CRISTO RAUL.ORG

THE FOUNDING OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE BY WILLIAM I.

BOOK VI.

GERMANY AT THE TIME OF THE CRIMEAN WAR.

CHAPTER I. DUALISM IN THE CONFEDERATION.

The newly-born Confederate Diet, even after all the states had joined it, retained the stamp of its origin; it continued to be, as ever, a weapon of war in the hands of Austria and the Lesser States against Prussia. After the German Parliament had been given up, the whole question of the future German Constitution was reduced to the simple one of supremacy between the two Great Powers in the Confederation. This played its role directly or indirectly in almost every discussion of the Confederate Diet, in spite of the secret alliance, in spite of the common war against Liberalism, in spite of the instructions sent to the new Prussian deputy, Herr von Rochow, and his earnest efforts to go hand in hand with Austria.

For, as the Emperor Francis Joseph once wrote to the Prussian King: Circumstances are stronger than men. As circumstances had been for more than half a century, the two Powers were natural allies in European questions, but on German soil their vital interests were necessarily different, and consequently in the most important matters a conflict was inevitable. In these disputes Austria’s prospects seemed to be decidedly favorable, as she was always sure of an unhesitating majority in the Confederate Diet. From the ranks of the Petty States that were once united in the Prussian Union, both Hesse and Nassau had fallen out, and had joined the Austrian camp. There was then no need of a very large following to secure a majority among seventeen votes; nor was this following small. Since the Olmütz Agreement, Austria’s favor had been considered more desirable and her ill-will more dangerous than Prussia’s. Many noble families had their sons enter the imperial service, and used their influence at home on the side of Austria. Without question, the Court of Vienna in the line of personal suasion was much more active and clever than the Court of Berlin. Then, again, Austria’s presidency counted for a great deal in her favor. In short, the imperial will was the predominant influence in the Confederate Diet.

Prince Schwarzenberg was surely not the man to leave unapplied such a source of power. He was very willing to acquiesce in the agreement with Berlin so ardently sought after in Rochow’s instructions, on the condition that Prussia would comply as readily with Vienna’s views as Ancillon had formerly yielded to the opinions of Prince Metternich. But if Manteuffel should venture to have any will of his own, then Schwarzenberg believed that in the Confederate Diet itself he had the best means of breaking that will and of keeping Prussia down by the passing of majority­votes. The simple result of this would be an attempt to extend gradually the authority of the Confederate Diet, and in this way to limit the scope of Prussia’s independent influence.

A few weeks after all the deputies had taken their seats in the Confederate Diet, Schwarzenberg took the first important step towards this result, by securing, on the 10th of July, 1851, the appointment of a committee to discuss and elaborate the material brought forward in Dresden on the subject of a tariff-union between Austria and the other German states. This meant, as we know, Austria’s determination either entirely to break up the Prussian Tariff-Union, or to share with Prussia in the leadership of the same, or even to thrust Prussia out of it altogether. The Prince was in this, also, certain of the support of most of the Lesser States, to whom nothing seemed more desirable than to have two leaders instead of one in matters of trade and duties, as well as in all other Confederate interests. For they were sure of the protection of the one against arbitrary measures attempted by the other; and in quarrels between the two, they could play the fine part of the deciding judge.

These developments were watched from Berlin with calmness. Prussia had at Olmütz yielded to a very unfavorable conjunction of European conditions. She had suffered badly in her political reputation, but had escaped any material damage. She felt, therefore, driven back, but not overcome. For the time, she gave up any attempt to rise to any higher position in the Confederation than she had formerly enjoyed; but she by no means intended to allow herself to be set lower in it than she had been before 1848.

As far as her military power was concerned, she considered herself, to say the least, Austria’s peer in financial possibilities, and in the internal harmony of the State far ahead of her rival; and if the Court of Vienna reckoned upon arousing against Prussia the mistrust of the Lesser States, Prussia believed that she herself had a much more reliable hold upon them by sharing with them the interests, both material and intellectual, of the whole German population outside of Austria. In commercial politics she was quietly busy with the inauguration of a thoroughgoing opposition policy. As deputy to the Confederate Diet, however, the King appointed in the place of Herr von Rochow, who returned to St. Petersburg, the former dike-grave, Herr Otto von Bismarck-Schonhausen. When the latter presented his credentials to the President of the Diet on the 29th of August, 1851, he took his first step in a career of worldwide reputation.

Bismarck was now in his thirty-sixth year, in the full bloom of his vigorous manhood. A tall and imposing figure, which towered by a whole head above the generality of the children of men, a face glowing with every sign of health, a glance lighted up with intelligence, in his mouth and chin the expression of an inflexible will—such he appeared to his contemporaries, enlivening every conversation with original thoughts, brilliant figures, and striking phrases, mani­esting a charming affability in social life, and in business affairs a consummate superiority.

He had been for the most part self-taught. The original freshness of his nature he had never been willing to repress by stereotyped courses of study at school nor to furbish by the constraint of superficial conventionalities. At the university he soon gave up attendance upon tedious lectures, and as a jolly Corps-Bursche enjoyed to the utmost the pleasures of “ academical freedom.” But in spite of his enthusiastic devotion to his corps, he did not allow this to be his chief end in life, as do so many, who afterwards sink aimless and spiritless into the ranks of the Philisters: on the contrary, no day passed that he did not spend some time in instructive and profound reading, which stimulated and trained his active, aspiring ideas.

As a boy even, he was fond of geography, which had not yet been developed into the modern conglomeration of fragments of all sciences, but confined itself especially to the distribution and outward conditions of the. human race in different lands. Bismarck liked to tell how this thorough study of the map of Germany, with its bright variety of colors representing the territory of thirty-nine different countries, early awoke in him the feeling that such a map portrayed a very unnatural state of things. Yet, as if with a presentiment of his future sphere of activity, he devoted himself especially to historical studies. He was afterwards, in the light of his own broad experience, accustomed to say, that for every statesman a properly-directed course of study in history was the most important element in the foundation of his knowledge; by this alone could he learn what might be attainable in dealing with other nations; and the highest lesson in the diplomatic art was to be able to recognize the limits of what might be attained.

His whole later life was a commentary upon this doctrine. From this principle he derived his boldness in setting as high as possible the objects of his efforts, and the prudence which never allowed him in the intoxication of victory to stray beyond these limits set to the attainable.

After leaving the university, Bismarck went through a short novitiate in the government-service; but he could not long endure the restraint of the bureau, and returned to his free life upon one of the country-seats belonging to the family, where he kept up his reputation of being unwearied in the chase, fearless in horsemanship, and invincible in the drinking-bout, but at the same time a skilful manager and careful administrator of the estate. With all the impetuous overflow of animal spirits, his inner life was being developed, as his letters show, both in ripeness of judgment and in self-reliance, upon the foundation of a deeply-serious piety.

Then came the years of political commotion, which drew him too into the current of public life. We have seen how, in the United Provincial Diet of 1847, he took a bold stand in defence of the King’s purposes. In his very first speech he showed a remarkable command of language, a classical power in the art of expression, and an inexhaustible skill in pertinent repartee. It was characteristic of the bent of his mind, that even here in questions of internal politics his thoughts went far out beyond the limits of Prussia and were busy with her relations to foreign States. He recognized the usefulness of the proposed Berlin-Konigsberg railway, not so much from a mercantile and financial point of view as from military and political considerations. With the same aims in mind, he urged the assembly not to demand more privileges than the King had offered them, and thus cause a rupture with the Government, but rather by a constant accord with the King to show to the whole of Europe that they were a strong and united people. When, then, in the following year the waves of the Revolution broke over Prussia and a wild spirit of anarchy took possession of Berlin, his blood boiled with loyalty to his King, and he became one of the most valiant members of the Kreuzzeitung party.

His personal relations with the King now became gradually more intimate. The King had already, in 1847, noted with pleasure Bismarck’s discourses in the United Provincial Diet upon the Christian State and the King’s tenure of office by the Grace of God. I am not able to decide whether the King felt any sympathetic bond between himself and this man of genius so utterly different from him in natural disposition; but certain it is, that Frederick William, whose forte was by no means a correct knowledge of human nature, did perceive the remarkable qualities so prominent in Bismarck’s character, and resolved to train him himself to some high position of usefulness to the State. “He considered me an egg,” said Bismarck later, “from which he expected to hatch a minister.” He surprised him, then, by sending him to Frankfort, as it were to a school of diplomacy, where indeed all the lines of German politics met in a focus.

With precisely the same sentiment that the King entertained, one often hears people speak of Bismarck’s years of apprenticeship at Frankfort. One might as well talk of a young fish going to a swimming-school. To be sure, he who had formerly had no experience in the diplomatic service, now entered a new world, and had a great deal to learn about people and things. But after he had within the first few weeks taken his bearings in this new field, he evinced in his very first political moves his skill as a master-workman. He was a statesman by birth. Nature had generously endowed him with all the necessary attributes of a great leader. He possessed the power of grasping quickly and exactly the relations of things, of exactly perceiving the strong and weak points of every position, and of gauging with penetrating discernment the possible usefulness of the most different sorts of men for the furtherance of his aims.

To a most resolute and unswerving determination in the pursuit of his ends, he joined an elasticity of mind in changing his methods to suit the occasion, that never played him false. Without ever having subjected himself to a systematic course of instruction, he had that faculty which Thucydides praised in Themistocles, the power of discovering almost immediately the wanting term by the intuition of his own nature.

All these traits appear quite as marked in his Frank­fort correspondence as in his later spheres of action in higher offices. One marvels everywhere at the circum­spection with which he considers a question from all points of view, his courage in presenting the merits of the cause, his inexhaustible fund of unexpected strategic movements to rout and confuse his adversary, and at the same time the ever-constant pulse of an energy always tempered and controlled by reason. He was not yet in a ruling position, but was obliged to obey the orders of his superiors in office; yet his reports were always so thoroughly based upon actual facts, and so irresistibly forcible in their logic, that the Minister only very seldom saw the possibility of a different conclusion. Herr von Manteuffel very likely often grumbled with incipient jealousy : “That young Schonhauser seems to be rather sure of what he is about,”—yet wrote “all right” at the end of the report.

In the early maturity of his talents and in his con­trol over those above him in office, Bismarck reminds one forcibly of General Bonaparte’s course of action in 1796. But by the side of this point of resemblance there appears in every other point only the greatest possible difference between the characters of the two men. In place of the tremendous selfishness which overwhelmed every other sentiment in the heart of the Corsican Imperator, the Prussian statesman showed a patriotic devotion to his country, an unreserved recognition of his duty toward his King and toward his Fatherland.

His soul was inspired with the mission of raising Prussia to a position of power and prosperity: his every act was made subservient to this single and ruling task. However zealous an adherent of his party he had been formerly, he was now, in the fullest sense of the word, a servant of the State. Before his duty to the State every other consideration must retreat to the background. Questions of the greatest importance, such as free-trade or protection, feudal or democratic institutions, religious liberty or a hierarchy, questions which thousands of men regard as involving the most vital interests of their existence, were for him nothing, except so far as they offered an occasion for Prussia’s aggrandizement; so that his adversaries not unfrequently upbraided him with being the most unprincipled time-server of any age.

As Frederick the Great, who devoted a long life to the service of the interests of the State, was in his inmost heart convinced that the State was only a means for the preservation and cultivation of the ideal blessings of Beauty, Truth, Art, and Science: so Bismarck held precisely the inverse doctrine, showing himself here also a utilitarian; and however much he did indeed appreciate those blessings, the first and last question with him was, How far can this art or that science serve the interests of Prussia as a state ?

Although, perhaps, not appropriately referred to in this connection, it may be mentioned here, that although he was farther removed than any other man from religious indifference, yet he warned his former party associates repeatedly against the prevalent doctrine of uniting Church and State. “You do not” — these were his words — “in this way preach the people into the church, but out of the church; and you injure the State by disgusting the people with their religion.”

To the enemies of Prussia in the Confederate Diet it was naturally very uncomfortable to have such a man in their way, a man that could handle all the weapons of polemics as an expert, and who left no boast of his adversary uncriticised, nor any weak spot unnoticed. He soon won the reputation of being an exceedingly dangerous opponent in the lists. Precise diplomatists, and not only those in Frankfort, censured him for being too off-hand, or wondered at his assuming already with the coolest mien the airs of a future prime-minister. At first, indeed, he was in every case cordial towards his colleagues in the Confederate Diet, and determined to preserve a good feeling between himself and them. For he had not come to Frankfort to oppose Austria on principle ; on the contrary, he had always hitherto acted upon the conviction that it was necessary for Prussia and Austria to hold closely together, and this had been the basis of his assumptions his whole life long.

Accordingly, he endeavored in the Confederate Diet to smooth over every incipient difference of opinion by manifesting especial cordiality towards the Presiding Deputy, Count Thun, in order to avoid presenting to the smaller states the spectacle of a dissension between the two Great Powers. But only too soon was he forced to acknowledge to himself that the necessary foundation for such endeavors, namely, the reciprocation of this feeling, was entirely wanting, and that it was foolish to expect Austria to recognize Prussia as her equal, or to hope that, considering their respective relation to German questions, she would ever do so. After having weighed this well, his future course of action was once for all decided. He would resist to the last point, ay, even further, to the rupture of the Con­federation, before he would allow Prussia’s honor or her just rights to suffer. Within the first few weeks the opportunity came for him to take this stand.

