



FIELD-MARSHAL VON MOLTKE.

THE FOUNDING
OF THE
GERMAN EMPIRE

BY WILLIAM I.

BASED CHIEFLY UPON PRUSSIAN STATE DOCUMENTS

BY HEINRICH VON SYBEL

TRANSLATED BY

MARSHALL LIVINGSTON PERRIN, PH.D. (*Göt.*),
OF BOSTON UNIVERSITY.

ASSISTED BY

GAMALIEL BRADFORD, JR.

VOL. III.

"He who sows the wind shall reap the whirlwind."

NEW YORK
THOMAS Y. CROWELL & CO.
46 EAST FOURTEENTH STREET

CONTENTS OF VOLUME III.

BOOK IX.

CHAPTER	PAGE
ORIGIN OF THE GERMAN-DANISH WAR.	
I. THE OLD CONSTITUTION OF SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN	3
Relation of the Duchies to Denmark.—Changes in the Conditions.—Frederick VI. of Denmark.—Provincial Estates.—The House of Gottorp.—Doubts about the Succession.—Rise of the "Eider-Danish" Party.—The "Eider-Danish" Projects.—Intended Incorporation of Schleswig.	
II. THE QUESTION OF THE SUCCESSION	22
Efforts of King Christian VIII.—Agitation by the Eider-Danes.—Motion of Algreen-Ussing.—Controversies about the Succession.—The Duke of Augustenburg.—Attitude of the Powers.—Attitude of France.—French Attempts at Intervention.—The Feeling in Germany.—View of Radowitz.—Resolution of the Diet in September, 1846.—Compromise suggested by Prussia.—King Frederick VII.—Excitement in Copenhagen.—The Ministry resigns.—Insurrection in the Duchies.—German War with Denmark.	
III. THE COMPACTS OF 1852	56
Summary of the Events of the War.—The Question of Succession.—Conference of Sovereigns at Warsaw.—Views of the Powers.—Danish Propositions.—The Danish Minister, Bluhme.—Bluhme's Proposals.—Change of Ministry in 1852.—Satisfaction of the Powers.—Negotiations with Augustenburg.—Bismarck and Augustenburg.—Danish Offers to Augustenburg.—New Difficulties.—Dissatisfaction with Prussia.—The London Protocol of May 8, 1852.—Signing of the Protocol.—Criticism of the Compacts.—Danish Act of Succession.—Augustenburg.	

CHAPTER	PAGE
IV. DENMARK BREAKS THE COMPACTS	97

Police Tyranny in the Duchies. — The General Constitution. — Attitude of the German Powers. — Bismarck's Report. — Decree of Feb. 11, 1858. — Ostensible Submission of Denmark. — The Affair drags on. — Hall's Reply. — Exchange of Notes. — Foreign Opinions. — English Attempts to mediate. — The View taken in Denmark. — Hall answers the German Powers. — Bright Prospects for Denmark. — Proclamation of March 30, 1863. — Hopes of the "Eider-Danes."

BOOK X.

THE CHASTISEMENT BY THE CONFEDERATION.

I. THE CHASTISEMENT DECIDED UPON	134
--	-----

Bismarck's View of the Situation. — The Diet and Public Opinion. — Bismarck's Action in the House. — Report of the Committees. — Demands of the Confederate Diet. — Martial Zeal in Denmark. — Various Sentiments in Germany. — King Frederick's Speech. — Bismarck and Baron Blixen. — Bismarck's Answer. — Bismarck writes to Von Sydow. — King Frederick and His Ministers. — The New Constitution. — The Constitution adopted.

II. THE SUCCESSION AND THE CONSTITUTION	163
---	-----

Napoleon's Project of a Congress. — Bad State of Things in Austria. — Accession of Christian IX. — The Feeling in the Duchies. — The Assembly at Kiel. — King Christian's Hesitation. — Violent Excitement in Germany. — Ministers, Chambers, and People agree. — Attitude of Austria and Prussia. — Bismarck's View. — Prussia anxious for the Chastisement. — Austria and Prussia agree. — England seeks to mediate. — Attitude of France. — The French Advances coolly met. — Royal Council in Berlin. — Warlike Measures.

III. THE CHASTISEMENT IN HOLSTEIN	198
---	-----

Austria accepts Prussia's Proposals. — Vote of the Diet. — Feeling in England. — Opposition in the Prussian Parliament. — The Chastisement decreed. — France and England. — Russian Mediatory Proposition. — Bismarck and Lord Wodehouse. — Change of Ministers in Denmark. — Bavaria takes a Prominent Part. — The Hereditary Prince in Holstein. — Plan of the Lesser States. — The Committee of Thirty-six. — View of Austria. — Bismarck's Memorial. — Proposition of Austria and Prussia.

CONTENTS.

v

CHAPTER	PAGE
IV. THE COMPACT OF JANUARY 16, 1864	233
Rechberg's Note to Bavaria. — Bismarck and Buchanan. — Rechberg's Compliance. — The Austrian Outline. — Bismarck's Amendment. — The Vote in the Diet. — Advance of the Troops. — Uneasiness of the Lesser States. — Lord John Russell. — English Proposal to defer Operations. — Rejection of the English Proposal. — The Note of the Two Powers.	

BOOK XI.

DANNEVIRKE AND DÜPPEL.

I. OUTBREAK OF THE WAR.	261
The Dannevirke. — Moltke's Plan of Operations. — Wrangel's Arrangements. — The First Combats. — De Meza's Resolutions. — Evacuation of the Dannevirke. — Impression made by the Event. — The Feeling in Germany. — Irritation in the Lesser States. — The Holstein Towns occupied. — Manteuffel sent to Dresden. — Manteuffel and King John.	
II. GENERAL MANTEUFFEL IN VIENNA	289
Discussion of Further Steps. — Austria's Protest. — Manteuffel's Mission. — Austria's Fears. — Repeated Delays. — Austrian Advice. — Defiance of the Danes. — Austria's Compliance. — Occupation of South Jutland. — Operations at Düppel. — Blumenthal's Plan. — Attempt to cross the Sound.	
III. THE STORMING OF DÜPPEL	315
Invitation to a Conference. — Austria against Augustenburg. — Death of King Max. — Beust chosen to be sent to London. — Bombardment of Sonderborg. — General Gerslach's Report. — Preparations for the Assault. — Capture of the Redoubts. — Advance into Jutland. — The Effect of the Victories. — Foreign Opinions.	
IV. THE LONDON CONFERENCE	341
Napoleon seeks Prussian Favor. — The Emperor's Proposals. — Prussia's Dilemma. — Prussian Despatch to Paris. — Napoleon's Sentiments. — Representatives at the Congress. — The Conference proposes a Truce. — Negotiations over the Truce. — Agitation in Germany. — Treaties of 1852 declared Void. — Attitude of England. — Message to Bernstorff. — The German Declaration.	

BOOK XII.

ALSEN AND THE PEACE.

- I. CLOSE OF THE LONDON CONFERENCE . . . 371
 Bismarck's Despatch. — Views of the King and Crown Prince. — Austria's Policy. — Rechberg's Reply. — Schmerling's Endeavors. — Bismarck's Telegram. — Motions in the Conference. — Proposal to divide Schleswig. — Bismarck and Augustenburg. — The Grand Duke of Oldenburg. — The Emperor Alexander. — Bismarck and the Czar. — Victory of the "Eider-Danes." — Motion for a Plebiscitum. — England proposes Mediation. — Close of the Conflict.
- II. ALSÉN.—PRELIMINARIES OF PEACE . . . 405
 Consultation in Carlsbad. — The Army in Jutland. — Prince Frederick Charles. — The Landing upon Alsen. — Effects of the Victory. — Discouragement in Copenhagen. — Fall of the "Eider-Danes." — Further Conquests. — Bismarck's Advice. — Beust's Ill Success. — Compacts with the Hanse Towns. — Peace Preliminaries. — Continuance of the Negotiations. — Prussia's Policy. — Bismarck's Standpoint. — General Observations.
- III. THE PEACE OF VIENNA 436
 Non-Participation of the Diet. — The South German States. — Interview at Schönbrunn. — The Future of Schleswig-Holstein. — New Tariff Treaties. — Popular Feelings in Austria. — Peace Negotiations at Vienna. — Financial Questions. — Rudolph Delbrück. — Bismarck and Rechberg. — The Tariff-Union completed. — Bismarck's Conciliatory Wishes. — Bismarck's Report. — The King's Opinion. — Change of Ministry at Vienna. — Peaceful Feelings.

BOOK IX.

ORIGIN OF THE GERMAN-DANISH WAR.

FOUNDING OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE.

CHAPTER I.

THE OLD CONSTITUTION OF SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN.

SINCE 1836 the matter of Schleswig-Holstein had drawn to itself the attention of Europe and the activity of the Great Powers ; and the opinion soon spread far and wide, that no man could unravel the complicated web of the legal question there at issue. This was by no means to be wondered at. It was a question whose historical antecedents ran far back into the fifteenth century, and whose solution turned upon doubtful statements of feudal rights, of the rights of independent princes, of the rights of mediæval and of modern states. It was a question which, for a generation, had been subjected to the profoundest investigation by contentious governments and popular assemblies, by a dozen learned Faculties, by crafty demagogues at Copenhagen, and by the scholars of the Confederate Diet. Under these circumstances it is easy to see how such dust-clouds of scientific disquisition had enveloped it as soon blinded the eyes of erudite Parisian journalists and of wise Parliamentary orators in London.

4 *CONSTITUTION OF SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN.*

The sole fact which these critics could still discern in the confusion was, to put it shortly, that Germany was big and Denmark was little, and that consequently Germany's hostility to her weaker neighbor was as unjust as it was unchivalrous; and some reflected upon the consideration that a Democratic Constitution existed at Copenhagen, while Holstein was controlled by the upper nobility, and Germany by reactionary governments. Therefore, in the opinion of these critics, magnanimity and the love of freedom demanded with equal emphasis that Europe should not stand by and see the liberal dwarf crushed by the brutal giant.

In our day every grain of that dust of learned dissertation has settled, and the very simple state of the case has become clear. Two disputed questions, each wholly independent of the other, had arisen between Denmark and the Duchies — one a question concerning the Constitution, the other concerning the inheritance of the throne. Only in regard to the latter had all the doubts and controversies arisen. In regard to the former the violent action of Denmark against Schleswig-Holstein lacked the faintest shadow of a reasonable excuse, unless, indeed, the argument that Schleswig had been a Danish province from the ninth to the fourteenth century be regarded as such. But since that time the country had become filled with a German population, and had formed an intimate union with Holstein; and when, in 1460, the two together had called the Danish King to reign over them, it had not been as King of Denmark, but, according to the express wording of the

Act of Election, as liege lord of the countries themselves. So that, from this point of view, there was no other political connection between Denmark and the Duchies than that of a personal union, and every attempt of Denmark to alter this relation without the consent of the Duchies involved an arbitrary attack of the strong upon the weak in all its ugliness by no means on the part of Germany, but on the part of Denmark. This was precisely the case with the dispute as it stood in the nineteenth century; and it was the misfortune of the Duchies, so far as Europe was concerned, that this simple relation had at that time become entangled in a wholly uncertain question of succession, and had by this means been drawn into the labyrinthine discussion over the rights of independent princes.

For several centuries, then, there had been in force in the Duchies a constitution which assured to them a common Chamber of Peers, a common Diet, a common supreme administration, a common system of justice, and a common citizenship. As opposed to the royal authority, the Diet had the right of refusing supplies and of giving its concurrence in a declaration of war; the King had but a limited control over military service; strangers were excluded from all the offices, and the native government of the country was endowed with the full powers of a regency, in the absence of the King-Duke.

It is comprehensible enough that such an unconditioned independence of the Duchies should be anything

6 CONSTITUTION OF SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN.

but agreeable to the Government at Copenhagen. More than one aspiring and ambitious King made every effort to gain a more complete control over the country; but all these attempts were wrecked on the obstinate resistance of the people,— a resistance which found a further support in the fact that Holstein was a portion of the German Empire, and could claim the protection of that Empire, not only for its own rights, but for those of Schleswig also.

At the same time the long continuance of the monarchical connection brought about various changes in the system of personal union, which took place naturally and in accordance with the requirements of an undeniable fitness of things. The Sovereign could not have one foreign policy as Duke of Schleswig-Holstein and another as King of Denmark. It would have been very disadvantageous to the Duchies themselves, if the navy of the Crown had not formed a united whole. In the army the Duchies kept their own regiments, with national colors and a national corps of officers, both the soldiers of the line and of the garrisons being always natives of the country; but the supreme authority and the highest posts were reserved for the common Government at Copenhagen.

A similar arrangement obtained in the management of the finances; and that this should be the case with everything connected with providing for the expenses of the institutions mentioned above was a natural result of the circumstances themselves. Added to this was the fact that, since 1712, the Government had not

convened the Schleswig-Holstein Diet; but as no new taxes were levied, the people made no complaint. Since that time there had been no control whatever of the finances by the Estates; the Government had united the revenues and the expenses of all parts of the country in one common exchequer. Yet this method, though originally unjustifiable, was, at least, intended to be equitable in practice; and even in 1846 the Estates of Holstein recognized that the financial burden of the Duchies was on the whole fairly proportioned to that of the rest of the Kingdom.

In all other respects the mutual union and the independence of the Duchies remained unquestioned.

This was essentially the state of things up to the end of the eighteenth century. The Danish Kings, ruling since 1660 with absolute power in Denmark Proper, occasionally allowed themselves in the same way to be led into arbitrary acts in the management of Schleswig-Holstein; the Danish people lay in political torpor, without troubling themselves about the Duchies which were strangers to them; or thinking of them at most only to be annoyed at seeing so many of the German nobility fill the highest Danish offices of court and state.

In Schleswig-Holstein also there was a profound political calm. The arbitrary acts above alluded to were transitory matters, not of sufficient consequence to cause serious disturbance. In general, in spite of the absoluteness of the King, there was very little interference or control by the central power: nearly

everything was left to the local officials, seigniorial lords, and communes, a state of things highly conducive to the love of independence, but by no means so much so to progress in reforms. The leading nobles were well satisfied with the connection with Denmark, which offered them so often a brilliant theatre for their political activity. The largest part of the population lived after the manner of their forefathers in the simple ruggedness of their farms and pastures; on the coast flourished a race of sea-farers and sailors unsurpassed in hardiness by any in the world; while the insignificance of the cities prevented the growth of great industries with their contrasts of poverty and wealth and their influence constantly working in the direction of change.

The fact that there were three different languages in the country was hardly felt. By far the majority of the people belonged to the Low-Saxon branch, a race of men serious and not easily aroused, but when once aroused not easily turned from their purposes; the West coast was mainly inhabited by Frisians, the northern part of Schleswig by Danish peasants, with Germans in the towns. In these towns Danish was spoken in the churches and schools, but the language of business and of the courts was, as in all other parts of the country, German. The people of the towns, like the rest of their compatriots, had no other idea than that they were Holsteiners; they read only German newspapers, they resorted for their higher education to the German university at Kiel, and all their

interests were connected with the German countries to the south of them. On the other hand, the feeling of a political oneness with Germany existed in Holstein only among a small minority of people of liberal education; the mass of the inhabitants felt a patriotic satisfaction in forming a part of the glorious Kingdom of Denmark. In short, the internal peace was nowhere disturbed.

Then came the storm of the great French Revolution, and in its train the military empire of the first Napoleon, which convulsed all Europe. In Copenhagen reigned at this time the eldest son of the imbecile Christian VII., first as Crown-Prince-Regent, and later as King Frederick VI. He was a man of limited cultivation and of moderate intelligence, but zealous for the prosperity of his government and for the welfare of his people, though he thought the latter would be best promoted by the removal of every restraint that could offer a hinderance to his good intentions. In Denmark he was accustomed to absolute sway; he regarded it as a blessing for the Duchies themselves, that he should provide there also a free course for his activity as sovereign, and, as a matter of fact, he accomplished much which was both useful and valuable, and gained for himself lasting renown by the abolition of the vassalage of the peasants.

On this account, he had the less hesitation in attacking ancient privileges where they interfered with his sovereign purposes. When in 1806 the Holy Roman Empire was dissolved, and Holstein, in conse-

quence, lost its connection with Germany, he ordered his Council of State to enact the incorporation of Holstein into Denmark. But this was energetically opposed in the Council of State itself by the head of a younger branch of the Royal Family, Duke Frederick of Sonderburg-Augustenburg, who so openly threatened an appeal to his powerful relations upon foreign thrones that the King thought best, for the time, to abandon his plan. From this time on, he cherished an unrelenting grudge against Augustenburg. In the Duchies he carried things, in practice, exactly as he pleased; he increased the taxes, not only for the citizens and peasants, but also for the clergy and the nobility — who had hitherto, as a last remnant of the otherwise effete Constitution of the Estates, retained and exercised the privilege of assent in the matter of taxation — and put down all opposition with a rough hand.

When, later, the fates of Europe were changed, he could not prevent the loss of Norway, and in return he received only the little Duchy of Lauenburg, nay, he was even obliged, as the representative of Holstein and Lauenburg, to enter the German Confederation of 1815, and so to renew the disagreeable relation with his great neighbor. Nevertheless, in this connection he found some compensation; for when in 1823, the nobility of the Duchies made a complaint to the Confederate Diet of the violation of their ancient rights, the Diet refused to listen, because, as they said, the complainants brought no proof that up to that time the old rights had been recognized as valid. It urged

them, therefore, to await with confidence the decree establishing a new Constitution on the basis of Estates, which had been promised by the King. Truly, this meant waiting for a good many years.

The patriarchal absolutism thus confirmed was, however, destined to be subjected to a severe test from another quarter. In the year 1830 the influence of the French July Revolution acted so strongly upon the hitherto sluggish temper of the German and still more of the Danish inhabitants of the Duchies, that the Crown found itself driven to make some concession to the tumultuous outcry for freedom. But the apathetic population returned so quickly to its wonted quiet that the King could soon restrict these concessions within very moderate limits. Above all things, he was anxious to prevent any restoration of the old common Estates of Schleswig-Holstein, since he feared that such a body would not only resolutely oppose his arbitrary authority, but even perhaps strive to bring about a complete separation from Denmark.

In May, 1831, therefore, the Estates were created, but for each Duchy by itself. That this division might not seem to imply a separation of the two countries, a similar method was adopted in Denmark Proper: instead of a general popular representation, a special provincial assembly for the islands as well as one for Jutland. These provincial Estates were empowered to decide finally in their own local affairs, and were entitled to be consulted in the passing of all laws concerning taxes and the rights of person and property; they

were granted unlimited rights to make petitions and complaints; and the assurance was given them that no change should be made in their privileges without their having been previously consulted. It was certainly not possible for the Crown to have given more meagre alms or to have protected its own possessions more carefully; but on the other hand, the main object of the measure, the appeasing of excited spirits, was very incompletely attained. On the contrary, after that time not a session of the provincial assemblies took place in which the Estates of the Duchies did not discuss their union; and those of Denmark, the extension of their rights and a national parliament.

Besides this, the King was oppressed with other and more serious anxieties. Neither he himself, nor his presumptive successor, nor the latter's son or brother, had male heirs; in all human probability, therefore, the extinction of the royal male line was at hand. In this case it was the opinion of most Holsteiners that a different law of succession obtained for the Duchies from that of the Danish Crown. Schleswig-Holstein was a male fief with succession only in the male line; but in Denmark Proper the so-named Law of 1660 had, in the absence of sons, given daughters a title to the throne. In consequence of this, on the death of the royal male heir, a Danish Princess or her son would succeed in Copenhagen; while in Schleswig-Holstein the inheritance would fall to the younger branch of the Royal House, the Sonderburgs, and among these to the elder, the Augustenburgs, whose heirs would be again the

younger branch of the Sonderburg family, the Glücksburgs. By this the Danish Crown would lose more than a third of all its territory.

And this was not all. In still earlier times the line of the Dukes of Gottorp had branched off from the Royal House, and during many generations had held territorial supremacy over certain parts of Schleswig-Holstein in common with the Royal Line, and over other parts in its own name and right. After much contention, in 1720 King Frederick IV. had driven out the Gottorp faction by force of arms, and had united their portion with his own.

The protest of the Gottorp party against this usurpation acquired enormous emphasis by the accession of the eldest branch of the family to the throne of Russia; and the matter was finally arranged in two compacts of 1767 and 1773, whereby Russia resigned all claims to Schleswig-Holstein in favor of King Christian VII., and received in return the Counties of Oldenburg and Delmenhorst for the younger branch of the House of Gottorp. How, then, would it be, if, after the extinction of the royal male line, the present Head of the House of Gottorp, the mighty Emperor Nicholas of Russia, should declare those compacts void, and should stretch forth his hand toward Kiel and half of the Duchies? Whether the claim were well or ill founded, Russia's military power was overwhelming enough to cover very considerable weaknesses in her interpretation of law.

It is easily understood that all these threatening

14 CONSTITUTION OF SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN.

possibilities weighed heavily on the mind of the Danish King, and drove him to seek every means of protection against them. For what King or what Government would willingly endure the loss of half the power intrusted to it, merely on account of laws of succession made two centuries before?

The danger from Russia seemed the remoter of the two, since in this direction the jealousy of the European Great Powers could be looked upon as a safeguard.

But the question of the claims of the Augustenburgs upon the Duchies was much more pressing and urgent; for Christian of Augustenburg had followed his father Friedrich's footsteps in taking every occasion to defend the rights of the country, and had by this means acquired considerable power among the Estates of the Duchies. Under any circumstances it would be difficult to bring the Duchies to recognize any other claim than his, and this difficulty might become an impossibility if Schleswig-Holstein should again possess an invincible organ of its will in the form of a common Diet. To the formation of such a Diet, therefore, the King was strenuously opposed.

Under these circumstances the following question naturally suggested itself: if the introduction of the female line into the Duchies met with such serious obstacles, why not keep the State entire by the opposite measure, and, by altering the Law of 1660, place Augustenburg upon the Danish throne? The King had no prejudice in favor of the Princess Charlotte who would

be excluded by such an arrangement; nor had the Princess any party in Copenhagen that would have supported her claim in opposition to an act passed in favor of Augustenburg.

Why, then, did this not take place? Why was a course adopted which from that time on led inevitably to the destruction of the common State?

It may have been partly owing to the personal feelings of the King: even if the Princess was indifferent to him, he still retained his old hatred of Augustenburg. But above all he was opposed to any change in the Law of 1660, which had proclaimed for Denmark at once the succession in the female line and the absoluteness of the monarchy; for the repeal of the first of these might seriously endanger the second, and, more than this, nothing of the sort could be accomplished without a re-establishment and a convocation of the Danish Parliament.

Therefore the King clung to his intention of extending the principle of succession in the female line to the Duchies also, and, in case they proved refractory, of bending or breaking their stubborn will; with this in view he determined at once to begin by destroying piece by piece all that was peculiar and independent in their government, in order that when the decisive moment came, the Princess Charlotte, or her heir, might enter peacefully upon the possession of a united country that had been reduced to complete subjection.

This meant not merely raising a doubtful question of succession; it meant the total alienation of the affec-

tions of Schleswig-Holstein from the Danish name; it meant perhaps, also, bringing a powerful German intervention across the path of Denmark. But Frederick VI. had no belief in this last danger. Since 1823 he had acquired an utter contempt for the German Confederation.

In his own country he soon found for his efforts an auxiliary that was vigorous, hot-headed, and by no means always agreeable to deal with.

Since 1660 the Danish People under its absolute monarchy had, politically speaking, slumbered. At that time all the rights of the nobility were abolished, and an omnipotent bureaucratic system of government was set over the country. Under its rule the people had lost all respect for the firm reign of law, but their love for democratic equality had constantly increased: a frame of mind which made it probable that here as elsewhere, when once the thought of freedom found a place beside that of equality, absolute monarchy would be replaced by a far more absolute rule of the masses. Besides this, there was the inborn character of the people to be considered: lofty contempt of danger, no mean intellectual capacity, under an outward calm passions easily excited, a self-satisfaction strongly inclined to vanity. No two things could be more different than the disposition of the Danes and that of the Schleswig-Holsteiners. To the Danes their German neighbors appeared sluggish, narrow-hearted, pedantic people, born to be submissive subjects, and only estranged from loyalty to the common Government by the carelessness of that Government itself.

With such a disposition of the population, the impression made by the July Revolution was much deeper and more effective in Denmark than in the Duchies. At one blow, ever-widening circles of thinkers were aroused to political activity, and at the same time to a sense of national pride; and the small beginning of constitutional institutions conceded by King Frederick formed the starting-point for a passionate agitation which soon spread over the whole country.

In Copenhagen a number of young and talented men from all walks of life joined together in a political Association: the barrister Orla Lehmann, the theologians Clausen and Monrad, the philologist Madvig, and Captain Tscherning, with numerous other sympathetic spirits; their first object was to bring about a vigorous development of the Danish Press. It was their opinion that Denmark must acquire for herself a full share of the Democratic Freedom which was flooding the world.

At first these men kept up a good understanding with those of like convictions in Schleswig-Holstein, without paying much attention to national differences; just as in Germany the national idea gave way before liberal ideas in general. But soon the younger Danish party began to think of the glorious past in which their country had once ruled a considerable part of the Baltic coast; to bring that past back was now, indeed, impossible, but there was at least one place where they thought a national revival might be practicable. This place was Schleswig, the country which in gray

antiquity had been a Danish province; and into which only since the fifteenth century had the Germans made their way, thus gradually bringing about an unnatural union with Holstein, to the detriment of the Danish population in the north of the province, and to the disgraceful diminution of the power of the Danish Nation as a whole. All this must be changed: first, in North Schleswig the Danish national feeling of the people must be revived; then, in the more distant South, the preponderance of the German element must be broken, and the Danish element strengthened; and above all, the atrocious connection of Schleswig with Holstein must be wholly abolished. If the cry was raised in Kiel: "Schleswig-Holstein to the Königsau!" this must be met from Copenhagen with the thundering answer: "Denmark to the Eider!"

Thus the historical rights of the fifteenth century stood opposed to those of the ninth. It was expected that the Schleswigers would be easily won over, if they were offered as a dowry, when they should be united to Denmark, that most valuable of all possessions, Democratic Freedom; and it was regarded as a sign of the stultification of the Schleswig people by German influence, that from the outset they remained entirely indifferent to this temptation, and persisted unalterably in their demand for the ancient national rights of Schleswig-Holstein.

As far as Holstein was concerned, the young Danes of the "Eider-Danish" party thought they had better leave it alone. So long as the German Confederation

allowed it, the future "Eider-Danish" State might treat the country as a subject province, and get what it could out of it; but if ever the Confederation or the country itself should make a decided protest against this method of treatment, it would be better to abandon Holstein altogether, than by means of this foreign member to allow to the German race outside any influence in the national affairs of Denmark. They saw clearly, moreover, and soon announced openly, in what quarter the fullest compensation for the loss of Holstein could be found. Here, again, the Radical party availed itself of a historical memory, the union of the three northern kingdoms attempted in the fourteenth century. If this should be renewed, Denmark might come forward with the liberated Schleswig as a bridal gift.

The fact that this programme was wholly inconsistent with the existing rights of the Crown and of the Duchies did not disturb the party in the least. For from the very beginning, they felt themselves borne onward by the universal tendencies that were soon destined to acquire a circulation and an influence decisive for the future of Europe — the ideas of popular sovereignty and of the principle of nationality. By this feeling they justified to their consciences the agitation they aroused, which with fanatical satisfaction they accustomed themselves to regard as nothing but the battle of modern ideals against the decayed abuses of a feudal past.

We can see at once how far this agitation of the younger Danish party could serve the wishes of the

old King. The King had no idea of giving up Holstein under any circumstances, and hated from the bottom of his heart the Democratic principles of the Copenhagen Association; what he wanted was the firm establishment of the unity of the entire State under a monarchy practically unlimited. But from the point of view of his final decision about the succession, there was one critical matter in which the agitation of the Democrats was useful to him: this was their common opposition to the close union of the two Duchies. Whether German or Danish was spoken in Schleswig, was to him a matter of small consequence; but that the independence of the country, which rested upon its connection with Holstein, should be assailed, was an essential part of his system.

Therefore he allowed the "Eider-Danish" party to grow and prosper, in spite of its political Radicalism; he felt himself strong enough to control it, if it ever attacked the prerogatives of the Crown, and thought that its *doctrinaire* extravagances about the language of Schleswig and the relinquishment of Holstein could be kept within bounds by being taken hold of at the proper time and with a statesman's skill. He caused Professor Paulsen to publish in 1836 a treatise on the legal question from a historical point of view quite in accordance with the ideas of the "Eider-Danish" party, and which asserted that the principle of succession in the female line, in accordance with the Law of 1660, applied directly to Schleswig. In the Duchies the surprise and indignation was great, and an agent of the

Augustenburgs, Barth, published in 1837 a forcible refutation of the theory.

The old King cared little for this; but at St. Petersburg in 1838 he made an effort to secure by diplomatic means the support of Russia for his plan of preserving the unity of the government. The Emperor Nicholas, however, thought there was no great hurry about the matter, and turned it off with a few friendly but non-committal words.

CHAPTER II.

THE QUESTION OF THE SUCCESSION.

IN the year 1839 the long reign of Frederick VI. came to an end. He was succeeded by Christian VIII., a man who preferred to approach things in a spirit of trickery rather than with open courage. In personal intercourse his manner was engaging, but in the attainment of his political ends he was characterized by boundless cunning and by invincible tenacity; he sought to ingratiate himself with all parties, in order to turn one against another, and so in the end to deceive and to control them all. His aim was, however, the same as that of his predecessor, the confirmation of the succession in the female line for all parts of the common State, with the maintenance of the Law of 1660 and of the absolute power of the Crown. He clung to this programme with even more heart-felt devotion than Frederick VI., because by this arrangement the crown would fall to his beloved sister, the Princess Charlotte, whose influence over him was great; he was by no means willing that she and her son, the Hessian Prince, Frederick, should sacrifice for the sake of the pretended claims of Augustenburg, half or perhaps the whole of their inheritance.

That the Duchies would neither now nor at any

future time agree to this programme was certain; it was, then, necessary to continue what King Frederick had begun; that is, by a succession of administrative measures to assimilate more and more the internal conditions of Schleswig to those of Denmark, and by this means to forestall all resistance. So that in 1842 the Danish currency was introduced into the Duchies, and a branch of the Danish National Bank was established in Flensburg. What was still more important, the contingents of the Duchies, which had hitherto been entirely distinct, were abolished, and a united army of the whole Danish Monarchy was founded; many of the new Schleswig battalions were removed to Danish garrisons, and a number of dispositions were made that must necessarily result, within a few years, in making five-sixths of all the officers Danish Nationalists.

The King did not, however, aim at destroying the connection between Schleswig and Holstein; on the contrary, he was very desirous to keep up a strong feeling of this connection in the Duchies themselves. For he believed that he could prove positively the right of succession in the female line for Schleswig; and whereas Frederick VI. had feared that Holstein might, under certain circumstances, draw Schleswig over to Germany, Christian hoped just the opposite, that Holstein, by means of its connection with the Schleswig, might be retained as a part of Denmark. With this in view he did not place the new Schleswig regiments under the General who commanded in Jutland, but

established a common supreme command for the Schleswig and Holstein garrisons ; he even gave this position, as well as that of Royal Governor in Schleswig-Holstein, to the brother of the Duke of Augustenburg, Prince Frederick of Noer.

Great joy followed this in the Duchies, and greater wrath in Copenhagen; there was even a ministerial crisis, which the King settled in favor of the Holstein party. In December, 1842, he declared expressly to the Schleswig Diet that he had, indeed, no intention of bringing Schleswig into the German Confederation, but quite as little of incorporating it into Denmark ; it should be Schleswig still, and should retain its old connection with Holstein.

It will now be clear in what way Christian placed himself between, or rather above, both parties. By countenancing the connection of Schleswig and Holstein, he expected to retain the favor of the Duchies ; and by gradually infusing a Danish element into the Schleswig-Holstein government, he hoped to gain the support of the party of the "Eider-Danes." Meanwhile he allowed the agitation of the latter even wider scope than had been granted by his predecessor. For as it was his plan that the succession in the female line should first be proclaimed for Schleswig, it seemed to him highly desirable that Orla Lehmann and his friends should, for the present, keep up there as much as possible their Danish propaganda. If Schleswig were once won, he, the King, would make it his business to prevent the loss of Holstein.

So the "Eider-Danes" strove with redoubled energy to transform Schleswig into a Danish country. One association after another was formed for this purpose in Copenhagen; contributions of money were taken; emissaries were despatched to the province itself; Schleswigers who favored the cause were boisterously welcomed; popular festivities were arranged which were accompanied with a parade of Scandinavian sentiment; and Danish patriotism was electrified in all its nerves. "If any one," cried Orla Lehmann, "should dare advise the Danish People to abandon the idea of a nation extending to the Eider, we would inscribe upon his back in the bloody letters of the sword: Denmark will not."

By such means the party gradually succeeded in making their efforts popular on the Danish Islands, and even in winning numerous followers in Jutland. But the main end was not attained. The object of all these benevolent plans, the people of Schleswig, or even the Danish-speaking people of the North, could by no means be roused to any enthusiasm for the "Eider-Danish" programme. Only a diminutive minority occupying official positions in the northern region showed itself well disposed; in the greater part of the country the agitation had precisely the opposite effect. People asked angrily, what right had the Provincial Diet of Viborg, or the Popular Assembly of Copenhagen, to trouble itself about the affairs of Schleswig; and they watched with anxiety the way in which the politicians of Copenhagen threatened with ever-increasing hostility the

entire framework of law in the Duchies. Ever wider spread the feeling that their incorporation into the Danish Monarchy might become a source of terrible danger to their laws, their manners, and their language ; and soon the suggestion became rife, whether it would not be advantageous, if Schleswig should become, like Holstein, a member of the German Confederation, and should in that way have a share in German protection against Danish tyranny.

In view of this unpleasant state of things, King Christian took occasion to repress the "Eider-Danes," caused Orla Lehmann to be legally prosecuted, and complained that the Press was sowing dissension among his subjects. Yet the old state of things essentially remained, and the suspicion of the Duchies, once aroused, took deeper and deeper root. Under Frederick VI. they had complained of the personal arbitrariness of the King ; the growth of the party of the "Eider-Danes" now extended this ill-will to the entire Danish Nation.

Meanwhile King Christian had approached nearer to his most important object, the settlement of the question of the succession. In the summer of 1842, in a personal interview at the Castle of Sorgenfrei, he had tried in vain to gain over the Duke of Augustenburg to his wishes ; and after this he determined to seek their fulfilment by means of foreign support. He therefore resumed the negotiation with Russia, which had been dropped since 1838, and managed it, it would seem, more skilfully than his predecessor ; at any rate, with a more satisfactory result.

In July, 1843, the country was astounded by the news of the betrothal of the third daughter of the Emperor Nicholas, the Grand-Duchess Alexandra, to the Hessian Prince Frederick, the nephew of Christian, and his favored candidate for the throne. The marriage followed in January, 1844; no one doubted that the condition of this marriage had been that Russia should agree to recognize the succession in the female line for the whole Danish State.

The young Princess was saved by a premature death from the party-struggles which her nuptials had re-kindled,—she died in August of the same year,—yet the political relation to which her marriage gave expression was not thus severed. In Denmark a firm support at St. Petersburg was now thought to be assured; and in October, 1844, the Burgomaster of Copenhagen, Algreen-Ussing, made the following motion in the Diet at Rothschild: that the King should solemnly declare that the Danish Monarchy forms one indivisible State, which is inherited as a whole, according to the Law of 1660, and that he will employ every means to hinder any effort on the part of his subjects directed toward the severance of this connection in any of the component parts of this State.

The news of this motion flew like lightning through the Duchies, and caused a violent excitement. First, there was just anger at the idea that a Danish Diet should presume to decide about the law of succession for the Duchies; and then there was a deeper indignation at the pretension of applying the Law of 1660,

which had never had force in these countries, to independent Schleswig-Holstein. All parts of the country and all classes of people called upon the Holstein Diet, which was then sitting, to vindicate the freedom of Schleswig-Holstein; and the result was a vigorous declaration, in which the Diet opposed to these proceedings, on the part of Denmark, the following three principles: that the Duchies were independent, that they were intimately connected with each other, and that they were inherited in the male line.

To the King this was all very annoying. For a moment he thought it would be necessary to begin the great work with the fundamental separation of Schleswig from Holstein. He wrote to the Prince of Noer to know what all this outcry meant; he had no intention of incorporating Schleswig into Denmark Proper; all that Algreen-Ussing intended by his, in other respects bungling, motion, was the maintenance of the existing State, and every patriot must desire this as ardently as did he himself, the King.

Meanwhile, at Rothschild, although the enthusiasm had been somewhat dampened by the outburst on the part of the Duchies, the motion of Algreen-Ussing was passed with the consent of the Royal Commissioner. The first important step towards the carrying out of the King's system had been taken.

The next thing to do was to win over the public opinion of Europe and gain the approval of the Great Powers. The King was very active in both directions. A great number of treatises were published in Danish,

in German, and in French, with the purpose of showing that the principle of succession established by the Law of 1660 had been accepted by the Estates of Schleswig in 1721, that a considerable part of Holstein had long been the private property of the House now on the throne and therefore would be transmitted in the female line, and that the Augustenburg family by failure to secure the investiture, by relinquishments on the part of consorts, and by misalliances, had long ago forfeited whatever rights it might have at any time possessed. It goes without saying, that every one of these positions was disputed by the other side with an equal display of erudition on the subject of feudal and seigniorial rights.

The decision of these questions depended then on complicated discussions in history and feudal law; and these turned upon the interpretation of documents of the fourteenth and fifteenth, of the sixteenth and seventeenth, centuries, often ambiguous, and in the criticism of which as well practical jurists as the authorities of the learned world had come to very different conclusions. Up to the seventeenth century the Imperial legal authorities had held that failure to fulfil the conditions of a fief involved the loss of the right of inheritance; but after that time they had gradually allowed a laxer practice to gain ground: Pütter, K. F. Eichhorn, and their followers, regarded this latter course as merely having applied to certain exceptions which could not affect the general rule; while other German scholars supported the opposite view. Whether

the precedents of 1721 had established the Danish law of succession for Schleswig or not, depended partly upon the decision of the question, whether by the *Lex Regia*, mentioned in the formula of homage of the Estates, was meant the well-known Danish Law of 1660, or a somewhat older Law which had been promulgated for the Duchies also, — either interpretation being allowed by the wording, — and it depended partly also upon another question, whether the Estates had promised the King and his successors due obedience according to the *Lex Regia*, or had promised due obedience to the King and to his successors according to the *Lex Regia*, which again depended upon the place in which a comma lacking in the original document was to be supplied, etc. The historian can hardly be expected to give a legal decision in these learned disputes: the effort to arrive at such a decision would be the more useless, since in the final judgment the ancient claim of Augustenburg was recognized to the exclusion of all the Danish pretensions, and then this claim itself was disposed of by two facts belonging wholly to modern times.

What is essential at this point is the emphasizing of the fact, that up to the year 1836 the right of succession in the male line in the Duchies had hardly ever been disputed, and that the Estates of the same had acted in perfect good faith when they protested against the violation of this right. Nor did any personal consideration for the Duke of Augustenburg cause them to take this attitude. On the contrary, Duke Christian had

made himself so little beloved as a proprietor on his own great estates that the disposition of the people throughout Schleswig was rather unfriendly than favorable to him. Even his sympathy with Opposition in the Diet had altered in no way this feeling; after it, as before, he remained without respect and without influence among the mass of the people.

Indeed, the sympathy of the population with this political movement, as one might expect from their cautious disposition, was very slowly aroused; they had, as has been said, no wish for any change in their actual condition, no desire for a completer separation from Denmark; with all their cry for the succession in the male line, they would probably have submitted to a change in this respect, if it had been accompanied by no attack upon the independence and the union of the Duchies. But what now excited the public opinion of the country to a more and more active support of Augustenburg, what led directly to the union of the questions of the succession and of the constitution, in the feelings of the Schleswig-Holsteiners, was the noisy onslaught of the "Eider-Danes" upon the German element in Schleswig and upon the actual union of the Duchies. In the face of this hostility of the entire Danish people, there seemed to be no other salvation for their freedom and nationality than the complete separation from Denmark, which by means of the difference of the laws of succession seemed fortunately close at hand. In this way Augustenburg became an object of interest, because his name betokened the speedy shaking off of a foreign yoke.

Unfortunately for Schleswig-Holstein, the European Powers looked at the matter from a different point of view. The requirement that was most important to them was in direct contradiction to the wishes of the Duchies: the maintenance of the Danish monarchy in exactly the limits it had had hitherto, for the sake of preserving it as what it has been the fashion to call since that time, a necessary element of the European Balance of Power. This view of the Emperor Nicholas and of Prince Metternich was shared by the English and to a certain extent by the Prussian Governments, so that, from the very first, King Christian's wishes were looked upon much more favorably in Europe than the claims of the Duchies.

It seems strange enough to find all the great Courts laying such stress upon the integrity of Denmark, as if the question whether a little state of two million inhabitants served one sovereign or another could be placed in the balance and affect the peace of a continent. But as a matter of fact, all this talk about "integrity" had a merely negative importance: the Powers desired a maintenance of the *status quo*, because each of them feared unpleasant consequences from a change. England was afraid that after the loss of the Duchies, Denmark, so crippled, would sink into a state of complete dependence upon Russia; Russia, on the other hand, thought that, under the same circumstances, Jutland and the islands would throw themselves into the arms of a Scandinavian Union, and that in that way she would lose all her influence at Copenhagen. To

the Court at Vienna a sovereign State of Schleswig-Holstein seemed to mean a strengthening of the Prussian hegemony in North Germany; while in Prussia, as in Russia, every step toward a Scandinavian Union was regarded with mistrust, and plans were cherished of drawing, not the Duchies alone, but the whole of Denmark, into the Tariff-Union. Of these in part self-contradictory ideas, one-half were, certainly incorrect; but as no one could tell which these were, the Cabinets thought the safest way would be to leave things in their old condition; that is, to keep the Danish State entire.

All the different relations considered, none of the Great Powers were so much affected by the development of the Schleswig-Holstein question as Prussia. According as the outcome of the complications was injurious or advantageous to her, it would be accompanied with a gain or loss of the utmost consequence in her trade and traffic, and in the security of her commerce and of her borders. So that in Berlin every phase of the struggle was watched with anxious attention. Moreover, Duke Christian of Augustenburg had turned to Frederick William IV. with an exposition of his rights and an appeal for the protection of the same, and the motion of Algreen-Ussing showed that the crisis was at hand.

While in the decision of the other Courts their own interest outweighed every other consideration, the legitimistic leanings of Frederick William and his lofty conception of the dignity of a German Prince made

him regard the question of the justice of these two contending claims as of paramount importance. First of all, therefore, he caused a number of distinguished men, the experienced Minister, Eichhorn, once so well known as a diplomatist, the learned Professor Lancizolle, and others, to make a legal investigation into the matter of the succession in the Duchies.

The result was a memorial prepared in 1845 by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Von Bülow. In this was embodied the opinion of the Ministry on the legal question, to the following effect: that Holstein with the exception of the County of Rantzau should go to Augustenburg, that Rantzau and the part of Schleswig that had formerly belonged to the Gottorps was subject to the succession in the female line, but that the part of Schleswig that had formerly belonged to the Royal House should probably, according to the soundest views, fall also to Augustenburg. The memorial explained further that this legal decision fortunately accorded entirely with Prussian interests. The establishment of the greater part of Schleswig-Holstein as a sovereign State could not but be desirable for Germany, and in every effort toward such an object Prussia would find herself supported by the public opinion of the whole German nation. At the same time it could not be concealed that Russia and England would oppose any diminution of Denmark's territory, and that Austria would consider any strengthening of the German national interest as an indirect increase of the influence of Prussia, and would therefore not regard any such strengthening with favor.

The King, however, as we shall soon see, viewed the question in another light than did his Ministers, and suffered it to lie undisturbed for a time, without making any decision about his own action in the matter. He was the more fixed in this course of inaction by learning toward the close of the year 1845 that the third of the non-German Great Powers, France, had finally ranged itself in the doubtful question on the side of Denmark.

Up to this time neither Louis Philippe nor his Minister, Guizot, abundantly occupied as they were with affairs at home and in Africa and Spain, had troubled themselves at all about the complications in Denmark. Now, however, the French Ambassador at the Danish Court, Baron Billing, a young and enterprising diplomatist, laid before the Ministry at home a memorial, in which he urgently recommended that France should oppose the Russian and Prussian thirst for territorial aggrandizement, which was ensnaring unfortunate Denmark on all sides. Above all things the integrity of the Danish State was to be maintained (though with the reservation of the privileges of Schleswig-Holstein), and the introduction of a uniform law of succession in all parts of the country was to be brought about, no matter whether this law worked in favor of the Hessian or of the Augustenburg Line; it would be well to despatch a French fleet to the Baltic forthwith, and to show the tri-colored flag on the Danish coasts. Such a fleet might be stationed at the convenient island of Bornholm, and France might openly appear before Europe as the protector of Denmark.

The *rôle* thus indicated was very seductive to the mobile ambition of Louis Philippe. He gave the Ambassador a high Order, and sent him over to London to make a preliminary investigation of the attitude of the English Cabinet on the Danish question; while at the same time a written communication was sent with the same object to Prince Metternich.

In the mean time, the Danish Government had got wind, if not of the details of Billing's memorial, at least of its general purport; and as Denmark was by no means disposed just now to endanger her friendly relations with Berlin and St. Petersburg, she sent to the Earl of Aberdeen an urgent warning against Billing as a meddling intriguer. Aberdeen, therefore, gave him a polite but evasive answer to the effect that the question of the Danish succession was an affair of the future, with which England did not care to concern herself at present; when the time came, it belonged to the King of Denmark alone to take the initiative; England would then gladly do what she could for the maintenance of the Danish Monarchy.

Austria gave a similar negative answer to the invitation of France. When, soon after, the Russian Chancellor, Count Nesselrode, stopped at Vienna on a journey, he took pains to come to an understanding with Metternich in regard to the attitude of expectancy recommended by Lord Aberdeen. Metternich then explained in his didactic fashion, that in every political question, there were to be considered, on one side the rights of the case, and on the other what was

expedient from a statesman's point of view; in the first connection, it was here necessary to examine carefully the legal foundation of the claims of the different parties; in the second, there arose the question of the integrity of Denmark as an important element of the European Balance of Power; in conclusion, it would be necessary to deduce the proper result from a combination of the legal and political considerations. Nesselrode declared his complete acquiescence in so admirable a theory, and the two communicated with entire satisfaction this understanding to Berlin. During the next few years, there was the less thought of giving France a share in this matter, as the Court of the Tuileries soon after became engaged in a sharp controversy with the Eastern Powers on the subject of Cracow, and with England in regard to the Spanish marriage.

For King Christian these proceedings had, at least, the advantage of having led four Powers to pronounce the integrity of Denmark a matter of European necessity. As they had all left to him, and to him alone, the initiative in the settlement of the question, he now decided to satisfy their desire in this respect, and to begin at once by an announcement of his views and purposes. He had appointed a commission for the final examination of the question of succession; the opinion of this commission was then laid before the Council of State, and on the 8th of July, 1846, the conclusions of the Council were laid before the world in the form of an open letter from the King to his subjects.

The judgment thus given differed as widely as possible from the decision of the Prussian jurists. The letter declared that the historical investigation had confirmed the King in his conviction that the principle of succession established by the Law of 1660 applied to Schleswig and to Lauenburg; this could certainly not be asserted so absolutely with regard to some parts of Holstein, but the King promised his faithful subjects that he would be careful to preserve in every way the inviolability of the Monarchy as a whole.

The declaration of war against the Duchies was thus founded. The unconditional rejection of the principle of agnatic succession for Schleswig carried with it the natural consequence that the connection of Holstein with its sister State would be severed, unless Holstein also submitted to the rule of the female line. Everything that up to that time had been regarded in Schleswig-Holstein as ancient and undoubted right was thus assailed; the principles of the whole political existence of the Duchies were shaken, and the public excitement was enormous. The two Diets entered an emphatic legal protest, the Estates of Holstein appealed to the German Confederate Diet; and popular assemblies of many thousand people confirmed these measures. Besides this, there were protests from the various male heirs, from the Grand Duke of Oldenburg, from the Augustenburgs, and with a single exception from all the Glücksburg Princes.

At the same time the popular excitement spread from Holstein across the Elbe into every corner of Germany;

in innumerable assemblies, resolutions, addresses, and pamphlets, the entire German People raised its voice in behalf of its threatened brethren on either side of the Eider; almost all the German Chambers re-echoed with declarations in favor of the independence of Schleswig-Holstein; and even among the German Princes, there were several who by similar manifestations knew how to win enthusiastic applause. The same kindling of the national consciousness that six years before had been directed against the French threatening of the Rhine-Provinces, now burst forth in fresh flames when Denmark prepared to wage war upon ancient rights and the German tongue in Schleswig-Holstein. The cry of the "Eider-Danes" for the conversion of Schleswig into a thoroughly Danish country, for its separation from Holstein, and for its incorporation into Denmark Proper, had pushed things so far, that in Germany, as in the Duchies, the people refused all credence to the King's statement that he thought only of maintaining the state as it had hitherto been, and not of altering the existing Constitution. It might rather be said that in Germany also the succession of Augustenburg in the Duchies was desired, because only in a complete separation from Denmark did there seem to be any safety from the attack of the "Eider-Danes."

The next question was, what position the then existing organ of Germany as a whole, the German Confederate Diet, would take in the contest; and here almost everything depended on the decisions of the two Great Powers.

In Berlin many considerations were weighed on both sides. That the crisis was difficult and serious was clear enough, in view of the hatred, now become irreconcilable, between the two contending races, and the no less conflicting interests of the different European Powers. A communication was therefore set on foot with the nearest ally, Austria. The aged Prince Metternich was extremely vexed and angry at the disagreeable affair which the perversity of the Danish King had brought into prominence so long before there was any need of it. He felt that now the party of confusion and the whole tribe of Liberals had unfurled the banner of Schleswig-Holstein, and had thus set all the crazy heads of Germany in an uproar. In his opinion, the King of Denmark had decided nothing, but had only forced the settlement of a difficult question, and now there would be hullabaloo through the whole country, and Burgomasters and village-politicians, poets and professors, would give judgment on a matter that should have been left wholly and solely to the management of statesmen. He proposed immediately that the two Great Powers should take part in every way against the revolutionary disturbances, and should by means of the Confederate Diet enjoin the same course upon the other Courts.

Meantime there came a report sent by General von Radowitz, at that time Prussian Ambassador at Carlsruhe, concerning the state of affairs in Baden. There the second Chamber had passed an energetic address urging upon the Grand Duke the defence of Schleswig-

Holstein, the Grand Ducal Commissioner had given his assent, and the approval of the first Chamber was assured. Radowitz emphasized the fact that Radicals and Conservatives, nobles and peasants, all joined in this enthusiasm; in Baden, as elsewhere, it was a question, not of any intrigue of the revolutionary party, but of a stirring of the national feeling in its profoundest depths. Now, he said, was the time when one more opportunity, the last, was offered to the Confederate Diet, that had fallen so low, to snatch from the Radical party the leadership of the German People — if only this time it would place itself at the head of the national movement, and not ruin a great cause with formalities, delays, and protestations of incompetence, but choose its course promptly, proudly, and decisively, and stand forth as the competent representative of the German Nation!

The King, who had hitherto believed that, for the present, a completely passive attitude was the fitting one for Prussia, could not resist the impression produced by this report, but ordered that it should be at once communicated to Prince Metternich. One can easily imagine that the Prince was by no means edified by the enthusiasm of the brilliant officer, who had long passed for a dreamer in well-ordered official circles. Even Metternich, however, could not at last help perceiving that in the actual condition of things, different as it was from what he would have liked to see, the Confederate Diet, which was already involved in the affair by the petition of complaint from Holstein and

by the protest of Oldenburg, could not well remain wholly inactive. But at any rate, such a decisive method of proceeding as Radowitz had in mind seemed to him in every respect, and above all in the existing state of affairs, wholly impracticable; it would be amply sufficient if the Confederation should manifest disapproval of the Danish proceedings and leave its course for the future undecided.

In this spirit, then, the Confederate Diet set to work. The unanimity of the members was this time very marked. For all the petty Courts felt strongly that a prince's right of succession must not be put aside for state reasons, nor in any such method as King Christian was now seeking to employ with the Augustenburgs. And thus, under combined pressure from the sovereigns and from the excitement of the nation at large, the Confederate Diet worked more quickly than ever before, so that the Danish King found himself obliged, at least in regard to the constitutional question, to do what he could towards quieting the public mind. His Ambassador to the Diet, Herr von Pechlin, made the following official declaration:—

The principle of succession announced in the open letter was by no means to be understood as referring to a state in which one part was subordinated to another, or in which one country was regarded as a province incorporated into a governing nation. The Danish Monarchy was composed rather of countries independent of one another, each in the possession of its own constitution, and legislative and administrative

system, at the same time that they were more or less closely connected by relations founded on their historical development and on expediency.

And then further: the King had no idea of altering the relation between Schleswig and Holstein. This relation consisted in the fact, that, leaving aside Holstein's individual connection with the German Confederation and the separate Assemblies of Estates, the two Duchies, with a common system of legislation and administration, shared with each other public privileges and rights.

It was not possible to portray the existing state of things more exactly, nor to recognize more explicitly its claim to continuance. A separation of Schleswig from Holstein, an incorporation of the former into the Danish Monarchy in the more limited sense, would have been, according to the admission of the Danish King himself, an exercise of arbitrary power wholly contrary to the Constitution.

This declaration, then, had such an effect that the Confederate Diet contented itself with expressing its opinion in the most courteous way, at the same time indicating very clearly its conviction as to the right of the matter. On the 17th of September, 1846, it passed a resolution to the effect, that, after the declaration of the King, it found itself confirmed in the confident expectation, that, in the final settlement of the succession, his Majesty would consider the rights of all and each, of the German Confederation, of the agnates, and of the Representative Assembly of Holstein.

In Germany the mild form of this Resolution called forth a storm of indignation; and in fact, necessary as are usually the forms of courtesy in international intercourse, in this case a more decided indication of the consequences dependent on Denmark's action would have been by no means out of place. At the same time, the Resolution could leave the Danish King no doubt but that the Confederation was determined to support the rights of the agnates and also of the Estates. If at that time the wildly-excited German Public did not appreciate this, King Christian himself understood it perfectly. In the summer of 1847, he sent Baron Löwenstern to Berlin and Vienna, with the object of again emphasizing his standpoint. His great object was, he said, the maintenance of the Danish Monarchy in its existing limits; in regard to the rights of the agnates, which stood in the way of this, some understanding might be reached, though questions of individual right must certainly be subordinated to the higher question of the integrity of the State; the treatment of the matter from this point of view should be begun so soon as public feeling became a little calmer.

Löwenstern, however, succeeded no better than Pechlin. Both Courts announced in reply that they were fully agreed in desiring the maintenance of the integrity of Denmark, but that they could not assent to the complete subordination of all legal claims to the question of that integrity. The Prussian King now declared his opinion with great energy, to the effect that he desired the permanence of the existing Danish

State quite as much as did the King of Denmark, but that he considered the only possible and permissible means to this end to be, not the exclusion of Augustenburg but of the Hessian Line, and consequently the summoning of Augustenburg to the throne in Copenhagen as well as in the Duchies. He thought that the Emperor Nicholas, himself a member of the Oldenburg family, would prefer the retaining of that family on the Danish throne to the intrusion of the Hessian Line; and he expected the eager thanks of Denmark, if his proposition averted the loss of the Duchies without further trouble.

This was a mediating idea, which, had it been adopted, would, as we remarked above, have obviated all the difficulties raised by the lawyers. But unfortunately, the Prussian policy of that decade had more than once the ill-luck to devise systems of mediation, which, though they were really honest and admirable, had the single weakness, that all parties concerned refused to have anything to do with them. King Christian was enthusiastic for the integrity of Denmark, but desired it only for the benefit of his sister, who governed him, and of her heirs; the Danish People hated the Duke of Augustenburg as if he were the Evil One; they could, at best, only have been induced to accept him, if that acceptance had meant the incorporation of Schleswig; but the Duke was wholly opposed to this, and was firmly determined to reject a crown of thorns offered under such conditions.

Meantime Russia had declared to King Christian her

readiness to support his programme, and her conviction, in consequence of the proofs adduced by Denmark, that Augustenburg had long ago forfeited all claim to the Duchies. This was natural enough. For the greater the number of the male heirs of the reigning Branch who were pronounced incompetent to succeed, the greater grew the chance, that, at a fitting opportunity, the claims of the House of Gottorp, that is, of Russia, to Kiel and other portions of the Duchies, might be resuscitated.

To the Danish King, under all these circumstances, the approval of Russia was invaluable. For his position became daily more difficult. The firm and unanimous determination of the Duchies to adhere to their ancient rights, and the violent attacks made upon these rights by the "Eider-Danes," roused the passions of the people on either side. By the favorable declarations of the German Governments and by the sympathetic outcry of the German people the defensive attitude of Schleswig-Holstein was confirmed, while from the same cause the impetuous zeal of the insular Danes was augmented in an equal degree. There was an ever-increasing probability of a violent outbreak on both sides. At the same time the King's health had long been uncertain; in every corner of the capital it was openly proclaimed that at a change of rulers this time the freedom of the People would be secured, that the new sovereign would ascend the throne only under a free constitution, and that then the Danish People would settle with the turbulent Duchies.

The Crown Prince Frederick had little opposition to offer to these tendencies. He was not unendowed by nature, but during the wild life of his youth he had degenerated in bad company. Twice married, he had each time brought on a divorce after a few years by his brutality, and had then fallen into the snares of a disreputable seamstress, who entangled him so successfully that he had married her morganatically as Countess Danner, and afterwards allowed her unlimited influence even in political matters. At the time when King Christian's health began to fail the Crown Prince was thirty-nine years old; but he had no higher wish than to retain complete freedom from restraint in his private life. He had no objection to leaving responsibility, and with it power, to constitutional Ministers; and the more he felt himself isolated among his former princely associates by his manner of life, the more he strove to gain favor among the masses who surrounded him in the capital. He therefore proclaimed at every opportunity his allegiance to liberal watchwords and to "Eider-Danish" principles, and made an open show of his hatred for Germany.

Under these circumstances King Christian saw that the hour of absolute monarchy in Denmark had struck, and that if he would carry out his purposes, he must obtain popular support for them. In the last months of 1847 he ordered a draft of a constitution for the united monarchy, as he conceived it, to be drawn up; but he died on the 20th of January, 1848, before he had been able to make the document public.

He had sown the wind, his successor was to reap the whirlwind.

The new Monarch, still surrounded at first by the old Ministers, allowed himself to be persuaded to issue on the 28th of January his father's draft of a constitution, or more exactly, decree for the preparation of a constitution. According to this a common Assembly of Estates for the Kingdom and the Duchies was to be established, with a deciding voice in the levying of taxes and in legislation on matters of common concern. In the arrangements of the provincial Estates, in the connection of Schleswig with Holstein, in the connection of Holstein with the German Confederation, and in the constitution of Lauenburg, there was to be no change whatever. The provisions to be adopted in this constitution were first to be laid for criticism before experienced men, and for this purpose eighteen were to be elected by Denmark and eighteen by the Duchies, while eight were to be chosen from Denmark by the King, and from the Duchies eight also. Thus the Danish King had once more recognized the indissoluble connection of the Duchies, and by making the number of their representatives equal to that of the Danish, he had also recognized indirectly their independence.

In spite of this, the decree caused a great deal of dissatisfaction in the Duchies. By the sixteen members of the Assembly who were chosen by himself, the King was sure of the majority in any contention between the two parties; and with his well-known tendencies, whom could the Duchies rely on for impartial

judgments in regard to what were "matters of common concern," or to the composition of the future royal Estates? Nevertheless, in spite of these well-grounded fears, it was decided to proceed with the election of the "experienced men."

Things were different in Copenhagen. As early as the 22d of January Professors Clausen and Schouw had published a treatise declaring that the proclamation of a constitution was now a necessity, and that that constitution must unite Schleswig with Denmark; Holstein, they said, might keep its own constitution with its own administration of finance and war-establishment, and a sharp and distinct boundary should be drawn between the two Duchies. All Copenhagen greeted the "Eider-Danish" demand with joy; Press and Popular Assembly cried out stormily for the dismissal of the Ministry, protested against the decree in regard to the constitution on the basis of a common State, and sent deputation after deputation to the royal palace. The public irritation against everything German burst forth in unbridled demonstrations.

Such was the state of things, when in the last week of February the announcement of the revolution at Paris and of the French republic set the mass of the people on fire throughout half Europe, made the thrones tremble in helpless impotence, and hastened the crisis on the already thoroughly-prepared soil of Denmark.

First of all, in Schleswig-Holstein, the royal officials lost the courage to continue employing against every trace of German-national feeling the petty police-methods

which had been in vogue up to that time. Everywhere citizens' associations and citizens' bands were organized; everywhere the Press raised its voice anew, and on the 18th of March seventy well-known men came together in Rendsburg and decided to send a deputation to Copenhagen, who should be charged to lay before the King the petition of the country for a common Assembly of Estates, for freedom of the Press and the right of holding meetings, for the formation of a militia, and for the entrance of Schleswig into the German Confederation. There was not a word of insurrection or of recalcitrancy; every proposition aiming at more than was contained in the petition was rejected: hated as the existing Ministry was, and suspicious as their draft of a constitution had been, there seemed, in the present outbreak of the "Eider-Danes," to be no other barrier against a far worse abuse of power.

A justification for this feeling was soon afforded. On the 11th of March a great meeting had been held in the Casino at Copenhagen, in which Tscherning cried out amid enthusiastic applause, that there would be terrible danger if Schleswig were not incorporated into Denmark; whether Schleswig wished it or not was not the question at all; if it made any opposition, that would be rebellion, which must be brought to reason by force of arms. One stormy speech of this nature followed another; it was falsely alleged that the Duchies were in open rebellion; the students, artists, and members of the polytechnic schools armed them-

selves under the leadership of officers of the line; the city officials besought the King to change his Ministry, and a great popular assembly added the request that the King would not oblige his faithful people out of mere despair to take things into their own hands.

Frederick VII. had no desire to oppose these tendencies; he had already quietly made military preparations and had ordered the contents of the Schleswig-Holstein treasury to be transferred to Copenhagen. On the 21st of March he announced to the Council of State that circumstances necessitated the adoption of a new system based on the incorporation of Schleswig. The Ministry resigned; and on the 22d of March four "Eider-Danish" leaders, Monrad, Tscherning, Hvidt, and Orla Lehmann, entered the new Cabinet.

Just at this time the deputation from Rendsburg arrived; its members saw clearly from the first that the appointment of this Ministry meant the frustration of their wishes and an immediate war upon Schleswig. Even on the 22d, orders were issued for the mobilization of the Danish regiments, for the marshalling of five thousand men upon the frontier of Jutland, and for the embarkation of ten thousand men destined for Eckernförde and Rendsburg.

On the 23d the King received the deputation in a gracious audience, but immediately afterwards declared to a high dignitary of Holstein, that as a constitutional King he had no responsibility. It was thus made clear to the deputation in the beginning, that their fate lay solely in the hands of the Ministry. They were next

informed, on the 24th of March, that they could no longer be protected from the rage of the populace, and must therefore embark for home as quickly as possible. Just as they were leaving, Orla Lehmann appeared on board their vessel to deliver to them the royal answer to their petition. It was a declaration that Holstein should retain its own free constitution; but that Schleswig should not enter the German Confederation, but be incorporated into Denmark under a common constitution, though with provincial institutions of its own. This was an official proclamation of the illegal act, kept back doubtless till the very last instant in the hope that before the deputation could arrive at Kiel, the troops which had been assembled would have crossed the frontier and with a sudden attack would have prostrated the defenceless Duchies under their feet.

The audacious assault was not destined to succeed so easily. Up to the 23d of March the Duchies had, indeed, awaited in breathless suspense the result of the deputation; and though since the first meeting in the Casino the country had been in a state at once of daily-increasing anxiety and of daily-increasing bitterness, no plan had been adopted, no preparation made. But on the afternoon of that day there came to Kiel in haste from Schleswig the President of the Schleswig Diet, William Beseler, a dignified personage of calm courage and of prudent firmness, who was always ready to risk his person and his life, for Right and for Freedom. He had news from Copenhagen, that, in consequence of the "Eider-Danish" agitation, the

Ministry had resigned, and the establishment of an "Eider-Danish" rule was assured. He declared to his friends in Kiel that disaster would certainly ensue, and that nothing was left but the choice between slavery and battle. They all agreed with him; and it was decided at once to summon to Kiel the other most prominent patriots after Beseler, Count Reventlow-Preez and the former Deputy-Governor, Prince Frederick of Noer. These two also regarded an armed attack as hourly imminent, and were disposed to resist to the last the violence threatened by Denmark against Schleswig and its national rights.

No time was to be lost: about midnight these men constituted themselves a Provisional Government for the purpose of defending in the name of the King, who was deprived of his free action at Copenhagen, the ancient national rights against an "Eider-Danish" Ministry. On the very next day, the 24th, the Prince with a handful of men hastened to Rendsburg, where the soldiers went over to him on the spot. The country as far as the Königsau rose as one man; untiring efforts were spent in preparations. Denmark found on its hands, instead of the expected surprise and submission, a difficult and bloody war.

In this struggle the question of right was as clear as possible. There was no discussion about a doubtful and complicated law of succession; for the throne was still occupied by a King of the royal male line, and the disputed inheritance was not yet an inheritance at all. The simple cause of quarrel, disguised by no pretext

or excuse, was the ancient constitutional right of the Duchies, the traditional connection of Schleswig with Holstein, the legitimacy of which had been only lately solemnly recognized by the Danish King Christian VIII. before the Confederate Diet in 1846, and by Frederick VII. himself in the draft of a constitution of January 28th, 1848. It was nothing but the thirst of conquest of the "Eider-Danes," who in the name of the principle of nationality, disregarding all rights and the promises of Kings, wished to force a country, two-thirds of which were thoroughly German, to become an integral part of Denmark. How could these fanatics be surprised, if German national feeling now awoke at such a deed of violence, and rushed with armed wrath to stay their hands so greedily outstretched?

As early as the 18th of March, the Duke of Augustenburg, foreseeing clearly what would happen, had hastened to Berlin to seek the protection of the friendly King of Prussia. He found the city in the full excitement of the revolution just accomplished, the population enthusiastic, as everywhere else in Germany, for the cause of Schleswig-Holstein, and the new Ministers inspired with the idea once expressed by Radowitz, that whoever interfered energetically in that quarrel, would place himself by so doing at the head of Germany. It was the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Heinrich von Arnim, who, on the 24th of March, induced the King to identify himself openly with the three principles: that the Duchies were independent States, that they were indissolubly united, and that

they were inherited in the male line. The necessary consequence of this declaration was the war with Denmark. When the Danish troops soon after entered Schleswig, General Wrangel led the Prussian Guards to the storming of the "Dannevirke," and pursued the flying Danes far into Jutland, while the Frankfort Confederate and Imperial Government recognized the Provisional Government of the Duchies, and sent North German regiments across the Elbe to the support of the Prussians.

