound him to promote peace; if he were conciliatory at first towards Francis, he could help the Emperor all the more effectively when he ultimately declared himself in his behalf. At the same time he professed himself willing to act up to Adrian's obligations, and raised the sum of 20,000 ducats, which he contributed, under a pledge of strict secrecy, to the payment of the forces of the league. But these protestations did not deceive any one. Already, in February, 1524, the Duke of Sessa warned the Emperor not to count on Clement's gratitude: he was weak and irresolute, and was coquetting with France. Really he was striving to forecast the future, and doubted about the success of the league.

The campaign which had been planned for the autumn of 1523 had led to no results. France was to have been curbed by a joint invasion of English and Flemings in the north, of the Spaniards in the south, and by the rising of the Duke of Bourbon in the centre. All these had been tried. Francis had been taken unawares; but none of the expeditions had succeeded, and the French army still maintained itself in the Milanese. Clement feared that Charles' resources would not hold out, that Henry would grow weary of paying for a war which brought neither glory nor profit, and would make peace. He frankly said that he was ready to join the league if he saw a chance of France being ruined; if that was not soon accomplished, it were better to make peace before the resources of the allies were entirely exhausted; and he was willing to use his good offices for that purpose. As a means of gaining time Clement sent Schomberg to treat of peace between Francis, Henry, and Charles. The Duke of Sessa urged that Schomberg should go from France to England, and should report to the Emperor last of all the conclusions to which the other parties were ready to consent. While this lengthy negotiation was being conducted, Clement might plausibly refuse to move from his neutral position, and could watch more carefully the chances of the future. All depended upon England being willing to furnish Charles with money.

But while Clement waited before committing himself in Italian politics, he knew the importance of the German revolt and was desirous to bring it to a speedy issue. The inconclusive Diet of 1523 had parted to meet again the next year, and Clement lost no time in choosing a legate who might plead his cause. His choice fell upon Lorenzo Campeggio, who had been an auditor of the Rota, then nuncio to Maximilian, for which
service he had been made Cardinal by Leo X, who afterwards employed him as legate to England, and Clement conferred on him the Bishopric of Bologna. Campeggio was a capable official, but not a man of much character. He stipulated before going that he should receive 2000 ducats for his expenses, and that in case he died on the legation, the Pope should give the Bishopric of Bologna to his son, and provide a husband for his daughter. He set out on February 1, and made his way directly to Nurnberg. On his journey he was painfully reminded of the growth of anti-Papal feeling in the German cities. When he entered Augsburg as legate and gave his benediction to the assembled throng, he was greeted with jeers and insults. On his approach to Nurnberg on March 16 he was met by many of the princes, who advised him, if he did not wish for a repetition of the same scene, to enter the city in his travelling dress, without any show of ecclesiastical pomp. The legate rode past the Church of S. Sebald, where the clergy were assembled, but had not dared to make a procession through the street, and sought refuge disconsolately in his inn. It was indeed a significant fact that the German princes had to acquiesce in laying aside the customary tokens of respect for the Papal authority. Still more significant was it that, on Maundy Thursday, 3000 people communicated under both kinds; amongst them Isabella, Queen of Denmark, the Emperor's sister.

It was no wonder that Campeggio did not find these conditions favourable to his eloquence. In fact his position was difficult; for the last Diet had listened to Adrian's promise of reform and had sent him a hundred grievances which they wished to see redressed. Campeggio might naturally be asked for some answer on the part of the Pope, and was instructed to say that, as the document had not been delivered to the legate, but sent after his departure, the death of Adrian had prevented any steps being taken; Clement, however, had seen some printed copies which had reached Rome, and was desirous of enforcing clerical discipline. Accordingly Campeggio, when he addressed the Diet, repeated his lesson with the greatest suavity; the Pope could not believe that the hundred grievances were really the work of the Estates of Germany, and was not prepared to discuss them; he only asked for the execution of the Edict of Worms, and wondered that it had not been more rigidly carried out already. There was much discussion in the Diet about the answer to be returned to the Pope. The majority were on the Papal side, but they had to consider what effect their utterance was likely to produce in the prevailing temper of the German people. Campeggio pressed for a simple renewal of the Edict of Worms, and was supported by the Archduke Ferdinand and the imperial Chancellor, Hannart. They so far succeeded that the recess of the Diet, drawn up on April 18, ran in the form of an enforcement of the orders brought by Hannart from the Emperor; in consequence of which the Diet concluded to carry out the Edict of Worms “as well as they were able, and as far as was possible”. Especially the part of the edict commanding the suppression of defamatory books was to be vigorously executed. Then the recess went on to say that, “lest the good be rooted up with the bad”", a General Council should be summoned as soon as possible in a convenient place in Germany. Further, an assembly of the German nation should meet at Speyer on S. Martin's Day to settle matters till such Council met. Meanwhile the Gospel and the Word of God was to be preached according to the interpretations of doctors received by the Church, without tumult or offence. The grievances presented at the last Diet were to be taken into consideration at Speyer and suggestions made for their redress.

How this particular form of compromise was arrived at is unknown; but it certainly was not fortunate. It aimed at pleasing everybody, but it pleased no one. It complied with the wishes of the Emperor and the Pope, for it reaffirmed the Edict of
Worms; but admitted that it was impossible to act upon it. It expressed the wishes of the moderate party by pointing to a General Council; but it set a National Assembly in the Council’s way. It recognized that there was some good in Luther's teaching; but it condemned him till the Assembly at Speyer had separated the wheat from the tares.

Campeggio was the first to express his disapprobation. He made answer to the Diet that he approved their affirmation of the Edict of Worms; to the clause, “that the good be not rooted up with the bad”, he strongly objected, as any good spoken by heretics was to be found free from error in approved writers; a General Council would require a long time to summon and must be left to the discretion of the Pope; the Assembly at Speyer would only lead to greater confusion and would spread heresy: its constitution would be impossible to settle, and it was absurd for Germany alone to discuss questions which concerned the Universal Church: as to the grievances of Germany, they should be laid before the Pope by chosen envoys, or discussed with himself as legate. When the Diet was unmoved by his remonstrances, Campeggio protested that he assented to nothing concerning the Council, or the German Assembly.

Clement was greatly aggrieved when he received an account of this impotent conclusion of the Diet, and wrote to Charles that the decree was a mere evasion, showing little respect to his commands, and the severe remedies should be applied to check the growing evil. The remedies desired in Rome were fourfold: the strict execution of the decree of Worms; the prevention of any examination of religious questions at Speyer, for which purpose the legate was to exhort all Catholic princes to protest against the proposed Assembly and absent themselves from its deliberations; the prevention of a Council, by the promise of reforms of the German grievances through a Congregation sitting at Rome; and the deposition of the Elector of Saxony as a terror to other rebellious princes. Such of these as it was expedient to lay before the Emperor were submitted to his consideration; and the Pope urged activity, not in his own, but in the Emperor’s interest; for a people greedy of novelty would soon throw off the yoke of subjection.

Further, Clement did his utmost to make the condition of Germany an international question. He wrote to Henry VIII, to Wolsey, on whom he had just conferred the English legateship for life, and to Francis I, committing to their consideration the grave dangers which threatened Christendom. He wished to bring the opinion of orthodox Europe to bear on the stubbornness of German heresy, and even suggested that this opinion should be decisively expressed. He advised that a demonstration should be made in London against the German merchants, and that the heads of the Steelyard should be threatened with a suppression of their trading privileges unless heresy were put down in the Hanse towns. At all events, Henry might exhort Charles to prohibit the meeting of the Assembly at Speyer, and in case his remonstrance was unheeded, should be prepared to send theologians who would protest against the claim of Germany alone to deal with matters concerning the Catholic faith.

Charles in the main agreed with the Pope, and was indignant at the little heed paid by the Diet to his commands. On July 15 he issued a decree which commanded strict obedience to the Edict of Worms, reproved the Estates for meddling with the matters of a Council which belonged only to the Pope, but said that he would move the Pope for that purpose, forbade absolutely the Assembly at Speyer, and denounced Luther as worse than Mahomet. At the same time, Charles informed the Pope that he was not sanguine of the success of his exhortation. Only two courses were open: either he must
go to Germany and punish the heretics, or a General Council must be summoned. It was impossible for him to go to Germany; he left the other alternative to the Pope. It might be well to anticipate the Assembly at Speyer by summoning a Council to meet at Trent in the next spring. The Germans counted Trent a German city, though it was really Italian. After meeting in Trent the Council might be transferred elsewhere—to Rome if the Pope thought fit.

It would have been well for Clement if he had listened to Charles’ advice. A Council summoned with an honest intention of reform might even yet have reduced the German movement within limits, and might have avoided a revolt. Clement certainly appreciated, better than Leo or Adrian, the gravity of the situation and the importance of the issue. There was no choice save between suppression and conciliation; and Charles told him frankly that he had neither time nor money for suppression. Clement was prepared for some measure of reform, and had commissioned Campeggio, if he found a general agreement among the princes to restrict their demands to a restoration of clerical discipline, to undertake the task and preside as legate over the deliberations of the Diet for that purpose. If, however, there was such disagreement that this proposal would only lead to further discussion, Campeggio was empowered to treat with the princes who were well disposed, and to associate with himself some of the German prelates. In accordance with this instruction Campeggio, on the appearance of the decree of the Diet, devised a scheme which should frustrate the Assembly at Speyer. He arranged a meeting at Regensburg, in the end of June, of those who were the chief opponents of the Lutheran movement, Archduke Ferdinand of Austria, the two Dukes of Bavaria, the Bishops of Trent, Augsburg, Bamberg, Speyer, Strassburg, Constance, Basel, Passau, and Brixen. Hitherto the question had been treated as a national question. This was the first definite step to organize a Papal opposition. It was taken, not as a mere measure of resistance, but as an effort at reform. Sixteen days were spent in deliberation; and Campeggio had to exercise all his tact and skill to reduce within proper bounds the demands even of the orthodox princes and prelates. The results were formulated on July 7. The legate declared that the spread of heresy was due partly to the specious offer of liberty, partly to the profligate life of the clergy, and partly to abuses in the regulations of the Church. As a first step to cutting away the ground from heresy the reform of the clergy was undertaken. Preachers were to be duly licensed by their bishops, and were to expound the Scriptures according to the ancient doctors; it was a great concession to the influence of the new theology that these were enumerated as Cyprian, Chrysostom, Ambrose, Jerome, Augustin, and Gregory. Clerical discipline was strictly enforced in dress and manner of life; all customs were to cease which might cause scandal. The grievances of the people at exactions of dues and fees for clerical services were redressed. The abuses of the preaching of Indulgences were checked. The holidays ordained by the Church were restricted to the great festivals. The use of excommunication and interdict for trivial matters was forbidden. At the same time the reading of Luther's books was prohibited, and students were not to attend the University of Wittenberg under pain of severe penalties. After this Campeggio passed on to Vienna, where he sanctioned Ferdinand’s efforts to put down Lutheranism by the execution of a few heretics.

This constitution was the first fruits of the conservative reformation, the beginning of the process afterwards carried on at the Council of Trent. It was for Clement to decide if that process should continue. Was the Pope prepared to listen to the Emperor, and in concert with him undertake a careful examination of the grievances of Germany?
Clement, however, was not ready to put the German question in the forefront of the Papal policy and make it the primary object of his activity. He even complained that Charles had admitted the possibility of summoning a Council; and Charles answered that he had done so with the best intentions, but left the matter in the Pope's hands. Clement did not conceal from himself the importance of conciliating Germany; but after all Italy was nearer than Germany, and the maintenance of the temporal power in Italy was more immediate than the restoration of the spiritual power in Germany. At first he hoped to combine the two objects, and his envoy, the Archbishop of Capua, vainly strove to make peace between the contending Princes of Europe. National jealousies were too strong to be appeased by representations of the dangerous advance of the Turk or of Luther. Moreover, the Pope might urge the good of Europe, but every one knew that he was seeking his own benefit as well. Clement was moved not only by the need of preserving the Papal States, but also Florence, where he sent as Governor the young son of his cousin Giuliano de' Medici, Alessandro, a boy of fourteen, under the care of the Cardinal of Cortona. Neither Francis, nor Charles, nor Henry paid much heed to the Pope's exhortations; they only sought for decent reasons to prove that war was inevitable, and that it was his interest to be on their side. Probably Clement had not much hope of preserving an attitude of neutrality, and merely wished to gain time. At all events he discovered beyond doubt that peace could not be restored by negotiations, but by the victory of one or other of the contending Powers. If Clement had wished for peace above all things, he would have seen that the best way to secure it was to throw his influence on the side of Charles. But this was too simple a course for the Medicean Pope. Clement hoped to hold back till he was sure to be on the winning side, or else by his skillful intrigues to bring about, what would have suited him best, a balance of power in Italy between the two. By adopting this policy he put the German question in the second place, and left its solution to the indefinite future. If Germany was to be pacified, it must be either by a Council or by imperial arms. For a Council, peace was necessary; for imperial intervention, Charles must be the victor over France. But Clement only wished for peace on the impossible basis of the existing state of things, and had no desire to see Charles a conqueror in Italy. He deliberately put the territorial interests of the Medici and of the Papal States above the interests of the Universal Church. The Curial party dreaded a Council, but thought that it might safely be proposed and discussed as a means of gaining time. The preliminary discussions would enable the Pope to take the matter into his own hands; and when he had thus made the Roman Court a centre of negotiations, he might escape a Council by illusory concessions.

However much Clement might wish for delay, the march of events dragged him to follow in their train. In April, Lannoy, the Viceroy of Naples, forced the French troops to abandon the Milanese; and Charles, delighted with this success, prevailed on Henry VIII to help him in carrying the war into France. The plan was carefully framed: Charles was to advance through Roussillon; the Duke of Bourbon was to invade France; and Henry was to make an onslaught on Picardy. But Charles delayed, and Henry waited till Bourbon had succeeded. Bourbon was successful in occupying Provence, but undertook in vain the siege of Marseilles; and meanwhile Francis was enabled to raise another army. At the end of September the imperial troops, abandoning the siege of Marseilles, retreated to Italy, whither it was Francis' turn to pursue. Milan welcomed him within its walls; all that the imperialists could do was to take refuge in the fortresses of Lodi and Pavia. On October 26 Francis laid siege to Pavia, and hoped after its capture to drive the Spaniards out of Naples.
In these circumstances it was natural for the Duke of Sessa to urge the Pope to declare himself on the Emperor's side; it would be fatal if the Emperor were to lose confidence in the Pope, at a time when the Church was threatened alike by Luther and the Turks. Clement answered that it would be suicidal for him to declare himself just then, and further, would not help the Emperor. He deplored his poverty, but said that he would try and secretly raise money for the payment of the imperial troops. Again he sent the Archbishop of Capua to Madrid to treat of peace, and also sent Giberti to advise Lannoy to withdraw southwards for the defence of Naples, and to urge Francis to rest content with the conquest of Milan. Giberti was obviously chosen for this mission because he was acceptable to the French; and the imperialists looked on the Pope's proceedings with growing alarm, saying that he would raise no money for them till he had seen if Pavia fell.