Prussia wished to be able to assert her legal right to be regarded as an independent European Power by again withdrawing East and West Prussia from the territory of the Confederation. For Austria, who was anxious to have all her lands included in the Confed­eration, this request from Prussia was untimely, and hence from many sides exceptions and misgivings arose. The emphasis with which Bismarck repelled this is seen from his appeal to Manteuffel for per­mission to make the declaration, that if the gentlemen persisted in their objections, Prussia would carry out the measure independently of them. It did not, how­ever, come to this; for the threatening attitude of Bismarck induced the majority finally to pass the vote. 

Another question, in the treatment of which the majority of the Confederate deputies showed their anti-Prussian sentiments, concerned the publication of the minutes of the sessions. Upon the motion of Austria a special committee was appointed to select from the matters discussed in the assembly those that might suitably be made public, and, weighing their respective importance, to prepare them for publication. Herr von Bismarck, who had voted against the motion and then had not been chosen as a member of the committee, scanned the selection made in the very first publication, and found his suspicions confirmed with regard to the choice made and the exactness of the report. It had evidently been a move made to secure a one-sided organ of the Austrian party to work in their interests against Prussia. He opposed this project on the spot, not only openly in the newspapers, but also by a bold challenge in the Diet itself, thus preventing, to the painful astonishment of his adversaries, a repetition of this unsuccessful attempt.

Even more disgraceful and in every way melancholy was the quarrel over the German fleet on the North Sea, which had been created in 1848. This matter monopolized for many long months the attention of the Diet; and from a stubborn haggling over an insignificant sum of money, it developed gradually into a strife over the fundamental questions of the whole Confederate Constitution.

The German fleet had originally been built for the German Imperial Government, which it was expected would be born in the immediate future. With this in view, Prussia had readily paid her contribution, which had covered the greatest part of the cost of the fleet, while Austria and a number of the inland states were either wholly or partly behind in their payments. Now, it was the opposition of these latter that had caused the projected Imperial Government to disappear in smoke; but the fleet still existed, and it was necessary to decide upon means of raising money for its support. We have already seen that at the Dresden Congress the inland states showed no great inclination to maintain a German navy; unanimity or a majority of three-fourths was demanded to pass any measure concerning it.

Prussia now proposed, that, for the support of the fleet, the contributions due in 1848, and still in arrears, should first be paid in and expended. But the states to whom this applied would not hear to it; and at their instigation the Confederate Diet by a majority­vote on the 7th of July, 1851, voted a new appropria­tion of 532,000 florins. Prussia objected to this on the ground that the fleet was not yet an organization sanctioned by the Confederate Diet, and that conse­quently, just as the South Germans had demanded at Dresden, unanimity would be necessary in any vote concerning its maintenance. The same thing occurred again, when towards the end of the year the majority decided to cover the deficit by negotiating a loan from the banking-house of the Rothschilds: this project determined upon in spite of her opposition, Prussia declared to be unconstitutional and null. The Majority replied that no Confederate law required unanimity for such measures. Prussia in turn demanded proofs that according to Confederate law the Majority possessed such powers.

This put the quarrel upon a very dangerous basis. The Majority believed, that, in doubtful cases, the functions and powers of the Confederate Diet were to be decided by itself, that is, by its majority; for otherwise the smallest Confederate state might by its veto prevent the passage of most important measures. Prussia responded that according to that theory the constitutional sovereignty of the individual states would be left, by the extension of the powers of the Confederation, without defence in the power of an arbitrary majority. These two principles it was equally impossible to disprove. Brought thus side by side, they showed very strikingly the unnaturalness and the unreasonableness of the principles upon which the Confederate Constitution of 1815 had been founded.

Moreover, as usual, this difference in the legal stand­points concealed a no less radical difference in aims and demands. Prussia would gladly have made further contributions, if the new North Sea fleet had been joined with the Prussian navy in such a way that Prussia might be the common commander of them both. Among the Lesser States, the opinion prevailed that Austria should maintain the fleet on the Adriatic, Prussia the one on the Baltic, and the other states the one oil the North Sea. Austria might perhaps have favored some system by which the North Sea fleet should remain, as well as the Confederate army, under the control of the Confederate Diet, since this was virtually in the hands of Austria. So it happened that scarcely a year after the agreement at Olmütz, the old standards of an “ entire ” Germany, a Union, and a Triad, advocated respectively by Austria, Prussia, and the Lesser States, stood again opposed to each other with renewed vigor. The representatives of these systems did not yet come to any open rupture; but the fleet went to ruin under their quarrelling.

When the project of the Triad came to be voted upon, the result, as the chairman of the committee on the navy was obliged to confess, was undeniably most melancholy. For it was not enough that the votes varied so widely that almost every one followed a different direction, — at least in minor details, — but some protested beforehand against possible compromises.

No better fate awaited the attempt to establish a restricted association of states for the maintenance of the North Sea fleet. The difficulty here lay in the simple fact that the smaller coast states, however gladly Hanover would have accepted the position of Confederate admiral of the North Sea, were not able to assume this responsibility without Prussia, nor had they any inclination to do so-with (i.e., under) Prussia. Thus the matter was already hopeless when the Confederation in February, 1852, decreed the dissolution of the fleet, in case the proposed association of states should not be formed by April. When this time arrived, this had not been accomplished; and to the sorrow and disgrace of all Germany, the fleet fell into the hands of the auctioneer. The ships were publicly sold at auction by the Oldenburg Counsellor of State, Hannibal Fischer.

This was at about the time when the Confederate Diet was displaying its efficiency to the German nation by the proclamation of the new Hessian Constitution. Meanwhile a stubborn diplomatic struggle was arising over the great commercial question between Prussia on the one side and Austria with her associates on the other.

As is well known, the coast states of North Germany had not hitherto joined the great Tariff-Union, because the import-tax on colonial wares and wines seemed to them too high. Instead of this, Hanover, Oldenburg, and Brunswick had formed a special tariff-league among themselves in 1834. Brunswick let this drop in 1841, and tried to gain admission to the great Tariff­Union. Many efforts to induce Hanover to do the same were unsuccessful. The Court of Hanover felt that in joining the Tariff-Union the sovereign authority of the King would be too seriously compromised; and the financial privileges with which Hanover wished to be favored beyond the other members as an indemnification for such a sacrifice were so great, that Prussia continually declared them to be inadmissible.

Since 1848, however, the tables had gradually been turning in these relations.

The Hanover “ March ” Ministry of Count Bennigsen-Strive had brought about numerous changes, in keeping with the current of the times, in the Constitution that had been given to the country in 1840 by the King Ernest Augustus. The First Chamber, in which the deputies from the nobility of the separate provinces formed a decided majority, was opened to elected representatives of the landed proprietors of all ranks. In the department of finance, Ernest Augustus had re-established the old system of keeping the royal and the state treasuries distinct: the royal exchequer received the income from the domains and other revenues, and, after providing for the expenses of the Court and the establishment of members of the royal family, paid over the remainder into the state treasury to cover the expenses attending certain branches of the administration. The legislation of 1848 reversed this relation, by uniting the two exchequers, placed the administration of the domains as well as taxes in the hands of the Minister of Finance, and determined a civil-list for the King during' his life­time. Beside these and numerous other changes in the Constitution, a new organization of the judicial and administrative authorities was projected, and also a reformation of the provincial constitutions by lessening in them the preponderance of the nobility.

In the autumn of 1850, it is true, the Ministry of Bennigsen-Stüve was dismissed by the King, because, in spite of its individualistic resistance to Prussia, it would not share in the Hessian measures of the “Rump” Confederate Diet; yet the new Cabinet, under the leadership of Baron von Munchhausen, kept up the policy of its predecessors in internal affairs, and began especially to put into effect the organizations planned by them. But these, like all good things on our earth, cost money; and the state treasury, as everywhere, had been exhausted by a variety of expenditures during the years of the Revolution. The Estates, indeed, showed everywhere a remarkable willingness to assist the Government; but in a state in which the agricultural resources had hitherto been so little developed, there was a limit to the possibilities of raising the taxes. So that before the end of the year 1850, the Government tried the expedient of augmenting its revenue by increasing the duties, but failed in this on account of the opposition of the Oldenburg provincial Estates.

After this the embarrassment was great; and when once the attention of the Government had been directed to the German Tariff-Union, inducements for joining it followed fast upon one another. Especially since the withdrawal of Brunswick the care of the frontiers had become very expensive and complicated. Connection with the German Tariff-Union would probably make the Hanover railways much more profitable; and many branches of industry which had been for some time enjoying an increasing prosperity, longed for free admission to the German market, and strong protection against English competition. The Prussian Government was fully aware of these symptoms, and in the beginning of 1851 made up its mind to take advantage of them in energetic fashion for its own interests.

This came about in the following way. Serious divisions had occurred in the Tariff-Union. Prussia inclined, not exactly to free-trade, but at least to a reduction of the tariff and other means of facilitating commerce; whereas, the South German States, for the sake of their large manufacturers, desired a thorough­going system of protection, and thus approached the commercial standpoint of Austria. If, then, Austria should now execute vigorously her plans for a tariff­union, Prussia would be in no small danger of suffering by reason of either a secession of the Southern States to Austria, or a complete overthrow of the Tariff­Union and interruption of free communication between the two halves of the monarchy. This last must at any rate be prevented, and at any price; and there was no better means of doing this than a commercial league with Hanover. If this could be accomplished, then Prussia, standing upon a firm basis, might await the action of the Southern States.

Accordingly, Austria had scarcely succeeded in securing in the Confederate Diet, on the 10th of July, 1851, the appointment of the committee on commercial relations, when Prussia sent a private message to Hanover, proposing to enter into negotiations with regard to incorporating the customs-league into the Tariff-Union, and to begin the same so soon as confidential information should be received that a speedy conclusion would be reached based upon the conditions accompanying Prussia’s message. These were indeed exceedingly advantageous for Hanover and Oldenburg, the concession of all those points which in former negotiations Prussia had constantly declared inadmissible: a great reduction of the duty on tea, coffee, wine, and French brandy, free importation of rails for the Hanover railways, and a prior claim of seventy-five per cent in the distribution of the Tariff-Union revenues.

In Hanover this offer was accepted without much hesitation. The Director of Customs, Klenze, was sent to Magdeburg, where he, with the Prussian Privy Counsellor, Delbrück, prepared in the greatest secrecy the separate articles of the treaty, which he signed on the 7th of September in Berlin, and which confirmed the admission of Hanover and Oldenburg into commercial alliance with Prussia and her associates of the Tariff­Union, to take effect on the 1st of January, 1854. On the 11th of September, Prussia announced the fact to the other members of the Tariff-Union.

But during these negotiations an internal crisis was impending in Hanover. Several of the societies of the nobility had sent complaints to the Confederate Diet concerning the loss of their old rights, begging for assistance in the recovery and defence of the same in the provincial as well as in the general assembly of the Estates. The people of Hanover did not think this act of the nobility of any importance, inasmuch as the Confederate Diet in 1839 had refused to consider the complaints of several cities and corporations against the unlawful coup d'etat of Ernest Augustus, and this time the laws which had offended the nobility had been enacted with the consent of the King and of both Chambers. The Ministry, however, who had protested so emphatically against any interference of the Con­federate Diet in the internal affairs of the country, were now not a little anxious, since they were well aware of the especial favor and partiality of the King and the Crown Prince towards the nobility.

When, then, the Diet’s committee on commercial relations summoned experienced men to its aid in the discussions, and Klenze for this reason was sent to Frankfort, the latter called on Bismarck and explained to him that the treaty of the 7th of September had many opponents in Hanover, especially among the party of the nobility; that if these by successes in the Confederate Diet should effect the overthrow of the Ministry of Munchhausen, it would then be impossible to secure for the treaty the approval of the Chambers; and that it therefore lay in the interests of Prussia to support the Munchhausen Ministry in the Confederate Diet as well as at the Hanoverian Court.

This gave rise to a characteristic correspondence between Bismarck and Manteuffel. The former, who indeed held that it was one of the functions of the Confederate Diet to decide in cases of complaint, wrote, nevertheless, on the 9th of October, in a private letter to the Prime Minister, as follows: “However strong my personal disinclination may be towards sacrificing political rectitude in my own country, yet I have self­interest enough as a Prussian not to be quite so conscientious with regard to the same in Hanover, and would humbly offer my advice that only such a ministry should be supported in Hanover, as would be ready to favor our policy embodied in the treaty of September 7tli, let the political color of that ministry be what it may. Our own state is strong enough for us to be able to countenance and encourage in Hanover a liberal ministry sooner than one that sides with Austria.”

Manteuffel took counsel with his under-secretary Lecoq, a man of few talents, and unprepossessing, but politically devoted heart and soul to the party of the Kreuzzeitung and the Von Gerlachs. To him it seemed like a sin against the Holy Ghost to favor, for the sake of Prussia’s interests, the opponents of the nobility in Hanover. Accordingly, Manteuffel replied on the 13th of October. “Klenze,” he wrote, “has already made remarks in Berlin to the effect, that the nobility arc hostile to the treaty, and that the overthrow of Munchhausen would be dangerous to it. But that opinion is simply his personal one. Aside from the financial advantages to be derived by Hanover from the treaty, the nobility would certainly, from political motives, recognize in the treaty with conservative Prussia a sure safeguard of their own future. The old King and the Crown Prince also favor the fulfilment of the solemnly ratified treaty. It is only to be hoped that the Confederate Diet will be cautious and deferential in its conduct towards the Hanoverian Government, so that the actions of the latter may still have the character and stamp of independence. Nor can anything more be required of us, in order to avoid the choice, painful enough, between supporting a politically uncertain [liberal, crossed out] ministry, and endangering the treaty of September 7th.”

