



M E M O I R S

OF THE

HOUSE OF BRANDENBURG,

AND

HISTORY OF PRUSSIA,

DURING THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES.

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**Translated from the German**

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MEMOIRS
OF THE
HOUSE OF BRANDENBURG
AND
HISTORY OF PRUSSIA.

SEVENTH BOOK.

It is perhaps not altogether superfluous, with a view to a clear understanding of the history of Germany in the eighteenth century, to bring before the eyes of the reader a brief outline of what would have been the state of things in the year 1740 and the succeeding period had Prussia and Frederick II. not existed.

There can be no doubt that, on the extinction of the line of Habsburg, a war would have broken out concerning the Austrian succession. The dread of the power and the hostility of the house of Lorraine entertained by the court of Versailles; the claims of the house of Wittelsbach, which had never been lost sight of by France; the family pride and ambition of the Bourbons, were facts independent of any alliances or confederations. Under all circumstances France would have seized the occasion of carrying on the ancient conflict, in the course of which she had already made such large acquisitions and produced such brilliant warriors—and of raising herself

for ever to the position of the predominant power of Europe.

Such was at that day the weakness of the Austrian ministry, and indeed of the whole condition of Austria both in a military and financial point of view, that we must not presume on her ability to defend herself with greater success than in our own times: the French would have been masters of the Rhenish provinces and the Danube before anybody had moved; they would have found as little resistance in Bohemia as Frederick had recently encountered in Silesia; while, had he not been restrained by the fear of so formidable a neighbour as the King of Prussia, continued success and high hopes would probably have led back Augustus III. to the policy of his father. Whether Russia, occupied since the death of the Empress with her own intestine troubles, could or would have offered any timely resistance, is very doubtful.

But even if Russia had roused herself to an active participation in the quarrel, and had imposed a truce upon Saxony—if England had afforded succours in money or in troops, which, considering the indecision of the Austrian policy, could have been but slowly accomplished—the situation of Germany would, even then, have been very miserable.

The English and the Russians would have fought on the side of Austria, and the French on that of Bavaria: the Queen would have been relegated to Hungary; the several states of Germany would have been carried away by the influence of one or other of these parties—a truly German interest would nowhere have existed.

Under these circumstances it was to be regarded as a piece of good fortune that there was at least one state which did battle in its own cause, however exclusive—which had unequalled military strength at its disposal, and took counsel from itself alone. For however important be the regular forms of a constitution to a great nation, its existence and welfare depend still more on the living and energetic spirit which has the faculty of discovering the means of power, and of employing them with success.

The King of Prussia had succeeded in raising himself to the highest pitch of strength and independence; nor was this the only result of the war in which he had been engaged.

It was in great measure owing to him, as we have seen, that the Queen of Hungary was able to maintain herself against the hostility of France; a less intentional but natural effect of which was, that she learned to estimate and to apply her own strength. The two great German states emerged from their first conflict with an armed force such as no previous century had witnessed.

Now, however, arose the question which has from that time continued to be the most important to the destinies of Germany: what should be their conduct towards each other, and whether a good mutual understanding were possible. The Silesian question was not the only cause of division between them; a more immediate one was their relation to the Empire.

Austria, accustomed to imperial honours, could not endure that another house should possess the

supreme dignity of the Empire. However much the prerogatives of that station might have been curtailed, it still conferred not only consideration, but influence of various kinds, and a real increase of power.

On the other hand, Prussia, which (as we remarked at the beginning of our work) might be regarded as the manifestation of the Idea of Territorial Sovereignty, though she now appeared in a fulness of strength and internal stability which nobody would have deemed possible, could not entertain the design of grasping at the imperial Crown; still less of severing herself from the Empire, to which it was less her duty than her right to belong. But her natural endeavour tended to prevent the supreme power from falling into hands from which she had nothing but hostility to expect, and to give it a new direction corresponding with the circumstances of the time.

For the accomplishment of this end the most necessary steps had already been taken during the war—the Elector of Bavaria had been chosen Emperor. Active as the French had been in securing his election, events proved that it could never have been secured without the co-operation of Prussia.

CHAPTER I.

ELECTION AND POSITION OF THE EMPEROR CHARLES VII.

IF we recall the period immediately succeeding the death of Charles VI., we shall remember that the court of Vienna then entertained no doubt that the Grand Duke of Tuscany, the Queen's husband, would succeed to the imperial throne. It was calculated that out of the nine electorates (the number at that time) four were in his favour: Mayence and Treves among the spiritual, Saxony and Hanover among the temporal; while a fifth, Bohemia, was in his own hands. Charles Albert, Elector of Bavaria, who offered himself as competitor, was so little feared by the Austrian party that they even hoped to gain over his own brother, the Elector of Cologne, who was supported out of the revenues of the chapters, which were all partisans of Austria. We have seen how ready Frederick was to give his vote to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, under the condition, indeed, that his right to Silesia should be acknowledged. Had this been agreed to, the Grand Duke would unquestionably have been Emperor. The Elector of Mayence was already strongly inclined to admit the Grand Duke, as co-Regent of Bohemia, to the elective assembly.

But the outbreak of the dissensions between Prussia and Austria threw everything into uncertainty.

Bavaria and the Palatinate, which had recently made up their last difference—that concerning the vicariate of the Empire—kept firmly united; and, little trustworthy as the Elector of Cologne generally was, he was not disposed to abandon his house at a time when its prospects were so splendid.

On the other hand, the Elector of Saxony raised a very serious objection to the co-Regency of the Duke of Lorraine; it was impossible, he urged, that the Queen should transfer to another a right she could not exercise herself—that of electing: thus the court of Vienna lost, in one moment, the vote of Saxony and the secure possession of that of Bohemia.

The affair was not, however, decided by this; since, although Saxony opposed the Grand Duke, she by no means declared herself in favour of the Elector of Bavaria.

Had Maria Theresa come to an understanding with Prussia in May, 1741, the Grand Duke would probably have been elected even then. The Elector of Mayence said openly that the issue of the election depended wholly on the events in Silesia: and, indeed, it was impossible that any competitor for the Crown could have stood against Austria and Prussia united.

But as no such union took place—as, on the contrary, the hostility between them then became more open and violent than ever—the Chancellor of the Empire also took courage to declare himself against the Grand Duke.

The chancellor was of the family of Elz; a man of estimable character and good intentions, who was

not blind to the defects of the system of the Empire, but advanced in years, and possessing neither the acuteness of mind nor the determination requisite for the task of a reformer. Whatever were the inclination of the majority in the Electoral College, he resolved, as its President, to adopt it; his first duty appeared to him to avoid all dissension. The ablest of his councillors, named Grossschlag,* who was in Berlin in 1740, had acquired, while there, a high idea of Frederick II.'s power and projects. Even when the French had crossed the Rhine, the Elector of Mayence did not yield to the pressing representations of the French court in favour of Bavaria; but he declared that if the King of Prussia joined that party, so that Charles Albert could reckon with certainty on four votes, he would give him a fifth.

The secret article of the treaty by which Frederick bound himself to do so could not be communicated to the Elector of Mayence; but gradually very distinct declarations to that effect were made on his part by his representative at the Electoral Diet.

On the 1st of August the King of Prussia directed his ambassador generally to act with Belleisle and the courts allied with France, though he did not absolutely bind him to that line of conduct; † on the 22nd of August he wrote to him not only to do nothing without the concurrence of the Marshal, but to act in

* Podewils calls him an "homme d'esprit et de talent." For the rest we follow the statement contained in a despatch from the Saxon minister.

† His reasons were: "Comme la cour de Vienne refuse opiniâtrément de me rendre justice sur mes droits incontestables sur la Silésie," etc.

concert with him in every detail; not, however, absolving him from the obligation to consult himself on the most important points; lastly, on the 6th of September, he desires him to proceed to the principal affair without sending back or waiting for further instructions.

It was the second of these despatches which was communicated to the Elector of Mayence, and determined his course. He immediately gave Marshal Belleisle to understand that he had now made up his mind to add his vote to the four already secured. The only condition he made was, that the King should not alter his mind; which, after his letter of the 6th, was no longer to be feared. The formation of a majority, however, concurring with the events of the war, had now, as so frequently in former times, the effect of bringing the most undecided to a decision.

The advance of French troops, and the warnings of the King of Prussia and the Elector of Mayence, had a powerful influence on the mind of George II. On the 14th of September he wrote, with his own hand, to the Elector of Bavaria, that he would no longer oppose his wishes; upon which Charles Albert besought the French to abstain from all acts of hostility, which could only serve to produce an unfavourable impression in Germany.

As Saxony, after much wavering, now also abandoned her opposition—as none was, in any case, to be apprehended from Treves—the business of the election could now be proceeded with.

On the 4th of November the first question, which,

though only of a preliminary nature, was extremely important to the main business, was put to the vote—viz. whether the vote of the electorate of Bohemia was, on this occasion, to be received. There were six votes against it; the two others declared that they would allow the majority in this case to take its course, which accordingly determined the exclusion.* The Bohemian ambassador was forced to abandon the lodgings he had already taken for the sitting of the Diet.

On the 20th of November the election conferences were opened by a solemn procession. The Saxon embassy displayed the most stately train, Hanover the finest horses, Bavaria the richest harness and accoutrements, Cologne the most gorgeous liveries; Brandenburg-Prussia was distinguished by its simplicity—by a total absence of pomp and ostentation. It derived all its splendour from its King, whose name filled the world, and who was the real mover in this solemn act.†

It was not the urgency of the French, as has been imagined, that hastened the debates on the capitulations, which had appeared likely to drag tardily on, but the zeal of the Prussian cabinet, which would not wait till some accident might occur to shake the favourable dispositions of the Electors. In conse-

* Olenschlager : *Geschichte des Interregni*, IV. p. 208, gives the first preliminary conference. *Conclusum*, "dass die böhmische Wahlstimme für dermaln und ohne künftige Consequenz zu ruhen hätte."—(That the vote of Bohemia was not to be given then or afterwards.)

† See Loen : *Kl. Schriften* II. 118.

quence of a memorandum from Podewils, which the King thought admirable, the election was fixed for the second half of January, so that the negotiation was to be regulated by this term, and not the term by the length of the negotiations.

The court of Vienna might certainly have expected that the success of its arms in the beginning of the year 1742 would produce on the Electors an impression favourable to its desires; but all the introductory measures were already taken; the violence of the language held at Vienna irritated the self-love of the Chancellor of the Empire and of his council; on the 24th of January, 1742, the election, and on the 12th of February the coronation, of the Elector of Bavaria as Emperor were consummated.

The Emperor Charles VII.—for so he was styled—was certainly not a prince who could be placed in comparison with the old German Emperors; indeed, to expect a man of that stamp would have shown a total misapprehension of the altered character of the times. Acts of external religion, mingled with the pleasures of a court, not entirely free from licentiousness, had hitherto filled his existence; independently of this, he is described by those of his contemporaries who knew him as a man of acute and perspicacious mind, unwearied activity, lofty ambition, and some originality of thought. He, too, wished to govern by himself; and the importance and value of his presence among his ministers was proved mainly by the faults they committed whenever he was absent. Schmettau speaks with admiration of his gifts—his rapid apprehension and sagacious decision. Klinggräfen, the Prussian

minister, says that, whenever he was perplexed by any act of Charles Albert's calculated to excite suspicion, he thought it his best course to go to him and ask himself; he was never known to utter an untrue word; sincerity and kindness beamed from his eyes. Had his energy and physical strength been equal to his other qualities, his elevation to the throne might have been an important event for Germany.

The transfer of the imperial Crown from the house of Austria—of the seat of the most important business of the Empire from Vienna—was in itself a mighty change. It was hoped that various complaints of the dependence of the administration of the Empire on the court would thus be removed.

These were mainly directed against the imperial councillor (Reichshofrath), who, it was alleged, exercised an oppressive power in the Imperial Chamber, disregarded the established privileges, and invented reserved imperial rights never before heard of; it was said that he meddled in affairs not really within his competence—*e. g.* in matters of infeudation; instead of applying to the estates, whose business it was to declare the laws, he thought of nothing but how to bring the Emperor over to his own opinion.

Nor was this all. The Directory, (or general ministry for managing the affairs of the estates of the Empire,) which alone could act as representative of the estates, had become far too intimately attached to the imperial court; no measure was brought forward that had not first been concerted between the court and the chancellor. No ambassador of a state could venture to oppose both united; if any one attempted

it, all communication with him was broken off, and means were found soon to make his court heartily weary of the whole affair.

Hence it happened that the assent of the Empire in foreign affairs was become a sheer form: princes were nominated to conduct them who were wholly incapable, and others suspended without sufficient ground; the complaints of the Protestants were utterly disregarded.

They urged that the Diet of the Empire, during the whole of the eighty years it had been sitting, had been constantly swayed by the interests of the Emperor; that it was a mere congress met to give assent to certain grants, and had lost the character of an assembly of the states of the Empire. It were better to dissolve it, and convoke a new one in a more parliamentary form.*

* In a document of the Diet, dated 14 Feb. 1741, it is stated: "Der achtzigjährige Reichstag sei von seinem Zwecke ganz abgekommen; statt der dahin remittirten wichtigen Angelegenheiten pacis osnabr. VIII. 3, habeantur und Reichsabschied de aō 1654 seien fast gar keine andere Sachen vorgekommen, als welche des Kaisers Interesse und Convenienz betreffen; man habe einen status mere monarchicus einzuführen gesucht; den Ständen mit ihren Anliegen fast gar kein Gehör gegeben, die Sachen mit der grössten Schläfrigkeit tractirt, so dass der Reichsconvent verächtlich geworden. Die Gravamina gegen die Reichshofrathsordnung de aō 1711 seien nicht allein nicht abgestellt, sondern gar nicht ernstlich in Betracht gezogen worden. Noch finden sich gravamina imperii communia von diesem Jahre, z. B.: neglectus imperii in negotiis pacis et belli; Dispensation der Reichscassengelder durch kaiserliche Generale; Verpflegung der kaiserlichen Truppen nach einem zu geringen Etappenfuss; Besetzung der Stelle eines Kammerrichters mit Personen, die durch allerlei Respectus gebunden; unerhörter

It could not, indeed, be expected from the new Emperor that he should at once put an end to all these evils; but it was impossible that he should exercise that indirect influence which rested on an excess of power in one family, like that possessed by Austria; according to the nature of the case a free and equal relation to the states of the Empire was

processus rescriptitius beim Reichshofrath, der *vota ad imperatorem* formire, und dadurch in die Hände der österreichischen Minister arbeite, da doch Sachen, über welche der Reichshofrath, nicht entscheiden wolle, ad *caesarem et status* zu bringen seien."—(The eighty years' Diet had completely departed from its original object; instead of attending to the important affairs, *Pacis Osnabr. VIII. 3*, and the Decree of the Empire de a^o 1654, scarce any matters were proposed but such as touched the Emperor's interest and convenience: the attempt was made to introduce a *status mere monarchicus*: scarce any attention was paid to the estates or their memorials; everything was conducted in the most dilatory manner, so that the Diet became contemptible. The *gravamina* against the regulations of the Reichshofrath, or imperial councillor, de a^o 1711, were not alone not remedied, but were not even seriously taken into consideration. In that very year there were *gravamina imperii communia*, e. g. *neglectus imperii in negotiis pacis et belli*: the money belonging to the Diet was expended by imperial generals; the imperial troops were poorly treated; persons were appointed to the office of *Kammerrichter*, or judge, who were sure to be partial; unheard-of *processus rescriptitius* by the imperial councillor, who made out *vota ad imperatorem*, and who thus played into the hands of the Austrian ministers; as matters which the imperial councillor left undecided were, referred to *Cæsarem et status*, &c.) Hence we perceive that the complaints which so frequently appear in Prince Eugene's correspondence can be met by others of an opposite tendency. It is to be wished that a history of the Empire reaching to the eighteenth century may yet be written. The history of the votes should then be closely examined.

much more likely in an Emperor of the house of Wittelsbach than in an Austrian.

In former ages some had thought that the centre of gravity of the German constitution should have been placed in the cities, and their companies or guilds: it is doubtful whether that scheme could ever have been realized; but now, on the contrary, they were excluded from all influence whatsoever. For the most part they no longer sent delegates to the Diet, but committed their interests to citizens of Ratisbon, whose conversation, in taverns and beer-cellars, did little honour to their constituents.

At a later period the most important affairs were decided by the College of Princes, which, owing to the great number of spiritual members, and the natural opposition of the less to the more powerful among the temporal, was apt, in difficult emergencies, to become the mere tool of the imperial and Catholic power. The princes regarded themselves as the real body of the Empire; indeed, even in the sixteenth century they had strenuously exerted themselves on the side of the capitulants, and, at the very time we are treating of, they held a meeting for the purpose of maintaining their privileges, the true cause of which, however, was, that they had already lost much of their ancient influence.

The College of Princes had lost some of its most powerful members: first, Bavaria, who carried off the electoral dignity as the sole reward of his efforts in favour of Catholicism; then Neuburg, who rose to be Elector Palatine; and lastly, Hanover, for whom a ninth electorate had been created. Among

the spiritual votes which the princes had lost, the most remarkable was that of Magdeburg, who had led the Directory, or general ministry, in affairs relating to Protestantism; and even that of Austria, who had sacrificed her independence as a sovereign state, in order to have the electoral vote restored to Bohemia. Such was the poverty or the niggardliness prevailing in the representation of the princes, that twelve votes were often committed to one proxy, and all moral weight was thus destroyed: the protocols of their councillors now produced scarce any effect.*

All that the other members of the imperial body had lost had been gained by the College of Electors, whose members, in fact, represented the greatest sum of power in the German Empire. How different was this from the state of things at its foundation in the fourteenth century! On this body, then, the imperial government under Charles VII. was obliged to lean for support.

After the election the Electoral Congress was formally established, and began zealously to attend to public business.

In consequence of one of its decisions the Diet was transferred from Ratisbon to Frankfort; and here, in the middle of May, 1742, the deliberations began. At the Emperor's accession, in consideration of the straitened circumstances in which he was,

* Olenschlager, II. p. 492, has given some of the acts of the Diet held in Offenbach. The statements given above, are taken from some other extracts contained in the very voluminous acts of the Diet of those times, which are now in Berlin.

fifty Roman months * were granted him. He made energetic complaints of the court of Vienna, which raised difficulties about delivering up the archives, and also of that of Rome, which protested against the electorate of the Protestant Duke of Hanover, † and persisted in designating the King of Prussia Margrave of Brandenburg. The whole college evinced a consciousness of its independent authority, fitly representing the dignity of the Empire.

* The R \ddot{o} mermonate, or Roman months, owed their origin to the R \ddot{o} merz \ddot{u} g, or visit to Rome made by the new Emperor for the purpose of being crowned by the Pope. In the R \ddot{o} merz \ddot{u} g the vassals of the Empire were bound, with their feudal attendants, to accompany the Emperor on his journey, under pain of forfeiting their lands. The duration of the R \ddot{o} merz \ddot{u} g and of the military services to be rendered was fixed at six weeks, which were called R \ddot{o} mermonate. When the R \ddot{o} merz \ddot{u} g ceased, a tax, which the Emperor Maximilian made permanent, was substituted for the R \ddot{o} mermonate: each knight bound to attend the Emperor to Rome was called upon to pay 12 florins, and his attendants 4 florins each. The sums thus raised were granted to the Emperor by the estates on extraordinary occasions, such as wars and the like.—*Transl.*

† Protest of the Nuncio Doria—1. against the electorate of Hanover: Solemniter protestari cogimur sanctam sedem Hannoveriani ducis inter S. J. Rⁱ principes electores adscriptioni ejusque ad suffragia ferenda admissioni nullatenus consensisse,—quinimo dictam admissionem reprobamus; 2. against any mention of the peace of Westphalia in the documents relating to the election: ad aures nostras pervenit inter conditiones futuro Romano regi praescribendas rursus eadem pacta irrepsisse quae pacis Westphalicae jam ab omnibus sequentibus pontificibus reprobatae confirmationem respiciunt. The court complained of the superscription, Marchio Brandenburgensis; the Nuncio replied that the Roman Pontiff thus recognised the electoral dignity attached to the house of Brandenburg.

Whether a firm and lasting union would thus be consolidated, or what share the college would be able to take in the business of the Empire, the future only could show. People were greatly shocked that the new Emperor appeared so entirely dependent on France. To this some answered, that this would put an end to all disputes with France, which had hitherto been kept alive by the hereditary enmity of the houses of Bourbon and Austria, and had cost the Empire so much. Others, among whom were Frederick II., thought that the new Emperor had sense as well as ambition enough not only to prevent French influence from forcing itself into the internal affairs of the Empire, but even to shake it off entirely. The form of Germany which floated before his eyes was totally different—resting internally on a union of the most powerful princes, affording security to the long-renowned German freedom, and freed from all foreign interference: the imperial power would then have been just towards the territorial sovereignty, and would, in return, have received its steady support.

But by far the greatest difficulty arose from the opposition made by Austria to the whole of this combination.

To be on a footing of mere equality with the other members of the Empire would hardly have been tolerable to the Austrian court, much less to find itself, as had lately been the case, excluded from its legitimate position, and deprived of all influence.

CHAPTER II.

VIEWS OF AUSTRIA AND ENGLAND.

IN September, 1741, when Maria Theresa resolved to cede Lower Silesia to the King of Prussia, she did it not without hope that he might thus be induced to reserve his vote at the election of an Emperor for the Grand Duke. I cannot find, however, that her negotiators ever ventured to mention the subject to Frederick, far less that they could have obtained any such promise from him. She was most deeply offended when the Elector of Mayence, at the same time that he announced to her the termination of the election in favour of Charles VII., expressed his hope that the security and peace of the Empire would thus be preserved.

It was just at the time when daily accounts reached her of the progress of her troops, and before the King of Prussia had reappeared in the field; elated by success, she formed the daring resolution not to acknowledge the new Emperor, and not to consent to the proposal for the restoration of peace.

But as this might be attended with danger (since the imperial authority was now united to that of the Confederation, which formed the strength of her and her husband's rival), she deemed it expedient to invoke the approbation of the Estates in Austria, as she

had already done in Hungary, and to secure their support in every possible emergency.

On the 3rd of February, 1741, a meeting of the Estates took place at the Favorita.* The Queen sate on her lofty throne, the crown on her head and sceptre in her hand. On her right, where a hundred tapers were burning before a large golden crucifix, sat the clergy, with the Papal Nuncio at their head; on her left, the nobles: the body of the hall was filled with the citizens of Vienna; the ministers were seated at the foot of the throne.

Hereupon the proposal which the Elector of Mayence had just made was communicated to the Estates. After a conference of many hours the Queen stated her conviction that it was not advisable so lightly to lay down arms now visibly under the blessing of Heaven: she exhorted the Estates to stand steadfastly by her side in her determination to resist. "Will you," they were asked in the Queen's name, "hold your oft-sworn troth, happen what may? Will you obey whatever commands may be given you? Will you sacrifice life and limb for her Majesty?" These questions, and some others of like purport, were assented to with acclamations, and the old troth was plighted anew. The oath of the Hungarian Estates was, as it were, transferred to those of Austria, and adopted by them, at the moment when the claims of an Emperor of the house of Bavaria were agitated.

The remarkable position of the King of Prussia,

* On this subject the Acts of the Diet give ample details, which we have here used as our authority.

when he had advanced into Moravia and threatened Vienna, and that of the Queen his antagonist, first appears in its full light when we consider that their contest really had for its object the imperial Crown. The King's intention was not to make peace till he had firmly established on the throne an Emperor in alliance with himself, and compelled the house of Austria to acknowledge and pay allegiance to him. This the Queen, with her hereditary pride, refused to do; nor did she despair of soon saluting her consort as Emperor, or at any rate as King of the Romans.

We know, however, that Frederick II. did not succeed in carrying his comprehensive schemes into effect, and was only able to maintain his own position. The Queen, on the other hand, adhered firmly to her designs, and now thought herself enabled, by the peace of Breslau, to put them into execution. With them, however, she connected other schemes.

We have remarked how much this peace cost her. Robinson is at a loss for words to describe how inconsolable she appeared when the cession of Silesia became inevitable: "compared to which," she said, "all former grief and misery was nothing." Nor would she accept the peace without some prospect of compensation. "As England," she said, "especially desired it, she hoped that, in one way or another, she should receive compensation, and that Austria would be put in a condition to recover its position in Europe, and be enabled still to resist the encroachments of the house of Bourbon, which aimed at the destruction of the general peace."

I cannot find that any explicit promise was given

her to that effect, but the court of St. James's certainly sent her a declaration of its views very nearly approaching to a promise.

Robinson, upon whom her great character and haughty spirit, together with her misfortunes, made a considerable impression, promised to place her wishes in the most advantageous light to his court. He says he could do no less, in order to give her some consolation.* The English minister, Carteret, sent an answer to his letter (dated the 29th of June), to the effect that the King of England not only had no thought of urging the Queen to make any further concessions in Germany, as she had seemed to fear, but was much more inclined to support her in her demands for compensation for what she had already lost.

This was not a formal promise, and, at all events, it had not been discussed in the Privy Council; subsequently the other ministers often declared that they knew nothing about it; but, in Vienna, these words were regarded as an assurance of all that was desired or hoped. Maria Theresa built upon them the most extensive projects.

Nor did the hopes which she derived from England rest merely on accidental and personal inclina-

* Robinson, 19th June, to Carteret. "One of the greatest difficulties I have been under of late was the not being able to give any authentick assurance of an immediate declaration on the part of England, much less of any more intention to indemnify by any means or other her Hungarian Majesty for the sacrifice of Silesia. I could not do less than promise to alleviate in some measure her present concern, by endeavouring to set her future wishes in the most advantageous light."

tions : after the fall of Sir Robert Walpole in 1742, the whole English government had taken a direction analogous to her own. It is essential that we should pause a moment to consider this change, which exercised a powerful influence on Germany.

That a minister, upon whom a political measure has been forced, should fall in attempting to carry it into execution, is in the common course of things. A change in the highest places in the state is necessary to bring personal opinions into conformity with a certain political system.

Of the events we have before alluded to, two were more especially laid to the charge of ministers—the failure of the South American expedition, which was attributed to the defective state of the troops landed,—and the neutrality of Hanover. I shall not repeat the common assertion, that Walpole had no notice of this latter circumstance ; at all events the grand idea connected with it—that of gradually placing Hanover under a separate political administration—originated with him. The English regarded this with great dissatisfaction, because they saw themselves involved in hostilities with France, and at this moment feared to lose in Hanover an ally who might be of use to them. In addition to this, when the Spaniards were at length ready to march their forces into Italy, the English admiral offered no resistance, either to the troops coming from Cadiz, in the Straits of Gibraltar, nor to the combined squadron, which had sailed from Barcelona. All the old mistrust of Walpole, the belief in his dependence on the Bourbon courts, revived ; he was thought capable not only of delivering

up Parma to a Spanish prince, but even Gibraltar to the King of Spain.

The importance of this state of the public mind was augmented by the near approach of the elections, which were to take place in the summer of 1741, while these impressions were in all their freshness and force. In the very first sitting of the new Parliament Sir Robert was worsted. The address, which was moved by one of his adherents in the lower house, contained "acknowledgments to H. M. for his royal care in the prosecution of the war against Spain;"* but the universal opinion was, on the contrary, that this war had not been prosecuted with the requisite vigour and forethought. A single speech, pronounced in a firm, manly, and clear manner, by a comparatively obscure member, Mr. Philip Gibbon, was sufficient to convince the minister that he would not be able to carry the vote of thanks, which was, in fact, addressed to himself. After a short reply this clause of the address was withdrawn.† As the main objections to his system were founded on his conduct of Spanish affairs, this proof of his conscious inability to combat them implies as overwhelming a defeat as

* Hansard, XII. 291.

† 8th Dec. 1741. We see from the letters of his son, Horace Walpole, that his conduct was not so weak as it appears from the very incomplete notice in the Debates. Nevertheless it shows great partiality on the part of Horace Walpole to quote this as a day of triumph. This can only be explained by the fact of the exaggerated accusations ("wickedness, which no language can exaggerate, and for which, as it has perhaps no example, human kind has not yet provided a name," p. 316) having been repelled with a dignity that secured some sympathy.

it was possible to experience. He remained in power a few weeks longer, but at length yielded to the judgment of his friends and adherents, and on the 11th of February, 1742, sent in his resignation.*

The formation of a new administration was of the greatest importance, not only to England but to Europe.

For the first time since the accession of the house of Hanover there seemed a chance that the Tories, who had taken an active share in the parliamentary struggle, would come into power. Already an expression, destined at a later period to produce great historical consequences, was current—that the King would be really King of the whole nation when he had accepted that party as ministers, and not before.† But affairs were not yet ripe for so great a change; for Sir Robert Walpole's fall was not so much to be ascribed to any question of internal policy as to the national discontent at his foreign measures. His colleagues, the Whigs, among whom the Duke of Newcastle was beginning to play a prominent part, kept their places; the only difference was, that they replaced certain discontented members of their party who had formerly been displaced, among others Lord Carteret, and made preparations, in conformity with the wishes of the nation, for a more active prosecution of the war.

* The letter is in Coxe, IV. 255.

† The objections are seen in Hansard, vol. XII. p. 412, quoted from the Secker manuscript. "Lord Chancellor in the evening, in private discourse to me, strong against taking in any Tories: owning no more than that some of them, perhaps, were not for the Pretender." He afterwards gave way.

The nation and the Parliament were thoroughly persuaded that the hostility of the Spaniards was solely kept alive by the French; and that France was the power which it was chiefly necessary to combat on the continent. On the 20th of March the Commons, on the motion of the man who had led the Opposition to Walpole, William Pulteney, unanimously declared themselves ready, in consideration of the dangerous circumstances into which Europe was thrown by the attack on the Queen of Hungary, to apply the resources of the country to the restoration of the balance of power. A large sum was then voted for the war expenses, and a subsidy of half a million granted to the Queen.*

For the same reason, and with a view to accomplish the same ends, the English took great pains to bring about the pacification of Austria and Prussia. How often did they remind the King of Prussia that it was not his interest to ruin the house of Austria; that he must trust to the Protestant powers, who would never suffer him to be robbed of Silesia!

As soon as their object was attained by the ratification of the peace of Breslau, England and Austria began to entertain the boldest projects: the internal movements and the external interests of the two powers concurred to give the same great impulse to both.

There were but few men on either side by whom these were discussed, or even known; on the one, these were, besides the King of England, princi-

* The address of confidence and fidelity (Hansard, 586) contains nothing more than this.

pally Carteret and Robinson; on the other, only the Grand Duke and the Queen, Uhlefeld and Bartenstein; others learned them but partially; yet they were projects which, in their original conception and gradual developement, exercised for some years the greatest influence over the whole course of events, and are well worthy of being rescued from oblivion.

The adversaries who stood opposed to the two powers in question were Spain, France, and Bavaria; these were to be, if not utterly ruined, yet reduced to a state to be no longer formidable, and the system of the European powers to be materially altered.

In Italy, Maria Theresa thought of coming to an understanding with Sardinia to drive the Bourbons out of the country by their united forces.

In a letter of the 8th of July Carteret expressly says, "Concerning Naples and Sicily, the King does and will do all in his power to animate his Sardinian Majesty to a concurrence with the Queen of Hungary in reconquering of those kingdoms." The Queen was inclined in that event to allow Sicily to pass into the hands of Sardinia, but Naples she intended to keep for herself; at least this was her first thought. The possessor of Tuscany and Naples, together with Milan, in the extent it then embraced, must have been sovereign lord of Italy.

In Germany she entertained the hope of incorporating the greater part of Bavaria with her hereditary states. She felt that it would be impossible completely to depose the house of Wittelsbach, but, in order to have wherewithal to indemnify it for its

losses, Alsace and Lorraine, on the other side of the Rhine, were to be wrested from the French, under the pretext that they were unjustly acquired, although the Grand Duke had accepted compensation for the latter, and the right in them was, for the future, to be vested not in him but in the Empire.

Nor did she for one moment lose sight of the Empire itself; for an Emperor imposed on Germany by the French could, on no condition, be tolerated by Europe. "The wrong which the Queen had suffered on this occasion must be redressed, and any repetition of it prevented for the future."

In order to accomplish these plans, she hoped, with the aid of England, to conclude a new alliance with Russia and Holland. The intention of attacking Saxony, which she had entertained at first, she had abandoned at the request of England, and was now on good terms with the court of Dresden. She calculated that England would, on her side, gain over Hessen, and that thus nothing would oppose their united will.*

I find no evidence to show that Maria Theresa

* *Reflexions secretes de la cour de Vienne.* Il est également juste et indispensable que la maison de Bourbon perde une partie de ce qu'elle a injustement acquis, ce qui est l'unique moyen de relever tant soit peu la maison d'Autriche d'arrondir ses états du côté de Bavière, en donnant un autre equivalent à l'électeur de ce nom. . . Comme l'on ne sait déjà que trop du quel prejudice est a l'empire et a toute l'Europe un pretendu élu empe-reur dependant absolument des ordres de la France, il est indispensable non seulement de s'opposer aux vues de cette cour a Francfort, mais encore de reparer les torts faits à cette occasion à la reine et de pourvoir à l'avenir.

hoped, as undoubtedly did the English, to draw the King of Prussia into this system. This accounts for George II.'s alacrity in guaranteeing Silesia the moment it was asked, and for the sincerity of his efforts to promote the same measure both in Russia and Holland. "The King," says Carteret, in so many words, "is anxious to build upon the foundations he has laid, and to fix and engage his Prussian Majesty irrevocably to those interests which he has in common with the Queen of Hungary."

The most zealous agent in the work of winning over the King to this alliance was Lord Stair, then charged with a similar mission to the Hague.

John Dalrymple, Earl of Stair, when a very young man, had distinguished himself in the revolution of 1688, as an adherent of the Protestant principles and an implacable enemy of Louis XIV.; and had from that time shared all the changing fortunes of the most zealous of the Whig party. At the fall of Marlborough he was thrown into the shade; on the accession of George I. restored to power; again dismissed under Walpole, and again recalled at his fall. He was a man of the most rigorous and honourable party-orthodoxy; never flinching from the discussion of party questions in any conversation, and possessing spirit and talent enough to maintain them, whether in war or in diplomacy; enjoying the highest consideration among his friends; at the moment we are treating of far advanced in years, but full of youthful imagination and boundless projects. In like manner as, shortly before, the partisans of the Bourbon policy had cherished the notion

that everything they had ever wished or designed was on the eve of accomplishment, so their adversary was now in a similar frame of mind. Lord Stair did not trouble himself much with what was passing in Italy, but mainly insisted on the expediency of restricting France within narrower boundaries on her eastern frontier. The liberties of Europe, he said, must be secured, and a solid peace be concluded; not, as so often before, a mere truce under the name of a peace. His opinion was, that the frontiers of the Netherlands must be again advanced to the Somme; moreover, that Lorraine, the three bishopricks, Alsace, and Franche-Comté should be wrested from France, and united to Luxemburg, to form one state, to be given to the present Emperor as compensation for Bavaria—ideas which remind us of the schemes of Charles the Bold, or of the conférences which, on more than one occasion, took place between Henry VIII. and Charles V., and which, though so often abortive, now appeared feasible to Lord Stair, in spite of the great accession of the power of France on that side.* He thought that he should march in person upon Paris from the north, at the head of

* *Projet d'un plan de pacification. Que la frontière du côté des Pays Bas soit étendue depuis Charleville incluse jusqu'à la Somme; qu'il fut approprié une lisière de pays pour servir de barrière entre l'empire et la France, cette barrière commençant au duché de Luxembourg et finissant à la Suisse, comprenant les duchés de Bar et de Lorraine avec les trois évêchés la ville de Strasbourg, le landgraviat d'Alsace, et le Franche-Comté; que tous ces pays soient cedés au présent empereur en échange de la Bavière et pays appartenants cedés (à céder) à la maison d'Autriche.*

a combined English and German army ; the Emperor was to declare war upon France in his own name and that of the Empire ; the Austrian troops would then invade that country in great force from the Upper Rhine. Stair expressed his conviction that, if Prussia would assist in this enterprise, France, suddenly threatened on every side, and by all the sovereigns of Europe, would not venture to offer any resistance. But, we may ask, what motive had the King of Prussia, after concluding peace, for making these efforts ? In the first place, it was said, his own security from the overwhelming power of France ; then his gratitude for the mediation of England ; but, above all, a new and vast prospect was opened to him. Lord Stair insinuated to Frederick II. that, if he aimed at extending his territory in the direction of Poland, he would now have no opposition to fear, either from England or from Russia.*

In surveying the projects entertained at that time, we seem to have a new world before us. The Spanish Bourbons driven out of Italy, separated from France, and forced to make peace with England. In Germany, an Emperor with his own hereditary possessions given up to the Empire ; all the princes of Germany united under him in a struggle with France. Austria fully indemnified for all her losses, whether more remote or recent, by the possession of Naples, Bavaria, and the enlarged province of the Netherlands. And

* Que si V. M. vouloit s'agrandir du côté de la Prusse polonoise le roi d'Angleterre n'étoit pas dans des liaisons si étroites avec la Pologne pour s'y opposer, et dans les circonstances présentes on n'auroit pas à craindre que la Russie y mit obstacle.

since there was an ultimate design of restoring that house to the imperial throne, the countries taken from France (with the exception of those which the Elector of Bavaria was to receive as indemnity for his abdication) were eventually to fall to Austria; while Frederick was to be permitted to execute one of the projects of his youth, and to take possession of Polish Prussia. Lord Stair was the first man in whose head the idea of a general war with France was associated with the designs upon Poland which were realized at the second partition of that kingdom.

The reader will be curious to learn what Frederick II. said to plans of this kind.

He had set himself in opposition to the French at the moment when they sought to assume a supremacy over Europe; but the new scheme of placing it in the hands of Austria and her ally England was no less dangerous. In the next place, the whole scheme appeared to him most romantic. He wondered how any man could even imagine the possibility of uniting all the princes of Germany in one league, and of calling on the already exhausted circles of the Empire for new contributions. The vast resources of France were well known. Such a project would raise the whole nation, and stimulate it to the extremest exertions. When they had won several great battles against France, had reconquered the most important strong places in the Netherlands, and the city of Strasburg—when they stood with a large army under the walls of Paris, it would be time enough to indulge in such dreams. “In the actual

situation of things," said Frederick, "it was like attempting to pluck the moon from heaven with your teeth." And what assistance could England give him against Poland? He asked his ambassador if Stair was not a madman or a fool, that he could give way to fantasies of such a kind. The minister replied, that in all other respects Lord Stair was a man of sense and even of talents, but that when this string was touched he seemed no longer the same.

The policy which Frederick then meditated was totally different. He thought that the best protection against France would be a defensive alliance with the two maritime powers. If they wished to destroy the preponderance of France, they must unquestionably separate her from the Emperor Charles; but this could not be accomplished by the means proposed. Overtures to the effect described had already been made to the Emperor, and had been promptly and decidedly rejected, because they would lead to a war, and to the conquest of territories to which he had no claim. Frederick was of the same opinion. The only means of gaining over the Emperor, he said, was to make proposals of a peace, such as he could accept without making his own position worse, and exposing himself to the scorn and ridicule of his contemporaries and the reproaches of posterity.*

So far was King Frederick from adopting the ideas of the ardent Whigs then in power in England, that, on the contrary, we discover the germs of an opposite policy in the two countries; which was the more

* Prussian Declaration, 7th Aug.

important as it regarded the general direction, which, with independent states, or independent minds, is always the most essential.

To limit or to destroy the influence of France in Germany was an object which may be regarded as common to both. But England wanted to instigate Europe to a combined attack upon France, and to humble that power before the house of Austria; or rather to employ the newly awakened warlike spirit of the latter in an attack on France: she intended that the imperial crown should revert to that house. Prussia, on the other hand, wished to defend the Emperor, who had been raised to the throne by an almost unanimous vote, to give to the Empire a constitution based upon the co-operation of the great sovereign houses, and to attach Holland and England to German interests by a defensive alliance. Of course, in the background of the English projects there always lay their naval war, which was not yet fought out: Austria demanded compensation for her losses; Prussia, on the other hand, having succeeded in establishing the most important of her claims, desired, above all things, peace. The aim of the former was to dispose of Bavaria at her good pleasure, while the latter demanded its restitution.

The several tendencies of the great powers lie thus clearly revealed before us. To the contemporary world they were less evident.

England thought she might succeed in drawing Prussia into a participation in her undertakings, or

at least in keeping her from offering any opposition to them. The King of Prussia thought it possible to induce the two other powers to conclude a peace of the kind he wished.

CHAPTER III.

PROJECT OF A PEACE IN GERMANY—SCHEMES OF
SECULARIZATION.

IN the course of the year 1742 and the beginning of 1743, it appeared as if Frederick's policy had the best chance of success.

Although the French still maintained a powerful position, not only in Southern Germany, but also in Bohemia, it was evident that they would not carry on the war in which they were engaged with vigour: they would have been glad to conclude an immediate peace. It is almost painful to observe how Cardinal Fleury, at the end of a political career distinguished by various successes, when life was ebbing, threw away his chances in search of peace.

In a letter to Marshal Königsegg he went so far as to decline all personal responsibility for the war which he had hitherto carried on: he said that he had only undertaken it at the urgent solicitation of others. He recurred to the principles which had always been prominently stated on occasion of a treaty between France and Austria—that a union of these two powers was equally necessary for the peace of the world and the cause of religion.

But it was now his turn to deceive himself; he fancied that Austria would listen to negotiations at

a time when the campaign promised her the most magnificent results.

Maria Theresa, who was fond of appealing to that public opinion which was so favourable to her, replied by printing the Cardinal's letter in the Leyden journal. Nothing could be better calculated utterly to destroy his credit both at home and abroad. The Parisians exclaimed loudly against the hypocritical falsehood of his conduct.

Hereupon the French bestirred themselves to send effectual succours to their armies in Bohemia; the division which had been stationed under Maillebois on the Lower Rhine advanced, and it occasionally seemed as if a serious engagement would take place. But this was only seeming. It would be superfluous to describe all their movements in this place, though, at the time, they engaged universal attention. Positive orders had been sent from Paris to bring the army back as quickly as possible to the Rhine. Belleisle thought that, if he promised to evacuate the country, he should be able to stipulate in return that Bavaria should be evacuated by the Austrians; but his orders were not to insist on this if he found the difficulties too great to be overcome.* The

* A letter from Belleisle to Amelot, wherein the Marshal mentions the proposals made to him by the ministers, is decisive on this point. "Les ordres du roi sont, d'obtenir à quelque prix que ce soit de ramener l'armée de Bohême et même celle du Danube saines et sauvées et honorablement en France; vous m'ajoutez même dans la seconde (lettre) du 14 (Août) un point bien essentiel, qui est celui de l'évacuation de la Bavière par les Autrichiens, que j'eusse absolument exigé et duquel vous m'ordonnes bien expressement de me desister après avoir employé

officers of the army coming from the Rhine were fully aware of this: they called themselves "Maturons," *i. e.* members of a monkish brotherhood, who in the middle ages devoted themselves to the redemption of Christian slaves out of captivity to the heathen. Maria Theresa had the good fortune to receive authentic intelligence of these orders. No wonder, therefore, that she rejected the offer of mediation, even though it had been favourably received by the generals of her army. The disunion between the French leaders, Maillebois, Broglie, the Count de Saxe, and Belleisle, was such that they found it difficult even to effect their retreat without making any conditions at all. When at length Belleisle remained alone in Prague, he had need of all his skill to conduct his army without a defeat to Eger, "amidst obstacles and perils," he says, "such as no French army ever encountered."

The remainder of that army being nearly destroyed by sickness, Prague reverted to the dominion of Austria. The inhabitants now looked upon this as a liberation; they hailed the sway of the *Kralowna* Maria Theresa with sincere joy.

In Germany, however, the hope began to be generally entertained that these events would contribute to the earlier restoration of peace. The retreat of the French would necessarily render the Emperor more

tout ; mais si je ne puis obtenir le retour des troupes du roi sans cette dure condition, dites vous (Amelot considered this a hard condition for Austria), le roi a pour unique objet et veut par préférence à tout retirer ses armées d'Allemagne et les avoir entières en France."

disposed to renounce his pretensions to Bohemia. He was, moreover, no longer satisfied with his allies, who had hardly shown the slightest care for his interests in their last negotiations. In the autumn of 1742, De la Rosée, an ambassador from the imperial court, gave the Prussian ambassador distinctly to understand, though rather by hints than in express terms, that his master might be induced to conclude a peace, even without the King of France.

But the fact that the defeat of the French was by no means complete, and that they still retained possession, not only of Eger and the Upper Palatinate, but also of the greater part of Bavaria, probably led to the expectation that the Queen might be disposed to grant the Emperor a peace on tolerable terms, in case he would detach himself from France.

To effect this, and at the same time to maintain the Empire in the form it now wore, was the leading aim of King Frederick II. during the years 1742 and 1743. If he could succeed in this, bring the alliance with the maritime powers to a conclusion, and then establish a permanent good understanding with Austria, he thought that his position would be thoroughly secure.

He charged Count Dohna, the ambassador whom he sent again to Vienna, towards the end of the year 1742, in his secret instructions, to direct all his efforts to the consolidation of the understanding which now existed between the two courts, and to the complete extirpation of all distrust and jealousy; for that upon this depended the balance of Europe and the

common welfare of both houses and both nations. Dohna was particularly ordered to try to discover on what conditions the Queen would consent to make peace with the Emperor. He thought it still possible that she would rather conclude it through the mediation of France than of England.*

Dohna was extremely well received ; the Empress Dowager spoke with admiration of the great qualities of the King, whom she regarded as a member of her family ; she formally recommended her daughter to his good will. Maria Theresa almost apologized for having at the beginning of her reign, while yet young, inexperienced, and in a state naturally of great agitation and distress, so absolutely rejected the King's proposals : she saw with pleasure that some Prussian officers were come to make the campaign in her army, but she should not be entirely satisfied till she saw the Prussian troops fighting by the side of her own, to defend her against the unjust aggressions of the French. In the course of the conversation with the General she drew a comparison between the two armies, and appeared greatly to give the preference to the Prussian. As to the Emperor, whose affairs had been alluded to by Dohna, she declared herself perfectly ready to make peace with him, in spite of all the mischief he had wrought her ; but she should demand three things in return—first, the as-

* Tous vos soins doivent se tourner à tout ce qui pourra tendre à affermir cette paix et à établir sur un pied solide et stable la présente bonne harmonie et amitié entre les deux états, et deraciner tout sujet de méfiance, d'aigreur et de jalousie et d'éloignement secret entre les deux cours.

surance that he would never again attempt to exclude the Bohemian vote, which Prussia must guarantee; secondly, the promise that her husband should be created King of the Romans; and lastly, liberty to prosecute the war with France (who had likewise behaved in an offensive manner to the Emperor, and was jealous of Frederick II.) with all her might. These words betray the difference in the views of the two parties; but the main thing was to conclude peace in Germany, and to that the Queen assented.

Immediately after the peace of Breslau, Frederick had concluded a defensive alliance with England.

In this case, too, the two parties were far from coming to a complete understanding. The King of Prussia wished above all things to settle the disputed question of the succession in Mecklenburg and East Friesland. "If we can take this thorn out of our foot," said he, "the union of the two houses cannot again be troubled; if not, the quarrel is only deferred." But the ministry of George II. could not be induced to consent. On his side, Frederick would not allow that his own obligation to defend Hanover extended to the case of George II. undertaking an offensive war. At length, however, he acquiesced, chiefly from the consideration that it would be injurious to the interests of Prussia herself, if Hanover, under any circumstances whatever, were invested by the French.* With the greatest reluctance, and in

* Frederick: "Quand même nous ne serions pas ami du roi d'Angl^e, la bonne politique ne permettrait pourtant pas que nous souffrions les troupes françaises dans le pays d'Hannovre." He demanded an article in which the King of England should

the worst possible humour, he signed the original copy of this alliance.

But after this had once taken place, it was followed by negotiations in favour of the Emperor on the part of Prussia. King George, reminded by Frederick that he ought not now to permit the laws and rights of the Empire to be violated towards the Emperor, to whom he had given his vote, declared himself, on his side, ready to endeavour to procure for him a peace consistent with his dignity. It was only necessary to find the conditions.

Having stated what were the plans of Austria, we must now mention those of Bavaria.

It was distinctly felt by the members of the house of Wittelsbach that they could neither retain the imperial dignity in perpetuity, nor reckon on an inheritance such as had seemed possible a year before; yet they could not resolve to return to their former position. They conceived the project of raising Bavaria to the rank of a kingdom, and enlarging it to such an extent that it might raise a revenue of six millions, and maintain an army of 40,000 men.*

promise immediately afterwards to conclude a convention with regard to these two successions; but this too was refused, as some misunderstanding might in this case have arisen with the Dutch with regard to East Friesland. On the 14th of November, 1742, Frederick agreed to sign, but with the understanding, that even without a special article something should be done about the other treaty.

* As early as July 1742 the Emperor declared, "qu'il lui étoit impossible de renoncer à la dignité royale, qu'ainsi s'il falloit absolument sacrifier le royaume de Bohême il se flattoit et espéroit qu'on voudroit lui arrondir la Bavière de façon qu'elle

These general views afterwards assumed the form of more determinate schemes.

The Emperor did not abandon the hope of extorting some concession from Austria; his claims seemed too well founded, he could not answer it to his descendants, to renounce them without compensation; he reckoned on acquiring Upper Austria, a part of Tyrol, and even flattered himself that he should obtain the circles of Bohemia lying nearest to Bavaria.

But, as even these acquisitions would not raise him to the degree of power he deemed necessary, another plan connected with the foregoing was suggested; perhaps the most extensive broached during this period so rife with projects.

In the very centre of the affairs of the Empire,—in the midst of the negotiations of the nearly-related Catholic courts,—a thought arose, which at a later period, in a totally different state of the world, indeed, was destined to give a new shape to Western Germany:—a secularization of church property on a great scale, combined with the mediatization of some of the most important of the imperial cities, as elements out of which to found this new kingdom of Bavaria.

The Emperor was afterwards induced by the

fut erigé en royaume, qu'il remettoit à V. M. et au roi d'Angleterre comment ils feront cette distribution, soit par quelques cercles de la Bohême du côté de Bavière, soit du Tyrol ou des Pais Bas, ou d'une partie de la Suabe, pourvu qu'il lui restât un revenu de 6 millions pour soutenir la dignité imp^{le} et pour entretenir une armée de 40^m h."

arguments of the Nuncio and of his own confessor to renounce this plan, which, indeed, was made known to the public with many exaggerations; but at that time he spoke of it with great openness. The scheme was, however, matured rather by the ministers of the Palatinate than by himself or his own ministers; and indeed it may be conjectured that it originated with the former.*

Filled with dynastic ambition, elated by the position acquired by the house of Wittelsbach, and determined, if possible, to maintain it, towards the end of 1742 they brought forward a scheme in all its details, according to which Bavaria, in order to constitute a kingdom, should receive the following additions:—1st, Upper Austria, the Vorlande, and the Swabian possessions, together with certain frontier towns of Tyrol. 2nd, The contiguous large circles of Bohemia; Bechin, Prachin, Pilsen, and Ellenbogen. 3rd, Certain imperial cities, among them Ulm and Augsburg. 4th, The bishopricks of Salzburg, Passau, Freising, Ratisbon, Eichstädt, and Augsburg. 5th, Neuburg and Sulzbach, for which the Palatinate was to be indemnified by the

* I find the matter first mentioned in a despatch of Klinggräfs, dated Frankfort, 24th November, 1742. He had been told, "qu'on pourroit recourir à une secularisation de quelques évêchés pour faire quelques conveniences pour un équivalent à S. M. Imp^e, comme on avoit agi à la paix de Westphalie." On the 27th of November, the more detailed plan was submitted to him. On the 8th of December, the Emperor wished some third party to take up this matter. On the 13th of December, his Envoy Rosée regularly brought forward the demand for the 6,000,000 florins; it was thought best at Berlin to persuade the court of London to agree to this.

acquisition of Limburg and the bishopricks of Worms and Speier. In order to avoid disturbing the constitution of the Empire and provoking the resistance of the Catholic church by the dissolution of the bishopricks, both the bishops and the chapters were to be endowed with an independent revenue, and to be allowed to retain their votes at the Diet; but their territories were to be incorporated with the new kingdom.

Thus, then, these schemes of rounding and of secularization, which have caused so violent a convulsion in more recent times, meet us, though not yet mature, on every side, at the period now before us.

Frederick, however earnestly he might wish to strengthen the hands of Bavaria—especially as the actual possessor of the imperial crown—can hardly be suspected of having acquiesced in this plan. He thought the stipulation of a fixed revenue and a determined number of troops, chimerical; those were things which could only be obtained by a powerful army and vigorous exertions. If any cession of territory were to be demanded of the house of Austria, it must, as it appeared to him, be of trifling extent, and only for the sake of equalizing and facilitating a settlement of differences; demands such as those abovenamed he declined even communicating to the court of Vienna; he had not the remotest claim to the degree of consideration there which would be necessary to ensure their reception.

The idea of a secularization of religious foundations, on the other hand, he embraced with as much

ardour as if it had been his own affair, and immediately proposed it to the English court. "It will be impossible," said he, "to induce the Emperor to make peace and to separate himself from France, unless some advantage be offered him; and this must either be conceded by the Queen, or an equivalent must be found:" as the former was impossible—for he himself could not think of urging her to make new concessions—they must adhere to the latter, and he saw no other solution of the difficulty than to revert to the means employed at the peace of Westphalia—the secularization of some bishopricks and abbeys. This would injure nobody, offend nobody, but the higher Catholic clergy; but he did not think it necessary to pay any heed to them, when the welfare of the country was at stake.

Upon this, a few days afterwards, he founded the formal proposition to unite the bishopricks of Salzburg, Eichstädt, Freisingen, Ratisbon, Augsburg, and, further, the cities of Augsburg, Ratisbon, and Ulm, with Charles VII.'s hereditary domains of Bavaria. He did not mention Passau, because he was of opinion that it would be better to give this to Austria, in order to incline the Queen to abandon her Swabian possessions to the Emperor; for he would hardly renounce his right to the succession, if some part, were it even a small one, of the great inheritance did not fall to him.

Nor was the affair by any means rejected by England. The government of that country would not consent to the mediatization; it only admitted that Ratisbon, which had always been claimed by

Bavaria, might be ceded to her, but not Protestant cities, like Augsburg and Ulm, whose commercial connexion with Switzerland and Holland entitled them to peculiar consideration. To the secularization she had nothing to object, if Austria acquiesced in it.

It was not thought that Austria would oppose that measure on religious grounds; at least, in a discussion at Vienna of another plan, more agreeable to the prevailing wishes—compensation to the Emperor in Alsace for the sacrifices demanded of him—it had been suggested that he might sequester the bishoprick of Strasburg if he liked.*

If we pause a moment to consider the general features of this plan, we shall find it impossible to believe that it could have been confined to a dissolution of the foundations specified. Hessen already stretched out her hand to seize some neighbouring abbeys; Hanover was said to be trying to appropriate Hildesheim and Osnabrück for ever; some others were destined to Saxony; it is impossible to suppose that the King of Prussia would not also take possession of a few bishopricks (indeed it was said in Berlin that Münster had been offered to him), though at present he prudently avoided expressing any wishes of the kind.

As things stood in Germany, this change, at one time or another, was inevitable. The contrast be-

* Robinson, 30th Jan., 1743: "The Grand Duke said that, as to Bavaria, which was however no equivalent for Silesia, he would for his part give the Elector all that could be conquered from France, when he might secularise Strasburg if he pleased."

tween the Catholic part of Germany, in which the church rested on endowments, and the Protestant, where the basis of its organization was territorial—a contrast which had hitherto divided Germany into two hostile parties, differing in manners, opinions, literature, and learning—had no longer a meaning, since a renewal of struggles which might terminate in the extinction of one of these parties was no longer probable; on the contrary, the most powerful of the Protestant states was naturally led by its extension of territory, and by the spirit which characterized it, to afford the Catholics every protection they could desire. In the sixteenth century, the plan had been to transform the chapters into secular electorates (in order that the necessity for self-defence might not present an obstacle to the spread of Protestantism), and to detach the spiritual functions from the temporal power; now, the prominent idea in the Catholic courts was, to effect this separation of the secular and the spiritual in another manner, viz. to sequester the estates and to maintain the bishopricks in the exercise of their functions. The question is, whether this scheme was practicable, and by what means; but the experiment would have been worth trying. For, in the first place, the rupture with the past would not have been absolute, as it was in the measures subsequently adopted; it would have admitted of transitions and adaptations of the state of civilization prevailing under the ancient Empire to the circumstances and wants of modern society; so far as we can judge of the prevailing ideas of the time, the forms of the Empire would have been far

more preserved. A dissolution of the spiritual electorates was as yet a thing wholly out of calculation. Würzburg and Bamberg would probably have retained their power; the quality of member of the states of the Empire would not have been extinguished in the case of the bishopricks. It would have been no slight advantage that the transformation would have been a purely German work. France would have had little or no share in it, for the proximate object of all these measures was, to extricate the Empire from the grasp of that power; nor would Russia, who was still a stranger to them all in their general bearings, have interfered; everything would have depended on the concord between the principal German rulers. Frederick II. most truly said, "If the courts of Vienna, Berlin, Frankfort, and London are agreed, no power in the world can prevent their carrying this scheme into execution."* At the court of London, the interests of Germany were felt to be identical with those of England. Lord Carteret said that, as an Englishman, it was nothing to him if all the bishopricks in Germany were secularized; but that he doubted whether his sovereign, as Elector of the Empire, could accede to it. In Hanover, undoubtedly, people were less scrupulous.

The ideas which distinguish modern from elder Germany were already afloat on another point; not only Bavaria, but Saxony, claimed to be created a

* 5th May. Aussitot que l'empereur et moi nous serons d'accord avec les cours de Londres et de Vienne et que S. M^e Imp^e ne manque pas a Elle même, on fera la chose et on laissera crier les bigots.

kingdom; this was partly attributable to rivalry between the two Archduchesses, daughters of Joseph, —the Empress, and the Queen of Poland. The Emperor Charles was inclined to nominate the Landgrave of Hessen-Cassel an Elector of the Empire; but in order to preserve the balance, it was suggested that an electorate should be created out of the Archduchy of Austria, and placed under the Grand Duke of Tuscany.

Had a new imperial government, and one not necessarily vested in the house of Austria, arisen as the head of this transformed community, what splendid renown would Charles VII. have won by accomplishing a change of such magnitude and importance!

It must be confessed, in the first place, that he did not set about the work with the requisite vigour and firmness; but independent of this, if there had ever been the smallest hope of obtaining the assent of the court of Vienna, that hope was at length wholly abandoned.

On the very first proposal, the English ministry remarked that there was one point which Austria would never concede; she would never permit the territory of Salzburg to pass into the hands of Bavaria, since that province was the key to the interior of Austria: and, indeed, how was it possible to imagine that Austria would consent to render this same Bavaria, which, in the course of ages, had often been troublesome and hostile, and was now become extremely dangerous to her, more important and independent than she already was, even could she

do so without any actual loss? On the contrary, (what the Queen wanted was, to rid herself of Bavaria for ever. If, during the time when her armies were fighting out the conflict in Bohemia, the advance of the allied troops of France and Bavaria, and the return of the Emperor to the capital of his hereditary dominions, made little impression on her, it was because she reckoned with confidence on regaining her ascendancy the next spring, by the aid of her veteran and warlike troops. If she had ever listened in any degree to the claims of the Emperor, it was only to a proposal for an indemnity proportioned to his former possessions, never to that of the restoration of those same possessions.

To this was added another consideration of general import. The spiritual estates had invariably been the best allies of the house of Habsburg, especially in the internal affairs of the Empire. There was a strong and intimate connexion between them and the corporation of the higher nobility, which sat in the chapters and constituted a great and important following throughout the Empire. The court of Vienna was extremely displeased that the idea of applying the domains of Passau as an indemnity had been made public, considering the discontent that it might be expected to excite in the chapter and throughout the territory.* Austria did

* The very thought of the secularization of Passau, when known to the good, pious Cardinal of that church, to the rich, powerful chanoines all of the first families of these countries, and to the very burghers of the town and inhabitants of its territories commanding the several borders of the Inn, the Danube, and the Ilz . . .

not for one moment resign the hope of regaining possession of the imperial power; and, according to all former experience, without the support of the spiritual estates, this hope must have proved illusory.

But these schemes, if not acted upon, might yet serve as a pretext for hostility.

Had the Emperor communicated the outlines of them to the King of Prussia alone, the secret would have been kept, and his name would not have been mixed up with them. But the Palatine ministers very imprudently suffered themselves to be persuaded to submit their schemes, in considerable detail and with various modifications, to persons who had no scruple in divulging them to others. Indeed many thought that they had been designedly entrapped into making these projects public. No sooner, however, had the Austrian court obtained a statement of them which had somewhat of an official character, than it opposed them with its wonted and, in this case, very justifiable violence. "The court of Frankfort," says a manifesto published in March, 1743, "is as overbearing and oppressive to the weak as it is crouching and abject towards the strong; it cares for nothing but its ill-acquired dignity: in order to found a kingdom of Bavaria it is ready to reduce those who hold immediately of the Empire to the condition of subjects of particular states, to crush the members of the Swabian and Franconian circles, and especially to destroy the most respected and important spiritual estates. The Queen is also perfectly aware that she too might make and enforce various demands; but she would not burthen

her conscience with the confiscation of property consecrated to the church." The excitement caused by this manifesto, both in the Empire and in all monasteries and chapters, may easily be imagined; it produced exactly the desired effect. For a time nothing else was talked of, and in the end the Emperor was forced to disclaim the whole project.

Nor was this the only quarter in which the ventilation of these schemes was followed by the worst consequences. An article in them (and, what is more, in the part more recently added)*—setting forth, that, if a territory of sufficient extent to raise a revenue of six millions could not be immediately obtained for Bavaria, the Austrian Netherlands should be delivered over to her as a sort of pledge—threw Holland into the same ferment as the ecclesiastical estates of Germany. The Republic felt it to be intolerable that her barriers should fall into the hands of a prince whom, spite of all the King of Prussia could say, she believed to be attached by indissoluble ties to France. The promise that the investment of the Netherlands was to be only temporary could deceive nobody—it must be permanent;

* We must refer the first of these plans to November, 1742, the second to January, 1743. In the former the chief point was the secularization, in the latter the mortgage: "Les morceaux cy dessus mentionnés ne rapportant guères plus de 2 ou 3 millions de revenus, il reste donc au moins 3 millions à trouver." The Netherlands, however, were to make up the difference: to the annoyance of Frederick, the cessions to be made by Austria were retained in both plans. Subsequently the plan of secularization was again adopted; there was no lack of projects concerning the new kingdom.

for where could Bavaria ever find or acquire a territory of the extent required?

Thus, then, not only were the schemes of secularization abandoned almost as soon as they arose, but all hopes of peace vanished with them.

In the summer of 1743 a trial of strength, between Austria and England on the one side, and the Emperor and the French on the other, became inevitable. On the issue of this, if the King of Prussia did not interpose, depended the whole future form and aspect of Germany.

CHAPTER IV.

FORTUNES OF THE COMBINED ARMS OF AUSTRIA AND
ENGLAND IN THE YEAR 1743.

IN the summer of 1743 an English army of 16,000 men was sent over to the Austrian Netherlands: the same number of Hanoverians were taken into the pay of England, and were principally quartered in the same country. Including a corps of Hessians and the Austrians already stationed there, they formed an army of more than 40,000 men, with which Lord Stair hoped to invade the northern provinces of France and to march upon Paris.

This project was, however, gradually regarded, even in England, as impracticable; and after various deliberations it was thought expedient (in conformity with the wishes of Austria) to march upon Germany, and there, in the territory of the Empire, to engage the Emperor and the French at the same time, and thus to break by force the alliance which they did not choose to dissolve by concessions.* In

* The alteration must have been adopted as early as the month of November, 1742. "Mercredi passé," says Stair in one of his despatches from Ghent, "21 de ce mois (November), le duc d'Artemberg arriva a Ostende et m'apporta le lendemain (22) l'ordre de marcher en Allemagne avec toutes les troupes qui sont sous mes commandements." Nevertheless it was some time before the parties agreed to carry the project into execution.

February, 1743, the Hanoverians, who were encamped in Brabant, recrossed the Maes; the English marched from their quarters on the French frontier towards Brabant; the whole army, with the exception of the Hessians, who refused to fight against the Emperor, advanced upon the Lower Rhine. The Dutch, among whom the war-party had become predominant in consequence of the projects of pacification which we have just described, were also ready to join in this movement. The chief organs of the two maritime powers displayed wonderful enthusiasm. The English and the Dutch thought themselves called upon to restore the state of things which had existed in Germany forty years before, at the time of the Spanish war of succession, and had no doubt of success: they were confident that all the princes of the Empire would unite with them. In a short time the world would see, if not an Emperor, at least a King of the Romans, of the house of Austrian Lorraine.

We shall not attempt to accompany the army on its march. In the month of May we find it in the neighbourhood of Frankfort (which the Emperor, as we have said, had quitted), where the Austrians established their head-quarters at Höchst, the English and Hanoverians at Gutleuthaus. These troops were regarded as a sort of ethnographical curiosity: the Hanoverians attracted notice by their continual alternations between violent squabbles and disorders and edifying devotions; still more were people struck by the well-fed looks of the Englishmen, the money in their pockets, and the number

of them who were accompanied by their wives; they made a very good figure, it was said, in their scarlet coats and with their handsome fire-arms and accoutrements. They were strongly built in the chest and limbs, excellently fitted to endure fatigue and hardships. The King of Prussia would delight in reviewing them, and if they were drilled in his fashion they would look twice as well. Towards the Germans they were affable enough; at the sight of the Frenchmen the blood rushed to their faces.

Whilst they were waiting here, the war, in which they had come to take an active part, had already been decided in another place against the Emperor and the French.

Had it depended on the will of the Emperor, he would have hazarded another attack upon the Austrians; but neither the German nor the French generals around him thought this practicable; they deemed it more expedient to post themselves in an enormous line, extending from Braunau, on the Inn, to Dingolfing, on the Isar, and then along the latter river as far as Plattling and Deggendorf, whence some posts even reached Eger. It was in any case an act of madness to attempt a defensive position of such measureless extent; but especially in this, where not only the military leaders, but the nations, were disunited. The Emperor possessed so little real consideration, that Broglie always appeared to do expressly what was most disagreeable to him.

As early as the beginning of May the Austrians broke the connexion between the several quarters

extending from the Isar to the Inn.* Khevenhüller immediately fell upon Braunau, where General Minuzzi, with his Bavarians, was compelled to surrender, notwithstanding the gallant resistance they made; Daun attacked Dingolfing, where the Pandurs and Croats made a fearful massacre of the French troops; while the Prince de Conti, to whom a command had been given, rather because he wished it than because he inspired any confidence, was unable to maintain himself at Deggendorf.

After these losses Broglie thought himself fully justified in withdrawing all his troops to Ingolstadt; nor did he think it advisable to remain even there. On the first approach of Prince Charles he moved up the course of the Danube, and so through Swabia to the Rhine. His march, with a body of sixty battalions and one hundred squadrons, was a continual retreat pursued by Hussars and Pandurs.

It was a campaign, like the former one, undertaken less for the defence of the Emperor than for the appearance of a defence. At Paris, people's only solicitude was to see the army safe back again; and the chief reproach made against the general, that he

* It was said at Paris of Marshal Broglie, that he had purposely withdrawn some of his advanced posts in order to prevent the Emperor from acting on the offensive. The statement of the Austrian envoy at Berlin was most explicit: "qu'on devoit cet avantage à la conduite et l'inaction de M^r de Broglie, qui s'étoit laisser intimider par l'enlèvement du partisan de la Croix avec son petit détachement de Pfarrkirchen, et avoit retiré toutes ses troupes derrière l'Isèr: que sans cette retraite M^r de Khevenhüller n'auroit pas tenté d'attaquer M^r de Minuzzi."

had thought too much of the Emperor, and needlessly sacrificed a great number of French officers.

Charles VII. thus found himself shamefully abandoned and exposed to his enemies. Almost without knowing how, at all events without a single serious battle, he had a second time lost Bavaria. His own army had followed the French as far as Ingolstadt, and Broglie thought that it should continue to do so.

But this was a point which the Emperor, who was gone to Augsburg, could not now be brought to concede. At length he found it necessary to do what had often been suggested—to separate himself from the French. He reflected that he should otherwise expose himself to the suspicion of designedly retreating out of his own country in order to transfer the seat of war from that to other provinces; that, on the other hand, if he endeavoured to spare the territory of the Empire, he might reckon in return on its support. He, therefore, gave orders to his troops to retreat into the neutral territory without any further hostilities, even against the Austrians, unless attacked by them. He styled them the Neutral Army of the Empire, and declared that they should unite with the troops of the circle to maintain the security of the Empire.*

* We have here followed a statement made by Seckendorf himself, in a letter to Frederick, dated 4th July: “L’empereur m’ordonna par écrit de me retirer avec les troupes dans les cercles auxquels il avoit fait declarer que son armée n’y entroit que comme une armée de l’empereur et de l’empire pour la conservation de la sûreté publique.”

The chief motive to this line of conduct was, that the King of England, who in the mean time had joined his army on the Main, continued to urge the Emperor to follow a similar course; and in that case held out hopes of the restoration of his dominions.

The Austrian generals assented to the neutrality of the imperial army under certain conditions. A formal convention to that effect was signed in the convent of Niederschönfeld between Seckendorf and Khevenhüller.

It seemed as if the affair had now reached its termination, both in a military and political point of view, when suddenly a second French army appeared in the field. Though the French consented to give up Bavaria or so remote a country as Bohemia, they could not endure that the English should establish themselves on the Middle Rhine, in their neighbourhood, and decide the fortunes of Germany. In order to counterbalance their influence, an army, collected with great effort, advanced upon the Lower Main under the Duke de Noailles.

Whether from political jealousy, or from a sudden outbreak of the old national antipathy, or from a soldier's thirst for glory, Noailles was no less rash in attack than Broglie had been prompt to retreat, and an engagement immediately ensued on the 27th of June, 1743, at Dettingen, which, if it cannot be numbered among the great battles of the century, was at least a combat of a very remarkable character.

The allied army was on that day marching along the right bank of the chain from Aschaffenburg back to Hanau, where they expected reinforcements.

