

BOURBON AND VASA

A TEXTBOOK OF EUROPEAN HISTORY, 1610-1715

WITH A SUMMARY OF THE EVENTS
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING

By J. H. SACRET, M.A.

LECTURER IN MODERN HISTORY, UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, READING



CONTENTS

CHAP.	PAGE
I. EUROPE IN 1610	1
II. THE CAUSES OF THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR .	24
III. FROM THE BOHEMIAN REVOLUTION TO THE PEACE OF LÜBECK	45
IV. THE POLICY OF RICHELIEU	75
V. GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS IN GERMANY.	96
VI. THE CLOSE OF THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR .	124
VII. FROM WESTPHALIA TO THE DEATH OF MAZARIN	153
VIII. LOUIS XIV AND COLBERT	180
IX. FROM THE DUTCH WAR TO THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION	207
X. THE WAR OF AUGSBURG, AND THE SPANISH SUCCESSION QUESTION	236
XI. THE SPANISH SUCCESSION WAR	262
XII. THE COLLAPSE OF SWEDEN	290
LIST OF BOOKS ON THE PERIOD	306
CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY	307
GENEALOGICAL TABLES	
1. The House of Bourbon	314
2. The House of Vasa in Sweden and Poland .	315
3. The Spanish Succession	316

	PAGE
INDEX	317
PLANS	
The Battle of Breitenfeld	109
The Battle of Lützen	121
The Battle of Blenheim	276
MAPS	<i>at end</i>
1. Europe in 1610.	
2. The Baltic Lands.	
3. Germany at the Peace of Westphalia.	
4. France, 1610-1715.	
5. The Netherlands, 1610-1715.	
6. Northern Italy.	
7. Europe in 1715.	

CONTEMPORARY SOVEREIGNS

England.

James I, 1603-1625.
Charles I, 1625-1649.
Commonwealth and Protectorate, 1649-1660.
Charles II, 1660-1685.
James II, 1685-1688.
William III, 1689-1702.
Anne, 1702-1714.
George I, 1714-1727.

France.

Henry IV, 1589-1610.
Louis XIII, 1610-1643.
Louis XIV, 1643-1715.

Spain.

Philip III, 1598-1621.
Philip IV, 1621-1665.
Charles II, 1665-1700.
Philip V, 1700-1746.

Portugal.

Under Spain, 1580-1640.
John IV, 1640-1656.
Alfonso VI, 1656-*dep.* 1667.
Pedro II, 1667-1706.
John V, 1706-1750.

The Empire.

Rudolf II, 1576-1612.
Matthias, 1612-1619.
Ferdinand II, 1619-1637.
Ferdinand III, 1637-1657.
Leopold I, 1658-1705.

Joseph I, 1705-1711.
Charles VI, 1711-1740.

Brandenburg—Prussia. *(Electors of Brandenburg).*

John Sigismund, 1608-1619.
George William, 1619-1640.
Frederick William (*the Great Elector*), 1640-1688.
Frederick III, 1688, became
(Kings of Prussia)
Frederick I, King of Prussia,
1701-1713.
Frederick William I, 1713-1740.

Saxony. *(Electors.)*

John George I, 1611-1656.
John George II, 1656-1680.
John George III, 1680-1691.
John George IV, 1691-1694.
Frederick Augustus I, 1694-
1733 (*elected King of Poland,*
Augustus II, 1697).

The Papacy.

Paul V, 1605-1621.
Gregory XV, 1621-1623.
Urban VIII, 1623-1644.
Innocent X, 1644-1655.
Alexander VII, 1655-1667.
Clement IX, 1667-1669.
Clement X, 1670-1676.
Innocent XI, 1676-1689.
Alexander VIII, 1689-1691.
Innocent XII, 1691-1700.
Clement XI, 1700-1721.

Savoy (Dukes).

- Charles Emmanuel I, 1580-1630.
 Victor Amadeus I, 1630-1637.
 Francis Hyacinth, 1637-1638.
 Charles Emmanuel II, 1638-1675.
 Victor Amadeus II, 1675, King of Sicily, 1713; King of Sardinia, 1720; *abd.* 1730, *d.* 1732.

Denmark and Norway.

- Christian IV, 1588-1648.
 Frederick III, 1648-1670.
 Christian V, 1670-1699.
 Frederick IV, 1699-1730.

Sweden.

- Charles IX, 1604-1611.
 Gustavus II Adolphus, 1611-1632.
 Christina, 1632-*abd.* 1654.
 Charles X, 1654-1660.
 Charles XI, 1660-1697.
 Charles XII, 1697-1718.

Poland.

- Sigismund III (*King of Sweden*, 1592-1600), 1587-1632.
 Ladislaus VII, 1632-1648.

- John Casimir V, 1648-*abd.* 1668.
 Michael Wisniowiecki, 1669-1673.
 John III Sobieski, 1674-1696.
 Augustus II (*Elector Frederick Augustus I of Saxony*), 1697-*dep.* 1704.
 Stanislaus Leszczynski, 1704-*dep.* 1709.
 Augustus II, *rest.* 1709-1733.

Russia.

- Michael Romanoff, 1613-1645.
 Alexis, 1645-1676.
 Theodore III, 1676-1682.
 Peter I the Great, 1682-1725.
 (*Ivan V joint Tsar, and Sophia Regent*, 1682-1689.).

The Ottoman Empire.

- Ahmad I, 1603-1617.
 Mustafa I, 1617-*dep.* 1618.
 Osman II, 1618-1622.
 Mustafa I, *rest.* 1622-1623.
 Murad IV, 1623-1640.
 Ibrahim, 1640-*dep.* 1648.
 Mohammed IV, 1648-*dep.* 1687.
 Solyman II, 1687-1691.
 Ahmad II, 1691-1695.
 Mustafa II, 1695-*dep.* 1703.
 Ahmad III, 1703-*dep.* 1730.

CHAPTER I

EUROPE IN 1610

1. Condition of France in 1610. 2. The United Provinces, and the Spanish Netherlands. 3. The eastern and southern frontiers of France. 4. Effects of the frontier question upon French foreign politics. 5. Spain and the Spanish possessions in 1610. 6. Austria and her dependencies. 7. The Holy Roman Empire, and the Imperial institutions. 8. The Ottoman Turks. 9. The Reformation and Counter-Reformation in the Austrian dominions. 10. The Baltic question. 11. Sweden. 12. Denmark, compared with Sweden. 13. Poland. 14. Summary.

THE assassination of Henry IV, the first of the Bourbon kings of France, in the streets of Paris in May 1610, was an event as decisive in the history of Europe as in that of France. It not merely ended the career of one who was, in spite of his moral errors, one of the wisest and most temperate of rulers, but it also postponed for another eight years the outbreak of a colossal European conflagration. Every country was as it were piled up with combustible materials, ready for the torch to set them ablaze, and there is little doubt that the war which Henry had been about to open, against the hereditary enemy Austria, on behalf of the two German Protestant claimants to the Cleves-Jülich inheritance, would, but for his death, have become merged, as did the Bohemian revolution of 1618, in all existing European rivalries, whether religious, political, or commercial. These causes of quarrel were very closely entangled, and it is difficult to settle generally which was the most important. Perhaps in most cases, and in Germany especially, unsettled religious contro-

§ 1. Condition of France in 1610.
Henry IV.

Causes of European rivalry.

versies were still of paramount interest ; but in those countries which had by this time taken a definite stand on the Catholic or Protestant side, religious questions were becoming subordinate to others of a more directly political, dynastic, or commercial character.

The Edict
of Nantes,
1598.

Such was now the case of France. The civil wars had demonstrated that the triumph of Catholicism as the state religion was an essential condition of national stability. The sometime heretic king had acquiesced in this by his conversion, and had become a pattern of orthodoxy. His Huguenot subjects had also acquiesced in return for the Edict of Nantes (1598), which, though not giving absolute equality, had granted them full civic rights and a generous measure of toleration far beyond anything enjoyed by any dissident sect elsewhere. Unfortunately for the future peace of France, they had been strong enough to exact terms which have been described as constituting a charter of latent rebellion. They were permitted to hold political as well as religious assemblies. They were allowed also to retain military control of two hundred towns in the south and west of the country, and the king even agreed to contribute towards the support of their garrisons and fortifications. These concessions had been wrung from Henry only by sheer necessity, and they were viewed with undisguised antagonism by the rest of the nation. For the present, however, both parties observed the compact, and the attention of France was directed by the policy of the king and his great minister Sully to internal development and to foreign affairs.

Foreign
policy of
France.

The foreign policy of France was chiefly determined by the imperative need of strengthening her frontiers. Since she first became a nation she has never entirely abandoned the ambition to recover the 'natural frontiers' of ancient Gaul, especially at the Rhine. On the other

hand, her rival, Germany, had been as determined to keep the whole of the Rhine valley under her influence, direct or indirect. This rivalry has produced a bitter conflict scarcely ever dormant throughout a thousand years. The leadership on the German side had now devolved upon the two intimately related branches of the House of Habsburg in Austria and Spain, whose territories almost completely surrounded France from the north-east to the south-west.

The most dangerous spot for France was on the north-east. Nearly all the seventeen Netherland provinces had during the fifteenth century come under the control of the French Dukes of Burgundy. By inheritance they had passed to Austria and then to Spain. They had revolted in the sixteenth century against the tyranny and bigotry of Philip II. The seven United Provinces of the north, after a desperate struggle during which they enriched themselves upon the spoils of their enemies and founded a colonial empire in the East Indies, had obtained in 1609 the Twelve Years' Truce which recognized their independence and gave them full trading rights. During the negotiations for the truce the United Provinces received powerful diplomatic support from Henry IV. Spain conceded what she did only because of her exhaustion, and she was eagerly anticipating a fresh opportunity to strike a blow against the independence, the Calvinism, and the trade of the Dutch. Thus the United Provinces were inevitably drawn into the circle of alliances against the Habsburgs.

The ten southern Flemish and Walloon provinces had been recovered for Spain and Catholicism, in a sadly impoverished condition, by the genius of Philip II's greatest general, Parma. They were now enjoying something like autonomy under the joint rule of the Austrian

Rivalry
with the
House of
Habsburg.

§ 2. The
United
Provinces,
and the
Spanish
Nether-
lands.

The Seven
United
Provinces.

The
Twelve
Years'
Truce,
1609.

The Ten
'loyal'
Provinces.

Archduke Albert and his Spanish wife, the Infanta Isabella. The greater part of the boundary adjoining France was open country without natural defences, and was guarded by a line of the strongest forts in Europe. The presence of thousands of Spanish veterans in these forts, within one hundred miles of Paris and Rouen, was a constant menace to France. Henry IV had vivid experience of this danger on two occasions, when, at the crisis of the struggle to secure his own throne and capital, Parma marched across the frontier, outmanœuvred him, and forced him to retreat. The strengthening of the north-eastern frontier, either by conquest or by diplomacy, was therefore an imperative necessity.

A menace
to France.

§ 3. The
eastern
and
southern
frontiers
of France.
(a) Lor-
raine.

South of the Netherlands lay the Duchy of Lorraine, separated from the French province of Champagne by the upper Meuse. Lorraine was nominally a fief of the Empire, but its inhabitants were mostly French-speaking, and its dukes, who were related to the royal house of France, and who were also French vassals for their Duchy of Bar in Champagne, had in past times secured practical independence of Imperial control by relying on French support. The natural defences of the duchy were strong, and it commanded the chief military route from central France to the fertile plain of Alsace (which belonged to Austria), and thence across the Rhine into the heart of Germany. Thus its strategic importance was enormous, and the command of the 'Lorraine gate' was another perennial source of dispute between France and the Empire. So far France was in the more favourable position, having in the sixteenth century gained possession of the three strongholds, Metz, Toul, and Verdun, as the price of support given by Henry II to the German Protestants. On the other hand, the duke of this period, Charles IV (sometimes known as Charles III), was be-

Metz,
Toul, and
Verdun.

coming weary of French control, and in his own interests was prepared to support her enemies.

South of Champagne and Lorraine lay Burgundy, the northern remnant of the ancient Burgundian kingdom. ^{(b) Burgundy.} It was divided into two portions by a line running nearly north and south. To the west of this line was the Duchy of Burgundy, a part of France; and to the east the County, known as the Franche-Comté, which was a part of the Empire, and was then occupied by Spanish troops. It was the ambition of both rivals to reunite the Duchy and the County under their own sole sway.

At the southernmost part of her eastern boundary, in ^{(c) Savoy.} Dauphiné and Provence, France came in contact with the state of Savoy-Piedmont, which to the north held both slopes of the Alps adjoining its rivals the Swiss, and to the south in the County of Nice reached to the Mediterranean; and therefore commanded all the direct land routes between France and Italy. Savoy thus, as a buffer state like Lorraine, gained an importance in European politics altogether disproportionate to its small size and resources. Its dukes were accustomed to play an exciting part in the great contests of the time by selling their support to one side or the other. Recently they had profited by the distractions of France to recover Saluzzo from her. But Henry IV, as soon as his hands were free, had forced them to surrender the important territories of Bresse, Bugey, Valromey, and Gex (1601), which gave France the upper Rhone frontier as far as Switzerland, and the southern frontier of Franche-Comté.

Between France and Spain the Pyrenees were the natural boundary. ^{(d) The Pyrenees.} The passes of these mountains are higher, more arid, and more difficult than those of the Alps, though their peaks are less lofty. Thus, while the Alps can be crossed with ease in summer at several

(e) Roussillon.

(f) Navarre.

places even by great masses of men, the Pyrenees form an effective barrier to the march of armies, except at the eastern and western extremities, where lay debatable lands which were the source of constant rivalry between France and Spain. On the east Spain held Roussillon, north of the mountains. Near the western extremity lay the Kingdom of Navarre, covering both slopes of the mountains. Like Roussillon, it had been seized by Ferdinand the Catholic (1479-1516), and Spain still retained the southern half. The northern half was inherited by Henry IV from his mother, the heroic Jeanne d'Albret, and had thus become part of the royal domain of France.

§ 4. Effects of the frontier question upon French foreign politics.

It will be evident from this survey of the boundaries, that, in an age when territorial aggrandizement and successful war were the accepted tests of national strength, no great penetration was necessary to discern the objects of the foreign politics of France. For purposes both of attack and of defence the frontiers must be strengthened and extended; friendly relations must be cultivated with all possible rivals of the House of Habsburg; those states which hesitated between one side and the other must be humoured and, when possible, overawed; and every means, direct or indirect, must be adopted to weaken and harass the arch-enemy. Since the peace of 1598 Henry IV had pursued these objects chiefly by diplomatic means, while he gave France twelve years of internal tranquillity which restored the prestige of the crown and the prosperity of the country. It may be doubted whether the time was yet ripe for the aggressive enterprise for which he was preparing when the assassin's dagger closed his career. But it is certain that, disappointed by the lukewarm responses made to his requests for foreign support, he was on the point of abandoning his design, when a sordid infatuation for the girl bride of

Henry IV's preparations for war in 1610.

his cousin the Prince of Condé threw his customary discretion completely out of gear. Condé hurried his wife across the Netherland boundary, seeking the protection of the Archdukes against this seasoned and versatile libertine of fifty-five. Wildly exasperated by refusals to surrender the fugitives, Henry prepared to launch 44,000 men against Austria and Spain. It was not the first nor the last occasion when the policy of France was vitally affected by the domestic infidelities of her monarchs.

His death produced a complete, though temporary, change in French policy, since his widow, Marie de Médicis, who became regent for her infant son, Louis XIII, was a friend of Spain. Change produced by Henry IV's death.

The European policy of Spain was determined by her position as leading champion of the Counter-Reformation; by her dominant influence in Italy and the Mediterranean; and by her possessions and claims in the Netherlands, which forced her, since the Dutch had proved too powerful by sea, to keep a firm hold upon the land route by way of the Rhine valley. All these made her the natural ally of Austria and the national enemy of the French, the Dutch, and the Turks. Her commercial and religious feud with England was temporarily appeased by the pacific policy of James I. Spain at this time was suffering from exhaustion and depression, owing to the intolerable burden imposed upon her by the enterprises of Philip II. But her decadence was not yet apparent to Europe. She was still in fact the leading military power, and her vast colonial and European possessions gave her a prestige which was scarcely diminished by the virtual loss of the United Provinces. § 5. Spain and the Spanish possessions in 1610. Austro-Spanish alliance. Decadence of Spain.

Philip II had conquered Portugal in 1580, but this, his one successful achievement, was in reality a source of weakness. Portuguese interests had been entirely Conquest of Portugal, 1580.

subordinated to Philip's European ambitions ; her navy had shared the disasters of that of Spain ; her splendid colonies in the East Indies, left unprotected, had fallen an easy prey to the Dutch ; and liberation from her oppressor was only a matter of time and opportunity.

Other
European
possessions
of Spain.

In Italy.

The Papal
States.

Tuscany,
&c.

Venice.

The
Valtelline.

The other Spanish possessions in Europe had to support their own governments and armies, which were used in Spanish interests. Besides the Burgundian inheritance, that is the loyal Netherland provinces and Franche-Comté, Spain held the Balearic Islands and a dominant position in the Italian peninsula and islands. The Kingdom of the Two Sicilies (Naples and Sicily together with Sardinia), the Duchy of Milan, and some ports in Elba and on the Tuscan coast (known as the Tuscan Presidencies) belonged to her. In the centre of the peninsula the ruler of the papal states, Pope Paul V (1605-21), one of the most strenuous and devoted of all the leaders of the Counter-Reformation, was a warm friend of Spain ; though some of his successors, notably Urban VIII (1623-44), became hostile, as the Reformation Popes had been, to Habsburg dominion in Italy. In the Grand-Duchy of Tuscany and the Republic of Genoa Spanish influence had entirely displaced that of France, while Parma, Modena, Ferrara, Mantua, and a few other smaller states were not strong enough to stand without foreign support. The great Republic of Venice, although on the decline, still maintained its old attitude of haughty isolation, with a single eye to the security of its commerce. Common antagonism against the Turk sometimes brought the Venetians to the side of the Habsburgs, but in the earlier part of the period they were more frequently hostile.

Between the Spanish possessions in Milan and those of Austria in Tyrol there lay the important pass along

the upper valley of the river Adda known as the Valtelline. It was owned by the three Grison Leagues (allies of the Swiss Confederation) whose lands lay immediately on its north, while Venice bordered it on the south. The Grisons were pledged by treaty with France to exclude the Habsburgs from the valley, and relied on the support of France, Savoy, and Venice for this purpose. The Valtelline question, which was to have an important bearing in the Thirty Years' War, was complicated with religious difficulties, since the inhabitants were strong Catholics, while their masters, the Grisons, were mostly Protestant.

The Spanish colonies in Central and South America, the West Indies, and the Philippines have no very important bearing on European affairs until towards the close of this period. They continued as before to be fleeced and misgoverned; and though the truce with the Dutch in 1609 allowed the treasure ships to land again without molestation, their supplies brought scarcely any perceptible relief to the impoverished exchequer.

There is little doubt that had Spain been wisely governed during the period of tranquillity which followed the truce of 1609, she could have recovered from her exhaustion and renewed her former glories. But her rulers were blind to her true interests. Philip III (1598-1621), son of Philip II, was an idle and pompous devotee, the tool of friars and nuns. The administration was left to the favourite Lerma (until his fall in 1618), and was shockingly incompetent, wasteful, and corrupt. The treasury was emptied by the extravagance of the court; the coinage was debased, and the army unpaid. The middle class had been almost crushed out of existence by the collapse of commerce, and by the constant drain of men to recruit the renowned Spanish infantry.

The
Spanish
Colonies.

Rule of
Philip III
and Lerma.

The mass of the population was made up of courtiers, gentry, soldiers, priests, monks, and beggars, whose common characteristic was contempt for peaceful industry.

Expulsion
of the
Moriscoes.

The one thrifty and industrious part of the population, the Moriscoes, descendants of those Moorish conquerors who had created a brilliant civilization in mediaeval Spain, had by an appalling act of folly and bigotry been recently despoiled of their possessions and expelled from the country (1609, 1610).

Golden
Age of
Spanish
literature
and art.

It is a curious fact that the period of material and moral decline coincides with the most brilliant epoch of Spanish literature and art. Cervantes published the two parts of his immortal work, *Don Quixote*, in 1605 and 1615; Lope de Vega, the founder of the Spanish drama, flourished at the same time; and they had a host of followers and imitators. Velasquez, one of the greatest painters of all time, was rising to eminence before Philip III's death, and became court painter to his son, Philip IV. But the decadence of the country is vividly reflected in its copious imaginative literature, whose constant theme is acute, although good-natured, satire upon the hollow idealism, the roguery, and the squalor which characterized a decrepit civilization.

§ 6. Aus-
tria and
her de-
pendencies.

The Austrian branch of the House of Habsburg derived its importance principally from two sources—the possession of the Imperial crown, and the more direct rule of great territories within and without the Empire. The ancient cradle of the race, the castle of Habsburg in Switzerland, had long been lost and dismantled. The Austrian territories, apart from isolated possessions in Alsace, the Breisgau, and along the upper Danube, lay in a fairly compact mass towards the south and east of Europe. Upper and Lower Austria lay on both sides of the middle Danube, at the eastern boundary of Germany.

To the south-west of these were the Alpine regions of Tyrol, Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola. To the north was the Kingdom of Bohemia with its dependencies, Moravia, Silesia, and Upper Lusatia, a huge Slavonic wedge thrust into the centre of Germany. To the east, and outside the Empire, was the Kingdom of Hungary, which, with its dependency Transylvania, was at this time almost overrun by the Turks. In Bohemia and Hungary the crowns were nominally elective, but long custom made them virtually hereditary in the House of Habsburg. In both countries the tradition of their former independence was maintained by the national Diets or Estates, which were a constant check upon the kingly authority.

The Imperial crown was also elective, but Habsburgs had been chosen without interruption since 1438. Theoretically the Emperor was the successor of the ancient Caesars, the ruler of the world, the wielder of the temporal sword of Christendom, and supreme over all other sovereigns. But these claims had now about as much reality as that by which the kings of England still styled themselves kings of France. The Holy Roman Empire of the middle ages was only by a fiction the heir of the ancient Roman Empire: in fact, it was established by German kings descended from those barbarians who had destroyed the western Empire of Rome. The colossal struggle between Papacy and Empire for universal dominion from the eleventh to the thirteenth century ended with the humiliation of the Hohenstaufen Emperors, and left the heritage of a century's weakness and schism to the Papacy. Efforts to revive the Empire in the fifteenth century had been shattered by the events of the Renaissance and the Reformation. The Imperial title still conferred dignity and influence, but little actual power. The Emperor

§ 7. The Holy Roman Empire, and the Imperial institutions.

was feudal suzerain over Germany and parts of Italy ; but even in Germany his actual authority was confined to his personal possessions. The Empire already merited the gibe, flung at it by Voltaire a century and a half later, that it was neither Holy, nor Roman, nor an Empire.

The
College of
Electors.

If the history of the seventeenth century is to be thoroughly understood, some attention must be paid to the Imperial institutions, feeble and archaic though they were. The Emperor was chosen by the College of Electors, which was composed of the seven leading princes: three ecclesiastics, the great Archbishops of Mainz, Trier, and Cologne ; and four laymen, the Elector of Saxony, the Elector of Brandenburg, the Elector Palatine, and the King of Bohemia. The Electors could choose any Christian prince, but national instinct was powerful enough to restrict the choice to a leading German House.

The
Imperial
Diet.

The Diet, or legislative assembly of the Empire, was composed of the greater tenants-in-chief, lay or ecclesiastical. It was divided into three chambers: the College of Electors, above mentioned, in which however the King of Bohemia had no vote except at an Imperial election ; the College of Princes, composed of thirty-eight ecclesiastical and eighteen lay princes possessing territorial dominion ; and the College of the Free Imperial Cities, composed of representatives of those cities which held directly from the Empire. It will be evident that such a body, a survival of the feudal epoch, was inadequate to provide any national or permanent solution of the difficulties created by the Reformation. In the first place it was unrepresentative of the German people. The only popular element was the College of Cities ; but that was in a distinctly inferior position to the other two chambers,

and it was held to have the right only of confirming, not of rejecting their decisions. The lesser nobles or Imperial knights had no place at all; while the princes might or might not be in harmony with the views of their subjects, who possessed no legal right against them. In the second place the constitution of the Diet was rigid. The lay princes sat by right of inherited tenure; and though the ecclesiastical princes (archbishops, bishops, and abbots) were elected by their chapters, they were as a matter of fact generally the nominees of the most powerful neighbouring magnates. There was no recognized method, such as existed in England by the fresh creation of peers or by a general election, of bringing the Diet into harmony with the will of the Emperor or of the nation. In the third place, in spite of some reforms attempted in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the Diet had no adequate means of enforcing its decrees. The Ban of the Empire, a sort of secular excommunication, might be issued against a recalcitrant prince or city, but it could only be carried out by means of war. The princes were too keenly interested in the cause of local independence to support the Ban with any vigour except against their private enemies, and in such cases it was not customary to wait for its formal pronouncement. Thus any prince who was strong enough could ignore decisions to which he objected, and the right of private war existed in fact if not in name. The Diet was rather a gathering of independent sovereigns than a true national assembly. It could only be of decisive weight, either when the princes as a whole happened to be agreed, which was rare; or at some great crisis such as that at the close of the Reformation wars in 1555, when a compromise was for the time being imperative.

The Imperial Court had been established in 1495. It

The
Imperial
Court.

was the supreme judicial body, and was composed mainly of nominees of the princes. Its decisions were based on the law of the Empire, that is, the ancient Roman Law supplemented by decrees of the Diet. In practice its functions were restricted to decisions of disputes between princes ; for the latter jealously resisted all attempts to interfere with their jurisdiction over their own subjects. Its authority had been very much weakened by the Reformation ; for, since its chief business came to be arbitration between Catholics and Protestants, and since the Catholics were in a majority, the Protestants asserted, rightly or wrongly, that its decisions were corrupt, and refused to be bound by them.

The
Aulic
Council.

The Aulic Council was a more recent institution. It was the Emperor's administrative council, and claimed in addition judicial powers in co-ordination with the Imperial Court. It was composed entirely of Imperial and Austrian nominees, and since it was simply the mouthpiece of the Habsburgs, its authority was hotly contested. The Calvinists and many of the Lutherans repudiated it altogether.

Besides their Imperial dignity, their territorial possessions, and their close connexion with Spain, two other influences helped to determine the policy of the Austrian Habsburgs—the Turkish peril, and the Counter-Reformation.

§ 8. The
Ottoman
Turks.

The Ottoman Turks, since their first appearance in Europe in the middle of the fourteenth century, had been steadily advancing westward. In the Mediterranean they were opposed by Venice and Spain ; on land, where their natural line of advance was along the Danube valley, the burden of checking them fell inevitably upon Austria, generally assisted by Poland, whose southern frontier was also menaced. War in Hungary had been

practically incessant for a century past, and the Treaty of Zsitva-Torok in 1606 had left the Turks in possession of the whole of that kingdom except a mere boundary strip of between fifty and eighty miles in breadth, and their lands were within a hundred miles of Vienna. The old crusading tradition which made it the duty of the whole of Christendom to aid in checking the advance of the Moslems was rapidly dying. It had not been strong enough during the Reformation epoch to prevent the Protestants, France, and even the Pope from profiting directly or indirectly by the embarrassment which the Turks caused to the Habsburgs. Francis I of France had gone so far as to make an alliance with the infidel. During the seventeenth century, when everything else was tending to become subordinate to political ambitions, Austria rarely received more than perfunctory aid from the rest of Christendom; her resources continued to be drained and her home and foreign policy thwarted by the constant danger in the eastern frontier. This period marks the zenith of the power of the Turks in Europe; and also the commencement of the decline, which dates from their repulse before the walls of Vienna in 1683.

The Reformation had made great headway in the Austrian dominions. Except in the half-Italian Tyrol, it had won probably nine-tenths of the inhabitants. The two preceding Emperors, Ferdinand I and Maximilian II, had been forced by reason of the Turkish danger to humour the Protestants, and Maximilian had at one time been more than half a convert himself. This fact, together with Spanish designs upon the Imperial crown, had made a temporary breach between the two branches of the House of Habsburg; but a fresh set of intermarriages in 1570 had restored harmony between

§ 9. The Reformation and Counter-Reformation in the Austrian dominions.

them. The sons of Maximilian were brought up under Jesuit influence at the court of Philip II, and the whole Habsburg influence was now pledged to the policy of the Counter-Reformation. However, feuds had recently broken out within the Austrian family, owing to the feebleness and incompetence of the Emperor Rudolf II. His brother Matthias, in agreement with the other brothers and Spain, had deprived him of the rule of Austria, Hungary, and Moravia, and was designed as his successor to the Empire. These arrangements were only made possible by granting concessions to the preponderatingly Protestant Estates of these kingdoms and provinces, where the cause of religious liberty was inseparably bound up with that of political autonomy.

Ferdinand
of Styria.

In one part alone of the Austrian possessions the Catholic cause was making definite headway, that is in the Alpine duchies of Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola, which were under the rule of Ferdinand, the cousin of Rudolf and Matthias. Ferdinand of Styria, by far the ablest living representative of the House, was a devout, stern, and fanatical Catholic. Under the guidance of his spiritual masters the Jesuits, by means of missionaries and teachers, of cajolery and bribery, of confiscations and evictions, in fact by every possible means just short of the excessive violence and cruelty which could only provoke rebellion, he had forced his subjects back into nominal allegiance to the ancient Church. Since neither Rudolf II nor any of his brothers had legitimate children, Ferdinand was destined eventually to succeed to the Empire after Matthias, and to the rule of all the Austrian dominions. His attempt to carry out on a grander scale the religious repression which had been such a conspicuous success in his duchies was the immediate cause of the Thirty Years' War.

We must now turn to the group of states which clustered round the Baltic Sea. During the latter half of the middle ages the preponderating powers in that region were the Hanseatic League, and the Crusading Order of the Teutonic Knights. The great North-European association of mercantile cities known as the Hanseatic League was now in a state of rapid dissolution. It had once controlled the Baltic trade, just as the Italian cities had controlled that of the Mediterranean; and like them it had suffered by the discovery of the new trade routes in the fifteenth century. England and the Netherland cities had freed themselves from Hanseatic influence, and had become energetic competitors of the League. The extraordinary migration of the herring shoals from the Baltic to the North Sea, which also took place in the fifteenth century, had transferred to these new rivals the enormously productive fishing industry which had been one of the chief sources of its wealth. However, the Baltic trade, though lessened in value, was still sufficiently important to arouse keen rivalry among the northern states. The Dutch were vitally concerned, since from the Baltic lands they drew nearly all their food beside herrings, and practically the whole of their timber for ship-building; while Denmark, Sweden, Poland, Brandenburg, and Russia were all eager to seize a share of the prize that was falling from the grasp of the moribund League.

§ 10. The Baltic question.

Decline of the Hanseatic League.

These questions of trade and commerce were intimately bound up with territorial questions, arising out of the break up of the Teutonic Order and its offshoot the Knights of the Sword, which between them had occupied practically the whole of the coast lands of the eastern Baltic from the Vistula to the Gulf of Finland. On abandoning the Holy Land in the thirteenth century,

Dissolution of the Teutonic Order.

the Teutonic Knights had undertaken the conquest and conversion of heathen Prussia, and had then extended their sway over other Slav territories further to the east and north. Their dissolution was a direct result of the Reformation. The Grand Master of the Teutonic Order, **Conversion of Albert of Hohenzollern.** Albert of Hohenzollern, adopting the policy which was making Lutheranism a profitable business to very many other German princes, became a Protestant in 1525, took to himself a wife, and turned East Prussia into a hereditary duchy under the suzerainty of Poland. This **Gains of Brandenburg,** Duchy of Prussia was soon to fall by inheritance to the Electors of Brandenburg, although Polish suzerainty remained until 1660. The rest of the territories were **of Poland,** left to a general scramble. Poland gained the lion's share (including, as it is very important to remember, West Prussia) and claimed suzerainty over the whole. **of Sweden.** In 1551 Courland was secularized by the Grand Master of the Knights of the Sword, on terms similar to those applying to East Prussia; while in 1561 Esthonia was seized by Sweden.

Russia. Russia also, recently liberated from Tartar dominion, laid claim to a share of the spoils under Ivan the Terrible (1547-84), thus taking her first important step within the arena of European politics. But after Ivan's death, disputed successions and civil wars threw the country back into anarchy. Sweden (who held Finland as well as Esthonia) and Poland completely blocked her access to the Baltic, and they fought out their own quarrels on her territory and at her expense. In 1613, however, the **Election of Michael Romanoff, 1613.** election of Michael Romanoff to the throne put an end to the internal troubles of Russia, and she prepared to reassert her claim to a footing on the coast of the Baltic and to a share in its trade.

In the seventeenth century Sweden was the most im-

portant of the Baltic states. The national hero Gustavus § 11. Sweden.
 Vasa (1523-60) had liberated the country from the polit- Work of
 ical dominion of Denmark, under which she had suffered Gustavus
 since 1377, and at the same time from the religious Vasa.
 dominion of Rome. He was the first of a line of monarchs
 who for about two hundred years maintained a level of
 intellectual eminence and of military and political genius
 which has scarcely a parallel in history. Gustavus's Reaction
 grandson Sigismund (1592-1600) was also King of under
 Poland, a Catholic, and a protégé of the Habsburgs; and Sigismund.
 he made an attempt to overturn the country's newly-won
 political and religious liberty. But his uncle Charles IX. Charles IX.
 (1604-11), the youngest and ablest of the sons of Gus-
 tavus, expelled him from Sweden, and restored the
 Lutheran faith. The dynastic quarrel, however, was
 still unsettled. Both Denmark and Poland continued to
 claim the Swedish crown; and Charles IX at his death
 left to his son Gustavus Adolphus an unfinished war
 against both countries. Denmark still held the three
 southern and most fertile Swedish provinces, Halland,
 Scania, and Bleking, and completely blocked her access
 to the North Sea except at the mouth of the river
 Göta, where Sweden had two strong fortresses, Elfsborg
 and Gothenburg (Göteborg), the latter recently founded
 by Charles IX.

Denmark, during the long reign of Christian IV (1588- § 12. Den-
 1648), probably reached the zenith of her power, despite mark, com-
 the loss of Sweden. Besides the peninsula of Jutland pared with
 and the islands of the Sound, she held the three Swedish Sweden.
 provinces mentioned above, the whole of Norway, and
 the important island of Gothland in the mid-Baltic, which
 had once been a prominent Hanseatic centre; while the
 king, as Duke of Holstein, was also a prince of the Empire.
 These possessions gave Denmark complete control of the

The Tolls
of the
Sound.

channels between the North Sea and the Baltic, and this she turned to financial profit by imposing heavy tolls upon the ships of other countries passing through the straits.

Reforma-
tion in
Denmark.

Opposi-
tion to
the Crown.

Thus at the beginning of the period Denmark appeared to be much stronger than her chief rival, Sweden. She had a great advantage in the extent and strategical value of her territories; she was far superior in population, wealth, and natural resources; and she was the old friend and ally of the Habsburgs. But there were weak points in her position. Her jealous guardianship of the Sound raised the hostility not only of the other Baltic powers, but of England and Holland. Her religious and political interests were divergent. She had accepted Lutheranism soon after Sweden; and Christian IV, a very energetic and ambitious ruler, was eventually led to undertake the championship of the Protestant cause in Germany. But this, while it did little to appease the commercial hostility of his Protestant rivals, ruined the valuable Habsburg friendship. The policy of the king also was continually thwarted by the numerous and powerful nobility, who were exceedingly jealous of royal authority. On the other hand, Sweden, though poor and thinly populated, and though her valuable mineral resources were as yet only partially developed, was united in policy and devoted to the monarchy. As in England, the nobles had been bound to the side of the crown by being allowed a share in the spoils of the Catholic Church. The Estates were nominally possessed of extensive powers; but accurate instinct taught the country that her interests were safe in the charge of the brilliant monarchs of whom she was justly proud. When Sweden took up the task of championing the Protestant cause in Germany, in which Denmark failed completely, she could do so in the con-

fidant assurance that she was at the same time advancing her own political and commercial interests. She thus embarked upon a career of meteoric brilliance, during which she decided the fate of North Germany, stemmed the advance of the Counter-Reformation, and turned the Baltic into a Swedish lake. Soon afterwards, however, she had to suffer the inevitable penalty of over-exertion, in a period of rapid and dismal decline.

Turning now to Poland, we shall find in this country the channel by which Habsburg influence penetrated to the eastern shores of the Baltic. Her territories occupied a huge plain about three times the size of modern France. From the Baltic coast they extended southwards to the Turkish possessions round the Black Sea, and south-westwards to those of Austria in Hungary and Silesia. They thus covered nearly the whole of the eastern frontier of Europe, separating it from the Russians and Tartars. The political organization of Poland was chaotic, owing to an excessive development of the vices of republicanism without any of its advantages. On the death, in 1572, of Sigismund II, the last male representative of the House of Jagello under which she had gained renown, the country became an aristocratic republic with an elective monarchy. Among her preponderatingly Slav population there was no true middle class. The few towns were inhabited mostly by Germans and Jews, who monopolized commerce and industry. In the country regions the serfs were in a depressed and powerless condition. Political functions were jealously monopolized by the numerous and turbulent nobility who had the right of personal attendance and voting in the Diet. Since, by law, the decisions of this body had to be unanimous, any single member could veto the will of the majority. Under such circumstances the sword alone could be the final arbiter ;

§ 13.
Poland.

Republican constitution of Poland.

Class divisions.

The Polish Diet.

Contests
for the
Crown.

and debates were frequently conducted amidst scenes of violence and bloodshed. Elections to the throne came to be the normal signal for civil war, and on one occasion during the eighteenth century produced a great European war. The Polish crown was a source of keenest international rivalry; France, Austria, Turkey, Sweden, Saxony, and Russia at one time or another putting forward candidates. This desperate condition of 'legalized anarchy' is sufficient to account for the decline of the country, which left her at the end of the eighteenth century the prey of her more powerfully-organized neighbours—Russia, Austria, and Prussia. For some time, however, the decline was delayed by the fact that the kings had sufficient ability, with powerful support from abroad, to initiate something like a consistent national policy.

The Polish
Vasas.

The reigning king, Sigismund III (1587-1632), was, as we have seen, a Vasa and a claimant for the throne of Sweden; a claim which was maintained by his sons and successors, Ladislaus and John Casimir. His mother was Catherine Jagello, a daughter of the old royal line. He gave unity to Polish affairs by his unwavering championship of the Counter-Reformation in alliance with the Austrians. At one time the country had been as disintegrated in matters of faith as she was in political organization. Before the Reformation the population had been divided between the Catholic and the Greek Orthodox Churches. During the Reformation the Bohemian Brethren, the Lutherans, and the Calvinists, all made numerous converts, while the famous Socinian sect originated in Poland. Protestantism in one form or another was accepted by the great majority of the nobles, though probably it did not penetrate very deeply among the lower classes. However, the introduction of the Jesuits

The Re-
formation
and
Counter-
Reforma-
tion in
Poland.

under Sigismund worked a profound change. They completely captured and reformed the educational system; and a new generation had now grown up devoted to the Catholic Church. Poland was the earliest and one of the most decisive of the conquests achieved by the Counter-Reformation.

It will now be evident from this survey of the condition of Europe at the opening of the period that the principal states were arranged into two groups, one headed by the Habsburgs and the other by France; that the Habsburgs were the champions of the Counter-Reformation; and that France, although a Catholic country, was for political reasons (except for the temporary change produced by the death of Henry IV) a supporter of Protestants abroad. Although the sources of international rivalry were numerous and complicated, the dominating issue of religion was for the next twenty-five years to give to European history a unity such as rarely occurs at any other period. In the words of the illustrious Gustavus Adolphus, 'All wars in Europe hang together.'

§ 14. Summary.

CHAPTER II

THE CAUSES OF THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR

1. Counter-Reformation policy of Austria. 2. Failure of the Religious Peace of Augsburg. 3. Dissensions among the Protestants. 4. The case of Donauwörth, and its effects. 5. The Cleves-Jülich succession. 6. The Bohemian 'Letter of Majesty'. 7. Efforts to secure the succession of Ferdinand of Styria. 8. Rebellion of Bohemia. 9. Attitude of Europe to the Bohemian rebellion. 10. First military operations in 1618.

§ 1. Counter-Reformation policy of Austria.

Its connexion with secular politics.

THE Thirty Years' War was immediately provoked by the revolution in Bohemia against the Counter-Reformation policy of the Austrian Habsburgs; a policy which, under the stimulus of a Reformed Papacy and of the missionary zeal of the Jesuits, aided by the support of Spain and favoured by the dissensions among their opponents, had already won significant triumphs in Poland, Bavaria, and even in one or two places in the north and west of Germany. Had the Habsburgs been willing or able to confine their attention to their own dominions, or had their efforts been immediately and decisively defeated there, the war might have been localized and brief. The other German rulers, Protestant as well as Catholic, were too keenly interested in the cause of princely despotism, which included the cherished right of dictating to their own subjects on matters of faith, to regard the fate of the Protestants in Bohemia and Hungary and Austria with anything more than passing concern. However, as has been shown in the preceding

chapter, the policy of the Habsburgs was so deeply involved in international issues that self-restraint was not to be expected from them. Early successes awakened in their minds the ambition to reassert the Imperial authority throughout Germany, and to restore the supremacy of the Catholic religion. This was a direct challenge, not merely to the Protestantism and to the independence of the German princes, but also to all those foreign powers who rightly or wrongly regarded the revival of Imperial power as a menace to themselves; and it led to the most devastating war from which Europe has suffered since the time of the barbarian invasions.

The religious distractions of Germany arising out of the Reformation had been only partially and unsatisfactorily settled by the Peace of Augsburg in 1555. The great middle party, the champions of princely independence against the Catholic Empire, had dictated that peace, after the war in which they had humiliated the Emperor Charles V. Although that event lies far beyond our period, some account of its results is essential if the causes of the Thirty Years' War are to be properly understood.

In the first place, the Peace of Augsburg gave to every secular prince of the Empire the right of choosing between Catholicism and Lutheranism for himself and his subjects; the principle known as *cuius regio, eius religio*. Control of matters of faith thus definitely passed from the ecclesiastical to the lay authority. The subject, whose rights were callously ignored, was allowed merely the option of conformity to the creed of his ruler or exile. So long as Lutheranism continued to be the religion of nearly all the secular princes and their subjects, little harm was done. But the Counter-Reformation and the spread of Calvinism revealed the latent vices of

§ 2. Failure of the Religious Peace of Augsburg, 1555.

Terms of the Peace :
(a) *Cuius regio, eius religio*.

Catholic
princes
purge their
dominions
of heresy.
Spread of
Calvinism.

the settlement. When princes who had been trained by the Jesuits began to purge their dominions of heresy, they could, equally with the Lutherans, claim that they had the sanction of the law of the Empire. Likewise Calvinism was becoming firmly established in the south-west and spreading from Switzerland and from the Netherlands along the Rhine valley. The Elector Palatine had accepted it; and he and his co-religionists had still to win legal recognition for their faith against the opposition of Lutheran and Catholic alike. Unerring instinct, fortified by experience, taught them that such recognition was only to be won by the sword.

(b) Secu-
larization
of ecclesi-
astical
lands.

In the second place, the Catholics had reluctantly consented that their opponents should retain such ecclesiastical property (and only such) as they had seized before 1552. But this *ex post facto* sanction of plunder failed to appease the Protestants' lust after the goods of the Church they had humiliated. To them it was outrageous that she should continue in possession of lands upon which, in many cases, not a single Catholic inhabitant was to be found. Therefore, secularization continued without abatement, and for a time without challenge. At length, however, four test cases were brought before the Imperial Court. The Protestants of course complained that the Catholic majority of the court was biased; but there was no question that they had broken the solemnly enacted law of the Empire, and the decisions were justly given against them. The Catholics naturally hailed the decisions with joy, and demanded the strict enforcement of the law. But under the circumstances a settlement of the quarrel on a legal and peaceable basis was impossible. The Lutheran princes, those of the north especially, had unified and strengthened their dominions, and had provided for troops of needy

The
Imperial
Court fails
to settle
the dis-
pute.

relatives, out of the secularized lands; and, against such material interests, considerations of mere technical legality could have but little weight. Law was made for the prince, not the prince for the law; and a menaced restoration of the disputed lands was sufficient, as the famous Edict of Restitution of 1629 was to prove, to rally even doubters and waverers to the great cause. Thus, short of a successful war, the Catholics could not hope to enforce the law.

But it was equally impossible for the Protestants to secure its alteration. They carried the dispute to the Diet, but they failed; partly because the Lutherans were almost as anxious to exclude Calvinists and the smaller rulers from the privilege of secularization as they were to legalize it for themselves; and partly because they had to face the steady resistance of the Catholic majority who were too wary to surrender a weapon which, however blunt just then, might yet be sharpened and used with effect.

A further result of this dispute must be noticed. The Imperial Knights had once been Lutherans almost to a man. Their own comparatively petty thefts before 1552 had now likewise been legalized. But by the same enactment (passed by a Diet in which they had no voice) they were excluded from the wholesale spoliation which followed the peace; while the continued extension of the great princely domains was a menace to their own independence. Unlike the princes they were not strong enough to be a law unto themselves in such matters, and, consequently, they became as eager as the Catholics for the strict enforcement of the rule of 1555. Common interest, backed up by the arguments of the Jesuits, enticed them back into the arms of the Church, and Catholicism thus gained the support of great numbers of the lesser

The Protestants fail to get the law altered in their favour.

Effect upon the smaller nobility.

nobility in South Germany, whose well-known fighting capacity was to be of no small influence in the approaching war.

(c) The Ecclesiastical Reservation.

In the third place, the Peace of Augsburg had provided no permanent solution for the allied but still greater difficulty of the position of the ecclesiastical princes. They were in a great majority in the College of Princes. So far they had mostly remained loyal to the Catholic faith, but their subjects were nearly all Protestants, and they themselves might easily be led to imitate the example of some who had already gained hereditary principalities by renouncing a religion which imposed clerical celibacy. Now the question was—could the spiritual princes be safely entrusted with those privileges in spiritual concerns which the secular princes had bestowed upon themselves? That is to say, were they to be allowed a free choice between the Lutheran and Catholic faiths? and were they to be allowed to enforce their choice upon their subjects? Such concessions could not be tolerated by the Catholics, who saw that it might mean the Protestantization of practically every see in Germany and the destruction of the Catholic majority in the Diet. So the Lutherans were forced to agree to a compromise. It was laid down by the famous Ecclesiastical Reservation, included in the peace, that a spiritual prince who became a Protestant must immediately resign his office and possessions. The Lutherans only consented to this under protest, and in return for a declaration made by the Emperor (which was not formally included in the peace) that Lutherans already living in ecclesiastical territories should be free from molestation, although fresh converts might be expelled. This unsatisfactory compromise created as many difficulties as it solved, and both parties evaded it when opportunity occurred. The

The Imperial Declaration.

Failure of the Ecclesiastical Reservation.

Protestants claimed that the Ecclesiastical Reservation did not apply to ecclesiastics who were already Protestants when elected; and since the chapters of the great sees of the north were almost wholly Protestant, the princes, in pursuit of their secularizing policy, were able to get their younger sons elected as archbishops and bishops, in defiance of the spirit if not of the letter of the law. The Popes of course could not recognize such appointments; but the Emperors, not yet ready to take up the challenge of the great princely Houses, usually evaded the question by granting indulgences, by which the Protestant bishops were allowed to 'administer' the sees pending Papal confirmation.

Imperial
Indul-
gences.

But a more thorny question remained. Were these administrators, these pseudo-bishops, to take their seats and to vote in the Diet? If so, the Protestants would have secured a clear majority in the College of Princes, and their triumph would have been decisive and final. The Catholics therefore steadily and successfully resisted this claim; and as the dispute grew keener, the Emperor Rudolf and his successors became much more cautious in granting the indulgences. The Catholics on their part maintained that the Imperial declaration concerning the immunity of Protestants in Catholic sees was not a part of the law and could not be recognized by the Imperial Court. Hence when some Catholic bishops began at last to imitate the aggressive methods of their opponents, and to banish heretics from their dominions, the excluded Protestants could get no legal redress, and their champions in the Diet failed, as in other cases, to get the law declared in their favour.

The
Protestant
Adminis-
trators.

In view of all this continually accumulating acrimony it may seem remarkable that war had not already broken out. The chief explanation is that the Protestants

§ 3. Dis-
sensations
among the
Protes-
tants.

Moderate and extreme Lutherans. were profoundly divided among themselves. Theological dissensions had existed during the lifetime of Luther, and since his death they had become more acute. His followers were unable to agree upon the interpretation of the central doctrine of their creed, that justification was by faith and not by works. Luther had somewhat modified his earlier position, and held that good works, though not essential to salvation, were useful. This interpretation was accepted by the larger and more moderate section; but a considerable and very noisy body of extremists were maintaining that good works were not merely unnecessary but were positively injurious; and not a few of them fortified their faith by actions which spoke even louder than their words. Then there was the still wider divergence between Lutherans and Calvinists. The former objected to the unqualified assertion of the doctrine of predestination, and to the purely symbolical interpretation of the words of institution in the Eucharist adopted by the latter. In relation to the State also, Lutheranism had become deferential and obsequious, though not absolutely Erastian; whereas Calvinism was theocratic and republican. Lutherans as a body were at least as bitterly hostile to the Calvinists as they were to the Catholics; and it is significant that the question whether the Calvinist Elector Palatine was entitled to the benefits of the Peace of Augsburg was first raised not by Catholics but by Lutherans.

Rivalry between Electoral (Albertine) and Ducal (Ernestine) Saxony. The weakest spot in the Protestant position was in the very cradle of the German Reformation, the Electorate of Saxony. This was partly because of its political jealousy of the Palatinate, and still more because of an old family feud which divided the two branches of the Saxon House of Wettin. In the middle of the fifteenth century the Saxon dominions had been shared between

two brothers, Ernest the elder and Albert the younger, from whom the two branches descended and took their names. During the religious wars which preceded the Peace of Augsburg the Emperor Charles V had bribed the younger branch to aid him against their fellow Protestants, by allowing them to dispossess the elder of the electoral dignity and four-fifths of their territories. This was the skeleton in the cupboard which kept Electoral Saxony on the best of behaviour towards the Imperial authority. Existing settlements must be maintained lest inconvenient questions concerning their own title should be reopened. Consequently, the Albertine Electors had steadily resisted attempts made by the Ducal or Ernestine branch, and by other Protestants, especially the upstart Calvinists, to get the Peace of Augsburg modified; and they were thus enabled, to their own selfish advantage, to pride themselves upon their love of peace and their loyalty to the Empire.

Similar family feuds divided most of the great princely Houses, but one which had great influence upon the coming war must especially be noted. The House of Wittelsbach was divided into two branches. The elder ruled in the Palatinate, and was represented by the Elector Frederick V, who succeeded his father Frederick IV in 1610. The younger ruled in Bavaria, and was represented by Duke Maximilian I (1597-1651). In very early times the electoral dignity had been shared between the two branches alternately, but eventually the younger branch had been excluded in favour of the elder. But the Bavarian dukes had never acknowledged the lawfulness of their exclusion, and the long existing political jealousy was now fomented by religious antagonism. For whereas the Palatinate was the leading German Calvinist state; Bavaria, which under

Rivalry between the two branches of the House of Wittelsbach, in the Palatinate and Bavaria.

Maximilian's predecessor had been almost entirely Protestant, had now been completely won by the Jesuits. In Bavaria was the great seminary of Ingolstadt, the very metropolis of the Society of Jesus, where their disciples were trained, and whence their missionaries went forth to carry their doctrines throughout the world. We shall then the more readily understand how it came about that in the early part of the Thirty Years' War, Lutheran Saxony and Catholic Bavaria fought side by side against the Calvinist Palatinate.

§ 4. The case of Donauwörth, 1607, and its effects.

Two incidents of recent occurrence, however, had almost served to close up the divided Protestant ranks. The first was the case of the free Imperial city of Donauwörth. This city was of immense strategical importance, since it lay on the Danube, close to the western boundary of the Duchy of Bavaria, to which it had once belonged. Except for about a score of households its population was entirely Protestant. The monks of a neighbouring convent had recently revived the custom, so obnoxious to their opponents, of holding public religious processions, and considerable rioting had resulted. Thereupon, the Aulic Council, whose authority it must be remembered the Protestants repudiated, pronounced the Ban of the Empire against the city and entrusted its execution to Maximilian of Bavaria. Maximilian, owing to political rivalry, was no great friend of the Habsburgs, but next to Ferdinand of Styria he was recognized as the leading champion of the Counter-Reformation in Germany. In December 1607 he quartered troops upon Donauwörth. The Protestant preachers and some of the citizens were expelled; Catholicism was speedily restored; and since then the city has remained (except on two or three occasions during the coming wars) permanently in possession of Bavaria.

This outrage led in 1608 to the formation by the Protestants of the Evangelical Union for self-defence. It was joined by the Elector Palatine, who became the President, by the Elector of Brandenburg, and by several other princes and cities mainly of the south. Most of the members were Calvinists; but although some Lutherans also joined, it need hardly be said that the Elector of Saxony held sternly aloof. The heart and soul of the Union was the fiery and ambitious Prince Christian of Anhalt, who dictated the policy of the Palatinate owing to the drunken incapacity of the Elector Frederick IV, and who, after the latter's death in 1610, acted as regent during the minority of Frederick V. Christian was already convinced that the safety of Protestantism, and particularly of Calvinism, lay in the overthrow of the House of Austria, and he immediately opened negotiations with France, Savoy, the United Provinces, and England.

The Evangelical Union, 1608.

Christian of Anhalt.

The Catholics replied by the formation of the Catholic League in 1610, under the direction of Maximilian of Bavaria. It was joined by the three Ecclesiastical Electors (Cologne, Mainz, and Trier), by many other princes, lay and ecclesiastical, and ultimately by Pope Paul V himself. It collected funds, raised forces, and concluded an alliance with Spain; in short, it organized itself in preparation for the war, which was now regarded as inevitable.

The Catholic League, 1610.

The other incident was the question of the Cleves-Jülich succession, which has been briefly referred to in the previous chapter. In March 1609 Duke John William of Cleves (a nephew of that lady Anne who is numbered among the wives of Henry VIII) died without children. There were many claimants, but the only two of serious importance were John Sigismund, Elector of

§ 5. The Cleves-Jülich succession, 1609.

Religious
and
political
importance
of the
dispute.

Influence
upon the
Arch-
bishopric
of Cologne.

Brandenburg, who had married the daughter of the late Duke's eldest sister, and Wolfgang William of Neuburg, a son of the second sister and a cousin of the Elector Palatine. The religious issue was at once raised, for whereas the late duke had been a Catholic, almost isolated among Protestant neighbours, both these claimants were Lutherans. But the political, strategical, and commercial importance of the duchies further complicated the dispute. The territories included Cleves, Jülich, Berg, Mark, Ravenstein, and Ravensberg, which counted among the most fertile and populous provinces of Germany, lying mostly on the lower Rhine and bordered on the north and west by the Dutch and Spanish Netherlands. Thus they commanded the principal trade route of western Germany, and formed part of the military route between Spain and her Netherland provinces. Further, they almost completely encircled the Electorate of Cologne. Now the chapter of Cologne was Protestant, and so were the mass of the population both of the electorate and of the duchies. Quite recently an Elector of Cologne, Gebhard Truchsess, had turned Protestant, married, and attempted to retain the see in defiance of the Ecclesiastical Reservation. Had he been successful, there would have been a clear Protestant majority in the Imperial Electoral College, with the appalling possibility of a Protestant Emperor at the next election. Hence the Habsburgs had intervened and with effect. Gebhard had been driven out and a loyal Catholic appointed in his place. But with a Protestant Duke of Cleves there was at least the prospect that the attempt might be repeated with a greater chance of success; and so, from all points of view, it was urgent for the Austro-Spanish House to keep the duchies under Catholic rulership. On the other hand, it was as urgent for the

Dutch, for the Protestant Union, and for France to keep the Habsburgs out ; and so influence from these quarters was brought to bear upon the two claimants to sink their differences and present a common front to all other competitors.

Temporary settlement of the dispute.

The Cleves-Jülich succession question, however, failed to provoke the great European war. Spain was exhausted ; the Austrian House was distracted by quarrels between the Emperor Rudolf and his brothers ; and the assassination of Henry IV was followed by a temporary reversal of the foreign policy of France. A small Imperial force which had occupied the fortress of Jülich was easily expelled by a combination of Dutch, German, English, and French troops ; and the two claimants settled down in peaceable joint possession. It was this defeat which helped to bring about the formation of the Catholic League described above.

Coalition against the Emperor.

But the Protestant claimants were soon at loggerheads again. The fertile brain of Wolfgang William devised a scheme by which he imagined all difficulties would be solved. He would bestow his hand upon the daughter of his rival John Sigismund, and then the latter could hardly refuse to bless the union by surrendering to him all the Brandenburg claims upon the duchies. But on breaking the news to his intended father-in-law he found him blind to the allurements of the scheme, and he was dismissed from the Electoral presence with a stinging blow on the ear. Thereupon, the errors of the faith in which he had been nurtured, and the advantages of the aid which the League might bring, began to dawn on the rejected suitor. Within a very brief time he had become a fervent convert to Catholicism, had received promises of aid from Philip III of Spain and the League, and had consoléd himself for his previous rebuff by

Breach between the two Protestant claimants.

Wolfgang William becomes a Catholic.

The
Elector of
Branden-
burg
becomes a
Calvinist.

Treaty of
Xanten,

§ 6. The
Bohemian
'Letter of
Majesty'.

marrying a sister of Maximilian of Bavaria. At the same time John Sigismund, to the distress of his Lutheran subjects in Brandenburg, became a Calvinist, and called in the aid of the Dutch against Spain. Once again the old antagonists, the Dutch Maurice of Nassau, and the Spanish general Spinola, faced one another in Cleves; but open hostilities were averted, and by the Treaty of Xanten, in November 1614, the two claimants agreed to a partition of the territories. Cleves, Mark, and Ravensberg fell to Brandenburg, and the rest to Neuburg. From this settlement dates the permanent possession of its Rhenish provinces by the House of Hohenzollern, which now wears the crown of a reconstituted German Empire.

Interest is now diverted to the Austrian dominions. The Emperor Rudolf had, as we have seen, been deprived by his brother Matthias of his authority in Austria, Hungary, and Moravia. In the course of their quarrels both brothers had sought aid by posing as champions of the liberties and religion of their subjects, and had made extensive concessions to the Estates throughout their dominions. To the Bohemians Rudolf had been forced in 1609 to concede the famous 'Letter of Majesty', which granted liberty to all the inhabitants to choose freely between the two recognized religions, which gave to the three Estates (i.e. Nobles, Knights, and Royal towns) the right of building churches, and which appointed a body of *Defensores* to guarantee the agreement. A supplementary clause had added the further important concession—that the Protestants might build churches on *any* royal domain, town or otherwise, where none already existed. A similar 'Letter of Majesty' for Silesia had followed. However, Rudolf was foolish enough to make a belated attempt to suppress these newly-won liberties, and in 1611 he turned

the army which had been mustered for the Cleves campaign into Bohemia. Matthias seized the opportunity to bid against his brother; he was hailed as deliverer by the whole nation, he secured the disbandment of Rudolf's forces, he confirmed the 'Letter of Majesty' in explicit terms, and he supplanted his brother on the Bohemian throne. A few months later, in January 1612, the miserable existence of Rudolf II came to an end.

Death of
Rudolf II,
1612.

Matthias was elected as Emperor without difficulty. Owing again to lack of support from Saxony, the Protestants failed to secure any serious modification of the Religious Peace; but a reform of the Imperial Court was promised; and a new rule of some importance was established, that for the future the reigning Emperor's consent should not be necessary for the election of his successor. Matthias as a ruler failed entirely to satisfy the hopes he had aroused. He was weak and prematurely aged, and though possessed of some showy personal qualities, was entirely devoid of the gifts of statesmanship necessary to initiate, either for the Empire or for Austria, a comprehensive policy, which might still have minimized, though perhaps not averted, the dangers ahead. Under the influence of his minister Klesl, Bishop of Vienna, he seemed inclined to compromise; but Klesl was hated not only by the Protestants, but equally by the militant Catholic party, who were able to force Matthias to adopt stern measures of repression. In Bohemia, although it was impossible to exclude Protestants entirely from official posts, the majority of the royal administration was composed of Catholics who were hostile to the 'Letter of Majesty', and who openly encouraged violations of its terms. One result was a bitter quarrel over two churches which the Protestants erected at Braunau and Klostergrab. Their right was opposed on the mere technical

Election of
Matthias
to the
Empire.

