


THE LAST CENTURY IN EUROPE (1814-1910)



C. E. M. HAWKES WORTH

PREFACE

MANY years ago, a friend, not specially nurtured on history, but carried away by a somewhat romantic account of the early struggles of modern Bulgaria, hazarded the suggestion, in my hearing, that the nineteenth century would provide in the future the most interesting and instructive period for historical study.

The suggestion, which I have come to regard as a truism, appeared to me at the time to be highly paradoxical. My own studies had been for the most part historical, yet of the history of the nineteenth century I had obtained no more definite impression than that it constituted a flavourless compost of legislation, constitution-making, party politics and the fortunes of ministries, vitiated by obvious prejudice, and only to be made palatable by scraps of gossip from the parliamentary green-room and occasional references to Continental warfare.

No such impression can survive a detailed study of the period. Gradually the great personalities of Bismarck, Cavour, Napoleon III., and the Russian Czars disengage themselves from the mists ; the heroism of the Italian Risorgimento stirs the enthusiasm; the complications of French politics excite the curiosity; and all the international relations of today stand out in a new fight.

But these discoveries were, in my case, made slowly and with difficulty. There was no one book providing a continuous narrative of the development and mutual relations of all the European Powers, which was not either too condensed and too impersonal to be interesting, or too guarded in its conclusions, too detailed in its information, and too allusive in its references to illuminate the darkness for a beginner. Any comprehensive view of the period could only be obtained from a library. It was not difficult to understand why the school-master, the student, and the general reader had eschewed so uncharted a sea.

It was, therefore, with the hope of providing something of which I had myself felt the want, that I undertook my present task. My efforts have been strictly limited alike by the purpose I had in view and by my own restricted opportunities. I have been dependent upon the labours of others to an extent which could only be represented adequately in a mass of references at the foot of every page, a form of acknowledgment impossible in a book of this size. But I wish here to express my sense of indebtedness in a few special cases. The Cambridge Modern History has naturally provided a quantity of information not easily accessible elsewhere. For my account of Spanish affairs I have depended very largely on Mr. Butler Clarke's Modern Spain. Mr. Bolton King's History of Italian Unity, and Mr. G. M. Trevelyan's three volumes dealing with the career of Garibaldi have supplied me with the bulk of my matter for the Italian chapters. Mr. C. M. Andrewes' Historical Development of Modern Europe has been of constant service, especially for French and German affairs, and for the middle years of the century. Lastly, it would be difficult to overestimate my obligation to Dr. J. Holland Rose's Development of the European Nations. From his book much of the information for my concluding Part has been derived, and his method of treatment I have found very suggestive.

I have not hesitated to express opinions. For these, no one is responsible but myself. They are at least not intended to justify or to incriminate any political party as such, and I have made no conscious attempt to suppress facts which tell against my conclusions. I have

simply found that for purposes of criticism and arrangement a definite point of view has proved absolutely indispensable. It is only necessary to read the text-books of thirty or forty years ago to realise that the historian, no less than other enquirers, starts with certain assumptions, tacit or acknowledged; that the historical standpoint of one generation will not necessarily be that of the next; and that every change of standpoint entails a regrouping and a re-interpretation of the facts.

C. E. M. HAWKESWORTH.

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Part I.
THE ERA OF RESTORATION
THE CONCERT OF EUROPE, 1814-1830

CHAPTER I

1814

IT was on March 31, 1814, that the victorious armies of the Allies entered Paris. At the head of a splendid procession of cavalry and household troops, whose brilliant uniforms and accoutrements gave little evidence of the of the toils of two years' hard campaigning, rode Alexander I, Czar of Russia, and Frederick William III, the Prussian King. And, hostile as may have been the feelings of the proud and conquered city, there could have been scarcely one man in the dense crowds which lined the route, whose gaze was not attracted by the gracious and soldierly presence of the Czar. To him popular opinion ascribed a noble singleness of aim which had held the alliance together through its early failures and jealousies, as well as through its later successes and divergencies of interest, and had bent all its forces to the one object of making an end of the Napoleonic tyranny. Even vanquished France discerned a generous foe in one whose proclamations breathed friendship for a misguided people and a new spirit of humanity and brotherliness between the nations at large. Beside him the honest unexpressive features and stolid martial figure of Frederick William could have claimed but a pathetic interest; chief victim through his own fatal irresolution of the malignant insolence of the fallen Emperor.

That the splendour of the pageant, the unexpected lenity of the Allies and the personality of the Czar called forth some enthusiasm we may well believe, and there is little doubt that the friends of the exiled Bourbons exerted themselves to atone by extravagant demonstrations for anything that might be lacking in the popular welcome; but the balance of evidence seems to prove that the scenes of intense excitement described by Englishmen who took part in the procession were coloured by their own feelings of triumph. Small wonder if it was so. Only two years had passed since Napoleon had marched across the Russian frontier at the head of an overwhelming army to punish the last organised government on the Continent of Europe that dared assert its independence of his will; and the memories of men already middle-aged scarcely reached back to times before the long series of military successes of Revolutionary and Imperial France. With dramatic suddenness Nemesis had struck down the conqueror in his pride, and the day of deliverance had dawned. What wonder if the world was dazed and walked in dreams? We may read Alison's description of the scenes of extravagant joy as the Allied monarchs crossed the Place de la Revolution, where Louis XVI, Marie Antoinette and the *noblesse* of France had perished by the guillotine, as an indication rather of the feelings of contemporary Europe than of Parisian fickleness. There is dramatic if not historical truth in his conclusion: "The thunders of Heaven had now been launched; the Revolution had been destroyed by the effect of its own principles, and the answer of God delivered, on the spot where its greatest crimes had been committed, by the mouths of the Revolutionists themselves."

It was the supreme moment of illusion in a year of illusions, illusions soon to be forgotten. It is perhaps as much the unreality of the hopes which attended this first entry of the Allies into Paris as the greater share which England took in that second occupation, when Wellington and Blucher entered amid silent crowds at the head of the tattered and war-worn victors of Waterloo, that has diverted the attention of English readers from the earlier occasion.

Yet this was the real fall of Napoleon. His meteoric reappearance during the Hundred Days was still to bring more woe upon France and to set Europe trembling, but his European

domination ended on April 13, when, after many days of struggling against the logic of facts and the inexorable determination of his own marshals to fight no more, he set his hand to his unconditional abdication at Fontainebleau, and vainly attempted to make an end of his own life by poison.

It is necessary to form some conception of the vast area over which the Napoleonic domination had extended. Enormous territories had been incorporated with France. Along the shores of the North Sea Belgium, Holland, part of Hanover and all the coasts of Northern Germany as far as the Elbe were included within her frontiers. A like fate had befallen all the German districts west of the Middle Rhine from Basle to the Belgian borders. In northern Italy the new French frontier bisected the peninsula from north to south along the line of the Ticino and the Apennines enclosing Savoy, Piedmont, Parma, Tuscany, and the greater part of the Papal States with Rome herself, within the limits of Imperial France.

Nor did French influence end at the frontier. A whole array of dependent Kingdoms and leagues prolonged Napoleonic authority towards the East and South. In an evil day for himself the Emperor had set his brother Joseph upon the throne of Spain, ejecting the Bourbon dynasty. A Northern Italian Kingdom, with its capital at Milan, ruled by Napoleon himself through Eugene Beauharnais as Viceroy, had been founded in the Po valley, extending thence along the Adriatic coast, and embraced the districts of Lombardy and Venice north of the river, and to the south the Duchy of Modena with the Papal territories of the Romagna and The March of Ancona. The whole of the south of the peninsula as far as the Straits of Messina, part of the old Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, was ruled by Joachim Murat, one of the Emperor's marshals, with the title of King of Naples, while the dispossessed Bourbon dynasty still maintained themselves in Sicily under the protection of the British fleet. In northern Germany the Kingdom of Westphalia, under Jerome Bonaparte, lay as an outpost against the Prussian frontier on the Elbe. Further to the East large portions of the ancient Kingdom of Poland had been constituted into a Grand Duchy of Warsaw, under the ruling house of Saxony, as a centre of French influence on the borders of Russia.

Napoleon was also Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine and Mediator of the Swiss Confederation. These two leagues claim a special notice in view of subsequent events. Western Germany had consisted of a strange patch-work of small sovereign states, principedoms, bishoprics and the minute territories of Imperial Knights and of Free Cities, owing an ill-defined and precarious allegiance to the Hapsburg Emperor at Vienna. It was the object of Napoleon's policy to "denationalise Germany" and to constitute within the German frontiers a "group of powers dependent collectively upon himself, of which no single member should be strong enough to act alone. In 1803, the ecclesiastical principalities were secularised, and their territories distributed among the lay princes. A similar fate overtook the smaller princes and Imperial Knights in 1806, when they were all "mediatised," that is, deprived of their "immediate" dependence on the Emperor and made the subjects of their more powerful neighbours. At the same time the Imperial authority itself was abolished, Francis II resigning the Crown of the "Holy Roman Empire," and a new confederation was established embracing all Germany except Austria and Prussia. The direction of the external policy of this Confederation of the Rhine, Napoleon kept in his own hands, and the members were firmly bound to their Protector by their desire to retain their ill-gotten gains. Less close was Napoleon's relation to Switzerland. The ancient Confederation of thirteen independent cantons, all differing from one another in institutions, habits, and personal rights, had passed under the levelling influence of French revolutionary teaching introduced by the French armies. The whole confederation had been constituted into an indivisible Republic on the French model, with the full approval of those classes and territories, whose interests the old cantonal governments had neglected. But local institutions and prejudices were too strong for the new arrangements, and Napoleon, alive to the strategic importance of Switzerland, interposed with an "Act of Mediation" by which he effected a successful

compromise between the newly-established union and the old-fashioned federalism, thus securing a predominant influence as the guardian of the compact and of the peace which it assured.

Even this formidable array of dependent Kingdoms and leagues does not exhaust the list of the Imperial tributaries. Denmark and Prussia, nominally allies of France, really the slaves of the despotic policy of the Emperor, added their unwilling support to the colossal fabric.

Thus the greater part of Europe had felt the weight of French authority. The feelings with which that authority was regarded were in fact as unanimous as they were widely diffused. Few perhaps deeply lamented the dispossessed dynasties or shared their impotent rage, and the spirit of national pride scarcely stirred in the petty principalities of Italy and Germany. It was neither the sentiment of loyalty nor as yet that of patriotism which Napoleon affronted. But the French Empire, built up for the sole purpose of making war, cast a shadow over the daily life of all its subjects. Only those whose dwellings lay in the track of the troops had seen homesteads burned and fields laid waste, and had experienced the systematic cruelty of requisitions and the horrors of private plundering. But near or distant from the seat of war all had felt the rigours of the conscription which had dragged their sons away to die in a quarrel that they did not understand, and of the war-taxes which had crippled their industry and circumscribed their comfort. And, while taxation straitened all resources, the Continental System, by which Napoleon hoped to bring England to her knees by excluding her manufactures and colonial goods from European ports, drove up prices for the consumer and ruined the merchant. Nor were sentimental grievances lacking. The French officials who administered the system, the spies and police-agents who helped to maintain it, were both ubiquitous and autocratic. Religious feelings were wounded by confiscations of Church property, by the treatment of the Pope, and by the atheistic tendency of French revolutionary thought. The pillaging of pictures and statues for the glorification of the capital of France at the expense of her dependents was only one of many examples of the same selfish national aggrandisement, which ere long awoke in its victims national feelings hitherto dormant.

Thus it was that the hopes of classes the most opposed to one another, and of interests and ways of thought the most diverse, had been brought to a common focus. Every existing evil was attributed to the state of war; Peace was the object of all aspirations and wore all the alluring colours of a golden age; hatred of the French became a sentiment shared by exiled princes, ruined merchants, and starving peasants. Brought into contact with contemporary thought all these materials took fire and were transmuted into new and strange shapes. It was the age of the Romantic movement, which began as a reaction in literature against the strict rules of art which had fettered the classical school, and against its preference for common-sense and reason as opposed to enthusiasm and imagination. The Romantics admired individuality and heroism, and gave a free rein to the fancy. Such a movement could not long remain merely literary or artistic. It became also religious and political. The fervour of the Mediaeval Church was contrasted alike with the cold morality of the eighteenth century and the dreary free-thought of the Revolution; the heroic deeds of old, the sentiments of loyalty and patriotism with the commonplace ideals and mechanical uniformity of contemporary bureaucratic government. Imagination soared beyond the realm of fact, and the restoration of ancient thrones, the regeneration of nationalities, the freedom of peoples seemed all capable of realisation by one supreme effort of the human will.

Such feelings and aspirations struck a responsive chord in the nature of the Czar Alexander, and the prominence of his figure and the publicity of his utterances during the War of Liberation, which had brought the Allies to Paris, did much to encourage them. Trained in early youth under a Swiss tutor, Colonel La Harpe, his dreamy enthusiastic nature

had imbibed large principles of humanity and beneficence which his autocratic position encouraged him to believe could be easily translated into practice for the advantage of mankind, if the sovereigns of Europe could be brought to utter the creative words "Let there be light." The shock of the French invasion, the deliverance of his country and the events of the War of Liberation had left a fresh impress upon his mystical temperament. He had become an eager student of the Bible, and the influence and friendship of Madame Krudener had intensified the new bent. He saw in Napoleon's fall the judgment of God, and felt himself the instrument of Providence. With his charm of manner and his smiling face he seemed made to win men to his will. But the Czar's character contained grave defects. Men noticed that his eyes never smiled, as though the mind within was distracted by a conflict of ideas. A sentimental sensuality pointed to a weakness of nature. But his failures as a statesman sprang from want of character and of resolution, and from the lack of that finer imagination which forecasts difficulties in detail, which counts the cost and prepares the will to make whatever sacrifices are necessary for the end proposed.

But the world did not know yet that the influence of Stein, the patriotic ex-minister of Prussia, had nerved him to the decisions of 1813, and several years were yet to pass before he was to shrink back disillusioned from the consequences of his own principles. In 1814, he typified much of the popular confusion of thought. He stood for the extirpation of the Revolution and for a restored Europe, but a Europe animated by new principles of conduct gathered from religion, from liberalism, and even from the Revolution itself, and administered by the wise hands of paternal governments. To enthusiastic souls of every nationality were likewise being revealed their own several visions of the coming millennium.

Such dreams as these were evidently not destined to crystallise at once into a new political system. But this truth they contained in common. The old Europe had disappeared and could not be restored by all the struggles of lost privilege or all the vigilance of timid governments. Europe had already been leavened by one change, and was beginning to feel the influence of another, changes which were to dominate both the domestic politics and the international relations of the nineteenth century. The first was the Social transformation effected by Napoleon, the second the Industrial Revolution which had originated in England.

CHAPTER II

THE NAPOLEONIC TRANSFORMATION OF EUROPE

WE have now traced the more immediate effects produced upon popular feeling by that European domination which Napoleon himself frankly admitted to have been created as a "weapon of war." It now remains to follow out another series of consequences of more lasting influence which were not fully appreciated till the waves of conquest had rolled back behind the French boundaries.

Napoleon, as heir of the Revolution, had destroyed the whole substructure upon which the fabric of the old Europe Feudalism rested. The change is often roughly and popularly expressed in the statement that Napoleon overthrew "Feudalism." This statement, however, is liable to be misunderstood by English readers. Feudalism, as a system permeating the whole of society and government, had long ceased to exist. All the mediaeval associations which the word calls up must be resolutely dismissed. We have to deal with certain institutions and survivals of institutions which, in Continental Europe, unlike England, had lived on into an age which in manners, dress, ways of thought, and principles of government had ceased to be mediaeval. To borrow an example from geology we may say that the upper strata of society had suffered as many changes and transformations as the surface of the earth undergoes from weather, tillage, new growths and human constructions. The lower strata remained as little modified as the rock measures beneath the soil.

At the base of the feudal system lay the system of land tenure and agriculture. The peasant tilled his lord's land rendering in return his personal service or a portion of his produce. To the land he was bound and could neither be ejected by his superior nor withdraw of his own will. His individual liberty of action was still further hampered by a system which prevailed in many parts of Europe under which whole villages cultivated vast fields in common. With the possession of the land the lords retained in many cases some of the functions of government, the right of administering justice and the right of taking tolls, while they retained the sporting rights which, in mediaeval times, had afforded them their occupation in peace. The system was not necessarily oppressive, for it is to be remarked that the serf had fixed rights and was not liable, like the free labourer, to the risks of unemployment and to all the fluctuations of the labour market. It is clear, however, that no peasant could hope to change his lot. The one notable exception was that of entire communities who, by contracting out of the strict conditions of feudal tenure in return for money dues or other equivalents, gave rise to a whole group of chartered towns and to a burgher class.

While agricultural labour and money payments have their value in every age, the duties, military and otherwise, which the lords of the land had rendered to their own feudal superiors, soon became obsolete with the progress of the science of war and changes in social life, and were replaced by modern and less cumbersome forms of service, or allowed to fall into disuse. But the same contemptuous negligence which had suffered the lapse of services no longer valuable suffered also the continued existence of their equivalents, and a whole series of survivals of mediaeval rights in lieu of service remained to the nobles in the form of privileges, some of the most important of which were immunity from taxation and unequal rights before the law. Law and custom alike prevented the noble from engaging in trade. There was thus a sharp caste distinction between noble, burgher, and peasant dividing society into horizontal strata. Serfage, privilege, and caste, such then were the

survivals of the feudal structure. To these may be added the privileges of the Church, a body which from the first had held an anomalous and special position in the feudal state.

The rulers of the eighteenth century had tolerated rather than guarded these survivals. To reforming princes, like Joseph II of Austria, the inviolable custom which protected local and personal immunities appeared to exist only to hamper the efforts of scientific government. It is true that the leaders of the earlier phases of the French revolution had abolished all such survivals in deference to a passionate devotion to Liberty and Equality, but, even before the appearance of Napoleon on the scene, French politicians had reverted to the object of the older governments, and were showing a preference for centralised and uniform institutions which would strengthen the authority of the State and secure its efficiency in war.

What these institutions were which Napoleon afterwards extended over the entire area dependent upon France we have now to enquire. All those constitutional expedients, so important in the history of our own country, by which the will and the needs of the nation have been brought to bear upon the central government, were little valued by the Revolution and still less by Napoleon. His Council of State consisted of a working body of experts charged with realising in detail the Imperial plans. A nominated Legislature maintained a feeble existence to give without comment the appearance of national endorsement to completed measures. A Senate, chosen by the Emperor, reproduced his will in decrees and helped to disguise his autocratic freedom from restraint.

It was far otherwise with the local machinery which was intended to make the control of the central government effective in the most distant corners of the Empire. This, at least, was real enough. French territory was divided into Departments, each under its Prefect, which were sub-divided into Districts (or arrondissements) controlled by sub-prefects. These latter again consisted of a number of municipalities (or Communes), each under its Mayor. It is true that local councils of the inhabitants met both in the Department and Municipality, but these were selected by the government rather than elected by the people, and existed for the purpose of helping the authorities in the imposition of taxation and for supplying information as to local needs and conditions. It was this system of local government in the hands of a trained staff of officials that the Napoleonic conquests introduced into the newly annexed territories and, with less uniformity, into the majority of the dependent districts.

The effects of its introduction were twofold. The restrictions and privileges of feudalism came to an end. The serf became a proprietor, free to sell his land or to use it as he thought best. Large areas of Church land were confiscated and sold to new owners. Old restrictions upon trade were removed. Caste distinctions were disregarded, and the privileges of individuals, classes and communities taken away. Every man, noble or peasant, was treated alike by the great system of French law embodied in the Code Napoleon. Thus every class became free to use to the best advantage the opportunities of a new age. Nor was this all. No short description can do justice to Napoleon's extraordinary capacity for detail and interest in material improvements, and he expected the same vigilance and activity in his subordinates. For the first time, the subject populations knew what it was to be under an efficient government. Finance was put upon a business-like footing, roads were made, bridges built, towns improved, trade encouraged, education cared for. Wherever Napoleon himself went he set the whole district humming with schemes of improvement.

And while the Emperor was accomplishing changes which, but for the ends to which he bent them, would have earned him the unmixed gratitude of mankind, his most determined and deadliest foes were working upon the same lines. The Spanish rising against the foreign invader, to be noticed in a later chapter, had revealed to European

statesmen a new force. If national resentment, ill-disciplined and ill-led, could defy the resources of a great military power, what might not be effected by the same national spirit guided and disciplined by the hand of government? It was in Prussia that the reaction against the Napoleonic ascendancy led to the most remarkable results. It is fair to regard these measures also as belonging to the effects produced by the career of Napoleon.

Baron vom Stein is justly regarded as the first in time, if not in service, of the patriotic ministers who have made the greatness of modern Prussia. An independent Imperial Knight of the Lahn valley, he retained the policy of his order in his desire to see an effective bond of union in Germany, and some of its traditional characteristics in his self-contained and lofty temperament and in his despotic and almost contemptuous will. He had entered the Prussian service and had become Minister of Trade at a time when such qualities as his were sorely needed; at the time when honest puzzled Frederick William III, torn between hatred and fear of Napoleon, never able by the very circumstances of his position to gain the Emperor's confidence, never resolute to defy his anger till too late, was conducting his country to the catastrophe of Jena. While yet the issue of peace or war hung doubtful, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been offered to Stein by the King and somewhat brusquely declined on the plea of inexperience, but in reality from the Minister's unwillingness to assume office except on his own terms. A rather insolent attempt to disregard modifications made in the office which he already held produced harsh words on both sides, and resulted in Stein's dismissal. But after the overthrow of Prussia and the removal of Count Hardenberg from office at the dictation of Napoleon, Stein was recalled to the Ministry of Civil Affairs and Finance with almost dictatorial powers. The King, indeed, was very willing to give him a free hand in certain directions. Prussia, a land without military frontiers or real unity of race, had been the creation of her administration, and progress along the traditional lines of administrative reform was what Stein had in view. Much of his work was not originated by him, much of it was left half-finished on his dismissal at the end of one year by Napoleon's mandate, much is owing to the later additions and alterations of his successor Hardenberg, yet it is quite certain that nothing but his dominating personality and unbending will could have realised for Prussia at the supreme moment of her fortunes the measures by which she was helped to save herself.

The first of these amounted to a reconstruction of the government. In place of ministers over separate departments, working in isolation and constantly thwarted by the decisions of an inner cabinet of the King's private friends and confidants, a Cabinet of ministers was established in which the heads of the newly organised departments met and deliberated in common. Legislation and matters of importance were to be referred to a Council of State under the King's presidency, consisting of the royal princes, the ministers, the great officers of state and others.

The second great measure amounted to a reconstruction of society. The recommendations of a commission appointed by the King were embodied in the so-called Emancipating Edict of Oct. 9, 1807. By it the serfs on the Royal Domains received complete freedom; those on the lands of other lords became personally free, while they remained subject to the obligation to pay their dues of service (an obligation for which Hardenberg afterwards enabled them to compound by the surrender of a part of their land to their lords); distinctions between noble, burgher, and peasant land, which prevented owners selling outside the class to which they belonged, disappeared; while, finally, caste distinctions between persons were done away with, leaving the noble free to engage in trade and opening up careers of ambition to the peasant and the townsman.

The third measure, a first tentative step towards bringing the influence of reconstructed society to bear upon the government, was a Municipal Ordinance giving self-government to the towns. That Stein intended to extend the principle to the rural districts

can scarcely be doubted; for the time being he contented himself with the division of the country into regular administrative Districts, with Superior Presidents in each Province over the group of Districts out of which it was constituted.

Side by side with Stein and even more directly encouraged by the King, who had already laid his finger unerringly upon the defects of the Prussian system, worked the military reformers, Scharnhorst the theorist and Scharnhorst scientific soldier, and Gneisenau the gallant defender of Colberg against Napoleon. To meet the immediate needs of Prussia were developed the principles, which, with many local variations, lie at the base of all modern military organisation. The first principle adopted was that of Universal Service. Prussia was small, but her geographical position compelled her to maintain an army out of proportion to the size of her population. Since the time of Frederick William I, therefore, the peasant class had been liable to the conscription. This obligation was now extended to all classes. It thus became possible to maintain discipline by milder methods, the Army became a school of patriotism and intelligence, and in the enthusiasm of the War of Liberation the obligation to service lost any remaining taint of unpopularity.

No country, however, can afford to withdraw more than a certain proportion of its population from industry without serious loss. This difficulty Scharnhorst met by the principle of short service, which assumes that a soldier, after a few years' training, will not forget his work, but can be recalled from civil life at any time to take a valuable part in the defence of his country. It was thus possible with a standing army of moderate size to put the whole male population through a training in its ranks, and possible also to comply outwardly with the requirement of Napoleon limiting the Prussian standing army to 42,000 men, while making the army for practical purposes identical with the nation.

Thus had modern social institutions and a national spirit been given to Prussia by a government in full reaction against the Napoleonic domination.

To Napoleon himself it is now time to return. Never did his genius for appreciating the drift of popular thought and prejudice or his respect for facts show themselves more remarkably than during the Hundred Days after his return from Elba. He had clearly apprehended all the floating ideas which had gathered into a reaction against himself. He saw plainly the new value attached to national independence and to representative institutions. And he set himself to trim his sails to the new direction of the wind. He loudly proclaimed that the Empire was Peace; and the man who had declared of the proceedings of legislators that he was unable "to be amused at these games of prisoner's base," now set Benjamin Constant to draw up a new Constitution for France in the *Acte Additionel*, with the cynical remark that the taste for political debates appeared to have returned. In this remarkable document, a free press, a popular electorate, and the control of the executive by the representatives of the people were introduced by an astonishing preamble offering an entirely new interpretation of the Emperor's past. Europe was at length to learn his great design for a federation of self-governing nations, only frustrated of its early realisation by incessant war, but now so curtailed in scope by his own overthrow that its intended blessings could be conferred upon France alone.

The world laughed at the transparent pretence, and conceived that the Battle of Waterloo had made an end of such trifling. Never was the world more mistaken. At St. Helena, Napoleon set himself undauntedly to the apparently hopeless task of re-setting the whole story of his career to the new interpretation, thus showing some faith in his own cynical maxim, "History is a lie which mankind have agreed to believe." It is this reinterpretation of his life and aims which has been called the "Napoleonic Legend." In the sham letters which he dictated to Las Cases, his secretary, purporting to come from, an Englishman, in the autobiography taken down from his lips, in the notes of his eager and

voluble conversations, preserved by his physician O'Meara, the same pose is attempted. He was a crusader for Liberty and the foe of tyrants, one who sought a sure peace through the fires of war. It was his misfortune to have had his career cut short midway, when the destruction of ancient abuses had not yet given place to the process of building up a new civilisation. His quarrels with Sir Hudson Lowe, the governor of the island, were calculated appeals to the compassion and sympathy of Europe with the Imperial martyr for Humanity.

He never attempted a harder task in all his career of wonderful achievement. And here, too, he succeeded. History has not done with Napoleon when he lands in St. Helena. The Legend lived in France and profoundly modified her destiny, as the French conquests had permanently affected the future development of Europe.

CHAPTER III

THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

WHILE the stratified society of Old Europe was fusing into new forms under the blasts of fiery energy breathed out from the furnace of Revolutionary and Napoleonic France, a process of disintegration and recombination of elements, more subtle and far-reaching, was passing through its early stages. And, by one of the paradoxes of history, the scene of a revolution, destined to have a wider and deeper influence upon the world than the French Revolution itself, was laid in England, the home of those Tory Governments which had played the leading part in the struggle against France. Here, little heeded by preoccupied ministries and diplomatists, a Grand Alliance of Coal, Iron, Steam and a whole group of Textile Industries was being developed, which was to modify Europe more profoundly than the Concert of the Great Powers or the new federal relations in Germany, which were to be elaborated at Vienna.

In England, during the last half of the eighteenth century and the first two decades of the nineteenth, forces were being generated which were to give for a while a new impetus to the failing influences of the Revolution, and, leaving them far behind, to issue in forms of political thought and activity very different in character and more permanent in effects. It will be the object of this chapter to trace the stages of this evolution, and to attempt the more difficult task of indicating the moment at which the new influences began to take effect in Continental Europe.

During the early decades of the eighteenth century, the industries of Great Britain and of the Continent were conducted on similar lines and in primitive forms. The processes of spinning the yarn from the raw wool and of weaving it into cloth were still the domestic industries of an agricultural population, and were mostly exercised by women. The thread was still drawn out by the fingers of the worker from the bundle of wool fastened to the head of the distaff, while the spindle twisted the loose strand, either by natural rotation as it hung freely from the lengthening thread, or by the aid of the treadle-worked spinning-wheel. The process of weaving was even more laborious. The upright threads of the "warp," fastened firmly to the frame at one end, were attached alternately at the other to two separate bars which permitted each series to be raised alternately above the other, the shuttle on which the "weft" or cross thread was wound being thrown by hand across that series of threads in the warp which at the moment was the lower. As soon as the lower series had been raised above the upper, the shuttle was returned, and the process was indefinitely repeated, producing the interlacing texture.

Mining, whether for coal or iron, and the smelting of the latter ore naturally demanded the concentration of the workers in one place, and, depending upon male labour, could not in most cases be practised as a by-employment. Thus we read of a foundry at Berlin under Frederick the Great, and of a foundry and glass-works at Creusot as early as 1782.

The only attempt at collective industry in the textile trades was the system by which the cottage workers engaged to spin or weave for a travelling merchant, who supplied their materials and disposed of their wares. This system was well developed in England, Holland, and Belgium before the middle of the century, but did not prevail to any wide extent in France or Germany; though we find woollen industries at Berlin, silk manufactures at Crefeld, and linen weaving in Silesia conducted on the same principles. Anything approaching the

modern factory owed its existence to government patronage, and was hardly to be found outside the more despotic states.

It is a somewhat remarkable fact that up till the year 1730, or thereabouts, England lagged behind the Continent both in the skill of her work-people and in the refinement of her processes, a failure perhaps to be attributed to a lack of the artistic taste and the instinct for nicety of detail. It is at least certain that the lessons taught by the Huguenot refugees at the time of the revocation of Edict of Nantes (1685) made an epoch in the history of the cloth industry, while in the early years of the eighteenth century we find England borrowing new processes and simple mechanical devices from the Netherlands, Germany, and Italy. It was not by the superior skill of her workmen, but by the application of more rapid and effective methods to production, that she secured an unrivalled pre-eminence, and by the efforts of her engineers and mechanics rather than by those of her handicraftsmen.

For such a development, however, the country already possessed some special advantages, and was to be presented by Fortune with another of inestimable value. The first of these was an ample capital. The system of Banking, so necessary for the accumulation and distribution of wealth, had already taken firm root, and foreign capitalists like the Rothschilds were transferring their operations to London from the insecurity of the Continent. Stock-broking was being systematised and company enterprise was taking shape in connection with canals and water-supply. The wealth of England was a popular boast, but perhaps few would have recognised an advantage at least as important in the possession of the rudimentary steam engine which had for some time been used in mines to pump water out of the workings. Fortune's special gift, the immunity from war in an age when few continental countries escaped an invading army, has perhaps been overrated in attempts to disentangle the factors in the new development, but its protecting influence secured a continuity of progress impossible elsewhere.

The evolution of the new forces of mechanical production proceeded at first along two simultaneous but separate lines of advance which ultimately united their streams into an irresistible current of progress and change. In one direction the search was directed to the discovery of a new motive power, in the other towards mechanical processes superseding or combining the operations of the human hand.

The beginnings of "collective" employment in the Coal and Iron industries have been already described. Two new departures now brought these industries into an power, intimate alliance in which they reacted powerfully upon one another. The first of these was the substitution of coal for charcoal in the process of smelting, about the year 1750, a change which had been rendered necessary by the gradual exhaustion of the wood supply of the country. The second was the invention of certain improvements in the steam-engine by the efforts of James Watt. Taking the old pumping steam-engine, devised by Newcomen in 1704, as a basis, Watt succeeded in applying the steam power both to the backward and forward stroke of the piston. He secured a regularity of movement by the use of the "governor" and converted the vertical stroke of the piston-rod into a circular motion, by means of the crank and the driving wheel, capable of working machinery through connecting bands. In 1769, the necessary capital having been assured by a partnership with Matthew Boulton, the new firm brought their first patents into the market. The improved engine created a demand for the iron requisite for its construction, while it assisted the production and working of the metal in countless ways, steam-power being first applied to the blast-furnace in 1790. New machines and tools themselves made by machinery followed; lathes, planing-machines, and drills appearing in rapid succession.

Meanwhile, in the group of textile industries connected with cotton and wool, a parallel development was proceeding. In this development it is to be noticed that the spinning and

weaving processes act and react upon one another and that any improvement in the one evokes an effort in the other to keep pace with it. The first advance upon primitive conditions was made by Kay with the invention of the “flying shuttle” in 1738, by means of which one weaver was enabled not only to control the movements of the frames carrying the warp, but to pass the shuttle to and fro without assistance. The consequent demand for yarn produced Hargreaves’ “spinning jenny” some thirty years later, a machine by which one spinner turning a handle could draw out a large number of threads at once. Almost simultaneously, in 1768, Arkwright patented another device for spinning by means of rollers, and, applying water-power to his new machines, became the founder of the first factories. Crompton’s so-called “mule” (1779) combined the devices of Hargreaves and of Arkwright for the production of finer yarns, and by this year spinning processes had left weaving far behind. It remained for a clergyman, named Cartwright, to restore the equilibrium by the invention of a power-loom.

At this point, engineer and manufacturer joined hands. In 1785, steam-power was first used in a factory at Papplewick in Nottinghamshire, five years later it was adopted by Arkwright, and between 1801 and 1804 it had become almost universal in the cotton industry. In the woollen trade, however, the hand-looms held their own for another thirty years.

It is not necessary to follow manufacturing activities further through the innumerable adaptations of the early nineteenth century. The changes already traced political results, constitute together a new system, the social and political effects of which we are now in a position to appreciate. The first visible sign of the changed conditions was the Factory. The use of steam-power and machinery decreed that the entire series of processes involved in any manufacture should be carried out on one spot. Labour, now definitely collective in character, was soon highly organised, different parts of each process being assigned to different workers, who thus gained a high standard of manual and mechanical skill, increasing enormously the rate of output. Thoughtful observers saw not without concern a second and still more striking evidence of change in the rise of the great towns. In an age when communication was still difficult, the factories necessarily gathered about the coal-fields and in the iron districts, and street after street of new dwellings for the workers gathered about the factories. These growing armies of toilers were maintained in ever increasing strength partly by the expansion of the population, now proceeding at an unprecedented rate, partly by the influx of whole classes which were drifting away from agriculture. New and scientific methods of tillage, cropping, manuring, and cattlebreeding were driving the small proprietor and farmer off the land. The enclosure of commons and the purchase of small holdings were consolidating those large estates, which could alone be worked at a profit under the new conditions. Ill-housed and living under insanitary conditions the urban population outgrew the efforts of the Church and of existing educational agencies to better their welfare in other directions. Englishmen in general scarcely noticed the birth-pangs of a new artisan class. None, however, could fail to mark the class growth of capital and the increasing influence of the middle-class Capitalist. Increased production built up fortunes out of profits in themselves modest. In England, by the Reform Bill of 1832, and in France under Louis Philippe, this class was to claim a preponderating share of political power.

These employers of labour left nothing undone to secure the industrial efficiency of the new communities; the laissez-faire teaching of their age made them careless of the human and domestic interests. They thought too much of the Factory and the “hands,” too little of the Towns with the men and women. Thus the Artisan class grew up in squalid and unhealthy surroundings and under precarious conditions of employment, while over-production or the invention of new machinery would, from time to time, throw hundreds out of work. So dependent were they upon the employer whose capital had created the

enormous material equipment of their industry that they were obliged to work under conditions dangerous to life and health, and to allow their women and children to labour for periods and at tasks unsuited to their sex and age. The artisans possessed but one advantage over the agricultural labourer. Where men are gathered together in large masses there is exchange of ideas and a corresponding activity of mind. The workmen of the towns were soon to discover the advantages and power of combination. The “trades-unions,” by which the men combined to exact better terms from their employers, were no longer treated as illegal conspiracies after 1824, while the theories of Robert Owen, who desired to see industries worked on co-operative principles by profit-sharing combinations of capitalists and artisans, bore fruit in a system of co-operative supply stores by which the cost of living was to be reduced. Of these the first example is found at Rochdale in 1844. The principle of combination had come into play, but so far without political bearing. It was, however, clearly a force capable of issuing in unforeseen contingencies both social and political.

It remains to indicate, as nearly as the difficulty of the question permits, by what date the new industrial conditions were operating in various parts of Continental Europe.

During the war, in spite of the dearth of capital caused by taxation and the drain upon the working population due to the conscription, some little progress was effected. The movements of armies did at least stimulate the development of the means of communication in the countries that obeyed Napoleon. Moreover, the cotton trade, a new industry which had never taken root as a domestic employment, began with the century to adopt the English improvements in spinning. By 1801, the use of the spinning jenny was established in the north-west of France about Lille; and Alsace, the Ruhr valley, Bavaria and Saxony were but little behind. Weaving was still performed on hand looms, though, thanks to direct encouragement from Napoleon, the flying shuttle was in use in France, and a notable invention of purely French origin, the Jacquard silk loom, was at work by 1804 in Lyons. But neither weaving by power nor the use of the steam-engine had come in before the end of the war.

With the peace, in spite of the rudimentary condition of foreign banking, in which the conveniences of cheques and of banking accounts were scarcely as yet in general use, and in spite of English competition, a fresh start was made under protective tariffs, but at very different rates of progress.

Belgium, where coal-mining was already developed and the iron industry had been fostered by the war, led the way. The first steam-engine had already been set up by Cockerill, an Englishman, in 1813; English machinery was now largely imported, and the new processes for smelting and for working up the iron stimulated the production of native machinery. By 1830, the cotton trade was entering upon the factory stage, and the same process, encouraged by the new government of 1830 was affecting the woollen industry by 1840.

In France, coal-mining developed more slowly. The extent of the Lille coal-field was at first unsuspected, and the old system of smelting with charcoal held its own till late into the forties. The power-loom appeared in the cotton industries of Alsace in 1823, and the factory system had taken hold of all the processes of the trade round Lille soon after 1840. But it was only towards the end of Louis Philippe’s reign that it began seriously to affect the old handicrafts connected with woollens, linen, and silk.

In Germany, before 1850, these changes had scarcely begun. Smelting and iron-working on a large scale were found here and there in Westphalia and Silesia in the forties, but in most cases these enterprises were of small account and the workers combined them with agriculture and other employments. The use of charcoal in smelting was almost

universal, and though there were spinning-mills for cotton yarn in Prussia, Saxony and Bavaria during the thirties, and for woollen yarn in Silesia and about the Rhine by 1840, these establishments were too small to create the conditions of the factory, indeed none of them employed steam-power. Even water-power had scarcely been applied to the work of weaving.

In southern and eastern Europe by the middle of the century, the new influences were still unfelt and may therefore be reserved for notice in later chapters.

The conclusion to which we are led by this brief survey, no less than by that of the preceding chapter, is that the old foundations of European society had disappeared, and that whatever superstructure statesmen as yet possessed the knowledge and the materials to erect upon the surface, would stand insecurely upon moving sands.

CHAPTER IV

THE SETTLEMENT OF VIENNA

NOT a little of the interest which gathered about the person of the Czar during the early days of the occupation of Paris was the outcome of an expectant curiosity. With him, as representing the allied governments, it would lie to speak the word which would determine the future of France. The question had already been discussed; there was a general preference among the allies for a Bourbon restoration; Alexander alone hesitated. The Bourbons were too prosaic to appeal to his imaginative temperament and savoured unpleasantly of the old order to one so absorbed in dreams of a regenerated Europe. He had been persuaded that no regency for Napoleon's son could be safe while the Emperor yet lived, but he had not yet abandoned his own preference for Bernadotte, the French marshal who, by a strange freak of fortune, had been adopted by Charles XIII, the childless King of Sweden, and was to be the ancestor of the present Swedish dynasty.

While Alexander yet hesitated there was one man in Paris who knew his own mind. Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord, the ex-bishop of Autun, had survived all the storms of the Revolution thanks to the skill with which he had invariably managed to place himself upon the winning side, having, as he put it, "never deserted a government till it had deserted itself." Supple, witty, and vigilant he had aimed always at guiding rather than controlling events; he had been Napoleon's ablest diplomatist and foreign minister, and was one of the provisional government of Paris when the allies approached the capital. Having arranged that he should be stopped at the barriers when the rest of his colleagues fled, he found himself in a position peculiarly suited to his abilities. Two things were necessary: to save France from dismemberment and humiliation, and to preserve the Revolution settlement. The return of the Bourbons would guarantee the first, a constitution would secure the second and conciliate the support of England. He persuaded Alexander to take up his quarters at his house, and opened to him his plan for a Constitutional Monarchy. He convinced the Czar that France would accept no soldier inferior to Napoleon, and disguising his own opportunism under an abstract principle grateful to the temperament of his guest, brought Alexander's mind to rest on the formula of "Legitimacy."

The next step was to wean the country of any hopes of retaining the House of Bonaparte, and a proclamation was issued in the name of the Allies declaring that no terms would be made with the Emperor or with any of his family. It was now easy for Talleyrand to secure the deposition of Napoleon at the hands of the Senate and the Legislative Body, and the recall of Louis XVIII under the provisions of a Constitutional Charter. A week later the Count of Artois, Louis' brother, afterwards Charles X, entered Paris amid scenes of extraordinary enthusiasm, and the remark attributed to him, "Nothing is changed, there is only one Frenchman the more," was heralded as an omen of the happiest consequence.

The way was now cleared for a formal settlement between France and the allies. To guard against the dangers of an outbreak of popular feeling and against the possible complications which might be introduced at the forthcoming Congress, it was felt desirable that the arrangements should be made at once while the armies were still in occupation of French territory. No treaty could have been drafted which would not have been galling to French national pride. The cession of the conquered districts in Belgium, Holland, Italy, Germany and even on the left bank of the Rhine was inevitable, and the frontier of the old monarchy, as it stood in 1792, was accordingly restored. Yet the terms granted by the Treaty

of Paris were generous. The Czar's instincts and England's wish to smooth the path for the Bourbons pointed in the same direction. Prussia was not permitted to claim an indemnity; England, while keeping Mauritius, Tobago and St. Lucia, restored Guadeloupe and Martinique, and France was even allowed to retain the art treasures of which Napoleon had stripped the European capitals.

The Allied Powers had thus carried out the first of the obligations which they had undertaken by the Treaty of Chaumont at the moment when they crossed the frontier, namely to impose a peace upon France. So fair a beginning might well inspire high hopes of the fulfilment to attend upon that other article by which they bound themselves to periodical meetings to maintain their present understanding. The first of these congresses met at Vienna in September, 1814, to complete the work of settlement which had been inaugurated at Paris.

In view of the severe criticisms which historians have been ready to pass upon the work of the Congress, it is worthwhile to consider shortly the objects proposed by the Great Powers and the limitations which circumstances imposed upon their action. The business of the Congress, as defined by the Paris treaty was to provide for the Redistribution of the ceded territories, and to reconstitute the relations of the German states, It was also understood that arrangements would be made for settling the internal disputes of Switzerland and for re-affirming her neutrality. A little thought will make it clear that these general aims were circumscribed by a number of practical limitations. There was, in the first place, a general agreement in favour of so readjusting matters upon the frontiers of France as to put serious obstacles in the way of any return on her part to a policy of aggressive ambition. Secondly, it was evident that the stability of any settlement must depend upon a recognition of pre-existing rights as far as it was possible. Thirdly, complete freedom of action was limited by a number of agreements and treaties between the Allies themselves, which had come into being during the War of Liberation, and upon which their several decisions to take common action had depended. Lastly it must never be forgotten that the Great Powers themselves were not an impartial body of arbiters legislating for a distant continent, but rival nations with divergent ambitions and interests. If these facts are borne in mind it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the settlement was, on the whole a wise and business-like arrangement and constituted a distinct advance upon anything which Europe had hitherto attempted in a collective capacity.

By the end of September, Vienna was full of a multitude of sovereign princes, courtiers, ministers, and diplomatists, and alive with social gaieties which gave rise to the unfair witticism "Le congrès danse, mais il ne marche pas." It was quite clear that in any assembly representative of all the independent interests concerned rapid progress was impossible, and it was arranged by the Four Great Powers, England, Austria, Russia, and Prussia themselves, that their representatives should constitute a committee to prepare resolutions to be submitted to the Congress. When once the ceded territories had been disposed of, France and Spain were to be admitted to the discussions. But the Allies had not reckoned upon the skill and courage of Talleyrand. Watchful for every opportunity of restoring the prestige of France he raised an outcry that the committee ought to be elected by a full session of the Congress, and to prevent such a session and the interminable disputes to which it would be sure to give rise, the Allies were forced to accept the compromise of admitting France, Spain, Sweden, and Portugal to take part in their deliberations.

It is impossible, in a sketch such as the present chapter attempts, to present the discussions and conclusions of the Congress in a chronological sequence. Our aim must be limited to arranging in as clear and logical an order as the matter permits the principal results of the negotiations.

We may begin with the measures taken to guard against a recrudescence of French military ambition. On these matters, opinion was tolerably unanimous. The northern frontier had never offered serious obstacles to the progress of French armies, and the difficulty of providing an adequate defence was complicated by the fixed resolve of Austria never to resume the possession of the Belgian provinces. The protection of this frontier had never been effective except when exercised by the Dutch. It was therefore resolved that Holland and Belgium should be united into a Kingdom of the Netherlands under the House of Orange, and it was hoped that the two peoples, the one industrial and the other mercantile, would soon be drawn together by considerations of mutual advantage. The arrangement also found favour as providing compensation to Holland for those Dutch possessions, including the Cape Colony, which were retained by Great Britain. The north-western frontier of Germany was covered by assigning to Prussia the German districts on both sides of the Rhine, from Coblenz to the borders of the Netherlands. In northern Italy, the Republic of Genoa, over whose roads and passes French armies had so often made their way into the peninsula, was united to the Kingdom of Sardinia and Piedmont.

So far agreement had been easy. But quite early in the proceedings of the Congress there arose a question involving both treaty stipulations and the interests of the Great Powers themselves, and creating divergencies of opinion which almost issued in war. This was the Saxon-Polish difficulty. The idea of restoring the ancient Kingdom of Poland had found favour in England, and appealed to generous instincts all over Europe. Inconsistent as it might appear with the interests of Russia it had become a favourite scheme with Alexander. Borrowing a hint from Napoleon's dependent Kingdom of Italy, he had determined to reconcile his personal predilections and the national interests of which he was the guardian by constituting an independent Polish Kingdom under free institutions, of which the Czars of Russia should wear the crown. With this object in view it was agreed between himself and Prussia in the Convention of Kalisch (Feb., 1813), by which the two Powers made common cause against Napoleon, that he should acquire those Polish districts formerly belonging to Prussia, which had been absorbed in the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. Compensation was to be provided for Frederick William in Germany. Though this arrangement had, strictly speaking, been cancelled by the Treaty of Reichenbach (June, 1813)/ by which Austria had joined the alliance and the three powers had agreed to divide the Grand Duchy, it was certain that Alexander still hankered after his original scheme, while a strong party in Prussia led by Stein desired to utilise his support in annexing the possessions of the King of Saxony, who (having remained faithful to Napoleon to the last) was at the mercy of the victors. Austria, moreover, in spite of some nervousness as to her Polish frontier and an unwillingness to see the Prussian state bordering on Bohemia, was disposed to be accommodating.

All seemed in a fair way to settlement when Talleyrand intervened with a stroke of matchless audacity. He saw in the Saxon question an opportunity of regaining for France an influence with the minor courts of Germany, and rightly divined the currents of opinion which would float him to success. Feeling in England, and indeed elsewhere, was not likely to view with indifference the outcry of the Saxons against an alien rule; all who cared for "legitimacy" would commiserate the fate of Frederick Augustus, the Saxon king, thus selected for punishment for no worse fault than having misjudged the turn of the tide in Germany; while Bavaria, who had secured her independence and made her peace with the Allies by the Treaty of Ried (Oct., 1813), and the other states who had followed her example, would regard his interests as their own. Well they knew that Stein and his friends hated the independent sovereign princes and wished to see some kind of central authority in Germany. These materials judicious intrigue soon blew up into a conflagration. England strove to mediate, Austria to effect a compromise, only to drive Alexander and Frederick William into closer union; and, having failed in their endeavours, the two first-named Powers actually combined with France in a secret Triple Alliance, to resist the proposal by force of

arms. The very violence of these measures induced a cooler fit, and a compromise was at last effected, Austria receiving back all her Polish possessions (except Cracow, which became a free city), while Prussia regained most of hers, and accepted in lieu of the remainder about two-fifths of Saxony. Frederick Augustus was confirmed in the possession of his mutilated Kingdom.

The remaining territorial adjustments effected by the Congress will be most clearly presented as modifications of different portions of the map of Europe. In the Baltic district a whole series of changes originated from the Treaty of Frederikshamn (1809), by which during his alliance with Napoleon the Czar had torn Finland from Sweden. The latter, on her accession to the alliance against Napoleon, had been, by way of compensation, promised the possession of Norway, which at the time belonged to Denmark, the Emperor's unwilling ally. This cession was now confirmed. When Denmark herself abandoned France by the Treaty of Kiel she had acquired from Sweden both Swedish Pomerania and the island of Rügen, but these she lost at the Congress to Prussia, receiving the district of Lauenburg from Hanover, which, as the result of these exchanges, recovered East Frisia from Prussia.

We may now pass to Central Europe. The recovery or acquisition of provinces in Poland, in Saxony and on the Rhine by Prussia we have already noticed; it should, however, be remarked that her hope of connecting her central and western possessions was doomed to disappointment by the restoration of the independent principalities of Brunswick, Hesse-Darmstadt, Hesse-Cassel and especially of Hanover, now raised to the rank of a Kingdom. The arrangements made between Austria and Bavaria by the Treaty of Ried were confirmed and extended. By these, Austria recovered the Tyrol and her other provinces east of the Inn, which Napoleon had added to the Bavarian Kingdom, Bavaria being compensated with certain districts on the Main and on the left bank of the Rhine.

South of the Alps Austria resumed possession of Lombardy, which she now succeeded in extending by the permanent acquisition of the Venetian territory, already held for a short period of eight years as the precarious gift of Napoleon. Elsewhere, the principle of "legitimacy" was closely adhered to. The Pope was restored to his temporal dominions. South of the Po, the Duchy of Parma went to Napoleon's Austrian consort Marie Louise; Modena to Francis IV, who represented the old dynasty of Este; the Hapsburg Grand Duke Ferdinand recovered Tuscany, and the widow of its Napoleonic tributary duke was compensated with Lucca. In Naples, Legitimacy conflicted with treaty obligations. Ferdinand I, the Bourbon King of the Two Sicilies, still held the island and expected his restoration on the mainland at the hands of the Powers. Austria had, however, guaranteed Naples by treaty to Murat with the object of detaching him from Napoleon. Murat himself ultimately simplified the settlement by joining his Imperial brother-in-law in his last struggle of the Hundred Days, and Bourbon rule was restored in Southern Italy before the Congress dispersed.

From the outset of the proceedings the business of drafting a scheme to govern the future relations of the thirty-nine sovereign German states had been left in the hands of a purely German committee. The question was one which bristled with difficulties. Stein, whose views were longer and whose designs were more sweeping than those of his contemporaries generally, desired the re-establishment of the Empire, and his plans found favour with the "mediatised" and with those smaller princes who dreaded absorption. To this scheme the attitude of the two great German Powers was fatal. Austria refused to resume the onerous and barren Imperial dignity, while she was equally determined that Prussia should not step into her place. Both were prepared to negative the obvious solution, namely, that they should stand altogether outside the new Germanic body, as one tending to curtail their influence in Europe and to open the door to foreign ambitions. A scheme drawn up by Stein and by Hardenberg, the Prussian minister, for a dual headship shared by the two

Powers was wrecked by the jealous fears of Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Baden, who were not prepared to sacrifice their rights to any scheme of central control based upon the representation of districts. They definitely objected to any plan for a common system of defence, of foreign relations, and of law-courts, and declined to be satisfied with a joint voice in determining matters at present left to their individual discretion, not unnaturally apprehending still further limitations on their sovereignty.

It became clear amid all these divergent interests that if the Congress was to provide a constitution for Germany at all, it must be of the loosest kind, and one which left all burning questions in suspense. It was finally agreed that Austria and Prussia should be included, in respect of their German provinces only, and that a Diet representing the sovereign states should be constituted under the presidency of Austria. In this Diet, eleven states had one representative each, while the remaining governments were disposed in groups, each group combining to send a representative. For matters of greater importance, the Diet was to meet in a different form, as a Plenum, or full assembly. Here no state had less than one vote, while the larger governments disposed of two, three, or more in proportion to their importance. While forbidding any member of the Confederation to make alliances with foreign powers against any other, with the object of guarding against French interference, the Congress shelved all difficult questions by leaving them to the future determination of the Diet itself. Even the famous Article XIII, declaring in favour of Constitutions by Estates, was so worded as to be permissive and not obligatory, for the clause, as finally drafted, stated that the various governments "will" grant such liberties, instead of laying down that they "shall" or "must." Thus, to all appearances, Germany was left to settle her own differences, a task hard enough in itself and not simplified by the fact that in reality her solutions were liable to interference from outside. Not only were Austria and Prussia interested, but England and Denmark also, by virtue of possessing Hanover and Holstein respectively; while the Constitution itself was placed under the collective guarantee of the Powers.

The settlement of Switzerland was an easier task. On the overthrow of Napoleon, a league among the older cantons, declared against the Act of Mediation, and civil war was imminent. Napoleon's arrangements had, in fact, conflicted in three ways with ancient prejudices and rights. Every Canton had been forced to remodel its institutions in conformity with the French principle of equality of rights; the old "allied districts" had been constituted into new Cantons, which shared with the older ones the direction of the Federal councils; while Berne had suffered the double humiliation of having her former "subject districts" of Vaud and Aargau torn from her and of seeing them erected into separate Cantons. The arrangements made by the Congress took the form of a compromise on much the same lines as the Act of Mediation. Freedom was indeed given to the Cantons to remodel their constitutions, and no attempt was made to develop the influence of the central Federal institutions. On the other hand, no interference was permitted with the new Cantons, and their number was now raised to twenty-two in all, by the addition of Valais, Geneva, and Neuchatel.

England had abolished the Slave Trade in her dominions in 1807, and the United States had followed her example. By the time of the peace her dominant navy had practically swept it off the seas. Prussia, Russia, and Austria had no interest in the traffic. The time seemed to have come for its general abolition, and Castlereagh's determined efforts secured from the Congress an unanimous agreement on the main principle involved. Its immediate application was, however, unfortunately limited, through the efforts of Spain and Portugal, by a clause leaving each separate power free to determine the date at which the provisions should take effect.

By the middle of 1815, the entire work of the various committees of the Congress of

Vienna had been embodied by a special committee in a Final Act and had received, with few exceptions, the separate adhesion of the Powers.

A few comments may be added in conclusion upon some of the shortcomings with which the work of the Congress is commonly charged. That it left some important outstanding problems untouched, such as the Eastern question and the destinies of the Spanish colonies, will be as easily understood as admitted. The stock objections to the Vienna settlement have not been of this nature but rather that in the work it actually accomplished the Congress was regardless of the "spirit of nationality," of the principles of political liberty and of the rights of peoples. In reading such criticisms it is difficult not to feel that the statesmen of 1814 are being charged with failing to allow for conditions which were not at the time in existence. The "spirit of nationality," kindled by the War of Liberation, was a new force and by no means widely diffused outside Spain and Germany. Its operation was incalculable, it was as often an agent of disruption as of union, and was, in many cases, inseparable from the narrowest kind of local prejudice and selfish isolation. Indeed we shall find that it was only one factor among many producing the ultimate organisation of the national units which the material conditions of the later nineteenth century imposed upon the peoples of Europe, at the cost of sacrifices to which modern armaments are a standing witness.

Much the same may be said of the failure of the Congress to pronounce in favour of constitutional principles. Only in England did there exist any long experience of the working of a popular government, and the elements for which the British Constitution was, at that time, most praised by its admirers were precisely those which were least popular in character. The experiments of the French Revolution were not encouraging, the constitutions of Sicily and of Spain did more than suggest doubts.

The charge of disregarding the rights of peoples may best be met by pointing out that the "national movements" of the century were only possible as the result of combinations which equally disregarded them. Each age will form its own judgment of what, in this respect, was warranted by expediency. Perhaps, today, historians might be found to regret that Belgium was not absorbed by France, while the Germany and Italy of 1870 would have had little sympathy to spare for Genoese objections to annexation by Piedmont, or for the aversion of the Rhenish provinces to Prussian rule.

The Congress desired peace and stability, and was guided by the political facts of the time. It could not be expected to prescribe principles which were as yet in the experimental stage, or to embark lightly upon a crusade in their favour. The gravity of either undertaking will best be appreciated by those who have studied the years of travail and strife during which the new conditions were painfully evolved. It is good for the world that the statesman should be arraigned by the idealist, and the business man by the humanitarian, but Europe will be inaugurating an era of unparalleled misfortune in the day when she commits her commercial enterprises to the humanitarian and her government to the idealist.

CHAPTER V

INTERVENTION

BEFORE the Congress had concluded its sittings the Allies were compelled to intervene by force to save the very corner-stone of their system, the Treaty of Paris itself. And though the Hundred Days and the Waterloo Campaign lie outside the scope of this book and may for purposes of convenience be passed over as a belated epilogue of the Napoleonic drama, the first failure of the Restoration Government in France belongs entirely to the new era.

Louis XVIII, lately Count of Provence, the elder of Louis XVI's two brothers, who was now called to the throne by the act of the French Senate with the approval of the Allies, had many of the negative qualities necessary for playing a part of extraordinary difficulty. An easy tempered man of the world without prejudices or passions, he had shown some sympathy with the early stages of the Revolution, and had taken no part in the fulminations of the *émigrés*. The cruel wrongs of his kindred had left no abiding wound in a somewhat cold heart. Religious and political enthusiasm made no appeal to his kindly cynical nature, and he entertained no illusions as to the feeling of his subjects towards himself. To this even and rational temper he added perfect manners and a gift for the apt phrase and the gracious word in season. Yet all these qualities taken together, calculated as they were to minimise friction and to elude unpopularity, were not of the kind which appeals to the imagination and arouses the sentiment of loyalty. And Louis possessed besides certain positive disqualifications which must not be left out of the account. His sixty years, his gout and corpulence denied to him the opportunities of appearing to advantage before his people on public occasions. His long exile on the continent and shorter residence in England had left him both ignorant of French politics and unpractised in the conduct of affairs. Moreover, he had no faith in the new institutions, and though playing his role of Constitutional King honestly, was never at his ease in the part.

He found little assistance in the members of the Royal House. His brother, the Count of Artois, though a man of dignified presence, was suspected and feared for the conspicuous violence of his utterances in exile, and, surrounded by returned *émigrés*, scarcely concealed his dislike of the new system. The Duke of Angouleme, his elder son, and the King's nephew, kindled no hopes for the future of the dynasty. Taciturn and ill-informed, he was never gracious or at his ease in public. The second brother, the Duke of Berri, was not unpopular, but, openmouthed as he was, and fond of pleasure, he inspired no confidence. And the past, which Louis would have had his subjects forget as easily as himself, was incarnate in the tragic figure of the Duchess of Angouleme, daughter of Louis XVI. French sentiment would have gone out to her if she could have found it in her hard nature and withered heart to accept anything from hands which her imagination saw stained with blood. The art of playing the restored prince demands some sacrifice of the nobler affections.

Even at the cost of waiving all personal considerations, the task of a government was not easy which was forced by the very conditions of its existence to adopt an impartial attitude between the French nation and its conquerors as well as between the irreconcilable interests of its own subjects. The conditions of the Treaty of Paris, however inevitable, were a blow to national pride, the new Constitution under the Charter awakened every slumbering prejudice. The hereditary House of Peers, nominated by the King, and the Chamber of Deputies, elected on a restricted franchise with the control of money supplies, commanded

general approval; but the fact that the Charter was now granted by the King's grace, instead of being accepted by him as the condition of his election, inspired some doubts. His power of initiating all legislation and even of issuing ordinances by Royal authority, however necessary as a temporary precaution, suggested future dangers. The partisans of the old regime were bitterly disappointed by the arrangements which left the confiscated property of the Church and of the nobles in the hands of their new owners. Acceptable as peace might be to the middle classes it was necessary for the Government to walk warily.

It must never be forgotten that the French Restoration differed entirely from the English Restoration of 1660. From France during the Revolution a whole class had gone into exile, and with them the old structure of society. These men had now returned to find their places swept away or occupied by others, and made no secret of their wish to see the work of twenty-five years undone. It is small wonder that all who had supplanted them were suspicious and uneasy, and saw in every injudicious act of the Government the evidence of a great conspiracy.

Nothing was more necessary than economy in finance, and Baron Louis, the Finance Minister, set to work with commendable vigour. But while he succeeded in restoring public credit, his zeal outran discretion. Though taxes were left on a war footing, rigid economies began in the army which created a whole discontented class of discharged half-pay officers and disbanded veterans, and starved the efficiency of a service with which the national pride was closely bound up. A series of injudicious concessions to Royalist feeling gave a sinister colour to the policy of economy. The white cockade took the place of the tricolour, the lilies were substituted for the eagle, the old Imperial Guard were removed from their position about the King's person and a new Household Corps composed of *émigrés* substituted. Even the Charter seemed in danger. A proposal for the censorship of the Press, and another, for the restoration to their original owners of such confiscated lands as had not yet been disposed of, produced an atmosphere of suspicion, in the midst of which the solemn removal of the remains of Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette to St. Denis gave rise to a crop of the wildest rumours.

Conspiracy was now widespread, and the most various schemes were discussed. Among the malcontents Fouché, Napoleon's infamous Prefect of Police, had formed a plan for approaching the Allies at Vienna with a proposal for Napoleon's deportation to a distant island and the restoration of his son under the Regency of the Empress, when sudden tidings from the south shattered alike the schemes of the conspirators and the security of the throne. Napoleon had left Elba.

In November, 1815, the victorious Allies dictated the second Treaty of Paris. Prussian feeling was intensely excited. At the entry of the Allies Marshal Blucher had scarcely been restrained by Wellington from blowing up the bridge of Jena. Hardenberg, the Prussian Minister now demanded Alsace and Lorraine as a security against French aggression, and prophesied that blood would one day flow to win the Vosges frontier for Germany, if the present opportunity were neglected. But England, in the interests of the restored Bourbons, and the Czar for his own ends, stood firm for generous treatment. Some small rectifications of frontier were made, the spoils of the European galleries were at last restored, and an indemnity was exacted. It was not, however, possible to stop there. Some security for the future behaviour of France was necessary, and her frontier fortresses were occupied by an army of 150,000 men under the Duke of Wellington. Meantime the ambassadors of all four Powers were to exercise their influence in common upon the conduct of domestic affairs.

The importance of these measures cannot be exaggerated. Europe had, in fact, made itself collectively responsible for controlling the destinies of an independent nation. The step was taken without misgiving. The idea of collective action by the Allies was indeed in the

air. We have seen that there were many who were disappointed that it had not been used to realise their ideals. That most of these enthusiasts would have protested against its use for promoting any other common object than that upon which their own hopes were set is likely enough, but there were besides a large number of persons, who, while unable to formulate any definite programme, were deeply impressed with the greatness of the opportunity created by the European Alliance, and who desired to give a permanent form to so great a power for good.

To these views Alexander gave expression in proposing to his fellow sovereigns the scheme of the "Holy Alliance." By this instrument they were to undertake to regard one another as brothers, and to base their common action upon the principles of the Christian religion. To this high-sounding but indefinite pronouncement the Emperor Francis and King Frederick William gave a hesitating assent, the Prince Regent of England being debarred by his Constitutional position from entering into a personal engagement, and its terms were duly proclaimed at a review on the plain of Vertus in September, 1815.

The declaration seemed upon the face of it as harmless as it was indefinite. Castlereagh called it "a piece of sublime mysticism and nonsense," Prince Metternich, the Austrian Minister described it as an "empty form of words." Nevertheless, it was regarded with some suspicion. Abstract principles had led in the past to surprising practical applications. Indeed, at a later date, the engagement was popularly regarded as a sinister league for the repression of popular freedom and the support of tyranny. That Alexander had any such purpose in his mind is out of the question. Any practical consequences which he may have had in view tended in an entirely opposite direction, in fact, he was suspected of disguising the Jacobin under the autocrat, and of being intent on encouraging popular causes to secure an influence in Europe with which he might promote the special interests of Russia. Indeed, his own subsequent suggestion that a general grant of constitutions would accord with the spirit of the engagement gave some colour to the suspicion.

Of much greater practical importance was the Quadruple Treaty of Alliance executed in November. It was necessary that the Powers should bind themselves to maintain the arrangements of the Second Treaty of Paris for safe-guarding the *status quo* in France. It was in connection with this treaty that Castlereagh took a step which was to have unforeseen results.

The character and policy of this minister have been much misunderstood, and he has suffered by an unjust comparison with his more brilliant and attractive successor, Canning. It may be admitted that under a popular constitution he was not qualified to shine. He was ineffective in parliament, being neither an orator nor a debater. His sympathy with popular enthusiasms and prejudices was small, and he never addressed himself to either, or took the world into his confidence. He has suffered in public estimation as the principal agent of the Irish Act of Union, and as a member of Lord Liverpool's repressive government. But in diplomacy and foreign affairs he deserved well of his country. It was mainly by his efforts that the Alliance against Napoleon took its final shape in the Treaty of Chaumont; the policy of England in his hands was one of honourable unselfishness, so much so as to excite the characteristic scorn of Napoleon; and he maintained a clearness of view and a consistency of aim which contrast favourably with the opportunism of his fellow-diplomats. He justly valued the understanding which existed between the Powers, and did his best to save it, but not at the cost of seeing its influence abused.

He now urged that the Treaty must be couched in general terms to avoid humiliating the French Government in the eyes of its subjects. Accordingly it was agreed that the representatives of the Powers should meet at fixed intervals for the discussion of common objects and for the maintenance of the peace of Europe. The danger which lay under these

general phrases was that it might become the interest of one or more Powers to use the Alliance for other purposes than that of restraining France. At the moment, however, there seemed to be little fear of any sympathy being extended to the proceedings, shortly to be noticed, of the restored governments at Madrid, Rome, and elsewhere.

Three years later, in 1818, the time seemed to have come for the withdrawal of the Army of Occupation from France, and a conference accordingly met at Aix-la-Chapelle to consider the question. Though there was still little belief in the stability of the new institutions the evacuation was readily agreed upon, but a difference of opinion arose over the application of France to be admitted to the Alliance. Castlereagh urged that it was better to attach France to the European system than to isolate her, and carried. It might now, however, be argued with much plausibility that the Alliance contemplated wider responsibilities than that of resistance to France, since France herself was included.

Such an interpretation of its terms Alexander accordingly attempted to perpetuate, perhaps with some idea of clearing himself of the suspicion with which he was regarded. He proposed that a general alliance of all the Powers who had signed the Treaty of Vienna should be formed to guarantee all recognised rights. The Alliance was to hold periodical meetings, and he suggested that, with this security behind them, governments would have no difficulty in granting popular constitutions without fear of unforeseen results.

Castlereagh's attitude was logical and clear. He rightly apprehended a series of "interventions" dangerous to peace, and likely to hamper the internal development of independent states on their own lines. He objected to the "general guarantee," and succeeded in satisfying the Czar with an abstract resolution approving of the Holy Alliance as a "system of political conscience," but declaring that international obligations were to be sought in existing treaties. He declined to assent on behalf of England to the proposed periodical meetings, but expressed the willingness of his government to share in any future Congress summoned for any special and defined purpose. The remainder of the discussions of the Conference may be neglected. They served mainly to show the ineffectiveness of such a body for dealing even with questions, like those of the Slave trade and of the Barbary pirates, which were essentially matters of common interest.

It might thus seem that the Concert of Europe had finally demonstrated its own impotence for good, while it had been deprived of a dangerous mandate for mischievous interference by the dexterity of Castlereagh. That the prospect was unfulfilled is to be attributed mainly to the influence of Prince Metternich. From this moment his figure replaces that of Alexander in the foreground of the picture. It was the fashion among historians of the last generation to paint his character and policy in lurid colours. He has been represented as a bigot animated by a fervent and stupid attachment to a worn-out theory of paternal government, who viewed popular movements with an uncomprehending and almost religious horror. The settlement of Vienna has been represented as almost entirely his work, devised and consistently used for the repression of every sort of freedom. No impartial survey of his career will sustain this theory. Metternich had entered the Austrian diplomatic service at an early age, and had imbibed a diplomatist's dislike of far-reaching schemes and constructive policies. He was essentially an opportunist, keeping an eye upon every turn of the European game and alert to score every possible advantage. Here his tact, secrecy, and insight made him a power. He was, moreover, intensely Austrian in his policy, and circumstances did not permit to Austria the wide views of Alexander or the detached unselfishness of England.

The Austrian Empire consisted of an almost fortuitous collection of nationalities—Germans, Slavs, Magyars, Poles, and Italians united under a single sceptre. The development of national feeling could only mean disruption; popular opinion, if once allowed

freely to express itself, would let loose every racial antagonism. So obvious are these special difficulties that it may be wondered at first sight why Austria did not stand apart and suffer the rest of Europe, from which she differed so profoundly, to go its own way. But there were two regions outside her own territories to whose affairs Austria could not afford to be indifferent. In Germany and in Italy were populations of the same blood and language as her own subjects; ideas and aspirations which took root among them were sure to spread to her own territories. Worse still, there were already in both central and southern Europe tendencies to union, which in Italy might rob Austria of provinces, and in Germany establish a powerful neighbour on her flank. Finally, there were in both regions ambitious princes ready to take advantage of such sentiments to enlarge their own dominions. Thus, in self-defense, Austria was bound to attempt to secure the status quo both east of the Rhine and south of the Alps, to exercise a control over the policy of the princes, and to induce them to believe that their own safety was concerned in repressing popular movements. Thus Metternich was able to say with perfect truth, "We initiate no policy, our policy is confined to maintaining treaties and public repose."

Such a policy appears on the face of it too negative to be successful for long. Indeed, Metternich sometimes spoke of himself as "propping up a mouldering edifice," and even stated his conviction that the old order was doomed. Nevertheless, he at no time ceased to talk of the agitation for representative government as a disease, and seems to have clung to the diplomatist's characteristic hope that new circumstances would one day arise under which Austria, preserved by himself from destruction, would find the solution of her difficulties. From one possible line of action he was debarred. A vigorous administrative reform has often welded together the most dissimilar provinces. But Metternich was not his own master. The Emperor Francis loved to direct every detail of the internal government, and between him and an efficient bureaucratic system stood the example of Joseph II's failure in the same direction. The remedy had been tried, and was believed to be worse than the disease. Napoleon once said of Metternich that he "mistook intrigue for statesmanship." It is difficult to see how an Austrian minister of the time could have played the nobler part.

Germany was the field in which Austrian policy first revealed its tendency. We have already seen how the Congress, in its anxiety to finish its work, threw upon the newly constituted Diet the task of drawing up the general laws which were to govern the affairs of the Confederation. In November, 1816, the Diet met at Frankfort to consider such important matters as a common scheme for national defence by a Federal Army, the re-arrangement of Customs tariffs in the interest of commerce, regulations for governing the freedom of the Press and the question of granting constitutions. In these last two matters it was important that all should act alike, as divergence would create discontent and unrest, while unanimous action would strengthen whatever decision was taken.

It was soon realised that the Diet was powerless to deal with the simplest business. The delegates were, in fact, the envoys of a number of jealous governments, and could commit themselves to nothing without instructions from home. Prussia would not hear of an arbitration scheme which might fetter her expansion; the smaller states put difficulties in the way of a Federal Army in which the preponderance was sure to belong to Prussia; the proposal for common action over the censorship collapsed; the petty sovereigns were more anxious to retain their customs revenues than to break down tariffs which restrained the growth of trade; in the matter of constitutions the Elector of Hesse made himself ridiculous by reviving every detail of the old regime, even to the queues and hair powder of the soldiers, while the Duke of Saxe-Weimar granted the most liberal institutions to his subjects, both acting without any regard to the views of the Diet.

Meantime, in the southern States, the rulers of Bavaria and Baden had both granted constitutions not without the idea of bidding against one another for the Czar's support in a

territorial dispute in which they were concerned, while a similar proposal had come to grief in Wurtemberg owing to the dissatisfaction of the old Estates of the principality with the details.

Nowhere had national feeling been stronger during the war than in Prussia, and Frederick William, by an ordinance of May 22, 1815, had actually gone as far as to promise a constitution. But whatever hopes had been entertained were doomed to disappointment. There was, in fact, a real difficulty. There was a strong and well-grounded feeling against a brand-new constitution, and a desire to base the new popular institutions on the old system of Estates which had existed in separate provinces. It was thought that out of representatives from these Estates a central deliberative body might be constituted without a decisive breach with the past. Unfortunately there were provinces where no Estates existed, nor, where they did exist, were they uniformly representative of the same classes. The situation called for a statesman possessed of the constructive power to reduce the Estates to uniformity and to create the superstructure. No such man was available. Hardenberg's powers were failing, and Stein's reforms were already producing a reaction which, coupled with Metternich's influence upon the King, delayed progress for two years. Ultimately, in 1817, a Commission was appointed to collect opinions in the provinces. Its progress was slow, and the results obtained were singularly indefinite. Yet, though a constitution was postponed, Prussia set foot firmly on the path of administrative reform from which Austrian statesmen had recoiled. A Council of State was organised to control all departments of the government; a strong system of administration was busy absorbing the new provinces; Maassen's efforts secured the abolition of internal customs, thus establishing freedom of trade within Prussia; an effective educational system sprang up under the guidance of Altenstein. Prussia was building firm foundations for the future.

All this while the jealousies of the German Governments were highly satisfactory to Metternich. But the time came when even he desired to see them take concerted action. The territories of the Duke of Saxe-Weimar had become the centre of a national patriotic agitation. A Students' League (*Burschenschaft*) was formed at the University of Jena, and the movement spread to other universities. Professors and students fell to discussing, pamphleteering, and demonstrating with all the idealistic fervour and disregard of material fact which has always marked the classes engaged in purveying and imbibing knowledge. A grand convivial demonstration at the Wartburg (1817), ended in a bonfire upon which some reactionary books and emblems of militarism were burnt amid great enthusiasm. All this appears at first sight silly and harmless enough, but Metternich's fears were excited by a movement which seemed likely to capture the mind of the rising generation and to conduct them to manhood imbued with the very principles the operation of which he had reason to dread. Nor were the declamations of professors and students altogether harmless. Our own experience in India may help to remind us of the close connection between unbridled license in denunciation and political crime, and it is a fact that many of the professors had not shrunk from recommending perjury and murder as means to the accomplishment of the national redemption.

This criminal nonsense was taken seriously. An attempt was made by a medical student closely connected with the *Burschenschaft* to assassinate Von Ibell, the Minister of Hesse. The attempt was followed by an even more senseless crime. A pamphlet had appeared written by Stourdza, an adherent of the Czar, condemning the views of the German agitators. Kotzebue, a German writer regarded as a Russian agent, having declared that this publication was inspired by Alexander, was sought out and stabbed by a Jena student, a member of the *Burschenschaft*. The crime acquires a greater significance from the fact that a leading professor was aware of his intentions, and that a patriotic preacher was found to describe his act as that of "a pure pious youth," and as "a beautiful sign of the times."

Metternich was not slow to take advantage of the revulsion of feeling caused by these outrages. Working on Frederick William's fears in an interview at Teplitz, he threatened to leave him unaided to face the general peril if he did not abandon his scheme for representative government in Prussia, and persuaded him to join in calling an extraordinary conference of the larger German States at Carlsbad (1819) to deal with the situation. Here decrees were passed putting all universities under close government supervision, dissolving all student associations, enacting a strict censorship for the Press, and establishing at Mainz a special commission to follow up any traces that might be found of widespread conspiracy, thus assuring to Metternich a general right of disciplinary interference. These decrees were next submitted to the Diet for acceptance, where they met with some opposition before they were ratified, the smaller states disliking the dictation of their more powerful neighbours.

The dissatisfaction took a more effective shape the next year at Vienna, where Metternich had summoned representatives from all the States to a conference which was designed to give to the Federal Constitution, in the interests of law and order, a definition which it had hitherto lacked. The attempt to revise Article XIII (which permitted the granting of constitutions) in a reactionary sense, was only partially successful. No authority was, indeed, allowed to the popular voice apart from the ruler's pleasure, but no restriction could be obtained upon the right of each sovereign prince to deal with the question in his own way. Thus the Vienna Final Act of 1820 was productive of little change, and the resolutions which charged the Diet with the duty of protecting the individual Governments against revolution were little more than pious recommendations.

Still, if Metternich had not been entirely successful in establishing Austrian tutelage, he had won the German princes to common repressive action, and he had so far prevailed with Frederick William that in 1821 a new commission was appointed whose task was specifically limited to the establishment of a universal system of local Estates in Prussia.

Events were already taking place which impelled the Austrian Chancellor to an attempt at bending the power of the European Alliance towards similar ends. In any such task seemed every day more likely that he would be able to count upon the co-operation of Russia. Recent events had been casting over Alexander's sanguine temperament the chill of disillusion. A plot discovered in his own army had preyed upon his nerves, and the anti-Christian tendencies of the German agitators had alienated his sympathy. Stourdza's pamphlet had already indicated some change in his view, and the assassination of Kotzebue had excited his strong resentment. Another assassination, that of the Duke of Berri in France, deepened still further his distrust of popular causes. His sentimental visions, hastily conceived, were as hastily abandoned. The Czar was ready for another conversion.

For some time past he had been led by his desire to play a great part in Europe to interest himself in the distracted condition of Spain. The Revolution of 1820, by which the restored King Ferdinand VII had been forced to accept a constitution which only aggravated the situation (a series of events to be described in the next chapter) quickened his desire to interfere. He proposed to Metternich a Congress of the Powers by which he should be armed with a mandate to carry a Russian force into the Peninsula. But Metternich's dislike for revolution varied inversely with the distance of the scene from any centre of Austrian interests. He declined, under cover of a number of fine distinctions, to lend his support.

The case was very different when only a month later Naples imitated the Spanish example and broke out into revolt against Ferdinand I. It will be necessary in another chapter to give some account of the condition of Italy under the restored Governments. A brief outline of the situation in Naples will be sufficient in this place. Here, as elsewhere, the new Government had been retrograde rather than oppressive. The French law and the French

administrative system were maintained, but everything was mismanaged by an inefficient Government. Ferdinand I had a bad record. He was ignorant, superstitious, and brutal, and he was justly mistrusted; the horrible cruelties perpetrated by his party in 1799 were too well remembered. Grievances enough existed, due to the return of old social conditions and an exiled party. The *émigrés* got back their land, and the peasants soon felt the weight of the change; trade was crippled by the ancient customs regulations; Murat's officers and Government officials found themselves replaced by supporters of the old regime. Hatred of the French, now transformed into hatred of the Austrians, wore the colour of a rudimentary national feeling. These sentiments took shape in a secret society, modelled upon the lines of Freemasonry. The members of this society styled themselves the Carbonari. No one definite political aim inspired them, but vague aspirations for the regeneration of society at large, in which Christian sentiment, humanitarian principles, revolutionary ideas, and even socialistic notions were mingled. The association spread rapidly over Italy, and contained for the most part men of high character and of some social position. Their secrecy and their numbers inspired an exaggerated estimate of their power, while their wide ramifications and organisation by local lodges made united action almost impossible. Nevertheless, they secured the control of some of the machinery of local government by enrolling the majority of the magistrates in their own organisation. With Carbonari in every profession and every office, the country was mined, and when the National Militia, raised to check brigandage, came under the command of Pepe, himself a leading Carbonaro, the time was ripe for overthrowing the system which the society had so long denounced.

Two lieutenants of cavalry at Nola, Morelli, and Salviati fired the train by imitating the Spanish revolutionists, and, leaving their quarters at the head of a small force, proclaimed a constitution. The country rose, whole regiments deserted, and Pepe was able to meet the King's insidious promises with a demand for "the Spanish Constitution of 1812." Ferdinand offered no opposition. Indeed, he grossly over-acted the part which his subjects forced upon him, and accepted the Constitution with great professions of enthusiasm and with loud imprecations upon himself if he failed to keep his oath. Ministers were found among Murat's former officials, an enthusiastic but inexperienced Chamber of Deputies was elected, and debates began.

Difficulties were plentiful. The Constitution itself was the work of inexperienced enthusiasts for popular control, and its provisions were calculated to paralyse any attempt at government. The legislature was to consist of a single Chamber, the King's veto was to be set aside if any measure was passed thrice, ministers allowed to be deputies, there was to be a general election every two years, and none of the retiring deputies were eligible for re-election. Thus the Chamber was to be alike uncontrolled, and to be deprived of the wisdom which comes of experience. The elaborate system of election demanded too much intelligence and interest from the voter. Moreover, the ministers, trained in the French official school, were out of sympathy with the democratic views of the Chamber, while the Chamber itself was swayed inconsistently this way and that by its deference to the vague and irresponsible authority of the Carbonari. Sicily rebelled. Her ancient Constitution had been replaced, under British influence, by one of a modern type, which had in its turn been withdrawn on the restoration. The independence of the island, thus already threatened, seemed finally doomed to extinction by her incorporation under the new constitution which was to apply to Naples and Sicily alike. At Palermo the nobles armed the mob, and fierce riots took place. It was only after desperate fighting that the Neapolitan troops succeeded in putting down the rising.

Metternich was determined to interfere. He still hoped to avoid a Conference likely to open the Spanish problem. He therefore circulated a proposal that Austria should intervene, backed by the moral support of Europe, in the shape of notes from the other Powers. Castlereagh flatly objected. England had no quarrel with Naples, and would not sanction an

undertaking the details of which she could not foresee. Metternich was therefore forced to fall back upon the support of Alexander and to attempt to secure a mandate from such a Conference as the Czar desired. He suggested for discussion a proposal that the Powers should undertake to refuse their recognition to revolutions forced upon rulers "from below." Castlereagh at once refused to bind himself to a general principle which would apply in circumstances which could not be foreseen, while expressing himself ready to assist in maintaining existing treaty obligations.

Accordingly, when the Conference met at Troppau, in October, 1820, England was only represented by Sir Robert Stewart, brother of the British Foreign Secretary, with no authority except to watch events. The conference. French envoy was also without full powers.

Alexander was more amenable. In an interview over a cup of tea he put himself unreservedly in Metternich's hands. "I deplore," he said, "all that I said and did between 1815 and 1818." It was therefore easy to secure the agreement of Austria, Russia, and Prussia on the Troppau Protocol, binding these Powers to bring States guilty of revolution back "into the bosom of the Great Alliance."

France gave a general approval to the Protocol. Castlereagh instructed Stewart to protest. He pointed out that the Quadruple Alliance had been directed against France alone, and did not cover the action now proposed. He further asked the pertinent question whether any one of the three Powers was prepared to see the new principle applied to itself by consent of the rest. From this moment England was detached in all but name from the Concert.

Ferdinand was now summoned to Laibach to attend the adjourned deliberations of the Allies. He was only suffered to go by his subjects upon taking another solemn oath to maintain all that had been done. Once there he disavowed his obligations with a haste which excited disgust. In spite of the protest, which Stewart insisted on inserting in the record of the proceedings, Austria was empowered to intervene. The Neapolitan army under Pepe, dreading the effect of negotiations, dared not stand on the defensive at the frontier, but took the initiative by advancing upon Rieti to render peace impossible. Here they were beaten, and Ferdinand entered Naples without further resistance (March, 1821), to inaugurate a series of ruthless reprisals. Thus ended the first Italian uprising for liberty. Regret will be tempered by the reflection that it was better for Italy that Piedmont and not Naples should be her champion.

And Piedmont was already making her first bid for leadership. The old system had come back with Victor Emmanuel I, and under his full approval; but constitutional ideas were rife among the nobles, and even the King hated the Austrians. The Carbonari hoped to force him into the position of national champion against the foreigner, and believed themselves sure of the support of Charles Albert, Prince of Carignano, a member of the Royal family, to whom the crown would ultimately fall after the death of the King's brother, Charles Felix. The Prince had been brought up in Paris, had served in Napoleon's army, and had given some encouragement to Carbonari schemes. A definite plan was now drawn up to proclaim the Spanish Constitution, to advance to the support of revolution in Milan, and to cut Austrian communications with Naples.

An interview took place between Charles Albert and the leaders, and they seem to have been satisfied that they had won his support. Next morning, for reasons not easy to trace, he laid the facts before the authorities. It was too late to stop the rising. Alessandria and its garrison proclaimed Victor Emmanuel King of Italy, and declared for the Constitution. The King, torn between promises he had made to Austria at Laibach and his unwillingness

to attack his own subjects, evaded the difficulty by abdicating. Charles Felix was absent, and Charles Albert, appointed Regent at the age of twenty-two in a position of exceptional difficulty, wavered for several days. Finally he proclaimed the Spanish Constitution, and began to talk of war with Austria. At this point a manifesto from the new King appeared, disavowing his proceedings. The Regent bowed to this decision and joined the troops at Novara, who had not yet declared for the conspiracy.

Charles Felix and the conspirators at Alessandria were thus left facing one another, and both refused mediation. By this time an Austrian army was at hand. The Alessandrian troops advanced upon Novara, and were there decisively beaten by the united forces of the garrison and the foreign invader.

Thus the curtain fell upon the first ineffective scene in Italy's long struggle for independence. Metternich had defied Castlereagh and bound Russia and Prussia to his chariot wheels. But he had put a heavy strain upon an understanding which, above all, demanded moderation, and the dissolution of the Concert was in sight.

CHAPTER VI

THE BREAKING UP OF THE CONCERT

THE extreme doctrine of the collective responsibility of Europe for suppressing revolution had adapted itself admirably to Austrian interests in Italy. Viewed from the Austrian standpoint, the affairs of Naples had presented a clear case for intervention, for Austrian predominance in Italy was manifestly imperilled. To achieve a sufficient measure of agreement between the great Powers had not been beyond the resources of diplomacy, for the interests of no other power were concerned, and none save England was perverse enough to consider the fact a valid reason for withholding approval. Finally, the military resources of Austria had proved sufficient, and near enough at hand to be independent of anything but the benevolent neutrality of the Allies.

Meanwhile the Spanish Revolution, itself one of the causes of the movement in Naples, had been running its course unchecked. The fact was that the problem obstinately refused to accommodate itself to the new doctrine of intervention without destroying the basis of agreement failing which intervention was itself impossible. Metternich himself at first struggled vainly to evolve some principle which would differentiate the Spanish from the Neapolitan troubles, and justify a policy of inaction. Austria had little to fear from the uprising, and nothing to gain from interfering in the Peninsula. Interference in any form was likely to let loose all the furies of international jealousy. The restored French monarchy could not be indifferent to a revolutionary movement south of the Pyrenees, and would gladly have renewed the old relations of alliance and patronage, dating from the days of the Family Compact, with a special view to commercial advantages in the New World. It was just at this point that the interests of England also were vitally affected. By the revolt of the Spanish-American colonies the trade monopoly of the mother country had come to an end, and English merchants had reaped advantages which they would be slow to surrender to Spain herself if restored to authority, and still more so to England's old rival posing as champion of Spain. Nor could the colonial be divided from the constitutional question. If Europe took action in the one she would at least be led to express an opinion on the other.

And even if the two questions could be satisfactorily divided, to whom could the execution of any decree of the Concert be committed? France was the nearest neighbour, but French intervention was scarcely possible in face of British jealousy. Britain had disavowed intervention altogether; Austria and Prussia would not move in a matter where they had no interests at stake. There remained Russia. Alexander was as eager as ever to draw the sword to enforce the decisions of a supreme tribunal of Europe, but Metternich was determined to prevent the passage of Russian armies across central Europe, and shrank from the possible consequences of committing the security of the world's peace to the impulses of the Czar. He would gladly have let so thorny a question alone, and yet the very importance of the interests involved made it certain that the Concert must attempt something, unless it was prepared to abdicate its claims and to leave national jealousies to fight out their differences in the old rough way.

An attempt must now be made to sketch in some detail the antecedents of the Spanish Revolution, not merely for the better understanding of the movement itself, but because they profoundly affect the whole subsequent course of Spanish history.

In May, 1808, Napoleon summoned the Royal Family of Spain before his judgment

seat at Bayonne. Thither came the good-natured cipher King Charles IV; his self-willed, low-minded Queen; Manuel Godoy, Prince of the Peace, at once the King's all-powerful minister, and the Queen's favoured lover; and the Infant Ferdinand, the mean-spirited and undutiful heir to the throne. The mutual relations of these sordid actors promised an easy realisation of the Emperor's purpose, which was nothing less than to secure a peaceful occupation of Spain, as a base of operations against England's Portuguese Allies and English trade interests. The promise of an independent principality had six months earlier secured from the favourite a free passage for French troops through Spain by the Treaty of Fontainebleau. Ferdinand's hatred for his father's minister had exploded ineffectively in an ill-managed plot, and he had been reduced to abject entreaties to save his own life, and had even been driven to court the favour of Napoleon.

A sudden turn of fortune altered the entire situation. The occupation of certain Spanish fortresses by fraud or by violence left no doubt as to the character of French intentions, and a furious rising at Aranjuez, followed by the hasty abdication of the old King, carried Ferdinand in the *rôle* of national hero to the throne of Spain. But hero Ferdinand never was. He desired first and foremost the favour of Napoleon, and what manliness he possessed quickly dissolved at Bayonne. As for the Emperor, he had decided that it was impossible to work any longer with such miserable tools. Ferdinand was forced to restore the throne to his father, and Charles was only too glad to escape from his difficulties by putting it at the disposal of Napoleon. A month later the news rang through the Peninsula that the ancient Crown of Spain and the Indies had been set on the head of Joseph, brother of the Corsican usurper. The American colonies there and then threw off their allegiance.

It can scarcely be doubted that Napoleon had failed to gauge the peculiar temper of the Spanish people. The fierce pride, national, local, and personal, which could never abandon dignity or self-love amid the meanest surroundings or the most convincing failures, was alien to his experience. Equally unintelligible was the harsh uncompromising spirit which the grim type of Catholicism long maintained by the Inquisition had planted deep in the hearts of the people. Superficially, Spain wore the aspect of a land ripe for the blessings which the Revolutionary armies brought in their train. Nowhere were the privileged classes so numerous, nowhere did the nobility contribute less to national burdens. In no other country did the Church own a greater proportion of the soil or exercise so strong an influence. Poverty cast a blight over the land. The influx of the precious metals from America had first destroyed the incentive to industry, and had ultimately raised all prices beyond the means of a thriftless people. Trade was held in contempt by native Spaniards, except in the seaport towns; the alien traders, both Moors and Jews, had disappeared before the determined policy of the Inquisition; governmental restrictions shackled every kind of enterprise. Enactments prescribing a maximum price for food destroyed agriculture at a blow; the countryside was deserted and often unsafe; the town population in casual employ increased; while noble and peasant starved in the provinces. Rank and blood commanded an almost superstitious respect, and the repressive clerical ascendancy imparted an unnatural stiffness to national manners while it discouraged intellectual activity.

Yet Spanish pride asked nothing better than to be left alone. Administrative reform had been tried before and had been as little acceptable to the subjects of the energetic Charles III, as to those of his younger contemporary, Joseph II. Vainly did Napoleon hope to conciliate Spanish feeling by the reformation of abuses. Each new improvement was but another symbol of the hated "Interloper," Joseph, the man whom all good Spaniards firmly believed to be a drunken, cross-eyed, misshapen dwarf. The advantages of enlightened government as compared with ancestral ways presented as little attraction to the mass of the population as they would to the wild hillmen of our own Indian frontier today.

But Napoleon had doubtless relied upon other forces than those which sound

administration could rally to his support. He saw in Spain a government so centralised that, with the one exception of the Church, any influence save that of the King and his immediate *entourage* had ceased to count. The mediaeval Cortes of three Estates had long since fallen into disuse or had been abolished in all the provinces; except in Navarre and the Basque country, where the local immunities or *fueros* were still jealously maintained. The central Cortes of Castille, with mediaeval powers and a mediaeval constitution, had been reduced to a shadow, and met for the last time in 1789. The Council of Castille, consisting of advisers nominated by the Crown, enjoyed a position of dignity rather than influence, and the work of government fell to a select Committee known as the *Camara Real*, which contained the secretaries of the various departments of state, responsible severally to the King and mere removable servants of his will. Yet even in this smaller body few decisions of importance were made. The informal *camarilla*, or clique of the King's personal companions and friends, swayed in the last resort the policy of the State. Paralysis and centralisation went hand in hand.

Nor were the evils of the system compensated for by any elements of independent strength in local government. Appointed by royal authority, the *corregidores* ruled the towns and the captains-general the provinces uncontrolled by local opinion.

There were thus no institutions round which the patriotism of Spain could rally, no organisation which could absorb and discipline the passionate energy and enthusiasm, which the attack on the French garrison of Madrid and the capitulation of General Dupont to the raw troops of Castanos at Bailen evoked all over the country. All the more amazing is the spirit which within a few weeks covered Spain with local Juntas or committees of resistance, and by September had gathered representatives from them all in a Supreme Central Junta at Aranjuez.

In this popularly appointed body, and in an atmosphere of storm and stress, a new element appeared in the political life of Spain. The loyalty of the nation to the Crown and to ancient ways had found its expression in an assembly elected on frankly democratic lines and driven every day to subordinate existing rights, traditions and customs to the necessities of national defence. It was no doubt with the aim of reconciling a devotion to the past with the supreme needs of the present that, in the absence of their King, the Junta decided to summon the ancient Cortes. But the details of the proposal reveal how far they were drifting from tradition. The three Estates were to be replaced by two Houses, and the colonies were to be invited to send representatives.

The on-coming tide of French invasion obliterated yet more of the ancient landmarks. The Junta was driven back, first to Seville, finally into the Isle of Leon, and there resigned its authority into the hands of a Committee of Regency charged as a first duty with the task of summoning the Cortes. In these surroundings, new influences came into play. The uncompromising spirit of men fighting with their back to a wall combined with the popular tendencies of the commercial towns of the south. The Regents found themselves obliged to yield to the demand for a single Chamber. This assembly, appointed by a complicated process of election, met in the autumn of 1810. But the distance of the colonies, the occupation of more than half the country by the French, the want of familiarity among Spaniards with voting under any conditions resulted in an enormous proportion of vacant seats. These were hastily filled with persons on the spot who could show any claim to be connected with the unrepresented districts. The views of the Cortes were not the views of Spain, but those of Cadiz and the maritime towns.

The proceedings of the Cortes need not claim attention in detail. They were characterised by a growing self-importance, by a steady tendency towards "progressive" views, and by financial expedients, such as the sale of royal domains and Church property,

certain to be called into question in the event of a restoration. It was the sense of the incompatibility of much that had been done with the traditional principles of Spanish government that led finally to the promulgation of that famous Constitution of 1812, which was destined to become the panacea for all the body politic in the eyes of revolutionary opinion in the south of Europe. The popularity of this Constitution and its essential weakness sprang from the same root. It was a party settlement designed to maintain a system which had come into being under wholly exceptional circumstances, and it took no account either of the past or of the actual facts of the existing situation. It affirmed the sovereignty of the people and bound the royal power in fetters. Ministers were made responsible to the Cortes and not to the King. The Cortes was to draw up a list from which the Crown should nominate the Council of State. Care was taken that the popular will should prevail in all cases of disagreement by omitting to provide a second Chamber and by the regulation that the royal veto should not take effect in the case of measures thrice approved by the Cortes. Such arrangements have of late found respectable advocates, but were plainly unsuitable to Spain in the early part of the nineteenth century. The whole was plentifully seasoned with the inexperience and suspicion of the amateur legislator. A new Cortes was to be elected every two years. No member could sit in two successive Chambers, nor was any permitted to hold office of any sort. The election of members required four successive processes. Thus there was created a system incapable of acquiring the unmistakable support of national opinion or that experience and sense of responsibility essential to the working of democratic institutions, while armed with an unrivalled power of making government impossible.

Even in the Cortes itself these provisions had by no means met with unanimous approval, and the majority dwindled daily as elected members from the districts cleared of the French armies replaced the nominees who had occupied the vacant seats. But in proportion as the hour of the King's return drew nearer, the more uncompromising became the attitude of the majority. Even the Inquisition, though it had long since ceased to be mischievous, was abolished before the Chamber was dissolved and before the first Cortes elected under the new Constitution had assembled. It was at once apparent how little the sweeping changes of the previous year represented the deliberate judgment of the country. The *Liberales* now commanded only a trifling majority. Unregarded and almost forgotten, the representatives of the nation passed resolutions restraining the King from exercising his powers till he had sworn obedience to the Constitution, and ordering him to proceed direct to the capita] by a route selected by themselves. Spain cared little or nothing for their resolutions. The battle of Vittoria had been won (June 1813), and Wellington had thrust the invader north of the Pyrenees (1814).

The crisis of Spanish history had now arrived. A group of men, self-important, inexperienced, but at least patriotic and well-meaning, had been led on step by step impose upon Spain a system unsuitable to its traditions and ways of thought. An exiled prince was on his way to resume the throne of his ancestors with no other thought than that things would be as they had been before he crossed the frontier, in a land where the old distinctions of class and the old subordination to authority had in fact been broken up by six years of frenzied local and individual effort.

It was the supreme misfortune of Spain that at this moment there was "none to take her by the hand of all the sons she had brought forth." No Stein arose to reconcile the old and the new, nor, if there had been any one of his greatness and insight, is it probable that the spirit of insubordination which guerilla warfare and Junta government had let loose would have suffered men to bow to his authority.

There was but one man who commanded at the moment the obedience and loyalty of Spain—Ferdinand, the "Long-Desired," and he was miserably unequal to one of the great

opportunities of history. Sentimental historians have loved to paint him as a monster. He was, unfortunately for his country, a man of a type only too common where a loose character and an untrained intelligence go together. Destitute of moral enthusiasm he recognised none of the duties which a ruler owes to his subjects. To him Spain was his patrimony, and authority his hereditary right. Devoid of breadth of intelligence, he failed to read the signs of the times or to recognise the altered conditions of Spain in 1814. Gifted neither with industry nor administrative ability, he took no pleasure or interest in the work of government. Nevertheless he was a man to be reckoned with. He commanded the hereditary devotion of Spaniards. And, if like other restored princes, he had forgotten nothing, he had at least learnt something from the humiliation at Bayonne—a reserve which never trusted mortal man, and a coarse shrewdness which tore all the fine disguises off naked facts. He dominated other men in his day of power by a bullying satirical *bonhomie*, and when beaten by circumstances evaded the consequences of defeat by a vulgar bluff good humour which covered the shameless mendacity of his professions. He likened himself to the cork in a bottle of beer preventing the liquid from running over in froth. And if he had known how to exercise this useful function he might have done good service to Spain. As it was, he inflated by repression the fanaticism and pedantry of the party in opposition, while he infected authority with a minute and irritating intolerance, characteristics which were to dominate Spanish history for many a long day.

His intentions were not long left in doubt. The civil message to the Regents and to the Cortes who had appointed them, which preceded him across the frontier, was more than ambiguous in tone. Once on Spanish soil, he ostentatiously defied the restrictions absolutism, imposed upon his movements, and from Valencia he finally issued a declaration, in which he refused in plain terms to maintain the existing constitution or to recognise the validity of the acts of the Cortes. To the vague promises of constitutional government and the denunciation of despotism with which the document concluded his first acts gave the lie. Secure in the support of the rank and file of the Army (untouched as yet by the opinions which were making way among its officers), confident in the goodwill of the Church, which the Cortes had alienated by recent legislation, and assured of the passionate loyalty of the mob of Madrid, he caused all the chiefs of the popular party to be apprehended in their beds and thrown into prison. A thorough proscription of all possible opponents now began. Informers were encouraged, military tribunals and sentences of banishment made short work of all against whom the least suspicion was breathed. The old system of government was restored in every detail, and every alienated right and privilege re-affirmed.

It is small wonder that the national visions of a renewed prosperity, which awaited only the return of peace and of the King, were never realised. An antiquated and inactive administration discouraged every form of local combination and enterprise. The interests and prospects of individuals and of whole classes had been adversely affected by the sudden restoration of the conditions of 1808. Commerce, deprived of its mainstay in the resources of the American colonies, was in desperate case. Heedless of plots and outbreaks, of the snubs of the Congress of Vienna, of the remonstrances of England and France, of the good advice of the Czar, Ferdinand went on his way.

Only in one respect did his policy adventure beyond the paths of mere repression. The finances of the nation were ruined. The recovery of the American colonies, now unwilling to part with the independence they had asserted against the French, could alone avail to pour a life-giving stream of revenue into the exhausted treasury. An army was assembled at Cadiz ready for embarkation, and a fleet was purchased from Russia to protect the transports. But the fleet proved wholly unseaworthy, and, while the troops awaited fresh arrangements, the blow was struck which precipitated the impending revolution. Many of the soldiers had served their time, pay was in arrear, the enterprise to which they were committed (the reconquest of a whole continent by a few brigades) might well appear

hopeless, the long voyage in unseaworthy ships excited their terrors, few believed that they should see their native land again. Freemasonry, with all its hostility to authority and to clericalism, was rife among the officers; the agents of the American colonists and the leaders of public opinion in Seville and Cadiz were busy disseminating their views among the troops. A conspiracy was organised; even the Count of la Bisbal, who commanded the expeditionary force, had been gained over by the plotters.

The crisis was delayed first by the defection of the Count and his denunciation of some of his associates, and later by an outbreak of yellow fever which made it necessary to isolate the several regiments in separate quarters. But on the first day of the year 1820, Rafael Riego, commander of the regiment of Asturias, declared for the Constitution of 1812, and apprehended the General in command with his staff, while Colonel Quiroga, the chief selected by the conspirators, made an attempt to occupy Cadiz. Foiled by the officer in command he retired into the Isle of Leon, where he was soon blockaded. Thereupon Riego started at the head of 1500 men to visit the quarters of the regiments which had not yet declared in favour of the movement. Their commanders withdrew the troops out of his reach. His efforts to rouse the towns of Andalusia were attended with no better success. Losing men every day by desertion he took to the mountains, and there his force finally dispersed. The military revolt seemed to have ended in a complete fiasco, and the man whose childish vanity, absurd self-importance and essential incompetence were not to prevent him from becoming the idol of the popular faction, seemed to have stultified himself by his precipitation and by his failure to enlist support.

The towns of the northern seaboard saved the credit of the mutineers. Corunna burst into revolt, appointed a Junta and proclaimed the Constitution. The example was extensively imitated. Spain had learnt the lesson of local self-help, and in less than a month the country was in flames. When the Count of la Bisbal carried over his forces to the revolutionary cause the issue was decided. Ferdinand had no choice but to yield, for the mob and the army had joined his opponents. But the revolutionary party were still monarchist to a man, and the King's utter shamelessness stood him in good stead. He readily assented to the convocation of the Cortes and placed himself in the meanwhile under the direction of a provisional Junta. His personal utterances were full of an easy cynical good-humour, his public proclamations rang with the high-sounding political moralities dear to his opponents. He swore solemnly to maintain the Constitution of 1812 and postured upon balconies to cheering crowds. Doubtless his satirical humour enjoyed many of the fatuities of the moment, the mobs who hugged copies of the Constitution to their hearts, the Chairs of the Constitution from which its blessings were to be expounded in the Universities, his own new title of "the Great" and the proposal to erect a statue in his honour surmounted by a civic crown.

But the situation was more serious than he supposed. He might indeed appoint his old victims of 1814 as his ministers, but the whole temper and tone of the members of the new Cortes had long outrun the views of these mild revolutionaries. Crown and ministry were face to face with a violent ill-balanced opposition of extremists who called themselves the *Exaltados*. The first trial of strength took place over the attempt of the ministers to effect an economy by the disbandment of the army. In this endeavour they fell foul of the popular idol, Riego, exalted by a success which he had done nothing to win to the supreme command of the troops. Summoned to Madrid he was received with extravagant honours by the extremist political clubs which honeycombed the capital, and only with great difficulty was a decree obtained removing him to a distant command and suppressing his supporters.

The violent party now found unexpected allies. The anticlerical measures of the Cortes had called into existence an extreme absolutist and reactionary party who called themselves the *Apostolicals*. Encouraged by their appearance the King planned a military *coup d'état*,

and as a preliminary step transferred the command in New Castille to an officer whom he could trust. The result was another humiliation, a renewed prevalence of extreme counsels and the recrudescence of the political clubs. Moreover, inspired by a common hatred, the Apostolicals worked hand in hand with the Exaltados to secure the resignation of the ministry.

Amid threats of European intervention, the time for electing a fresh Cortes arrived (1822). The new assembly differed widely from its predecessor. Composed principally of journalists and lawyers it was less inclined than ever to moderate courses. Meantime, while Riego and his friends defied the central authority in the provinces, the Apostolicals had seized and fortified Urgel on the French frontier and declared against the government. If ever intervention was justified in the cause of order and common-sense the case seemed to have arisen.

To Metternich it had hitherto fallen by the accident of Austria's needs to guide the counsels of Europe. A congress had already been summoned at Verona for the autumn of 1822. But the Austrian Minister was in difficulties. At all costs the Czar's design of interfering as the mandatory of Europe must be prevented. This could scarcely be done without imposing the duty upon France. And this solution, unless England's consent could be secured, bristled with perplexities. Some means must therefore be found of inducing England to cooperate with the allies. The news, received at Laibach, of a rising against the Sultan in Moldavia seemed to offer common ground of interest and action to England and to Austria. As the question developed it appeared doubtful if England could long dispense with Austrian support.

This question was nothing less than the Eastern question in all its complexity. Not the least of the many antagonisms which beset any attempt at its solution was the mutual suspicion between England and Russia which had first taken shape after the Treaty of Tilsit, by which Napoleon appeared to have delegated to Alexander all his designs against England's Indian empire in return for Russian support in Western Europe. The conquests of Catherine II already reached to the Black Sea, and Alexander's own operations on the Danube and in the Caucasus, to be noticed elsewhere, had not tended to allay England's suspicion. Her statesmen already dreamed of Russia astride of new routes to India, by way of Asia Minor and the shores of the Red Sea, shorter than the long sea voyage round the Cape.

The Eastern Question itself arose out of the assumption that the Turkish Empire would sooner or later fall to pieces, and that the Turks themselves would be expelled from Europe. The question, propounded in its simplest form, was the problem of finding a successor to the Turkish authority. The character of the Ottoman rule seemed to give some warrant for the assumption, a community of blood and faith with the subject populations, and certain treaty rights which had been vigorously pressed, seemed to point to Russia as the destined heir.

The Turks had entered Europe as a conquering army. They had never entirely parted with the character. As in the case of other Mohammedan conquerors their faith divided them from their new subjects. They despised and rejected the civilisation of the Eastern Empire; they failed for the same reason, and indeed scarcely tried, to assimilate their dependents. Even after the decay of their military power in the eighteenth century they still remained essentially an army of occupation in a conquered land. An invading army does not concern itself with the civil government of a subdued district. It demands its requisitions and its indemnities, and for the most part leaves the conquered to raise them how they will. It punishes with a severity born of fear attacks upon its own members, gives much licence to its representatives, and views all disputes between soldier and civilian with a strong

prejudice in favour of the former.

Such was in fact the Ottoman rule. A sharp line was drawn between the Turk and his Christian subjects, a line which could only be passed by those who embraced the Mussulman faith. So far as the Turkish government had created a system of civil government and equal rights it existed for men of the privileged faith alone. Christians were free to manage their own mutual relations in their own despised way. As for their relations with the true believers, these were left undefined, dependent mainly on the caprice and power of the latter. The government meantime demanded the *haratch* or poll-tax from its Christian subjects, as well as the land-tax, or proportion of produce, which fell on Moslem and Christian alike. These taxes were farmed out, generally to the governor of the province, but the ultimate apportionment of the burden and the actual work of collection were in native hands.

The Christian population of the Balkan peninsula comprised a strange mixture of interlacing nationalities. Serbs and Vlachs predominated along the Danube, Bulgarians in the centre, Albanian, Greek and Balkans. Slav elements in the south and in the islands. But national lines of cleavage were not emphasised, the division between Moslem and rayah effaced all other distinctions. The provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia had indeed never come under direct Turkish rule, but were administered as dependent states under Christian Hospodars, or governors, sent from Constantinople. Servia had struggled fiercely for independence from Mussulman rule under the heroic Karageorge, ancestor of the present dynasty, an exsergeant in the Austrian army, turned pig-dealer. But the withdrawal of Russian support in 1812 had left the practical independence of Servia to be accomplished in another way by another pig-dealer, also an ancestor of kings, Milosh Obrenovich, who, in 1820, secured from the Sultan a grant of the government of the province and the title of prince.

But none of the dependent peoples was more conscious of its nationality than the Greeks, though in truth none of them contained such diverse racial elements, and among these it must be admitted that the pure Greek strain, except in the islands, was very far from predominating. The population of the Morea was largely Slav, that of Greece north of the isthmus mainly Albanian, while the language and the traditions around which their pride and their hopes centred derived from Byzantium and the Greek Empire, and not from ancient Athens.

It is necessary to examine the condition of the Greek people a little more closely. The relations between conqueror and conquered which have already been defined did not in fact commonly result in the oppression which theoretically they appear to entail. In the Morea, the Mussulman population was comparatively small, in the islands negligible, while in northern Greece difficulties of communication and the fact that whole villages and districts were commonly of one faith minimised the occasions of hostile contact. There was nothing like serfage nor was the Mussulman conqueror at all universally lord of the soil. Moreover the Christian population enjoyed something approaching the elements of self-government. The only organisation which had survived the Turkish conquest was the Orthodox Church. The Sultans seized upon it to perform the duties they were unwilling to undertake. The Patriarch of Constantinople became the representative of the Christian population, almost a minister of the Porte charged with their supervision as a special department. The Bishops were the judges and civil magistrates of the Christian districts. And while the higher clergy were somewhat degraded and their influence imperilled by this official position, the local priests kept alive a national consciousness which was based on a religious distinction.

Furthermore, the needs of the revenue developed something like a system of local government to facilitate collection. In the Morea, where it was most completely organised,

each community elected its own Demogeront, who apportioned taxation among individuals and helped to appoint similar officers called Proestoi for the district, who in their turn elected Primates for each province whose duty it was to meet the Pasha of the Morea in Council. These officials, though often by the necessities of their position oppressive, were natural leaders of the people, and the principle of local collection in one form or another, with similar results, obtained throughout the country.

Nor were the Greeks destitute of the elements of military strength. In the mountainous districts of northern Greece, the maintenance of the peace and the protection of the mountain passes had long been in the hands of irregular bands of Christian militia, or Armatoli, recognised by the Porte, but not very clearly distinguishable from the brigands, or Klephts, whom they hunted; and when the policy was initiated of replacing the Armatoli by Albanian mercenaries, adventurous individuals and even whole bands of the former defenders of the country adopted the profession of the Klepht, commanding a certain popular admiration as heroes of ballad and story, which their savage doings did little to conciliate or deserve. Brigandage, too, was not uncommon in the Morea, but the fighting men of the south were the Mainotes of the mountain fastnesses of the ancient Taygetus, a proud race of plunderers and pirates.