CHAPTER III.

THE COMPACTS OF 1852.

WE have already had occasion to relate in former sections of this book the unfortunate course of the war so enthusiastically begun, since the varying fortunes of the same had often a decisive influence upon the fate of the Parliament at Frankfort and of the Prussian Union. It will be sufficient here to recapitulate the main points :

The important influence of Russia, France, and Austria working for Denmark and against Prussia, by which Prussia's energy for the struggle was weakened.—

The truce of 1849, in which Prussia recognized the admissibility of a separation of Schleswig from Holstein. —

The Peace with Denmark of the 2d of July, 1850, by which, with a reservation of all existing rights, Prussia, in the name of the German Confederation, discontinued hostilities, and left it to the King of Denmark, on condition of his communicating his plans for a constitution, to require the assistance of the Confederation in restoring his sovereign authority in Holstein. —

The recognition of the integrity of the Danish Monarchy by the first London Protocol. —

The proclamation of the Danish King containing the

agreement not to incorporate Schleswig into Denmark Proper. —

The seizure of Schleswig after the unfortunate day of Idstedt. —

Finally, in accordance with the conditions of the Olmütz agreement, the marching of Austrian troops for the purpose of restoring order in Holstein in the name of the Confederation.

The prostration of Germany at the end of the war was none the less humiliating because it had been brought about by internal dissensions. On the contrary, exactly by reason of this an indelible brand was placed upon the general condition of things which had lingered along since 1815. The nation had reason indeed to bow its head in profound sorrow. And the bitter grief which was felt in Germany was fully equalled by the vain and haughty arrogance which prevailed in Denmark. "The Prussian dogs bark, but they do not bite," said the people in Copenhagen; or, "If four Prussians stand up against one Dane, the Dane has the advantage."

When in December, 1850, the German Confederate troops under the Austrian General, Count Mensdorf-Pouilly, and the Prussian, Von Thümen, approached the frontier of Holstein, the Government of the Duchies, after serious deliberation, came to the bitter conclusion that they would yield to the requirements of the Confederate Powers, disband their troops, and so make the forcible execution of the Confederate decree unnecessary. This decision was recognized by the two Com-

missioners; but the military occupation of the country was still indispensable on account of its relations to Denmark. For by Article IV. of the Peace of July 2d, the latter was called upon, after the abolition of the administration which had been organized during the revolution, to communicate its plans of a constitution for the Duchies to the representatives of the Confederation. We must examine rather carefully the negotiations entered into on this subject, as their results formed the point of departure for all the later complications.

In Copenhagen the sway of the "Eider-Danish" democracy continued. The Ministry, with the exception of the more moderate Herr von Reedtz, who controlled the Foreign Affairs, and of the Minister of War, Hansen, whose political opinions were unpronounced, was thoroughly imbued with "Eider-Danish" sentiments; and the draft of a constitution elaborated at that time by the Minister of Finance, Sponneck, embodied the views of that party, in spite of the royal promise of July 14, 1850: in this draft Schleswig was entirely separated from Holstein and incorporated into Denmark Proper. It was intended to lay the draft at once before an assembly of notables from both Duchies, to be convened at Flensburg, and of which a favorably disposed majority was carefully chosen by the Government.

At the same time the Danish Government proceeded to consider the question of succession. By the events of the past year the matter had been simplified in more

than one respect. Denmark Proper had received a Democratic Constitution, the Law of 1660 no longer existed, and the difficulties that had hindered former Kings in attempting any alteration of the same were thereby removed. For the succession of Prince Frederick of Hesse neither King Frederick nor any portion of the Danish people had any enthusiasm whatever. Every claim of the Augustenburgs had been disputed even before the war; and now that they had encouraged the rebellion against their lawful King, every one in Copenhagen eagerly concurred in the opinion of Russia, that a rebel should never be rewarded with a crown. The Princes of the House of Glücksburg were also, with a single exception, subject to the same objections.

There was, therefore, open ground for an entirely new structure; and to form a valid decision in regard to this, fell, according to Danish ideas, only to the Heads of the two great Branches, the Royal Branch and that of Gottorp, that is, to King Frederick of Denmark and to the Czar Nicholas as chief of the three Gottorp Lines: Russia, Wasa, and Oldenburg. These two Princes turned first of all to the Heir-Apparent of Oldenburg, whose father, however, showed little desire for the precarious honor; against another Prince of that House the Emperor Nicholas made objections: finally the following combination was adopted.

The young Prince Christian of Glücksburg was the son-in-law of the Princess Charlotte, and had married Louise, the sister of Prince Frederick of Hesse. In consequence of this connection he alone of all his House

had held aloof from all share in the protest against the "Open Letter," and in the ensuing years, when the Duchies were in revolt, he had remained faithful to his military allegiance, and had followed the service of the King. By this he had won a certain consideration in Copenhagen, and in a still higher degree the regard of the Sovereign of Russia. Frederick and Nicholas now decided to pass over the Hessian Prince Frederick and to confer the crown directly upon the Princess Louise, on condition that she would transfer the right to her husband and to his male heirs. They then sought to obtain a recognition of this from all the other Powers.

It happened favorably for this design, that just at that time, at the end of May, 1851, there took place at Warsaw a personal interview of the three Sovereigns of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, for the purpose of announcing and confirming the restoration of concord between them. Naturally the whole of Europe was anxious as to what great political matter was being discussed; but the Russian Chancellor, Count Nesselrode, wrote: "Incredible as it may seem, we had no political object in view; our sole occupation would have been excursions in the morning and balls in the evening, had not Heaven produced the Danish Minister Reedtze with his arrangement of the succession."

This interruption of their brilliant leisure brought, after all, to the assembled Potentates neither great trouble nor any very serious differences of opinion. Like his royal allies, the King of Prussia looked upon

the integrity of the Danish Kingdom as a European necessity, and saw that the acceptance of one principle of succession for the whole country was therefore unavoidable; he only insisted that in the consummation of the new arrangement all the formalities required by the rights of German Princes should be observed, and any difficulties about conflicting legal points should be examined and removed. No one made any objection to this; and the King promised, on his side, that if these stipulations were conscientiously attended to, he would use his whole influence with the Duke of Augustenburg to induce him to subordinate his personal claims to the higher interests of Europe. On the 5th of June, therefore, Reedtz, together with the Russian statesmen, signed a protocol concerning the candidacy of Prince Christian and his male heirs. The agreement was, that the renunciation on the part of the female line should be obtained in Copenhagen, and that Russia should transfer the Gottorp rights to the Prince; the King of Prussia was to obtain the consent of Augustenburg; and after the settlement of all these questions of form in regard to different rights and claims, the matter was to be laid before the London Conference, for recognition by all the European Powers.

Pleasant as all this was for the Danish Minister, he soon learned, in the prosecution of his journey to Vienna and Berlin, that there was still more than one obstacle to be overcome before he could succeed in his object. In Vienna, Prince Schwarzenberg made an energetic protest against the tyrannical treatment of

Schleswig, which had inflamed anew in Holstein also the hatred of the German population for Denmark and its King. Reedtz promised that immediately after his return there should be an improvement in this respect, that in Schleswig and Holstein a uniform plan of administration should be adopted, and a system established that should at once appease the German population of the Duchies and afford the Powers assurance against attempts to incorporate Schleswig into Denmark, either politically or socially. Schwarzenberg required the Russian Ambassador, Meyendorff, to take what amounted to a formal cognizance of these statements.

From the Prussian Minister, Manteuffel, Reedtz had to learn further, that he made a great mistake if he thought the King regarded Augustenburg's claims as either void or abrogated; it was his intention neither to affirm nor to deny them. He wished, acting on the basis of the rights of German Princes, to hold a family council of all the members of the Oldenburg Line, and hence with the sympathy of the Augustenburgs themselves; and only after the meeting of such a council, would he exert his influence upon Augustenburg in the way he had promised.

As both England and Russia sent messages to Copenhagen urging conciliatory advances, it became clear at once that European recognition of the new succession could not be obtained before some arrangement with Augustenburg, and still more, some settlement of the constitutional difficulties, was brought about.

By this time the Danes were beginning to see, to their

great disgust, that their general cossetting at the hands of all Europe was over. Russia, England, and Austria had defended them, so long as the danger of a dismemberment of Denmark and an extension of the Prussian hegemony was thought to exist. After this more serious danger was completely averted, the Governments of St. Petersburg and of Vienna recollected once more that the "Eider-Danes" who ruled in Copenhagen were an ultra-Radical body; that therefore, if Schleswig became Danish, it would become Democratic; and that, in spite of the rebellion of 1848, there was much more conservatism among the Estates and the people of the Duchies than in the Danish Provinces. While, for the sake of maintaining European equilibrium, the separation of the Duchies from Denmark was certainly to be prevented, the solidarity of conservative interests demanded quite as much the preservation of Schleswig's independence and of its German sympathies. The part of wisdom, then, was to favor neither Schleswig-Holsteinism nor "Eider-Danish," but a united State organized in some harmonious way.

The result of these considerations was a mild pressure exerted by Russia in July, 1851, upon the Danish Cabinet, as a consequence of which two men of German origin, Count Carl Moltke and Herr von Scheel, entered the Ministry. The political position of these two is pretty well indicated by the fact that Moltke was a fanatical opponent of all free action on the part of the people, no matter whether it sprang from "Eider-Danes" or Schleswig-Holsteiners, while Scheel was a

self-seeking and time-serving intriguer. But the main point was, that they were ready to devote all their energy to realizing the idea of a "united State;" and by their admission a broader ground seemed to be gained for an understanding with the Powers.

Meanwhile King Frederick had obtained the required renunciation on the part of the members of the female line, and every effort was being made to lay the law concerning the succession in a definite form before the Powers. The question of a constitution had also advanced a stage: the notables at Flensburg had considered the draft of Sponneck, though with a somewhat doubtful result. The majority of the notables, under the powerful influence of the state of siege and of the "Eider-Danish" fanatics who had been sent to Flensburg, had intensified the tendencies of the draft, and had made the connection of Schleswig with Denmark still closer, and the separation from Holstein more radical; while the Holstein faction, in two minority votes, had rejected the draft in its entirety, and demanded the restoration of the state of things that existed before the war.

In the Danish Cabinet, for the time, no decision was arrived at in regard to these differences, one party favoring the draft of Sponneck, another the majority of the notables, and a third desiring a modification of the draft in the spirit of the minority. So far as the reform of the administration desired by Austria was concerned, the Ministers were unanimously of the opinion that such a reform could not be introduced,

until the authority of the legitimate rulers was in force in Holstein also; that is, only after the Confederate Commissioner and the Confederate troops had been wholly withdrawn from the country. Austria and Prussia, on the contrary, made it the essential condition of evacuation, that a conciliatory settlement of the constitution and of the administration should be first brought about.

Under these circumstances it was impossible to lay before the German Powers any definite proposals; there was nothing to be done but to remain within the bounds of well-sounding generalities. Herr von Reedtz accordingly charged the Danish embassies in Vienna and Berlin with the statement, that only after the withdrawal of the Confederate troops from Holstein could definite measures of organization be adopted; when this had taken place, the proposals made at Flensburg would be rejected, and a final settlement in the spirit of the draft of Sponneck would be adopted; Holstein would be governed according to its existing laws and privileges, and changes in the Constitution would be attempted only in a constitutional way. At the same time, in a second note, was sent the new Order of Succession and a proposal for the European recognition of the same by the London Conference; and this was confirmed and supported by an autograph letter of the same date, written by King Frederick to the two Monarchs. In this communication the utter worthlessness of the Augustenburg claims was once more emphatically reiterated.

But the Danish Cabinet found this proceeding a total failure. Prince Schwarzenberg had been irritated to the highest degree by the behavior of Denmark at the Dresden Conferences; he considered it impertinent that such a petty Government should venture to set up "Eider-Danish" obstinacy against the formal programme of all the Great Powers, to which even the mighty Prussia had given way. In two despatches, marked by a highly categorical tone even in their wording, he blamed the indefinite generality of the Danish statements, pointed out how many ancient institutions were common to both the Duchies, stigmatized "Eider-Danish" as incompatible with the most important principle, the integrity of the Danish Monarchy, and demanded a positive promise that Schleswig should never be incorporated in Denmark Proper, as a preliminary to the evacuation of Holstein by the Confederate troops, and as a formal condition of the recognition of the new Order of Succession by the London Conference.

In all essentials the Prussian reply of September 14th was the same. The style of it was certainly not so undiplomatically rude as that of Schwarzenberg's message, but, on the other hand, it contained what Schwarzenberg had omitted, an allusion to the rights of Augustenburg. The King renewed his promise to use his influence with the Duke, but made it distinctly understood that until a renunciation on Augustenburg's part had been obtained, Prussia would not sign the protocol in favor of Glücksburg.

The Danish Minister Reedtz was discouraged by these declarations. A sitting of the Danish Diet was about to take place immediately; he knew that he had long been regarded by the "Eider-Danish" Majority as a lukewarm patriot, and that after such failures he had a bad outlook before him. The result was entirely as he had expected. The fanatical wrath of the Assembly raged high; so that Reedtz, Hansen, and Carl Moltke, in the face of an immense vote of want of confidence, hastened to resign their places. In their stead, "Eider-Danes" of the purest water were appointed, and the management of Foreign Affairs fell to the Counsellor Bluhme, who had been a member of that first Casino-Ministry, which in 1848 had begun the attack on the connection of Schleswig with Holstein. The Hall of the Diet once more re-echoed with the cry, that Denmark would sooner perish honorably than allow the fruits of victory at Fredericia and Idstedt to wither and fade.

The new Minister of Foreign Affairs, however, was neither a savage Chauvinist, nor a Democratic hobby-rider, but a cool and collected practical man. He immediately intimated by a third party to the two German Ambassadors, that he would be found as conservative and as ready to make advances as his predecessor, and the very fact that, as an "Eider-Dane" of long standing, he enjoyed the full confidence of the party, would enable him to persuade them to greater concessions than Herr von Reedtz had been able to procure. At the same time he made it a point to find out the dispo-

sition of the non-German Great Powers, and what he learned in this direction removed every doubt about the course to be adopted. France spoke warmly of its sympathy for Denmark, but expressed a determination to stand by England in the treatment of the matter. England distinctly advised the fulfilment of the wishes of the German Powers, considering them entirely reasonable. Finally the attitude of Russia was decisive. The Emperor Nicholas was angry at the change of Ministry; he would, indeed, have nothing to say to the claims of a man branded with felony, as was Augustenburg; but in regard to the question of a constitution, he simply informed his representative in Copenhagen that he should energetically support any steps taken by his German colleagues. Thus deprived of all hope abroad, Bluhme resolved to yield to the inevitable, to bring about the adoption, first by his fellow Ministers and then by the King, of a programme that would be acceptable to Austria, to arrange the matter on that basis with the two Powers, and then to surprise the Diet with the accomplished fact.

This was no easy task, considering the "Eider-Danish" tendencies of the other Ministers, the unfortunate personal character of the King, and the practical difficulties surrounding this question in which so many things must be considered. It would lead us too far to follow all the turns and devices of the wily statesman. In November, after the arrival of Russia's communication, he won over the Minister of Finance, Sponneck, — "for," wrote the Austrian Ambassador,

“this little man always goes with the strongest side;” and when, on the 13th of November, the Ministry rejected Bluhme’s proposal, the two decided to induce the King to form a new Cabinet, a project that had already been often mooted by the ambassadors of Russia, Prussia, and Austria, and mentioned by them as a necessary guaranty for the accomplishment of the new system.

But meanwhile Bluhme continued his negotiations with his colleagues, made some modifications in his first propositions, and above all emphasized the fact that he had no thought of any binding compact in regard to the Constitution, but that, in order to secure the evacuation of Holstein, he wished to communicate in a conciliatory manner to the Governments of Vienna and Berlin the paternal intentions of His Majesty, by doing which he would in no way interfere with any dispositions that it might be necessary to make in the future. In this way he finally succeeded in gaining the assent of the Cabinet and of the King to his programme, and on the 6th of December Chamberlain von Bille was sent to Berlin and Vienna with the following proposals.

It was announced in the beginning that King Frederick could give foreign Powers no legal guaranties concerning the internal condition of his kingdom, but that he was prepared to give moral guaranties to the following effect. Out of the plenitude of his power the King had determined to rule Schleswig, for the present, as an absolute monarch, with the co-operation

of the Provincial Estates acting as a consultative body. He would, however, keep before his eyes as a definite object, the union of all the different elements of the State by an organic and homogeneous bond in one common kingdom; and this object he would seek to attain by legal and constitutional means; that is, by the advice and assistance of the Provincial Estates, dealing with each of the Duchies by itself, consulting the Diet as far as the Kingdom Proper was concerned, and in Lauenburg co-operating with the Nobility and the Commons. In regard to Schleswig it was further added, that while the King had already declared, and now declared again, that neither should any incorporation of Schleswig into the Kingdom Proper take place, nor should any steps be taken in that direction, yet he could not look with approval on anything that either then or in the future would lead to a union of Schleswig and Holstein or would bring about a different or closer connection between those Duchies than existed between them and the remainder of the Kingdom. This, however, did not mean that he would oppose the continuance of such bonds of union as would naturally exist between countries bordering on one another, or such as were based on common institutions not of a political nature or on community of private relations.

When these royal intentions were laid before the two German Courts, the impression in Vienna and in Berlin was the same. From the standpoint that had unfortunately been adopted, there was nothing to be said against the content of the Danish proposals; on the contrary,

both Courts accepted them at once. But for this very reason they desired a reliable guaranty for their literal performance. Royal intentions had been known to change; moral guaranties existed no longer than suited the will of their author. All this amounts to nothing, was the feeling at Berlin: Denmark has, as much as ever, the liberty to give her policy every day any new direction she pleases.

Prince Schwarzenberg hastened to state the question clearly. While he gave his approval to the Danish propositions, he wrote on the 26th of December to the imperial ambassador at Copenhagen, to the effect that his Court could consider intentions of King Frederick *only* on the condition of having an explicit declaration which should be regarded by the King as *binding*, and thus be certain of being fulfilled. If the Danish Government recognize this view of their programme as their own, if the actual execution of the royal intentions, which had hitherto been officially communicated only as a possibility, should be confirmed in the *binding* form of a *declaration drawn up at the command of His Majesty the King*, and if the Government should be guided by this: then all chances of misunderstanding could be looked upon as avoided, Holstein could be evacuated, a pledge for the *settlement agreed upon* could be given to the Confederate Diet, and the founding of the new union of the whole country under one ruler could be regarded as far enough advanced to cause the Powers to interest themselves in an international guaranty of the integrity of Denmark by means

of the recognition of one principle of succession for the country as a whole.

Thus, before Holstein could be evacuated or the new succession recognized, there was required, not the mere announcement of agreeable but possibly doubtful intentions, but a formal compact that should be binding on both sides. With an accurate judgment of the Danish statesmen, Schwarzenberg added confidentially the observation, that the essential preliminary of success would be a change of Ministry in Copenhagen, a replacement of the "Eider-Danish" Ministers by men who favored the idea of a united State. Prussia expressed herself to exactly the same effect on the 30th of December. In St. Petersburg Count Nesselrode grumbled at this arbitrary fashion of making the fulfilment of the wishes of Germany the condition of the London protocol; but he desired before all things an early settlement, and therefore urged the Danes to unqualified acquiescence.

So, then, it happened Bluhme had as little inclination to lose his place as Sponneck, and conducted, himself, the negotiations with Counts Carl Moltke and Reventlow-Criminil, as well as with Herr Bang and Herr Steen Bille, with the object of bringing them into the Ministry. In the last week of January, 1852, the new Cabinet was formed; and on the 28th of January appeared a royal manifesto, which arranged the future organization of the Monarchy, with some still further concessions to the German view of the matter. In the spirit of maintaining and improving relations that had

already a legitimate existence, it was declared in the beginning, that the union of different portions of the Monarchy into a well-ordered whole should first of all be confirmed by the administration of matters of common importance by authorities common to the kingdom as a whole, and that afterwards attention should be given as soon as possible to the introduction of a common constitution that should apply to the management of these matters of common importance.

The matters of common importance were then carefully specified: Foreign Affairs, War, Marine, and a portion of the Finances.

The remaining financial matters, as well as whatever had hitherto been under the control of the Schleswig-Holstein Government, were to be administered by a special Minister in each Duchy. Such institutions, not political, as were common to both Duchies, the University at Kiel, the Order of Nobility, the Canal, the Fire-Insurance, the Institutions for criminals, for the deaf and dumb, and for the insane, were to be managed by both Ministers acting together. Each of the Duchies was to have a representative Assembly with full power in matters within the sphere hitherto appertaining to the consultative Provincial Estates, and drafts of laws relating to such matters were to be laid before these Assemblies; the draft for Schleswig would contain special provisions to insure both the Danish and the German nationalities equal privileges and equal protection. The Ministers for Schleswig and for Holstein were to be responsible only to the King; the remaining

Ministers to the Danish Diet, but only in matters that concerned Denmark Proper.

On the 20th of January a Note was sent to Vienna and Berlin, which communicated this Manifesto to the two German Courts, and at the same time declared, "with the authorization of the Crown," that the King recognized as agreeing with his own the interpretation which the Austrian despatches of December 26th had given to the intentions he had proclaimed; and while this agreement held good in every particular, he emphasized it especially in what concerned the non-incorporation of Schleswig into the Kingdom Proper. It was added, that there could therefore be no longer any doubt that, after this confirmation of the agreement of the Danish views with those of Prussia and of the Imperial Court, the form which had been selected for the expression of the King's intentions could not fail to satisfy the two Courts, so that they would no longer delay the measures that had been promised on their side. Finally, the hope was expressed that the two Governments would be moved to become surety in the Confederate Diet for *the settlement which had been agreed upon*.

The requirement of the two German Great Powers was thus complied with to its fullest extent. The formal character of the Danish promises was not only recognized as a fact, but the decisive word itself was expressly spoken. In spite of the complaints of Russia, Schwarzenberg had carried his point, that the non-incorporation of Schleswig should be a formal condition of the London protocol. To the same effect, we may

•

here add, in July, 1852, Austria and Prussia reported to the Confederate Diet concerning the new arrangement of the united Danish State: "In its recognition of the independent and equal position of the different components of the Monarchy, of which no one is subordinated to or incorporated in another, the Manifesto of January 28th accords exactly with the former Royal Proclamation of July 16th, 1850, by which the promise was renewed that no incorporation of Schleswig with the Kingdom of Denmark should take place." The Danish representative in the Confederate Diet confirmed the whole statement in the name of his Government, and supported the two Powers in their proposals founded upon it.

By the Manifesto of January 28th, then, the constitutional difficulties were, or appeared to be, got rid of. During February the Confederate troops withdrew from Holstein, and in Copenhagen and St. Petersburg there were hopes of bringing the question of the Order of Succession before the London Conference at the beginning of March. But unless one obstacle was removed, Prussia was unwilling to take any further steps, and that obstacle was the consideration of the hereditary right of the Augustenburgs. We must here briefly review the negotiations in regard to this matter.

Immediately after the first Danish advances at the end of August, 1851, and the rejection of these by Austria and Prussia, the Minister, Manteuffel, had taken steps for the settlement of this difficult matter. The King, as we have seen, would not support

the claim for the Augustenburgs, but could not, in consideration of his own attitude in 1848 and 1849, concur in the Russian view, that the Duke had forfeited his rights by rebellion and felony; nor could he accept at once the Danish assertion that the Sonderburg Line had long before 1844 ceased to have any well-founded right to the Duchies or to any part of the same. He desired, therefore, as has been mentioned above, that all the connections of the ruling House of Oldenburg should meet in a family council, in order to arrive at an authorized family decision in regard to the succession in the United Danish Kingdom; and he promised, on these conditions, to use his influence to procure a renunciation of all claims on the part of the Duke of Augustenburg. Manteuffel, well knowing the high value that the King placed on "Teutonic Princely Rights," and sure, on the other hand, that Nicholas and Frederick would never meet in a family council with the Duke, held it essential to place the question at once in a different light before the King; and for this purpose he found in Professor Pernice of Halle the aid he desired. The Professor's legal opinion, delivered with great erudition, was to the effect that Augustenburg, by failure to fulfil the conditions of the fief, by misalliances, and by repeated renunciations, possessed no longer any claim, and that therefore a family council composed only of the royal Danish and the Gottorp Lines was quite competent to give a binding family decision.

In well-founded anticipation of this opinion given by

a legal authority, recognized by the King as well as by the Public, the Minister had already, on the 11th of September, 1851, commissioned the representative in the Confederate Diet, Herr von Bismarck, to begin negotiations with the Duke of Augustenburg, who was at that time living in Wiesbaden. This was to be done on the basis of the offer of a considerable indemnification in money to be made by the Danish Government, if the Duke would recognize for himself and for his family the Order of Succession arranged in Warsaw, and would give up all claim on his own account to the Duchies.

The object that Prussia and the other Powers sought in this negotiation is clear in itself, and was repeatedly stated by the Powers themselves. King Frederick William IV., after the bitter experiences he had passed through in the Danish War, felt, as did the others, an anxious wish to settle once for all the dangerous question, and to cut off forever the possibility of such complications in the future; mainly from this motive he strove to obtain the Duke's absolute renunciation, not only in his own name, but in that of his whole family. "If the Duke," wrote Manteuffel on the 9th of September, "accepts a fitting indemnification, it is clear, that by that act he withdraws definitively from the number of those who have a claim on the succession."

With the same view, Lord Palmerston, on the 25th of September, recommended such an arrangement to the Danish Court, at the same time remarking that the

stipulations might be made in such a form that Denmark need not expressly recognize the claims of Augustenburg, nor Augustenburg expressly renounce those claims. At any rate, let the forms of the renunciation be what they would — so wrote Palmerston — the object of the indemnification was and remained, that the succession of Glücksburg should at no time be liable to attack from the Augustenburgs. Palmerston's successor, Lord Granville, wrote, on the 9th of January, 1852, to Copenhagen, that the London Protocol could be drawn up in favor of Christian and his descendants only when the matter had been rendered easy by the projected indemnification of the Duke of Augustenburg, and by the distinct assurance at the same time that the German Confederation also would raise no further difficulties. His main point was the same as that of the others: that the contents of the London Protocol must be assured for all time against every claim of the Augustenburgs. The indemnification was not to be offered for a merely personal renunciation on the part of Augustenburg himself, but for one binding on the entire family.

Nor is there any possible doubt that this intention of the other contracting parties was made clear to the Duke at the very beginning. When Herr von Bismarck had the first conversation with him, on the 16th of September, some points regarding his legal claim were discussed; and the Duke then observed, that he granted the existence of political considerations that rendered the realization of the claims of his House im-

possible, and might make another solution of the matter appear desirable; but he declared that it was impossible to make an immediate decision in the matter, inasmuch as such a decision would not have the desired legal result, unless his sons also took part in it. It was then explained to him that the Powers desired a settlement that would bind his sons as well as himself. He rejoined that he expected the Princes in a few days, and would then communicate further with Herr von Bismarck in regard to his decision.

The Princes came; and the Duke announced on the 26th of September that he accepted the King's counsel with thanks, and wished it at any rate to be understood that he was willing to enter into negotiations. Bismarck then explained to him, on the 1st of October, that the King of Prussia, in the interests of the general peace, had declared himself satisfied with the new Order of Succession, in the hope that it would be possible to obtain such guaranties of the same as would protect it from the action of hostile and perhaps doubtful claims. The Duke appeared surprised that the affair had gone so far; they might go on then, he said, without treating with him, and sacrifice justice wholly to expediency. He soon recovered himself, however, and declared himself ready to continue the negotiation, having recourse to Prussian mediation as far as possible. The next thing, then, was to await an offer from the Danish Government. At the same time he expressed the earnest wish, that, at least, the eventual succession might be assured to his House, after the

failure of the Glücksburg male Line, a wish which naturally involved the recognition of the Glücksburg succession by the entire House of Augustenburg.

On the 11th of October, Bismarck gave him preliminary notice that Denmark thought of allowing him a yearly pension of 70,000 to 80,000 thalers, provided he would relinquish his Schleswig estates, and agree to live out of the country. He agreed that this was a legitimate demand, so long as he had not renounced his claims; but he considered it unreasonable after he should have once bound himself and have recognized the new Order of Succession; for in that case his presence could not disturb the peace of the land. This observation, also, had no meaning except on the supposition that a renunciation on the part of all the Augustenburg Princes was intended.

The negotiation thus begun continued for some months. In the beginning of November, King Frederick William called the Duke's attention to the fact that everything depended on a speedy decision; considering the hostility of Russia toward the "Eider-Danish" Ministry, the opportunity was more favorable for the interests of the Duke than ever before, if he would without reserve and without condition recognize the succession of Prince Christian, and leave the settlement entirely in the hands of Prussia. The Duke, on this, expressed his thanks to the King for having graciously undertaken to mediate in the matter of the succession, "that important question," he wrote on the 20th of November, 1851, "which affects my own claims

and those of my heirs, not only to the Duchies, but to the Danish Throne." But he hesitated; there was discussion over questions of form and over minor points; the Duke thought the indemnification insufficient, and had a suspicion that the Danes would defraud him entirely in the end.

Meanwhile in Copenhagen there was constant fear of taking some step that might be construed as a recognition of Augustenburg's claims. It was not till the new Ministry, formed in the interests of the United Kingdom of Denmark, were driven by Prussia's and England's misgivings in regard to the Protocol to take the decisive step, that Bismarck, on the 31st of March, was able to make an official proposal. It consisted of an offer of two and three-quarters millions of thalers¹ for the estates of the Augustenburgs in Schleswig. In return for this payment, the Duke and his family were to reside outside of the Danish Kingdom, and in his own name and in that of all his family, he was to promise that nothing should be attempted whereby the peace of the Monarchy might anywhere be disturbed, and that he would at no time oppose the royal decisions in regard to the settlement of the succession for all the countries then united under His Majesty's sceptre, or in regard to the future organization of the Kingdom. Bismarck was able to add the information, that, from the Danish point of view as well as from the Duke's, the recognition of the proposed succession applied only to Prince

¹ Two and one-quarter millions clear, one-half million by the assumption of the debts that encumbered the property.

Christian and his heirs, and that, in case that Line should at any time become extinct, all previously existing rights of other claimants would again come into force; the Danish King was also disposed to agree that the money to be paid to Augustenburg should be held free from all claims of entail that related to the estates, and also from the reversionary rights to which a part of the estates were subject. But in all these respects the King regarded the proposal as an ultimatum, by which he would be bound only up to the 30th of April.

The Duke informed Herr von Bismarck that he would send him his reply in writing.

In Copenhagen, meanwhile, it was thought that by this ultimatum the Augustenburg question was settled, since the Duke would either accept, or by an obstinate refusal would throw away every chance of further consideration from the Powers: consequently about this same time the Danish draft for the London Protocol was laid before the Courts on the 29th of March, 1852. It was Russia most of all, who urged with the greatest zeal, that the struggle which had endured for years should at last be brought to an unalterable settlement. Just at this juncture a final obstacle arose from an unexpected quarter.

Immediately after the dismissal of the Whig Ministry, which had occurred in February, 1852, Queen Victoria had confessed to the new Premier, Lord Derby, that, in spite of the events of 1850, she had serious doubts in regard to the proposed arrangement, partly

conscientious ones as to whether the rights of the heirs ought to be set aside in such a way, and partly political, as to whether the interests of Germany, the best ally of England, ought to be allowed to be so decidedly prejudiced. Lord Derby argued for the arrangement, advocating it less zealously than Palmerston, but regarding it as a necessity, after the steps that had been taken; whereupon the Queen proposed to him to lay the matters at issue before the lawyers of the Crown for their opinion. But this also seemed to the Cabinet Council out of the question.

They said that they themselves, the Ministers, were unable even to state the question, so great was the obscurity and confusion of opinion among the foremost legal authorities in Germany itself. But the King of Prussia had expressed himself as clearly as possible in regard to the necessity of maintaining the integrity of the Danish Monarchy, so that this principle could be regarded as generally recognized. There was no question of prejudicing the interests of Germany; for a special Article of the Protocol would protect the rights of the German Confederation.

“Well, then,” answered the Queen, “I will approve the signing of such a compact, if the German Confederation has first given its assent to the same.” When the Ministers opposed this also, because such a decree of the Confederation could not be obtained, or, at any rate, only after endless delay, and further, because, according to all former usage, the Confederation was represented *virtualiter* by Austria and Prussia, the

Queen concluded by saying: "Then, since Austria's consent is assured, I will give mine, so soon as Prussia shall have given hers, and no sooner."

These discussions continued into March; and it is by no means probable that they remained unknown to the King of Prussia, who, in spite of Pernice, was as little convinced as Queen Victoria of the invalidity of Augustenburg's claims. However that may be, when the Danish Protocol arrived at Berlin, on the 29th of March, the King announced, on the spot, that he had long ago become satisfied with the arrangement, but that he must require that the German Confederation as such should be represented at the Conference and should give its assent; he thought that it concerned Denmark, first of all, to be secured in that direction against any future attacks.

Immediately after this, on the 4th of April, a request was sent to Bismarck to give his opinion upon the prospects which such a proposal would have in the Diet; and on the 6th he answered in a private letter to Mantuffel, which was followed on the 17th, after further information had been obtained, by an official communication to substantially the same effect. The main idea was, that any acceptance of the London Protocol by the Diet was out of the question, even though it were strongly supported by Austria and Prussia. The real reason for this was the fear the Petty Courts had of public opinion and of their Chambers. The more these Courts were driven to reactionary measures in their own internal affairs, the more they felt themselves

inclined in measures of general importance to shift the odium of unpopularity upon the action of the Great Powers, and then to approve the accomplished fact under the appearance of a gentle pressure on the part of those Powers. "You see," wrote Bismarck, "His Majesty thinks better of us than we deserve, and makes demands upon us that are not commensurable with the heads and hearts of the Diet politicians." He remarked, besides, that Austria, for her part, would gladly see the Confederation brought as a unit into international affairs, in order that, under this form, the foreign policy of Prussia might be entirely absorbed.

In spite of this verdict, Manteuffel was obliged to communicate the royal wishes to the ambassadors of the other Courts, but found the same reception everywhere. In view of the universal excitement throughout Germany and of the well-known condition of things in the Confederate Diet, the proposal was regarded by every one as an attempt, at the last minute, to blow the European recognition of the integrity of Denmark into the air. "If Prussia persists in this," cried Bluhme, "the Protocol will not be carried through, and the Ministry which is aiming at a united Denmark is lost." The English Minister complained of the cumbrousness of negotiations with the Confederate Diet and of the "one-sidedly German sentiment" of the German Courts. Nesselrode, especially wrote on the 13th of April three despatches in place of one, in which he read the Prussian Government, in haughty language, a lecture

on a demand so utterly and in every respect inadmissible. "We showed in 1850," he wrote, "what a value we place on the German Confederation" — "*this sounds 'almost' like mockery,*" wrote the Prussian Minister on the margin — "but it has no shadow of a right to any participation in this matter." King Frederick William, more angered than persuaded by this, sent to Vienna, on the 22d of April, the proposal for common action in the Confederation.

Meanwhile, in London the Cabinet met in order to place before the Queen the question of a change of Ministry: except on the basis of signing the Protocol, they did not feel themselves in a position to carry on the government any longer. Thus, a very serious crisis seemed to threaten the condition of all Europe. Then, on the 23d of April, a telegram from Bismarck arrived in Berlin, announcing that the Duke of Augustenburg had accepted the Danish offer. Every one breathed more freely. What object was there now any longer in disturbing the German Confederation, if the Augustenburg Family itself recognized the substance of the Protocol?

In fact, the Duke had made his decision a week before the time allowed by Denmark had elapsed. In his statement on the subject he first criticised the pettiness of the sum offered to him. "But as," he continued, "the circumstances being what they are, no other choice is left me but to accept or to refuse; and as, in the latter case, I should run the risk of forfeiting all the property and possessions of my family, I find

myself obliged to accept the propositions of the Danish Government."

He added, that he awaited the coming of a Danish Commissioner, in order to settle the details of the agreement. These stipulations about the form and manner and times of payment, about the personal property appertaining to the estates, about the removal of the entail, consumed many months; the single point to be noticed here is the assent of the Duke's two sons to the settlement of what concerned the entail. The promise of the Duke made in his own name and in that of his family, to undertake nothing against the new Danish Order of Succession, stood in the final document textually as it had been laid before the Duke by Bismarck on the 31st of March; no particular documentary statement by his sons was added.

The news of the Duke's acceptance reached London on the 27th of April, and Lord Malmesbury immediately invited the representatives of the other Great Powers to a conference, for the purpose of formally drawing up the Protocol. The Prussian ambassador, Bunsen, as yet without instructions, and personally disinclined to the whole matter, came, but with the distinct understanding that he would take no part in the business. Upon this, Malmesbury announced, that, in case Prussia held aloof, the other Powers would draw up the Protocol without her. The text of the document was then agreed upon: recognition of the integrity of the United Danish Kingdom as a European necessity, and therefore recognition of the succession

of Prince Christian and of his heirs in the male line. If, at any time, the extinction of this Line should appear imminent, Denmark was to invite the Powers to further consideration of the matter. The relations of Holstein and of Lauenburg to the German Confederation were to continue unchanged. The remaining Courts of Europe were to be asked to concur. The word *guaranty* was everywhere avoided, because the English Parliament had never undertaken such an obligation. The signing was delayed for a few days, that Prussia might have time for a decision.

The Russian member of the conference, Baron Brunnow, a man imperturbably suave and sympathetic, and at the same time extremely clever, then proposed to his colleagues a special means for influencing the King; this was, the general recognition of his claim upon Neuchâtel. The other Powers agreed to this. As we know, what the Protocol promised on this subject was not much; but nevertheless, it rejoiced the King's heart, and it would certainly have been very difficult for him to have made up his mind, by a further rejection of the Danish Protocol, to endanger that which concerned Neuchâtel.

He was spared this trial, however. He had, as we have seen, invited Austria to common action on the part of the Confederation; but on the 29th of April he received the news, that Austria would gladly have seen the Confederate Diet take action in the matter, but that, under existing circumstances, she must regard the measure as undesirable. By this announcement every

hope of obtaining any result at Frankfort was cut off, and leave was telegraphed to Bunsen to take part in the Protocol, accompanied with the charge of sounding his colleagues confidentially on the subject of consulting the German Confederation — a charge which came to nothing, as may be easily understood.

On the 5th of May, then, the Neuchâtel Document was signed by the five Great Powers; and after Queen Victoria's consent had been obtained, the completion of the Danish Protocol followed, on the 8th. So far as the ratifications were concerned, Manteuffel assumed that all the contracting parties were mutually to pledge themselves, and therefore he sent to Bunsen six copies of the instrument. But, meanwhile, Herr von Brunnow had asserted, with great decision, that this was not an agreement between seven Courts, each with all the others, but between six Powers on one side, and Denmark on the other; the other Cabinets supported this view, and hence the ratifications of each of the six Powers were exchanged with Denmark alone. Each one, therefore, remained bound to Denmark alone and not to the other Courts.

In the evening Bunsen wrote to Berlin: "The fact that the German Confederation was not consulted is, perhaps, an advantage for the future; but for the present it amounts to a declaration of bankruptcy. To my mind, it is equally certain that the present settlement is a European necessity, and that it is a humiliation of Germany."

So it was. With all the enthusiasm of thirty mil-

lions of people for the freedom of Schleswig-Holstein, with all the sympathy of thirty sovereign Princes for the legitimate rights of Augustenburg, such a result! But of what use to a giant is his strength when his limbs are bound, or strike convulsively against one another? Prussia had yielded to the pressure of a European Coalition, at the head of which Austria herself, as chief Power in the German Confederation, had taken her place. The Kings of the Lesser States had helped according to their power, those very Kings who now in wrath and anxiety beheld the hereditary right of a German sovereign House decreed away by the Great Powers of Europe.

Austria asserted that she had only wished to restore the legitimate authority of the Crown in the Duchies, and at the same time also to place the legitimate rights of the people under the protection of herself and of the German Confederation. But for the attainment of these ends the most indisputable of all the rights of the people, the intimate union of Schleswig and Holstein, had been violated, a firm basis of constitutional principles had been temporarily renounced; in place of this, vague promises of allowing equal importance to the different portions of the country, of uniformity of administration and of the non-incorporation of Schleswig had been accepted; and then the Duchies had been handed over to the absolute control of a King who, by a legal fiction, was impartial.

Now it was well known, that this impartial King was an "Eider-Dane," like the omnipotent Majority of the

Diet. One had no need to be a prophet to foresee that very soon in Copenhagen the Compacts of 1852 would be interpreted in a contrary sense, that the independence and German character of the Duchies would be threatened, and that then the dispute would burst forth again with redoubled bitterness. Under the most favorable circumstances the constitution sketched out in the Manifesto of January 28th, 1852, would have been extremely complicated and difficult in its application: three independent Provincial Diets for something more than two millions of people, beside these a Royal Danish Diet, and at the head of all a Parliamentary Royal Council for the entire United Kingdom. And with such an apparatus as this it was intended to carry on a just and beneficent government over two peoples, hating each other to the death, one of which had its foot on the neck of the other, while this other nourished no dearer wish in its heart, than to shake off the hateful yoke! Whether Prince Schwarzenberg had blinded himself to these things from ignorance or from inconsiderateness, whether the Government at Berlin had agreed with him from forced submission or in conscience-stricken atonement for 1848, the Austro-German political system could not have written for itself a clearer certificate of incompetency than these Compacts of 1852!

But in order to appreciate fully the wisdom of such a policy, it must be remembered that it not only filled humiliated Germany with bitterness, but filled triumphant Denmark with a bitterness that was deeper still.

Not perhaps the majority in numbers, but all the active and vigorous elements of the Danish People were at that time "Eider-Danish" in their sentiments, and felt that their own political programme had been quite as decidedly rejected by the Powers as that of the Duchies. What was it to them that the intimate union of Schleswig and Holstein was severed, when they were forbidden to strive for the highest aim of their patriotism, that of making Schleswig a part of Denmark in government and in national character? And this prohibition was not only laid upon them by their own Government, which could be made to bow to the will of the People by the means furnished by the Danish Constitution, but the precious Ministry of Bluhme had guaranteed it to the German Powers by a binding contract, and had thereby given the despised German Nation a humiliating right of supervision to be exercised for an indefinite period over the internal policy of Denmark!

The London Protocol, also, was quite as unacceptable to the "Eider-Danes" as the Compacts in regard to the common Constitution. While it was their dearest wish, after the death of Frederick VII., to bring Schleswig as a dowry to their longed-for Scandinavian Union, and to make Copenhagen the Capital of the United North, the London Protocol had now sanctioned anew the United Kingdom of Denmark-Holstein, and, what was worst of all, it had decided that this same Kingdom was again to fall to a King who was of German descent and who spoke the German language. Their vexation was boundless; and not until a year had elapsed did the

Government venture to propose the contents of the Protocol for acceptance by the Diet as a new Act of Succession.

In spite of all indignation, however, the impossibility of rejecting the proposal was evident; and after the Diet had assented, the proclamation of the Act throughout the whole Kingdom followed. The Estates of the Duchies were not heard on the subject, because, by the Decrees of 1831 and 1834, their concern was only with laws affecting taxes and the rights of person and property or with changes in their own privileges as Estates, none of which matters were dealt with in any way by the Act of Succession. When, then, in the autumn of 1853, the Government laid before these Estates the draft of a Provincial Constitution affecting matters that particularly concerned the Duchies, but excluded from consideration the first paragraphs of this draft, as referring to matters of common importance to the whole Kingdom, the Estates of Schleswig and Lauenburg made no objection; those of Holstein, however, presented to the Crown a memorial protesting against every restriction of their freedom of discussion.

Now, Section 1 of the draft mentioned the new Law of Succession; and it has been often asserted since that the Estates of Holstein by this action protested against the legality of the Act, and that inasmuch as, in 1860, the Schleswig Estates also refused to recognize those paragraphs, as not having been approved by them, the Law of Succession had never become valid for the Duchies. But the Act possessed validity from the day

of its proclamation, that is to say, long before the proposal of the drafts, because, as has been said, the privileges of the Estates were in no way affected by it; there would, therefore, have been no need of making any reference to it in the constitutional drafts. The German Confederation later obliged the Danish Government to strike out those paragraphs of the Holstein Constitution that had not been approved, and after that time they no longer stood in the document; but neither the German Confederation, nor any one else, ever supposed that by this the Act of Succession had lost its validity for Holstein. At the same time that Section 1 was struck out, Section 2, which declared the continuance of the rights of the German Confederation in Holstein, was also removed: consequently, if, by the removal of Section 1, the Act of Succession lost its force, by that of Section 2 the Confederation would have forfeited its rights in Holstein. In short, the memorial above-mentioned could have no meaning, except that without the advice of the Estates no provision should be admitted into the Constitution that involved any change in the privileges of those Estates. But it was impossible that an already proclaimed and valid Act, which changed nothing in the privileges of the Estates, could lose its validity by that memorial, or by not being admitted into the Provincial Constitution. And then, moreover, so long as Frederick VII. lived, neither the Estates of Holstein, nor those of Schleswig, ever made any express protest against the principle of succession contained in the Act.

So, in spite of everything, the reconciliation of 1852 remained equally unsatisfactory to both parties. If ever diplomatic mediation had fallen between two stools, the combined wisdom of Schwarzenberg and Manteuffel, of Palmerston and Brunnow, had done so in this case — if it is permitted to apply so trivial a figure to such great statesmen.

Besides all this, these edifying agreements of 1852 had one more weak point, of whose existence certainly none of the great men of that time had any idea. The Duke of Augustenburg, in exchange for the Danish payment, had promised, for himself and his family, to attempt nothing against the Order of Succession to be established by the Danish King, and his sons had signed an agreement that the money received from Denmark should be held under a new entail. As the object of the whole negotiation had been known to both father and sons from the very beginning, no one doubted that, on the reception of the money, the whole family had, as Manteuffel said, withdrawn once for all from the rank of pretendants; and no man was more convinced of this than the Frankfort agent in the settlement, the Prussian representative in the Diet, Herr von Bismarck.

But there were others who felt very serious doubts on the subject. The foolish anxiety of the Danes to avoid every shadow of recognition of the Duke's rights had led them to require the consent of the Duke, not to a renunciation of his right of inheritance, but to a promise that he would undertake nothing against the succession of Prince Christian of Glücksburg. Conse-

quently he still retained his right after the agreement, as well as before, and was only bound not to assert it against Christian and his heirs. How was it now in regard to his sons? Their father had, indeed, made the agreement in their name, but authorities, learned in the rights of German Princes, declared that such a promise on the part of the father of sons that had attained their majority was not binding on the sons without their express consent, and that such a consent had not followed and never could follow merely from their assent to the new arrangement of the entail. Therefore, even if the father was restrained from the assertion of his rights, the sons were quite as free to act in the matter, after the agreement as before, so soon as, by the death or abdication of their father, they became the bearers of the title of Augustenburg.

As has been said, no statesman in Europe had at that time any suspicion of these legal consequences. In Schleswig-Holstein, also, the view generally prevailed, that the Duke had irrevocably bartered his rights and those of the country for good gold. The Duke himself was silent and bided his time. He had been, in a certain way, starved into an acceptance of the Compact: the thought soon suggested itself, that a promise so extracted lacked all binding force.

CHAPTER IV.

DENMARK BREAKS THE COMPACTS.

THE realization of the Constitution promised by Denmark may have involved great and perhaps insuperable difficulties; but from the very beginning a decided disposition was manifested in Copenhagen not to keep the agreement that had been made with the German Powers.

Immediately after the Danish troops in the autumn of 1850 had reoccupied the Duchy of Schleswig, a reign of terror had been inaugurated in that country, of such a nature that, as we have seen, even Prince Schwarzenberg pronounced it to be insupportable, and therefore impolitic, tyranny. The Minister, Reedtz, readily held out the prospect of more moderate measures. He had, however, so little success in inducing his colleagues to favor this policy, that on the 29th of November, 1851, King Frederick William IV. took occasion to complain of "the outrageous course pursued in Schleswig by the existing revolutionary Government of Denmark;" and this was passing on that Government the severest judgment that could possibly be formulated in the mind of the King.

Nevertheless, when the final settlement of the subject was arrived at, the general promise was accepted

as sufficient, that the two nationalities in Schleswig should receive equal consideration, and that all parts of the country should be placed on an equal basis, and no one subordinated to any other; on this understanding Holstein was delivered over to the Danish administration.

It was at once seen what was understood in Copenhagen by the placing of the German and the Danish sections of the country upon an equal basis. It was not the constitutional freedom and security of rights enjoyed in Denmark that was extended to Holstein, but the arbitrary tyranny which was oppressing Schleswig. Every one who had taken part in the administration of the preceding years was threatened, maltreated, and persecuted. The officials that had been appointed by the German Government lost, for the most part, their positions and their incomes; even the supreme judiciary was purified by the arbitrary dismissal of counsellors of German sympathies; and the Schleswig-Holstein paper currency, which had been in circulation since 1848, was declared worthless, without any compensation being given to the holders of it; while on the other hand, the Duchies were obliged to bear a large portion of the expenses of the war that had been waged by Denmark against them.

In Denmark the Constitution guaranteed an almost unlimited freedom of the Press, an undisputed right of forming associations and of holding assemblies, and security against police machinations not supported by proper legal orders. In the Duchies every movement

of an independent Press was visited with severe penalties; associations and assemblies were forbidden to such an extent that three or four persons were not permitted to meet even for the signing of a petition to the King, and there was no end of petty and odious commands and prohibitions on the part of the police authorities. A swarm of Danish officials spread over the country, all filled with insolence and hatred towards everything that bore the name of German. In Schleswig, in the districts where the population was mixed, the German pastors and teachers were expelled, and were replaced by Danes, whose zeal, both as propagandists and police, soon earned for them among the people the nickname of "the black gendarmes."

Under this frightful oppression the people retained their unshaken courage. The apostates, who were few in number, found themselves excluded from all communion with their countrymen, by whom they were despised; and the great majority of the population clung together in silent resolution awaiting an opportunity to manifest their feeling in a vigorous way.

A tone of mind similar to this prevailed among the people in all parts of Germany. The majority of the German Cabinets disapproved of the abominable fanaticism of Denmark; but they were quite sufficiently occupied with the sudden development of the tariff policy of Prussia and with Austria's active hostility to the same. Moreover, it was generally felt, that, after all, this was the natural course of things after the suppression of a dangerous revolution; the Danish

Government must take such measures as were necessary for its own security and authority. The actual condition of Schleswig-Holstein was regarded as a transition state, and the proclamation of the constitutions promised in the Manifesto of January 28th, 1852, was daily expected.

It could not be said that Denmark was in any hurry to fulfil this expectation. Two years passed before the Danish Government took any steps in that direction, and then it appeared that there had been a most edifying reason for the delay. As we have seen, in 1851 the King had declared to the German Powers that before the new Constitution of the entire Kingdom was proclaimed, it should be subjected to the criticism of the Danish Parliament, and the Provincial Estates of the Duchies should be consulted in regard to it. This latter provision seemed inconvenient to the powers in Copenhagen. In the final proclamation, therefore, made on the 28th of January, 1852, the assent to the co-operation of the Estates in the framing of the general Constitution was silently omitted; the new provincial Constitution for each of the three Duchies was then announced; and by these Constitutions, a deciding voice in regard to provincial laws was granted to the Estates, but all deliberation in regard to affairs common to the whole kingdom was forbidden them. In spite of the promise of 1851 it was thus made illegal for the future to listen to the provincial Estates in regard to the projected Constitution for the entire kingdom.

On the 31st of July, 1854, such a Constitution was

imposed upon the Duchies by the simple act of the King's will. Though a decree of this sort was contrary to the compacts, the substance of what was proposed proved to be tolerable enough. The originator of the Constitution, the Minister Orsted, had not, in fact, wished to permit the German Minority to be oppressed by the Danish Majority, and had therefore limited, so far as possible, the powers of the General Council. But in Copenhagen the "Eider-Danish" party attacked him with such violence in the Parliament and in the Press, that the Ministry, already undermined by the intrigues of Countess Danner, was driven to resign its position. Upon this a worthy friend of the Countess, Herr von Scheele, took it upon himself to carry out the commands of the sovereign Danish People. The Constitution of 1854 was abolished; and on the 2d of October, 1855, another was proclaimed with the approval of the Danish Parliament. Naturally, once more no hearing was given to the Duchies.

By this the royal promise of 1852, that the different portions of the monarchy should be equally considered, and no one subordinated to any other, was unreservedly altered into its contrary. The entire State received under the name of a General Council an assembly with an overwhelming majority of Danish votes, as compared with the German, and with full power to legislate and to control the finances in matters affecting the whole kingdom. If any doubts should arise as to whether a thing fell under the head of matters of provincial or of common importance, the decision was to rest with

the Council of State; and in this the Danish Ministers had quite as decided a majority as had the Danish representatives in the General Council. Denmark thus became legally competent to contract at her pleasure, step by step, the sphere of the functions of the provincial Estates in the Duchies, and thus at length to put an end to the independence of the same.

So far as the finances of the entire State were concerned, a normal budget was established — a measure in itself very appropriate, considering the complicated state of existing relations — so that any necessary additions to the same could be made only with the common approval of the popular representations in the different divisions of the country. But in this arrangement also infringements of laws and of the compacts were not lacking. The normal budget was established in 1856, at first provisionally, after consultation with the Danish Parliament, but without any hearing being given to the Estates in the Duchies. The revenues of those domains which, according to the compact of 1852, belonged to the provinces, were assigned to the common treasury, and in addition to this, a long list of disproportionate burdens was imposed upon the Duchies.

The establishment of a Ministry of the Interior for the common State was then arranged, although, according to the compact of 1852, the internal administration of each Duchy was to be managed exclusively by a minister appointed for the purpose. Finally, even after the proclamation of the Constitution, the contrast that had prevailed hitherto between the unlimited popular

freedom in Denmark and the boundless power exercised by the police in the Duchies still remained. In spite of the provisions of 1852, Schleswig-Holstein was, and continued to be, subjected to the rule of the revengeful and greedy democracy of Copenhagen.

How happened it that neither the German Confederation nor the two German Great Powers took steps to prevent so crying a disregard of the compacts?

The reason for this inactivity was as simple as it was cogent. It lay this time, not alone in the wretched constitution of the German Confederate organization, nor alone in the reactionary tendencies of the Ministers at Vienna and Berlin. Little as Count Buol in Vienna or Herr von Manteuffel in Berlin felt disposed to protect the rights of Estates against royal supremacy, they nevertheless felt the insult, when a small state like Denmark trod under foot with impunity a compact that had been entered into by Austria and Prussia. But Denmark had chosen her time well. Those were the days of the Crimean War, of increasing bitterness between the German Powers, and of deep anxiety lest in the west of Germany French troops should cross the Rhine as allies of Austria. Under such circumstances it would have been madness, in addition to all these dangers, to kindle a conflict between Germany and Denmark, especially as it was certain, that, in such a case, all the Powers then contending in the Orient would be on the side of the enemy. For Lord Palmerston, without having examined the new Constitution of 1855, declared it a glorious advance in the path of

liberal parliamentary principles, because it enlarged the powers of the General Council. Neither in Vienna, nor in Berlin, nor in Frankfort, could a thought be given to Schleswig-Holstein.

In the Duchies themselves this was perfectly well understood, and the inevitable was borne with silent determination. Hardly, however, had the Crimean War come to an end, in the spring of 1856, when the Holstein Estates thought of presenting a complaint to the Confederate Diet. Minister Manteuffel instructed the Prussian representative at Frankfort, Herr von Bismarck, to report what the prospects would be for such an appeal to the august assembly.

Bismarck's answer went far beyond the question that had been addressed to him. In it he discussed the affair of the Duchies in its entire German and European relations; and he now expressed himself in regard to Schleswig-Holstein no longer from the point of view of the leader of the Conservative party, but from that of the Prussian statesman. He, however, advised circumspection. "That Denmark," he said, "has infringed both rights and treaties is indisputable. The majority of the German Courts would, indeed, warmly approve any action taken in accordance with the principles of the Confederation, in order that they might meet the wishes of their own people; but the decision which would be adopted by Austria under the circumstances would never be left out of consideration. The Court of Vienna, always well disposed towards Denmark, will not go a step further, out of deference to public opin-

ion, than is absolutely necessary ; it will constantly thrust the initiative and the responsibility for action upon Prussia, and will then be always ready, if she takes any steps, to accuse her in Germany of lukewarmness, and abroad of impetuosity. The event would depend entirely upon the decisions of the foreign Great Powers ; every measure is therefore to be avoided which could give these Powers occasion for hostile interference. Even with the most favorable turn of affairs the result would probably remain far behind the demands of popular zeal in Germany. Whether Prussia in such a case would gain for herself any definite advantage is very doubtful. We have at any rate no reason for desiring that the Holsteiners should live very contentedly under their Duke ; for if they did so, they would no longer take any interest in Prussia, and their taking such an interest may on occasion be very useful to us. For this reason it is very important that Prussia, however just the cause may be, should act with great prudence and circumspection. We must not neglect anything that is imperatively demanded by our obligation to protect Germany from a foreign foe ; but no step of a nature calculated to irritate Europe must be taken without the participation of Austria. It therefore seems advisable to postpone any motion of our own in the Confederate Diet until the complaint of the Holsteiners has been presented ; nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent our taking even now, in common with Austria, some diplomatic action at Copenhagen in behalf of the sorely oppressed provinces."

This was the opinion of the boldest statesman of our century as to Prussia's attitude in the justest of causes, considering the constitution of the German Confederation at that time. He was only too much in the right. For this very reason, however, such a confederate constitution cannot escape fatal condemnation.

The course which Bismarck had advised was taken: in June, 1856, Prussia and Austria made confidential representations at Copenhagen, calling the attention of Denmark to the agreements of 1852. The Danish Government, after having delayed till September, gave an evasive answer, and meanwhile made efforts to stir up the non-German Powers against the German demands. But the English and Russian Governments were well enough acquainted with the ill-treatment of the Duchies, and in Paris the Emperor Napoleon decided that the much-talked-of integrity of Denmark was a matter of indifference to France. Prussia, therefore, saw no obstacle to taking further action.

Unfortunately the two German Powers now abandoned the method of direct negotiation with Copenhagen that had been employed in June. Instead of this, they prepared a common motion to be brought forward in the Confederate Diet, in case Denmark persistently refused to lay the Constitution of 1855 before the Estates of the Duchies for their consideration. The turning over of the question to the Confederation had the ostensible advantage, that by it the foreign Powers were deprived of the right to interfere in a matter that belonged to the internal affairs of Germany;

but what would happen if the Powers interfered without any right on the ground of their own interests? The apparent advantage thus obtained was much more doubtful than the positively disadvantageous circumstance, that the Confederation was justified in concerning itself only with the Confederate territory of Holstein-Lauenburg, and had no right whatever to interfere with Schleswig. While, therefore, the chief ground of complaint of the Duchies was the separation of Schleswig from Holstein, the activity of the Confederation could only tend to widen the gulf between the two, and not to fill it. This result was only too soon to make itself practically felt.

The entire year 1857 was consumed in endless writing back and forth between Frankfort and Copenhagen, and in investigations, as thorough as they were circumstantial, carried on by the committees of the Confederate Diet. Finally, on the 11th of February, 1858, a Confederate decree was passed, that the General Constitution of 1855 could not be recognized as legally in effect for Holstein and Lauenburg, and that a definite statement must be awaited from Denmark as to how she expected to carry out the promises of 1852.

Some time was taken for consideration. The foreign Powers strongly urged the adoption of a conciliatory attitude; and on the 15th of July the Danish Ministry made answer that the authority of the Confederation in matters especially concerning Holstein was unquestioned. "But," they said, "the General Constitution of the Danish monarchy, and consequently also the

position of Holstein in that monarchy, belongs to the internal affairs of Denmark: any criticism of the same that the Confederation may permit itself is an unjustifiable attack upon the independence of the Danish State as a whole, which has been recognized by Europe. Moved by her love of peace, however, Denmark is willing for the time to regard the General Constitution as suspended, and declares herself ready to enter into negotiations concerning arrangements of a different nature."

Austria, Bavaria, Saxony, and Würtemberg were inclined to enter into such negotiations; but we have already related in what way the energy of the Prince of Prussia tore in pieces the diplomatic web thus spun by the Diet, and at his direction Bismarck on the 29th of July brought about the passage of a Confederate decree containing a threat of armed chastisement by the Confederation.

In Copenhagen there was by no means an unwillingness to meet force with force, when the Confederate troops should appear on the Elbe. But the foreign Powers, and especially Russia, strongly urged that so serious a complication should be avoided by submission; and the Danish Government therefore adopted another position which was offered to them by the form of the German proceedings, and which was in the highest degree agreeable to the "Eider-Danes."

"The Confederation," it was said, "which can only pronounce in regard to Holstein-Lauenburg, declares that the Constitution of 1855 is illegal. Very well!

Let this be literally carried out; let the Constitution be abolished for Holstein and Lauenburg, and for these only, while it remains in force for Denmark and Schleswig. Denmark cannot ask for anything better than this. For Holstein will then continue under the supremacy of the King, who will once more have become absolute there in all matters affecting the kingdom as a whole. The laws and the budget, so far as such matters are concerned, will be settled as heretofore in consultation with the Danish General Council without any participation of the Holsteiners, and will then be carried out in Holstein by royal order. As to Schleswig, the Danish people will have the satisfaction of feeling that the mandate of the Confederate Diet itself has confirmed the separation of the country from Holstein and its union with Denmark. The forbidden word 'incorporation' need not be used, but the fact will be undeniable."

Acting on this view, King Frederick VII., in a proclamation of November 6, 1858, announced the abolition of the General Constitution so far as Holstein and Lauenburg were concerned, as well as the continuance of the same in force for Denmark and Schleswig.

As may be easily imagined, the affair was viewed in a very different light on the German side. The Confederate Diet was, however, obliged to pause in its military preparations; this could not be avoided, since the letter of the Confederate decree was to be exactly followed. The next thing to do was to await the deliberations of the Holstein Parliament, which had

just been summoned. The Danish Government had employed on the elections to this Parliament every means that was at the disposal of either their temporal or their spiritual police; but all attempts to influence or to intimidate that rugged people were rendered abortive by their unalterable firmness. On the 11th of March, 1859, the Parliament voted as follows: "The Constitution is law for the monarchy as a whole, and for what concerns questions of common importance. Since the monarchy is to continue to exist as a whole, that law cannot, on general principles of law, cease to be in effect for one portion of that whole and remain in force for another. Rather, it is the duty of the Government at once to give its attention to the establishment of another general constitution that shall be in accordance with the promises of 1851 and 1852. Equal consideration with Denmark has been promised to the Duchies. Therefore, if the present Constitution remain in force in Denmark and Schleswig, then so long as it so remains the Holstein Estates must at least be allowed rights similar to those of the General Council at Copenhagen: that is to say, no law concerning matters of common importance must be promulgated without the assent as well of the Holstein Estates as of the General Council."

This statement was as direct and free from ambiguity as the statement of the Danish Government to which it was opposed. Posterity will not remain in doubt on which side was to be found good faith and substantial right, and on which legal pettifoggery and a spirit of arbitrary tyranny.

In these positions, between which no compromise was possible, the two parties persisted for several years. Denmark held out the prospect of fresh negotiations with the Holstein Parliament. On the 8th of March, 1860, the Confederation decided again to postpone military action during the continuance of the present provisional state of things, so long as Denmark passed no law or budget affecting the kingdom as a whole without the approval of the Holstein Parliament. Denmark, however, made public the new budget on the 3d of July, without having given a hearing to the Holsteiners. Military measures were once more talked of in Frankfort, and were once more postponed until after another meeting of the Holstein Parliament. This ended in the spring of 1861 in an open breach between the Government and the Estates; and now finally the punishment of Denmark was to be seriously taken in hand.

Meanwhile the increasing complication of affairs had caused growing anxiety among the foreign Great Powers also, and England exerted all her influence at Copenhagen to avert the threatening storm. The President of the Danish Ministry was now Hall, who in 1857 had taken Scheele's place. Hall was an experienced and prudent official, of a clear and keen intellect, and a vigorous nature kept well under control. He was convinced of Denmark's just right not to allow her sovereignty to be subjected to the constant supervision of the German Confederation, and consequently to refuse to be bound by the promises of 1852. At the

same time, it was manifest to him that without the protection of Europe, Denmark ought not to venture on war with a neighbor whose power so far exceeded her own; and therefore, at the end of October, 1861, he listened to the urgent advice of England that an attempt should be made at bringing about a direct diplomatic understanding with the Courts of Vienna and Berlin, independently of the Confederate Diet.

On the German side this move was hailed with joy. It had been found by experience that the action of the Confederation, limited as it was to Holstein, had simply worked in favor of the "Eider-Danish" plans against Schleswig. The two Great Powers to which in 1852 Denmark had plighted her word concerning Schleswig as well as concerning Holstein, could now take the whole affair into their own hands.

On the 30th of November and the 5th of December, 1861, the answers of the two German Courts were sent to Copenhagen. In these the standing complaint in respect to the treatment of Schleswig-Holstein was first renewed. Then the demand was made that the agreement of 1852 should be carried out in all its provisions: that is to say, that the Danes should fulfil their promise to give an equal position to all provinces in the entire State, subordinating no one to any other, to abandon the incorporation of Schleswig and every measure tending to that end, and in Schleswig to bring about and to secure equal rights for both nationalities. In his reply of December 26th, Hall declined to discuss some of the points of the negotiations of 1851; especially

those concerning Schleswig, inasmuch as he held it to be more than doubtful whether the Powers had by the compacts acquired a right to interfere in the internal constitutional questions of the Danish Monarchy.

Upon this, the two Courts asked the definite question, whether Denmark did or did not recognize the binding character of the agreement of 1852. In his reply of March 12th, 1862, the Danish Minister did not exactly show a disposition to make up his mind to a simple yes or no, but he did not leave the slightest doubt concerning his real feeling. "Denmark," he said, "fulfils every obligation undertaken by her; but with the Danish Duchy of Schleswig the German Confederation has nothing whatever to do. It is to be regretted that the Confederation has not hitherto said positively what it desires for Holstein. Germany must not set up, as the only valid one, any interpretation of the correspondence of 1851 that pleases her, nor must she draw, from single statements in the same, conclusions as to the validity of the whole, regarded as a formal compact. Germany ought to explain what obligations Denmark has left unfulfilled, and ought not to make Denmark responsible for Confederate decrees by which the opposition of the Holstein Estates to every general constitution has been strengthened. The question of nationality in Schleswig was never touched upon in the diplomatic negotiations: the clause referring to this subject in the manifesto of 1852 only sanctions the existing state of things as established, after the suppression of the rebellion, by the Danish decrees

concerning the language to be used in the churches and schools."

In all this there was no sign of yielding in any point, no trace of recognition of the rights of Germany, no shadow of anxiety lest the sorely-trying neighbor should rise up in her strength. Certainly, at this moment much-divided Germany seemed even less imposing than she had in the past. The secret hostility which had long been increasing between the two German Great Powers had, since the change of Government in Prussia, and by reason of the question of Confederate reform, once more developed into an open enmity. The Lesser States were seeking to throw off the influence of Prussia, and in addition to this the struggle between the Crown and the Parliament in Berlin concerning the Constitution was already approaching.