Repression
in Bohe-
mia.

The
churches at
Braunau
and Klos-
tergrab.

plea that these places were in ecclesiastical and not in royal territories, although customary usage in Bohemia included the ecclesiastical in the royal dominions.

Disaffec-
tion in
Austria
and
Hungary.
Bethlen
Gabor.

In Upper and Lower Austria also, and in Hungary, there was growing animosity against Habsburg rule. Transylvania in 1614 declared its independence under a native Protestant prince, Bethlen Gabor, who was a tool of the Turks; and Matthias, unable to get supplies for the Turkish war, was obliged to recognize him in return for a secret promise of allegiance, a pledge which events proved to be absolutely worthless. Moreover, Christian of Anhalt and the Palatinate party were already intriguing to get the young Elector Palatine chosen King of Bohemia in place of Matthias, which would give the Protestants a majority in the Imperial Electoral College, and would enable them to exclude the Habsburgs from the succession on the death of Matthias.

Intrigues of
Christian
of Anhalt.

§ 7. Efforts
to secure
the suc-
cession of
Ferdinand
of Styria.

The House of Habsburg, therefore, appeared to be menaced with the disruption of their ancestral dominions, and with the loss of the Empire as well. In order to forestall the danger it was necessary to provide immediately for the succession of Ferdinand of Styria, in whose dominions alone no concessions whatever had been made to the Protestants during the recent feuds. Matthias, supported by Klesl, was reluctant to stand aside, but his brothers, who, like him, were childless, and who resigned their own claims in favour of their cousin, overcame his opposition.

The
Estates of
Bohemia,
1617.

Suddenly, the Bohemian Estates were summoned for June 5, 1617. The government demanded a formal declaration of the hereditary character of the Bohemian succession, and the recognition of Ferdinand of Styria

Election of
Ferdinand.

as king-designate. The Protestants, who were led by Count Matthias Thurn, had not yet matured their plans,

and were unprepared with an alternative proposal. Overborne by the steady unanimity of the Catholic officials and of the Catholic minority in the Estates in favour of Ferdinand, by the scarcely veiled threats of sterner measures by the government, and by the knowledge that the country was not ripe for revolution, they gave way.

The only concession they obtained in return was the explicit guarantee of the 'Letter of Majesty' by Ferdinand, whose conscientious scruples at this recognition of the rights of heretics were soothed by his Jesuit advisers. Ferdinand was crowned at Prague on July 19, and the Habsburgs thereupon proceeded to negotiate for his succession to the Empire and to the Kingdom of Hungary.

Before these negotiations were complete, however, Bohemia had broken out into open rebellion. The question of the Bohemian crown was of more than local significance. It was generally recognized as being the decisive issue in the wider Germanic and European questions. The intrigues of Christian of Anhalt and his party to exclude the Habsburgs from the Imperial throne had never ceased. Failing the chance of a Protestant Emperor (which they reluctantly had to admit was impossible), they were prepared to support Maximilian of Bavaria or Charles Emmanuel, Duke of Savoy. But if the Habsburgs were to be supplanted, whether by a Catholic or a Protestant, it was essential first to gain control of the Bohemian vote in the Electoral College; and there is little doubt that the untiring efforts of the Palatinate party to achieve this object were of vast importance in impelling Thurn and his followers to repudiate the sovereign whom they had so recently and so solemnly accepted. However, the intrigues of Christian of Anhalt would have been futile but for the exasperation of the

He confirms the 'Letter of Majesty'.

§ 8. Rebellion of Bohemia, 1618.

European importance of the Bohemian question.

Bohemian Protestants at the violation both of the letter and of the spirit of their religious charter, as recently and as solemnly confirmed.

Persecu-
tion in
Bohemia.

Matthias, now practically superseded by Ferdinand, was driven to sanction the application of Styrian methods in Bohemia. More Catholic officials were appointed; in several towns the franchise was manipulated so as to secure Catholic majorities in the town councils; the Protestant churches in Braunau and Klostergrab were forcibly closed and the latter razed to the ground; Catholic priests were encouraged to forbid their parishioners to attend Protestant churches outside their parishes; and Protestant peasants on the royal domains were driven into exile.

The
'defences-
tration' at
Prague,
1618.

Appeals to Matthias were fruitless, and the resentment in Bohemia found expression in an act of savage brutality, only too characteristic of that recklessness of the Bohemian aristocracy which was a leading cause of their ultimate ruin. On May 23, 1618, an armed body of about a hundred, headed by Count Thurn, made their way into the regents' board-room in the castle of Prague. After a heated altercation, two of the regents, Martinitz and Slawata, who had made themselves specially conspicuous in their antagonism to the religious charter, together with the unoffending secretary Fabricius, were seized and hurled through a window into the moat below, a sheer drop of fifty or sixty feet. Mercifully for them the fall was broken by a heap of rubbish, and, although grievously hurt, all three escaped alive.

Organiza-
tion of
resistance
in Bohe-
mia.

Preparations were immediately made to resist the inevitable Habsburg vengeance. A provisional government was formed, and several obnoxious ecclesiastics and the whole body of Jesuits were expelled from the country. The task of raising troops among a turbulent

populace was comparatively easy, but the greater one of organizing resistance on a durable and national basis proved to be beyond the capacity of the Bohemian leaders. Attempts to raise funds only exposed the caste jealousies which divided the nation. Taxes were voted, but could not be collected; nobles and towns alike were eager to relieve themselves of monetary sacrifice and to throw the burden upon others; so that recourse was at last had to sheer spoliation in the form of forced loans.

Appeals to the other Austrian territories met with disappointing response. Silesia indeed, after considerable delay, decided in October to send a force to the sister province, though for defensive purposes only; but Moravia granted Ferdinand the right of passage for his troops, and Lower Lusatia for a time held aloof; while Upper and Lower Austria and Hungary merely made profit out of the Bohemian revolt to press their own grievances upon Ferdinand's attention.

Lack of support from the other Austrian territories.

Elsewhere the attitude of princes and statesmen revealed the extraordinary fact that this thunder-clap which was to precipitate the impending deluge found Germany and Europe unprepared. John George, Elector of Saxony, offered verbal condolences to the Bohemian Protestants, but could not countenance rebellion, and expressed his intention of helping to put out the fire. John Sigismund, Elector of Brandenburg, more remote and more detached, had still less incentive to dissipate his resources in what seemed a hopeless cause. Frederick, the young Elector Palatine, was more enthusiastic; but, although coveting the Bohemian crown, he as yet offered no effective aid. The Protestant Union, of which Frederick was nominal head, hesitated to abandon its defensive attitude. Christian of Anhalt, alone among German Protestant princes, was already determined to make the

§ 9. Attitude of Europe to the Bohemian rebellion.

Bohemian war the basis of a grand attack upon the Habsburg power. It was through his negotiations that Charles Emmanuel, Duke of Savoy, tempted with the dazzling prospect of the Imperial crown on the death of Matthias, allowed Ernest von Mansfeld, a capable and experienced military adventurer in his service, to be dispatched with his 2,000 mercenary troops to Bohemia. Some financial aid was promised by the Dutch, who could also be counted upon to create a diversion in the west against Spain at the conclusion of the Twelve Years' Truce, which had only three more years to run.

James I of
England.

From England, as the leading Protestant power, very much was expected. The nation, instinctively grasping the fact that the cause of European Protestantism was at stake and that Spain would be necessarily involved, was eager to participate in a war which might revive the glories of the Elizabethan epoch. But the king, although wiser than his subjects in his genuine desire for peace, blundered deplorably in face of a crisis, when peace, if possible at all, could only be secured by decisive and unequivocal action. James I was in alliance with the Union, and his daughter Elizabeth was the wife of the Elector Palatine. When that marriage was being negotiated, in 1612, the prospect of Frederick's future election to the Bohemian crown had been mentioned; and it was again suggested at this juncture, to secure English support. But James, besides his constitutional aversion to war, had a kingly horror of rebellion, and was already negotiating another marriage alliance with Spain. So, while on the one hand, in reply to his son-in-law's anxious inquiries for advice he was unable to use the blunt negative where his paternal affection was so deeply concerned; on the other hand, imagining that his boasted sagacity could devise a solution satisfactory to everybody, he proposed through the medium of Spain that the

quarrel between Ferdinand and his subjects should be referred to his own arbitration. Such ambiguity was criminal. Christian of Anhalt interpreted James's hesitancy in accordance with his own desires, and urged the Bohemians to elect Frederick in the assurance that English aid must follow. Spain and her allies merely deluded James by professing to accept his mediation, and used it as a screen for their military preparations. Thus Frederick was impelled towards his doom, while England was neutralized until her aid was of no avail. And meanwhile, in this very year, to the indignation of the whole nation, Raleigh, the last of the Elizabethan heroes, was sent to the block as a peace offering to Spain.

The Catholic powers were as yet equally unprepared. France, under the regency of Marie de Médicis, could only offer the Habsburgs friendly mediation. Spain was certain to aid, but was slow to move. Maximilian of Bavaria, at the head of the Catholic League, which possessed the only organized force ready to take the field, was under the influence of two conflicting impulses—loyalty to the Catholic cause, and political rivalry with the Habsburgs, whom he had persistently excluded from membership of the League. Under these circumstances Matthias and Klesl talked of appeasing the Bohemian rebels by conciliatory measures. But Ferdinand, although distracted by open opposition in Upper and Lower Austria, by unrest in Hungary, and by the scarcely veiled antagonism of Bethlen Gabor in Transylvania, was implacable. In July he secured his succession to the Hungarian crown, upon recognizing the religious liberty of the country, and conceding the principle of election by the Estates. By September a hastily levied force of 14,000, mainly of raw Hungarian recruits, was dispatched through Moravia into Bohemia under the command of Count de Bucquoy.

Attitude
of the
Catholic
powers.

Austrian
policy.

Election of
Ferdinand
in Hun-
gary.

§ 10. First
military
operations
in 1618.

In Bohemia the war that autumn concentrated round two Catholic towns, Pilsen and Budweis, which had declared for Ferdinand. Mansfeld distinguished himself by capturing the former, and Bucquoy was forced to retreat upon the latter. Thurn, in command of the principal Bohemian army, anxious to secure the co-operation of the Austrian Estates, instead of throwing his whole army against Bucquoy commenced a march towards Vienna. The winter put a stop to military operations, and southern Bohemia was left the helpless prey of armies which by failure of regular provisions and lack of discipline became predatory rabbles. The wholesale atrocities inflicted upon the suffering peasantry during that terrible winter, by friend and foe alike, were only a foretaste of what Germany was to suffer on a larger scale for the next thirty years.

CHAPTER III

FROM THE BOHEMIAN REVOLUTION TO THE PEACE OF LÜBECK

1. Stages in the Thirty Years' War. 2. Succession of Ferdinand II. 3. Election of Frederick V as King of Bohemia. 4. Ferdinand II's allies. 5. Conquest of the Palatinate and Bohemia, 1620-3. 6. France from 1610 to 1624. 7. The United Provinces during the Twelve Years' Truce. 8. Sweden under Gustavus Adolphus. 9. Preparations for European war. 10. Protestant disasters, 1625-7. 11. The Great Baltic Design and the Peace of Lübeck.

THE difficulties involved in following the complex events of the Thirty Years' War may be lessened if one notices at the outset that it falls into five well-marked stages, each of which corresponds with a fresh development of the questions at issue. During the first stage, from 1618 to 1623, the war was practically localized in Bohemia and the Palatinate. Austria and Spain were triumphant in both regions, and the ultimate effect was to secure the predominance of Catholicism in the south of Germany and along the Rhine. The second stage, from 1623 to 1629, is characterized by the extension of the war into North Germany, and by the intervention of Denmark, subsidized by France and England. Denmark was thoroughly beaten and was forced to retire by the Peace of Lübeck in 1629. England, who had given only inadequate aid, withdrew in 1629, and was henceforth entirely absorbed in internal political and religious quarrels. France and Sweden, as yet without open intervention in

§ 1. Stages in the Thirty Years' War.

i. The Bohemian and Palatinate stage, 1618-23.

ii. The Danish episode, 1623-9.

Germany, created valuable diversions; the former, by attacking Spain in the Valtelline and Italy; and the latter by a war against Poland. In the Netherlands Holland was fighting Spain. In Germany the victories of Tilly and Wallenstein brought the Catholic and Imperialist cause to its zenith, and challenged the very existence of Protestantism even in the north. The third period sees that challenge taken up by Sweden. It includes the brilliant episode of the intervention of Gustavus Adolphus, and it closes with his death at the end of 1632. Protestantism was definitely saved in the north, and in its turn threatened to overthrow the Catholic supremacy in the south. In the fourth period, from 1633 to the Peace of Prague in 1635, the balance was adjusted. With some negligible exceptions the territorial limits of the two religions were then definitely fixed. In the last period, from 1635 to 1648, the war entirely loses its religious character, and becomes a political struggle between France, Holland, and Sweden, on one side, and the Austro-Spanish House on the other. The Thirty Years' War proper closed with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which left the Empire humiliated, and for a time at peace. But the other powers had not settled their quarrels. France and Spain continued fighting until the Peace of the Pyrenees in 1659. Holland began her gigantic naval contest with England. Sweden, soon after, renewed her conflicts with her Baltic rivals. These wars were finished by 1661; and from that date the aggressions of Louis XIV of France in the west, those of the Turks in the east, and the decline of Sweden before her enemies in the north, are the principal features of interest in European history.

iii. The intervention of Gustavus Adolphus, 1630-2.

iv. 1633-5.

v. 1635-48.

Separate wars between 1648 and 1661.

§ 2. Succession of Ferdinand II, 1619.

The winter of 1618-19 was occupied with diplomatic negotiations. While Matthias lived compromise was

still conceivable; but his sudden death in March 1619 forced at once into prominence the questions of the Imperial election, and of the recognition or final repudiation of Ferdinand in Bohemia. The cause of the latter just then seemed hopeless. Thurn had now secured the hesitating alliance of Moravia on his way through that province; and his approach towards Vienna, which he reached in June, roused Upper and Lower Austria to open revolt. Lower Lusatia had already joined Bohemia, and Bethlen Gabor was threatening to overrun Hungary. Vienna in danger.

But Ferdinand in Vienna, with a tiny garrison of only 300 men, amid a hostile populace, and with Thurn clamouring at the gates, sternly resisted every concession demanded by the Austrian Estates. His heroic fortitude at this the most desperate crisis of his career was rewarded with success. A regiment of horse, detached by Bucquoy, galloped to his assistance and burst in through the one unguarded gate of the beleaguered city. This reinforcement was sufficient to overawe the populace; and Thurn, who had no artillery or provisions necessary for a protracted siege, and who had been counting upon treason within, slunk back to Bohemia, only to be met with the news that Mansfeld had there suffered a severe defeat by Bucquoy at Zblat. Relief of Vienna.

Battle of Zblat.

Ferdinand utilized the respite to secure his election as Emperor. At Frankfort-on-Main, where the election took place, divisions among the Protestants ruined whatever prospect they might have had of excluding the Habsburg. In vain the Palatinate interest sought to postpone the election until the Bohemian question had been settled. The three Ecclesiastical Electors were firm for Ferdinand. John George of Saxony, distrusting the Calvinists, at last followed suit; and the others, unprepared with a definite candidate, gave way. On August 28, 1619, Ferdinand elected Emperor.

Ferdinand was unanimously chosen as Emperor Ferdinand II.

§ 3. Election of Frederick V as King of Bohemia.

In the meantime the Bohemian Estates had taken the decisive step so long contemplated. In agreement at length with Silesia, Moravia, and Lower Lusatia, they had deposed Ferdinand; and on August 26, two days before the election at Frankfort, Frederick V, the Elector Palatine, was chosen at Prague as King of Bohemia and its dependencies. The young prince, who was thus called upon to defy the might of the Habsburgs, was hopelessly unqualified for the task. He lacked both courage and military capacity, and was entirely devoid of statesmanship. He was chosen because of his Protestantism and because of his wife's relationship to England; and fate made him the sport of circumstances and the tool of stronger wills than his own. John George of Saxony and Maximilian of Bavaria warned him of the serious consequences involved if he should accept the offered crown. Hardly any of the princes of the Union were prepared to back him up. His own subjects were reluctant. On the other hand, Maurice Prince of Orange and Nassau, representing the military party of the Dutch provinces, and John Sigismund of Brandenburg, advised him to accept. James I, in reply to fresh inquiries, could only repeat his provocative ambiguities; saying that he would support his son-in-law if satisfied that the election was legitimate, and meanwhile proceeding with his ponderous efforts at mediation. The plausible story that Frederick was impelled to accept the crown by the entreaties of his beautiful and high-spirited wife is completely discredited. His hesitation was really overborne by the dominating personality of Christian of Anhalt, who had pledged himself too deeply to withdraw, and who had convinced himself that,

once the fatal step was taken, England and the waverers among the German Protestants would be forced to follow. Frederick, consoling himself with the assurance that the election was the will of God, accepted the offer, set out with his wife to his new kingdom, and was crowned at Prague in November.

The bright hopes aroused by his presence were doomed to disappointment, and his popularity was soon on the wane. The proud Bohemian aristocrats found themselves set aside in favour of Frederick's Germans, in court and camp. The puritanical narrowness and aggressiveness of his Calvinist ministers gave offence to the Lutherans and Bohemian Brethren alike. The expenses of the new court added a heavy financial burden; and, above all, the anticipated military aid was not forthcoming.

Disappointment of the Bohemians.

At the end of November the members of the Union met at Nuremberg. A list of grievances was drawn up for presentation to the Emperor, and a demand was made for the disbandment of the forces of the League. But Frederick, who presided, was unable to secure more on his own behalf than a pledge for the defence of his hereditary dominions in case they should be attacked. James I., short of money, unwilling to face a Parliament, and still tempted with the alliance of Spain, also decided to limit his assistance to the defence of the Palatinate; though he allowed his subjects to raise subscriptions by means of which volunteers were equipped and dispatched. Bethlen Gabor indeed carried out his promise, overran Hungary, captured Pressburg in October; and then in co-operation with a Bohemian force under Thurn, invaded Lower Austria in November and menaced Vienna. But the barbarities committed by the Transylvanian army brought opprobrium upon the cause which could invoke such an

Attitude of the Union,

Bethlen Gabor in Hungary and Austria.

Retreat of
Bethlen
Gabor and
Thurn.

ally. At the end of November, threatened by a force of Cossacks from Poland, and unable to recover his expenses from the Bohemians, Bethlen retired to Hungary; while Thurn's army, also unpaid, returned homeward. For the second time within six months Vienna had been saved from imminent peril.

§ 4. Fer-
dinand II's
allies.

In striking contrast to the ineptitude of Frederick and his allies was the energy displayed by his enemies. Ferdinand, on his way back from the election at Frankfurt, had an interview with Maximilian of Bavaria at Munich. Maximilian's hesitation to aid the Emperor was entirely overcome by Frederick's acceptance of the Bohemian crown, which threatened to create overwhelming territorial power for the rival branch of the Wittelsbach House. A momentous bargain was arranged, by which Maximilian was to have his expenses guaranteed, and (under certain contingencies) to receive Frederick's electoral dignity, with the prospect of additional territory to be captured from the enemy. In return he engaged, while retaining independent control, to bring the forces of the League to the aid of the Emperor.

Saxony and
the Agree-
ment of
Mühl-
hausen,
March
1620.

The alliance of Electoral Saxony was secured soon afterwards. John George was as hostile as Maximilian to the creation of a vast state under the Palatinate, since the latter would then outweigh the influence of his own electorate; moreover he had claims of his own upon Lusatia. By the agreement of Mühlhausen in March 1620, the League and the Emperor promised him, in return for his support, never to recover by force the lands of the Protestant administrators or the secularized lands in the north, so long as their holders remained loyal subjects.

Elsewhere the Catholic powers were already stirring. Spain, besides sending money to Ferdinand, was organ-

izing a force under Spinola in the Netherlands to strike along the Rhine at the Lower (Rhenish) Palatinate, and another in Italy to operate from the south. The Pope also sent money; Savoy and Venice were veering round to the Imperial side; while Bethlen Gabor was quieted by a temporary truce. Ferdinand II then felt himself strong enough, in April 1620, to issue a proclamation ordering Frederick to leave the Emperor's domains by June, on pain of falling under the Ban of the Empire.

Now at last, if the Union was to justify its existence, decisive action was essential; but it was still distracted by jealousies and probably also by treachery. Its army was encamped near Ulm, and that of the League about twenty miles further down the Danube. A conference took place between the two associations at Ulm; and the result was a treaty in July, by which each of them undertook to abstain from invading the territories belonging to the other. Frederick's hereditary dominions were included in this arrangement, but Bohemia was specifically excluded. It was a virtual surrender of Frederick's cause; for while Maximilian was left free to enter Bohemia, with his rear secure from attack, the Spaniards (who of course were not concerned in the bargain) could deal with the Palatinate.

Spinola began his march up the Rhine in August, towns falling before him with scarcely a show of resistance. By the end of the year he was firmly established within the electorate, on the left bank of the Rhine. The Union was powerless to check his victorious career and consented to a truce to last until the following spring. The campaign in the east was equally rapid and even more decisive. One Imperialist force was detached to hold Bethlen Gabor, who (having secured in the meantime his formal election at Pressburg as King of Hungary)

Treaty of
Ulm, July
1620.

§ 5. Con-
quest of the
Palatinate
and Bo-
hemia,
1620-3.

was again moving to the aid of the Bohemians. John George of Saxony entered Lower Lusatia, and a force of Cossacks from Poland invaded Silesia. Bohemia being thus isolated on the west (by the treaty with the Union), on the east, and on the north, Maximilian could approach from the south. He entered Upper Austria in July and secured the submission of that province; and then, having joined with Bucquoy, struck due north against Frederick's army at Prague.

Tilly.

Maximilian's general and adviser in the campaign was Count Tilly, who now took the chief command, since Bucquoy had been wounded. Tilly, a Belgian by birth, was an experienced veteran who had served with distinction under Parma in the Netherlands, and against the Turks in Hungary. A great strategist, prudent and yet intrepid in action, and a rigid disciplinarian, he was the most loyal and devoted servant of the Catholic cause throughout the war, and his career was one of almost unchecked triumph until his overthrow eleven years later by Gustavus Adolphus. Frederick's weak and disunited army under Anhalt and Hohenlohe was drawn up on the White Hill to the west of Prague. On November 8 Tilly advanced to the attack, and in an hour his opponents were in full flight. The news that the battle had begun had scarcely reached Frederick, who happened to be entertaining the English ambassadors at dinner at Prague, when fugitives from his panic-stricken army arrived at the gates clamouring for admission. The city might have withstood a siege with some prospect of success, since Bethlen Gabor, who had routed the force opposed to him, was rapidly advancing to the rescue, and was already only twenty miles off. But the timid monarch sought safety in ignominious flight. The same evening, with his wife and family and a few of his counsellors and generals, he

Battle of
the White
Hill,
November
8, 1620.

Flight of
Frederick.

was on his way to North Germany, ultimately finding refuge at the Hague. His inglorious reign of one year earned him the nick-name of the Winter King.

Maximilian entered Prague on the following day and received the submission of the Estates in the name of the Emperor. The punishment inflicted upon the conquered country was severe, but hardly more than the circumstances warranted. Several leaders who had not taken the opportunity of flight were executed. Wholesale confiscations of the rebels' lands followed, and Ferdinand sought to recoup his depleted treasury from the proceeds. A new Catholic nobility of Germans, Italians, Spaniards, and French soon took the place of the old Bohemian and Protestant aristocracy. The 'Letter of Majesty' was declared to be forfeited by the rebellion; the Jesuits and the Catholic clergy were recalled; and within a few years, by means of banishment and forced conversions, Bohemia and Moravia were completely purged of heresy, and were added to the triumphs of the Counter-Reformation. Silesia and Lusatia escaped more lightly. The Silesian Estates came to terms with John George of Saxony in January 1621, by which they agreed to recognize Ferdinand as their lawfully elected king, and to pay a fine, on condition that their religious and political liberties were respected.

Punish-
ment of
Bohemia.

Toleration
granted to
Silesia,
1621.

Had Ferdinand been content with his triumph; and had Frederick been as ready to sacrifice his claim to the crown as he had been to abandon the kingdom, the war might yet have been prevented from becoming a European one. But Frederick from his secure retreat implored the Union and the other Protestant powers to come to his aid, and ordered Mansfeld, who was holding out in Pilsen, to continue the war as his general; while Ferdinand replied by issuing the Ban of the Empire against him

Frederick
put to the
Ban,
January
1621.

and his chief supporters in January 1621. The Emperor was led to take this very serious step, which could only render the quarrel implacable, by his financial necessities. Maximilian was holding Upper Austria as a pledge for his expenses, and he might be recouped with a part of the Palatinate, and with Frederick's forfeited electoral dignity. Such were the terms which, although not yet made public, were offered to Maximilian; and he, only too ready to seize the long coveted prize, undertook the execution of the Ban.

The war
protracted
in conse-
quence.

But considerable misgivings were aroused elsewhere. The Emperor had promised at his election that no such sentence should hereafter be issued except after a fair trial; but with characteristic Jesuistical casuistry he now declared, that as Frederick's rebellion was unquestionable no trial was necessary, and that the pledge therefore did not apply in his case. But Denmark, Saxony, and the other Lutheran princes of the north, who had hitherto been loyal, saw that this extreme exercise of Imperial authority might, if successful, be extended at their own expense; and they trembled for the safety of their secularized lands which depended upon the agreement of Mühlhausen, a pledge which might as easily be broken.

Dissolution
of the
Evangelical
Union,
April-
May 1621.

The princes of the Union, however, were terrorized into submission; and that association which had provoked a war and left others to fight it, appropriately crowned its career of incompetence by voluntary dissolution at a meeting held at Heilbronn in April and May 1621.

Spain not
favourable
to an ex-
tension of
the war.

Even in Spain the Emperor's policy was viewed with some misgivings, as conditions there were unfavourable to an extension of the war. Philip III died in April 1621, and was succeeded by his son Philip IV. The young king's new minister, Olivares, saw the need of economy and reform. The truce with the Dutch had just expired,

and Spinola and his army were needed for the defence of the Netherlands. The attitude of England was becoming menacing. James I might indeed be deluded for some time longer with the bait of the Spanish marriage, upon which his heart was set ; but he had at last been forced to call a Parliament (January 1621) after an interval of seven years, and the Commons were clamouring for war against Spain, and even summoning up sufficient courage to talk of paying for it. France, under Louis XIII and his favourite Luynes, was rapidly returning to her traditional hostility to the Habsburgs, a sign of which was her diplomatic intervention just then to prevent the Spanish occupation of the Valtelline.

Thus Spain, though friendly to Ferdinand, for the present rejected his invitation to undertake the execution of the Ban in the Lower Palatinate, and made an agreement to prolong the truce in that quarter. Spinola retired to take up the war against the Dutch, leaving Gonzalez de Cordoba in command in the Palatinate. The truce however was soon broken. The Protestant commander in the Palatinate now was an Englishman, Sir Horace Vere, who had come out the year before with a body of volunteers. Like all Frederick's allies he was left without pay or provisions, and he was compelled to demand quarters in the adjacent Bishopric of Speier. The Catholics were roused to indignation, and Cordoba at once reopened the war.

Renewal
of the war
in 1621.

Soon afterwards Mansfeld was fighting the League in the Upper Palatinate. Wearying of service in Bohemia, which was stripped almost bare of plunder, he had, both before and since the battle of the White Hill, tried to make terms with the Emperor ; but in the hour of victory Ferdinand could afford to ignore his overtures. He had then attended the meeting of the Union at Heilbronn in

Mansfeld
in the
Upper
Palatinate.

The Upper
Palatinate
submits to
Bavaria.
Mansfeld
in the
Lower
Palatinate.

order to urge the princes against their meditated surrender. Failing in this he returned to Bohemia, only to find that Pilsen had been occupied by the Imperialists in his absence; and now with a force swollen to 16,000 by disbanded soldiers of the Union army, and supported by Dutch subsidies, he passed into the Upper Palatinate to defend it against Tilly. At first he had some success, but the terrible depredations of his army made the inhabitants anxious to get rid of him. In October the Upper Palatinate submitted to Maximilian, and has remained Bavarian ever since. Mansfeld, deluding his enemies by an offer to disband his army, slipped away with it to the west, and Tilly started in hot pursuit. Reaching the Lower Palatinate Mansfeld co-operated with the English volunteers with great success and rescued the capital, Heidelberg, and some other strong places from the Spaniards. He then retired into winter quarters in the fertile plain of Alsace, where he was joined by his master Frederick.

Death of
Bucquoy.

War in
Poland.

The only other military events of importance in 1621 were the defeat and death of Bucquoy during his campaign against Bethlen Gabor; and the war between Sweden and Poland, which will be dealt with later.

Chris-
tian of
Brunswick.

In 1622 the fate of the Lower Palatinate was decided. Two fresh armies had now arrived to aid Frederick. One, equipped and supported by the Dutch, was led by Christian of Brunswick, an impetuous commander and a marauder after Mansfeld's own heart, who as the Protestant bishop or 'administrator' of the see of Halberstadt, had already made himself notorious as a persecutor and a robber of the Church. The other, also probably in the pay of the Dutch, was led by the Margrave George Frederick of Baden-Durlach, a more disinterested champion of the Protestant cause, who on taking up arms

The
Margrave
of Baden.

made over his hereditary dominions to his son, lest the family should suffer by falling under the Imperial Ban. At first Tilly was driven to retreat before Mansfeld and the Margrave at Wiesloch (April). But the two latter, Battles of Wiesloch, being unable to agree upon the conduct of the campaign, separated their armies, and gave Tilly an opportunity which he quickly seized. The Margrave, who was aiming at Bavaria, was caught and routed in May at Wimpfen Wimpfen, on the Neckar. In June Tilly, having joined with Cordoba, inflicted a still more disastrous defeat upon Christian of Brunswick at Höchst on the Main; and and Höchst. then drove him and Mansfeld, who had arrived too late to take part in the battle, into Alsace.

James I in the meantime, still trusting in his diplomacy, had been counselling his son-in-law to submit Conference at Brussels. his cause to a conference which was sitting at Brussels. Frederick, defeated and powerless, now gave way; he dismissed Mansfeld and Christian from his service and sought refuge at Sedan. The two adventurers thus Dismissal of Mansfeld and Christian. deserted, looked round for fresh employers, and at length decided to join the Dutch. Marching northwards by different routes and committing terrible depredations on the way, they reached Breda, and took service under Maurice of Orange, who, thus strengthened, was able to force Spinola to raise the siege of Bergen-op-Zoom. Siege of Bergen-op-Zoom. The Margrave of Baden made peace with the Emperor and disbanded his army. Tilly was now free to complete the Baden retires. subjugation of the Rhenish Palatinate; and by the end of the year Frankenthal was the only spot which still acknowledged the unfortunate Frederick. The work of purging the Electorate of heresy was undertaken forthwith, and the famous Heidelberg library was sent as a present to the Pope.

A meeting of the princes of the Empire was summoned

Settlement of the Palatinate question. at Ratisbon in January 1623, to set its seal upon the work of spoliation. Ferdinand's proposals for dealing with the Palatinate encountered much opposition, not only from the Protestant princes, but also from England and Spain. But after much negotiation, by means of playing upon the rivalries of his opponents, and by allowing his supporters a share in the spoils, he at last got his way. Frederick's electoral dignity was formally transferred to the younger or Bavarian branch represented by Maximilian, together with the territory of the Upper Palatinate. To meet the protests of England (and of Spain, who was still acting with her) Ferdinand agreed that the transfer should be for Maximilian's life only, so that Frederick's heirs might ultimately succeed. But he gave Maximilian a secret assurance that this promise should never be fulfilled. Equally hollow was the promise made to Frederick that, if he offered complete submission to the Emperor, and recognized the surrender of the electoral vote, the restitution of his dominions should receive favourable consideration. The Elector of Saxony was allowed to retain Lusatia, and smaller concessions were made to some lesser princes. Thus was closed the first stage of the Thirty Years' War.

Electoral vote transferred to Bavaria.

Terms offered to Frederick V.

Saxony retains Lusatia.

§ 6. France from 1610 to 1624. Before dealing with the second and more extended stage, it is necessary to review some events which had taken place elsewhere, and which were to have important bearings upon the development of the war. In France the death of Henry IV left the crown to his son, Louis XIII, a boy under nine years of age. Henry's widow, Marie de Médicis, was regent, and was a friend of Spain. Her rule produced a change in the policy of France, similar to that which had followed the accession of James in England. Marie and her favourite, the

Italian adventurer Concini, became the servile friends of Concini. Spain abroad, and by their corrupt and casual rule at home dissipated the treasure hoarded by Henry IV, and relaxed the royal authority. Louis arrived at his legal majority in 1614, but the regency practically lasted until the fall of Concini in 1617. The alliance with Spain was cemented by a double marriage, arranged in 1612. Louis XIII became the husband of Anne of Austria, eldest daughter of Philip III; and his sister, Elizabeth, became the wife of Philip III's eldest son, afterwards Philip IV. As a concession to the nobles, whose organized opposition was a prelude to the revolts against Richelieu and Mazarin, the States-General were summoned in 1614; an event which is notable as the last meeting of this assembly before the great Revolution of 1789, and also because it witnessed the first appearance in public life of Richelieu, the young Bishop of Luçon, who was on two occasions selected as the spokesman of the Estate of the Clergy.

Marriage
alliances
with
Spain.

States-
General
of 1614.

Richelieu was introduced by a friendly patron to the queen-mother, and attached himself to her cause. For a brief period of five months, from November 1616, he was Secretary of State with the charge of foreign affairs. He displayed great energy as an administrator at home and abroad, though not yet manifesting the open hostility to the Habsburgs which characterized his later policy. In 1617 the king, under the influence of his favourite Luynes, asserted his right to rule. Concini was murdered and the queen-mother was dismissed. Richelieu followed his mistress into exile, and played an adroit part in the contests which followed between Marie and Luynes, with the object of securing his own restoration to power.

Richelieu
in power
1616.

Louis
XIII and
Luynes.

The foreign policy of Louis and Luynes was more

Louis
XIII's
policy.

Rebellion
of the
Huguenots,
1621-2.

Peace of
Montpel-
lier, Oct.
1622.

Richelieu
restored
to power,
1624.

alert than that of the regency; vigorous protests being at once made against Spain's attempt to occupy the Valtelline. But at home their aggressive Catholicism stirred up revolt. The restoration to the Church of her ancient possessions in Protestant Béarn, one of the fiefs inherited from Louis's ancestors of Navarre, was rigorously enforced; and this, together with the alarming disasters suffered by their Calvinistic brethren in Germany, caused the Huguenots to organize themselves as an independent republic. Seizing the occasion of the quarrel with Spain over the Valtelline, they broke into open rebellion. Two campaigns were fought, in 1621 and 1622, in the midst of which Luynes died of fever. The Huguenots, realizing the futility of resistance without foreign aid, submitted. Marie de Médicis, prompted by Richelieu, urged her son to grant favourable terms in order to secure lasting peace, at home in view of the growing danger from the Habsburgs. The result was the Peace of Montpellier in October 1622, which was the first step towards the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. The Huguenots were allowed toleration, but their political assemblies were forbidden. Of the two hundred towns formerly held by them, only La Rochelle and Montauban were left, and all recently constructed forts were to be destroyed. The settlement prepared the way for the restoration of Richelieu (who was created a cardinal in 1622) to the royal Council in 1624. Gradually he gained complete ascendancy over the affairs of France and made himself indispensable to Louis XIII, who, though a courageous and ambitious prince, was indolent, and subject to the control of a stronger will. From that time until the great minister's death in 1642 the policy of France was the policy of Richelieu.

§ 7. The

In the United Provinces the conclusion of the Twelve

Years' Truce was followed by a period of growing material prosperity, of repute abroad, but also of distressing internal strife. Under the wise and able administration of the Advocate Oldenbarneveldt, friendly relations were established with the Hanse towns, Sweden, Russia, and Brandenburg, to secure the extension of the Baltic trade, and to check the selfish policy of Denmark over the tolls of the Sound; while with Venice another agreement was made which freed the Dutch trade in the Mediterranean. A sharp quarrel with England over the herring fisheries of the North Sea, which were then the chief Dutch industry, was satisfactorily arranged; and the Advocate, in 1616, seized the occasion of James's chronic lack of cash to secure, for the sum of £250,000 (less than half the debt still owing) the restoration of Brill, Flushing, and Rammekens, the towns which had been mortgaged to Queen Elizabeth. The rivalry between the Dutch and English East India Companies tended however to increase, and eventually led in 1623 to the so-called massacre of Amboyna, when ten Englishmen and some others were executed by the Dutch in that island on a trumped-up charge of conspiracy. This event was of no small importance in colonial history, since the English traders, lacking the support which the Dutch received from their home government, abandoned the East Indies and concentrated their efforts upon the Indian peninsula.

United Provinces during the Twelve Years' Truce.

Oldenbarneveldt's policy.

Relations with England.

The 'massacre' of Amboyna, 1623.

The internal disputes of Holland were chiefly religious, but they became entangled in politics, and left in their train a bitter feud which distracted the country again and again throughout this period. While a large proportion, probably a majority, of the populace were still Catholics, all the influential classes were Calvinists. But a rift appeared within Dutch Calvinism, corresponding to that

Religious and political feuds.

which had broken the unity of German Lutheranism. The rigid and intolerant orthodoxy of the strict Calvinists was opposed by a moderate party of broader and more tolerant views, represented in the teaching of the great theologian and preacher Arminius, who died in 1609. The quarrel gave rise to some serious popular riots. The moderates were supported by Oldenbarneveldt; by the young Pensionary of Rotterdam, Hugo Grotius (the most brilliant and versatile genius in the history of Holland, save only Erasmus); and at first by Maurice Prince of Orange, whose illustrious father, William the Silent, had been a moderate, and who was himself indifferent about dogmatic disputes. For a long time Maurice remained the firm friend of Oldenbarneveldt; but, since his own predominance depended on war, and that of the Advocate on peace, he was gradually driven by political jealousy to support the orthodox party. At a great national Synod which met at Dort in November 1618, at which appeared representatives from England, Scotland, Switzerland, and several German states also, orthodox Calvinism gained complete ascendancy. The triumph was followed by the proscription and persecution of Arminians and Catholics alike; by the execution of Oldenbarneveldt after a flagrantly unjust trial which left an indelible stain on the fame of Maurice; and by the banishment of Grotius, who in his exile in France produced the work *De iure belli et pacis*, which immortalized his name.

The
Arminians.

Triumph
of the
Orthodox
party.

Execution
of Olden-
barneveldt.

Renewal of
war with
Spain.

The renewal of the war with Spain confirmed the ascendancy of the House of Orange. It was a totally uninteresting war of sieges, and soon became a mere phase of the Thirty Years' War. Maurice relieved Bergen-op-Zoom in 1622; but failed in 1624 at Breda, which fell to the Spaniards shortly after his death in

April 1625. The military command and the practical sovereignty of the United Provinces devolved upon his younger brother Frederick Henry, who continued the war with great success, and whose more tolerant policy allayed for a time the religious and political dissensions within.

Death of Maurice of Nassau, and accession of Frederick Henry, 1625.

In Sweden the death of Charles IX in 1611, in the midst of the Danish war, left the crown to his son Gustavus II Adolphus, a youth of seventeen, but already a proved warrior, and every inch a king. Cultured, courteous, and endowed with great moral and physical courage, he was the worthy monarch of a virile race. He was fortunate in his chief adviser, the Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna, then only twenty-eight, but soon recognized as one of the leading statesmen of the age, whose tactful caution exercised a wholesome curb upon his master's impetuosity. The country was poor and sparsely populated, but was stimulated to tremendous energy and heroic endurance by its brilliant leaders. The war was going badly for Sweden, and her two most important fortresses, Kalmar and Elfsborg, were in the enemy's hands. But Christian IV was hampered by the jealousy of his unpatriotic nobles, and was thus prepared to accept the inevitable offer of mediation from his brother-in-law James I. After another year the Peace of Knäred was arranged in January 1613, and was, under the circumstances, fairly favourable to Sweden. She recovered Kalmar; and Elfsborg, which was left in pledge to Denmark, was bought back after two years.

§ 8. Sweden under Gustavus Adolphus.

Oxenstierna.

The war with Denmark.

Peace of Knäred, 1613.

Then came a war with Russia (1614-17) closed by the Peace of Stolbova in February 1617; by which Russia, besides paying a war indemnity, ceded to Sweden the provinces of Ingria and Carelia, and abandoned all her claims to Esthonia and Livonia, being thus entirely excluded from the Baltic.

War with Russia, Peace of Stolbova, 1617.

War with
Poland.

Immediately after came the news that Poland was attacking Swedish Livonia, and another year's fighting ensued; ended by a truce in 1618 which lasted until 1621.

Marriage of
Gustavus.

In 1620, Gustavus, hoping to gain a firm ally among the North-German Protestants, was married to Maria Eleanora, sister of the young Elector George William of Brandenburg, who had just succeeded his father John Sigismund. But, as events were to prove, George William had no intention of allowing family connexions to disturb his habitual sloth, except under compulsion. The renewed

Renewal
of the
Polish war,
1621-2.

war with Poland in 1621 was a succession of triumphs for Sweden. The great fortress of Riga, at the mouth of the Düna, was captured in September, and Courland was overrun. The Polish king, who was then also fighting the Turks on the southern frontier, consented to another truce in June 1622, leaving Sweden in possession of Livonia and of several places in Courland. Gustavus was now free to turn his attention to the struggle in Germany, which had never been absent from his thoughts, and to which we must now return.

Sweden
gains
Livonia,
and part of
Courland.

§ 9. Pre-
parations
for Euro-
pean war.
Bethlen
Gabor
again.

The ancestral dominions of Austria had now been cowed into submission, and Frederick was a landless exile. Bethlen Gabor, indeed, rose again in 1623, but he consented to another truce, resigned the title of king, and agreed to recognize the election of the Emperor's son Ferdinand as King of Hungary. He broke the truce more than once, but for the future his doings are of scant importance. He married Catherine, a sister of George William of Brandenburg, in 1626, and died in 1629.

Ferdinand
II's Im-
perial
ambitions.

There still remained however in Ferdinand's mind the ambition of restoring the Imperial authority. To him the causes of religion and Empire were one and indivisible. The restoration of Imperial power must involve the triumph of the Counter-Reformation throughout

Germany, and the restitution of secularized property to the ancient Church. But to others these causes were sharply divided. The North-German Lutherans and the foreign powers might look upon the humiliation of the Calvinistic usurper and the suppression of rebellion in Austrian lands with indifference or approval; but they were all hostile to an extension of Habsburg authority, which threatened to disturb the balance of power. Hence the widespread protests, feeble and ineffectual though they had been, against the transference of the electoral dignity to Bavaria. Signs of the times were shown, early in 1623, by the formation of a defensive league in the Westphalian and Lower Saxon Circles, that is to say, the north-western part of Germany, a district which was crowded with secularized bishoprics. Here in August, Christian of Brunswick, who had now resigned his bishopric of Halberstadt, suffered another crushing defeat by Tilly at Stadthlohn in the diocese of Münster.

Hostility of Europe.

Battle of Stadthlohn, August 1623.

Further signs were the diplomatic parleyings between England, France, Holland, Denmark, Savoy, Venice, Sweden, and Brandenburg, which continued intermittently from 1623 to 1626, and which resulted at last in a series of alliances for the recovery of the Palatinate and for resistance to the Emperor's designs. The new Pope Urban VIII (1623-44) was friendly to France, and hostile to the aggrandizement of the Habsburgs in Italy. In England the return of Prince Charles and Buckingham from their foolish jaunt to Madrid, and the consequent rupture of the Spanish alliance, were followed by the unfamiliar spectacle of Court and Parliament in harmony. Buckingham for one isolated moment in his career tasted popularity. Money was voted quite freely. All were enthusiastic for war against Spain. Mansfeld, who had come over to negotiate and offer his services, was to lead

Alliances against the Emperor.

Pope Urban VIII. England turns against Spain.

an English force into Germany. The rejected suitor Charles was to be consoled with a French bride, the sister of Louis XIII, and ships were to be lent to the new ally. France was not yet ready for open war in Germany. Richelieu had still to secure his own position against the opposition of nobles, Huguenots, and *Parlements*. But he sent liberal aid to the Dutch in men and money, and some doles also to Mansfeld and Christian IV of Denmark. Elsewhere he diverted the attention of Spain by intervention in the Valtelline and Mantuan disputes.

Richelieu's
policy.

Who is to
lead the
Protestant
campaign?
Sweden or
Denmark?

The question of the leadership of the anti-Habsburg alliance was not settled until 1625. There were two rival candidates for the honour, the kings of Sweden and Denmark. Both of them were impelled by religious and political motives. Gustavus Adolphus was sincerely concerned for the safety of the Gospel, in which he devoutly believed; and, in addition, he saw that the Baltic ambitions of Sweden were menaced by the possibility of Imperial conquests on the German shores of the sea. Christian IV had a more direct and a more selfish interest in Germany. As Duke of Holstein he was a prince of the Empire, and his second son, Frederick, held the secularized bishoprics of Bremen and Verden, which controlled the mouths of the two great waterways, the Weser and Elbe. Like most of the North-German Lutherans he had hitherto been friendly to the Emperor, but like them also he was roused to action by new dangers ahead. He was as ambitious and as energetic as Gustavus, and priding himself (justly so far) upon his military prowess, was equally anxious to gain the prestige of appearing as the Protestant champion. Thus the two Scandinavian monarchs laid their proposals before the allies who were to bear the expense. Those of Gustavus

involved the formation of a Protestant Grand Alliance, with an army of 50,000, which should carry the war into the heart of the Austrian dominions; and, moreover, he also demanded payment in advance. James I thought the terms too high, and so by what was practically the last public act of his life he accepted (March 1625) the more moderate proposals of Christian. A force of 30,000 was to be recruited chiefly in Germany; and England was to support it by a contribution calculated at £30,000 a month. Gustavus then turned aside to fight the cause of Sweden and of Protestantism in Poland, a war which occupied him for the next five years.

Proposals
of Gus-
tavus
Adolphus.

Proposals
of Chris-
tian IV
accepted.

Gustavus
reopens
the Polish
war.

Meanwhile, Ferdinand II was also maturing his plans. He had no money and no army of his own except a few thousand mercenaries barely sufficient to guard the Hungarian frontier. His great victories had been won by the army of the League. But the League was pledged solely to the defence of religion, and Maximilian and the other members were likely to be scarcely less hostile than the Protestants to any great general attack upon princely independence. They would still fight for the restitution of secularized lands to the Church; but not for the restitution of Imperial authority to the House of Habsburg. Ferdinand needed a new commander with an army pledged to the Imperial cause and able to support itself; and he found what he required ready to his hand.

Ferdinand
II's neces-
sities.

Count Albrecht von Waldstein, or Wallenstein, now forty-two years of age, came from a noble but impecunious German family settled in Bohemia. He was a man of transcendent ability, highly educated, widely travelled, and a born administrator. Though a Catholic, and a convert from Protestantism, religion affected him scarcely at all; on the other hand, he was a devotee of the pseudo-

Appoint-
ment of
Wallen-
stein, 1625.

science of astrology. Stern, pitiless, consumed by a soaring ambition, and with little faith in God or man, he was yet possessed of some noble impulses. Entirely free from religious fanaticism, he perceived the political advantages of toleration, and earnestly longed for the creation of a united Germany under an authority strong enough to curb the dissensions of politicians and priests alike. After his first marriage with a wealthy Moravian lady, many years his senior, he had applied his great talents to war, and had fought with distinguished success in the Emperor's service at the head of a troop raised and paid by himself. As a Catholic and an Imperialist he had suffered proscription during the Bohemian revolution; but when Ferdinand triumphed he had been generously rewarded for his services, and had increased his riches enormously by speculating in the confiscated lands of his defeated countrymen. The two men were now indispensable to one another, and a bargain was struck in April 1625. Wallenstein was created Commander-in-Chief of all the Emperor's forces, and was shortly afterwards raised to the rank of Duke of Friedland in Bohemia. He undertook to raise a new army to be used entirely in the Emperor's service, stipulating for a free hand in the appointment and promotion of officers, and supreme control of the war. The common assertion that he agreed to bear the expense of the new army has been disputed, but in fact he was bound to do so since Ferdinand was penniless. The work of recruiting and organizing was carried out with great ability and rapidity. Soldiers were drawn from all nations, and commissions were offered to Catholics and Protestants without distinction. By June a force of upwards of 20,000 was ready to take the field, and was rapidly welded into a coherent and disciplined body. It was

The new
Imperial
army.

a new epoch in the history of warfare ; and Wallenstein's new regiments were the foundation of the regular standing army of Austria.

His methods of warfare, though they necessarily im-
posed a fresh and terrible burden upon the unhappy
country, were an improvement upon the reckless and
purposeless depredations of Mansfeld, Christian of Bruns-
wick, and Tilly. Regularly proportioned contributions
of money were levied upon towns and villages in lieu of
quarters, and so long as these were paid there was tolerable
immunity from further molestation. Thus he made war
support itself, and his army was better paid and disci-
plined than any which had yet taken the field. His
strategy, which has earned him somewhat incorrectly the
title of the 'general without victories', was quite simple,
though novel. Avoiding battles in the open field when-
ever possible, he would entrench himself in some strong
defensive position—for which he had an unerring eye—
in the enemy's country, would lure him to a hopeless
attack upon his own superior lines, and then by rapid
cavalry charges would finish his discomfiture.

Wallen-
stein's
methods of
warfare.

For the present he had no intention of risking his new recruits in an arduous campaign, until they had been thoroughly drilled and disciplined. Therefore, after spending some time in Bohemia, he quartered his army in the autumn of 1625 upon the defenceless open country of the two secularized sees of Magdeburg and Halberstadt.

Meanwhile, events elsewhere were already proving that
the English support to the Protestant cause was but
a broken reed. The warlike policy of Charles I and
Buckingham was as disastrous as the pacific mediation
of James I. The young king was at once involved in
disputes with his Parliaments, with the result that only

§ 10. Pro-
testant
disasters,
1625-7.
English
failures.

a miserable trifle out of the promised subsidies was sent either to Mansfeld or to Christian IV. Mansfeld's English contingent was left destitute in Holland, and, decimated by privation and disease, failed to save Breda from Spinola. They never entered Germany at all, and their leader passed into the service of Christian IV. The English naval war against Spain was hopelessly mismanaged, and the expedition to Cadiz in 1625 was a miserable fiasco. Then a quarrel was picked with France, and another stupid and humiliating war was Buckingham's last achievement. The dagger of Fenton dismissed him from the scene in 1628. In 1629 Charles, determining to have done with Parliaments for ever, made peace with both France and Spain; and England until the time of the Commonwealth remained a nonentity in European affairs.

Breach
with
France.

Death of
Buckingham,
1628.
England
retires.

The war in
Germany.
Weakness
of Christian
IV.

Wallenstein's
victory at the
bridge of
Dessau,
April
1626.

Serious fighting in Germany began only in 1626. Christian IV, lacking the English money, was forced to support his army much in the same way as his predecessors, and was harassed by the necessity of choosing his ground rather with a view to contributions than from purely strategical considerations. He divided his forces into two parts; one under Mansfeld to prevent Wallenstein, who was strongly entrenched at the bridge over the Elbe at Dessau, from advancing against Holstein; and the other under himself to watch Tilly in the northern part of Lower Saxony. In its first engagement the new Imperial army covered itself with glory. On April 25 Mansfeld dashed in vain against Wallenstein's entrenchments, and was finally driven off the field in utter rout. Wallenstein then visited Tilly to discuss the future conduct of the war, and, after leaving him some of his troops, turned back to follow Mansfeld, who had been reinforced, and was advancing through Silesia aiming at Austria. Mansfeld

passed on into Hungary, where Bethlen Gabor was again moving. But the Transylvanian leader succumbed to Wallenstein's wiles, and made another truce, which involved the expulsion of Mansfeld from Hungary. With a few followers the latter then turned towards Venice, hoping to gain the Republic by his skill as a negotiator. On the way he was seized by mortal disease and, like the hero he was in spite of all his faults, refusing to die in bed, he faced his last enemy on November 29, 1626, standing supported in the arms of his friends, with armour buckled on and sword drawn.

Death of
Mansfeld,
November
1626.

Already Christian IV's army also had been shattered. With troops unpaid and mutinous, he was forced to take the offensive. He began a south-eastward march, hoping to overtake Mansfeld and to join with him and Bethlen Gabor in an attack upon Austria. But he himself was overtaken and thoroughly routed by Tilly, in a fiercely contested battle at Lutter on August 27, in which he lost the flower of his army and the whole of his artillery. He was driven back towards Holstein, bitterly complaining, not without justice, that the disaster was due to English breach of faith, which had left him with a half-starved and demoralized army.

Rout of
Christian
IV at
Lutter,
August
1626.

The first half of 1627 was employed by Tilly in completing the reduction of the Lower Saxon Circle by wholesale terrorism and brutality. Brunswick, where the Lutheran populace offered resistance, was treated with special barbarity, some three hundred villages being burned to the ground. Wallenstein, after detaching a regiment to aid Sigismund of Poland against Gustavus Adolphus, was engaged, first in clearing Silesia and Moravia of the remnants of Mansfeld's force, employing milder methods than Tilly, and enlisting a large number of his late opponents in his own army; and

Reduction
of the
Lower
Saxon
Circle by
Tilly.

Wallen-
stein in
the east.

Tilly and
Wallen-
stein
attack
Denmark.

secondly in conciliating George William of Brandenburg to the Imperial cause. In November the two Catholic generals commenced a joint attack upon the dominions of Christian IV. Resistance was of the feeblest character. Holstein, Bremen, and the peninsula of Jutland were completely overrun by the end of the year. In the latter part of this campaign Wallenstein took sole command, as Tilly was wounded.

Partial
reconcilia-
tion
between
Sweden
and Den-
mark,
1628.

Christian IV fled for refuge to his islands, and his humiliation was accompanied by signs of a better understanding between Denmark and Sweden. Gustavus, still engaged in Poland, but ever intent on the wider conflict, refused indeed to detach his army for the defence of Jutland; but in January 1628 he agreed to keep eight men-of-war in the Baltic, in return for the remission of the Sound dues in favour of Sweden.

§ II. The
Great
Baltic De-
sign, and
the Peace
of Lübeck.

The need for fresh efforts on the part of the Protestants, and especially of the Baltic powers, was evident in the alarming development of the designs of Wallenstein and the Emperor. The triumphs of 1627 were followed by further huge rewards to the successful general. Towards the end of that year the two Duchies of Mecklenburg on the Baltic coast, just east of Holstein, which had been on the Danish side, were occupied by the Imperial troops, and the dukes were expelled. Soon afterwards Wallenstein was formally created Duke of Mecklenburg by the Emperor. Thus with Spain attacking Holland, with East Frisia, Bremen, Holstein, Schleswig, Jutland, and Mecklenburg occupied by Imperialist troops, and with the Danish islands and the Pomeranian ports threatened with immediate attack, the House of Habsburg appeared to be on the point of establishing its dominion on the North Sea, the Sound, and the Baltic, and thus challenging the maritime ascendancy of the northern nations.

Wallenstein, who just then assumed the grandiloquent title of General of the Oceanic and the Baltic Seas, made strenuous diplomatic efforts to include the Hanse towns within the circle of the Imperial alliance. But having failed in this, he then turned his attention seriously to the reduction of the ports of Pomerania, of which Stralsund was the chief. Stralsund, at the north-western extremity of Pomerania, was a strong and prosperous city of supreme commercial and strategical importance, since, with the island of Rügen just opposite, it commanded the western entry to the mouth of the river Oder. Quarters had been demanded by Wallenstein's lieutenant Arnim in the previous autumn. The town council were timid and inclined to make terms, but were nerved to resistance by the courageous determination of the burghers. In June 1628 Wallenstein with a great army appeared before Stralsund to undertake the siege in person, vowing that the city 'must down, were it bound with chains to the heavens'. But it was from the sea, not from the skies, that succour came. Hitherto invincible on land, Wallenstein made the great mistake of attempting to reduce a maritime city without ships. Reinforcements and supplies poured in from Sweden and Denmark. Among others came Alexander Lesley and a band of Scots, destined before long to gain in the service of Gustavus Adolphus the military experience which was so important later on in deciding the struggle in Great Britain between Charles I and his subjects. After repeated attacks Wallenstein had to retire baffled on August 3.

Siege of
Stralsund,
1627-8.

Siege
raised,
August
1628.

This serious check hastened the close of the second period of the war. Wallenstein, who scarcely ever interrupted his negotiations in the midst of fighting, was the principal Imperial representative in the discussions which produced the Peace of Lübeck in May 1629.

Peace of
Lübeck,
May 1629.

Christian IV was let off lightly. Upon agreeing to resign all claims for himself or his family upon the German bishoprics, and to surrender the Directorship of the Lower Saxon Circle, he regained Jutland, Schleswig, and Holstein without indemnity. Most of the European powers were included in the peace, which was finally ratified on June 7.

CHAPTER IV

THE POLICY OF RICHELIEU

1. Connexion between home and foreign politics. 2. Establishment of absolute despotism in France. 3. General characteristics of Richelieu's government. 4. The Huguenots. 5. Princely conspiracies and rebellions. 6. Spain and the Valtelline. 7. The Mantuan Succession. 8. Richelieu's diplomacy in Germany, Poland, and Sweden. 9. Open intervention in the Thirty Years' War.

AT the time when Wallenstein was vainly endeavouring to reduce Stralsund, two other sieges of as critical a character were going on elsewhere. On the west coast of France the Huguenot stronghold La Rochelle was holding out against Richelieu; and in the north of Italy a French garrison in Casale was holding out against a combined force of Spaniards and Piedmontese. The coincidence of these events was not accidental. The French were led to interfere in Italy in order to stem the tide of Habsburg conquest in Germany; and the Huguenots were stimulated to revolt in France by the distractions of their rulers abroad. In order to understand the interrelation of these events, it is necessary at this point to study the policy of the real ruler of France, Cardinal Richelieu, the ablest diplomatist and the most rigid autocrat of his time.

When Richelieu was restored to a place in the Council of State in 1624, before he had secured his position, and while there were still rivals of equal influence to be got rid of, he drew up a comprehensive scheme for internal

§ 1. Connexion between home and foreign politics.

Richelieu's original scheme of reforms.

reform, which, had it been carried out, would have placed him in a distinguished position among the benefactors of mankind, but which in the light of his actual efforts and achievements resembles the programme of some corrupt political clique anxious only for the spoils of office. As soon as he was firmly seated in power the scheme was consigned to oblivion. It is often said that he was forced to abandon it by the overwhelming pressure of foreign affairs. With most men, even those of more than ordinary ability, this might be true. But Richelieu was one of the mightiest men of affairs in the world's history. The extraordinary thing about his genius is that, even when immersed in foreign affairs, he actually was able to devote ceaseless attention to his domestic policy. Had he been really willing to display the same energy as a reformer that he did as a destroyer, he might have carried out his earlier scheme, and at the same time he would have lightened considerably the prodigious burden which he carried on his own shoulders.

Richelieu's
deliberate
objects.

Towards the end of his career he placed on record another statement of the aims which he set before himself when he entered the service of Louis XIII, and this, unlike the earlier one, gives an accurate epitome of his policy. His objects were, he says, to ruin the Huguenot faction, to humble the pride of the nobles, to reduce all the subjects of France to their duty, and to exalt the name of the king to its proper position among foreign nations. It is obvious that the first three aims were subordinate to, and essential for the achievement of, the last. It is that which gives the clue to his whole policy, at home and abroad. He could not commence the grand attack upon the Habsburgs until he had triumphed over his domestic enemies; and he therefore used diplomatic means to keep the war alive in Germany until he was

Essentially
a foreign
minister.

ready for open intervention. His resolve to make the name of France eminent among the nations was a great and glorious ambition. In pursuit of it he performed much good work in France, work which was necessary to her safety, and which few but he could have achieved. But at the same time he ignored almost everything which was not immediately necessitated by the primary object; and thus it is that one can discern scarcely a trace of truly ameliorative and beneficent statesmanship in all his innumerable activities. He must be judged by what he chose to do, and by what he chose to leave undone.