Encouraged by the Sultans of the early part of the eighteenth century, who saw their commerce falling into the hands of foreigners, the Greeks had built up a considerable naval power. The Albanians, who had settled in Hydra and Spezzia, and the Greeks who had colonised Psara and Kasos, paying light taxes or furnishing a contingent to the Ottoman fleet, rapidly became prosperous commercial communities. Whether governed by an oligarchy of ship-owners, as at Hydra, or by a democratic assembly, as at Psara, they were practically independent of the Suzerain power. An immense stimulus was given to their activity by a system of profit-sharing between owners, captains and crews, and they went armed to the teeth for fear of Algerine Corsairs. Only discipline and unity of action was lacking to convert their fleets into a formidable fighting force.

But it was not on the mainland of Greece nor in the islands that the intellectual leaders of Greece were to be sought. In the quarter round the Phanar, or lighthouse of Constantinople was settled a community whose leaders were men of high training and intelligence, who had amassed wealth by commerce and gained influence and experience in official positions under the Sultan. Many of these Phanariots travelled, took service under Russia or came in contact with the ideas of the time at Paris and in the other capitals of Europe. It was at Paris that Adamantios Korais devoted himself to the work of recovering for Greece the Hellenic heritage of pride in the past by his editions of the classics, and of showing in his introductions and other writings how the popular tongue could be purified of its foreign elements and brought into close connection with the ancient speech, without ceasing to be the language of the people.

But the vision of a revived Hellas, however calculated to fascinate Europe, scarcely blended at all with the ideal aspirations after liberty which the French Revolution had generated among educated Greeks. Still less did it colour that mixture of vague hatred, humiliation, and fear prevailing among the vulgar, which sprang from a large measure of real independence coupled with a status exposed to all the possibilities of such cruelty and caprice as tales and memories of sporadic outrage everywhere recorded. Those who founded at Odessa in 1814 the famous revolutionary society known as the *Philike Hetairia* had nothing less in mind than the restoration of the Greek Empire of the East.

To Russia the eyes of the conspirators were turned with confident hope. Upon the Treaty of Kainardji, made with the Porte in 1774, Russia based a somewhat doubtful claim to a protectorate over the Sultan's Christian subjects; and the character of Alexander, as

well as the nationality of his Greek minister Capodistrias, suggested that the hour for exercising it in practice was at hand.

Only a favourable opportunity was now wanting, and this seemed to have arrived when, in 1820, Ali Pasha of Janina was declared a rebel by his master the Sultan Mahmoud II. Born of Christian parents, though himself a Moslem, this remarkable Albanian adventurer, beginning his career as a common brigand, had raised himself by a mixture of audacity, cruelty, and cunning from the lordship of his own immediate birthplace to the control of all the neighbouring districts, and finally to the favour of the Sultan and the Pashalik of the greater part of Albania. Criminal as he was he established a wild kind of justice and order among these mountains, and, though an utter savage, posed as a patron of learning. But the day came when his power attracted the jealousy of Mahmoud, already intent upon diminishing the independence of the Pashas. The assassination of one of his personal enemies, whom the Sultan had favoured, in the very streets of Constantinople, filled up the measure of his misdoing. Khurshid Pasha was sent against him with the bulk of the Turkish army, and in a few months had beleaguered the "Lion of Janina" in his lair.

The moment had come to act. But the self-appointed leaders of the Hetairia were neither soldiers nor statesmen. It was necessary to find someone of influence and distinction to guide their enterprise. Capodistrias, the Greek minister of the Czar, was the obvious man, but knew the mind of Alexander too well to accept the dangerous and doubtful honour. The choice of the conspirators finally fell on Prince Alexander Ypsilanti, son of a former Phanariot Hospodar of Wallachia, now a general in the Russian army. No choice could have been more unfortunate.

Ypsilanti, though not devoid of courage, a fluent talker and a man of pleasing manners, was little suited to be the chief of a desperate undertaking. He was alike deficient in resolution, organising power and judgment of men. Worst of all he had no grasp of facts. He already saw himself acclaimed the successor of the Byzantine Caesars, and the Russian armies moving to his support.

The plan adopted was an invasion of the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia with the object of raising the country against the Turk. The scheme was enough in itself to condemn the common-sense of its promoters. The Principalities did not know the Turk. The peasants, weighed down under serfage to the boyars, or nobles, were little likely to respond to revolutionary ideas. The boyars themselves hated none so bitterly as the Phanariot governors and officials who battered upon them, and who alone represented to them the disadvantages of Turkish suzerainty.

With the encouragement of the Greek officials, Ypsilanti passed the Pruth. Common prudence would have counselled an immediate advance to the Danube and the improvisation of a flotilla to deny its passage to the Turk. Ypsilanti chose to remain at Jassy, where he affected all the airs of a crowned King. Meantime, Karavia, one of his Greek supporters, had occupied Galatz, and in defiance of the terms of its capitulation had massacred in cold blood, not only the handful of Turkish soldiers who held it, but all the Mussulman inhabitants in the place. The outrage passed unrebuked and was repeated at Jassy under the eyes of Ypsilanti himself. The forces of the revolutionists were a prey to divisions. The leaders of the native levies scarcely yielded the show of obedience to the Hetairist chiefs, and it was some time before an advance took place to Bucharest. Here, while the same scenes of mock royalty were enacted, heavy news arrived. Both the Czar and the Patriarch of Constantinople had condemned the revolt. Ypsilanti falsely declared that these pronouncements had been made for form's sake, and that he had private assurances that they would be retracted when the proper moment arrived. But the Turkish columns had already crossed the Danube, and he was obliged to give the word for retreat

upon the Austrian frontier.

At Dragashan, a disastrous battle was fought. It had been determined to attack and destroy a Turkish detachment, and a Greek leader named Georgaki had made arrangements to cut their retreat as soon as the assault from the front should begin. This turning movement required more time than had been allowed for it, and Georgaki sent a message to head-quarters to postpone the frontal attack. The jealousy of Karavia would brook no delay, and the annihilation of the Sacred Band of Greek volunteers who executed it was the result. Ypsilanti fled across the frontier endeavouring to cover his shame by loudly asserting that Austria had declared war against the Porte.

The revolt was over. Two gallant deeds redeemed it from infamy. Georgaki, attempting to break through to the Russian frontier, was driven into the church tower of a monastery at Seko, and after a desperate resistance fired the powder magazine and perished in the explosion. The rearguard of the Moldavian rebels, after reaching the Pruth at Skuleni, refused to pass the river without fighting and were slain almost to a man in the Turkish assault upon their entrenched camp.

But the peril to European peace was by no means at an end. The outbreak of revolt in the Morea, to be described in the next chapter, made it doubtful whether the Czar would long maintain his attitude of indifference, and a visit of King George IV to Hanover in October, 1821, was the occasion of an exchange of views between Castlereagh and Metternich. Both desired that the Greek revolution should be allowed to "burn itself out" without interference from outside, both were willing to bring diplomatic pressure on the Sultan to meet the special grievances of Russia and to evacuate the Principalities. The Czar proved unexpectedly amenable and agreed to attend the forthcoming Congress of Verona. It was no small diplomatic success to have averted so easily the intervention of Russia.

The tragic death of Castlereagh by his own hand at this moment (September, 1822) made no immediate change in English policy. The spectre of the Eastern Question had, for the moment, been laid, and Spanish affairs were to be the main subject of discussion at the Congress. England had now no reason to bargain away any part of her objection to intervention, and Canning was content to take his stand upon Castlereagh's previous declarations. Wellington, the British representative at the Congress, was instructed to adopt an attitude of "rigid abstinence from interference in the internal affairs of that country" and to make it clear that England would be "no party to affirming the rights of Spain over her colonies."

The formal breach in the European alliance was now at hand. The Conference began with a series of questions asked by the French representatives to ascertain the attitude of Europe if their government were compelled to interfere beyond the Pyrenees. Alexander then put before the Congress his own counter-suggestion that he should be empowered by Europe to intervene. The proposal was combated as vigorously by Metternich as by Wellington, and found no support. Wellington now suggested that France should express her wish to maintain the peace, and should ask for mediation. But England was the only possible mediator, and her interests were too antagonistic to those of France to make her good offices acceptable. In this position of affairs, Metternich fell back upon the French proposal, and urged that the other Powers should give their moral support to the action to be taken by France. Wellington was instructed to protest and to withdraw from the further discussion of the subject. England's separation from the Concert was complete.

The end of the Spanish crisis was also in sight. The other Powers proceeded to address identical notes to the Spanish government, and in April, 1823, the Duke of Angouleme crossed the frontier at the head of a French army.

Spain had awaited the event in a blind confidence born of the erroneous belief that she had by her own efforts expelled the Napoleonic armies from her territory. She was quickly undeceived. Her generals turned traitors, her towns tamely surrendered ; while, profiting by hints which Wellington had dropped at Verona, Angouleme, masking what fortresses resisted, pushed on to Madrid, whence the unwilling Ferdinand was carried off to Seville in the clutches of his retreating advisers, the Permanent Commission of the Cortes. Here there was much talk and still more division of opinion, while nothing stayed the French advance. From Seville the King was carried in spite of his protests to Cadiz, only to be followed by the French, who commenced the siege in August. Then at last the King's captors abandoned the pretence of defending him against an invader, and let him go where he would. Detained by the mob till he had promised to respect the persons and some of the arrangements of his enemies, he did not reach the French camp till October.

The Spanish revolution thereupon collapsed. Angouleme behaved like an honourable and upright man, and did all that lay in his power to secure the lives and liberties of the defeated party. He had already restrained the vengeance of the victors at Madrid by show of force. But he was unable to stem the tide of reaction or to put any check on the campaign of fierce reprisals which Ferdinand now inaugurated. He left Spain, sickened by the violence of the government he had come to restore, having proved to the world how futile and disastrous intervention might be even in a situation which seemed most urgently in need of a moderating influence from outside.

CHAPTER VII

CANNING AND “NON-INTERVENTION”

THE solution of the Spanish question adopted at Verona had divided England finally from the counsels of the Concert. This result has been popularly ascribed to the influence of George Canning. According to a view once widely held his advent at the Foreign Office on the eve of the deliberations of the Congress inaugurated an entirely new departure in British foreign policy. That Canning came into power at a crisis in our foreign relations may well be admitted, but the suggested account of his influence will not bear examination. The principle of “non-intervention” which brought about the breach is laid down with great distinctness in the despatches and instructions of Castlereagh already quoted in an earlier chapter. There is nothing in the European situation as developed at the moment the Congress assembled to suggest that Castlereagh would have abandoned his own principles. The Eastern Question which had brought him into momentary relations with Metternich seemed to be buried. It may be admitted that Canning’s weight in the Cabinet had always been thrown into the scale against interference in the internal affairs of other nations, and attempts have been made to prove that his representations deflected Castlereagh from his natural bent of policy. The proof breaks down in face of the entire consistency of the elder statesman’s later attitude with that which he adopted at a time admittedly previous to the operation of Canning’s alleged influence.

There was in fact no break in the principles which had guided England’s relations with the Allies, principles defined by Canning himself with admirable clearness and ascribed to their proper origin in his instructions to Wellington : “The rule I take to be that our engagements have reference wholly to the state of territorial possession settled at the peace; to the state of affairs between nation and nation; not to the affairs of any nation within itself. I thought the public declaration of my predecessor had set this question entirely at rest.” It is not intended to assert that the policy of the two statesmen was identical. The question that Canning had to answer was whether, in view of the general refusal to admit the English interpretation of the right of intervention, it was worth England’s while to maintain a close co-operation with the Continental Powers. That Castlereagh would not ultimately have answered the question in the same negative sense is not certain. He had, it is true, valued the Concert of Europe as a guarantee of peace, and no just estimate of the period with which we have been dealing will fail to recognise that in this direction it had achieved appreciable results. It is, however, perfectly consistent with such a view to hold with Canning that the time had come, or was rapidly approaching, when a just regard for national rather than European interests would be the surest guide of British policy. In this sense he was, as was truly said of him, “more insular than European,” or as Canning himself put it, “Every nation for itself, and God for us all: the time for Areopagus and the like of that is gone by.”

These phrases help to explain why the differences between the two statesmen have been emphasised and the points of similarity have been neglected. The chief difference was a difference of temperament. Canning was a stranger to the slow tentative methods and compromises of a conscientious but not a brilliant diplomatist. He was richly gifted with the fine intellectual powers which make for brilliancy. His rapid insight gave the qualities of swiftness and assurance to his decisions, his eloquence and his glittering phrases never left any doubt as to his meaning. These gifts combined with certain flaws of nature and training to sharpen the edges of every difference of opinion in which he was engaged, and to leave a residuum of truth in Metternich’s exaggerated description of him as “a malevolent

meteor hurled by an angry Providence upon Europe.”

He was always something of an Ishmaelite in politics. Though of gentle birth, the humble and almost squalid surroundings of his early life among travelling players separated him from the family influences which were strong in politics, a separation which his unconcealed contempt for mediocrity still further emphasised. His satirical gifts, his egoism and the later irritability, due to a long exclusion from power after notable services to his country, neither conciliated distrust nor allayed fear, and to the last he failed in the management of men and in the art of carrying others with him. England owes him gratitude for great services as well as the admiration due to brilliant gifts, but we cannot be blind to grave defects in his policy. He gloried in an irritating isolation and self-sufficiency which has again and again marred England's influence abroad and alienated would-be friends : himself a phrase-maker he was at times a victim of phrases : too careless to win inferior minds his boldest decisions in foreign policy were crippled in characteristic English fashion by want of support: while his rapid apprehension of the end in view too often took less than a sufficient account of the means, and committed him to half-measures.

The French intervention had settled but one, and that the less difficult, of the two questions which constituted the Spanish problem. On the question of the invasion of Spain Canning adopted from the first a rigid attitude of “ non-intervention,” resisting all the efforts made in Parliament to engage England on the side of the Spanish Constitution. The question of the Spanish colonies in America remained yet to be settled. Spain's government of her dependencies had often been corrupt and ineffective, and the jealous monopoly maintained over their commercial relations had been inimical to material progress. Thanks to the ability and character of her representatives it had seldom been oppressive; peace was maintained and her rule met with general acquiescence. Thrown upon their own resources by the Napoleonic conquest of Spain, which excited their passionate opposition, and by the new constitutional government which was alien to their habits, the colonial provinces and towns elected their own Juntas and took their own several lines, soon coming into conflict with the surviving representatives of royal authority, and finally with Ferdinand's determination to re-assert the control of the mother country.

English sympathies were from the first with the revolutionists. English volunteers had fought on their side, and Cochrane had commanded the Chilian navy. Moreover, the breakdown of the Spanish protective system opened the way for English merchants and English investors ; and, by the time that Ferdinand had been restored by French arms, British material interests were deeply engaged. Alexander had openly discussed the possibility of lending assistance to Spain to subdue the revolt, and France in undertaking the Spanish war had not been uninfluenced by the hope of advantages in the New World. Her retention of Cadiz seemed to point to some such design. Moreover, while Spain had offered Monte Video as the price of British support, France had even hinted at partition.

In 1822 the United States recognised the revolutionary governments. Canning regarded English recognition as a matter of time only, but did not act at once. He was deterred by the unwillingness of his colleagues, by his own formula of non-intervention, by some respect for the rights of Spain, and by a well-grounded doubt as to the stability of the new governments. Nevertheless, it can scarcely be doubted that the wiser and bolder policy would have been to take immediate action, for time was not likely to remove any of the difficulties, and in the meanwhile he incurred all the discredit which attached to his known intentions.

To define his attitude and to keep his hands free he proposed to the United States a joint expression of opinion embodying the assertions that reconquest seemed hopeless, and that recognition was a question of time. To this was to be added a declaration that the

two powers, while offering no opposition to reconciliation with the mother country and disclaiming all intention of seeking advantages for themselves, would not permit interference from elsewhere. This proposal was rejected. The United States, intensely jealous of England, were nervously afraid of appearing in the character of her satellite, and required as a condition of joint action that Canning should proceed to immediate recognition. France now asked for a Congress, and Canning retaliated by appointing Consuls to represent English trade interests at the Spanish American ports, and by despatching a commission to report upon the advisability of recognising the *fait accompli*.

While he yet delayed, the American government, guided by Adams, had thrown down the "Monroe Doctrine" as a gage to Europe. This famous declaration of President Monroe asserted, first, that the United States did not admit the existence in America of any field for further colonial acquisitions by European Powers, and, secondly, that, while recognising the validity of Spanish claims, the government of Washington would not view with indifference any efforts of the Allies to extend their political system to the New World. The Republic thus snatched for herself the credit of an act originally suggested by Canning, while evading a connection which his more decided action would have imposed upon her, and which would have assured to England that to which her possession of Canada entitles her, the right to share a moderating influence upon the destinies of the western hemisphere.

The only course now left to Canning, short of immediate recognition, was to offer his mediation to Spain, and, when the offer was rejected, the fear of being forestalled by France in return for commercial advantages led him to the inevitable step. "I called the New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old," were the words with which he concluded the justification of his policy to Parliament. This brilliant piece of tinsel was as little warranted by the contemporary condition of South America as by its subsequent history, but the personal boast which it contains is scarcely an exaggeration. The English recognition was decisive.

The relation between the Old and the New Worlds, between an absolute monarchy and popular movements, had created problems in Portugal which, though different in form, brought similar antagonisms into play. At the outset of the Napoleonic invasion the reigning queen, Maria I, had withdrawn with her court to the colony of Brazil, and her son and successor John VI had been unwilling to return after the expulsion of the French. But Portuguese pride soon became acutely conscious of a change which exhibited the mother country in a new and dependent relation to her former colony. The irritation was increased by the predominance of English influence, represented by Marshal Beresford's position at the head of the military forces of Portugal and by his known influence with the King. In 1820 the army and the country broke into revolution against the Regency during Beresford's absence, and demanded the inevitable Spanish constitution. The ancient Cortes were summoned, and at once began a series of sweeping changes of the fashionable type.

The good-natured irresolute King found himself between contending forces. His determined Queen, Carlota sister of Ferdinand VII, opposed concession, and her younger son Miguel, a youth of no capacity, shared her views. But the influence of the elder son Pedro was set against so impracticable a policy. He had already shown some sympathy with popular claims, and his active mind dominated his father's wavering European nature. King John promised to treat with the Cortes and to send Pedro to Europe for the purpose. He was finally induced, sorely against his will, to cross the Atlantic in person, and landed in Portugal in 1821, leaving Pedro behind as Regent.

The task he had undertaken proved too great for his ability and resolution. A constitution on the Spanish model was indeed accepted in 1822, but the King found himself at once exposed to all the forces of reaction openly encouraged by the Queen's refusal to

recognise the new system. The year 1823 brought with it the French intervention in Spain, and every diplomatic effort was made to neutralise British counsels at Lisbon, and to draw Portugal within the circle of French influence. The King was invited to co-operate against the Spanish revolutionists, and given to understand that help would be forthcoming if he desired to effect any changes at home. Canning's position was somewhat delicate. The dislike of English interference was strong in Portugal, and Europe was eagerly watching to denounce him for violating his own formula of "non-intervention." But the formal alliance subsisting between the two countries gave him the right to define his position and a logical principle of action. John was informed that the alliance bound England to his defence in case of attack, but did not contemplate the support of Portuguese aggression.

Foiled in their attempts to win over the King, the French agents proceeded to encourage Miguel, who was now recognised as the leader of the reactionary party, to attempt a *coup d'état*. At the head of an armed revolt he demanded amid general applause the abrogation of the new Constitution; and the Cortes dispersed without resistance. But the people were by no means anxious to see the restoration of all the abuses dear to the victorious party, and the King, under the guidance of Palmella, recognising that the unpopularity of the Cortes had been due in some measure to the defects of an unworkable Constitution, proceeded to appoint a committee to draft a fresh one upon the British model. Meanwhile, he took the step of asking armed support from England.

Canning was in great difficulties. He was asked in plain terms to interfere in the internal affairs of another country. He fell back upon half-measures. No troops were sent, but a squadron was despatched to Lisbon to give "moral support" to the authorities, and to guarantee the King's personal safety. Miguel at the head of the army once more resorted to violence, capturing the reins of government and driving his father to take refuge on the British flag-ship. By the very completeness of his success he had, however, over-reached himself. The French could not openly support a plain act of rebellion, and, after a vain attempt to recover European support by an apology, he found himself completely discredited among his own followers, and obeyed the order which sent him into exile.

While the rival tendencies at Lisbon remained evenly balanced the problem was complicated by a new phase in the relations of Portugal and Brazil. The sympathies of the Regent Pedro had originally been enlisted in favour of the Portuguese constitutional movement. This sympathy had been dissipated by the action of the Cortes themselves. They had declared all the new institutions which King John had given to Brazil null and void, had issued a peremptory summons to the Regent to present himself at Lisbon, and had showed every intention of insisting on the old supremacy of Portugal. Pedro was thus placed in a serious dilemma between loyalty to his father's government and his duty to Brazil. Circumstances decided for him. The independence of Brazil was proclaimed, and Pedro became its first Emperor (1822). Canning at once offered mediation, a step which entailed for the moment the complete sacrifice of British influence at Lisbon. It was only with great difficulty that the obduracy of Portugal was overcome, a threatened Congress of Europe staved off, and a treaty signed at Rio acknowledging Brazilian independence (1825). Almost at the same time changes in the French ministry resulted in the recall of the French ambassador at Lisbon, and in the adoption by France of a neutral attitude.

The treaty had made no mention of the Portuguese succession. It was generally assumed that, as Pedro had announced his intention of resigning the Portuguese crown, he would do so in favour of his brother Miguel, and that the strife of parties would automatically cease as soon as the latter had no personal ends to serve by posing as a reactionary. But when John VI died in 1826, Pedro chose, doubtless with the best intentions, to take a line of his own, and to develop his original policy towards Portugal. The late King's committee had not succeeded in producing a constitution. Pedro accordingly granted one of his own

royal motion to the Portuguese people, and immediately resigned the crown, not in favour of Miguel, whom he distrusted, but of his own seven-year-old daughter Maria da Gloria. It was, however, provided, to meet the wishes of the Powers, that Miguel should ultimately marry the young queen, and should, in the meantime, act as Regent. These arrangements were no doubt devised in the hope that the Constitution would have time to take root, that Miguel would meantime keep quiet, and that the parties would ultimately be reconciled.

This confidence was misplaced. The arrangement had all the defects of a compromise. Portugal was not likely to accept with enthusiasm a ruler provided by Brazil. If, as was possible, Miguel was too strong to be set aside, he should have been frankly accepted. Strife began at once. The new Constitution, though recommended by the influence of Canning, had to be forced upon the Council by the threats of the Portuguese commander at Oporto. Outbreaks occurred all over the country. Canning's hands were still tied by his refusal to take sides in a civil war. But finally a body of Portuguese exiles, equipped by Spanish assistance, crossed the frontier and gave him an excuse for action. Five thousand British troops were sent to Lisbon to resist by intervention this attempt at intervention, the invaders were beaten and order was restored (1826).

Meanwhile, Miguel, having taken the required oaths, landed to find himself the hero of all who detested "the Brazilian," his Constitution, and British interference. He assumed his position of Regent, and professed no desire but to act in that capacity. He then dissolved the Chambers, which were not again summoned. It was plain that he meant mischief, and, when he next moved, Canning no longer lived to restrain him. England had, in fact, scored a diplomatic triumph without effecting a settlement, and had barely saved the principle of "non-intervention." It was, indeed, well-nigh as difficult to maintain amid the clash of national interests as that of "intervention" itself, and we shall find it abandoned in all but name by Canning himself during the complications of the Greek revolution.

To the beginnings of this movement we shall now retrace our steps. Throughout the autumn of 1820 the agents of the *Hetairia* had been active in the Morea inflaming the religious and political passions of the population against the Turks. Meanwhile, the Moslem inhabitants, though well aware of the agitation which was going on in their midst, took no precautions. The official leaders of the Greeks, Archbishop Germanos of Patras and the primates, who were attempting to organise the outbreak, were conscious that popular feeling was getting beyond their control, and found themselves summoned by the deputy governor to Tripolitza before their schemes were ripe. Most of them evaded the summons on one excuse or another, and while they yet hesitated whether to give the word or to feign submission, the storm burst. A Turkish tax-collector was murdered, and a detachment of Albanian troops was surprised and cut up by Klephts. Without waiting for their leaders each village and each district flew simultaneously to arms. There was no concerted plan. Local chiefs were not hard to find. Mavromichales, called Petrobey, lord of the Mainotes, and Kolokotronis, the Klepht, once in the British service in the Ionian Isles, were only the most conspicuous among a host of similar leaders.

But there was a singular unanimity of action. The rising from the first called out all the hideous passions with which we are familiar where creed strives with creed in the Nearer East, from the Crusades to the present time. The savage triumph of the *Te Deum* sung by Petrobey's hillmen still reeking from the slaughter of every male in Kalamata reflects the whole spirit of the revolt. All over the Morea the Mussulmans were slaughtered like sheep, and helpless women and children were butchered, outraged, and subjected to indescribable tortures. Of the twenty-five thousand Mohammedans who dwelt in the peninsula not one was left alive save a few unhappy slaves and those who had escaped into the towns.

Before the walls of these strongholds scenes were enacted in which faithlessness was

added to barbarity. At Monemvasia, at Navarino, at Vrachori in Northern Greece, terms of surrender were granted and shamelessly violated. But the capture of Tripolitza inspires the most disgust from the selfishness and meanness of the Greek chiefs, which no talk about the heroic rage of an oppressed people can palliate. Demetrius Ypsilanti, who had come to take command in his brother's name, was carefully got out of the way, while the Greek leaders drove a shameless traffic in provisions, and in promises of safety to the rich inhabitants, till the rank and file, suspecting that they were being defrauded of their share of the spoil, broke loose, burst into the town and raged for three days like wild beasts. It is good for us to remember these things lest we too hastily assume that barbarity is the monopoly of the Turk.

By October, 1821, the whole of the Morea (save Nauplia Patras and a few other towns) was in the hands of the insurgents. In northern Greece meanwhile their success had not been so decisive. Attica and Boeotia had risen, and the Turkish garrison of Athens was besieged in the Acropolis. But Omar Vrioni pushed southwards at the head of a Turkish relieving column, thrusting before him Odysseus, the most savage and self-seeking of all the Greek leaders, and broke up the siege. His retreat was, however, rendered necessary by the action of Vasilika in the passes of Oeta, where Odysseus cut up the large reinforcements which were to have carried the invasion across the isthmus. While Ali Pasha still held out at Janina, no operations were possible against the Greek movements in the western mountains north of the Gulf of Corinth.

It was certainly not Turkish oppression that impelled the semi-independent sea-faring communities of the islands to join the revolt. The cause must be sought in racial and religious hatred and in the distress caused by the slackness of trade which followed the peace. Spezzia led the way, and Psara was not long in following its example. The commercial oligarchy of Hydra hesitated, but were forced into the same course by a popular movement. Cruelties were enacted at sea similar to those which had taken place upon the land, and the fleets gave themselves up to a predatory war indistinguishable at times from piracy. The Ottoman fleet, which had always depended largely upon the Greek maritime communities for its supply of seamen, was unable for several months to get to sea. When at length it succeeded in doing so its action was hesitating and timorous, and the burning of one of its vessels by a Psariot fireship in the bay of Eresos drove it back in terror under the guns of the Dardanelles. In the meantime, the vengeance of Sultan Mahmoud had fallen in characteristic Turkish fashion upon the Phanariot settlement at Constantinople, where the mob was encouraged to rob and murder the Christian inhabitants. Similar scenes of barbarity were enacted in other towns of Europe and Asia Minor. But what moved the horror of Europe most was the execution of the Patriarch Gregorios. The Patriarch was an official of the Porte; he had known of the Hetairist plans; according to Mussulman theory he was a traitor responsible for the acts of those whom he represented. On Easter Sunday he was solemnly deposed, hanged in his robes at the gate of his palace and his body was abandoned to the insults of a Jewish mob. Whatever the legal aspects of the case Europe did rightly to regard it as an act of vengeance and not of justice, and the Orthodox are not to be blamed for regarding the victim as a martyr. Feeling in Russia ran high, and it was generally expected that Alexander would declare war. He did indeed address a protest to the Sultan and withdraw his ambassador, but he wavered between his hereditary claims as protector of the Orthodox Church under the Treaty of Kainardji and his own personal abhorrence of rebellion. Mahmoud half disarmed his hostility by showing that the Greeks had died as traitors and not as Christians.

Victorious over their enemies the Greeks were rapidly drifting into anarchy, while their leaders were turning to plunder and personal aggrandisement. Government there was none and no attempt was made to remove the grievances which the peasants had associated with Turkish rule. Germanos and the primates had indeed formed a self-elected oligarchical

council styling itself the Senate of the Peloponnese, which steadily opposed Demetrius Ypsilanti, the recognised leader of the Hetairists, and his more educated following. To counteract this influence Ypsilanti summoned a National Convention to Argos, which was forced by the attitude of the oligarchs to move to Epidaurus. Here it produced a still-born Constitution, and elected Alexander Mavrocordatos, a Phanariot whose figure, spectacles, and European clothes excited popular ridicule, to the Presidency of Greece.

There was work at hand to be done too rough for Phanariot legislators. In April, 1822, an abortive attempt to rouse rebellion in the island of Scio (Chios), attended with the slaughter of Moslem prisoners by the raiders, brought the Ottoman fleet to the island, and gave a pretext for an abominable crime—no less than the wholesale massacre or enslavement of an industrious and peaceful population. This gratuitous piece of cruelty was avenged by the Greek fleet under Miaoulis, the noblest and most unselfish of all the Greek leaders, and occasioned one of the most dramatic incidents of the war. While the Ottoman squadron lay at anchor on the night of the feast of Bairam, Kanaris the Psariot, guided by the coloured lanterns which illuminated their rigging, ran a fire-ship under the quarter of the flag-ship of Kara Ali, the Capitan Pasha. Crowded with the officers of the fleet, the crew, and the prisoners, she burnt to the water-line. Scarcely a soul survived.

By this time Janina had fallen, and Khurshid Pasha was free to direct the full weight of the Turkish army against the revolutionists. His plan was well-conceived. One column under Omar Vrioni was to advance upon Missolonghi, on the Corinthian gulf, cross the straits and enter the Morea by Patras; the other under Mohammed Ali, Pasha of Drama (called Dramali), was to relieve the Acropolis, cross the isthmus, and in the first instance to raise the siege of Nauplia. By the time the latter reached Athens the Turkish garrison had surrendered on terms and had been butchered, but he had no difficulty in recovering the town and in occupying Corinth. At this point he made the mistake of despising his foe. Instead of setting himself to subdue the country piecemeal from his new base, he struck boldly across the difficult passes of the Devernaki for Nauplia. The gallant resistance of Argos under Ypsilanti checked his progress, and meanwhile Kolokotrones had occupied the Devernaki in force. The invader now strove to retrace his steps. After a disastrous repulse he managed with a fragment of his army to struggle back through one unwatched pass, and was shut up in Corinth. Nauplia might still have been saved from the insurgents, but the irresolution of the new Capitan Pasha prevented his standing in to its help. The capitulation was respected, thanks to the presence of a British war-ship.

The advance of the western column was inevitably delayed by Reshid Pasha's preliminary operations for the reduction of the Suliots of Albania. The Greeks at Missolonghi under Mavrocordatos took the desperate resolution of marching to their help. They were utterly defeated at Peta through the treachery of some Albanian allies, and a corps of foreign volunteers, trained and disciplined on the European system, was cut to pieces. This unfortunate incident inspired the Greeks from that moment with an ignorant contempt for those qualities of disciplined troops in which they were conspicuously lacking. The Suliots submitted, and Omar Vrioni was free to move against the pass of Makrynoros, which he found undefended, and appeared before Missolonghi, a mean town lying among shallow lagoons and covered by no better protection than a mud rampart and a ditch. But his attack was too long delayed, panic among the defenders was succeeded by resolution, and the assault was repelled with heavy loss. The severities of the winter forced the Turks to break up the siege (January, 1823).

The second phase of the war was now over. It had already attracted the attention of Europe. The cause of the Greeks had enlisted the enthusiasm of a philhellenic generation more deeply imbued with reverence for classical antiquity than ours. Imagination painted the Greeks such as their reputed ancestors had been, whom in fact they resembled in little

save in cruelty and factiousness. Volunteers went out to their assistance, and not a few returned disillusioned. They “came expecting to find the Peloponnesus filled with Plutarch’s men, and all returned thinking the inhabitants of Newgate more moral.” Among them came Lord Byron to redeem his fame by heroic purpose combined with sound common sense. “He,” says the same authority, “judged them fairly; he knew that half-civilised men are full of vices, and that great allowance must be made for emancipated slaves.” Canning, too, sympathised, though he openly expressed his contempt for the classical pose of “Epaminondas and Co.,” and it was only with the practical object of protecting British commerce from their piratical enterprises, for which Turkey could not be held responsible, that in March, 1823, he acknowledged them as belligerents. Meantime he took no measures to stop the private assistance which found its way from England to the Greeks, a neglect against which the Porte protested with some justice.

The step which Canning had taken was misunderstood. His attitude to the Concert and his known sympathies made it appear that he contemplated asserting for England a position as protector of the Greeks which the Czar regarded as his own. Alexander accordingly met the Austrian Emperor at Czernovitz to discuss the situation. The result was a circular from Russia to the Powers suggesting a Conference at St. Petersburg to effect a settlement of the Greek revolution by the erection of the affected districts into three separate principalities under Turkish suzerainty. No proposal could have been more distasteful to Metternich. His consistent aim had been to avert any Russian action which might establish the Czar’s influence on the Lower Danube, a contingency dangerous to Austrian interests. He had accordingly at the outset recommended that the revolt should be allowed to “burn itself out outside the pale of civilisation.” But the Ottoman power of repression had failed to respond to his hopes. The semi-independent states suggested by the Russian proposal, whatever their relation to Turkey, could scarcely be independent of the protection of the Czar. With characteristic opportunism Metternich accordingly suggested the recognition of Greece as a united and independent State. The antagonism thus excited, and England’s unwillingness to abandon the principle of non-intervention. except as mediator between consenting parties, brought the conference to grief. England withdrew, and a joint note offering the mediation of the other two powers was rejected by the Sultan (1825).

All this while the removal of Turkish pressure had let loose the differences between civilians and military chiefs, and between Moreots and Islanders, in miserable wranglings and in two civil wars. It was at this moment that the first British loan found its way to the revolutionists, to be scrambled for by the greedy leaders, leaving the common cause little the better for the efforts of its foreign friends, and reappearing too obviously in the fine clothes, silver-mounted accoutrements, and lavish expenditure of the more fortunate patriots.

They were recalled to their senses by the greatest peril they had yet been obliged to face. The Sultan had bent his pride to ask assistance of his ambitious vassal Mehemet Ali, Pasha of Egypt. A disciplined army and a magnificent fleet were placed at his disposal under the Pasha’s son Ibrahim, and in June, 1823, as a base for the intended invasion, Crete was conquered by the Egyptians with barbarous cruelty. A year later the first-fruits of the new alliance were seen in the surprise and destruction of the island community of Kasos by the Egyptians, and that of Psara by Khosrew the Capitan Pasha. Their long account of cruelty and of piracy must temper our sympathy with their fate. But the transport of the Egyptian armada proved a difficult task, owing to the feeble co-operation of the Ottoman squadron in face of the efforts of the Greek fleet under Miaoulis; and the advantage at sea lay with the Greeks till the selfishness of the Hydriot seamen, who struck for arrears of pay, forced their admiral back to Nauplia. Then at length during the winter months Ibrahim crossed to Crete and thence to the Morea, landing his force at Modon.

The Greek irregulars were now to learn the value of the military discipline which they had despised. Navarino and Pylos were besieged, a relieving force was driven back at the point of the bayonet near Krommydi, the two fortresses capitulated, and the terms of surrender were rigidly respected. There was a loud outcry against the President Kondurriotes, an islander who retained his seat on horseback by the efforts of two grooms, and his presidential dignity by the influence of his secretary Kolettes, ex-physician to Ali Pasha. But the Klepht chieftains did no better, and Tripolitza fell.

In September, 1825, Ibrahim was called away from the reduction of the Morea to assist Reshid Pasha, whose southward advance in Western Greece had been checked by the fortifications of Missolonghi, much strengthened and improved since the first siege. Again and again his assaults had been repulsed and the town had been re victualled by Miaoulis and the fleet. Ibrahim and his regulars met with no better fortune. Attack after attack reeled back from the town and its outworks, and it was decided to invest it by sea and land. The honourable capitulation offered by Ibrahim was scornfully refused. Famine in the end did its work, and then at last the only episode of pure heroism to be discovered in the whole war found an appropriate conclusion in the desperate attempt of the garrison to cut its way out by a midnight sortie. But the Egyptians were ready. Many of the defenders fled back into the town with the besiegers at their heels, and few won their way to safety. Yet the defence of Missolonghi deserves to be remembered with another heroic failure. It was the Thermopylae of modern Greece.

Reshid was now free to move against Attica, where the bandit chief Gouras held the Acropolis and tyrannised over the country. Delayed by the operations of the gallant Karaïskakis he had just succeeded in occupying Athens when the new mercenary leaders hired by the National Assembly, Admiral Lord Cochrane and General Sir Richard Church, appeared on the scene. Their attack upon the Turkish positions from Munychia and Phalerum ended in a complete fiasco, and was sullied by another massacre of prisoners, which Church should have been able to prevent. Greece lay at the invader's feet. Only the unwillingness of Reshid to join hands with Ibrahim gave her another breathing space (1827).

The systematic devastation of the Morea and the long-protracted agony of Missolonghi had already forced upon the two most generous minds among European statesmen the conviction that a restraint must be put upon the victorious Turk. Canning made overtures to the Czar for combined action, but with the condition that force should not be used. But Alexander had already made up his mind, and gave it to be understood that Russia would act, even if unaided, cost what it might. The eyes of Europe were upon him as he journeyed southward, when the news came that his sad and strange career had ended at Taganrog on the shores of the Sea of Azov (Dec., 1825). But Canning had met with enough encouragement to persevere; and Wellington, who was sent to congratulate Nicholas on his accession, opened communications with the new Czar. A step was thus taken fraught with consequences to which in our judgment Canning does not seem to have been sufficiently alive. In the first place, any attempt to bring pressure on the Turk demanded, if success was to be assured, a readiness to sacrifice the formula of "non-intervention." In the second place, it was necessary for England to abandon frankly her attitude of suspicion towards Russia. Canning, in our view somewhat disingenuously as well as illogically, hoped to employ "the Russian name upon the fears of Turkey without a war," and at the same time to restrain Russia from acting alone to the disadvantage of England. It was doubtless difficult for him to take the rest of the Cabinet with him even as far as he was prepared to go, but it would have been better in any case, as events proved, to have confronted them with all the consequences at once.

The first result of the negotiations was the Protocol of St. Petersburg (April, 1826) by which England, encouraged by a conference with the Greek leaders at Perivolakia, where

they had accepted in principle the solution by which Greece was to become a tributary state, engaged to offer her mediation to the Porte, Russia promising her unconditional support. The Protocol was described by Metternich as a feeble and ridiculous production," and it may be admitted that it did not promise to be particularly effective, while the attitude of England remained what the Austrian chancellor described as a compromise between "an English and a Liberal policy." Meanwhile, Nicholas had issued an ultimatum to Turkey upon the private matters at issue between Russia and the Porte apart from the Greek question. The Sultan thus confronted by a double set of demands prepared actively for resistance. But a reorganisation of the army which touched the privileges of the Janissaries threw these troops into open mutiny. The mutiny was crushed and the Janissaries were finally exterminated, but Turkey was left in no position to resist the special demands of Russia. By the Treaty of Akkerman (October, 1826) the Porte gave way upon all the points at issue.

A year passed before action was taken upon the Protocol. Canning hoped that English mediation would be accepted without bringing in the name of Russia. Meanwhile, Russian suspicion grew that the Protocol was a device for preventing her separate action. At last the document was presented to the Sultan and rejected with scorn. The Russian view of the situation was correct. "We are invited to sanction a principle. We invite the recognition of its consequences. It is part of their civil and religious system that Orientals never act save in obedience to absolute necessity."

In July, 1827, the Protocol was converted into a Treaty of London between Russia and England, to which France gave her adhesion. The parties to this agreement undertook to procure the independence of Greece under Turkish suzerainty, without abandoning friendly relations with the Porte. It was thought that this object might be achieved by blockading Ibrahim in the Morea. Before the demands of the allies had been submitted to the Porte, Canning was dead (August, 1827).

The *dénouement* was sudden and dramatic. The joint fleet of the three powers commanded by Admiral Codrington conveyed to the contending parties a proposal for an armistice. The Greeks consented, but the refusal of the Turks plainly left the revolutionary leaders free to continue operations, and their fleet was at the moment actively engaged in the Gulf of Corinth. Ibrahim, who had been informed of the Treaty of London and lay at Navarino under observation of the allied squadrons, stood out to sea with the object of proceeding to the Gulf, but was headed back by Codrington. At Navarino he found orders from the Sultan to disregard any attempt at intervention, and before long clouds of rising smoke left no doubt that his ravaging columns were again at work. Codrington therefore decided upon entering the bay to make a "demonstration." The inevitable consequences resulted. The Egyptians refused to withdraw a fire-ship, whose position threatened the allies, and fired on the boats which attempted to remove it. A general action ensued. At the end of two hours the Turco-Egyptian fleet lay at the bottom of the bay or drifted a mass of battered wreckage towards the shore.

There could be no further pretence of friendly relations. Far better it would have been if the combined fleets had forced the Dardanelles in the first instance and dictated terms in the Golden Horn. It would have been well if the allies could even now have summoned up resolution to do so. Perhaps if Canning had lived he might have broken through the pedantry of non-intervention. But from the standpoint of his colleagues, now under Goderich's leadership, and of the policy of compromises which had been bequeathed to them, Navarino was truly enough characterised in the speech from the throne as "an untoward event." The naked fact remains that the allies had put themselves in the wrong. They had attacked a friendly power with friendly professions on their lips. Nor can the blame be laid upon Codrington's shoulders. The task imposed upon him made collisions all but inevitable.

Few Powers would have consented to sit still under similar aggression, and already Mahmoud's rising wrath scarcely needed the spur. He at once denounced the Treaty of Akkerman, and it was clear that Nicholas could not refuse the challenge, though he did his best to reassure Europe as to his intentions. He got no support from Wellington, who became Prime Minister in 1828. Mindful only of India, he desired to do nothing further to imperil England's traditional friendship with Turkey.

It was thus left for the sword of Russia to cut the knot into which the Greek question had become entangled. With the events of 1812 in mind few doubted that the war would prove a repetition of the French "military promenade" in Spain. The sword of Russia proved none too sharp. The passage of the Pruth and the march across the Principalities were accomplished without trouble, but serious difficulties began at the Danube. In deference to the suspicions of Austria it was decided to cross the river near its mouth ; but the plan had the disadvantage of exposing the line of communications to the Turkish fortresses which covered the middle reaches of the river, from Shumla and Silistria westward. The first campaign (1828) was therefore devoted to the siege of Varna, with the object of securing a new base in communication with the fleet. Varna indeed fell, but the Russian army meantime suffered from sickness in so unhealthy a district, and from all the disorganization of supply and medical service which want of experience and distance from the base could combine to produce. Few guessed that complete and decisive success awaited the despairing troops within six months.

At the beginning of 1829, Nicholas, recognising with bitter disappointment his own failure as a general, selected Diebitsch, a Silesian by birth, for the supreme command. The new commander had a true sense of the value of audacity in warfare. He decided to capture Silistria which threatened his rear, mask the bulk of the Turkish army at Shumla, and to strike across the Balkans at the capital. The first operation involved the weakening of the forces which covered Varna, and Reshid Pasha dashed out from Shumla to profit by the opportunity. But Diebitsch appeared from the north upon his flank, overthrew the Pasha before he could effect his retreat at Kulevcha, and leaving a corps to watch his movements hurried his own columns over the Balkans to a new base captured by the Russian fleet. Spreading out his tiny force of 13,000 men over the country, to give the greatest possible impression of his strength, he reached Adrianople. Panic now seized Mahmoud. His troops were on the far side of the Balkans, and could only reach the scene by circuitous passes. He yielded all the points at issue—the practical independence of the Principalities, the freedom of the straits and of the Black Sea to the commerce of all nations; he even swallowed the Treat of London (1829). In the meantime a French expedition was sent under General Maison to clear the Morea, only to find itself anticipated by Codrington, who, acting on his own responsibility, appeared before Alexandria with the fleet, and forced Mehemet Ali to recall Ibrahim.

England and Austria were now at one in the wish to cut down the new Greek state to its smallest limits, and to abolish the Turkish overlordship with the object of guarding against Russian influence The Powers either upon vassal or suzerain. The result was a Protocol offering the sovereignty of Greece to Leopold of Coburg, and adopting as the northern frontier a line drawn from the mouth of the Aspropotamos eastwards to Mount Oeta. The proposal met with the determined hostility of Count John Capodistrias, Alexander's ex-minister, who had been elected President by the Greeks in 1827. His motives were partly personal, partly patriotic. The creation of a weak and petty state was a miserable return for years of sacrifice and effort, and its limits involved the abandonment of communities who had been foremost in the struggle. Moreover Capodistrias had hoped that the sovereignty would have been conferred upon himself. The scheme was wrecked by the sudden decision of Leopold to withdraw, under the influence of the representations of Capodistrias and of the obvious dissatisfaction felt by his future subjects.

While the Powers, amid the distractions of the July Revolution, discussed other arrangements, Greece was once more a prey to anarchy. The government of Capodistrias will be differently judged according as men value more highly the principles of liberty or the elements of civic order. The President had been bred in a bureaucratic school, and arrived in Greece to find the new democratic institutions exploited by personal and local faction. He fell back upon a centralised system acting through committees, and supported by the services of mercenaries, spies, and the press censor. He was at no pains to conceal his contempt for the vanity and self-seeking of some of the patriots, and, in his distrust of their leaders, showed an unwise preference for his own friends and connections. Relations were clearly strained to breaking point when even Miaoulis could set fire to Greek ships to keep them out of the hands of the government. Capodistrias offended less scrupulous foes when he attempted to force the Mainotes to pay their share of taxation, and imprisoned Petrobey for recalcitrance. Two of the fierce Mavromichales clan sought him out and slew him at Nauplia.

The final settlement was delayed till 1833. By Palmerston's influence a frontier line was adopted from the Gulf of Arta to that of Volo, and Otho of Bavaria landed in Greece to assume an authority beset with troubles. The Eastern Question had proved the final solvent of the European Concert. The several Powers had combined, separated, and re-combined at each phase of the Greek struggle with all the perplexing variety of the kaleidoscope. .

CHAPTER VIII

THE RESTORED BOURBON MONARCHY

IT is one of the coincidences of history that the dissolution of the European Concert had scarcely been achieved when the Restoration government in France, the establishment of which had been the first work of the Allies and whose maintenance had furnished the *raison d'être* for their permanent co-operation, came crashing to the ground. Few periods of history have been more generally misunderstood than the fifteen years in France which intervened between the Second Treaty of Paris and the July Revolution. The fact is that all the clues to the understanding of the period are closely intertwined with a web of unfamiliar institutions, protracted debates and party combinations, most wearisome when described in detail, and quite unintelligible in outline. According to his temperament, the distracted reader extricates himself from political nightmare by means of one or other of two fatally easy assumptions, and the sufficient explanation for all that happened is discovered in the changeable and illogical nature of the French people, or in the proverbially stupid and bigoted attachment of restored dynasties to theories of Divine Right. It is scarcely necessary to observe that these theories neither separately nor in combination will account for the facts.

A sufficient outline of the provisions of the Charter under which Louis XVIII assumed the government has been given in an earlier chapter. Before proceeding to trace the course of the events following his second restoration it is necessary to consider some of the essential features and general tendencies of the new system.

The first fact to be grasped is that the Restoration settlement deliberately maintained the reconstitution of society and government effected by the Revolution. No attempt was made to touch the *Code Napoléon*, with its recognition of the equality of persons before the law and of the freedom of contract. The Concordat with the Pope which brought the Church under the control of government and the accompanying measure of equal toleration for all religious creeds remained untouched, as well as the highly centralised system of local government described in Chapter II. All these things had become part of the life of France. Any authority that undertook to rule Frenchmen must accept them as axiomatic.

The superstructure, a restored Bourbon dynasty reigning under a Constitutional Charter, was the device of Talleyrand, a diplomatist rather than a statesman, and was the outcome rather of diplomatic exigencies than of a just estimate of its adaptability to the rest of the political system. Talleyrand had declared for the Bourbons with the immediate object of assuring the Powers of the good behaviour of France, and for a Charter that he might assure the French of the good behaviour of the Bourbons. It is not difficult to show that both the dynasty and the Constitution entailed serious difficulties, and that their combined effect was to create a force subversive of both.

It has generally been assumed that Alexander's preference for Bernadotte, as the ruler of France to be appointed by the Powers, was a fantastic notion arising from personal prejudice. It had, however, something to recommend it in the remarkable abilities and personality of Bernadotte himself, as well as in certain obvious objections to the Bourbons. We have already seen how destitute they were of all qualities calculated to appeal to popular imagination. The manner of their restoration, "brought back in the baggage of the Allies," affronted national pride, and they remained for many Frenchmen a symbol of defeat. A perverted sense of honour attached them to externals such as the white flag and the lilies, which were a standing offence in the eyes of their subjects. Worst of all their return logically

demanded the return of the émigrés, whose noisy partisanship and support of foreign invasion had made them almost foreigners in France. It is not too much to say that the monarchy might have stood in the keeping of a dynasty independent enough to exclude them.

The Constitution, which has often escaped the criticism which has been lavished on the dynasty, presented in reality at least as many difficulties. The problem which any successful constitutional system was called upon to solve was two-fold. It was necessary somehow to base government upon public opinion, and, what was even more important, to create in the organs of public opinion a sense of responsibility, a task of extreme difficulty among a people without much experience of self-government. In dealing with the first aspect of the problem it is to be noted that the founders of the new system had not a free hand. It was impossible to appeal to public opinion at large because it could scarcely be doubted that the mass of the nation viewed the Restoration with hostility. It was therefore necessary to rely upon the sympathies of selected interests and classes.

The new settlement commanded in the first place the support of the commercial class—the manufacturers, investors, and merchants whom the Industrial Revolution, noticed, was calling into being. It was, however, a small class as yet, and was characterised by timidity. It possessed no political enthusiasm and sold its support in return for the maintenance of peace and order. In the second place, the Constitution addressed an appeal to the men of ideas, the intellectual class whom Napoleon had tried to win by the *Acte Additionel*, and who were to emerge as a political party under the name of the *Doctrinaires*. Among them at least enthusiasm might be expected. But these professorial, legal, journalistic, and professional persons have seldom failed to disappoint their political leaders. Easily influenced by ideas they too commonly show an insufficient reverence for fact; they are prone to subtle distinctions, and split upon minor differences. Plato may have been right in desiring that philosophers should be Kings; he could hardly have recommended them in the capacity of electors. For reasons which will appear in the sequel, the government was unable to rely upon the support of the landed class, ever an element of stability in the state, inasmuch as its circumstances compel it to recognise, willingly or unwillingly, the rudimentary conceptions of public duty.

Such, then, was the unstable basis upon which the Monarchy stood. Its instability was further increased by the frank admission that the foundations were experimental and liable in case of need to modifications. It is a truth too seldom realised that a Constitution requires to be closed when there is any question of alteration and repair.

It remains to consider how far public opinion in this restricted sense was likely to acquire a real feeling of responsibility. The absence of this quality is perhaps the most conspicuous feature in the domestic history of France during the nineteenth century, and it has been plausibly explained as due to the paralysing influence exerted by her highly centralised institutions. To the Frenchman of the provinces, the government is represented by the paternal administration exercised under the Prefet of the department, almost irresponsible, so far as appearances are concerned, to the fluctuating majorities of the Chamber. The result has been a lack of interest in struggles which seem to affect the voter only remotely, and a sense of freedom to indulge prejudices which can have no ulterior consequences for evil. The actual influence and interference of local officials in electoral battles has often contributed to the same result. Centralisation has had a further and still more disastrous consequence in assigning an altogether overwhelming influence to Paris. Whoever, by fair means or foul, could control the capital had little need to fear the power of local resistance. He had only to give the word of command to the hierarchy of officials, who were accustomed to take their orders from Paris. And the action of Paris was rendered all the more incalculable by the mischievous system, which the country had inherited from the

tumults of the Revolution, of arming the middle classes as a "National Guard" for the security of property and order, without subjecting them to the reality of military discipline.

Enough has been said to prove that the Restoration settlement was a gigantic experiment, dependent for its success upon strengthening influences of time. The experiment, moreover, was to be conducted in an atmosphere highly charged with dangerous elements. The Revolution had left bitterness, divisions, defeated ideals, and oppressed interests in plenty behind it. There were grievances, individual and personal, that admitted of no compromise. Many new wounds had been inflicted and many old ones reopened by the events of the Hundred Days. Since 1789, experiment after experiment had been tried upon the body politic, till France had been reduced to the nervousness of the *malade imaginaire*, ever on the watch for symptoms of mortal sickness, while eating, sleeping and prospering normally. Nothing is so remarkable in the speeches of the period as the gloomy forebodings which augur from a detail of some disputed measure the downfall of the Monarchy or the dissolution of the Revolutionary settlement.

The political history of these fifteen years is the story of an attempted counter-Revolution, and is to be understood by following the policy of the returned *émigrés*. Political prejudice has led historians to regard them as the bigoted foes of a popular constitution, and the devotees of absolute power. No view could well be more misleading. To the constitution as such they had no objection; on the contrary, they showed themselves exceedingly clever at working it in their own interests. These interests were purely selfish. They had no sort of wish to make of Louis XVIII another *Roi Soleil*, nor did they as a party desire to arm Charles X with the despotic powers of Ferdinand VII. On the contrary, their most uncompromising spirits, the *émigrés pur sang*, were in opposition to the Crown throughout. The French noble of the *ancien régime* had no long traditions of loyalty, and his last struggle did not belie his ancient reputation.

The *émigrés* returned to France to find themselves strangers in a country whose institutions had been completely transformed. They could render none of the services nor did they possess any of the capacities which commanded place, power, or wealth under the new regime. Pride restrained even the youngest of them from the attempt to acquire by their own efforts a new claim to their ancient influence. They expected and demanded nothing less than their former dignity and power by the time-honoured right of birth and title.

No forecast of the forces with which the Restored Monarchy would have to reckon seems to have done justice either to their desire or to their power of embarrassing the government. Yet the latter was formidable enough. They were in no sense a stupid party. In an age of great literary activity the name of Chateaubriand, whose voice and whose pen were engaged on their side, is not the least conspicuous, and they produced party managers and journalists at least as dexterous as their opponents.

Moreover, they had found powerful allies. Most conspicuous of these was the Catholic Church. The Church, like the nobility, had lost much of its ancient authority during the eighteenth century either through the Revolution or at the hands of reforming rulers like Joseph II of Austria, and Napoleon. The latter, by his Concordat with the Pope, had restored to the Church its dignity, and to the clergy of every degree their offices, while he had deprived them of all authority over persons and affairs not strictly ecclesiastical, and subjected them to the power of the State. By these means he had calculated on weakening their power. He had omitted important factors from his calculation. Deprived of her semi-secular authority, the Church no longer attracted the courtiers, politicians, and diplomatists who figured as bishops under the old regime. Alike in her leaders and in her aims she became more strictly professional, looked for guidance to Rome and the religious orders, and put national considerations in the background. These tendencies gained impetus and

inspiration when caught up in the Romantic movement, that return of the human spirit to sentiment and tradition expounded in the works of such men as De Maistre and Lamennais in reaction against the hard common-sense and dry reasoning of the eighteenth century. From this union was born the new international force of Ultramontanism, which throughout the century was to embarrass the governments of Catholic countries by its open claim to put the interests of the Church before those of the nation, and was to end by modifying and inspiring the official policy of Rome. The task before its early representatives in France was to win back the hearts of the nation to the Church, and with that end to secure all those positions of advantage from which ideas can be formed and guided.

Far less conspicuous but scarcely less powerful support was afforded by a body of opinion which has scarcely received the attention it deserves. Not all the landowners in France had emigrated, not all had lost their estates. Such men had little sympathy with the Revolution, but the Terror had effectively silenced their opinions. The seal was now removed from their lips, and they were scarcely less eager than the exiles to claim a greater measure of influence for the landed classes.

A group of interests was thus formed having sufficient solidarity to exercise appreciable weight. Their foes were fatally divided. The Monarchy was obliged to rest for its support upon those who accepted alike the Revolution settlement and the Constitutional Charter. They were not, as we have seen, by any means a majority of the nation. Meantime the opponents of the government, so long as they remained in opposition, could calculate upon the assistance of everyone who, while devoted to the Revolutionary settlement, detested the Charter, whether he called himself Bonapartist or Republican.

There was little difficulty in selecting the point of attack. The Charter itself had obligingly indicated the weak points of the structure by leaving certain matters of importance undefined or subject to arrangements to be made by the Chambers when they met. It was, in the first place, not distinctly laid down whether the Crown was competent to choose what ministers it pleased, without reference to their opinions, or bound to select them from the party which possessed a majority in the Lower Chamber. If the latter doctrine could be maintained, the malcontents only needed to secure a majority to be able to dictate terms. Secondly, the Electoral Law, by which the franchise and the method of election was determined, formed no part of the Constitution itself. There was nothing therefore to prevent its being so modified and adjusted as to produce a majority of the required complexion. Thirdly, no system of censorship for the Press was prescribed, and this omission evidently left the door open to the *émigrés* to agitate for regulations silencing opposite opinions, or giving the freest expression to their own, as occasion might require. The power of the press in an electorate of the kind established by the Charter needs no explanation. Lastly, there was nothing to prevent attempts to alter the regulations which the Concordat had empowered the State to make for the Church. An increased influence for the religious orders, and the practical control of the centralised system of education by the Church were innovations which would win clerical support and do much to cripple opponents.

Scarcely had Louis XVIII been re-seated on his throne when the combination of these forces burst forth in unexpected activity and strength. In the south of France, especially at Nimes and Toulouse, riot and massacre blazed out in the name of royalism and religion in the excesses of the so-called "White Terror." It was partly the influence of these manifestations in the south and the presence of the allied armies in the north, but quite as much the unmuzzling of opinions hitherto repressed, that sent up from the elections a majority of a wholly unexpected character. The King and his ministers found themselves face to face with a body of men who called themselves Ultra-Royalists, but whose royalism contained no element of personal or dynastic loyalty, serving only as a thin veneer to cover their extreme opinions. It was indeed as Louis called it a "Chambre Introuvable" a find most

unlooked for, and well-nigh as unwelcome as unexpected.

Few could have regretted the retirement of Napoleon's detestable Police Minister, Fouché, but it was a bad sign when it was found impossible for Talleyrand to co-operate with the victorious party. No ministry could possibly hold its ground which was not frankly Royalist in sentiment.

Happily the man was found whose character, career, and opinions marked him out to essay the difficult task. The Duke of Richelieu was uncompromised by any connection with the Revolution, having left France not long after the first outbreaks. He was equally unconnected with the *émigrés*, having taken service under Alexander, displaying exceptional capacity as an administrator at Odessa. He returned without bitterness or grudge to serve his country. One of his utterances to the Chamber deserves quotation for the light it throws both upon his opinions and his difficulties. "I do not understand your passions, your relentless hatreds. I pass every day by the house which belonged to my ancestors. I see their property in other hands and I behold in museums the treasures which belonged to them. It is a sad sight, but it does not rouse in me feelings either of despair or revenge. You appear to me sometimes to be out of your minds, all of you who have remained in France." He undertook office as a moderate Royalist loyal to the Revolution settlement.

The first conflict of the Ministry with the majority took place over the pains and penalties to be inflicted for complicity in the Hundred Days, over the securities to be taken against new disturbances, and over the Amnesty Bill, which was intended to close the entire incident. The fines and imprisonments as securities against sedition were scouted as inadequate. Fouché's list of persons to be proscribed failed to satisfy the passions of revenge aroused by the eloquence of Chateaubriand. The escape of many of the intended victims called down denunciations upon a government who had notoriously connived at this solution of their difficulties. Neither the King nor his ministers dared, in face of this clamour and (it must be regretfully added) of the general expectation in Europe, to refuse their sanction to the execution of the gallant Marshal Ney. Indeed, on logical grounds, it was difficult to defend him. His offence was undeniable. He had taken service under the Bourbon government and had betrayed it to Napoleon. His conduct had been that of a soldier of fortune and not that of an honourable patriot. But it was for all that an unwise decision to hold the ignorant impulsive soldier responsible to a code of duty, which neither he, nor indeed many of those who condemned him, recognised.

Richelieu was fully determined to make no more martyrs. By constant appeals to the royal wishes, the Amnesty Bill was forced through, in the teeth of extravagant amendments, by a bare majority of nine. Even so the government had been forced to abandon to the penalty of exile "the regicides," those members of the Convention who had voted for Louis XVI's death. In the midst of all these distractions, hampered in his dealings with the Allies by the apparent insecurity of his government, discredited in the Chamber by his inevitable concessions, Richelieu had negotiated the Second Treaty of Paris.

Matters of immediate necessity being now disposed of, the stage was clear for the development of the constructive designs of the opposition. The first move was a bold attempt to secure in all future Chambers a majority favourable to their views. The Charter had limited the franchise to those paying 300 francs in direct taxation, and the government now brought in a bill to define the process of election. Villèle who, if not a states-man, was the most adroit politician in the ranks of the opposition, seized on the opportunity to move an amendment. By his proposal, the qualification for a vote was to be reduced to 50 francs paid in direct taxation, a measure which would have enfranchised two million country voters. The qualification for a deputy (or member of the Chamber) was to stand at 1000 francs.

Election was to be the result of two distinct stages. The voters of each arrondissement were to choose representatives, by whom, in conjunction with the fifty largest landholders in the department, the deputies to sit for the department were to be elected. The amendment aimed at securing large constituencies open to local influence, a second process of election giving a preponderance to the views of the more prominent people who were certain to be chosen by the arrondissement, and a vote at both stages of the election for men of considerable property. The elections were to take place every five years, thus giving a victorious party an extended spell of power. It was a bold attempt to place authority in the hands of the local gentry, and it is a fact worth remarking that within twenty years of the Revolution such a measure should only have been defeated by the veto of the Peers.

Another and an equally insidious proposal was foiled by the same agency. Loud demands were made in the name of liberty and constitutionalism that the ministers should be chosen by the King from the majority in the Chamber, and to that effect was carried, which would have put the reactionary party in a position to claim the assistance of the Crown in forcing their programme upon the Peers.

These proposals, however extreme, were legitimate and within the terms of the Charter. The majority now advanced a step further, and defied the Charter itself. Taking advantage of a suggestion put forward by the government proposal for making an increased allowance to the Church, they not only recommended an annual grant of 42 millions of francs, but boldly demanded the restoration of confiscated ecclesiastical property. But the final collision occurred over the Budget. Richelieu proposed to wipe out the National Debt from 1813 onwards by a sale of the State forests, formerly Church property. An amendment was promptly presented to the Chamber deprecating the sale of the forests and proffering to the creditors shares in the Funds having less than two-thirds their nominal value. A drawn battle was terminated by an adjournment.

The proposed declaration of partial bankruptcy, for the amendment amounted to that, was a matter of immediate concern to Europe, and remonstrances were made through Wellington. Richelieu indignantly repelled such interference. But a tumult which took place at Grenoble, greatly exaggerated by Donnadiou, the officer who suppressed it, forced his hand. He had been persistently urging the removal of the army of occupation, and the outbreak seemed to the Allies to confirm their suspicions that France was no yet to be trusted. Yielding to the influence of Decazes and of the King Richelieu declared the recalcitrant Chamber dissolved after an existence of scarcely a year (September, 1816). The first stage of the struggle was now over and its main issues were clearly defined.

The new Chamber met in October, 1816. Several influences had been at work to change its character. Among these were a modification of the electoral law, reducing the number of deputies while raising the qualifying age, and a vigorous if somewhat one-sided application of press censorship by Decazes. Most important of all, however, was the growing alarm of the commercial classes at the outspoken aims of the émigrés and their friends. The government had a working majority consisting of the moderate Royalists who accepted the constitution and the group of Constitutionals who accepted the monarchy, known as the "Doctrinaires." But a new feature of some importance now made its appearance in a knot of twelve deputies styling themselves the "Independent Left," to whom neither the monarchy nor the Constitution were of primary importance.

The ministry succeeded at length in defining the Electoral Law on lines suggested by Decazes. The 300 francs basis was retained to qualify for a vote, and that of 1000 francs for the position of deputy, the qualifying age for the latter being fixed at 40 years. An arrangement was made by which one-fifth of the Chamber, selected by ballot, should retire annually, new deputies being elected in their places. But the position of Richelieu was by

no means secure. Decazes had appealed before the election for the assistance of all constitutional royalists “whether they supported the Charter because of the King or the King because of the Charter.” It was just this difference of aim which weakened a government confronted with the compact minority of Ultras, and hampered by the uncertain action of the Independent Left.

An attempt to establish a settled principle of censorship broke down before a combination between the Ultras and the Left, against which the Doctrinaires, whose principles were affronted by the proposal, failed to support the ministry. A scheme for modifying the Concordat proved impossible in face of the unanimity of the Left and the Doctrinaires. Clearly the new elements in the Chamber had not made for stability, while on the other side the Count of Artois was discovered to have approached the Allies urging them to use their influence with the King to secure a ministry of more pronounced Royalist opinion. In spite of Louis’ support of his advisers, which took the form of a sharp censure of Artois and his dismissal from the command of the National Guard, in spite of Richelieu’s own success at Aix-la-Chapelle in securing the evacuation of France by the Allies, he could no longer feel that he commanded a sufficient backing in the Chamber. The system of allied groups had failed. He arrived at the deliberate conclusion that he must endeavour to gain over the more moderate of his Royalist opponents, and so to modify the electoral law as to get rid of the Left and reduce the power of the Doctrinaire party, upon whose steady and consistent support he was unable any longer to depend. Villèle, conscious that his day was approaching, refused to treat, and Richelieu resigned (1818).

The second phase of the struggle was now over, and a Constitutionalist ministry replaced the moderate Royalists. Its guiding spirit was Louis XVII’s favourite adviser, Decazes, though he was not yet President of the Council. Pledged to the support of the existing Electoral Law the government succeeded in silencing a resolution in the contrary sense, passed in the Upper Chamber, by the creation of new peers. More liberal in tendency than their predecessors they carried enactments leaving the press free of censorship and directing that all prosecutions of newspapers should take place before the ordinary courts with the aid of a jury. They failed to conciliate the Left while goading the Ultras to fury. The latter now adopted new electoral tactics, voting even for men of Republican views rather than the government candidates. The result was a great loss of strength for the ministry in the partial elections of 1819. Among the new deputies was the ex-Abbé Gregoire, a regicide and a man of violent and outspoken opinions. His election was nullified amid wranglings which its importance did not justify, and both Decazes himself and the King were convinced that the Electoral Law must be modified if the Chamber was to be protected from a possible majority of the Left, hostile to the Constitutional monarchy itself.

But while the proposals of the government were yet being debated, a horrible crime closed the third phase of the strife and turned the current of events into the channels it was never to leave till the final catastrophe of the monarchy.

The Duke of Berri, upon whose recent marriage the dynasty pinned their hopes of an heir, was stabbed as he left the opera by a fanatical Bonapartist saddler, named Louvel. A storm of indignation broke out against all who had professed even the mildest Liberal views, and Louis was not able to refuse to dismiss Decazes, to whose policy the Ultras pointed as the fatal influence which had let loose the revolutionary spirit of which the crime was the embodiment.

Richelieu was the only man who could hope to keep the forces of reaction within the bounds of moderation, and he only with the good-will of the Ultras. He took office with great reluctance, after obtaining from the Count of Artois an assurance of active assistance. “I will be,” said he, “the first of your soldiers.” The immediate need was a change in the

Electoral Law which would secure an electorate favourable to the new combination. The qualification of 300 francs in direct taxation was retained, but the process of election was to consist of two distinct stages. By the first, each arrondissement was to choose as many names as there were seats for the department, and by the second the actual deputies were to be selected from this list by a fifth of the electors composed of those who paid the highest taxes (1820). The new Chamber elected under these provisions showed a large majority devoted to the landed interest. Villèle now consented to serve under Richelieu, but both the Left and the Doctrinaires were in decided opposition, and the extreme wing of the Ultras was irreconcilable. The spirits of these last were raised by the birth of a posthumous son, afterwards the Count of Chambord, to the late Duke of Berri, and they had now found a new weapon of attack. Richelieu's influence at Troppau and at Laibach had not been, in their eyes, sufficiently exerted on the side of repression to maintain the credit of France. Further successes at the annual partial re-election encouraged them to draw up an address to the King demanding a spirited foreign policy, a protective corn-law and the fulfilment of the obligations of the Charter. The vagueness of the concluding request succeeded, as it was intended to do, in capturing the votes of the other opposition groups. Defeated and with a melting majority Richelieu sought the promised assistance of the Count of Artois to moderate the extreme faction. It was not forthcoming. "What would you?" said Louis XVIII. "He conspired against Louis XVI, he conspired against me, he will end by conspiring against himself." Richelieu's attempt had failed. The understanding between the two wings of the Royalists, which might have succeeded in 1816, had proved impossible, and his electoral law of 1820 had entrenched the Ultras behind defences which long resisted the growing dissatisfaction of the country. They had now at last captured the government as well as the Chamber. It remained to see how they would use their newly won power (1821).

The victors proclaimed as their guiding principle the Union of "Throne and Altar." Supported by their loyalty the monarchy was to defend and foster the work of the Church, through whose efforts France was to be regenerated. Behind these phrases was determination to reconquer the lost influence of their class. To English ears the attempt sounds utterly fantastic and impracticable. Yet there were elements of strength which should not be left out of account—the influence of a united minority, a monopoly of political power, a highly centralised administrative machine, the organised propagandist activity of the Church, and the nervous dread of avenging Europe, which paralysed armed resistance. And at the head of the party stood a leader wiser and more dexterous than his followers, a typical man of expedients, the Count of Villèle. His whole policy is thus outlined in his own words: "To know where it is best to go, without ever taking a wrong turning, to make a step towards the goal on every possible occasion, never to get into a position from which it is necessary to retreat."

Very cautiously the new minister went to work. His first care was to distract public attention from his own ulterior designs, by keeping the fears of revolutionary violence, which Louvel had aroused, permanently awake. He was for ever discovering and punishing conspiracy. He next proceeded to silence the Press. Nothing was to be published without previous sanction, and offences were to be judged without the aid of a jury. A protective law, directed against foreign imports in the interests of French agriculture and manufactures, gave great satisfaction among the classes who exercised the franchise. The President of the Council of the University was given complete authority over the teachers and the subjects of instruction in all secondary schools, and Bishop Frayssinous was appointed to the office. The prosperity of the country seemed to promise a period of repose in which these measures would have time to bear fruit.

In 1822 a rift appeared in the party which was to react fatally upon its fortunes. The romantic and enthusiastic nature of Chateaubriand had been fired with the idea of seeking a new source of strength for the Restoration in military glory. He failed to perceive with the

more cautious Villèle that, quite apart from the risks incurred, no success could be hoped for that would not challenge contemptuous comparison with the titanic achievements of the Napoleonic era. Held within bounds by his chief he successfully arranged at Verona for the French intervention in Spain. But the further intrigues of his agents at Madrid and his own talk of the Rhine frontier alarmed Villèle and resulted in his dismissal.

In 1824, a dissolution took place. A new Chamber with an opposition so small as dangerously to threaten the unanimity of the majority was elected, and passed an act assuring to itself a period of power for seven years. Villèle thereupon proceeded to the difficult task of compensating the *émigrés* for the confiscation of their property, a measure which was intended to set at rest the fears of disturbance entertained by all those who had profited by the confiscations. French finances were in a flourishing state. It was, under the circumstances, a perfectly fair proposal to reduce the rate of interest from 5 to 4 per cent. With the money thus saved it was intended to pay the interest on a new loan to be expended in compensation to all landholders displaced by the Revolution.

At this point, the Ministry experienced an unexpected check. The Peers, largely composed of ex-officials of the Empire, supported by Chateaubriand and his malcontent faction, threw out the proposed alteration in the rate of interest. The same fate befell a measure authorising the Crown to permit at discretion the establishment of convents of nuns, which was intended to pave the way for the complete restoration of the religious orders. The cautious Villèle had to all appearances been going too fast.

The explanation was not in reality so simple. The President of the Council was face to face with a dilemma. To persevere did indeed mean the steady growth of opposition among all the moderate and Liberal elements in the country, but to slacken the pace was to permit his own followers to pass over to the violent faction which spoke through the mouth of Chateaubriand.

The death of Louis XVIII (Sept., 1824) determined his choice, removing as it did one restraining influence; for it is a most perverse misreading of history which treats the King as half an accomplice of the factious opposition which checkmated the best efforts of his ministers. His brother, the Count of Artois, now succeeded as Charles X, to experience all the difficulties which his own ill-considered encouragement of reaction had been largely instrumental in creating. The ill-conditioned malicious youth of the early days of the Revolution, the exile who had made himself the mouthpiece of the fiercest denunciations of the emigres, was not indeed superficially recognisable in the person of the new King. Under the influence of a devotion to the forms of his faith he had acquired a certain dignity of person and character. But he was still without knowledge of men or insight into the trend of events. Thus he lacked judgment, the quality most necessary at the crisis when he ascended the throne. He was no enemy of the Constitution as such, though a firm believer in his indefeasible rights, having stated that he would rather chop wood than be a King on the English pattern. He was only so far the foe of the existing arrangements that he intended to restore as much of the lost dignity and power of the Church as was possible.

Under this new influence Villèle decided to press on. The *émigrés* were compensated, not by a lump sum as originally suggested, but by an annual payment (as a kind of interest upon what the State had appropriated) obtained by the reduction of the rate of interest upon the Debt. The Crown acquired the right to sanction new religious houses; the Jesuits were authorised to return. As though to advertise in the plainest terms what was being done, the coronation at Rheims was conducted with all the ancient ritual and ceremony.

But discontent was steadily growing. A new and more stringent Press law was rejected by the Peers, the National Guard broke into disorderly cries at a review and were disbanded,

the extremists under Chateaubriand, encouraged by the news of Navarino, were calling out for intervention in Greece. Villèle made one more attempt to set his house in order. The peers were swamped by new creations, and the Chamber was dissolved in the hope of securing a more unanimous majority. When the deputies assembled he found himself helpless in the presence of the increased voting power both of the malcontent Ultras and the Left. The King accordingly called upon the Vicomte de Martignac to form a ministry (1828).

Martignac was no Liberal. He had been a conspicuous member of Villèle's party and had supported some of his most unpopular measures. But the word had been given that conciliation was to be attempted, and Martignac possessed the conciliatory manner. He at once began to lighten the ship. The Doctrinaire professors were recalled to the posts they had lost during the clerical domination, and caressed. Frayssinous was snubbed. The unauthorised seminaries of the clergy were attacked. A new law removed the more stringent of the press regulations. The violent Royalists were furious. The Left confidently awaited another change in the Electoral Law, which would carry them back to the Chamber with a majority and an undeniable claim to form a ministry. Martignac disappointed them. In place of such a bill he introduced a measure for local self-government. His intentions were now clear. Nothing in the new system was to be abandoned ; only irregular encroachments were to be thrown to the wolves. The two aggrieved factions repeated their unnatural combination, this time to defeat the Budget, and Martignac followed Villèle into retirement (1829).

Charles X was left with an apparent choice between the Ultras and the Left. In reality he was now in the hands of fate. No ministry from the Left could at this stage be trusted not to embark upon reprisals, which would cripple the Church for ever, and might even modify the Constitution and limit the power of the Crown. As to the consequences of resistance the King was afflicted with judicial blindness. "It is time," he said, "to call a halt." The Prince of Polignac, an *émigré*, was commissioned to form a ministry in which were included a Vendean general and an agent of the "White Terror." Polignac went forward with the sublime confidence of a Crusader. He treated the Chamber with a strong dose of Chateaubriand's prescription, a spirited foreign policy. Vague schemes were outlined of vigorous action in Europe, and it was announced that the Dey of Algiers would be chastised for his refusal to give satisfaction for the injuries inflicted by his piratical subjects. The Chamber merely drew up an address to the King asking [for the dismissal of the ministers. He replied with a dissolution. The elections sent back a new Chamber in which the majority against the government was increased by 53.

Charles now suffered himself to be persuaded by Polignac that Article 14 of the Charter, which permitted the King to issue ordinances for the safety of the realm, contemplated just such a case as had arisen. Acting upon this theory he put his signature to four such ordinances, the first dissolving the Chamber before its assembly, the second prescribing a new electoral law, the third imposing fresh restrictions upon the press, while the fourth and last fixed the new elections for September (July 25, 1830).

The situation had now developed to a point at which force of some kind must inevitably come into play, and the force which brought on the unexpected *dénouement* was that wielded by the mob of Paris. By the next evening the appeal of the suppressed journalists to the workmen and students had brought crowds into the street; another day, and Republican agitators were busily organising resistance ; on the 28th, the mob was in collision with Marmont's troops in the narrow winding streets, and a Provisional government under Lafayette had established itself at the Hotel de Ville. Meanwhile, such of the deputies of the dissolved Chamber as had reached Paris were taking a line of their own. The majority had no wish to play into the hands of the Republicans, and forwarded a resolution to the

King through Marmont assuring him of their support in return for a withdrawal of the Ordinances. By the evening of the 29th, the mob had mastered the troops, and occupied the Louvre and the Tuileries. Before night, the military had evacuated Paris. The Chamber was now in a difficult position. No answer had been returned by the King from St. Cloud. The deputies could not but recognise that the revolutionists had won the day, and issued a proclamation accepting the situation; yet they still hoped to stave off a republic. The active exertions of a group of Liberal plotters headed by the banker Laffitte were all this while preparing a solution of the dilemma. Their plan was to transfer the Crown to Louis Philippe, Duke of Orleans, son of the Philippe Egalite who had figured in the Revolution, a prince who had taken no pains to conceal his Liberal opinions.

Meantime, nothing had been able to convince Charles X of the seriousness of the situation. The Duke of Mortemart, reaching St. Cloud late on the 28th to urge conciliation, was not received till the next morning, and even then could only prevail on the King to send a verbal message to the Chamber. Something more definite was required to secure the reversal of the recognition already given to the *fait accompli* in Paris. The messengers therefore returned to St. Cloud, but arrived too late for an audience, and when next day Mortemart, after endless mischances and misdirections, reached the capital with the King's signature to his submission, the decisive step had been taken. The Chamber had invited the Duke of Orleans to assume the Lieutenant-Generalcy of the Kingdom. The same evening, the Duke somewhat reluctantly assented and made his way to Paris.

The Provisional government at the Hotel de Ville had still to be reckoned with. Neither these leaders nor the mob had begun the outbreak to make Louis Philippe King. But they were taken by surprise, and knew that, they could count upon little support in the provinces and upon the certain hostility of Europe. They were therefore obliged to recognise the *fait accompli*. An edifying ceremony was enacted on July 31, when Louis Philippe, wearing the national colours, proceeded to the Hotel de Ville, accompanied by the members of the Chamber, and was there embraced at one of the windows by the veteran revolutionist Lafayette, thus receiving in the presence of the mob the final seal of the people's approval.

Charles X still struggled against the inevitable. He abdicated in favour of the Count of Chambord, and acknowledged Louis Philippe Lieutenant-General. He only received a civil answer and the advice to withdraw from the vicinity of Paris, a suggestion which was supported by a movement of the National Guard in his direction. Slowly and with dignity the fallen King retreated across France and embarked at Cherbourg.

The Revolution which hurled him from power inaugurated a new era.

Part II.

THE ERA OF UNREST

THE ENTENTE CORDIALE AND THE EASTERN COURTS,
1830-1848.

CHAPTER IX

THE ENTENTE CORDIALE AND THE BELGIAN REVOLUTION

THOSE who would understand the history of the July monarchy must never forget the little comedy enacted at the Hôtel de Ville; for beneath all its naive absurdity may be discovered the key to the contradictions and surprises of the next eighteen years. On the one side stood the deputies of the Chamber, drawn from a small and select class, representatives of the landed and commercial interests. These men had taken their stand against Charles X with no idea of overthrowing his throne, but with the sole purpose of driving from his counsels a ministry offensive to the majority. They had been simple enough to suppose that the matter could be thrashed out within their own charmed circle. Yet as a political party they possessed one element of strength: they knew what they wanted. On the other side stood Lafayette and the Republican chiefs of the Provisional government, with the Paris mob behind them. These were the real conquerors of Charles X. Among them there existed a singular unanimity on two points—a rooted distrust of the governing classes, and a vague impatience of the repressive control which had been exercised over France by Europe. Yet their unexpected victory found them destitute of guiding purpose. Their leaders had appealed, not unsuccessfully, to the fine abstract generalities and to the glories of the Revolution. But the vain pedantic Lafayette and his colleagues had no constructive policy. The Revolution was a thing of the past, its memories and sentiments were powerful, but its conditions could not be recreated. The popular leaders lacked the power to apprehend and to organise the practical social grievances which had brought the workmen of Paris into the streets at the sound of the old battle-cries. France had not spoken, and there could scarcely be any doubt that Europe would claim to speak nor any possibility of mistaking what would be her verdict. “You are wrong in thanking us,” said Cavaignac to one of the deputies. “We are not ready to resist you.”

Between the two opposite bodies of opinion stood the Duke of Orleans, a plain commonplace *bourgeois* figure, grotesquely decorated with a tricolour sash. Very acceptable to the Chamber, for was not he a Bourbon prince, and therefore a possible King whose election would ensure the existence of the Constitution; as well as a *bourgeois* by taste and feeling, never likely to be tempted by theories of Divine Right or fascinated by the glamour of the Catholic Church? Not unacceptable to the opposing party, who, for the moment, asked nothing more tangible than concessions to sentiment. Here was the son of a revolutionist, one who had fought at Jemappes, a man of the people, who had earned his own bread in humble callings, who had never concealed his divergence from the views of the Court. And was not the tricolour a guarantee that France had thrown off a humiliating tutelage and would be feared and respected as in the great days? After all the name of King lost half of its sinister associations when borne by a man of such genial, friendly, democratic manners, whose hand was ready to grasp that of any honest Frenchman. It was thus that on Aug. 7, 1830, Louis Philippe was declared by the Chambers to be “King of the French.”

Yet this unanimity was more apparent than real. The King had bought his Crown by a hard bargain, or rather by two inconsistent bargains, none the less binding because they were tacitly implied rather than expressed. To the Chambers he stood as the guarantee of the “just mean,” the rule of the middle classes nicely balanced between the excesses of autocracy on the one side and of republicanism on the other. To the Republicans and their working-class supporters he was the symbol of new hopes and expanding liberties, uncovenanted indeed by any Charter, but implied by the submission of their leaders. To the

Chambers again he was the guarantee of peace, standing between suspicious Europe and the right of France to determine her own destiny. To the people at large the acceptance of the tricolour seemed to carry with it the pledge of a spirited and glorious foreign policy.

It may be doubted whether these contradictions could ever have been reconciled. At least Louis Philippe was not ill-equipped for the task which lay before him. He was fifty-seven years old and had seen the world and men in many aspects. He had been soldier of the Revolution, member of the Jacobins' Club; he had been reduced in his exile in Switzerland to teach mathematics for a living. He had dabbled in Spanish politics not without a hope of supplanting Ferdinand VII; he had visited America; he had represented his father-in-law, the King of Naples, in London in 1814, where he had mixed with all the leading statesmen of the time; he had managed, under the Restoration government, to secure the credit for Liberal views without quarrelling with the Court or attaching himself to any party. Thus the whole tendency of his mind was diplomatic, his instinct to follow the line of least resistance. Cautious before all things, even to meanness, he sacrificed to no principles nor accepted any risks. He was a born temporiser, and his easy popular manner helped him to gain time and to mediate between conflicting interests. But he never possessed the resolution or the insight to do more than guide the play of the forces around him. He failed for lack of boldness at the crisis of his fortunes.

So conservative a revolution needed but little constitution making. The Charter underwent some little revision at the hands of the existing Chambers without any fresh mandate from the electors. It was now understood to have been *accepted* by the King as a summary of the national will, and not *granted* by his good favour. The power of issuing Ordinances was to be admissible only in such cases as did not involve suspension or hindrance of the ordinary law, the censorship was abolished and press cases were to be tried by jury. The aspirations of the Church were plainly discouraged. The old declaration in favour of Catholicism was watered down into the statement that "the Catholic faith is that professed by the majority of Frenchmen," while secondary education was placed under rigid state control. To put some check upon the aristocratic and landed interest, the qualification for the franchise was reduced from 300 francs in direct taxation to 200 francs, while the power of the new *bourgeois* majority was extended by giving the Chamber an initiative in legislation, and by enacting that seats in the Chamber of Peers should cease to be hereditary and that the members should be appointed for life only. As a guarantee of these arrangements, a step was taken fraught with dangerous consequences. This was the re-establishment of the ill-omened National Guard, consisting of all citizens who could afford to buy uniforms, to which was now granted the privilege of electing its own officers. This force was to prove as often a ready-made engine of revolution as a guarantee of order. It impeded at best the action of the regular troops, while the houses of its members became the convenient resort of any mob in search of weapons.

The intention of those who revised the Charter is laid bare in Guizot's words: "The King will respect our rights, for it is from us that he will hold his own." He was to be the obedient servant of a Parliamentary majority. But whether as servant or master he had work to do, and it was his hand that guided the country through the early difficulties which beset the new government. The first task was to secure the recognition of the Powers, who were already drawing nervously together. Even in England, serious politicians talked of taking action. But the new King's emissaries soon convinced all but the Czar that in Louis Philippe they had to deal with a ruler who could be counted upon to restrain the forces they feared, and in six months' time even Nicholas had grudgingly followed the general example of recognition, on condition that the King should respect the engagements of the Treaties of Paris.

The hesitating confidence of Europe and Louis Philippe's own adroitness was to be

severely tested. On the 25th of September the long-continued dissensions which had been troubling the Netherlands culminated in a revolutionary outbreak at Brussels. These dissensions were the outcome of the arrangements effected at the Congress of Vienna under which the Dutch and the Austrian Netherlands had been constituted into a single kingdom.

It was at the end of the year 1813 that the Dutch had driven out the French garrisons and the French government established by Napoleon. Two weeks later the exiled Prince of Orange had landed amid immense enthusiasm, and had been invited to undertake the sovereignty as William I. He had all the characteristics calculated to win the hearts of his people. Genial and affable, simple in his tastes, a hard worker with considerable knowledge of commercial matters, he had the inestimable advantage of personal sympathy with and understanding of all things Dutch. He possessed besides some of the qualities of a King. Exile had trained and widened practical abilities of a high order, and he had been a careful student of the history and institutions of his country. He was an untiring administrator, with a marvellous capacity for detail. His faults were the faults of a business man—an exaggerated confidence in the effectiveness of organisation and of system, a failure to make allowance in his calculations for sentiment and for human nature.

The Napoleonic occupation had long since sapped the attachment of the nation to the ancient and elaborate constitution with all its local exceptions and privileges. There was a general sense of the need for re-constitution, constituting Holland on the lines of a modern state. This work was effected by a Fundamental Law, called the *Grond-wet*, declaring the Crown hereditary in the House of Orange and vesting the control of the executive, of finance and of the armed forces of the State in the King. Provincial assemblies were responsible for local government, and these nominated the 55 members of a central States-General possessed of the rights of initiating and rejecting legislation and of sanctioning all new expenditure, but not competent to hold the ministry responsible to themselves. It was to this newly constituted State that the allies proposed to assign the Austrian Netherlands, as conquered territory lying at their disposal, since Austria evinced no desire to re-enter into so troublesome a heritage. In June, 1814, the proposal, with eight articles attached defining the conditions, was submitted to William and by him accepted. These articles stipulated for a corporate union between the two countries, for complete equality of creeds, for equal commercial rights and opportunities The Kingdom both at home and in the Dutch colonies, for the representation of Belgium in the States-General, for a common responsibility for the debt of both countries and the upkeep of the Belgian frontier fortresses, while the maintenance of the sea dykes was declared to be a matter of local concern. While these matters were still under discussion with the representatives of Belgium the sudden peril of Napoleon's return from Elba drove the two hesitating nations into each other's arms. William, with general approval, proclaimed himself King of the Netherlands, and contingents from both peoples served side by side at Waterloo under the command of the King's son, the Prince of Orange.

Nevertheless the difficulties in the way of union were real though not insuperable. The thinly-veiled annexation of the southern provinces by the northern did nothing to weaken a certain contempt with which the Dutch, proud of their long history of independence, viewed their neighbours, while the larger population of Belgium, nearly three and a half millions as compared to two millions, seemed to entitle the former possessions of Austria to a decisive voice in determining their destinies. Moreover, though the Belgian population was not racially homogeneous (consisting of Flemings in the western provinces, akin to the Dutch, and of Walloons in the Eastern districts, of Celtic extraction), French influence and the French language had done much to harmonise their institutions and their sympathies. The Spanish oppression of the sixteenth century had drawn a sharp line of religious division between the two countries. The successful subjugation of the southern provinces by Philip

It had left them devotedly Catholic, and under the control of clerical influence, while the independent Dutch of the north had been carried by force of reaction into a Calvinism of the most uncompromising type. Nor were the social or industrial characteristics of the two peoples similar. The power of the nobility in Holland had long ceased to be a political force; in Belgium it enjoyed a decided preponderance. The merchants and ship-owners of the north were drawn by no natural affinities towards the industrial interests of the south, where farming, manufactures, and mining, gave employment to the people.

These differences raised many difficult questions, but the whole problem was approached by the joint commission appointed by the King, in which the endeavour had been made to provide for the representation of every important interest, in a spirit of real compromise and conciliation. On two articles only did agreement prove impossible. Of these the one affirmed the principle of religious equality, the other was intended to settle the proportion of representatives to be assigned to each people. It was, however, unwillingly recognised by the Belgian commissioners that the Allies did not mean to leave the first point open to discussion; and the second, after both sides had claimed a numerical majority on plausible grounds, was settled by assigning an equal number of representatives to each. The *Grond-wet*, as adapted by the commission to the needs of the new state, emerged in a modified form. The States-General was to consist of two Chambers, the First of 60 members chosen by the King for life, the Second Chamber of 110 deputies, 55 from each half of the kingdom. Every ten years, the latter body was to have the right of revising the budget. These alterations increased rather than diminished the royal power. Few seem to have realised that, in view of the delicacy of the relations called into existence and of the known temperament of the King, the situation was full of danger. Compromise above all things was necessary, and the *Grond-wet* put the King above the need of seeking compromises.

His first act might well have inspired uneasiness. The new arrangements were submitted for sanction to the Dutch States-General and to an assembly of Belgian notables. The former accepted them, the latter rejected them, and by a large majority. The King took the matter into his own hands and proceeded to revise the Belgian decision. He counted in favour of the constitution the votes of all those members of the assembly who had been absent from the division, and he boldly disallowed every vote that had been given for the expressed purpose of protesting against religious equality. He thus secured a substantial majority. Yet when he entered Brussels a month later he was well received. The union being now completed, the Powers gave him the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg in exchange for his ancestral German dominions of Nassau.

In spite of its inauspicious beginning, there was much to encourage the hopes of those who had favoured the Union. The wealth and prosperity of the Belgian provinces grew apace. The King showed himself active in the promotion of material improvement. Means of communication were rapidly developed. Under the combined influence of the new processes of production, described in Chapter III, of new markets thrown open in the Dutch colonies and of the stimulus of the Dutch carrying trade, the manufactures of cotton, wool, and iron advanced by leaps and bounds. It can scarcely be doubted that wise moderation in dealing with the inevitable jarring of other interests would have been crowned with success.

From the first, however, fundamental differences were apparent. Wherever there was a divergence of national interests, however small, the deputies of the States-General voted solidly by nationalities, and the Dutch invariably secured a majority by the votes of a few Belgian government officials. The Hague was definitely adopted as the seat of government, nor was the stipulation of the Eight Articles that the Chambers should meet from time to time in Belgian territory regarded. The religious question gave trouble. The Bishop of Ghent denounced the oath to the Constitution as amounting to treason to the Church, and the

government retaliated with harsh measures. The King's zeal in the encouragement of secular education, and a decree enforcing a philosophical course upon candidates for the priesthood, however salutary, provoked suspicion. An attempted Concordat with Rome, which might have settled both disputes, broke down, because at the last moment the Pope withdrew a clause which would have given the King the right of objecting to candidates for bishoprics, whose opinions were likely to be hostile. Moreover, the language question was one of extreme difficulty. At the outset of the connection the use of either French or Dutch for all public purposes had been legalised. Obvious practical difficulties led the government in 1819 to demand a knowledge of Dutch from all candidates for state employment. Three years later, Dutch was formally recognised as the national and official language. It was however the common responsibility for the debt which really occasioned the final breach. The Belgian debt had been trifling, the Dutch debt enormous, and the expenses of the Waterloo campaign and colonial troubles in Java had augmented the joint burden. Moreover, the King did not feel himself justified in repudiating the obligations of the former French government. To relieve the financial situation, two most unwise and unpopular taxes were imposed upon food, the *mouture*, or tax upon meal, and the *abbatage*, or tax upon meat (1821). Finally, severe measures were taken against the growing hostility of the Belgian newspapers. During the Hundred Days a temporary decree had abrogated the freedom of the press guaranteed by the *Grond-wet*, and this decree was quite unjustifiably maintained in operation.

There could scarcely have been any possibility of mistaking the unanimity of Belgian feeling. By 1828, Catholics and Anti-clericals had laid aside their time-honoured feuds and were acting in concert. As if this national were not enough, a stream of widely signed petitions began to flow into the Chamber demanding the consideration of the more intolerable grievances. This movement was met by a peremptory royal message ascribing the agitation to the work of a faction, and declaring in plain terms the freedom of the executive from popular control. To this statement the Minister of Justice, Van Maanen, was empowered to require the assent of all government officials. The challenge was taken up, and over the Budget the ministry suffered their first formal defeat in the Chamber (1829). The King retaliated by depriving six Belgian deputies of their official posts. The Belgian press now burst all bounds, and an attempt to establish a government journal under a foreign editor of disreputable antecedents only added to the popular irritation. Yet even the most bitter opponents of Dutch rule scarcely ventured as yet to preach separation.

When the news arrived of the July Revolution in Paris Brussels was holding a great industrial exhibition. The proceedings were to close with a grand display of fireworks, which, owing to seditious placards, were now somewhat timorously countermanded. At the same time no provision was made for strengthening the troops, and the performance of an opera of revolutionary tendency was suffered to proceed without prohibition. On August 25th, a wild tumult of popular excitement originating in the theatre spread into the streets, and fomented by the alien refugees with whom Brussels abounded soon swelled into a formidable riot, in face of which the troops, irresolutely handled, proved powerless. In self-defence the principal inhabitants gathered an assembly of notables at the Hôtel de Ville which took charge of the government and organised a citizen-guard which succeeded in restoring order (1830).

The Prince of Orange, whose person and known views commanded much respect in Brussels, was now sent by the King to attempt conciliation. But William, who did not altogether trust his son, failed to arm him with full powers, and while the Prince returned to report the views of the Committee at the Hôtel de Ville, the extreme party had taken steps to make reconciliation impossible. An armed mob from Liège entered the city, and while their leaders were yet debating with the moderate chiefs of the committee, carried the populace with them to an assault upon the Hôtel de Ville. Amid scenes of violence, committee

and citizen-guard disappeared. The extreme faction and the mob controlled the city.

This intelligence decided the King to order Prince Frederick, his second son, to occupy Brussels with troops, and to put down the movement by force. The 10,000 men at his disposal proved inadequate and he was forced to retire upon Antwerp. But though it had failed to restore order the attempt had not been without result. Confronted by a Dutch army, the national spirit awoke. Moderates and extremists coalesced, an attempt of the Prince of Orange to assume the government of Belgium in the interests of conciliation and order met with no support, and in November a National Congress of 200 elected deputies assembled, and declared for the independence of Belgium and for the immediate election of a new King.

The tidings precipitated a fresh crisis in Paris. The populace heard with delight that another people, in a land but recently constituting an integral part of France, and unwillingly abandoned, had imitated the French example and defied the authority of a tyrannical King. They were already clamouring for the blood of Charles X's ministers. The old appeals to the Revolutionary traditions of national ambition and of the brotherhood of peoples were now loudly urged with the object of impelling France to war. A furious mob assaulted the Palais Royal and the Castle of Vincennes where the ex-ministers were lodged. In this crisis the King kept his head. His ministers were divided into the so-called "party of movement" and "party of resistance." Repression was worse than useless, and he accordingly permitted the retirement of the latter section, and gave his confidence to the former under the guidance of Laffitte and General Sebastiani.

But the rioting in Paris was not the most serious of his difficulties. In spite of the efforts which had secured the recognition of his government, he now found himself in a dilemma between the fierce demand his own people for intervention and the certain hostility of the European Powers, already turning an ear to the Czar's proposals of combined action, if he abandoned his neutrality. With quick insight, Louis Philippe grasped at the one solution of his difficulties. England could save him in his need if Canning's principle of "non-intervention" still had power across the Channel; and in London, Talleyrand, the fittest man for his purpose, was ambassador. Talleyrand approached Wellington, then prime minister, and found him disposed to listen, for suspicion of Russian intentions ruled high since the Treaty of Adrianople.

The two statesmen were not long in reaching an agreement. By the end of October they had accepted the principle of separation between Holland and Belgium, and had decided neither to intervene themselves nor to permit the intervention of others, except by way of mediation. The attention of Russia and of Prussia was at the moment directed towards Poland and that of Austria towards Italy. Too much occupied to interfere they gave their adhesion to the principle of separation, and the task of giving effect to this determination fell to a Committee appointed by the Conference of the Powers still sitting in London on the Greek question.

This was the origin of the famous *Entente Cordiale*, and it is worthwhile to pause in the narrative to take note of its character. It was not, as many have tried to represent it, an alliance of two constitutional powers drawn together by their Liberal sympathies against the forces of despotism and reaction. The plain fact is that it was formed between England and the French government to restrain the traditional ambitions of the French nation, which seemed likely once more to make shipwreck of France. There was no pretence on either side of mutual guarantees, no undertaking on the part of either to support the interests of the other. Such close alliances have been, for better or for worse, very seldom acceptable to England. Wellington was not far wrong in calling it "a cardboard alliance."

But if the sense of national honour was soothed, the French passion for national glory

was not satisfied. Sympathy with revolted Poland and discontented Italy took the form of fresh riots, in one of which the Church of St. Germain l'Auxerrois was sacked. Already it had been necessary to force Lafayette to resign his position at the head of the National Guard by a premeditated slight, when the publication of the Protocols of the Conference (Jan. 1831) imperilled all that had been done. The Protocols laid down that Holland was to be separated from Belgium, one third of the debt was to be assigned to the latter, and Luxembourg was to be handed over to King William. The Belgian National Congress indignantly rejected the last two stipulations. The French ministers and the "party of movement" perceived the opportunity. It looked for the moment as though France might yet take the field as the ally of the Belgians. The ministers had already essayed through Talleyrand to bargain for territorial advantages, and General Sebastiani, who was in charge of Foreign affairs, now attempted to disavow the protocols. He even encouraged the Belgians to elect Louis Philippe's son, the Duke of Nemours, as their new King. The election took place, the offer of the Crown was made, and for the moment the King wavered. The desire to secure advantages for his own family was always a powerful motive with him. But prudence prevailed and the offer was firmly declined, not before the French designs had given rise to much suspicion and to some vigorous language on the part of Lord Palmerston.

The situation was relieved by the resignation of the Laffitte ministry. Anxious to intervene in Italy and unable to do so in face of Louis Philippe's unwillingness to countenance their policy they resigned in dudgeon (March, 1831). The end of the first and most dangerous phase of the Belgian question was now in sight. Leopold of Coburg, the widowed husband of the English Princess Charlotte, the same who had declined the Crown of Greece, was approved by the Powers and accepted at Brussels as the new King of the Belgians. He declared himself willing to accept the Crown on condition that he was permitted to secure some modification of the Protocols of January. In spite of vigorous protests by the Dutch, Eighteen Articles were finally approved leaving revolted Luxembourg in Belgian hands and laying upon Holland the entire burden of her debt incurred previous to the Union. By the end of July, Leopold had taken possession of his new kingdom. Louis Philippe had saved both his throne and his country from imminent peril. But at the very moment of his victory he found his hands unexpectedly tied.

In March, 1831, a new ministry drawn from the "party of resistance" had come into power. At the head of the ministry stood Casimir-Périer, a man of clearly defined aims and immovable strength of purpose. The temporising policy of the King gave place to definite principles of action boldly enunciated and vigorously enforced. The immediate result of the change was seen in determined action against the Republican party. "I do not recognise," said the new minister, "the right of insurgents to force the government into a course of political change." There can be little doubt that his policy was right. Real grievances the working classes had in plenty, but these were not adequately represented by the Republican leaders and by such bodies as the "*Société des Droits D'Homme*" (founded in July, 1830), which exploited them. Their militant abstractions suggested, as a contemporary observer remarked, a greasy, dog-eared back-number of some Revolutionary publication of the nineties. Casimir-Périer did not wait to be attacked. He fell upon them with prosecutions of journals and societies. A riot among the silk-weavers at Lyons was firmly repressed by the troops. Meanwhile, the Legitimist party had not ceased to give trouble. Under the leadership of the exiled Duchess of Berri they attempted to paralyse the government by loudly supporting the most extreme democratic demands. Strong in the support of the middle-classes, Casimir-Périer defied their clamours.

In foreign policy, the government followed the old lines but with a vigour and decision which was unusual. "The July Revolution," said Casimir-Périer, "has not made a new France and a new Europe." The cause of Poland was resolutely abandoned. Nevertheless, non-intervention was not synonymous with inaction. King William I had never accepted the

Eighteen Articles, and resolved to appeal to the sword. In July, 1831, the Prince of Orange at the head of the Dutch Army entered Belgium. Thrusting himself between the widely divided armies of the Scheldt and the Meuse he routed the former and occupied Louvain. The Belgian cause was all but lost when Casimir-Périer took a step at once bold and wise. A French army passed the frontier, and the Dutch came to a halt. Paris rejoiced at the manifest triumph of the French arms. But the boldness of the action did nothing to recommend it in the eyes of Palmerston, and the Entente seemed to tremble in the balance. His language clearly implied that England only valued the understanding as a security for peace, and he added with much truth that unless the French withdrew nothing could avert a European war. But Casimir-Périer had effected all that he had aimed at by his assertion of the independence of French policy. Both armies now evacuated Belgium and left the ground clear for the diplomatists. Twenty-four fresh articles gave part of Luxembourg to Holland, and effected a repartition of the debt unfavourable to Belgium.

A similar boldness characterised French policy in Italy. The memories of the Napoleonic occupation turned towards France the eyes of all Italians who resented the preponderance of Austria, while Frenchmen could never be indifferent to the lost provinces of the Empire. As a result of movements in the Papal States, to be noticed later (Chap. XIII.), Gregory XVI called in the assistance of Austrian troops from Lombardy. The French offered no objection to the repression of revolt so long as the other Powers were prepared to combine in recommending certain necessary reforms to the Pope. But when it seemed probable that Austria would undertake the permanent occupation of the revolted districts, a French regiment was despatched by sea to occupy Ancona, where it held a position threatening the southward advance of the Austrian power, and could cover the landing of any reinforcements that might prove necessary. Thus, for the second time, Casimir-Périer had protested against the restraint placed upon French independence of action as a precaution against French revolutionary sympathies.

Yet, in truth, those sympathies were by no means extinct at home, and it will always remain doubtful what would have been the ultimate domestic policy of the resolute statesman who perished in the terrible cholera visitation of May, 1832, leaving his work well begun but incomplete.

Louis Philippe in the meantime had been far from satisfied with an adviser whose domineering will had taken little regard of his opinions, and whose policy was too bold for his balancing temperament. Moreover, he was well aware that it was due to himself alone that France had extricated herself from the immediate consequences of the July Revolution, and resented the appropriation of the entire credit by his ministers. He seems to have had no very great confidence in the efficacy of repression, and he was intensely nervous as to European interference. Till October, he struggled to keep the following of his late minister out of office.

The apparent results were not encouraging. The funeral of the Republican General Lamarque was the occasion of riots in which, for the moment, Paris was again at the mercy of the mob, while the adventurous Duchess of Berri, who had already attempted a landing at Marseilles, was busy inflaming a new Legitimist rising in La Vendée. In October, Louis Philippe submitted, and his old ministers returned to power under Marshal Soult, who was supported by a group of able and distinguished men, including Thiers, journalist and historian, Guizot, historian and professor, and the Duke of Broglie; these last two both being the trusted leaders of the Doctrinaires. With these advisers, the King accepted the policy of repression and their influence was to dominate him for four years under different leaders and in various combinations.

The first business of the new ministers was to take part in the final act of the Belgian

revolutionary drama. King William still obstinately refused to accept the Twenty-four Articles, and declined to surrender Antwerp, which was held by his troops. England and France were commissioned by the Powers to exercise a joint intervention. The English fleet blockaded the coast, while Antwerp fell before a French army. It only remains here to anticipate the final settlement. Not till 1839 did King William at last accept the situation and offer to give his adhesion to the Twenty-four Articles. It was now Belgium that protested, for all this while she had remained in *de facto* occupation of Luxembourg, and had no mind to surrender what she had come to regard as her own. But the Powers were weary of the long wrangle and combined to impose obedience.

By 1833, Guizot had confidently announced that insurrection was dead, and had embarked upon educational proposals and upon public works calculated to silence discontent in the midst of enlightenment and material advantages. The next year saw a recrudescence of the activity of the revolutionary societies. The prosecution of some of the leaders resulted in an acquittal. The societies were thus encouraged to proclaim their aims without concealment. The government thereupon set to work systematically to strengthen and to sharpen the law. At Lyons early in April four days' fighting took place between the workmen and the troops before order could be restored. Later in the month an ill-timed rising in the St. Merry quarter at Paris gave less trouble. In the summer of 1835, a wholesale prosecution was successfully directed against the Republican leaders, in the course of which an attempt by a Corsican, named Fieschi, to assassinate the King by means of an arrangement of gun-barrels lashed together and fired simultaneously, served only to strengthen the hands of the government.

But there were new symptoms in this outburst of discontent that the ministers did ill to disregard. Behind all the childishness, the pedantry, and the clap-trap of the Republicans material grievances lay hidden in the mists. Strikes had become frequent, and had been treated in the same way as the political movements, with which, it must be admitted, they were commonly entangled. The future of the new French monarchy depended upon its being able to evolve a policy which would allay the social discontent, and so deprive revolution of its driving force. Louis Philippe seems to have been not insensible to the danger. For the present he was tied hand and foot to the policy of his middle-class advisers, happy in their doctrinaire fool's paradise of the "Just mean."

CHAPTER X

THE CZAR NICHOLAS AND EASTERN EUROPE

PROBABLY no one has done more than Byron to popularise an entirely false conception of the Czar Alexander I. The bitter lines, which few people now read, were well calculated to hit the taste and prejudices, if not of his own generation, at least of that Alexander, which succeeded it. The sons of those who had admired the hero of the War of Liberation learned to laugh at—

“ The coxcomb Czar,
The autocrat of waltzes and of war,
As eager for a plaudit as a realm,
And just as fit for flirting as the helm;
Now half dissolving to a liberal thaw,
But hardened back whene'er the morning's raw.”

There could scarcely be a more misleading picture of a man who for all his social gifts lived his own simple strenuous life either wrapped in morbid solitude, or moving within the narrow circle of men who shared his dreams, nor one less just to a ruler whose ideals were in deadly strife with circumstances more compelling than any Englishman could guess at. Byron might well have spared for Alexander some of the immense self-pity of Childe Harold. It was not for him at any rate to deride the fatal influence of sentiment upon life and politics. Had Byron worn a crown his bitterness would have dissolved in enthusiasms as generous as Alexander's own, yet his ultimate disillusionment would have been as complete. Indeed, before he died he had realised the sordid truths which underlay the beautiful mirage of Philhellenism.

In Russia the Czar was better understood. His hopes, his reforms, his repressive measures, his despair, were but the moods of his own country and of his own time acting upon a singularly receptive nature. At the court of his grandmother, Catherine II, sensitive in spite of all its corruption, selfishness and rigid autocracy to the impress of western ideas, his youth was nourished amid chosen friends upon all those ideals of liberty and constitutional rule which formed such stuff as the dreams of the later eighteenth century were made of. The grim interlude of Asiatic tyranny which filled the five years of his father Paul I's reign turned dreams into resolves. “I shall set myself the task of making my country free. This revolution must be effected by constituted authority, and this authority will only disappear when the new Constitution is in working, and Russia has elected her representatives.”

When in 1801 his father's murder set him upon the throne, the work which he had thus outlined was begun. He re-organised the ministerial system, placing each department under the supervision of one of his own friends. A Council of State was founded as the nucleus from which the projected constitutional system was to grow, and a senate to exercise a revising and controlling power over the administration. Meantime, education was

encouraged, and the censorship relaxed.

A period of protracted wars followed, first with Napoleon and his allies, a struggle suspended by the Treaty of Tilsit (1807) only to be resumed in 1811; with Sweden, by which Russia gained Finland (1809); with Persia, resulting in the annexation of Georgia (1802) and in complications with the tribes of the Caucasus; with Turkey, ending in the Treaty of Bucharest (1812) and the acquisition of Bessarabia. Probably nothing was more fatal to the Czar's plans than the demands which all these struggles made upon his time for fourteen continuous years.

During the short interval of friendship with France the constitutional schemes were resumed under the guidance of Count Speranski. Finland acquired its free institutions, and the Council of State received legislative powers. But all that was worst as well as all that was noblest in the Russian national spirit awoke to resist the dictation of Napoleon, and in the uprising of 1812 the new-fangled western ideas and Speranski with them were swept away. Alexander never had so free a hand again. He was involved from the War of Liberation onwards in the web of European politics. The condition of finance, industry, and the army seemed to indicate a time unfavourable to experiment, and his impressionable nature fell much under the control of Arakchieff, an absolutist to the core. His new found piety took a turn towards self-condemnation fatal to his strength of will. The gigantic administrative system, corrupt and ineffective in its workings, and with all its manifold ramifications and vested interests, seemed alike incapable of assisting reform and instinct with all the powers of resistance. Alexander was driven to satisfy his aspirations with the most far-reaching paper schemes, while salving his conscience by activity in administrative reform.

Only one constructive measure was in fact realised, the establishment of the system of Military Colonies which aimed at keeping the ranks full while avoiding the disadvantages of tearing the men away from home and from industry. In 1817 certain village communities on the Crown lands were made the subjects of an experiment. Every householder was required to have, as partner and inmate of his home, a soldier on the active list. In return for this service the State laid out money in buildings, repairs and improvements, and made provision for education. Thus each regiment became a semi-military, semi-agricultural group of villages under the authority of the commanding officer. The children, drilled from their youth, naturally passed into the army, and on leaving the army became householders in their turn. The system consorted well with the traditions of communal agriculture prevalent in Russia, but it broke down under the weight of military authority and military regulations conflicting with the laziness and with the daily habits of the peasants. Another sweeping reform was contemplated but never realised, the emancipation of the serfs. Serfage, in its completed development, was neither universal nor of great antiquity in Russia, having been introduced to check migrations of the peasantry to new lands after the repulse of the Tartar invasions of the fifteenth century. Nor was it accepted as a matter of course. Napoleon once said "with an army abroad the State goes travelling," and Russian soldiers had introduced the knowledge of freer agricultural conditions and the hope of change. Alexander did something by precept and example to encourage emancipation, but in the Baltic provinces, where systematic action alone was taken, its effect was marred by the failure to assign lands to the peasants, who thus became hired labourers.