Lannoy listened unmoved to Giberti's exhortations. It was natural that the Pope should wish to exalt himself by arranging that Lombardy should belong to France and Naples to Spain: this was a simple method of securing Central Italy for the Church and the Medici. On November 10 Giberti passed from Lodi to Pavia, and found more scope for his diplomacy with Francis. In deep secrecy the terms of an alliance between France and the Papacy were discussed. The only soldier of the Medici family, Giovanni delle Bande Nere, as he was called, the representative of the younger line, entered the service of Francis. More significant still was the fact that, on November 17, Francis wrote to the Pope and asked permission for some of his troops, under the leadership of the Duke of Albany, to pass through the Papal States on their way to Naples. He explained that this was a tactical movement to draw Lannoy southwards for the protection of the kingdom. Clement seemed to hesitate, but Giberti strongly advised him to give way. The Duke of Sessa was astonished, and made strong representations to the Pope of the need in which he stood of Charles' friendship. He told him, truly enough, that no other Power in Europe could help him against Luther, the Turks, and the cry for a Council; he warned him that he had not much to expect from the friendship of either France or England. Clement gave evasive answers, and was so agitated at the responsibility of a decision that he fell ill. When Clerk, the English envoy, joined his remonstrances to those of the Duke of Sessa, Clement asked: “What would you have me do? The French are strong and I cannot resist them. The imperial army needs money and I have none to give. The Emperor is far off and cannot help me”. Clement tried to get all the advantages of neutrality; but thought that, if the imperialists won the day without his aid, he would have less to fear immediately from their anger than he would have to fear from Francis if, as seemed possible, the victory were to fall to him.

So Clement allowed the French troops to advance through the Papal States, on the ground that he dare not refuse: at the same time he promised to raise money for Charles. Then he sent his Chamberlain, Paolo Vettori, to propose to Lannoy an armistice, on the basis that the Milanese should be handed over to the Pope till negotiation had settled who was to be its master; otherwise he would be compelled to make terms with the French king, stipulating that the Emperor should also be included. Lannoy warned Clement to remember how Kings of France had treated former Popes, and refused to accept the terms offered. Meanwhile Giberti’s activity had already borne fruit in a league between Venice and France, under the Pope's security, which was made on December 12. The prospects of the imperial side suffered from this defection, but still more from the lack of money; and Lannoy began to despair. On December 22, he wrote to the Duke of Sessa that the Emperor had done enough to satisfy his honor in trying to
help Italy, which refused his help: he suggested that peace should be made, and Milan be delivered to the Pope as he proposed. At the beginning of January, 1525, Clement no longer disguised from the Duke of Sessa that a treaty with France was being drafted; and Sessa was almost in despair, because the English ambassador assured the Pope that England would lend no help to Charles in his Italian campaign. The Pope was so elated that he even said that, if he did what Francis asked him, he might receive from France Naples and other possessions.

When the league of the Pope with France was known, diplomatists naturally began to speculate on the possible consequences. Clerk, the English envoy, told him that he had been faithless to Henry and Charles: the English and Spanish peoples might resent this deception, and take some action against the Papacy which their princes could not restrain. Clement asked what he should do; and Clerk advised him to limit his treaty to the recognition of France in Milan. Clerk was of opinion that the Spanish Ministers, by their overbearing treatment of the Pope, had driven him into the arms of France. “If Clement succeeds in making a corresponding league with Charles to maintain him in Naples, and so makes a general peace, he will have done a great act; but”, he adds, “the Apostolic See hath ever feared too much friendship and concord between princes”; and he reported to Wolsey that Clement was as studious of his own particular as any living man, without any respect or regard to friend Lannoy wrote to Clement that he was imitating the father in the parable who killed the fatted calf at the return of his prodigal son, and rejoiced that he had gained two sons where before he had only one: he hoped that the Pope would justify his action by showing an equal love to both.

Charles could not restrain his anger when the news reached him. “The Pope”, he said, “knows that I was but a youth, scarce knowing what I did, when I entered on this war for him alone—for him, as he was the ruler of Pope Leo. I have lost money, men, and friends for his sake: I have risked my honor and even my soul. I could never have believed that the Pope would desert me. However, I do not despair, nor will I yield: I will go to Italy to seek my own, and I will take revenge on all who have wronged me, especially that poltroon of a Pope. Perhaps someday Martin Luther will become a man of worth”.

Clement must have quailed if these words were reported to him. It is true that Charles spoke in anger, and that his charge of ingratitude was not well founded; but he showed a temper that did not brook resistance, and a dogged obstinacy of purpose that boded ill for one who crossed his plans. The day was past when Giulio de' Medici could weave his dexterous intrigues without serious dread of a coming reckoning. It was a sad fact that Luther had gone far to show the Emperor that it was possible to dispense with a Pope, if need were.

To the Pope himself Charles wrote in milder terms; but Wolsey spoke out what Charles omitted to say. He wrote to Clerk that the Lutheran heresy made it necessary for the Pope to act wisely, lest Germany be estranged from the Church; and Germany’s example would greatly affect England. “I do not see”, he went on, “how it may stand with God’s will that the head of the Church should involve himself in war by joining with temporal princes. Since these leagues in the Pope’s name began, God hath sent affliction upon the Church and upon Christendom. Contentions to advance particular families have not furthered the Papal dignity”.

It was astonishing how much good advice, founded on lofty principles, the Pope received when he annoyed his confederates. The Curia had no longer the monopoly of
statecraft, the sole capacity for wrapping up self-interest in high-sounding phrases. The trick had been found out. Instead of delivering homilies, the Pope had to listen to them. Giberti could only humbly answer that, if the Pope deserved a reproof, he ought not to be threatened with Luther; even if the Pope had erred, that was no reason for taking revenge on the Christian faith.

In fact Clement’s joy at his French alliance was short-lived. Pavia still held out: Charles continued to raise money for Lannoy: German lanzknechts were crossing the Alps to reinforce the imperial army. Again Clement strove to make peace through his legate in Lombardy, Cardinal Salviati. Each day that deferred the expected fall of Pavia increased his terror; so that Giberti wrote on February 19: “I cannot tell you how great has been the Pope’s anxiety and suspense, now that the two armies are near one another. For though he greatly confides in the forces of the French king, still the love which he bears him cannot be without fear of the dangers which war brings with it. The desire which he always had to bring about some peace or truce, rather than risk everything on a battle, has greatly increased; and day and night his holiness hugs this thought”. Clement had thought himself quite safe in making a league with France; now that the prospects of success did not seem so certain, he tried to draw Francis back, after doing all he could to urge him to persevere. He had cast his little stake on the board where two gamesters were playing a high game: it was childish to hope that he could influence their play.

He had not long to await the issue. The imperial army, reinforced by 12,000 Germans, was almost equal to the French; and the generals, destitute of pay for their soldiers, could not afford to wait to spend time on scientific maneuvers for the relief of Pavia. On February 23 they had neither money nor provisions, and must either give battle or see the army disperse. They resolved to attack the next day, animated by the thought that it was the Emperor's birthday. Francis was prepared for the fight, and at first repulsed the assailants; but the Spanish forces under Pescara soon formed again, and were supported by the Germans under Frundsberg. The Swiss mercenaries of Francis were the first to give way. The Captain of Pavia poured his troops out of the city. The French army was hemmed in by its assailants, and the slaughter was terrible. Francis fought bravely, but was at last made prisoner. The victory of the imperialists was complete.

When the news was brought to Rome Clement was overwhelmed with consternation. His first terror was lest any letters, showing the extent of his agreement with Francis, should have fallen into the hands of Lannoy; but he was reassured by the friendly terms in which the victory was announced to him, as though he was still an ally of the Emperor. He soon felt, however, the effect of the shock which Italian politics had received. On all sides there were signs of the revival of old feuds and the rise of parties which had been suppressed. Rome itself was insecure. The Duke of Albany had slowly advanced through the Papal States, and the Colonna raised forces at Marino to protect Naples against his advance. Albany was the guest of the Orsini, and the two great Roman families renewed their ancient rivalry. The news from Pavia emboldened the Colonna to attack a band of the Orsini, who were pursued into Rome, where the fight continued in the Campo dei Fiori; so that Clement in alarm shut himself up in the Vatican. This threatening aspect of affairs was only partially put an end to by Albany’s withdrawal to the coast, whence he embarked for France. Nor was it only Rome that was disturbed. Florence was ready, if occasion offered, to rise against the Medici; and in
the Romagna Guicciardini reported that it would need only a very little to bring about a Ghibelline rising.

Clerk was the first to comfort the Pope by offering the mediation of England to check the undue arrogance of the Spaniards. Clerk took a statesman-like view of the situation. England had no interest in the extension of Charles’ power in Italy, but wished to gain something from Francis. If Charles pursued his victory in Italy, the Italian powers would be driven to combine against him; and he would be involved in a long and expensive war, which would prevent an attack on France. Clerk therefore told the Duke of Sessa that Henry VIII would not consent to any changes being made in Italy, and urged the renewal of the league between the Emperor, England, and the Pope. On the other hand Venice, and the Dukes of Ferrara and Urbino, offered to enter a league for the defence of Italy, if the Pope would declare himself as its head. If this plan were to succeed immediate action was necessary. But Clement was not a man for quick decision. He told Venice that he did not intend to make a league with Charles; and he sent to raise troops among the Swiss. Meanwhile he dreaded an open breach with the victorious Emperor, and was reassured by Lannoy’s frank admission that he was still without money to pay his forces, and needed the Pope's help for that purpose. So Clement dallied with both parties, and on March 19 took counsel with Clerk, who dissuaded him from the Italian league, on the ground that, even if the league were to succeed, the Papacy would be left one of the weaker Italian States, would have cut itself off from allies outside, and “many mean powers of Italy would plume its feathers”. Clement assented to this view of Papal patriotism, and thanked God who had put it in his mind to hesitate. He was content to trust Clerk's assurance that Henry would see that Charles used his victory with moderation, so far as Italy was concerned; in return he was willing to leave France to their mercy: Francis might be kept in prison and his eldest son declared king in his stead; Henry and Charles might help themselves to French territory, leaving the new king so plucked that his neighbors might live in peace. Clement had by this time come to the conclusion that the safest course for himself to pursue was to make an agreement with the imperialists, which would at least prevent them from plundering the Papal States. Accordingly on April 1 he proposed a treaty of alliance with the Emperor, who was to take under his protection the Pope, the house of Medici, and the city of Florence, and was within twenty days to withdraw his protection from all enemies of the Holy See. By another agreement, made with the Duke of Sessa, he undertook to furnish Lannoy with 100,000 ducats, to be repaid in case the treaty was not ratified within four months; and stipulated in return for the right to import salt from the Papal mines at Cervia into Milan, and for the restitution of the cities of Reggio and Rubiera which the Duke of Ferrara wrongfully occupied. At a great crisis in the fate of Italy Clement behaved like a huckster eager for small gains. The Italians judged him to be a man “of very faint heart and little will”.

The future did not depend upon the Pope, but upon the Emperor. He had met with unexpected success: could he use it so wisely as to escape the nemesis which attends good fortune? The first proceedings of Charles were singularly impressive. The news of the battle of Pavia reached him on March 10, as he was talking with some of his household in his palace at Madrid. For some moments he remained speechless, then he exclaimed: “The King of France is in my power, and we have won the day!” He withdrew to his chamber, and kneeling before a picture of the virgin which hung at the head of his bed, poured out his heart in prayer. Then he returned and asked to have the story told at length. The ambassadors and a crowd of Spanish nobles entered hastily to
offer their congratulations; but Charles’ face was unmoved, and he showed no signs of elation. He gave all the glory to God, and rejoiced only in the thought that now he could assure the peace of Christendom. But he soon showed that he was not so magnanimous as to forget the past. He said to the Venetian ambassador: “I could have wished that the Signory’s forces had joined mine, as was becoming”. He remarked to the Papal nuncio: “They tell me that the Pope gave passage to the Duke of Albany, who marched into the kingdom of Naples”. It was obvious that Charles expected Italy to obey him.

The hope to which Clement clung was that a disagreement would arise between Charles and his ally, Henry VIII; and every one eagerly watched their relations. Already before the news of the battle of Pavia, Henry had begun to weary of an alliance which had cost him large sums of money and had gained nothing. Two invasions of France had been unsuccessful, because Charles had not fulfilled his part in the joint undertaking. Henry grumbled; and Wolsey, who had never been in favor of the imperial alliance, began cautiously to make overtures to France. Perhaps in search of a pretext for a breach, he intercepted on February 11 the letters of the imperial envoy, De Praet, complained of their contents as insulting to the English king, and ordered De Praet to write no more; this violent act was done just before the battle of Pavia; and the news caused Wolsey to pause, while it rendered Charles easily placable. Wolsey did not wish to break with Charles, if anything was to be gained for England out of the victory; Charles did not wish to quarrel with England, which might become the head of an Italian league against him. The diplomatic struggle between Charles and Wolsey was keen, and Charles did his utmost not to commit himself, and so gain time. But it became apparent that his one object was to win from France the Burgundian possessions, and that he did not intend to imperil his chances by pressing the claims of his ally. In June Francis, at his own request, was carried off to Spain; but Charles was not to be moved by the sight of a king in captivity. Wolsey, meanwhile, despairing of any aid from the Emperor, determined at last to win from the helplessness of France a substantial price for an English alliance, and began negotiations for that purpose with Louise of Savoy, who acted as Regent.

Clement was anxiously looking on. At first he seemed satisfied with the imperial alliance, which was proclaimed on May 1. He even attended mass in the Church of SS. Apostoli, and was entertained at dinner in the Colonna Palace, to the great surprise of those around him, who wondered to see him enter an enemy's house. After dinner he looked through a window into the church, where the mob was engaged in climbing a pole with a pig on the top. It was the last time that such pagan revelry was carried on in a Roman Church, before the eyes of the bishop. Already popular opinion was beginning to be shocked at such profanity. In the Papal Court Giberti retired into the background, and Schomberg was Clement’s chief adviser. But though Clement submitted to what he regarded as inevitable, he groaned over his unhappy lot. On May 14 he confided his sorrows to Clerk; the imperialists had treated him cruelly; though he was driven to pay them 200,000 ducats, they still kept their troops in the lands of Piacenza and Bologna, where they had pillaged to the value of 200,000 ducats more; if he had been their foe, instead of their friend, he could not have fared worse. Clerk asked him to help in a projected invasion of France, which still kept a place in the diplomatic schemes of England. Clement answered that he was the common father of all Christian princes and could attack none of them; moreover his finances were exhausted. When Clerk pressed him further, he said that the continuance of war threatened the ruin of Christendom, as the condition of Germany only too clearly showed. The commons had risen in rebellion,
not only against the Christian faith, but against their lawful rulers. Nor was it only the commons who were rebellious. The Grand Master of the German Order, the knights who had conquered Prussia from the heathen and were still bound by their religious vows, had cast off his old allegiance. Albert of Brandenburg had been elected Grand Master in the hope that his family connections would enable him to defend the knights against Poland, which threatened to absorb their lands. But Albert had listened to Luther's teaching, and resolved to turn its lessons to practical account. In April he made an agreement with the King of Poland, by which he surrendered to him the lands of the order, and received them back as a Polish fief, granted to himself as Duke of Prussia, then to his brothers and their heirs. At the same time he married the daughter of the Polish king. The Bishop of Samland also declared himself a Lutheran and took a wife. The Lutheran movement was indeed leading to political and ecclesiastical dangers. Clement exhorted Clerk to use his influence with Henry VIII that he should mediate; for, he added, “if the wars continue, we shall see a new world shortly”.