The first essential was to secure his position with the king. Louis XIII had no intention of becoming a mere figure-head. He was ambitious and warlike. He continually chafed under the control of the minister, as he had done under that of his mother during the regency; also his moods were changeable, and he was ever ready to listen to tale-bearers. Though he came to respect and eventually to like Richelieu, he regarded him to the last with a certain awe, which might easily have developed into hostility. Richelieu, however, gradually strengthened his position, by tact, by absolute frankness, by ceaseless vigilance, and, above all, by his continuously successful administration. He carefully avoided the position of a court favourite, and made himself secure and indispensable by conferring upon the king the glory which he coveted; and Louis was wise enough to perceive that there was no one able to fill his place.

The next task was to suppress, or at least to enfeeble, every existing institution which could challenge the despotic authority of the crown. When he became minister there were only two bodies which could exercise constitutional checks upon the central power of the crown, the States-General and the *Parlement* of Paris.

§ 2. Establishment of despotism in France.
Louis XIII.

Suppression of independent privileges.

The
States-
General.

The States-General had originated in much the same way as, and shortly after, the English Parliament ; but it had never rid itself of the caste instincts due to its feudal origin, and thus was far from being a truly national assembly. Richelieu never summoned it ; and its claims fell into abeyance until 1789, when, revived by the dire necessity of the expiring Bourbon monarchy, it became the herald of the French Revolution. The *Parlement* of

The
Parlement
of Paris.

Paris was the supreme judicial body, a close, privileged, and hereditary corporation of lawyers, similar only in its name to the English Parliament. One of its ancient functions was to register the royal edicts, and this had developed in course of time into a claim of remonstrance and ultimately of refusal or veto. Richelieu curbed its powers by holding sessions known as *lits de justice* ; that is, the king attended the *Parlement* in person, and commanded the members, on their allegiance to the crown, to register the edicts. By this means an edict was registered in 1641 which deprived the *Parlement* of the whole of its political claims ; allowing the members to discuss but not to alter financial measures without the king's permission ; and compelling them to register all other edicts without discussion. Richelieu also encroached upon the *Parlement's* judicial functions ; causing great political offenders to be tried by specially nominated commissions of subservient judges, and thus developing enormously the evil of arbitrary jurisdiction.

*Lits de
justice.*

Edict of
1641 curbs
the *Parle-
ment*.

Local
privileges
stamped
out.

In the sphere of local administration and justice, equally energetic attacks were made upon any privileges which restricted the royal authority. In the twenty-five provincial governments into which France was divided considerable rights of local independence existed, which cannot be summarily described since they varied very much in the different provinces. In general, however,

the nobles were the provincial governors, possessing military authority and various other rights; the provincial *Parlements* had civil and judicial authority; and in some provinces known as *pays d'États*, in contradistinction to those known as *pays d'Élections*, there existed provincial Estates whose privileges included the assessment and collection of the ordinary direct taxes.

The nobles were attacked at all points. Their rebellions were stamped out. Their castles, except those necessary for defence of the frontiers, were destroyed without compensation. Many lost their provincial governorships, and those who retained them were left with their rank and revenues, but deprived of all political power. A royal edict forbade duelling, though, in spite of severe punishments inflicted upon a few who disobeyed, the custom was too deeply rooted to be destroyed. The offices of Constable and Admiral which belonged by hereditary right to noble families were abolished, as conferring authority too great to be safely entrusted to subjects.

Richelieu also attacked the provincial *Parlements*; and he endeavoured to abolish the local estates altogether, but in this case opposition was so strong that, except in Dauphiné, he had to give way. However, he undermined the authority of both *Parlements* and Estates by means of intendants, or officials who were directly appointed by the crown, and responsible to it alone. Much that has been written about this famous institution has been proved to be recklessly exaggerated; and on it has been built up the legend of Richelieu's creation of an administrative system at all, either central or local; whereas he did much to add to the chaos which existed before his time. He was not the first to appoint intendants, though he

Attacks
upon the
nobles.

Provincial
Parlements
and
Estates
weakened.
Richelieu's
'Inten-
dants'.

made far greater use of them than any one before him ; and he did not lay down any rules for their regular and permanent organization. They were used by him as the creatures of a personal, arbitrary, and irresponsible despotism ; they simply ignored all competing authorities, and disregarded established forms of administration and legal procedure.

§ 3. General characteristics of Richelieu's government.
The royal council.

All this work threw an enormously increased burden upon the royal council, the supreme executive authority. But Richelieu, its directing genius, made no provision for its future efficiency when his own hand should be removed. He deliberately preferred subserviency to ability in his subordinates, and, except in the sphere of diplomacy, left not a single trained administrator to take up his work.

Financial chaos.

The most imperative requirement in French administration was reform of the financial system, which was shockingly corrupt, wasteful, and oppressive. The privileged classes, the nobles, clergy, and many of the professions, probably a quarter of the population in all, were exempt from the *taille* and other forms of direct taxation ; and the burden thus fell with crushing weight upon the poor. The indirect taxes were farmed out to professional extortioners who made huge fortunes at the expense of both the taxpayer and the government. Nearly a half of the revenue probably was wasted in the process of collection. The country was covered with a network of internal customs barriers which were a fatal obstacle to trade. Yet Richelieu not only made no attempt to cure all this, but left it in a worse state than he found it. He greatly increased the vicious expedient of creating and selling useless offices, whose salaries formed a permanent and ruinous charge upon the revenue. The interest on the public debt multiplied tenfold during

his eighteen years of office, and at his death the national income had been spent three years in advance. And, moreover, he did nothing to stimulate the productiveness of the country by encouraging industry and agriculture.

In the positive work of administration his greatest achievement was the creation of the French navy, to which he devoted unceasing attention; building ships, constructing harbours and arsenals, and encouraging the mercantile marine as the necessary supplement to the royal navy. He also enormously increased the army, but he did little or nothing to improve its organization; he was to the last afraid to trust his generals in the field with full control, and attempted to direct European campaigns from Paris. He indeed encouraged colonization, but kept the French foreign settlements under such rigid control that enterprise was stifled. He did a little to reform the monastic orders in France, but left untouched the graver abuses of the Church, such as non-residence, pluralism, and the possession of spiritual dignities by laymen. He himself was a pluralist of the worst type. Though a cardinal of Holy Church he commanded his armies in person; and in spite of Papal protests he appointed cardinals and archbishops as generals under himself. After this it is hardly necessary to say that he was practically indifferent to religion; but it is more strange to find that his cool brain was swayed by some foolish superstitions, and that he was inclined to a belief in magic. His belauded toleration of the Huguenots was due to political considerations rather than to a comprehension of the virtue of toleration in itself. It was principally that a general crusade against heresy would have strengthened the hands of his opponents among the ultra-Catholics. There is nothing whatever in his writings to show that he would have

Creation
of the
French
navy.

The army.

The
Colonies.

The
Church.

Tolera-
tion due to
policy.

hesitated to stamp out Protestantism in France, had it been for his own personal advantage ; and he displayed a quite irrational prejudice and intolerance against the new Catholic sect of the Jansenists.

Literature,
in Riche-
lieu's time.

Richelieu's age was an important literary epoch, and the forerunner of one far greater. He himself was a voluminous writer and a generous patron of letters. But to him literature itself was a department of state rather than a creative art, and useful principally as a prop to the ministry. He established a rigid censorship in place of the comparative freedom enjoyed before. Among those writers who were favoured by his patronage there were numerous apologists and panegyrists, but only one, Corneille, who stands in the front rank of men of genius. Descartes, the most brilliant intellect of his time, the great mathematician and scientist, and the founder of modern metaphysics, though a Frenchman by birth and training, was a cosmopolitan by choice, and owed nothing to him. Some historians credit Richelieu with the foundation of the French press ; but the *Gazette de la France*, which he established, was originally a private news sheet which he took under government control so that the people might be informed of just so much of public events as he thought convenient. It must still be remembered, however, that literature owes a great debt to him by reason of the foundation of the French Academy. This unique institution had its origin in a private literary society. Richelieu offered it government patronage, which was not much welcomed, but could not very well be refused. In the new form it was organized in 1634, and formally sanctioned by the *Parlement* in 1637. Under Richelieu's direction it attained the position which it has kept ever since, as the supreme authority on the French language and literature. While no government

The
*Gazette de
la France.*

Founda-
tion of the
Académie.

organization can create genius, the French Academy by stimulating great literary interest and activity created a favourable environment in which genius could develop. It was no mere accident that its formation was immediately followed by the golden age of French literature.

It will be evident then that, although within the sphere Lack of constructive statesmanship. which he deliberately chose his ability was supreme, the work of Richelieu in France was with few exceptions essentially repressive. Much that he destroyed was indeed useless, archaic, and vicious, and required to be cut away; but he left nothing to fill the gap which he created. It is quite true that France in his time was not prepared for anything like constitutional government, and that the monarchy was her natural safeguard against anarchy. But it is also beside the mark. He did nothing to ensure that the despotism which he established should be wielded in a temperate and beneficent manner. He left behind him an irresponsible and corrupt autocracy devoid of any wholesome curb. Truly beneficent statesmanship regards the welfare of the state as meaningless apart from the welfare of the people. Richelieu subordinated everything else to one great abstraction—Dominion. To that he sacrificed his own health and leisure, wearing out his life in unrelenting toil; and to that he sacrificed the happiness of a nation. He glutted France with military glory; he humiliated all her foreign and domestic foes; but he robbed the nation of political experience, and left it divided and enslaved. It has been truly said that no individual French subject was any the better for Richelieu's eighteen years of office. Together with Louis XIV, who was the true heir of his policy, he must be held responsible for the disasters which fell upon the monarchy and people alike in the cataclysm of the great Revolution.

§ 4. The
Huguenots.

We turn now to the events of Richelieu's ministry. He was faced at the outset with the necessity of curbing the rebellions of the Huguenots, whose independent political privileges, though much diminished since their last revolt, were still a formidable menace to national unity.

Huguenot
grievances.

The Huguenots were evidently prepared to utilize any opportunity to recover their former position. They complained that the fortifications of Saint-Louis, a royal stronghold which overlooked the harbour of La Rochelle, had been strengthened instead of destroyed, as had been promised, so they maintained, by a private undertaking at the time of the Treaty of Montpellier. Seizing, as before, the occasion of trouble in the Valtelline, they broke into revolt in 1625, and were strongly supported by the nobles. One of their leaders, Soubise, seized the island of Ré outside La Rochelle, and then captured the royal vessels in the harbour of Blavet; and another, the Duke of Rohan, stirred up rebellion in Languedoc. Richelieu borrowed ships from his allies, the English and Dutch, whose governments feared that the rebellion would ruin the newly arranged coalition against Spain and Austria. The Duke of Montmorency took command of the fleet and gained a complete victory over the Huguenots, who had to submit to a disadvantageous peace.

Revolt of
1625.

Defeat
of the
revolt.

Rebellion
of 1627,
provoked
by Eng-
land.

The next rebellion was provoked by England. The parliamentary and national antagonism to Charles I and Buckingham had been lately increased by the disasters to the English volunteer force under Mansfeld, by the hopeless mismanagement of the naval war against Spain, and especially by the recent loan of British vessels to France for a war against Protestants. The government now sought to recover popularity by posing as champion of the Huguenots. Buckingham, who when negotiating the Anglo-French treaty of 1624 in Paris had affronted

Louis XIII by making open love to the Queen of France, and who treasured a grudge against Louis because of the severe snubbing he had received in consequence, was chiefly responsible for this criminal enterprise. He conducted the English fleet in person, and landed on Ré in July 1627. Again La Rochelle and Languedoc were stirred to revolt. Richelieu determined to crush the Huguenots once and for all. He was now no longer dependent, as he had been during the previous revolt, upon foreign vessels. The ancient office of Admiral of France had been abolished; Richelieu himself had undertaken the new office of Superintendent of Navigation and Commerce, and many new royal ships were already on the sea. The king, who at the beginning of the campaign had been ill, was able to join the army in October. Buckingham failed dismally and had to retire: he prepared another expedition for the following year, but was assassinated at Portsmouth in September 1628 when about to embark. The English fleet set sail under another commander but accomplished nothing. By that time La Rochelle was completely blockaded. Under Richelieu's direction a great stone dyke had been built out into the sea from the land on either side of the harbour, leaving only a narrow entrance which was blocked by sunken vessels. Shut off from succour by land and sea La Rochelle was doomed, and after a heroic resistance the citizens capitulated in November 1628. The following year witnessed the reduction of Languedoc; and, in August 1629, Richelieu was able to enter in triumph the one remaining Huguenot stronghold of Montauban.

Buckingham's expedition to Ré, July 1627.

Failure and death of Buckingham.

Fall of La Rochelle.

As a result of their defeat the Huguenots were completely deprived of their political privileges, but they retained the religious toleration granted by the Edict of Nantes. Richelieu was far too politic to allow his victory

Moderate use of the victory.

to be turned into a crusade against heresy ; which would only have strengthened the hands of his enemies the ultra-Catholics, and possibly have renewed the discords of the sixteenth century. He hoped to win the Huguenots by peaceable persuasion, and so encouraged Catholic missions among them. Though the missions were not a great success, his tolerant policy was justified by its results. In the next generation the Huguenot middle classes became the most thrifty and prosperous part of the population. Some of the greatest generals who were to take part in the humiliation of Spain—Gassion, La Force, Rohan, Duquesne, and, above all, Turenne, were Huguenots ; while many other nobles, tiring of the social ostracism which their religion involved, became Catholics. Turenne himself in later life was converted by the persuasions of Bossuet.

§ 5.
Princely
conspiracies and
rebellions.
Marie de
Médicis.

Throughout his long ministry Richelieu was continually faced by other rebellions, and by the conspiracies of princely and noble opponents whose privileges were undermined by his influence. The queen-mother, Marie de Médicis, became the implacable enemy of the man who had climbed to power by her aid, only to supplant her in the confidence of her son. She was the champion of the ultra-Catholic party, which detested his toleration of Huguenots at home, and his enmity to the Catholic powers abroad. As mother of the queens of Spain and England, Marie had special cause to hate his foreign policy. She was the centre of constant court intrigues against him, and was supported by her younger son, Gaston Duke of Orleans, and by her daughter-in-law, Anne of Austria, the neglected wife of Louis XIII. Marie's opposition came to a crisis in September 1630, when she and the queen gained Louis's ear during one of his frequent illnesses. The king was apparently per-

The Day
of Dupes.

suaded to dismiss the minister and his subordinates, and a list of officials to take their place was prepared. On the following day, however, Louis left for Versailles. Richelieu, probably by arrangement, followed him, and before the end of the day, which has become famous as 'the Day of Dupes', had completely recovered his position. The queen-mother's influence was at an end; shortly afterwards she left the country, and spent the rest of her life abroad.

The great nobles of France were also constantly hostile. They seized every possible opportunity to rebel, and sought aid both from the Huguenots and from the foreign enemies of France. But they were invariably unsuccessful, and Richelieu's vengeance followed with absolute certainty, and it must be said with utter lack of scruple. He neglected the small and struck at the great. The extent of guilt was to him a secondary matter, so long as the victim selected was sufficiently prominent to provide a terrible warning to others. The aristocratic opposition centred round the person of Gaston of Orleans, who took up his mother's cause on her defeat in 1630. He was a shallow, vicious, and cowardly prince; but his position as next in succession to the throne, until the birth of the future Louis XIV in 1638, gave him a prominence absolutely unmerited by his feeble talents. As the leading prince of the blood, he could dabble in treason with the knowledge that his own head at least was safe; and he was ever ready to make terms for himself by betraying his supporters.

The most dangerous of his earlier rebellions occurred in 1631 and 1632 in the midst of a fresh war with Spain in Italy. He made an alliance with Charles IV of Lorraine, and was secretly married to his sister Margaret. The plan was for an invasion of France with the

Aristocratic rebellions.

Gaston, Duke of Orleans.

The rebellions of 1631-2.

Reduction
of Lor-
raine.

Rebellion
of Mont-
morency.

Defeat and
execution
of Mont-
morency.

§ 6. Spain
and the
Valtelline.

assistance of Imperial and Spanish troops, the overthrow of Richelieu, and the liberation of Lorraine from French domination; while the discontented nobles and *Parlements* were to stir up revolt within. Richelieu anticipated the invasion. Two brief campaigns sufficed to reduce Lorraine, and its duke was forced to accept the humiliating treaty of Liverdun (June 1632), by which he promised to abandon all hostile alliances. Gaston of Orleans had meanwhile fled to Brussels, but was soon back in France. Most of the conspirators within the country had been terrorized into submission by stern precautionary measures adopted by Richelieu. But the Duke of Montmorency, the greatest noble of the south, invited Gaston to support him in his province of Languedoc. Montmorency, though formerly an intimate friend and supporter of Richelieu, had special cause for discontent at his repressive policy. Languedoc had been treated with great severity in the last Huguenot revolt, although the duke himself had fought on the side of the government. The suppressed dignity of Constable of France was hereditary in his family, and he desired to revive it in his own person. Also his wife was a relative of the queen-mother. The rebellion, however, was defeated, and Montmorency was captured and executed in November 1632. Gaston, who made no attempt to save his ally, was offered easy terms, but, being afraid to reveal his secret marriage, fled again to Brussels.

The suppression of these dangerous rebellions coincided with a great disaster to the Protestant cause in Germany, the death of Gustavus Adolphus at Lützen in November 1632. This inevitably led to open intervention by France in the German war, and it is necessary now to review Richelieu's foreign policy up to this point. Enough has already been said (pp. 65-67) of the alliances which he

had helped to form in 1624-5 to check the advance of the Habsburgs, and of his subsidies to the Dutch, to Mansfeld, and to Christian IV. He himself had undertaken to create a diversion against Spain. Philip IV had succeeded to the throne of Spain in March 1621. He was as well-intentioned as his father, but just as indolent, less devout, and more addicted to sensual pleasures. His one claim to distinction is that he was a generous patron of art and letters. The Count of Olivares, whom he chose as his minister and who became all-powerful, was the real director of the policy of Spain. Olivares was a man of great energy and industry, and a vast improvement upon favourites of the Lerma type. He made sincere attempts to abolish corruption and to check extravagance; and he quickly raised the navy from the seven ships which he found to over a hundred. But he failed to perceive that nothing could save the country from disaster short of a radical reorganization of the financial system and the development of agriculture, industry, and commerce. His ambition to take up the heritage of Philip II, and to make his master the arbiter of Europe and the leading Catholic champion, ruined his well-meant efforts at economy. Richelieu perceived that Spain was weak enough to be safely attacked, while his allies kept the war alive in Germany; and he found a pretext ready to hand.

Spain
under
Philip IV
and
Olivares.

In 1620 the Catholic inhabitants of the Valtelline had been stirred up to revolt against their Protestant oppressors, the Grisons, and had called upon Spain for aid. The valley was cleared of the Grisons' troops; and four forts were erected, and garrisoned by Spaniards. French diplomacy had then intervened and a compromise had been arranged; but the outbreak of the Huguenot rebellion of 1621 emboldened Spain to reopen hostilities.

Revolts
in the
Valtelline.

Spain
occupies
the valley.

Interven-
tion of
France.

Expulsion
of the
Papal
troops.

Treaty of
Monzon,
1626.

In 1622 the Grisons were attacked both from Milan and Austria, and were forced to conclude a treaty which left Spain in control of the valley. Immediately after the humiliation of the Huguenots by the Treaty of Montpellier, France, in alliance with Savoy and Venice, intervened again. Another compromise was arranged by which the dispute was submitted to the arbitration of Pope Urban VIII, and the forts meanwhile were to be garrisoned by papal troops. The Pope, although opposed to Habsburg dominion in Italy, was unable to resist the pressure brought to bear by Spain to save the Valtelline from the Protestants; and Richelieu therefore, on his return to power in 1624, determined to use force. An ambassador was sent to levy troops from the Swiss; and these, aided by the Venetians, expelled the papal garrisons. At the same time assistance was given to Savoy in an attack upon Genoa.

But the outbreak of the Huguenot rebellion of 1625 compelled Richelieu to make peace in haste. After protracted negotiations the Treaty of Monzon with Spain was arranged in May 1626. The Grisons were allowed to retain formal sovereignty over the Valtelline, but without any real power, since they were forbidden to use force against the inhabitants, and since the Catholic religion alone was to be permitted in the valley. The forts were to be handed over to the Pope for immediate destruction, and he was to be arbiter in the religious question. This treaty, which is frequently misrepresented as a triumph for France, was really favourable to the Habsburgs. There was nothing except paper to prevent the latter from re-entering the valley whenever they chose; while Savoy (whose attack upon Genoa had meanwhile failed), Venice, and the Grisons themselves, were all embittered against their recent ally by terms which com-

pletely ignored their interests. Imperialist troops passed through the valley with impunity during the next war, which arose over the disputed succession to the Duchy of Mantua.

In December 1627, Duke Vincent of Mantua died without children. His territories, Mantua and Montferrat, lay in the valley of the Po, to the east and west respectively of the Duchy of Milan; and consequently were regarded as falling within the sphere of Habsburg influence. But the next heir, Charles Duke of Nevers, a very distant kinsman of the late duke, was a naturalized French subject and governor of Champagne, and Richelieu determined to support his cause. Nevers took possession of Mantua, but the Emperor refused to grant investiture of the duchy (which was a fief of the Empire), and Spain induced a number of other claimants to dispute the succession. Among them, Charles Emmanuel Duke of Savoy, revived an old claim to Montferrat, which was adjacent to Piedmont; and, aided by the Spaniards, he occupied the whole of that part of the inheritance, with the exception of the city of Casale, in which a French garrison strenuously held out.

§ 7. The Mantuan Succession.

Charles of Nevers.

Other claimants.

Richelieu just then was occupied at home with the siege of La Rochelle, but no sooner had the Huguenot stronghold fallen than he made rapid preparations for a campaign in Italy. Early in 1629, accompanied by the king and a large army, he appeared on the frontiers of Savoy. Charles Emmanuel was brought to terms, and forced to become the unwilling ally of France, agreeing to abandon Montferrat, to help in the relief of Casale, and to induce the Spaniards to withdraw. Then, after negotiating a league between France, Savoy, Venice, and Mantua for the defence of Italy, Richelieu returned to complete the reduction of Languedoc.

Richelieu invades Savoy, 1629.

Savoy submits.

Defection
of Savoy.

French
campaign
of 1630.

Capture of
Pinerolo.

Fall of
Casale and
Mantua.

§ 8. Riche-
lieu's
diplomacy
in Ger-
many,
Poland,
and
Sweden.

Charles Emmanuel, however, broke his pledges and called in the Spaniards. Spinola, now Governor of Milan, invaded Montferrat, and Casale was again besieged. The Imperialists, freed from Christian IV of Denmark by the Peace of Lübeck, poured troops through the Valtelline and attacked Mantua. Another French campaign was necessary to secure the work of the previous year. Richelieu, at the head of one army, passed over the Mont Genève, and in March 1630 captured the important fortress of Pinerolo, which guarded the exit of the pass from Dauphiné into Piedmont. By the end of June the king with another army had occupied the whole of Savoy, and then went on to join the cardinal in Piedmont. On the other hand, Spinola took the city of Casale and attacked the citadel, while the Imperialists captured Mantua. Soon after this, the deaths of both Charles Emmanuel and Spinola, and the news that Gustavus Adolphus had landed on German soil, cleared the way for a settlement.

France emerged from the dispute with far more favourable terms than were warranted by the military situation ; but only after long negotiations, which are worthy of some attention, since they give a supreme illustration both of the astonishing ability and of the unscrupulousness of Richelieu's diplomacy. The Emperor, having already issued in 1629 the Edict of Restitution to which more particular reference will be made in the next chapter, assembled the princes of the Empire at Ratisbon in 1630 with the objects of gaining their sanction to the Edict, their support against the threatened Swedish invasion, and the recognition of his son Ferdinand, already King of Hungary, as King of the Romans, a title which carried with it the succession to the Empire. Two French ambassadors, one of whom

was the famous Père Joseph, Richelieu's lifelong and most intimate friend, were present at Ratisbon, and were nominally entrusted with powers to arrange the Mantuan settlement. They were also secretly instructed to utilize every means of stimulating the antagonism of the Catholic League, and especially of Bavaria, against Ferdinand and Wallenstein; so that the war in Germany might be protracted, and the Mantuan question settled to the advantage of France. Ferdinand would only consent to evacuate Mantua in return for a specific pledge that France would give no assistance, direct or indirect, to the enemies of the Empire. Père Joseph and his colleague consented, and signed a treaty to that effect in October 1630. But Richelieu had no intention of carrying out any such pledge; and after the assembly had broken up, and Wallenstein (largely as a result of the French intrigues with the League princes) had been dismissed, he repudiated the treaty on the pretence that the envoys had exceeded their powers. This characteristic piece of trickery was probably pre-arranged between him and Père Joseph.

Père Joseph at Ratisbon.

Richelieu repudiates his agents' treaty.

In the meantime French diplomacy had been active elsewhere, in order to involve the Emperor deeper and deeper in war. Charnacé, Richelieu's envoy at the negotiations at Lübeck, had endeavoured to induce Christian IV to continue the struggle; but when, as was expected, this effort failed, he passed on to mediate between the kings of Sweden and Poland, who were still fighting. Richelieu, who did not want the French attack upon the Habsburgs to be turned into a Protestant crusade, would have been far better pleased by an alliance with Catholic Bavaria than with Sweden. With the sanction of Pope Urban VIII, who was hostile to Habsburg dominion in Italy, he had tempted Maximilian with

Negotiations of Charnacé.

Richelieu fails to secure the alliance of Bavaria.

the prospect of the Imperial crown for himself. But Maximilian's jealousy was appeased by the dismissal of Wallenstein, and he refused the French alliance. Richelieu was therefore forced to fall back upon Sweden.

French
diplomacy
in Sweden.

Truce of
Altmark,
1629.

It had been evident for some time that the cessation of the Polish war would be immediately followed by Swedish intervention in Germany. The Swedish force which had aided in the relief of Stralsund remained there after Wallenstein's withdrawal; and the city made an alliance with Gustavus. Charnacé was instrumental in arranging the Ten Years' Truce of Altmark between Sweden and Poland, and he then made proposals for an alliance between France and Sweden. Although Gustavus was far too able and independent to be made the cat-paw of France, and though he refused to be bound by the conditions which Charnacé sought to impose, or even to accept French money until he had safely landed in Germany, he could be relied upon to keep the Imperialists occupied while the remaining difficulties in France and Italy were being settled.

Treaties of
Cherasco,
1631.

His invasion enabled Richelieu to exact better terms in Italy. By the Treaties of Cherasco (April and June 1631) the Emperor agreed to recognize Charles of Nevers as Duke of Mantua and Montferrat, and to withdraw his troops from his territories; France agreed to restore her conquests in Savoy-Piedmont, and Nevers was forced to sell the greater part of Montferrat to Savoy. The inner meaning of this last proviso, which was, of course, a humiliation to France's own ally, Nevers, was soon evident. Richelieu had no intention of surrendering his most brilliant conquest, Pinerolo; and Montferrat was the price for which he gained a secret promise from the new Duke of Savoy, Victor Amadeus, that France should retain it. The secret part of the bargain was carried out after the

Richelieu
retains
Pinerolo.

treaties had been signed ; and after a show of resistance on the part of Savoy to save appearances, France was allowed to retain this great fortress, which gave her command of one of the most important passes into North Italy.

In these four years of ceaseless and ubiquitous activity (1628-31) Richelieu had fought England and made peace with her, had crushed the Huguenots, had defeated the intrigues of Marie de Médicis and the rebellions of Gaston of Orleans, had humiliated Lorraine, had brought the Mantuan war to a triumphant conclusion, and had helped to neutralize Poland and to launch the Swedes against the Emperor. The death of Gustavus Adolphus at Lützen in 1632, and the crushing defeat of the Swedes two years later at Nördlingen, forced him to participate openly in the Thirty Years' War. At first the new French armies suffered a series of disasters ; but in 1638 the tide began to turn, and by the time of Richelieu's death in 1642 the situation was completely changed. These later episodes of his career, however, and the completion of his work by his successor, Mazarin, must be reserved for treatment in subsequent chapters.

§ 9. Open intervention in the Thirty Years' War.

Defeats and triumphs.

Richelieu's death, 1642.

CHAPTER V

GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS IN GERMANY

1. End of the Polish war. 2. Gustavus's military reforms. 3. The Edict of Restitution. 4. Dismissal of Wallenstein. 5. Gustavus's conquests in Pomerania and Mecklenburg. 6. The sack of Magdeburg. 7. Breitenfeld. 8. Gustavus occupies the 'Priests' Alley'. 9. Diplomatic negotiations, and the return of Wallenstein. 10. Death of Tilly, and the Swedish invasion of Bavaria. 11. Nuremberg. 12. Lützen.

§ 1. End
of the
Polish
war.

Branden-
burg de-
feated.

Terms of
the Truce.

THE war between Sweden and Poland was brought to a close through French mediation, as we have seen, by the Truce of Altmark in September 1629. Long before that the Polish armies in the field had been practically crushed; but the war was prolonged mainly owing to the dogged resistance of Danzig, the great and wealthy Hanse town at the mouth of the Vistula. George William of Brandenburg had temporarily joined Poland against his brother-in-law (1627), in resentment at the Swedish occupation of his Duchy of East Prussia as a base against Danzig. But his intervention was futile. His little army was captured; and he was forced to surrender two valuable Prussian ports, Memel and Pillau, which remained in Sweden's possession at the truce. Sweden restored her conquests in Courland and the rest of Poland to Sigismund, but retained Livonia and some ports on the coast of Polish Prussia. Danzig was declared neutral, but Sweden gained a share of her customs dues, which, together with those of the

Prussian ports, brought considerable relief to her strained exchequer.

Gustavus Adolphus thus emerged from the struggle against Sigismund on highly satisfactory terms. But even more important than that was the fact that he had during the Polish war trained a school of captains, who were to help him to gain his victories in Germany, and to carry on the war after his death; also that he had tested and proved those military innovations which were to introduce a new epoch in the art of war. The classic school of Spanish infantry, whose tactics had been copied from the Swiss, and whose last great exponent was Tilly, relied principally upon the resisting force of huge masses of foot soldiers, several ranks deep, armed with the pike and the musket. The musket was then a heavy, unwieldy machine which had to be fired from a rest. Cavalry was used chiefly for foraging, scouting, and for finishing off the pursuit after victory; on the field of battle it was accessory to the infantry and not properly an independent force, so that it lost most of the advantage of its superior speed. Gustavus opposed to these tactics lightness and mobility. He made use of smaller bodies of men, drawn up six deep at most, so that every one could come into action. The infantry were interspersed, all along the line, with small bodies of horse and with light field guns. He decreased the weight of armour, both offensive and defensive. He made the musket a comparatively light and manageable weapon, and introduced the cartridge to increase rapidity of firing. He raised military engineering to the level of a science, and the spade became with him a weapon no less important than the sword. His artillery was by far the best in Europe; and the efficiency of his cavalry was enormously improved. And not least important was his careful

§ 2. Gustavus's military reforms.

Spanish tactics.

New Swedish tactics.

attention to the discipline and health of his soldiers. Insubordination and looting were sternly punished; while regular pay and provisions, adequate shelter, and the best attention which the primitive medicine and surgery of the time could procure, kept his armies comparatively free from those most terrible of all enemies, famine and pestilence.

§ 3. The
Edict of
Restitu-
tion.

The Swedish intervention in Germany in 1630 was favoured by propitious circumstances. We have already seen in the preceding chapter what Gustavus owed to French diplomacy; and we must now give more direct attention to the part which the Emperor had played in preparing the way for his most formidable enemy. Infatuated with his success over Denmark, Ferdinand II believed that the time was ripe for taking a long-contemplated step, which he regarded as the legitimate and necessary completion of the work of the Counter-Reformation, and which at the same time might be the means of recovering the good-will of the Catholic League, which was becoming openly hostile to the Imperial policy represented by Wallenstein. Before the Treaty of Lübeck had been signed he had issued, in March 1629, the famous Edict of Restitution. This was an attempt to enforce by the personal authority of the Emperor (ignoring Diet and Imperial Court alike) a strict interpretation, entirely in favour of the Catholic Church, of the disputes which had arisen over the Peace of Augsburg of 1555 (see chapter ii). First and foremost, all ecclesiastical property which had been secularized since 1552 was to be restored to the Church; while Protestants who were in possession of any of the princely sees and abbeys were forbidden to sit or to vote in the Diet, and were to be deprived in favour of Catholics. This decree affected two great archbishoprics, Magdeburg and Bremen;

Terms
of the
Edict.

twelve bishoprics, including the important sees of Minden, Verden, Halberstadt, Lübeck, and Brandenburg; and about a hundred and twenty smaller ecclesiastical foundations, such as monasteries, and churches in towns. Secondly, Catholic princes were authorized to expel all their Protestant subjects after giving proper compensation. And thirdly, a special blow at the Calvinists, only Catholics and Lutherans were to have the benefit of the religious peace. The execution of the Edict was entrusted to Imperial commissioners, from whose award there was no appeal.

The Edict completely failed to bring about the results expected, because the religious and the political objects were mutually destructive. Wallenstein had desired to re-establish the Imperial power over a strong, united Germany, upon the only possible basis of religious toleration; but the Edict was an impassable obstacle to that condition. In opposition to the hated Jesuit faction who were responsible for it, and to the despised League who hoped to benefit by it, he still endeavoured to work the Edict in the interests of the Imperial treasury, and for the territorial aggrandizement of the Habsburg House; and he treated Catholics and Protestants who stood in his way with the same ruthless unconcern. Practically nothing therefore was accomplished in allaying the apprehensions of the League.

Results
of the
Edict.

But antagonism did not stop there. Pope Urban VIII, already hostile, as we have seen, to Habsburg domination in Italy, was affronted when he found that his claims as arbitrator over the German Church were ignored by the Imperial commissioners. The monastic orders were incensed at the undue favour shown to the Jesuits, who were awarded some vacant monasteries to which they could have no possible right. And finally the Lutheran

The case
of Magde-
burg.

princes and the free cities were profoundly alarmed. Those who had hitherto maintained an attitude of cautious and calculating loyalty protested and prepared to resist; and the question of Magdeburg led even Electoral Saxony to make an individual protest against the Edict, which however the Emperor treated with contempt. The chapter of Magdeburg were induced to depose their Protestant administrator, Charles William, a Hohenzollern prince; but they refused to elect a Catholic in his place, and chose a son of John George of Saxony instead. The town council and citizens who had hitherto been on bad terms with the chapter, now gave their support by closing the city gates against the Imperial general and his army. Wallenstein maintained a blockade from March to September 1629, but then withdrew in return for a sum of money.

§ 4. Dis-
missal of
Wallen-
stein.

These were the circumstances under which the Emperor met the assembled princes at Ratisbon in July 1630. Complaints against the depredations of Wallenstein, and demands for his dismissal, were practically unanimous; while the Protestants clamoured for the suspension of the Edict. The French ambassadors, as we have seen, used every possible means to widen the breach between Ferdinand and his great vassals. The Emperor, who was determined to enforce the Edict at all costs, at last made up his mind to appease the League by sacrificing his general. The decision was announced to Wallenstein in August, and he accepted it without demur, professing to have foreseen his fate in the motions of the stars. He retired to his estates in Bohemia, probably knowing that his time would come again. Part of his army was disbanded, and the rest was joined to that of Tilly. The Emperor failed to secure the election of his son as King of the Romans; but

harmony appeared to be restored, and one of the last acts of the assembly was a unanimous protest by Protestants and Catholics alike against the Swedish invasion, definite news of which had now arrived.

On May 29, 1630, Gustavus Adolphus took leave of his assembled Estates at Stockholm, committing to their charge his infant daughter Christina. Soon afterwards he turned his back upon his beloved country, which he was never to see again. His force of Swedes amounted to about 40,000, and probably as many more joined him from other countries by the end of the year. Asserting that the war was a defensive one, since the Emperor had attacked his allies the Straßunders, he landed on June 14 on Ruden, a little island at the mouth of the Oder, between the larger islands, Rügen and Usedom. The Oder, whose estuary divides Pomerania into two portions, commanded the most direct pathway into the heart of the Austrian dominions, and it is evident therefore that the first requirement of the Swedish campaign was to secure control of its lower valley. This involved the occupation of Pomerania and Brandenburg. The old Duke of Pomerania, Boguslav IV, was the last of his line; and the succession was claimed by the Elector of Brandenburg. Though a Protestant, and though his duchy was suffering terrible depredations from the Imperialists, Boguslav was unwilling to commit himself to either side. But Gustavus, insisting on the rule which he made general during the war, that no Protestant could be allowed to remain neutral, forced him to make a treaty. The army, the whole military resources of the duchy, and the capital, Stettin, were placed in control of the Swedes, who were to occupy the country after the duke's death until indemnified for their expenses by his successor, whoever that might be. Thus secured and reinforced,

§ 5. Gustavus's conquests in Pomerania and Mecklenburg.

Landing in Ruden, June 1630.

Treaty with Boguslav IV of Pomerania.

Occupation of the Baltic coast of Germany. Gustavus spent the rest of the summer and winter in establishing a broad base of operations along the coast lands of Pomerania and Mecklenburg, during which some eighty strong places fell into his hands. The Imperialists offered but small resistance. Only one serious action had to be fought, that on Christmas Day (January 4, 1631, by the new style) at Garz and Greifenhagen on the Oder, where the enemy had concentrated in force to threaten Stettin. They were defeated and driven back upon Frankfort-on-the-Oder.

Weakness of the Imperialists. In that half-year, the tortuous intrigues at Ratisbon were already bearing bitter fruit for the Emperor. Tilly was far away in the west carrying out the Edict. In the absence of Wallenstein, the Imperial army, under incompetent and cruel lieutenants, became a body of undisciplined marauders, so that the inhabitants welcomed the Swedes as deliverers. When Wallenstein was dismissed, great numbers of his troops went over to Gustavus, and under superior discipline proved to be among the best of his soldiers. By the end of 1630 only five places in the coast lands of Pomerania and Mecklenburg held out for the Imperialists. The Swedes then occupied territory which formed an obtuse-angled triangle, with its base along the coast and its apex at Garz.

Treaty of Bärwalde, January 1631. These initial successes had the effect of completing the French alliance. Gustavus and Richelieu were now essential to one another. The Swedish supplies were rapidly becoming exhausted, and a poor country could not for long support the great army in Germany. Richelieu had failed to detach Maximilian and the League from the Emperor, and he was still faced with serious rebellion at home. He had the money and Gustavus had the army. Charnacé reopened negotiations at Bärwalde, and the bargain was struck in January 1631. The object of

the treaty was stated to be 'the defence of their common friends, the security of the Baltic, the freedom of commerce, the restitution of the oppressed members of the Empire, and the destruction of the newly-erected fortresses in the Baltic, the North Sea, and in the Grisons territory'. France agreed to pay a huge annual subsidy and compensation for expenses already incurred. Sweden agreed to keep an army in the field of 30,000 foot and 6,000 horse. She was to respect the institutions of the Empire; to leave the Catholic religion undisturbed where she found it existing, and to observe friendship or neutrality towards Bavaria and the League, so long as they observed it towards her. Neither ally was to make peace without the assent of the other. The treaty was to last for six years and to be then renewable. The terms affecting Catholicism and the League are sufficient to demonstrate, were additional evidence necessary, the strictly political nature of Richelieu's antagonism to the Habsburgs, and show that he was still hoping to win over the League. He can hardly have expected Gustavus to observe the terms implicitly; but he could at least satisfy the religious scruples of Louis XIII, and meet the attacks of the ultra-Catholic party in France, by pointing to the definite pledges which he had exacted.

Terms
of the
treaty.

Richelieu's
objects.

The French treaty, however, failed to avert the greatest calamity which the Protestant cause had suffered since the beginning of the war, the fall and sack of Magdeburg, although four months more were to elapse before the blow fell. Magdeburg, lying in a commanding position on the Elbe, was one of the leading commercial cities of the north, and a member of the Hanseatic League. The archbishopric had been created in the tenth century by Otto the Great, the first Saxon Emperor, in order to balance the overwhelming influence of the see of Mainz

§ 6. The
sack of
Magde-
burg.

Import-
ance of
Magde-
burg.

It ranked next to the three ecclesiastical Electorates. Since its archbishop was by ancient right President of the College of Princes, its secularization by the Protestants had provoked some of the most heated of those controversies which had raged, in the period preceding the war, over the interpretation of the religious Peace of Augsburg; and the Catholics had raised determined opposition to the claim of the Protestant administrator to take his seat in the Diet. It was therefore the very bulwark of the Protestant cause in North Germany, and this, even apart from its strategical and commercial importance, made it imperative to save it at all costs.

Its resistance to the Edict.

Return of the administrator Charles William.

Soon after Wallenstein's failure to enforce the Edict of Restitution upon Magdeburg in 1629, the citizens had come to an agreement with other leading members of the Hanseatic League for mutual aid in resisting further attacks by the Imperialists. In June 1630, the dispossessed administrator, Charles William, intent on recovering his 'bishopric', got back into the city and raised a revolt of his partisans. Soon he was in possession of the city and of the whole diocese. He was, however, a vain and foolish person, unable to inspire confidence, and he was opposed both by a Saxon and by an Imperialist party. Still, on receiving assurance of aid from Gustavus, he was recognized, and the town council prepared for the defence.

Gustavus's responsibility.

His difficulties.

German historians bitterly accuse Gustavus of callous disregard of the fate of Magdeburg, and quote this as confirmation of their very general assertion that his professed defence of Protestantism was a mere pretext to enable Sweden to conquer Pomerania. In face of the bare facts it is indeed difficult to acquit him of the charge; but on the other hand it must be allowed that the difficulties which lay in his path were enormous. First and fore-

most, there was the distressing selfishness and apathy of the North-German Protestants. To reach Magdeburg he would have to march through the territories of the Electors of Brandenburg and Saxony. While preparing for his expedition in 1630 he had, without success, endeavoured to secure their alliance. His brother-in-law, George William of Brandenburg, was still aggrieved at the loss of his Prussian ports, while the Swedish occupation of Pomerania threatened the loss of a long-coveted inheritance far more desirable than anything affected by the Edict of Restitution. John George of Saxony had less cause for complaint against Gustavus. But, absolutely blind to the fact that the Edict was a declaration of war by the Emperor on all his Protestant vassals, and still hoping to be excepted from it, he clung to his professed neutrality, which was now not merely a mistake but a dishonour. He imagined also that he could organize a middle party such as that which, under his predecessor Maurice in 1555, had secured the triumph of princely independence, at the expense of both extremists. To the appeals for aid from Magdeburg he replied with the fatuous advice that they should make their peace with the Emperor.

Apathy
of the
North-
German
Protes-
tants.

Branden-
burg hos-
tile.

Saxony
selfish.

Now Gustavus was determined to identify his cause with that of German Protestantism as the only possible justification of his intervention; and it was therefore essential to gain the alliance of the two great Electors of the north, by pacific means if possible, and failing that by force. He seems to have judged that the time for the latter had not yet come, that the implacable determination of the Emperor must at last arouse the Electors from their apathy, that Magdeburg would be able to hold out longer than it actually did, and that in the meantime he could divert the attention of Tilly

Gustavus
attempts to
divert
Tilly.

by attacking the remaining Imperialist strongholds in the north. It may be said in his favour that it was against all the accepted rules of strategy to make an advance southwards leaving unreduced garrisons in his rear; and there was the additional danger of rousing Brandenburg and Saxony to arms against him. But on the other hand the Lutheran subjects of the northern Electors would hardly have fought with any zeal against one who came to rescue the citadel of the Protestant faith from the clutches of the Pope; and above all there was the imperative need of convincing Germany that no Protestants who had the courage to rise on their own behalf should cry in vain for succour.

Magdeburg receives insufficient aid from Gustavus.

To Magdeburg Gustavus sent some money in October 1630; and he sent also a heroic leader, Falkenberg, to organize the defence, who completely superseded the incompetent administrator Charles William; but unfortunately he sent not a single additional soldier to strengthen the inadequate garrison. Whatever may be said about the more virulent charges against him, it is impossible to acquit him of a gross and irreparable blunder. The reduction of the northern strongholds took longer than was expected, and as an attempt to divert Tilly it was only partially successful.

Pappenheim commences the siege.

Pappenheim, the most brilliant of Wallenstein's lieutenants, who since his dismissal had joined Tilly, and who was enduring tortures of impatience at his new leader's excessively deliberate methods, was dispatched to Magdeburg in September 1630. He soon cleared the open country of Charles William's troops, and appeared before the city in November. About the end of the year Tilly began his march from the Weser. He invaded Mecklenburg, and in March 1631 reduced Neu-Brandenburg in that duchy with great cruelty, putting to the

sword the garrison (with a few favoured exceptions), and the whole of the male population. In the next month, refusing to risk the general engagement for which Gustavus longed, he turned southwards to join Pappenheim before Magdeburg. Gustavus then marched up the Oder into Brandenburg territory and on April 13 stormed Frankfort-on-the-Oder, which had been occupied by the refugees from Garz in the previous January, wreaking upon them a vengeance scarcely less severe than that of Tilly upon Neu-Brandenburg. Temporizing with the timid Elector was now no longer possible. Marching straight upon Berlin he compelled George William to allow him a free passage, with the fortress of Spandau as guarantee. Then came the turn of Saxony, and precious time was wasted in futile negotiations before Gustavus determined to use force with him also. But it was too late to save Magdeburg. Tilly opened a general bombardment on May 17. Falkenberg and the garrison maintained a heroic defence, but their powder began to fail, and they had to fight treachery within the city as well as the enemy without. On the 20th Pappenheim carried the last defences. Falkenberg and his heroic little garrison fought in the breach to the last and fell to a man. For two days the city was given over to the worst atrocities of sack, violation, fire, and slaughter, during which, according to the lowest estimate, twenty thousand defenceless citizens perished. At the end, the great cathedral, saved as it is said by Tilly's personal efforts, stood towering above a heap of smoking ruins. It was restored to the Catholics, almost the only remnant of what had been the proud city of Magdeburg.

Tilly reduces Neu-Brandenburg.

Tilly before Magdeburg. Gustavus in Brandenburg.

Forces the Elector to make terms.

Fall and sack of Magdeburg.

With a heavy heart Gustavus turned back through Brandenburg. The Elector hoped now to wriggle out of his recent treaty, but he was taught a wholesome

§ 7. Breitenfeld.

lesson when the terrible Swedish artillery was pointed at the palace of Berlin itself. He was forced to submit to more severe terms than before, including the payment of a monthly subsidy to the Swedes.

Tilly in
central
Germany.

Tilly, with incredible sloth, which increased the impatience of Pappenheim, spent the next two months in occupying some defenceless territories in central Germany, being reinforced meanwhile by troops which were gradually drafted from Mantua after the conclusion of the treaties of Cherasco. Gustavus, to guard his northern base from attack, took up a strongly entrenched position outside the city of Werben on the Elbe, immediately north of the diocese of Magdeburg.

Gustavus's
lines at
Werben.

William of
Hesse and
Bernard of
Weimar.

There he was joined by the Landgrave William of Hesse-Cassel and Bernard of Saxe-Weimar, who marched to his aid with their own forces through hostile territory. It was their honour to be the first German princes to join him of their own accord.

Saxony
arms.

The Elector of Saxony also began to arm. Slowly, but very surely, it was beginning to dawn upon his sluggish intelligence that the Emperor was determined to enforce the Edict, even upon such a loyal subject as he professed himself to be, and that his own bishoprics were menaced with the fate of Magdeburg. His general and adviser in this matter was Arnim, a Saxon who had served under Wallenstein, and who had adopted the latter's views not only about the Edict but on the general question of the Empire. The policy which Saxony follows from this time is to be explained very largely by the influence which Arnim exerted.


Influence
of Arnim.

Tilly
checked at
Werben,
and enters
Saxony.

Early in August, Tilly attacked the camp at Werben, but it was impregnable and he was driven back with heavy losses. Thereupon he turned upon Saxony. Demanding that the recent levies should be disbanded

and that the Elector with the rest of his troops should join the Catholic army, Tilly advanced towards Leipzig, burning every village in his path. Gustavus broke up his camp at Werben and marched south to intercept him. He was now welcomed by John George with a heartiness which was in striking contrast to his lethargy when only Magdeburg was at stake. On September 12 a treaty was made by which the Elector agreed to place

Gustavus's
treaty
with
Saxony.



all his forces at the disposal of Gustavus and not to make peace without him.

On the morning of the 17th the armies faced one another on wide, open country about two miles north of Leipzig, which Tilly had occupied on the previous day. The Swedes, with the Saxons on their left, were superior in numbers and immensely superior in artillery. They were drawn up in Gustavus's light formation, in small bodies, with the infantry predominating in the centre,

Battle of
Breitenfeld,
September
17, 1631.

and the cavalry on the wings, but with musketeers and field artillery interspersed all along the line. Tilly had the infantry massed in the centre, and the cavalry on the wings. His left lay a little to the north of the village of Breitenfeld, from which the battle takes its name. His cautious plans were upset by the wild impatience of Pappenheim on the left, who, after the opening artillery duel, dashed out against the Swedish right. He lost touch with Tilly in the centre, and was, after repeated charges, entirely broken. On the Swedish left the Saxons and their Elector fled in panic. Tilly then advanced with his centre, hoping to turn the exposed flank of the Swedes; but the latter rapidly wheeled round their centre and right, faced him in a new formation, and then completely cut him off. His troops maintained a desperate resistance until sundown, when at length a few survivors managed to bear their veteran leader, severely wounded, off the field. The rout was complete. The army of the Edict was shattered. More than a third, and those the very flower of Tilly's forces, were left on the field. The whole of his artillery and camp stores fell to the victors. It was the death knell of the old school of tactics.

Tilly's
losses.

Effects
of the
battle.

The moral and political effects of the battle were enormous. After twelve years of almost uninterrupted disaster, the Protestants had won their first great victory. They were invigorated with a new courage and a new spirit of resistance. As far as North Germany was concerned, any real danger from the Counter-Reformation and the Edict of Restitution was at an end.

§ 8. Gus-
tavus
occupies
the
'Priests'
Alley'.

But the fate of the centre and south of Germany still remained to be settled. Was Gustavus to go to the rescue of the Protestants there, or was he to strike at once at the heart of Austria? Vienna appeared to be at his mercy, since there was only an undisciplined force of

10,000 in Silesia to oppose his march thither. The Saxon Elector warmly advocated the latter course, vowing that he would place the Imperial crown upon the head of his great ally. Oxenstierna and the Swedish national party, to whom aggrandizement in the Baltic was the predominant motive, also eagerly desired and expected it, as the readiest means of gaining from the Emperor the formal cession of Pomerania. It was also the wish of Richelieu, who well knew that he could more readily accomplish his own particular ambitions on the Rhine while Gustavus and Ferdinand were embroiled together in distant Austria. But Gustavus was convinced that not even the fall of Vienna would suffice to rescue central Germany from the Edict. The awful devastation of the war filled the country with homeless desperadoes from whom another League army would spring up as soon as the Swedes were out of the way; and only a great army to oppose it on the spot could guard against that danger. John George desired to undertake the campaign in central Germany himself, but Gustavus feared to trust him until he was committed beyond recall against the Emperor. His new-born enthusiasm for Sweden might fade at any moment; he might easily be tempted, when his ally's back was turned, to revive the dormant scheme for a middle party; and there would be some justification for that, should Gustavus utilize the Protestant victory solely or mainly in the interests of Swedish aggrandizement.

Saxony
not to be
trusted.

Hence Gustavus determined to dispatch the Elector into Silesia against the Emperor, while he himself made a great détour to the west and south, to the fertile lands of the Main and Rhine, which were crowded with Catholic ecclesiastical principalities, and known therefore as the Priests' Alley (Pfaffengasse). There also lay the

The
Elector
sent to
Silesia.

conquered Palatinate, and, in addition, numerous little Protestant states, and many important towns eager for deliverance from their Catholic oppressors. There his army could recuperate during the coming winter after its gigantic labours, and he could watch the development of events, keeping an eye upon the doings of his difficult ally Richelieu, whose constant intrigues with Bavaria and the League were causing grave apprehension.

Swedish
march
to the
Main.

The march was a triumphal progress. Gustavus entered Erfurt on October 2 and restored it to the Protestants, and then made for the great Bishopric of Würzburg. The castle of Marienburg, after a severe struggle of two days, was carried by storm on October 15, and huge booty fell into his hands, including the military stores belonging to the League, which were kept there as the castle was believed to be impregnable. Princes and towns from far and near offered their alliance and sought his aid. Many would have preferred neutrality, and so have secured his protection at no cost to themselves; but he insisted on his rule that no Protestant could be neutral in this struggle. An important alliance was made with the city of Nuremberg, which agreed to arm in its own defence and put its resources at Gustavus's disposal. Frankfort capitulated on November 28; and Mainz, the see of the German primate, was taken on December 22 after a feeble resistance by the Spanish garrison. Bernard of Weimar went on to occupy the Lower Palatinate. By the end of the year the whole of the League's possessions in the Main and Middle Rhine districts, with the exception of Heidelberg, the greater part of the Archbishoprics of Cologne and Trier, and a small part of that of Mainz, were in the Swedish king's hands. The ecclesiastical princes fled at his approach, and he treated their sovereign rights as forfeited. The exiles of 1621

New
allies.

Nurem-
berg.

Lower
Palatinate
occupied.

crowded back again to the Palatinate, and Protestants everywhere were restored to possessions which had belonged to them before the war. But all just claims to property, and to freedom of worship, on behalf of Catholics, Lutherans, and Calvinists alike, were scrupulously observed. The Jesuits alone were treated as beyond the pale, and suffered general confiscation and expulsion.

Gustavus spent the winter of 1631-2 in Mainz, where he held a court in great state. His queen, Maria Eleanora, and the Chancellor, Oxenstierna, came over from Sweden to visit him. There also appeared Frederick the ex-King of Bohemia, ambassadors from England and France, and messengers or deputies from practically every state concerned in the questions at issue. Before describing the effects of the negotiations which ensued, we may glance at the principal military events which had occurred elsewhere since Breitenfeld.

Gustavus
winters in
Mainz.

Two Swedish commanders, Tott and Banèr, had been left to settle the north. The former reduced the last two places holding out in Mecklenburg, Rostock, and Wismar. The latter recovered the Archbishopric of Magdeburg, and the city soon began to rise again from its ruins. The Saxons, after recovering Leipzig, passed into Lusatia and Silesia; and then, against Gustavus's orders, into Bohemia. The Imperialists retired before them, and Prague, which was defenceless, was occupied in November. Thereupon a restoration, similar to that in the Palatinate, took place; and the Protestant exiles, headed by Thurn, crowded back again. But no effort was made to reduce the forts south of Prague; and, as events were soon to prove, the Saxon occupation was a very ephemeral affair.

Tott and
Banèr
in the
north.

The
Saxons in
Bohemia.

Tilly, after his defeat, was ordered by the Emperor to raise another army. Finding that he was not pursued, Tilly raises a fresh army.

he had little difficulty in picking up the scattered remnants of his forces, while starving fugitives from a hundred villages, over which the army had lately passed like a pestilence, came in to fill up the ugly gaps cut by the sword of the Swede. Fresh detachments from the Mantuan army also kept coming up; and a most important ally was gained in Charles IV of Lorraine, who, as has been seen, was deeply implicated in the rebellions of Gaston of Orleans, and whose fresh defection was to bring upon him the swift vengeance of Richelieu in the next year. Meanwhile his reinforcement of 12,000 was of great value to Tilly; it brought his army up to 40,000, a far greater force than that which had been broken to pieces at Breitenfeld, but a much less effective one, since it was largely composed of raw recruits. Early in December Tilly attacked Nuremberg, but met with such stern resistance that he retired. Pappenheim in disgust now left him, and for nearly a year fought a separate campaign in the north-west, until summoned again to the side of his old and beloved leader Wallenstein.

Charles of
Lorraine
joins Tilly.

Tilly fails
before
Nurem-
berg.

§ 9. Diplo-
matic
negotia-
tions, and
the return
of Wal-
lenstein.

Views of
Riche-
lieu,—

Turning now to the negotiations, it is necessary to remember the objects which the principal parties had in view, and to trace the effects of the Swedish occupation of the 'Priests' Alley'. Gustavus desired to impose a peace which should ensure general toleration; and compensation for Sweden in Pomerania. He demanded the restoration to the Protestants of whatever they had held before the Bohemian Revolution; the dissolution of the League, or at least its reduction to the position of a purely defensive organization; and, as a guarantee for all this, the formation of a Protestant League with himself as its head. Richelieu desired to humiliate the Habsburgs beyond recovery, and to strengthen the French frontiers at their expense; to detach the League from the Emperor;

and to dispatch Gustavus against Vienna, since he was now far too close to Alsace and Lorraine to suit French designs in these quarters. Those members of the League whose territories were occupied by the Swedes desired to get rid of them as quickly as possible, even at the price of conceding toleration and the reduction of the League army. Maximilian, whose territories were as yet free from the Swedes, and who was determined to retain the Upper Palatinate and the electoral vote, refused to hear of any compromise on the Edict of Restitution. Saxony and Brandenburg were looking for a chance to slip their necks out of the Swedish collar, and to revive the independent middle party at the expense of Gustavus and Ferdinand alike. England indulged in a spasmodic reminiscence of her duty towards Frederick and the Palatinate; but this was estimated by all the rest at its exact value, which was nothing.

of the
League,—

of Maxi-
milian of
Bavaria,—

of Saxony
and Bran-
denburg,—

of Eng-
land.

In the meantime the Emperor's views were becoming seriously modified by the Swedish conquests. Wallenstein, whether seriously or not, had been intriguing with Gustavus even before the battle of Breitenfeld, with the object of achieving his ambition of a strong united Germany on the basis of toleration. But, after the great victories of the autumn and winter, the Swedish king could afford to ignore him, and so he renewed his offers to the Emperor. Ferdinand II, trembling for the safety of his ancestral dominions, and unable to overcome the hostility of Pope Urban VIII, who roundly declared that the war was a political one, was coming again to regard his old general as indispensable.

The
Emperor
and
Wallen-
stein.

The result was, in the first place, that Wallenstein in December 1631 was reappointed Imperial general, at first only provisionally, and then permanently in the following April. His powers were vaster than ever. No

Reappoint-
ment
of Wallen-
stein.

other independent command was to coexist with his; he was to have full powers for negotiating treaties and confiscating lands; and, although the exact terms are unknown, it is fairly certain that on the question of the Edict, Ferdinand was forced to promise concessions. Only bitter need could have wrung such terms from him. In the second place, Gustavus's plan of a Protestant League failed owing to the opposition of Saxony and Brandenburg, who began to listen to Wallenstein's proposals. In the third place, the Catholic League was practically dissolved, as a result of terms arranged between Sweden and France in January 1632, as follows:— (1) the League army to be reduced to 12,000, and quartered only upon territories of the League; (2) all assistance of the League to Ferdinand to be withdrawn; (3) all territories in the Lower Saxon Circle taken from Protestants since the beginning of the war to be restored. These severe conditions were accepted perforce by all the members of the League except Maximilian, who, unaware of the terms of Wallenstein's commission, summoned Tilly to the defence of Bavaria, and ranged himself definitely upon the side of the Emperor on behalf of the Catholic faith.

The
Protestant
League
fails.

End of the
Catholic
League.

Bavaria
and the
Emperor.

§ 10. Death
of Tilly,
and the
Swedish
invasion of
Bavaria.

The campaigns of 1632 are exceedingly complicated. Gustavus at the beginning had as many as eight separate armies in the field. But his main plan, upon which our attention must be concentrated, is comparatively simple. Its object was a march down the Danube through Bavaria upon Vienna, and then probably (although events prevented it) back, by way of Bohemia and Saxony, to Pomerania. Leaving Oxenstierna with adequate forces behind him to guard the Rhenish districts, Gustavus advanced up the Main in March and concentrated at Schweinfurt in Würzburg, joining his lieutenant Horn,

who had been sent forward to secure the Bishopric of Bamberg but who had to retire before Tilly, and recalling Baner from Magdeburg. Tilly now retreated into Bavaria. Gustavus then struck south-eastwards and entered Nuremberg on March 31, being received with joyous demonstrations by the citizens. Then Donauwörth, the capture of which by Maximilian in 1609 had been one of the causes of the war, was recovered for Protestantism on April 5; and the Swedes passed south of the Danube on to the western frontier of Bavaria. Tilly, with 20,000 troops, had entrenched himself strongly in the angle formed by the junction of the Lech and the Danube and had destroyed all the bridges. On the 14th and 15th, in the course of a terrible artillery battle, the Swedes threw a pontoon bridge over the Lech and the passage was forced. This was the last battle of the veteran Tilly, who was carried off the field mortally wounded. His dying advice to his master was to retire and to secure Ratisbon at all costs, in order to keep in touch with Wallenstein, who was in southern Bohemia. When the passage was forced Maximilian retired in good order down the Danube, and Bavaria lay at the feet of the Swedes.