Meantime, Alexander was active in administrative reform, but the results did not correspond to the trouble expended. In attacking the evils of the system of government he assailed the symptoms rather than the disease. He was untiring in his journeys from place to place. Again and again his emissaries intervened to remodel provincial governments and to dismiss corrupt officials. The men who replaced them, exposed to the same influences, too often fell back into the same ways. Thus each new decree of the Czar's was marred in its application. Still much was done. The enormous paper currency was reduced, an

Imperial Bank was founded, and the national debt was put upon a proper footing. Manufacture was encouraged and Moscow began its modern development with glass, paper, and cotton industries, behind the protection of an import tariff. Roads, bridges, and canals opened possibilities of communication. Alexander's modernising ideas took shape in the expulsion of the Jesuits, the encouragement of Bible societies, efforts for prison reform, and restrictions upon the use of capital punishment. But it was in Poland rather than in Russia that the Czar found himself in a position to realise his dreams. He had taken immense pains at Vienna to secure for himself a free hand in restoring the kingdom of Poland on a constitutional basis. Unable to recover for her the provinces which had passed under Austrian and Prussian control he had contemplated embodying in his creation the Polish districts of Lithuania, Podolia, and Volhynia, which had long been annexed to Russia. At times he even regarded the work as a first experimental step towards reconstituting the Russian Empire as a great federation of self-governing states under his crown. But his measures were taken with commendable caution and applied in the first instance to the former Grand Duchy of Warsaw only.

A constitution was drawn up by his Polish friend and counsellor Adam Czartoryski. The Crown was to be hereditary in the Russian royal house. There was to be a Viceroy and a Council of State and a Diet of two Chambers, the upper nominated by the king for life, the lower elected partly by the nobility, who held 77 seats, partly by the commercial, professional, and small landholding classes to the extent of 51 representatives. The Diet was to meet every two years and was to be summoned and dissolved by the King. Five ministers undertook the different departments of government. The members of all faiths were to enjoy equal civil rights, the Polish language alone was to be used, there was to be a separate Polish army, and only Poles were to be eligible for state employment.

A Polish general, Zaionchek, became Viceroy. The Czar's brother and heir, Constantine, a man of narrow mind and brutal nature, was appointed commander-in-chief, not without the hope that his new surroundings would educate him in more generous ideas against the time when he would succeed to the throne. Poland prospered under her new government. Education was cared for, a University was founded splendidly equipped for all branches of study, mining was developed, the capital was beautified, communication by road and river was improved. The financial difficulties of the moment were tided over by making Russia responsible for the budget. Alexander was able to meet his first Diet in 1818 with a speech full of hope and with hints at a further extension of territory. Yet his words were not without a note of warning. To the eternal misfortune of Poland it was not heeded in the country at large, and the fair opportunity of recovering her place among the nations was lost.

The whole history of Poland had been one of undisciplined self-will in individuals and classes, which her institutions seemed designed to foster, and which had resulted in anarchy and ultimately in partition. A "Patriotic Society" had existed in 1814 with a large number of branches. Encouraged by Alexander the society repaid him with admiration, which gradually gave place to much criticism of the government and to a good deal of anti-Russian feeling. By 1820, when the second Diet met, there were already fatal differences between the chief men in authority, and a new spirit made its appearance in the Diet itself. While maintaining an attitude of general moderation the members rejected two bills, refused taxes, and presented a long list of grievances, while a bitter attack was made upon the government by a leading deputy. Alexander gravely warned them that they were delaying progress. Before the next Diet met he had passed under the influences which sent him to Verona in 1822 a changed man. Arakchieff and the churchmen, Seraphim and Photius, affected his policy at home as Metternich had affected it abroad. The Bible societies, the Press and education all suffered a sharp check from his increasing suspicion. Upon these suspicions the increased activity of the "Patriotic Society," which culminated in a series of

trials in 1822, acted as a powerful irritant. The censorship of the press was established, the Diet was deprived of publicity of debate, and other precautions were taken to silence opposition before the members met. Much useful work was done, and the Diet was commended by Alexander but less warmly than of old. It was his last visit to Warsaw.

Without children or the hope of heirs, since he and the Empress had agreed long since to live apart, he had for some time contemplated abdication, and his distaste for the views and distrust of the abilities of Constantine had turned his thoughts to his third brother the Grand Duke Nicholas, eighteen years younger than himself. Constantine was not unwilling to agree. He had little faith in his own powers, he was childless, and had recently divorced his wife and married a Polish lady, Johanna Grudzinska. Nicholas was sounded. Happy in his home life with the Princess Charlotte of Prussia and absorbed in his military duties, he heard with horror the fate proposed for him. He saw in his brother a ruler labouring incessantly for the good of his people, and meeting only with disappointment and ingratitude. The projected abdication was therefore dropped, and it was without the knowledge of Nicholas that Alexander and Constantine proceeded to settle the succession. An Imperial decree re-affirmed the principle of primogeniture, and excluded the succession of females except in default of male heirs, while it was laid down that no one who had married outside a royal house should be allowed to pass on a claim to his descendants. Finally, an instrument was secretly drawn up formally designating Nicholas as heir, and sealed up, with the correspondence which had passed between Alexander and Constantine, in a packet deposited in the Cathedral at Moscow. These papers were not to be opened till the Czar's death. So strange a method of procedure seems to have been prompted alike by the uncertainty of Constantine's intentions and by a wish to deprive Nicholas of the opportunity for protest. It was attended with fatal results.

Alexander was not the only Russian in whom generous instincts and imperfect political experience had begotten visions of reform more fantastic than practical. The officers of the army, educated by contact with western ideas during the War of Liberation, dreamed of Constitutions and the reorganisation of Russian society. As time went on hope turned to disappointment and disappointment soured into conspiracy. By 1821 the secret societies contained none save those who were prepared to seek their ideals by way of revolution. In the north they coalesced into the "Society of St. Petersburg," under the nominal guidance of Prince Trubetskoi; in the south Pestel, son of a justly disgraced governor of Siberia, headed the "Union of Salvation," which took for its avowed aim the extinction of the House of Romanoff and the establishment of a republic. It was the ease with which these societies absorbed all the discontent, disappointment, and personal vindictiveness generated under an autocracy which constituted their danger.

Before leaving Warsaw for the last time Alexander had heard of the existence of conspiracy. In the Crimea fuller details came to his knowledge, and orders were given for extensive arrests. There can be little doubt that it was this final blow to his hopes which made him refuse the advice and help of his physicians till his weary spirit and shattered frame were beyond their assistance. His death precipitated the dramatic crisis which his own action had prepared. The mysterious packet was produced and opened, and the Imperial Council acclaimed Nicholas as Czar. Nicholas refused to be his brother's supplanter, and his iron will bore down all entreaties. He forced the council to take the oath of allegiance to Constantine, and to issue a decree requiring it of all who served the State. Scarcely had these measures been effected when the Grand Duke Michael arrived, bearing letters from Constantine announcing his fixed determination to abide by Alexander's arrangements. He was sent back in haste with the information that steps had been taken which could not be retraced. But Constantine had already heard the news from St. Petersburg without wavering in his resolution, and the Grand Duke met his messengers half way. Their tidings convinced him that further remonstrance was useless. After three weeks,

filled with rumours and counter-rumours, Nicholas was at last proclaimed (Dec. 1825).

In this interval the conspirators had not been idle. Fortune seemed to offer them a fair opportunity for realising their plans. It was decided to use the name of Constantine to work upon the regiments of Guards stationed in the capital. The accession of the younger brother was to be represented to the ignorant soldiers as a usurpation, a military coup d'état was to force an abdication from Nicholas, and then the way would be clear for a National Assembly and a republic. There were noble and generous spirits among these Decembrists, as they were called, and the objects they sought were not unlike those which had inspired the best years of the late Czar. But justice requires that we should not be blind to the criminal recklessness of those who pursued their vision of an ideal Russia by the crooked ways of assassination and military violence.

During the morning of December 27 the mutinous troops, among whom the conspirators had been at work all night, began to defile into the Square of the Senate cheering loudly for Constantine and Constitution, a word which most of them understood as being the name of the Viceroy's wife. Here they formed up, and awaited the next move of their leaders. A Louis XVI would have been lost. But face to face with the probable defection of all his troops the resolution of Nicholas had never faltered. "If I am to be Czar for an hour," he said, "I will be so with dignity." Early in the morning he had ordered the oath of allegiance to be administered to the officers of all the Guards regiments. This prompt action secured the adherence of a majority of the garrison, though in some cases the men shot the officers sent to reason with them. The Czar in person appeared outside his palace and addressed the hesitating populace, whose support the conspirators had hoped to enlist. His commanding presence and fearless demeanour had their effect in a burst of cheers and professions of loyalty. The issue of the day was already as good as decided when Nicholas, following the first detachment of loyal troops, rode into the Square of the Senate, and faced the mutineers who stood waiting for orders with their backs to the Neva, and with old general Miloradovich lying dead at their feet. Trubetskoi and the rest had lost their heads, and while the soldiery on both sides hesitated and wavered, resolution, and resolution alone, could have snatched a victory. Nicholas had never wavered. The exits of the square were now closed, the surrender of the mutineers seemed in sight. But as the afternoon waned away in suspense it became clear that decisive measures must be taken before darkness, with all the possibilities of riot, came on. The cavalry were ordered to charge the disaffected troops and disperse them. Their horses slipped upon the frosty pavement, and they were unable to act in the confined space. Then Nicholas brought up the guns and unlimbered opposite the rebels. Before giving the command to fire he sent two Archbishops in their robes to speak to the disloyal regiments. They met with nothing but hoots and hostile cries. Once the guns fired, and the grape-shot screamed over the heads of the mutineers. There was a pause, and still they stood fast. Then twice, and in rapid succession, the square echoed again to the artillery, and when the smoke lifted the ground was strewn with dead, and the survivors were a flying mob.

The victory was followed up by a relentless prosecution of the movers of the conspiracy. The investigations were conducted in secret, and every kind of pressure, short of actual torture, was used to extract evidence. Of 121 persons found guilty, five were hanged, 31 sent to Siberia, and the rest were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment. They had done their country an evil turn. December 27th completed the political education of the Czar Nicholas I.

Born in 1796, he had been brought up in seclusion and under influences very different from those which had moulded Alexander. The French revolution had run its course, and seemed to promise disastrous consequences to ideal strivings after liberty. The War of Liberation appeared to confirm the judgment of those who stood by the good old ways.

These influences reacted upon a character essentially different from his brother's. If in Alexander sympathy had been developed to the detriment of will power, in Nicholas will was incarnate at the expense of sympathy. A lover of order and detail he was caught by the fascination which military command exercises upon such natures, while his home life inclined him to optimism, and set him at peace with his own thoughts. Honourable as he was, high-minded, and a man of his word, his knowledge of the limitations imposed on him by his narrow education bred a distrust of himself which issued in such stiffness and reserve as repelled sympathy and excited the distrust of others. The tragedy of his brother's life and the events of his own accession led him to see in innovation the danger to Russia's peace, and blinded him to other dangers at least as menacing. From the beginning of his reign he stood fast for the old traditions of Russia and for the principles of absolutism. His gigantic figure arrayed according to his invariable custom in stiff military uniform, loomed large in the imagination of his contemporaries, and the unbending will excited according to their prepossessions, either their fears or their respect.

His dealings with Poland first revealed his autocratic temper to Western Europe. He declared at once his acceptance of the Constitution granted by Alexander, while making it clear that he did not intend to restore the districts already incorporated in Russia. At the same time he demanded from the government of the unwilling Constantine an investigation into the proceedings of the Polish patriotic societies, whose connection with the Decembrist movement the St. Petersburg trials had demonstrated, while exculpating them from a share in any murderous designs. A Court of the Diet tried the suspected persons, pronounced some light sentences, and declared many of them acquitted. The Czar resented what he regarded as the obvious sympathy shown by the Court. It was several months before he confirmed the sentences. Nevertheless his coronation at Warsaw in May, 1829, was attended by no unpleasant incidents, and his speeches to his first Diet in 1830 were friendly without being cordial. Meanwhile, a new secret society had been founded by Vysocki, and conspiracy spread slowly. The Czar's own determination to use the Polish army against the July Revolution in France moved the plotters to action, for it was on the troops they chiefly relied. But Polish opinion was fatally divided. The Princes would gladly have conciliated Russia, a moderate party desired merely to insist on all the guarantees of the Constitution, only the extremists desired complete national separation.

But extreme counsels were gaining ground, and riots broke out in Warsaw on November 29, 1830, in which the Viceroy's palace and the cavalry barracks were stormed. Constantine showed fatal irresolution. Unwilling or afraid to use the military against the people he withdrew with his Russian regiments, leaving the Polish army free to join the insurgents. The Council and the party of the Princes at first attempted to hold the revolution in check. Chlopicki, a veteran of Napoleon's wars was appointed to command the troops, and Constantine was invited to return, but was frightened across the frontier by the more violent party. This made a Provisional Government necessary, though Chlopicki made one more effort to gain time by declaring himself Dictator. His position became impossible when the Czar's reply to the Polish deputation which had been despatched to St. Petersburg came in. It was a stern demand for unconditional submission.

Poland had now to fight. A national government took over the direction of affairs, Radzivil, one of the princes, was willing to lead the army. There were good grounds for hope. Poland possessed a disciplined and well-trained force, the Russian armies were far away, a resolute advance into the Polish provinces of Russia, such as Chrzanovski advised, would have set them in flames. The opportunity was missed; and at the beginning of February Diebitsch crossed the frontier and made straight for Warsaw. A desperate battle at Grochov within striking distance of the capital, in which he only just succeeded in driving the Poles from the field, convinced him of his inability to attempt a siege. He drew off and dispersed his force to cover the Russian frontier against the invasion he rightly

apprehended.

The Poles with characteristic suspicion had superseded their commander in favour of Skrzynecki. The new general failed to perceive the advantage which his opponent's dispositions offered him, and followed his example in dividing his forces. He was thus unable to win more than trifling successes, and allowed two raids into Lithuania and Volhynia to fail for want of support. At last, on the advice of a subordinate, he resolved to throw his whole force on the most northerly of the Russian detachments, and to place himself where he could threaten their communications both with their advancing reinforcements and with the friendly territory of Prussia. The Russian detachment was beaten and driven off the field, but Skrzynecki's unwise decision to send a column into Lithuania exposed the remainder of his force to the full weight of Diebitsch's army at Ostrolenka, where he suffered a crushing defeat.

It was the last achievement of the Russian general. Both he and Constantine fell victims to cholera, and Paskievich the victor of the Persian war, took command. The new general, now strongly reinforced, adopted a strategy which threw the Polish plans of defence into confusion. Crossing the Vistula below the enemy's positions he moved in on Warsaw from the north and west, while suspicion, riot, and changes of command in the capital destroyed all hope of resistance. On September 8 the Russians entered the city, and by the end of October the insurrection was over.

All this while the Poles had been making agonised appeals to the opinion of Europe and to the Treaties of Vienna. They met with much sympathy. Few knew or cared to know what provocation had been offered by a nation gallantly striving for liberty. But Poland was far away, and whatever the people might think it was only in England and France that the governments were likely to take action. Nicholas felt himself strong enough to defy English and French representations which appealed to the guarantees of national independence given at Vienna. He stated in plain terms that he intended to disregard them. Repression and Russification were pressed on apace.

In Russia itself, while commerce was actively encouraged and literature of a non-political character flourished, a system of passports, the censorship, and the jealous control of education set barriers to any inroads of disturbing tendencies from abroad.

From this moment Nicholas became the hope and support of all who dreaded revolutionary change. Metternich made overtures to him, which were at first met with suspicion owing to Austria's attitude during the Turkish war. But difficulties with England, shortly to be described, decided the Czar to reconsider his position. It is to be noted however that he never yielded himself, like Alexander, to Metternich's guidance, and that in his relations with Austria his attitude was that of a protector and patron. The result of the *rapprochement* was a meeting between the two Emperors and the Prussian Crown Prince at Munchengratz (September, 1833), where an important agreement was arrived at. The three Powers undertook, first, to seek no territorial advantages in Turkey except in the event of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, in which case they agreed to act in common; secondly, to take combined action against unrest in their Polish districts and in the mutual surrender of political refugees, and, thirdly, to recognise the right of any of the three to summon the other two to his help when threatened by rebellion at home. The agreement was in fact a counterblast to the entente cordiale, and as such it was interpreted.

In default of definite knowledge of its provisions its scope was even magnified in the imagination of the Western Powers. It was believed to contain a formal arrangement for the partition of Turkey between Austria and Russia. It was not then known that in 1829 a committee, specially appointed by the Czar to consider the question, had reported in favour

of maintaining Turkey as a weak State, instead of absorbing further portions of her territory, as more likely to conduce to Russian influence in the East. Moreover, the Persian war had revived the suspicions with which England watched any extension of the Russian power in the direction of India. After the Treaty of Gulistan in 1813 Alexander stood possessed of the whole valley of the Kur south of the Caucasus, comprising Georgia and the districts reaching to the Caspian, together with the provinces of Mingrelia and Imeritia, which connected it with the Black Sea. Frontier disputes had led to an invasion of Russian territory by Shah Fattah Ali in 1826. Repulsed at Elizabetopol by Paskievich he had been pursued into his own land, the frontier fortress of Erivan had been stormed, Tabriz had been occupied, and while the Shah, relying upon Turkey, still refused to acknowledge defeat, Paskievich, disregarding his communications, had struck boldly for Teheran and had dictated the Treaty of Turkmanchai (1828), by which the Russian frontier was advanced still further south.

But it was another series of events, which had preceded the meeting at Munchengratz by a few months, which seemed to afford the strongest authority for the most sinister interpretations. In 1831 the ambition of Mehemet Ali raised the spectre of the Eastern Question. An Albanian adventurer, like Ali Pasha of Janina whose career presents points of resemblance to his own, he went to Egypt with a regiment of Turkish irregulars, at the time of Napoleon's expedition, and was narrowly saved from drowning by an English man-of-war's boat, when the French drove the Turks into the sea at Aboukir Bay. He had returned in 1801 to play for his own hand in the strife between the Mamelukes and the Sultan's troops, had been accepted by the chief men at Cairo as the only ruler capable of restoring order, and had been confirmed in his authority as Pasha of Egypt by the Sultan in 1806. With an army drilled and disciplined on the European model by the aid of French officers, he had exterminated the Mamelukes, dictated terms to Arabia, and subdued the Soudan as far south as Khartoum. To maintain his army and his fleet he had declared the land of Egypt the property of the State, and had established a government control and monopoly over every branch of trade and manufacture. These so-called "reforms," which were the ruin of Egypt, were loudly acclaimed by ill-informed persons all over Europe and especially in France.

The part which he played in the Greek Revolution has already been described. Owing to the intervention of the Powers Mahmoud had been able to withhold from him the greater part of his promised reward. Crete was a small consolation to one who had hoped to receive the Morea, Syria, and Damascus besides. Moreover, the Sultan had been showing a disquieting activity in setting his house in order. The independence of the vassal Pashas was being curtailed, and in Bosnia Reshid was actually engaged in putting down the rebellious governor by force. Khosrew, the bitterest foe of Mehemet Ali, was a power at court. Ambition and fear combined to urge the Pasha of Egypt to strike, and, in 1831, Ibrahim invaded Syria and laid siege to Acre, while loudly declaring his loyalty to the Sultan.

After painful hesitation Mahmoud, surrounded as he was by difficulties, decided to declare war. Bosnia was heaving with discontent, his fleet had perished at Navarino, his funds had been absorbed by indemnities to Russia. His fears proved well founded. Ibrahim captured Acre without difficulty. Winning the Christian Druses of Lebanon by the promise of equality for all creeds, and the Arabs of the desert by his successes against the power that restrained their depredations, he was now free to continue his advance. At Homs and at Hamah the Turks went down before him, Aleppo was occupied, the Beilan pass was forced, and the victorious Egyptians entered Asia Minor.

In his distress the Sultan looked wildly about him for a friend. His own subjects hated him for his reforms and for his concession of equal rights to his Christian subjects; Europe was attracted by the sham civilization of Mehemet Ali. Mahmoud feared Russia, and Austria had thrown herself into Russia's arms. France he hated for annexing the territory of his

vassal in Algiers. He therefore approached England, supported by Stratford Canning, her ambassador. Palmerston hesitated. He dared not throw himself into opposition to the supposed policy of Russia, and every prejudice and presumption restrained him from the wiser course of seeking an agreement with her.

Meanwhile events were moving fast. Ibrahim had advanced still further, had beaten Reshid at Konieh, and was preparing to move forward on Brusa (1832). A Russian envoy, Count Muravieff, appeared at Constantinople to offer the assistance of the Czar, and proceeded to Alexandria to threaten the Pasha. The threat was ineffectual, and Mahmoud had but one resource. "Drowning men," said Khosrew, "clutch at serpents." The Sultan appealed to Russia and a Russian squadron appeared in the Bosphorus. France and England now combined, but they were already to all intents and purposes diplomatically beaten. They first bent their efforts to induce Ibrahim to withdraw. This he refused to do save on his own terms, which amounted to a demand for the pashaliks which he had occupied south of the Taurus. The two Powers thus found themselves forced into the invidious position of attempting to thrust upon the Sultan in the guise of friends the demands of his deadliest enemy. In this endeavour they succeeded. Russia, though her troops were already encamped on the Bosphorus, was unwilling to face the European War which the active assistance of Mahmoud would have entailed. The Convention of Kiutayeh ended the war by giving the Pasha of Egypt all that he asked (May, 1833).

The clumsy diplomacy of the allies bore strange fruit. French and English influence now counted for nothing against Prince Orloff the emissary of the Czar, fortification began on the Dardanelles, and the Russian retirement was delayed from week to week. Suddenly in July the astonishing explanation was made public. Angered at the desertion of his pretended friends the Sultan had come to terms with his hereditary foe, and had signed the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi with Russia for mutual assistance and support. Then slowly it leaked out that by a secret clause the Porte promised to close the Dardanelles to war-ships "if need are." The indiscretion of a minister supplied the explanation of the ambiguous phrase. The Dardanelles were to be closed at the discretion of the Czar. Turkey was indeed reduced to the position of a vassal state.

To Englishmen from this moment all that they detested in politics seemed incarnate in the person of Nicholas, the barbarous oppressor of Poland, the would-be devourer of Turkey, the insidious foe of their Indian Empire. The Czar was less prejudiced. Sentimental reasons were not, it is true, without their weight with him. He despised William IV for his assent to the Reform Bill, as the King "who had tossed his crown into the gutter." But he by no means extended to England his detestation of Louis Philippe and of France. He saw that English and Russian interests were not inconsistent, and he desired to sever the slender thread of the *entente*. In 1834, when Peel was in power, an exchange of views took place, through the agency of the Duke of Wellington in which the Czar described the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi as possessing only an historical significance. Next year Palmerston, "the Jacobin," as the Czar called him, returned to office, and no further advances were made. But events were in progress which were to bring even an Anglo-Russian agreement within the bounds of possibility.

CHAPTER XI

RUPTURE OF THE ENTENTE—THE CARLIST WAR AND THE EASTERN QUESTION

EVENTS had already been taking place which had put a severe strain upon the *entente*.

For ten years, since the French intervention of 1823, Spain had been left without interference to the solution of her own problems. But Ferdinand VII had learned nothing by the movement of 1820. In common, it must be admitted, with the majority of his subjects he did not realise the existence of any problem at all. As for a solution he unconsciously made the task all but impossible by deferring the day of reckoning with forces which meanwhile acquired explosive power. His restoration to authority inaugurated a relentless proscription of everything that savoured of revolution by means of a system of courts-martial, spies and informers, directed by his Minister of Justice, Calomarde.

Thorough as his measures were, they did not go far enough for the stiffer exponents of Spanish tradition, who had their own grievances to avenge on the revolutionary party. Ferdinand had not restored the Inquisition, he had shown himself ungrateful to his most zealous partisans, even his severities wore to their eyes the appearance of culpable mildness. This party, the so-called "Apostolics," looked with hope to the King's brother and heir Carlos. A revolt of the reactionary elements under Bessières gave Ferdinand an excuse for repressive measures as thorough and searching as those against the Constitutionals. Carlos, meanwhile, narrow-minded but strict in his personal loyalty to his brother, gave no encouragement to reaction. The one immediate result of the agitation was Ferdinand's recognition of Louis Philippe, whose accession put an end to the assistance afforded by French ultra-Royalists to Apostolical raids across the northern frontier. Both parties had felt the weight of Ferdinand's hand and suffered, the one in despair, the other with hope. The future seemed to belong to Carlos.

The prospects of the two parties were suddenly reversed. In 1829 the King's third wife died. A few months later, influenced by his domineering Neapolitan sister-in-law Carlota, he married her sister Cristina, a girl of twenty-three. Under her influence the surroundings of the Court became more cheerful and its policy milder. Many regarded the Queen as a Liberal in disguise, and the confidence of the Apostolical party was shaken by the birth of the Infanta Isabel in October, 1830. This event, however, was by no means decisive of the future. The ancient Spanish code of *Partidas* recognised the right of females to succeed to the throne. Philip V, the first Bourbon King, had introduced the Salic Law prevailing in France. But at a later date Charles IV, Napoleon's victim, had signed a "Pragmatic Sanction" restoring the old custom. This document had been kept a secret. It was now published by order of the King, and a will was made in favour of Isabel.

Carlos never accepted its legality. He refused to rebel against his brother, but he declared himself determined, when the time came, to assert his rights. Strife and intrigue gathered round Ferdinand's declining years. Once during an illness he had actually revoked the Pragmatic Sanction, when the resolute Carlota appeared at the royal bedside, boxed Calomarde's ears in the King's presence, and secured the nomination of Cristina as Regent till Ferdinand's recovery, when the oath of allegiance to Isabel was imposed on all who did not quit Spain. And all this while the government was driven more and more to lean upon Liberal support against the faction of Carlos. In September, 1833, Ferdinand died, and Cristina was proclaimed Regent.

Meantime, a series of events which read like a chapter of romance were leading to a situation curiously similar in Portugal. It will be remembered that, as the result of the mediation of the Powers directed by Canning, Miguel had been left in the position of Regent for his niece Maria da Gloria. In 1828, he found himself strong enough for a coup d'état. The Cortes in their ancient form were summoned and declared the Regent King amid the applause of the nation, with whom he had always been the ruler of their choice. A fierce persecution of his political opponents began, rather at the instigation of his advisers than by his own wish, for Miguel, though coarse and reactionary enough, was himself good-natured. Maria was taken to London by her counsellor, Palmella, and afterwards proceeded to Brazil. The Powers stood neutral, and while attempting to mediate, recognised the new government. The revolution was to all appearances completely successful.

The tables were to be turned in a most unexpected fashion. Alone in all the Portuguese dominions, the little garrison of Angra, on the island of Terceira, in the Azores group, held out for Maria II. In spite of the vigilance of British war-ships, which were being used to enforce neutrality, they were relieved and reinforced by a Brazilian cruiser, and under the command of the gallant Villa Flor beat off an expedition despatched against them by Miguel. Palmella now appeared in the Azores to organise a government in the Queen's name, and before long Villa Flor had succeeded in mastering every island of the group (1829).

The year 1830 brought Louis Philippe to power in France, and installed Palmerston at the British Foreign Office, as a member of the Whig Government which carried the Reform Bill. For thirty years from this moment his influence was to be a decisive factor in European politics. Bluff, genial, dogmatic, and outspoken, he embodied in himself all the qualities which the mass of Englishmen respect. They liked his almost brutal recognition of facts, and they believed him to be the incarnation of common sense and the foe of anything approaching ideas and principles. In this belief they were wrong. As Castlereagh had passed from common action with the other Powers to "non-intervention," as Canning had carried "non-intervention" to the length of mediating in favour of the popular cause, so Palmerston gave a colour both to mediation and non-intervention which was frankly Liberal. He openly sympathised with popular movements as such, without much regard to their origin. He connived at infractions of British neutrality in their favour. He lectured foreign potentates on the blessings of Constitutional rule. All this was forgiven by the most conservative of Englishmen, because it flattered the national pride. Abroad, Palmerston was well hated by the monarchs. Later on, their discontented subjects found out that his sympathy did not go to the length of interfering by force of arms on their behalf, and were correspondingly disappointed. Altogether, while he stimulated a healthy national feeling in his own country, he did not enlarge the circle of her continental friends.

The friendly indifference of the British and French Governments was soon to be valuable to the cause of Queen Maria. But the moving spirit of all that followed came from across the Atlantic. Barely thirty years old, the Emperor Pedro was already restless on the throne of Brazil. His adventurous, unquiet nature, ever eager for fresh sensations, had brought misfortune on his country and had offended his subjects. A new quest now beckoned him across the sea, and in 1831 he abdicated of his own will in favour of his son Pedro II, to appear as a freelance in the cause of his dispossessed daughter.

In London, and afterwards in Paris, his plans were formed. A loan was raised, two Indiamen were converted into war-ships, manned by English crews, and placed under the command of an English captain named Sartorius. At Belle-Isle, in full view of French officials, these ships took on board Colonel Hodges and a small band of British mercenaries, as well as the ex-Emperor and his staff, and sailed for the Azores. By a strange chance the tiny squadron possessed for the moment the command of the sea. To exact satisfaction for wrongs inflicted upon French subjects, Admiral Boussin had sailed up the Tagus and

insisted on the temporary surrender of Miguel's fleet.

The Emperor firmly believed that the "Liberator Army" had only to show itself in Portugal to be received with acclamation. Nothing could have been further from the truth, and yet it was this unwavering confidence in a false premise which, in spite of much opposition, won the sanction of his supporters for a step which was to prove decisive. After a short delay, caused by the insubordination of the troops, the expedition, 7000 men all told, sailed from the Azores and landed unopposed at Mindello. Its peril was extreme. To the north lay Oporto, with a garrison of 12,000; from the south another army was prepared to move in to enclose the invader. Then an amazing thing happened. General Santa Martha evacuated Oporto, and the Emperor took possession. Even now his situation was hopeless, if his enemies had closed the Douro and cut him off from Sartorius, whose squadron lay out at sea. Squandering their strength in useless assaults, they did not try to do so till too late, when the attempt was checked by Saldanha. Nevertheless, by the beginning of 1833 the position of Oporto was well-nigh desperate, and the garrison were reduced to their last resources when Captain Napier superseded Sartorius, who by his failure to seek out the enemy's fleet had shown some lack of enterprise.

At Napier's suggestion it was decided to attempt a diversion. Some steamers were brought from England, and a tiny force of 2500 men under Villa Flor, now Duke of Terceira, was sent round by sea and landed at Cacellas Bay in the district of Algarves. Faro the capital of the province was occupied, and a government established by Palmella. Meanwhile, Napier, free to act on his own discretion, had run down the enemy's fleet off Cape St. Vincent. Inferior in the number of his vessels and the power of his guns, but confident in the superiority of his English crews, he gave the order to lay ship to ship and board. His daring was rewarded. The whole of the enemy's fleet with the exception of two of the smallest craft were captured.

Encouraged by this success, Terceira determined to act with similar audacity. A movement of his opponent, Mollélos, to recapture a lost town momentarily uncovered the road to Lisbon. With 1500 men, Terceira made for the capital. At Setubal a detachment of the enemy took to their heels at his approach. At Piedade, on the banks of the Tagus, he overthrew the advanced troops of the garrison. But the estuary lay before him, and Mollélos was coming up behind. Once more the Miguelists played into their opponent's hands. The Duke of Cadaval evacuated Lisbon and Terceira occupied the town, where he was joined by Napier's squadron. The Emperor took possession at the end of July.

Miguel, who was still before Oporto, at once broke up the siege. He did not advance from Coimbra upon Lisbon till the fortifications had been sufficiently improved to defy his assault. But the country was not yet won, and Pedro's reprisals upon the supporters of the late Government did not win friends. In spite of the activity of Saldanha in the field the result still hung doubtful when assistance arrived which turned the scale.

Carlos, the Spanish Pretender, had not yet returned from his self-imposed exile, and was at the time serving with Miguel in Portugal. But already the northern provinces of Spain had declared in his favour. Thus, the two young queens, Maria and Isabel, were alike threatened by the combination of the absolutist claimants, whose cause was already attracting sympathy at the Eastern Courts. Palmerston resolved to be first in the field, and to lend just enough support to decide the struggle, at any rate as far as Portugal was concerned where England could not afford to stand neutral. An alliance was concluded with the two Queens early in April. From this alliance France, by reason of her old interest in Spain and her jealousy of English influence at Madrid, was determined not to be excluded. The alliance therefore became a Quadruple Alliance. Spain was to send an army to Portugal, Portugal was to expel Carlos, the English fleet was to be used in the interest of

the allies, and French help was to be rendered, if necessary, in such a way as the signatories might jointly determine (1834).

The effect on the situation in Portugal was immediate. Before the combined forces of Terceira and the Spanish general Rodil, Miguel retreated to Evora-Montes, where he surrendered under the terms of a convention, and left Portugal for ever, accompanied by Carlos. Four months later his brother and conqueror, the ex-Emperor Pedro, died at thirty-five.

Thus the young Queen began her reign under the provisions of her father's Charter of 1826. Under the guidance of her minister, de Silveira, the institutions of Portugal modernised, and an age of constitutional rule agitated by party struggles and revolutions began. In 1836, Maria married as her second husband Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, nephew of the King of the Belgians. Later in the same year her old advisers, Palmella, Terceira, and Saldanha were overthrown by a party calling themselves the Septembrists, who desired to restore the constitution of 1822. Once more, in 1842, Pedro's Charter was re-established by the efforts of Costa Cabral, and this minister ruled the country till 1846 with almost autocratic authority. In that year a rebellion broke out which was only put down by the arrival of a British fleet at Lisbon and by the operations of a British force against Oporto (1847).

From this digression from the main narrative we must return to the situation in Spain at the accession of Queen Isabel. The attempt must be made to furnish the reader with some preliminary assistance towards understanding the long political strife which raged in that distracted country for nearly half a century with all the baffling incoherence of comic opera. It must never be forgotten under what circumstances Spain first attempted to remodel her ancient institutions. The progressive party, by whichever of its many names we choose to call it, was born in an atmosphere of war and revolution. The leaders were obliged to act or to perish with a lamentable lack of experience to guide their actions, and their ideas were crude, pedantic, and unpractical. By the greatest misfortune Spain presented at the time a free field for experiment, and the Constitution of 1812 embodied in a concrete form the ideas of the time, and became for a long while the palladium of the party. Hence the continuity of an unpractical type of statesmanship. Constitutional movements had been twice over, in 1814 and 1823, savagely suppressed. From this time onwards Spanish politics display an uncompromising party spirit happily unique. Spanish parties, outdoing even the stern one-sided dogmatism of the national character, fought not to conquer but to annihilate. The day came when the throne of an infant queen needed the support of the new ideas against all the forces of tradition arrayed under the banner of Carlos. But a cordial alliance was never possible. The aggressive and destructive character of Spanish Liberalism would have reduced the Crown to a shadow, and provoked reaction by its attacks on institutions which were part of the national life. On the other hand, the progressive groups having tasted complete freedom of action could be content with nothing less. Hence the third characteristic of Spanish history is the oft-recurring combination between the Crown and the moderate elements, who found themselves driven into supporting measures which were not of their choice by the violence of the extreme factions. Our own political experience would prepare us to expect the early triumph of the popular forces. This was not the case in Spain. The progressives won constant victories, but were never able to control the government, partly because the majority of the nation were apathetic, or persistently on the other side, partly on account of the enormous power of manipulating the elections possessed by the ministry in office. Thus it happened that the point of attack for the party out of power was always the ministry and not the constituencies. The normal action of constitutional systems was reversed, and the golden rule for success became first to overthrow the ministers, afterwards to secure a majority. The means of attack lay always ready to hand in the violence of the city mobs, usually in sympathy with the extremists, and in the

so-called *pronunciamentos* of sections of the army under the influence of ambitious generals. These were the common features of every political crisis. The personal character of all these struggles is to be accounted for by the fact that those who took part in them looked to the salaries and spoils of office for their daily bread, and that changes of Government produced changes of *personnel* in every civil and military employment. Lastly, the lack of permanence in party combinations and the tendency to split into faction is explained by remembering that the beaten party were scarcely represented, owing to the influence exercised at elections, and that the victors had none of the stimulus to united action afforded by a vigorous opposition.

If the regent Cristina ever hoped to retain Ferdinand's absolute authority the pressure of the Carlist rising soon undeceived her. In 1834, she called the moderate liberal statesman Martinez de la Rosa to power, and by his advice proclaimed a constitution known as the "Royal Statute." It provided for a Parliament of two Chambers, the Upper to consist of dignitaries nominated by the Crown, the Lower of "proctors," appointed in each province by two commissioners, themselves elected by the notables of the district. Their discussions were limited to matters laid before them by Royal authority, and the Regent reserved the right of summoning and dissolving them at her pleasure. While the Chambers violently debated the restrictions thus imposed upon them the attention of Europe was concentrated on the Carlist war.

The chief seat of the rising was in the Basque provinces of the western Pyrenees, and the ancient kingdom of Navarre. These mountainous districts had always enjoyed exceptional privileges known as *fueros*, and it was in defence of these, which they rightly regarded as menaced by the levelling and centralising tendencies of the recent revolutions, rather than from any personal devotion to Carlos, that they had flown to arms. The Spanish customs frontier had always been drawn south of their districts, and they had thus enjoyed the advantages of free trade with France and all the profits of an active smuggling traffic with central Spain. Their villages and towns had possessed rights of self-government unknown elsewhere in the Peninsula. It was clear that bankrupt and distracted Spain would endure such exceptions no longer.

The secluded mountain valleys and difficult passes of the country, the active and hardy habits of the people offered all the conditions necessary for conducting a successful guerilla war, and the ideal leader was found in Zumalacarregui, formerly a colonel in the Spanish army. In league with all the inhabitants, the Carlist bands would disappear before the Spanish troops into the fastnesses of the hills, to emerge again in some well-conducted raid or disastrous surprise. Unable to keep their prisoners they slew all whom they caught, and the war was disgraced by hideous reprisals on both sides, till a British Commissioner, Lord Elliott, succeeded in bringing about a convention which for a while imposed some restraint upon such ferocity. Foremost in these atrocities was Ramon Cabrera, who had kindled rebellion further east in the mountains of Catalonia.

General after general came against the rebels, failed, and was recalled. Invasion in force only led to surprises and disasters; the attempt of Mina to imitate guerilla methods was too slow for the patience of the Government; even the defensive blockade of the Ebro failed to protect the loyal provinces from desolating raids. The only gleam of success in the first two years of the war was the repulse of an attempt to capture Bilbao, undertaken against Zumalacarregui's judgment, in which the guerilla chief sustained a mortal wound. Harassed at home by the attacks of the *Progressistas*, the *Moderado* Government at length appealed to France (1835).

The French Government approached Palmerston under the terms of the Quadruple Alliance. But already divergences had made themselves visible between the allies. The

influence of the French Embassy guided by Louis Attitude of Philippe's family relationship with the Regent, had been used on the side of the *Moderados*, while English policy, directed by Palmerston's sympathies, had favoured the *Progressistas*. England was most unwilling to see a French invasion of the Peninsula, and Louis Philippe was told that if he acted he must act alone. Thiers was still urgent for intervention. He had strongly opposed Broglie's common action with England in dealing with Mehemet Ali, and he suspected, not unjustly, that Palmerston wished to secure an advantageous commercial treaty from Spain. But the ministers and the King were alike determined to take no risks, and France declined to act.

Attacked at home and without hope of assistance from abroad, the Regent was thus driven to accept the advice of the *Progressistas*. Accordingly they came into power in September, under Mendizabal, a self-confident financier of Jewish extraction, who was acceptable to England. He unhesitatingly declared himself able to avert impending bankruptcy and to finish the war by a wholesale confiscation of Church property. He was taken at his word, but his operations left the State not a penny the richer, and he was glad to escape from an impossible situation (1836). Meantime, the Carlists, changing their tactics, began a series of raids extending almost to the gates of Madrid.

The fall of Mendizabal had discredited himself, but not his party. The attempt of the Regent to keep the *Moderados* in power under Isturiz brought matters to a climax. At her summer residence of La Granja her own bodyguard, under the command of a sergeant named Gomez, dictated terms to their captive mistress, and brought her a prisoner to Madrid in the middle of August. In the preceding March Thiers had been called to power in France, to deliver the King from the tyranny of his Doctrinaire ministers. He had warned Palmerston of the intention of France to act alone, and he now announced that a French army would enter Spain to co-operate against the Carlists. The King without a word inserted a contradiction in the official Gazette, and the minister resigned in bitter indignation (Sept. 1836).

Meantime, the victorious party, calling together a Cortes under the Constitution of 1812, proved surprisingly conciliatory. The new Constitution of 1837 was accepted with the approval of all the wiser heads on both sides, providing that the Upper Chamber should be nominated by the Regent from a list presented to her, and that the Lower should be elected by constituencies of 50,000 persons apiece. Yet while the position of the throne had undoubtedly been strengthened, the darkest hour for the fortunes of Queen Isabel was still to come. Two Carlist expeditions, one headed by the Pretender himself, struck resolutely south, and concentrated within sight of Madrid. But the city gave no sign of welcome, and Carlos, who seems to have expected that Cristina would be prepared to come to terms to escape from the clutches of her advisers, gave the order to retreat.

His cause was ruined. He had demonstrated his inability to conquer Spain. The Basques were weary of war, and hoped to combine the blessings of peace with the retention of their prized fueros. The priests and courtiers who surrounded Carlos thwarted and alienated the men who led his armies, and, of these latter, Maroto was already in negotiation with Espartero the deliverer of Bilbao, who had just restored discipline among the Regent's troops by drastic methods. The allegiance of the Carlist general had long been wavering. He had shot some of his rivals, and had been summoned before Carlos to answer for his conduct. He came with his troops at his back, and secured an effusive commendation of his acts which did not blind him to his danger. His master having refused to accept the mediation of France and England, he took matters into his own hands. At Vergara, in August, 1839, he came to terms with Espartero. In 1840, Cabrera, after prolonging a desperate resistance, crossed the frontier into France.

But Cristina's troubles were not over. She had still to reckon with the successful

general now styled Duke of the Victory. His sympathies were known to be with the *Progressistas*, and he had already compelled the Government to weaken the forces commanded by his rival, Narvaez, and ultimately to dismiss him. Extremely ambitious, he was irresolute in action, and it was his habit never to declare himself till issues were already decided. The elections under the new Constitution had produced a Chamber which, with one exception, was unanimously "progressive," while the ministry belonged to the other party. Cristina would willingly have submitted to direction from Espartero, but he never moved. She took her own line and secured the return of a new chamber of *Moderado* opinion. To guard for all future time against disasters at the polls, it undertook to modify the municipal law which controlled the appointment of the town councillors who managed the elections. Espartero protested, Cristina for the moment hesitated, and together they visited Barcelona. But here her mind changed, for Espartero showed no wish to stand between her and the abusive hostility of the faction which supported him, and she signed the modified law. The general, following his instinct, "played to the gallery." He resigned all his offices. A Junta proclaimed itself at Madrid, and acted in his name. Waver as he might between the Regent's orders to repress the rebellion and the Junta's invitation to Madrid, he could no longer refuse to declare himself. To Madrid he went, and became in a moment the tool of his allies. Rather than submit to their terms, Cristina abdicated (Oct., 1840). For three years Espartero was to dominate Spanish politics.

The events in Spain just described had put a severe strain on the *entente*, but since Louis Philippe, in defence of his own cautious foreign policy, had rid himself of the militant Thiers, the activities of his Government had been directed into other channels. A period began, unfortunately too short to produce permanent results, full of promise for the peace of the country and the stability of the dynasty. Guizot had again been called to office, but, finding his advice subordinated to that of his colleague Mole, made haste to escape from a situation which wounded his dignity (March, 1837). For the next two years Mole, formerly an official of the Empire and an ex-doctrinaire, directed French policy with the cordial co-operation of the King. The new minister boldly professed himself an opportunist, declaring that "the spirit which should animate a government is one which meets circumstances as they arise without regard to prejudices based upon the past."

The circumstances in which he found himself were, in fact, widely different from those of 1830, little as the Doctrinaires allowed themselves to recognise the change. The Republican party had largely abandoned its militant and pedantic attitude, and had devoted itself to the study of social questions and to schemes for improving the lot of the working classes. The Legitimists had abandoned politics altogether, and were engaged through the Church and the Press in promoting new ideals of life and character. Mole realised that repression had had its day, and boldly set himself to conciliate the old foes of the July monarchy. The Republican leaders were amnestied, and graceful concessions to religious feeling, such as the reopening of St. Germain l'Auxerrois, were offered to the other party. The growing prosperity of the country seconded his schemes. Debt was discharged, and extensive plans of railway development and contracts for public works gave steady employment to labour. The industrial revolution was working for peace.

While the *entente* was not abandoned, French influence no longer depended upon English co-operation, nor was it exercised systematically upon the popular side. France and Austria drew together, a combination long desired by Louis Philippe, as a check upon Russian menace and English patronage, and as a guarantee of the "legitimacy" of the Orleanist monarchy. When the Austrian troops withdrew from their advanced positions in Italy, the French also withdrew from Ancona. French influence was used to good purpose in Greece in support of the Government of King Otho, and in the final stage of the Belgian question rendered invaluable support to Leopold against the extreme claims of Holland.

Meantime, the minister, who had declared that “the blood of Frenchmen was their own,” was building up a new Empire for France round the nucleus of the foothold which Charles X had won in Algiers. The work was carried on in the face of the insistent demand of England for evacuation and of much ignorance and ill-will in France, where the enterprise was regarded as a dissipation of energies which could have been more gloriously employed in Europe. Ever since the report of a commission sent out in 1834, two policies had been in the field, that of General Clauzel supported by Thiers, which advocated the conquest of the whole country, and that adopted by Soult’s ministry, which decided to restrict permanent settlement to the coast-line. The latter had resulted in emboldening the Arabs under Abd-el-Kader, in the defeat of the French at Macta (1835), and in a series of expensive punitive operations. Mole decided on a compromise. With the support of the colonial party the city of Constantine was taken, and Marshal Valée set to work to organise a French territory of manageable extent.

All this while the opposition in the Chamber grew more bitter. The political leaders could never forgive Mole for rescuing the King from their dictation. Agreed in little else, they denounced the Crown for personal government and the minister for servility. But to raise an outcry for the revival of repression promised small success. Aided by the growing popularity of the Napoleonic Legend, they combined on the question of the “National honour.” In January, 1839, Molé succeeded in repelling an Address to the King on this subject by a narrow margin of thirteen, and a dissolution brought back his opponents in a majority. The ministry resigned. It was the crisis in the fortunes of the July Monarchy.

The question of the “National honour ” was to expose France to a rebuff of a kind to which she was peculiarly sensitive. For a long time past the Czar Nicholas had been labouring for a good understanding with England. He had taken pains to deny Russian complicity in a Persian advance on Herat, in 1838, and he had sent his son Alexander to England, where his gracious personality had made a pleasant impression.

It had long been clear that the Eastern question was about to be reopened in an acute form. The Sultan had never forgiven Mehemet Ali, and there was much to tempt him to make an effort to recover what he had lost. His troops had been reorganised under German officers, and twice over the surrendered Pashaliks had burst into rebellion against the military conscription and the trading monopolies enforced by the Egyptians. Fear, and an impending commercial treaty between the Sultan and England, impelled Mehemet Ali in the same direction. Both sides tried to secure the favour of the Powers, both were warned to keep the peace. At last the Sultan’s hatred outran his discretion. In April, 1839, Hafiz Pasha was ordered to cross the Euphrates.

The Turkish power collapsed like a house of cards under the combined influence of incompetence and treachery. Hafiz was utterly overthrown by Ibrahim at Nessib, while Ahmed Pasha carried the fleet to Alexandria and surrendered it to Mehemet Ali. Mahmoud did not live to see the ruin of his hopes, and the advisers of his youthful son Abdul-Mejid at once opened negotiations with the victorious Egyptians. France and England, however, were cordially united in a determination to play such a part in the settlement as might result in diminishing the exclusive influence which Russia had enjoyed since Unkiar Skelessi. Accordingly, at their instance, all five Powers drew up a common note announcing that they had arrived at a decision, and demanding the suspension of hostilities. In reality, of course, the actual decision had yet to be made, and Palmerston did well in urging that the Powers should avoid possible misunderstandings by making all future representations in common.

Such caution was particularly important in view of the divergent opinions of England and France. Palmerston justly held that no peace could be durable till Mehemet Ali had been securely confined within his Egyptian dominions, while France saw in the development

and extension of his rule a desirable counterpoise to English sea-power in the Mediterranean. Nicholas was quick to notice the divergence. He believed that the opportunity for the long-desired understanding had come and sent Baron Brunnow to London with proposals which surprised Palmerston. The Czar offered to accept any reasonable solution that England might propose for the existing complication, to abandon the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, to act in concert with the other Powers in his future dealings with Turkey, and to sanction the closing of the Bosphorus as well as the Dardanelles in time of war, so that Russia should be in no better position than others for striking at Constantinople. To this understanding Austria, under the terms of Munchengratz, gave her assent, and was followed by Prussia.

It remained to be seen what France would do; and, since she was clearly in disagreement with the understanding arrived at, her best course would have been to retract her adhesion to the original joint note and to retire. Instead of doing so she proceeded to strive for terms which were utterly opposed to the principles which the other Powers accepted. Nevertheless, attempts were made to secure her co-operation. Palmerston suggested the addition of the province of Acre, but without the fortress, to the Pasha's Egyptian dominions; he proposed a conference of the Five Powers to reopen the whole discussion; he was prepared in the last resort to accept the Austrian suggestion to concede the fortress of Acre itself. France was irreconcilable, and her action became all the more decisive from the moment that Thiers came into office, eager for a diplomatic triumph, and confident that the Powers were not in a position to coerce Ibrahim. Clearly he should now have broken with the Allies and have allowed matters to take their course. He did not do so.

As a result he soon found himself in an extremely false position. Khosrew, the Grand Vizier, Mehemet Ali's old enemy, had fallen from power, and the event encouraged the Pasha to open direct negotiations for a settlement with Constantinople through the French Consul-General. This action Thiers was misguided enough to approve, and directed Guizot, the ambassador in London, to gain time, while empowering him to deny French connection with the negotiations.

Never was statesman more effectively hoist with his own petard. Guizot had to listen indignantly to what he described as a "mortal affront." Palmerston read him a long statement setting forth that in consequence of the action of France the other Powers had been obliged to act alone. France had to all intents and purposes been banished from the council-table of Europe. It is difficult to give an idea of the excitement at Paris. War fever rose to a dangerous height, military preparations were actively begun, while Thiers was loudly appealing to the memories of the Revolution and of the Empire, and threatening to tear in pieces the settlement of 1815. Once more the habitual caution of Louis Philippe preserved the peace, but this time at the risk of the stability of his throne. He declared himself unable to adopt the language in which his minister had couched the King's speech to the Chambers. Thiers instantly resigned, and from that moment, in spite of much wild talk, the crisis was at an end.

Meantime, the Allies had made haste to deal with Mehemet Ali. By the Convention of London, he was to have Egypt as a hereditary pashalik, with the addition of Syria and of Acre along with its fortress if he submitted in ten days. Relying upon French aid, he answered with a jaunty refusal. It was then seen how ill Thiers had calculated the Egyptian power of resistance. Beirut was bombarded, and its fall was the signal for all Syria to break into revolt. Acre surrendered to the Allies, and in November Admiral Napier appeared before Alexandria and forced the unwilling Pasha to accept the Convention, by which he was recognised as hereditary ruler of Egypt, while he was deprived of all his Syrian conquests.

The Powers, anxious to save the face of France, now signed a Protocol setting forth the closure of the incident, and having done so, invited Louis Philippe to join in adhering to

the “Convention of the Straits” by which the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus were to be closed to ships of war (1842).

Nevertheless, for the moment the incident seemed to have altered the balance of Europe. The entente appeared to be dead, while the future seemed to hold out the hope of a mutual understanding between England and Russia.

CHAPTER XII

THE DECLINE OF THE JULY MONARCHY

IN the midst of the fierce national spirit called out by the crisis of 1840 and the excited patriotic harangues of the Chamber, the July Monarchy appeared to be already tottering to its fall. Nevertheless, though materially weakened by the convulsion, the fabric was to stand yet another eight years, and to collapse under the impact of very different forces. The King had, in fact, succeeded in setting the apparent wishes of the nation and of his advisers at defiance. That he was able to do so was due to the fact that the *bourgeoisie*, who constituted the electorate and commanded the majority in the Chambers, could not afford to push their difference of opinion with the monarchy to extremes, without playing into the hands of the Republican party and bringing about the drastic political revolution from which the accession of Louis Philippe had originally secured them. Beneath a cloud of brave words Soult's ministry followed the King's pacific policy, and when Guizot came into power later in the year its permanence was assured.

Nevertheless, in fact, if not in appearance. Louis Philippe had not dictated his own terms. He had been a party to a bargain in which he had surrendered as much as he had gained. Already, in 1839, he had been tween the crown forced to abandon Molé, and with him any attempt at conciliating disaffected elements at home. The crisis of the succeeding year made his renunciation final. Measures directed to the relief of working-class discontent were not to be looked for from his new advisers; and any attempt to enlarge the franchise or to alter the balance of political power (changes which alone could force them to modify their attitude), promised at the same time to bring his government under the influence of forces tending to impel it in the direction of the adventurous foreign policy which he dreaded. Advancing years, moreover, had weakened his will, and a growing absorption in the prospects of his family had dulled his personal interest in affairs of State.

Thus, on a superficial view, the situation of 1830 seemed to have come back. The King and the propertied classes were necessary to one another. Never, perhaps, were they more so; for a glance below the surface will reveal the fact that neither the person of the King nor the policy of the dominant party was any longer necessary to the country. In 1830 Louis Philippe had seemed to stand between France and the violent interference of Europe in her internal affairs, an interference prompted by the nervous dread of a second outburst of revolutionary doctrine propagated by the sword. Ten years had served to calm the fears on both sides. The crisis of 1830 had left the settlement of Vienna intact, belying all the gloomy forebodings of contemporaries, while the conduct of the Powers ever since, and especially at the critical period of the Eastern Question, had made it evident to all thoughtful Frenchmen that no interference was to be expected in the internal affairs of France. Even in her dealings with questions of foreign policy a considerable measure of forbearance could be counted upon; while anything like a standing combination against her had long ceased to exist.

Thus, the time seemed to have come when the nation might reassert its former position in Europe, and with the opportunity there had come the definite wish to do so. Time had blurred the harsh features of the Napoleonic Era, its glories only shone the more golden through the mists. The audacious misrepresentation of history, which had its origin in the conversations of the Emperor at St. Helena, was being popularised by the pen of Thiers in his "History of the Consulate and of the Empire," and inspired much of the poetry of Victor

Hugo, Lamartine, and Beranger. Even the government paid homage to the Napoleonic cult, and it was with their full consent that in 1840 the remains of the national hero were brought back to France and solemnly interred beneath the dome of the Invalides. Frenchmen saw in Mehemet Ali the successor to Napoleon's Egyptian policy, and in England the traditional enemy intent on depriving them for the second time of a foothold in the East. Men of spirit dreamed dreams of the Rhine and of the Nile, and cursed the dullness and caution of their rulers.

Yet to dullness and to caution their rulers were bound by iron necessity. To stand alone meant inglorious inaction or revolutionary activity. The nation would not tolerate the one, the government dared not risk the other. The choice of allies was limited. Nicholas would have no dealings with a revolutionary government, even if the French people could have ever consented to touch the hand of the oppressor of Poland. Austria, tied to her engagements with the Czar and with Prussia, and weakened by increasing embarrassments, had little of advantage to offer, and any understanding with her must carry with it the virtual renunciation by France of all claim to interfere in Italy. There remained England. Allied with England, France avoided the slur of isolation, while retaining her independence. No definite agreement was required of her, only an understanding, but an understanding most fatal in the sequel to the popularity of the government who promoted it, for it was required of France that she should act with just that caution which in her existing mood she found insufferable. "La France s'ennuie," said Lamartine, and in France such symptoms were ominous.

Even in its home policy and in the eyes of the classes whose interests were its exclusive study, the principles of the Orleanist regime appeared to have lost the imperative necessity which they had seemed to wear in the days of Casimir Périer. The security of the propertied classes had dulled their sense of personal concern in the barriers which guarded their monopoly of power. The teaching of the new Ultramontane Catholicism which looked to Rome, separated at length from the exiled dynasty, was winning its way among the well-to-do and dividing them in sympathy from a government which maintained the Concordat, and which, by retaining the State control of education, bore hardly upon all teaching of a distinctively religious character. Yet another section, occupied exclusively in the new opportunities for money-making opened up by the rapid industrial development of the country, had come to treat politics with indifference as the province of professional politicians.

Outside the charmed circle of the electorate there was discontent enough. The smaller *bourgeoisie*, who had shared in the general prosperity, were beginning to resent their exclusion, and possessed a weapon which could not fail to be dangerous if party strife should pass from the Chambers to the street. For from this class the National Guard was principally recruited. It was a sign of the times that the small Republican minority among the deputies led by Odilon Barrot, abandoning extreme claims for the time being, was throwing all its energies into a demand for an extension of the franchise. To our present ways of thinking it may appear that the government in rejecting the demand threw away a golden opportunity of founding their system on a broader basis. In reality, at home as well as abroad, they were in the grasp of a compelling fate. They dared not lower the franchise, for if they did, what became of the boasted perfection of their "Just Mean," their ideal compromise between despotism and democracy? A new arrangement could scarcely be declared perfect in its turn, and once altered, why should not the system be altered again?

Hitherto we have spoken as though the deputies within the Chamber itself were tolerably unanimous. This was very far from being the case. Opposed to the group known as the Right Centre, which supported Guizot and the government, was the Left Centre, or following of Thiers. Divided more by personal rivalries than by any other cause, neither of

the two leaders gained a compact and steady following in the Chamber, while both bid for the support of a neutral and unenterprising majority known as the *Ventre legislatif*, which could never make up its mind to abandon Guizot's policy of peace, while sympathising with and even supporting Thiers in his denunciations of particular surrenders of national *prestige*. It is not surprising that Thiers came gradually to seek more whole-hearted allies in the Extreme Left, encouraging their demand for an extended franchise, while Guizot, Protestant as he was, fell back upon the support of the Catholic Right, and held out hopes of greater liberty for education on religious lines. To the *ventre* he could offer more solid attractions in the shape of posts in government service, and ill-disguised corruption became more and more the mainstay of his authority.

But when at length the catastrophe arrived it was not any one of the elements of opposition yet noticed which generated the force to overthrow the mined and nodding structure. We are now to witness the operation of the first wave of those new tides which the Industrial Revolution had set flowing round the base of ancient political coasts. Here in Paris, for the first time and for the moment only, the socialistic ideal appears as a power for statesmen to reckon with.

The changes which have been traced in our third chapter had created two new classes, the wage-earning artisans and the capitalists, and the contemplation of either of these sections of society gave to thoughtful and sympathetic minds matter for serious uneasiness. The squalid and miserable surroundings in which the life of the one was passed, intensified from time to time by periods of unemployment or low wages, during which the sacrifice of all that made human life worth living failed even to secure the bare means of subsistence, aroused a passionate conviction that these men and women had the right to exist, and to exist under conditions less intolerable. The growing wealth of the other class, often the result of no visible personal effort, stirred an indignant dissatisfaction at the unfairness of the advantages which it derived from enterprises in which both capital and labour played their part, and awoke the demand that the workers should enjoy a proportionate share of what their toil had helped to win. And with a growing sense of the helplessness of such sympathies in the grasp of economic law, the feeling spread that these evils were due to a faulty organisation of society, organised long since in a manner quite unsuited to the conditions of the new age. This conviction has then and since given birth to the counter-claim that society should be reorganised on lines which take account of little else save the conditions of industrial production.

It is unnecessary to say that schemes for the redistribution of the material advantages of life according to some rule of ideal justice, instead of leaving them to the operation of chance and of self-interest, are well-nigh as old as the world itself. They have been very various in character, and it would serve no purpose to trace back their history beyond the commencement of our period. During the Revolution Babeuf had proposed that all property should be transferred to the State, and had paid for a suggestion so little in accord with the ideas of the time with his head. But the socialistic views of the first quarter of the nineteenth century were of a very different type. They were for the most part the conceptions of thinkers and philanthropists, and addressed themselves to the reason and to sentiments of benevolence. They differed from later theories in two important respects. Their authors did not for the most part contemplate a complete reconstruction of society at large, but only a transformation of industrial relations, in which the claims of labour were to receive a fair recognition side by side with capital. Moreover, this result was to be achieved rather by attracting the spontaneous support of the wealthy than by the compulsory action of the State. The generous-minded French nobleman, St. Simon, who died in 1825, did indeed demand that the State should undertake the formation and control of associations in which a proper share of the rewards of industry should be assured to all who took part, but he laid great stress upon the work of the Church in winning over mankind to a new view of the

duties owed to their fellows. His younger contemporaries, Fourier in France, and Robert Owen, a self-made manufacturer, in England, distrusted State interference altogether. The former looked to the voluntary combination of groups of families, which he called "phalanxes," to be brought into existence with the help of benevolent capitalists. They were to own in common all the means of production, and to produce among themselves all that their members could require. The results of their combined efforts were to be shared according to a fixed proportion, a due reward being allotted to the labourer, to the capitalist, and to the directors of labour severally. Owen's plans were very similar. He had already started in his own factories at New Lanark all manner of institutions for the education, comfort, and recreation of his workpeople, as well as an arrangement by which each received a share of the general profits of his ventures. He rested his hopes for the future on the gradual division of the country into "parallelograms," within each of which every man would share in the ownership of all that was necessary to common enterprises, would contribute his capacity to the common efforts and share in the fruits of the common toil.

It is not surprising, then, that springing from such beginnings socialistic demands had as yet made no appearance in the field of practical politics. But another school of opinion was coming into being during the thirties and forties, animated by a new bitterness against the existing framework of society, and holding much more uncompromising views, of which Proudhon's assertion that "all property is theft," and Leroux's demand for complete state ownership are fair examples. These theorists, propagating their doctrines through pamphlets and reviews, were far from being either consistent or definite in their principles. Their work had, however, another side. Addressing themselves to the working classes they set forth in fragmentary suggestions a whole programme of benefits to be secured for labour, which, taken together, includes almost all that their successors have since demanded. These were caught up and discussed in such secret societies as that of "The Seasons." But among all who professed such doctrines, there was but one prominent politician, Louis Blanc, and it was through his articles in *La R forme*, and ultimately through his practical efforts, that the claims of the working classes were presented in the form of "the Right to Work," and the "Organisation of Industry."

Of these underground workings the government took small account. The crisis of 1840 and the heartburnings which it left behind made the question of foreign policy the one question of paramount interest in the Chamber. Guizot loudly charged Thiers with having brought humiliation upon France by his aggressive policy, while he himself sought small occasions for proving to the country that the ministry were eager for the maintenance of the national honour. On each of these occasions he found in Thiers an unscrupulous critic, ever ready to declare that the credit of France was being sacrificed to a policy of peace at any price, and striving to push the ministry beyond the bounds of prudence.

The conclusion of a new convention dealing with the Right of Search, exercised by war vessels for the suppression of the slave trade, put the government at an initial disadvantage. In 1830 France and England had agreed to concede this right to one another, stipulating that it should be exercised by a like number of vessels commissioned by either Power, with the object of limiting any preponderance which the size of her navy might give to England. It was now suggested that the other three great Powers should become parties to the arrangement, and a new Convention was drafted accordingly; but, as Prussia possessed practically no fleet at all, it was no longer possible, by putting a limitation upon the number of ships detailed for the service by each Power, to secure at once efficient action and equality of authority. The new convention therefore proposed no limit upon the number of ships to be employed by any of the parties to the agreement. It was accordingly represented as a betrayal of French maritime influence to England, and Guizot was forced by the attitude of the Chamber to promise that it should not be ratified (1842).

In domestic affairs he was for the time being well able to hold his own. His immense scheme for railway construction, by which, while the State acquired the land for the enterprise, the actual laying and working of the lines was left to private companies, won him the support of the classes represented in the Chamber. It is true that he failed to realise the danger of connecting Paris with the other centres of industrial discontent, but this danger was not to become serious for many years.

Before the year 1842 was out the government had weathered a second crisis. The Duke of Orleans, the heir to the throne, met his death by an accident, and it was evident that on the demise of Louis Philippe, a Regency would be necessary during the childhood of his grandson. The case had not been provided for by the changes of 1830, and the government proposed to allow the Salic Law, designating the nearest male, under the Charter of 1814, to hold good. Thiers would willingly have opposed, but his hands were tied. If one article of the Charter could be revised so could all, and the "Just Mean," which he no less than Guizot was concerned in defending, might perish in the process.

But Guizot was well aware that it was by his foreign policy that he would be judged in the Chamber, and it was by his foreign policy that he was determined to justify his government. He now directed all his energies to the revival of the "Entente Cordiale," with a great dynastic and diplomatic triumph for France in view. This was nothing less than the marriage of the young Queen of Spain to a French prince. Without the friendly neutrality of England the enterprise would be difficult, but he believed it to be not impossible to secure the goodwill of the English Foreign Minister, Lord Aberdeen. For the moment, however, the situation in Spain was not encouraging. Never had French influence stood lower at Madrid. The revolution which had driven Queen Cristina, always well-disposed towards Louis Philippe, from the Regency, had left the face of the country dotted with the independent insurrectionary juntas in which, from the time of the Napoleonic occupation, popular commotion had normally expressed itself. The junta at Madrid had succeeded through the able lawyer, Manuel Cortina, in securing the countenance of the popular military hero of the hour, General Baldomero Espartero, round whose great name it was hoped that all the ill-led and divergent local factions might be induced to rally. This was precisely the part which the general's own self-importance and his inability or unwillingness to give a definite lead made particularly acceptable to him. By his aid the juntas were gradually induced to give place to the provisional authority of the progressist ministry which the Regent had recently accepted, not without some heart-burning on the part of the more uncompromising spirits. It would have been well if a similar process of painless extinction could have been applied to the greater part of the army, which drained the resources of the State and shared with the local juntas an evil pre-eminence among the agencies of revolution. But while it was easy enough to discharge the rank and file, the authorities had bound themselves to employ those Carlist officers who had submitted, and could scarcely deal less generously with their own supporters. Well aware how grudgingly the burden of their pay was endured, these officers were ready for any enterprise which might secure their position against retrenchment.

As soon as the Cortes met, the question of the Regency came up for decision, and revealed a wide difference of opinion between the authors of the revolution and their military protector. A commission of three was proposed and was indignantly rejected by Espartero. He could not yet be spared, and in face of his threat to withdraw entirely from politics, he had his wish, and was installed as sole Regent (May, 1841). Eager to enjoy the reality as well as the appearance of power, he accepted the resignation of the ministers, and chose his advisers among men who had played no great part in the recent movement. His action was singularly unwise. He succeeded at the same time in alienating Cortina and some of his ablest supporters, and in assuming a more direct and personal responsibility for difficulties which might well have appalled a man of much greater insight and more resolute

purpose than himself.

Of these, much the most serious was the uncompromising attitude of Queen Cristina. She had taken refuge in France, where she enjoyed the unconcealed sympathy of the government, and had lost no time in issuing a passionate protest against the proceedings which had separated her from her daughter". Her line of attack against the new Regency was cleverly chosen. Her claim to stand by the side of her child appealed to elementary human instincts, and the revolutionary government confessed its own weakness when it surrounded the unhappy Isabel, to guard her against rival influences, with tutors and governors of unimpeachable progressist views, under whose forbidding rectitude the wayward girl fretted. It was soon perfectly clear that the authority of Espartero and his advisers depended upon retaining in their own hands the person of the sovereign in whose name they professed to act, and might be overturned at any moment by rescuing her from their clutches. The agents for such an enterprise were easily to be found in the army. Already in several places ill-managed military outbreaks had taken place, and in October, 1841, General Concha ventured upon the bold attempt to carry Isabel off from her residence on the western outskirts of Madrid under cover of the night. He had actually succeeded in penetrating into the palace, and had nearly beaten down the unexpected resistance of the handful of pensioners who were on duty, when the appearance of the "National Militia," or citizen guard of Madrid, forced him to beat a hasty retreat. It was through no energy or foresight on the part of Espartero that the enterprise had miscarried.

Menaced by the continual plots which were hatched across the French frontier, the Regent was forced to lean more and more upon English support. The connection was, however, as much a source of weakness as of strength, and served to arouse the suspicion of the very classes upon whose support his power rested. England eagerly desired a favourable commercial treaty under which her manufactured goods might find a market in Spain. Such a treaty could not fail to be injurious to the interests of native industry, and was a constant source of apprehension to employers and employed, more especially as primitive Spanish methods could not hope to compete with the fully developed factory system of Great Britain.

Equally unfortunate were the measures which were dictated by the financial necessities of the new government. Monastic property had already been confiscated and sold. The State now swooped upon the property of the secular clergy. Rome had never actually recognised Queen Isabel, and relations were already strained when a protest against some of the details of the new measure by the Papal representative led to his expulsion, followed by an open quarrel with his master. Gregory XVI thereupon declared every limitation which had been put upon the rights and privileges of the Church to be null and void. This formal condemnation of the government by Rome alienated another large body of Spanish opinion.

One of the problems bequeathed by the Carlist War was the question of the retention or abolition of the *Fueros* or privileges of the Basques. For the satisfactory settlement of this question Espartero, as the officer who had concluded the convention of Vergara, had made himself peculiarly responsible. The Convention itself had given no guarantees, but the general had promised that all local rights should at least receive favourable consideration. It had been finally decided that the *Fueros* should be respected so far as they were consistent with national unity. That they were highly inconsistent with the working of a centralised government was soon apparent, and again and again they were disregarded in detail. Disorder became rife, and it was only the strict injunctions which Carlos had given to his partisans that they were to do nothing to favour the cause of Queen Cristina which prevented a general revolt. Espartero was obliged to leave Madrid to deal with the situation. He had determined to use the recent disturbances as a pretext for extricating himself from

an ambiguous position between his obligations to the disaffected provinces, and the expectations of the dominant party in Madrid. At Vittoria, he published a decree making a clean sweep of the bulk of the provincial privileges. The local Parliaments lost most of their powers, the administration was assimilated to that of the rest of Spain, and the customs frontier was drawn along the line of the Pyrenees (1841). Welcomed effusively at Madrid as the "Peacemaker," Espartero had won for himself in the northern provinces the steady and undying hatred reserved for a false friend. He had not even served his country at the cost of his personal popularity. The second Carlist War was the direct result of his precipitate and one-sided settlement.

The Regent's failure to act as a moderating influence between contending forces was still more conclusively demonstrated in his dealings with Catalonia. In this province the spirit of local independence was as strong as in the Basque regions. But while the latter found the policy pursued at Madrid too modern and democratic for their tastes, the city of Barcelona, within whose walls Catalan feeling assumed a form unusual even in the neighbouring country districts, condemned the central government as retrograde and despotic. Its busy seafaring and industrial life, its close connection with France, the discontent which had resulted from the loss of the Spanish-American markets, disposed the people to extreme political and social views, and strengthened a desire for freedom to determine their own destinies which had been conspicuous alike in the war of the Spanish Succession and in their half-hearted opposition to Napoleon. The revolution which had brought Espartero to power had raised the highest hopes only to occasion bitter disappointment. A republic and practical independence were as far off as ever, while the dreaded commercial treaty with Great Britain seemed nearer. Other influences were at work. The withdrawal of Cristina's pension and the demand for her removal from France had deeply offended Louis Philippe. The French ambassador was removed from Madrid, and wherever a French Consul was to be found he became an active agent in fomenting discontent. Lesseps, at Barcelona, was the most active of them all. Encouraged by the temporary absence of its captain-general, Van Halen, who had been sent to suppress one of the movements in favour of Cristina, the city elected a local junta, and set about a scheme of town improvement which involved the demolition of part of the citadel. The return of the garrison put a stop to these doings, and popular discontent smouldered, till the proclamation of martial law, as the result of a trifling commotion, led to a general outbreak in which Van Halen was driven to take refuge behind his fortifications. Rural Catalonia, however, did not stir, and the disorder would probably have subsided as easily as on the previous occasion had not the personal intervention of Espartero given it a significance more than local.

The Regent was acutely conscious that public opinion blamed him for a lack of initiative and determination in dealing with the risings of Cristina's partisans, and he intended to take advantage of the disturbances at Barcelona to show that his resolution had been misjudged. He failed entirely to lay to heart the ominous recommendation of the Cortes that he should make use of "legal measures." Rejecting all overtures from the rebels he subjected the city to a day's bombardment, which secured an immediate submission (Dec. 1842). But to the already alienated democratic leaders at Madrid the measures, which they would have applauded if directed against reactionary *Cristinos*, were highly offensive when applied to Catalan democrats. There was nothing, indeed, to prevent their ultimate application to themselves. They determined at all costs to overthrow the Regency.

In a newly-elected Cortes a resolution was carried condemning martial law. This was practically a vote of censure upon Espartero. A general amnesty was granted to all political exiles, which was no less than an open invitation to all his enemies (May, 1843). It was in vain that he dismissed the Lopez ministry, equally in vain that he dissolved the Cortes when they refused to recognise his action. With a unanimity which made an appeal to violence unnecessary, the juntas all over Spain declared against the Regent. The military chiefs of

Cristina's party, Narvaez, Concha, and others, landed at the ports and were welcomed by the discontented officers of the army. After a week or two of painful hesitation and a futile recourse to pathetic proclamations, Espartero at length set out to reduce Andalusia to submission, leaving his enemies free to march into Madrid. Failing to take Seville and rejected by Cadiz, he took refuge on board a British man-of-war, and disappeared for the time being from Spanish politics (July, 1843).

The events just narrated had gone a long way to forward Guizot's dynastic schemes. In return for Louis Philippe's support, Cristina had consented to serve his ambitions, and to sanction the marriage of her two daughters, Isabel and Luisa, to the Dukes of Aumale and Montpensier. Palmerston, however, had objected, and had secured the disavowal of the project in return for an assurance that England on her side would do nothing to push the claims of Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, Queen Victoria's cousin. Guizot was unable to obtain Palmerston's assent to a modification of his proposal by which the marriage of the younger sister to the Duke of Montpensier was to take place without delay, while Isabel's future remained undecided. Not till the succession was assured could England view with equanimity the union of the heiress presumptive to a French prince.

The advent of a Tory ministry to power in 1841 under the guidance of Peel, suggested fresh possibilities. Apart from a promise of commercial advantages, which seemed as far off as ever, the new ministry were not very likely to set much store by the friendship of Spanish *progressistas*. And, when the fall of Espartero put an end for the moment to British influence at Madrid, it seemed not impossible to secure a unanimity of action between England and France very favourable to the interests of the latter.

Accordingly, in 1843, during a State visit paid by Queen Victoria and the Prince Consort to Louis Philippe at the Château d'Eu, it was agreed that Isabel should be free to choose a husband from the Spanish branch of the Bourbons, and that as soon as an heir to the throne should be born the Montpensier marriage should take place. Thus was the restoration of the *Entente Cordiale* proclaimed to the world.

Guizot had now secured an initial advantage, and hoped to lead Lord Aberdeen, who controlled the Foreign Office, still further in the direction of his great scheme. He was, however, sorely embarrassed by the constant attempts of Thiers to force him, in the alleged interests of the "national honour," to inflict petty annoyances upon the patience of his ally. In 1842, Admiral Dupetit Thouars had induced Pomare, Queen of Tahiti, to sign an agreement which virtually placed the island under the protection of France. The English Consul, a missionary named Pritchard, on whose advice Pomare relied, had been absent at the time of the treaty, and succeeded on his return in inspiring the Queen with great dissatisfaction with what had been done. The Admiral proceeded to simplify the situation by a formal annexation and the expulsion of Pritchard. His action was eventually disavowed, but not before loud recriminations had been exchanged between the allied nations over what Louis Philippe justly styled "ces bêtises Tahitiennes." Similar indignation was excited in France by the consent of the government to abandon an adventurous policy in Morocco in deference to British susceptibilities.

In the meantime, affairs in Spain had been marching steadily in the direction of Guizot's hopes. The overthrow of Espartero was the work of a coalition of three not very harmonious elements. The Court party, which looked for guidance to Queen Cristina, the *Moderado* partisans, who wished to undo the revolution of 1840, and the *Progressistas*, who had resented the Regent's autocratic methods, were all able to combine in hostility to his person. Their agreement extended no further, and their real incompatibility was immediately displayed in their one unanimous act. To avoid the inevitable disputes to which the appointment of a new regent would give rise, Isabel's majority, fixed by law at the age of

fourteen, was antedated by a year, and she was declared to have entered upon her full royal authority. But the victorious factions could not yet afford to quarrel, and, by a sort of tacit understanding, each proceeded to establish itself firmly on the ground it already occupied. After the usual series of dismissals and appointments, which characterised every revolution in Spain, the Court party found themselves installed about the Queen's person; the *Moderado* officers and politicians controlled the army, the local governorships, and the Senate; while a progressist ministry under Olozaga, Isabel's late tutor, assumed office with the support of the majority in the Lower House of the Cortes.

It was soon apparent that the real gainers by the revolution were the more reactionary elements. The majority in the Lower House dwindled, and Olozaga's task in preventing the complete reversal of all that had been done during the last three years became daily more difficult. Accordingly, he visited the Queen to procure her signature to a decree dissolving the Cortes. What actually passed will never be known. Under the influence of her personal attendants, Isabel told a strange and incredible story to the effect that her minister had locked the door and set his back against it, and had extracted her signature by actual violence. His dismissal and disgrace immediately followed, and his place was taken by Gonzalez Bravo, an ex-journalist, who had made himself conspicuous by his attacks on Cristina, and by publishing to the world her secret marriage with a corporal of the Royal Guard, named Munoz. He was now ready to atone for his past by the utmost servility, restoring her pension, making her husband a duke, and securing her return to Spain. But the Court faction could not stand alone. It needed the support of public opinion and the services of a stronger man. In 1844, General Ramon Narvaez undertook to form a ministry.

Narvaez deserves more credit than he has generally received from historians. His short, stiff figure and his stern, silent personality were little calculated to win popularity. But he had a real preference for good government, and was alike opposed to the intrigues of the Court and the factiousness of the democratic party. He had none of Espartero's fatal vanity, and was, above all, disinterested. It will scarcely be disputed that he was right in thinking that Spain needed nothing so much as discipline. He was indeed a disciplinarian to the backbone, and it must be freely admitted that his methods were drastic. An apocryphal story relates that on his death-bed, being urged by his confessor to forgive his enemies, he replied that to do so was impossible, for he had shot them everyone. That his name is now connected with mere repression was not entirely his fault. The *Moderado* groups which he protected never succeeded in organising an effective party. He was constantly called to power by the Court to save a hopeless situation, only to find himself shaken off when the storm had passed and his masterful personality began to be felt as a restriction upon corruption and intrigue.

He now set himself to secure a greater stability in the affairs of the country. The finance minister, Mon, introduced a new and more scientific system of taxation, which, while it was the source of much discontent, did something towards relieving the growing burden of debt. Through official pressure and owing to the abstention of the opposing party an overwhelming majority was procured in the new Cortes, one member only styling himself a progressive. Unhampered by opposition, Narvaez was able to proceed to a fresh revision of the Constitution. The Constitution of 1845 provided that the members of the Upper House should be nominated by the Crown, and established a property qualification for a seat in the Lower House. While thus attempting to secure the preponderance of *Moderado* elements in the Cortes, it aimed at putting a check upon the instruments of revolution outside by leaving any enrolment of "National Militia" entirely to the option of the local governors appointed from Madrid, and by considerable restrictions upon the freedom of the Press. Concessions were even offered to Rome in return for the recognition of Queen Isabel's title and of the sales of Church property, which were not, however, immediately accepted.

The critical moment for Guizot's scheme had now arrived. In the restoration of Cristina's influence in Spain he saw his opportunity, but realised that favourable conditions could not be of long duration. The Tory ministry in England was tottering, and he knew that he could count on the determined opposition of Palmerston. Meantime, Thiers had secured the votes of the Left under Odilon Barrot by a promise to support an extension of the franchise, and was already in correspondence with Palmerston. Guizot for the moment maintained his position by guaranteeing the freedom of religious education to the Catholic Right in return for their support, and pressed on his negotiations at Madrid for the marriage of the Duke of Montpensier to the Queen's younger sister.

In Spain itself Isabel's own marriage excited greater interest. It was understood, since the royal meeting at Eu, that her choice must be made from the Spanish branch of the Bourbons. Of the possible candidates, the Count of Montemolin, son and heir of Carlos, was barred by the active opposition of Narvaez, and the same influence seemed likely to be fatal to Cristina's brother, the Count of Trapani, whom she favoured. Of the two sons of the Queen-Mother's sister Carlota, Enrique Duke of Seville, who among all the candidates was best qualified by ability and character, had so miscalculated the future as to make himself the champion of progressist views, while Francisco of Asis, Duke of Cadiz, was known to be unlikely, for physical reasons, to have children to succeed him. Just for this reason he seemed the candidate best adapted to further Orleanist ambitions, by securing the succession to the issue of the Montpensier marriage. Cristina, to her discredit, was ready to abandon Trapani and lend herself to French designs, and the plan for a simultaneous marriage between Francisco and Isabel and between Montpensier and Luisa, though formally denied at another interview at Eu between the sovereigns of England and France (1845), was only postponed by the momentary recovery of the Tory ministry and Guizot's renewed hope of obtaining his object without a rupture of the entente. But the final breach between Narvaez and the Court and the general's consequent retirement in March, 1846, removed a possible obstacle in Spain, while Palmerston's accession to power in June counselled haste. Through the French ambassador Bresson, a final agreement was effected, the formal betrothals took place in August, and the marriages were accomplished in October. To the protests of the British government it was answered, quite untruly, that England had broken the agreement made at Eu by continuing to support the Saxe-Coburg candidate. The *Entente Cordiale* was now finally at an end. The cruel wrong done to Isabel and the duplicity of the French government combined to excite the strongest indignation. Palmerston vowed vengeance, and set himself by every means in his power to thwart and to hamper the policy of Louis Philippe.

It is, however, a mistake to regard the scandal of the Spanish marriages as the death-blow of the Orleans Monarchy. France certainly lost her ally, but a growing community of interest with Austria seemed likely for the next two years to counterbalance the loss.

At home the effects were almost negligible. Guizot did, indeed, entirely fail to secure the prestige he had promised himself by the assertion of the "National honour." The nation viewed the mean intrigue either with indifference or disgust, and refused to recognise a French triumph in a dynastic success for the House of Orleans. But the parties in the Chamber barely suspended their wranglings to notice the event, and the working classes of Paris scarcely averted their eyes for a moment from their grievances. Paris and the Chamber between them were to bring the monarchy to ruin.

CHAPTER XIII

THE AUSTRIAN DOMINATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE

WE have already traced the process by which England, Russia, and France, each following the dictates of its own national interests, had detached themselves successively from that closer union between the great Powers which had momentarily expressed the aspirations of the years which saw the downfall of Napoleon. Austria alone, under the guidance of Metternich, determined by interests and exigencies no less selfish, had been tolerably consistent in wishing to maintain a common guarantee of the status quo in Europe. Her efforts in this direction had been attended with little success. Aided by the countenance of one or more of the three Powers first mentioned, Belgium, Spain, Portugal and Greece had asserted a claim to determine their own destinies in a sense contrary to the Austrian ideal of stability, thus emancipating themselves from the collective tutelage by which Metternich had sought to secure it.

In Italy and in Germany the case was very different. In both these countries Austria enjoyed possessions and an influence which could not but be endangered by the growth of national sentiment or popular institutions. And just as she was constrained to oppose both tendencies within her own composite dominions, as certain to lead to racial strife and disruption, so, by the same law of her being, was she driven to constant intervention outside her own Italian and German districts to guard against movements, which, after eliminating the influence which she exercised beyond her frontiers, might even end in attracting her outlying provinces into new political connections. In Italy no other great Power held a single foot of territory; in Germany, Prussia under Frederick William III was usually disposed to be guided by Vienna. Thus it happened that in a narrower sphere of influence Austria was enabled to give consistent application to the principles which she had failed to establish as the public law of Europe. The revolutionary movements of 1848, often represented as a kind of epidemic spreading over Europe from Paris, were in their essence a spontaneous outburst of all the forces long pent up by the domination of Austria in Italy and in Germany, and the overthrow of Louis Philippe merely gave the occasion for what was already inevitable. The present chapter will attempt to sketch the history of both countries during the quarter of a century which preceded the outbreak.

Metternich once described Italy as a "geographical expression." The Congress of Vienna left the country much as Napoleon had found it, parcelled out among a number of independent governments. There was no federation here or common organisation of any kind. The one unifying principle was the informal influence exercised by Austria. Nor were the divisions of Italy altogether artificial. They corresponded tolerably closely to the physical features of the country, to differences of taste, temperament, history and institutions, and to the various degrees of civilisation existing among the people.

The rich agricultural plain of Lombardy and Venetia, bounded by the Alps, the Po, the Ticino and the Adriatic, and dotted with thriving and busy towns, was under the direct rule of Austria. Alien as it was, a rigid bureaucracy staffed by German officials, the government was probably the best in contemporary Italy. It was effective; it was even-handed in its dealings with individuals and classes; justice, save in political cases, was well administered; education was encouraged; the Press obtained a certain freedom; the clergy were firmly controlled by the State; the country enjoyed a considerable measure of local government on a small scale. There were grave faults, however, inseparable from the alien character of

the administration. It sought to denationalise the province. Lombards and Venetians lived under Austrian law, a system ill-suited to their customs and habits of thought; everything used in the public service was imported from Austria; Austrian history alone was taught in the schools. It was, besides, too dependent upon instructions from Vienna. Its action was therefore invariably slow, and its methods so unadaptable as often to cripple industrial and commercial enterprise. Worst of all, it was suspicious. The trials of political offenders were travesties of justice, a few thoughtless words might consign a man to a life's imprisonment in the Spielberg in far-off Austria, and the *sbirri*, or political police, exercised an irritating espionage on every department of private life. Easy-going as were the Lombards, and pleasure-loving as were the Venetians, the vexatious stupidities of the government and the humiliation of a foreign rule were spreading a growing discontent among the classes to which the Napoleonic occupation had opened careers for talent and ambition.

Southward of the Po the two duchies which occupied the northward slope of the Apennines presented a remarkable contrast. That of Parma, bordering upon the territories of Piedmont, had been granted as a principality to Napoleon's consort, Marie Louise. Here almost the whole apparatus of the French occupation had been maintained—the French Code, the French Concordat, a Council of State on the French model. Education was cared for, there was little espionage, and the people were contented. Eastwards of Parma, Duke Francis IV ruled over the Duchy of Modena. Along with a disposition naturally kindly and well-meaning he possessed all the instincts of a benevolent despot. Unhappily, his benevolence never stood the strain of anything that appeared to threaten his despotic authority. In spite, therefore, of some enlightened measures outside the sphere of politics, he deliberately strengthened every kind of reactionary influence, tolerated every long-standing abuse, and interfered again and again to make the best institutions inoperative for good, thus gaining for himself a reputation as the worst of tyrants.

The Grand Duchy of Tuscany, south and west of the great curve in the Apennines, was ruled by Leopold II, a scion of the House of Hapsburg, whom an Italian satirist has nicknamed "the Tuscan Morpheus." Indeed, in this favoured land there brooded over ruler, government, and people alike a spirit of somnolent, easy-going good nature. Leopold, whose chief interest lay in farming, public works, and the drainage of marshes, left his bureaucratic government to its own devices, and paid little heed to external politics. The officials were too inactive to be tyrannous, the police, however annoying their petty persecutions, were seldom cruel. The law was mild, the Church was kept under restraint, the great landed proprietors were intent on agricultural improvements, the citizens on business and pleasure, and the people generally were contented and comfortable. But the state of the Grand Duchy was too truly described by one of its own patriotic nobles as "Paradise without either the tree of Knowledge or the tree of Life." Closely connected with Tuscany the little Duchy of Lucca maintained an independent existence under the mild despotism of an Austrian duchess.

From the frontier of the Papal States to the southern shore of Sicily misgovernment and corruption reigned supreme. The institutions and government of the Kingdom of Naples had indeed undergone a sweeping reformation on the French model at the hands of its French Kings, Joseph Bonaparte and Joachim Murat. The law was remodelled, feudalism was abolished, monasteries were dissolved, great estates broken up into smaller holdings, a regular system of local government and education was introduced. The restoration of the Bourbon Ferdinand I had left the main fabric untouched. In theory Naples possessed the best institutions in Italy. In practice no better illustration could be found of the powerlessness of laws and institutions alone to confer the blessings of sound government. The dynasty knew no other rule of conduct than its own will. Under the perjured Ferdinand I and the slothful and immoral Francis I the law was disregarded, set aside by exceptional police instructions, or rendered inoperative through the corruptibility of officials. Shrewder than his

father or grandfather, popular even, owing to his sham military tastes, his patriotic talk, and the easy vulgarity of his manners, Ferdinand II, who succeeded to the throne in 1830, was no less a tyrant, if more effective and less contemptible, and was to earn an unsavoury notoriety surpassing theirs as the *Re Bomba*, who laid Messina in ashes.

Nor was the Crown only to blame. In fact, if not in name, the nobles quietly resumed their lost powers and privileges, and exercised them the more unsparingly in that they were based no longer upon custom but on encroachment. Finally, there was in Naples no class strong or united enough to give consistent support from below to institutions whose only strength had resided in the bureaucracy which had imposed them. The capital was at the mercy of the idle starving mob of *lazzaroni*; in the country districts, where roads and drainage were neglected, brigandage alone flourished.

Sicily, united to Naples under the same Crown, in all else stood apart. The fiery, silent, half-savage people of the island detested Neapolitan rule, and bitterly resented the Act of Union of 1816, by which they had been deprived of the Constitution which in 1812 and under English influence had taken the place of the still older forms of self-government dating from the Norman invasions of the eleventh century. While, however, the Neapolitan officials and tax-gatherers were hated impartially by all classes, they were not, perhaps, the worst foes of the prosperity of the island. Feudalism, abolished in name, had never ceased to exist in reality. It was a land of enormous estates belonging to the nobles, where a primitive agriculture struggled here and there in the midst of immense tracts of waste pasture, where roads scarcely existed, and where the peasants were driven by malaria and brigandage to dwell in walled villages often remote from their work. Only among the orange-groves of Palermo and the vineyards of Marsala were the riches of the island turned to account.

North of the Neapolitan frontier the Papal States struck diagonally across the Peninsula in an irregular belt of territory extending from the neighbourhood of Rome to the mouth of the Po. They comprised districts upon both seas ; on the one the Romagna, or southern watershed of the lower valley of the Po, with the Marches of Ancona prolonging the coastline southwards between the Apennines and the Adriatic ; on the other the level country on either side of the Tiber estuary. These two districts were at once divided and connected by the mountainous tract of Umbria. At first sight it seems one of the paradoxes of history that here under the direct rule of the head of the Catholic Church misgovernment and tyranny should have reached their climax in Italy. Yet, on closer consideration, such misgovernment will seem to have been well-nigh inevitable. A rapid succession of rulers of advanced age, elected as the result of complicated intrigues in the College of Cardinals, gave little promise of either a vigorous or a consistent policy. The administration, conducted as it was by clerics or under their supervision, necessarily developed grave faults. It was out of sympathy with secular and material interests. Agriculture, trade, and roads were neglected. By a not unnatural extension of the functions of government in the supposed interests of religion it exercised a prying, minute, and vexatious supervision in matters properly outside its sphere. Nowhere were the policeman and the spy more actively employed. By an easy confusion of mind opposition to and criticism of persons invested with a sacred character assumed the dimensions of impiety. The government became timid and obscurantist. All independence of thought was proscribed; books, ideas, and inventions of any novelty were rigorously excluded. The habit of interference was universal and on the increase. But the government was not merely vexatious, it was also incompetent. It was scarcely to be expected that the narrow training of the clerical seminaries would turn out great statesmen and administrators. There was no organisation, no unity of system, no attempt to replace what was obsolete. Nor was justice even-handed. The Canon law drew cases of the most diverse kind under its own special jurisdiction, and prescribed penalties of exceptional leniency for clerical offenders ; while the ordinary courts, presided over by priests ignorant of the law, were really controlled by their deputies who were amenable to

every kind of corruption. Thrown by its own defects upon the defensive, the government paid no heed to the misdoings of its supporters.

In the hands of men of the highest character such a system could scarcely have succeeded. As it was, corruption and self-seeking were widespread. Men chafed under the regulations of a ruling caste many of whom did not know how to regulate their own lives, and spurned the claims of those who showed but little respect for the sacred basis of their own authority. The police, the Inquisition, and the licensed assassin of the reactionary Sanfedist association alone maintained the government in power.

Italy was indeed in an unhappy case. Everywhere the *sbirri* swarmed. Political, industrial and literary activities were everywhere fettered by obsolete social institutions, and by minute and unintelligent regulation. A growing middle class found its energies everywhere repressed. The governments would not, or dared not, undertake reforms. And behind the governments stood Austria, ready for the sake of peace in her own provinces to guarantee the *status quo* elsewhere and foredooming every revolt to failure. It was truly said that those who still dared to hope for better things “ate Austria in their bread.”

In the little kingdom of Piedmont alone, wedged between Lombardy and the Alps, there existed, along with much that was unpromising, the elements of a healthy national life. It may be granted at once that government was bureaucratic and unprogressive; that the nobles, retaining most of their feudal rights, kept their tenants in abject dependence; that the clergy, though strictly controlled by the State, exercised an unusual amount of disciplinary power over the life of the inhabitants; that the monastic system flourished; that class distinctions were peculiarly rigid; that there was little intellectual life or moral enthusiasm, and that dullness and ignorance characterised every section of society. But geography had not set Piedmont in the path of the warring armies of France and Austria for nothing. The dangers and opportunities of the position had developed in the House of Savoy a breed of hard-working and vigilant rulers, and had imparted to the officials a respect for honest administration and sound finance, to the nobles a strong sense of national duty, and to the people an instinct for obedience rare in Italy. The maintenance of a strong army necessary to the very existence of the State invigorated the administration and served to implant the military virtues in princes and people alike. Nor was self-preservation the only motive at work. The traditional policy of the House of Savoy viewed Lombardy as “an artichoke to be devoured leaf by leaf,” and suggested a natural antagonism to the Austrian occupation, which inspired hopes outside the boundaries of Piedmont itself.

In 1831 Charles Albert Prince of Carignano ascended the Piedmontese throne. We have already described his connection with the attempted revolution of 1821. For his share in that ill-fated movement a deliberate attempt had been made by his cousin and predecessor Charles Felix, to exclude him from the succession with the connivance of Austria, and only the jealousy of the other Powers represented at Verona had defeated the scheme. He was destined to play a conspicuous part in the events which led to the liberation of Italy, a part in which, owing to his peculiar temperament, both his actions and his motives are often difficult to understand. He may be credited with a real sense of royal duty and a desire to serve his people, and his hatred for Austria was whole-hearted, based as it was upon personal no less than national grounds. But, like many well-meaning princes of his time, though ardently desiring the end in view, he had an instinctive distaste for the means which the circumstances of his age offered for its achievement. There was, indeed, little hitherto in the history of popular movements to inspire confidence. Everywhere they had overshot the mark of their first endeavours, and their forces had been dissipated in factious strife. Charles Albert frankly hated and dreaded reform by way of revolution. Moreover, he had good reason to respect the might of Austria. It was a matter of the nicest calculation to know when and where she might be safely defied, and popular passion seldom calculates.

Here, then, was his problem. Impotent as he was without the driving power of enthusiasms which he dreaded, it was ever a question with him whether at all these forces were to be let loose, and if so, when and how far. And the King never possessed the moral character which alone can pluck a decision out of a tangle of opposing considerations, and sustain it through success and failure alike. His morbid, self-torturing nature, the prey alternately of sensual excess and of asceticism, submitting its harassed sense of duty to the counsels of the confessional, was a very seed-plot for irresolution and hesitation. Men called him "*// Re Tentenna*"—the Wavering King. With such a nature as his it was well done in him that in the end he divined the time and made the sacrifice of his prejudices and of his life.

At the very moment of his accession revolution was again stirring in Italy. The seat of the movement was the Romagna and the neighbouring duchies of Parma and Modena. Nowhere was Papal rule more disliked than in Romagna, and Cardinal Consalvi, the reforming minister of the restored Pius VII, had only added to the discontent by destroying local liberties, as the first step towards a reorganisation which his fall left uncompleted. Leo XII (1824-1829) returned to a policy of restoration on the old lines, and at the moment that Pius VIII, after a reign of a single year, was succeeded by Gregory XVI, the districts north of the Apennines were ripe for revolt.

The conspirators were mostly men of the middle class, Carbonari of the theoretical type and of no practical experience, with a programme imported from Paris and hopes of active French support. Strangely enough, they had received encouragement from Francis, Duke of Modena, who was ambitious of extending his duchy at the expense of Austria or of the Pope. But the times were not favourable, and the conspirators inspired little confidence. He turned upon them and arrested them in their beds. Immediately Bologna rose in revolt (Feb. 1831). Never was there a more unanimous movement. In Romagna, Umbria, and the Marches, without fighting or bloodshed, the cities abolished the Temporal Power and formed provisional governments. The infection spread to Parma and Modena, and the rulers were soon in flight. But France was far away, and Louis Philippe was cautious. Austria was very near, and the doctors, professors, and lawyers who led the movement did not know how to fight and die for a cause. Austrian troops restored the governments at Parma and Modena, and entered the Romagna. The insurgents failed to make the most of their one small military success at Rimini, and by May the provisional governments had submitted. At this point the Powers interposed with recommendations of reform. But they were more interested in securing the departure of the Austrians than the acceptance of their suggestions, and when the invader withdrew in July the proposals of the memorandum were still unfulfilled. Revolt broke out afresh. This time Europe desired above all things the 'restoration of order'; for the Austrian troops were again on the move. One gallant action at Cesena against a Papal force redeemed the rising from contempt, before the arrival of the Austrians and the inevitable end. A new incident more dramatic than dangerous closed the whole episode. It was at this moment that Casimir Périer despatched the French expedition already noticed to occupy Ancona (p. 126). The July monarchy had disappointed the naive hopes of the revolutionists; public opinion in France was uncomfortable, and demanded this act of national self-assertion, to prove that the patroness of revolution could still interfere if she would.

The revolution in Romagna was the last effort of the Carbonari. They had proved themselves unequal to the greatness of their task. Their operations were not confined to Italy alone, and their teaching thus became international rather than national, offering a vague and negative condemnation of tyranny rather than any positive or practical aim to guide the endeavours of an Italian patriot. Their organisation by lodges was fatal to unity and co-operation; their secrecy made the rank and file of the members blind instruments of the leaders' will; the ceremonies which they had borrowed from the Freemasons fostered a taste for conspiracy and secrecy as such, without reference to any definite purpose, and

encouraged a puerility worthy of small boys playing at pirates.

From these devious and miry ways Giuseppe Mazzini lifted Italian patriotism by the foundation of his association of "Young Italy." Born at Genoa, in 1805, he became in early manhood the prophet of United Italy. First and last an idealist, with all an idealist's moral enthusiasm, sense of duty, quickness of conscience, and, it must be added, all an idealist's one-sidedness and intolerance, he addressed his pleading to enthusiasm, and set before his followers a definite object for attainment calculated to appeal as much to the heart as to the understanding. He addressed himself especially to the young, and bade them stir the heart of the people. The goal of their common endeavour was to be a United Italy, to be reached by the spontaneous exertions of all Italians, rising against the Austrians as Spain had risen against the French. Nor was the work to end with liberation and unity alone. Italy must be regenerated, and in this great task no form of government save a Republic was to be trusted to do justice to the poor and to seek after universal enlightenment. And this regenerate and republican Italy, with its capital at Rome, was once more to give a law to the world, lighting and guiding the other nations along the path of future progress.

This was the message which, spread by pen and tongue through the agency of countless eager disciples, kindled the flame of an enthusiasm in Italy sufficient to ensure the ultimate triumph of the idea of unity. Without the moral forces which it set in motion the work could never have been accomplished. But it is equally true that unaided by other influences it could have effected little. Mazzini, misreading entirely the lessons of the Peninsular war, relied too confidently upon the valour of undisciplined patriots. He put too great a faith in the efforts of amateur politicians, minimised difficulties, and had a fierce intolerance for anything which modified the ideal completeness of his visions, an intolerance which made him at a later period a thorn in the side of those who were working for Italy. And, estimated by the results of the first movements which it inspired, the teaching of "Young Italy" might well have been judged as ineffective for practical good as that of the Carbonari.

The earliest of these movements took place in Piedmont. On the accession of Charles Albert, Mazzini, with some inconsistency, addressed him in a letter, calling upon him to take up the national cause. The only consequence of this venture was a severe sentence passed upon the writer. Having, as he thought, thus unmasked a false friend of liberty, Mazzini proceeded to direct the energies of Young Italy into a plot for the King's deposition and murder. But the vigilance of the police was not to be eluded, the whole conspiracy was exposed, and Charles Albert stamped it out with all the remorseless cruelty of fear (April, 1833). Equally futile was a raid directed by Mazzini from the safe refuge of Switzerland early in the next year with the object of carrying over to the side of revolution the Piedmontese army and fleet. The raiders were dispersed; and Giuseppe Garibaldi, a young sailor of Nice, who makes his first appearance in the attempt to corrupt the allegiance of the navy, incurred the sentence which sent him to the New World to seek his fortunes and to make his name as a leader of irregulars in the service of Uruguay.

Three years later the revolutionary societies were at work in Sicily stirring up native discontent against Neapolitan rule. Maddened by an outbreak of cholera which was represented as the work of the government, the people of Syracuse and Messina broke into revolt, only to be crushed with thorough-going cruelty (1837).

Once more "Young Italy" re-wove its plots, and a rising was prepared in Tuscany, Naples, and the Papal States for 1843. But while the conspirators hesitated the governments had possessed themselves of the details of their plans; and the sole result of their efforts was the desperate attempt of a handful of doomed men, under the two Muratori, to hold their own among the hills of Romagna.

It wanted but one more incident to prove the futility of sporadic revolt. In 1844 two gallant Venetian brothers, named Bandiera, inspired by Mazzinian teaching, though strongly dissuaded by Mazzini himself, threw up their commissions in the Austrian navy to make a descent in Calabria, with the confident expectation of rousing the whole province. But their intention leaked out through letters written from Italy to Mazzini in England, and Ferdinand was ready for them. They were captured and mercilessly shot.

It was a turning point in the national movement. Frightened by the democratic and anti-clerical teaching of "Young Italy," disgusted by high-strung sentiment and by the futile outbreaks which only provoked reprisals, moderate men took refuge in the work of associations for the improvement of education, agriculture, and trade, and for the encouragement of science and the railway system, which, as they foresaw, would "stitch the boot." It was inevitable that social work should lead on to politics, and round the Moderates there gathered all those elements in Italy which, while opposed to the existing regime, held aloof through timidity, caution or common sense from the ways of conspiracy.

The Moderates were divided into two schools of opinion. The one, the Neo-Guelfs, whose views were set forth in the *Moral and Civil Primacy of the Italians* by a Piedmontese priest, Gioberti, pinned their hopes upon a regenerated Papacy presiding over a federation of Italian States, secure against foreign interference and regenerated by the efforts of individuals and classes. It was an inspiring book, and, unlike much of Mazzini's teaching, took some account of the situation in Italy as it was. But the spectacle of Gregory XVI's oppressive misrule gave little promise of an early fulfilment for its visions.

The other school, who came to be called the Albertists, turned to the House of Savoy. Cesare Balbo, son of a Piedmontese minister, in his *Hopes of Italy*, called upon Italians to forsake sloth and to federate themselves with their rulers under Charles Albert to work for the first necessity of all progress, national independence. He was followed by D'Azeglio, a Piedmontese noble, who had dabbled in painting and literature, and had openly advocated Albertist views in Romagna. In a pamphlet *On Recent Events in Romagna*, he divided his censures between the Papacy and the revolutionaries, denouncing the execrable misrule of the former and the ill-managed outbreaks of the latter, which staked all the hopes for the future upon a doubtful hazard. He called for patience till the day of opportunity.

The book directed the thoughts of patriotic Italians in a new direction. But Charles Albert made no attempt for the time being to place himself at the head of those who had begun to look to him for leadership. It is true that he leaned to ministers of reforming tendencies, remodelled the law and reorganised the army; that he encouraged trade, education, and railways; and that, in the course of disputes with Austria over trade monopolies, railway construction and customs duties, he used language of unmistakable menace, threatening to "set the bells ringing from Ticino to Savoy," and declaring that if Piedmont lost Austria's friendship she would win Italy. But he always drew back from a decisive breach, and for the moment another figure took his place on the forefront of the political stage.

In June, 1846, Gregory XVI died, and the Cardinals, apprehensive of fresh Austrian interference in Romagna, made haste to elect a man of a very different type, Cardinal Mastai Ferretti, the "Pio Nono," whose reign was to be an epoch in the history of his country and of his Church. The son of a noble house who had found his way into the priesthood as the result of an epileptic affection which had unfitted him for the life of a soldier, he had made a name for himself as a high-minded gentleman, a devoted pastor, and a preacher of a strongly emotional type. Personal kindness, love of conciliation, and an open mind were guarantees of the best intentions, and had brought him into sympathy with the noblest

aspirations of his time. His first act was an amnesty to all political offenders, his first utterances promised the removal of all the barriers which had been raised against material progress and enlightenment. Then it was seen how truly Gioberti had gauged the real feelings of Italy. His conception of an ideal Pope was one which appealed to all hearts. In Rome itself and all over Italy the presence and the name of Pio Nono awoke outbursts of enthusiasm. Charles Albert, strengthened by the sanction of Papal approval, promised in no doubtful terms to stand by him.

But there was not in Pius IX the stuff of which leaders are made. Only too truly he said of himself, "They want to make a Napoleon of a poor country parson." He had no seriousness of purpose, he lost his head amid political clamour, and he dared not assume responsibility or harden his heart to make enemies. No reform was possible without a clean sweep of existing officials, and from so drastic a step the Pope's kindly nature shrank. Popular agitation began everywhere to outrun the intentions of the governments, Austria only waited an excuse to interfere, and still no lead came from Rome. The Pope was drifting into the helplessly expectant attitude of the other rulers. A citizen guard as a precaution against reaction and as a restraint upon anarchy was demanded and conceded in Tuscany, and even in the city of Rome, where the mob, still loyal to Pius, now held control of the streets under the leadership of a popular blacksmith nicknamed Ciceruacchio. Anti-Austrian and national feeling rose yet higher when Austria heavily reinforced the garrison which she had a right to keep at Ferrara. The small thrones rocked. The Duke of Lucca fled, and sold his rights to Tuscany; the Grand Duke of Tuscany changed his advisers; the death of the Duchess of Parma resulted in rearrangements of frontier, which nearly brought the neighbouring duchies into armed collision.

War, in fact, was in the air, and men's eyes turned again from the Pope to the King of Piedmont. Charles Albert was wavering between his distaste for the growing popular excitement and his own harassed sense of a call, which impelled him to come forward. Another hostile act of Austria would have turned the scale, when the garrison at Ferrara was suddenly withdrawn in deference to Palmerston's protests (Dec., 1847), and there was a momentary lull before the inevitable storm burst.

In Germany, as in Italy, political development stood still, while Austria jealously watched for every symptom of combination or change. There was, indeed, little either of real oppression or of misgovernment, but the system failed to forward, and even effectively retarded, the fulfilment of any aspirations in the direction of national unity and self-government. The seat of this paralysis of public life lay in the central organ of authority, the Diet of the Confederation. We have already seen how Metternich, with the goodwill of Prussia, contrived that it should be powerless to set in motion changes detrimental to Austrian interests. Austria, however, was not solely responsible for its weakness. The sovereign States, great and small, had given their willing adhesion to a Constitution which erected no power capable of modifying their independence. The victory had remained with the princes; and even where constitutions had been granted, as in the southern States of Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Baden, they had been granted by the princes for reasons wholly personal or local, and with no idea of forwarding the general interest of the Confederation. It is, therefore, with the policy of individual States that we are concerned in the period now before us, and the central institutions scarcely figure at all, except when galvanised into momentary activity from Vienna.

By far the most important development during the thirty years which preceded the outbreak of 1848 was due to the commercial policy of Prussia. We have already seen, how under the guidance of Maassen internal customs disappeared and free trade was established within the boundaries of the State. There remained, however, a serious obstacle to the growth of prosperity. The Prussian provinces presented a very irregular outline. The

shortest line of communication between two Prussian districts very often passed across the territory of a neighbour, and the Western or Rhine provinces were bodily divided from the central mass. It became the object of the government to induce the neighbouring States to combine with Prussia in one Customs Union, or *Zollverein*, thus abolishing the restrictions on the movement of trade between one State and another, while the Prussian tariff was adopted on the frontiers of the whole union and the revenue shared in proportion to population between the associated governments.

The growth of the *Zollverein* was gradual, considerations of utility only gradually overcoming State jealousies. The first treaty was made with Schwarzburg-Sonderhausen, in 1819, and Hesse-Darmstadt joined nine years later. Meanwhile, in 1826, the Southern states had formed a rival union led by Bavaria and Wurtemberg. Isolated states now found themselves at a disadvantage; and accordingly, in 1828, a third or Central Union took shape under the guidance of Saxony. The position of the newest union clearly gave it an enormous advantage in controlling the main lines of traffic, and the northern and southern groups were forced to lay aside their jealousies and combine against the interloper. By detaching two of its members a breach was effected in the barrier, the Central Union broke up, and the other two leagues having learned to work together, gradually coalesced under Prussian leadership, absorbing at the same time the rival organisation. It was a circumstance full of promise for the future that, without the intervention of the Diet and without any pressure from popular forces, the states had shown themselves able to combine for practical objects (1836).

The news of the revolution of July 1830 in Paris revived political unrest. The agitation was, however, of a milder character than heretofore, and found many of the rulers not ill-disposed to concession. Constitutions were granted in Brunswick, Hanover, Saxony, and Hesse-Cassel. But such local successes were far from satisfying the extremists. An epidemic of public meetings broke out, culminating in 1832 in a great demonstration at the Castle of Hambach in the Rhine country. Here there was much noise, oratory, and conviviality in honour of such abstractions as Liberty and German Unity, before the meeting dispersed having caused more alarm than its proceedings justified.

To Metternich the event came as an opportunity. He had been seriously disquieted by proposals for a common military organisation under Prussian leadership, as a precaution against possible enterprises by the new French government of Louise Philippe, and though his influence had decided Frederick William not to countenance the suggestion, he was glad to be able to revive his own authority in the Diet. A fresh set of restrictions were therefore drafted and accepted. The Press and the Universities were put under control, political meetings and songs as well as the black, red, and gold badge of German Unity were proscribed, while the Diet was charged to interfere in the event of quarrels between a ruler and his Estates.