Clement, as he sat cowering between two attempts to create a new world, was a truer prophet than perhaps he knew. On the one side Luther’s summons to found the life of the soul on freedom from outward authority threatened to overthrow the ecclesiastical system. On the other side Charles V was pursuing with cold persistency a course of territorial aggrandizement which, if successful, would reduce the Pope to the position of imperial chaplain. Whichever way Clement looked, the future was full of danger. The continuance of European war left Germany free to work out its own conclusions; but in his inmost heart Clement knew that he only complained of war when the Emperor was victor, and would welcome war in which the Emperor was defeated. The news from Germany was not altogether unpleasant. Ever since Luther's teaching began to be heard, the Popes had warned the German princes that the disregard for authority in things spiritual would lead to the downfall of authority in things secular as well. Their predictions seemed only too likely to be fulfilled. The discontent of the German peasantry with their hard lot found a justification and a basis for action in the teaching of the Lutheran preachers. Men who were urged to judge the lives and doings of their spiritual rulers naturally applied the same principles to judge their temporal rulers, and found the oppressors of their bodies at least as culpable as the oppressors of their souls. It is true that Luther himself affirmed the need of maintaining civil order, and urged obedience to law as a Christian duty. But many of his followers did not keep within his limits. Carlstadt and Munzer preached the equality of all men, not merely as a religious, but as a social, truth. They approved of force for the destruction of error, and iconoclasm was hard to restrain to the pillage of churches and monasteries. In the autumn of 1524, in various parts of Southern Germany, the peasants began to form in bands, but at first dispersed quietly before a show of authority. When no redress was given to their grievances, the scattered bands of insurgents united and put forth their demands in a connected scheme. The 'Twelve Articles' of the German peasantry were conceived in no revolutionary spirit. They asked for congregations the right of choosing their own ministers, and removing them for misconduct; the abolition of the small tithe, of the game laws and forest laws, of excessive feudal service, unfair rents, and arbitrary punishments; they submitted the justice of their demands to the test of Scripture, and named a number of divines, foremost amongst whom was Luther, to whose interpretation they were ready to submit.

At first the Council of Regency attempted to negotiate with the peasants; but while they negotiated, the Swabian League gathered its forces under Georg Truchsess,
and it became clear that the question would be decided by the sword. Truchsess was successful in crushing the Swabian rising in April; but in Franconia the peasants were powerful and stained their cause by a savage massacre at Weinsberg. In Thuringia the fanatic Munzer exhorted his followers to spare none of their opponents and establish the kingdom of God with the sword. In the midst of this tumult, the Elector Frederick of Saxony died, speaking to the last words of peace, and still hopeful that God's will would make itself manifest in the issue of events.

All this was a serious crisis for the fortunes of Luther and for the future of his teaching. On all sides was heard the cry that Germany was reaping the fruits of its revolt against authority, and that the Papal predictions were only too rapidly fulfilled. But Luther had the instincts of a statesman as well as the zeal of a teacher. He saw the paramount importance of the maintenance of order and was not misled by his sympathies. Early in May he issued *An Exhortation to Peace* in which he first addressed the nobles and pointed out that God’s wrath had declared itself against their pride, their luxury, and their injustice. For himself, he had always inculcated civil obedience, and had striven against confusion; prophets of murder had arisen in spite of his attempts, and none withstood them more diligently than he. But he exhorted the nobles to lay aside their tyranny, to deal reasonably with the peasants, and consider their demands when they were just. To the peasants he spoke with equal force: they took God's name in vain by making Him the author of confusion; He allowed no man to judge and avenge his own cause. He bade them endure, and pray, and trust in God's help. Even as he wrote the issue of events was doubtful, and Luther knew that his words would give dire offence to the insurgents. “I go home”, he wrote, “and with God’s help will prepare for death, and await my new masters, the murderers and robbers. But rather than justify their doings I would lose a hundred necks: God help me with His grace. But”, he added, with an amazing force of purely human passion and human willfulness, “before I die I will take my Catharine to wife”. Luther did not wish to end his life till he had expressed to the full in a definite act all the desires of his individual self, and had left his example to the world.

But Luther was not called upon to suffer martyrdom for his moderation. Munzer was slain in battle; Truchsess pursued his career of conquest in Swabia; the rebellion was stamped out in blood. Luther rejoiced in the triumph of authority, and threw himself unreservedly on the side of repression. His denunciations of the “robbing, murdering peasants” lost all sympathy with their grievances. They were guilty of every sin, and clothed their sins with the pretence of God’s law. “Let the nobles take the sword as ministers of God’s wrath. Whosoever has it in his power to punish, and spares, is guilty of all the slaughter which he does not prevent. Let there be no pity: it is the time of wrath, not of mercy. He who dies fighting for authority is a martyr before God. So wondrous are the times that a prince can merit heaven better by bloodshed than by prayers. Therefore, dear lords, ransom, save, help, pity the poor folks: let him who can stab, smite, destroy. If you fall, well is it for you: you could never die a happier death. I pray every one to depart from the peasants as from the devil himself: those who flee not I pray God enlighten: those who will not turn, God grant they have no luck nor success. Let every pious Christian say Amen. For the prayer is righteous and good, and pleases God well: that I know. If any man thinks this too harsh, let him remember that rebellion is irreparable, and the destruction of the world may be expected every hour”.

These are startling words in the mouth of a Christian teacher, who had been fighting the battle of liberty of opinion. Now, as at other times, Luther’s views were
stated in exaggerated terms, and were adapted to temporary needs. Luther was too
entirely concerned with theology in its relation to the individual to consider the bearings
of his new system on civil life. He was quite genuine in his horror of Carlstadt and
Munzer, who carried his principles out of the sphere of religion into the sphere of
politics. He was entirely convinced that the renewal of the spiritual life of man would
work harmoniously from within, and would transform, without rending asunder, the old
social order. He interposed to express this belief with his wonted force, in the hope that
it would approve itself to all. When his exhortations failed to calm men who were in
pursuit of immediate good, he had no scruple in withdrawing entirely from them; and he
ranged himself on the side of their assailants. But his impetuous temper carried him
beyond all bounds, and he had no pity for his misguided followers. The man who had
cast away the bonds of ecclesiastical authority felt himself compelled to assert the
binding obligation of civil authority with all the greater vehemence, because he had
been himself a rebel. No man is so certain as he who draws a fine distinction because it
is practically necessary. Luther, who had exhorted his countrymen to cast off the yoke
of their ecclesiastical superiors, could find no punishment too severe for them when
they attempted to diminish the burdens wherewith their temporal superiors oppressed
them. His utterances caused much disappointment and indignation. He was called a
hypocrite and a flatterer of princes. But he only repeated his general principle: “It is
better that all the peasants should be slain than the magistrates and princes, because the
peasants take the sword without God’s authority”.

The result of the Peasants’ War was a serious blow to the prospects of the
Lutheran movement. Germany, conscious of many ills, had caught at a fruitful principle
which made reorganization possible. Then, as always, there were many who hailed a
new doctrine, not for itself, but for its possibilities of extension. Luther kept his teaching
within the limits of the religious life, and asserted the right of the individual to free
spiritual communion with God. Many, who were not primarily concerned with religion,
looked kindly on an attempt to breathe a new spirit into common life, and were hopeful
of its success. Its first result had been a premature rising, which was put down by
slaughter. The demands of the rebels had been moderate; but they had naturally
committed some excesses. The religious leader of the new movement had shown
himself incapable to mediate, and had ranged himself steadfastly on the side of
authority. The limits of his principles and of his influence had been painfully
manifested. His utterances had been harsh and unsympathetic: he had no better advice to
give than patience under old wrongs, and submission to grievances for God’s sake.
There was nothing that was new, and little that was hopeful, in such a message.

Still Luther’s resolute attitude encouraged the nobles of Germany, and saved the
country from disorder, which must have proved fatal to the future of the Reformation.
Luther carried with him the good sense of Germany, and proved that his teaching was
free from revolutionary fanaticism. But he lost greatly in personal importance, and
could no longer claim to command the movement which he had originated. His ideas
were clearly capable of other meanings than he was willing to allow. They had been cast
upon the world, and the world would deal with them in its own way. There was
henceforth a difference between the Lutheran movement and Luther. The simplicity of
an ideal had passed away, and the sternness of practical life had been disclosed.
Germany was reduced to desolation; on all sides were heard the mutterings of
discontent. The new ideas were no more powerful than the old to bring an immediate
remedy to the woes of society. With somber resoluteness men ranged themselves on one
side or the other, in the conflict which was now inevitable; and both sides felt that the struggle would be long and stubborn.

Luther on his part was determined to show how irreparable was his breach with the past, and how entirely he was free from old traditions. On June 13 he married a runaway nun, Katarina von Bora, whom he had for some time sheltered in his house. It was a bold act, which created a great sensation, and struck dismay even into the hearts of many of Luther's friends, who thought that such a step was unworthy of a religious leader. It is strange that so much attention should have been given to the breach of vows which had been long since renounced, while another far more significant action awakened little notice at the time. On May 14, amid the tumult of the Peasants' War, Luther laid his hands on the head of his secretary, Georg Roser, and conferred on him the title of deacon. It was needful that some provision should be made for the new society, whose followers could not obtain ordination from the Bishops of Saxony. But Georg von Polenz, Bishop of Samland, had adopted Luther's teaching; and Luther, had he chosen, could have followed ecclesiastical tradition in the call of new ministers. But he was so convinced of his own inherent capacity to reform the Church, that he did not think of recognizing any superior authority.

The state of affairs in Germany might have afforded Clement VII many reasons for changing his policy, and looking away from purely Italian considerations. We have seen that he was not unaware of their importance, and for a moment at all events he showed some desire to face them. On June 7 he wrote to Charles and besought him to employ all his efforts in preventing the spread of heresy: to help him in the laudable attempt he sent him from his poverty a small sum of money. But these amicable intentions did not outlast the disappointment of finding that Charles refused to ratify the addition which Clement had made to the treaty of April 1, by restoring Reggio and Rubiera. Moreover, he shared in the alarm which was aroused in Italy when it was known that Francis had been carried off to Spain. In fact the departure of Francis was a mistake on the part of Lannoy, as much as on the part of Francis himself. Francis hoped that in person he would prevail on Charles to give him his liberty on easy terms; but he little knew the man with whom he had to deal. On the other hand Lannoy, by listening to the request of Francis, threw Italy into a ferment of suspicion and opened the door to the negotiations of Louise of France for a league against the Emperor. Milan and Venice were ready to listen to the French proposals, but looked to the Pope for guidance. Cardinal Canossa wrote to Giberti at the end of June: “All depends upon the Pope, who must often have repented of his previous lack of promptitude. If I see this opportunity also lost, I shall despair of the future; for I shall be certain that God has decreed the slavery of Italy and our ruin”.

Such utterances were hard to be endured by a Pope, an Italian, and a Medici. Again Clement changed his tactics, was deeply immersed in negotiations with England, Venice, and France, and had hopes of serious blow at the Emperor's power in Italy. The Milanese Chancellor, Giroiamo Morone, was a diplomatist of great experience. He conceived a scheme worthy of the ideal politics of Machiavelli. Italy was to be rescued from the barbarians by a league of all its powers; unfortunately, however, Italy possessed no leader of her own, and success was only possible by corrupting one of the imperial generals. The victory of Pavia was chiefly due to the generalship of the Marquis of Pescara, who was annoyed that Lannoy had carried off his royal prisoner to Spain. So Morone suggested to Pescara the probability of an Italian rising against the Emperor, and intimated that, if it succeeded, no one was fitter to receive the Neapolitan
kingdom than Pescara himself. Giberti, in the Pope’s name, promised absolution from
perjury and investiture of the kingdom: he sent a servant bearing the written approval of
the Pope. But Fernando Davalos, Marquis of Pescara, though a Neapolitan by birth, was
proud of his Spanish descent and was in heart a Spaniard. He listened, and revealed
Morone’s schemes to Charles. Morone was seized by the imperial general De Leyva,
and confessed on October 25; Pescara died soon afterwards. The imperialists saddled
the Duke of Milan with Morone’s guilt, and proceeded to take possession of his
dominions as of a faithless vassal. Clement knew that his double-dealing had been again
discovered by Charles.

Still Charles did not change his relations towards the Pope. He knew that Italy
regarded him with dread, and did not wish to face another war with an Italian league; he
knew that the best means of averting this risk was to humour the Pope’s irresoluteness.
Clement sent a useless ambassador to Toledo in the person of Cardinal Salviati, who
was delighted with Charles’ suavity. But Charles had no confidence in Clement and did
not mean to let go his hold on Italy. On October 31 he wrote to the Duke of Sessa that,
if the Pope delayed to ratify his treaty, he was to warn him that the Emperor knew he
was watching the progress of events; he was to threaten him with the Emperor's
hostility, and the growth of Lutheranism in Germany. Charles proposed that Clement
should leave to him the restoration of Reggio and Rubiera; should be content with his
promise that, in case of Sforza’s death, Milan should pass neither to Charles nor his
brother Ferdinand, but a third person, such as the Duke of Bourbon; and should
contribute 200,000, or at least 150,000 ducats, to enable Charles to withdraw his troops
from North Italy.

Accordingly, after discussing these points with Salviati, Charles sent an envoy to
Rome, Don Michiel Herrera, early in December. But Herrera’s instructions were not
explicit, and left some ambiguity about the expulsion of the Duke of Milan. So he
proposed a delay of two months that he might communicate again with the Emperor;
and Clement agreed, though he said: "I know that I am acting against my own interests,
for the danger lies in delay; but I prefer to put my trust in the Emperor rather than lose
his friendship and alliance altogether". Still more frankly he told the Duke of Sessa: “I
know that, if the Emperor makes an agreement with the French, my ruin is certain; but
the more I see the danger, the more I wish to show the world my desire for the
Emperor’s friendship. I know that I put into his hands a sword with which he may cut
my throat; but I trust entirely in his magnanimity and kindness”. This, no doubt, was
noble, if it had been true. But no one believed Clement; and those near him only
concluded that he wished to be on the safe side, and was not satisfied that France was in
a position to do much, unless England openly joined the league. Again Clement was
only thinking of himself, and using fine phrases until he was sure on which side his
advantage lay. Meanwhile he played into Charles’ hands, by preventing the formation
of an Italian league, and so impressing the captive Francis with a feeling of the
hopelessness of any succor from outside, and the need of submitting to the Emperor’s
terms if he were to obtain his release.