Prussia kept true, then, to this determination, to refrain from exerting any positive influence upon Hanover’s internal policy. This determination was all the more gratifying, since at the death of King Ernest Augustus on the 18th of November, 1851, his blind son, George V, after having promised with his royal oath to maintain the Constitution, immediately appointed, under Baron von Scheie, at the time Hanoverian deputy to the Confederate Diet, a conservative Ministry, who proceeded in the next assembly of the Estates to secure the recognition of the tariff treaty in both Chambers. Klenze’s assertions were then seen to have been without foundation, and to have arisen purely from party-ambition.

Meanwhile the September treaty had caused no small excitement in the rest of Germany. The Lesser States pretended to be gravely insulted by the secrecy of its preparation ; it was, they said, a cutting slight to their dignity, and evidently an act of vengeance for the part they played in Prussia’s defeat at Olmütz. This complaint was fitted to produce an impression upon political children, the number of whom was indeed not small in the Fatherland. Evidently there was no thought in Prussia’s mind of vengeance for past grievances, but of precaution against present hostilities, against the Austrian tendencies of the Lesser States, who, had they been aware of the negotiations before the settlement of the treaty, would without any doubt have made a previous understanding with Vienna the condition of their consent. This was immediately manifest when Prussia, now sure of her position, announced in November, 1851, that the Tariff-Union would cease on January 1st, 1854, and at the same time expressed her willingness to renew it upon the basis of the September treaty. To this end all the members of the Tariff­Union were invited to conferences to be held in Berlin beginning on the first of April, 1852.

Thereupon, Prince Schwarzenberg without hesitation took upon himself the leadership of the Opposition, and summoned all the German States to a conference to be held forthwith, in January, in Vienna, to consider in the first place a commercial treaty (Document A), and then the project of a complete union of Austria and Germany in the matter of duties (Document B). The fundamental idea of these projects, as was natural under the circumstances, was an increase of facilities in internal trade between the two groups of countries, together with a raising of the duties upon imports from all other countries, according to the standard of the Austrian system, that is to say, in direct contrast to the principles of the Hanoverian treaty.

For the more than probable event of Prussia’s remaining obstinate, a third plan (Document C) was secretly laid before the old friends, Bavaria, Württemberg, Saxony, both Hesses, and Nassau, by which these states were to bind themselves to a tariff-league with Austria, without Prussia; that is, to withdraw from the present Tariff-Union. When the delegates met, they praised the purpose and aim of documents A and B, but differed widely in their views upon the details of the schemes. And the six confidential friends came to no decision about Document C, further than that they would give it their serious consideration. To this end they met together alone at the beginning of April in Darmstadt, and agreed to hold together as a unit in the pending negotiations, and to recognize all the former Tariff-Union treaties as consequently binding among themselves, but under no circumstances to enter into a compact with Prussia concerning a continuance of the Tariff-Union before January 1st, 1853. unless an understanding should be already reached between Austria and all the Tariff-Union states.

To this Prussia replied in the Berlin Conference, that a tariff-league with Austria was a matter of time, which could be effected only very gradually; and that Prussia was ready to discuss a commercial alliance between the Tariff-Union and Austria so soon as the continuance of the latter was assured beyond the first of January, 1854. During the whole summer the deliberations continued. An endless amount of talking and negotiating was done on all sides. Gradually an agreement took shape between Prussia and the Darmstadt allies about the essential contents of the new Tariff-Union treaty as well as of the commercial treaty with Austria.

But the technical difficulty was not yet surmounted. Prussia persisted in her logical demand: first the renewal of the Tariff-Union, and then a treaty between this body and a third party—while the Southern States remained just as determined in their claim that both points should be settled at the same time. This resolved itself into the practical question: Shall the treaty with Austria depend upon the needs of the Tariff­Union, or shall the character of the Tariff-Union conform to the will of Austria? At last, at a final conference with the Darmstadt faction in September, Prussia felt that she had had enough of arguing in a circle. She de­clared the conference closed and negotiations at an end.

It was now expected in Vienna that the Southern States would carry out Document C, and form a tariff­union with Austria, thus freeing South Germany finally from Prussian influence. According to Herr von Beust, Bavaria and Würtemberg would not have objected to doing so; but that Darmstadt agreement to preserve at all events the tariff league among themselves stood in the way; for Saxony, in view of her highly-developed industries, positively refused a tariff alliance with Austria. Public opinion, moreover, in the other states of the Coalition, expressed itself in favor of maintaining the old Tariff-Union, in spite of all protective interests.

It may be remarked in passing, that Herr von Bismarck contributed not a little to this, by making his influence felt from his post at Frankfort through the Press, by founding societies, by sending out workers, etc., although it is true that the chief cause of this public feeling lay in the nature of things. The Governments of the Coalition were helpless.

Then a variety of causes produced an unexpected change, not only in Vienna, but in Berlin as well.

In Vienna, the talented statesman, whose boldness and energy had led Austria from success to success, Prince Felix Schwarzenberg, had breathed his last. His health, long since undermined by indulgences of every kind, was completely broken down by his exertions in political life. Yet in spite of many serious attacks of illness, his love of life was not extinguished. On the morning of the 5th of April, 1852, as he received an invitation to a ball, at which he expected to meet a certain belle whom he adored, he cried: “Most certainly I shall come, unless I am dead.” In the course of the day he held several meetings and conferences, and sent in the mean time q choice bouquet to the lady mentioned. As he was preparing his evening toilet for dinner, he suddenly fell in an apoplectic fit, and did not again recover consciousness.

We will not attempt to determine how far his power might have succeeded in carrying out his all-embracing plans of dominion; certain it is that his pupil and successor, Count Buol-Schauenstein, although most zealous and ambitious, by no means possessed the ability necessary for fully realizing and completing the political schemes of the deceased Prince. It is very true that an imperious, despotic nature may produce a great impression and effect much; but nothing is more dangerous than for an unskilful imitator of such a character to try to continue the work of his predecessor.

In the matter of a tariff-union, Count Buol began by being excessively domineering. When, in June, Herr von Bismarck, having been sent by the King to Vienna on a special mission, waited upon the Count, the latter declared to the Prussian envoy, that Austria would not allow herself to be treated by Germany as a foreign country, and that this would be implied, if she were offered a mere commercial alliance without the prospect of a closer tariff-union. He remarked that the consideration of such matters belonged, moreover, to the Confederate Diet, adding in a manner not over­polite that he was sorry that just at this moment, when he had sent Count Thun very important instructions, Herr von Bismarck was not to be found at his post. In this same strain the tone of his diplomacy made itself heard and felt at all the German Courts.

In the autumn, however, he found many reasons for lowering somewhat the pitch of his anti-Prussian zeal. In France, Louis Napoleon was taking one step after another toward the imperial throne; and it was no longer a secret that he considered the popular vote not the source, but merely the acknowledgment, of his inherited right to the crown, and that he would thus openly withstand the treaties of 1815, which excluded forever the House of Bonaparte from the French throne. From this quarter, then, there appeared to be the possibility that a serious European danger might arise, and therefore it would be desirable to be sincerely on good terms with Prussia. The Emperor Nicholas pressed this point most urgently ; and when then, to Count Buol’s bitter mortification and disappointment, Document C seemed likely to remain a dead letter with the South German States, the Emperor Francis Joseph offered to his royal uncle the hand of reconciliation.

His good words fell upon good ground. For, just as in Vienna operations in connection with the Darmstadt Coalition had proved fruitless, so, too, the basis of Prussia’s new position, her friendship with Hanover, had given way. The young King desired most ardently, if he could not indeed overthrow the whole legislation of 1848, at least to nullify the changes made by it in the Constitution of 1840, and at the same time to prevent the carrying out of the new organization of offices. In this he was the natural ally of the nobility, whom he also favored in other respects, and whose chiefs easily persuaded him that the September treaty would bring about the complete industrial ruin of . Hanover and her dependence upon Prussia, from which nothing could save her but a close connection with Austria. The Austrian ambassador consequently found during the summer a ready ear in advocating the “Darmstadt theory,” that before, or at least simultaneously with, the renewal of the Tariff-Union, negotiations with Austria must be brought to a successful issue.

A special circumstance contributed to making the feeling in Hanover more intense. It was discovered that Prussia was about to enter into a compact with Oldenburg, by which the latter should give up the bay of Jahde for the establishment of a Prussian naval station on the North Sea. This touched the King of Hanover in a very sensitive spot. It was one of Hanover’s ancient ambitions to gain the leadership of the fleets bearing the German flag upon the North Sea, and now Prussia was trying to get a foothold in this old hereditary domain of the House of the Guelphs. “That would be,” cried the Minister, Bacmeister, “with Magdeburg and Minden the third of the strong positions with which Prussia is seeking to surround us.”

The ill-will against the September treaty soon found a way of manifesting itself practically. In this treaty Hanover had promised to publish before March 1st, 1853, a preliminary tariff-system preparatory to entering the Tariff-Union. This had been already drawn up, but, in spite of repeated reminders from Berlin, King George had not published it; so that in the autumn of 1853, anxiety began to be felt in Berlin lest it should not appear at all, and the whole affair in this way should be exploded. This was the last straw which induced Prussia to meet Austria’s advances in a friendly manner.

Accordingly, the Austrian Minister himself, Baron von Bruck, went to Berlin to negotiate, at first, about the commercial treaty. Prussia took no exceptions at all to the principles laid down by Austria in Document A, by which in the internal reciprocal trade between Austria and the Tariff-Union there was to be imposed upon a long list of articles a lower import-duty than either of the parties intended to levy upon the introduction of the same articles from other foreign coun­tries. If at any time either of the parties intended to lower this tax upon the importations from foreign countries, this was to be announced to the other party three months before its accomplishment, so that the latter could make those changes considered necessary in the internal traffic; neither party should favor any foreign country with a change in the tariff that would at once prove disadvantageous to the other party.

Thereupon Bruck brought forward for discussion the second great question, the possibility of a reciprocal tariff-system. Prussia was still convinced of the economical and also the political impossibility of such a system, but allowed herself to be moved by the force of circumstance to yielding in some degree: six years after the conclusion of the present treaty, i.e., in 1859, negotiations were to be opened on the subject of a closer tariff-union, which it was to be hoped might then be effected. Hereupon, on the 19th of February the commercial treaty was signed.

This seemed to remove the difficulties in the way of a renewal of the Tariff-Union. But those who enter­tained this hope found it thwarted now, not by the South Germans, but by Hanover, who, it is true, published the required preliminary tariff-system at the same time that the Austrian commercial treaty was made public, but then, in addition to the great favors accorded to her by the September treaty, demanded a long list of further advantages, thus delaying the negotiations for weeks, much to the annoyance of all the other states. It took a severe reprimand from both of the Great Powers to force Hanover, with many a murmur, to give up her exorbitant demands. At last, on the 8th of April, the Tariff-Union and the Austrian commercial treaty were both concluded for a term of twelve years.

Thus the crisis was terminated. Prussia had for the time asserted her position, but had been obliged to make formal as well as material concessions. Above all, she had not been successful in emphasizing the principle that Austria could not share in the Tariff­Union on account of her position in the German Confederation; it was to be expected that six years later new discussions would arise from the same source. Meanwhile, a truce had been concluded, and very soon a new turn in European politics proved that this was most beneficial.

Just here it may be in place to give a short account of how the matter of the Hanover Constitution was settled.

King George was, to even a greater degree than his father, imbued with the majesty and dignity of the royal office. In the case of Ernest Augustus, it was the possession by the Crown of the highest military authority, that had been the basis of his political absolutism. The soul of the son, however, who was a zealous High-Churchman, was filled with a belief in the mystical sacredness of the royal office, in an eternal decree of God, according to which the House of the Guelphs was called to rule over its possessions until the end of time; this sovereignty, from its very nature, could be neither divided, subordinated, nor limited.

The immediate consequence of these sentiments was the King’s disinclination to join the Tariff-Union and his desire to annul so far as possible the laws of 1848. The Minister, Von Scheie, sympathized greatly with this latter wish, and did his best to bring about its realization by constitutional means; he could not, however, secure the necessary consent of the Chambers, and resigned on the 9th of November, 1853.

If the King’s ambition was to be satisfied, there were only two ways in which it might be done. But there stood in the way of the first, the proclamation of a new Constitution on the basis of royal supremacy, the solemn oath of the King taken at his coronation. The second method would have been to call upon the reactionary committee of the Confederate Diet to com­mand a change in the Hanoverian Constitution. But here, too, the King met with difficulties. Indeed, he allowed himself, like the Elector of Hesse, to be persuaded that one is not guilty of violating one’s oath, if one can induce a superior authority to command this violation. But it was repugnant to his instinct of sovereignty to recognize in the Confederate Diet such a superior authority; and so a year and a half was frittered away in continual wavering.

Meanwhile, the reactionary committee, in which Hanover still took part, drew up an overwhelming list of points in the Constitution of 1848 that were said to be contrary to the principles of the Confederation.

After the Confederate Diet had recognized in its decree of April 12th, 1855, the justice of the complaints of the nobility, and had commanded the purification of the Constitution from those faults mentioned, the King finally made up his mind and commissioned his Ministry, that of Count Kielmannsegge and Von Borries, appointed especially for this purpose, to execute the decree of the Confederation.