Noailles conceived the plan of attacking them on their road ; and at Seligenstadt, just half way, he crossed over also to the right bank. A few well-directed batteries at Dettingen were to arrest the enemy's progress till he could attack them with the whole of his forces. In this he succeeded ; the allies found themselves compelled to make a halt on an unfavourable ground, which did not allow them to distribute their troops to advantage. Had the French held back till they could bring their whole force into the field, they might easily have obtained a great victory. But the young nobility of France were fired with an ardour to attack the English, as burning as in the days of Cressy and Poitiers. The Duke de Grammont, colonel of the French Garde—a post which Charri the Brave and Philip Strozzi had once illustrated by their brilliant exploits—surrounded by gallant comrades of illustrious race, led on his high-spirited band against the enemy before the preparations were concluded, and was followed by other troops. His charge actually broke the English cavalry ; and another was about to be made upon the Duke of Ahremberg, who had formed a brigade of different arms—cavalry, grenadiers, and artillery. The result was as follows :—In pursuance of a system of tactics which had already been tried more than once, the Austrian cavalry opened their lines as the French advanced ; the latter rushed upon the grenadiers, who also, after some resistance, gave way. Confident of victory, the French dashed forwards, when suddenly they found themselves in face of the enemy's guns, which made terrible havoc among

them, while their extremities on both sides were attacked by the grenadiers and cavalry, who had formed again, so that the destruction of this column was the work of a moment.* And now the English infantry, who had hitherto been held back by their King, rushed upon the already shaken line with all the fury of national hatred. It was reported that Englishmen were seen to strike their enemy dead with the butt end of their muskets; and that some of their women rushed into the ranks, and, seizing weapons, avenged the death of their husbands. The French saw that their attack had utterly failed, and were happy that they were not pursued with still greater energy.

A few days after the battle, in order to make it appear that he had not been beaten, Marshal de Noailles made a movement forward; but towards the end of July he thought it advisable to retreat across the Rhine, where he was soon after joined by Broglie.

The allies were thus completely masters on the right bank of the Rhine: it now remained to be seen how they would manage the affairs of Germany.

The King of England had been previously acquainted with the treaty of neutrality above mentioned, and had already invited Charles VII. to return to Frankfort, where he said everything should be arranged; † he had repeatedly promised the King

* Extract from a letter, dated Frankfort, 6th July, 1743, in Klinggräfen's despatches.

† Among others the Prince of Hessen sent a message to him, as he himself says on 12th June, 1743, "que si S. M^e Impe-

of Prussia that he would neither suffer the Emperor to be stripped of his hereditary estates, nor the imperial dignity to be insulted in his person.

Accordingly, immediately after the battle, negotiations for peace were set on foot, and seemed to promise a successful issue.

The Emperor, in whose name Prince William of Hessen negotiated, declared himself ready to renounce his claims to the Austrian hereditary dominions, to acknowledge Maria Theresa as Queen of Hungary and Bohemia, to allow the validity of the vote of Bohemia in the affairs of the Empire, to dismiss the French from the fortified places which they still held, and to garrison the frontier fortresses with imperial troops. In return for all this, his principal stipulation was, the restoration of his own hereditary domains. He reiterated the demand that his revenues should be raised to a suitable sum, and that his descendants should enjoy kingly rank ; but, in the first place, as the French subsidies would now fall off, he required to be provided from other sources with the means necessary for upholding the imperial dignity.

A preliminary agreement to this effect was actually concluded. The King of England bound himself by a secret article to the payment of subsidies ; and the Emperor declared himself ready, in conjunction with the Empire, to assist in forcing the French to consent to a general peace.*

riale vouloit prendre de la confiance au roi d'Angleterre, que l'on feroit pour elle tout ce qui serait possible, et que l'on iroit peut-être au delà de son attente."

* *Projet et idées d'accommodement entre S. M. Imp^{le} et la*

Things had been successfully conducted so far that even the King of Prussia, who immediately sent an ambassador to the camp of Hanau, raised no objection; the only reservation he made was that he should not be called upon to draw the sword against the French, with whom he had concluded an alliance for fifteen years.

A great point would have been gained had it been possible to secure peace for the Empire in its actual condition, although more under the influence of Hanover and England than he would have wished; the work of the year 1741 would not have been destroyed, and—what was more important than all—Austria would have been compelled to submit to the authority of an Emperor of another house. The treaties were in such a state of preparation that they wanted only the signatures and the last binding word.

Nevertheless, as often happened in those times, that word was not uttered, and everything was again thrown into doubt and uncertainty.

If we investigate the grounds of this failure, we shall find that it was then generally attributed (and, it must be admitted, with the greatest appearance of probability) to the duplicity of Lord Carteret and George II. But Lord Carteret was by no means so

reine d'Hongrie, July 40. According to the 2nd article the Emperor and the Empire were to co-operate "à obliger la France à consentir à une paix stable et générale de l'Europe." There was a proviso that the Emperor should be able "d'augmenter ses revenus d'une façon solide à perpétuité et convenable à sa dignité impériale aussi bien qu'au lustre de sa maison." Carteret introduced several changes into the project, whereby, however, he showed his approval of it.

much considered by the dominant Whig party, nor the King himself so powerful, that they could have decided by themselves in an affair of this magnitude; they had laid the basis of the proposed peace before Parliament, by which it was at once rejected.

The English ministers saw in the Emperor an ally of France. Now, all the subsidies they had furnished, the troops they had sent into the field or taken into their pay, were for no other purpose than to combat France, and, in the first instance, this her most attached ally. Prussia they had only wished to detach from France; Bavaria they wanted to pull down, and to restore the power of Austria, from whom they would not readily have to fear any sympathy with the French. In this project they were only afraid lest they might be thwarted by some partial Hanoverian interests, as had been the case in 1741.*

It happened just then that the letters from the army were filled with complaints of the preference which George II. showed to the Hanoverians over the English. Lord Stair, especially, who had played so great a part in the commencement of the war, was thrown into the background; not consulted, according to custom, on the filling up of appointments, and sometimes not even asked to take part in the council of war. The retreat from Aschaffenburg to Hanau was undertaken without his knowledge, the order of battle adopted without even hearing his opinion. After the battle his advice was, that the army should without delay cross the Main lower down, cut

* Coxe: Henry Pelham, I. p. 75.

off the French from the Rhine, and attack them: and indeed something of the kind was expected in England. Instead of this, appeared a treaty of peace, by which the nation was to be bound to pay fresh subsidies to a prince regarded as incurably devoted to the French. The English ministers saw in this nothing but the selfish work of Hanoverian interests, to which Lord Carteret was thought to have yielded in order to please the King, whom he now accompanied. They would not hear of it, and in this they were supported by the general temper of the nation. People said that they had not expended countless treasure, only to be duped again in negotiation, as had happened to them so often within the last twenty years.

Hereupon Lord Carteret was obliged, to the astonishment of the world, to break off the negotiations.* He blushed, as he declares, "at the sight of the men with whom he had been treating:" with a reserve, easy to be understood and not entirely to be condemned, he endeavoured to conceal the real state of things; the only effect of which was that all the blame was thrown on himself and the King. The Prussian ambassador was astonished at his evasions, which sometimes even degenerated into grammatical quibbles; he regarded them as the result of a natural

* The Emperor complained most bitterly: "Ayant sur les instances reiterées du roi d'Angleterre donné un plein pouvoir au prince Guillaume, on avoit dressé et communiqué des articles, lesquels après une mure délibération ayant été refondus conformément aux idées du roi d'Angleterre et de son ministère, S. M. ne comprenoit rien à la lettre de M' Carteret."

versatility and untrustworthiness, and represented them in that light to his sovereign.*

The ideas and wishes of Austria were, however, in complete unison with the views of the English. On the 12th of May the Queen had been crowned in Prague, had received the homage of her hereditary subjects in Upper Austria,—not, indeed, without protests on the part of Spain and Bavaria, but amidst a constant succession of the most brilliant reports of the fortune of her armies. She had dispensed favours, even to those who had fallen off from their allegiance to Austria in doubtful times. The news of the battle of Dettingen was the harbinger of her return to Vienna, where she was received with indescribable joy; she was hailed as the great and the benign. “I can bear no more, my children,” she exclaimed, overcome by the manifestations of reverence and love which were pressed upon her; “leave me for to-day.” All these feelings of delight and attachment, the success of her armies, and the devoted allegiance of her people, had, however, no other effect than to make her cling with still greater energy to the views of policy she had embraced, and determine on the prosecution of the war with the utmost vigour. She believed that the Divine favour visibly directed the affairs of Austria, and would uphold her in the fulness of her ancient might for the safety and welfare of Europe. Those who sought to incline her and her generals to peace entreated her to recollect what her situation would

* Finkenstein, 10th August. “J’y vois partout un homme qui se deguise jusque dans les éclaircissemens que je lui arrache.”

have been if the battle of Dettingen had been lost; but, as it happened, that battle was won, and she was determined not to allow so great a triumph to pass unimproved.

Under these circumstances the tendencies were far stronger towards war than peace. Lord Carteret himself was infected with them, and, in the course of the negotiation, suffered the expression to escape him that a prince who could not maintain his position would do better to abandon it.

And indeed it seemed possible that it might come to this, considering the forlorn condition of the Emperor, no longer defended by France, stripped of his dominions, unsupported by the temporal and overwhelmed with the hatred of the spiritual estates of the Empire.

Already the Austrian influence began to exert itself powerfully in the affairs of the Empire, strictly so called. At the first vacancy of an archbishoprick—and, indeed, of the most powerful and important of all—the Austrian party achieved a great victory.

Philip von Elz, Elector of Mayence, had arrived at so advanced an age that Frederick II. had more than once urged the Emperor not to allow an office conferring such powerful influence as that of Arch-chancellor of the Empire to fall, after Philip's death, into the hands of one of his enemies; and the Emperor had hereupon conceived the project of raising his own brother, John Theodore, to the post of coadjutor of the archbishoprick.

But by this plan he alienated the members of the chapter, who did not choose that this see, as well as

that of Cologne, should fall into the hands of a Bavarian prince. The vacancy occurred just as the combined English and Austrian army was ascending the Rhine. The revolution in public affairs with which this movement was connected* emboldened the chapter to throw off all deference to the Emperor, and to raise to the electoral throne the man perhaps the best inclined towards Austria from among their own number and one whom the Emperor had expressly excluded—the Count von Ostein, custos of the cathedral.

The Queen did not hesitate instantly to avail herself of this advantage in its full extent.

She had always endeavoured officially to keep present to the public mind by a sort of protest her rights violated at the election of the Emperor. But this was couched in such language that those to whom it was addressed scrupled to receive it, or to admit it to the Dictatur,† or Record Office, according to the usage of the Empire. In the beginning of 1743 the electors opposed its reception; the King of Prussia particularly sent word to the Queen that she must acquiesce in the order to which all others submitted.

But what Philip von Elz had refused Frederick von

* The connection that the one bore to the other is confirmed by the well-informed author of the 'Life of Maria Theresa,' II. p. 279, who mentions this election as "die erste Frucht des Hereinmarches mehrbesagter Auxiliartruppen" (the first fruit of the advance of the above-named auxiliary troops).

† All matters brought before the consideration of the imperial Diet were first sent to the Elector of Mayence—the hereditary Chancellor of the Empire by virtue of his office, and the director of the Diet. The decisions were then *dictirt* or written by the Chancellor, and sent to the other chanceries; this office was called the Dictatur, or Record Office.—*Translator*.

Ostein was very willing to grant. Without deeming it necessary to make any further communication to the electoral college, according to the tradition and usage of the Empire, without regard to the opinion already expressed by that body, on the 23rd of September he brought the Queen's protest to the Dictatur.

In this she declared that she should consider nothing that had taken place during the exclusion of the vote of Bohemia as consistent with the public law of the Empire until she had received satisfaction for the past and security for the future. She spoke of the election of the Emperor as "said to have fallen on the Elector of Bavaria." Her words prove generally that she did not acknowledge the Emperor in that quality; doubt was thrown upon everything that had taken place under his reign; the change in the election capitulations—nay, the validity of the acts of the Assembly of the Empire, transferred to Frankfort—were thus called in question. It seemed as if she meant to institute a suit for annulling the proceedings of the electors before the other colleges of the Empire, and on that ground declare war upon the whole existing state of things.

The impression produced by this protest and the whole conduct of the Queen was naturally enhanced by the successful progress of her arms and the consequent increase of her influence.

On the German side, where the army of the King of England crossed the Rhine at Bieberich, and Prince Charles appeared with another on the Upper Rhine, no important action took place. Higher up, the sight of Trenk's Pandurs excited great surprise.

With their muskets slung across their necks, their swords in their hands, and long knives in their mouths, they swam across the river; they committed trivial acts of pillage, and distributed orders for levying contributions. Lower down, Menzel made a great noise: he forced his way, at the head of his hussars, into the Ardennes, plundered convents, interrupted convoys, and once more drank the health of his Queen in the duchy of Lorraine. He published a proclamation, declaring that his Queen would force back France within her old frontiers, and deliver the German provinces from the yoke under which they groaned.

In Italy, on the other hand, important results had already taken place: as in the old times of the Romish-German empire, a web of Italian and German policy was woven, which promised to stretch over a long futurity.

There was a moment in which Austria was very near giving up Lombardy. When those regiments which were required for the invasion of Bavaria were recalled, the Austrian government was prepared for the necessity that might arise for General Traun, who commanded in Italy, to retreat into Tyrol; and would have been contented if he could only retain Mantua and the citadel of Milan.* It was thought very possible that Sardinia also, in consequence of this diminution of the Austrian force, would declare for the Spaniards, that Venice would immediately follow her example, and Modena deliver up her fortresses to them.

* From a letter to Traun in the *Oestr. Milit. Zeitschrift*, 1829, III. 117.

At this time (November, 1741) the first convoy of Spanish troops, under the Duke of Montemar, the former conqueror of Naples, appeared in Italy; a little later a second, and then a third, arrived, and the whole body was joined by a Neapolitan army. Queen Elizabeth Farnese expected that her hereditary domains of Parma and Piacenza, and a part of Lombardy in lieu of Tuscany, would soon fall into the hands of her third son Don Philip, who had just taken the command of another army about to penetrate into Italy from the South of France.* She intended, after the death of her husband, to return herself to Italy, where she would be surrounded by her wealthy and powerful sons, dwell in the neighbourhood of Alberoni, who was legate in Romagna, and pass the evening of her life among the prelates in the manner most agreeable to her.†

But affairs took a totally different course.

The King of Sardinia perceiving that, encompassed on all sides by the Bourbons, he would lose his independence,—concluded a provisional treaty with the Queen in terms which are singularly characteristic of the wavering state of political relations at that period; he reserved to himself the right of reced-

* Hence, for example, in the convention between Bavaria and Spain it was expressly stipulated, that Parma and Piacenza “siendo del patrimonio de la casa de la ser^{ma} donna Isabel Farnesio, r. d. E., S. M^a debera gozar de ellos mientras viva.”

† In one of his reports Traun maintains that all the Cardinal legates favoured the Spanish cause. Castruccio Bonamici asserts that the Florentines wished to have Don Carlos as the successor to the Medici.

ing from it under certain circumstances. But even such an agreement as this had the effect of confirming Venice in her accustomed preference for the existing order of things over every change whatsoever.* Austria and Sardinia determined, on the other hand, to compel the Duke of Modena to accept the proffered terms of neutrality which he had rejected. In the spring of 1742 their troops appeared in considerable numbers in the Modenese territory; the Austrians having received reinforcements from Hungary. The Duke did not venture to await their arrival, and Montemar, who meanwhile had marched to the frontiers of the States of the Church, was equally afraid to advance to meet them. This commander was very severely censured for having allowed Modena and Mirandola to fall into the hands of the Austro-Sardinian army before his eyes in the months of June and July, 1742.†

* Botta, *Storia d'Italia*, XIII. p. 16, maintains that the King of Sardinia had proposed to the Venetians to help him to drive all foreigners out of Italy. In the reports of Foscarini, to whom this scheme was to be proposed, I find that the former King, Victor Amadeus, after his abdication, had often said in private conversation to those about him in his retirement, that an union of these two powers would restore Italy. At that time, indeed, the only question was to prevent the Bourbon powers from gaining the upper hand in Italy.

† In an otherwise very well written chapter of his Italian history, Muratori has given the tone to other historians who find fault with Montemar. Colletta can scarcely be called an independent witness in this case, as he follows Muratori almost word for word. Colletta, lib. I. No. 38:—"Numerando i colpi del nemico stava come spettatore delle ruine; Muratori, 12, 2, p. 103: *contando le bombe et canonate de nemici spettatore tranquillo delle suenture.*" The only mistake is, that Lobkowitz is

In August an English commodore, with his squadron, appeared in the Gulf of Naples, and threatened to bombard the city if the King did not promise to consent to the treaty of neutrality and withdraw his troops from the Spanish army. The commodore, holding his watch in his hand, allowed two hours' time for deliberation; and, amidst the outcries of the terrified people, the King submitted to the orders imposed on him.

This alienation of the Italian states, however, did not hinder the Spaniards from energetically preparing their attack in another quarter. After experiencing one repulse they made an irruption from the South of France into Savoy with an overwhelming force; and Charles Emanuel found himself compelled to retreat, with great loss, across the Alps in the most rigorous part of the winter. The Pyrenean Miquelets drove the Piedmontese lowlanders before them in all directions; unwonted exertions, which no strength could withstand, engendered terrible diseases in the Sardinian army; the disasters of this retreat never ceased to be among the bitterest recollections of the life of Charles Emanuel.*

confounded with Traun. Posterity will be less inclined to censure him so harshly, when the saying of a Spanish officer of the time is called to mind: viz. that the Spanish infantry was in the Pontifical territory, their cavalry in France, their artillery in Spain, and their military chest in Peru.

* "Der Tod raffte einen grossen Theil das Heeres hin; den Verstorbenen fielen gleich Nase, Zehen und Finger in Fäulniss ab; wer am Leben blieb verfiel in Siechthum."—(Death destroyed a great part of the army; their noses, toes, and fingers instantly dropped off the dead, of corruption: those who survived were palsied with disease.) Oestr. Milit. Zeitschrift, 1829, IV. 57.

Encouraged by this success, the Queen of Spain urged the new general-in-chief, whom she had sent to central Italy in the stead of Montemar, to use double zeal, in order to repair the faults of his predecessor, and to endeavour to measure his strength with the enemy in the open field. In the month of February, 1743, this commander, named Gages, a Walloon by birth, crossed the Panaro, in the hope of attacking the enemy, who lay before him, while dispersed in their quarters: but General Traun was far too vigilant to suffer this. On the contrary, it was he who, no less strongly urged by his Queen to an engagement, attacked the disappointed and now retreating Spaniards. A bloody battle ensued at Campo Santo; the Austrians and Sardinians had rather the advantage, though the Spaniards fought with the greatest valour; the Walloon and Spanish guards vied with each other in the ardour with which they rushed on the enemy's fire. *Te Deum* was sung at the Spanish head-quarters and at Madrid: and, in fact, they had lost so little by this engagement, that, when Charles Emanuel was threatened with an invasion of Piedmont in the summer of 1743, he gave his troops express orders not to cross the Panaro. The Austrians were too weak to undertake anything unsupported.

In this state of affairs—if Charles Emanuel had gone over to the side of the Bourbons, as he sometimes seemed inclined to do—the fate of Italy would perhaps have been decided for ever. The chief obstacle to the negotiations which were incessantly carried on was, that the latter wanted to obtain Mantua,

in consideration of which they were ready to give up two-thirds of the Milanese; whereas the King of Sardinia was reluctant to cede that fortress to them. A proposal was made that it should be delivered into the hands of the Pope. Had this been acceded to, Sardinia would have united with the Bourbons and the Duke of Modena, who had taken refuge with them, to wrest Lombardy from the Austrians.

On the other side, however, Sardinia was negotiating with equal zeal with Austria to transform their provisional treaty into a definitive one. She demanded the cession of some portions of Lombardy, by which she hoped not only to enlarge her possessions, but to acquire a more formidable position with regard to Genoa. England, who had already paid large subsidies to the King of Sardinia, seconded these demands. Austria still hesitated; but her sense of her own interests was keenly excited by the consciousness that the prospect of reconquering the kingdom of Sicily could only be attained upon this condition.*

* The separate article proposed by Sardinia ran thus: "Vû l'extrême danger où l'Italie se trouve exposée par les joints efforts des rois d'Espagne et de Naples—il est convenu entre S. M. le roi de la Gr. Bretagne, S. M. la reine de Hongrie et de Bohême, et S. M. le roi de Sardaigne, que s'il plaisoit à Dieu de benir leurs armes—pour lors LL. DD. MM. concerteront tout de suite les mesures convenables pour deloger entièrement la maison d'Espagne tant des royaumes de Naples et Sicile que des autres pays qu'elle occupe en Italie. . . . Il est arrêté qu'en cas que d'un commun accord ils conviennent, de restituer ces dits pays et royaumes à la ser^m maison d'Autriche pour les garder au dedommagement de ce qu'elle aura été obligée de ceder de ses pays hereditaires, ils conviendront au même tems d'un commun accord d'une satisfaction ulterieure pour S. M. le roi de Sardaigne."

Charles Emanuel took up arms like one of the condottieri of old times, determined to use them for those who should promise him the greatest gain: in the one case to drive the Bourbons, in the other the Austrians, out of Italy.

In the summer of 1743 the anti-Austrian interests seemed for a time to predominate. A treaty was very nearly concluded between the Emperor, who also had a right to intervene in the affairs of Italy, and King Charles Emanuel. The Sardinian ministers revised and amended a project of an agreement drawn up by the French, and altered nearly all the articles in such a manner that it seemed to them hardly possible that it should be accepted; but the French at that moment deemed no price too high, and declared themselves ready to adopt the alterations.*

It was not likely, however, that the English, whose policy was chiefly directed towards the carrying on of the war both in Germany and Italy with continental forces, would suffer this to be concluded.

Their success at the battle of Dettingen had rendered their influence so powerful that they induced Austria to give way. At length, on the 13th of September, 1743, a definitive treaty was concluded at the head-quarters of King George II. at Worms, by Lord Carteret and the other envoys who had followed the English court into the field—Wasse-

* On the 2nd of September, it was fully believed in Paris that the convention was agreed upon. Among other things, Sardinia wished to have more French and less Spanish auxiliaries. Chamberier, on hearing of the treaty of Worms, exclaimed, "Un coup de foudre pour ce ministère."

naer on the part of Austria, and Osorio on that of Sardinia. Austria consented to make the cessions which the King of Sardinia demanded—Vigevano, the greater part of the territory of Pavia on either side the Po, the city of Piacenza, with a considerable tract of land in that territory, and the claims to Finale. The last especially excited great surprise. After Finale had been ceded to Genoa, during the Spanish war of the succession, for a considerable sum of money, and had repeatedly been guaranteed to that republic, all Europe was astonished that Maria Theresa could bring herself to renounce whatever rights she might have over it to a third party, which her father had always steadily refused to do.* On the other hand, the King of Sardinia promised to set on foot an army of 40,000 infantry and 8000 cavalry, and to adhere steadily to the allies, till peace was concluded in Germany, as well as between England and Spain—till which time the cessions made to him should not have full and irrevocable validity.

Secret stipulations were annexed to this treaty, under the title of explanatory clauses, the precise form of which has never been made public.† From

* *Traité conclu à Worms*, in Wenck, I. 677, § 12.

† It is, as was said in England, "the utmost extent of Lord Carteret's unknown promise." Letter from Newcastle, dated 27th Sept. and 14th Oct., in Coxe's *Pelham*, I. 95, p. 77. Yorke, ditto, 477. The treaty of Worms was signed, not so the declaration. In the beginning of August, according to a despatch of the 6th, Lord Carteret said to Baron Asseburg, "que lorsque quelqu'un étoit chargé d'une dignité qu'il ne pouvoit soutenir, qu'il étoit juste de l'abdiquer; que comme l'empereur insistoit sur la dignité royale, il faudroit tâcher de faire un troc, et de

the correspondences of the English ministers, however, we infer that Austria also bound herself to prosecute the war in which she was engaged until peace should be concluded between England and Spain; and that England formally promised in return to use all her power to procure for Queen Maria Theresa (according to her favourite formula) "satisfaction and security."

It was at this juncture that the notion hitherto cherished of indemnifying the Emperor with the border provinces to be conquered from France was exchanged for a still more extraordinary plan. Naples and Sicily were to be conquered, and immediately ceded to Charles VII., who, on the other hand, was to be compelled to abandon Bavaria to the Queen.* The court of Vienna made this proposal while the English negotiations with the Emperor were still pending: when they were broken off, Lord Carteret described this exchange as the only means by which the house of Wittelsbach could hope to obtain the long desired kingly dignity. One of the great favourers of the plan was Count Kaunitz. The court of Vienna was intent upon it; for of all the indemnities proposed none was of any real importance save Bavaria—a foot of land in Bavaria was of more value than

faire la conquête de Naples et de Sicile pour ce prince, et qu'alors la Bavière resteroit à la reine d'Hongrie pour l'indemniser."

* The Queen of Hungary has proposed in form that she should keep Bavaria and the Upper Palatinate, etc., as the demodgement solemnly proposed to her, and that the Elector of Bavaria should in exchange have the kingdom of Naples. Stone to Harrington, 31st July, 1743. Coxe's Pelham, I. 469.

whole circles in other countries; but, besides this, it would be a means of expelling this dangerous house, so often the ally of France, from the centre of Europe, where it might otherwise exercise a very mischievous influence in future. The court of Vienna greatly preferred an arrangement by which Bavaria would be provided for in the north of Italy, instead of across the Rhine, according to the first idea.

The treaty does not contain a distinct agreement to that effect, but it was evidently the principal, though remote, aim of the contracting parties.

War was now carried on with great promptitude and energy. Early in October the Spaniards, now openly supported by the French, made preparations for forcing the passes of Casteldelfino. This time, however, Charles Emanuel had availed himself of the advantages of his geographical position: he had put the defiles through which the enemy had to pass between inaccessible mountains in a thorough state of defence. Hemmed in between gorges and glaciers, where all progress was physically impossible, or was rendered so by the fire from the Piedmontese entrenchments, Don Philip, for whom Lombardy was to be conquered, determined, contrary to his mother's will, but supported by the opinion of his generals, upon a retreat, which was effected not without great danger and loss. General Mina, who commanded with the Infante, set the example of throwing all his baggage down a precipice, which was followed by the rest of the army. Their cannon and mules fell into the hands of the lowlanders.

At the same time the Austrians and Sardinians,

now under the conduct of Prince Lobkowitz, marched against the Spanish army in the States of the Church, and compelled it to fall back. Towards the end of October, 1743, the latter encamped near Pesaro, whence, on the first movement of the enemy, in March, 1744, it crossed the Tronto into the Neapolitan territory. As King Charles, in spite of the treaty of neutrality which had been forced upon him, had received his father's army, his enemies availed themselves of this reason or pretext for attacking him. As has always been the case when negotiations of this kind were going on, numerous Neapolitan emigrants congregated around the Austrian ambassador at Rome, promising the speedy defection of their friends in the kingdom of Naples.

This ambassador, Count Thun, Bishop of Gurk, was indefatigable in forming new connexions in the Neapolitan dominions, in keeping alive the Queen's ardour by favourable reports, and in stimulating the activity of the army and its leader. In April, 1744, Lobkowitz took the road by Foligno and Castellana, in order, like so many preceding conquerors, to advance upon Naples and Campania by the high road of St. Germano.* He issued manifestoes combining

* *Castrucci Bonamici de rebus ad Velitras gestis commentarius*. Cardinal Aquaviva, the especial patron of this author, wrote to the King,—“Lobcowizio esse in animo,—commodiore itinere Neapolim petere maxima cum spe, quam vani etiam rumores alant, fore ut, propinquitate exercitus sui, Campania omnis ipsaque arx et caput regni Neapolis ad rebellandum resurgat.” This author endeavours to imitate the ancients, especially Cæsar, but his subject was ungrateful. He spared no labour in collecting information.

allusions to the past and flattering promises for the future, on the part of the house of Austria. The light Hungarian troops formed the van, and Browne followed with grenadiers on horse and on foot; the army was in high spirits, and hoped soon to reach the capital.

Such were the wide and brilliant prospects that opened upon the Queen, both in Germany and in Italy.

It appeared quite possible, if the English fleet came to her aid as zealously in the Mediterranean as the army had done on the Rhine, that she might establish her authority on both sides of the Alps at once.

But hers was not the only victorious army in the world. There was another which had proved itself superior to hers; and at its head a prince who felt—like Henry the Lion with regard to Frederick Barbarossa—that the tide of her successes threatened to overwhelm him.

The King of Prussia took a lively interest in what was passing both in Germany and in Italy.

CHAPTER V.

POSITION AND CONDUCT OF THE KING OF PRUSSIA IN
THE YEAR 1743.

THOSE who beheld in Frederick a mere military chief might suppose that the spectacle of the English troops would delight him ; but others who knew something of his policy said, with justice, that there was no man to whom the sight of the red-coats on the Continent was more distasteful than to Frederick. From the very first the Court of Berlin perceived all the mischievous effects that were to be expected from their presence ; and the only real question for the inquirer is, how it came to pass that Frederick allowed things to take their course so long without opposition.

The principal reason for this was the positive assurance of the King of England that he would do nothing to deprive Charles VII. of the imperial throne, but would strive to procure him an honourable peace.*

Moreover it was to be expected that the French

* Declaration of Lord Hyndford, dated 29th Jan., 1742: " Je suis autorisé d'assurer que rien n'est plus éloigné de l'esprit du roi mon maître que la ruine de l'empereur, le roi ayant les plus grands égards pour ce prince tant par rapport à ses grandes qualités personnelles reconnues de tout le monde qu'à cause de sa dignité imperiale."

and imperial troops would make some resistance, so as in a degree to maintain the balance of affairs.

Lastly, it seemed possible to induce the empire to raise an army of neutrality for the purpose of excluding the French as well as the English; in which case King Frederick was ready immediately to co-operate with it with all his might.*

For he steadily adhered to the idea of establishing a great peaceful alliance between the maritime powers and the more powerful estates of the Empire, among which Austria was to be included, on condition, however, that she recognised the Emperor; and of combining watchful care for the welfare of the Empire, and especially for that of Bavaria, with the maintenance of a good understanding with Austria. All his language has this tendency.

In January, 1743, he declared to the Queen through his minister, that he would neither do nor negotiate anything to her prejudice; that he would offer no opposition to the English, and, for her satisfaction, would willingly do for them all that could be required of a friend; but that what he was bound, as a member of the Germanic Empire, not to omit to do out of deference for the head of that body was another matter. In February he put forward the

* *Toujours avec la declaration, que nous ne voulons pas rompre les engagements que nous avons pris avec la reine d'Hongrie mais simplement defendre et protéger l'empire contre le malheur qui le menace. 19th April: Wenn die mehrsten Stimmen vor die Armatur wären, so würden wir die ersten sein so das ihre dazu beitragen.—(If the greatest number of voices had been for the arming, we should have been the first to have done our part towards it.)*

other side of the affair; if he required that the Emperor be supported, it was not, he said, with the view of oppressing the Queen of Hungary, or of forcing her to concessions unbecoming in her to make; he would keep inviolate the peace he had concluded.* In the earlier part of the year 1743, a closer alliance between Prussia and Austria was often talked of. The only aim of such a one would necessarily be mutual defence, and even with this limitation, Frederick remarked, that it would place him at a disadvantage, since the Austrian territory was so much more extensive, and exposed to hostilities at so many more points, than his own. It seems that if the scheme for secularization had been put in execution, he would have availed himself of this negotiation to obtain some advantage for himself, but even that motive would never have led him to agree to an offensive alliance; he incessantly recurred to the peace to be concluded with the Emperor, whose cause he never abandoned. He repeated that he had the Queen's interest greatly at heart, but the Emperor's no less; his sole object was to prevent further calamity; he, on his part, would neglect nothing to dispose Charles VII. favourably, but the conditions proposed to him must be tolerable, in order

* To Dohna, 12th March: "Ni moi ni les autres états de l'empire, nous ne consentirions jamais que l'on engage la patrie dans des mesures offensives contre la France. 20 April: Finalement résolu de cultiver par toutes sortes de moyens la bonne et parfaite intelligence avec S. M. la reine de Hongrie je n'y mets point d'autres limitations que celles qui resultent du devoir primitif que m'impose la qualité d'électeur et d'un des principaux membres du corps germanique."

to induce him to make a speedy cession of what was demanded.

But he produced not the slightest effect by these suggestions. The Queen excused herself on the ground of the consideration she was bound to show to her allies; or on that of the season, better suited to active warfare than to negotiation. She declined every advance that could give occasion to any claim whatsoever; though she was assured that none should ever be addressed to her.*

Meanwhile the Diet, after long deliberation, passed a conclusion to the effect that the Empire itself should undertake to mediate between the Queen and the Emperor, and should endeavour to secure the co-operation of England and Holland. But the maritime powers were just as firmly resolved to carry on the war as the Queen herself; the Empire had to endure the humiliation of not even receiving a respectful answer to its proclamation.

And now followed the battle of Dettingen, which at first appeared calculated to bring about a reconciliation with the Emperor, but soon led to results of an opposite kind; in flagrant contradiction to what had been promised by the distinct declarations of George II.

One of those exceptional cases occurred in which it was impossible to hold a man personally responsible for a breach of his word; since it was forced upon him by the party under whose command he acted. But the King of Prussia, from whom this

* The offer made by the Court of Vienna was very peculiar: an alliance *de non offendendo*.

state of things had, as we have already mentioned, been most carefully concealed, could see nothing in the whole transaction but duplicity and falsehood, premeditated for the attainment of ends which seemed immediately to be fulfilled.

Whilst, after the advances made by the Emperor towards England, people were expecting the restitution of his hereditary dominions, they learned to their astonishment that the inhabitants of Bavaria had been compelled to do homage to the Queen of Hungary. In a rescript to her plenipotentiaries she says, that it is not necessary to give any opinion whether the duty of allegiance were to be regarded as perpetual or transient.

The meaning of this was no longer doubtful, when the suggestions about an exchange of Bavaria for Naples became known. How often had Frederick declared that he would not allow the Emperor to be oppressed, nor robbed of his hereditary dominions! The elevation of the Grand-Duke to the imperial dignity, which was then talked of, in connexion with this seizure of Bavaria, appeared to him an overthrow of the whole existing system of the Empire.

He must have been another man than he was, had he allowed things to go on further in this course.

In order to form an accurate conception of what could be effected by the co-operation of a portion of the estates of the Empire, he repaired in person to Franconia, in September, 1743. He thus got a nearer view of the various family and personal relations, by the adroit management of which the court

of Vienna was accustomed to govern the Empire, than he had otherwise contemplated doing.

In Baireuth he met the Duchess of Würtemberg, who had shortly before been staying in Berlin, and had left her sons there. The eldest of these princes had been affianced to the youthful princess of Baireuth, to the great joy of the Würtembergers, who regarded this as an additional prop to oppressed Protestantism.* Frederick, by employing his personal influence, had brought his sister the Margravine of Baireuth to consent to the alliance; but the Duchess, a woman of fickle, violent, and capricious temper, now raised fresh obstacles to it; she showed a disposition to relapse into the interests of the court of Vienna.

According to all appearances, though we have no distinct evidence of the fact, Frederick had also a secret interview with the Bishop of Würzburg. We find only that the King wished it, and that the Bishop, in order to make the acquaintance of a sovereign who ennobled his high station by so many personal qualities, proposed his family castle of Geubach as a place of meeting. The Bishop, who liked to have a hand in everything, without appearing to interfere, was of opinion that the dignity of the Empire must

* Gotter to Frederick: "Ces pauvres gens (the Würtembergers) seroient bien a plaindre si avec cette grande espérance et confiance, qui porte uniquement sur la protection de V. M^e comme l'asile et le rempart de leur liberté de conscience, ils s'en trouveroient tout à coup frustrés." 25th March, 1742. In the original manuscript Frederick condemns the Duchess in the strongest terms.

be secured by a formal union of the most important states, especially Dresden, Hanover, and Berlin.* Unfortunately, however, after all that had passed such a thing was out of the question.

The same opinion was entertained by Count Seckendorf, the Emperor's field-marshal, whom the King met at Anspach, and accompanied to his camp in the neighbourhood of Oettingen. The circle of Franconia, he said, had hitherto been restrained only by its weakness and isolation from going over to the Emperor; the first step must be to set on foot the negotiation concerning an armed association of the Empire, in which the King might reckon on the support of the Bishop of Würzburg and the Franconian margraves. "The small bells," he said, "must not be pulled till the large ones were heard to ring."† The King replied, that if they made known their intentions prematurely, they would only furnish occasion for the total overthrow of the power of the Emperor and his friends.

Frederick likewise paid a visit to the Duke of Saxe-Gotha (who could then command a few regiments) and his philosophical wife, but that court was already engaged in negotiations with the Dutch republic, to which it was to furnish a certain number of troops.

Strong as was the conviction impressed on Fre-

* He thus expressed himself to Gotter, who negotiated with him concerning the meeting. "J'espère," added Gotter, "qu'il donnera de la satisfaction a V. M."

† Qu'ils n'attendoient que le concours de tout l'empire pour donner leurs contingents. Anspach, 16th Sept.

derick by all that he saw and heard, that the court of Austria had numerous and enthusiastic friends, and that it would be very difficult to effect anything against it, yet he knew that the idea of the Empire still inspired attachment, and it was impossible for him to relinquish it.

Soon after his return, the imperial ambassador presented to him the plan of an association, or, as he expresses it, of a "close and firm union, for the sole object of the maintenance and re-establishment of the tranquillity, freedom, and security of the Empire; especially for the support of the lawfully elected Emperor in the dignities and powers belonging to him." * A combined army was to be set on foot, and every member of the alliance defended from injury.

Frederick thought the project well drawn up, and gave advice himself on several points. Above all, he said, they must take care that the union had a thoroughly German character. No French auxiliaries must be permitted to join the army of the association, which would otherwise not be neutral; †

* Lettre de Spon a Amelot, 26 Octbr.: Indique, que le terme d'association étoit le plus convenable, que d'autres, comme de neutralité et de sécurité, lieroient les mains à S. M. Imp. "Le roi de Prusse m'a promis que non seulement il y accédroit, mais que même il y disposeroit les princes de Baireuth d'Anspach, le duc de Wirtemberg, même Würzburg, mais il exige que S. M. Imp^e commence de s'assurer des cours Palatine de Bonn et de Dresde."

† Oral resolution of the King's according to a despatch of the 1st Feb. "Wenn die Franzosen mit den Kaiserlichen zusammenstossen sollen, so kann eine Neutralitätsarmee nicht Statt haben, wie denn auch durch eine Associationsarmee offensive zu agiren wider den Plan ist."—(If the French join the Impe-

when the association was actually formed, he was ready to send 30,000 Prussians to join it. He avoided receiving at his court a French ambassador extraordinary, who at that time visited several German courts. Besides this, he said that the strictest secrecy must be observed, and nothing must be asked of friendly courts, beyond a promise that they would not suffer the Emperor to be crushed; during the winter they must prepare and arm. In the following year the war between England and Austria on the one side, and the Bourbon powers on the other, would most likely be carried on with still greater ardour. When that had begun, and the Austrians had advanced some way into France or Italy, the neutral army might suddenly make its appearance in Central Germany; the impression it would make would be immense; the associated powers might utter the decisive word, which might establish the system of the Empire, as it now stood, under an emperor of the house of Wittelsbach.

Whatever might come of this union, it could, however, be nothing more than a prop. To accomplish the grand object at the right moment, it would be indispensable that Prussia should be ready for war; and to that end, every nerve was now strained in each department of the state.

In the first place, the Silesian fortresses were actively put in a state of defence. Eleven large bulwarks were erected at Neisse, each of which was

rialists, a neutral army cannot exist, as any idea of acting on the offensive by means of the army of association would be altogether opposed to the plan.)

surrounded with a defence of ravelins and intrenchments, before the middle wall; each ravelin again with other outworks, and these again with a first and second covered-way, a first and second glacis, the whole surrounded by a ditch, which was filled by the waters of the Bila and the Neiss. These works formed the defence of Lower Silesia on the side of Austria. On the other side the river, the King laid in the spring of 1743 the first stone of several strong casemates and a gallery: 7000 men were constantly employed upon it. In the following August he inspected the works again, and reviewed Walrave's pioneers, after which he proceeded to Glatz, where similar works were carried on with equal activity. In March, 1744, he again inspected Neisse, and convinced himself that all would be ready in July.* In the district of Oppeln he had chosen Cosel as a place to fortify; a choice fully justified in later times, though not perhaps at first.

Another indispensable thing was, the filling the ranks of the army, after the losses it had sustained during the war; a report was made to the King on the state of every single company of the regiment of Anhalt, which had suffered so fearfully in the battle of Chotusitz. In the spring of 1743, he ordered a new reinforcement of 18,000 men. Six battalions were put on the footing of new field regiments, eight others on that of garrison regiments; the grenadier

* Prince Ferdinand, Neisse, 23rd of April: "Hier S. M. fist 2 fois le tour des fortifications de cette place, qui sont d'une beauté infinie et avancées déjà prodigieusement, de façon qu'au mois de Juillet tout sera achevé."

companies were increased by thirty men in each; the hussar regiments were each to be raised to 1200 men, and two new ones formed.

According to traditional usage, the existing regiments had to furnish the recruits for the new ones. Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, to whom we are chiefly indebted for these details, writes to his brother the Duke, in August, 1743, that most of the other commanding officers were admirably provided; that he alone, who had to furnish a hundred men, was badly off; he begs the Duke to send him some of his subjects of Brunswick.

Meanwhile the different divisions were unremittingly drilled, and their progress examined by the King himself. Prince Ferdinand, who accompanied him, relates that, on a journey made between the 17th of July and the 13th of August, from Küstrin to Ratibor, and from thence to Glogau, he reviewed 88 battalions and 153 squadrons; so strong was the army in this part of the country.

The founding of cannon was extended, and any successful experiments in that department delighted the King.* A foundery was established at Breslau, on the model of that at Berlin, in order to use the metal raised on the spot.

The manœuvres consisted of exercises having immediate reference to what had taken place in the late war, or might be expected to take place in the

* Letter to the Prince of Anhalt, 15th of Feb., 1743: "Die neuen Geschütze habe ich probirt und seynd vortrefflich."—(I have tried the new cannon, and they are excellent.) See the directions to Linger, in *Schöning*, I. 435.

one impending, especially a very brilliant one at Schöneberg, in September, 1743, where the precautions to be taken against the attack of light troops, whether in the open field or in going into cantonments, were tried, to the King's perfect satisfaction.

During the winter, lectures were delivered on the attack and defence of fortified places, to the officers in garrison at Berlin; in December, 1743, these were given every afternoon.

Frederick would not listen to the suggestions of political observers concerning his own interests, nor to the requests of the friends who needed his assistance. "When the fortresses are finished, new troops raised, and the finances completely re-established," said he, "then I shall feel myself enabled to speak." "The King of Prussia is not in a hurry; he will know when to come forward again; as yet his hour is not come."*

It might, indeed, be inferred that he did not think this hour very remote, but, from a vague project to a positive resolve, the step is a wide one. This he was mainly compelled to take by the contentions between the courts of Vienna and Frankfurt, which daily became more violent and more bitter; and as they involve the grounds of the division, we may be permitted here to revert to them.†

* Valori, 28th Sept. : Neiss, Glatz, et Cosel en état, dit ce prince, mes 18,000 hommes absolument levés et les arrangements des finances pris et statués dans mes états (as yet he was not quite sure of the arrangements to be made in Silesia) je serai en situation de parler.

† See the letter of a Franconian noble to his Highness the Elector of Mayence, and more especially a Promemoria of Plettenberg, dated the 16th of August, 1743, on the part of the court of Vienna, printed with the remarks of the imperial court.

The court of Vienna represented that the succession was solemnly guaranteed by the Empire, and that all that had been done in contravention thereof was invalid; to which that of Frankfurt replied, that the guarantee had been given without due examination, and that such a one could never invalidate the rights of a third party.

The Queen repeated that the exclusion of the vote of Bohemia was at variance with the fundamental constitution of the Empire; to which the court of Frankfurt replied, that if a dispute arose among several interested parties concerning a right to vote, the established usage of the Empire was to quash it.

The Queen maintained that the bonds of human society would be broken if ratified treaties were annulled under the pretext of the rights of third parties; to which the Emperor rejoined, that they were far more broken when two or three, who had the power in their own hands, violated the just claims of another.

Austria complained that the German soil was overrun with French soldiery; the imperial ministers answered, that these soldiers would never have been seen in Germany, had not the other side rejected every offer of a compromise; and that they had been marched straight into the countries which were the subject of contention; whereas Austria had brought foreign armies (among which the Hungarians must be reckoned), consisting chiefly of uncivilized hordes, into neutral countries, and had thus caused indescribable devastation.

The Queen said that her demands extended only to two just conditions; adequate satisfaction for the past, and security for the future. But these, it was observed, were in themselves demands of immeasurable extent; the former might be made to comprehend indemnity for all that had been ceded since the death of Charles VI., and even compensation for the expenses of war; the latter, the invasion and subjugation of France.

In some quotations from former treaties that occurred in the Vienna memorial, the word Elector of Bavaria was substituted for Emperor; a denial of the imperial title which was most bitterly resented, and regarded as an act of open hostility.

In this tone and spirit was the protest drawn up which the Queen, with the help of the new Elector of Mayence, as we have seen, sent in to the Dictatur in September, 1743.

All the Electors, except Hanover, protested against this,* as an act so selfish and exclusive, that it must be treated as null and void; and which only proved that Austria, by the line of conduct

* It seemed rather strange that Hanover should take so ill a protest (that of the see of Rome) against its electoral privilege, at the same time that it demanded not only acceptance, but even approbation for the protest of an estate of the Empire which had withdrawn "eo ipso ex nexu imperii" directed against the Emperor, and the amplifications which he had introduced into the constitution of the Empire upon his own authority. The proposal was made, that in like manner as any petition presented to the Empire which called in question the "quaestionem status" of the Emperor and the Diet, was in itself inadmissible, the protests "de facto" presented should be held "pro non dictatis."

she adopted, as it were, severed her connexion with the Empire.

There were also many in other circles who regarded the Queen's proceeding as highly blameable; her refusal to acknowledge the constitution of the Empire in its actual completeness; the disrespectful expressions she employed towards the head of the Empire; her rejection of mediation, and of every negotiation having peace for its object; her disregard of all her obligations as a member of the Empire. How easily, they remarked, might the war concerning the interests of her house have been terminated. But it appeared almost as if she meant to indemnify herself at the expense of the Empire, for the injury she had sustained by the violation of the Pragmatic Sanction; she sowed discord in the highest colleges; she tried to reduce the Emperor and his supremacy to nothing.*

All those high-sounding declamations about the violation of the constitution of the Empire, which the court of Vienna had been wont to employ against others, were now turned against itself at the diet.

The King of Prussia, without actually adopting them all, was displeased, not only on public, but on personal grounds, at the proceedings of Austria.

The court of Vienna had prudently apprised him beforehand of its intention of entering a protest against the suppression of the Bohemian vote; the King had declared that he had no objection, provided it con-

* Unvorgreifliche Gedanken, wie das österreichische Betragen im Reiche eigentlich anzusehen—(incontestable thoughts, how the conduct of Austria in Germany is to be viewed).

tained nothing at variance with the rights or the election of the Emperor.* The protest, in which the Emperor's election, his right to convoke the diet, and the whole existing state of things was attacked in the most violent manner, was now sent in to the Dictatur.

King Frederick felt this to be a similar affront to that which he had recently received from George II. He repeated, that against a protest in itself, he should have had nothing to object; but, when couched in the terms in which this was conceived, it could not possibly be tolerated in the Records of the Empire; so offensive was the matter it contained, and so offensive also the manner in which it had been sent in to the Dictatur.†

He repeatedly declared to his ambassadors that, notwithstanding the expressions of friendship to himself contained in all the overtures of the court of Vienna, he perceived that the grand aim of that court was to force the Emperor to unconditional submission, in order that Austria might govern the

* Podewils to Klinggräfe, 12th October: "da ein jeder sein Recht durch Protest wahren könne"—(as every one could defend his rights by protest).

† "Que le grief roulait sur les expressions offensantes, qui y étoient contenues et sur la methode qu'il avoit choisie pour la porter à la dictature." The letter of Schmettau to Frederick of the 9th of November is remarkable: "La protestation que l'El' de Mayence a fait porter furtivement à la dictature contre toutes les règles de l'empire est une partie du remboursement qu'il a promis pour la dignité électorale.—Aucun membre de l'empire ne peut plus douter, que la protestation ne tende à annuler à main armée avec des troupes étrangères l'acte le plus autentique que les électeurs ont fait à la pluralité des voix."

Empire and overthrow the present system. The circular rescript contained bitter insinuations against the courts which did not side actively with that of Vienna. He could not accede to the Queen's claim to any other indemnity than the restoration of the Bohemian vote; nor could he possibly suffer the Emperor's election to be called in question. Such is the spirit of all his declarations.

In a letter of the 20th of November he says, "I am, in all respects, a friend of the Queen; but she will not persuade me to endure any act of hers contrary to the dignity of the Empire and the Emperor." On the 27th he added, that he could not suffer his hands to be tied against such a contingency, by any treaty whatsoever; on the 28th, that if any attempt were made upon the Empire he must always consider it as an indirect attack on himself.*

The court of Vienna complained of the vehement remonstrances addressed to it, not only by the Prussian ambassadors, but by the court of Berlin itself. Frederick replied that they must not imagine that he wished to daunt the Queen by threats; they must place themselves for a moment in his situation. Had they had as large a share in any work as he in the Emperor's election, would they quietly look on while that work was destroyed? He was like a man who was told that his arm was going to be cut off: and

* The King added to a despatch of Dohna concerning the statements he made to the court, these words, "fort bien, pour leur faire sentir vivement leur attentat à la liberté germanique."

who answered that if it were attempted he would defend himself.

It was said in Vienna that the King of Prussia's zeal in the cause of the Emperor was only a feint; that he merely sought a pretext for fresh hostilities against the Queen. We have examined innumerable letters, memoranda, drafts, and essays of the most various kinds, written by his own hand or under his dictation, and kept in the profoundest secrecy; and we have been unable to detect the slightest trace of such a design. The irritation prevailing on both sides might possibly arise from the feeling entertained by the Queen that, by her cession of Silesia, she had, as it were, acquired a right to the King's compliance in affairs in general. Frederick, on the other hand, to whom nothing had been conceded with good will, did not recognise the smallest claim of this kind upon him. But, independently of this, it was evident that the greatest and most important interests stood here directly opposed.

In progress of time, however, the Austrian policy gradually gained ground throughout the Empire.

The Emperor was too ill-served for the project of the Association of States—which required the profoundest secrecy—not to be immediately divulged; it excited, of course, the most vehement opposition.

The Bishop of Würzburg, on whom he reckoned, was of opinion that the line of policy he was adopting was not the right one. If the formation of a league was contemplated, that was a thing utterly forbidden in Germany from the earliest times. If they intended to set on foot an army of the Empire for the

purpose of maintaining neutrality, that was a measure which must first be discussed and decided at the Diet. It must be distinctly known how much each state would have to contribute to its formation and support, and to whom the command of it was to be intrusted. The affair was undertaken in such a manner, with such a disregard to traditional forms, that it excited the dissatisfaction of almost all those who were attached to the ancient laws of the Empire. With that singular mixture of ecclesiastical and juridical pedantry, in which the affairs of the Empire were usually treated, they talked of a "Neutralitäts-glaucoma," a "Securitäs-impietät," and the like.

Even at the imperial court many were alarmed at the thought of a German policy which would compel them to separate themselves from France. Count Seckendorf, it must be admitted, had a mind capable of embracing another system; but Count Törring, a man of firmly-established influence, adhered to the French alliance with exclusive devotedness. The contradiction inherent in the system, according to which German interests were intrusted to an Emperor so entirely dependent on France, could not be gainsaid, and served as an apology for the partisans of England. The Elector Arch-chancellor of the Empire did not disdain, at this moment of the most difficult complication of German affairs, to receive 8000*l.* as the price of his adhesion to English policy. The Elector of Cologne also suffered himself to be persuaded by his lord chamberlain to accept English subsidies and to separate himself from his own

brother, the wearer of the imperial crown. There were still more powerful sovereigns who were carrying on similar intrigues.

It was, however, by no means the general welfare of Germany alone which the King of Prussia had at heart. Whilst he imagined that he was still contending for the Emperor, he must have been conscious that his own existence was menaced by the course of European affairs.

(He himself was convinced, and it had been a thousand times repeated to him from the Imperial and the French courts, that at the very first opportunity the Queen would try to resume possession of Silesia. As the King of England had indeed guaranteed this province to him, but had not required a similar guarantee either from Holland or Russia with the zeal that had been expected, it appeared to him that England might also once more unite with the Queen for this purpose.

The first strong impression that something of this kind was impending, was produced on him by a conversation which passed between his ambassador and Fagel at the Hague. The ambassador one day argued that the reception of the French troops had not been nearly so important in the Empire as the intrusion of the English; the Empire would not endure to see itself left to the good pleasure of the court of Vienna. Fagel answered that the Queen had, however, a just claim to full restitution. The ambassador, without going further into the subject, requested him to explain himself more fully. Fagel replied that the Queen had a right to de-

mand back all that she had possessed before the war.*

Nor did he seem by this to express merely his own individual opinion: it was generally regarded at the Hague as certain that a resolution had been taken by Carteret, the court of Vienna, and the adherents of both at the Hague to obtain compensation for the Queen, and even probably to attack the King of Prussia as soon as they had expelled the French.

Trevor, the English ambassador at the Hague, also expressed himself in the same offensive manner. He treated all that had taken place in Germany since the death of Charles VI. as unworthy of consideration: he spoke of the rejection of the Bohemian vote, and the election of Charles VII., with as much indignation as if they were sheer crimes.

It struck the King as very significant that men of such importance—and especially Fagel, who had always passed for a reserved and cautious man—should permit themselves expressions of such a nature; he desired that the matter should be inquired into, and received qualifying and apologetic answers; but in spite of all that could be urged to the contrary he became firmly convinced that the successful progress of the Anglo-Austrian arms threatened his possession of Silesia.† In this conviction he was confirmed

* “Mais,” repondit il, “la reine de Hongrie est en droit de demander restitutionem in integrum; je le priai d’expliquer plus clairement ce qu’il entendoit par ce mot: sur quoi il me dit que la reine de Hongrie étoit en droit de redemander ce qu’elle avoit possédé avant la guerre.”

† Eichel, 3rd March, 1743: Das Schlimmste ist, dass S. Mt. in dero Suppon immer mehr fortificirt werden, dass wenn man

from another quarter. At the Diet, the urgent demand for indemnity was understood to mean that the Empire should furnish this to Austria; in default of which she would consider herself at full liberty to seize upon that which had been wrested from her. That this was the general sentiment of Vienna, when the Austrian armies returned victorious from every side—when the Germans in the service of the Emperor, the French, Spaniards, and Italians retreated before them—can surprise nobody. They flattered themselves that if a battle were to take place between their troops, now so much better inured to war, and the Prussians, even they too must yield. Bets were laid that King Frederick would not rule over Silesia two years longer. Bartenstein was reported to have been heard to say, that he might possibly be once more Margrave of Brandenburg.

These menaces to his own existence, combined with the danger impending over the Emperor and the constitution of the Empire, threw the King into a state of intense anxiety and excitement, which was infinitely increased when an authentic copy of the

erst die Franzosen obligirt haben wird Deutschland zu verlassen, dass alsdann der Wienerische und der Englische Hof S. K. Mt. werden Gesetze vorschreiben wollen, ohne sich weder an Tractat noch Garantie zu kehren. Gott lenke des Königs Herz zu allem Guten und dirigire dero Consilia zu dero und dero Landen Wohlfahrt.—(The worst is, that his Majesty is more and more confirmed in his suspicions, that whenever the French shall have been forced to leave Germany, the courts of Vienna and of London will seek to prescribe laws to his Majesty without regard to treaties or guarantees. May God lead the King's heart to all that is good, and direct his counsels to his own welfare and that of his country.)

treaty of Worms (as yet a profound secret) was put into his hands.

In the second article of this are enumerated the previous treaties confirmed by the new one. Among them are the guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction, given by the Empire in the year 1732, and all that had preceded or followed it. Whatever the several powers possessed or might possess in pursuance of this was secured to them, in so far as it was not revoked by the present treaty; yet not the slightest mention of the treaty of Breslau occurs in the document.

Had this been mentioned, Frederick's growing anxiety would probably have been appeased; its complete omission doubled his alarm. And when he saw further that the thirteenth article declared that as soon as Italy should be freed from the enemy, the King of Sardinia should take the Queen's Italian dominions under his armed protection, in order that she might employ all her troops in Germany, Frederick thought he discovered the design of employing these troops against himself, since they would not be needed against Bavaria, who would be already sufficiently humbled.

Another treaty, which was concluded at the same time with the King's nearest neighbour, evinced similar dispositions.

In the construction of the project of the Association it had been intended to invite Saxony to join it, and in this hope Seckendorf undertook a journey in person to the Saxon court. But before he arrived there a treaty with Austria had already been concluded by that state, whereby Saxony guaranteed

the Pragmatic Sanction without excepting the treaty of Breslau.* It was a renewal of the compact of the year 1733, and, like that, directly opposed to the interests of Prussia in relation to the succession to the throne of Poland, which was thus to be secured to a prince of the house of Saxony. Saxony had made it out that she needed not afford assistance to any of the powers now involved in war, yet she now promised assistance: against whom could this be intended but the King of Prussia? And if she stipulated for equivalent advantages (especially a better communication between Poland and Saxony), in proportion to the circumstances that might occur, there was no possibility that these advantages could be obtained from any other source than from the spoils of Prussia. Paolucci, the Nuncio, expressly affirmed that the treaty was directed against Prussia.†

It must not be concluded that an attack on Prussia had as yet been formally concerted; but that a fresh outbreak of the war was deemed possible, and that preparations were made for that event, can admit of no doubt. The court of Vienna was determined to pursue the course she had entered upon as to the affairs of the Empire without any regard to the remonstrances of the King of Prussia. Should he offer

* Treaty of Vienna, 20th December, 1748. *Articulus secretus secundus*, in Wenck, *Corpus juris gentium*, I. p. 732.

† Klinggräfen, 11th January, 1741: "Le nonce de Dresde avoit écrit au C^{te} Doria lorsque celui-ci s'étoit trouvé à Pommersfeld qu'il avoit lu l'article secret qui porte que la Saxe, dès que V. M. entreprendroit la moindre chose contre la cour de Vienne, assisteroit la reine de Hongrie contre V. M., de sorte que ce traité est contre V. M."

any active opposition, Austria had not only her own forces, but friends and allies wherewith to meet him.

Frederick might perhaps have let matters take their course, and awaited the event. But not to mention that he would thus have tried to act in a manner inconsistent with his character, the danger would have gone on increasing; and meanwhile he would, as he himself says, have fallen into a contempt like that to which his father had once subjected himself.

There was no help: a conflict between the two powers had again become inevitable. The questions which had been left undecided at the peace of Breslau now assumed so vast and momentous a character that they threatened to trouble it anew.

What an undertaking was it, however, to attempt to stem the current which had set in since that time in the affairs of Europe and of Germany! To render it anything less than hopeless Frederick was compelled again to look to France for aid. But had he not sufficiently experienced how little he could reckon on earnest and active support from that quarter? And what had he to expect if Russia were to join the league between Saxony and Austria, as was reported in the latter country?

In order to understand Frederick's political situation, we must pause a moment and bestow a glance on his great and powerful neighbours: and, in the first place, on those of the North, where changes had taken place which rendered hostilities from that quarter improbable.

CHAPTER VI.

RELATIONS OF PRUSSIA TO THE NORTHERN POWERS.

IN the year 1741, when the Swedes ventured, at the instigation of France, to renew the war with Russia, they had not the rashness to trust entirely to their own strength; they reckoned on the intestine troubles which broke out under the Regent Anne, and were fostered by the uncertainty of the succession and the antipathy of the native Russians to what they called foreign domination.*

But their preparations were so inadequate and the conduct of their first military operations so ill considered, that it required but a slight exertion of the Russian force, led by two of those very foreigners—Lacy and Keith—to inflict upon them a loss which, in the actual state of things, might be regarded as a complete defeat.

Yet, though strengthened by this victory, the Russian government of that day was unable to sustain itself.

* Ein von dem secreten Ausschuss verfasster Aufsatz: Anmerkungen über das Betragen des schwedischen Ministerii—(report drawn up by the secret committee, remarks on the conduct of the Swedish ministry, &c.) in Büsching's Magazine, II. 333, 339. The French said that the party of Princess Elizabeth must not be allowed to be crushed.

With a blindness to their own interest by no means uncommon among men, the foreigners, who had risen to power under Empress Anne, not perceiving that that power rested on a common basis, fell out among themselves, and brought about their common destruction.

Biron was overthrown by Münnich, and he in his turn by Ostermann; and already Ostermann felt the ground totter under his feet.

The Regent Anne was not devoid of understanding, but wilful and capricious in her conduct: jealous in the highest degree of her power, she turned from the very man to whom she was mainly indebted for it, and surrendered herself—almost without a will—to those immediately about her person. She passed the whole day in the rooms of one of her ladies in waiting, in which two foreign ministers, Count Lynar, of Saxony, and Marquis Botta, of Austria, were the great oracles; it was expected that the former, for whom she showed the most marked preference, would shortly be declared her high-chamberlain, and would then take an official share in the government. From this private circle favours were dispensed, and here views of foreign policy in the Austrian interest and opposition to Ostermann's government originated. The Regent took a pleasure in doing the very contrary of what he wished; nay, she even granted access to his personal enemies, by whose overthrow she herself had risen.

Ostermann hoped to create to himself a support in Antony-Ulrich of Brunswick, the husband of the Regent, father of the youthful Ivan, who was

invested with the title of Emperor. Antony-Ulrich was already commander-in-chief of the forces, and enjoyed a certain degree of consideration in the army. The minister wished to create him co-Regent, and to secure to him an independent influence on the government. He also conceived the project of marrying another prince of Brunswick, Ernst Ludwig, to the Grand-Duchess Elizabeth: by which combination he hoped to hold the Regent in check and to maintain his own system. But Antony-Ulrich was incapable of serving even as the instrument of a change; he had not the bare rudiments of education: he read with difficulty, and could hardly write at all. He was soon weary of attending to any discourse or statement from others, and was thus condemned to perpetual shallowness and ignorance: the allowance made to him by the Regent he gambled away.*

The Regent, having a suspicion of what was going forward, sought to curtail him even of the rights he then possessed. Discord and contention reigned paramount; and as the supreme power was the centre of personal enmities, they engrossed the attention and employed the energies of all men. Hence it happened that a party entirely opposed to the whole actual system formed itself—if not unperceived, yet imperfectly appreciated—around the

* I here follow letters written by Prince Louis of Brunswick from Petersburg, from which among other things we perceive that Mannstein is wrong when he asserts, in his *Mémoires sur la Russie*, 411, that the court wished to force Princess Elizabeth to marry Prince Louis. It would have been anything but agreeable to the Regent; but Ostermann had thought of it as a means of keeping the house of Brunswick in Petersburg.

(Grand-Duchess Elizabeth, on whom the eyes of the nation had long been fixed.

She was the daughter of Peter the Great: handsome, and conscious of her beauty; fond of pleasure, frivolous and licentious, but kind and confiding towards all; open-handed and devout, even to bigotry, according to the rite of the Greek church. She had something in her whole manner and character in harmony with the tastes and sympathies of the Russian people.

The Regent and Antony-Ulrich, Biron, Münnich, and Ostermann, Lynar, and Botta, were all equally hateful to her. Her levity, which disarmed fear and suspicion, contributed to her success, and still more the inherent feebleness of her adversaries. It was only necessary for her to gain over a few hundreds of the grenadiers of the guards; instead of marching against the Swedes, as they had been ordered, they took possession of the palace, and in a few hours overthrew the whole government. (Nov. 1741.) The possessors of power were treated with ruthless violence, dispersed, exiled, and rendered utterly helpless and harmless.*

Some thought that this transfer of the crown would bring about a complete revolution in affairs: that

* A letter of Prince Louis' is extant, containing an "umständlicher Bericht von der grossen Rebellion, welche die Elisabeth mit Chetardie, dem Chirurgo nunmehrigen Minister Lestock und einigen andern Uebelgesinnten geschmiedet, und die Nacht zwischen dem 5 und 6 Dezember ausgebrochen ist"—(a circumstantial account of the great rebellion which Elizabeth contrived with Chetardie, Lestock the surgeon, now the minister, and sundry other evil-disposed persons, and which broke out in the night between the 5th and 6th of December).

Russia would retire within her own limits, and content herself with the part she had played before the reign of Peter I.*

But among those who had assisted the Grand-Duchess the foreigners had been the most active and efficient; a few only of the native Russians had had sufficient address to maintain their posts; besides no people voluntarily surrender the influence they already possess.

It certainly appeared at first as if the political leanings of the court would be changed: it seemed as if the French ambassador especially, the Marquis de la Chetardie, who had promoted the revolution by word and deed, and, above all, by money, would have great influence with the new government; there was even some talk of a marriage between Elizabeth and a French prince.

Averse as the King of Prussia had been to the connexion between the former government and Austria, he was no less uneasy, during the early part of the year 1742, at the dependence of the present on France; but he soon perceived that this was less absolute than he had imagined. It appears from all we can discover that the Swedes, who being now in a better state of preparation, wished to profit by the moment of confusion to extort an advantageous peace, were deterred by the flattering promises of

* According to Chambrier, many French people expected "ce que la cour souhaitoit depuis longtemps que de voir en ce pais là le gouvernement des étrangers aboli et les Russes reprendre leurs anciens principes pour se remettre comme ils étoient avant Pierre I."

Chetardie, which at the time he thought himself authorized to make, but which he was never able to fulfil. If Elizabeth, after her government had become firmly established, did not insist on all the advantages which the uninterrupted success of her arms had gained for her, she put forward, on the other hand, a demand of the greatest importance.

Resolved not to marry, but convinced that a settled succession was necessary to her own security, Elizabeth conceived the project of declaring her sister's son, the young Duke Charles Peter Ulrich, of Holstein Gottorp, her successor.

Now the King of Sweden was old and childless, and that nation also had to consider the choice of a successor to the throne.

In this state of things the idea arose in the Scandinavian kingdoms of founding a new and more powerful union by electing the Crown-Prince Frederick of Denmark successor to the throne of Sweden also. The undisguised purpose was to found a northern power able to bring a hundred thousand men into the field, and to make head more effectually against Russia than Sweden alone could do. In the spring of 1743, a Swedish envoy made his appearance at Constantinople, charged to invite the Grand Seignior to support a combination so eminently advantageous to the Ottoman empire.* In Sweden

* La Porte étant fort intéressée à cette election, puisque ce prince étant souverain des deux royaumes seroit plus en état de diminuer conjointement avec le grand seigneur la puissance de Russie. The ambassador from the Netherlands thus gives the offer of the Swede Carlson, in a despatch dated May, 1743.

itself not only were the peasants already gained over to the cause of the Prince of Denmark, but the burghers and clergy were greatly inclined to give him their votes ; especially if Russia should persist in her hostile attitude and refuse to restore Finland.

The Empress Elizabeth had proposed to the Swedes the nearest cousin of the present Grand-Duke of Russia, Duke Adolphus Frederic, of Holstein, then Bishop of Eutin, who was descended on the female side from the house of Wasa ; it is obvious that his election must appear to her most desirable, with a view to establishing a good understanding. But she knew the price she must pay : she must reinstate Sweden in the possession of Finland ; if not, the Danish prince would be successful, and then,—the nation being already in a state of ferment, and Dalecarlia in a sort of insurrection,—the Germanic portion of the North would take a direction adverse to the interests of Russia.

Although some votes in the Empress's privy council were hostile to this scheme, the political interests at stake appeared to the majority so vast, that they came to the resolution to restore to Sweden the conquered provinces, with the exception of the tract of border country up to the Kymene. On the 16th of June, 1743, peace was concluded upon these conditions ; on the 4th of July, Adolphus Frederick of Holstein was elected future King of Sweden. In a short time a Russian corps under Keith marched to the assistance of Sweden, against Denmark and her claims.

One provision for the future destinies of the

northern kingdoms yet remained to be made: princesses of good houses must be found as wives for the two princes, in order to secure the succession.

George II., King of England, would gladly have seen one of his daughters seated on the throne of Sweden; while the Saxon minister hoped that a daughter of his Sovereign, whose portrait he exhibited, would be selected as consort of the Grand-Duke. When we remember that at this juncture a quadruple alliance between Austria, Russia, England, and Poland was talked of, and when we consider how much this alliance would have been strengthened by these proposed marriages, we see how completely they would have followed the current in which the general affairs of Europe had flowed since the middle of the year 1743, and how dangerous this state of things might have become to the King of Prussia.

But the Russian court was not yet so completely gained over to the interests of Austria as to adopt these views.

Among those who had supported the Empress, both before and after the revolution, Count Woronzow might be regarded as the foremost. He was not a man of brilliant parts, but of sound understanding; he was pacific, and disinclined to every measure hostile to Prussia. Lestocq, too, who had played a conspicuous part in the night of the revolution, and still enjoyed a certain consideration, and Chief-Marshal Brummer, declared their hostility to the plans of Austria.

In addition to these circumstances, a combination—for it could hardly be called a conspiracy—of mal-

contents was discovered in the summer of 1743, in which the Austrian ambassador was said to have taken part. It was also reported that among some families of distinction—those of Lapuchin, Golowkin, and others who had been connected with the party overthrown, and exiled at the late change in the government—the hope had been expressed that this party would soon be restored to power; that Marquis Botta, formerly ambassador in Petersburg, and now transferred to Berlin, had censured the ordinances of the new Empress, fostered the general discontent, and even on his departure for Berlin had said that he thought the King of Prussia would surely do something for the restoration of the Brunswick family, to which he was so nearly related.

The affair was looked upon very seriously by Elizabeth, various unusual precautions taken for her personal safety, the accused brought to trial, and a correspondence of the bitterest kind opened with the court of Austria.*

On the other hand, she made advances to the King of Prussia, who, it was certain, could never have contemplated the restoration of the deposed family, whose policy had extinguished in him every consideration of family ties.