In Copenhagen there was good reason for doubting whether there was any occasion for fear or for weakness in the face of an opponent inwardly so feeble. It was also not unknown, that although the Prussian Minister at Vienna, Count Bernstorff, acting in accordance with the view of his Sovereign, seriously and warmly urged the support of Schleswig-Holstein, yet the head of Austrian affairs, Count Rechberg, was reluctant to act in the dangerous affair, and did nothing more than he could possibly help.

But on the other hand, the very fact of its quarrel with Prussia was a strong inducement to the Court of Vienna to make an effort to gain the favor of the small States and of the German people, and for this

purpose there could be no better means than the furtherance of the Schleswig-Holstein matter. Austria, therefore, on the 26th of August, 1862, sent an answer even sharper than Prussia's to the declaration of Hall. Her memorial unreservedly declared the retention of the Constitution for Schleswig after it had been repealed for Holstein, to be an open infringement of the agreements of 1852. "For according to these agreements all the divisions of the country were to be affected alike by the general Constitution. Schleswig, therefore, must not be placed in a different light from Holstein in this respect: a General Council for Denmark and Schleswig in which Holstein should not be represented, will at once be seen to be legally inadmissible, and to mean the beginning of an incorporation of Schleswig. A provisional arrangement of such a nature can consequently only be prolonged with the consent of all parties concerned, that is, of the Holstein Estates and of the German Confederation."

Austria accordingly expressed a desire that the Danish Parliament and the Estates of the three Duchies should simultaneously and with equal consideration be heard concerning a new general constitution, which should above all things afford security against the continued wronging of the German minority by the Danish majority; at the same time, the severe laws of 1850 in regard to language should be repealed, and in this respect the state of things in 1847 should be revived. "But to sum up," said the despatch, "why will Denmark now, when the question of succession is settled,

and consequently the possession of the Duchies assured to the monarchy — why will she not restore the old union of Schleswig-Holstein, and so make an end of all internal strife? ”

This touched the heart of the question; and the Danes were all the more deeply affected by it, when, soon after, two non-German Great Powers (and those the very two that had once been most friendly to Denmark; namely, Russia and England) recognized without reserve the fairness of the German demands.

In general, the European public had up to this time rather favored Denmark than Germany. In the beginning, Germany was injured by the unfortunate catastrophe of 1850: without an accurate knowledge or judgment of the circumstances, the idea had remained fixed in the world's memory, that a malicious attack made by great Germany had been miserably brought to grief by the determined courage of little Denmark. As to how Denmark managed in the Duchies afterwards, how many people outside of the Cabinets knew anything about it? The Press in Schleswig-Holstein was completely gagged; even the Hamburg newspapers did not dare to speak of the ill-treatment of the country. On the other hand the Danish organs daily presented their arguments to the whole civilized world, and the Government was indefatigable in finding a reception for “Eider-Danish” articles in the English and French newspapers.

In addition to this, there was the ever-increasing complication of the legal rights of the case, in the confusing

and obscuring of which the Danish Government worked wonders. In this connection things were very much as they had been ten years before in respect to the question of the succession: no one in Paris and London wished to hear anything more about these hair-splitting distinctions. The only thing that seemed clear was the ostensible fact that Denmark was granting every sort of freedom to the German Confederate country of Holstein, while Germany was anxious to prescribe to Denmark in her internal constitutional affairs. This view took all the firmer hold, since the Courts of Berlin and Vienna were not credited with much honest enthusiasm for parliamentary rights and popular liberty, whether at home or in the Duchies.

Great surprise was therefore felt, when on the 24th of September the English Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Lord John Russell, circulated among the contending parties a proposal of mediation, which was at least half conceived from the German standpoint. So far as we know, it was the merit of Prussian diplomacy to have thoroughly enlightened the English statesman concerning the true state of affairs; and once accurately informed, the little, energetic, and conscientious man, who wished well to every one and was anxious that every one should have his own, betook himself zealously to his pen.

He began by stating what was indisputable in the question in hand. "It is clear," he said, "that, in view of the decision of the Confederation, no laws can be promulgated nor taxes imposed in Holstein without the

consent of the Estates. It is clear that the Constitution of 1855 has no force in Schleswig and Holstein because it was proclaimed without the consent of the Estates. Finally, it is clear that Denmark Proper may decide upon laws and taxes for itself without the consent of the Duchies.

“Two great questions, however, remain unsettled. The first concerns Schleswig. The obligations that Denmark has undertaken in regard to Schleswig are: the royal promise that Schleswig shall not be incorporated, and the further agreement that in Schleswig the Germans shall be considered as on an equal footing with the Danes. Now Prussia, in her latest despatch, complains that all the natural ties between Schleswig and Holstein have been torn asunder, that the rights of the University of Kiel have been treated with contempt, that Schleswig has been flooded with Danish officials and pastors, and that all the family relations have been affected by the edicts on the subject of language. Here, then, something must be done. But a perpetual supervision exercised by the Confederation over the administration of Schleswig is evidently impracticable; and consequently the necessary guaranty must be furnished by the Constitution of the country itself. Complete autonomy ought therefore to be granted to the country, and the provincial Estates ought to have the management of whatever concerns the University, the Church, the schools, and the language. In that case, the Duchy would no longer be represented in the Danish General Council.

“The second question,” continued Lord John, “is that of the General Constitution. It would be practically impossible to carry out the provision that every law or budget must be deliberated upon and agreed to by four parliaments independent of each other and meeting in different places. This could be avoided by having the four assemblies agree every ten years upon a normal budget for the standing common expenses (the civil list, the army, the marine, and diplomatic relations), and then letting any additions to this be granted yearly by each assembly according to its proper proportion. The expenditure of these sums should be decided upon by a council of State, two-thirds of which should be Danes and the remaining third Germans.”

As will be seen, this proposition demanded that Denmark should recognize the complete independence of Schleswig, and that Holstein should renounce the ancient union of the Duchies. It required also the equal consideration of all parts of the country in the granting of supplies for common expenses.

The news of this despatch had hardly arrived in St. Petersburg, when the Russian Government hastened to recognize on the 29th of September the appropriateness of the English propositions and to recommend urgently at Copenhagen the acceptance of the same. As to the German Powers, Austria announced that she recognized in Lord John's despatch a suitable basis for peace: and the Prussian statesman, who had entered upon his ministry on the very day the English despatch was signed, expressed even more unreservedly his approval

of this plan of mediation. At one stroke Denmark saw herself opposed to the united will of four Great Powers and the German Confederation.

There was at first in Copenhagen great astonishment, dismay, and indignation. But if the insolent "Eider-Danes" were lacking in a sense of justice, it must surely be admitted that they possessed determination and boldness, and unlimited confidence in the strength of their cause. The course of reasoning pursued by them was something as follows: "When the state of things is carefully examined, does it prove to be so dangerously changed? Will Austria's love of peace be really transformed by a friendly word from London, in spite of Hungary and the deficit, into zeal for war? Will the new Prussian Minister, who once condemned so sharply the rebellion of Schleswig-Holstein, now take arms in their behalf against Denmark? Russia, too, crippled and hampered like Austria internally, seems to have had no other than peaceful wishes at heart."

Finally, the "Eider-Danes" thought that they understood thoroughly the chief sinner in the whole affair, namely, England. The Queen might even now still sympathize with Germany; but the final decision, they felt, would depend upon public opinion, upon parliament, and upon its leaders. Now, the great majority of the newspapers overflowed with sympathy for Denmark; the head of the Government, Lord Palmerston, had been the prime mover in the London Protocol; the majority in the Lower House seemed devoted to

him; and the Tory Opposition was almost more anti-German than the Minister himself.

“And as for Lord John Russell,” said the “Eider-Danes,” “what does he care, after all, about the Holstein Estates, or the Schleswig schools? What he, as well as Austria and Russia, really care about, is to avert a European war; and to this end to get rid of the interminable German-Danish difficulty, no matter on what conditions. His now going so far to meet the wishes of Germany proves nothing more than that he regards Denmark as the weaker party, who can be more easily influenced by diplomatic pressure than the more powerful Germany. Denmark’s main object must therefore be to convert him entirely from this view. The material strength of the German Confederation is indeed ten times greater than Denmark’s; but Denmark must show the world that she excels to an even greater degree her indolent opponent in determined energy, and that she is resolved under any circumstances to battle for her national rights to the last drop of her blood. If England is only convinced of this fact, Lord John will at once, for the sake of peace, urge christian submission no longer at Copenhagen, but at Berlin and Vienna.”

This Danish calculation was accurate in almost every respect, as the following months were quite sufficiently to prove. On one point only it turned out to be as erroneous as possible; though it must be said in excuse for the Danes, that their mistaken judgment concerning Bismarck was shared at that time everywhere, and

especially in Germany — with the exception of some ten or twelve persons. The fates of Denmark had so arranged it. Everything, even this underestimating of her only dangerous enemy, was to work together to hold Denmark firm in her mistaken course, the outcome of which was to be the complete liberation of Schleswig-Holstein.

On the 15th of October, 1862, Hall sent to England a negative answer, assuming a tone which left nothing to be desired in the way of haughty decisiveness. "The carrying out of the English propositions," he said, "would mean the dismemberment of the Danish monarchy, to protect the integrity of which was the object of the London Protocol. That the General Constitution shall remain in force for the Kingdom and Schleswig is a question of life and death for Denmark; and the Government will never depart from the line prescribed to it by this conviction."

This diplomatic declaration had been preceded by warlike speeches in the General Council, and by energetic motions made in the same for the union of Schleswig with Denmark. The King confirmed the whole by a toast given at a parliamentary banquet, announcing that he hoped soon to see his whole State settled, and that he was convinced that if circumstances should render it necessary, his faithful people would boldly gather round him.

On the 6th of November, Hall sent his answer to the German Powers. He emphatically rejected Austria's proposal that the union of Schleswig and Holstein

should be restored, on the ground that this would not tend to pacification, but only to fresh efforts to separate the Duchies from Denmark. But rather, if Denmark, in accordance with the demands of the Confederate Diet, granted enlarged independence to the Holsteiners, she would be obliged to associate Schleswig so much the more closely with the Kingdom.

Hall then reiterated the old proposition, that Schleswig was a Danish country with whose affairs Germany had not the smallest right to interfere. He now positively denied that the agreements of 1851 and 1852 were binding. "Austria," he said, "declared that the King's sovereign rights should not suffer by his making a statement to the Powers of his intentions. After the King had stated what his intentions were at that time, he might, indeed, feel himself to a certain extent morally bound; but there can be no question of an international obligation. At any rate, the question is too large to be settled by the interpretation of isolated despatches: it involves the right of the Danish Monarchy to arrange its own internal affairs in complete independence. Germany is seeking to bring about a closer union of her Confederate States under a national constitution; so much the more does it behoove us to be careful to preserve the independence of all the countries beside Holstein that belong to our monarchy."

Let any one consider how formally Denmark in 1852 had recognized as a binding compact the agreements made at that time, and how violently at the end of 1862

the domestic quarrel over Confederate reform was blazing in Germany; and it will be easily understood that the German Powers saw in the Danish despatch only an open expression of contempt, and did not feel themselves called upon to continue such a correspondence. Lord John Russell, indeed, was not so easily to be convinced that his admonitions, at once so humane and so reasonable, could be entirely ineffectual at Copenhagen. Yet once more he sent a despatch thither; and the natural result was that he again received on the 5th of January, 1863, a more decided rejection of his well-meant suggestions.

On the 16th of January, Hall then sent a despatch of a similar nature to St. Petersburg. In this he prophesied the most difficult and serious complications, if the German Confederation did not refrain from continuing its interference in the question of the Holstein Constitution. In connection with Schleswig he expressed regret that he could not count upon the entire approval of Prince Gortschakoff. "Denmark," he said, "remembering the former important services rendered her by Russia, is extremely anxious to meet the wishes of the Emperor so far as possible. There exist, however, questions of so great weight and significance that a Government cannot give up its own judgment on them to that of its friends, not even of its sincerest friends. The question of Schleswig is to Denmark a question of that sort."

Five days later, the Upper Chamber of the Danish Parliament resolved upon an address to the King, in

which a definitive constitution for the Kingdom and Schleswig—and hence the incorporation of the latter—was asked for, with the declaration that the Danish people were ready to make any sacrifice for the carrying out of such a policy.

The waves of national self-consciousness were rolling high in Denmark at that time. Hall's calculations seemed to have been brilliantly verified: Denmark had spoken, and the world and the Great Powers were struck dumb. There was a fixed determination to carry the "Eider-Danish" programme completely into effect. The separation of Holstein and the incorporation of Schleswig had been practical facts since 1858; this provisional state of things was now to be formally stamped with legality. Naturally, this did not mean that Holstein was to be entirely withdrawn from Danish rule and to be relinquished to Germany: it was only to be completely cut off from constitutional existence in common with Denmark-Schleswig, and then as a subject province to be all the more thoroughly spoliated for Danish ends.

Fortune seemed to smile more and more benignly upon these patriotic resolves. For immediately after the above-mentioned propositions of annexation made by the Upper House, came crowding upon one another the news of the Polish revolt, which crippled Russia, then of Prussia's being threatened by a French attack, and finally of the diplomatic campaign carried on by the Western Powers and Austria against Russia, a campaign which certainly was not in itself equivalent

to war, but which might kindle war at any moment. In such a fortunate conjuncture not an hour was to be lost. The Holstein Estates had recently exhibited afresh their old repugnance to all royal favor, nay, they had even complained of the Danish Government to the Confederate Diet: now they should be made to feel what their revered Confederate Diet, and especially what their adored Prussia, could effect against Denmark's energy, in the actual condition of European affairs.

On the 30th of March, 1863, appeared the royal proclamation, which was to open the new epoch of "Eider-Danish" rule. In the very beginning it was announced that the legal basis of 1852 was to be abandoned. "The concessions made at that time," said the proclamation, "were granted with the necessary presupposition that the German Confederation would not abuse its rights in Holstein for the purpose of interfering in the internal arrangements of the Danish Monarchy, and that the Estates of the Duchies would meet the efforts of the Government with a loyal disposition. Unfortunately, neither of these expectations has been fulfilled; and since a definitive settlement of the affairs of the Monarchy can no longer be postponed, the King is obliged to take the steps necessary for this end, 'so far as possible' in harmony with the demands of the German Confederation."

That is to say, a new constitution was to be proclaimed for Holstein,—so far as form was concerned, without the previous consent of the Estates; and so far

as substance was concerned, with no regard whatever for the agreement of 1852: "so far as possible," therefore, in contradiction to the decrees of the Confederate Diet.

The legislation for the Duchy was in future, both in questions affecting Holstein only and in those of common importance to the whole monarchy, to be carried on by the King and the Estates. If in any affair of common importance the Holstein Estates and the Danish General Council came to opposite decisions, the matter in hand was at once to be taken out of the list of such affairs — by which arrangement Schleswig would be left completely at the mercy of the Danish majority.

As for the finances, the provisional normal budget of 1856 was declared definitive; and the public domains with their revenues were thus permanently taken away from the Duchy.

Beside this, it was decided, in further contradiction to the principles of 1852, that the outlay of the Ministry of War, which had nearly doubled since 1856, should, with the exception of the expenses connected with the highest offices of the central administration in Copenhagen, be taken away from the general exchequer and be divided among the exchequers of the different provinces, while the general exchequer should retain all the revenues it had hitherto received. This meant an increase of about two and a quarter million thalers (national currency) in the burden of the Duchies, all imposed without the consent of the

Estates, while the Danish General Council had previously had the opportunity to vote upon the subject. There was no mention of any participation of the Holstein Estates in determining how the money should be laid out, nor in the control of the expenditure. In a word, by this document Holstein was unconditionally shut out from the General Council, and Schleswig was left to take its fate there alone; the former was granted Estates having a deciding voice in its own legislation, and in gratitude for this was to continue to pay Denmark "interest and taxes."

The logical conclusion to these proceedings was not far to seek: it lay in a correspondingly definitive settlement of the Constitution for Denmark and Schleswig, in other words, in the final incorporation of Schleswig into the Kingdom. As a matter of fact, a royal message, addressed three weeks later to the Parliament in special session, expressed the intention of proposing to the assembly at the next regular session, that is to say, in the course of the summer, a revision of the Constitution for Denmark-Schleswig. The King concluded by expressing his confidence that he would be supported by the patriotism of the General Council in his determination to assert the independence of the Fatherland in the midst of these trying and dangerous circumstances.

Thus everything was well under way. That the indignation in the Duchies was general, was well known in Copenhagen; but reliance was placed upon the police, the clergy, and the army. The stiff-

necked obstinacy of the German subjects was held to be only another reason for cutting them off from every prospect of relaxing or breaking the yoke. From Germany it was learned that the Confederate Diet had referred to its committees the complaint of Holstein, and that Austria and Prussia had prepared a provisional protest against the proclamation of March 30th. But these things had become habitual after ten years, and it was thought that Germany, on her side, would gradually become accustomed to the Danish method of procedure.

The "Eider-Danes" fixed their brightest hopes, however, upon the idea of a European war soon to break out, in which Austria would attack Prussia, and the Western Powers, Russia, while Denmark, by an active alliance with Paris and London, would arrive at the goal of all her wishes. The friendship with Russia, which had once, in Nicholas' time, been so fruitful, had long before become a source of vexation — ever since it had given opportunity for such troublesome pieces of advice. On the other hand, the Danish democracy had an inborn enthusiasm for the struggles for liberty in Poland; and though the Minister Hall acted prudently in this connection, yet newspapers, associations, and assemblies openly proclaimed their Polish sympathies. No proof is necessary, that this did not contribute to improve the Emperor Alexander's disposition toward Denmark. But the fact that the "Eider-Danish" liberalism was favorable to the Poles, won for it all the more approval in England.

BOOK X.

CHASTISEMENT BY THE CONFEDERATION.

CHAPTER I.

THE CHASTISEMENT DECIDED UPON.

To the German Powers the news of the Danish *coup d'état*, coming as it did in the midst of a general tension of European relations, was by no means agreeable. The Government at Vienna would have given a great deal, if Denmark had been willing to hold out the smallest respectable possibility of a peaceful settlement. To the gay imperial city these hyperborean troubles seemed to be enveloped in misty obscurity; and just as in 1850, Austria wished the integrity of Denmark to be maintained, since if that were destroyed, nothing was more probable than that Prussia's power would receive an enlargement in one form or another—a misfortune which, according to all Austrian traditions since Kaunitz and Thugut and the days of Metternich and Schwarzenberg, was to be avoided at any cost. The proclamation of March 30th, however, was too brutal even for Austria, and touched her honor too nearly. The popular feeling in Germany became daily more excited. It would not do to leave the guidance and the satisfaction of this feeling to the Prussian Court alone. Count Rechberg therefore said to the Prussian ambassador, Herr von Werther: "Denmark has broken the compact of 1852. What is to be done? I should be very

thankful if your Government would communicate to me its views on the subject."

In Berlin, King William, as was natural with his direct and decided temper and his high sense of military and national honor, had looked upon the endless dragging-on of the Schleswig-Holstein question with angry impatience. He had made up his mind to interfere so soon as there should be any prospect of a good result, and, if necessary, to interfere with the full force of the Prussian sword. His new Minister, Herr von Bismarck, was filled with a similar spirit; though with regard to the method of proceeding and the proper time to choose, he still persisted in the views he had expressed with so much foresight in 1856. A few days after his entrance into the Cabinet he put himself secretly in communication with men who could be relied on as well in Schleswig-Holstein as in Hesse-Cassel; and he at once required from the Minister of War an opinion concerning the preparations necessary for a war with Denmark. The substance of the information he received was, that Denmark could within four weeks place 43,000 men in the extremely strong position of the Dannevirke; in the winter, in case of a severe frost, it would be possible to go round this position, but a force of 60,000 men would be required in order to do it; this force should be kept in readiness so that it could march at once on the day when war was declared.

In a confidential letter of December 22d, 1862, Bismarck wrote: "It is certain that the whole Danish

question cannot be settled in a way satisfactory to us, except by war. A pretext for such a war can be found at any moment that is deemed favorable for carrying it on. In this connection, however, much more depends upon the view of the matter taken by the non-German Great Powers than upon the intrigues of the 'Würzburg Governments' and their influence on the feeling in Germany. We share with Austria the disadvantage of having signed the London Protocol, and we cannot declare ourselves free from the obligations involved in that signature without the risk of war. But should it come to a war, the result would decide the future territorial conditions of Denmark."

At that time, in December, 1862, Bismarck was of the opinion that a chastisement inflicted by the Confederation would not be desirable, since it would be burdensome to the people of Holstein and would have no application to Schleswig: the only thing that could help oppressed Schleswig was not a chastisement by the Confederation, but a national war. For the commencement of such a war, however, the Minister thought the state of Europe rather unpromising, and the condition of Germany wholly so. "It cannot be foreseen," he wrote, "what course the development of German Confederate relations is destined to take in the future. But so long as they remain at all what they are at present, I cannot think it for the interest of Prussia to carry on a war that would result, in the most favorable event, in giving a new Grand Duke to Schleswig-Holstein. Such a prince, from fear of Prus-

sia's desire for annexation, would vote against us in the Confederate Diet, and his Government would become a willing subject for the machinations of Austria, in spite of any gratitude that he might owe Prussia for his elevation."

Bismarck, therefore, thought that a watchful reserve accompanied by a complete state of preparation was the proper attitude to be adopted for the time. As the Prussian army, under the new arrangement, could furnish at any moment the 60,000 men desired by Von Roon, there was no mention of any preparations whatever. It was thought quite sufficient to send a few reliable officers into Denmark, in order to keep informed of any military measures taken by the enemy. Bismarck could only be confirmed in this expectant attitude by the outbreak of the Polish revolt and the complications resulting from the February convention.

But when the proclamation of March 30th appeared, it seemed to the Prussian Minister, as well as to Count Rechberg, impossible to allow so direct a challenge to pass entirely unnoticed. A Prussian war against Denmark was, indeed, even less to be thought of now than three months before; but independent of its close relation to the threatened incorporation of Schleswig, the proclamation offered points enough on which to base Confederate action in favor of the special interests of Holstein. For although the proclamation, in accordance with the demands of the Confederation, gave extended rights to the Holstein Estates, King Frederick in issuing it had once more acted entirely without con-

sulting those Estates, thus treating with open contempt the promises of 1852. And further, in spite of the Confederate decree of March 30th, 1860, the new order of things involved the imposing upon Holstein of severe burdens of a financial nature.

Matter enough was thus afforded for deliberations at Frankfort concerning the final carrying out of the chastisement by the Confederation. This, indeed, would be but a half-measure, but it had at least one favorable side; namely, the very slowness in which the following of constitutional methods necessarily involved all action taken by the Confederate Diet. It could be easily foreseen that the year would come to an end before the chastisement could be actually resolved upon and the troops put in motion; up to that time diplomatic negotiations could keep the question alive, and in the interval much might happen, perhaps the entire condition of European affairs might undergo a radical change. Prussia therefore answered Rechberg's question by agreeing that steps should be taken in the Confederate Diet.

At the same time, however, public opinion in Germany began to bestir itself with lively impatience. Everywhere the Liberal Press urged that active measures should be resorted to against the unjust doings of Denmark. It was declared that the standpoint hitherto adopted by the Confederation, the demand for the rights granted in the compacts of 1852, should be entirely abandoned, since those compacts themselves had imposed unworthy limitations upon the ancient rights of

the Duchies. It was said to be a cause for thankfulness that Denmark had of her own accord destroyed these limitations, and Germany must not exert her strength in a laborious effort to restore them. At the same time, little confidence was expressed in any policy that the Great Powers might adopt in the important question, since in its earlier stages Austria had always shown herself friendly to the Danes, and Bismarck had called the struggles made in self-defence by Schleswig-Holstein an insolent rebellion.

This latter point was especially insisted upon by the National Association. In a violent manifesto put forth by that body, the Prussian policy was condemned as illegal in internal affairs, as hostile to liberty in Poland, and as faint-hearted against Denmark; it was declared that Prussia, by pursuing such a policy, had lost all claim to the leadership of Germany. The manifesto went on to demand the assembling of a German parliament, which, acting in accordance with the will of the German people, should carry into effect the sacred right of the Duchies to common independence and to succession in the line of agnates, in spite of the malice of their enemy.

The majority of the Governments of the Lesser and Petty States regarded the National Association in general with abhorrence, and felt grave anxiety whenever a German parliament was mentioned; but they also observed that the cry for the liberation of the Duchies found a lively echo, not only among the political parties, but in the hearts of the entire people, and several of

them were ready, by taking action on their own account in behalf of Schleswig-Holstein, to snatch this means of agitation from the hands of the detested partisans of National Unity. On this occasion, as before, Hanover made very energetic declarations in the Diet. The Baden Minister, Roggenbach, expressed the opinion that by concurrence with the Western Powers in the Polish question their support might be obtained for Germany in the Danish. And Oldenburg proposed at Frankfort, that since Denmark had broken the compacts of 1852, Germany should declare them no longer binding, and demand for the Duchies the complete restoration of their ancient rights.

Such a proceeding seemed to the Prussian Minister in the highest degree questionable, since Germany, however good her cause, would be exposed to the same danger as in 1848, that of complete isolation in face of a general opposition on the part of the European Powers, whom Austria would again join as she had done before. Bismarck, therefore, on the 17th of April, emphatically rejected in the Lower House a motion to the above effect directed against the compacts of 1852; though when the deputy Twesten asserted that, in view of the complications at home, Prussia was unable to undertake a war against Denmark, the Minister uttered the caustic retort, that the Government would carry on war when it should appear necessary, with or without the approval of the House.

When, then, in the beginning of June, the committees of the Diet were bringing their proposals concern-

ing the chastisement to completion, and the peace-loving Lord John Russell had sent urgent admonitions to Vienna and Berlin, Bismarck, on the 7th, addressed to the Grand Duke of Oldenburg a thorough exposition of the question in detail. "The abandonment of the compacts of 1852," he wrote, "would make the worst possible impression in England, and would drive that Power over to the Danish side. The same is true of France and of Russia also, at least if we should at the same time declare ourselves no longer bound by the London Protocol in what concerns the question of succession. If the Great Powers should adopt a hostile attitude, Germany's position in the future would become much worse, a result doubly undesirable in the existing tension of European relations. Moreover, Austria will stand firm on the basis of 1852, and nothing is more important for the Duchies than that the two German Great Powers should act in harmony. Both, however, are bound by the London treaty of 1852; I can, therefore, only beg your Grace most urgently not to disturb by your proposal that concord in the Confederation which is so eminently essential. It is extremely probable that Denmark will not accede to the demand now being discussed in Frankfort, that the proclamation of March 30th should be withdrawn, since that would presuppose a complete change of system in Copenhagen. Should the chastisement then take place, the Confederation will always have it in its power to fix the conditions for the cessation of the same; and should Denmark make armed opposition,

this would be the best thing for the German cause that could possibly happen, since Denmark by so doing would assume in the eyes of Europe the rôle of an assailant without legal justification."

This exposition had no effect whatever upon the Grand Duke. At the time, however, the attitude of Austria and Prussia decidedly influenced the sentiments of the deputies at Frankfort. On the 18th of June, the committees made their report, rejecting the scheme of the Grand Duke of Oldenburg, and proposing that a demand should be addressed to the Danish Government to the following effect: that within six weeks it should revoke the proclamation of March 30th, and should take steps preliminary to the introduction of a general constitution based upon the agreements of 1852, or upon the English mediatory proposition of 1862. At the same time it was moved in the Diet that committees should be instructed to propose measures necessary to be taken in case of refusal.

Since no one believed that the Danish Government would yield at once, Bismarck had already opened communications with Vienna concerning military preparations. His proposal was, that out of consideration for Europe, the chastisement should be intrusted at first neither to Austrian nor to Prussian forces, but only to troops from the Lesser and Petty States, in order that the purely Confederate character of the penal measures might be emphasized. With this Count Rechberg entirely agreed. Since in spite of all Hall's fierce grimaces the Count did not believe that the

Danes would make any armed resistance, he thought that four or five thousand men would be abundantly sufficient; at most, he said, the Great Powers could keep a reserve in readiness for the very improbable event that they might be needed.

A military opinion delivered on the 24th of June by General Moltke, on the ground of the reconnoissance undertaken in Denmark, supported this view. The report was to the following effect: "Denmark is as yet making no direct preparations for war, but she is getting ready for a conflict with Germany. She has withdrawn the German element of her army to the island of Zealand, and has filled the Duchies with Danish troops on a semi-war-footing. The line of defence from Friedrichstadt to Eckernförde with the Dannevirke in the centre is completed, and numbers seventy different works. The outlay occasioned by this leaves room for no other idea than that the Danish army will make its stand in that place and there only. For since the military force is hardly sufficient to occupy this position, it is not to be supposed that that force will be weakened by being distributed throughout Holstein."

Moltke then indicated as necessary for the capture of the Dannevirke the method of operations which he made the plan of action for the allied army in the following year.

On the 9th of July, 1863, the Confederate Diet by a majority of thirteen to four accepted the proposal of the committees. The demand was at once sent to

Copenhagen, that within six weeks a declaration should be made with regard to the March proclamation, and to the position of Holstein in the Danish State. The negotiations concerning the strength and the arrangement of the Confederate army were then continued. Austria persisted in her view, that there should be a Confederate commissioner, and 4,000, at most 5,000 men. She privately called upon the King of Hanover to furnish both the commissioner and the troops, thinking that so honorable a distinction would be instrumental in making King George hold fast to her party in the German question. Bismarck, considering that no better occasion for war could be offered to Germany than if the Danes should expel the army of chastisement from Holstein, agreed to the small number of men suggested by Austria, only stipulating that an Austrian and Prussian reserve should be kept in readiness. He protested decidedly, however, against vesting the authority in Hanover alone, and desired that proposals should be made to Saxony as well as to Hanover to furnish a commissioner and a body of troops. Austria was willing to agree to this, if Hanover, to whom she esteemed herself bound, made no objections.

While this correspondence was going on, the European horizon without seemed to be clouding over heavily. In Denmark various proclamations were issued, one after another, all indicating an increasingly warlike tone of mind: there were proclamations concerning the arrangement of the burden of quartering the soldiers, concerning the clearing of the area within the

military limits of the fortresses, and concerning an increase in the number of naval officers. Then the King of Sweden made the Danish Sovereign an unexpected visit at the Villa of Skodsborg, and the rumor immediately spread through Copenhagen that a Scandinavian alliance had been concluded, a rumor that increased the courage and the turbulence of the "Eider-Danish" party.

Much more important, however, was the fact that on the 23d of July the head of the English Administration, in full Parliament, threw his word into the scale with all his energy in favor of Denmark. This time it was not the friendly mediator, Lord John Russell; it was the First Lord of the Treasury, Lord Palmerston himself, who now with hasty thoughtlessness shouted a threatening *Quos ego* to Germany, always so little beloved by him. He cared not much about the rights of the matter. He had, indeed, before declared that the Schleswig-Holstein affair was so complicated that only three men had ever understood it: the first was Prince Albert, who was dead; the second a Danish Statesman, who had gone mad; the third Lord Palmerston himself, and he had forgotten all about it.¹

Borne along by this fortunate ignorance, Palmerston now cried out to Parliament: "The German Confederation may exert authority over Holstein: it has as little right to do so over Schleswig as over Spain or Morocco. Luckily Austria, considering her internal difficulties, stands so much in need of peace that she will certainly

¹ Related by La Marmora: *Un po' più di luce.*

do anything to avoid a collision with Denmark. Should any attempt be made, however, to do what cannot be permitted, should Germany assail the integrity of Denmark, so important for Europe and above all for England, it will not be Denmark alone whom she will have to meet." Lord John shook his head anxiously at this warlike utterance. When the Prussian ambassador remonstrated with the haughty orator, Palmerston, treating the matter lightly, answered: "We must encourage the Danes a little; they are the weaker party, maltreated by you."

If this was the intention, the encouragement had a most fatal success. No doubt about English assistance was any longer felt at Copenhagen, and with the greatest enthusiasm it was urged that the Confederate chastisement should be looked upon as a *casus belli*. "Nothing has yet been decided upon," said the Minister Hall at that time to the Russian ambassador; "but my opinion is decidedly in favor of war, since the Confederation is determined to interfere, without any right to do so, in the affairs of Schleswig and of the kingdom as a whole." King Frederick's tone was the same. "I seek no conflict," he said; "but I can yield no further. My army is ready; my iron-clad, Rolf Krake, will shortly pay a visit to the town of Danzig." Especial satisfaction was shown in the Danish newspapers, when it was known that Hanover was to furnish troops for the chastisement. It was felt that they could assail this state on the sea-coast in a thorough fashion by water.

In Germany, in the beginning of August, the preparations for the chastisement were brought to a standstill by the Frankfort Assembly of Princes, which came suddenly upon the country. While the deliberations and festivities attendant upon this were going on, the more particular business in the Eschenheim palace was allowed to rest. Indirectly, however, the Assembly of Princes had very important consequences even for Schleswig-Holstein. Although the august assembly did not carry out the wish of Minister von Beust, that, at the close of their deliberations, they should make a great demonstration in behalf of the Duchies, yet Austria had, by the course of affairs in the congress, arrived at a point at which the favor of the German Governments and people was doubly desirable for her. She therefore went on with increased zeal in the treatment of the Danish difficulty.

On the 26th of August the answer of Denmark to the Confederate decree of July 9th was received at Frankfort. In this the revocation of the March proclamation was refused, and it was rather plainly indicated that the execution of the chastisement would be regarded as a *casus belli*. Rechberg then wrote to Bismarck, declaring the answer to be entirely insufficient, and expressing the hope that the Prussian, as well as the Austrian, deputy in the Diet had already been instructed to proceed with the necessary measures for the chastisement.

The committees accordingly set to work. But the carrying out of the chastisement proved to be less easy

than had hitherto been supposed. Hanover and Oldenburg, in spite of all their bold language, were filled with grave anxiety now that the question became serious; and they were seconded by Hamburg, who sighed deeply at the blockade of the mouth of the Elbe which seemed possibly imminent. Count Platen, the Minister of Hanover, groaned over the chances that the little body of Hanoverians, which was to march at the expense of the Confederation, might be cut to pieces by the Danes: "For," he cried, "we have no money to set on foot ourselves the reserves necessary to prevent this; we cannot help ourselves out of the misfortune, unless Prussia mobilizes a sufficient relief-corps."

While the coast States were thus lukewarm, language all the more warlike was indulged in at Dresden, Stuttgart, and Munich, to which places their inland position gave a feeling of complete security. Austria, who had by no means abandoned her Confederate reform, praised this patriotic disposition, admonished Hanover to pluck up courage, and urged the Confederation to take energetic action. Yet Rechberg was not altogether inclined to begin a Confederate war; he lived rather in the hope that by the adoption of a threatening attitude the Danes would be shaken in their resolution, and so some concessions could be obtained for the Duchies without a breach of the peace.

A diplomatic attempt of Lord John Russell to decrease the tension of relations was, therefore, although supported by France, rejected by Rechberg, on the

ground that only matters belonging to the internal competence of the Confederation were concerned. He said that the authority of the Diet was sufficient even for the examination of the question whether Holstein had received in the General Constitution the consideration due to her by compact. As Prussia declared her concurrence in this view, in the month of September the committees of the Diet united on a motion that the Courts of Austria, Prussia, Saxony, and Hanover should be requested to undertake the chastisement in the following way : each of the two last-named Governments was to send a civil commissioner and 3,000 men to Holstein ; and the two first-named were to hold ready the necessary support in case of resistance. This was to be signified to Denmark, and an interval of three weeks was to be allowed for the averting of these results by submission to the Confederate decree of July 9th.

In Copenhagen, where the confidence in the support of England still continued unshaken, the news that such a proposal was pending only produced a determination to proceed as quickly as possible along the path that had been irrevocably chosen. The March proclamation had been issued mainly with the object of preparing the way, by the exclusion of Holstein, for the incorporation of Schleswig. It was thought that if this incorporation were carried into effect as quickly as possible, the March proclamation, which would have become useless, might be sacrificed to the wrath of the Confederate Diet, and the Confederation then be told,

with the approval of Europe, not to interfere further in the internal constitutional questions of Denmark.

Accordingly there followed, on the 28th of September, the opening of the special session of the General Council which had been formally announced in the summer. In the Speech from the Throne, King Frederick proclaimed a new Constitution for Denmark-Schleswig, "for our Kingdom," as he designated the two countries in contradistinction to Holstein-Lauenburg. "The General Council," it was declared, "will be so strengthened that it will be sufficient alone to carry on the whole constitutional development of the monarchy." No one could take this to mean anything but that in future the functions of both the Parliament of Denmark Proper and of the Schleswig Estates were to be limited to affairs of provincial administration with no control of the budget and no legislative power. Even if this last step was not actually proposed at that moment, the fact nevertheless remained for Germany: that ever since 1858 the Confederation had designated the existing provisional state of things as being a disguised incorporation of Schleswig, that is, contrary to the compacts, and that now the state of things that had hitherto been provisional was to be changed into a definitive incorporation.

The challenge thus given to the Confederation was even more insolent than that implied in the March proclamation. It was therefore natural that when the Confederate Diet, on the 1st of October, came to vote on the proposal of the committees, the announcement

of the chastisement was almost unanimously approved. Just as the question was about to be put, the Austrian presiding deputy received a fresh despatch from England deprecating any such step as that proposed. Kübeck informed the assembly of this, but said at the same time that he saw no reason for postponing the vote. When this was taken, the only dissenting voices were Denmark and Luxemburg, opponents of the measure on principle, and with them Baden, for whom the proposal did not go far enough, and who held the demand for the actual union of Schleswig-Holstein that had obtained in 1848 to be the only one worthy of Germany. The proposal of the committees became a decree by a vote of fourteen to three.

The hostile determination of both sides had thus been expressed in full distinctness.

But at this moment Bismarck found it advisable to modify, not indeed the aim, but the attitude of Prussian policy. He was anxious, if it were possible without unfortunate results in other respects, to postpone the chastisement once more for a time, since the state of things in general seemed to him still unpropitious for an undertaking that might involve great European complications. Ever since Gortschakoff had broken off so categorically the negotiations concerning Poland, it was no secret that Napoleon was meditating a war against Russia. Moreover, since the Frankfort Assembly of Princes, the relations between Prussia and Austria had been extremely strained; and it was a matter of grave doubt, whether it was best to undertake

with such an ally an armed expedition, the consequences of which were as yet beyond all calculation.

Of Russia's friendship Prussia was for the time certain. Napoleon also had since August been manifesting a desire to maintain more intimate relations with her. Yet in the general uncertainty of affairs, it seemed desirable to keep on good terms with the third of the foreign Great Powers, England, as well; and there were no better means to this end than to show a conciliatory spirit in the Danish affair, and to make advances in the direction of the English plan of mediation which had hitherto been rejected. Even if Denmark should learn of this action, the German cause would hardly be likely to suffer. On the contrary, in view of the tone of feeling prevailing at Copenhagen, nothing was more likely than that Prussia's adoption of such an attitude would provoke an ever-increasing insolence, and an ever-increasing violation of rights, thus making the chances more and more favorable to Germany in the war which was sure to come.

More than one opportunity soon followed for taking a stand in accordance with this view.

One of the most prominent personages in Denmark, Baron Blixen-Finecke, brother-in-law of the Heir-Apparent Prince Christian, a great land-holder in Jutland and Sweden, and formerly for a time Danish Minister, was now the representative of a Jutland district in the General Council. As such he had given his attention, with judicious enthusiasm, to the interests of the peasants, and by so doing had acquired great consideration

among the people. He had recently, to the great indignation of the "Eider-Danes," declared to his Jutland peasants that they had no interest in the world in the March proclamation and the enslavement of Schleswig, but a very great interest in the preservation of peace. On the 3d of October he wrote to Bismarck, whom he had formerly known personally, inquiring whether Prussia would be inclined to avert the Confederate chastisement, if Denmark withdrew the March proclamation, arranged justly the condition of the Schleswig Germans, and at once inaugurated a new ministry as a guaranty for a change of system.

Bismarck had hardly received this communication, when, on the 7th of October, the English ambassador, Sir Andrew Buchanan, presented himself with instructions from Lord John Russell to discuss with the Prussian Minister the same question, the prevention of the chastisement. "We turn this time," wrote Lord John, "not to Austria, who seems much irritated," — Rechberg had once more rejected English mediation, — "but only to Prussia, whose moderation we cannot doubt."

Bismarck said that he must first of all consult the wishes of the King, who was then in Baden. "Personally," the Minister added, "I consider the question a very difficult one, and it should properly be discussed only with the Confederation. In affairs affecting internal Confederate rights, there can be no question of foreign interference. As to the international part of the matter (Schleswig), I will give my voice in the

Confederation for the acceptance of English mediation, provided Denmark has previously accepted it and has offered no opposition to the chastisement."

After he had obtained in Baden the consent of the King, he sent the following answer to Blixen on the 10th of October: "If the proclamation of March 30th be revoked, if the situation be encumbered with no new difficulties by the arrangements which the Ministry will declare necessary that that proclamation may be dispensed with, if, moreover, the improvements suggested by you in the condition of the Schleswig Germans be carried into effect, — then I will give my voice against the carrying out of the chastisement, and I believe I shall be able to make my opinions prevail, however violently Austria and her friends may urge the contrary. Should the above conditions be wanting, my moderate views would lack a basis to work on, and the Confederation has already gone too far for any prospect of practical results to be left even to an English plan of mediation. . . . I should be greatly pleased, should it so come about that I could negotiate with *you officially* concerning our mutual relations. Your present Ministers, owing to what is past, have not the freedom of movement necessary to bring about an understanding."

To the same effect, the Minister sent to the English ambassador, on the 15th of October, a reply well-weighed in every word: "Let Denmark declare to the Confederate Diet her readiness to give the Confederation satisfaction in respect to the right of Holstein and Lauenburg to control their own legislation, as well

as the expenditure of all sums of money raised in the Duchies; let Denmark further declare that she has accepted English mediation for the solution of the international difficulties: then Prussia will attempt to prevent the carrying out of the Confederate chastisement."

The whole thing was so worded that England, in her position of an impartial mediator, could hardly raise any objection, yet at the same time in such a way that a full acceptance by Denmark of the various preliminary conditions was hardly to be expected. On the preceding day, indeed, the 14th of October, a council of the Prussian Ministry at which the King presided had declared that the Minister of Foreign Affairs was, so far as it might be consistent with Prussia's honor, to make efforts for the preservation of peace; but that at the same time the Minister of Finance and the Minister of War were to make estimates of the expense requisite for the defence of the coasts and the equipment of troops, for which Prussia might be called upon, in case armed intervention should be deemed necessary.

Bismarck also explained his general view of the state of the question in instructions sent on the 16th of October to the Prussian representative in the Confederate Diet, Von Sydow:—

"The challenge contained in the Danish proclamation of March 30th imposed upon the German Confederation the necessity of taking some definite action in reply. If this action was to correspond entirely to the Ger-

man claims, a Confederate war was the only suitable form for it to take. The proposal of Oldenburg, that the compacts of 1852 should be declared void, could only have afforded a satisfactory solution, if at the same time the decision had been adopted to restore practically and by force of arms the *status quo ante*, which would by such a step have been legitimately demanded. As, however, the general situation of Europe made it unadvisable to begin a Confederate war at that juncture, a way out of the difficulty was found by taking up once more the process of armed intervention begun in 1858.

“ We have never concealed from ourselves the insufficiency of this measure nor the doubtfulness of its practical success for the cause of the Duchies, but have not held it expedient to make a single-handed opposition to it, so long as it was supported by the majority of the German Governments with a zeal arising from a partly real and partly feigned ignorance concerning the results to be expected from the chastisement. The difficulties that we should have encountered in openly opposing the chastisement, and the complications to which Prussia especially would have been exposed in consequence of the same, were well known to our enemies in Germany. For the sake of profiting by these disadvantages to Prussia, former opponents of the cause of the Duchies now gave that cause their liveliest sympathy. This, however, seems to have cooled off among the maritime states who are equally exposed with us to the consequences of a Danish war; while

Austria and the South German inland states are urging all the more determinedly summary proceedings against Denmark.

“While all this has been going on, the trusted security in the relations of the Confederate States to one another has been disturbed by the conditions which Austria’s efforts for reform have called into life. On account of this disturbance the present moment seems unpropitious for such common undertakings as might bring about European complications. In this state of affairs it is not our wisest course to push the chastisement for its own sake, if honorable means offer themselves for avoiding it, or if, without any fault on our part, it encounters obstacles in the bosom of the Confederate assembly.”

Meanwhile the time was not far distant, at which the paths of German policy were to begin to grow smooth, even by reason of the very blindness of the enemy himself.

While Lord John Russell was wasting a vast amount of ink in sending incessant admonitions to Frankfort against executing the chastisement, and to Copenhagen against resisting it by force of arms, the Danish Ministry persisted in its programme of first completing the incorporation of Schleswig, and then, by the withdrawal of the March proclamation, of taking away from the Confederate Diet every pretext for interference. On the 15th of October King Frederick came from the Castle of Glücksburg to Copenhagen for the purpose of being present at the consultation of his Ministers

over the answer to be sent to the Confederate Diet. The tone of feeling in the capital was self-confident in the highest degree. It was not believed that the Confederate Diet would have the courage to carry out the federal execution in the face of England's opposition; and the boldness of Denmark increased, as always, when Germany was supposed to be hesitating. Orla Lehmann, now Minister of the Interior, had recently declared to a Danish marksman's guild: "The Government has been fully aware of what it was doing in bringing on the present breach with Germany; it therefore finds itself not in the least embarrassed by the further progress and development of its plan of action."

Meanwhile Blixen informed first Minister Hall, and then, on the 18th of October, the King also, of Bismarck's communication. The ever-indolent Sovereign, who had hitherto, to please the masses in Copenhagen, pursued the policy of the "Eider-Danes," was now filled with anxiety lest his comfortable quiet might be disturbed by the Confederate chastisement. He fell upon Blixen's neck and called him his deliverer. He said that he would never sanction the new Constitution that was now being discussed by his Ministers, not even if it should be accepted by the General Council. More than this, however, Blixen did not obtain.¹ In the presence of his Ministers the King did not venture to make any opposition. It was decided to send to Frankfort an answer negative in every respect. On the

¹ Blixen's account of the matter to Pfuel, in the latter's report of Feb. 21st, 1865.

19th, King Frederick returned to Glücksburg, and the "Eider-Danes" remained in undisturbed possession of the reins of government.

Hall then caused his newspapers to open a fierce pen-and-ink war against Blixen, who, it was said, was exchanging political counsels with the enemy, to the detriment of his own country; and the Minister took all possible measures otherwise to push the new Constitution through the General Council as quickly as possible. In public, he caused Bismarck to be accused of seeking to interfere by means of the miserable Blixen in the constitution of the Danish Ministry; while in private, he tried to work upon the deputies, who were filled with many doubts, by pretending that he had information, from direct communication with Bismarck, of Prussia's fixed determination never to allow things to go so far as a serious conflict with Denmark.

Yet, in spite of all this, it took some pains to keep together the necessary majority of two-thirds for the new Constitution. In the discussion in detail at the second reading, Hall did, indeed, obtain the rejection of all propositions of amendment, the minority against him consisting of only three or four votes. A motion of Blixen, that, after the General Council had arrived at a decision, the new Constitution should be then subjected to consideration by a new constitutive assembly, was likewise emphatically rejected; and at Hall's desire, the 1st of January, 1864, was fixed as the date for the introduction of the Constitution.

But a sharp contest took place once more before the

final decision. No less a person than the former Minister, Bluhme, the negotiator of the compacts of 1852, now came forward against the infringement of those compacts by the new Constitution. "The royal manifesto of January 28th, 1852," he said, "formed at that time the legal basis both for the London compact and for the restoration of peace with Germany. The chief point in all these was the integrity of the Danish monarchy, as a necessary element of the European balance of power. Even as early as 1858 this integrity was infringed by the exclusion of Holstein; but hitherto this has been only provisional, and it has therefore been a measure for the time endurable. But with the March proclamation this provisional state of things became definitive; and thus the legal basis of 1852 was abandoned, and instead of the integrity of the monarchy being preserved, its dismemberment was undertaken. In the year 1852 it was promised that Schleswig should have a position similar to that of Holstein, that Schleswig should not be incorporated, that no effort should be made for its incorporation: in contradiction to this, this new law now appears, concerning which the Ministry do, indeed, assert that it neither implies in itself, nor prepares the way for, incorporation. For my part, I will not dispute this assertion; but which of the foreign Great Powers will believe it?"

The answer to this question was ready on all sides. The Swedish Minister, Manderström, declared that the new Constitution, if it did not directly alter the powers of the General Council, the Parliament, and the Pro-

vincial Estates, yet must necessarily lead to such alterations. When the Constitution was first confidentially communicated to him, he had at once, on the 5th of October, addressed a serious warning on the subject to Copenhagen.¹ The English ambassador at Copenhagen, Sir Arthur Paget, whose sympathies were strongly with the Danes, spoke of the new Constitution as a direct declaration of war against Germany.² Lord John Russell was, like Manderström, of the opinion that the new Constitution did not exactly contain the incorporation of Schleswig, but certainly prepared the way for it, and therefore involved a direct infringement of the compacts of 1852.³ This was the view of the merits of the case taken by the two Governments on whose help Denmark hoped first of all to be able to count.

But the "Eider-Danish" leaders pushed on in blind zeal, forced forward as they were by the inevitable consequences of their former doings. They paid no attention to the fact that on the 5th of November the Emperor Napoleon, by a few short sentences in his Speech from the Throne, put out of gear the whole condition of things in which European political affairs had been running up to that time. They contented themselves with sending to Frankfort on the 8th of November the declaration, that if the Confederate Diet would ask in Copenhagen for certain very moderate

¹ The Prussian ambassador sent a copy of this to Berlin on the 2d of September, 1864. The Prussian Government had already received notice of it in a report of October 12th, 1863.

² Schlözer's report, October 16th.

³ Bernstorff's report, November 16th.

extensions of the rights of the Holstein Estates in regard to the budget, the Danish Government would be disposed to grant this request, always providing that the Holsteiners continued to behave loyally. Under the existing circumstances this proposition could only be regarded as a fresh insult to Germany.¹

Finally, on the 13th of November, after Blixen had, by a bungling speech against the new Constitution, increased the bitterness of feeling, and after Hall had announced, with great emphasis, that the Cabinet would stand or fall with this question, the final decision was arrived at in the General Council. Thirty-seven votes were necessary for the required majority of two-thirds: Hall won by forty against sixteen. The Government had delayed the by-elections in two Schleswig districts, which had been long unrepresented, and which would

¹ Shortly before this the English ambassador in Copenhagen, Sir Arthur Paget, had held out the prospect of more considerable Danish concessions to Holstein. Bismarck thereupon observed to the Danish ambassador in Berlin, Herr von Quaade, that if these concessions were at once carried out in Holstein, and if Denmark at the same time accepted the English mediation in regard to Schleswig, the chastisement might be given up, and the actual state of things might continue provisionally — that is, till the satisfactory conclusion of the entire negotiation. Both sides, he added, would soon find the continuance of that state of things intolerable.

Quaade reported this to Hall, and the latter took occasion both then and later to say that Bismarck had beforehand approved the offer of Nov. 8th concerning Holstein, and also the new Constitution that was introduced at the same time for Denmark-Schleswig. Bismarck's whole correspondence proves the want of foundation of this statement: as early as the 3d of November, and again on the 5th and 13th, Bismarck charged the ambassador Balan to present to Hall an earnest protest against the new Constitution, and on the 8th of December the Prussian Minister distinctly contradicted Hall's story.

All this did not prevent the Duke of Gramont (Andreas Memoir) from repeating Hall's fiction with all seriousness.

certainly have fallen to the Opposition; the five Ministers voted with the majority: yet, in spite of all this, the transference of four votes would have been sufficient to throw out the bill. But at any rate, whether the majority was small or great, the blow had fallen, and the compacts of 1852 had been blown into the air by Danish hands.

On the day on which the decision was arrived at, Hall hastened to Glücksburg to conclude the whole matter by obtaining the royal signature. But on his arrival, he found the King mortally ill. A carbuncle on the nose had suppurated and brought on erysipelas in the head. Only during brief moments did the invalid show signs of consciousness or of mental clearness. It was at such a moment that Hall presented to him the document for signature. But the King, whether under a final impulse of a feeling of justice, or from a mischievous disposition toward his successor, who was but little loved by him, refused his signature, as he had told Blixen before that he would do. "I will not sign," he cried. "Christian may do it."

On the 15th of November, 1863, King Frederick died, at the age of fifty-five, the last of the royal male line. By his death an entirely new outlook was opened for the German-Danish quarrel.

CHAPTER II.

THE SUCCESSION AND THE CONSTITUTION.

EMPEROR NAPOLEON'S Speech from the Throne on the 5th of November, 1863, had burst upon the political world like a flash of lightning.

“The compacts of 1815 have ceased to be in force. Can anything be wiser than to summon all the European Powers to a Congress which may act as a supreme tribunal concerning all the questions at issue?”

On the very same day an invitation was sent to all the sovereigns of Europe to be present in person at such a congress to be held in Paris.

This meant the announcement of a drama, beside which the Frankfort Assembly of Princes would have appeared like Tom Thumb beside the ogre.

The most powerful and the most ambitious of the monarchs of Europe, as Napoleon was then universally considered to be, solemnly declared that the legal basis on which the stability of the European states rested, no longer existed; and that it was therefore necessary to subject the general condition of the European world to a critical investigation by all the sovereigns. A conference of twenty crowned heads, with no definition nor limitation of the subjects of discussion, with no announcement of the results or objects to be aimed at,

and with no previous understanding concerning the powers of the assembly, its methods of business, or the means of carrying out its decisions, gave little prospect of a peaceful conclusion. Such a project implied unmistakably only fresh revelations of a warlike purpose on the part of its originator.

“The Speech is impertinent!” cried Queen Victoria of England. “This is too much!” said the Emperor Alexander of Russia. No one was pleased at the invitation; but, to say the truth, no one was anxious to draw upon himself by a refusal the anger of the dreaded Emperor. The smaller Courts, the Pope and Sultan first of all, vied with each other in the declaration of their readiness. Among the Great Powers, however, each one would have been glad to yield to the others the undesirable honor of drawing back. Russia hoped that England and Austria would take the initiative. But Lord John Russell was of the opinion that it belonged to Austria and Russia to decline first; and he confined himself for the time to laying stress in Paris upon the continuance in force of the compacts of 1815, and to asking for more explicit information as to the subjects that Napoleon proposed to bring before the Congress for discussion.

No one had any doubt as to the tendency of the French move. Napoleon had publicly and distinctly declared that he had no cause for complaint against Prussia and Russia, who had pursued their course openly and honorably in the Polish matter without any special hostility to France. But he had quite as little

made a secret of the bitterness which he had felt at the conduct of Austria and England, who had first led him to break off a promising connection with Russia, and then, when national honor called for warlike action, had disgracefully left him in the lurch. The proposal of a congress, therefore, meant the covering up of the diplomatic defeat that he had suffered, at the expense of the faithless allies, of Austria especially.

Thus things took once more the course they had taken after the Crimean war: Napoleon was preparing to go over from the side of those who had been his allies hitherto to that of the enemy; and just as the Italian Question had then taken in his mind the place of the Eastern Question, so now it took the place of the Polish one.

The natural consequence of this sudden revolution in French policy was a general change in the mutual relations of the Great Powers. Hitherto England and Austria had stood at the side of France in opposition to Russia and Prussia. It now became the watchword, both at Vienna and at London, that nothing was more necessary for the quiet of the world than a close understanding, even if not a quadruple alliance, of the four Great Powers against the disturber of the peace at Paris.

In Russia, where the indignation was still fresh over Napoleon's action in respect to Poland, this suggestion found a strong echo. Prussia, however, did not join in it so unreservedly. In Berlin there existed, indeed, in King William perhaps even more than in his Minister,

a profound mistrust of the schemes of the French Emperor, and a doubt as to what reliance could be placed in him. But it was unquestionable that the latest turn of Napoleon's policy was taking a course favorable, for the present at least, to Prussia.

So far as the project of a congress was concerned, Bismarck's views differed little from those of Lord John Russell or Count Rechberg; but he was very far from being disposed to take upon himself the negative *rôle* that was assigned to him in London. On the contrary, when the first news of the plan arrived, he said in an informal conversation with the French ambassador that personally he had no objection to make. "If things were still as they were in January, I could most readily have given this assurance officially. But since that time the attitude of France on the Polish question has given the King cause for anxiety. Yet I hope that confidence will soon be restored. Prussia has just now no interest for her own part in the congress; but she has also no reason whatever for objecting to its taking place."

On the 14th of November the King received from the ambassador the imperial invitation. He at once replied by word of mouth that he had no objection to make to the congress on principle, and would only submit for consideration, whether it would not be advisable to have a previous understanding between the five Great Powers, and to let the principal ministers meet instead of the sovereigns. Meantime he said that for his part he regarded the compacts of 1815 as

binding, except so far as they might have been altered by agreement.

This, as is easily seen, did not mean very much. Napoleon expressed especial regret at the proposition to give up the meeting of the sovereigns, and so to rob the opening of the congress of an unprecedented splendor. Count Goltz, however, succeeded in pacifying him by observing that the King was only in doubt as to the question whether the sovereigns were to appear at the beginning or at the conclusion of the deliberations, and that the first was clearly undesirable, since there could be no certainty that positive results would be obtained. This could not be disputed; and Napoleon therefore assumed the truth of what he desired: that Prussia had agreed to the congress. He consequently redoubled his friendly advances to the Court of Berlin,—a result which to that Court was by no means unsatisfactory.

In Vienna, on the other hand, no very cheerful feelings prevailed. As a matter of fact, Rechberg's policy had everywhere produced an unfavorable yearly balance. The last attempt to carry out, at least partially, the Confederate reform of the Frankfort Assembly of Princes, had resulted at the Nuremberg conference in total failure. A threat addressed to Berlin of a Franco-Austrian alliance, in case Prussia did not accept the Confederate reforms, had been met by Bismarck with the laconic reply, that Prussia's refusal was irrevocable. With Russia, on account of the attitude that the Austrian Government had chosen

to adopt in the Polish matter, relations were as uncertain as after the Crimean War. And with things in this condition, Austria suddenly found the point of the French dagger directed against her own breast. If the congress actually met, the Italian question would once more be brought to the attention of Europe; and if Austria's opposition interfered with the congress, she would have Napoleon's active hostility to fear.

It was clear, then, that to England, protected by her ocean boundaries, must be left the charge of rendering abortive the Napoleonic project. Yet Napoleon's disposition toward Austria would still remain the same. It was probable that any help she might obtain from England would amount to no more than diplomatic despatches. A like result was certain, if she turned to Russia. The restoration of a good understanding with Prussia seemed, therefore, more desirable and more important than ever. As early as the 11th of November, the Prussian ambassador, Werther, was able to report to that effect from Vienna: "The English ambassador," he wrote, "remarked to Count Rechberg how important it was that there should be harmony between the two German Great Powers, in view of the superiority of France, and urged that Austria should therefore let the Confederate reform lie where it was. Count Rechberg at once replied: 'How gladly would we do it, if Prussia would only make it possible for us!'"

Three days later Rechberg himself expressed to the ambassador his regret that Prussia had not yet commu-

nicated to Vienna her views concerning the congress. When Werther suggested that Austria's attitude in regard to Confederate reform had disturbed the good-feeling of the past, Rechberg cried: "To-day there are more important things than Confederate reform. Prussia, I think, has an equal interest with us in the maintenance of the compacts of 1815."

A more thorough change of circumstances cannot be conceived, than had thus taken place within a few weeks for the two German Powers. Prussia, but a short time before hampered by Austria's Confederate reform, opposed by a mighty coalition, completely isolated in Germany, now found herself treated with consideration by England, courted by France, and sought for by Austria as her only reliable ally. This was the well-merited result of a course of action as determined as it was far-sighted, and a policy above all things clear as to its ends and fearless in the pursuit of them.

While this transformation of European relations was in progress, the news of the extinction of the male line went abroad, and new surprises were at hand for the Cabinet of Vienna.

On the 13th of November the Danish General Council had adopted the new Constitution for Denmark-Schleswig. On the 15th, Frederick VII. died at Glücksburg. On the 16th, Christian IX., the "Protocol-Prince," as the Germans called him, was proclaimed at Copenhagen ruler of the United Danish Kingdom, and he retained in office for the time the "Eider-

Danish" Ministry of Hall. But on the same day the heir-apparent to the title of Augustenburg announced, that, in virtue of the hereditary agnatic right which, after his revered father's renunciation in his favor, had descended to him, he should enter upon his government as Frederick, eighth Duke of Schleswig-Holstein; that he called upon the German Confederation to protect the legitimate Order of Succession; and that in accordance with the fundamental law of 1848, he promised to uphold the Constitution of Schleswig-Holstein and the rights of his people. In spite of the promise paid for in ready money in 1852, in spite of the London Protocol, in spite of the Law of Succession of 1853, Augustenburg came forward with a demand for his hereditary possession of the Duchies.

We know the legal argument, following which the Prince considered himself not bound by the promise given by his father in 1852. He had, indeed, kept silence at the time; but when, some years later, the dispute began between Denmark and the German Confederation, he sent a protest, asserting his rights, to Copenhagen and to Berlin. This had, however, everywhere been simply put away on file among the public documents as in itself of no importance. In it he had said, that, since his father had promised to maintain a passive attitude, it became his own duty to uphold the claim of his House: a statement which was open to the objection, that, so long as the father lived, the son had no legitimate right whatever to act as the head and representative of his House.

For this reason the form now chosen for the proclamation was, that Duke Christian had abdicated in his son's favor and ceded to him the legal right to the title of Augustenburg. This, however, placed the proceeding on an extremely uncertain basis, and the opponents of the new claimant did not fail to urge this against him with effective emphasis. "Frederick himself," they said, "may or may not be bound by his father's promise; but there can be no question but that his father is bound. Now the latter's pledge, made on his princely word and honor, had been given, 'in his own name and in that of his family,' and was to the effect that he would undertake nothing to disturb the succession and the new order of things to be established in Denmark. But what could he have undertaken more calculated to shake that succession to its very foundations than a cession of the claims, which in his hands could not be made use of, to an heir whose hands were free? The cession is, therefore, in formal contradiction to the promise of 1852, and its complete legal worthlessness follows without further argument."

And what was the feeling of the people in the Duchies?

The reports lying before us give the following information on that subject.

Since 1852, years had passed, during which the name of Augustenburg had not been heard in Schleswig-Holstein. The family had received money from Copenhagen; they lived abroad; few knew anything at all about them. In the much-oppressed Schleswig they

had never been beloved; no one placed any hope in them or in their German connections: certainly, if the German nation hesitated to take into itself the Confederate country of Holstein, had Schleswig anything whatever to look for from that direction? The desires of all the patriots in that country were therefore centred upon the heir to the crown designated in the Law of 1853, Prince Christian of Glücksburg. However he may have conducted himself in the stormy times of 1848, he had an honest German heart; as King, he would put an end to the abuse of his German subjects and once more restore the old mutual relations of the Duchies and Denmark so advantageous to either side. Moreover, the strict supervision exercised by the Danish police prevented much news from abroad from penetrating into the country. The thoughts of all were therefore concentrated upon the hope attending the change of sovereigns.

In Holstein, things were different. The "Eider-Danes," as we know, laid but little stress on the assertion of the oneness of that country with Denmark. Furthermore, there was the intervention of the German Confederation, which, in spite of its procrastination and incompetence, gave an ever-increasing impulse to the desire for complete liberation. So far as Duke Christian of Augustenburg was concerned, he had established, since 1856, new connections with some members of the Estates, while he also, by a close friendship with the Duke of Saxe-Coburg, whose restless activity had long found that little principality too

narrow, had secured for himself a new basis for further operations.

When, by the Danish proclamation of March 30th, a rupture between Germany and Denmark was made much more probable, Duke Christian appeared at a great agricultural exhibition in Hamburg, where at the same time a consultation took place between a large number of members of the German and of the Holstein National parties. After that, a silent agitation began to spread through all parts of Holstein: a central committee, confidential agents in all the cities and official positions, a designation of those that sympathized with the cause, a careful watch kept upon every political opponent — these were the beginnings of a popular organization embracing the whole country. Soon these methods were extended in a similar way, even if with a smaller result, to Schleswig. Lawyers, teachers, merchants — in general, the men of the upper citizen-class — were the active representatives of the movement, which developed more and more with every step forward taken by the Confederate Diet.

In the midst of all this the news of King Frederick's death suddenly burst upon the country. The leaders felt that the critical moment had come. They called an assembly at Kiel of men from both Duchies that could be relied on, in order to arrive at the final decision for the good of the country. The Holsteiners hastened thither, unanimous in the feeling that the desired separation from Denmark was to be obtained by acknowledging Augustenburg. The majority of the Schleswig-

ers, on the other hand, were looking with beating hearts for the fulfilment of their hopes at the hands of King Christian IX.

How gladly would this well-disposed Prince have answered these expectations! How clearly lay the errors and the dangers of the "Eider-Danish" policy before his eyes! He was a plain, well-meaning man, who up to that time had lived wholly for his family, had brought up vigorous sons and amiable daughters, and had undertaken the perilous burden of the throne without ambition and without joy. When he received the news of King Frederick's death, he uttered the melancholy words: "Now my days of happiness are over."

The new Sovereign was at once visited by the Prussian ambassador Balan, who earnestly begged him to refuse his sanction to the new Constitution; the Austrian ambassador hastened to follow this example; and the representative of Russia urged the same thing. The King had often before expressed the opinion, that Frederick VII. was going too far on the Danish side; Christian himself had an eager desire to offer justice and conciliation to his German subjects. But for this very reason he stood alone and unsupported in Copenhagen. The passion of the Danes was aroused to the highest point. The newspapers spoke of the German movement in a contemptuous and irritating style, and threatening petitions signed by great numbers of people demanded from the King his immediate sanction of the Constitution. He was therefore obliged to make the fatal decision at the very beginning of his reign.

On the 18th of November he discussed the question with the Prime Minister in the presence of the gray-haired General de Meza, who in the war of 1849 had done his best for Denmark. After some balancing of the considerations on one side with those of the other, Hall said dryly: "Sire, if you do not sign, I cannot undertake to answer for your life and the lives of your family," pointing while he said it to the throng of people which with shouts and tumult was surging back and forth under the windows of the palace. But the old De Meza cried out to the King: "Your Majesty, I will answer for you with my head. Do what is right without anxiety. With your brave Holstein battalions I will scatter all this rabble to the winds." There could be no doubt as to what was right; but it is easily understood how the King wavered in cruel uncertainty. On the one hand he had before him the joyful enthusiasm of his grateful Schleswigers; on the other, the possibility of a rising in the capital, perhaps of a defeat of the troops, or, if they should conquer, the prospect of the curses of the Danish people upon the blood-stained German tyrant.