A group of irresponsible extremists determined to retaliate. A plot was laid for the destruction of the members of the Diet at Frankfort with the aid of a number of Polish and other political refugees (1833). The plot totally miscarried, but, not unnaturally, it did not dispose the assembly to milder measures, and a committee was finally appointed for the definite purpose of watching over and reporting upon the internal affairs of the separate states. The repressive energies of the governments were not exhausted by the action of the Diet. The compact concluded at Münchengrätz between the Czar, the Emperor of Austria, and the Crown Prince of Prussia, already noticed, pointed as much to common principles of domestic policy as to co-operation against Canning's principle of non-intervention. A second conference between representatives of the German states at Vienna (1834) marked a third attempt to secure common action against revolution and an organ through which it might be exercised. Resolutions of a restrictive character were agreed upon, and a Court of

Arbitration was established for dealing with difficulties which might arise between a prince and his subjects. It thus happened that, when in 1837 the justly detested Ernest Augustus, Duke of Cumberland (succeeding to the throne of Hanover on the accession of Queen Victoria), proceeded to abolish the existing Constitution, his unhappy subjects got more sympathy than practical support. Seven professors of Gottingen, who for their protest were ejected from their chairs, received something like a national ovation, and soon found professorships elsewhere; but the Diet decided by the casting vote of Austria to allow matters to take their own course in Hanover.

The death of Frederick William III marks the year 1840 as an epoch in the history of Germany. Closely associated with the misfortunes of the Napoleonic domination and with the triumphs of the War of Liberation, the old King had become part of the national life, and his policy, for all his unwillingness to move with the times, had been loyally accepted by his subjects. His death set free hopes and speculations hitherto repressed, which the character of his successor did much to quicken into activity.

Frederick William IV, son of the late King and of the lovable and gifted Queen Louisa, differed from the majority of his house in that he was no soldier and no lover of bureaucracy. Cultured, versatile, artistic, imaginative, he seemed little likely to be satisfied with a policy which was traditional and negative. A natural orator with the gift for telling phrase and striking objective illustration (which Bismarck seems to have imitated while mingling with it a brutal directness which was all his own), he seemed fitted to play a leader's part in an age of expanding ideas and popular movements. His sympathetic and attractive personality appeared destined to capture the hearts of his people no less certainly than his mother had done. But Frederick William dwelt in a world apart, a world from which the sordid and the commonplace elements, which form so large a part of things as they are, were rigorously excluded. He has been called a true son of the Romantic movement. The past with its glories fascinated him; religion with him was an enthusiastic half-puritan creed; for himself he aspired to the hero's part, and would have been happy in the devotion of a loyal following and in the self-abnegation which a great cause inspires. In his eyes a King's office was sacred, his duty to his people paramount. To the people it belonged loyally to receive the benefits which the ruler under his high obligation toiled to give them. Criticism and opposition were out of place, for every man and every institution had an appointed post and an appointed function. These views, as time went on, were exaggerated and distorted by the mental failure which finally clouded a nature of high promise.

It will be remembered that the original prospects of a Constitution, which Frederick William III had held out to his subjects, had issued in nothing more than the establishment of a universal system of local Estates. But in the year 1820, when an immediate grant of a constitution was expected, a law had been passed requiring the consent of the representatives of the nation to the negotiation of any loan or the imposition of any new tax. The accession of the new King coincided in time with the beginnings of railway enterprise in Germany, the first passenger line in England having been opened ten years earlier. Frederick William, eager to promote material prosperity, found himself hampered by the law of 1820. No railway could be constructed, even by private enterprise, without government guarantee, and such a guarantee presupposed a loan. No loan could be raised without some kind of popular representation to sanction it.

But the King had no intention of providing Prussia with a Constitution. He had decided, in spite of the misgivings of Metternich and the strong opposition of his brother Prince William, on a plan of his own, namely, to summon the members of the eight provincial Estates to Berlin, there to discuss and to approve in common the proposal he intended to submit. The Combined Estates met in April, 1847, and were addressed by the King in a speech that left no doubt as to his intentions. Speaking of written constitutions, "I will never,"

he said, "suffer a sheet of paper to come between the purposes of Almighty God and this country." The expedient was clearly temporary; at best, tentative. Even the annual balance-sheet was to be submitted not to the whole body, but to a small permanent committee of eight. The Estates fell to demanding the fulfilment of the promises of Frederick William III, and rejected all the royal proposals. The King had only succeeded in liberating the forces of discussion.

This result was in keeping with a general growth of restlessness over Central Europe. The free Republic of Cracow, erected out of a fragment of Poland by the Congress of Vienna, had become a hotbed of nationalist conspiracies, and in 1846 revolt broke out in the Austrian province of Galicia and the Prussian province of Poland. The Galician rebels were crushed by Colonel Benedek, who set the Ruthenian peasants against their Polish masters ; and, with the full sanction of Prussia and of the Czar, Austria annexed the little republic which had been the seed-plot of so much mischief. Nor was Poland alone stirring. Already in the constitutional states of the south, Baden, Bavaria, and Wurtemberg, public opinion was outrunning the policy of the governments, and even leading to scenes of violence.

PART III
THE YEARS OF REVOLUTION: 1848 AND AFTER

CHAPTER XIV

THE PRELUDE—THE SONDERBUND AND THE SECOND REPUBLIC

WE have already seen that the movements which were to convulse Europe in 1848 and in the years which immediately preceded and followed it were the result of a long period of restlessness and agitation. Those who initiated them plunged into revolution with the utmost confidence and with the highest hopes. They firmly believed that the ideas which had been so long repressed needed only to be clearly stated to command the allegiance of mankind, and required but to be put into practice to regenerate the world. They did not foresee the process by which the fairest ideals were warped and soiled in their passage from the study to the market-place. They failed to realise that society is based upon a compromise between conflicting ideals, a compromise which can seldom be effected by an idealist, requiring as it does the guiding hand of the statesman, and entailing sacrifices which he alone dares make to timidity, to time-serving, and to the baser elements of human nature. Hence, at the end of an immense upheaval, the face of European politics remained practically unaltered, and the revolution did but define the issues which succeeding years were to deal with by the hands of other men and by very different methods.

It is not a little remarkable that the earliest movement of all, and that the least connected with the main struggle, achieved permanent results which were to be denied to the revolution as a whole. We have already had occasion to notice in outline the principal effects of the Napoleonic conquests and of the Congress of Vienna upon the affairs of Switzerland, and it now becomes necessary to present the facts in fuller detail,

Prior to 1798 the Swiss Confederation had constituted a league of the loosest and most anomalous kind. It consisted of a bundle of differing races, French, Germans, Italians, and Romansch, drawn together solely by the exigencies of common defence. Across these divisions of race and language ran the cracks and fissures left behind by the Reformation. The Calvinist, the Zwinglian and the Roman Catholic Churches all claimed adherents. The political divisions were at least as perplexing as those of faith and of language. The process of gradual accretion by which the league had been built up had combined communities of the most various kinds. There were the small original Cantons, such as Uri and Unterwalden, governed by their *Landgemeinden*, assemblies in which every citizen sat and voted; there were leagues such as those of Grisons and Valais; there were oligarchical urban communities, often ruling a surrounding district, like Berne or Lucerne; Basel was the principality of a bishop; St. Gall the dependency of an abbey; while Neuchatel was the hereditary domain of the King of Prussia. Nor were the relations of all these communities to the Confederation and to one another by any means uniform. The Cantons were full members of the League, while the "Allied Districts" constituted an inferior order of membership with limited rights. Yet another status belonged to the "Subject Districts," dependencies and possessions by right of conquest of one or more Cantons. The constitutions of the separate communities were at least as various as their relations to the Confederation, ranging from the primitive democracies of the ancient Cantons to the close oligarchies of some of the towns. Lastly, the Central Diet of the Confederation possessed little power of common direction, for the representatives were dependent upon instructions from home, and no majority was entitled to compel the obedience of a minority.

The French invaders of 1798 characteristically swept away every division, distinction, and privilege. The Helvetic Republic became a united State with a common franchise, a

common representative body, and a common executive. All Swiss enjoyed equal rights, and there was one coinage, one law, and one postal system for the whole land. Admirable as these changes were in theory, they conflicted with the habits and prejudices of the majority of the people, and a Federalist party, finding its chief support in the old urban oligarchies and the primitive democratic Cantons, soon confronted the Unitary party, who favoured the French innovations. Napoleon, quick as he ever was in his earlier days to trim his sails to the breath of popular forces, interposed in 1803 with his "Act of Mediation." The new-fangled Republic made way for a reconstitution of the ancient Confederation, which was now to consist of nineteen instead of thirteen Cantons, for the Emperor would not tolerate distinctions of status between the members, or the subjugation of one to another. Nor would he permit political inequality among the citizens of the separate Cantons. Democratic institutions were established everywhere, either in the form of *Landgemeinden* or of representative chambers. Finally, the central power was strengthened by taking all external relations out of the hands of the Cantons and by giving some effective powers to a majority of the Diet.

The equalising of political rights and the restraint put upon the complete independence of the separate Cantons led to the request by a strong minority that the Allies should revise the Articles of Confederation afresh, and it was only the influence of Alexander which prevented a restoration of the pre-revolution anomalies. Accordingly a Swiss commission, working with the approval of the Allies, drew up the "Federal Pact" of 1815. This measure followed closely the lines of the Act of Mediation. Additional Cantons constituted out of the districts which Napoleon had annexed to France, raised the membership of the league from nineteen to twenty-two, while the Diet was charged with the duty of organising and training the federal army, a scheme which the Emperor would have resolutely opposed. The other changes were in the direction of granting greater freedom of action to the separate Cantons. They were permitted to group themselves into alliances within the Confederation; a democratic Constitution based upon an equal franchise was no longer definitely prescribed; and freedom of belief and residence were not specifically guaranteed. From the Allies themselves Switzerland obtained the inestimable advantage of a declaration which made the country neutral territory in all future wars.

The result of these changes was a general movement within the Cantons in the direction of modifying the democratic character of their local Constitutions. Towns like Berne, Basel, Zurich, and Lucerne took care so to apportion the representation between urban and rural districts as to give a preponderance to the former, while elsewhere property qualifications or indirect methods of election made their appearance. Nevertheless, the fifteen years before 1830 were a period of peace, recovery, and material progress.

The Greek war of independence re-kindled democratic sentiment, and the July Revolution in France led to an organised expression of opinion all over the country, in the form of public meetings, in favour of a wider extension of political rights. Almost without disorder or bloodshed the Constitutions of all the Cantons underwent during the years 1830 and 1831 a transformation into representative democracies, and an attempt on the part of Berne to secure the intervention of the Diet in a contrary direction failed to meet with support. The change was followed everywhere by renewed reforming activity designed to foster trade, education, and freedom of thought.

In three of the Cantons, however, the innovations had been attended by serious disturbances. In Basel the rural districts, still finding themselves at a disadvantage as compared with the city, rose in arms, and, though put down by the Federal troops and deprived for the moment of all political rights whatsoever, quietly reorganised themselves as a separate Canton, ultimately compelling the Diet to recognise them and to divide the vote of Basel into two half votes. A similar subdivision took place between Inner and Outer

Schwyz. In Neuchatel the governing classes, deferring to the policy of the King of Prussia, declined to go beyond the concessions he was prepared to make, thus provoking revolts which were sternly repressed after an unsuccessful attempt of the Federal authority to arrange a compromise.

These three untoward incidents excited the alarms of the democratic party throughout Switzerland, and the Diet having refused to listen to a proposal that the central authority should guarantee the new Constitutions, seven of the democratic Cantons leagued themselves together for purposes of mutual support (1832). This league was promptly answered by a conservative counter-association, the League of Sarnen, whose members threatened to withdraw from the Diet altogether and to hold a Diet of their own.

The occasion of this threat was a growing wish on the part of the majority for a modification of the Federal Pact. In truth, the Constitution of 1815 had not proved uniformly successful. The Diet, whose members were fettered by their instructions, and which Federal Pact, could only act with a majority which it required the agreement of twelve Cantons to obtain, had proved singularly ineffective during the recent troubles. The part of Directory, or Executive, was played in rotation by the Cantonal executives of Berne, Lucerne, and Zurich. Its policy was therefore seldom consistent and the duties were regarded as a burden by the three Cantons concerned. A resolution for the revision of these arrangements was accordingly proposed by the Canton of Thurgau, in 1831, and carried by fifteen and a half votes, upon which a draft scheme was prepared for the approval of the Diet. The new features of the scheme comprised the erection of a separate Federal Directory of five members, the freedom of the Cantonal representatives in the Diet from the control of instructions, except in questions of peace, war, or Constitutional change, and the extension of the powers of the central authority to cover the army, the customs, the post-office, and the coinage.

The Diet met at Zurich in 1833, under the impression that a bare majority would be secured for revision. But Lucerne, one of the Cantons well-disposed to the measure, had made its vote conditional upon the approval of a poll of the people taken within the Canton, and clerical influence turned the scale against the proposal. For the moment, therefore, amendment was impossible. It was at this time that the Powers began to turn their attention to the protection afforded by the Confederation to political refugees. It must be admitted that there was considerable ground for complaint, as the raid organised by Mazzini upon Savoy was to demonstrate; but Metternich's representations were not successful in inducing England and France to act with the other Powers. The League of Sarnen, however, derived sufficient encouragement from the threatening attitude of Austria, as well as from the failure of the revision scheme, to make an attack upon the independence of Rural Basel and Outer Schwyz (July, 1833). The attempt ended in disaster, the League was broken up and its members were forced to resume their connection with the Diet.

Thus, for the moment a breach in the unity of the Confederation was averted. There was, however, another influence making for division in the shape of religious disagreement. In 1834, certain Protestant Cantons concluded an agreement at Baden for the purpose of defending the rights of The State against what they regarded as ecclesiastical encroachments. This agreement was condemned by the Pope and was followed by political strife between Radicals and Clericals all over the country, in the course of which the Canton of Aargau decreed the suppression of its monasteries. The decree was a breach of the Constitution, inasmuch as the Federal Pact had guaranteed the religious houses, and it produced so much strife that in 1843 the offending Canton thought it prudent to restore four nunneries, a partial restitution with which the Diet declared itself satisfied. Not so the Roman Catholic Cantons. Meeting at Lucerne, they proclaimed that they would be contented with nothing short of complete restitution. Aargau was plainly in the wrong, and strove to confuse

the issue and to gain support by raising a new question. It retaliated with a demand for the expulsion of the Jesuits.

It was in vain that the Diet declared that the question of the monasteries was settled, and refused to entertain the proposal for expulsion. There was a desperate attempt on the part of the Radicals to overthrow the Roman Catholic government of Lucerne, attended with much bloodshed. Rioting was everywhere rife, and it was certain that the next President of the Confederation would take up the Jesuit question. Under these circumstances the Cantons of Lucerne, Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden, Valais, Fribourg, and Zug organised themselves as the *Sonderbund* (or "separate league"), pledged to require the restoration of the Aargau monasteries, and to resist, by Constitutional means or by arms, both the expulsion of the Jesuits and the amendment of the Federal Pact, and even, if necessary, to invite the support of foreign Powers (Dec., 1845). The new league was not without its justification, but it is evident that the whole Confederation was in danger of dissolution if seven of its members could defy the general will, and it was decided that the *Sonderbund* should be put down. Some time was occupied in securing the necessary majority in the Diet, a majority which was not obtained without the forcible ejection of the representatives of one government at least, but by October Dufour at the head of the Federal Army was prepared to strike.

In the meantime, events pointed to an interference by the Powers on behalf of the dissentient minority. The difficulties which had already arisen over the harbouring of refugees by the Confederation created a very natural unwillingness to see the Radicals in power, and the acceptance by the Congress of Vienna of the original text of the Federal Pact seemed to entitle Europe to express an opinion on the question of revision. Already Austria and France had been displaying a readiness to co-operate in general policy, the more so as Guizot was nervously eager to replace the entente with England, now irretrievably shattered owing to the Spanish marriages, by an Austrian alliance. But the French Government, though perhaps even more desirous than Metternich himself to intervene, was not prepared, in the face of a public opinion which would have deprecated interference as reactionary and uncalled for, to accept the Austrian suggestion that all the Powers should address identical notes to the Swiss Diet and should support the protest by effective action. A direct appeal from the *Sonderbund* for the good offices of Europe extricated Guizot from his dilemma. He proposed a European Conference, thus maintaining a judicial attitude while securing the main object of his policy.

But England had more sympathy for the aims of the Swiss majority, and had nothing to fear from the shelter afforded to political exiles; moreover, Palmerston owed Guizot a grudge, and was determined to repay him at the earliest opportunity. The English answer was deliberately delayed, and when at length it arrived, was found to contain nothing more definite than a series of suggested amendments. Meanwhile, Palmerston, acting upon his peculiar interpretation of Canning's principle of non-intervention, had urged the Swiss Directory to make short work of their opponents.

The hint was accepted. Dufour occupied Fribourg with slight resistance, and then struck straight at Lucerne and the Forest Cantons. On November 23rd, there was fighting all along the positions which Salis-Soglio had occupied to cover Lucerne. In this engagement, known as the battle of Gislikon, the recalcitrant Cantons were everywhere worsted. Thereupon their resistance collapsed, and when on November 20th a joint note arrived from all the Powers offering mediation (to which even Palmerston had agreed when he saw that it would be too late) the *Sonderbund* had ceased to exist. The reformers now carried their whole programme. The central authority secured complete control of external affairs, of the army, customs, coinage, and the postal service. It guaranteed the democratic character of the Cantonal Constitutions, and forbade the association of two or more cantons

for political purposes. The central authority itself was reorganised as a legislature of two Houses, comprising a "Council of Estates," representing the Cantons, and a "National Council," representing the people. A new Federal Council of seven constituted the executive, at the head of which stood the President of the Confederation (1847).

The overthrow of Louis Philippe's throne in the following February relieved the Swiss from any further fear of collective intervention from without, but the connection of Neuchatel with the Prussian Crown was to lead to further trouble. Frederick William had never surrendered his rights, and in 1856 there was a Royalist rising against the new regime, which was overpowered, after a trifling initial success, leaving a large number of prisoners in the hands of the authorities. The possession of these hostages put the Swiss in a strong position, and when the Emperor Napoleon III came forward to mediate on behalf of Frederick William, the liberation of the prisoners was only effected as the price of a treaty by which Prussian rights in Neuchatel were finally surrendered (May, 1857). Yet, though this last success was delayed, Switzerland had already secured her internal unity and asserted her independence of external dictation at the moment when the revolutionary storm burst over Europe.

The failure of his Swiss policy still further discredited the government of Guizot, and furnished a new weapon for his adversaries. But it was round the questions connected with the extension of the franchise that the conflict between the minister and the two wings of his opponents, led by Thiers and Odilon Barrot, chiefly centred. On the side of the Opposition it was urged that the highly centralised institutions of France paralysed the local independence of opinion upon which a representative system should be founded, and led to habitual abstention from the polls; that an electorate of 200,000 citizens, based on a property qualification of 200 francs paid in direct taxation, was in no way representative of national opinion; and that of the members of the Chamber very nearly one half were bound to the support of the government by office, commercial privileges, or some form of indirect corruption. Evading a direct answer to these criticisms Guizot took refuge behind a general statement that the steady majorities in the Chamber offered sufficient evidence that there was no demand for electoral reform in the country. In this inference there was in all probability this element of truth, that those who were dissatisfied with the Constitution were not to be contented with such remedies as the party of Thiers were prepared to recommend, a "reform to avoid revolution."

The opposition accordingly set themselves to test the truth of the ministerial assertion, and at the same time to educate public opinion by a series of Reform Banquets. The banquets proved an immense success, and were extensively imitated by the leaders of republican and even of socialistic opinion. The government at once claimed authority to forbid such gatherings, thus exciting a series of heated debates in the Chamber, as the result of which Guizot's resolution faltered. He offered the King his resignation. Louis Philippe refused to hear of concession. It is indeed doubtful if Thiers and his followers could have postponed the crisis and saved the existing Constitution by such reforms as they advocated. But the King's determination now made the crisis inevitable.

A monster banquet had been planned in the twelfth arrondissement, and the Government and their opponents had agreed to make it a test of the legal aspect of the question. The banquet was to take place, arrests were to be peacefully effected, and the matter at issue was to be thrashed out in the law courts. The situation was altered by information received that a popular procession had been planned by the leaders of the extremists to increase the effect of the demonstration. Both parties in the Chamber were frightened. The Government withdrew their consent, and the opposition decided that no banquet should take place.

Popular excitement and anticipation were, however, already beyond control. The leaders of the opposition, stung by the reproaches heaped upon them, published a denunciation of the general conduct of the Government. Rioting began on the 22nd of February, and on the 23rd the National Guard characteristically refused to act against the mob. There was now one chance for Louis Philippe—the resolute use of force. He did, indeed, move regular troops into Paris, but he still hesitated between incompatible courses of action. Paris had cast a nameless spell over its rulers, and the “whiff of grape-shot” was forgotten. Simultaneously with his resolve to employ the troops the King decided to yield the point at issue. Guizot was dismissed, and, when Molé had failed to form a ministry, Thiers was called to office. What chance conciliation had of succeeding, and it was slight, was destroyed by the entry of the troops and by the unpopularity of General Bugeaud, who commanded; while any prospect of restoring order by force was lessened from hour to hour by the uncertain attitude of the King, which made subordinates unwilling to commit themselves; by faults of discipline, equipment, and supply; and by the paralysing presence of the National Guard, who could neither be treated as enemies nor relied upon for support.

Point by point Paris was abandoned to the mob. An inspection of the National Guard by the King in the court of the Tuileries left little doubt of their untrustworthy character, and on the 24th, shortly after midnight, Louis Philippe signed an abdication in favour of his grandson, the Count of Paris. Another dynasty had succumbed to the violence of the streets.

For the real victors in the struggle were not to be contented with a change of ministry or with the substitution of one monarch for another. It was the monarchical Constitution itself, nay even the existing balance of classes in society, which was the point of attack. It was in vain that the Chamber met to make arrangements for the installation of a regency. The hall was invaded by an armed and excited mob, and the majority of the deputies dispersed, leaving a minority of the extreme Left to proclaim a provisional government with Lamartine at its head. These men sought a confirmation of their powers from an informal revolutionary assembly which had assumed authority in the name of the people at the Hotel de Ville, and consented to receive three representatives of this body as colleagues, of whom one, Louis Blanc, was the principal exponent of political socialism, and another, Albert, was himself a workman.

The price exacted from the new government by the self-appointed leaders of the mob was the immediate proclamation of a republic, and thus a small committee of ten men, appointed by a minority of the Chamber at the dictation of the populace of the capital, ventured to impose a new system upon France without consulting the wishes of the people. Nevertheless, guided by the wise moderation of Lamartine, and under the spell of his enthusiastic eloquence, the wilder spirits resigned themselves for the moment to dreams of a new and perfect order in the State and in society, while all who had anything to lose rallied round the Government as the only bulwark between them and anarchy.

For the dreams of one section at least of the revolutionists took an intensely practical direction. For three days and two nights an excited crowd surged round the Hôtel de Ville, and were only induced to disperse after forcing their rulers to a momentous decision, a decision which virtually pledged the whole resources of the country to the task of satisfying the material wants of the urban population. The government accepted the socialist doctrine of “the Right to Work” and accepted with it the obligation to furnish employment for every unemployed workman upon demand. It is doubtful if anything else would have satisfied those who were for the moment masters of the situation, nevertheless the step was fatal to the Second Republic.

Louis Blanc now urged the appointment of a special Ministry of Labour to give immediate and practical effect to the resolution. But Lamartine was unwilling to *allow carte*

blanche to men who had already formulated a programme. He evaded the demand by the nomination of a commission at the Luxembourg, headed by Louis Blanc and Albert, to study the labour problem, and to recommend remedies. Socialists and capitalists were alike furious. To the one class the concession seemed a surrender to anarchy, to the other a deliberate attempt to hamper reform. Meantime, the disorders of the revolution itself and the succeeding uncertainty had immensely extended the area of unemployment, and the authorities found themselves obliged to accept the logical consequence of their declaration by opening the so-called "National Workshops." By the end of the first week in April, 59,000 names were on the books, by the middle of May the number had risen to 120,000. The workshops, though ill-managed and worked at a loss, found employment for 14,000 at 2 francs a day. The remainder received 1| francs for doing nothing, or for laboriously digging and filling up trenches in the Champ de Mars.

Amid all the evidences of a coming storm, Lamartine kept a steady hand upon the helm, at once humouring socialist opinion while he strove to prevent the movement from degenerating into anarchy, and watering down with conciliatory phrases the fierce language in which the new republic would have made the announcement of its birth to Europe at large. But there was a crisis at hand which was to tax all his powers, and one which inspired even greater alarm among the leaders of the labour movement than among the more conservative Republicans. France was to be summoned to elect her representatives by universal suffrage, and the stewards would be called to give an account of their stewardship. There could be little doubt as to the general character of the forthcoming verdict, and the socialist wing declared for a postponement in the hope of "educating the country." A postponement was conceded, but a demonstration which was designed to secure a further delay was frustrated by the National Guard. The result of the elections exceeded all expectations. In Paris, out of twenty-four labour candidates, only three were elected. Extremists were everywhere rejected. Of the whole assembly actually one-fourth were Legitimists. These, with the Orleanist section, were ready for the time being to support the Republican government in maintaining order. Loud were the allegations made by the defeated party of undue influence exercised at the elections.

If the elections meant anything they meant that Lamartine's temporising policy was no longer possible. The disappointed socialists and the Conservative the Chamber, majority were ready to fly at one another's throats. When Louis Blanc resigned his position at the Luxembourg, the Assembly flatly refused to appoint a Minister of Labour. A commotion in Prussian Poland provided the opportunity for a demonstration against a government which cared nothing for the rights of oppressed peoples. The Chamber was invaded by a yelling crowd, who for five hours and a half indulged in every kind of noise and menace. But by the time that they had tired of mere tumult and proceeded to action in an attempt to establish their own leaders in authority at the Hôtel de Ville, Lamartine was upon them with the National Guard, and dispersed them in all directions.

The incident strengthened the party in the Chamber who were opposed to compromise. Proposals were now put forward for ridding Paris of the forces of disorder by closing the national workshops, which had attracted immense numbers of workmen from the provinces, idle and industrious alike. As a preliminary step all who had not resided in Paris for more than a year were to be furnished with the means of returning to their homes; those for whom private employment could be found were required to accept it; the younger men were invited to choose between work upon the provincial railroads and enlistment. These measures were ineffective, and the majority of the Chamber decided to force the unwilling government to take the bull by the horns. "We must," they said, "make an end of it." On June 21, the workshops were closed by decree, the younger men were to be drafted into the army, the remainder were to be employed on railway construction.

It was a declaration of war. Lamartine resigned, and General Cavaignac assumed the ominous office of military dictator. This time there was no hesitation; a systematic plan of campaign was laid for the reconquest of the capital, street by street and quarter by quarter. During four days' desperate fighting the troops were concentrated against one point of resistance after another. The Hôtel de Ville, the Place de la Bastille, and finally, on June 26, the narrow streets of the workmen's quarter in the Faubourg St. Antoine itself were carried in succession. The Paris mob, which had thrice overturned the throne, had met its match.

But the victorious Second Republic already contained within itself the seeds of dissolution, for once again it was not the apparent victor that had won the battle, nor was it Republicanism that had triumphed. Nevertheless, for the moment the Assembly was able to proceed to the drafting of a Constitution undisturbed by invasions and alarms. There was to be a Single Chamber elected by universal suffrage, to which the ministers were to be responsible. Over against the Chamber there was to be a President, by whom the ministers were to be appointed, himself elected for four years by the same constituencies which elected the Chamber (October, 1848).

Such was for the time being the conclusion of the Paris Revolution. In its origin a social and industrial movement, it bears little resemblance to the commotions in Central Europe, next to be noticed, either in its causes, progress, or results. But it unquestionably precipitated outbreaks elsewhere. The historical associations of the first Revolution long perpetuated a confusion of mind which saw in every movement in Paris an invitation to rise for objects entirely unconnected with the issues of French politics.

CHAPTER XV

THE AUSTRIAN MONARCHY AT BAY

THE more closely the political storms of 1848 are studied the more clearly is it apparent that the whole set and trend of the main winds and currents is directed against the fabric of that Austrian domination, which had so long overshadowed Europe. Amazing as is the scene of chaos and disintegration presented by the Hapsburg countries and their dependencies at the height of the revolution, still more amazing is the turn of events by which the ancient landmarks reappeared all but unchanged by the forces which had submerged them. But perhaps most amazing of all is the discovery of the slenderness of the foundation upon which Austrian influence had been reared. That Power which, behind the play of Metternich's diplomacy, loomed large in the imagination of Europe as the irresistible champion of reaction, stood in sober truth upon feet of clay. A short enquiry into the condition of the Empire will reveal three symptoms, which promised to be of the gravest consequence in an age of transition and change.

First and most important of the three elements of weakness was one to which attention has already been directed. The Empire was in no sense homogeneous. It consisted of a bundle of nationalities and fragments of nationalities connected with the central power and with one another by very various ties. Germany, politically disunited, was at least Teutonic; Switzerland, racially divided, had been forced into unity by the stern logic of her history ; both were impelled by every circumstance of the age towards a closer union; in the Austrian Empire, where political ties were loose, and national differences fundamental, every impulse born of the times was centrifugal. In the very heart of the Empire the plains on either side of the parallel streams of the middle Danube and the Theiss were the home of the Magyars, a people of Turanian stock. This district was bordered to the west by Austria proper and its dependencies, comprising the upper valley of the Danube and the mountain district to the south and south-west, between that river and the Drave, where the inhabitants were almost exclusively German. East of the Magyar lands, and astride the Carpathians was the wild mountainous country of Transylvania, with Magyar and Saxon settlers here and there among a Roumanian population. Alike on its northern and southern frontiers the Empire was fringed with Slavonic peoples. Of these perhaps the most important were the Czechs of Bohemia and Moravia, along the northern border of Austria proper, though portions of both provinces had been almost entirely Germanised. Further eastwards, the frontier skirted the country of the Slovaks on the watershed of the Hungarian plain, and continued through the Galician provinces on the northward slope of the Carpathians, which had formerly belonged to Poland, where a Polish land-owning class were super-imposed upon a Ruthenian peasantry. South of the Drave from Belgrade westwards Serbs, South Slavs, and Croatians successively lined the frontier, while Slovenes occupied the extremities of the Alpine Chain, and Dalmatians fringed the Adriatic. Evidently there was a fair field for national aspirations and for national rivalries tending to disunion.

Nor was a recombination into new national units the only danger, nor even a possible solution of irreconcilable impulses. A glance at the map will show that the Slavonic elements were geographically debarred from union. Moreover the Czechs, by virtue of the ancient independence of the Crown of Bohemia, had never parted with their desire for an autonomy implying the subjugation of the German population in their midst, while the Magyars continued to dominate the Slavonic districts of the south (which were still attached to Hungary as provinces of the Crown of St. Stephen), and never ceased to claim a similar

right in Transylvania. To compel these peoples to live peacefully side by side and to cooperate for common ends—this was the national problem which constituted the first and fundamental weakness of Austria.

The second element of weakness is to be sought in the obsolete structure of society. The French revolutionary armies had never penetrated to the frontiers of Austria. Napoleon, though he had invaded her territories, had annexed no part of her German or Slavonic lands, nor had he attempted to remodel her government. Thus, in an age in which both the ideas and the material interests of Europe were rapidly assuming their modern complexion, the constitution of society remained feudal. Aristocratic privileges were undiminished, the nobility remained exempt from taxation and military service, and were alone qualified for positions of authority in the State. The functions of local government were still attached to the ownership of land, and the great landowners administered justice and maintained order among their tenants. The conditions of agriculture were unchanged, the peasant cultivator was bound to the soil and occupied his holding subject to labour service upon his lord's domain. And all this time, owing to the expansion of trade and the growth of a middle class in the towns, the system was becoming less and less applicable to the conditions of the age, and stood in daily peril from the sparks of revolutionary agitation. This, then, was the social problem which threatened at any moment to give birth to a democratic political movement.

National tendencies to disunion have often been restrained, and anomalous social conditions have been long perpetuated by firm government. The third element of weakness lay at the very heart of the system. Austria had fallen under that mortal disease of a bureaucratic government, the paralysis of the central authority. Government was the business of separate and independent departments each under its own head, and the divisions between their spheres of action were not distinctly drawn. Without some co-ordinating authority collision was inevitable, or, worse still, the neglect of such duties as seemed not strictly assignable to one department rather than to another. This authority had been in part supplied by the fussy and minute diligence of the Emperor Francis till his death, in 1835. Under his successor, Ferdinand, who was totally without ability, the attempt was made to provide it in the shape of a body styled the State Conference, presided over by an archduke and containing, besides an ornamental array of dignitaries, both the head of the foreign department and the head of finance. This body was empowered to call in other ministers and heads of departments, as occasion might require. But the Archduke Louis was not a capable President, the dignitaries had little to recommend them save their position, and Metternich was not only too busy to take the lead, but was at open war with Kolowrat, who directed finance. It is scarcely to be wondered that inaction spread from the head to the members, till the officials in Vienna and the provinces had even ceased to exercise those repressive measures against the Press and discussion upon which Metternich set so much value. If the Austrian system of government deserved to perish it was not by reason of intolerable oppression.

Another influence contributing to the weakness of the bureaucracy was the fact that it did not exclusively hold the field. Joseph II's centralising policy had stopped halfway, and in every province there still existed Provincial Estates, having some share in the local government and enjoying upon sufferance the right of giving their formal approval to taxation. Composed entirely of nobles, with here and there representatives from privileged towns, these bodies had for a long while given little trouble to the authorities at Vienna. But a moment's reflection will suggest that their very existence promised a basis for national resistance, while their medieval constitution challenged the exponents of popular ideas to make them a political battlefield.

These two features had already made their appearance in Hungary many years before

the revolution. Here the survivals of the ancient Constitution were something more than local. There was a Diet which met at Presburg divided into two Houses,—the “Table of Magnates,” consisting of the greater nobles who sat by hereditary right, and the “Table of Estates,” consisting of elected representatives, two from each of the fifty-five “County Assemblies.” In 1825, this Diet had not been summoned for twelve years, during which the County Assemblies had endeavoured to extort its convocation by ineffectual resistance to taxation. From 1826 onwards it was convened every three years. The Diet which met in 1832 set itself boldly to demand concessions. Those suggested were partly national and partly political—on the one hand, the more frequent visits of the Emperor, the recognition of Pesth as the meeting-place of the Diet, the use of Magyar as the official language, instead of Latin, and a greater influence for Magyar elements in the executive; on the other; the abolition of feudal rights and the grant of an extended franchise.

The double character of these demands deserves attention. It proved fatal to the combined programme, as it was afterwards to be fatal to the whole revolutionary movement. There was a practical unanimity upon the distinctively Magyar claims, but the Table of Magnates were not prepared for reforms which were either constitutional or social, and rallied to the Government. Simultaneously in Transylvania an attempt of the Magyar party in the Estates to secure a union with Hungary, which was accompanied with much illegality and disorder, was defeated by a dissolution.

For the next decade the same demands were repeatedly presented in the Diet with the same want of success. The Louis sole result of ten years’ struggle was the recognition of the Magyar language, a concession which was to work in the end much evil for the Hungarian cause. But, in the meanwhile, a new figure had come to the front. For good and for evil the fortunes of Hungary were to be bound up with the character and career of Louis Kossuth. By profession a lawyer, he had been brought into contact with politics as secretary to one of the members of the Diet. In 1839 he had been imprisoned for the outspoken violence of his opinions, and on his release had turned to journalism and founded an opposition newspaper. At heart a democrat first and a patriot afterwards, he had accepted with all the fervour of his uncompromising nature the popular doctrines of the west. But he knew his countrymen too well to imagine that such views could be made to prevail without being intimately bound up with the historical nationalist impatience of control from Vienna. This feeling he exploited with all the powers of his fine presence and compelling oratory till national independence became to him an article of faith more binding than even his democratic creed. His enthusiasm and his determination fired his countrymen and made his name a power. But he was, to their misfortune and his own, essentially a party man, one whose moral earnestness in his own cause was rooted in bitter hatred of all that he opposed. He knew no compromise, and was a hard man for others to work with. It might have been confidently predicted that in such hands the manifold antagonisms of the Empire would break out into a notable conflagration; it was equally certain that his were not the talents to bring a settled order out of the chaos.

While patriotic nobles like Szechenyi, and moderate reformers like Deak, were discussing schemes of internal improvement, the news of the February revolution fell like a bombshell into the midst of the Diet. On March 3, in a speech of burning eloquence, Kossuth flung down the gage to the Imperial Government. “From the charnel-house of Vienna,” he cried, “a pestilential breath passes over us paralysing our senses and deadening our national spirit.” Under his influence an address to the Emperor was carried, demanding a Constitution. The Hungarian revolution had begun.

It was a strange consequence of a speech breathing anti-Austrian feeling that it should have contributed to precipitate revolution in Vienna itself. Nothing illustrates more forcibly the complete lack of accord between the Austrian Government and the Austrian people.

The former had, in fact, never been German in spirit. It was non-national, and had aroused local prejudice as much at Vienna as elsewhere. We have already remarked the growing laxity of the Austrian official world in the administration of a strict repressive code. By a thousand channels literature and ideas of a disturbing tendency filtered in and saturated a receptive soil. Vienna was Europe's city of pleasure. The upper classes were given over to selfish amusement. The extremes of wealth and poverty met within its walls, and a half-starving working class needed only organisation and leaders to become formidable. Serious thinking was scarcely to be found outside University circles, where professors and undergraduates thought in characteristic superlatives. In an atmosphere of increasing unrest even the Estates of Lower Austria, though mainly representative of the landed classes, were tentatively petitioning for reforms. On March 13 their proceedings were quickened by the invasion of their hall by a mob of students and artisans. Kossuth's speech was read and his proposals acclaimed. Rioters and deputies together surged up to the Hofburg and met with conciliatory answers from the panic-stricken authorities. Fighting broke out in the streets between the populace and the troops, deputations besieged the palace, and here and there the crowd broke in.

Before many days had passed, astonished Europe learnt that Metternich had fallen. His proffered resignation had been accepted with undignified haste, and the statesman who had so long dominated international counsels found himself a homeless exile in full flight for England. He has received less than his due at the hands of posterity. The history of his times has been recorded by writers professing the old-fashioned type of Liberalism prevalent in the sixties. Pre-occupied with the memories of a struggle still recent, they have not been magnanimous to a fallen foe in the hour of their victory, and have attempted to combine preternatural craft and singular fatuity into a single portrait. The presentation is not convincing. For reasons good to him and at least intelligible to us, the man set himself to stem the current of the times. Incidentally he played no small part in preserving the peace of Europe for forty years.

It would be difficult to blame the new ministry under Baron Pillersdorf for resisting anything. A free Press, a National Guard, and other salient features of the normal popular programme were conceded. There was to be a new Constitution for all the Austrian dominions except Hungary, and a joint session of representatives from all the Estates of the Empire was to meet to draft it in the summer.

The downfall of the central power set free in a moment all the nationalist aspirations of the provinces. Hungary led the way with a series of sweeping changes which left her a democratic and practically independent State, connected only with Austria by common allegiance to the Hapsburg Crown. Encouraged by the assent of the Emperor to the resolutions passed on March 3 in favour of a Constitution, the leaders determined to secure their programme beforehand from possible defeat at the hands of reactionary influences in the Diet. A great mass meeting at Pesth acclaimed with enthusiasm an outline scheme of "Twelve Points," and appointed a Committee of Public Safety. This evidence of popular approval decided the vote of the Diet. The so-called "March Laws" transformed that body into a modern representative assembly, and transferred its meeting place to Pesth, abolished all feudal privileges and restrictions at one stroke, annexed Transylvania, and declared the right of Hungary to manage her own army and her own government. The Palatine, or Viceroy, the young and impulsive Archduke Stephen, supported these measures at Vienna, and, after some opposition, but with a haste which did not permit relations with the Austrian half of the Empire to be properly defined, the laws themselves, and with them a separate Hungarian ministry under Count Batthyany, received the Imperial approval.

With the concession of the Bohemian demands for an autonomous government

assuring equal rights to Germans and Czechs, and with the issue of the promised Constitution for Austria and the remaining provinces, the transformation of the Empire seemed practically complete. But three influences now came into play which were to shatter to fragments the flimsy work of patriots and Constitution-makers—the widening breach between Vienna and the Imperial Government, the national hatred of Czech for German, and Slav impatience of Magyar rule.

The occasion which brought the first of these into operation was the decision of the government to promulgate the promised Austrian Constitution at once, without waiting for the meeting of the Estates, in the hope of avoiding democratic amendments. A good deal of rioting ensued in the streets of Vienna, and the city was rapidly falling under the control of mob violence. In these circumstances the military governor decided to dissolve the committee to whom the ministry had delegated the management of the National Guard, and who had recently reconstituted themselves, with the addition of some student representatives, as a Central Committee claiming a general right of interference. This ill-judged measure produced a renewed outbreak, followed by abject concession of the point at issue. The same results attended a later attempt to break up the students' "Academic Legion," and involved both the resignation of the ministry and the reorganisation on a firmer basis of the revolutionary Central Committee. There could be little doubt any longer where such authority as existed in Vienna resided, and the Emperor, starting as though for a country drive, removed himself out of the way of danger and coercion to Innsbruck.

It was a tacit notification that the Government was no longer a free agent and an invitation to all in authority to act for themselves. Two self-contained men so interpreted the situation—Prince Windischgratz, the military commandant at Prague, and Baron Jellachich, Ban, or Governor, of Croatia.

The former now assumed complete independence of instructions from Vienna, and proceeded to take a line of his own in a situation which was becoming very critical. The momentary union of Czechs and Germans to extort an independent Constitution for Bohemia had been short-lived. The Germans had been attracted by the ideal of a united Germany propounded at Frankfort, which was to include all the non-Hungarian lands of the Empire, a suggestion which had also met with much sympathy among the Vienna democrats. No scheme could be more offensive to Czech national feeling, for it sounded the death-knell of the autonomy they had just secured. With the full consent of Windischgratz, Count Thun formed a provisional government in defiance of Vienna, and on May 1, a Pan-Slav Congress gathered at Prague to unite the Slavic races against the German nationalist programme propounded at Frankfort.

But in the face of the fatal difficulty of geographical dispersion it was not easy to give a practical direction to the Slav aspirations, and the leaders were literary men and historical visionaries without a consistent policy. The movement got out of hand. Extreme democratic demands, industrial disputes and race hatreds jostled one another. Finally, the whole city broke into revolt and assaulted the palace. Windischgratz, though his wife had been shot through one of the windows, endeavoured to restore order by peaceful means, even withdrawing his troops from the city to facilitate negotiations. But scarcely had an armistice been concluded than it was broken by the rioters. Windischgratz accordingly decided to make short work, and twelve hours' bombardment laid Prague at his feet (June, 1848). In the strife of Czech and German the monarchy had found a champion. The assembly at Frankfort, which congratulated him on his victory over the Czechs, received the ominous answer that he had merely put down a revolt against authority. The fate of Prague was being prepared for Vienna.

Meanwhile, the Hungarian question had entered on a new phase. The Southern

Slavonic fringe of the Empire had been abandoned to Hungary, and the Magyars, acutely sensitive themselves to anything that savoured of German domination, were firm in their determination to refuse to the other peoples attached to the Crown of St. Stephen the rights which they claimed for their own nationality. At the outset of the revolution the Emperor had refused to the Southern Slavs the autonomy which had been conceded to Hungary and Bohemia. Pesth was not likely to be more yielding than Vienna. Slav and Serb deputations, and petitions from the non-Magyar elements in Transylvania had been met with an inexorable refusal to recognise their separate existence or any other official language save the Magyar tongue. The newly-appointed Ban of Croatia saw in the rising nationalist feeling an influence that might be turned to account in the interests of the Hapsburg monarchy. In June he summoned a Diet of Croatia and Slavonia to Agram. Hungary was quick to recognise the menace. A deputation headed by Batthyany proceeded to Innsbruck and obtained from the hesitating Emperor a pronouncement rejecting the claim of the non-Magyar peoples to independence, and suspending the authority of the Ban. But Jellachich was bold and astute enough to read between the lines. He paid a personal visit to Innsbruck, and on his return accepted dictatorial authority at the hands of the Diet. He was encouraged by the reverses sustained by the Hungarians against the Serbs under Stratimirovic, and firmly believed that a decisive success would secure his own recognition as the champion of the monarchy.

Nevertheless, the Imperial Government had by no means made up its mind to accept the risks of conniving at racial war. For the moment its efforts were directed towards securing peace with the assistance of the moderate party in Hungary, led by Batthyany and the Palatine, but sorely hampered by the uncompromising attitude of Kossuth. Indeed, his intensely provocative measures seemed to argue a deliberate intention to defeat agreement. He had struck a blow at Austrian finance by his refusal to recognise Austrian notes, and by an issue of a paper-money of his own. In glaring contrast to Jellachich, who had bidden the Croats in Italy fight loyally for their Emperor, he had done everything to tempt the Imperial troops into the National Guard. He had openly supported the German national movement as likely to absorb the Austrian provinces and to leave Hungary free to go her own way.

Meanwhile, the spirit of the government was rising. The Emperor had ventured back to Vienna, and the victories of Radetzky in Italy, shortly to be noticed, begat renewed confidence. Decrees were issued withdrawing the powers of the Hungarian Palatine and restoring Jellachich to his office. It seemed that all hope of agreement with the Magyar leaders had been abandoned, and that the long-deferred decision had been taken. Jellachich had only been waiting for the signal, and crossed the Drave at the head of a Croatian army. Deak and the moderate party in the Hungarian Diet abandoned politics in despair.

But the patriotic Batthyany had remained at his post, and one more effort was made by the Austrian ministry, with his approval and that a group of Hungarian nobles in the capital, to avert the armed conflict which would make any peaceful settlement impossible. The Hungarian general, Lamberg, was sent to Pesth to assume supreme command of all the military forces in Hungary, Croatian and Magyar alike. If only the troops could be brought to a halt, a moderate ministry might be appointed and fresh negotiations attempted. It was too late. Kossuth carried a resolution through the Diet rejecting the new commander-in-chief's authority, and the Pesth mob added a grim endorsement to the challenge by brutally doing him to death upon Buda bridge (September, 1848).

The Magyars had now to fight in good earnest for their national existence. They began with a success. Jellachich was checked at Veldencze, and found it prudent to retire, losing the whole of his rear-guard, which was surrounded during the retreat. But Kossuth and his

party had relied as much upon the Viennese as upon the national resources, and for the moment it seemed as though he was not to be disappointed. In July the promised general Assembly of Estates had met at Vienna. The progress of business was not rapid, for the gathering proved a very Babel of Slavonic tongues. But a committee was appointed to draft an entirely new Constitution, and one great and permanent reform was effected—the abolition of all feudal burdens and privileges. Nevertheless there were few who had not realised that all the issues which the last six months had raised would be decided not in the debates of the Assembly, but on the plains of Hungary. The increasing firmness of the government and the persistence with which Latour, minister of war, was despatching all available troops to the front, both provoked and encouraged fresh popular commotions. The unexpected mutiny of a regiment which was entraining at the railway station brought the crisis to a head. Latour was hunted out and murdered, and Vienna was for the third time at the mercy of a raging multitude.

But this rising, as it was the worst, was to be also the last of the series. The Emperor escaped to Olmutz, the majority of the Assembly withdrew to Brunn, and Jellachich, with the Croatian Army, abandoning the Hungarian war, appeared upon the hills above Vienna, though with insufficient forces to attempt the reduction of the city. Here he was joined by Prince Windischgratz, who assumed supreme command, and demanded instant submission. But under the heroic leadership of Bern, a Polish refugee, Vienna was to offer a better resistance than Prague. At the end of two days' bombardment the defenders were still unsubdued, and a general assault did no more than establish a footing in the town. Nevertheless, capitulation was in sight when the spirits of the citizens were unexpectedly revived by the news that the armies of Hungary were in full march to the rescue of their allies. But Windischgratz was not to be baulked of his prey. He maintained his positions while Jellachich, detached to cover the siege, routed the relieving force at Schwechat. Next day Vienna surrendered, and ceased to influence the course of events (October, 1848).

Hungary was thus left face to face with the united forces of the Imperial Government, a government now inspired by a spirit which rejected all compromises. The lead had been taken by Count Felix Schwarzenberg, whose political motto is said to have been "to speak out straight and to have 40,000 men to back the decision." Decisive measures were at least adopted. The Assembly was summoned to Kremsier, a place at a safe distance from popular influences. Ferdinand, who had compromised himself by his acceptance of the Hungarian Constitution was induced to abdicate, and his nephew, Francis Joseph, eighteen years of age, assumed the Imperial Crown. By the new Emperor's authority a Constitution was proclaimed for the Austrian dominions as an indivisible and united whole, and the Kremsier assembly, since it had been elected to give effect to arrangements consequent upon the division between Austria and Hungary, was accordingly dissolved.

In Hungary there was still no thought of surrender. The Diet refused to recognise Francis Joseph, and prepared for war. In December, Windischgratz passed the frontier. There were two circumstances advantageous to the Magyars—the concentration of the bulk of the Austrian Army in Italy, and the immense size of their own country, offering as it did more than one centre of resistance. There were two grave difficulties—the paucity of the national forces, and the fact that the frontier was encircled by enemies with separate and converging lines of approach. The two possible roads from Vienna were covered against the Austrian advance by the Hungarian commanders, Gorgei and Perczel respectively. Windischgratz took the southern road and beat Perczel at Moor. Gorgei, a cool-headed soldier, who was no friend to Kossuth, and whose policy was to gain time till both sides wearied of the struggle, declined to defend Pesth. The Diet accompanied by Kossuth retired to Debreczen. Even here its security was menaced by the southward movement of a Galician force under Schlick. But Windischgratz, after occupying the capital, moved so slowly as to allow Gorgei to get away through Waitzen into the mountainous districts on the

Gran. Thence he proceeded to effect a junction with Klapka, who was facing Schlick, and together the two Hungarian commanders forced the Galicians back towards the frontier.

But the conduct of these operations had not been decisive enough for Kossuth, and he now engaged the services of two Polish refugees. Bern was sent to Transylvania, where he beat the Austrian troops and even ejected a Russian force which had responded to the appeals of the Saxon population of Hermannstadt and Kronstadt. Meanwhile, Dembinski was directed to assume the offensive against Windischgratz. He found the Austrian commander reinforced by the army of Schlick, who had worked round to the north, and he sustained a decisive defeat at Kapolna, between the Danube and the Theiss (February, 1849).

But the defeat of Kapolna, which seemed to the Austrians to herald the end of the war, only roused the Magyars to fresh exertions. Gorgei, now as eager as Kossuth, pushed forward towards Pesth, drove the main Austrian army from Godollo into the capital, and following up his victory with the capture of Waitzen and the overthrow of another force at Nagy Sarlo, entered the fortress of Komorn. Pesth was evacuated by the invader, and in June Kossuth retook possession of the city. Before leaving Debreczen he had induced the Diet to shatter any lingering hopes of a settlement by proclaiming Hungary an independent republic and appointing himself "Governor-President." It was a fatal mistake.

The step completed the alienation of Gorgei, who had occupied himself in the siege of Buda instead of advancing, as Kossuth desired, upon Vienna. He and many of generals did not believe that the struggle could be maintained six months longer, and deplored the policy of war *à l'outrance*. *Indeed*, the end was now near. The proclamation of the republic had incurred the hostility of a new foe, as relentless as he was powerful, in the person of the Czar Nicholas; and Francis Joseph, whose resources were well-nigh as exhausted as those of Hungary, decided to appeal in his difficulties for Russian support under the terms of the treaty of Münchengratz. The peril of a brother sovereign, the dangerous proximity of his own Polish provinces to the Hungarian storm-centre, and his hatred of revolution were motives sufficient for the Czar. Without stipulating for advantage or reward he ordered his armies under Paskievich to cross the Carpathians.

In the meantime, the active and ruthless Baron Haynau had begun a steady advance from the west, had seized Raab and forced Gorgei to abandon Komorn and Pesth. The Russian advance deflected the Hungarian retreat in a south-easterly direction, and the government was obliged to remove to Szegedin, a position uncomfortably near the hostile Serb province. Haynau followed up his success. Encountering Dembinski at Szoreg on the Theiss, he forced him further southwards towards Temesvar, thus defeating the plans of Gorgei, who was falling back before the Russians by way of Arad, with the object of effecting a concentration of the Hungarian forces. Haynau now delivered his final stroke, and at Temesvar brought Dembinski's army to an engagement which terminated in its decisive overthrow.

The cause of Hungary was now hopeless, and Gorgei had already announced his resolve to make an end of the struggle. At Arad he forced Kossuth to abdicate and to invest him with full powers to act on his own discretion. Moving to Vilagos, he ordered his army to lay down their arms at the feet of the Russian commander (August, 1849).

A terrible vengeance was exacted of Hungary. Schwarzenberg determined to show no mercy, and Haynau's savage nature led him to improve upon his instructions. With many of the other leaders, Kossuth escaped to Turkey, where the Sultan, to his credit, refused to surrender him at the summons of Schwarzenberg and the Czar. Two years later he stirred the indignation of English audiences by his eloquent story of the sorrows of his native land.

His hearers were perhaps ignorant of the severities of his own patriotic tribunals, and they could not foresee that seven years afterwards they would be crying out for vengeance, at least as thorough as the Austrian, upon the authors of the Indian Mutiny.

CHAPTER XVI

ITALY IN REBELLION

THE impotence of the Austrian Government during the early weeks of the revolution and its increasing confidence in the later stages are alike explained by the course which events were taking south of the Alps.

The Italian situation at the opening of the year 1848 was big with the menace of coming war. The national feeling was urging the governments along the road to which their own separate ambitions and grievances were pointing, and was assuming in consequence an increasingly anti-Austrian complexion. Charles Albert was nettled by the Imperial opposition to his scheme for a railway across the Lukmanier Pass and by a tariff barrier erected against Piedmontese wines. Pius was indignant at the menace offered to his territory and to his independence of action by the occupation of Ferrara. Tuscany, recently the scene of an agitation for reform, quivered with apprehension of Austrian intervention; while the Grand Duke found himself for the moment in sympathy with his people, owing to the support offered by Austria to the Duke of Modena's claim upon certain Tuscan districts, as a compensation for the absorption of Lucca in Tuscany. There was talk of a commercial league between the three aggrieved rulers. But any definite action depended upon Charles Albert; and, though he would have resisted aggression, his ambitions were Piedmontese rather than Italian, and he was scarcely likely to take the initiative except with the prospect of securing some advantages in Lombardy.

And in Lombardy the situation was slowly gathering to a head. The old easy acquiescence and the old indifference to politics were gone. By infection from Piedmont schemes of material improvement began to stir men's minds, and these led by insensible degrees to more burning questions, as when Lombard and Venetian shareholders combined to modify the route selected by the authorities for the new line from Milan to Venice. Austrians were shunned in Milanese society; the election of an Italian as archbishop led to popular rejoicings in the streets, which were suppressed with exasperating violence; finally the Central Congregation, consisting of representatives of elected local bodies more ornamental than effective, presented a definite petition for an inquiry into the causes of the prevailing discontent.

There was as yet very little thought of resistance to the government. But it chanced, most unfortunately, that the controlling influence in the Austrian provincial counsels was that of Marshal Radetzky, a veteran martinet of the stiffest type, whose policy it was to chastise discontent with scorpions. He was reported to have said that three days of blood would guarantee thirty years of peace. The police became daily more minutely vexatious, while the half-humorous conspiracy to irritate and baffle them, which had been in progress since the archiepiscopal election, continued. Forbidden colours were worn, revolutionary tunes were whistled, or sung to nonsensical words, standing jokes greeted the appearance of soldier or policeman. At last some one hit upon something more practical. If patriots would but agree to abstain from tobacco it would serve the double purpose of proving the unanimity of popular feeling, and of inflicting a considerable loss upon the Austrian revenue. The joke, if it may be judged by its fatal results, was a gigantic success. For two days the few cigars that appeared in the streets were roughly confiscated by a laughing crowd. On the third day the troops organised a countermove in the childish game, and swaggered up and down in places of public resort directing clouds of smoke into the faces of all who

passed. Blows were exchanged, and resulted in cavalry charges and the use of the bayonet. Several persons were killed and more were wounded, and the breach between the citizens and those in authority was complete (January, 1848). But the outbreak was delayed while popular excitement gathered energy from events occurring elsewhere.

While most of the Italian rulers had been advancing, however hesitatingly, in the direction of national independence and even of reform, Ferdinand II of the Two Sicilies, had steadily retreated to a position of unyielding hostility to change. The contrast between the theoretical excellence of his government and its abominable character in practice provoked the activity of countless secret societies, and drove men who would have been moderates elsewhere to countenance the most desperate attempts. By January, 1848, revolutionary committees at Naples and in Sicily had agreed upon a simultaneous outbreak to extort a Constitution, and on the 12th Palermo rose. Townsmen and half-savage peasants from the surrounding country drove the troops by hand-to-hand fighting from street to street, and, rejecting every concession short of the Constitution of 1812, forced the Neapolitan commander to abandon the city. Their example was everywhere imitated. Before the end of the month the citadel of Messina was the only position of first-rate importance held for the King.

The Neapolitan conspirators had for the moment failed to play their part. But a peasant rising, magnified to gigantic proportions by report, accomplished by sheer terror what decisive action might have failed to win. The government dreaded a repetition of the scenes in Palermo. Even the troops wavered, and the revolutionists ventured at last to demonstrate in force. Then Ferdinand gave way without a struggle, and, with satirical professions of reforming zeal, granted of his own free will a Constitution to his people. The Neapolitan revolution gave definite shape to wishes which were widespread in Italy. Everywhere a Constitution became an object of desire, and what Ferdinand had granted no government which professed to regard the feelings of its subjects could refuse. Charles Albert led the way, his anti-Austrian prepossessions overcoming his instinctive dread of all the accompaniments of parliamentary government. The Grand Duke of Tuscany had neither the wish nor the power to resist. Even Pius, divided between a benevolent desire for good government accompanied by material improvement and a sensitive terror of finding himself committed to measures inconsistent with the traditions and claims of his office, could not resist the stream. His popularity had rested on great expectations; it was now barely maintained by a series of grudging fulfilments. Municipal government for the city of Rome, a regular ministry composed of laymen, finally, under the impulse of the news from Paris, a Constitution itself were successively wrung from him.

Meanwhile, in Milan the friction between the populace and the authorities had never ceased, and important communications had begun to pass between the leaders of opinion and Charles Albert. An explosion was imminent, when the spark fell from an unexpected quarter. On March 17, Milan learned with mingled amazement and joy that Metternich had fallen. Next day Imperial edicts promising concessions were found posted in public places. They were indignantly scribbled over with the words "Too late," and the whole population, with no better arms than stones, glass bottles, tiles, and sticks, flung themselves in a fury of enthusiasm upon Radetzky's garrison of 13,000 men. Barricades were thrown up in every street, every campanile pealed back frantic defiance to the volleys of the troops. Then came heavy rain, and the troops, soaked to the skin, demoralised by the resistance at the barricades, and pelted without intermission from the house-tops, gave ground everywhere. In vain Radetzky proposed an armistice. By March 22 he held no more of Milan than the Castle and the walls. Assisted by aid from outside, the citizens carried one of the gates. Lack of supplies and fear of a Piedmontese advance completed what the valour of the Milanese had begun. Radetzky evacuated the city, and began a steady retreat upon Venetia. Such were the "Five Days at Milan."

Behind the retreating army Venice, astir with the tidings from Vienna, hesitated on the brink of an outbreak. The Venetians shrank from exposing their city in all her matchless beauty to the risks of bombardment. The confident audacity of Daniele Manin, a lawyer of Jewish extraction, carried them through the crisis. He roused the people, he pushed the panic-stricken Austrians from one fatal concession to another, he extorted successively permission to enrol a National Guard, the surrender of the arsenal into his own hands, and finally the withdrawal of both army and fleet y from before the city.

The news of these successes was the call to arms for which Italy had been waiting. All over Lombardy and Venetia the provincial cities followed the example of the capitals. The Dukes of Parma and Modena fled. The Grand Duke of Tuscany declared war on Austria to secure himself from their fate; and from his own dominions, from Piedmont, from the Papal States, even from Naples volunteers streamed to the front. Ferdinand talked of sending the Neapolitan army to the aid of the national movement. And now, in spite of a hesitating ministry, Charles Albert nerved himself to the great decision which was to determine the future of his country and of his house. On March 23, 1848, he offered his assistance to Lombardy and Venetia.

It was an important accession of strength, for the victorious Milanese had neglected their opportunity. In the intricacies of the irrigated tract which lay between Milan and the Mincio, the operations of a handful of active irregulars might have brought Radetzky to a standstill before he could have reached a position of safety. But the Piedmontese army, ill-found in supplies and destitute of leaders of strategic ability, proved equally incapable of accepting the gifts of fortune. An enterprising commander would have dashed down the Po past Radetzky's left flank, would have seized Mantua and thrust the Austrians northwards with their backs against the disaffected Alpine districts of the Tyrol. Delay gave the enemy time to establish himself within the famous Quadrilateral.

The position claims a short notice. From Lake Garda the Mincio runs south to the Po. At its egress from the lake lies the fortified town of Peschiera, and where it enters the marshes which border the Po stand the still more formidable defences of Mantua. The river thus offers a line of resistance between the plain of Lombardy and Venetia, with one flank resting upon the lake and the Alps, the other on the marshes of the Po. Parallel to the Mincio the Adige descends through the Brenner Pass, which affords the most direct line of communication with the Austrian capital. At the mouth of the pass stands Verona, and the possession of this fortress is therefore essential to the very existence of an Austrian army in Italy. Lower down the stream, eastward of Mantua, is Legnago, the fourth stronghold of the group. The strength of the whole position consists in the fact that an enemy who forces the Mincio must turn north-eastwards against Verona, only to find his rear threatened by Mantua and his right flank by Legnago.

In the first week of April the Piedmontese forced the passage of the Mincio at Goito, and established positions on the Sommacampagna, a line of hills facing Verona. Peschiera was thus isolated and exposed to siege, while bands of volunteers surrounded Mantua and occupied Venetian territory. But here Charles Albert's strategy failed him. A victory at Pastrengo gave him the chance of sending troops to stiffen the irregulars who had entered the Tyrol. Had he done so the Brenner might have been closed and Verona starved out. As it was, the invaders were dispersed, and the passes kept open. Meantime a month's delay was producing serious political effects. An immediate victory was essential to maintain enthusiasm, and at the beginning of May an assault was directed on the Austrian lines which covered Verona. Heroic fighting carried the centre at Santa Lucia, but the Kling, dispirited by failure elsewhere, and failing to perceive the tactical advantage of having cut the enemy's line, ordered a retreat.

The check reacted unfavourably upon a situation which was already becoming serious. The fear of annexation at the hands of Piedmont, a fear to which the actions of some of her agents had given some countenance, weakening of was beginning to weaken the resolution of the movement, governments. The Pope's nationalist feeling, genuine as it was, proved not strong enough to neutralise his aversion to war against a Catholic power. It was very unwillingly that he had allowed his ministers to despatch a force under Durando to support the Piedmontese, and at the end of April he issued an "Allocution," in which he proclaimed his hatred for war, and his equal love for all peoples. It was not his intention to announce defection, but few failed to take his words in that sense. He had now implicitly recognised the impotence which his office imposed upon his sympathies. As Mrs. Browning wrote of him—

" His heart beats warm,
But, like the Prince enchanted to the waist,
He sits in stone and hardens by a charm
Into the marble of his throne high-placed."

The clergy accordingly began to drift away from the nationalist cause. Ferdinand of Naples, among many other perplexities, had never troubled himself with sympathies. The Constitution had not rescued him from his difficulties; it had not satisfied the reformers, alleviated distress, or put an end to the dangerous disorders of the country. Taking alarm at the symptoms of another rising, he massed his available troops in the capital and let them loose upon the populace. One day of pillage and slaughter made an end of all resistance, and left him free to recall those regiments which were already on their way, under Pepe, to the seat of war. The ideal of an independent federation of Italian States had become impossible.

Had Charles Albert been a man of another mould it is just possible that an appeal to all the peoples of Italy might have anticipated the later union under the Piedmontese Lombardy and Crown. But as it was, even North Italy was falling asunder. Lombardy had not lived up to the promise of the Five Days. Little attempt had been made to form a Lombard army, a republican faction was frankly opposed to union with Piedmont, and the Press fiercely criticised the conduct of a war which the people had left to be fought out by others. Under the circumstances it is not surprising that Piedmont should have urged the immediate "fusion" with herself of Lombardy and Venetia, thus forestalling arrangements which were to have been left till the end of the war. *Plébiscites* in Lombardy and in Venetia decided for fusion; the city of Venice, where Manin had proclaimed the Republic of St. Mark, followed with more hesitation. But the union did not make for strength. The other governments saw their suspicions confirmed, and the traditional French jealousy of a powerful State in Northern Italy was aroused.

Meanwhile, the war had entered upon a new stage. Charles Albert, sadly hampered by the lack of any recognised control over the movements of his allies, had been obliged to leave Venetia to the doubtful protection of Papal troops and volunteers, and at the end of April an Austrian relieving army, under Nugent, burst over the eastern passes by way of Udine, routed a body of volunteers at Comuda, while Durando and the Papal troops remained inactive, and, after failing to capture Vicenza, reached Verona from the north-east. Encouraged by the slowness of the Piedmontese, Radetzky now ventured upon a bold counterstroke to save Peschiera. By a perilous flank march he moved round the Piedmontese right to Mantua, crossed the Mincio, and turned north, thus menacing the enemy's rear. But at Curtatone he met with a gallant resistance from a small Tuscan force,

which, though overwhelmed by numbers, secured enough time to enable Charles Albert to prepare another line of defence at Goito and to bring the advance to a standstill. The stroke had failed, and Radetzky fell back hastily upon Mantua to learn that Peschiera had fallen.

Fortune had now placed in Charles Albert's hands the choice between two brilliant opportunities. He might have flung himself upon Verona and carried the town in the absence of its defenders, or he might have struck hard at the flank of Radetzky as he retired towards the Brenner. He did neither, and by his inactivity even allowed his opponent to compel Durando to surrender Vicenza, thus ensuring the Austrian communications with the eastern passes. During the pause which followed, Charles Albert made the mistake of lengthening out his line in order to undertake the blockade of Mantua. Accordingly on the arrival of fresh reinforcements, Radetzky resolved to take the offensive and to penetrate the Piedmontese centre on the Sommacampagna. The heights round Custozza were carried, and, in spite of the gallant leading of the King of Piedmont's two sons, who twice over stormed positions in the heart of the Austrian line, want of co-operation and the failure of the commissariat compelled a general retreat.

The line of the Mincio was already broken through and had to be abandoned. But the situation was not yet hopeless. The army might have crossed the Po and threatened Radetzky's left, if the King had not refused to uncover Milan. The line of the Adda might have been held against the Austrian advance, but his quixotic resolve to defend Cremona enabled the enemy to anticipate the attempt. The defeated army struggled back to Milan in the opening days of August. Here the spirit of the people seemed to give promise of a successful defence. But supplies were scarce, the artillery had gone astray, and, rightly or wrongly, his military advisers put pressure on the King to capitulate, in spite of his promises to the townsmen. Overwhelmed with shame, assailed in his quarters by the enraged people, whom he had come to deliver and had ended by abandoning, the unhappy Charles Albert was extricated by his troops, and with them withdrew from the city, amid the curses of the Milanese. On August 9, by the armistice of Vigevano, Piedmont abandoned all for which she had fought.

Italy, in the bitterness of failure looked angrily about for victims upon whom to vent her disappointment, and found them in the Moderate party and in the House of Savoy, who were accused of mismanaging the national movement. Everywhere democratic feeling gained in intensity and won fresh adherents. In Piedmont these tendencies took almost entirely the form of an eager desire for the renewal of the war; elsewhere the ideas of Mazzini were recovering their popularity, and they reacted in the first instance upon the domestic situation. At Rome the "Allocution" had all but destroyed the popularity of the Pope. He had been obliged to accept a ministry of a democratic complexion under Mamiani, who had tried quite vainly to mediate between the demands of the people and his master's ill-concealed restiveness. At the news of Custozza, the harassed minister threw up the desperate game, and, at the end of August, Pius placed Pellegrino Rossi at the head of the government.

Rossi had been a professor of law at Bologna, and afterwards at Paris, he was a supporter of national independence, and a friend of reform, and he had suffered exile for his opinions. But his residence in France and his friendship for Guizot had coloured his views with a strong preference for a policy conforming to the ideals of the middle classes. He stood for the repression of disorder and for financial and administrative improvement. Pius was well pleased with an adviser who set himself to curb disorder, and treated the Temporal Power as an axiom. But the most divergent interests united in hostility towards the minister whose unsympathetic and harsh personality scorned the enthusiasms of the democrats, and whose hand fell heavily upon the laziness and corruption of the officials. On November 15, as he was entering the Chamber, he was struck down by the dagger of Brunetti, son of the demagogue, Ciceruacchio.

The democrats, who now controlled the streets and terrorised the Chamber, advanced in procession to the Quirinal and late in the day attacked the gates. Some days afterwards the Pope left Rome in disguise, and threw himself upon the hospitality of King Ferdinand at Gaeta, where he fell under the reactionary influence of Cardinal Antonelli, which was to dominate the rest of his life. Rome, after an interval of consternation, accepted the challenge. A Constituent Assembly was elected p by universal suffrage, which, on February 8, proclaimed the Roman Republic. Garibaldi, fresh from the last desperate guerilla struggle in Lombardy, and Mazzini, full of hope for the realisation of his visions, had hastened to the spot.

Fierce rioting in Leghorn, and agitation all over Tuscany had brought into power a democratic lawyer, named Guerazzi, whose policy was to restore order by liberal concessions, coupled with a firm attitude towards violence. A Constituent Assembly for Tuscany was promised by the Grand Duke; but when the democrats at Rome proposed a Constituent Assembly for the whole of Italy, and his own ministers pressed him to acquiesce, he left Florence suddenly, rather than give his tacit approval to the deposition of the Pope. After three weeks of painful Grand Duke! indecision between the alternatives of throwing himself upon Piedmontese or upon Neapolitan support, he accepted an invitation to Gaeta. Already, on February 8, a meeting of Florentine citizens in Orcagna's Loggia had established a provisional government.

Piedmont all this while, though completely out of touch with the democratic movements, without hope of help from abroad and divided in opinion at home, was drifting, under the influence of wounded pride and indignation at Radetzky's severities in Lombardy, into a renewal of the war. On March 12, Charles Albert denounced the armistice, and Chrzanovski, a Polish refugee, who had displaced the discredited Piedmontese generals, set the army in motion. It was open to the new commander either to hold the Ticino, or to cross the Po and rouse Parma and Modena against the Austrian flank. But the former course was too passive to promise decisive success, and the latter would uncover Turin. Chrzanovski instructed Ramorino to hold a position at La Cava, near the mouth of the Ticino, to guard the principal approach from Lombardy, while he himself with the rest of his forces struck across the river higher up its course in the neighbourhood of Magenta with the object of reaching Milan. But his own advance was slow, and Ramorino disobeyed orders, with the result that when Radetzky appeared with every available man before La Cava no serious resistance was possible. Chrzanovski was obliged to hurry back, only to come in contact near Mortara with the Austrians now moving north to intercept his retreat. Of the two columns in which his troops marched, one was crushed, the other, though signally successful, failed to render the support which would have turned defeat into victory. The whole army retreated to a position covering Novara.

Here, on March 23, it was attacked by the enemy's advance guard in greatly inferior numbers, and nothing stood between the Piedmontese and victory but the insane refusal of their commander to permit a charge, headed by the King's sons, which would have swept the Austrians off the field. The opportunity was fleeting, and as the afternoon wore on the enemy's reinforcements came up.

Charles Albert, fighting like a paladin, had courted death throughout the day, and, when night fell and his generals would no longer resist, he resolved to sacrifice his country from intolerable terms. Before morning he had abdicated, and was on his way to far-off Portugal, there to die a broken and disappointed man. Long as he had hesitated, often as he had compromised, mingled as his motives had been with baser elements of ambition and fear, he had never abandoned his sympathy for the national cause, and on the two supreme occasions had made the right decision. Italy justly inscribes the name of the Royal Waverer upon her roll of martyrs. And Piedmont was not yet decisively beaten. The strength

of her army, the attitude of England and France, the resolute determination of her people to suffer no dishonour forced Austria to negotiate.

But elsewhere the flowing tide of reaction gathered strength from the news of Novara. Ferdinand II had weathered the storm when he recovered his hold upon the capital, and now traded astutely upon the divisions of his enemies. By a pretended respect for the Constitution he induced the reforming party in Naples to look on while his generals harried the revolted districts of Calabria into submission, and he prepared to undertake the more difficult task of reducing Sicily, with full confidence that the islanders would find little sympathy on the mainland. For, unable to obtain the concessions they desired, the Sicilians had embarked upon a purely separatist policy, in which the questions of national unity and the expulsion of the Austrians had no place. Confident in their insular position, and strong in the hope of French and English support, they declared Ferdinand deposed, and proceeded to elect Charles Albert's second son, the Duke of Genoa, as their King. But the Duke delayed his acceptance, and in the meantime their leaders had shown themselves unequal to the tasks of keeping order among the half-savage population, and of raising an effective army.

In September the blow fell. A Neapolitan expedition landed at Messina. A ruthless bombardment was followed by a savage massacre, and, gallantly as the ministry under Cordova struggled on at Palermo, it was the beginning of the end. Ferdinand now offered terms. His ultimatum contained promises of a Constitution and of a separate parliament, but so guarded by reservations of his prerogative as to make them illusory. Sicily elected once more to try the chances of war. But the resistance of the eastern coast under the Pole Mieroslavski was crushed by the capture of Catania, and the ultimatum had already been accepted when the rising died as it had been born, in a fierce struggle among the streets of Palermo. King "Bomba," as he was henceforward called, had recovered his authority without foreign assistance, and proceeded to use it without deference to foreign scruples (May 9, 1849).

In Tuscany Austrian intervention was scarcely needed to accelerate the end of a movement which was collapsing from its own inherent weakness. Nobles and Moderates were alienated from Guerrazzi's government by its relations with the sacrilegious Roman Republic; the peasants dreaded nothing more than being dragged into war; the radical factions were irritated by necessary measures of coercion. A riot in Florence brought the government to the ground, and a new provisional authority declared for the Grand Duke (April, 1849). But the Austrians were determined not to miss their opportunity. On the pretext of reducing Leghorn to order, D'Aspre occupied both that city and Florence, and from the moment when Leopold returned in July he was as much an Austrian vassal as the Dukes of Parma and Modena, who owed the restoration of their thrones entirely to the invader. He not unnaturally followed their example in making an end of Constitutional Government.

But it was on Rome that the eyes of Italy and of all Europe were fastened, for round the walls of the Eternal City was being enacted a drama of surprises in which two of the heroes of the revolution played the principal parts and a new actor made his debut upon the European stage. Mazzini, the prophet of United Italy, had become the head of a Triumvirate charged with the government of the new republic. Men watched with amazement the visionary revolutionist, while bating nothing of his enthusiasm, setting himself with wise tolerance and practical capacity to the difficult work of reform, and winning alike the hearts and the reason of his subjects.

At his side was Garibaldi, the man of action, a born leader of men, with his picturesque following arrayed in the red shirts and wearing the long hair which they had adopted on the Pampas. His leonine face and yellow beard, his generous sympathies and his kindly heart

won all who came in contact with him; while his confused and illogical intelligence made him ever the instrument of other men's designs or of his own prejudices. "Heart of gold and brains of an ox," D'Azeglio said of him. He was at this moment the sword of the infant State, great in fight but by his perversity a thorn in the side of those in authority.

And Rome had need of him. Every Roman Catholic State was eager to defend the Pope, and, while others deliberated, France acted. Louis Napoleon, now President of the Second Republic, stood in need of the Catholic vote, and was prepared to pay a price of which he could not then foresee the fatal consequences. At the end of April a French expedition under Oudinot landed at Civita Vecchia. Under cover of friendly professions it attempted the surprise of two gates reported to exist in the city wall where it skirted the Vatican. One gate proved to have been long since blocked up, the other, situated in an angle of the wall, exposed the assaulting troops to a deadly converging fire. A sortie against the French flank and line of retreat completed Oudinot's discomfiture, and compelled him for a while to await reinforcements.

Meanwhile Bomba, eager for the credit of restoring the Pope, had occupied the Alban Hills. Garibaldi, moving out upon Palestrina to the north-east to threaten the Neapolitan line of retreat, was attacked there, and repulsed the enemy. Obligated by the attitude of the French to return to Rome, he was not able to develop his original plan till ten days later, when, advancing to Velletri, south-east of the Alban Hills, he forced the retirement of the Neapolitans, fell upon their flank in retreat, and scared them into a hasty evacuation of the Papal States (May, 19).

On June 3, the French abandoned the negotiations which had been proceeding without effect, and surprised at dawn the Villa Corsini and the neighbouring buildings, which formed an outpost covering the gate of San Pancrazio in the western wall of the city. All day by charge after charge, conducted with heroic gallantry, but directed with little tactical skill, the defenders strove for the recovery of a position from which the French could support operations against the wall. But all in vain. From that moment the Republic was doomed and though, when the artillery had effected several breaches, a nine days' desperate defence was offered on the line of the wall, there remained by June 30, no choice but to submit. Only a small but gallant band accompanied Garibaldi in a dash through the very midst of pursuing columns across country to San Marino, and thence finally dispersed.

Venice alone still maintained the desperate struggle. On the news of the armistice of Vigevano, Manin had repudiated the decree of fusion with Piedmont. In a city well supplied with provisions, loyally supported by the military leaders under the control of the Neapolitan Pepe, and seconded by a spirit of noble self-sacrifice among the citizens, he held out against assault and bombardment till the end of August, showing all the enthusiasm, wisdom, and serene constancy of a great leader. And when famine and cholera supervened, and foreign assistance was no longer to be hoped for, he won the assent of his reluctant countrymen to a capitulation by which they were spared the worst humiliations of defeat.

Thus all Italy lay prostrate. The enthusiasm of the early months of the revolution had been noble and inspiring. But, as Cavour afterwards said, there were "too many songs about freeing Italy". Many indeed there were who could surrender themselves to the inspiration of the Five Days, or of the fight round the Porta San Pancrazio, but few had learnt the discipline, self-restraint, and self-sacrifice which sends men to a distant war and keeps them in the field. The Constitutional movement had proved in the event a source of weakness, giving an outlet to all the jealousies of party and of class. Worst of all, perhaps, Piedmont had not produced a general nor Italy a statesman.

Amid the general ruin the constancy of Piedmont was winning the respect of Italy and

of Europe. In the crisis of her destiny she had found the King she needed in Victor Emmanuel II. His blunt, hearty manner, his straightforwardness of speech and thought, his sterling common-sense, firm will and solid reverence for fact were to be no small part of the resources of Italy in her next struggle. After Novara he firmly refused to continue a hopeless war, and twice dissolved his parliament rather than yield to the cry for fighting to the bitter end. With equal firmness he declined all offers that Austria could make to induce him to abolish the Constitution. And this loyalty to his father's promise to observe the Statute was a fitting introduction to the new reign. The Royal Waverer's son was to be known as Il Re Galantuomo, the Royal Man of Honour, long before men learnt to style him King of United Italy.

CHAPTER XVII

THE GERMAN NATIONAL EXPERIMENT

THE news of the February revolution in Paris found Germany in a peculiarly receptive mood. For years, in spite of repressive measures, men had been thinking, discussing, writing, and even intermittently demonstrating, and while on the restricted stage of the middle-sized States the methods of popular agitation and Constitutional government had been vigorously if somewhat crudely rehearsed in a variety of phases. Moreover, in Germany, where the agitation had been from the first something of an intellectual movement, the imagination of the educated classes, who were principally affected, responded readily to the stimulus of a distant catastrophe, which would have been inoperative elsewhere without the aid of intolerable local grievances.

With singular unanimity the fires of revolutionary activity were everywhere re-kindled, and ran sputtering and flaming through the States of the Confederation. A detailed account of these movements would serve no good purpose, there was a general demand states, in the towns for wider individual liberty and increased popular control, while in the country districts the peasants were in arms against the landowners. There was little power of resistance in the Governments, and concession was the order of the day. Thus, for the moment the forces of "particularism," as the jealous policy of the territorial princes has been called, were paralysed.

The time was therefore favourable to plans for the establishment of effective national unity. An organised national party had been some time in existence, and in October, 1847, a public meeting at Heppenheim had accepted a tentative programme for the remodelling of the Confederation on national and popular lines. On March 5 a self-chosen gathering of fifty-three reformers assembled at Heidelberg, and proceeded to take definite steps. A committee of seven was appointed to summon a *Vorparlament*, or preliminary convention, to be elected on a wide popular franchise. This committee provisionally accepted a scheme submitted by Heinrich von Gagern, by which the Constitution to be established was to consist of a President, an Upper Chamber representing the governments of the separate States, and a Lower Chamber elected by the people. The central authority thus constituted was to take over the entire regulation of commerce, foreign affairs, and national defence throughout Germany.

It is clear that in the long run the success or failure of these proposals would depend upon the attitude of the governments of the separate States, who alone commanded the forces necessary to crush or sustain the national movement; for the old Diet, conscious of its weakness, had already assumed a friendly neutrality. Austria, occupied with her own revolution, could for the time being be neglected. A considerable proportion of the princes, influenced by their newly-appointed progressive ministries, had given in their adhesion. Bavaria indeed was openly hostile. But neither the support nor the opposition of the minor princes could be effective to counteract the weight of Prussia and of the Prussian army as soon as the inevitable moment arrived when it must be thrown into one or other of the scales.

And as yet Prussia had not spoken. Frederick William IV was not insensible to the glamour of the nationalist ideal of unity. But he held two strong prejudices which were in the end to make it impossible for him to contribute to its realisation in practice. One was his

loyal veneration for Austria. For the moment Austria had no attention to spare for Germany, but her influence was to tell later, and there could be little doubt in which direction it would be exercised. The other was his rooted distrust of all movements of a democratic character, which led him from the outset, with the approval of his friend and confidant Radowitz, to suggest an alternative method of arriving at unity through the action of a congress of German princes. The position of the princes was, in fact, the crux both of the Prussian and of the popular scheme, for, as the latter could scarcely count upon their ultimate neutrality, the former was as little likely to secure their initial consent, in view of the certain diminution of their authority.

But events now occurring in Berlin were to efface Prussian influence in Germany almost as completely as that of Austria had already been obliterated. At the beginning of March disturbances were rife in the western and eastern provinces, and Berlin was full of ominous symptoms of growing agitation, stimulated by an influx of alien refugees. The ministry, on the eve of retiring from an impossible position, had induced the King to put his signature to a decree convoking for the second time the Combined Estates, and declaring in favour of a national representative Constitution for Germany (March 18, 1848). On the news of these concessions dense crowds began to throng the approaches to the palace. Their attitude became more and more menacing as the morning advanced, till it became ultimately necessary for Von Pritwitz, who commanded the troops, to attempt the task of clearing the palace square. A body of dragoons, covered by infantry on either flank, was drawn across the open space and began slowly to push the crowd back. Some little scuffling ensued, one or two troopers drew their sabres, and two muskets were let off by accident. Not a soul was injured. But the incident was enough to turn the ugly temper of the crowd to downright fury. With cries of "Murder," and "Treason," they fell to raising barricades, where fighting was soon in progress between the rioters and the troops.

The Prussian soldiers were no National Guards to fraternise with rebels, and Von Pritwitz would speedily have cleared the streets and made Frederick William master of the situation in his own capital and free to make his own decision on the German question. But the King could not make up his mind to order an advance. He was torn by irresolution and urged by well-meaning advisers along the path of concession on which he had already set foot. Most of all he was influenced by the horror of finding himself at odds with the people, whose devoted loyalty to his person was one of his illusions. Clinging to this belief he issued a proclamation calling upon "his dear Berliners" to disperse, and promising to withdraw the troops. Next day he even bettered his promises, ordering the soldiers back to their quarters while the mob still stood at their barricades, and actually consenting to a distribution of arms among the people for the purpose of constituting a National Guard. The evening witnessed the abject spectacle of a Prussian King standing bare-headed on his balcony, while a procession defiled before him, escorting the bodies of the fallen rioters. The troops were now ordered out of Berlin. With them went the King's brother, Prince William, whose strong dislike to concession had made him an object of popular dread, and had earned him the name of the "Cartridge Prince." Shame and disgust were universal in official and military circles, and found no more energetic expression than in the mouth of young Otto von Bismarck.

There was worse to come. Abandoned to his new advisers and more than half sincere in his desire to go with the wishes of his subjects, the unhappy King allowed himself to issue a proclamation declaring that thence forward Prussia was absorbed in Germany, and even consented to ride in solemn state through the streets of Berlin wearing a sash displaying the red, black, and gold colours of the German nationalist movement (March 21, 1848). His unlucky ride deprived Prussia of a decisive voice in determining the direction of events, while it inspired little desire among those who were now free to elaborate their own schemes to seek the championship of one whose conduct had been so equivocal.

For, in the meantime, the *Vorparlament* had met, without waiting for the sanction of the governments, and had summoned a National Assembly consisting of a single chamber to meet at Frankfort on May 18, a step which had received the sanction of the historic Diet. Thus far the work of the Nationalist party had proved easy, so easy, indeed, that the leaders had failed entirely to realise the supreme need of rapid and decisive action. Everything depended upon the question whether Germany could place her new institutions in a position of unassailable strength before Austria could free her hands of embarrassments in Hungary and Italy. It was the end of June before a provisional government had been appointed. The Archduke John of Austria, who was generally acceptable on account of his easy popular manners and his known dislike of Metternich's repressive policy, was proclaimed Imperial Vicar, with power to nominate a ministry responsible to the Assembly, through whom he was to assume control of the foreign, commercial, and military policy of the German nation.

This done, the Assembly, swayed by logic rather than by practical considerations, made the fatal choice of deciding in the first instance to settle the Fundamental Rights of all German subjects. The congenial theme was handled with great eloquence, but not without some interruptions, till the middle of October, and in the meantime Germany was losing faith in her representatives, and had seen their authority treated with indifference on more occasions than one.

Of these the most important was an episode which demonstrated the utter futility of the Assembly's claim to control the foreign policy and military action of Germany at large. The racial and political borders of the Scandinavian and German worlds were ill-defined, and irreconcilable differences smouldered along the Danish frontier, which only awaited the revival of German national feeling to burst into flame. Some account of the history of the Baltic powers since 1814 becomes therefore necessary, and will involve but a short digression from the main narrative.

Sweden, deprived of Finland by Russia, and united with Norway which had been torn from Denmark, entered upon a new era under Charles XIII and his adopted heir, the French Marshal Bernadotte, who ascended the throne in 1818 as Charles XIV. Every inch a king, this brilliant, gifted, and attractive personality succeeded in conciliating the goodwill of all the European Powers alike, and, unable though he was to speak the Swedish language, his energy, activity, and passion for improvement started his adopted country on sure paths of material progress. The finances were restored; agriculture, commerce, and industry made rapid strides under the King's encouragement; roads, canals, and harbours were constructed. Not the least of Bernadotte's achievements was the maintenance, in spite of much friction, of the union with Norway. In 1814 that country, objecting to the transfer of her crown to Sweden, had declared herself independent under a Danish prince. Bernadotte had easily overwhelmed her resistance, but had recognised by the *Riksakt* her separate existence under his Crown with a democratic legislature of two houses, known as the *Storting*. By a combination of firmness and astuteness he had averted the intervention of the other Powers in the difficult question as to the share she was to bear of the Danish debt. But Norway was sensitive, Charles XIV was by instinct an absolutist, and relations were never cordial. Even with the Swedish Diet, constituted on the old-fashioned system in four separate Estates, there was strife in the period preceding the King's death in 1844, after which, owing partly to the personal popularity of his son and successor the kindly Oscar I, and partly to the alarm engendered by the events of 1848, political agitation receded into the background.

The condition of Denmark in 1814 was even more deplorable than that "from which Bernadotte rescued Sweden. Debt, the loss of Norway, the ruin of the capital owing to the English bombardment, were among the darkest features of a gloomy situation. Happily Frederick VI, an honest, kind-hearted soldier, who had borne more than his share of his

country's misfortunes, was honoured with the same affection which had clung to Frederick William III in Prussia. Never repressive in his policy, he had, before his death in 1839, established four provincial Diets for Jutland, Schleswig, Holstein, and the islands. His nephew and successor, Christian VIII, who lived to belie the hopes of constitutional reform which his early career had excited, was at least a strong and capable ruler, and the reorganisation of the finances, the recovery of prosperity and much humane legislation, are to be set down to his credit. But his reign was clouded with the menace of the Schleswig-Holstein question. It was not, however, his fault that Denmark did not succeed in establishing a modus vivendi with these dependencies, as Sweden had done with Norway. The problems they presented were, in fact, all but insoluble.

The Schleswig-Holstein question was three-fold. It was at once a national, a legal, and a dynastic question. The national issue was as follows:—

The Duchy of Holstein was German in population, and, though a possession of the Danish Crown, was a member of the Germanic Confederation, just as Hanover had long continued to be in spite of the fact that its Electors were kings of England. The German population resented Danish rule, and dreaded political incorporation. These considerations suggest the possibility of reaching a solution on nationalist lines by detaching Holstein from the Danish Crown. But the national issue was not in reality quite so simple. There was a large Germanic element in the population of Schleswig, and some districts were almost exclusively German. And this difficulty was accentuated by the legal aspect of the case. Schleswig had never been, any more than Holstein, an integral part of the Danish Kingdom. It was equally a duchy belonging to the Danish King in his capacity of Duke., And, what was more important, the Treaty of Ribe in the year 1460 had recognised that the two Duchies were inseparable, a principle which had hitherto passed unquestioned. It is clear that, German national claims once admitted in Holstein, a tolerable case could be urged for their extension to Schleswig. It is equally clear that any such extension must bring the national sympathies of the Danish people for their compatriots into the field. The strongest party in Denmark, the Eider-Dane group, would therefore have been content with something less than the whole territory in dispute, and would have accepted a partition following the line of the Eider, which divided Schleswig from Holstein.

The dynastic question served to bring these contending claims to an immediate conflict by presenting to the Germans the prospect of an easy and automatic realisation of their most extreme demands, while it imposed aspect upon the Danish Crown and people the necessity of taking immediate precautions to guard against impending dismemberment. Frederick, son and heir of Christian VIII, was childless, and by the terms of the Lex Regia of 1665, permitting the succession of females, the Crown of Denmark would naturally pass to the descendants of the reigning King's sister, Charlotte. But in the duchies the ancient Salic Law, excluding females from the succession, still held good. Separation was therefore in sight unless decisive steps were taken.

Accordingly, in 1846, Christian VIII issued an open letter declaring that the law of succession which held good for Denmark was applicable to the duchies of Schleswig and of Lauenberg, but that in the case of Holstein the legal position was not clear. In 1848 his successor, Frederick VII, went further. Obligated by popular pressure to grant a Constitution, he was unable to do so without either affirming or denying the Danish view of the relation between the kingdom and the duchies. The Constitution was accordingly drafted for the whole territory under the Danish Crown, and was therefore a direct challenge to German feeling. Holstein revolted and established a provisional government.

Frederick William IV was invited to interfere. He had just made his astonishing submission, and was anxious to prove his sincerity as well as to recover his lost credit. But

he did not wait for the authorisation of the National Assembly. His troops, under Wrangel, entered Holstein and invaded Schleswig, whereupon the Assembly solemnly issued their belated commission to the King of Prussia to act on the national behalf. But the dreams alike of the Assembly and of the King were rudely dispelled. The Powers interposed to protect Denmark, and Frederick William had no choice but to recall his army. In vain the legislators at Frankfort insisted that Prussia was but their instrument, and that they alone could authorise withdrawal. The Danes refused to recognise their existence, and Frederick William could not afford to defy the Powers. Prussia, acting as an independent belligerent, concluded the truce of Malmoe, by which Schleswig was to be evacuated, and a temporary joint commission of Prussians and Danes was to administer the affairs of Holstein (August, 1848).

The impotence of the Assembly was now conclusively proved, but it was to receive a still more striking illustration. The members adopted the undignified course of rejecting the Malmoe truce, only to rescind the resolution some days later. The wiser heads had at last realised that an unprotected body of legislators did but imperil their own work by defying the only armed power of any consequence which had favoured their plans. Germany did not fail to mark the humiliation. Nor were humiliations at an end. Democratic Frankfort broke out into riot on the news of the second vote, and two members of the moderate party were barbarously murdered before Prussian troops had restored order.

With impaired credit the Assembly approached in October the task of drafting a Constitution, which involved a preliminary question of great difficulty. It was necessary to decide whether the German territories of Austria were to be included within the new State or not. German national feeling was strongly in favour of inclusion, but Austria, under the guidance of Schwarzenberg, was now in a position to answer the question for herself. The Hapsburg territories were to be constituted as a centralised kingdom, and no distinction implying special and different obligations in one group of provinces was likely to be recognised. Schwarzenberg demanded the inclusion of the entire Austrian monarchy with all her non-German dependencies. This proposal was distasteful alike on sentimental grounds, and because it would have given Austria a preponderance in the national councils over all the other States put together.

Regretfully the majority at Frankfort fell back upon the alternative of a narrower Germany from which Austria should be excluded. And since it was daily more evident that Austria, unable to enter on her own terms, would resent the exclusion of her influence from a field in which it had been all-powerful, the scales at length dropped from the eyes of the Assembly, and they saw how entirely the issue of their labours must depend on the friendly co-operation of Prussia. The Constitution was hastily completed, and on March 28 it was resolved to offer the position of German Emperor to Frederick William IV.

The offer found Frederick William no longer in the melting mood. Weary of democratic dictation and of mob violence, he had in the previous October plucked up courage to occupy the capital with troops, a measure which was effected without resistance. The legislature having refused to obey an order to withdraw to Brandenburg, the new ministry, under Count Brandenburg, received authority to dissolve it. The blow was followed up by the issue of a fresh Constitution, a modification of the old in a sense favourable to the authority of the Crown.

The King of Prussia had thus recovered his liberty of action. He now met the deputation from Frankfort with an answer which was tantamount to a refusal of the Imperial dignity (April 3), and from this moment the National Assembly began to melt away. The Austrian deputies withdrew in April, those of Prussia in May, and the bulk of the abler and wiser members speedily followed their example. The last struggles of the minority against

a foregone conclusion claim no notice.

Thus ended a great Constitutional experiment, one highly honourable to those who shared in it. The end proposed was nothing less than the realisation of the destiny which patriotism and enlightenment claimed for Collapse of the Germany; the men who took part in the work were for the most part distinguished by high-mindedness and ability the Constitution was an achievement of which more experienced statesmen need not have been ashamed. But the times were unpropitious, and the leaders singularly incapable of reading the signs of the times. Bismarck, in his brutal way, passed a true verdict upon their work when he said, in later years, "It cannot be done with speeches and celebrations and songs, it can only be done with blood and iron." Indeed, the common criticism on Frederick William's action as a "great refusal" which postponed for twenty years the destiny of Germany fails to take account of important facts. Doubtless the King was unduly influenced by his respect for Austria and by his distaste for a crown "picked up out of the mud" of revolution. But Austria would have fought rather than accept the new Empire, and behind Austria stood the Czar, while the lesser kingdoms of Germany would have lent no support to a system which was essentially opposed to "particularist" interests.

Nevertheless, Frederick William had not entirely cast off his nationalist sympathies, nor was the Imperial Crown destitute of attraction for him. He now set for Germany, under Prussian leadership and on popular lines, by agreement with the lesser Kings. His plan was that this federal union should be connected by the closest ties with Austria, and that the two Powers should establish a common central machinery for dealing with matters of common interest. The moment was favourable to an extension of Prussian influence. Fierce revolts, born of the national disappointment, had spread from Baden far and wide over Germany. Many of the threatened governments had been saved by Prussian military assistance, and their apprehensions drew them closer to Prussia.

By May, 1849, matters had so far advanced that a "League of Three Kings" had been formed between Prussia, Saxony, and Hanover, that the general outline of a Constitution had been approved, and that the smaller states had given in their adhesion. It was hoped that the other kingdoms would gradually come in as they had done in the case of the *Zollverein*. Though the difficulties of Austria made the opportunity favourable, it was no part of Frederick William's plan to resort to compulsion.

Bavaria and Wurtemberg held ominously aloof, and by August Austrian successes in Hungary put Schwarzenberg in a position to support them. Hanover and Saxony, more eager from the first for the guarantee of Prussian bayonets than for federal reform, immediately abandoned the League on the mere proposal to proceed to the election of its representative body. With indecent haste they Austria and the entered a "League of Four Kings" with Bavaria League, and Wurtemberg, and accepted a counterscheme which Schwarzenberg had baited with territorial advantages. The two leagues were now arrayed against one another. Prussia convened her Parliament at Erfurt, which accepted in their entirety the Prussian Constitutional proposals (March, 1850).

Schwarzenberg craftily declined to follow his opponent on the path of untried paper programmes. Dropping the Four Kings' League, he summoned representatives from the governments to Frankfort, and immediately took Schwarzenberg steps for reviving the old Diet on the basis of the, treaties of 1815. It was an admirable rallying-point for all who were weary of change and experiment. Meanwhile, Frederick William's difficulties were increasing. Diplomacy had failed to provide a solution of the Schleswig-Holstein tangle, satisfactory both to Denmark and the duchies, and in April, 1849, Prussia had again taken up arms on behalf of the latter. She found herself opposed by all the Powers, and in July another truce was concluded. Finally, in July, 1850, Prussia, yielding to Russian pressure,

withdrew her troops, leaving Denmark to settle the question at her own discretion. The war and the subsequent negotiations left Prussia humiliated and suspected by the Powers at the moment when the inevitable issue between herself and Austria was brought to a crisis by events in Hesse-Cassel.

The Elector had long chafed under Constitutional restrictions which had put limits upon his personal extravagance, and saw in the revival of the old Diet an encouragement both to recover his former independence of restraint, and at the same time to free himself from his obligations to Prussia. In this latter design he had been resisted by his advisers, and he accordingly proceeded to call to his councils a minister named Hassenpflug, who was a professed reactionary, upon which the Estates declined to vote the taxes, only to be dissolved for their pains. The result was a deadlock which sent the Elector posting to the Diet in quest of assistance against his subjects. Schwarzenberg was quick to turn the occasion to advantage. The incident gave him at once an opportunity of bidding for the support of the princes by a fine display of solicitude for their rights, and of inflicting a severe blow upon Prussia by withdrawing a member of her league, whose position connecting the two principal masses of Prussian territory made her adhesion of special value. Prussian protests were disregarded, Bavarian troops were commissioned to restore the Elector's authority in the name of the Diet, and a league was formed to sustain their action. Urged by Radowitz, the King of Prussia consented to send troops to protect the Constitutional rights of Hesse. The situation was now exceedingly grave, and actual fighting took place between opposing outposts at Bronzell. Having thus succeeded in producing a crisis, Schwarzenberg presented the Prussian Court with an ultimatum demanding the dissolution of the separate league, the recognition of the Diet and the evacuation of Hesse. If Radowitz had had his way the issue would have been decided by the sword. The Prussian army was actually mobilised. But Frederick William hesitated. The attitude of the Czar was an all-important factor in the choice he was called upon to make, and already in October Count Brandenburg had been sent to sound Nicholas at Warsaw. The result was most discouraging. After a vain attempt to reach an agreement on the basis of abandoning the league, the King despatched Manteuffel to Olmütz to arrange matters in a personal interview with Schwarzenberg. By the "Punctuation of Olmütz," Prussia gave way on all the points at issue (November 29, 1850). Her humiliation was complete, but she was yet able to snatch from her enemy the fruits of his victory.

At the Conference of Dresden, which met to settle the future Constitution of the Confederation, Austria counted upon securing her permanent supremacy by insisting upon her original demand for the inclusion of the whole Hapsburg monarchy. All the fears of "particularism" were roused by the proposal, and Manteuffel was not slow to mark his opportunity. He boldly took his stand for the original Constitution of 1815, and compelled Schwarzenberg to recede. The national movement both in its democratic and monarchical phases was now at an end. But it had succeeded in defining the issues. The earlier phase had convinced far-sighted men that force alone could consummate the union, the later that in Austria Germany was to recognise the foe.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE EPILOGUE—LOUIS NAPOLEON AND THE SECOND EMPIRE

WHEN at length, in the early fifties, all the toil and endeavour of the years of revolution had spent their force, there remained standing but one new political structure to testify to the activity of the epoch, and that the least representative of the hopes which it had called forth. Twice over men had built upon the ruin-strewn site of the July monarchy, and, by 1852, the garish fabric of the Second Empire had replaced the insecure constructions of the Second Republic.

It will be remembered that there had been established in France by October, 1848, a Constitution of a unique kind. By this Constitution there were created side by side two practically co-ordinate authorities, a single Chamber based upon universal suffrage with a responsible ministry; and a President, himself elected by universal suffrage and not directly responsible to the Chamber, in whose hands rested the appointment of the ministry and the control of the entire executive. A very slight acquaintance with political questions is sufficient to suggest that in these arrangements there existed every prospect of a deadlock. Neither power possessed, in fact, the authority to say the last word. Constitutionally, the President had no means of over-riding a Chamber which he had no power to dissolve, while the Chamber could at best harass a President, whom it had no power to depose, by rendering the position of his ministers impossible. Strife was therefore certain, and in the event of strife, it is to be remarked that the control of the army and of the highly centralised administrative system, through the Ministers of War and of the Interior respectively, gave an enormous advantage to the President. Well might a contemporary critic urge that a President who chose to resort to extra-legal means to perpetuate his power "would not need to have behind him the victories of Lodi, Montenotte, and the Pyramids." But that was just the kind of prestige which the man who was destined to fulfil the speaker's fears brought with him to his task. The "Napoleonic Legend" which had co-operated with other destructive forces to sap the throne of Louis Philippe was to give more positive evidence of its vitality by contributing to rebuild a throne for Louis Napoleon.

Louis Napoleon Bonaparte was the son of Louis Bonaparte, King of Holland. Born in 1808, he became, on the death of the Duke of Reichstadt, in 1831, the heir to the claims of his uncle's dynasty. There was little in the outward man to proclaim the future Emperor. His insignificant figure, too short in the legs and somewhat stooping at the shoulders, his heavy, almost flaccid features, his dull eyes and his expressionless and all but wooden cast of countenance, together with the natural taciturnity of his disposition, passed in early life for evidence of negligible stupidity, as they became to the public opinion of a later period the appropriate disguises of a consummate dissembler. The public was as little right in its later as in its earlier estimate. Nevertheless, there were behind the ungainly exterior a passionate craving for distinction, which it would be shallow to dismiss as mere vanity, and an imaginative faculty overleaping intermediate difficulties to embrace with a faith that was almost fatalistic the vision of an inherited destiny. Debarred from the field of action by the misfortunes of his family, his abilities were bent towards study or spent themselves in dreams. Yet of studies and dreams alike politics were the subject-matter and his destiny the guiding-star, and both were sustained by a singular pertinacity.

His first excursion into practical life made little stir, while it unquestionably influenced the subsequent bent of his mind. Living at Rome, Louis Napoleon became a Carbonaro,

and was expelled from Italy for his share in the abortive Romagnuol rising of 1831. From these early associations he carried with him through life the ineradicable taint of the conspirator's methods, and was often secret and evasive when candour would have better served his purposes. His next two adventures attracted attention enough, but bade fair to extinguish his pretensions for ever under a flood of ridicule. The history and the ideas of the great Emperor were his study night and day, and in 1836, at Strasburg, he attempted to re-enact the return from Elba. Dressed for the part he was to play in the familiar uniform of the petit caporal, and followed by a party of confederates in the guise of a staff, he attempted to win over the garrison to his cause. The result was an utter fiasco, and the would-be Emperor found himself packed off to America with a gift of money, through the forbearance of Louis Philippe. Nothing daunted, he repeated the experiment at Boulogne, in 1840, with similar results, and this time was placed in easy confinement in the Castle of Ham. Both episodes illustrate a certain theatrical bent in his nature, as well as the incurable tendency of his imagination to stop short, exhausted as it were with the evolution of an idea. To others or to fortune he left the task of accommodating it to a world of prosaic facts.

For seven years he wrote and dreamed at Ham, producing, among other writings, a book on "Napoleonic Ideas," and after his escape in the disguise of a workman, he remained pre-occupied with the same thoughts for another year in London. No worse training could have been devised for one who was to be a ruler of men. It is true that he came to know France, its parties, prejudices, and classes with tolerable accuracy. But he fell, in those years, completely under the spell of the legendary abstractions of St. Helena, till he failed to see their fatal inconsistencies. And, since each political suggestion that he threw out was with him a means to an end, not an end in itself, he acquired the fatal habit of suspending judgment between contradictory policies, each of which might serve his turn. Moreover, there came to him, as to most ambitious exiles, a weakening of the moral scruples, which was to deprive him in later years of a guiding principle in the choice of alternatives, and of the confidence of his fellow-men. Yet much of the hatred and suspicion which he aroused was undeserved. His nature was kindly; cruelty and even sternness were alien to him. According to his lights he was a patriotic ruler, and he studied with real zeal the welfare of his subjects. His support of liberal and national ideals was no mere lip-service. But he had chosen for himself the throne of France, where daily homage to hard unreasoning facts was never more imperative than in his day, and in the crisis of his fate he chose to follow dreams.

The decree of exile against the House of Bonaparte was withdrawn by the representatives of the nation on June 2, 1848. In the following September Louis Napoleon was returned to the Chamber by five departments. In November, under the new Constitution, he was a candidate for the Presidency. His electoral manifesto was adroitly constructed to appeal to the interests of all classes. The Catholic voters read of his determination to protect and foster the work of the Church, the discontented artisans of schemes for social improvement, the army of a renewed care for the national dignity and for the interests of time-expired soldiers, the thrifty peasantry of peace and the maintenance of order.

But all these considerations will not account for the overwhelming majority of two millions by which he was declared elected on December 10, at the head of the poll, defeating Lamartine, the resourceful pilot of the Second Republic, Cavaignac, the tamer of Paris, and Ledru-Rollin, the champion of the democratic working classes. The Napoleonic Legend had done its work. The name "Napoleon," as its bearer truly said, was in itself a programme, and one far more effective than he supposed, for it was the programme of a golden age, of which the memories were still alive, not only in history and in the national monuments, but in the stories of every peasant's fireside and the pictures on every cottage wall.

Hardly had the Prince President been installed than the inevitable strife began,. It was the duty of the Chamber, after producing the Constitution, to dissolve itself. It declined to do so. Meanwhile the socialists, crushed by arms in June and beaten at the polls in December, were preparing for renewed violence. The President asked for powers to close the political clubs, but the Chamber, seeing an opportunity of retaliating for his attitude on the question of dissolution, declined to confer them, and scouted the idea of danger. Their prescience was at fault. There were commotions in the streets of Paris at the end of January, put down by General Changamier, and the Chamber, having lost public confidence, passed the proposed measures, and fixed their own dissolution for the following May.

The utmost surprise was expressed at the result of the May elections. Of 500 members 200 were Legitimists, and 180 belonged to the social democratic parties. Yet no result was more probable from the operation of universal suffrage among the peasants on the one hand and among the artisans of the industrial towns on the other. The representatives of the latter, with some countenance from the moderate republicans, now raised a vigorous outcry against the action of the government in sending General Oudinot to Rome to suppress a sister-Republic. The struggle was transferred to the streets by an attempt on the part of Ledru-Rollin to constitute from his own supporters a National Convention distinct from the Chamber. The troops were called out, and both in Paris and the provinces, where similar rioting had broken out, order was restored. The Chamber was now obviously divided, and likely to remain so while the existing electoral system remained in force. The majority got the credit for the repressive measures which they had vigorously advocated, while the President, showing himself everywhere at exhibitions, reviews, and the opening of railway lines, was winning golden opinions as the representative of peace and material progress.

These things were expected of the Head of the State, but, in matters of administration and policy, he was constitutionally bound to act through his ministers. Emboldened by the dissensions in the Chamber, the Prince President began to assume an independent and personal initiative. Irritated by the reactionary excesses of the restored Papacy, and especially anxious, owing to the bad impression which they created in France, to dissociate himself from so unfortunate a result of the occupation of Rome, he wrote a vigorous set of instructions to his aide-de-camp, Colonel Edgar Ney, directing him to remonstrate with the Pope. This letter was published in the official Press. The Legitimist majority in the Chamber were highly incensed at the attempt to put pressure on the Holy See, and resolutions were passed expressing satisfaction with the Papal explanations. In these resolutions the ministers acquiesced, nor in face of the attitude of the Chamber did they venture to insist on the President's demand for concrete evidence of a disposition to reform on the part of the Pope. No better occasion was likely to present itself for teaching a proper subserviency in the Cabinet to the Presidential will. The ministers were required to give in their resignations on the ground that France needed stronger men, and looked to the Prince President to provide them (October, 1849). From this moment President and Chamber stood in undisguised opposition, and men began to range themselves under one standard or the other.

With singular lack of foresight the Chamber presented their enemy with an initial advantage. The elections, which took place in March and April, to fill the seats vacated by the extremists who had taken part in Ledru- Rollin's secession, resulted in the return of pronounced radicals. A regular panic seized on the majority, and of many wild suggestions one of those that passed into law was a proposal intended to deprive all anarchists, criminals, and vagabonds of a vote. A qualification of three years' previous residence in the voter's district was hastily imposed. It was found in practice to disfranchise nearly three millions of Frenchmen (May, 1850). The measure at once alienated the nation, split up the majority, and provided the President with a *casus belli*. The Second Republic was evidently in the throes of dissolution, and every interest began to organise its plans for the inevitable

catastrophe.

It had been expected that Louis Napoleon would take up the challenge at once. He had been touring the provinces with confident and optimistic speeches, and twice he had been greeted at reviews with cries of *Vive l'Empereur*, which had gone unrebuked. But he was not ready, and no reference was made at the re-assembling of the Chamber in November to the recent legislation. It was, however, an ominous circumstance that, in January, 1851, General Changarnier was removed from the command of the National Guard. A desperate effort was made to censure the President, which issued, owing to internal divisions, in a feeble vote of want of confidence in the ministry. There could now be little doubt which side would win, for the nation could scarcely venture to commit authority to the divided and discredited elements of opposition.

By the middle of 1851 it became clear that a revision of the Constitution would be imperative. By the laws of October, 1848, the dissolution of the Chamber was due at the end of the ensuing April, and the resignation of the President half-way through May. Everything suggested that the period of transition would be one of extreme danger. Unfortunately, the law made revision almost impossible within the time available. The Chamber was required to discuss any proposed revision at three separate meetings held at intervals of one month, and a majority of three-quarters was necessary for its approval. The decision could only be finally confirmed by a specially elected convention of 900 members, who were to sit for three months. Lack of time and of unanimity seemed to be conspiring with Louis Napoleon's inclinations towards a revision which would be extra-legal. Ominous petitions were already coming in for an extension of the President's period of office. His own utterances grew bolder. At Dijon he declared that the Chamber had never helped him save to repress disorder, and had remained cold to all his efforts for the good of the people. He openly invited the country to express its will. "France," he said, "shall not perish in my hands." By way of answer the Chamber fatuously refused so much as to consider revision.