At length Francis grew weary of his captivity and agreed to the terms which
Charles demanded. In the treaty signed at Madrid on January 13, 1526, Francis
renounced his claims over Milan and Naples, and gave back to Charles the Burgundian
possessions. His two sons were to remain as hostages for the fulfillment of these
conditions. The Emperor’s triumph now seemed complete; but no one in Italy believed
that Francis would keep his word. Clement when the news reached him was rather
proud of his dexterity. He had made an offer of alliance to the Emperor; but his terms had not been accepted, and his hands were free for the future. “If”, he said, “the French king, using wise and prudent counsel, has resolved to free himself from prison with the intention of using his freedom for the good of his realm and the interest of Christendom, all that follows from this treaty is that the Emperor has the sons instead of the father; and the father can do more for the liberation of the sons than the sons could do for the liberation of the father. If this be the French king’s purpose, I will spare no labour nor expense to bring the matter to a proper end, and promote the peace of Italy and the quiet of Christendom”. The Pope was the first to express frankly the political cynicism of the times. Treaties were only promises which could be kept or broken as was most convenient: Francis was justified in obtaining his liberty by any means; if when he was free he was likely to give the Emperor trouble, the Pope was quite ready to use the opportunity, without considering how it had been obtained.

It is honorable to Charles V that he stood alone among European princes in believing that the word of a king was steadfast. On March 17 Francis was set at liberty, and at once became the centre of European intrigues against the growing power of his rival. Meanwhile Charles pursued his negotiations for a league with the Pope. On February 8 he wrote to the Duke of Sessa that he was willing to have the conduct of the Duke of Milan investigated: if he were innocent, he should continue in his dominions; if he were guilty, his state should be declared forfeited and conferred on the Duke of Bourbon. The Duke of Ferrara must be induced to join the league also, and the question of the restitution to the Pope of Reggio and Rubiera must be treated with caution. Clement on his part was willing to continue the negotiations till he saw what the French king would do. As Francis delayed to publish the treaty in France, Clement began to complain of ill-usage by the Emperor. On April 17 Sessa was convinced that the Pope was only biding his time, and advised Charles that he must either make an agreement with him which restored mutual confidence, or must reduce him to a condition in which he could do no harm. On all sides diplomacy was busy. England, Venice, and the Pope were waiting for Francis to declare himself. All wished for war against Charles, but none wished to take the chief part in it. The Pope especially was anxious that the war should not be fought on Italian soil. None of the Powers trusted each other. The appearance of Lannoy at the League of French Court at Cognac to demand the ratification of the treaty of Madrid compelled Francis to come to a decision; and the result was the League of Cognac, published on May 22. This ‘Holy League’ was made for the purpose of promoting the peace of Christendom by the Pope, the French king, Venice, and the Duke of Milan. The King of England and the Emperor were invited to join; but the Emperor must first release the sons of Francis for a ransom, must not enter Italy to be crowned except with such retinue as the Pope and Venice may approve, must leave the Duke of Milan undisturbed, restore to the other Italian Powers what they possessed before the last war, and finally must pay the English king the money which he owed. An army was to be maintained to preserve the peace of Italy; Francesco Sforza was to be left in possession of Milan; but the country of Asti was to be given to France, and a pension of 50,000 ducats. When North Italy had been pacified, the allies were to drive the Emperor out of Naples, which belonged to the Pope, who, however, undertook to pay Francis 75,000 ducats yearly, to provide a principality for the Duke of Richmond, Henry VIII’s natural son, and to pay 30,000 ducats yearly to the Cardinal of York. All the allies undertook to protect the Medici family. Two private articles provided that, in case Charles yielded and was left in possession of Naples, he should be saddled with a yearly payment of 40,000 ducats to the Pope; further, that Florence should be defended
by the league, though it was not mentioned as one of the contracting parties, owing to
the financial losses which its citizens would suffer if it declared itself at war with the
Emperor.

The decisive step had been taken and defiance proclaimed. Clement VII at last
came forward as an Italian patriot; but it was clear that his timidity, or caution, was
overcome not by foresight but by circumstance. Charles stood towards Italy in much the
same position as he did a year before; but Clement had discovered that nothing was to
be won for himself or the Medici from Charles. He had offered Charles his uncertain
friendship, but Charles was not prepared to pay his price. The treaty of Madrid
awakened universal dread of Spanish domination; and Francis I needed some cloak for
his perfidy in breaking his plighted word. Clement had shrunk from an Italian league
against Charles; but he plucked up his courage when a European league was projected.
He did not stop to think what additional guarantees were thereby provided for the Italian
cause. The aim of the Italian Powers was independence from foreign intervention; but
though the claims of Spain were disposed of, the claims of France were passed lightly
over. There was no solidarity of interest between Francis and his Italian allies. Nothing
was demanded on his behalf save the release of his sons, which could only be procured
by a revision of the treaty of Madrid. This was a far-off prospect, and Francis was not
likely to lend effective help to Italy.

Clement had not even the wisdom to bind to the league the Duke of Ferrara, but
demanded the restoration of all that he had won from the Papacy since the days of Leo
X, and offered in return to make the duke's son, Ercole, a Cardinal. Giberti, sure of
success, induced the Pope to make such exorbitant demands, that Tebaldi, the Ferrarese
envoy, wrote, in answer to objections against the duke's want of patriotism, that he and
his subjects "would call in the Turk, and even the devil, rather than be enslaved to
priests".

These considerations weighed little with the Pope. It was enough for the present
that Charles was thrown into great embarrassment by the coalition formed against him.
His troops were all in Italy. He had no money to pay them, or to raise new forces.
Germany was exhausted by the Peasants’ War. An attack on Spain or Flanders would
have reduced him to great straits. But Francis was not prepared to take the field; and
Henry VIII accepted only the title of Protector of the League, and did not wish to arouse
discontent in England by another futile expedition. Charles saw that he had still some
time before him, and hastened to use it to the best advantage. He sent a trusty envoy,
Don Ugo de Moncada, to try and separate the members of the coalition.

Moncada was an old soldier, who had served under Cesare Borgia, and had no
love for the Italians nor any scruples about the sanctity of the Pope. First he went to
Cognac, where he found that little could be done with the French king. Thence he went
to Milan, where he arrived on June 6, and offered to make terms with the duke, who
was besieged in the castle by the imperial troops; but Sforza refused to surrender his
position and submit his conduct to judicial inquiry. So far, Moncada’s mission had not
been successful. On June 11 he left Milan for Rome, which he saw was the key of the
situation. The Duke of Sessa had done his best to prepare the way for Moncada’s
overtures. He remonstrated against the Pope's warlike preparations, reminded him of the
danger of a breach with the Emperor, and warned him of his duty as Vicar of Christ to
keep the peace. When these arguments had little effect he asked the Pope to wait till he
had time to communicate with the Emperor. Clement turned to him and said: "If you
have powers to treat with me, I am willing to make a treaty; but I will not wait for an hour, as I see that the Emperor does not wish for my friendship, but only wishes to delay. For the first time in his life Clement showed signs of resolution, and hastened his military preparations. When Sessa again besought him to await the coming of Moncada, who would satisfy all his requirements, Clement answered: "I am already engaged, and must keep my engagements."

Giberti, who was now once more the chief adviser of the Pope, used the prospect of Moncada’s arrival, and the compliant attitude of the Emperor, as a means of stirring the zeal of the French king. When Moncada reached Rome on June 16, the Pope was in no mood for yielding. Moncada told Clement that he came with ample powers to treat, and was ready to give full satisfaction about Milan and the restoration of Reggio and Rubiera; the choice of peace or war rested with him. Clement answered that the proposal came too late; he could not treat without the consent of his allies. Moncada asked him to consider his answer till the morrow, and seems to have sent him a draft agreement which dealt with the question of Milan. Next day Clement made his position manifest by consulting with the ambassadors of his allies; then he answered Moncada that nothing could be done until the ambassadors had communicated with their princes. Clement’s resoluteness filled those around him with admiration; and Wolsey, who had often complained of the Pope’s inconstancy, was bidden to mark that it had not arisen from want of courage or good-will, but that never before had he been sure of allies.

As Clement refused to treat for peace, Moncada left Rome on June 27, and went to Genanzano: on July 1 Sessa departed for Naples. The house of the Spanish Embassy was closed, and only a secretary, Juan Perez, was left behind. Peace was not likely to be obtained except through war, and Clement was raising troops as fast as his poverty allowed.
CHAPTER IX.
THE SACK OF ROME.
1526-1527

The success of the league largely depended on the vigor of its first undertakings. Clement did his best by appointing as his generals Guido Rangoni and Giovanni dei Medici, while he sent to Lombardy as his lieutenant the experienced statesman, Francesco Guicciardini. Venice was ill-advised in employing as general Francesco Maria della Rovere, whom Leo X had dispossessed of the Duchy of Urbino, and who bore no friendly feelings towards the Pope. The first object of the allies was to prevent Milan from falling into the hands of the imperialists. The town was already taken, but the castle still held out. The besieging army was only 11,000, while the forces of the league numbered 20,000. But the Venetian troops were slow in crossing the Adda; and it was not till June 30 that the army of the league was united at Marignano. Even then Rovere delayed; and the experienced generals of the Emperor used the time to strengthen their lines round Milan. When the allies at last arrived, they found that they could not break through the trenches, and the Castle of Milan was driven to surrender on July 24. Rovere professed to await the arrival of Swiss mercenaries before attacking Milan, and meanwhile diverted his troops to the siege of Cremona.

Thus the allies failed in their first object: and Charles was able to raise money and send it to the Duke of Bourbon, whose arrival filled the imperialists with fresh courage. At the same time another enterprise, which was of great importance to the Pope, ended in ignominious failure. Siena, which lay on the road between Rome and Florence, underwent one of its periodical revolutions after the battle of Pavia. The aristocratic government, which was in alliance with the Pope, was expelled by a popular rising, and the new government looked for help to the Emperor. The Siene exiles, aided by troops from Rome and Florence, sought to regain their power; but the citizens were prepared for their attack, and there was no discipline amongst the assailants. An unexpected sortie drove them from the city, and they fled, abandoning their artillery, on July 25.

This ill-success filled Clement with alarm. On July 8 he had proclaimed the league in Rome with solemn pomp and pageantry. On August 1 he sat trembling in the Vatican counting the cost of his boldness. “I never saw a man so perplexed”, wrote the French ambassador. “He is almost ill, and said plainly that he never expected to be so treated. His ministers are more dead than alive”. Clement had believed in paper promises, and expected that in numbers was strength. He complained bitterly of the lukewarmness of Francis I and Henry VIII; had he not trusted in their persuasions he would never have committed himself so far; now they had done nothing; and he was plunged into expenses which he could not long endure, and saw nothing but ruin awaiting him.

Clement’s fears were amply justified. He had supposed that Francis and Henry would make some demonstration which would withdraw the imperial troops from Italy; or else that the forces of the league would rapidly disperse the ill-paid army in
Lombardy. Neither of these things had happened; nay, the imperial army had been reinforced, and it had won advantages. Clement had gained nothing from his allies; but by his desertion of the Emperor had exposed himself to his personal enemies. Chief amongst these was Cardinal Colonna, to whose adhesion Clement had owed his election to the Papacy, Colonna was a strong imperialist and hoped to influence the policy of the Pope. In this he was disappointed; and his disappointment turned to open hostility, when in May, 1525, Clement refused to send him as ambassador to Spain. Colonna withdrew from Rome to the abbey of Subiaco, and employed himself in organizing his party. The Spanish envoys in March, 1526, proposed to Clement that he should summon Colonna to Rome to help by his advice in the negotiations which were then pending. Clement displayed an unusual amount of indignation for one so gentle, and denounced Colonna in no measured terms. Colonna retaliated by writing to Charles, offering to drive the Pope out of Rome, and turn Siena and Florence against him. When the breach with the Emperor took place, Moncada showed his knowledge of the Pope's vulnerable side by withdrawing to Genanzano. There he raised forces in Naples, and consulted with Cardinal Colonna, who could command the adhesion of almost all his house. It was an obvious plan that the Colonnesi should invade the Campagna, threaten Rome, and compel the Pope to withdraw his forces from Lombardy and Siena, if need were pressing.

The knowledge of such active foes in the immediate neighborhood of Rome was the cause of Clement's alarm; and Moncada's first intention was to work on the Pope's fears and induce him to abandon his allies. In fact, it was now obvious that the Pope was the weakest factor in the league; and the opinion of the astute Spanish diplomatists in Italy was, that the Emperor would be wise to make peace with the Pope, taking from him reasonable securities for the future; if he refused to make peace, he must be driven from Rome, and receive such a lesson as would make him harmless for the future.

The conception of this policy arose from a careful survey of actual facts. The Pope's enemies were close to Rome, and the forces of Naples lay behind them. It was intolerable, on military grounds, that an adversary whose basis was so easily assailable, should be allowed to detach his forces for warlike operations elsewhere. At first the Neapolitan barons felt scruples about attacking the lands of the Church. Had the league been successful, these scruples would have had increasing weight. But as the league was wasting time in fruitless undertakings, the advantages to be gained by a dash upon Rome became more and more obvious. On September 5, there was a rumor in Rome that Charles had submitted to his confessor the question, if he could withdraw from obedience to the Pope. One version of the story ran that the answer had been returned that, since the Pope had begun the war, it was lawful in self-defence to take any necessary measures.

The hostile attitude of the Colonnesi made it essential for the Pope to garrison Rome with 6000 foot and 600 horse. The payment of this garrison, when added to the payment of his contingent to an attack on Genoa, which was now the object of the league, was a heavy burden on the Papal finances. When Moncada found that he could do nothing by negotiation to separate Clement from his allies, he retired into the background, and allowed Vespasiano Colonna to discuss conditions which might be advantageous to both parties. The Colonnesi and the Neapolitans professed their unwillingness to make war against the Pope, but they wished to help the Emperor. For this purpose an agreement was made between Vespasiano Colonna and the Pope on August 22, whereby the Pope pardoned the Colonna on condition that they restored the
places which they had seized, withdrew their troops into the Neapolitan territory, and undertook not to wage war from the lands which they held of the Church; otherwise they were at liberty to fight for the Emperor, and help in the defence of Naples. Accordingly the Colonna troops were withdrawn over the Neapolitan frontier, and Clement reduced the garrison of Rome to 500 men. He felt more secure now that immediate danger was averted, and could turn his attention to the tardy proceedings of the forces in Lombardy.