Hitherto the King had vainly wished to induce the court of Petersburg to join in the guarantee of Silesia; he always maintained that Lord Carteret's influence had prevented this; there had even been a

* See Moser *Völkerrecht in Friedenszeiten*, IV. 382. Botta is reported to have said, that he would so manage that the porridge might be eaten without burning the mouth.

hesitation about the renewal of the old treaty contracted between Frederick William I. and Catherine I.; now, however, this was not only actually executed, but in November, 1743, the Russian court gave its formal assent to the treaty of Breslau, which was regarded as equivalent to a guarantee.

Altogether the Empress Elizabeth at this period evinced very favourable dispositions towards the King of Prussia. She said there were serpents' tongues around her that tried to calumniate him, but that she saw they did him injustice. Taking no offence at the King's declining a proposal for the hand of one of his sisters—on the ground that he did not like to expose her to the dangers of one of those revolutions in the dynasty then so frequent in Russia—she now requested him to name a German princess whom he thought fitted to become the consort of the Grand-Duke, her successor, and would listen to no proposal from any other quarter. It was Frederick's prudent and sagacious minister Podewils, who, on being asked his advice, first proposed Princess Sophia of Zerbst, afterwards Catherine II. He likewise mentioned some other princesses of the houses of Darmstadt, Hessen-Philpsthäl, and Würtemberg; but he chiefly insisted on the first, and expressed his surprise that the court of Russia had not thought of her already, in consequence of her near relationship to the house of Holstein.

She was the daughter of Prince Christian Augustus of Anhalt-Zerbst, who had served from his youth up in the Prussian army, and had risen to be General Field-Marshal, and Governor of Stettin. He had

just entered upon the government of his small dominions, as co-regent with his brother. Her mother was Elizabeth, Princess of Holstein-Gottorp, sister of Adolphus Frederick, just nominated successor to the throne of Sweden. Princess Sophia was born in 1729, consequently only just fourteen; but Podewils assured the King that she was tall of her age, and handsome, and might be regarded as completely grown up.

The King, who had great confidence in her father, and a very high opinion of her mother—a woman of some intelligence and cultivation—immediately caught at this proposal, and submitted it to the court of Petersburg. There the Princess of Zerbst was no sooner mentioned than she was accepted. An objection might have been taken to her on the score of the degree of consanguinity in which she stood to her destined husband; but after some deliberation the Archbishop of Novgorod, and the synod convened by him, decided that there was but the shadow of kindred, and that it could offer no obstacle, since it was on the female side.*

The Prince and Princess of Zerbst, utterly ignorant of what was going on, were passing the Christmas of 1743 and the new year of 1744 in profound tranquillity in their old castle of Zerbst, when, just on new-year's day, an estafette arrived, bringing an invitation from the Empress of Russia to the Princess and her daughter, "of whom," she said, "rumour spoke so favourably," to come to her court.† The

* Qu'il n'y avoit aucun parentage sur tout parce que cette ombre d'affinité venoit du coté de la mère et non du père.

† Dont la renommée nous vient de publier bien de belles choses.

purpose of this invitation might have been doubtful, had not a letter from the King of Prussia arrived at the same time, in which he expressed the opinion that a marriage might be brought about between the Princess and the Grand-Duke of Russia.

The Princess-Mother, who had long secretly cherished hopes of this kind, beheld in this the hand of Providence, which had showered so much unexpected good-fortune on her house within the last few years: she thought of the aged Olearius, who had laboured with prophetic earnestness to bring about advantageous alliances.*

There is a sheet of paper extant on which the youthful Princess wrote, or rather drew, in large characters, her names as Princess of Zerbst; below this she describes, in very imperfect handwriting and language, the agitation into which the letters just received had thrown her mother,—as if the oracle that was to pronounce upon her fate were contained in them.

Without much delay, as her father had (to say the least) no objection, the journey was undertaken. On the 8th of February, on the road between Mitau and Riga, the Princess and her mother were met by Prince Narischkin, charged to welcome them in the name of the Empress. They joined the court at

* Erhebe dein ehrwürdiges Haupt aus deinem Grabe Olearius, du wahrer holsteinischer Prophet, siehe den Anfang der glücklichen Zeiten die du verkündigt hast.—(Lift up thy venerable head from thy grave, oh Olearius, thou true prophet of Holstein, and behold the beginning of the happy times thou didst predict.)

Moscow, where their presence was not agreeable to many persons, but where the impression both of them made on the Empress was favourable.

One important obstacle, however, presented itself—the difference of religion.

People at Zerbst had imagined that the Grand-Duchess would, like the consort of the unfortunate Alexis, have been permitted to attend divine worship according to the Protestant ritual, or that she might be left to the simple precepts of the Christian religion, commonly called the peasant's creed. But this was out of the question; neither the Empress, who attended the ceremonies of the Greek church with great assiduity, and was just preparing to set out on a long pilgrimage, nor the clergy, who, in granting their consent to the marriage, had not insisted on the rigorous observance of the rites of their church, nor even perhaps the nation, would have been satisfied with such an arrangement. It was represented to the Princess that the difference consisted rather in external forms, to which it was necessary to adhere for the sake of the rude multitude, than in essentials; that the prejudice against the Greek church in this respect was extremely unjust, and that in regard to doctrine it differed little from the Protestant. In a letter to her father the Princess expresses herself convinced of the truth of these representations; but they were less agreeable to the Prince, who remained at home, surrounded by German influences, and was a steadfast adherent of the Protestant doctrines. The Princess his wife, however, remarked to him that the Greek church regarded works only as proofs

of faith, and not as of themselves meriting salvation ; and that though they were under the necessity of seeing a beloved and amiable child go over to a mode of divine worship differing in externals from their own, the consciences of her parents might be tranquil as to the essentials of her faith.*

On the 9th of July, 1744, the public confession of faith, and on the 12th the betrothal, took place. The Princess received the name of Katharine Alexiewna : the Empress said she preferred her mother's name to her own, for that the nation had loved her mother better than herself.

But the young Princess's entrance on this new world of power and magnificence was by no means without its sorrows. The climate affected her health ; if we are to believe the Prussian minister, the conversion to the Greek church awakened more scruples in her mind than she ventured to confess to her father ; at times she was seized by a sort of home sickness and longing after the freer atmosphere of her German fatherland, and she was found bathed in tears. There was no lack of enemies ; and though

* Letter from the Princess. " Un article essentiel me sauta d'abord aux yeux : ce fut celui qui regardoit ma fille . . . sur lequel je ne me suis pas trompé. Il nous a couté beaucoup a mon epoux et moi, de nous resoudre ; mais rassurés ensuite du coté de la religion par l'exemple de la Zarowitzin et convaincus par des considerations légitimes qu'il n'y a pas à reculer sur les propositions d'une aussi grande princesse, a qui d'ailleurs nous avons de si eminentes obligations, mon départ fut resolu." The correspondence of the Princess with her husband, equally characteristic in style and contents, serves as our authority. H. R. H. the Duchess Frederica of Anhalt-Dessau has the merit of having discovered the letters, and recognised their value.

the Grand-Duke, her betrothed husband, was friendly in his manner to her, he frequently betrayed a want of inclination for her, proportioned to the influence exercised on him by others. Notwithstanding her extreme youth, the Princess displayed from the first astonishing talents for her situation. Everybody was struck with the degree to which she understood it, and from day to day learned to conduct herself in it with propriety and address. She soon secured to herself a larger share of the Empress's confidence than her mother. If the rumour then current, that the Empress had taken measures for securing to the Princess the succession to the throne, in case the Grand-Duke (who was then feeble and sickly) should die without issue, were to prove true, a new light would break on her whole existence.

At the moment, however, that this marriage was first talked of, the Russian court proposed another to that of Prussia, in order to form at least an indirect tie between them: this was the union of a Prussian Princess with the successor to the throne of Sweden.

A great inducement to this alliance for Sweden was to be found in the conduct of Denmark, which, discontented at the sudden elevation of its ancient enemies of the house of Holstein-Gottorp, had attached itself more closely to England. The marriage of the Crown-Prince Frederick of Denmark with an English Princess, in December, 1743, tended to strengthen the political ties between these two countries.

Frederick of Prussia regarded his younger sister

Amelia as better fitted to fill the throne of Sweden than the elder. She had better health, and a more simple and cheerful character; while her elder sister was more lively and volatile, and had a certain taste for intrigue. The Swedes, to whom he could only hint this, considered it, however, a point of honour that their heir-apparent should marry the elder sister, Ulrica. The King accordingly acceded to their demand, and employed all his fraternal tenderness to console the younger, whose expectations he had excited. In June, 1744, Count Tessin arrived, charged to solicit the hand of the Princess with all the accustomed ceremonies; after which the marriage was immediately celebrated.

Frederick was very far from making political affairs depend on matrimonial alliances; but neither did he regard them as wholly insignificant. "For," he once remarked, "a well-educated princess is incapable of forgetting the land of her birth, or of doing it an ill service; a foreigner in her place might easily become mischievous to the country." He esteemed it the most important point in these alliances that any extension of hostile influences over Russia and Sweden was thus prevented. Negotiations were carried on with great zeal concerning a triple alliance between Russia, Prussia, and Sweden, from which no great effect on the relations of Western Europe was to be anticipated; for Frederick it was enough if it only contributed to relieve him from the fear of what might assail him from the East, and left him at full liberty to take part in the other affairs of Europe.

We must now, like him, turn our attention to what was passing at Paris and Versailles.

As the policy of one country can never be independent of the condition and movements of the neighbouring powers, so neither is it possible to obtain any clear historical view of the events of one country without a knowledge of the circumstances and relations of those by which it is surrounded.

CHAPTER VII.

OFFENSIVE TREATY WITH FRANCE.

(CARDINAL FLEURY died in January, 1743, more unhappy than Sinzendorf, inasmuch as he was doomed to see so miserable a conclusion to the enterprises he had planned and undertaken. It was the final catastrophe of the world-embracing schemes of Richelieu and Louis XIV. Fleury had carried them a step further; but failed to attain their end—the supremacy over all Europe. On the contrary, events took a course which seemed to menace France herself.

But, as we have before incidentally remarked, his death was attended by no important consequences.

Louis XV. had certainly cherished the idea of imitating his predecessor in one respect, viz., that after the death of an all-powerful cardinal, who had acted as the guide of his youth, he would take the reins of power into his own hands. He immediately declared that he would not fill the place left vacant by the cardinal's death; that for the future nobody should stand between him and his ministers; he would work with them himself.

But for this something more than good-will was needed.

The ministers actually in power, the learned and methodical Amelot, to whom foreign affairs were

intrusted, Argenson, the minister-at-war, and the most vivacious and active of all, Maurepas, minister of marine, held the threads of public business in their hands. From the fear that some one might endeavour to force himself into the place of Fleury,* they contrived, in spite of all discordances, to keep up a good understanding among themselves; and the affairs already begun imposed upon them the necessity of adhering to the views of the Cardinal with whom they had originated. The only difference was that they were more independent, and that the hand which held them all together in its powerful grasp was felt to be no longer there.

In the summer of 1743 much attention was excited by a proposal which a servant of the French government from Strasburg was reported to have laid before the Elector of Mayence. Its purport was, that if the Emperor were reinstated in his hereditary dominions, France was ready to make common cause with the Queen for the recovery of Silesia. That this proposal was made does not admit of a doubt, though we cannot discover at whose instigation or by whose orders. Prince Charles and Count Khevenhüller very seriously debated whether the Queen ought not to enter into the negotiation; and rejected it mainly because they suspected some trick on the part of the French ministers.†

* The first who openly attempted this, Chauvelin, who had been once before exiled by the Cardinal as being too ambitious, was on this account sent forty leagues farther from Paris. Others were more cautious, and therefore did not succeed in obtaining any share of power.

† Vous ne doutez pas, que ce Hatzel, qui a negocié ou plu-

And in fact the latter shortly after made an attempt in a totally opposite direction, to invite King Frederick to renew the war. The agent they employed was most remarkable; it was no less a person than Voltaire; and the history of the affair was as follows:—

Voltaire, too, had the ambition (if we may use that word) to become the successor of Cardinal Fleury; he wished to succeed to his chair as member of the French Academy. He hoped that body would regard it as a sort of honour to replace the man who had held in his hands the reins of Europe, by one whose sole distinction was due to his talents and learning. When we read his letters we see that his soul panted to return to the capital, the centre of French life; and it would have been well worth while to receive this powerful writer, who was not insensible to outward distinctions, once more within its circle. In the hope of being admitted, he took care to set forth whatever religious sentiments or moral dispositions he could command. But considerations of this kind cannot influence learned bodies. The ecclesiastical members who then sat in the Academy would not have a man of such questionable religion as a colleague; they preferred a bishop.

This excited in Frederick,—who was at that moment studying in manuscript Voltaire's great historical works, the 'Essai sur les Mœurs,' the 'Esprit des

tôt brouillé a Mayence, ne soit un temeraire, qui serait puni si vous le vouliez. Voltaire to Frederick, Beuchot, LIV. p 600.

Nations,' and the 'Siècle de Louis XIV.,' and admired him more than ever,—the wish and the hope of inducing him to come to live with him. What, he asked, could attach him to Paris, where pious ignorance triumphed over talents and acquirements? The light-minded public would not always be disposed to greet him with their plaudits; he had better come to Berlin, where he would be fully appreciated and admired, not only for the moment, but for ever; there should be his country; he had only to make and specify his own conditions. Whatever appeared to him to conduce to the enjoyment and comfort of life should be provided for him, and yet he should remain free; he should feel no ties but those of friendship and happiness.

But Voltaire cherished very different thoughts; his ambition was to step out of the domain of literature, and to play a political part. The appointment of the Bishop of Mirepoix to the administration of ecclesiastical affairs excited his displeasure, because he attributed the failure of his attempt to enter the Academy to that prelate, but he only attached himself the more closely to the other ministers who were favourably disposed towards him. From the Hague, whither he first repaired, he sent them reports, copies of despatches, which were frequently circulated there, and the lists of the troops of the republic; nor did he neglect to submit opinions and plans of his own. Whilst the King of Prussia was wishing to have him at his court as a literary friend, in whose society he might forget the cares of government, Voltaire, turning to account the confidence Frederick

showed him, solicited the ministry to give him some political mission to Berlin. Voltaire hoped to shine as a mediator between France and Prussia, as Prior had done between France and England.*

Though Amelot gave him no credentials, he actually intrusted him with a commission.

Voltaire arrived at Berlin in September, 1743, in a semi-diplomatic character. He represented to the King that France was more powerful than he imagined; that Prussia had nothing to expect from England, or from Austria, but new aggressions; that there was a large party in Holland favourable to peace, which ought to be encouraged; according to him, Frederick ought suddenly to appear on the Lower Rhine at the head of an army, which would decide everything.

Frederick had several conversations with Voltaire on political subjects; but how little was the latter capable of understanding the King's system! When Frederick, with perfect truth, affirmed that the report that he had offered the Queen auxiliaries against France was utterly false, Voltaire thought it a proof of extreme cleverness and penetration to disbelieve him. Frederick's opinion was, that, of all men living, Voltaire was the least fitted for a politician, and at last he told him the only message with which he would charge him was to recommend the

* Letter to Amelot, 16th August, LIV. 567. The King expresses himself in such a manner, in the sketch of his memoirs, as to prove that he knew something of it. The matter may have subsequently escaped his memory.

French to behave with more wisdom.* He laughed at the idea of the poet wanting to use him as *Deus ex machinâ* for the developement of the plot of his drama.

Generally speaking, he had the worst opinion of the sagacity, as well as of the energy, of the French ministers; they appeared to him to have no other idea than peace, and yet to seek it in a way by which it could never be attained: he described the French monarchy as a huge body without spirit or nerve.

This, however, was not so entirely the case as he imagined; the King of France and those around him gradually awoke to great activity and vigour.

Louis XV. was deficient neither in talents nor acquirements. His letters are marked by justness of thought and correctness of expression; those written at an early period of his life evince a becoming diffidence of his own powers, reflection and feeling; and sometimes contain acute observations.† He kept

* Two notes from Voltaire to Amelot, which do not appear in the collection of his works by Beuchot, throw some light upon this matter. "5 Juli de la Haye: je suis dans une liaison intime avec quelques étrangers, qui me font part de toutes les affaires et qui me mettront en état de le (Frédéric) brouiller avec l'Angleterre. Berlin 8 Spt. il me paraît de la plus grande consequence, que M' de la Ville m'y (à Bareuth) envoie les nouvelles qui pourront être favorables au roi et à l'empereur, et induire le roi de Prusse à vous servir." The most remarkable points are the questions put by Voltaire, and the King's answers, No. 1253, in Beuchot. But as they contain some mention of an impending journey to Baireuth, the correspondence must have taken place in the beginning of September, and not in October.

† Some of these letters are printed in the *Memoirs of Noailles*. Petitot, vol. 73, p. 291, 320 f.

continually before his eyes the model of Louis XIV., whose autocratic government he desired to imitate, though not to the exclusion of seeking and taking good advice; he complained that the Cardinal had not initiated him more deeply into public business; probably because he wished to retain the exclusive management of it; and expressed the hope that men of talents and merit would no longer be kept under by a prejudiced and partial despot, who would tolerate no opinions but his own, but would attach themselves to their sovereign: it was his ambition to bring things to an honourable conclusion. If we were to suggest the question (which is one of general psychological interest) wherein lay the principal difference between these two princes, we should not find an answer to it in the common remark that the one was more dissolute than the other; for, in the early years at least of Louis XV., this was not the case; nor that he had less firmness, for he did not lightly relinquish what he had once grasped: nor that he was possessed of fewer of the appliances of power; for, on the contrary, the kingdom was enlarged by the acquisition of a whole province—the difference lay in a fundamental quality of the two natures. Louis XIV. lived and moved in public affairs with all the vigour of an energetic soul, and impressed upon them a general direction in harmony with the grandeur and brilliancy of his personal qualities. Louis XV. lacked the courage and resolution necessary to do this; when he received the reports of his ministers, nothing interested him but the occurrences of Paris, the distribution of favours and places, or personal

anecdotes of foreign courts; business for its own sake, work as work, had no attractions for him; nor would he have remained at the summit of affairs had he not been constantly stimulated by others. These were—the Duke de Noailles, who urged a more active prosecution of the war; Cardinal Tencin, who advised a more comprehensive view of the policy of the country; and, to omit nothing, the King's mistress, the Duchess de Chateauroux, who tried to gloss over the infamy of her position by her efforts to restore France to its ancient splendour, and to become the Diane de Poitiers of Louis XV. At length incidents occurred which strengthened these personal impulses by the addition of one more powerful, and arising from the nature of events.

At the very time that the court of France thought it had gained over the King of Sardinia, that sovereign concluded the treaty of Worms, which had been constructed with a view to the annihilation of the Bourbon power in Italy. Though it was not probable that France would ever suffer Don Carlos to be driven from the throne of Sicily and Naples, of which he had but just taken possession, the danger which impended over those countries was also menacing to her, in so far as it might induce the court of Spain to yield the contested points concerning America, and to conclude a separate peace. So Lord Carteret seemed to understand it when he declared that he had thus pointed his batteries against Spain.

Besides this, France was threatened within her own frontiers. Everybody knew Lord Stair's plans; and had the Austrians and English advanced more rapidly

in the autumn of 1743, had Prince Eugene and Marlborough (as Noailles remarked) led on the allies instead of George II. and Prince Charles, things might have assumed a very formidable aspect for France.

In October, 1743, the Family Compact concluded with Spain ten years before, was renewed in an extended form. Louis XV. undertook to adopt the differences between Spain and England as his own; he promised not to consent to any reconciliation with the latter till Gibraltar and Port Mahon were restored to Spain; he pledged himself to force the English to destroy their colonies in Georgia, which they had no right to establish, as well as all the fortresses they had erected on Spanish ground: on the other hand, the King of Spain bound himself to revoke all the commercial privileges enjoyed by the English in South America. The immediate aim of their military operations was, however, to be Italy. Here Don Philip was to be reinstated in the possession of Milan, Parma, and Piacenza, the right of the Farnesi to Castro and Ronciglione was to be asserted and established, and everything that the French crown had ceded to the King of Sardinia at the peace of Utrecht was to be wrested from him. The number of troops to be furnished by each party for the approaching campaign, was determined; and as many privateers as possible were to be fitted out in all the ports of the allies, in order to destroy the English shipping.*

* Segundo pacto de familia, concluido en Fontainebleau el 25 de Octubre de 1743, in Cantillo, *Tratados de paz*, 307.

To these projects an unexpected one was now annexed; the Bourbons once more openly espoused the claim of the Stuarts to the throne of England.

The report, which suddenly reached England from Vienna, and was soon confirmed from other quarters, that Charles Edward, the son of the Pretender, had disappeared from Rome, and, spite of the numbers and strength of the English navy on the coast of Italy, had proceeded to France by sea, excited great and universal interest. On his arrival in that country he was not received at court, nor could he obtain an interview with Louis XV.; he was obliged to remain in strict concealment at Gravelines, and content himself for the present with the distant view of the white cliffs of Albion.* It was afterwards discovered that several English, and still more Scottish Jacobites, had entered into a correspondence with the French court, and had instigated the Prince to this attempt. The house of Hanover did not feel itself so secure on the English throne as not to be thrown into some anxiety by such an event.

We are perfectly astonished when we call to mind the manifold projects which were the offspring of this period. The supremacy of France over Europe—the separation of Bohemia from Austria—the erection of a new kingdom of Bavaria, and the transformation of the Germanic Empire by means of an extensive secularization—the restitution of Naples and Sicily, Alsatia and Lorraine, to the house of Austria—and, lastly, the restoration of the Stuarts to the throne of England;—all these schemes were

* Lord Mahon, History of England, vol. ii.

successively entertained. The projects of the seventeenth century and those of the nineteenth touch.

At this moment, when France was animated by fresh zeal and ardour, when she was busily arming in every seaport and throughout the length and breadth of the land, when there was a serious talk of a change in the ministry, Frederick II. once more turned his eyes towards her.

It might have been imagined that as a mighty and violent struggle between the western powers was imminent, he might the more easily have remained quiet and enjoyed his neutrality.

He has himself pronounced that he could have done this; and that nothing would have moved him from the secure position he had taken up, had not the interests of the Emperor urged him to relinquish it.*

It is true that Spain and France had not forgotten the Emperor, whose authority would be useful to them for the recovery of Parma and Piacenza; they repeated their promises that they would defend his rights, and raise Bavaria to such a pitch of greatness that she might counterbalance the power of Austria; but it is no less clear that the main object of the Bourbons lay in a totally different direction, and that a really efficient intervention in Germany was neither to be expected nor, indeed, to be wished from them. The only means by which the

* S. M. Imp^e me fera la justice, que ce n'est que ses intérêts qui me menent a ce que je me suis proposé de faire pour elle, et que sans cela il n'y auroit ni acquisitions ni quoique soit au monde, qui me feroit sortir de l'assiette où je me trouve actuellement. 7th May, 1744.

Emperor could receive any solid assistance as regarded his German interests was by a rising in his favour on the part of the Germans themselves, who might take advantage of the opportunity afforded by any serious movement of the Bourbon powers. Frederick conceived the idea of carrying this into execution. It not only seemed to him necessary to unite the Prussian and Bourbon (and, what is more, the German and French) interests; but he held it to be practicable. Let us accompany his policy step by step.

The first and most important thing was to strengthen the Emperor. He had already frequently advised the French to gain over by subsidies some of the princes of Germany to the side of the Emperor; for example, the Duke of Gotha, but more especially the Prince Vicegerent of Hessen, who was well inclined that way since the failure of his negotiation with Lord Carteret. This advice they had hitherto constantly rejected, on the plea that the pecuniary succours which they had again furnished to the Emperor were so considerable as to render it impossible for them to burthen themselves with other obligations. At length, however, in the beginning of the year 1744, in consequence of the united urgent representations of Montijo and of Chavigny, the French ambassador accredited to the court of Frankfurt, who had just arrived at Paris,—the conviction that something more must be done forced itself upon them. In a very animated sitting of the privy council, in which Noailles distinguished himself by his earnestness, it was resolved to provide Chavigny with the means

of enabling the Prince of Hessen to break off his connexion with England, and to place six thousand men in the pay of the Emperor.

Such, then, was the situation of the sovereigns of Germany that, without foreign assistance, they could neither maintain their troops nor take any political step. The arms they wielded shed renown on their names, but failed to secure their independence.

Hereupon Frederick was enabled to take a second step, and to bring to a conclusion the union which he had so long endeavoured to effect. Though the only parties to it were the Emperor, the Elector Palatine (who had all along made common cause with the Emperor), the King of Prussia, and the Prince of Hessen Cassel, its object and bearing was far more extensive and general.

Frederick's intention in forming this union was by no means to make it subservient to the interest of the French, or to concede to them a peculiar influence over it. Chavigny had made a draft of a compact, in pursuance of which France was immediately, as a preliminary measure, to be received into the union as guarantee of the peace of Westphalia, and the Queen of Hungary to be threatened with war if she did not at once acknowledge the Emperor and restore his hereditary dominions. Frederick rejected every part of this draft and substituted for it one of a far less warlike character. The Queen was certainly to be called upon to acknowledge the Emperor, to reinstate him in his hereditary dominions, and to leave the decision of their differences to the Empire; but she was not to be threatened with force, only "all ima-

ginable good offices" were to be used to induce her to consent. The demand for the restitution of Bavaria was founded on the regulations of the ancient association of Electors; but the contracting parties mutually guaranteed only the territories of which they were actually in possession; and would not pledge themselves to reconquer for the Emperor what he had lost. Whether this plan would succeed is another question; but the intention, at least, was to keep distinct the alliance with France and the union of German princes of the Empire. In the original document France was not mentioned. Frederick's idea was to lay the foundation of a general union, by which no one was to be injured or offended, but only the authority of the Empire revived, and the way prepared for a decision of all these contested points, according to its established forms.*

It is, however, perfectly evident that by these means alone the Emperor could not be maintained

* This treaty, which was signed on the 22nd of May, 1744 (Wenk, II. 163), must be considered as a work of the month of March of that year: nothing was altered at a subsequent period, but the matter was brought to a conclusion. The supposed secret article, which is likewise to be found in Wenk, is a fiction. There was at one time a question about it; but it was to contain nothing more than an invitation to France to join them. The King rejected it on the 2nd of April, in the following terms: "ich halte es besser, dass dieser Articul zur Zeit ganz wegbleibe, denn ich erst sehen muss, was die Franzosen vor Effecte thun, und ob sie vigourens agiren werden, bevor ich mich auf Articles séparés et secrets einlasse."—(I hold it to be better that for the present this article be entirely omitted, for I must first see what the French can do, and whether they will act with vigour, before I can enter into articles séparés et secrets.)

on his throne, nor any check opposed to the encroachments of the house of Austria. King Frederick had, as we know, resolved once more to devote all his energies to this object. The contingent events connected with it rendered a third negotiation necessary.

As the project of making a provision for the Emperor out of the revenues of secularised bishoprics was now wholly out of the question, in consequence of the contemplated union of the Estates of the Empire in their ancient form, the once-abandoned plan of conquering Bohemia for him, in case a rupture with Austria should become inevitable, was now revived, and with it the wish which Frederick had so ardently cherished before the peace of Breslau, of getting possession of the circles of Pardubitz and Königingrätz for himself. It was said even by those immediately around him, that the whole project originated solely in his desire of conquering these circles in order to increase the number of his troops, an object which it is sufficiently notorious he had extremely at heart. The acquisition of those districts would certainly have been of great advantage to him; but that he would have thought it worth while to break with Austria from that motive alone is incredible: he was not such a madman as to endanger his whole position for the sake of the acquisition of two circles. He repeatedly affirms that his sole intention was to uphold the Emperor, and not to allow the Empire to become dependent on Austria. His assertion has since been believed by the most incredulous. The idea of demanding of the Emperor the cession of those two circles, in case he should succeed in con-

quering Bohemia for him, occupied only the second place in his mind; for the conquest must have been achieved by him, and would have required such an exertion of all the powers, such a drain of all the resources of his kingdom, and would have been so pregnant with danger, that he had a right to expect some compensation.

(The Emperor had no objection to offer. He declared himself ready to make every concession to the King, on whom the success of the undertaking entirely depended; to comply with everything which he might deem reasonable and just; he only desired that, in order to avert all disputes for the future, the boundaries of the ceded territory might be distinctly marked beforehand.*

The interests of the Emperor and those of the King were once more strictly coincident. By a union in the Empire, which would give a peaceful support to his cause, and by the conquest of Bohemia, the former would be placed in a situation suitable to the dignity of his office. To the latter it would be an inestimable advantage not to allow Austria to acquire a supremacy in the Empire a second time by force of arms; he would also gain an extension of territory.

(All this, however, could not be set on foot without a new understanding with France: this was the

* Seckendorf to Frederick, 7th April: "L'empereur ne connaissant que trop le service que V. M. lui peut rendre—convient qu'Elle peut pretendre de bon droit des conveniences proportionnées aux hazards, embarras et risques, qu'elle en court."

fourth of Frederick's negotiations at this time, and the most important and perilous of all.

On this occasion Frederick did not wait, as in the year 1741, when he did not determine to join the alliance proposed to him until every attempt to obtain his rights by any other means had proved abortive; he now made spontaneous advances to the French. With a conviction that war was inevitable and a grand alliance necessary, and, as usual, in the profoundest secrecy, without discussing the matter even with the tried and trusty Podewils, he despatched one of his most confidential personal friends, Count Rothenburg, as ambassador to Versailles.

Count Rothenburg might be regarded as the natural mediator between Prussia and France. The family to which he belonged had estates both in the duchy of Crossen and in Alsatia; he himself had learned the profession of arms in the French service, had accompanied a Spanish expedition to Africa, and had come to Berlin shortly after Frederick's accession to the throne; he was staying at Rheinsberg at the moment the news of the Emperor's death arrived there. Frederick found in him a union of French grace and German judgment, which appeared to him to constitute a model of perfection. Their letters are confidential outpourings of opinions on the most various subjects—theatre, art, events of the day, but chiefly military affairs. Rothenburg was heart and soul a soldier. Speaking of the service in time of peace, he says that he fully sees the value and necessity of incessant practice; he would not be content with mediocrity, but strive after a distinguished re-

putation. In the field he was always foremost ; at Chotusitz he and Buddenbrock led on the Prussian cavalry in the first successful charge. He received a wound there, which heightened the King's attachment to him. Rothenburg, on his side, declared that he had no other aim in life but to please and serve the King.

This was the military ambassador whom Frederick chose to make overtures to France. If any instructions were drawn up for his guidance, they are not now forthcoming ; at all events, Rothenburg was informed of all the King's views and opinions by daily intercourse with him. Seckendorf had just been at Berlin, and a few projects of a preliminary nature had been drawn up with his assistance, nor can I discover that Rothenburg took with him anything beyond papers of this kind. He must have left Berlin about the 21st of February, 1744 ; his travelling expenses were not paid out of the legation fund, but out of those of the cabinet, which were administered by Eichel.

The difficulties which Rothenburg had to encounter were not such as usually arise out of the conflicting interests of two states : they related entirely to the opposition in the views of those by whom the King of France was surrounded.

The reports which Rothenburg sent in from Paris present a very remarkable contradiction. At first he thought it best to address himself to the ministers actually charged with the government of the country ; he made communications to them all, to the comptroller-general, to the minister of marine, and like-

wise to Amelot. They were unanimous in the opinion that an alliance between France and Prussia was most desirable; the conditions were not so easily agreed upon, especially since Frederick now insisted upon some fresh ones. Hereupon Rothenburg attached himself to the opponents of these ministers: to Marshal de Noailles, with whom he was related; to Marshal de Belleisle, who had been out of favour ever since the failure of his campaigns in Germany, but nevertheless continued to exercise the secret influence of a gifted and consistent counsellor; to Cardinal Tencin, and, above all, to the Duke de Richelieu, who enjoyed the King's good graces to an eminent degree. Nor did Rothenburg scruple to place himself in communication with Madame de Chateauroux, who, as we have already mentioned, was endeavouring to inspire the King with feelings of military ambition. In her apartments he saw the King, and talked with him upon political subjects. He told him one day that he did not think he should be able to come to an agreement with Amelot; Louis XV. replied that Amelot should not conduct the negotiation with the King of Prussia, or indeed continue much longer at the head of affairs. In a short time, accordingly, this minister received his dismissal. In one of his reports to King Frederick, Rothenburg says, quite coolly, that he has combined with Noailles, Belleisle, and Richelieu to overthrow Amelot. It has been asserted in France that Frederick II. caused the fall of that minister, and not without truth, in so far as the King can be held responsible for the actions of his plenipotentiary; but

in fact Frederick took no part in the affair himself, nor had he even in the remotest manner commissioned Rothenburg to attempt anything of the kind. The change of ministry had long been prepared in France, and it may be doubted whether Rothenburg was not rather the instrument of others than, as he imagined, the original mover in the affair. But when the change had actually taken place, the negotiation assumed the same character at the court of France as at that of Prussia; it was carried on quite beside the ordinary course of business, and became, as it were, a personal matter between the two monarchs.

In the very earliest times, at the acquisition of Crossen, the Rothenburgs had attached themselves to the house of Brandenburg; subsequently one branch of the family had taken military service in France, where they had risen to great consideration at court and in the army: it may be looked upon as the culminating point of their fortunes when a Count Rothenburg, belonging to both these states, contributed to the overthrow of a French minister and executed a personal mission from one king to the other relating to the most important affairs, without the intervention of a Prussian minister.

Spite of all his devotion to Frederick, Rothenburg at times assumed a tone almost of independence. It was contrary to Frederick's wish that he made any positive proposals. Rothenburg was quite elated when the French readily accepted the most important of these, relating to the conquest of the Bohemian circles. He wrote to the King, saying that

these circles were the best and most advantageously situated part of that country ; that within a few months he, the King, might fix himself in the possession of them ; but that if he neglected to seize this opportunity of so doing, it would never return, and he would be unable to resume negotiations with France.

It may be doubted whether Rothenburg fully understood the posture of affairs or appreciated the value which the renewal of the Prussian alliance necessarily had for the French at that time, and also whether he did not estimate too highly the sanction of France to the acquisition of the Bohemian circles ; these, however, were trifling mistakes : on the whole he executed Frederick's intentions well, and fully understood the military character of the treaty he had to conclude.

The conditions agreed upon were as follows:—The King of France, regardless of the Barrier Treaty, was to invade the Netherlands with his best troops, in order to give full occupation to the maritime powers, the basis of whose policy would thus be endangered. At the same time a French army was to advance through Westphalia, so as to threaten Hanover. It was taken for granted that the main body of the Austrian army would invade Alsatia, in which case the King of Prussia promised—but under very definite conditions—to enter Bohemia with 80,000 men ; should the Prince thereupon fall back upon Lorraine, the French army was to pursue him. Louis XV., who intended to take the field himself, declared that he would do all that was in his

power to that end.* This combination, supported by the imperial army, seemed likely to bring about a great revolution in the affairs of Germany; France and Prussia never doubted that they should have completely the upper hand, and be able to conclude a peace to their own advantage. The King of France was to have possession of the barrier towns of Ypres, Courtrai, and Furnes, and other districts in the Low Countries; the Emperor was to be made King of Bohemia; the King of Prussia was to have sundry Bohemian circles and the whole of Upper Silesia.

Frederick insisted upon one other condition, which was very odious to the French: he refused to take the field until the triple alliance with Sweden and Russia was concluded. The French inferred that in this case he would not adhere to the time fixed for the renewal of hostilities, namely, the month of August; but, on the other hand, they felt that the main point was to detach the King of Prussia from the interests of their enemies, and to draw him into a close, even though imperfect, alliance with France.†

* Qu'il agiroit avec ses armées toujours de façon à soulager le roi de Prusse autant qu'il le doit et qu'il le pourra, en suivant le prince de Lorraine aussitôt qu'il voudra quitter les rives du Rhin.

† Observations générales sur le traité, sent by Tencin to Noailles: "Comme ce traité, quelque defectueux qu'il soit en ce point, ne peut contribuer qu'à attirer le roi de Prusse dans les intérêts de l'empereur et du roi et de l'éloigner de ceux des ennemis communs, sans qu'il en naisse d'inconvenient nouveau qui puisse porter aucun préjudice à la situation des affaires, il ne parait pas convenable de faire aucune difficulté qui puisse en empêcher la conclusion." Noailles to Tencin, 2 Juin. "V^e Emi-

After making a few ineffectual attempts to get this condition withdrawn, they signed the treaty at Paris on the 5th of June. Meanwhile Louis XV. was gone to the army of the Netherlands; in order to avoid exciting attention he had caused the treaty to be concluded in Paris, instead of in the camp.

Thus then was this fellowship in arms renewed, which two years before had been broken off because it could lead to no further result. Just as the French had resolved to carry on the war which they had formally declared under the Prussian influence, with increased vigour, they suddenly received assistance and support from a quarter whence they had ceased to look for it. Frederick II. hoped to escape from the hostile influences which pressed upon him by a resolute intervention in this struggle. The course he took was bold and perilous, and many, both at the time and subsequently, have doubted whether it were the right.

Frederick did not confide the secret to his ministers until the affair was wholly settled and the treaty concluded. He then himself summed up the arguments which might be urged on either side; and sought to prove that the interests of his state necessarily filled him with the most pressing cares as to the conduct of Austria and England, and compelled him to pursue the course he had taken. He began by calling to mind that Jägerndorf and the highlands had been wrung from him at the first conclusion of the peace, and that although it was
nence a touché la raison décisive. Nos projets ne souffriroient aucun changement par ce traité."

perfectly true that every man tried to keep all he possibly could, that did not alter the fact that the possession of those mountain-passes by another power was very dangerous to the country. Why, too, he asked, did the Queen of Hungary try to bring about a revolution and change of dynasty in Russia, in favour of the house of Brunswick? She could have no other motive—for she was not at war with the Turks—than to employ that power against Prussia. Whatever interpretation might be put upon the treaty of Worms and the alliance with Saxony, they manifestly were intended in a spirit of hostility towards Prussia. People said that the Queen's finances were exhausted, but such an objection as that could deceive none but children; her provinces afforded incalculable resources, and moreover, she could command the money of the English. He said that Podewils, who refused to believe in her enmity, reminded him of Count Sinzendorf, who, in the year 1733, still dreamed of peace with France at the very time when the French were attacking Philippsburg. The Queen thought herself injured, and was proud, determined, and revengeful. It were folly to imagine that she was awed by the Silesian fortresses or the Prussian army. The Austrians were proud of their ancient greatness: vain of their success, full of chimerical plans, and intoxicated by their alliances, they thought the King of Prussia far too weak to offer them any further resistance.

On the other hand, he continued, it was impossible to rely on the English. Lord Carteret had intentionally avoided to settle the little differences be-

tween Hanover and Brandenburg, in order to reserve to England the possibility of territorial aggrandizement; while in Russia he had done everything to prevent that power from guaranteeing Silesia: * the pretence, indeed, was that it had only been done in order to bind Prussia completely to England; but still it showed a want of truth and faith. In the same manner, when the English troops were advancing, in the year 1743, he had given assurances which the sequel had entirely belied. How, then, if it were conceded that the imperial dignity should revert to the house of Austria? Prussia would then have three-fourths of Europe against her. He would be lost if he permitted the Queen to add one stone after another to the edifice she was building, and to advance, step by step, to accomplish his overthrow.

The King did not succeed in entirely convincing his ministers. They thought that he would have nothing to fear from Austria if the Northern Alliance were formed: now, he would be fighting only for France, who found in him a valiant ally, but would not on that account make the slightest exertion in his behalf, or, as Podewils expressed it, "would not set one pot the more on his fire;" he would gain nothing by it; the Queen would certainly consent to be buried alive rather than sacrifice one circle of Bohemia; nor would it be possible to induce the maritime powers to consent to her losing Bohemia, for they were persuaded, justly or unjustly, that the balance

* Ayant corrompu les Bestuchefs (Carteret) faisoit naître par leur canal des incidents toujours nouveaux pour empêcher cette garantie.

of power in Europe would be in danger, if Austria were to lose Bohemia. Podewils did not disapprove Frederick's exertions in the Emperor's behalf; but that, too, he thought might have been managed differently. If one man was drowning, it surely was not the natural duty of another to jump into the water, at the peril of his own life, to save him.*

Other statesmen of the time, too—friends of Frederick, such as Lord Chesterfield—were not to be persuaded that his conduct in this case had been judicious and right. What he alleged was certainly calculated to rouse his suspicions, but did not constitute a valid ground for war: Hugo Grotius would not be satisfied with it, if he could rise from the dead.

Frederick replied to Lord Chesterfield, that he spoke like an Englishman; he did not know the difference between an Emperor who lived in Vienna, and one who held his seat in the centre of Germany, and this difference was most essential. People might contend about words and forms of law, but no King of Prussia, in the situation in which he was placed in the beginning of the year 1744, could consistently have acted otherwise than he had done. He would be a friend to his friends, but not their humble servant. He would not be obsequious to people who had nothing but their own convenience in view, and continually brought him into conflict with his own true interests.

(If we follow the current of events we distinctly

* *L'amour bien ordonné doit commencer de soi-même, et vouloir sauver quelqu'un prêt à se noyer aux dépens à périr soi-même, paraît répugner à la nature.*

(see that a new recourse to arms was inevitable. In the year 1742, when the peace was concluded, King Frederick had thought to maintain the power of the Emperor, and by that means a suitable state of things in the Empire; to conclude a defensive alliance with the maritime powers; to bring about a good understanding with Austria, as well as with Russia; and thus to establish the security of his conquest and his position: England, Austria, and the Bourbons might carry on the struggle between themselves in a manner commensurate with their respective powers, so that it did not re-act upon Germany.

But instead of this, it was precisely in Germany that the battle had been fought out: and the project of annihilating the Emperor, and altering all the territorial relations, had been entertained. When Frederick intimated that he would not suffer this, the policy of England and Austria assumed a decidedly hostile character; and there is no doubt that he was menaced and jeopardized in the possessions he had acquired.

It may be asked, how it happened that Frederick did not, from the first, foresee this. The answer is, that though the former result seemed to him more desirable and more probable, and his policy therefore was guided by it; yet he had always seen the possibility of the latter. But he reckoned that if things should go so far, he would be able, with his military force, to restore them to such a state as he desired.

This moment seemed to him now to be arrived. The projects against him were made, the batteries erected; his enemies only waited till they should be

free from other occupation to attack him; he must therefore anticipate them. He was forced to go to war to counteract the open and manifest designs of his enemies. It was true that his position was not the most favourable that could be imagined for an offensive war, but it would every day become worse. He must, therefore, make a virtue of necessity, and crown the conquest of Silesia by consolidating and securing its possession.*

“I preferred,” said he afterwards, “to make the matter worse rather than suffer myself to be trampled upon by my enemies; I chose war, with the danger of falling—but with honour.”

* “Articles qui donnent lieu aux justes apprehensions que le roi doit avoir des desseins pernicieux de la reine de Hongrie et du roi d’Angleterre;” and “Articles qui doivent rassurer le roi contre les desseins de la reine d’Hongrie et du roi d’Angleterre.” These articles are written in two columns on the same page. Ten points are then placed in counterposition to each other; then follows: “Le cas exposé s’ensuit la question, que faut-il faire pour se precautionner contre les dangers qui menacent le roi de Prusse.” In the original copy of Frederick’s Memoirs, this paper is followed pretty closely, though with some additions and variations; but in the second printed edition it is less complete and much altered.

EIGHTH BOOK.

CHAPTER I.

BREAKING OUT OF THE WAR.

IN the beginning of June, 1744, when Frederick was using the baths of Pyrmont, he had an interview in one of the adjacent woods, to which the walks of this watering-place lead, with Count Mortaigne, the French military plenipotentiary, whom an adjutant had been sent to fetch from the neighbourhood. They went together deeper into the wood until they reached a seat, where they entered into a long conversation, turning first upon the selection of commanders for the French army, the choice of whom had again been influenced by personal motives—the very natural discontent of the Emperor at seeing his army exposed to every sort of privation; and above all, on the manner of combining their respective military operations. The first and strongest inspirations of authors and artists are derived from the great features of their subjects; how far more deeply must the politician or the strategist be affected by the importance of some combination through which he may hope, by a bold application of all his strength at the right moment, to give some wished-for turn

to public affairs. The pith of Frederick's new alliance was a plan of campaign, for which he lived and moved in drawing up schemes. The basis of the whole appeared to him to be the making himself master of Prague: this alone could rouse Saxony out of its state of indecision, and at the same time procure to his troops the necessary means of subsistence. But, to enable him to carry out this plan, he demanded two months' time, during which the French army must occupy the attention of the Austrians and reconquer Bavaria.* In a letter to Louis XV., Frederick said that the Queen's power then rested upon three main props—the possession of Bavaria, the subsidies she drew from Bohemia, and the English-Hanoverian support. By following his plans, all these resources would be taken from her.

One great cause for uneasiness still existed in his mind: in spite of the personal advances he had received from Russia, to which we have already alluded, he nevertheless was not quite sure of that power. Even before Frederick informed his ministers of his plans, he communicated them to his ambassador in St. Petersburg, and directed him, should he find the dispositions of the court favourable, to

* Copie de la minute que M^r le C^{te} de Mortaigne a écrite sous la dictée du roi de Prusse dans le bois à un quart de lieue de Pymont le 7 Juin, with a letter to Belleisle, dated, Frankfurt, 17th June. In it he remarks that the King had the following subjects of anxiety:—(1) "sur son traité avec les Moeovites; (2) de ne pouvoir prendre Pragues avant le secours du prince Charles; (3) que la France ne l'abandonne quand il aura levé le bouclier."

make the following proposals to the Empress: either that she should assist him with a body of light troops, or that she should use her influence over the Saxon court to induce it to remain neutral; or that if she would not act with him, she should, at any rate, promise not to act against him.*

Mardefeld, who from long residence was completely at home in Russia, and who performed his duties with dispatch, secrecy, and ability, wrote word to the King in reply, that he must not reckon upon any armed assistance, as the Russian government at present avoided every cause of expenditure: he added, however, that the Empress still wished the triple alliance to be brought about, and that, so far as his great enterprise was concerned, she had declared that she would throw no impediment in his way.†

Under these circumstances there was no need of a formal negotiation. A few days later the Empress repeated the declaration she had already made; with this the King could for the present rest content. The marriage of the Crown-Prince of Sweden with the Princess Ulrica of Prussia, which was solemnized soon after the return of the court from Pymont, laid the foundation of a family connexion, from which some political results might be expected.

Things had proceeded thus far when an event oc-

* (Il faut) que je suis bien avec la Russie soit pour la faire entrer dans le plan, que je me propose, ou du moins qu'elle n'y apporte d'empêchement.

† Mardefeld, 19th April: "L'imperatrice a positivement assuré qu'elle ne mettroit point d'empêchement à certaine grande affaire." This was reiterated on the 23rd.

curred which made it advisable, under the existing circumstances, to act immediately.

Louis XV. had opened the campaign in the Netherlands with an army of 100,000 men, in good condition, and provided with an excellent battering-train. In order to alarm the Dutch he had directed his attack chiefly against the barrier towns. First the smaller, such as Waasten, Furnes, and Fort Knokke, then the larger, like Menin and Ypres, were taken. The presence of the monarch, who began to show some interest in military affairs, materially assisted the enterprise: it was hoped that he would acquire as great a taste for war as he had hitherto shown for the chase.

Things went very differently on the Upper Rhine, where Marshal Coigny commanded an army far inferior in numbers to the Austrian forces under the Prince of Lorraine and Marshal Traun. This was the same Coigny at whose appointment to so important a post Frederick had declared his dissatisfaction at Pymont. The Austrians made use of a stratagem, which has proved successful for the passage of rivers both in modern and ancient times. While they drew the attention of the enemy by feigned preparations for crossing the river at some places lower down, they effected a passage some way higher up, almost without opposition. The Hungarians did the best service, in which they were assisted by some Servian Pandours, who made the banks of the Rhine resound with their unintelligible war-cries. The Queen, on this occasion, assured the Hungarian nation of her especial thanks. Coigny suddenly found himself hard

pressed: he was first compelled to reconquer Weisenburg, which had already fallen into the enemy's hands. When he returned to Hagenau, he still feared that he should not be able to hold Alsatia. He therefore sent most pressing entreaties for assistance to Louis XV., who immediately set himself in motion with his army, in order to clear the French territory of the invading foe.

The same cause induced Frederick to take up arms. Without waiting, as he would otherwise have done, until the projected triple alliance was concluded, he announced to Louis XV. that by the middle of August he would bring his army into the field, and that towards the end of the same month he would be before Prague.

But he did not promise this without calling attention to the service he was rendering them, and to the claim which he thus acquired to a return: he likewise repeated his two principal demands, that the Imperial and French troops should advance upon Bavaria, and a French corps threaten Hanover: without this the whole thing would fail. Mindful of former disasters, he ventured moreover to add a few words of advice. This he was chiefly led to do by the fact, that on the frontiers of an enemy's country the French had taken merely defensive measures, whereas offensive operations were always to be preferred, even when the attacking party was the weakest: a bold movement often astonished the enemy and gained the victory. From the time of Condé, the great French commanders of the last century had won for themselves, by the boldness of their attacks, a glory which

neither time nor envy could lessen.* If France did but display courage and decision this time, the war might be brought to a conclusion during the following year. "But there must not be a moment's inaction, and we must strain every nerve in our operations."†

Such was the posture of affairs in Germany, that the advance of either of the two German armies into those territories which had once been severed from the Empire appeared to the other to be fraught with danger to itself. Frederick did not wish to see an enemy, from whom he feared everything, become still more powerful, nor did he wish to give an excuse to France for suddenly concluding a peace in order to get rid of this enemy. The moment seemed to him to have arrived for putting an end to the luck which had hitherto attended the Austrian and English arms, and giving a new turn to affairs: with one blow he might free himself from every danger—the advice which he had given to others, to make a resolute attack, he was determined to enforce by his own example.

After the officers had, in the beginning of August, received especial instructions as to the conduct and maintenance of the troops, in which the experience of the last campaign had been condensed into rules, the various regiments left their quarters.‡ They marched in three columns, under the command of the King, through Saxony towards the Bohemian frontier; a

* *Mémoires de Noailles*. Petitot, LXXIII. 370.

† "Il faut, que tout soit nerf dans nos operations, et qu'il n'y ait aucun moment vide et d'inaction."

‡ The instructions are to be found in Henkel, at the begin-

fourth column, which was the weakest, advanced under Schwerin from Silesia into Bohemia.

Frederick thought himself justified in marching straight through Saxony, as he was waging war in behalf of the Emperor, in whose name he sent the necessary requisitions, drawn up in the usual form, to the Saxon court—Augustus III. was at that moment in Poland—he was, he said, acting solely in the Emperor's behalf in thus proceeding to attack Austria. The court of Vienna, so ran his manifesto, was endeavouring to make a prey of the highest honours of the Empire, which had been bestowed upon the Elector of Bavaria by the free and unanimous choice of the German nation, and to bestow them on a prince who was not even settled in Germany. This proceeding was not only insulting to the Emperor, but still more to those who had chosen him, and destructive to the inestimable right of the Germans to select their own head. He had no other object than to restore freedom to the Empire, the supreme dignity to the Emperor, and peace to Europe.

The Saxon government, upon whom it produced no slight impression that these were "Imperial auxiliary troops" for whom Charles VII. himself demanded permission to cross the Saxon territory, after some little opposition, sent its commissaries to the Prussian quarters, in order to concert measures with the Estates of each province, for the route and

ning of his *Militärischer Nachlass*; but they had been printed before. In the documents there is a third set of instructions for the artillery. Copies were to be given to staff officers, and to none else.

the supplies for the Prussian army.* The Prussian troops paid ready money for all their provisions; the Saxon peasants, far from seeming alarmed by their arrival, even showed a secret joy, and cheerfully supplied them with what was wanted. Forage, horses, and other necessaries were provided, and receipts given for the value, in order to enable the Saxon government to keep an account against the King or the Emperor. The Duke of Weissenfels, who took measures to secure the capital at any rate against a sudden attack, was in all other respects civil and conciliatory. The discipline maintained by the Prussian troops was so good that the Imperial envoy in Dresden complimented the King upon their behaviour, saying, that they had passed through Saxony like Capuchins, but with this difference, that whereas the monks got everything gratis, the Prussians, on the contrary, paid for all they had.

The difficulties which they encountered on their entrance into Bohemia were but trifling. A dam, thrown up across the Elbe to prevent the passage of the boats conveying the Prussian artillery, was

* From the reports of the military Commissioner Winterfeld, of the 7-11th of August, it appears that Henneke and Rex, the Saxon commissioners appointed to attend the conference, considered the demand perfectly legitimate: the only thing that excited any uneasiness was the number of the troops. On the 9th Winterfeld writes: "ich bin nur schon zufrieden, dass ich es durch Drohen und Bitten, Schelten und gute Worte so weit gebracht habe, dass man mir glaubt wie es Ernst."—(I am now satisfied that by dint of threats and entreaties, angry and gentle words, I have brought matters to this point, that people believe me to be in earnest.) The Saxons made great improvements in the route drawn up by the Prussians.

speedily cleared away: the Bergschloss, from which fort the enemy had intended to defend the passage, was soon taken. At the very first encounter with the Austrian hussars, Ziethen, with the loss of only two killed and a few wounded, brought forty prisoners and fifty horses into the Prussian camp. They flattered themselves likewise with the hope of finding no serious resistance on the part of the inhabitants, of whom a great part were supposed to be favourable to the Emperor.

Before leaving Potsdam the King had calculated on which day the Austrian army, informed of his advance, would begin to retreat from the Rhine, and how soon it could meet him in Bohemia. "We must not delay the siege of Prague," said he; "an attack must be made with the utmost vigour, in order to take it at once, and thus protect our rear." He was inclined,—as he wrote to Schwerin,—if Prague were not too strongly fortified, and the marshal agreed with his opinion, "to attack the town by broad daylight on eight different points at once."

The march of the troops was hastened as much as possible: as early as the 1st of September Schwerin arrived before the gates of Prague. Accompanied by Walrabe, he immediately began to inspect the fortifications.

These appeared to be in too good a state to allow them to carry the town by a *coup de main*. The garrison had been strengthened by some battalions of regular troops and by 9000 of the new militia enrolled since the last peace. A party of brave borderers formed part of the garrison and demanded that one

or two of the bastions should be intrusted to them alone, promising to defend them to the last drop of their blood. The walls were provided with about one hundred and fifty guns; several of the outworks, too, especially the Ziskaberg, were in a tolerable state of defence, and the commandant, Count Harsch, determined to await a serious attack.

On the 2nd and 3rd the Prussian army, which was about 80,000 strong, encamped on the Weissenberg before Prague. The Austrian troops quartered in Bohemia, under Bathiany, were far too weak to resist the Prussians; even some Prussian battalions, which had been somewhat rashly sent in advance against Beraun, were not overpowered by them.* As soon as the needful artillery had

* To the various accounts of the affair at Beraun, we will add the following notice from a letter written by Eichel, who had it from the King: "Wie Hake (mit 3 Bat. Inf. und 2 Grenadierb.) ankommt, hält sich das feindliche Corps in dem dortigen sehr häufig befindlichen unpracticablen, doch sehr diffi- cilen Gebirge ganz stille, als aber vermeldete Bataillone in sehr enge Defilees kommen, werden solche mit der grössten Furie von allen Seiten attaquiret, wobei insonderheit die feindliche Cavallerie zwei ganz furiose Attaquen gethan, bei allen diesen diffi- cilen Umständen aber von unseren Bataillouen dergestalt empfangen worden, dass es nicht möglich gewesen solche zu rom- piren, sondern die feindliche Cavallerie genöthigt worden, mit Hintansetzung bis an 500 Todten sich zu retiriren, nachdem die feindliche Artillerie sich vorher schon zurückgezogen."—(As Hake came up with three battalions of infantry and two of grenadiers, the hostile corps remained perfectly quiet in the imprac- ticable or at least very difficult mountains of which there were plenty there; but as the aforementioned battalions entered some very narrow defiles, they were attacked on all sides with the greatest fury, especially by the enemy's cavalry, which made two most

arrived, the Prussians opened the trenches, on the 10th of September. The King was occupied all day in reconnoitring the place and planning the attack: he was in the highest spirits. After the Austrian artillery had directed its fire for a couple of days principally in the direction of the King's quarters, the commandant sent a trumpeter to inquire where these really were placed, as he had orders not to point his cannon in that direction. Frederick replied that his quarters were everywhere in the camp. And accordingly I find mention of some personal danger which he encountered in consequence.

On the 12th of September Schwerin was to storm the redoubts thrown up on the Ziskaberg. The King went to one of his batteries, where he possibly had to give some orders, and whence the attack might be completely overlooked. His brothers, several other princes, and some officers of high rank accompanied him. He warned them not to stand too close together, lest they should excite the attention of the enemy, but his advice was disregarded, and, when he put up his telescope, they all crowded round him, to see what was going forward. At this moment a cannon ball from the fortress plunged in among them, and struck off the head of Margrave Frederick William, who was standing close to the King. Eichel

furious onslaughts upon them. In the midst, however, of all these difficulties the enemy was received in such a manner by our battalions, that he found it impossible to break our lines, and his cavalry was compelled to retreat, leaving about 500 dead: the hostile artillery having retired previously.)

asserts that if the ball had been less spent, and had gone quite straight, it must have struck the King himself; as it was, it hit a page, whom it killed, and grazed the arm of Prince George of Darmstadt. The King took care to inform his mother of the Margrave's death in such a manner that she should not be made still more anxious for the safety of her younger sons, who likewise accompanied the King; he declared that he would never again allow his brothers to accompany him on such occasions. If he would but have a care of his own personal safety, exclaims the privy councillor, while he gives thanks for God's mercy which had preserved him on this occasion. Meanwhile the attack on the Ziskaberg was successful; a volunteer sprang into the first redoubt and called upon his comrades to join him. From these works, hewn in the solid rock, distant about one hundred paces from the ditch of the town, the Prussian artillery was now pointed against the besieged.

On the 13th of September the town was on fire in several places; early on the morning of the 14th more than thirty houses were burnt. Hereupon the inhabitants, who had no wish again to undergo the horrors of a capture by storm, began to murmur, and induced the militia to join them. Pressed on all sides, Count Harsch came to the determination of making proposals of surrender to the King.

On the afternoon of the 14th he offered to evacuate the new and the old town, on condition that he should be suffered to hold possession of the district called the Kleinseite, a proposal which was, of course,

rejected. On the 15th he offered to give up the whole town, provided he and his garrison were allowed free egress. As this, too, was denied, and all the batteries began firing again with great effect, Count Harsch surrendered himself prisoner of war on the 16th of September.

The King wrote, half jestingly, half triumphantly, to Podewils, "It is over; the city is taken about which so much noise was made, and which I was told I should not take so easily as I fancied." He thought he had struck a decisive blow, and that if Saxony did not ally herself with him, as he still hoped, she would not, at any rate, dare to be against him.

And now, in order that those important positions, upon the possession of which so much had turned in the previous campaign, might not fall into the enemy's hands, he advanced to occupy them himself. On the 24th of September General Nassau seized Tabor, and made the inhabitants take the oath of allegiance to the Emperor. A few days later Budweis was invested, after Ziethen had charged and dispersed, sword in hand, the Pandours that went to oppose him. Frederick still held it to be an indisputable maxim in the art of war, to push forward a part of his troops very far in advance; he thought he was prepared for whatsoever Prince Charles might attempt. If the Prince should retire upon Austria, in order to protect it, Seckendorf must in the mean time push on to Schärding and take Passau, whence he could assist the Prussians. But if the Prince, as was more likely, should march towards Bohemia, a battle would ensue; in which case the King did

not doubt of gaining the victory. "I have no fear that the army should give the lie to my prediction that it will gain honour by my enterprise." In the beginning of October he wrote to Berlin that all went on well and promised so to continue; the army was in the best possible condition; the officers and soldiers in high spirits, and anxious to strike a decisive blow. He only regretted that the season was already so far advanced, otherwise much might still be effected during this campaign.

The position he had assumed was certainly very important. He saw Bohemia at his feet, and he hoped in the course of the next year to be able to dictate a peace on his own terms: he never had been more powerful. The whole of Europe was deeply interested in his further success or defeat.

CHAPTER II.

IMMEDIATE EFFECTS OF THE PRUSSIAN ATTACK.

THE invasion by the King of Prussia excited no alarm or serious anxiety in Vienna, but rather opposite feelings.

The opening of the campaign, from which decisive results, both in Germany and in Italy, were expected, was accompanied by unwonted devotional exercises: prayers, which lasted three days and three nights, and which the Queen attended twice a day, morning and noon, coming in from Schönbrunn for the purpose.

The first losses in the Netherlands had filled every one with discouragement. The Queen thought herself justified in complaining of the want of earnest assistance on the part of England; it seemed to her as if the English government saw with complacency the progress made by the French in that quarter, as by this means a tract of country fell into their hands, by giving up which they might one day compensate her for the restitution of Bavaria.

So much the greater was the satisfaction with which the passage of the army across the Rhine was hailed. When the news reached the Queen at Bruck on the Leitha, she hastened back to the capital, where a solemn "Te Deum" was sung in her

presence. It cannot, however, be said that by this movement much progress was made towards the attainment of her chief object—indemnification for the territories which she had ceded. Lorraine could not be seriously attacked, as that province had been given up instead of Tuscany; the towns in Alsatia were so well fortified, especially Strasburg, which had been additionally strengthened by Vauban, that it appeared scarce possible for an army that had been embarrassed by much weaker places, and whose strength lay chiefly in its light troops, to hope to take them.

Meanwhile news came on the 5th of August that the King of Prussia had asked the leave of the court of Dresden for the passage of his heavy artillery through the Saxon territory. On the 7th, the Prussian envoy made an official declaration, to the effect that his master would send auxiliaries to the Emperor, as he could not suffer the troops of the head of the Empire to be driven out of the same, and the Emperor himself turned “root and branch” out of the imperial possessions. The most dangerous opponent of Austria was thus again allied against her, as of old, with France and the Emperor, and meditated an invasion of Bohemia.

This was an event totally unexpected at that moment, running counter to the enterprise then undertaken by Austria, but nevertheless not altogether undesirable.

For—since the attack of the Bavarians and the French had been repelled—the real object of continued hostilities could be no other than to obtain

(some compensation for the territories which Austria had been forced to give up to Prussia. In the pursuit of this object, however, she had to encounter almost insuperable difficulties, arising from the state of European affairs: and it almost seemed as if the most advisable course would be to reconquer Silesia itself. Hitherto this had been prevented by the treaty of Breslau, which was guaranteed by England; but the Austrians now felt themselves relieved from this restriction, as the treaty of Breslau appeared to be broken by this invasion of Bohemia. The court of Vienna wondered at the blind, good-natured zeal which Frederick II. showed in the Emperor's service. The Queen called to mind the earnestness with which proposals for peace had been made to her on the part of the French, leaving her the choice of retaking Silesia. Not only the Queen, but one of her ministers, Count Kinsky, maintained, that a letter from the Empress (the Electress of Bavaria) could be produced, wherein she expressed the same thought.* And yet the King of Prussia was now advancing at his own peril to the assistance of these very courts of Bavaria and of France. Some statesmen began to doubt whether the King of Prussia really possessed the powers of mind ascribed to him. People repeated an expression of Charles VII. that he could not stand, unless he involved Prussia as deeply as possible in his own embarrassments, and it was believed that he had actually succeeded in his object.

* Robinson: "that this court had in his custody under the electrice's own hand a proposal for the restoration of Silesia against the restitution of Bavaria."

The resolution was immediately taken to put aside all other considerations, and to direct the whole force of the nation against the newly arisen foe.

The Queen was full of zeal and activity. She visited the arsenals, and inspected the artillery which had been specially cast for the campaign against the Prussians: she went in person to a meeting of the principal magnates in Presburg, to urge them to rise in a body against the enemy. We see, from a manifesto of Count Palfy, that even the civil institutions which Frederick had introduced into Silesia had roused the indignation of the magnates; "the heavy yoke which he had laid upon them, the insatiable extortions he had practised." How much better off were the Hungarians under a gentle rule, and in the enjoyment of such valuable privileges. They promised an "insurrection," by which they expected to raise above 60,000 men.* The chief point, however, was, that the main army, which had advanced into Alsatia, should march back upon Bohemia, there to oppose its powerful foe: the great question, and that which would in fact decide the matter, was, whether this were possible, and in what condition the army would return.

Field-Marshal Schmettau had been sent by Frederick to the French head-quarters, with instructions to hasten the French in their operations upon Bavaria and Hanover. He was to represent to them that the harder they pressed the Austrians the sooner would

* The number of men to be raised for the "insurrection," in the various districts bound to furnish them, were reckoned to amount to 42,866 infantry and 21,512 cavalry.

they gain their ends; that the King of England would sooner be brought to terms by threatening his German possessions than by any number of conquests in the Netherlands. In enterprises of this nature it was most important to make the best use of time. When Frederick heard of the French King's movements against Alsatia, he conceived still bolder hopes, or, at all events, he thought it advisable to let the French know that such hopes might be entertained. "What glory," writes Frederick to Louis XV., "will your Majesty be able to win in this campaign! If the army of Prince Charles recrosses the Rhine, it will in all probability be cut to pieces."

Schmettau—who met Louis XV. at Metz on the 9th of August, and was received with the show of friendship which the prompt assistance rendered by Frederick could not fail to secure for one of his representatives—drew up, as he was wont, a comprehensive plan of campaign. He reckoned that the united imperialist and French armies would amount to 134 battalions and 256 squadrons; in all, about 110,000 men. Of these, as soon as Prince Charles had retreated over the Rhine, 40,000 men were to march upon the Danube, and complete the conquest of Bavaria; 30,000 more were to be applied to threatening Hanover; the remaining 40,000 were first to pursue the retreating foe towards the Upper Palatinate and Franconia, until Frederick, to whom the capture of Eger would thus be rendered much more easy, could give battle to the Austrians. All this, however, was more certain to succeed if the Austrians were not allowed to recross the Rhine without having

been forced to give battle. He explained that this would be attended with no danger, even should the Austrians prove the stronger of the two and have the advantage over the French, as they could not remain on the left bank of the river; they must of necessity hasten back to the defence of the hereditary dominions. The Austrian force could easily be so severely handled as to ensure its complete destruction during its subsequent perils, and the Queen did not possess a second army. Maria Theresa would soon be driven back into Austria and Hungary, the German Empire would once more submit to the Emperor, while Holland and Hanover would be forced to ask leave to remain neutral.

Schmettau liked comprehensive schemes. Whatever may be thought of those which he then proposed, there can be no doubt that the French, had they been so minded, might have inflicted the severest injuries upon the Austrian army.* The King of France was at that moment prevented by sudden illness from joining the army himself, but Schmettau succeeded in causing full powers to be sent, on the 12th of August, to Coigny and Noailles, the two generals in command of the French troops on the Rhine, to attack Prince Charles. On that same day the Prince's army received orders to retreat: it is evident that this would have been the moment to strike a decisive blow.

* I find that Folard said to the Bishop of Würzburg, that Austria was lost, if France were really in earnest; the safety of the Queen depended upon France not acting with vigour—"si on se relâchera."

We need not discuss the possible contingencies of the marching and countermarching, or the probable consequences:* it is certain that the French, who only wished to defend themselves against an enemy that had invaded their territory, thought it a stroke of good luck that the Austrians were forced to retreat through the agency of a distant ally. It was by no means the intention of the French to render any real assistance to that ally by an attack upon the retreating foe, or even to take revenge upon the latter for the invasion of their territory. On the 21st of August the French army was arrayed against the Austrians in equal if not in superior force; nevertheless, they allowed them to break up their camp during the night, and to retreat undisturbed towards their bridges over the Rhine. On the 23rd, when the passage across the Rhine was effected near Beinheim, certain divisions of the French army made a few slight and desultory attacks which could lead to nothing.

But no better could have been expected from Noailles, of whom his relation Count Rothenburg had always told the King of Prussia, that, although undoubtedly a man of parts, and even of military talent, he nevertheless in the hour of danger showed neither resolution nor clear-sightedness. He had, moreover, been made particularly cautious by the affair at Dettingen. Noailles defended himself against the re-

* Schmettau to Seckendorf, on the 20th of August. On the 13th, 14th, and 16th, a body of troops might have crossed the Rhine. "4 bateaux et 12 chevalets de plus auroient fait passer ce corps, et l'auroient mis suffisamment en état pour barrer les ponts que les ennemis ont sur le Rhin."

proaches with which he was assailed, by saying that he had acted all along under the sanction of Count von Seckendorf; but by this he only exposed the latter to unpleasant suspicions. It was thought very strange that the general of the Emperor did not conduct his master's affairs somewhat better.*

(As the French had thrown no difficulties in the way of the retreat of the Austrian army, it was not to be expected that they would show much zeal in pursuit.

After the disagreeable experience which the French had once had, they showed no inclination for the present to venture very far into Germany.

We have already seen that in the year 1741, when they advanced against Vienna, they avoided taking the last decisive step. It is no less remarkable as an historical fact, that when an opportunity was now again afforded them to revenge the attack they had suffered and to conclude a peace on their own terms, they nevertheless could not pluck up courage to engage in a battle which must have put an end to the war.

(The Austrians themselves were astonished at having succeeded in so hazardous an enterprise with so little loss—scarce 500 men. The Austrian army altogether, more especially the cavalry, retreated across the Rhine in better condition than when it had entered France;† it had acquired perfect self-confidence, and

* Chambrier: "Le Mⁱ de Noailles s'appuye beaucoup pour sa défense sur ce, qu'il n'a rien fait sans l'avis et le consentement du Mⁱ de Seckendorf, et si le dernier y a reellement adheré comme le Mⁱ de Noailles le dit dans toutes ses lettres, il est bien singulier, que le Mⁱ de Seckendorf général de l'empereur n'ait pas temoigné plus d'empressement."

† Louis de Brunswik, 25 Août. Je puis assurer V. A. que

was not afraid to march against the most perfectly disciplined foe even in the worst time of year. The Hungarians especially, whom the line of march led near home, showed the greatest zeal. On the 25th of September, after twenty-one days' march, the army reached Waldmünchen. Seckendorf can scarcely be blamed for not having pursued them with more zeal. He naturally feared lest Prince Charles might turn upon him, and destroy him with his army: indeed, the King of Prussia had himself warned him of this danger, and had advised him to proceed towards Bayaria, and if possible to take Passau.

The only thing which moved Frederick's anger was that the French had not pursued the enemy with greater vigour. Moreover the demonstration against Hanover had not been made; and he now saw that the only effect of his enterprise had been to draw upon himself the whole weight of the Austrian forces.