Christian's mind was not bold enough, his heart not hard enough, to endure this trial. He left the room to seek counsel from his mother-in-law, and when the Princess Charlotte threw her voice on the Danish side, he gave the fatal signature. Hall announced the result to the Prussian ambassador with the incredible comment that of course the international negotiations were not affected by it. The Danish newspapers, how-

ever, were full of rejoicing that from this time on any return to the disgraceful United Kingdom of 1852 would be impossible.

Yes, this was henceforth impossible. In the assembly at Kiel the majority of the Schleswigers, relying upon King Christian, had rejected the candidacy of Augustenburg and the expulsion of all royal officials, which had been proposed by the representatives of Holstein. But then a despatch from Copenhagen announced the royal sanction of the November Constitution; and by that the decision at Kiel, also was determined. With burning indignation the Schleswigers now joined in the cry, "Separation from Denmark!" and consequently in the elevation of Augustenburg.

In a few days these sentiments prevailed over the whole country, from the Elbe to the Königsau. The great majority of the officials, the clergy, the magistrates, and the teachers, refused to take the oath of allegiance to the "Protocol-Prince." The members of the Provincial Parliaments and the nobility met together to sign petitions to the German Confederation, begging for assistance. Everywhere where there were no Danish troops the Danish administration had practically ceased to exist. "Separation from Denmark!" This had become the unanimous cry of Schleswig-Holstein. It did not, indeed, go so far as an armed insurrection: the people were unprepared, and there were 30,000 Danish troops in the country. But all glances, all expectations, were directed toward Germany.

In the great Fatherland, however, popular feeling had come to a decision even sooner, even more speedily, than in the Duchies. In Germany nothing either good or bad was known about Augustenburg, except that he had fought for the national cause in 1848, and that at that time the agnatic succession had been recognized by Germany. The impression made by his sudden appearance on the scene was all the greater, since it came just at the moment when the latest and most arbitrary breach of the compacts by the "Eider-Danes" had brought the bitter feeling between Germany and Denmark to a head, and when at the same time the sudden death of King Frederick had seemed to bring the hand of Nemesis vividly before the eyes of the nations.

"It has been tried," was the cry in all the organs of the German people — "it has been tried and found true that, no matter what may be the form of connection between Denmark and the Duchies, neither compact nor fundamental law can secure to the latter the sure protection of their rights. The sole means of saving German rights and German honor lies in the complete separation of the Duchies from the Danish Kingdom; so that in this matter, as in no other, the demands of princely legitimacy, of popular freedom, and of national dignity are one."

The thought that there might be other means besides the Augustenburg succession, for overthrowing the Danish rule in Holstein, was present to only one man among all the millions in Germany, and that one concealed it for the time deep in his breast. To all the

rest of the world the only choice possible for the Duchies seemed to lie between Augustenburg and the continuance of the Danish yoke — and how could there be any hesitation in such a choice as that?

To the German Princes the London Protocol had always been hateful; for if in this case a conference of the Great Powers succeeded in exerting its authority to the extent of settling the succession in a sovereign dynasty, what German princely House was sure of its throne in the event of any future dispute? The German people, on the other hand, had long been indignant at the hesitation of the Confederate Diet, at the half-heartedness of the Austrian policy, and at the domineering arbitrariness of the Prussian: now was the time, it was felt, to drive ahead the unworthy leaders by the stormy and irresistible tide of the national will.

New developments followed each other day after day. The Baden Government permitted its deputy in the Diet, Herr von Mohl, to receive full powers from Duke Frederick VIII. as well, and as his representative to address to the Confederation on the 16th of November a protest against every violation of his sovereign rights.

On the 17th of November Oldenburg made objections to the succession of Christian IX. in Schleswig-Holstein. On the 18th, the legislative body of the city of Frankfurt proposed to the senate that Duke Frederick should be recognized. On the 19th, such a recognition was announced by Duke Ernest of Coburg. On the 20th, the representative Rechbauer put a question to the

Austrian Government in regard to the liberation of Schleswig-Holstein. On the 23d, the liberal sections of the Prussian Lower House brought forward their proposals for the recognition of Duke Frederick. On the 24th, Minister Beust declared to the Saxon Second Chamber that the Government would move in the Diet that the representative of Denmark should not be received, and that Holstein should be occupied by a Confederate force of greater strength than had been intended, until the legitimate order of succession should have been decided upon by the Confederation. On the 25th, the Second Chamber expressed unanimous approval of these intentions of the Ministry. On the 26th, there followed a like unanimous declaration from the Darmstadt Second Chamber; and on the 27th, the Minister, Dalwigk, announced his approval of these desires. On the same day, in the Württemberg Chamber, Minister von Hügel expressed himself to the same effect, though in a more cautious manner.

Beside all this, a cry went up from a vast chorus of associations, assemblies, city magistracies, and other corporate bodies. The committee of the National Association sent its greeting to Duke Frederick. Resolutions and contributions were everywhere rife. There was much talk of the formation of companies of armed volunteers for the defence of Schleswig-Holstein.

At last, then, the breast of mighty Germany was freed from the weight that had for ten years been stifling her; the national wrath that had been for so long accumulating burst forth in an overflowing tide; what foreign

foe would dare to place himself in the path of this universal enthusiasm? For in this cause, not only all sections, but also all parties, of the Fatherland stood shoulder to shoulder, princes and subjects, Conservatives and Liberals, Democrats and Legitimists. Stormy as the outbreak of the movement was, it was all the less infected with the idea of material revolution, for the simple reason that there was a profound conviction that the moral weight of the question at issue would very quickly sweep along with it any doubt or contradiction that might arise within Germany itself. The small groups of the extreme Left, declared Republicans or Social Democrats, stood aloof in vexation, and ridiculed the noise about freedom with which the German people were trying to add a thirty-first to the thirty absolute petty princes they had already.

Considering the difficult state of things at that time, nothing more disagreeable could easily have happened to Count Rechberg than this general movement among the German Princes and people in favor of Augustenburg, this eager desire to destroy the integrity of Denmark, this contemptuous disregard of old Austrian traditions concerning the German-Danish difficulty. How long was it since Francis Joseph had journeyed to Frankfort and been delighted at the jubilant homage of the German Princes? And now those same Princes hurled in his face the demand that he should abandon all the well-weighed principles of the Vienna policy, and that, if he would earn the German Imperial Crown, he must embark in an adventurous crusade to the far borders of the Baltic Sea.

And what would happen if he refused, and Prussia then put herself at the head of the movement,— Prussia, who rejoiced in the intimate friendship of Russia and the flattering friendliness of France, whose Minister was better known to Count Rechberg than to any one else through their old encounters in the Diet, whose King had for years been disgusted with Danish insolence and German long-suffering? In that case, where would be the end of misfortune for Austria? It was only too clear, that in the crisis that had so suddenly developed, everything depended upon Prussia's attitude; and Rechberg repeatedly sent requests to Berlin, that, in accordance with the Confederate relations of the two Powers, information might be forwarded to him and some agreement arrived at for adopting modes of action that might be as similar as possible.

Bismarck, as we have seen, had never been in any hurry to enter into a Danish war, and had even on the 16th of November in no way objected to the accession of Christian IX., but had practically recognized the new King by his admonition that the royal sanction should be refused to the Constitution of the 18th. But when just the contrary took place and the Constitution was signed, a new outlook was opened. Denmark had nailed her flag to the mast, and flagrantly in violation of law and justice: it was now possible to aim at the complete liberation of the Duchies, and the King and his Minister were entirely agreed on this subject.

The Cabinet of Berlin, however, thought that this

end was to be attained by very different means from those advocated by the petty Governments and the popular agitation. The King approved Bismarck's view that above all everything depended upon Prussia's relations to the Great Powers, and in this connection again upon the co-operation of Austria. "We found out in 1849," said Bismarck, "that it is a bad thing to be one against four; two against three is a more satisfactory relation." But in this direction the first condition was that the London Compact regarding the succession should not be meddled with. For Austria and all the Foreign Powers agreed in declaring this to be absolutely binding.

Now fortunately Christian IX., by sanctioning the November Constitution, had furnished the German Courts with a *casus belli* independent of the question of succession, to the sufficiency of which no objection could possibly be made. This, therefore, was the point to be insisted on. By means of this, and of this alone, could it be hoped that Austria might be drawn into the path of the Prussian policy. In Vienna the desire was to uphold the succession of Christian IX. and the integrity of Denmark: very well, Prussia was making no demand incompatible with these, when she sought to obtain the repeal of the November Constitution, if necessary, by force of arms. On this ground, and on this ground only, was there any prospect of remaining in league with the Austrian Government, while bringing on step by step an open war with Denmark. This was what was for the present necessary, what was abso-

lutely indispensable. The war once begun, all former compacts with Denmark would fall to the ground of themselves. The effort might then be made also to make plausible to the Cabinet of Vienna the complete separation of Schleswig-Holstein from Denmark. At any rate this method of proceeding would afford the foreign Powers no ground for interference.

There was another consideration. If this course were taken, and only if this course were taken, could Prussia avoid pledging herself in advance to support the claims of some pretendant; and we know how little enthusiasm Bismarck had for the creation of a new sovereign Grand Duke and Confederate Prince under the protection of the principles of confederation as they had hitherto obtained. Above all, moreover, as the statesman who in 1852 had negotiated the settlement with Duke Christian and who consequently now felt himself to be personally deceived and almost compromised before Europe by the action just taken by that family, the Prussian Minister would hear nothing whatever of the title of the Augustenburgs. In his view, the results of the war alone should decide the territorial arrangements; but in no case was the creation of a new Grand Duchy to be allowed without a previous reform of the Confederate Constitution.

In one word, then, in spite of the commotion in public opinion in Germany, Prussia decided to make, not the question of succession, but the constitutional one, the point of departure for proceedings against Denmark. Accordingly, the Hereditary Prince of

Augustenburg, who appeared at Berlin on the 18th, received from Bismarck the curt answer that he could give him no advice, since Prussia was bound by the London Protocol.

It was soon afterwards seen how correctly the Court of Vienna had been judged at Berlin. The Austrian Government was so far from feeling any doubt as to Christian's right, that, on the contrary, it expressed the opinion that it was only fair to leave the new King an opportunity for the examination of his position, and on that account to defer for the time the carrying out of the chastisement. Word was even sent to Berlin that Austria would be very grateful, if Prussia would set on foot alone the entire reserve for the chastisement, since the sending of so small a body of troops such a great distance could not but be attended with various military inconveniences. It was added, moreover, that the Augustenburg agitation must be energetically met, and the Confederate Diet compelled soon to recognize King Christian. The gist of the matter was: Austria would rather do nothing; something should be undertaken some time later; but if military measures were unavoidable, she would prefer to leave them to Prussia.

Bismarck replied to this by asking whether all the compacts of 1852 did not form an indivisible whole, any infringement of which by Denmark would leave the German Powers in every respect free to act. He declared, however, that Prussia would for the present make no use of this freedom, but would hold fast to the

London Protocol; and that on account of this very fact she felt herself all the more driven to demand from Denmark the fulfilment of her constitutional promises, and must, therefore, above all things desire despatch in the carrying out of the chastisement that had been so long ago determined upon.

The Austrian Minister was destined soon to receive enlightenment concerning the tenableness of his position.

In Frankfort, among the diplomats of the Confederate Diet, opinions and propositions were bandied about, and it became clearer every day that the feeling of the great majority was strongly in favor of Augustenburg. The admission of the representative of Denmark was hotly opposed, because the Confederation had not yet come to a decision concerning the legality of the succession of Christian IX. to the throne of the Duchies.

In accordance with instructions received beforehand, the representatives of the two Great Powers, Kübeck and Sydow, brought up for discussion the prosecution of the chastisement in Holstein and the entering of a protest, on the part of the Confederation, against the new Danish Constitution. But the Bavarian representative, Baron von der Pfordten, supported by many voices, declared that it was neither the proper time for chastisement nor for protest; for by the chastisement King Christian would be recognized as rightful Duke of Holstein, and by the protest as rightful Duke of Schleswig. "But since the succession is in dispute,"

said Pfordten, "the Confederation ought to proceed not to the chastisement, but to the military occupation of Holstein, to ascertain who is the rightful duke and to recognize him, and finally to obtain for him, as a member of the Confederation, the possession of Schleswig, and that too, if it should be necessary, by force of arms. The Confederate Diet need pay no attention to the London Protocol, of which it has never had a sight."

Considering the state of feeling in the whole of the "Third Germany," there was no doubt that Austria alone would be unable to hinder Confederate decrees of this extravagant tendency, as it was termed in Vienna. Vigorous co-operation on the part of Prussia would be indispensable to that end. The news was therefore received in Vienna with keen satisfaction, that Prussia still stood by the London Protocol, and hence coincided with Austria on the essential principle. Although the former desired more speedy action in the constitutional question than did the Court of Vienna, yet if the two Courts held closely together, precisely this would put Austria in a position to exert a restraining and moderating influence, as circumstances might dictate.

It was therefore decided, in order to secure Prussia's support in the question of succession, to proceed with her at once to the chastisement, even on the very ground of Pfordten's declaration, that the chastisement would presuppose the legal right of the prince against whose administration it was directed, that is, in this case, Christian IX. Lord John Russell himself, whose

agents were all the time preaching peace and mediation at all the Courts, had himself recognized the justice of this argument, and for the same reason urged that the chastisement should be carried out as soon as possible.¹

King William was no less anxious for this, though his anxiety was based rather on the simple calculation of sound common sense which told him that it would be much more advantageous in the further development of the matter to have German troops on the Eider than to have them stationed only on the Elbe. So on the 24th of November, the agreement was arrived at between Bismarck and the Austrian ambassador, Count Karolyi, that efforts should be made by both Powers in common in the Confederate Diet, to effect the execution of the chastisement as quickly as the Confederate laws would possibly permit. That Austria, in accordance with the previous Confederate decrees, should take part in the chastisement, went without saying.

Austria was thus gained over to the first step of a vigorous policy, and Bismarck had reason to hope that the natural consequences of this step would lead her onward in the new direction. The world was astounded to see Austria, after having stood for years at the head of the German Lesser States in bitter opposition to Prussia, now come forward and unite with Prussia in an action contrary to the wishes of the great majority of the "Third Germany."

And yet this was natural enough. In view of her

¹ Bernstorff, November 22d.

isolated and threatened position in Europe, Austria was anxious at any cost to avoid being left alone in Germany also. The Danish dispute was then the chief factor in the situation, and in that dispute she chose the party that for the time held most nearly to the standpoint favored at Vienna. Austria desired the integrity of the Danish Monarchy under King Christian; any understanding to this effect with the "Third Germany," enthusiastic as that was for the Augustenburgs, was out of the question; the Government of Vienna therefore preferred to join with Prussia, who certainly left all courses open for the future, but for the time declared that she would remain firm upon the basis of the London Protocol.

The news received by Bismarck at this time concerning the attitude of the other Great Powers was not less encouraging. England still continued to be the most doubtful, for the simple reason that no definite decisions were reached in her own councils. Queen Victoria, whose eldest daughter was Crown Princess of Prussia, and whose eldest son had married the daughter of Christian IX., sympathized with both sides. She complained of the obstinacy of Denmark, and at the same time considered Prussia bound by the London Compact. Her heart's desire was that peace might be maintained.

In this feeling she found the most zealous supporter possible in Lord John Russell, to whom any condition of peace, German or Danish, was entirely indifferent, provided it meant an escape from war, and who in this

spirit was constantly sending off despatches, appeals, and admonitions in every direction. Lord Palmerston kept for the time in the background; but his hostility to Germany was unchanged, and the Press at his instigation often directed most violent attacks against her, especially against Prussia.

All the more did Bismarck take pains to maintain a prudent caution in his relations with the English ambassador. Shortly before the death of Frederick VII., Lord John had lost his ardor in offering English mediation. Now, however, he made inquiries both at Berlin and Frankfort as to whether such a proposal would have any prospect of being accepted. In a conversation with the English ambassador, Sir Andrew Buchanan, Bismarck expressed regret that Lord John had not been able to come to that point a fortnight before. "At that time," he said, "the Confederation was ready for it. It is very doubtful whether it would be so to-day, owing to Denmark's breach of her promises. Prussia's position in regard to the London Protocol of 1852 has also been affected by this. Not without reason are we reminded that Denmark has not fulfilled her engagements made at that time, and that we therefore are no longer bound by the Protocol. We are, indeed, far removed from proclaiming this as our own view; but we have no longer any means of influencing others to look at it as we do. So far as we ourselves are concerned, we are, nevertheless, very ready to give our voice in the Confederation for the acceptance of English mediation."

Sir Andrew sought in vain to make it clear that Denmark's breach of the compacts in her dealings with Schleswig did not justify Prussia in declaring herself free from the compacts affecting the integrity of Denmark and the succession, and that by these latter Prussia was obligated not only to Denmark, but also to the Great Powers. The refutation of these arguments was easy to deduce from a more careful consideration of what had happened in 1852. "Besides, what is the object of such a discussion?" asked Bismarck. "You admit that the new Danish Constitution contains a breach of the compacts which we are bound to resent. On our side, we have not declared ourselves free from the London Protocol, and are ready to give our voice for the acceptance of your mediation. Therefore why are we not already at one?"

But two days later English mediation had again disappeared from the horizon, and in its place came a proposal that the question in dispute be laid not before England alone, but before all the signers of the London Protocol. If this were not accepted, England might perhaps feel herself driven to support Denmark more actively. One week previously England had offered to mediate alone, expressly for the reason that the co-operation of other Powers might result in a revival of the French plan of a congress. It is easily understood that such a medley of concessions, threats, and vacillations as Lord John thus indulged in was not calculated to inspire a statesman of Bismarck's capacity with fear nor with respect. However troublesome

such a policy occasionally might be, it could hardly be a source of serious danger to a well-considered course of action judiciously pursued.

Important in a different way were the reports received at this time from Count Goltz in Paris. Goltz, a man of brilliant and vivacious temperament, occasionally self-willed, and always dependent upon external impressions, had greeted with great joy the growing estrangement between France on the one hand, and Austria and England on the other, and met with eagerness the friendly advances of the French statesmen. "I wish," said Napoleon to him on the 23d of November, — "I wish to come to an understanding with you at the congress concerning very important matters. I have nothing to ask of you; but you will not conceal from yourselves that you cannot remain in your present position. Prussia is surrounded by small states which embarrass her action and do not increase her strength. At the congress we could consider this and many other things in common."

To the Minister, Drouyn de Lhuys, Goltz then recommended the cause of Schleswig-Holstein as affording an opportunity for France to manifest at once her sympathy for the principle of nationality and her respect for ancient rights. The Minister conceded this, but said that France was bound by the London Protocol: at the congress the matter could be discussed further. He thought there could be no objection to the Confederation's occupying Holstein, in order to insure their rights to all parties concerned.

When Goltz threw out the suggestion that Schleswig might be divided according to the nationality of its population, so that South Schleswig should fall to Holstein, Drouyn de Lhuys answered: "If such a separation were to be effected, especially in view of the possibility of a Scandinavian union, it would be better even for the sake of strengthening the German naval power, if nothing more, to make Schleswig-Holstein a Prussian province and not an independent Duchy. I should therefore advise Prussia not to represent the claims of Augustenburg as indisputable."

While making these declarations, Drouyn de Lhuys hinted at compensation; and when Goltz at once observed that Prussia had no provinces to give away, the Minister answered that he was not thinking of cessions of territory: the compensations might consist in a money payment to Denmark, in the bestowal of a high position in Prussia on Augustenburg, and in good offices to be rendered to friendly Powers in other matters.

It was easy to divine in what other matter France desired Prussia's good offices, and for which she was willing to pay by permitting the acquisition of Schleswig-Holstein. Goltz shared the French aversion to Austria, but had no other thought concerning Schleswig-Holstein than to bring about, in spite of Austria, the independence of those countries under Augustenburg, in accordance with the popular wish in Germany. To this effect on the following day he spoke once more with Napoleon at Compiègne. They had a confidential talk over their cigarettes after dinner.

The Emperor said at first that he did not wish to take either side; the question was clearly suitable for discussion by the congress. "But," he added, with a sudden turn, "after what the Great Powers have said, the plan of a congress does not seem to promise any great results. The only thing left for me to do is to consider the formation of a system of alliances for France, and I am anxious to enter into such an alliance with Prussia." Goltz, highly delighted, answered that the agreement between the two Governments in almost every question (except the Polish) would of itself bring about this result. For it was a matter of time and of temperament: the one went quickly to the object to be attained, the other more carefully. He was pleased to find that Napoleon shared his view, that France could ally herself with England, Russia, or Prussia, but not with Austria.

The import of this news extended, as will be seen, far beyond the Holstein question. Doubtless it was more agreeable for Prussia to have friendly than strained relations with France. But as a whole, the French declarations rather repelled the King than attracted him. "How does Goltz," he said, "come to speak of a French alliance without my authorization?" In fact, such an alliance, openly framed against Austria, would have accorded but ill with the efforts then being made to induce Austria to take part in a Confederate war against Denmark.

Beside this, in spite of all the political complications that had occurred up to this time, the King had a warm

feeling for his imperial nephew in Austria. He did not, indeed, feel at liberty to sacrifice to such a feeling any interest of the Prussian State, but it was a pleasure to him when duty and inclination were at one in this direction. On the other hand, the state of things was just the contrary with regard to Napoleon. With him the King was willing to act in harmony if the good of the State required it; but it would be a sacrifice always rendered more difficult by an incurable mistrust.

The hint of Drouyn de Lhuys at a Prussian annexation of Schleswig-Holstein had no effect on the King whatever. For years his soul had been filled with a desire for the protection of German honor and for the liberation of those German countries. But a selfish thought had never entered his mind on the subject; and if, as he eagerly desired, the London Protocol were to be put aside, he was ready to come to an understanding with Augustenburg.

But all these were anxieties for the future. For the present it was clear that, in spite of England's wavering dissatisfaction, Prussia, now acting in harmony with Austria, could, without fear of France or of Russia, begin active operations against Denmark.

On the 26th of November King William assembled his Ministers in the royal palace for a council. In a lengthy speech he called attention to the excitement in Germany, which, though patriotic, appeared to be mixed here and there with revolutionary elements, and therefore required to have a salutary direction given to it by energetic measures. "For the present," he said,

“Prussia continues bound by the London Protocol. It is true that the Hereditary Prince of Augustenburg did not take part in the renunciation made by his father; but Prussia and Austria recognized in London the succession of Christian IX., though with a reservation of the rights of the Duchies. In spite of the infringement of these rights by Denmark, things have not yet gone so far that Prussia can declare herself free from the London Compact.

“This being the case, the rights of the Duchies must for the time be protected against the new King, as against his predecessor, by a Confederate chastisement. Many of the smaller states have objected to this, on the ground that it would involve a recognition of King Christian. Be that as it may, it is essential, in any event, that Holstein should come, as soon as possible, into the hands of German troops.

“Prussia has been called upon to set on foot a reserve for this purpose. But considering the imminent possibility of more serious complications, it is indispensable that preparations should be carried further than this. I shall, therefore, order the mobilization of the 6th (Brandenburg) and the 13th (Westphalian) divisions, and, as a further support, the corps of the Guards. One week after the passage of the Confederate decree, the troops must be ready to march. A statement concerning the expense must be brought before the Parliament; and the Parliament cannot refuse to approve it, since the Confederation will order a general contribution for the chastisement.”

The King then asked his Ministers to give their opinions. The result was an agreement practically unanimous. When Roon asked whether Austria's co-operation was insured, Bismarck stated that the Vienna Cabinet apparently held more firmly than ever to the London treaty, but from that very standpoint now pressed urgently for the chastisement. "Although England," he continued, "is hardly likely to oppose this, it may, nevertheless, easily result in a war with Denmark, who is no longer in any position to accede to the demands of Austria and Prussia; and a still further consequence may be a European war. It is therefore important to hasten the preparations as much as possible."

On the same ground Bismarck objected to a proposal of the Minister of Finance, that the statement to the Parliament should be postponed until after the general contribution had been decreed by the Diet. In the end the King and council approved the draft of the document by means of which Bismarck proposed to lay the financial statement before the Parliament.

The three bodies of troops designated by the King amounted, in round numbers, to a force of 60,000 men, that is, just as many as Roon had indicated in the spring as necessary for a Danish war. No member of the council had any longer any doubt that such a war would break out. Denmark had already repeatedly referred to the chastisement as a *casus belli*; and, moreover, no one who understood the state of things at Copenhagen regarded the repeal of the new Constitu-

tion as possible. More than ever was felt the truth of Bismarck's words of December 22d, 1862: "The Danish question can be settled in a way satisfactory to us only by war. An occasion for such a war can be found at any moment when our position with regard to the Great Powers is favorable for carrying it on." Thanks to his judicious policy, this favorable moment had finally come, and the King, as well as his Ministers, was determined to take advantage of it at any risk. At any risk: for truly the path was even now not free from danger, however fair the prospect had opened in these latter days of November.

CHAPTER III.

THE CHASTISEMENT IN HOLSTEIN.

IF Austria had entered into co-operation with Prussia with the silent resolution to exert a moderating influence, the natural result of this was that the active, pushing, and therefore the leading *rôle* in the alliance, fell to Prussia from the very first. Austria had already acceded to Prussia's wish for the hastening of the Confederate chastisement. A few days later she also gave up her opposition to Bismarck's important theory, that Germany's obligation to the London Protocol depended upon Denmark's fidelity to the compacts in constitutional questions, and must stand or fall with this.

In this connection also the pressure exerted by the Lesser States had not been without effect. They kept laboring zealously for their object, which was, that on account of the insufficiency of King Christian's claims to inherit in Holstein, his representative should not be admitted to the Diet. And Bismarck accordingly pointed out to Count Rechberg how little prospect there would be of preventing an irritating decree to this effect, unless some spirit of concession were shown and the recognition of Christian accompanied at least with the condition that Denmark should first fulfil in constitutional questions her obligations according to

the compacts. Rechberg could not but admit the justice of this observation, since as a matter of fact the great majority of the Confederate assembly daily declared themselves more unequivocally on the side of the Augustenburg party. The Count, therefore, gave his assent to the Prussian proposal.

Moreover, though the Holstein chastisement was to be hastened, Bismarck declared himself willing, in the Schleswig constitutional question, to regard the past sins of Denmark simply as a non-fulfilment of her former promises, and to assume that the positive breach of those promises would be consummated only by the introduction of the new Constitution on the 1st of January, 1864. But against this he was determined to take emphatic action. Here, again, Rechberg could only answer by praising the moderate and conciliatory character of such a method of proceeding, by joyfully accepting the postponement until the 1st of January, and consequently by also indirectly pledging himself to vigorous action after that date.

The true significance of Bismarck's proposal was understood at that time neither in Vienna nor elsewhere. Any one who, like Austria, earnestly desired a peaceful solution, would have had urgent reasons to take just that interval before the first of January for sending an ultimatum as speedily and energetically as possible, demanding the withdrawal of the new Constitution. For before that date, at the latest, there would be a General Council on the old basis, which could legally vote the withdrawal. From the 1st of January

on, the withdrawal could be accomplished legally only by the General Council under the new Constitution; and the assembling of such a Council, quite as much as the continuance in force of the new Constitution, was designated by the German Powers as a *casus belli*. Only a *coup d'état* could then preserve peace, and how could poor Christian accomplish a *coup d'état*?

The two German Courts therefore agreed to hold fast for the time to the London Protocol, and consequently to consent to the conditional admission of the Danish representative to the Confederate Diet, while at the same time they were determined to execute as speedily as possible the Confederate chastisement against Christian IX. as Duke of Holstein. The Emperor Francis Joseph expressed to the Prussian ambassador at once his contentment with the understanding that had been effected and his dissatisfaction at the improper proceedings and insubordinate attitude of the German Petty States, who were usually so correct in their behavior. An agent of Augustenburg arriving in Vienna at that time at once received a clear intimation that his mission would be unsuccessful.

In the session of the Confederate Diet that took place on the 28th of November, at which the admission of the Danish representative came under consideration, the two Great Powers gave their voices as mentioned above. Their position, they said, was determined by the London Protocol and by its preliminary conditions as accepted by Denmark. On their part they were ready to stand by the compact, if Denmark fulfilled these

preliminary conditions. The representative of Christian IX., they added, should in any case be admitted for Lauenburg; for Holstein, however, only in case the King carried out the promises of 1852.

In opposition to this, Saxony proposed that the representative should not be admitted, and that Holstein should be occupied by a strengthened Confederate army until the Confederation should recognize the rightful heir. Whereupon Darmstadt suggested as a compromise that the measures taken for the execution of the chastisement should now be carried out for the protection of the rights and interests of all concerned. After a very animated debate, the result was a vote, passed by twelve against four, that the Holstein-Lauenburg votes should be disregarded for the present; that is to say, there was still no positive declaration against King Christian, but at the same time the Austro-Prussian point of view was definitely rejected. In spite of the union of the two Great Powers, Hesse-Cassel alone (beside Luxemburg, who always favored Denmark) had sided with them.

In complete accord with this attitude of the Confederate majority, the tide of the popular agitation throughout all Germany was rising higher and higher. A Swabian popular assembly presented to its Government an address, that spoke of the London Protocol, to which the Great Powers adhered, as infamous. An assembly, convened in Munich by the party favoring an entire Germany, declared that the Great Powers held to the London Protocol, but that public opinion was more

powerful than the Great Powers. King Max of Bavaria had gone to Italy at the orders of his physicians for the restoration of his health, which was seriously affected. The City Council of Munich now sent him a peremptory summons to return, saying that his presence was needful to the Fatherland; and the King hastened to comply with the request.

The Minister Beust told the Prussian ambassador that he had no warmer desire than to go hand in hand with the Great Powers, but that if he changed his attitude in the matter of the Duchies, his position in Saxony would become untenable. Similar reports were received at Berlin from the ambassadors in Carlsruhe and Stuttgart.

In Frankfort, Pfordten earnestly besought the representatives of Prussia and Austria, if the Powers, as a matter of fact, did not intend the complete separation of the Duchies from Denmark, to say so openly, in order that the Confederation might then decide that for the time nothing was to be done. "For," he said, "if under such circumstances any military measures are entered upon against Denmark, the end can only be such a wretched failure as occurred in 1850: Denmark will grant the desired concessions, so forcing us once more to deliver up Holstein; and then, after a short interval, she will recommence the faithless game of maltreatment." The Baden Minister, Roggenbach, talked in the same strain: "A Confederate chastisement in Holstein directed against King Christian, who has no right to the possession of Holstein, is impossible.

Germany's duty toward the Duchies is to occupy them for the rightful heir."

To all this tumult and disturbance, Bismarck, who felt sure, in any event, of Prussia's freedom in military action, had little objection to make. Some details of it might be inconvenient; but as a whole it served his purpose by keeping Austria firmly at his side, by placing his own moderation in a favorable light before the Foreign Powers, and by calling the attention of Europe to the fact that the violent excitement of forty-five millions of people was always to be taken into account.

An intimation of this nature was of weight not only with Napoleon, but also in England, where the appearance of Augustenburg on the scene had called forth great indignation among all parties. While Lord John Russell continued to speak rather mildly and yet very seriously and warningly, Sir Andrew Buchanan in Berlin and Sir Arthur Paget in Copenhagen rivalled each other in the use of threatening words, declaring that England would not suffer any German interference with the internal affairs of Denmark, and still less any deviation from the London compact. Naturally, this increased the obstinacy and the martial ardor of the Danes. And to this also Bismarck had no objection whatever to make. At the same time, it seemed doubly necessary to leave to English zeal no point unguarded, and no pretext by means of which the hostile disposition of Lord Palmerston might succeed in drawing that really peace-loving nation into a war-policy.

While things were in this condition, Bismarck on the 1st of December presented to the Prussian Lower House the declaration which had been approved by the Ministerial Council concerning the Prussian policy in the matter of the Duchies. "Prussia's position," so the document began, "is regulated by the London Protocol: our fidelity to treaties must be open to no impeachment. But the same standard also applies to Denmark, whose promises made at that time form with the London compact an indivisible whole, and must stand and fall with that compact. Nor, did we abandon this basis, should we have any right that Europe would recognize to concern ourselves with Schleswig.

"The Government must reserve to itself the decision of the question, whether and when the non-fulfilment of the Danish obligations will place us in a position to declare the London compact void. That decision can neither be left to the Confederate Diet nor be made the subject of explanations here. So long as we do not regard the London compact as void, we see in King Christian the heir, both of the rights and of the wrongs of his predecessor, and we have, therefore, in common with Austria, brought forward the necessary proposals for immediate chastisement. Under all circumstances Prussia will with prudent determination stand firm for the rights of Germans in the Duchies and for her own dignity in the ranks of the Great Powers." The speech closed with the announcement of the military preparations and of the financial statement to be laid before the Parliament in connection with them.

The delivery of this speech was immediately followed in the House by a stormy and tumultuous debate, which lasted for two days, and in which all the various watch-words of the foregoing popular agitation were most emphatically re-echoed: the legitimate hereditary right of Augustenburg, the non-recognition of the London Protocol by the German Confederation, and that the measures taken by Denmark in contradiction to the compacts had caused the London Protocol to become void also for Prussia and Austria.

Besides this, there was the general feeling of bitterness entertained by the majority against the Ministry on account of the still-continued constitutional difficulty. There was also a lack of information about the state of things in Copenhagen, which caused a fear lest the Government there should yield on the constitutional question, and the integrity of Denmark be once more recognized by the Great Powers. Finally, and above all, there was the deepest mistrust of Bismarck's sincerity of purpose in the matter of Schleswig-Holstein, since he had at one time strongly condemned those countries. Fifteen years before this, the Prussian Government had been as ready as now with bold and patriotic language; yet in 1850 the Prussian troops had helped to reduce Holstein once more under the sway of its royal tyrant, and Herr von Bismarck-Schönhausen had openly approved this course. Who could answer for it, that the same man would not now behave in the same way?

Unfortunately, Herr von Bismarck could not as yet

tell the august House what he intended to do; and therefore, on the 2d of December, 1863, a majority of two hundred and thirty-one against sixty-three voted as follows: "The honor and the interests of Germany require that the German States as a whole should recognize the Hereditary Prince Frederick as Duke of Schleswig-Holstein, and should render him effective assistance in the assertion of his rights."

It is unnecessary to observe that the vote of the House had not the slightest effect upon the further action of the Government. On the contrary, such perverse proceedings on the part of Augustenburg's supporters were rather calculated to weaken what feeling the King did have in his heart for the Prince.

Everything now depended upon obtaining the Confederate decree for the immediate commencement of the chastisement; and Bismarck drew up, in accordance with Rechberg's wishes, the joint note, by which the two Courts expected to gain an affirmative vote of the individual Governments and then to be able to point out to them the serious responsibility of conjuring up European complications.

As the committees of the Diet, acting according to the purport of the Darmstadt proposition, were anxious to substitute for the chastisement an occupation of the country for the protection of the rights of all parties, Bismarck, with the consent of Karolyi, at once sent to Frankfort the counter-proposition of the Great Powers. This was very simple, being merely the speedy carrying out of the chastisement. Only at the urgent request

of Herr von Kübeck was the clause added, that a vote to this effect should not prejudice the validity of any decrees concerning the question of succession that might afterwards be passed by the Confederation within the proper limits of its authority. Bismarck did not consider it expedient for the time to announce in Frankfort that the Confederate assembly had in Prussia's estimation no authority at all to give a decision about the question of succession.

Rechberg concurred in all this. Indeed, the irritation at Vienna over the wilfulness of the Lesser States had, since the last Confederate decrees, increased to such an extent, that Rechberg communicated to Berlin his opinion that, if the Confederation rejected the chastisement, the Great Powers should go on with it alone, and should use every means to hinder any other action on the part of the Confederation. To the German ambassadors in Vienna he said with the greatest emphasis: "It must never be expected that Austria will allow herself to be put down by a majority of smaller states," — weighty words, none of which Bismarck failed to note, and to which he listened with amusement, as he remembered the old battles at Frankfort against the attempts of a majority to put down Prussia.

All this, taken in connection with the identical notes sent on the 4th of December, did not fail to have an effect on a number of states of the second and third rank, so that on the 7th, the proposal of the Great Powers obtained a majority, although of only eight votes against seven. The chastisement was, then, to

take place, directed against the King-Duke Christian IX. of Holstein, for the purpose of compelling him to carry out the Confederate decrees of 1860 and 1863, and to give the Duchies a satisfactory position in the Danish State: this was certainly a sharp contrast to the popular cry, "Separation from Denmark!"

The decree was, however, passed, and the preparations for its execution were fully under way. Already a military commission, sitting at Frankfort, had recommended a great strengthening of the army of chastisement: 6,000 Saxons and the same number of Hanoverians should at once occupy Holstein, and 5,000 Prussians and as many Austrians should be placed as a reserve on the frontiers; while, to provide for the meeting of armed resistance, a second reserve of 21,000 Austrians and 30,000 Prussians should be kept in readiness. The four Governments at once approved this, and Austria immediately announced her willingness to place her troops under the supreme command of Prussia. This was in part occasioned by the hope that so magnanimous an example would induce Saxony and Hanover to take the same course, and that thus in case of war the Augustenburg party might be deprived of the command. In fact, the two Lesser States (Hanover with rather a wry face) did signify their willingness to do as desired, if common action should prove to be necessary. For the time, however, as there was no question of war, but only of chastisement, the Saxon general, Von Hake, received the command of the troops appointed for that purpose.

Thus, one of the first essential objects of the Prussian policy had been attained, and that in the very headquarters of the opposite party, the Confederate Diet. Contemporary events abroad also confirmed the justness of the position hitherto adopted, and were favorable to the pursuit of the course determined by that position.

The English Cabinet had at length come to a decision about Napoleon's great congress, and had on the 25th of November announced to the Emperor its refusal in a very detailed and very categorical explanation, an example which was followed immediately afterwards by the Court of Vienna. At this Napoleon felt himself most grievously insulted. He raged against Lord John, whom he declared to be his personal enemy, prophesied for Austria troubles of every sort through war and through revolution, and renewed to the Prussian ambassadors his proffers of most intimate friendship.

When, at this time, the Hereditary Prince of Augustenburg took the step, in his situation doubly unwise, of asking the Emperor in a humble letter for the support of France, Napoleon answered in vague phrases, saying that he was bound by the London Protocol and therefore prevented from favoring Augustenburg in any way, while at the same time he recognized the national efforts of the German people as justifiable.

He also, with the object of revenging himself upon England, sent to the great continental Courts an invitation to let their prime ministers meet, for the sake of arriving at some understanding about all questions then

pending. It was clear that there was no immediate prospect of common action on the part of France and England, that Napoleon had for the time no intention of interfering in any way with Prussia, and that his hostile attitude toward Austria only made it the more desirable for that Power to cultivate good relations with Prussia and consequently to continue her support of the Prussian policy against Denmark.

In Berlin the importance of this situation of things was well understood. There was certainly no inclination to listen to Napoleon's insinuations in the direction of intimate friendship; but there was quite as little wish to disturb at once by a cool rebuff the Emperor's favorable disposition. The King, therefore, approved an answer to the proposal for a conference of ministers, to the effect that Prussia had no objection to make; the other Powers would not, of course, permit such a conference to discuss the Polish, Roumanian, or Venetian questions; the Danish question, therefore, was the only one left, and for the settlement of this the participation of England would be indispensable; and that with this condition, Prussia would be glad to enter into the conference.

In Paris it was felt that a conference on this basis would lose very much of the great and peculiar character originally intended; but once again the friendly spirit of Prussia was recognized, "who," said Drouyn de Lhuys, "is always anxious to remove difficulties from the way, while the others have no greater pleasure than to invent them." But from these others also,

England, Russia, and Austria, Prussia received warm thanks for having, by her transformation of it, made the new Napoleonic idea harmless; and these Courts unanimously approved her proposition of bringing the Danish question before a conference of the Great Powers.

About this same time Prussia also received from another quarter proof of how well she had succeeded, even in the eyes of the non-German Powers, in showing Denmark to be in the wrong. Gortschakoff was, as ever, anxious to avoid a dismemberment of Denmark, that, as he said, the Baltic might not become a German nor a Swedish sea; but since he plainly saw what just cause for war Denmark had given the German Courts, he proposed that all the Great Powers should join in exerting pressure upon the Danish Government. It was now the time for all the Courts to send the customary envoys-extraordinary to Copenhagen for the purpose of congratulating the new King on his accession. Gortschakoff thought that by means of these envoys it should be made clear to the Danish Government that the German Powers had signed the London Protocol only with the understanding that the well-known promises concerning the Constitution were to be kept; and that by infringing these and incorporating Schleswig, Denmark would make it impossible for her friends to support her in a war waged on this ground.

Napoleon received this proposition very coolly; but it was taken up with all the more ardor by Austria and England. It was only suggested by Lord John, who

for variety's sake had just now expressed himself once more in a way very friendly to Germany, that, in view of the great tension of relations unfortunately existing between Germany and Denmark, it would be better in the first place for the three neutral Powers alone to unite in the step proposed by Gortschakoff: He therefore recommended that the envoys of these Powers should first go to Berlin and consult with Bismarck before betaking themselves to Copenhagen. In this Gortschakoff readily concurred. Denmark's withdrawal in the mean time (on the 4th of December) of the March proclamation, when taken in connection with the illegal promulgation of the November Constitution, was not regarded by any of the Cabinets as a serious concession.

Under these circumstances it was not difficult for Bismarck to come to an understanding with the Russian envoy-extraordinary, Baron Ewers, who arrived in Berlin in the first part of December. Ewers was to point out to the Danes the serious dangers attending their behavior which was so contrary to the compacts. Should they remain obstinate, he was to announce that the Powers disclaimed all responsibility for the consequences. Should they, on the other hand, appear acquiescent, the Powers might also be able to influence the German Confederation.

Somewhat more animated was the interview which took place a few days after, on the 12th of December, between the English envoy, Lord Wodehouse, and Bismarck, before which the latter, at Rechberg's request,

had put himself in confidential communication with Count Karolyi. Wodehouse complained that Austria and Prussia had made the fulfilment of the London compact dependent on Denmark's attitude toward the constitutional question. Bismarck said: "No one can be surprised, if we take arms to enforce the fulfilment of the Danish promises of 1852. With the outbreak of war the London Protocol will become void. That we have not done all this before, proves our peaceful disposition."

Wodehouse then expressed regret at the Confederate chastisement, which might lead, he said, to measures of revolt on the part of the Prince of Augustenburg and his followers. He expressed the hope that a preliminary proclamation of the Confederation would effectually repress such plans. Bismarck had nothing to say against the issuing of such a proclamation, but he would not undertake to answer for the effectiveness of it. "If the Prince," he said, "should come to Holstein and raise the banner of revolt, it would be necessary, in order to quell the movement, to arrest him; and it is very doubtful whether this could be done without bringing on an uncontrollable outburst throughout all Germany of the popular passion which is now so thoroughly aroused."

"But consider," cried Wodehouse, "to what dangers of war Germany will be exposed, if she adopts such an attitude, and if disorder and disturbance follow in the train of the Confederate chastisement!"—"No one," replied Bismarck composedly, "can regret more than I the possibility of war."

The envoy then turned to a discussion of the constitutional questions in detail, and declared it practically impossible to carry out the arrangements promised in 1852. Bismarck would not allow this to be true in such general terms; but he was ready, if Denmark would replace the former promises by better propositions, to give these latter as favorable a consideration as possible. "And how about the Constitution sanctioned on the 18th of November?" asked Wodehouse. "On that point," answered Bismarck at once, "there can be no thought of a compromise. The Constitution mentioned must be annulled for Schleswig before the 1st of January. Otherwise the German Powers will regard themselves as freed from all those obligations toward Denmark in which the London Protocol may have involved them. If, however, between now and the New Year, the Constitution shall be repealed, Danish propositions concerning a new general constitution will be awaited."

To this Wodehouse objected that it would be impossible before the 1st of January to bring about a decree of the Danish General Council concerning the repeal of the November Constitution, since the old Council had ended its sittings, and the royal patent from which it derived its authority had thus ceased to be in force, while the new Council could not meet till after the 1st of January. This was undeniable, but it did not make the least impression on the Prussian Minister. "It is the Danes' own affair," he said, "how to make good the wrong they have done. We must insist upon it, that

by the 1st of January Schleswig be exempted from the workings of the new Constitution. The King," he added confidentially, "will have to make up his mind to a *coup d'état*, at any rate to a change of Ministry: with a peace-loving and stable government we can keep on good terms, but a revolutionary and German-hating government under the control of the street-democracy is for us a dangerous and intolerable neighbor, with whom war must be unavoidable."

Wodehouse naturally saw in this language another proof that Germany was anxious to interfere in the internal affairs of Denmark. Yet Lord John in his inmost heart could not avoid recognizing the justice of the Prussian arguments, and accordingly instructed his envoy to urge with all possible emphasis at Copenhagen the repeal of the November Constitution as the indispensable condition of the continuance of peace.

After all this had taken place, Wodehouse, whose sympathies were with the Danes, did not exactly leave Berlin with a light heart. Nor was his tone of mind improved, when he sought from the English consul at Hamburg, Ward, information concerning the state of things in the Duchies. Ward told him that there was throughout the whole country only one idea, only one desire, complete separation from Denmark, and consequently the recognition of Frederick VIII., not at all out of love for him personally, but because that was the only means, as it was thought, for shaking off the Danish yoke. The consul said that even a simple personal union with Denmark had now become impracticable.

When the envoy arrived at Copenhagen on the 16th of December, he received information of a corresponding nature from the other side. His Russian colleague, Ewers, immediately met him with the news that the Danish Government was indeed willing to give up opposing the Confederate chastisement in Holstein, but was all the firmer in holding to the November Constitution, and had just then, on the 13th, made public the new electoral law connected with it. The Danish Minister, Hall, whom Wodehouse visited without delay, confirmed Ewers's statement: "I," he said, "will not in any case be the Minister to advise that in accordance with England's wishes the new Constitution be repealed."

Wodehouse and Ewers then agreed upon an identical note, demanding the abandonment of the Constitution. Yet Hall persisted in his determination, although Lord Wodehouse, on the 21st of December, distinctly informed him that in that case England must leave it to Denmark to confront Germany on her own responsibility. "I know," said Hall, "the danger of refusal; but the danger for us of internal dissension, in the event of yielding, is greater. For the dynasty and for the country, the best thing will be to take up a strong position in Schleswig and accept the challenge."

Sir Arthur Paget then appeared, having instructions from King Christian to represent to Hall that His Majesty had a right to expect that the Minister who was the author of the Constitution and had obliged the King to sign it should take it upon himself to propose

the repeal of the same. The consequence of this was an immediate request from Hall for dismissal.

The King then tried to form a ministry that should restore peace. He turned to men of the old "Party of a United State," to conservative generals, and he thought of Blixen-Finecke. But, in view of the power of the "Eider-Danish" party, the Majority that had control of the General Council, and the hopeless complication of affairs, no one either wished or dared to take up the crushing burden. In a few days the King was forced to give way once more to the "Eider-Danes." But at least he avoided calling upon Hall, who since the 18th of November had become intensely odious to him. At the head of the Cabinet was now placed the former Minister of Education, Bishop Monrad, who, however, fully shared the political opinions of his predecessor. Indeed, he was much less inclined than Hall to prudent deliberation, and more prone than he to inconsiderate action. The change of Ministers meant, therefore, not a more moderate tone, but a more lofty one. Monrad refused even more decidedly than Hall to repeal the November Constitution: Denmark was prepared for war.

Meanwhile in Germany things had advanced in the same direction. The Confederate decree of December 7th, which ordered the chastisement against the King-Duke Christian, had called forth far and wide a storm of indignation among the people. It now seemed to be clear that the two Great Powers were only seeking a reactionary object: that they wished to suppress all

popular agitation, all activity on the part of Germany in favor of Schleswig-Holstein, and that then, after having, for shame's sake, obtained a few concessions on the constitutional questions, — no matter whether they were apparent or false, — they would hand over the country in fetters to the usurper who had been exalted by strangers.

Everywhere the innumerable local societies for the assistance of Schleswig-Holstein began to organize into stronger bodies and into associations embracing the countries at large. In order that a controlling central point might be given to these, the leaders of the two great organizations, the National Association and the Reform Association, had already issued a summons to all the members of German Parliaments to meet in a great assembly at Frankfort on the 31st of December and come to a decision concerning the enforcement of the rights of Schleswig-Holstein.

A large popular assembly in Augsburg called on King Max of Bavaria to place himself at the head of the German people, to lead the grand Bavarian army to Schleswig-Holstein, and there, as the savior of the nation, to place Duke Frederick in the position that properly belonged to him. The Chambers of the individual states kept rivalling each other in issuing addresses and resolutions of the same or similar import: this was done in Frankfort, Oldenburg, Baden, Brunswick, Würtemberg, and Berlin. Several of the Governments openly joined the movement, in some cases taking steps of distinct practical significance. Baden

asked and obtained from its Chambers a credit of 2,300,000 florins for the mobilization of its entire *corps d'armée*. Coburg allowed the Prince of Augustenburg to make a beginning on Saxon soil in the equipment of a Schleswig-Holstein army. In Weimar, the Government asked the Chambers for a credit of 500,000 thalers and the power to raise a war-tax for the next two years. In Oldenburg, the Minister declared to the Parliament that now or never was the time to secure the rights of Germany and of Schleswig-Holstein. Hesse-Darmstadt announced that she intended to propose formally to the Confederation, that for the protection of the rights of all parties, Schleswig, as well as Holstein, should be occupied by Confederate troops.

King Max answered the Augsburg address at once by a public letter to his Minister, in which he said that he was convinced of the validity of Augustenburg's claims, and was ready both in the Confederation and with the aid of the Confederation to support with all his energy the carrying out of that policy which such a conviction involved. Various motives concurred to urge the King in this direction. Shortly before, the throne of Greece, from which the King's brother, Otto, had been driven, had been accepted by a son of Christian IX., and this had increased Bavaria's ill-will towards Denmark. But above all, the idea seemed especially attractive at Munich, that Bavaria, now borne along on the swelling tide of popular favor, might by some great deed raise herself to the headship of the "Third Germany," and so realize the old and fondly-cherished plan of a German Triad.

In the midst of all this agitation the four Governments to whom the chastisement had been assigned sent on the 12th of December a formal summons to Denmark to withdraw her troops from Holstein within seven days. On the 14th, the Confederate Diet approved the instructions to be given to the civil commissioners, as they had been sketched out by Prussia. The chief provision of these instructions was, that during the continuance of the chastisement, the country should be governed according to the existing laws.

From all sides the troops were on the march. The Austrian reserve took up its position in Hamburg, the Prussian in Lübeck. On the 19th of December, General Hake entered upon his duties as Confederate commander-in-chief, and on the 24th, the Saxon and Hanoverian divisions crossed the frontier. They first took possession of Wandseck, and spreading their troops from there as a centre, they had occupied the whole Duchy even before the close of the year.

No occasion for a conflict of arms had offered itself, since, on the approach of the Confederate troops, the Danes abandoned to them every position, so that it was like relieving guard in the profoundest peace. The feeling in the country, however, at once burst forth. Everywhere, as the troops advanced, the people proclaimed Duke Frederick sovereign with unanimous enthusiasm, and expelled the hated Danish officials and pastors who had taken the oath of allegiance to King Christian. The two Confederate commissioners could not but feel that both these acts were in contradiction

to their instructions, and they consequently issued a prohibition of them. But when the people did not allow themselves to be influenced by this, and in every place that was abandoned by the Danes continued to shout for the Duke and to replace the unpopular officials, and when, at the end of the year, Prince Frederick arrived at Kiel and was greeted with overflowing enthusiasm by the inhabitants, — then the commissioners also were not dissatisfied, and gradually entered themselves into confidential relations with the young Duke.

This might almost have been expected in the case of the Saxon commissioner, Herr von Könneritz, considering the political tendencies of his Government. In Hanover the King and his Minister, Count Platen, were indeed, hostile to the Augustenburg agitation, but, in the face of the people and the representatives of the people, they did not venture to manifest this feeling openly; and therefore their commissioner in Holstein, Privy Councillor Nieper, offered no serious opposition to his Saxon colleague with his Augustenburg sympathies.

The Hereditary Prince not only established a court in his dwelling at Kiel, but even formed a cabinet and various ministries, the heads of which then constantly supplied the Confederate commissioners with good advice in the conduct of the administration of the country and especially in the filling of the numerous offices that had become vacant. At the head of the administration was placed a college with the title of Provincial Government, which was supposed to execute

the orders of the Confederate commissioners, but which had at the same time a far-reaching authority for the independent transaction of business. Only reliable adherents of Augustenburg were called to be members of this commission or placed in the subordinate positions. Those in whom less confidence was felt were not appointed till they had signed a pledge of their allegiance to Augustenburg.

The hateful Danish laws against political associations, though they were not repealed, yet fell into complete contempt; and the country was soon covered with a network of "Schleswig-Holstein" associations, or associations of "brothers-in-arms," which suppressed by the methods of popular terrorism every shade of opinion unfavorable to the Hereditary Prince. To the Press, however, the Confederate commissioners by no means permitted so wide-spread or so polemical an unfolding of the Augustenburg banner, for the very natural reason that, considering the Confederate instructions of December 14th and the attitude of the Great Powers, complete publicity in the agitation could not be deemed wise. Nevertheless, so much was done in broad daylight, that Beust had good grounds for asserting later that the chastisement had been from the very first an occupation. The fears of Lord Wodehouse were therefore justified, and the feeling with which Germany's policy was regarded both in England and in Russia was rendered more unfavorable.

But this new kind of Confederate chastisement met with all the more approval in Germany. The severity

with which the decree of December 7th had been originally condemned was equalled by the enthusiasm which greeted such a method of putting it in execution. In the great majority of the Lesser and Petty States both people and Government were busily occupied in doing their share to advance the cause of Augustenburg still further.

Herr von Beust had been at Munich from the 19th to the 22d of December, and had come to an agreement with the Bavarian Minister, Von Schrenck, as to what was to be done next. On his return, he had had an interview at Augsburg with the Würtemberg Minister, Von Hügel, and had then communicated to the Chambers in Dresden the complete accord of the three Governments. According to the reports of the Prussian and Russian *chargés d'affaires* in Munich, this plan, as Beust had outlined it, was that Bavaria should at once propose in Frankfort an investigation of the Augustenburg claim; and it was hoped that within a week a majority might be obtained for the recognition of the same. Then the occupation of the Duchies was to be ordered by the Confederation, and if Austria and Prussia would take no part in it, it was to be undertaken by the forces of the Lesser States, which were amply sufficient to overcome Denmark. The Estates in Holstein were also to be summoned for the formal recognition of Frederick VIII.

At the same time that the conference of Ministers was held at Munich, the great assembly of representatives met at Frankfort on the 21st of December, an

assembly consisting of four hundred and ninety-one members from all the German Chambers, but in which there were no more than forty-seven Prussians and only seven Austrians, a fact that was very significant for the future course of the agitation. The assembly voted unanimously and without debate to use every legally admissible means to compel the Confederation to recognize Duke Frederick, and to secure to him his rights without regard to foreign opposition. It was also voted to support every Government that favored this, and to oppose with every constitutional means any Government that worked against it. The speedy convening of a general German parliament was also demanded. Finally the assembly (against the wishes of the leaders of the party favoring an entire Germany) appointed a central committee of thirty-six members as the central organ of the legitimate action to be taken by the German nation in behalf of Schleswig-Holstein and Frederick VIII.

The repeated emphasis put upon the legal and constitutional means to which the action thus designated was to be limited, was meant in all seriousness; and it was also founded on the consideration of the actual state of affairs. What would be the use of revolutionary steps, when Beust, at that time the leader of the Governments of the Lesser States, openly declared that those Governments could not resist the popular agitation and must therefore place themselves at the head of it? That this feeling was general is shown by the fact, that the Committee of Thirty-Six no longer thought of the formation of companies of volunteers, but simply

of assisting Duke Frederick in collecting recruits for his future Holstein division.

The prevailing idea of the matter was, that after the Duke should have been recognized by the Confederate Diet, King Max would put the Bavarian army in motion towards the north; that Würtemberg and Baden, and afterwards Darmstadt and Saxony, would join it; that the rolling avalanche would then urge on before it the North German Lesser and Petty States; and that the armed action of so mighty a people would fill the Great Powers with awe, and assert victoriously the ancient rights of Schleswig-Holstein and of Germany. Prussia, whose population shared the national enthusiasm, would then, it was thought, venture no opposition, nay, would perhaps even be herself hurried along by the patriotic stream.

It was not only well-intentioned, popular representatives, but even a number of the leading statesmen, that at this time cherished such ideas. It was soon to be seen that they were following mere pictures of their imagination, which had no foundation in prosaic reality.

The agitation thus carried on in common by the Lesser States and the people in general was certainly not without important results. But these were in exactly the opposite direction from what the originators of the scheme intended. We saw the Cabinet of Vienna at first opposing the chastisement, but afterwards, in order to hinder the Lesser States from the occupation of the country in behalf of Augustenburg, eagerly supporting Prussia's proposal. Precisely the

same thing now happened in regard to Schleswig. Hitherto, Austria had thought only of further negotiations in regard to the complaints of that province. But now that the Lesser States and the popular agitation were rivalling each other in urging the conquest of the country for its Hereditary Prince, the opinion began to prevail in Vienna that in order to draw the bolt upon this criminal folly of the Lesser States, as the Russians called it, Austria and Prussia must forestall the Augustenburgs by occupying Schleswig, and must take into their own hands the decision of the dangerous question, with the object of assuring, for Schleswig also, the integrity of the Danish monarchy.

Already, on the 19th of December, Rechberg had sent to Karolyi a despatch to the following effect: —

“Matters have been so managed that Europe makes no opposition to the advance into Holstein. But it will be no longer possible to hold to that standpoint from which the question in dispute is regarded as one belonging only to the internal affairs of Germany. The pressure of circumstances will oblige us to take the affairs of Schleswig into consideration. The Confederation cannot well send an army of chastisement into Holstein and at the same time remain a passive spectator of the incorporation of Schleswig. Austria and Prussia have declared that the validity of the London agreement depends for them upon the fulfilment of the Danish obligations towards Schleswig. In the present general complication of affairs it seems impossible to avoid the question whether the moment has not arrived for

demanding from Denmark that those obligations be fulfilled.

“As this question is an international one, the participation of the foreign Powers cannot be overlooked. On the other hand, the interests of the Confederation and the state of feeling in Germany call for guaranties as positive as possible. Prussia appears to consider as the first step the fixing of a definite limit of time, with the understanding, that if this period elapses without fruitful results, we are to declare ourselves free from the London compact. But it appears to us, that, in the eyes of the other Powers, who regard the integrity of Denmark as essential to the European balance of power, this arrangement would be creating a *casus belli*, while the inhabitants of Schleswig would gain nothing. So far as we can see, the occupation of Schleswig, accompanied by a declaration of willingness to enter into a European conference such as has already been proposed, would involve the danger of a general European war to a much less degree than would a flat refusal to respect on principle the integrity of Denmark. If Lord Wodehouse succeeds in bringing about before the 1st of January a suspension of the new Danish Constitution, we can content ourselves with urging a final settlement of the constitutional question, and can let the chastisement in Holstein be looked upon as a guaranty for Schleswig. If Lord Wodehouse fails, the Confederate troops must enter Schleswig itself.”

Austria also proposed in Berlin that the two Governments should demand in common at Frankfort the

giving up of the Committee of Thirty-Six. Bismarck consented to this without hesitation. The Vienna city authorities had sent a petition to the Emperor demanding the energetic support of Schleswig-Holstein; and they had been told in reply that they were not to trouble themselves about general politics, but only about the welfare of the city.

Meantime at Berlin Bismarck, whom neither the Confederate Diet, nor the Lesser States, nor Public Opinion inspired with any especial respect, had hitherto looked on during the agitation very calmly. So far as the King was concerned, his personal sympathy for the Prince of Augustenburg had not been diminished by all the outcry, but his enthusiasm for the Augustenburg cause had cooled down very much. He decidedly refused the Prince's request to be allowed to form companies of troops on Prussian soil. So much the greater was the satisfaction caused by the fact that Austria now appeared ready to take vigorous action according to the Prussian method in regard to Schleswig also.

Once more Bismarck weighed the chances of all possible courses. "We cannot," he said, in a memorial laid before the King — "we cannot remain passive, if the Danish Constitution goes into effect on the 1st of January. There are in this case three ways open to us. The first way would be, in accordance with the demands of public opinion, to declare ourselves no longer bound by the London compact, and to march into Schleswig with our whole force. That would be open war, more than that, a Confederate war, and the result of the con-

test would alone decide the fate of the Duchies. At the same time we should without doubt get into serious difficulties with the Great Powers and especially with England.

“The second way would be to give up the London Protocol without taking any warlike steps. In this case, the Confederation could come to a decision on the question of succession, and if it decided for Augustenburg, the Prince could be given his rights in the Confederate country of Holstein. But Schleswig would then remain defenceless; for we have no other right to interfere there than that derived from the compacts of 1852; and those would be broken on our side by the abandonment of the London Protocol. The Confederation would be incompetent to examine the right of succession for Schleswig; and even were Augustenburg's claim indisputable, the Confederation would not be any the more bound to conquer for a German Prince a non-German country. If it were so bound, it would have to claim Neuchâtel for Prussia, and Tuscany for Austria. This second course, therefore, would take us only to the Eider, unless we simply fell back upon a declaration of conquest, such as all the Powers would view as unlawful aggression. We should get Holstein from Denmark, which might perhaps be done by simple negotiations without any fighting; and we should forfeit Schleswig, which is the main object of Danish zeal. England would never participate in a conference on such a basis.

“The third way remains. Austria and Prussia may

say nothing whatever about the London compact, but may take action at once to compel Denmark to fulfil the promises of 1852. That is to say, an ultimatum can be sent on the 1st of January by the Confederation, or if the Confederation is unwilling, by the two Great Powers. Or no ultimatum need be sent, but the troops may march at once and snatch from the enemy the bone of contention which Denmark is just on the point of seizing. That would mean war with Denmark, which should be quickly and energetically carried on. The other Powers would then have no ground for interfering. Sweden would be the only one that might come into the field. Our position in the conference would be none the worse for our being in possession of the object under dispute."

This latter course was the one recommended by Bismarck to the King. Nothing could have been more agreeable to King William than to turn his back on the integrity of Denmark and the London Protocol; but he also well knew how important it was for his relations with the rest of Europe, to keep Austria at his side, and how little Austria as yet thought of destroying the unity of the Danish kingdom. The thing that was practically important was, that the German troops should now cross the Eider as they had formerly done the Elbe, — the troops of the whole Confederation if possible, but, in any event, the Prussian together with the Austrian. Therefore, after Rechberg had expressed his approval, instructions were sent on the 26th of December to Sydow at Frankfort, to the effect that in

common with Kübeck he should urge upon the Confederate Diet a proposal that the Confederation should take Schleswig as a guaranty for the fulfilment of the Danish promises of 1851 and 1852. In this proposal the recognition by Germany of the London Protocol and the order of succession contained therein was not indeed an expressed, but an implied, presupposition.

The diplomats of the Confederate Diet were then still under the influence of the impression recently made upon them by the assembly of representatives. Sydow himself had reported in this connection on the 22d of December, that now that that assembly had taken place it would be impossible for the Confederation to pass decrees on any other basis than that of the abandonment of the London Protocol. The alternative, he thought, would be immediate revolution, or what was perhaps worse, a general feeling of deep political despair. The same tendency was manifested in the Bavarian proposal, on the 23d, that a speedy investigation of the question of succession should be entered upon, so that a report might be made on the subject within a week. Darmstadt also followed the same line by proposing, on the 28th, that Schleswig should be occupied for the protection of the rights of all parties. It was therefore only with grave anxiety that Kübeck and Sydow, also on the 28th, obeyed the orders they had received to move the taking of Schleswig as a guaranty, with the object of maintaining the hated compacts of 1852. By their doing so the two systems were brought into contrast with each other as sharply as possible.

At the same time, too, the outside world made its views known at Frankfort. An English note, which Sir Alexander Malet delivered to the presiding deputy, on the 27th of December, emphasized the fact, that if the Confederation by an over-hasty step entered upon any path in contradiction to a compact which, like that of London, had been signed by all the Great Powers, most serious complications might ensue. England, therefore, the note said, was ready to propose the assembling of a conference of the Powers that had signed the London Protocol and a representative of the Confederate Diet, for the discussion of the question. But the excitement at Frankfort was too great for this communication to have any other effect than that of increasing the passion already in full sway. Mohl expressed a wish that the document might be buried among the papers of the committee, if indeed the Diet was to receive at all a letter which appeared to have been written for New Zealanders. Pfordten said that after such a proceeding it was to be hoped that no voice would any longer be raised in the assembly in behalf of the London compact.

Disturbed and distracted by such passions did Germany enter upon the year 1864.

CHAPTER IV.

THE COMPACT OF JANUARY 16, 1864.

THE outlook for the motion made by the Great Powers in the Confederate Diet was poor enough. On the 31st of December they made, at Rechberg's instance, the further demand that the Confederation should call upon Prince Frederick to abandon Holstein. The vote taken on the 2d of January, 1864, showed them that the majority they had at the time of the decree of chastisement on the 7th of December had faded away: their demand was rejected by nine against seven.

In Hanover, up to this time, the King and his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Platen, had been decidedly opposed to all the claims of Augustenburg. Count Platen, however, was a man who considered that the highest political virtues centred in the determination to remain Minister, and consequently, flexibility in yielding in all directions. He now saw the country, the Chambers, his colleagues without exception, and finally even the man who was peculiarly in the King's confidence, the Councillor of State, Zimmermann, carried away by the stream of public opinion. "If I separate myself from the Lesser States," he said to the Prussian ambassador, "Windthorst [who was at that time Min-

ister of Justice] will at once resign, and then a cabinet crisis will be at hand."

Duke Adolphus of Nassau had quite as little inclination to place himself under Bavarian leadership as to join his Parliament in its enthusiasm for Augustenburg; but his feeling had no effect at Frankfort, since he was there joined with Brunswick in one curia, the vote of which was for the time controlled by Brunswick. Mecklenburg and Hesse-Cassel still held to Prussia; but it was known that the Courts of Schwerin and Strelitz only unwillingly yielded to the pressure of their powerful neighbor; and in Cassel Minister Abée stood quite as much alone in his opinion as did Platen in Hanover. Abée was this time a practical statesman. He held that the German nation with its cry for Augustenburg was once more perpetrating a great piece of folly, and that the only reasonable solution of the question was to be found in the annexation of the Duchies to Prussia. Nevertheless, he did not conceal from the Prussian ambassador at Cassel the fact, that he should hardly be in a position to give his voice for the main proposition of December 28th.

Meanwhile the committees of the Diet had for the time kept this proposition in the background, and had, instead, commissioned Baron von der Pfordten to prepare a report on the hereditary right of Augustenburg. In a few days the experienced jurist, who for the time by his bold attitude, his restless activity, and his ready dialectic controlled the majority of the assembly, presented a detailed exposition of the two points, that the

Confederation was not bound by the London compact, and that in any case the carrying into effect of that compact had become impossible.