The separate interests of the allies were a hopeless hindrance to united action. The Papal forces were still watching Milan; the Venetian troops were besieging Cremona; while French reinforcements were closing around Genoa by land, and the fleet of the league was blockading it by sea. No great success could be expected from these separate undertakings; and Clement soon received a sharp reminder that his present policy lay outside the real interests of Europe and of Christendom. On September 18, the news reached Rome that, on the plain of Mohacs, King Lewis II of Hungary and all the chivalry of his realm had fallen in battle against the Turks, who, under their warrior Sultan Suleiman, were now masters of the Danube valley. Even Clement was for the moment struck by the unseemliness that Pope and Emperor should be contending for the possession of towns in Italy, while the enemies of the Christian Faith were destroying the bulwark of Christendom.

He summoned the Cardinals and ambassadors. With tears in his eyes he besought them to use their efforts for a truce. He proposed a conference with Charles, Francis, and Wolsey, and would go to Narbonne, or Perpignan, for the purpose. He expressed his readiness to go in person on an expedition against the Turks, and would devote his crosses, chalices, everything, to the purpose; if something were not rapidly done, the Turks would soon be in Rome plundering the Vatican. So spoke the Pope on September 19. Next day he found that there were those near at hand who had no scruples about spoiling the Papal palace; and he experienced a shock, which turned his mind away from crusading schemes and reduced him to struggle for his very existence.

The death of the Duke of Sessa on August 18, left the unscrupulous Moncada supreme director of affairs in South Italy; and Moncada had a clear perception of a useful stroke to be struck in the Emperor’s interest. He employed Vespasiano Colonna to lull the Pope into false security. Meanwhile he gathered 2000 men in the Abruzzi, and prevailed on the Council of Naples to send him 2800 more for an expedition against Siena. These, added to the troops of the Colonna, gave him a force of 6000 foot men and 800 horse. On September 16, he informed the Council of Naples that his real intention was to advance on Rome, 'whence all the mischief springs'; he asked them to help him by sending the Neapolitan fleet to Ostia. By a forced march he appeared unexpectedly before Rome on the night of September 19, and took possession of the Lateran Gate without meeting any resistance. He rode through the city with Cardinal Pompeo and his kinsmen, Vespasiano and Ascanio Colonna, and bivouacked in the palace by SS. Apostoli. The Roman people did not rise against them; for they were discontented with the Pope's government, and regarded the Colonna as citizens who were only exercising their rights. In fact the financial straits of Clement had led to oppressive taxation on the part of his minister, Cardinal Armellino. An impost on wine was very unpopular; the tolls on all things sold in the market were excessive; it is even said that he devised a tax on laundresses for washing in the Tiber. Moreover, the temper of the Romans was by no means warlike. Leo X, in the interests of public safety, had forbidden the bearing of arms, and the idea of a citizen militia had entirely disappeared.
In vain the Conservators of the city, who were hated as upstarts, summoned the people to arms; they were answered that it was a device of theirs to impose a fine for breach of the law. No one feared the Colonnesi; they had come to settle their private grievances with the Pope. So the Romans looked on unmoved when, as morning dawned, a dash was made across the Ponte Sisto, and the troops captured the Porta di San Spirito, which was feebly defended, and pushed on to the Vatican.

At first Clement declared his resolution to seat himself, clad in full pontificals, in his chair, and face the rebels, as Boniface VIII had faced Sciarra Colonna. The Cardinals had little difficulty in persuading him that it was safer, if less dignified, to shut himself up in the Castle of S. Angelo. Scarcely had he gone before the Spanish troops rushed into the Vatican, and pillaged everything on which they could lay their hands. The sacred vessels of S. Peter’s were carried away. Nothing was respected. “There was no greater respect for religion”, says Guicciardini, “nor horror of sacrilege than if they had been Turks despoiling the churches of Hungary”. The rest of Rome was spared, but so much of the Borgo was pillaged as was out of the range of the guns of the castle. Moncada wished to read the Pope a severe lesson without incurring needless odium. He sought an interview with Clement and proposed terms of peace. Clement’s resolute attitude of resistance was short-lived, and on the evening of the 21st a truce was made for four months. The Pope agreed to withdraw his troops and fleet from the service of the league, while Moncada undertook to withdraw from Rome. The Colonna were to be pardoned, and the Pope gave two of his relations as hostages for the fulfillment of the treaty. When this had been settled Moncada, with many apologies for the damage done by his soldiers, withdrew his troops from Rome.

It was believed at the time that Cardinal Colonna was bitterly disappointed at the little use made of the brilliant opportunity. Men said that he wished Clement to be deposed or made away with, and himself elected in his stead. But it is obvious that the entire scheme was of Moncada’s devising, and that he had carefully considered how much responsibility it was wise for himself to assume. Charles had been informed by Cardinal Colonna of his project to drive the Pope out of Rome, and had commissioned Moncada to help him if need were. But it was to be done by Colonna himself; and if this appearance were to be kept up, the enterprise must necessarily wear the form of an unexpected onslaught for a personal object. The Colonna redressed their own grievances, and Moncada used the opportunity offered by their zeal. The Pope was terrified, and might withdraw from actively helping the league, on the plea that he was unable to send his troops from home. Moncada hoped to render the Pope amenable to reason by a summary process. Beyond this he did not venture to go.

In truth the seizure of Rome was an unwelcome revelation to Clement of his real position. Just as he had plucked up his courage to act as an Italian patriot, the feebleness of his power was ruthlessly manifested. Not only had he been ridiculously outmaneuvered, but he had no hold on Rome itself. His government was unpopular; he inspired no personal loyalty; he had no party in his favor. He could scarcely escape the galling reflection that the Papacy, with all its pretensions, was merely a puppet in the hands of the monarchs of Europe. Clement could only free himself from the power of Charles by the help of France and England. Henry and Francis urged him on to harass Charles, and then left him unsupported. Charles had mockingly reminded him of his impotence; and Clement had to consider whether or not he would regard the reminder as decisive.
Clement’s only policy was to lean on those bruised reeds, the Kings of France and England. At first he must seem to keep the convention made with Moncada and withdraw his troops from Lombardy. He accordingly ordered Guicciardini to return, but to leave as many soldiers as he decently could under the command of Giovanni dei Medici, as forming part of the Florentine contingent, and so not under the Pope’s control. Many of the troops were recalled to Rome, and the city soon wore a military appearance. But Clement talked of peace, and even proposed a journey in person to France and Spain for the purpose of bringing it about. His intention rapidly changed with the news that the army of the league had captured Cremona. He recovered from his fears, and even thought of drilling the Roman people into soldier-like ways. On October 2 the great bell of the Capitol, which had not been heard for sixty years, sent forth its summons in the night; and 4000 citizens assembled under arms only to hear that it was a false alarm. The Papal troops in Rome soon reached the respectable number of 10,000 men; and it became evident that Clement thought of nothing save vengeance on the treacherous house of Colonna.

Early in November the blow fell. The Papal troops stormed the castles of the Colonna, Marino, Frascati, Grotta Ferrata, Genanzano, and others. They fired the houses, pulled down the walls, and scattered ruin on every side. The luckless peasantry fled to Rome in utter destitution, the women bearing their helpless children on their backs. It was said with truth that the Turk had not acted more cruelly to the Hungarians than had this Pope to Christians living in the dominions of the Church. When the Spaniards tried to interfere, Clement answered that the Emperor could not object to his punishing rebellious vassals. When he was told that it was a breach of his agreement, he replied that Cardinal Colonna had been summoned to Rome to answer for his conduct, and that plea could then be discussed. In pursuance of this determination a Consistory was held on November 21, in which Cardinal Colonna, his brothers and nephews, were deprived of all their dignities. Perez was of opinion that the Pope in his severity against the Colonna was providing a means of escape from the Emperor’s wrath; he could offer the restoration of the Colonna as a condition that all else should be forgiven.

The question was still unsettled. What was the Emperor’s attitude towards the Pope? Diplomatic relations were certainly strained since the publication of the league in Rome. Clement had justified that step by a manifesto addressed to Charles, dated June 23. He rehearsed the various services which he had rendered to Charles before and after his accession to the Papal throne; the failure of his hopes of the Emperor’s forbearance in Italy; his endeavors for the peace of Italy and security for the Duke of Milan; the wickedness of the Emperor’s agents in Italy; the refusal to make satisfaction to his moderate and necessary complaints; the despair which at last led him to make common cause with the league. When it was too late Moncada arrived with terms which might have been discussed if they had come earlier. As it was, the Pope saw no other way of defending justice and procuring peace save by taking up arms, not to attack the Emperor, but to defend his own, to maintain the cause of his country and the dignity of Christendom. This manifesto was delivered to Charles by a Papal nuncio on August 20, and awakened in him, as he says himself, “boundless astonishment”. Gattinara was charged to draw up an answer, in which the violence of the Pope’s language was loftily reproved. The Pope said that he had not neglected the duties of his high office; the information which the Emperor had received did not agree with that statement. The Pope said that he only wished to defend himself; no one was attacking him. The Emperor then went on to give his account of the matters of which the Pope complained,
and declared that his own conduct had given no just ground for mistrust. As for the Pope's statement that Moncada came too late, it was unworthy of the chief pastor of the Church to put any agreement made with other princes before his duty of averting bloodshed. If any evil befalls Christendom, the Emperor is not to blame. If the Pope persists in acting, not as a father but as a partisan, the Emperor will appeal to a General Council, which he asks the Pope to summon at once in some safe place.

So spoke Clement and Charles with simulated dignity. But Clement did not feel equal to the majesty of his first utterance, and two days later sent a second letter, in which he spoke more mildly and expressed his wish for peace. Charles followed his example, and addressed him a second letter of a more pacific kind on the day after his first was sent. Yet he did not abandon the position which he had taken up, and on October 6 wrote to the Cardinals exhorting them to dissuade the Pope from his impious designs. He urged the service which he had rendered to the Church in Germany, the growing hostility to the Papacy, and the necessity of a General Council. If the Cardinals did not provide for the summoning of a Council, it would be the duty of the Emperor so to act as to show his zeal for the welfare of the Church.

All this, however, was merely for public display, Charles was dealing with the Pope by means of Moncada and the Colonna; and Moncada was the first to advise the Emperor to disavow any knowledge of his action in plundering Rome. In a letter written on September 24 he wrote: “It seems to me that your majesty ought to show great regret at what has befallen the Pope, and especially at the sack of his palace. You should give complete satisfaction to the nuncio, and write to the Pope so as to cheer him in his misfortune. It would be well to write to the Cardinals also, and to assure all Christian princes that what has happened was contrary to your will and intentions; and you should do this in such a way as to ensure complete publicity”. Perhaps Charles did not need this advice; but, anyhow, he acted upon it. The invasion of Rome was a deplorable episode, which was not allowed to affect the high political considerations by which the Emperor was moved. Clement might draw from it his own conclusions; but the Emperor would not help him by assuming any responsibility whatever. If the Pope chose to wreak his vengeance on the Colonna, that was his own affair. If the lesson which he had received did not teach him wisdom, he had only himself to blame. The political maxims of Italy were now an open secret; and Moncada was an apt expounder of the principles by which the Borgia had aimed at dominion.

Clement, however, did not long enjoy his triumph over the Colonna. He heard with dread of the unexpected success of the Emperor in raising new forces for reinforces the Italian war. Lannoy sailed from Spain with 10,000 men, and landed at Gaeta on December 1. A body of 12,000 German lanzknechts, mainly Lutherans, under the command of Georg von Frundsberg, made their way across the Alps in November. The general of the league, the Duke of Urbino, was still engaged in blockading the imperial troops under Bourbon in Milan. When he heard of the arrival of Frundsberg’s reinforcements, he saw the necessity of preventing their union with Bourbon, but chose the doubtful plan of dividing his forces, so as to watch both detachments of the enemy at the same time. The result was that he was not strong enough to engage with Frundsberg; and the attempt to impede his march only led to a series of indecisive skirmishes, in one of which Giovanni dei Medici received his death-wound, and Italy lost its one general of eminence. The Duke of Urbino’s plans entirely failed. In the middle of December Frundsberg was at Piacenza waiting for Bourbon, while the army of the league was dispersed, and powerless to prevent their junction.
In addition to these causes of alarm the Emperor gained an important ally in Italy itself. The Duke of Ferrara, who had long hesitated, gave in his adhesion to Charles at the end of November. Clement, by his pertinacious attempts to win back Reggio and Rubiera, drove Alfonso to join the imperial side. In this, as in all else, he could not bring himself to renounce the opportunity for making small gains, even while he embarked on a large policy which was fraught with danger. But the defection of Alfonso was a severe blow; and when the Ferrarese ambassador announced it to the Pope he answered angrily: “If the duke wishes to make the Emperor master of all Italy, let him do so; much good may it bring him”.

Clement’s condition of mind was described by one who saw him. “The holy father is in such a state that he does not know where he is”. He was somewhat comforted by the arrival of an emissary from Lannoy, who brought letters from the Emperor excusing himself from any share in the plundering of Rome by the Colonna. He at once sent envoys to Lannoy, who was warned by Perez that, unless he obtained valid securities, promises were of no avail. “The doctrine is openly professed at Rome that no compulsory act need be valid. This plea has been used to justify the attack on the lands of the Colonna”. Again we see that the political tricks of Italy had been found out, and that the Spaniards knew exactly the principles of the Papal Court. Moreover, they knew that it was well sometimes to make a show of their astuteness. On December 12 Perez entered the Consistory accompanied by a notary and four witnesses. He handed in two letters addressed by the Emperor to the Pope, and one to the College of Cardinals; then he retired and procured an attestation of the delivery of the documents. Clement was very angry at this suspicious treatment; and the rumors which spread among the Roman people made Perez tremble for his personal safety.

Clement was so anxious for an answer from Lannoy that he sent Cardinal Schomberg to hasten matters. The answer came on December 12, proposing a truce for six months, as security for which the Pope was to give up either Parma, Piacenza, or Civita Vecchia and Ostia, and further was to pay a sum of money. Clement thought himself lucky to get such easy terms, but hoped by prolonging negotiations to escape the money payment, and gain time, in case anything should happen to his advantage. Lannoy, who was carefully watching, raised his terms, demanding more without consulting his allies, but was willing to pay 120,000 or 150,000 ducats for a six months’ truce, and would discuss other matters personally with the Viceroy. Lannoy, seeing that the Pope was only endeavoring to gain time, again raised his terms, demanding Pisa and Livorno from Florence and the restoration of the Colonna at Rome. Clement answered that he was willing to make conditions of peace, but if everything was to be taken from him he would rather be deprived by force than by agreement. To show that he did not mean to be pressed any further, he issued on January 1, 1527, a monitory against Lannoy and the Colonna. Perez sent the news to Lannoy with the remark that it was a foolish step to take while he was negotiating for peace, and that it could be of no use, because if Lannoy meant war he would not be hindered by a monitory. In fact Lannoy joined the Colonna, who with the help of some Neapolitan forces were besieging Frosinone.