Battle of
the Lech,
April 14
and 15.

Death of
Tilly.

After Augsburg had been captured, garrisoned, and restored to Protestantism, Gustavus made for central Bavaria. The campaign there was a military parade. One severe check however was suffered before Ingolstadt, which proved to be too strongly fortified and garrisoned to be taken. Three weeks were spent in Munich, the capital (May-June), and then the arrival of serious news from elsewhere prevented further progress. The army was much diminished by garrisons left on the route, and as it advanced it necessarily became continually weaker. So long as the armies of Wallenstein and Maximilian were able to swoop round upon the rear and cut off the retreat,

Invasion of
Bavaria.

Gustavus
in Munich.

the advance to Vienna was impossible. The object of Gustavus was to prevent their junction, and to fight and crush them separately. But this opportunity they wisely refused to give him. Then came the news that Ulm on the Danube far behind was being attacked ; that Pappenheim was advancing from the Weser towards the Main ; and that John George, listening to Wallenstein's offers to free his electorate from the Edict, was turning traitor and abandoning Bohemia to the Imperialists, who thus blocked the retreat to the north. Not less serious was the news from France. Richelieu was now withholding his subsidies, and, having subdued Lorraine (p. 88), was taking independent action on the Rhine. Gustavus therefore retreated from Bavaria, and on June 19 was back again at Nuremberg. He made a rapid dash eastwards into the Upper Palatinate, but just failed to prevent the junction of Maximilian and Wallenstein.

§ 11. Nuremberg. Gustavus could now have safely retreated down the Main, but he determined not to leave the noble city, which he had sworn to protect, to suffer the fate of Magdeburg. Summoning reinforcements from west, south, and north, he had barely time to strengthen the defences of Nuremberg, and to construct a camp for his troops outside the city, when Wallenstein appeared early in July, with a huge army of upwards of 60,000, and entrenched himself in a great camp near Fürth, to the north of the city, on the heights which overlook the whole of the surrounding plain. Wallenstein, avoiding all offensive tactics, sought to starve his enemy into surrender. For two months the armies faced one another. Famine and sickness made terrible ravages on both sides, the besieged being necessarily the greater sufferers. The condition of Nuremberg was the more deplorable, since the peasantry from the country side had crowded within

Danger in
the rear.

Saxons
evacuate
Bohemia.

France
on the
Rhine.

Prepara-
tions for
the de-
fence.

Wallen-
stein's
entrench-
ments.

the walls on the approach of the enemy. Gustavus's reinforcements came slowly, and when the last of them had arrived, bringing his numbers to about 40,000, he was reduced to such a condition that he must attack, or retreat, or starve. To attack an enemy superior in numbers, and planted on the summit of steep hills which were defended by batteries all along the front, seemed like tempting Providence. But it appeared to be the only way of redeeming his pledges to the faithful Nurembergers. All day long on September 3rd and part of the following morning the battle raged. The key of the position was the Alte-Veste, a ruined castle which had been specially fortified, and which was situated in the centre of the heights, in a dense forest through which the defenders had cleared paths for themselves. Three times the gallant Swedes set foot in the position, only to be hurled back again. Torrents of rain, which rendered foothold impossible, at length put an end to the conflict and Gustavus, with 4,000 of his bravest men lying dead upon the slopes, had to admit the bitterness of defeat. A few days more were spent in fruitless parleyings; and then, leaving a garrison in the city, and detaching Bernard of Weimar to watch Wallenstein's movements, Gustavus marched out past his enemies' impregnable lines, and returned to Bavaria. Wallenstein was too badly mauled to continue the siege: when the Swedes were well out of sight he broke up his camp and made off to the north, leaving a line of blazing villages in his track.

Gustavus
storms
Wallen-
stein's
camp.

Gustavus
returns to
Bavaria.
Wallen-
stein re-
tires to the
north.

The last act of the drama was approaching, and once again the scene was laid in Saxony. The shifty Elector had in June been induced by the remonstrances of Gustavus to abandon his negotiations with Wallenstein. It was impossible to judge how far Wallenstein's offers were seriously intended; but enough was known about

§ 12.
Lützen.
Saxony
reconciled
to Gusta-
vus.

him to make it certain that no pledge would bind him if it stood in the path of his ambitions. Now since the Electorate of Saxony lay between Bohemia and Mecklenburg, it was an obstacle to his recovery of the latter duchy, and to the fulfilment of his dreams of maritime dominion in the Baltic. He may have intended to ruin Saxony completely, or merely to reduce her to impotent neutrality; but in either case John George was wise in recovering the good-will of Gustavus while there was time. In October, having sent back the Bavarians to defend their own territories, and summoning to his aid Pappenheim, who had been carrying on successful operations in the north-west, Wallenstein entered the Electorate of Saxony, burning and plundering on his way, and captured Leipzig on the 31st. Gustavus, true to his pledges, hurried to the rescue. Taking up Oxenstierna at Nuremberg, summoning Bernard of Weimar from the Main, and sending forward urgent messages to the Elector to muster all possible reinforcements, he marched northwards with a rapidity which astounded his enemies. He seems to have felt premonitions of approaching death. On the way he gave Oxenstierna careful instructions for the conduct of the war, and for the government of Sweden if he should fall. Then, taking a tender farewell of his queen and the Chancellor at Erfurt, he pushed forward into the Electorate. John George sent only a miserable reinforcement of one regiment to his aid, and even this came too late to take part in the battle.

Wallenstein invades the Electorate.

Gustavus to the rescue.

Battle of Lützen, November 16, 1632.

Wallenstein had entrenched himself with his usual care. Relying upon the strength of his position, and confident that Gustavus would not risk an attack in the cold, rainy, and foggy November, he had just allowed Pappenheim to withdraw again westwards when he perceived by the enemy's motions that a battle was imminent. Pappen-

heim was immediately summoned to return with all possible speed, but did not arrive until the conflict was half over. The battle of Lützen was fought on November 16, 1632, on the southern part of the broad plain around Leipzig where a hundred and eighty-one years later, in a more terrible and more decisive battle, the armies of Napoleon were shattered by those of the combined nations. Although there is much confusion

Pappenheim summoned.



and discrepancy in the available accounts, it seems probable that the arrangement of the forces on both sides was similar to that at Breitenfeld, with the difference that the Swedes were this time inferior in numbers. Wallenstein drew up his lines to the north of the road which runs north-eastwards through the plain, from Lützen to Leipzig, with his right resting upon Lützen. He had strongly entrenched the ditches on each side of the road for some

Wallenstein's position.

Plans of Gustavus. distance, and had lined them with musketeers, and guarded them by batteries of artillery. The object of Gustavus was to annihilate Wallenstein, and to get in touch with the Saxons (who never came) before the arrival of Pappenheim. For this a direct attack upon the road by his left and centre was necessary, instead of the easier and surer flanking movement to the right. Thus the road was, as Wallenstein intended, the key of the situation. The battle began on a misty November morning with the customary artillery duel. About ten o'clock, as the fog temporarily lifted, the Swedes advanced. In face of vigorous cavalry charges from the Imperialist right they carried the first of the batteries on the road, when a terrible charge from their enemies drove them out again and almost annihilated their centre. Gustavus hastened across from the right, at the head of a regiment of horse, to retrieve the disaster. Galloping recklessly with only three attendants far in advance of his men, he was carried, as the fog settled down again, into the midst of a troop of the enemy's cavalry. Shots rained upon him, and he fell to the ground grievously wounded. His foes leapt from their horses and plunged their swords repeatedly through his body as he lay helpless. They rifled the body, left it naked and horribly mutilated, and then mounted and rode off, and were well out of sight before the foremost of Gustavus's troop arrived on the fatal spot. Two of his companions had escaped, but the third, a faithful page named Leubelfing, remained by his master's side and shared his fate.

Rally
of the
Swedes.

The sight of their beloved king's white charger, with empty saddle and streaming with blood, galloping in wild terror right across their front, announced the terrible calamity to the Swedes. Inflamed with a mad passion for vengeance, they closed their shattered

ranks, and, under Bernard of Weimar, who took over the command, advanced again and again to the assault. Pappenheim's forces were already arriving when Gustavus fell, and their impetuous leader, vainly seeking out the Swedish king, fell himself at the head of his cavalry. Wallenstein's letter was discovered upon his dead body, and can be seen to-day, stained with his blood, in the military museum at Vienna. The Swedes had now to fight a new battle against a fresh foe. Once again the battery in the road was carried, but they were driven back with fearful losses by Pappenheim's cavalry. The battle continued to rage all day. Then at length as dusk was falling, a last rally and a last grand assault carried the road, and Wallenstein ordered a retreat.

Death of
Pappen-
heim.

Wallen-
stein re-
treats.

Both sides claimed the victory, though the Swedes had the better right to do so, since they retained the field of battle. But the only one who really benefited was the craven drunkard John George of Saxony, whose sloth and timidity had deprived the Swedes of the reinforcements which might have turned a doubtful victory into a decisive one, and who afterwards took the first opportunity of deserting his brave allies. Such were the barren results of this terrible battle, in which the flower of both armies was sacrificed, and which cut short at the early age of thirty-eight the precious life of the 'Lion of the North and the Bulwark of the Protestant Faith'.

CHAPTER VI

THE CLOSE OF THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR

1. The League of Heilbronn. 2. The fall of Wallenstein. 3. Nördlingen. 4. The Peace of Prague. 5. France takes the lead against the Habsburgs. 6. Revolts of Catalonia and Portugal. 7. Death of Richelieu, and the ministry of Mazarin—victories of Enghien (Condé) and Turenne. 8. Concluding events of the War. 9. The Peace of Westphalia. 10. Effects of the Thirty Years' War upon Germany.

§ 1. The
League of
Heilbronn.
Oxen-
stierna in
Sweden.

ON the death of Gustavus his political work was taken up by his friend and Chancellor. Oxenstierna first secured the succession of the infant Queen Christina in Sweden, and established a regency in which his own influence was supreme. Then he returned to take up the direction of his late master's work in Germany.

Renewal
of the
Franco-
Swedish
alliance.

The treaty with France was renewed in April 1633; and Richelieu, as yet without open declaration of war against the Empire, went on to complete the conquest of Lorraine. A few days after the treaty with France, Oxenstierna brought to completion Gustavus's scheme of a German Protestant alliance under the direction of Sweden. On April 23, 1633, the League of Heilbronn was formed, consisting of the four German Circles of the south and west (Swabia, Franconia, and the Upper and Lower Rhine) and Sweden. The supreme direction was placed in the hands of Oxenstierna as representative of Sweden. The members of the Alliance pledged themselves to carry on the war for mutual support against the Edict of Restitution, and not to make any separate peace

League of
Heilbronn.

until religious liberty and the rights of the princes were secured. Sweden was to be reimbursed for her efforts on behalf of German Protestantism; and the Elector Palatine (that is the young Charles Louis, for his unhappy father Frederick had died shortly after the battle of Lützen) and the Dukes of Mecklenburg were to be restored. Later on the Alliance was joined by the Elector of Brandenburg, who realized that neutrality could not save him from Wallenstein, and by several smaller princes in Westphalia and Lower Saxony. The Swiss were also invited; but, although friendly both with the Swedes and with France, they were wise enough not to abandon their neutrality. The Elector of Saxony held aloof.

The Heilbronn Alliance maintained several armies in the field. By the terms of the treaty these were in the service of Sweden; but the troops were now mainly Germans, since the tiny population of the Scandinavian kingdom (about a million and a half) could fill only a small part of the terrible gaps created by battle and disease. The two chief commanders were Bernard of Weimar and Gustavus Horn, who were both worthy disciples of the Swedish king, but unable to maintain the high standard of discipline which he had set up. The awful expense of the war was already producing disastrous effects. Even before Lützen the pay of the army was in arrears, and although the recent French treaty brought a renewal of the subsidies, they were inadequate to make up the deficit. It was impossible therefore to prevent the soldiers from harrying and plundering after the fashion of their enemies; and for the future there was little to choose between the two sides.

Armies
of the
Alliance.

A serious conspiracy broke out among the officers of

Conspiracy in Bernard's army, June 1633. Bernard's army in the summer of 1633, which was only quelled by granting terms which practically admitted that the war was one of spoliation. While the Heilbronn Alliance advanced a month's pay to the officers and soldiers in lieu of arrears, the chief commanders were to be compensated for their expenses by grants of land, confiscated from the Empire, from which they could levy contributions to support the Alliance.

Bernard created Duke of Franconia.

Bernard himself, so far only a cadet of the ducal House of Saxony, was ambitious to gain the dignity of hereditary prince, which his great abilities and services certainly merited, and Oxenstierna, without any reference to the Estates of the Empire, created a new Duchy of Franconia in his favour out of the Bishoprics of Würzburg and Bamberg. Some such design had, it was asserted, been meditated by Gustavus, but it can hardly be doubted that he had intended only a temporary and defensive occupation of Catholic territories as a pledge for the restoration of excluded Protestants elsewhere. Bernard's duchy was to be permanent and hereditary, and it transferred Catholic subjects to the rule of a Protestant. Protestants were thus committed to aggression as bad in principle as that of the Edict of Restitution.

Campaigns in 1633.

The campaigns of 1633 were important. After the battle of Lützen, the Swedes, leaving the Saxons to recover Leipzig, dispersed their armies again all over Germany. In May 1633 they recaptured Heidelberg; and the Lower Palatinate, cleared once more of Catholics, gained a period of peace and began to recover its prosperity. During 1633 also, the Swedes drove the Bavarians from Swabia; they overran Westphalia; and they almost completely conquered Alsace. The Duke of Lorraine came to the aid of the Imperialists in Alsace and thus incurred afresh the vengeance of Richelieu.

Lorraine was occupied by a French army in August and September, and the capital Nancy surrendered. Duke Charles was dispossessed; Gaston of Orleans was induced to renounce his marriage with Margaret of Lorraine, and was reconciled to Louis XIII; Richelieu maintained his hold upon Lorraine and completely ignored the suzerainty of the Empire. The Electors of Mainz, Trier, and Cologne had now placed their territories under the protection of France. Further north the Dutch had captured Maestricht (1632) and Rheinberg (1633). Thus the Habsburgs were excluded from practically the whole line of the Rhine.

These events compelled the Spaniards to intervene more actively on behalf of the Imperial cause than they had done since the early years of the war. The Infanta Isabella, Governor of the Netherlands, died in November 1633, and Philip IV destined his youngest brother Ferdinand, Archbishop of Toledo and a Cardinal, and known as the Cardinal-Infante, to succeed her. The direct land route to the Netherlands was now completely blocked, and the Dutch commanded the sea. Therefore a force of 24,000 was ordered to be raised in Italy under the Duke of Feria and to pass through the Valtelline, in order to co-operate with the Imperialists in clearing a path through Alsace. This plan, as it will be seen, aroused the hostility of Wallenstein. It was a sign of the growing suspicion at Vienna as to the nature of that general's schemes.

Wallenstein, after the battle of Lützen, had retired into Bohemia, with prestige much impaired, although he confidently asserted that he had won a complete victory. His artillery was almost gone, and some months had to be spent in restoring the numbers and the efficiency of his troops. In spite of the deplorable opportunism and

Spain comes to the aid of the Empire.

§ 2. The fall of Wallenstein.

Wallenstein's plans.

duplicity that characterized his unceasing negotiations with both sides, so that at last no one could rely upon his sincerity, and in spite of the vanity and personal ambition, which were the ultimate sources of his ruin, he deserves the credit of being the one man at this time who discerned the only possible basis of a durable peace, and who was supremely anxious to accomplish it—with the Emperor's sanction if possible, but without it if necessary, and above all without any obnoxious dictation from Spain and the Jesuits. He desired to maintain the Empire intact against Swedes, French, Spaniards, or other foreigners, with his own personal authority as its indispensable bulwark. But he made the mistake of imagining that he could force his ideas upon the stubborn fanatic Ferdinand; and he fatally miscalculated the extent of his own sway over the army upon which alone his power depended.

His intrigues with Saxony and Brandenburg.

In the early months of 1633 he was busily negotiating with Saxony and Brandenburg, it being understood that they should in the meantime not be molested unless they assumed the aggressive. His objects seem to have been to detach the northern Electors from the Heilbronn Alliance, so that with Bohemia safe from attack in his rear he could invade Pomerania and Mecklenburg, cut the Swedes off from their base on the sea, recover his own duchy, and so dictate a satisfactory peace. The Emperor supported him thus far, and the negotiations were conducted with his full sanction. Ferdinand was prepared even to consider favourably the restoration of the son of the late Elector Palatine to a part of his father's dominion; but he rigidly refused to consider any concessions to his exiled Bohemian subjects.

On the Bohemian question Wallenstein's offers to the northern Electors undoubtedly went further than

Ferdinand had sanctioned. The Saxon and Swedish army in Silesia was largely officered by Bohemian exiles, with Count Thurn, the old revolutionist of 1618, at their head, and they were anxious to secure restoration to Bohemia with Wallenstein's aid. With this object they were scheming to elect him as their king, as they had done in the case of the Elector Palatine in 1619. Wallenstein, without committing himself, dallied with the offer, revealing nothing about it at Vienna. Since, however, the negotiations with Saxony hung fire on the Bohemian question, he reopened the war in Silesia in May. Soon afterwards arrived the news that Ferial's force from Italy was not merely to march through the Empire to the Netherlands, but was, in conjunction with the Bavarian force commanded by Aldringer, to operate in the Imperial interest in Alsace.

Proposals to make him King of Bohemia.

Two very important results followed. In the first place, Bernard of Weimar, at Oxenstierna's orders, reopened the campaign in Bavaria in order to divert Ferial from Alsace. His attack was brilliantly successful. The greatest triumph was the capture of Ratisbon on November 13. The Catholic clergy of the city were heavily fined and mostly expelled; the burghers organized themselves for defence; and the city was included in the Heilbronn Alliance. Ferial was successfully diverted from Alsace, but was kept from molesting Bernard's rear by a force under the command of Horn in Swabia.

Bernard of Weimar's triumphs in Bavaria.

In the second place, Wallenstein, since Ferial's independent command was an open violation of the terms of his appointment, became convinced that the Emperor, in league with Spain, intended to get rid of him; and he determined to forestall this design by enforcing a peace. He immediately protested against Ferial's intrusion

Wallenstein prepares to defy the Emperor.

Suspensions
of Oxen-
stierna and
Bernard.

in Germany; he made a truce with Arnim, the Saxon commander in Silesia (formerly, as we have seen, one of his own lieutenants); and he reopened his negotiations with Saxony and Brandenburg. It was probably at this time that he began to think seriously of accepting the Bohemian crown, in compensation for the loss of his Duchy of Mecklenburg. Oxenstierna and Bernard of Weimar were aware of the plan, and approved. But, suspecting his duplicity, they wisely insisted upon an open breach with Ferdinand as a preliminary to definite proposals—Bernard already expressing doubts whether the army would follow their general in open defiance of the Emperor. On this rebuff, Wallenstein turned to the Saxons and demanded that Arnim's force should join him in an attack upon the Swedes. But John George had again convinced himself that he alone was the destined dictator who was to impose the peace upon Germany, and broke off negotiations. Thereupon Wallenstein, ignoring urgent messages from Vienna which summoned him to the aid of Bavaria against Bernard, cleared the Saxons out of Silesia in October, and then invaded Brandenburg and Lusatia. Count Thurn was taken prisoner, and liberated without ransom, a definite sign that Wallenstein was thinking of the Bohemian crown. At last the repeated orders from Vienna could no longer be ignored without showing his hand; and in the middle of November, although professing to disbelieve the news of the fall of Ratisbon, Wallenstein marched southwards. But when the news was definitely confirmed, without an effort to recover the city or to fight Bernard, he turned back into Bohemia.

Ferdinand
is con-
vinced of
Wallen-
stein's
treachery

Such flagrant disobedience could not be condoned. The Emperor throughout the year had been pestered with accusations brought against his general by the

Jesuits, by Spain, by Maximilian, and others. They accumulated evidence of his treasonable intrigues (which they undoubtedly exaggerated), and complained loudly of his contempt both for religion and for his master's interests. Ferdinand, though irritated by his general's domineering behaviour, long hesitated to admit that he was a traitor. But the retreat from Ratisbon appeared to confirm every suspicion; and it happened also to coincide with a plan of his own for conferring a great command upon his son and namesake, Ferdinand, King of Hungary, which could be readily accomplished by Wallenstein's dismissal.

The tragedy, which has been immortalized in one of the noblest of German dramas,¹ was hastening to its climax. Two commissioners were dispatched from Vienna to Pilsen, where the general had his headquarters, bearing specific orders that he should recover Ratisbon and then winter in the enemy's territory, that is, in Franconia or Swabia, not in Bohemia. These orders were shortly afterwards followed by the insulting suggestion that he should send to the Spaniards, against whose presence in Germany he had vigorously protested, a reinforcement of 6,000 horse to assist them in clearing Alsace and the approaches to the Netherlands. On January 11, 1631, Wallenstein summoned a meeting of about fifty of his chief officers—some whose loyalty he doubted had already been dismissed—laid before them the Imperial demands, and threatened to resign. The officers were quick enough to perceive that his removal would mean the loss of those rewards which he had promised them, and urged him to remain. On the following day a paper pledging them to absolute fidelity

Wallenstein ordered to evacuate Bohemia.

The officers' oath.

¹ Schiller's *Piccolomini*.

to their general was drawn up, and during a drunken orgy was handed round and signed. According to one account, a clause saving their allegiance to the Emperor, which appeared in an earlier copy previously submitted to them, was now struck out by Wallenstein himself. Assured, as he thought, of his officers, he thereupon rejected the Imperial demands.

Wallenstein
deposed.

Messages quickly followed from Vienna deposing him from his command, denouncing the officers' resolution as a plot against the Emperor, and at last ordering his seizure dead or alive. Still trusting his army, he determined to resist, sent hastily to the Swedes for aid, and himself moved towards Eger in the west of Bohemia to be nearer Bernard's army. But it was in vain. Two of his lieutenants, Piccolomini, the brilliant cavalry leader who had nearly routed the Swedes at Lützen, and Gallas, were appointed Field-Marschals in his place; and nearly all the other officers, terrorized by threats of confiscation or bribed by offers of promotion, were openly or secretly preparing to abandon him. The garrison at Prague declared for the Emperor; and the main army, mustered outside the city on the historic White Hill, followed suit. Only two regiments remained on his side. On February 24 he entered Eger, the two faithful regiments encamping outside. On the following evening, at a banquet given by the commanders of the fortress, his three remaining friends were hacked to death; and some men from a body of dragoons which he had picked up on his way to Eger were dispatched to his private chamber, and murdered him as he was retiring to rest.

Deserted
by officers
and army.

Assassina-
tion of
Wallen-
stein at
Eger,
February
25, 1634.

§ 3. Nörd-
lingen.

The death of Wallenstein brought about a close co-operation between the Imperialists and the Spaniards. While they were completing their plans for the recovery

of Ratisbon and Bavaria, the Protestants gained some successes elsewhere. But the League of Heilbronn was only kept together by Oxenstierna with the utmost difficulty. The generals hampered one another's operations by individual jealousies; and the Elector of Brandenburg, incensed at Oxenstierna's refusal to betroth the young Queen of Sweden to his son Frederick William, the future 'Great Elector', broke off and joined Saxony.

The
Heilbronn
Alliance
dying.

The Imperialists commenced their advance from Bohemia into Bavaria in May, the way having been prepared by Bavarians, who recovered a passage across the Danube. They recaptured Ratisbon in July after seven assaults, Donauwörth soon afterwards, and then advanced against Nördlingen, the most important Protestant city in Swabia, into which Bernard had thrown a garrison. Bernard had joined forces with Horn at Augsburg, but had been too late to save Ratisbon. Nothing but a successful attack upon the main army of the Imperialists could now stop its victorious career. Bernard was anxious to attack immediately, while Horn preferred to wait for reinforcements from Alsace. The result of their dispute was disastrous. Their own reinforcements came too late, but the delay was just long enough to allow the Cardinal-Infante to join the Imperialists with 15,000 Spaniards. The battle was fought on September 5 and 6, 1634, and the Protestants, greatly outnumbered, suffered an overwhelming defeat. They lost 12,000 in killed, wounded, and prisoners, and the whole of their artillery, baggage, and stores. Both Bernard and Horn were taken prisoners, but the former managed to escape. Nördlingen surrendered to the victors on the following day. The campaign was brought to a triumphant conclusion by the occupation of the whole of Swabia and Franconia with the exception of a few fortresses; and

The Im-
perialists
recover
Bavaria.

Siege of
Nörd-
lingen.

Battle of
Nörd-
lingen.

the Cardinal-Infante then made his way safely to the Netherlands.

Results of
Nörd-
lingen.

The effects of the battle of Nördlingen were profound. The work of Gustavus Adolphus in South Germany was undone. Just as Breitenfeld had saved Protestantism in the north, so Nördlingen saved Catholicism in the south. It brought about the definite defection of the Saxon Elector, who was followed by nearly all the princes and cities, and it forced France to discard the thin veil which had covered her intrigues, and to intervene openly in Germany. Thus it closed the religious phase of the war, and initiated a purely political conflict between the House of Habsburg on the one side, and France, Sweden, and Holland on the other.

Close of
the epoch
of Re-
ligious
Wars.

§ 4. The
Peace of
Prague.

Saxony made peace with the Emperor by the Treaty of Prague in May 1635. The religious Peace of Augsburg was at last modified in favour of the Protestants, by terms which involved the virtual abandonment of the Edict of Restitution. A new date was selected for the settlement of disputes about ecclesiastical estates. All such property was to be held by those, whether Catholics or Protestants, who were in possession on November 12, 1627, and to remain in their hands for forty years, during which further disputes were to be settled by amicable arrangement. The Imperial Court was henceforth to be composed of equal numbers of Catholics and Protestants. All princes and Imperial cities were to be allowed to exercise the Lutheran religion, a privilege also granted to Silesia, but not to Bohemia or any of the other Austrian possessions, where Catholicism alone was to be tolerated. No definite concession was made to Calvinism, and it remained an open question how far Calvinists were to benefit by the peace; but since the Elector of Brandenburg was

offered the succession of Pomerania as a bribe to induce him to accede, the Emperor must have made up his mind to recognize tacitly, if not openly, the rights of the Calvinist princes to the exercise of their religion. Saxony retained Lusatia; and a few other territorial changes were made, which were of little importance since they were modified at the Peace of Westphalia. With the exception of Charles Louis of the Palatinate and a few others, amnesty was offered to all the princes and cities of the Empire who should accept the peace and join the Emperor and Saxony in expelling the foreign armies from Germany, and in recovering all territories conquered from Austria or her allies (including the Duke of Lorraine) since the landing of Gustavus. Thus a definite challenge was flung at France and Sweden, and the Peace of Prague initiated a fresh phase of the war. The terms were quickly accepted by nearly all the princes and the Imperial cities; the moribund League of Heilbronn crumbled to pieces, and was finally dissolved in September.

End of
Heilbronn
League.

France was in the meantime making gigantic preparations for the war. While the Imperialist successes in Bavaria before the battle of Nördlingen were diverting the Swedes from the Rhine, Oxenstierna had been induced to hand over the important fortress of Philippsburg on the right bank of that river, with the promise that Alsace should follow on certain conditions. A lively diplomatic duel between the two nations followed, in which Grotius, who was then acting as Swedish ambassador at Paris, took a prominent part. Oxenstierna would have made peace with the Emperor if satisfactory terms could have been gained for Sweden, but his proposals were ignored at Vienna, and he was driven into the arms of France. By the Treaty of Compiègne,

§ 5.
France
takes the
lead
against the
Habsburgs.

Treaty
between
France and
Sweden.

in April 1635, an offensive and defensive alliance was concluded against the two branches of the House of Habsburg. Sweden was to receive French subsidies, and was promised the restoration of her conquests on the Rhine, which (including Philippsburg) had been rapidly falling to the Imperialists. By the aid of French diplomacy also, the truce between Sweden and Poland was prolonged for another twenty-five years.

France
declares
war upon
Spain.

In March the Cardinal-Infante had made a raid into Trier, and had carried off the Archbishop-Elector, who was a protégé of France, a prisoner to the Netherlands. This was answered by the formal declaration of war against Spain in May, eleven days before the conclusion of the Peace of Prague. In February, Richelieu had

Franco-
Dutch
treaty.

concluded a treaty with the Dutch for the conquest and partition of the Spanish Netherlands; and the united Franco-Dutch forces were placed under the command of

Italian
alliances.

Frederick Henry, Prince of Orange. In July he made another league with the Dukes of Savoy, Parma, and Mantua for the conquest of Milan; and this was followed by the occupation of the Valtelline, by a French force under the Duke of Rohan, with the approval of the

Treaty
with
Bernard.

Grisons. By a separate treaty in October, Bernard of Weimar was taken into French pay, and agreed to maintain an army in Germany with the promise of Alsace as his reward. In this, however, as in the Swedish treaty, Richelieu insisted upon full recognition of the rights of Catholics in the lands which should be conquered from the enemy.

Causes
of the
French
failures.

In the campaigns of 1635, in addition to the forces of her allies, France had four separate armies in the field amounting in all to 132,000 men. But for the first three years everything went wrong. The operations were hampered by the divergent aims of the allies. The

French armies were inexperienced in war, and as yet they had no commander of great ability. Richelieu was always unwilling to grant his generals the independent control essential to success, and he increased their difficulties by attempting to direct the whole war from Paris.

In North Germany the Swedes were at first successful. Baner and Torstensson, two of the ablest of Gustavus's lieutenants, defeated the Saxons and Imperialists at Wittstock in October 1636, but in the following year they were driven out of Pomerania, and the Imperialists once more stood on the shores of the Baltic. The Italian campaign was an utter failure, in spite of one success over the Spaniards on the Ticino in 1636. In 1637 the deaths of the Dukes of Savoy and Mantua broke up the league, and the Duke of Parma made peace with the Emperor. Ferdinand also won over the Grisons by offering, for once in his life, better terms to the Protestants than his enemies, and Rohan was forced to evacuate the Valtelline. The campaign on the Rhine was a succession of disasters; by the end of 1637 the French had completely lost control of the middle Rhine and of Alsace. In the Spanish Netherlands Richelieu and Frederick Henry had been counting upon the aid of an insurrection of the Flemish populace, who were seething with discontent under the strict rule of the Cardinal-Infante after their practical autonomy under the late Infanta Isabella. But the invasion only revived the patriotism of the Flemings and their old animosity against the Dutch. The allies failed to co-operate and the campaign was another complete failure. Frederick Henry withdrew to besiege Breda, which he ultimately recovered in October 1637; and the Cardinal-Infante was able to turn the tables on his enemies by an invasion of Picardy in the midsummer of 1636, while Charles of

Battle of
Wittstock.

Failure in
Italy,—

on the
Rhine,—

in the
Nether-
lands.

Dutch
recover
Breda.
France
invaded.

Lorraine made a simultaneous attack upon French Burgundy. The Spaniards crossed the Somme and advanced as far as the Oise. Paris was in a state of panic, and the court removed to Orleans. But France responded nobly to the appeals of Richelieu. Money and volunteers poured in. Paris was put in a state of defence under the Huguenot La Force, and a fresh army was rapidly mustered to repel the invader. The Cardinal-Infante, menaced by another Dutch invasion of the Netherlands, withdrew. In September Louis XIII took the field in person, and by October the north boundary was again secure. The invasion of Burgundy was also repelled at the same time.

Invasions
repulsed.

Revolts
in France.

The foreign invasion gave a fresh opportunity to Richelieu's domestic enemies. Gaston of Orleans and the Count of Soissons hatched a plot to assassinate him; but on the withdrawal of the Spaniards, their courage failed them, and they fled. A serious revolt of the peasants of Guienne against the tax-gatherers had also to be stamped out by a royal force.

Death of
Ferdinand
II.

In the meantime, the Emperor, whose fanaticism had brought eighteen years of incessant bloodshed and desolation upon his country, died at Vienna in February 1637, having just before secured the long-desired election of the King of Hungary as King of the Romans. Ferdinand III was a man of less ability than his father, and, though as devout a Catholic, was more inclined to tolerance and peace. From this time, Pope Urban VIII and the King of Denmark made constant efforts to bring the war to an end. But the determination of Richelieu to retrieve his failures, to recover Alsace, and to humble the Habsburgs beyond hope of recovery, made their efforts fruitless.

Efforts for
peace.

The year 1638 was the turning-point of the war. The

French armies were gaining experience, and the great captains, Turenne, Enghien (better known as the Great Condé), Harcourt, and many others, who in the next reign were to raise the military prestige of France to a level hitherto unapproached, were rising into prominence. The birth of a Dauphin to Louis XIII, after more than twenty years of fruitless marriage, strengthened the hands of the minister at home. It reduced his princely antagonists to impotence, and enabled him to devote more undivided attention to the foreign war. From that time the Imperialist cause went steadily downhill.

Bernard of Weimar, who hitherto had not been very strongly supported, won a series of brilliant successes which assured the conquest of Alsace, and which culminated in the capture of Breisach, a great fortress on the right bank of the Rhine, in December 1638. He refused to hold Alsace under French suzerainty, declaring that he would not be the first to partition the Empire; but on his untimely death in the following July at the age of thirty-six, Richelieu reaped the fruit of his victories. His German officers and soldiers accepted the Cardinal's bribes. A French general was placed in command of his army, a French garrison was placed in Breisach, and the conquest of Alsace was soon completed.

On the sea, likewise, France and her allies were victorious. The Spanish minister, Olivares, had been as active as Richelieu in repairing his predecessor's neglect of the navy, and for the first three years from 1635 the Spanish fleet had maintained control of the sea against France. But the French won two victories in 1638, one in the Bay of Biscay, and the other in the Mediterranean off Genoa; while in 1639 the Dutch, under Van Tromp, in the battle of the Downs, inflicted the severest naval disaster upon Spain which she had suffered since the

French
successes
from 1638.

Conquest
of Alsace.

Death of
Bernard of
Weimar,
1639.

Naval
victories.

Battle of
the Downs,
1639.

defeat of the 'Invincible' Armada. These victories effectually cut off Spain from communication with Italy and the Netherlands, and restored the predominance of her enemies in those countries.

Spaniards
driven
out of
Piedmont.

In Savoy, Christina, the widow of Victor Amadeus, was left as regent for her two infant sons. Although she was the sister of Louis XIII, she was anxious to prevent Savoy from becoming a mere satellite of France. But the opposition of the two brothers of the late duke, Thomas and Maurice, who disputed her claims to the regency, and, with the aid of the Spaniards from Milan, drove her out of Piedmont, threw her upon French support. Harcourt was dispatched by Richelieu to her aid. He recovered Turin in September 1640, and by the end of 1641 had driven the Spaniards completely out of Piedmont. In the following year, Thomas and Maurice abandoned Spain, and joined their sister-in-law.

§ 6. Re-
volts of
Catalonia
and
Portugal.

Repressive
policy of
Olivares.

Within her own boundaries, at the same time, Spain, already distracted and impoverished by the ambitious foreign policy of Philip IV and Olivares, suffered overwhelming disaster by the revolts of Catalonia and Portugal in 1640. Olivares, perceiving that the strength of France was due to the power of the crown, had attempted to imitate the policy of Richelieu by stamping out independence in Spain. But the conditions in the peninsula were very different. Though no absolute distinction can be drawn, the opposition in France came mainly from classes, while in Spain it was due to the survival of the national antagonism of Aragon, Navarre, and Portugal to the predominance of Castile, dating from the time when they had all been separate kingdoms. Catalonia was a part of the Kingdom of Aragon, and it included the Counties of Roussillon and Barcelona, in both of which some very important local privileges survived.

In 1638 Richelieu had sent an expedition to invade Spain at the western extremity of the Pyrenees, but it failed badly. In 1639 he repeated the attempt at the east, in Spanish Roussillon, hoping to receive aid from the discontented Catalans. But provincial patriotism was stirred by foreign invasion; Catalonia, without aid from without, heroically defended itself, and the French were driven across the boundary. Thereupon Olivares, in callous disregard of its ancient privileges, quartered upon the province a Castilian army which had been summoned, though too late to be of any assistance, to take the field against the French. The opportunity was taken to stamp out real or imaginary disaffection, and the troops, who were as usual unpaid, treated Catalonia like a conquered country. In May 1640, rebellion flared out in Barcelona, the capital, and quickly spread throughout the province. The royal garrison and the Castilian soldiers, wherever they could be caught, were massacred. A fresh Castilian army overran the province, but was destroyed before the walls of Barcelona. The Catalans offered their allegiance to Louis XIII, which was eagerly accepted, and French armies achieved their deliverance. In 1642, Louis XIII in person, in the last of his invariably successful, though never very formidable campaigns, completed the second and final conquest of Roussillon for France.

French
fail in
Spain.

Suppres-
sion of
Catalan
privileges

Rebellion
in Cata-
lonia.

Louis
XIII con-
quers Rous-
sillon.

Portugal, which was oppressed and heavily taxed in purely Spanish interests, would have rebelled before this but for the lethargy of the Duke of Braganza, the chief representative of the old royal line. A strong national party had organized itself, and was ready to declare for independence. While the Catalan revolt was draining the energies of Castile, Olivares made despairing efforts to win Braganza by cajolery and bribes. The

Portuguese
independ-
ence.

ports of Portugal were put in his hands, and a sum of money was sent to him with which to raise forces for their defence. The opportunity was too good to be missed. Braganza hung back, but he was forced to action by his ambitious wife, who, though a Spaniard and a relative of Olivares, was the chief inspirer of the conspiracy. On December 1, 1640, the palace of Lisbon was surprised. Braganza was proclaimed as King John IV, and Spain was powerless to resist. After suffering under the dominion of Spain for sixty years, Portugal thus in a few days recovered her independence, which she has retained ever since. These disasters led immediately to the fall of Olivares. In January 1643, Philip IV, yielding to the clamorous appeals of the queen and his other numerous enemies, expelled him from the court. His humiliation drove him out of his mind, and two years later he died in poverty and obscurity.

John IV of
Portugal.

Fall of
Olivares.

§ 7. Death
of Riche-
lieu, and
the minis-
try of
Mazarin.

The
Great
Elector.

Battles of
Wolfen-
büttel, and
Kempten.

In Germany, meanwhile, in spite of continued efforts for peace, and in spite of a general Diet which met at Ratisbon in 1640, the war raged with varying result. The Elector of Brandenburg died in December 1640, and was succeeded by his son Frederick William, known afterwards as the 'Great Elector'; who, anxious to clear his sorely harassed territories from foreign troops, hastened to make a truce with the Swedes on terms afterwards confirmed at the Peace of Westphalia. Banér died in May 1641, and the leadership of the Swedish force was left to Torstensson, the great artillery commander of Gustavus Adolphus, and the last of the prominent generals of the war who had been trained by him. The French general Guébriant won a victory at Wolfenbüttel in Brunswick in June 1641; but on the whole the war went in favour of the Imperialists in that year. In January 1642, Guébriant won another victory

at Kempten. Torstensson overran Silesia and Moravia, and threw Vienna into a panic; and then, retiring before superior forces into Saxony, at the second battle of Breitenfeld, in November, inflicted a crushing defeat upon the pursuing Imperialist army.

Second
battle of
Breiten-
feld.

The news of this crowning triumph reached Richelieu as he lay on his death-bed. In the closing months of his life he had to deal with two more conspiracies. The first was hatched in 1641 by Soissons, the rebel of 1636. He was aided by Bouillon, the governor of Sedan, whither Soissons had fled after his former rebellion, by the young Duke of Guise, and by Charles of Lorraine, who, though he had recently made peace with Richelieu and been restored to his duchy, turned traitor again. The rebels, aided by an Imperialist force, invaded France, and routed the army sent against them. But in the moment of victory a chance bullet killed Soissons, and the rebellion collapsed. Guise fled to Brussels. Charles IV was once more deprived of his duchy, but Bouillon submitted, and was pardoned. One of the accomplices of the rebellion was a young noble, Cinq-Mars, who had risen to favour with Louis under the patronage of Richelieu, but had become infatuated by success, and presumed to regard his former patron as his rival. In 1642 he plotted with Gaston of Orleans to assassinate Richelieu, but the Cardinal's spies immediately revealed the whole conspiracy. The ignominious Gaston again saved his own life by turning informer against his accomplices, but he was stripped of all his offices and honours and dismissed into private life. Cinq-Mars and a fellow-conspirator were executed on September 12. Bouillon, though equally implicated, was again pardoned on surrendering Sedan to the crown of France. Three months later, on December 4, the great Cardinal died. His last request to the king

Rebellion
of Soissons,
&c.

Con-
spiracy of
Cinq-Mars.

Deaths of
Richelieu
and Louis
XIII.

was for the appointment of Mazarin as his successor. Louis XIII quickly followed his minister to the grave, dying on May 14, 1643.

Mazarin.

Mazarin was a Sicilian by birth, of humble origin, educated in Rome and Spain. After a brief career as a soldier, he had entered the service of the Court of Rome; and his diplomatic skill in negotiating the treaties of Cherasco, which closed the Mantuan war, attracted Richelieu's notice. In 1639 he entered the service of France, was naturalized, and became a Cardinal in 1641. On the death of Richelieu, seeing that the health of Louis XIII was failing, and that a long minority was inevitable, he set himself to win the queen's favour and was completely successful. In the brief interval before Louis XIII's death, a general amnesty was granted. The enemies of Richelieu were liberated from prison or returned from exile; among them Gaston of Orleans, who was soon afterwards reunited to his wife, Margaret of Lorraine. Louis XIII's plans for the regency, which would have limited his wife's authority, were immediately upset on his death, with the sanction of the *Parlement* of Paris, which was only too glad to have its authority recognized again. The queen-mother, Anne of Austria, was declared Regent, and she nominated Mazarin as her chief minister. The Dukes of Orleans and Condé were associated in the government.

The *Parlement* recovers its privileges.

Enghien (Condé).

Battle of Rocroi.

A great military triumph immediately covered the new ministry with glory, and at the same time revealed the genius of a new commander. The Spaniards had invaded France from the Netherlands and were besieging Rocroi on the frontier of Picardy. The young Duke of Enghien, son of Condé, was sent to relieve it. Urged by his lieutenant, the veteran Gassion, who had fought under Gustavus at Breitenfeld, and who had learnt there

how easily the solid formation of the Spaniards could be broken by rapid movements, he rejected the more cautious advice of the other generals and risked a general engagement against superior numbers. In a terrible two-days' battle, May 18 and 19, the Spanish army was cut to pieces, and the safety of the northern frontier was secured.

This was followed by the capture of Thionville in Luxembourg, and in the following year Enghien was sent to serve under Gaston of Orleans in Flanders. Just before the fall of Gravelines, which the French, aided by the Dutch fleet, captured in July, he was detached to the aid of his still more brilliant colleague, Turenne.

Thionville
captured.

Gravelines
captured.

The Viscount of Turenne, the greatest strategist of his age, was a younger brother of the Duke of Bouillon. He had recently commanded in Piedmont, and on the death of Guébriant, at the end of 1643, he was appointed to succeed him in Alsace. With the weak, ill-furnished, and half-mutinous army which he found there he could at first do little; and the Imperialists captured Freiburg on the other side of the Rhine. In the summer of 1644 he was reinforced by Enghien with 10,000 fresh troops. The most awful series of conflicts of the whole war was fought among the vineyards outside Freiburg on August 3, 5, and 9. Both sides suffered terribly, but the Imperialists were eventually forced to retreat owing to failure of provisions. Then the French made an orderly march down the Rhine. Philippsburg, Worms, Mainz, and other places fell in rapid succession; and by the end of September the whole left bank of the Rhine from Breisach to Coblenz was in their possession.

Battles of
Freiburg.

French
hold the
Rhine.

In the meantime, Danish animosity against the Swedes had dragged Christian IV again into war. Before he was ready to move, however, Oxenstierna anticipated his attack by ordering Torstensson to invade Denmark. By

§ 8. Con-
cluding
events of
the War.

Danish
disaster.

Battle of
Jankau.

Retirement
of Torstenson.

January 1644 the whole of the Jutland peninsula was overrun; and the Swedes, aided by the Dutch fleet, were preparing to attack Copenhagen, when, in the autumn, Torstensson was diverted by the approach of a relieving Imperialist force from the south. He drove the latter back into Bohemia, and in the next year burst into that kingdom, and, by means of his vastly superior artillery, won a crushing victory at Jankau in March. He then went on to threaten Vienna, but was himself forced to retreat again in September. This was Torstensson's last campaign. Overcome by bodily infirmities he resigned his command to Wrangel at the end of 1645.

Treaty of
Brömsebro.

The end of the weary conflict was at length in sight. The aged Christian IV, though fighting with great heroism on land and sea, suffered fresh disasters, and had to make the humiliating Peace of Brömsebro in August 1645. This treaty is a notable landmark in the advance of Sweden. She gained the province of Halland for thirty years (which was only a polite way of saying for ever), the Baltic islands Gothland and Oesel, a slice of Norway, and freedom from the tolls of the Sound for all her Baltic provinces. About the same time Saxony imitated the example of Brandenburg and made a truce with the Swedes, who were thus left supreme in North Germany.

Second
battle of
Nördlingen.

In August 1645, Enghien and Turenne won the second battle of Nördlingen, at which Mercy, the best of the remaining generals of the Empire, was killed. Enghien was then dispatched to finish off the campaign in Flanders; and Turenne to reduce Bavaria, which had been free from foreign armies since the retreat of Bernard of Weimar in 1634. Enghien captured Dunkirk in October 1646; and shortly after his succession to the title of Prince of Condé by the death of his father, he beat the Spaniards at Lens in August 1648.

Dunkirk
and Lens.

Some time previously the Dutch had withdrawn. France was useful to them as an ally, but far too powerful to be a safe neighbour, and they were alarmed at the prospect of the whole of the Spanish Netherlands falling into her power. Though their fleet, under Van Tromp, co-operated in the siege of Dunkirk, the army under Frederick Henry had for some time been acting quite independently of the French. Then the news leaked out that Mazarin was offering to abandon Catalonia, upon which his armies were already losing their hold, if Philip IV would cede the Netherlands to France. Frederick Henry thereupon hastened the negotiations for a separate peace with Spain. It was practically completed before his death in March 1647, although not confirmed until the Treaty of Münster in January 1648. The independence of the Seven United Provinces as sovereign states was formally recognized; and they retained all that was in their possession, including their vast colonial acquisitions in both hemispheres at the expense of Spain and Portugal.

Holland
makes
peace with
Spain.

Death of
Frederick
Henry.
Treaty of
Münster.

In July 1646, Turenne, in conjunction with the Swedes under Wrangel, invaded and devastated Bavaria, and forced the Elector to conclude a separate truce at Ulm in March 1647. But the greater part of the Bavarian army refused to observe the truce and joined the Emperor, and Maximilian himself, shamed by Ferdinand's reproaches for his desertion, determined to make a last effort to resist the French. Turenne, who had retired to Alsace, joined Wrangel again and marched eastwards. At Zusmarshausen in Swabia, the last pitched battle of the war in Germany was fought on May 17, 1648, and the Bavarian and Imperial forces were overwhelmed. Bavaria was then devastated with ferocity greater than that of the year before. A detachment of the Swedes penetrated

Bavaria
devastated.

Battle of
Zusmars-
hausen.

into Bohemia, attacked Prague, and had captured half of the city, when the news arrived early in November that peace had been concluded in October. Thus the Thirty Years' War ended, as it had begun, at the Bohemian capital.

§ 9. The
Peace of
West-
phalia.

It is unnecessary to trace the course of the protracted negotiations which had been going on for more than four years at Münster and Osnabrück. The result was the Peace of Westphalia signed on October 24, 1648, which registered the unalterable facts of the war.

French
gains.

France retained her conquests in Alsace, together with Breisach on the right bank of the Rhine; but without the Imperial city Strassburg, ten other cities and some territories which were direct fiefs of the Empire. Her possession of the three Lorraine bishoprics, Metz, Toul, and Verdun, which she had effectively held for nearly a century, was also formally recognized. These conquests were definitely incorporated in the domain of France and separated from the Empire. France was also allowed to place a limited garrison in Philippsburg, which remained in the possession of the Bishopric of Speier; while her protégé, the exiled Archbishop of Trier, was restored to his possessions and dignities.

Bavarian
gains.

Switzerland and the United Provinces, which had long been practically independent, were likewise formally separated from the Empire. Within Germany, thus diminished, the Upper Palatinate was united to Bavaria, and the electoral vote was confirmed to Maximilian and his heirs. The Lower Palatinate was restored to Charles Louis, the son of Frederick V, and an eighth Electorate was created in his favour in partial compensation for his losses.

The eighth
Electorate.

Swedish
gains.

Sweden gained the Archbishopric of Bremen, the Bishopric of Verden, and the western part of Pomerania,

including the town of Stettin, a slice of territory on the right bank of the Oder, and the islands of Rügen, Usedom, and Wollin at its mouth; and thus she retained her command of the mouths of the Weser, Elbe, and Oder. She also retained the port of Wismar and its vicinity in Mecklenburg; the rest of Mecklenburg being restored to its dukes. These possessions made Sweden a member of the Empire, with the right to a seat and vote in the Diet.

The rest of Pomerania went to the Elector of Brandenburg; and in compensation for the surrender of his claims on the whole, he received the bishoprics of Halberstadt, Camin, Minden, and the greater part of the diocese of Magdeburg. His possession of Cleves, Mark, and Ravensberg, the Brandenburg share of the Cleves-Jülich inheritance, was also recognized. Saxony gained a small part of the diocese of Magdeburg and retained Lusatia.

Brandenburg gains.

Saxon gains.

The religious difficulties were settled in a manner which, while it ignored as callously as ever the rights of the private citizen, left no grounds for further conflicts among the princes. Calvinism was admitted as one of the legalized religions of the Empire. Both Lutherans and Calvinists were declared free from the jurisdiction of the Pope or any Catholic prelate whatsoever. A new date, January 1, 1624, was accepted as a test by which disputes over Church property were to be settled. All ecclesiastical foundations were to remain in the undisturbed possession of whichever faith held them at that date, and if any of their holders should change their religion, their title was to be *ipso facto* void. Thus the changes introduced both by the Edict of Restitution and by the Swedish conquests in the south were cancelled for ever. Any question in dispute brought before the Diet was to be settled, not by a vote of the whole assembly

The religious settlement.

(since the Catholics were still in the majority), but by an amicable arrangement between the Protestants and Catholics, divided for the purpose into two separate parties. The Imperial Court was to be composed of equal numbers of Protestants and Catholics. The rights of the princes to impose their own religion upon their subjects, and to exile dissentients, were again explicitly recognized. Later on, however, the Lutherans and the Calvinists made a separate agreement, by which existing adherents of either confession were to be allowed to remain in the territories of princes belonging to the other.

Imperial
powers
reduced.

The political jurisdiction of the Emperor was reduced to a shadow. The Diet was to have the right of deliberating and voting upon all questions affecting the Empire, whether of making war, or peace, or alliances, or the levying of tribute. Each of the component states was to have power of making treaties and alliances on its own behalf, provided (a merely formal concession) that such alliances should not be against the Emperor or contrary to the public peace. Both the Imperial Court and the Aulic Council were restricted so as to be practically impotent in Imperial concerns.

§ 10.
Effects of
the Thirty
Years' War upon
Germany.
Religion.

The Peace of Westphalia marks the close of an epoch for Germany. The territorial limits of the two religions were finally fixed. The chief inducement to conversions in high places was removed by the effective prohibition of the further secularization of ecclesiastical property, and by the equally effective prohibition of further restitution. Except for the belated agreement between the Lutherans and Calvinists, the principle of toleration made no advance. The right of the individual princes to settle the faith of their own subjects was established more firmly than ever.

The Holy Roman Empire as a political force ceased to exist. Whatever little reality there had been left in it after the Reformation had been swept away in a torrent of blood. The Emperor outside his immediate dominions became a mere functionary with the right of granting titles and of confirming tolls. The authority of the Imperial Court and of the Aulic Council was reduced to a shadow. The apparently increased powers conferred upon the Diet were deliberately designed as an obstacle to the revival of Imperial power, and as a permanent guarantee of princely independence. Besides Sweden, Bavaria and most of the Rhenish states became the firm allies of France, and utilized their votes to resist any concerted action against the most formidable enemy of the Empire. On the death of Ferdinand III in 1658 half the Electoral College was in favour of electing Louis XIV of France as Emperor. Sessions of the Diet were wasted in protracted and frivolous discussions which brought the assembly into contempt.

The Empire practically extinguished.

The princes of Germany came out of the war triumphant at the expense of Empire and people alike. The nation was cut up into three hundred independent principalities, each with its own court, its diplomatic service, its army, its laws and tribunals, its separate system of coinage and of tolls, and custom houses. The local Estates lost all authority and generally ceased to meet. The princes had no notion of a German patriotism. They made their own wars and alliances, and hired themselves and their subjects to foreign powers. Most of these conditions were indeed in existence long before ; but, as we have seen, one or two great men in the past had aspired, and not without some prospect of success, to found a greater Germany, which, if not politically free as we understand freedom to-day, would at least have

The Princes become independent despots.

gained unity and the inestimable blessing of religious toleration. But the Peace of Westphalia, in formally legalizing the authority of the princes, raised an impassable barrier to all such aspirations. A long period of moral and intellectual stagnation followed in Germany, and the ideas of liberty and of nationality lay dormant for more than a century and a half.

Loss of
life.

It was thus in the interests of Sweden, of France, and of three hundred petty despots within her own boundaries, that Germany had passed through thirty years of indescribable suffering. It has been estimated that in those years two-thirds of the total population had perished by the sword, famine, or pestilence. In Bohemia, out of 35,000 villages, hardly more than 6,000 were left standing. In the Lower Palatinate, only

Degenera-
tion of the
populace.

one-tenth of the population survived. A new generation of serfs and vagabonds had grown up, debauched by the incessant butchery and spoliation of the war, and ignorant of the arts of industry and agriculture, German commerce passed under the control of foreigners.

Ruin of
industry
and agri-
culture.

Many prosperous towns were reduced to beggary, though their sufferings were far less than those of the unprotected peasantry. Vast agricultural districts were completely depopulated, and what had been fruitful fields became

Lasting
effects.

desolate wastes infested by beasts of prey. The material ruin wrought by the war was said to be still perceptible until the latter half of the nineteenth century, when at last, under the stimulus of a new national unity, Germany entered upon her present amazing career of industrial development. The political effects are partly visible even to-day in the separation of Austrians from the rest of the German people.

CHAPTER VII .

FROM WESTPHALIA TO THE DEATH OF MAZARIN

1. Continuance of the war between France and Spain. 2. Causes of the Fronde. 3. The Old (or parliamentary) Fronde. 4. The New (or aristocratic) Fronde. 5. Conclusion of the Franco-Spanish war. 6. Peace of the Pyrenees. 7. Holland after the Peace of Münster. 8. Christina of Sweden. 9. Charles X of Sweden. 10. The Great Elector. 11. General war in the North, 1655-60. 12. Settlement of the Baltic.

THE thirteen years following the Peace of Westphalia fall between two great epochs, in each of which one dominating interest gives comparative unity to European history—in the former the Thirty Years' War, and in the latter the personal ascendancy of Louis XIV. The purpose of the present chapter is to review the principal developments in these intervening years.

§ 1. Continuance of the war between France and Spain.

The victories of Turenne and Condé enabled Mazarin to withdraw from the German war in triumph. But Spain refused to make peace. She had claims of her own upon Alsace, the control of which was vital to her as a link with Flanders. The French were losing their hold upon Catalonia; and Spain, in spite of a serious revolt in Naples in 1647, had successfully resisted their attacks in Italy. Philip IV, therefore, freed at last from the Dutch war, and encouraged by the increasing animosity against Mazarin's government in France, determined to continue the struggle. In this war the issue was for some time doubtful, chiefly because the

energies of France were paralysed by the rebellion known as the Fronde, which broke out before the Peace of Westphalia was signed, and which was a fortuitous combination of the *Parlement* of Paris, the nobility, and the mob of the capital masquerading as a constitutional movement, in opposition to Mazarin.

§ 2. Causes
of the
Fronde.
Mazarin's
govern-
ment.

Mazarin, though as skilled and as successful a diplomatist as his master Richelieu, was a man of a very different stamp. He was a true Italian in his subtlety and love of intrigue, but he possessed none of Richelieu's intrepidity, decision, and force of character. Consequently, in face of opposition at home, he intrigued and hesitated, alternately stern and yielding, where his predecessor would have acted with relentless severity. Still, it may be doubted whether Richelieu, placed in Mazarin's situation, would have been more successful. He had been able to rely throughout upon the steady support of the king, whose authority was undoubted. Mazarin succeeded to a heritage of accumulated animosity against ministerial irresponsibility, and to a disorganized and bankrupt treasury. His Italian origin made him unpopular from the first, and he had to depend upon the more questionable authority of the queen-regent; who, in order to buy support, distributed money and honours so recklessly that Mazarin had to appeal to her not to make her son dependent upon his subjects.

In the first year of the new government, there were serious risings in the provinces against the oppressive taxation; and there was a sort of prelude to the Fronde in an obscure conspiracy against Mazarin, organized by a party of courtiers whose exaggerated notion of their own consequence was satirized in the nick-name which they gained — *Les Importants*. They were headed by the Duke of Beaufort (a grandson of Henry IV by one of his irregular

*Les Im-
portants.*

alliances), and were mainly composed of people who had befriended Anne of Austria in the days of her humiliation during her husband's lifetime, and who now in the time of her prosperity expected to be rewarded with places in the government. But Mazarin easily dissolved the intrigue, and Beaufort was arrested and imprisoned. By the end of 1644, strengthened by victory abroad, the regency had triumphed over its early difficulties at home. Mazarin steadily advanced in the queen's favour, and their relations became so intimate that it was said that they were secretly married—an assertion which, though not improbable, lacks definite confirmation.

Discontent, however, was steadily rising. The Princes of the Blood discovered that their position upon the Council of State was a delusion, and that all real power was exercised by the queen and her favourite—the one despised as a woman, and the other hated as a foreigner and an upstart. The rest of the nobles looked for any opportunity to recover their confiscated privileges; the *Parlement* of Paris, especially stirred just then by the great deeds of its English namesake, was eager to pose as the constitutional champion of the nation; while the provincial *Parlements* and Estates, and municipalities, were equally anxious to recover their liberties. Above all, the whole nation was groaning under the intolerable burden of taxation produced by the wars; and it was perhaps inevitable that the immediate cause of the outbreak should be on a question of money, which is the root of all evil and of all rebellions.

Mazarin, like Richelieu, made no attempt to cure the shockingly disorganized and wasteful condition of the treasury. His financial agent Emery displayed endless ingenuity in discovering fresh methods of extortion. Like Attorney-General Noy under Charles I, he revived

General
discontent.

Emery's
bad
finance.

some obsolete imposts; and in addition he mortgaged the future revenue of the country more recklessly than any of the bad financiers who preceded him. Two hundred more useless offices were created and sold for cash; and a sum of 12,000,000 *livres* was borrowed at 25 per cent. In 1647 a particularly heavy *octroi* or tariff upon goods entering the city was imposed upon Paris, causing very great distress, and the *Parlement* took up the struggle and protested against the edict.

Gondi
(de Retz).

The opposition was inflamed by the arts of the man who was then Mazarin's most dangerous enemy, Paul de Gondi, better known by his later title of Cardinal de Retz, and remembered to-day principally because of his *Memoirs*, which are among the most brilliant in French literature. Gondi was one of the many adventurers who had expected to succeed to the ministry on the death of Richelieu; and he had also attempted to rival Mazarin in the personal affections of Anne of Austria. The queen had rebuffed his presumption in both cases, but in order to forestall his antagonism and to buy his support to the new ministry, she had made him Coadjutor to his uncle the Archbishop of Paris, an office which gave the right of succession to the see and a seat in the *Parlement*. His hatred of Mazarin, however, was unappeased, and his efforts to upset the minister were unceasing. Gondi, although utterly unscrupulous, profligate, and unreliable, and a faction leader by deliberate and avowed choice, was yet a man of almost irresistible personal charm. He had already gained complete ascendancy over the populace of Paris by an ostentatious display of almsgiving, and had won the affection of the parish clergy of the city. He also gained the support of the Jansenists, of the younger and more energetic members of the *Parlement*, and of many of the nobles.