By this means a large number of the existing rights of the Assembly of Estates were cut off, and the nobility reinstated in the enjoyment of their ancient prerogatives. Every attempt at resistance throughout the kingdom was effectually suppressed by new Con­federate laws concerning the Press and societies, and by the proclamation in 1856 of further and more rigorous police regulations. The nobility were ever afterwards enthusiastic for the King who was so kindly disposed to them; but apart from this class, respect for the Confederate Diet was as thoroughly shaken throughout the country as was the feeling of devotion to the House of the Guelphs.

CHAPTER II. THE NEW AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN ALLIANCE.

The settlement of German affairs suffered in 1854 long delay and serious detriment by reason of a great European crisis, the war of Russia against Turkey and the Western Powers. We are interested here only in its reflex influence upon German relations ; about the course of events in general, such brief observations will suffice us as are necessary for an understanding of German politics during those years.

The Emperor Nicholas stood at this time at the height of success, of eminence, and of power. In keeping with his dignity as ruler of Russia and an autocrat in matters of church and state, lie had always, as we have seen, spurned the principles of modern liberalism, and had opposed with the greatest energy, so far as in him lay, the Revolution of 1848. This policy had everywhere reaped for him rich rewards. By his suppression of the Hungarian rebellion lie felt that lie had gained the unreserved devotion of Austria. He had at first treated the Prussian King roughly, but had afterwards, to the great satisfaction of the King, saved him from the snares of the union policy. He had assisted in keeping up the dismemberment of Germany, so desirable for the Lesser States and for Russia herself. His threats had forced the German Powers to give up Schleswig-Holstein to Denmark; and the Czar had profited by the opportunity of confirming his ancient personal friendship with several of the leading English statesmen. The only Great Power in Europe that was not eager to profess its readiness to serve him, and that was then the hated source of all revolutions, seemed to him weakened by anarchy and party hatred. He had no scruples about expressing openly his contempt for everything that was French by directly insulting the new chief of the Republic.

Thus he had become in the eyes of all the world the repository of legitimate government and of conservative principles. He was hated and still more feared by the Liberals of Europe, but profoundly reverenced among the influential circles of the feudal and High-Church parties. It is no wonder, that in such a position he was filled with an unparalleled self-satisfaction, a state of mind fostered by the feeling of his tremendous strength as well as by his firm belief in the sacredness of his acts, and which was indeed almost forced upon him by the devoted admiration of those portions of the great European world which he considered alone worthy of regard.

In the year 1852 he saw the European Occident tolerably well arranged according to his instructions, and his eyes turned longingly again to that goal of ancient Muscovite ambition, the Ottoman Orient.

Here, too, he believed that he should find a field for the exercise of his vocation of ruler. However humbly and unhesitatingly the Porte had been willing to obey his nod, the poison of revolutionary ideas had also reached Constantinople. The Porte had offered a hospitable reception to Polish and Hungarian refu­gees, and had even taken a number of them into its service.

When France demanded for the Roman Catholics in Jerusalem a greater share in the possession and the use of the so-called Holy Places at the expense of the Greeks living there, the Divan after some resistance graciously granted the request. To be sure, Russia made such violent objections, that these concessions were immediately reduced again to ridiculous insignifi­cance : namely, to the possession of the key to a church door which was never locked ; but even then, Nicholas, supported by England, asserted that that attempt to wound the feelings of the Greek Church involved a very serious personal insult to himself, especially since the Greek congregations in several provinces had suffered severe injuries and losses by the arbitrariness of the Turkish officials, and that Russia in virtue of old treaties had the formal right to protect her associates in religious faith. The more prudence shown by France, in now giving up her demands, in spite of the evident utter lack of foundation for the Russian claims, and the more overwhelming Russia’s power in Europe had in 1852 grown to be, the more plausible to the proud despot seemed the idea that an auspicious time had come for solving the old and perplexing

Eastern Question exclusively in accordance with Russia’s wishes. Or, in other words, he gave himself up, as in 1829, to the thought that Turkish rule was perishing from internal demoralization; that the Christian subjects, of whom from ten to twelve millions in Europe were of the same faith as Russia, were about to throw off the yoke of the Crescent; and that it would be dishonorable and wicked to deter them, and not rather to encourage and support them. The inheritance of the Siek Man would then come in question; and it would be very desirable at the settlement of the same to prevent so far as possible any one whose presence as a neighbor would be undesirable from sharing in it.

In this strain he conversed in February, 1853, with the English ambassador in St. Petersburg, Sir Hamilton Seymour, and explained that he should claim for himself only a protectorate over Moldavia, Wallachia, and Servia, and should leave to England Candia and Egypt. He hoped that this offer would prove irresistible to England. “We are both agreed,” he said, “and therefore we need not trouble ourselves about any one else. And when I say Russia, I mean also Austria, for our interests are identical in the East.” He did not even mention Prussia at all. Concerning France, he expressed himself to Sir Hamilton with contemptuous animosity; which, however, did not prevent him, upon the receipt from London of a cool rejection of his plans, from trying the effect of the same offer upon the French Ambassador, M. de Castelbajac.

He felt so sure of himself that he made ready his fleet on the Euxine to set sail from Sebastopol, collected a large army in Bessarabia, and sent the admiral Prince Mentschikoff with a decisive ultimatum to Constantinople. This ultimatum turned upon the acceptance of a treaty in which both Powers were to promise to sustain all the rights and privileges of the followers of the Russian-Greek faith in the Turkish empire; so that in the future at every actual or nominal injustice the Czar should have the right to interfere. It is clear that this meant nothing more nor less than the downfall of Turkish independence and the death of the Sick Man. To the Divan was left, then, only the choice of voluntary submission or annihilation by the Russian sword.

But in this case, too, pride went before a fall. To the Czar, so certain of victory, was decreed a long list of bitter disappointments from all sides.

The Divan made up its mind that an end in the midst of horrors was more glorious than horrors without an end. The Russian ultimatum was rejected. Nicholas replied by ordering his troops to occupy Moldavia and Wallachia, not, as he said, for any purpose of war, but to hold in his possession some material pledge that his just requests would be complied with.

This was his second and more serious mistake. He, who had hitherto controlled Europe according to his wish, now aroused the ill-will of Europe by his own conduct.

From the beginning of the complications, Napoleon, who had just been raised to the imperial throne and was at this time surrounded by wise counsellors, saw in Russian vainglory the possibility of great successes for himself. By well-calculated compliance in the question concerning the Holy Places he had encouraged the selfish conduct of his opponent; but when Mcntschikoff’s action had rendered a rupture unavoidable, Napoleon sent at once a French fleet into Grecian waters.

The English Ministers were at first lulled to sleep by the pleasant words of their mighty Russian patron; but at the occupation of the principalities, public opinion in London asserted itself so forcibly against the Czar, that the Cabinet followed the French example of sending out a fleet for the protection of Turkey.

Not less important was the effect of the Russian doings upon the Court of Vienna. It is true that the personal esteem and gratitude which the young Emperor felt for his powerful neighbor remained unchanged, but only too plainly did the Czar’s latest measures endanger the most vital interests of the Austrian empire. Russian territory already bounded Austria on the north and east: it would not be desirable to be henceforth hemmed in by the same giant power on the south. Special considerations gave weight to this feeling; for the freedom of the navigation upon the Danube would by the Russian possession of Wallachia become quite dependent upon the will of the Czar.

It was then learned, too, that Russian agents were exciting the Christian subjects of Turkey to a rebellion against the Porte. Now, although the greater part of the Turkish Christians held to a common faith with Russia, yet they were of a common race with the Slavs in the south of Austria, and no one could say how easily a national agitation among the former might spread across the frontiers of the empire. To be sure, in the further course of events, Nicholas gave to the Emperor Francis Joseph a solemn promise in his own name and that of his heirs, that no such encroachment should take place. Count Buol, however, without making any reflection upon the sincerity of this promise, had doubts as to the possibility of keeping the same, and consequently was quite ready in common with the other two Powers to attempt to settle the difficulty by diplomatic mediation.

So far as Prussia was concerned, the King and his Ministers were well pleased, that, owing to Prussia’s geographical position, they had no immediate interest in the outcome of the complications, yet they recognized, as did all the world, the inexcusableness of the Russian offensive acts, and felt no scruples about joining in the diplomatic efforts of the other Courts. So a conference of the four Powers was held in Vienna with a view to bringing about upon fair terms a settlement agreeable to all parties.

The first attempt failed: Russia at first accepted the proposition of the Powers, but after a closer examination of its contents rejected it. Thereupon the Porte declared war upon the northern aggressor, and sent a force to liberate Wallachia: bloody encounters on the Danube followed with varying result, and immediately the fleets of the Western Powers appeared in the Bosphorus, to defend Turkey against any attack from the sea. But when in spite of this Admiral Nachimoff annihilated a Turkish squadron off Sinope, the Western Powers ordered their fleets to sail into the Black Sea itself, with the declaration that they would not suffer any further attack upon the Turkish coasts. Thereupon Russia broke off diplomatic relations with France and England.

In Vienna the four Powers in conference agreed upon the chief points that would be necessary for the establishment of a lasting peace. These were: inviolability of Turkish territory, and consequently, as the first condition of peace, the evacuation of the principalities by the Russians; modification of the treaties of 1841 and the recognition of Turkey as a European Power; and the voluntary promise of the Sultan to assure protection to Christian churches of all sects.

The Divan consented to all this ; but Russia insisted upon her original demands, and would not hear at all to any officious mediation by the four Powers, for she said that her quarrel with Turkey was entirely an internal family affair.

Thus within the space of a year’s time, the political situation in Europe had undergone a fundamental change. At the beginning of 1853, Russia, standing at the head of the Holy Alliance, and in confidential friendship with England, had without question held the position of leader in the politics of the continent, while France, regarded with mistrust by all the Courts, stood entirely alone. A year later, Russia found herself facing the united and unanimous opposition of all the other Great Powers, saw her conduct uniformly condemned by them all, and herself threatened by two of them with armed chastisement.

By no means the least cause for annoyance at St. Petersburg was the fact that at the head of this league of Governments stood just that most hated and most despised scion of the Bonapartes whose energetic persistence had, step by step, set the English fleet in motion, and whose prudent diplomacy had won for him the leading1 voice in the Vienna conference. England had already seconded his assertion that the butchery at Sinope had affected the honor of the mari­time Powers themselves, so that, if Russia continued her defiance, it would mean war against them as well as against Turkey. If, now, the two German Powers should be brought to a similar decision, to execute by force of arms their verdict expressed in the resolutions of the Vienna conference, then the Holy Alliance lay indeed in ruins, and there could be no bounds set to Napoleon’s restless and visionary ambitions.

A note of inquiry was sent by the Western Powers, at the end of February, 1854, to the Courts of Vienna and Berlin, stating that they intended to demand from Russia the evacuation of the principalities by the 30th of April at the latest, and to consider failure to respond to this as a declaration of war; they wished to know, then, what attitude in the matter was to be expected in that case on the part of the Courts of Vienna and of Berlin. Immediately afterwards the representatives of the maritime Powers laid before the two Courts the outline of a convention in which the four Governments bound themselves to use, for the carrying out of the principles laid down in the resolutions of the conference, such means as their representatives in that body should decide upon and advise.

The critical moment had come. But here the paths separated. In Vienna, the Emperor Francis Joseph had with great distress and deep sorrow watched the gulf daily growing wider, which had opened itself between his own and Russian interests. But so it was, and there was no help for it. The Russians, after crossing the Danube, began to press on into Bulgaria. Their agents there worked with redoubled energy in trying to raise a revolt among the Christians. In Epirus and Thessaly there was already an armed band of insurgents set on by the agents at Athens. Austria could never allow these things to go further. Count Buol placed an army of 25,000 men in the Banat, induced the maritime Powers to adopt vigorous measures at the Court of Athens, and expressed to Russia his surprise that the high and mighty protector of legitimate rule should now himself wish to unchain Revolution.

This surprise, however, was uncalled for; for the Czar was not only Imperator but also Pontifex Maximus of Russia, and consequently an insurrection of orthodox subjects against an unbelieving Government seemed to him, as formerly to the prophet Mohammed and to the Roman popes, a perfectly legitimate enterprise. However this might be, Count Buol believed it best to stifle these dangers in their infancy, and, if worst came to worst, not to risk an open rupture with Russia.

His courage in carrying out such a policy was the more increased, since he saw the Western Powers preparing for an armed intervention, so that Austria would be strongly supported in any steps which she might take. If everything went well, Austria might end by acquiring the Danube principalities, or at least holding the protectorate over them in the place of Russia. He did not, however, shut his eyes to the unfavorable condition of Austria internally, both financially and politically; and therefore he ardently desired to have, in case of war, not only the friendship of the distant Western Powers, but especially the assistance of Austria’s nearest neighbors, Prussia and Germany. For this reason, he had already made in Berlin, on the 8th of January, the proposition of a treaty of alliance, which began with the declaration of common neutrality and ended with the reservation that either party might act freely in protecting its own interests. Prussia had replied at that time, that inasmuch as everybody was united everywhere, and threatened by no one, there was really no need of any formal document.

Meanwhile the irritation felt in Vienna at the presumption of the Muscovites increased, the further Russia pushed her operations on the Danube. Large troops of soldiers were collected in Hungary, and, on the 25th of February, Austria urged upon the Western Powers the necessity of sending a peremptory request to St. Petersburg to accede to their demand that the principalities be evacuated: otherwise the responsibility for the consequences should fall upon the Russian Cabinet, and henceforth Austria would act only in accordance with the dictates of her own interests.