In reply to this, Count Rechberg sent to the Bavarian Government on the 10th of January a no less detailed protest against the position taken by the Lesser States in the matter of the Duchies. "When the Confederate Diet," he said, "passes decrees within the limits of its proper authority, Austria and Prussia will make no objection to them. But on the other hand, the two Powers will never allow themselves to be put down by a majority in the case of such decrees as may be framed at pleasure to suit political convenience without regard to law and constitution. The right of succession of Christian IX. depends not on the London compact, but upon the Danish royal edict of 1853, which was issued with every proper legal form. By the decree of July 29th, 1852, the Confederation also expressed its concurrence in the maintenance of the integrity of Denmark. By no law is the Confederation invested with the right to decide a disputed question of succession or to occupy a country not belonging to the Confederation on account of possible claims of inheritance asserted by a prince not yet recognized. The rejection of the motion of December 28th will mean the destruction of German solidarity. The Schleswig-Holstein question will be solved with honor and advantage to Germany, or with disgrace and loss, according as Germany does or does not respect the limits of legality."

Bismarck's communication to Sydow was in briefer

terms. "Pfordten's production," he wrote, "seems to me partial and superficial. We cannot suffer such a method of dealing with international transactions, in which we ourselves had a part. We are as little disposed as Austria to give ourselves up in this important matter to the leadership of His Bavarian Majesty's representative in the Diet. I desire you to take this view as a guide in your action in the committees and to defend the standpoint of the Great Powers with the energy which we are determined to use, if necessary, in holding to it."

Sydow, who was characterized by unusual goodness of heart, replied, greatly troubled, that he and Kübeck had spoken quite in accordance with these directions. "But," he said, "nothing can be accomplished in Frankfort. The representatives of the other side have binding instructions with which their own personal opinions for the most part coincide. Above all, King Max of Bavaria is firm in the course he has chosen, firstly, because he fears a general revolution if any other should be pursued, and secondly, because he is unwilling to concede to the European Powers the right to decide concerning the sovereign and hereditary rights of German princely Houses. The Confederate Diet could not now be brought to recognize even a personal union between the Duchies and Denmark."

In Berlin, pressure was now being exerted on both sides. In the Lower House the Government had moved a loan of twelve million thalers for military equipments, and the Majority, in profound mistrust of the Bismarck

of 1850, had refused to grant the money, unless the Government would burn its ships by recognizing Augustenburg. On the other hand, Sir Andrew Buchanan in the name of England demanded the withdrawal of the motion of December 28th, since any advance of German troops into Schleswig would seriously endanger the peace of Europe; and he therefore urged the bringing of the matter before a conference of the Powers, the *status quo* to be in the mean time maintained.

Bismarck told the representatives of the people that if they refused the money, the Government would take it where it could find it. To the English ambassador he said that Denmark had illegally altered the *status quo* by the proclamation of the Constitution, and must restore it by the repeal of the same; in case of refusal, the occupation of Schleswig was the proper means to use for compulsion. "To adhere to the London Protocol," he said, "and at the same time to endure in silence Denmark's infringement of the compacts, is quite out of the question for Prussia. If England hinders us from taking steps to enforce the fulfilment of the Danish obligations, Prussia must refuse to abide by the London compact, must have a change of ministry, and must then yield to the demands of the Lower House and join the Augustenburg party." This put a stop to Sir Andrew's threatening language.

It was very clear that if anything was to be done, not an hour was to be thrown away. On the very day on which he talked with the ambassador (the 5th of Jan-

uary), Bismarck took the decisive step. He sent to Werther at Vienna a despatch which first asserted that both Courts, considering the attitude persistently adopted by Denmark, were justified in refusing to abide by the London compact, but went on to add that, the feeling of Europe being what it was, it was better for the time to make no use of this position, but to force Denmark to fulfil her obligations by a threat of armed intervention, whether in the name of the Confederation or in that of the two Powers themselves.

“It is probable,” said the despatch, “that the Diet will accept the Hessian proposition to occupy Schleswig on account of the invalidity of the London Protocol. Nevertheless, we will pursue the course we have adopted because in it we are resting on a basis recognized by Europe, while our right to assail the London compact is disputed by all the world outside of Germany. Everything we do, however, depends upon the presupposition that Austria stands wholly with us. In Prussia the orders for the mobilization of the necessary troops are already issued. The political and military grounds for all possible haste are evident enough. After such long and patient endurance, we are in a position to take rapid action against Denmark, to demand therefore the repeal of the November Constitution within forty-eight hours, and on receiving the refusal, which can be foreseen, to enter Schleswig at once. We therefore ask that an Austrian officer of high rank may be sent hither immediately to conclude the military arrangements. It is hoped that all this will coincide with the views of Austria.”

The Minister added a confidential observation: "Considering the great importance and the incalculable consequences of the affair, it is indispensable that Austria's intentions should be expressed in a binding form and one that precludes any drawing back. Without some assurance of this sort it will be impossible for us to proceed. In Schleswig neither Danish nor Augustenburg demonstrations must be suffered. While the occupation continues, the country must be under military government."

This invitation fell upon good ground in Vienna. The indignation at the arrogance of the Lesser States and the anxiety as to the results of their proceedings had increased all the more, when it was learned that the Emperor Napoleon gave these proceedings his open approval, and that his ambassador at Vienna, the Duc de Gramont, kept daily encouraging his German colleagues. Rechberg concluded from this very rightly that Napoleon was seeking allies against Austria; and the Count clung all the more closely to the support of Prussia which had been so unexpectedly obtained. He had but lately explained to Werther that the Duchies must be helped effectually, that their ancient connection with each other must be restored, and only a personal union with Denmark be allowed to continue.

There could naturally be no thought of Augustenburg, since his accession would not be permitted by Europe. In the midst of such conflicts Napoleon, who privately sought to establish Augustenburg, would indeed be fishing in troubled waters! It was necessary

therefore to anticipate the instigations of the Confederate Diet and plainly demonstrate to it its inability to settle the question of the succession. Everything depended upon securing permanence to the harmonious action of Austria and Prussia.

Accordingly Rechberg was exceedingly well pleased, when Werther informed him of the proclamation of January 5th, and proposed to come to an understanding concerning its contents in some binding form. Inasmuch as the Prussian Government for the present advocated no renunciation of the London Protocol nor violation of the integrity of the Danish monarchy, the proposed peremptory measures against the November Constitution were entirely acceptable to him. In a session of the Ministerial Council presided over by the Emperor, on the 10th of January, the outline of an agreement with Prussia was decided upon, together with the proper instructions to Karolyi. "With sincere satisfaction," said the latter, "have we learned that Prussia also has determined not to renounce the London Protocol, but to continue the same course as hitherto: at one on this point, we are ready to assent to Prussia's further proposals."

The document then went on to say that consistent with the desire of both Governments to insure harmonious action by some binding agreement, they had settled upon the following points: Firstly, requisition to be made of Denmark to withdraw the November Constitution within forty-eight hours; and in the event of a refusal, the recall of the ambassadors and occupa-

tion of Schleswig by Austrian and Prussian troops already equipped for the purpose. Secondly, independent action of both Powers, if the Confederate Diet refuse to accept the motion of the 28th of December. Thirdly, preparation of forces necessary to capture or pass around the Dannevirke. Fourthly, in the event of the occupation of Schleswig, the prevention of all Danish, Augustenburg, and Democratic demonstrations, and the administration of the country by civil commissioners under the supreme authority of the commander-in-chief of the troops. Fifthly, acceptance of the proposal for a European conference only on the presupposition of the withdrawal of the November Constitution or the occupation of Schleswig.

The outline then continued: "In case hostilities in Schleswig ensue, and consequently the present obligations between the German Powers and Denmark become annulled, the Courts of Austria and Prussia reserve to themselves the right, with reference to the future relations of the Duchies, of establishing in concert other conditions than those contained in the stipulations of 1851-52, and of then agreeing upon further measures. They will in no case without mutual consent swerve from the principle of preserving the Danish monarchy in its limits hitherto maintained, nor from their obligations assumed in the London Protocol to recognize the hereditary claims of King Christian."

Sixthly, reservation of further consultation with each other in the event of actual interference on the part of other Powers.

“The agreement contained in the foregoing articles shall have the same force as if they formed the contents of the formal instrument of a treaty.”

It will be seen that, after the fashion of a treaty, the first articles determined the course of action to be pursued, and the fifth, the purpose and aim of the same. The maximum requisition from Denmark in case of war was, then, the personal union of the Duchies and the Kingdom. Their complete liberation and a reduction of the Danish limits should be demanded only with the consent of Austria, that is, not at all. When Karolyi on the 12th of January delivered this outline to the Prussian Minister, he especially emphasized this article, namely, the renunciation of the London Protocol only after a mutual understanding; for this alone could insure mutual confidence, the confinement of the war to one locality, the prevention of a general European conflagration, and the success of the undertaking.

But, as we well know, the sentiments of King William and his Minister were fundamentally opposite to this. Out of consideration for Europe, they for the time limited their demands to the preservation of the stipulations of 1852; but their hopes were wholly set upon Danish persistence in the wrong, which would bring on war and the nullification of former treaties: and their determination was immovably fixed then to free the Duchies completely from every form of Danish rule.

Bismarck therefore proposed the following wording of the fifth article: “In case hostilities in Schleswig

ensue, and the existing obligations between the German Powers and Denmark are consequently annulled, the Courts of Austria and Prussia reserve the right to decide only in concert with each other upon the future relations of the Duchies. To promote such harmonious action they will then agree upon further measures. They will in no case without mutual consent determine the question of the succession."

Here, as in Rechberg's outline, any independent policy on the part of either country was excluded. But the agreement was limited to this negative statement. There was no longer any positive standpoint defined, which was to remain immovably fixed, in case no mutual understanding should be reached. Karolyi allowed himself to be convinced that in view of the possibility of war all paths must be left open, and recommended to his Court the acceptance of the Prussian amendment.

Who can tell what might have happened, had not the high and mighty Confederate Diet taken upon itself again to drive Rechberg to a decision? The Lesser and Petty States had just been greatly exalted in their own presumptuous zeal by a circular from the French Government dated the 8th of January and addressed to them — to them alone and not to the Great Powers — in which the London Protocol was termed an impotent document, the participation of the German Confederation in the conference proposed by England was urged as desirable, and the decision of France with regard to the conference was deferred until the reply of the German States should be received.

The Lesser States did not exactly long for a renewal of the Confederation of the Rhine, but the possibility of friendly relations with France in case of an emergency seemed to comfort them. France appeared, moreover, to favor the cause of Augustenburg; and so the Confederate Diet felt that it might go forward with no misgivings.

It was announced that the vote upon the motion of the 28th of December would be taken on the 14th of January, the very day upon which Bismarck's amendment was being considered in Vienna. Kübeck and Sydow had reported that they reckoned upon the support of five or six votes at the most. They received by return-post instructions to announce in the name of the two Governments, immediately after the rejection of the motion, that as two European Great Powers they should proceed independently of the Confederation with the occupation of Schleswig.

And so it happened. The Great Powers were supported only by Hesse-Cassel, Mecklenburg, and the Petty States of the sixteenth curia. The motion was accordingly lost, and the two ambassadors, Kübeck and Sydow, announced at once the decision of their Governments. Great was the surprise, the confusion, and the indignation! Bavaria arose solemnly to the defence of all the rights of the Confederation, — although it would have been hard to say, what right of the Confederation would be threatened by Prussia's occupation of a non-Confederate country, or violated by her insisting upon the fulfilment of duties pledged by a treaty and sol-

emly accepted by the Confederation. Bavaria's action was seconded by a large number of the deputies, and Saxony descended so far as to protest against the passage of troops bound for Schleswig through Holstein, a country at present under Confederate control.

These sentiments were taken up and expressed more emphatically in the popular representative bodies, in clubs, and in assemblies of the people. The magistrate of Nuremberg protested against any passage of Austrian troops through Germany without a Confederate decree. A popular assembly in Munich besought King Max to throw Bavaria's sword into the balance. The Würtemberg Chambers urged their Government to mobilize army and militia. The Committee of Thirty-Six declared that both Great Powers had forfeited their position as leaders in Germany. The Prussian Lower House refused the government loan because Prussia had become apostate and had misused her influence as a Great Power.

Everybody was penetrated with the conviction (which, to be sure, so far as Austria was concerned, was not unfounded), that the object of the announcement of the occupation of Schleswig was none other than the abandonment of the Duchies to the Danish King and "Protocol Prince" Christian. Just for this reason the "Eider-Danes" felt encouraged. "The real enemies of the German Great Powers," said they, "are the Lesser States and the Revolution which now threatens alike Austria, Prussia, and Denmark. The whole matter will take its course just as in 1850."

The events which had occurred in the Confederate Diet were already enough to decide Rechberg. His deputy in Frankfort had announced the occupation of Schleswig, and the louder the noise raised against it, the more rigidly did the Government see itself bound to its word so solemnly spoken. There was no further use in sinking back into disgraceful inaction on account of a difference with Prussia over a question which might never present itself. And even if Prussia would not positively bind herself to support the integrity of the Danish kingdom, yet she had promised not to take any steps without consulting Austria; so that the latter would still be in a position to nip in the bud every disagreeable notion of that audacious Prussian Minister. And more than all, in view of the French demonstrations a break with Prussia was unwise in the extreme.

Accordingly, Rechberg succeeded in persuading the Emperor to accept the Prussian amendment, and on the 16th of January the Agreement was officially signed. On the very same day the ambassadors Balan and Brenner received telegraphic orders to demand from the Danish Government the withdrawal of the Constitution within forty-eight hours. When the ambassadors carried out their instructions, Monrad offered to continue negotiations, but they replied that the time for that was past. On the 18th, the Danish Minister sent his answer, refusing to comply.

It had been long understood that Schleswig would not, like Holstein, be evacuated by the Danes without any resistance, and this meant definitely war. In

Prussia, as in Austria, military preparations were going on in full force. The Austrian troops, on account of the popular sentiment in Bavaria and Saxony, were to march to the north through Silesia; a passage to Holstein for the 18th Prussian division was sought through Hanover, but permission was not readily granted; so that Bismarck wrote to the ambassador that the passage would take place with or without permission, a remark which the ambassador, he said, was not to make use of as a threat, but only as a personal piece of information. Then it was decided in Hanover to allow the troops to pass, under a reservation of all Confederate rights.

Field-Marshal Wrangel took command of the united forces on the 20th. On this and the following days the allied troops entered Hamburg, Lübeck, Eutin, the Oldenburg capital, and Holstein, without any further announcement of their coming than the arrival of their quartermasters; so that these Petty States, as well as the two Confederate commissioners, raised a formal protest against such arbitrary doings. An inquiry from the Prussian Minister of War, asking the Confederate General Hake whether he would not place himself and his troops under the supreme command of Wrangel, was angrily answered in the negative. To the Saxon Government especially, which had seriously taken umbrage at these movements, Bismarck remarked with the calmest friendliness: "We should have been so glad to have had the valiant Confederate troops share in patriotic and glorious work!"

Yet however much Prussia in all these points showed

her indifference to the sentiments of the Confederate Diet, the Great Powers were very ready to declare in Frankfort on the 19th of January that the steps that they were now taking to confirm and make good the German claim to Schleswig were in no way to interfere with the decrees of the Confederation concerning the chastisement and the administration of Holstein; and they also said they expected that the Confederation and the Confederate countries lying adjacent to Holstein would not fail to second their efforts to secure the rights of Germany and of Schleswig.

This line of conduct, and, more than all, the rapid movement of such imposing bodies of troops towards the Eider, produced at once an effect upon the Confederate Diet and the Lesser States. The former replied to the declaration of the Great Powers by promising that, under the condition that rights of the Confederation were respected, the allied troops should receive all possible support and assistance.

Beust, who had instructed his deputy at Frankfort to work for the prevention of the passage of the troops through Holstein, said a few days later to the representative of Prussia at Dresden that he hoped no one would take him for such a Don Quixote as to conceive the idea of armed resistance. In Stuttgart, the Minister Hügel had always thought with a shudder of the possibility of an open rupture with the Great Powers, and had talked in the Chamber so boldly only to quiet as much as he might the agitation among the people. The old King William of Würtemberg had even publicly

proclaimed what he had long before said to the ambassadors at his court, namely, that he did not wish to have anything at all to do with the whole bad business.

King Max of Bavaria was exceedingly troubled, and his Minister Schrenck excited beyond measure, at seeing their beautiful dream of a Bavarian triad-hegemony vanish into mist; but that they should not and could not stand with dagger drawn in the path of the two Great Powers was at once evident to both. Beust, indeed, talked about a new conference of ministers, and Roggenbach, of a union of the Chambers of all the Lesser States to form the nucleus of a German Parliament: but the powers in Munich were suddenly and thoroughly convinced that talking and deliberating would do no more good now; for while their armies were not at all equipped, Prussia could be ready with an overwhelmingly superior force within fourteen days. Furthermore, King Max recoiled from the bottom of his heart at the thought of bloodshed between German and German.

And now, supposing that after all their noisy talking they had acted, when it was all at once evident that the time for action had come, according to the tenor of the agitation they had been keeping up, — what would have happened? For the sake of getting a little more from the Danes than the Prussians for the time demanded, they would have fallen upon the Prussian troops while these were driving their bayonets into the sides of the Danes. In the forenoon the Lesser States would have fought side by side with Danes against the Prussians,

and in the afternoon as allies of the Prussians against the Danes. A confusion worthy of world-wide fame would have enriched the annals of the German people. No! Since it was not possible for them to rouse themselves to take the one only sensible stand in the matter, and, as Roon proposed, place the Confederate troops under the supreme command of Wrangel, there was nothing left for the Lesser States to do but to submit to the fate of an obstinate minority, and in sullen inaction make way and leave the road open for those that were stronger.

Meanwhile, the behavior of the two Great Powers had aroused no less excitement in the rest of Europe than in Germany itself. Before all others in this regard stood Lord John Russell, who had already on the 31st of December sent to the Powers a formal invitation to a conference, and who was now by a double pressure driven to action, by the anti-German sentiments of Palmerston and the influence of the Princess of Wales. His zeal in writing articles on the subject became more inexhaustible, and his despatches and proposals more numerous. He warned the non-German signers of the London Protocol to insist upon the integrity of Denmark and the succession of Christian IX. He called upon them to send to Prussia and Austria identical notes as a means of hindering them from occupying Schleswig.

In Copenhagen he urged the speedy repeal of the unfortunate November Constitution, that thus the last excuse might be taken from the Germans for a breach

of the peace. In Vienna and Berlin he proposed a definite declaration that the German Powers would hold firmly to the principle of Denmark's continued integrity. To the German ambassadors he orally suggested that in the latter instance England would have no objections to make to the personal union of the Duchies with the Kingdom, but if the opposite were the case, she might be forced to send a fleet into the Baltic to protect Denmark.

On the 24th of January he wrote again to Paris begging for some common action of all the Powers against the candidacy of Augustenburg, if necessary, by force of arms. He acknowledged, however, that Prussia and Austria were not rash in their movements, and that serious results were to be feared only if Denmark fulfilled her obligations in the matter of the Constitution, and the German Courts nevertheless increased their demands; yet in view of this, too, he considered the immediate concerted action of the European Powers as greatly to be desired.

At the same time, in compliance with a Danish proposal, he asserted in Vienna and Berlin that it was entirely unfair to require that Denmark should repeal the Constitution within forty-eight hours; for that could not be done without a *coup d'état*. He accordingly wished for a postponement of six weeks, in which time the Danish Government could summon the General Council and in a legal manner accomplish the desired result.

But at every point he was forced to see how impreg-

nable was the position taken by Bismarck in his active policy, and how exactly it was fitted to the European situation at the time. In their inmost hearts all the Cabinets knew well that Denmark had with shameful audacity supported the wrong in her relations with Germany; and no one of them had any desire, for the sake of defending so rotten a cause, to commit itself to a war against entire Germany, bristling as she was with arms, while neither in Vienna nor in Berlin had any single word been spoken yet against the integrity of Denmark or the succession of Christian IX. Russia, to be sure, wished to see Denmark treated as tenderly as possible, but refused to entertain any thought of breaking with Prussia, her brave comrade in the confusion of the Polish tumults.

Napoleon held firmly to his idea of winning Prussia for an ally, and to his hope of seeing new complications arise out of the Danish war which might draw Prussia to his side. He had already in December remarked to the Italian ambassador, Nigra: "We shall finally bring it about that Prussia and Austria fire with their cannon pointed at each other." On the 27th of January he asked the Prussian ambassador whether the rumors were true, which reported that Prussia had guaranteed to Austria her non-German possessions. And when he had received in reply a decided answer in the negative, he sent word to the English Government, on the 28th, that he should only with repugnance adopt any measure that might involve him in a war with Germany. Such a war, he said, would mean for England nothing more

than the blockading of a few forts and the capture of a few ships; but for France it would be the most unfortunate and most venturesome of all possible wars that the Empire could undertake, and so long as the balance of power in Europe was not disturbed, he should confine himself merely to retaining his full freedom to act as he saw fit.

The non-German Courts received favorably only the proposal to postpone military operations in order to allow to Denmark time for repealing in a legal manner the Constitution of November. France, Russia, and Sweden recommended this in Berlin. Meanwhile, in his first conversation with Count Goltz, Napoleon conceded to him that this was no question of a sudden ultimatum, but rather a final word after twelve years of patient waiting for the fulfilment of the treaties, during which protests had been made every three months against open violations of them; and every doubt disappeared when England submitted her proposal in a formal document.

“The German Powers” — so this document was worded — “ought to accept, instead of a material guaranty in the form of an occupation of Schleswig, the diplomatic guaranty of a treaty to be signed by all the participants in the London Protocol, in which treaty Denmark should pledge herself to propose to her General Council the repeal of the Constitution for Schleswig and to urge with all her powers the acceptance of the proposition by the General Council.”

Lord Palmerston delivered the proposal to Count

Bernstorff with warning threats in the event of a refusal. The Count inquired whether England would guarantee the repeal of the Constitution. Palmerston replied that that would not be necessary, since, if Denmark declined the proposition, all the Powers would recognize the correctness of Germany's position, and would refuse to give any assistance to the Danes.

The value of the English proposal was at once placed in a glaring light by Denmark herself when Minister Monrad in his speech to the Upper House declared that "it would be hard to say what could be gained by negotiations with Germany about Schleswig; but it would be easier to define what would never be conceded, namely, a Schleswig-Holstein, an independent Schleswig as well as Holstein, or a division of Schleswig,"—that is, we may add, any single thing that might have in the least ameliorated the unlawful subjection of Schleswig.

When the news of this reached Berlin the King commanded at once the rejection of the English proposal, and held firmly to his decision, although Russia vigorously urged acceptance, and both Bernstorff and Rechberg expressed their serious alarm at the heavy clouds which were darkening the political horizon. Rechberg acknowledged that in the present state of excitement among the German people the march into Schleswig could not be delayed; but he was very anxious to pacify England by the desired declaration with regard to the preservation of the integrity of the Danish kingdom, and to show Germany's love of peace by

urging the speedy assembling of the European conference.

His first move was to instruct the imperial ambassadors in Paris and London to explain that the postponement of the march into Schleswig after it had been publicly announced would compromise the German Powers; and that the first consequence of such a postponement would be that the Confederate Diet would decree the occupation of Schleswig in the name of Augustenburg, which would openly violate the integrity of Denmark, not yet molested by Austria and Prussia. Further, that Austria did not contemplate a dismemberment of Denmark; it did not lie in her interests nor among her wishes, but was, on the contrary, inconsistent with her principles and all her traditions; that, as ever, she did not care to play the *rôle* of a champion of races; and that she now crossed the Eider in order to anticipate more serious complications that would long since have ensued, had Austria held aloof and permitted Denmark to have suffered from an invasion by the German Confederation.

Bismarck spoke still more sharply in a circular which he sent to London, Paris, St. Petersburg, and Stockholm. "If we allow," said he, "the General Council to convene, as recommended by the English proposal, then in doing so we shall be acknowledging the legality of the Constitution which we refuse to recognize. The only possibility of preserving peace depends upon Denmark's making no resistance to our occupation of Schleswig as a guaranty: if she attempts to resist, such

open hostilities will result as will the more deeply disturb the relations between Germany and Denmark, inasmuch as in that case all treaties existing between the two countries will be overthrown." Rechberg, to Bismarck's surprise, thought this language was somewhat too excited and dangerous, and urged some joint declaration of the two Powers with regard to their recognition of the integrity of Denmark.

In Berlin, the King and his Minister were very determined not to bind their hands in this matter; and for three whole days, from the 31st of January until the 2d of February, the two Cabinets telegraphed back and forth to each other, until at last a wording was agreed upon which in accordance with Austria's wishes recognized for the present the integrity of Denmark, yet satisfied Prussia by making no promises concerning the future.

Accordingly, the note, dated January 31st, read as follows: "Inasmuch as the Austrian Imperial and the Prussian Royal Governments base upon the stipulations of 1851-52 the rights which they strive to defend, they thereby recognize the principle of the integrity of the Danish monarchy: when they take steps preparatory to the occupation of Schleswig, they do not have in mind the abandonment of this principle: yet if, in consequence of complications resulting from the persistence of the Danish Government in its illegal course, or in consequence of the armed interference of other Powers, they shall find themselves compelled to renounce relations which could lead only to results no longer

proportionate to the sacrifices thus laid upon the German Powers: then, no definite arrangements can be made without the co-operation of those Powers that signed the London Protocol."

These sentences were more long-winded and abstruse than Bismarck was wont to write, when he held his pen with no nervous coadjutor at his elbow. Nevertheless, they contained all that was necessary. It is true that the beginning contained a recognition of the principle of Danish integrity, and the end, a willingness to take part in a European conference; but in the middle stood the declaration that with the first cannon-shot the treaties were annulled, and the very decided assertion that foreign interference would make the fate of Denmark only the more severe. This was to be understood once for all in London.

Meanwhile, on the other side of the Eider hostilities had already begun.

BOOK XI.



DANNEVIRKE AND DÜPPEL.

CHAPTER I.

OUTBREAK OF THE WAR.

AT the end of January the troops destined for the occupation of Schleswig were, with the exception of a few regiments still on the march, assembled in the neighborhood of the Eider. They formed three army corps: the first consisted of the 6th and 13th Prussian divisions (Generals von Manstein and von Witzingerode) with the corresponding cavalry and artillery, under the command of Prince Frederick Charles of Prussia; the second, of the Austrians under Lieutenant Field Marshal von Gablenz, four brigades of infantry, one of cavalry, and seven batteries, six battalions of this force being Germans, and the remainder—to prevent national fraternization with the Schleswigers—Czechs, Hungarians, Poles, and Italians; the third, of a division of Prussian guards under General von der Mülbe. The strength of the whole was 57,000 men.

The commander-in-chief, Field Marshal von Wrangel, once a gallant and dashing cavalry leader, was now quite eighty years old, and had not, as was soon to be seen, gained with age in breadth of view and keenness of insight, in sureness of judgment, nor in evenness of temper and will. The officers and men of his army, however, were with few exceptions admirable, at once

full of spirit and thoroughly disciplined, each body of troops being well arranged and compactly organized, and so forming a united mass always ready to be directed against any object of attack. There was, therefore, reason to hope that, at least against the enemy now in question, the excellence of the parts might make up for anything that seemed wanting in the supreme command.

The state of things on the Danish side was in a certain way the reverse of this. The commander-in-chief, General de Meza, was an energetic and prudent officer, who had signally proved his capacity in the war of 1850; and not less excellent were the active officers of the army, even when it was on a peace-footing. But the little state was obliged, owing to the smallness of its financial resources, to keep the number of its officers and non-commissioned officers in time of peace within very narrow bounds, and to limit the term of service of the soldiers to ten months. Therefore, when the mobilization came, the number of men in the different regiments was increased more than fourfold; this necessitated the employment of a great number of imperfectly trained officers of the reserve; and, the discipline of the troops being superficial, the battalions, in spite of the courage of individuals, lacked the internal unity which was so conspicuous among their German enemies.

Besides this, there was for the Danes in this particular war another element of danger: the complete unreliability of the regiments recruited in Schleswig-Holstein, who saw in the German troops, not enemies, but

liberators. The total strength of the army was about 55,000 men, of whom not quite 40,000 were available for the approaching contest in Schleswig. Nevertheless, considering the peculiar fitness of the country for defence, the deeply penetrating gulfs, the swampy hollows, and the plains everywhere surrounded by heights, the 60,000 allies could not consider that they had greatly the advantage in numbers, especially since Denmark possessed in her superior fleet the means of effecting a surprise by transporting her land troops from one point of the scene of war to another far more quickly than was possible for her opponents.

As General Moltke had foreseen, it had been decided at Copenhagen to offer serious resistance, not at the Eider, but only at the position of the Dannevirke. The Dannevirke was a strong line of fortifications, surrounded by deep morasses, and extending from the city of Schleswig to the sources of the river Rheide. This was still further protected on the east by that broad arm of the sea, penetrating far into the country, called the Schley, the point of crossing which at Missunde, a mile and a half from Schleswig, was strongly fortified; and on the west by the river Rheide, and then by the Treene as far as where it empties into the Eider, both these streams being bordered by extensive swamps and fens.

As the German attack would doubtless be directed at the Dannevirke itself, the main body of the defenders was placed there, about 22,000 infantry and artillery, together with a reserve of 5,000 infantry and 2,000

dragoons. The guarding of the Treene was left to only one brigade; while the covering of Missunde and of the Schley, a distance of nearly twenty-three miles, was intrusted to a chain of outposts consisting in all of 9,000 men. The whole position, in spite of its great length (of more than forty-two miles), was a very strong one. The people at Copenhagen regarded it as impregnable. In Paris, the Emperor Napoleon gave it as his opinion that the Germans might spend two years before its walls without gaining any great results. If the worst should happen, the way of retreat for the Danes would lead by Flensburg to the Sundervitt, where, opposite the island of Alsen and in front of the bridge to Sonderborg across the strait, a no less strong group of fortifications would secure to them a threatening position on the flank of the enemy, as these passed to the northward.

While these Danish preparations were going on, General Moltke, at the command of King William, was considering the German plan of operations. "This war," said the General, "is easy to carry on, but difficult to finish. A speedy conclusion can be brought about only by cutting off from the enemy all possible sources of assistance, that is, by occupying as large tracts of country as possible."

The first thing was naturally to master the Dannevirke; and in Moltke's opinion this was to be done, not by direct assault upon the front, but by making a detour on the eastern flank; that is, by crossing the Lower Schley. The General considered that a front attack on

the Missunde fortifications would take quite as much time and be quite as unprofitable as one on the Dannevirke. It was necessary, however, to place troops before this strong sally-port and at the same time to keep the Danish main-body in its position by prudent demonstrations at the Dannevirke. If, now, Prince Frederick Charles could succeed in getting his men across the Schley a few miles below Missunde at a point where the southern shore was higher than the northern, and in gaining Flensburg immediately by a rapid march, then the Danish army would be cut off from retreat toward the north and east: it could be driven into the western part of the country and there be annihilated.

Should the warlike ardor of Denmark not be extinguished by this, or the result aimed at in these operations not be completely attained, Moltke considered that time and blood should not be squandered in besieging the fortifications of Düppel, since the capture of that place would bring with it no other advantage than the possession of a couple of hectares of Schleswig soil. The allies had force enough, he thought, to be able to leave a division behind to prevent the Danes from making sallies, while the main body could overrun the whole of Jutland, the loss of which would be most seriously felt at Copenhagen. Should this, however, not lead to peace, the Germans should again not stop to besiege the Jutland stronghold of Fridericia, but confine themselves to keeping a watch upon that, and at once transport a strong body to the island of Fünen, a move-

ment that would without doubt oblige the enemy to make a final submission.

This plan of operations was communicated to the headquarters of the army, that it might be there taken into consideration; but it was not intended as a binding order. On the contrary, in the general instructions drawn up by the King on the 29th of January for the guidance of the Marshal, it was expressly stated that all opposition on the part of Denmark was to be overcome by force of arms, but that the Commander-in-Chief was to have complete freedom of decision. Attention was, however, called to the following points: "It is a main object to destroy the enemy's army before it reaches a place of embarkation. If it is in any way possible, the enemy's retreat to Düppel must be cut off. When any advantage has been obtained, it must be followed up as energetically as possible. After the occupation of the Duchies has been completed, the country must be insured against the return of the Danish troops. The necessary measures against diversions in the rear of the army must be taken, and accordingly the harbors of Eckernförde and Kiel must be secured."

So far as political matters were concerned, the Field Marshal was instructed to take upon himself the government, to carry it on as far as possible according to the existing laws, meeting the costs out of the revenues of the country, and to suffer no Danish, Augustenburg, or Democratic demonstrations. At the same time, the King remarked in regard to this latter point that no force was to be used, nor any pedantic or petty measures

to be resorted to: the Marshal was to interfere only when public proceedings took place of such a nature as might arouse hostile feeling in Europe generally.

The former President of the Police, Von Zedlitz, was joined with the Field Marshal as civil commissioner for the administration of the country; and it is as well to mention here that Von Zedlitz later received as a diplomatic colleague, Herr von Wagner, and from the Austrian side, Baron Reverera also. The latter, however, left the management of administrative business almost entirely to his Prussian associate.

Wrangel, who, on the 29th of January, had changed his headquarters from Hamburg to Bordesholm, sent from there on the following day to General de Meza a summons — naturally without effect — to evacuate Schleswig; and on the same evening he gathered together his leaders of the divisions and his generals for a conference, in order to make arrangements for the next few days. At this council the opinion was unanimous that the Dannevirke must be taken, not by a direct attack, but by making a detour.

It was decided that this should be undertaken by the division of Prince Frederick Charles. While the Austrians and those of the Guards that had arrived from Rendsburg were to advance on Schleswig and keep the main body of the enemy occupied there, the Prince was to march from Kiel directly to Missunde, to storm the fortifications at that place, and then, crossing the Schley, to strike the Danish army in the rear. Right here, accordingly, in a very important point, the Field

Marshal departed from Moltke's suggestions. Some doubts expressed as to whether the Missunde fortifications could be taken by storm were briefly and emphatically disposed of by Wrangel, who persisted in the arrangement that had been made, and gave further orders that the Prince should march from Missunde to Glücksburg, and from there to Düppel. The old General for the moment forgot all about the Gulf of Flensburg, which lay right in the way of such a movement.

On the morning of the 1st of February, then, the two armies, nearly equal in strength, crossed the Eider at different points without meeting any opposition. During that day the Danish troops retired everywhere from position to position almost without fighting; so that the first division, following up the enemy eagerly, went beyond the prescribed limit of march, and after a slight but vigorously-fought skirmish reached the town of Eckernförde.

Leaving there on the 2d, the troops arrived a little before midday in the vicinity of the fortifications at Missunde, where they were at once received with a well-directed fire. The Prince brought up his artillery, sixty-four cannon, in the hope that the fire from these, covering a large portion of the works, would do so much injury that an assault might be made in accordance with the orders he had received. A cannonade of three hours therefore ensued, during which the Prussian sharpshooters who protected the guns, in their zeal for battle, pressed very near to the enemy's redoubts and

suffered a loss of nearly 200 men killed and wounded. As the firing made no impression on the works, the Prince, who had not in his heart agreed with Wrangel, broke off the fight with much vexation.

A consultation with the Field Marshal on the 3d of February had no result. Colonel Blumenthal, Chief of Staff of the first division, then prevailed upon General Manteuffel, who happened to arrive, to obtain from Wrangel, on the 4th, permission for the army to cross the Schley farther down, near Arnis or Kappeln. The march thither was made on the 5th, under great difficulties, upon a road covered with ice and in the midst of a driving snowstorm. About midnight it was learned that the Danes had abandoned the opposite bank, and General Röder at once carried his men over in boats. On the morning of the 6th of February the remaining troops followed on a pontoon bridge that had been hastily put together; and no sign of the Danes anywhere appeared. The news of other astonishing events was soon received.

The Austrians and the Guards had advanced in their march toward Schleswig as far as the river Sorge on the 1st of February, and on the 2d as far as Nordby. As they were going northward from there on the 3d, the Austrian brigade of Gondrecourt met a body of the enemy near the Hahnenkrug, while the Austrian *jäger* and Prussian grenadiers on the left likewise found the village of Jagel occupied. At both points the Danes were vigorously attacked, and driven back after a brave resistance. They again took up a position in the village

of Overselk, whence they were again driven by the bayonet, and retreated to Königshügel, a little height near the first fortifications of the Dannevirke and situated within range of its guns. The Austrians, however, stormed this also with irresistible enthusiasm, in spite of severe loss. They then took up a position there, and at once received twelve Prussian cannon for the purpose of firing upon the works.

The battle with its gradual advance had lasted four hours, and had cost the Danes 417, the Austrians 430, men. On the 4th of February, on the ground thus gained, batteries were constructed all along in front of the eastern wing of the Dannevirke, and the bombardment was begun. On the western wing the Prussians drove in the Danish outposts along the meadows of the Rheide. A staff officer, accompanied by two men, succeeded in reaching the wall on the other side of the flooded morass. He found that the ice would bear, and that the fortifications thrown up for the protection of the dams were weak. According to his report, which unfortunately arrived too late at headquarters, an attack on this point might have been made even as early as the 5th.

On the Danish side King Christian with his Minister, Monrad, had, on the 3d of February, come to the camp to encourage his army, now engaged in the struggle. He found officers and troops in the best temper possible; and on the 4th, with his mind relieved, he returned to Sonderborg, his departure being pressed by the Minister, who may have feared that the King would

interfere disadvantageously in the command of the army.

General de Meza had, like every one else, shown the King a confident countenance, but in his heart he was full of great anxiety. He knew, what the Prussian officer had seen, that the frost had put an end to the defence afforded by the water. The effect of the enemy's cannonade was found to be much greater than had been suspected. The troops, courageous in battle, were not sufficiently experienced to endure for a long time such a winter bivouac in the works as the close proximity of the enemy would demand. Under these circumstances, how long could the defence be continued, and what would be the fate of the army, if a successful attack by storm should bring the Germans into the works? And Denmark possessed only this one army. If that should be destroyed, the war would be ended in five days from its commencement; and accordingly, De Meza's instructions had expressly indicated the preservation of the army as the most important of all objects to be kept in view.

After the manner of strong characters, the General came to a decision without long delay. On the evening of the 4th, he assembled his higher officers for a council of war, and laid before them the facts that caused him so much anxiety. If permanent action on the defensive appeared hopeless, there was only one means of maintaining the position, and that was to make a sally with their entire force against the besieging enemy, to wage an offensive battle in front of the works. It was known

by the cannonading at Missunde that the enemy had sent strong detachments to the eastward; and there was, therefore, a prospect that the fight might be carried on at the Dannevirke with fairly equal numbers. But on the other hand, this also would be staking everything on one card. If the victory should not be gained, the complete destruction of the army was as good as certain. And after the fighting on the 3d of February, when the force of the enemy had made itself so severely felt, an absolute confidence in the Danish superiority was no longer entertained.

The council of war recognized the fact that the organization and training of the troops were by no means what is required in a well-prepared army. The prospect was therefore not very favorable either for defensive or offensive action; and nothing remained but to evacuate the Dannevirke immediately, in order to preserve for Denmark the army and with it the possibility of continuing the struggle, as well as to gain time for the friendly Foreign Powers to interfere.

The whole council, with the exception of General von Lüttichau, adopted this view. The order to retreat was at once sent to Missunde and Friedrichstadt; and on the evening of the 5th, the march of the troops out of the Dannevirke began, the stationary guns being left behind. By midnight the fortifications were entirely empty. The army proceeded at once to Flensburg. On the 6th, the rearguard was engaged at Oversee in an extremely bloody contest¹ with the Austrian brigade

¹ The Danish loss was 200 men killed and wounded, and 676 taken prisoners; the Austrian, 430 killed and wounded.

of Nostiz which was in pursuit. Except for this the Danes reached Flensburg unassailed, and from there the greater part of the infantry was transferred to the works at Düppel. Two brigades, however, and all the cavalry were sent northward.

Thus not in two years, as Napoleon had thought, but in five days, did the Dannevirke fall into the hands of the Germans. To be sure, this had not been accomplished by making a detour in accordance with Moltke's plan, which would have resulted in the annihilation of the enemy's army. The evacuation had not been brought on by the making of a detour, but on the contrary, that portion of the German army which was performing this manœuvre was spared from any fighting or loss by the vigorous threatening of the Dannevirke. Prince Frederick Charles, instead of being sent at once to Arnis, where the weak Danish outposts would not have been able to hinder his passage across the Schley, had been kept, during the 3d and 4th, before the strong works of Missunde where he could accomplish nothing. Instead of being satisfied with making significant movements at Overselk, the full force of the brave troops had been launched against the enemy.

"There are," wrote Colonel Blumenthal to Moltke, "but few men, indeed, who can execute a simple plan in a simple way. The Danish army does us the kindness of so placing itself that by making a detour we can bring it into the greatest possible embarrassment; instead of this, we run so violently at their strongest position and produce such terror there, that an early

opportunity is taken by them to sound a retreat. The Danes on the 4th of February were wiser than we: we made our detour two days too late.

If Moltke's plan had been exactly carried out, the war would most probably have been at end, or the occupation of Düppel and Alsen, of Jutland and Fünen, would have been a military promenade. As it was, the army was to shed many a drop of noble blood, and Bismarck to spend many an hour of mental anxiety and toil, before a profitable conclusion could be reached.

Nevertheless, the impression made by the speedy capture of the Dannevirke was very great. The more exaggeratedly the Danes had boasted to themselves and to others of the invincibleness of their works, the more stunning was the effect of the blow upon the public mind in Copenhagen. The people stormed through the streets, crying that the nation was betrayed, betrayed by that incapable parson Monrad, by the German generals in the army, and by the King himself who came of a German race. There were tumults that required the interference of the troops, who were themselves Schleswig-Holsteiners. The Queen and one of her daughters were publicly insulted. The Government had the weakness to yield to this outcry, and to sacrifice the savior of the army, General de Meza. The General and his Chief of the Staff, Kaufmann, an equally able officer, were deprived of their places, and the supreme command was given for the time to the only man who had dissented in the council of war, General Lüttichau.

No less keen was the excitement abroad. In Paris

the sensation was all the greater, since the Danish embassy had just before put in circulation dismal false reports of defeats suffered by the Germans. All sorts of sentiments were manifested in confusion in Paris society: great wrath on the part of Russians and English, surprise and annoyance on the part of the French. As for the French Government, the expressions of the Emperor and his Minister showed a mixture of feelings: earnest congratulations to the Prussians for their victory, but a secret regret that it had been gained with such effective assistance from Austria. For, as has been said, the French had encouraged Prussia in the war, with a hope that it would lead to complications between the two allied German Powers concerned in it. It could not, therefore, but be disagreeable to see a laurelled brotherhood-in-arms confirm too emphatically the intimacy between Berlin and Vienna. Napoleon again took occasion to speak of the rumors that Prussia had guaranteed to the Cabinet of Vienna the possession of Venetia, provided that Cabinet would agree to her annexation of the Duchies. And again was Goltz obliged to repeat the official assurance that not a word of this was true.

Still more decidedly was Lord Palmerston's hostile disposition displayed. He declared to Count Bernstorff that Prussia's proceedings involved the most unjust aggression and the most outrageous action known to history, that is, an attack at the moment when the enemy has promised to fulfil all demands and has only asked for the delay necessary to make the accomplish-

ment of this possible. We have explained above, how little this criticism amounted to after the official declaration of Monrad, that Denmark would never agree to the political autonomy, nor to a division, of Schleswig: the proposed delay would only have led to profitless writing and talking, and would have postponed military operations to a season of the year more favorable to Denmark. After making the above complaints, Palmerston also added the milder observation that nothing would, indeed, now be done until Parliament had expressed its opinion; but that in the spring England would not fail to assist the Danes.

The greater part of the Press concurred in this view. In the Parliament, also, the majority of all parties sympathized with Denmark; but it was another question whether on that account a war should be entered into with Germany, the German market be closed to English trade, and a door thrown open to the ambition of Napoleon. The leader of the Tories, Lord Derby, declared that he should shrink from such a war as from the greatest of misfortunes, and Lord John Russell admitted that England had never held out to the Danes any hope of material support.

The state of things in Sweden was much the same. The people and the Estates had no inclination whatever to go to war; but they made all the more complaint of the unjust attack of the Germans upon their northern Teutonic kinsmen. The King, however, secretly wished to take an active part in the war in the hope of making capital out of it for a Scandinavian Union; and his

Minister, Manderström, said without reserve that if France or England gave any assistance, Sweden would at once also send troops. The utter uncertainty of the state of things is thus evident; and it seems natural enough that Gortschakoff should charge the Prussian ambassador to urge prudence upon his Government. "Russia," he said, "will never arm against Prussia, never! But for Heaven's sake, hold fast to the London Protocol, so that you may not, in addition to Denmark, have England, France, and Sweden upon your hands."

In Germany, the astounding news of the capture of the Dannevirke called forth all sorts of feelings: delight and enthusiasm, discouragement and confusion; in general, a joyful disposition among the people, and dismay among the party-leaders and the Governments. The agitation for Augustenburg began to lose importance, now that the interest of the public was turned almost exclusively to the military operations. Seeing this, some said: "Brute force has now the upper hand; things can be properly settled only by the approaching revolution." Others argued: "If Austria and Prussia continue to whip the Danes, everything will be right in the end; but who could have trusted this Bismarck beforehand?" The Committee of Thirty-Six published an energetic manifesto against such views, urging a vigorous continuance of the agitation, with the only half untrue remark, that without that national agitation Austria and Prussia would never have gone so far as they had done.

Among the people of the Lesser States, numerous

expressions of regret began to be heard that their troops had no share in the laurels of victory. The foreign ambassadors to the Confederation spoke publicly of the Prussian annexation of the Duchies, and their German colleagues listened with silent annoyance. Reports of a like nature reached Berlin from Hanover and Munich: the annexation was everywhere spoken of as a certainty. King Max asked the Prussian ambassador what the real state of things was, what he knew about all these things, the annexation of the Duchies, and the guaranty for Venetia undertaken in consideration of the same. Herr von Arnim answered what was true, namely, that he had received no information on the subject, but that he distinctly did not believe in the existence of any such agreement. "But," asked the King, "where do all these rumors come from?" — "Your Majesty," answered the ambassador, "they spring from the feeling of every unprejudiced observer, that the state of things they indicate is the natural one." Thereupon the King let the conversation drop.

But yet once more was the wretchedness of dismemberment in Germany to be stirred up from its very bottom.

The common note sent by the two Great Powers on the 31st of January had renewed the bitter feeling of the Governments in the Lesser States, especially in Saxony and Bavaria. Without regarding the conclusion of the note, they saw in it only a renewed recognition of the compacts of 1852; and above all, Beust, Roggenbach, and Pfordten expressed lively indignation.

Roggenbach said that the declaration made by the Great Powers on the 14th of January ought to have been met at once with the recognition of Duke Frederick and the setting on foot of a Confederate army; the action of Austria and Prussia threatened, in his opinion, the independence, nay the very existence, of the Lesser States.

The Bavarian Government sent to the Courts that shared its views an invitation to another conference of ministers at Würzburg, for the purpose of arriving at an understanding in regard to some common action. Minister von Schrenck was of a somewhat calmer temperament than Beust and Roggenbach, but his standpoint in the matter agreed entirely with theirs. In an interview with the Prussian ambassador he explained this standpoint with great emphasis. "The conflict," he said, "is now unavoidable. So soon as the Confederation shall have decided the question of succession, the Lesser States are bound to march at once to Holstein in support of the Duke. It is to be hoped that the Great Powers will not then take military measures against Germany. Should they do so, we should be overpowered by force of arms." The ambassador pointed out to him that the adoption of such an attitude would simply mean inviting the French to interfere. "I shall not call upon them," said the Minister; "but if they should come to the aid of the Lesser States when the latter are unjustly assailed, I could not hinder it." The conversation continued for some time in this tone very warmly and quite without result.

In the Saxon Chamber, Beust came out with a lengthy polemic against the policy of the two Great Powers: "It is now seen," he said, "how exaggerated was their dread of foreign interference. The Foreign Powers have become reconciled to the advance into Schleswig; they would be still less inclined to make opposition, if the German Great Powers were to act in harmony with the Lesser States and the German people."

Simultaneously with the reports of these doings there arrived at Berlin many complaints from Wrangel and his officers about the uncomplying disposition of the Confederate commissioners and their officials in Holstein in all that concerned the necessities of the army in the field: they refused quarters to the troops that arrived; they oftener delayed than hastened the delivery of supplies; they allowed the army only one wire in the telegraph, and, on the other hand, gave passage to a host of false or even mischievous newspaper reports. "These men," wrote the Prussian ambassador at Hamburg, "are entirely under the influence of the so-called Ducal Government." Zedlitz also reported that now, too, in the Schleswig towns of Friedrichstadt, Husum, Tönning, and Gading, immediately after the departure of the Danes, the people, at the instance of Holstein agents from Altona, had proclaimed Duke Frederick sovereign of the country; and the French ambassador pointed out very earnestly to Bismarck the consequences that might follow such revolutionary symptoms.

Bismarck, who had no intention of letting Prussia be

at all embarrassed by the Confederation or by Augustenburg, instructed Sydow on the 8th of February to demand, in common with Kübeck, a speedy remedy for these complaints. He also called attention to the fact, that, in order to make secure the military basis of operations for the army, it would be necessary to propose that the most important points of communication, Rendsburg, Neumünster, Kiel, and Altona, should be occupied by Prussian troops. The two representatives succeeded with some difficulty in extracting from the committees on the 9th of February a letter to the Confederate General Hake, which met in as limited a way as possible the Prussian demands concerning quartering, supplies, and the telegraph.

But in the mean time a Prussian brigade had already arrived at Hamburg, who were to occupy the several points of communication; and before Bismarck could have his motion about this matter brought forward at Frankfort, Wrangel had taken practical steps, by calling upon Hake on the 10th of February to admit bodies of Prussians into Neumünster, Kiel, and Altona. When Hake refused, the Marshal, on the 12th, sent into Altona on his own authority a battalion, which quartered itself on the inhabitants as a permanent garrison, but which at the same time did not interfere with the Hanoverians. Some days after, the other towns were occupied in the same way.

When Hake's telegraphic despatch concerning Altona was received, the ill-humor of the Lesser States, which had been accumulating for a month, was poured forth

in violent outbursts of wrath. Beust was for repelling force with force. Count Platen in Hanover did, indeed, give the Hanoverian commandant in Altona, General Gebser, orders contrary to this, but he declared that Prussia's behavior was inexcusable. The really delicate point in the question was touched by Herr von Schrenck. He said to the Prussian ambassador: "We know well that the occupation has for its object, not simply to get possession of the military points of communication, but to hinder the establishing of Duke Frederick in his rights. Extreme measures are unavoidable, unless speedy satisfaction is made." In Frankfort all the representatives of the Lesser States unanimously agreed that the withdrawal of the Prussian garrisons with a guaranty against a repetition of the steps taken should be demanded, and that a considerable re-enforcement of the Confederate troops in Holstein must be provided.

The occupation of the Holstein towns by a permanent Prussian garrison was certainly not in accordance with the Confederate decrees passed up to that time; but the same was true of the toleration of the Augustenburg agitations by the Confederate commissioners. Bismarck, moreover, in arguing the matter, persisted calmly in his standpoint, that the promise given by the Confederate Diet on the 22d of January to further all military operations could not but justify the belief that the securing of the military basis for such operations would be agreeable to the Confederation. To be ready for any emergency, he caused a portion of the

Silesian army-corps to be concentrated on the Saxon frontier, so that Herr von Beust's ardor might be a little cooled; but at the same time King William decided to send General Manteuffel to Dresden and Hanover with autograph letters, and so to offer the right hand of reconciliation to the two Sovereigns.

General Edwin von Manteuffel was a man of decided character and great natural intelligence; he was cultivated in many directions, and for the most part by his own efforts; he was independent in his judgment, full of original views, and always able to express them in a manner peculiar to himself. Politically, he held closely to the Conservative party. Without the prejudices of a doctrinaire, he had a practical conviction that only one could be master, and that in Prussia that one must be the King. Entertaining this view of the matter, parliamentary methods seemed to him decidedly burdensome; and even from the agitation for German Unity he feared rather a dissolution of the solid frame of the Prussian state than hoped for a political strengthening of the German nation.

His remarkable ability had won for him in a great degree the personal confidence of Frederick William IV., and had then brought him into the difficult position of head of the royal military council, where he took an important part in the work of newly organizing the army, made a thorough clearing out of the useless elements in the corps of officers, and several times undertook with success military, and occasionally even diplomatic, missions at foreign courts. In this way he

gained considerable acquaintance with the people that held the most prominent positions in Europe, to all of whom he was from the start recommended by his well-known political principles. He had formed for himself a peculiar fashion of intercourse in these relations: while preserving all the courteous forms of respect, he took advantage of that frankness so well suited to a soldier, and said the most disagreeable things with natural honesty, always making it a point to hit the nail on the head. For a confidential negotiation like the one now in hand, he was in every respect the man to choose.

He armed himself, moreover, for his mission to Dresden, with a political treatise, in the composition of which his friend Leopold Ranke, I almost think, had something to do with guiding the pen. After some observations on the European significance of the Schleswig question and on the necessity of considering, besides the claims of Augustenburg, the political relations involved, this document continued: "The Princes must not believe that their Chambers are enthusiastic for Augustenburg on account of his hereditary rights. Nor does the present conflict spring exactly from democratic principles or from a desire for revolution. The question is, to whom shall the preponderating influence in public affairs fall—to the majorities in the Chambers, or to the Sovereign? If the Chambers succeed in putting through their candidacy of Augustenburg, they will be the masters in public affairs. The Great Powers alone are strong enough to prevent this. What would

the consequences be, if the Schleswig-Holstein question should lead to an open breach between the Great Powers and the Lesser States — especially if the latter should summon France to their aid! France would perhaps give ear to this wish. But England would certainly oppose it; and Russia also would take sides. What a fate would then await the German Princes! Should one man die, they would all be lost. But even if that man lived, he would not be able to defend them against such an evidently superior force. If he himself were assailed and in danger, he would be more ready to sacrifice them than himself and his dynasty: they would be ruined, and no one would pity them.”

On the 16th of February, Manteuffel was graciously received by King John. The General at once presented the royal letter, which in friendly words pointed out the impossibility for the two Great Powers of letting themselves be bound in European affairs by majority-decisions of the Confederate Diet, emphasized the necessity of a secure basis of operations, and complained of the spectacle which was presented to the world at large by all this petty friction in a great cause of common national importance.

King John expressed his thanks for the friendly epistle, and his readiness for reconciliation; but he persisted in his opinion that satisfaction must be made to the Confederation. Manteuffel then took the liberty of remarking that there had been peace for so many years that war had long ceased to be understood: the troops were facing the enemy, and it was impossible to

introduce by diplomatic proceedings every measure necessary for their safety.

The conversation turned on the two different points of view thus indicated. Manteuffel said that when both parties were fighting for the same object and against the same enemy, it was no time to debate about points of form. The King answered that unfortunately the objects were different: the Lesser States wished to bring about the elevation of Augustenburg, the Great Powers to hinder it. When Manteuffel read his political treatise, the King asserted that he was far from thinking of a Rhine Confederation, nor was he by any means dependent upon his Chambers.

A conversation between the General and Beust brought more precise explanations. Beust spoke very calmly. He regretted that he was obliged to go to the Würzburg conference, and could not, therefore, fittingly give a final answer beforehand. Manteuffel admitted this, but begged the Minister to consider that "we could be in Saxony to-morrow; do, therefore, use your great abilities to prevent so unfortunate a contingency." — "What!" cried Beust. "What do you mean might occasion an advance of your troops into Saxony?" — "It is very simple," said the General. "If a single Prussian soldier should be shot in Holstein, the King could not do otherwise than occupy Saxony. We must both do what we can to avoid that." Beust then expressed his satisfaction at having spoken with the General before his departure for Würzburg.

When he returned on the 24th of February — we

shall say a word later concerning what happened at that conference — King John wrote to King William that he must persist in the conviction that Augustenburg was the rightful heir; and that therefore the Confederation ought to help him to obtain his rights. “Nevertheless,” he said, “Saxony, while asserting and maintaining her position as to the rights of the question, will facilitate, so far as in her lies, the operations of the Great Powers, which at any rate must tend to weaken the common enemy.” General Hake, he added, would receive orders to avoid every chance of a conflict.

Meanwhile Manteuffel had arrived at Hanover on the 19th of February. The course that things took there was substantially the same as at Dresden. King George spoke in disjointed sentences, somewhat more warmly and with more irritation than King John had done. “The forms must be observed,” he said. “Wrangel seems to pass over forms very lightly; but forms are necessary for the maintenance of the Confederation.”

Minister Platen declared that he was no enemy to Prussia, but that he could show his sentiments only within the proper limits of the principles of the Confederation. “Hanover’s position,” he said, “is difficult. Here the National Association rules; and in South Germany the Democracy. Saxony stirs the fire. If our Government takes a strong stand, it will sink at once into dependence upon Prussia; and as Hanoverian Minister, I cannot favor that.” He, however, promised that he would do all he could to maintain concord; and the King in the same tone answered the letter of the

Prussian Monarch. The affair was thus smoothed over for the time; and the Prussian battalions remained in the Holstein towns.

Manteuffel was soon engaged in a more extensive and more important negotiation. The Confederate Diet had already received its first warning as to the weight that its Majority would have, when opposed to the Great Powers. Once more the folly of a Confederate Constitution that placed the authority to say and the power to do in different hands had been made manifest through the false steps taken by those who had the authority. But the lesson was not yet severe enough. After it, as before, the Majority persisted in its opposition to the main policy of the two Great Powers.

CHAPTER II.

GENERAL VON MANTEUFFEL IN VIENNA.

AFTER the first dismay at the evacuation of the Dannevirke had been overcome, the determination was still alive in Copenhagen to resist to the very last. An embargo had already been laid on the 3d of February, not only upon Prussian and Austrian ships, but also upon all German ships lying in Danish ports; so that in a supplementary way the Confederate chastisement of Holstein was also branded as an act of war, and a proper title given to the Confederation for the declaration of the Confederate war. At the same time a blockade of Holstein and Schleswig ports was decreed by Denmark; and soon afterwards this was also extended to a number of German ports on the Baltic Sea.

Side by side with these operations, negotiations went on with reference to an intervention of the Foreign Powers. This had already been requested in a circular note of the 6th of January, without any specification, for the time, of the form in which assistance was desired. When, then, England on the 20th of January renewed her proposition of a conference, and Russia also seconded it, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Quaade, a quiet and temperate man, who had only out of patriotism taken his seat in the Eider-Danish Cabinet,

announced the approval of his Government. Thereupon England repeated her proposition in Berlin and Vienna, and at the same time demanded, as the necessary condition of calm negotiations, the immediate proclamation of an armistice.

Without any previous conference with each other the answers of the two Courts were the same: that they were ready to consent to a truce if Denmark would first withdraw from Düppel and the island of Alsen. This demand was, politically considered, the consequence of the original plan of holding all Schleswig as security, and from a military point of view imperative in order to protect the flank of the allied army against possible offensive attacks of the enemy. But inasmuch as Denmark categorically refused to comply, and furthermore now declared that she could not negotiate at all unless the Germans should evacuate Schleswig entirely, — there was nothing to be done but to let military operations take their own course.

After the allies had on the 7th of February occupied Flensburg, a lively discussion ensued in headquarters as to the next steps to be taken. On one side it was deemed advisable to take possession as soon as possible of the Düppel redoubts; and on the other side the most effective means of overcoming the resistance of the Danes appeared to be the occupation of North Schleswig and Jutland. Moltke, who was still of the opinion that the sacrifice and expense connected with a siege of Düppel were out of all proportion to the benefit derived from its possession, whereas the occupation of

Jutland would necessarily produce a decisive impression in Copenhagen, hastened, himself, to headquarters.

In conformity with Moltke's opinion, Wrangel then gave the order to Prince Frederick Charles on the 10th of February to remain behind with the 1st army-corps to keep watch of Düppel, and commanded Gablenz and the division of the Guards to march forward towards Jutland. The smaller portion of the Danish army under General Hegermann-Lindencrone, to whom had been left the defence of this province, had entirely quitted North Schleswig, so that the allies by the 17th of February reached the Jutland boundary without meeting any opposition.

Meanwhile, however, the Austrian civil commissioner, Baron Revertera, had already, on the 14th, informed the Chief of Staff, General Vogel von Falckenstein, that for diplomatic reasons it would be hardly advisable to cross the Jutland frontier; in reply to which Falckenstein with the express approval of the Field-Marshal begged the Austrian to forbear making such diplomatic representations to him, since at headquarters only military considerations could have any weight. Falckenstein, nevertheless, had the Prussian diplomat, Wagner, telegraph the whole circumstance to Bismarck without delay. The latter, who had hitherto had no share in the deliberations and discussions about the military operations, now took a decisive and resolute part in them.

All moves that had hitherto been made in common with Austria had been wholly confined to Schleswig.

Werther kept sending reports continually of Rechberg's increasing anxiety about a break with England and a consequent English-French alliance. On the 7th of February, Werther had particularly sent word that the Emperor Francis Joseph rejoiced at the successes thus far, but had expressed his hope that it would not be necessary to pursue the Danes into Jutland.

If in spite of this the army should march forward, then, in view of such sentiments in Vienna, to which at that time Karolyi gave decidedly the tone, there seemed to be danger lest General Gablenz might suddenly receive contrary orders from his own Government, and before the eyes of Europe the paths of the two Powers might widely diverge. This must not be! On the 15th of February the royal order was sent to Wrangel not to cross the frontier before receiving further directions; on this occasion the Minister of War felt also called upon to instruct further the Field-Marshal to make no more definite arrangements in Holstein without taking preliminary diplomatic steps concerning the same in concert with Bismarck.

How needful such measures actually were, was made evident on the very following day, when Werther telegraphed that upon hearing Revertera's report, the Emperor Francis Joseph had written directly to King William, and had at the same time sent express orders to General Gablenz under no circumstances to join in an invasion of Jutland: it was now possible to pacify the Emperor with the announcement that Wrangel had already the day before received similar instructions.

But the Field-Marshal himself was enraged at the reception of such orders. He telegraphed to the King that these diplomats who had upset the finest plans deserved the gallows;¹ yet he hastened on the 17th of February from Apenrade to Hadersleben, in order to be on hand to make the necessary arrangements. But here he received the news, on the 18th, that the hussars of the Prussian Guard at the van of his army had had a hand-to-hand engagement with a small squad of Danes, and in the pursuit had crossed the Jutland frontier and had occupied the nearest city, Kolding. Thereupon Wrangel gave orders that Kolding should be held, but no further advance made. Moltke hurried back to Berlin to explain this accidental occurrence, but with the intention to recommend the maintenance of the position once secured, and in general to advocate the pursuance of the plan determined upon.

Here he encountered no difficulties. The King and Roon had always shared his opinion; and Bismarck had no objections to offer, if Austria's consent could be secured. "The storming of Düppel and the crossing to Alsen," he wrote on the 16th of February to Werther, "would involve enormous sacrifices. Why make them, if we can gain the same results by a pressure

¹ Bismarck, having been officially informed of this despatch, took occasion to have his revenge by ignoring the presence of Wrangel at every meeting, when the latter returned later to Berlin. Wrangel could not endure this long; once, as the two were sitting side by side at a royal banquet, he asked the Minister: "*Mein Sohn, kannst du nicht vergessen*" (My son, can you not forget)?" "No!" was the answer. After a moment's pause: "*Mein Sohn, kannst du nicht vergeben*" (My son, can you not forgive)?"—"With all my heart," said Bismarck; and after that they were always good friends.

brought to bear upon Jutland ?” Werther, on his part, and upon a hint from Rechberg, urged that some one might come to Vienna on a special confidential mission, to try to influence the Emperor personally.

Since the news of the occupation of Kolding produced again great excitement in the *Hofburg*, instructions were given to General Manteuffel, after his Hanover mission should be finished, to proceed to Vienna with an autograph letter from the King. Bismarck’s idea was to take this opportunity to revise the whole basis of relations with Austria, and to involve in the pending military question the whole political situation in general.

The letter of the King to the Emperor, dated the 21st of February, summed up the matter in the following manly words : —

“ Our policy would be abortive if we did not follow it out to a satisfactory conclusion. I place great value upon England’s friendship; but do not believe that England or any other Power will find it in their interest to attack us, so long as we remain united. And even if the danger lay nearer than is in my opinion the case, there are still circumstances in which I do not consider it would be possible to yield to the fear of it. Therefore, I believe that nothing could be more likely to make this danger imminent than such conduct on our part as would betray any anxiety about it.”

The instructions given to the General contained also the following declarations: “ There are two questions involved: the advance of the army into Jutland, and the settlement of the dispute between the Lesser States and the Great Powers over the possession of the dominant

position in Germany : these two questions are, moreover, intimately connected. The occupation of Jutland is indispensable as reprisal for the capture of German ships and the blockade of our ports, which must soon be expected ; and it is very clear that we cannot take such reprisals in Schleswig. We owe it to public opinion in the army and among the people, to carry out our programme resolutely and completely, to assert our power and influence in Germany, and not to yield to any direct attacks from the Lesser States. The motion of Austria and Prussia together, that they should share in the Confederate chastisement in Holstein, must be accepted by the Confederation : the Lesser States must learn that if they attempt to subject the European policy of Austria and Prussia to the control of the majority of the Confederation, they will make the continuance of such confederate relations impossible for these two Powers. The matter has been brought to the critical point by the Lesser States themselves ; and the moment is favorable for bringing them to a decision, because neither England nor Russia would now take the part of the Lesser States, their policy being exactly the contrary of that adopted by those Powers. As for France, Austria and Prussia need fear no protest on her part, so long as they remain united."

It is clearly seen that in this statement the German question was considered as immediately depending upon the Schleswig-Holstein affair, and that in making it Prussia took the standpoint from which in the following years she brought about the overthrow

of the Confederation and the founding of the German Empire.

Manteuffel was confidentially told to avoid every mention of any propositions for a close or permanent alliance between Austria and Prussia; and if Rechberg should suggest such, Manteuffel was to reply that they lay outside of the scope of his instructions. Only when forced to do so, might he allow it to be understood as his personal opinion that the King would hardly beforehand assume a guaranty for the protection of territory or any obligations of the nature of a treaty, yet would consider an alliance with Austria advantageous for special purposes and in special cases, since each of the two Powers seemed to him forced by her own interests, in the event of the other's being attacked by a more powerful enemy, not to leave her in the lurch; that for the present, however, the relations with France gave no occasion for such apprehension: on the contrary, if England continued to make trouble, it might not be impossible to employ French influence against England.

When Manteuffel arrived with this commission in Vienna, he found himself in an atmosphere entirely different from the fresh and ambitious spirit which breathed through his instructions. After the short excitement of 1863, the people had very soon again lost every inclination to make war: the fight on the distant Baltic might perhaps be the source of great profit to Prussia, but could bring only danger and sacrifice for Austria. The war had grown universally unpopular. "The Danes have done us no harm," was heard on all

sides. A vague distrust of Prussia was widely prevalent among the people, as well as in the administrative circles. Beside this, the finances of the Empire were disordered, the deficit great, credit bad, the majority in the Imperial Council upon strained terms with the Government, and all Hungary as one man openly protesting against the unifying tendencies of the imperial Constitution.