Louis Napoleon had already gathered round him a group of men of lax principles and keen ambitions, adventurers, like Persigny his partner in the Strasburg *fiasco*; soldiers of fortune like St. Arnaud, who had been selected as a fit instrument from the army in Algeria; men of broken fortunes, like Fleury the spendthrift officer, and Maupas the discredited prefect of Upper Garonne, together with his own half-brother De Morny, a company promoter and speculator on the Paris Bourse. Room was now to be made for these men in the ministry. In October, the President propounded to his constitutional advisers the necessity of repealing the law of disfranchisement. They refused, as he expected, and resigned. St. Arnaud became Minister of War, and Maupas Prefect of Police. The new ministry put the project of repeal before the legislature only to be rejected. The Chamber had dug its own grave, for the President could now declare war in the name of popular rights.

It is characteristic of Louis Napoleon that he should have hesitated, when all his plans had come to ripeness, to take the final step which could no longer be peacefully or legally accomplished. But he had now associates of coarser fibre than himself to urge him on, and in the night of December 1, 1851, the conspirators put their long-prepared plans into execution. Troops under Magnan were sent by St. Arnaud's orders to occupy both the meeting place of the Chamber at the Palais Bourbon and selected points of vantage throughout the capital. Morny, there and then appointed Minister of the Interior, caused the government printing office to be surrounded, and forced the compositors to set up in type the proclamations which were to be posted on the walls before morning, securing secrecy till then by allotting to each separate workman a fragment unintelligible without the context. Maupas meanwhile had executed to perfection the most difficult task of all. Two hours after midnight, he had summoned to his office police commissioners whom he could trust, and

by their agency all the leading men of the Chamber and the general officers opposed to the President were arrested in their beds shortly before dawn.

The morning of December 2 found Paris standing dazed before the placards which announced the restoration of universal suffrage, the grant of a new Constitution, and the confidence of the President in the loyalty of the army. Only gradually did resistance begin to show itself. The conspirators were too quick for the few members of the Chamber who gathered together surreptitiously for the purpose of deposing Louis Napoleon, too quick for the High Court of Justice which met to sign a warrant for his arrest. Both attempts were defeated by the police. The task of dealing with the republicans and democrats of the working quarters was not so simple. On December 3 barricades were raised, and every symptom of approaching trouble was in evidence. The self-constituted authorities acted with ruthless thoroughness. The troops were withdrawn, rested and fed, and the streets abandoned to the insurgents. On the next day a general advance began. There was desperate fighting, in which the soldiers were everywhere victorious, and little mercy was shown to the vanquished. But perhaps the most horrible episode of the whole day was a deadly fusillade poured into a crowd of unresisting bystanders in a moment of panic by a body of troops in the Boulevard Montmartre. It was a gloomy and ill-omened beginning, and only subsequent events in the provinces cloaked the true nature of Louis Napoleon's enterprise with the fair appearance of a crusade for the preservation of order. Wherever the socialist teaching had taken root savage outbreaks took place, which scared France out of any sympathy for the victims of Louis Napoleon's ambition, and seemed to demonstrate the necessity of all that had been done in his name. A searching proscription followed the victory. It is estimated that over 20,000 persons were removed from France by exile, by flight, and by deportation to Guiana, Cayenne, or Algeria.

Such was the Coup d'État. It was an immoral, sordid, and bloody business. But the features which must remain most repulsive to men of honour are the deliberate plotting by the chief actor against the system he was charged to defend, and the methods of midnight conspiracy to which he resorted. Humanity, indeed, sickens at the terrible list of lives sacrificed or marred for what was primarily a difference of political opinion, but such things had happened before and were to happen again in France, because Frenchmen had not learned the virtue of moderation. Louis Napoleon was not a monster, and the events of December 4 had formed no part of his nebulous schemes. They had rather been the unforeseen though inevitable consequence. The same considerations apply, though in a less degree, to the machinations of which Morny and Maupas were the instruments. The President was not a finished Macchiavellian. A student rather than a statesman, he embarked upon cloudy designs of which he did not clearly apprehend the conditions, and he had not the moral sense to stop short where further progress involved divergence from the paths of honour. At least, we shall not waste lamentations with contemporaries over the "liberty" which he "murdered." The Second Republic contained little promise within itself of domestic prosperity and repose. France owed nearly twenty years of both to Louis Napoleon, and he bestowed them deliberately, and not by accident.

It was because France had an instinctive confidence in these intentions, quite as much as because the voting was influenced by official pressure, that the nation gave him by Plébiscite on December 20 full powers to reconstitute the government of the country, and that by a majority of nearly seven millions. It was because Frenchmen saw the work well begun that on November 21, 1852, they went to the polls a second time to give a still more decided verdict for the revival of the Empire. The consequences were as momentous for Europe as for France. A dreamer and a conspirator had ascended the French throne with the title of Napoleon III, and believed himself the heir and the destined exponent of what he understood to have been his uncle's policy.

Part IV.

THE ERA OF CONSTRUCTION

THE BUILDING OF THE MODERN NATIONS, 1852-1878

CHAPTER XIX

THE CRIMEAN WAR

Two only of the greater Powers had remained unaffected by the storms of 1848, England, through a process of peaceful internal development, Russia by dint of standing still. And few would have ventured to predict that Russia was on the threshold of sweeping domestic changes, and England on the verge of a foreign war.

To most Englishmen the Great Exhibition of 1851 seemed to inaugurate an era of peaceful industry and commerce. New processes of manufacture and new facilities for communication promised the advent of an age in which the suspicious diplomatic relations of the European Powers would give place to an active commercial co-operation in the exchange of commodities. The hope was freely expressed that war was a thing of the past.

A new era had indeed begun, and an era in which material forces were to exercise an influence as yet undreamt of. The railway, the telegraph, and the press were to bind the peoples more closely together as national units. They were to furnish the governments with a power of organisation and control hitherto beyond their reach, and with a fullness of knowledge contributing to decision in action. They were to bring rival Powers into closer touch with one another, thus multiplying occasions of friction. They were to facilitate the rapid concentration of enormous bodies of men against the frontiers of a hostile state. Study was everywhere turning material forces to the service of the human race, and swiftly the nations learnt the lesson that the issues of armed strife depended not upon blind chance, but upon man's patient self-adaptation to conditions of politics and geography, and upon his power of drilling the forces of nature to obedient service in the operation of his engines of war. It was to be an age of statesmen and generals, an age of diplomacy and scientific warfare. But the achievements of statesmen and of armies alike were to be the expression of national impulses felt through the new channels of communication existing between government and governed.

The illusions of the British public were not shared by Continental potentates, and least of all by the Czar of Russia. Nicholas had good reason to know how unsettled was the condition of the Balkan peninsula, for there were two Russian interests at stake in that corner of Europe which imposed an unremitting vigilance on the government at St. Petersburg. These were the preservation of an open road to the south, and the protection of the Orthodox subjects of the Porte. Since the Treaty of the Straits, Turkey, under Abdul Mejid, had been busy with the elaboration of paper reforms, greatly assisted by the English Ambassador, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. One result of the consequent growth of British influence had been the successful defiance by the Sultan of the Russian demand for the extradition of the Hungarian refugees. The new Muscovite policy of substituting diplomatic control for conquest was manifestly imperilled. Nevertheless, it was not abandoned. The dependent Christian States still provided occasions for interference and mediation which the Sultan was not strong enough to repudiate.

But the successful assertion of Greek independence had introduced a new factor. There were active-minded men among Slavs and Vlachs who were burning to imitate the Greek example, and there was a rising disinclination among them to remain the passive clients of Russia. It was by Russian support indeed that Danilo, prince-bishop of Montenegro, succeeded in throwing off the restrictions of his semi-ecclesiastical status and

transforming his little realm into a lay principality hereditary in his own family (1852). But elsewhere the nationalist spirit often forced Russia into co-operation with Turkey, or obliged her to acquiesce in Turkish predominance,

In Servia Prince Milosh Obrenovich, the ex-pig dealer, had long desired to gather in under his rule all the outlying Servian districts. But his despotic government provoked resistance among his own subjects and even a rising, to which he so far gave way as to attempt the realisation of his objects by a grotesque imitation of Constitutional government (1835). The plan failed, arbitrary measures re-kindled discontent, and Russia combined with Turkey in forcing the Prince to accept the advice of an oligarchical senate. Further friction was followed by the abdication of Milosh, and by the two short reigns of his sons, Milan and Michael. The latter, having defied the Senate and attempted reforms, was forced to withdraw from the country. The Turks thereupon installed the rival claimant, Alexander Karageorgevich, to the ill-disguised annoyance of Russia (1842).

Before evacuating the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, after the Treaty of Adrianople, Russia had secured that the Hospodars should in future be natives, and that Constitutions should be granted placing considerable power in the hands of the provincial nobles, or Boyars. It was hoped that the disappearance of the Phanariot Greek rulers would weaken the influence of Constantinople, and that the Boyars would be devoted to Russia. The expectation was falsified owing to the mistakes of the Russian agents, who, admirable as administrators, have seldom succeeded in the role of friendly advisers. Events occurring in 1848 widened the breach. Nicholas had encouraged a tendency to union between the principalities; but the movement went beyond his intentions when risings broke out to rescue and absorb the Roumanian districts of Transylvania in revolt against Austria. A combined Russian and Turkish occupation took place, and the new representative institutions were superseded by nominated councils. The Czar had thus little reason for building upon the friendship of the Principalities.

The general weakening of Muscovite influence was accentuated by the situation in Greece. Here the control which Russia possessed as a guaranteeing Power was exercised conjointly with England and France, and the tendency of events had been rather to eliminate than to increase it. The Church had secured a national organisation free from the authority of the Patriarch at Constantinople, who had always leant upon Russian support. King Otho was dependent upon Bavarian advisers; and a narrow Germanising policy was combined with a failure to understand the needs of the situation. The maintenance of the obsolete Turkish system of taxation, and the misapplication of the loans required for the development of the country ultimately led to disturbances at Athens, an attack on the palace and the demand for a Constitution (1843). The demand was supported by England and France, and its success naturally increased the French and English influence. It did not either abate the dissatisfaction of the Czar or enhance the reputation of Greece. Indeed, the most ardent Philhellenes could no longer refuse to recognise the sordid actualities which had so strangely belied their glowing dreams. More factious and corrupt than their reputed ancestry, the Greek people were possessed with an inordinate self-confidence, and with a sublime assurance that they possessed the admiration of all Europe. Their attitude towards Turkey was one of insolent menace. Ultimately they drew down upon themselves a sharp lesson from Great Britain.

They had possessed themselves of two islets claimed by Britain as part of the Ionian group, then under British protection; their King had seized without compensation the property of the historian Finlay to extend the royal grounds; the Athenian mob had wrecked the house of Don Pacifico, a Portuguese Jew by origin, but a naturalised British subject. Palmerston demanded satisfaction, and getting none, blockaded the Greek ports, beat down opposition in Parliament by a long-remembered speech, the key-note of which was

sounded in the words "*Givis Romanus Sum*" and carried his point, after agreeing to abate considerably the extravagant claims of Don Pacifico (1850). Thus the state of Greece was a source of threefold dissatisfaction to Russia. The divided control, the Hellenic national ambition which coveted Constantinople itself, the determined action of one of the Powers in asserting separate claims without reference to the other two, were all evidence of the existence of growing influences, in surroundings where but a short while back the only external pressure had been exercised by Russia.

Nicholas had always entertained an admiration for England and a firm conviction that an understanding between her and his own country would be the surest guarantee of European peace, and he had given practical expression to his opinion by abandoning the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, and by acting in concert with her against Mehemet Ali. In 1844 he visited England determined to conquer British suspicion by the frankest explanation of his views. Here, by his simplicity and charm of manner, he quite overcame the prejudices of Queen Victoria, who seems to have expected to find some of the characteristics of an ogre in the conqueror of Poland. Palmerston, whom the Czar detested, was not in office at the time, and Nicholas was therefore prepared to be communicative in his conversations with the Foreign Secretary, Lord Aberdeen.

There is no reason to doubt the entire good faith of his utterances. He declared his readiness to assist in maintaining the existence of the Turkish Empire as long as possible, but insisted on his personal conviction that its days were numbered. While denying any wish to claim a single inch of its territory, he stated his unalterable determination not to permit annexations of Turkish soil by other Powers. He concluded by urging the necessity for a clear and definite understanding between England and Russia. It is not difficult with our present knowledge, to follow his motives. He desired above all to avert combined European intervention in the affairs of the Balkan peninsula, which might issue in a general partition or in the erection of a native State with its capital at Constantinople, powerful enough to close the Mediterranean for ever to Russian enterprise. He saw in England a Power, disinterested except in matters of trade, having none of the special claims of Austria or the ambitions of France, whose fleet, combined with the Russian armies, would command respect for a joint decision. It was one of the great opportunities of England's foreign policy, but the agreement which might have settled the Eastern Question and avoided sixty years of distrust and hostility, was not so much as considered. Nicholas was heard with suspicion and answered in cold and cautious phrases.

It was not long before an incident occurred which seemed to the Czar to confirm his worst fears. He had very unwillingly followed the English lead, and had decided to enter into diplomatic relations with the new Bonaparte, despite the revolutionary associations of his name. He had, however, deprived a very belated recognition of any grace by refusing to employ towards him the form of address usual between sovereigns, addressing him as "mon ami," instead of as "mon frère." To such slights Napoleon was intensely sensitive, and he was on the watch for every opportunity of acquiring prestige, for his throne by an active foreign policy, or even by a successful war. Such an opportunity already existed in the East. The custody of the reputed sepulchre of Our Lord and of other Holy Places in Palestine had been granted by treaty in the sixteenth century . to the Latin or Roman Church. These privileges had been invaded by monks of the Greek Orthodox Communion, but had been re-affirmed owing to the intervention of France in 1740, France herself acquiring a recognised position as guarantor of the arrangement. Revolutionary France had not troubled herself with such matters, while the Latins themselves had suffered the shrines to fall into decay by their neglect, with the result that the Greeks had stepped in and had succeeded with Russian support in reasserting their claims. Louis Napoleon had already reopened the question while still President, with the object of winning the Roman Catholic vote. The cause of the Latins now acquired a new value in his eyes as furnishing an

opportunity at once for advertising the might of the Second Empire and for annoying the Czar. The Sultan, in despair between France and Russia, temporised and made inconsistent promises. Each Power treated the Ottoman reply as a confirmation of its own claims, and declined compromise. Nicholas was convinced that the moment had come when Russia must make a firm stand or turn her back for ever on the Danube.

He determined to make one more effort to win over England. The time was not unfavourable, for, in January, 1853, Lord Aberdeen was again in office. In a series of conversations with Sir Hamilton Seymour, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, the Czar set forth his views, which he desired might be communicated to the British Cabinet. "We have to deal with a sick man," he said, "and we must be ready for the event of his death." The suggestions of 1844 were re-stated in greater detail. Neither Russia nor any other Power was to be permitted to make acquisitions of territory in Europe. There was to be no attempt to resuscitate the Byzantine Empire or to extend the kingdom of Greece. The Balkan peninsula might be divided up among Christian States under Russian protection. England might take Egypt, and Cyprus or Crete. Nothing is more remarkable in these suggestions than their striking similarity to the arrangements which have been evolved after years of misunderstanding by the logic of events. But the bribe which Nicholas deliberately offered to commercial England only served to rouse the honourable suspicions of her government. Moreover, the question of Constantinople was an insuperable difficulty. The Czar professed, and no doubt with sincerity, that he did not desire to possess it; he admitted, and he could scarcely do otherwise, that he might be obliged to occupy it. The admission roused every latent prejudice against the autocrat who had destroyed the liberties of Poland and Hungary. But the real obstacle to any understanding was that the British government did not recognise the existence of any crisis at all. They coldly but civilly replied that the action proposed was only calculated to precipitate just such a catastrophe as the Czar apprehended.

Nicholas had already prepared an alternative line of action. It was now necessary to revert to the principles of Unkiar Skelessi, and to extract permanent guarantees from the weakness of the Turk. Military preparations were pushed forward, and Prince Menschikoff was despatched to Constantinople. With studied insolence, he demanded that the Greeks should be left undisturbed in the custody of the Holy Places, and that the vague rights of exercising protection over the Orthodox subjects of the Sultan, claimed by the Czar in accordance with a forced interpretation of the Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji and subsequent engagements, should be definitely recognised. The Sultan firmly but courteously refused, and there is no doubt that Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, acting not in his official capacity as ambassador, but as the private friend and adviser of Abdul Mejid, influenced the decision. The Czar had made a mistake. Europe now regarded him as the aggressor, and was content to see Napoleon come forward as the champion of existing rights ; while England, through the prepossessions of her ambassador, was being drawn insensibly into the quarrel.

The representatives of the Great Powers met at Vienna to attempt to compose the difference. They had a difficult task to perform. If not by treaty, at least by precedent the Czar had undoubtedly enjoyed special rights as against the Ottoman Government for the protection of its Christian subjects. That some such external control over the Porte was necessary had again and again been proved. The problem was so to state the Russian rights as not to place the Turkish Government under the tutelage of the Czar, and so to affirm the Ottoman sovereignty as to leave room for Russian remonstrance. This is what the "Vienna Note" attempted. It was accepted by the Czar. The Sultan, however, rejected it, and it was known that Lord Stratford, while recommending acceptance in his official capacity, took care to point out in private that it reduced Turkey to the condition of a vassal State. A study of the alterations, which the Porte accordingly suggested, will satisfy an unprejudiced mind that they left the Christians unprotected by anything better than the Sultan's promises.

But the Russian reply made it equally clear that the Czar's interpretation of the original document was not that of its authors. England and France abandoned further diplomatic efforts.

This result, coupled with the presence of the French and English fleets in Besika Bay, was highly encouraging to Turkey. Russia was summoned to evacuate the Principalities or to prepare for instant war, and hostilities began on the Danube. Apprehensive concerning the movements of the combined fleets, the Czar determined to secure the command of the Black Sea by a sudden stroke. On the last day of November the Russian admiral in those waters sought out and destroyed the Turkish fleet off Sinope. The news was received with a storm of indignation in both the western capitals. Memories of Warsaw and Vilagos made Nicholas an object of popular hatred as the incarnation of a political principle. A legitimate act of war was accepted as a fresh proof of perfidy and brutality. Nor were the governments likely to restrain public opinion. Napoleon, indeed, had no sort of wish to do so ; and Aberdeen, anxious though he was to preserve peace, was the head of a coalition cabinet containing Palmerston, whose desire for energetic action was shared by the British ambassador at Constantinople.

Nicholas had made up his mind that England would not fight. He had rated too highly the sentimentalities of the Great Exhibition and the pacific oratory of the "Manchester School" of politicians. He was now to be rudely undeceived. The two western Powers combined to invite the withdrawal of the Russian fleets from the Black Sea; and when the Czar indignantly declined to answer this and subsequent communications, proceeded to declare war (March, 1854). Much abuse has been lavished on Napoleon for dragging England into a quarrel not her own. The responsibility rests mainly with the British public, but Palmerston and Lord Stratford must share the blame.

The primary object of the Allies was to eject the Russians from the Principalities, and, with that end in view, a joint expedition under Lord Raglan and Marshal St. Arnaud landed at Varna to support the operations of the Turks. With the assistance of British officers Silistria made a gallant defence against Russian attacks, and the Turks forced the passage of the Danube at Giurgevo. But before the allied armies came into the field other circumstances had driven the Russians behind the Pruth.

Austria was deeply in debt to the Czar Nicholas, but her gratitude was not proof against the dictates of self-interest, which caused her to view with suspicion any increase of Russian influence on the Lower Danube. Count Buol, Schwarzenberg's less able successor, now determined to turn the war to account in the Austrian interest. His idea was to allow the Allies to do all the fighting and to interpose at the right moment, with the support of Prussia, to dictate terms. Accordingly, early in June, he demanded of the Czar the evacuation of the Principalities. Nicholas naturally required as a preliminary condition a guarantee against further attacks from England and France. This guarantee Austria set herself to obtain. But the attitude of Prussia, whose statesmen had no reason to love the Austrians, was so faltering, that Buol was unable to persevere when the Allies answered his overtures with a peremptory demand that Austria should herself enter the alliance. Meantime his equivocal attitude had secured his immediate object, but the success was dearly bought. Russia, anxious to avoid drawing Austria into the struggle, did indeed evacuate the Principalities. But no advantage resulted for Austria. Buol had only effected the alienation both of Russia and of her opponents.

The ostensible objects of the war were now to all intents and purposes attained. But the "Four Points" submitted by the Allies through the mediation of Austria were not calculated to salve the wounded pride of Russia. Nicholas refused to resign his rights as protector of the Principalities, to abandon his claims as patron of the Orthodox Church, to

concede the free navigation of the Danube, and to submit to a revision of the Treaty of the Straits. His enemies, moreover, desired nothing better than to continue the war. Napoleon had still his spurs to win, and England was resolved to humble the arch-autocrat to the dust. It was agreed to render Russia powerless for future mischief by the destruction of Sebastopol, her arsenal on the Black Sea.

Sebastopol stands on the south-western promontory of the Crimea. The Allies landed on the western coast, considerably to the north of the fortress, and advanced in a southerly direction. On September 20 they carried at the point of the bayonet the defensive

position occupied by Prince Menschikofi on a line of hills which follows the southern bank of the river Alma. The defences of Sebastopol were incomplete, and an immediate attack could scarcely have been resisted. But the harbour, an inlet of some length, covered the town to the north, and the sinking of Russian vessels in its mouth denied to the Allies the co-operation of their fleet. The invaders therefore swept round eastwards by an extensive flank march, and approached their objective from the south. Once in sight of the walls, however, they remained inactive, establishing their communications with the southern coast and waiting for artillery to undertake an unnecessary bombardment. Meanwhile the genius of Colonel Todleben was converting an almost open town into a fortress.

Not till the middle of October did the remarkable siege begin. Siege, in truth, it was none, for the northern defences were unassailed, and supplies were never interrupted. The dissensions between the allied generals weakened every enterprise, and before long the Russian forces in the Crimea outnumbered the invaders. Prince Menschikoff, with the field army, began to harass the besiegers. The English held the right or exposed flank, and upon them accordingly the attack fell. On October 25 an attempt against their base at Balaklava was repulsed after a confused engagement, which will be remembered to all time for the useless gallantry of the charge pressed home against the Russian guns by the Light Cavalry Brigade. Again, on November 5, in a dense fog, the right of the English siege lines was assailed at Inkerman by heavy Russian columns. Here the defenders just maintained their ground in a desperate hand-to-hand encounter, long remembered as "the soldier's battle," till the French came up in support.

Thus, ill as they were led, the quality of the British troops made them more than a match for the Russians. They were no match for the forces of nature and for adverse material circumstances. The campaign was to provide a lame rehearsal of modern methods of warfare, and to furnish conspicuous examples of the operation of all those contingencies which the modern soldier must set himself to eliminate. An army trained for the barrack and the parade-ground found itself exposed to the unfamiliar diseases of a camp and to all the rigours of an unforeseen winter campaign. Clothing was insufficient, transport was inadequate, and ultimately almost inoperative owing to the state of the roads; ammunition, medicine, and food failed to reach the front; and utter disorganisation infected the whole supply service. Public indignation was aroused at home, of which Aberdeen and Russell were somewhat unfairly made the scape-goats. Palmerston became Premier; but not till the spring of 1855 had the effective working of communications been secured. Too well-justified had been the Czar's confidence in "Generals January and February."

Meanwhile, the Russian armies had suffered no less than the Allies, and not in the Crimea only had winter claimed its victims. The proud spirit of Nicholas was broken at last. All the weakness of the system which he Nicholas, had laboured to build up stood revealed in the glare of defeat. The army on which his care had been lavished had crumbled at a touch. In spite of his doctors' warnings he struggled on with tasks beyond his weakened powers. "You have done your duty," was his reply to all remonstrances, "and I must do mine." He was spared the bitterness of submission, and on March 2 died, as he had lived,

unconquered. His enemies were as little generous to him in death as in life. There is an unworthy note of exultation in *Punch's* contemporary cartoon of "General Fevrier turned traitor."

Thus disappeared one influence antagonistic to peace. A change in the attitude of Austria, which forced her into a closer understanding with the Allies, tended in the same direction. Count Cavour, the Premier of Piedmont, in his resolve to obtain for his country the friendship of the victors and a place in the councils of Europe, had prevailed upon the King and people to sanction the despatch of a Piedmontese force to co-operate with the Allies. Buol, desperately afraid of being outbid by Austria's persistent foe, now agreed to join the alliance if peace could not be secured. His efforts at mediation failed, but he still evaded his obligations, losing credit with both sides.

In the summer of 1855 the end was at last in sight. In June a general assault was attempted, but without success. The French and Piedmontese beat off a Russian attack at the Tchernaya in August; and in September the Allies, now under the command of Pelissier and Codrington, made a final and successful attack. The English carried the Redan, only to lose it again after desperate fighting, but the French succeeded in occupying and holding the Malakof. This was the key of the defences, and the Russians now evacuated the city south of the harbour.

The new Czar, Alexander II, was willing to treat, for Sweden was beginning to display designs for the recovery of Finland. Napoleon had had enough. Palmerston indeed realised that too little had been done to secure protection for Turkey in the future, but shrank from Napoleon's declared intention of re-kindling revolt in Poland. In February, 1856, a Congress met at Paris. By the terms of the treaty there concluded the Black Sea was declared neutral. Russia agreed to establish no arsenals and to keep no warships in those waters, to resign her protectorate over the Principalities, to surrender a slice of Bessarabia, to assent to the free navigation of the Danube, and to abandon her special relations with the Christian peoples of Turkey. Under Lord Stratford's influence the Sultan issued a decree promising freedom of worship and extensive reforms. The Powers thereupon admitted Turkey to a place at the council-board of Europe, outdoing even the misplaced confidence of their adviser in an Article by which they formally parted with all claim to collective or individual interference. Such was the Treaty of Paris, perhaps the most short-sighted of all the diplomatic achievements of the century. The restrictions imposed upon Russia in the Black Sea were impossible to maintain and were defied in 1870; Bessarabia was won back in 1878; needless to say, the Turk made no attempt to keep his promises. Such were the meagre results of the struggle. The Allies had fought only to avert a solution which time has approved, while England had made an enemy where she might have secured a friend.

Upon Austria the ignoble part which she had played brought immediate humiliation as well as ultimate disaster. All Buol's efforts failed to exclude Cavour from the Congress of Paris or to prevent him from stating the Italian case against Austria, and he was obliged to listen with what patience he could muster, while Clarendon, on behalf of England, dwelt feelingly upon the unhappy condition of Italy. The Austrian statesman, by his disingenuous handling of events, had made his country the despised auxiliary of the victors, and he had won the bitter hatred of Russia by his ingratitude as well as by his eager advocacy of the cession of Bessarabia. "It will one day cost his country," said Orloff, "a payment in blood and tears."

A brief notice of Balkan affairs subsequent to the war may here find an appropriate place. Greece had profited by the Crimean War to make an inroad into Thessaly, and had only been restrained after a joint occupation of Peiraeus by the fleets of England and France. Again, in 1859, the three guaranteeing Powers were obliged to interfere to introduce

order into the finances, and to obtain proper treatment for the nation's creditors. Greece promised, but did not perform. Meantime, King Otho's unpopularity was immensely increased by his German sympathies during the Italian war of Liberation ; and, in 1862, the people of Athens, profiting by his absence, declared his deposition, and set up a provisional government. The King never returned. Queen Victoria's second son, the Duke of Edinburgh, was elected to fill his place, but was excluded by an agreement between the three Powers not to sanction the accession of any prince belonging to their own reigning families. The choice then fell on William, second son of Christian IX, of Denmark, who took the title of George I (1863). As an act of complaisance to the new King, England now ceded the Ionian Isles to Greece. Nevertheless a joint occupation of Athens was necessary before order could be restored. The King was then left to his thankless task, aided, or rather impeded, by a legislature consisting of a Single Chamber.

The union of the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia had been proposed by Napoleon and was desired by both peoples. It was, however, unacceptable to Austria and Russia, and England, fearful of Russian influence, ultimately inclined against it. In 1858 separate and identical Constitutions were approved by the Powers. But the people of the Principalities resorted to an expedient which had escaped the calculations of the diplomatists, and elected the same Prince, Alexander Couza, to reign over both States under Turkish suzerainty. Unfortunately, the clergy and the boyars were soon alienated by reforms affecting the property of the Church and the feudal obligations of the peasants, and in 1866 a body of conspirators invaded the palace by night and extorted the Prince's abdication. A National Convention was summoned at Bucharest, which finally elected Prince Charles of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, and decreed the union of the Principalities under the name of Roumania. To these arrangements the Powers demurred, but the Roumanians held their ground, England and France imposed their veto upon coercion, and in 1866 the Sultan recognised the situation.

Servia throughout the war had remained neutral under Austrian pressure. Indeed, Prince Alexander Karageorgevich was too Austrian in his sympathies to suit his subjects, and in 1858 he was deposed to make way for the return of Milosh Obrenovich, in whose family the Principality was now declared hereditary. On the death of Milosh, in 1860, he was succeeded for the second time by his son Michael, who rendered his people an eminent service by securing the gradual withdrawal of the Turkish garrisons. In 1868, however, he was assassinated by the Karageorgevich faction ; but the attempt to restore the rival dynasty failed, and his cousin Milan, a lad of fourteen, was accepted as Prince, a representative Constitution taking the place of the oligarchical Senate.

CHAPTER XX

THE 'CZAR LIBERATOR'

RUSSIA is a nervous patient who has been the victim of two rival systems of treatment. One set of advisers have prescribed plenty of fresh air and outdoor exercise, the other have relied upon the recuperative properties of rest and the absence of all excitement. Neither system has had a fair trial, for, at the first symptom of malaise, the patient has lost confidence and has begun to hanker for the alternative treatment only recently abandoned. Ever since the time of Peter the Great one school of thought looked to the introduction of Western ideas and institutions for the salvation of Russia, the other laid stress upon the preservation and development on purely national lines of all that was distinctively Russian. The advocates of that set of ideas which did not for the moment command the approval of the government usually possessed the ear of the public, for the Russian is predisposed by his climate to an incurable pessimism as to his surroundings. Besides, his exclusion from the experience of public affairs inclines him to abstract speculations, which often make him the dupe of political visionaries. Moreover, in the eyes of men beset by officials the government is the enemy, and the appropriate attitude of the subject is one of passive resistance. Lastly, it must never be forgotten that the final decision rested with one autocratic will, and that the transitions from the pursuit of the one ideal to that of the other had none of that conciliatory character, or of that permanence, which belong to gradual change.

Alexander I had opened his heart to all the influences of the West. Long before his death public opinion had condemned his activity in European politics and his innovations in Russia. Nicholas, amid general approval, had closed the doors of his Empire against Europe, and had pursued a policy, which, saving only his championship of absolutism abroad, was purely Russian. The Crimean War proclaimed that policy a failure, and the pendulum stood poised for its backward swing.

The new Czar, Alexander II, was a very different man from either his uncle or his father. He had inherited the fine presence and the gracious manner which belonged to both, but he had neither the enthusiasm of the one nor the inflexible will of the other. Nicholas had always deplored his own lack of liberal culture, and he had taken care that his sons Alexander and Constantine should not grow up under the same narrow influences. He had not failed to subject them both to a stem military training, but there had gone with it an extensive study of German romantic literature. Alexander entered manhood without much taste for soldiering, with a cultured mind and wide sympathies, but with little or no knowledge of the working of Russian institutions or of the principles which govern the social and political action of mankind. It followed from the character of his mind that, while he was singularly receptive of suggestions, he was never able to determine for himself the exact measures by which his general intentions were to be realised, and found himself always in the position of an enquirer charged with the duty of deciding between the conflicting solutions presented by his counsellors. This attitude of mind was both his strength and his weakness. Hence sprang his caution and his preference for advancing step by step, which made so much of his work permanent; hence, too, his fatal readiness to pause, and even to turn back, in the face of unfavourable symptoms or weight of adverse counsel.

At the moment of his accession it did not need the driving power of an irresistible will to set reform in motion. The failure of the dead Czar's system was manifest in the failures

of the war. In an idle and inexperienced society reforming ideas floated as nebulous and as all-pervading as in Parisian salons on the eve of the French Revolution. It was believed that the Czar had only to speak the creative word. The wishes of Nicholas himself were on record to urge his successor to that reform which was recognised as the indispensable groundwork of every other reform—the Emancipation of the Serfs.

There was a general agreement in tracing the misfortunes of Russia to the paralysis of individual enterprise resulting from the ubiquitous activity of officials. But the only alternative to officialdom in the modern State consists in a system of vigorous local self-government. And local self-government is not possible without the existence of independence, intelligence, and public spirit either in one class or in the community at large. These were the qualities which Emancipation was intended to bestow.

The land of Russia was divided into large estates which were the property of the Crown, of the members of the reigning house or of individual nobles. On every estate the peasants enjoyed the inalienable occupation of their houses, their gardens, and a certain proportion of the land. They were bound in return to labour services (*barschina*) by means of which the lords of the soil cultivated that portion of their estates which they kept in their own hands. No serf was permitted to leave the land without the permission of his lord, nor did such permission carry emancipation with it. It was only granted to domestic servants in the lord's household or to the surplus population who sought paid labour elsewhere, and in the latter case was conditional upon the payment of an annual *obrok*, varying in amount between £1 and £2. Each lord was judge of his own peasants, and was responsible to the government for their share of the taxes and their quota of recruits for the army. It is a mistake to regard the pictures drawn by contemporary Russian novelists as representing the spirit in which these powers were normally exercised. The novelist seeks for abnormal types and heightened situations. But it is clear that there was much room for oppression and even for brutal cruelty on the one side and for savage retaliation on the other.

It will conduce to an understanding of Alexander's methods to study the steps by which his great reform was worked out. His first allusion to the subject was in reply to a congratulatory address from the Moscow nobility. While denying his intention to proclaim emancipation by his own authority, he declared himself not altogether opposed to it, and suggested that a change, which was probably inevitable, would be more satisfactorily effected from above than from below. A year later, in January, 1857, a committee was appointed to study the subject. During the discussions of this committee the policy subsequently adopted first took tangible shape in the recommendations of Nicholas Miliutine. He laid emphasis upon three postulates. First, that a grant of emancipation without land would only result in the introduction of the diseases of the Western labour-market; secondly, that the estates of the nobility, being theoretically held by service, and not as freeholds, could legally be resumed; and thirdly, that the peasants could only be restrained from the sale of any lands allotted to them by making these the common property of the whole village-community, or mir.

By a happy coincidence these suggestions were seconded by an application on the part of the nobles of Kieff, Volhynia and Podolia for permission to complete by grants of land and emancipation already partially effected. Alexander profited by the opportunity to send a copy of the petition to all the provinces, following it up in November, 1857, with a decree ordering the formation of Provincial Committees of landowners to discuss the question; and by another decree in March, 1858, Miliutine's principles were recognised as the basis of the changes contemplated, subject to a money compensation to be guaranteed to the landowner by the State. At this stage selfish interests began to appear; there was a good deal of difference of opinion, and most committees sent in minority reports. The Czar accordingly threw his own personal influence into the scale by travelling round the country

to win over important waverers.

The information and recommendations supplied by the Provincial Committees were next arranged, compared and embodied in a code by a drafting Commission ; and the result of their labours was laid before the Principal Committee, whose proceedings were quickened by the Czar's influence and by the appointment of the Grand Duke Constantine as President. Finally, the Council of State gave its approval on March 3, 1861. By the new law serfage was entirely abolished. Each peasant entered into full possession of his cottage and garden-plot. The *mir* received sufficient land for allotment among its members, the individual lot varying in different regions with the productivity of the soil from 5, 1/2 to 27, 1/2 acres. The remaining land became the property of the lords in absolute ownership, and, by way of compensation for the loss of labour-dues, the peasants were to buy their allotments, the State advancing the purchase-money and collecting it by instalments, called "Redemption Annuities," spread over forty-nine years. Domestic servants and serfs on the *obrok* system received their liberty, but without a grant of land. These arrangements were worked out on each estate by those concerned in separate "Regulation Charters," and differences were settled by arbitration.

It was not to be expected that a change involving so many interests and effected through so many different agencies should have given entire satisfaction. It is, however, a tolerable proof of the fairness of the arrangements that neither party was wholly contented. The peasants regarded the land as their own, and resented payment. They complained that the amount allotted was too small, and indeed the growth of population ultimately produced this result. The disappearance of the rights of pasture and of cutting wood on the lord's domain was a serious loss. On the other hand, except in the fertile Black Earth Region of the central provinces, the landowner was commonly ruined. His land at the time of the change was frequently mortgaged, in fact, it was the attraction of ready money which had induced him to part with it. There was so much haste in realising the government bonds, in which payment was made, that they became much depreciated in value. Ready money was quickly spent by persons unused to cash transactions, and labour was difficult to obtain. On both sides all the evils appeared which attend a sudden transition from a condition of fixed status to one of free contract.

Upon this foundation the Czar and his advisers proceeded to rear a system of local government. The *mir* was to manage its own small affairs, and in each *volost*, or group of ten or more villages, there was set up a *Zemstvo*, or District Council elected by the landowners, the *mirs* and the towns conjointly. The District *Zemstvos* of each province elected the members of a Provincial *Zemstvo*. Education, the care of the roads and public health, were placed under their authority (1864).

The law, since its codification under Nicholas, was good, the administration of justice was bad. The latter was now reformed with the object of making the Courts of Law entirely independent of the executive, and of securing publicity of procedure, oral pleadings and the co-operation of a jury in all important trials. The whole system of law courts was reorganised, and Justices of the Peace, charged with the duty of hearing minor cases, were to be elected by the *Zemstvos*.

Besides these reforms, the finances were set in order, and the army and navy reorganised on modern lines. The term of military service was reduced from twenty-five years to fifteen, and the first ironclads were built. Much attention was paid to railway development, some 600 miles being laid down annually.

Less wise were the wholesale relaxations of the Press censorship and of the restrictions upon the admission of students to the Universities. A deluge of crude political

speculation and of virulent, and often ignorant, attack upon the government began to pour out of the Press. A crowd of poor students living in circumstances of the utmost misery, underwent an intellectual training with little prospect in the existing state of society of finding scope for their acquirements, and turned their newfound mental activity against society as they found it constituted. Indeed, by 1865, the pendulum had reached the end of its swing. Disappointed enthusiasm, baffled self-seeking and injured material interests were ranging themselves everywhere against the government or rallying to the support of traditional usages with the cry that it was time to stop.

But the most powerful impulse to reaction was given by a series of disturbances in Poland. That unhappy country in her suicidal madness was destined, like another Samson, to drag down in her expiring struggles the liberties of her captor. The events of the Crimean War had re-kindled the national hopes. The Polish nationalists were divided into two sections of opinion—the “Reds” and the “Whites.” Of these, the Reds had made the revolution of 1831, and demanded nothing less than the restoration of Polish independence and the frontiers of 1772. The Whites, on the other hand, who were principally nobles, and still looked to Prince Adam Czartoryski as their leader, sought the restoration of the autonomy under the Russian Crown granted by the Constitution of 1815. But the counsels of both sections, and especially of the Reds, were unhappily warped by the fanaticism of groups of exiles settled in distant European capitals, who had ceased to have any stake in the prosperity of their country, and shared nothing with her but her memories of hatred.

Alexander had solemnly warned the Poles of the futility of their political aspirations. He was, however, prepared to go far in a policy of conciliation. He appointed Michael Gortchakoff viceroy, restored the ballot for recruits, instead of the system by which political malcontents were selected, and offered a general amnesty to the exiles, which, however, only resulted in the readmission Poland, of irreconcilable elements.

Meanwhile, the Whites, under the guidance of Count Andrew Zamoiski, had embarked upon a new line of policy. The nobles enjoyed an immense power over their serfs, and were supported by the Roman Catholic clergy. Emancipation was in the air, and the Polish leaders were not slow to realise that the Russian government was in a position to steal an advantage by coming forward as the champion of the oppressed. An Agricultural Society was therefore founded for the encouragement of farming and for the improvement of the peasant's lot, and the liberation of the serfs was proposed in 1860. The Russian government vetoed a suggestion which sought to anticipate its own plans. This action provoked intense excitement and played into the hands of the Reds. Nationalist demonstrations took place in Warsaw, and, though no actual violence was used on the popular side, the troops were more than once employed with deadly effect against the mob. Gortchakoff and successive Viceroys lost their nerve, concessions were unwisely made without a preliminary attempt to restore order, with the only result that the malcontents were emboldened till the authorities were goaded into an unwise severity. The Agricultural Society was even suppressed.

Alexander was greatly distressed, and readily listened to the counsels of the Marquis Vielopolski, one of the small group of Poles, who saw that the future of their country depended upon co-operating with the better intentions of the Russian government. In 1862 the Grand Duke Constantine, whose liberal instincts were notorious, was sent to Poland as Viceroy, with Vielopolski as his chief adviser. The new government behaved with extraordinary self-restraint in the face of much provocation. Constantine appeared everywhere in Polish uniform, spoke in the Polish language, surrounded himself with Poles, began to repair the ancient palace and answered an attempt at his assassination with friendly proclamations. But even the Whites were irreconcilable. Headed by Zamoiski, they demanded the Constitution of 1815, and with it the restoration of the Polish districts of Russia (p. 132). Well might Vielopolski exclaim, “Good may be done for the Poles

sometimes, but through the Poles themselves never.”

His patience was now broken, and his attempt to restore the old recruiting law and under it to seize the ringleaders of discontent on the night of January 15, 1863, precipitated the struggle. The enterprise was ill-managed, many of the intended victims escaped to the woods, and guerilla war began; Mieroslavski, that stormy petrel of revolution, being declared dictator by the Nationalists. But this time there was no regular Polish army to depend upon, and organised resistance was brief. Bismarck securely guarded the Polish frontier of Prussia, a service which was to be repaid tenfold in the sequel, and the rebels were pushed into Galicia. But even then a secret national committee, whom the government could never track down, continued to gather supplies and money from patriots, and maintained a guerilla war, not without hope of European intervention. Such action was indeed proposed by Napoleon to England, and he lived to rue the suggestion. England contented herself with recommending the restoration of the Constitution of 1815, a proposal showing the most profound ignorance of the situation, as Alexander Gortchakoff was able to demonstrate. She joined later with Austria and France in sending simultaneous notes to the Russian government, and supported by the latter Power came forward once again in June with a proposal for a European conference, only to be met by a very peremptory assertion of Russia's right to manage her own business.

The old Russian party, championed by the vigorous journalism of Katkoff, were now carrying public feeling with them, for opposition to Polish claims united all parties. The conduct of Muravieff, who by the most savage repression had tamed rebellion in Lithuania, was loudly applauded. Count Berg superseded Constantine, and lost no time in applying the same methods with a like result. No sooner was order restored than Nicholas Miliutine was sent to Poland to effect the liberation of the serfs and to destroy thereby the influence of the Polish nobility for ever. The peasants received the freehold of their lands, and the State undertook to bear the costs of compensation. The right of access to forest and pasture was deliberately secured to them with the object of creating a permanent source of dispute with their former lords. Each village obtained the right to manage its own affairs independently of nobles and clergy, and the power of the latter was broken by an extensive dissolution of monasteries and by the confiscation of their revenues, which left them dependent on State salaries.

Far more important than its effects in Poland was the influence exerted by the Polish outbreak upon Russian opinion, and therefore indirectly upon the Czar. Reaction was now the order of the day. By 1865, Alexander II had in his own person passed from the phase of political thought which had animated his uncle to that which had dominated his father. It is to his credit that the change was not final. The pendulum was to swing forwards and backwards, and forwards again, before the tragedy of the concluding scene beside the Catherine Canal.

CHAPTER XXI

THE LIBERATION OF ITALY

Louis NAPOLEON BONAPARTE occupied in the year 1856 a position of unchallenged authority in France, and of commanding influence in Europe. All his personal ambitions had been fulfilled, and a fair field seemed to lie before him for realising those plans for the good of France and of mankind which, to do him no more than justice, were never absent from his thoughts.

The Constitution which he had established put no control upon his will. The ministers were appointed and dismissed by him, justice was administered in his name, every public servant was bound to him by an oath of allegiance. He selected and presided over the Council of State; the Senate, or Upper House, consisted of his nominees; the *Corps législatif* or lower Chamber, though elected by universal suffrage, was summoned, prorogued, and dissolved by his will, and could do no more than discuss and approve the measures submitted to it by the Emperor. He was supreme commander of the army and navy; peace and war, treaties and alliances were in his hands to make and unmake.

Material improvement was the key-note of his domestic policy. His speech at Bordeaux, in 1852, proclaimed his intentions. After declaring that the Empire was synonymous with the reign of peace, religion and morality, he proceeded, "We have wide tracts of waste to open for cultivation, roads to build, harbours to dig, rivers to adapt for navigation, canals to complete, a network of railways to perfect. There lies opposite Marseilles a boundless realm to be assimilated to France, our western ports await more rapid communication with America. Lastly, there are everywhere ruins to rebuild, false gods to cast down, truths to be made victorious." To these aims Napoleon III remained constant. Charitable institutions were founded, grants were made for the improvement of working-class dwellings, a credit foncier, or land bank, was established offering easy loans for agricultural improvements, and a credit mobilier to do the like for industrial enterprise. Railways, steamships and the telegraph were steadily encouraged. In spite of the misfortunes of floods, famine and cholera, prosperity was everywhere manifest, and nowhere more so than in the capital itself. Here a rapid industrial development gave rise to active speculation. Immense fortunes were quickly made and as quickly spent, and an extravagant and somewhat vulgar tone dominated society. In 1853 the Emperor had married a Spanish lady, Countess Eugenie de Montijo, and the Court of the Tuileries set an example of lavish splendour. Paris, rebuilt by Haussmann with wide and handsome boulevards (not without some idea of making street warfare more difficult in the future), became the pleasure city of Europe. The Crimean War shed the glamour of military glory on the Imperial Crown, and the Congress of Paris seated its wearer at the head of the Council-table of Europe. The birth of an heir, the ill-fated Prince Imperial, seemed an earnest of Fortune's continued favours to the new dynasty.

Yet at this very moment Napoleon was being insensibly involved in that series of events which formed the first drama in the trilogy of his ruin. And the siren voice that lured him on was, appropriately enough, a voice from an islet in far distant seas—the voice of the man of St. Helena. Little did the fallen Emperor imagine when he re-edited his career for the benefit of posterity that his own nephew and destined successor would be the most uncritical of his many dupes. The "Napoleonic Legend" consisted, it will be remembered, of two amazing propositions. The first asserted that the Emperor had been a conqueror only

that he might bring the blessings of freedom to enslaved peoples, the second that he had been a despot only that in his good time he might the more surely establish liberty. Louis Napoleon had made his uncle's precepts his study day and night, but he had paid less attention to his practice. With his strange inability to recognise essential inconsistencies between conflicting ideas he had firmly associated the supposed liberationist policy with that extension of the French frontiers and that predominance of French influence, which his uncle's reign had witnessed. He had failed to perceive that the carving and re-carving to which Europe had been subjected by its conqueror was one of the causes of the organised uprising of 1813. He was resolved to play the Liberator's part and to claim the Liberator's reward. Similarly, at some distant day he would lay down his autocratic power to receive a new authority under popular forms from the hands of a grateful nation. We have already seen the first of these illusions at work in his somewhat tentative support of the unionist idea in the Principalities (p. 275). His diplomatic intervention on behalf of Poland was still in the distant future. But Italy's demand that he should make good his professions in her case (the crying case of despised national claims) had been audible at the Congress of Paris ; and Italy now possessed a man armed with the craft and determination to exploit those professions in her interest.

We have already indicated the debt which Piedmont owed in the dark days which followed Novara to King Victor Emmanuel, a debt which Italy at large was to share. It is not for nothing that the squat figure of the valiant little monarch, with the face of almost savage ugliness, with the gigantic moustache, the flat nose and cavernous nostrils rides in triumph in many an Italian piazza. His bursts of ill-temper, his coarse tastes, his open profligacy were more than atoned for by his strong commonsense, his steady consistency of purpose and the downright openness of his speech and manners. Italy understood him and never distrusted him, as she distrusted some of her more gifted leaders, and in the hour of failure the panic that swayed others had no power over the sturdy nature of the Royal sportsman and mountaineer. Yet it was not he that made Italy.

Nor was it the Marquis D'Azeglio, the leader of the Conservatives, the resolute opponent of further fighting, who had induced the King to dissolve the militant Piedmontese parliament for the second time, and appeal to the common sense and loyalty of the nation by the Proclamation of Moncalieri. But his work too was indispensable, and is well expressed in his own words, "I am minister that I may save this country to be the stronghold of Italy." In character a strange blend of the artistic and aristocratic temperaments, he was not likely to initiate a vigorous forward policy. The national independence and honour of Piedmont were his concern. Yet, by making these secure, he provided the indispensable condition of the *Risorgimento*, or Resurrection of Italy. And care for national independence soon brought him into conflict with Rome.

The Pope had spoken the word, and everywhere the clergy had rallied to the side of reaction. In Piedmont they constituted the strongest influence opposed to the Constitutional and anti-Austrian policy of the government, and nowhere did they enjoy greater power for mischief. Ecclesiastical courts still judged cases in which clerics were involved, besides a mass of other matters, supposed to possess a semi-religious character. The right of affording asylum to offenders against the law existed in many places. Marriage was entirely, and education partially, under priestly control. No restrictions existed on the inheritance of property by the Church, monasteries abounded, and yet the government was obliged to contribute to assist the ill-paid and hard-working parish priests. Many of these powers were inconsistent with the new law of Piedmont, but all attempts at an accommodation with Rome broke down owing to the obstinacy of Antonelli. In 1850 Siccardi was instructed to lay before Parliament a partial scheme of reform. The ecclesiastical courts and the right of asylum were thereby abolished, and a law of mortmain placed restrictions on the acquisition of property by the Church. The result was an incident which strengthened the hands of the

ministers. One of their number, Santa Rosa, Minister of Commerce and Agriculture, a man of unaffected piety, was refused the last consolations of the Church upon his death-bed by the friar who confessed him. This act of mean spite hardened the heart of the public for the struggle which was obviously impending over the marriage question and the existence of the monasteries.

The death of Santa Rosa had another and an indirect result. It brought into the ministry the protagonist in the struggle for Italian liberty, Count Camillo Benso di Cavour (October, 1850). The exterior of the man did little to suggest either his noble descent, to which indeed he attached no importance, or the abilities which were to sway the destinies of Italy and of Europe. His square, plain face, clean-shaved but for a frill of ragged beard, the half-closed eyes that blinked through his spectacles, the merry humour that lurked at the corners of his mouth, the commonplace figure and the ill-fitting, untidy clothes were suggestive rather of the comic middle-class father of the stage. At least, his appearance was not inconsistent with the bent of a mind intensely independent and practical. He had visited England and studied her institutions, her agriculture, and her trade with close interest. On his return he had devoted himself to the improvement of his estates at Leri, and was recognised as a first-rate authority on all economic questions, displaying prodigious industry in all that he undertook, as well as unusual powers of memory, and a unique gift for marshalling facts. Italy had failed in 1848 because she had failed to respect facts, and here was a man who rendered them daily and hourly homage. Perhaps few guessed that this solid, genial incarnation of common sense could spend himself for an ideal, or could be transformed by devotion to the one object of pursuit into the boldest, the wariest, and at need, the most unscrupulous antagonist that ever played for high political stakes. Yet, though he stooped to the tricks of the diplomatic gaming-table, he never, like Bismarck, subscribed to its creed. He was free from cynicism, and never lost his faith in humanity, in political freedom, and in the ultimate triumph of good.

His activity in his new office was unrelaxing. "He will," said the King to D'Azeglio, "end by displacing you all." Indeed, his masterful nature made him a difficult colleague, and at the beginning of 1852 his agreement for common action with Rattazzi and the Left Centre party, concluded without the sanction of his chief, led to his resignation. But there was work to be done which needed stronger hands than D'Azeglio's. The introduction of a Bill to make the registration of marriages the affair of the State, while insisting in all but exceptional cases on the religious ceremony, produced an outcry at Rome, and even the King bent to the storm. D'Azeglio resigned, and Cavour, with the support of the Right and Left Centres, became Premier (October, 1852).

He had not taken office with any intention of being tender to clerical scruples. The wealth of the Church made it impossible for a government in daily difficulty for funds to consent any longer to subsidise the parish priests. A Bill was introduced dissolving all religious houses not engaged in practical work, while permitting the inmates to remain in residence during their lives, and levying contributions upon bishoprics and well-paid livings. The funds thus set at liberty were to be applied to pensioning the monks and nuns, and to increasing the incomes of the parochial clergy. Once more Rome put out all her strength and chance played into her hands. Within one month the King's mother, wife and brother all died, and Victor Emmanuel, recognising the signs of Divine displeasure, faltered and urged a compromise. Cavour resigned. But D'Azeglio was at the King's elbow with wise counsel, and the Royal assent was secured. Cavour returned to office, and the Bill was carried.

At the very moment of this crisis the ministry had just taken the momentous step in foreign policy described in a previous chapter. England and France, engaged in the Crimea, desired the co-operation of Piedmont, not only as an accession of much-needed strength, but as a means of liberating Austria from apprehension in Italy, so as to leave her free to

make common cause against Russia. Cavour, as we have seen, wished to place himself in close relations with two powerful friends, to prevent Austria from monopolising their gratitude and to secure a place for Piedmont at the council-table of Europe. At home his policy was ill-understood. It seemed at once a dissipation of the resources that should have been husbanded for Italy's day of need, and in the weakened state of the national finances a reckless extravagance. Only Cavour's personal influence and the steady support of the King carried the day. But after months of anxious waiting, the part played by La Marmora and his troops in the victory of the Tchernaya, the admission of Cavour to the Congress of Paris, and Lord Clarendon's frank denunciation of misgovernment in Italy were recognised as gains well worth the price that had been paid. As Cavour himself said, "The disgrace of Novara is effaced," and "the case of Italy is before the bar of Europe."

And Austria was swift to mark her peril. At the beginning of 1857, Francis Joseph's younger brother, the ill-fated Maximilian, was sent as Viceroy to Lombardy. His noble character, his open mind, and his kind heart might have done much in a situation that had not been embittered beyond the power of remedial measures. Not only did he lighten taxation and promote railway enterprise and education, but he would gladly have conceded self-government, have propitiated Piedmont with Parma and Modena, and have rescued Romagna from the Pope by annexation. But the officials and the military party never gave him a free hand.

Meanwhile, Cavour's domestic policy was directed to the end of making "Italy's case" as convincing as possible. Everything was done to promote the freedom, prosperity, and industrial progress of Piedmont. A whole band of writers made known to Europe the enlightenment of the little State, and showed up every mistake and act of tyranny committed by her enemies. The Italian refugees within her borders were closely watched. Piedmont had paid a stiff price for acquiring the services of the noblest and ablest of the Italian patriots by suffering the simultaneous influx of elements of a very different character. And it was at some sacrifice of popularity that Cavour was obliged to guard the frontier against any imprudent attempt to carry help to a hopeless rising at Milan, in 1853, followed by cruelties and injustice against which he lodged a vigorous protest.

We have seen that Cavour put no faith in Charles Albert's maxim, "*Italia fara di se*" (Italy will manage her own business). Since the Congress of Paris, every faculty had been bent to the single aim of securing that when Piedmont at last drew the sword one or other of her powerful friends should stand beside her. England had been the more profuse in sympathy, but Cavour soon found that remonstrances and congresses were her methods, and securities for good government in existing States her aims. Her devotion to peace and her traditional friendship for Austria assured him that she would do nothing to disturb the *status quo*. There was more to be hoped of Napoleon III, and by every appeal to generosity, ambition, and vanity Cavour strove to lead him on. There were, however, two serious difficulties. Napoleon had committed France to the support of the Papacy. The French garrison remained in Rome, and could not be withdrawn without offending the Catholic party in France. Italian unity and the Temporal Power were mutually inconsistent. Moreover, the Emperor had his own solution of the Italian problem, a solution borrowed from the policy of the first Napoleon. He was prepared to favour an extension of Piedmont, which might thus answer to the old Cisalpine Republic, but he aimed at establishing a Kingdom of Tuscany for his cousin, Prince Napoleon, and at substituting another cousin, Lucien Murat, for the Bourbon dynasty in the Two Sicilies. The Italian States together were to be constituted into a federation under the presidency of the Pope and the protection of France.

Cavour was therefore compelled to mine deeper than his prospective ally. National feeling would never accept so partial a scheme of redemption, and to national feeling the policy of Piedmont had been one long appeal. A great step was taken when Pallavicino,

with the sympathy of the noble republican Daniele Manin founded the “National Society” to promote the union of Italy under Victor Emmanuel (1857), which, through its active secretary, the Sicilian La Farina, was soon in touch with every shade of patriotic opinion. Mazzini’s dislike counted for nothing. His encouragement of the hopeless rising of 1853, and of Pisacane’s expedition, to be noticed later, discredited him. The republicans followed Manin. Among these men was Garibaldi, who had quarrelled with Mazzini during the defence of Rome, in 1849. From his island home in Caprera, he was brought by Pallavicino to visit Cavour and Victor Emmanuel, in 1856, and succumbed to the spell of the King’s hearty and honest manner.

But the plot within a plot needed wary treading. Napoleon could not be allowed to suspect the larger design. “If need be,” said Cavour to La Farina, “I will, like Peter, deny you.” And at the beginning of 1858 occurred an incident which bade fair to scare the Emperor out of all his sympathies with Italy. In the January of that year an Italian exile in London, named Orsini, persuaded, quite wrongly, that Napoleon alone prevented France from aiding his country, flung three bombs at the Emperor as he was driving to the opera, injuring 148 persons and causing 8 deaths, but doing no harm to his intended victim. The incident deprived Napoleon for the moment of his self-command. He rushed into an angry quarrel with England for harbouring refugees, which nearly resulted in war, and he wrote a strong remonstrance to Victor Emmanuel, which the King answered with a dignity and firmness which won the Emperor’s respect. But, most surprising consequence of all, he resolved to put his plans for Italy’s redemption into immediate execution. We can scarcely doubt that Orsini’s dignified and affecting letter written on the eve of suffering the penalty for his crime, convinced him that he could no longer dally with Italian hopes without sacrificing the opportunity for ever. On July 20 Cavour met him privately by his own invitation at Plombières, a watering-place in the Vosges.

Terms were soon arranged. Piedmont was to put 100,000 men into the field, and France was to send 200,000 across the Alps to join them. Lombardy, Venetia, Parma, Modena, and the Romagna were to fall to Victor Emmanuel. Tuscany and Umbria were to form a Central Italian kingdom. Revolution was to be left to do the work of the allies in Naples, after which the claims of Murat were to be considered. The Pope was to retain Rome and its immediate surroundings, and a scheme of federation was to be arranged. As a reward for his assistance the Emperor claimed the hand of Princess Clotilde, the King’s daughter, for Prince Napoleon, son of his uncle Jerome, and the cession of Savoy and Nice to France.

The one object of Cavour was now to provoke immediate war. All promised fairly for his plans in the early months of 1859. Napoleon significantly told the Austrian ambassador that he regretted that mutual “relations were not as good as they had been.” Victor Emmanuel followed up the announcement with a speech to Parliament, in which his sympathetic reference to the *grido di dolore*, (cry of agony) which sounded in his ears from every corner of Italy was received with tumultuous enthusiasm. A week later Prince Napoleon visited Turin to claim the sacrifice of the luckless Clotilde. In February the Emperor authorised the publication of a pamphlet entitled “Napoleon III and the Pope,” in which his views were explained. All seemed ready, and volunteers were speeding from every part of Italy to Piedmont, when England, now under Lord Derby, took alarm.

A special mission was sent, first to Napoleon then to Vienna, suggesting the removal of grievances. Austria was conciliatory, but demanded that Piedmont should disarm. Meanwhile, the Czar suggested a Congress. The suggestion was awkward for Austria ; she dared not refuse, but knew well that the decision of Europe was likely to go against her. She assented with the proviso that Piedmont should first disarm, hoping that the national indignation at disarmament would overthrow Cavour. That patient intriguer was nearly at

the end of his resources, but made a last desperate throw. Speeding to Paris he saw Napoleon. What passed is not certainly known, but it is probable that he threatened to reveal to astonished Europe every word that had passed at Plombières. Having made sure of the Emperor, he flatly declined the Austrian condition. England was not to be beaten. She now produced a suggestion that the disarmament should apply to both sides alike, and that the Italians should be represented at the Congress. Napoleon bade Cavour yield, and, overwhelmed with despair, he bowed to necessity. It seemed that he, like all the others, had laboured in vain for Italy.

It was the darkness before the dawn. Before yet his submission had reached Vienna, the military party, weary of Piedmontese provocation, had despatched an ultimatum offering the choice between disarmament and instant war. Joyfully Cavour chose and claimed the fulfilment of his ally's promises.

His joy might well have been tempered with anxiety. Thanks to the circumstances of the declaration of war the game was in the hands of the Austrian commander, Giulay. He could have crushed the Piedmontese in the position they had selected north of Alessandria, where they covered both the passage of the Po and the road to Genoa, by which the French were expected. He could have struck at Turin, which their plan of operations compelled them to uncover. After much hesitation and delay, he attempted the latter course of action, but recoiled alarmed by the fierce hostility of the country, and anxious for the safety of his fine of retreat. Before the French came up the Piedmontese had repulsed an attack at Montebello, and shortly afterwards cleared their left by an action at Palestro for a general advance on Milan.

Giulay now took up a position behind the Ticino covering Magenta. On June 4 the French Guards crossed the river on the partially destroyed railway bridge and engaged the Austrians in front. Here they were almost overwhelmed before late in the afternoon the divisions of Niel and Canrobert came up in, support. One hour later MacMahon, who had crossed the Ticino further north, appeared on the right flank of the enemy, who thereupon retired. The Piedmontese who had followed the flank attack to menace the Austrian rear scarcely came into action at all. Meanwhile, Garibaldi, with his irregular bands of *Cacciatori degli Alpi*, was conducting a brilliant guerilla campaign among the foot-hills of the Alps, well out to the left of the main army, which, while producing but little effect on the general course of the war, served to kindle national enthusiasm, to enhance his own reputation, and to train his men for greater enterprises in the not distant future.

On June 8 the allies entered Milan and proclaimed the annexation of Lombardy. The rulers of Parma and Modena fled, and the Romagna rose in rebellion.

Interrupted only by Bazaine's attack on their rearguard at Melegnano the Austrians retired behind the Mincio. But before the allies reached that river, Francis Joseph, now in command, had been persuaded to resume the offensive. It was his intention to occupy the hills facing the enemy to the south-west of Peschiera, and with the rest of his troops to cross the stream lower down at Goito, and to drive the allies northward against the Alps. The plan failed. After terrible slaughter the French stormed the Austrian centre at Solferino, and the Piedmontese at San Martino carried the heights opposite the allied left. Niel's division securely covered the right flank (June 23). The Austrians fell back upon the Alps, and by the first week in July the decisive battle was expected near Verona.

News, not of battle but of peace, falsified the expectations of Europe and overwhelmed with dismay the Emperor's own allies. He had met Francis Joseph at Villafranca, and had agreed to an armistice. The younger man had got the better of the elder. Piedmont was to have Lombardy and Parma for her pains. In Venetia, Modena and the Romagna things were

to be as if there had never been a Avar. Federation was to be attempted under Papal presidency.

Small wonder that Europe was amazed. Yet it was all in reality very simple. Neither for the first time nor for the last had Napoleon, with his ill-defined ideas, allowed himself to be carried by the activity of his fellow-conspirators into a situation the consequences of which he had not clearly faced. Campaigning was disagreeable to his love of personal comfort; the horrible carnage of Solferino had shocked his humane temperament; the Italian movement was slipping out of his control and threatened to involve him in trouble with the Pope and with his Catholic subjects at home; the two victories had not been decisive, and the Quadrilateral might again turn the tide of the war. Worst of all, rumours had gone abroad about Savoy and Nice, and Prussia, seeing in the extension of the French frontier to the Alps the ear' nest of similar designs upon the Rhine, had mobilised her forces.

Small wonder, too, that Cavour was enraged with an ally who had promised to free North Italy from the Alps to the Adriatic, and the more so when he found that his own King intended to sign the treaty. Hurrying to the seat of war he violently urged that Piedmont should persevere alone, and left the Royal presence with words of insolent and ungovernable anger. But bitter as was his own disappointment, Victor Emmanuel had not forgotten Novara. And he saw that France had check-mated Austria, and knew that, with Austria powerless to interfere, Italy at last "would manage her own business."

His confidence was justified. Early in the war Parma, Modena, the Romagna, and Tuscany had declared against the Austrians, and had offered a dictatorship to Victor Emmanuel. In the last-named state an effort had been made by the Florentine nobles to induce the Grand Duke to join the allies. A feeble attempt on his part to overawe the city with artillery led to a demand for his abdication; and this amiable but ineffective personage left Florence for the last time followed by cries of "Meet you again in Paradise." Piedmontese commissioners had promptly been sent into the revolted districts. The news of Villafranca changed the situation. Cavour's successor, Rattazzi, was obliged at least to make a show of respecting the treaty, and the commissioners were recalled. D'Azeglio in Romagna declined to quit his post; Farini in Parma and Modena, remained in a private capacity; at Florence the stern Tuscan patriot, Baron Ricasoli, refused to treat with the Grand Duke. The four States formed a league of defence, and Piedmont allowed General Fanti, with Garibaldi under him, to set out to take command of their forces. The next step of the revolted districts was to decree, through assemblies elected by popular suffrage, their own annexation to Piedmont. The offer was refused, but the refusal was understood in the sense in which it was meant. Napoleon was in sore perplexity. He was bound to stand by his decision at Villafranca, but very shame forbade him to desert the Italians. He refused to allow Austria to interfere, he refused to allow the Central States to elect a regent. He had at first resolved to shuffle off his difficulties on to the shoulders of a Congress, and Europe was ready to accept the burden. Then suddenly he changed his mind. He saw that the Central States must carry their point unless indeed, the domination of Austria was re-established, to which he could never consent. Federation was impossible, so was the establishment of a French dynasty in Tuscany. He resolved to agree with the Italians while he could claim a price for his complaisance, and to insist upon the surrender of Savoy and Nice. So he proceeded to wreck the proposal for a Congress by authorising the publication of an inspired pamphlet entitled "The Pope and the Congress," which argued for the diminution of the Papal States. Austria declined to take part to be confronted with such suggestions.

Cavour was now back in office, the one man bold enough to make, in case of need, the sacrifice Napoleon demanded. He hoped, however, to avoid it. England had supported the Emperor's last change of front so far as the Central States were concerned, but, when his designs upon Nice and Savoy leaked out, she angrily sheered off. Piedmont, however,

dared not rely on English support in defiance of her grasping friend, who was now deliberately making fresh difficulties to quicken her anxiety to come to terms. Before the plebiscites had been taken, by which the Central States finally declared themselves subject to Victor Emmanuel, Cavour had been forced to sign away Savoy and Nice, and the Emperor, defying engagements with England, had taken them without the confirmation either of plebiscites or of a Congress (March, 1860). It was a heavy sacrifice, but one rather of pride than of real strength. Nice was indeed Italian, but Savoy was neither by race nor traditions likely to blend naturally with the new state. But the demand was ungenerous. By it, as much as by anything else, Napoleon sacrificed the gratitude of his ally. With little regard to his wishes, Italy proceeded more vigorously than ever to "manage her own business."

Since the events of 1849, "Bomba," King of the Two Sicilies, had abandoned himself to a mood of cheerful optimism. Alone of all the Italian princes, he had known how to put down revolution unaided, and the reflection inspired contempt for others and a pride in his own methods, which encouraged him to give rein to his unlovely individuality, making himself in the process a kind of diplomatic pariah in Europe. We have already described his attempt to assert himself as the champion of the Pope; he had alienated Austria by a contemptuous refusal of her patronage and protection; he was now to excite the hatred of opponents by the horrors of his domestic government. Bomba had a certain limited faith in his army, a firmer confidence in his police, and he put a wide interpretation on the maxim that prevention is better than cure. His plan was to keep all his declared opponents to the number of some 20,000 in prison, and all whose views were doubtful under police surveillance. He possessed, besides, a distorted sense of humour which vented itself in practical jokes, and he had anticipated Gilbert's Mikado in the discovery of the humorous possibilities of punishment. To him, no doubt, the sufferings of his victims were a "source of merriment," but of a merriment by no means "innocent."

In island prisons, or in half-ruined fortresses of the interior, there languished on lifelong sentences in filth and misery the men who were too high-minded or too intelligent to acquiesce in his misrule. They were chained to common felons or turned loose in dens of horror, where every iniquity was rampant, and where the knife alone commanded respect. It so happened that Gladstone was travelling in Italy in 1851. He attended one of the trials, and saw with hot indignation the abominable perversion of justice. He succeeded in visiting two of the prisons, and those not the worst. His "Letter to Lord Aberdeen" made known to Europe "This negation of God erected into a system of government."

Ferdinand defied remonstrances with all the shameless mendacity of a Sultan of Turkey. A raid organised by Mazzini under Pisacane to free the prisoners only liberated a few; and the convicted felons who shared their escape ruined Pisacane's further attempt to excite revolution in the Basilicata by turning the peasants against the expedition. On the eve of Magenta Bomba died in peace, surrounded by a formidable array of relics, and left his kingdom to a spiritless oaf, Francis II. It was the parting of the ways for the Bourbon dynasty. Vainly did General Filangieri urge the grant of a Constitution and an understanding with the allies. Twice over the friendly advances of Piedmont were repulsed, and Francis drifted into a league with Austria. The wiser policy was to be adopted before many months were out, but adopted too late to save his throne.

Nationalists of the Mazzinian school had long been active in Sicily. In one respect no more hopeful field could have been found for their labours, for priest, noble, peasant, and townsman were all united in a common hatred of Naples. But it was the weakness of the Sicilians then, as in 1848, that they cared nothing for Italian unity, and were most unwilling to serve under arms. It was recognised that their deliverance must come from without, and already all eyes began to turn to Garibaldi. The suggestion found him a prey to deep

dejection. He had been recalled from the Central States when on the point of invading Umbria, and he had just seen his native Nice bargained away by Cavour. He was strongly attracted, but told the Sicilian conspirators that his assistance depended on their organising an effective rising, and was for the moment half inclined to divert his energies to stirring up an anti-French movement in Nice.

In April, 1860, an ill-managed and abortive rising under Riso, a plumber, took place in the streets of Palermo, which nevertheless spread to the surrounding district. Garibaldi was then near Genoa, volunteers were pouring in from all sides, a committee of conspirators was busy organising ways and means, while Cavour was playing a difficult part, now ostentatiously taking precautions against a raid on a friendly state, now giving the enterprise his secret encouragement. All was ready, when tidings arrived that the Sicilian revolution was already flickering out, and the news decided Garibaldi, quite properly, to abandon the adventure just at the moment when Rosolino Pilo, who had landed in the island, was loudly proclaiming that help was coming, and was stirring the embers into life. Crispi, who was at Genoa, made the most of this later news, with the result that at length, on May 5, Garibaldi and his Thousand Volunteers sailed in two commandeered Rubattino steamers, the *Piemonte* and *Lombardo*, embarking by boat-loads off the rocks at Quarto. They were ill-armed with some old muskets belonging to the National Society, for D'Azeglio, disliking Cavour's duplicity, had refused to abandon his custody of the rifles belonging to the "Million Rifles Fund," which Garibaldi had himself founded to further his own earlier designs upon the Central States. Moreover, at the last moment the ammunition had gone astray. The deficiency was supplied by the Piedmontese commandant at Orbetello, where the steamers touched on the voyage, who was persuaded to believe that the King had sanctioned the enterprise.

Such was the beginning of this hare-brained expedition, across a sea patrolled by Neapolitan warships, against an island garrisoned by nearly 25,000 regular troops. From the Piedmontese fleet there was little to be feared, for Admiral Persano had received contradictory instructions from Cavour which he very clearly understood to enjoin a friendly neutrality, but the enterprise was exposed to the gravest peril when the steamers approached Marsala, the point selected for the landing, and three Neapolitan war vessels hove in sight. The Garibaldians were saved by what was nothing short of a miracle. The presence of two English cruisers, wrongly suspected of collusion with the invaders, paralysed the resolution of the Neapolitans till the steamers were safely in port; and, when at length they ventured to open fire, their own atrocious gunnery failed to injure their enemies as they marched up the exposed mole to take possession of the unguarded town.

Garibaldi at once pressed on towards Palermo, joined on his march by bands of half-armed peasants, of little military value. At Calatafimi he first met the Neapolitan troops. Bomba's army was not ill-trained, but, owing to his suspicious and repressive policy, it was officered by men of no spirit or by ignorant fellows promoted from the ranks. By a series of rushes with the bayonet the invaders finally drove them step by step from the crest of the terraced hill, where they had attempted to make a stand.

The little band moved cautiously forwards on Palermo, skilfully evading among the mountains the columns sent out in pursuit. Finally, by a night march across the rich plain of the *Concha d'Oro*, they appeared before the walls of the city, and though they failed to effect a surprise, captured the Termini gate in broad daylight on the following morning. Then revolution broke loose. For three days volunteers, citizens, and peasants fought their way from barricade to barricade, and from street to street, while the fortress of Castellamare rained projectiles into the town, till Lanza, the Neapolitan Commander-in-chief, lost heart. Through the mediation of the British admiral, Mundy, he concluded a capitulation, and marched out, leaving Palermo to opponents whose own situation was already worse than

desperate.

A pause was now inevitable. The expedition needed ammunition and reinforcements, for the Sicilians could not be converted into serviceable troops. Some kind of a government was a necessity, and Garibaldi assumed the office of dictator. The actual power, however, was in the hands of Crispi, who, at this stage of his career, was unscrupulous, tactless, and factious. While he busily destroyed the old system and issued new laws which no one observed, scarcely any steps were taken to preserve order or to keep the administration in the hands of honest men. Cavour was alarmed. The outcry which had greeted the raid was subsiding, but he knew and dreaded the determination of Garibaldi, and of Garibaldi's friends, not to stop short till the revolution had reached Rome, a contingency which would doom all his plans to failure by bringing about a conflict with Napoleon. Accordingly he sent La Farina to Sicily to organise a movement for annexation. For this the Sicilians were ready, but Crispi and his friends would have none of it. Garibaldi was persuaded that Cavour meant to prevent his crossing the Straits of Messina, and La Farina was deported from the island with every circumstance of indignity.

Garibaldi, as it happened, was not altogether wrong in his suspicions. For Cavour was at this time distracted with perplexities which drove him to resort to such double-dealing as puzzled even his best friends, and which even drew from him in private the confession, "If we had done for personal ends what we are doing for Italy we should be unmitigated scoundrels." Garibaldi's expedition had at the outset fallen in admirably with his plans. It had enabled Piedmont to maintain an ostentatious neutrality acceptable to Napoleon, and sufficiently correct to deprive Austria of any excuse for attacking her in North Italy. Nor could Austria, for the sake of whose friendship Francis II had sacrificed every other ally, venture to interfere with a revolutionary movement at such a distance from the Brenner. It seemed only necessary for Piedmont to look on till the Bourbon rule had finally collapsed.

But after the taking of Palermo the situation had become very much more complicated. We have already seen that Garibaldi himself was not inclined to defer to Cavour's tacit understanding with Napoleon that the Papal territories should be respected. This was still less the case with the extremists who looked to Mazzini, and at any moment an ill-considered raid might provoke intervention from without. Nor was this apprehension the worst of Cavour's difficulties. Too late indeed to save himself, Francis II had come round to Filangieri's counsels, and had decided to seek the alliance of Piedmont and to throw himself upon the good offices of France and England. Napoleon was consulted, but, though desirous to see the independence of Naples preserved, declined to take an active part, confining himself to good advice, and laying particular stress upon the grant of a Constitution and upon the Piedmontese alliance. The Constitution was accordingly proclaimed, and Cavour found himself confronted with a request for assistance from the very Power whose territories he was hoping to annex. With the eyes of Europe upon him he dared not refuse outright, while haunted by the dread that Italian patriots would misunderstand his hesitation. His hands were strengthened by vigorous language in the new North Italian Parliament, and he strove to evade the dilemma by demanding impossible terms. But he relied most of all upon exciting through his emissaries an ostensibly spontaneous revolution in Naples, which would at once extricate him by overthrowing the Bourbons, and would leave him free from further dependence upon the doubtful action of Garibaldi. It was with this hope that he had decided to secure the immediate annexation of Sicily, and even to put obstacles in the way of Garibaldi's passage of the Straits of Messina. But the expectation upon which his whole policy was based was without foundation. Naples remained quiet, and before long he had reason to be thankful that his failure to annex the island had saved him from official responsibility for Garibaldi's actions, and that he had not succeeded in excluding from Naples the only agency which could set revolution in motion.

Meanwhile, the Neapolitan resistance had been considerably weakened by the recent Constitutional concessions. The King's new advisers added to the incompetence of their predecessors a real dread of a decisive success for the Bourbon arms, which the past history of the country justified them in regarding as a sure prelude to another period of reaction likely to be fraught with serious consequences to themselves. Their action was therefore hesitating and timorous, and Garibaldi, already strongly reinforced, was once more upon the move. Two flying columns, passing respectively through the central and southern districts of Sicily, were to rendezvous at Catania, while the main advance was to proceed along the northern coast. The Neapolitans had now the choice of two alternatives. Either they could confine themselves to the defensive and refuse the passage of the Straits, or they could concentrate a vigorous counter-attack on one portion of the force which Garibaldi had somewhat imprudently dispersed. They did neither, and Colonel Bosco was despatched by General Clary from Messina to assist the garrison at Milazzo, a strong fortress perched upon a rocky peninsula connected by a narrow isthmus with the mainland. Here a desperate hand-to-hand engagement took place among the vineyards, sunken lanes, olive-groves and cactus hedges of the plain which lay south of the town, as the result of which the Neapolitans were driven behind their walls and within a few days actually surrendered the impregnable castle rather than endure the hardships of a blockade.

The garrison of Messina now alone held out, and they might be disregarded. Garibaldi advanced to Charybdis sands, and there awaited his opportunity to pass the Straits. While he yet waited two letters reached him from Victor Emmanuel, the one an official communication, for European consumption, forbidding him to proceed further, the other a private notification that he was to disregard the first. It is not surprising that such duplicity should have misled others, and when Napoleon proposed to the English government that the joint fleets of the two Powers should prevent the passage of the Straits, Lord John Russell, a sincere friend of Italy, was preparing to sign the treaty which he believed to be in accordance with Cavour's wishes. Just in time a private interview with a Neapolitan refugee, Sir James Lacaita, who had been naturalised in England, revealed the true state of Cavour's mind, Napoleon's advances were politely repelled, and the conquerors of Sicily were free to deal unhindered with the Neapolitan troops who lined the opposite shore. The enemy's attention was drawn to the western end of the Straits by increased activity in that direction, and, on August 18, at nightfall, with the main body of his volunteers, Garibaldi himself put out from Taormina in two steamers, and landed next morning on the south-eastern coast of Calabria. The general concentration of the Neapolitan fleet and army in his direction permitted the rest of his troops to cross in open boats at the other end of the Straits, and Garibaldi moved to meet them, taking Reggio by assault on his way. The two forces joined hands across the high ground dominating the coast-line occupied by the Neapolitans. Thus enclosed, the defenders of the Straits laid down their arms at Villa San Giovanni.

The remainder of the advance on Naples was one triumphal progress. Whole districts rose to welcome the invader. At Soveria and at Padula, large bodies of regular troops were overtaken in their retreat, and laid down their arms. The strong mountain ridge at Sorrento, from which the plain round Naples might have been covered against attack, was abandoned owing to the false rumours as to Garibaldi's strength which had been industriously circulated. On September 6, Francis II sailed from Naples for Gaeta, and on the next day Garibaldi, who was now far in advance of his troops, entered the city by train and almost unattended, before the Royal forces had abandoned the citadel of St. Elmo and the other fortifications.

Meanwhile, Cavour had adapted himself to the new situation. He had long since made up his mind to send troops into Umbria and to anticipate Garibaldi on the Neapolitan frontier. He now persuaded Napoleon that the Catholic volunteers, under the command of Lamoricière, who had gathered from all parts of Europe to defend the Pope, were little short

of a standing challenge to the revolutionists, and that he could not undertake to restrain national feeling any longer. He promised that the proposed expedition should leave Rome itself untouched. "Go, if you wish," said the Emperor, "but be quick about it." No time was lost. The Pope was requested to disband his volunteers, and refused. The Piedmontese army, under General Fanti, thereupon entered his territory in two columns. Cialdini, in command of the one, following the east coast, overthrew Lamoricière at Castelfidardo and forced him to surrender in Ancona. Della Rocca, moving through Umbria at the head of the other, stormed Perugia and Spoleto, and penetrated to the vicinity of Rome. Pius meditated flight, and, had he done so of his own free-will, none would have been better pleased than Napoleon, who could have then withdrawn the garrison which had already caused him so much embarrassment.

But Garibaldi, with his fine scorn of consequence, counted all that he had done as done in vain if his career was to be stayed before the flag of United Italy had been planted upon the walls of Rome. With fierce anger he demanded the dismissal of Cavour, "the man who had sold Nice," and the abandonment of all compromise, while he persevered in his resistance to the clearly expressed wish of the Neapolitans for that annexation to Piedmont which would, as he foresaw, finally put a limit to his further advance. But already, and for other reasons, any forward movement had become impossible. Behind the Volturno, with a strongly fortified advanced post in Capua on the southern bank of the river the Neapolitan armies, with greatly improved *morale* and in superior numbers, stood at bay under General Ritucci. Face to face with this formidable resistance Garibaldi could hope to do little more than stand on the defensive and prevent the recapture of Naples. On the first day of October he was assailed in his positions both by a direct attack from the gates of Capua and by a wide turning movement from the north-east. Never was Garibaldi's tactical skill displayed to better advantage, both in his choice of defensive positions and in the use which he made of his reserve. Yet it was only want of information and the complete lack of co-operation on the other side which saved him from defeat. The military situation had now convinced Garibaldi that no purpose could be served by resisting any longer the demand for annexation. *Plébiscites* were taken both in Sicily and on the mainland, and resulted in overwhelming majorities for union under Victor Emmanuel.

Cavour could proceed to play his trump card. The Piedmontese army moved forward, and at the head of the army went Victor Emmanuel in person. The Neapolitans fell back when the Royal troops began to menace their flank, and the way was clear for the historic meeting at Teano. With tolerable cordiality the two leaders shook hands. It was Garibaldi's surrender. His volunteers were now sent to the rear while the Piedmontese regulars routed the Neapolitans on the Garigliano, and laid siege to Gaeta, the last refuge of Francis II, which finally surrendered after a valiant defence in February, 1861. Before the town fell Garibaldi had taken bitter offence at finding himself and his troops thrust aside, a result to which his own extreme demands almost as much as the mean jealousy of the Piedmontese military faction had contributed. After entering Naples in the same carriage with the King, he declined all honours or gifts, and sailed for Caprera, with no more to show for the conquest of two kingdoms than a pocketful of money and a bag of seed for his island farm.

On February 18, 1861, there met at Turin in the First Parliament of United Italy representatives from Piedmont, Lombardy, Modena, Parma, Tuscany, Romagna, Umbria, the Marches, Naples, and Sicily. For Venice the nation waited till 1866, and for Rome X till 1870, nor was either won without heavy sacrifices. And in the meantime men had realised that the task of Italy's redemption was but half accomplished by the glorious deeds of 1859 and 1860, and that it would need years of strife, disillusionment and patience before the full harvest of that heroic seedtime could be gathered in. And at this moment Fortune suddenly withdrew the most indispensable of all the gifts with which she had endowed awakened Italy. On June 5, 1861, leaving one great work accomplished, and another and a greater to

be wrought out by feebler hands, Cavour, the master-builder, died.

CHAPTER XXII

THE DUEL OF PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA

THE humiliation of Prussia before Austria at Olmütz had only been possible because some of the strongest elements in the national life had been sturdily opposed to the plans for German unity under Prussian leadership into which Radowitz had succeeded in leading Frederick William. Indeed, to some of these elements the national disgrace wore at first something like the appearance of a political triumph. Prominent among the opponents of the Radowitz policy had been the party of Junkers, or landowning nobility and gentry, and their attitude had been mainly determined by their hostility to Constitutional schemes which menaced their own local influence, and tended to put political power in the hands of the commercial and professional middle classes. They stood for authority against popular claims, for religion against free thought, and for the old ways against innovation; in fact, they were a typically conservative party. They were generally described, from the name of their organ, as the *Kreuzzeitung* faction. Their satisfaction at the issue of the recent crisis was not, however, solely a matter of class prejudice. There burnt in most of them a spirit of Prussian "particularism," as strong as any similar feeling that could be found at the lesser courts. This spirit had been expressed by Bismarck before the Assembly in energetic language. "The Crown of Frankfort," he said, "will doubtless be bright, but the gold to which it will owe its brightness can only be obtained by melting down the Prussian Crown. Prussians we are and Prussians we will remain." To one who called him the Prodigal Son of the German Fatherland, he hotly retorted, "My father's house is Prussia, and I have never left it."

With this party Frederick William found himself in considerable sympathy. Their half medieval, half military conceptions of duty and authority appealed to him, and the March Days had given him a horror of democratic ideals sufficient to last his life-time. Respect for his word, indeed, determined him to maintain the Constitution, but the Upper Chamber became practically a House of Lords through a reduction in the number of elected members. His minister, Manteuffel, though not at one with the views of the *Kreuzzeitung*, maintained himself in office largely by deference to *Junker* prejudices, and from him the landowners secured the restoration of certain rights of administering justice on their own estates, and of a reduced scale of payments in the matter of taxation. The police were everywhere active, and vigorous measures were taken against pamphlets, teaching, and even opinions of a progressive kind.

These measures were not, however, successful in killing out resistance, indeed, they provoked the opposition of one who was in no sense an upholder of popular claims. This was the King's brother and heir, William, Prince of Prussia. Before everything else a soldier, he had been disgusted by Prussia's tame surrender. A man of clear and practical if of somewhat prosaic common sense, he had little sympathy with his brother's flights of romantic fancy. He had fretted at the follies of the March Days, but he distrusted the authors of Prussia's abasement, and he held that their policy was dividing the nation. He had faith in the ultimate union of Germany, but believed the day of its accomplishment to be far off. He saw in the Prussian army the appointed instrument for its consummation.

Events were rapidly knitting together the ties of a life partnership which was to fulfil within his own days more than he either hoped or desired. The selection of Count Otto von Bismarck as Prussian representative in the Diet of Frankfort had been prompted by a desire

to stand on good terms with Austria. No one seemed better qualified than one who had so fiercely denounced the aims of Radowitz. The experiences of the Diet were to prove a political education. Bismarck returned from Frankfort the determined enemy of Austria. The change was inevitable in a man who frankly acknowledged no other guiding-star but the particular interests of Prussia, when plunged in an atmosphere of jealousy and intrigue in which every State strove to get the better of every other and Austria of all.

To the service of the end he sought, Bismarck brought a ruthless intelligence and a ruthless will. He sacrificed to no political theories or enthusiasms; to the end of his days he remained an arch-opportunist. He acknowledged no obstacles; for him obstacles only existed to be surmounted or turned. He admitted very frankly that he was more alive to the weakness of mankind than to their virtues, hence he seldom sought to persuade or to lead. He preferred to trade upon cupidity, to outmanoeuvre stupidity, to overbear weakness. His policy was ever to temporise till he was in a position to deal a stunning blow. The cynical and almost brutal frankness of his utterances was often made to serve as a cloak for plans yet unrevealed. And it is not too much to say that his immense success left a fatal impress upon the traditions of European diplomacy. Cavour, perhaps, told as many lies, but he never erected unscrupulousness into a creed. Yet Bismarck was a great and unselfish patriot. He was also a sincerely religious man, even if the God he worshipped was conceived too exclusively as the tutelary deity of Prussia. He created modern Germany, and it may perhaps be doubted whether his country's ills would have yielded to remedies less heroic than his. And in a short period of suffering and war he consummated what fifty years of striving had been powerless to effect, and removed a state of affairs which was a standing menace to European peace. Such men must answer before a tribunal other than that of history, but history will fearlessly condemn their lesser imitators.

The story has often been told how Bismarck first asserted the dignity of Prussia in the Diet by arrogating to himself the right to smoke at the meetings, till then the unwritten privilege of the Austrian representative alone, and with humorous results. For his self-assertion drove even luckless non-smokers from the smaller States into painful if patriotic struggles to acquire the unfamiliar habit. There were, however, more serious occasions for asserting Prussian independence. From the wreck of her German policy at Olmütz Prussia had preserved her *Zollverein*, and Austria now sought to destroy the last fragment of her rival's influence by securing her own inclusion in the union. Through Bismarck's efforts the suggestion was repelled, and the question postponed for six years (1852). The same newly-found independence governed Prussia's refusal to make herself the instrument of Austrian policy in the Crimean War, a decision which, however, diminished for the moment her influence in the counsels of Europe and almost brought about her exclusion from the Congress of Paris (1856).

A year later Berlin was acclaiming a "New Era." It had long been suspected that Frederick William's aberrations betokened constitutional unsoundness of mind, and in 1857 his faculties finally gave way. The Prince of Prussia was called upon to act as deputy and subsequently as Regent, and in 1861 he became King at the age of sixty-three by his brother's death. He did not wait for that event to dismiss the Manteuffel ministry. They were replaced by advisers of moderate progressive tendencies, repression came to an end, and some of the most unfair measures of the late regime were rescinded. Scarcely had this change been effected when the national uprising of 1859 broke out in Italy. Its effect in Germany was twofold. There was a great revival of the unionist ideas of 1848, which found little favour in Prussian official circles, for Radowitz, if he had accomplished nothing else, had succeeded in spreading a conviction that union, if it came at all must be effected under Prussian leadership. More important was the determination of the attitude to be adopted towards the French intervention. Prussia had no concern in the quarrel, and little sympathy for Austria, but the temptation to recover her own influence by offering mediation enforced

by an advance upon the Rhine frontier proved irresistible. The army was mobilised, and became an important factor in the calculations which led Napoleon to the armistice of Villafranca.

The mobilisation was to have an indirect but still more important result. It convinced the soldier King of the inadequacy and defective organisation of the Prussian army. The system established by Scharnhorst, in 1814, made military service a universal obligation, three years being required with the colours, two in the reserve and fourteen in the *Landwehr*, or militia, whose members remained liable for active service during their first seven years.. The system had been dislocated by the growth of population. The number of regiments was not sufficient to receive the annual supply of young men due for training, with the result that the term of service with the colours had been reduced to two years. But even this arrangement had failed to meet increasing numbers, and as many as 25,000 young men annually were escaping training altogether by 1860. Thus, at a crisis the nation would be deprived of the services of this excellent material and forced to depend too much upon the somewhat rusty efficiency of the *Landwehr*. William accordingly appointed General von Roon Minister of War, and set himself to remedy existing defects. By the plan now suggested the army was increased by thirty-nine infantry and ten cavalry regiments. It was thus possible to restore the obligation to three years' service with the colours, and, owing to the increase in numbers, to relieve the *Landwehr* of liability to active service after the first two years.

The proposal produced an explosion of indignation in the Prussian Parliament, whose members, influenced by the recrudescence of the ideas of 1848, saw in the new law a detestable alliance between militarism and Prussian particularism. But the ministry, anxious not to throw the King into the arms of the opposite party, induced a majority to make a sufficient grant for the new regiments, provisionally and for one year, on the understanding that the alterations in the period of service were reserved for further discussion. The King and Roon proceeded to put the entire scheme into operation. Thus began the "Conflict Time." The Parliament which met in January, 1862, not unnaturally showed a determination not to sanction the new conditions of service, and a dissolution took place followed by the resignation of the ministry. Their Conservative successors were no more fortunate. The elections in May produced an overwhelming majority opposed to the recent changes, and a vote was carried to remove from the estimates the grant which they involved. The ministers thereupon resigned.

To English readers it may seem as though the King had no choice but to abandon his plans or to suppress the Constitution. There were, in fact, two other alternatives. William was now sixty-four years of age. He had never expected to reign, and did not value his position as King, while he attached the first importance to army reform. His son, the Crown Prince Frederick, had married the Princess Royal of England, and was disposed both by his own temperament and by his wife's influence to Constitutional courses. It was not difficult therefore for the King to abdicate. There was yet another course open. In the Prussian Constitution the ministry were appointed by the Crown, they were not members of Parliament, and were neither in theory nor in practice dependent on a parliamentary majority. If a minister could be found to defy nation and Parliament alike the struggle might be continued, and Roon had for some time been pressing the King to send for Bismarck. By the end of September the future Chancellor received the Royal summons, and found William sitting before a table with his Act of Abdication spread out and newly signed before him. Before the interview ended the paper had been torn in half, and the great partnership had begun.

The new minister's first attempt at conciliation was foredoomed to failure, indeed, his vigorous and epigrammatic language rubbed salt into smarting wounds. It was expected,

and indeed, almost hoped, that he would be forced to do violence to the Constitution. Bismarck had no intention of doing anything of the kind. He was going to show the members that a strict insistence upon the letter of a Constitution is a double-edged weapon. The Lower House amended his Budget as they had the right to do. The Upper House had no power to propose amendments, but had the right of rejecting them. This right it proceeded to exercise. The law required the government to go on collecting taxes which had once been imposed till they should be abolished. The taxes had not been abolished, all that had happened was that the Budget, which authorised the government to spend them, had not been passed. The situation was ridiculous, and Bismarck declined to recognise it. The money was spent, and there was no way in which the Lower House could prevent it. No dissolution took place, for, as Bismarck said to the members, "we desire to give the nation the chance of becoming thoroughly acquainted with you." From this moment he treated them like children, hectoring and bantering them by turns. None the less, the tension was serious, for public opinion supported the opposition, the Crown Prince had, with questionable loyalty, openly dissociated himself from the acts of the government in a speech at Dantzig, and even the King had wavered and needed to be reminded that "Charles I was quite a respectable historical figure."

Nevertheless, the attitude of the Crown Prince was indirectly of service to Bismarck. It was generally felt that the King could not live long, that his death would witness a reversal of policy, and that in the meantime it was not worthwhile to push matters to extremities.

Meanwhile, the increased military strength of Prussia was having its effect, In 1862, on the occasion of a proposed commercial treaty between the *Zollverein* and France, Austria again pressed for her own inclusion. The request was refused, and the Austrian protests sharply answered by the recognition of the Kingdom of Italy. An old foe, the Elector of Hesse-Cassel, was made to feel Prussia's hand. He had required of his subjects an oath to his new Constitution of 1860. Prussia protested, and her protest being disregarded, mobilised two army corps. The Diet was thereby emboldened to insist on the abolition of the Hessian Constitution altogether in favour of its earlier and more popular predecessor.

In this instance Prussia had taken the popular side, but the episode was the exception. The rising in Poland, which broke out in 1863, and the attitude of the Prussian Government filled high the measure of Bismarck's unpopularity. To the Emperor of the French the incident presented a clear case of despised national claims calling for the application of Napoleonic ideas; and the opportunity was all the more attractive, because he could count upon the joint support of the Catholic and the democratic sections of opinion alike, both of whom he had succeeded in offending by his Italian policy. English sympathies were inevitably with the Poles, as was popular feeling in Germany, while Austria characteristically attempted to hedge. Russia was without a friend, and Bismarck was swift to mark the danger and the opportunity. An independent Poland would strive to reach the Baltic through Prussia's eastern provinces. On the other hand, the friendship of Russia would be invaluable when the day came to settle accounts with Austria. A convention was concluded with Russia whereby Prussian troops were stationed on the frontier, and either Power granted to the other the right of entry in pursuit of rebels (February, 1863). The announcement was received by Parliament and the nation with violent anger, at which Bismarck could afford to mock. The results were substantial. France, whose influence was to be feared in the future, had been considerably weakened. She had lost the goodwill of Russia, and neither England, mindful of Savoy and Nice, nor Austria, still sore about Italy, had been willing to combine unreservedly with her. Austria, the immediate enemy, who had already disappointed Russia bitterly in 1854, had filled up her cup of offence.

It was therefore with a light heart, that Bismarck watched an attempt by Austria to turn Prussian unpopularity to account in Germany. Francis Joseph invited the German princes

to meet at Frankfort to consider a reform of the Confederation. King William was persuaded to refuse to attend. There were only two other abstentions, but without Prussia nothing could be done, for the smaller States had no wish to commit themselves to any arrangement under which the influence of one of the two great Powers would not be counter-balanced by that of the the other. Moreover Bismarck played adroitly upon sentiments which neither Austria nor the princes had intended to propitiate. Germany heard with incredulous amazement the announcement that the reactionary minister refused to consider any reform of the Confederation which did not provide for an assembly elected on a popular franchise. Events were to prove that he was in earnest.

But at this juncture the recrudescence of the Schleswig-Holstein question swept all other issues out of the field. In 1852 two difficulties seemed to have disappeared. The first was that of the succession; for the Duke of Oldenburg, the Duke of Augustenburg, and other claimants had been induced to resign their pretensions. The second was that of the future relations between the duchies and the Crown of Denmark, Frederick VII having issued a proclamation promising independent assemblies to Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg. The Powers accordingly met in conference at London, and on the strength of these understandings guaranteed the integrity of Denmark and the succession of Christian of Glücksburg. But the popular party in the Danish *Rigsrad* never for one moment abandoned their determination to secure a uniform Constitution for the whole kingdom, and the Crimean War, by occupying the attention of the Powers, gave them their opportunity. A new Constitution was drafted in 1855, restricting the authority of the provincial assemblies in the duchies to matters of secondary concern, and denying to them the separate administration of their revenues. A vigorous protest by the German Diet secured a reversal of these arrangements so far as Holstein and Lauenburg were concerned. In the case of Schleswig, however, which lay outside the Confederation, Denmark was justified in disregarding German feeling, and refused to entertain a suggestion from England that the duchy should be granted as a privilege the same powers of self-government which had been conceded as a right to Holstein (1862).

The preoccupation of Europe with the Polish question presented the Danes with a new opportunity, and in 1863, by the "March Patent," Frederick VII declared the London Treaty of 1852 no longer binding, and announced that a Constitution would shortly be drafted incorporating Schleswig with Denmark, and establishing a form of self-government for Holstein. In spite of the threats of the German Diet the measure was pressed forward and was ready for signature when Frederick VII died in November. At this point the Constitutional issues were complicated by the re-opening of the succession question, for the young Duke of Augustenburg unexpectedly declared that he was not bound by his late father's resignation. Holstein at once rose in his favour, and all Germany rallied to his cause when Christian IX signed the obnoxious Constitution. The new King could scarcely have done otherwise, indeed he was told that his refusal would cost him his Crown if not his head. But his consent cost him also the allegiance of Schleswig, which threw in its lot with Holstein and the Augustenburg claimant.

The wrath of the German people and of the German Diet, though great, did not promise to be very effective. With Schleswig the Diet had legally no concern, nor were forces at its disposal sufficient to deal with the Danes apart from Austrian and Prussian help. And any assistance to the policy of the Diet these Powers were not in a position to render. They had been parties to the London Treaty of 1852, which the Diet had defied by recognising Augustenburg, and, even if they had been willing to disavow their obligations, they had to reckon with the other guarantors of the treaty. Bismarck, however, was determined to interfere. The excitement in Germany promised an advantage to any Power which should take the lead in the national quarrel, and afforded a justification for action, which Europe could scarcely ignore. The breach by Denmark of the Treaty of London would

offer the excuse, and would cover the case of Schleswig as well as that of Holstein. Bismarck resolved to take up arms for the arrangement of 1852, and to declare for self-governing duchies under the Crown of Christian IX. Such a solution would have the advantage of excluding Augustenburg, whose investiture as Duke would only have provided another vote in the Diet to be exploited by Austria. Once the Danes had been beaten a new situation would be in existence out of which Prussia might make her profit, without much to fear from the Powers, Russia was busy in Poland, England alone was strongly in favour of Denmark, and Napoleon, irritated at her failure to go along with French policy in Polish affairs, was not likely to lend her his support. Austria Bismarck intended to have as his accomplice. She could not, for the same reasons as Prussia, adopt the policy of the Diet, but she could not afford to allow Prussia alone to pose as the champion of German claims. In 1864 the compact was concluded between the two Powers, the Diet refusing to go beyond an occupation of Holstein hi the interests of Augustenburg. Denmark was summoned to withdraw the Constitution within forty-eight hours.

Bismarck had taken care to avoid the possibility of a Danish submission. A vote of the *Rigsrad* was indispensable for the purpose, the existing *Rigsrad* had just been dissolved, and the writs had been issued for the election of another. There was no time. Amid loud protests both in the Diet and in the Prussian Parliament at the selfish policy of the Allies, the invasion began. The Eider was crossed, the Danes were forced to retreat from their first line of defence at the Dannewerke, the entrenchments at Düppel were stormed by the Prussians under Prince Frederick Charles, the Danes retreated into the island of Alsen, and Jutland lay open to the invader. The result in Prussia was electrical. In a few weeks her detested army had become what it has never ceased to be from that moment, the dearest object of national pride.

At this juncture the invading Powers decided to declare the Treaty of London non-existent. Napoleon had given it up, Russia was in no position to interfere, England was unlikely to act alone, and the support of Germany at large was to be had by denouncing it. Austria was most unwilling, but out of deference to German opinion was forced to go as far as her ally. But if Europe would not fight it was ready to try the effects of another Congress. A truce was secured, and a meeting of diplomatists took place in London. But the uncompromising obstinacy of Denmark doomed all the efforts of her friends to failure. She flatly declined to be bound by the solution of 1852. It was necessary, therefore, to put forward new proposals. Bismarck, with an eye to German opinion, insincerely suggested the independence of the duchies under Augustenburg, a solution which was, as he anticipated, rejected. The English proposal for a division of Schleswig, the northern part to be incorporated with Denmark, broke down in face of the refusal of the Danes to accept any frontier save that suggested by themselves. The Conference broke up in despair, and left Denmark to her fate, a fate to which it must be admitted that the indiscreet sympathy of Palmerston, entirely counter-balanced at home by the pro-German tendencies of the English Court, had contributed to expose her.

The war began afresh, Alsen was taken, and the Danes abandoned hope on the news that Palmerston's policy had been definitely disapproved by Crown, Commons, and ministry alike. By the Treaty of Vienna, the three duchies were surrendered to Austria and Prussia to dispose of at their discretion (October, 1864). The obvious solution of the problem presented to them was the recognition of Augustenburg as Duke. But both Powers were anxious to turn their success to their own profit. Bismarck wanted the duchies for Prussia and Austria was willing to let him have them at the price of compensation in Silesia. This Prussia refused, and Austria, anxious to be rid of a perplexing responsibility, now pressed the Augustenburg claim. Bismarck professed to concur, on condition that the duchies should enter the *Zollverein* and should put their post office as well as their army and navy under Prussian control, urging that they could not defend themselves against Denmark, nor could

Prussia, upon whom the duty of protection must fall, undertake to perform it without proper facilities. Such vassalage the Duke declined, and agitation on his behalf began in the duchies encouraged by Austria.

By this time Bismarck had recognised that the situation would sooner or later provide him with an excuse for the war with Austria which he had always contemplated as the ultimate solution of the German question. He was not, however, ready. German sentiment was running strongly in favour of Austria as the champion of Augustenburg, and Prussia could not afford to quarrel till she had made sure of the alliance of Italy and the neutrality of France. By the Convention of Gastein it was agreed for the time being to divide responsibility, Prussia undertaking the administration of Schleswig, and Austria that of Holstein. Lauenburg was to be annexed by Prussia, and Austria was to receive an equivalent in money (August, 1865). Thus the uneasy partnership was maintained for nearly another year while Bismarck watched the diplomatic omens.

Much the most important secret which the future enshrouded was the probable attitude of France. Western Germany had been too long a sphere of French influence or the training ground of French armies to permit France to be indifferent to the erection of a strong military power beyond her frontier. But the Emperor might be bought, as Cavour had proved, though his price for supporting Prussian schemes would inevitably be a high one; and Bismarck would have been prepared to pay it if absolutely necessary. Circumstances were, however, inclining him to believe that the same influences which had decreed Napoleon's impotence in the Polish question would do the like in the impending duel in Germany. For the second drama in the Napoleonic trilogy was approaching its *dénouement*—the unrelieved tragedy of the Mexican adventure.

Long since, amid the dreams of the prisoner of Ham, there had floated the vision of a revived influence for the Latin races in the New World, which should reverse the policy of Canning and cry halt to the ambitions of the United States. Somewhere and somehow under French protection, new fields should be opened to the commerce of Southern Europe, and the Roman Church should recover its dignity and its power. And now, in 1860, the hour seemed to have struck in Mexico. The Clericals under Miramon, and the popular party under the Indian Juarez, were in the throes of civil strife, and the latter was committed to the confiscation of ecclesiastical property and to other measures directed against the Church. The outbreak of the American Civil War between North and South seemed likely to paralyse the action of the United States, even if it did not result in the victory of the Confederates, with whom Napoleon was in active sympathy. Mexican envoys in Paris told fabulous tales of the devotion of the country to the old ideals, and of the inexhaustible riches of its mines. It seemed the golden opportunity for the Second Empire to take its place as a world-Power; to silence for ever the lesser grievances of the Pope and of the Catholic party; to salve the wounded pride of Austria; to conciliate the powers that ruled the money market. It was the gambler's illusion when he doubles his stakes to recover his losses. Nor was reasonable ground for interference difficult to find. The government of Juarez, after illegally seizing treasure belonging to British subjects had finally, in 1859, decided to suspend payment of interest upon foreign debts.

Accordingly, in 1861, England, France, and Spain agreed, by a treaty signed at London, to cooperate in asserting the claims of the creditors, while formally renouncing any schemes of conquest or of internal intervention. The combined fleets appeared off Vera Cruz, and the Convention of Soledad was concluded, by which Juarez was recognised and negotiations were set on foot. At this moment the Mexican Almonte arrived from Paris, asserting that it was Napoleon's intention to substitute monarchical government for the republic, and began to act independently of the other allies. Upon this England and Spain withdrew.

The first operations of the French army, barely 6000 strong, should have warned Napoleon of the difficulties of his task. The Imperial troops sustained their first defeat in an attack on Puebla, with losses so heavy as to constitute a serious disaster. But the Emperor refused to surrender his illusions. General Forey, with reinforcements of 23,000 men, succeeded in taking Puebla and the city of Mexico. An assembly of Mexican dignitaries was thereupon called together, and proceeded at Napoleon's suggestion to offer the Crown to Maximilian, brother of Francis Joseph, a prince whose fine presence, kind heart, energetic character and wide views gave some promise of success in a difficult part. Maximilian hesitated. But his wife's persuasions, coupled with liberal guarantees of military and financial support from Napoleon, carried the day, and in May, 1864, he landed in Mexico. He was swiftly undeceived. North and south were in rebellion, funds were scarcely to be procured, even the Clericals turned against him when he discovered their narrowness and incompetence, and declined to execute the details of their policy; promising instead to guarantee religious liberty and the freedom of the Press, and refusing to restore the Church lands.

Then came the crushing blow. The American Civil War was over, and the victory at Appomattox had given a decisive advantage to the Federals. In December, 1865, Congress declined to recognise Maximilian and formally required France to evacuate Mexico in the name of the Monroe Doctrine. Napoleon dared not refuse. He had sacrificed money, men and reputation for a shadow.

His gallant victim decided to stand his ground, influenced as much by his own sense of honour as by the evil counsel of Marshal Bazaine. The Empress Charlotte returned to Europe to seek help. Vainly she appealed to Napoleon, to Austria, to her father Leopold of Belgium, and when her last hope failed her, and Pius refused to use his influence with the Mexican Church, her mind utterly gave way. She was at least spared the bitterness of the final tragedy. Maximilian was driven into Queretaro, besieged, betrayed, and led out to be shot, in retribution for a sentence which he had once passed upon two officers of the other party (1867).

The situation in Mexico was nearing its crisis when Bismarck went to meet Napoleon at Biarritz with every hope of finding him amenable. The prospect of strife between the German Powers promised indeed a golden opportunity for French aggression, while motives of self-preservation counselled interference to maintain the balance against Prussia. But Napoleon was in no position to act decisively. What actually passed is not known, but Bismarck seems to have obtained the Emperor's sanction to his purchasing an alliance with Italy by the promise of Venetia, as well as a guarantee of French neutrality. We may be certain that Bismarck on his part gave no definite assurance as to compensation for Napoleon, but it is probable that he indicated in general terms that there would be no difficulty in obliging France.

He was now in a position to make advances to Italy. Since the death of Cavour the Tuscan Ricasoli had been Premier, and of the two objects of Italian ambition had resolutely subordinated the acquisition of Venetia to that of Rome. There were two ways in which Rome might be won : either by agreement with Napoleon for the withdrawal of the French garrison, or by the Pope's consent to Cavour's policy of a "Free Church in a Free State," which implied an abandonment of the Temporal Power by the Vatican in return for a surrender of all claims by the State to regulate the affairs of the Church. Either policy demanded cautious action, and to caution the King himself was little disposed, preferring to postpone the Roman question, and to take vigorous action for the acquisition of Venetia. The hostility of Rattazzi's party to the Premier gave him a following, and the Court combined with the opposition to foster a popular desire for war by encouraging Garibaldi to hope that some new enterprise would be entrusted to him. These manoeuvres brought about the

resignation of Ricasoli and the accession of Rattazzi to power, but Garibaldi, whom he had used as a tool, outran the intentions of the ministry, and was already on the borders of the Tyrol, when the authorities turned him back. It was, however, easier to incite Garibaldi than to restrain him. He appeared in Palermo, where the officials, ignorant how far the King was implicated in his acts, did not venture to interfere, and with "Rome or death" as his watchword, he succeeded in passing the Straits, followed by 4000 volunteers of the worst quality. The country remained indifferent, and he was finally compelled to surrender at Aspromonte to a regular force under Cialdini, himself sustaining a severe wound in the foot (August, 1862). All parties felt that the Roman question was not to be settled in this way, and two years later, in 1864, Napoleon agreed to withdraw the garrison from Rome on the understanding that the Minghetti ministry would not attempt to occupy it, and would give evidence of their good faith by adopting Florence as the capital. This so-called September Convention, by closing the Roman question, turned men's thoughts to Venetia.

In 1865 La Marmora, then Premier, had made efforts to buy the province from Austria, and in the following year began to listen, not without suspicion, to the overtures of Bismarck. By April, 1866, a secret alliance had been concluded on condition that Prussia went to war in three months.

The suspicions of Austria were gradually aroused, and she determined to counteract the Prussian understanding with Italy by currying favour with the German princes. Accordingly, while Manteuffel, who represented Prussia in Schleswig, repressed every symptom of agitation in favour of Frederick of Augustenburg, the utmost freedom was given in Holstein to the manifestation of such sympathies. The movement culminated in a huge meeting at Altona, in which Prussia was assailed in unmeasured terms. Bismarck remonstrated, not without menace, and Austria replied that her administration of Holstein was no concern of Prussia's. In view of her rival's preparation she announced her intention of calling upon the Diet to mobilise the Federal forces.

Bismarck had not been unprepared for the Austrian appeal to Germany, and he had his own counter-appeal ready. He laid before the Diet a plan for the reform of the Confederation, which was to comprise, among other provisions, the exclusion of Austria and the establishment of an Assembly elected by universal suffrage.