We shall speak of Prussia somewhat more in detail.

Here the Eastern Question had from the very begin­ning aroused the feelings of the people far and wide. Whoever cherished any liberal sentiments whatever, whoever had any enthusiasm left for German Unity, whoever mourned over Olmütz and Schleswig-Holstein, watched with exultation Russia’s ambition conjure up threatening and ever-increasing dangers above its own head. It was thought that a new era of freedom would dawn if the northern champion of despotism should fall to pieces under the blows of united Europe. To the great majority of the people it seemed inconceivable that Prussia, upon whom Russia’s hostile rage had fallen the most severely, should not join the common stream. Here there was again, they thought, an opportunity offered to Prussia to raise herself by a bold policy at one blow to the chief place in Germany, and to rid all Europe forever from the pressure of Russian supremacy.

These views were held in many influential circles. A group of prominent officials and diplomatists, Counts Goltz and Pourtales, and the privy counsellors, Bethmann-Hollweg and Mathis, who together had founded their own organ, the Preussisches Wochenblatt, for the repression of feudal tendencies, urgently advocated co­operation with the Western Powers. Baron Bunsen, then Prussian ambassador in London, drew up with the English statesmen the outline of a new map of Europe on which the boundaries of Russia were considerably pushed back. The Minister of War, Bonin, saw under the existing circumstances no reason for wishing to avoid a rupture with Russia. The heir to the throne himself, the Prince of Prussia, inclined to this side. He thought that after Russia had been so wilfully the disturber of European peace, she needed to be taught a lesson, and that some security was due the rest of the continent against a return of such dangers.

But those men in Berlin in whose hands the decision lay, entertained entirely different opinions.

The President of the Ministry, Herr von Manteuffel, who by no means looked upon his Olmütz Agreement as a defeat, felt himself repelled rather than incited by the loud signals of the Liberals thirsting for war. Yet he did acknowledge, and still more decidedly than lie, his most influential counsellor, Balan, that Russia had committed a great wrong; and consequently, he had without hesitation allowed Prussia to take part in the Vienna conference, and to give her assent to all of its decrees. He also intended to continue this policy further. Would he have resorted to arms? Who can tell? Certain it is, that in accordance with his cool, almost apathetic nature, he did not wish to pursue a bold, but rather a safe policy : hence it was very natural for him to believe that a persistent agreement among the four Powers would finally, even without the threat of war, induce the Russian Monarch to yield, and so bring about a restoration of peace.

In sharp contrast to these determinations or tenden­cies, stood the sentiments of those personally about the King; among whom were in the first place Adjutant-General von Gerlach, also Generals Count Drohna and von der Groben, and then, though of less importance, Adjutant Colonel von Manteuffel, the Cabinet Counsellor Niebuhr, and the former Minister, Count Alvensleben-Erxleben. These men, in accordance with their conservative principles, were definitely and decidedly inclined towards Russia. They were filled with enthusiastic admiration for the mighty Czar, who had protected Austria in 1849 and Prussia in 1850 from the demon of Revolution, and who now was waging a holy war to plant once more the Cross upon the Hagia Sofia and to purify Europe from the contamination of Islam. They did not exactly wish to rush into battle for the sake of the Czar, but would do everything possible to improve Russia’s position. Should participation in a war be unavoidable, then Prussia should be found not on the side of revolutionary France, but of conservative Russia.

To this party there belonged at this time a man, who was as well a faithful Christian as a firm royalist, but who was free from the extravagant theories of the Krezizzeitung, and a thoroughly practical politician, namely, the Prussian deputy to the Confederate Diet. Bismarck decidedly agreed whit General von Gerlach in the wish that a war with Russia might be avoided; but certainly in this case, if ever, the proverb held good: si duo faciunt idem, non est idem. Bismarck weighed the consequences of such a war, and foresaw only evil results for Prussia. He argued that the war would involve no serious dangers for the Western Powers, and victory would bring them great benefits. For Prussia, just the reverse would be the case. The burden of the war would fall chiefly upon her, and from the most glorious victories she would reap no advantages. “What are we after in the East?” said he. “On the other hand, we have great reason to be careful to preserve our friendly relations to Russia, which may in the future be exceedingly advantageous and even indispensable to us. Our only adversary, as we continually see in matters concerning the Tariff­Union and the Confederate Diet, is Austria; and she is the only Power whose defeat can bring us any real good. If there must be a war, then we have to enter the lists on the side that opposes Austria, unless the Court of Vienna is willing to make great and important concessions to us in German affairs. For the time, however, strict neutrality is the best plan, especially since this is also the desire of all the other German states.”

The Monarch, upon whom in this matter everything depended, heard every day the expression of all these different opinions; and each one found, as was natural with him, an echo in his breast, open as he was to every passing impression. He commended England, like Bunsen, in her resistance against Russia’s conquest of Turkey, and mourned over the presumption of his brother-in-law, which had sundered the firm alliance of old conservative Europe against the Revolution and its representative, Napoleon.

But as ever, religious views and considerations had a much stronger influence upon him than political principles. England had always seemed to him the most valuable ally on account of their common Protestant faith; but from the same feeling it was revolting to him to see in Turkey many million Christians under heathen rule, and he prophesied divine judgment upon every one that drew the sword on the side of the Crescent and against the Cross. There could be for him no sadder nor more perplexing turn of things than that England should, step by step, enter into a league with Turkey and with Napoleon, and, to use his own expression, be drawn into the incest between Paganism and Revolution; and that, too, without his being able to justify Russia’s conduct, which was the source of all the trouble.

His first efforts were directed towards doing what he could to prevent an open rupture. He had already, in June, 1853, made ah attempt to mediate, which had the usual misfortune of displeasing all parties. Then he assented to the resolutions of the Vienna Conference, and urgently advocated them in St. Petersburg, constantly hoping that Russia would yield to this united pressure from the rest of Europe. But when this, too, failed, and a declaration of war on the part of the Western Powers against Russia grew more and more imminent, in the confusion of his contradictory feelings he arrived at decisions of the most peculiar nature.

He had firmly made up his mind, in this “abominable” war, to remain neutral; for he could not side with Russia, because she was in the wrong, nor against Russia, because that would mean fighting for Mohammed against Christ. Then, on the other hand, he had no doubt but that Napoleon would let loose against neutral Prussia all the bloodhounds of the Revolution, and, alas, would only find too many sympathizers in Germany itself. To obviate this danger he determined to turn once more in confidence to England. For this purpose he chose one of those anti-Russian diplomatists, the talented and intense, although perhaps not always prudent nor pliant, Count Albert Pourtales.

This man he sent to Prince Albert with a letter dated the 22d of December, 1853, in which, among other things, he wrote: “ I shall make every attempt that lies in Prussia’s power to be ready ‘for the spring of the Tiger’ from the west, to protect from his claws poor, unfortunate, guilty, and consequently ‘half-stultified,’ half-conspiring Germany, and to fight against that godless, anti-Christian monster of Revolution, that is arousing the ‘Tiger’ in Hungary, Poland, Italy, and Germany. It has been my most earnest wish and honest purpose in these complications to engage in the mortal combat side by side with my beloved England. But of England now is willing from sympathy with Turkey to hurl ruin and death upon Christian soldiers, then this cherished wish, too, must fall to the ground.”

Accordingly, Pourtales was to try every possible means of making the idea of Prussia’s neutrality acceptable to the English Government, indeed, of making it seem to be most advantageous for the common cause. He was to represent that it was of the greatest importance to have some neutral party at hand that would be always ready to mediate and to convey messages of peace; that Prussia’s neutrality would by no means be a passive one, but she would, on the contrary, be constantly active in striving to introduce wise propositions to the Russian Court, and if definite action must be taken, Prussia would not be tardy in throwing into the balance, if need be, the weight of her own influence; but that in order to be able to render such important services, Prussia must ask that England, and, through England’s influence, also France should guarantee the preservation of the integrity and also the inviolability of Prussian and of German territory, that both Powers should refrain from any interference with the internal affairs of Germany, and that they should beforehand assure Prussia of their assent and concurrence, in case the latter found herself compelled, either as the result of revolutionary agitations or of the leaning of individual German states towards the opposite party, to take upon herself again, and perhaps exceeding the limits of the existing Confederate rights, the duties which she had fulfilled in the year 1849.

The English Ministers, after this communication, were astonished to learn that Prussia’s neutrality was to be more valuable to them than the assistance of a Prussian army of 30,000 men. Their astonishment increased at the idea that they were to assure Prussia, as a reward for this precious neutrality, the unreserved right of changing the principles of the German Confederation. But the highest pitch was reached when Baron Bunsen set as the price of this “real and autonomic” neutrality, the further condition that England after, in, and through the peace, should regain for the King his faithful Neuchatel.

We have narrated already, how after the February Revolution in 1848 the Radical party in Neuchatel banished the royal authorities and set up a democratic government in their place. The King, whose protests were of no avail, finally succeeded in 1852 in obtaining from the remaining Great Powers an agreement, which recognized unconditionally his sovereign rights and promised to institute negotiations of the Powers upon the subject, whereas the King pledged himself, during the continuance of these negotiations, to make no move on his own part. Since that time the Powers had not lifted a finger in the matter; but among the foremost political thoughts of the King still stood the desire to possess again “that dear little country in the Jura,” the ever-faithful Neuchatel, of whose inhabitants he was “prouder than of all his other subjects.” We shall see later, what weighty consequences this abnormal and eccentric sentiment was to have for him and for Prussia.

It hardly needs to be said that the mission of Count Pourtales in London was entirely unsuccessful. Quite as bootless was the endeavor of Baron Bunsen, with all the friendship of his royal patron for him, to bring the King over to the standpoint of the Western Powers. When, in February, 1854, the formal note of inquiry from the Western Powers came to hand, the King, it is true, sent an urgent request to his august brother-in-law to avert a terrible disaster from Europe by evacu­ating the principalities; but he remained immovable in his position, that he would have nothing to do with a war that was to be waged for Turkey’s sake and against Christians, declined categorically the convention proposed by the Western Powers, and declared that Prussia then, as ever, was satisfied with the conditions of the agreement, but in the choice of means to carry it out, she was unwilling to bind her hands.

Thereupon, in the beginning of March, he sent autograph letters—for the time seemed to him to have come when diplomats could with their science do no more, and the sovereigns must take the matter into their own hands—to Victoria and Napoleon, imploring them most urgently to favor reconciliation and peace, and declaring his own absolute and unreserved neutrality. Whatever may be thought of the King’s motives, or of his individual acts and the fantastic flourishes with which he adorned them, no unprejudiced observer today will deny that in view of the situation of Prussia at that time, her relations with Austria and the weakness of the German Confederation, neutrality was the only policy consistent with the interests of the State.

The assertion that Prussia would have been able, by a powerful attack upon Russia, to have assembled about herself all Germany, and thus to have established national unity under her leadership, might have gained credence, had she not had in such a war two allies who would have been very glad to see Prussian battalions arrayed against the Russians, but who would so much the more regardlessly have crushed out every movement in Germany towards unity. “ Only no German Unity,” said Napoleon to the Duke of Coburg. “No idea is more atrocious than that of German Unity,” said Count Buol, as decidedly as did once Metternich.

In short, Bismarck’s reasons as briefly given above, leave no doubt as to the correctness of the position of neutrality. The noisy cry in the French and still more in the English newspapers, that Prussia was renouncing her claim to a position as a Great Power, was, to be sure, childish; for what Great Power would ever act in a way contrary to its own interests ? Yet it is easy to understand their clamor, for they would only too gladly have thrown the main burden of the war upon Prussia’s shoulders.

If Bismarck’s unceasingly emphasized counsel had only been followed in Berlin! If in spite of all threats and abuse the proposed neutrality had only been maintained with persistent courage and becoming dignity !

But the fancied picture of “the spring of the Tiger from the west” left the Prussian Government no peace; and General von Gerlach urgently advised, since England offered no support, that Prussia, in order not to be exposed to the danger wholly alone, should turn to Austria. How would it be, if Austria should accept the offers of the Western Powers, and should then draw the other German states into her own war policy ?

We have seen that in January, in order not to bind her hands in any direction, Prussia declined an offer of a neutrality-alliance proposed by Austria. The King now decided on his part to send the same message to Vienna in the hope that he might in this way in the East restrain the Court of Vienna from engaging in the war, and in the West insure the protection of the German boundary against the French. On the 11th of March he wrote to the Emperor Francis Joseph, and told him of his letter to Queen Victoria, saying that although he had taken this step with a good deal of formality, it had been without any reasonable hope of meeting with success.

“ Your Majesty,” he went on to explain, “will understand how my letter to the Queen was written, I might say, with my conscience. It shall be a testimony to the fact of my having recognized the vocation which Divine Providence has placed before me; namely, of being a man and advocate of Peace, in season and out of season, in fair weather and in foul. I am forced to tell people the truth, to represent to them dangers that may be imminent and the fearfulness of assuming responsibilities, no matter whether I find attentive ears or not. I will show that I have recognized and fulfilled my duty. God the Lord will then direct events. At the close of that letter I declared my intention to remain absolutely neutral, and my firm purpose in so doing to defend Prussia’s independence with all the forces at my control against every one who tries to play the master over us.”