The opportunity came in 1648. Mazarin was then in § 3. The desperate straits for money, and sought to wring con- Old concessions from the *Parlement* by threatening to suspend Fronde. the *Paulette*. This was a regulation introduced by The *Paulette*. Henry IV's minister Sully, and renewable every nine years, by which members of the *Parlement* and other closely-allied sovereign corporations were allowed to make their offices hereditary on payment of one-sixtieth of the annual income. The period expired in January 1648; and Mazarin demanded four years' income from the officials concerned, as the price of the renewal of the privilege. It is said that between 40,000 and 50,000 families in France were affected by this measure, which, if it could have been carried, would have been a salutary reform.

It was in vain that Mazarin attempted to allay the The opposition, which was at once aroused, by exempting Chamber of Saint-Louis. the members of the *Parlement*, and applying the measure only to the other corporations. The whole bulwark of hereditary official privilege was menaced. The *Parlement* took up the cause of the other corporations, and deputies from all of them were appointed to meet in the Chamber of Saint-Louis in May. The government at first annulled this self-constituted body, and exiled or imprisoned its leading members; but some ominous events forced it to give way. Gondi stirred up the Paris mob in support of the *Parlement*, Orleans joined the opposition, Beaufort escaped from prison, the Spaniards captured Courtrai, and the provinces were breaking out into rebellion. The Chamber was allowed to resume its Reforms sessions, and by July had agreed upon its proposals for demanded. reform. The *Parlement* claimed for itself full control over fresh taxation, and over the creation of new offices; also the abolition of arbitrary imprisonment, the dismissal

of the intendants, the remission of one quarter of the *taille*, and of all arrears incurred in the past year, the abolition of all trade monopolies, and an investigation into the extortions of the tax-farmers.

Influence
of the
Puritan
Revolution.

In all this one can see the profound effect of the contemporary events across the channel. Had France, like England, possessed a representative body, able and fit to lead the nation, these reforms might have initiated an era of constitutional government. But the *Parlement* of Paris had nothing except its name in common with the English Parliament. It was simply a narrow legal oligarchy; it had no wide political or administrative experience; and no man of real ability such as Eliot, Wentworth, Hampden, Pym, or Cromwell to guide it. The States-General had passed into oblivion. The nobles' support of the *Parlement* was purely factious. The turbulence of the townsmen and peasantry was simply due to their blind despair under a ruinous and tyrannical government. Hatred of Mazarin was the sole bond which connected, without uniting, the incongruous elements of the opposition; and it is not surprising that, bad as the government was, the monarchy, although brought to the verge of ruin, triumphed at last more completely than ever.

Arrest
of the
leaders
of the
Parlement.

Mazarin made a show of concession, but he was only waiting until success in the foreign war should restore the popularity of the government. In August came the news of Condé's great victory over the Spaniards at Lens. During the celebration of the victory at Notre-Dame the two chief leaders of the *Parlement* (Broussel and Blancménil) were arrested and imprisoned. But the blow was premature. The populace of Paris, incited by Gondi, rose in revolt and secured the liberation of their favourites; and the triumphant Condé on his return to

Paris was for a moment won over by Gondi to the popular side. The court temporarily retired from Paris, ^{Mazarin gives way.} It returned on the day of the signature of the Peace of Westphalia (October 24), and shortly afterwards an edict was issued confirming all the demands of the Chamber of Saint-Louis.

Mazarin, however, was again only temporizing. Condé, ^{Civil war.} whose arrogance and open contempt of both lawyers and populace quickly undermined his influence in Paris, was detached by large bribes, and agreed to reduce the *Parlement* by force of arms as soon as the winter should release the troops then fighting against Spain. In January 1649 the court gave the signal by withdrawing secretly to Saint-Germain; the hardships suffered in consequence of that rapid flight made an indelible impression upon the mind of the boy-king. Condé advanced against Paris. The citizens, however, unexpectedly manned the walls in defence of the *Parlement*, and many nobles joined them, including Condé's younger brother Conti, who led the defence. Normandy and other provinces again broke into revolt; Turenne prepared to advance with his army from Swabia in support of the *Parlement*; and the Archduke Leopold from the Netherlands invaded Picardy.

The operations against Paris, which lasted for twelve weeks, were not very serious on either side; and Gondi, ^{Origin of the term Fronde.} contemptuously likening the antagonists to the *frondeurs*, as the street-arabs of Paris were called because of their game of stone-slinging, gave to the movement the name which has become historic. Condé's forces were insufficient for a regular blockade. He was probably already meditating a double treason, hoping to step into Mazarin's place and to triumph at the expense of both parties. On the other hand, the execution of

Peace of
Rueil.

Charles I of England produced a reaction among the nobles in favour of the court. Under these circumstances a hollow peace was patched up in April, at Rueil, on the basis of a general amnesty and confirmation of the previous concessions to the *Parlement*, terms which nobody meant to observe.

§ 4. The
New
Fronde.

Henceforth the Fronde loses its constitutional interest. It becomes a purely selfish struggle for power between Mazarin and the queen on the one hand, and their aristocratic enemies on the other, in which the intrigues of several brilliant, but frivolous and generally licentious women had a dominating influence, and in which the claims of the *Parlement* were practically ignored. For a time there was apparent harmony, and the court returned to Paris in August, accompanied by Mazarin and Condé. But Condé again proved to be insufferable. He insulted the queen and quarrelled with the *Parlement*; and Mazarin, having bought the Old Fronde by the promise of a cardinal's hat to Gondi, determined to strike him down. On January 15, 1650, Condé, Conti, and the Duke of Longueville were suddenly arrested by his orders and carried off to confinement at Vincennes. This display of energy, a reminiscence of the methods of his master Richelieu, was hailed with enthusiasm by the *Parlement* and the people of Paris, who were heartily sick of the nobles. But a New Fronde immediately sprang up. The nobles combined, with the definite programme of releasing the captive princes and of overthrowing Mazarin; and they sought support from the provinces, and even from Spain. Turenne himself, under the influence of the beautiful Duchess of Longueville, joined the rebels; and they were aided by rebellions in Normandy, Burgundy, and Guienne.

Arrest of
the three
Princes.

Fortune at first favoured Mazarin. The provincial revolts were quelled without very great difficulty. Turenne, in command of a Spanish force from the Netherlands, invaded Champagne, but was defeated at Réthel in December 1650 by Du Plessis Praslin, and Mazarin, who was present at the battle, was able to claim the credit of having overcome the greatest general of France.

Rebels
defeated.

Battle of
Réthel.

There was, however, fresh trouble in Paris. Mazarin in the hour of triumph thought he could dispense with the support of the Old Fronde. He refused to carry out his promises to Gondi, and he offended the *Parlement* afresh. The result was a combination between the Old and the New Frondes; and Gondi now carried with him Gaston of Orleans, who, during the last two years, had supported the court. Mazarin realized his mistake, liberated the three princes, and retired from France. Condé was now for a time supreme, but he was soon at enmity again with Gondi. The queen undermined his authority by declaring her young son of age on the attainment of his thirteenth year, in September 1651. Turenne soon afterwards returned to his allegiance, and Mazarin was able to join the court again in February 1652, at Poitiers.

Combina-
tion of the
Old and
New
Frondes.

The
princes
liberated.

Louis XIV
declared
of age.

Civil war raged for another eight months. Condé was outmanœuvred by Turenne near Blenau, and was utterly defeated by him in July outside Paris. He gained refuge within the city by the entreaties of the young and brilliant Mademoiselle de Montpensier, and the capital declared for the princes. But Mazarin, by another judicious retirement in August, divided his enemies, and so prepared the way for peace. Condé once again disgusted the Parisians by his insolence and cruelty, and at last, in 1653, went over definitely to the enemies of his country, fighting for the next eight years on the

Conclusion
of the
Fronde.

Condé
joins
Spain.

Louis XIV
enters
Paris.

side of Spain. On October 21, 1652, the young king was welcomed into his capital at the head of his army. Orleans retired and joined forces with Condé. Gondi was arrested, but eventually escaped to Rome in 1654. A fresh edict was registered depriving the *Parlement* of any control over affairs of state, finance, and administration, and ten of its councillors were exiled. Mazarin returned to France in February 1653, and the last of the provincial revolts was concluded by the submission of Bordeaux in August.

§ 5. Con-
clusion
of the
Franco-
Spanish
war.

Meanwhile Spain had recovered most of her recent losses. Her troops had overrun Catalonia. In Flanders she had gained Dunkirk, Gravelines, Mardyke, and Furnes. In Montferrat the French garrison was driven out of Casale, and the place was handed over to the Duke of Mantua, whose adhesion to Spain was thus secured. But both adversaries were fatigued and unable to bring the war to a decisive conclusion without foreign aid.

England
under
Cromwell.

England was the only available ally. Cromwell, triumphant over Ireland, Scotland, and both the royalists and the Rump in England, had been made Protector by the Instrument of Government in December 1653. The new government was firmly seated in power. The European monarchies soon recovered from their horror at the execution of Charles I, and showed little reluctance to recognize the Protectorate. The commercial and naval war against the Dutch, which had been provoked by the Navigation Act of 1651, was brought to a conclusion by the satisfactory treaty of April 1654. This was followed by commercial treaties with Sweden, Portugal, and Denmark. Both Spain and France, in pursuit of their own quarrel, were ready to condone the Revolution, and were at the same moment negotiating with Cromwell.

Cromwell's foreign policy was designed on clear and simple lines. They can be readily discerned in the proposals which he put before the two suppliants for his alliance. He was anxious to obtain toleration for Protestants abroad; to secure his own country from invasion or intrigue on behalf of the exiled royal princes; and generally to advance her commercial interests. Both for political and commercial purposes he desired a port on the opposite side of the Channel. Thus he demanded from Spain (*a*) Calais, to be taken from France; (*b*) the abolition of all restrictions upon English trade in America and the West Indies; and (*c*) freedom for all English traders and sailors from the Inquisition. The Spaniards were not very willing to agree to the first condition; and the last two were dismissed with a flat negative, the Spanish ambassador curtly replying: 'To grant you this would be to give you my master's two eyes.' War followed rapidly. Penn and Venables failed at San Domingo in 1655, but captured Jamaica. Admiral Blake in the last year of his life crushed the naval power of Spain in a series of victories culminating in the great battle of Santa Cruz in April 1657.

Objects of
Cromwell's
foreign
policy.

His de-
mands
from
Spain.

The outbreak of war between Spain and England hastened the negotiations between England and France. From Mazarin, Cromwell requested (*a*) Dunkirk and Mardyke, to be recovered from Spain, (*b*) toleration for the Huguenots, and (*c*) expulsion of the princes Charles and James from French territory, where they had taken refuge after their expulsion from Holland. The negotiations were interrupted by the brutal massacre of the Protestant Vaudois in Piedmont by the orders of Christina, the Regent of Savoy, in which French troops assisted. Cromwell could not secure the requital demanded in Milton's majestic sonnet,—

Cromwell's
demands
from
France.

Massacre
of the
Vaudois.

Avenge, O Lord, thy slaughtered saints, whose bones
Lie scattered on the Alpine mountains cold,—

but he insisted on favourable terms being granted to the survivors. An Anglo-French commercial and defensive treaty followed in November 1655.

Mazarin, in the meantime, had been negotiating for peace, but the resistance of Spain was stiffened by Condé's victory over Turenne at Valenciennes in July 1656; and Mazarin was driven instead to seek a closer union with Cromwell. In March 1657, by the Treaty of Paris, a full offensive and defensive alliance was concluded. The whole of Cromwell's terms were conceded; and an English force was immediately landed at Boulogne to aid the French. The allied forces quickly brought the war to an end; the Flemish strongholds fell with great rapidity; and before Cromwell's death in September 1658 the triumph was complete. After Turenne's great victory of the Dunes, outside Dunkirk, in June 1658, the latter city capitulated, and was, together with Mardyke, handed over to the English.

Towards the latter part of the war the Spaniards received some support from Ferdinand III, in violation of the Treaty of Westphalia. But Ferdinand died in April 1657, and Mazarin used his influence with the Imperial Electors to wring concessions from his successor. He even offered the young Louis XIV as a candidate; but this was only meant as a move in the diplomatic game. Ferdinand's son Leopold pledged himself, in return for the withdrawal of French opposition, to renounce all support to Spain either in the Netherlands or in Italy, and he was then unanimously chosen as Leopold I in July 1658.

The Peace of the Pyrenees in November 1659 concluded the war. France retained Roussillon, but aban-

Treaty of
Paris.

Anglo-
French
victories.

Battle of
the Dunes.

Death of
Ferdinand
III.

Election of
Leopold I.

§ 6. Peace
of the
Pyrenees.

doned Catalonia to its fate; and thus the Pyrenees became the political as well as the physical boundary between the two countries. The north-eastern boundary of France was immensely strengthened by the acquisition of the whole of Artois except Saint-Omer and Aire, and some places in Flanders (including Gravelines), Hainault, and Luxemburg. Spain renounced her claims over Alsace, and abandoned the cause of Charles IV of Lorraine; while France similarly agreed not to aid the Portuguese, and to restore Condé to his position and dignities.

The treaty was a brilliant triumph for Mazarin; and the terms might have been still worse for Spain but for Anne of Austria's anxiety to marry her son to Maria Theresa, the eldest daughter of Philip IV. Philip IV was hostile to this proposal. His only son by his first marriage was dead. The sons of his second marriage were sickly, and only the youngest of them (not yet born) survived infancy. There was no Salic law in Spain to prevent the succession of females, and so there was the alarming prospect that the crown of Spain might eventually fall to France if the proposed marriage took place. An unexpected obstacle also came from the young Louis himself, who, while the negotiations were going on, fell desperately in love with Marie Mancini, the beautiful niece of Mazarin, and determined to marry her. But, in spite of Louis's tears and entreaties, the dangerous maiden was carried off into safe seclusion. Thus the monarch, who was to be the very incarnation of despotism, was forced to sacrifice the most passionate desire of his youth to the necessities of state.

The marriage treaty was included in the Peace. Philip's scruples were overcome by a formal renunciation of the claims of his daughter and her descendants upon the whole Spanish inheritance. But Mazarin,

French gains.

The marriage alliance.

Marie Mancini.

The act of renunciation.

through the agency of Lionne, his brilliant representative in the negotiations, managed to insert a clause in the treaty by which the validity of the renunciation was made to depend upon the payment of the Infanta's marriage dowry; and he knew that bankrupt Spain might be trusted to evade the payment. It is essential to notice that the great Spanish Succession question, which in one form or another dominated the whole of the foreign policy of Louis XIV, was deliberately bequeathed to him by the far-sighted diplomacy of Mazarin.

Genesis
of the
Spanish
Succession
question.

Catalonia
and
Portugal.

Catalonia had long been weary of the French and of the war, and submitted to Spain; but the attempt to reconquer Portugal, as will be seen in a subsequent chapter, proved to be hopeless.

Submission
of Charles
of Lor-
raine.

Charles of Lorraine at first refused the terms offered him, but submitted in February 1661. France retained several strong places in Lorraine with the right of passage through the duchy; and the fortifications of Nancy were razed. On these terms Charles was restored to the rest of Lorraine and to Bar.

Death of
Mazarin.

Before his death in March 1661, Mazarin also took a prominent part in bringing about the Anglo-Portuguese alliance, which rapidly followed the restoration of Charles II in England, and in arranging a settlement of the conflicts which had been raging among the northern nations, and to which some attention must now be devoted.

§ 7. Hol-
land after
the Peace
of Mün-
ster.

Holland had emerged from her war with Spain in triumph, and enjoyed a short period of amazing brilliance and prosperity. She was the leading commercial and maritime power in the world. She commanded the carrying trade of the two hemispheres; and her colonial possessions, further developed by the important settlement at the Cape of Good Hope in 1652, were the

most productive and best administered of any nation. At this period she reaches the zenith of her fame in letters, science, philosophy, and the arts. Grotius had died in exile in France in 1645; but Descartes made Holland his home for twenty years, from 1629 to 1649, and produced there all his greatest mathematical and philosophical works. His follower, Spinoza, of equal eminence as a philosopher, was born and spent all his life in Holland, although a Portuguese Jew by descent. The works of Vondel, Cats, and many other poets, besides prose writers and scholars, make this the greatest and the most copious period of Dutch literature. And lastly, the great painters Rembrandt, Frans Hals, Cuyp, Hoogh, and many others nearly as eminent, were living at this time, and producing those works which have conferred imperishable renown upon the Dutch School.

Unfortunately, as at the time of the Twelve Years' Truce, the conclusion of peace was followed by the outbreak of civil strife. William II, who was the husband of Princess Mary, the eldest daughter of Charles I of England, succeeded his father Frederick Henry as Stadtholder and Captain-General in 1647, although only twenty-one years of age. He was as ambitious for military glory as his father and uncle. He stood for the policy of continued war and the French alliance, and was supported by all the provinces of the Union except the principal one, Holland.

Holland, although far wealthier and more important than the six smaller provinces combined, and although she had borne more than half the expense of the war, had only an equal vote with each of the others in the States-General of the United Provinces. Among the commercial classes, who were supreme in Amsterdam and her other great cities, the political principles of

Holland's
'Golden
Age'.

Political
divisions.

William II.

The
Province of
Holland
opposed
to the
House of
Orange.

Attack
upon Am-
sterdam.

Death of
William II.

Triumph
of the Re-
publican
party.

John de
Witt.

Anglo-
Dutch War,
1652-4.

Navigation
Act, 1651.

Oldenbarneveltdt survived, in spite of the suppression of his party in 1618-19. The provincial Estates of Holland, therefore, stood for peace with Spain on the ground of economy and the security of the trade with the newly won colonies; while in the States-General of the Union the military party devoted to the House of Orange commanded a majority. These divisions were the source of protracted internal strife, and were one of the chief causes of the decline which set in so rapidly towards the end of the century. There were some bitter conflicts during William II's brief period of rule. He had just inflicted a great humiliation upon his opponents, by imprisoning their leaders and terrorizing Amsterdam into submission, when he died suddenly in November 1650. A week later his widow gave birth to a son, who was to become famous as William III, Prince of Orange and King of England.

Deprived of their head, the Orange party temporarily collapsed. The constitution of the Union was modified so as to diminish the importance of the States-General, and thus to increase that of Holland. In 1652 the famous John de Witt became Grand Pensionary of Holland, and he guided the destinies of the Republic with great wisdom and ability until his tragic death in 1672. The naval war with England had already broken out when he took office. The cause of that terrible and futile conflict was the commercial and colonial rivalry between the two nations, which dated back to the days of the 'massacre' of Amboyna. The outbreak of the Great Rebellion had prevented England from pursuing that quarrel; but the death of Charles I was quickly followed by the Navigation Act of 1651, which struck a shattering blow at the Dutch carrying trade. Neither De Witt, nor yet Cromwell, who had unsucces-

fully endeavoured to establish a close union between the two republics, was in favour of the war ; and in April 1654, soon after the latter's accession to the Protectorate in England, peace was concluded. Holland had been worsted and had to submit to somewhat humiliating terms. Among other things Cromwell insisted upon the perpetual exclusion of the House of Orange (because of its relationship to the Stuarts) from the Stadtholdership and from the military command. De Witt, although hostile to the Orange party, was anxious to assuage the feud, and saw the extreme danger and impolicy of agreeing to this demand. But the only concession that he could obtain from Cromwell was that the Act of Seclusion should be kept secret. However, the miserable secret leaked out, and De Witt had to bear all the odium of the step which he had sincerely endeavoured to avoid. The people never forgot or forgave the insult to the great family whose heroism and genius had rescued them from the clutches of Spain.

Terms
of peace.

Exclusion
of the
House of
Orange.

In 1657 difficulties about Brazil caused the outbreak of a war with Portugal, during which Holland added Ceylon and Macassar to her colonial possessions. Peace was concluded in 1661, by which Holland retained her new conquests but resigned her claims upon Brazil. In the meantime also she had been drawn into the Baltic war which had been stirred up by the ambitions of Charles X of Sweden.

War
between
Holland
and
Portugal.

War
in the
Baltic.

In Sweden, Oxenstierna retained his ascendancy during the minority of Christina. He not only carried on the foreign policy of Gustavus Adolphus, but his home policy also ; devoting great care to the development of the country's resources and commerce, and to the promotion of education and religious toleration. By the 'Form of Government' adopted in 1634, the principles laid down

§ 8. Chris-
tina of
Sweden.
The
minority.

The
'Form of
Govern-
ment',
1634.

The
nobles.

Death of
Oxen-
stierna.

Character
of Chris-
tina.

by Gustavus for the government were registered in what was the first of modern written constitutions. Its purpose was to avoid the dangers which disputed successions, the lack of an organized constitution, and religious disunion had brought upon the country. The crown, which had been nominally elective, was now declared hereditary. The monarch was to be supreme governor, but was to be aided and advised by the Råd or Senate; and Lutheranism was declared to be the state religion. However, the terrible financial strain of the war enfeebled the royal authority, and increased the power and independence of the aristocracy. The crown was forced to sell to the nobles its rights over its estates, and thus to mortgage the resources of the future; while the French subsidies involved wholesale corruption, and created a French interest in Sweden which was antagonistic to national independence. The young queen was declared of age on completing her eighteenth year in 1644, and from that time Oxenstierna's influence steadily declined. He died shortly after Christina's abdication, ten years later, in 1654.

Christina is one of the most fascinating and attractive figures of the time. She was the most cultured member of the brilliant race from which she sprang. At eighteen she not only read Thucydides and Polybius in Greek, but could write and converse familiarly in Latin, French, and German, and was a lover of philosophy, poetry, science, and the fine arts. Under her rule Stockholm became the chosen resort of the leading intellects of the age. Descartes, Grotius, and Salmasius, among others, enjoyed her friendship and patronage. However, her finer qualities were those of the private citizen rather than of the monarch. As a ruler she was the worst that Sweden had endured since Eric the Mad. Endowed by nature with

a physique of iron and unflinching bravery in the face of personal danger, she was yet without sufficient moral determination to face the drudgery of administrative routine. Simple and frugal in her private life, she wasted the slender resources of the crown in wanton liberality to friends, protégées, and courtiers. Naturally humane, she was yet vindictive and even cruel in avenging private grudges; and she treated the great Chancellor Oxenstierna with ingratitude. Although personally chaste, she shocked and scandalized her none too squeamish contemporaries by her friendship for the notorious courtesan Ninon de L'Enclos, and by her general contempt for queenly decorum. She was clear-headed and gifted with an indomitable will; yet she was hasty in making decisions and obstinate in adhering to them, whether right or wrong.

Her ten years of personal rule were signalized (besides the Treaties of Brömsebro and Westphalia) by two events of importance. The first was the conspiracy of Arnold Messenius in 1651, a widely-supported plot to depose her in favour of her cousin Charles Gustavus. This she stamped out with promptitude and rigour. Charles Gustavus successfully cleared himself of complicity, and Messenius was executed. The second was the war against Bremen, which, as a free Imperial city, resisted Swedish dominion. This war was left for her successor to finish. Her personal administration was neglectful and wanton. She left a ruined exchequer, a nobility battenning on the spoils of alienated crown lands, a peasantry on the verge of revolt, and the recently-conquered provinces unsettled and unassimilated.

Nothing became Christina on the throne so much as her manner of leaving it. Her country needed an heir, and the question of the queen's marriage and the

Conspiracy
of Mes-
senius.

War with
Bremen.

Christina's
abdication.

succession was as critical as it had been in England under Elizabeth, who scarcely rivalled her in the number and variety of her suitors. The man she respected most was Charles Gustavus, the playmate of her childhood and her passionate admirer. But unable to endure what she considered to be the servitude of marriage she refused his hand. She had for some time been under the influence of the Jesuits, and she desired to proclaim herself a Catholic; but she judged correctly that Sweden was indissolubly bound to Lutheranism. She therefore persuaded and commanded the Diet to recognize Charles Gustavus as her successor (as Charles X), and to settle the succession upon his descendants. Then she retired to a life of intellectual and cultured ease; retaining, along with her unalterable charm, that autocratic temperament and that scorn of convention which had characterized her as monarch.

§ 9.
Charles X
of Sweden.

Charles X, on his accession in 1654, at the age of thirty-two, had already served a long apprenticeship in politics and war. In piety, culture, and ability, he was worthy to rank among the foremost of the marvellous Vasa dynasty. He inherited to the full their extraordinary military genius, and his short reign was one continual war. His first work was to redress the balance, constitutional and financial, which had been upset by the extravagance of Christina. To achieve this he carried through the 'Reduction' of 1654-5, by which the nobles were forced to surrender a great portion of the alienated crown lands. Next he finished off the struggle with Bremen, receiving the submission of the city. And then he persuaded the Diet in 1655 to support the burden of a new Polish war.

The 'Reduction',
1654-5.

Wars with
Bremen
and
Poland.

The last
Polish
Vasas.

The state of Poland invited attack. Sigismund III had died in the same year as his cousin and rival Gustavus

Adolphus. He was followed in succession by his two sons, Ladislaus IV (1632-48) and John Casimir (1648-68), the last of Polish Vasas. The former had won some military successes against the Russians, but under the latter Poland appeared to be on the verge of dissolution. The Cossacks had transferred their allegiance to the Tsar Alexis (1645-76), and the Russians were steadily advancing westwards and threatening to outflank the Baltic possessions of Sweden. It was to avert this new menace that Charles X declared war upon Poland; and John Casimir was unwise enough to give him a pretext, by refusing to recognize his succession to Sweden. Revolt of the Cossacks.

Another Baltic power was inevitably drawn into the conflict. Brandenburg, under the 'Great Elector' Frederick William, was slowly emerging from its position of insignificance. In November 1640 Frederick William, at the age of twenty, had succeeded his father under the most distressing circumstances. His territories were overrun by foreign armies, and he was only in name the ruler of his subjects. His first task was to clear out the foreign troops, by the treaty with Sweden in 1643; although, until the Peace of Westphalia, Brandenburg's territory was on several further occasions violated by the other belligerents. In the meantime he scraped together some ready money by means of loans or otherwise; he reorganized the finances and husbanded his resources to provide for future revenue; he raised and trained a small force and gradually worked it up into that magnificent army which was to win its first notable triumph at Fehrbellin in 1675 against the Swedes; he reasserted his despotic authority over all his dominions; and, lastly, by provident and unremitting care, he did everything that could possibly be done to develop the wealth and productivity of his dominions. In the words of the biographer § 10. The Great Elector.

Peace with Sweden, 1643.

His internal policy.

of his great-grandson Frederick the Great: 'He drains bogs, settles colonies in the waste places of his dominions, cuts canals; unweariedly encourages trade and work. The Friedrich-Wilhelm's Canal, which still carries tonnage from the Oder to the Spree, is a monument of his zeal in this way; creditable with the means he had.'¹ No available means were neglected to achieve these ends. He was as unscrupulous as any of his contemporaries, and he could use double-dealing, bribery, and terrorism when it suited his purpose. But his single-minded patriotism had something lofty about it in comparison with his generation; his piety was sincere and steadfast; and, above all, his domestic life was unique in its spotlessness and simplicity. He was the real founder of the modern Prussian state, which, under Frederick the Great a century later, was to wrest the hegemony of Germany from Austria.

His
foreign
policy.

His foreign policy was determined by the situation of his territories which lay in detached portions from the east to the west of North Germany. The Mark of Brandenburg was their political and geographical centre. The Duchy of East Prussia was held as a fief of Poland, and was separated from Brandenburg by West or Polish Prussia. Far to the west lay the Brandenburg share of the Cleves-Jülich inheritance—the Duchy of Cleves, the County of Mark, and the County of Ravensberg. In addition, the Treaty of Westphalia had added the eastern part of Pomerania, adjoining Brandenburg on the north-east; the greater part of the Archbishopric of Magdeburg, and the Bishopric of Halberstadt, adjoining Brandenburg on the south-west, and commanding the valley of the Elbe to the north of Saxony; and the Bishoprics of Minden and Camin, adjoining Ravensberg. His immediate

¹ Carlyle, *Frederick the Great*, vol. i, Bk. III, c. 18.

objects were to free himself from Polish suzerainty in East Prussia, to join that Duchy to Brandenburg by gaining West Prussia, and, if possible, to turn the Swedes out of Eastern Pomerania. These necessarily brought him into antagonism with both Sweden and Poland, and go far to explain the shiftiness of his dealings with those two rivals. He was as yet too weak to oppose Charles X openly, but he intrigued with the friends and foes of the Swedish king to rob him of the fruits of his victories.

The campaign of 1655 in Poland was a triumphant success for the Swedes. The whole of the south and west of the country fell into their hands, including the two capitals, Warsaw and Cracow ; and John Casimir fled to Silesia. While the Swedes were conquering Poland the Great Elector tried to get hold of West Prussia. But Charles X was too quick for him, isolated him in East Prussia, and forced him to accept a treaty of alliance at Königsberg in January 1656, by which he had to recognize Swedish suzerainty over East Prussia in place of that of Poland, and to send a contingent to join the Swedes in an attack upon Danzig. Meanwhile, Swedish aggression was raising up enemies on all sides. A great national rising in Poland in 1656 undid the work of 1655, and John Casimir recovered Warsaw. A Russian army, aided by the Lithuanians, menaced East Prussia. The Dutch took the opportunity to seize the Swedish colony in North America ; and their fleet in the Baltic went to the relief of Danzig. Charles recovered Warsaw by a brilliant victory against a vastly superior force, but he could not reconquer Poland, and the increasing dangers of his position forced him to modify his policy. The Dutch were bought off by a favourable commercial treaty ; an alliance was made with Rakoczy II, Prince of Transylvania ; and, to secure the closer friendship of

§ 11.
General
war in the
North.
Conquest
of Poland.

Treaty of
Königs-
berg.

Coalition
against
Sweden.

Battle of
Warsaw.

Treaty of
Elbing.

Treaty of
Labiau.

Brandenburg, he consented, by the important Treaty of Labiau in November 1656, to allow the Elector to hold East Prussia free from the Swedish suzerainty recently imposed. Meanwhile, an Austrian force had come to the aid of Poland, and Denmark had declared war upon her old enemy, Sweden.

Frederick
III of
Denmark.

The long reign of Christian IV of Denmark had come to a close in February 1648, just before the Treaty of Westphalia. He left the country weakened and humiliated and definitely deposed from its leading place among the Baltic states. The all-powerful nobles reasserted their ancient right of electing the king; and they refused to recognize Christian's son Frederick III (1648-70) until he had made concessions, which robbed the crown of the last vestiges of its power and left the country under the control of an aristocratic caste. During the early years of his reign, Frederick III was surrounded with treachery and rebellion. His only chance of restoring the power of the crown was by a successful war. Poland, Russia, Spain, Austria, and the Dutch were urging him to join the coalition against Sweden. In June 1657, therefore, when Charles X appeared to be hopelessly entangled in Poland, he declared war, and his army rapidly conquered Bremen and Verden. This diversion saved Poland, but brought ruin to Denmark. Charles X, leaving the Polish war to

Charles X
conquers
Denmark.

take care of itself, marched northwards with marvellous rapidity and invaded Denmark from the south. He performed prodigies of valour. After reducing the mainland he struck at Frederick's capital in the islands. The Swedish fleet which came to convey him was beaten back; but, nothing daunted, Charles, in the terrible Baltic midwinter of January 1658, performed one of the most extraordinary military feats in history by marching his whole army of 20,000, horse, foot, and artillery, across

the icebound straits. He conquered the islands and forced Frederick to make peace. By the Treaty of Roeskilde in February 1658, Sweden recovered the whole of the southern part of the Scandinavian peninsula. Treaty of Roeskilde.

In the meantime, the wily Elector of Brandenburg had deserted Sweden. By the Treaty of Wehlau in September 1657, Frederick William sold his alliance to Poland, and received from John Casimir the recognition of his full sovereignty over East Prussia. Before Charles could deal effectively with the new danger in the east, the Danish war had broken out again in July 1658, owing to disputes Treaty of Wehlau.

over the territorial settlement following the recent peace. At first Charles was again successful, and captured the great fortress of Kronburg in Zealand, which, together with the provinces recovered by the recent treaty, gave him control of both shores of the Sound. Copenhagen itself Renewal of the Danish war.

must also have fallen but for the intervention of the Dutch. The great naval powers of the North Sea were determined to keep the Sound open, and to prevent it from ever again becoming the possession of one state. England was paralysed by the death of Cromwell; but the Dutch fleet joined the Danes, cleared the Sound, and drove the Swedish fleet off the sea. Further humiliations followed, and Charles was already suing for peace when his brief and brilliant career was closed by his death in February 1660. Intervention of Holland.

The settlement of these northern wars was finally arranged, largely under French and Dutch mediation, by three treaties. By the Treaty of Oliva in April 1660, between Sweden, Poland, and Brandenburg, John Casimir of Poland renounced his claims upon the Swedish crown, and recognized the sovereignty of Brandenburg over East Prussia. Poland was confirmed in the possession of West Prussia, and Sweden in that of Livonia. By the Treaty of Copenhagen in June 1660 between Sweden and Den- § 12. Settlement of the Baltic. Treaty of Oliva.

Treaty of Copenhagen.

mark most of the terms of Roeskilde were confirmed, that is to say, Sweden gained the three southern provinces, Halland, Scania, and Bleking, which had been so long in dispute, and also the adjacent strip of the Norwegian coast. All the other Swedish conquests in the Danish peninsula and islands were restored. The Tsar held out a year longer, but in June 1661 by the Treaty of Kardis he restored what he had conquered from Sweden in the eastern Baltic.

Treaty of
Kardis.

Importance of
the settle-
ment.

These treaties were of the utmost significance. They secured for the great maritime powers free entrance to the Sound ; and they settled the relations of the Baltic states for forty years. For Sweden they marked the completion of the political work of Gustavus Adolphus. The succession to the throne was secure, the claims of the Polish Vasas were abandoned, and Denmark's grip on the southern provinces was cast off. Sweden now had full access to the North Sea ; she commanded the whole of the eastern Baltic and a considerable part of the coast of North Germany, including the mouths of the Weser, Elbe, and Oder. She had reached her greatest territorial limits. Internally, however, the royal authority was weakened by another minority. Charles XI, the only child of Charles X, was only four years old at his father's death ; and though he took control of affairs in 1672 at the early age of sixteen, the nobles, corrupted by French gold, regained their power in the interval.

Charles XI,
1660-97.

Decline of
Denmark.

Frederick
III crushes
the nobles.

Denmark had lost for ever the command of the Sound which had been the chief source of her international importance. The peace was followed by a monarchical revolution in 1661, in which Frederick III, backed up by the clergy, the towns, and the peasantry, crushed the power of the nobles. But henceforth Denmark is of little significance in European politics.

Brandenburg had definitely emerged from obscurity. The Great Elector, watchful and ambitious as ever, continued his work of development, steadily increasing and improving his army, and securing the political uniformity of his dominions by reducing the local Diets to impotence.

Russia had again been kept back from the Baltic coast. After 1661 she was involved in a struggle with Poland, and then with the Turks, for the doubtful privilege of ruling over the turbulent Cossacks of Ukraine. Until Peter the Great commenced his long and extraordinary reign she had little opportunity of reasserting her Baltic ambitions.

Poland, menaced by all her neighbours and especially by Russia and Turkey, continued in a state of decline and anarchy. John Casimir, the third and last of the Polish Vasas, resigned in 1668, and the crown became again the sport of foreign powers. Mazarin had already made efforts to undermine the Habsburg influence in Poland, and these were carried on by Louis XIV; but, in spite of temporary wavering, the danger from the Turks, who, after fifty years of comparative quiescence, were now recommencing their aggressions in the south-east of Europe and in the Mediterranean, kept Poland generally on the side of Austria throughout this period.

CHAPTER VIII

LOUIS XIV AND COLBERT

1. Character of Louis XIV. 2. Completion of the centralized despotism. 3. The policy of Colbert. 4. Condition of Europe in 1661. 5. Revival of the Ottoman Turks. 6. Relations between France and England. 7. Holland under De Witt. 8. The War of Devolution. 9. The Triple Alliance, and the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. 10. Dissolution of the Triple Alliance.

§ 1. Character of Louis XIV.

WHEN Mazarin died in March 1661 the question of immediate and absorbing interest in France was who would be his successor as chief minister. Louis XIV had been king since 1643, and was now in his twenty-third year. Although long past his legal majority he had acquiesced with apparent willingness in the state of tutelage in which he had been hitherto kept. The courtiers expected that the experience of his father's reign would be repeated; that the young king, immersed in his pleasures, would be unable to endure the burden of personal administration; and that the real ruler would be whoever might happen, by force of will, by successful intrigue, or by mere personal attractiveness, to win the favour of the monarch. But they were mistaken. Louis was determined to be his own first minister. He announced that all officials were to retain their places, but that they were to report to himself and to take his orders, as before they had done with Mazarin.

His own chief minister.

End of ministerial despotism.

This decision introduced a change into the government of France, which was as profound as it was unexpected. Since the death of Henry IV there had been no king

except in name. The monarchy had existed only to give sanction and authority to a long reign of ministerial despotism. For the first time in fifty years France had a king who was also ruler.

Louis XIV was justly confident of his ability to fulfil both these functions. Dignified and handsome, courteous, tactful, and self-controlled, he was eminently qualified to take the leading rôle in the great pageant of royalty; and no monarch has ever played that part with more consummate art, or has more successfully realized its political value as a means of captivating the imagination of a nation. Although his own education had been shockingly neglected, he had sufficient sagacity to associate the monarchy with the artistic and intellectual triumphs of the age. Under him the French court became the most magnificent and polished of modern times. His sumptuous, though architecturally commonplace, palace at Versailles (built on the site of his father's favourite hunting-seat) was embellished with every adornment that art could invent and money procure; and, from 1682, supplanted the Louvre as the permanent abode of the court. Molière, Corneille, Racine, Boileau, Bossuet, and a host of other great writers whose genius makes this the classic epoch of French literature, enjoyed the royal patronage and reflected additional lustre upon the monarchy.

Louis's
abilities.
*The Grand
Monarque.*

Patronage
of art and
letters.

But Louis was much more than the leader of a splendid court. In the severe routine of administration he displayed untiring industry and great efficiency. He regularly devoted five hours a day to business, and even apart from these, he was always ready to receive officials who had urgent matters to transact. Although his policy was necessarily affected very considerably by the views of his ministers, everything was done under his personal

Adminis-
trative
efficiency.

supervision, and no important matter escaped his attention. Order, regularity, and dispatch took the place of the administrative chaos left by Richelieu and Mazarin. To the last year of his life he directed and controlled a vast and complicated diplomatic system which affected every court in Europe, and by means of which he achieved at least as much as he did by his wars. In France he wielded an unlimited personal despotism. He probably did not invent the famous phrase, *L'État, c'est moi*, which has been attributed to him, but it accurately represents both his idea of monarchy and the facts of his government.

*L'État,
c'est moi.*

His faults. His good qualities were, however, marred by conspicuous faults, which were unfortunately fostered by the deficiencies of his youthful education, and by the atmosphere of flattery and servility which surrounded him from the cradle to the grave. He was narrow-minded, intolerant, obstinate, and inordinately vain. He was as licentious as his cousin and contemporary Charles II of England; and although in later years, under the sobering influence of Madame de Maintenon, his private life became correct and austere, his vanity and bigotry became only the more excessive. He had an exaggerated notion of the Divine Right of Kings, which was stimulated by the writings of Bossuet, who was tutor to his son. Although but imperfectly acquainted with the doctrines of the Catholic Church, he regarded himself as the supreme exponent of the Divine will, not only in France but throughout Europe. Like Philip II of Spain he identified the cause of religion with his personal aggrandizement; and not even when he encountered the opposition of Pope Innocent XI, who thought his bigotry as great a danger to the Church as avowed heresy, could he perceive his error. Foreign princes who would

Belief in
the Divine
Right of
Kings.

humbly submit to his dictation could always count upon his generous support and protection; but any who presumed to regard themselves as his equals or to resist the aggressions which threatened their independence were treated with insolence and disdain. The brilliant successes of the first part of the reign infected him with a megalomania against which no consideration of justice or policy could stand. He was utterly devoid of public faith; he repudiated the most solemnly enacted treaties; and he pursued his career of aggrandizement with equal disregard for the rights of enemies and allies; so that at last the great states of Europe were forced in self-defence to sink their differences and to combine against the common danger.

His
arrogance.

Want of
public
faith.

He was not a bad judge of character, but like most autocrats he was distrustful of genius. Flatterers, and his personal vanity, convinced him that the achievements of his generals and ministers were solely due to his own initiative, and that under his direction all men were equally good so long as they obeyed his commands. Hence, when the great men who had risen under Mazarin passed from the scene, he replaced them by mediocrities, who were largely responsible for the disasters of his closing years.

Distrustful
of genius.

However, Louis, with all his faults, retained his popularity with his subjects almost to the last; and even in his greatest blunders, the attack upon Holland, the persecution of the Huguenots, and the effort in face of the opposition of Europe to win the crown of Spain for his grandson, he could count on the support of the nation. The mass of the population had no experience as yet of civil liberty, and did not expect it. They were passionately devoted to the monarchy, and the experience of the Fronde had taught them that the monarchy

His popu-
larity.

was the only bulwark against faction, the only power which could secure that political and religious unity for which the nation yearned. The people were proud of their showy king, dazzled by the brilliance of his court, and eager to follow him on the path of national glory. Although the gigantic burdens which the profligate extravagance of the king's foreign policy imposed upon the people had the inevitable effect of producing local disturbances, these were very different from the rebellions against Richelieu and Mazarin; and nothing is more significant than the comparative tranquillity of France during this reign, after fifty years of chronic rebellion.

§ 2. Completion of the centralized despotism. The nobles become courtiers.

The States-General not summoned. The *Parlement* loses its powers. Provincial privileges stamped out.

In the work of stamping out opposition at home there was little to be added to the work of his predecessors, but that little was done with effect. The nobles were allowed to retain their obnoxious social privileges, but they were ignored in the work of administration. The king's personal favour was skilfully used to neutralize their turbulent propensities. Attracted by the splendour of the court, and too often ruined by its extravagance, they lost touch with their provinces, and thus lost also the motive, and even the ability to rebel. The States-General were never summoned. All the political powers of the *Parlement* of Paris were taken away; the records of its actions during the Fronde were erased from its registers; and an edict of 1673 forbade it to make any remonstrance until after the royal edicts were registered. Those provincial estates and municipalities which retained any political privileges were intimidated or bribed into yielding them, and the administration was conducted by means of intendants and other officials who were directly controlled by the government and who were all members of the middle classes.

For the higher offices Louis was extremely fortunate

in being able to command the services of several very able men who had been trained under or promoted by Mazarin. In Colbert he possessed one of the ablest administrators in the history of France. In the sphere of diplomacy Lionne, who had already displayed his talents in the negotiations which led to the Treaties of Westphalia and the Pyrenees, was supreme. In Turenne and Condé he possessed the greatest generals in Europe ; in Vauban the greatest master of the art of fortification ; and in Louvois an eminently skilled military administrator.

The great men of the earlier period.

Colbert. Lionne.

Turenne and Condé.

Vauban. Louvois.

While Turenne improved the discipline of the army, Louvois thoroughly reformed its organization, and brought it under the direct control of the government as it had never been in the days of Richelieu, when the nobles had still been mainly responsible for its recruiting and equipment. Corruption was ruthlessly stamped out ; the method of recruiting was reformed ; the arms of the artillery, cavalry, and infantry were improved, and the bayonet was introduced ; field hospitals were established ; and the reforms in the transport and commissariat services were so far-reaching that the armies of Louis XIV were placed and maintained in the field with such rapidity and ease as had hitherto been unknown in modern warfare.

Military reforms.

The policy of Colbert, whose ideas prevailed in the first eleven years of Louis's personal government, requires special attention. Jean-Baptiste Colbert was sprung from a bourgeois family of Champagne. He had entered the service of Le Tellier, Mazarin's minister for war. Mazarin, who was struck with his talents, made considerable use of his services, and on his death recommended him to Louis. The Superintendent of Finance at that time was Nicholas Fouquet, who, although brilliant

§ 3. The policy of Colbert.

His rise under Mazarin.

Fall of Fouquet.

and able, was excessively corrupt, and had built up a huge fortune at the expense of the state. Colbert had pointed out his misdeeds to Mazarin, but every official from the Cardinal downwards was tainted with the same vice, and no action had been taken. When Louis took the government into his own hands, Fouquet was at first confirmed in his office. In spite of warnings he was overconfident, and expected that Louis's enthusiasm for administration would rapidly cool, and that he would soon step into Mazarin's place as chief minister. Colbert, then forty years of age, was appointed Intendant of Finance, and in that capacity audited the accounts. He discovered and secretly revealed to Louis several false entries made by Fouquet, which afforded abundant evidence that the maladministration was continuing. Louis was enraged. In September 1661, Fouquet was arrested, deprived of his offices, and after a trial which created a great stir and lasted for three years, was condemned to perpetual imprisonment. The office of Superintendent was nominally suppressed; but Colbert as head of the Council of Finance performed all its functions, and was afterwards raised to the office of Controller-General of Finance. His success was so convincing that Louis rapidly conferred several other responsibilities upon him. He became the minister for the navy, for the royal buildings, and the king's household, and for commerce and the colonies. He was practically supreme over every department except that of war, and until the Dutch war of 1672, when his influence began to wane, he may be said to have directed the policy of France.

Colbert in
power.

Colbert's reforms were not of a revolutionary character. He never rose above the ideas of his time, and he was not entirely free from the obnoxious methods which he condemned in others. But, while accepting existing

institutions, he sought to purge them of waste, inefficiency, and fraud. His first task was to set the finances in order. He persuaded the king to sweep away a vast number of useless offices. He made no attack upon privileges which had the sanction of law, but he resisted all fraudulent claims to exemption from taxation. He lightened direct taxation, and forced the privileged classes to contribute a greater proportion to the revenues by increasing the customs and other indirect taxes. He improved the methods of collection, and cured the worst abuses of finance farming. He established a court for the trial of fraudulent financiers which compelled more than four thousand of them to disgorge their ill-gotten gains. He reduced the public debt by persuading the king to repudiate certain loans altogether which by reason of exorbitant interest and speculation had brought practically nothing to the treasury; while other loans were refunded less the interest already paid. At the same time, he fixed the rate of interest on state loans at a maximum of five per cent. When he took office he found the expenditure exceeding the revenue by thirty-two millions of *livres* annually; within the space of six years he had performed the amazing feat of changing this deficit into an annual surplus of about thirty millions; a remarkable testimony not only to the efficiency of the minister, but to the abundant resources of the country.

Colbert's commercial measures were designed to increase the productiveness of the country. He neglected no means of stimulating her trade and manufacture, except that of allowing freedom of competition. By high tariffs he attempted to revive dying and unproductive industries. Every year some fresh manufacture was introduced. He maintained the heavy export duties on raw material, and extended them so as to include

His
financial
reforms.

His com-
mercial
policy.

corn in order that a store of grain might be kept in the country. He invited foreign workmen to immigrate into France and prohibited French workmen from leaving the country. He formed new societies for the encouragement of trade and inventions; and he issued stringent regulations against, and imposed penalties to prevent, bad workmanship. He endeavoured to simplify the chaos of internal customs, which was one of the severest handicaps to trade, by equalizing the duties levied on goods passing between province and province; though in this he had only partial success owing to insufficient support from the king. He enormously improved the internal communications of the country. He was the greatest road-builder in France since the time of the Romans; and he carried out the project, which had been mooted before his time, of the great Languedoc canal, a waterway 162 miles long connecting the Mediterranean with the Bay of Biscay.

Road-
building.

The
Languedoc
canal.

Naval and
colonial
policy.

He was also just as ardent and as untiring in his efforts to make France the greatest maritime country of the world. Mazarin had allowed Richelieu's ships to rot in the harbours; Colbert recreated the French navy. By 1667 he had 50 men-of-war on the sea, by 1672 there were 196, and by the end of his life in 1683 there were 276. With the aid of Vauban fresh naval arsenals were constructed and fortified. He initiated a policy of colonial expansion. He promoted both foreign and colonial commerce by the reorganization of the French West India Company, and by the foundation of other privileged trading corporations to which French nobles and merchants were persuaded or forced to subscribe; although none of these, owing to his misconceived protective policy, had much success.

New
Academies.

In other spheres his activity was boundless. He

created five new academies. He directed the royal patronage of letters, science, and the arts, upon which Louis prided himself. He organized a new police force; he reformed judicial procedure; and he was chiefly responsible for the new criminal code, the *Code Louis*,^{The Code Louis.} which, though it confirmed some of the harsher features of the old system, was yet an immense improvement upon it.

The immediate effect of Colbert's commercial policy^{Defects of Colbert's policy.} was to give a great stimulus to the industry and prosperity of France. And yet some of its ultimate results were very different from what he intended. His rigid control stifled enterprise, and French traders were taught to rely upon state support instead of upon their own energies. In his anxiety to promote manufacturing industries, he was entirely blind to the importance of^{Neglect of agriculture.} agriculture, which was then, as it still is, the chief source of French prosperity. The bourgeoisie were enriched at the expense of the peasantry, and he thus contributed his part to the severance of the classes which was such a potent influence in bringing about the French Revolution. His colonial policy, energetic and ambitious though it was, was as meddling and narrow as that of Richelieu. The colonies were populated very largely by forced emigrants—gaol-birds, debtors, and other outcasts; the feudal system of land-holding was enforced upon them. The Catholic clergy and the home government combined to keep the colonists in leading strings, and hindered the development of that self-reliance and individuality which was a marked feature of the English colonies, and which enabled them, in spite of the inferiority of their military organization, to triumph over their rivals in the wars of the next century.

The whole of his policy also was vitiated by the

The mercantile system.

Tariff-war against Holland.

fundamental economic error of the mercantile theory, that strange doctrine then universally believed, and of which he was one of the most prominent and consistent exponents of all time, which held that the total wealth of the world could not be substantially increased or diminished, and that therefore any one country could only increase its wealth at the expense of others. Thus he was not only desirous of stimulating the trade and manufactures of France, but was just as eager to destroy those of her commercial rivals, particularly Holland and England, believing that France must inevitably profit thereby. This was the motive of his tariff-war against Holland, which not only failed entirely in its object, dealing as it did a severe blow to French trade, but helped to bring about, and led him to support, the Franco-Dutch war of 1672. This committed France irretrievably to the policy of continental aggression; it had the effect of ruining Colbert's economic reforms, and of destroying his influence with the king, to the advantage of his rival Louvois, who was chiefly instrumental in urging Louis forward upon his career of conquest. Colbert, although alive to the necessity of strengthening the frontiers, was opposed to mere aggression. He realized the dangers to France lurking in the extravagant ambitions of the king, and endeavoured to divert his attention to the wiser and safer policy of commercial and colonial expansion. But Louis was altogether wrapped up in the army, and but feebly interested in the colonies and the navy. The money provided by Colbert made him imagine that his resources were inexhaustible, and only inflamed his lust for aggrandizement. It was a strange irony of circumstance which made this economical, benevolent, and politic minister an unconscious and unwilling instrument in bringing

about all that was most profligate and reckless in the policy of the king. For without Colbert, the Louis XIV whom we know would have been impossible.

The condition of affairs in 1661 provided an unequalled opportunity for the realization of French ambitions ; and from that time until the day of his death the intrigues and wars of Louis XIV dominated the international politics of Europe. Spain and the Empire were hopelessly weak, and the Baltic powers were exhausted. The Peace of Westphalia had dissolved Germany into atoms. The eastern boundary of France was fringed with petty states, which were actually or virtually independent, but which were too weak to defend themselves, and could be readily bribed or intimidated by their wealthy and powerful neighbour. The Emperor Leopold was prevented from offering any effective opposition to France by trouble in the east, by continual rebellions in Hungary which were fomented by French intrigues, and more important still by the sudden revival of the power of the Turks, whose aggressions in the east were for a time as formidable a menace to Europe as those of Louis XIV in the west.

The Turkish Empire in Europe had been created by war ; and by war alone, or by the rivalries which divided its Christian enemies, could it be maintained. The Ottoman Turks have never displayed any ability or inclination for constructive statesmanship or the arts of civilization. With the one exception of the great nineteenth-century reformer, Midhat Pasha, the few statesmen they have produced have been of foreign origin. The motive of their conquests, besides the primal barbaric instinct, has always been the imposition of tribute. They have never attempted to assimilate the peoples over whom their sway has extended, or to win their affections by good government. Existing local institutions

§ 4. Condition of Europe in 1661.

§ 5. Revival of the Ottoman Turks.

Characteristics of the Turkish Empire in Europe.

in the subject provinces were generally suffered to continue, although in a mutilated condition and under the supervision of native officials and priests, because the Turk had nothing to put in their place. In spite of the general opinion to the contrary, the Ottoman Turk is not a proselytizer, or if so only by accident. The humiliations and extortions suffered by the Christian populations led many of them to accept the faith of Islam; but the government did not encourage conversions, since these involved a diminution of the tribute from which the faithful were free. Consequently the Turkish Empire had no cohesive force. The European provinces were divided by mutual animosities—religious, political, and racial; there were Catholics and members of the Orthodox Greek Church as well as Mohammedans, and the only bond was common subjection to a dominant military caste.

Want of
cohesion.

Decadence
since 1566.

The
unwarlike
Sultans.

Decline
of the
army.
The Janis-
saries.

The
'toll of
children'.

Since the death of the great warrior Solyman the Magnificent in 1566, decline had set in, and was greatly accelerated after the Peace of Zsitva-Torok in 1606 (see chapter i, p. 15). The sultans became unwarlike and degenerate, and were usually mere puppets in the hands of court intriguers. The central government was a sink of corruption and inefficiency; while the Pashas of the provinces became semi-independent and defied such feeble attempts as were made to control them.

Degeneration also affected the army. The bulwark of the invincible Turkish armies, which had swept like a flood over Europe from the fourteenth to the sixteenth centuries, was the famous body known as the Janissaries. This force had formerly been recruited by the infamous 'toll of children', which was the greatest of the wrongs inflicted by the Turks upon their subjects. Every year one thousand of the finest boys from Christian families

were torn from their homes, forcibly converted, and trained to a life-long military career, and thus they grew up strangers and enemies to the race and religion from which they had sprung. They were not allowed to marry, but special privileges and favours were showered upon them, and they became the most devoted servants of the warlike sultans, and the most terrible warriors of Islam. During the seventeenth century the 'toll of children' gradually ceased; the Janissaries were allowed to marry, and fresh recruits were drawn from the Turkish peoples. The force then developed into a hereditary military corporation, more intent on exacting fresh privileges and plunder than on maintaining discipline and efficiency. They increased the chaos in the government, they overturned ministries, and they deposed and murdered sultans. They became as great a menace to the Empire of Turkey (and for the same reasons) as the Pretorian Guard had been to the Empire of Rome. It was fortunate for Europe, and especially for Austria, that the time of peril during the Thirty Years' War coincided with this period of disintegration in Turkey. There had been, as we have seen, sporadic disturbances in Hungary and Transylvania, in which the Turks pursued their customary policy of fomenting disaffection. But their chief military undertakings in that period were against Persia; and the only important aggression in Europe took place in 1645, when the ambitious but incompetent Sultan Ibrahim (1640-48) invaded Crete. The Venetians, to whom the island belonged, defended it with heroic valour, and the capital, Candia, which was attacked in 1648, was only reduced after a siege which lasted for twenty years.

Quiescence
of the
Turks
during the
Thirty
Years'
War.

Attack
upon
Crete.

In the meantime, Ibrahim was deposed in 1648, and shortly afterwards murdered. His son and successor

Deposition of
Ibrahim.

Mohammed IV.

was Mohammed IV, a boy of seven years, and there was a struggle for power between the new Sultan's mother and his grandmother, which ended in the assassination of the elder lady, and the appointment in 1656 of Mohammed Kiuprili, an Albanian, as Grand Vizier. Although over seventy years of age, Kiuprili displayed remarkable energy and ability. He stamped out disaffection; he restored the discipline of the army; and he reduced the provincial pashas to submission. He initiated a period of forty years' ministerial supremacy, during which the Turkish Empire reached its widest limits, but which in the end left it in a state of more rapid decay than ever.

Mohammed Kiuprili,
Grand Vizier,
1656-61.

Kiuprili attacks Transylvania.

The struggle between Sweden and Poland afforded a pretext and an opportunity for the war which was the essential condition of the revival of the Turkish Empire. It will be remembered that Prince Rakoczy of Transylvania had joined Charles X in the Polish war in 1657. Kiuprili, asserting that his vassal had acted without his sanction, invaded Transylvania with an overwhelming army in 1658. Rakoczy was deposed in favour of a Turkish nominee, but held out until defeated and slain in 1660. The patriotic party chose a successor, and called upon the Hungarians and the Emperor Leopold to help them. The Austrian general Montecuculi was dispatched to Transylvania, but could accomplish little. The war was still unfinished in 1661, when Kiuprili died, and was succeeded as Grand Vizier by his son Ahmad, the ablest Turkish general of the century.

Ahmad Kiuprili,
Grand Vizier,
1661-76.

The war languished for a time, and Ahmad Kiuprili hoodwinked the Emperor by friendly negotiations. But in the meantime he was preparing an army unprecedented in size and equipment since the age of Solyman the Magnificent, whose glories he was determined to revive.

When the war recommenced in 1663 with a direct attack upon Hungary, Leopold was totally unprepared, and only the slowness of the Turkish advance up the Danube saved him. The whole of Christendom, however, was stirred by the news of the renewal of the ancient peril. Volunteers poured in from all parts; the Imperial Diet voted money, and even Louis XIV, abandoning the old Franco-Turkish alliance, which dated from the reign of Francis I, sent a force of 4,000 to fight under the banner of Montecuculi, who, thus reinforced, was able to win a great victory at St. Gothard, in August 1664. But in spite of his victory the Emperor was too weak to continue the struggle. By the Treaty of Vasvar in the same month, the Turks retained the additional slice of Hungary which they had conquered (Neuhäusel), received a payment of money, and in return agreed to a truce of twenty years. Ahmad Kiuprili then devoted his energies to the reduction of Candia, which fell at last in 1669.

He invades Hungary.

Battle of St. Gothard, and Treaty of Vasvar.

Kiuprili reduces Candia.

The principal reason which led Leopold to make a peace so humiliating and so obnoxious to his Hungarian subjects, just after a great victory, was his growing anxiety at the designs of Louis XIV upon the Spanish succession. Louis was already employing his diplomacy to exact from Philip IV a formal recognition of the invalidity of Maria Theresa's renunciation of her claims (see p. 165), though without success. Leopold, as the destined husband of the Infanta Margaret, Philip's second daughter, was vitally interested in the question. Only the life of one child, the future Charles II, who was not expected to survive infancy, stood between the succession of Maria or Margaret to the Spanish throne. The Emperor's anxieties were increased by the French intrigues in Poland and Hungary, in each of which money and influence were being employed to create a French party in antagonism

Leopold's anxiety about the Spanish succession.

to the Habsburg interest. Until 1673 Leopold wavered between the policy of alliance with France on the basis of a future partition of the great inheritance, and that of open opposition: but in either case he required to have his hands free from the Turkish trouble.

§ 6. Relations between France and England.

In the meantime Louis's diplomacy was, with apparent success, employed to forestall antagonism in England and Holland, the only two powers capable of offering effective opposition to his schemes.

Marriage of Charles II.

Charles II, after his expulsion from France, had been welcomed at the court of Philip IV, and on his restoration to the throne of England his first proposals were for a Spanish alliance and a marriage with the Infanta Margaret. But Margaret was destined for the Emperor; and exasperated at the rejection of his suit Charles easily forgot his resentment at Mazarin's alliance with Cromwell, and became the ally and pensioner of his cousin the splendid autocrat of France. In 1661 his favourite sister Henrietta was married to Louis's brother, Philip Duke of Orleans; while his own marriage with Catherine of Braganza in 1662, by which he gained a huge dowry (over £800,000) and the possession of Bombay and Tangier, was brought about by French negotiations which had been opened just before Mazarin's death. Another triumph for

Sale of Dunkirk.

France and a further blow to Spain was the sale of the great Flemish port Dunkirk, Cromwell's acquisition, to Louis for £200,000. By these transactions Charles gained two firm allies, two valuable commercial possessions, and a million pounds in cash; while Louis, who by the Treaty of the Pyrenees was prevented from aiding the Portuguese openly, was enabled to do so indirectly with as much effect. The dowry of Catherine of Braganza was spent in equipping an English force which was at once dispatched to Portugal, and which completely turned the

English aid to Portugal.

scale against Spain. Two great victories, Amegial in 1663, and Villa Viciosa in 1665, finally secured Portuguese independence, although as yet Spain refused formally to recognize the accomplished fact.