At the same time, however, another hostile movement began at his side and in his rear.

He had thought it easy, by means of some territorial concessions which the Emperor would have to make, as well as by the display of his own superiority in the field, to bring over Saxony to his side. But in this he encountered more opposition than he had anticipated. The imperial court showed some reluctance to make any further concessions; and that of Saxony, shaken by the experience of the first war,

l'armée est dans un état magnifique, la cavallerie si belle qu'elle n'a jamais encore été et en meilleur état que quand elle entra en campagne, et je puis dire avec verité, que notre armée passe les 60^m M.

and enraged against the King of Prussia, to whom it ascribed every failure, had connected itself more and more closely with the Queen of Hungary. It had formed new schemes of conquest, but its views were no longer directed against Bohemia, but against Silesia, and thus coincided with those of the Queen. The Saxon court had not yet concerted with her any details, but they had agreed on the line to be pursued. We should not believe, did it not exist in writing, that Augustus III. sent an order from Warsaw, directing that the Prussians should be repelled by force if they attempted to march through the Saxon territory.* It was fortunate

* A letter of the 11th of August, written from Warsaw to the Privy Council, contained these orders: "dass zuörderst der Bedeckung und Sicherheit unsrer Lande gegen alle jählinge Eindringungen schleunigst prospiciret und zu solchem Ende sowohl unsere in Sachsen stehenden Regimenter, es sei nun in den vier Generalats oder noch näher fördersamst zusammengezogen, und selbigen die Geschwindschiesskanons nebst gehöriger Munition sonder Anstand ausgetheilet; wie nicht minder die Creissregimenter versammelt, und mit hinlänglicher Provision an Pulver und Blei versehen, als auch auf allen Fall die nechst angrenzenden Landesunterthanen von dem im Hauptzeughause vorrätzig vorhandenen Geschütze bewaffnet, und alles übrige was sonst zu einem vigouereusen Widerstand gegen einen feindlichen Ueberfall erforderlich sein möchte, vorgekehrt werde."— (That, first of all, every measure be immediately taken for the protection and security of our provinces against all sudden attacks, and to this end our regiments quartered in Saxony be speedily brought together, either in the four Generalats or somewhere nearer, and to these troops the flying artillery, as well as all the necessary ammunition, should be delivered without delay. Likewise the regiments of the circle should be assembled, and duly provided with powder and ball; moreover, under all circumstances the subjects of the neighbouring terri-

for Saxony that this order came too late to be executed, otherwise the transit across Saxony would have been turned into an invasion, and the whole country have been ruined. We have already mentioned that the commander of the forces, the Duke of Weissenfels, who possessed more discretion than the court, avoided all appearance of hostility; he even confirmed the King of Prussia in the idea that an alliance with Saxony was possible. After the taking of Prague, Frederick renewed the very advantageous offers he had already made to the Polish-Saxon court. These—especially the cession of the circles of Leutmeritz and Saatz—he would have found means, under the pressing circumstances of the case, to carry into effect. He promised to show himself in all respects a good neighbour and a good friend.* But the leading minister, Count Brühl, was completely in the interest of Frederick's enemies; and Augustus III. felt himself fettered. Assured by Hanover that in case of necessity the Saxon court should receive

tories should have arms given them out of the store in the arsenal, and everything else done that can in any way help us to make a vigorous resistance against an hostile invasion.)

* Letters from Frederick of the 8th and 16th of September, in a collection of documents in the Dresden Archives: "das von dem König von Preussen wiederholt angebotene Bündniss betreffend."—(Concerning the alliance repeatedly offered by the King of Prussia.) "Je tâcherai de disposer l'empereur à faire à S. M. Polonoise des avantages considerables et qui seroient plus convenables aux frontières de ses états d'Allemagne que ceux qu'on lui avoit voulu stipuler dans le temps passé (he meant the circles of Saatz and Leutmeritz); qu'outre cela je tâcherai de faire de mon mieux une double alliance entre les deux maisons, etc."

assistance from thence, and provided with money from beyond sea, Augustus III. ordered an army of 20,000 men to advance from Ölsnitz and Adorf into Bohemia, in order there to join the Austrians.

The court of Vienna founded the greatest expectations upon this proceeding. The Union, which had caused so much alarm lest it should oppose the retreat of the Austrian army, had been totally ineffectual. England was pouring forth her golden showers; Saxony was rising; and good assurances were received from Russia: the Poles were ready to mount on horseback. It was quite evident that the French court had no intention of giving any real support to the King of Prussia. Meanwhile the German, Hungarian, and Slavonic populations were all rising in arms against him: the returning army, too, was burning to engage him. The Queen's conviction that she stood under the especial protection of God, had spread to the army, and it believed itself destined to great things.

CHAPTER III.

THE RETREAT FROM BOHEMIA.

THE energy of Prussia mainly depended upon this combination: its policy was continually supported by the vigorous bearing of the armed power, while war was always conducted strictly in accordance with political motives. Frederick's political and strategic ideas were identical; this was, no doubt, an uncommon advantage, but one which also contained the germ of a great danger.

For, as we have already seen, not only does the conduct of an army depend upon a certain presumption of what the enemy may do or may neglect to do, but politics have a similar foundation, and are exposed to similar errors, which, if not avoided, may communicate themselves to the conduct of the war, and produce a course of action altogether mistaken.

In forming his plan, Frederick had taken two things for granted: first, that the French, after the change of ministry, would be efficient and trustworthy allies, and would endeavour to bring the whole matter to an end by a few decisive strokes; secondly, that the Saxons might be won over to his side, or, at any rate, be induced to remain neuter. The whole plan of the campaign had been based upon these assump-

tions. The King had imagined that he should completely secure his rear if only he took Prague; by garrisoning Tabor and Budweis he had thought to prepare for the general co-operation of the allies in the next campaign. But now that his political premises turned out to be false, his military plans proved equally mistaken. For those places were of no use unless the French or the imperialists advanced boldly into the valley of the Danube, and he had committed a grave error against all sound rules of military science, by leaving in his rear a country which now assumed a hostile attitude, and closed against his army the road by which it had entered. A measure which, when viewed through the double medium of the political and strategical tendencies, had seemed great and bold, now appeared very faulty. He had been misled by his own rapidity of conception and of execution.

It may be asked whether he would not have done better to withdraw his army within a narrow compass in Bohemia, and there to act on the defensive. But it was not until now he began clearly to understand his position. At that time, he said, he knew no more of the movements of the Austrian and Saxon armies, than if they had taken place in China. He clung to the hope that he should be able to meet in the open field the large army now advancing against him. In what light, too, would he have appeared to his allies, had he given up to the enemy possessions which he had but just gained for the Emperor?

The army commanded by Prince Charles and

Count Traun formed a junction with the troops of Bathiany at Mirotitz on the 2nd of October, and as news arrived that, after this reinforcement, the Austrians had marched towards Budweis to restore their communication with Austria, Frederick advanced to meet them, in the hopes of attacking and driving them back during their march, and then quietly taking up his winter quarters in Bohemia. He did not hesitate, with this object in view, to cross the Moldau.

This movement, however, proved altogether fruitless. The Austrian army merely moved to another more distant camp, in which it could not well be attacked; their light cavalry had already crossed the river, and appeared in the rear of the Prussians: on the 8th of October the King found it necessary to retreat to the other side of the Moldau.

His intention still was to retain possession of the whole district between Prague and Budweis which he had already taken, and to await the enemy's attack on the right bank of the Moldau.

As soon as Prince Charles directed his march towards the Lower Moldau, and crossed the river there, with the view of cutting off the Prussians from Prague, and possibly from the Elbe, the King made a corresponding movement. It appeared to him of the highest importance to occupy the strong positions of Beneschau and Konopischt before the Prince: it was not without difficulty that he reached and took possession of these positions, where he determined to await the enemy's movements.

The King was by no means alarmed by the junc-

tion of the Saxons with the Austrians on the 21st and 22nd of October, though their united forces amounted to 70,000, whereas the Prussian army might consist of about 60,000 men. On the contrary, Frederick saw it with pleasure, as the Austrians might now more readily resolve to give battle. His confidence in the discipline and skill of his troops was unlimited, and he did not doubt that, even in very inferior numbers, they would gain the victory.

Most likely, however, Prince Charles—who already had some experience of his foe—and his adviser, Count von Traun, entertained a like opinion of the superiority of the Prussians; they advanced to within six or eight miles of the Prussian position; and at Marschowitz they too formed a strongly fortified camp.

Hereupon Frederick resolved to attack them at once, if possible even in their strong position. This was the decisive moment of the whole campaign.

In the afternoon of the 24th of October the Prussian army left its own camp and advanced in eight columns against that of the enemy. The baggage was left behind under the charge of one regiment, and protected by a fortification constructed of military waggons. The common soldiers carried with them nothing but their cartouch-boxes with sixty rounds of cartridge and their rations of bread. Forty squadrons of hussars scattered the Austrian troops, who could not stand against them: "It was a bold and beautiful manœuvre," exclaims an Austrian leader who, from the camp, watched the approach of the

Prussians.* It was, however, too late for an engagement to take place that day; and the Prussians passed the night in the immediate vicinity of the Austrian camp. It may very possibly be true, as was said, that Schwerin comforted his soldiers, who certainly had no great abundance just then, with the prospect of feasting upon the Austrian and Saxon stores on the following day. The Austrians likewise passed the night under arms, the officers sitting round the watch-fires, the light of which mingled in the horizon with the glare from the Prussian camp.

It was not until day broke that the King was able to take a nearer survey of the camp which he was about to attack. It spread in the form of a half moon over about twelve miles of ground on the heights before him.† The Saxons, who had but just joined the Austrians in full force under the Duke of Weissenfels, and who numbered above 20,000 men, formed the left wing; the Austrians, amounting to

* Prince Louis of Brunswick, in a letter to his brother, Duke Charles, dated 27th Oct., in the Archives at Wolfenbüttel. A similar account was forwarded to the same Duke Charles from the Prussian camp by Prince Ferdinand, another of his brothers. The Duke of Brunswick was probably the only man in the world who received such good and circumstantial accounts from both camps.

† Relation de ma campagne, 18 Dez., 1744, sent to France. "L'ennemi étoit posté sur une montagne qui faisoit comme un demicercle dont la gauche tournait vers notre droite et leur droite étoit entièrement éloignée de nous dans la vallée au pied de la montagne." This narrative deserves to be made public. The relation it bears on one side to the published account, and on the other to the older and amended memoirs, is very remarkable.

about 50,000 men, occupied the right wing and the centre. In front of the camp was a marshy ravine, at the bottom of which flowed a brook, commanded at all its fords by field-pieces planted on the heights. As it seemed as if the King purposed first to attack the Saxons on the left wing, the Austrians sent some cavalry to strengthen them, and, moreover, the position occupied by the Saxons was in itself admirably defended by deep ravines and patches of wood. On the other hand, the Prussians had not sufficient space, where they stood, to deploy preparatory to making a general attack, and in order to do so they would have to cross some broken ground, which Frederick described as precipices.

After Frederick had kept the enemy on the alert the whole morning by various contradictory movements of his troops, he determined, towards midday, to beat a retreat, which he effected with the greatest celerity.

It seems strange that the Austrians did not attack him with vigour, either in the weak position he occupied in the morning, or during his retreat. It was not that they were wanting in courage and ambition. They had often boasted that in the improved state of discipline which they had now reached, even the King of Prussia would not be able to resist them. The younger generals urged Prince Charles to attack the King, who showed no inclination to commence the fight; this, they said, would put an end to the whole affair with one blow, and their representations were not without weight upon the Prince. But there was in the camp another man, whose advice had to be

asked—Count Traun, whom Frederick himself has called his master in the science of war. Traun had studied his art for a short time in the service of the house of Brandenburg,* and subsequently under Guido of Starenberg, one of those solid unassuming men who, without noise, perform the greatest deeds. Traun understood the art of sparing his soldiers while he repulsed the enemy. He did not suffer himself to be driven by the most pressing commands into doing more than he thought good. On this occasion he was not carried away by the general excitement. The nature of the ground, which had prevented the King of Prussia from attacking them, rendered it impossible for the Austrians to sally forth against him with the necessary vigour and order. Traun declared his conviction that whichever party attacked the other, would infallibly be beaten.†

And indeed the King was placed in a most disadvantageous position by the refusal of the Austrians to give him battle. That the Austrians would meet him in the field, was another assumption which remained unfulfilled.

While Frederick pushed forward with all haste in pursuit of the Austrians, the garrisons which had been left in distant places, and which never received the orders for their recall, were totally unable to defend themselves against their enemies. Budweis

* Dreihaupt, Saalkreis, II. 14, has his name among the eight young counts, who were then studying in Halle; at the inauguration of the university he bore the privileges granted to it by Frederick.

† Oestr. milit. Zeitschrift, 1824, I. p. 273.

was stormed by Colonel Trenk and his Pandours; Tabor fell before a more regular siege. The position which the King had taken up near Konopischt turned out useless, since the enemy would not fight, and soon became untenable from want of provisions. When Frederick retreated still farther, with the view of taking up a position in front of the Elbe, by which he might cover both his magazines and Prague, the able foe by whom he was opposed reached Kuttenberg before him. Frederick was obliged to take up his quarters on the right bank of the Elbe, at Bohdanetz. He now stood behind the Elbe, as he had done shortly before behind the Moldau, no longer facing from the west towards the east, but from the north towards the south: he had lost an immense tract of country.

It is not saying too much to assert that the great question, whether the Elector of Bavaria, invested with the imperial dignity, should reign in Bohemia, or the house of Austria maintain itself in that kingdom—whether the general peace should be concluded in the interests of the latter rather than the former—was in fact decided by this event. “Your Majesty now sees,” said Podewils to him in a letter at the time, “that it is not so easy as you thought to reduce the power of the house of Austria to that height at which you wish to fix it.”* The commerce between the King and his ministers was carried on on both sides with a frankness and confidence alto-

* V^{re} Maj. voit, qu'il n'est pas aussi facile qu'elle a cru, d'abaisser la maison d'Autriche et de la reduire au point, qu'on s'est proposé (10 Nov.).

gether at variance with courtier-like behaviour. The events which had taken place led Frederick to recognise the sound and accurate judgment of his assistant, Podewils. At Konopischt, even before his last attempt to bring on a battle, the King had admitted to him that he judged matters very well. "Could I have had a suspicion," said Frederick, "of the perfidy of the Saxons, I should have taken very different measures."* In that case he would most likely have occupied Eger instead of Budweis, and endeavoured, above all, to prevent the junction of the Saxons and the Austrians. But Frederick had not yet given up all hopes of advantage from his enterprise. He thought that he should still be able to make good terms,—not only to secure the recognition of the Elector of Bavaria as Emperor, and the restitution of his hereditary dominions, but likewise a further increase of territory for him in Lower Austria; for himself, however, he hoped to secure, as "ransom for the keys of Prague," the high mountain range in Upper Silesia, provided only he could maintain the position he yet held in Silesia.† This change in his general views and in his immediate object, showed itself in various ways; among others, that in the quarrel which arose between the Crown-Prince of Dessau and General Schwerin, the King

* Vous jugez fort bien des choses. Si j'avois soupçonné la perfidie des Saxons j'aurois pris des mesures toutes différentes; ils sont cause que je me suis approché de Prague pour m'assurer la possession de cette ville, qui est toujours le principal objet dans ce pais, etc.

† Eichel, 12th Nov., to Podewils: "Le roi souhaite ardemment de voir cet hiver la paix retablie."

leaned more to the side of the former. Schwerin was ill: he says in one of his letters, that he came to Prague almost in the agonies of death; but he was no longer in favour. He himself, on one occasion, relates that he had displeased the King. Frederick said that there was not a braver man in the world, nor one better fitted to perform bold and prompt feats of arms: he was invaluable on the day of battle, but he lacked patience to carry into effect plans needing calmness and prudence. As soon as he thought himself sure of success, he gave himself up to pleasure: moreover, he was obstinate, and made divisions in the army. On the other hand, Prince Leopold of Dessau was little to be relied upon for courage in the battle field, but he had excellent gifts for the general management of an army and for procuring supplies. No sympathy could exist between these two men.*

It now seemed as if everything was prepared for the final struggle. The troops lay in order of battle near Bohdanetz and Chlumetz. The two most im-

* Valori, 22nd Dec., 1744: "Il me dit, qu'il ne croyait pas, qu'il y eut un plus brave homme dans le monde ny plus propre au jour d'affaire; qu'il le egrettoit toujours dans ces moments, mais qu'il étoit opiniâtre et se livroit à son plaisir, dès qu'il croyoit avoir mis ses troupes en securité: qu'au contraire prince Leopold étoit une poule mouillée quand il est question de combattre, mais que pour les details d'une armée et les expediens pour la faire subsister personne n'y étoit plus propre; que ces deux hommes ne peuvent sympathiser; et que M' de Schwerin se faisoit un parti dans l'armée." In the printed *Memoirs* mention only is made of a difference of opinion concerning some military movement: the contrast is expressed in much more general terms.

portant posts on the other side of the Elbe, Pardubitz and Collin, were placed in the best possible state of defence. General Nassau, one of the ablest Prussian officers, commanded in the latter, through which the communication was kept open with Prague. The principal fords across the Elbe were fortified, while detachments of hussars patrolled the banks of the river every quarter of an hour.

With all this, however, it was impossible to prevent the enemy from crossing the river, which in this district is shallow, and runs between low flat banks. The protection which it seemed to afford only increased the danger.

The Austrians failed in one attempt to cross the river; but on the 19th of November they succeeded in making good their passage between Teltschitz and Teinitz, close to some very old fords which are used to the present day. Not that they crossed the river without opposition. George Wedel offered so brave a resistance to the Austrian grenadiers, who were the first to cross the river, as to call forth a poetical eulogy from the King as well as admiration from his foes; but with his two battalions he was far too weak to withstand their ever increasing numbers. The whole army of Prince Charles crossed the river and took up a strong position at Teinitz on the Elbe.* The

* Prince Louis of Brunswick: "Les 2 bataillons ont fait une belle defense, mais aussi ont-ils été tres maltraités et bien ruinés surtout les 2 belles compagnies des grenadiers du roi. L'entreprise du passage a été tres bien concertée aussi de notre côté et avec un secret admirable, l'armée a passé d'une vitesse prodigieuse."

King exerted himself to the utmost to oppose their advance, but he was manifestly beaten in strategical skill.

The Austrians had crossed the river at the most convenient spot, where they could cut off the Prussian main army from Collin, and therefore from Prague. The King might, indeed, have made another attempt to reach Prague, but even had he succeeded in his object, he would have been hemmed in between the mountains of Saxony and the hostile army, which meanwhile had taken possession of the passes of Silesia and of Glatz, and would have been placed in a position which must have ended in his destruction. Nothing, therefore, was left to him but to give up Prague and the more distant positions, and to fall back upon Silesia. His chief care now was to prevent the scattered divisions of his army from being cut to pieces by the enemy. None but a man gifted with Nassau's "extraordinary courage, military experience, acuteness, readiness," and all the various other qualities which Frederick enumerates—in a diploma drawn up with his own hand—could have brought back in safety to the King the battalions from Collin, together with some thousands of waggons—turning the position of the Austrian army in its immediate neighbourhood with such consummate skill that he never gave an opportunity for attack. When Nassau came into the King's presence, Frederick took from his own breast the order of the Black Eagle, and hung it round Nassau's neck. Hereupon the retreat was effected in the most perfect order. On the 27th Frederick left Königingrätz

with his rear-guard, and on the same day the Austrians entered the town and restored the bridges which the Prussians had destroyed. The Prussian army retreated in three columns by Braunau, Trautenau, and Glatz, into Silesia, pursued only by Nadasti's hussars, from whom they suffered no loss worthy of mention.

One division, however, was less fortunate—the garrison of Prague, led by Count Einsiedel. These troops were forced to leave behind them their guns, which were triumphantly carried to the Arsenal of Vienna.* During their retreat they had to encounter great danger and hardship from the newly awakened hostility of the inhabitants: in the district of Bunzlau, through which they directed their retreat, they were purposely led astray, and hemmed in upon the heights of the Isergebirge, where, without tents or food, and exposed to the severest weather, they must inevitably have perished, had not Count Nassau arrived in the very nick of time with a considerable body of troops, sent from Silesia by order of the King to fetch them back out of Bohemia. On the 16th of December, Nassau and Einsiedel reached Friedeberg, in Silesia.†

* *Kriegsrechtliches Erkenntniss in Sachen der Räumung von Prag gegen den Generalm. von Einsiedel*—(decision of the court-martial on General von Einsiedel, in the matter of the evacuation of Prague)—16th Feb., 1745, in *Schöning, Nachrichten zur Geschichte der Artillerie*, I. p. 444. Einsiedel was tried and acquitted by a court-martial.

† General Nassau, in his report of the 16th of December, remarks, that the mere rumour of succour had afforded Einsiedel's corps the opportunity to withdraw from the Hochwald. During

Thus, after a campaign of two months, Bohemia once more fell under the absolute dominion of the Queen. The Austrians themselves were astonished at having conquered a great kingdom in so short a time, without a siege or a battle.

If we look closely into the causes of these events, we shall find that they chiefly arose out of those political combinations, the appearances of which had misled the King into the boldest enterprises, but which in their real nature were so much to the advantage of the Queen.

The absence of all fear of interference on the part of the French and the imperialists, and the support given by Saxony, which was so important in a geographical point of view, gave to the Austrian strategy an advantage of which they availed themselves with consummate skill. Their refusal to give battle, where they could conquer without one—the occupation of Kutteneberg at the right moment—the passage of the Elbe at admirably selected points—are actions which have immortalised the memory of Traun, to whom they must be attributed.

the retreat, a Saxon lieutenant met him at Schwerta (in Saxon Lusatia), "mit der schriftlichen Ordre, dass er durch Sachsen, als ein neutrales Land, keine armirten Truppen sollte passieren lassen, auch nicht ihre eigenen, so in der österreichischen Armee englische Auxiliartruppen wären"—(with a written order not to allow the passage of any armed troops through Saxony, that country being neutral ground; not even of their own, who were English auxiliaries in the Austrian service). When asked whether he had orders to repel force by force, he answered, "er sollte nur protestiren"—(he was only to protest).

But there was yet another cause which contributed largely to the success of these manœuvres.

Although in the present century it has often seemed, and has almost always been supposed, that the result of a military enterprise depends altogether upon the operations of large armies, nevertheless it soon appears that the disposition and the sympathies of the population exercise a great influence upon it. The Bohemians had wavered when a Catholic prince made his appearance in Prague and set up his throne in that city. But the failure of the attempt, and the disturbances and calamities incident to the war which accompanied it, had caused a revulsion of feeling in favour of the house of Austria, and had disinclined the people to any change. The Kralowna, as the Sclavonians called the Queen, at her coronation had won over the nobility by the favour which she showed them; the clergy, too, had no mind to see a Protestant king make himself master of the kingdom, even indirectly and by degrees; the people, who were exasperated by the excesses of the Prussian soldiers, were altogether guided by the priests. Intelligence of the movements of the Prussians spread from village to village;* the cattle were driven off into the woods, the corn was buried in the earth, the houses were often found deserted and stripped

* Les Baillifs et les prêtres sont encore pis (que le peuple), ils servent d'espions aux Autrichiens et ayant toutes les commodités d'apprendre ce qui se passe dans une armée qui embrasse leurs villages dans le camp qu'elle occupe ils informent incontinent l'ennemi du moindre manœuvre, d'un petit mouvement. (Rel. d. m. c.)

of all the necessaries of life. It was useless, under such circumstances, to think of putting in practice any system of levying supplies: the troops were dependent upon supplies brought from the magazines, and the difficulty of transport was much increased by the state of affairs. Everything combined to embarrass the Prussians—the nature of the country, which was broken and wooded—the vast superiority in numbers, though not in discipline, of the Hungarian cavalry, which was increased by Dalmatians, Arnauts, and Croats—and the hatred of the country people. For the most part this hatred was negative, but it sometimes happened that Prussian stragglers were killed. Here and there, too, adventurers placed themselves at the head of irregular bands of armed insurgents, and took upon themselves the command and defence of a district against the Prussians. In a thousand instances, each apparently trifling, but collectively of great influence on the final issue of the war, the sympathy and assistance of the people of the country is most valuable to an army. Without the army the disposition of the people would matter very little, but with it is invincible.

The conclusion is, in short, that as the conquest of Silesia was greatly promoted by the favour of the Protestant, in like manner the attempt upon Bohemia failed partly on account of the hatred of the Catholic population.

We cannot wonder, however, that the court of Vienna saw this in a different light. They beheld in it a manifest interference of God, vouchsafed in order to direct them to the recovery of all that they

had lost, and they determined not to delay one moment in obeying the dictates of Providence.

The first attempt of the kind followed immediately upon the recovery of Bohemia by the Austrians.

The army would not have undertaken the enterprise by its own choice. The men wanted rest after the fatigues of a double campaign, and were afraid that the nature of the country, the time of year, and the severe weather would throw insurmountable obstacles in their way. But the Queen longed to be able to call a portion of Silesia her own as soon as possible; at any rate, she wished to see her troops take up their winter-quarters in the Silesian territory, which would prepare the way admirably for the movements of the following spring. Immediately on receiving her commands, six regiments of infantry and eight of cavalry made their way in the beginning of December through the territory of Glatz; these troops occupied Neustadt and Patschkau, and prepared to establish regular outposts all along the Neiss. At the same time the Hungarian insurgents appeared in large masses under Esterhazy, and poured down from the Oderberg over Upper Silesia.

And at first these troops did obtain the upper hand.

General Marwitz, who, with about 10,000 men, was quartered in Troppau and Jägerndorf, was not a little embarrassed on suddenly finding himself surrounded by swarms of irregular troops. The council of war, which he immediately summoned, decided that it was impossible to hold out in these open towns, which were ill supplied with forage and provisions; it would be far better to save the King's troops than

to expose them to destruction by attempting to defend a few untenable places, of which the defence had not been expressly enjoined.*

They made an able and a successful retreat; but this did not ensure to them the approbation of their King.

Thinking that the campaign was at an end, Frederick had left the old Prince of Dessau in command of the troops in Silesia, and had gone back to Berlin. The invasion of the Austrians was as annoying to Frederick as it was welcome to the Queen; and, in his first heat, he started to go and drive them out; but after a conference which he had with the Prince at Liegnitz, Frederick felt convinced that his presence was not needed: he determined to leave the matter in the hands of the Prince, who had been deeply hurt at not being called upon to take part in the attack upon Bohemia, and who was now all the more rejoiced at having an independent command intrusted to him.

The old Prince of Dessau had one failing which always made itself felt. His manner of giving orders wounded the pride of those immediately under him: he was soon involved in all sorts of disputes with Count Münchow, the president of Silesia, and with General Walrabe. His preparations, which were always comprehensive and accurate, even to the smallest details, cost much time. It was not until

* Sentiments derer Herren Generale—(opinions of the generals), Troppau, 16th Dec., 1744. These were Hautcharmoy, Bredow, Borcke, Dohna, and Prince Diederich: the opinion given by the last-named general is the most masterly.

the 9th of January, 1745, that he was ready to cross the Neiss and commence his attack on the Austrians.

The two Princes of Dessau afforded a singular spectacle. Prince Leopold, enfeebled by age and infirmities, but still feared, looked upon by both friend and foe as half a wizard, might be seen driving across the snow-covered ground in an open cart at the head of his strictly-disciplined troops; the hereditary Prince, who held the next command, was so exhausted and excited by the last campaign, that, while he sat on his horse, he was frequently seized with feverish fits of shivering. But Traun, hitherto victorious, retreated before them as soon as they appeared at Neustadt. One division of the army took Patschkau, which had successfully resisted a former attack conducted with less vigour; the main body drove the Austrians out of Troppau and Jägerndorf.* In February Glatz was retaken by the Prussians, but not before the cavalry—which on both sides were most eager for the combat—had had a fierce encounter at Habelschwerdt. The Austrians came down from their vantage ground on the heights, while the Prussians rode boldly up hill to the charge: the latter kept possession of the field.†

* Bericht von der Unternehmung in Oberschlesien—(account of the campaign in Upper Silesia). Seiffart, I. Appendix, 145.

† Short account of Prince Ferdinand, according to the report of the adjutant of General Lehwald: "L'affaire a duré 2 heures entières et l'attaque de la cavallerie autrichienne a été des plus vives. Ils avoient l'avantage de la hauteur mais ils sont descendus, pour nous combattre tandis que les autres alloient aussi a grands pas a eux ayant passé auparavant un petit ravin et cela avec tant de vigueur les notres les pressant si vivement qu'ils

It caused no little satisfaction in Berlin that the enemy was thus everywhere expelled from the Prussian territory: "Te Deum" was sung in all the churches. No one, however, doubted that next year a violent and obstinate struggle would take place.

During the advance of the Austrian troops the Queen issued a proclamation, wherein she inveighed against the King of Prussia for having overthrown the old constitution of the land, more especially with respect to the introduction of the system of district legislation, whereby he had reduced the country to perpetual slavery. Nevertheless she herself subsequently adopted this very system. She thought herself justified by the war which he had once more begun against her, in demanding the restitution of the territories of which he had deprived her. It appeared, said she, as if the Lord of Hosts would now reverse their fates, and bring back the Archduchies of Upper and Lower Silesia, and the loyal subjects of the county of Glatz, under that dominion to which they belonged by every law, human and divine.

The King thought it advisable to publish a counter proclamation. He reminded the inhabitants of the bad management of the former government; how it mortgaged the land to any one that would advance money upon it; that it did not protect the weak against the strong; that it had oppressed and in-

furent obligés à nous céder le champ de bataille. Leur corps se rallia une seconde fois, à un bois, mais le g^l Lehwaldt marchant de nouveau droit à eux les obligea à lâcher pied et à lui céder tout le terrain."

jured the Protestants. Whereas he, on the contrary, had afforded equal protection to both religious parties, had distributed the places of honour and profit without distinction of confessions, and had done his utmost to reform innumerable abuses, to introduce order and regularity, and to secure to every one his rights. He expected that his subjects would keep the oath they had sworn to him, and would manfully resist the foe, should he invade the province. He asserted his original and undeniable right to the territory, and the lawfulness of the assistance he had afforded to the Emperor. This proclamation was read aloud in all the churches: at Breslau, by Count Schafgotsch, who had already been named coadjutor to the Bishop.

Thus two distinct schemes of government and of society—one might almost say, two different ages—prepared to contend for the mastery in this district, whose whole future, both as to internal and foreign relations, entirely depended upon the issue of the struggle. It was, at the same time, a question of general policy, and one in which Germany and Europe took part for or against each of the great contending powers.

CHAPTER IV.

STATE OF POLITICAL PARTIES DURING THE FIRST MONTHS
OF THE YEAR 1745.

ARGUING from the usual course of events, it might almost be taken for granted that the unsuccessful result of the war—the failure of the great enterprise—would produce unfavourable effects upon the politics of Prussia.

During the uncertainty which prevailed among all political parties in Germany, and the anxiety and excitement caused by the beginning, the continuance, and the issue of the war in Bohemia, no progress could be made with the alliance to be formed among the German Princes, in order to secure to the Empire the decision of the great questions at issue in Germany.

The Estates of Francônia, upon which such stress had been laid at the time of the Union or alliance, as well as the Margraves, answered the summons of the Emperor with only general expressions of devotion to his cause; mentioning at the same time their own weakness and danger. The Duke of Gotha said that he approved of the object in view, but that he was prevented from at once joining the Union by the necessity of first consulting with his kinsmen. Frederick had procured for the young Duke of Würtem-

berg a recognition of majority, and consequently an earlier accession to the government of his principality. The idea of the Union had actually given him political existence; but this was not sufficient to induce him to join it. He referred to the counsels which Frederick himself had given him on his accession, one of which was to the effect that he should avoid an alliance with either France or Austria; as, in the event of any change in the fortune of war, he would be exposed to the revenge of the one or the other.* The chief motive, however, was, that nothing was more dreaded in Würtemberg than an increase to the Bavarian territory taken from Swabia, which would give to Bavaria by far the greatest influence in that circle. Among other princes, Frederick had invited the Duke of Holstein, now Grand-Duke of Russia, to become a party to the Union. The answer he received was, that neither the Duke's present dignity nor his minority would permit him to take such a step.

(The Emperor encountered the most violent opposition in the country immediately adjoining Bavaria. On the death of Firmian, Archbishop of Salzburg, the chapter did not hesitate to admit Austrian troops into the fortresses of the province. Things would have turned out very differently had the Prussians continued to occupy Budweis and the Bavarians

* Together with the Duke's letter of the 24th of October, appeared the "*Réflexions d'un Cosmopolite*," by a Würtemberg minister. He ascribes to the Emperor the intention: "*de s'acquérir une autorité distinguée dans le dit cercle, éluder peu à peu les prérogatives directoriales de la maison de Wurtemberg.*"

pushed forward as far as Linz. In that case Cardinal Sinzendorf, who was by this time Frederick's friend, and who had been proposed to fill the vacant see at Salzburg, would have had every chance of success. But none of these events had taken place, and the hostile tendencies were predominant.

No great loss, however, was yet sustained as to the main point, *i. e.*, the carrying on the war in the Empire. The Emperor was able to leave Frankfort, where he felt like one banished, and to return to Munich. While Frederick kept the Austrian army in play, Freiburg and the Brisgau were conquered for Charles VII. The French army which made this conquest held possession of those districts. Another French army took up a strong position on the Middle Rhine and on the Lahn. The Union still held together under the name of the Emperor. The imperial army, reinforced by troops from Hessen and the Palatinate, seemed strong enough not only to undertake the recovery of such Bavarian fortresses as still remained in the hands of the Austrians, in which the French were to assist them with artillery, but likewise to attack Upper Austria. We need not enter into particulars in order to show how materially a movement of this kind would have helped the King of Prussia in his defence of Silesia. Marshal Belleisle was to have visited Berlin, on his way from one of the allied courts to the other, in order to confer with the King on the subject of a general plan of campaign adapted to the altered circumstances of the case.

(But at this juncture, one of those events took place which determine the issue of human affairs, and

which are nevertheless beyond the reach of human forethought. The Emperor Charles VII., for whose authority Frederick had once more taken up arms—and who, although not old, had long been ailing,—died unexpectedly on the 20th of January, 1745, worn out in body and mind by his manifold and fruitless exertions.

With his name and his life, weak as he was himself, was associated the idea of Imperial power disconnected from Austria—a power which Frederick had founded and was resolved to maintain. Had Charles VII. died eight months sooner, Frederick's policy would have been totally different: he would have had no inducement to take up arms. But now that the war had been begun—and what was worse, had been unsuccessful—a terrible blow was struck by the death of the man who bore the hallowed name of Emperor, round whom all their plans centred, and in whose favour the war had been undertaken.

The idea of putting the son of the deceased Emperor in his place suggested itself for a moment, but was soon given up as impracticable. This young Prince, "a pious child," as Seckendorf calls him, was far too insignificant in personal character, and too dependent upon others, to be seriously thought of. Moreover, the French had no wish to promote his interests. The first feeling called forth in Paris by the death of the Emperor was certainly not that of regret for the loss. The court and the nation were relieved from engagements which of late years had become extremely burdensome, and were not at all

disposed to enter into similar engagements with his successor.*

They, however, declared that it was their intention to maintain, or rather to reinstate, the young Elector in the possession of his hereditary dominions. The King of France would continue to assist the son with troops as he had assisted the father, and the same subsidies should be paid him :† but the want of serious determination, and a variety of mishaps, co-operated to render all useless.

Another unfortunate accident was, that Marshal Belleisle, on his way from Cassel to Berlin, thought, spite of previous warning, that he could cross the territory of Hanover. He was seized at Elbingerode (as soon as he had crossed the frontier, and escorted to Hanover as a prisoner of war, and thence he was sent to England.‡ Belleisle was well acquainted with the views of his own court, and he had concerted measures with the allied German princes; but what was

* Infiniment onereuse par la mauvaise conduite de l'empereur de ses ministres et generaux; ils tous envisagent cette mort comme un moyen, qui leur procureroit la paix. (Chambrier from Paris.)

† Observations sur l'évenement de Bavière (de la part de France). Le roi a continué les mêmes subsides pour sa maison qu'il donnoit à l'empereur. Les subsides des troupes ont été payés avec la plus grande regularité, pour les Hessois d'avance. Le nombre des troupes a été porté jusque près de 60^m h. le projet étoit d'assiéger Ingolstadt, pour lequel effet on avoit laissé sous Fribourg un train considerable d'artillerie et de pénétrer jusqu'en Autriche.

‡ Podewils says in one of his letters, that he was warned "von hier aus das Hannoversche Territorium zu evitiren"—(by his friends in Berlin, to avoid the Hanoverian territory).

still more important was, that he was naturally disposed to enter into Frederick's ideas. Had Belleisle succeeded in reaching Berlin, he and the King would have consulted together on the difficulties arising out of the Emperor's death, and would in all probability have devised a well-combined plan of campaign, to the execution of which Belleisle would have devoted his best energies. At one moment Frederick thought of sending Rothenburg again to Versailles, but there, too, personal influences and connections had changed so much, that he scarcely could have produced much effect.

The plenipotentiary whom the French sent to replace Belleisle, one Chevalier Courten, was charged with the most extraordinary schemes by the French government: among others there was one for a fresh attack upon Moravia, which had no political object, and, in a military point of view, was impracticable. Courten certainly was not the man to suggest any practicable plan in the place of these dreams.

Owing to this, as well as to various other causes, there was no longer any possibility of co-operation between the French and Prussian forces at specified times or places. It would have been something if the French had only been able to hold possession of Bavaria. But a decisive catastrophe soon occurred in that country.

The commander of that division of French troops which had been pushed forward as far as the Lahn, was a certain Maillebois, whom the Germans looked upon as an empty, insolent Parisian coxcomb, and who had often insulted the Emperor. This Maille-

bois now either thought he wanted the force, or he really wanted the courage, to await the attack of the allied troops advancing against him from the Netherlands, under the command of the Duke of Arenberg. The position which he abandoned was the more important, as it covered Hessen, which now took part most strongly for the Franco-Bavarian cause. The retreat of the French exposed the whole country to the extortions and cruelties of the Duke of Arenberg's troops, and the Prince-Vicerent of Hessen found it necessary to provide for his own safety, and to make such terms with the hostile leaders as would secure his own territory. He reflected, moreover, that the Union was dissolved by the death of the Emperor Charles VII., and he now promised that the Hessian troops which were then with the imperial army in Bavaria, should take no part in any action there, but should remain quietly in their quarters.* He did not feel bound by the subsidies of France to continue a system which would bring ruin upon his country.

* According to Klingrāfen's statement of the 23rd of March, Arenberg said to the Prince, that he should be sorry to attack the states of the King of Sweden; and asked where were the Hessian troops: after the Emperor's death they could no longer be considered as his auxiliaries. The Prince replied: "qu'ils étoient en Bavière en leurs quartiers et qu'ils les défendroient; jusqu'à ce, qu'on eut trouvé une occasion pour les faire retirer;" whereupon orders to that effect were given.—25th Dec. The Prince wished them to hold the Bavarian fortresses, but they had lost the Tramontane. 31st Dec. Before the attack of the Austrians and the burning of Vilshofen: "Dans cette confusion les Aut^{rs} ont eu beau jeu et la garnison, 2500 h. la plus part Hessois à été presque toute passé au fil de l'épée."

But the effect of this agreement was decisive for Bavaria. Not only was it hopeless to think of any further aggression upon Austria, but the whole assembled army was thrown into confusion. The Austrians, who now again advanced, under the command of Bathiany and of Bernclau, directed their attacks precisely against the places held by the Hessians. On the 28th of March they took Vilshofen, and drove the Hessians beyond the Isar without any trouble, as everything was paralysed by the change of policy that had taken place. The young Elector of Bavaria found himself compelled, as his father had been two years before, to leave Munich, and take refuge in Augsburg: it was evident that he would soon be forced to conclude a peace.

To this it soon came. The Emperor was dead, his son deprived of his hereditary dominions; the Union was either still incomplete, or, so far as it had been effected, again broken up; moreover, the conduct of the war by the French was as inefficient as ever, and as little conducive to the interests of Germany. "It is all very well for France," said Frederick, "to have conquered Flanders, but it is of no importance to Prussia." Frederick saw himself thrown entirely upon his own resources.

And at this very moment his enemies showed greater energy than ever.

In Germany all the dislike to the Prussian name, and all the old sympathies in favour of the house of Austria, were reawakened. There was a general wish to see the imperial dignity restored to the house of Austria, or rather bestowed upon the house of Lor-

raine, now identified with it. Frederick's alliance with the French did not render his position more easy; on the contrary, it roused against him the dislike of the German people: the presence of the French was universally detested. In the higher circles his sudden military enterprises—the motives to which few understood and none appreciated—were attributed to boundless and insatiable ambition, and roused against him a general feeling of dislike; the hatred of his natural opponents found response and approbation on all sides, and his destruction was eagerly sought.

This was first shown by the conduct of Saxony.

It was the intention of the French to start the Elector of Saxony as a candidate for the imperial dignity, in opposition to the Grand-Duke of Tuscany. Distasteful as this was to the King of Prussia—for he could not fail to perceive that it would not be for his interest if the imperial power were vested in the hands of a jealous neighbour—he nevertheless entered into the scheme. When the French envoy, Valori, was on his way to Dresden to set the project on foot, Frederick said to him, in the excitement of a lively conversation, that he, Valori, would deserve to have altars raised in his honour if he should succeed. The court of Dresden was no less anxious now than formerly to obtain possession of the imperial dignity: the King and the Queen, as well as the ministers, flattered themselves with the hope of it. The occupation of the throne of Poland placed great obstacles in the way, but these were not considered insurmountable, and the court of Dresden could easily have come

to an understanding with that of France. But that this should take place so long as France was at war with England, or that the court of Dresden should at that moment again unite with Prussia, was impossible.

Saxony, following the course upon which she had already entered, had strengthened more and more her connexions with the other side.

(On the 8th of January, 1745, an alliance, which had immediate reference to German as well as other affairs, was concluded at Warsaw between Augustus III., the Queen of Hungary, and the two maritime powers. The Queen, both the Kings, and the three Electors, pledged themselves in the secret articles of this treaty to make common cause at the imperial diet, as was most conducive to their own interests and those of Holland. They were to take such measures in common, and with other Estates of the Empire,—more especially with the three ecclesiastical Electors,—as they might consider necessary for the peace and security of Germany. Saxony promised to bring 30,000 men into the field for the defence of Bohemia, in consideration whereof she was to receive 150,000*l.* sterling; one-third was to be paid by Holland, the other two-thirds by England. The relative proportions of the subsidy and the number of troops would seem to make the bargain very disadvantageous to Saxony, did we not know that that court cherished ulterior views.*

* Brühl, 5th Feb., 1746. Die Bewegursachen, warum man ein so mässiges Subsidiendum acceptiret, seien nach der

For example, the defence of Bohemia was not the sole object; the conquest of Silesia was likewise projected. Augustus III. was no less anxious for it than the Queen of Hungary. He advised her to make peace with France and Bavaria, and to strain every nerve in order to overpower his dangerous and enterprising neighbour. The negotiations that passed between the two courts in the course of the winter are well worthy of remark.

The principal demands made by Saxony, in return for her co-operation in attacking Silesia, were as follows. The first, which, though less important, was by no means agreeable to the Queen, was the cession to Saxony of the ancient feudal rights of the crown of Bohemia over Schwarzburg, Reuss, and Schönburg. The second demand was of the greatest importance, no less than the cession of the three duchies of Jauer, Sagan, and Glogau, in order to secure the long desired connection between Poland and Saxony.

The Queen was not disposed to agree to these demands; the maintenance of the Pragmatic Sanction was the very object she had in view, and she was determined to hold possession of Silesia whole and undivided. But she declared herself ready to ensure to the house of Saxony an increase of territory from the proper possessions of their common foe: she offered to transfer to Saxony the Prussian province of Lusatia, as well as the duchies of Crossen and

Hand fehlgeschlagen. — (The projects which caused so moderate a subsidy to be accepted, afterwards failed.)

Züllichau, so as to secure the communication with Poland.

The grounds she alleged, which were as follows, were plausible enough. She said that before the King of Prussia could be brought to give up Silesia, he must be so completely overpowered that they might force him to make still greater concessions.*

(This was the object of the Saxon policy. We do not intend to charge that court with it as a moral offence, but it forms a remarkable contrast, that while the King of Prussia, after long hesitation, made up his mind to vote in favour of the Elector of Saxony at the choice of an Emperor of Germany, the latter should be engaged in schemes for the dismemberment of the Prussian monarchy. The same projects were revived which, in the year 1741, had been weighed at several courts of Europe.

(Saxony and Austria hoped to obtain the assistance, not only of England, but also of Russia.

At any rate, there was a strong party in Petersburg which looked upon Prussia much more as an enemy than as a friend. The Arch-chancellor Bestuchef declared that one of the greatest political blunders ever made by Russia was in not opposing the

* Pro memoriâ, to be laid before Count von Bünau. "Sonder Zweifel erheischt sowohl das gemeinsame Interesse, als die gemeinsame Sicherheit, Alles anzuwenden, umb nicht nur Schlesien und Glatz dem König von Preussen abzunehmen, sondern auch dessen Uebermacht noch mehrer einzuschränken."—(Doubtless the interest as well as the security of all parties require that every effort be made, not only to take Silesia and Glatz from the King of Prussia, but likewise still further to limit his power.)

measures of Frederick William I. She ought to have prevented that monarch from increasing an army which at his accession amounted to about 30,000, to 80,000 men. Still greater, however, was the error of later years, in suffering the conquest of Silesia, which enabled the King of Prussia to increase his army to 140,000. Moreover, the marriage of a Prussian princess with a prince of Sweden, a scheme which the Russian court itself had formerly desired, was now described by Bestuchef as an admirable stroke of policy on the part of Frederick, who could thus employ his sister in effecting the restoration of the monarchical power in Sweden, of which he could avail himself in offering resistance to Russia; Frederick was also forming a party in Poland. Truth and falsehood were blended together in order to work upon the Empress Elizabeth, who was no longer insensible to such impressions. Her originally favourable dispositions towards France and Prussia were much altered by a despatch of the French minister Chetardie, which was intercepted and immediately laid before the Empress by those hostile to the French alliance. In this despatch Chetardie wrote in contemptuous terms of her love of pleasure and dislike of work, and drew a very unfavourable picture of the Russian court. The services which Chetardie had formerly rendered were now forgotten by the Empress. Elizabeth was fully inclined to look upon the outward marks of displeasure received by the Marquis Botta as a sufficient satisfaction; and there can be no doubt that the disfavour into which the French fell with her extended to their ally, the

King of Prussia, to whom similar expressions were attributed. The allied courts hoped to gain over the Empress completely to their side, if they could supply her with some millions of rubles to support her lavish expenditure, and gratify the ambitious temper she had inherited from her father by proposing to her schemes of conquest.

The plan they suggested was comprehensive enough. Russia was to bring into the field an army of 40,000 regular troops, and a numerous horde of undisciplined bands; with this force she might take part in a general attack upon the Prussian dominions, beginning with East Prussia. After conquering that province she might easily give it to the republic of Poland in exchange for other districts lying close to the Russian frontier.* Silesia was to fall to the

* Article of the proposed *Acte séparé*: "Les hautes contractans se sont engagés de ne pas se borner, de reconquérir sur ce prince le comté de Glatz et la partie de la Silesie qui n'avoit pas été cedée par le traité de Breslau, mais encore d'employer tous leurs efforts humainement possibles pour procurer des avantages à ceux d'entre-eux, qui pourroient avoir à craindre le ressentiment de ce prince, à moins que sa trop grande puissance ne fût borné ultérieurement. 3. Il doit révéner à S. M. Polonoise pour le moins les principautés de Crossen et Züllichau tous les fiefs de Bohème du roi de Prusse situés dans le Lusace, et le cercle de Saal faisant partie du duché de Magdebourg. 4. La haute et la basse Silésie ne seront pas compris dans le partage des états appartenants au roi de Prusse, ni réputés tels, la haute et la basse Silésie devant être préalablement et sans être demembrés restitués à la reine de Hongrie. 6. La Prusse ducale c. a. d. la partie de la Prusse à présent possédée par la maison de Brandebourg appartiendra avec tous ses droits prérogatives forteresses, et munitions de guerre à toute perpétuité à S. M. de toutes les Russies excepté si S. M. Imp^{le} trou-

share of Austria; Crossen and Züllichau, together with the territory of Lusatia, to that of Saxony: the duchy of Magdeburg was likewise to be partitioned among the allies. So far as we can discover, Austria put in a claim to this territory, and was disposed to give only the circle of the Saal to Saxony: another portion of the duchy was to be incorporated with Hanover. In order to bring about a peace with Bavaria, some districts belonging to the Palatinate were to be ceded to Bavaria, and the Palatinate was to receive Cleves as an indemnity. Thus the house of Brandenburg would retain a very small portion of its possessions. But even that little was to be sequestered in order to satisfy the claims of the maritime powers for the subsidies they were to furnish.*

It is not clear who actually devised this plan. Maria Theresa said that it did not originate with her; nevertheless it appeared to her admirably fitted to promote the attainment of her objects.

That they were not sure of Russia is obvious from the project, to which we have alluded, of gaining over

veroit lui être convenable de permuter le dit état avec la république de Pologne contre quelques districts de sa convenance principalement de l'Vcraine."—(State Paper Office.)

* Art. 9. "Pour que les puissances maritimes soient en quelque manière et autant qu'il est possible dedommagés de subsides qu'ils ont payés à S. M. (d'Hongrie) et des grands frais, qu'ils sont obligés de faire d'ailleurs, on est convenu que toutes les contributions taxes et impôts qui seront perçus dans le pais conquis sur le roi de Pr. seront remis et perçus fidèlement par les commissaires nommés et établis à cette fin par les puissances maritimes."

the Empress Elizabeth by a present of two millions of rubles.

Still less could they rely upon the co-operation of England. Robinson was amazed when he first saw the plan. He at once made the obvious objection that no one in England could wish to see Protestant Prussia again subjected to the dominion of Catholic Poland: the scheme seemed to him so grotesque, that he could scarcely venture to communicate it to his own court. We shall have to allude to the circumstances under which Lord Carteret lost his place in the English ministry; and Lord Harrington, his successor, was still less inclined than Lord Carteret had ever been to take part in projects of so extravagant a character: he rejected the plan in the most decisive manner.

I imagine that he would have given nearly the same answer even had he not already been carrying on negotiations with Prussia. A plan similar to this proposed in the year 1741 had been rejected for the very same reasons.

But, on the other hand, he could not decisively oppose a combination between Saxony and Austria for the purpose of making an attack upon Silesia—a scheme which had been recognised in the treaty of Warsaw. Frederick's assertion that he had only sent auxiliary troops to the Emperor, and that, therefore, no infraction of the peace of Breslau had taken place, was considered by most Englishmen as untenable: the peace seemed to them to have been actually infringed, whereby the guarantee of England was rendered null and void.

Although the plan, which aimed at a general

co-operation of all parties, was rejected, Saxony and Austria were still at liberty to prosecute their own especial schemes, in which they received the assistance of the maritime powers, so far as subsidies were concerned. The allies hoped even thus to inflict the most serious injuries upon the King of Prussia, and differed only as to the division of the spoils.

Meanwhile the most unexpected projects were occasionally started in Dresden. It was again asserted that if the Grand-Duke of Tuscany wished to become Emperor of Germany, he must first possess a territory of his own, and it was proposed to conquer Silesia for him; in which case, however, the three duchies already named were to be taken from it and ceded to Saxony. But mindful of the possibility that, spite of all their endeavours, they might still fail in reconquering Silesia, in that case Bohemia might be given up to the Grand-Duke; while a convenient strip of land, for instance, three circles, might be dismembered from that kingdom, and given to Saxony.

It may be inferred from Maria Theresa's character and position, that she would not agree to either of these two proposals. Her husband seemed to her perfectly qualified, as co-Regent of her German hereditary dominions, to wear the imperial crown. These proposals, therefore, and others of a like nature, were rejected. The agreement, however, which was at length concluded on the 3rd of May, was based on very sanguine expectations. Three distinct degrees in the defeat of the Prussian arms, and in the consequent cessions which the King of Prussia was to be compelled to make, were therein laid down.

In the event of the greatest degree of success, it was thought possible to obtain possession of the duchy of Magdeburg for Saxony; under less favourable circumstances, to secure for that power at least the circle of the Saal, in that duchy; if things turned out still less favourably, Saxony would rest satisfied with Crossen, Züllichau, and the Lusatian fiefs of Bohemia, among which were included Storkow and Beeskow, which, together with Schwiebus, would form a very considerable increase of territory, and secure the direct communication with Poland.*

The Queen could only be brought to make this one concession — she agreed to alienate the circle of Schwiebus in favour of Saxony. With this exception the whole of Upper and Lower Silesia, as well as the province of Glatz, was to return under her sway.

The contingency which had previously been considered, namely, the chance of failing to conquer Silesia, was not once adverted to this time; the victory of the allies, and the ruin of the King, was looked upon as certain.

* Propositions et demandes de la cour de Saxe communiquées dans la dernière confidence. “ Si on ne fait que la conquête de la Silésie le roi de Pologne pour prix de sa coopération et de sa voix en demande la moitié et l'autre moitié sera cédée au Gr Duc. Si on fait des conquêtes sur le roi de Prusse au delà de Silésie et que le roi de Pologne en ait sa portion, alors ce prince ne demande que Schwiebus et Glogau, le reste de la Silésie étant cédée au GrDuc. Si rien ne peut être conquis sur le roi de Prusse, alors on peut céder la Bohème au GrDuc sa vie durant, en réservant pour être cedées au roi de Pol. 4 cercles vz. Königsgrätz, Bunzlau, Leutmeritz et Saatz, comme aussi la ville de Prague.” It is not easy to see how the Saxon court was induced to lower its demands.

That which mainly inspired this security, was the pacification of Bavaria by the treaty of Füssen, concluded on the 22nd of April.*

It cannot be denied that this peace was promoted by a party which had gained complete ascendancy over the Elector; and certainly old General Seckendorf, who had had the conduct of the war for so long, ought not to have been so eager to negotiate a peace.† But we must also admit that the position in which Maximilian Joseph was placed was hopeless, and that he had no choice left but either, like his grandfather, to throw himself entirely into the arms of France, or to accept the peace which Austria had for some time been offering to him. He accordingly gave up the pretensions which had caused so much commotion in the world, but in return he got back his hereditary dominions.

It was no slight matter that Maria Theresa should bring herself to make this restitution. In return the young Elector promised to give his vote to the Grand-Duke; and, moreover, the Queen was enabled to employ all her forces towards the recovery of Silesia.

* On comparing the preliminaries of Füssen, it appears that these points of reconciliation (Hormayr, III. 264) served as a foundation to it.

† Klinggräfen, 1st May: *L'imperatrice étoit en un état d'affliction à ne pouvoir rétenir les larmes.—Elle me fit entrevoir qu'il y avoit peut-être des personnes qui dans l'état critique ou son fils s'étoit trouvé, avoient abusé de sa jeunesse.*

CHAPTER V.

THE CAMPAIGN IN SILESIA IN THE SPRING OF 1745.

(ON the 15th of March, Frederick, after having passed the greater part of the two days preceding his departure with his mother, left Berlin to join the army. Rothenburg, Wartensleben, and Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, travelled in the King's carriage; General Bork and another adjutant followed. Cardinal Sinzendorf and a considerable number of the Silesian nobility were expecting him, as he entered Breslau on the afternoon of the 17th, and got out of his carriage at Schellenberg's house.

It cannot be supposed that the nobility and Catholic clergy of Silesia could be unmoved by the prospect of being once more subject to the Austrian sceptre.* On the other hand, the burghers and peasants, without distinction of religion, were favourable to the Prussian rule. I cannot find any foundation

* Rapport de Mr. de Perron de Castera sur son voyage en Silésie, Mars 1745, to the French court. "La noblesse Silesienne est accablée—elle n'aspire qu'à une révolution." But his statements are generally much exaggerated: e. g. that Cardinal Sinzendorf formerly had 100,000 florins yearly income, and now about 24,000; that of a hundred bushels of oats supplied by a nobleman, only twenty-five were paid for, and this at a moderate price. We can take but small account of statements such as these, made merely on hearsay.

for a story told by a traveller, that while the Austrians occupied the county of Glatz, the common people raised a voluntary subscription among themselves, the proceeds of which they intended to offer to the King of Prussia; but it shows the view which was generally taken of the feelings of the country.

The last campaign had raised some doubts in the army as to the King's talents. Complaints were made that he would listen to no one, that he affronted the most deserving officers, and that he did not spare the troops; many individuals complained of the loss of their goods and chattels, for which they had received no compensation. Frederick neglected no means of allaying this discontent; for instance, he never treated the old Prince of Dessau with greater consideration than he did now in Neisse, on taking back the chief command out of that prince's hands. All his endeavours were directed to making the army complete and ready for service. The zeal and care which he displayed, both as to men and things, and the effect of his presence, quickly silenced calumny and dissatisfaction.

When he took the field, matters were not at that point which they shortly afterwards reached. We will not, however, now stop to inquire how and where these things came to his knowledge.

The hostile intentions of the allied courts were wrapped in the most profound mystery; he could only guess at their objects from their actions; and could never form a certain idea of their plans. In a short time, however, the course of public affairs—the retreat of Maillebois, the dissolution of the Union, the catas-

trophe of Bavaria—led him to expect the greatest annoyances. The two powers, Bavaria and Saxony, which had formerly been allied with him against Austria, were now on her side: Saxony especially exerted herself against him to the utmost of her power. Frederick had opened negotiations for peace with England; but neither did England enter with any zeal into the matter, nor was Queen Caroline the least inclined towards it: she even took it ill if her relations attempted in their letters to make any overtures towards peace. Russia refused her mediation, which Frederick had requested. He could expect no diversion on the part of France of sufficient importance to render his own schemes easier of execution.* Frederick was too proud to ask for subsidies from that power, unless he were justified by the most urgent necessity: a letter which had been drawn up for this purpose was kept back by him. He dreaded the terms which might be imposed upon him, and it was long before he would give up the hope of obtaining peace by some other means.

In a letter of the 29th of March he says: "We are now in a crisis of our fate: if we fail to obtain peace through the mediation of England, my enemies will fall upon me from various quarters. I cannot enforce a peace. As regards war, I am determined to conquer, or that not one of us shall return to Berlin."

* Eichel complains that they had to thank France for nothing save the laying waste of Silesia by friend and foe: the French crown was meanwhile quietly employing its troops on the Rhine, and endeavouring to make this and that plan suit its convenience in the Netherlands.

At the beginning of April he took care, as on a former occasion, to place a division of his army so as to threaten Saxony. After mentioning this arrangement, he adds: "I have already got my troops together at this place. Sickness is fast disappearing, recruits continue to arrive, and in a short time everything will be complete. This need not, however, prevent our making peace; but in the opposite case, no one will be able to accuse me of neglecting my duty."

The feelings and views with which the sovereign and commander looked forward to the dangerous contest which awaited him are very remarkable. We cannot deny ourselves the satisfaction of dwelling a little longer on his own expressions.

On the 17th of April Frederick wrote to Podewils as follows:—"I work day and night to improve our position. The soldiers will do their duty; there is not one among us who would not rather break his back-bone than give way a foot's-breadth. They must grant us good terms of peace, or we will surpass ourselves by miracles of courage, and by our superiority compel the enemy to seek our friendship."

On the 20th of April he writes: "Our situation is unpleasant and strained, but my resolution is fixed. If we must fight, it will be with desperation. Never was danger greater than that to which I am now exposed. I trust that time will unravel this knot; or that fate, if such there be, will decide the event. The game I am playing is for so high a stake, that it is impossible to look upon its final issue in cold blood. Put up vows for the return of my lucky star."

Podewils was much alarmed when Frederick mentioned the dangers to which Berlin would probably be exposed, and gave provisory directions for removing the various government offices and the crown plate and jewels to Magdeburg. He gave the royal family the choice of going there or to Stettin. From the very first, Podewils had anticipated a disastrous end to the war. On taking leave of the King at Potsdam, he told his friend Eichel that he was afraid the period of decay had already begun for the house of Brandenburg; its downfall seemed to him to be now fast approaching.* Podewils added, that it made his hair stand on end. He was well aware that it was upon no hasty or needless alarm that the King's directions had been given: he himself had to report unfavourable expressions which had dropped from the Russian envoy in Dresden.

Frederick replied to him on the 26th of April, "I can understand your being uneasy in Berlin; I have more to lose than any one: nevertheless, I am calm, and prepared for the worst. If the Saxons take part in the invasion of Silesia, and we beat them, I am determined to fall upon Saxony itself. Great evils require great remedies; I will keep or lose all. It is true that the breach of faith on the part of

* That the *periodus fatalis* of that house drew near. He deprecates the commission given him to look to certain measures of security. "J'espère que S. M. voudra charger M. de Boden de certaines commissions, dont je suis hors d'état de m'acquitter si je dois vacquer aux affaires." "Je fais," replied Frederick, "expedier un ordre secret a Boden, que vous ne lui delivrerés pas que lorsque je donnerai le signal."

the Russian court, arising, too, from such inconsiderable motives, could not have been anticipated, and much misfortune may be in store for us; but it is not worth while to fret about a year or two sooner or later. If things take a good turn, our position will be better and safer than it has been hitherto: if we have nothing to reproach ourselves with, we need not grieve over misfortunes, to which all men are liable."

At this moment the worst news of all arrived, namely, that a treaty of peace had been concluded at Füssen, from which the King was excluded. The whole storm now gathered over his single head.

Frederick wrote: "I can say nothing, but that that has happened which was to happen. Nothing now remains to me but patience. If all my resources and negotiations fail, if all chances turn against me, I prefer falling with honour to leading an inglorious life, deprived of all consideration. It is my pride to have done more for the increase of my house than any of my ancestors, and to have played a great part among the crowned heads of Europe. To maintain this position is a personal duty, which I will fulfil at the cost of life and happiness. I have no other choice left: I will either maintain my power entire, or it will be annihilated, and the Prussian name be buried with me. Should the enemy undertake anything against us, we will conquer, or we will be cut to pieces to the last man for the salvation of our country and the honour of Brandenburg. It would be vain to offer me any other counsel. What sea-captain is there who, after all his endeavours to save his vessel had failed, would not have the courage to

set light to the powder magazine, and thus, at any rate, disappoint the expectations of the foe? A woman, the Queen of Hungary, when the enemy were at the gates of Vienna, and her best provinces occupied by them, did not despair: and shall not we have the courage of a woman? As yet we have not lost a battle, and one stroke of fortune may raise us higher than we have yet stood."

Podewils excused the anxiety he felt by saying, that his fears were not for himself or for his property, which was of small value, but only for the King; but that he knew that the King's heart and courage would, with the assistance of Providence, overcome all obstacles. Frederick gave Podewils credit for doing as much as any one could expect from him; but he himself was not disposed to depend altogether upon the assistance of Providence. "Do you on your part fulfil your duties as I do on mine, and leave the rest to blind chance. If we fail, it shall be through no want of prudence or of courage on our parts, but the fault of circumstances, which have been adverse to us."

"I am prepared for whatever may happen. Whether fortune be kind or cruel, I shall be neither cast down nor puffed up. If I must perish, I will fall with glory and sword in hand. Learn from a man who never listened to the sermons of Elsner, that we must oppose a front of bronze to the misfortunes which come upon us, and even during our lifetime we must resign all joys, all possessions, and all illusions, which will not follow us beyond the grave."*

* *J'ai jetté le bonnet par dessus les moulins: . . . adieu mon*

If Frederick had had faith, his resignation would have carried with it a dash of Protestant devotion, and would have more easily communicated itself to his people. But from this he was far removed, and he stood alone in his sentiments. It was characteristic of his nature to look for no help from any quarter, not from Heaven itself; he strained every nerve to meet the threatened danger, but he was prepared for defeat. He feared nothing and hoped nothing, but lived only in the endeavour to fulfil his duty.

Frederick's expressions remind us of the maxims written by a Roman Emperor during his campaign against the Quadi. But the sentiments which in the former were school reminiscences, or the results of reading or experience, and applicable alike to all, arose spontaneously in Frederick's mind, in the midst of one of those great political struggles which call forth the whole force of the intellect; it has far less method, but more individuality and life. We see a German sovereign in whom personal and dynastic ambition, heroic courage, and military talent are combined with the feelings and opinions of a Stoic. Who shall dare to find fault with his ambition? It is the noblest that a prince can have—to win for his people and his state complete political independence—for himself a position in which none shall be his superior in actual importance. His very opinions, deeply as they were rooted in him, were not the pure result of his

cher Podewils devenez aussi bon philosophe que vous êtes bon politique et apprenez d'un homme qui n'a jamais fréquenté les sermons d'Elsner n'y d'autres qu'il faut savoir opposer un front d'airain aux malheurs qui peuvent nous arriver.

own reflections; they were partly called forth by the dangers which threatened him on every side, and by the necessity for incessant activity.

“For,” said Frederick, “in order to preserve the freedom of the mind, we must learn to look forward calmly to the coming of those events which cannot be avoided. I have suffered much, and have been obliged to exercise great self-control, but, thank heaven! I am now able to work in cold blood at the preparations I have to make.”*

Things far different from the romantic tale of an escape render the abbey of Camenz a spot ever memorable in Frederick’s history. It was there that he made these reflections, and acquired this firmness and self-command, while his whole day was occupied with military cares and duties. He had thought it advisable to place his troops in cantonments on either side of the Neiss, whence he could easily lead them to any point that might be seriously threatened: his own head-quarters were for some weeks in the abbey.

The spring was just beginning, and every one rejoiced at seeing the army in every respect restored, full of courage, and eager for action. Prince Ferdinand reckoned that out of the 114,000 men, which made the full complement of the King’s army, 1500, at most, were wanting. The cavalry was complete and well mounted; the infantry likewise had its full

* 8th May, from Camenz: “Je crois que vous vous étonnez de me voir si tranquille dans la crise la plus violente où j’ai été de ma vie: je vous reponds à cela que j’ai été obligé de gagner beaucoup sur moi, avant que de me procurer cette impassibilité.”

numbers, except perhaps those regiments which had been in garrison in Prague, and for these recruits arrived every day. Those who had deserted their colours during the previous campaign returned to their old regiments: the health of the army was excellent. The King remarked with pleasure that its temper was likewise improving. The tone of mind of the officers was just such as he wished to see; all were in good heart, and full of confidence; every man would do his duty to the last drop of his blood: each saw his own honour in the honour of the State.*

Thus were the King and his army prepared for the great struggle, to which the prelude now began on the posts near the frontiers.

In a village called Rosenberg, near Oppeln, a Prussian major was attacked by a body of hussars, under General Caroly, ten times superior in number to his troop, and, after a gallant resistance, was forced to capitulate. Hereupon, with the avowed object of retaliation, the Prussians quartered at Cosel and Oppeln attacked the Austrians encamped on the right bank of the Oder, and cut off or dispersed the troops they encountered in the open field. At first the Prussian cavalry regained the upper hand, and wrung from the enemy many a contribution which they had levied. General Caroly had his head-quarters in a wood. He alone slept in a tent; all his companions

* Camenz, 13th May. Above all things he praises the situation: "Grâce à dieu tout continue à jouir ici de la santé la plus parfaite et de tout le repos et la tranquillité imaginable. Le séjour d'ici est assez agreable par rapport à la belle situation se trouvant à portée pour tout, pour se porter à Neisse," etc.

in arms lay under the trees, or on the edge of the morasses, in the open air.

The hordes led by Esterhazy against Jägerndorf were somewhat better disciplined. That which Marwitz had formerly determined to do on his own responsibility, the King himself now thought necessary. He ordered Margrave Charles, who held that place with eleven battalions of foot and thirty squadrons of horse, to fall back. One of Ziethen's most distinguished actions was the manner in which he, with a small body of followers, forced his way through the numerous hostile troops which occupied the defiles and narrow passes between the Prussian army and the Margrave's quarters, and succeeded in conveying to him this intelligence. The appearance of Ziethen's hus-sars was so unexpected, that many of the Austrian auxiliary forces took them for a body of their own troops, and thus fell an easy prey into their hands.* The retreat of Margrave Charles was, however, attended with far more serious difficulties. The Austrians had stationed a great number of soldiers, with artillery, at

* The narrative of Frau von Blumenthal, in Ziethen's Life, I. p. 472, contains much that is fabulous. According to Prince Ferdinand's account, the happy issue of the battle was mainly brought about by the Margrave, who, hearing firing in the distance, despatched five squadrons of Bronikowski's horse to meet the advancing foe. These troops fell upon the rear of the Pandours, with whom Ziethen was engaged. Prince Ferdinand knew nothing of Ziethen's intention of making his men pass for Austrians. Nevertheless he speaks of a "certain Capitain des Dalmatines, qui croyoit bonnement, voyant venir les 5 escadrons de Zieten que c'étoit le regiment de Spleny." This probably was the origin of the whole story.

the most convenient points of the wooded heights on either side of the road by which he had to pass: they thought to surround the Margrave's corps, and to destroy it by a general attack on every side. But the Prussians did not allow matters to come to this pass. No sooner did the enemy approach their van, than the Prussians faced about, routed the double lines of Austrian infantry that were opposed to them, without being checked for a moment by their fire, dispersed the cavalry that came to the assistance of the infantry, and then continued their march more proudly than ever—their baggage and artillery increased by a few Austrian cannon: nor did the enemy again venture to attack them. The white uniforms of the Ludwig Würtemberg dragoons were stained with blood, for the battle had been fiercely contested hand to hand. This was a feat of arms which the King estimated highly; he pronounced his cousin to be a worthy grandson of the Great Elector, and in the presence of the whole army he testified to the officers his approbation of their services.

In a third quarter, on the mountain passes of Lower Silesia, the struggle was incessant. The Silesian peasants took an active part in the war. They often brought to the camp hussars whom they had captured, or the horses of such as they had shot, of which they were paid the price. At length Nadasdy's Hungarians, strengthened by some infantry, attempted a regular attack upon Landshut. There they encountered Winterfeldt, who, as he said, had great pleasure in making their acquaintance, although their numbers amounted to some 6000 men, while he had not above

2500. For seven hours he withstood, with great skill and courage, their frequent and obstinate attacks, until at length the arrival of a fresh regiment gave him additional support; whereupon the enemy were attacked with twofold vigour, and driven back over the mountains.* The pursuit was likewise very bloody, as the hussars would give no quarter to any Hungarian.