He then gave expression to his pleasure at hearing that Austria was willing to accept the offer of a convention with the maritime Powers “only as one of four,” meaning not without Prussia. “ Taking for granted that this refreshing draught is no deception, I beg of Your Majesty to send us word at once concerning the hopes which you undoubtedly connect with those blessed decrees. To me, some proposal result­ing from a genuine, vigorous union of Austria and Prussia, and directed to all the Teutonic states, seems imperatively necessary, and it must be drawn up at once. The form of the same may be determined by the diplomatists; but the kernel—so it seems to me—must be an offensive and defensive alliance of the three great groups of countries in Central Europe, entered into for the time of the impending direful war, and guaranteeing the mutual defence of all our frontiers during its continuance.”

He closed with the words: “ Our position is not free from great and serious dangers; but I have good courage and trust in God. For Your Majesty, young in years and fresh in valor, this will be much easier still than for me. I commend myself now with all my heart and all my soul to your inspiring friendship and good-will.”

In Vienna this note fell with great weight into the balance. There, too, people had been looking towards Paris with anxiety and fear, and indeed had much more reason to do so than had Prussia. But then the war between Russia and the Western Powers had already begun. On the Danube the Russians were preparing to make a more effective attack upon Bulgaria. The necessity of preventing this and of freeing the principalities seemed to Count Buol more and more urgent. How would it be if Prussia could be persuaded to incorporate in the proposed alliance Austria’s full power to engage in such action, and thus to gain Prussia’s consent in this instance, though she did not take part herself in the war, to the protection of Aus­trian lands outside of Germany, as had been the case in May, 1851?

It was decided to make the attempt immediately. The Emperor answered the letter of his royal uncle in a very full and explicit note, in which he above all expressed his wish that universal peace might be preserved, and his conviction that there could be no better means to this end than the defensive alliance of all Central Europe proposed by the King. He said that he would accordingly send General of the Ordnance von Hess to Berlin to lay before the King in fullest frankness Austria’s most private views and intentions with regard to every possible turn of affairs.

“Each of the contracting parties,” he went on to say, “would still, after the conclusion of the alliance, retain its full right to act independently, except so far as the object of this alliance is concerned; and if Austria should wish to take advantage of that liberty by occu­pying certain Turkish provinces, then she would have the right, in case Russia attacked her possessions, to count upon the full support of the Confederation. It seems to me of the highest importance for us to have a clear understanding of the extent to which this principle can be applied.

“Although I am firmly determined to continue in the unbound, expectant attitude, which I have maintained hitherto, and not to allow myself to be moved from it by the entreaties of the Western Powers, yet I cannot close my eyes to the dreadful possibility of ray being compelled by Russia’s inconsiderate behavior to protect Austrian and also German interests, by ordering the occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia. At the same time, I intend by no means to declare war for­mally against Russia, nor to make an attack upon Russian territory. The Austrian bayonets would in any case halt at the Pruth.”

In spite of all the spirit of peace that separate sentences in the note contained, the difference was very apparent between the ideas entertained at Vienna as to the purpose of the proposed alliance and those entertained at Berlin. Bismarck, who had not yet been heard in this matter, was displeased with the whole plan. When he learned of it, he said that this step ought not to have been taken with Austria, but with the other Confederate states against Austria; for what could be more agreeable to Prussia than to see the coalition of Russia, Austria, and the Lesser States, which had pressed so hard upon Prussia since 1849, broken up forever?

On the other hand, General Gerlach was now full of the greatest hopes, although he considered it necessary, in view of Austria’s desire to move ahead, to be very prudent in negotiations. That there was good reason for this, was evident when Hess reached Berlin at the end of March and announced his proposals. These embraced simply the conclusion of an offensive and defensive alliance between Austria, Prussia, and Ger­many for all time, as a means of protecting all their possessions, from whatsoever direction any danger might threaten. Austria, he said, had stationed 150,000 men in Hungary, and would soon send thither 100,000 more; she proposed that Prussia should now equip 100,000, and later 50,000 more, and that the other German states should at once mobilize one-half of their Confederate contingent, and promise to send the other half upon receiving orders from the two Great Powers. Soon afterwards the General added another article, to the effect that the allies should jointly and separately bear the expense of the equipment and the conduct of the war.

Of course there was no thought of all this on the part of Prussia. Balan drew up a counter-outline, in which the alliance was limited to the duration of the present war, its more detailed regulations and the ordi­nances concerning the beginning and the extent of the equipments being left to further consideration, and the item of the expense being passed over in silence.

When, upon this, Hess brought forward the draft of a common despatch to St. Petersburg, in which the Russian evacuation of the principalities was demanded under the threat of armed interference, the representatives of Prussia gave their assent, but demanded a modification of the form, so that it should contain no aggressive challenge.

While Prussia showed such caution in her move­ments, the Vienna Court was trying to confirm and even strengthen its relations with the Western Powers. On the 9th of April, Count Buol summoned the ambassadors of the four Great Powers to a conference, who then drew up a protocol to the effect that the Powers, although two of them were now at war with Russia, would persist in the principles formerly laid down; namely, the preservation of the integrity of Turkey, involving the evacuation of the principalities by Russia, the confirmation of the rights of the Christian subjects by a free act of the Sultan, and the admission of Turkey into the number of the European States: in no case was a Power to enter into any agreement inconsistent with these principles, without first laying the matter before them all for consideration.

When this protocol was presented to the Prussian King for his approval, he expressed some misgivings, but finally decided not to retract anything that he had before asserted, and signed it.

Meanwhile an understanding was arrived at in Berlin about the separate points of an, alliance, mainly based upon Balan’s draft. The two Powers were mutually to guarantee the protection of all their possessions. They were to promise to defend the rights and interests of Germany, and also to assist in warding off a foreign attack upon their territories when one of them, with the consent of the other, should find itself called upon to take active measures in defence of German interests. Just what might be termed such an occasion was to be made the subject of special consideration, as well as also the matter of establishing such a body of troops as this alliance might demand. All the German Confederate Governments were to be requested to join the alliance. During its continuance, neither of the two Powers was to make any other alliance with other Powers, that would not be fully in accord with the principles of the one in question.

Prussia had evidently taken care not to lay herself open to being drawn against her will by any one-sided movements of Austria into complications involving war. The second article implied the possibility of such movements, but bound Prussia to defend Austrian territory only in case Austria should previously obtain Prussia’s consent to her plans. This point had hardly been settled, when General Hess, before the papers had been signed, came forward with the declaration that such an instance was already at hand; since Austria, in the interests of Germany and upon the basis of the protocol of the 9th of April, was about to demand of Russia the evacuation of the principalities, and was ready, if necessary, to back her request by force of arms: therefore she now desired, in virtue of the second article, Prussia’s assent to the step, and the promise to guard Austria’s possessions from danger in the event of its being carried out.

In view of all that had taken place, this declaration in itself ought not to have caused any surprise; but the King was startled at its suddenness, and as he meditated upon the possible consequences, he almost repented of having signed the Vienna protocol. Yet he was very anxious to see the alliance concluded; and, moreover, at this moment he received from Russia a curt refusal to accede to Prussia’s conciliatory propositions, which both in the form of the reply and its contents aroused the King’s displeasure towards his brother-in-law to an unusual pitch.

So that, in accordance with the proposal of General Hess, he consented to an additional clause in the treaty, to the effect that if Russia should not, in response to a request from Austria supported by Prussia, withdraw from the principalities, then the measures decided upon by Austria would fall under the second article. A common aggressive movement would, however, the clause went on to say, be sanctioned only in case of an attempted incorporation of the principals ties by Russia, or, added the King in his vexation at the Russian reply, in case of an attack or of the crossing of the Balkans by the Russians.

Accordingly, the treaty of alliance together with this additional clause was signed on the 20th of April, and at the same time it was agreed that Prussia should under given circumstances station 100,000 men within thirty-six days upon her eastern frontier, and possibly increase her army to the number of 200,000 ; on these points it was said she would come to some understand­ing with Austria. Here, too, the decision of the questions whether and when these measures might be necessary was accordingly not left to Austria’s judg­ment alone, but to the united conviction of the two allies.

In fact, this was an alliance of a very peculiar nature : hearty co-operation together with the greatest circum­spection, brotherly confidence ever on guard. Prussia saw very well the possibility of a break with Russia, and Austria was pleased with the alliance whenever she thought of Italy and of France. Yet the chief aim of the treaty was after all for Austria the protection of her possessions in the event of her going ahead against Russia, for Prussia the assurance of her neutrality in the face of possible schemes of France and of the Revolution. To Austria’s mind the alliance was a bulwark against the East, for Prussia it was a defence against the West. The strength of Frederick William’s convictions in this line was made manifest to the world by his treatment of those men who had been hitherto the representatives of the opposite tendencies: at the very beginning of May, Baron Bunsen was recalled from London, the Minister of War, Von Bonin, was suddenly dismissed, and the Prince of Prussia was given leave of absence from all his military offices ; indeed, the latter was even threatened with fortress­confinement because of his former adherence to the Opposition.

Meanwhile a circular note was sent from Vienna and Berlin to the German Courts, announcing the conclusion of the alliance, the invitation to join in the same, and the intention to bring the matter before the Confederate Diet. But at this point there was in store for Austria an exceedingly unpleasant experience. She was forced to see, even more strongly than in the recent tariff war, that the interests of Germany were very far removed from those of the Austrian Empire, whereas they were identical with those of Prussia. In fair weather this fact might easily be concealed by the mistrust felt by the Courts towards Prussian projects of union or of annexation; but when any really serious dangers threatened, the relations of things could not but be seen in their true light.

The Lesser States, like Prussia, felt the strongest disinclination to take any part whatever in a war­policy. The only exception was found in the person of the ever-restless and ambitious Herr von Beust. He had not forgotten the services which Russia had rendered to German individualism in 1850: “We must hope for Russia’s triumph,” he said; “we have need of her assistance against Prussian ambition.” Ever since the summer of 1853, he had been urging those Govern­ments that had formed the Darmstadt Coalition against Prussia in the tariff quarrel, to establish a closer league of the Lesser States, which might then join an Austro-Prussian alliance with Russia.

But these belligerent plans were at once decidedly discountenanced by his friends at Munich and at Stuttgart. There these projects were met by a universal desire for rest and peace, and for strict neutrality on the Eastern Question. The feeling was in every respect like that manifested at Berlin, which found in any meddling in Turkish complications only serious sacrifices for Germany, and not the least prospect of any gain.

Consequently, the members of the Darmstadt Coali­tion met again at Bamberg, in order to give expression to their distrust of Austria’s ambitious schemes. They drew up on the 25th of May a common circular, prais­ing in the usual phrases the patriotic magnanimity of the two Monarchs and their endeavors to unite all the power and strength of Germany. The states would, therefore, gladly join the alliance, but they hoped that it was the intention, consistent with actual neutrality, to keep not only Russian, but also Turkish and the allied troops as well, out of the principalities. They said that it was presumed that at future peace-congresses the German Confederation would be specially represented as such, by the side of Austria and Prussia, but that during the continuance of the war, Germany would hold herself so far as possible aloof.

Count Buol was, as may easily be imagined, quite as much astonished at these declarations as he was enraged. Whereas King Frederick William urgently besought his imperial nephew to accept graciously the peacefully-inclined attitude of the German Princes, to preserve as mild a tone as possible in the message which was to be sent to St. Petersburg, and to delay the sending of the same until after the German Con­federation, as such, should have joined the alliance: Count Buol decided upon just the opposite, to confront the Bamberg expectations with an accomplished fact, and to send at once, on the 3d of June, the peremptory note to St. Petersburg without consulting either the Confederation or Prussia with regard to its form.

To prevent any Prussian disaffection at this pre­cipitation, the Emperor Francis Joseph, who was staying at the time in Prague with his newly-married wife, sent a most hearty and urgent invitation to the King to meet him at Tetschen, whither Buol and Manteuffel were then also summoned. Here the Emperor succeeded in retaining his influence over the King, to whom the principles of the Bamberg confederates seemed correct enough, but their conduct rather an attempt on the part of small people to play the grandee; and the King was induced still to navigate in Austrian waters.

The King approved the form of the Austrian note to Russia; a Prussian despatch in its support was prom­ised, and a common reply to the Bamberg confederates was settled upon, the drift of which was, that their co-operation in the alliance was beyond question counted upon, and that then their wishes would be regarded so far as circumstances would allow.

Furthermore, the Emperor, who had just before this ordered a fresh levy of 95,000 men, took no pains to conceal from his august ally that Russia’s refusal to comply with their demand would immediately be followed by war, and that in that case he should be obliged to depend upon Prussia’s protection of Austrian territory. The King expressed his hope that the best results might be expected from Russia’s willingness to acquiesce.

CHAPTER III. DISCORD.

Only too soon was it made evident how unsteady was the foundation upon which the alliance of the 20th of April had been based.

To start with, everything depended upon the decision of Russia about evacuating the principalities, and this seemed at first likely to turn out unfavorably; but soon the powers at St. Petersburg considered the evil consequences of such a method of procedure, and thought better of it. The Czar, according to the reports of the Prussian commissioner, was over-burdened with work, continually ill, anxious with cares, and alternately excitable and irresolute. The custom­ary regularity and system disappeared from the conduct of business. The Czar made rash decisions, and then noticing the silent dissatisfaction of the Chancellor, Count Nesselrode, let the matter go, and allowed him to determine and carry out plans as he best saw fit. So the Count now succeeded in getting a partial answer returned to the summary note from Vienna. Russia declared, on the 29th of June, her willingness to withdraw^ from the principalities, if Austria would guarantee that Russia’s adversaries would refrain from all further hostilities towards Russian possessions; in the event of such a truce, Russia was ready to enter into peace-negotiations upon the basis of the Vienna protocol of April 9th.