More than once Rechberg declared to the Prussian negotiator, and the Emperor confirmed his statement, that until a reconciliation had been effected with Hungary, Austria would not be in a position to carry on a great war, and, indeed, it would be hard even to send a re-enforcement to the army-corps in Schleswig. There was everywhere a great fear of a French attack, which outweighed other considerations and induced Austria to try to keep on good terms, not only with Prussia, but also with Russia and England, and to do nothing that might estrange these Powers from the Court of Vienna.

Serious symptoms had been perceived of a closer intimacy between France and Italy; and therefore the force stationed in Venetia had just been increased by twenty-one battalions. To please Russia, a state of siege had been declared in Galicia on the 24th of February, and the final *coup de grâce* was thus given to the Polish Rebellion, which was still alive in that country; but in consequence, the garrisons there had to be strengthened. From England the news came that Lord Palmerston had declared in open Parliament that the

criminal German war against Denmark had been made doubly heinous by the violation of the Jutland frontier; and it was at the same time learned that he was making every possible effort to induce the Emperor Napoleon to favor an intervention in aid of the Danes.

And just now this most feared and most hated of men was wrinkling his brow and suggesting to the Austrian ambassador the possibility of a diplomatic mediation on the part of the two Western Powers, while he rather seriously (probably to give Prussia a slight hint of his displeasure at her increasing intimacy with Austria) made the inquiry in Berlin, whether it was the intention of the Government soon to call back the troops from Jutland; to which Bismarck replied by asking whether the neutral Powers would perhaps be willing to insure the protection of the troops in Schleswig against Danish attacks. In view of all this, the Prussian proposal to occupy not only Kolding, but also all Jutland, seemed to the Vienna Cabinet in the highest degree dangerous, as almost certain to cause Napoleon and Lord Palmerston to unite upon some hostile plan.

All these fears and distresses will serve the present observer only as new proofs of the abnormal and disorganized state of affairs in Germany. The Foreign Powers had recognized, although with reluctance, the justice of the ends proclaimed by Austria and Prussia as the object of the war: namely, the protection of Schleswig against the threatened incorporation into Denmark. Now, by what international law in the world could the

right to make use of that unavoidable element of warfare, an advance into the enemy's country, be at this time called into question? or by what logic could military occupation be construed into an attempt to make a permanent conquest of Jutland?

This is so palpably evident, that only the most evil intentions could seize upon such an excuse for hostility; and King William in his letter had plainly enough said what the honor of a great nation in such a case demanded. That there was no need, however, of worrying about such an event, was emphasized by Moltke in his plain language: "As Napoleon did not attack us on account of Schleswig, he certainly will not do so on account of Jutland."

In spite of all this, Manteuffel had great difficulty in representing in Vienna the force of the Prussian position. He was, it is true, graciously received by the Emperor and heartily welcomed by Rechberg; but he found the generals, though very polite, not so cordial as in former years. With regard to Jutland, at the very first mention of the subject he was told that nothing could be definitely decided until further news should come from Paris, especially about Bismarck's proposition that the Great Powers should guarantee the protection of Schleswig against hostile attacks, in place of an occupation of Jutland. Some time was spent in thus waiting, although Bismarck immediately replied to this by saying that his remarks about such a guaranty had been nothing more than a rhetorical figure, and that Talleyrand had understood it just as it

had been meant; that, indeed, both of them knew very well no such guaranty was at all practicable.

Meanwhile, Manteuffel discussed with the Emperor and Rechberg the second portion of his commission, the subordination of the Lesser States. On this point they were at once agreed; for Beust's policy in favor of Augustenburg was condemned by the neutral Powers more severely than by Austria and Prussia. It was agreed that the plans adopted in Würzburg, namely, the summoning of the Holstein Estates and the march of South German troops to Holstein, must at all events be hindered, even, if need be, by force of arms. If the majority of the Confederation should proceed to recognize the title of Augustenburg, and receive his ambassadors at their courts, then the two Great Powers would, with a protest against such measures, recall their deputies from Frankfort and thenceforth take into their own hands the conduct of German as well as Holstein affairs.

This was entirely consonant with Bismarck's sentiments. To be sure, the Viennese were especially energetic in expressing these opinions, simply because they were firmly convinced that it would not finally come to such extreme measures, but that a strong diplomatic pressure would be quite sufficient to gain the end desired.

While awaiting the news from Paris, the military questions were also talked over. General Hess, the most influential of all, declared the projected advance into Jutland to be, from a strategic point of view, a

mistake; for it would extend too much the line of operations and expose many weak points to dangerous flank-attacks from the Danes. A very detailed memorial drawn up by General Huyn in defence of this theory was sent to Berlin. It asserted that the object of the war was the occupation of Schleswig, and this did not require an invasion of Jutland, but rather the taking possession of Düppel and Alsen; the advance into Jutland would split up the forces and make it possible for the Danes to overcome with superior numbers each one of the isolated divisions.

“A genuine piece of official pedantry of the old style,” was Moltke’s criticism. “The occupation of Schleswig is not the object of the war, but merely a means, in itself insufficient, of attaining the real end, the establishment of a legitimate and law-abiding state of things in the Duchies. All misgivings about the advance into Jutland and the lengthening of our line of operations are removed by the simple consideration of the strength of the respective forces: the Danes have to-day not more than 34,000 active men in the field; of these they can collect at the very most 27,000 for an offensive attack; but we have 31,000 at Kolding, 29,000 in the vicinity of Düppel, besides 5,000 men in Holstein. So that nothing can be more opportune for us than any attempt to attack us, and nothing could be worse for us than a total cessation of operations, by which we should declare that we had reached the limit of our powers.”

Manteuffel, on his part, explained to the Emperor

that to the seriously-demoralized Danish army no time nor leisure ought to be given for recuperation; that to prohibit the Germans from crossing the Jutland frontier and at the same time to allow the Danes to pass it freely was an anomaly; and that it would be sacrificing a great deal of the European and national influence of both Powers to declare that, in response to the reasonable demands of the army and the complaints of the plundered ship-owners, nothing could be done because of the fear of a possible war, and because of Austria's unwillingness.

The Emperor persisted that Austria's position was attended by too many difficulties. With almost indignant resoluteness he rejected the idea of diplomatic negotiations with France, such as Bismarck suggested to Count Karolyi. Manteuffel replied, however, that the Emperor need not be troubled on that account; Bismarck had, of course, canvassed with Karolyi all possible eventualities, but was a genuine son of Brandenburg, and consequently by no means a friend of Bonaparte; and furthermore the King would have sent to Vienna another than himself if he had intended to propose to the Emperor a French alliance.

Thus they prolonged these discussions for five days without advancing an inch. At last more favorable reports were received from Paris and London. Palmerston felt, to be sure, more and more embittered; but in spite of all sympathy with Denmark, neither Queen Victoria, nor the majority of the Ministers, nor the leaders of the Opposition were willing to commit themselves to a war against Germany.

But Napoleon chuckled with delight at the embarrassment of the hated Lord John Russell. He might, perhaps, have taken up with an alliance with England against Prussia, if England had been willing in return to guarantee to him the acquisition of the left bank of the Rhine or of Belgium,—but unfortunately it was just such ambitions on the part of France that held back English statesmen from taking decided steps against Germany. No definite nor binding declaration could even now be obtained by Prince Metternich from the French Monarch.

Then there had to be taken into account also the defiant attitude of the Danes, which had been aroused by Palmerston's speeches. They made preparations with all their might, levied recruits for the army and the navy, were unwilling to enter into negotiations until they should have reconquered Schleswig, and would accept an armistice only upon condition of their retaining Alsen and of the Germans' evacuating Kolding. Lord John thereupon inquired in Berlin whether Prussia would without any armistice join in a conference. Bismarck replied immediately that she would. So it was impossible for the neutral Powers, in the face of Prussia's conciliatory attitude, to take sides actively with Denmark, thirsting as she was for war.

Some result was, then, at last arrived at in Vienna. Rechberg's personal opinion had been, as Manteuffel had believed, favorable to Prussia from the beginning; and now, on the 29th of February, the Emperor also announced that he inclined to the plan of going ahead

and of delaying no longer. Yet he wished to have an exact statement from Prussia, giving the reasons for invading Jutland, and also what military measures were projected, so that they could be specified to the Great Powers.

Bismarck replied by telegraph as follows: "The reasons are threefold: reprisals for the capture of German ships, the scattering of the Danish forces, and the breaking down of the Danish resistance to an armistice and conference. No specifications should be made to the Powers beforehand, which might occasion annoying responses, but rather official notice simultaneously with the act, which would deprive it of any political significance." Manteuffel was left at liberty in the matter of military plans to accede to the wishes of the Austrians so far as possible.

Accordingly, Manteuffel, Werther, and Rechberg came to the following agreement on the 1st of March. Consistently with the original understanding about the occupation of Schleswig, the possession of Düppel and Alsen was to be the central object of further operations; but that such operations might be protected against Danish attacks from the direction of Fridericia, Wrangel was given permission to cross the frontier of Jutland; for the Danish hostilities on the sea justified the extension of the war to the Kingdom of Denmark in its more restricted sense of the term. The Powers were to be informed that this purely military measure in no way changed anything in former declarations; a conference or an armistice would be accepted as readily as

ever, the latter either upon the basis of the existing military status, or of the simultaneous evacuation of Jutland by the Germans and of Alsen by the Danes, and furthermore, under all circumstances, of the discontinuance of Danish privateering. Moreover, since in accordance with Article V. of the agreement of January 16th the breaking out of the war had nullified the treaties of 1852, the two Courts were to come to an understanding, upon the basis of the new propositions to be recommended by the conference, concerning the position of the two united Duchies in the Danish Monarchy as a whole.

After receiving the imperial approval, this agreement was sent to Berlin, and there signed on the 5th of March. The corresponding military orders were issued on the 6th.

This new treaty was a curious production, resulting from a mixture of Prussian and Austrian wishes. Prussia had succeeded in obtaining permission to occupy Jutland, in spite of Huyn's anxiety about too long a line of operations, and in spite of Rechberg's fears of European complications. But in order that this move should appear to the neutral Powers as merely made for the protection of troops engaged in the main action in Schleswig, Prussia had decided, in spite of Moltke's serious objections from a military point of view, to begin in earnest the siege of Düppel. Lastly, it was of political significance that Austria had recognized the nullification of the treaties of 1852. As a counter-weight to this, however, Prussia had committed

herself by agreeing to make it the first demand of the two Powers at the conference that the Duchies of Schleswig-Holstein should have a common sovereign with Denmark, and should thus be united with the Kingdom under the rule of Christian IX. By this a complete separation of the two countries would still be avoided and the claims of Augustenburg absolutely put aside.

In short, Prussia and Austria had arrived at an understanding. The Emperor rejoiced at the strengthened bond which united to him that Monarch whom he revered as an undaunted champion in the struggle against parliamentary encroachments, in marked contrast to the fickle Courts of the Lesser States. Even Bismarck, too, was well spoken of at that time in Vienna: "One cannot love him," they said, "but one must respect him for his energy and his devotion to his King." Manteuffel considered these sentiments the chief cause of that sudden wheeling about of Austria in November from the Lesser States to the side of Prussia.

However that may have been, after the Emperor Francis Joseph had once made up his mind, he showed again enthusiasm and zeal for carrying on the war. Inasmuch as it did not seem practicable, as we have said, to increase his land-forces in Schleswig, he was ready to send six or eight large war-ships from the Adriatic to the North Sea in order to protect German commerce in those parts and to break up the Danish blockades, — although it was just by means of a mari-

time move that England's jealousy was likely to be aroused upon a most sensitive point.

Rechberg wrote at this time to Karolyi, that if ever again any misunderstanding should arise between Berlin and Vienna, he only hoped the King would straightway send General Manteuffel to them once more.

In Jutland, operations had begun immediately after the orders of the 6th of March had been issued. The greater portion of the Prussian division of the Guards advanced from Kolding against Fridericia, took two hundred Danish prisoners on the way, and surrounded the fortress on all sides. A short bombardment of the city by the Prussian field-artillery naturally resulted in nothing. The Austrians, re-enforced by Prussian cavalry, stormed Veile on the 8th of March in a sharp engagement.¹ This produced such an effect that General Hegermann-Lindencrone abandoned the idea of further resistance, and temporarily withdrew, conveying his troops for safety beyond the Lijm fjord to the island of Mors, and into North Jutland. About the 20th of March, the greater part of the country south of the Lijm fjord was given up to the German occupation.

Wrangel wished to establish here also a German administration, and to raise a large contribution for the benefit of the injured German merchants; but he received without delay the notification that these plans should be included under political measures, which he

¹ Without, indeed, much loss: Austrians, 12 killed, 72 wounded; Danes, 35 killed and wounded, 132 taken prisoners.

had no right to put into force without instructions from his superiors, and that for the present he must content himself with demanding from the inhabitants provisions for the support of the troops as is usual in times of war. The Field-Marshal gave expression to his vexation at this fresh reproof by asking whether under provisions for the support of the troops he was expected to include shoes for the soldiers. Roon calmly replied in the affirmative.

Moreover, Wrangel was no more amiable as a superior than as a subordinate. Zedlitz was continually complaining that the Field-Marshal, now here, now there, had disturbed by a hasty order some carefully planned arrangements in the administration of Schleswig. The officers, too, were often heard to grumble at the way in which with tiresome restlessness he used to meddle in the details of operations, without showing any trace of having in his head as superior commander any general plan of action. Therefore every one was glad of the presence of the Crown Prince, who had tarried in the headquarters from the beginning of the campaign and with the most unwearied good-nature had wisely and firmly done his best in smoothing away such occasions for friction. The King, therefore, on the 20th of March gave the order that in the future Wrangel should make no dispositions without first consulting the Crown Prince, which, as a matter of fact, meant the giving of the supreme control of the army into the hands of the latter.

With the same zeal with which Wrangel had favored

the occupation of Jutland did he, in a report to the King on the 23d of February, oppose the plan of laying siege to Düppel. In this document he says that "this cannot be carried out without the presence of heavy artillery. The transportation hither of the necessary bombardment-train would take a very long time, since there exists no bridge between Hamburg and Harburg, nor any connecting track between the different railway-stations in Hamburg; and furthermore, the highway from Flensburg to the Sundewitt peninsula has now no solid foundation, owing to the dreadful weather and to the great amount of military transportation over it. Four weeks might pass before the required artillery stood in readiness before Düppel, and this would cause an interruption of all operations. Therefore it is better to give up that plan altogether, especially since the conquest of that little corner of the earth would be no real gain. It would not even lead to the possession of Alsen, since the passage thither could not be effected without the help of a fleet."

Yet, had these arguments been twice as forcible, it was necessary after the recent Vienna agreement to go ahead and do something. Moltke, too, had gradually withdrawn his opposition, after considering that that town, in front of which nearly half of the army had now been reconnoitring and skirmishing for a whole month without effecting anything whatever, must at length be taken, as a matter of honor especially for Prussian arms, which had not as yet found an opportunity for accomplishing anything of importance.

Already on the 26th of February orders had been given for placing twenty-four heavy cannon in readiness; and then, after the decision at Vienna, on the 3d of March the transportation of the same was arranged and the despatch of an additional detachment. On the 13th, the first section arrived, consisting of twenty-six cannon from Westphalia, which were used in establishing batteries near Gammelmark on the south shore of the Bay of Wenningbund, from whence across the water at a distance of about three thousand feet the left flank of the Danish redoubts could be fired upon, and at a somewhat greater distance the town of Sonderburg on the island of Alsen and the bridges between that town and Düppel would be covered.

On the 15th of March a fire was opened there, which caused the burning of some houses in the town and annoyed not a little the Danish garrison of the redoubts by destroying their barracks; and then, after the Danes had been driven out from the villages of Westerdüppel and Rackebull in front of the redoubts, a battery could also be set-up on the north shore of the Wenningbund. After the arrival of more and heavier pieces of artillery, it was planned toward the end of the month to proceed to the actual siege, and to dig the first parallel trenches.

Yet the redoubts seemed to be very much stronger, when more nearly approached, than had been at first supposed; and so Colonel Blumenthal hit upon the idea of reversing the present plan of capturing first Düppel and then Alsen, and proposed to effect a landing

upon Alsen, to overcome the Danes upon the island in a pitched battle, utterly annihilating them (as he hoped), and thus to insure the fall of Düppel without any further efforts.

Prince Frederick Charles at first considered the undertaking to be exceedingly hazardous. General Moltke, too, however desirable the project seemed to him in the event of success, declared it to be impracticable, unless some ships of war could be brought from the Pomeranian coast to the Sound of Alsen to cover the attack; he would have decidedly preferred a landing upon the island of Fünen by the Prussian Division of the Guards, where the Danes were at the time not at all prepared for an attack. But this would have necessitated new negotiations with Vienna, which would very likely have dragged along for weeks, and finally be without any result; and in Berlin, in view of the urgency of England for a conference and a truce, every one was very anxious that some speedy and brilliant achievement might soon be consummated.

Inasmuch, then, as Blumenthal held fast to his proposition with all the tenacity of a carefully formed conviction, and since he importunately urged his arguments upon the attention of Frederick Charles and Moltke, as also of the Crown Prince and Wrangel, persisting that the scheme was practicable, and asking even if it were somewhat hazardous, what great successes were ever achieved in war without great dangers? — therefore the plan was approved on the 25th of March, and in order that during the landing a sufficient force might be on

hand in front of Düppel, the greater part of the Division of the Guards was called back into the Sundewitt, whereupon the Austrians were concentrated again at Veile and Fridericia.

Now, the northern portion of the Alsen Sound is more than twice as wide as the southern; and on the other hand, the Danes, in order to support Düppel, had stationed their troops almost entirely in the southern half of the island. So that, although the transportation of the successive divisions of the troops across the northern end of the sound would take a much longer time, yet in return for this there was greater prospect of surprising the Danes and of effecting a landing without a fight. Consequently, the village of Ballegard in the north was selected as the place for crossing; and of course it took some time to get together the boats and pontoons required in the passage, and for the regiments of the Guards to march thither.

Meanwhile, the Danes in fierce engagements on the 28th of March were driven still further out of the region in front of the redoubts; so that on the night of the 29th the first trench could be dug at about one hundred feet in front of the enemy's works. It could, however, be furnished only with a few mortars, since the heavier and more effective artillery had to be sent to Ballegard to cover the passage and to protect it against Danish ships of war. The weather was very auspicious, the sea quite quiet, and the night of the 2d of April was chosen for the landing. Twenty-six battalions were assembled in Ballegard and its vicinity.

At midnight everything was ready. But just at that moment the weather changed suddenly, and the sea became so boisterous that every sailor and pontoonier declared the passage out of the question.

After all these preparations, by which the plan had been made known to many thousand men, it could no longer be hoped that the Danes would be surprised, as was necessary, in a later venture. Indeed, all the arguments against this plan of action now made themselves felt, after this miscarriage, with redoubled force; and it went almost without saying that the long-postponed siege of Düppel should now at last be undertaken with as much energy and haste as possible. The number of heavy pieces of artillery, too, had meanwhile been doubled, and was soon quadrupled by fresh re-enforcements. Everything was soon in readiness for opening upon the redoubts an overwhelming fire.

While these military deliberations were being carried on in the vicinity of Düppel, Prussia went through a few naval episodes, which could be looked upon as propitious signs of future maritime feats. On the 16th of March a battalion of Schlegell's Brigade successfully crossed, though in a violent storm, the arm of the sea that separates the island of Fehmarn from the Holstein coast, and upon surprising the Danish garrison on the island, took prisoner every one of the enemy thus taken unawares. On the 17th of March, Captain Jachmann with two screw-corvets and one wheel-steamboat, carrying altogether forty-three cannon, put out to sea from Swinemünde to reconnoitre the Danish fleet under

Rear Admiral Dockum, which consisted of six ships with one hundred and eighty-three cannon, and lay off Rügen eastward from Arcona. In spite of the tremendously superior force of the enemy, Jachmann attacked them boldly, kept up an exchange of shots for two hours, did considerable damage to a Danish frigate, and then, amid the enthusiastic exultation of the people, brought back his light vessels, well preserved, if not wholly without damage, safely into port again. To the astonishment of the whole world, the initiative and fearless courage in making an attack were here seen only on the German side, and on the part of that famous old Maritime Power, Denmark, only the most cautious and well-considered movements in her own self-defence.

CHAPTER III.

THE STORMING OF DUPPEL.

IT grew, in very truth, more and more desirable by the end of March for Prussia to confirm and strengthen her position as a Power in Europe by some effective and brilliant success of her arms. For the time was drawing near, when the attitude of the Great Powers to the German-Danish question must be once for all decided. It was evidently then of the greatest consequence, in what light the figure of Prussian power should stand before the eyes of the European Nations.

We have seen above that Denmark had sharply rejected the English proposals for a conference of the signers of the London Protocol of 1852, always persisting in the belief that if the state of war were only continued long enough, the other Powers would at last interfere in her favor, and perhaps, too, the internal quarrelling in Germany would excite a civil war in that country itself. Palmerston's speeches continually strengthened this assurance; and when, at that time, the elections were held for the Danish General Council, the former Minister, Hall, and Monrad, the succeeding manager of state affairs, vied with each other in representing forcibly to the electors that Denmark would never renounce her union with Schleswig and would never permit a union of Schleswig with Holstein.

Soon after this it became evident how correctly Moltke had foretold the effect of the occupation of Jutland. Although this occupation actually affected for the first few weeks only a small portion of the country, yet it was clear that Copenhagen would soon lose all its revenues and recruits from Jutland. This was felt so strongly that the Danish Government determined to secure the good-will of England by yielding a point — for the first time. Denmark declared herself ready to take part in a conference, upon the basis of the treaties of 1852. Lord John Russell had, indeed, in his eagerness to bring about a conference, several times said that for his part any conference would be acceptable, with or without a basis, with or without a truce. He now hastened to communicate Denmark's proposal to Berlin and Vienna, with the observation, that if Germany did not wish to accept the treaties of 1852 as a basis of negotiations, they might perhaps be termed a starting-point.

As Bismarck, however, emphatically rejected this also, and Rechberg, in consideration of the public opinion of Germany, seconded him, Lord John made up his mind that Denmark or any other Power might be left to choose for herself any starting-point, but without thereby binding the others in any way. He concluded that the warring parties were ready for the conference, and proclaimed that the object of it was to seek means for restoring peace. Inasmuch as Russia and Sweden had long ago expressed their assent, he now repeated officially and urgently the frequently

announced invitation to the only one that still remained aloof, the Emperor Napoleon, who at last complied, in the sure hope that this attempt at mediation would also fail. The invitation was also sent on the 25th of March to the German Confederation, which was certainly not to be left out in the proceedings of 1864, since its not having taken part in the London Protocol of 1852 had had such inconvenient consequences.

At other times the principle had, indeed, been recognized, that wherever Austria and Prussia had a voice in counsel, the Confederation was *virtualiter*, as it was called, represented and bound. But in this instance both Cabinets were of the opinion that the Confederate Diet must send a special representative to London, that the latter might be convinced with his own eyes of the impossibility of reaching his ideal, and that *vice versa* the Foreign Powers might be made to see the wild and threatening fermentation that was going on among the German people, and appreciate the moderation of the two Cabinets.

Therefore, in reply to England's proposal, that the conference should be opened on the 12th of April, Bismarck replied that that day was as convenient for Prussia as any other, but that official assent could not be given until it should be learned (as was not yet the case) that the German Confederation had accepted the invitation to be represented. For without the German Confederation the results of the conference would not be legitimate; and in no case could Prussia and Austria consent to become the executors of the decisions of the

spirits of the Confederate Diet into lively commotion. Since Prussia's bold conduct in Holstein, the majority in the Taxis palace seemed to have had its wings cut. At the last Würzburg conference Beust's proposal of warlike preparations had not met with the least favor; the old determination had been persisted in, of advocating the summoning of the Holstein parliament, the re-enforcement of the troops in the Duchy, and the speedy recognition of Augustenburg. But even for the adoption of these measures there was no longer in Frankfort sufficient courage nor unity.

On the 11th of February the committees, on the basis of the memorial of Pfordten, had reported that the London Protocol was not binding upon the Confederation, nor in point of fact practicable, and that consequently the Danish deputy, who had been sent on the ground of the same, should not be received; but the committee was to report further on the question of the succession. But on the 25th, the first point of the committee's report was rejected, and the last two accepted with only nine votes against seven. When, on the 3d of March, the motion of the Great Powers, to place the Confederate troops also under the supreme command of Wrangel, and to establish a common civil administration for Schleswig-Holstein, was put to vote, it was a tie; so that the motion was consigned to the committees for a thorough examination.

Thus the majority were still strong enough to hinder, but not themselves to pass any positive decrees. Bavaria proposed the strengthening of the Confederate

troops in Holstein with the continued independence of Hake; Hanover demanded the declaration of a Confederate war against Denmark, in which of course Wrangel should receive the supreme command; Saxony also would be contented with this; Darmstadt even wished to recognize the Field Marshal already as commander-in-chief, if only the question of the succession were kept open.

While all these proposals were being further discussed in the committees, the Austrian Government sent the Archduke Albrecht to Munich, to represent to the Bavarian Court the motives and aims of the imperial policy and to urge in every way its acceptance. But the Bavarians persisted in considering the motives improper and the aims insufficient; and the Archduke was obliged to leave Munich without having accomplished his task.

Immediately after this, on the 8th of March, King Max grew ill. In consequence of a very insignificant wound, the left side of his breast became inflamed with erysipelas, which disturbed the circulation of the blood and then induced blood-poisoning; so that at noon on the 10th, death ensued, much sooner than the physicians anticipated. The sorrow at the loss of this excellent Prince was universal in Munich and throughout the whole of Bavaria; and sincere sympathy was felt far beyond the boundaries of the kingdom. We may be allowed here to introduce a few remarks concerning the event, from the report of the Prussian ambassador.

“One cannot exactly say,” wrote Arnim, “that the

King fell a victim to the excitement and mental pain caused by the recent political complications; but after the presumptuous Munich authorities had by their insolence, which has not been censured enough, in a measure forced his return to his home, and after that vainest of all conceited professors, Pfordten, had deceived him with regard to the actual state of things, and had by officious counsel caused him to compromise himself by an unfortunate communication: then the King had fallen into a situation from which perhaps it is no misfortune to have been freed. There had been a burden laid upon his soul which he could not bear. With no gradual transition he had at once come into contradiction with his traditions and inclinations. Between the obligations undertaken and the impossibility of fulfilling them he saw no satisfactory compromise. The mission of the Archduke Albrecht had aroused into redoubled liveliness all the doubts and anxieties which were natural under the circumstances. These inner struggles must have exerted the most injurious effect upon his bodily health, and have reduced his power of resisting the disease. His heart was full of generous feeling, and his spirit purified by earnest effort and by the intercourse, always sought for by him, with the noblest men of thought in his times. What was wanting in him was for the most part due to his ill-health."

It will hardly be possible to believe that, in the case of his having lived longer, King Max would have been able to change materially the course of events, yet his

death was for the Würzburg Coalition also a serious loss.

His young son, Louis II., soon showed that he possessed, by the side of many idiosyncrasies in private life, an acute faculty for comprehending situations and for forming decisions quickly, as well as also a thoroughly independent will. But at this time he was hardly out of his boyhood's years, during which he had been kept utterly in ignorance of business affairs, so that he had not the least knowledge of men and things connected with German politics. Consequently, he was obliged for a time to give the ministers of his father free course, and in so doing to lay upon them a doubly great responsibility.

This involved the impossibility of introducing any marked change into the policy hitherto pursued, or even of taking any decisive steps in the carrying out of that line of conduct adopted by King Max: the third German state hung for the time like a dead weight of lead upon the feet of Confederate politics. It is true that on the 12th of March, in accordance with the directions of the deceased King, Pfordten brought forward in Frankfort a formal motion to recognize Augustenburg, and succeeded in gaining for it a small majority, so that it was not at once buried by being relegated to the committees; but he himself did not dare, in the face of the threatened opposition of the Great Powers, to push it to the point of being voted upon as a decree.

It was under such circumstances as these that the Confederation on the 26th of March received the invi-

tation from England to be represented in the conference to be opened in London on the 12th of April. Inasmuch as Lord John in the invitation no longer mentioned the treaties of 1852, there was no real reason why the Lesser States should on principle refuse to accept it. It was also agreed among the deputies that this time the Confederation was not to be represented by the Great Powers nor by a delegation from any one state, but by some one person chosen and instructed by the Confederation.

With this in mind Roggenbach and Schrenck tried with all their might to secure before the opening of the convention the recognition of Augustenburg by the Confederation, so that there would need to be in the conference a special representative of the new Duke. But Würtemberg retorted that that would mean so much as a refusal to join in the conference; and Beust, who gradually began to appreciate the hopelessness of his former wishes, now expressed himself emphatically against a premature recognition of Augustenburg and the consequent unavoidable break with the Great Powers.

This settled at once the personal question about the representative to the conference. Bismarck gained Austria's vote for Beust, who for his part felt not a little flattered at this token of confidence from the Great Powers, while Schrenck in Munich made a wry face at the news that the prospects for the election of Pfordten by the Diet were doubtful. The instructions that the Confederation should give its representative

formed a second subject of discussion. Rechberg demanded the recognition of the integrity of the Danish State; Schrenck and Roggenbach, on the contrary, insisted that the hereditary claim of the Augustenburgs should be represented.

Opinions were directly opposed to each other, until at last Bismarck, with an observation of sound common-sense, fixed upon a platform for common action. "We are all agreed," he said, "in the wish to preserve, so far as can possibly be done, the rights of the Duchies; we differ only in our views as to the path that leads to this goal." "Therefore," he wrote to Sydow on the 3d of April, "we must act upon the basis of those principles in regard to which we are agreed. The essential point of the instructions to be given to the ambassador must be, to work for the independence of the Duchies, to defend at all times and in all directions their rights and their interests, and to secure for the same every obtainable guaranty." This was convincing, and on the 6th of April the committee brought forward the proper motion in the Confederate Diet. There was no doubt of its being passed; but just as certainly was Bismarck right in sending word to London, that it would be quite impossible in the order of business of the Diet to conclude the matter, to choose the representative, and at any rate to insure the arrival of the latter in London before the 12th of April, and that consequently the first session of the conference would have to be put off at least a week.

This news was welcome in the headquarters at

Düppel; for although it would not have been positively impossible to finish the preparations for the siege before the 12th of April, yet the time was hardly sufficient. Indeed, the French military plenipotentiary, Count Clermont-Tonnerre, who was present at headquarters, repeatedly asserted that the Danish redoubts were so strong that it would take months to prepare properly for the storming of them.

Nevertheless, after the 3d of April, the Colonel of the Artillery, Colomier, and the Colonel of the Engineers, Mertens, displayed a systematic and effective energy in going ahead. The command of the operations was then, on the 8th of April, intrusted to General von Hindersin. Along the whole line of the semicircle that surrounded the redoubts there continually arose new batteries, which covered the enemy's works with immense masses of iron; and from the northern flank of the line, near Rackebull, the enemy's batteries on the shore of Alsen were covered, as was also from Gammelmark the city of Sonderburg with its barracks and military magazines. Although this last circumstance had been announced to the Danes beforehand on the 2d of April, all the inhabitants had not yet left the city; so that a number of these, among them several women and children, were killed by the Prussian guns.

This fact seemed to the Danish sympathizers in England to offer an opportunity for reading a lecture to the detested Germans. Sir Andrew Buchanan sent a private note to Bismarck on the 6th of April, with the

inquiry, whether it was true that Sonderburg had been bombarded without warning? whether women and children had perished? and whether the Prussian Government sanctioned such conduct? The Minister with proud composure replied that he had received no report about the matter; but that he was exceedingly surprised at being taken to task in that way by a friendly Government, and should answer only an official communication on the subject.

Thereupon, there followed a pouring torrent of indignant philanthropic sentiment and venomous wrath from the German-haters in both Houses of Parliament. Especially the pious Lord Shaftesbury fairly overflowed in furious protestations that after such monstrous deeds Prussia no longer deserved to be counted among the civilized nations. Lord Palmerston, mindful of the smarting rejoinder received the day before by Sir Andrew, contented himself with saying that one could not dictate to a Foreign Power the way in which she should carry on her wars, but it might be allowable to express one's opinion about the matter.

Bismarck took no further notice of these rhetorical exercises in phraseology than to have printed in the Berlin newspapers a long list of those Russian towns and fishing hamlets on the coast, which in the Crimean War the English fleets had with Christian humanity bombarded, plundered, and burned. Concerning the correctness of the cannonading of Sonderburg from a military point of view, a Danish authority shall presently also bear witness.

Those in command of the Prussian army had from the very start determined to direct the main action against the left southern wing of the enemy's position. After the taking of those redoubts the Prussians would be near the bridges leading to Sonderburg, the line of retreat for the Danes. Thus there would be a prospect of cutting off the garrisons of the northern redoubts.

Accordingly, the first parallel trench had been already laid out upon a line between the Wenningbund and the Flensburg highway, opposite the four southernmost redoubts of the enemy. On the night before the 8th of April a second one was dug three hundred feet in front of the first, and on the night of the 10th, still a third, two hundred and fifty feet in front of the second. The last was only five or six hundred feet from the Danish works. The number of heavy guns had now risen to eighty-eight, and their thunders filled the air by day and by night.

As to their effectiveness, the Danish Commander-in-Chief, General Gerlach, who was now in Lüttichau's place, sent the following report on the 9th of April to Copenhagen: "I consider it my duty to express my convictions about the further defence of Düppel. Since the 7th of April the superiority of the Prussian artillery is undeniable. The Danish guns are weaker, and some of them antiquated. Very soon it will be necessary to abandon fighting from a distance and limit the defence to the preservation of a few guns in the redoubts, with which to repel with grape-shot an assault upon these. The redoubts are being demolished more

and more ; and the repairing of them by night is becoming more difficult. The infantry keeps up very bravely ; but their strength is naturally diminishing the faster by reason of the unfavorable effect upon them of the bombardment of Sonderburg and of the fact that their barracks are no longer secure. Thus the hope for a successful issue is sinking every day. There would be very little prospect of a safe retreat in the event of a victorious assault by the enemy ; for they would cover the whole route with a sweeping fire from their fortifications, and a fearful press would ensue upon the bridges. Hence, political considerations must decide whether the struggle to hold the position at Düppel shall continue, or whether this portion of the army shall be saved by a voluntary retreat."

It is plain that Gerlach had the same conviction with regard to Düppel as De Meza two months before felt about the Dannevirke. But the ill-treatment which his predecessor had received on account of the same frightened Gerlach from acting quite so independently. Therefore he laid the matter before the Ministry, and at once received the reply by telegraph : that the position at Düppel must at all events be defended.

A few days later a despatch came from the Minister of War, Lundby, to the effect that the maintenance of this position was of supreme importance in view of the impending conference. This was, however, followed by the additional observation, that it was not the intention of the Ministerial Council to interfere in any way with the freedom of the General to act as he saw fit. That

was an observation worthy of the demagogues that were then in power in Copenhagen!—an observation that was meant in any case to roll the responsibility from their shoulders and to throw it upon the unfortunate officer.

Meanwhile, the effectiveness of the Prussian batteries increased daily. By the 13th of April their guns numbered one hundred and eighteen. The redoubts had been levelled by the huge missiles to shapeless piles of earth. The embrasures and blinds had been demolished, and it was impossible to remain within the works. The Danes replied only with rare shots. The troops, with the exception of a few observation posts, had been withdrawn from the redoubts, and were concealed behind them in holes in the ground. The strength of the four regiments which had chiefly occupied this point sank in a few days from 6,400 to 4,200 men.

Already the Prussian commanders considered the storming of the town advisable; but in Berlin there were misgivings from the fear lest with a distance of six hundred feet between the foremost of the parallel trenches and the redoubts, the assaulting columns should suffer too great loss before reaching the foot of the enemy's works. It was therefore decided to dig out a fourth parallel two hundred feet in advance of the third. This was done on the night of the 14th of April, after the enemy's outposts had been chased back into the redoubts by a sudden attack.

Then Gerlach telegraphed to Lundby that the assault was expected every moment; if it came soon, an attempt

must be made at resistance, since a few days more were necessary for rendering the island of Alsen safe; and that therefore he begged that the supreme command might have its hands free. Lundby replied that the General had *carte blanche* in military as also in political questions. Thereupon Gerlach sent the chief of his staff to Copenhagen, and received word from there by telegraph, that the Government persisted in its view of the political importance of holding on, even if that resulted in comparatively heavy losses. Then, on the 15th, General Gerlach planned to get some breathing space by a last desperate effort, in making a common sally in concert with the war-ships. This attempt, however, was given up, because the admiral of the fleet refused to run into the *Wenningbund*. The impending catastrophe was awaited in mute despair.

Prince Frederick Charles had meanwhile settled upon the 18th of April for the assault, and had given out the proper instructions. To begin with, the six southernmost redoubts were to be attacked, each by a column consisting of infantry, pioneers, and artillery, altogether of about 8,000 men. Each redoubt gained by the stormers was to be held by them; and everything else, the assault of a second line of fortifications behind the large works, as well as the capture of the *tête-de-pont*, was to be left to reserves kept in readiness.

General Gerlach had about 2,500 men in the six redoubts that were in immediate danger. In the whole position at Düppel were in round numbers 10,000 men, beside a brigade of somewhat more than 2,000 men kept

as a reserve near Sonderburg, upon the island of Alsen. The rest of the troops that were at his disposal, about 7,000 men, were distributed in the different parts of the island to repulse any Prussian attempts to land.

On the 17th of April all the Prussian batteries kept up a murderous fire all day long, in the course of which the Danish soldiers, with the exception of those in the observation-posts, withdrew again behind the redoubts. After this firing had ceased late in the evening, the storming columns at about two o'clock in the night moved forward into the front parallel, while the reserves took up their position behind these. In the gray of the morning the batteries opened their fire again, which lasted for hours, so that the Danish officers believed the day would pass like the previous one without further signs of an attack, and allowed the bulk of their troops again to seek shelter behind the redoubts.

But suddenly, just as the clocks struck ten, the cannonading ceased, and at the same moment the storming columns sprang out of the parallel and rushed forward. In a few minutes they were at and in the trenches of the enemy, demolished the obstructions, — it was here that the pioneer Klinke, in order to open the way between the palisades for his comrades without loss of time, instantly set fire to a sack of powder, blowing the pales and himself into atoms, — and scaled the breastworks, in some cases even before the Danes hastening from within had reached the summit. Hardly a half hour had passed, before all six of the redoubts had been captured, their garrisons killed or taken prisoners, and

the Prussian banners were floating everywhere above the works.

The triumphant enthusiasm with which the troops had executed the assault impelled them in many places still further, to attack the second line of the enemy's fortifications; so that General Manstein ordered strong detachments from the reserves to go forward, partly to the support of the others and partly to make an attack upon the four northern redoubts. All this was finally successful after a fight of three hours, which was at various points a bloody struggle. The Danes suffered such heavy losses, and their power of resistance was so thoroughly broken, that General Gerlach no longer ventured to defend even the *têtes-de-pont*, but led the rest of his troops across to Alsen, and then threw down the bridges.

By three o'clock in the afternoon, every part of the Danish position at Düppel, and with it the entire mainland of the Duchy of Schleswig, was in the hands of the victors. This brilliant success cost Prussia, who had sent, all told, 16,000 men into the fight, the loss of a little more than 1,100 dead and wounded. On the Danish side about 11,000 men had taken part in the battle; and their loss was more than 1,100 dead and wounded, beside 3,600 uninjured prisoners, 118 cannon, and 4,000 guns that were captured by the enemy.

The news of this grand victory called forth great joy and enthusiasm in Berlin. The King received the telegram containing the information immediately after the close of a parade of some regiments of the Guard. He

hastened back at once in order to announce to the troops the glorious message himself, and then sent to Prince Frederick Charles and to the brave army his royal thanks.

There was, indeed, reason for great satisfaction. The seriousness of the situation during the last few weeks had proved conclusively not only the vigor and the wisdom of the leaders, but also the superiority of the excellently trained troops over the valor of their ill-disciplined adversaries, and thus demonstrated anew the technical correctness of the King's determination to insist unyieldingly upon the much-opposed extension of the time of military service.

So much the more anxious was the King to express to his brave soldiers in person his gratification: he set out immediately for Schleswig, in order to review on the 21st of April the battalions that had taken part in the storming of Düppel in the very uniforms which they had worn on the day of the fight. The inhabitants of the Duchy everywhere received the Monarch with grateful cordiality, and heard from his own lips the promise, which he had from the beginning meant in all earnestness, that they should always be protected against the unlawful arrogance of Denmark.

Without losing a single hour, it was at once decided at headquarters to take advantage of the success already won. The plan of crossing to the island of Alsen was again given up, from the conviction which was still held, that what might be gained by this move would not be in proportion to its possible cost. It was

decided, instead of this, to occupy Jutland as completely as possible; and for this purpose were chosen, besides the Austrians, the Prussian division of the Guards, assisted by a newly arrived Silesian brigade, a battalion of *Jäger*, and a few regiments of cavalry, — all under the command of General Vogel von Falckenstein. His place as Chief of the Staff at headquarters was now taken by Moltke himself.

Without meeting any great resistance, these hosts poured over all parts of Jutland as far as the Lijmfjord, behind whose protecting waters General Hegermann-Lindencrone for the second time retreated before the superior forces of the enemy. Wrangel was as zealous as ever to undertake the siege of Fridericia, although Moltke objected quite as decidedly and upon the same grounds as in his former opposition to the storming of Düppel.

Meanwhile, the adversary did his part in causing these differences of opinion to be neglected. In Copenhagen, the loss of the position at Düppel had spread a feeling of oppressive discouragement in all classes of the population, yet without fully breaking the determined will of the ruling party: it appears that they therefore resolved no longer to make any useless sacrifices in trying to defend the mainland, but to employ the remaining strength of the troops in protecting the islands, and at first, Funen and Alsen. Accordingly, on the night of the 28th of April, the garrison of Fridericia was transported to Funen, and the deserted place was abandoned to the Austrians without a struggle.

Moltke immediately urged preparations for a landing upon the poorly defended Funen, in order to deprive the enemy of their last resources, and to give the final blow to the stiff-necked obstinacy of the "Eider-Danes." General Gablenz at first seized upon the idea with soldier-like ardor, but then, as afterwards appeared, he entertained serious and well-founded doubts with regard to the views of his Government; and so the plan was for the present given up.

At this time Germany, victorious in Schleswig, offered in its own internal affairs a remarkable spectacle. The news of the success at Düppel called forth, it is true, a shout of patriotic exultation in all hearts. But soon this pure joy gave way to party-quarrelling. The great majority of the Prussian people still felt angry over the unconstitutional condition of things and an administration without a budget. This spoiled their enthusiasm at the brilliant victory of Prussian arms; for this was precisely what would lessen the prospect of a change in the evidently successful military system. This feeling was increased by the conduct of the feudal party, which greeted with great ado the fall of the Danish Düppel as the first step towards the storming of the domestic Düppel.

There were at this time in the country many virtuous men, to whom the Constitution and laws about the budget in Prussia as she was, seemed to be more important than the solution of the great national question; or, to put it in another way, who with full confidence expected German Unity to come with the increase

of popular freedom, and therefore to this end earnestly longed for the strengthening of parliamentary rights, but in spite of the experiences of 1850, would hear nothing of an extension of the Prussian military power.

These sentiments spread into the other German states. There the liberal parties looked upon a Germany led by Rechberg or by Bismarck as fatal to all rights and hopes of freedom. Their joy for Schleswig-Holstein at the defeat of the Danes was now equalled, as the time for the London conference drew near, by their redoubled agitation in favor of the complete independence of the Duchies under their Hereditary Prince; in spite of the blood shed at Düppel, and in spite of the King's word pledged by himself in Schleswig, they still continued to feel the greatest hesitation at placing any reliance upon the Prussian policy. They still continued to cherish the childlike hope that, in the face of all Austrian traditions and Austrian armies, a German parliament and German Unity could be brought about by popular decrees and by milk-and-water resolutions passed in the Chambers.

Consequently it was not reasonable to demand from the Governments of the Lesser States any great enthusiasm for the glorious career of a policy which they had from the very first day most violently opposed, as being contrary to international and Confederate principles. To be sure, after the events of the last few months, the impulse to resist openly had, in the case of most of them, passed away: with reference to the conference,

the Confederate Diet had on the 14th of April accepted, by a vote of ten to six, Bismarck's proposition concerning the general instructions to be given to the representative, and had, in spite of all efforts on the part of Schrenck and Roggenbach, omitted in the instructions any mention of Augustenburg, sending accordingly as its representative to London, not Pfordten, but Beust. Yet the general feeling still remained discontented and bitter, and was directed just now especially against Austria, who only a few weeks before had, in a circular note to the neutral Powers, assured them of her devotion to the cause of preserving the integrity of the Danish nation, and represented as her only reason for taking part in the war, the desire to prevent in that way further extravagances on the part of the Lesser States.

And on the other hand, what could be expected from the arbitrary and violent Bismarck, who had just given his Austrian fellow-combatant the severest possible rebuff in the great quarrel over the Tariff-Union, and thus crossed the old and cherished longings of the Lesser States? Could it be hoped that this hand would conduct the affairs of the Duchies to any result desired by Germany? Indeed, what result was desired by Germany? What would have at once been satisfactory in Dresden, in Berlin, and in Vienna?

Among the Foreign Powers much simpler views began to be entertained.

"It would be utterly impossible," said Count Clermont-Tonnerre in his report to the French Government,

“to keep the Duchies connected with Denmark ; even a personal union could no longer be forced upon them.” Not unlike this was the opinion of the correspondent of the *Times*, whom Bismarck in spite of Wrangel’s protest had admitted into headquarters. “A union of the Duchies with Denmark in any form whatever,” he wrote, “is no longer to be thought of.” The English ambassador in Paris, too, Lord Cowley, confessed to Count Goltz : “Whatever one may say, the conviction is steadily gaining ground with us in England, that the people of Schleswig-Holstein wish to get free from Denmark, and that it would not be at all consistent with England’s principles to force them back in spite of this under the dominion of the Danes.”

King Leopold of Belgium, when in London towards the end of March, expressed to Queen Victoria his belief that it would be quite as impossible to keep Denmark and the Duchies together as had once been the case with Belgium and Holland ; and the Queen agreed with him entirely. The same sentiments gained supporters, too, in the Lower House. An influential member, Bernal Osborne, announced that he should soon bring forward a motion to the effect that it was unjust and unwise to force upon the Duchies against their will the succession to the throne determined by the London Protocol. This was re-echoed upon all sides, since it quite agreed with the general spirit of England’s doctrines. Nevertheless, Palmerston and a large majority of the newspapers obstinately persisted in their tone of hatred to Germany.

More decidedly still, although with weightier underlying motives, did Napoleon at this time express himself on the side of Schleswig-Holstein ; but we shall give a more detailed account of this later, in a special connection.

CHAPTER IV.

THE LONDON CONFERENCE.

THE sentiments aroused in the heart of the French Monarch, by the failure of his Polish schemes and of his plan for a great congress, became more and more augmented and confirmed by the succeeding events. Austria had thoroughly angered him by her decree of a state of siege in Galicia, which in the following months had effectually stamped out the last sparks of the Polish revolt. And this Austria, who had incited him to take sides against Russia, and then after empty demonstrations had left him in the lurch, had openly crossed over into the enemy's camp.

Accordingly, it was with inner satisfaction that he sent on the 20th of March to London, and then to the German Courts, that despatch in which he proposed to leave the settlement of the Schleswig-Holstein difficulty to a popular vote of the inhabitants of the Duchy; knowing well, as he did, how irritating a remark of this nature would be to the Vienna Court more than all others. In fact, Rechberg declared on the spot that Austria would never countenance such a revolutionary proceeding; and he was pleased to find that the Russian Cabinet also maintained the same correct political principles. The Prussian Minister, however, thought

Rechberg's arbitrary behavior was as impolite as it was unnecessary, and therefore exceedingly impolitic. The authorities in Berlin were quite as little inclined as those in Vienna to follow the new Paris fashion of founding one's own state and government upon a plebiscitum; but the former saw no risk involved in a friendly willingness to discuss the question with their powerful and dangerous neighbor, and, as formerly in the matter of a congress, to show a desire to co-operate with him so far as possible.

"Most assuredly," said Bismarck in reply to Talleyrand's first communication to him on the 31st of March, "Prussia also considers that the wishes of the Duchies themselves ought to be taken into account in the conference, especially so far as these wishes rest upon definite rights and needs." But at the same time he called the ambassador's attention to the plan of a great canal between the North Sea and the Baltic, affirming that the advantage of such a canal to French commercial interests would be recognized first of all by the Emperor Napoleon, who had taken such a lively interest in the Suez Canal.

The French Minister, Drouyn de Lhuys, responded to this that it was all very well, but that it was a very indefinite sort of assent to Napoleon's suggestion. He then explained to Count Goltz that France attached no special importance to the question whether the will of the Schleswig-Holstein people was to be expressed by a plebiscitum or by a vote of the Estates. Two further suggestions, that during the voting the troops of both

of the contending parties should be removed from the country, and that the raising of Rendsburg to a Confederate fortress was not practicable, met with the decided disapproval of Goltz, and were therefore immediately withdrawn.

Bismarck then, on the 7th of April, expressed himself more exactly. "Very justly," said he, "has the complaint been raised against former congresses, that they have dealt with the inhabitants of a country merely as objects of barter at the mercy of third parties. The conferences that gave rise to the London Protocol of 1852 were also not free from this censure. The pending conference must not lay itself open to this charge. We are therefore glad that France has emphasized this important factor of the discussion, and thus insured its consideration by the conference. Yet, although a very important factor, it is not the only one that demands attention: the existing rights of the Duchies as states, the international treaties, and the convenience of the parties concerned."

Nor was this an out-and-out seconding of Napoleon's proposal of a plebiscitum. But the Emperor could not help confessing that, as was the case with his proposal for a congress, Prussia showed herself more favorable to the French standpoint than any of all the other Powers. Therefore, in proportion as his hostility to Austria increased, so did his wish daily grow stronger to establish intimate relations with the Court of Berlin.

This was augmented by the grudge which he had borne in his heart against England ever since Novem-

ber. And this, too, was now renewed and aggravated by exceedingly disagreeable circumstances. At the beginning of the new year another conspiracy against the Emperor's life had been discovered in Paris. It was believed that Mazzini, who was then living in England, had had a hand in the conspiracy, and therefore judicial proceedings against this great demagogue were demanded in London by the French Government. This was done the more earnestly, since it was also suspected that Mazzini had been supported in the affair by one of England's highest government officials, the Lord of the Admiralty, Stansfield. But the English Government was unwilling, for want of evidence, to institute a legal process against Mazzini; and for the same reason the Lower House refused to pass against Stansfield a vote of distrust. Napoleon could take no exceptions to the legal grounds upon which this conduct was based; but that did not lessen his wrath at the protection of the murderous plot in which he was fully convinced these men had figured as accomplices.

Nor was this enough! On the 4th of April, General Garibaldi, that Italian who next to Mazzini was most hateful to Napoleon and his most zealous adversary in the Roman troubles, landed at Southampton on a visit to his English friends. This famous hero of national freedom was at once received with a tremendous outbreak of popular enthusiasm, in which all classes vied with one another in boisterous demonstrations. Wherever he showed himself, he was surrounded by shouting crowds. Lords and commoners pressed their way to

him to offer their homage; and even the Prince of Wales very indiscreetly paid him a visit. For a moment, Garibaldi was the idol of the English people and the lion of English society. Napoleon took so little pains to conceal his vexation at these doings, that Lord Palmerston finally considered it advisable to recommend to his troublesome guest his return to Caprera.

Thus sorely irritated against England and filled with hostile plans against Austria, the Emperor was the more anxious to enter into closer relations with Prussia; and immediately after Garibaldi's appearance in London, Napoleon instructed his Minister to confer confidentially with Count Goltz about Schleswig-Holstein.

Drouyn de Lhuys accordingly invited the Count to a conference with him on the 9th of April. In his usual rather ostentatious and pedantic manner he disclosed to Goltz that England intended to bring forward for renewed confirmation in the conference the integrity of the Danish kingdom and the Protocol of 1852, and then to leave it to the contending Powers to agree among themselves about the position the Duchies were to hold within the monarchy. This seemed to him beyond the possibility of acceptance by Germany; and France, too, was ready to oppose such a programme, which would be pure mockery. Now the Emperor, he said, as Bismarck had correctly foreseen, had favored the general plan of a canal, and had in mind, though subject to further deliberation, a line connecting the Schley and Husum. Since the condition of things established in 1852 evi-

dently could not be kept up, and the system of maintaining a personal union would after all satisfy neither party, the best move, in his opinion, would be the complete cession of Holstein and that part of Schleswig lying south of the proposed canal. The people were to be consulted, no matter whether through a plebiscitum or a vote of the Estates. If the people wished to form an independent state under the Augustenburg Prince, France would raise no objections, although she could only regret the founding of another small state. If, however, the vote should be in favor of uniting with Prussia, Napoleon would in the conference make their cause his own. Nor would he in return require for himself any, not even the least, cession of territory, but would be satisfied with the compensation afforded him in open and substantial support in other directions.

Drouyn de Lhuys showed further how few objections could be raised against such a system: the inherent grandeur of the idea, he said, must meet with irresistible success in the conference. He then begged the Count to observe the strictest secrecy, and remarked that towards the English Minister, Lord Clarendon, whose arrival was expected in a few days, he should be in every way uncommunicative and reserved, until he received from Berlin a reply to the information just imparted.

Thus the idea of the Prussian annexation of the Duchies, which was, as we have seen, already in the air, which without any doubt would have been the solution of the problem most advantageous to the common

interests of Germany, and which had been formerly mentioned in conversation by Napoleon himself, was now officially communicated from Paris to the Prussian Government.

The London conference was at hand: the decision must be made and publicly announced. How invaluable Napoleon's support might be for Prussia, if it were meant in earnest, needs no explanation. But could it be taken for earnest, considering the always unreliable nature of the Emperor? To be sure, he had, from the very beginning of his reign, always sought to oppose Prussia; and now, after the short Polish interruption, he seemed to have returned to his old inclinations. Yet, like his uncle, he was fond of having more than one string to his bow. It was well known, that in questions of alliance or of war he was in the habit of changing his front very quickly and very readily.

"Just now," wrote Count Goltz, "it is true that he is seeking our friendship. He recommends to us the annexation of the Duchies, because that would ruin our relations with Austria and the Lesser States, and necessarily bind us closely to France." On the other hand, King Leopold of Belgium had sent a serious warning to Berlin, saying that the agitation in London, inimical to Germany, was nourished by whisperings from a quarter where it would truly be a great pleasure to see England and Germany at war with each other, in order that this party might then stretch out its hand with sudden energy to secure its own interests. The King then urged Prussia to hold fast to Austria, and

not to give ear to the friends of that Prince, Augustenburg, whom England hated.

So far as this Pretender was concerned, his unpopularity in Vienna also seemed to increase. The Privy Counsellor, Von Biegeleben, on his way to the London Conference made a short stay in Berlin, and there expressed his rejection of Augustenburg's claims so emphatically that, according to his opinion, Austria seemed more likely to be willing to recognize an hereditary claim to the throne of the Duchies in a Prussian Prince than in Augustenburg.

King William, in whose personal favor the Hereditary Prince still stood, could not throw off these impressions entirely. He replied to King Leopold that he felt warm sympathy for the Prince, but still must ask himself whether it was Prussia's duty, for his sake alone, to expose herself to a European war and perhaps to a defeat after the Olmütz fashion. What Bismarck thought of the matter, we already know. He had not yet fully decided to put aside the Prince; but insurmountable hinderances to his recognition remained fixed in the Minister's mind.

After the King had weighed all these arguments and considerations, Bismarck sent on the 14th of April a reply to Goltz with the following content: —

“Prussia could assent to the English proposition only on the condition that until negotiations shall be concluded with Denmark, Schleswig-Holstein shall be occupied and controlled by us. Inasmuch as this can scarcely be effected, the King expresses his concurrence

with the general plan proposed by Drouyn de Lhuys, although he must require somewhat more favorable conditions for the German element of the Duchies, more especially a more northern situation of the canal or of the frontier. In this regard the requirement would be more moderate, if the second of the alternatives proposed by Drouyn should be decided upon, namely, the annexation to Prussia; but yet the consent of those concerned could not be gained, unless the first (the accession of Augustenburg) should prove to be impracticable. Nevertheless, this first plan would appear to Prussia allowable. We could be willing to see the Hereditary Prince upon the throne; but we should have no interest in waging a European war in his favor.

“Prussia will at all stages of the conference certainly insist upon consulting the will of the inhabitants, about which we are negotiating with Vienna, and upon the proposal of a canal, although Russia will not listen to it. Yet it will not be advisable to call upon the people to cast their votes at the very outset. If the vote should be taken now, it would be in favor of Augustenburg, but against any division of Schleswig, and, consequently, not in accordance with Napoleon's wishes.

“Prussia therefore intends to bring forward at first in the conference the demands made hitherto: personal union with Denmark, admission of Schleswig into the German Confederation, and elevation of Rendsburg to the rank of a Confederate fortress, and of Kiel to a

Confederate port. Denmark will surely reject these demands, and prefer rather the cession of Holstein and of a part of Schleswig. Then the people will see that there must be a division in any case, and they will make up their minds to it.

“The same is true of the question, to whom the territory which is ceded shall belong? Prussia, of course, would prefer the plan of annexation; but the people will not vote for that, until the other plan has proved itself to be hopeless, and the matter is reduced to the simple question: Prussian or Danish? Moreover, the postponement of the decision, so long as the occupation of the country continues, would not be prejudicial to Prussian interests.”

When Goltz, in conformity with these instructions, expressed to Drouyn the desire for a boundary line more favorable to Prussia, he learned anew that although the Minister had followed the dictation of his master, he was himself very little inclined to second the Prussian tendencies of Napoleon. Drouyn, indeed, would rather bring the boundary-line southward from the Schley to Eckernförde than to push it further to the north. On the other hand, after King William had witnessed in Schleswig the despair of the inhabitants at the thought of a possible return to Danish rule, he made the irrevocable resolve, never to yield again to Denmark any German territory, and accordingly to demand in the name of Germany and the German people all the country at least as far as Apenrade. Bismarck, in order to bring matters to a conclu-

sion, would have been contented with less ; but he was obliged to communicate to Goltz the distinct commands of the King.

Fortunately Napoleon showed himself more friendly than his Minister. Immediately after the news of the fall of Düppel he had sent, on the 19th of April, a congratulatory telegram to the King, and then affirmed that to him the question of race and the vote of the people seemed to be of chief importance ; that he considered the line connecting the Schley and Husum as a good one for a boundary, and if Prussia would be willing to accept this, if it should prove to be a last resort, he would hold himself bound to support Prussia's further wishes ; and that for his part he should raise no objections to any other boundary-line, provided Prussia gained the consent of the people to the same : on the contrary, he would do all in his power to secure its acceptance by the conference.

No less emphatically did he express his approval of Bismarck's proposed plan of action in the conference ; namely, first to demand the personal union, "that bastard institution of the Middle Ages," as he called it, which would surely meet with opposition on all sides ; then to propose the recognition of Augustenburg, which was the more certain to be rejected by the conference, the more territory and subjects were claimed for him ; and finally, there would be nothing left but the division of Schleswig according to nationalities, and the annexation of the German portion to Prussia.

That all this was to be kept strictly secret, goes with-

out saying. It was no treaty that had been struck; it was a temporary understanding which actually bound neither of the two parties, and merely signified for the moment a mutual friendly sentiment. Only with the greatest reluctance did the King make up his mind not to reject once for all and under all circumstances the boundary line of the Schley. Goltz received instructions to impress upon the mind of the Emperor as strongly as possible the feeling of the population as it had been observed by the King himself in Schleswig, and emphasize accordingly the need of their being consulted. This would bring, to be sure, the candidacy of Augustenburg more into the foreground. "But we do not object to it," wrote Bismarck, "if acceptable terms for the German cause can be obtained thereby."

While these interviews were being held in Paris, the time for the opening of the conference had arrived. However indefinite the understanding with Napoleon was, it seemed very weighty and useful compared with the sentiments entertained by the remaining members of the conference. Of course, in view of the evident justice of the case and the strength of the German army, no one had the boldness nor the inclination to exhibit open hostility to Germany. But everywhere the wish reigned to take as little as possible from the Danes, and to give as little as possible to the Germans.

Napoleon, himself, had repeatedly said to Count Goltz that there was in all France no soul that shared his sympathy with Germany; and several times during the conference Prussia felt the influence of this condition

of things upon the votes of Prince Latour d'Auvergne. In St. Petersburg, Gortschakoff protested that the Emperor never would fall out with Prussia, and yet gave unreserved full powers in the conference to Baron Brunnow, who had been with Palmerston the author of the London Protocol of 1852. The English Government had intrusted its representation to Lord John Russell and to Lord Clarendon, who was known to harbor sentiments unfriendly to Germany since the Crimean War, and who had been but just now eagerly working in Paris against the interests of Germany. The Swedish representative, Count Wachtmeister, appeared with the simple instructions to support the Danes in every way with all his might. Denmark herself sent, it is true, the moderate Minister Quaade; but had appointed for his assistance, or rather to supervise him, her ambassador in London, Baron Bille, a zealous "Eider-Dane," and the counsellor Krieger, one of the promoters of the November Constitution.

In the face of all these opponents, Prussia had on her side the Confederate ally, Austria, who up to this time had taken no important step without fear of incurring England's displeasure, and had everywhere protested her devotion to the cause of preserving the integrity of Denmark. Nor was the personality of the representatives from Vienna very encouraging: the one, Count Apponyi, the imperial ambassador at the English Court, was by nature neither clear-headed nor energetic, and was constantly anxious not to spoil the pleasantness of his environments in London; the other, Herr von Bie-

geleben, was a prudent, earnest, zealously Catholic man, whose leading principle had always been: hostility to Prussia. Prussia, on her part, supported her ambassador, the always well-meaning, but only moderately gifted, Count Bernstorff, by sending to his aid her former representative in Copenhagen, Balan, considering him as more than all others a connoisseur in such affairs.

On the 20th of April, Lord John, moved by the fact that the English Parliament was also in session, made an attempt to open the Conference before the arrival of the representative from the Confederate Diet. But Bismarck remained immovable in the determination not to begin before Beust's arrival; and Rechberg, although reluctantly, could not very well help seconding him. Biegeleben, too, talked over the whole matter in Berlin with Bismarck and Karolyi, and allowed the very slender instructions given to him at Vienna to be supplemented by Bismarck with a long list of important demands, which should, in the event of the continuance of a personal union with Denmark, insure to the Duchies the necessary guaranties for the preservation of their rights.

Accordingly, the opening of the Conference took place on the 25th of April. The neutral Powers at once brought forward the motion for an armistice. The Germans announced that they wished to report on the matter to their Governments, and at once asserted as without question that in the case of an armistice, hostilities would cease on the water as well as on land,

especially signifying the blockade of the German ports. The Danes objected to this last point, and were unwilling to give up the blockade even during a truce. To the great surprise of the Germans, the Earl of Clarendon asserted his agreement with the position held by the Danes, since, as he said, a blockade was not to be reckoned among active hostilities.

The Conference adjourned until the arrival of those instructions from Vienna, Berlin, and Copenhagen, that were necessary with regard to the truce. The five German plenipotentiaries during the interval talked over among themselves the policy to be pursued later in the negotiations for peace; and in their discussions very marked differences of opinion came to light.

The Austrians desired to put their motion for preserving the integrity of Denmark so soon as possible, and thus hold as closely as they could to the principles of 1852. The Prussians were resolved to follow Bismarck's directions and to let the enemy come on, but in any case to consent even to a personal union only under the most complete guaranty of the freedom of the Duchies from any oppression by the Danes. Beust contented himself with the remark that he should support any motion favorable to the Duchies, with the reservation of the right to bring forward further propositions. Here, as at all stages of the war, Austria held back in reserve and played a subordinate rôle, so that the active work, and consequently the leading part, fell of its own accord to Prussia.

Just at this time, on the 26th of April, the first

division of the Austrian fleet, two frigates and one gunboat under Captain Tegetthoff, appeared off Deal, in sight of the English coast. Thereupon, all the disaffection felt in England towards the German cause poured itself out in violent torrents of abuse. Newspaper articles and orators in both Houses of Parliament vied with each other. Lord Palmerston very ungraciously observed to Count Apponyi that the appearance of this squadron in English waters during a war which England had constantly declared to be unjustifiable was an insult to the English nation; and that if Tegetthoff sailed into the Baltic, the English Channel-fleet would follow him in order to protect Denmark, and a war between Austria and England would then be unavoidable.

The Danes exulted at this. They took fresh courage and hoped that the longed-for aid from Europe might come; and they determined to hold firmly to their "Eider-Danish" rights without showing any cowardly signs of yielding. In Vienna, too, Palmerston's words had their proper effect: Rechberg at once announced in Berlin, that to avoid greater evils the ships-of-war would not sail into the Baltic, and that for the same reason no attack upon Fünen should be made before a fresh understanding had been arrived at between the two Courts.

With regard to the truce, Bismarck, in spite of French and Russian advice to show a conciliatory spirit, had declared upon the spot that the continuance of the blockade during the armistice would be insufferable and dishonorable for Germany, and that Prussia at

any risk forbade it. Rechberg, too, felt that yielding to this condition was impossible, especially just after the expedition of the ships-of-war to break up the blockade; and so he seconded the Prussian proposition to offer, in return for the removal of the blockade, a discontinuance of the demand for war-contributions levied in Jutland, cash payments for the support of German troops, and the freedom of the Danish civil government in that province.

Then the second session of the Conference opened on the 4th of May, and the decision of the German Powers was announced as had been agreed. The Danes responded immediately that only the complete evacuation of Jutland by the German troops would induce them to remove the blockade. To this Bernstorff answered, that if the neutral Powers also wished the evacuation of Jutland, then Germany would consent, on the condition that Denmark on her part should give up the Schleswig islands hitherto occupied by her, and immediately release all German ships that had been captured. To this again the Danes would not listen. But in spite of their resistance, Lord John Russell made the following motion: "An armistice may be concluded under the conditions of removal of the blockade, evacuation of Jutland by the Germans, and evacuation of the Schleswig islands by the Danes. Before the next session, which is fixed for the 9th of May, the Conference expects to receive the answers of the Courts concerned." France, Sweden, and Russia voted for this motion.

In Vienna and Berlin there was rejoicing at the possibility of concurring with the wishes of the neutral Powers by means of the simple acceptance of the English proposition. But it was different in Copenhagen. It was very clear that something must be done to prevent the trifling away, through stubborn obstinacy, of the good-will of the neutrals; but the Danes were on no account willing to give up the Schleswig islands, which they held to be wholly secure from every German attack, and they thought that if the first Prussian proposition was carried out, they would be able to draw unhindered, under the very eyes of the German army, not only revenue, but even recruits from Jutland.

Accordingly, Quaade surprised the Conference on the 9th of May with the announcement that Denmark must decline the English proposal, but was contented with the Prussian one, and under the conditions of the latter would be willing to accept a truce for a month, during which the blockade should be removed. Balan tried in vain to secure a longer time for the truce, for the sake of German commerce. Finally it was unanimously decided that the truce should be based upon the conditions mentioned, together with the stipulation that neither party should be allowed during the armistice to strengthen its military position or force. The truce was appointed to begin on the 12th of May.