In Holland the attitude of the Grand Pensionary De Witt towards France was affected in diverse ways by the question of the Spanish Netherlands and by the Restoration in England. It was evident that the Netherlands must sooner or later fall out of the grasp of Spain, but if they fell to France the safety of the United Provinces would be menaced by the situation of a powerful military monarchy on their boundaries. The established policy of Holland was to 'greet France as a friend, but not as a neighbour'. De Witt, therefore, was determined to maintain the Netherlands in some form or another as a buffer state. His favourite plan was that they should be formed into an independent Republic, and he rejected Louis's suggestion that they should be partitioned. However, in 1662, before the open declaration of Louis's intention to conquer the Spanish Netherlands for himself, De Witt concluded a close alliance with France, to which he was principally led by the menacing attitude of England.

§ 7. Hol-
land under
De Witt.

Several sources of dispute were rapidly leading England and Holland again into war. De Witt was anxious to preserve peace; but the Restoration in England was a serious embarrassment to him, owing to his bad treatment of the exiled Stuarts and their relatives of the House of Orange. Moreover, he also had wars with Portugal and Sweden on his hands. He did his utmost to placate Charles II. The English regicides in Holland were handed over; the Act of Seclusion against the young Prince of Orange (see p. 169) was withdrawn; and the war against Portugal was brought to an end with the

The
second
Anglo-
Dutch war.

Navigation Act of 1661.

friendly aid of England. But the maritime and commercial jealousy between the two countries could not be overcome. The Convention Parliament passed another Navigation Act more stringent than that of 1651, and this was confirmed by the new Parliament elected in 1661.

Seizure of Dutch possessions.

In spite of De Witt's efforts for peace, the disputes were deliberately fomented by the English ambassador at the Hague. Two acts of inexcusable aggression by England in 1664 made war inevitable. One English expedition seized some Dutch possessions on the west coast of Africa, the seat of the slave trade; and another sent by the king's brother, the Duke of York, took possession of the New Netherlands, the Dutch colony in North America, and renamed it New York, after their patron. The Dutch commenced to retaliate; war was declared in March 1665; and a terrible struggle raged for more than two years.

Secret treaty between Louis and Charles.

De Witt called upon France for the aid promised by the alliance of 1662. Louis XIV was reluctant to join the Dutch against his cousin Charles: but Colbert was glad to see the two commercial rivals of France ruining one another; and as the English at first were on the whole successful, Louis was induced to declare war against them early in 1666. However, the effect of this declaration was minimized by a secret treaty, the first of a series which Louis made with Charles in March 1667, by which he undertook to keep his fleet from joining the Dutch, and by which Charles in return promised not to oppose the French designs in the Spanish Netherlands.

DeRuyter's raid into the Medway.

But the Dutch proved to be sufficiently strong without the French fleet. In June, De Ruyter made his famous raid into the Medway and destroyed the shipping in Chatham harbour. London, whose citizens heard the

thunder of a foreign enemy's guns for the first and last time on record, was thrown into a state of panic. The ministry was thoroughly discredited by the humiliation, and hastened to make peace. In Holland, alarm at the French invasion of the Spanish Netherlands, which had begun in May 1667, and at the renewed activity of the Orange party, who always became more aggressive in times of war, led to the same result. De Witt, menaced by these two dangers, consented to somewhat unfavourable terms. By the Peace of Breda, in July 1667, the Navigation Act was only slightly modified in favour of Holland, while the New Netherlands were surrendered to England.

Peace of
Breda.

De Witt then endeavoured to stamp out the disaffection of the Orange party, who were clamouring for the appointment of their young Prince as Stadtholder and Captain-General. In August the States of Holland passed what was known as the Eternal Edict, which abolished the office of Stadtholder of Holland, and declared that no one could at the same time be Stadtholder of any province and Captain- or Admiral-General of the Union. The ultimate effect of this measure was as sinister as that of the Act of Seclusion. It rallied the nobles, the military interest, and the general population of the provinces, to the cause of the young Prince; who at the age of sixteen was already developing qualities which proved him worthy to follow in the footsteps of his fathers. But the republican party, headed by De Witt, rightly or wrongly considered it necessary to maintain their own supremacy at all costs when the safety of the state was menaced by the aggressions of France.

Disaffec-
tion of the
Orange
party.

The
Eternal
Edict of
1667.

Philip IV had died in September 1665, and Louis XIV had seized the occasion to reassert his wife's claims upon the Spanish inheritance. Maria Theresa was the sole

§ 8. The
War of
Devolu-
tion.

surviving child of Philip's first marriage; and the only surviving children of the second marriage were the Infanta Margaret, betrothed to the Emperor (whom she married in 1666), and Charles II, the sickly infant who succeeded to the crown of Spain in the cradle, and whom fate destined to be the last of the Spanish Habsburgs.

Ius devolutionis.

In Brabant and one or two other places in the Belgic provinces there existed an ancient custom known as the *ius devolutionis*, by which the children of a first marriage had the prior right of succession to land held by their father over any children of a subsequent marriage. Louis XIV declared that this rule, from which the name of the consequent War of Devolution is derived, made his wife the heir of her father in the Spanish Netherlands. By other local customs he also laid claim on her behalf to parts of Luxemburg and Franche-Comté. The claim was preposterous. The customs were purely local, affecting the private ownership of land; they were not, and never had been, concerned with public rights and sovereignty; and they only existed in parts of the territories claimed. But the pretext was good enough for Louis's supple conscience. He made vast military preparations, which were, as usual, masked by his astute diplomacy. He neutralized Austria by stirring up revolt among the Hungarians, who were incensed at the Emperor's surrender of their territory at the Treaty of Vasvar. And then, having as he thought secured the protraction of the war between England and Holland which would neutralize those powers also, he entered upon his first great act of European aggression. In May 1667, with a powerful army under the command of his great generals, he crossed the Belgian frontier without a declaration of war, proclaiming that he came to take peaceable possession of his wife's inheritance. The

Revolt
against the
Emperor in
Hungary.

French
invasion
of the
Nether-
lands.

Spanish army, still staggering under the defeat of Villa Viciosa, was powerless, and a number of great fortresses fell with scarcely a show of resistance. In the following February, while the famous Triple Alliance was already being arranged to check France, Condé made a sudden dash into Franche-Comté, and conquered it in a fortnight.

Franche-Comté.

Great alarm was created throughout Europe at these events. Spain at once recognized the independence of Portugal (February 1668); and endeavoured to gain the assistance of the Emperor, though her efforts were effectively prevented by Louis's diplomacy. In England there was a sudden change of policy. The conclusion of peace with Holland was followed rapidly by the fall of Clarendon. He was overthrown by a factious combination of opponents who were anxious to step into his place, and who were supported by the malign influence of the king's mistress, Lady Castlemaine. After the custom of all oppositions, the minister was made the scapegoat of the popular discontent arising from public calamities such as the plague and the fire of London, which were beyond the control of mankind, as well as of his own misdeeds, real and imaginary. Although there was no evidence to support the charge, it was confidently believed that he had been heavily bribed to consent to the sale of Dunkirk; and the immense unpopularity of the transaction in England reflected discredit upon his foreign policy, more particularly as his friendship for France had not been effective in preventing Louis from joining the Dutch in the recent war. It was natural, therefore, that the Cabal, which succeeded him, should reverse his foreign policy; and Sir William Temple was allowed by Arlington to open negotiations at the Hague for his favourite scheme for an alliance between England and Holland. De Witt, although

§ 9. The Triple Alliance, and the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle.

Fall of Clarendon.

The Cabal.

Temple at the Hague.

Triple
Alliance
between
England,
Holland,
and
Sweden.

Treaty of
Aix-la-
Chapelle,
May 1668.

Louis's
motives for
peace.

Secret
partition
treaty.

somewhat suspicious of the sincerity of this sudden change of front, was only too ready to accept Temple's proposals; and in January 1668 he agreed to form a defensive treaty with England, which by the accession of Sweden under certain conditions in April became the Triple Alliance. Thus Louis's first great act of aggression produced the first of the European coalitions against him. Faced by the Triple Alliance he gave way and concluded with Spain the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, by which he retained a line of fortresses in the Netherlands which strengthened the north-eastern boundary of France, but surrendered his other conquests, including Franche-Comté.

European diplomacy hailed the treaty as a decisive triumph for the Triple Alliance, and undoubtedly the coalition was an unexpected check to France. But Louis, while he rightly deemed it prudent to pause for the moment, had a vaster ambition in view. He had lately induced the Emperor Leopold to consent to a secret treaty of partition, by which the Spanish inheritance was to be shared between them in the event of the death of Charles II of Spain without children. Nobody then expected Charles to survive infancy, and Louis was confident that in a few years at most he would thus be able to appropriate more than he surrendered at Aix-la-Chapelle. Moreover, he regarded both treaties as the tacit recognition by Spain and the Empire of the invalidity of Maria Theresa's act of renunciation. He was thus, by the apparent check in 1668, only impelled to pursue his schemes of aggrandizement with greater determination than ever. The formation of the hostile coalition convinced him that Holland at least would never consent to his occupation of the Spanish Netherlands. Holland, therefore, must first be isolated and

ruined. This plan required the detachment of England and Sweden from the Triple Alliance; especially of England, who possessed the only fleet then capable of resisting the naval power of the Dutch.

Charles II was very easily won. He had not been responsible for the Triple Alliance. He detested the Calvinism and the republicanism of the Dutch as much as did Louis; and he was personally affronted at the treatment of his nephew William of Orange by the dominant party. He was also longing to free himself from the irksome control of his Parliament, in which the growing opposition had become only the more active and confident by its triumph over Clarendon. His brother James was anxious to make public profession of his Catholic faith; and Charles himself, though generally indifferent in religion, had at least strong preferences in the same direction, and believed that as a Catholic king, backed up by French arms and money, he could make himself absolute.

§ 10. Dis-
solution
of the
Triple
Alliance.
Views of
Charles II.

The English people themselves were but feebly interested in the cause of checking French continental aggression. To them the vital concern was their commercial and colonial rivalry with Holland; and the king knew that he could count upon their support in a war waged in pursuit of that quarrel. In his negotiations with Louis, Charles urged the necessity of keeping this point uppermost as the ostensible cause of the war; and he therefore endeavoured to secure the promise of a considerable share in the Dutch colonial possessions as part of the price of his alliance, so that he might satisfy the inevitable demands of the English commercial classes. But Louis was impolitic enough to resist the request; and thus, as events proved, he exposed his real designs, and ruined the chance of making the war popular in England.

English
commer-
cial in-
terests.

The
Dutch
tricked.

Henrietta
of Orleans.

Secret
Treaty of
Dover.

Death of
Henrietta
of Orleans.

Franco-
Swedish
alliance.

Meanwhile every possible means was adopted to allay the suspicions of the Dutch. De Witt was successfully hoodwinked by the confirmation of his friend Temple as English ambassador in Holland. The most delicate part of the negotiations was conducted by the Duchess of Orleans, who came to England on what professed to be a merely private visit to her brother: and the result was the secret Treaty of Dover, signed on behalf of France by Colbert in May 1670. Charles II promised to declare himself a Catholic, and to join forces with France on land and sea against Holland; he was to receive three Dutch ports as his share of the spoils, a subsidy of two million *livres*, and the aid of a French force to quell possible disturbances in England. The treaty was followed by the untimely death of Henrietta of Orleans on her return to France, under circumstances which roused, though probably without truth, suspicions of poison. The Duchess in her dying agonies was confident that she was the victim of the political and personal jealousy of her husband, who was, with justice, distrusted by his brother Louis, and had been completely ignored in the recent negotiations.

Sweden was gained as easily as England. The only question to be settled was her price, which the Triple Alliance enabled her to raise considerably. She had no real interest in resisting France. Her interests were to preserve her continental conquests and her Baltic commerce by checking the ambitions of the Dutch, of Brandenburg, and of Denmark. By a treaty in May 1672 she also joined France, agreeing to land an army in North Germany, and in concert with Denmark to close the Baltic to the Dutch navy, in return for cash down and an annual payment to follow.

In other quarters also vast diplomatic and military

preparations were made for the approaching war. In February 1670, Ferdinand Maria, Elector of Bavaria (son and successor of Maximilian, who had died in 1651), made a treaty with France by which he agreed, among other things, to support Louis's candidature to the Imperial throne on the death of Leopold I.

French
alliance
with
Bavaria.

Then Louis picked a quarrel with Lorraine, and in August 1670 French forces once again occupied that duchy. Holland was thus cut off from any prospect of aid from the Spaniards in Franche-Comté; while she was also isolated on the east by French alliances with several of the smaller North-German princes.

Louis XIV
occupies
Lorraine.

In November 1671, Leopold I, towards whom Louis was alternately conciliatory and intimidating, distressed by the dangers from Turkey and Hungary, agreed to observe neutrality so long as Louis abstained from attacking Spain or the Empire. The last condition was secured by an important French alliance with the Elector of Cologne, who also controlled the Bishopric of Liège. By this means Louis gained a route for the invasion of Holland through the territories of Liège and Cologne, thus avoiding the Spanish Netherlands; while Louvois was enabled to accumulate, in advance, vast stores of arms, ammunition, and food, at Neuss, Kaiserwerth, and other places close to the Dutch boundaries.

Leopold I
agrees to
remain
neutral.

French
alliance
with
Cologne.

Tempting offers were also made to Brandenburg, and the Great Elector hesitated for some time between the rival powers. But eventually his Protestantism, and his antagonism to the Swedes on the Pomeranian and Baltic questions, carried him to the side of the Dutch. In February 1671 he made a treaty by which he promised armed assistance to the Republic.

Branden-
burg joins
Holland.

In Poland strenuous efforts had been made since 1660 to secure the election of a French candidate as successor

French
intrigues in
Poland.

to John Casimir, who pledged himself to abdicate and to retire to some rich estates provided for him in France. But these plans for the time being failed. John Casimir resigned in 1668; and after a fierce conflict between the French and Habsburg parties the choice of the Diet fell in June 1669 upon a native and neutral candidate, Michael Wisniowiecki, who the year after his election married the Emperor's sister Eleonora Maria. However, the situation was soon to be changed again in Poland. The second of the great acts of aggression of France in the west of Europe coincided with, and was indirectly aided by, the second great act of aggression of the Turks in the east. While Louis XIV was attacking Holland in 1672, Ahmad Kiuprili invaded Poland with an overwhelming force; and one effect was, as the sequel will show, to re-establish for a time French predominance in that distracted land.

Election of
Michael
to the
Polish
throne.

Turkish
invasion of
Poland.

CHAPTER IX

FROM THE DUTCH WAR TO THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION

1. The Dutch War of 1672. 2. Formation of a coalition against France. 3. Peace of Nimeguen. 4. War between Turkey and Poland. 5. The Reunion policy. 6. Turkish attack upon Vienna. 7. Results of the Turkish rout. 8. The Truce of Ratisbon. 9. Revocation of the Edict of Nantes. 10. The League of Augsburg. 11. Louis XIV and Innocent XI. 12. The Revolution in England.

By the spring of 1672 Louis's preparations for the subjugation of Holland were complete. With an army 120,000 strong, the greatest hitherto known in modern warfare, commanded by Turenne and Condé and accompanied by Vauban to direct siege operations, he marched with great rapidity from Charleroi down the Meuse, past Liège and Maestricht, and reached the Rhine at Neuss on May 31. Condé with one part of the army then crossed to the right bank of the Rhine. Turenne with the other part marched down the left bank by a parallel course, reducing the towns on his route, and rejoined his colleague on the right bank at Wesel. On June 12 the passage of the Old Rhine at Tolhuys was forced by the French ; and thus, after a brief and brilliant campaign of one month, Holland lay at the mercy of Louis XIV.

§ 1. The
Dutch
War of
1672.

Instead however of pushing on at once to Amsterdam, the fall of which would have destroyed the Republic, Louis turned aside to besiege some unimportant places. The Dutch seized the opportunity to open the sluices at Muiden. The sea flowed in ; Amsterdam was turned

into an island ; and the Dutch fleet carried men and provisions to other towns similarly isolated. The respite proved sufficient for the people to organize a more strenuous defence ; and Holland was saved, though at a grievous cost.

De Witt's
respon-
sibility.

De Witt must be held responsible for the distressing lack of preparation which the disasters of that year revealed. The unhappy feud with the military party, and the motive of economy, had led him to reduce the army, and garrisons of the towns. In spite of the vast military and diplomatic preparations of France, and the increasing animosity which he provoked by retaliating against Colbert's hostile tariff, he obstinately adhered to his conviction, until too late, that the invasion was not seriously intended or at least could be averted by diplomacy. The immediate result was the collapse of his party in an explosion of popular resentment. In July, the Eternal Edict was swept aside ; and William of Orange, not yet twenty-two years of age, was proclaimed Stadtholder of Holland and Zeeland, and Captain- and Admiral-General of the United Provinces. A month later John De Witt and his brother Cornelis were literally torn to pieces by the infuriated mob in the Hague.

William
of Orange
Stadtholder.

Murder
of the
De Witts.

The
question of
William's
responsi-
bility.

William's supposed responsibility for this terrible outrage is a hotly debated question. He was absent from the Hague at the time, and the minutest investigation has failed to furnish any proof of his complicity. But there remains as an indelible blot upon his memory the painful fact, that not only did the real perpetrators escape without punishment, but were actually rewarded. The only possible excuse is that proceedings against them would inevitably have stirred up party strife afresh, when the very existence of the state was endangered. Louis did his best to gain the young Stadtholder, and offered

Louis's
offers to
William.

him the sovereignty of Holland under French protection. But the offer was rejected with the scorn which it merited ; and from that day, when he beheld the fruitful fields of his beloved native land turned into a waste of waters, until his death, undying hatred of France became the one profound passion of William's cold and reserved nature.

Notwithstanding the early successes which appeared to justify it, Louis's attack upon Holland was a blunder of the gravest character. It ruined the one party in the Provinces which was inclined to be friendly to France ; and it brought out of obscurity the man whose diplomatic genius was to be the chief agency in persuading the states of Europe to sink their minor differences and to combine in a great coalition against the public aggressor. It was the frank abandonment of the old and safe policy of exploiting the Protestant antagonism to the House of Habsburg in the interests of France. It estranged from Louis most of the German states and helped to heal their feud with the Emperor.

The war also marks the decline of the influence of Colbert, the abandonment of his commercial and colonial policy, and the ruin of his economic measures. Although he retained his offices until his death in 1683, his rival Louvois was henceforth the first man in the king's favour.

There can be no question as to the efficiency of the administration of Louvois, displayed chiefly, though by no means solely, in his wonderful reorganization of the army. But it is equally unquestionable that his political influence was of the most sinister character. It stimulated to excess the natural arrogance and recklessness of the king, and it was responsible for some of the worst blunders of the reign. It was Louvois who, when the

French
blunders.

Decline of
Colbert's
influence.

Louvois's
influence
upon
Louis.

Neglect
to seize
Muyden.

Rejection
of terms
offered
by the
Dutch.

§ 2. For-
mation of
a coalition
against
France.

Success of
William's
diplomacy.

French
losses in
1673.

success of the first campaign depended upon the immediate capture of Muyden, which guarded the great dykes, a course strongly urged by Turenne and Condé, allowed and encouraged Louis to waste invaluable time, and divert himself in the region of the Yssel in his favourite and safe recreation of reducing defenceless towns. It was Louvois also who in June 1672 persuaded the king to reject terms offered by the States-General of the Union which, in face of the growing alarm and antagonism of Europe, would have given him all that he could hope to retain, and would have enabled him to retire in triumph.

The first two years of the war were a race between strategy and diplomacy. The French generals and army were unequalled, but in order to win they must crush their enemies utterly before William's diplomacy brought Europe to the aid of the Dutch. William was an inferior general, although a brave and intrepid soldier; but in diplomacy he was Louis's master, and he successfully transformed the attack upon Holland into a European war. In October 1672 the Emperor Leopold, convinced that his hopes of safety on the basis of neutrality or alliance with France were illusory, joined the Dutch; and in 1673 he was followed by Spain and Lorraine. Turenne's successes on the Weser and the Elbe forced the Great Elector to make peace in June 1673; but in August the capture of Bonn by the allies forced the Electors of Cologne, Trier, and Mainz to abandon France, and diverted the war entirely from Holland. By the end of that year France had lost all her conquests in the United Provinces except Maestricht and Grave; and the extension of the war prevented her from ever recovering the ground thus lost. In 1674 Denmark, the Elector Palatine, and Brunswick joined the coalition, and the Great Elector once more

took up arms. More important still, in February 1674 France lost her most valuable ally, England.

In England the opening of the war had been coincident with two very ominous events, the reception of the Duke of York into the Catholic Church, and the issue of the Declaration of Indulgence; and the suspicion was aroused that the war was intended as an attack, not so much upon a commercial rival, as upon the Protestant religion. A reaction set in. Charles II had to withdraw the Declaration of Indulgence, and to accept the Test Act, which forced the Duke of York to retire from the Admiralty, and Clifford from the ministry. The naval war had gone badly, and the English force promised to Louis by the Treaty of Dover had never been able to land in Holland. The great battle of Southwold Bay in June 1672, often described as indecisive, was really a strategical victory for the Dutch; since De Ruyter, although with an inferior fleet, gained his object in preventing his enemies from attacking the coast of Holland while Louis invaded by land. In the following year Prince Rupert, who succeeded the Duke of York as Admiral, suffered a succession of defeats, which he, with some justice, attributed to lack of support from the French fleet.

At the beginning of the war the Dutch had recovered their colony in America, and they now offered to restore it as the price of peace. They gained their object. In 1674 the Cabal was overthrown, and Charles was forced by the Parliament to make peace. He could congratulate himself that he had secured some at least of his objects. The Dutch republican party was overthrown, his nephew, William of Orange, was restored to the dignities of his ancestors, and New York was recovered. In 1677 William himself crossed over to England and obtained the consent

Events in
England.

Declara-
tion of In-
dulgence.

The
Test Act.

Battle of
Southwold
Bay.

Rupert's
naval
defeats.

England
makes
peace.

Marriage of
William
of Orange.

of Charles to his marriage with Mary the daughter of the Duke of York, a union which was to be of momentous importance in the history of England and of Europe.

Progress of
the Euro-
pean war.

Victories
and death
of Turenne.

Battle of
Fehrbellin.

The naval
war.

§ 3. Peace
of Nim-
eguen.

The European war progressed with varying fortunes. In 1674 France won a series of successes. Franche-Comté was conquered in June. Condé defeated William at Seneff in Brabant in August, and ruined the latter's design of an invasion of France. Turenne carried out a brilliant campaign upon the Rhine, blackened by the atrocity of the devastation of the Palatinate, which was ordered by Louvois. In the autumn of 1674 he was forced to retire from Alsace by the approach of a large army of Brandenburgers; but in the midwinter, taking his enemies unawares, he issued from behind the screen of the Vosges, reconquered Alsace, and then crossed the Rhine, outmanœuvring the Imperialist general Montecuculi, and forcing him to accept battle in July 1675 in a disadvantageous position. As this contest was about to open, the great French general was struck by a cannon ball and killed on the spot. Condé retired from his command soon after his colleague's death. In June 1675 the Swedes, who had invaded Brandenburg, were overwhelmed by the Great Elector at Fehrbellin, and were soon driven out of western Pomerania. In 1677 Louis's brother, Philip of Orleans, defeated William at Cassel, and the Swedes overthrew Christian V of Denmark at Lunden. The naval war in the Mediterranean was about equally balanced; and the death of De Ruyter in 1676 removed another great figure from the scene.

By 1678 all the combatants were ready for peace. The war was concluded by a series of treaties between France and Holland in August 1678, between France and Spain in September 1678, and between France and the Empire in February 1679, which together are known

as the Peace of Nimeguen. The Dutch retained their territories intact, and they secured the lowering of the hostile French tariffs. France gained Franche-Comté and another line of fortresses in the Netherlands from Spain; she restored Philippsburg to the Empire but retained Alsace with Breisach and Freiburg. Charles V (IV) of Lorraine who, on the death of his uncle in 1675, succeeded to the empty title of Duke of Lorraine, refused the terms offered to him, and his duchy remained in French hands. Thus France, though she failed entirely in the primary object of subduing the Dutch, secured further important acquisitions at the expense of Spain and the Empire.

Holland saved.

French gains.

Louis also displayed the utmost generosity to his ally Sweden, insisting that she should come out of the struggle without loss. In 1679, by the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, the Great Elector was forced to surrender nearly all his conquests in western Pomerania; and by the Treaty of Fontainebleau Denmark also restored what she had gained from Sweden.

Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye.

Treaty of Fontainebleau.

The war between Turkey and Poland, which began in 1672, lasted until 1676. Kiuprili's first attack was irresistible, and Michael, the Polish king, concluded a humiliating treaty in October 1672, by which he ceded Podolia, and acknowledged Turkish suzerainty over Ukraine. But the national cause was taken up by the heroic John Sobieski, who repudiated the treaty and won a crushing victory over Kiuprili in November 1673. Just then King Michael died, and the national champion was elected to succeed him in May 1674. His choice was a triumph for France. He was identified with the French party in Poland, and was married to a French wife. In 1675 he made a treaty with Louis, by which, in return for French subsidies and the promise of French aid in restoring Polish suzerainty over East

§ 4. War between Turkey and Poland. Kiuprili conquers Podolia.

Sobieski elected King of Poland.

Prussia, he promised to support the Hungarian rebels against the Emperor. He won some further successes against the Turks, but failed to drive them from Podolia ; and by the Treaty of Zurawna, arranged under French mediation in 1676, the Turks were left in possession of the greater part of their conquests.

Treaty of
Zurawna.

Death of
Kiuprili.

Kara
Mustafa's
plans.

Ahmad Kiuprili died a few days after the Peace of Zurawna was signed, having by his acquisition of Neu-häusel, Crete, and Podolia, extended the Turkish Empire to its widest limits in Europe. His successor Kara Mustafa was as warlike and as ambitious as the Kiuprilis, but without their ability. During the peace negotiations he had already expressed to the French his intention of making war upon the Emperor.

§ 5. The
Reunion
policy.

Immediately after the Peace of Nimeguen Louis XIV laid his plans for a third great act of European aggression, which is known as the Reunion policy, by which he gained more territory, while nominally at peace, than by any of his wars ; and he did so in the confident assurance that the alliance with Poland, the Hungarian rebellion, and the promised Turkish attack upon the Emperor would effectively prevent the House of Habsburg from interfering. The pretext of the Reunion policy was the vagueness of the terms of the Treaties of Westphalia, Aix-la-Chapelle, and Nimeguen. Certain places had been ceded to France together with their dependencies. But in France the feudal bond involved a much stricter and closer tie than in the Empire ; and it was by means of an interpretation of the term 'dependency' far more comprehensive than even French law warranted that Louis now sought to extend his dominions further along the Rhine.

The case
of Lor-
raine.

The three Lorraine bishoprics, Metz, Toul, and Verdun, included both spiritual and temporal dependencies, and

some of these were situated well within the Empire. The bishops, who were all creatures of France, on being summoned to do homage, applied, undoubtedly at the instigation of Louis, for a tribunal to settle their claims; and a committee of the *Parlement* of Metz was thereupon appointed to investigate the nature and extent of the sessions. This committee was the first of the Chambers of Reunion. The bishops laid before it a list of all those who had occupied territories which they claimed, and of those who owed but had not performed feudal duties. Since Louis was both suitor and judge in the same court, the decisions were of course in his favour, and his armies promptly carried them into effect.

The
Chamber
of Metz,

A still more important case was that of Alsace. The Treaty of Westphalia had saved the rights of the immediate vassals of the Empire; and these included besides some nobles, the great free city of Strassburg which commanded the principal passage across the Rhine in Alsace, and ten other Imperial towns. A second Chamber of Reunion was established at Breisach, which in 1680 declared Louis absolute sovereign of the whole of Alsace. There was but little resistance. The nobles and smaller towns soon submitted; while Strassburg was powerless without external aid. The Protestant citizens called in vain for help. The bishop, Fürstenberg, was in the pay of France; the Emperor was menaced by a greater danger from the Turks; and other powers were neutralized by Louis's diplomacy and bribes. After a process of gradual isolation Strassburg was occupied in September 1681 by Louvois and the French army; and a month later Louis and his court entered the city in great state.

The case
of Alsace.

The
Chamber of
Breisach.

Seizure of
Strassburg.

Two other Chambers of Reunion were established, one at Besançon for Franche-Comté, and another at Tournay

Chambers
of Besan-
çon and
Tournay.

Casale,
and
Luxem-
burg.

for Flanders, with similar results. On the same day as the capture of Strassburg another French force seized Casale; and in November 1681 siege was laid to Luxemburg.

These flagrant acts of spoliation were only made possible by the distracted and exhausted state of Europe. While the armies of France had been maintained on a war footing after Nimeguen, the other powers, weary of war and too ready to convince themselves that the danger was past, had disbanded theirs; and William of Orange was too harassed and enfeebled by the renewed antagonism of the republican party in Holland to rouse his own countrymen or his recent allies to action.

The
Great
Elector
allies with
France.

Brandenburg was again on the side of France. The Great Elector was incensed at the Emperor, who had looked on in unconcern while France had forced him to hand back to Sweden his conquests in western Pomerania, and who also refused to recognize his claims in Silesia. Frederick William therefore became convinced that he could gain more as the friend of France than as her enemy, and with his customary opportunism changed completely round. He accepted French money, and in return promised to support Louis as candidate for the Imperial crown on the next vacancy.

England
neutra-
lized.

Charles II of England also had again become Louis's pensioner. Towards the close of the Dutch war the English Parliament was on the point of forcing their king to declare war against the French, and Louis, in order to teach Charles that French support was indispensable to him if he wished to be king indeed, had intrigued with and sent money to the opposition. By this means he secured another secret treaty in 1678 by which Charles, in return for six million *livres*, promised to dissolve Parliament, disband the army, and not to

Secret
treaty of
1678.

assist the Dutch. The treaty was drawn up by Danby, who, though an opponent of France, was sufficiently loyal to his master to obey his command. As soon, however, as Louis had secured peace with the Dutch, he revealed the secret, in order to ruin Danby. The nation was already in a state of frenzy over the Popish plot; the fresh news appeared to confirm the worst fears of the existence of a widespread conspiracy to overthrow the Protestant faith; and Danby was swept from power in a flood of popular exasperation aroused by the policy which he abhorred. Charles himself became seriously alarmed at the Reunion policy, especially at the siege of Luxemburg; but, distracted by the bitter conflicts over the Exclusion Bill at home, he could do nothing but protest. At last in 1681, determined to be rid of Parliam-
 ment for ever, he accepted another huge bribe from Louis, which effectually neutralized what little European influence he possessed.

Fall of
Danby.

Last
treaty
between
Louis and
Charles.

But outside France the chief though unavowed assistance to the Reunion policy came undoubtedly from the Turks. Kara Mustafa's promised attack upon Leopold had been postponed by the outbreak of a war with Russia in 1677—a war which was epoch-making, since it was the first conflict between the Turks and their great Muscovite enemy, who was eventually to oust Austria from her position of champion of Christendom against the infidel. The war lasted until 1681, and left Russia in control of Ukraine. Then Kara Mustafa immediately began his preparations for a grand attack upon Vienna. The Emperor, scarcely master in his own state, distracted by the aggressions of France in the west, and by the continual rebellions in Hungary, was in no condition to resist without allies. After the Peace of Nimeguen, convinced at last that he could never

§ 6. Turk-
ish attack
upon
Vienna.
War
between
Russia and
Turkey.

Kara
Mustafa's
prepara-
tions.

Attempts
to conciliate
the
Hun-
garians.

crush the Hungarians by force, he had attempted conciliation. He granted them religious toleration, complete amnesty for past disloyalty, and a wide extension of political liberty. But these well-meant efforts failed. The Catholics were exasperated at the recognition of Protestantism; and the extreme Protestants professed to be still dissatisfied. Some were determined at all costs to win complete independence; and many, not without cause from their past experiences, distrusted the sincerity of this sudden change of front. Probably both these motives influenced the national leader Emeric Tökölyi in his ultimate decision to throw in his lot with the Turks.

Emeric
Tökölyi.

Leopold's
want of
prepara-
tion.

Leopold, however, in spite of warnings, appeared to be blind to the approaching danger; or was confident at least that he could avert it by negotiations and further concessions to Tökölyi. He made no military preparations until almost too late; and but for the incredible slowness of Kara Mustafa he must have been overwhelmed. By the end of 1682, however, the excessive demands made by the Turks at last convinced him that the worst was intended; and hasty messages were sent throughout Europe imploring aid against the infidel.

Louis XIV
and the
Turkish
invasion.

Louis XIV stood aloof. He, of course, had no desire to see Europe submerged under the Mohammedan flood; and in fact made a great parade of his generosity in raising the siege of Luxemburg at this time. But just as he was always ready to foment domestic opposition to his political allies whenever they showed the slightest sign of independence, in order to reduce them again to the position of humble suppliants for his favour, so he thought Europe would at length be driven by adversity to seek not his alliance but his patronage. He was now avowedly aiming at the Imperial crown;

and his natural greed and vanity were stimulated by the adulatory writings of court historians, who, in defiance of the truth, asserted that the French monarchy was the legitimate heir of the Frankish Empire; whereas in reality Louis's ancestor Hugh Capet had usurped the French crown from the heirs of Charlemagne. When Leopold, as Louis expected and probably hoped, should have succumbed to the Turks, he himself intended to step in like a new Charlemagne as the protector and champion of the Church and civilization, and to restore the unity of Christendom under his sole dominion. In the meantime, the comparatively modest Reunion policy could be concluded without interruption.

Louis's allies England and Brandenburg also remained neutral; William of Orange was rendered powerless by the republican opposition; and Spain was in a hopeless condition.

However, help poured in. Pope Innocent XI sent money and used his influence with the Catholic princes. Venice joined Leopold against her ancient enemy. The Electors of Bavaria and Saxony, and the young Prince George of Brunswick-Lüneburg (afterwards King George I of England) accompanied by four of his brothers, led their forces to join the Emperor, while even the Imperial Diet voted money. Leopold and his family sought safety in Passau; and since Montecuculi had died in 1681 the Imperial command was given to Charles, the titular Duke of Lorraine, who was now Leopold's brother-in-law, having married Eleonora Maria, the widow of the Polish king, Michael. Under him fought the young Prince Eugene of Savoy, who before long was to rise to eminence as the greatest, after Marlborough, of the commanders opposed to Louis XIV, and second to none in the military annals of Austria.

European
aid against
the Turks.

Charles of
Lorraine.

Eugene of
Savoy.

John
Sobieski
joins
Leopold.

But beyond all in value and importance was the aid which came from Poland, in spite of Louis XIV's effort to prevent it. John Sobieski, although a recent ally of France, and married to a French wife, was already disgusted with Louis, and was sufficiently familiar with his methods of intrigue to be able to baffle them. Motives of generosity, ambition and vengeance, devotion to the Catholic faith, and the need to secure his own boundaries, all impelled him to resist the Turks to the utmost. On March 31, 1683, he concluded with Leopold the momentous treaty by which he promised to come to the rescue of Vienna with a force of 40,000.

The Turk-
ish rout
before
Vienna.

The urgency was so great that Sobieski had to commence his march with only 25,000 men; but with these he was able to bear off the chief laurels of the magnificent victory which followed. The Turks, after a long and dilatory march through Hungary, commenced the blockade of Vienna in July. Charles of Lorraine left a large garrison in the city, which maintained a heroic defence; and he himself manœuvred in the vicinity in order to harass the besiegers and to cover the Polish advance. After two months of desperate anxiety the Poles appeared. The great battle was fought on September 12. Kara Mustafa had left his best troops lying idle in the trenches around Vienna, and he committed almost every other conceivable blunder. His advance guard was swept away in an irresistible onrush; and the besiegers, hemmed in between the relieving army and the garrison of the city, were cut to pieces. The carnage continued for eight hours until closed by nightfall; and before the dawn the survivors had vanished, never to return.

§ 7. Re-
sults of the
Turkish
rout.

The Turkish rout before Vienna was as momentous in its consequences as any battle—Breitenfeld, Nördlingen, or even Blenheim—fought during this century of inter-

minable war. It revealed the fact that the Turkish menace was passing away. The Ottoman soldiers were as well disciplined and as brave as ever, but their methods of fighting and their equipment were those of a century before. They had to face foes armed with improved weapons and commanded by generals who had learned to apply the strategical lessons taught by the Thirty Years' War. The defeat in 1683 was the beginning of the process, sometimes rapid, sometimes very gradual, but never intermitted for more than two or three decades at a time, of the expulsion of the Ottoman Turk from Europe, which has taken 230 years to bring to the eve of completion. It opened the most terrible epoch in the experience of the subject races. While the Turks were conquerors or merely quiescent, their rule, although both incompetent and oppressive, was comparatively tolerable; but in the hour of defeat they behaved like fiends. Starving and panic-stricken hordes swept back again like a plague, wreaking their fury upon the defenceless peasantry in the Balkans and adjacent lands; thus nourishing among the Christian populations that implacable hatred against the Moslem which, in spite of the past century of diplomatic efforts by the great powers, devoted principally to the strange and, as events have proved, futile object of maintaining for the Turks a foothold in Europe, has at last spent itself in an orgy of blood.¹

End of the
Turkish
menace.

Gradual
expulsion
of the
Turks
from
Europe.

Misery
of the
subject
races.

The first stage of that process was a war of fifteen years' duration, closed by the Peace of Carlowitz in 1699. The victory of Vienna was followed in March 1684 by a still closer alliance between Austria, Venice, and Poland, under the protection of the Pope, which was

War
against
the Turks,
1684-99.
The Holy
League,
1684.

¹ This was written before the recovery of Adrianople by the Turks in July 1913.

known as the Holy League. After her first triumph Poland did but little. John Sobieski, though faithful to his allies, was hampered by the turbulence of his country, continually fomented by French intrigues. But for the first few years the other two allies won a series of almost uninterrupted successes. The Venetians attacked the Turks in the Adriatic, the Mediterranean, and the Aegean. Athens fell to them in 1687; and though they evacuated it in the following year, by 1690 they had completely conquered the Morean peninsula.

Successes of Venice.

Conquest of the Morea.

Successes of Austria.

Recovery of Hungary.

Capture of Belgrade.

Mohammed IV deposed.

Leopold continues the war.

The Austrians, under Charles of Lorraine, by winning a great victory at Harkány in August 1687, undid the work which had been accomplished by Solyman the Magnificent at the battle of Mohacs very near the same spot in 1526, and restored Austrian dominion over practically the whole of Hungary. The Hungarian Diet shortly afterwards consented to recognize the crown as hereditary in the Habsburg House. In September 1688 the capture of the great fortress Belgrade laid open the way to Constantinople. Constantinople itself was in a state of revolt and anarchy: Mohammed IV, in November 1687, had been deposed in favour of his brother, Solyman II. The humiliated Turks made constant appeals for peace, which William of Orange and Spain urged the Emperor to accept, in order to enable him to devote his undivided attention to the western problem. But Leopold confidently expected to drive the Turks out of Europe, and decided to continue the war. The outbreak of the war of the League of Augsburg against France ruined all prospect of achieving this ambition. Once again Louis XIV proved to be the best friend of the Turks. In fact, but for his renewed aggressions in the west of Europe at this crisis in their history the events of 1912 and 1913 would in all probability have been anticipated by more than two centuries.

Meanwhile, we must examine the effect of the Turkish defeat of 1683 upon Louis XIV and his Reunion policy. It was a blow to the French monarch hardly less than to the Turks themselves. In restoring the prestige of Austria it ruined for ever his coveted ambition of gaining the Imperial crown, though Louis himself failed to recognize the fact. It revealed the hollowness of his professed desire to undertake the championship of Christendom, and conferred the laurels upon the Polish king who had refused to be his tool. Louis's parade of magnanimity in suspending the siege of Luxemburg hoodwinked nobody. It was really due to the opposition of Holland and England, and the siege was renewed in 1684. The 'Most Christian King' stood exposed as the real, if not avowed, ally of the infidel. Although the victory of Vienna was followed by some recrimination among the allies, they had at least learnt the wisdom and necessity of combining against one aggressor, and were soon to apply the lesson with as great effect against the other. The alliance which saved Vienna from the Turk was the true forerunner of the League of Augsburg against Louis XIV.

Effect
of the
Turkish
defeat upon
France.

However, the Turkish War enabled the Reunion policy to be continued with apparent success, and Luxemburg fell at length in June 1684. But in spite of all, the policy was a gross blunder both in its conception and in the methods of its accomplishment. If it were to be permanently successful, the greatest care was necessary to conciliate all possible antagonists. But instead of this, Louis recklessly and needlessly outraged the susceptibilities of enemies and allies alike.

§ 8. The
Truce of
Ratisbon.
Louis's
blunders.

William III was the enemy most to be feared, but in 1680 Louis had further embittered his antagonism by devastating his little ancestral principality of Orange, situated on the Rhone in the south of France.

Devasta-
tion of
Orange.

Seizure of
Zwei-
brücken.

Sweden, except for the temporary detachment in 1668, was France's old and faithful ally ; but when in 1681 the Duchy of Zweibrücken, to which Sweden had claims by the Treaty of Westphalia, fell vacant, Louis promptly occupied it, callously ignoring the rights of his ally.

Bombard-
ment of
Genoa.

In 1684 Louis wreaked a terrible vengeance upon the Republic of Genoa for its friendship to Spain. In his own words to the Papal Nuncio who endeavoured to intervene, he was determined 'to leave a memorable example of his vengeance upon all those who should dare to offend him'. In May the French fleet opened a bombardment, and in six days reduced three-quarters of the city to ashes. In the next year the unfortunate Doge was forced to visit Versailles, and there to tender the submission of the Republic to Louis in person.

William's
diplomacy.
Treaty
between
William
and
Charles XI
of Sweden.

In the meantime, the diplomacy of William of Orange was unceasing. Immediately after the seizure of Zweibrücken, Charles XI of Sweden had made a treaty with him against France. Upon this foundation William sought to build up a great European coalition, which was to maintain by diplomacy or by force the settlements of Westphalia, the Pyrenees, Aix-la-Chapelle, and Nim-

The league
of 1682.

eguen. In 1682 the alliance was joined by the Emperor, Spain, Saxony, Bavaria, Hesse-Cassel, and the leading members of the Circles of the Upper Rhine and Franconia, each of whom was menaced in one way or another by the Reunion policy.

Truce of
Ratisbon.

However, the elements of antagonism to France were not yet sufficiently concentrated to permit of open intervention ; and in August 1684 the Truce of Ratisbon was arranged, by which France was allowed to retain the 'reunited' territories, including Strassburg, Casale, and the fortress of Luxemburg, for twenty years. In France the truce was hailed as a great triumph, and Louis's next

plan was to convert it into a permanent peace. But William regarded it as a breathing-space in which to complete his preparations for the European coalition.

Everything now depended upon England. William, realizing that neither the maritime coalition of 1668 nor the continental coalition of 1673 had been adequate to stay the aggressions of France, sought to combine the two; and for this purpose the aid of the English navy was essential. He watched the development of events in England with the keenest interest. He perceived that while the English king was out of harmony with the Parliament, the country could be of little weight in European politics, and would probably be in the pay of France. On the other hand, with the sovereign and Parliament in harmony, England's influence would be great, and her interest would be to maintain the Balance of Power in Europe, which France alone threatened to disturb. Thus William advised Charles II to yield before the storm raised by the Popish Plot. He has been accused of suggesting the Exclusion Bill; but although that ill-considered measure favoured his personal interests there is no truth in the accusation. However, when it was evident that unless the Bill were carried there would be a complete breach, he again advised Charles to give way, though Charles was too loyal to his brother to accept this advice. When the reaction against the Whigs came in 1683, he did all that he could to propitiate Charles. He sent his friend and adviser Bentinck to London to express his horror at the Rye House Plot, and he sheltered Monmouth at the Hague. When Charles II died, in 1685, William's attitude to his father-in-law, James II, was scrupulously correct and conciliatory. He dismissed Monmouth, promptly sent over the English regiments in the pay of Holland when James required

William's
policy
towards
England.

Import-
tance of the
English
navy.

William's
advice to
Charles II.

His atti-
tude to
James II.

them to serve against the western insurrection, and even offered to command them in person. He soon found, however, that James could never be his ally; and when that infatuated monarch declared his real policy, and set himself with a skill which could not have been greater if it had been deliberately designed with that object, to drive into rebellion every class of his subjects except those who were as fanatical and as blind as himself, William's only course was to open direct negotiation with the English opposition. It must never be forgotten that the Whig Revolution of 1688 was as important an event in European history as it was in the history of England; that William was but little interested in its constitutional aspect; and that his primary motive in expelling his father-in-law from the throne was the political necessity of detaching England from France in order to add the weight of her wealth and her fleet to the great coalition which he was busily organizing.

European
importance of the
Revolution
of 1688.

§ 9. Revo-
cation of
the Edict
of Nantes.

Character-
istics of
the Hu-
guenots.

In the meantime, Louis XIV was, like his English cousin, playing into the hands of his enemies; and the accession of James II emboldened him to commit the crowning act of a series of atrocious crimes, by the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes. The Huguenots had long abandoned their rebellious proclivities. They had given no aid to the Fronde; they warmly supported Colbert's commercial policy; and they had settled down as the most industrious and among the most loyal of the subjects of France. From early in the reign their religious privileges had been gradually whittled away: but there was no wholesale persecution until Louis's private life underwent the remarkable change which was due to the influence of Madame de Maintenon.

Madame de
Maintenon.

This famous lady was the widow of the comic poet Scarron. She, like her former husband, had been a

Huguenot, but since his death she had been converted to Catholicism. In 1679 she came under the notice of the king's mistress, Madame de Montespan, by whom she was introduced at court as governess of the royal bastards. She rapidly supplanted her patroness in Louis's favour; and she set herself to win him from his evil ways, and to reconcile him to his neglected wife. Under the new influence Louis became severely pious; and his court austere, correct, and at the same time exceedingly dull. Maria Theresa died in 1683, the year also of the death of Colbert; and shortly afterwards Louis was privately married to Madame de Maintenon. She was not directly responsible for the persecution of the Huguenots: on the other hand, as humane as she was devout, she used her influence on behalf of charity and mercy. But Louis's bigotry increased with his piety, and he lent a ready ear to the suggestions of the Jesuits and the clergy, who, backed up, as it is hardly necessary to say, by Louvois, assured him that the toleration of heretics in France was an affront to heaven.

About the year 1681 terrible severities commenced, the chief of which was the system of *dragonnades*. Soldiers were quartered upon Huguenot families, and were deliberately encouraged to commit nameless atrocities which made existence intolerable. Many sought safety in flight, many others by submission, and the government was able to congratulate itself upon the apparent success of its work by publishing lengthy lists of professed converts. In October 1685 an Edict was issued which revoked the Edict of Nantes and all other measures of toleration. The Huguenots were prohibited from public worship, their schools were closed, and their ministers were exiled. Protestant laymen were forbidden to leave the country on pain of condemnation to the

Louis
marries
M^{me} de
Maintenon.

The dra-
gonnades.

Revoca-
tion of the
Edict of
Nantes.

Effects in
France.

galleys in the case of men, and of 'confiscation of body and goods' in the case of women. Nevertheless, thousands of Huguenot families managed to escape. Some districts of France were almost entirely depopulated; others, such as Normandy, were reduced from prosperity to poverty; in the south, where the Huguenots had been most numerous, rebellions again became frequent; and the general effect of the measure was almost as disastrous to France as the expulsion of the Moriscoes had been to Spain eighty-six years before.

Persecution
of the
Vaudois.

Victor Amadeus II of Savoy, who, though aggrieved by several humiliations which Louis forced upon him, had renewed the treaty with France in 1682, was compelled to follow his patron's example by expelling the Vaudois from their native valleys. In April 1686 the task was undertaken by Louis's general, Catinat, in command of 7,000 or 8,000 French and Savoyard troops, and was carried out with great brutality. In June Catinat could report to his master: 'This country is completely desolated; there no longer exists either man or beast.'

Inter-
national
effects of
the Revo-
cation.

The international effects of Louis's criminal intolerance were of great importance. The policy of William in both England and Holland was much facilitated. In England the presence of thousands of Huguenot refugees enormously intensified the antagonism to France and the popular dread of Catholicism. Even the Catholic James II was compelled to simulate sympathy with the exiles and to contribute to a public fund raised for their succour. In Holland, where, as a matter of course, French intrigues were being constantly employed to increase the antagonism of Amsterdam and the republican party to the House of Orange, the Revocation did much to reproduce the conditions of 1672; and William's task of overcoming the opposition, already made easier by Louis's seizure of

Luxemburg, was brought still nearer to accomplishment.

In Germany the Revocation drove from Louis his most important ally. The Great Elector's Protestantism now triumphed over every other consideration. Antagonism to Sweden had hitherto kept him on the side of France ; but early in 1685 he took his place by the side of his Baltic rival as a member of the hostile coalition. He invited and warmly welcomed the Huguenots to his own dominions, and he was well rewarded. Their gifts were utilized for the welfare of their new country, and many of its waste places were turned into fruitful fields by their industry.

Other events of this momentous year came to stiffen the opposition to France, and to renew the bond between the Emperor and the German princes, for which their common action against the Turks had prepared the way. In May 1685 Charles the Elector Palatine died, and with him ended the male line of the House of Simmern. The succession passed to the Neuburg line, represented by Philip William, the son of that Wolfgang William whose quarrel with the Elector of Brandenburg over the Cleves-Jülich succession (see p. 35) had done much to bring about the Thirty Years' War. Philip was a Catholic, and the father-in-law of the Emperor. His claims were recognized by the whole of Germany. But the late Elector had left a sister, Elizabeth, who was the second wife of Louis XIV's brother, Philip of Orleans ; and Louis, entirely against her desire, put forward a claim in her behalf, obviously as a means of bringing the Palatinate under French dominion. With his customary specious pretence of moderation he offered to submit the dispute to the arbitration of the Pope ; but the German princes with one accord refused to submit to Papal intervention in a matter which was purely German.

The
Great
Elector
and the
Hugue-
nots.

§ 10. The
League of
Augsburg.

The
Palatinate
succession.

The
Cologne
succession.

A similar quarrel occurred in Cologne, where Louis was striving to secure the appointment of his creature Fürstenberg of Strassburg as Coadjutor or successor to the Archbishop-Elector, against a Bavarian candidate supported by the Pope and the Emperor.

The
League of
Augsburg,
1686.

The series of aggressions brought about the formation of the League of Augsburg in July 1686. Its purpose was to maintain intact the settlements of Westphalia and Nimeguen; and it was composed of the same parties as the coalition of 1681-2 with some additions, though as yet without Denmark or Hanover. Most significant of all, the League was secretly joined in 1687 by Pope Innocent XI.

§ 11. Louis
XIV and
Innocent
XI.

The relations between the Papacy and the self-constituted champion of Christendom had long pointed to a definite breach. Louis had inherited from his predecessors a long-standing dispute about the immunities of the Gallican Church, and this quarrel had been actively pursued, with a few intervals of harmony, throughout his reign. Louis was determined to be as complete a master over the French Church as he was over the state, especially in the appointment and control of the bishops, and he refused to yield one iota of his pretensions.

The
Gallican
Church.

The
Jesuits and
Jansenists.

Closely connected with this was the quarrel between the Jesuits and the Jansenists. Incidental mention has already been made of the latter sect, but no account of this epoch would be complete without a little fuller reference to the one new and very important religious movement which it produced.¹ Jansenism was but one phase of the eternal controversy between determinism and free-will. Its founder, Cornelius Jansen (1585-1638),

Origin of
Jansenism.

¹ Puritanism and Arminianism, although of the supremest importance in this period, originated, of course, just before it opens.

a Dutchman and sometime Bishop of Ypres, drew his ^{Jansen.} inspiration, like Luther, Zwingli, and Calvin, from St. Augustine, and reasserted the Augustinian doctrine of predestination, with its corollary Justification by Faith.

The movement was chiefly significant in France, where Jansen's doctrines were popularized by his contemporary and friend the Abbot of Saint-Cyran (1581-1643), ^{Saint-Cyran.} under whose direction the Jansenists adopted that austerity of manners, and that indifference or hostility to the pleasures of the world, which together with their theology justifies their description as the 'Puritans of Catholicism'. They made a very large number of converts among all classes in France, even in the court itself. Just before his death Saint-Cyran was imprisoned by Richelieu; and his followers suffered a good deal of persecution from Mazarin. They were indirectly associated with the Fronde owing to the fact that the unscrupulous Gondi (de Retz) professed himself as their champion. This necessarily roused the hostility of Mazarin, although he was indifferent on the doctrinal question. In 1653, Pope Innocent X, in a Bull afterwards confirmed by his successor Alexander VII in 1656, condemned the Jansenists' doctrines as heretical; and ^{Jesuit antagonism.} in the meantime, their bitter and persistent enemies the Jesuits called upon the minister for the systematic suppression of the sect.

In 1656-7, however, the whole Jesuit position, its ^{Pascal's} theology, its ethics, and its policy, was mercilessly exposed and ridiculed in the *Lettres Provinciales* of Blaise ^{Lettres Provinciales.} Pascal (1623-62), who was not only the most eminent Jansenist but one of the greatest men of letters of his time. There was then a brief suspension of the persecution; but the Jesuits, unable to overcome their opponents by argument, redoubled their efforts to crush

Persecu-
tion of the
Jansenists.

them by force. The young king, who hated all liberty of thought and action, and was as bigoted against the Jansenists as he was against the Huguenots, eagerly supported the Jesuits. From the time when Louis took control of affairs in 1661 the Jansenists suffered a general proscription; and although the influence of Madame de Maintenon, who had many friends among them, was on the side of moderation, their enemies the Jesuits were implacable. The dispute culminated in the destruction of Port-Royal, the head-quarters of the community, in 1710; and in the extortion from the somewhat reluctant Pope Clement XI of the famous Bull *Unigenitus*, in 1713, which condemned the 101 errors supposed to be discovered in another popular Jansenist work, the *Reflexions* of Quesnel.

Bull *Uni-
genitus*.

Innocent
XI's atti-
tude to the
Jansenists.

Innocent XI, however, differed from these other Popes. He was himself favourable to the Jansenists. He was convinced of the impolicy and of the wickedness of persecution; and he was an opponent of the intolerant zeal of the Jesuits, both in France and in England, as harmful to the best interests of the Church. Moreover, in the dispute over the Gallican liberties, the Jansenists stood for the unity of Christendom under the Pope; whereas the Jesuits, while in Rome they professed to support the Pope, in France were foremost in urging Louis to resist his claims. Thus the famous Society of Jesus was found in antagonism to the Papacy to which its tenets pledged it to render implicit obedience.

The
privileged
districts
at Rome.

There was further a bitter quarrel between Louis and Innocent about the privileges of the French embassy at Rome. Every foreign embassy in that city was surrounded by a district which was held to be a part of the country which the ambassador represented, and was thus cut off entirely from the jurisdiction of the Pope. The

districts became in consequence the resort of vagabonds and fugitives from justice; and Innocent XI sought to cure these abuses by restricting the privileges of the embassies. Louis alone among European sovereigns refused to give way. He asserted his rights with his customary arrogance, and dispatched a French force to Rome to maintain them.

Then, in June 1688, the Archbishop of Cologne died, and Louis forced his candidate upon the chapter against the protests of Pope and Emperor. Meanwhile, by fortifying many of the towns in the Reunion territories he was showing his determination to retain them permanently; and his armies also were already threatening the Palatinate.

Such behaviour was more than sufficient to remove any scruples which Catholics might have in joining the alliance headed by the Protestant William; and that supremely astute statesman was enabled to undertake his expedition to England (which was there represented as a blow struck for Protestantism against Popery) with the goodwill of the Pope, the Emperor, Spain, and almost every other Catholic state, since to them it was a political necessity as the only possible means of detaching from France her most powerful remaining ally.

In June 1688 all prospect of the peaceable succession of William's wife, Mary, to her father's throne was dispelled by the birth of a son to James II's Catholic wife, Mary of Modena; and William, having at length overcome the antagonism of Amsterdam, hurried on his preparations for the descent upon England. Louis, fully aware of the plan, did his best to warn James. He massed his forces on the Dutch frontier; he offered to join his fleet with that of England; and his ambassador made a public

Cologne,
the Re-
union
territories,
and the
Palatinate.

§ 12. The
Revolution
in Eng-
land.

Birth
of the
Pretender.

Louis
warns
James II.

James
offended.

declaration at the Hague that he had taken James under his protection. But this friendly support was thrown away upon the infatuated Stuart. French patronage, which, when it had been merely one means of alienating his subjects, he had sought and accepted with tears of gratitude, he now scorned, just when it was absolutely vital to secure the safety of his throne and the succession of his infant son. His dignity was affronted. He replied that, being convinced that no invasion of England was intended, he meant to pursue a policy of neutrality; and he assured the Dutch that there was no alliance between France and England.

Louis
attacks
Philipps-
burg
and the
Palatinate.

Louis reluctantly left him to his fate. He moved his forces away from the Dutch frontier, leaving the way open for William's expedition, attacked Philippsburg, and commenced the invasion of the Palatinate. It is quite probable that he merely intended to teach James a lesson of the sort that had proved successful with Charles II, in order to frighten his piqued ally into a more submissive and friendly attitude. But he did not foresee, and probably no one out of England except William himself foresaw, the astounding collapse that followed. The memory of his father's terrible fate turned James's bluster into cowardice; and Louis's occupation in the Palatinate was scarcely achieved when the news arrived that his English ally was a fugitive in France.

Flight of
James II.

Louis's
mistake.

It is not conceivable that Louis, by attacking Holland in 1688, could have prevented the Whig Revolution in England, but his mistake undoubtedly contributed to its immediate success; with the result that he began the war at a disadvantage instead of with everything in his favour. Notwithstanding James's touchiness, the expedition of William should have been prevented at all costs.

Louis's blunders in 1688 were as great as those of 1672. By his attack upon Holland in 1672 he had brought out of obscurity the man whose diplomatic genius was to be the chief instrument in checking his aggressions ; and by failing to attack her in 1688 he made that same man the present of a brilliant crown.

CHAPTER X

THE WAR OF AUGSBURG, AND THE SPANISH SUCCESSION QUESTION

1. The Second Hundred Years' War. 2. Character of the War of Augsburg. 3. The naval war. 4. The Continental war. 5. The Peace of Ryswick. 6. Close of the Turkish War. 7. The Spanish Succession. 8. The Partition Treaties. 9. The last Will of Charles II. 10. Preparations for war. 11. The Grand Alliance.

§ 1. The
Second
Hundred
Years'
War.

THE siege and capture of Philippsburg, the invasion of the Palatinate, and the expedition of William of Orange to England, were the opening events of a war of nine years' duration, which is known as the War of the League of Augsburg or of the Grand Alliance. That war - itself was only the first of a series of gigantic conflicts, in which France was usually, though not always, the aggressor, and which lasted until the defeat of Napoleon in 1815. It will be apparent that these were in many ways the continuation of the struggles already described ; but in one fundamental particular the series which began in 1688 differed from that which preceded it. England was to be henceforth, except for the interval of neutrality which began with the death of Louis XIV and ended with the fall of Walpole, the unwavering enemy of France, and was generally the organizer and the paymaster of the coalitions which were formed to oppose her.

Revolution
in British
foreign
policy.

Thus the events of 1688 not only shattered for ever the Stuart theory of the prerogative, and established the supremacy of Parliament in England, but they introduced

an equally important revolution in her foreign policy. Since the alliance of 1572, brought about by the sagacity of Queen Elizabeth, France and England had been with few exceptions friends and allies; but after 1688 they reverted to their mediaeval attitude of chronic antagonism. Hence the name of the Second Hundred Years' War, popularized by Seeley, who was the first to lay great emphasis on the fact that the real clue to it is to be found, not in European rivalry, but in the world-wide contest for colonial and commercial supremacy. Portugal and Spain, the pioneers of colonial expansion, and still the owners of vast transatlantic possessions, had been left far behind by their rivals in the race for the world's trade. Holland had hitherto been England's most serious rival; but she now became her ally under William III, and her participation in the wars against France was all to her disadvantage as a commercial power. For whereas she had to bear the brunt of the exhausting continental conflict, England was allotted the chief charge of the naval war, and carried off all the spoils which were won in consequence.

France, therefore, recently stimulated to fresh endeavours by Colbert, was the chief colonial and commercial rival of England. Quebec, the first permanent French settlement in North America, had been founded by Samuel Champlain in 1608, the year after the first permanent English settlement at Jamestown, which was the nucleus of the Colony of Virginia. By 1688 the French had obtained firm control over the lower valley and the estuary of the St. Lawrence by their possessions in Canada, Acadie (Nova Scotia) and Cape Breton Island. Between 1672 and 1682 the great fur-trader La Salle explored the Mississippi from the Ohio to its mouth, naming that vast region Louisiana after his king; and

Colonial
expansion.