After the unfavourable impression left by the last campaign, these incidents were needed in order to inspire the army with confidence in itself. Meanwhile things were gradually drawing towards some more decisive conclusion.

Since the beginning of May the main army of the Austrians had been gathering together, under Prince Charles, at Königgrätz. It gradually increased to 70,000 men of regular and about 15,000 of irregular troops, horse and foot. Among the latter were to be found, on foot, not alone Borderers from Maros and the Danube, but likewise Servians, Albanians, Dalmatians, and, on horseback, Jazygians and Cumanians, and the "insurrection" cavalry troops of Transylvania. The Saxon troops, 30,000 strong, under the Duke of Weissenfels, assembled at Jungbunzlau.

* Relation, was vom 21 Abends bis 22 Mittags bei Landshut vorgefallen—(Narrative of that which took place at Landshut in the interval between the evening of the 21st and mid-day of the 22nd). See Varnhagen von Ense's *Life of Winterfeldt*, p. 59. In a letter to the King, Winterfeldt says: "General Stille mit dem möllendorfschen Regiment kam noch just zur rechten Zeit."—(General Stille came up with Möllendorf's regiment in the very nick of time.)

On the 21st of May the Saxons and Austrians joined forces at Jaromirz, though still in cantonments. The Austrians extended as far as Neustadt, the Saxons to Königshof. These two armies, whose co-operation had given to the campaign in Bohemia a turn so desirable for Austria, were much stronger than before. Their plan was as follows:—

The King of Prussia was to be attacked from Upper Silesia by the united forces of Esterhazy and Caroly, and of the generals associated with them. This would compel him to divide his forces; whereupon it was proposed to fall upon him with the main army, without allowing him to retreat, as he had done before, and to give him battle wherever they might find him: they reckoned upon a certain victory, on account of their overwhelming superiority of numbers. They had already sent heavy artillery from Dresden to Wittenberg: one division of the victorious army was then to force its way through Lusatia into the March: some Uhlans were already on their way from Warsaw towards the frontiers of the Neumark. Thus the movements in Silesia were to be accompanied by an attack from various quarters on the Marches of Brandenburg, and the fate of Prussia decided for ever.

Frederick, who was ignorant of all these schemes, wished only to see his enemies prepare to give him battle. On considering his position, and the hostility which threatened him on every side, he judged that nothing but a battle could save him. He was well aware that he was expected to commit acts of imprudence, and he was the more anxious to avoid so doing. He said that he would venture to lay

his plan before a Condé or a Turenne, with the certainty that they would approve it.*

On the 25th of May the Austrians and Saxons made a decisive movement towards the mountain-pass near Landshut, which town Winterfeldt had evacuated, after defending it against Nadasdy. On the 29th of May Prince Charles and the Duke of Weissenfels took up their joint quarters in Landshut, and were constantly receiving reinforcements: from time to time their light troops made incursions into the country beyond the mountains.

The King, who had remained quiet until he could discover with certainty the direction taken by the main body of the hostile army, left his cantonments on the 27th, and encamped at Frankenstein. On the 30th he removed to another camp near Reichenbach; and on the 1st of June he advanced in the direction of Schweidnitz. He fixed his camp in the neighbourhood of Jauernik, commanding a view of the whole mountain-range, which the enemy was about to cross.

At this moment Frederick took small account of Upper Silesia: he could do nothing to prevent the fortress of Cosel from falling into the enemy's hands even before its works were completed; and although this was one of the fortresses upon the erection of

* 22nd May: "Les ennemis font des mouvements mais ce n'est encore rien d'assez pour que l'on puisse pénétrer leurs desseins. En attendant le foudre repose en mez mains." . . . At this moment news arrived of the battle of Fontenay, which took place on the 11th of May. "Ah! puissions nous trouver un jour comme l'onze de Mai!"

which he had set great store, its loss now gave him no uneasiness: he fixed his whole attention upon the main allied army, which was now marching across the mountain-passes. On the 2nd of June the Prince fixed his head-quarters in Baumgarten, and the Duke his in Bolkenhain. Their ardour for battle received fresh fuel from the news of the capture of Cosel, and by a report, to which they lent a ready ear, that the King of Prussia was on the point of retreating. They hoped to consecrate their new colours by a speedy entrance into Breslau, where they should make up for all the privations they had endured.

On the morning of the 3rd the Austrian and Saxon generals met on the heights of Hohenfriedberg, and fixed upon the passes through which to advance. Towards midday the whole army marched in eight columns. The two commanders ate their midday meal on one of the heights, and pleased themselves with seeing the different columns deploy all at the same moment from the defiles of the mountains, and advance, colours flying and bands playing, as if to a festival.

At the moment when they set themselves in motion, Frederick was standing on a height, near Streigau, which lay opposite to one of these mountain-passes: he had repaired to this spot for three successive days in order to watch the enemy with his own eyes. At length he saw them, as he wished, leaving their camp. The rising dust showed him which direction they took: he was able to distinguish their columns of infantry and cavalry, and to guess their destination. He hastened back

to his camp near Jauernik, where his troops had been ordered to stay over the following day. "Now," said he, as he got off his horse, "the enemy are where we would have them." He gave orders that the whole army, cavalry, infantry, and artillery, should march at eight o'clock that evening, in order to meet the enemy on the following morning at the foot of the mountains.

The hour drew near which was to decide whether he was to remain lord and master of Silesia, and to maintain that position in Europe which he had acquired by means of his state and of his army.

The state of things on both sides, on this eventful evening, was as follows:—

First of all, the Saxons advanced out of the mountain defiles, and took up their appointed position on the left, extending from Rohnstock to the wooded heights which rise just above the plain. During the early part of the night they occupied a hill in their front, probably the Breiter Berg, or Broad Mountain, with some artillery and a few battalions of grenadiers. On the right the Austrians, who descended the mountains somewhat more slowly, encamped in the neighbourhood of Hausdorf, where the low ground is everywhere intersected by ditches, or covered with stagnant water: the soldiers passed the night under arms. They intended to take Striegau on the following morning, and to pursue the King of Prussia, whom they believed to be in full retreat.

While this was going on at the foot of the mountains, the muffled drums of the grenadier battalion of Buddenbrock gave the signal at the appointed hour

in Frederick's camp, and the army commenced its march towards Striegau in two columns. The first reached that place at about twelve o'clock; the second, which had to make a difficult passage across the Freiburg mere, did not arrive till two. At the earliest break of dawn the generals and lieutenant-generals assembled round the King—who meanwhile had taken a little rest wrapped in his cloak—in order to receive his commands. No systematic plan was concerted; each man knew his place in the order of battle; the King only directed that the attack should be made on the left flank of the enemy by successive brigades, each one supporting the other.* The Saxons and the Austrians had come intending to crush the King of Prussia by the weight of their united numbers. He determined to seek them in their camp before they were prepared for it; to beat the Saxons first, and then to attack the Austrians. It was said in the army that his object was to cut off the communication between the two forces: but this meant nothing more than that he intended to attack first the one, and then the other.

At four o'clock in the morning the first cannon shot was fired. Dumoulin, who, during the night, had, with the advanced guard, taken up a position in the immediate neighbourhood of the Saxons, drove them from the heights in their front near Pilgrams-hain, and planted his own cannon in the place of

* Account of Prince Ferdinand's battles in Lützow; the battle of Hohenfriedberg: "que l'attaque se feroit par la droite par brigades et successivement l'une soutenant l'autre, sur les Saxons."

theirs. While the Saxons prepared for resistance they were vigorously attacked by the first brigade of the right wing, which had joined the advanced guard. The Saxons resisted with determination, and once or twice with effect; but the Prussians were far superior in skill and discipline, and at their head fought the fiery Rothenburg, the thoughtful Stille, the cool and courageous Winterfeldt. "If you had been present," writes Stille to a friend, "you would have admired the union of steadiness and courage displayed by our troops. More than once the cavalry got entangled with the infantry, but both managed to free themselves with the greatest rapidity. In a few minutes we saw the cavalry drawn up in two lines, and the infantry of the second line, which had got before the first, already engaged in the conflict. The Saxons were driven from their positions near Pilgramshain, and out of the village itself."

Meanwhile the regiments of the line which next followed had to contend with another difficulty caused by the mistake of the army, which, deceived by the watch-fires, had at first directed its march too far towards the left;* and now that the right wing pushed forward with great impetuosity still further towards the right, it was with very great difficulty that the line could be formed. This had to be

* Narrative of an officer in Margrave Charles's⁷ regiment; ungedruckte Nachrichten (unpublished Documents), I. p. 329. "Man ward gewahr, dass der Feind, ohngeachtet der bemerkten Feuer, nicht an dem Orte wogegen wir aufmarschirt waren, sich befand."—(We discovered that the enemy, in spite of the fires we had seen, was not on the spot upon which we had marched.)

accomplished while the troops were advancing in double quick time over uneven ground: so that occasionally large spaces were left between the troops, and while the battalions closed with those which were advancing, their flanks were frequently left exposed to attack in the face of the enemy, who were now coming towards them drawn up in full order of battle. The French envoy, an experienced soldier, who happened to be present, was astonished at the steadiness, activity, and discipline displayed by the infantry. Frederick was forced to execute a most dangerous manœuvre, which a merely methodical leader would fear to attempt. The manœuvre in this case was inevitable, and recourse was had to it rather in order to make good an error, than from choice. The self-command he had acquired was not merely theoretical; he was now solely occupied with the means of gaining the victory, and not with its possible consequences: he recognised the danger of his situation, and met it with intrepid coolness.

The troops had scarcely got into order before the battle raged in every quarter, especially, however, in the centre of the field, where some few Austrian regiments were drawn up by the side of the Saxons. Occasionally, where they were the strongest, the enemy pushed forward until they came within the range of the Prussian guns, which drove them back with great loss. But, generally speaking, the Prussians forced their way onwards, even where the enemy had hedges, wooded ground, and morasses in their front.* Here and there the cavalry had to

* Eichel, 5th June, to Podewils. "So viel ist gewiss, dass

break down high fences, before they could get at the enemy. When the infantry brigade of Prince Maurice passed by one end of a green glade in the midst of a thicket, it received the whole discharge of a battery planted on the opposite side. The commander of the brigade, Bonin, ordered his men to face about and charge the Saxons. As they could not carry their guns with them across the ditches, they faltered for a moment, and the issue of the contest might have been doubtful, had not the Prince of Prussia approached, whose "march" was received with loud cheers. Without much firing the regiments charged the enemy, and utterly routed them. One Saxon officer was bayoneted while on the point of firing off a cannon. There had not been so sharp a fire of cannon and musketry either at Mollwitz or at Chotusitz. The air was perfectly still, and the smoke hung heavy over the battle-

der Feind in einem sehr avantageusen Posten gestanden, so dass nicht nur die Infanterie durch Gräben, Moräste und Hecken, die feindliche Infanterie so anfangs mehrentheils im Gebüsch verdeckt gestanden, sondern dass die Cavallerie noch öfter 2 bis 3 Gräben passiren müssen, ehe solche zum Choc mit dem Feinde kommen können."—(Thus much is certain, that the enemy occupied a very advantageous position, so that not only the infantry had to cross ditches, morasses, and hedges, whereas the enemy, for the most part was concealed in thickets, but the cavalry likewise had frequently to cross two or three ditches, before they could charge the enemy.) In the townhall at Striegau hangs a remarkable picture of this battle, which differs materially from other plans of this battle. The difficulties that stand in the way of a correct military comprehension and description of the battle are shown in a paper by Field-Marshal von Müffling. Militär-wochenblatt, 1845. No. 36.

field : the very mountains appeared to tremble. The inhabitants of Pilgramshain made up their little differences under the trees in a garden amid the thunder of the artillery and the whizzing of the shot over their heads.* Towards seven o'clock the whole left wing, as far as the centre of the enemy's position, was entirely beaten. Here and there large heaps of slain showed how determined a resistance had been offered by the Saxons.

The main body of the Austrians, however, still remained in the field unconquered. Prince Charles hoped to turn the fortune of the day, if he could succeed in falling upon the Prussians in their left flank. He advanced with infantry and cavalry upon the village of Thomaswaldau, which the Prussians had occupied in the mean time. The charge made by his cavalry was not very successful. On one side they were received by a well-directed fire from the village, while on another they plunged into some marshy and broken ground. Wherever the hostile cuirassiers came into actual conflict, Nassau, at the head of the Prussians, obtained a decided advantage over his opponents. On the other hand, the Austrian infantry, led by Leopold Daun, with whom were a number of Prussian deserters, for a time had the best of the engagement. The grenadiers were posted in the ditches; the advancing Prussians, who had only just succeeded in spreading out their line so far, were received with a well-sustained fire of musketry

* From the Shöppenbuch of Pilgramshain; in Lützow: the battle of Hohenfriedberg or Striegau, 138.

and a perfect hail of grape-shot. The regiments Brunswick-Bevern, Hacke, and Schlichting, as well as one battalion of Einsiedel's, suffered tremendous loss: "We have," says an officer of the first-named regiment, "five hundred wounded and two hundred killed; the colonel, one major, five captains, and eleven subalterns are wounded. It was by God's grace that our lads held their ground, and that the indescribably heavy fire did not make them waver." They must, however, have given way, or have been cut to pieces, if timely help had not arrived. This was the dragoon regiment Baireuth, led by General Gessler, which here earned an imperishable name. The dragoons charged between the breaks in the ranks of the infantry: the condition of comrades who had so often fought by their side roused them to fury. They fell upon the Austrian infantry, which was now worn out by the resistance it had encountered, and disheartened by the defeat of the Saxons, and utterly routed it.* Some

* Narrative of Bevern's regiment: "Dieses waren also unsere endlichen Erlöser, und weil die Dragoner sahen, dass ihre sonst so getreue Nachbarn so grausam zerschossen und zugerichtet, encouragirten sie sich unter einander zur Rache; sie jugen mit vollem Galopp zwischen uns durch, hielten das österreichische Feuer sowohl aus groben als kleinem Geschütz geduldig aus, und attaquirten die ohnedem zur Retirade schon auf dem Sprunge gestandenen Oestreicher mit der grössten Furie; sie schmissen den Ueberrest sowohl vom Leopold Daunschen als auch Grünschen Regiment völlig über einen Haufen, und brachten den ganzen österreichischen rechten Flügel hiedurch zur Flucht, wobei sie zugleich fast alle Fahnen, welche dazu noch funkelnagelten, und welche derer Gefangenen Aussage nach mit der Preussen Blut und Untergang eingeweiht werden soll-

squadrons of Austrian horse attempted to come to the assistance of their discomfited countrymen, but the general discharge which they poured upon the advancing Prussians produced no effect, and the Austrians gave way before the cold steel of the Prussian cavalry. In spite of the evil plight of the regiments of Hacke and Bevern, they pushed boldly forward to avenge their losses upon the Austrians: their ammunition was exhausted, but the few that remained of the hostile ranks fled before the charge of their bayonets. Towards eight o'clock in the morning the Prussians were completely masters of the field. In order to prevent the retreat from becoming a thorough rout, the Duke of Lorraine, who thus exposed himself to great personal danger and was very nearly taken prisoner, occupied the heights of Hohenfriedberg. A cannonade now ensued, which lasted till midday, by which time all the Austrian troops had retreated into the mountains. The King had ordered refreshments to be brought

ten, nebst 2 Haubitzen und 7 Kanonen erbeutet."—(These then were our real saviours, and when the dragoons saw their trusty neighbours so cruelly treated and shot down, they encouraged one another to revenge: they went at full gallop through our ranks, patiently stood the Austrian fire both of musketry and cannon, and made the most furious onslaught on the Austrians, who indeed were already on the point of retreating. They completely routed the remainder of Daun's and Grün's regiments, and thus forced the whole of the right wing to fly, capturing nearly all the colours, which were bran new, and which, according to the statement of some prisoners, were to have been hanselled with Prussian blood: two howitzers and seven cannon were likewise taken.) (Archives of Wolfenbüttel.)

and distributed on the spot to the weary troops. He directed drink to be given to all the wounded on the field of battle, without distinction. He rode up to the regiments which had suffered the greatest losses—we will not say which had shown the greatest courage, for all had vied with each other in bravery—and thanked them in person.

It was impossible to pursue the Austrians with much vigour, as the night march and the bloody engagement of the forenoon had already exhausted the strength of the troops. All were quite contented as the proud enemy, who had all along been so confident of victory, had suffered an unquestioned defeat, and the possession of Silesia had been maintained against him.

The whole country felt that this battle had decided the question for ever. During this great crisis, divisions had once more arisen between the two religious parties. The Catholics talked a great deal of a crucifix which had suddenly turned itself round towards the approaching Austrians; while the Lutherans interpreted, as a token of God's especial favour to themselves, a bright double rainbow which, on their fast-day, in the month of May, spanned the heavens, while both its ends rested on the earth. Wherever the thunder of the artillery reached the ears of the inhabitants of the Lutheran villages, they fell on their knees in crowds, beseeching God to give the victory to the purified faith. In Breslau the Jews added their wishes to those of the Lutherans. The joy was great indeed when, late in the evening of that same day, sixteen messengers rode into

Breslau, blowing their horns, and proclaimed the news of the victory, of which a vague rumour had already reached the town. Three days after, the colours that had been taken, for the most part new and handsome, were brought into the town. One of these was the great standard bearing the Queen's initials. Among those who thronged to see the spoils was a Catholic citizen, who, after gazing once more upon the initials, knelt down, kissed the blood-stained corner, and then went quietly home to his daily work.

The privy counsellor Eichel, who had watched the course of events in immediate attendance upon the King, conceived the opinion that the victory was owing to the direct interposition of Providence. Notwithstanding the fury of the attack, not a standard, not a drum had been lost. Of all the soldiers that were missing, to the number of seventy-one, there were very few whose absence could not be accounted for. Such a thing had never happened before: the hand of the Lord was manifest in it.

The King announced his victory on that selfsame evening to Podewils with his own hand. "Our cavalry," said he, "has done wonders; every corps fought admirably. My brothers, too, fought like lions for their country: we have kept our word." In another letter he says that the battle was the best he had yet seen; nothing so decisive had occurred since the battle of Höchstädt.

But Frederick was not so completely under the dominion of his stoical views as not to perceive that this result depended upon something more than

courage and discipline. The convictions of those who surrounded him exercised their influence over Frederick. "God hath blinded mine enemies, and protected me in a wondrous manner," said he to the French envoy, with mingled exultation and thankfulness.

The pursuit of the Austrians was carried on with so little eagerness, that they resolved to take a day's rest at Landshut on the 6th of June. The Prince and the Duke were walking on the ramparts of the town, when news reached them that a Prussian corps was seen ascending the hilly ridge and approaching the town. The proposed day's rest was instantly interrupted, and the retreat continued. By the 11th of June the allied armies were once more in their former position near Jaromirz, between the Upper Aupa and Metau, and the King of Prussia made his appearance on the high mountainous ridge near the sources of these rivers.

Podewils wrote to him that the victory, which had quieted the fears and crowned the hopes of many thousand souls, would have so much the greater influence upon the political state of Europe, according as it was used with moderation. "Do not be afraid," replied the King, "that I shall commit myself by undue precipitancy, or suffer my impatience to get the upper hand in matters upon which depends the welfare of my country. I shall prosecute the war, but only as a means of obtaining peace."

He did enter Bohemia, it is true; but it was only in order to guard himself against fresh attack, by occupying the frontiers provisionally, and by destroy-

ing the magazines. When Prince Charles took up a strong position near Königgrätz, he did not attempt to attack him there. All he wished was, that General Nassau should reconquer Upper Silesia, a service on which he had despatched that general from one of the first camps he occupied in Bohemia. He wished to make peace on condition of holding only his former possessions.

But to obtain this was a much more difficult matter than he had anticipated.

He had bravely and successfully repelled one great attack, but this did not quell the movement that had arisen against him over one half of Europe.

Indeed, he founded his hopes not only upon the victory he had achieved, but likewise upon certain political changes which meanwhile had taken place in England. We must now examine more narrowly the causes and the effects of these changes, to which we have already alluded on a former occasion.

CHAPTER VI.

CHANGE OF POLICY IN ENGLAND.

IF we judge Frederick's policy by its results, we are tempted to blame his connexion with France in the most unmeasured terms. Trusting to this alliance, Frederick undertook the enterprise against Bohemia, which ended in so disastrous a manner; he at the same time rendered his position in Germany difficult, and exposed his plans, which in themselves were well-meant, to suspicion and reproach from the nation. The ill will shown by Russia was caused by this, and he received not the slightest assistance from France. But it is hard to find fault with true genius. When we examine further into the matter, Frederick's bold declaration of war, in alliance with France, had one result which turned out greatly to his advantage.

We have related in a former chapter how Lord Carteret, who accompanied King George to Germany, and who embraced his sovereign's views as far as possible, found himself for this very reason at variance with the old members of the English ministry, who had received him into their body on the fall of Walpole. On his return to England, Carteret was vehemently attacked. He was accused of having

encouraged the court of Vienna in its impracticable schemes; and even of having called them into existence, without regard to the interests of England; he was reproached with wishing for war, which he was utterly incapable of conducting. It was said that his despatches to the home government were disjointed and unsatisfactory, and that he wanted to involve England in all the continental embarrassments, in order to forward the interests of Austria and Hanover.

At this very moment the King of Prussia raised the standard of war.

However little the actual terms of the treaty justified the idea, still the impression produced by the event was, that it was owing to the false policy of Lord Carteret that the warlike Prussian monarch had again made common cause with the Bourbons, and thrown an army of 100,000 men into the scale adverse to that of England.

This impression was much strengthened by the retreat of Prince Charles. George II. and Lord Carteret were satisfied with this movement; not so the nation or the other members of the ministry. A subsidy of 150,000*l.* had been voted, said they, for the purpose of making a vigorous attack upon France through Alsatia; but no sooner had the money been paid, than the Queen withdrew her whole army from that province. This was all very well for the Queen, as it enabled her to oppose the Prussians; but the King of France was thus empowered to bring so much the greater force against the allies. The Queen of Hungary looked solely to her own interests; it was

impossible to carry on the war any longer on these terms.*

This was the purport of "the paper presented to the King by the Duke of Newcastle" in November, 1744.†

Carteret had imagined that whosoever had the King on his side could successfully resist all opposition: this turned out to be a great mistake; George II., offended at finding his own cherished policy attacked, made an attempt to retain Lord Carteret, but again the opposition was too strong for him, and he was compelled to let his favourite minister fall.

Certain slight but very significant changes were instantly apparent in the public declarations of government.

In the speech from the throne, delivered on the opening of Parliament on the 27th of November, the King once more expressed himself most decidedly as to the necessity of war; but he was not allowed to say, as he had intended, that he would "agree to no peace until all his allies were satisfied," he only said that he would never abandon his allies.‡

The King's words were repeated in the addresses from both Houses of Parliament. But while the peers re-echoed and even amplified his unfavourable

* Pelham to the Duke of Newcastle; in Coxe's Pelham, 26th Aug., 1744, I. 168.

† Coxe's Pelham, I. 177.

‡ He meant to say: "agree to no peace until all his allies were satisfied." But it ran thus: "I am determined to carry on the war, in such a manner as may be most conducive to a safe and honourable peace, it being my firm resolution never to abandon my allies."

allusion to Frederick II., the Commons thought it better to omit that passage altogether: they had no wish to affront the King of Prussia.

The withdrawal of a single member of the government commonly matters but little. On this occasion, however, it could not fail to produce very important effects upon the general politics of Europe, when the man whom Frederick looked upon almost as his personal enemy retired from the administration, and was succeeded by Lord Harrington, who had uniformly endeavoured to conciliate the interests of Prussia with those of England. The otherwise fruitless attempt upon Bohemia produced this most important result, which, though not remarked at the time, could scarcely have been obtained in any other way; for deeds alone have any weight in the general conflict of European powers: England and Prussia could again unite.

Frederick declared that it was mainly owing to Carteret's measures that he had been driven to take up arms again. This Harrington fully comprehended, and wished only to know whether Frederick had not already entered into such engagements with France, as would prevent him from renewing his former good understanding with England. The King replied that such was not the case.

Hereupon, in the beginning of the year, Frederick communicated to Harrington his notions of the terms upon which a general peace, as well as one for Germany alone, should be concluded. In the latter he took especial care to stipulate for certain advantages for the Elector of Bavaria, whom he looked upon as his natural ally. Harrington declared that it was

impossible for him to procure any such : he likewise refused to conclude a provisional treaty, on the ground that the King of England could only come forward as a mediator for the restoration of the old state of things on the footing of the peace of Breslau. As the Prussian government agreed with this view of the case, some preliminary articles were drawn up which were destined to be laid before the court of Vienna. According to this scheme the peace of Breslau was to be confirmed, the house of Bavaria reinstated in its possessions, and the King of Prussia to promise his vote to the Duke of Lorraine at the election of an Emperor. As early as the month of March the English ministry sent a communication on this subject to the court of Vienna.*

But although the most dangerous enemy to Prussia was now removed from power in England, it by no means followed that his system would at once be abandoned in the conduct of public affairs.

The prevailing opinion in Parliament was that it was quite immaterial how the war had arisen, or whether it had been rightly conducted or no; now that they were once engaged in it, they must fight it out to the end.

Thus much was resolved, that the Hanoverians, against whom a universal jealousy prevailed, should no longer receive British pay. On the other hand,

* Harrington said : “ que tout ce, que S. Mé Britannique pouvoit faire, seroit de porter la cour de Vienne à s'en tenir au traité de Breslau ; que c'étoit par déférence à V. Mé que S. M. Br. employeroit son credit à la cour de V. pour la restitution en entier.”

the English army in the Netherlands was very considerably increased. So far from withdrawing the subsidy which had hitherto been granted to the Queen of Hungary, it was still further increased. Subsidies were likewise voted for Sardinia, Mayence, and Cologne.* The treaty of Warsaw, which contained some new stipulations, and would most likely have encountered great opposition had not the negotiations already gone too far, was now adopted and ratified.

Public affairs have a certain natural and inevitable course: it was impossible to allow any suspicion of breach of faith to attach to the English nation or to their King. Some suggested that the Queen of Hungary should be pledged to employ her army against France alone, but even this was impracticable: it was out of the question to use the Austrian troops as mere hirelings.

The English ministers, while they wished the King of Prussia all possible success, nevertheless allowed the attack upon Silesia to take place without opposition or remonstrance. There can be no doubt that the armaments of Prince Charles and of the Duke of Weissenfels were mainly defrayed by English money, at a time when it was no longer the interest or the wish of England that the Austrian arms should be successful.

This was certainly one of the most glaring in-

* Sardinia had 200,000*l.*; Cologne, 24,299*l.*; Mayence, 8620*l.*; the Queen, 500,000*l.*; and a further subsidy of 500,000*l.* "to make good such other treaties as are or shall be made with his Majesty's allies, and for other service for the year 1745." This last service met with some opposition.

stances of inconsistency that could arise in the government of a country. Such contradictions are, perhaps, unavoidable under a representative form of government, in which the successive ministries raised to power by the struggles of hostile parties, still feel bound by the measures of their predecessors, although totally differing from them in opinion. But to Frederick II. such conduct appeared to arise either from weakness or double dealing.

And, indeed, the fact was, that, whatever might be the opinion of this or that ministry, still the King of England himself invariably pursued a line of policy directly opposed to that of Prussia.

At the first glance the chief characteristics of George II. appeared to be method and severity: he had never been known to be too late for an appointment. It is said that in the midst of the turmoil of a battle he invariably maintained the attitude taught in the fencing-school. He liked to see even his children held at a respectful distance, and took pleasure in a sort of proud solitude. He seemed cold and unfeeling; though he was known to be much given to sensuality, and always kept up some illicit connexion: but the strongest passion of his soul was political ambition. When he reflected that he was at the head of a great nation, that, as a German electoral prince possessing an imperial fief of the first rank, he could exercise considerable influence over the affairs of the Empire, moreover that he was the acknowledged champion of Protestantism, and that he held the purse-strings of England, and he thought himself destined to play a great part in Eu-

ropean affairs, though what was to be its nature he had never clearly conceived : he always had in view some petty dynastic advantage to be gained in the vicinity of Hanover, some claims to be made good against Mecklenburg, or East Friesland, or upon some neighbouring bishopric : at one moment he hoped to effect his purposes by an alliance with the imperial power, at another by opposition to it. His schemes were, however, met by a two-fold resistance. The first arose out of the independent developement of the Prussian power, which he had formerly attempted to attach entirely to himself by means of matrimonial alliances. We all know the stubborn behaviour of Frederick William I., and the no less firm, but more discerning, views of Frederick II. Sophia Dorothea, the Queen Dowager of Prussia, who felt personally aggrieved by George II.'s suppression of his father's will, by which a legacy had been bequeathed to her, was by no means inclined to side with her brother.* That monarch never, probably, entertained a serious design of utterly ruining the King of Prussia ; but it would have given him great satisfaction to wring something from Frederick, to humble him, and to force him to give up his schemes of territorial aggrandisement, and, whether he would or no, to adhere to the Anglo-Hanoverian line of policy. But here he encountered a second impediment in the unchangeable nature of a popular and parliamentary government. We have already men-

* For his proceedings with regard to his father's will, see Horace Walpole's *Memoirs of the Reign of George II.*, especially the last ten years (III. 308).

tioned how, during the first years of his reign, he wished to take part against Austria and Spain, and how, shortly afterwards, when disturbances occurred in Poland, he was inclined to side with Austria, but could not. "In this country," he once exclaimed, in angry mortification, "the ministry is king." But beyond this, again, an independent movement was carried on by the opposition of parliamentary factions and the voice of the nation, which set up one ministry and displaced another. George II. did not sufficiently understand the character of a constitutional sovereign as to bear this interference with his wishes quietly; he could not behold the fall of Carteret without irritation. The successor of that minister, and, indeed, the whole party of the Pelhams, which then held the reins of government, received from him public marks of disfavour. This did not, indeed, make them swerve from their line of policy, but as the personal opinions of an English monarch can never be altogether without weight, the ministry could not venture upon an open opposition to the King. As cautious and quiet men, they could not, under the circumstances, carry into effect the system they had now adopted, so rapidly as they otherwise would have done.

Meanwhile, however, during the summer of 1745, events occurred which proved to the King, the ministers, and the nation, the danger of the course they had hitherto pursued.

In Flanders the French had decidedly obtained the upper hand. On the 11th of May, at Fontenay, the English were driven back with great loss by the

(Marshal de Saxe. It is remarkable that, even at Paris, the fortunate issue of the engagement was not attributed altogether to the admirable military dispositions of the Marshal, but mainly to the Irish brigades in the service of France. It was most galling to the English, who, as we read in history, were almost invariably the victors in the open field, to be now forced to own themselves beaten. After Tournay had fallen into the hands of the French, in consequence of their victory, the allies quitted the position they had hitherto occupied on the frontiers of Hennegau and Flanders, in order, at any rate, to cover Brabant. But this only left the French at liberty to direct their whole force against Flanders. On the 11th of July they took Ghent, with all its ample military stores, and on the 21st Bruges. They made fresh progress every day.

Great was the amazement of Lord Stair, who made this campaign, when he saw the rapid and brilliant successes gained by the French arms against an army such as that which King William had once commanded.

Moreover, France now resolved to execute a scheme she had long cherished—to land on the English coast the heir of the house of Stuart, Charles Edward, the son of the Pretender, and the hereditary foe of the Hanoverian dynasty.

It has been the fashion in recent times to deny that the French government took any part in the enterprise of Charles Edward, and it almost appears as if he actually suffered himself to be persuaded that the support and assistance he received was mainly

afforded by private individuals. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the French ministry conducted the affair. As early as the beginning of July, D'Argenson, the minister for foreign affairs, openly proposed the scheme to the Prussian envoy; and the motive which he assigned for the enterprise is characteristic. It was not proposed with a view of replacing the Stuarts on the throne of England, but merely in order to produce internal troubles, to cause a fall in the funds, and thus to force the nation to wish for peace.*

The King of Prussia was not at all disposed to adopt the schemes of the French. He was disgusted at their cherishing extravagant plans while they paid no attention to more important affairs. His opinion was that the enterprise would fail, and would only give additional power to the party of George II.

Nevertheless, this affair, added to all that had already taken place, produced an immense effect from the very first, when, in the month of July, reports reached England of the preparations that were being made; but greater far was the excitement when, in the beginning of August, Charles Edward actually appeared off the coast of the Scottish Highlands. The French man-of-war which was to have formed part of the expedition encountered an English

* Chambrier to the King of Prussia, 5th July: "Argenson m'a dit qu'il étoit question de la part du roi son maître (he still expressed himself very vaguely) de quelque nouvelle entreprise sur l'Angleterre, pour tâcher par le trouble interieur que cela causera de faire baisser les fonds publics et forcer la nation à desirer la paix."

ship on her way, and was so roughly handled that she was forced to return to harbour. When Charles Edward reached Scotland, unaccompanied by the French vessel, his adherents were staggered for a moment when they saw how defective his preparations were. They asked one another, "What supplies of arms and money has he brought with him?" and were told, "Scarcely any." "Has he any generals or officers with him to lead us?" "Not one," was the reply.* This did not, however, prevent them from following him. In the Scottish highlands, spite of all the efforts of the Whig government, the old system of clanship still existed in all its pristine force, and still held the people together by its influence upon their feelings. In order to come to life again in full vigour, this system only needed a leader who could enter into the spirit of the country as fully as it acknowledged his authority. When, on the 30th of August, Charles Edward solemnly unfurled his banner on an eminence in the valley of Glenfinnan,† he was accompanied by about 700 adherents, whose numbers increased on the following day to more than 1600: the whole of the Highlands joined him. As the small English force which was then in Scotland,

* Narrative of a conversation with Mr. Hugh MacDonald, from Forbes's Collection in Chambers' Jacobite Memoirs, p. 18.

† It is curious, that according to a statement repeated a thousand times over, the words "tandem triumphans" were to have been inscribed on the banner somewhat later, and yet the first intelligence conveyed from Holland to Berlin states, "qu'il a fait arborer un étendard avec le devise: tandem triumphans, qu'il a été joint par 500 familles," etc., etc.

misled by false information, marched to Inverness, the Lowlands of Scotland were likewise open to him. On the 15th of September Charles Edward was in Perth; on the 28th, Murray and Lochiel, with 500 Camerons, forced their way into Edinburgh, when the gates of the town were first opened in the morning. Once more a Stuart was solemnly proclaimed King of Scotland, by the title of James VIII., in the capital of his country. The heralds in full dress—the sound of the bagpipes—the Highlanders in the strictest order and discipline, for once forswearing the whiskey-flask—the wife of one of their chieftains on horseback, sword in hand, distributing white cockades, the distinguishing badge of the Stuarts—the excitement of a population usually so cold-blooded—the town-councillors in their official robes—in the midst of all, Charles Edward himself, a well-looking, well bred, but weakly young man, in whom, nevertheless, the Scotch beheld a second Robert Bruce—and in the centre of the town the castle, which held out, and where the soldiers had a great mind to disturb the ceremony by a bomb or two—all this formed the strangest mixture of contrasts that can be conceived possible in the middle of the eighteenth century. Charles Edward's cause did not at this moment seem altogether hopeless. A few days later the royal troops were beaten at Preston-Pans by a vigorous attack from the Highlanders. Great alarm was felt in England; even men of note called to mind the old saying, that England should belong to the first comer, and fancied that the fate of the country depended upon which should first receive help—Charles

Edward from the Bourbons, or George II. from the Dutch, or, better still, by the return of his own troops to England.*

It frequently happens that in the turmoil of events which succeed each other day by day, those principles are forgotten upon which power and position depend, until some great and sudden danger recalls them to the mind.

Such was the effect produced by the arrival of the Pretender. England felt that, while she was wasting her strength in a thousand distant expeditions, her own independence was endangered, and that she must again unite with her natural allies—the Protestant powers of Northern Germany.

Each day the opinion gained ground that the first thing to be done, was to restore peace between Austria and Prussia; even George II. could no longer hold out against this general feeling.

About this time an eminent Prussian diplomatist, Count Podewils, the nephew of the minister, passed through Hanover, on his way from the Hague to Berlin. Harrington expected from him a renewal of negotiations; but Podewils carefully avoided so much as alluding to the subject. The Prussians were tired of constantly recommencing negotiations which led to no results, and wished to see the English take the first step. The regular envoy, Andrié, was equally silent and reserved. Hereupon, towards the end of July, Lord Harrington himself spoke out. He requested Andrié to despatch a courier to the

* Fox to Hanbury Williams, 5th Sept., in Coxe's *Pelham*, I. p. 264.

King of Prussia with the information that George II. seriously intended to endeavour to bring about a peace. He must see, added Harrington, how sincere the King of England was in the matter, from his declaring himself at a time when the election of the Emperor was already secured and on the point of taking place. If Prussia would adhere to the articles which had been agreed upon a few months before between Andrié and Harrington, England would likewise stand by them, and would do her best to persuade the court of Vienna to adopt them.

The two main points in these articles were the confirmation of the treaty of Breslau, and the securing the vote of Prussia for the Grand-Duke of Tuscany.

We know that the King of Prussia looked upon a peace as necessary ; but the ministers and the cabinet council were still more impressed than he was with its necessity, since the prospect of having to break with Saxony filled them with dismay when they contemplated the probable consequences. Andrié was instructed to make one more attempt to obtain at least the whole of Upper Silesia, or the Moravian districts enclosed within Silesia, or, at the worst, a compensation in money. If, however, this should be quite impossible, he was to agree to a mere renewal of the treaty of Breslau.

A lengthened negotiation was out of the question. The yacht that was to convey George II. back to England, in order to rouse, by his presence, the zeal of his subjects against the son of the Pretender, was already lying at Helvoetsluys, and the basis of the

pacification of Germany had to be constructed before the King's departure. As Harrington persisted in his declaration that he could agree to nothing beyond the terms laid down by the treaty of Breslau, Andrié at length admitted that he, on his part, was authorized to accept the same, on the understanding, however, that the matter should be decided without further delay: on these conditions he might immediately bring the affair to a conclusion.

Hereupon the Prussian envoy and the English minister each drew up the text of a convention in the terms they had previously agreed upon, and it was no very difficult task to melt the two schemes into one. This convention, drawn up in haste, left several questions still undecided,* nevertheless it fixed the main point—that the King of Prussia was to retain possession of Silesia, in accordance with the terms of the treaty of Breslau, under the guarantee of all the European powers; in return for which he was to give his vote to the Grand-Duke of Tuscany at the approaching imperial election. The Palatinate and Hessen were to be included in the treaty.

We may ask, indeed, by what right England made stipulations for the Queen of Hungary, or for Saxony, and whether those two powers would recognise any such right? But it was an enormous gain for Prussia that the country which supplied the largest

* For example, in the second article, the words were to have been not only "la Silesie," but likewise "et le comté de Glatz." These words were in fact added in the ratified copy. In the fourth article, the Saxons were not only to cede, but likewise to guarantee this.

amount of money should renounce the schemes entertained by the other two.

This had been the intention of the new English ministry from the very first; but the proper time and opportunity for carrying it into effect had only just arrived.

Before Harrington signed the convention, he thought it advisable to ask his King whether he felt any repugnance to it, or whether he entered into it with a willing heart, and a full intention to carry it into effect? "Yes, my Lord," said George II.; "such is my honest intention." Hereupon the convention was signed by Harrington and Andrié on the 26th of August.

The King of Prussia was well pleased with this decision, and instructed his minister to draw up the scheme of a definitive treaty in accordance with the terms of the convention, taking care that all that was still obscure and ambiguous should be clearly explained and permanently settled.

But there was still another side to the whole affair. It surely was manifest that if England was reduced to wish for peace, she must likewise have lost a good deal of her influence upon public affairs.

Important as this convention was, we shall nevertheless see that subsequent events did not so much depend upon it as upon the decision of the sword.

CHAPTER VII.

THE ARMIES IN BOHEMIA—THE ELECTION OF THE
EMPEROR—THE BATTLE OF SOOR.

WE know from Frederick's own mouth, that when he entered Bohemia it was with no intention of making conquests: he hoped, by gaining a victory, "to soften Pharaoh's heart," as he expressed it, and to be enabled to obtain peace.

The Prince of Lorraine occupied Königingrätz, where he was protected by the Adler, which carries off all the waters from the mountains of Glatz, and there can be no doubt that the strength of his position did much to prevent Frederick's further advance into the country. Nevertheless, as the Duke of Weissenfels once demonstrated at an Austrian council of war, this position was by no means so secure as it seemed against a serious attack. Frederick himself maintained that he could have taken Königingrätz, but that, upon mature consideration, he determined not to attack it. Of what use, said he, would the position have been to him: to defend it against all Bohemia would have involved him in difficulties which would have far outweighed any advantages he might have gained from it.

It would be a useless labour to detail the chances

of the petty warfare which was carried on between the troops on either side.

The Hungarians were generally the aggressors; occasionally, however, the Prussian hussars made the attack; sometimes the one and sometimes the other party were victorious, and rode off with some prisoners or some captured horses. The Prussians constantly endeavoured to draw their nimble foe out of the woody and broken ground into the open country: all manner of wiles and stratagems were practised, and both camps were filled with stories of bold adventurous deeds, wherein each individual thought he had performed prodigies of valour. "We are fighting, and not amiss," says a Prussian report, "to win hay and laurels." The main armies remained tolerably quiet. For some time there was a tacit understanding between them not to fire upon such single troops as left the camp without any hostile intention; or occasionally an armistice was agreed upon, after the most primitive fashion, in order to give time to bury the dead. Two brothers of the house of Brunswick, Ernest Ludwig, who served in the Austrian army, and Ferdinand, who was with the Prussians, took advantage of an opportunity of this kind to meet on the banks of the Adler, after a separation of many years.

On the 20th of July Frederick crossed over to the right bank of the Elbe, which offered a wider field for procuring forage, and greater facilities of transport: he took up his head-quarters at Chlum.* One month

* Letter from Chlum, 27th July: "Unser Lager ist eins der allerschönsten, und gleichsam wie ein Garten anzusehen. Weil S. M. sehr scharf verboten, jemanden das geringste Leid zuzu-

later, more in order to give signs of life than in obedience to any strategical plan, Prince Charles changed his position, and crossed the Adler. In consequence of this move the King likewise shifted his camp to Semonitz, also on the right bank of the Elbe, where he remained until towards the end of September.

Of still greater importance, however, was the expedition of General Nassau into Upper Silesia. Separating himself from the main army in Bohemia, he marched through the district of Glatz. Avoiding Wartha, where they were prepared for his coming, General Nassau advanced by Reichenstein, forcing the Hungarian irregular troops, who had pillaged and laid waste the country on both sides the Neiss, to fall back upon Neustadt, when the Prussians threatened them in their rear. Nassau attacked them close to Neustadt in the morning of the 11th of July. In a diary of these events we read how one portion of Nassau's dragoons, carrying their carbines and ammunition on their heads, rushed through a large sheet of water to attack the foe,* first putting the Austrian infantry, and then the irregulars, whom

fügen, so wird uns alles im Ueberfluss zugeführt, und es kommen täglich über 600 mit Früchten und anderem Vorrath beladene Wagen bei uns an."—(Our camp is one of the most beautiful, and almost like a garden. As his Majesty has strictly forbidden the slightest injury to be done to any one, every thing is brought to us in abundance: above 600 carts, laden with fruit and all other provisions, come to the camp daily.) *Berlinische Nachrichten*, 10th Aug., 1745.

* *Tagebuch*, so der verstorbene Generalmajor v. Saher über die oberschlesische Campagne von 1745 geführt,—(Journal of the campaign in Upper Silesia in 1745, kept by the late General von Saher) . . . in the *Ungedruckten Nachrichten*, IV. 257.

they accompanied, to flight. While Nassau was at Neustadt he busied himself in securing the most dangerous passes against surprise, and in driving the irregulars out of the most important positions; he then directed his march upon Cosel, which was retaken by the Prussians on the 5th of October.

We see, then, that the war still continued: the Queen of Hungary was not inclined to peace, even by the defeat she had sustained at Hohenfriedberg. Shortly after this event, she represented, in a circular letter addressed to all the powers that were allied with her, that they must not suppose that an enterprise for the recovery of Silesia had been rendered impossible by this defeat: her army would soon be recruited afresh, and perfectly able again to cope with the enemy. That as she had given up the idea of obtaining an equivalent in Bavaria, the recovery of Silesia had become a political necessity. It was imperatively required for the security of Austria, the maintenance of the peace of Germany and of Europe, and even for the safety of the maritime powers themselves. Prussia had entered into the closest connexion with France; if she (the Queen) were forced to choose between the two, she would prefer making peace with France.

In England the prevailing sentiment was, as we have already seen, very different. After the reverses experienced in Flanders, and under the influence of the anxiety caused by the Pretender, the English

The original, with very neatly drawn up plans, is still in the Archives of the State. The newspapers also gave some passages from it.

ministry, in the latter half of July, commissioned Robinson to make the strongest representations to the Queen. The English, they said, had not pressed their views at the previous consultations, as Saxony and Austria had looked upon the recovery of Silesia as certain; but now that these hopes had been dashed, those courts must perforce rest contented with the treaty of Breslau.* The state of affairs was melancholy and hopeless: moreover, England could no longer endure the absence of her whole military force.

On the 2nd of August Robinson made these representations to the Queen at Schönbrunn. She listened to him attentively, but the ambassador had never seen her more reserved, nor had his words ever made less impression upon her.

She said that she should not think it so great a misfortune if Holland were forced to accept terms of neutrality from France, and bluntly put to him the question, whether it would not be easier for her to gain over France than Prussia. Robinson replied, that the latter power wished only to keep what it had already got, whereas the former made conquests which it was impossible to allow it to retain. The Queen

* "You know well, that the maritime powers did some months since, whilst their affairs with regard to France were yet in a hopeful state, gave their opinion for the detaching of the King of Prussia, and that they pressed the Queen most earnestly upon it; but her Majesty's great aversion to an accommodation with that Prince upon the foot of giving up Silesia, and the vast preparation made by your court and Saxony for recovering that province, together with the sanguine and almost indisputable hopes which they held forth to us of a prosperous campaign on that side, prevailed upon the ministry of the republick, as well as upon the King himself, to drop the matter for that time."

merely insisted upon it that she must recover possession of Silesia, without which the imperial dignity which her husband hoped to obtain would be but an empty title. Or did they wish him to administer the affairs of the Empire under the tutelage of the King of Prussia? Not one of her generals, she said, could now be induced to lead her army out of Bohemia to the Rhine. Robinson remarked, that in Bohemia matters were not quite as she could wish, that by no means the best understanding prevailed between her troops and the Saxon auxiliaries. The Queen replied, that Prince Charles was quite able by himself to give battle once more to the King of Prussia: she was determined to make no peace until this should have been done. The allies must await her decision until October. "Were I forced to conclude a peace with the King of Prussia to-morrow," said she, "I would yet give him battle this evening."*

To this purpose she obstinately adhered. It troubled her but little to find the Bourbons getting the upper hand in Italy as well as in Flanders; for a reverse of this kind already seemed imminent. Prince Lobkowitz's expedition against Naples had been completely foiled at Velletri by a Neapolitan and Spanish army: and as Genoa, when threatened by the convention of Worms, opened its territory to the Bourbon forces, troops poured in from all sides. In July, 1745, Spaniards, French, Neapolitans, and Genoese assembled at Scrivia, to the number of 70,000, under experienced leaders, and threatened

* *Dussé-je conclure avec lui le lendemain, je lui livrerois bataille ce soir.*

to alter the whole condition of Lombardy. To these troops the Austrians and Sardinians could oppose no force nearly equal in number. But even this could not deter Maria Theresa from sending to Königingrätz all the reinforcements she could possibly command. She maintained that the King of Sardinia ought to be satisfied if the most dangerous enemy of the alliance to which he belonged was first deprived of his powers for mischief.

But it was not on account of Silesia alone that she was so resolutely bent upon active hostilities against the King of Prussia; while she carried on the war with him and kept him employed, she was endeavouring at the same time to effect another object, at that moment of the deepest interest to her.

At length the time had come when her husband might restore the imperial dignity to the house of Austria, which he had founded afresh.

It is self-evident that this election could not be effected by the voluntary and peaceable agreement of the Germanic princes and of the nation, as people like to assume on such an occasion.

The condition of the Empire was in fact much what it had been from the thirteenth century; as in the sixteenth, at the election of Charles V., and in the seventeenth, at the election of Leopold I., a vast deal depended upon the influences exercised by foreign powers. The election of the Emperor was a prize for which the hostile parties in Europe were contending. Maria Theresa reminded the two maritime powers that as her father had been chosen Emperor through their instrumentality in the year 1711, they

were now in like manner bound to assist her husband. The vote of Hanover, she said, depended upon England; the Electors of the Rhine would vote according to the dictation of the maritime powers; and Saxony, which received subsidies from them, would not be able long to resist their wishes.*

And in fact she could in this affair rely upon the cordial co-operation of the maritime powers. Although England did not share the Queen's views on every point, still that power was firmly resolved never to suffer any German prince who was dependent upon France to sit on the imperial throne. And now that by the peace of Füssen the Elector of Bavaria had been brought to consent to the election of the Grand-Duke of Tuscany, and that the French army on the Rhine had been so much weakened by the large detachments sent at Louis XV.'s desire to the Netherlands, that it was as little able to cope with the Austrian army headed by the Grand-Duke in person, as Maillebois had been to resist the Duke of Arenberg,†

* Instructions to Reyschach, in *Hormayr's Anemonen*, III. 257.

† The French had raised expectations diametrically opposed to this. Argenson to Valori: "Mr. de Conti n'ambitionne que les occasions de signaler de plus en plus son courage, en battant aussi de son côté les ennemis—si le prince peut y parvenir—ce sera le cas ou S. A. S. pourroit se porter vers la Saxe ou vers Egra s'il le falloit." The Queen-Mother, after the departure of her son, said to the Abbé Loise, who remained behind: "que le roi son fils en étoit d'autant plus, fâché, qu'il ne s'y attendoit pas: qu'il lui avoit marqué dernièrement que le p^{re} de Conti auroit fait le troisième tome des batailles de Fontenois de Fridberg."—Valori was of opinion that this retreat of the Prince de Conti reacted upon the negotiation then pending with Saxony.

there remained little doubt of a favourable issue to this matter. The Grand-Duke took the field in person in order that he might gain the credit of driving the French out of the German territory. Before long Conti was forced to retreat across the Rhine, and the electoral bodies began to deliberate at Frankfort under the protection of the Austrian army.

When we call to mind the reasons which had mainly induced Frederick to undertake the war, we cannot fail to perceive how bitterly he must have felt the turn affairs had taken, and how threatening it must have appeared to him.

The imperial dignity was the very prize for which he had contended with Austria, and that was now about to pass into the hands of his opponent.

While in Bohemia he made one more attempt to induce the Elector of Saxony to oppose the Grand-Duke, in whose favour the Saxon envoy at Frankfort had not as yet by any means declared. But whatever might be the inclinations of the court of Dresden, it was determined at all events no longer to act in concert with the King of Prussia in questions relating to the regulation of the Empire. The King received an answer which he thought offensive and contemptuous, implying that the court of Dresden no longer thought him entitled to any consideration.*

“Le retour de Mr. le P^{ce} de Conti est bien préjudiciable à la négociation qui est commune entre M^r de Vaulgrement (at Dresden) et moi.”

* Hist. de m. t. Brühl qui jugeait le roi aux abois ne vouloit point le recevoir (the old copy of the MSS. has it more correctly thus) à composition.

It is necessary, said Frederick, to show the Saxons and our other neighbours that they can neither insult us with impunity nor unite with our enemies without sufficient cause. He now determined to execute his original project—to take vengeance for the share the Saxons had borne in the attack upon Silesia by an invasion of their territory. He was now convinced that it was mistaken policy to carry on the war with the moderation he had hitherto observed, and to allow his enemies to execute all their combinations without in the meantime attacking them on their most vulnerable points; he determined to abandon a line of conduct which had turned out so much to his disadvantage. In the middle of August he issued a declaration of war against Saxony, drawn up in very bitter and threatening terms. The Prince of Dessau had already received orders to advance into Saxony, and if he had been supported by troops detached from the army in Bohemia, as Frederick promised, the Prince would without doubt have succeeded in conquering the country.*

At this very moment, however, the convention of Hanover was agreed upon, and Frederick instantly sent counter orders to the Prince of Dessau. The King was persuaded that a convention entered into with England would be accepted by Austria and Saxony.

Nevertheless, such was not the case.

The subsidies had already been paid, the troubles caused by the Pretender had, as we have already

* 31st July. Quand même les Saxons devraient détacher, je détacherai toujours à proportion.—(The King to Podewils.)

observed, weakened the influence of England: and neither the court of Vienna nor that of Dresden could be brought to make peace.

Saxony, unexpectedly threatened with an invasion, made every preparation to meet the danger, which was already passed. Four weeks later the Prince of Dessau would probably have encountered a far more formidable resistance than at the moment when Frederick's orders stopped his advance. It was not till then that the several points at issue between the two courts of Dresden and Vienna were satisfactorily arranged, and a new and far closer alliance concluded.

The court of Vienna was still less inclined to yield on any point. After the convention of Hanover had been sent to Vienna, and when Frederick judged that time enough had elapsed for some consultation on the subject to have taken place, and for the decision to have been forwarded to the army, Frederick sent to ask Prince Charles whether no orders had reached him to suspend hostilities. Prince Charles answered in dry and measured terms, that nothing had reached him that could deter him from carrying on his operations.*

Whether the court of Vienna accepted the terms of the convention or not, the most important affair then at issue, namely, the election of an Emperor, was not touched by it. Upon that the King of Eng-

* "Soll ohnverhalten, was massen mir vom Hof bis nun nichts zugekommen welches mich behinderte, die seitherige Operation fortzusetzen."—(I shall without delay continue the operations as hitherto, seeing that nothing has reached me from the court to prevent me from so doing.)

land exercised influence solely through his Hanoverian ministers, with whom those of England had held no communication on the subject.

No sooner, however, had the business of the election begun, than its result was decided. Hanover, Bavaria, the three Ecclesiastical Electorates, the Bohemian Estates whose vote was now again recognised, and at last the Elector of Saxony, formed so considerable a majority, that the opposition of Brandenburg and the Palatinate was altogether disregarded. On the 13th of September, 1745, the Grand-Duke Francis was elected at Frankfurt with the usual forms; the dissentient envoys adjourned to Hanau. The project which Maria Theresa had formed on receiving the news of the election of Charles VII. was at length crowned with success. She had steadily refused to acknowledge the late Emperor, and she now saw her husband hailed as Emperor of Germany. She was herself present at the coronation, which took place on the 4th of October, at Frankfurt,* and beheld it with the most lively emotion. She was there when her husband walked to the cathedral, whither she then hastened to precede him in order to witness all the ceremonies of the coronation. When, upon his return to the Römer, he appeared at the window, she stood in the market-place before it, and waved her handkerchief as the signal for the acclamations of the people. During the coronation banquet she would not rest,

* She was very popular at Frankfurt. Every one was delighted when, after making some people wait for her at an audience, she begged pardon for what she had done. "Il n'y a qu'une voix pour cette reine."

—difficult as it was to reconcile her wishes with the ceremonial,—until she had seen her husband clad in the imperial robes. No one can fail to recognise in her conduct the devotion of a wife, the simple love of a woman, but with it was mingled the enjoyment of a political victory, the exultation in the attainment of a great and splendid object.

The Emperor, Francis I., possessed some very good qualities,—sound understanding, judgment, and memory: the advice he gave frequently turned out afterwards to have been the best; but he lacked the warmth and energy of a vigorous character. His only desire was to enjoy life after his own fashion, and to see the wealth he had deposited in the banks of Venice and of Amsterdam accumulate. He was no man to revive the power of the German Empire. His co-Regency of Austria had ever been but a name and a shadow, and now, in like manner, he was a cipher in the conduct of the affairs of the Empire, which fell into the hands of his wife's ministers, who conducted everything with a view to the policy of Austria. It may justly be said of Maria Theresa, that as she had formerly maintained possession of the kingdom of Hungary, so she had now conquered the Imperial dignity in Germany. She was rightly called the Empress Queen.

She cared but little that two electoral delegates protested against the proceedings of the election as hasty, disorderly, and informal. It depended only upon her will to accept the terms of peace offered by Brandenburg, and in which the Palatinate wished to be included; but, on the contrary, she was fully

determined that, as she had made her husband Emperor of Germany in spite of the King of Prussia, she would likewise now wrest from him the province she had lost. She sent word to Prince Charles that he could not celebrate his brother's election more worthily than by a victory over the King of Prussia.

Meanwhile Frederick found himself forced to think of retreating from Bohemia, by the total exhaustion of the country, where two large armies had been encamped for several months, and where not even fodder was now to be found for the horses, much less food for man: the former had to be brought from a distance by circuitous routes, so that the mere transport ruined the peasants.

The King's position was once more very difficult and dangerous. Neither the battle he had won, nor yet the convention of Hanover, had given him any assistance. He feared that England was not acting honestly by him, for the ratification of the treaty was still delayed. He felt it as a great misfortune that the new Emperor should have mounted the throne without first making a peace with him. It seemed to him very possible that Francis might call the Empire to arms against France, and afterwards against him as an ally of that country.*

To these cares was soon added another still more pressing, namely, the impending exhaustion of his pecuniary resources.

* "L'empire," says Frederick in a letter, dated 23rd July, "une fois obligé de déclarer la guerre à la France et à ses alliés fournirait un prétexte specieux pour que la Saxe pût juridiquement depouiller son voisin."

The whole financial system of the Prussian state was based on the assumption that even during peace all the resources of the country should be brought into play, and each individual should bear as large a share of the public burthen as he was able. All extraordinary expenses, especially in the case of a war, were to be paid out of the accumulated surplus of the revenue. Had the government attempted to raise a war-tax when the army was out of the country, the whole administration would have been thrown into confusion. These savings from the revenue, however, both in the greater and the lesser treasure, were nearly exhausted: there was no prospect of raising supplies for another campaign, and it was clear that the moment was approaching, possibly during the course of that very year, when all his resources would come to an end.

We have already mentioned, that when the threatened exhaustion of his treasure first forced itself strongly upon his attention, Frederick drew up a letter to the King of France, reminding him of the really inestimable services he had rendered him in the preceding year, and requesting a subsidy. Partly in consideration of the negotiations then pending, but chiefly from a feeling of personal pride and a repugnance to be indebted to any one, Frederick had for a long time withheld this letter; but at length, when the negotiations seemed to have failed while his necessities daily became more pressing, he sent it off.

The manner in which he once spoke on this subject to the French envoy at his camp is very characteristic.

• He reminded the envoy of the principles which guided him in such matters, from which he might judge how great must be the distress that could drive him to demand a subsidy. In spite of his last victory he could no longer get on without help. He drew no revenue from Upper, and very little from Lower Silesia: he had not money enough to maintain his cavalry, a matter of the most pressing necessity, and which must be attended to without delay, lest he should hereafter find himself deprived of all means for the purpose. “I can hope for no further supplies,” said Frederick, “from the inhabitants of my different provinces: painful as it is to me, after all my endeavours to appear above such considerations, I must nevertheless avow my necessities. Spain and France, England and Holland, are alone able to support a protracted war. To all other countries it is impossible.” It was quite consistent with the pride, which he had to subdue in himself before he could bring himself to ask anything of others, that his request was worded in the tone of a just demand, and that for so considerable a sum,—no less than four millions of thalers.

He perhaps reckoned upon the French being now prepared to grant so large a sum, as they no longer had to furnish supplies to the Emperor, of whose enormous expenditure they had so frequently complained. They once more had an opportunity of rendering Frederick a service which he would never forget.

(But the French, on their part, had to expend large sums of money upon their own wars, and it was

no easy matter for the comptroller of the finances to procure the necessary funds. The demand made by the King of Prussia was large and unexpected. The French government at first returned him an answer that meant and promised nothing, and finally offered him a much smaller sum, to be paid in monthly instalments.*

Frederick did not choose to bargain. As the French would not give what he asked, he refused to accept what they offered.

Fortunately the nobility of the marches of Brandenburg, who had managed their own finances with great order and economy, were in a condition to assist the King with a sum of money very considerable for those days. He received it as a loan; but he beheld in the readiness with which so large an advance was made, a token of their devotion to him, for which he frequently and warmly expressed to them his gratitude.

But the very fact of his needing such assistance

* The King of France altered the letter which he intended to send to Frederick two or three times. In the first draft he wrote: "quand nous avons traité de notre alliance, V. M. ne demandoit pas des subsides et je ne m'y étois pas attendu avant sa dernière lettre;" in a later copy the following words were added: "V. M. se faisoit gloire d'être un ami utile et point onéreux. Je crois que ses dépenses sont grandes, les miennes sont énormes. Cependant je vais faire toutes les recherches possibles." . . . This hurt the King on account of the contradiction in which it stood with other letters. "Le ministre me dit que le roi de France s'en est expliqué dans la lettre, qu'il me fait, et celui-ci ne dit rien, que de se vouloir concerter là dessus avec son controleur général." "All this, he thought, was calculated "de vouloir par une défaite honnête me refuser tout à fait et me tenir en attendant le bec dans l'eau."

was the best proof what disasters awaited him, should the war be continued, possibly under still more unfavourable conditions, if the Empire or Russia should declare against him. When he looked around him, he thought himself menaced by the whole world, and it seemed to him doubtful how long he could at all maintain his position. Rothenburg relates that he once found him sitting in his chair, sunk in deep thought as to the future, which looked so black.* "He suffers cruelly," exclaimed Eichel; "I fear he will sink under it."

But these were mere passing shadows, which did not for a moment damp the King's activity.

On the 13th of September Frederick had quitted his camp at Semonitz, and retreated through the mountainous passes of the range of the Sudeten, encountering great difficulties, chiefly from want of provisions. "It is not I," said he once, "who command here; meal and forage are our real masters." Dumoulin had been sent on to Schatzlar, and Lehwald to Trautenau: the King himself, intending soon to follow them, had encamped at Staudenz. The army that he had with him did not amount to above 19,000 men. He imagined that now, as before, he should only have to encounter the light troops, commanded by the "eternal Nadasdy," as he called him.

But the Queen's commands had already reached

* Dans une vraie consternation sur un avenir, qu'il voit en noir. Eichel, 27th Aug.: Das Blut stehe ihm in den Adern stille, wenn er die Hasards considerire, in die der König gerathen könne.—(His blood stood still in his veins when he thought on the hazardous position of the King.)

Prince Charles, and the fiery Lobkowitz had arrived at the Austrian camp, in order to quicken the Prince's deliberations. They determined to give battle to the Prussians, and Nadasdy devised a plan by which he placed the King in the utmost danger.

Frederick was encamped on a plain not far from Soor, between the Upper Elbe and the Aupa, where the rise of the wooded hills is broken by numerous ravines: this plain was commanded on several sides by the surrounding heights. From the top of a neighbouring hill Nadasdy discovered the insecurity of the Prussian camp. He led Prince Charles, who, with his army, was distant only one day's march, to the spot, that he might convince himself of the fact. Prince Charles, who is said to have had a good eye for the disposition of the ground, perceived at once that the right wing of the Prussians might be attacked with advantage from the heights; and since the Queen had expressly desired it, and his army was superior to that of the enemy, and anxious to wipe out the memory of Hohenfriedberg, he determined to hazard an attack.

Prince Charles was perfectly successful in so ordering his advance that the Prussians had no knowledge of his intentions. Frederick had sent out several strong reconnoitring parties, but they did not penetrate far into the woody defiles, and brought back no intelligence. While he imagined himself perfectly safe, intending to march next day to Trautenau, the Austrians advanced on the evening of the 29th of September, in six columns, in the immediate neighbourhood of his camp. The grenadiers took up

their position on the heights near Burkersdorf, and strengthened them with cannon and howitzers. While the Prussians were perfectly unconscious of what was taking place on the heights just above their heads, the Austrian divisions were distributed according to the posts assigned to them, in readiness to attack on the following morning. Lobkowitz, who took an active part in all the preparations, is reported to have said that he would show how an enemy's camp should be taken: resistance seemed to him impossible.

On the morning of the 30th of September, Frederick was busily employed in his tent, dictating the orders of the day, directing where the foragers were to meet previous to the march, where the bread was to be dealt out to the regiments, and the like,—when news arrived that a strong party of the enemy had been seen in the direction of the right wing. Frederick hastened to the spot, and saw the Austrians already drawn up in order of battle beyond Burkersdorf; their numbers were increasing every moment. Frederick instantly ordered the drummer nearest at hand to beat to arms. While the tents were being struck, and all the soldiers seized their weapons, he rode over the field, in order to see in what manner he must meet the foe.*

Three courses were open to him; either to defend the encampment, for by this time the rear and left flank were likewise menaced; to pursue his way to

* Relation des opérations de l'armée Prussienne en Bohême depuis le 27 Dcbr., de la glorieuse journée du 30 Spt. dressée par Ferdinand, prince de Brunswic. (Archives at Wolfenbüttel.)

Trautenau, in order to join Lehwald ; or at once to attack the main body of the enemy. The boldest measure is commonly the best, and the King determined to convert the defence into an attack. The order was given to quit the camp, to turn somewhat to the right, and to fall upon the enemy full in their front.

The battle about to be fought was not like those which preceded it: no great political interests depended upon its issue ; the possession of Silesia or of Bohemia was no longer at stake. Frederick was already forced to evacuate Bohemia, and would have to continue his retreat, whether he were victorious or not. It was simply a passage of arms, in which, on one side, the Austrians made an attempt to revenge upon a hated foe, before he was suffered to depart, all they had endured from him, and to inflict upon him a severe blow ; while, on the other hand, the Prussians, spite of the unfavourable position in which they were placed, and in the face of superior numbers, fought to maintain their character of being invincible.

The Prussians found great difficulty in forming into line under the enemy's fire: the grenades thrown among the cavalry frequently destroyed ten horses at once.

When at last they had succeeded in forming, and had accomplished the side movement in full order of battle, they saw before them the enemy drawn up in a strong position and in formidable array. They had occupied the heights which commanded the camp far and wide, and had covered them with

artillery; a strong battery, from which a highly effective fire was expected, was planted on the most advantageous points, and protected by deep lines of infantry, which exhibited a proud and courageous bearing: a number of battalions of horse grenadiers and several companies of carabineers, who were considered the best soldiers in the whole army, were stationed on the left of the infantry. Before them was a deep hollow.

The Prussians had to attack these heights and to dislodge the enemy from them.

One of the bravest deeds recorded in military history is the rivalry between the Prussian cavalry and infantry of the right flank in attacking the Austrian position. The cavalry was forced first to descend into the ravine, and then to mount what the enemy considered an impracticable ascent, and this under such a fire of cannon and bombs as General Buddenbrock said the cavalry had never yet encountered.* The services of the cavalry in this action exceeded all they had ever done. General Goltz, who had been the first to perceive the enemy, and had sent the intelligence to the King, was likewise the first to rush upon the foe.† The boldness of this movement, and the sight of the squadrons of horse rushing up the hill towards them at full gallop, dismayed the Austrian troops, who were immediately thrown into confusion. But the battalions of infantry which advanced against the

* Letter to Prince Leopold, quoted by Orlich, II. 236.

† Frederick, in his eulogy of him, ascribes to him the victory.

battalions in front had to face a still more tremendous fire; their ranks were fearfully thinned: in some places one-half of the men were mown down. In this action fell Wedel, who had distinguished himself so much at the passage of the Elbe the year before; and it was evidently impossible to attack the enemy with lines so full of gaps: the commanders, therefore, thought it best to fall back. At this moment the Austrians believed that they should still gain the victory: the grenadiers hastened down the declivity, shouting "Maria Theresa." But already the second line of the Prussians, under La Motte and Bonin, appeared instead of the first; the former had allowed the battalions of the first line to fall back between their ranks, in order to form again in their rear.* In a short time the two lines were again united, and thus they climbed the heights: it seemed as if they were resolved to encounter death with their music playing. At their approach the Austrian grenadiers retreated; the Prussians reached the heights at the same moment as their foe, and the great battery at once fell into their hands. The centre had advanced against the wooded heights occupied by the Austrian infantry: Prince Ferdinand ascended them at the head of the second battalion of the guards. By this movement the victory was, in fact, already secured. The Austrian troops retreated

* Prince Ferdinand, in his very instructive account of the battle, ascribes great part of the success to Leopold, the hereditary prince of Dessau. "Le prince Leopold a marqué ce jour là des parties d'un grand général par toutes les belles dispositions qu'il a pris à la droite de l'infanterie."

from the heights they had lost, to others in the neighbourhood; but they carried disorder into the ranks of those regiments that were stationed there. Already their fire betrayed a want of courage and decision, and very soon they retreated on all points. Meanwhile the Prussian left wing, strengthened by the victorious regiments which Goltz had brought up from the right flank, made an attack upon the enemy's front, routed them, and took nearly a whole regiment prisoners. The Austrians left 8000 men on the field of battle.

In the mean time the Hungarians had taken advantage of their first success to plunder the Prussian camp: Frederick, exclusively occupied with the great object of the day, had paid as little regard to the baggage as at the battles of Mollwitz and Chotusitz.

On the evening of the 30th, Frederick wrote thus to Podewils: "I was very near being surprised, but, praised be God, all is well. The battle was terrible, but very glorious."*

He added, on the following day: "Of the four battles that I have now seen, this was the hottest.

* The note is written with a lead pencil on a fly-leaf torn out of a duodecimo volume; it is only from reading the original that we can see how rapidly his ideas followed one another, at the moment: "Mon cher Podewils, nous avons totalement battu le prince Charles. Pr. Albert est tué, mon Wedel, sans cela personne de connaissance; Forcade est blessé dans le pied légèrement. La bataille a été terrible mais très glorieuse. J'ai pensé d'être surpris, mais dieu soit loué tout est bien: beaucoup de prisonniers en un mot c'est une grande affaire: voilà tout ce que j'ai le tems de vous dire, tout mon bagage est au diable et Eichel pris."

We never before encountered such a cannonade ; our right was victorious, but even then we had to take two woods and two heights, so that we had, in fact, to fight five battles with the enemy, who were enabled by the lay of the ground continually to form afresh. The enemy had about 30,000 men, while we had not more than 19,000. Neither Dumoulin, Lehwaldt, Retzow, nor Winterfeldt, with their different divisions, were present. We must thank Providence which disposed things so fortunately for us." In the hour of victory, 'his heart was again opened to the common convictions of humanity.* Frederick adds—" Do you sometimes think of those who every three months fight for your peace and safety."