On the very day upon which this agreement was arranged, a sharp sea-fight took place between two of Tegetthoff's frigates and three Danish ships-of-war, a few miles to the east of Heligoland. The combat

resulted in no definite victory, since a fire breaking out on Tegetthoff's flag-ship obliged the Captain to withdraw from the encounter. The cleverness and bravery with which he extricated himself from his dangerous situation, nevertheless, induced the Emperor Francis Joseph, immediately upon hearing the news, to raise him to the rank of Rear Admiral. Throughout all Germany, where indeed the people were not accustomed to naval triumphs, the praise of the brave seaman was sounded, and the glory of his having withstood with success the superior power of the Danes. Indeed, the national feeling had everywhere in Germany taken a new start in view of the London Conference and the conclusions which it was expected would be reached there. "Now is the time," was the feeling in every quarter, "to show the officious foreign nations how firm and ready the German people are to make sacrifices for the holy cause of Schleswig-Holstein."

Even before the opening of the Conference, the committee of the thirty-six deputies in Frankfort had drawn up a document, with the intention of having it signed by as many members of German Chambers as possible, and of then sending it to Herr von Beust in London, to be laid by him before the Conference. It was a reiteration of the three old fundamental and cardinal principles of Schleswig-Holstein's freedom, and a solemn protest against the adoption of any decision about the Duchies without or against their will.

On the 18th of April the document was signed by all the members of the Lower Chamber in Dresden. It

went then from country to country, until on the 8th of May, when it was sent to Beust, it had received thirteen hundred and fifty signatures of representatives of the German people, among whom were one hundred and eighty-three Prussians and forty-six Austrians. On the same day the Reform Association of entire Germany issued a manifesto in favor of the freedom of Schleswig-Holstein, and the succession of Augustenburg.

On the same day, too, there gathered at Rendsburg 40,000 men from the Duchies. They made similar resolutions to those passed in Germany, and declared their readiness to stake the last drop of their blood upon the maintenance of them. At the same time a movement spread among the people of the Duchies, to call upon the King of Prussia to unite Schleswig-Holstein to the Prussian-German Nation; and on the 11th of May one of the most prominent statesmen and distinguished men of Prussia, the former Minister, Count Arnim-Boytzenburg, circulated an address to the King requesting a complete separation of Schleswig-Holstein from Denmark, whether as an independent state under the protection of Prussia or as a part of the Prussian state itself. In a few days this petition, signed by more than 30,000 persons, was ready to be presented to the King.

However severely Bismarck may have formerly many times censured the interference of the popular voice in the work of statesmen, he now watched with pleasure the agitation which, as he hoped, would overawe the Conference and push Austria forwards. He commanded

Zedlitz to let the agitation have free course throughout Schleswig, and, indeed, to favor it, even if it was directed towards demanding Augustenburg as ruler: this, too, he said, might be also propitious for Prussia's interests. "We will let the whole pack bark!" he cried, in his drastic fashion. And what a noise they made! From countless assemblies and clubs, and from the Alps to the sea, resounded and re-echoed the shouts: "A German Schleswig-Holstein!" "Separation from Denmark!"

Bernstorff wrote from London at this time: "If we are obliged to demand the complete separation of Schleswig-Holstein from Denmark against or without Austria's consent, then Austria's influence in Germany is done with forever."

Count Rechberg thought so too, and with a heavy heart. He therefore risked no open resistance to Bismarck's well-considered and resolutely projected plan of operations. The first step, namely, the declaration that the treaties of 1852 were no longer binding, had been already sanctioned by Rechberg in the Vienna agreement of the 6th of March, and in the rejection of the basis demanded by Denmark for the deliberations of the Conference.

Consequently, in the session of the 12th of May, Count Bernstorff was at liberty to announce to the Conference, in the name of all the German Powers, that, since the treaties of 1852 had become void, Germany was ready to consider any new proposition that might lead to a firm and lasting peace without

violating any acquired rights. Apponyi and Biegeleben were hardly willing to assent to this last clause; but Beust showed them that just such a reservation had been made in the decree for the federal execution in Holstein, to which Austria had agreed, and which did not in the least affect the result of negotiations. And as Bernstorff persisted in his standpoint, the Austrians finally yielded.

This announcement from Bernstorff kindled a lively discussion in the Conference; in which Clarendon with polemic acuteness and Brunnow with elegiac pathos emphasized the binding force of the London Protocol, and Krieger and Bille, in strange contrast to the spirit of countless "Eider-Danish" programmes, would hear of nothing but the glorious General Constitution of 1852. Bernstorff held fast, naturally, with the greatest composure, to his announcement; and in the next session, on the 17th of May, the Conference voted to listen to whatever new system the German Powers now had in mind to propose.

Bismarck was at first not inclined to compromise himself by responding to this request. "Our aim," he said, "is the establishment of judicial security in the Duchies. Since the experiment of 1852 has so signally failed, we are ready to consider any new proposal, but in no way are we obligated to invent such an expedient ourselves."

Meanwhile Bernstorff reported on the 18th of May a private conversation that he had had with Lord John, in which he had told the English Minister that Prussia

could in the next session demand nothing less than the complete independence of the Duchies, and that even a union in the person of the sovereign was out of the question until Christian IX. had proved by law his claim to the hereditary succession. After several impracticable suggestions, Lord John, according to Bernstorff's report, declared that he very well saw that it would be impossible to hold together in one government the two discordant races; and that there was nothing left but their complete separation and the division of Schleswig according to the nationality of the inhabitants. He said, too, that he would propose this to the English Ministerial Council.

Palmerston had just now endeavored once more to arouse in Paris a common and violent demonstration against Prussia. But he received on the 14th of May the news that Napoleon refused to countenance such a movement as decidedly as formerly, and that, on the contrary, he had instructed Prince Latour to work in every way to bring about peace, but to avoid uttering any word hostile to Prussia, as that would not harmonize with the general tendency of French politics. This was the passing of the death-sentence upon the integrity of the Danish monarchy. Bernstorff's only fear was lest Denmark might seek a last chance for salvation in Austria's favorite scheme of a personal union. "Every one," he wrote on the 16th of May, "is ready to hear from us the most far-reaching demands. The least drawing back on our part might ruin everything."

Even after receiving the report of the 18th, Bismarck had already no more misgivings about going ahead. On the 15th, in an order to Bernstorff, which was soon afterwards made public, he repeated the assertion that after the manifold violation of the treaties of 1852 by the Danes, the German Powers were also no longer bound by them; indeed, he even went so far as to mention the fact that the Law of Succession of 1853 had never been laid before the Estates of the Duchies, and consequently could not be regarded as having ever properly become a law.

This assertion was, as we know, historically incorrect, but had become through the Augustenburg agitation quite a common remark in every German's mouth. It is the more noticeable in the present connection, because of its being the only instance in which Bismarck in the whole course of this great question fell into even a temporary inconsistency. Yet of course it is clear that by such a passing remark of the Minister to his ambassador no harm could accrue to his own State nor any point be exposed to a third party.

Bismarck telegraphed on the same day: "The King has ordered me to inform you that our aim is, in truth, the complete separation of the two races from each other, while we reserve the question of the dynasty, which is of only secondary importance to us. But in order to gain this end without breaking our word to Austria, we must first pass through the stage of considering the plan of a personal union, and must not allow it to be accepted nor yet to appear to have been beaten

by our opposition. So soon as it is recognized as impracticable, we shall try to obtain Austria's consent to the arrangement of things talked over in your conversation with Lord John. The next step is to invite Austria to join us in demanding, in the session of the 17th, the political autonomy and independence of the Duchies as far as the Königsau."

Rechberg expressed his assent in reply to the inquiry sent to him on the same day. He favored as ever the removal of Danish influence in the Duchies, but, nevertheless, the confirmation of Christian IX. as Duke of Schleswig-Holstein, and consequently the connection of the two parts of the Kingdom in the person of the Sovereign. Yet Rechberg himself had formerly protested against any express mention of the personal union in the motion itself, on account of its unpopularity in Germany;¹ but the more earnest was he in wishing it distinctly understood. In London, Bernstorff had great difficulty in making his outline seem plausible to his Austrian colleagues, because in it not only was even any indirect reference to the personal union avoided, but it was the next thing to being in so many words excluded. It was not until after Beust came forward and announced his intention to propose several amendments to the motion, that Biegeleben yielded.

The session of the Conference held on the 17th of May was opened amid great suspense on the part of all the members. Upon the invitation of Lord John

¹ Werther, April 29th.

Russell, Bernstorff read the following declaration of Germany: "That peace can alone be lasting which assures to the Duchies a guaranty against foreign oppression, and to Germany a guaranty against the periodical return of the present disturbance; and such a guaranty is to be found alone in the complete political independence of the two Duchies which were bound together by common institutions."

A pause of astonishment and expectancy followed. The chief point had not been touched. What was it, then, that Germany actually desired? The complete cession of Schleswig-Holstein, or the personal union? Finally Quaade asked: "What shall be the fashion of the union of the Duchies? And in what way shall they remain joined to the Danish crown?"

Bernstorff replied: "The union shall be a complete one; and then the next thing to decide is, who is the legitimate sovereign of the Duchies." This did not help the matter any. It acknowledged the possibility of the succession of Christian, but no more than of any one else. In short, Germany still held back in proclaiming her candidate.

What was the reason for this indefiniteness in the most important part of the motion? The thought flew through the ranks of the neutrals: Germany is silent, because her understanding with Austria, complete hitherto, does not cover this point; Prussia wants to annex the Duchies, and Austria wishes to prevent this annexation by the appointment of Christian IX.

Immediately was seen how much the co-operation of

the two Powers had actually signified for the cause; at this first intimation of their falling out, the Englishmen and Brunnow fell back again with renewed emphasis upon the sacredness of the treaties of 1852. Latour and Wachtmeister joined with them in averring that the German declaration was no motion at all that could be discussed; for just the most essential point, the dynastic question, was left in the dark as much as ever and deferred to an uncertain future. In long discussions and debates the representatives quarrelled over this and that, over the functions of the German Confederation, over the constitutional treaties of 1852, and over the binding power of the London Protocol.

In all this confusion the courage of the Danes rose. It was they who finally put an end to all the uncertainty. They said they had come to London with the idea that the treaties of 1852 were to be taken as the basis of the Conference. Of course, said they, it was not in their hands to prevent other Powers from assuming other principles as the foundation for negotiations, but Bernstorff's motion was so far from the Danish standpoint that they could not consider it as even a subject upon which to make a report to their Government. Quaade closed with the decisive words: "We must reject the motion, even in case it should be intended that the succession in the Duchies should fall to King Christian."

By these words the personal union was discarded, once for all and irrevocably discarded, before it had been proposed, not to say before it had been seriously

discussed in detail. Even Biegeleben, its most tenacious advocate, was obliged to confess that it had become necessary to invent some new arrangement.

With this in view the Conference adjourned to the 28th of May, in order to give the Cabinets time for further deliberation and agreement. "As for England," said Lord John to Count Bernstorff as early as the following day, "the Cabinet Council has unanimously adopted the doctrine that the only possible thing now to do is to divide Schleswig according to her nationalities. England will bring forward this motion in the next session."

BOOK XII.



ALSEN AND THE PEACE.

CHAPTER I.

CLOSE OF THE LONDON CONFERENCE.

IMMEDIATELY after receiving the detailed reports concerning the session of May 17th, King William approved, on the 21st, a despatch of Bismarck's to Werther, in which Germany's further plans were submitted to Austria's consideration and assent.

Bismarck began by saying that, after Denmark's categorical refusal of the personal union, any yielding on the part of the German Powers was out of the question, from regard for their own honor and public opinion. "Nothing remains," he said, "but to demand the complete separation from Denmark of both Duchies as far as the Königsau. Very likely, from considerations of moment to Europe as a whole, there will be a dispute about the northern part of Schleswig; there would be no talk about such a measure in case of the preservation of a personal union, for the sake of not increasing Denmark's preponderance over the Duchies; but in the event of a complete separation, we can the more readily allow it, since the two nationalities would be thereby wholly set apart from each other, and there would be no room for mutual complaints on the score of oppression.

"The dynastic question, the question of who shall

rule over the Duchies in the future, may be postponed for a while in the conference. In its settlement, not only questions of rights, but also of compromise and of expediency, must be considered; and about them we are ready to consult with Austria.

“Count Rechberg,” the despatch continued, “will recognize with us that the most important point to be kept in mind is, that for both Powers such a measure of success is necessary, as not only can be defended and justified, but may actually prove that German interests will be most fully protected so soon as the foreign policy of the Confederation shall be controlled by the two Great Powers acting in concert. With reference to our future mutual relations, their satisfactory condition at present will thereby gain in strength and permanence; and we must consider it of the highest importance to see to it, that to the minds of the people throughout Germany a brilliant victory in the national cause shall be looked upon as the result of our present harmonious action and as an earnest of the fruits promised by a further and firm continuance of these relations.”

After these general observations, Bismarck turned to the dynastic question, which, as we have seen, he wished to have postponed until later in the Conference, but about which he wished already to come to some understanding with Austria. We must give this part of the despatch entire.

“After putting aside the consideration of Christian IX., the claims of Augustenburg are doubtless the

ones that could under the present conditions be most easily realized, and with the least danger of European complications. There would be nothing to fear in the way of opposition from the Duchies themselves; and any tendency towards *suffrage universel* could also be avoided. We are therefore not disinclined to favor this solution of the problem, if we may hope for the co-operation of the Imperial Government.

“In the first place, however, it would be imperatively necessary to obtain guaranties for a conservative administration, and some security that the Duchies shall not become the home of democratic agitations. The Hereditary Prince would be obliged to sever his present connections, and to lay his cause wholly in the hands of Austria and Prussia. He must, above all, abjure his unwise promise to recognize the Constitution of 1848, and must take, with proper modifications, the old Constitution with its Estates as the basis of his future position.

“But although his claims (which are consistent with a wide-spread conviction, and which can be supported on legal though not perhaps incontestable grounds) may be acknowledged by us as the most easily satisfied under the existing circumstances, yet we do not intend by saying this to exclude other arrangements, provided they meet with the approval of the Vienna Cabinet.

“The Grand Duke of Oldenburg has raised claims for himself, which he pretends precede those of Augustenburg, and which he has kept until now in the background, either because of regard for the Hereditary

Prince or because he has been waiting for a propitious moment. We should have no real reason for refusing on principle to see these claims recognized; and we wish to know the opinion of Count Rechberg concerning them, as indeed we shall be glad to consider any other proposition offered by Austria, which has for its object the protection of the Duchies.

“Of course, there can be no doubt but that it is well known in Vienna that there are those, even in the most influential and distinguished circles in Prussia, who believe that a connection of the Duchies with Prussia would be not only a proper indemnification for the efforts and sacrifices made by the allies, but would also afford the surest guaranty for the prosperity of the Duchies themselves, and the best security against any possibility of their again falling a prey to the danger threatening them from Denmark.

“We will not deny that such opinions, held by our own countrymen, must be allowed to have some weight, nor that we should not decline such an arrangement if it should be the natural outcome of circumstances. Yet we are very far from being willing by ambitious plans in this direction to call forth European complications, or to endanger the harmony of our relations with Austria. Although addresses and petitions to this effect have been presented to His Majesty by a portion of his subjects without any solicitation from the Government, the King will take no step towards the realization of these projects without the full consent of his Imperial Confederate ally.”

These last words, as indeed the whole despatch, were meant in full earnest. For, however unyielding the mighty Minister was in the execution of a great design, he was quite as versatile and pliant in choosing the proper means; and Prussia's annexation of the Duchies was only one of the possible means of solving the question at issue. The essential objects in view, the military protection of North Germany and the creation of a German maritime power, could be attained without annexation, if the parties concerned would permit the Schleswig-Holstein military forces to be connected permanently with the army of Prussia. This involved, it is true, a limiting of the sovereignty of Schleswig-Holstein, and consequently a modification of the German Confederate rights: the question was, what would be the attitude of Austria and of Augustenburg to this scheme?

Personally, Bismarck was not merely indifferent to the Hereditary Prince of Augustenburg; it must rather be said that the Minister disliked him. The King, however, continued to sympathize with him. The Crown Prince always desired with great interest and warmth to see his friend, the young Prince of Augustenburg, raised to the throne. He also hoped that the Prince would acquiesce in the really well-founded requirements made by Prussia, which had been enumerated as follows in a memorial of the 26th of February: namely, the establishment of Rendsburg as a Confederate fortress, and of Kiel as a Prussian marine station; entrance into the Tariff-Union; the building of a great canal; and the

arrangement of a permanent connection of the army and navy with the forces of Prussia.

So far as Austria was concerned, it was the ardent wish of the King, as well as of his Minister, to gain the free and sincere consent of the Vienna Court to some such settlement as was indispensable for the welfare of all Germany, and not to see, as so often in the past, plans for the good of Germany as a whole either rejected or hindered simply because they meant at the same time some increase in Prussia's individual strength. However often during the last decade Bismarck had opposed Austria, and however determined he was, if worst should come to worst, to carry through by force of arms what he felt was best for Prussia and for Germany: he nevertheless was equally imbued with the conviction that in the very nature of things there could be no more desirable alliance for Prussia than an Austrian one, so soon as this same standpoint should also be reached in Vienna. It is very certain that some arrangement which only meagrely satisfied the requirements of the main object, provided that Austria would co-operate in it, would be preferred by him to a more fruitful and more brilliant result that would have to be wrung from the Vienna Court by waging a bloody war.

Thus, after the session of May 17th in the Conference had made an immediate decision of the fate of the Duchies imperative, he laid before the Imperial Cabinet, with that open frankness which has more than once astounded the world, the question whether Austria in

the Schleswig-Holstein affair intended to act in keeping with the new alliance, or in the spirit of the old jealousy?

The answer to this question had already been matured in the minds of the Austrian statesmen, and when Denmark rejected the plan of a personal union, it was at once decided.

We have noticed in how many places throughout Europe the idea of Prussian annexation had been for several months discussed; and, as Arnim very properly remarked to King Max of Bavaria, it lay quite in the nature of things. This proved to be exceedingly irritating to the Austrians. Rechberg had already, on the 27th of April, said to Werther most confidentially that he very well understood how the thought should become prevalent in Berlin, that the future position of Schleswig-Holstein must be made to be as advantageous as possible for Prussia; and that Austria would very gladly offer her hand to assist in the scheme, were not extreme caution necessary. "But," he added, "English and Russian friendship must be preserved as a shield against the inevitable struggle with France and the Revolution. If this is done, victory, which would be in that case certain, would bring an increase of territory to Prussia also, whereas the present conjuncture is ill-suited to the obtaining of such a result."

Rechberg held the more firmly, then, to the hope of saving Schleswig-Holstein for Christian IX. by means of the personal-union plan, and of preventing Prussia from being led into the temptation of selfish covetous-

ness. When, nevertheless, Denmark so unconditionally rejected the personal union, a great crisis was felt to be at hand in Vienna, as well as in Berlin. The ducal throne of King Christian IX. had through Denmark's refusal become vacant; and it seemed to the Austrians all-important to find some one to fill it, before this vacancy should arouse ambitious hopes in the minds of the Prussians.

It was uncertain how Prussia would regard the matter. But the candidate of the "Third Germany" was right at hand, not only of the Lesser States, but also of the Holstein people and of the whole German nation. So that if the Court of Vienna proclaimed Augustenburg for its candidate, then all that stream of national enthusiasm which had hitherto so vexatiously opposed Austria's dearest wishes would be turned in the channel of Austria's influence, and could with her support fearlessly await Prussia's movements.

Then came the most unexpected of surprises: Prussia herself moved in the Conference to claim Schleswig-Holstein for Augustenburg! To be sure, the despatch mentioned other possibilities; but, never mind! those things would all settle themselves, after His Grace, Duke Frederick, should be once installed in Kiel and recognized as a Confederate Prince.

When Werther on the 23d of May waited upon Rechberg and read the famous despatch, the Minister cried: "Just look at this message of mine which I was about to send to Berlin. It, too, proposes the raising of the Hereditary Prince of Augustenburg to the ducal

throne of Schleswig-Holstein. Of the various expedients which have been mentioned by Herr von Bismarck, I had already chosen the same one that he puts before all others. Our agreement could not, I am happy to say, be more complete. I go, however, one step further, and would propose the Hereditary Prince at once to the Conference. That the Prince *must* maintain a conservative policy, goes without saying.

“So far as the other possibilities hinted at by Herr von Bismarck are concerned,” continued Rechberg, “Oldenburg’s claims could hardly be carried through the Confederate Diet; and as for a Prussian annexation, although we should gladly agree with Berlin on the subject, it is not practicable at present, on account of the situation of things in Europe.” The Minister closed his observations with the request that Bismarck’s despatch might be left in his hands, in order that, for the sake of the very favorable impression its form and contents would make upon the Emperor, he might lay the document itself before him.

Such friendship! such good-heartedness! To Karolyi and Apponyi, Rechberg wrote somewhat more definitely on the very next day, the 24th of May. “The hereditary right of Augustenburg,” he said, “has never appeared doubtful; but now that Denmark has made the continuance of a bond between herself and the Duchies impossible, it seems as if the German Powers, following out the wishes of Germany, ought by their rights as victors, to make good what perhaps may have been lacking in the claim of the Duke of Augusten-

burg. This will begin a new chapter in our politics. The peace of Europe would be endangered by any solution of the question that should change the existing balance of power among the Great Nations. So that Augustenburg's advancement to the position has the advantage, that the application of the principle of nationality, advocated by France, and so utterly inadmissible for us, would become superfluous."

Rechberg's words were only too true: "This will begin a new chapter in our politics." Hitherto, in confronting Denmark, Austria had declared Augustenburg's claims to be unjustifiable; and now, in alliance with the German States, she was to try to make good in their eyes the flaws in the rights of the Prince. Hitherto, she had held with Prussia against the Lesser States: now she thought again of siding with the Lesser States against Prussia.

Rechberg still hoped and wished, by fine predictions about the future or by compliance in this or that detail, to avoid any open rupture with Prussia. But there were other men besides Count Rechberg in Vienna, enemies of the Prussian alliance from the very beginning, who were now determined to nip in the bud Prussia's wishes and to bring out as distinctly as possible the actual contrast between the two Courts. At their head was Herr von Schmerling, filled ever since 1848 with hatred to Prussia, and now holding the position of Minister of the Interior and Superintendent of the Press Bureau.

Even as early as the 25th of May, the two news-

papers, *Der Botschafter* and *Die Wiener Abendpost*, contained triumphant articles proclaiming that the integrity of the Danish kingdom, that empty chimera of European diplomacy, had been as good as abandoned by the Powers; that Prussia had given up her ideas of annexation, and had joined Austria on the side of Augustenburg; that the question alone remained, whether she would perhaps demand from the latter certain concessions, such as, for instance, a promise to make the Schleswig-Holstein army and navy dependent upon Prussia; and that it would be Austria's task to preserve the full sovereignty of the Duke intact. The question, it was said, might then arise, in what way and by what formalities should the Duke be installed in his position, and to whom should Denmark formally cede the Duchies; it seemed most natural, that, as was the case with Lombardy in 1859, they should be ceded to the victors; Austria would then urge an opposite course in behalf of Augustenburg, and even bring the matter before a European court of arbitration; yet perhaps the accession of the Duke might take place without any legal proceedings, by a simple Act of the European Powers. Moreover, it was said, Austria would not fail, after the Schleswig-Holstein matter should have been settled, to return to her grand undertaking, a reform of the German Confederation.

The programme was clearly as complete as possible. Beust and Pfordten themselves could not have written differently. Before Prussia had said a single word about a military arrangement or anything of the kind,

she received notice that her only reward for her efforts and Germany's only gain from the dangerous war would be an addition to the number of the Lesser States, and the prospect of the convention of another Frankfort Assembly of Princes, from which Prussia, after having had such a lecture read to her, would hardly be likely again to hold aloof. Only that sentence in the programme sounded very strange which said that Denmark was to cede the Duchies to the two victors, in which case it would seem as if the Prussian victor would have a word to say about the disposal of her new possessions.

Quite in the same tone as these declarations in Vienna, was the news which Bernstorff on the 27th of May telegraphed from London: "Since we are to bring forward Augustenburg's claims to-morrow, Beust considers it in order for the Confederate Diet to settle this question in the same way as soon as possible, perhaps by next week."

Bismarck, after the hostile reception of his despatch in Vienna, had made up his mind to preserve silence toward Austria with regard to future plans; but to the Confederate Diet he had a very decided word to say. He sent word to Bernstorff to notify Herr von Beust and Count Apponyi, that Prussia would feel herself obliged to oppose most obstinately such a motion in the Confederate Diet as had been suggested, for the simple and irrefutable reason that such an anticipation of the subject in hand by a Confederate decree would be a very serious insult to the Powers deliberating in

the London Conference,—an assertion which even Rechberg could not contradict.

To his telegram Bismarck added the following observations as instructions to Bernstorff: "Austria is endeavoring to establish irrevocably the candidacy of Augustenburg, in order by this means to render more difficult Prussia's imposing special requisitions. We are not in a position to put up with this conduct. The dynastic question is to be discussed with special consideration for Prussian interests; and consequently, other possibilities cannot be ruled out until we have negotiated with Augustenburg and ascertained in what relation to Prussia he intends to place himself and his country. If the person of Augustenburg meets with more opposition in the Conference than the project of a division, then let the former drop."

In conformity with these instructions, Bernstorff and Balan prepared very carefully the exact wording of their motion. It read as follows: "The German Powers desire the establishment of Schleswig-Holstein as an independent state under the sovereignty of the Hereditary Prince of Augustenburg, inasmuch as this Prince not only possesses in the eyes of Germany the best-grounded claims to that throne, thus insuring his recognition by the Confederate Diet, but also would have without doubt the vote of a tremendous majority of the population in those countries themselves." In this way an acknowledgment of Augustenburg's claims by Prussia herself was cautiously avoided. The only reason given for bringing forward the motion was

the feeling of the people in the Duchies and the opinion of the Confederate Diet: that is to say, the candidacy of Augustenburg was advocated not on account of its justness, but of its practicability.

Meanwhile the Earls Russell and Clarendon had talked over their plan of a division with the neutrals. Inasmuch as neither France nor Russia was willing, for the sake of maintaining the integrity of Denmark, to begin a war against Germany, and even Palmerston comprehended the advisability of compromising in the event of their withholding their assistance, the English proposition, to save for Christian IX. at least the Danish and the mixed portions of Schleswig, met with general approval. According to this, the Schley and the Dannevirke were fixed as marking the future boundary; in the German portion neither fortresses nor fortified harbors were to be established; no measure was to be introduced in the future into this portion of the countries without the consent of the inhabitants; Germany was to renounce every thought of interference in the internal affairs of Denmark; and finally, to the Danish King the remainder of his possessions were to be guaranteed by the Great Powers of Europe.

Bernstorff, likewise taken into the confidence of Russell, did not conceal from him that the line of the Schley would not answer the purpose in the matter, and that the prohibition of fortified places would not be consonant with Germany's honor. Nevertheless, the neutrals kept to their text. It was agreed that in the Conference session Bernstorff should first declare Ger-

many's demands, and then Russell should set forth the English proposition.

This then was done on the 28th of May. Brunnow immediately arose, and with his usual sentimental pathos expressed his painful surprise at Germany's desire to divide in sunder the Danish monarchy, rejected the motion with much regret, and reserved the rights of all Augustenburg's rivals, particularly those of the Grand Duke of Oldenburg. Count Wachtmeister declared that his instructions would not permit him to enter into any discussion of the German motion, much less to vote for it. Quite as decidedly did Quaade say that although he had declared the German motion of the 17th of May acceptable, that made him only the more unable to discuss the present one. And since Prince Latour also supported the English proposition to its full extent, the elevation of Augustenburg was thus in the councils of Europe rejected by all voices except the German ones.

The German plenipotentiaries then took up the discussion of the English proposition. Count Bernstorff said that the German Powers could not help seeing in any division of Schleswig whatsoever a great reduction of their just demands, but that they would probably, in the interests of peace, suffer such a concession in principle; they nevertheless made the reservations of a more correct determination of the boundaries and of full liberty to establish fortifications in the German portion of the country.

Lord Clarendon in vain requested the Danes to

express their opinion about the principle involved in a division. They said they could do so only after the Germans should have exactly declared their position upon every particular point of the English proposition. There was nothing to do but to adjourn the session until the 2d of June, in the hope that before that time the contending parties would come to definite decisions.

Although the neutrals were little inclined to oppose with arms the German demands, they now sought the more eagerly a reduction of the same by diplomatic means. On the 31st of May the Germans had a confidential talk with the neutrals, which was unusually exciting. Earl Russell announced that Denmark had accepted the plan of a division, so that the Germans might express themselves about the proposed boundary. Thereupon, Bernstorff, supported by Beust and Apponyi, explained that the aim of a division was the complete separation of the two nationalities; that the proposed line along the Schley, however, would leave thousands of German inhabitants under Danish rule; and that consequently Germany must demand a more northern boundary, the line connecting Apenrade and Tondern.

These words were scarcely spoken, before the neutrals broke out in a storm of indignation. Germany, they said, was demanding the whole of the mixed district; about such requisitions there was no use in talking; the Conference might as well in that case close its sessions at once. Bernstorff replied that there was simply no other way: after the past experiences Ger-

many could not trust the King of Denmark with one single German subject.

In the greatest excitement Lord John cried, with a voice trembling from emotion, that such an insulting remark could not even be repeated to the Danes. "Well, then," said Bernstorff and Beust, "ask the population, and you will see how much Danish sentiment is to be found north of the Schley." Apponyi hastened to observe that he had no objection to make against asking the provincial Estates of Schleswig, but that he must very decidedly protest against an exercise of universal suffrage among the people. Prince Latour remarked that a vote of the people could not have anything to do with determining the amount of land to be ceded, but only with choosing the ruler, and at any rate Denmark must have for a boundary some strong military position assured to them, such as the Schley and the Dannevirke.

To appease the neutrals a little, Bernstorff came over to this view of the question, and observed that the German troops had taken the Dannevirke in two days, but Düppel only after several weeks; therefore from a military point of view the Schley afforded a much less secure boundary for Denmark than some line further to the north, for instance, the one connecting Flensburg and Tondern. He said that he had, to be sure, no powers permitting him to propose the latter; and that he must the more decidedly reject the desired prohibition of fortifications in the German section of the country.

In the midst of these discussions came then, to the astonishment of all, an announcement of Brunnow, to the effect that through the overthrow of the London treaty of 1852, the reservations made in the Warsaw Protocol were again revived, which concerned the hereditary rights of the House of Gottorp; but that the Emperor Alexander, in order to show to the world his supreme unselfishness, and at the same time to promote the work of peace, had conveyed his whole right and title to the Grand Duke of Oldenburg. This was again a new protest against Augustenburg. The Emperor had already on the 28th of May declared to the Prussian plenipotentiary, Von Loen, that in the elevation of the Hereditary Prince he could see only a victory for Revolution.

In the official session of the 2d of June these doings were repeated, and were equally fruitless. The Danes would not even consent to the line of the Schley, but demanded as boundary a line further south: that connecting Eckerförde and Friedrichstadt; that is to say, they wanted to keep just about five-sixths of the whole Duchy. Bernstorff, on the other hand, held up the prospect of a further concession on the part of Germany, by announcing that both he and Balan were ready to recommend to their Government, instead of the Apenrade line, the one connecting Flensburg and Tondern. With no hesitation the Danes declared that this was as unsatisfactory as any of the others proposed.

Bernstorff then introduced the subject of a prolonga-

tion of the truce which was to terminate on the 12th of June, by saying that he could guarantee Prussia's willingness to agree to a formal armistice that should continue as long as possible. But the Danes, fearing to lose the auspicious summer season for blockades and reprisals, showed themselves in this matter, also, to the disappointment of the neutrals, most determinedly unwilling to yield, by declaring that they could not favor a further truce unless there were a sure prospect of the conclusion of a just peace.

The Danes evidently still believed that, inasmuch as England would not allow the Austrian fleet to run into the Baltic, they were secure upon their islands and could watch with composure for a long while yet the German invasion of Jutland. Not until the following session on the 6th of June did they graciously condescend to offer an extension of the truce until the 26th, to which the German Powers, unwillingly enough, assented on the 9th.

Meanwhile, in Prussia negotiations had already been begun with the Hereditary Prince. The young Prince had hastened to Berlin; but in an interview with Bismarck late one evening, he proved to be very little in a hurry to fulfil Prussia's wishes. After the motion of May 28th, and perhaps, too, since reports had reached him of the latest developments in the feelings at Vienna, he appeared to himself to be already a sovereign Confederate Prince, in duty bound not to betray the rights of his House and of his State.

The conversation with Bismarck turned in general upon the same points that had been specified by the

Crown Prince in his memorial of February 25th. The Pretendant remarked that without the consent of the Schleswig-Holstein popular representatives he could not bind himself to any cession of land nor limitation of his sovereignty. The more of Schleswig that was left to the Danes, the less could he, on the other hand, give up to Prussia. As to a common military arrangement, something might be effected; but the conditions agreed upon in the compact with Coburg would not be admissible in the case of Schleswig-Holstein.

"The attempt must not be made," he said, "to bind me with paragraphs; they must seek to win my heart." "We hoped," replied Bismarck, "that we had already won your heart by driving back the Danes." The Prince hastened to dispel this misconception. "The Duchies," he said, "did not call upon Prussia. Without Prussia the Confederation would have accomplished their liberation more easily and without disagreeable stipulations." Bismarck answered by reminding him of the fear of the Hanoverians to cross the Elbe until Prussians were stationed in reserve, and by hinting that Prussia's enthusiasm in supporting the claims of the Prince would in some measure depend upon the attitude of His Highness towards Prussia. "In that regard," said the Prince, "I am not at all anxious. The matter has already advanced so far, that there is no longer any danger of its being unsuccessful."

Further conversations between him and his personal friend, the Crown Prince, led to no very much better result, and certainly to no more definite decision.

For Bismarck, the motion of the 28th of May was from the very beginning nothing more than a proposal of peace to the Conference, as good or as bad, according to circumstances, as any other; and under all circumstances it existed no longer for Prussia after it had been rejected by the Conference, any more than did the proposal of a personal union.

Immediately after the conversation with the Prince, Bismarck wrote to his commissioner in St. Petersburg, Baron Pirch, that Prussia had no objection to the candidacy of Oldenburg, but had proposed that of Augustenburg, because it seemed to be more practicable; and that she did not consider herself bound to the latter, if any other combinations would more readily lead to the attainment of the main object, or would offer better conditions. Likewise he wrote to Goltz: "The personal question is not the important feature of our programme. Since talking with the Hereditary Prince, I can only wish in the interests of Prussia that, after an acceptable arrangement of the frontiers, the question of the dynasty might for a while remain open." And lastly to Bernstorff: "After having had explicit negotiations with the Hereditary Prince, it seems to me to be for Prussia's interest, not to go at present any further than we have already done in advocating his candidacy; and to declare, if opposition arises, that the settlement of the dynasty is by no means the chief aim of our programme."

Also Werther received, on the 8th of June, similar instructions with regard to talking with Rechberg on

the matter. "Even if Austria hitherto has not favored Oldenburg's claims, and, indeed, has finally decided for Augustenburg, the situation has now been materially changed by the Russian abdication of the hereditary title of the Gottorps in favor of the Grand Duke. There has now come out of those foreign and almost forgotten rights the direct claim of a German Confederate Prince; and this has already been laid before the Conference and will certainly be brought forward in Frankfort. To demonstrate to the Confederate Diet the legal basis of the claim, is the business of the Grand Duke. From political considerations, it seems to me, we have no reason to put ourselves in the way of the Grand Duke. Both of the German Powers need as great a victory as possible; it may very possibly be true that this is to be obtained by the candidacy of Oldenburg, since to this cause Russia's patronage is certain, and the Western Powers would hardly be hostile. It may be seen beforehand, that the Grand Duke will extend his claims to the whole of Schleswig-Holstein; and the division of Schleswig would be for him not a cession by Denmark, but to Denmark, and Russia could not very well oppose a boundary-line that is favorable to the Grand Duke. We have, moreover, never wished to regard the candidacy of Augustenburg as the only possible one, to the exclusion of all others. That was simply presented as a motion; and since it was not accepted by the other side, it is consequently no longer binding upon the original mover."

Rechberg listened to all that without raising any

objections; yet he remarked coolly: "We should hardly better our situation in the eyes of the neutrals, if we changed our position again so soon."

On the 9th of June, the Emperor Alexander of Russia, accompanied by Prince Gortschakoff, arrived in Berlin on his way to the baths at Kissingen. Bismarck, on the evening of the 10th, had the honor of a long audience with the Monarch, and saw no reason for regretting his having inclined toward the candidacy of Oldenburg. He found the Emperor filled with a strong desire for the preservation of peace. "If the effort to continue the truce be unsuccessful," said the Czar, "then let Prussia endure the blockade, and not cross over to Fünen, lest this step might rouse the anger of England to an open rupture."

Bismarck confessed the great dangers which such a turn as this would bring. "But," said he, "there are evils that are worse than war, and among them I must reckon such a conclusion of the Danish strife as would still leave the Germans in Schleswig unprotected, and in this way bring a great humiliation upon His Majesty the King, upon his brave army, and upon the Prussian people, as well as" — here he struck a chord that echoed loudly in Alexander's heart — "place a dangerous weapon in the hands of the Revolution, against which it is still the chief task of the Government to use its powers."

The Emperor warmly seconded these words. "May Prussia always hold fast to these principles!" he exclaimed. "In that case," observed Bismarck, "it will

be necessary to prevent our foreign difficulties from changing into internal ones. We certainly cannot be expected to lay upon Germany the burden of the embarrassments which the English Cabinet has artificially brought upon itself by its Danish policy, nor to settle questions for the English Cabinet at the expense of our own internal security."

The conversation then turned upon what should be done with the Duchies in the future. The Emperor expressed his great satisfaction at the friendly reception accorded in Berlin to Oldenburg's candidacy. He appeared, on the other hand, to be very much prejudiced in this connection against the possibility of a Prussian annexation. Bismarck observed: "We would not for the sake of that stir up a European war; but if the annexation should be offered to us, we should hardly find ourselves in a position to refuse it."—"Very well," said the Emperor, "it will hardly come to that. I am sure, I do not know who would be likely to make you such an offer."

The passage was easily made from this point to an urgent request to hold together firmly with Austria, and to make no separate compact with France. Bismarck replied that Prussia would resolve upon the latter only in case Austria or Russia formed a third party in the alliance. Again the Emperor admonished the Minister not to irritate England too much, and thereby drive her over to the side of France; for Napoleon was brooding over very dangerous schemes.

Bismarck held firmly to his assertion that England

would scarcely resolve upon war alone, and that Napoleon could not shut his eyes to his conviction that a fight along the Rhine, over a question of German nationality, would not only find Germany united and determined, but would unavoidably call into existence a coalition of the three Eastern Powers. For neither of these could suffer the defeat of the others; and if French armies should stand victorious on German soil, Russia would, out of consideration for Poland, be forced to take part, whether she felt like doing so or not.

The Emperor closed the audience by a repeated warning not to endanger the peace of Europe. He expressed his opinion that Schleswig should be divided by a line joining the Schley and Flensburg, and spoke, himself, of the London treaty of 1852 as an antiquated standpoint.

At least so much had been learned from this interview, that no serious danger threatened from the side of Russia, if the Duchies should be separated from Denmark. Whether this would also be true in the case of a Prussian annexation, was another question.

What great anxiety the Russian Government felt lest a Scandinavian Union should be formed, and how desirable it was for that reason to save Denmark from such great losses, was shown by a despatch sent to King Christian by the Russian ambassador Nicolai, on the 16th of June. It was received by the King while presiding at a session of the Cabinet, and contained a most urgent admonition to the King, even at the last

moment to avoid a sacrifice of the integrity of Denmark, by accepting the plan of a personal union between Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein.

The King, who was no "Eider-Dane," and who placed no more reliance upon foreign aid (Napoleon had just refused emphatically a repeated summons from Palmerston to interfere), was ready, as was also the Crown Prince, to take **this step**. But the Ministers, still conscious of their insular security, most vehemently declared themselves opposed to such a measure, which to them and their party seemed to be the very worst thing possible, and in reality the actual loss of the whole of Schleswig. For, of what use was it to the Danish people that Christian IX. should, in addition to the Danish crown, wear that of Schleswig-Holstein, if Schleswig's finances, military matters, and diplomacy were to be entirely taken out of the hands of the Danish patriots? It certainly would be better to give up Holstein entirely to the Germans, and if necessary even a strip of the southern part of Schleswig, and then victoriously proclaim the incorporation of Schleswig into the Danish State.

The discussion grew so heated that the observation was let fall by some one, that the acceptance of the personal union would drive the Danish people to the declaration of a republic. Inasmuch as the King persisted in his standpoint, all the Ministers resigned. The King closed the session, and in the course of the afternoon summoned various men of the old "United Kingdom" party, to consult with him about the formation of a new cabinet.

But he found no support from any direction. The feelings of the Parliament, the Press, and the population of the capital were extremely bitter. No one among them would hear of any independence of Schleswig. An attempt to act conformably to the Russian despatch might cost the King his throne. So the unhappy Monarch again yielded, called back to the ministerial chairs Monrad and his associates, and approved instructions to Quaade, to the effect that he should, as a final concession, accept the English motion of the 28th of May as an indivisible whole with all its clauses, but in every case to refuse further admissions. This meant the tearing down of all bridges, and the determination to depend entirely upon the protection of the waves of the sea. Yet other unpleasant experiences in the Conference were now in store for the Danes.

Bismarck, who was unwilling to lose the opportunity of employing practical means on account of theoretical scruples, had returned, after the Conference had rejected the Augustenburg motion, to the idea of consulting the population,—the idea originally introduced by the French. To be sure, the French would no longer hear of this as a means of fixing the boundary, but only of expressing the people's choice of their ruler in the German portion of the country. In sharp contrast to them, Austria repudiated every form of plebiscitum, and would suffer no other expression of the national will than a vote of the provincial Estates confirmed by the reigning sovereign; whereas England and Russia

wished for the plebiscitum for the same object as France, to help in the choice of a sovereign, and they would not recognize any vote of the provincial Estates before the installation of that sovereign.

In the midst of this confusion, Bismarck kept tenaciously and unmoved to his own course. "Nor will I," said he to the Austrians, "lay in the hands of popular assemblies the decision of either the question of the boundary or of the sovereign." In very truth, this was meant with all earnestness by him who was determined under no circumstances to pay any attention to any wishes of the inhabitants in favor of Augustenburg. "But England," he said, "has made the very laudable proposition of dividing Schleswig precisely in order, by a separation of the two nationalities, to put an end to their interminable quarrelling. Unfortunately, however, it is difficult to determine where one nationality ceases and the other begins. The Danes say at Eckernförde; we say at Apenrade. Now, what can be simpler, and what can be more necessary for an intelligent decision by the Conference, than to ask the people themselves whether they are Germans or Danes, — whether they are German at heart or Danish patriots? The result of such inquiry will not be the only factor in the minds of the Conference; but without this the Conference can never form a judgment adequate to the situation. In any case, the decision will not be given by the people, but by the Conference."

In Vienna this speech, concise as it was, produced no effect. Rechberg would not even allow such a

motion in the Conference to be passed over in silence. Yet, however much Bernstorff tried to dissuade Bismarck from the undertaking, so hopeless under these circumstances, the latter persisted in his intention. In the session of the 18th of June, Bernstorff was obliged to bring forward in due form a Prussian motion, drawn up by the Minister himself, and of the above-mentioned nature.

Immediately Bismarck's anticipations were realized. It was evident that the Danes and their friends could permit no official inquiry whatever concerning the actual situation of things in Schleswig, concerning the language and the sentiments of the inhabitants, without seriously injuring the Danish claims. Scarcely had Bernstorff read the motion, before the Danes raised a vigorous protest; only in the future German portion of the country, and not upon that which was to remain Danish, might the wishes of the inhabitants be listened to. With intense conservative unction Brunnow seconded them.

The Russian representative loudly regretted his being obliged to oppose the representatives of a Government so closely related to his own; but above all his feelings of friendship stood his duty to his own Court. "Now," continued he, "it is against all the principles of Russian Government to ask of subjects, whether they are willing to remain true to their sovereign. Should the peasants of Schleswig then decide a question which is being discussed by the Powers of Europe in this Conference? Never can I favor a view which will

subordinate the judgment of the European Governments to that of the Schleswig populace." Bernstorff interrupted him with the observation that "the people of Schleswig, who by the way are not all peasants, are, of course, not to decide the matter, but only to contribute to the Conference necessary material by way of information."—"This motion," cried Brunnow, "betrays the intention to rob the King of Denmark of his possessions. I am exceedingly sorry that it has been possible for the motion to be made by the plenipotentiary of His Majesty the King of Prussia."

Lord Clarendon confirmed this by saying, "The proposition aims eventually at the dethronement of the King of Denmark. That is what those are driving at who would ask his subjects whether they wish to remain his subjects or not." Prince Latour thought it might be well to follow the course proposed by Prussia, at least in the districts where the population was mixed; but he found no supporters. Austria and Sweden seconded Brunnow's remarks. Beust, in his own peculiar fashion, gave his vote for Prussia.

Thus the motion was utterly lost; but at the same time it was proclaimed to the world, and confirmed by Brunnow and Clarendon, that the continuance of the Danish rule was incompatible with any regard for the will of the people. The Danes again had every reason to pray, "Heaven save us from our friends."

English statesmen had felt beforehand what the moral effect would be, if the Prussian proposition should be rejected, and how emphatically it would disclose the

untenableness of the Danish rule over the Germans in Schleswig, and also of England's own proposal of the line of the Schley. They were therefore ready with a new attempt at a solution.

The Peace of Paris of 1856 had at Clarendon's request included the recommendation that in future contests both parties, before they took up arms, should request the valuable services of some friendly Power. Lord John accordingly now proposed that Germany and Denmark should in this way call upon some friendly Power to mark out a boundary-line, neither farther northward than the line designated by Germany nor to the south of the one insisted upon by Denmark. Clarendon added the observation that England's idea in making this proposal was that the settlement determined upon by this Power should be final and at once have binding force. To this Bernstorff replied that that would not be mediation but arbitration, and would consequently transgress the paragraph of the Peace of Paris, which nowhere mentioned anything more than "a mediating Power," whose "valuable services" and by no means final decision was desired, and which expressly spoke of preserving the "independent action of the contending Governments."

The Danes deeply regretted that England, by making this last proposition, would very likely be led to give up the line of the Schley, which had been designated by herself, and that she no longer seemed to lay any weight upon the other clauses of the former proposal. Both parties took occasion to report to their Governments

upon the new English proposition. Balan then declared that a prolongation of the truce could be granted only if the length of the same be fixed at six months; while Biegeleben was of the opinion that one might be contented with two or three months. The Danes peremptorily refused to discuss this question.

In the following session of June 22d, Bernstorff was able to announce that the German Powers were ready to accept the last English proposition exactly in the spirit of the Peace of Paris, according to which a mediator should be chosen who would proffer "valuable services" in effecting a peace, but without passing any binding decrees. We shall soon return to this point, and explain how it was brought about. Quaade, in opposition to the announcement, explained in the name of the Danish Government that that clause in the Peace of Paris could not be applied to the present situation, and that consequently Lord John's proposition could not be accepted. King Christian had been inclined at first to approve it, and Hall, who had been requested to give his advice, urged its acceptance; but Monrad, strengthened in his sentiments by encouraging hints from the Court of the Prince of Wales, stood immovably fixed in his determination to reject it.¹

This was again a move that was unfavorable for Danish interests. Denmark had again been less compliant than the German Powers. Clarendon sought in vain to smooth over this naked fact by an artificial explanation to the effect that under the term "valuable

¹ Bernstorff, Dec. 22d, 1864.

services" in the Peace of Paris had also been understood the office of an arbitrator, and that therefore the Germans had shown themselves quite as obstinate and unyielding as the Danes. The exact wording of the Parisian document favored, however, too clearly the interpretation placed upon it by the Germans.

The same result occurred when Prince Latour, this time in the name of his Government, repeated his motion to allow, for the sake of the information needed by the Conference, a general vote of the inhabitants to be taken by parishes in the mixed districts lying between Apenrade and Eckernförde, with the understanding that the German troops were to be removed during the voting. Bernstorff and Beust both declared themselves ready to report to their Governments upon this motion; but Quaade, in consequence of the ministerial crisis in Copenhagen, was obliged to decline it shortly and definitively.

Inasmuch as the armistice was to last only four days longer, Balan again expressed Prussia's willingness to negotiate about a prolongation of the same. Quaade replied that he could now only say as before, that his Government would consent to such a prolongation only in case a peaceful termination should be seriously in prospect; and that, inasmuch as this unfortunately was not the case, there could be no thought of a longer truce.

Thus the work of the diplomats was at an end. The closing session of the Conference on the 25th of June was uneventful, and witnessed, outside of some further

mutual recriminations, nothing other than the usual formalities and polite assurances. On the following day Clarendon said to Bernstorff: "So far you have won your game. You came into the Conference as masters of the situation, and as masters of the situation you now leave it. — Have a care how long that will last." In the first place, arms were to decide whether the hopes which the Danes had staked upon the security of their islands were well founded.

CHAPTER II.

ALSEN. — PRELIMINARIES OF PEACE.

SINCE the 18th of June, King William had been staying, in company with Bismarck, at Carlsbad, for the sake of the baths. The Emperor Francis Joseph, anxious to be on good terms with everybody and to leave himself in no way exposed, had visited the Russian Monarch in Kissingen, and now, after having sent his Minister thither before him, appeared in Carlsbad.

Bismarck, on the 20th and 21st of June, explained to his Austrian colleague the same principles that he had shortly before in Berlin advocated to the Russians: namely, the necessity of not being frightened by any threatening danger before the accomplishment of the desired end; the certainty that England would not take up arms alone against Germany; the improbability of Napoleon's favoring such a venture himself; and the assurance that in such an event not only all Germany, but Russia too, must join the alliance.

At first, Rechberg opposed this in every point. The question was still, whether it would be best to yield to England's demand for arbitration or to limit their assent to simple mediation; and Rechberg in his distaste for a war was ready to promise beforehand compliance with the decision of the mediator. "Other-

wise," he said, "a declaration of war is to be expected from England. In that case, Palmerston could arouse incalculable sources of danger to the Vienna Court along the Dalmatian coast, in Venetia, and also in Hungary and in Galicia; and a serious financial crisis in Austria would be the result of a rupture with England. Then, too, England would not fail to come to an understanding with France, and the calamities of Germany would be doubled."

Bismarck's observation, that it would be no easier for England than for the German Powers together to make an alliance with Napoleon, was not enough to change the attitude of the Imperial Minister. Nor was any greater impression produced by Bismarck's warning, that the effect upon the German people, of yielding in this matter, would be that they would see in revolution alone the means of obtaining for the German Nation a place of importance in European affairs. These disadvantages, which were to be borne in common with Prussia, who would also be yielding, seemed to the Count to be much more endurable than the prospect of war, which his colleagues in the Vienna Ministerial Council looked upon as the worst of all possible evils.

Over and over again he preached compliance with England's wishes. Then Bismarck announced to him Prussia's fixed resolve not to yield under any circumstances. "Austria," said Bismarck, "may in that case leave to us the continuance of the war, and withdraw herself from the whole affair, with the understanding that our mutual friendship shall be preserved, and that

she will certainly offer her heartiest support, if Germany should be attacked by land." This carried the day; if things came to that pass, Austria's influence in Germany would be entirely lost, and Prussia would without contradiction be the leader of the German nation. This would be a still worse evil than an English declaration of war. Rechberg decided to approve Bismarck's wish to reject the plan of arbitration.

On the other hand, the Count held to his conviction that in the now certain event of the renewal of the Danish war, England ought not to be further irritated by an attack upon Fünen, and that, furthermore, such a step should be taken only after it should be agreed upon later by both Powers. Instead of this, then, it was decided to effect a landing upon Alsen, as well as also to occupy North Jutland on the other side of the Lijmfjord, and to subject the country to German civil administration and taxation. The German Confederation was to be requested to consent at last to the common administration of both Duchies; and the declaration was to be made to the European Powers, that after the re-commencement of the war, the consent to a division of Schleswig, which had been formally given, would no longer be considered binding. The aim of the war should be rather the separation of the Duchies from Denmark under the most favorable conditions possible in the circumstances. All these points were then comprehended on the 24th of June in a formal treaty between the two Cabinets.

Meanwhile, in the allied army everything had been

prepared most expeditiously and most carefully, so that the unsuccessful close of the Conference might be followed on the spot by a decisive blow. The period of rest from active war had been passed by no means pleasantly by the troops in Jutland. The inhabitants were so hostilely disposed, that the support of the troops (for cash payments) by those with whom they were quartered could not be carried out as had been agreed in London. The necessaries of life had to be transported in large quantities from Hamburg, and upon this importation the Danish authorities tried to levy an import duty, and detained the ships, until the chief officers of the army interfered and, instead of the ships, had the customs officials arrested. Trusting to the liberty promised in the civil administration, Denmark ordered a general levying of recruits in Jutland; whereupon the military authorities, inasmuch as the treaty of truce forbade any increase of forces or improvement in the military position of either side, captured the recruits and carried off to Rendsburg the officials engaged in the levying.

Consequently, although Bismarck and Monrad enjoined upon the authorities of both sides the duty of making as little disturbance as possible, there were constantly instances of friction at all points. The sessions of the Conference resounded continually with complaints from both sides; and the troops of either army grew more and more impatient over this anomalous condition of things. The Danish officers longed for the termination of the hopeless struggle, and cursed

the Copenhagen demagogues, who in their secure retreat proclaimed war to the knife. The Germans, on the other hand, wished for nothing more than for the end of this lazy standstill and a new opportunity for feats in arms.

Field Marshal Wrangel, weary of the whole business, had at the very beginning of the truce besought the King for his dismissal from the post of Commander-in-Chief; and on the 18th of May he received the same, being at the same time honorably raised to the rank of Count. His place was taken, at first provisionally and then definitively, by Prince Frederick Charles, as the general who of those present had been the longest in the service. The Prince took hold of the work with all the youthful fire of his vigorous nature.

All the news that was received concerning the enemy was favorable. The force of the Danes that still remained had been reduced by fighting, by disease, and by desertion, to about 24,000 men. The islands had not been able to supply more than 3,000 recruits as reinforcement. The courage of the troops as well as of the officers had sunk very low. On the island of Alsen were somewhat over 10,000 men under General Steinmann.

Both the Prince and Moltke had now abandoned all their former misgivings about making an attempt to land upon the island. The Prince even had, shortly before the fall of Düppel, caused a new plan of crossing to be elaborated; and Moltke would now have proposed a simultaneous landing upon Fünen and upon Alsen, had this been consistent with the Carlsbad

agreements. The attack upon Alsen alone was therefore undertaken.

The first army corps, formerly commanded by the Prince and now by General Herwarth, was appointed for the task, which was to be carried out at that point where the southern, smallest half of the Straits of Alsen begin, where strong oarsmen can cross and re-cross the distance of eight hundred feet inside of half an hour. With all possible secrecy as many pontoons and boats were brought together as could transport about 2,500 men to the island in one passage; and these would every half-hour receive a re-enforcement of the same number. To the right and left of the place chosen for the crossing, numerous batteries were thrown up, that their heavy guns might frighten the Danish ships of war from offering any hindrance to the transportation. So soon as the 21st of June, the Prince was able to send word to Carlsbad that all preparations were made and in order, — “only for Heaven’s sake let there be no prolongation of the truce!” The announcement that on the morning of the 26th, the war should be renewed, was hailed with joy by the whole army.

Meanwhile the Danes had everywhere lined the western coast of the island with redoubts, batteries, and trenches, but had scattered their troops among these so much, that at no single point was any considerable force collected; and moreover, the common reserve, not consisting of more than 3,000 men, remained in the remotest southern part of the island, in the

vicinity of Sonderborg, more than two hours' march from Arnkiel, the point of the Prussian attack.

Late in the evening of the 28th of June, General Herwarth assembled his twenty-five battalions opposite Arnkiel in the Satrup woods. As soon as darkness came on, the boats and pontoons were taken to the shore and put into the water. At one o'clock on the morning of the 29th, the embarkation began; and at half-past one the crafts were all in motion. The troops, most of them being Brandenburgers of the 24th regiment, Röder's brigade, entered into the undertaking eagerly, although they were somewhat anxious at the thought that the ocean has no floor, and still more oppressed, like true Berliners, by the order to preserve strict silence in order to elude so long as possible the observation of the Danes.

But no more than half of the distance had been traversed before they were discovered by the Danish sentinels, and at once met with a shower of cartridges. This was a relief to their smothered breasts, and a thundering "Hurrah!" broke from the line of boats. That here and there a ball struck its mark, or a boat was smashed, did not affect them. Their swimming comrades were fished out of the water as successfully as possible under the circumstances, and the exertions of the rowers redoubled. In ten minutes they were on the beach; and in another ten minutes the enemy's batteries had been stormed, the Danish regiment driven from its position, and a firm footing won upon the island.

Without delay they pressed onward, and the Rönhoff forest was captured from the Danes. There soon followed a second and a third transportation. The troops which were landed were still stronger than the small companies of the enemy that came up to resist them. Meanwhile, the Danish ships-of-war that were lying at anchor in the Augustenburg Fjord had waked up: Rolf Krake and four gunboats. The latter, not being ironclads, could not venture to come within reach of the Prussian batteries. Rolf Krake advanced; but instead of rushing as a matter of life and death into the midst of the Prussian fleet of boats, it got involved in a useless artillery engagement with the first battery, and then, after retreating, withdrew with the gunboats to the eastern coast of the island to pick up the fugitives from Danish battalions that had been defeated or cut off in their retreat.

Thus the landing of the Prussians continued without any interruption. Röder's Brandenburgers were followed by Göben's Westphalian brigade. The former at six o'clock in the morning captured the enemy's position at Kjär; the latter at the same hour drove the Danes out of Sonderborg. Then Wintzingerode's brigade landed and took Ulkebüll by storm. At nine o'clock the contest was already decided, and everybody on the Danish side that was not dead or taken prisoner was making a hasty retreat to the southernmost point of the island, that small peninsula of Kekenäs, joined to Alsen only by a narrow, strongly-fortified neck of land, in order to seek safety in the transport vessels

which were stationed at this point. An attack upon this position would have probably cost much blood; and therefore the embarkation of the Danes at this place during the next two days was not molested.

On the 1st of July there was not a single Dane upon Alsen. This brilliant victory had cost the conquerors scarcely 200 dead and severely wounded, and the same number slightly wounded. The Danes had lost 700 dead and wounded, and about 2,500 prisoners; that is to say, nearly half of their whole army, and besides this, two gunboats, 108 cannon, 2,000 guns, and a large amount of other implements of war.

The effect of this catastrophe in Copenhagen was decisive. Three days after the Danes, as masters of the Baltic with its Belts and Sounds, had defiantly refused Prussia's offer of a truce, the crushing blow had fallen: the attack which, like a stroke of lightning, gave no chance for resistance, the conquest, accomplished in a few hours, of that island so long looked upon and boasted of as impregnable. Denmark had succeeded in accustoming herself to the thought that the mainland might not be able to hold out for an extended length of time against German superiority in numbers; but now the waves had proved to be no longer an impassable bulwark. Where would there be a barrier to this misfortune? The passage from Fredericia to Fünen across the Little Belt would be scarcely more difficult than the landing upon Alsen; and many a frightened soul began to consider whether the Great Belt would offer any more effective protec-

tion to Zealand and Copenhagen, especially if the Austrian fleet should appear in the Baltic and thus make the forces equal on the water as well as on the land.

Until now, this latter danger had been regarded as an impossible one, since Lord Palmerston had characterized it expressly as a signal for a declaration of war. But this hope had begun to fade away. After the close of the Conference, the English Ministry had to endure in both Houses of Parliament a great storm of words, in which from the 4th to the 9th of July they were taken to task for their conduct in regard to the German-Danish question. Lords Granville and Clarendon had from the very beginning, with the vigorous support of the Queen, carried through, at first in the Cabinet itself and in opposition to Palmerston, the declaration of a thoroughly peaceful policy: henceforth all that was required from Prussia was that she should not utterly wipe out the Danish Monarchy from the map of Europe.

Palmerston, who had again without success in Paris and St. Petersburg hinted at the sending of a common fleet into the Baltic Sea, would have liked only too well to make, at least, a warlike speech against Germany; but his colleagues opposed him so energetically that nothing was left of the speech but the portrayal of the possible horrors of a German bombardment of the peaceful city of Copenhagen.

In the Upper House, Clarendon declared that "England had in January called upon France and Russia to

grant some material aid to Denmark ; but both Powers declined the proposal. England alone could then have only destroyed German commerce, and not even that without injuring her own much more. Thereupon England repeatedly told the Danes that they could not count upon any armed assistance ; but the Danes exhibited at the Conference a blind and stiff-necked obstinacy, which can only harm themselves, for they are now sure of losing North Schleswig also."

That in the beginning of the debate the victory of the Ministry was exceedingly doubtful, brought no encouragement to the Danes, since even the leader of the Opposition, Lord Derby, had said very decidedly that although he sharply censured the flagrant mistakes of the Government, yet, should he himself be called to the head of affairs, he most certainly would not wage war against Germany. The Ministry finally won the day by a small majority, through the acceptance of a motion expressing thanks to the Queen for the preservation of peace.

Thus the last hope for aid was taken from the Danes, and their haughtiness and thirst for war effectually brought low. The defeated army threatened to turn its arms in their own country against the "Eider-Danish" originators of the war: General Hegermann-Lindencrone sent a friend of his, a landed proprietor, from Jutland to Copenhagen, to offer to the King the services of his battalions in the execution of a *coup d'état* against the democratic enemies of the State.

But this was no longer necessary. The population

of the capital saw in their mind already the Prussians upon the island of Zealand and the black and yellow flag floating over the Sound. They were eager to collect all the forces around Copenhagen for its defence, and cried for peace. The chief newspapers of the "Eider-Danish" party, *Dagbladet* and *Fädrelandet*, no longer ventured to swim against the current. On the 7th of July the *Dagblad*, after recounting all the menacing factors in the situation, announced: "Whether we are to pursue the war at the risk of our life, or whether we shall submit to a humiliating peace, the Government alone can decide. But let it decide quickly, before the sword of the victor shall weigh more heavily in the balance. The nation will follow any decision."

In the same tone *Fädrelandet* expressed in its issue of the 7th of July the following sentiments: "If no change of the Ministry in England brings us salvation, then we must seek for peace. Discouragement is everywhere prevalent, and with good reason, in view of the shameful conduct of the army, and the thought that 10,000 men behind an arm of the sea a thousand yards broad, on a coast bristling with batteries, and for three days exactly informed of every preparation and move of the enemy, should in spite of all that give up Alsen to 16,000 Prussians within four hours' time!" It is evident, that between the party in power and the army the dislike was in every way mutual.

A few days later *Dagbladet* made further confessions: "Dangers threaten us from all sides; and the sentiments of the nation, which have at no time been propor-

tionate to the importance of the struggle, have now sunk to a minimum of power and enthusiasm. Between the King and the Ministry there has never been perfect harmony. This has played an important rôle in the political discord which has been manifest in the nation and in the army."

The confession could not have been more frank, that it was not the Danish nation that had attempted to make Schleswig over into a Danish country, and that it was not the Danish army that had been wishing to wage war against Germany; but that it was the "Eider-Danish" minority, who, supported by the restless portion of the population of the capital, had been making the King (and through him the whole country) serve their own selfish ends, and in this way were to blame for the loss of the Duchies.

King Christian felt this more deeply than any other person. It was against his will that he had followed the domineering counsels of Hall and Monrad. Their vain presumption now lay low in the dust; but the misery, too, which he had continually feared, had broken over the whole country. Immediately after the fall of Alsen, he ordered his ambassador at Paris to ask the Emperor categorically whether Denmark could hope for any assistance; and he also sent his brother John to Brussels to King Leopold, to beg for his help in opening direct negotiations of peace with both of the German Powers, and to suggest the admission of the whole of Denmark into the German Confederation, as a means of saving the integrity of the monarchy.

A decisive turn of things was not long in coming. Early on the morning of the 8th of July came a telegram from Paris: "Everything lost. The Emperor will do nothing for us." At noon a session of the Ministerial Council was to be held; but Christian had not the patience to wait so long, and summoned Monrad at once. "To this point you have brought us," cried the King excitedly. "Everything will be lost, if I do not at once change my Ministry." Monrad, pale as death, but with composure, answered, "Precisely my opinion, Your Majesty. I could not conclude a peace on the terms upon which it could now be secured. Your Majesty will do what you consider necessary for the welfare of the country, which, too, has always been the aim of my endeavors. We shall retire." Thereupon the King broke out in a storm of indignation: "True! you will retire now that you have completed the ruin of the monarchy. And you still dare to pose as the saviors of the State. That is too much!" With a low bow Monrad replied, "History shall some day be my judge. I have done my duty," and left the room.¹

The King intrusted the formation of the new Cabinet to the creator of the treaties of 1852, Bluhme, who then without delay, on the 12th, sent off to Berlin and Vienna propositions for a truce, and for negotiations of peace.

Meanwhile, the allied armies had in all places moved forward. On the 10th of July, the Prussians crossed the Lijmfjord at Aalborg. On the 13th, the Austrians occupied the island of Mors; and on the same day,

¹ From a monograph by Blixen-Finecke in the *Paris Presse*.

Falckenstein's headquarters were moved to Frederikshaven, where General Hegermann had just before, without making any attempt at resistance, embarked his forces for Zealand. On the 14th of July, Falckenstein and Prince Albrecht with their staffs rode around the northernmost point of Jutland by the Skaw, at the foot of which the waves of the North Sea and the Baltic intermingle. The view out over the broad, boundless surface of the sea disclosed to them a Danish war-steamer and several transport-ships. Before the eyes of these the Austrian and the Prussian banners were raised upon the very extremity of the land.

During these same few days, there appeared on the west coast of Schleswig a squadron, consisting of three large and two small Austrian ships of war beside two Prussian gunboats, which had the intention of freeing the Frisian islands, Sylt, Föhr, Amrom, and Pellworm, from the oppressive control of Naval Commander Hammer. An Austrian battalion of *Jäger* assisted by land; and, after many clever manœuvres among the shallows and flats of the islands, whither the larger ships of war could not follow, Hammer was at last forced to give himself up as a prisoner of war to the Prussian gunboat Blitz. This put the whole of Schleswig and Jutland into the possession of the allied forces. On the day after Hammer's capitulation, on the 20th of July, the new truce began, which, to start with, was to last until the end of the month, and was based upon the maintenance of the military positions as they were, and, of course, the cessation of the blockades. This time Jutland was

to be, so long as the armistice lasted, exclusively under German control and German taxation.