At this moment Napoleon changed his mind. He thought he saw an opportunity of realising his own aims without the dangerous expedient of befriending Prussia. He resolved at one and the same time to help Italy and to equalise the combatants for his own purposes. He accordingly induced Austria to offer Venetia to Italy in return for Italian neutrality. The offer was most tempting, but La Marmora's sense of honour forbade him to accept it, and Italy stood by her engagements. The Emperor now fell back upon his favourite suggestion of a Congress. This time Austria wrecked the proposal by insisting on the inclusion of the Pope and upon a definite assurance that no cessions of territory were to be discussed. Napoleon thereupon retired into watchful neutrality.

Austria now made a deliberate bid for the support of the Confederation. She declared her intention to submit the destinies of Schleswig-Holstein to the decision of the Diet, an open breach of the Convention of Gastein, to which Prussia replied that she could recognise no such solution, unless the Diet had previously been reformed on the popular lines which she had herself suggested. Her scheme was accordingly laid before the Federal representatives. It was rejected, and the decision was followed by the acceptance of an Austrian proposal for Federal execution against Prussia. The die was now cast. Prussia solemnly withdrew from the Confederation, and proceeded to occupy Holstein, on the plea that, the Convention of Gastein having been broken, the joint responsibility for the duchies came again into force.

Technically, Austria was the aggressor by her repudiation of the Gastein Convention, but Bismarck was running a tremendous risk. He could not have doubted for a moment that if the struggle were protracted Napoleon would attempt to make his own game, and in the meantime Austria had drawn Germany to her side. He had, however, his reasons for confidence. He believed that the Prussian army, organised, armed, and trained by Roon and Moltke as no army had hitherto been organised and trained, was invincible; and he knew that in case of victory he held in his proposals for universal suffrage a weapon that would be more than a match for any unanimity among the princes and governments. Nor were the governments in cordial agreement with Austria. Federal reform, in whatever shape it was presented, was just what in the interests of particularism they wished to avoid. Accordingly, their armies were concentrated in the south to defend their own territories, and made no effort to co-operate with the offensive campaign planned by the Austrian Field-Marshal Benedek. Prussia was therefore enabled to employ a small force against them which, under Falkenstein, won the first success of the war at Langensalza, where the Hanoverians were crushed in an attempt to move southwards to join the Federal troops.

Bohemia bulges out from the frontier of Austro-Hungary into the heart of Germany. To the south-west where it bordered upon Bavaria, no danger was to be apprehended, but the kingdom of Saxony to the north-west was already occupied by one Prussian army under Prince Frederick Charles, and on the north-east, in the Prussian province of Silesia, the Crown Prince commanded another. Benedek's plan was to stop the latter force from entering Bohemia in the Nachod passes, and meantime to overwhelm Frederick Charles shortly after his passage of the frontier. He would then be free to hold out a hand to the Bavarians. The scheme was fraught with peril. The two Prussian armies had orders from Moltke to concentrate at Gitschin, and any failure to close the passes would put the Crown Prince in a position to strike at Benedek's flank.

The Prussian strategy was the sounder, but the astonishing rapidity of the catastrophe was in the main due to superiority of tactics and armament. Fighting in loose formations and armed with a new breech-loading rifle, known as the "needle-gun," the army of Charles drove back the Austrians in a series of engagements round Munchengratz. Meanwhile the Crown Prince forced the passes, and his success compelled Benedek to take up a new and less advanced position at Koniggratz. Here he was attacked in front by Frederick Charles, and having imprudently thrown into the fight the force which had been detailed to watch for the Crown Prince, was overwhelmed by the belated arrival of the latter, who drove in and crushed the whole of the Austrian right flank (July 3, 1866).

The success was decisive. The other operations of the war were merely subsidiary. In Italy La Marmora crossed the Mincio, but sustained a defeat at Custozza, the scene of Charles Albert's earlier repulse, and was forced to withdraw from Venetia, till the retirement of the Austrians, owing to their reverses in the north, permitted a second advance. Thus Venetia was finally won for Italy, but the Powers prevented the annexation of the Trentino, or Southern Tyrol. This last disappointment, together with the loss of military *prestige*, at Custozza and a naval defeat sustained by Admiral Persano off Lissa, left very bitter feelings in Italy. Baden, Wurtemberg, and Bavaria remained to be disposed of, but, even before their submission was made, the issue had been practically decided by negotiation.

Napoleon had not calculated upon the efficiency of the weapon which the King and Roon had forged. Greatly disturbed at the result of his neutrality, he accepted Austria's invitation to interpose, and Bismarck saw clearly that the Emperor's change of front must entail two important consequences. Prussia would be obliged, at any rate for the time being, to limit her ambitions in Germany, and to treat Austria with the utmost forbearance. Germany could not be united under Prussian leadership till accounts had been settled with Napoleon, and in view of an ultimate rupture with France Austria must be weaned from harbouring

thoughts of vengeance. Bismarck was therefore willing to accede to the demand of the French Emperor that no surrender of Austrian territory should be required, on the understanding that Prussia should be free to consolidate her scattered dominions by the annexation of Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, and Nassau, and to establish a new Confederation embracing the North German States only. He had more difficulty with his own King. William desired to mutilate Austria, and to enter Vienna in triumph, while he was most unwilling to destroy the menaced princely dynasties. But the Crown Prince supported Bismarck, and by the end of July the preliminary treaty of Nikolsburg had been signed, which was converted in August into a permanent peace at Prague (1866).

The successes of the Prussian arms were no less effective in the domestic concerns of Prussia and Germany. Bismarck had no difficulty in obtaining from the Prussian Parliament an Act of Indemnity for the sums unconstitutionally spent upon the army. Schleswig, Holstein, Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, Nassau, and Frankfort were annexed to Prussia. The remaining States north of the Main were required to associate themselves with Prussia and her dependent provinces in a North German Confederation, from which Austria and the Southern States were excluded. The federal institutions were to consist of a *Reichstag* elected by universal suffrage, and a *Bundesrath*, or Federal Council, consisting of the representatives of the various governments. So far the scheme wore the appearance of an attempt to compromise between "particularism" and the popular ideas of 1848. But the executive was alien to either. The King of Prussia became President, and appointed all officials, including the Federal Chancellor, who was practically sole minister. And while each State was left free to manage its own domestic affairs, foreign policy and national defence were placed under the control of the central executive, and the State armies were thenceforward armed and organised on the Prussian model under Prussian direction. Here, at last was no loose federation, but a strong federal State. And it had come to pass as Bismarck had predicted, "not by speeches and majority votes, but by blood and iron."

The battle of Koniggratz decided the destiny of Austria no less than that of Germany, for by giving the death-blow to her purely German ambitions it enabled her to turn her undistracted attention to the task of setting her own polyglot house in order. The one permanent effect of the movement of 1848 within the Austrian dominions had been the destruction of every kind of feudal authority. Schwarzenberg had found the ground clear for the establishment of an autocratic military monarchy, which disregarded national distinctions, and governed through officials (1851). By a Concordat arrived at in 1855 the Church, in return for extensive privileges, took sides with the government. Bach, Minister of the Interior, controlled the Empire for ten years with the combined aid of army, police, and clergy (1849-1859), while Buol ruined Austrian influence in Europe, and the finances went from bad to worse.

The Italian war revealed the inherent weakness of the whole system. Francis Joseph, with his clear good sense, ascribed the ruined credit of the Empire and the disloyalty of her peoples to the true causes. Bach was dismissed, and, by the March Patent of 1860, thirty-eight distinguished men from different parts of the Emperor's dominions were summoned to offer their counsel on the question of reform. From the discussions of this body two rival solutions emerged. Of these the Centralist scheme, while granting local diets to the provinces, proposed to reserve all matters of importance for a central representative Parliament of the whole Empire. The Federalist solution, on the other hand, was to concede complete self-government to the separate nationalities. By the October Diploma the latter system was adopted. It was wrecked by the ultra-nationalist party in Hungary, who, not content with the restoration of the Constitution in existence before 1848, behaved as though the March Laws of that year had been re-enacted.

The Emperor now gravitated back to the Centralists. By the February Patent (1861)

issued under the influence of Schmerling, a central Parliament was created whose members were to be elected by the new provincial assemblies. Hungary was to keep her separate administration, but, under the leadership of Francis Deak, stood out against an arrangement which made her in matters of taxation and legislation an Austrian province. The more violent party went further, and, encouraged by the fulminations of Kossuth from his place of exile in Italy, demanded a final breach with the Hapsburg dynasty.

Francis Joseph never faltered in his belief that a satisfactory arrangement could be discovered. Dismissing Schmerling, he went in person to Pesth to hear at first hand the wishes of the Magyars, and to his wisdom and to the moderation of Deak the final solution was due. Centralisation being impossible, the choice now lay between Federalism and a Dualism which was distinct from both. The latter system may be roughly described as a partnership between the two independent States of Austria and Hungary, under one Crown and with a common government for certain well-defined common purposes. The discussions were interrupted by the war with Prussia, but the final arrangement was materially hastened by the transference of Count Beust from the service of Saxony to the Austrian ministry of foreign affairs, and in March, 1867, the *Ausgleich* or Compromise which established the Dual Monarchy was concluded. The Empire was divided into Cisleithania (Austria and its dependencies), and Transleithania (Hungary and its dependencies). Each was to enjoy self-government under its own Constitution, but the departments of war, finance, and foreign affairs, were to be in the hands of three ministers common to both. Two bodies of sixty members each, called the Delegations, were to be appointed to represent the legislatures of Austria and of Hungary respectively in questions of commerce and the like, and were to sit alternately at Vienna and at Pesth, In the event of disagreement they were to meet and vote without discussion and in silence. The agreement as to the share of taxation to be borne by each partner was to be revised every ten years. The claims of the smaller nationalities were thus sacrificed to an understanding between German and Magyar, but Hungary under the guidance of Deak, to whom the scheme for a central authority was mainly due, adopted a wise and liberal policy to Croatia and the other Slavonic dependencies. Amid the welter of conflicting tendencies it was no small achievement to have effected a settlement which has endured for nearly half a century.

CHAPTER XXIII

THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR

GARIBALDI once said of Louis Napoleon that he had a tail of straw and was afraid of its catching fire, and there was this element of truth in the saying that the influence of public opinion and of party clamour at home made it difficult for him to pursue a steady and consistent policy abroad. It will always remain a debateable question whether, with wiser management, the Napoleonic regime might not have established itself permanently in France. Certainly at the outset it had given to the country internal peace, prosperity, and a commanding influence abroad, results which suggest that had the Emperor been supported by advisers of greater honesty, steadiness, and consistency of purpose, France might have acquired the stability of today without undergoing the discipline of a national humiliation. The Italian war of 1859, undertaken for an "idea" and in defence of an oppressed nationality, first divided public opinion, and Napoleon, at once the protector of the Pope and the patron of his nationalist enemies, was forced to temporise between two inconsistent aims, only to incur the ill-will of the Catholic party at home.

Thus had one of the two leading "Napoleonic Ideas" been applied with little regard to practical consequences. It was part of the Emperor's singular blindness that he should have chosen a time when his policy offered so easy a mark for criticism to apply the other. In 1860 the first step was taken towards realising that transformation into a popular government, which by a strange hallucination Napoleon regarded as the unfulfilled intention of the First Empire, and therefore the proper destiny of the Second. Calculation reinforced sentiment. It was believed that clerical hostility could be neutralised by the steady support of all whose views inclined towards free institutions, and that a share in the responsibility of government by the nation would sober violent opinions, while the Emperor would no longer be chargeable with the entire blame for every passing ill success. The right was given to the Chambers of moving and discussing an address in reply to the speech from the throne. It was an invitation to criticism which was promptly accepted. Those who desired further concessions combined with the alienated Catholics and with protectionist manufacturers, who were enraged by the commercial treaty with the English free-traders, to attack the government. This opposition was not conciliated by the grant in 1861 of a right to discuss the Budget in detail, nor by the change, which took place in 1862, in the Emperor's attitude towards the Italian nationalists. In 1863 the failure to extend to Poland a protection which would have satisfied all parties led to the opposition. election of a compact opposition in the *Corps législatif*, which found in the Emperor's newly appointed Minister of State, charged with defending his policy before the Chamber, a definite mark for its shafts. The Roman Convention of 1864 stirred the Catholics to renewed fury, which was further exasperated by Napoleon's refusal to permit the publication of the Papal Syllabus, and by the liberal educational policy of Duruy. Rouher, Minister of State, vainly strove to limit discussion to the functions of a safety valve, and to render popular control illusory. By 1866 a Third Party had come into being, under Emile Ollivier, whose aim was to save the Empire by placing it on a constitutional basis.

Events were rapidly driving the government into his arms. The industrial prosperity of France had brought its inevitable crop of labour troubles, and working class discontent had been stimulated by the teachings of two German Jews, Ferdinand Lasalle and Karl Marx. The latter, who is perhaps the father of modern socialism, abandoning the old co-operative and benevolent notions taught that the gradual evolution of society would destroy private

property and capitalism as inevitably as it had destroyed the feudal system, and would place the “means of production” in the hands of the State. In 1862 he founded in London an “International Association of Working-men,” pledged to accelerate these changes by peaceful methods, which held annual congresses and passed somewhat vague resolutions till it was dissolved by internal disagreements. The Parisian artisan was not peaceful, the memories of 1852 were strong upon him, but the movement stimulated his discontent. In 1868 the practical removal of censorship restrictions let loose all the fury of a scurrilous and irresponsible press, and it was in the same year that a fiery young lawyer from Marseilles, Leon Gambetta, leaped into sudden notoriety by a vigorous denunciation of the Coup d’état in a trial resulting from a political demonstration over the grave of one of its victims. At each election the opposition increased in strength.

In 1869 the final step was taken, and the “Liberal Empire” came into being with the concession of a ministry responsible to the Chambers and a grant to the *Corps législatif* of the right to initiate legislation and to vote the Budget. The arrangement was confirmed by a *plébiscite*, in which the votes were deliberately taken upon the double issue of confidence in the Empire and approval of the new changes, an artifice which naturally procured a decisive majority by appealing to the most diverse opinions. Thus, at the crisis of its fortunes, the Second Empire found itself dependent upon maintaining a parliamentary majority, and exposed to the clamours of irreconcilable Catholics, of a revolutionary urban populace, and of a rising republican opinion. Meanwhile, the Imperial policy lost all steadiness swayed by the dynastic motives of the Court and the selfish fears of society. Over the festivities of the Exhibition of 1867 there brooded the black cloud of the Prussian triumph at Koniggratz and of the tragedy in Mexico.

The influences which we have endeavoured to place before the reader had made it impossible for Napoleon, whose own health and spirits were broken by the constant recurrence of a painful internal disease, to maintain a consistent policy in his dealings with Prussia. His own instincts would have been to follow that preference for national consolidation, which we have had many occasions for noting, and to look with favour on the German unitary movement. Indeed, he had gone so far as to suggest to Bismarck the annexation of Schleswig-Holstein. The only practical alternative would have been armed interposition in defence of Southern Germany before the conclusion of the struggle, and for this his financial difficulties and the Mexican entanglement had incapacitated him. He had thus allowed the preliminary treaty at Nikolsburg to be signed without putting forward French pretensions.

The result was an outcry, in which Frenchmen of all opinions joined indiscriminately, and Napoleon was pushed by his foreign minister, Drouyn de Lluys, into demanding from Prussia the cession of the Palatinate along with portions of Hesse-Darmstadt and of the Prussian Rhine province. The demand was bluntly refused and cleverly exploited. A copy of the request was shown by Bismarck to Pfordten, the minister of Bavaria, to which State the Palatinate belonged, and served both to hasten an understanding between Prussia and the Southern States, and to inspire the latter with a deep suspicion of France. In 1868 they even consented to co-operate with the North German Confederation in establishing a common Customs Parliament for the control of the affairs of the *Zollverein*.

In 1867, Napoleon, still nervously on the watch for an occasion to recover his lost *prestige*, made an attempt to buy Luxembourg from Holland. Once again Prussia stood in the way, for the right to maintain a garrison in the fortress belonged to her by treaty. The Emperor had therefore to be content with the very small satisfaction of securing the neutrality of Luxembourg at the hands of the Powers and the withdrawal of the Prussian garrison. The incident left popular opinion on both sides of the Rhine excited and unsatisfied. War was evidently in sight, and at this inopportune moment the French

Government was obliged to abandon Marshal Niel's suggestion for army reform' on the basis of universal service, in deference to opposition in the Chamber and to financial difficulties. France, in fact, would neither permit the Emperor to keep the peace nor to prepare for war.

The attitude of other Powers was therefore of considerable importance. Since the death of Palmerston, in 1865, England had abandoned all interest in foreign affairs, and was about to embark under Gladstone's leadership on a programme of domestic change. Russia had not forgotten Napoleon's remonstrances against her action in Poland, nor Bismarck's effective support. Italy was smarting under a new grudge against France. Victor Emmanuel indeed never allowed himself to forget his debt of gratitude for Magenta and Solferino, but he could hardly have carried his people with him into active support of his old ally. The withdrawal of the French garrison from Rome in 1866 in accordance with the convention of 1864, had led to another hare-brained attempt by Garibaldi to penetrate into Papal territory, this time from the north. The enterprise was the signal for renewed intervention and for another French expedition which crushed the raiders at Mentana and remained in permanent occupation of Civita Vecchia. These troops Napoleon dared not remove in face of Catholic opinion, and therefore could look for no help from Italy. From Austria there were better hopes of obtaining assistance, and with Austria negotiations had been proceeding behind the backs of the responsible ministers of both countries. In June, 1870, Marshal Lebrun had a series of interviews with Archduke Albert, the victor of Custoza, at Vienna, and a subsequent audience with Francis Joseph. He was given to understand that if France invaded Germany as liberator of the Southern States in the spring of the following year there would be every probability of joint action by Austria and Italy within six weeks. Napoleon was never able, as it turned out, to fulfil the condition, but it may be doubted if Russia would have suffered Austria to stir.

Bismarck was now ready. He believed war inevitable, and desired to precipitate it, as the sole possible method of absorbing South Germany. An incident now presented itself which, with the aid of the suicidal folly of France, he succeeded in transforming into a *casus belli*. In 1869, Prince Leopold of Hohenzollem-Sigmaringen, brother of Prince Charles of Roumania, had been offered the throne of Spain, which was now vacant through the deposition of Queen Isabel. He had, however, declined the invitation. Bismarck seems to have secured the renewal of the offer, and in June, 1870, it was accepted. The prince was a Roman Catholic, and he was related to Napoleon; but he was a German, and his friendly connections with his distant cousins of the Prussian branch of his house were proved by his asking for the King's consent as head of the family. The French were accordingly justified in objecting to his accession to the Spanish throne, and they were justified in regarding the King's sanction as provocative, though such was certainly not William's intention; but the language employed by Gramont, the foreign minister and by the French press was not suggestive of any wish for a peaceful solution. Yet for the moment the storm seemed to have blown over. King William was wisely determined not to regard the question as one in which Prussia had any concern, and his attitude made concession possible without loss of dignity to the nation. An attempt by Bismarck to rush the prince's election failed of success, and the question was set at rest by Leopold's spontaneous withdrawal.

France had gained her point, a great peril was averted, and honour on both sides was satisfied, but with insensate folly she tried to turn her success into a humiliation for Prussia. Paris was wildly excited, the Court party were eager to conciliate popular feeling by ministering to its thirst for a national triumph, and by these two forces Ollivier and his colleagues were hurried into an unjustifiable act of provocation. Benedetti, the French ambassador, was instructed to approach King William, who was taking the waters at Ems, and to ask for a definite guarantee that he would never at any future time approve Prince Leopold's candidature. The interview took place upon the promenade, and the King very

properly refused to give the pledge required, afterwards sending a message to the ambassador informing him that he had now heard definitely of the prince's withdrawal and had nothing further to add.

The facts were telegraphed to Bismarck and communicated by him in a condensed form to the press. There is nothing to bear out the Chancellor's claim that the message was deliberately edited by him with the object of precipitating the war. Indeed, the condensed version omits certain provocative phrases which occurred in the original. But the incident itself stirred up an outburst of inconsiderate fury in the press on both sides of the Rhine. The one nation declared that its King, the other that its ambassador had been insulted. The French ministry were instant for war, and were hounded on by the mob, the Chamber, and the press. Once more Paris had triumphed over her Government and over the soberer instincts of the rest of the nation, and the Empress and the self-styled friends of the dynasty looked on with satisfaction till Napoleon, weary with pain, at length yielded to his advisers. Paris and the Imperial house were appropriately enough to bear between them the heaviest share of the penalty.

France was confident in her army. In China, where she had taken part with England in enforcing the opening of the Treaty Ports (1860), in Syria, where she had intervened on behalf of the Christians of the Lebanon district (1860), in Algiers, as well as in the campaigns already described, her troops had seen constant active service. They were armed with the new *chasse-pôt*, a better weapon than their enemies possessed, which, to the indignation of the Italians, had been reported on officially as having "worked wonders" at Mentana. But Europe was to witness for the first time the scientific application to warfare of the resources of the age, and here the advantage lay all on the German side. The railways leading to the seat of war were completely under staff control; the officers had received a thorough scientific training; the cavalry had been practised in all the duties of reconnaissance; artillery tactics had been improved by the system of massing batteries together; every necessary was ready and in the right place; every man knew his rendezvous and every regiment its post; indeed, Moltke's plans for the campaign were already made, and orders had only to be issued to set the whole machine in motion. None of these things were to be found on the French side, and yet the support of Austria, and indeed everything else, depended upon her invading South Germany before her enemy could secure the frontier. Moreover, she had a smaller army and, thanks to her defective system, practically no reserves.

By the beginning of August three German armies were in contact with the French frontier. The First, under Steinmetz, moved up the Moselle on Metz; the Third, containing the South German contingents, and commanded by the Crown Prince, advanced up the Rhine against the northern frontier of Alsace; while the Second, led by Frederick Charles, the "Red Prince," pushed forward along a line intermediate between the other two. It was with this last force that the French first came into contact in a reconnaissance by which they obtained a delusive advantage and occupied Saarbrücken. The rapidity of the German movements had in reality reduced the enemy thenceforward to a purely defensive strategy. The first blow was struck by the Crown Prince. Crossing the frontier he surprised and defeated MacMahon's advanced troops under Douay at Weissenburg, and followed up the success by an attack upon the Marshal's entire army drawn up in position along the crest of a formidable wooded ridge at Worth. After desperate and wasteful assaults against the face of the position, the left flank of the French was turned, and so crushing a defeat inflicted upon them that MacMahon was forced to retire without a pause south-westwards upon Chalons (August 6).

Once arrived at this point the army of Alsace were powerless to support the army of Lorraine upon which the brunt of the fighting now fell. On the very day of Wörth the struggle began. The advanced troops of the Second Army having cleared the French out of

Saarbrücken committed themselves to a rash attack against a superior force under the command of General Frossard which occupied the heights of Spicheren. But the failure of Bazaine to send forward reinforcements and the initiative of the German generals, who brought up their commands successively to the sound of the firing, turned what might have been a French victory into a defeat. The army of Lorraine, under the command of the Emperor himself, fell back upon Metz, followed by the First and Second German Armies. Here Napoleon resigned his command to Bazaine, at the instance of the ministry under Count Palikao, whom the Empress had placed in office, when at the news of the first reverses the Chamber had turned savagely on Ollivier and his colleagues.

The fortress of Metz stands on the east bank of the Moselle, which for practical purposes may be described as flowing north and south. Moltke's design was to hold the French in position by attacking the town from the east, while he passed part of his force over the river at a point further south with the object of cutting the two roads by which retreat was possible in a westerly direction, upon Paris. Accordingly, the leading troops of the First Army fell upon the French rear-guard at Colombey on the line of the river Nied, east of Metz. The fighting was stubborn but the French held their own, and succeeded in drawing off under cover of darkness. The main army was still stationary, though it was not the action at Colombey but defective staff arrangements, the difficulty of bridging the Moselle, and the narrowness of the streets of Metz that had delayed Bazaine's retreat. Frederick Charles, indeed, who was in contact with the river south of the town, believed that the enemy were already well on their way west of Verdun, and awaited further intelligence. At this moment one of his subordinates, the commander of the Brandenburg Corps, General Von Alvensleben, received information which decided him to act on his own initiative. Crossing the Moselle he wheeled north and struck at the line of the Verdun road between Metz and Mars-la-Tour, maintaining his position against increasing odds till reinforced. Even so he might easily have been thrust back had not Bazaine, over-anxious to retain his power of issuing from Metz, and blind to the need of securing his line of retreat, concentrated his defence on the flank nearest the town. The mistake was fatal. As the evening closed in a series of cavalry charges placed the Germans astride of the Verdun road at Mars-la-Tour (August 16).

The proper course of action should now have been clear. Bazaine ought, by all the rules of war, to have left a small garrison in the fortress and to have broken away with his main army in a north-westerly direction. But the movement would have exposed him while on the march to the danger of an attack upon his flank, his supplies were not ready, and he resolved to play for safety. Taking up his position on the plateau of Gravelotte with his back to Metz and facing west, he decided to await the German attack. If successful he intended to continue his retirement, if beaten he could at least retreat into the city. On August 18, the First and Second German Armies, having crossed the Moselle south of Metz and changed front, moved against him from the west. Their plan was to drive in his right or northern flank, and so to thrust him back into the fortress. The furious attack of Steinmetz at the southern end of the plateau, attended by losses for which he was subsequently deprived of his command, led to the concentration of the French reserves in the wrong place. Meanwhile the assault by the German Guard on the French centre at St. Privat, where Bazaine's right flank was wrongly supposed to rest, was almost equally costly, and it was evening before a successful flank movement was ultimately directed upon Amanvillers. The German losses had been unnecessarily heavy, but the victory was worth any purchase. The army of Lorraine, consisting of 180,000 of the best French troops, was cooped up in Metz.

MacMahon, with the army of Alsace, now accompanied by the Emperor in person, had meanwhile reached Châlons, pursued by the Crown Prince with the Third German Army, and had arrived at the perfectly sound conclusion that the only practical course of action was to fall back upon the strong outworks of Paris. The decision was taken out of his hands

by urgent orders from the Empress and Count Palikao. Influenced by the rising temper of the capital they instructed him to move forward in a north-easterly direction, and to assist Bazaine to break out of Metz. The Crown Prince, fully informed of the change of plan by his cavalry scouts and by French and English newspaper paragraphs, was soon in pursuit, and his advanced troops ran into the French flank at Beaumont, where a sharp engagement took place. MacMahon was obliged to draw off northwards, and halted at Sedan, perilously near the Belgian frontier, to give his weary and disheartened troops a much-needed rest. The town lay in a hollow and was exposed to artillery, but was guarded from direct attack by the Meuse to the south, two tributary brooks in deep hollows to the east and west, and by thick woods to the north. By dawn on September 1 the Germans had surrounded the place. The only chance for the enclosed army now lay in attempting to force their way out to the north and west where the enemy were weakest, and of this chance they were deprived by the infatuation of De Wimpffen. MacMahon had been wounded shortly after daylight, and had resigned his command to this officer on the strength of a special mandate which he bore from the Empress. Resolute to persevere at all hazards, he strove to cut his way out eastwards and towards Metz. Early in the afternoon the French were being penned into the town under a terrible artillery fire, and Napoleon insisted upon the white flag being hoisted in token of surrender. The whole army and the Emperor himself were thus made prisoners of war.

Bazaine had done little to justify the effort to extricate him. He had allowed the investment to be completed, having failed to realise, just as MacMahon had done when he halted at Sedan, the new power conferred upon the besieger by modern artillery and rifles of restraining a besieged force from breaking through lines however weak. Owing to these causes and defective organisation by his staff, a half-hearted attempt to cut his way out at Noisseville on the very day of the great catastrophe ended in complete fiasco.

Napoleon had truly said to Bismarck, at the historic interview on the Donchéry road outside Sedan, that he had not sought the war, but had been driven into it by public opinion. Yet public opinion made him its scapegoat, and, on the news of the surrender, the Second Empire fell. Crowds gathered in the streets of Paris and shouted, "Down with the Empire." The Chamber was raided, a resolution was carried to depose Napoleon, and a Republican "Government of National Defence" was installed at the Hôtel de Ville. The memories of 1792, of Valmy and of Jemappes, conjured up the vision of a Republican France rising in her youthful might to hurl the invader across the frontier. But enthusiasm was vainly matched against science; in less than three weeks the investment of Paris was complete.

Nevertheless the task of the German armies was by no means simple. The country people were now actively hostile, the movements of the cavalry were thereby circumscribed, and information was hard to get. A Delegation of the National Government had gone to Tours to rouse the provinces, and at the beginning of October its action was quickened by the arrival of Gambetta, who had escaped from Paris in a balloon. This passionate southerner, with his burning eloquence and inexhaustible energy, was well fitted to rouse the fighting spirit of the people, and to impart vigour to sluggish counsels. But Thiers had hit his weakness when he called him "*un fou furieux*" and his egotism never permitted others to make a wise use of the forces which he called into being.

In six weeks he had created an army, and it was decided to use it in threatening the German lines from the direction of Orleans, where Von der Tann was posted to cover the siege. In pursuance of these plans the General d'Aurelle de Paladines advanced up the Loire, overwhelmed Von der Tann with superior numbers at Coulmiers, and occupied Orleans. The Germans were thoroughly alarmed, and there was even talk of breaking up the siege of Paris, when the news arrived that Metz had capitulated. The army of Frederick Charles was thus set free to join in the operations round Paris. No condemnation is too

severe for the action of Bazaine, who by holding out but another fortnight might have seriously compromised the position of the invaders. The First German Army, now under the command of Manteuffel, was sent to deal with the French forces mustering between the Seine and the Somme. In view of the reinforcements received by the besiegers of Paris, and the inexperience of his own troops, d'Aurelle de Paladines was rightly desirous of awaiting the inevitable German attack in a carefully prepared position. But Gambetta, eager for an immediate success calculated to arouse the national spirit, forced his unwilling general to move forward upon Paris. The indifferent training of the troops did not lend itself to such rapid concentration as was necessary in order to break through the German covering force, and the two attempts successively made at Beaune la Rolande towards the French right, and at Poupry towards the left, only resulted in defeats. The retirement, conducted in severe December weather, so disorganised the troops that Orleans had to be abandoned. One-half of the force, under Chanzy, maintaining a dogged resistance, was thrust away westwards towards Le Mans, the other succeeded in crossing the Loire and concentrating under Bourbaki's command at Bourges. An effort made by Ducrot to break out of Paris towards the relieving army had been likewise unsuccessful.

Meanwhile, Manteuffel, having taken Amiens and Rouen, pushed on intending to occupy the port of Havre, through which the French were receiving munitions of war. He had, however, to deal with an active and able antagonist in General Faidherbe, who striking at Amiens, brought Manteuffel back in haste to meet him on the Hallue, from which position, after an indecisive engagement, the French retreated in good order. This renewal of activity in the north encouraged the defenders of Paris to attempt another sortie in that direction, but with no better success. In the last days of December the bombardment of the city began.

Nothing daunted, Gambetta was preparing a fresh enterprise. Bourbaki received orders to move his troops by train to join the French levies in the neighbourhood of Besançon. With the support of other troops from Lyons and a body of volunteers, whom Garibaldi had brought to the aid of Italy's old ally, he was to relieve Belfort and to cut the German communications with the Rhine. Meanwhile Chanzy from Le Mans, and Faidherbe from Amiens, were to press in upon Paris. The paper combinations of amateur strategists are seldom successful, and Gambetta's plans proved no exception to the rule. The task of transporting the troops by rail was attended by endless delays and by an amount of mismanagement which inflicted untold suffering on Bourbaki's soldiers. By the time he reached Besançon, Werder was ready for him, and a temporary advantage gained by the French at Villersexel was neutralised by a decisive repulse at Héricourt. The French now retired, but were not to escape. Manteuffel was recalled from his command in the north, and, at the head of a force hastily gathered from the troops round Paris, struck in at Bourbaki from the west driving him over the Swiss frontier. The unhappy general took his own life, and his troops were obliged to lay down their arms. Three weeks earlier Frederick Charles had scattered Chanzy's army in a desperate battle at Le Mans.

There remained only Faidherbe in the field, who had been engaged at the very moment of Bourbaki's disaster in a well-planned but unsuccessful attempt to relieve Peronne. He was now ordered by Gambetta to work eastwards round the opposing German Army, thus threatening its communications, and to approach Paris from the north, with the object of supporting another sortie. The conception was thoroughly unsound, and the Germans, concentrating with great rapidity, came up with him at St. Quentin and succeeded at last in defeating him decisively and irretrievably. With better troops, in better weather, and unhampered by civilian interference, Faidherbe might have effected much.

He could scarcely have averted the inevitable end. On the day before St. Quentin had been fought Trochu had made the last desperate sally from Paris against the German positions round Versailles. The Provisional Government, disregarding the angry protests of

Gambetta, thereupon decided to accept an armistice with a view to the conclusion of peace. The forts and the garrison were surrendered, provisions were to be admitted, everywhere the armies were to stand fast till an assembly had been elected at Bordeaux to discuss and ratify the terms of peace (January 28, 1871).

Ten days before the armistice was concluded that for which patriotic Germans had waited and watched so long, for which Prussia had fought and Bismarck had plotted and planned, had been at length achieved, and the old Confederation had become the German Empire under the King of Prussia as German Emperor. It was with a certain appropriateness, if perhaps with questionable taste, that the *Galerie des Glaces* in Louis XIV's palace at Versailles, the very spot upon which his dazzling Court had again and again acclaimed the victories of the old regime over prostrate Germany, was selected as the scene of the ceremony which was to inaugurate a new era not only in Germany but in Europe. Here, surrounded by his fellow princes, by his military staff and state officials, by the Crown Prince, Moltke, Bismarck, and all the heroes of the war, and to the sound of the cannon, which still boomed over defiant Paris, William I was proclaimed. Few whose swords leaped from their scabbards to honour the new Imperial dignity were aware how hardly the final step had been won or with what hesitation King Louis of Bavaria had signed the letter making the proposal to his brother princes, a letter written by the same hand which had edited the telegram from Ems.

While Germany thus completed her political structure at the moment of her triumph, France, chastened by her misfortunes, prepared, with a courage which won her the respect of Europe, to rebuild her house out of the ruins. Frenchmen went to the polls on the single issue of peace or war, and peace was the first object of the national desire. Only a small minority of Republicans was elected. They could not be trusted to stand firm against the cry for war *à l'outrance* still raised by their most conspicuous leader Gambetta. At the particular crisis the landowner, the noble or the monarchist was the safe candidate, the man who could be relied upon never to cast in his lot with the fiery demagogue whose policy the country dreaded. When, therefore, the Assembly met at Bordeaux the large majority were Monarchists, supporters either of the Legitimist or of the Orleanist branch. Their Royalist sympathies were, however, for the time being entirely secondary to the pacific intentions to which they had owed their election.

This wise preference was to be strengthened by the influence of the leader to whom the majority gave their confidence. France in her hour of need has seldom failed to find the indispensable man; and, if Gambetta had saved her honour, it was Adolphe Thiers who now came forward to preserve her very existence. He was strangely transformed since the days of the July monarchy. The party leader whose factiousness had done so much to ruin the Orleanist dynasty which he served, the aggressive patriot who had strained every nerve to involve France in war for an affair of honour in 1840, had already had his windows broken by the Parisians for his out-spoken opposition to the war-fever of 1870, and now returned to public life to conclude a humiliating but necessary peace with the enemies of his country, and to be the one moderating influence between contending parties at home.

With unerring instinct the old party-chief grasped the cardinal facts of the situation. All question of the future constitution of France must be postponed while she parleyed with the enemy at her gates, and in the meanwhile a provisional republican regime would divide Frenchmen least. The Monarchists, wholly unprepared for action, would be glad to postpone the inevitable dissension between the two wings of their party, and the Republicans would be able to give their best energies to the service of France without abandoning their creed. By the Compact of Bordeaux it was agreed by all parties to suspend all questions affecting the constitutional settlement, and Thiers was declared Head of the Executive Power.

There were problems before him which might have appalled the stoutest hearts. His first task was to make tolerable terms with the victorious Germans. Bismarck was in no mood to be generous, and Jules Favre, minister of foreign affairs, had already found him a hard bargainer. Behind Bismarck stood the German military party, who meant "to bleed France white," in spite of the manifest unwisdom of such a course. Between the high-strung and almost frantic appeals and expostulations of Thiers, and the obduracy of the German staff, Bismarck often lost his temper and was rude to the verge of brutality. But if he had had his way he would have left France with Metz, which is little better than a German outpost in French territory, while depriving her of Strasburg, which had so often proved an open gateway for French inroads into Germany. Ultimately, France was obliged to submit to the surrender of Alsace with part of Lorraine, and to an indemnity of five milliards of francs. Pending the completion of the payment she was to be charged with the maintenance of an army of occupation, and she was to permit a portion of the enemy's forces to enter Paris in triumph. By this last sacrifice of the national pride Thiers saved the important fortress of Belfort.

Before these arrangements had been finally embodied in the Treaty of Frankfort the Government found harder and even more thankless work to be done at home. Not for the first time in French history the opinion of the country at large was defied by the city of Paris. The causes which led to the revolutionary movement of the Commune are somewhat difficult to trace. The men whom circumstances compelled to act together were guided by very different aims, and their ideas perished with them in the general proscription of their party. Moreover, they have received much less than justice at the hands of their victorious opponents, who not unnaturally regarded the violent assertion of sectional aims in the presence of the foreign foe as an act of treachery to the common interest. It is possible, however, to disentangle some of the guiding influences amid the complex variety of the passions and ideas which swayed the action of the capital. The indignity and the privations of the siege had produced a bitter and irreconcilable temper, which did not dispose the Parisians, accustomed by long habit to dictate to France, to acquiesce in the decisions of a majority elected by the rural districts. Suspicion no less than pride played its part in exasperating the opinion of the capital. To the city populace the views of the Monarchists were odious, and their control of the Assembly inspired the gravest distrust. The excited imagination of the half-starved work-people suspected a plot to restore the monarchy, or at least the intention to establish a middle-class Republic, which would disregard the claims of their own class. Nor was this all. To many of the leaders of popular opinion the fall of the Empire seemed a golden opportunity for the reconstruction of France upon new lines. Their ideal was a loose federation of popularly elected municipal governments, which was to relax the rigid uniformity imposed by the solidarity of the State, and to substitute something more flexible for the centralised system of local administration. Local needs were to be of the first importance, and the object of a minute organisation, which took account too exclusively of the requirements of an urban industrial population. The vast agricultural interests of rural France scarcely found a place in the scheme.

Thus Paris was disposed to take offence, and the Government were not careful enough to avoid giving it. The German triumphal entry was, as we have seen, inevitable; the establishment of the Assembly at Versailles instead of in the capital, was a matter of common prudence; but the refusal to suspend any longer the payment of rent and commercial debts, and the withdrawal of pay from the half-starved classes who had enrolled in the National Guard were needless aggravations of existing difficulties.

Friction soon passed into overt strife. As a measure of precaution the Government decided to remove the artillery, which had been placed for the defence of the city upon Montmartre, and the attempt resulted in the repulse of the regular troops and the murder of Generals Thomas and Lecomte by the mob. The capital had now openly defied the

Assembly, and what authority existed within the walls was vested in the Central Committee which controlled the National Guard. Throwing to the winds the Compact of Bordeaux, Paris proceeded to elect a General Council of the Commune, which at once adopted the revolutionary calendar and the red flag, set a whole series of committees to work at reorganising municipal institutions on new lines, and appealed for the co-operation of all the other great towns in France.

Meanwhile, the authorities at Versailles had determined to use force. The sporadic outbreaks in the provinces were put down, and an unhappy precedent was set by the execution of some prisoners who had fallen into their hands during a sortie from the capital. On the return of the prisoners released by the Germans, troops became available, and Paris was to be subdued by the only methods which within living memory had tamed her fury, the methods of General Cavaignac and of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte. On May 21, a systematic attack began from the west, and for a whole week a carnival of savagery raged from street to street and from quarter to quarter. All the passions of hatred and cruelty were unloosed on both sides. Non-combatants and prisoners were slain in cold blood by the troops, hostages were butchered, and the Tuileries and other public buildings were burnt to the ground by the National Guards and the mob. And when at length the last position of the Communards was carried at Père la Chaise, it was only to inaugurate a campaign of proscriptions at least as unsparing. Executions and transportation finished what the rifle and the bayonet had begun. The revolutionary industrial party was for the time being wiped out of French political life.

Such hideous scenes augured ill for the future. But the fever fit once past, France set herself soberly and patiently to lift the immense financial burden of her own debt and the German indemnity. The thrift of her people and the soundness of her credit proved in the hands of Thiers to be assets of which Europe had scarcely estimated the value. The requisite loans were easily raised, the last instalment of the indemnity was paid off by the middle of 1873, and Thiers was justly acclaimed as the Liberator of the Territory. So great was the confidence that his government inspired that he was able to reorganise the army upon the basis of universal service, though it laid upon each citizen not exempted by educational attainments, the heavy burden of five years with the colours. He succeeded in like manner in securing concessions to the idea which had inspired the *Commune* by instituting elective councils, and permitting the municipalities to choose their own mayors except in the largest cities.

But by this time the truce between the rival parties in the Assembly was at an end in everything but in name. The Orleanist princes, the Duke of Aumale and the Prince of Joinville, sat in the Assembly, and both wings of the Monarchists conceived that the moment had come to press for a permanent settlement. Thiers had been an Orleanist, and was perhaps still a monarchist at heart, but had long since convinced himself that the practical difficulties in the way of a restoration were insuperable, since any definite proposal directed to that end must at once divide Legitimists, Orleanists and Bonapartists by the bitterest jealousies. "There is," he said, "only one throne, and it cannot have three occupants." As soon as this attitude became clearly defined all three sections desired nothing so ardently as the removal of the man whom they quite wrongly regarded as the sole obstacle to the realisation of their hopes; and the wish hardened into a determination when in November, 1872, he declared that the time had come to establish the Republic. It was now merely a question of opportunity. By a small majority the Monarchists declined to elect his nominee to the presidency of the Chamber. A later election in Paris proved that the Republicans could not be trusted to support his candidates.

No man could divine more quickly than Thiers the turn of the political tide. There was to be a sharp conflict between two rival ideals of policy and government, in which a

moderating influence could find no place. On May 24, 1873, he resigned. He had brought France through the crisis of her fortunes. Whether it were Republic or Monarchy that in the end should be established he had laid the indispensable foundation for either.

CHAPTER XXIV

RECONSTRUCTION IN EUROPE

WITH the treaty of Frankfort the series of national wars by which the new order in Europe had been evolved came to a conclusion. The epilogue of the Russo-Turkish war, to be noticed in the next chapter, served only to determine the destinies of the distant Balkan peninsula, and to prove the solidity of the new structure in the presence of an unexpected strain. It will be the aim of the present chapter to give an account of certain permanent modifications of character and feature in some of the nationalities playing their several parts in the European drama, characteristics which they will continue to exhibit during the concluding scenes, and which are traceable to the events of the epoch now under discussion. In this connection the affairs of Italy, Germany, France, and Spain will successively claim our notice.

The outbreak of the Franco-Prussian war still saw Italy deprived of her natural capital at Rome by the unwilling protection which the needs of Napoleon's domestic policy obliged him to extend to the Holy See. The government of Victor Emmanuel was thus placed in the dilemma of having to choose between action which would court the certain hostility of France and abstention only too likely to turn the national aspirations and disappointments into dangerous discontent. We have seen how the authorities in their dread of the former alternative, stopped Garibaldi's misguided expedition on the heights of Aspromonte in 1861, and even concluded the injudicious September Convention in 1864, by which, in consideration of the French evacuation, they undertook not to occupy Rome by force. Again, in deference to popular clamour, they had in 1867, attempted to secure Rome without violating the letter of the Convention by exciting revolution within the Papal borders, a piece of disingenuousness which had encouraged Garibaldi to another raid, and had forced Napoleon, sorely against his will, to despatch a fresh expedition, which, after dispersing the invaders at Mentana, had remained in occupation of Civita Vecchia. The declaration of war between France and Prussia evidently presented Italy with a golden opportunity for realising her hopes. Opinion was divided as to the use to which it was to be turned. The bitter hatred for France, which the bulk of the nation had entertained since Mentana, as well as the passionate desire for Rome, awoke a demand that Italy should claim her heritage without reference to either of the combatants. But Victor Emmanuel could not forget Magenta and Solferino ; and all that was chivalrous in him bade him take the side of his old ally. An attempt was made to effect a compromise between these opposing views by offering assistance to France in return for the withdrawal of the French from Civita Vecchia, and the abandonment of the September Convention. Happily for Italy the attempt was made in vain. Napoleon, indeed, knew that "the occupation of Mexico and of Rome were the two bullets that France carried in her heel"; but Clerical support was necessary to him, and the remark attributed to the Empress, "Better the Prussians in Paris than the Piedmontese in Rome," expressed accurately enough the Clerical point of view. And, when at length the series of disasters which culminated at Gravelotte brought the Emperor to the point of desiring Italy's support on any terms, Victor Emmanuel's eyes had at last been opened. He thankfully decided for neutrality with the comment: " Poor Emperor, I pity him, but we have had a lucky escape."

The garrison of Civita Vecchia had long since been recalled, and the rising feeling of the country was already making it difficult to respect any longer the obligations of the September Convention, when the fall of Sedan decided the Government to act. Troops were massed on the frontier, and an attempt was made to obtain the peaceful possession of the

Holy City by negotiations with the Pope. Such an attempt was foredoomed to failure. The years of the French occupation had been the turning-point in the history of the Papacy. Pinned within a contracted territory by the rising floods of revolution, Pius IX and his adviser Antonelli were developing a policy designed to pilot the Catholic Church through the political and intellectual currents of an age which they imperfectly understood. Alike to the aspiration after political liberty and to the tendency towards criticism and free inquiry they were becoming more resolutely opposed. It would indeed have been strange if the Church of Rome, with all its insistence upon the claims of order and authority and the duty of obedience, had welcomed the new and conflicting ideas of contemporary politicians and thinkers. But even at Rome policy had in the past at times outweighed tradition, and something more than obstinacy, however conscientious, is required to explain an attitude which has done so much to divorce the Church from the common life of Catholic countries. There was, in fact, much to encourage men whose knowledge of the world did not extend far beyond the limits of their own profession in the belief that the world was only waiting for a strong lead from Rome.

The secular attitude assumed by European States since the Revolution had led them in the first instance to treat the Church as a voluntary association outside their cognisance. The clergy generally had, as a result, become more homogeneous, more professional in character, and more careful of the interests of their own order. The later bickerings between State and Church, due partly to jealousy of ecclesiastical influence in politics, partly to the difficulty of defining the proper share of the Church in education, had denationalised churchmen and produced a solidarity of Church feeling all over Europe, increasingly dependent for guidance upon Rome. The papal control of the Catholic hierarchy, assisted, like every other form of control, by new and more rapid means of communication, had seldom been stronger. Nor did the change of attitude lack the approval of lay opinion. The dull utilitarianism of bureaucratic government, and the sordid opportunism of party under free institutions, had disposed imaginative minds to welcome in matters of conscience the authority of an organisation invested with all the glamour of the past, and appealing to ideals of enthusiasm and loyalty. Moreover, there was scarcely a lost or failing cause in an age of sweeping change which did not rally to the Church for the support it could afford. Of these elements was built up the Ultramontane party, the members of which, lay and clerical alike, to whatever nation they belonged, put the Church before the State and took the word of command from Rome. Even the changes which made for political freedom had, curiously enough, operated in the same direction, and rulers dependent upon the votes of their subjects, could not afford to disregard an organised section of public opinion. Formidable auxiliaries, moreover, had been enlisted, for the Papacy had definitely accepted the alliance of the Jesuits and had discovered and utilised all the resources of a free press.

Finally, the diminution and impending loss of the Temporal Power was not without its effects. Less concerned than of old for the security of his territories the Pope had less need to conciliate the friendship of the great military powers by concessions to their prejudices. Despoiled of the ancient possessions of the Holy See he approached the problems of the age with a judgment clouded by the sense of personal grievance.

Pius IX saw authority in Church and State assailed by free inquiry. He resolved to compel the recognition of the issue by the classes and interests upon which he believed he could rely, and to make hesitation or compromise no longer possible for them. In December, 1864, he issued the famous Encyclical Letter to Christendom, *Quanta Cura*, and attached thereto a *Syllabus* of all those errors of the age, which had already been condemned by himself or his predecessors. The Encyclical declared the paramount authority of religion (meaning the faith prescribed by Rome), and denounced every manifestation of independence of thought or action in Church and State by which that authority was impaired. The *Syllabus* consisted of a heterogeneous collection of eighty propositions, dealing with

such miscellaneous subjects as Bible Societies, the Temporal Power, Education, lay control of the Church and religious toleration, and including under a general condemnation a number of current forms of philosophical and political opinion.

This step created much consternation among moderate churchmen, and many and vain were the efforts to explain away the plain meaning of the pronouncements. Such attempts sufficiently revealed tendencies towards disunion dangerous to his newly won autocracy which decided Pius to take a further step. He resolved to call a General Council both to consolidate the Papal authority and to settle the questions to which the last half century had given birth. It was no secret that the Church would be asked to affirm the doctrine of Papal Infallibility. The Council sat at the Vatican during the great part of 1875. The proceedings were little better than a Papal coup d'état. Contrary to all precedent European sovereigns were not invited to send representatives, nor did they attempt, perhaps unwisely, to insist upon so troublesome a privilege. No general preliminary programme of the matters to be discussed was published; the preparatory committees were chosen by the Pope, and worked with closed doors; by the Pope the whole procedure was, in the first instance, laid down, and afterwards arbitrarily modified. The multitude of Italian and titular prelates, though far from representing the majority of Christendom, assured the Infallibilists of a majority in every session, and no effort was spared to counteract any influence which the personal qualities or learning of the minority might command. Strict regulations forbade private meetings, the printing of speeches, and the publication or even the receipt of books and pamphlets, thus defeating any attempt at organised opposition. No opportunity was lost of appealing to the loyalty, perplexity or fears of all who hesitated. Finally, when it was clear that resistance could not be entirely conciliated or evaded, it was decided to apply the closure and to accept the verdict of a majority instead of the unanimity which precedent demanded. Thus confronted with the certain prospect of defeat the minority dwindled away, and even the last twenty irreconcilables ultimately agreed to leave Rome without voting. 535 prelates accepted the definition of the new doctrine now presented to them. It was authoritatively declared that when the Pope speaks *ex cathedra* his decisions are invested with Infallibility. The Council then dispersed, leaving its other business either untouched or unfinished.

It was not to be expected that the Power which had thus flung down the gage to the spirit of the times would tamely bow to the will of the Italian Kingdom. Intentionally slow as was the advance of Victor Emmanuel's army, Pius made no use of the respite to repent; yet he was in no position to resist. The walls were bombarded and a breach effected near the Porta Pia, through which the Italian troops entered amid the plaudits of the people. The dearest wish of the Government was now to conciliate the Pope. It would have been well if a less sympathetic attitude had scared the Papal Court to flight. In vain was Cavour's and Ricasoli's principle of the "Free Church in a Free State" adopted. Pius was irreconcilable. And though, under the Law of Guarantees, the sanctity of the Pope's person, his sovereignty within the Vatican, and his freedom to deal independently with the Church and with foreign powers were duly recognised, though a handsome provision was made for his support, and though the State surrendered in name any claim to control the Church within the borders of Italy, it proved in practice impossible to reconcile the law of the land at all points with the claims of the Syllabus. The Pope, from the first, declined to recognise the terms of the enactment. He and his successors have remained "prisoners in the Vatican" within the capital of United Italy ever since Victor Emmanuel took possession (1871).

Before very long the Papal claims brought on a serious conflict with the young German Empire, whose constitution modelled upon that of the North German Confederation demands here some further notice. It was characteristic of Bismarck that the Constitution was introduced by none of the preliminary declarations of "Fundamental Rights," so dear to earlier constitution-makers. Equally characteristic was the absence of all attempt to

reproduce the features of foreign constitutions or to follow out abstract principles to their logical conclusions. He decided to build out of native materials, and to be guided by the practical issues of German political life. There were two strong and ineradicable tendencies in Germany which had proved at different times serious obstacles to unity and to his own policy. The one was "Particularism," exemplified in the mutual jealousies of the princes and in every kind of local prejudice and patriotism, the other the unifying and levelling influence of Liberalism, indirectly injurious to national unity through its defiance of Particularist prejudice, and distasteful to Bismarck himself owing to its distrust of a strong executive. He was too wise to attempt the extinction of either. He resolved to recognise both, and to set them to neutralise one another.

Two representative bodies were constituted to embody the two principles. The one, the *Bundesrath*, or Federal Council, was composed of the representatives of the different governments; the other, the *Reichstag*, or Parliament, of members elected by equal constituencies all over the Empire on the basis of manhood suffrage. Contrary to the practice of other constitutions it was to the non-popular chamber that the balance of political power was entrusted. Through a system of standing committees appointed to deal with various departments of public business, it acted as a kind of deliberative council of State; in its collective capacity it was the principal legislative body, where laws were introduced and discussed before submission to the Reichstag. Its proceedings were secret. The Reichstag's powers were limited to the right of sanctioning, rejecting, or amending new laws, and of granting or refusing new taxes.

The executive was practically independent of either body. The Emperor, as head of the State, had the sole right of appointing the Imperial Chancellor, the only minister in any true sense of the term, for the others were little more than departmental clerks. The Chancellor presided over the *Bundesrath*, where the jealousies of the other States were sufficient to secure a preponderance for Prussia; he was neither a member of, nor responsible to the Reichstag; it was his duty to address that body in explanation of Imperial policy, and in his dealings with the members he was chiefly concerned to secure by political bargains a combination of party groups favourable to the policy he pursued. To the Imperial Government the federated States surrendered the control of foreign affairs, colonisation, commercial policy, and the railway, postal and telegraph services, while retaining the management of local matters. The strength of the military contingents to be maintained by each State was to be determined by the Emperor; all soldiers were to take the oath of allegiance in his name; and the Prussian military law, universal service system, methods of training and organisation were to prevail throughout the Empire. To these arrangements there were not a few special exceptions, conceded by Bismarck in spite of the centralising tendencies of the Liberals and of the Crown Prince, with a view to conciliating the injured pride of Saxony and of the Southern States, more especially of Bavaria.

Tolerant as Bismarck was of the engrained historical tendencies of parties and districts he showed himself impatient from the first of any new combinations which attempted to control or deflect the policy of the State. The events which had occurred in Italy during 1870 had already begun to react powerfully upon Germany in two distinct ways. At one and the same moment it became the object of Ultramontane Catholic opinion to influence the foreign policy of the Empire against the new Italian Kingdom in the interests of the lost Temporal Power, while, on the other hand, a large body of Church opinion was not prepared to accept the decisions of the Vatican Council. Of these latter those who refused their assent were excommunicated, and proceeded to form the so-called "Old Catholic" communion, denouncing the Vatican decrees as revolutionary novelties. The result was the expulsion from their posts of a number of religious teachers and professors, including the great scholar Dollinger, by the authority of the bishops acting on instructions from Rome. The government entered the lists to protect the professors, and at once found

itself in conflict with a new party group in the Reichstag, calling itself the Centre. Such was the origin of the *Kulturkampf*, or war on behalf of civilisation, as it was styled by the State authorities. Bismarck was in no mood for compromise. Alluding to the famous submission of the Emperor Henry IV, he loudly declared that he would not “go to Canossa,” and threw himself on the support of the National Liberal party. The Jesuits were expelled from the Empire, and civil marriage was required in addition to the religious ceremony throughout its borders. In Prussia itself, with Dr. Falk as Minister of Worship and Instruction, a series of enactments known as the “May Laws” were passed forbidding public excommunication, providing for appeals against ecclesiastical sentences, imposing upon divinity students a three years’ course at a university followed by a State examination, making all Church appointments conditional upon notice given to the authorities and their sanction, and establishing State inspection of religious training colleges.

But Bismarck had not reckoned on the power of “passive resistance.” The clergy systematically broke the law, and accepted the results in fines, imprisonments, suspensions, and the closing of places of worship. The ministrations of the Church almost came to a standstill; and the religious habits and consciences of the laity were affronted, while the victims of State persecution won all the admiration which is accorded to men who suffer for their convictions. The party of the Centre grew in strength and numbers. Bismarck had gone too far. Moreover, the National Liberals were inconvenient allies. They were not at heart in sympathy with his foreign and financial policy. Socialism was lifting its head, and he could not count upon their support in the extensive programme by which he hoped to quiet industrial discontent. In 1877 he sent in his resignation, which was received by the Emperor with the single comment “Never”; and the Chancellor retained an office which he was perhaps only half serious in attempting to relinquish. The death of Pius IX and the succession of Leo XIII in 1878 offered an opportunity for terminating the strife. The new Pope, as unbending as his predecessor in maintaining all the principles of Papal authority, was more conciliatory in their practical application. Diplomatic relations were restored, and little by little the May Laws were modified or dropped.

Meanwhile, in France the increased activity of the Catholic Church proved one of the most potent of many agencies at work to secure a monarchical restoration. No sooner had Thiers been disposed of than the royalist majority set to work to gather the fruits of the victory which they had won by their temporary alliance with Gambetta’s section of the Republican party. Marshal MacMahon, a Legitimist by descent and sympathies in spite of having served Napoleon, was elected President, and proceeded to appoint a mixed ministry of Legitimists, Orleanists and Bonapartists, under the Duke of Broglie. Great efforts were made to purge the personnel in the public services of republican elements, to control the press, to increase the authority of the Church in education, and to exercise official pressure at the supplementary elections to the Assembly, which had recently been going in favour of Republican candidates. But while the ground was thus prepared for a restoration, any practical steps in that direction were deferred by the secession of the Bonapartists and by the irreconcilable rivalry of the Orleanist and Legitimist claimants.

At last, after repeated negotiations, the former, the Count of Paris, grandson of Louis Philippe, a man of thirty-five, who had seen life from many sides, having fought in the American Civil War, and studied social and political questions in England, made a real effort to secure a compromise. He visited his rival Henry, Count of Chambord, grandson of Charles X, at the castle of Frohsdorf. He offered to stand aside in favour of his childless cousin, who was now fifty-two, if the latter would accept him as heir-presumptive. The Count of Chambord was not ill-disposed to agree. He desired to rule in France and believed himself the destined instrument of her regeneration. But he had nourished, during a secluded existence, a half romantic, half religious devotion to the traditions of an idealised ancient regime and a hatred of everything suggestive of the Revolution. He insisted that

during his own life, at least, the ancient white banner and the Lilies of France must be restored. This condition the leaders of the party in Paris justly regarded as impossible; MacMahon even declaring that “the *chasse-pôts* would go off of themselves” in defence of the tricolour. But all efforts to shake the royal exile’s resolution proved in vain. “Henry V” deliberately threw away his chance of wearing a crown under conditions distasteful to his fastidious temper. His partisans declined to recognise the fact. They were not prepared to transfer their allegiance to the Count of Paris; they even combined with the Republicans to overthrow the Broglie ministry to punish its Orleanist sympathies. Accordingly, the Orleanist and Bonapartist sections united upon a step calculated to gain time. A measure known as the “Law of the Septennate” was proposed, prolonging MacMahon’s presidency for seven years. By the end of that period the Count of Chambord might be dead, and Napoleon’s son, the Prince Imperial, would have reached manhood. The proposal was carried with the goodwill of the Republicans, who rightly saw that every year which passed without a restoration brought the final triumph of the Republic nearer.

Indeed, amid the dissensions and perplexities of the other factions they were gaining ground every day. In July, 1874, Casimir Perier succeeded in obtaining from the Assembly an expression of opinion in favour of giving a regular organisation to the Republic, and, in the following January, a proposal, carried by Wallon as an amendment to another motion, declared by a majority of one for the election of a new President at the end of MacMahon’s seven years. From that moment the future of France was decided, and during the next few months the Constitution, destined to last into our own times, was built up piece-meal by successive enactments. It consists of a President and two elective bodies, known as the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. The President elected at a joint session of the two Chambers for a period of seven years enjoys the authority of a constitutional monarch, except that, instead of possessing a veto upon legislation, he is entitled to refer measures back to the Chambers for reconsideration. He acts through ministers responsible to the Chambers whom he is empowered to appoint or dismiss with due regard to the balance of parties in the Chamber of Deputies. The Deputies, 584 in number, are elected by universal male suffrage for four years, every voter having the privilege of voting for as many candidates as his department commands seats. The Senate of 300 members is chosen for nine years by electoral bodies in each department, composed of the departmental senators and deputies together with delegates from the local Councils. Every three years one-third of the members retire.

The National Assembly was dissolved on the last day of 1875, and the new elections returned a large Republican majority to the Chamber of Deputies. The victorious party proceeded to undo the preparations which their predecessors had made for a restoration, by dismissing officials of anti-republican views, by relaxing Government supervision over the press and the elections, and by placing restrictions upon the action of the clergy. MacMahon made one last attempt at resistance. He dissolved the Chamber and recalled Broglie and his coalition ministry to power. But the elections, in spite of a vigorous campaign, resulted in only a trifling reduction of the Republican majority in the Chamber. The periodical renewal of a third of the Senate shortly after was no less discouraging, giving the Republicans a clear majority in the Upper House. MacMahon recognised the inevitable, and in January, 1879, resigned the Presidency, being succeeded by Jules Grevy.

The year which saw the establishment of the Third Republic was disturbed by a war-scare. For several weeks the country seemed to be on the brink of another struggle with Germany. Ever since the Treaty of Frankfort the policy of Bismarck had been governed by a two-fold fear, the dread of French revenge, for which the temper of the defeated nation, “staring as if hypnotised into the gap in the Vosges,” afforded some justification, and the danger of a combination between France and Russia. These perils he strove to forestall by keeping France weak and by cultivating the friendship of her prospective ally. Accordingly,

he had looked with favour on the Republican party, which he regarded as a disintegrating influence, and had recalled and disgraced Count Harry Arnim, the German ambassador in Paris, for the countenance he had given to the royalist plans (1872). In the same year he had brought about a friendly meeting between William I, Alexander II, and Francis Joseph at Berlin, at which a general understanding was arrived at for common action in maintaining the *status quo*, and in dealing with any future phases of the Eastern Question or of revolutionary activity. There was, however, no formal "Three Emperors' League," as the public wrongly supposed; indeed, Russia soon became aware of a private understanding between Germany and Austria to promote the ambitions of the latter in the Balkan peninsula.

If Bismarck felt himself secure against France, the military party in Berlin had never ceased to be alarmed by the rapid payment of the indemnity and by the uncompromising language used about Alsace-Lorraine. A large addition to the French armies in 1875 precipitated the crisis, and Moltke and his friends urged the Emperor to attack France before she was ready. It seems that Bismarck made up his mind to defeat the designs of the military party by making them known. If so he overreached himself. Radowitz, who stood high in the Chancellor's confidence, met Gontaut Biron, the French ambassador, at a ball in Berlin, and took the opportunity to perpetrate a calculated indiscretion, warning him of the peril which France was incurring. The French premier, Duke Decazes, was greatly alarmed, and permitted himself to discuss the matter with Blowitz, the correspondent of the *Times*. The *Times* thereupon published the whole story, to the consternation of Europe, and in the meanwhile France had approached the Czar, urging him to take action to avert the crisis. Alexander was at the moment on the point of visiting Berlin, and his personal remonstrances with the Emperor were seconded by a letter from Queen Victoria. There was probably little real danger of war. The Emperor's own wishes were pacific, and there was nothing to tempt Bismarck to endanger the success of his foreign policy to please a faction which he disliked. Nevertheless, as was natural, the intervention of foreign Powers was most distasteful to him, and he nourished a long-standing grudge against the Russian Chancellor Gortchakoff (which was to have its consequences later on) as well as against the Crown Princess (daughter of Queen Victoria), whom, with her husband, he regarded, rightly or wrongly, as a centre of English influence at Court.

No review of the general results in Europe of the period closing with the Franco-Prussian war would be complete without some notice in outline of the events by which Spain, during a period of chronic turbulence and misgovernment, assumed the political features which she exhibits today. The fall of the July monarchy extinguished those national and dynastic ambitions, which had engaged French interests in the affairs of the peninsula, and severed the link by which it had been connected with international politics. For thirty years Spanish struggles lie wholly apart from the general current of events in Europe.

We have already described the discreditable intrigue which had sacrificed the young Queen's domestic happiness and tied her to a contemptible husband. To Isabel personally, with her sensual nature and her entire lack of any conception of duty, a virtue which her upbringing under an unprincipled mother had done nothing to inculcate, the experience was ruinous. Left without guidance at the early age of sixteen, she revenged herself for the wrong done to her by a series of disgraceful connections, which, continued throughout her reign, were to no small extent accountable for her deposition. Thus it happened that personal intrigue and the interest of the latest favourite swayed the policy of the Court, and were exercised to promote ends wholly selfish. The sole counter-balancing influence, no less disastrous if less discreditable, was to be found in the Queen's whole-hearted devotion to the interests of the Church, and in the power which the monks, nuns, and confessors who haunted the palace were able to gain over her superstitious mind. A tolerably close understanding generally existed between these persons and the King Consort, with whom

Isabel was naturally at variance.

Nor were better things to be hoped of the political parties and their leaders than of the Crown. There were few individuals, and not one of the party groups, whose aims were not selfish, while a factious spirit utterly regardless of compromise dissolved every combination into its elements, and rendered consistent political effort impossible. It was seldom during the thirty years from 1845 to 1875, that any Government could hold its own which was not dominated by a general whose personal influence with the army was sufficient to ensure respect for his authority. Yet the army, though it proved the sole guarantee of order, prevented the evolution of more stable conditions, since again and again it saved the Court from the consequences of its crimes and follies; and, by checking political passions in full career, deprived demagogues and reactionaries alike of the sobering experience of witnessing the logical results of their own follies.

By October, 1847, scandal was already coupling the Queen's name with that of General Serrano, discontent was rife, a rising kindled by the Carlists had broken out in Catalonia, and the mutterings of the approaching upheaval were audible all over Europe. At this moment, on the eve of the Year of Revolution, Isabel, influenced by her fears, summoned Narvaez to her support, and gave him the permission he asked for to "seize the stick and strike hard." On the news of the February revolution in Paris martial law was proclaimed with the consent of the Cortes, which was itself dissolved ten days later lest it should put difficulties in the way of repressive measures. Narvaez had come to power threatening to "shoot Serrano and to kick Bulwer," the British ambassador by whom the favourite had been encouraged as an agent of the *Progresistas*, and he quickly sent the former into exile. He had not long to wait for an excuse for dealing with the latter, and, when the ambassador ventured to publish in a Radical journal a note he had sent to the Government demanding the summons of a Cortes, he was promptly handed his papers. Meanwhile the Carlists had been put down in Catalonia, their old guerilla chief Cabrera recrossing the frontier in April, 1849. It even proved possible to send an expedition £0 cooperate with the French against the Roman Republic. Thanks to the strong hand at the helm, Isabel weathered the hurricane season which proved fatal to so many thrones. She was not on that account grateful. The period of martial law closed in October, 1848, and before the year was out the Clerical party in the palace induced the Queen to appoint a new ministry, whom Narvaez characteristically disregarded and put under arrest. But the influence of the confessional and the Queen's impatience of control, encouraged by the intrigues of her mother, were too strong for him, and in January, 1851, he resigned.

He was succeeded by a civilian, Bravo Murillo, honest in intention, but of absolutist views and less independent of Court influence than his predecessor. Some order was restored in the finances, and a Concordat was at length arranged with Rome, by which the Pope agreed to recognise the sales of Church lands already effected, in return for concessions including a guarantee of the remainder, a property tax to be devoted to the maintenance of the clergy and considerable relaxations of State interference. The news of Napoleon's coup d'état renewed political excitement. There was even an attempt to assassinate the Queen. The minister's methods became more and more drastic, and he finally proposed to revise the constitution, so as to bring it into harmony with the practice of his own government and that of his predecessor. But the army began to show symptoms of discontent, and it was in vain that the civilian premier threatened "to hang the generals in their own gaudy sashes." The Court was alarmed and sacrificed Bravo Murillo (December, 1852).

But it was against the Court itself that public feeling was now directed. The Queen's own conduct, and the corrupt dealing in railway concessions in which her mother was involved, were openly denounced in a scurrilous paper called *The Bat*, and San Luis, who

had come into power after the collapse of two stop-gap ministries, only fanned the rising discontent by the mixture of severity and futility which characterised his measures of repression.

The *Moderados* were now entirely alienated. One of the military chiefs of the party, General O'Donnell, rode out of Madrid, and induced a brigade of cavalry to declare against the ministers. General Blaser was sent against him only to be repulsed at Vicalvaro outside the gates of the capital. The success, though trifling, prepared the way for a more decisive step by a leader who gauged the situation more accurately than O'Donnell. Canovas, the future minister of Alfonso XII, saw that the *Moderados* were not strong enough to effect a revolution unaided. With the consent of the generals he now made an open bid for the support of the *Progresistas* by the publication in Madrid of the "Programme of Manzanares," setting forward a number of definite aims upon which all parties could unite in the interest of better government. The mob of Madrid rose in arms and the provincial towns followed the example of the capital.

There was only one man in Spain who combined in his person the qualities necessary to ride the tempest which had been let loose. All eyes were turned to Espartero, the hero of the army and the idol of the mob. On the news of his approach to Madrid the riots ceased. His entry was a triumph in which genuine patriotic emotion was freely mingled with the ludicrous; and a stranger might have been forgiven for seeing nothing but pure comedy in the commonplace bourgeois figure standing erect in an open carriage, and flapping outstretched arms, like the wings of a huge bird, in a gesture of comprehensive embrace. Next day there was more embracing, this time between Espartero and the newly arrived O'Donnell, in token of the indissoluble union of Progressive and Moderate elements.

Isabel at once submitted. Power was therefore divided in name at least between the two generals, "the barn-door fowl" and "the peacock," as they were called, from the contrast between Espartero's underbred slovenliness and O'Donnell's fine presence and natural dignity of manner. But the immediate advantage belonged to Espartero, whose party had made and whose influence had quelled the revolution. He might even have made himself King. Under his nominal guidance the ministry set to work, after a penitent speech from the throne, to reward supporters, to expel Cristina, and to draft a brand-new Constitution, that of 1855. But the future belonged to O'Donnell. He had none of Narvaez's sense of duty, none of Espartero's irresolution. A cool and ambitious schemer, he set himself to undermine his chief by placing his friends in every office, by encouraging the campaign of unfair depreciation and humorous ridicule, of which Espartero's vanity and indecision made him the butt, and lastly by currying favour with the Queen. Isabel was already bitterly offended. She had been forced, in spite of her protests and in glaring violation of the recent Concordat, to sign a Bill for the further alienation of Church lands, and her Clerical advisers had been summarily expelled from the palace for encouraging her resistance.

The crisis was brought on by the report of Escosura, Minister of the Interior, on a famine which had been accompanied by riots. The report was a Progressive party pamphlet, and as such was challenged by O'Donnell, who threatened resignation. Espartero, having attempted conciliation, appealed to the Queen, who summoned all three ministers to her presence. Both the disputants declared compromise impossible and tendered their resignations. With formal regrets the Queen accepted that of Escosura. "Then I must go too," said Espartero. The threat did not produce the expected effect, for he was no longer indispensable. Isabel replied that O'Donnell would not desert her, and the Duke of the Victory was ushered out leaving his rival in possession of the field. Yet had he known how to be resolute he was not yet beaten. The National Militia in Madrid declared for him, and the Cortes called upon him to defend their privileges. Either from indecision, or, as he afterwards declared, from the belief that the throne would be imperilled, he declined to act.

He passed out of political life to spend the rest of his days in retirement at Logrono.

Isabel had not rid herself of Espartero in order to submit to O'Donnell. For the moment he was allowed to think himself all-powerful, while he played the Queen's game by shelving the abortive Constitution of 1855 and re-issuing that of 1845, by abolishing the National Militia, by putting restrictions on the press and finally, sorely against his own will, by rescinding the new law for the sale of Church property. His usefulness was soon exhausted, while his original offence was unforgotten. Narvaez reappeared and was ostentatiously singled out for the royal favour at a State ball, and O'Donnell made haste to anticipate his dismissal by resignation (October, 1856).

For the third time Narvaez stood like a grim sentinel beside the throne, while colleagues more reactionary than himself carried out the ideas of the Court; but Isabel, having recovered much lost ground under his protection, was alike impatient of his plain speaking and ill-disposed to share the odium of his harsh measures. She persuaded him to retire in favour of more conciliatory leaders. Her position was not so strong as she supposed. By June, 1858, there was no alternative to O'Donnell, now at the head of a combination calling itself the "Liberal Union."

The patient schemer at last reaped the fruits of his double treachery. He was resolved to put no trust in the Queen. Aided by a clever party-manager, Posada Herrera, he proceeded to fortify his position in the Cortes. Official posts were found for his most dangerous opponents, and care was taken to secure a sufficient representation of reactionaries and of radicals to put the moderate majority on their mettle. Even Isabel was appeased for the sale of Church lands by the device of giving their value in 3 per cent, bonds to the clergy. Men laughed at the ill-assorted "Happy Family" which supported the Government.

The army was to be given something better to think about than political *pronunciamentos*. Already Spanish troops had helped Napoleon in his venture in Cochin China. An expedition was now sent to the Spanish possessions in West Africa, and war was declared against Morocco on the pretence of protecting the Spanish settlements at Melilla and Ceuta. Under O'Donnell in person a difficult and useless march was executed along the coast from Ceuta upon Tetuan, a successful battle being fought at Castillejos on the way. Muley el Abbas, the Sultan's brother, was driven out of Tetuan, and a victory was won at Wadi-Ras on the road to Fez (1860). But Britain had already interposed a veto on annexation, and a Carlist descent on Tortosa, planned by Ortega, governor of the Balearic Islands, accelerated the conclusion of peace. Fortune again favoured O'Donnell. Ortega's troops refused to act against the government, and Montemolin the pretender fell into the hands of the authorities, and only secured his liberty by a solemn renunciation of his claims. O'Donnell was free to accept an invitation from San Domingo to re-assert Spanish authority over the island, and to send General Prim to Mexico to support the action of France and England.

But the end was now near. The policy of adventure had been costly, and the burden was borne with increasing impatience; none of the problems of domestic government had been attacked; the savage repression of an agrarian revolt in Andalusia alienated the popular leaders; and the rash determination to recognise the Kingdom of Italy threw into the scale against the ministry all the Queen's devotion to Rome. In February, 1863, the hollow charlatanism of the Liberal Union stood revealed, and O'Donnell fell.

Yet there were no sounder elements in Spanish public life to replace him. Three makeshift ministries rose and fell in succession, and in the meanwhile a new and alarming symptom made its appearance in the body politic. The *Progresistas* withdrew altogether

from the arena with scarcely veiled allusions to the Queen as the “traditional obstacle” to reform. It was too clear that they had determined to compass the downfall of the throne, and they now had behind them a general of a very different calibre to Espartero. Prim, a rough Catalan soldier, with the “manner of a sympathetic undertaker,” had been accustomed to boast somewhat ostentatiously of his loyalty. His plebeian sensitiveness had not been proof against a vulgar insult. One day on leaving the royal presence he had caught sight in a mirror of Isabel, with her thumb set against her nose extending her fingers in a most unqueenly gesture behind his back. From that moment he set himself with untiring pertinacity to excite rebellion in the army, and when the country became too hot to hold him, continued his efforts by means of manifestoes and repeated descents across the frontier and upon the coast towns.

Amid ominous signs of impending dissolution at home, and an unnecessary war against Chili and Peru abroad, the Court, more than ever under Clerical influence, held on its way. Narvaez was called to power to maintain order, but removed in two months to allay the odium excited by the suppression of a students’ riot on the night of St. Daniel. O’Donnell, summoned to conciliate public feeling, held office for a year, but was unable, owing to Prim’s machinations, to maintain the conciliatory attitude. A savage mutiny of discontented artillery sergeants, who shot down their officers and were suppressed with equal savagery, decided Isabel that his further retention of office was inadvisable. He withdrew in deep disgust, and his withdrawal and subsequent death in 1867 proved fatal. The Moderate party were now decisively alienated, and owing to the abstention of the *Progresistas* the only possible alternative was Narvaez. But the day had past when his favourite expedient of a dictatorship was able to restore order, and his supporters were all men who desired the permanence of measures which he, to his credit, had always regarded as temporary. For two years the gallant old soldier struggled on, and died in April, 1868, leaving his coadjutor and successor Gonzalez Bravo to ruin the monarchy.

This rash civilian proceeded to challenge the military power which had so often saved the throne. Well aware of the disaffection of the generals of the Liberal Union party he had them all arrested and banished to the Canaries. At Cadiz they succeeded in winning the adhesion of Admiral Topete, who commanded the fleet. To the same spot Prim was already hastening, and on his arrival the squadron declared against the Queen and occupied Cadiz. Meanwhile Serrano, with his fellow generals, was on his way back from his place of exile, and as soon as he landed took command of the troops which were to march on Madrid. At Alcolea, in the Guadalquivir valley, he overthrew Novaliches, who had been sent against him, and occupied Madrid, which had already declared for the revolution, without striking another blow. On September 30, 1868, Isabel fled across the Bidasoa into France.

Serrano, under the title of Regent, assumed the leadership of a provisional government with Prim as his right-hand man. Both had decided for a constitutional monarchy, and had little trouble in convincing the Constituent Cortes; but it was difficult to find a candidate. Of the royal family Alfonso, Isabel’s son, was too young, the Duke of Seville had been shot in a duel by the Duke of Montpensier, whose own constant intrigues against his sister-in-law’s throne made him unacceptable. The Carlist princes were excluded by their opinions. The thoughts of many Spaniards turned to Espartero, who might now have inaugurated a *bourgeois* monarchy. But he refused to allow his name to be submitted. Foreign princes were approached and proved extremely shy. Luiz of Portugal, who in 1861 had succeeded his brother Pedro V (1853), son of Maria da Gloria, and of Ferdinand of Saxe Coburg, resolutely held back in face of his subjects’ unwillingness to be absorbed in Spain. Ferdinand himself was equally unwilling. The application to Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen had no other result than to kindle the Franco-Prussian war. Finally, with immense difficulty, Amadeo, second son of Victor Emmanuel, was induced to accept the crown (1870).

Three days before the new King landed in Spain, the only man who could have secured him a fair chance of success had been removed by death. As Prim was driving home on a snowy night through the streets of Madrid he was shot through the window of his carriage by the hand of an unknown assassin. Amadeo was thus thrown on his own resources. Brave, conscientious, and possessed of a remarkable charm of manner, the young King had firmly resolved to maintain among his new subjects the traditional principles of his house. But the moderation, the deference to the popular will and the strict fidelity to the royal word which had won Italian hearts for Victor Emmanuel were wasted upon Spain. The clergy stood aloof from the son of the despoiler of the Church ; the nobility treated the King and Queen with insolence or open neglect; an attempt was even made on Amadeo's life. Carlists and Republicans banded together in the Cortes to defeat the Constitutional party, while the Constitutionals themselves were divided between the followings of Sagasta and Zorrilla.

To add to the troubles of the new regime, a dangerous Carlist rising was in progress in the North. The carlists were now under a new chief. Shortly after the fiasco at Tortosa, Montemolin and his second brother Fernando had died, and Juan, the third of the sons of the original claimant, became the representative of pretensions which he declared had already passed to himself in virtue of the renunciation of his elders. He had, however, shown a disposition to compromise with the ideas of the time very offensive to his party, and had even made overtures for submission to Isabel. His supporters accordingly set him aside and adopted his son Carlos Maria as their chief. Great efforts were made to induce Cabrera to put himself at the head of a rising, but the veteran's conditions were too exacting, and Carlos entered Navarre without him, only to be defeated at Oroquieta and to be obliged to withdraw under the Convention of Amoravieta.

But the Convention added nothing to the strength of the government. The new dynasty commanded no real support, and its position was frankly impossible. Amadeo only awaited a pretext to extricate himself, and found it in the disregard shown by his ministers for his unwillingness to order the dismissal of some insubordinate officers. He yielded to their opinion and immediately abdicated (February, 1873).

The abdication of Amadeo inaugurated a year of confusion unparalleled even in the stormy annals of modern Spain. A Republic was hastily proclaimed, and Figueras, an unpractical philanthropist, was chosen President, only to give way in a few weeks to Pi y Margall. The new head of the State was a Federalist, and believed in reducing Spain to a loose confederation of self-governing cities and districts. But while he and his advisers were endeavouring to secure their position at Madrid, their ideas were acted upon in desperate earnest by the great cities of the south. Malaga led the way, and at Seville, Cadiz, Granada, and Cartagena scenes of anarchy and bloodshed were enacted by the self-styled "Cantonalists." At the last-named place the fleet caught the infection, and ranged along the coast spreading revolution by the threat of bombardment, till the government, by declaring them pirates, gave the British squadron an excuse for turning the crews ashore and towing the ships into Gibraltar.

Salmeron, a Republican but no Federalist, now became President. He was fully determined to restore order, and sent General Pavia to Andalusia. Seville, Cadiz, and Granada had already submitted to his vigorous measures, when Salmeron, intensely suspicious of military authority, put a stop to his progress. The final subjugation of Malaga and Cartagena was deferred till Castelar succeeded Salmeron, and ordered Pavia to advance. The bitter experience of a few months had taught him the futility of his earlier visions of an orderly and prosperous republic, and he set himself, in a spirit worthy of Narvaez, to reorganise the army and to combat the existing anarchy.

The Carlists were up again in the north. In Catalonia the war had never ceased, and Dorregaray was recovering the Basque country for the pretender. This renewal of activity was a mistake. Nocedal, the wisest adviser of the party, had urged them to wait till republican federalism and anti-militarism left Spain a defenceless prey. Yet a resolute advance might, at the outset, have carried them to Madrid. The opportunity was neglected, and their energies were devoted to subduing the country behind the Ebro. It was soon too late.

Castelar had played the dictator to some purpose, but had incurred in the process the inevitable penalty of unpopularity. The Cortes determined to put an end to his authority by a vote of censure. The result was a surprising scene. General Pavia, acting upon his own authority, surrounded the House, and like a second Cromwell, forced the protesting deputies to disperse. Bitter was his disappointment when he found that Castelar was not prepared to take advantage of his blundering loyalty.

Serrano thereupon became President. He was scarcely appointed when he had to go north to relieve Bilbao. Checked at Sommorostro he called up all the resources which his government could secure him, and turned the enemy's positions. But the success was more than neutralised by a Carlist victory over Concha at Abarzuzi and the struggle still dragged on. Suddenly when winter had already set in, Serrano began to display feverish anxiety to end the war at all costs. He was again in the north when a new and decisive turn was given to events.

Canovas, the most clear-sighted of the supporters of O'Donnell, had held himself aloof and awaited the moment for pressing the claims of Alfonso. His plan was to give the Republic enough rope to entangle itself past extrication. The failure of every other party was daily attracting supporters to his own. The time had now come, and the progress of the movement both in the country and in the army was no secret. It was the knowledge of what was preparing that had roused Serrano to a last attempt to anticipate it by a military success. No sooner was his back turned than a manifesto appeared at Madrid in the name of Alfonso. There was indeed little that was promising or attractive in the insignificant and mean-looking youth of sixteen who was undergoing a military training at Sandhurst, but, like the central figure of many another restoration, he was necessary to his country.

Canovas would have postponed the issue still longer, but among the Alfonsist generals the fear of Serrano's success and the desire to play the part of Monk precipitated events. At Murviedro, on December 24, 1874, General Martinez Campos proclaimed Alfonso, and the result could no longer be doubtful when Primo de Rivera, Minister of War at Madrid, turned against the President to whom he owed everything. Serrano's troops refused to march against the capital, and he was quietly superseded.

The King landed at Barcelona in January, 1875, and the wise moderation of Canovas rallied men of the most divergent views to his cause. Carlism withered when it stood no longer for order against anarchical republicanism, but for worn-out theories of authority and for the separatist aspirations of the northern provinces. Gradually the area of the aimless guerilla war was restricted, and in February, 1876, Carlos retired across the frontier. Two months later Canovas met a Cortes elected by universal suffrage with the draft of the Constitution of 1876. Parliamentary government was established, authority being vested in two houses, a Senate containing hereditary, nominated, and elective elements, and a Congress elected on a limited suffrage. Difficulties were plentiful, with Rome, with Cuba, and with the northern provinces owing to the inevitable abolition of their fueros. But the anarchy of thirty years was at least ended, and the death of Queen Cristina and of Espartero in 1878 appropriately closed a chapter in the history of Spain.

CHAPTER XXV

THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR

THROUGH the Treaty of Paris of 1856, by which the Crimean War was brought to a conclusion, Turkey gained a new position in Europe, and Europe a new relation collectively with Turkey. The Ottoman Empire was formally admitted as a member of the European system, from which it had been implicitly excluded by the Treaty of Vienna, while the privileges of the Principalities were placed under the joint guarantee of the Powers. Moreover, there was embodied in the treaty a decree of the Sultan which extended the fullest religious freedom to his Christian subjects; and, inasmuch as Russia now surrendered her ancient claim to exercise an undefined protectorate over their interests, it became the business of Europe at large, notwithstanding the formal disclaimer of any collective authority over the Porte, to see at least that the obligations of the treaty were respected.

These obligations the supine and self-indulgent Abdul Aziz had made no effort to fulfil. Indeed, the worst grievances were so much a part of Turkish methods of government as to be practically ineradicable. The system of tax-farming placed the cultivator at the mercy of extortionate middlemen whose sole object was personal profit, while the defenceless status of a Christian in the law courts, where the evidence of his co-religionists was systematically refused, deprived the oppressed of their recognised refuge from the oppressor. An outbreak in the Lebanon district had already occurred in 1862, which had occasioned the interference of the Emperor of the French. Nor was the treaty respected in other quarters. In 1870, profiting by the crisis of the Franco-Prussian war, Russia denounced the clauses which restrained her from establishing an arsenal or a fleet in the Black Sea, and secured the unwilling concurrence of Europe.

But serious trouble did not begin till 1875. In that year, after a bad harvest, an outbreak began against the combined exactions of the tax-farmers and of the Turkish Herzegovina. landowners in the mountain land of Herzegovina. The rural population 'were all of Servian blood, though a considerable proportion had accepted the Moslem faith, and their struggles were accordingly watched with a sympathy, which no pains were taken to conceal, by the two kindred principalities to north and south, which acknowledged the suzerainty of the Sultan. Of these Serbia was governed by Prince Milan, a man of ambitious temper but of a low-bred and ill-disciplined character thinly veneered over by a course of study and dissipation in Paris; while Montenegro obeyed the patriarchal rule of Prince Nicholas, who combined in his singular personality the attributes of poet, statesman, and mountain chief. It was the ambition of each prince alike to revive the ancient kingdom of the fourteenth century which had embraced all the Servian lands, and neither could afford to disregard for long the struggles of a people whom he hoped to absorb. Every form of unofficial help and encouragement was afforded to the rising. Opinion in Russia was profoundly moved. The ideal of a great Slavonic union had long exercised a powerful attraction. A stream of Russian volunteers, provided with assistance of a more material kind, began to find its way into the revolted province. The outbreak grew into a rebellion, and spread rapidly northwards over Bosnia.

At this point Austria, alarmed for the safety of her own Slavonic dominions on the Adriatic, interposed. The understanding between the three Emperors, already noticed, entitled her to make overtures to her neighbours for common action. Her Chancellor,

Andrassy, had no difficulty in agreeing with Bismarck and Gortchakoff on a note to be presented to the Sultan (afterwards known as the Andrassy Note) demanding for the affected districts real religious liberty, the abolition of the system of taxfarming, and guarantees for the cultivators against the tyranny of their landlords, the whole programme to be put in operation through a mixed commission of Christians and Moslems.

The presentation of these demands was delayed in deference to the objections of Disraeli, Prime Minister of England since 1874, who urged upon the three Powers that any action was inopportune till the Porte had been given time to execute certain promises of reform only recently issued. The suggestion was not in itself unreasonable, but it afterwards transpired that the British Government had advised the Sultan to lose no time in suppressing the outbreak, and subsequent events leave no room for doubt that the action of Great Britain was not primarily dictated by a wish to promote the cause of reform within the Turkish dominions. England, under her versatile Premier, was preparing to make a capital blunder in foreign politics, and one which was to cost her dear.

The limits of our subject prevent us from tracing the growth of the British Colonial Empire. It is sufficient here to point out that the events of the Indian Mutiny together with the immense development of Canada and of the Australasian settlements, which had taken place between the thirties and the sixties, had effected a great change in public opinion. It was no longer the fashion to regard the colonies as inconvenient encumbrances which in process of time would separate from the mother country to the advantage of both. Here, as in so many other cases, material improvements had produced a revulsion of sentiment. The steamship and the oceanic cable had brought with them a better knowledge of the oversea dominions, and had increased their commercial value. Pride of possession began to replace the indifference of ignorance. With this feeling there blended another of curiously different origin. As a foreign minister, Lord Palmerston had possessed many faults, but his policy had appealed powerfully to British imagination, not least by its somewhat hectoring assertion of national interests, and by the disdainful pose of isolated superiority with which it surveyed and sometimes even condescended to take a part in European quarrels. Since Palmerston's death the influence of England abroad had counted for little. Her views had not been regarded in the great questions which had found their solution in 1870. She had, indeed, expressed none. The extension of the franchise had occupied her thoughts during the middle sixties ; and the Gladstone ministry, which had taken office in 1868, were absorbed in questions of domestic reform. There were not a few who wished to hear the Foreign Office resume its earlier tones. Of the union of these elements modern Imperialism was born. It rests upon a reasoned appreciation of the advantages and obligations attaching to oversea possessions; it is strong for the assertion of national interests ; it has evolved out of its later experiences a binding code of duty—and its besetting sins are still Palmerstonian, a tendency to isolation and to a certain noisy assertiveness.

The Imperial ideal was exactly calculated to harmonise with Disraeli's temperament. It addressed a compelling appeal alike to the strong and to the weaker sides of his nature. It filled his eager imagination with new visions of the national destiny almost unlimited in scope, while it ministered to his half Oriental taste for magnificence and display. The practical methods of the new creed were no less alluring than its more distant dreams. Its rigid devotion to British material interests satisfied a humorous cynicism impatient of the political and moral abstractions so dear to his opponents. Finally, Disraeli was engaged in rebuilding a shattered party, and could afford to neglect nothing that promised to substitute living enthusiasm for the cold negations of mere conservatism.

Yet with all his acuteness the genius of Disraeli lay rather in the direction of adaptation than of creative effort, and, while he suffused his foreign policy with the new spirit, its aims and its principles were alike traditional. Among all the fixtures at the Foreign Office none

was more massive and immovable than suspicion of Russia. We have seen how, twice over in the century, this suspicion had stood between England and an understanding which might have averted deplorable consequences, and it had at last succeeded in creating a prejudice upon the other side ; while the dangers of the Indian Mutiny and the Russian advances in Central Asia, to be noticed in the next chapter, had deepened the original distrust. Disraeli, with the majority of the Englishmen of his time, believed that the ultimate goal of Russian policy was the valley of the Indus, an opinion at least arguable. He saw that, given such a design, the establishment of effective Russian control over the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles would enable the Russian sea-power to menace Britain's new line of communication with India by the Suez Canal—a proposition that admits of no dispute. And he arrived at the deliberate conclusion that England's interests could be best defended by the maintenance of the integrity of Turkey, and by a steady resistance at all points to Russia's policy in the Nearer East. Events were to prove that the conception was essentially unsound. The maintenance of Turkey implied the reformation of her government, to the scandals of which Europe could not remain insensible. Of such reformation there was no reasonable chance. Lord Salisbury could say in after years with perfect truth that England "had backed the wrong horse." There can be little doubt that if danger there was from Russia it would have been best met by such collective action on the part of the Powers as would have prevented her separate interference.

The Andrassy note was an effort in the right direction, and, while Disraeli's disapproval was a plain invitation to the Sultan to lean on English support in view of still distant eventualities, Britain could offer no further objection to its presentation when the Porte's own programme proved as illusory as it had in fact been intended to be. The note was accordingly presented and was accepted without protest by Abdul Aziz, for its acceptance merely substituted one set of promises for another, which it would be quite as easy to disregard, since no provision for coercive measures was attached to it. The omission was not unnoticed by the Bosnian leaders, who declined to abandon their defiant attitude, and meanwhile the situation was becoming every day more strained. Servia and Montenegro could not long be held back, while on the other side an ominous symptom of rising Moslem fanaticism had already made its appearance in an anti-Christian riot at Salonica.

Under these circumstances the three contracting Powers decided upon stronger action. A memorandum was drafted at Berlin demanding an immediate armistice for two months, the withdrawal of the Turkish troops from the revolted districts, and the execution of the promised reforms under the supervision of the foreign consuls. It concluded with a plain threat of coercion if by the end of two months the demands remained unsatisfied. Copies of the memorandum were circulated for the approval of the other Powers. France and Italy unhesitatingly endorsed it. England replied with an uncompromising negative, and, to the astonishment of Europe, ordered her fleet to Besika Bay at the outlet of the Dardanelles. It was a deliberate encouragement to the Sultan to refuse concessions, and as such it was understood. Collective action was now doomed to failure, and the " Berlin Memorandum " was never presented.

Meanwhile the successes of the despised *rayahs* and the pressure exercised by the Powers had served to rouse Turkish national feeling. The patriotism of the Turk is deep-seated, and burns hotly when kindled, but its manifestations have never been such as to win the sympathies of other nations; for it has proved inseparable from a fanaticism of creed attended by barbarities which have shocked the civilised world. This strange and sinister blend of hatred and devotion was now stirring in Moslem veins, and took effect in the first instance against the incompetent Sultan who had just crowned his career of selfishness and extravagance by the repudiation of the debts of the State. Fired by a group of idealist reformers who called themselves the "Young Turks," the *softas*, or divinity students, of the capital broke into fierce rioting, and forced the Sultan to replace his Grand Vizier by a

successor of strongly nationalist views. The new adviser of Abdul Aziz began his "reforms" at the top by deposing his master. The unhappy Sultan took his own life by opening his veins with a pair of scissors. Murad V was substituted for his uncle, only to give place within a few days to his own brother, Abdul Hamid II, for failing to display the qualities required of him by his counsellors.

Such were the events which carried to power one whom nature had formed from the stuff of which tyrants are made; whose long saturnine cast of countenance and narrow brow testified to the suspicious exacting disposition, which, seconded by a singular craft and capacity for detail, enabled him to bind his provinces to his feet by means of the railway and the telegraph, to play upon all the passions of Mohammedan fanaticism and to defy with impunity the general conscience of Europe.

Three months before he ascended the throne the growing excitement had found an outlet more terrible than in palace revolutions. Early in May symptoms of unrest had appeared in a new district. The Bulgarians were as yet scarcely known to Europe. A people of Asiatic origin, akin to the Turks themselves, they had derived their name from the Volga, on whose banks they had sojourned till the days of the later Roman Empire, and had brought with them to their new seats on either side of the Balkan chain a language and a set of national characteristics entirely Slavonic. At one time the scourge of the Eastern Empire, they had dwindled into insignificance, and their separate existence had but recently been recognised by their Turkish masters in the grant of an independent national religious organisation under an Exarch of their own (1870). The Bulgarian movements of 1876 were trifling. There had been some rioting and a few murders of unpopular officials. But Turkish fears were already thoroughly roused, and regular troops, and, what was worse, swarms of irregular Bashi-Bazouks, were sent into the provinces. To the latter are mainly to be attributed the indescribable horrors which followed. Whole villages disappeared before a storm of cruelty in which every foul and fiendish passion that can pervert human nature played its part. At the little town of Batak 2000 only out of a population of 7000 escaped alive. The remainder had fallen by the lance and the sword, or had perished in the flames of the church and the school.

The massacres put the British government in an odious position. But for British opposition the Powers would already have applied coercion; but for the hope of British support Turkey would not have dared to defy their anger. It was in vain that Disraeli, supported by a section of the press, strove to discredit the terrible reports. As further facts came to light the more certainly was their essential truth established. Gladstone emerged from his retirement, and both in a pamphlet entitled "Bulgarian Atrocities," and before crowded public meetings, denounced Turk and Tory alike. It must be admitted that his strictures upon the latter were not undeserved. A great revulsion of feeling passed over public opinion, and, even had the ministry desired it, there was no longer any danger of England's protecting the delinquent Power from the consequences of its acts.

In the meantime, Servia and Montenegro had rushed into the fray, and although the former had secured the services of a Russian general, were soon themselves exposed to the peril of Turkish invasion. Accordingly, Russia secured a pledge of Austrian neutrality, Bismarck preferring to stand aloof from so indefinite an engagement, and proceeded by threats to impose upon the Turks an armistice, which Britain had already failed to secure by friendly representations. But Alexander II had no wish for war either with Turkey or Great Britain. To the ambassador of the latter Power he gave a solemn assurance that he had no designs against Constantinople, while declaring in plain terms that if Europe could not save the situation he should find himself forced to act alone. For the moment there seemed to be good hope of the more peaceful alternative, England having suggested a Conference at Constantinople. But a bellicose speech by Disraeli, now Lord Beaconsfield, at a Guildhall

banquet inspired some anxiety, and impelled the Czar to define more clearly his intention to act in default of a peaceable settlement.

Nevertheless, when the Conference met, a very gratifying unanimity of opinion was evident. Lord Salisbury joined the other envoys in demanding that there should be and the some "external guarantees" attached to any Constitution. Turkish promises, and the introduction of Belgian troops was discussed. The slipperiness of the Porte seemed at last to be of no avail in the grip of a common purpose. But Abdul Hamid was not at the end of his resources. Suddenly he summoned Midhat Pasha, and made him Grand Vizier. His new adviser was the leader of the more enlightened section of the "Young Turk" party. He was a theorist with a firm belief in the curative power of Constitutional government even for the chronic diseases of the "Sick Man of Europe." Under his auspices a Constitution was proclaimed of a highly democratic type, the proposals of the Powers were politely repelled, and they were invited to expect the immediate advent of a golden age, in which Moslem and Christian, now placed on equal terms, would compromise their differences without external assistance. The Conference broke up in despair (January, 1877). Of the perfect sincerity of Midhat there can be no doubt. But he had now served his purpose. Early in February he was arrested and deported to Italy, and his Parliament only met in March to disappear upon the outbreak of the war. Midhat did not long survive his creation. Five years later he was decoyed back to Constantinople and put to death on a charge of complicity in the alleged murder of Abdul Aziz.

Very unwillingly the Czar now set about the fulfilment of his pledge. A final treaty with Austria secured her neutrality at the price of concessions which denied to Russia any hope of private advantage from the war. The Czar would perhaps have preferred an understanding with Germany, since she had no special interests to protect and her support would have check-mated Austria. But Bismarck again held aloof. He saw clearly that any reconstitution of the Balkan peninsula must give rise to disputes between the two other Eastern Powers, and did not wish to find himself obliged to make a choice between them. On more effort Alexander made for peace. Even Lord Beaconsfield was induced to sign a London Protocol summoning the Porte to execute its promises of reform and hinting unmistakably at coercion. But by this time Abdul Hamid had lost his sense of proportion, and defied advice. No voice could reasonably be raised against the Czar if he now proceeded to declare war. Yet, when the declaration at last came, in the middle of April, 1877, the British government signified their disapproval. The assurance of the Czar that neither Egypt, the Suez Canal, nor Constantinople was affected by his plans succeeded however in silencing a ministry who were now much divided among themselves.

The Russians decided to operate simultaneously on the Armenian frontier and upon the Danube, to which river they had unhindered access, thanks to a convention concluded with Roumania, whose ruler had taken the opportunity to declare his independence of Turkish suzerainty. But at this point difficulties began for the Russian army under the Grand Duke Nicholas. The Roumanian railways were inadequate, organisation was bad, supplies, owing to the fraudulent understanding existing between contractors and not a few of the officers employed upon the staff, were deficient in quantity and quality. And when at last an advance was possible, the Danube proved a formidable military obstacle.

The advantages of the defence did not lie solely in the Turkish gunboats which patrolled the river, nor in the high ground, which bordered the southern bank and commanded the wide stretch of level over which the stream was approached from the north. A quadrilateral of four strong fortresses, Varna, Silistria, Rustchuk, and Shumla, eastward of the Russian positions opposite Sistova, dominated the country between the Danube and the Balkan ranges which lay parallel to its course. Further to the west, on the river itself, a formidable Turkish garrison, under Osman Pasha, held the fortifications of Widdin. It was

therefore tolerably clear that any Russian force which succeeded in crossing was exposed to serious risks. Barring their line of advance towered the most difficult section of the mountain rampart of the Balkans, all the easier passes being covered by the Turkish fortresses to east and west. And, while the invaders essayed to force the more formidable central defiles, it was open to the garrisons of Shumla, Rustchuk, and Widdin to close in upon their flanks and rear, or at least to sever their communications. Such was, in fact, the perfectly sound conception of the Turkish commander-in-chief, Abdul Kerim, and his plans only failed of success because the Russian leaders were superior to their opponents in enterprise.

By the end of June the Russians had disposed of the gunboats, and had passed a large force across the Danube near Galatz, just above the Delta, which, occupying the Dobrudscha district north-east of the Quadrilateral, served to distract the attention of the Turkish garrisons. No sooner had this movement been effected than the first troops of the main advance, under General Dragomiroff, succeeded in crossing by night from a point opposite Sistova, and in establishing a footing on the southern bank after a hard day's fighting. A pontoon bridge was thrown across the Danube, and, within a fortnight, the occupation of Biela to the east, and of Nicopolis to the west, secured the invaders against immediate peril from their flanks, while the operations were in progress which pierced the defences of the Balkans.

The formidable mountain barrier was carried by the dashing tactics of General Gurko, commanding the advance guard. Having occupied Timova, he learned that the Shipka Pass to the south was held in force, and that the Turks were making efforts with inadequate numbers to cover the other practicable roads further to the east. At this juncture an intelligence officer who accompanied the column discovered that one of the passes, the Khainkoi, had a reputation for being impracticable, which local opinion did not altogether bear out. He accordingly explored it, found it unprotected save for a detachment of 300 men on the far side, and satisfied himself that with a little simple engineering it would permit the passage of light guns. Gurko at once determined to make the attempt. Every difficulty was surmounted by the willing efforts of his men, the covering party were driven off, a reinforcement from the Shipka was scattered, and, having deceived the enemy by feints towards the south, the little column attacked the defenders of the Shipka from behind and drove them up to the crown of the pass. Here, assailed from both sides and cut off from supplies, the Turks dispersed over the hills, leaving the Russians in possession of the main road to the south.

This sudden turn of events struck terror into the Sultan and his advisers. Mehemet Ali replaced Abdul Kerim in the Quadrilateral, and Suleiman Pasha was directed to hurry all available troops up to the Balkans. But Alexander had no wish to push his successes further. Enough seemed to have been done to bring Abdul Hamid to his senses, and the Czar had opened negotiations with Britain with a view to engaging her mediation, when a sudden reversal of fortune revived the courage of the Turks.

Osman Pasha, commander of the garrison at Widdin, a stem, self-contained soldier and a born leader of men, had moved forward too late to save Nicopolis from the Russians. But with unerring instinct he fixed upon Plevna as a position from which he could at once threaten the enemy's communications on the Danube and maintain his own connections with the south by means of the western passes of the Balkans. Covered on the west by the abrupt depression of the river Wid, and to the east by a girdle of open hills well adapted for the construction of entrenchments, the little town was soon converted into a first-class fortress. The Russians had already been warned of the importance of the position, but made their attempt to secure it too late. Osman was already in possession, and they were forced to retire with considerable loss. Accordingly, General Krüdener received orders to attack

forthwith, and eject the intruder. The result was a serious disaster. Ignorant of the position of the entrenchments, the Russians made an ill-combined attack from two points, advancing over an open glacis exposed to a murderous musketry fire, and drew off with the loss of something like a quarter of their numbers.

The success of the invasion now hung upon a hair. Had Suleiman, instead of hammering at the central passes of the Balkans, carried his whole force round the enemy's flank to the assistance either of Osman or of Russian Army. Mehemet Ali, who was attacking Biela, had even Osman alone abandoned the defensive, the Russian communications must have been cut, and their whole army captured or thrust across the Danube. The opportunity was let slip. Reinforcements began to arrive from the north; the assistance of the Roumanian army, which had hitherto remained inactive owing to Prince Charles' refusal to place it under the direct control of the Russian commander-in-chief, was gladly welcomed on its own terms, and Prince Imeritinski was instructed to make a third attempt on Plevna.

But the influence which inspired two of the fiercest days of battle that the century had yet seen was that of the youthful General Skobelev, whose name was to become a household word in England as that of one of her most determined foes. His open manner and splendid physique proclaimed the man of action, and in his character the soldier spirit was incarnate. Amid the perils and hardships of campaigning in Central Asia no heart was lighter than his, and in the thick of battle he was as it were transfigured. The common soldiers, who adored him, looked forward to the day when they should follow the 'White General' to the Ganges. He had already cut Osman's connection with the Balkans by the capture of Lovtcha. But in vain did he hurl line after line against Osman's works; in vain, grimed with powder and waving his shattered sword, did he head the rush of stormers which carried the Kavanlik redoubt. The Russians were thrust back again and succeeded in penetrating at no other single point. It was a lesson in the deadly effect of modern infantry fire.

The Grand Duke Nicholas urged a retirement across the Danube, and only the determination of Alexander kept the Russian troops in their places. But Osman, with half-trained irregulars, still hesitated to take the field, and General Todleben, the defender of Sebastopol, was summoned to do with the spade at Plevna what Skobelev had failed to effect with the bayonet. By the end of October the circumvallation was complete, and in December the supplies of the besieged were exhausted. Osman made a gallant effort to cut his way out across the Wid, and was forced by superior numbers to lay down his arms. It seems that the Sultan had refused to permit a retirement while it could have been safely effected. At least, the garrison in its well-chosen position had paralysed the Russian army for six months.

The Turkish resistance under the direction of Suleiman, who had replaced Mehemet Ali as commander-in-chief, now finally collapsed. The passes of the Balkans were once more cleared, Sofia was occupied, and the main Ottoman army was severely defeated near Philippopolis. Before the end of January the Russians had entered Adrianople. On the Armenian frontier General Loris Melikoff, after a campaign whose results had long been doubtful, had taken Kars. Servia and Montenegro had declared war afresh, the former winning three successive victories, the latter laying hands upon the coveted coast-line about Dulcigno. Thessaly was in rebellion, and a new Greek Cabinet under Admiral Kanaris (p. 83) was preparing to take advantage of the opportunity for the rectification of the Hellenic frontier.

The Turkish Empire appeared to be in the throes of dissolution, and Constantinople lay at the mercy of the invaders. It was well known that the intentions of the Russian military party were by no means limited to the objects originally defined by the Czar, and public opinion in England veered decisively round. The Beaconsfield ministry strengthened by the

justifiable alarm of the country, but weakened by its own internal divisions (Lord Carnarvon and Lord Derby being altogether averse from war), prepared to play an active part in the denouement. Amid an active exchange of questions and assurances the Russian troops were advanced to San Stefano, a position commanding Constantinople, while Beaconsfield, having obtained a vote of credit from Parliament, moved a British squadron into the Sea of Marmora to a station off the island of Prinkipo within sight of the Russian lines.

War seemed imminent when the action of a third Power relieved the situation. Austria had good reasons for doubting whether Russia in her hour of victory would observe the self-restraint which she had promised. Indeed, the conditions she proposed to exact had already leaked out. Accordingly, Francis Joseph took the precautionary step of mobilising his army, and came forward with the suggestion of a European Congress to assemble at Berlin. The geographical position of Austria made her action decisive, and none knew better than Alexander how precarious was the fortune which had turned disaster into victory.

The proposal was accepted, but in the meanwhile an attempt was made to anticipate the interference of the Powers and to strengthen the hands of Russia by securing the submission of the Turks. Accordingly, a treaty was signed at San Stefano to the following effect. First : A new State of Bulgaria was to be constituted under Turkish suzerainty, including within its boundaries the whole area between the Danube, the Black Sea, the Aegean, and the Albanian Mountains, except the Turkish districts reaching from Adrianople to the shores of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. By this arrangement Turkey would only have retained in full sovereignty four detached fragments of her European possessions, namely, the portion of Roumelia east of Adrianople, the peninsula of Salonica, the turbulent districts of Albania and Thessaly, and the distant lands of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The new Bulgarian State was to be under Russian control for a period of two years. Secondly : Roumania, Servia, and Montenegro were to be declared independent, and the two latter were to have accessions of territory which would almost bring their frontiers in contact, and would extend Montenegro to the sea. Thirdly : instead of an indemnity, Russia claimed the Dobrudscha, which she proposed to force upon Roumania in exchange for the slice of Bessarabia lost by the Treaty of Paris. Fourthly : reforms were to be guaranteed to the Armenian province of Asia Minor, while on the same frontier Russia appropriated the fortress of Kars, the port of Batoum, and certain other districts.

A set of conditions more injudicious or more certain to alienate friends and foes alike could scarcely have been drafted. England saw Russian influence extended to the Mediterranean; Austria recognised that her progress to the Aegean was for ever barred; Greece resented the extinction of her hopes of acquiring Macedonia; Servia, jealous of the new Bulgarian State, despised her own meagre reward; Roumania denounced the ingratitude which proposed to strip her of the fertile territory of Bessarabia. But the most serious obstacle to peace lay in the conflict between the British demand that the entire treaty should be submitted to the Congress and the natural suspicion and pride which withheld Russia from so indefinite a concession. War seemed all but certain, Lord Derby followed Lord Carnarvon into retirement, and the Prime Minister ordered eight Indian regiments and two batteries to reinforce the troops at Malta. But the Czar could not afford to fight England without the countenance of Austria. An agreement was arrived at in London between Lord Salisbury and the Russian ambassador on the understanding that the area of the new Bulgarian State should be considerably restricted.

The "Big Bulgaria" scheme being thus abandoned, the way was clear for the Congress, in which Bismarck had promised to play the part of "honest broker" between the contending parties. Indeed, the news of the Anglo-Russian agreement leaked out and somewhat spoiled the dramatic interest of the Congress for those who believed the story in spite of official denials. In June, 1878, the chief ministers of the Great Powers met at Berlin,

the Earl of Beaconsfield and the Marquis of Salisbury representing England, and here terms of peace were finally concluded. Bulgaria was limited to the area between the Danube and the Balkans. The suzerainty was to belong to the Sultan; a prince was to be freely elected with his assent, who was not to be a member of a reigning house, and a Russian representative was to undertake the organisation of the government for the first nine months. The Bulgarian districts south of the Balkans with the name of Eastern Roumelia were to remain under the Sultan's authority exercised through a Christian Governor-General, an arrangement dictated by military considerations, the object being to provide Turkey with a secure mountain frontier. To Austria was granted the right of occupying and administering Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as authority to maintain garrisons in the district of Novibazar, which parted Montenegro from Serbia. These two latter States received their independence, but the territorial gains promised by the Treaty of San Stefano were much reduced; and the former was prohibited from establishing a navy, however small, to protect her coastline. Since it was nobody's business to protect Roumania against her ally, she was forced to digest with the best grace she might the injustice of the Dobrukscha-Bessarabia exchange. As for the Greeks, who had only been kept out of the war by the promises of the Powers to bear their interests in mind, they were put off, owing to England's unwillingness to see Turkey further dismembered, with a recommendation to the Sultan's generosity. Definite promises were, however, exacted of reforms in Armenia and in Macedonia, and an undertaking that the Christians in those districts should enjoy adequate protection (July, 1878).