On the day of the battle, Eichel had gone forwards to Trautenau, and had been taken prisoner by the way. He had burnt some of his papers beforehand, and the captain of hussars in whose hands he fell did not prevent him from destroying the rest. The King, who had no one to act in Eichel's place, was forced for a few days to be not only his own minister and general, but also his own secretary. The account of the battle which appeared in the papers was entirely composed by the King, and written with his own hand. He said that he had purposely made it dry, flat, and insipid, in order that

* What might otherwise be taken for a mere form of speech, must, from the preceding sentences, by no means be viewed in that light. " Rendons grace à la providence, qui a si heureusement dirigé les choses pour nous."

the newspaper writers, who had no love for him, might think it worthy the honour of being printed. The officers thought it too modest.

After the battle Prince Charles retreated first to his old encampment, and then down the banks of the Elbe. The King continued his march by Trautenau towards Silesia.

Nothing was changed in the general posture of affairs by the victory of Soor; but the superiority of the Prussian tactics and discipline was again made manifest. It now appeared that the English convention was to stand. In Trautenau Frederick received the ratification of the treaty concluded with Hanover. As he had all along doubted the good faith of the English, this gave him all the greater satisfaction: he said it was the first good news he had received for fifteen months. It encouraged him in the hope that peace would not long be deferred.

If there are events in the history of the world which determine great questions, undoubtedly the campaigns of 1741 and 1745 are of them. Frederick had attacked Bohemia, the Austrians had attacked Silesia, and both had been repulsed. As Frederick now gave up all thoughts of Bohemia, he hoped that Austria would likewise renounce her plan of retaking Silesia, more especially as England was once more on his side, and as the two contending powers had had another trial of strength, in which Austria had again been defeated.

No doubt it was much easier for the King of Prussia to accept this decision than for the court of Vienna, which merely sought to recover pos-

session of a province which had formerly been its own.

No one that had watched the actual course of events in the German Empire, and that knew the nature of the agreements already concluded, would have shared the King's expectations. The views and inclinations of the principal personages, more especially those of the most powerful of all—the Empress Queen—were essentially warlike.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE CAMPAIGN IN SAXONY DURING THE MONTHS OF
NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER, 1745.

MARIA THERESA had lost the charm of youth which, when heightened by misfortune, made her irresistible, so long as she appeared only the gentle, innocent, and courageous object of hostility. Her features had grown more marked, her bearing prouder and more majestic, her whole manner had become more conscious of power. She had formerly shown a great taste for courtly pageants, masquerades, balls, and music; but now she was never so happy as on horseback: she rode at a pace which alarmed her friends, she took no care whatever to preserve her beauty, and exposed herself to all weathers: her naturally strong constitution made her brave all that was unendurable to other people. In the capital she made as plain an appearance as possible: she was frequently to be seen dressed like an ordinary burgher's wife, visiting her friends on foot, after the English fashion: it was perfectly consistent with all this that she should devote herself with the greatest zeal to the duties of government. Every morning, from six to ten, she read the memorials and dispatches which had been sent in, and gave her decision upon them. In this she, like the King of

Prussia, was assisted only by one secretary. Her chief objects were to remedy the abuses of government and to raise the condition of the army. Herein, also, she invariably kept in view, in trifles as well as in important matters, the system of the King of Prussia, with whom she was at war. To the great disgust of the high nobility, she invited untitled officers to her own table: she said openly, that no one should make his fortune in her service that could not wield his sword bravely. The generals whom she intrusted with the chief command were chosen by herself. She studiously sought to gain the affection of the common soldiers. This woman, although she never ceased to be the wife and the mother, was, when on the throne, deeply imbued with the spirit of the age, which rejected the mere outward show and splendour of royalty, in order to secure the possession and exercise of supreme power. It cannot be said that her subjects loved her the more for this; they felt the continuance of the war to be hopeless and oppressive: their sympathy no longer broke out, as formerly, in lively expressions of enthusiasm; but this the Empress, in her proud career, scarcely perceived; she trusted to her own genius and to the immediate protection of Providence. Her whole mind was set upon making Austria as strong and great as it had ever been, and, while she was Empress of Germany, to recover for Austria its pre-eminence in the German Empire, and its ancient position in Europe.

She encountered little opposition to her plans from her ministers. Neither Uhlefeld nor Colloredo, one

of whom managed the foreign affairs, the other the affairs of the Empire, were duly qualified for their respective offices. Uhlefeld displayed, even in trifles, a want of decision and of judgment: he expressed himself obscurely, or at all events hesitatingly. Colloredo was a man of the world, fond of pleasure, and absorbed in mere externals; he disliked business; and frequently sent forward documents which he had signed and sealed without even reading them. In all matters of importance both these men were governed by the opinion of Bartenstein, who, after overcoming the difficulties he had to contend with during late years, again exercised the greatest influence. He was more self-sufficient than ever; in all discussions he took the whole conversation to himself, and laid down the law in an imperative tone. He seemed to think himself the greatest genius in Europe; he imagined that he knew more of military matters than any general; and in foreign affairs he not only held the pen, but gave advice which was generally adopted. There was but one man in the council who did not bow to his judgment, but took his own line; this was Count Harrach, the Chancellor of Bohemia. On the other hand, Harrach's predecessor in Bohemia, Count Kinsky, who was at this time intrusted with the management of the finances, encouraged warlike dispositions against Prussia with all his might. This was no more than he had always done, but just now his hostility was much increased by the losses he had sustained during the campaign, which he stated at several hundred thousand florins.

Thus, by the agency of these men, a feeling was kept alive at court which caused all the defeats that had occurred to be attributed solely to some blunder on the part of the generals, and encouraged the belief that Austria would yet gain her ends if she did but persevere and avail herself of the alliance with Saxony, with whose assistance a successful and decisive attack might be made.

Towards the end of October, Robinson was instructed to deliver fresh exhortations to peace. In order not to risk all hope of success by exposing himself to a flat denial, arising from the vehement temper of the Empress, Robinson endeavoured to prepare her for the interview through her husband, to whom he presented a full statement of all the reasons for concluding a peace; and then, on the 31st of October, he had an audience with the Empress Queen herself. He communicated to her the project for a definitive peace, which had meanwhile been prepared at Berlin, and reminded her that she had originally requested time and liberty for further action, until October the 2nd, and that this period was now passed. She replied, that she had only meant that she would then see what was to be done;* moreover, that negotiations with him were apt to bring her no good luck; how many of the projects which they had formerly discussed had proved empty

* According to Robinson, she had said: "alors on feroit ce qu'on voudroit" (that is, the English might); she maintained that she had said: "alors on verroit ce qu'on feroit" (that is, what the Austrians would do). Robinson said: "voir et consentir à l'heure qu'il est, c'est j'espère, une et la même chose."

and vain: she now saw herself threatened by England with a catastrophe such as the peace of Utrecht had been to her father: she said that the state in which she lived was miserable, dangerous, and oppressed. That which Maria Theresa only signified by this outpouring of anger and grief, her husband and Count Uhlefeld enounced with much greater distinctness. They insisted upon it that there would be no quiet in the German Empire until the King of Prussia was humbled and deprived of power, and they declared that Austria would continue to use her utmost endeavours to this end.

For this very purpose the court of Vienna now carried on the most earnest negotiations with that of Dresden.

At the time when Frederick uttered against Saxony those menaces of war which he immediately withdrew, the court of Dresden entered into a new alliance, stricter even than the former one, with the court of Vienna.

This agreement, which was concluded on the 25th of August, 1745, is well worthy of notice.

The two powers bound themselves to maintain "the most intimate and indissoluble union,"* so that neither of them should ever make peace with the common foe without the free consent of the other. The Queen engaged to detach as soon as possible from her army on the Rhine from 10,000 to 12,000 men, and to send them to reinforce the allied army; to continue military operations during the winter months; and to carry the war wherever it would

* *L'union la plus intime et la plus indissoluble.*

annoy the enemy most.* The King of Poland promised to employ against Prussia not merely the number of troops stipulated in the treaty, but his whole force, and likewise that he too would direct the most vigorous operations against those parts where the enemy would feel it most.†

Both courts were exclusively occupied with this object, and the most active preparations were made for carrying this agreement into effect without regard to any proposals of peace.

The King of Prussia considered the campaign at an end, and had returned to Berlin. It was supposed that the army he had left in Silesia had suffered so much, that it would scarcely be able to take the field again before the following spring. Moreover, the regiments which had been quartered at Halle under the Prince of Dessau were now dispersed, and the court of Dresden heard with pleasure that some of them had retired into winter quarters so far off as in Pomerania. On the other hand, the Saxon army was so disposed that in eight and forty hours the whole might be united. As soon as the danger on the

* La reine promet tertio de faire poursuivre par son armée en Bohême l'ennemi commun et de tâcher de porter le théâtre de la guerre dans l'endroit, qui lui devra être le plus sensible, même de faire continuer ses opérations pendant tout l'hiver; 4. elle s'engage de détacher au plus tôt possible de son armée du Rhin un corps de 10^m h. a 12^m h. effectifs vers la frontière de la Saxe pour renforcer l'armée alliée.

† Le roi de Pologne employera dorenavant non seulement le nombre des troupes stipulé par les traités mais toutes ses forces contre ce prince; s'engage de vouloir diriger encore de son côté les opérations les plus vigoureuses contre l'endroit qui lui sera le plus sensible suivant le concert à faire entre les généraux.

French frontier was at end, while Maria Theresa was still in Frankfort, a body of troops had marched from the Rhine towards the frontiers of Saxony and Bohemia, and had already reached the territory of Baireuth. Prince Charles of Lorraine did not feel that the battle of Soor had rendered him at all incapable of action.

This posture of affairs, and the security indulged by the King of Prussia, led the allies to expect that in the course of the year they might fall upon him and deal him a blow which would effectually destroy him.

We can speak with certainty as to the plans which were made for this purpose, as they are recorded in the narrative of an adjutant of the Saxon general Rutowsky.*

The first was drawn up by Rutowsky himself. According to this, Prince Charles was to advance into Lusatia, more for the purpose of engaging the attention of the Prussian army quartered in Silesia, and of protecting Saxony against any attack from that quarter, than in order to commence any active hostilities. General Grüne, on the other hand, was to form a junction with the Saxon army, which, thus reinforced, was to make the principal attack on the Prussians. Rutowsky hoped to surprise the nearest Prussian regiments in their quarters, and to

* *Mémoire contenant un recit militaire et historique de ce qui est arrivé en Saxe vers la fin de l'année 1745.* Some later hand has added the docquet: "Dressé par l'adjutant du comte de Rutowsky appellé Thier" (Dyherr). In the collection of the General Staff Office.

cut them to pieces; and should the Prince of Dessau venture into the field, to beat him, or, at any rate, to force him to throw himself into Magdeburg, and in the mean time to enter the territory of Brandenburg, which would be left exposed.*

This plan had not been adopted in every particular by Prince Charles, and was still under discussion, when an unexpected opposition to it arose on the part of Russia.

The Empress Elizabeth went along with the courts of Vienna and Dresden, inasmuch as their intentions concerned Silesia, the possession of which she had never formally guaranteed to the King of Prussia. She even considered herself justified in giving her support to such an enterprise, so far as to promise protection to Saxony against any act of hostility that might ensue in consequence thereof. This she announced to the King of Prussia in terms that might have been understood to mean still more; but she had no mind to overstep the line thus drawn, or to sanction an attack upon the provinces of Prussia Proper, such as was now projected by the allies. She

* Aussitôt que le C^e de Grune seroit arrivé a la hauteur de Zeiz, l'armée du Gn. Rutowsky devoit sortir de ses quartiers, se porter sur Halle de l'un et de l'autre côté de la Saale par autant de chemins, qu'il y avoit d'attaques, bruler et emporter les postes sans defense, raffier tout de suite les quartiers separés de Prussiens sur la Saale et sur l'Elbe . . . Le corps du C^e de Grune qui auroit joint l'armée du C^e Rutowsky l'eut rendu tellement superieure à celle du P^{ee} d'Anhalt; supposé même qu'elle n'eut été battu et dissipée en detail qu'elle eut été forcée à combattre ou à se jeter dans Magdebourg. Le succes du combat nous rendoit maitres de tout le Brandebourg.

was willing to abide by the treaty of Warsaw: she repeated that if the Saxon forces went to aid the Austrians in the recovery of Silesia, she would assist Saxony in case that power should be threatened with war by Prussia;* but if Saxony directed her arms against the provinces of Prussia Proper or the Marches of Brandenburg, she would render her no such assistance.

This declaration made all the more impression, as the warlike courage of the Saxons depended altogether upon the support afforded them by Russia. They imagined that they should entirely conciliate that power by complying with the objections it raised. To these conditions the court of Vienna likewise cheerfully acceded.

For these reasons it was now determined to place only a corps of observation to watch the movements of the Prince of Dessau, while the Saxon main army was to join Prince Charles in Lusatia, thence to advance as far as the frontiers of Brandenburg and Silesia, to interrupt the communications with Berlin, and to turn the full force of their arms against the army in Silesia, which would thus be cut off from all assistance. At the same time General Grüne was to place himself in the neighbourhood of Guben, whence he was to invade the Marches of Brandenburg. The allies presumed that even the Russian court would raise no objection to this proceeding, or, at any rate, that it would not on this account withdraw its aid

* Dyherr: "on avoit tout lieu de croire, que cette cour s'engageroit solidement dans nos intérêts, si nous avions l'attention de ne pas étouffer ces bonnes intentions dans leur naissance."

from Saxony, seeing that Grüne's corps formed part of the Austrian army.*

While all these consultations were held, and these plans devised, the court of Berlin and the Prussian army were fully persuaded that they should have a quiet winter.

It was not till the beginning of November that some suspicions were excited in Berlin by the constant movements of the Austrian army in Bohemia, of which some news reached the King, spite of all the care taken to keep them secret. Most people thought that these movements were caused by the scarcity of provisions in the interior of the province, or by the anxiety of the Austrians to be fully prepared for war by the next spring. The Prince of Dessau, however, judged it advisable not to allow the Silesian army intrusted to his charge to disperse in order to go into winter quarters.

Further suspicions were excited by General Grüne's advance, not, as was expected, into Bohemia, but into the Voigtland.

But Frederick's attention was first really roused by the above-mentioned declaration of the Russian court. He suspected that the intention of his two

* Le corps du comte de Grune comme purement Autrichien pouvoit et devoit estre dans le Brandebourg pour donner jalousie sur Berlin et la marche du C^{te} Rutowsky devoit être réglée de manière qu'en appuyant ce corps et en étant également cottoyé sur la gauche il marcheroit toujours par sa droite pour aller devant du P^{re} Charles qui depuis le moment de cette résolution prise étoit censé être le chef et de toute l'armée et de toute entreprise, la cour de Saxe n'y entrant comme auxiliaire.

neighbours was to attack him in Silesia from Lusatia, with a view to involving him in hostilities with Russia, in case they should be beaten and pursued by him through Lusatia. "The idea," said he, "is by no means bad; but, by God, I shall be justified in pursuing mine enemies wherever I may chance to find them." Podewils declared to Prince Woronzow, who was in Berlin at the time, that if the King were attacked from Lusatia, no one could blame him for going thither in pursuit of an enemy whose object was to wrest Silesia from him.

Frederick would admit no distinction as to international right between his old and his new provinces.

At present, however, everything was more or less matter of vague surmise. The King's eyes were first opened to the truth by the information given to him by some Swedish diplomatists who had attached themselves to him in an especial manner ever since the marriage of his sister to a Swedish prince: these men communicated to him the comprehensive plans of the allies, which had come to their knowledge accidentally, but certainly from Brühl's own information.

At the first moment scarce any one would have believed such a story. It was hardly credible that a Saxon minister should be rash enough to expose his own country to the danger of becoming the theatre of a terrible war, with all its devastating consequences. Neither Podewils, nor even the old Prince of Dessau, who was generally so easily moved to anger against Saxony, could be persuaded that it was possible.*

* The original copy of the Memoirs runs thus: "Le prince

But the concurrence of so many apparently heterogeneous movements, which were at once explained by this supposition, carried conviction to Frederick's mind. He had a keen sense of the enormous responsibility which the Saxon minister was thus taking upon himself. His conduct appeared to him like that of a maniac, who exposed himself to certain death in order to murder his brother. But knowing Brühl's character, especially his exorbitant vanity, which had been wounded by certain passages in the last manifesto, and also the blind reliance he placed upon Russia and Austria, Frederick had no doubt that matters really stood as he had heard.

On making this discovery, a bitter complaint escaped him of the incessant inquiet to which he was condemned: "To live thus," said he, "cannot be called to live, but to die a thousand deaths each day."* But at the very moment he expressed himself thus he had already resolved not to await the danger, but, as he saw it coming from afar, to meet it boldly. The stoical determination which had become a second nature to him, was destined to be put to a fresh trial. "North and south," said he, "appear to have conspired for our destruction, but at such times we must strain every nerve; to danger we must oppose courage; to fraud, dexterous ingenuity; and we must arm ourselves against all future events with

d'Anhalt me répondit sechement : cela n'est pas vrai, cela n'est pas possible."

* Cela ne s'appelle pas vivre mais mourir le jour mille fois que de passer toute sa vie dans des inquietudes et dans une crise de 18 mois.

stoical indifference." This time he felt that he took a higher stand than ever, as he had done all he could to obtain the peace which had been denied him; and now that the war seemed to be directed against the Marches of Brandenburg, he felt himself engaged in a righteous contest in defence of his country, his kindred, and his subjects.

As it was impossible to calculate the plans and movements of the enemy, it was thought advisable to take some measures for the security of Berlin: the burgher guard was doubled, cannon was placed in the principal squares, and so forth. The main point, however, was that two armies were got ready to enter Saxony upon the first hostile movement. The one, consisting of twenty-five battalions and seventy squadrons, was collected near Halle under the Prince of Dessau; the other, of 40,000 men, under the prince's son, had just reassembled in the vicinity of Goldberg. On the 18th of November, the King joined the latter force in person.

He had resolved within himself, and had strictly enjoined the prince, not to take a single step until the Austrians had actually arrived in the Saxon territory: this time he was determined not to appeal to arms without the fullest justification.

On the 20th of November, Lobkowitz marched into Saxony; on the 21st he was followed by Prince Charles. Hereupon, Frederick no longer hesitated to order his army to march, and once more to open the campaign.

"I commend you all," he writes, on the 22nd, "to the protection of Providence; to the genius

which watches over the safety of great nations: if only we are successful, we shall not complain of the labour and hardship it may cost us."

In order fully to appreciate Frederick's conduct, we must not forget that he thereby exposed himself to the danger of breaking with Russia—which his enemies did not imagine that he would dare to do.

On the 23rd he led his forces across the Queiss, at Naumburg, in four columns. He did not deliberate long, and yet he chose the right moment. General Grüne had just arrived at Königsbrück from the opposite direction; and before he could concert any common plan of operations with Prince Charles, the King of Prussia appeared in the midst between their two armies. Never was a threatened storm so suddenly dispelled. On the afternoon of the 23rd, the Saxons were attacked in their quarters at Hengersdorf, where they thought themselves perfectly secure, and scattered after a brave, but fruitless, resistance: whereupon the Prussian army spread itself out as far as Görlitz.* Thus, most unexpectedly cut short in his movements, while yet irresolute as to his future plans, Prince Charles determined to withdraw into Bohemia, with the whole force he had but lately brought thence. This was not effected without loss and confusion. Wherever Prince Charles pitched his camp in the

* Letters from Frederick to Prince Leopold, 23rd, 25th, 26th, 27th, 28th Nov., in Orlich, II. 421. Similar letters, with some additions, were sent to Berlin: e. g. "J'ai commencé mes opérations le 23; c'est aujourd'hui le 27 et les Autrichiens sont déjà à moitié resortis de la Lusace; à ce soir il n'y en aura plus à Zittau. Nous avons fait l'impossible pour aller si vite."

evening, the Prussians made their appearance a few hours later, compelling him to strike his tents and pursue his retreat in the middle of the night. The Prussians made forced marches, and generally encamped at night in the open air: their only desire was to meet the enemy in the field. It was not until the Austrians were in full retreat, early on the 28th, that the Prussians were enabled to take their first day's rest. They were the more rejoiced by their success, when, from the statements of the prisoners and the intercepted dispatches, the full extent of the plans entertained by the two courts now first became generally known.

At the same time Grüne, driven back from the frontiers of Brandenburg, retreated towards the Elbe, and shortly afterwards crossed it.

Such were Frederick's views and feelings, that it would have wounded his pride and grieved his heart if his military enterprises had brought any disasters upon his old hereditary dominions. This rapid success accordingly caused him all the greater joy. In his letters he swears, with *naïve* self-satisfaction, that he had surpassed himself in watchfulness and alertness. Another time he says, "You will certainly be satisfied with me; I have saved my country from the horrible calamity with which it was threatened; and the whole affair has not cost me above thirty killed and sixty wounded. God be praised. Our enemies were beaten before I could come up with them; I have nothing wherewith to reproach myself before God and my country."

Not only had he defended himself, but he had

at the same time acquired the right to take up an aggressive position.

One division of the army under his command took possession of Bautzen without encountering any opposition. Meanwhile, after a slow and cautious preparation, the old Prince of Dessau had advanced, with the troops intrusted to him, from Halle upon Leipsick, taken the outworks and entrenchments, which he found almost deserted, and the town itself; he then spread his troops out towards the Elbe.*

But even this aggressive movement was, in reality, only intended as a measure of defence; the Saxon court was to be forced to accept the peace it had hitherto declined, and eventually to accede to the convention agreed upon in Hanover.

On the 28th of November, upon the first successes at Hennersdorf and Görlitz, Podewils announced to Villiers, the English minister at the court of Dresden, that the King of Prussia was ready to withdraw his troops and to make peace, provided the King of Poland would send the Austrian troops out of Saxony, and promise never again to grant them a passage through his territories on their way to attack Silesia or any other province belonging to the King of

* Journal von der Expedition, die S. K. Maj. in Preussen dem Fürsten in Berlin, weil sich der Fürst damals daselbst befand, die Execution aufgetragen.—(Journal of the expedition, the execution of which his Majesty, who was in Prussia Proper, intrusted to the Prince, who was then in Berlin.) Berenhorst thinks that the Prince himself dictated the substance of this paper.

Prussia; but, above all, the King of Poland was to subscribe unconditionally to the convention of Hanover.*

The courier reached Dresden on the evening of 29th, and that same night Villiers announced these proposals to the Saxon court, which, however, still continued adverse to them. Augustus, King of Poland, trusted to the assistance of his powerful allies, and thought it expedient, in order not to be exposed to the risk of a sudden attack in his own capital, to retire without delay to Prague. His reply to Villiers was, that he would not consent to dismiss his Austrian auxiliaries until the King of Prussia should withdraw his troops from the Saxon provinces; and that he would only accept the convention of Hanover after advising upon it with Austria.

It need scarcely be said that Frederick could not listen to such terms. He, naturally, suspected that the object was to put him off with unmeaning words, while his adversaries in the meantime prepared a grand attack in the coming spring.

The sum of all the variously turned declarations exchanged between the adverse parties came to this. The King of Prussia refused to suspend hostilities, or to quit the Saxon territory, until peace was not only concluded, but likewise ratified upon the terms of the convention of Hanover. To this the Polish-Saxon court could not be brought to consent.

* Recueil de quelques lettres et autres pièces pour servir à l'histoire de la paix de Dresde, 1746. Frederick to Podewils, 1st Dec.: "si l'esprit ne tourne point au roi et ses ministres, ils souscriront le traité de Hannover."

The King of Prussia was therefore compelled to renew the war.

Frederick said that he pitied the King of Poland for suffering himself to be led by his minister—whom he condemned in the strongest terms—to act directly against what was obviously his interest. That he, Frederick, on his part, felt himself perfectly innocent of all the evil which he was forced to inflict. God would recognise the purity of his intentions, and would bring matters to a happy issue. “I am rejoiced,” he added, “that my own country is satisfied with me. But here, too, the whole country is for us: we spare it as much as possible; if we did not, everything would be destroyed. My heart bleeds when I see the mischief that I do against my wish: a reasonable peace would have prevented all this.”

The Prussian army entered Saxony from various sides. The King's object was, first of all, by occupying the bridge over the Elbe near Meissen—which Dessau was charged to do—to restore the communication between the two divisions of his army; when this was done, he hoped to conclude a peace on the glacis of Dresden.

The Saxon court was not as yet without the means of resistance. Their own army—forced to retreat, it is true, but by no means conquered—amounted to 25,000 men, under leaders of high reputation, and it was now strongly reinforced by Grüne's corps. Prince Charles, after quitting the Saxon territory in Lusatia, had marched his army across Bohemia to the other side of the Saxon frontier, which he crossed, coming from Aussig and Leutmeritz. The force thus col-

lected seemed, not to the Saxons only, but to many others beside, quite strong enough to execute the intended attack upon Brandenburg. Even Goltz, one of the most distinguished and bravest of the Prussian generals, agreed with the hereditary Prince of Dessau in thinking that there was still much to fear, and they both recommended the King to purchase peace, even on disadvantageous terms.

Frederick, on the contrary, was for attacking the enemy, if possible, before he could assemble all his forces, and for "driving the Saxons out of Saxony." It made him very impatient that the Prince of Dessau would lose time in taking such places as Wurzen, Grimma, and Torgau, and advanced so slowly in consequence.

The most remarkable contrast was exhibited by these two natures, which now had to work together. On the one hand was the young King, all life and fire, who took in at a glance the whole state of affairs and the danger of delay, who counted the days when this and this should happen, and when everything might be accomplished. On the other was the old Prince of Dessau, who this time exceeded even his usual methodical slowness and caution, and advanced only in the most methodical manner, as if he wished to give a practical example how a country like Saxony ought to be conquered according to rule, without leaving the most insignificant fort in his rear. Frederick, who was already offended by the manner in which Prince Leopold had contradicted his first surmises as to the intentions of the enemy, imagined that he deliberately acted thus in order, by the contrast, to

represent him, the King, to the world as a rash, thoughtless young man. Had these two leaders been men of equal rank, their misunderstanding might have led to the most serious consequences. But this time rapid decision was supported by authority which Frederick did not hesitate to use. He accused the Prince of a degree of dilatoriness likely to ruin everything, and called upon him, in no very measured terms, to rouse himself to more active exertion, otherwise he should be forced to resort to extreme measures. In matters affecting the honour of his house, and the welfare of his country and his subjects, he could spare no man's feelings. The Prince of Dessau did accordingly hasten his movements,* which, on his arrival at Meissen, were at once crowned with success.

The Saxon general posted there would not wait to be attacked, but fell back upon Rutowsky's corps, while negotiations were still pending. The prince found no difficulty in repairing the bridges, of which the enemy had only destroyed the planks, leaving the beams uninjured. General Lehwald, who had arrived with a considerable body of troops some days before, and, much to the King's annoyance, had had to wait, by which his corps was exposed to some danger, was now able to join the old Prince of Dessau, and together they were able to undertake an enterprise which could not fail to be decisive.

The Prince of Dessau had another strong motive

* Les deux marches qu'il venoit de faire étoient furieuses dans une saison moins rude que celle où se trouvoit. (*Mémoires de Dyherr.*) See Stille, *Campagnes du Roi*, 276.

to avoid all delay on the present occasion : he wished to show what he could do. In a manly friendship there is frequently, besides mutual esteem, an ingredient of jealous rivalry, which shows itself in an ambition to excel, each in his own line, in all matters of importance, and to win the approbation and esteem of the other. The King's admonitions had stung the Prince of Dessau to the quick ; he was also mortified by the loss of a few men in his rear-guard in a manner that caused him, whose systematic caution was proverbial, to be accused of want of prudence. He ardently longed, now that his life was drawing to a close, to recover his reputation by some great action.

The original intention of the Saxons had been to advance at once against the Prince of Dessau, but the privy council had represented that then Dresden might be attacked and taken from the opposite side, as most of the fortifications of the town had been converted into gardens. Rutowsky had determined to defend the capital, by taking up a strong position on the main road leading from Meissen to Dresden, through Wilsdorf.

At this moment Prince Charles, with his Austrians, arrived in the neighbourhood of Dresden ; and whether it was that he did not think Rutowsky's position so strong as the latter supposed it to be, or that it was really impossible to form a junction with the Saxons, at any rate he imagined that he could not do so, and desired Rutowsky to fall back and join him in the immediate neighbourhood of the capital. Rutowsky, who even without the Prince's army had

more troops than the advancing Prussians, chose rather to remain in his former position.*

Not far from the hill, at the foot of which lies Kesselsdorf, the Tzschone forms one of those ravines which run from the high lands down to the Elbe: the ravine becomes deeper and more difficult to cross the nearer it approaches the river. Rutowsky occupied the hill and fortified the village with strong batteries. Hence, his lines stretched along the side of the ravine as far as Zöllmen and Benerich, where they touched the Austrian force under Grüne. Here, too, the position was defended by batteries, which seemed to render any attempt to cross the ravine impossible.

From this position the Prince of Dessau had to drive the Saxons, not in order to conquer the country, but to force them into a peace—as the King expressed it, to wrest from them the sword which they only used to their own destruction.

Rutowsky was ambitious, full of the most far-reaching plans, and obstinately attached to his own opinions. The fame of his half-brother, Marshal Saxe, goaded him on, but he was far from possessing the same military talent. He was said to be fond of pleasure, and careless: the memoirs, which his adjutant wrote after his instructions, show little prudence or judgment.

* Narrative of Franchini's in Vienna: "qu'il (le Duc) leur avoit fait dire plusieurs fois de plutot se replier sur lui que de risquer seul une affaire générale, qu'il avoit été trop loing pour avoir pu venir a tems, que les Saxons n'avoient pas voulu suivre son avis, qu'ils s'étoient cru dans un poste si sure, qu'ils n'avoient rien a craindre, croiant, qu'une ravine qui étoit devant eux seroit impraticable." (From a letter written by Prince Louis from Vienna.)

The Prussians were astonished when, after taking Meissen, they found the important pass of Neustadt undefended. The Prince of Dessau ordered his cavalry to hasten thither at full gallop, in order to take possession of the spot. On the 14th of December his troops took up their night quarters at Neustadt: on the 15th he marched to Kesselsdorf in four columns, much as he had quitted Halle; his hussars driving the light cavalry of the enemy before them. Towards noon the Prince found himself in front of the enemy's position, and drew up his men in order of battle preparatory to commencing their hard day's work. While forming them into two lines, he took care that if a gap were made in the first line by the difficulty of the ground it had to cross, the second should be ready to fill it up at once.*

The first and most important thing was to take the village and the batteries by which it was defended, on which the whole strength of the Saxon position on the left flank depended; this the Prince immediately prepared to do.

He took two battalions of grenadiers from the

* Journal: "da nun dieses alles so nachgelebet und die sämtliche Armee in Schlachtordnung aufmarschiret, so liess der Fürst mit die 3 Grenadierbataillons und die 3 von Anhalt in Gottes Namen den Anfang machen."—(Now that all his orders had been obeyed, and the whole army had marched out in order of battle, the Prince desired in God's name that the three grenadier battalions and the three Anhalt regiments should begin the action.) The prayer attributed to the Prince, "that if God would not help the Prussians, at any rate he should not assist the enemy," belongs in reality to General Sporck at the battle of St. Gotthard, 1664.

second and one from the first line, which were to open the action. Behind these he placed three battalions of the old Anhalt regiment; behind these again were Bonin's dragoons, to which were joined the Stille cuirassiers.* In this order he advanced against the foe.

The grenadiers advanced with their muskets ready, but without firing a shot. The fire from cannon, howitzers, and musketry, with which they were received, was however so murderous that they were forced to give way somewhat towards the right. The Old-Anhalt regiment fared no better. The two together, the grenadiers and the Old-Anhalt, advanced to the charge once more, but were again repulsed, and this time their line was not so well kept. The Austrian and Saxon grenadiers, of whom there were nine battalions in Kesselsdorf, already believed the victory to be their own. At the summons of a Saxon general they sallied forth from the village where they had hitherto been well covered. It seems, indeed, as if at one time some of the Prussian guns fell into their hands. The old Prince of Dessau was in the thick of the fire and confusion of the advancing and retreating regiments. It was said that he courted death, at all events he did not avoid it, and would certainly have sought it had he been beaten. Meanwhile he perceived that in the heat of pursuit the enemy had fallen into disorder, the Saxon grenadiers even more than the Austrians. The Prince seized the opportunity, and ordered Bonin's dragoons to charge: they completely routed

* Canitz, *Thaten der Reiterei*, I. 47, remarks, that they acted here in the manner of the more recent brigade cavalry.

the hostile grenadiers, few of whom escaped. As Rutowsky had neglected to place a second line of infantry to support the first, he found it impossible to keep possession of the village. The Saxon cavalry, which was placed close by, was either taken prisoner by the Prussians or routed and dispersed. The village was burnt, and the batteries taken.

Meanwhile, spite of the difficulties presented at many points by the valley of the Tzschone, the general attack commenced upon the centre of the Saxon position. Maurice, the youngest son of the old Prince of Dessau, who had been methodically brought up by his father to be a soldier after his own heart, and who strove to rival the old prince in prudence as well as in courage, sprang into the marshy stream accompanied by two musketeers who helped him through.* No one would now be left behind. The regiments Leopold and Polenz were forced, within range of the enemy's fire, to slide down the declivity, slippery from half-melted ice and snow, and to clamber up the precipitous bank on the opposite side, supporting each other in the ascent. They made their appearance in front of the Saxons in small bodies of from thirty to forty. A Saxon colonel, who thought it possible to drive them down the hill again, charged them with his cavalry. But when he came so near to them that they could measure each other's strength, the Prussians were already formed into line, and received him with a steady fire, which forced his regiment to fall

* The whole of his brigade followed him, and did like him. Account of the Campaign in Saxony: Seyfert, I. Appendix, p. 223. See Stille, 284.

back, leaving the colonel himself dead on the field. The Saxon infantry then formed into a solid square, supported by some of the cavalry, who, however, quickly retreated before the fire of the advancing Prussian battalions: and the Saxon infantry were soon compelled to follow their example.* Had not the increasing difficulties of the ground in that direction prevented the left wing of the Prussian cavalry from coming up, the whole Saxon army would most likely have been annihilated.

The battle had begun at about two o'clock; at three the firing was hottest; at five all was over, and the old Prince of Dessau master of the field.

The Saxons, who were confident in the strength of their position and of their batteries, and who moreover fought very well at several points, firmly believed that the old Prince of Dessau, whom they had seen riding about the field of battle in his tattered cloak, had used some magic arts against them. They told how, a few days after the battle, a noise like the thunder of artillery had been heard from the bowels of the earth—a sufficient proof of the presence of diabolical agency.

On the 16th an advance on the part of the Austrians was fully expected by both the Prussian armies. By this time the King also had reached

* According to Dyherr's statement: "le feu de 3 ou 4 bataillons deposta cinquante escadrons et occasionna une deroute qui auroit fait detruire toute l'armée, si le ciel n'avoit favorisé sa retraite." In the Royal Gist. Library there is a German translation of these Memoirs, with notes by one calling himself a grenadier, from whose account I have taken some of the details.

Meissen. Prince Charles is said to have proposed a movement of this kind, but Rutowsky refused to attempt it. On the same day the Saxons retreated towards Pirna, and the fires in the Austrian camp were gradually extinguished. Hereupon the fate of the campaign was decided.

On the 17th the King visited his victorious army on the field of action. The Prince of Dessau, surrounded by his staff, met him on the spot where the order of battle had first been formed. The King got off his horse, walked, with his hat in his hand, up to the old hero, embraced him, said to him everything he could think of that was most flattering, and did him the honour to request the Prince in person to conduct him over the scene of his triumph. The face and manner of the old Prince proclaimed the delight and exultation that he felt. He had performed the last act of a long military life; the achievement was glorious and important in its results, and his ancient reputation was confirmed for ever. From the King's writings it is evident that he felt and acknowledged the courage and ability of the old Prince of Dessau, although he still spoke of him with a certain air of compassionate indulgence.*

What struck Frederick most on his visit to the field of battle, was the presence of several of the inhabitants of Dresden, who manifested the greatest satisfaction.

* In the original copy of the *Memoirs* more unconditional praise is given to the Prince than in subsequent editions. "Il donna des marques d'une expérience consommée et d'une valeur à toute épreuve. La disposition qu'il fit à sa droite pour l'attaque du village doit servir de modèle à tous ceux qui auront des villages si bien garnis à attaquer."

They had long disapproved the conduct of the Saxon government, and had of late suffered not a little from the Austrians. They were well pleased that the Prussians had been victorious, and came to meet them with perfect confidence.

On the following day Frederick took possession of Dresden, and used his utmost endeavours to justify the confidence reposed in him. While the Prince of Dessau behaved precisely as if he were in a conquered country, the King won all hearts by the affability of his manner, and by the consideration that he showed for the children of the King of Poland who had been left at Dresden. He gave himself the pleasure of restoring to freedom some unfortunate prisoners, whose offences had been trifling, and were fully expiated by the length of time they had lain in prison.

Another remarkable trait was his ordering the opera of Arminio to be performed; in this piece, as originally given, several passages occurred which were levelled against himself; these were now omitted by the performers, but remembered all the more by the audience.

“I often sit,” thus writes one of his suite,* “and wonder whether that which we have seen and done can be actually true! One day we march into Lusatia, on the same evening the Saxon army is beaten; the following day Görlitz is taken, the day after that the Austrians are driven beyond Zittau; the next day again they are chased out of the

* Letter from Dresden, in the Archives of Wolfenbüttel.

country, and Bautzen is taken ; on the fifth day Leipsick is occupied, and the Saxon army driven back upon Dresden ; lastly, not this army alone, but likewise the Austrians who were with them, are beaten, and Dresden is forced to capitulate : all this, too, at a time when the arrogant foe wanted to drive the King from his country and his people, to destroy his army, to lay waste his lands and his cities by fire and sword. The Lord hath done great things for us, let us therefore rejoice."

(The war was at an end, and peace ensued in a few days.

CHAPTER IX.

THE PEACE OF DRESDEN.

THE wish of France was, that the King of Prussia should either make peace with Saxony alone, or that he should take advantage of the success that had attended his arms, to bring about a general pacification. The ambassador, Valori, urged the adoption of the former alternative; the second was subsequently suggested in Paris, where it was said that such a project had been entertained by Charles XII. in 1706, but defeated by the Duke of Marlborough, who had gained over one of the Swedish King's confidants: whereas the King of Prussia was not dependent upon any minister or confidant, and was resolved to promote the welfare of Europe according to his own views.

At this moment Frederick was, however, heartily tired of his alliance with the French: he thought that he had experienced from them nothing but ingratitude and neglect. At the last outbreak of hostilities on the part of Saxony, he had written to Louis XV., representing to him the danger in which he was placed, and appealing to the friendship, goodness, and wisdom of the French monarch, as the last ally he possessed in Germany. The answer he then received was not only evasive, but ironical. The

French ministers, annoyed at the convention with England, in which Prussia had beheld her salvation, took pleasure in saying insulting things to Frederick: it afterwards came out that every one had contributed his share to the affront. In this document the Prussian feats of arms were represented as altogether secondary, and the whole stress was laid upon the deeds of the French. Scarce any notice was taken of the dangers with which Frederick saw himself surrounded: good counsel, he was told, he might take from himself. Frederick received the letter when the campaign had already terminated to his own advantage. He replied, that he now set a double value on the good fortune which attended his arms, since he saw that without it he must have been lost. His own judgment, to which the French monarch had referred him for good counsel, told him that, threatened as he was on all sides, and supported on none, he must immediately put an end to the war.

The King of Prussia had, besides, two especial motives to avoid entering into any very comprehensive scheme of negotiation—the threatening attitude still maintained by Russia, who was ready to fall at any moment upon his eastern provinces, and the recollection of his past dangers. The French secretary of embassy, Darget, who shortly afterwards entered the King of Prussia's personal service, said to him at this time in Dresden, that it would be glorious for him, after becoming the hero of Germany, to act the part of pacificator of Europe. The King answered, that the part was grand, but too

dangerous; that he had far too vivid a remembrance of the state of mind in which he had left Berlin, and had no wish to go through the like again. That he was met at every turn by a "check to the king." Had fortune been unpropitious—and he wondered that she had so long been true to him—he should now be a prince without a throne, while his country would be subjected to the most cruel oppression. When he was told that Austria would always oppose him, he replied that that probability was too remote to occupy his attention: he was content to conclude a treaty with the Elector of Saxony in Dresden itself, and to see the Chancellor of Bohemia make his appearance there to sue for peace.

For to this point matters were now come.

Frederick had received the first overtures at the very moment when he heard the roar of the cannon at Kesselsdorf. After the successful issue of this battle and the occupation of Dresden, there could be no doubt as to whether Saxony would wish for the peace, which was essential to her, but only as to whether Frederick would still grant the same terms he had offered hitherto. Those who were about him feared that he would not do so, after three weeks of such great and uninterrupted success, and in possession of the whole hostile territory: but Frederick surpassed their expectations.* On the

* Eichel: Es ist gewiss schwer so viel Avantages in so kurzer Zeit von ungefähr 3 Wochen zu haben, und solche mit Moderation zu tragen.—(It is certainly difficult to have gained so many advantages in the short space of three weeks, and to bear success with moderation.) Eichel had feared that the

18th of December he announced to the mediator that he would abide by his first word, and content himself with the acceptance of the convention of Hanover. It is certain that he hoped by this conduct to win over the court of Saxony to his side ; we will not, therefore, repeat the praises lavished by his contemporaries upon his moderation in the midst of victory. A remarkable example of the general progress of moral development is, however, afforded by the absence of any thirst for vengeance or retaliation.*

Even Austria could no longer delay making proposals of peace.

In another quarter that power was rapidly losing ground. The Spanish troops entered the Milanese territory here and there, taking under their protection the municipal interests of certain towns—Pavia, for instance—where they were consequently received with rejoicing. On the 16th of December the Spanish general entered the capital of Lombardy, where he soon was followed by Don Philip. The population received with delight a prince, in whom they saw their own future ruler. The couriers, with the

King's head would be turned, and he might be made insolent, "noch zur Zeit aber geht es Gottlob damit gut"—(but, God be praised, as yet all is well).

* A heavy contribution was imposed upon the town of Leipsick. On the 21st Podewils declared : "Comme l'intention du roi mon maitre n'a jamais été de ruiner la ville de Leipsic et son commerce, dont S. M. souhaite plustôt la conservation pour le bien et les intérêts de ses propres sujets, V. Exc. peut bien croire, que les sommes considerables que le roi a fait demander à la susdite ville ne s'entendent point comme devant être payés par elle seule."

intelligence of the capture both of Milan and of Dresden, must almost have met in Vienna. While the imperial court fought with strenuous but fruitless animosity against the King of Prussia, it allowed its ancient Italian dominions to slip out of its hands.

England, moreover, now distinctly announced to both Austria and Saxony that they must no longer expect to receive subsidies, which were chiefly given to support the war against France, unless they would consent to a peace with Prussia—a condition which was absolutely essential to success against the French.*

At this moment Austria was utterly unable to dispense with the English subsidies.

The most pressing motive of all with Austria was, however, the situation of Saxony. Frederick had always been persuaded that an attack upon Saxony would be the true means of obtaining peace. It was only by the representations of his ministers, the consideration of the alliance between Russia and Saxony, and the conviction that the convention of Hanover must of itself bring about the desired result, that he had been induced to desist from the project. The peril by which he was most unexpectedly threatened, at length drove him to put it in execution, and Saxony soon fell into his hands. The court of Vienna could, on no account, suffer such a state of things to last, or Saxony to conclude a sepa-

* See Pelham to Trevor, Dec. 11. "The Queen of Hungary has undoubtedly lost the affection of the people of England—that house (of Austria) totally neglects the general view for which almost every honest man is their friend."

rate treaty of peace; in which case that state would become absolutely dependent upon Prussia.

All this at length produced its effect: the representations of Count Harrach, who, of all the Austrian ministers, was least carried away by the prevailing prejudices against Prussia, were now heard with more attention than before. Harrach himself—a man of simple habits and tastes, who preferred a country life to the dissipations of the town, and who was gentle and peaceably inclined—was intrusted with the conduct of the negotiation.

His instructions originally were to introduce into the terms of the convention of Hanover certain modifications, of which the nature has not transpired. Hereupon the King of Prussia declared that he once more offered the convention, but exactly as it stood—not a single letter of it should be changed. Count Harrach, on arriving in Dresden, was prepared to accept the terms of the convention as they were.

In drawing up a formal convention with Saxony several incidental questions came under consideration. For instance, Saxony levied a toll exceedingly injurious to Prussian interests at Fürstenberg and Schiedlo on the Oder; and it was proposed that these places should be exchanged against others: but what these were to be, was not yet definitively settled. Other territorial arrangements of a like nature were also left for future discussion. But the main point was, that the convention of Hanover was finally accepted by the King of Poland. The Queen, his wife, was to renounce any claims that she, as an Austrian Princess, might ever have raised for herself or her heirs

to the provinces ceded to the King of Prussia by the treaty of Breslau. The King of Poland himself promised never to disturb the King of Prussia in the possession of these territories under any pretext whatever. Hostilities were to cease, and the levying of contributions to be stopped, in consideration of the payment of one million of thalers; on which terms the Prussian troops would immediately evacuate Saxony. There was to be no further question of compensation for any loss either party might have sustained. The utmost care was taken to guard against all cause for future dissension that might possibly arise out of the position in which Saxony stood with respect to Prussia.*

Hereupon the articles for a definitive treaty with Austria, which had been drawn up by Podewils some months before, were now at length accepted by the plenipotentiaries of that power. Frederick recorded his vote, as Elector, in favour of the Grand-Duke of Tuscany as Emperor of Germany. Maria Theresa, who was now recognised as Empress Queen, in return accepted the convention of Hanover, and confirmed the preliminaries of Breslau, the definitive peace of Berlin, and the territorial divisions laid down therein. She once more solemnly renounced all claim to the districts ceded by these treaties. She guaranteed to the King of Prussia the possession of all and each of his lands and states, without excep-

* *Traité définitif de paix*, in Wenck, II. 194. The editor was, however, too scrupulous when, in the VIth article, he altered "pretendre," which is correct, into "prendre," which was a misprint of the Berlin edition.

tion; the King, on his part, secured to her all that she held in Germany.

Sir Thomas Villiers, who had made every effort to remove the obstacles that had arisen at the last, was present when the documents were signed. On the 25th of December the Austrian treaty was first read in his presence, and then the Saxon in that of Count Harrach also; after which both documents were signed. Villiers, a man of the world and fond of literature, when thanked by Podewils in the name of Frederick, was deeply moved by the consciousness that he had served as an instrument in this great act of reconciliation.* Podewils asserted that the tears stood in his eyes.

“I thank heaven,” says Frederick, in his answer to his minister, “for this good news; and hope that the work will prove strong and lasting.” At length he found himself once more in undisputed possession of that great province, the acquisition of which had been the foundation of his glory and of his position in the world’s estimation.

I do not find that the French court made any serious complaints on the subject of this peace. Frederick sent word thither that he had no mind to submit to the fate which had befallen so many other allies of France, namely, that of being utterly ruined without receiving any aid from that power: and such declarations as these scarcely admitted of a reply.

{ As much satisfaction was felt in England at the

* Algarotti to Villiers: *Opere Varie*, II. 455.

Te di virtute et del buon Flacco amico . . .

Te le guerre a compor nato d’Europa.

second peace as at the first, everybody went to congratulate the Prussian minister: the Prince of Wales displayed the most lively personal sympathy.

But, as may be supposed, it was in Berlin that the greatest joy was excited by the conclusion of peace.

The feeling that prevailed in the Prussian capital had not been favourable to Frederick when he entered upon his first campaign. The battle of Mollwitz—the bold advance and rapid retreat in Moravia—spite of the great success that attended these movements, had left the King's personal merits still doubtful. The second war was blamed still more; the principal motive for undertaking it, namely, the affairs of the Emperor and the Empire, excited but little sympathy in Berlin. On the other hand, the campaign of 1745—the moderation and prudence with which it was prepared—the bold and successful conduct of a battle like that of Hohenfriedberg, had called forth universal admiration. This was increased by Frederick's magnanimous bearing during the subsequent months, and his heroic repulse of the foe at Soor. When Frederick returned in October, his reception was altogether unlike what it had ever been before, and it gladdened his heart to perceive it. He was heard to say, "I see that my burghers love me: they did not greet me thus on my accession."* But now that a comprehensive plan, aimed at the destruction of the state, and especially of the capital, had been foiled by the energy, the determination,

* Report of Hofmann, the Brunswick resident in Berlin.

and the good fortune of the King—that he had wrung from the enemy, at the sword's point, the peace which they had refused to grant—his subjects felt not only respect, but likewise gratitude towards their sovereign. Never had a Prince of Brandenburg been received with greater enthusiasm than was Frederick on his return from Dresden: now, for the first time, he was solemnly and by general acclamation hailed as the Great. The critical judgment of the capital, so hard to render favourable in serious matters, at length conferred upon him this title, without condition or reservation. Frederick's triumphs were pronounced to be equal to those of the Romans or Macedonians.

One of the chief ceremonies in honour of the proclamation of peace was the closing of a symbolical temple of Janus. Both the King and the people imagined that they should now long enjoy the peace they had so ardently desired.

In his conversation with Darget, Frederick declared that he thought there was more honour to be gained in securing the happiness and welfare of his subjects, than in busying himself with the pacification of Europe. Maupertuis wrote to him, saying, that he had done as much in a few weeks as the most successful and most practised general could ever accomplish. It was only during peace that he could hope to become greater than he already was.

NINTH BOOK.

CHAPTER I.

THE YEARS OF PEACE.

A TREATY of peace must not be considered solely as the termination of a war. Every peace that is anything more than a mere armistice is likewise the beginning of a new epoch. The motives and impulses which led to the war receive a new shape and direction, which is determined by the issue of the conflict, and which must necessarily characterize the policy of many succeeding years.

If the sole object of the second Silesian war had been to defend Silesia, that object was fully attained. Whatsoever may have been the secret views and wishes of other princes and potentates, the splendid deeds of arms performed by the Prussian army had so much increased the power and consequence of Frederick and of his kingdom, that he would have had no reason to fear any fresh aggression. He had shown how well prepared he was, not alone to meet, but to anticipate an attack, and to carry the war into the enemy's territories before they could even begin it.

The last war, however, had not in reality broken out on account of Silesia, but of the assistance given by Frederick to the reigning dynasty of Bavaria, more especially to Charles VII. It in fact arose out of the question whether Prussia, allied with Bavaria, or Austria alone, was to possess the greatest influence upon Germany. In this point of view the issue of the contest was by no means favourable to Prussia.

It may, indeed, be considered as one consequence of this war, that Bavaria was not confiscated by Austria. But this was not even an indirect advantage to Prussia, as that country, more exhausted than ever, was forced to follow implicitly the line of policy dictated by Austria. The imperial crown itself, which Frederick had long contested with the Grand-Duke of Tuscany, now fell into the possession of the latter, and the government of the Empire immediately reverted to its ancient course, under an Emperor of the house of Lorraine.

Francis I. at once removed the Diet back to Ratisbon: the medal struck upon this occasion appears to intimate that public security was closely connected with the re-opening of the town-hall of Ratisbon. The first proposal that was made there related to the general armament—the first motion, carried by a large majority, was an imperial decree directing that the number of troops should be increased threefold; the four frontier circles, in their first zeal, expressed a readiness to send a still larger number of troops into the field.

After the project of secularizing the ecclesiastical

territories had failed, owing to the opposition of Austria, the connection between the ecclesiastical princes and the power to whom they owed their preservation naturally became still more intimate, and at the Diet they threw the whole weight of their interest into the scale of Austria. The same thing was repeated in the different circles of the Empire where the Estates met; questions were decided by the influence of the clergy, owing either to their superior numbers or to their greater power, as in the case of the Bishop of Würzburg, in Franconia. Frederick had hoped to alienate the Saxon court from Austria, not only by the gentle treatment which both the court and the people had received at his hands, but also by holding out to it the prospect of an increase of territory—he would not have objected to a scheme for separating the town of Erfurt from the Archbishoprick of Mayence, and uniting it to Electoral Saxony: indeed in the secret articles of the treaty of Dresden this matter is expressly mentioned. But it soon appeared that this formed no part of the policy of Count Brühl: after the peace he still clung to Austria. This was also the case with Hanover.

In the introduction to this work we endeavoured to explain how the kingdom of Prussia, like the other territorial principalities, developed itself in opposition to the supreme power of the Empire. Without striving to obtain the imperial crown for himself, Frederick II. had endeavoured to acquire a preponderating and directing influence over the general affairs of Germany, and to remodel the Empire according to the interests and in the spirit of the tem-

poral powers. In this attempt it is obvious that he had completely failed.

Although Frederick's might far exceeded all that had yet been exercised by any potentate but the Emperor, still the relation subsisting between them was not entirely changed, and the new state retained the character of opposition to the imperial power, which rested on totally different principles.

This position was not the free choice of the Prussian monarch, but was forced upon him by necessity. No attack had been able to shake his authority within the circle of his own dominions, but he had been repulsed in the attempt to extend his influence over Germany. As regarded himself, he was victorious ; as against the Empire, he was defeated.

Frederick, who, indeed, never applied the whole energies of his mind to the affairs of the Empire, accepted the position that was forced upon him. But he was far too powerful to submit to remain in an inferior position. He looked upon his position as Prince of the German Empire as merely accidental, and considered himself to be in reality one of the sovereigns of Europe.

It was this view that influenced his whole policy, both foreign and domestic.

CHAPTER II.

POLICY DURING THE WAR OF SUCCESSION.

FREDERICK II. has not unfrequently been compared, during his early campaigns, with Charles XII.; nevertheless there was the greatest difference between the two monarchs.

Charles XII. once confessed that he never concluded a peace without already meditating a fresh war: he could not live at home in peace. Frederick II. had made a conquest, which he looked upon as a political necessity, and had achieved a secure and important position. With this he was perfectly contented. During the last year he had waged war solely in order to obtain peace; and he now endeavoured to keep at peace himself, while the whole of western Europe was engaged in war, into which all parties strove to draw him.

About this time a most extraordinary project arose out of the doubtful state of affairs in England. Though not made the subject of a regular official communication, the suggestion was reported by the English Ambassador.

Charles Edward, who would, perhaps, have played a far more important part could he have resolved to concentrate his forces in Scotland, had retired thither after his adventurous English expedition: he found

real sympathy both in the Highlands and the Lowlands of Scotland, and it did not seem easy to crush him.

Without doubt he had reason to complain that the French did not come to his assistance in right earnest; but while they neglected Charles Edward in Scotland, they made an attack upon Brussels, where they encountered no opposition, and they might by this means have seriously embarrassed the English government.

The maritime powers had hoped to receive forcible aid from Austria, after peace had been concluded between that nation and Prussia. But it soon became manifest that the Empress devoted all her energies to Italy, leaving the defence of the Austrian Netherlands to the two maritime powers. The Dutch, at least, were much annoyed at this proceeding.

Another great interest of the English nation was bound up with this. In the year 1745 the English, zealously supported by the colonists in Massachusetts, had taken Louisburg, on Cape Breton, at that time the most considerable fortress in North America, and one upon which the French had expended large sums of money. The English now feared that the unfavourable turn of affairs in Europe might force them to give up their conquest.

In this posture of affairs they cast their eyes upon the King of Prussia. In order to secure his assistance a scheme was suggested of the most daring and comprehensive nature.

They started with the assumption that the disturbed state of Holland rendered it necessary that

there should be a Stadhouder, who, by his power and position, could give that country some stay and assistance. No one seemed so well able to do this as the King of Prussia. In order to secure him for ever, it would be necessary to give him a permanent interest in the country, and a position with respect to France like that formerly held by the Dukes of Burgundy; he must wrest the Austrian Netherlands from the hands of the French, and not only recover, but likewise retain possession of them. As Austria was unable to defend these provinces, she was to resign them to Frederick so soon as she had driven the Bourbons out of Italy, and could recover from the French the provinces they had taken on the Upper Rhine.*

Although these ideas were never wholly realized, both the suggestions of Pitt in 1805, and the strong position assumed by Prussia since 1815, were an approximation towards them.

The English imagined that in this case they should no longer be compelled to take part in any continental war: they would send an army to Ame-

* Description de l'état déplorable, où nous sommes réduits. "Il est aisé de penser, que les Hollandois se preteroient à le faire leur stadhouder et les Autrichiens à lui ceder leurs titres sur les pais bas—si l'on considère qu'on peut engager le roi de Prusse à se charger de reconquerir les pais bas, de payer aux Hollandais les sommes, qu'ils ont avancé à la maison d'Autriche sur ces pais; de leur rendre leurs barrières et que de plus il continuera la guerre à la France jusqu'au tems que les Autrichiens auront mis les Français et leurs alliés hors de toute l'Italie et qu'ils ayent aussi recouvrés les provinces, que les Français leur prirent autrefois sur le Rhin."

rica, raise another in the colonies, and drive the French out of North America; meanwhile the fleet would take possession of the most important maritime stations, such as Cuba, Hispaniola, and Porto Rico.

It would have been as it were a common enterprise of the Germanic against the Romance nations; Austria, Prussia, and England were to combine in order to wage war against their foes.

Such vast schemes as these were only entertained by a few; it would have been impossible for the English ministry to make a proposal of this kind, seeing that the Prince of Orange was the son-in-law of their King, who was doing all he possibly could to raise that prince to the dignity of Stadhouder.

But they did propose to enter into a perpetual alliance with the King of Prussia, to whom they promised still larger subsidies than had ever been given to the Queen of Hungary—one million sterling.

If even the first suggestion, which reached his ears merely as an idea current among the people, had been officially communicated to him, it is doubtful whether he would have entertained it. But he was far too proud to carry on a war for the sake of subsidies; he replied that he had not yet sunk so low as to be obliged to accept such an offer.

And it soon became evident that without the help of Prussia little could be recovered from the French and their allies.

The English, indeed, soon mastered the Pretender, who received no efficient support from France. After his return to Scottish ground he had achieved

a few slight successes ; but on the appearance of the troops which had made the campaign in the Low Countries under the Duke of Cumberland, Charles Edward was instantly forced to retreat into the Highlands. On the 16th of April was fought the battle of Culloden, which put an end to the whole contest : the Highlanders used their broad swords as vigorously as ever, and cut their way through the first line of the English troops. But the same thing happened to them as to the French at Dettingen ; the fury of their charge brought them within the range of the English guns, and of a steady fire of musketry, which mowed down their ranks. Their bold advance was suddenly turned into as rapid a flight.

England no longer stood in need of the aid which she had requested of Prussia.

On the other hand, the French maintained their superiority on the Continent. It would be out of place here to narrate the details of the war ; it is sufficient for our purpose to mention that in April, 1746, they took Antwerp, in July Mons, in August Charleroi, in September Namur ;— in October Marshal Saxe won the battle of Raucoux. By the end of the year 1746 they had taken all the Austrian Low Countries, excepting Luxemburg, Limburg, and Guelders ; and in the beginning of 1747 they attacked the Dutch provinces. This brought about the change which had long been imminent. As in 1672, the aristocratic form of government was overthrown by a revolt, and the Prince of Orange was raised to the dignity of Stadhouder and

(Captain-General. But he was neither a William III. nor a Frederick II., and had no military talent. The Dutch troops fought no better under his command than they had done before. At Lafeld, in July, 1747, it was only the English who offered a bold resistance to Marshal Saxe, and he was again the victor. The fortress of Berg-op-Zoom, considered as the masterpiece of Coehorn and the key to Holland, was, after a two months' siege, surprised by the French during the night of the 16th of September.*

For some time, however, the allies were far more successful in Italy, whither Maria Theresa, after making peace with Prussia, had dispatched her best troops.

Before the castle of Milan was regularly invested Bernclau's hussars left Pizzighetone and Lodi, and made their appearance near the capital. The Infant Don Philip, who had passed the winter in the diversions of Milan, was forced to retire on the 19th of March, 1746. Two hours after his retreat Milan was occupied in the name of Maria Theresa. Hereupon the King of Sardinia once more renewed his alliance with the Queen, and turned his arms against the Bourbons. On the 16th of June the Spanish troops were driven out of the field at Piacenza; it was observed that the small field-pieces, the form of which the Austrians had copied from the Prussians,

* General Cronström, who was 86 years of age, had undertaken the defence of the place; he subsequently demanded to be tried by court-martial; the verdict given was, that he had done more than could have been expected from so old a man.

did them great service. The whole Austro-Sardinian force now advanced upon Genoa. The death of Philip V. of Spain, the accession of his successor Ferdinand VI., the wavering policy and the change of generals in command of the army, consequent upon it, did much to render the condition of the Genoese so precarious that they were soon forced to think of capitulating. When the terms were discussed, they insisted upon some difficulty arising out of their own laws; hereupon Marquis Botta Adorno, who conducted the negotiation, is reported to have answered, that there was now but one law for them, to obey the victor. A contribution of nine millions of florins was extorted from the Genoese, which enabled the Queen to discharge the arrears of pay due to the officers of her army.

Maria Theresa still wished to renew the war against Naples; Bartenstein expressed the opinion, "that no security was to be had for Europe while there remained a single branch of the House of Bourbon in Italy."* The Duke of Savoy, at any rate, could raise no objection to this, as the cession of territory to be made in his favour was incidental to the carrying out of the plan adopted at the treaty of Worms.

But the English would hear no more of this scheme. They hoped to gain over the new King of Spain to their side, and shrunk from a breach with

* June, 1746: that no security was to be had for Europe while there remained a single branch of the house of Bourbon. Uhlefeld and Bartenstein fought against an "emplastered peace."

the Spanish Bourbons reigning in Italy. Instead of rushing headlong into a fresh enterprise, the consequences of which could not be foreseen, they wished to turn the victory gained in Italy to account against France, and to call off the French troops from Holland, "prosecuting the present advantages to the extirpation of the enemy's force in Lombardy, and seconding that blow by an immediate diversion on the side of France."

After some opposition, the Queen agreed to this suggestion. General Browne, with whose name we have already been made familiar on the frontiers of Silesia and of Naples, collected an Austro-Sardinian army of 30,000 men, in November, 1746, and directed his march upon Provence. In the middle of December he took Fréjus, and only waited for the arrival of the heavy artillery to begin the siege of Antibes.

But this enterprise was not more successful than so many similar ones, both in early and in recent times.

The Genoese had paid two-thirds of the contribution levied upon them, and were in hopes that payment of the remainder would not be exacted. No such remission, however, was made, and the general dissatisfaction was such, that, after the departure of the army, a popular tumult broke out upon some trifling pretext, which forced the Austrian garrison to leave the town.

This movement in their rear compelled the Austrians to evacuate Provence, and in the following year they vainly attempted to take vengeance upon

Genoa. The French came to the assistance of the town, bringing with them not only excellent artillerymen, but likewise a body of troops sufficient to threaten Sardinia, and give her army plenty of employment. Hereupon the siege was necessarily raised; there was as little chance of taking Genoa and Naples as of recovering the Barrier towns which had been taken by the French in the Netherlands.

Great efforts were deemed necessary by the allies to retain possession of those places still in their hands. Not only German troops, but even 30,000 Russians, were to be sent into the Netherlands at the beginning of the campaign, in the year 1748, and to be taken into the pay of the maritime powers.

It soon appeared, however, that Holland was no longer able to contribute her share of the expenses. She was forced once more to request a large loan from England.

Hereupon the English cabinet reflected that, although they were now prepared for all contingencies, matters could not fail to go amiss, should the want of money make itself felt during the war; and those members of the cabinet who had all along urged the necessity of making peace, obtained the upper hand.*

On the other hand, the resources of the French were thoroughly exhausted, and they desired nothing

* Newcastle to Cumberland, 15th March, 1747, states how impossible it was to agree to the demand made "to advance his money from the supplies granted for this year. . . . Your Royal Highness knows, that there is not one farthing granted by parliament without its being appropriated to some particular use."

more than to recover possession of the North American provinces they had lost: both parties were anxious for peace.

The English were victorious by sea, and the French by land. Each party chose rather to relinquish its own advantages than to recognise those gained by the other; and peace was at last concluded on the terms that the English should give up their conquests in America, the French theirs in the Netherlands.

For the present the English were satisfied with the promise made them by Ferdinand VI., of certain commercial privileges, to be determined by subsequent negotiation. In return, they gave their own consent, and obtained that of their allies, to the erection of a principality in Parma and Piacenza to be bestowed, in accordance with the wishes of the Bourbons, upon the Infant Don Philip.

On this occasion the question of Silesia was once more brought under discussion.

The court of Vienna could not bear to see the possession of Silesia guaranteed to the King of Prussia, in a treaty which was to form a new basis for the settlement of Europe. As far as George II. was concerned, he was perfectly willing to give up this point; but his ministry, which, after some tottering, was once more firmly fixed in office, was determined neither to leave so important a matter unsettled, nor irreconcilably to offend the King of Prussia. Towards the end of the war the English nation had become as zealous partisans for Prussia as they had been, at the beginning, for Austria.

Legge, who went to Berlin as envoy in April, 1748, said that he was the delegate of a ministry strong in the approbation of the public, and of a nation that loved and honoured the King of Prussia as a great prince and hero, beheld his deeds with unspeakable admiration, and was resolved that the rest of Europe should guarantee him the possession of all his dominions. The promise made by Legge in Berlin was already being fulfilled at Aix-la-Chapelle. The preliminaries of peace, signed on the 30th of April, contained the stipulation that all the powers that took part in the treaty should guarantee to the King of Prussia the possession of all those portions of the dukedom of Silesia and the county of Glatz which he held at that time. The Pragmatic Sanction was not wholly renewed, as at the convention of Worms; it was indeed confirmed by a subsequent article, but with the express exception of such territories as had been already ceded to other powers—for instance, Silesia.

For some months it continued doubtful whether this settlement would be definitively accepted: no one could be astonished if, after the great exertions she had made, Maria Theresa found it hard to consent to the sacrifices demanded of her in various quarters. But she was not in a condition to carry on the war alone. At length, in a state of bitter indignation against England, Maria Theresa submitted to what was unavoidable, and allowed the treaty to be signed on the 18th of October, 1748.*

* With reference to Silesia, the terms of the preliminaries were repeated. Abbé Loyse, the *locum tenens* of Valori, writes on the 28th of September, 1748: "que le roi de Prusse

The two great European questions that had caused the breaking out of the war, were the maritime and the continental. Of these, the first had become obsolete during the peace; the second was, in fact, decided.

Austria, whose very existence had been threatened, still held her ground as an European power: it is true she no longer possessed the same extent of territory, for those very allies, who had afforded her the greatest assistance by means of their subsidies, had themselves forced her to make considerable cessions south of the Alps, and had suffered others to do so on the north.

Prussia was now, for the first time, acknowledged as one of the powers of Europe.

Frederick had always congratulated himself upon having no reason every moment to fear the storms of the world, and upon being able to listen from afar to the roar of the tempest. "A man is happy," said he, "so long as he remains quiet from moderation." At the same time, however, this was the best line of policy he could have followed. While he kept on good terms with France—and even under present circumstances he would not assent to the Pragmatic Sanction until the French had approved it—he managed at the same time to gain over the English nation to his side. The consent of these two powers

est dans la persuasion et espérance que la garantie de la Silésie sera mise dans les mêmes termes et sans aucune altération dans le traité définitif, qu'elle est dans les articles préliminaires."
Puisaulx answers on the 21st of October: "Le roi a été flatté, d'obliger le roi de Prusse dans une chose, qu'il paroît avoir si fort à cœur."

was absolutely necessary in order to secure to him the largest of his newly-acquired possessions.

During the last few years he had made another acquisition with far less trouble ; the territory gained was of much smaller extent, but of greater importance to the security of the Prussian state than even Silesia.

CHAPTER III.

THE ACQUISITION OF EAST FRIESLAND.

THE Elector Frederick William was the first to establish a closer connection between Brandenburg and East Friesland. When, in the year 1683, Holland appeared inclined to assume a sovereign jurisdiction in the disputes that arose between the reigning house and the Estates of East Friesland, the Emperor, at the same time that he forbade both parties to appeal to foreign powers for aid, delegated a conservatorium in favour of the Estates to the Elector Frederick William, in virtue whereof garrisons of Brandenburg troops were placed, first in Gretsyl, and then in Emden. At this very time Frederick William was anxious to revenge upon his old allies, Holland and Spain, their desertion which had cost him his conquest of the province of Pomerania. He fixed upon Emden as a central position for his maritime expeditions, and already some East Frisian vessels sailed under the Brandenburg flag. Moreover, Frederick William demanded of the Emperor, in part payment of the compensation he had been promised, the reversion of the principality of East Friesland, where it seemed unlikely that the house of Cirksena would last much longer. His request was refused, but his son subsequently

obtained possession of the principality in due form, and under every proper guarantee.

To obtain possession of this reversion whenever it should fall vacant, was one of the most important objects of the policy of Brandenburg. This question contributed not a little to the disagreement of Frederick William with Holland and Hanover, neither of which liked that East Friesland should lapse to Prussia.

At this time the condition of the province was anything but satisfactory. The disputes between the Prince and the Estates, which, for the most part, had been at rest during the first half of the eighteenth century, now broke out afresh, causing great disturbance throughout the country, and even bloodshed. The origin of the quarrel was as follows:—

The management of the revenues of the province, which was vested exclusively in the hands of the Estates, had as usual given rise to many and, in some cases, well-founded complaints. The Chancellor Brenneisen undertook to support the interests of the Prince. Brenneisen, a man of proud and ardent temper, had been educated in the Halle school of politics, in which the maxims of Thomasius were combined with Lutheran fanaticism. He procured from the Emperor the issue of some imperial edicts in favour of this prince, and by degrees—by dint partly of persuasion, partly of open violence—he succeeded in bringing over to his side the majority, but by no means the whole, of the Estates: the nobility, and Emden, the chief town of the province, were invariably opposed to him, and a complete division

ensued. Two parties arose in the state, who from time to time held rival Diets : two distinct bodies for the administration of the government sat, the one at Aurich, the other at Emden, and were vehemently opposed to each other. Both the loyal and the disaffected Estates assumed to be the representatives of the people. The last prince of the house of Cirkseua, Charles Edzard, never succeeded even in forcing the latter to do him homage : nor did he once enter Emden, although he lived only a few leagues from that town. However, the royalist Estates gained the chief influence in the greater part of the province. The members of the disaffected Estates were excluded from any share in office and from the Diets, and in part deprived of their possessions, and the town of Emden of its domains. From time immemorial a few imperial troops had always been quartered in the province as a safeguard ; internal dissensions, however, had caused other troops to enter East Friesland ; for instance, the Dutch and the Prussians, who sided with the Estates, and some few companies of Danes, who took part with the prince. The latter received, moreover, some support from Hanover, which power endeavoured to prove an ancient treaty of succession with East Friesland ; this, however, obviously ran counter to the reversion granted by the Emperor to Prussia. There was no prospect of a united or stable government of the province, when Edzard, the last of the Cirkseuas, died during the night of the 25th of May, 1744. His death was said to have been hastened by the disappointment of his hopes of issue

by his wife, with which he had flattered himself for some time past.