Clement had received promises of help from France, and on January 8 arrived Renzo da Ceri, without money, and with little to offer save his name, for he was a capable soldier and had defended Marseilles in 1524. Under his leadership the Papal army assumed a more military appearance, and the defence of Frosinone was gallantly maintained. Clement thought it wise, despite the remonstrances of the Cardinals, to
embrace this opportunity of coming to terms with Lannoy; and on January 28 agreed to pay 150,000 ducats, place Parma, Piacenza, and Civita Vecchia in the hands of a third party as pledges, and restore the Colonna. The truce was to be for three years, and Venice might join it on paying a sum of money. A courier was sent to Venice; but before his return the Pope had changed his mind. Some money arrived from France; Lannoy was worsted before Frosinone and was driven to retreat on February 3. Clement’s advisers joyfully assured him that the time was come when he could use his money to exterminate his enemies; and Clement thought that at least he could make better terms. He therefore withdrew his offer to pay money or restore the Colonna, and employed the English envoy, Sir John Russell, who had just come to Rome, as his agent in negotiating with Lannoy. Russell was of opinion that a brief truce would break up the imperial army, and would give England an opportunity for mediating, which was the aim of Wolsey’s policy. He found Lannoy so downcast by his reverses that he was prepared to offer a truce without either money payment, surrender of towns, or restoration of the Colonna. Lannoy had little grasp of the real position of affairs, and believed that the help given to the Pope by France and England was greater than it really was. Perhaps he was jealous of Bourbon, or had no hopes that the northern army would hold together when their pay was not forthcoming. Anyhow he rapidly abandoned the position which he had taken up a month before. Instead of dictating terms to the Pope, he humbly sued for a truce.

Clement had thus improved his position by foreign aid, and in consequence was in the hands of his foreign advisers. Russell, when he returned to Rome, besought the Pope not to make peace for himself, but to consult his allies. The French and Venetians did their utmost to dissuade him. Clement pleaded his poverty, his inability to withstand Lannoy by his own means, his fears for Florence if the northern army marched against it. Words ran high in the Pope's presence, and Clement vaguely tried to keep the peace. Again time was gained by sending to consult the Venetians, while Clement was watching to see if Florence was really in danger. Things seemed so threatening in North Italy that Clement at last judged that the time was come when he must consult his own interests. Without waiting for an answer from Venice he concluded a truce with Lannoy on March 15. The truce was to be for eight months, and Venice and France might make themselves parties if they chose; the places occupied in the kingdom of Naples, and in the Papal States, were to be restored; the northern army was to retire into Lombardy, and, if France and Venice joined the league, was to withdraw from Upper Italy. The Pope further stipulated for the ransom of the two hostages whom he had given to Moncada in September, in return for a payment of 60,000 ducats.

Neither party was satisfied with the result. It was not honorable to Lannoy, who abandoned the Colonna, in return for greater ease at Naples. All that Perez could say in its favour was, that it greatly annoyed France and Venice. Clement could only plead to his allies his poverty and helplessness, as an excuse for abandoning them. At last he was in earnest about peace, and welcomed Lannoy to Rome on March 25 for the negotiation of the treaty.

It was not, however, the fear of Lannoy that had led the Pope into the paths of peace, but anxiety about the doings of the German and Spanish troops in Northern Italy, where on February 19 Bourbon and Frundsberg united their forces. The advantage of the alliance with the Duke of Ferrara was now manifest; for by his help the army rapidly marched to San Giovanni, between Bologna and Ferrara, with the intention of advancing upon Florence. But the imperial generals were at their wits’ end to provide
for their soldiers. The country was desolate; the season was exceptionally wet, and the rain fell in torrents upon the soldiers, who were absolutely destitute of supplies. A sum of 15,000 ducats was raised by the Duke of Ferrara and distributed among the Germans, as the Spaniards seemed more patient. On March 13 orders were given to march next morning. But the good temper of the Spanish troops had been overestimated, and before going farther they resolved to present their grievances. At night-fall they rushed to the tent of the Duke of Bourbon, clamoring for pay with such fury that he fled and sought refuge with Frundsberg. The Germans, hearing the noise, made for Bourbon's tent with cries of "Geld, geld"; when they found the general gone, they ate the supper that was prepared for him, carried off his silver plate, and made havoc of all his furniture. The two bodies of mutineers spent the night in consultation. They paid no heed to orders that they were to return to their quarters, but answered by sending deputations to demand their pay. At noon next day an agreement was made by the Marquis of Guasto and Juan de Urbina, who were able by their personal influence to induce the Spaniards to be content with the promise of a crown a piece. Frundsberg was not successful with the lanzknechts, who would not be satisfied with less than half their arrears of pay. The Abbot of Najera and the Marquis of Guasto hastened to Ferrara to raise the money, and returned with 12,000 ducats, which were immediately distributed. But on the following day, March 16, the mutineers made a fresh demand that the Duke of Bourbon should promise more pay when they were arrived at Florence, and should undertake to pay arrears in full, amounting to 150,000 ducats, on April 21. Bourbon refused to make a promise which he could not fulfill, and the storm grew louder. Frundsberg exerted himself to calm his troops, and in his agitation fell down in a fit of apoplexy. He was carried to Ferrara, where he died.

This was the state of things in the camp when on March 19 a messenger arrived from Lannoy with the news of the armistice concluded by the Pope. Lannoy excused himself on the ground of the damage done to Naples by the enemy's galleys and of his ill-success in the field. He advised Bourbon of the speedy arrival of Cesaro Ferramosca with the articles for his signature, and added that Bourbon must make up his own mind about his answer; if he thought fit to advance, let him do so; if Lannoy felt strong enough, he also, when things had gone far enough, could advance against Rome but great caution was needed. It was natural that such a message should suggest to the imperial generals a way of escape from their pressing difficulties. Why should not they advance, and extract from the Pope's terror at least the terms which Lannoy had first demanded, the payment of 200,000 or 300,000 ducats which were so sorely needed for their troops? The Duke of Ferrara was consulted and warmly approved of this device; but its execution was left to be determined by events.

On March 23 Cesaro Ferramosca arrived with the articles of the treaty; and on the 25th Bourbon summoned the captains of the army, and ordered Ferramosca to explain to them his commission. They answered that they must lay the matter before their several companies. The Spaniards at once declared their wish to advance, even without pay; they would not turn back till they had been paid in full. The Germans, whom Bourbon had promised to pay on April 20, at first were ready to obey. But the Spaniards told them that the alternative, of invading the Venetian and advancing against Rome. Still it does not seem that any of the onlookers saw the gravity of the situation. The English envoy, Casale, and the Spanish secretary, Speron, both thought that, after a hostile demonstration against Rome, the imperialist troops would pass on to Naples, which they would hold in pledge for their arrears of pay. Perez hoped that the Neapolitan troops
would advance and keep Bourbon's forces from pillaging Rome. Such was the general uncertainty that the goods of many of the Florentine citizens were being brought into Rome for safe custody, while the Papal troops were marching out to hold Viterbo against the approaching army.

On May 3 came the news that Bourbon had passed Viterbo, and the alarm was great in Rome. Preparations for defence were still carried on by Renzo da Ceri; but Clement doubted the military powers of the Roman citizens. At one time he thought of going forth to address them, but his courage failed. Men were busy packing up their goods to send to Ancona, but were stayed from flight by the Pope's orders, and no one was allowed to quit the city. Clement was still of good courage. He thought that Bourbon could not attack the city till he had brought his artillery from Siena; before that could be done, the army of the league would march southwards, and force him to retire to Naples.

On May 4, Bourbon was at Isola Farnese, six miles from Rome. He expected to receive a messenger from the Pope, proposing terms of peace and offering money. His generals were uneasy at the prospect before them; if they failed to take Rome, they would be lost; if they succeeded, they knew the fearful pillage that would follow, and dreaded its results. Bourbon listened to their representations, and on the morning of May 3 sent a trumpeter with a letter to the Pope. His messenger was not allowed to enter the city, and no answer was returned to the letter. Renzo da Ceri was confident that, with the 3000 men under his command, he could defend the walls against a rabble of famished soldiers, destitute of artillery. Bourbon saw that this was a point for immediate decision, and wished to lead his soldiers to the assault in the evening. But they were wearied with marching and pleaded for rest. The enterprise was put off till the following morning. Then he cheered his troops by pointing out that all things were possible to men of valour. Behind them was the army of the league; around them was hunger and poverty; before them lay Rome and riches; there was no way to cross the Tiber, except by the bridges of Rome.

In the grey dawn of May 5 Bourbon’s forces advanced to the attack, carrying such ladders as they found in the neighboring vineyards. They chose the part where the walls were lowest, on the summit of the Vatican hill, between the gates of San Pancrazio and Santo Spirito. At first the fire of the defenders of the wall played heavily upon the assailants, and the cannon of the Castle of S. Angelo scattered their ranks. But the beams of the rising sun caused a dense fog, under cover of which the imperialists advanced noiselessly, and the fire from the walls was rendered ineffective. The Duke of Bourbon was foremost in the assault, and when he reached the walls seized a ladder and called to his men to follow. Scarcely had he placed his foot upon it before a ball from a musket struck him in the groin, and he fell to the ground. He was borne from the field, and lived long enough to receive the last sacraments, and express his wish that the Prince of Orange should succeed to his command. Then he died, murmuring in his last agony: “To Rome; to Rome”.

The fall of their leader only increased the fury of his followers; and the attack became so fierce in so many places that the defenders grew bewildered. When a few Spanish soldiers appeared unexpectedly on the walls of the Borgo a cry was raised: “The enemy are in the city”, and every one fled to seek safety for himself. The Spaniards pursued with the shout of: “España! España! Ammazza! Ammazza!”. Some of the fugitives made for the Ponte Sisto, hoping to find safety across the Tiber; others
fled to the Castle of S. Angelo, where they found the entrance blocked by a struggling crowd of Cardinals, prelates, officials of the Court, merchants and women. Those who came first were lucky in gaining entrance; at last the bewildered guard with difficulty let down the rusty portcullis and closed the gate. Cardinal Pucci was pushed down in the scramble and seriously injured; but some of his household managed to push him in through a window. Cardinal Armellino, who had been left outside, was placed in a basket and drawn up to the top of the castle by a rope. Clement, who was on his knees in his chapel, was warned by the shouts and shrieks of pursuers and pursued that it was time for flight. He just succeeded in escaping from the Vatican; for "had he stayed long enough to say three creeds", wrote an eye-witness, "he would have been taken". Already muskets were being fired outside, when Clement hurried along the gallery which led from the Vatican to the Castle. He wept and moaned that everybody had betrayed him. Paolo Giovio gathered up his train and carried it that he might run faster, throwing over the Pope’s head and shoulders his own violet cloak, lest the white color of the Papal vestments might attract attention. He was followed by thirteen Cardinals and most of the officials of the Court.

At first only the Borgo was taken; and Renzo da Ceri still hoped to save the rest of the city. He went to the Capitol, and proposed to the Council that they should break down the bridges, and defend the southern walls against the Colonna, if they attempted to enter. But the Romans were not prepared for heroic measures. They would not sacrifice their beautiful bridges; and they did not see their way to exclude the Colonna, who were Roman citizens like themselves. They still thought that, by deserting the Pope and placing themselves under the protection of the imperialist party, they would escape more easily than by fighting. In the midst of their hesitation, a trumpeter was dispatched from the Borgo, summoning Trastevere to surrender. Renzo refused to parley, and led such troops as would follow him to the defence of Trastevere, which was the next object of the enemy's attack. But in this condition of divided policy, his troops offered no effective resistance. As soon as they were assailed by a volley of musketry from the vineyards on the Janiculum, they threw away their arms and fled over the Ponte Sisto. Renzo and a few French soldiers made their way to the Castle of S. Angelo. By two o'clock in the afternoon the fighting was over. Shortly afterwards Guido Rangone arrived with 800 trained soldiers to help the Romans, but finding that all resistance had ceased could do nothing save retire.

Clement was now ready to open negotiations; and at first the imperialist captains, uncertain of the difficulties which might still be before them, were inclined to listen. But when they saw that the efforts of the defence had ceased, they moved in military order to the Porta Settimiana, and thence to the Ponte Sisto, slaying all who came in their way. After crossing the bridge, they encamped for the night in the Piazza Navona and the Campo dei Fiori.

Then began a scene of unimaginable horror. A horde of 40,000 ruffians, free from all restraint, gratified their elemental lusts and passions at the expense of the most cultivated population in the world. They were worse than barbarians, for they possessed all the vices of depraved civilization. Brutalized by hardships, by poverty, by suffering; of different nations, Germans, Spaniards, Italians; they were held together by no common bond save that of boundless cupidity and wild desire. Rome was at the mercy, not of a conquering army, but of a host of demons inspired only with avarice, cruelty, and lust. As soon as the soldiers found that resistance was over, they rushed like a pack of wolves upon the defenseless houses, whose trembling masters were standing at the
doors, offering quarters and begging for mercy. No heed was paid to their prayers. They were slain, or seized and maltreated, that they might show where their riches were concealed. No age nor sex was spared. The women were violated, till fathers slew their daughters out of compassion, and mothers tore out their own eyes that they might no longer be witnesses of the terrible scenes around them. Each nationality among the soldiers contributed its worst qualities to the utter depravation of the rest. The Germans were the most ferocious at first; and the Lutherans amongst them set an example, which was quickly followed, of disregard of holy places. The Spaniards excelled in deliberate cruelty. The Italians were the most inventive, and hounded on their comrades to new fields of discovery. Those who had taken refuge in churches were dragged out by the Lutherans; vestments, ornaments, and relics were seized by greedy hands. Monasteries were stormed and sacked; nuns were violated in the streets. Those who tried to barricade their houses were besieged and burned out. There was no distinction made between friend or foe. Spaniards, Flemings, and Germans resident in Rome were treated like the rest. The best that could befall them was to be made prisoners and escape with a heavy ransom. The streets were filled with the dying and the dead, amidst whom the soldiers staggered to and fro laden with heavy bundles of spoil. The groans of the dying were only interrupted by the blasphemies of the soldiers, and the shrieks of agonizing women who were being violated or hurled out of the windows.

For three days this indiscriminate butchery and pillage raged unchecked. On the fourth day the quarrels about the division of booty made it possible to re-establish some sort of discipline. Further slaughter was forbidden, and the soldiers were told to enjoy what they possessed. The Germans were ready to obey, and turned to drunkenness and buffoonery. Clad in magnificent vestments and decked with jewels, accompanied by their concubines, who were bedizened with like ornaments, they rode on mules through the streets, and imitated with drunken gravity the processions of the Papal Court. The Spaniards were not so easily contented. They had no pleasure in anti-Papal demonstrations; they were devout sons of the Church and respected holy places, when it was not inconvenient. But they were determined to use to the full the opportunity which was in their power for gathering riches. They had gleaned the field most diligently; but there still remained the discovery of secret hoards of wealth, and the possibility of extracting ransoms from those who had possessions or friends elsewhere. For this purpose they had recourse to every refinement of cruelty. They hung up their prisoners by the arms; they thrust hot irons into their flesh, or pointed sticks beneath their fingers; they pulled out their teeth one by one, and invented divers means of ingenious mutilation.