It should be added that it was only after an abortive boundary commission and several conferences between the Powers that Greece secured in 1881 a rectification of frontier, which gave her Thessaly, but restricted her gains in Epirus to the district east of the Arta, contrary to the recommendations of the treaty. Even this result was only secured by a threat of vigorous action suggested by the Gladstone ministry for the solution of another problem. The Albanians had declined to abandon Dulcigno to Montenegro, and remained unmoved by the application of "moral pressure" by the combined squadrons of the Powers in the shape of a "naval demonstration" off their coasts. The Porte professed its inability to secure the observance of the treaty. It was thereupon decided to act upon the British proposal and to offer the Sultan the choice between instant submission and the occupation of Smyrna by the Powers (1880). The Albanians were accordingly expelled by Turkish troops, and the question of the Greek frontier taken up in earnest and brought to a conclusion.

Before the Congress broke up the plenipotentiaries had been treated to a startling surprise in the announcement of a special agreement already concluded between England and the Porte. By this instrument, known as the Cyprus Convention, Great Britain undertook to assist in the defence of the Sultan's territories in Asia Minor in consideration of a promise on his part to introduce proper reforms in those districts. She was to be permitted to occupy Cyprus as a convenient base of action so long as Russia retained her conquests on the Armenian frontier, and was to pay to the Sultan the annual surplus of the revenue of the island over expenditure. The arrangement was a great diplomatic and personal triumph for Beaconsfield, and no doubt helped to swell the enthusiasm with which his boast that he had brought home "Peace with Honour" was received by the shouting crowds at Charing Cross and outside Downing Street. But Cyprus has proved of little strategic value for the protection of the sea road to India, and what little it ever possessed for that purpose has disappeared with the British occupation of Egypt. It may possibly in the future enable England to assert her views in the development of Asia Minor, but for the time being its acquisition saddled her with a special responsibility for the protection of the Armenian Christians quite beyond her power to fulfil, a responsibility which was to put the nation in a painful dilemma between the promptings of conscience on the one hand and every consideration of expediency on the other. The underhand character of the negotiations were felt to be a stain on England's reputation for fair dealing, and undoubtedly contributed to the misrepresentation to which

she was subsequently quite unfairly exposed.

Much the same criticism may be passed on Beaconsfield's Eastern policy as a whole. While his opposition to the Treaty of San Stefano was necessary and justifiable, the situation was to a great extent the direct consequence of his own refusal to co-operate against Turkey, nor was his later action such as to secure a satisfactory settlement. He had not preserved the integrity of Turkey, nor done anything to strengthen her. He had not even won her gratitude, for he had taken his place in the end among her Critics of spoilers. And he had made for England one bitter foe, whose persistent enmity and whose power of inflicting injury, or, at least, of causing alarm, was to be counted on against her in every passing quarrel, and was to cast the shadow of irresolution over her counsels. If Germany entered the new period of armaments and world politics haunted by the spectre of French revenge upon the Rhine, England, no less distracted, was to go upon her way starting at every sound of Russian footsteps behind the barrier of the Hindu Kush.

Part V.
THE ERA OF EQUILIBRIUM
EUROPE AND WORLD POLITICS, 1878-1910

CHAPTER XXVI

THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN FEUD

IN January, 1878, died Victor Emmanuel II, first King of United Italy, and in February, Pio Nono, the last Pope who ever wielded the Temporal Power, followed him to the grave. The simultaneous disappearance from the political stage of two figures so typical respectively of the new and of the old order was singularly appropriate, and marked the conclusion of an era. The Old Europe of the Vienna Treaties was no more, and the King had lived to see his liberated country accepted as a full member of the new State system, while the Pope seemed only to have survived the publication of the Encyclical and the Syllabus to exemplify in his own person the impotence of his hostility to the principles upon which the modern order of Europe was to be founded. The questions which divided men in 1848 had been settled, the war-cries of the Year of Revolution had lost their significance, the national aspirations of the fifties and sixties had run their course to the several issues of triumph, compromise, or failure, and Napoleon III, alike the presiding genius and the most conspicuous victim of the process of reconstruction, was himself already dead.

The national units of Europe stood complete. Everywhere the outstanding questions between parties and between peoples had been submitted to a decisive trial of strength. Italy was an independent kingdom; Germany a united and powerful Empire ; Austria had evolved a compromise between contending national interests; Spain was a Constitutional Monarchy; France, a parliamentary Republic; the Balkan peninsula had been parcelled out into independent or semi-independent Christian States; the Turkish power had gained another prolongation of its corrupt existence.

Moreover, there had appeared since 1870 a new phenomenon in Europe which, paradoxically enough, provided the strongest possible guarantee for the permanence of the new system. The triumph of Prussia had proved to the world that no success in modern warfare is to be anticipated which has not been carefully prepared for in time of peace. The highly trained troops, the overwhelming numbers, the weapons and war material of the latest pattern with which victory is alone to be purchased, even the very plans of campaigns to all appearances unlikely, must stand ready, while the diplomatic sky is yet unclouded, for the sudden emergency which brings swift ruin upon the unprepared nation. France, taught by experience, imposed the burden of conscription upon her people to avert another catastrophe like that of 1870, while she nursed the hope of a not too distant revenge; Germany maintained her armies, alike to secure the Prussian predominance within her borders and for fear of France without; Austria, Russia, and Italy could not be indifferent to the military preparations of their neighbours. "The pike in the European fish-pond," as Bismarck put it in later years, "prevent us from becoming carp." Even England, by Cardwell's army reforms, had established the short-service system with the object of providing a large trained reserve (1871).

Hence the period upon which we are entering has been an age of gigantic armaments; and historians and journalists alike have been loud in condemning the burden and the waste both of money and effort which they have involved. Such criticisms may very easily be overdone. It is impossible at a time when unemployment is recognised as one of the worst diseases of the modern body politic to take very seriously the oft-repeated objection to conscription that it withdraws large numbers of capable workmen from productive industry, except in so far as the capital, itself withdrawn from productive industry by taxation, might

have sufficed to furnish new employment. It is just at this point that the criticism becomes cogent, and not even the most thorough-going admirer of the Services as a school of the manly virtues, nor the most convinced believer in the supreme importance of national defence can be blind to the immense financial strain and the essential wastefulness of modern military and naval expenditure.

But there is another side to the question. Much has been written about the nightmare of fear in which these warlike preparations have kept the nations of Europe. Such fears, however disturbing, have proved not a little salutary. For more than thirty years no collision has taken place between first-class Powers, though occasions of friction have been perhaps as frequent as in any previous period of the world's history. These years have witnessed the absorption by the European peoples of immense territories in distant continents, amid trade rivalries far more acute than those which helped to make the similar expansion of the eighteenth century one drama of almost continuous warfare. The armed struggles of the period have arisen in cases where apparent weakness has constituted a standing temptation to superior strength, either between Powers whose inequality was from the outset manifest, as in the case of the Spanish-American War, or where there has been serious miscalculation of the comparative resources of the combatants, as in Russia's attempt to coerce Japan. Experience proves that citizen and statesman alike recoil from the prospect of a war whose issues are uncertain, while both are too ready to pay the price for an assured success. It is not too much to say that if such influences had been in operation in 1870 there would have been no Franco-Prussian war ; it might even be possible to cast up an account showing that armed peace has entailed less cost than must have attended the struggles which it has averted. Moreover, it seems as certain as anything in the future can be that if ever the ideal of universal peace is realised it will not be through the efforts of peace societies, or the mutual forbearance of journalists, or even by acts of complaisance on the part of one Power towards another, but through the conviction being forced by sheer weight of figures upon all the Powers alike that the modern State with its infinite responsibilities cannot afford to maintain in perfection the elaborate mechanism of modern war. And if this be so, history will hereafter observe a wise forbearance in passing judgment upon the period of transition.

While Peace and Permanence were thus the characteristics of inter-European relations, the activities and ambitions of the Great Powers were driven to seek those wider horizons to which they were being already directed by other influences long since at work. It is scarcely too much to say that the history of Europe becomes the history of the world. The steamship and the railway were every day bringing nearer to Europe the untrodden recesses of the continents and the most distant islands of the sea. Commerce, armed with improved means of production, and stimulated by the rising standard of comfort at home, was seeking new fields for its enterprise along the new world-highways, while the protective tariffs, by means of which the Continental Powers strove to provide employment at home for their expanding populations, drove the manufacturer in every European State to seek distant markets for his surplus output. All at once men's eyes were opened to the value of colonies, of oversea markets, of the sea-power which safeguarded the access to both. And almost simultaneously continental Europe realised with a sudden pang of jealousy that Britain, almost by accident, had stolen a march upon the world, and stood already possessed of those advantages which were to constitute the elements of national greatness in the coming epoch.

We have already taken occasion to remark the dawn of popular interest at home in the British possessions across the sea, and the growing appreciation of their actual and potential value among Englishmen themselves. Indeed, the national inheritance was one which might justly awaken national pride, even if it must be admitted that the new-found Imperial patriotism too often expressed itself in vulgar and exaggerated forms. Since the

Sikh War, which ended in 1849, and Lord Dalhousie's extensive annexations, no power had existed in India which could question British authority, while the storms of the Mutiny had only served to prove how firmly it was rooted, and to transfer the last vestiges of the East India Company's powers to the Crown. The proclamation of Queen Victoria as Kaiser-i-Hind, or Empress of India, in July, 1877, by the advice of the Beaconsfield Ministry, a step which was greeted with a good deal of sentimental and ill-informed denunciation at home, undoubtedly helped to materialise for the native imagination an ill-defined foreign rule, and to invest it with an appearance of legality and permanence. Across the Atlantic the Canadian provinces had secured unity and self-government in 1840, as the result of Lord Durham's Viceroyalty, and in 1867 had developed into the Dominion of Canada, a great federal union of self-governing provinces which by 1872 comprised all British North America, with the exception of Newfoundland. In the Southern Seas the separate colonies of Australia had all received representative government by 1856, while the various settlements in New Zealand were united as one colony with similar institutions in 1875. A year earlier, in 1874, self-government had been conceded to the mixed British and Dutch population of Cape Colony, and by 1877 there had even been talk of a federation which was to include the outlying colony of Natal and the Dutch settlements, to be noticed later. England retained her possessions in the West Indian islands, and on the mainland of South America, though their prosperity had sadly fallen off with the decline of the sugar industry resulting from the abolition of slavery and the competition of European beet-sugar. The older route to the Far East, as well as the newer line of communication by way of the Suez Canal, was marked at every stage by British ports or islands, of which it will be sufficient to mention St. Helena, Walfisch Bay, Mauritius, Ceylon, Singapore, and Hong Kong ; while the presence of British squadrons in the China Seas and in the Persian Gulf secured the preponderance of our interests in those waters.

But public opinion, though conscious at length of the existence of the Empire, alive to its more obvious advantages, and perhaps even prone to set too high a value upon it from merely sentimental considerations, had not properly appreciated the responsibilities which it entailed or the changes which it imposed upon our traditional foreign policy. Greater Britain was not merely Great Britain writ large. The Empire was not an island, and it possessed extensive land frontiers, which were destined, through the enterprise of other Powers, to march with the territories of rival Empires. The self-contained isolation of the earlier nineteenth century was no longer possible, nor its indifference to continental combinations. Nor was this all. The possession of oversea dependencies imposed upon foreign nations the necessity of creating and maintaining war-fleets. Sooner or later these would inevitably bestow the power of menacing the internal communications of a widely-scattered maritime Empire. The days of Canning and of Palmerston had gone never to return.

It was because the conditions of the New Era were imperfectly understood that successive governments displayed but little either of foresight or of enterprise in dealing with the multitude of new problems which cried aloud for solution from every quarter of the globe where British interests came in contact with opposing forces. Responsibilities were too often light-heartedly assumed without due consideration of the consequences. Still more frequently the home government, after paltering with vital issues, found itself dragged unwillingly into action so belated as to entail the minimum of success with the maximum of friction, or took refuge in a policy of passive acquiescence calculated to encourage the belief abroad that British interests might be safely disregarded. To the same cause may be traced the popular impatience with oversea difficulties and disasters, and the tendency to require more of the ministry of the day than they were capable of performing within the limitations of a foreign policy whose principles both government and people regarded as axiomatic. Thus British action abroad was alike hesitating and spasmodic, and Matthew Arnold's description of his country as a "Weary Titan " scarcely exaggerates the perplexity of the

harassed Imperial Power.

In 1878, if we may neglect the French conquests in Algeria and in Cochin China, there was only one other European nation besides England which had committed herself to a policy of Imperial expansion. Russia had long since set out with deliberate purpose and calculated confidence upon the path into which Great Britain had been unconsciously directed by circumstances, and which she now followed with infinite hesitations. As the sea had led the British sailor and merchant to distant islands and coasts, so the vast plains of the Asiatic continent lay open to the march of the Russian armies, through Central Asia towards the Indian frontier and across Siberia to the Far East. The beginnings of the Russian land empire in Asia date back to times when the Elizabethan adventurers were embarking upon those voyages which were to open up the seas to English enterprise, and its foundations were firmly laid while England's footing in America and in India was still precarious. Before Peter the Great acquired the Baltic provinces, before Catharine II had claimed the lion's share of dismembered Poland, or had added the shores of the Black Sea to her Empire, Russia had set out upon that eastward march to which her geographical situation and the half Oriental characteristics of her race had predestined her. The gentle slopes of the Urals presented no serious obstacle, and in Western Siberia beyond the mountain range lay a region rich in the furs which formed one of the staples of Russian trade, and peopled by ill-organised tribes whose weakness invited, and whose predatory habits almost compelled interference.

Chance set in motion the train of events which destiny had prepared. In 1580, the year in which Drake completed his famous voyage round the world, another adventurer, Yermak by name, fled towards the wilderness from the justice of the Czar for acts of piracy committed on the Volga. On the river Kama, close to the Siberian frontier, dwelt a family of traders, named Stroganoff, who engaged the services of the outlaw and his band to forward their fur-trading enterprises beyond the Urals; and before he perished in the waters of the Irtysh, after several years of desperate fighting with the Tartar tribes, Yermak had won the Czar's pardon and brought the whole of the country west of that river under the Imperial authority. Further and further eastward the Russian fur-trader followed the sable, and in advance of the fur-trader spread in an ever-widening protective circle the Cossack settlements. For, from the first, the Czars had adopted the policy of covering their eastern provinces with military settlements of irregular horse, formed out of those elements among their subjects whom misfortune, misconduct, or the spirit of adventure drove out from civilisation to the wild life of the frontier. Thus, step by step, the advance continued till before the end of the seventeenth century the Russian outposts had reached the eastern ocean at Okhotsk, and had penetrated into Kamchatka northwards, and to the river Amur to the south. And it is perhaps some evidence of the ease with which these conquests were effected that even the helpless Chinese Empire, the only organised power with which the Russian pioneers had as yet come in contact, should have succeeded in imposing a veto upon any advance beyond the last-named river by the Treaty of Nertchinsk, in 1689. Then came Peter the Great, and for 150 years his countrymen turned their faces westwards.

But, as a recent writer has put it, the course of Russia's expansion has been towards the warm water, "east half south"; and the Amur could not remain the boundary of her ambitions for ever. In 1847, the Czar Nicholas appointed General Muravief Governor-General of Eastern Siberia. During a memorable governorship of sixteen years he founded Petropavlosk on the coast of Kamchatka, which defied an attack of the allied fleet during the Crimean War; secured the control of the Amur by building Nicolaievsk at its mouth; and, having gained from China the entire coast-line north of Korea by the Convention of Aigun (1858), he chose the site of Russia's new naval base in the Far East by the shores of a magnificent natural harbour, and, confident in its destiny, bestowed upon it the proud name of Vladivostok, "the Dominion of the East."

It was not only upon the shores of the Pacific that Russian expansion had taken the "half south" bent. There was indeed little to tempt an invader across gigantic mountain ranges into the Mongolian desert, which guards the north-western limits of the Chinese Empire. But on either side of the Caspian neither the snows of the Caucasus to the west nor the wastes of Turkestan eastward of that great inland sea availed for long to stay the process of absorption. We have already seen (pp. 130, 141) how Alexander I's conquests of the Transcaucasian districts prepared the way for Nicholas' treaty of Turkmanchai, which brought the Russian Empire in touch with the north-western boundary of Persia. Similarly, in Central Asia, the year 1846 saw the Siberian frontier advanced southward to a line drawn through the southern shores of Lake Balkash and the Aral Sea, and Russian forts planted on the lower reaches of the Oxus and Jaxartes.

Between this line and the northern limits of Persia and Afghanistan lay the open steppe peopled by nomad Tartar and Turkoman tribes. But, where the waters descending from the Pamirs had fertilised the desert and made settled occupation possible, the three Central Asian Khanates of Khiva, Bokhara and Khokand ruled the districts which had formed the nucleus of the conquering Empires of Genghiz Khan and of Tamerlane in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. These Khanates were centres of savage Moslem fanaticism and of an administration as cruel and corrupt as could be found in all the continent of Asia. There still stands in Bokhara the tall round tower, from which condemned offenders were hurled to their death, and the horrible prison in which two British envoys, Colonel Stoddart and Captain Conolly, were deliberately flung to be devoured by vermin, till their execution put an end to their sufferings (1843). Nevertheless, the continued existence of these tyrannical little States was regarded as a matter of concern by the British Government from their proximity to the border of Afghanistan; and, in 1844, Nicholas, at the time that he was seeking an understanding with England, had offered, among other inducements, to respect their independence.

The Crimean War freed Russia from any obligation in the matter, while it provided a new motive for aggressive action in the desire to annoy the Power which had thwarted her policy in the Balkans and condemned her proceedings in Poland. For the moment there was work to be done in the Caucasus, where the Czar's armies had pierced, but had not subdued, the mountain range. But no sooner had the tribes of the Eastern fastnesses, which had held out for well-nigh thirty years under a native hero named Shamil, been finally reduced in 1859, and the Circassians of the western heights overhanging the Black Sea been conquered or expelled in 1864, than a forward movement began in Central Asia.

There was indeed reason enough for action apart from European grudges. The nomad tribesmen of the frontier raided Siberia, and the subjects of the Khan of Khokand had repeatedly attacked and robbed Russian caravans on the banks of the Jaxartes. General Chernaieff was despatched to read them both a lesson. Several border fortresses were taken, and British fears had only just been allayed by Gortchakoff's explanations, when the action of Chernaieff precipitated a new series of events. Hearing that large forces were mustering further south at Tashkend, he decided that military considerations compelled him to attempt to surprise them. He failed, and failure made it impossible to withdraw without a loss of prestige which might well have proved fatal to Russian influence. Pocketing unopened a despatch from the Czar, which, as he suspected, forbade any further advance, Chernaieff stormed the town. Alexander II, personally averse to aggressive action, was furious, but retreat in the face of a fanatical enemy would have entailed certain disaster, and Russia retained Tashkend (1865).

Indeed, the situation had already passed out of the control either of the Czar or of his representatives on the spot. The Ameer of Bokhara proclaimed a holy war, and from all sides the fanatical Moslems of the Khanates gathered to his banner. Chernaieff, who had

been already superseded for his disobedience, sustained a reverse at Jizak; and neither his successor Romanoffski's victory at Irjai nor his occupation of the province of Zarafshan, nor even the overtures for peace which he made at the peremptory orders of the Czar prevailed against the obstinacy of the Ameer. At this moment General Kaufmann arrived to take over the command, and struck straight at Samarcand, the ancient capital of Tamerlane, where the magnificent colleges, mosques, and tombs, once resplendent with coloured tiles and gold, serve even in decay to attest the city's departed glories, fifteen miles from the walls the Bokharan host turned to bay, their entrenchments were stormed, Samarcand was occupied, and Kaufmann advanced upon Bokhara, only to be recalled by the tidings that the garrison he had left behind in the citadel were surrounded and in dire peril. The tables were suddenly turned, and Kaufmann's hand fell heavily upon the besiegers. At the news of the four days' slaughter and pillage with which he scourged the rebellious city, the Ameer of Bokhara submitted. Already during the course of the war Russia had annexed the districts between the Aral Sea and the frontier of the Khanates (1867). She now deprived the Ameer of the rich province of Zarafshan and turned Bokhara itself into a protected State (1868).

The fate of Khiva and of Khokand was not long delayed. The possessions of the former along the Oxus outflanked the new Russian province of Turkestan, and the Khan proved unable or unwilling to restrain the depredations of his subjects. In 1873, Kaufmann received the instructions which he had been eagerly awaiting. Three converging columns were moved upon Khiva, the city was carried by assault and its ruler accepted the Russian suzerainty, and submitted to a considerable loss of territory. Khokand survived till three years later, when Kaufmann took advantage of a civil war to interfere, and, after an easy victory followed by an unsuccessful attempt to establish a new ruler under a Russian protectorate, annexed its entire dominions outright to Turkestan, as the province of Ferghana (1876).

On any candid review of the facts it is impossible to resist the conclusion that up to this point the Russian advance had been actuated rather by the inevitable compulsion of frontier difficulties than by any settled design against India. Nor can it be denied that the conquered peoples gained immeasurably by the substitution of peace and firm government for the chronic disorder and tyranny of native rule. But it was not in the nature of things that England should view the process with equanimity. The Czar's government had again and again proved unable to fulfil its friendly assurances when confronted with unforeseen developments, and the want of correspondence between its professions and its actions gave colour to suspicions of bad faith, suspicions which were not allayed by the deliberate exclusion of British and Indian trade from the annexed provinces. Moreover, the two eastern Khanates were conterminous with the ill-defined mountain barrier of Northern Afghanistan, while further to the west the Turkoman districts round Merv alone separated Russian territory from a less formidable section of the dividing ranges, and from the line of the Persian frontier westwards to the Caspian.

To the affairs of Afghanistan the predominant power in India can never afford to be indifferent. The rugged passes of that mountainous land have proved practicable for the invader from the days of Alexander the Great onwards, and the question of their control is a problem of vital concern for those who bear rule upon the Ganges and the Indus. No solution is either easy or obvious. The character of the Afghan people is no sooner understood than the problem assumes the aspect of a dilemma. The mountain fastnesses are the home of fierce clannish races, very different in origin, but agreeing in the two characteristics of fanaticism and independence. Consequently, English public opinion has oscillated between the equally perilous alternatives of occupying the land and of leaving it severely to its own devices.

In the fifties and sixties of the nineteenth century the pendulum had swung decisively

in the latter direction, as the result of a very bitter experience, the first Afghan War. In 1839, the reigning Ameer, Dost Mohammed, was suspected, not without good cause, of leanings towards Russia, and an expedition was sent into the country to instal a rival claimant, Shah Sujah, likely to be more amenable to British influence. The army of occupation left at Kabul, under General Elphinstone, proved unable to control the situation, and was forced to withdraw under a safe-conduct, which the wild tribes of the passes did not respect. Only one survivor reached the Indian frontier; and, after British prestige had been partly retrieved by a punitive expedition under General Pollock, Dost Mohammed recovered his throne and made his own terms with the Indian government.

From this moment forward successive Viceroys adopted as their guiding principle in dealing with Afghanistan a policy described by its admirers as one of "masterly inactivity," and of this policy there was no more consistent exponent than Lord Lawrence, who was governing India at the moment of Dost Mohammed's death (1863). The Ameer had proved a loyal friend during the crisis of the Mutiny, and expected a reward. One service the Indian government could render of which he stood urgently in need. The ambitions of his numerous sons and the local and tribal dissensions of his subjects promised a struggle for the succession, of which no one could forecast the issue. Dost Mohammed accordingly claimed the guarantee of Great Britain for the succession of his favourite son, Shere Ali. The request was refused. Shortly afterwards Shere Ali found himself involved in the struggle which his father had foreseen. Once more the application was renewed and once more refused. The new Ameer in his hour of peril was informed that Britain could only recognise *de facto* rulers, and that no countenance was to be expected of her till his own efforts had put his position beyond dispute. After five years of alternating disaster and success Shere Ali won the day; and then at last the British recognition was vouchsafed to him along with a present of money and a consignment of rifles (1868). It so happened that at that very moment Kaufmann had just occupied Samarcand, and it is scarcely surprising if the Ameer felt little gratitude for assistance which he no longer needed, or if he drew his own very natural though mistaken conclusion that his recognition was solely due to fear of Russia. Nevertheless, the supposed new factor in British calculations encouraged him to make a fresh attempt to secure in an interview with Lord Mayo, at Umballa, the pledges which Lord Lawrence had refused. He asked for a regular allowance, for the occasional services of British officers as military instructors, and for an unconditional guarantee of his own position and that of his heirs after him. The most he could get was an assurance that Britain would "view with severe displeasure any attempt to disturb his position."

Shere Ali was now thoroughly dissatisfied. He was genuinely afraid of Russia, under whose protection his nephew and rival, Abdur Rahman, had taken refuge, and he saw, what British ministers did not perceive, that a cordial understanding between England and Afghanistan on terms satisfactory to both could alone secure the alienated Indian frontier, and would serve at the same time to establish his own throne. Nothing less would content him. To successful diplomatic assistance against Russian claims on the Oxus he remained indifferent. In 1873, he believed that events had demonstrated the correctness of his views beyond the possibility of doubt, and that England could no longer evade the inevitable understanding. The Russian armies were moving upon Khiva, and the Ameer pressed the argument for all it was worth to secure the dynastic guarantee that alone would satisfy him. Once more he was to be disappointed. Lord Northbrook was instructed by the Gladstone ministry to inform him that the government did not share his fears, and to repeat the familiar assurances of general support. Shere Ali now finally despaired, and it was not long before a frontier dispute with Persia served to confirm his growing distrust in the value of British friendship. British arbitration had been invoked by both parties, but, when the Shah defied the award, Lord Northbrook had no better counsel to offer the Ameer than to submit to an inevitable loss of territory. Shere Ali then and there resolved to seek an understanding with the common enemy, and opened negotiations with Russia.

It happened by a signal fatality that the policy of the Disraeli ministry, which came into office in 1874, was exactly calculated to precipitate those disastrous consequences which the “masterly inactivity” of their toward predecessors had prepared. The new Cabinet and their Viceroy, Lord Lytton, fully shared the views of that section of public opinion which judged of Russia’s intentions rather by her actions than by her assurances. These were also, as we have seen, the views of the Ameer, and at a first glance it might seem not improbable that he would approve of any determination to take precautions. But the precautions contemplated by the new “forward policy” were just such as appeared to threaten that very independence which the rulers of Afghanistan had so jealously guarded. In exchange for assurances scarcely less vague than before, the Ameer was asked to give free passage to British political emissaries across his dominions. While the matter was still under discussion an arrangement made with the Khan of Khelat, by the Treaty of Jacobabad, secured the permanence of British influence in Baluchistan, and the right to establish a British garrison at Quetta. Shere Ali saw with growing displeasure his southern frontier thus outflanked. Lord Lytton did not overstate the case when he declared that the Ameer had “slipped from our hands.”

It was at this critical moment that Disraeli, now Lord Beaconsfield, took the momentous decision of interposing to deprive Russia of the fruits of her victories in the Balkans. The Czar was not slow to notice the opportunities which his position in Central Asia presented for a counter-attack, and Russian policy at once assumed the menacing shape which had haunted British dreams. Skobelev, the life-long foe of England, had already drafted two detailed plans for the invasion of India; and, while the Congress was still sitting at Berlin, a Russian mission under General Stolieteff, had penetrated to Kabul, and effected an arrangement with the Ameer, and a Russian army was already on the march for the frontier. It came to this, that the Gladstone government had driven Shere Ali into the arms of Russia, and that their successors had irritated both the Ameer and his new friends into a combination against Britain (1878).

The Treaty of Berlin brought the Russian columns to a halt, and left their ally exposed to the consequences of his double-dealing. Strongly as we must condemn the policy which had produced the situation, there can be no question that it was now necessary to take securities of Shere Ali. It was resolved to dispatch a political mission to Kabul without leaving him any choice in the matter. The Ameer objected, shuffled, and ultimately stopped the commissioners in the Khyber pass. To this action there could be but one answer. By the end of the year Afghanistan had been invaded by three British columns. The southern, starting from Quetta, occupied Candahar; the northern forced the Khyber and entered Jalalabad; the central army, advancing up the Kurram valley, under General Roberts, carried the Peiwar Kotal pass and pressed on to Kabul. It was in vain that Shere Ali turned in his despair to Russia. Alexander II’s love of peace had been confirmed by the experience of the Russo-Turkish war. Disillusioned and a fugitive the Ameer died at Balkh, shattered, as Lord Lytton put it, like the earthenware pot in the fable between the pots of iron and brass; and an example to all who would put their trust in Russian protection, which did not pass unnoticed by his rival Abdur Rahman.

The British government selected Yakub, a son of the late Ameer, as his successor, and had no difficulty in arranging with him, by the Treaty of Gandamak, that Sir Louis Cavagnari should be installed as Resident at Kabul, the new ruler undertaking to be guided by his advice. The arrangement was short-lived. Yakub had forfeited the confidence of his own people by submission to the foreigner; his troops mutinied, attacked the British residency, and massacred its occupants, the Ameer himself making but little effort to restrain them. Thus from neglect to interference, from interference to occupation, and from occupation to disaster, English policy had trod the same cycle of errors which had resulted in the catastrophe of 1842.

Another invasion could hardly be avoided. Roberts, moving by the Kurram valley route, stormed the Shutargardan pass, defeated an Afghan army at Charasia and entered Kabul. Here he found himself in considerable danger, and even sustained a slight reverse before the reinforcements despatched from India secured his position. Meanwhile Yakub, who had from the first taken refuge in the British camp, was discarded and removed to India. His successor had already appeared in the field, and he, strange to relate, was none other than the Russian candidate Abdur Rahman. Assisted with Russian money he had crossed the frontier, and was carrying all before him in the north-western provinces. Gradually it dawned upon the British authorities that here was the strong man they sought, and Abdur Rahman, who had already digested the lesson of Shere Ali's downfall, was not slow to respond to their advances. The bargain was as good as struck, and on terms for which Shere Ali would have been grateful, when at the beginning of 1880 Lord Beaconsfield fell from power as the result of the events just described and others shortly to be noticed, and the determination of the new Gladstone ministry to evacuate the country accelerated the final arrangements.

But the evacuation was not to be effected before events took place which gave rise to the most famous episode of the whole war. A new pretender, Ayub Khan, brother of the deposed Yakub, had entered the country by way of Herat, and was threatening Candahar. The commander of garrison despatched General Burrows with a mixed force to meet the invader. The desertion of the entire native contingent left him isolated in presence of greatly superior forces of the enemy, and a rash determination to attack resulted in a disaster of the first magnitude at Maiwand. Candahar and its garrison were now in the gravest peril. The situation was extremely critical, but the authorities at Kabul proved equal to the height of the occasion. It was resolved to send Sir Frederick Roberts with every available man to the relief of Candahar.

The column disappeared into the unknown on August 9. Through the midst of disaffected tribes and over lofty passes, under a burning sun by day, and in bitter cold by night, it held on its way till on the 31st of the month it reappeared to view before the gates of Candahar, having covered 313 miles of the most difficult country in 22 days. On the following morning the gallant little army marched out to try conclusions with Ayub. The pretender was attacked in position, outflanked, and his entire force broken up in irretrievable rout. It was the last British exploit in Afghanistan. The Gladstone ministry and their new Viceroy, Lord Ripon, were resolute for an instant evacuation of the half-subdued country. That ultimate withdrawal was sound policy will be readily conceded, but its immediate application was full of perils. Everything depended upon the sense and resolution of Abdur Rahman. To the great good fortune of England and of Afghanistan he proved more than equal to the situation, and by the middle of 1881 had crushed Ayub and sat securely upon his throne, sensitively proud of his independence, but loyal to the British connection.

Indeed, it is not too much to say that for some years the peace of the world depended on the political wisdom of the Ameer. In 1878 Russia had resumed her progress "east half south" in the unconquered districts between the Caspian Sea, the territory of Khiva and the Persian frontier, a region peopled by plundering Turkomans; but at first, only to meet with a decisive check. Operating from Krasnovodsk General Lomakin was twice repulsed by the Tekke Turkomans, and the second time sustained serious losses in an attempt to storm a formidable set of earthworks at Geok Tepe. The situation called for a striking success, and Skobelev, Russia's greatest living soldier, was sent out to win it, with Colonel Kuropatkin, the future commander in the Japanese war, as his lieutenant. Substituting a light railway for camel transport, and inspiring every service with his own energy, the new general pushed rapidly forward to the scene of his predecessor's defeat. For three weeks the Russian trenches were steadily advanced to the Turkoman ramparts, and a mine was successfully exploded which blew away a whole corner of the defences. While the Russian infantry, led

by Kuropatkin, were pouring in at the breach, Skobelev had been preparing to make his blow final and decisive. His Cossacks were held ready for the moment when the defenders should break from their entrenchments in the attempt to escape. It came, and for miles over the plain artillery and infantry joined the cavalry in the merciless pursuit, sparing neither man, woman, nor child. Skobelev had outdone even Kaufmann's terrible lesson at Samarcand, and no Turkoman ever lifted his hand against Russia again.

It was his last achievement. The Russian government dared not trust the ambition and self-will of England's bitterest foe with the command on a debatable frontier. He was recalled, and in 1882 the excesses of his skobelev. passionate nature brought him to an early grave, while that nobler English soldier who, but for the Treaty of Berlin, might have had him for antagonist instead of Ayub Khan, still lives among us, honoured no less for his moderation in victory than for the unselfishness of his patriotism.

But it was out of no friendly consideration for England that Russia refrained from stretching out her hand to seize the last fragment of the Turkoman country round Merv, that parted her frontier from the approaches to Herat. From the day when she reluctantly abandoned the Treaty of San Stefano she owed England a grudge and lost no opportunity of trading upon her weakness or of aggravating her fears. But for the moment the spectre of Nihilism paralysed the action of the Russian government.

We have traced in a previous chapter the influences which by the year 1865 had turned the mind of Alexander II in a direction adverse to reform. This change had arrayed the so-called intelligent classes decisively against the government. In Russia, where the possession of a University degree was a necessary qualification for public employment, the universities were thronged with poor students, whose purely intellectual training failed to supply them with some of the essential elements of education in the truer sense, while they remained acutely conscious of the sufferings and disabilities of the classes from which they were drawn. It was in this soil that the seeds of the earlier form of Nihilism germinated, spreading thence to other strata of society. Alexander's own reforms and the influence of political ideas from Western Europe had begotten lively hopes. These hopes the manifold hardships and difficulties which the Edict of Emancipation had left behind, as well as the apparent powerlessness or indifference of the government, had extinguished. A deep pessimism, literary in its expression and destitute of practical aim, settled upon the classes who read and thought. In its nobler form it took the shape of an assertion of the rights of the individual against society, among the baser spirits it degenerated into a crude and cynical materialism. It was, in fact, as its name implies, a gospel of indignant negation directed against accepted institutions and beliefs. The government, guided by Count Dmitry Tolstoi, fought it with press restrictions and with' decrees limiting the number of students to be received at the universities.

Before long a more practical creed found its way into Russia. In 1862 there had been founded by the efforts of Karl Marx and others, a federation of workmen's societies, styling itself "The International," having a permanent council in London and holding an annual Congress, whose object was to secure the collective ownership of the means of production by peaceful and legal means. The teaching of this society found its way into Russia and won some adherents ; but Socialism offers few attractions to any but an urban population, and Russia had not yet entered decisively on an industrial stage.

The new development of Nihilism owed its origin to the teaching of Bakunin. A Russian noble who had dabbled in Western ideas, who had been hunted from France and Germany for his connection with revolutionary societies, who had been deported by his own government to Siberia and had thence escaped to renew his activities from the secure refuge of Switzerland, he stood for the doctrine that the forcible destruction of existing

authority was the first step to improvement. To this end he had founded the "Alliance of Social Democracy" (1869) which he had succeeded in amalgamating with the International without surrendering its separate existence, with the natural result that the International soon broke up owing to internal dissensions (p. 330). Bakunin urged his Russian disciples to go among the peasants, to live their life, and to win them to the cause of revolution. Here at last was a practical object upon which dissatisfied idealists could concentrate their energies. His advice was widely acted upon. For the realisation of its immediate end it proved a complete failure. There was no real point of contact between the classes thus artificially flung together. The peasant was irresponsible, suspicious, and uncomprehending, the student ill-at-ease, awkward and unadaptable to the hard conditions of rural life. In spite of much generous enthusiasm, the enterprise ended, for most of those who took part in it, in disillusionment or Siberia. Yet it was not altogether barren of results. Men and women returned embittered to engage among themselves in plots and conspiracies which steadily assumed a more and more desperate character. Imprisonments led to forcible rescues, rescues to murders, murders to deliberate assassinations of spies and minor police officials, and before long men were found to aim higher.

It was just at this critical moment that the catastrophes of the Russo-Turkish war and the humiliation of the Treaty of Berlin left the government without a friend. The Slavophiles, or patriotic national party, burned with indignation at the failure and loss of *prestige*, the Liberals were not slow to point out the necessary connection between mismanagement and speculation on the one side and the bureaucratic autocracy on the other. A small but determined section of the revolutionaries calling themselves the "Will of the People" were emboldened to attempt to force their programme upon the government by the methods of terrorism.

The first victim in high places was General Trepofi, chief of the St. Petersburg police, shot by a young girl named Vera Zasulich in revenge for a flogging administered to an insubordinate prisoner. The incident served to reveal the alarming state of public opinion, for the assailant, in defiance of the clearest evidence, was acquitted by the jury who tried the case, and was subsequently rescued from a fresh arrest by the crowd. One murder now followed another, and by the end of 1879 the little group of desperados had begun to aim at the life of the Czar. The first attempt was directed against the Imperial train from Livadia to Moscow. Of the three mines laid one was not fired, one failed to explode, and the third wrecked another train. In the following February some of the conspirators obtained employment in the work of redecorating the Winter Palace, and the banqueting hall was blown up at the moment when the Imperial party should have been sitting down to dinner. Once more the Czar escaped, this time owing to the late arrival of one of his guests, the Grand Duke of Hesse.

Meanwhile a "Supreme Disposing Commission" had been appointed to deal with the revolutionary movement. At the head of this commission stood General Loris Melikoff, an Armenian by extraction, who was one of the few commanders who had gained credit in the recent war as the result of his operations before Kars. He was not slow to observe that, criminals as they were, the Nihilists held strong ground in their demand for national representation. He urged upon the Czar the supreme necessity of weaning public opinion from all sympathy with assassins by giving to it a recognised channel of expression and an influence, carefully limited indeed but effective, upon the action of the government. He was allowed to remove press restrictions, and to dismiss a number of unpopular officials, and, on the expiration of the period of the commission, still retained authority in the capacity of Minister of the Interior. In February, 1881, he presented a definite set of proposals to the Czar. The government was to resume the work of reform abandoned in 1865. No effort was to be spared in securing the fullest data, and upon this basis the suggested measures were to be drafted. These were to be submitted for discussion to a General Commission, which,

besides the members appointed by the Czar, was to contain representatives from the Zemstvos and from the towns. The function of this body was to advise, not to decide, final action being reserved for the Council of State.

Alexander wavered. He accepted the proposals in principle, then delayed his signature, signed and then postponed the publication of the decree. It was not till the morning of the fatal 13th of March that his final consent was given. On that day, in spite of the protests of his family, he drove through St. Petersburg to visit the Michael Riding School. His previous escapes had produced a strong impression upon his mind. He declared that when God ceased to protect him no precautions could avail to do so. The outward drive was safely accomplished, but, as the Czar returned along the Catherine Canal, a bomb was thrown by a youth of nineteen which shattered the back of the Imperial carriage and killed or maimed several of the escort. Alexander sprang to the ground, and went to the help of his wounded Cossacks. "No, no," he cried, to one who pointed out the assassin, "he looks an honest fellow." At that very moment another of the conspirators threw a second bomb which exploded with deadly effect almost between the Emperor's feet. Shockingly mangled he was carried back to the palace to die within a few hours (March, 1881). Thus perished the "Czar Liberator," and with him, in spite of all the weakness of his resolve, perished for a whole generation the hope of reform for Russia. The fatal bomb had done effectively what Loris Melikoff's scheme might well have failed to do. Russian public opinion turned uncompromisingly against the Nihilists, and even looked askance at those very hopes which had shed a deceptive glamour upon their cause. And the new ruler who now mounted the throne of the Czars was impelled, not only by filial affection, but by every impulse of his autocratic nature, to chastise revolution with scorpions.

CHAPTER XXVII

THE SOUTH AFRICAN PROBLEM AND THE BRITISH OCCUPATION OF EGYPT

AT the moment when Britain had incurred, through the events described in the preceding chapter, the persistent hostility of Russia, she was already plunged in colonial troubles destined in the fulness of time to develop into a question of European importance, and she was about to undertake a new burden of responsibility which was to carry with it the bitter jealousy of another continental Power.

Of colonial troubles during the earlier years of the century she had already had some experience. The presence of an alien European race in Canada had produced in 1837 the revolt of the French province, and the existence of formidable native tribes in New Zealand had brought about the Maori wars of 1843, 1863, and 1869. In South Africa alone it was her misfortune to be confronted with a situation which combined the peculiar difficulties both of Canada and of New Zealand. The Dutch settlers of the Cape bore no love to the British rule, and the fierceness and the numbers of the native Bantu tribes constituted a standing peril to the white races. Moreover, the solution of the South African problem, delayed by its inherent difficulty, became all the harder at a time when the colonial affairs of every European State had become, what they had never been between the thirties and sixties, a matter of international interest. The extended political outlook which we have remarked in the last chapter was already producing its effect.

In 1814 the old Dutch Colony of the Cape passed finally into British hands. By its new possessors it was valued chiefly as a port of call on the ocean route to India. Its internal affairs were viewed with a certain impatience at home, and for some years the white population, inconsiderable in comparison with the native Bushmen and Hottentots and the restless Bantu tribes of the frontier, remained almost exclusively Dutch. In 1820, however, owing to the prevailing distress in England, an organised scheme of emigration was carried into effect. Most of the emigrants were planted in the eastern districts of the colony, but before long many of those who had no aptitude for farming drifted into other employments in the older settlements. A population of English-speaking colonists had thus been introduced which may be fairly assumed to have constituted one-eighth of the white inhabitants of the country.

It was perhaps not unnatural that the new settlers should have inspired an interest at home not previously displayed in relation to South Africa. But the manifestations of this sympathy were distinctly injudicious. In 1825 English was declared to be the official language, and was in future to be exclusively used in all legal proceedings and public documents. In 1828 the courts of justice were themselves reconstituted upon the English model. English-speaking magistrates took the place of the Dutch *landdrosts* and their assessors, and, though no attempt was made to substitute English for Dutch law, the methods of trial were those in use in English courts and involved the introduction of the jury system.

These arrangements, though sufficiently irritating to Dutch feeling, were completely overshadowed by a grievance of far greater importance—the attitude of the home government to the native problem. Public opinion in England, honourably proud of the Abolition of the Slave Trade in 1807, was eager to see slavery itself abolished and the rights of coloured races everywhere respected. It was too easily forgotten that such aspirations

entailed no personal sacrifices upon those who entertained them, nor was the public imagination sufficiently active to picture the real difficulties of a handful of white men living among savages. Labour was scarce, the native Hottentots were disinclined to exertion and their numbers were a serious menace to the settlers. The result of the labour difficulty had been a wholesale importation of negro slaves, and an elaborate system of passes had been established restraining the Hottentots from moving from one part of the colony to another without a licence. A ten years' apprenticeship was further required of such children as were born to Hottentot parents during their service under European masters. We may well believe that a system which thus subordinated a large coloured population to a handful of whites was not more elevating to the character of the dominant race than it has proved to be elsewhere, and that it produced a general hardening of the conscience which degenerated at times into downright brutality. On more than one occasion the authorities had interfered between Dutch master and Hottentot servant, and in 1815 the shooting of a farmer, who had been charged with cruelty, in a scuffle brought about by his own resistance to arrest, occasioned the small local insurrection of Schlachter's Nek. This rising was followed by the execution of some of the rebels, which was carried out with such a refinement of hideous bungling as to leave a very painful impression upon Dutch feeling.

In spite of cases of ill-treatment, no doubt well-authenticated, it is not improbable that public opinion in England would have been modified by fuller information as to the conditions of life in the colony. Most unfortunately the bulk of what professed to be first-hand and impartial evidence tended rather to confirm popular prejudice. Even before the British annexation missionary societies had been active among the natives, and their influence, and especially that of the London Missionary Society, guided by Dr. Philip, played a conspicuous part in the series of blunders which ensued. The missionaries were not unnaturally disposed to favour the natives and to resent influences which often seemed to run counter to their work. They were also not a little credulous of native grievances, careless of making mischief, and swayed by sentiment. However that may be, their representations had enormous weight in England, which, with Parliamentary Reform in the air, was somewhat at the mercy of philanthropical abstractions.

Accordingly, in 1828 the entire system of passes and apprenticeship for the Hottentots was done away with at one stroke, and the colony was left exposed to the inconvenience and danger of a large idle and vagrant population.

Worse was to follow. Already the British government had several times interfered between negro slave and slave-owner to regulate food, clothes, and hours of labour ; thus creating some insubordination on the one side and much dissatisfaction on the other, while paying no heed to the plans for the gradual extinction of slavery which found considerable favour among the Dutch themselves. In 1833 an Act of Parliament was passed emancipating all the slaves in the British dominions throughout the world, and setting aside a sum of twenty millions for the compensation of the owners. Altogether laudable as was the object of the Act, the suddenness with which such a great social change was introduced, and the total insufficiency of the funds provided, occasioned serious damage to the interests of the colony. After a short period of apprenticeship an idle and thriftless people were turned loose upon society ; farmers were suddenly deprived of their labour in a land where labour is scarce ; the compensation proved wholly inadequate, only one and a quarter million being available for South African owners, and of that sum not much more than half ever reached its proper destination, since the claims had to be proved in London and were consequently purchased by speculators and agents at much less than their face value.

It needed but one last blunder on the part of the home government to convince the Dutch colonists that their interests were neither understood nor regarded at Westminster. The Kosas, a tribe upon the eastern frontier, had burst into British territory at the end of

1834 carrying fire and slaughter into the settled districts. Sir Benjamin D'Urban, Governor of the Cape, after reducing the raiders to submission, had placed their country under British authority, and had planted a hostile tribe among them as a check upon their future action. He had not calculated upon the strength of the missionary party. Dr. Philip visited England, obtained the ear of a committee of the House of Commons, and, supported by a malcontent official who had retired from the colonial service, secured the reversal of the annexation and the recall of the Governor. The Boers of the frontier districts, exposed to the peril of native raids and no longer doubting that in the event of future troubles the influence of the government would be used against them, decided to rid themselves of the latter difficulty by plunging into the interior, where they would be able to deal with the native question in their own way. This was the origin of the Great Trek of 1836. Taking with them their cattle, and carrying their wives and families and all their possessions in their slow-moving waggons drawn by immense teams of oxen, they struck out northwards into districts which chanced at that time to be almost without inhabitants.

About 1820 a savage of real genius named Chaka had made himself paramount chief of the Zulus, and had organised the whole tribe into a formidable military State. The people were divided into regiments, or *impis*, each possessing its own allotted settlements. None but regiments which had distinguished themselves in action were given leave to marry, to wear the distinguishing head-ring of acacia-gum worked into their hair, or to carry white cowhide shields. Fresh regiments were from time to time constituted out of the lads growing to manhood, whose one aim was to win the privileges and the insignia of their elders. All were armed alike with a broad-bladed stabbing spear or *bangwan*, Chaka having discovered that troops armed with throwing spears could not be trusted to stand their ground when these were used up. Each' corps was distinguished by its own special ornaments of feathers or skin. The tactics of the Zulu armies were uniform. They moved at a surprising pace and attacked in a crescent formation, striving to encircle the foe with the "horns," while the so-called "chest," in heavier formation, bore in against his front. The Zulu people thus became a standing menace to peace, but were not without the redeeming virtues of honour and truthfulness.

Before this terrible military power the neighbouring tribes fled or went down like standing corn before the sickle. Natal was almost depopulated. The lands which afterwards became the Orange Free State and the Transvaal twice underwent a like devastation, first by a mixed horde of fugitives from the Zulu power, and later by a mutinous division of Chaka's army, which ultimately settled under the new name of Matabele in the north-west districts of the latter territory.

Into the desolated tract of country, which these last had interposed between themselves and their former ruler, the pioneers of the Trek pushed their way. The first arrivals perished almost to a man by the spear of the Matabele or by the ravages of fever. But a second party, led by Hendrik Potgieter, was more resolute and more fortunate. The Matabele were vigorously attacked and driven across the Limpopo, and a republic of a very primitive and loosely organised kind was set up by the sparse settlers in the Transvaal and Orange River districts. Meanwhile a portion of the stream of emigrants had been deflected across the mountains, under Pieter Retief, into the more fertile lands of Natal. There was already a small settlement of Englishmen at Port Natal on the coast, but England had consistently refused to undertake responsibility for the country, divided as it still was by native districts from the Cape frontier, and Retief hoped to secure the right to settle there by negotiation with Dingan, the murderer and successor of Chaka. In pursuance of this design he proceeded to the Zulu King's capital of Umkungunhlovu, where he and his companions were received with every mark of friendship. Encouraged by their reception they ventured to attend the final conference without their arms, only to be attacked and massacred. The treacherous deed was followed up by an onslaught on the nearest Boer encampment, in

which men, women, and children perished together. The remaining immigrants received sufficient warning to make hasty preparations for defence, and maintained a successful resistance behind their barricades of waggons.

But Boer pertinacity rejected the idea of evacuating the country. Aided by the English settlers from Port Natal and by their own kinsmen from both sides of the Vaal, they determined to make an end of Dingan and his power. The campaign began with disaster after disaster, till at length the man for the crisis made his appearance in the person of Andries Pretorius. Leading his followers in the spirit of an Old Testament warrior, he marched straight on Umkungunhlovu, repulsed the Zulu attack on his camp at the Blood River, in the historic engagement of "Dingans' Day" (December 16, 1838), and reached the enemy's capital to find it already deserted. Internal divisions completed the ruin of the Zulu power. A half-brother of Dingan, named Panda, turned against him, and, after assisting the Boers to win a second victory, was established as a vassal King under the new Dutch Republic of Natal (1840).

These arrangements were not destined to last. The Boer victories were regarded by public opinion in England as gratuitous massacres of defenceless natives, while the government had a better cause for uneasiness in the Dutch control of a coast-line which seemed likely to afford the best means of communication with the interior. The actual ground of quarrel was the determination of the Boers to expel some of the more recently settled native tribes, and a small British expedition was despatched by sea to interfere. The Boers were more than a match for a handful of soldiers. The little force met with a reverse and was closely besieged for four weeks before reinforcements arrived. Further resistance then became impossible, Natal was declared a British colony, and the Boers for the most part took refuge in the districts north of the Orange (1842).

It had long been the settled conviction of the missionary societies that the natives were harmless and peaceable enough if not interfered with by white men. In this opinion they were quite possibly right, and acting upon it they had consistently urged the erection of a barrier of protected native States along the frontier of the colony. The radical unsoundness of the policy consisted in the fact that the principle on which it was based assumed conditions unattainable in practice. Nothing could prevent the interpenetration of the black and white races. But to the government it offered a fatal attraction for other reasons. It was supposed that the barrier would restrain further migration from the Cape, and might even force the trekkers to return, by cutting them off from such supplies as they drew from the colony. The attempt was accordingly made to put the suggestion into practice. The Pondos to the south of Natal, and the Basutos, who had held their own against Chaka in the mountains to the south-east of the Orange districts, formed the two eastern links in the chain. Further down the Orange no more promising material existed than two communities of half-breed Griquas. The westernmost under a chief named Waterboer, already protected by treaty, might have served the purpose, but the State extemporised to occupy the gap between his lands and those of the Basutos proved utterly unable to hold its own in a territory already largely peopled with Dutch. All attempts to assign different localities to the two races failed utterly.

The result was that in 1848 a new Governor, Sir Harry Smith, who had considerable experience of South African affairs, decided on a complete reversal of the recent policy, acting on the perfectly sound principle that only the Imperial power could be trusted to preserve the peace and to deal impartially with native and Boer alike. Accordingly, he annexed the Kosa districts, where in the meanwhile a fresh war had broken out, and proclaimed British rule over the country between the Orange and the Vaal under the name of the Orange River Sovereignty. The Boers attempted resistance but were decisively crushed at the battle of Boomplatz.

Before long the newly recognised Basuto State under a chief called Moshesh, proved too strong for the authorities at Bloemfontein, ill-supported as they were by the discontented Boers and dependent upon a handful of British troops. A serious rising of the Kosas made it impossible to send effective aid from the Cape. It became necessary to buy the support of Pretorius and the Boers north of the Vaal by the Sand River Convention, which recognised their complete independence (1852). On these somewhat humiliating conditions British authority on the Orange was for the moment maintained. But the successes gained by the Basutos over a powerful force, which the Cape authorities were at length able to despatch against their mountain strongholds, decided the home government, now distracted by the complications which brought about the Crimean War, to reduce its responsibilities still further. In 1854, by the Convention of Bloemfontein, England handed over her rights in the Orange River sovereignty to its somewhat unwilling inhabitants, and acknowledged its independence as the Orange Free State.

With the same object of limiting responsibility it was decided to confer a measure of self-government upon the Cape Colony, and in 1853 a representative Parliament of two Chambers was established, while the ministry remained as heretofore the nominees of the Governor. Sir George Grey would have gone further, and during his term of office constantly urged upon the authorities at home a scheme for the federation of the whole of South Africa, to which the two struggling republics would probably have offered no objection. Indeed at the time the Free State was hard pressed by the Basutos, while the Transvaal was rent asunder under four separate governments. By 1860 the opportunity had passed, and the latter State had been united under Martinus Pretorius as President, with Paul Kruger as his Commandant-General. It was now divided more than ever in sympathy from the Cape owing to the success achieved by the newly founded "Dopper" Church, a secession from the Dutch Reformed communion standing for the narrowest racial patriotism and for the most uncompromising opposition to modern ideas of progress.

The years 1869 to 1872 constituted the decisive era in the history of the Cape. The opening of the Suez Canal made it clear that the prosperity of the colony must depend upon the control and development of the resources of its *hinterland*. Almost simultaneously the discovery of diamonds at Kimberley in Griqualand West set in motion a great rush of British immigrants into the country. At the same moment Boer susceptibilities were not unnaturally exasperated by the result of British arbitration between Waterboer and the Republics, which assigned certain disputed territories in the diamond fields to the former. The ill-feeling was increased by the immediate cession of the districts in question to Great Britain by the successful disputant. Yet further irritation was caused by the annexation of Basutoland to protect its inhabitants, after years of protracted struggle, from the tardy vengeance of the Dutch. But the two most decisive events of these years remain yet to be noticed. It was in 1872 that full self-government, with a ministry responsible to the Cape Parliament was granted to the colony, and in 1871 that Cecil Rhodes, who was to give a definite direction to colonial policy, landed in Africa.

Before long it was apparent that trouble of a serious nature was brewing in the South African Republic, as the Transvaal country was now called. The tribes within and beyond its frontiers had increased in number and in confidence, while the settlers were ruthless in the exaction of a labour-tax, and often not too scrupulous in their dealings with the natives, for the worst elements in the colony had gradually drifted into this ungoverned land. The authorities of the Republic, crippled by the general refusal to pay taxes, and by the unwillingness of different districts to co-operate for mutual protection, were powerless either to restrain or to defend their subjects. It seemed as though a general native outbreak was imminent, of which no one could foresee the consequences, and the remonstrances of the British government were frequent and vigorous. A disgraceful panic at Steelpoort, in which the Boer commandos fled in terror before the tribesmen of the chief Sekukuni, seemed to

suggest that the settlers had lost that dogged courage which had been their most distinctive characteristic. And at the moment no quality was more indispensable. In 1872 Cetewayo had succeeded Panda as King of the Zulus and had restored to its full efficiency the military system of Chaka. He was only awaiting his opportunity to emulate the career of his terrible predecessor. The Boers had given him a colourable pretext by laying claim to lands upon the Blood River which he regarded as his own. Sekukuni was his vassal and his pawn. Cetewayo had only to raise his spear to let loose a flood of savagery over the Dutch Republics and Natal.

To meet these perils the imperialist policy of Sir Harry Smith, as developed by Sir George Grey, was revived, and a permissive Act of federation for South Africa was passed through the British Parliament in 1877. The measure came to nothing owing to the hostility of the Cape legislature. Meantime the situation up country craved immediate attention, and already, in 1876, Sir Theophilus Shepstone had been despatched to the Transvaal, with authority to proclaim its annexation if events pointed in that direction. He found the country unprepared for resistance to the natives, the funds at the disposal of the authorities reduced to a sum of twelve shillings and sixpence, great unwillingness on the part of the government to effect the reforms for which he pressed, and a strong feeling among the English and German inhabitants of the towns and villages in favour of the alternative solution of annexation by Great Britain, a feeling to which he appears to have attached excessive importance. Annexation was accordingly proclaimed, a step which was to have consequences of unforeseen gravity, and was duly confirmed by Sir Bartie Frere, the new Governor of the Cape, whose far-seeing policy contemplated no other escape from existing difficulties than by the Union of South Africa under the British flag. The annexation was a venture which success would have abundantly justified. Nothing, however, could justify it but success.

Sir Bartie Frere thus shouldered the burden of the Dutch quarrel with Cetewayo. His award upon the question of the disputed territory was decisively in favour of the Zulus. But it was plain that no territorial settlement could by itself guarantee the peace of South Africa. The Zulu armaments were not maintained like their European counterparts for purposes of defence. The Governor demanded that they should be immediately disbanded, and that the right to marry, hitherto the privilege of valour and as such the very corner-stone upon which the tribal military system rested, should not be withheld from any Zulu subject. There can be little doubt that he gauged the political situation aright; his estimate of the military resources of the power he had challenged proved miserably inadequate.

The force available under Lord Chelmsford's command did not amount to 20,000 men, and with the object of covering the Transvaal and Natal against possible Zulu inroads it was decided to reduce its effective strength still further by conducting the advance against Cetewayo's capital at Ulundi in three converging columns. The central column, accompanied by Lord Chelmsford in person, crossed the Buffalo, a tributary of the Tugela, at Rorke's Drift, moved forward to deal with a native force reported to be in the neighbourhood, leaving a detachment under Colonel Pulleine to guard the camp, which had been pitched at the foot of the rocky eminence of Isandlwana. Neither by this officer nor by Colonel Durnford, who superseded him on the following morning, were any adequate measures taken for defence. The usual precaution of forming the waggons into a laager was neglected, and the mounted vedettes were withdrawn from the advanced positions in which they might have obtained timely information of the impi which lurked within striking distance. When the Zulus unexpectedly appeared the cavalry were actually pushed forward against them, no effort being made to concentrate the infantry into a compact defensive formation till it was too late. The "horns" of the impi closed round the ill-fated detachment, and, as ammunition began to run short, the "chest" rushed in to close quarters plying their deadly stabbing assegais. None but a few mounted men succeeded in making their escape.

Natal only escaped a devastating raid through the gallantry of the handful of men left behind at Rorke's Drift. Under Lieutenants Chard and Bromhead they occupied an old mission station, and behind a frail rampart of mealie bags and biscuit boxes beat off their assailants, after a night of desperate fighting. Next morning Lord Chelmsford, retiring, as the result of his losses, upon the fords of the Buffalo, found the British flag still flying over the drift.

The disaster brought the other columns to a standstill. Colonel Evelyn Wood on the Transvaal border halted at Kambula and there repelled an attack on his camp, while Colonel Pearson, who had crossed the Tugela near its mouth, was surrounded and besieged at Ekowe. As soon as reinforcements arrived Lord Chelmsford went to the relief of the latter place and laagered at Ginghilovo to meet a desperate Zulu attack, which he repelled with slaughter from secure positions behind his trenches and waggons. Ekowe was relieved and the whole force retired, to begin the invasion afresh from the direction of the Transvaal border. It was during this advance that the gallant and attractive Prince Imperial, son of Napoleon III, who had come out eager to see service and to win himself a name, was cut off with a reconnoitring party and left to perish through the unmanly panic of his companions. Had he lived he might well have played a part in the French crisis of the middle eighties calculated to modify the destinies of his country.

Just before Sir Garnet Wolseley arrived to supersede Lord Chelmsford, the latter had won a decisive success. Forming his troops into a hollow square within sight of Ulundi he had shattered the attacking masses with musketry and artillery fire, and had broken for ever the military power of Cetewayo. The King himself was shortly afterwards captured and deported to the Cape (1879).

But the annexation of the Transvaal had not yet exhausted all its consequences. It had already brought in its train the Zulu war, and with it quite unmerited discredit upon Lord Chelmsford and Sir Bartie Frere. It now contributed along with the troubles in Afghanistan to the unpopularity and downfall of Lord Beaconsfield's ministry at the General Election of 1880. The outgoing government had steadily refused to listen to the indignant protests of the Boer leaders against annexation. Their policy had been strongly opposed by Gladstone while still in opposition, and his accession to power inspired lively hopes among the Dutch, which turned to bitter resentment when he declined unconditionally to withdraw the British authority. The deceptive calm now came to an end, and general resistance to taxation ripened into revolt. The Governor, Sir Owen Lanyon, ordered a regiment under Colonel Anstruther, quartered at Lydenburg, to reinforce the garrison of Pretoria. The rout at Steelpoort had bred an ignorant contempt for Boer valour, and it was forgotten that men who will not stand against a horde of charging savages thirsting to get to close quarters, may prove redoubtable adversaries behind cover against troops depending upon musketry fire. The regiment accordingly moved without precautions and with its band playing at the head of the column. At Bronkhorst Spruit it was surrounded by invisible riflemen. The Colonel refused to discontinue his march in obedience to a Boer flag of truce, and found himself obliged to surrender at discretion after ten minutes' helpless endeavour to assume a fighting formation under fire. Every British garrison in the country was now besieged, but the Boers proved as helpless in attacking defences as they were at a later date.

Sir George Colley commanded in Natal a force of barely 1200 men. Filled with an undue contempt for his adversaries and eager to secure for himself the credit of crushing the rebellion, he rashly decided to enter the Transvaal and to attempt the relief of the garrisons without waiting for reinforcements. He encountered the first resistance at Laing's Nek, a slight depression in a ridge covering the approach to the main Drakensberg range. The British infantry advanced up a long and open slope in the close formation of the day, exposed to a murderous fire from riflemen placed in concealment both to their front and

flanks. They had no chance from the first, and were withdrawn after gallant but unavailing efforts. The camp at Mount Prospect was now in serious peril. Parties of Boers had moved round southward and were interrupting communications. Colley's attempt to clear his line of retreat by an attack on a commando holding a ridge beyond the Ingogo River resulted in an almost exact repetition of his previous misfortune. The approach of Sir Evelyn Wood reopened communications with Natal, and it was understood between the two commanders that no fresh advance should be attempted till further reinforcements had arrived.

Before long Colley had changed his mind. He seems to have believed that by occupying Majuba, a flat-topped mountain which commanded Laing's Nek from the west, he could terrify the Boers into retirement, in spite of the fact that it was quite impossible to get artillery to the summit. The hill was occupied by dawn on February 27 after a most wearisome ascent, and proved a veritable death-trap. Scattered parties of Boers crept up the slopes from boulder to boulder, while others from under cover picked off every soldier who showed his head over the edge, for there had been no time to make entrenchments. Then panic supervened. Leaving their commander dead upon the summit those who succeeded in escaping capture fled down the precipitous slopes under the deadly fire of the Boers. There is no more painful incident recorded in the annals of the British army (1881).

On the news of this disaster the Gladstone Cabinet decided to undo the act of their predecessors. By the Pretoria Convention the independence of the Transvaal was restored under British suzerainty. No decision was ever more hotly debated by contemporaries. The case for the government rested upon arguments addressing a strong appeal both to common sense and to humanity. The British administration had proved a failure, and failure once admitted, further military operations for the mere recovery of prestige could only entail unnecessary bloodshed. Yet in that foresight which is the highest quality of statesmanship the Pretoria Convention was utterly lacking. The destiny of South Africa was union, and union under British authority. Such a destiny could not indeed be prevented, but it might be fatally retarded if the conviction once took root in the mind of a resolute but ill-informed people that they had defied unaided the might of the Imperial power. The Convention of Pretoria qualified by that of London, in which all mention of suzerainty was inexplicably omitted, contained within itself the seeds of a second Boer War.

By a strange irony of fate the very ministry which had shown itself so eager to get rid of a disagreeable responsibility was about to involve the national policy in an entanglement which was to govern British relations with the European Powers for over twenty years. We have already noticed in a previous chapter the career of Mehemet Ali Pasha of Egypt, and his tentative dabbling in Western ideas. His son and successor, Ibrahim, reigned only a few months; his grandson, Abbas I, reverted to the worst practices of Oriental despotism. With the accession of Said, another son of the founder of the dynasty, European influence, came once more into fashion. This eccentric ruler is said, among other strange freaks, to have insisted upon his suite accompanying him, smoking as they went, along a path deeply strewn with gunpowder, by way of proving his courage, recently called in question by a European newspaper. It was from him that the French engineer, Ferdinand de Lesseps, obtained in 1856 a concession for cutting the canal of which Alexander the Great and Napoleon I had dreamed. The enterprise was delayed by the opposition of Lord Palmerston, who was acute enough to foresee that it would give to England as the possessor of India so compelling an interest in Egypt as would lead to complications with France, and was not completed till 1869. Meanwhile in 1863 Said died, leaving a debt of something over three millions incurred in connection with the Canal, railway enterprise, the Barrage at the head of the Delta, and the care of ancient monuments.

The new-found resources of European credit were the ruin of his successor, Ismail, son of Ibrahim, the first who bore the title of Khedive. A reckless spendthrift, full of grandiose

designs, some useful, others utterly useless (for his lack of business capacity and his cynical good humour made him the prey of every specious knave), he borrowed at a lavish rate as long as credit lasted, and, having exhausted every debtor's shift to evade the day of reckoning, dragged Egypt with himself into the gulf of ruin. His first venture was to grow cotton on a large scale during the American Civil War, when the blockade of the southern ports deprived the European markets of their supplies. Egypt at large followed his example and huge profits were realised. But the end of the war brought a swift fall in prices, and Ismail set to work to recoup himself by growing sugar, borrowing extensively for plant, and sinking deeper in the process. Fetes, palaces of the most expensive kind and in the worst possible taste, lavish personal expenditure as well as some few works of public utility, designed to develop the resources of the country, went to swell his indebtedness; and at each fresh borrowing the Khedive obtained a smaller proportion of the nominal loan. The consequence was that in 1876 the debt stood at 91 millions, while the land-tax had been doubled and was being exacted in advance, forcing the fellahin, or native cultivators, to borrow at usurious terms on the prospects of half-grown crops.

Before this result had been achieved even Ismail had begun to realise the need for retrenchment. He resolved to dispose of his shares in the Suez Canal Company to the French Government. But Napoleon III, who had consistently supported the Canal scheme, had fallen, and the offer was made to the infant Third Republic at the moment of the German scare of 1875. It was accordingly declined, but Ismail was not long in discovering a purchaser. A British journalist in Egypt communicated the secret to the home government, and Lord Beaconsfield made haste to profit by the opportunity, closing with the Khedive for £4,000,000. Commercially a splendid investment, the shares being today worth nearly eight times the purchase-money, the transaction was something much more, giving England a decisive voice in the control of a world highway to which she could not afford to be indifferent.

The sacrifice proved of little avail to avert the impending ruin, and bankruptcy was already in sight when the French and British creditors, relying on the support of their governments, banded together to exact securities of Ismail. He agreed to the establishment of the "Caisse de la Dette," a commission of Europeans charged with the duty of receiving all money necessary for meeting the interest and other charges on the various loans, and empowered to forbid future borrowing (1876). Later in the same year a further step was taken by the advice of Mr. Goschen and M. Joubert, who were sent out to readjust the original arrangements in the interests of the bondholders. The "Caisse de la Dette" was retained, but as an additional security two Controllers-General were appointed to supervise the national revenue and expenditure respectively. This was the beginning of the "Dual Control."

It was not long before fresh interference became necessary. In spite of the most unsparing pressure upon the taxpayer, and the starvation of every public service, Egypt proved unable to meet her liabilities. The creditors were only prepared to accept a reduction of interest as the result of a searching enquiry. The enquiry took place in 1878, and revealed an incredible record of waste, mismanagement and oppression. At the recommendation of the Commission of Enquiry the "Dual Control" was suffered to lapse, and Ismail's influence was to be eliminated by providing him with a responsible ministry under Nubar Pasha, and by forcing him to accept a limited personal allowance.

From this humiliating position the Khedive determined to disentangle himself, and made a skilful use of the only weapons at his disposal, namely, the discontent of the army, in which many of the officers had been put on half pay, and the growing dislike of Egypt for her creditors. A mutiny among the officers against Nubar and his colleagues enabled him to rid himself of the ministry under the semblance of compulsion, and certain proposals of

the Commission of Enquiry for dealing with the debt, drew from him a declaration that aided by a native ministry and an elected Chamber of Deputies, he would stave off a bankruptcy discreditable to Egypt. It was obvious that he did not intend to submit to the findings of the Commission. There was only one way out of the difficulty. Pressure was exerted by England and France upon the Sultan to proclaim the deposition of the Khedive, and with the co-operation of the other Powers, the matter was brought to a successful issue. Ismail thereupon abandoned the struggle, and his son Tewfik was proclaimed in his place. The "Dual Control" was revived, the Controllers being selected by France and England respectively. The Englishman, Sir Evelyn Baring, was destined to bear the title of Lord Cromer, and to be the principal instrument in the redemption of Egypt. A Law of Liquidation divided the revenue between the Caisse and the expenses of government. These expenses were limited to a certain figure, and any surplus in the funds set aside for them was to be transferred to the Caisse, which was further to have a claim upon the government for any deficit in its own share of the revenue.

The new Khedive and his ministers were beset with difficulties. Of these the most serious was the mutinous spirit of the army. It had long been the custom to reserve the higher commands for officers of Turkish descent, and the aggrieved native colonels now bound themselves together to obtain redress under Ahmed Arabi, a man of fine presence and a fluent talker, but destitute of the higher qualities of leadership. An attempt to arrest the chiefs of the conspiracy provoked an armed demonstration which enabled them to insist upon the dismissal of the Minister of War. Encouraged by their victory the mutinous colonels repeated the successful manoeuvre on a more ambitious scale. Assembling large bodies of troops outside Tewfik's palace they clamoured for the dismissal of Riaz Pasha, the Premier. The Khedive's resolution was not equal to the occasion, and once more the mutineers prevailed. The new ministry, under Cherif Pasha, obviously held office on sufferance.

The success of Arabi and his friends had an unexpected result. It inspired them with an extreme fear of reprisals. Their aims had so far been entirely selfish. The Khedive had no reason to love them, the Powers watched their proceedings with disapproval. They began to cast about nervously for support. They therefore seized upon the opportunity presented by the decision of the government to convene a Chamber of Notables, raised the cry of "Egypt for the Egyptians," and urged the Chamber to demand a National Assembly. The situation was very grave. There was a good deal of simmering discontent in the country, and a tendency to ascribe the existing troubles to the presence of Europeans. So long as the Notables maintained their caution and stood by the ministry all might still be well, but if anything occurred to invest Arabi with the character of a national champion the worst was to be feared. There was, it is true, little or no national feeling in Egypt, but in the towns there was a growing anti-European sentiment, which might at any moment flame out into fanaticism likely to make armed intervention unavoidable.

By singular misfortune the English and French governments now took the very action calculated to precipitate the crisis. Gladstone and his Foreign Secretary, Lord Granville, were sincerely anxious to avoid intervention, and believed that their object could be best secured by close co-operation with France. In the last resort they were prepared to invite the Sultan to interpose as the Khedive's suzerain. They were, in fact, seriously disquieted, but had no settled plan of action. Gambetta, who at this moment guided the policy of France, was clear as to his aims. He entertained the traditional French objection to Turkish interference in Egypt, but his chief object was to guard against an English occupation. This he believed could best be avoided by a combined Anglo-French intervention. Thus the two Powers were very far from being agreed; but, by reserving entirely the question of the particular action to be taken in case of necessity, Gambetta persuaded the British government to take part in a Joint Note declaring the determination of the two Powers to support the Khedive in all complications, internal or external.

The note was construed as a threat, and precipitated the fusion of the national and military parties. The Chamber of Notables claimed the right to vote the Budget, a claim fraught with menace to the Dual Control. The government hesitated. Their opponents promptly demanded changes in the ministry, and Arabi was installed as Minister of War. The Khedive struggled in vain against the growing strength of the military party, and plucked up courage to dismiss Arabi only to find himself obliged to reinstate him. Meantime Gambetta had fallen from power, and with him all prospect of joint intervention, the policy of France, in the hands of de Freycinet, being solely directed to avert the Turkish intervention which England desired. The two governments fell back upon a Conference of the Powers to be convened at Constantinople. It was hoped in England that they would take the responsibility both of inviting the Sultan to step in and of controlling his action. The Sultan, however, hung back. He was playing a double game, and had even sent a decoration to Arabi, hoping to recover his authority in Egypt by the aid of the national party. Nor was Europe anxious to save England and France from their difficulties by giving to either or to both a mandate for interference.

The knot was cut by an outburst of Moslem fanaticism in Alexandria resulting in pillage and massacre. It was an ominous fact that no attempt was made by the authorities to punish the culprits, no less ominous that the Egyptian garrison began to strengthen the forts which commanded the anchorage of the Anglo-French squadron lying off the port. The patience of England was exhausted, and Admiral Seymour was instructed to demand that the work should be immediately discontinued. A satisfactory assurance was returned, but the searchlight before long revealed the fact that the preparations were proceeding by night. The British admiral thereupon despatched an ultimatum, and the French Fleet put to sea, de Freycinet pleading that no act of war was legitimate without the consent of the Chamber. The truth was that France had succumbed to a dread of involving herself in complications fatal to her freedom of action so long as her relations with Germany remained unsatisfactory. On July 11, 1882, Admiral Seymour opened fire, and after five hours' bombardment silenced the forts. It was not till he received explicit instructions three days later that he ventured to land, and meanwhile Alexandria had undergone all the horrors of a sack at the hands of the Mussulman mob.

The duty of the British government was now clear. France, in a fit of despondency, had resigned the prize of which her past history seemed to promise her the ultimate reversion, and England had unwillingly assumed a distasteful responsibility, a responsibility indeed more onerous than she yet knew. Order had to be restored before she could wash her hands of the Egyptian problem. Accordingly, Sir Garnet Wolseley was despatched at the head of a British expedition to Egypt. It was generally expected that he would operate from Alexandria, and he encouraged the delusion. Instead of doing so he landed at Ismailia, half-way down the Suez Canal, intending to move upon Cairo westwards along the Sweet Water Canal, which meets it at right angles. He thus dislocated all the plans of his opponents, and led them to divide and misplace their greatly superior forces. Thrusting the Egyptians out of their entrenchments at Tel-el-Mahuta, General Graham's advanced guard occupied a position at Kassassin lock, and repelled all attempts to dislodge them in two successive engagements, in the first of which the enemy were finally dispersed by a splendid cavalry charge by moonlight. It was not till September 13 that the decisive blow was struck, when Wolseley brought up the main body, and, by a night march ending in an attack at dawn, carried the formidable lines of Tel-el-Kebir at the point of the bayonet. The success was followed up by a stroke of magnificent and well-calculated daring. Sir Drury Lowe with 500 British cavalry was despatched at full speed across the desert to summon Cairo to surrender. The little force appeared before the city on the evening of the second day. Arabi and 11,000 troops laid down their arms without striking a blow (1882).

The war was over, but England's troubles in Egypt had scarcely begun. The immense

difficulty of restoring order in a land where maladministration had reigned supreme in every department was scarcely realised. England. To the astonishment of the Powers, who had expected nothing short of a British protectorate, the government promised an early, nay an immediate withdrawal. Equally amazing was the declaration that during the occupation England's function would be limited to giving advice to the government of the Khedive. Thus it came about that a stupendous task was undertaken with an authority resting upon no indisputable basis and under the shadow of a perpetual notice to quit. And by her mere presence in the valley of the Nile England had added the bitter jealousy of France to the sullen resentment of Russia, while there was not one Power in Europe whom she could account her friend.

CHAPTER XXVIII

GERMAN IMPERIAL POLICY AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

THE strained relations between England and France resulting from the occupation of Egypt suggest at first sight a community of interest between the former Power and Germany. That no actual *rapprochement* took place was due to a variety of causes, of which England's own refusal to interest herself in Continental rivalries and German jealousy of her exceptional advantages beyond the seas were not unimportant. But the decisive factor which governed the readjustment of European relations was the deliberate policy of Bismarck. Sufficient stress has seldom been laid upon the fact that from the moment of the final overthrow of France his diplomacy entered upon a new phase. An opportunist Bismarck was through the whole of his career, and the ultimate end of all that he planned remained consistently the same, the exaltation of his own country. But it is important to observe that, whereas in his earlier years of power his efforts were directed to the creation of a great European State, all his later action was concentrated upon the single object of securing what had been won. This defensive attitude explains the general characteristics of his policy. He no longer takes splendid risks, or defies public opinion and powerful opponents. He is for ever trimming the ship of State to isolate undying enmity, to conciliate the hostility of foes not entirely irreconcilable, and to snatch an advantage from passing weakness.

The foundation stone of his diplomacy was the assurance that France could never forgive. Of the Third Republic, unaided by allies, he was not indeed very seriously afraid. But a Monarchist or Bonapartist restoration would address its first appeal to anti-German patriotism, and the dread of a Franco-Russian alliance haunted his dreams. He must set himself to bind fast to Germany, or at least to conciliate, all Powers who were ever likely to aid France. England he did not reckon among them. It is perhaps too much to expect that modern statesmanship should look forward over forty years.

In 1872 an informal understanding was arrived at between the three Imperial courts of Germany, Austria, and Russia, which has been dignified with the name of the Three Emperors' League. It appears that an exchange of views took place resulting in a general understanding that the three Powers would act together in maintaining the status quo in Europe, in dealing with any future development of the Eastern Question, and in opposition to revolutionary propaganda. It is plain that the Czar had nothing to gain by the first clause and everything to lose by the second. Unless other matters of common concern should emerge it was inevitable that the two more interested partners should gravitate to one another, and that Russia should gradually drift out of the system.

The process began at once. In the very same year which witnessed the inauguration of the Three Emperors' League, Bismarck effected a secret agreement with Austria promising her ultimate compensation in the Balkan peninsula for her Italian losses. Alexander II's remonstrances at the time of the Franco-German war of 1875, already noticed, were intensely irritating to Bismarck, and at the Berlin Congress his influence was used in accordance with his new obligations to Austria, and with scant regard to Russian interests. The Russian press was loud in its denunciation of German "honest brokerage," and the possibility of a Franco-Russian understanding was freely canvassed both at Paris and St. Petersburg. The Three Emperors' League subsisted in name, but its activities were confined to the occasional interchange of personal amenities between the monarchs.

The effect of these misunderstandings was to draw Germany and Austria more closely together. In 1879, Bismarck concluded with Count Andrassy a permanent defensive alliance, by which it was agreed that either Power should aid the other in case of attack by Russia, and should maintain a strict neutrality as against any other assailant. Thus one of the would-be allies of France in 1870 had been bound to protect her conqueror. But Bismarck was not yet satisfied. He could not forget Victor Emmanuel's generous enthusiasm for France at the crisis of the negotiations, and he had not failed to observe that the claims of the Vatican might well provoke the French and Italian governments to common action.

The condition of Italy since 1870 had been far from happy, and gave rise to a dissatisfaction and unrest all the greater for its contrast with the glowing visions of the years in which she had won her national unity. The Papacy remained irreconcilable, and imposed upon the young Kingdom the obligation of maintaining considerable armaments, for the grievances of the Pope were a standing temptation to any Catholic Power in search of a casus belli. Austria and the Monarchist party in France inspired the liveliest apprehensions. Hence in a land of small natural resources taxation ruled high, and the growth of prosperity was further retarded by the issue of an extensive paper coinage. Even the well-meant efforts of the government to assist commerce by the purchase of the railways only added another load to the national burdens. Moreover, by 1876, the party of the Right, which, but for two short interludes, had guided the nation for seventeen years with conspicuous patriotism and unselfishness, had lost its hold on the country and had been replaced by the Left. The change was partly due to the unpopularity of taxation, but more permanent causes were at work. The Papal veto prevented the stricter Catholics from taking part in elections, and the transference of the capital to Rome gave increased importance to the less prosperous, less educated, and ill-balanced population of the south. The change was a national misfortune, for the new rulers of Italy tended to break up into small groups actuated by personal and sectional rather than by national interests, and proved unequal to restraining the growing indiscipline of the country. Republicans, socialists, and anarchists, manufactured by over-taxation, became increasingly active, and the "Irredentists," caricaturing the national aspirations of better days, clamoured for the restoration of "unredeemed Italy," meaning all Italian speaking lands in the possession of foreign Powers from Tyrol to Malta, and did much to alienate European friendship. And not the least of Italy's misfortunes was the loss of the steadying influence of Victor Emmanuel at the very outset of these years of trial.

When King Humbert ascended the throne in 1878, nothing seemed less likely than that the country would be tempted into any European combination. Bismarck thought otherwise, and was quick to perceive and to use a passing opportunity. Since the overthrow of Marshal MacMahon France, under a succession of short-lived ministries, had been conducting a campaign, which often seemed to pass the bounds of legitimate precaution, against the clergy and especially against the religious orders engaged in teaching. Elementary education was made gratuitous and compulsory, and was placed under lay control. The legal rights of the State were strained to the utmost to destroy the educational privileges possessed by those universities which were not under State direction, and to break up and expel unauthorised religious bodies. Among the most active of those who took part in this campaign was the professed free-thinker, Jules Ferry. Besides this somewhat negative policy he had, however, other and more ambitious views for France, desiring to turn her thoughts from barren dreams of revenge to more fruitful plans for colonial expansion.

The prospect of French preoccupation in distant enterprises was highly gratifying to Bismarck, and at the Congress of Berlin he dropped a hint that no objection would be raised by Germany to any designs France might entertain upon Tunis. A similar assurance seems to have been given by Lord Salisbury, and three years later Tunis was occupied on the

pretext of frontier difficulties with the Kroumirs (1881). The fall of Ferry and the accession of Gambetta to power was the immediate consequence. The latter strongly condemned the adventure, desiring to reserve the national energies for another trial of strength with Germany. The apparent inconsistency of his Egyptian policy traced in the last chapter, was due to a wish to put an end to the isolation of France by engaging England with her in a common enterprise.

In Italy the occupation of Tunis produced an explosion of anger. Italians had always regarded the country, divided as it was by the narrowest part of the Mediterranean from the shores of Sicily, as their own destined share of the Turkish Empire. The ministry of Cairoli, strongly French in sympathy, had no choice but to resign, and their successors, under the guidance of Depretis, flung themselves into Bismarck's arms. In May, 1882, the Triple Alliance was complete. One solid advantage Italy gained by the compact. Whatever its natural sympathies the Austrian government was now debarred from supporting Papal designs against her national unity. Nothing illustrates more forcibly the change in European relations during the last quarter of the century than the permanence of this strange alliance between the jealous rivals of 1866, and between the oppressor and oppressed of the Italian wars of liberation.

The conclusion of the Triple Alliance was highly disagreeable to Russia. The fact that no active steps were taken to neutralise such a formidable combination is only to be accounted for by the internal politics of the Russian Empire and by the personality of the new Czar. At this point, therefore, a short digression becomes necessary for any clear understanding of the European situation. Alexander III inherited the splendid physical endowment of his grandfather Nicholas, and not a little of his character. He possessed an unbending will, an unflinching courage, and an immense capacity for sustained work combined with great honesty of purpose and a strong sense of duty. As the ruler of a constitutional country he would have achieved a notable success. But something more is required of an autocrat than character. Alexander's mental outlook was narrow and his imaginative powers small. His father exactly hit his characteristic of blundering strength in his boyhood's nickname of "the bullock." It was his misfortune to have been a second son, and therefore to have been educated without due regard to his future destiny, and his constitutional shyness deprived him of many of the lessons which other rulers learn in the school of life. Once he was possessed of an idea it became ineradicable, and he never understood opponents, interpreting their action as the outcome of pure malice.

The moment of his accession was to be decisive for a nature so loyal, blind, and determined. Affection for his father and regard for his country might impel him to persevere in carrying out Alexander II's bequest to his people. The same motives might lead him to make indiscriminating war upon all those influences which might plausibly appear to have troubled Russia's peace and to have made an end of a too indulgent ruler. At first his inclinations seemed to tend in the former direction. "Let my father's orders," he is reported to have said, "stand as his last will and testament." But an influence was at hand to suggest the other alternative with all the power of reasoned advocacy. Pobiedonostseff, Procurator of the Holy Synod, has been vulgarly represented as an ecclesiastic and a bigot. He was, in fact, neither. He was a lawyer of great acuteness of mind, but of very limited sympathies, and it was through him by virtue of his office, that the Czar exercised the imperial control over the National Church. He possessed the cynic's one political virtue, a cordial detestation of shams. It must be admitted that the current democratic principles of Western Europe had not presented themselves in Russia under very attractive forms. Their boasted truth, universality of application and moral cogency laid them peculiarly open to attack. Ruthlessly, and in the very spirit of the old-fashioned Nihilism, Pobiedonostseff tore off their tinsel, probed their weaknesses, and laid his finger upon their more sordid manifestations. No human method of government which claims to be axiomatic, whether based upon Divine

Right or the Rights of Man, can emerge unscathed from this type of assault. On the positive side Pobiedonostseff had little to offer. He found hope in the fact that the majority of mankind are politically apathetic, and desired the maintenance of autocracy and of the authority of the Church in Russia as the best means of preserving them in that healthy condition.

Nor did these propositions appear paradoxical to the great majority of Russians. The Slavophil, or national, party turned resolutely against the ideas of liberalism, and raised the cry that it was "time to go home." The assassination of Alexander II had provoked a strong revulsion of feeling. The new Czar's decision to maintain the autocracy intact was received with general approval. A policy of thorough-going reaction began. The press was put under a rigorous censorship, the Universities were subjected to searching inspection. In the law courts the jury system was now limited in its application. Local government, as well as the local administration of justice, was paralysed by the substitution of "Land Captains," nominated by the Minister of the Interior, for the elected Justices of the Peace, and by committing to them what amounted to a discretionary authority over the action of the *mirs*. The *Zemstvos* themselves were placed under the control of the provincial Governors.

On the other hand, Alexander's real care for the interests of his subjects was evidenced by a whole series of measures for improving the position of the lower classes. Large reductions were made in the sums still due for the redemption of lands ; a Land Bank was founded to assist further acquisitions of property; a new and better system of licensing the emigration of peasants from their native places led to successful colonisation beyond the frontier; a number of Factory Laws protected operatives against the greed or neglect of their employers in the rising industries of St. Petersburg and Moscow.

And all this while the government, with the goodwill alike of liberal and reactionary opinion, waged unrelenting war upon the Nihilists, and not without a measure of success. The movement was scotched if not actually killed. Less commendable was the persistent pressure exercised upon alien nationalities, such as the Poles and the Germans of the Baltic provinces, and upon alien religious bodies, like the Jews and Stundists, in the interests of Russian nationalism and of Russian orthodoxy.

We are now in a position to understand Alexander's foreign policy. To the objects of his domestic administration it was entirely subsidiary. The Russo-Turkish War had taught him to regard military action in Europe as the precursor of certain trouble at home. He was firmly resolved to undertake no crusading adventures for the sake of oppressed Christian races or for the purpose of combating revolutionary tendencies abroad. If Russia was to draw the sword, she should draw it for purely Russian interests. He had no reason to love Germany, and the Czarina, a member of the Danish royal family, had not forgotten Schleswig- Holstein. At the same time the instability of French political life and its democratic character repelled him. He chose for his Foreign Minister de Giers, a resolute advocate of peace.

Under these circumstances Bismarck was enabled, in 1884, to recapture the alienated goodwill of Russia. By the Treaty of Skiemewice the Three Emperors' League was revived in a more definite form. Each Power agreed to stand neutral in ease either of the others should engage in war. They would together watch over the execution of the Treaty of Berlin, and refrain from separate occupation of the Balkan States. Should any dispute between two of the Powers arise in these districts, the third Power should decide the issue. Clearly Russia had for the time being abandoned aggressive designs beyond the Danube, and wished to impose a similar abstention upon Austria.

If the Czar believed himself to be consulting his own interests, the treaty was at least as advantageous to Bismarck, It freed his hands for certain secondary designs which had

long been in his thoughts. To understand these it is necessary to glance for a moment at his domestic policy. There were dangers and difficulties to be apprehended within the German Empire itself no less than beyond its frontiers. The influx of the French war indemnity had proved a doubtful blessing to Germany. Prices rose, speculation attained an unhealthy activity, feverish over-production characterised German industry. A period of depression, bankruptcy, and unemployment followed, during which the doctrines of the German Socialist party gained a wide currency among the labouring class. Bismarck began to listen to the voices which were raised for the protection of native industries. Another motive was driving him in the same direction. It would undoubtedly do much to conciliate the smaller States if the burden of their contributions to the federal exchequer could be laid upon indirect taxation.

Since the foundation of the *Zollverein* the trend of fiscal policy in Germany had been in the direction of free trade, and the movement had been accelerated by the Repeal of the English Corn Laws in 1846. In 1879 Bismarck resolved to break with the past, and carried his proposals through the Reichstag at the cost of his long-standing alliance with the National Liberals. Protective duties were imposed upon manufactured goods, on some raw materials, and even upon foodstuffs, without, strangely enough, raising the cost of the last. Germany now entered upon a period of great commercial prosperity. How much of her success is to be ascribed to Protection and how much to other causes is a question which has been very variously answered, and, in most cases, on insufficient data. It can at least be proved beyond the possibility of doubt that the tariff in Bismarck's hands became a weapon of irresistible power in forcing other countries to lower their barriers against German trade.

The protective policy did not succeed in conciliating the Socialists. To please the Agrarian party and to encourage rural life the duties on corn were twice subsequently raised, and the consequent increase in prices was regarded as a grievance by the artisan population of the towns. Once more Bismarck displayed his amazing adaptability, deciding to fight the Socialist leaders with their own weapons. In 1882 he came forward with two proposals, for the insurance of workpeople against sickness and against accident respectively. By the former every workman was forced to belong to a Benefit Club, to which the employer was bound to pay over a small weekly deduction from the man's wages together with a contribution of half that amount from his own pocket. By the latter the employer was required to bear the whole cost of insuring his workmen against accident. To complete our account of this legislation we may so far anticipate later events as to add that in 1889 similar principles were applied to secure a provision for Old Age and for Incapacity. It should be noted that these measures have failed to cure the discontent of the working-classes, who evidently prefer higher wages with absolute freedom in their disposal to any organised system of security against distress.

The protective system had other and more important results than these experiments in State Socialism. They emphasised the need for foreign markets and gave force to the pleadings of the German colonial party. Bismarck himself was no whole-hearted "colonial." He could never have said with Napoleon, "This old Europe bores me." But he was not unwilling to favour German interests beyond the seas if he could do so without sacrificing points in the European game, and the treaty of Skiemewice had for the moment set his more pressing anxieties at rest. His complaisance did not go so far as to support colonial enterprise at the risk of actual hostilities, and this consideration imposed serious limitations upon his outlook. Central and Southern America were guarded by the Monroe Doctrine. England would undoubtedly refuse to abandon without a struggle her monopoly in Australasia. There remained therefore the islands of the Pacific and the coasts of Africa. Even in Africa, Germany could expect no absolute freedom of choice. France occupied the most desirable portions of the Mediterranean coast, was busily pressing forward her West

African frontiers from Senegal towards Timbuctoo, and had avowed designs on Madagascar dating from the seventeenth century. England stood possessed of the Cape. And upon the Eastern and Western coasts respectively the long-standing Portuguese possession of Mozambique and Angola required respectful treatment.

There remained therefore the unclaimed regions on either coast of the Gulf of Guinea, the tract of no-man's-land separating Angola from the Cape Colony, and the shores of the Indian Ocean from Mozambique to the Red Sea. There was, it is true, one difficulty. On all these three stretches of coast-line British commercial interests were at least predominant where they did not enjoy an undisputed field, and the advent of German rule, and with it the German protective tariff, would involve the extinction of these interests. Here, in fact, is the sole and sufficient cause for any jealousy which Britain may have shown of German expansion. To Bismarck the difficulty did not appear insurmountable. In England the Afghan and Zulu adventures had produced a nervous dread of "responsibilities." The national policy was hampered by the difficulties and enmities entailed by the occupation of Egypt. The tone of the existing government on questions affecting Imperial interests was accommodating, nay, almost apologetic. England could evidently be squeezed without the slightest risk.

Events which had already occurred counselled immediate action. Public interest in the African continent had received an immense stimulus from the noble work of Livingstone as missionary and explorer, from rising indignation at the horrors of the slave-trade, which was still plied by Arab dealers for the Moslem markets of North Africa, though the transatlantic traffic was long since dead, and by the travels undertaken by geographers and scientists for the purpose of tracing the courses of the great waterways. But it was left for H. M. Stanley, neither a geographer nor a missionary, but a journalist and man of the world, to excite attention of a more practical kind. In 1875 he accepted a commission from the Daily Telegraph to cross the Continent in the Congo region, and his periodical letters to that newspaper produced an extraordinary impression.

On no one did the fascination of the Dark Continent take a stronger hold than on Leopold II, King of the Belgians. Active-minded and ambitious, with little outlet for his energies in his own Kingdom, he conceived the idea of placing himself at the head of a movement which should alter the history of the world. In 1876 he summoned an International Conference at Brussels of all who were interested in the opening up of Africa for humanitarian, commercial, or scientific reasons. The Conference founded an International African Association, and each nation represented undertook to form a National Committee, and to collect funds for the central body. Enterprise was indeed stimulated, but it is not surprising that each committee worked in isolation, and in fact contributed little to the Association as a whole. On Stanley's return he was immediately invited to Brussels, with the result that the King's plans took a new and definite direction. A separate committee of the Association was formed called the "Committee for the Study of the Upper Congo," which before long shed its non-Belgian subscribers, and in 1882 assumed the more ambitious title of the "International Congo Association," practically extinguishing the parent Association altogether. But it was not merely a name, nor yet the particular direction to be taken by the energies of an international society that Stanley's influence had altered. Leopold now contemplated nothing less than the foundation of a new State, under his own authority, in which civilisation should be bestowed on Africa in return for commercial advantages to be enjoyed by Europe and, more especially, by Belgium. Indeed Stanley had returned to Africa without delay, in order to undertake the preliminary task of founding trading-posts and of making treaties on the Congo, financed by the King out of his private purse.

At this point difficulties arose. De Brazza, a French explorer, appeared upon the river intent upon doing the same work for France, and Portugal succeeded in persuading England

to accept a treaty recognising her own possession of the Congo estuary. This treaty was abandoned in deference to a general protest; but it was now evident that only a European Conference could confirm the position of the Association. The Conference met at Berlin in 1885, and by its act the Congo Free State, which already possessed a flag, a Governor, and a staff of officials, was formally created and its boundaries defined. It was further laid down that the slave-trade was to be extirpated, that the navigation of all rivers should be open to all nations, and that commerce should be free except for such duties as were necessary for revenue. How these conditions were observed will be related in another place. Besides settling the Congo question the Conference established the rule that occupation of African territory could only be recognised if actually effected, and that notice of such occupation must be given to the Powers.

This last provision was the result of events which had in the meantime been taking place elsewhere. In 1884 Germany had secured her first African colony. Sir Bartle Frere had long suspected German designs upon the coast-line north of the Orange River. He was aware that communications had passed between the German colonial party and the Boer Republics, and the presence of German missionary traders in Namaqualand disquieted him. In 1878 he pressed for the annexation both of this district and of Damaraland. Lord Beaconsfield, already somewhat distracted by the results of his own Imperial policy, refused the request, proclaiming British sovereignty over Walfisch Bay only, as a concession to his zealous subordinate. In 1880 the German settlers made a formal application to the British government for protection against the natives. The reply of the Gladstone ministry was the withdrawal of all British officials from the country.

Bismarck at once realised the possibilities of the situation. He asked the plain question whether England was prepared to protect Europeans in the district. Lord Granville's reply categorically denied all responsibility for the coast-line north of the Orange River (1880). Bismarck was not yet ready and the next step came from the German "colonials." Lüderitz, a Bremen merchant, was sent out to establish a new trading station, and the protection of the German government was solicited. Bismarck renewed his application to Lord Granville, stating that, if no British protection was to be looked for, Germany would, without any ulterior designs, exercise her general duty of protecting her subjects. The reply was a request for further information, and a promise to consult the Cape authorities. Lüderitz was now ready. Having obtained satisfactory assurances from Bismarck, he organised an expedition, landed at Angra Pequena, obtained the cession of a tract of country from a native chief and hoisted the German flag (1883). Still the British government remained blind to the real situation, and imagined that Germany would be satisfied with an offer of protection. The Cape authorities now asserted that the whole district had always been regarded as within the sphere of the colony's interests. This was true, but they had always been unwilling to undertake definite responsibility for it, and it was difficult to answer Bismarck's polite requests for evidence of title in view of previous disavowals. At last the resolution was taken to establish British authority, and the public were assured that the wishes of the German government had now been met. But in the meanwhile Bismarck had declared a protectorate, and had sent his son to London to enforce its recognition. By August, 1884, the German flag floated over the whole coast-line north of the Orange River.

England began to be seriously alarmed. The extension of German influence inland and the attempts of armed parties of Boers to establish settlements in Bechuanaland seemed likely to menace the northward expansion of Cape Colony by establishing two allied Powers in contact across its *hinterland*. In 1884 a missionary named John Mackenzie was authorised to proclaim a British protectorate. In the next year Sir Charles Warren was despatched to the country at the head of a colonial force, and by him the southern districts were erected into a Crown colony, while Khama, chief of the country northwards, accepted the protectorate of Britain. There is scarcely a more important incident in the history of South

Africa.

This was not the only quarter from which Germany attempted to open up communications with the Boers. In September, 1884, an emissary of Lüderitz landed in Zululand, and endeavoured to obtain the cession of St. Lucia Bay from Dinizulu, son of Cetewayo. The British government was induced, apparently by Sir Donald Currie, to despatch a cruiser to the spot, the British flag was hoisted, and, in view of treaty rights dating from 1843, Gladstone declined to give way.

Along the Guinea coast and in the Cameroons district, petitions had been again and again presented by native chiefs for annexation by Great Britain, their motive being a desire to secure the peace and justice which obtained in the British dependencies. These petitions were disregarded. In 1884, Lord Granville was informed by the German government that a certain Dr. Nachtigal was proceeding to this coast to report on German commerce, and was requested to instruct the British consular authorities to assist him. Thus aided, Bismarck's agent proceeded to Togoland which he placed under a German protectorate, and thence to the Cameroons. Here he succeeded in obtaining treaties from King Bell and other native chiefs. An English warship discovered what was on foot, and hastily summoned Hewett, the British Consul. He arrived too late to prevent the annexation, but made haste to secure the Oil Rivers district for his own country. It is not a little remarkable that certain other treaties made at the same time to the detriment of French claims, were promptly disavowed by the German government.

It was after the Conference of Berlin that the East Coast became the scene of similar rivalries. From the Mozambique frontier to the Gulf of Aden the sovereignty was claimed by Sultan Burghash of Zanzibar, but his actual authority did not in reality penetrate far inland. In matters of commerce British influence was paramount, and Sir John Kirk, the British Resident, was the Sultan's most trusted adviser. Here, too, opportunities favourable to the extension of British authority had been deliberately put aside. In 1878 the Sultan had offered a lease of his claims on the mainland, and in 1881 a protectorate over the whole of his dominions, on each occasion without result. Meanwhile the designs of the German colonial party in these regions had been of long standing, and in 1884 their activity provoked enquiries addressed to the German government, which were answered with somewhat equivocal assurances. Towards the end of the same year, Dr. Peters and two companions, acting as representatives of a colonizing society, proceeded in the disguise of workmen to Zanzibar, crossed to the mainland and obtained the signature of a large number of "treaties," on the pretence, as it was generally believed, of obtaining the autographs of the guileless native chiefs. A German East African Company was founded, and official notification was given to the British government, who obligingly instructed Sir John Kirk, greatly to his disgust, to use his influence in obtaining its recognition from the unwilling Sultan.

The Sultan's rights were, in fact, like all such claims of suzerainty, exceedingly disputable, and did not satisfy the test laid down by the Berlin Conference. He strove, however, at least to make them good, as far as the valuable mountain slopes of Kilimanjaro were concerned, by definite treaties with the chiefs. It so happened that German agents were simultaneously working for the same object, and that a year earlier an Englishman, H. H. Johnston, had been doing the like on behalf of a group of Manchester merchants. Of this latter enterprise, the origin of the British East African Company, the British government proceeded to give notice to Germany, announcing that it would not be supported officially if it proved to interfere with the German schemes. Such cordial co-operation brought about an early settlement. The unhappy Sultan was coerced by a German squadron, and a joint Boundary Commission assigned him the coast-line to a distance of ten miles inland and bestowed the whole of the *hinterland* upon Germany. The northern frontier of the new

German colony was so drawn as to include Kilimanjaro, the concessions obtained by the Sultan and by Johnston being alike disregarded (1886). The development of the British Company belongs to a later period.

Much more valuable than anything that Germany had yet acquired were the regions commanding access to the Niger and its great tributary the Benue. But here she was forestalled by the vigilance of a Company of British merchants guided by Sir George Goldie, at one time an officer in the army. Formed in 1879, the Company set to work to freeze out later intruders, especially the French ; and by dint of presents and of competition which took no account of profits, succeeded in ruining and finally buying up their enterprises. But in April, 1885, a German agent named Flegel left Berlin, bound for the Benue and the Arab Sultanates of Sokoto and Gando, bordering upon Lake Chad. No time was to be lost. The services of Joseph Thomson, the explorer of Masailand, were secured, and through him treaties were obtained which put the position of the Company beyond dispute. Flegel therefore returned empty-handed. Thus by 1886 the Company was able to make out a case for the grant of a Charter, which had been hitherto refused owing to the existence of other interests, and was officially recognised as The Royal Niger Company.

On the whole series of events some general observations may perhaps be offered. It will be readily conceded that Germany has as good a right to facilities for colonial expansion as any other Power. It is manifest that in no case, save in the single instance of the Niger territory, did Britain at this time prevent Germany from obtaining what she sought. It is indisputable that in her dealings with the Sultan of Zanzibar Germany received even more assistance than she could reasonably claim. It may be granted that British policy in South-West Africa was to the last degree exasperating; on the other hand, that of Germany in the Cameroons was scarcely ingenuous. Undoubtedly the British government would have acted most wisely if they had recognised the existence and the validity of German ambitions and had invited a frank exchange of views. The difficulty of such a policy lay in the German protective tariff, and in the consequent injury which German colonisation promised to inflict on British merchants. But the only alternative line of action implied a claim to universal dominion which the wildest imperialist would have rejected, and a power of sustaining it which England did not then possess. The actual course pursued provoked in the first instance much jealousy and bad blood, and in its final stage a contempt for tactics at once obstructive and timid, which lowered still further the already diminished prestige of Great Britain.

CHAPTER XXIX

“ SPLENDID ISOLATION ”

VERY slowly the eyes of English statesmen were opened to the magnitude of the task which they had undertaken in Egypt and to the gratuitous folly of the engagements by which they had tied their own hands. It will be remembered that the British government had announced that their action would be confined to giving advice to the Khedive and his ministers. They now advised, and they were well justified in advising, the evacuation of the Soudan. That half-civilised dependency of Egypt had risen into rebellion under a fanatic, named Mohammed Ahmed, who assumed the title of the Mahdi, and who claimed to be the long-expected Deliverer foretold by the Prophet. Moslem fervour and hatred of Egyptian oppression combined to extend the movement slowly northwards till it was evident that sooner or later all the garrisons in the country must be cut off from the outer world. In spite of some misconceptions in England there was nothing to redeem the reign of savagery thus spreading over the country. But the hard facts remained that the Egyptian treasury was empty and that the Egyptian army was in a state of dissolution.

The ministers of the Khedive unwisely decided to reject British advice, and the British government more unwisely decided not to restrain them. The decision resulted in an overwhelming disaster. Hicks Pasha was sent up the Nile with an army of the most untrustworthy description to strike at the Mahdi's capital of El Obeid, and perished with his entire force two days' march short of his destination at Shekan (1883). Shortly afterwards Baker Pasha, who was despatched by way of Suakim on the Red Sea to relieve Tokar, barely succeeded in escaping at El Teb from the rout and slaughter of his troops at the hands of Osman Digna, brought about by their own disgraceful cowardice (1884).

There could no longer be any doubt that reconquest was out of the question. Indeed, on the arrival of tidings from El Obeid, the British advice was tendered again without the option of refusal. There still remained, however, the difficult task of extricating the garrisons from a fate which could not be doubtful if once the tribes of the nearer regions made common cause with the Mahdi. The *Pall Mall Gazette* put forward the name of General Gordon, who was on the point of starting to take up the governorship of the Congo, and the suggestion was received with public acclamation. Gordon's character and career were indeed such as to account for the enthusiasm. He was himself an enthusiast. A true Christian and a lover of his fellow-men, as well as a soldier of incomparable daring, he possessed a magnetic power of winning the hearts of uncivilised men and of inspiring his subordinates. He had already done good work as Governor of the Soudan ; but his highest distinction had been won in China, where he had turned a composite force of the most unpromising materials into the “ever-victorious army” of the Taeping rebellion, and had gained his service nickname of “Chinese Gordon.” Unhappily he possessed serious disqualifications for a mission, the success of which would depend upon the use of large discretionary powers with strict and loyal regard to the limitations imposed on him. He was too prone to follow his own impulses, too inconsistent in his actions and judgments, and too little inclined to yield an implicit deference to instructions.

Nevertheless, in spite of objections urged by Sir Evelyn Baring, now Consul-General in Egypt, the government, wishing to do something, and not knowing quite what to propose, sent him out to Egypt. His first instructions authorised him to do no more than consider and report, except so far as he was further commissioned by the authorities in Egypt. Such a

commission clearly did not meet the needs of the situation, and, at the instance of Gordon himself, the government were induced to consent to his making arrangements for the future settlement of the Soudan, and to his being invested with the office of Governor-General for that purpose. These suggestions were embodied by Baring and the authorities at Cairo in a letter of instructions laying stress on the primary object of evacuation, but leaving Gordon free as to time and method, and suggesting, with his own approval, the restoration of the local Sultans dispossessed by the Egyptian occupation. He was provided with two firmans from the Khedive, one appointing him Governor-General, the other, to be published at his discretion, announcing the intended evacuation. Unfortunately, the home government never clearly realised their responsibility for what they had done by deputy.

On January 26, 1884, Gordon started, and from that moment began to perplex the Egyptian government with contradictory suggestions. At Berber he very rashly published the proclamation announcing the intended withdrawal. Before arriving at Khartoum he made known, what it was indeed impossible to avoid, that the decree for the abolition of slavery, which was to have taken effect in 1889, would no longer hold good. Of this announcement the parliamentary opposition in England made unscrupulous use.

Gordon's arrival and his first measures produced an excellent impression at Khartoum and in the neighbourhood. But he soon realised the impossibility of securing peace in the country by the restoration of the Sultans. He therefore requested that Zobeir Pasha might be sent up from Egypt as his destined successor, in the character of a subsidised but independent native ruler, whose power would depend upon his own resources. Zobeir had great personal influence in the Soudan, but as a notorious slave-trader his record was bad. Moreover, his attitude towards Gordon was more than doubtful, for in 1878 his son had been shot by order of one of the General's subordinates. Nevertheless at an interview in Cairo, Gordon had, in his own words, experienced "a mystic feeling" that Zobeir would be his friend, and had only been restrained by Baring from taking him then and there to Khartoum.

Baring was now convinced that Gordon had other than merely sentimental reasons for his request, and six times over pressed Lord Granville to accede to it. The government refused. They were undoubtedly justified in thinking that the experiment was fraught with the risk of failure, but it would seem that they were much more seriously alarmed by the effect likely to be produced upon public opinion at home by the recognition of the old slave-hunter. And while every day the perplexed ministers laid more stress upon the "evacuation" prescribed by the dual instructions, Gordon himself had almost forgotten evacuation in his eagerness to secure the promised "settlement." To Baring's alarm he began to talk about the need of "smashing the Mahdi," pointing out, what in the end proved only too true, that Egypt itself would have no peace till the work was accomplished. By the beginning of March the tribes round Khartoum had joined the revolt. Evacuation was now the most that could be hoped for. And to Gordon's chivalrous nature evacuation had come to mean the sacred duty of extricating every one of the garrisons and all the civilians who wished to leave. Here undoubtedly he was wrong. The spirit of his orders now demanded his withdrawal with all he could bring off. And every day that passed made it more certain that the evacuation of Khartoum itself could not be effected without military aid.

Operating from Suakim on the Red Sea, General Graham had been engaged with the tribes under Osman Digna. Moving in hollow square formation, a tactical expedient by which British musketry and bayonets were matched against the headlong fury of the tribesmen, he had won the two barren victories of El Teb and Tamai. It was accordingly suggested that Graham should be reinforced and should push forward on Berber across the desert. The enterprise was difficult, but had the support of military opinion, and it was proposed to meet the special difficulties of the climate by employing Indian troops. In spite of the protests of Baring the government refused to authorise the undertaking. They had nothing better to

suggest than peaceful overtures for the submission of Osman Digna.

From March to August the ministers, relying upon earlier expressions used by Gordon himself, refused to face the disagreeable fact that a relief expedition was necessary, and, in spite of the plainest speaking by all who were on the spot, declared themselves not satisfied that Khartoum was in danger. Only in September was the inevitable expedition sanctioned. It was to be still further delayed by Lord Wolseley's fatal decision to follow the river instead of crossing the desert from Suakim. With a low Nile the difficulties of steamer and boat transport caused by the cataracts were almost insuperable, and on reaching Korti Wolseley resolved, owing to urgent messages from Gordon, to despatch a flying column under Sir Herbert Stewart, through the Bayuda desert across the great bend of the Nile. Meanwhile General Earle followed the course of the river, and lost his life in winning a brilliant little success at Kirbekan.

Stewart was attacked at Abu Klea, and two days later at Abu Kru. In the former engagement the British square was at one time broken and the whole force was in grave peril, in the latter Stewart was mortally wounded. Sir Charles Wilson who succeeded him, got into touch with Gordon's steamers at Metammeh, and embarking with a small detachment pressed on for Khartoum. He was saluted with a hurricane of shot and shell both from the town and the river banks, from which he had much difficulty in making his escape, and which proved that relief had arrived too late. Two days earlier, on January 26, 1885, Khartoum had fallen and Gordon had been slain. His mistakes will be readily condoned by all who remember the superhuman difficulties of his task, and who honour his heroic, if mistaken, determination to stand by the garrisons to the last.