Hereupon the Prussian claims came into force ; it was obviously the interest of Prussia not only to occupy a vacant place, but likewise to be beforehand with the rivals in the field, to banish all foreign influences, to restore the internal peace of the country, and, above all, to make it once more into one united province.

Even before the death of Charles Edzard, the King of Prussia had taken care to have his claims recognised by several of the Estates. Baron Wedel von Evenburg asserts, in a letter written subsequently, that he was the first to do so. There is a rescript of Charles Philip of Inn-and Knyphausen, dated the 13th of May, 1744, wherein he recognises the King's claims as just and lawful. On the self-same day the ratifications of a convention, drawn up in the same spirit, were exchanged between Prussia and the town of Emden : this was of the more importance, as it greatly facilitated the act of taking possession.

Immediately after the death of the prince, the chief magistrate of Emden invited to a conference in the town-hall the commander of the Dutch forces, between whom and the citizens a bad understanding had subsisted for some time. The magistrate entreated the Dutch commander not to throw any difficulties in the way of the taking possession by the Prussians. The Dutch commander was astonished, but complied notwithstanding. Another Prussian plenipotentiary, Homfeld, was already associated with Major Kalkstein, the commander of the Prus-

sian forces. By their joint orders the Prussian eagle was immediately hoisted on the walls of the citadel, and a royal proclamation posted in all public places. On that same morning the magistrates took the oaths of allegiance: among the acts is the rescript, signed and sealed by the four burgomasters and eight chief magistrates.*

In return for the compliance of the town, its ancient domains and privileges, of which it had been deprived, were immediately restored.

But the act of taking possession would have been very incomplete, and in no degree answerable to the claims of Prussia, if only the Estates, until now disaffected, had given in their adhesion to the King of Prussia; in that case everything would most likely again have been involved in doubt.

Frederika Wilhelmina, the aunt of the deceased prince, in combination with her sisters, claimed to carry on the former government, alleging that East Friesland was a mixed feud, and, therefore, descended to female heirs. Two members of the privy council sided with the princess, and attempted to prevail on the royalist Estates to do the same. They occupied the citadels of Aurich and Berum with a few companies of Danish troops. Denmark had always expressed opinions favourable to the princess's claims,

* The ministers to the King on the first news of the prince's serious illness: "on a renouvelé les instructions envoyées cydevant a Mr. de Kalkreuth, Commandeur des troupes de V. M. en Ostfrise ainsi qu'au conseiller Homfeld avec plein pouvoir de procéder selon la coutume à la prise de possession le cas existant."

but neither the magistracy nor the Estates, nor yet the citizens of Aurich itself, received them with the favour they had anticipated. The citizens of Aurich forced the two magistrates to dismiss the Danish troops from the citadels.* On the 1st of June the Prussians took formal possession of the town of Aurich. The troops of the late prince joined those of the King of Prussia as they entered the town, and at once took service under Frederick. The whole district followed their example.

All this took place during the King's sojourn at the baths of Pyrmont, which we have before mentioned. He had not thought the decision so near, and took no part in the transaction, which was managed by the authorities in Berlin, in pursuance of previous instructions; but now, highly pleased at this successful beginning, he took a personal share in the new arrangements.

Cocceji, the minister of justice, who had already borne an active part in the affairs of East Friesland, was at this moment engaged at Quedlinburg in arranging the succession of Amalie, the King's sister, to the rank of Abbess of Quedlinburg. Frederick sent for Cocceji, directed him in conjunction with Homfeld to receive the oaths of allegiance, and at the same time explained to him his ulterior views.

* Homfeld maintained (29th May) that he helped to effect this, by reminding them "dass der Gebrauch der dänischen Miliz zu vielen landesverderblichen Weiterungen Anlass gegeben werde"—(that the employment of the Danish militia occasioned many proceedings highly detrimental to the country).

Frederick declared himself willing to confirm the privileges of the province, and to terminate the lawsuit between the prince and the Estates by an amicable adjustment; in return for this he wished to obtain from them somewhat larger grants in his favour than the prince had hitherto enjoyed.

On the 6th of June Cocceji arrived in Aurich; on the following day a division of the Prussian troops quartered in Wesel likewise entered the town.

This division consisted of only 500 men, but at their first appearance the Danish garrison, which had apparently intended to defend the claims of the princess, left the country with all speed. The imperialist guard, whom the inhabitants now refused even to shelter, immediately broke up: both officers and privates quitted the service.

The Estates, no longer thwarted by foreign influence or divided by party factions, could now assemble. It was the first time for many years that all the Estates had met together; the nobles, and the delegates of the towns and of the peasantry—the latter to the number of 180—assembled in Aurich on the 20th of June.

The first question was that invariably mooted in all cases where oaths of allegiance are to be taken by representative Estates, namely, whether their grievances should first be redressed, or the prince's rights be recognised at once. The grievances were innumerable, and during the time it would have taken to discuss them the rival claims of their neighbours would probably have revived. Cocceji and Homfeld, with the support of the nobles, succeeded

in inducing the Estates to proceed first to the act of homage.*

In his rescript the King assured the Estates that he was right royally determined to protect them in the exercise of all their traditional privileges, laudable customs, and ancient rights. The Estates promised to acknowledge him as their liege lord and master, to be faithful and obedient to him in conformity with their "accords." These "accords," or agreements, were confirmed by the King, "after due thought and consideration," in all their points and clauses, as laid down by the decrees of the Diets, from that of Norden in 1620 to that of Aurich in 1699.

It had hitherto been a subject of dispute whether East Friesland ought to be governed according to the constitution of the Empire, or the "accords" of the province. The first consequence of the Prussians taking possession was, that the imperial decrees were no longer valid, but that the constitution was to be based upon the old conventions, or rather, that these were to be confirmed by a fresh agreement with the new ruler of the province.

In drawing up the new agreement, the Estates made their most important demands in writing. The royal commissioners for the most part received these demands, and endeavoured only to guard by special clauses against any infringement of the royal prerogative. The most important points were, that the

* Cocceji, 23 Juin : "la noblesse dont j'ai gagné l'amitié et la confiance m'a secondé par son autorité, et je ne saurois assez me louer de l'assistance du C^e de Fridag, des Barons Wedel, Appel et Cnyphausen."

Estates should meet, and conjointly exercise their rights and privileges; the decrees of the Diet were to be executed without condition or limitation, and the supplies were to be granted and applied to the necessities of the province by officers appointed by the Estates.* With respect to the last point Homfeld and Cocceji represented to the King that all the disputes that had hitherto arisen were caused by the attempts made by the prince to shake off the trammels thus imposed upon him; they therefore advised Frederick to avoid this. On all points entire and unrestricted power was secured to the constitution of the province. In case the government should feel confined within too narrow limits, it could no longer, as formerly, break through them by means of imperial decrees or sovereign privileges, but was forced to have recourse to negotiations with the Estates.

Hitherto the Prince of East Friesland, besides the income arising from his domains, had received from the revenues of the province an annual payment of only 12,000 thalers; the Estates now agreed to raise the amount in favour of their new sovereign to the sum of 24,000 thalers.

Another of the King's demands, more in accordance

* In the second article, the words "dass den Ständen freistehen solle, conjunctim ihre Rechte zu vertreten"—(that the Estates should be allowed to defend their rights conjunctively) were inserted by the Estates; the subsequent article, "dass dabei nichts gegen die Landesherrn und die Landesverträge beschlossen werden soll"—(provided always nothing therein contained were contrary to the interest of the liege lord or the conventions with the country), was added by the government.

with the military character of Prussia than suited to the condition of East Friesland, provoked far more discussion; this was, that a certain number of recruits should be raised every year for his army,* a demand which called forth the strongest opposition. The population of the province was stated to be insufficient as it was; if the young men were seized and made into soldiers, the farms belonging to the nobles, and let by them to foreign tenants, would be ruined and deserted. But still greater excitement would be produced by such an innovation among the native peasants; to them it would appear an intolerable grievance if their sons, who were entitled to sit in the Diet, were taken from them and made into soldiers. The King yielded to representations to this effect, made to him by some members of the Estates who were best affected to the Prussian cause, and accepted the payment of a contribution in lieu of the recruits.†

Thus was the convention brought about upon which the union between the new dynasty and the province was to subsist. Frederick would have been better pleased had he secured greater power and efficiency for his sovereign prerogative, but he was

* His words were: "wenn ihm die Stände ein jährliches erkleckliches Quantum (an Geld) nebst einer Anzahl von Recruten liefern würden, wolle er keine Processen mit ihnen haben."—(He would have no disputes with them if the Estates would grant him a yearly and sufficient quantum of money, together with a certain number of recruits.)

† They promised 16,000 thalers, which with the imperial contingent made altogether 40,000 thalers.

reminded by his ministers that in this case nothing was left to his arbitrary will and pleasure, but that he could only confirm or reject the conditions proposed by the Estates. Hereupon the King ratified the convention as it stood, on the 31st of July, 1744.

Nevertheless, it soon became clear that this convention could not be definitive. The Estates that had hitherto been openly disaffected had gained the upper hand in this sudden revolution of affairs, and they used their new power to oppress the loyal Estates. Acts of violence and injustice were now committed by those who had hitherto suffered them. An examination was made, under the influence of prejudice and animosity, into the former management of the revenues of the province; this, however, led to no positive results: moreover, the administration of the now dominant party was not a whit better than that of their predecessors; embezzlement by the receivers of the taxes, frauds on the land revenue, and the like, were constantly recurring. The claims advanced by the city of Emden, upon the ground of advances anciently made for the general service of the province, and the set-off made to these claims by the province on account of arrears owing by Emden, created endless quarrels and confusion. It seemed contrary to the general interest of the province that Emden should complain because the King succeeded in the year 1744 in removing the Dutch garrison. Moreover, the finances of the town were in the worst possible condition; Emden could neither pay the interest due to its creditors, nor bear its share of the burdens of the country.

During the prevalence of the feeling that it was impossible that this state of things should last, the elections took place for a new provincial Diet, which met in January, 1749. One of the first measures proposed in the Diet was, to transfer to the King the chief superintendence, "maintenance, and direction" of the finances of the country. The Estates had long and obstinately denied this power to the princes of the former dynasty, and they now, of their own accord, conferred it on the King of Prussia, in direct opposition to the terms of the convention entered into only a few years before. They demanded at the same time some reform of the municipal corporation of Emden ; this was effected, though not without some popular commotion, at which the Prussian troops quietly looked on. The Prussian finance director then contrived in one single sitting to bring all the questions at issue between the town and the country to an amicable conclusion.

Owing to its own deed, the province was now for the first time tolerably governed. Under the King's superintendence the finances of the country were much better managed, and the amount paid by each individual somewhat lessened. It was not easy to reconcile the claims of the Prussian administration with a constitution resting on a free "accord." The newly appointed officers for the management of the domains frequently had to be called upon to observe the accord more strictly ; but, on the whole, the conduct of affairs gave general satisfaction.

When Frederick paid his first visit to East Friesland in the year 1751, he was received with rejoicing

such as had never welcomed the old native princes. The maritime endeavours of the great Elector were renewed. East Friesland was of especial importance to the state at large, inasmuch as by its harbours a communication was opened with the most remote ports of the eastern hemisphere—with Bengal and China. A trading company to the Indies was established in Emden, whose first enterprises excited great hopes and general interest.*

A provincial constitution on such a model as that established in East Friesland formed a great exception to the Prussian system of government, in which the royal prerogative, or the rights bestowed by the Emperor, exercised an overwhelming influence. Nevertheless, it is not to be supposed that the Estates were altogether powerless in other parts of Prussia; under Frederick II. the influence of the Estates and their participation in the government became stronger than ever. This was more especially the case in an undertaking commenced during the first years of the peace, in which the influence of such institutions would scarcely be looked for, as it involves directly contrary tendencies, namely, the reform of law and judicature.

* See Wiarda's *Ostfriesische Geschichte*, the 7th and 8th vols., which, with the Acts, have been of great use to me.

CHAPTER IV.

LAW REFORMS OF COCCEJI.

THE chief value of the law reform which, in 1746 and the following years, Frederick undertook to execute, with the assistance of Samuel Cocceji, has commonly been supposed to reside in the attempt to draw up a new code of civil law. He was the first upon whom, for many centuries, this task had devolved. His contemporaries, as we see by the medals struck on the occasion, hailed the new code as a real improvement of the law, and Cocceji has since found many followers. This is not the place in which to inquire whether the purpose of introducing a plain and intelligible code of local laws was actually reached, or whether Cocceji's work has the defect with which it is reproached, of following too closely the Roman and canon law, which it was intended to supersede, and that it therefore left the true want still unsupplied. Although not without merit, it has failed to maintain its place.*

* The reason why the directions did not always accord with the recognised theories was, that regard was paid to the existing customs and institutions of the country. (Bornemann, *System des Preussischen Civilrechtes*, I. 106.)—It is much to be desired that this subject were treated more in detail, according to its value in a scientific point of view. Some outlines are to be found in Abegg, *Geschichte der Pr. Civilgesetzgebung*, 68.

In another point of view, however, the reforms that were undertaken were useful and even indispensable. It was not so much the law itself that was corrupt, as the practice of the law, and those that administered it.

To us it seems barbarous when we read an order of Frederick William's directing the magistrates of Berlin to inflict corporal punishments rather than fines: the reason, however, was that the criminals were for the most part poor people, and the King did not wish to see their whole families ruined. In the country the administration of justice had been farmed, together with the Crown lands, and, as may be conceived, those who held this privilege made it entirely subservient to their own interests. They for the most part neglected that which was strictly enjoined upon them, namely, to have the law administered by a sworn jurist. A report of that time contains a statement to the effect that there was not in the whole of the Neumark a single magistrate who was conversant with the law, or had taken the oaths. The legal dues on bills of sale, or marriage certificates, were raised in the most arbitrary manner,* and woe to him who ventured to remonstrate. "The stick," exclaims the author of the report in question—"the stick is their *corpus juris*." Things were no better in Prussia. The authorities used to appoint ignorant and needy men to administer the law; with these were associated unpractised clerks.

* There is a statement in the Acts, to the effect that for a marriage certificate a sum of 15 thalers (about 2*l.*) was exacted, instead of 6 groschen (about 8*d.*).

Both the one and the other, says another report upon Prussia, live upon plunder.

Such was the state of most of the inferior courts; but even in the higher ones there was much room for improvement. The main evil was the employment of numerous ill-paid councillors, who were forced to resort to other means of gaining a livelihood. The preliminaries of legal procedure were completely under the control of so-called procurators—men or no education, many of whom had formerly been menial servants. These men, when they commenced a prosecution, used to designate the particular councillor to whom the affair was to be referred, and over whom they thus exercised considerable influence.* The documents lay unread in the magistrates' houses; a multitude of unanswered petitions were frequently found in the hands of the messenger of the court.

There existed, it is true, a supreme court for the superintendence of the practice of the law, called the Privy Council of Justice, which formed part of the Council of State. This court sat regularly enough, and there was no lack of appeals. But as this court was generally composed of the presidents of the criminal courts, in which the judgments appealed against had been given, it is easy to conceive that

* Cocceji says, that frequently the advocate, when called upon by the court to make a statement of his case, was incapable of doing so in an intelligible manner; but was in the habit of referring to the Acts, or desired to have the case postponed. (Report to the Estates, 30th Oct., 1747.)

the cases were not very minutely examined, and that but few grievances were redressed.

The orders repeatedly given by Frederick William, that the strictest attention should be paid to these matters—that unrighteous judges should be dismissed—that the law should be administered without respect of persons or chicanery—availed but little under this system.* Although it was impossible to induce the King again to raise the salaries which he had cut down, even in the highest courts of judicature, he at length took a step which may be looked upon as the first towards improvement.

There were already three ministers of state nominally charged with the administration of justice; but these were presidents of divers courts, whose time was taken up with a variety of other duties. Frederick William determined to appoint one minister, whose time should be exclusively devoted to the superintendence of the administration of justice. "He shall not be employed in courts of justice, nor in the government, nor upon commissions, but he shall have the supervision over all superior and inferior courts of law, civil, ecclesiastical, and criminal, as well as over the proceedings of the Fiscal in Berlin and in the provinces. He shall be their comptroller-general; all complaints of delay or neglect of justice

* There is such a letter, dated 26th Sept., 1737, addressed to Grumbkow, Görne, Bork, and Thulemeier, who formed a central commission, and conferred with Cocceji, Viebahn, and Broich. These men declared that the matter "was far worse than could be imagined"—("Als man es sich nicht einbilden könne").

shall come before him ; he is to bring the cases before the Privy Council, and it shall be his duty to redress grievances.”*

(Cocceji was recommended to the King as a proper man to fill this office. After finishing his studies at the university of Frankfort, Cocceji had passed thirty years of his life working in the Prussian courts of law, and had already made several projects for a general reform in the practice of the law. He was at that time president of an upper court of appeal, and of a court of fees ; he resigned both these offices on being appointed to his new functions. Frederick William paid him a salary in some other way.

Something was already gained when a man of great practical skill, of a reforming spirit and a strong will, was directed to devote his attention to the general practice of the law.

(Immediately on his appointment Cocceji began a tour of inspection through the provinces, by which he acquired a more intimate knowledge of the abuses which prevailed ; and he then prepared to draw up a general code of law,† “such as no other German province yet possessed.” The further schemes proposed by Cocceji were, however, abandoned, owing to

* Order in Council, dated the 1st of November, 1737.

† In the Acts is to be found the commented and amended order drawn up by his Majesty the King of Prussia (Frederick William I.) for the guidance of the supreme court of judicature in the electoral March of Brandenburg, to which is appended a patent of introduction. Orig. doc., most likely of the year 1738, which served as the foundation for the Codex Fridericianus.

Frederick William's dislike of any increase in the expenditure, which they would have unavoidably entailed, and which might probably have forced him to alter his civil list.

Frederick II. was deterred by the same considerations during the first years of his reign. He answered the minister who, in August, 1743, proposed an increase in the salaries and perquisites of office, that this must be deferred till a more convenient opportunity, and that in the mean time the most crying evils must be remedied by stricter superintendence. This was the very moment when the disputes with Austria again took a warlike turn, and all the mental energies, as well as the material resources of the nation, had to be turned into another channel.

But as soon as Austria had been forced to accept the treaty of Dresden, Frederick took the matter seriously in hand.* He had already desired the minister, in drawing up reports on the corruptions of the law, and projects for its amendment, not to throw away his time upon the bark of the evil tree, but to cut at the root. He no longer shrank from completely remodelling the courts, upon which almost everything depended.

Moreover, just at this moment an occasion presented itself, which justified a sweeping reform.

* The well-known order in council against chicane, tricks, old humdrum, and traditional observances, is simply a stronger repetition of what had always been said. Cocceji replied to this on the 26th of January.

So long as the greater part of the territory of Brandenburg was obliged to refer, in all important matters, to the imperial courts of law, no comprehensive measure of reform could be attempted: but now everything was changed. The good terms on which he stood with the Empire under Charles VII. materially assisted the Prussian monarch in this as well as in many other circumstances. Charles VII. had promised to extend to all Frederick's provinces a general and unlimited privilege *de non appellando*, which, until then, had only been enjoyed by the Electoral March. The new Emperor could not retract a right that had been legally conceded, and on the 31st of May, 1746, this privilege was formally granted by Francis I.

To this imperial privilege Frederick added another measure on his own authority.

Hitherto the documents had generally been sent to foreign faculties of law, where judgment was given by professors who could possess no competent knowledge of the cases submitted to them for decision. These judgments, Cocceji says, were sometimes so utterly wrong, that they had to be expunged from the documents. Frederick unhesitatingly forbade that any documents should be sent to foreign jurists for the future.

While he thus boldly broke loose from the whole system of German law—even forbidding his subjects to frequent foreign universities—the minister brought forward a plan for a most comprehensive reform of the whole system of judicature.

(This plan comprehended three points—a reform

of the courts, of the procedure, and of the code itself.*

Cocceji proposed that in future only a limited number of councillors should sit in the higher courts; they were to be chosen for their learning, experience, and integrity: above all, they were to be sufficiently well paid to enable them to devote themselves exclusively to their duties. Moreover, no one was to practise in more than one court. The procurators were to be abolished; the advocates were to be allowed to practise only in one court, and their fees were not to be paid during the course of the proceedings, but after the case had been decided, and the amount was then to be fixed by the court. All perquisites were to be carried to a common fund, in order to take away from the judge any mercenary inducement to lengthen the proceedings. The duty of the judge should be rather to forward business as much as possible; he was not in all cases to observe the full period of delay allowed by the law, but to proceed at once to the decision of a case, especially if the parties in question were at hand. The first step in any lawsuit between lords and their vassals, or landowners and their tenants—which usually were the most complicated and tedious cases of all—should be to examine the disputed piece of ground. Cocceji forbade that any delays should be granted—least of all in cases where

* *Unvorgreiflicher Plan wegen Verbesserung der Justiz, und Erläuterung desselben*—(a humble plan for the improvement of justice, with explanations thereof), in *Kamptz, Jahrbücher der Gesetzgebung*, vol. 59, p. 76.

the debtor was ill able to satisfy the claims of his creditor: it was better that the debtor should be ruined, rather than the creditor. He pronounced the obscurity of the law to be the first of all evils. The Roman law—which was utterly without order, and could be interpreted both for and against in almost every case—had been further complicated by the admixture of Saxon and canon law, and by countless edicts. Nothing was more needful than to draw up a rational code of common law in the German tongue, and in accordance with the constitution of the country, and to abolish all other laws and edicts.

Cocceji laid this project before the cabinet in March, 1746.* He told the King that he would give him a sample of his fifty years' experience: he wished, for the honour of His Majesty, to perform something that no power had yet been able to complete.

The privy-councillors Schumacher and Eichel took an active part in this undertaking; they knew better than any one, from long experience, the nature of the complaints that were incessantly sent in. The King expressed some doubt as to whether such men as Cocceji wished to appoint could be found. He, however, took Cocceji's plan with him to Pymont, and made himself master of all its details.

* Schumacher was the first to whom the plan was communicated. On the 28th of March he thankfully acknowledges the communication and hopes that "the solid and rational scheme for the improvement of justice may have a successful issue"—("solide und vernünftige Plan von Verbesserung der Justiz einen gesegneten Fortgang haben möge").

Soon after his return, it happened that a complaint came before him of the state of the Criminal Court of Stettin, the truth of which there was no reason to doubt. The president was an infirm old man, who no longer did anything. The councillors were ignorant of law, and were therefore entirely dependent upon other cleverer men who looked only to their own interests; the wretched administration of justice produced the most crying abuses, by which the district was being ruined. When asked whether this was really the case, Cocceji replied, that it was so, not only in the Central Court, but in all the other courts in Pomerania; and that this province above all others stood in need of a searching reform: this he declared to be perfectly practicable.

Hereupon a consultation took place early in the morning of the 15th of September, 1746, between the King and the minister. It would have been very interesting had the latter written an accurate account of what passed at the meeting. All we know is, that they agreed upon every point. The King determined to carry out Cocceji's plan at once, and to begin where reform was most needed, in Pomerania.

Cocceji drew up some instructions for his own guidance, according to the idea which the King had communicated to him by word of mouth during their interview. Frederick approved these instructions, as entirely consonant with his own opinions.

The general views were identical with those upon which Cocceji had based his original plan. Here and there certain points are more strongly urged; for

instance that no action should be commenced without a previous endeavour to bring about an amicable adjustment; and that, as a general rule, every law-suit was to be concluded within the year.

The new order of things could not, however, be called into life by orders and regulations alone. It was on such occasions as these that Frederick turned for assistance to the Provincial Estates, who were most deeply interested in the amelioration of the law.* The Pomeranians hailed the measure as a glorious patriotic work; Providence itself, they said, had appointed Cocceji to deliver their country from a crying evil. The King had desired them to associate two deputies of their own to the commission that was about to proceed to Pomerania on this inquiry; he recommended Von Walsleben and Dean von Kleist; and these very men were chosen by the Estates for the purpose.

Cocceji had examined the ordinance regulating the procedure of the Court of Exchequer (*Kammergerichtsprozessordnung*), commenced under Frederick William, and had brought it into the form of the *Codex Fridericianus*; and when he reached Pomerania, in January, 1747, he laid his scheme before the deputies and several members of the local courts of law. These men appended several remarks, which are often very curious.†

* On the 4th of October, which is the date of the rescript to the Pomeranian courts of justice (*Kamptz*, 59, 111), notice was given to the Estates of Upper and Lower Pomerania. The latter deprecated contributing to the salaries; but agreed to an increase of the fees.

† E. G. One councillor of noble birth, and two of the burgher

The main point was that the administrative and judicial bodies of Stettin were united so as to form one court, which was provided with a small number of well-paid councillors—the procurators were abolished; the perquisites of the administration of the Central Court, of the feudal Chancery, and of the Consistory, were carried to one common fund, out of which the subaltern officers were paid. The same thing was repeated in Cöslin that had been done in Stettin. The newly formed courts applied themselves with uncommon zeal to work off the arrears of old and new cases. The advocates were directed, with regard to the old suits, to draw up a summary of the state of the case and of the chief difficulties in the way of its settlement, and to mention the points which still had to be cleared up. Shortly after the arrival of the minister, they set to work. In May, 1747, Cocceji announced with no little satisfaction that a lawsuit between the Court of Exchequer and certain nobles, touching certain boundaries, that had already lasted more than two hundred years, and filled above seventy volumes of manuscript, had been brought to a conclusion satisfactory to the parties mainly by the industry of Jarriges and Fürst. In this manner they worked during the whole year. In January, 1748, Cocceji reckoned that, during the past year, 1600 old and 684 new suits had been before the court in

class, were to be appointed for each of the two senates to be established in Pomerania: the Referendaries were to be half of noble and half of the burgher birth: the deputies evaded specifying the numbers; they merely specified the two classes.

Stettin; and 800 old and 310 new in Cöslin. All the old cases had been decided, and of the new ones only 183 remained outstanding in Stettin and 169 in Cöslin. "Your Majesty perceives," exclaimed Cocceji, "what can be done by courts of justice presided over by learned and upright men."

Never had Frederick been better satisfied with any one of his ministers. He made Cocceji chancellor of the realm, gave him the highest order, and praised him most warmly in one of his writings.

Not every one, however, was so well pleased with these doings. Arnim, Cocceji's successor at the Court of Appeals, wished to keep that just as it was. He gave it as his opinion that the King's object, which was the welfare of his people, would not be attained by a hasty administration of the law; adding that he himself would offer no opposition, but just let things take their course.* The King reproached Arnim, in strong terms, with being influenced by private jealousy, and signified to him that the improvement of the administration of justice was his, the King's, own well-considered work. Arnim gave in his resignation, and the reforms were carried out according to the original plan without further hindrance.

(In the year 1747 the procedure of the tribunals

* "Alles Ding währet seine Zeit"—(Every thing lasts its time). Letter of the 19th of January, 1748.—From Nüssler's *Leben von Büsching*, Appendix, I. 375, we can judge how severely many individuals suffered from these reforms. Nevertheless we must not believe too implicitly the stories of personal intrigue told by those who were injured by these innovations.

and of the Court of Exchequer was examined:— here, too, a great number of arrears were cleared off. In the year 1748 a totally new system was organized. The different courts of law which had hitherto existed—the tribunal, palace, and criminal courts, as well as the commission especially appointed for settling the differences among the Jews, were amalgamated with the Court of Exchequer into one single court. This court, however, was divided into four separate senates, so that appeals might be sent from one to another without delay; the Consistory suits were likewise referred to them. Cocceji complained that, in all matters connected with the management of the property of minors, the greatest confusion prevailed; that in many cases the appointment of the guardians had not been duly confirmed, and that they had not been forced to give proper securities, or to render any account. A special court was accordingly established to watch over the interests of minors; this court was merely composed of representatives of the four senates, but was bound by very strict rules of procedure. In this court the same system was pursued, of appointing few councillors, but of paying those few well; and no regard was paid to personal claims or expectations. Instead of the forty-five members of the former courts, the whole court now consisted of only eight-and-twenty. But an additional sum of 8000 thalers was required to pay the salaries of this diminished number—this was a large amount for those days. Frederick stated that he was not, at that moment, prepared to pay this sum out of the revenue, and requested the Es-

tates of the Marches to advance 5000 thalers. The assembled deputies, convinced of the urgency of the case, readily complied with his request. Frederick paid out of his own personal savings the remaining 3000 thalers, which could not for that year be charged upon the current revenue.

A like course was pursued in the territory of Magdeburg. The nobility granted a considerable sum, to be raised together with the contribution; the local courts next followed their example, then the chapters, and, lastly, the Catholic convents. The King thanked them for their compliance with his wishes, and promised that the burthen should be but temporary; he would shortly be in a condition to take the whole payment upon himself.

It would lead us too far were we to follow out the introduction of these changes into all the provinces. We will only observe, that reforms were introduced into the inferior as well as the higher courts of law. The first step was to protect the common people from the most glaring and arbitrary injustice, and to take the practice of the law out of the hands of perfectly ignorant men. As far as was possible the old offices (*ämter*) were replaced by small courts of justice, and legal knowledge was made a necessary condition to any appointments in those courts.

The chief aim and end of the reforms introduced by Cocceji was to place the legal profession in Prussia on an entirely new basis. He restricted the members of the legal body to their proper functions, and made it possible for them to live by their profession. He restored to them the practice of the

law, which had almost slipped out of their hands, and required that they should be qualified by learning for the exercise of their calling. The offices of Referendary and Auscultator were founded, and these appointments made to depend upon the testimonials of the universities and the result of examinations. The whole acquired connexion and vitality, without a rigid adherence to the new forms of procedure that had already been introduced in many places.* Rapid and prompt administration of justice was the condition under which the state carried out these reforms.

But there were some other questions to be considered with reference to these changes.

The public offices (Kammern) under the direction of the ministry (general directorium) had, thanks to Frederick William, acquired an overwhelming influence: in town and country, the administration of the law was controlled by the government. Now that the legal principle was fully recognised, conflicts between the two powers were inevitable.

Complaints were made against the officers employed under government, for preventing the execution of the law; for encouraging burghers and peasants in acts of disobedience to the same, and for publishing edicts at variance with the newly established order of things. The chief causes of contention were as follows:—

The exchequer demanded that no decision should

* They are mentioned by Kamptz. Seifart mentions the progress of law reform, II. 1. pp. 66, 89.

be pronounced without previous conference with itself in any lawsuit against the fiscal, the royal domains, or even the towns. This Cocceji declared to be mischievous and impracticable. The exchequer indeed had a judiciary of its own, but his hands were full of other matters; moreover the courts of law were now filled with learned and upright men, and there was no longer any need of this sort of appeal.

The ministry further conceived that the appointment of the officers of the courts of law in the towns belonged, as a matter of right, to itself. Cocceji replied, that as the department of justice was responsible for the capacity of the magistrates of the towns, it must examine them, and select the most worthy candidates: he would only consent to leave, at most, the payment of these officers to the ministry.

The ministry was of opinion that the public offices should retain every profit and privilege that was not expressly taken from them by the new regulations. Cocceji answered, that every legal appointment not specially reserved to the public offices belonged, as a matter of course, to the jurists.

In all this Frederick was on the side of the legal authorities. He distinctly forbade the public offices to meddle with the practice of the law, and suffered them to retain only such privileges as were necessary to support their position in the state.

The articles of the Codex Fridericianus are well known, wherein the officers of justice are admonished not only to decide the legal questions brought before

them, but likewise to see their decisions executed, to pay no regard to any rescripts by which the strict course of justice might in any way be impeded, not even should they proceed from the cabinet itself, and accurately to keep in view that justice which they had sworn to maintain, more especially in all cases at issue between the fiscal and the subject: no orders of a tendency opposed to this would serve as an excuse for any such dereliction of duty.* To this was appended an order in council, wherein the fiscals were reprimanded for commencing legal proceedings without sufficient cause, and for annoying the King's subjects on the commission of the most trifling offence by the most far-fetched claims, and consequent inquiries and examinations. Frederick wished that the fiscals should be made to repay, out of their own properties, the expenses to which others might have been unjustly subjected by their fault.

Without doubt this was a most important step towards the attainment of general and individual liberty, as far as it was possible, in the Prussian states. The administration of Justice thus acquired political functions; and private individuals were in some measure secured from the arbitrary interference of the government, which at one time threatened to become extremely oppressive.

* The words which appear in the project of the Codex, § 15, are as strongly expressed in the § 18 of the amended order of procedure. Frederick II. confirmed them by a special order in council. "Je me suis resolu," says he in the Test. Pol. of 1752, "de ne jamais troubler le cours de procedures.—Les loix doivent parler et le souverain doit se taire."

Hence it was that the Estates took so lively an interest in these reforms. All parties gained by having limits assigned to the power of the ministers and of the public offices, by the fulfilment of this conception of law and of justice.

CHAPTER V.

THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE ARMY.

A REMARKABLE document, that has come down to us, throws considerable light upon the position assumed by Frederick towards the government.

In the year 1748 he revised the old instructions drawn up for the guidance of the ministry. He wrote on the margin such remarks as occurred to him, and these were subsequently inserted in the new text: it is evident from this document that he sought to introduce stricter discipline than had yet prevailed among the officers of government.

He enumerates "watchfulness, diligence, and incorruptible honesty," as the qualities most essential to men in office. He required, as his father had done before him, that they should be at their posts by eight o'clock in summer, and nine in winter, and not separate until the business was done, which could not take so very long, if only they chose to apply themselves diligently to it. He did not encourage long deliberations: if they could not agree among themselves, they were to refer to him, the King. Like his father, he looked upon himself as chief president. In all disputed questions the arguments for and against were to be laid before him for decision. He insisted most strongly upon official

secrets being religiously kept; to this point he returns in several different paragraphs: he did not choose that the clerks or secretaries should work at home. The officers of the treasury had hitherto occasionally taken part in the administration, and this was one of the abuses that he most strenuously resisted. Frederick said that cases had occurred of their having on their own authority raised extraordinary taxes: the receiver of a certain circle, in order to cover a deficit, for which he alone was responsible, had, in the most arbitrary manner, increased the amount of the contribution. He therefore forbade the treasury officers, under pain of death, to demand one penny more than he had given them authority to levy; and, at the same time, he issued fresh instructions for the control of the revenue. Shortly before, a case of gross malversation had occurred, and Frederick now directed that all the finance accounts of every province should be examined, in order to see whether the like peculations had not taken place elsewhere. "Now was the time," he said, "to work out the old leaven: it was all the same whether the Estates were cheated or the peasants: the interests of the country were the interests of the King: the accounts must be wound up and strictly balanced at the end of every year." In order to secure the administration of government against being influenced by any personal considerations, Frederick, "for good and sufficient reasons," renewed the ordinance, to the effect that no native of any province was to be employed in the public offices or in the commissariat. He desired that the gifts and acquirements of

each individual should be turned to the best account: the economist was to manage the crown leases—those who were most regular in their habits and trustworthy in their conduct were to have the control of the finances—the active and industrious were to be employed in the superintendence of manufactures.* He was extremely dissatisfied with the management of the fund for raising recruits, which had degenerated into a kind of sale of offices. He wanted to have none but diligent and able men in his service, and desired the colleges to induce young men to enter the service of the state. He introduced into this department of the public service regulations similar to those which obtained in the practice of the law. He exacted the strictest obedience from all the members of the administration, from the highest to the lowest, at the same time that he wished them to be men of high honour and good education.

∕ The difficulty was how to secure to the administration complete efficiency, and at the same time to avoid all harshness and oppression. The King's instructions display, in the strongest manner, his solicitude for the various classes of his subjects.

For instance, in granting new leases care was to be taken to ascertain whether the farmer (Amtmann)

* The Testament Politique contains the following Maxims: "Quant au grand directoire, il vaut mieux qu'il y ait des gens d'esprit avec une probité equivoque, que des bêtes honnetes gens. . . . A croire que le monde est peuplé de scélerats c'est penser en misanthrope; s'imaginer que tous le animaux à deux pieds sans plume sont des honnêtes gens, c'est s'abuser en imbecille; il faut qu'un souverain se connaisse en homme pour choisir au moins des gens de probité à la tête des finances."

had hitherto behaved well to the peasants. The services they were bound to render were under no circumstances to be increased. "I know," said the King, "that one of the hardest things in the country are the services which the peasants are bound to render, and which bring forth nothing but their ruin. It is intolerable that they should be called upon to give their services five, or even six, days in the week. Spite of the outcry it will cause, it shall be looked to, and two or more days in the week shall be taken off the peasants' work, not only on the royal domains, but on those of the nobles also."* The deserted farms were to be reoccupied, and the services due from the

* Neuer Artiquel vorn in das Buch geschrieben. Dahr ich bedacht bin das Land in allen Stücken zu soulagiren und aufzuhelfen, so weiss ich, dass eins der Ding so zu hart seind die grausamen Dienste so sie thun müssen, wobei nichts als ihr Verderben herauskommt. Also soll in jeder Provinz und jedem Kreis, sowohl Amts als adlichen Dörfern dahin gesehen werden, ob man es nicht so einrichten konnte, dass die Bauern 3 Tage, höchstens 4 dienten. Dieses wird was Geschrei geben, aber vor den gemeinen Mann ist es fast nicht auszustehen, wenn er 6 oder 5 Tage die Woche dienen soll.—(New article written in the book. I am minded to relieve and help the country in all ways; and I am aware that one of the things that are most hard are the cruel forced services they are bound to give, whereby nothing but mischief ensues. Therefore it shall be looked to in every province and circle, whether the land be crown property or belonging to nobles, whether matters cannot be so arranged that the peasants do forced service three, or at most four days. This will raise some outcry; but it is scarce to be borne that the common man should do forced labour five or six days in the week.) The above-mentioned instruction further mentions that the proprietors will soon find that the peasants will work better in fewer days.

peasants to be so apportioned, that those rendered by the new peasants should in some measure relieve the old. Wherever the farms were too large, they were to be divided. The forced service of the peasants at wolf-hunts was no longer to be left to the discretion of the huntsmen, but they were to be spared as much as possible.

The towns, which had not as yet attained any independent development, were still left entirely in the hands of the public officers, and more especially of the local commissioners. Frederick contented himself with recommending their welfare in the strongest terms to the care of the government officers. It sometimes happened that the farmers of the crown lands in the vicinity of towns requested to be allowed to open public-houses, and offered to pay a higher rent for this privilege. "But," said Frederick, "the plus which is made by the misfortunes of others is accursed: old privileges must certainly be respected, but real increase can only be obtained by industry." The presidents were to do their best to encourage various kinds of manufactures in the different towns, and to take care to select honest and well-meaning men as burgomasters, to see that the municipal offices should be well administered, and the revenues of the corporations applied in the manner most beneficial to the interests of the towns.

Everything that was possible was done to enable the various handicraftsmen to live by the exercise of their trade.

Frederick would gladly have relieved them still further. "His heart bled," said he, "when he

thought of two taxes, the service* money in the towns, and the contribution levied upon the country for the support of the cavalry. Would to God that he could abolish them altogether; but this the state of his finances would not as yet allow."

One of the most important elements in the constitution of his government was, the separation of the estates: he endeavoured to keep them distinct, and to take care that no one estate should interfere with the privileges of the others.

The peasants were not allowed to purchase the estates of nobles, nor were the nobles to confiscate the properties held by peasants. The reason of this was, that on the one hand the former could not serve as officers, while on the other the nobles, by making the land they' acquired from the peasants into manors, diminished the number of the inhabitants.

In like manner, no burgher was allowed to buy any estate belonging to a noble, as this would prevent him from employing his capital in trade and commerce.†

The officers who managed the royal domains were equally forbidden to think of purchasing the estates of the nobles, even in cases where the royal domains would thus be doubled in extent and productiveness.

* *Servis* properly means all that one has to furnish to the soldiers quartered in his house: this was frequently commuted for a tax, the produce of which was applied to defraying the expenses of the troops in barracks and quarters.—*Trans.*

† We find reports from Silesia, in which permission to do this is demanded, on the plea that formerly several properties belonging to burgher families had fallen into the hands of nobles; so carefully was the attempt made to maintain a balance.

“For the King must not be guided in these matters by the same motives as private individuals; there is need of noblemen whose sons may defend their country, and whose race is so good that every care must be taken to preserve it.”

In the event of any dispute between the administration of the royal domains and a nobleman, the King desired that injustice should be done to himself rather than to the noble: seeing that while to him the loss would be small, and of no account, the gain to the nobleman would frequently be of the greatest consequence, and even preserve him from ruin.

The strictest orders were given to all public offices to take no unfair advantage of the nobles in their dealings with them, and not to revive any old disputes. No one was bound to prove his title to his property further back than the year 1740. “For,” said the King, “the nobility of many countries are far richer, but none excel the Prussian in loyalty and courage.”

The same spirit prevailed in the government of the provinces; each one was to be administered in the manner best suited to its peculiar character.

He considered it advisable, on acquiring possession of any new territory, to give it a constitution differing from the old forms, and independent of the central government. He said “that to govern all the provinces in the same manner would be simply to ruin them all in cool blood.” His endeavour was to secure to each one separately that which it most needed.

What was chiefly wanting in Prussia were trade and manufactures; the land produced nothing but a

superabundance of corn; the crown held a vast amount of property, but the climate was bad, the flat country subject to frequent inundations, and the government was constantly obliged to draw the purse strings.

In Cleves Frederick paid particular attention to the plantations, which could not fail to become very valuable, owing to the growing scarcity of wood. In Silesia he looked to the linen trade, which was, he said, the Peru of the Kings of Prussia, and must be encouraged as much as possible. In Magdeburg he gave the greatest encouragement to the mines and salt-works.

In Pomerania and the March of Brandenburg, which had not yet recovered from the devastations of the thirty years' war, nothing appeared to him so needful as an increase of population.

Villages sprang up in the midst of the Pomeranian forests; the native peasantry looked with amazement at the active settlers in their country, whose labours in the field were crowned with complete success. In the year 1755 fifty-nine new colonies were planted. Between the years 1748 and 1755 the population of the Lowlands of Prussian Pomerania increased from 228,549 to 280,342.*

An idea which Frederick William had conceived when visiting the district on a hawking expedition—the draining of the fens at the mouth of the Oder—Frederick II. began in the year 1747 to execute in right earnest. The hills between Upper and Lower

* Dähnert Pommersche Bibliothek, IV. III. 83. Statistical Tables in Brüggemans Beiträgen, I. 367.

Wrietzen were cut through, and a canal dug, into which the waters poured with considerable force, owing to the greatness of the fall. A tract of land soon appeared, which was now for the first time exposed to the action of the sun and the air, and which has proved more and more productive ever since.* The King commenced similar works in other districts; he took care that the newly reclaimed districts should not be made into manors, but that villages should be built upon them, seeing that the land had only been brought into cultivation for the use of man.

This view of political economy induced him not to leave the increase of the manufacturing population to its natural progress, but to hasten it by government regulations. He thought it a fortunate discovery when he was told that the best thing to be done was no longer to import yarn ready spun from abroad, but to settle the spinners themselves in his dominions. He assumed that each family ought to have a house, a small garden, and grass for two cows, and reckoned that he could afford to settle one thousand such families every year. There were plenty of people in Mecklenburg, Saxony, and Poland ready to embrace his offer. He likewise thought it advisable to keep as residents the foreign journeymen bricklayers who came to Berlin; he took care to furnish them with work enough to live by. When he was plagued by his new colonists—who were by no means the most industrious sort of folk—he comforted himself with the idea that, as a rule, the first generation of settlers was never worth much, but that the second would

* Ulrich, Beschreibung der Stadt Wrietzen, 122.

be better. He thought he had gained a sufficient advantage when he found that during the first fifteen years of his reign the population of the Churmark had increased by about one-fifth—from 476,000 to nearly 580,000 inhabitants.

The manufacturing system, to which this increase was mainly owing, was that introduced by Frederick William I. in all its severity. We learn from an agreement which the four old departments of the general Directory, or administration of the country, concluded with the fifth, which had been established by Frederick, what were the rights and privileges they reserved to themselves—the supervision of all craftsmen and artisans settled in the province, the increase or diminution of their numbers, their transmission from one district or town to another. We find the same organisation of labour that we have already described, paternal, no doubt, but meddling and despotic.*

At the same time that care was taken to improve the breed of sheep,—the export of wool, and even the carriage of fleeces from one province to another, was strictly prohibited. At shearing time the government, following the example of Frederick William, bought up a quantity of wool, which it afterwards retailed to the small manufacturers at cost price.†

* Protocol of the 5th of January, 1741, in the Archives. Orders in council, additions and tables, in *La Motte Abhandlungen*, II. 354.

† To the exchequer for the Electoral March, 6th June, 1730: Da uns bekannt ist, dass es allhier viele Wollaufkäufer giebt, welche den unbemittelten Manufacturiers zwar Wolle vorschliessen, solche sich aber mehr als doppelt wieder bezahlen

These were not obliged to repay the government until they had finished and sold their work; the government likewise did its utmost to promote the sale of their produce. As the army was always the chief consumer, even those portions of it which might have been in themselves superfluous could not be retrenched for fear of discouraging the manufacture and diminishing the produce of the Excise. The connection between the different branches of the administration was felt even in the smallest details, and the very insignificance of the several parts which make up a great whole form an interesting subject of observation.

But the views and objects of Frederick II. were

lassen, dadurch aber solche Manufacturiers nie auf einen grünen Zweig kommen können, sondern in beständiger Misere verbleiben müssen, so sind wir nicht abgeneigt,—ein gewisses Capital ohne Interessen herzugeben, wovor alle Jahr eine gute Quantität Wolle aufzukaufen, und nachgehends an die kleinen Fabrikanten vor eben den Preis zur Verarbeitung vorschussweise hergegeben werden könne, da dann das Wollmagazin dergestalt eingerichtet werden müsste, dass das in der Wolle steckende Capital abermal bei jeder Wollschur wieder in Cassa sey.—(Seeing that it is well known to us that there are here many persons who buy up the wool and advance that commodity to the poorer manufacturers, charging them more than double the original price—whereby such manufacturers can never prosper, but remain for ever in a state of constant penury,—we are therefore well inclined to advance a certain capital without charging any interest, wherewith a large quantity of wool may be purchased and distributed among the smaller manufacturers at wholesale price, to enable them to commence work. The wool-magazine must be so managed, that the capital invested in wool should invariably be replaced in the treasury by shearing-time in every year.) Acts relating to the capital to be set apart for the Berlin wool-magazine.

far more comprehensive than those of Frederick William. The new department of the General Directory, or government, had not only to watch over the improvement of the old, but to take measures for the establishment of fresh manufactures, and to superintend the whole commercial system. In the provinces extracts were made from the Customs and Excise registers, in order to ascertain exactly what was imported from other countries, and what was still wanting in the Prussian dominions. Frederick thought it a disadvantage to his country to pay so much money for sugar, wine, and silks. He endeavoured to restrict the importation of foreign wines by heavy duties, and by encouraging the manufacture of beer. He would doubtless have done great things for the beet-root, had the discovery of the saccharine matter in that root, which was made under his own eyes by Marggraf, been understood and practically applied. He took care, at any rate, to establish sugar-refineries, so as to avoid paying to foreigners the price of the manufacture. It may easily be conceived how important the cultivation of the mulberry-tree appeared to him; his plantations had already survived several very severe winters. In order to encourage the cultivation of the mulberry he bestowed much land upon several private individuals.* Communes, schoolmasters, and farmers of crown land were exhorted, on the renewal of their leases, to attend to this branch of

* Acts concerning the houses bestowed upon manufacturers and private individuals by His Majesty since the year 1740. The most remarkable are the tables relating to Berlin and Potsdam.

industry; he hoped at some future time to be able to produce enough silk within his own dominions to meet the wants of his subjects. Until this could be effected silk-factories were warmly encouraged: the political economy of those days commended even those manufactures, of which the materials were not produced in the country, but had to be brought from abroad. The King liberally furnished the speculators with sites and materials for building; he endeavoured to attract the best workmen, and procured the most expensive tools at his own cost, *e. g.* a marble roller from Holland, used for glazing the stuffs manufactured in his dominions.

As the system was not fully developed until somewhat later, we will not dwell upon these matters at any great length; let us, however, mention one example of the care and attention which was extended to the smallest details.

Among Frederick's papers were found notes which he had made to assist his memory during a journey into Silesia. In Schweidnitz and Neisse he observed that there were no tiled roofs, and that he must take care to provide some; that the inhabitants of Schmiedeberg were oppressed by the mercantile class—this must be looked to; a new Protestant Church was wanted in Pless; in other villages the churches and schools were too far off to be of any use to the inhabitants. He considers how the poor land in several places can be improved, and what measures can be taken for the better preservation of the forests, as the want of wood must hereafter make itself felt; he noted where the gardens were ill-stocked with vege-

tables or fruit-trees; Striegau would be the better for some kind of manufacture, but he does not know what to suggest, unless indeed it were that of vitriol; nowhere, however, were manufactures so entirely wanting as in Upper Silesia. There was a good opportunity for establishing a factory of half cotton and half linen in Gleiwitz; and wood-carvers and cabinet-makers might find employment and materials for their trade at Tarnowitz. Cracau and Teschen offered an excellent market for wooden articles like those made at Nuremberg. Like a careful landlord, who examines his property in the early spring, in order to lay out the work for the summer, Frederick observed what was wanting in each place, and considered how it could best be supplied.

According to the example of his ancestors, he endeavoured to promote as much as possible internal traffic, especially by water. By the canal of Plau he shortened the transit from the Elbe by about eight days; and by the canal of Finow the voyage from Stettin to Berlin was diminished by one-half. Thus at a greatly diminished cost the salt produced in the Magdeburg territory could be sent to Silesia, while the wood from the Neumark could be transported to Magdeburg to be used in the preparation of the salt. The acquisition of Silesia and the opening of the internal navigation gave a fresh impulse to the trade of Stettin.

Frederick used to judge of the internal management of a province by examining the Exchequer accounts. For instance, out of the 700,000 thalers raised every year in the Neumark, only 520,000 were

devoted to the service of the province, the rest was paid into the common fund of the state; and it seemed doubtful whether the province could maintain itself; but on turning to the tables specifying the imports and exports, it appeared that it drew a profit from trade, reckoned at 265,000 thalers. This put an end to all anxiety on the subject.

It is obvious that, from their nature, no implicit trust can be placed in the debtor and creditor accounts of trade, and we do not pretend to vouch for the accuracy of those which were prepared for Frederick from the books of the various provincial exchequers; still, if we take them even as mere approximations, the figures are very remarkable. The balance-sheet for the year 1752 makes the exports amount to twelve and a half millions of thalers for the old provinces, and to ten millions for Silesia; the imports for the former amounted to nine millions and a half, and in Silesia to seven millions and a half thalers; the exports, therefore, amounted altogether to about twenty-two millions, the imports to seventeen millions of thalers, giving, after barely six years of peace, a surplus of five millions of thalers.*

* 1 Oct., more accurately thus :

	Export.	Import.
The old provinces	12,658,702	9,413,971
Silesia	9,967,290	7,541,984

The Königsberg exchequer alone showed a deficiency of exports below the imports. The surplus was calculated at 5,610,056. In the year 1794 the exports amounted to 51, the imports to 53 millions; in the year 1828, the former were reckoned to amount to 106, the latter to 85 millions. The difference in the balance is to be accounted for by the increase and decrease of the Polish population.

It would, however, be a great mistake to suppose that the chief efforts of Prussia were devoted to the development of its commercial powers. Much as had been done for the promotion of trade, it was but a secondary consideration. The ruling idea was to add to the power of the state and to the means whereby alone that power could be materially increased.

Frederick adhered to the system established by his father, according to which the taxes were to be exactly and punctually paid into the Exchequer in the current coin of the realm. The money thus collected was then applied to the purposes to which it was regularly appropriated. The estimates could not be altered during the current year, and the different funds were carefully kept distinct.

During the early part of Frederick's reign, as in the latter years of Frederick William, the income from the crown lands amounted to 3,300,000 thalers. The revenue regularly and specially set apart for the military chest amounted to somewhat more than 4,000,000 of thalers. But the sum actually received by the treasurers of the military chests was, since the various augmentations of the army, increased on an average to nearly 6,000,000 thalers.* As in the reign of Frederick William, this increase was caused by the payment of certain sums, amounting to about 2,000,000 thalers, drawn from the crown lands into the military chests. What

* Accounts from 1740 to 1741: 5,226,437. 6. 1; 1742: 6,034,614. 11. 10; 1743: 5,727,825. 20. 5; 1744: 5,804,023. 8. 10; 1745: 6,133,192. 8. 9; 1746: 5,927,488. 11. 13; 1747: 5,862,742. 8. 6; 1748: 5,833,468. 13. 4.

with the revenue raised in Silesia, which amounted to 3,500,000 thalers, the income paid into the exchequer, the subsidies granted by East Friesland, which at first amounted to 250,000 thalers, and some other extraordinary receipts, the total revenue of Prussia for the year 1752 amounted to above 12,000,000 thalers. The provincial treasuries were separately charged with the payment of the several regiments. The Prussian regiments received 64,000 thalers every month; those of Magdeburg 42,000; those of the Churmark received 67,000 in the month of September of the year 1741, and in June, 1744, 77,000 thalers, and so forth. The King inspected the accounts with the most minute care, and then, as we learn from notes written by himself, took into his own hands the various sums of money which were not absorbed by the current expenses of government. These sums were paid over to him, and he kept a most exact account of their application. In the year 1741 the surplus moneys amounted to more than 300,000 thalers; but the King remarks, that should war break out, what with the absence of most of the regiments, and the consequent decrease in the Excise, he could no longer count upon this resource.* After a few years of peace, in the year 1750, the surplus had already risen to about 700,000 thalers. This excess arose from the increased produce of the royal posts—a natural consequence of

* In the year 1744: "sur les quels on peut peu à peu compter hormis en tems de guerre que les 60,000 ecus des accises (then a surplus) n'y manqueront pas seulement mais qu'il en manquera bien encore 180^m à part. . . ."

the growing traffic, from the sale of wood out of the royal forests, the surplus revenue from the Excise duties in Silesia, the various savings of the provincial exchequers, and an embargo to the amount of 100,000 thalers upon the subsidy paid by East Friesland. Moreover, various sums under the name of travelling expenses and contingencies were set apart out of the regular revenue, and paid over to the King: these sums were, however, entirely appropriated by him to the payment of extraordinary military expenses, such as the high pay of the third battalion of the guards, and a grant towards the cost of the uniforms and the mess of the officers. The King's household expenses—his aliment-money, as he called it—was paid out of these extraordinary supplies. He set aside 120,000 thalers yearly for this purpose. The rest he applied to the payment of such extraordinary services of the state as were not defrayed out of the regular revenue, such as the erection of fortresses, the improvement of the artillery, the breeding of horses, or works of public utility, *e. g.*, the draining of marshes, which we have already described. Occasionally he paid these surplus sums of money into the treasury, in order to make up a good round sum.

Besides the sums placed in the King's own hands, a considerable portion of the general revenue was regularly paid over to the funds appropriated to the payment of the war expenses.

A memorandum of Frederick's of the year 1744 gives us some idea of this process. The treasure was again filled up, and amounted to 6,200,000

thalers: out of this 2,000,000 were taken at the beginning of the war. Half a million was to be devoted to setting on foot the newly raised cavalry; another half-million to the subsistence of these troops, which was not as yet provided for in the regular estimates. Frederick reckoned that with a third half-million he should defray the cost of the march and of remounting the regiment in the course of the next year, and still keep in hand an ample fund to meet any unforeseen emergencies. At this time he hoped to be able to fix his winter-quarters in Bohemia, which would relieve the military chests. But we know how far otherwise matters turned out—how the treasury was by degrees completely exhausted—the request made to France for subsidies refused—and how Frederick, sorely against his will, was compelled to raise a loan. The manner in which this was done was, that the provincial Estates—for it would have been altogether against his principles to borrow from a foreign country—raised the necessary funds; the payment of the interest was then charged—according to ancient custom—upon certain duties or taxes, the natural increase of which shortly covered the whole amount. In the year 1745 the sum lent by the Estates of the Electoral March of Brandenburg to the King, which was of such signal service to him, amounted to 1,356,000 thalers. This was sufficient for the occasion, as peace was shortly after concluded.

After the peace, the King's first care was to restore everything to its former state, and the treasure soon began to accumulate, as before.

In the year 1752 the treasure amounted to seven millions of thalers; and the finances were so administered that every year two millions more were added to it. Frederick reckoned, that in the year 1754 his treasure would amount to 11,000,000; in 1756, to 15,000,000; and in 1758, to 19,000,000 thalers. With this sum he thought he could carry on four or five consecutive campaigns. Besides this principal treasure, he had accumulated a smaller one of 200,000 thalers, which he intended to apply especially to the transport service of his army.

(We do not need to be reminded that this accumulation of treasure was altogether condemnable, in a financial point of view: in Frederick's position it was a necessary precaution, as he was every moment liable to be attacked.

This is not the place to enter into all the knotty political questions which combined to bring about a fresh and most important crisis in European affairs.

But we need only cast one glance towards the east and north of Europe, where the coalition against Frederick William I. that had arisen upon occasion of the vacancy of the throne of Poland, was renewed and strengthened between the three powers—Austria, Saxony, and Russia—to see how great was the danger with which this union threatened Prussia. Frederick, indeed, was convinced that the hostile attitude of Russia was purely accidental, and altogether independent of any real interests; that the Empress Elizabeth herself had no part in it, but only her minister, who was all-powerful and entirely de-

voted to Maria Theresa.* Frederick did not anticipate any attack upon Silesia, but he dreaded seeing the throne of Poland occupied by some prince, possibly an Austrian, who might force him to take up arms.

When he looked around for assistance, he saw that he could reckon upon none in the north: Sweden was fully occupied with her internal affairs, and Denmark had turned all her energies to the acquisition of Holstein. As to the maritime powers, they could not accustom themselves to the sight of the Prussian flag in the German Ocean, neither could he hope for aid within the German Empire.

The degree to which most of the German Estates inclined towards Austria was made manifest by the numerous difficulties raised throughout the Empire against the guarantee of Silesia. English money exercised an irresistible influence over the greater number.

With regard to France, the defensive alliance concluded in the year 1741, between that country and Prussia, still subsisted, and on the whole the relations between the two powers were friendly. But previous events had brought to light the vast contradiction between them, especially with regard to the affairs of Germany. "Is it not true," said Frederick to one

* Testament Politique. "La Russie ne doit point se compter parmi nos véritables ennemis; elle n'a rien à démêler avec la Prusse; c'est un ennemi accidentel. Un ministre corrompu par l'Angleterre et l'Autriche a eu bien de la peine à trouver un prétexte apparent par brouiller nos deux cours; la chute de ce ministre doit remettre les choses dans leur état naturel."

of his ambassadors, "that it is for my interest to ally myself with France?" "Undoubtedly," replied the ambassador, who proceeded to urge all the reasons why confidence should be reposed in France. "Very well," said Frederick, "but it must be no more than a lip confidence." Weakness and disorder increased daily in France. There was more to be feared than hoped from a monarch who fancied that he governed, while he was, in fact, under the dominion of selfish and rapacious ministers, and of a mistress accessible to every whisper of vanity.

Surrounded by powerful and dangerous foes, and without a single ally in whom he could confide, the King of Prussia had to trust entirely to himself, and to the courage and discipline of his army.

He accordingly looked upon the care of his army as one of his most important duties. As Frederick William took the rank of field-marshal, so, in like manner, Frederick called himself *connétable*. We should learn little of his character if we left this side of his policy unnoticed.

Frederick acted upon the maxim of Vegetius, that peace was the time for the study, and war for the practice of the art. A discipline like that of the Romans prevailed in the Prussian army alone: upon this depended his country's fame and the stability of the state. To keep up this discipline he declared to be the duty of his generals and his own. It was all very well, he said, to have earned a reputation, but it would be shameful negligence and want of forethought not to make ready such further means of defence as might soon be needed against

the enemy: and, unluckily, the words enemy and neighbour were for him synonymous.*

He declared it to be of the utmost importance to keep a strict watch over the first enrolling of the men. It was only by neglect of this precaution that Holland, which had once served as an example to Prussia, had sunk so low, since the management of her military affairs had fallen into the hands of a few merchants.

A prince *connétable* ought, in Frederick's opinion, to have the recruits brought before him for personal inspection, in order to see that in all cases the ranks were filled up with men of equal height and strength. The principal reason for maintaining the standard of height was, that, as a general rule, the best grown men were also the strongest. But this was not the only consideration: the necessity of observing this condition prevented the cantons from being drained by the conscription, which it was the duty of the government to prevent.

The regulations on this subject could hardly be stricter. Frederick declared that the system of assigning cantons to the several regiments was adopted merely in order to make up for the ordinary decrement of life, and that only in part, out of the inhabitants; and above all to complete a regiment at once on a sudden emergency, such as the breaking out of a war. But that it was not to be borne that the recruits should be looked upon as serfs, or that

* *Generalprincipia vom Kriege.*—(General principles of war.) The introduction printed in *Preuss, Friedrich als Schriftsteller*, 227.

money should be demanded under any pretence whatever from those who were not enrolled ;—this shows us what abuses still prevailed. Frederick looked upon it as one of the duties of his office to remedy these abuses, and more especially to keep the balance even between the soldiers and civilians.*

But while these conditions were enforced, the captains were held responsible that none but proper and serviceable men should be admitted into the ranks of the army. The King required from the young officers not only irreproachable conduct and considerable acquirements, but likewise ability ; the captains were expected to put their whole souls into the service ; the commanders were not only to keep the strictest discipline, but to be capable of acting for themselves on any sudden emergency. He could name colonels upon whose conduct the issue of a battle and the safety of a kingdom had depended.

Generals and colonels were held responsible to the prince for the conduct of their regiments ; to ensure this they were to enforce implicit obedience. Any soldier who refused obedience to his corporal, any officer who drew his sword upon his superior, must be punished without mercy ; to pardon under such circumstances would be most dangerous.

The domestic arrangements for the soldiers were made with a view to their bodily health and comfort,

* Orders in council, e. g. to Linger, in *Schöning Geschichte der Artillerie*, I. 429, 436. “ Il faut que le souverain tienne une espece d’équilibre entre le soldat et les gens des villes et campagnes, pour que les uns et les autres ne s’emancipent point de sortir de leurs bornes.” Test. Pol.

and to a life in common, of a kind to encourage good feeling among comrades. In this respect, also, peace was to be a preparation for war; the men were to be accustomed to moderation in their diet. Drinking and play were on no account to be allowed; the conduct of a well ordered regiment should be as regular as that of a monastery.

A Prince *connétable* should know how to put the troops through their exercise himself, and be a perfect master of the art of drill, in order to see where it is defective. Uniformity in all externals had, in Frederick's opinion, a great influence on the mechanical part of military tactics; the effect produced by well drilled troops could be reckoned upon with double certainty.

The French ambassador remarked, that at first the cavalry went through their exercise with a certain feeling of disgust and humiliation; the fear of the lash was their only incentive; but that now every one saw the utility of this arm, and the men bore their lot with a resignation based upon reflection. His admiration was especially roused when, on a given signal, the cavalry halted suddenly in the midst of a charge, keeping admirable order, or when he saw the first rank continue the charge at full gallop, while the second slackened its pace and followed at a trot.

Valori's military tastes were equally gratified by the manner in which the infantry went through their drill. "It is amazing," he writes, after being present at a review of some troops in May, 1747, "to see regiments, which have suffered so much,

already in such admirable condition. The old regiments have even gained in discipline and military precision. We saw a line of 19,000 men advance at the rate of 80 steps a minute, in as straight a line as though they had been measured with a cord. I have known the rapidity of their firing for the last eight years, both in the field and on parade, and yet it amazes me every time I see it.”*

Valori's admiration of the Prussian troops was not, however, unconditional. He was of opinion that, as a general rule, their fire was too low, and not well aimed; he said that the soldier was like a machine, which once set agoing, fired without thinking where. But when Valori accused the King of being the author of this manner of firing, he did him great injustice.

“What,” said Frederick, “is meant by gaining a battle? It means forcing the enemy to quit the field. I accustom the troops to advance as rapidly as possible; they are not to fire, but to make use of their bayonets, or to rush forward with their muskets over their shoulders; they thus throw the enemy into confusion. It is not musketry that wins a battle, but the good bearing of the troops. I also expect the cavalry to make compact and brilliant charges. As the ranks of the enemy's squadrons are less close, it is almost impossible for them to resist a charge of this sort; it seldom happens that troops actually cross swords. The infantry ought to drive the

* Observations sur le service militaire du roi de Prusse remis par Valori, Sept., 1746. (Paris Archives.)

enemy, so to speak, out of the field; the cavalry to crown the work by the number of prisoners they bring back to the camp."

The whole system of drill was accordingly directed to the sole object of gaining the victory in the field of battle.

The troops were taught to form with the utmost rapidity in manifold ways, in line or in column, now from one wing and now from the other, at the first word of command; the two rearmost lines were expected to be as perfect in their evolutions as the front ranks. Frederick first introduced the custom of exercising large bodies of men, in order, as he said, to accustom the officers to manœuvres on a great scale.*

These exercises were calculated to meet every possible contingency of warfare. The troops were taught how to march through a forest without breaking the line, to make sudden evolutions so as to fall upon the enemy's flank, to accomplish a retreat without falling into disorder, to defend themselves against hussars when attacked on a foraging expedition—these were their principal exercises.

Frederick always premised that it was impossible for him to realize his own ideal of the art of war, that he could only practise it as might be most to the purpose against those of his neighbours from whom he had to expect hostilities. He was every moment reminded of the restraint it imposed upon his opera-

* *Instruction pour les généraux qui auront à commander des détachemens, des ailes et des secondes lignes des troupes Prussiennes.*

tions, that one half of his troops consisted of soldiers who felt no real interest in the welfare of his country. For this very reason he felt it to be all the more important to cherish the strong warlike spirit and military virtue which characterised his army.

This he placed in three things—discipline, obedience, and courage. Discipline, which had become a second nature in the Prussian army, effected thus much—that when exposed to the most imminent danger, the utmost confusion of the Prussians was accompanied by more self-possession than ever appeared in the ordinary condition of the enemy. Obedience caused the Prussian soldiers never to call in question or to discuss the possibility of performing any enterprise they were ordered to undertake, and thus none were led to despair. Their courage rested upon this; the officer had only his sword to look to for promotion, and ambition made him bold; the common soldier had confidence in himself, and thought it a point of honour never to give way. Want of pluck made him contemptible among his comrades: soldiers had frequently been seen to fight, spite of their wounds.

The King's chief endeavour was, during peace, to keep alive this spirit, which had arisen in time of war, and to render the condition of his army more and more perfect.

About the year 1750 the infantry consisted of forty-eight regiments employed in the field, and thirteen regiments in garrison—in all 122 battalions, each battalion counting 880 men. The cavalry was composed of eight hussar regiments, each containing

1200 men, and 130 squadrons of cuirassiers and dragoons, of 158 men each. The army numbered from 133,000 to 136,000 men. In proportion to the size of the country, the army was larger than in the time of Frederick William I.; and at every fresh increase in the revenue, Frederick II. first of all considered whether he could not raise a few new regiments.

The independence of Prussia, threatened on every side, could only be maintained by these iron defences.

Every one of Frederick's measures had its origin in his determination to be a free agent, and not to suffer the provinces united under one sceptre, more especially Northern Germany, to become the battlefield on which foreign powers might void their quarrels. This it was that rendered his army necessary; and the army called forth the financial organization—each entailed, supported, and maintained the other; without the one the other was impossible.

CHAPTER VI.

RELIGION : SCIENCE.

THE ruling principles, which have ever maintained the upper hand in the conflicts of spiritual and material forces, define life in each of its forms.

Frederick had been led by the course of his own education and the spirit of his century to shake off the trammels of a peculiar confession, and his great acquisition of territory, the wide and large increase in the number of his Catholic subjects, and the policy which he adopted at the moment of entering upon possession, could not fail to confirm him strongly in such a tendency. The principle which he once roundly laid down in a marginal note for the authorities of the Protestant Church, he repeated in a milder form to Cardinal Sinzendorf,—that each of his subjects should be at liberty to worship God in the way he held most conducive to his salvation. On one occasion he requested that prelate to hold up the example of Silesia to the Poles, amongst whom religious persecutions had broken out, and to impress on their minds how strongly their proceedings were opposed to the laws of God, to Christian charity, and to the natural principles of human society. “I stand neuter,” he says of himself, “between Rome and Geneva: he who wrongs his brother of a different

faith is punished; were I to declare for one or the other creed, I should call forth party-spirit, persecution, and expulsions; my object is to show the members of the different communions that they are all fellow-citizens." Even in the distribution of public charity, which formerly was mainly determined by the church to which the claimant belonged, he forbade the attaching any importance to this; nothing but the greater necessity of the applicant was to be suffered to turn the scale.

He not only admitted Catholics to his service, but was anxious to see them enter it. He announced as distinctly as possible, that all his subjects should have an equal chance of advancement under him; and we find that he expressly looked out for a chamberlain of the Catholic persuasion for the Prince of Prussia. He readily received into his service old Jacobites like Keith, though he did not yield to the desire of the Pretender to take up his abode in Prussia. He expressed satisfaction at seeing a Catholic church, dedicated to a Brandenburg saint, erected in Berlin. Rothenburg, his most confidential friend at the time, had the superintendence of all the necessary arrangements; while in every difficulty recourse was had to the King himself.

Notwithstanding all this, it was inevitable that he should be met by much religious hostility on the part of the Catholics, particularly in the conquered province.