Holland's
disadvan-
tage.

The
French
in N.
America.
Quebec.

The St.
Lawrence.

The Mis-
sissippi.

Louisiana.

his discoveries led immediately to the famous scheme for linking up the Mississippi with the Great Lakes of the St. Lawrence by a line of forts, and so preventing the English colonists on the coast from expanding westwards.

Factories
in India.

In India there were French settlements and factories in proximity to all the three chief English centres, in the Carnatic, Bombay, and Bengal.

Effects
of the
Second
Hundred
Years'
War.

Thus during the Second Hundred Years' War France and England fought one another both on land and sea. But whereas France was chiefly interested in pursuing the continental part of the war, England was chiefly immersed in the naval and colonial struggle. In the European part of the wars England could always count upon the support of those countries which were vitally concerned in checking the continental aggressions of France; while France in the colonial struggle had some, but not very adequate, assistance, from the other naval powers. The colonial contest usually continued during the intervals of nominal peace on the continent; and the final result was that whereas France in the long run gained nothing on the continent, England, at the expense of France and her unfortunate allies or satellites, secured her dominant position in the Mediterranean, India, South and West Africa, and the West Indies; while in North America, though she lost her own original colonies, she captured those of France.

King
William's
War in
America.

The first
Colonial
Congress,
1690.

Immediately the news of the Revolution of 1688 reached America the French colonists attacked New York, New Hampshire, and Maine, with forces composed largely of native Indians. The alarm was so great that the English colonists summoned a congress to meet at New York in 1690, the first of its kind and the prelude to many others, for the purpose of organizing united resistance. To them the conflict became known

as King William's War, and they dispatched expeditions to attack Acadie, Quebec, and Montreal. They captured Port-Royal in Acadie in 1690, but lost it in the following year; and the other expeditions were mismanaged and failed. The French had a superior military organization and were better led. Before the conclusion of peace they had destroyed the English fishing settlements in Newfoundland, and had captured their principal forts on Hudson's Bay. Conclusion of peace in Europe was followed by a mutual restoration of conquests in America.

English
Colonists'
failures.

In India the English East India Company as yet took no part in the war, but the Dutch and French Companies worried one another to the ultimate advantage of England.

Dutch and
French
East India
Com-
panies.

As a military event the War of the League of Augsburg is not of much interest. The great generals of the earlier period had now passed away, and those who were to give distinction to the wars which followed had either not appeared or were not yet completely masters of their art. Vauban, the one great military figure remaining, was neither a strategist nor a tactician, but an engineer, supreme in his own sphere as a maker and taker of fortresses. It is his peculiar genius which gives the character to the war. As writers upon the period have repeatedly pointed out, his works upon the French frontier had turned the country into one gigantic fortress thrust into the heart of Europe, which like all first-rate fortresses was equally adapted for the purpose of attack and of defence. From their interior lines the armies of France issued out to the attack wherever an opportunity occurred, like a garrison sallying from a beleaguered city, and then retired behind the screen of the impenetrable frontiers, before the enemy could concentrate

§ 2. Char-
acter of the
War of
Augsburg.

Vauban.

France
resembles
a great
fortress.

The war
resembles
a siege.

upon the assaulted position. Thus the war was like one vast siege operation ; and with an impregnable defensive position on one side, and an overwhelming alliance on the other, no decisive result was possible.

The
Second
Devasta-
tion of the
Palatinate.

Moreover, just as a siege usually begins with the destruction by the defenders of all outworks which they cannot hold in force, lest these should be used to strengthen the enemy, so the opening of this war witnessed the appalling catastrophe of the second devastation of the Palatinate. The invasion of the Palatinate in 1688 had overcome the hesitation of Saxony and Hanover, who immediately joined the League for the defence of Germany. Louis soon became convinced that he could not hold the Electorate against the advancing forces of the coalition. He therefore determined to turn it, together with some adjoining districts, into a desert barrier between France and her enemies. The order, which contemporary writers again attribute to the sinister influence of Louvois, was issued in December 1688, and during the next three or four months was carried out with relentless severity. The capital, Heidelberg, and all the great cities were sacked ; the open country was ravaged and left desolate and depopulated.

Effects of
the Devas-
tation.

Whether or not this atrocity was necessary as a military measure (and even on this ground it was condemned at the time by Marshal Villars and other great French soldiers), it was undoubtedly another political blunder. It was a crime for which Germany never forgave France, and under the influence of the implacable hatred which it created in the hearts of the German princes the League of Augsburg was bound more closely together.

The
Grand
Alliance.

France was soon left without an ally. In February 1689 the Germanic Diet declared war. In May the Emperor Leopold signed the Grand Alliance with

William III, who was thereby recognized as King of England, and in return pledged himself to the defence of Germany. Just a year before, in May 1688, the Great Elector had died, but Frederick III (afterwards King Frederick I of Prussia) continued his father's policy and sent 20,000 troops to co-operate with the Imperialists on the Rhine. Soon afterwards Denmark abandoned France. Victor Amadeus of Savoy also, incensed at the continued French occupation of Pinerolo and Casale, joined the Alliance. He reinstated the Vaudois in their native valleys, welcomed a body of Huguenot refugees to his territories, and created a valuable diversion on the Franco-Italian frontier. Finally, in April 1689, war was declared between France and Spain.

The naval war was chiefly directed on the part of France to the object of weakening England in her most vulnerable spot, Ireland. For this purpose it was necessary to secure command of both the English Channel and the Irish Sea. Louis attempted the former but neglected the latter, and he also underestimated the strength of the Irish resistance to William. Consequently, while James II was only given an insufficient reinforcement of French troops to aid him in Ireland, where he landed early in 1689, William was able to bring superior forces with him from England. On July 10, 1689, the French admiral, Tourville, beat a combined English and Dutch fleet off Beachy Head; but on the following day the Irish and French were routed by William at the decisive battle of the Boyne, and James was soon an exile once more in France. In May 1692, at the battle of La Hogue, the English and Dutch fleets under Admiral Russell utterly routed a great French fleet under Tourville which had been prepared for the invasion of England, and recovered control of the Channel. Although the English suffered a great

§ 3. The naval war.

James II in Ireland.

Battles of Beachy Head,

the Boyne, and La Hogue.

disaster in the following year, when a large merchant fleet was captured off Cape St. Vincent, William's communications with the Netherlands were re-established ; and thereafter the French were effectively prevented from sending aid to the Jacobites in Ireland or Scotland.

War in the
Mediterranean.

From 1694 the naval war was transferred to the Mediterranean, where the French fleet from Toulon was co-operating with the army in an attack upon Catalonia. Russell was sent to the Mediterranean and successfully checked these operations. Barcelona was saved, and Tourville had to retire to Toulon, where he was blockaded by the English fleet until the danger in Catalonia was over.

§ 4. The
Continental war.

The
Netherlands.

Mons,

Namur,

Steinkirke,
and Neerwinden.

The
Rhine.

On the continent of Europe the greatest efforts on both sides were devoted to the war in the Spanish Netherlands, which was mostly composed of a series of exhausting sieges. The French captured Mons in April 1691, Louis himself being present at the surrender. In the following year they went on to besiege Namur, which fell in June 1692. William III was defeated by the French general, Luxemburg, at Steinkirke in August 1692, and at Neerwinden (Landen) in July 1693; but Luxemburg died early in 1695, and William recovered Namur, his greatest military feat, in October 1695.

The war on the Rhine was uninteresting. In 1689, soon after the devastation of the Palatinate, the Allies captured Mainz and Bonn, which resulted in the French evacuation of the three ecclesiastical electorates. But the Emperor, engaged in the Turkish war, was unable to devote full attention to the western struggle, and the war there was mainly defensive.

Savoy.
Battles of
Staffarda
and Mar-
saglia.

On the Franco-Italian frontier the French general, Catinat, was very successful. He won a brilliant victory at Staffarda in 1690, and occupied Savoy, Nice, and the

greater part of Piedmont. In the next year Victor Amadeus and Prince Eugene invaded Dauphiné, but eventually had to retreat. Catinat won another victory at Marsaglia in October 1693 and overran Piedmont.

However, Louis was in urgent need of Catinat and his army of 30,000 to restore the balance in the Netherlands, which, owing to the recapture of Namur by William, definitely turned against the French. This necessity induced him to offer Victor a lavish bribe, the restoration of the whole of his territories in French occupation, including Pinerolo and Casale, in order to detach him from the Alliance. The offer was too tempting to be resisted, as it secured everything for which Victor had been fighting; and so in 1696 Savoy became once more the ally of France.

Defection
of Savoy.

His defection was a serious blow to the League. William had long been anxious to bring the war to an end; and the new danger of the transfer of Catinat's victorious army to the Netherlands, which threatened to prolong the war there indefinitely, heightened his anxiety. But Louis showed an unexpected readiness to discuss terms, and an unwonted moderation in his demands, so that the war was rapidly brought to a conclusion. Peace had in fact become an imperative necessity to Louis, in spite of the vast military display by which he deluded his antagonists. His treasury was bankrupt, and his people were on the verge of starvation. The drain of men to the war left industries languishing and fields uncultivated, and the appalling poverty and misery caused by the war was increased by a succession of bad harvests. The close of the Turkish war was evidently approaching, and that event would liberate fresh German armies to take the field against him. Above all there was the burning question of the Spanish succession. Charles II of Spain had already outlived the term confidently assigned to him,

§ 5. The
Peace of
Ryswick.

Louis's
motives
for peace.

The
Spanish
Succession.

and had recently been prostrated by repeated illnesses which threatened to terminate fatally. If he died before peace was made, every circumstance would be against the chances of the French candidate for the succession. An armed League was in existence, pledged to resist any encroachments of France. The French campaign in Catalonia was a failure; the country was full of German troops, and the Archduke Charles, the Austrian candidate for the Spanish throne, was shortly expected there to take over the command. The assurance that he could get more by diplomacy than by continuing the war, and the necessity of recovering the goodwill of his enemies as a means to that end, were undoubtedly the chief reasons for Louis's moderation at this juncture.

The
treaties of
1697.
Louis
recognizes
William
III.

End of the
Reunion
policy.

The
Dutch
Barrier.

In 1697 treaties were arranged, which are known together as the Peace of Ryswick. Louis XIV recognized William III as King of Great Britain and Ireland, and the Princess Anne as his successor, to the exclusion of James II and his son. With his customary chivalry to his dependents he refused to expel James from France, but he promised not to abet any rebellions against William. He ceded all places taken by France since 1678, that is to say the Reunion territories, with the important exceptions of Strassburg and Landau; and consented to withdraw from all other places on the right bank of the Rhine. Lorraine (except Saarlouis) was restored to its lawful Duke, Leopold, the son of Charles V. Louis also surrendered the claims of his sister-in-law, the Duchess of Orleans, upon the Palatinate in return for a sum of money; and he recognized the Bavarian candidate, Joseph Clement, as Archbishop of Cologne. The Dutch, as a protection against France, were allowed to garrison several important fortresses in the Spanish Netherlands which became known as the Dutch Barrier;

and they gained some favourable commercial concessions which practically abolished Colbert's tariff policy. Victor Amadeus remained in possession of his territories, including Pinerolo and Casale, as arranged in 1696. The Peace in Europe was followed, as noted before, by mutual restoration of conquests in America.

End of Colbert's tariff.
Savoy retains Pinerolo, Casale, &c.

The Turkish war was concluded very soon afterwards. Up to 1688 the Allies had won, as we have seen, a series of almost uninterrupted successes. But the outbreak of the War of the League of Augsburg which forced the Emperor to detach considerable forces to the Rhine, under Charles of Lorraine and the Elector of Bavaria, gave to the eastern war an entirely new character. Louis of Baden-Baden, who thereupon undertook the command, was successful in overrunning Servia in 1689. But at the end of that year Mustafa Kiuprili, the brother of Ahmad, became Grand Vizier, and like his predecessors of the same family he carried out some vigorous reforms which temporarily revived the Turkish power. Aided by a diversion in Transylvania, where he successfully rekindled antagonism to the Habsburgs, he managed to drive the Austrians out of Servia, recaptured Belgrade in October 1690, and proceeded to attack southern Hungary. Louis of Baden, who in the meantime had reduced Transylvania to submission, hurried to the relief; and at a great battle at Szalankemen in August 1691 Kiuprili was utterly defeated and slain. For the next four years there was a pause in the conflict. The Imperialists, on the advice of William III, who wanted them to devote their energies to the war on the Rhine, acted mainly on the defensive in Hungary. In 1695 the accession of the young and warlike Sultan Mustafa II, the son of the deposed Mohammed IV, again revived the Turkish power. Mustafa undertook the command of the

§ 6. Close of the Turkish War.

Mustafa Kiuprili.

He recovers Servia, with Belgrade, 1690.

Battle of Szalankemen.

Accession of Mustafa II.

His victories.

army in person and inflicted several defeats upon his enemies in Hungary; while the Venetians also lost ground in the Aegean.

Interven-
tion of
Peter the
Great.

On the other hand, the balance began to weigh heavily against the Turks in another quarter. Russia, under the lead of Peter the Great, was already asserting her claims to a recognized place within the circle of western civilization. A more general statement of the aims of that extraordinary man is reserved for the last chapter; but it may be noted here that he was determined to secure an outlet to the sea both in the Baltic and in the Black Sea. In pursuit of the latter object he attacked the Turks in the Crimea in 1695, and though at first unsuccessful he captured Azoff in 1696.

The
Elector
of Saxony
becomes
King of
Poland.

Meanwhile, also in 1696 John Sobieski died, a disappointed man, having entirely failed to clear the Turks out of the south of his country. The usual scramble for the Polish throne ensued. The Imperial candidate was James Sobiński, son of the late king and related by marriage to the Habsburgs; and the French candidate was the Prince of Conti. Between these two equally balanced parties the choice of the Diet ultimately fell in 1697 upon Frederick Augustus, the young Elector of Saxony, who changed his religion to secure the throne, since Catholicism was the one essential condition for any Polish monarch. At the time of his election he was fighting, very unsuccessfully, at the head of the Imperial and Saxon forces, against the Turks. He at once resigned his command, and withdrew to his new kingdom, taking the title of Augustus II.

Prince
Eugene.

His place as commander of the Imperial army was taken by a far greater man, Prince Eugene, who had been set free when the Italian war ended with the defection of Savoy in 1696. In September 1697 Eugene won an over-

Battle of
Zenta.

whelming victory against the Turks on the banks of the river Zenta, which practically closed the war. The Emperor, with his attention diverted to the Spanish succession question, reluctantly resigned his ambition of recovering Belgrade; while the Turks, after the great disaster at Zenta, and faced also by Venice, Poland, and Russia, were in no position to resume the aggressive. The young rulers of Poland and Russia also were anxious to free themselves from the Turkish war in order to attack Sweden in the Baltic, and so were equally ready for peace.

In October 1698 the Turks for the first time in their history took part in a European congress. This met at Carlowitz, and peace was finally signed there in January 1699. The Emperor gained control of the whole of Hungary except the *banat* of Temesvar, and the Turks explicitly surrendered their suzerainty over Transylvania. Poland secured the restoration of Podolia and Kameniec. Venice retained her conquests in Dalmatia and the Morea. Russia, though she would only consent to a truce of two years, was left in possession of Azoff. Freed from the Turks, the monarchs of Russia and Poland immediately turned their arms against Sweden; and so in 1700 commenced the Great Northern War, which will be narrated in the last chapter.

Thus the long struggle which had opened with the advance of Kara Mustafa in 1682 dispelled for ever the possibility of European civilization being swept away by the Moslem inundation. Although the Turks regained Azoff from Peter the Great in 1711, and the Morea from Venice in 1715, they never recovered their losses in Hungary. In fact, a further war with Austria (1715-1718) deprived them finally of the *banat* of Temesvar, and temporarily of portions of Bosnia, Servia, and Wallachia. But a danger of a different character, and not then

The
Peace of
Carlowitz.

Turkish
losses

End of the
Turkish
menace.

A new
danger.

apparent, was to perplex European statesmanship until the present day; and that arose out of the rivalries created among the Christian powers for a share of the spoils of the slowly but surely expiring Ottoman empire.

§ 7. The
Spanish
Succession.

Meanwhile, the great powers were absorbed in the task of parcelling out the dominions of the miserable Charles II of Spain, whose reign had been one long humiliation during which no effort had been made to arrest the decadence of the country, whose death was anticipated with unbecoming eagerness by those who hoped to step into his place, and whose sufferings—in the words of Macaulay—‘were aggravated by the thought that his own dissolution might not improbably be followed by the dissolution of his Empire’.

The
Claimants.

The purely genealogical aspect of the Spanish succession question is complicated by the inveterate habit of the Habsburgs of marrying their own cousins and nieces. If we neglect all irrelevant relationships, it may be somewhat simplified by keeping the following points in mind (see Table 3, p. 316). Since neither Philip IV's brothers, nor his only surviving son, Charles II, left descendants, the claims were all derived through females. These were (a) the two daughters of Philip IV, and (b) his two sisters. By the strict rule of primogeniture the claims of Philip's daughters were stronger than those of his sisters, and, therefore, the hereditary claims went in the following order of superiority:—those derived from (i) Philip's elder daughter, (ii) his younger daughter, (iii) his elder sister, (iv) his younger sister. Now, (i) Philip IV's elder daughter was Maria Theresa the wife of Louis XIV, and, therefore, her son the DAUPHIN LOUIS had the strongest hereditary claim: (ii) Philip IV's younger daughter was Margaret the first wife of the Emperor Leopold; her only child Maria Antonia, now dead, had

(i) The
Dauphin.

married the Elector of Bavaria, and, therefore, the infant son of this marriage JOSEPH FERDINAND, THE ELECTORAL PRINCE OF BAVARIA, came next: (ii) The Electoral Prince of Bavaria. (iii) Philip IV's elder sister, Anne of Austria, had married Louis XIII of France, and so her son LOUIS XIV came next; but Louis XIV combined his own claims with those of his son, which were much stronger: (iii) Louis XIV. (iv) Philip IV's younger sister Maria had married the Emperor Ferdinand III, and thus their son the EMPEROR LEOPOLD came last. (iv) The Emperor Leopold. Two other princes, the Duke of Savoy and the King of Portugal, also had claims, but they were not of sufficient importance to require separate explanation.

There were, however, complicating circumstances. Both the wife and the mother of Louis XIV at the time of their marriages had been made to renounce their rights for themselves and their descendants, with the direct object of preventing the crown from ever falling to a French prince. But Louis declared that the renunciations, especially that of his own wife, were invalid, on the grounds that sovereignty was inherent and could not be renounced by the will of any individual; that Maria Theresa at the time of her marriage was a minor; that even if she had the power to renounce on her own behalf, she could not sign away the rights of her unborn children; that neither the Spanish Cortes nor the French *Parlement* had ever ratified the deed; that the dowry promised by the marriage treaty of 1660 had never been paid; that Spain, by surrendering to France (at Aix-la-Chapelle and Nimeguen) certain territories which he had claimed through his wife, had tacitly admitted the invalidity of her renunciation; and that the Emperor Leopold had done likewise in assenting to the secret partition treaty of 1668 (see p. 202). But such arguments naturally had no weight with the Spaniards. Renunciation of the French claims. Louis repudiates them.

Leopold's
claims.

The Emperor Leopold also, on bestowing his daughter upon Maximilian Emmanuel of Bavaria, had forced her to resign her claims to himself. But his right to do so was recognized by nobody else ; and it was entirely repudiated by the Spaniards, in whose eyes, therefore, the little Electoral Prince of Bavaria, Joseph Ferdinand, was the natural and legitimate heir to the undivided Spanish empire.

Spain
prefers the
Electoral
Prince.

Views
of the
Maritime
Powers.
The
Balance
of Power
threatened.

But the problem could not be solved by mere rules of succession. The two maritime powers, England and Holland, were vitally interested. In the first place, the European Balance of Power, to the preservation of which William's life had been devoted, would be irreparably disturbed if the vast resources of the Spanish empire were added to those of a first class power like France or Austria. In the second place, there was the closely allied and even more important question of trade. The native industries of Spain had never recovered from the shock produced by the expulsion of the Moriscoes in 1609, and she had practically no manufactures. The mineral wealth which came from her American colonies was simply poured into the coffers of foreign traders, of whom the English and the Dutch were the chief ; and these two nations between them had also absorbed the merchant carrying trade between Spain and her foreign possessions. These vast sources of wealth would be lost, in part if not entirely, if the Spanish empire should fall to a power strong enough to control them ; and particularly if that empire, or any considerable part of it, should be acquired by a naval power like France.

The
question
of the
Spanish
trade.

Bavaria
favoured
most.

It was on these grounds that the maritime powers asserted their right to a voice in the settlement of the dispute. It is evident that they were led to favour Bavaria most, as the weakest of the three, and as having

no navy ; that their views would also be met, though less satisfactorily, by a partition of the inheritance which should give the lion's portion to Bavaria, and should compensate the other two for the surrender of their claims upon the crown ; but that they were absolutely opposed to the succession of France, not only as the strongest of the three, but also as their only serious naval and commercial rival.

A partition
next.

France
least of all.

Since neither France nor Austria would consent to the total succession of Bavaria, the maritime powers had to fall back upon the plan of a partition ; and it must be noticed as a fact of great importance, that their policy thus ran directly counter to the desires of all patriotic Spaniards, to whom it was a point of national honour to maintain their great empire one and undivided. The latter was a circumstance which the ceaselessly vigilant diplomacy of Louis XIV was able to utilize in the interests of his own ambition.

§ 8. The
Partition
Treaties.

Unpopu-
larity of the
partition
policy in
Spain.

The question had been brought to the forefront some time before the Peace of Ryswick had been signed. The first concession obtained was a recognition of the principle of the Balance of Power by all parties ; so that, whoever was the eventual successor, the crown of Spain should not in any case be united with that of France or Austria. Therefore, the Dauphin was induced to resign his claim to the crown (though not necessarily to a share of the possessions of Spain) to his younger son, Philip Duke of Anjou, by which act France, with characteristic inconsistency, tacitly acknowledged the validity of the other renunciations ; while the Emperor likewise resigned his claims to his second son, the Archduke Charles.

The crown
of Spain
not to be
united with
France or
Austria.

Immediately after the Peace of Ryswick Louis engaged in a double negotiation. In February 1698 an extremely able diplomatist, the Marquis d'Harcourt, arrived in

Harcourt
sent to
Madrid.

Tallard
sent to
London.

Madrid as French ambassador. He set himself to overcome the Spanish hereditary animosity to the Bourbon, and to create a French party in order to outweigh the Austrian interest, which was naturally very strong in Spain and was supported by the queen. At the same time Louis, fully aware that in any attempt to secure the whole Spanish empire for his grandson he would have to face the armed resistance not only of the Emperor but of the maritime powers, supported probably by the rest of Europe, opened negotiations with William III for a partition. In April Tallard arrived in London as French ambassador and was commissioned to arrange a treaty.

Louis's
objects.

The apparent inconsistency of these two lines of policy makes it somewhat difficult to penetrate Louis's real motives. With the facts of the reign before us, and especially his action in 1700, there can be little doubt that he was already scheming to gain the crown, and the lion's share, at least, of the Spanish empire, for his grandson; and yet his instructions to Harcourt, and his voluminous correspondence with both Tallard and Harcourt, appear to contradict this. It is quite possible that he intended the negotiations with William for the purpose of lulling suspicions, and as a screen to cover the intrigues of Harcourt in Madrid. He may also have foreseen that the exasperation aroused in Spain at the Partition Treaties could be turned, as eventually it was, entirely against the maritime powers to the advantage of the French candidate. And possibly he saw that he could make more advantageous terms with William by being able to demonstrate to him that the French succession was the only alternative to partition. But it is more probable that he was influenced by all these motives at the same time; that he was aiming at the whole inheritance if it

could be gained ; but that he also desired, in case affairs proved unfavourable, as for a time they did, to keep open the partition policy as the best alternative. It is fairly certain also that as events developed, and especially when he perceived William III's increasing difficulties in both England and Holland, he became at length convinced that he could afford to defy the opposition of Europe once more, and so greedily grasped at the whole prize.

William's embarrassments, in both the countries which he had saved from disaster, were in fact being cruelly exposed just then. In England he had only been accepted as the sole alternative to James II, and he was never popular. The old horror of standing armies, which dated from the military rule of Cromwell, was still vivid ; the whole country was sick of war, and demanded and expected a durable peace. Even the Whigs, whose main support came from the commercial classes, disliked William's foreign policy, and did not fully perceive its intimate connexion with the country's commercial interests ; whereas the Tory opposition, supported chiefly by the Church and landed interests, and indifferent or hostile to the commercial classes, was seething with Jacobitism. Probably the whole Tory party would have welcomed the return of James II, if only he could have been induced to abandon Catholicism. In any case, they hated the war policy, which could only diminish the chance of a reconciliation. In December 1697 the Whig House of Commons passed a resolution that all the forces raised since 1680 should be disbanded. In the new Parliament, which met in December 1698, the Tories were in a majority ; and they insisted upon further reductions of the land forces, which involved the dismissal of the Dutch regiments amounting to several thousand men

William
III's diffi-
culties.

His un-
popularity.

Disband-
ment of his
troops.

which William had kept in the country and paid out of his civil list. They also inflicted other humiliations upon the king, so that for a time he seriously meditated permanent retirement to Holland.

Difficulties
in Holland.

In Holland also his policy was weakened by the jealous antagonism of the republican party, headed by the town council of Amsterdam; though it must be said that their opposition to war was much more justifiable on commercial grounds than was that of English politicians. Of course William was just as anxious for peace as any of his opponents; but it was impossible for him to negotiate with complete success unless he could threaten war in the last resort. These then were the difficulties which he had to face throughout the course of his diplomatic contest with France over the Spanish succession.

The First
Partition
Treaty.

The first Partition Treaty was arranged between England, Holland, and France in October 1698. It was then agreed that the Electoral Prince should have Spain, the Spanish Netherlands, and the Colonies; that the Archduke Charles should have the Duchy of Milan; and that the Dauphin should have the rest of the Italian possessions, including the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, the Tuscan ports, and the Marquisate of Finale, and, in addition, the Spanish province of Guipuzcoa on the Bay of Biscay contiguous to France, which included the important ports of San Sebastian and Fuenterrabia. These were hard terms for William, since, if carried out, they would have handed over the Anglo-Dutch trade in the Mediterranean to France; but they were the minimum to which Louis would consent as the price of surrendering the claim to the Spanish crown.

Hostility
in Spain.

The Will
of 1689.

The news of these proposals to dismember their empire produced the most violent indignation among the Spaniards; and the patriotic party prevailed upon

Charles II to make a will in November leaving the whole of his dominions to the Electoral Prince. This will, while it was much more favourable to William's interests than the Partition Treaty, was entirely adverse to those of France. Harcourt had utilized his best efforts, without success, to prevent it; and his master at once demanded that William should reject it and adhere to the terms of the Partition Treaty.

But all these arrangements were unexpectedly nullified by the sudden death of the Electoral Prince in February 1699. The Elector of Bavaria, who had been made Governor of the Netherlands by the influence of William, firmly believed the prevailing rumours that his son had been poisoned by emissaries of the Emperor. This conviction embittered the antagonism between Bavaria and Austria, which had been revived, after some years of comparative cordiality, by their rivalry over the Spanish succession; and it accounts for the fact that Bavaria, the ally of Austria during the Thirty Years' War, was her enemy and the ally of France during the Spanish Succession War.

Death
of the
Electoral
Prince.

Diplomacy again set to work to solve the problem; while Louis's agents pursued their intrigues at Madrid with greater determination now that the Bavarian claim had expired. In the Anglo-French negotiations, both Spain and Austria were again left out in the cold; and a provisional agreement known as the Second Partition Treaty was signed on behalf of William and Louis in June 1699. By this the Archduke Charles was to receive Spain, the Netherlands, and the Colonies, on condition that the crown of Spain should never be united to the Empire. The Dauphin was to receive the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, Guipuzcoa, the Tuscan ports, and the Marquisate of Finale. The Duchy of Milan was to go to

The Second
Partition
Treaty.

the Duke of Lorraine, provided that he should consent to resign Lorraine to France; if not, the Dauphin was to be compensated by some other territory contiguous to France, either Navarre or Savoy or Luxemburg.

§ 9. The last Will of Charles II.

In May 1700 these arrangements were officially communicated to Spain and Austria, though a few provisions were kept secret. The Emperor seemed disposed to agree, although he never gave the Treaty his formal sanction; but in Spain the news reproduced the indignant protests of 1698. Charles II, it is said, 'flew into an extraordinary passion, and the queen in her rage smashed to pieces everything in her room'. The Austrian and French parties at Madrid continued their unseemly strife over the very death-bed of the unhappy monarch, who was now rapidly sinking into the grave. The former worked for a royal will in favour of the Archduke Charles, and the latter for one in favour of the Duke of Anjou.

Austrian and French rivalry.

Conditions in favour of Austria.

Nearly everything appeared to be in favour of the Austrian party; the king's fondness for his Habsburg relatives, the hereditary antagonism to the House of Bourbon, and the eager championship of the queen. The latter almost persuaded her husband to execute in favour of Charles a will, which was fully drawn up and only lacked the royal signature. But on the other side there were some of the leading clergy of the Spanish Church and the king's confessors, who were in the pay of France. They secured a letter from Pope Innocent XII recommending the French candidate. Over the mind of one who was daily expecting to face his Maker the influence of the Church became invincible, and even the queen was won over. On October 3, 1700, Charles signed the fateful Will which bestowed the whole Spanish inheritance upon Philip Duke of Anjou, the grandson of Louis XIV, or failing him upon the Dauphin's next son, the Duke of

The Will of October 1700.

Berry. If neither French prince should accept the inheritance it was to pass to the Archduke Charles, and failing his acceptance to the Duke of Savoy.

The news of the Will was received with unbounded delight in Spain ; but Louis XIV at first solemnly assured William that he intended to observe the Partition Treaty. However, on the death of Charles II on November 1, Death of Charles II. after two or three weeks of hesitation, real or feigned, Louis decided to accept the crown of Spain and all its dependencies on behalf of his grandson. Philip was Louis XIV's decision. solemnly presented to the assembled court at Versailles as the King of Spain, and the Spanish ambassador on that occasion used the famous words, *Il n'y a plus de Pyrénées*, which are often attributed to Louis himself. The young monarch soon afterwards bade adieu to his Philip V in Madrid. native land and reached Madrid in February 1701, where he was received with passionate demonstrations of attachment.

Many very plausible arguments have been used in Arguments in Louis's favour. justification of Louis's decision. If he refused the prize he would have simply handed it over by the terms of the Will to the Archduke Charles; and that would have revived the great Habsburg coalition which had been such a formidable menace to France and to Europe in former times. Suppose he adhered to the Partition Treaty, could he count upon the parties to enforce it upon Spain by war? Apparently not. The Emperor had not yet assented to it, and he was not likely to do so, now that his son was nominated as heir to the whole in case France refused. The Partition Treaties were Unpopularity of the Partition Treaty. highly distasteful to the people of England and Holland, who foresaw in them the ruin of their Mediterranean trade, and a serious blow also to their Atlantic trade. The news of the Will, particularly as it

Several
states
recognize
Philip V.

provided against a union of the two crowns, was received with satisfaction in England; and it was hailed with joy by the republican party in Holland as a check to the House of Orange. Maximilian Emmanuel of Bavaria immediately recognized Philip V as King of Spain; and his example was soon followed by several German states. It seemed possible, to Louis at least, that a great war might be avoided. The Emperor indeed at once prepared for war, but without allies he was not a formidable opponent, and the attitude of England and Holland at that moment made it appear probable that he would have but little support from them. But even if Louis adhered to the Partition Treaty there must still be war, since Spain would never consent to dismemberment: and whereas in the former case he would fight with the whole resources of Spain (which might soon be reinvigorated by French administrative efficiency) added to those of his own country; in the latter case he would fight with at best half-hearted allies, to secure for himself only a portion of the prize, and to confer the crown upon the hated Habsburg rival.

Arguments
against
Louis's
decision.
War in-
evitable.

None the less there can be no question that in openly flouting the public opinion of Europe, in repudiating his solemnly enacted pledges, Louis was committing an act of ruinous folly. His policy throughout the reign had created a universal dread of French aggression, in comparison with which the unpopularity of the Partition Treaties was as nothing. Notwithstanding the provision in the Will to avoid a union of the two crowns, it must soon become obvious to everybody that Louis would be the real ruler of Spain as well as France; and a European coalition against such a combination was inevitable.

§ 10. Pre-
parations
for war.

William III and Heinsius, the Grand Pensionary of Holland, were at one, and they opened negotiations with

the Emperor for the renewal of the Grand Alliance of 1689. William's policy was to allow the animosity aroused by the Partition Treaty to wear itself away. He was justly confident that, as soon as the magnitude of the actual danger from France revealed itself, he would have the people of both countries at his back. Holland was soon brought to her senses. In February 1701 Louis suddenly seized the Dutch Barrier fortresses, occupied them with French garrisons, and placed them in charge of the Elector of Bavaria as Governor of the Netherlands. The States-General, in order to secure the liberation of their garrisons, consented to recognize Philip V, but they could not fail to realize that the very existence of the country was at stake.

In England William's task was more difficult. He had not only to overcome the popular antagonism to war, but he had also to convince the people that it was to be waged in their own interest and not merely to save Holland. In February 1701 he met his Parliament. The Commons in a flame of resentment at the Partition Treaty resolved to impeach Somers, Portland (Bentinck), and other members of the late ministry who were held to be responsible for it. In April William was himself induced by his Tory ministers to recognize Philip V. But the House of Lords, in which the Whigs were strong, was more favourable to the king's policy; and the public opinion of the country, stirred up by pamphleteers, among whom Daniel Defoe was pre-eminent, began to declare itself on the same side. Numerous petitions were addressed to the Commons, demanding that they should cease their recriminations and vote supplies for the war. The impeachment of Somers broke down, and even the Tories came to realize the necessity of supporting the king.

Seizure of
the Dutch
Barrier
fortresses.

William's
difficulties
in England.

The Par-
liament of
1701.

Public
opinion in
England
against
France.

Louis's
blunders.

Meanwhile, Louis was playing into his antagonists' hands. The utmost caution, and scrupulous regard for the susceptibilities of England, Holland, and the Empire, were necessary if the throne of his grandson were to be secured in safety. But infatuated by his apparent success he violated every precaution. In December 1700 he formally declared that the rights of the Duke of Anjou to the French throne were in no way impaired by his acceptance of the Spanish throne. Then, in February 1701, came the seizure of the Dutch Barrier fortresses. This was followed by some negotiations, in which he flatly refused to consider any proposals for a Dutch Barrier in the Netherlands, or any compensation to the Emperor out of the dominions in Spain. In the meantime, he issued decrees which plainly revealed his intention to exclude the Dutch and English from the Spanish-American trade.

Recognizes
the Pre-
tender as
James III.

But his crowning act of folly was committed in September 1701, when, on the death of James II, he formally recognized his son as James III, King of Great Britain and Ireland. This was not, as is often asserted, an explicit violation of the terms of the Peace of Ryswick. By that treaty he had merely recognized William as king *de facto*, with Anne as his successor, and had promised not to support rebellions against them. There was nothing in it to prevent him from giving titular recognition to James or his son. It is highly improbable that, at that moment, he seriously contemplated the restoration of the exiled prince to his father's throne. It was one of his characteristic acts of magnanimity towards his dependents; and he possibly imagined also that it would embarrass the government and revive the Jacobite sentiment in England. But if so he utterly miscalculated. This gross blunder did more than anything else to secure the English

adhesion to the Grand Alliance. It was interpreted as an arrogant intention to impose a king upon England as he had just imposed one upon Spain ; and as a design to restore Catholicism and to overthrow the Protestant succession to which the Tory ministry and the Parliament had just reasserted their unalterable allegiance by the great Act of Settlement. The whole nation was roused to fury against France ; enthusiastic public demonstrations were organized ; and patriotic addresses were showered upon the king. William seized the opportunity of the popular excitement to dissolve the Parliament. He was rewarded by the return of a great Whig majority, and was able to rid himself of his Tory ministers. The new Parliament passed a bill of attainder against the Pretender ; reaffirmed its determination to uphold the Protestant succession ; and voted supplies for the maintenance of a force of 40,000 on land and an equal number on sea.

Indigna-
tion in
England.

Act of
Settlement,
1701.

New Whig
Parliament.

William's last public act was the completion of the Grand Alliance. In September 1701 a treaty had been signed at the Hague, between England, Holland, and the Empire, allowing two months for negotiations, and after that pledging the contracting parties to secure Spain for the Emperor, a Barrier for the Dutch in the Netherlands, and granting to the maritime powers any conquests which they should make in the West Indies. It was joined by the Elector of Brandenburg, upon whom the Emperor had recently conferred the title of King of Prussia as the price of his support, and by practically every other German state except Bavaria and Cologne. Savoy and Portugal for the present were also on the side of France ; and the Baltic powers, already hotly engaged in the Northern War, held aloof. William III died in March 1702, and in May war was formally declared against France by the Grand Alliance.

§ 11. The
Grand
Alliance,
1701-2.

Death of
William
III.

CHAPTER XI

THE SPANISH SUCCESSION WAR

1. First campaigns in Lombardy. 2. The general war—balance of advantages. 3. The genius of Marlborough. 4. The campaigns of 1702-3. 5. Defection of Savoy and Portugal from France. 6. Campaign and battle of Blenheim. 7. Campaigns of 1705-6—Ramillies. 8. Campaigns of 1707-8—Oudenarde. 9. Peace proposals—Malplaquet. 10. Break up of the Grand Alliance. 11. Peace of Utrecht.

§ 1. First campaigns in Lombardy.

THE War of the Spanish Succession opened in Lombardy, where, early in the spring of 1701, the French, under the command of Catinat, aided by a Spanish contingent, and with the connivance of the Dukes of Savoy and Mantua, occupied the Spanish possessions in the valley of the Po. The position of the Emperor was exceedingly difficult at that moment. Hungary was still disaffected and on the verge of revolt. The Grand Alliance had not yet been signed, and so the maritime powers and the greater number of the German princes were still holding aloof; while the Baltic powers, already engaged in the Northern War, could give no help. The Austrian forces, under the command of Prince Eugene, were mustered in Tyrol; but their passage into Lombardy by the Valtelline or by the more westerly and circuitous route through the Engadine, was barred by the neutrality of the Swiss, and that through the Brenner (the upper valley of the Adige) by the neutrality of Venice. Leopold was therefore willing to compromise; and Louis XIV, had he been willing to grant some territorial

compensation to his Habsburg rival, might yet have avoided war in Italy. But Louis, as we have seen, obstinately refused to consider the question of compensation; and Leopold was driven back upon the Austrian war party, represented by his two sons, the Archdukes Joseph and Charles, and by Prince Eugene.

Prince Eugene of Savoy was one of the many great men whom Louis XIV, by his want of foresight and indifference to genius, drove into the arms of his enemies. His father was a member of the cadet branch of the House of Savoy, and his mother was Olympia Mancini, one of the nieces of Cardinal Mazarin. He was born at Paris in October 1663. Originally destined for the Church, his own predilections were strongly in favour of a military career. He made repeated applications to Louis XIV for a commission; but, partly because his mother had fallen into disgrace at court, and partly because of the jealousy of Louvois, he was curtly refused. He then left France in disgust, treasuring a lifelong resentment against the king, and took service under the Emperor. As we have seen, he had fought at Vienna in 1683, and against Catinat in Piedmont in the War of Augsburg; and he had then completed the triumph of Austria over the Turks by the signal victory of Zenta in 1697. He was now to face his old enemy Catinat in Lombardy.

The strategical interest of the Lombard campaigns of the Spanish Succession War is concentrated, as in all the great conflicts in that region, such as the Napoleonic campaigns and the wars for the liberation of Italy in 1848-9 and 1859, upon the attack and defence of the succession of barriers formed by the rivers Adige, Mincio, Oglio, Adda, and Ticino, which flow in roughly parallel courses southward from the Alps and the great lakes through the plain of Lombardy into the Po or its estuary.

Eugene of Savoy.

Physical characteristics of Lombardy.

To the north flanking movements are made excessively difficult by the mountainous character of the country, and to the south the Tanaro and the Po form equally formidable obstacles. (See map of Northern Italy.)

Catinat's
position.

Eugene
turns the
French
flank.

In the spring of 1701 Catinat had advanced as far as Lake Garda. Relying upon the neutrality of Venice to protect his left flank on the Adige, he massed his forces to the north of Lake Garda to oppose the Austrian advance, which he expected to be made through the passes to the west of the Adige. Towards the end of May, however, Eugene crossed the Brenner, and in spite of great obstacles marched down the Adige, ignoring the neutrality of Venice, and placed himself on Catinat's left flank. Catinat turned to guard the Adige, but, uncertain of his enemy's movements, he spread his line over a distance of sixty miles, and it was easily pierced. Eugene crossed the Adige at Carpi, near Legnano, driving back the French with great losses, and forced Catinat to retire behind the Mincio. Then Eugene crossed the Mincio almost unopposed at Peschiera, struck towards Brescia and thus outflanked Catinat again, threatening to cut him off from Milan, and so forced him to recoil in haste behind the Oglio, to cover that city.

Appoint-
ment of
Villeroi.

Battle of
Chiari.

Enraged by these sudden reverses, Louis XIV superseded Catinat in August by a court favourite, Marshal Villeroi. Eugene was on the point of forcing the passage of the Oglio, near Pontoglio, when he heard that Villeroi was advancing against him with a greatly superior army. He fell back and awaited the attack at Chiari, where, on September 1, in the first important battle of the war, the inexperienced and incompetent Villeroi suffered a sharp reverse. By November, when the armies retired into winter quarters, the Austrians had occupied the whole of the Duchy of Mantua, except the city itself, in which

a French garrison held out. In February 1702 Eugene made a brilliant raid upon Cremona, the French headquarters for the winter. Advancing rapidly under cover of night with the forces which were besieging Mantua, he took Villeroi completely by surprise and captured the general himself and his staff. Meanwhile, a revolt had broken out in Naples in favour of the Emperor. Philip V undertook to suppress it in person, and the Spanish contingent of the Lombard army had been dispatched southwards to his support. The French forces, thus defeated and deprived of their general, retired behind the Adda. Eugene was able to occupy the territory of Parma, and the Dukes of Modena and Guastalla declared in favour of the Emperor, while Victor Amadeus of Savoy began to contemplate a change of side.

However, the capture of Villeroi was a doubtful advantage to the Imperialists, since the far abler Marshal Vendôme was appointed in his place. Vendôme was strongly reinforced from Spain, and Philip V also marched up from Naples later in the year to support him. Eugene was badly hampered by the incompetent Council of War at Vienna; and on the outbreak of the general war, the reinforcements which had been destined for him were diverted to the defence of Austria. He found himself greatly outnumbered, and forced either to abandon the war in Italy altogether, or to allow himself to be cut off from his base. He decided on the latter course, retired south of the Po, and maintained himself throughout the summer in the territory of Modena, living as best he could upon the supplies of the country. Here, in August 1702, he fought the battle of Luzzara against great odds. Both sides suffered terribly, and both claimed a victory. But the strategic effect was favourable to Austria, since

Capture of Villeroi.

Appointment of Vendôme.

Eugene retires to Modena.

Battle of Luzzara.

Vendôme's losses were so severe that he had to abandon, for that year at least, his plan of advancing through the passes into Tyrol. At the end of the year Eugene retired to Vienna to take a place on the Council of War.

§ 2. The
general
war—
balance
of advan-
tages.

Meanwhile, by the completion of the Grand Alliance in the winter of 1701-2 and the declaration of war by the Allies in May 1702, the conflict had become general. There were certain circumstances which at first seemed favourable to France. She had the inestimable advantage of unity of interest and control against the divergent purposes and jealousies of the Allies. Her own boundaries were in normal circumstances impregnable. She had the resources of Spain and Spanish-America added to her own. With Portugal as yet her ally, and with her hold on the Spanish possessions in Italy, the Atlantic and Mediterranean ports were closed to the maritime powers. Her seizure of the Belgian fortresses laid Holland open to attack. The friendship of Savoy, doubtful though it was, gave her the initial advantage of the entry into Lombardy, and the alliance of Bavaria (although not yet declared) opened the way into the heart of Austria.

On the other hand, there were serious weaknesses in the position of France which more than counterbalanced these advantages. Although the French and Spanish navies were a formidable combination, they could not possibly hold out for long against those of England and Holland. The very vastness of the Spanish empire made it the more vulnerable, and robbed France of the strategic advantage, which she had possessed in the previous war, of fighting almost entirely within her interior lines. The need to defend Naples, the other Mediterranean possessions, and the American colonies, was a constant anxiety, and a constant drain upon the

resources of the two kingdoms. Moreover, Portugal soon abandoned France, and Catalonia, refusing to acknowledge Philip V, broke again into revolt—the Allies thus gaining an entrance into both sides of the peninsula.

In the next place, mere superiority of numbers was bound to tell in the long run. Although Louis XIV astonished his enemies by the vastness of the armies which he placed in the field, maintaining for the first few years numbers at least equal to those of the combined forces of the Allies, this could not last long against the inevitable wastage of war. Whereas the Allies had practically inexhaustible resources of population to draw upon, Louis was soon driven to desperate expedients to find recruits.

Far more important was the fact that France, since the days of Colbert, had no financial resources to compare with those which the vast and rapidly expanding wealth of England placed at the service of the Grand Alliance. The foundation of the Bank of England, and the regularization of the National Debt, make the reign of William III an epoch in the history of English finance no less important than it was in that of her Parliamentary constitution and her foreign policy. While her enemies and allies alike were on the verge of bankruptcy, England was enabled to raise enormous loans at moderate rates of interest. She was the banker and the paymaster of the Grand Alliance; and her great wealth and particularly its immediate accessibility were, in the last resort, the deciding factors in this as in most of the great conflicts of the Second Hundred Years' War.

Importance
of English
wealth.

Lastly, the war was to reveal that both in administrative efficiency and in generalship France was losing her pre-eminence. The well-meaning but humdrum officials who now stood in the places of Colbert and Louvois were

ludicrously unable to carry out their predecessors' work. Louis XIV had still many able generals, such as Vendôme, Villars, Boufflers, Catinat, and Berwick, but no one to fill the places of masters like Turenne, Condé, and Vauban ; or to compare with antagonists such as Eugene or Marlborough.

§ 3. The
genius
of Marl-
borough.

It was particularly in the genius of Marlborough, in his combination of political and military gifts, that the Grand Alliance gained a directive force sufficient to counterbalance that of Louis XIV.

His rise.

One may pass over with bare mention the story, which is sufficiently squalid even after discounting the exaggerations of his enemies, of the rise in the reign of Charles II of John Churchill, afterwards Duke of Marlborough, and of his double treachery, first to his patron James II and then to William III, as more relevant to English than to European politics. After the death of Queen Mary, William had become reconciled to his sister-in-law, Anne, and

Succeeds to
William's
position.

in consequence to her close friends, the Churchills. On the death of William, Marlborough, owing to the dominating influence of his wife over Queen Anne, succeeded to an authority such as has rarely been wielded by a subject. In England he was the true successor of William III, and he likewise stepped into his master's predominant place in European politics. He had already, as William's representative at the Hague, taken a leading part in completing the Grand Alliance ; and it was he who in subsequent years, by his genius in the management of men, by his wonderful tact in dealing with timid, half-hearted or jealous allies, by his patience and resolution in face of repeated disappointments, and by his brilliant achievements in the field, kept it alive and inspired it with whatever unity of purpose it possessed.

Negotiates
the Grand
Alliance.

As a general Marlborough displayed a rare combination

of gifts ; a supreme confidence and daring which never shrunk from hazarding dangers, however great, so long as the chances were favourable, and yet the utmost caution and providence against possible mishap ; the capacity to conceive the most comprehensive schemes, and at the same time to devote unremitting attention to minute details of organization and execution. Both as a strategist and as a tactician he had an unerring instinct for the decisive situation and for the critical moment ; and he possessed unrivalled skill in compelling the conflict to be fought in that spot where the enemy was likely to be weakest, and where he himself could concentrate every available arm to the greatest advantage. But he was not only a successful fighter of isolated campaigns or battles. Among the great generals of the world he is almost unique in his comprehension of the principles of naval strategy ; and he had a keen insight into all other matters, great or small, political or merely personal, which could affect the issue of war. These gifts enabled him to combine the forces of wealth, diplomacy, and war on land and sea in one vast campaign against the Bourbon.

Marlborough as a general.

In April 1702 Marlborough took command of the Allies' troops in the Netherlands, where he was opposed by Boufflers, whose front stretched in a greatly extended line from Antwerp at the mouth of the Scheldt to Kaiserwerth on the Rhine. France now had all the advantage which had previously belonged to her enemies in the possession of the Spanish Netherlands. Those famous Belgic fortresses which had once been such a menace to Paris now formed for her a mighty defensive barrier. Marlborough was too good a soldier to exhaust his troops in a wearisome, expensive, and probably futile, frontal attack. The alternative was to penetrate the eastern frontier of France south of the Netherlands.

§ 4. The campaigns of 1702-3. The Netherlands.

For that purpose it was necessary in the first place to push back the French occupation of Belgium far enough to leave Holland in comparative safety behind a protective line of fortresses, and in the next place to clear the valley of the middle Rhine, and to establish communications with the forces operating in southern Germany.

The Dutch
hamper
Marl-
borough.

In these plans Marlborough was occupied during 1702 and 1703, terribly hampered throughout by the timidity of the Dutch deputies. The latter, whose consent had to be obtained for each move, apparently considered that the sole function of the Alliance was the protection of Holland, and they resisted every proposal which might let the main army out of sight of their boundaries. Marlborough's first move in 1702 was a successful feint upon the left of his enemies' lines. Boufflers, fearing that his communications with Brabant were threatened, concentrated towards Antwerp. Marlborough rapidly swept round upon his weakened right, and drove it back upon the next line of defence behind the river Demer, from Antwerp to Namur (August). On two occasions when he appeared to have Boufflers at his mercy the timidity of the Dutch prevented a pitched battle, but he captured Venloo, Ruremonde, and Liège (September–October), and thus established himself strongly in the valleys of the Rhine and Meuse.

Boufflers
driven
behind the
Demer.

Marl-
borough in
Cologne.

In the next year he overran the Electorate of Cologne, capturing Bonn in May, but had to return to assist the Dutch, who, through carelessness and impatience, had suffered a disaster near Antwerp which he had instructed them to besiege. On his return Boufflers retired, and Marlborough, prevented once more by the Dutch from attacking him in force, contented himself with the capture of some remaining fortresses between the Rhine

Dutch
disaster
near
Antwerp.

and the Meuse, which cleared the path for his great march in the following year to the rescue of Vienna, which was already in imminent peril.

Elsewhere the Allies had not been successful. In southern Germany the Margrave Louis of Baden was in command. He was not a great general, and was usually more concerned in securing himself against attack than in taking the offensive. In 1702 he won some initial successes, crossing the Rhine and capturing Landau in September, but this was due to the fact that Louis XIV, intent as in the previous war upon the Netherlands campaign, left Catinat with depleted forces in Alsace. Suddenly, Max Emmanuel of Bavaria, who had hitherto professed neutrality, declared for France and seized Ulm. Louis of Baden, fearing that his communications with Vienna would be cut, hurried back across the Rhine. Marshal Villars, who now superseded Catinat, followed him, and overtook and defeated him at Friedlingen in October. The season, however, was too far advanced to enable Villars to follow up his victory; and the Margrave was enabled to retire into a strong defensive position in the lines of Stolhofen, in the northern part of the Black Forest.

German campaigns of 1702.

Louis of Baden invades Alsace.

Bavaria declares for France.

Battle of Friedlingen.

Lines of Stolhofen.

In the following spring Villars pushed past the Margrave's lines, and near Ulm joined Max Emmanuel, who had in the meantime captured Ratisbon and defeated an isolated body of Austrians at Scharding. The path of the combined Bavarian and French armies to Vienna was now absolutely unimpeded; and that city, menaced as it also was by a Hungarian rising, must have fallen had they advanced at once. But Max Emmanuel preferred first to undertake a campaign in Tyrol in order to get into touch with Vendôme, who was to meet him by advancing through the Brenner with half of the French

Peril of Vienna in 1703.

Campaign in Tyrol.

Battle of
Höchstädt.

army from Lombardy. This scheme failed owing to the desperate resistance of the Tyrolese peasantry, and Max Emmanuel, unable to join Vendôme, had to retreat to Bavaria. Villars, who had been left to watch the Allies on the Danube and who, by his victory of Höchstädt (September), had kept the Franco-Bavarian communications intact in that region, now again urged a dash upon Vienna. But the Elector refused, and the violent quarrels which broke out between the two generals over the matter led to the recall of Villars.

Tallard
secures
Alsace.

Meanwhile, Tallard had entirely restored the French hold upon Alsace and had won a victory at Speyerbach (November) which was followed by the recovery of Landau.

§ 5. De-
fection of
Savoy and
Portugal
from
France.

France, in spite of her losses in the Netherlands, had thus more than held her own by the end of 1703. But in that year she suffered two serious diplomatic reverses which had a most important bearing upon the future course of the struggle. Victor Amadeus of Savoy, distrustful of the French promises, had long been looking out for the favourable moment to change sides, and was secretly negotiating with the Emperor for a slice of Milanese territory. Vendôme's demand that he should hand over Turin and Susa to the French and disarm his own troops decided him that the time was come to declare himself, and he signed a treaty with Leopold in October. This meant that the French communications with Italy were cut, that a flanking movement upon Vienna through Lombardy was no longer possible, and that it was, therefore, all the more essential for France to maintain her hold upon the line of the Danube.

Import-
tance of
Savoy's
change.

Portugal could never be a warm ally of France while the latter controlled Spain. Fear for her own safety was the chief motive which had kept her so far

in nominal alliance. But these fears were relieved by Admiral Rooke's demonstration of naval superiority in the Mediterranean and the South Atlantic in 1703. King Pedro II was enticed by promises of part of Galicia and Estremadura and some accessions in South America. In May 1703 he signed a treaty which bound him to the side of the Allies; and in the following December the famous commercial treaty known after its negotiator, Lord Methuen, the British ambassador at Lisbon, was arranged between Portugal and England. The result of the Portuguese defection was to give to the Allies the control of ports for the invasion of Spain itself. This encouraged them to increase their claims, and to demand not merely compensation, but the expulsion of Philip V from the Spanish throne. The Emperor and his eldest son, Joseph, formally renounced their own claims in favour of the Archduke Charles, who set out for Portugal in February 1704.

Pedro II joins the Allies.

The Methuen Treaty.

Importance of Portuguese aid.

But these defections would have been more than counterbalanced by the capture of Vienna, which Louis XIV definitely ordered to be undertaken in 1704; and in the early months of the year it looked as though nothing could prevent its fall. Hungary was in open rebellion; a French force of 40,000 under Villars's successor, Marsin, was in Bavaria, in addition to the Elector's own army; and Tallard with another 30,000 men crossed the Rhine from Alsace and established himself near Kehl, in order to send supplies and reinforcements to his colleagues and to protect the line of communication with France. To oppose them there were only the inadequate forces of Eugene to cover Austria, and those of Louis of Baden in the Black Forest. Villeroy, now in command in the Netherlands, was expected to keep Marlborough fully occupied.

§ 6. Campaign and battle of Blenheim.

Danger of Vienna.

Plan for
the rescue.

However, during the winter Eugene and Marlborough had arranged the bold plan of transferring the main army of the Allies from the Netherlands to the Danube, and this brought about the memorable campaign and battle of Blenheim. It involved the exceedingly hazardous operation of a flank march right across the enemy's front; and it was necessary to conceal the ultimate object not only from the enemy but from the Dutch allies, who would never have consented had they suspected its real motive. But all this Marlborough, in spite of enormous difficulties of transport, supply, and communication, of which only a faint impression can be gathered from a brief account, performed with complete success.

The march
along the
Rhine and
Neckar.

Professing, in order to calm the fears of the Dutch and to delude Villeroi, that he intended to turn the flank of the French position in the Netherlands by a campaign on the Moselle, he marched his forces rapidly during May from their position on the left of the Meuse across to the Rhine at Bonn, and thence in three days to Coblenz at the junction of the Rhine and the Moselle. It was then soon apparent that the latter was not his objective, as, crossing both rivers, he struck as rapidly as before up the right bank of the Rhine, reaching Cassel opposite Mainz in another three days. Then by feinting to cross to the left of the Rhine again, he deluded Tallard into the belief that Alsace was his objective; so Tallard himself withdrew over to the left bank in order to protect that province. This enabled Marlborough to advance unimpeded up the Neckar and across the difficult hill country which separates it from the Danube, and to join Louis of Baden near Ulm.

Junction
with
Louis of
Baden.

The first part of the scheme was thus accomplished. The balance of forces on the Danube was turned completely in favour of the Allies. Marlborough's great

army was thrust between the Elector and Tallard, and so long as he was undefeated Vienna could not be attacked.

The next part of the plan was to crush the enemy while the superiority still lasted and supplies still held out. For this purpose it was arranged between the three allied generals that Eugene at Stolhofen should hold Tallard in check, while Marlborough and Louis of Baden went against the Elector and Marsin.

On July 2 the capture of Donauwörth, after a desperate struggle on the adjacent heights known as the Schellenberg, gave Marlborough the key of Bavaria; the Elector and Marsin were forced to retire southwards up the Lech, thus abandoning the line of the Danube and leaving central Bavaria at the mercy of the foraging and raiding parties of the Allies. By this time Villeroi, who as soon as he perceived that he had been deluded by the feint on the Moselle had hastened to repair the mistake by a southward move, had joined Tallard. The latter was thus enabled to cross the Rhine again and to march to the relief of the Elector, the presence of Villeroi's superior numbers preventing Eugene from impeding him. However, after waiting a few days, finding that Villeroi did not mean to attack, Eugene hastened by forced marches to join Marlborough, and reached Höchstädt on the Danube on August 6, only a day or two after Tallard had joined the Elector near Augsburg. Marlborough was now enabled to detach his uncongenial and over-cautious colleague, Louis of Baden, to besiege Ingolstadt, the only strong fortress on the path to Vienna, while he himself got into touch with Eugene.

Capture of
Donau-
wörth.

Tallard
joins the
Elector.


Eugene
joins Marl-
borough.

In the meantime, Tallard and the Elector crossed to the north of the Danube at Dillingen hoping to catch Eugene isolated, or at least to cut the Allies' line of

communication. Marlborough, however, also concentrated to the north of the river and joined Eugene, and on the 13th their combined forces attacked the enemy.

Arrange-
ment of
the forces.

The Franco-Bavarian forces were arranged behind the Nebel, a little rivulet running southwards into the Danube. Their right, with Tallard in command, rested on the village of Blindheim (which in its corrupted English form gives its name to the battle), which was



stockaded and occupied in great strength. Their left under Marsin and the Elector stretched from the village of Oberglauheim to the line of wooded hills parallel to and about three miles to the north of the Danube.

Battle of
Blenheim.

Marlborough grasped the important facts that his enemies' centre was the weak spot, that Blenheim and Oberglauheim were too far apart to support one another properly, and that the cavalry in the centre was posted too far back to dispute the passage of the Nebel effec-

tively. Therefore, dispatching Eugene through the woods on the north to keep Marsin engaged, he diverted Tallard's attention from the centre by fierce frontal attacks upon Blenheim. These attacks failed and the Allies suffered severe losses, which however were justified, since Tallard further weakened his centre by massing additional forces to the defence of the village. Under cover of this action and a tremendous artillery fire, Marlborough then sent his cavalry across the Nebel; supported by the infantry they routed Tallard's centre, capturing the general himself, and then swung round upon the north of Blenheim, forcing the whole of the 11,000 troops there to surrender. On the defeat of their right, the forces of Marsin and the Elector made an orderly retreat towards and then across the Danube.

The victory of the Allies was overwhelming. It was the first great defeat suffered by France for a generation, and her military prestige, unimpaired since the rise of Condé and Turenne, was shattered. The remnants of her great army recoiled behind the Rhine; Vienna was saved; while Bavaria was placed under Austrian control and ceased to be of any importance in the war.

Little occurred in the Netherlands or Italy in 1704, and the land war in Spain had as yet brought no results. But Admiral Rooke, after conveying the Archduke Charles, now calling himself King Charles III, to the Tagus, entered the Mediterranean; and, although unsuccessful in an attack upon Barcelona, on the way back he captured the great fortress Gibraltar on August 4. Three weeks later he beat back the French fleet from Toulon which had set out to recover the prize.