The irresolution of Gladstone and his colleagues was not altogether the effect of judicial blindness. Harassed by the Irish question at home they were simultaneously confronted with a dangerous situation in Central Asia. Since the victorious advance of Skobelev described in a previous chapter, there remained only the Turkoman country round Merv, the ancient "Queen of the World," between the Russian frontier and the north western districts of Afghanistan. In 1881 Alexander II, shortly before his assassination, had authorised the transmission of an assurance to Britain that Russia had no ambitions in this direction, and good Liberals waxed merry over the "Mervousness" of imperialist opponents. It was, however, the tradition among Russian military and diplomatic agents in Central Asia to put a wide interpretation on the pronouncements of St. Petersburg, and in 1882 Colonel Alikhanoff, a Mohammedan subject of the Czar, came to Merv disguised as a clerk and succeeded in organising a party in favour of Russia. He had not to wait long for the reward of his efforts. In 1884 the new Czar conceived that England's failure to carry out her promise of evacuating Egypt absolved him from his engagements, and Alikhanoff was authorised to demand the submission of Merv.

Action was evidently necessary to prevent a collision between Russia and the Ameer, and Abdur Rahman was induced to consent to an Anglo-Russian boundary commission. Meantime, in September, 1884, the Treaty of Skiernewice had been concluded; in January, 1885, Khartoum had fallen, and in the following March affairs in Central Asia developed into a serious crisis. The English commissioners reached the frontier in October, but Russia still temporised and in the meantime pushed forward her troops. To save Penjdeh, which both sides claimed, the Afghans occupied the village. General Komaroff ordered them to retire, and on their refusal, attacked and captured the position, disregarding the protest of an English officer on the spot. The insolence of the act was patent. Public opinion in England was stirred to its depths, and the ministry obtained a vote of war-supplies. But the Czar had already calculated the risks. Relying upon the embarrassments of England and upon his understanding with Bismarck he declined to reprimand Komaroff, and the British government, as he anticipated, were not prepared to press the point. Happily Abdur

Rahman set little store by Penjdeh, and was above all things anxious to avoid a struggle in which he himself was certain to be involved. The Boundary Commission at last got to work, and Russia kept Penjdeh.

Before the year was out Alexander's own mistakes enabled English diplomacy to deal him a blow in a quarter where he was as vulnerable as he was sensitive. Allusion has already been made to the dissatisfaction of Russia's late allies in the Balkans with the scanty consideration for their interests which she had displayed both at San Stefano and Berlin. Russian influence in the peninsula had sustained a decisive set-back. But there was one State at least upon whose gratitude the Czar counted. To his father the new principality of Bulgaria owed her freedom, and Russian soldiers and administrators had been freely lent to assist her in the organisation of her government and of her army. In return for all this he looked for the obedience of a vassal and an unhesitating support of Russian policy.

It was with these objects in view that Alexander of Battenberg, a scion of the princely line of Hesse-Darmstadt, and nephew of Alexander II, had been selected in 1879 as the ruler of Bulgaria. His dashing soldierly presence and handsome features were likely to recommend him to his new subjects; his close connection with Russia seemed a guarantee of his loyalty; while his youth, his ignorance of the Bulgarian language, and his lack of political experience, coupled with a certain want of political capacity and tact, appeared to afford sufficient assurance that he would never prove dangerous. The imaginative side of his temperament, inherited from his Polish mother, had been left out of the calculation. He was too sensitive of his dignity to remain a puppet, and there was in his nature a latent strain of romantic heroism capable of responding to a great occasion.

The Prince's position was extremely unpleasant. Dondukoff Korsakoff, who directed the Russian officials, treated Bulgaria as a conquered province and set a Russian in every post of profit or of authority. Bulgarian opposition in the *Sobranje*, or popularly-elected Chamber, was, as was natural among a newly liberated people, often factious and undignified. Alexander got all the blame for maintaining in office ministers to whose want-of judgment he was alive, but with whom his Russian patron would not suffer him to dispense. In 1881 the friction had become intolerable, and, since he dared not break with Russia, he decided to give the foreign officials a free hand. He suspended the Constitution, obtained a grant of autocratic power for seven years, and, since he was not equal by himself to the difficulties of the situation, obtained from the Czar the services of Generals Skobeleff and Kaulbars.

Russia had thus gained all that she sought. The folly of her representatives threw away the advantage. Alexander writhed under a tutelage more undisguised than ever, and his ill-concealed discontent only served to render his position doubly precarious. His mentors now proceeded to trade upon his unpopularity with a view to securing his deposition. The Prince no longer hesitated to adopt the only course which promised to save his throne. In 1883 he declared for the restoration of the Constitution and came to terms with the national leader Karaveloff. It was not long before he had won the confidence of a stronger man, the inn-keeper's son of Timovo, Stepan Stambuloff, whose fiery patriotism was destined to save Bulgarian independence in the hour of its trial. The Czar was defied, and the attempt of his two generals to kidnap the Prince only served to restore the latter's popularity.

Alexander III was bitterly offended. The conduct of Bulgaria savoured of the grossest ingratitude, the action of her Prince excited his angry contempt as a piece of impulsive folly only to be expected of his Polish blood. He had, however, little doubt of bringing both Prince and people to reason without the need of resorting to force. Hence he welcomed the Treaty of Skiernewice which promised the exercise of German restraint on the possible action of

Austria, which was already in alliance with Servia, and failed to observe that it tied his own hands if indirect methods proved of no avail.

He believed himself to hold the trump card of the game. Bulgaria still hankered for the possession of Eastern Roumelia, separated from her by the Treaty of Berlin, and Russian agents had steadily encouraged Amelia, unionist hopes in that province. Such encouragement was now withdrawn. The territory was to be the reward of unconditional submission on the part of Bulgaria. Meanwhile the Czar lost no opportunity of annoying his namesake. Making use of Bismarck's anxiety to propitiate Russia he secured the German Emperor's veto upon the proposed marriage between his granddaughter Princess Victoria and the Bulgarian Prince. This service Bismarck rendered with undisguised goodwill, and not merely out of complaisance to Russia. It gave him an unrivalled opportunity for exciting public feeling against the English influence which he insisted on discovering in the proposal. The assertion was calculated to injure the Crown Prince and his English wife, who had never favoured the Chancellor's policy, and to assist him in his plans for profiting by England's weakness.

But events in Eastern Roumelia moved faster than the Czar had foreseen. In September, 1885, the people of Philippopolis declared against Turkish rule, and arrested their Governor, Gavril Pasha. After drawing his carriage round the town in triumph, with a Bulgarian schoolmistress seated at his side holding a naked sabre in her hand, they quietly sent him across the frontier and tendered their allegiance to Prince Alexander. The Prince hesitated, but Stambuloff confirmed his wavering resolution. "Two roads lie before you," he said, "one to Philippopolis, the other to Sistova and Darmstadt! Choose which you will." Alexander chose, and the revolution was thus effected without the loss of a single life.

The Czar had little doubt that Alexander had sealed his own fate. He might now be left to the tender mercies of Turkey, and the Russian ambassador at Constantinople was instructed to urge the Sultan to action. An unpleasant surprise was in store. Lord Salisbury was in power in England. No lover of Turkey since the Berlin Treaty, he had drifted still further from the traditional attitude of friendship, owing to Turkish jealousy of the Egyptian occupation. He strongly urged the Sultan not to act, and scared him with visions of a general war in the Balkans. Abdul Hamid therefore refused to be the catspaw of Russia. The same determined attitude on the part of England prevented any definite action being taken by a conference of ambassadors which sat at Constantinople to consider this infraction of the Treaty of Berlin. The only result of much discussion was a mild expression of regret.

Nevertheless Bulgaria was not to win her new province save at the cost of imminent peril. King Milan of Servia thought he saw his chance of trading upon his war. neighbour's weakness and unpopularity to secure at his expense that extension of territory which had been denied him at Berlin. He had a strong and well-disciplined army. The bulk of the Bulgarian forces were on the frontiers of Eastern Roumelia in expectation of a Turkish attack, and the Czar had recalled all the Russian officers who filled the higher ranks of the service.

Alexander hastened back from Philippopolis to join the small available force which had taken up an entrenched position at the village of Slivitzna, half-way between the Servian frontier and the Bulgarian capital. The right flank of this position ended among the precipitous southern slopes of the Balkans; upon the left flank the entrenchments were bent back to guard against a turning movement. Here from November 17 to November 19 the defenders withstood the determined attacks of greatly superior forces. On the first day their numbers did not permit the occupation of the trenches on the extreme left, and it was only the Prince's well-conceived instructions to Bendereff to take the offensive fiercely on the right that concealed this disadvantage. The attack was purely frontal, and was repelled with

heavy losses. On the second day the arrival of Bulgarian reinforcements enabled "the trenches on the left to be occupied and doomed the Servian efforts, which were now directed against this portion of the defences to like failure. Meanwhile Bendereff, pushing forward from the positions secured on the previous day, had occupied a village threatening the enemy's rear, and proposed to take the offensive from that point on the following morning. This movement Alexander wisely forbade, thus arousing resentment which was to have grave consequences. At dawn on the 19th, news arrived that a Servian column to the south had scattered a Bulgarian covering force and was making for Sofia. Thither Alexander returned at top speed, and had succeeded by his energy and enthusiasm in overcoming the general panic and in putting the town in a state of defence by the time that further information showed that the danger had been exaggerated. Meanwhile at Slivitzna the last assault had been delivered and had failed. The Bulgarian army advanced hard on the heels of its vanquished opponents, while Bendereff cleared the heights which surrounded his gallant little detachment at the bayonet's point, the bands actually playing the Bulgarian National Anthem at the head of each party of stormers.

The tables were now decisively turned. The main Bulgarian army reached Slivitzna by superhuman efforts on the day after the last engagement, and the distant cheer, caught up by brigade after brigade of the approaching troops at the sight of the Prince's figure outlined against the sky on the position he had defended, was the birth cry of a nation. The frontier was crossed, the town of Pirot was occupied and was only retaken by the Servians to bring upon themselves a heavy defeat after desperate street fighting. Alexander was making ready to enclose the whole opposing army, when a stronger than King Milan bade him desist. Count Khevenhiiller rode into the Bulgarian camp and insisted upon an armistice in the name of the Austrian Emperor. In March, 1886, the Treaty of Bucharest was signed between the belligerents. Serbia suffered no loss for her unwarrantable attack. But Bulgaria gained something better than an indemnity or a few Servian villages. There was no more talk of enforcing the Treaty of Berlin. And already in February, Turkey had recognised the *fait accompli* in Eastern Roumelia, and, stranger still, had signed an offensive and defensive alliance with the victorious principality. To the diplomacy of England and to their own right hands the Bulgarians owed their safety.

But for Prince Alexander there was to be no peace. Indignant with the allies who had tied his hands the Czar was more indignant with the kinsman who had defied him. His utterances breathed menace to the repose of Europe, but his action never passed beyond the encouragement of conspiracy. A Russian agent set on foot an assassination plot at Sofia. The design was discovered, and Russia actually demanded the release of the conspirators. Surer means were soon available. Within the Bulgarian army victory had produced an arrogant self-confidence which resented the appointment of a staff of German instructors. This feeling found a champion in Bendereff, now Minister of War, whose annoyance at the order which had restrained him at Slivitzna vented itself in such personal rudeness as had led to an inadequate recognition of his real achievements. He accordingly lent himself to serve the ends of his country's foes. Carefully arranging that certain loyal regiments should be stationed at a distance from the capital, he concentrated the entire strength of the disaffected troops against the small trustworthy force remaining in the city, surrounded the palace by night and holding a revolver to the Prince's head, forced him to sign a hasty act of abdication. Next morning Alexander was hurried to the Danube, thrust on board a yacht and landed on Russian soil, whence he was allowed to depart into Austrian territory.

But do what they would to excite popular enthusiasm for their *coup d'état* the conspirators failed to secure more than sulky acquiescence. Stambuloff threw the weight of his energy into the scales against them, and the commander of the garrison at Philippopolis, urged by the British Consul, defied their orders. His example was widely imitated. Half the

army and the bulk of the civil population demanded the return of Alexander. He came and was received in triumph, and then at the crisis of his fortunes proved unequal to the demand imposed upon his resolution. The Russian Consul at Rustchuk induced him to send a telegram promising devotion to the Czar and tendering, in default of his kinsman's favour, his unconditional abdication. Whether the message was obtained from him by delusive assurances or dictated by his own despair, loss of nerve, and weariness of the long struggle, no one will ever know. His Imperial cousin was ungenerous, and took him at his word. Thus disappeared from the stage of European politics a figure which had played for a few short years a part of such intense dramatic interest.

The Czar had only succeeded in exchanging a half-hearted opponent for a determined foe. From this moment Stambuloff became the ruler of Bulgaria. A regency was constituted in which his influence was predominant, and the demands of the Russian emissary, General Kaulbars (a brother of his predecessor in the same capacity), were set at naught. Alexander III still hoped to boycott the Bulgarian throne, and induced Waldemar of Denmark to refuse the Sobranje's advances. Not without difficulty did Stambuloff, who meanwhile acted as dictator and even ordered nine disloyal officers to be shot, find a candidate sufficiently ambitious and daring to brave the perils of acceptance. In July, 1887, Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg was at last elected, a man utterly different from his predecessor; no soldier, but rather a dilettante student and a man of fashion; no hero, but what was of more value to his adopted country wary, tenacious, and self-seeking. Turkey was friendly, the attitude of Europe forbade active interference by Russia, and Stambuloff's autocratic methods held down conspiracy and faction. But the day came when the all-powerful minister was no longer necessary to his master, and in 1893 Stambuloff resigned in hot anger. After two years spent in bitter recriminations unworthy of a noble past, the hand of the assassin made an end of the life which one conspirator after another had failed to reach while it was still indispensable to the national safety. Meanwhile Ferdinand had married, and on the birth of his son, Prince Boris, the child was received into the Orthodox Church, and a complete reconciliation was effected with Nicholas II, the heir of the Czar who had tried to strangle Bulgaria, and had failed.

Even before the accession of Prince Ferdinand, Alexander III had become disagreeably conscious of the real isolation and impotence to which his co-operation with the Triple Alliance had reduced him. He was well aware that Bismarck had sacrificed nothing by the vigorous denunciation of English influence which had given pleasure at St. Petersburg; that in reality he was grateful for the interference of Britain in the Bulgarian question, which had postponed for him the inevitable choice between Russia and Austria; and that his ultimate decision in any irreconcilable issue between them could never be doubtful. Another alliance was clearly desirable for Russia, the patriotic Slavophil party urged him on with no hesitating voice, but the only possible ally was exhibiting symptoms eminently distasteful to the Czar.

France was indeed at this time more than usually eager for an understanding. After the fall of Gambetta, Jules Ferry, who came to power at the head of a ministry in 1883, had once again endeavoured to steady French action in Europe by a vigorous colonial policy. The result had been a bitter disappointment which will entail a short digression.

In 1859 under the Second Empire, France had occupied Saigon in Indo-China at the mouth of the Mekong, hoping that the river would prove a commercial highway to the southern frontiers of China. This hope had been disappointed, and in 1872 a rebellion in the province of Yunnan led to an attempt by French traders to supply the Chinese authorities with war material by way of the Red River through the province of Tongking. The attempt resulted in disputes with the natives, and in an expedition under Gamier, who declared the river open and captured Hanoi, but lost his life in the subsequent defence of the town. A

treaty was now effected (1875) by which France obtained a number of vague concessions, to which after a while scanty respect was paid. Accordingly in 1882 Commandant Riviere was despatched to Tongking and attacked Hanoi. The enterprise miscarried, and a severe reverse, in which Riviere himself perished, was sustained at the hands of the savage piratical tribes known as the "Black Flags," who were openly encouraged by China. Another treaty with the natives signed in the same year drew a strong protest from Peking as constituting an infringement of Chinese suzerainty in Annam.

It was at this point that Ferry came to power. The French now displayed so much military activity that China despatched Li Hung Chang as Commissioner to Southern China to arrange terms. After some discussion he returned to Peking to find that the French Government had authorised a naval officer named Fournier to effect a secret understanding at the capital. A treaty was made by which China undertook to withdraw her garrison, and France to protect Tongking. The date of the withdrawal was not sufficiently clearly defined, and a misunderstanding took place. Colonel Duchesne advancing upon Langson, encountered at Bac-le the Chinese army of occupation, which had received no instructions to withdraw, and suffered a severe defeat. Another reverse sustained by General Negrier roused universal indignation in France, and Ferry was driven from power in March, 1885. It was in vain that the action of the French fleet ultimately compelled the ratification of the Fournier Convention, equally in vain that Madagascar admitted a French protectorate as the result of Ferry's efforts. France passed through a fit of sharp disgust with her colonies, and Tongking remained a colony peopled solely by officials, a by-word for languishing trade and lack of enterprise, and remarkable only for the hideous cruelties with which the natives resented the presence of the intruder, till in 1896 Governor Doumer arrived to inaugurate changes which led to the more prosperous conditions of today.

"France," as once before—in 1848—was "bored," bored with the dullness of the Third Republic and with its failure in the sphere of achievement, and at the critical moment there appeared in French politics a figure which seemed to embody the aspirations of the hour. The immense reputation momentarily achieved by General Boulanger was quite unwarranted by his very slender abilities, but he loudly proclaimed what France desired to believe. In 1886 he became Minister of War, and devoted himself to strengthening and re-arming the forces of the Republic.

Bismarck, disquieted by the denunciations of the Russian press, resolved, probably without the intention of provoking actual war, to read France a lesson. A French police officer named Schnaebele, was arrested on the frontier by German spies. It was Boulanger's opportunity, and he made the most of it. But when war seemed imminent Alexander III interposed, like his father before him, with a private letter to the Emperor William, and Schnaebele was released without reference to Bismarck.

Boulanger's reputation was now assured, and he became far too strong for his colleagues. Accordingly in 1887, he was removed to a provincial command, but only to become more than ever the idol of the Boulevards and the hope of Orleanists, Bonapartists, patriotic nationalists, and of everyone who was discontented with things as they were. Fortune played into his hands by discrediting the Republic. Wilson, son-in-law of President Grevy, was discovered to have been selling his personal influence to procure the distinction of enrolment in the Legion of Honour for aspirants of little merit. Grevy himself was compromised, and made matters worse by his undignified struggles to evade resignation.

Strengthened by the election of Carnot as President of the Republic, the ministers plucked up courage to reward Boulanger's open insubordination by dismissal from the service. He thereupon entered the Chamber as an elected deputy, and proposed a revision of the Constitution which would have placed the fate of the Republic at the mercy of a

plébiscite, (1888). The proposal was defeated, and Boulanger resigned his seat, only to reappear next year with a larger majority as one of the deputies for Paris. Had he but ventured at this juncture to appeal to violence and to stake all upon an attempt to coerce the President he might well have achieved success. His resolution failed him, and the tide began to turn. The ministry of the day decided to prosecute him for treason, and he fled across the Belgian frontier. He was already almost forgotten when he committed suicide at Brussels in 1891. The fact was that the essential impossibility of his bellicose policy had dawned on all but the most fervid of his supporters. The Czar had drawn back, to the bitter disappointment of the Slavophiles, Germany having offered him by the so-called "Reinsurance Compact" a guarantee of support in case of attack by Austria. Moreover, Bismarck by a triumphant justification of the national policy before the *Reichstag* had secured a material increase of military strength (1888).

Nevertheless Russia and France were drawn gradually but inevitably together. The first bond between them was financial. In 1888 Russia found increasing difficulty in obtaining in Germany the loans requisite for railway development in Asia. French financiers came eagerly to her help where business and patriotism pointed in the same direction. In 1891 the French fleet paid a ceremonial visit to Cronstadt, and the Czar stood bare-headed while the Marseillaise was played. Alliance was within measurable distance when Alexander for the second time drew back, disgusted, it would appear, by the Panama scandals. The Panama Company, founded by de Lesseps in 1880, to connect the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans went bankrupt in 1888. It was notorious that fraud had played a conspicuous part in the collapse. The government refused at first to prosecute the Directors, and when at length the step was reluctantly taken, it revealed a widespread taint of corruption among public men calculated to destroy confidence in the Republic itself (1892).

Yet in 1893 the two Powers were again gravitating to one another. The Russian fleet visited Toulon, and once more effusive compliments were exchanged. French anarchist plots in the same year and the assassination of President Carnot in 1894, a third time delayed the issue, and in November Alexander III died. His latter years had been passed in close seclusion as a precaution against plots. His successor, less cautious, less inclined to temporise, and more eager for the security which the alliance would afford for his designs in Asia, finally completed the- bargain in 1895. The Dual and the Triple Alliances stood opposed to one another.

Russia thus abandoned the practical isolation to which the agreement of Skiernewice had committed her. For the moment it looked as though England was about to take a similar step. Already Bismarck was blowing cold upon the colonial party when in March, 1888, the aged Emperor William I died, and Frederick III, the soldier Crown Prince of the Franco-Prussian war, succeeded him. Had he lived, German policy must have been profoundly modified. Though an enthusiastic believer in German Imperial unity he had never concealed his distaste for Bismarck's methods. He had a decided preference for popular government, and disliked the military and autocratic character of the German State. Married to the Princess Royal of England he had strong sympathies for her country. Bismarck had always regarded his own dismissal by the new Emperor as certain, though the latter as Crown Prince had honourably made it a rule to refrain from interference.

But Frederick was now dying of cancer. The Chancellor's position was trying. If the Emperor lived long enough to' dismiss him, a breach with the past was to be feared, likely to be all the more disastrous because the new policy was certain not to be maintained by the Crown Prince William. Moreover the Emperor, as an invalid and now entirely unable to speak, was necessarily obliged to depend upon the help of the Empress, and Bismarck, ever anxious to keep in with Russia, dreaded the consequences of her English sympathies. He quite frankly desired that Frederick should not reign. He was supported by the new

Crown Prince. To his master he showed indeed a kindly consideration, but he could not hold his tongue about the Empress, in spite of her admirable self-restraint in perhaps the most difficult part of all, tortured by her own sorrow and suspected by her adopted country. We have not, however, the knowledge to do justice to any of the actors in the tragedy except, indeed, to the suffering Emperor, whose noble constancy won universal respect. The dismissal of Puttkamer, a minister who had used undue influence in the elections, was his most startling political act, and in June his reign of ninety days ended.

The Crown Prince ascended the throne as William II, and his first utterances excited considerable alarm in Europe. Few people then understood that the passionate imagination which clothed his thoughts in telling metaphor, with all Frederick William IV's fatal facility, was joined to a steadiness of purpose and a prudence in action which were to make him the most influential as well as the most original of the sovereigns of Europe. But if Bismarck ever imagined that he could control a nature as imaginative and autocratic as his own he was soon undeceived. He had reached the age when a man does not readily modify his methods to suit new conditions. William II desired to try conciliation as a remedy for social discontent before resorting to repression. He saw the essential futility of attempting any longer to play the friend both to Austria and Russia. But the decisive issue was his wish that the Cabinet order of 1852, by which ministers communicated with the Emperor through the Chancellor only, should be so modified as to admit of independent access by individual ministers to himself. This change would have dethroned Bismarck, and he offered his resignation which was accepted with formal regrets (March, 1890). No honours could conciliate him, and he spent his latter days as the spiteful and undignified critic of his successors, a deplorable end to a life of high patriotic purpose and almost unparalleled achievement. Count Caprivi became Chancellor in his stead.

William II was a convinced supporter of colonial expansion. But he soon showed that his anti-English attitude at the time of his father's death was due rather to his determination to resist the introduction of English Liberal principles into Germany than to any sense of necessary antagonism between the two nations. He believed that they might work together in World Politics. These views were first publicly expressed in the Anglo-German agreement of July, 1890. The British East Africa Company, founded in 1888, had leased a strip of coast-line from the Sultan of Zanzibar and was engaged in opening up the interior. A rebellion had broken out in the German sphere in 1889, which the British authorities had helped to extinguish. Nevertheless, feeling was far from cordial, and Dr. Peters had started for Uganda north-west of Victoria Nyanza, a land distracted by the feuds of Catholic and Protestant missionaries, with the object of cutting off the new British Company from the interior. The agreement put an end to such hopes. Uganda was assigned to the British sphere, and Britain assumed a protectorate over Zanzibar and its dependent island of Pemba. Germany received compensation on the borders of Lake Nyassa, to the south of her sphere, as well as the island of Heligoland in the North Sea, and purchased outright the Sultan's strip of coast-line.

When the Emperor visited England in 1891 it seemed as though England was about to come to a definite understanding with the Triple Alliance. The opposition of France in Egypt and the hostility of Russia in Asia seemed alike to recommend the step. Yet Britain held back, and to her immediate loss. Her motives can only be guessed ; and it is likely that the old preference for "splendid isolation" had greater weight with her than any more prudent hesitation about committing herself to a share in the enterprises of an expanding world-Power.

Of this isolation England was to have two unhappy experiences before the series of events, to be narrated in our final chapter, which first led her to modify her attitude. In 1895, owing to boundary disputes with Venezuela, Lord Salisbury's government found itself

obliged to listen to a somewhat uncompromising assertion of the Monroe Doctrine by President Cleveland, and in the end to accept the arbitration of the United States. It is fair to add, however, that the verdict proved favourable to British claims.

More distressing still was British impotence at the time of the hideous Armenian massacres between 1894 and 1896. The Armenian race scattered widely over the Turkish Empire in the pursuit of commerce, had their original home on either side of the Russo-Turkish frontier in Asia Minor. Their secret societies, of which the *Hindchak* was the chief, had undoubtedly conspired to procure for these districts a separate national existence. Abdul Hamid let loose the savage Mohammedan Kurds upon the Armenian villages, and even afforded them the assistance of Turkish troops. While making play with the usual dilatory devices of promises, commissions of inquiry, and schemes of reform, he undoubtedly encouraged his officials to perpetrate or to connive at massacre after massacre. Driven to desperation, some of the Armenians of Constantinople made an attempt to avenge their countrymen by an insane attack on the Ottoman Bank. This was the signal for a systematic slaughter of the Armenians in the streets of Constantinople itself. In England opinion was profoundly stirred, and Frenchmen shared her indignation. But France was bound to Russia, and Russia had so bitter an experience of Armenian agitation within her own frontier that she determined to do nothing to encourage it, while Germany was chiefly intent on using the crisis to give the death-blow to English influence at Constantinople and to replace it by her own. British statesmen did wisely to decide that no separate action was possible by a friendless Power in the face of the general determination to sit still. But Britain shares with Europe a deep disgrace, and her share is the greater in that the Cyprus Convention made her in a special sense responsible for Asia Minor. She had indeed neglected to make the only provision which in the existing state of European relations could have secured for her a respectful hearing.

CHAPTER XXX

RECOVERY OF BRITISH INFLUENCE

FROM 1870 to the point which our narrative has now reached, British Imperial policy has exhibited two well-marked phases. During the later seventies there emerged a new interest in the distant possessions of the Crown and a pride in the national heritage. The policy which gave expression to this spirit was often rash and often ill-informed, and it entailed a standing feud with a great European Power. Both the Imperial spirit itself and its misapplication in practice England owes in great measure to Lord Beaconsfield. His errors resulted in a sharp reaction, and throughout the early eighties government and people alike displayed a nervous shrinking from responsibilities, which on more occasions than one involved the country in troubles which a resolute determination to face the facts would have avoided. The difficulties with which the Gladstone administration had to deal were more in number than fall at one time to the lot of most Cabinets, nor were these difficulties all of their own making. But it was not possible for the world to return to the conditions of the era previous to 1870. One European State after another was turning its gaze seawards, and the failure of a government primarily interested in domestic affairs to appreciate the new importance of world-politics led to a constant attempt to limit liabilities. This policy in its turn lowered British prestige at the critical moment when other nations were beginning to realise and to envy the special privileges which Britain enjoyed. Thus British world-policy made an unfortunate start only to display immediate symptoms of flagging. Both political parties must bear their several shares of the blame.

The Jubilee of Queen Victoria in 1887 served to produce a healthier and more hopeful tone of public feeling. From this moment more firmness appears in the assertion of British claims and more consistency of action where such claims are rightly or wrongly abandoned. But there is still no definite principle or purpose at work in Britain and view of the new grouping of the European Powers. England has no understanding either with the Triple or the Dual Alliance. At first sight such entire freedom from obligation appears singularly advantageous. By balancing the one combination against the other, and by throwing her weight into either scale as occasion might dictate, it has been suggested that England might have ensured both her own preponderant influence and the peace of the world. The suggestion fails to take account of one fact of first-class importance. Divided upon most other issues the Continental Powers had, as against England, a common interest. Germany, France, and Russia alike desired an increased share of the world's unoccupied territory with the avowed object of creating close preserves for their own commerce. England, already satisfied with her share of power, desired nothing better than the free entry of her merchandise into the unclaimed lands. On any important question of world-politics an anti-British combination was almost inevitable. It could only be averted by purchasing the co-operation of one or more of the Powers by services of which they could recognise the value.

Such a policy was still a long way off at the end of the eighties. Nevertheless British credit was recovering, and nothing helped so much to restore it as the success attained in the administration of Egypt. Yet it is no exaggeration to say that of all the tasks England ever undertook none was more difficult or at first sight more hopeless. It will be remembered that the Gladstone Cabinet had declined to proclaim a protectorate, and had announced that Great Britain would confine herself to the role of giving advice to the Khedive and his native ministers. It very soon became clear that no progress was possible unless such advice was understood to have the force of a command. The presence of a British army in

Egypt left the plain facts of the situation in no doubt. Nevertheless unnecessary friction and difficulty were caused by the elaborate game of make-believe. In all the more important departments was an English official, nominally subordinate to an Egyptian minister, but practically directing his action- Every one of these British officials looked to the British Consul-General as his real chief. Occupying nominally a position in' no way different from that of the Consuls-General of other Powers, he was, in fact, the mainspring of Egyptian policy. The situation was, upon the whole, accepted by the Khedive and his ministers in a manner very creditable to their loyalty in an extremely uncomfortable position.

Nevertheless, the Consul-General, Sir Evelyn Baring, and the Khedive's British advisers had by no means a free hand. In two very important respects the whole administration was in the fetters of international control. The Capitulations were a set of concessions granted by the Porte to the subjects of European Powers in the days when the presence of foreigners was scarcely recognised in the Turkish Empire. Egypt, as an original part of that Empire, continued to be bound by them. They conferred upon foreign residents immunity from taxation, the right of denying entry to their premises against the police, unless the latter were accompanied by the foreign consul concerned,-and the right to be tried for any offence by their own consular courts and under the laws of their own nation. Thus, even supposing foreign Powers well disposed, no arrests could be effected without the co-operation of the consuls, nor could any Egyptian or local enactment be made binding upon foreigners, unless, indeed, all the Powers could be induced to consent. In the existing state of feeling there was always a strong probability that a consul would throw every obstacle in the way of arrests, and that a consular court would do all it could to acquit its fellow-subjects, whatever the offences alleged against them.

No less hampering was the authority possessed by the Caisse de la Dette. The Commission which watched over the interests of the bondholders had at first consisted of an Englishman, a Frenchman, and an Italian, but to conciliate the other Powers, all of them had been invited to appoint representatives, who in practice took their instructions from their home governments. And inasmuch as the Law of Liquidation imposed a Limit of Expenditure on the Egyptian government, and no fresh loans could be contracted without leave of the Caisse, it was absolutely impossible to find money for new schemes, however beneficial to Egypt. Thus in finance, as in legislation and, police, the government was tied hand and foot. Under these difficult conditions taxation remained high, though much good was done by making the method of its collection just, and the season of payment convenient to the taxpayer, as well as by introducing rigid economy in all departments and a proper system of accounts.

In 1884, however, the funds available became so hopelessly insufficient that the government announced their intention of retaining for the expenses of administration a considerable part of that share of the revenue which by the Law of Liquidation belonged to the Caisse. Legal proceedings were at once taken, but in the meanwhile Britain opened negotiations with the other Powers. She had, in fact, a considerable inducement to offer if they were prepared to be reasonable. The indemnities promised to foreign residents in Alexandria for the losses incurred in the riots of 1882 had never been paid, from sheer want of money. These obligations the Egyptian government undertook to meet at once in return for adequate financial concessions. The result was the Convention of London of 1885. The interest payable on the Debt was to be reduced for two years ; a loan of nine millions was sanctioned, which settled the indemnities and left a million available for a purpose shortly to be noticed; and a diminution of the sum payable annually to the Caisse was approved for the purpose of reducing the Land-tax. Moreover, and this was most important of all, a higher Limit of Expenditure was authorised for the expenses of government, and, if the share of the revenue allotted for that purpose proved inadequate, the Caisse was to make up the deficit from its own share. Further, if the Caisse, after meeting the charges due for the Debt

and making up any deficit for the authorised expenses of government, had still a balance, that balance was to be divided equally between the Treasury and the Caisse. It was now possible for the government to pay its way, and the improved administration which it had introduced was already beginning to be reflected in the growing prosperity of the country.

Nevertheless it was at this time that the Salisbury Cabinet made a determined effort to cast off the burden from British shoulders. In 1887 Sir Henry Drummond Wolff was sent to Constantinople to arrange a Convention for that purpose with the Sultan. England undertook to withdraw her troops at the end of three years, and it was understood that both Powers reserved to themselves the option of reoccupying the country in case of disturbance, an option which, owing to the procrastinations of the Porte, could in practice belong to England alone. But the Convention had been no sooner drafted than both the French and the Russian ambassadors intervened from dislike of the provision for reoccupation, and persuaded the Sultan to withhold his ratification. The British government took no further steps in the matter, and the two interposing Powers were thus instrumental in postponing indefinitely the realisation of their dearest wishes.

Of the financial measures of the government none was more beneficial than the abolition of the *Corvée*, that is to say the forced labour exacted by the State for keeping the irrigation canals clear of silt. It was practically a huge tax upon industry. The sum allowed for reduction of the Land-Tax proved difficult to apportion fairly for its original purpose, and it was decided to apply it, along with a further sum saved by a conversion of the Debt effected in 1890, after much opposition on the part of France, to the clearing of the canals by contract.

Meanwhile British officers under Sir Evelyn Wood had been busily creating a new Egyptian army. The old army which had behaved so badly at Shekan and at El Teb had been disbanded. Yet their misconduct was not to be wondered at. Once dragged away from his native village the Egyptian soldier seldom saw his home again. He was ill-treated, ill-paid, ill-housed, and ill-fed. His officers were bad, and the instruction he received was contemptible. The conditions under which the new army was raised and maintained were very different, and before long a native force was in existence, at once contented, self-reliant, and well-trained, which gave a good account of itself both in the repulse of an audacious attempt at invasion by a Soudanese Sheikh named Nejumi, at the battle of Toski (1889), and in the recovery of the Tokar delta on the Red Sea by the victory of Afafit. Before long the authorities ventured to recruit and train battalions of native Soudanese, whose intense love of fighting made them peculiarly valuable.

We turn now to the greatest service of all that England has rendered to Egypt, the improvement of irrigation. There is practically no rain in Egypt. The country is watered and fertilised by the Nile, which, swelled by the rains of the equatorial regions, floods the whole country in the months of August and September, leaving a rich black silt upon the surface. Since the earliest times there had existed a system of basins and channels to take full advantage of the flood, and the method was in use in Upper Egypt at the time of the occupation. Under Said Pasha a new system had been inaugurated in the Delta. A great dam of masonry was built across the stream above the point where it divides, and the water thus held up was distributed throughout the Delta by means of artificial channels all the year round without at any time submerging the country. It was thus possible to raise more than one annual crop and to cultivate both cotton and sugar, which will not bear complete submergence.

But by the end of Ismail's reign the Barrage had fallen into disrepair, and the so-called *Sefi*, or summer canals, never laid out upon proper scientific principles, had become choked with silt. A staff of Anglo-Indian engineers under Sir Colin Scott Moncrieff was introduced,

and the million obtained by the London Convention was devoted to the repair of the Barrage and the reconstruction of the defective system of channels. Meantime on the Upper Nile the network of basins and flood-canals (to be carefully distinguished from the *Sefi*) was improved, and constant care was exercised in maintaining the banks in flood-time. The results achieved have been astounding. More land has come under cultivation, agricultural prosperity has increased by leaps and bounds, and the revenue has steadily risen in proportion. It should here be added that in 1898 the Great Barrage at Assouan was commenced, which has enabled the *Sefi* system of irrigation to be applied to Upper Egypt.

It is with a strong sense of painful contrast that we turn from the affairs of Egypt to those of the Congo. In the one case a heavy responsibility, most unwillingly assumed, has been so discharged, in spite of inherent difficulties and international opposition, as to add incalculably to the sum of human happiness; in the other an enterprise, eagerly undertaken with the loudest professions of zeal for the cause of humanity and civilisation, has till recent years been productive of nothing but misery for Africa and dividends for Europe.

The Berlin Conference had recognised the existence of the Congo Free State, but had done nothing to provide for its future government. The omission was promptly supplied by King Leopold. In April, 1885, he assumed sovereign powers, and issued a Constitution which made him practically absolute. In fact, the only limitation upon his complete freedom of action was a guarantee given to France that in the event of the territory being sold she should have the first claim to purchase.

The international character of the undertaking very quickly disappeared. Non-Belgian officials were one by one dismissed. Operations against the slave-trade led indirectly to another change of even greater importance. Encouraged by the brisk demand for slaves in the Soudan under Mahdist rule, an Arab slavecatcher named Tipu Tib had established himself as de facto ruler between the Upper Congo and Tanganyika. He was only put down in 1892 by an expedition whose doings excited some natural qualms in Europe. But in the meanwhile an Anti-Slavery Conference, which assembled at Brussels in 1889, was induced, having regard to the expense incurred, to sanction the imposition of customs duties for the increase of the revenue (1890). It was not long before these duties were used to exclude non-Belgian imports, while the most valuable articles of export were treated as government monopolies. Moreover, in 1889, Leopold by his will left the sovereignty of the Congo to Belgium, and in 1890 induced its Government to provide him with a loan bearing no interest, in return for the option of annexing the country at the end of ten years.

An energetic administration soon resulted in a rapid growth of material prosperity. Railways and roads were built, and steamers penetrated to the upper reaches of the river. The slave-trade was firmly repressed. But scarcely anywhere has the presence of Europeans borne more cruelly upon a native population. The Government claimed all so-called vacant lands (meaning those not actually under cultivation round the native villages) for the purpose of granting concessions. By contracts made with the chiefs they provided themselves with unpaid forced labour barely distinguishable from slavery. They enlisted native troops to whom they permitted a discreditable licence. Their officials were ill-paid, and recouped themselves by unauthorised exactions. Worst of all was the rubber-tax, each village being required to collect and furnish its quota of rubber under pain of severe punishment. Foreigners who infringed the government monopolies were severely dealt with, an Englishman named Stokes being actually hanged. It is small wonder that by 1904 the growing disgust in Europe should have taken shape in a Congo Reform Association.

By the beginning of the nineties France had resumed her activity as a colonising Power in spite of the notorious Dreyfus case, which from 1894 to 1899 agitated and divided the public mind even more than the Boulangist movement or the Panama scandals. Captain

Dreyfus was an officer of Jewish extraction on the General Staff of the French army. He was condemned to imprisonment on the Île du Diable, off the coast of Guiana, on the charge of selling military secrets to Germany, on the strength of circumstantial evidence, in which too much weight was given to details of handwriting and ambiguous secret documents (1894). The resignation of Casimir Perier, President Carnot's successor, was due in some measure to his dissatisfaction with the verdict and at the discovery that his own hands were tied (1895). Certain revelations made by Colonel Picquart, head of the Intelligence Department, led to an attempt to fasten the guilt upon Major Esterhazy, a soldier of fortune in the service of France. But the honour of the French army was regarded by its chiefs as bound up in the original verdict. The major was acquitted, and Picquart was disgraced (1898). The novelist Zola then published a scathing accusation of all who had taken a decisive part in the case, only to be himself condemned on the strength of a forged document. The forger, Major Henry, being detected, committed suicide. The Court of Cassation thereupon ordered a re-trial of Dreyfus by court-martial at Rennes.

But it was no longer in the power of five subordinate officers to unravel the tangled skein. Loyalty to their chiefs, the violence of party-spirit, which had made the cause of the army that of the Conservative and Catholic party, while Secularists, Socialists, and Liberals of all shades of opinion were making Dreyfus a stalking horse, the whole tissue of personal motives, rival interpretations of documents and side issues rendered them incapable of holding fast to the one undeniable truth that Dreyfus had not been proved to be guilty. It had at least not been proved that his guilt was impossible, and on the strength of this fact they condemned him by three votes to two. But the election of Loubet to the Presidency in place of Felix Faure, on the death of the latter, with the accession to power of the Waldeck-Rousseau ministry containing a resolute minister of war in the person of General Gallifet, at last enabled the Court of Cassation to acquit the unhappy officer, whose sufferings in prison had made him an old man before his time (1899).

We may now return to colonial enterprises. The activity of French agents in Indo-China compelled Great Britain to annex Burma in 1885, and later to assume a protectorate over the Shan States between that country and French Annam. Meanwhile France had claimed to readjust her frontier on the Mekong at the expense of Siam, by acquiring an extension on the west bank of that river. The Siamese government behaved with such short-sightedness and folly as to justify the French in sending gun-boats up the Menam to threaten Bangkok (1893). England was therefore compelled to look on, though reasonably suspicious that her interests were likely to be affected. In 1896, however, an Anglo-French agreement was concluded, which, while making concessions to France which were severely condemned in England established the neutrality of Siam. In the same year France took the final step in Madagascar to which her previous action had long pointed, and annexed the island.

On the continent of Africa she had already taken the place of Germany as the eager rival of Britain. Her ambitions compassed nothing less than the extension of her influence over the Niger basin, the region of Lake Chad and even the upper waters of the Nile as far as the shores of the Red Sea. Her gallant explorers pushing forward from Senegal, with the active support of the home government, succeeded in cutting off England's colonies on the West Coast from further access to the hinterland, and in reaching Lake Chad. Confirmed in these positions by treaty they reached forward towards the Niger. Dahomey was annexed in 1892 and Timbuctoo occupied in 1894. In 1897 a French expedition was threatening pre-existing British interests at Bussa on the Lower Niger.

It will be remembered that the Khedive had abandoned at British dictation his power on the Upper Nile. The sovereign rights should properly have reverted to Turkey, but Turkish claims were in fact treated as non-existent. Sir Frederick Lugard, had successfully established the authority of the British East Africa Company in Uganda, just north of Lake

Victoria, and, after a temporary decision to abandon the country, the British government had finally proclaimed a protectorate (1894). Further down the Nile on the left bank lay a district which King Leopold had long wished to acquire for the Congo State. He succeeded in obtaining the consent of the British government, who had in point of fact no right to dispose of the territory, to his annexation of the Bahr-El-Ghazal province and the left bank of the Nile at Lado, in return for a slip of the Free State connecting British East Africa with Tanganyika. France, supported by Germany, entered an energetic protest. The treaty had to be dropped, and Leopold only succeeded in obtaining Lado on lease. It was clear that France regarded the Bahr-el-Ghazal province as destined one day to be her own, indeed the King of the Belgians formally recognised the claim.

This fact combined with other considerations to urge the British government to a step of first-rate importance. The Salisbury Cabinet decided to advise the Egyptian government to attempt the reconquest of the Soudan. The rule of the Khalifa Abdul Taashi, who had managed to get himself accepted as the divinely appointed successor of the Mahdi, was a tyranny the appalling savagery of which challenged every sentiment of humanity to interfere. His authority was intensely unpopular, except among the Baggara Arabs whose atrocities he connived at. Nor could Egypt ever be permanently secure behind her frontier, while the Soudan remained an overflowing cauldron of barbarism. Lastly, the life of Egypt was the Nile, and any interference with its head waters, such as a European Power might attempt with a view to the irrigation of the equatorial regions, must entail her ruin.

The field seemed for the moment clear. Italy, the only Power with whom complications might have arisen, had reluctantly abandoned her hopes of conquest. It was in 1882 that the Depretis ministry first acquired the port of Massowah on the Red Sea. Crispi, who came to power in 1887, eager to found an Italian colony, engaged in war with King John of Abyssinia, and on his death used Italian influence to help Menelek to the throne. The operations were a severe strain on the already over-taxed resources of Italy, and in 1890 Crispi was overthrown. Three years later he returned to power pledged to support the monarchy, the middle classes and colonial development. Italian arms were now turned against the Khalifa, and achieved a victory at Agordat and the capture of Kassala. But Italy had miscalculated her strength. The claim to exercise a protectorate over Abyssinia and to annex part of her territory drew Menelek into the fray in 1895, and Crispi's taunting messages sent General Baratieri with a wholly insufficient force to court an overwhelming defeat at Adowah (1896).

The catastrophe brought about Crispi's fall, and the policy of adventure disappeared with him. But its evil effects lasted for many years, and even threatened the monarchy. The stress of taxation caused extreme destitution and even starvation among the lower classes. Socialism grew apace. In 1898 strikes attended by riots in Milan and elsewhere were repressed with an injudicious severity which exasperated public opinion against the government. It was not till King Humbert had fallen a victim to the revolver of an anarchist in 1900, that the eyes of those in authority were opened, and Victor Emmanuel III summoned to office advisers pledged to meet working-class discontent by gentler methods. Under Giolitti's influence conditions slowly improved, till in 1906 the revenue yielded a surplus of two and a half millions over expenditure, while a better understanding with the Papacy increased the influence of the government, and secured permission for strict Catholics to vote at elections.

On the news of the Italian resolution to withdraw from all advanced positions, a request was addressed to the government at Rome to hold Kassala until Egyptian troops could be sent to occupy it. The movement directed against Khartoum was, however, to follow the Nile route. In 1897 the Anglo-Egyptian expedition started under the command of Sir Herbert Kitchener, Sirdar of the Egyptian army. This time there was no occasion for hurry, and it

was decided in the first instance to secure the country as far as Dongola, depending for transport upon the railway, which was simultaneously being carried southwards. At Ferket the first engagement took place with the Khalifa's forces, which were surprised and scattered, and Dongola was occupied without serious fighting.

A pause now took place while a new line of railway, diverging at Wadi Haifa, was laid across the desert direct to Abu Hamed, thus avoiding the detour round the great bend of the Nile south of Dongola. Abu Hamed itself was taken without difficulty. Here a surprise was in store for the expedition. The enemy were reported to have evacuated Berber. The report proved true, and the first serious stand was made at the river Atbara behind entrenchments surrounded by a thorn zariba. The position was carried by assault, and another pause ensued till railway communication could be established.

From this point the troops were able to be conveyed for some distance by water, thus leaving the enemy in doubt whether the attack was to follow the right bank against Khartoum, or the left upon Omdurman. The Shabluka gorge and the Kerreri hills, positions which might have been held by the Khalifa, were successively abandoned, and on September 1, the whole expedition was encamped behind a zariba on the left bank within sight of Omdurman. Next morning the Egyptian cavalry sallied out to draw on the Dervishes to an engagement. They were completely successful. The Khalifa's entire army swooped over the hills upon the zariba, only to be mown down by a steady and continuous fire. It soon became necessary to order a further advance to tempt them' to decisive action. The challenge was accepted, and for a few short moments the expeditionary force was in grave peril, owing to a vigorous attack upon their right, which was only met by the steadiness with which' Macdonald's Soudanese brigade wheeled back its right wing to cover the flank, till the reserves could come into action. It was the Khalifa's last effort. His troops broke and fled, and before night Omdurman surrendered (1898).

The Sirdar had barely time to hold a funeral service in memory of General Gordon amid the ruins of Khartoum, when urgent but not unexpected news called him south. In spite of tolerably definite warnings from England the French government had despatched Major Marchand from the French Congo in 1896 with orders to reach the Nile. Simultaneous attempts were being made by French and Russian explorers from the Abyssinian frontier. These latter efforts failed, but Marchand, by the most heroic exertions, succeeded in reaching Fashoda, and on the arrival of Kitchener's steamer was found occupying a fort which flew the French flag. The meeting was conducted with courtesy and firmness on both sides. The Sirdar insisted that the Egyptian flag must be hoisted, and Marchand steadily declined to permit it.

The matter was therefore referred to the home governments. The rights of the case were disputable, but England was clearly in a situation to insist. The Anglo-Egyptian army was on the spot, its communications by way of the Nile were assured, while Marchand's little band were cut off from assistance by tracts of pathless wilderness. Russia was busy in the Far East, and the French fleet could scarcely turn the tables on England in the Channel. Lord Salisbury therefore stood firm, and the French government decided not to press the point, the two nations settling the boundaries of their respective spheres of influence by agreement in 1899. It was the sharpest as well as the last of a whole series of disputes which had kept alive the ill-feeling between the two nations ever since the occupation of Egypt.

That Turkey, whose right to the disputed territory was better in law than that of either of the claimants, took no part in the Fashoda question was due to troubles nearer home. By the Pact of Halepa, concluded in 1878, in accordance with the views of the Berlin Congress, the Sultan bestowed a reformed constitution upon Crete. The governor was to be assisted

by a Christian adviser, and was to consult with an assembly in which Moslem and Christian were alike represented. The Greek language was recognised for official purposes. The arrangement was not permanently successful. The union of Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia stimulated the desire among the Christians for annexation to Greece, and Abdul Hamid's own deliberate policy of reviving Moslem feeling sharpened existing differences. In 1889 the Christians attacked the Moslems, and the island was placed under the absolute control of a Moslem governor. In 1895 a Christian governor was substituted at the instance of the Powers, and the Moslems began to murder the Christians. In 1896 there was a general revolt of the latter. The Sultan now consented to the appointment of a Christian governor, and of European commissioners to undertake the reform of justice and police. These measures were resisted by the Moslems, and there was a massacre of Christians at Canea, upon which the national party proceeded to proclaim the union of the island with Greece. A Greek force actually landed, and the Greek fleet set out to intercept Turkish reinforcements.

At this point the Powers intervened with the promise of practical independence for the Cretans if their Greek auxiliaries were withdrawn. The five admirals occupied Canea, and even bombarded the positions of the insurgents, when they declined to desist from attacking the Turkish troops. But in Greece itself popular excitement was already out of hand, and King George, though most unwilling to be drawn into war, dared not risk his throne by holding back, more especially as a message of sympathy from 100 irresponsible members of the British Parliament was widely construed into a promise of support. The old illusions prevailed as to the might of national enthusiasm, however untrained and undisciplined, and the raids of unauthorised irregulars equipped by the *Ethnike Hetairia*, or National Society, forced the Sultan to an unwilling declaration of war (1897).

The Greeks made but a poor resistance. The passes were carried after some fighting, Larissa was occupied, and the battles of Pharsalos and Domokos brought the victorious Edhem Pasha within striking distance of Athens, where in the meanwhile the royal family were in some danger from the mob. Europe made haste to interpose, and Turkey had to be content with a war indemnity and a slight rectification of frontier.

The Cretan question was a more difficult matter. Germany throughout the war had befriended the Sultan, and she and Austria now withdrew from the naval blockade. England, France, Russia, and Italy held the ports and protected the Mussulman population which had crowded in from the open country occupied by the insurgents. It was finally agreed that Prince George of Greece should govern the island as High Commissioner under the Suzerainty of the Porte, the Turkish garrison was withdrawn, and a large proportion of the Moslem inhabitants emigrated. Prince George held the High Commissionership till 1905, when another nationalist attempt to bring about union with Greece by violence led to a fresh intervention and his own resignation. He was succeeded by a Greek statesman of his own choosing named Zaimis.

Simultaneously with the success of British arms in the Soudan events occurred in the other hemisphere which deprived Spain of the last fragments of her colonial empire, and incidentally called attention to Britain's power by sea. The reign of Alfonso XII in Spain (1874-1885) was devoted to healing the wounds which the country had sustained in half a century of strife. Politics remained corrupt and sordid, but the party excesses of Queen Isabel's reign were avoided. Carlism was stamped out, and there was considerable material progress, roads and railways helping forward industrial development. The King was regarded as too subservient to Germany, and forfeited in his later years the affection of his subjects. Nevertheless his infant son, Alfonso XIII, born after his father's death, succeeded to an undisputed throne under the regency of the Queen Mother, Maria Cristina, a woman of character and courage.

The darkest cloud on the horizon was the chronic discontent of Cuba, where a rising in 1868 had been settled by Martinez Campos by the Convention of El Lanjon (1878), embodying concessions which were afterwards withdrawn, the resulting discontent being repressed by force. The fact was that the influence of the Spanish officials, merchants and capitalists of the sea-port towns was then and afterwards consistently used to prevent the home government from meeting the demands of the Cubans. Meanwhile the growing business interests of American citizens in the island led the United States to view the continued disorder with grave disapproval. In 1895 a new rebellion broke out. Martinez Campos, despatched to restore order by a policy of conciliation, was obliged to admit his failure, and recommended drastic measures, which General Weyler was sent out to apply.

The barbarities of the new governor and his continued want of success increased the impatience of the American government, and the destruction of the United States war-ship *Maine* by a mine in the harbour of Havana, not without grave suspicion attaching to the Spanish authorities, provoked the Republic to declare war. The Spanish army and fleet were cooped up at Santiago, and the town was closely besieged by the American expeditionary force. An insane order directing Admiral Cervera to put to sea and to run the gauntlet of the blockade led to the destruction of the entire Spanish fleet off the mouth of the harbour, and not long afterwards Santiago surrendered after a somewhat tame resistance. Meanwhile an American squadron had appeared before Manilla and occupied the Philippines. These islands with Porto Rico in the West Indies were annexed at the end of the war. Cuba was placed under an independent government, which has since then provoked American interference twice over, in 1902 and 1909.

There had been in Europe a good deal of unofficial talk about intervention. Indeed the Monroe Doctrine, which closed the thinly populated regions of South America to European ambitions, constituted a Doctrine standing challenge and provocation. It was generally understood, however, that the British fleet would not remain inactive in the event of an attempt to redress the balance in favour of Spain. Whether such action would have been wise may well be doubted. The United States have always preserved an isolation from European politics at once more complete and more intelligible than that affected by Great Britain, and it is open to question whether England could have looked for any tangible results from the goodwill of the Republic, calculated to out-weigh the enmity which she would have incurred. It is, however, not more than a coincidence that Germany, having finished the Kiel Canal in 1895, should have passed her first Navy Act, containing a regular programme of progressive naval construction, in 1898. Other events to be described in the next chapter had enabled William II to impress upon his people the necessity of sea-power.

Britain was to learn to attach more value to her own strength at sea in the struggle which at last solved the longstanding problem of South Africa, and, having brought the ill-will of her rivals to a focus, proved to the world that she possessed resolution and military resources with which she had not been credited. The origin of that struggle will now claim our attention. Cecil Rhodes had from the first dreamed of a great future for South Africa. He wished to see all its diverse colonies, states and provinces united under one progressive government. The most formidable obstacle in the way of such a union was the Transvaal now under the presidency of Paul Kruger, whose policy was to maintain the isolation of his state, the supremacy of the Dutch within it, and the pastoral and primitive structure of society as opposed to the tendencies of a commercial age. Here he surrendered a point to his opponent. The Cape Dutch had formed a political league known as the Africander Bond. Its sympathies though not exactly anti-English, were strongly Dutch, and so far in harmony with feeling in the Transvaal; but its ideals of union, popular government and progress brought it into close affinity with Rhodes and divided it from Kruger. In 1890 the former became Premier at the Cape, supported by a Bond majority.

By this time his policy had undergone an important modification. There can be little question that till 1884 he had cared little for the Imperial connection as compared with the union of South Africa, and may even have thought that the end he had in view was most likely to be attained by a Dutch nationalist movement. The establishment of the German colony north of the Orange (p. 441) and the evident sympathy between the new colonists and the Transvaal Boers seem to have convinced him that British support could alone protect his design from foreign interference. He eagerly supported the Bechuanaland expedition, began to talk of an all-British route from the Cape to Cairo, and founded the Chartered Company in 1889.

He was now working in a dual capacity, both as a Cape statesman and a British Imperial agent. The dualism was not at first obvious. By treaty with Lobengula, chief of the Matabele, he secured the regions north and west of the Transvaal for British enterprise. In 1890 an expedition was sent into the country and settlement began, though the same year saw further northward extension along the great lakes barred by the Anglo-German agreement (p. 462). In 1891 an attempted trek by Transvaal Boers was repelled ; outbreaks of the Matabele were quelled in 1893 and 1896, on the former occasion by force, on the latter by a conference between Rhodes and the chiefs ; in 1897 the railway was carried northwards from Kimberley as far as Buluwayo. The Company's occupation of Rhodesia was assured. Surrounded by British territory the Transvaal might sooner or later have drifted peaceably into union.

Events moved too fast. Circumstances arose which led to a direct challenge of the domestic policy of the Boer State. In 1886 gold was discovered on the Witwatersrand. There was an immense influx of aliens, and the prosperous town of Johannesburg leaped into existence. The authorities were not unnaturally disquieted at the presence of a foreign element which before long constituted a majority of the population. They refused to recognise the language of the Uitlanders or to admit them to the franchise except on conditions which were illusory. Meantime the new-comers were taxed, and the increased resources of the State imparted greater confidence to the President's policy. The Uitlanders were irritated by the badness of the government, the unsatisfactory administration of justice and the regulations which crippled their trade. In 1892 they formed a National Union to agitate for redress.

So far the Cape Dutch had felt little sympathy with policy, indeed the President's abortive attempt to block the Cape railway route to Johannesburg, in favour of that from Delagoa Bay to Pretoria, had aroused strong popular feeling which welcomed the British ultimatum by which it was defeated. But Rhodes now made an irretrievable mistake. The National Union had resolved to use force where persuasion had failed, and Rhodes promised the support of the Rhodesian mounted police in the meditated rising, provided that the separate national existence of the Transvaal should come to an end in case of success. The leaders hesitated, and in the meanwhile Dr. Jameson, who commanded the police at Pitsani, more rash than Rhodes himself, crossed the frontier, and, receiving no support from Johannesburg, was obliged to surrender ignominiously to the Boers after a skirmish at Doornkop (1896).

The results were disastrous. The British government ordered an enquiry which revealed the complicity of Rhodes, who had already fallen from power at the Cape. The Cape Dutch and the government of the Orange Free State, formerly well-disposed, were decisively alienated. Moreover, the suspicions of President Kruger were not unnaturally deepened. He began to arm and to sound European opinion. The latter step received some encouragement from a telegram sent by the Emperor William congratulating him upon his triumph over Jameson. The despatch of the telegram has been variously interpreted as an act of sheer impulse and as a deliberate attempt, to feel the pulse of Europe. It is at least

as likely that the Emperor thought that the goodwill of the Boers might in the future possess a value for Germany, while seeing clearly that England was precluded from showing official displeasure by the indefensible conduct of her subjects.

It was in vain that Lord Milner was sent out to persuade Kruger to consent to constitutional reforms. The Conference of Bloemfontein between the President and the High Commissioner was absolutely sterile of result. It was equally in vain that the Imperial government were warned of the probable intentions of the Boers and of the inadequacy of the British forces at the Cape. Nervously anxious not to give provocation the authorities sent reinforcements insufficient for defence but just enough to bring matters to a crisis. In October, 1899, the two Dutch Republics issued an ultimatum, demanding the immediate withdrawal of the British troops on pain of instant war. They calculated upon a rebellion in Cape Colony and upon the eventual interference of Europe. No answer was returned, and the struggle began.

The war opened in Natal. General White's small force, after meeting the invaders with success at Talana Hill and Elandsplaagte, was compelled to retire behind the defences of Ladysmith. But the Boers were not strategists enough to use their advantage. Instead of pressing on into Cape Colony the Transvaal generals in Natal proceeded to besiege Ladysmith. Quite unfitted though the Boers were, both by equipment and training, for undertaking siege operations, similar methods were adopted at Kimberley, and at Mafeking on their western frontiers. In the centre, along the southern boundary of the Orange Free State, their operations were characterised by great lack of decision.

Reinforcements therefore reached South Africa under Sir Redvers Buller before serious harm had been done. But the plan which divided the force into three columns, designed no doubt to prevent an invasion of the colony at any point, seriously weakened all striking power. Lord Methuen, moving on Kimberley, drove the Boers from their positions at Belmont and Graspan, only to sustain a severe check at Magersfontein. General Gatacre, advancing towards the Orange, was repulsed in a disastrous night attack at Stormberg. Buller himself, in an attempt to relieve Ladysmith by a direct frontal attack over open ground against the Boer lines behind the Tugela, was decisively worsted at Colenso.

The news of this "Black Week" brought Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener to the Cape with greatly increased forces, including invaluable contingents of colonial mounted riflemen, whose presence bore witness to the solidarity of the Empire. Moving north upon Kimberley and effecting the relief of that town, Roberts succeeded in surrounding Cronje and the besieging force at Paardeberg, where they capitulated on the anniversary of Majuba. Bloemfontein was occupied without difficulty. Meanwhile Buller, after failing twice to reach Ladysmith at Spion Kop and Vaal Kranz, at length outflanked the lines of the Tugela by the capture of Pieter's Hill, and set the garrison at liberty. Roberts then moved forward on Pretoria, and the battle of Diamond Hill secured his entry to the capital.

The war was not yet over. The surprising thing is that public opinion should ever have imagined it was. But surely though slowly Lord Kitchener wore down the guerilla bands who infested the country. Organised drives, a connected system of blockhouses, and the removal into concentration camps of the non-combatants, who provided the enemy with an admirable intelligence department, ultimately produced their effect. In May, 1902, by the Treaty of Vereeniging, the Boers submitted.

President Kruger had fled to Europe, where he died in 1903. Much sympathy was expressed on the Continent both for him and for the Republics. Public opinion was deeply stirred against Great Britain by a very malevolent press campaign which gave currency to highly imaginative tales of horror. It was indeed only in accordance with human nature that

some sympathy should be felt for the weaker side, and no less so that the difficulties of a rival Power should beget a lively satisfaction. Whether or no intervention was seriously discussed cannot, with our present information, be confidently stated. At any rate, the governments remained rigidly neutral. Undoubtedly the British command of the sea must have been a factor of some importance in any calculation.

The Transvaal and the Orange Free State became for the time being Crown colonies. In 1906 a Liberal administration took the bold step of granting to both the privilege of self-government under the British flag. The recent history of South Africa is thus a happy instance of an extremely rare political phenomenon. Both parties performed complementary parts in bringing about a satisfactory settlement, and each happened to be in office at a time when the courage of the other would have been unequal to the requirements of the situation.

CHAPTER XXXI

THE FAR EAST AND THE TRIPLE ENTENTE

SUPPORTED by the resources of the French money-market Russia pushed forward her policy of railway construction in Asia. In 1888 the Trans-Caspian line, from Krasnovodsk on the Caspian to the eastern limits of her territory in Turkestan, was completed. From Merv a branch line was built, known as the Murghab river extension, with its southward terminus at Kushkinski Post on the Afghan frontier, eighty miles from Herat. This line, though constructed for purely strategical reasons, may play a great part in the future as a high-road of commerce in consequence of changes in international relations, to be described in this chapter. Of more immediate importance was the great Trans-Siberian railway ; and it was in 1891 that Nicholas II, then Czarevitch, turned the first spade full of earth at Vladivostok to inaugurate the gigantic enterprise. By 1898 the western section had been carried to Lake Baikal, where powerful ice-breaking steamers were launched to ferry the trains across, and the engineers were already busy in the difficult mountainous section beyond. Meantime the eastern portion of the track, starting from Vladivostok, had reached the Amur along a route from which subsequent events were to divert the main line.

The Russian railway was running a race against developments in the Far East, of which Russian statesmen had determined to take advantage. The weakness of China and the growing strength of Japan seemed to promise a speedy break-up of the Chinese Empire, and to urge the necessity of anticipating the ambitious island Power. The scope of this book does not admit an account of the decay of the one nation, or of the marvellous adaptability with which the other had transformed itself within twenty years from an Oriental monarchy based on feudal institutions into a modern State on the European model. Our survey must begin with the one-sided struggle which broke out between the two Powers in 1894.

The bone of contention was the peninsula of Korea, the so-called "Hermit Kingdom," which had long tempted Japanese ambition, and had been a source of constant irritation owing to injuries and insults inflicted on Japanese subjects. China on her part steadily repudiated responsibility, while she continued to exercise an ill-defined suzerainty. The internal politics of the country centred round the intrigues of two factions, the one progressive, which looked to Japan, the other reactionary, which leant on China. Twice over, in 1882 and 1884, there had been riots at Seoul, which had culminated in an attack on Japanese residents; and on the latter occasion a Chinese army, which had crossed the frontier to restore order, had come to blows with the Japanese legation guard. Each Power finally agreed to concede a right of intervention to the other, due notice to be given on either side of any intention to exercise it.

In 1894 fresh trouble at Seoul led to a further proposal from Japan. China was urged to co-operate in forcing reforms upon Korea. The suggestion, entirely repugnant to Chinese policy, was rejected, and Japan proceeded to act alone. The result was war. The Japanese soon cleared their opponents out of Korea. A fleet of Chinese transports was dispersed by a Japanese squadron, the port of Asam was taken, and a victory was gained at Ping-Yang, which carried the invaders to the Chinese frontier on the Yalu. Opposite the mouth of this river an action took place between the two fleets, in which the more mobile tactics of the Japanese secured a decisive success which gave them the command of the sea. Chinese territory was then invaded, and the advance continued to Ying-Kow, while a separate

expedition under Marshal Oyama landed in the Liao-tung peninsula and captured with little trouble the formidable works of Port Arthur. The fleet meanwhile forced Admiral Ting to surrender the fortress of Wei-Hai-Wei on the opposite side of the Gulf of Pechili. China now submitted. The treaty of Shimonoseki was signed, by which Japan obtained, among other concessions, a free hand in Korea as well as the possession of the Liao-tung peninsula and of the Island of Formosa (1895).

At the very moment of their triumph the islanders were compelled to forego no small part of the fruits of victory. Russia had long marked Korea as her own, and now saw in the weakness of China the opportunity for securing the long desired ice-free port. The Emperor William was quick to seize the occasion for such an advantageous combination of interests as England had been unwilling to enter upon after 1890. France supported her ally. The three Powers presented a note to Japan requiring her to abandon Port Arthur and the Liao-tung peninsula. With extraordinary forbearance the Mikado, Mutsuhito, and his advisers decided to give way and to wait.

Meanwhile a secret convention was effected between the Chinese statesmen Li Hung Chang and Count Cassini, Russian ambassador at Peking, by which, in return for a guarantee of the integrity of the Chinese Empire, Russia was to receive concessions for the construction and protection of a railway seawards through Manchuria. A shorter route was thus assured than that to Vladivostok, and a better terminus was already in view.

By this time Russia and Germany seem to have arrived at a clear understanding as to their several shares in the spoil of the common enterprise. In November, 1897, two German missionaries were murdered in the peninsula of Shantung. The Emperor at once demanded reparation, and sent his brother Prince Henry in command of a squadron to play the part of Germany's "mailed fist" in the East. China submitted, and Germany secured, besides due compensation for the outrage and the punishment of offenders, a lease of Kiaochow and the surrounding district for ninety-nine years. Kiaochow had already been promised to Russia, but no objection was made to the German lease, and the reason was soon apparent when the magnificent harbour and fortress of Port Arthur passed under Russian control on very similar terms (1898).

All this while British policy had exhibited a singular impotence. Lord Salisbury declared in the first instance for the integrity of China. This principle being disregarded, he fell back upon that of the "open door," or free trade for all nations, which was as little likely to command the adhesion of Russia and Germany, naturally anxious as they were to supplant British commercial predominance. Finally, Britain swallowed her scruples and followed the fashion by obtaining a "lease" of Wei-Hai-Wei. Her ineffectiveness proceeded from her failure to recognise the essential facts of the situation. Russia and Germany were determined to exploit the weakness of China and to establish their own commercial ascendancy. Their partners in the two alliances were prepared to lend their countenance if not their active support. England stood alone in desiring the integrity of China and freedom of trade; she could command no support, active or otherwise, and if she wished to maintain her views she had no choice but to fight for them against the rest of the world. There is reason to believe that it was her humiliation in the Far East that opened her eyes at length to the true "splendour" of isolation.

The action of the Powers had the effect of quickening the activity of the anti-foreign sentiments long prevalent in China. The Emperor Kwangsu had in the first instance drawn a salutary moral from the war. China, he decided, needed nothing so much as administrative reform. Instantly the elements of reaction took alarm, and the Emperor was forced to place himself under the tutelage of the Dowager Empress Tsu Hsi, who had acted as regent during his own youth and that of his predecessor. This palace revolution brought to a head the

feelings originally excited by the widespread dislike of missionaries, by the opium traffic, and by the recent proceedings of the Powers. There sprang up all over the country a secret patriotic society, calling themselves the "Patriotic Fists,"

The movement became more and more dangerous, officially ignored and privately encouraged as it was by the and hence known in England as the Boxers. government, and at last, after the assassination of the German ambassador, Baron von Ketteler, the foreign legations at Peking appealed to the European squadron at Taku for protection. Admiral Seymour accordingly started with a detachment of blue-jackets for the capital, but was unable to proceed, and effected his retreat with some difficulty to Tientsin. Meanwhile the Taku forts were seized as a precaution, and thereupon the Chinese regular army openly joined the Boxers. Tientsin and the Peking Legations were cut off from the outside world. The latter were besieged for two months in the buildings of the British Embassy before a relief column, composed of contingents furnished by all the Powers, including America and Japan, succeeded in reaching Peking and in exacting satisfaction and securities (August, 1900).

The Boxer rising was turned to account by Russia for tightening her grip upon Manchuria. Her troops in that province were heavily reinforced on the perfectly intelligible plea that her subjects and her interests must be defended. But, the crisis once past, Admiral Alexeyeff, her viceroy, came to an agreement with the Chinese commander at Mukden whereby China was only to resume authority under a Russian protectorate, and in the meanwhile effective measures were taken to stifle foreign and especially British trade (1900).

So far the policy of the Czar's advisers in the Far East had been entirely successful. They were now about to overreach themselves. The murder of the spirited Queen Consort of Korea in 1895, not without suspicion of Japanese connivance, resulted in a great increase of Russian influence in that country. An abortive attempt was made to profit by the situation to acquire the Korean port of Masampo, and the efforts of a group of Russian speculators, who had secured the interested support of members of the imperial family, were successful in obtaining concessions for cutting timber across the frontier.

While yet these schemes were in progress came the news that Britain had concluded an offensive and defensive alliance with Japan, whereby each of the contracting parties promised to come to the help of the other if assailed by two Powers at once (January, 1902). It was clear that Russia would now have to do her work in the Far East single-handed, and her policy at once assumed a more pacific tone. In April, 1902, she agreed with China to withdraw her troops by degrees from Manchuria, while retaining her hold upon Port Arthur. China undertook to protect all Russian interests in that province.

The careful abstention of Russia from all complications in Europe served to emphasise her absorption in the affairs of the Pacific sea-board. In 1898, just after the acquisition of Port Arthur, Nicholas II invited representatives of the Powers to meet in conference at the Hague with the object of concerting measures for the better preservation of peace, the reduction of armaments, and the substitution of arbitration for war. Little was effected, except for the establishment of an Arbitration Commission. A good deal of somewhat unfair criticism was expended upon the alleged hypocrisy of a voracious Power in thus attempting to secure an interval for digestion.

Not less remarkable was the indifference displayed at St. Petersburg to the sordid tragedy of the Belgrade murders. King Milan, the vanquished aggressor of Slivitzna, after troubling his kingdom and wearying Europe by his domestic quarrels with Queen Natalie, treated his subjects to the triple sensation of a royal divorce, a liberal Constitution, and his

own abdication (1889). His son Alexander ascended the throne under the control of a regency. The boy, who was of a singularly headstrong nature, no sooner reached seventeen than he declared himself of age, dismissed the regents, dissolved the *Skupshchina* and altered the Constitution in a reactionary sense (1893). Sometime afterwards he proscribed the whole of the party favourable to Russia for alleged complicity in an attempt to assassinate the ex-King, whose presence and that of the ex-Queen did not help to smooth the path of the young ruler.

In 1900 the King fell desperately in love with Draga Mashin, a widow and an adventuress belonging to the suite of Queen Natalie, and married her in spite of the strongest remonstrances. The new Queen ruined his popularity alike by her indiscretions and by the advancement of her own relatives. The grant of a more liberal Constitution in 1901 failed to conciliate opposition, and another *coup d'état* in 1903 only served to exasperate it. The personal and political enemies of the royal pair now combined to secure their ends by midnight assassination. After dark on June 10, the palace was surrounded by troops; in the dead of night the doors were burst in with a charge of dynamite, and the King and Queen were stabbed where they cowered together in a cupboard. With disgusting cynicism the occasion was celebrated by popular rejoicings and thanksgivings, and Peter Karageorgevich, the exiled representative of the rival dynasty, was called to the throne. Russia joined with her rival Austria in a cold-blooded but politic recognition of the *fait accompli*.

The preoccupation of Russia in the Far East was by no means agreeable to France. Her home policy indeed dealt with matters in which Europe claimed no interest, and the Combes ministry (1902) was directed towards the withdrawal of all corporate rights from religious orders and associations not primarily concerned with charitable work. These measures brought about a conflict with Pius X, who succeeded Leo XIII, in 1903. He declined to recognise the formation of secular associations to act as guardians and administrators of the property of the orders, and, shorn of this provision, the Briand Law of 1906 has resulted in the complete separation between Church and State.

Beyond her own frontiers, however, the Republic was engaged in an enterprise for which she was anxious to conciliate European countenance. The anarchy prevailing in Morocco, under the rule of the Sultan Abd-el-Aziz, affected her own position in Algeria, and in 1901 a treaty was made by which she undertook to offer him her assistance and guidance. The assent of Italy was secured and promises of support were obtained from Russia. In August, 1904, a still more important step was taken. The old grudges between France and England had been rapidly disappearing. Time had familiarised public opinion with the British occupation of Egypt, and the geniality, tact, and genuine appreciation of France and of the French people displayed by King Edward VII, who had succeeded Queen Victoria in 1901, had captured the national affections. By a treaty signed at London the two nations arrived at a comprehensive settlement of outstanding differences, France conceding to England a free hand in Egypt in return for a recognition of her special claims in Morocco.

Events soon converted the understanding into an alliance. Germany, at the moment engaged in quelling a revolt of the Herreros in South-West Africa (1904-1907), had refrained from expressing an opinion on the conference. French enterprise, but in 1905 the Emperor William, perhaps with some idea of dissolving or at least of testing the new-made friendship, landed at Tangier and demanded the dismissal of Delcasse, the French Foreign Minister, and the abandonment of his policy. The challenge was met with considerable self-restraint. A conference of the Powers took place at Algeciras, where France, supported by England, successfully maintained her claim to special authority in Morocco, while disavowing all intentions either of annexation or of establishing a commercial monopoly. It was generally understood that Britain had promised to stand by France in case of unprovoked attack

(1905).

It was in the midst of these readjustments in Europe that the long-expected storm in the Far East burst with dramatic suddenness. The short-sighted and provocative policy of the Viceroy Alexeyeff had been steadily exhausting the patience of Japan. The promised evacuation of Manchuria was only partially effected when it was suddenly discontinued, and the Russian replies to Japanese remonstrances were so worded as to leave considerable doubt as to Muscovite intentions in Korea. The government of the Mikado wisely decided to narrow the issue and to bring matters to an immediate head. In January, 1904, they frankly abandoned all claim to influence Russian action in Manchuria, demanding in return a similar declaration of abstention by Russia from all interference with the affairs of Korea. To this despatch they pressed for an immediate answer. No answer was forthcoming.

Japan had chosen her time well, and had regulated the pace of her diplomacy by the state of her preparations. Thus at the moment of the rupture the Russian forces in the Far East, both naval and military, were divided between Port Arthur and Vladivostok; and on land at least were inferior to the troops which the Japanese could place in the field. The Trans-Siberian railway, possessing but a single track, hastily laid in its more easterly stages and broken by the passage of Lake Baikal, was insufficient to secure the rapid concentration of reinforcements and stores. The season of the year would soon be far enough advanced to ensure the melting of the ice along the Manchurian coast-line which might have obstructed a Japanese landing. The government of the Mikado had been preparing nearly ten years for the inevitable struggle, and possessed a highly trained army, whose officers had been taught their business by German instructors, while the rank and file were animated by the fierce patriotism and self-devotion of the Samurai, the ancient feudal military caste.

The plan of the Japanese staff was in the first instance to secure Korea against Russian influence. This object being attained, it was intended to isolate Port Arthur by a landing in Manchuria, and afterwards to make use of the Russian railway for a general advance upon Mukden. For all this the command of the sea was necessary, and the first step was to strike hard at the Russian fleet.

Accordingly, Admiral Togo made steam for Port Arthur. The first blow, however, was struck elsewhere by Admiral Uriu, who was engaged in convoying a small Japanese force to Chemulpo with orders to occupy Seoul. The two Russian warships *Variag* and *Koriets* put out from the port to meet the invaders. After a short action the *Variag* was sunk and the *Koriets* disabled. Meantime Togo had brought on an engagement off the mouth of Port Arthur in which seven Russian vessels were badly injured, and the whole fleet was forced back under the guns of the fortress. The Japanese were thus free to begin the transport of their land forces, and the First Army, under General Kuroki, was safely landed at Chemulpo and pushed on to the line of the Yalu. The Russian fleet, however, was not destroyed, and everything depended on the vigilance and vigour of Togo. The arrival of Admiral Makaroff put fresh life into the defence, the damaged ships were repaired, and the Russian squadron again issued from port. But as he was returning to his anchorage his flagship, the *Petropavlovsk*, struck upon a mine and went to the bottom with all hands, while another battleship was severely damaged.

The command in Manchuria had been committed to the hands of Prince Kuropatkin, twenty years before the lieutenant of the fiery Skobelev in Bulgaria and Turkestan. It was obvious that during the first weeks of the campaign the forces at his disposal must be inferior to those of his adversaries. He therefore decided to leave garrisons in Port Arthur and Vladivostok and to assemble all available troops in a central position where he could hold his own till reinforced. Such a position he found at Liaoyang, where the roads from the Yalu converged upon the Manchurian railway. He was satisfied that the mountains of Korea

would deter his opponents from any attempt to strike at his communications across the peninsula.

Such strategy was eminently sound. Unfortunately the influence of Alexeyeff was still all-powerful with the Czar. Unwilling to abandon his commercial enterprises in Manchuria, full of contempt for the "yellow dwarfs," and as a seaman nervously afraid of losing touch with Port Arthur, the necessary base for the relieving fleet which was now being prepared in Europe, he interfered more than once with disastrous results. The disobedience of subordinate commanders proved almost equally fatal. Zsulich, who had been pushed forward to the Yalu, to keep Kuroki under observation without committing himself to a battle, occupied a position behind the river where it divides into a network of channels across sandy flats. This advantage encouraged him to disobey orders. But Kuroki deceived him into concentrating his main strength at Antung on his right hand, and, this done, crossed at Wiju clear of the Russian left and crumpled up the whole defensive line.

General Oku, with the Second Japanese Army, now landed in Manchuria, and, reaching the railway, cut Port Arthur off from the Russian headquarters. He then turned southwards down the Liaotung peninsula and carried the lines of Nanshan, which had been constructed from sea to sea at a point where it was little more than two miles across. The fortress itself being thus exposed to attack, a Third Army, under General Nogi, was landed to conduct the siege, and Oku was free to move northwards against Liaoyang along the line of the railway.

Meanwhile Kuroki had carried the Motien pass, and was preparing to push forward on the last stage of his mountainous march towards the Liao valley. A weak division, on which had hitherto filled the gap between him and Oku, was strengthened into a Fourth Army, and under the command of General Nodzu, soon got into touch with the latter. Marshal Oyama now arrived to take supreme command of a combined forward movement. The advance was for the time delayed by difficulties of transport, and Kuropatkin might possibly at this stage have hurled his whole force upon one of the unconnected armies of his opponents. He had, however, no proper transport for a mountain march against Kuroki, and any movement against either of the other armies would have exposed his communications to that commander. The influence of Alexeyeff, however, secured the despatch of Stackelberg with a weak force to hold out a hand to Port Arthur, a wholly indefensible proceeding which met with its due reward in the defeats of Telissu and Ta-shih-chiao at the hands of Oku.

But it was at sea that the war was to be decided. It had been a time of intense anxiety for Togo, who had lost two of his battleships. The Vladivostok squadron evaded the blockading force, sunk two transports and raided the Japanese coasts. Admiral Witthoft put out from Port Arthur and nearly succeeded in slipping through the opposing fleet. But the situation was relieved in an unexpected manner. The activity of Nogi excited alarm at St. Petersburg for the safety of the harbour and the fleet, and Witthoft was ordered to join the Vladivostok squadron. Togo thus succeeded in bringing on a general action in which the Russian naval power was finally disposed of, the ships being destroyed, scattered, or put *hors de combat*.

By the end of August Oyama's three armies, directed by telegraph and telephone, were converging on Liaoyang. Kuroki on the right was still out of touch and in difficult country, but the furious onslaughts of Nodzu in the centre and of Oku on the left of Kuropatkin's defences kept him busy till the First Army had cleared the mountains and was threatening his flank. The Russians now retired behind the Shah-ho, and by the beginning of October had received reinforcements, bringing their numbers up to 220,000 men as against Oyama's 160,000. Kuropatkin therefore decided on a forward movement, and obstinate fighting ensued for several days along 90 miles of front, till the Russians were

again forced back.

All this while Nogi's desperate assaults upon Port Arthur had been again and again repelled with slaughter unprecedented in the annals of modern warfare, and every day the necessity for capturing the fortress became more urgent. The Russian Baltic fleet under Admiral Rozhdestvensky, ill-found, ill-manned and consisting to a great extent of obsolete ships, had at last got to sea. While passing the Dogger Bank by night it found itself in the midst of a flotilla of British fishing smacks and trawlers, and in a panic of alarm, mistaking the latter for Japanese torpedo boats, opened fire with fatal results. The excitement in England was intense, but to the credit of both governments the incident was referred to an international commission and was closed with an explanation, an apology, and compensation for the injured fishermen.

By patient burrowing and furious attacks Nogi succeeded in November in carrying the 203 Metre Hill on the north-west of the defences, which completely commanded the harbour. The capture of two other forts on the eastern front a month later and the death of General Kondratenko, whose determination and whose engineering skill had been the strength of the defence, decided General Stoessel to surrender on his own responsibility. The decision, in view of the approach of the Baltic fleet, and of the fact that provisions for three months were still in hand, was highly discreditable, and the order of merit sent by the Emperor William to the weak-spirited commander before the facts were fully known, was certainly undeserved.

Kuropatkin was aware that he would now have to deal with superior numbers, and endeavoured to anticipate Oyama by striking at his communications. A cavalry raid, under Mishchenko, effected nothing beyond some slight damage to the railway, but a turning conducted by Grippenbergh against Oku's left, a fierce engagement round Sandepu, and might successful if the commander-in-chief had dared movement, resulted in have been move his reserves to its support. In February the final battle was fought at Mukden. Oyama pushed out a Fifth Army beyond Kuroki's right, and thus induced his opponent to move all his reserves eastwards to meet the threatened flank attack. Meanwhile Nogi, whose movements had been carefully concealed, was directed to prolong Oku's line to the left, and the two commanders together were thus able to turn the Russian right, and to bring about a general retirement. Kuropatkin thereupon resigned his command.

The interest shifted to the sea. Early in May, Rozhdestvensky, who had successfully accomplished the seemingly impossible task of provisioning and coaling his fleet entered Chinese waters. Togo was watching for him at Masampo, and on the 27th went out to meet him in the Straits of Tsushima. The Russian commander disposed his fighting force in two columns with the non-combatant ships between them. He thus sacrificed his liberty of movement, and put serious limitations upon his power of developing fire against an attack from in front. Of this circumstance Togo took advantage. He steered across the front of the advancing columns and, opening fire at a range of four miles, soon disabled the leading ships. The ensuing night gave the torpedo boats their opportunity, and on the following day the Japanese fleet moved in to closer quarters, and dealt the finishing stroke of the war (1905).

The United States, through President Roosevelt, now tendered her friendly offices. Representatives of the belligerents met at Portsmouth in America, and, in spite of delays caused by Count Witte's refusal on behalf of Russia to pay any indemnity, a treaty was at length signed. Korea was to be left under Japanese influence, Russia was to evacuate Manchuria, and Japan was to receive the Liaotung peninsula, 'with the fortress of Port Arthur and half the island of Saghalien.

Russia had not yielded to the blows of her formidable antagonist alone. The war was intensely unpopular at home and had brought to a head every discontent which had been acquiring force under the repression of Alexander III's reign. The Czar Nicholas II, possessed neither the commanding presence, the unbending will, nor the capacity for continuous and detailed work which had belonged to his father. Full of kindly intentions, but personally insignificant and without a definite policy of his own, he was unable to control or even to co-ordinate the machinery of the bureaucracy, which Alexander III had made all-powerful. He ascended the throne at a moment when Russia was passing through an inevitable transformation, which, gradual in the case of most other countries, proceeded in this instance with amazing rapidity. The empire was in the grips of the Industrial Revolution.

The process was stimulated by the deliberate policy of Count Witte, who from the successful management of a great railway was promoted to the Ministry of Finance in 1892. He restored a standard value to the Russian *rouble*, thereby steadying the currency; he spent large sums in the State purchase and State construction of railways; he placed heavy duties upon foreign imports with the avowed object of building up home industries, and conducted a successful tariff war with Germany. Manufacturing enterprise developed apace.

It was not in financial matters only that Witte favoured reform. He had placed the sale of spirits under a government monopoly with the object of restricting temptations to drunkenness. It was partly to make capital against his rival Plehve, the reactionary Minister of the Interior, that he held out encouragement to the *Zemstvos*. These bodies, following the example of the *Zemstvo* of the province of Moscow presided over by a landowner named Shipoff, had been doing admirable local government work in the departments of public health, education, agriculture and the regulation of industry, and presented perhaps the most hopeful feature in Russian political life.

The progress of the industrial revolution created a new class with new ideas and new needs, and the Socialist doctrines of Karl Marx began to take root in the country. At first, however, the views of the artisans and their leaders did not extend to politics, and the government actually subsidised and encouraged them in their struggles to obtain better terms from their employers, with the object of turning their discontent into safe channels. The device was not long successful, and only enabled the Socialists to discredit the non-political movement. The demands of each successive strike became progressively more hostile to autocratic rule. Long-standing discontents were thus stimulated into new life and became conscious of fresh driving power behind them.

The vague and somewhat *doctrinaire* Liberalism of the middle classes had in the last reign been thrust out of sight, but had never been extinguished. It now acquired fresh life and a more definite creed by frankly accepting a purely democratic basis for the institutions it hoped to create. The same kind of stimulus reacted upon the nationalist aspirations of those parts of the Empire which had felt the weight of governmental pressure exercised in the interests of uniformity. In Poland the concentration of large masses of operatives in towns like Warsaw and Lodz added a new factor to a problem already difficult. In Finland resistance was offered to the limitations imposed in 1899 upon the legislative autonomy granted by Alexander I to the Finnish Diet, as well as to regulations which abolished the exceptional conditions of military service in the Grand Duchy and assimilated them to the system prevailing in the rest of the Empire. This resistance gradually passed from an attitude of respectful protest to proceedings of undisguised violence, heralded by the murder of the Governor-General Bobrikoff in 1904. In the Baltic provinces, on the other hand, the encouragement which had long been given by the authorities to the Lettish population against their German landlords was found to have prepared the way for outbreaks dangerous to the principles of social order.

The first disasters of the Japanese war blew the smouldering discontent into a flame. In July, 1904, Plehve, the hated Minister of the Interior, was assassinated with a bomb. The authorities were seriously alarmed, and Prince Sviatopolk Mirsky, appointed in his place, set himself to make overtures to public opinion, actually inviting the views of an informal conference of the *Zemstvos*, to be convened at St. Petersburg by Shipoff. There was much unanimity as to the concession of civil liberties, but the meeting was sharply divided on the question whether the National Assembly, which all desired, should be legislative or consultative only.

The result was a general outburst of discussion, criticism and suggestions, wise and unwise, statesmanlike and irresponsible. At once fresh checks were put upon the press. Thereupon the various professions severally made haste to form unions, the only bodies entitled by law to the privilege of public meeting, and proceeded to hold banquets for the purpose of discussion and demonstration. Public feeling was thus already sufficiently excited when the factory hands of St. Petersburg, led by Father Gapon, having failed to exact their demands from their employers by means of a strike, resolved to go in procession to lay their wishes before the Czar. Bearing in mind some of the earlier incidents of the French Revolution of 1789 we shall scarcely be inclined to blame the authorities for resolving to stop the procession, peaceful as it was in character and preceded by sacred *Eikons*, by calling out the troops. Actual firing should probably have been unnecessary. But little as there was, that little seems to have been ordered with a callousness which has given to January 22 the name of "Red Sunday."

Prince Mirsky's appeal to the public had scarcely been successful. He was accordingly dismissed, and the government issued a programme of minor reforms, which went hand in hand with the repression of disturbance. But the country was now quite out of control. Strikes were rife, self-appointed committees and congresses were darkening counsel, among which the "Union of Unions," representing the collective views of the professional unions, was leaning more and more to extreme opinions; the peasantry were plundering and wrecking the property of the country gentry, while at Odessa the battleship *Potemkin*, falling into the hands of its mutinous crew, held the city at its mercy.

In August the government was again veering round to concession. An edict was issued constituting a Duma, or assembly, whose functions were to be consultative only, and whose members were to be elected by a very complicated process. The action of the workpeople condemned it to futility. There was a general strike all over Russia. Witte was called to the rescue. He issued a manifesto giving the Duma a legislative character, and two months later, when the extravagances of the Labour leaders and an abortive rising in Moscow had alienated public opinion, proceeded to a drastic extension of the franchise. While the old Council of State was reconstructed to form a Second Chamber, Durnovo worked hard at the task of repression, and nearly provoked another reaction. Both he and Witte retired before the Duma met.

In the First Duma the prevailing party were the "Cadets," holding strongly radical though not revolutionary views. There was also a moderate party, the "Octobrists", representing the old *Zemstvo* attitude, and a group of Labour delegates of various shades of opinion. The loquacity of the Chamber was appalling and extremely discursive, but at last a definite issue emerged between the majority and the government, the Cadets deciding so far to favour the Labour point of view as to insist on the resumption of all lands for the use of the peasants. Stolypin was appointed premier with orders to dissolve.

The new minister was a strong man who had formed his own conclusions. He was a convinced supporter of constitutional government, but entirely rejected the conception that the executive should be at the mercy of a parliamentary majority. He stood between the

Duma on the one side and the reactionary bureaucracy on the other, and his hands were again and again weakened by the action of the latter. Yet not altogether weakened. Reactionary cancelled out Extremist. Repression and the spirit of faction helped to strangle one another, and all who desired reform were drawn towards the one man who seemed to desire the success of the constitutional experiment.

The Second Duma met with an increased Labour representation, to which the Cadet leaders were obliged to defer. The Premier expected steady spade-work of the assembly, the deputies desired to talk. On the strength of a supposed plot to murder the Czar the Social Democrat members, who had refused to take part in a resolution congratulating him on his escape, were charged with treasonable conduct and their expulsion was demanded. The Duma merely appointed a committee to investigate. Stolypin could no longer resist the pressure brought on him from above, and dissolved the House.

But the Premier still held firmly to his policy. A Third Duma elected on a restricted franchise, after a considerable redistribution of seats, met in November, 1907. The majority were of the Octobrist persuasion, and represented the ideas of the reforming country gentry of the *Zemstvos*. Stolypin had at last got a party behind him, and held his own against the reactionaries, while he set committees to work on practical measures of reform. The violent stage of the revolution had exhausted itself.

Simultaneously with the revolutionary movement in Russia the long-standing disunion of the Scandinavian monarchy came to an open rupture. In 1859, Oscar I had been succeeded by his brilliant and erratic son Charles XV, in whose reign the old *Riksdag* was reorganised as a Parliament of two Chambers. His brother Oscar II ascended the throne in 1872, the most dignified, cultured and sympathetic personality among all the contemporary sovereigns of Europe. In 1876 he consented to making the Prime Minister responsible to the *Riksdag*, but political change was not rapid owing to the constant opposition between the Upper and Lower Houses, representing agricultural and urban interests respectively. In foreign affairs Sweden's influence was effaced by the break-up of the alliance between England and Louis Napoleon to which she had attached herself, and by her attitude towards the victories of Germany over Denmark and France. In 1888 a protective policy was applied to agriculture, which in 1892 was extended to manufactures. In 1901 a long continued agitation for better means of national defence took effect in an Act imposing compulsory military service, and Sweden is now for her size a well-armed Power. Gustavus V succeeded his father in 1907. In 1909 the franchise was extended, but the strife between the two Chambers was not allayed, the peasants finding a foothold in the Upper House against the artisans in the Lower. Industrial development came to the country with the last years of the century, and the immense amount of water-power available promises a great future to manufacturing enterprise.

Peaceful as were the domestic annals of Oscar II's reign, the whole period was one of continuous strife with Norway. The Union rested on the Fundamental Law and on the *Riksakt*, and these enactments could not legally be amended without the consent of both nations. That was the Swedish case. The Norwegians rested their claims upon the fact that the Union was not of their seeking, and upon the sacred right of nationalist feeling to override mere law. Of this feeling the Radical party were the principal exponents, and the national grievances were sentimental rather than material. The separation between the legislatures of the two countries and the fact that the Crown possessed only a suspensive veto in Norway gave the *Storting* an extremely strong position.

The first success was scored in 1873. The King was induced to abolish the office of *Statholder*, or Lord Lieutenant, without reference to the Swedish *Riksdag*, on account of the vehemence of the Norwegians and the unimportance of the matter. Norway had thus

obtained a precedent for modifying the Fundamental Law without the consent of Sweden, and followed up her success by resolving upon another alteration by which the ministers were to be required to sit in the *Storting*. This demand was secured by the impeachment of the King's ministers for refusing to publish the resolution, and by their wholly illegal condemnation. Sweden was indifferent and Oscar disinclined to extreme measures. The result was the formation of a ministry dependent on the majority of the legislature and a series of Radical reforms (1883).

The Fundamental Law was now waste-paper. The *Rikssakt* was to prove no stronger. Part of the military forces of Norway were withdrawn from the Army of the Union (1885), and efforts were made to secure a separate Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs, which had been hitherto directed by Sweden on behalf of both countries. Sweden was the Norwegian Radicals, and as a step towards their goal they demanded a separate Consular Service, and used every power they possessed of withholding supplies to press their point. For the moment they overshot their mark, and the King was able to find a more moderate ministry (1895). An exchange of views now took place, and Sweden showed every disposition to concede the joint control of foreign affairs and a separate Consular Service. The Norwegian Radical party wrecked all attempts at compromise.

Accordingly in 1903 a separate Consular Service was offered to Norway on the understanding that it should act under the general control of the Foreign Office. The *Storting* thereupon declined further discussion, established the Service on its own authority, and, on the King's refusal to assent, declared that he had ceased to reign. It was now clear, as it should have been from the first, that the constitutional relations between the two kingdoms were of such a kind that nothing but force could hold the Union together in the event of serious disagreement between the partners, and that the application of force was likely to be more disastrous to both than separation itself. A conference at Karlstad resulted in the erection of Norway as a separate kingdom under Haakon VII, grandson of Christian IX of Denmark (1905).

England had taken advantage of the preoccupation of Russia to secure her Indian frontiers. In 1895 Chitral was occupied, and the opportunity was taken to delimit the boundary between the two Powers in the Pamirs. In 1897, after the Tirah campaign against the fringe of independent tribes which bordered Afghanistan upon the east, Lord Curzon, then Viceroy of India, effected a compromise between the policy of the "Forward School" and that of its opponents by leaving tribal independence untouched, while making it clear that order must be preserved, and by arranging that the British forces were so placed as to be able to enforce it. In 1904 he sent a small expedition to Lhasa, the capital of Tibet, nominally to secure the entry of British trade and to enforce a settlement of boundary questions, but in reality to counteract the visits of Russian agents, and the influence which Russia seemed likely to obtain through her hold upon the suzerain power of China.

Much more serious was the situation in Persia. Witte, like Bismarck before him, had been driven by his protective policy to seek closed markets for Russian commerce. No sooner had the Caspian become a Russian lake and the Trans-Caspian railway been completed in Persia, than Russia found herself in a position to exercise formidable pressure along the northern frontier of the moribund Persian State. A road was built with Russian capital from Resht on the Caspian to Teheran; the Shah was induced to enrol a force of Persian Cossacks under Russian officers, which formed the only effective part of his army; a Russian Bank was established in 1903, supported by the Russian government, with which he contracted loans so enormous that the poverty of the country made repayment impossible. These loans were secured on the Persian customs, which had been already entrusted to a staff of Belgian officials, as representing a neutral Power. These officials consistently favoured Russian as opposed to British commercial interests, and in 1902 a

final step was taken by the conclusion of a Russo- Persian Convention, by which an entirely new tariff was adopted. The tariff being applicable to the traders of all nationalities did not indeed deprive Britain of her treaty right to be dealt with by Persia on the same terms as the most favoured nation, but its details were so arranged as to penalise the staple commodities of British trade, while giving every facility to goods distinctively Russian.

Since 1820 peace and order in the Persian Gulf, formerly a nest of pirates and slavers, had been secured and maintained by the sole efforts of Great Britain, and by the Persian activity of her warships in those waters. Her reward had been the expansion of her trade ; she claimed no territorial advantages. The complete subservience of Persia to Russian dictation and the analogy of Manchuria and Port Arthur suggested alarming possibilities. A Russian railway through Persia with an arsenal on the Gulf would enable a hostile Power to out-flank British sea routes to India, Australia, and the Far East.

The situation was complicated by the intrusion of a third party. Since 1880 German influence had replaced that of Great Britain at Constantinople. By his neutrality at the time of the Armenian massacres and by his open sympathy with Turkey during her war with Greece, William II had obtained a firmer hold on Abdul Hamid. In 1888 a German Company obtained control of a short line of railway from the Bosphorus to a port on the Sea of Marmora, and in 1893, as the "Anatolian Railway Company," acquired a concession for extending it by way of Konieh down the Tigris to Bagdad. The extension reached Konieh in 1896. In 1902 leave was obtained to prolong the system to the head of the Persian Gulf. At this point the German Government asked for European co-operation, and approached both England and France. The Company was to be reconstituted and both governments were asked to back investors with guarantees. The reasons for this step were probably as follows.

Russia had already shown displeasure, and had succeeded in restricting German railway enterprise in the direction of her Georgian frontier. Abdul Hamid was unpopular in Turkey, and his fall might affect German interests adversely. Moreover there were difficulties about a terminus on the Gulf. Kuwait had always been indicated as a suitable place, and it was more than a coincidence that Turkey at- this moment began to furbish up her vague claims to suzerainty over the Sheikh Mubarak. This ruler, whose rights had been guaranteed by England in 1899, showed no disposition to submit, and a filibustering expedition, organised with Turkish help by a rival claimant, was scattered by the prompt arrival of H.M.S. *Lapwing* (1902).

England declined the German offer on the ground that the proposed conditions placed the undertaking too exclusively under German control (1903), but the incident quickened a growing desire to arrive at an understanding with Russia. In 1907 Sir Edward Grey concluded the Anglo-Russian Convention. The existing situation in Afghanistan is recognised. Tibet is barred to the enterprises of either Power, saving only those concessions secured by Britain in 1904. The independence of Persia is affirmed, but the predominance of Russia in the northern half and that of England in the southern is definitely accepted. The arrangement is obviously only local, and from the Russian point of view can scarcely be more than temporary. But it will give time for a good understanding to replace ancient suspicions, and may lead to the linking up of Russian and British railways, and to a solution of the Gulf problem in which the legitimate ambitions of one Power and the vested interests of the other will be alike safeguarded.

We have now seen England enter into friendly relations with the two Powers who had been her bitterest foes. As far as it is possible to judge from a standpoint so near as ours the conclusion of this Triple Entente marks the close of one era in international relations and the opening of another. Whatever may be the issue of the next few decades there can be little doubt that Britain finds herself to-day embarrassed by fewer problems, hampered

by fewer enmities, and less dependent on her own unaided resources than in the perilous years succeeding 1878.

These advantages, however, must depend upon the recognition by British statesmen and by the British public of certain elementary facts. The new relations with European Powers entail new obligations and some sacrifices, not least the sacrifice of a good many persistent illusions. That British policy at the present day is inspired by a genuine devotion to peace is scarcely questioned by responsible statesmen or journalists abroad. And it is scarcely possible to doubt that the closer the relations between any Power actuated by such motives and the rest of Europe, the better it will be for Europe and for the world.

As European politics are at present constituted, such intimate relations are not to be achieved by general professions of friendship for all nations indiscriminately. International friendships are not unlike personal friendships in that they imply selection from many and special obligations to a few.

But international friendships differ from personal friendships in an important respect. The element of sentiment is absent or is at best a secondary consideration. An international friendship is primarily a business transaction, and requires a *quid pro quo*. The will and the power to assist another State to maintain its interests are the qualities which are sought and valued in an ally. If Britain desires to retain the influence with her allies which alone can forward her desires, she must not shrink from giving occasional offence in other quarters, nor must there be any hesitation on her part in maintaining an army and a navy sufficient to reassure her friends, and to give pause to hostile designs against their interests or her own.

It cannot be too often repeated that European relations of the present day depend upon mutual guarantees. With adequate resources on both sides such guarantees assure security and influence to the partners. Without such resources behind it a continental alliance is in a very true sense an "entanglement," and an attitude of deliberate isolation or even of detached and general benevolence (which in practice amounts to the same thing) if neither very "splendid" or secure, is at least more logical, and will entail a sufficient number of distressing experiences to dispel anything like undue pride in England's influence or undue confidence in her destiny.

CONCLUSION

It remains to notice some recent occurrences and to offer a few closing remarks.

The increased consideration shown for England in Europe did not depend only upon formal understandings and alliances. The personal relations established by Edward VII with individual rulers, and new dynastic connections with the British royal family promoted a kindlier feeling than was general on the Continent in the eighties and nineties. The King's daughter, Princess Maud, wife of Haakon VII, was well received in Norway, and the marriage of his niece, Princess Victoria of Battenberg, to Alfonso XIII, was popular in Spain. With Portugal the friendly visits exchanged between King Edward and King Carlos served to restore the good feeling which had been interrupted by an ultimatum presented to Portugal by Lord Salisbury in 1890, when the northern boundary of Rhodesia was settled (p. 481). So bitter had been Portuguese resentment at the time that it had induced King Luiz (1861-1899), son of Queen Maria da Gloria (p. 150), to return the Order of the Garter as an expression of the national annoyance.

The incident remained for some time the most noticeable in the somewhat uninspiring annals of Portugal, but in 1908 a sordid political struggle culminated in a tragedy. The country had long been the prey of professional politicians. The political parties took office by turns, according to a well-understood arrangement, and each used its period of authority to dispense patronage among its supporters. A revolution in Brazil which had replaced the Empire by a Republic (1889) had introduced republican ideas into the mother country, whose connection with her colony had remained close. The King's extravagance and the Queen's patronage of proscribed religious orders had brought the Crown into conflict with the ministry.

Carlos seems to have persuaded himself that an opportunity had arisen for at once relieving his own financial difficulties and for satisfying the popular dislike of ministerial corruption. He appointed Joao Franco minister, and suppressed the Cortez. There was little affection in Portugal for the corrupt politicians thus deprived of office, but unfortunately Franco was unable to diminish the national burdens. A strong army was more than ever needed to counterbalance the party organisations, and the King expected the remission of his debts to the State and an increase of his personal allowance. There was a considerable revulsion of feeling. In February, 1908, Carlos and his eldest son were shot in the royal carriage as they drove through the streets of Lisbon, and his second son Manuel, who escaped almost by a miracle, became King at the age of eighteen. He was obliged to restore the old corrupt system. The establishment of the Portuguese Republic lies outside our period.

Far more important, if less dramatic, were the events which took place in the Balkans in the same year. For more than a decade constant agitation and unrest had been going on in Macedonia. No more baffling problem could be set for diplomacy to solve than here presented itself. The country is a medley of races, Servians, Greeks, Bulgarians, and Kutzovlachs (a people akin to the Roumanians). The rivalry of the Greek and Bulgarian Churches adds religious bitterness to the feud between the two chief elements in the population. Servia, Greece, and Bulgaria each regard the land as their destined heritage and encourage their own kindred. Roumania hopes to use the turbulence of the Kutzovlachs to obtain the Dobrudscha from Bulgaria as the price of concessions in Macedonia. To put an end to this state of affairs Austria and Russia agreed in 1903 on the so-called Mürzsteg programme.

The Sultan was induced to appoint an Inspector-General, to establish a *gendarmérie* under foreign officers, and to introduce reforms in the government and in the administration of justice. In 1905 the occupation of Mitylene by an international squadron forced him, much against his will, to place the finances of the province under European delegates.

The Macedonian question was put into the shade by the revolution which took place at Constantinople in July, 1908. The "Young Turks," a faction favourable to constitutional government, had obtained a preponderating influence in the army, and were able without striking a blow to force the Sultan to restore the institutions granted in 1876. Democratic Europe loudly welcomed the prodigal to the constitutional fold. The world had forgotten, it would seem, the fiasco of 1876, and neglected to scratch the constitutional Turk to investigate the underlying material.

For Austria the change had much more than a sentimental interest. A regenerated Turkey might well claim to resume the various leases which the Sultan's own misgovernment had forced him to grant. Accordingly Count Aehrenthal, the Austrian Foreign Minister, proclaimed the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in defiance of the Berlin Treaty. With a promptitude which pointed to concerted action, Prince Ferdinand declared himself Czar of Bulgaria and repudiated the last vestiges of Turkish suzerainty. The action of Austria roused Servia and Montenegro to fury. They saw themselves destined to be wedged apart by the Austrian dominions, and the long-deferred hope of a great Servian nation extinguished for ever. England, indeed, protested. But the only hope of the discontented principalities lay in Russia, and William II in his own words, stood by his ally "in shining armour." Russia, if she had ever meant serious opposition, desisted. Servia received no compensation, and the changes were accepted as part of the public law of Europe. In 1909 a counter-revolution was attempted at Constantinople, which was put down by the army of Salonica, and Abdul Hamid II was deposed in favour of his brother Mohammed V. He escaped the normal fate of deposed Sultans, which, by the character of his rule, he had done more than most of them to merit, and was kept under restraint at Salonica.

In the same year Leopold II died, and Belgium assumed responsibility for the Congo, not before she had given assurances to Europe of an improved administration. In September, South Africa, rejecting the example of Australia which had established a Federal Constitution in 1899, merged all its governments in a single close union with a Parliament at Cape Town and the seat of administration at Pretoria.

With the death of King Edward VII, in 1910, this narrative comes to a close.

Without pretending to forecast events, some attempt may be made to indicate the more immediate problems which may affect international relations.

The problem of China's future is doubtless the most momentous question on the international horizon, and he would be a bold man who would venture to predict either the date or the manner of its solution. All that can be said is that it will probably depend less than was once supposed upon the direct action of the European Powers, and that more time will elapse before the destiny of the Chinese people reveals itself than would have been predicted in the nineties.

To turn to issues nearer at hand. Within Europe itself there is none which equals in interest the future evolution of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, nor one which appears more likely to become of immediate importance. Ever since the Compromise of 1867 Hungary has adopted an attitude of increasing independence while exercising a growing influence upon the policy of the Dual Monarchy. Magyar predominance has been

accompanied by a rising impatience among the Slavonic dependencies of the Crown of St. Stephen, who have been recently reinforced by the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is well within the bounds of possibility that the claims of the Slavs may result in the reconstitution of the Empire as a Triple Monarchy, doubtless producing effects upon international relations at least as important as those which are traceable to Hungarian predominance. Poland and the Balkan peninsula may well open new fields to organised Slavonic ambition and sentiment.

In the sphere of world-politics all other issues are dwarfed by the determination of Germany, supported as it is by the resources of the strongest military State in the world, to secure what she deems her fair share of oversea Empire and trade. She chooses to see in England the obstacle to her destiny. A dispassionate survey of the situation seems scarcely to bear out the contention. England has, in fact, very little that Germany could profitably take. Tropical colonies she possesses, but so does Germany. Moreover tropical colonies are valuable solely for commercial purposes, and not for settlement, and the Crown colonies of England are open to German trade. There remain the so-called White Man's colonies. Germany is justly dissatisfied that she has no possessions where her surplus population may live and bring up families under the German flag. But it is quite certain that England's self-governing colonies in Australasia and Africa would not submit to conquest without a struggle, and could not be retained without garrisons of enormous size, more especially as their ultra-democratic institutions would make them peculiarly sensitive to German principles of government.

Land practically unoccupied there is in the world, rich in minerals and suited to European colonists, soon to be brought 7000 miles nearer to Europe by the Panama Canal, on the West Coast of South America. True, the Germany and country is not a no-man's land ; it is parcelled Doctrine, out among self-governing States, but population is sparse, and if Germany is to acquire new possessions in a world where nearly every inch of territory is earmarked, she cannot afford to be squeamish, nor indeed does she profess to be so. The Monroe Doctrine forbids her access to these shores. That doctrine, if anything, will prove her 1 birth's invidious bar," and England's interests are as little bound up in that doctrine as in the famous Bull of Alexander VI, which in the fifteenth century assigned the same regions to Spain. Doctrine and Bull alike are legal fictions which dilute for diplomatic consumption the potency of a pointed threat.

Germany at this stage of the world's history may never desire, may not even be able, to accept the challenge. To the present writer it seems that her policy took a false turn when she annexed Alsace-Lorraine, and that she has since been working out the consequences. The hostility of France entailed the alliance with Austria, a State unable to furnish support in questions of world-politics, and herself standing in need of protection. The support of Austria entailed, in spite of Bismarck's efforts to escape the consequences, the hostility of Russia. The attitude of her European neighbours has compelled a disproportionate outlay of national strength upon her land forces. Even England, averse as ever to continental connections, has been drawn at last into the opposite camp, because Germany had still failed to conciliate France. Bismarck was no thorough-going colonial, and he left his country entangled in Europe. His system of alliances looked back to the Rhine and to 1870, not on to 1900 and the open seas. Germany, we firmly believe, must expand. But it will be to repeat the original mistake if she should begin by aggressions in Europe. England acquired her Colonial Empire while Europe was busy with internal quarrels; Spain lost hers by allowing herself to be absorbed in Spanish or French schemes for dominating the continent.

Still -wider is the question opened up by the growing power of the labouring classes, and its probable effect on international relations. With the growth of democracy as such this book has no concern. Democratic movements have been treated only when and in so far

as they have exercised a determining or disintegrating effect upon the external policy of the State. Of democratic development as a whole it is much too early to trace the growth or estimate the results. We have indeed reached a stage when it is possible to affirm with certainty that democratic government possesses neither the simplicity nor the logical necessity, nor even the precise consequences claimed for it by the enthusiasm of a past generation. It is not more certainly productive of political justice than other forms of government nor less difficult to administer in practice. But it has been a very logical evolution from certain principles, and neither those principles nor the intermediate stages can be judged fairly before the ultimate issues of the movement are more distinct.

In international concerns organised labour has almost unanimously adopted a pacifist attitude, while demanding greater publicity in diplomacy. It may be remarked at the outset that the two aims are scarcely under existing circumstances consistent. International disputes will not be more easily settled when popular prejudice and passion enter the arena. Nor, when once the working classes have acquired a larger share in the material resources of the country, will the pacifist attitude be likely to be strengthened. Men who are quite prepared to go to extremes and even to repudiate agreements in trade disputes will not be less combative when the issue is between trade interests in which they have a personal stake and similar interests belonging to another country. Doubtless there will be wars, doubtless protective tariffs will tend to increase rather than to disappear ; for strife, whether between individuals or nations, whether with weapons of war or with tariffs, is only effectively extinguished when bitter experience has proved its failure to secure the ends which it professes to seek. Armaments and tariffs are perhaps a stage in the education of mankind.