The Cardinals of the imperialist party, who had trusted that they would be treated as friends, had reason to regret their confidence. The Cardinal of Siena, in spite of his ancestral devotion to the imperial side, had to pay a ransom to the Spaniards; he was then seized by the Germans, who dragged him naked through the streets, beating him with their fists till he agreed to pay them 5000 ducats. The Cardinal of Araceli met with still more ignominious treatment. The Germans laid him on a bier, and bore him through the streets as dead; they placed the bier in a church and celebrated mock obsequies, singing ribald songs over the pretended corpse, and attributing to him every form of vice. Other Cardinals were taken for enforced rides, mounted behind a trooper, amid the jeers of his comrades. The inferior prelates fared still worse. A lanzknecht was pulling off the episcopal ring from a bishop’s finger, when a corporal exclaimed: “I will
...show you a shorter way”. Drawing his dragger, he hacked off the finger, drew the ring, and flung the finger into the prisoner’s face.

Some refuge was provided for men of position by the arrival in Rome of Cardinal Colonna on May 10. He came full of exultation at the chastisement which had befallen the Pope, who had attacked his house; but when he saw the miserable condition of the city he burst into tears, and did his utmost to mitigate the universal distress. Though his authority was of small avail, yet his palace was a secure refuge; and there the luckless Cardinals found a home when they could contrive to escape from the hands of their persecutors. But the security of the Colonna palace was only due to the troops who accompanied the Cardinal and defended the gates against assailants. No other house was secure. The ambassador of Portugal, nephew of the king, refused to pay a ransom, and trusted in the strength of his palace and the protection of the Portuguese flag. The gates were carried by assault; all who had taken shelter were dragged away; everything was plundered; and the ambassador himself, captured half naked, was only rescued from personal indignity by the intervention of Juan de Urbina, and the promise to pay 14,000 ducats. The Markgraf of Brandenburg, resident in Rome, was made prisoner. The Marchioness of Mantua saved her palace with difficulty by the intervention of her son, who was a captain in the imperial army; but all the Romans who had taken refuge there were held to ransom; and the Marchioness was subject to such threats from the lanzknechts that she thought it prudent to set sail from Ostia as soon as she could. Even the Emperor’s secretary, Perez, had to purchase security by paying 2000 ducats, for which a couple of Spanish soldiers agreed to guard his house. He could only express his thankfulness to heaven that he had escaped so easily.

While such was the miserable fate of the Papal capital, the Pope remained shut up in the Castle of S. Angelo. His conduct throughout this crisis showed the same vacillation which always marked him. He took no personal part in anything that concerned the defence of Rome. He did not venture to summon the citizens, or visit the walls, or exhort his soldiers. He did not even try to save the Papal dignity by timely flight, that by his presence he might hasten the tardy advance of the army of the league. When the enemy was inside the city, he made no effective efforts to come to terms. During the terrible days of pillage he sat waiting for the arrival of the relieving army, and made no effort of his own to intercede. Trusting in the strength of the Castle of S. Angelo, he hoped to gain time by negotiating. On May 7 he requested that someone might be sent to arrange terms. Juan Bartolome de Gattinara arrived for that purpose, and found Clement seated weeping amongst his thirteen Cardinals. He whined out that all his misfortunes had come through his trust in Lannoy; he was no longer in a condition to think of defence, and placed himself and the Cardinals in the hands of the Emperor. Gattinara consoled him with the reflection that his misfortunes arose chiefly from his own fault in not sending money in time to pay the army; now he had no course open except submission, and Gattinara undertook to arrange terms. He did his best; but Clement was only seeking to gain time and still hoped that the Duke of Urbino would come to his relief. For four days Gattinara was employed in running to and fro, while Clement exercised his ingenuity in raising objections to the form in which the capitulation was drawn up. Finally the lanzknechts interfered, and declared that they would not consent to leave Rome till they had received their arrears of pay amounting to 300,000 ducats. They did not see why the Pope, and those who had shut themselves up in the castle, should escape on easier terms than their less fortunate brethren. Clement declared that he had not with him more than 10,000 ducats; and negotiations came to a
standstill, while imploring letters were sent to the Duke of Urbino to hasten his advance. But the duke was as dilatory as ever; and his delay gave the imperial leaders time to restore military discipline in their army, which had been demoralized by its rapid success. They pointed out the dangers to be apprehended from a sudden attack, and gathered forces enough to blockade the Castle of S. Angelo. The generals also were anxious to assure themselves of their victory by having the Pope a prisoner in their hands; they were ready to make themselves personally liable for the pay of the lanknkechts and trust to recover from the Pope later. On May 18 Clement was prepared to sign the capitulation; but when Gattinara went for his signature on the next day he found that new difficulties were raised. After much debate Clement at last exclaimed: “I wish to deal fairly with you. I have made a capitulation which is little to my honor, and would willingly escape from the disgrace. I hear that the army of the league is close at hand, and I ask for a term of six days to see if I am succored. When a fortress is summoned to surrender such a condition is generally granted”. Gattinara answered that such a proposal would show the imperial captains that the negotiations had only been a device to gain time; they would break off further dealings, and would assault the castle; if they took it there would be no place for repentance, but the Apostolic See would be ruined forever. This caused great consternation, and the Pope consulted with his advisers what he should do. The French and English ambassadors, Alberto Carpi and Gregory Casale, induced him to adhere to his demand for a delay of six days. The imperialists dug a deep trench round the castle and reduced it to a state of siege; at the same time the sense of approaching danger brought the soldiers increasingly back to their military duties.

The army of the league set out from Florence on May 3; but it was not till the 22nd that the Duke of Urbino reached Isola. He did not venture to attack the of the enemy; for his troops could not be depended on and many of them deserted. The Colonna carried on a series of skirmishes, in which they were generally successful; and the army of the league began to suffer from want of food. The strict blockade of the Castle of S. Angelo prevented the Pope from holding communication with his lukewarm friends. It soon became evident that the siege would not be raised by the efforts of the Duke of Urbino; and Clement was obliged to re-open negotiations for surrender. He made one last attempt to gain better terms by summoning to Rome Lannoy, who arrived on May 28. Clement hoped that Lannoy’s presence might introduce discord amongst the imperialists. Since Bourbon's death no one held the Emperor's commission as general of the army. Juan de Urbina was most popular with the Spanish soldiers; but the Prince of Orange declared that he would serve under no one without the Emperor's orders, and he was allowed to exercise the authority of chief commander. But Lannoy, as Viceroy of Naples, might claim to be supreme; and Clement endeavored to gain time by demanding his ratification as a necessary guarantee. Lannoy, however, was powerless before the army, who looked on him with disfavor, as the man who had already tried to interfere with their plans of dealing with the Pope; so after a few days’ sojourn in Rome Lannoy, fearing for his personal safety, withdrew to Civita Lavigna.

Clement was now at the end of his resources. The army of the league was useless, and on June 2 withdrew to Viterbo. Lannoy was useless. The imperial army did not disband, in spite of pestilence and the difficulty of obtaining food. The siege of the castle was steadily maintained, and the provisions of the besieged began to fail. There was nothing for the Pope save to agree to the terms which he had vainly striven to escape. On June 5 he signed the capitulation, by which he placed himself and his
Cardinals in the hands of the imperial generals; agreed to pay in installments 400,000 ducats for the payment of the army; surrendered Ostia, Civita Vecchia, Modena, Parma, and Piacenza; restored the Colonna; and revoked all censures and excommunications incurred by those engaged in war against the Apostolic See. On June 7 the garrison of S. Angelo marched out and was escorted on its way from Rome. A garrison of Spaniards and Germans took its place. The Pope was thus a prisoner in the Emperor's hands.

It was a question how the Emperor had best use his power, and the advice tendered to him by those on the spot is full of interest. It shows that Luther and the German rebels only spoke out what everybody felt, when they maintained that the relation of national Churches to the Papacy was a matter of convenience, to be determined on grounds of expediency. The defenders of the Papacy frankly admitted that they upheld it in their own interests, and that the form in which it should exist depended simply on political considerations. “We are waiting”, wrote Gattinara from Rome on June 8, “to know how your majesty intends the city of Rome to be governed: whether it is to be some sort of Apostolic Seat or no. The opinion of many of your majesty's servants is that the Apostolic Seat should not be entirely removed from Rome; for then the King of France will set up a patriarch in his kingdom, and deny obedience to the Apostolic Seat; the King of England will do likewise, and so will all other Christian princes. The opinion of your majesty's servants is that it would be best to keep the Apostolic Seat so low that your majesty can always dispose of it and command it. Provision should be made for this purpose at once, lest the officials and members of the Curia leave the city, and so reduce it to nothing by removing all its business. The Pope and Cardinals have asked me to inform your majesty on this point; as they think your majesty does not wish the Apostolic Seat to be entirely ruined”.

This was the opinion of the moderate men amongst the Spaniards in Italy. More advanced opinion was expressed by Lope de Soria, ambassador at Genoa, who regarded the sack of Rome as a judgment of God, and looked forward to the prospect of a real reformation of the Church. Let the Emperor take to himself the lands of the Papacy, and reduce the Pope to the discharge of spiritual functions only.

Charles, however, was not the man to commit himself to any far-reaching scheme without counting the cost. He had been quite willing that Bourbon should inflict some chastisement on the Pope, and wrote to him, before he heard the news of his death: “I do not know what you may have done with the Pope; but what I desire is a good peace. I hope you will take care not to be deceived, and will prevail on the Pope to take the trouble to come here for the purpose of establishing definitely a universal peace”. When the news of what had actually happened first reached him, he doubtless wished that the success of his army had not been quite so complete. But he had an answer ready to the remonstrances which he received —an answer which breathed the old spirit of imperial superiority to the Papacy, and manifested the intention of using the opportunity to the full. He set forth his services to Christendom, and especially to the Papacy; he had defended the Papal power in Germany, and his efforts had been requited by the friendship of Leo X and Adrian VI; Clement had thought fit to break the peace made by the treaty of Madrid, and raise an Italian league for the purpose of attacking the kingdom of Naples. The Emperor's protests were disregarded; the truce made with Moncada was broken; the Emperor was compelled to send troops to succour Naples; those troops, knowing the Papal capacity for deceit, were unwilling to accept the truce made with Lannoy, though the Emperor would have been contented with it; they seized Rome and wrought much damage, though the extent of that damage had been greatly
exaggerated. This had happened without the will of any one—a manifest sign that it was the judgment of God—though the Emperor regretted it so much that he would rather have been defeated than win such a victory. However, as such was the pleasure of God, who from great evil works still greater good, Charles was determined to carry on his work for the good of Christendom and the welfare of the Church.

Charles, in fact, did not find his position immediately improved by the capture of the Pope. Already, before his success in Italy, there were negotiations proceeding in England for a close alliance between Henry and Francis; and Wolsey prepared the way by proposing to the Emperor a modification of the treaty of Madrid, which Charles was not inclined to accept. Francis wished to obtain the restoration of his sons, and the commutation of the claim for Burgundy into a money payment. When Charles was stubborn, Francis turned to the English alliance; and the captivity of the Pope gave an additional color to the interests of the contracting parties. In the festivities wherewith the French Court celebrated the alliance in June, “there was a play of shepherds which brought in the ruin of Rome”. Francis showed his earnestness by sending an army of 20,000 men under Lautrec, who entered North Italy in the beginning of August. He did not, however, pay much heed to the exhortations of the Papal nuncio, who implored him to march straight to Naples, where he would find an easy victory, and whence he could march against Lombardy at his pleasure. He preferred the more straightforward course of taking things in the order in which they came, and after capturing Alessandria, Vigevano, and other smaller places, laid siege to Milan, which was driven to surrender early in October.

Thus, in military matters, the position of the Emperor in Italy was by no means strong. Lannoy surveyed the situation with tolerable accuracy in a letter written on August 18. “The imperial forces in Lombardy can scarcely defend Milan. The army in the States of the Church, through want of pay, is so out of discipline that it will be very difficult to bring it into order again. The Pope still hopes that your majesty's affairs will not go well in Italy; and indeed they never stood in greater danger. I have no good account of the Duke of Ferrara: I fear the French king will win him over by great promises. The Pope is glad of any trouble caused to your majesty; because it will be easier for him to settle with your majesty, who have for your enemies all the potentates of the world, and have no money wherewith to sustain so great a war. Therefore, if things could be secured by making peace with the Pope, I should advise to make some honorable agreement with his holiness. There are, however, two reasons against it: one, that his holiness has offended in many ways, and has been grievously offended, and there is no sufficient security by which your majesty can be sure of his friendship; the other is that, whatever his holiness agrees to, he cannot secure that, if the affairs of the league prosper in Lombardy, their forces will not invade Naples. Now that Lombardy is being assailed, I think the safest course is for me to take the Pope into the kingdom; and there I will try to bring his holiness to the necessary point, and will advise your majesty that you may be able to judge how to deal with him finally”.

This was the method of dealing with the Pope that was suggested by the exigencies of Italian politics. But his position as head of the Church opened out other considerations. Francis and Henry were, of course, greatly shocked at the Pope’s captivity, and put his liberation as one of the objects of their league. Henry had a strong motive for wishing to lay the Pope under an obligation. Wolsey was sent to France that he might settle with Francis the future of Europe. Amongst the subjects of deliberation was the prevention of Charles' supposed plan of summoning a General Council,
depriving the Pope, and translating the Holy See to Spain or Germany. To prevent this it was proposed that the Cardinals who were at liberty should be summoned to meet Wolsey in France, and there should confer about the government of the Church during the Pope's captivity. Wolsey, on his arrival at Calais in July, proclaimed a fast on behalf of the Pope's liberation, that the Emperor's mind might be moved by a universal display of popular sorrow.

When Wolsey reached Paris he laid his scheme before the Papal nuncio, Cardinal Salviati, who at first was completely carried away by its plausibility. He quite agreed that a convention of Cardinals in France might provide for the preservation of the States of the Church, work for the Pope's liberation, and arrange such matters as the Pope's captivity prevented him from attending to. Such a display of energy would be an assertion of the indestructible vitality of the Church, and would show the Emperor that he could not hope, by keeping the Pope a prisoner, to dispose of the spiritual jurisdiction of the Papacy.