Had Marlborough's plans for following up his victory at Blenheim been adopted and loyally supported, the war would probably have closed very rapidly. But

Effects
of the
victory.

Capture of
Gibraltar.

§ 7. Cam-
paigns of
1705-6.

though further great defeats were inflicted upon France, Marlborough on his part suffered a hardly less exasperating succession of disappointments owing to the apathy and timidity of his allies. Humiliated though he was, Louis XIV was stimulated to continued resistance by the prospect, which never seemed far distant, that the Alliance would be dissolved by mutual jealousies and recriminations; and as a matter of fact he managed to hold out just a little longer than the Alliance kept together.

The plan
for 1705.

Marlborough's plan for 1705 was to undertake a great invasion of France by the Moselle, such as he had only threatened in 1704, while Louis of Baden should follow up the beaten enemy in Alsace. However, the scheme was ruined by the failure of the Dutch and of the Rhenish Electors to perform their promises to provide ammunition and transports; and by the death of the Emperor Leopold in May, which led to the recall of the Austrian contingent. Marlborough, therefore, had to retire to the Netherlands and operated there against Villeroy much as he had done against Boufflers in 1702. By successive feints against his enemies' wings he drove their lines still further back; but the Dutch again, on more than one occasion, prevented him from seizing a favourable opportunity of giving battle.

Death of
Leopold I.

Marl-
borough
in the
Nether-
lands.

Eugene in
Lombardy,
1705.

In Italy in 1705 Eugene took command again and drove his enemies behind the Adda; but he suffered a check from Vendôme at Cassano in August, which forced him to retire again. However, while he was thus prevented from joining Victor Amadeus, the latter was just able to hold out in Piedmont.

Spain and
Catalonia.

In Spain in the same year the Allies took a few unimportant towns in the west, but the chief interest was in the east. The English fleet commanded by Sir

Cloudesley Shovell convoyed Charles and the Earl of Peterborough to Barcelona, which was captured, and the whole of Catalonia then declared for Charles III.

The plan of Marlborough and Eugene for 1706 was for a concentrated attack upon Italy in co-operation with the English fleet, in order to obliterate the French influence there as it had been obliterated in Bavaria in 1704. The consent of the States-General had this time been practically secured, when the retreat of Louis of Baden from Alsace renewed their old terrors; and their opposition once again ruined the greater scheme which, had it been carried out, would have been as wonderful a campaign as that of Blenheim. Marlborough himself remained in the Netherlands to oppose Villeroi; and meanwhile he sent a quarter of a million of English money to Eugene, which enabled the latter to re-enter Lombardy with adequate reinforcements, and to restore the situation there, which in the spring of 1706 had turned badly against the Allies.

In the Netherlands Villeroi, seizing what appeared to be a favourable occasion, advanced out of his lines to the attack, but was utterly routed at the great battle of Ramillies, fought on May 23, which was perhaps the most brilliant of Marlborough's actions, because of the rapidity of movement which enabled him to intercept Villeroi's advance, and because of his immediate perception of the tactical advantages of the ground which was not of his own choosing. The Allies thereupon poured over Brabant and Flanders, and rapidly reduced nearly all the great towns in those provinces, including Antwerp, Ghent, Bruges, Oudenarde, and Ostend; the last place giving them a closer line of communication by sea with their true base, England.

The victory had very important effects upon the other

Failure of
Italian
plan for
1706.

Battle of
Ramillies.

Effects of
Ramillies.

campaigns. Villars in Alsace detached 30,000 of his men to repair the losses in the Netherlands, and so had to act on the defensive, and lost the chance of pursuing Louis of Baden; while Vendôme, who in April had during Eugene's absence chased the Imperialists from Lombardy back into Tyrol, was recalled to supersede Villeroi on the northern frontier of France, leaving Marsin to oppose Eugene in Lombardy.

Eugene in
Italy in
1706.

Junction
with
Savoy.

Battle of
Turin.

Eugene, with strong reinforcements provided by the English subsidy, re-entered Italy in July, passing down the Adige, ignoring Venetian neutrality, and successfully outflanking his opponents as he had done in 1701. Then he passed to the south of the Po, and by rapid movements outmarched and outflanked Marsin (who took a parallel course to the north of the river), and reached Victor Amadeus safely in August. The combined armies then hastened to the relief of Turin, which the French were besieging, and before its walls on September 7 they won a great victory, in which Marsin himself was among the slain. This triumph meant the expulsion of the French from practically the whole of Lombardy and Piedmont; and, what was as important, it bound the ever hesitating Duke of Savoy firmly to the Alliance.

Spain in
1706.

In Spain in the spring of 1706 a French army supported by the Toulon fleet made an effort to recover Catalonia, during the temporary absence of the English fleet. But the return of Admiral Lake to the Mediterranean forced the Toulon fleet to retire to its harbour, and the French army was driven across the Pyrenees. From the west the Allies under Galway penetrated as far as Madrid, which was occupied in June. But after a brief stay, Galway was forced to retire by a rising of the Castilians, and he made his way across the country to Valencia.

The humiliations suffered by France in 1706 forced her to appeal for peace. Louis XIV was willing to give up Spain to Charles, and an adequate Barrier to the Dutch, provided that Philip was allowed to retain the Italian possession of Spain. The Dutch would have been glad to make peace on these terms ; but the other leading members of the Alliance, puffed up with their victories, now rejected with contempt that very principle of a Partition which they had originally made war to enforce. Louis XIV was encouraged to resist their more arrogant demands by a turn in the Northern War, which brought a prospect of a renewal of the old Franco-Swedish alliance against Austria.

Negotiations of
1706-7.

Charles XII of Sweden was in the midst of his triumphs. He had a bitter grievance against the Emperor Joseph I on account of aid which the latter had sent to Augustus of Poland and Saxony. In the spring of 1707 he appeared within the boundaries of the Empire, and it looked as though he meditated an attack upon Vienna. Both sides were now anxious suppliants for his alliance, and Marlborough himself visited Charles in order to win him over or at least to divert him from his supposed designs upon Austria. But Charles, as will be seen later, had other aims, and the prospect that the Baltic conflicts would, as in the case of the Thirty Years' War, become involved in the general European struggle was not realized. However, the consternation at the possible danger was so great that the most of the German members of the Alliance withdrew their contingents. The plans of Marlborough and Eugene were seriously hampered, and Louis XIV was thus enabled to prolong his resistance with brighter prospects than at any time since Blenheim.

Charles
XII in
Saxony.

To some extent the events of 1707 justified him.

§ 8. Campaigns of 1707-8.

Villars in South-east Germany.

Marlborough, lacking the anticipated reinforcements, and hampered as ever by the Dutch, could do nothing in the Netherlands. Villars, in Alsace, taking advantage of the death of Louis of Baden which occurred in January 1707, broke out across the Rhine, and captured the lines of Stolhofen. He terrorized the princes of South-east Germany, and levied contributions from them which were not only sufficient to maintain himself, but left a handsome surplus which he sent to supply the depleted treasury of his king. However, as it was necessary to detach part of his troops for the defence of Provence, which was being menaced by Eugene, Villars retired again into Alsace on the appearance of George Lewis of Hanover (the future George I of England), who succeeded to the command of Louis of Baden. Most significant of all, however, in 1707 was the great victory won in Spain by the Duke of Berwick (a natural son of James II) over Galway at Almanza in April. This proved absolutely fatal to the cause of Charles in that country, and was followed by the abandonment of all the Allies' conquests in the peninsula except Gibraltar and Catalonia.

Battle of Almanza.

Imperialists occupy Naples.

In Naples, however, where the populace were bitterly hostile to the Bourbons, and were encouraged now to hope that Charles on his defeat in Spain would take up his residence among them, a small Imperialist army under Daun easily occupied the kingdom on behalf of Charles III.

Allies' failure before Toulon.

But this success was more than counterbalanced by, and was partly responsible for, a fresh disaster in the north. Eugene and the Duke of Savoy penetrated from Piedmont into Provence to attack Toulon, while Admiral Shovell with the English fleet blockaded by sea. But before their arrival Toulon was strongly reinforced by

detachments from Berwick's victorious army, and all the heights around the city were occupied; while Eugene was weakened by the Emperor's insistence on the detachment of the force under Daun to Naples, and by the delay and inefficiency of Victor Amadeus. Eugene, finding his communications menaced, was forced to beat a disastrous retreat back into Piedmont. However, the French had to destroy their Toulon fleet to prevent it from falling into the hands of their enemies. The English were thus left absolutely supreme in the Mediterranean, and were able in the next year to occupy Sardinia in the name of Charles III, and to conquer Minorca, Spain's chief English conquer Minorca. naval base in that sea.

In 1708 fortune favoured the Allies again. The original plan was for a double invasion of France. While Marlborough kept in check the main French army under Vendôme in the Netherlands, George of Hanover was to attack Alsace, and Eugene to advance along the line of the Moselle. But, like many another of Marlborough's comprehensive plans, this was ruined owing to lack of co-operation by his allies. Most of the German princes failed to provide their contingents, and George was left without an army. Allies' plans for 1708.

As soon as the failure of the German part of the scheme became evident, the French from within their interior lines were able to reinforce their Netherlands army with greater rapidity than were the Allies; and thus Vendôme took the field in July at a great advantage. Marlborough summoned Eugene from the Moselle. Eugene himself arrived just in time to take part in and to share the credit of the battle, but his army was too late. Vendôme advanced to seize the line of the Scheldt. Aided by treachery among the garrisons he captured Bruges and Ghent, and his advance upon Oudenarde. Battle of Oudenarde.

brought on the great battle of that name, on July 11. Superior generalship, superior mobility, also quarrels between the French generals Vendôme and Louis XIV's grandson the Duke of Burgundy (of which Marlborough was aware and counted upon as an aid) secured another crushing victory for the Allies. The French abandoned Bruges and Ghent; the Allies pushed on into French Flanders, and after a desperate siege (August–December) captured Lille.

Capture of
Lille.

§ 9. Peace
proposals
—Mal-
plaquet.

Terms
offered by
Louis.

These events should have ended the war. France was in a desperate condition. The winter of 1708–9 was one of the longest and severest on record; the crops failed, and the terrors of famine were added to the suffering and exhaustion already produced by the war. The state to which Louis was reduced can be gathered from the terms to which he was prepared to submit in the course of the negotiations at the Hague, which occupied the first half of 1709. He offered to surrender the French claims upon Newfoundland to England, to recognize the Hanoverian succession, to expel the Pretender from France, and to grant the Dutch a Barrier. Ultimately he professed his readiness to surrender the whole Spanish inheritance on behalf of his grandson.

Views of
the Allies.

In view of the fact that the Allies by accepting these offers would have gained everything for which they had been fighting, it is astounding that the negotiations broke down. But the difficulty lay in the position of Philip V in Spain, where he was accepted by the whole country except the Catalans. The Allies suspected, not unnaturally, that Louis was plotting to hoodwink them as he had done so frequently before, and that after another interval of peace and recuperation his armies would again be at the service of his grandson. They therefore required a guarantee against this danger. The Emperor also

created another difficulty. Realizing that practically the whole burden of the war for his peculiar advantage would continue to fall, as it had done already, upon the maritime powers, he was emboldened to demand the restoration of Alsace and Franche-Comté. But diplomacy should have been able to solve these difficulties by some arrangement short of the atrocious demand which the Allies presented as their ultimatum to France, namely, that Louis should himself join with his bitter enemies to expel his own grandson from Spain.

No man with a spark of pride could have submitted to such a humiliation. The old king rejected the proposals; and in a dignified letter addressed to his subjects he denounced the shameful demands of the Allies, called upon the country for a last great effort, and prayed for the blessing of Heaven upon his armies.

Louis XIV
rejects the
Allies'
ultimatum.

French patriotism responded nobly. Recruits poured in, and the half-famished country was ransacked for provisions. A fresh army, untrained, badly supplied, and inferior in numbers to the enemy, but inspired with a supreme resolve to shed its last drop of blood in defence of king and country, was dispatched to the Netherlands frontier. Villars, who was in command, constructed an immensely strong defensive position, known as the lines of La Bassée, behind Tournay and Mons, which were still holding out for France. Tournay, after an unexpectedly determined and protracted resistance, capitulated in July 1709, and the citadel held out until September 3. The Allies then turned against Mons, and in the effort to save it the battle of Malplaquet was fought on the 11th. The strength of the Allies was overwhelming; but the French made a heroic resistance, and at the end of a long day of desperate fighting they retired in good order, leaving the field to their enemies. The

Villars's
defensive
position.

Fall of
Tournay.

Battle of
Malpla-
quet.

little garrison of Mons had to capitulate, but the total losses of the Allies far outnumbered those of the French. The battle of Malplaquet, though nominally a victory for the Allies, marked the turn of the tide, and demonstrated that the subjugation of France was impossible.

In the next year the Allies had some success in Spain. Stanhope won the battles of Almenara and Saragossa, and Charles III himself was at length able to enter Madrid. But the arrival of Vendôme, who reorganized the French forces in the peninsula, turned the scale. The Allies were driven back to Catalonia, and by the end of the year Charles retained only Barcelona and Tarragona.

Spain in
1710.

§ 10. Break
up of the
Grand
Alliance.

Conquest
of Acadie.

The Grand Alliance was now doomed. England had gained all she could by the war, and was thoroughly weary of it. Her colonists in America, aided by a force from England, had in September 1710 added to her conquests by capturing the French settlement in Acadie. The pretence that the war was necessary to curb French preponderance could no longer be kept up. The country was loudly protesting against the terrible expenditure of blood and treasure in the selfish interests of the Austrian ally, who left nine-tenths of the burden to be borne by others. After Malplaquet, Marlborough's popularity, already on the wane, vanished altogether; his enemies proclaimed with some justice that he was prolonging the war as a source of glory, political influence, and profit to himself. Addison ably defended the policy of the Whigs; but their opponents gained the powerful support of the caustic pen of Swift. The revulsion of feeling was heightened by the impolitic prosecution of Sacheverell in 1710; and the Tories, now led by Harley and St. John (Bolingbroke), were borne back to power upon a flood of popular enthusiasm only comparable to that which had driven them out in 1701. They at once opened

secret negotiations for peace with France; and, meanwhile, cleared out of the way the chief obstacles in England. The Duchess of Marlborough's influence with the queen was superseded by that of Harley's friend, Mrs. Masham. Marlborough himself won further successes against Villars in 1711; but at the end of the year he was charged with the misappropriation of public funds, and was dismissed from all his offices and commands. At the same time twelve new Tory peers were created to swamp the Whig majority in the House of Lords.

The Tories negotiate with France.

Fall of Marlborough.

The death of the Emperor Joseph I in April 1711 produced a change in the European situation which was an additional justification of the peace policy. Joseph left no children, and his brother, hitherto the Allies' candidate for the Spanish throne, succeeded him as Charles VI. Had Charles been allowed to add the vast empire of Spain to the Austrian possessions, the ancient dread of Habsburg dominion would have revived, and the Balance of Power would have been endangered far more than it could be by the recognition of the enfeebled Philip V.

Death of Joseph I.

Although the methods of the Tories were justly condemned—their curt dismissal of Marlborough, their appointment of a Jacobite, the Duke of Ormonde, to the command in his place, their indifference to the interests of their allies, especially in the abandonment of the brave Catalans, and their violation of the pledges upon which the Grand Alliance had been founded in making terms with France without the knowledge or sanction of the other parties—they yet deserved the gratitude of Europe as well as of England for bringing this ruinous war to a close. Preliminaries of peace between England and France were quickly arranged in September 1711. These were communicated to the other members of the Alliance,

Criticism of the Tory policy.

and were eventually accepted by all, except the Emperor, by the treaty signed at Utrecht in March 1713.

Defeats of
Eugene.

Charles VI refused to surrender his claims to Spain, but, although aided for a brief space by the Dutch, he was fighting a losing cause. Villars, who was left with superior forces by the withdrawal of the English in 1712, finished off the war, and considerably restored the prestige of

Battle of
the bridge
of Denain.

France. Eugene, badly supported by the Dutch, suffered a disaster at the bridge of Denain in July 1712, and the defection of the Dutch in the next year drove him from the Netherlands. He made a last attempt to hold the

Capture of
Freiburg.

upper Rhine. But in September 1713 Villars stormed his lines near Freiburg, and with the surrender of the latter town and castle to the French (Oct.-Nov.) the fighting came to an end. The Emperor made peace by the treaties of Rastadt and Baden in 1714; and in 1715 he concluded the Third Barrier Treaty with the Dutch.

§ 11. Peace
of Utrecht.

The settlements of 1713-15 may be grouped together as the Peace of Utrecht. 1. Philip V retained Spain and the possessions in the New World, but the crowns of France and Spain were never to be united. 2. The Emperor received the Spanish-Netherlands, though the Dutch were allowed to garrison eight of its strongest fortresses as their Barrier. 3. The Emperor also received Naples, Sardinia, and most of the Milanese. 4. Sicily and a part of the Milanese were given to the Duke of Savoy, to whom also France restored all her conquests in Savoy and Nice. 5. France retained Alsace, including Strassburg and Landau, but surrendered the fortresses of Kehl, Breisach, and Freiburg on the right bank of the Rhine. 6. Great Britain received Gibraltar, Minorca, Newfoundland, Acadie, St. Kitts, and certain undefined territories in Hudson's Bay; also the *Asiento*, or monopoly of the slave trade with Spanish-America,

and the right to send one vessel annually to trade in those waters. 7. France recognized the Hanoverian succession in England, and agreed to expel the Pretender, while a favourable commercial treaty was arranged between the two countries. Other terms included the formal cession of Orange to France, the restoration of the Electors of Bavaria and Cologne, and the recognition of Prussia as a kingdom and of Hanover as a new electorate. The Catalans were left to their fate, and were reduced with shameful cruelty.

Thus was the Spanish empire partitioned, the power of France broken, and England left supreme above all her rivals in naval and commercial power. Louis XIV did not survive his humiliations long. His closing years were embittered by cruel personal bereavements, the death of his son the Dauphin in 1711, and of his grandson the Duke of Burgundy in 1712. After a reign of unexampled duration of seventy-two years the old king passed away in September 1715. His popularity had gone, and the news of his death was received with widespread rejoicings in France. The crown was left to his great-grandson Louis XV, then an infant of five years; and the regency to the atheist and libertine, Philip Duke of Orleans, nephew of the late king.

Death of
Louis XIV.

CHAPTER XII

THE COLLAPSE OF SWEDEN

1. General causes of the Northern War. 2. Charles XI of Sweden. 3. Charles XII. 4. Patkul and the coalition against Sweden. 5. Russia under Peter the Great. 6. Peter's foreign policy. 7. The Northern War—first stage, 1700-6. 8. Charles XII's invasion of Russia. 9. Conclusion of the Northern War. 10. The close of an epoch.

§ 1.
General
causes
of the
Northern
War.

WHILE the War of the Spanish Succession was raging, another great war, very similar in character and results, was going on in the north and east of Europe. The achievements of the House of Vasa, culminating in the victories of Charles X, had made the Baltic as nearly a Swedish lake as the Will of Charles II of Spain, had it been carried out, would have made the Mediterranean a French lake. Just as the aggressions of the House of Habsburg in the Thirty Years' War, those of France under Louis XIV, and of the Turks at the same time, had raised up coalitions, which had opposed and humiliated them, so it was with Sweden.

There could be no lasting peace in the Baltic while the dominant position in that region was held by a country so poor and sparsely populated as Sweden. The vastness of her possessions, greater in area than the German empire of to-day, was a standing incitement to the ambition of her neighbours and rivals; while the severe burdens which her rule imposed upon her continental provinces stirred up enmity which was to be a source of fatal weakness.

The minority of Charles XI was a period of shocking extravagance and misrule. The intervention in 1674 on behalf of France led to a succession of disasters on land and sea, in the midst of which the heroic young king took control, and by his military prowess partly retrieved the situation. The generosity of Louis XIV to his ally had enabled Sweden to emerge from the war without material loss, but his dictatorial and patronizing tone was highly offensive to Charles XI, who then conceived a distaste for everything French, which was inherited by his son.

§ 2. Charles XI of Sweden.

End of the French alliance.

At home Charles XI followed his father's policy. By further 'Reductions', carried out on a wholesale scale, and with severity barely distinguishable from tyranny, the nobles were made to disgorge crown lands, which had been alienated during the regency. With the enthusiastic support of the clergy, burgesses, and peasantry, Charles also crushed the political power of the nobles, and established a benevolent despotism. The army and fleet were restored; trade, industry, and agriculture revived; and although the national revenue still exceeded the expenditure at the time of his death, the finances were in a better condition than at any time during the previous seventy years. He died in April 1697, leaving the crown of a reunited and reinvigorated nation to his son Charles, a boy of fifteen years.

Charles's home policy.

Careful regulations had been made for the regency, but these were almost immediately upset by the contrivance of the nobles. The latter imagined that if they conferred full powers upon the young king they would be able to use him as their tool, and thus to recover their lost power and possessions. Their lead was meekly followed by the other estates, with the result that the regency was abolished. But the result was not what the nobles had

§ 3. Charles XII.

anticipated. The boy-king refused to be the tool of any one, and soon made himself absolute master of his country's destinies.

Charles from early boyhood had given evidence of remarkable precocity. Although delicate as a child, he was courageous beyond his years, fond of the most rigorous forms of exercise and sport, and an absolute stranger to fear. Under his father's wise direction he had been carefully educated by accomplished tutors, and had devoted himself with great avidity to his studies, especially those connected with military science. In his first experience of unlimited power, it is hardly to be wondered at that he committed several acts of extravagance and folly which created general alarm. But as these boyish defects rapidly wore off, and his finer qualities developed, the country soon gained confidence in their young monarch, who proved himself in spite of his tender years worthy to wield the sceptre of his fathers.

He was, however, to have little opportunity of displaying his qualities as a ruler. He had scarcely been on the throne for three years when the country was plunged again into a gigantic conflict, and the rest of his life was spent in incessant war.

§ 4. The coalition against Sweden—Patkul.

The coalition against Sweden was organized by a Livonian noble named Patkul, who from his tragic death has gained the unmerited renown of a national hero and martyr. He had undoubtedly been treated with great injustice by Charles XI. As spokesman of the Livonian gentry in their protests against the 'Reductions', he had used violent and offensive terms which brought upon him the royal vengeance. He was condemned as a traitor, and had to flee into exile to escape punishment. But in reality he was merely the champion of that narrow aristocratic caste which was solely concerned for

the restoration of its old misused predominance, at the expense of crown, burgesses, and peasantry alike. In 1698 he at length found refuge at the court of Augustus II of Poland and Saxony; and he incited that ambitious prince to undertake the conquest and partition of Sweden, for which the extreme youth of Charles XII appeared to offer a favourable opportunity.

Denmark was then approached, and was only too ready to join against her ancient enemy. She had now recognized the impossibility of recovering Scania, but she had a fresh source of grievance in Holstein. In that duchy Sweden supported the claims of Denmark's rival, Duke Frederick IV of the Gottorp line, who about this time married Charles XII's favourite elder sister. Prussia was also invited to join the coalition, but for the present held aloof; and so Russia was approached instead.

Russia as we have seen had for a long time been a competitor in the Baltic disputes. But her interventions hitherto had been only occasional and unsuccessful. Although under the Tsar Alexis (1645-76) and his eldest son Theodore III (1676-82) the country had been just touched by Western ideas, she was still fundamentally Oriental, in civilization as in policy, until the epoch of Peter the Great; who, in spite of his frequent and lamentable lapses into pure savagery, was yet one of the greatest and most enlightened reformers of all time, and to whose work as the founder of modern Russia we must devote some brief attention.

Like his future enemy Charles XII, Peter was as a child extraordinarily precocious, and gave early evidence of remarkable qualities—receptivity to new ideas, indomitable industry, perseverance, and patience, and a wonderful aptitude for the mechanical and technical arts, especially those relating to warfare. His favourite boyish pastimes

Denmark
joins the
coalition.

§ 5. Russia
under
Peter the
Great.

Peter's
boyhood.

were characteristic of the future reorganizer of the army of Russia and the creator of her navy. Together with his playmates he used to practise the assault and defence of model strongholds, which were constructed and completely fortified by themselves; and later on he learnt to build and to sail boats and ships.

Succeeds
Theodore
III in
1682.

End of
Sophia's
regency.

Lefort.

Theodore III was succeeded in 1682 by his two younger brothers—the semi-imbecile Ivan V, who nominally ruled as joint Tsar until his death in 1695, and Peter the Great. Peter's personal rule dates from 1689, when the regency of his elder sister Sophia was overthrown by a palace revolution. About 1690 he came under the influence of the disreputable but brilliant Swiss adventurer François Lefort. Although responsible for initiating the young monarch into the revolting vices and debauchery which blackened his private character, Lefort also taught him the superiority of Western ideas and civilization, and fired within him the ambition to free Russia from the bonds of Orientalism, to give the country a recognized place among the leading states of Europe, and as a preliminary to all this to educate himself by foreign travel.

Internal
reforms.

The work of internal regeneration was carried on throughout the reign with unremitting zeal. Western manners, customs, and dress were introduced and enforced with penalties, even to the extent of a heavy tax on the wearing of beards, which in Old Russia were regarded with superstitious reverence. Russian women were emancipated from the despotic control of their fathers and husbands; and were freed, much against their will, from the Oriental seclusion to which they were habituated. Education was stimulated by every available means, and was made a necessary qualification for entry into the public service. The alphabet was simplified; and the

art of printing, scarcely known in Russia hitherto, was encouraged so that cheap books began to circulate. Brick and stone began, though very gradually, to replace the old and dangerous buildings of wood. Hospitals and medical schools were instituted, and sanitary regulations enforced. Hosts of foreign craftsmen were introduced to teach the people new industries ; trading companies were founded ; and the natural resources of the country were developed.

The whole system of government, from the central to the local administration, was revolutionized on the Western model. The great departments of state were placed under special boards and directories ; permanent embassies were instituted in the foreign courts ; and the beginnings of self-government were introduced in the cities and provinces. Taxation became necessarily severe, but its incidence was made more just since the privileged classes, hitherto almost exempt, were made to contribute. The currency, which was shockingly debased, and inadequate for the requirements of trade, was reformed and enormously increased in amount. And lastly, valiant, although only partially successful, attempts were made to purge out official corruption, the most deeply-rooted vice of Russian society.

Adminis-
trative
reforms.

Unlike so many other monarchs who have gained the credit due to the genius of their great subjects, Peter was personally responsible for the initiation of all these reforms, against the constant opposition of a people who had to be civilized in spite of themselves. Open resistance, such as the revolt in 1698 of the *Strieltzy*, the bulwark of the old army, was easily crushed, and was punished with savage ferocity. But more serious was the dull, inert conservatism of the mass of the population, backed up by the Church. It was Peter's constant dread

Opposition
to Peter.

Revolt
of the
Strieltzy.

lest the whole of his work should be swept away in a flood of reaction when he was gone, that led to that appalling tragedy, the persecution, torture, and execution in 1718, of his eldest son Alexis, to whose accession the reactionaries had confidently looked for a restoration of the old order.

Death of
Alexis.

§ 6. Peter's
foreign
policy.

To the achievement of the other part of Peter's ambition, that is, to make his country of decisive weight in European politics, a footing on the sea-coast was imperative. Russia's only outlet hitherto was the White Sea, which was ice-bound for nine months of the year. A glance at the map will show that the country was cut off from Western Europe by the huge mass of the sister Slav state Poland, but that the latter's flank might be turned either to the south by the Black Sea or to the north by the Baltic. As we have seen (chapter x), the Turkish war gave Peter the opportunity to win a southern port, and culminated, after the failure in 1695, in the capture of Azoff in July 1696.

Capture
of Azof.

The
Grand
Embassy.

Immediately afterwards the Grand Embassy was organized, and, headed by Lefort, set out in March 1697 on its journey through the Western courts. Its primary object was to rouse up a European coalition against the Turks; but in addition it was designed to educate a number of picked Muscovite youths of the best families in the languages, arts, and customs of Europe. Peter himself set the example by attaching himself to the expedition as a volunteer sailor, and, as is well known, gained invaluable experience by working for some months as an artisan in the dockyards of Holland and England. However, the main object of the Embassy failed owing to the absorption of Western Europe in the question of the Spanish succession. England and Holland, though willing to see the struggle continue between

Peter
works in
the dock-
yards.

Failure of
the Grand
Embassy.

Russia and the Turks, so that the latter might be prevented from aiding France, could not at such a crisis give direct aid to the Tsar. They were also anxious to rid the Emperor Leopold completely from his Eastern embarrassments so that he might be an effective ally in the event of war against Louis XIV.

Thus Peter abandoned, for the time being, further designs in the Black Sea and turned towards the Baltic. Patkul and a Saxon general visited Moscow in 1699 and secured his alliance. The truce of two years arranged with the Turks at Carlowitz (see p. 247) was extended to thirty years in July 1700, and immediately afterwards the Russian armies were ordered to the north.

The Great Northern War had already been opened in February 1700 by a sudden attack of the Saxons upon Riga, the capital of Livonia; while the new King of Denmark, Frederick IV, had at the same time commenced operations in Holstein against his namesake Frederick IV of Gottorp, the brother-in-law and ally of Charles XII.

Charles, though fully prepared against the designs of Denmark in Holstein, was entirely taken aback by the attack of Augustus II and Peter the Great, whose plans had been carefully and treacherously concealed, and against whom he therefore treasured an implacable resentment, which was ultimately to prove the chief cause of his own undoing. However, he determined to deal with Denmark first, as the nearest and most vulnerable of his foes. In April 1700 he left Stockholm, which he was never to see again. Aided partly by the proximity of an Anglo-Dutch fleet, whose purpose was to localize the war, and partly by the timidity of the Danish admiral, he succeeded, after boldly forcing a passage through one of the channels of the Sound supposed to be unnavigable,

Peter joins the coalition against Sweden.

§ 7. The Northern War—first stage, 1700-6.

Charles XII defeats Denmark.

Peace of
Traven-
thal.

in transporting the whole of the army, which he had massed in Scania, into Zealand. Denmark was at his mercy, and the king, Frederick IV, hastily made peace in August, contenting himself with a satisfactory settlement of the Holstein question.

Saxon
attack on
Riga fails.
Siege and
battle of
Narva.

Meanwhile, the Saxon attack upon Riga had failed, mainly owing to the fact that the Livonians refused to rise at the bidding of Patkul. Peter the Great had invaded Ingria, and was besieging Narva, the key of Esthonia, when the startling news arrived that Charles XII, who was thought to be far away and fully occupied in Denmark, was rapidly approaching with a force, which, though in reality it was ludicrously small, rumour magnified into a vast and overwhelming host. Peter himself fled to Novgorod; and on the following day, November 20, in a fierce battle fought in a snowstorm, the huge Russian army of 40,000, mostly composed of hastily levied and untrained recruits, was routed and driven in panic from before Narva by Charles's 8,000 veteran Swedes.

Battle of
Düna-
münde.

In July 1701 Charles won another great victory in Livonia. Transporting his army across the river Düna in rafts and boats, under the fire of the enemy, he routed a combined force of Russians and Saxons at Dünamünde, and followed up the victory by the occupation of Courland.

Charles
XII in-
vades
Poland.

Charles, now utterly contemptuous of the Russians, and misled by the ease of his victories over them, determined to postpone all else until he had completed the humiliation of Augustus II. Declaring that the 'Elector of Saxony' had forfeited the throne of Poland, he entered Warsaw in May 1702, beat the Saxons at Klissow on July 9, the anniversary of Dünamünde, and three weeks later captured Cracow. In April 1703 he beat the

Warsaw
occupied.
Battle of
Klissow.
Cracow
captured.

Saxons again at Pultusk; and in the following year a small body of his Polish partisans were induced, with the aid of bribes and the support of a Swedish force, to depose Augustus, and to elect Charles's nominee, the young Palatine of Posen, Stanislaus Leszczyński, to the Polish throne, in spite of the latter's distaste for that dangerous eminence.

Battle of
Pultusk.

Stanislaus
Leszczyński,
King
of Poland.

In the meantime, while his enemy was involved in the Polish morass, Peter had raised and trained a new army on the European model. Against the inferior forces left to guard the Baltic provinces he had little difficulty in occupying Carelia and Ingria. At the mouth of the river Neva a little village, the nucleus of the new capital Petersburg, was already growing up; and on the adjacent island the fort of Kronslot (now Kronstadt), designed by Peter himself, was being built to guard a harbour large enough to contain the whole of the rapidly growing Russian navy.

Peter
occupies
the Baltic
coast.

Founda-
tion of
Petersburg
and of
Kronstadt.

Having gained all he desired for the present, Peter would have welcomed peace, but Charles was confident that he could recover the losses on the Neva as soon as the Polish business was settled, and refused even to negotiate. Consequently, Peter transferred his forces to Poland. In February 1706 an overwhelming victory was gained at Fraustadt by Charles's general, Rehnskjöld. The remnant of the Russian army, favoured by floods up the Niemen, which cut off the pursuing Swedes, made good its escape; but Saxony, in spite of a Swedish reverse at Kalisch, was at the mercy of Charles, and Augustus was forced to make a peace by which he recognized the election of Stanislaus. The unfortunate Patkul was handed over to Charles, and suffered a barbarous death by being broken on the wheel.

Peter
intervenes
in Poland.

Battle of
Fraustadt.

Battle of
Kalisch.
Peace of
Altran-
stadt.

Death of
Patkul.

Charles XII, still barely twenty-five, was now at the

Charles
XII and
the Em-
peror.

zenith of his fame and fortunes. His alliance was eagerly sought by both sides in the Spanish Succession War, and had he chosen he might have been the arbiter of Europe, and have settled that long-drawn-out conflict forthwith. But in spite of a sharp quarrel with the Emperor Joseph I, owing to the latter's ill-treatment of the Silesian Protestants, which detained Charles in Saxony for a year, and for a time convinced Europe that his alliance had been bought by Louis XIV, he had no intention of intervening, at least until he had accomplished his long-meditated vengeance against Russia. The Emperor, who had already recognized Stanislaus, at length conceded all Charles's demands.

§ 8.
Charles
XII's
invasion
of Russia.

Peter's
desire for
peace.

Peter the Great, since his defeats in 1706, had been anxious for peace with Sweden. Through the medium of Great Britain (since Charles still refused to open direct communications), he offered to surrender all his Baltic conquests, with the exception of Petersburg. In addition to huge personal bribes to Marlborough himself, he also offered to join his forces to the Grand Alliance, if Great Britain could persuade Charles to accept the desired peace. But Charles could be satisfied with nothing less than total surrender and a war indemnity, and so lost the chance of agreeing with his greatest, albeit despised, enemy. In November 1707, with a great army of 24,000 horse and 20,000 foot he set out upon his fatal campaign in Russia.

Peter's
defensive
strategy.

Peter's plans for resistance were practically those which, adopted by his successors a little more than a hundred years later, ruined the Grand Army of Napoleon. The Russians retired before the invaders, devastating the country as they went; they avoided giving battle in the open, but harassed the enemy as much as possible, especially at the great rivers. The country people also

were warned to hide their provisions, to drive off their cattle, and to flee at the approach of the Swedes, who would thus be left to starve in a desert.

Instead of first recovering the Baltic provinces, Charles, encouraged by a rebellion of the Cossacks in the south, and by the prospect of aid from the Turks, was tempted against the advice of his best generals to undertake the hazardous plan of a pursuit of the retreating Russian army into the heart of Muscovy. The brilliant victory of Holowczyn on the Wabis in July 1708 was the last pitched battle won by Charles, though he gained several small actions against great odds. Thereafter the march was one long agony of disaster and privation. The terrible cold of the winter 1708-9, the bitterest experienced in Europe for a century, brought appalling sufferings upon the Swedes and ruined their stock of ammunition, while the expected aid from the Cossacks proved of little value.

Charles enticed southward.

Battle of Holowczyn.

Swedish disasters.

At length, while undertaking the siege of Pultava in Ukraine in June 1709, Charles was severely wounded in the foot by a bullet, and Peter, hearing of this fresh calamity to his enemy, determined to strike the decisive blow. With an army well furnished, supplied with artillery of the latest pattern, and four times as numerous as his opponents, the Tsar enveloped and overwhelmed the famished and dispirited Swedes. Their brave infantry was annihilated, and the whole of the cavalry forced to surrender. Charles himself was borne from the field on a litter, and with the aid of the Cossacks escaped to Turkish territory, where he was a fugitive for the next five years.

Battle of Pultava.

Charles in Turkey.

The battle of Pultava was the signal for the renewal of the coalition against Sweden. The Poles repudiated King Stanislaus and restored Augustus II; in July 1710

§ 9. Conclusion of the Northern War.

The Turks recover Azoff. Peter the Great captured Riga; the Danes attacked Scania without success, but in 1712 conquered Bremen and Verden. However, Charles in his exile managed to prevail upon the Turks to renew the war against Russia, and this diverted the attention of the Tsar once more to the south. In August 1711, in a campaign on the river Pruth near Jassy, Peter the Great was outmanœuvred and completely cut off. He was forced to surrender his conquest of Azoff to the Turks and to allow Charles a safe conduct back to his dominions.

Charles XII's last stand.

It was not however till November 1714 that Charles reappeared in the north. In the meantime the Russians conquered Finland; while in Germany the Swedes lost everything except Stralsund and Wismar.

Third coalition against Sweden.

Three months before Charles's arrival at Stralsund, a fresh impetus had been given to the enemies of Sweden by the accession to the throne of Great Britain of the Elector of Hanover, who, in 1715, organized a third coalition, in which Hanover, Russia, Prussia, Poland, Saxony, and Denmark joined. George's share of the spoils was Bremen and Verden, which he bought from the Danes. For a year Charles heroically defended Stralsund. He had to abandon it, by that time a mere heap of ruins, in December 1715; and with the fall of Wismar in the following April he lost his last foothold in Germany. The war then continued in the Scandinavian peninsula; and at length, in December 1718, the extraordinary career of the warrior king was closed, in his thirty-sixth year, by a bullet shot which struck him down while he was attacking the Norwegian fortress of Friedrickssten.

Death of Charles XII.

Settlement of the North.

The facts of the war were registered in a series of treaties culminating in the Peace of Nystad in 1721. Russia gained Livonia, Esthonia, Ingria, and Carelia, but

restored her conquests in Finland; Augustus of Saxony was recognized as King of Poland; Prussia gained part of Swedish Pomerania; Denmark was allowed to occupy Holstein, but restored her conquests in Sweden; and George I as Elector of Hanover gained Bremen and Verden. The great age of Sweden had passed.

The selection of a definite date to mark the opening or close of an epoch must always be somewhat arbitrary. § 10. The close of an epoch. In 1715 the Great Northern War was still raging; while in the south-east another war had begun between the Turks and their enemies Venice and Austria, which was properly a continuation of those already described in this volume. But in spite of this, there is hardly a date in modern history (except perhaps 1815) which more distinctly ends a stage in international politics.

The Peace of Utrecht (with the supplementary settlements, which were not completed until 1715) introduces Effect of the Peace of Utrecht. a new epoch in the history of diplomacy. It solved the Spanish succession question, the most critical of all those which had arisen in the long rivalry between the Habsburgs and the Bourbons, by the expedient of partition; and thus broke up the great Spanish empire which had existed since the days of the Emperor Charles V. It practically established, as part of the public law of Europe, the principle that the settlement of affairs of individual states, particularly territorial changes which may affect the Balance of Power, may be undertaken by the great powers as a whole, even against the clearly expressed wishes of the rulers and the peoples immediately affected. This principle, for good or ill (more frequently the latter), dominated the whole of the diplomacy of the century which followed. It largely accounts for the callous disregard of the interests of peoples and nationalities which characterizes the rulers

of the eighteenth century, and which found its culminating expression in that great outrage, the Partition of Poland.

Again, the settlement of the Spanish succession removed all immediate danger to Europe from the ambition of the House of Bourbon; and it closed the first phase of the great commercial conflict between Great Britain and France. Although Louis XIV in the last few months of his life was plotting to aid the approaching Jacobite rebellion in Britain, his death in 1715 was followed by a complete change in the relations of the two countries. The Regent Orleans in France, and the Whigs in England, immediately made a close alliance; the former in order to preserve his own claims upon the succession to the French crown against the designs of Philip V of Spain; and the latter in order to give security to the Hanoverian dynasty upon which their own power rested. This alliance achieved its objects; and it was the principal European influence during the years which immediately succeeded, in maintaining the settlement of Utrecht.

Effects
of the
Northern
War.

And further, although the Great Northern War was unfinished in 1715, by the end of that year the results which were registered in the treaties of 1719-21 were practically accomplished. In the Baltic region also, the Balance of Power, which had been disturbed by the astonishing achievements of the Vasa kings, was re-adjusted by the method of partition. A fresh direction was then given to the policy of those who participated in the settlement; particularly in the case of Prussia and Russia. The ambitious rulers of those two states, having both established their power in the Baltic upon the ruins of the Swedish empire, now turn their attention elsewhere; and their policy, inherited by their successors, gives the clue to many great events in the period

which follows. Poland, lying between the two, was marked down for eventual destruction. But, more immediately, Prussia was inevitably led to challenge the supremacy of Austria in Germany. And Russia, whose appearance in the arena of European politics is one of the most remarkable features of the century, was as inevitably led to renew her efforts to secure a position on the Black Sea. In pursuit of this ambition she supplanted Austria as the recognized champion of Christendom against the Turk; and thus an entirely new phase in the Eastern Question was opened, and a number of fresh problems created, many of which have yet to find satisfactory solution.

LIST OF BOOKS ON THE PERIOD

The following are suggestions for further reading. Detailed bibliographies may be found in the first three books on the list :

Cambridge Modern History, vols. iii, iv, v.

Lavissee et Rambaud, *Histoire Générale*, vols. v, vi.

Lavissee, *Histoire de France*, vols. vi, vii, viii.

Acton, Lord, *Lectures on Modern History*, viii-xvii.

Bryce, *Holy Roman Empire*, cc. xix, xx.

Gardiner, S. R., *Thirty Years' War*.

Schiller, *Thirty Years' War* (trans.).

Fletcher, C. R. L., *Gustavus Adolphus*.

Lodge, R., *Richelieu*.

Hassall, A., *Mazarin*.

„ „ *Louis XIV.*

Airy, O., *English Restoration and Louis XIV.*

Hume, M. A. S., *Spain. Its Greatness and Decay*.

Bain, N., *Scandinavia*.

„ „ *Charles XII.*

„ „ *The First Romanovs*.

Creasy, E., *Ottoman Turks*.

Voltaire's *Le Siècle de Louis XIV* and *Charles XII* may also be used with caution.

CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY

OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS MENTIONED IN THIS VOLUME.

DATE.	EVENT.	PAGE
1555	Religious Peace of Augsburg	25
1598	Edict of Nantes	2
	Accession of Philip III of Spain	9
1606	Peace of Zsitva-Torok	15
1607	The Donauwörth incident	32
1608	Formation of Protestant Union	33
1609	Cleves-Jülich Succession question	33
	Twelve Years' Truce between Spain and Dutch	3
	Bohemian Letter of Majesty	36
1609-10	Expulsion of Moriscoes from Spain	10
1610	Murder of Henry IV of France	1
	Formation of Catholic League	33
1611-13	War between Sweden and Denmark	63
1611	Accession of Gustavus Adolphus	19
1612	Death of Emp. Rudolf II. Accession of Matthias	37
1613	Peace of Knäred	63
	Election of Michael Romanoff to Russian throne	18
1614	Meeting of States-General in France	59
	Treaty of Xanten	36
1616	Richelieu's first ministry	59
1617	Peace of Stolbova	63
	War between Sweden and Poland	64
	Ferdinand of Styria elected in Bohemia	38
1618	Bohemian Revolution. Thirty Years' War opens	39
1618-19	Synod of Dort. Execution of Oldenbarneveldt	62
1619	Death of Emp. Matthias. Election of Ferdinand II	47
	Deposition of Ferdinand in Bohemia and election of Frederick V, Elector Palatine, as King	48
1620	Agreement of Mühlhausen	50
	Treaty of Ulm	51
	Battle of the White Hill	52
1620-3	Conquest of the Palatinate and Bohemia	51-7
1620-2	Spanish occupation of the Valtelline	89
1621	Accession of Philip IV of Spain. Ascendancy of Olivares	89
	Dissolution of the Protestant Union	54
	Rebellion of the Huguenots	60

DATE.	EVENT.	PAGE
1621	Renewal of war between Holland and Spain . . .	62
1622	Huguenot Peace of Montpellier . . .	60
1623	War spreads to Lower Saxony and Westphalia . . .	65
	France intervenes in the Valtelline . . .	90
	Prince Charles and Buckingham at Madrid . . .	65
	'Massacre' of Amboyna . . .	61
1624	Beginning of Richelieu's great ministry . . .	60, 75
1625	Death of James I. Accession of Charles I . . .	67
	Intervention of Denmark in Thirty Years' War . . .	67
	Death of Maurice Pr. of Orange. Accession of Frederick Henry . . .	63
	Wallenstein appointed Imperialist general . . .	67
	Spinola captures Breda . . .	62
	Rebellion of Huguenots . . .	84
	English expedition to Cadiz fails . . .	70
	Gustavus Adolphus attacks Poland . . .	67
1626	Treaty of Monzon . . .	90
	Battle of Dessau bridge . . .	70
	Battle of Lutter . . .	71
	Death of Mansfeld . . .	71
1627	Buckingham's expedition to Ré . . .	85
	Tilly and Wallenstein overrun Denmark . . .	72
1628-31	Mantuan Succession War . . .	91 ff.
1628	Siege of Stralsund . . .	73
	Capitulation of La Rochelle . . .	85
1629	Edict of Restitution . . .	98
	Peace of Lübeck . . .	73
	Reduction of Languedoc. Submission of Huguenots . . .	85
	Truce of Altmärk . . .	96
1630	Richelieu captures Pinerolo. French occupy Savoy . . .	92
	Assembly at Ratisbon. Dismissal of Wallenstein . . .	93, 100
	Landing of Gustavus in Pomerania . . .	101
	End of Marie de Médicis' intrigues against Richelieu . . .	87
1631	Battle of Garz. Treaty of Bärwalde . . .	102
	Treaties of Cherasco . . .	94
	Fall and sack of Magdeburg . . .	107
	Rebellion of Gaston Duke of Orleans . . .	87
	Battle of Breitenfeld . . .	109
	Gustavus occupies Franconia . . .	112
	Reappointment of Wallenstein . . .	115
1632	Battle of the Lech. Death of Tilly . . .	117
	Gustavus occupies Bavaria . . .	117
	Gustavus and Wallenstein before Nuremberg . . .	118
	Richelieu subdues Lorraine. Treaty of Liverdun . . .	88
	Execution of Montmorency . . .	88
	Battle of Lützen. Death of Gustavus . . .	121
1633	League of Heilbronn formed . . .	124
	Bernard of Weimar invades Bavaria . . .	129
1634	Murder of Wallenstein . . .	132

DATE.	EVENT.	PAGE
1634	Battle of Nördlingen	133
	Foundation of the French Academy	82
	Swedish 'Form of Government' adopted	170
1635	Peace of Prague	134
	French alliances with the Swedes, Dutch, North-Italian Dukes, and Bernard of Weimar	136
1636	France invaded by the Cardinal-Infante	137
	Rebellion of Soissons	138
1637	Death of Ferdinand II. Accession of Ferdinand III	138
	Frederick Henry recovers Breda	137
1638	Birth of the Dauphin, afterwards Louis XIV	139
1639	Death of Bernard of Weimar. France occupies Alsace Battle of the Downs	139
1640	Revolts of Catalonia and Portugal	140 ff.
	Accession of the Great Elector	173
1641	Rebellions of Soissons, Bouillon, and Chas. of Lorraine Edict suppresses privileges of <i>Parlement</i> of Paris	143 78
1642	Conspiracy of Cinq-Mars	143
	Second battle of Breitenfeld	143
	Roussillon conquered by France	141
	Death of Richelieu	143
1643	Fall of Olivares	142
	Death of Louis XIII. Mazarin's ministry	144
	Conspiracy of the <i>Importants</i>	154
	Battle of Rocroi	145
	Swedish invasion of Denmark	145
1644	Battles of Freiburg	145
1645	Battle of Jankau	146
	Peace Congresses open at Münster and Osnabrück	148
	Treaty of Brömsebro	146
	Second battle of Nördlingen	146
	Invasion of Crete by Sultan Ibrahim	193
1646	Turenne and Wrangel invade Bavaria	147
	The French capture Dunkirk	166
1647	Death of Frederick Henry of Orange. Accession of William II	147
1647-8	Revolt of Naples	153
1648	Peace of Münster between Spain and the Dutch	147
	Beginning of the Fronde	157
	Battle of Zusmarshausen	147
	Battle of Lens	146
	Peace of Westphalia	148
	The Turks besiege Candia	193
1650	William II, Pr. of Orange, attacks Amsterdam	168
	Death of William II. Birth of William III.	168
1651	English Navigation Act	168
1652	Settlement of the Dutch at Cape Colony	166
1652-4	First Anglo-Dutch war	168
1654	End of the Fronde	162

DATE.	EVENT.	PAGE
1654	Abdication of Christina of Sweden. Accession of Charles X	171
1654-5	Restoration of Crown lands in Sweden	172
	Charles X invades Poland. General war in the North	175
1655	English capture Jamaica	163
1656-7	Brandenburg gains independent control of East Prussia	175-7
1656	Massacre of the Vaudois	163
	Revival of Ottoman power under the Kiuprilis	194 ff.
1657	Alliance of England and France against Spain	164
	Death of Emp. Ferdinand III	164
	Charles X invades Denmark	176
	Blake's naval victory of Santa Cruz over Spain	163
1657-61	War between Holland and Portugal	169
1658	Treaty of Roeskilde	177
	Battle of the Dunes	164
	Election of the Emperor Leopold I	164
	The Turks attack Transylvania	194
1659	Intervention of Holland in Baltic war	177
	Treaty of the Pyrenees	164
1660	Death of Charles X of Sweden	177
	Treaties of Oliva and Copenhagen	177
	Restoration of Charles II in England	196
	Marriage of Louis XIV and Maria Theresa	165
1661	Death of Mazarin. Personal rule of Louis XIV begins	180
	Monarchical revolution in Denmark	178
1662	Marriage of Charles II and Catherine of Braganza	196
	Sale of Dunkirk to France	196
1663	Ahmad Kiuprili invades western Hungary	195
1664	Battle of St. Gothard. Peace of Vasvar	195
	English capture New Amsterdam (New York)	198
	Colbert founds French India Trading Company	188
1665-7	Second Anglo-Dutch war	197
1665	Battle of Villa Viciosa secures Portuguese independence	197
	Death of Philip IV of Spain. Accession of Charles II	199
1667	War of Devolution opens	200
	Dutch fleet in the Medway	198
1668	Secret partition treaty between Louis XIV and Leopold I	202
	The Triple Alliance	201
	Condé conquers Franche-Comté	201
	Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle	202
	Abdication of John Casimir of Poland	206
1669	Fall of Candia. Crete ceded to the Turks	195
1670	Secret Treaty of Dover	204
	Lorraine occupied by the French	205
1672	Alliance between Louis XIV and Sweden	204
	Louis XIV invades Holland	207
	Ahmad Kiuprili invades Poland	206
	William of Orange proclaimed Stadtholder	208

DATE.	EVENT.	PAGE
1672	Murder of the De Witt brothers	208
1672-4	Formation of a coalition against France	210
1672-82	Exploration of the Mississippi by La Salle	237
1674	Charles II makes peace with the Dutch	211
	John Sobieski elected King of Poland	213
1675	Battle of Fehrbellin	212
	Death of Turenne	212
1676	Treaty of Zurawna between Poland and Turkey	214
1677-81	First war between Russia and Turkey	217
1677	Marriage of William of Orange and Princess Mary	212
1678	Hungarian nationalist movement under Tökölyi	218
1678-9	Peace of Nimeguen	212
1679	Treaties of Saint-Germain-en-Laye and Fontainebleau	213
	Beginning of the Reunion Policy	214
1680	Devastation of the Principality of Orange	223
1681	French seizure of Strassburg and Casale	215-16
	French occupation of Zweibrücken	224
1681-2	Formation of league against France at the Hague	224
1682	Accession of Peter the Great. Regency of Sophia	294
1683	Rout of the Turks before Vienna by Sobieski	220
	Death of Colbert	227
1684	Formation of Holy League against the Turks	221
	French bombardment of Genoa	224
	The French take Luxemburg	223
	Truce of Ratisbon	224
1685	Death of Charles II of England. Accession of James II	225
	Disputed succession in the Palatinate	229
	Revocation of the Edict of Nantes	227
1686	Expulsion of the Vaudois	228
	Formation of the League of Augsburg	230
1687	Battle of Harkány. Austria recovers Hungary	222
	The Venetians capture Athens	222
	Quarrel between Louis XIV and Innocent XI	232
1688	Death of the Great Elector. Accession of Frederick III	241
	The Austrians capture Belgrade	222
	Louis XIV invades the Palatinate	234
	Expedition of William of Orange to England	234
1689	Second Devastation of the Palatinate	240
	Formation of the Grand Alliance	240
	Beginning of personal rule of Peter the Great	294
1690	Anglo-Dutch fleet defeated off Beachy Head	241
	Battle of the Boyne	241
	Venetians complete conquest of the Morea	222
	Turks recover Belgrade	245
1691	Rout of the Turks at Szalankemen	245
1692	Anglo-Dutch naval victory of La Hogue	241
	French capture Namur	242
	Defeat of William III at Steinkirke	242
	Invasion of Dauphiné by Eugene	243

DATE.	EVENT.	PAGE
1693	Defeat of William III at Neerwinden	242
	French invasion of Piedmont. Victory of Marsaglia	243
1695	William III recaptures Namur	242
1696	Defection of Savoy from the Grand Alliance	243
	Capture of Azoff by Peter the Great	296
1697	Augustus of Saxony elected King of Poland	246
	Eugene defeats the Turks at Zenta	246
	Peace of Ryswick	244
	Accession of Charles XII of Sweden	291
	Peter the Great's Embassy to the West	296
1698	Suppression of the <i>Strieltz</i> revolt	295
	First Partition Treaty	254
1699	Peace of Carlowitz	247
	Death of Electoral Prince of Bavaria	255
	Patkul organizes coalition against Sweden	293
1700	Great Northern War begins. Defeat of Denmark	297
	Second Partition Treaty	255
	Death of Charles II of Spain	257
	Battle of Narva	298
1701	Dutch Barrier forts seized by the French	259
	Spanish Succession War opens in Italy	262
	Charles XII's victory of Dünamünde	298
	Renewal of the Grand Alliance	261
	Death of James II. His son recognized by Louis XIV	260
1702	Eugene's raid on Cremona	265
	Death of William III	261
	Battle of Klissow. Charles XII takes Warsaw and Cracow	298
1703	Charles XII's victory at Pultusk	299
	Portugal and Savoy join the Grand Alliance	272
1704	Augustus of Poland deposed in favour of Stanislaus Leszczyński	299
	Campaign and battle of Blenheim	273 ff.
	English capture Gibraltar	277
1705	Death of Leopold I. Accession of Joseph I	278
	Catalonia declares for the Allies	279
1706	Swedish victory at Fraustadt	299
	Battle of Ramillies	279
	Eugene's victory of Turin	280
1706-7	Charles XII in Saxony	300
1707	Defeat of the Allies at Almanza	282
	Failure of Eugene's attempt on Toulon	282
	Opening of Charles XII's Muscovite campaign	300
1708	Battle of Oudenarde	283
	Charles XII's victory at Holowczyn	301
	English capture Minorca	283
1709	Siege and battle of Pultava	301
	Battle of Malplaquet	285
1709-14	Charles XII in Turkey	301


DATE.	EVENT.	PAGE
1710	Allies' victories at Almenara and Saragossa . . .	286
	Second coalition against Sweden . . .	301
	Fall of the Whig Ministry in England . . .	286
	Capture of Acadie by English Colonists . . .	286
1711	Death of Joseph I. Accession of Charles VI . . .	287
	Campaign of the Pruth. Peter the Great surrenders Azoff . . .	302
	Dismissal of Marlborough . . .	287
1712	French victory at Denain bridge . . .	288
1713	Treaty of Utrecht . . .	288
1714	Treaties of Rastadt and Baden . . .	288
	Peter the Great conquers Finland . . .	302
	Death of Queen Anne. Accession of George I . . .	302
1715	Third coalition against Sweden . . .	302
	Death of Louis XIV. Regency of Orleans . . .	289
	Third Dutch Barrier Treaty . . .	288
	Fall of Stralsund . . .	302
	The Turks recover the Morea from Venice . . .	247
1715-18	War of Venice and Austria against the Turks . . .	247
1718	Death of Charles XII . . .	302
1719-21	Treaties of Stockholm, Frederiksborg, and Nystad close the Great Northern War . . .	302

THE HOUSE OF BOURBON.

Illustrating relationships with the Spanish, English, Savoyard, and Palatinate Houses.

Numerals in brackets thus—(1) (2) (3)—indicate (when necessary) the order of births or marriages.

Henry IV = Marie de Médicis



THE HOUSE OF VASA IN SWEDEN AND POLAND.

Gustavus I Vasa, King of Sweden, 1523-60

Eric XIV,
dep. 1568

John III, Cath. Jagello, dau. of
died 1592 Sigismund I of Poland

Sigismund, K. of Swed., 1592-dep. 1600
K. of Poland, 1587-1632

Ladislaus VII,
K. of Poland, 1632-48

John Casimir V,
K. of Poland, 1648-abd. 1668

Charles IX, K. of Sweden, 1604-11

Catherine — John Casimir of
Zweibrücken

Charles X,
K. of Sweden, 1654-60

Charles XI,
K. of Sweden, 1660-97

Charles XII,
K. of Sweden, 1697-1718


Gustavus II Adolphus,
1611-32

Christina, 1632-54,
died, 1689

THE SPANISH SUCCESSION.

(Candidates of 1698 in heavy type. Other near claimants in capitals.)


Philip III = Margaret (*sister of Emp. Ferd. II*)



EUROPE IN 1610

SCALE
Eng. Miles 0 100 200 300


- Austrian Habsburgs
- Spain
- The Empire
- Denmark
- Sweden



FRANCE 1610-1715

French boundary in 1610

Acquisitions under Henry IV	1589-1610	
"	Louis XIII 1610-1643	
"	Louis XIV 1643-1715	



THE NETHERLANDS

1610-1715

SCALE

Eng. Miles 0 10 20 30 40 50

External Boundary of the Netherlands in 1610

Ecclesiastical Territories

Boundary of the United Provinces
as settled by the Treaties of 1648 and 1661

The Barrier Towns of 1715 thus

Limit of French acquisitions to 1715

Provincial Boundaries



Furnes



Limit of French acquisitions to 1715

Provincial Boundaries



AB. = Archbishopric
B. = Bishopric


EUROPE IN 1715

after the
Treaties of UTRECHT, RASTADT & BADEN

SCALE
Eng. Miles 0 100 200 300

Prussia		Savoy	
Austria		Denmark & Norway	
" acquired 1699		Venice	
" " 1718		Boundary of the Empire	


In the North the shadings represent the changes made by the Treaties of Stockholm and Nystad 1720-21.



THE BALTIC LANDS

Illustrating Expansion & Decline of Sweden

Eng. Miles 0 50 100 150 200




B.V. Barbishire, Oxford, 1913

GERMANY AT THE PEACE OF WESTPHALIA 1648




SCALE OF ENGLISH MILES
0 50 100 150 200


Route of Gustavus Adolphus, 1630-32, shown thus: ———→



FRANCE 1610-1715

French boundary in 1610

Acquisitions under	Henry IV	1589-1610		
"	"	Louis XIII	1610-1643	
"	"	Louis XIV	1643-1715	



THE NETHERLANDS

1610-1715

SCALE

Eng. Miles 0 10 20 30 40 50

External Boundary of the Netherlands in 1610

Ecclesiastical Territories

Boundary of the United Provinces
as settled by the Treaties of 1648 and 1661

The Barrier Towns of 1715 thus

Limit of French acquisitions to 1715

Provincial Boundaries




Furnes ■



Barrier Towns











AB. = Archbishopric
B. = Bishopric




EUROPE in 1715

after the
Treaties of **UTRECHT, RASTADT & BADEN**

SCALE
Eng. Miles 0 100 200 300

Prussia.....		Savoy.....	
Austria.....		Denmark & Norway.....	
" acquired 1699.....		Venice.....	
" " 1718.....		Boundary of the Empire.....	

In the North the shadings represent the changes made by the Treaties of Stockholm and Nystad 1720-21.



NOTE
To Venice 1699
Reconquered by
the Turks 1715