These were indeed no insignificant concessions. But Count Buol was not contented. He had already, on the 14th of June (without any consultation with Berlin), concluded a treaty with Turkey about a common occupation of the principalities, and was now pushing large bodies of troops towards the Roumanian frontier. On the 9th of July he declared to the Russian Government, that he would recommend Russia’s desire for an armistice to the attention of the Western Powers, though he could in no way vouch for the nature of their decision; but let that turn out as it might, Austria must still insist upon her demand that the principalities be soon evacuated. At the same time he kept urging Prussia to consent to the mobilization of 200,000 men, and half of the Confederate con­tingents. Indeed, soon afterwards, to Prussia’s great surprise, he announced to the German states that a motion for mobilization would presently be brought forward in the Confederate Diet by both of the Great Powers in concert. In short, every action of the Count betrayed an ill-concealed thirst for war.

Prussia, on her part, maintained persistently, as was consistent with the interests of the country, her pacific attitude. The contrast between her position and Austria’s, which had seemed almost removed in the April treaty, now stood forth in sharp outlines. In Berlin the Russian reply was deemed satisfactory; Russia’s demand, that if she should withdraw from the territory of the enemy, her own territory should be protected from hostile attacks, seemed founded in fairness; and the Russian note, it was said, could certainly be made the starting-point for a general settlement of the terms of peace. Consequently, Prussia had no notion of mobilizing; the only thing that the King determined upon was the raising to a war-footing of the number of horses in the cavalry and artillery. He himself sent despatches to Paris and London, saying that it was now the business of the maritime Powers to declare their aims in the pursuit of the war, and the conditions which they on their part would impose as the terms of an armistice or of peace.

At this time there came to Paris and London also Austria’s inquiry, what verdict the Western Powers passed upon Russia’s reply. The answer was just what Count Buol expected. So soon as the contents of the Russian note of June 29th were known, the position of the Western Powers was determined, namely, that the only proper response to it was the conclusion of an offensive and defensive alliance with the Vienna Cabinet, and consequently the immediate prosecution by Austria of the war with Russia. The draft of such an alliance was prepared in Paris, and very carefully considered in Vienna.

But then came an unexpected turn. After the Czar Nicholas in his last note had shown that he would not be dictated to by foreigners, he ordered immediately afterwards, as the result of his own private reflection, and “for strategic reasons,” the withdrawal of his troops from the principalities to a position beyond the Pruth, thus taking out of Count Buol’s hand his excuse for declaring war.

Now the political tendencies of the German Lesser and Petty States in the Confederate Diet were fully manifest. Even after the Tetschen circular, the majority of the Governments felt no enthusiasm for the proposition to join the April alliance. Then the opinion took root in many places, that it would be better to join in order to give strength and support to Prussia’s hinderance of Count Buol’s projects. Yet the preliminary deliberations of the several committees progressed with the pace of a snail. It was not until the withdrawal of the Russians had already made the questionable additional clause of no effect, that it was decided, on the 24th of July, to join, but still with the prudent paragraph, that the best means of attaining the end should be made the subject of further deliberations. In order not to allow Prussia’s new position as leader to be too marked, Austria voted in all cases with the majority.

All this might well have dampened somewhat the ardor of Count Buol. He gave up for the time the idea of a formal alliance with the maritime Powers ; although the discussion went forward with reference to the conditions which ought to be imposed upon Russia as the terms of an armistice and of peace-negotiations. An agreement was soon reached upon the basis of the former Vienna protocol. Count Buol also consented to the demand of the maritime Powers that the provokingly peace-loving Prussia should be allowed no share in any of the deliberations, and that Austria should be bound by the articles decided upon, almost as formally as in an alliance. By the interchange of similar documents, the following demands were agreed upon on the 8th of August, with the reservation of further requisitions as the course of events in the war might prescribe :

1. A European guaranty of the rights of the Danube principalities in place of the former Russian protectorate.

2. Free navigation of the Danube to the sea.

3. Revision of the treaty of 1841 in the interests of the European balance of power.

4. Promotion of the interests and rights of the Turkish Christians in a way consistent with the sovereign prerogatives of the Sultan.

None of the contracting parties were to consider any Russian proposals that should not express full acceptance of these principles.

On the 10th of August, then, Count Buol sent these demands, made in the name of the three Powers in common, to St. Petersburg, and simultaneously communicated this fact to Berlin with an invitation to join in this work of peace.

One can easily imagine the impression which such news made upon the Prussian Government. The confidential ally of April 20th had again, on her own account and without consulting Prussia, taken a step which for Austria involved a new declaration of war against Russia, and which was only too likely to draw Prussia and Germany into the complication. Prussia’s resentment was increased by the fact that the Western Powers preserved a strict silence towards her with regard to the matter. “It seems,” said Herr von Manteuffel, “as if we were to be punished for differing in our opinion from the Western Powers.”

Besides, it was impossible to discover the least advantage to German interests in the four requisitions. The freedom of navigation upon the Danube meant at the time almost nothing to the Germans, and would not be likely to be of consequence to them, unless perhaps in the distant future. The removal of the Russian protectorate over the Danube principalities was all very well, but the replacement of the same by a Pan-European guaranty might be attended with very unpleasant consequences. The third and fourth points concerned matters to which Germany was decidedly indifferent; and furthermore, they were stated so indefinitely that everything depended upon their more exact interpretation. In spite of all this, the King decided on the 13th of August to recommend to the Czar the four requisitions as a starting-point for peace­negotiations and an armistice; but he also made it known in Vienna that he would not bind himself by promising to take up arms against Russia, if she saw fit to decline these demands.

While this correspondence was going on, the Russians had completely withdrawn from Wallachia, and on the 20th of August, Austrian and Turkish troops entered the country. Yet there was anxiety still at Vienna as to the consequences. Therefore, Count Buol instructed the deputy to the Confederate Diet, Herr von Prokesch, to sound carefully the sentiments of the German Courts as represented at Frankfort. Prokesch, then, just before the usual adjournment of the Diet, put the question in a session of the committee whether the German Governments were inclined to include, as under the protection of the April alliance, the Austrian troops in the Danube principalities as well as Austria’s own proper territory, and also whether the Governments following Austria’s example were ready to bind themselves to accept and carry out the four points of the requisitions. The other members of that committee could only reply by promising to announce the answer of their Governments after the vacation.

At the beginning of September, a Russian note appeared, dated August 26th, rejecting absolutely the four requisitions, and declaring that Russia would in the future confine herself to the defence of her possessions, and with fixed resolution await the course of events.

The Prussian King was at the time at Putbus on the island of Riigen, attended by Bismarck, Alvens- leben, and Colonel Manteuffel. The President of the Ministry was also summoned thither. On the 3d of September, as a negative reply to the questions proposed by Prokesch, a circular to the German Courts was drawn up, to the effect that, after Russia’s declaration that she wished to remain upon the defensive, there was no imminent danger threatening the Austrian troops in the principalities, and therefore an extension of the April alliance for their protection was not necessary; further, that the four requisitions were open to many objections, and the King, especially since Russia’s refusal, could not recommend to his allies any participation in them that might give rise to burdens and to obligations; he also hoped that Austria would refrain from any aggressive movement, and so avoid new complications.

By this means, in view of the well-known sentiments of the Lesser States, all hope was destroyed for Austria of influencing the Confederate Diet to pass warlike decrees, unless, indeed, Frederick William should allow himself to be persuaded to change his position at the last minute. Accordingly, Count Buol decided for the present to remain passive, especially since the English and French land-forces, to the number of 50,000 men, which had been gathering up to this time at Varna, now embarked, on the 5th of September, with a portion of the Turkish army for the Crimea to besiege the great military seaport town, Sebastopol; and thus no support was to be looked for by Austria from that source along the Danube and the Carpathian Mountains, in case she made an attack upon the Russians.

The Western Powers were exceedingly angry at the course events had taken. Former remarks of Buol’s had led them to count at least upon Austria’s recalling her ambassador from St. Petersburg in case Russia refused to comply with the four requisitions; after which diplomatic rupture, military operations would probably soon follow. But nothing of the kind was done, and Russia could with composure bring great masses of troops together to crush the bold assailants at Sebastopol.

Austria turned the blame off upon Prussia, but was only half successful in gaining credit for this in Paris and London. The two Courts kept up, of course, their resentment against the Berlin Cabinet; but yet they confessed that Prussia had indeed more reason than Austria to wish to preserve Russia’s friendship, and had always shown consistently only one color, whereas Austria was always playing with the sword, but did not draw it at the critical moment. Thus they poured out the vials of their wrath over both of the German Powers.

Napoleon, who at the time was visited by Prince Albert, confidentially told his guest that although he was obliged, naturally, to direct his policy according to the course of events, yet the inmost wish of his heart was ever the liberation of Poland from the Russian yoke, and Italy from the Austrian, a wish which his endeavor at that time to provoke Austria into a war with Russia placed in a peculiar light. His ambassadors at the German Courts remarked significantly that if Russia were not forced by Germany’s attitude into making peace before the end of the year, then it would be necessary in the spring to call in revolutionary help.

In keeping with this, a rumor arose in several places, to the effect that France, in a secret understanding with Austria, was collecting troops upon her own eastern frontier, with a view to letting them march through South Germany towards Poland in order to attack Russia in her most vulnerable spot. The English newspapers kept saying that if the sleepy Germans did not soon of their own accord fulfil their duty towards Europe, it would be necessary to drag them in disgrace into the arena. The English diplomats, too, made similar observations; so that Minister von Manteuffel began to believe in the possibility of a blockade of the Prussian coasts by the allied fleet. Bismarck laughed at the idea. “I place no belief,” he wrote, “in the probability of a blockade that would do English commerce more harm than it would us, until I see it actually taking place; and as to the passage of a French army across Germany, the simplest and most effective means of resisting this would be the mobilization of two Prussian and two South German army­corps. If we show ourselves to be absolutely without fear, others will not molest us.”

Meanwhile, the King was disturbed by very earnest and half-threatening letters from Prince Albert, which induced him to favor an attempt to still the fury of the storm rather by friendly advances than by mobilization. He therefore sent one of his adjutant-generals, the old General von Wedell, to Paris, without any definite instructions, but with a fine letter to Napoleon, overflow­ing with affectionate sentiment and respectful phrases.

The effect of this step was not happy. Napoleon, appreciating thankfully the kind feeling expressed in the letter, nevertheless had Drouyn de Lhuys ask the Prussian ambassador, Count Hatzfeldt, whether all that was indicative only of the personal relations be­tween the two Sovereigns, or meant an alliance between the two Governments and common action. Count Hatzfeldt considered himself at liberty only to say that the intention could hardly have been to signify that if one of the Governments went to war, the other would immediately pounce upon their common enemy. While Wedell’s mission was thus unsuccessful in Paris, it created everywhere in Germany the impression that Prussia was beginning to hesitate, and that this time, too, Austria was again proving herself to be the strongest of the Confederate Governments.

This was the state of affairs when on the 28th of September a despatch from Bucharest was received at Vienna with the information that a Tartar had brought the news of a great defeat of the Russians at Sebastopol, and that the city had fallen into the hands of the allies. Count Buol in his exultation twice sent burning congratulations to Napoleon, and determined, in the midst of the intoxicating impression which the news of this victory was making upon all Europe, to put to rout completely the resistance of Prussia and the Lesser States to his propositions.

On the 30th of September he sent word to Berlin that Austria must now proceed in Frankfort even without Prussia’s co-operation; and on the 1st of October announced to the other German Courts that Austria would make in the Confederate Diet at once a peremptory claim for the protection of her troops in the principalities, and for the definite acceptance of the four demands addressed to Russia. Buol’s calculations proved to be well founded. The great majority of the Lesser and Petty States were completely overawed, and assured the imperial ambassadors of their most ardent friendship.

Prussia sent, indeed, on the 13th of October, a warning circular to them all, urging them not to be led into making a promise of such a nature that afterwards any miserable affray between Turks and Russians on the Pruth would involve first Austria and then with her all Germany in the war. But meanwhile the probability of such a war grew less every day. The news brought by the Tartar very soon proved to be a fabrication; for Sebastopol had in fact made an heroic resistance. So the forces of both parties collected about this point, and there was no talk about any engagements on the river Pruth.

Russia renewed in Berlin the declaration of her determination to limit her action to the defensive, and indeed implied a willingness under certain circumstances to accede to the four requisitions. Milder messages came, too, from Vienna: saying (November 9th) that although Austria might be obliged in case of necessity to compel the acceptance of the four points by force of arms, yet she had no desire at all to make any aggressive movements, and would make no agreements with the other Powers concerning a war, without first informing Prussia and Germany.

Upon this, Herr von Manteuffel inquired several times during the next few weeks of Count Buol with regard to the latter’s relations with the Western Powers, and received only the reply that the details of the application of the four points were being discussed. Under these circumstances, when everything seemed to be tending towards peace, it seemed to the Berlin Court that there would be no danger in yielding a trifle to the wishes of Austria: on the 26th of November it was agreed that an additional clause should be attached to the April Alliance, and the whole was immediately laid before the Confederate Diet for its acceptance.