Wolsey's diplomacy was as usual wonderfully successful; he arranged a marriage between Mary of England and the eldest son of Francis; he settled all the details of the treaty which was to unite England and France in a perpetual peace; he received the highest marks of favor from the French king, who revealed to him the proposals of the Emperor, and exchanged ciphers, as a guarantee that neither party would carry on secret negotiations with the imperial Court. When this had been accomplished Wolsey turned to the Papal question in the middle of August, and slowly disclosed his plans to the astonished Cardinals who had come to Compiègne to meet him. Wolsey had a scheme for protecting the Papacy from undue pressure by the Emperor; and his scheme was practically a proposal that the Papacy should place itself in the hands of Henry and Francis. He suggested, purely as a provisional measure, that himself should be appointed Papal Vicar, with full power to grant dispensations and the like. "See", exclaimed the luckless Salviati, "to what straits we are reduced; but if the Pope be set free there will be a remedy for all".

However, Salviati did his best to hinder Wolsey's schemes. He approached the French Chancellor Duprat with an offer of a Cardinal's hat, which he said the Pope had determined to give him on the first occasion possible; he was horrified to receive the answer that Wolsey had already made a similar promise, and that Wolsey's promise was better than the Pope's. However much he might trust that the good understanding between France and England would not last long, he saw that Wolsey had taken the curb between his teeth and could not be checked at present. He dreaded lest any opposition should lead to an immediate withdrawal of obedience on the part of France and England; and to avoid this disaster he thought it wise to dissemble for the purpose of gaining time. So the first definite move in Wolsey's game was agreed to by the French Cardinals present at Compiègne, who on September 16 signed a protest, declaring that they would never consent to any alienation of ecclesiastical lands, or to any creation of Cardinals, made while the Pope was in the Emperor's power; in the case of the Pope's death they would not recognize an election made in Rome; they besought the Pope to supply his own absence by entrusting his power and authority to another, who could take steps to meet the pressing necessity of immediate disaster.

It was clear that the imprisonment of the Pope was raising awkward questions, which would be settled on political and personal grounds. Ecclesiastical tradition had no more weight in France and England than in rebellious Germany.
Meanwhile the Pope remained helpless in the Castle of S. Angelo, receiving the news of repeated disaster. The severest blow was the first to fall. Florence wearied of the government of a Cardinal in the name of two illegitimate youths of the Medici house, and smarting under the heavy taxation imposed in the interests of the Pope, welcomed the news of the occupation of Rome, drove out the Medici, and restored its old form of popular government, with Niccolò Capponi as Gonfalonier. This was followed by the occupation of the cautionary towns, Ostia and Civita Vecchia, by the imperial troops. The Duke of Ferrara seized the opportunity of annexing Modena and Reggio, and then, having gained all that he could from the imperial alliance, veered round to the side of the league. The Venetians took Ravenna and Cervia, lest they should fall to the Duke of Ferrara. The Malatesta family again showed signs of life, and possessed themselves of Rimini and Imola. The Papal dominions were being dismembered on every side.

In Rome itself everything was in confusion. Pillage and carnage produced the usual result of famine and plague. Already on June 23, the death rate averaged two hundred a day, and food was hard to get. But the soldiers refused to leave Rome till they had been paid; and there was no man in the position of responsible leader. The first object of the Pope was to raise the money which he had promised; and in this he was helped by Lannoy, who wished to dispatch the troops to succor the army of Lombardy. For this purpose, a proposal was made to the Pope that Cardinal Colonna should be appointed Governor of Rome, and also receive legatine power. Clement answered that the army might do as it pleased, but must not ask for his consent. The difficulty of raising money caused delay; and the plague raged fiercely, till on July 1 the daily tale of deaths reached seven hundred. The soldiers murmured, and again became mutinous, so that the Prince of Orange withdrew from Rome, and such authority as there was ceased to exist. A detachment of the army retired, and encamped at Narni, still clamoring for money. The office of commander was offered to the Duke of Ferrara, who refused it. The captains of the imperial army, wearied with the long delay, summoned Lannoy to Rome, that he might give surety for the Papal payments; otherwise they threatened to advance into the kingdom of Naples. Lannoy, alarmed at this prospect, raised all the money that he could, and brought renewed pressure to bear on the Pope, who wept and entreated that he be put under no new restrictions. “It is disgrace enough”, he said, “that the three bare-footed friars who remain with me can only feed themselves by borrowing. I leave it to you to judge if this be honorable to the Emperor”. Attempts to devise means for satisfying the demands of the soldiers were wearily continued; till in the middle of September there was great fear that the exasperated troops would again take possession of Rome. The Germans threatened to set the city on fire, or sell it to the Venetians, or take the Pope's side, so that the Emperor should have no profit from his victory. To add to the difficulties Lannoy died on September 23, and was replaced by Moncada.

As yet the Emperor had given no sign of his intentions to his representatives in Italy. But on September 19 arrived at Naples Pierre de Veyre, bearing instructions to the Viceroy. He was bidden to induce the Pope, if possible to come to Spain; if not, to reestablish him in the possession of his spiritual functions; in regard to the temporal power, he was to take care that the Emperor was not deceived as he had been in the past; the Pope was to be reduced to a condition in which he would have no power to do harm, if he had the will. The death of Lannoy left the full responsibility of carrying out these instructions to Veyre, who was impressed with the dangers of the existing situation of affairs. There were rumors that the Duke of Ferrara was trying to persuade
the Germans to carry off the Pope to Lombardy; the duke was tending towards the league, and had said when he refused the command of the army: “When the Emperor pays his men it will be time enough for me to command them”. On the other hand, there were suspicions that Cardinal Colonna was inciting the Germans to mutiny, in hope that the Pope might be murdered. There was also a possibility that in the existing confusion the Pope might make his escape. Veyre therefore proposed to begin negotiations at once, and bind the Pope by strong guarantees before setting him at liberty. This conclusion was hastened by the action of the Germans, who on September 25 marched back to Rome and demanded of Alarcon, who was in charge of the Castle of S. Angelo, that the hostages given by the Pope should be handed over to their keeping as security for their pay. Alarcon had no means of resisting the demand, and sent word to the Pope, who replied that he would consult the Cardinals. Alarcon saw that delay would inevitably lead to another outburst of pillage. He was ill in bed, but dragged himself into the Pope's council chamber and angrily demanded the hostages at once. In vain Clement pleaded that he had already paid what was due, and had mortgaged the revenues of the States of the Church for the remainder. Alarcon insisted; and the hostages were dragged away amidst the groans and lamentations of the assembled Cardinals. Clement saw torn from him his trusted adviser, Giberti, his relatives, Jacopo Salviati and Lorenzo Ridolfi, besides Mario Montano, Archbishop of Siponto, Onofrio Bartolini, Archbishop of Pisa, and Antonio Pucci, Bishop of Pistoia. They were imprisoned in the palace of Cardinal Colonna.

In this extremity of personal sorrow, Clement made an appeal to the humanity of the man whom he had progress so greatly injured, Cardinal Colonna, saying that only the spear of Achilles could avail to heal the wound which it had made. On October 2 Colonna went to S. Angelo, and was received with every display of affection by the Pope. Next day arrived Veyre and the Emperor's confessor, Fray Alfonso Quinones, who was well known to the Pope. Veyre brought with him 30,000 ducats, but did not think it wise to give it to the soldiers without a promise that they would withdraw. When no further payment was made, the soldiers held a meeting on October 8, after which they rushed to the Colonna palace, seized the hostages, put them in irons two and two together, and dragged them through the streets, threatening to slay them if money were not at once forthcoming. It was with difficulty that Cardinal Colonna could obtain permission to supply them with food. After this demonstration the soldiers announced that, if they did not receive 50,000 ducats in five days, the hostages would be put to death.

This quickened the desire of every one to come to terms, and discover guarantees which would satisfy the army and the Emperor alike. Cardinal Colonna offered to sell or mortgage his office of Chancellor; and messengers were sent on every side to raise money. This, however, was not very fruitful of results; but, luckily for the hostages, a diversion was made by the Abbot of Farfa, Napoleone Orsini, who from his stronghold at Bracciano began to pillage the stragglers of the army. This led to a military expedition, and strengthened the influence of the captains, who on October 21 agreed to furnish as much money as they could, if the Pope would find banks which would give security for its repayment. This proposal also came to nothing; and the month of November was spent in endeavoring to satisfy the claims of the Emperor and of the army. On October 31 the Pope became restive; whereupon he received orders to prepare for a journey to Naples, and to leave behind him three Cardinals as hostages. Clement tried to pluck up his courage and say that he would go; but he broke down, and left the
Congregation overcome by tears. While Veyre represented the interests of the Emperor, Alarcon and Cardinal Colonna strove to reduce the demands of the soldiers. There were frequent riots and mutinies, which were quelled by the Marquis of Guasto and Don Juan de Urbina. Urbina was once in imminent peril of his life. As he was addressing his men, one of them leveled his arquebus at him. Luckily the match fell to the ground; and Urbina restored order by killing the mutineer with his own hand.

Clement, true to his shifty character, tried to help himself by spreading discord in the army. He sent a message to the Germans asking their advice; he said that he was powerless against the Spaniards, who had deprived him of all his resources both in Rome and throughout his dominions. His feeble effort failed ignominiously. The German captains informed Cardinal Colonna of the Papal intervention. When Clement was taxed with it, he could not deny his message, but said that its only object was to procure better treatment of the hostages. Clement knew well enough that it was more important for the Emperor to induce the soldiers to march into Lombardy against Lautrec than to keep himself a prisoner in the castle. He still hoped that Lautrec might march to his deliverance; and the imperialists were not without their fears. Hence the imperialists were more desirous to free Rome from military licence than was the Pope, and were fertile in devices for enabling the Pope to raise money. Moncada proposed that five Neapolitan Cardinals should be created for a payment of 20,000 ducats apiece. This source of revenue, together with what could be raised in Rome and Naples, would produce 150,000 ducats, which were immediately necessary. But Moncada found that the Cardinalate was not readily saleable, on the doubtful security which he could offer. Only three prelates would accept it; and they would only deposit 10,000 ducats each, on condition that they were not given to the Pope till he was free and they had received their hats; the remaining 10,000 ducats would be paid when their creations were published. On the strength of this security, Cardinal Colonna offered the Germans 49,000 ducats in ten days; if on the receipt of that sum they would consent to the Pope’s release, he promised 68,000 ducats more in fifteen days from that time. The Germans demanded an additional 17,000 ducats in the first instance, and to this the Pope assented.

There was now a basis for arranging the definite points of the two agreements between the Pope and the Emperor, and the Pope and the army. The latter, as being more immediately pressing, was taken in hand first; but when the provisions were laid before the Pope on November 23 he raised some not unnatural objections. One article provided that the soldiers, who had extorted from their Roman captives houses or lands as part payment of their ransoms, should not be molested in the possession of their ill-gotten gains. Clement declared that he would not accept this; he rose from the table in anger saying: “I will speak no more of my liberation”. But this resolute attitude lasted only for a night, and Clement accepted what he could not avoid. When the agreement with the Emperor was under discussion. Cardinal Colonna wished that the restoration of the Colonna family should be included. But Quiñones objected, on the ground that it would seem as though the Emperor exerted pressure on the Pope for his own political interests. He proposed instead a clause which restored to the Pope all the lands of the Church, save those given in security to the Emperor and the lands held by the Colonna. With this the Cardinal was satisfied.

The general result of this protracted discussion was that the Pope paid 66,000 ducats to obtain his freedom; agreed to pay 300,000 within three months; promised not to oppose the Emperor in Italy; granted him permission to levy a crusade in Spain; gave
him the ecclesiastical tithes of Naples, valued at 500,000 ducats, on condition that half of that sum was to go in payment of the Pope's debt; left in his hands Ostia, Civita Vecchia, Civita Castellana and Forli as guarantees; and further handed over five Cardinals as hostages, three of whom were to go to Naples as a pledge to the Emperor, while two were to be left with Cardinal Colonna as a pledge to the army. Clement was so weary of discussion that at last he exclaimed: “Give me the treaty, I will sign it at once without hearing any more”. It was accordingly signed on the evening of November 26.

Clement was not so overwhelmed with shame that he could not see the comic side of the situation. One of the hostages mentioned was Cardinal Trivulzi, who had no ambition for that distinction, but slipped out of the Pope's chamber with the Marquis de Guasto, put on a civilian's dress, and tried to pass the sentries. He was recognized and was taken to Alarcon, who put him under arrest. When Clement heard of it, he asked that he should be allowed to go free in the castle as before, and laughed heartily at the confusion of the Cardinal when he appeared in his presence.

Next day Veyre set out for Naples to procure Moncada's signature to the treaty. He carried with him also the three Cardinals' hats which were a necessary portion of the agreement. During his absence the Germans again mutinied, dragged the hostages to the Campo dei Fiori, where they erected a gallows, and threatened to hang them. They were only saved by a promise of payment on the next day. Cardinal Colonna was so moved by their danger that he devised a scheme for their escape from prison. Their keepers were quieted with a copious repast, while the prisoners were drawn up through the chimney with ropes. At first the troops were furious at their escape; but possibly the thought that other hostages were provided by the new treaty assuaged their anger. The Cardinals Trivulzi, Pisani and Gaddi were given to Alarcon, and Orsini and Cesi to Colonna on December 6. The money was paid; the Spanish garrison withdrew from S. Angelo; and the Roman clergy flocked to S. Peter's to sing a Te Deum in thankfulness for the Pope's release.

When the treaty was signed, it was assumed that the Pope would remain in Rome till the army had marched out. But Clement announced his intention of going to Orvieto, on the ground that there it would be easier for him to raise money: were he to stay in Rome it might be said that he was still under restraint.

Quiñones approved of this determination; the imperial generals agreed, and offered an escort. But Clement was afraid lest the soldiers at the last moment should raise objections to his departure. On the evening of the 6th, disguised as a merchant and followed by a servant, he crept out of the castle, and through a postern in the Vatican garden, where Ludovico Gonzaga was waiting for him with a horse. Rapidly mounting, the Pope rode through the darkness of the night to Capranica, and the next morning to Orvieto. The imperial leaders were glad to be rid of him; but they knew they could not trust him. There was nothing to do save to let him go; if they kept him a prisoner much longer the Papal authority would crumble away. The Italian Cardinals had met at Parma, and through them the league would establish a Papal Vicar for Italy; while Wolsey and the French Cardinals would set up a Vicar of their own. So Clement was allowed to go to Orvieto, helpless, at all events for the present; with only one fixed purpose in his mind, that he would not again run the risk of falling into the hands of the Spaniards. Otherwise, he could only watch the advance of Lautrec, and devise means for gaining back the towns which he had lost.
There was, however, a troublesome piece of business which the English king had laid before him, from which, perhaps, some advantage might be gained. Clement little knew that his attempts to manage that business for the purpose of his political necessities were destined to bring upon the Papacy more irretrievable disaster than the revolt of Germany.

THE END

A HISTORY OF THE POPES FROM THE GREAT SCHISM TO THE SACK OF ROME