Immediately after the receipt of the above-intimated news from Brussels, Bismarck communicated with Austria concerning the conditions of peace. "In my opinion," he wrote to Rechberg on the 11th of July, "the conditions ought to involve Christian's renunciation, in favor of the allied Powers, of all those rights which he has had, or claimed to have, south of the Königsau, and Denmark's recognition and assent to whatever final disposition the two allied Powers may make of the three Duchies, and of territory belonging to Jutland, lying in Schleswig. A proper share of the whole public debt, besides the costs of the war, would fall heavily upon the Duchies, unless the expenses of the war, as really belonging to Denmark, can be added to a part of the old State debt."

Bismarck regarded as impracticable the idea of admitting Denmark into the German Confederation. For, if it were presupposed that Denmark was to remain united with the Duchies, then the quarrelling between the nationalities would not be at all obviated, and the Confederation might find itself soon in the situation of being obliged to give assistance to the King against his German subjects; and, in the other case, there would be the unprecedented example of the admittance into the Confederation of an entirely un-German State, which seemed to be in no way desirable. The objection of France to this was also well known. In fact, Napoleon had within the last few days remarked in so many

words to Count Goltz, that such a measure would drive him into a policy exactly contrary to the one he had hitherto pursued.

Bismarck urged speedy action in any case, in order to bring the Danish negotiations to a quick conclusion, inasmuch as the present attitude of the Powers was favorable, and no one could tell how soon the situation might change. He advised, accordingly, that during the armistice preparations should be made, as conspicuously as possible, for crossing over to Fünen; because, he said, the Danish desire for peace was only the child of fear, and this feeling must be kept alive in them until the conclusion of a treaty. The Vienna Cabinet agreed to all this; but it once for all refused to hear to any threatening of Fünen, which might arouse anew the anger of England, and forbade all demonstrations in that direction. Bismarck shrugged his shoulders at this timidity; and, as the strongest pressure that could be brought to bear in securing a speedy peace, had a great quantity of heavy artillery, pontoons, and other craft conveyed to Fridericia with all possible ado.

To make his course as safe as possible, he begged of Prince Gortschakoff another short visit to Carlsbad, and had there the satisfaction of finding the Prince entirely satisfied with such a German basis of peace as was naturally expected by everybody after the recent occurrences. King William thereupon betook himself to Gastein. Bismarck, however, went to Vienna, in order there to determine upon the preliminaries of peace personally with Rechberg and Quaade. But beforehand

instructions were sent to Prince Frederick Charles, to give once again to the German Lesser States a strong hint concerning the stern realities of the situation and of the relations of power.

What led to this step was the following: Beust had sent, immediately after the close of the Conference, on the 27th and the 29th of June, two reports to the Confederate Diet, in which, in the first place, he represented in the brightest light his own services for the great Fatherland, and what they had accomplished in London, and then urged the speedy recognition of Augustenburg as Duke of Schleswig-Holstein, inasmuch as now, after the motion of the 28th of May, no opposition was to be feared from the Great Powers, and the same would make an end to the very pernicious talk heard everywhere, especially in England, about the selfish aims of the German Great Powers. The Grand Duke of Oldenburg was then to be referred with his claims to an arbitration. Moreover, Beust demanded an immediate declaration of war on the part of the Confederation against the Danish Government, in order to insure to the former a proper amount of influence in the future peace-negotiations. He observed finally, how much easier his task in London would have been, if some common German central organs existed, so that the German demands and concessions could have been backed by a national parliament.

Upon his return from London, he stopped at Frankfort, where he had appointed a confidential interview with Hügel, Roggenbach, and Dalwigk. Here, how-

ever, he met with very moderate applause; the committees, at the instigation of Kübeck and Savigny, refused him the privilege of making a public speech, or of publishing his reports, on the ground that the Confederate Diet was not a parliament. Roggenbach too was very much disturbed, however monstrous he regarded the proposition that Christian IX., who indeed had no claims to the Duchies, should cede them to the Great Powers. The majority of the Confederate Diet also were willing, in accordance with the wish of the Great Powers, and in spite of Pfordten's former representations, to call upon the Hereditary Prince Frederick, as well as the Grand Duke of Oldenburg, to establish legally their claims.

Bismarck considered it still advisable to put another heavy damper upon the agitation aroused by Beust; and when at that time a great brawl occurred at Rendsburg between the Saxon and the Prussian soldiers, and to the mind of the Prussians the Confederate authorities failed to display the necessary energy, General Hake received, on the 21st of July, a letter from Prince Frederick Charles, in which the writer said that he had orders to take command of Rendsburg. As a Prussian division of six thousand men already stood before the gates and Hake had at hand scarcely the tenth part of that number, the General left the city under protest. A week later, Prussia offered in the Confederate Diet conciliatory explanations, and said that the Saxon garrison nevertheless might return; in reply to which Saxony declared that, in view of all former experiences,

she should refrain from making any further proposals: and the Prussian commandant remained for the time master in Rendsburg.

When Bismarck spoke of this small affair in Vienna, the Austrians shook their heads at such summary proceedings; whereupon Bismarck remarked that, as in social intercourse so also in politics, it was not wise to have a reputation for extreme leniency. Moreover, the Vienna Court looked upon the matter with divided feelings. With all their new preference for Augustenburg, they found themselves temporarily constrained to reserve on this point, in order not to run counter to Russia, the mighty patron of Oldenburg. Beust's proposition for the Confederation to declare war had no longer any application, since the war was at an end. Austria was very anxious to grant to the Confederation some share in the control of the Duchies after the settlement of peace; but she felt that allowing it to take part in the peace-negotiations would be decidedly inconvenient.

Moreover, Beust had completely gained the personal ill-will of Rechberg by his recommendation, at this moment, of a German parliament, and by his highly colored portrayal of his own doings in London. "Beust's reports," cried Rechberg, "are insulting to the Great Powers. They are presumptuous and dangerous to us all." At Rechberg's recommendation, very courteous but also very sharp protests were sent to Dresden by the two Powers; and Bismarck was all the more determined to encounter Beust's ambitious endeav-

ors openly and with unrelenting firmness, on account of the last manœuvre, at this very time, of the Saxon Confederate Commissioner in Holstein, Herr von Könneritz, which had excited great dissatisfaction in Berlin.

This action of Könneritz consisted in having concluded, on his own responsibility (his Hanoverian colleagues subsequently expressed their assent), on the 22d of July, in behalf of the Duchy of Holstein, two treaties with the Hanse Towns Hamburg and Lübeck concerning the establishment and control of new telegraph-lines, — the treaties to be binding for ten years. The contents of the treaties seemed to the Prussian Minister of Commerce to be inconsistent with the interests of his State. Bismarck declared on the spot that the commissioners of the chastisement had no authority whatever to conclude such treaties as would bind beyond the duration of the chastisement the state intrusted temporarily to their guidance. He accordingly had a notification published in all countries concerned, that Prussia considered these treaties as null and void and protested against their execution. Rechberg, too, acknowledged that the commissioners had certainly overstepped the limits of their authority in this matter, but urged that, in order to spare the sovereign Confederate States, Hamburg and Lübeck, the treaties be not cancelled, but rather that their insufficiency should be made good by a subsequent decree of the Confederation, — an expedient which Bismarck again in full seriousness rejected.

When the Ministers then turned their attention to

the main business in hand, a Danish treaty of peace, Bismarck at once spoke again of the policy, in case the enemy proved to be stubbornly obstinate, of landing upon the island of Fünen; but he found his Austrian colleague as disinclined to this step as ever. In fact, this time it was Rechberg that suggested the question, whether Prussia would be willing, if it should be found advisable, to undertake this step alone. Bismarck expressed her readiness to do so, if Austria's support could be counted upon in other respects. Then the question of the expenses of the war was taken up, and Bismarck sounded the Count with regard to Austria's giving her consent that Prussia should, in return for a portion of her disbursements, receive Lauenburg. After some hesitation, Rechberg answered that he had personally no objections to raise, but that before making any official declaration, he must consult the wishes of the Emperor. To a question of Bismarck's, whether Austria would not in a similar manner be glad to receive the Danish islands in the West Indies, Rechberg immediately replied by rejecting unconditionally any offer of such insecure and fruitless possessions.

Hereupon the Peace Conference with Quaade and his military counsellor, Colonel Kaufmann, was opened on the 25th of July. Very naturally Quaade declared the cession of the three Duchies, which would be two-fifths of the whole monarchy, to be too hard a requisition. Bismarck replied that the feeling of severity would disappear, if Denmark would look at the matter from the standpoint prevalent among the German peo-

ple, in accordance with which, aside from the now repudiated London compact, different persons should have succeeded, at the death of Frederick VII., to the thrones of Denmark and of the Duchies, so that the separation of the two parts of the kingdom would have taken place of itself.

The Danes thereupon wished to bring forward legal proofs of the identity of the succession; but Bismarck interrupted them by saying that he had mentioned the matter only for the sake of calling the attention of the Danes to an easier way of comprehending the situation. "As a matter of fact," he said, "it is of no consequence whether the separation of the Duchies from Denmark shall ensue on account of the division in the inheritance or in virtue of our conquest. The question depends no longer at all upon legal arguments *pro* and *con*, but, in view of the limited duration of the truce, upon the actual progress made toward a settlement, and accordingly upon a declaration by the Danes, what concessions they are ready to make." Quaade hesitated a moment longer; but the situation was only too evident; he therefore entered without further protests or reservations into the negotiations. It is not necessary for us now to follow the course of these day by day. It will be enough to enumerate the chief points upon which everything turned.

The cession of the three Duchies was in principle no further disputed. "The King of Denmark," it was said in the final document, "renounces all his rights to these Duchies in favor of the Emperor of Austria and the King

of Prussia, and pledges himself to recognize the dispositions that these Sovereigns shall make concerning them." But the more eagerly did the Danes labor to obtain from the victors by some means or other a piece of North Schleswig. It was argued that for Lauenburg, to which the claim of the Danish crown was confessedly undisputed, a corresponding portion of Schleswig land might be left to Denmark; and again, that that part of Schleswig to which there were proofs of a Danish hereditary right might be given back to the Danes. Both of these demands were at once and decisively rejected.

On the other hand, another proposal was listened to more favorably. Southwards from the Königsau, in the western part of Schleswig, there were a number of enclaves, or lands belonging from time immemorial legally to Jutland and under her administration, and which were entirely enclosed in foreign territory. These districts Quaade earnestly wished either to save for Denmark or to give up only in return for some indemnification. After numerous discussions and telegraphic communications with Gastein and Copenhagen, it was decided that the Danes should retain the district of Ripen, and in return for the remaining enclaves be given the island of Arrö and a small strip of land to the south of Kolding. More detailed determination of the boundaries was referred to the final peace-negotiations.

Also definite fundamental principles with regard to the money questions were temporarily fixed, which were

afterwards to be regulated in minor points at the later negotiations. It was decided that the debts specially contracted by any of the countries, by the Kingdom of Denmark, or by one of the three Duchies, should be assumed by that country itself; and the debts contracted on the account of the Danish State as a whole should be divided among Denmark and the Duchies in proportion to the population. Excepted from this was, on the one hand, the Danish war-loan negotiated towards the end of 1863, which Denmark should assume, and on the other hand, the war expenses of the allies, which should fall to the lot of the Duchies. To this last point Quaade had continually asserted the physical impossibility for Denmark to make this payment, and declared that she would not sign a peace with this burden, but rather wait to see what the allies would then do. In fact, it did seem cruel to burden a State, from whom one had already taken almost one-half of her former possessions, still further with a heavy war-debt, however much a portion of the German people complained at such one-sided leniency towards the originators of the war.

At the very last a sharp dispute arose over the treatment of Jutland during the truce, which was to be extended. At first the Danes had demanded the evacuation of the Province immediately after the signing of the Preliminaries; but the Germans had no idea of giving up this means of pressure for securing a speedy conclusion of definite terms. Rechberg, who did not care much about the conditions one way or the other,

but was anxious to come to some settlement quickly, announced that if the Danes insisted upon the evacuation, the war would be renewed on the 1st of August.

Thereupon a telegram from Copenhagen on the 30th of July brought to Quaade instructions to abandon the demand for the evacuation, but yet to ask for the maintenance of the Danish civil administration in Jutland. This point gave rise to an unusually heated debate on the 31st of July, in which Bismarck was obliged to threaten again the discontinuance of negotiations, before Quaade made up his mind to send a final telegram to Copenhagen, which succeeded in procuring also in this point submission to the will of the German Powers.

Thus, on the 1st of August, 1864, the Preliminaries of Peace were signed. Schleswig-Holstein was free from Denmark. The German brothers north of the Elbe were delivered from foreign oppression; the German language, German churches, and German schools were again to have free course from the Elbe to the Königsau. After a generation of insupportable injury and empty words, the honor of the German name had in this vital question been at last brilliantly restored.

According to the unanimous testimony of Europe, which was partial towards our adversary, the credit of having secured this salvation was due in the foremost place to the Prussian Government, to the patriotic determination of King William, who, in spite of all obstacles and dangers, constantly held the great goal before his eyes, and to the far-seeing energy of his Minister, who from the very first day with his quick

foresight discovered and held fast to the only possible course that could afford a prosperous passage through the seas so filled with dangerous rocks. The course decided upon owed its selection to Bismarck's conviction that the solution of the question depended less upon the popular enthusiasm of the German people than upon the favorable attitude of the foreign Great Powers.

The Prussian Government had succeeded, up to the very moment when the crisis appeared, in shaping the European relations of Prussia most satisfactorily: by interfering against the Polish insurrection she secured the true friendship of Russia; by resisting the Frankfort assembly of Princes she gained the good-will of France, and then increased this to warm sympathy by a clever treatment of Napoleon's idea of holding a congress, while at the same time she aroused in Vienna the urgent desire to become more closely connected with Prussia. Not to have improved the advantages of such a position, but to have compromised it, would have been a sin, not only against the rules of politics, but against sound common-sense.

Now, Prussia had, like all the other Great Powers, recognized in the London Protocol of 1852 the integrity of the Danish Kingdom and the succession of Prince Christian. It was well known that in 1863 almost all of these other Powers had eagerly desired to consider this compact valid. If, then, Prussia had at that time in flagrant violation of the treaty suddenly declared against Christian and in favor of Augustenburg as the

rightful heir, she would have stood again, as in 1848, in open opposition to the whole of Europe; she would have been certain of the mortal enmity of Austria, and would have been a prey to Palmerston's thirst for war and to Gortschakoff's hatred. Bismarck had, moreover, still less thought of exposing Prussia to such dangers, since he, who had in 1852 conducted those negotiations with the Duke of Augustenburg, was firmly and sincerely convinced, that by the latter's promises the hereditary right of his House was rendered ineffective until the extinction of the Glücksburg line. Consequently, at the death of Frederick VII., Prussia unreservedly declared that she considered herself then as before bound by the London Protocol, and accordingly would raise no objections to the succession of Christian IX., even in the Duchies.

But on this account the deliverance of Schleswig-Holstein from Danish foreign rule was not to be given up. Denmark, too, had in 1852 taken upon herself obligations towards Germany with regard to the constitution of the Duchies; but these she had never fulfilled, and she had finally been openly false to them by the November Constitution. This was acknowledged by all the Great Powers to be illegal, while they declined absolutely to entertain any doubts about Christian's claims to the succession. They consequently were unable to make any objections, when Prussia, after many and useless negotiations, at last, on account of this quarrel over the Constitution, declared war upon the King-Duke. Austria, who thanked Heaven that

Prussia was not putting herself at the head of a movement supported by the enthusiasm of the German people, joined her Confederate ally in the undertaking. In face of this strong alliance, no one of the Continental Powers felt further tempted to interfere with hostile intentions. At the outbreak of the war, in accordance with the first principles of international law, all former treaties between the belligerent parties were nullified; so that also Prussia and Austria were no longer bound to the London Protocol further than they might find to their own advantage.

In Bismarck's judgment the integrity of the Danish kingdom was most certainly not to be respected, but Christian's right of succession not to be interfered with. Once, at the time of the London Conference, when all the other Great Powers were emphasizing more and more vigorously the continued validity of the Protocol of 1852, Bismarck threw out the suggestion that, legally considered, Christian's claim to the throne was by no means such that it could not be called into question; and Bernstorff elaborated this observation in the Conference. Immediately afterwards, however, Bismarck returned to the old standpoint, avoided any recognition whatever of the Augustenburg claims, and declared the motion of May 28th, by its rejection by the Conference as settled for all time. By no means the smallest proof of the stability of his standpoint was the fact that all the efforts of the adversaries only served to insure and extend his success. The great agitation for Augustenburg in Germany constantly resulted in attaching Austria

so much the more firmly to the policy of Prussia; and on the other side, Palmerston's bloodthirsty inciting of Denmark against Prussia caused an increase of the Danes' persistent obstinacy, and therewith the continuance of the war, until this led to complete overthrow.

Thus the old dream of the German nation, the liberation of Schleswig-Holstein, was successfully fulfilled. Bismarck had good reason to say, as he did often afterwards, that of all his undertakings, he considered the diplomatic task of 1864 to be at once the hardest and the most fortunate. By the Treaty of August 1st the Duchies were delivered from Denmark, and the determination of their political future placed in the hands of the two German Great Powers.

But at this final moment the Austro-Prussian alliance itself took on a new phase. For Austria had entered into it, not in order to help build up Prussia by the ruin of the united Danish State, but to prevent any increase of Prussia's power; not to separate the Duchies from Denmark, but to procure for them a somewhat better constitution under Danish supremacy. Only by the force of circumstances and not by its own will was the Vienna Cabinet brought finally to the Treaty of August 1st. And if one had asked for the ultimate reason why Schleswig-Holstein ought to remain connected with Denmark, the answer, scarcely concealed in Vienna, and yet irrefutable, would have been: that it may not become Prussian. At present, the country had been

ceded to the two Powers as a common possession, and the two had mutually promised each other not to decide about its future, except in common agreement; and now, in view of such opposing desires, would it be possible to make any such agreement?

CHAPTER III.

THE PEACE OF VIENNA.

IMMEDIATELY after the signing of the preliminaries of peace, Bismarck left Vienna to have an interview with the King at Gastein. Preparatory arrangements for the final compact, which was also to be settled at Vienna, were at once entered upon by the Cabinet of Berlin. Herren von Balan and von Werther drew up general outlines of such a document. In the department of trade the indemnity due the merchants and ship-owners was calculated. Special commissioners for the more exact settlement of the boundaries, as well as for the difficult proportionate adjustment of the Danish and the Schleswig-Holstein state-debt, were selected: for the former the Prussian Colonel Stiehle with the Austrian Colonel Schönfeld, and for the latter the former president of the Holstein Estates, Baron Carl von Scheet-Plessen, an official who had gained experience in the Danish service, and who was now a zealous supporter of the Prussian annexation of the Duchies.

The management of the negotiations as a whole was intrusted to Count Rechberg on the part of Austria, and to Baron von Werther on that of Prussia; and the former ambassadors in Copenhagen, Brenner and Balan,

were appointed to assist them. The two Powers were agreed that in these negotiations, as in those of the preliminaries, the German Confederation was not to participate, not being allowed a voice in the peace, since it had taken no part in the war. On this point, however, there was a difference in the attitude of the two Cabinets, Rechberg being anxious to act with all possible mildness so far as the Lesser States were concerned, while Bismarck was disposed to be peremptory.

Rechberg, for instance, thought it would be desirable to communicate the preliminaries of peace officially to the august assembly; but Bismarck answered at once that this could not be allowed, in view of the passions then prevailing at Frankfort, because the discussion that would ensue there would have a disturbing effect upon the speedy settlement of a definitive peace. "If," he added, "we cannot prevent questions from being asked in the Diet, we must shift, in the eyes of the public, upon those who ask them the responsibility for the encouragement which Denmark, before the conclusion of the peace, may draw from such wrangling within the Confederation."

That anxiety of this sort was not altogether fanciful, was shown by a proposition from Saxony, which Beust announced the second week in August; namely, that the Confederate Diet should ask the two Powers for tranquillizing information as to Article I. of the preliminaries, especially for the assurance that Denmark's renunciation of her rights to Schleswig-Holstein was understood to cover the claims of Denmark only, and

did not bring in question the right of the Confederation to participate in the settlement of the succession. Rechberg, as we know, had been pursuing since May the very object that was then aimed at by Saxony; but he shared Bismarck's view that no discussion of the sort was to be entered into before the final conclusion of peace. He therefore sent a very concise telegram to this effect to Dresden; and as Beust received advices of the same nature from his friends in the Lesser States, he hastened to withdraw the unacceptable proposal.

In Hanover, Platen expressed himself to the Prussian ambassador as being completely disgusted with Beust's assumption of importance and his inclination to stir up trouble. Abée in Cassel disclaimed entirely any sympathy with Beust's conception of the rights involved in the Schleswig-Holstein question.

The tone taken in the South German Courts was somewhat different. Schrenck admitted to the Prussian ambassador that Bavaria had been in no way injured by the two Powers; but he said that the imperious tone of the Austrian Government and the contemptuous polemic of the Prussian newspapers was intolerable. "For a time," he said, "we were especially provoked with Austria; but now our mistrust is again directed toward Prussia, who, by the delay in the settlement of the question of succession, has aroused the suspicion that her aims are selfish, while Austria, with no consideration of her own advantage, desires that a decision may soon be reached as to who shall be the sovereign of the Duchies."

Arnim thought it best to answer plainly that that suspicion was well-founded. "It would be childish," he said, "to think that we can abandon the Duchies without any security for our position in the future; but still more childish is the cry raised in South Germany, that our acting in accordance with this view will be a misfortune to the Fatherland. We could, if necessary, get along without the Duchies; but they could not get along without us. Within a few days after our departure, they would become Danish again." Schrenck replied: "The annexation might perhaps be advantageous to Germany, but it could never be consistent with what is right. Herr von Bismarck once said that 'Prussia's armor was too big for her body;' so every one suspects that her body is now to become somewhat stouter."

A conversation which was even more frank, if possible, took place about this time between the Würtemberg Minister, Von Hügel, and the representative of Prussia, Von Zschock. Hügel had disapproved of Beust's proposal, and had also secured for this disapproval the support of King Charles, who had been on the throne two months, and who was then at Ostend. The Minister showed Von Zschock a letter from the King, saying that Würtemberg must persist with firmness, but with moderation, in the course followed hitherto. Von Hügel added in explanation that the Lesser States would for the time take no steps in the question of the Duchies, since Count Rechberg at Vienna had repeatedly promised the ambassador of Würtemberg that

Austria would suffer no delay in the decision of the Schleswig-Holstein succession, but rather would urge a speedy investigation of the various claims, and would then bring about a recognition by the Confederation of that candidate that had relatively the best right to become the sovereign of the three indivisible Duchies. With this promise in view, Hügel thought the Lesser States could spare themselves the trouble of making such proposals as Beust's, and could without concern leave the initiative in the affair to the Imperial Cabinet.

These arguments were only too well-founded. Rechberg had distinctly promised a number of the ambassadors of the Lesser States that in the final settlement of the Schleswig-Holstein matter the German Confederation should neither be ignored nor excluded. That the Cabinet of Vienna was inclined to this course, had long been known in Berlin; but there was no suspicion that the thing had taken a definite form, and that binding declarations had been made to the Lesser States; and for the moment, Bismarck entirely rejected the idea that Austria could have decided on so open a breach of the compact of January 16th. It was now agreed that the King, accompanied by Bismarck, should, on the 22d of August at Vienna, return Francis Joseph's visit at Carlsbad, when an occasion would be afforded for clearing up matters thoroughly.

In fact, during the three days of the King's stay at Schönbrunn, confidential conversations on all the questions then pending took place between the Sovereigns and their Ministers. When the general condition of

Europe was discussed, it soon appeared how much the minds of the Austrian statesmen were exercised with anxiety in regard to French machinations, and the Emperor also expressed with special emphasis his dislike and mistrust of Napoleon. "No one can rely on him," said Francis Joseph; "since in every undertaking he has always several objects in view at the same time."

In German matters, the Emperor dwelt on the great importance that he attached to the continuance of the Prussian alliance. When Bismarck enlarged upon the necessity that the two Great Powers should guide firmly and in common the entire German policy, Rechberg concurred with sincere warmth; though, indeed, as to the nature of this guidance the difference between the two Ministers became unmistakably manifest—Bismarck being disposed to act decidedly and vigorously, and Rechberg to conciliate and to make advances. These tendencies were evident in regard to the dispute about Rendsburg, which was still pending in the Confederate councils. Rechberg warmly recommended that a little courtesy should be shown the Saxons, which Bismarck considered entirely unnecessary, but at length consented to. It was the same with reference to the Hamburg telegraph agreements; Rechberg renewed his recognition of the justice of the Prussian view, but strove to soften things, defended the wishes of the Hanse Towns, and finally met Bismarck's urgent representations with evasive encouragement, saying that formal right was certainly on Prussia's side, but

that an amicable way out of the difficulty might yet be found.

These were minor matters. But in the main questions, too, the difference between the wishes of the two Ministers made itself felt.

Naturally the most important and most pressing subject of discussion was the future of the Duchies. Rechberg wished that the temporary administration of them should be intrusted to a college in which, in addition to the Austrian and Prussian commissioners, a place with equal rights should be given to a representative of the Confederation. Bismarck, however, could see no reason in the world for making such a concession to the Lesser States, which the circumstances did not require. All the more eagerly did Rechberg speak of his hope of a speedy decision about the right of succession, and with it of the establishment of the future sovereign in Schleswig-Holstein. Bismarck very coolly insisted upon the necessity of a thorough investigation of all the existing claims, towards which the Confederate Diet had as yet hardly taken the first step.

Rechberg, as in his former interview with Werther, emphasized the fact that even considering only the general state of things in Europe, a union of the Duchies with Prussia would afford matter for grave anxiety, and the Emperor also expressed himself to his royal Confederate ally in the same tone. King William maintained a good deal of reserve on this subject. It was repugnant to him to appear, in so many words, a Conqueror. Nor had he by any means decided about

his own attitude towards the Hereditary Prince of Augustenburg. The remark was then made on the Austrian side, that the annexation could be permitted only on condition that Austria should also in turn gain something, either by a cession of Prussian territory, or in the form of a Prussian guaranty for the protection of all Austria's dominions. To this the King replied by distinctly rejecting a plan of annexation with such conditions attached to it. He would neither give up to Austria any part of the Prussian population, nor would he undertake in regard to the non-German possessions of Austria any general and indefinite guaranties, which indeed would have made his whole European policy dependent upon any unforeseen action that might be taken by the Court of Vienna.

No positive result, therefore, was arrived at on any point in the matter of the Duchies.

A second question of the utmost importance, which was discussed at Schönbrunn, was the subject, just then coming up again, of a great tariff treaty between Austria and the States of the German Tariff-Union. In order to make the crisis now under consideration intelligible, it is indispensable to cast a brief glance backward over the negotiations that had immediately preceded.

We have seen how energetically Count Rechberg, in the years 1862 and 1863, had fought against the Prusso-French tariff-treaty, and what efforts he had made in the Confederation among the Lesser States to secure the admission of Austria into the Tariff-Union;

but his zeal in this direction had cooled with astonishing rapidity, when in November, 1863, Napoleon's plan of a congress and the anti-Danish enthusiasm in Germany made the Cabinet of Vienna desire as intimate a relation with Prussia as was possible. When in February, 1864, the Tariff-Union States met again at Berlin to discuss once more the old points of dispute with the old arguments, Austria held back in perfect silence. In March, at her instance, a conference was held between an imperial and a Prussian commissioner. This, however, ended in a few days without result, and rather disturbed the Lesser States than improved their disposition toward Austria, since it made the latter seem more inclined to come to a separate understanding with Prussia than to co-operate with her old associates.

In fact, in the ranks of the Munich Opposition all the signs of an imminent dissolution were beginning to appear. Bavaria and Würtemberg alone persisted in holding firmly and unconditionally to the programme established two years before, even though, as their Ministers, Schrenk and Hügel, said, the Tariff-Union should go to pieces on it. The other Governments kept up negotiations, as a matter of truth, only in the hope that Prussia would at last prove pliable. But, on the other hand, it was well known in Berlin that these Governments would on no consideration leave the Tariff-Union, and would, if there was nothing else to be done, approve the French commercial treaty and give up Austria.

Already Prussia had come to an understanding with

Saxony, the Thuringian States, Brunswick, Frankfort, and Baden. In June, by a secret negotiation carried on personally with the Elector by a Frankfort banker, the consent of Hesse-Cassel was obtained, which was a surprise to every one. Then, on the 28th of June, the new Tariff-Union treaty between the above-named Governments was signed in Berlin; and it was left open to the States that for the time held aloof, to enter on the same conditions, though only until the 1st of October. Hanover took advantage of this as early as the 11th of July, and Oldenburg also soon after, when Prussia had conceded at least a portion of the revenue drawn from the imposts.

The States that held aloof had now lost every prospect of succeeding in their opposition. The people in Nassau and Darmstadt with one voice urged their Governments to come to terms with Prussia; and even in the States that favored protection, many voices were heard declaring it impossible to remain outside of the Tariff-Union. A conference opened at Munich on the 7th of July, at which plenipotentiaries of Austria, Bavaria, Würtemberg, Darmstadt, and Nassau were present, could not conceal from itself the force of the accomplished fact, especially as Austria left no doubt in the minds of her friends that she had no intention of opposing Prussia with the same determination as in 1853.

The Conference contented itself with drawing up on the 12th of July a declaration that the conclusion of compacts between Austria and the Tariff-Union was to be brought about on the basis of the agreement of 1853,

with the idea of the preparation of a general tariff-union in the future, and that consequently commercial intercourse should be facilitated on both sides as much as possible. The new Tariff-Union and its tariff as established according to the commercial treaty with France were thus actually recognized, and so far as the entrance of the Lesser States into that Union was concerned, an arrangement with Austria was no longer made a condition of this, but was simply indicated as something to be desired.

In a communication of July 28th, Count Rechberg then presented this declaration to the Prussian Government, at the same time proposing that negotiations on the subject should be opened, and that, too, between Austria and Prussia alone. "Should the Royal Cabinet," observed Count Rechberg in this connection, "contrary to our expectations, refuse to enter into the negotiations thus proposed, we should, to our great regret, be obliged to see in that refusal a disregard of the obligations implied in the existing compacts. And in that case we should not fall in any degree into the illusion that such an attitude would be incompatible with the relations of Confederate friendliness now so happily established between the two Governments."

These threatening words did not truly correspond to the personal feelings of the Austrian Minister. For he had learned to prize the Prussian alliance, and, like his Emperor, he heartily desired to see it continue. But to make this popular in Austria itself was not an easy task. The great results of the Danish war had

not made that war any the more popular among the Austrians, a clear indication of the fact that many of the vital interests of Germany were viewed with indifference on the Lower Danube.

The old rivalry with Prussia had stronger root among all classes of the population than at the Imperial Court. If Francis Joseph rejoiced in the Prussian alliance as a support for his conservative principles, the parliamentary Minister Schmerling saw in it the source of a threatening reaction, while the German officials of the administration, with Herr von Biegeleben at their head, feared lest the influence of Austria among the beloved Lesser States should be entirely eclipsed by that of Prussia. This party thought that the open abandonment of the plan of a great tariff-union would be the signal for a complete exclusion of Austria from the German Confederation; and every one who for any reason was hostile to the Prussian alliance chimed in eagerly with this view. If, for the time, no progress could be made in the path opened in 1853, at least, not one inch of the position then won must be given up.

At Schönbrunn, therefore, Rechberg expressed to King William and his Minister an ardent wish that the commercial treaty now under consideration might again, like that of 1853, be considered as preparatory to a future tariff-treaty, and accordingly that, as in Article XXV. of the old compact, so in this one, it might be specified that within twelve years negotiations should be held about a tariff-union. Bismarck saw no particular danger in agreeing to this, since a simple promise to

negotiate in the future involved no obligation as to the result of the negotiations. At the same time, he expressed to the Austrian Minister his surprise at such eager anxiety in a matter which amounted to nothing but empty phrases, since Rechberg himself confessed that the cherished tariff-union was then out of the question, and would very probably be quite as much so twelve years hence.

King William expressed grave misgivings on this subject, and was little disposed to consent to the holding of any conferences at all upon it. Rechberg, however, persisted in his statement that Austria could never permit herself to be treated by Germany as a foreign nation. He alluded distinctly to the possibility that a purely negative result in this question might make it impossible for him, the defender of the Prussian alliance, to keep his position as Minister. This decided the King to approve at least the opening of a conference. So far as the Prussian instructions for the same were concerned, Bismarck promised the Austrian statesman that he would do what he could to bring about a favorable disposition on the part of those ministers to whom the matter especially belonged. He therefore, on the 25th of August, signed a despatch in which he announced Prussia's readiness to negotiate a commercial treaty, and without making any further promises, agreed to meet Austria's wishes so far as possible.

So ended the meeting at Schönbrunn, in all harmony so far as outwardly appeared. From there the King went to Baden-Baden, and Bismarck at first to Berlin,

in order to discuss with his colleagues Rechberg's requests.

Meantime, on that same 25th of August, the German plenipotentiaries with the Danish Minister, Von Quaade, and his military associate, Colonel Kaufmann, met at Vienna for the first sitting of the peace-conference. England, France, and Russia had sent urgent recommendations both to Berlin and to Vienna that the Danes should be dealt with in a generous spirit. This naturally strengthened the desire of the German Powers for a speedy conclusion, though this desire for the most part manifested itself in the two Courts with the difference well known to us, that Austria was very ready to make concessions to the Danes, while Bismarck preferred to influence his opponents rather by intimidation than by compliance.

It was soon evident, however, that in spite of all the efforts on the German side to hurry things, a long and complicated affair had been begun, especially as the Danes everywhere manifested an inclination to settle every detail definitively in the actual treaty, and to leave nothing to be arranged later by commissions. First of all, the three officers were charged with the fixing of the boundaries, and the sitting was adjourned until they should bring in their report. Before this was ready, however, Quaade, on the 6th of September, brought forward Danish proposals about the postal arrangements, the customs, and the telegraph, the tendency of which Werther concisely described in the phrase: "Circumstantial and impracticable."

The postal question gave rise to an important difference of opinion between the Great Powers themselves. For centuries Denmark had had post-offices of her own at Hamburg and Lübeck. Prussia now demanded that these should be transferred as appurtenances connected with the Duchies. Rechberg replied to this, that the Hanse Towns were anxious to abolish these offices entirely, and to exercise, themselves, the control of all the postal arrangements in their own territory, a wish which, he said, was entirely consistent with Confederate rights. There could, therefore, in his view, be no talk of a transference of these offices to Prussia and Austria. After long discussion the result was, that the offices were not mentioned in the treaty at all. This was, as we see, an exact counterpart to the question of the Könneritz telegraph-compacts, a fresh instance of Austria's striving to acquire the favor of the Lesser and Petty States.

The former Danish Minister of Finance, Fenger, had now arrived in Vienna as special commissioner in the settlement of the State debts; and he at once began with Scheel-Plessen this extremely complicated task. Apart from a number of doubtful particulars, the main point in dispute was the question whether the assets were to be divided as well as the liabilities, — the State funds as well as the State debts. As the assets had not been mentioned in the preliminaries, the Danes here at last prevailed in their determined refusal, though they were forced to admit that certain funds unquestionably belonging to the Duchies must be

accounted for to them. As to the debts, Fenger estimated the share of Schleswig-Holstein at forty-four, Plessen at twenty-two millions.

Thereupon, Rechberg declared on the 1st of October that there was only one way of arranging the difficulty: to agree upon a satisfactory compromise. He proposed, with this view, the sum of twenty-nine millions. The Danes were horrified at such severity; but as Prussia agreed to the proposition, and at the same time hinted at increasing the number of troops in Jutland, Denmark made up her mind on the 11th of October to consent. In regard to the fixing of the boundaries, too, a settlement was arrived at. In return for the cession of the Jutland enclaves, Denmark received, in addition to the district of Ribe, about one hundred and thirty-two square miles in the south of Kolding.

The chief points were thus disposed of. There then remained a number of minor details to be settled: the compensation to be made to the German merchants and traders, which involved a dispute as to whether they were to be indemnified for direct losses only or for indirect as well, and also for the profits of which they had been deprived; then the division of the archives, Denmark not wishing to surrender all such documents as owed their origin to the Duchies, but only such as were connected with the administration of them; and then the assumption of the appanages and pensions, in which either party strove to reduce its obligations as much as possible.

Several weeks were spent in tedious haggling over

these points. Complaint was made by Werther, that since the territorial and financial questions had been settled, Rechberg showed great signs of weakening: he urged a speedy conclusion by the concession of what the Danes asked, and gave the Prussian demands only a feeble and reluctant support. This was the actual fact, and Werther was soon to learn on what weighty grounds such conduct was based. We are now brought back to the question of the Austro-German commercial treaty.

Bismarck had not been able to obtain all he sought from the Prussian Ministers that were the authorities in these matters. The official representatives of the customs service were the Minister of Commerce, Count Itzenplitz, and the Minister of Finance, Von Bodelschwingh. In reality, however, in consequence of the manifest lack of technical knowledge of the two gentlemen bearing these titles, the deciding word was generally given by the ministerial superintendent of commerce, Delbrück. Delbrück, trained by industrious and widely extended study, had rapidly and brilliantly passed through all the grades of the Prussian government-service. His was a character that was extraordinarily reliable, strong of will, yet free from violent passions, never idly quiescent, but always evenly balanced. His mind was thoroughly filled and possessed with a thirst for clear understanding, for clear ideas, clear purposes, clear and definite data. Thus he took hold of everything with exhaustive thoroughness, resting always on scientific principles, and always

having an eye to practical adaptability, — a theorist, who was never a doctrinaire; a practical man, who never fell into routine; one learned in technical details, who confined himself to the sphere in which he was a master, and in this sphere cared for nothing but the most satisfactory performance possible of the one duty in hand.

As a political economist, he was a free-trader by scientifically-trained conviction, not in the modern sense of thinking that for both State and society there are no higher laws than those of economic individualism, but with the simpler view that in the economic world freedom of trade and of labor give the best results. He had therefore warmly greeted and defended the turn in Prussia's tariff policy, which had begun in 1852, and become victorious ten years later; and he was filled with a desire to save the Tariff-Union, which had just been renewed on this basis, from a repetition of such crises as that recently passed through.

It can easily be conceived how repugnant to such a man was the demand once more brought forward by Austria, that a definite limit of time should again be set for negotiations about the entrance of Austria into the Tariff-Union, her admission having been once for all recognized as out of the question. Delbrück saw in this desire on the part of Austria a diplomatic snare, in the satisfaction of this desire a deceitful phrase, and in both an intentional obscurity which was foreign to his whole nature, and which promised nothing but new difficulties for the future.

That the preamble of the commercial treaty should allude to a great tariff-union as something desirable, thus much had been conceded to the President of the Ministry by the Superintendent Delbrück; but he declared with the strongest emphasis that it was impossible to go further than this, and especially that Article XXV. must not be renewed. "For in this article," he said, "the opposition of the Lesser States in the Tariff-Union crisis has hitherto had its origin and its pretext. To renew that article would, therefore, be a very substantial concession, which would involve similar dangers for the Tariff-Union in the future."

Bismarck replied that this was mistrusting their own firmness. Delbrück, however, pointed to the Austrian despatch of May 7, 1862, and the assertion contained in it, that the treaty of 1853 forbade Prussia to reform her tariff in a direction different from that followed by Austria. As Bismarck, in the interests of a good understanding with Austria, persisted in his own view, the King had to be called in to decide. He had already been in doubt at Schönbrunn, as we have mentioned above; and when Delbrück said that he should resign his position if the article were admitted, the King rejected it. Bismarck regarded this as a political mistake. He yielded, however, and at once left Berlin to go to the King at Baden-Baden.

With instructions to the above effect, Privy Councillor Hasselbach then met at Prague the Austrian plenipotentiary, Baron von Hock, for a consultation about the commercial treaty. In the beginning Hock

believed the result would be favorable, but found only too soon that there was no use in thinking any more of Article XXV. Rechberg was deeply affected when he learned this, and decided to make yet one more trial of a personal interview with Bismarck. Ever since their service together at Frankfort, there had been a friendly feeling between the two, in spite of all official differences. Bismarck considered Rechberg to be passionate and easily irritated, but honorable, and at bottom good-hearted; and Rechberg, though he was daily angry with Prussia and with Bismarck too, could not give up the desire of maintaining a good understanding.

A couple of incidents of the Frankfort days may serve to characterize the relation between these men. Once in Rechberg's rooms, they got into so violent a dispute that the Count cried, "I shall send you my seconds." — "What is the use of so much red tape?" answered Bismarck. "You certainly have pistols here. We will settle the matter at once in your garden. While you are getting the weapons ready, I will write a report on the affair, which I desire to have sent to Berlin, if anything happens." This was agreed to. When the report was written, Bismarck requested the Count to examine its accuracy. Rechberg read it, and, his blood being now cooler, said, "It is all correct, — but," he then cried, "to break our necks over this would be foolish beyond all measure." — "I agree with you entirely," said Bismarck.

Somewhat later, Rechberg came to Bismarck, and

showed him despatches from Vienna, in which the Count was instructed to give his vote on an important question at the next session, on the same side as Prussia. Bismarck glanced over the document, and returned it with the words: "There has been probably some mistake here." Rechberg looked at the paper, was horrified, and turned pale: it was a confidential letter which had accompanied the other, with instructions to vote indeed on the side of Prussia, but to make every effort to have their common vote defeated by the representatives of the remaining States. He had exchanged one paper for the other. "Do not be disturbed," said Bismarck. "You did not *intend* to give me the letter, therefore you *did* not give it to me; and therefore its contents are entirely unknown to me." And, as a matter of fact, he never reported it to Berlin, thereby winning Rechberg's confidence forever.

The Count, consequently, undertook in the present complications a private correspondence with Bismarck, some parts of which shall be given here, since it is at once remarkable as the last attempt to conciliate the old and the new Germany, and instructive in showing the views of the two statesmen at that time.

"It is our task," wrote Rechberg, on the 6th of September, "to consign the differences and struggles of many years to oblivion, to obliterate the results of the same in the minds of the people, and to awaken an appreciation of the mutual advantages of an Austro-Prussian alliance." He accordingly urged that nothing should be allowed to prevent an amicable solution of

the commercial question, and that in the matter of the Holstein telegraph compacts, the invalidity of form should be amended by a supplementary Confederate decree, and so the sovereignty of the Hanse Towns acknowledged.

In his answer of September 8th, Bismarck first expressed his hearty thanks to Rechberg for having taken the initiative in a confidential discussion of the pending questions. He then mentioned the anxiety of his colleagues, to whom belonged the consideration of technical details in the proposed commercial treaty. "I cannot see," he said, "what magic lies in the word tariff-union, that the mere mention of it affects our statesmen unpleasantly and yours agreeably, when we are all agreed that the thing itself is neither possible nor desirable. It is to be hoped that our two commissioners will employ themselves with good results on the question, what shape our commercial relations shall take so long as we do not have a tariff-union. Let us not, in the pursuit of such a will-of-the-wisp as that, neglect the practical benefits of the commercial treaty."

He then said that his colleagues kept holding up to him Austria's unaccommodating spirit in other questions, the provisional government of the Duchies, the occupation of Rendsburg, and the telegraph compacts; and he admitted frankly that Austria's attitude towards this last outrageous disregard of formal Confederate rights had been a surprise to himself. "If," he remarked, "we cannot agree to interpose against so flagrant a violation of Confederate rights by our own

commissioners, how shall we agree about the guidance of the entire Confederate policy within the utmost allowable limits?

“Permit me, honored friend, to express my opinion openly. In all these matters the attitude of the Imperial Cabinet is conditioned by a slight, but I fear increasing, tendency to let the small States look upon Austria as a bulwark against Prussia. It seems to me impossible that the most prominent officials of the Austrian administration [Biegeleben, Meysenberg, Gagern] who have come to Vienna, having had more or less connection with the Lesser States, should have already entirely broken with the traditions of their earlier years. I consider it natural that men who feel themselves to be good swimmers in the parliamentary stream [Schmerling] should seek to keep open the springs which flow into that stream from the Lesser States that have parliamentary governments, and from public opinion in those States.

“But the more influence the elements thus indicated have upon the course of Austria’s policy, the nearer are we brought to the old ruts in which Austria and Prussia were held fast for more than ten years, to the injury of both. We shall succeed in the task you propose for us, only if we keep our connection animated with the fresh life of an *active* common policy such as we have pursued hitherto during this year. A policy of that nature, consistently followed out, will doubtless lead to the desired results: Germany will be united against all foes within and without, the foundations of

monarchical government will be restored, and revolution will be deprived of its power to do harm."

"The contrary of all this will happen, however," Bismarck added in conclusion, "if we go only half-way and each then turns again to his old path. For no one would any longer believe in the firmness of our connection: it would be said that the sympathy of the Senate of Hamburg was valued more by the Court of Vienna than the friendship of Prussia."

On the 17th of September, Rechberg answered with equal frankness.

"You know," he wrote, "that I give myself with my whole soul to the task of maintaining in the future the harmony that has once more been brought about between Austria and Prussia. . . . You will grant to me, most honored friend, that a sincere and loyal recognition of Austria's oneness with Germany is one of those essential conditions without which Austria cannot feel at home in the Prussian alliance. This fact gives the answer to the question, what inexplicable magic is contained for us in the simple word 'tariff-union.' The value of this word is, I admit, one of those things that are imponderable, but the value of our position as a *German Power* is also imponderable. [Marginal note by Bismarck: *More Power than German.*]

"The opinion that a tariff-union is impracticable has often been expressed. But nevertheless it cannot be disproved that sooner or later a tariff-union will inevitably be concluded.

"The present question, whether Austria shall with-

draw from her right to be included in a tariff-union, and thus acknowledge that in a politico-commercial connection she does not belong to Germany [Bismarck: To the Tariff-Union], I must, as an Austrian Minister, answer in the negative. What would have been said in 1815 to the exclusion of Austria from a German tariff system, what to the theory that in such a system Austria was to have no preference over foreigners? If we persist in our claim to a tariff-union, it is not because Prussia signed Article XXV. of the commercial treaty, — although it is not setting a very good example to make one's plighted word depend on the value of a form of speech, — but because Austria is a German Power, and cannot allow a common German institution to be closed to her on principle, nor permit herself to be treated as a foreign nation by her own associates in the Confederation. . . .

“When conferring with a man of your keenness of insight and of your determination, I cannot forbear expressing the wish that it might for once be seriously and carefully considered in Berlin whether it is nowadays still desirable to pursue that course of policy which may be designated as the crippling of the Confederation and the making of petty acquisitions. This course was originally pursued on the presupposition of the voluntary separation of Austria from Germany. I doubt whether Prussia would to-day gain anything by this.

“If your colleagues, who look at the matter from a professional point of view, ask what equivalents are

offered for their concessions in commercial matters, I can only conclude from their question that they do not stand on the same high ground of politics that you do. Were it my business to answer them, I should beg them to remember how Prussia stood in Europe and in Germany before she accepted the hand held out by us, and how she stands now, thanks to the course pursued by you. I should ask them whether whole volumes of petty military, postal, and telegraph compacts could have to Prussia the value of the friendship of Austria and of the confidence of the other German States. I should point out to them that, on account of great European necessities, the united action of the two Powers can move only in a conservative course, that is, with severe respect for Confederate rights, and the independence of the associate States. [Bismarck: Up to what point?]

“You yourself called my attention to the period before 1848, during which Germany willingly followed the leadership of Austria and Prussia. Well, with what care did the two Great Courts then treat the independent feeling of their Confederate associates and respect their rights! The consequence was, that for a generation there was no thought of mistrusting the two Powers, nor did any one mention a Confederation of the Rhine.

“If their independence is respected, the small States are now also ready to lean on Austria and Prussia. Their accession to the Austro-Prussian alliance would give it the strongest position in Europe. But if they

are suspicious, if they fear for their independence or for their Confederate rights, if they are anxious about being absorbed by the two Courts, and give their attention to maintaining their own individuality, then a secret and dangerous disquietude will prevail in Germany, which Europe at once will perceive and profit by, and which will alter the relations of power not a little to the disadvantage of Austria and Prussia.

“Do what you can therefore—it is my urgent request—to keep your neighbors from thinking that they stand in need of a bulwark. I shall then no longer be open to the suspicion of scheming to make Austria appear to the small States a bulwark against Prussia. You will then have friends everywhere, and find everywhere a willingness to fulfil your wishes. No one will any longer doubt the firmness of our connection. If the German Governments no longer feel any anxiety, they will also cease coquetting with the elements of popular agitation.”

Rechberg urged that the Hamburg telegraph-com-pacts should be treated in this spirit.

Bismarck's answer to all this was delayed by various accidental circumstances until the 29th of September. As it was not advisable to say roundly to his friend in Vienna what he thought of the relative Germanic character of the Empire on the Danube, he took occasion to declare that he regarded progress in their common path to be more certain if both parties took their stand on the practical ground of state policy, without letting the situation be obscured by the mists

that arose from the doctrines of German sentimental politicians. It would then be seen that if the German character of Austria was to be of advantage to her position as a Power, this would be effected not by a commercial treaty with problematical phrases, but by an intimate association with Prussia. As to Rechberg's comment, that a plighted word ought not to be transformed into a mere form of speech, Bismarck pointed out that he had always disputed the possibility of a tariff-union with Austria, and that recently at Schönbrunn he had promised to recommend at Berlin the mention of the same in the new commercial treaty, only upon Rechberg's express assurance that such mention was to be looked upon merely as a form of speech.

But on the same day, the 29th, Rechberg wrote his letter of complaint about the negative course things were taking in the conference at Prague. "The impression it makes," he said, "is painful to me and to the Ministers whose departments are especially concerned. According to the agreement between us two, the new treaty was to involve no departure from the position represented in the February treaty; this, however, would not be the case, if the phrase in question remains only in the preamble and Article XXV. is omitted. This would make my position in the matter untenable. Prussia might the more easily give a promise to negotiate with us within a given time, since we have already recognized the fact that by so doing she would not be giving up her autonomy in questions of tariff."

In his answer of October 4th, Bismarck explained his colleagues' grounds for refusal, and then continued: "Do not lay too much stress on these tariff matters, my honored friend. More or less favorably worded promises for the future cannot settle these things. Either it will be seen in *both* countries that a tariff-union is desirable, and then it will be made, independent of all promises; or the conviction of its usefulness will not be felt, and then nothing will be any more likely to come of it in 1877, no matter whether in the mean time a date for opening negotiations has been fixed upon or not.

"It seems to me that the future of Europe contains the possibility of too serious crises, for it to be worth our while to stir up public opinion about forms of words that are to apply to an event which is to remain for twelve years problematic, and which practically is not dependent upon these forms of words at all. Personally, I would gladly yield to you in regard to Article XXV., if I could carry it through without a sort of *coup d'état* or a cabinet crisis at home. The determination with which the thing is insisted on, on your side, causes the suspicion here, that it is a question, not merely of the theoretical position established in 1853, and of the momentary impression on public opinion in Austria, but of the serious and practical realization of a tariff-union. For this, as I have often said, I am by no means ready to hold out my hand, so long as it would be only the artificial product of political compacts, and not the natural result of a harmony of real interests."

The letter then turned to Rechberg's former utterances about German politics in general: "The King has certainly given many proofs that he is not hungering for the property of his neighbors nor for the suppression of the German Princes. We have put no German state in a position to require a bulwark against us. We stand on the *defensive* against the encroachments and the arrogance of Confederate majorities and their individual members. Was not the position, which Herr von Beust and others with him in league with the Revolution took up against us both, entirely an aggressive one? They needed only a little more power to make an actual attack on us. Otherwise they would have tried it. A confederation in which the European policy of Prussia and Austria is to be directed by the majority of the small states is worse than no confederation at all. If I must choose between subjection to such claims, and the open hostility of the Lesser States, I prefer the latter.

"The Beust policy went far beyond the bounds of what was required by 'the maintenance of individuality': it was the thirst for power. We do nothing to endanger the independence of our neighbors as assured by the principles of the Confederation; but our own independence cannot yield to the ambition of the Lesser States. If we allow such proceedings as the juggling to which Prussia and Austria were sacrificed in the Federal chastisement in Holstein to take place often, we shall accustom the Lesser States to the assumption of a tone which in the long run we shall not be able to put up

with. If the rein by *suddenly* tightened, it will be said that we are putting them down by force, and they will threaten us with a Confederation of the Rhine. If we let ourselves be *frightened* by this threat, it will become dangerous and will finally be carried out. If we are not frightened, and let them feel that we are not, it will never even be mentioned.

“At Schönbrunn we set before us the task of *guiding* German politics in common. We can do that only if we keep the other members of the Confederation accustomed to the idea that Prussia and Austria will come forward unitedly and determinedly against all excesses, such as was the whole policy of the Federal chastisement in Holstein from the beginning up to the telegraph-compacts. No German Prince need therefore be anxious about his independence, nor forego *such* participation in the general decisions as he is entitled to in proportion to his power.

“The folly of those members of the Confederation who have hitherto taken the lead shows itself most of all, to my thinking, in the fact that the harmony between Vienna and Berlin is unwelcome to them, and that they hope to disturb that harmony. Should they succeed in this, Germany as a political unit and the Confederation itself could continue only with the continuance of peace. With the first war in which a German state was concerned, the whole structure would fall to pieces, and the weaker ones would certainly be more deeply buried under the ruins than the stronger. Therefore the small states should thank Heaven for the

harmony between us, under the protection of which they exist — whereas, on the contrary, I do not think that our safety is dependent on the three heterogeneous Confederate corps.

“Let us, then, cherish our mutual relations at any price. By maintaining and strengthening them, we shall serve Germany at the same time that we shall control it in common, not by force, as did the Protector the Confederation of the Rhine, but by friendly Confederate relations, as the first among equals. I look upon our alliance as existing for this object. Should we, however, lose this object from sight, should we cease to show our active interest in it, we should diminish the vitality of our alliance. The simple desire to be on our guard against attacks from without is strong enough neither with you nor with us to keep up permanently between us that close community of policy, which has been so fortunately established by our common *action* in the Danish affair.”

To this exposition of a system of double rule in Germany, which Austria might have listened to, if at that time, instead of Bismarck another Ancillon had been at the helm of the Prussian State, Rechberg returned no further answer. Meanwhile, at Berlin, the last seal was being put upon the triumph that had been won in the crisis of the Tariff-Union, and the final submission of the South German recalcitrants was about to be received. Since the last conference at Munich, the South German Governments had come to perceive that they could not escape entering the Union ;

and the Bavarian Minister, Schrenck, was only considering how he could give an honorable color to his surrender. Since for him also the most important element in the struggle against the French commercial treaty had been the relations with Austria, he was anxious to present to the country some result, though even a small one, in this direction. He therefore first proposed at Berlin that nominal stipulation which had been urged also by Rechberg: that at some time in the future, negotiations were to be carried on with Austria concerning a great tariff-union.

When this very naturally was refused, he asked for a postponement of the time for entrance into the Tariff-Union, from the 1st to perhaps the 15th of October, that is, until the probable conclusion of the Hasselbach conference at Prague. His object in this was to be able to say that the essential condition imposed by him for entrance, namely, a previous negotiation with Austria (although for the present unfortunately with no result), had been fulfilled, and that he could therefore join the Union without inconsistency. Bismarck now, as in the negotiations with Austria, advocated a conciliatory attitude, but the Ministers of the Departments, in the full consciousness of victory, held obstinately to the limit of October 1st, and rejected the Bavarian proposal all the more decidedly because Hesse-Darmstadt had already signified her unconditional submission.

Hereupon, Schrenck announced to King Louis, that consideration for his personal and his political reputation obliged him to give up his office; and on the 21st

of September he presented his resignation. The young King, who had been for some weeks annoyed with his Minister, had the harshness not to answer the request at once, but ordered Schrenck to give notice at Berlin of Bavaria's entrance into the Tariff-Union.

At the same time, also, Minister von Hügel at Stuttgart was wrecked on the same rock, and was replaced on the 24th of September by Baron von Varnbüler.

On the 30th of September, then, all the states of the old Union were represented at the Berlin tariff conference, and on the 4th of October Schrenck was dismissed. The Prussian ambassador, Arnim, expressed regret at the fall of the Minister; for he had always hoped that the latter might retain his position. "Schrenck," he said, "is at bottom neither Prussian nor Austrian, but Bavarian, in his sympathies, the characteristic representative of a Lesser State that has no great rôle to play and yet desires to remain perfectly independent. Pfordten, on the other hand [who had been immediately designated as Schrenck's probable successor], is much more inclined to a restless policy on a large scale, after the fashion of Beust." This confirmed Bismarck in the view developed above, that by pursuing such a course in her tariff policy, Prussia would injure her other external interests.

But this event was immediately afterwards thrown into the background by one of far more importance. On the 9th of October, Bismarck, who was then taking the sea-baths at Biarritz, received the following telegram from Baden-Baden: —

“Werther telegraphed yesterday that the Austrian Ministerial Council had decided to break off negotiations on account of the refusal to admit Article XXV. Rechberg can reverse this, if the Article be approved. Otherwise he will resign, because he is unwilling to act upon that decision. He begs that Herr von Bismarck be informed, and requests a speedy answer. The King has asked for an immediate report from Berlin as to whether a form can be found which, without involving compliance in the matter, will render it possible to continue negotiations. He would regard Rechberg’s resignation as a great misfortune, and hopes that the Emperor will not, for the sake of a stipulation about uncertain things in the future, endanger the present political concord.”

Bismarck answered at once, on the 10th of October, urging that everything compatible with the French treaty should be conceded. “There is no danger,” he said, “in agreeing to a limit of time for a future negotiation, the result of which continues to depend entirely upon ourselves. The whole matter is either an intrigue against Rechberg, or an experiment to see whether we still value the Austrian alliance. Except on one of these suppositions, the importance of Article XXV. is too slight to afford sufficient cause for Rechberg’s retirement.” This opinion was expressed again in a telegram of October 15th: “My advice is strongly against rejecting Austria’s request, and I cannot undertake to be responsible for a foreign policy conducted in that fashion.”

On the 16th, in a report sent to Berlin, whither the King had returned, Bismarck developed these views in giving more specific arguments: "A promise to enter into negotiations that cannot result in anything without our voluntary consent involves no danger. If we give such a promise, it will no longer appear to be a price paid for the Tariff-Union, but a proof, entirely gratuitous on our part, of our friendly disposition towards a Confederate associate. It cannot be shown that the promise will be attended with any disadvantage. In our refusal Austria will seem to see a proof of our readiness to give up our alliance with her. Schmerling would then induce the Emperor to pursue a course unfavorable to Prussia, and accordingly to make advances to the Lesser States and to France. To be sure, such a turn may perhaps be taken by Austrian policy in any case sooner or later, and we must be ready to meet it when it comes; but it would be very inconvenient to have it come before the Danish affair is settled.

"In the effort to deprive Prussia of all, even of the indirect, fruits of our victories in that contest, Austria would find willing ears at almost all the Courts of Europe. She is prevented from taking this course even now only by the consideration that in foreign complications she may need the help which the alliance with us offers her. If we show her that that alliance is a very unstable one, by letting Rechberg retire, who is the chief defender of it, it is probable that the Imperial Cabinet will prefer to avoid danger by yielding to France, rather than to face it relying on our support.

“If the Emperor entirely loses his confidence in Prussia, Schmerling will get the upper hand. One of the main points of Schmerling’s system is a connection of Austria with the Western Powers, such as existed for a time in 1863. Even now Schmerling is seeking, by means of agents of the Paris Press, to bring about a connection with France, implying a good understanding between the latter and England. The next step in such a course of policy would be the recognition by Austria of the Kingdom of Italy; and this also Schmerling has already in view. Then the exclusion of Prussia as completely as possible from all gain accruing from the Schleswig-Holstein affair would follow, with the approval of the Lesser States and the majority in the Confederate Diet. All this is, indeed, only a matter of probability, and the effect such a policy would have in France is doubtful; but the magnitude of the danger contrasts glaringly with the insignificance of the concessions demanded from us.”

The King did not deny the force of this reasoning; but he was not yet wholly convinced, especially as the Ministers of the Departments persisted unwaveringly in their opposition. He held that Article XXV. was not so harmless as Bismarck thought: it would cause twelve more years of uncertainty about what would finally happen, and that was surely a great disadvantage; if it was really of no significance, then certainly the Austrian threat of removing Rechberg proved that in Vienna there was a great readiness to dispense with the alliance of Prussia. The probability of the dangers

portrayed by Bismarck would, in the King's opinion, unfortunately continue, even if the wished-for concessions were made, since the whole thing was what Schmerling *desired*, and he would use *every* occasion to overthrow Rechberg.

This feeling, that in the end all concessions would prove useless, was all the stronger, since on the very morning of October 17th an Austrian despatch was received, in which Rechberg suggested to the King that after the Duchies had been abandoned to the two Powers, a portion of the Confederate troops should be left there. This proposal unmistakably betrayed an intention of using the Confederation, that is, the Lesser States, to interfere with Prussia's wishes.

Werther, therefore, at Vienna received orders to hold back, if possible, until the Danish peace had been concluded; and when, immediately after, urgent messages were received from the Austrian capital, to the effect that the crisis was there growing more imminent, and haste was necessary, the King sent word in reply that he would meet all Austria's wishes so far as possible, but that he must reserve his answer till Bismarck should have returned from France. On the 22d of October, he discussed the situation with a cousin of the Emperor Francis Joseph, the Archduke Leopold, who conveyed to King William the Emperor's desire for the unaltered continuance of the alliance. The King pointed out that at that very same time Schmerling, in the organs of the Press controlled by him, was carrying on the most active warfare against the Prussian alliance, and

against Rechberg as the defender of it. "This," said the King, "has driven Rechberg to persist in the demand for a general tariff-union, which everybody admits to be out of the question. If Schmerling gets the upper hand, all the conditions of the past will once more be revived: the opposition of the Lesser States, the rivalry of Prussia and Austria for the favor of those States, and the delight of the rest of Europe at such an exhibition of internal impotence and distraction."

But meantime the matter had been already settled at Vienna. Rechberg found himself absolutely alone in the Cabinet. His colleagues reproached him with the barrenness of the policy he had hitherto pursued, and with the fact that Austria stood isolated in Europe, while Bismarck was even then occupied at Biarritz and Paris with a Franco-Prussian alliance. No decision was reported from Berlin about Article XXV. The newspaper storm let loose by Schmerling against his unfortunate colleague continued to rage; and the Liberal party accused Rechberg of negotiating secretly with Bismarck for the overthrow of all constitutional institutions. The Emperor therefore received at the same time, from Schmerling and from Rechberg, the declaration that it was no longer possible for them to serve together: the Emperor must choose between them.

The internal condition of the Empire being what it was, the presence of Schmerling seemed to Francis Joseph indispensable for the conduct of parliamentary business. It therefore became necessary for Rechberg to withdraw. Schmerling would gladly have assigned

the Count's place to some adherent who would be completely subordinate to himself; but this was by no means in accordance with the intentions of the Emperor, who, in spite of Schmerling's usefulness, had no great fondness for him, on account of his liberalism and his hatred of Prussia. On the contrary, Francis Joseph was filled with a desire to persist in the course he had hitherto followed in his foreign policy, and to maintain the alliance with Prussia. Therefore, at Rechberg's suggestion, he invited the Governor of Galicia, the strongly conservative Count Mensdorff-Pouilly, an officer who was highly esteemed by the King of Prussia also, to fill the vacant position.¹

Meanwhile Werther and Balan had done what they could to bring the Danish peace to a conclusion, by making numerous concessions on minor points. On the same day on which Rechberg received his dismissal, the 27th of October, the treaty was formally drawn up, and it was signed on the 30th. This most pressing complication, at least, was thus removed.

On the 26th of October, Francis Joseph sent a confidential letter to King William, in which he explained that Rechberg's retirement meant nothing more than that a personal change in the Ministry had become necessary. "Mensdorff's name alone," wrote the Em-

¹ My account of these events at Vienna is taken from the reports of the Prussian ambassador, which, according to a memorandum of Under-Secretary von Thile, were confirmed by the statements of Counts Chotek and Blome, at that time Austrian representatives at Berlin and Munich. It is still to be seen how much they can be amplified or corrected by documents at Vienna.

peror, "would convince you that I myself, Francis Joseph, am firmly determined to suffer no change in the course of my policy. The fact that we have acted in common, has been owing to me personally; and my most anxious care will constantly be directed to the maintenance of our alliance unweakened, and to confirming it still further."

The same warm friendship showed itself in the King's answer of November 2d. "Your words," he wrote, "are so entirely reassuring to me, that I cannot thank you enough for taking the view of the matter that you do. I have long valued Count Mensdorff; I esteem and trust him, and place therefore full reliance on his character, and on his determination to continue the policy you have lately been pursuing toward Prussia." The King, however, did not conceal some anxiety lest Mensdorff, new as he was to the business, should be led away against his will by Schmerling.

In regard to Mensdorff, Count Blome, who was intimate with him, declared at Munich to Herr von Arnim, that the new Minister was determined to hold to the Prussian alliance: the only question was, whether he could carry out that determination in opposition to his colleagues and the imperial councillors. On the other side, we have seen before with what emphasis Bismarck, both before and at the time of the ministerial crisis at Vienna, spoke in favor of maintaining the alliance with Austria; how both by word of mouth, by telegram, and by letter, he pressed the acceptance of Article XXV. and consideration for the Bavarian Minister; and how

urgently he pointed out to the King the serious consequences of taking the contrary course.

We may here add, that at Biarritz and at Paris, in his communications with Napoleon and with Drouyn de Lhuys, Bismarck in no way departed from the line of conduct hitherto adopted, and neither made nor received any more intimate advances of any nature whatever.

The French Government persisted in their opinion, that Prussia should annex the Duchies by a plebiscitum, and then on the ground of the principle of nationality surrender North Schleswig to Denmark. The acceptance of this proposal would have meant a definite and open breach with Austria. Bismarck therefore contented himself with the certainty that France now, as before, was not to be numbered among the distinct opponents of the annexation.

Even after Rechberg's retirement, the Prussian Minister remained firm in his resolution to protect, indeed, under all circumstances, Prussia's and Germany's interests in Schleswig-Holstein — but, if possible, to do this not in opposition to, but in harmony with, Austria. He still continued to look upon an alliance between Prussia and Austria as at once the most influential and the least dangerous connection that could be entered into by either State.

The Sovereigns and their principal Ministers were, therefore, at one in the sincere wish to keep the newly knit bond of friendship intact, and to draw it ever closer. But once more it was to be demonstrated that the force of circumstances is stronger than the best

intentions of men. According to the historical position of the two Powers, the hopes which each of them placed in the alliance were in irreconcilable contradiction. Prussia saw in the connection a means of inducing Austria to recognize her rising and growing interests: Austria expected to use it for the purpose of keeping down Prussia, of bridling her ambition, and of restraining her within the limits of the old Confederate principles. The mutual attitude was that in which the two Powers had stood with regard to one another from the beginning to the end of the Danish war, and in which they now became more and more confirmed when the question was to be settled of who should profit by the victory. Napoleon had rightly foreseen that an understanding between the two Powers about Schleswig-Holstein was out of the question.

Bismarck, in speaking of the matter later, expressed the state of the case very justly: "It was perfect folly, by not agreeing to Article XXV., to drive Rechberg out of his position; Rechberg would have sacrificed anything to have prevented war." "Yet, after all," he added, "war was bound to come some time, and it was perhaps fortunate that it came then, when the constellations were tolerably propitious."