The members of the Silesian magistracy, above all, who had hitherto owed their advancement to the court of Vienna, appeared bent on re-establishing its

authority. One of the King's earliest cabinet orders in relation to that province directed that, as the posts of burgomaster fell vacant, they should be filled only with Protestants; but the power of choosing such officers was not thereby taken away, or the selection confined to Protestants for ever. Frederick was of opinion that the right of free choice might be given back to the second generation without danger.*

His next difficulty was with the monks, who often made their convents the centre of Austrian conspiracies. In the war of 1745 the King discovered that plots in favour of the court of Vienna were being concocted in the abbey of Grüssau. He at once, without hesitation, removed those implicated in them to different provinces, before their plan could be carried into execution, in the conviction that he was thus doing them a kindness, as he merely wished to prevent them from incurring a guilt which he must have punished severely. After the peace they returned quietly to their convent. He declared that they ought to be much obliged to him.†

The most formidable opponents appeared to him to be the Jesuits, notwithstanding many friendly overtures on their part. In Silesia, as elsewhere,

* Je leur ai ôté le droit des élections de crainte qu'ils ne remplissent les places d'échevins de gens devoués à la maison d'Autriche, avec le tems et quand la génération presente sera éteinte on pourra rendre à la Silésie les droits d'élection sans courir aucun hazard. (Test. Pol.)

† Ce que leur otant les moyens de se rendre coupables leur fit éviter les punitions, qu'ils se seroient infailliblement attiré, si on leur avoit laissé la liberté de suivre leur penchant. (Test. Pol.)

they exercised great influence over the higher classes, and had the control of education. To escape the embarrassment of their enmity, he conceived the notion of "setting the altar against the altar," as he expresses it. He invited Jesuits out of France, who, superior in education to their native brethren, successfully contested with them their influence on the higher classes of the inhabitants, and showed themselves devoted to Prussian interests. The important point in every case was to neutralize the political operation of religious differences, without encroaching on the religious principles themselves.

There was, however, a political danger involved in the mere dependance of the Catholic confession on a common head, bound to carry into effect the old hierarchical principles. The influence of Rome was in profound contradiction to the peculiar character of the Prussian kingdom.

It was sometimes the fashion at the court of Berlin to fight theoretically the contested questions which naturally arose on such points.

Frederick says in one of his cabinet orders, that in all points which concern no article of faith, he is the supreme bishop of the realm, and as such, bound to recognise no other authority. In a treatise destined for the Papal chair, it is expressly stated that, if the Romish church enjoy in Prussia the same reverence as in Catholic countries, it is only on condition that the court of Rome, on its part, show to the King of Prussia all the respect which it evinces to Catholic princes, and that the clergy pay the same obedience to him as to a king of their own

faith; that the religion which he professes ought not, in his case, to impair the rights which princes enjoy elsewhere.

He did not, however, think it politic to contend with the see of Rome about principles upon which there was no probability that that Church would ever give way. Practical life, as has been already hinted, was to be employed to smooth differences which theory could not reconcile.

Frederick was fortunate enough to find precisely such a head of the Silesian clergy as he wanted, in the Cardinal-Archbishop Sinzendorf, who concurred in his views, and was personally attached to him.

He occasionally visited Berlin, where the appearance of a Romish prelate of the highest rank excited no little attention. He himself could not find terms flattering enough to describe the reception vouchsafed him by both the queens, the amiable princes, and the gifted King.* On the other hand, slight personal differences now and then arose between them. Sinzendorf, on the occasion of some fancied reticence, observed to the King that, confidence once reposed in him, must be entire; that confidence can no more be partial than love. The King answered him with the assurance that he did not feel the slightest distrust.

* The Saxon resident Siepman, 29th Jan., 1748: "Le C^{te} Sinzendorf qui ne paroît à la cour, qu'en chaise roulante, la goutte ne lui permettant pas de marcher ni de se tenir debout, est particulièrement souffert du roi, qui le met presque de tous ses repas. Son éloquence naturelle, sa qualité d'esprit fort au dessus comme on parle de la prétendue bagatelle de l'orthodoxie affectée au chapeau sont censés les moyens les plus infallibles de plaire."

Frederick established the principle that all salaried dignities in Silesia should be open only to natives of the province, claiming in the selection all the rights exercised by the Emperor Charles VI.

/ The King was likewise favoured by fortune inasmuch as, at this time, one of the mildest of popes filled the Papal chair, Benedict XIV., who was anxious to establish a good understanding with all the temporal princes of Europe. The nuncios, both to Vienna and Dresden, vied in co-operating with him for that purpose. The nuncio to Dresden, in particular, gained the confidence of Frederick. The opposition of the court of Vienna, which sometimes gave rise to serious misunderstandings, was thus rendered harmless.

In violently disturbed times a different mode of proceeding from that adopted by Frederick might have been employed; but this juncture, at which excitement and violence were especially to be avoided, did not so much require a theoretically perfect policy as an accommodation to circumstances, vigorous whenever it was necessary, and, at the same time, mild and prudent. Frederick had nothing but support to expect from the Protestant Church, but it might easily have embarrassed his relation to Catholicism by unseasonable polemics. His chief endeavour was to prevent this, and especially to leave no room for sectarian doings in Silesia itself. He is anxious (as he says in one of his cabinet orders) that none should be appointed to benefices but men of good sense and intelligence, who cherish no fanatical zeal against other creeds. In the main he left the

government of the Church to the consistories, according to the traditional usages.

In the year 1750 a head consistory was appointed, or rather, what had been hitherto the consistory of the Electoral March, was entrusted with the superintendence of all the other consistories in the old province, and with their direction in matters of importance. It was to exercise a control over the examinations and conduct of candidates in theology, the doctrines and life of clergymen, and the due administration of charitable foundations; to have a voice in the filling up of theological professorships; to govern schools; and, when it inflicted punishment, was entitled to the support of the temporal arm.

As the influence of the sovereign over the Church has generally originated in this support, so in this instance recourse to the secular judicial authorities remained open to the consistories, as had always been usual in churches so constituted. Both exercised a concurrent jurisdiction over the public regulations of the Church, and the offences of spiritual persons were cognizable by the secular tribunals. Little intrusion of the personal will of the King appeared in the consistorial regulations. It was expressly enjoined upon the president to listen to the opinion of every member in the deliberations of the consistory, to allow of no long discussions, and only to decide by a majority of voices.*

* Instruction vor das über alle königliche Lande errichtete lutherische Oberconsistorium.—(Instruction for the supreme Lutheran consistory appointed for the guidance of all the royal dominions.) 4th Oct., 1750, in Mylius, *Continuatio Corp. Const. March. IV. nr. 106.*

Special attention was paid under Frederick, as under his father, to the externals of Church administration. During the last eighteen years of the reign of Frederick William, and the first eleven of that of Frederick II., 156 churches or church towers were repaired in the electorate, 129 new ones built, and many organs and bells supplied out of the consolidated Church revenue fund. Amongst the orders in council of Frederick II. are several for advances in aid of church buildings and benefice houses.

He had laid down for his own guidance certain maxims to be applied to cases in which he might be personally applied to: for example, not to deck out the clergy with many high titles and dignities, since Paul writes himself only a servant of Jesus Christ; in filling up benefices, to give more weight than had hitherto been given to the wishes of congregations, particularly when these pointed to virtuous and charitable persons; above all, to allow no intrusion of newfangled doctrines, the best way of dealing with which, he thought, was to make them ridiculous. He did not approve the tone of the preachers of his day, whom he found wanting in knowledge of the world, and even in acquaintance with the Scriptures. In order to work upon the world, men must take it as it is, and a preacher is bound to make the study of the Scriptures his principal employment.* He would have

* Qu'on ne se remplit pas la tête de vos saintes écritures, qu'on ne fait pas de cette lecture son affaire principale—et que ces êtres destinés à l'église ne voyent pas le bon monde, ne suivent pas assez les hommes et les passions: il faut prendre le monde tel qu'il est.

insisted on a more real satisfaction of existing wants in the religious as well in the juridical branch of administration, had he devoted more attention to the former, but neither his spiritual nor political tendencies led him in such a direction. He was satisfied with keeping down that enmity between different persuasions which had occasioned so much confusion during the last few centuries. He bestowed no more attention than the position of a prince rendered necessary on the high schools, which, since time immemorial, had stood in the closest relations with their respective churches. He insisted on the observance of old statutes, when they fell in with his views, as, for example, in the University of Frankfort on the Oder, where the regular theological professorships continued to be reserved for the Calvinists, as this faculty was bound to teach according to the mildest forms of the Calvinist faith. To the Lutherans were left only the extraordinary chairs, which were, however, invested with certain academic rights, necessary for the completion of the university course of studies.

Frequent consultations took place on the subject of the University of Halle, but no organic change was made.* It was thought sufficient to exhort teachers

* A return to the old method was recommended,—to appoint but few professors, and to confine them strictly to one fixed course of study. But this proved impracticable, and accordingly a greater number of professors was appointed, and they were allowed greater liberty of action. Report of Schlabiendorf, President of Magdeburg, Dankelmann, and Bielefeld, dated 1752.

as well as students to a more rigorous observance of discipline and greater diligence. After the death of Wolff, whose stipend had been paid out of the privy purse, Frederick did not feel himself called upon to replace this loss to the university.

The active interest which he took in science concentrated itself in the Academy, which he restored in Berlin. From his accession, he had entertained the design of gathering about him men of literary reputation. During the first years of his reign he declared his intention of transforming the scientific association of the capital (which, notwithstanding some meritorious members, maintained but an obscure existence) into an academy which might vie with the French and English bodies of the same character. Maupertuis, who was the first man invited to aid in this project, was already busied with a plan for such an institution in the spring of 1741. It was this which took him to the camp of Frederick II., and drew down on him the misfortune which led to his leaving Prussia after the battle of Mollwitz.

The acquisition of Silesia furnished the next occasion of reverting to the design. Euler, who had been summoned to the court a short time before that event, and who was a man of great talent for conducting the business of a learned society, calculated that the revenue derived from the monopoly of printing calendars, which would thenceforward be extended to this province, would prove sufficient to defray the expenses of founding an academy. He was aided by another impulse acting in the same direction, but

originating in an entirely different quarter. Following the example of the King, all who surrounded him busied themselves with literature. Generals of the highest rank, ministers, courtiers even, felt the necessity of instruction upon current topics, and for this purpose formed a new association amongst themselves. We find amongst them the names of Podewils and Borcke, Schmettau, Goltz, Stille, Sweerts, the director of the theatre, Bielefeld, and Jordan. The nucleus of the society consisted of the literati already established in Berlin, who devoted themselves to general science, such as Pott, Marggraf, Lieberkühn, Euler, Jarriges, and Formey. The meetings took place on Thursday afternoons, at first at the house of Schmettau or Borcke; subsequently at the palace, where the King assigned the society an apartment for the purpose.

The person in whose suggestion originated the establishment of the Academy, as afterwards constituted, was Marshal Schmettau,* with whose projective enterprising genius in political and military affairs we are already familiar. In October, 1743, he advised the amalgamation of the two societies, of which the one best answered to the spirit of the

* Denina is in error, when he ascribes to Field-Marshal Schmettau the foundation of the new society. The most remarkable paper on the change in question, is an order in council of Frederick's, dated 29th Oct., 1743. "J'ai été bien aise d'apprendre que vous acceptez avec quelque satisfaction la place assignée dans la nouvelle société des sciences, en songeant déjà aux moyens propres pour la mettre sur un pied solide par sa combinaison avec l'ancienne académie." The appointment of the commission is dated 13th November.

age, while the other had the best right to the funds at command, and that out of both should be formed an Academy worthy of the name. Frederick, though occupied with very different matters at the moment, gave his consent, and appointed a commission of some of the ministers and members of both societies to examine the project. The arrangement could not be attended with any great difficulty, as the most distinguished members of the old society already belonged to the new one. It was accordingly found very easy of execution, and after a short interval of time, the new Academy opened its sittings on the 23rd of January, 1744, the eve of the King's birthday. Schmettau, in person, delivered the inaugural speech, and the new statutes were read. The most remarkable feature in them is the including of philosophical inquiry in the plan of the Academy, which was not satisfied with the field occupied by the Academies of Sciences and of Inscriptions at Paris. Nevertheless, it was far from being so learned a society as that.

The professional literati played only a subordinate part in the Berlin Academy, as they were thrown into the shade by the splendour of ministers and generals, who took part in their proceedings, and kept under by the curators, who were appointed over them. They consisted mainly of physicians and theologians, some of whom employed themselves with the physical sciences, others with antiquarian researches,—and of some professors of mathematics, astronomy, and botany: solid science seemed likely to be swamped by the claims of mere diletantism.

Maupertuis, who soon after returned to Berlin, has the merit of having protected this element of the Academy, and of having not so much saved, as created for it a certain independence.

Moreau de Maupertuis, son of a successful privateer of St. Malo, had been in early youth a captain of dragoons, and afterwards devoted himself to the mixed mathematical sciences, in which he was particularly fortunate in his defence of the Newtonian system against the Cartesians. He was at the head of the expedition which the French government dispatched to the north polar regions in 1736, to determine the question whether the earth be an elongated or an oblate spheroid (which was contested between the disciples of Cassini and of Newton), by the measurement of a degree in the neighbourhood of the pole; and by this the question was first settled. On his return to Paris, Maupertuis became the object of general attention and admiration;* young men were by his example incited to devote themselves to literature. Voltaire recommended him to the King of Prussia, who was desirous to secure a man of such extended reputation, and who, after the reconstruction of the Academy, persisted in his determination to make him its president. On the proposal being made to him, Maupertuis considered that he would, by accepting it, be exposing himself to the jealousy of the literati, but this he was ready to encounter.

What he found really intolerable in his new posi-

* Marquis d'Argens: *Histoire de l'Esprit Humain*, IV. 341.

tion, was the subordination to curators, men of rank, who were set over the Academy. He points out to the King, in a remarkable letter, that the position of a president of the Academy had become honourable in the hands of Leibnitz, in those of Gundling ridiculous, and perfectly insignificant in those of Jablonski; that, at the present moment, the King might make of the place anything he liked. The same that, according to Fontenelle, was true of France in a preceding century, could not now be said of Prussia,—that to possess scientific knowledge was only not injurious to a man's consideration. He was well aware, he added, that in pleading the cause of science, he was likewise pleading his own; but he felt that from Frederick he might safely demand all that could give to himself the consideration required to work with effect for the advancement of science itself.*

Maupertuis was accordingly appointed perpetual president, and placed above the curators. After a time, the right of appointing to vacancies in the Academy was reserved to him exclusively. Such a constitution, more monarchical than ever was given to any other learned body, was rendered enduring, in this instance, by the fact that the presidency was

* Letter of the 15th of January, 1746. "Je vois beaucoup de contradiction et de mécontentement dans la manière, dont cette compagnie est administrée, fort peu d'esperance pour ses succès et ses ouvrages: je ne puis cependant remedier à rien; pas même assister à ses assemblées. . . . Je vous demanderai tout ce, qui pourra me donner de la considération et du credit nécessaire pour le bien de l'académie et pour remplir avec honneur une place qui doit être honorable sous le regne d'Auguste."

conferred on a man of purely scientific authority, without any influence derived from causes foreign to the business of the Academy. Even Schmettau soon found himself powerless. The brilliancy of Maupertuis' social position was enhanced by an order, an honour which until then had been reserved solely for military services, by the distinguished connections which he formed by marriage, and, above all, by the uninterrupted intimacy which he maintained with the King and court. The literati submitted themselves to his predominancy, because they all felt themselves honoured in his person.

Maupertuis cannot be justly charged with having Frenchified the Academy. It had been determined, from the first restoration of the society, to publish its transactions in French only, as the use of that language was daily extending, while that of Latin was becoming more contracted. It appears, in fact, that Maupertuis was not quite satisfied with this decision. A mere reference to the Transactions will prove that the peculiarly French spirit of the time had little influence upon them.

In the department of physics, next to Pott and Euler, the leading men were Marggraf and Gleditsch; the mathematical was supplied by Euler with numerous and valuable papers. In the philosophical, the principal labourers were members of the old association, with whom were afterwards associated some Swiss literati, as Sulzer and Merian; the philological, as yet unimportant, was cultivated by some native schoolmen and theologians. The sole advantage that could possibly result from the unnatural

process of translating into French the transactions of a German learned body, in order that they might be printed, was, that labours, like those of Marggraf, —whose exact and repeated experiments led to important discoveries,—were by this means sooner and more widely known and appreciated. But for this, too, the King would scarcely have taken the interest in the Academy which he actually vouchsafed it.

In the department of philosophy and *belles-lettres*, Frederick himself appeared, for two years continuously, as the most diligent and efficient contributor.

Soon after the war, he began to employ himself on the records of his own house and realm, from the natural wish to set clearly before the world the history of his own power, of which there existed no satisfactory account. I find, to my astonishment, that Podewils, his indefatigable aid in public business, rendered him help in this also. He drew up for the King a sketch of the thirty years' war, in its relation to Brandenburg, set on foot investigations into the military arrangements of those and of the subsequent times, prepared a chronological list of the treaties concluded under Frederick William I., and the like.* The Margravine of Baireuth, also, procured for her

* Podewils, 10th May, 1747. "Je travaille avec toute l'application imaginable aux mémoires que V. M. a souhaité d'avoir pour son grand édifice. Je suis actuellement occupé à dresser celui de la guerre de 30 ans autant qu'elle est relative à la maison de Brandebourg sous trois regnes. Il est de plus grand détail mais fort intéressant." 8th Mai, 47: "Je joins ici avec un profond respect la 2^{de} et la 3^{me} partie du mémoire du regne de Frederic I., je travaillerai incessamment à l'extrait chronologique de tous les traités faits sous le feu roi."

brother information from the archives of Plessenburg.

On the 1st of June, 1747, the first chapters of the *Memoirs of the House of Brandenburg*, extending to the year 1640, were read by Darget, at a sitting at which were present the King's brother, and his sister Amalia. The style was pronounced to be dignified and characteristic, full of the expression of an independent and lofty position, raising the author above all personal consideration of consequences.* Mau-pertuis directed the attention of the company to the difference between the times represented in the memoirs and their own day; the royal palace, in which the present sitting was held, which had formerly served as the quarters of a foreign guard, had now become the abode of science. On the 24th of January, 1748, was read the *Life of the great Elector*, which excited still greater admiration, not only by the elegance and brilliancy of the composition, but likewise by the character of its hero, drawn, for the first time, in sharp and definite outlines.

Frederick executed another historical work at this time, not intended for the public, and only partially communicated to one or two of the King's particular intimates—the *History of the late War*. Frederick stood too near the events described, to take a perfectly objective view of his subject, but the work derives all the more value from the freshness and distinctness of recollection which breathes in every

* Valori, 3rd June: "également curieux par la beauté et la singularité du style."

word of it. It is thrown together with the reckless buoyancy of youth, and as light and amusing as it is instructive. In his later version of the same narrative, much has been omitted, the retention of which would have been desirable for the purposes of history.

CHAPTER VII.

THE SOCIETY OF SANS SOUCL.

LET us take a last and general glance at the relations of Frederick to literature and art, during the period of our history.

In his youth, he had looked upon it as his future task, to change the military circle in which his father moved, into one of a mingled artistic and literary character. After his accession to the throne, he contented himself with aiming at a union of the two.

Very early in his reign he had conceived the design of erecting an academic edifice, with a convenient observatory, and a grand opera-house.* Frederick himself designed the general outline of the latter building, and Knobelsdorf, who had seen and studied all the most famous edifices, which the King only knew through representations, and whose innate taste for the simple and grand had never been impaired by the variety of its objects, had the honour of erecting this building, whose noble and pure outlines have survived, as they deserved, a destructive fire. On ornamental details, Knobelsdorf

* Dedication of the plans, printed in Schneider's *Geschichte der Oper*.

consulted with Algarotti,* and the house was opened on December 7, 1742, with an opera of Graun's.

It is very probable that the first performances of this theatre left much to be desired, notwithstanding the official praises lavished upon them. Siepman, the Saxon resident, who has left the most notices on such subjects, finds fault with both decorations and singers, and pronounces the whole to be far below the level of Dresden; indeed, Frederick himself does not appear to have been satisfied at first: the opera did not come up to his standard till the accession of Salimbeni (in 1746) and La Astrua to the company. Frederick attributes to the former good taste and grace: as to the latter, he pronounces her voice incomparable for variety, flexibility, and sweetness, and her acting like that of a French actress.† Amongst the dancers, La Barbarina, one of the most beautiful women who ever trod the stage, was long the favourite. The scenes and machinery were intrusted to the ingenious Bellavita. Of all the representations of this period the opera of Cinna had the greatest success, at least in the opinion of the King himself, as well from the subject, which united interest with awe, as from the effect of the music, at once

* See a letter of Algarotti's *Opp. Varie*, II. 273. To introduce Varius among the dramatic poets of Rome is an idea of Algarotti's: Algarotti likewise gave the inscription "Apollini et Musis."

† L'Astrua est reellement surprenante: elle fait des arpeggios comme des violons; elle chante tout ce que la flûte joue avec une agilité et une vitesse infinie.—C'est un phénomène singulier en fait de musique. (Frederick to the Margrave.)

touching and animated. The subjects most peculiarly adapted for musical and operatic treatment had already been selected, for example, Iphigenia and Armida. The situations in the opera of Montezuma, the text of which Frederick wrote himself, are repeated in that of Cortez.

The Academy was finished a little later than the opera-house. The Catholic church was begun in 1747, Prince Henry's palace in 1749; the new cathedral was finished in 1750. It is in the nature of things that buildings, whose principal features are borrowed from architectural drawings, the originals of which the architect has never seen, can hardly claim the character of works of art. Some of those planned by Frederick, however, were successful. The area of the city was laid out in stately style, and Berlin within the walls assumed all at once the air of a European capital. New squares and streets rose on the surrounding space formerly occupied by fortifications; plantations were formed outside the gates, at first merely with a view to bind the sandy soil and fill up waste spaces. Even the asylum which Frederick founded in 1748 for his invalids—his "wounded invincibles"—would hardly have been finished without the latter motive. Trees were planted in all directions, to give shade to future generations.

The greatest care was bestowed on the Thiergarten, which, enclosed by a paling, and used for grazing cattle, had hitherto presented the appearance of a game-preserve rather than of a park. Knobelsdorf made no attempt to change the natural character of

the spot, but contented himself with bringing out such features of it as might furnish effects to the landscape gardener;—opening here and there avenues through the wood to the central points of picturesque situations, bounded by extensive views. The Great Star, the Churfürstenplatz, near which then stood a few tents, but not the buildings which now darken and disfigure the neighbourhood—the Saloon of Flora, with its belt of limes, in the centre of well-grown oaks—were either restored or planned by him.*

Frederick's residence at Potsdam, where he entirely remodelled the palace after Knobelsdorf's design, was not merely more splendid than that of his predecessors, but, above all, more comfortable and cheerful. The modest dwelling erected by him for country privacy, on a vine-covered hill near that town, has acquired a European reputation. The accumulated revenues of East Friesland, not dedicated at that time to any other special purpose, furnished the means for the buildings. The gardens were supplied by the different provinces with their choicest products—Cüstrin and Magdeburg sent loam, Silesia marble for the fountains. Frederick was anxious to adorn his retreat with works of art, of which France furnished some, while native talent contributed others, both in the narrow taste of the time: but the King was fortunate enough to acquire, besides, some master-pieces of painting and sculpture. The "Boy Praying," probably of the school of Lysippus, lifted up his

* See G. W. v. Raumer's *Geschichte des Thiergartens*, p. 49.

hands in Sans Souci.* The sweetest productions of Correggio's sensual imagination found their way to the same spot. In this scene of mental repose and simple enjoyment, Frederick resumed his Rheinsberg studies, and sought to gather about him companions to share them. What would he not have given for the presence of the old friends who had been associated with him through his whole course of education, Keyserlingk and Jordan! Both had died, the one within a brief interval of the other.†

He still retained Rothenburg, who enjoyed his entire confidence, and possessed the royal ear so completely, that calumny fixed on him as the court tale-bearer. He, however, had none of those literary acquirements which distinguished a foreign nobleman who subsequently introduced himself to the court of Frederick,—the Marquis d'Argens, a native of the south of France, who had taken it into his head that he could not live in his native country. He first appeared at Berlin in the train of the Duchess of Würtemberg, whose unaccountable caprices, however, soon disgusted him. He was of a kindly and obliging character, negligent in externals, by which, indeed, he often incurred ridicule, but full of the most varied knowledge of general literature, and

* Prince Eugene had formerly bought the "Boy Praying" from the Marquis of Belleisle for 18,000 francs; Prince Lichtenstein, who had received this statue from Prince Eugene in exchange for some other, sold it to Frederick for 5,000 thalers.

† To Podewils, 22nd Aug., 1745: "Je suis plus mort que vif après sa nouvelle, que vous venez de m'annoncer; je perdis dans trois mois mes deux plus intimes amis." See a letter to M. de Camas, 30th August.

actuated by a comprehensive interest in all that was worth knowing.* He describes himself as a Deist and Epicurean, or sometimes as a modern Democritus: his opinions agreed generally, though not always, with those of the King; he would sometimes grow heated in argument, but had the art, on such occasions, of turning the discourse into a pleasanter channel by some Provençal *bon-mot*. His relations with Frederick grew every year closer and more affectionate; he was devoted to the King heart and soul, and often showed more confidence in the monarch's lucky star than Frederick himself.

Another prominent figure of the group was the physician, De la Mettrie, a native of the north of France, one of the most thoughtless writers that ever lived. He wrote books of the most offensive character, and was terrified when the consequences of his assertions were pointed out to him. He believed everything that was told him, and allowed himself in his works to blurt out the worst things imaginable of any one in the world, and then, with equal levity, he would rush into apologies to those he had thus offended, and overwhelm them with undeserved eulogiums. He owed his introduction to the King to the fact that he had been banished from France for his opinions, Frederick seeing in him the victim of the fanatical persecution not only of the priests, but of his brother physicians. Besides this, Frederick relished his wild and confused conversation, which, through all its froth and cloudiness, showed

* "Par un caprice singulier et par un entêtement ridicule," as he himself says: *Mémoires de l'Esprit Humain*, XII. 376.

sparks of genuine fire. There certainly are men in whose natures the moral sense is undeveloped. De la Mettrie was guilty of much which is best passed over in silence; but still, in his general behaviour he was well disposed and unselfish, and of a gaiety that nothing could overcloud, and which yet seldom became oppressive; the royal favour maintained him in his place among the society of Berlin.

Of a very different character was his countryman and patron Maupertuis, who thought himself justified by the European reputation which he enjoyed in all its fulness, in living exactly in his own way. In dress, demeanour, and domestic arrangements he distinguished himself by a haughty originality, which it was his aim to invest with dignity. In conversation his thoughts came out in lightning flashes, unexpected, abrupt, and energetic. His expressions, which he knew how to render especially flattering, were often offensive: he did not think it worth his while to spare those with whom he came in contact; at times he even conveyed his displeasure to Frederick in a sulky and petulant style. He insisted, however, on being treated with consideration himself. His good-will was chilled by the least show of rivalry, and his warmest patronage was given to those who never could throw him into the shade.* Year by year he fell off more and more from the doctrine of materialism, carrying to the highest point his conceptions of the capacity and power innate in man's spiritual nature.

* Forney, *Souvenirs d'un citoyen*, for this very reason is for, while d'Argens is against, him.

Algarotti returned to the court in 1747, no longer bent on winning distinction in diplomacy (in which his first essay had been unsuccessful), but on shining in society as a man of wit and cultivation. Frederick said of him, that he appropriated to himself all that was most interesting in every branch of knowledge, and could give a return "in ready money" to every question addressed to him on philosophy, art, or belles-lettres—an inestimable qualification for a literary courtier. He was an egotist, but not an offensive one; a dexterous flatterer, by which he succeeded in making his life pass agreeably, but was incapable of true devotion, either to friend or mistress.

We need not enlarge on the character or qualities of the honest Darget or of Chasot; the former an accomplished secretary, the latter an agreeable adjutant, and little more. The personage who excited the greatest interest of all the literary group was Voltaire, when he was at last induced to accept the advantageous position which Frederick offered him for life at Berlin. The King's invitation arrived at the moment when the philosopher's susceptibility was chafed by some petty slights put upon him in Parisian society. Frederick, who from his youth (except where business interfered) spoke French so habitually that one might be long at his court without hearing a word of German, was possessed by an irresistible impulse to express thoughts and feelings, of universal application, in French verse. From the time of the Romans, practical familiarity with an acquired and foreign tongue has been thought indispensable for the acquisition of that intellectual independence which enables us to

refuse a blind submission to home-bred and national influences, with regard to which habit often exercises the authority of law. The German courts of that day carried this to the length of utterly neglecting their mother tongue. Frederick, at all events, was anxious, as he wrote French so much, to write it as perfectly as possible. It was repugnant to his nature not to attain to mastery in everything he undertook; he determined to become the scholar of the man whose French style was distinguished by a purity and elegance based on study and insight into the language. Voltaire was in fact, as he himself expresses it, Frederick's master in composition. It was his duty to look over the royal poems (of some of which a very few copies were at first printed), and to point out and correct their defects of style. He proved himself anything but an indulgent teacher, sometimes wholly condemning Frederick's efforts, and recommending their entire suppression. Many of his compositions the King remodelled twenty times, and even then they were not approved of. Voltaire occasionally proposed very sweeping amendments, which his royal pupil adopted; now and then, however, came a poem which the master pronounced excellent as it stood: of one he said that he will not try his chisel on the Farnese Hercules. He generally expressed a high appreciation of his pupil's literary ability; he felt himself inspired by the King's ardour, and acknowledged that, while correcting Frederick's works, he was himself acquiring new lights to guide him in his own future studies.*

* 15 Oct., 1750. "Je goute le plaisir de lui être utile

All these men laboured diligently in their several vocations. D'Argens gave himself up exclusively to literature, the whole circle of which he strove to compass. The peaceable Algarotti allowed himself to be so carried away by surrounding influences as to devote his attention to the art of war, ancient and modern—to commenting the theory of Machiavelli and the tactics of the Scipios. It was in Potsdam that Voltaire completed one of his best works, his 'Siècle de Louis XIV.,' the materials for which he had collected long before.* It would be too much to assert positively, though it is not improbable, that the contemplation of the all-pervading activity of a highly accomplished prince may have influenced him in this production. It would have been an offence against good taste in that society to have acknowledged such an impelling cause; but Voltaire himself often says that his residence in Potsdam raised him above innumerable considerations which would have weighed upon him in Paris. He felt, in his association with the King, a new impulse to the production of great works.

Frederick, bent on acquiring a style which in his eyes was classical, was actuated by the same feeling. Neither political nor military occupations checked the productiveness of his pen; nor did he look merely to the advantages of literary labour, but to those also

dans ses études; et j'en prends de nouvelles forces pour diriger les miennes. J'apprends en le corrigeant à me corriger moi même."

* 18 Oct., 1750. "Je finirai ici ce siècle de Louis XIV. que peut-être je n'aurais jamais fini à Paris."

of associating with literary men. "Mind," he says on one occasion, "is a fire, which goes out if unsupplied with fuel." He thought it the duty of a prince to sharpen his intelligence by intercourse with the intelligent; and, moreover, lively conversation and scientific discussion gave him great personal delight.

The circle of his associates was well chosen for such purposes, so long as the natural antagonism between Maupertuis and Voltaire served only to enliven the society. The one a natural philosopher of the fantastic and mystical kind, the other a cold and caustic poet; the former full of an energy, not always kept under control,—in conversation an enemy to long speeches, lying in wait till he could strike in with a telling hit; the poet a skeleton in frame, whose life seemed a mere breath, but ever dogmatizing, and forcing the discourse into his own channel. Voltaire lived and moved in hostility to positive religion, especially Catholicism; Maupertuis, from the day of Voltaire's appearance at Potsdam, never missed hearing mass. Yet they had much in common. Both were Newtonians; Maupertuis, perhaps, even more unjust than Voltaire to Leibnitz and Wolf: moreover, they were old friends and associates.

The King was, by his whole nature, more inclined to Voltaire than to Maupertuis. Every one must have experienced that the relations of mind to mind are not arbitrary or accidental. There are persons whose mere presence puts us out of tune, in whose company we feel oppressed and dull; others, in contact with whom the thoughts wake up, the words flow of themselves, while the soul seems to rejoice in its

own activity. Frederick stood in this relation to Voltaire, whose mind he pronounced the best organized and most graceful that nature had ever created.

The only reason why Voltaire, under these circumstances, did not attain a complete and oppressive mastery over all around him, is to be found in certain of his peculiarities, which set bounds to the prepossession felt by the King for his intellectual character.

The stories, one more odious than another, which at that time were the town-talk of Berlin, are familiar to us from frequent repetition. Jealousy and avarice seemed to be Voltaire's ruling passions. His only pleasure appeared to be in revenging slights or sowing dissensions even between his nearest friends. D'Argens was sometimes taken in by him, but he had not so easy a victim in the subtle Italian, Algarotti. Frederick says that a book as thick as a volume of Bayle might be written of Voltaire's follies; that, with an intellect of the highest order, he combined one of the blackest and most perfidious of hearts; that in his intervals of apparent calm he was most certain to be planning some treachery, and that those with whom he most seemed to agree must be most on their guard against him.* We

* Frederick to the Margravine "ce 22" (this is the only date), he relates the affair with the Jew. "C'est l'affaire d'un fripon, qui veut tromper un filou.—Il n'est pas permis, qu'un homme d'esprit que Voltaire en fasse un aussi indigne abus.—Voltaire s'est emporté, et a sauté au visage du Juif; il s'en est fallu de peu, qu'il n'ait dit des sottises a M' de Coccei." Again: "Voltaire avec son esprit est la fable de la ville; ses incartades

need not pause to sift truth from exaggeration in this judgment; to do so would involve details of the most repulsive pettiness: it is enough that this was the general impression made by his conduct in Berlin. At times the King refers this to a principle of natural compensation; were it otherwise, Voltaire would exercise too great a power over his fellow-men. Frederick himself tried hard to bear with him, in the hope that one so advanced in years must end by arriving at a knowledge of himself; and during a constant alternation of favour and disgrace, of repulses and reconciliations, tolerable relations were still kept up between the monarch and the poet.

At length, however, a circumstance occurred which brought out all the ill humour on both sides, and ended in a total rupture between the two.

(The two hostile natures, Voltaire and Maupertuis, came at last to a breach. The poet could as little endure the official as the social authority of a man whom he had himself originally recommended to Frederick, but whom, at bottom, he looked upon as a mind of an inferior order. It is quite conceivable that their enmity was embittered by the alternate triumphs of the one over the other in society.* Injurious expressions were bandied to and fro between them: Voltaire ascribed to the influence of the President of the Academy a bitter critique which appeared on his last work. Maupertuis took offence at the

desennuyent les fainéants de la capitale.” Later still: “*L’âme la plus noire et la plus perfide aigrit et gâte tout son esprit.*”

* Not alone does Thiebault make this statement; but I find it also confirmed by Frederick’s own words.

nomination by the King of a corresponding member on Voltaire's recommendation.

At this juncture Maupertuis allowed himself to be hurried by anger into violent proceedings on the occasion of an attempt made by Professor König, of Leyden, to contest with him the discovery of a law of nature to which he ascribed an exaggerated value. He set in motion both the civil power and the Academy to pronounce a letter, upon which the dispute turned, a forgery. Misled, it seems, by the approbation which his views commanded in the circles where he exercised sway, he at the same time published a correspondence, in which he gave the reins to his imagination. This correspondence contains some good suggestions; for instance, a proposal for a more energetic exploration of the southern continents, which has since given results of which the world had at that time no conception; another for the prosecution of microscopic inquiry, with more of the same character; but with these is mixed up much that is wild and extravagant. The writer shows himself not averse to return to astrology, and declares his belief in the possibility of working up the mind to the perception of futurity.*

In this union of obstinate conceit with scientific hallucinations, Voltaire perceived the long wished for opportunity of crushing his rival's reputation. He took part with the Leyden professor, for whom otherwise he had no partiality, and turned the whole force of his irony, in the 'Akakia,' against the mysticism and presumption of the President of the Academy.

* Lettres de M' de Maupertuis, Dresde, 1752, p. 154.

But, it may be asked, are literary quarrels such a novelty? and what was there in this one so peculiar, as to render it so frequent a subject of attention to the whole literary world?

The truth is, that in this proceeding Voltaire personally offended the King. He employed the royal licence, which he had obtained for quite another work, to get this satire printed in Potsdam. The King, who would not suffer ridicule to be thrown on the President of his Academy, to whom he had given so brilliant a position, forced Voltaire to suppress the publication, and extorted from him a promise to bring out no other edition. But no consideration had power to check in its literary impulses that mind which seemed created to destroy the totality of those ideas on which rested the actual fabric of society in his time. Not even the King, whom he had so often lauded as the Solomon of the North, was strong enough for this. Voltaire did not lose a moment in getting his satire printed elsewhere, and copies of it were soon in circulation at Berlin.

The King was deeply offended. Since his arrival at Potsdam, Voltaire's aim had been to oust from Frederick's service every opponent and every rival; and he had, in some cases, succeeded. Frederick thought he was now desirous of driving away Mau-pertuis, in order to occupy the president's chair in his stead. For such a part he did not think the poet qualified. Besides, here was an event until now unheard of in Prussia—a royal command had been disobeyed in the very capital! In his indignation

at such an outrage, heightened, as it was, by the tricks and treacheries which the occurrence brought to light, the King had Voltaire's libel burnt at the corners of the streets of Berlin by the common hangman.

Voltaire was too thoroughly an author to allow the freedom of his pen to be controlled in any way whatever; Frederick too thoroughly a King to permit any contempt of his authority under his own eyes.

From this moment a separation was inevitable, though attempts were made to bring the King and the poet together again. But even after their parting, the conflicting elements jarred once more. Voltaire had taken away with him a copy of Frederick's poems, and on its being demanded of him in Frankfurt, a discreditable scene followed, in which the slippery dexterity of the author was unequally matched against the dry zeal of a Prussian official;* a conflict which unpleasantly attracted the attention of Europe.

In speaking of this quarrel, Frederick afterwards said, that he ought never to have taken any notice of this affair, in which he had come off like a man who interferes between two combatants, and gets a thump for his pains. In his anxiety to hinder the rivals from fighting, he lost both.

Maupertuis could not get over the 'Akakia.' He was never himself after its appearance. Voltaire meditated revenge from a distance. It was not

* Freitag's report in Varnhagen: Berliner Kalender, 1845.

immediately, nor, indeed, until the moment arrived, in the midst of a complication of affairs dangerous for the King, that he turned his weapons against Frederick, to wound not the writer only, but the King and the man by the same blow.

Frederick had hoped, by the sacrifice of domestic privacy, to enjoy a literary retirement, and to spend his leisure hours in intercourse with the men whom fame marked out as the leading minds of the age, and who were personally acceptable to him. But this peaceful retirement is hardly attainable by man—those associations which might make him happiest, being often the very ones which expose him most to the storms of passion.

There is another point of view in which Frederick's royal station bears upon his literary tastes. It has often been remarked, that his words and his actions were in contradiction; that his nature was influenced by two opposite tendencies, the one of which was apparent in Frederick the King, the other in Frederick the author.

We cannot conclude this survey of the first epoch of Frederick's life without devoting a few more words to explain the relation borne by his general views to his government.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE KING'S OPINIONS AND MODE OF GOVERNMENT.

It would be presumption to attempt extracting a complete theory of Frederick's opinions from his works as they developed themselves in the times and in the circle we have been describing.

He began by diligently studying many of the most important productions of ancient and modern literature. Stimulated by reading, society, or life, he made various essays in poetry, often with the sole object of shaking off the weight of business, or mastering some unpleasant impression. Those who consider him as a writer who aims at instructing or delighting the public, will judge him by an inappropriate standard. His works are impressed with the character which the time and circumstance stamped upon them. In this respect he was entirely different from Voltaire, who laboured only in order to work upon his readers; while Frederick, on the contrary, derived unmixed enjoyment from the act of production, in and for itself.

Among his more important works, the first that presents itself to us is 'The Palladium,' a burlesque epic, in which the hypocritical piety and real viciousness of his enemies in the late war are ridiculed in a

style of broad caricature;* an extravaganza, in Callot's manner, full of talent, but wild and unruly. On the other hand, Charles of Lorraine, who figures absurdly in this satire, appears in a brilliant light in Frederick's serious poem, 'On the Art of War,' in which that prince's passage of the Rhine is put on a level with the exploits of Hannibal. He is offered the pure homage and well-earned praise of an enemy, who has no voice for the howl of hate. Seldom has a didactic poem been written with such thorough knowledge of the subject-matter as this. It is enlivened by reminiscences of the recent war, which breathe the true fire of patriotism. The picture of the officer returning to his home is thoroughly German; while a still higher merit must be ascribed to the character of the general, which Frederick himself aimed at realizing. Voltaire once asked him, whether the battle did not fill him with fury? "On the contrary," he replied, "there is no moment which

* It is well known that the capture of Valori, who figures as the Palladium, is the main subject of this poem. Nevertheless, Valori never could get it into his hands. "Toute la grace," he writes on the 24th of January, 1750, to his court, which likewise showed some curiosity on this subject, "que mes instances ont pu obtenir a été, qu'on m'en feroit la lecture devant (le roi) de sorte que je me suis rendu dans son cabinet, ou le M^r Darget, son lecteur, en lut 4 chants. C'est un ouvrage extrêmement badin et plaisant au possible, il est effectivement de nature, à ne pouvoir être confié. . . . Cet ouvrage est autant plus singulier, qu'il a été fait en peu de tems. Il a été imprimé dans une des chambres du château, avec toutes les précautions les plus exactes. Le livre est orné de vignettes et d'estampes a chaque commencement du chant, où je suis peint comme le Palladion des Prussiens que le prince Charles veut enlever."

calls for greater presence of mind." So in this poem he represents the general guiding the movements of the fight, controlling every disorder, strengthening every point of weakness, expecting nothing from luck, everything from himself; thoughtful in council, desperate in act. In the court of Mars' temple the novice is taught the laws of honour and rigorous duty; greed and ferocity are condemned, humanity and self-sacrifice honoured; the image of the god of battles is surrounded by wakeful laboriousness, cool valour, stratagem, with her Proteus forms, and creative imagination, who throws out her plans, glowing with a heaven-breathed fire.

In many of his smaller poems the author would seem to value only the enjoyments of life; exertion is treated as a sacrifice of freedom. We meet with imitations of Lucretius, in which are repeated the dogmas of Epicurus; but where Frederick, in one of his epistles, propounds the opinion that Providence does not trouble itself with trifles, we can hardly infer that he intended this theory to be taken in the sense in which it was understood by Malebranche.*

Throughout his works, however, we find an earnest tendency towards what is genuine and true in matters of life. Mortal intelligence is treated, according to the philosophy of Locke, as incapable of grasping the infinite; but the conclusion drawn from this by Frederick is, that man ought not to aspire to this higher region, but rather devote himself to virtue here upon earth, and learn to distinguish good from

* See Moses Mendelsohn's *Gesammelte Schriften*, IV. II. 85.

evil. He impresses on one of his brothers that virtue and capacity have no ancestry ; he who would acquire a name must earn it. He deploras the miserable ambition of the German princes, who, on their return from their visits to France, strive to reproduce at their tiny courts Meudon or Versailles in miniature. No one was ever more thoroughly persuaded of the futility of the life of courts and cities than Frederick. He expresses perfect contentment in his solitude, as pleasure is only to be found in intellectual occupation ; diligence must complete what nature has given. It was love of fame that spurred him on to war, but he knows, nevertheless, the value of human judgments, how they depend on circumstances, are tossed to and fro by trifles, and often prefer the brilliant to the enduring and the strong. From the accidents which determine praise and blame he derives the lesson that men must scorn the incense of applause and love virtue for her own sake.

He once owned to his sister that his philosophy had two faces ; that in times of peace and success he enrolled himself among the disciples of Epicurus, while in misfortune he adhered to the doctrines of the Stoics : which is as much to say that he tempered enjoyment by reflection, and endeavoured to surmount adversity by moral elevation. This is precisely the doctrine of a philosopher of his own century, that out of the conflict of our inclinations to enjoyment and to virtue, when the former is bridled by the latter, is evolved the highest moral and physical good.* In Frederick's poems, however, sometimes the one ten-

* Kant, *Anthropologie*, 239.

dency and sometimes the other prevails, according to the temper of mind in which it was composed.

Frederick did not confide to his Muse all the poetry of his character. We have already spoken of his proficiency on the flute; here also each of his compositions was an effort to overcome a particular difficulty. Generally, however, he expressed in his music his emotions, his joys, and, above all, that sadness which hung about him through life. His verses are often rather reasoning under lively excitement than poetry; as Voltaire expresses it, "not of the genuine French colouring, but all the more original in expression for the want of it, and full of ideas which sweep a wide horizon."

As in his poems, so likewise in his letters and conversations, Frederick continually employed himself on the knottiest problems that man can propose for his solution, such as freedom and necessity (which he calls the noblest theme for the "divine" metaphysics), destiny or providence, the materiality or immortality of the soul, to the last of which he was perpetually recurring.

He sometimes holds the connection between soul and body to be indissoluble, so long as individual identity is preserved. What is left, he asks, of "the me" when stripped of the attributes of sensation and memory? Man finds himself in the midst of an infinity of time which has been before him, and of time which will come after him. Assuming that he had no existence before birth, he must thence conclude what awaits him after death. The night of the grave closes around the thinking being. He did not, how-

ever, always adhere to this view ; it could not hold its ground in his mind against the death of a friend he loved, or the severing of a link in his family circle.* He said, on such an occasion, that though the soul be dependent on the body, yet it is often seen, at the very moment of the dissolution of this our mortal frame, to take a new flight and disclose a wondrous power. "Perhaps," he writes, "I shall one day behold again those whom I have lost. How happy should I be, could I in a future state see face to face the great men of antiquity." At one time he was most impressed by the notions of Lucretius, at another by the arguments of Plato in his defence of Socrates.

Not to believe is by no means to deny ; though simply not to reject is very far from feeling conviction. I do not know whether it be possible to escape from this scepticism, unless by accepting Revelation as a guide, which Frederick was in no way disposed to do. We have seen his wavering between the doctrine of a blind fate and that of an all-ruling Providence, and how, in the decisive events of his life, he came back to the latter. He generally maintained that the universe must remain an inexplicable riddle, unless we assume a Providence which guides the world's destinies to some lofty goal. On one point his belief could not be shaken ; whenever in conversation any one doubted his faith in a living God, he would bring forward the popular proofs of the exist-

* To the Margravine ; "notre vie est si brieve qu'à bien considerer les choses nous sommes insensés, nous affliger de la perte d'amis, que nous rejoindrons dans peu."

ence of an Almighty Being, particularly those derived from the evidence of design in nature, and would repeat with the strongest expression of conviction, "I know not God, but I worship him."

The scepticism he showed on most points of positive doctrine was, no doubt, connected with the line of policy he had adopted towards the different religious professions in his dominions, and was, in fact, necessary to save him from inconsistency. But as we have seen him stopping short in conversation, on perceiving that his want of orthodoxy caused pain to others, we may be sure that he would have carefully avoided promulgating his deviations from commonly received opinions,—deviations which he was keenly sensible led to nothing that could satisfy an individual mind or supply the spiritual wants of a people. He thought himself fortunate in finding toleration for these opinions in himself.

Frederick rested in the conviction that the aim of life was to be found in the happiness of the individual, and that true philosophy consisted not in daring speculations, which reduce the science to mere guess-work severed from practical application, but in the morality, which enables man to moderate and curb the violence of first impulses; that the secret of happiness was to be sought in virtuous habits, self-knowledge, the diligent practice of self-control, and moderate views of life. Frederick's religious feelings never rose above the simplest elements; his moral sense, on the other hand, was inspired with the most vital energy.

He looked upon self-control as one of the first

(Duties of man, which, as doubly binding on one highly placed, he laboured unceasingly to fulfil in his own case. He acknowledged to his friends that, on occasions of disagreeable excitement, his effort was to master by pure dint of reflection the first emotion, which in him was peculiarly violent. In this attempt he sometimes succeeded, sometimes failed, and was then guilty of rash actions, and ended in being very angry with himself.*

He made out for himself a theory of personal happiness, which consisted mainly in not looking too seriously upon human affairs, and in contenting one's self with the present, without taking overmuch thought for the morrow. We are bound, he thought, to congratulate ourselves when misfortune passes us by unscathed, to enjoy the good that falls to our share, and never to permit spleen and gloom to pour their bitterness into our cup of joy.

"I have conquered the fumes of ambition," he writes; "I leave others to be led astray by error, cunning, and vanity. My sole aim is to enjoy the days that Heaven allots me, to taste of pleasure without excess, and to do all the good I can."† This last wish especially is ever present to his mind.

* Je mets œuvre tout ce, que j'ai de réflexion pour éviter le premier moment, qui est tres vif chez moi, et tant que cette vivacité du premier moment dure, je me garde soigneusement, de décider sur ce, que j'ai vu, sur ce que j'ai entendu, et qui m'a echauffé la bile; malgré mes soins je ne l'évite pas toujours, ce premier moment, et pour lors Monsieur fait parfois des sottises et Monsieur s'en ronge les doigts.

† Letter to the Margravine, 7th Oct., 1747. "Pour moi je suis heureusement desabusé de cette passion (d'ambition); j'ai

He preferred Racine to all other poets, placing him far above Voltaire, not merely for the harmony and melody of his style, but also for the matter of his verses. On his journeys he used to read Racine's plays over and over again, and learned whole speeches by heart; but nothing in that poet's writings made a deeper impression on him than the scene in the 4th act of 'Britannicus,' when Burrhus asks Nero,

"Et ne suffit-il pas, Seigneur, à vos souhaits
Que le bonheur public soit un de vos bienfaits?"

* * * * *

and says further on,

"Quel plaisir de penser et de dire en vous-même,
'Partout, en ce moment, on me bénit, on m'aime.'"

"What can be at once more pathetic and more sublime," asked Frederick, "than this passage, which I can never read without the deepest emotion?" He was forced to lay down the book; tears choked his utterance. "This Racine," he cried, "wrings my heart."

No one who knows Frederick merely through his campaigns and his vigorous administration would look for such tenderness in him, and yet the latter stands in close connection with the qualities that exhibit themselves in the former.

It seemed to him a piece of ridiculous dullness in the world to envy the happiness of princes; they are

cuvé le filtre qu'elle m'avoit donné, et je ne songe, qu'à écouler d'une façon tranquille les jours que le ciel me départ, de profiter du plaisir sans en abuser, de faire tout le bien que je puis et d'abandonner l'erreur, l'astuce et la vanité à ceux qui en veulent être les dupes."

ill served, their orders imperfectly executed, and yet everything that happens is laid to their charge; views are attributed to them which they have never conceived; they are hated when their requirements are heavy; and, to crown all, the world easily grows tired of them.

Who would believe that, even in his youthful flush of fame and heyday of life, Frederick had seriously conceived the notion of abdicating? He had formed the design of giving up the crown to his brother, of whom, in early life, he entertained the highest opinion. At first, indeed, he would have suffered from feeling another's will imposed on his own, and he had devised means of avoiding this subjection. But he was never carried away by the mere charm of power or riches. He could have lived content, he said, with twelve thousand, nay, with twelve hundred dollars; he would have had friends, and been a true friend to them, throughout a life entirely devoted to the pursuit of science.

But even while caressing and brooding over the thought of becoming nothing more than a simple but independent votary of letters, he saw clearly, on consideration of surrounding circumstances and personal character, especially at those critical moments in which his life was so fertile, that all this was impossible. "I have a people," he exclaims, "whom I love; I must bear the burden that is laid upon me; I must continue at my post."

What is it makes the man, if not the inner impulse and spring of his moral self? We will not go so far as to say that the mood in which Frederick

cherished these schemes was the prevailing one, that he was not constantly penetrated with the sense of innate kingship;—but yet the feeling was there, and never left him. The reflection that his wish was unattainable, and the very inclination we have described for another course of life, quickened his sense of duty for that station which was his birthright.

We ought not to omit what he has himself told us, that he would often have been glad to prolong his sleep of a morning, but his servant had strict orders not to allow him to indulge the habit, on the ground assigned by Frederick, that business might suffer by it.

He on one occasion avows that he has greater pleasure in literary labours than in the management of political affairs; but he adds, that he would not on that account withdraw from the latter a single moment of activity and attention; since for such cares he was born. A king, he tells us in his 'Political Testament,' who, from weakness or love of pleasure, neglects the noble duty of promoting the good of his people, is not only useless on the throne, but guilty of a crime. A prince is not raised to his high rank, and intrusted with supreme power, in order to batten on the wealth of his people, and to riot in pleasures, while the world pines in suffering around. "A prince is the chief servant of the state, and well paid to maintain the dignity of his place; but he is bound to labour diligently for the good of the state, and, at the very least, to administer, earnestly and sincerely, such matters as are of weightiest moment."* He

* Un souverain n'est pas élevé à ce haut rang, on ne lui a pas confié le pouvoir suprême, pour qu'il vive dans la mollesse,

thoroughly approved of the woman's question, who asked the King of Epirus, when he refused to listen to her complaints, "What, then, was he King for, if he would not do her right?"

Frederick's conception of his royal duties reminds us of the idea of the kingly office in China,—that oldest of secular states,—as laid down by her wise men and lawgivers. The prince, according to them, "is the living reason of things; his might is unbounded, but only that through it may be realized the supremacy of order. The man who is highly placed, we are told in the discourses of the great master,* must confer benefits without prodigality; must exact services and dues without harshness or greed; must have dignity and majesty without ostentation. So long as he requires what is reasonable and necessary, who shall be wroth against him? Magnanimity wins the many; frankness awakens confidence. Whilst ye are active and watchful, business goes on well; whilst ye show an interest in all, the people feels itself happy." Such sentiments might have been spoken by Frederick.

The subordination of the idea of religion in an energetic character cannot fail to call into more active life conscientiousness in the secular calling of the

pourqu'il s'engraisse de la substance du peuple et qu'il soit heureux pendant que tout le monde souffre. Le souverain est le premier serviteur de l'état, il est bien payé pour qu'il soutienne bien la dignité de son caractère, mais on demande de lui qu'il travaille efficacement pour le bien de l'état et qu'il gouverne au moins avec attention les principales affaires. (Testam. Polit.)

* The book Lun-hu; in Pauthier's *Confucius et Mencius*, 196.

individual. The soul, in such a case, is not, indeed, lifted up by the feeling of that spiritual bond which gathers all in one, which satisfies it, even when the result does not correspond to the endeavour. There is, indeed, something dry and narrow in the unspiritual mind, but its practical sense becomes all the keener, as it ever demands that the end should answer to the means. The spirit of his age seconded this tendency in Frederick, and inspired his efforts; and, moreover, the mere sense of duty discharged brings with it an unspeakable satisfaction.

To qualify himself for his practical duties, Frederick thought it necessary to study men, as he says himself; those especially who served him as instruments, or who were the objects of his care. Amongst his subjects he contrasted the subtle and pliant Prussian, whose versatility, however, especially at home, was liable to degenerate into mawkishness, with the simple and straightforward Pomeranian: he did not class as on a level with either one or the other the inhabitant of the Electorate, who valued the comforts of life too highly, and whose capacity for business seldom rose above mediocrity: the nobility of Magdeburg had a livelier spirit, and many men of mark had arisen amongst them: the natives of Lower Silesia still wanted a Prometheus to impregnate them (by education) with the fire from heaven; they had hitherto shown less disposition for exertion and industry than love of enjoyment and easy-going appetite for titles. In Minden and the Margravate he found a lack of education and training, but not of capacity; Cleves, of all his dominions, least came up

to his wishes. He strove to elevate all his subjects, and to unite them by sinking all provincial appellations in the common name of Prussian, which he used with particular effect in the field of battle.

We have seen how he strove in every branch of the state service to train up assistants according to the inherent requirements of each department; as, for example, in that of justice, of civil and of military administration. In the same spirit he had conceived a school of diplomacy and foreign affairs, set on foot in 1752, under the direction of Podewils. Those gifts of nature which must be the groundwork of all success were to be developed in this institution through the medium of general knowledge and by the inculcation of the true idea of the state.

The ministers at the head of the different departments sent in their reports to the King from day to day, on all points of doubt and difficulty. Frederick was not favourable to convocations of his privy council, on the ground that "in the multitude of counsellors" there is seldom wisdom, but that an affair is rather obscured in their hands, by private jealousies and squabbles. He chose rather to proceed by written interrogatories, containing statements of the reasons for and against, which the prince has only to read and examine; a sound understanding could easily master the main points as they presented themselves.*

* Les ministres exposent le pour et le contre dans les cas litigieux ou difficiles ce qui met le souverain en état de prendre son parti du premier coup d'œil pourvu qu'il se donne la peine de lire et de bien entendre l'affaire proposée; un esprit juste

Such a system of government requires no less application than capacity to carry it out. Frederick's intellect was as rare as it was many-sided. We have seen him striving after mastery of style; taking the largest views on legal and judicial regulation; following out civil administration into the minutest details of accounts; planning new manœuvres for his campaigns,—nay, his very visits to the hospitals were not without fruit, for his father had early insisted on his frequently attending at such places, so that he acquired some knowledge of surgery; we even find him in particular cases suggesting improvements in manufactures, and regularly drawing the plans for his own buildings.

To this manifold capacity were added a penetrating regard to the arguments laid before him, and the full determination to do all as it should be done.

Questions were not always decided at the first discussion. When a subject had been brought forward, and the privy counsellors had withdrawn, Frederick would take up his flute; but his thoughts were less busied with the notes, which, indeed, were but the utterance of his predominant feelings, than with the subject of the council that had just broken up: in total solitude Frederick debated with himself all difficult questions, and pronounced his decision when his advisers returned.

(The foreign ambassadors often complained in their

saisit avec facilité le point capital d'une question. Cette methode d'expédier les affaires est préférable a l'usage des conseils qu'on pratique ailleurs par ce que ce n'est pas de grands conseils que resultent des avis sages.

despatches of the King's undecided and even timid style of expressing himself in their audiences with him.* His resolves, however, were conceived in the depths of his spirit, and, once formed, were fixed for ever.

Another frequent cause of complaint in the diplomatic communications from the Prussian court is, the King's determination to do all by himself, and that the foreign ambassadors can obtain no answer on any point but from Frederick in person. The management of foreign affairs they represent as divided between two ministers, neither of whom was acquainted with the whole. A privy counsellor, who may perhaps have a general view of affairs, must not venture to put himself in communication with the representative of a foreign power. They say that there is but one man in the kingdom, except Frederick himself, familiar at once with the internal and external affairs of Prussia. They describe almost like a mythic personage this man, who works with the King, accompanies him in his journeys, knows everything, has a universal experience, whom, yet, no one can boast of having seen in the flesh, and whose name undergoes wonderful metamorphoses in their despatches. This mysterious personage is Eichel, to whose correspondence with Podewils we have more than once referred, who held the pen in the royal cabinet, wrote down Frederick's verbal resolutions, and drew up the

* Tyrconnel, 1751, describes him—one would scarce believe it possible—as “l’homme du monde le plus timide, le plus indécis, et qui a le moins de courage d’esprit; il est naturellement paresseux et déteste tout ce qui s’appelle art militaire.”

most important orders by the King's directions; a man of unwearied industry, arising from love of his work and personal devotion to his sovereign, sharp-sighted and full of judgment, but somewhat pedantic withal, and possessed by a sort of awe at the incalculable movements of the master-mind before him. The charge which strangers have urged against Frederick, of disregarding the representations of ministers, when opposed to his own views, is contradicted by cabinet documents; at times, he even manifests impatience that he cannot carry out his will. The King's dislike to verbal deliberations increased with time. Whenever he consulted two of his ministers on the same point, he thought it impolitic to let the one whose report he asked for first, know of his application to the other. This arose from his anxiety to avoid the jealousy and ill will which the preference given to the one over the other was likely to occasion. A different practice, moreover, would have impaired that secrecy which Frederick considered the soul of business.

"I conceal my views," he once said to one of his readers, "from those about me; nay, I even mislead them on the subject; for if they guessed my intentions, they might talk about them without knowing the consequences. It is only by secrecy that I can protect myself from harm."

"I keep my own secret," he says again, "and employ only one secretary, of whose trustworthiness I am assured. Unless I allow myself to be bribed, it is impossible to divine my intention." Of foreign affairs, he left to his ministers those only of a some-

what legal character ; the guidance of the rest he kept in his own hands.

He evinced so much suspicion of the secrecy of others, that it became a rule in intercourse with him, however unconstrained in other respects, rather to avoid confidential communications.

At the same time, he was constantly on the watch for everything that fell from those about him. "Entering into any conversation that people may begin with one," he writes, "listening to everything that folks would have one hear, allowing oneself to be drawn into questionable connections, is a form of affability that may have worse results than harshness itself. From the first my object has been to impress upon those about me, that with me they will gain nothing by tricks and misrepresentation, that I am a man who will look at things with my own eyes, and not to be shaken in the plans I have once formed. Goodnature must be united with firmness. A prince should surround himself with worthy and honest men ; though he may gain little for himself by such a practice, it is all in all for the welfare of his people." His preference of foreigners as his personal associates, may have been partly caused by their independence of petty local interests.

If monarchy is to be a reality, the fountain-head of resolves must be untroubled by extraneous influences ; the supreme will of a state must base itself on actualities.

Nothing, in Frederick's opinion, was more injurious to the interests of France, than the want of united action among the different ministers of that country,

each of whom had his own peculiar objects in view, and strove after his own private interests. It would have been as impossible, says he, for Newton to have worked out his system in conjunction with Des Cartes and Leibnitz, as to work out any political system effectually which does not spring from one head, and that head the prince's. Minerva must spring fully formed from the brow of Jove. More thoroughly impressed with his own conceptions than with the ideas of others, a monarch will throw all his energy into the attainment of an object which calls his self-love in aid of his determination. Finance, civil politics, and military organization are inseparable. There is no such thing as sound administration in one or the other of these departments separately, but only in all taken together.* The three must work together, like the chariot-horses in the Olympic games, which run the course with equal pace and harmonious action, and secure the prize to their charioteer.

In finance, and his whole internal administration, Frederick followed, as we have seen, in the footsteps of his father, whose image and recollection were ever present to him, and of whom he would sometimes in conversation mention traits of goodnature which no other record has preserved; though, a more frequent topic with him was his father's harshness, and the

* Il faut, qu'un gouvernement bien conduit ait un système aussi lié que peut l'être un système de philosophie, que toutes les raisons prises soient bien raisonnées, et que les finances, la politique et le militaire concourent à un même but, qui est l'affermissement de l'état et l'accroissement de la puissance. (Test. Polit.)

sufferings he had endured at his hands. He describes him as "a terrible man, before whom all trembled, but honest to the core—a philosopher king in the true sense of the word. His fault was that he had formed too high an estimate of human capabilities, and required from his subjects, and those about him, the same strictness he was conscious of in himself. No one, without personal experience of it, could conceive what a spirit of order he had introduced into every department of his government; how he strove for the highest possible perfection in the minutest particulars. All that he was himself, he ascribed to the untiring industry, admirable economy, and severe discipline of his father; who, while he tried to make a soldier of his son, durst scarcely hope to succeed in the attempt. He pictures to himself the astonishment of that father, could he rise from the grave, and see his son at the head of a victorious army in the heart of the once imperial dominions; with a cavalry, above all, such as had not been dreamt of in the old king's time. He would not believe his eyes."

If we may venture upon a final estimate of Frederick's relation to his father, we must consider it as having exercised far less influence upon the world than that of Charlemagne to Pepin, or Alexander to Philip, but as, in itself, more remarkable than either.

In the father we see self-control still in the guise of self-will, with all the harshness and violence of the seventeenth century, united with a religious tendency, in which is discernible a Pietistic vein. We see him submitting to the idea of the general subordination in

the German Empire, even when it was inconvenient or injurious to himself. In the son, on the other hand, a lively impulse towards self-formation is apparent even from his earliest years; he grapples with the sciences with the double zeal of a self-taught votary. Of religion he lays hold of only the most general principles; he acknowledges the Imperial power only in so far as it conferred rights, not where it imposed duties. The natural antagonism of such a father and such a son led to those early struggles which turned the eyes of Europe on the Prussian court. Had Frederick William carried out the intention, which contemporary authorities ascribe to him, of executing his son, the State, which he was so anxious to maintain, would have been in danger of being again overthrown by such an act. He would have been guilty of a moral suicide; or rather, if we may be allowed the illustration, it would have been one head of Janus destroying the other. It was this very son, who, in every practical point, showed himself the true finisher of his father's work. We may see, by their example, how one age evolves itself out of another, how identity and difference are possible at the same time. Progress is the only true development. The foundations must be laid by the stronger and more reckless will, still under the dominion of the first involuntary impulse; to rear the fabric is reserved for the more self-conscious activity, whose ken embraces a wider horizon.

Frederick united the rigid administration of his father, with that impulse towards self-culture, which was born with him, and which reconciled the

contradiction between the military character of his reign, and the tendencies of his century. The success of his warlike undertakings secured to his kingdom the strength it still needed to give it permanence, consideration, and position, among the European powers.

As a general Frederick always acknowledged himself indebted to the instructions given him by Prince Eugene of Savoy, during his youthful service in the imperial camp. One recommendation in particular he never forgot—to study the history of former campaigns, and to make present to his mind the positions of the generals who conducted them, in order to cultivate in himself the faculty of striking out the right course in emergencies. He occasionally styled himself Eugene's pupil; but his real school was that of all great generals, to which the Prince did but introduce him, and in which he studied with the utmost diligence and zeal.

The politician cannot model himself on precedents, for the world is ever changing, and the sum of political wisdom consists in insight into the present as it develops itself. The usual conditions of political reputation, knowledge of forms, and care not to offend, or to commit oneself in words, were not Frederick's forte. He spoke with vivacity, and was not sparing of sarcasm. Expressions of his, transmitted from mouth to mouth, made him enemies in most courts—nay, sometimes irritated even whole nations (as for example, the Hungarians) against him. He would never have made a successful diplomatist. But nature had implanted and culture had

developed in him the qualities which are required for the supreme conduct of affairs, such as the consciousness of his own position and the foundations on which it rested, that natural keenness of observation which gives a death-blow to all falsehood, the sense of what can and what cannot be done at a particular juncture, wise moderation and circumspect determination. It was by this union of powers that he achieved an undertaking which, according to the ideas of the time, was utterly desperate, and which was carried to a successful issue no less by the talent of the politician than by the skill of the general.

The position, however, which he now assumed, in no way corresponded with what might have been generally expected of a newly established power. Had it depended on Frederick himself, he would have placed himself in a very different relation towards Germany, by bringing West Prussia within his dominions, extending his frontier towards Saxony, thus escaping the mortification and anxiety of seeing his capital exposed to the attack of a dangerous neighbour and his East Prussian territory separated from the other provinces. It is probable, also, that he would have furnished himself with a naval force, but experience forbade him to entertain such a design.*

But even within the narrow limits to which he was

* If Prussia possessed Danzig, "alors," said he in the *Testament Politique* of 1752, "je conseillerais d'avoir une trentaine de galères avec quelques bacs, comme les Suédois, sur lesquels ils ont des batteries considérables qui entre les îles forment un môle et servent à défendre les galères qui sont à la rade, on pourroit outre cela entretenir 8 ou 10 frégates qui escorteront ces galères aux lieux où l'on en auroit besoin."

restricted, he had succeeded in founding a power, unassailable, invincible, and independent. Its historical basis was the principality, with its subjection to the Empire, and its hereditary and reversionary rights, from which the monarchy of Frederick extricated itself, carrying in its existence the proof of its inevitableness; in it the Protestant continental state of Northern Germany—which for centuries prince and people, energy, capacity, and good fortune, had combined to raise—was at length realized.

As we cursorily remarked, in our Introduction, the great European powers had risen upon the basis of antecedent nationalities, and the results of religious and political events. The Sclavo-Greek world concentrated itself in the autocracy of Russia; the Roman-Catholic in the Bourbon monarchies; while the German-Catholic power was represented by Austria; and the England of that day rested on her exclusion of the Catholics, and the empire of the sea.

Protestantism on the Continent had attempted, but in vain, to elevate itself into a power in Sweden. Prussia now effected, though after a different fashion, what the warlike kings of Sweden, Gustavus Adolphus, Charles X., and Charles XII., had been unable to accomplish. The latter would have strenuously upheld the religious idea. The rise of Prussia, in the middle of the eighteenth century, was due to its relinquishment. In this rise the state dissevered itself, for the first time, from its connection with a positive creed. The idea of the Protestant prince endowed with the right of ecclesiastical reform, transformed itself into that of the state, whose first act

is to renounce that right. It was only by such a transformation that the Protestant world could defend itself against the preponderance of other political elements, or assert its rights against them.

That which, in the first half of the eighteenth century, was an innovation, twenty or thirty years converted into the common opinion of Europe. The connection of Frederick with the intellectual movement of the time, gave him greatness in the eyes of his contemporaries, and furthered his undertakings. He raised up a state, in which the harshness, which in many points could not be avoided, was lightened by considerations of necessity, while obedience in no way excluded the consciousness of freedom. When the prince submitted himself, absolutely, to the conditions of the existing state of things, no subject was ashamed to do the same.

The generation which surrounded Frederick at this time was one of the richest in capacity which Northern Germany has ever produced. As the best generals of the day, Münnich, Marshal Saxe, the old Prince of Dessau, and so many other comrades of the King, were all North-Germans,— so likewise were those to whom must be attributed the regeneration of German philosophy and poetry, and the creation of criticism, and antiquarian research. As Frederick restored in his army the old Roman discipline, so did the Germany of his day in every branch of letters vie in its native tongue with Greece and Rome. It produced a body of writers, conscientious, earnest, and laborious; minds opposite in their tendencies, often at variance with each other,

never drawn into actual co-operation, but nevertheless working together in a higher sense than that of personal association.

Germany at length saw the Empire, in the heart of its political existence, reduced nearer than ever to a territorial principality, and the territorial principality, on the other, elevating itself almost into an empire. In Brandenburg-Prussia, neither in its legislative nor religious arrangements, neither in its judicial nor administrative constitution, was anything kept in view but the internal wants of each department of the state. The claims of authority were justified by the external independence which that authority secured for the nation. Even Austria was compelled to struggle against the dictatorial preponderance of the maritime powers. Saxony was dependent on Russia; Hanover, by her connection with England, was implicated in the policy of that country. The remaining princes of Germany were weak to insignificance. In Prussia, and in Prussia only, was founded a mighty and self-supporting power, at once German and European, which, for the first time since ages, brought back into the minds of its subjects the full feeling of independence, blended with the proud consciousness of being foremost in the developement of the world.

THE END.