In this additional clause, Prussia extended the promise of protection of Austrian territory so that it might also apply to the Austrian troops in the principalities, and both Powers declared that they would together try to induce Russia to accept the four required points. All promises, however, of resorting to war in the event of Russia’s refusal, and of assisting Austria in any armed aggressive step, were, as before, strictly avoided. They very soon were seen, too, to be superfluous; for as early as the 28th of November, the ambassador, Prince Gortschakoff, announced to Count Buol that the Emperor Nicholas accepted the four requisitions as they stood. It might now be believed, that the way was opened to successful peace-negotiations.

But a new surprise was in store for the Prussian Government, indeed a much greater one than ever before, and prepared for her by her “ close ally ” of April 20th.

It had not been the exact truth that Count Buol had stated when he said the details of the application of the four points were being discussed with the Western Powers. He had in the last few weeks been at work upon important matters of quite another character. It appears that he had become weary of the long post­ponement of the crisis; and since the finances were exhausted, the army must either be reduced to a peace­footing or must fight. For fighting, however, there was need of more certain help than Germany was willing to offer. Therefore he turned to the Western Powers, and begged of them a treaty establishing a closer alliance.

This request found willing ears both in London and in Paris, especially because the tenacious resistance of Sebastopol made it vitally important that a threatening attitude on the part of Austria should prevent Russia from collecting an overwhelming force in the Crimea. Accordingly, Count Buol declared himself ready to take part in the war, if Russia should decline to fulfil the demands based upon the four points. The Western Powers did not at first wish to limit themselves still to those four requisitions, but finally contented themselves with the reservation which had been already made on the 8th of August, namely, that new conditions might be added according to the course that events should take in the war.

Count Buol then further proposed, that, so soon as war broke out between Austria and Russia, an offensive and defensive alliance of the three Powers should come into force, which should insure for Austria the assistance of the allies by land and by sea. He also demanded the settlement of some definite date upon which this alliance should begin to take effect, in case a general European peace should not have been already concluded, and proposed as such a time the last day of that year. The representatives of the Western Powers could give their consent to all this, and the diplomatists came to an agreement about the middle of November.

The Emperor Francis Joseph had as yet raised no objections. When Count Buol, however, now laid before him the accomplished fact, he wished to hold aloof. His personal feeling for the Czar Nicholas rebelled against a step that according to all human calculation would make a war inevitable with the Sovereign whom he had formerly so highly respected. But Count Buol, it is said, explained to him that the interests of his empire demanded the measure; that under the circumstances the choice lay only between a break with Russia and a break with the Western Powers; and that he himself, if the Emperor persisted in his passive delay, would be constrained to ask for his dismissal. Thereupon, the Emperor, though painfully affected, granted his approval.

Up to this point, no one in Berlin had any idea of all that was going on. Count Buol now remembered his promise of November 9th, and thought — for indeed the new treaty of alliance had not yet been officially signed and sealed—that he would literally fulfil it by a message to Herr von Manteuffel. So the Austrian ambassador, Count Esterhazy, on the 1st of December called upon the Prussian Minister and read to him (but did not give into his hands) a despatch dated the 28th of November, in which Count Buol informed him that the Western Powers had imperatively demanded further and greater requisitions than those included in the four points; that Austria had stood out against this until she had become convinced, that, in order to make her opposition of any effect, it would be necessary to enter into closer relations with these Powers; that this involved definite mutual pledges and obligations; and that the result of the negotiations which had been held so far had pointed to the conclusion of a treaty of alliance, which, to be sure, had not yet been signed nor drawn up, but which had been agreed upon in its main points. Then followed a resume of the above-mentioned details of the agreement, with the observation that Austria would hold the treaty of alliance open to Prussia if she chose to join.

On the following day, the 2d of December, the ambassador at Vienna, Count Arnim, telegraphed that the treaty of alliance had already been definitely concluded.

The effect of this circumstance was violent excitement on all sides. Russia appreciated the correctness of what Prince Schwarzenberg had once said: that Austria would astonish the world by her ingratitude.

Prince Gortschakoff was dumfounded when Count Buol informed him in a few words of the contents of the treaty. At first, he was about to ask for his passports; he complained that he had been deceived, and that, although the Russian assent to the four points had been graciously accepted only three days before, a compact of war had been immediately afterwards entered into, which was especially directed against Russia. lie declared finally, that he could make no reply until he received further instructions from St. Petersburg; and left the. Minister, filled with enduring hatred, not against the Western Powers, with whom Russia was in open war, but against the faithless Austria.

Likewise beside themselves, in view of the present imminent danger of war, were the ambassadors in Vienna of the German Lesser and Petty States, and soon, too, the German Courts themselves, so that for a moment it seemed doubtful whether the Confederate Diet would accept the additional clause of the 26th of November. The prevailing opinion in Berlin was, that such an open declaration of hostility was not advisable; and so the Confederate Diet, on the 9th of December, signified its approval, although it was done in a way that excluded every obligation to act upon the offensive against Russia, and the Diet instructed its military commission to propose the necessary measures for securing the safety of Germany.

In Berlin, as one may readily imagine, there was only one opinion concerning the craftiness of the Vienna policy and the unreliableness of such a Confederate ally. The King, seriously offended in his inmost heart, at first declared with external composure that he would simply persist in his promises made on the 20th of April. But his constantly-varying temperament and his ever-active fancy were excited, as ever, in different directions. Certainly lie did not wish to have anything more to do with Austria. But her new alliance became a source of anxiety to him by making his fear of the hostility of the Western Powers doubly vivid. The rumor already gained ground that Prussia would not be admitted to the future peace-conferences unless she joined the new Triple Alliance.

Such an exclusion, however, seemed to the King to be quite as dishonorable as it would be, after Austria’s conduct, to join the Alliance. He meditated and meditated how he might avoid both courses, and settled upon the plan of declining the Vienna treaty on the one hand, and on the other, of offering to the Western Powers a special Prussian alliance of the same import as the instrument of December 2d, and of promising, should peace not be effected, to station an army upon her eastern frontier, upon the borders of Russia. He would consent to do all this, however, upon two conditions : first, he required a guaranty that the kingdom of Poland should not be restored by a revolution (for the strategic move of stirring up a rebellion among the Russian Poles in order to cripple Russia's forces in that quarter, would be attained by the above-mentioned location of Prussian troops upon the frontier); and secondly, a guaranty that no foreign troops would presume to march through Prussian or German territory.

He wished to make these proposals first in London, and selected for this purpose a diplomat of a liberal complexion, namely, Count Usedom. The King recom­mended him and his mission to Queen Victoria by an autograph letter of the 14th of December. “ He is,” said the King, “the bearer of weighty matters, which I put confidently into your hands. As one of the world’s Great Powers, and as the greatest Protestant Power, Great Britain must not leave Prussia to the fate that is planned for her. Usedom’s mission is merely an expression of confidence in Your Majesty; you yourself, Most Gracious Queen, shall then decide whether he shall consult with your ministers. The arrière-pensée of severing the connection between England and France is entirely foreign both to me and to my Government.”

This message achieved no more than the sending of Count Pourtales before. The Queen of England instituted no public discussion over the matter; and when later something of the contents of the message became known in Paris, the Minister, Drouyn de Lhuys, said very sharply that all this seemed to have been done in order to prevent a French invasion of Poland, and to defend for Russia her weakest frontier. “It appears,” he said, “as if Usedom had had several alliance-drafts in his trunk, and had by mistake offered in London the one intended for St. Petersburg.”

Thus everything came about as Bismarck had predicted on the 19th of December to Baron Manteuffel. He had written: “I believe that any one-sided negotiation with England will make our relations with the Western Powers rather worse than better; for England will only turn us off, and we shall have given out of the whole cloth an evidence of our uneasiness.”

Simpler and more practical than this intermezzo was the action of the Prussian Government, when on the 16th of December the ambassadors of the three Powers officially presented the document of their alliance, and requested a statement regarding Prussia’s willingness to join it. In his answer of the 19th of December, the Minister von Manteuffel showed how much good Prussia had already accomplished in the Eastern Question; the Western Powers had used arms, Prussia had confined herself to diplomacy, and had contributed no less to the results that had been secured; though different means had been employed, the same end had been in view; but now Prussia was to join in the war against Russia, unless the latter before the close of the year should accept the conditions of peace imposed by the allies; yet it lay in the very nature of the case, that Prussia must before all things be made acquainted with these conditions of peace, for she could never consent to pledge herself to assist in a war which was being waged for the sake of gaining unknown ends; everything depended for the time upon the construction put upon the four demands; and therefore Prussia begged the Powers to acquaint her with what they had already determined upon.

There could not be much objection made to this. But Prussia would have immediately introduced the desired information into further negotiations, and against this France and England decidedly protested. Accordingly, Count Buol, on the 24th of December, replied that he could not say anything about the construction to be put upon the four points by the Powers, because they had as yet come to no agreement upon the matter among themselves, and that furthermore any such agreement was impossible so long as the war was raging. This bold statement, that conditions of peace could not be formulated so long as the war lasted, left in Berlin only the two alternatives of believing that the logic of the Viennese was a strange science, or that they intended openly to mock the Prussians.

So much the more drastic was the impression that was produced, when on the same day another despatch from Count Buol arrived, likewise dated the 24th of December, in which Prussia’s holding aloof from the Triple Alliance was regretted, and in which, with all the coolness possible, the request was made, in view of the evident immediate danger to Austrian territory from Russian attacks after the opening of the new year, that, agreeably to the military convention of the 20th of April, the mobilization of 200,000 Prussian troops determined upon in such an event should now take place. Notice was also given that Herr von Prokesch had received instructions to request the corresponding mobilization of half or the whole of the Confederate contingents, and their assignment to the Austrian and Prussian armies. Evidently Count Buol flattered himself that just after the close alliance of Austria with the Western Powers, no German Government would have the courage to make any resistance to the demands of the Court of Vienna.

Yet after all, it became evident, soon after the sending of the two despatches, that although peace would not be assured by the end of the new year, and consequently the offensive and defensive alliance would come into force, yet Austria would by no means begin at once a war with Russia. However angry the Czar Nicholas might inwardly feel at Austria’s hostile turn, yet Russian interests too evidently depended upon preventing an open rupture. Prince Gortschakoff accordingly received instructions to begin negotiations upon the basis of the four requisitions.

The first conference between him and the representatives of the three Powers took place on the 28th of December. At this conference certain demands were made by the allies, to which Gortschakoff was again obliged to reply that in his instructions and full powers those points had not been anticipated, and that he therefore must ask for a respite of two weeks that he might receive fresh information. However much Count Buol sighed at this loss of time and money, the request could not be refused, especially since the unusual severity of the winter made all military operations for the moment out of the question.

Furthermore, a dark shadow had already fallen over the Count’s affection for the Western Powers, from the circumstance that Napoleon—we already know his motives—had in the course of December held negotiations with Sardinia with regard to her joining the Alliance and her sending troops to the Crimea. England, owing to the paucity of her soldiers, had eagerly favored this scheme and promised Victor Emanuel a magnificent donation of money; and upon that, the treaty of alliance was signed on the 26th of December between Sardinia and the Western Powers.

Nothing more disagreeable or more alarming could possibly have happened for the Court of Vienna. The champion of Italian Unity, the patron of all Italian revolutionaries, the mortal enemy of Austrian dominion in Italy, was to win claims upon the gratitude and support of the Western Powers, and above all of that Italian conspirator who had made himself the absolute Imperator of France! “Never!” exclaimed Count Buol to Baron Bourqueney, “never can the standards of Piedmont, though side by side with those of France, become for us any other than the banners of the enemy.” However much Drouyn de Lhuys emphasized the fact that the treaty was purely a military and temporary one, yet Count Buol’s mistrust was not in the least allayed, and all the more anxiously did he await the reply of Prussia to his despatch of the 24th of December.

This reply came to hand on the 5th of January, 1855, and was precisely what the situation of things made alone possible. It was to the following effect: the April treaty and its additions aimed only at the warding off of Russian attacks, and there is less reason now than ever to expect that such an attack will be made; if Austria, on the other hand, should aggressively invade Russian territory, that is no concern of Prussia’s, nor could Austria in that case lay any claim to assistance from the German States; moreover, the additional clause of the 26th of November presupposes a common support of the four points by both Powers: therefore so long as Austria continues to exclude Prussia from the Vienna conferences, the clause does not in the least bind Prussia; consequently, there is no reason for a mobilization of Prussian troops ; yet as a matter of fact, Prussia has so far quietly continued to prepare her troops for the possibilities of war, that if necessary they can appear upon the scene in much less time than the thirty-six days mentioned in the treaty of April.

Thus Austria saw upon one side the threatening attitude of Sardinia, and upon the other the flat refusal of support from Germany. Count Buol’s courage sank, and in the heart of the Emperor Francis arose again the old unwillingness to wage a war with Nicholas.

Meanwhile, Prince Gortschakoff was prepared on the 7th of January to lay before the conference the assent of his Government to the demands made by the allies on the 28th of December; so that nothing stood any longer in the way of bringing forward the special conditions of peace.

Count Buol, however, still considered it advisable to try once more his success with the remaining German states. He sent word to them in a circular note dated the 14th of January, that, in spite of Prussia’s difference of opinion, the imperial presiding deputy of the Confederate Diet had received the order to propose to that body the mobilization of half or the whole of the Confederate contingents, and also the election of a Confederate commander-in-chief. To provide for the very probable event of the failure of such a motion to pass in the Diet, the Count also took on the same day another step, by sending a confidential note to several of the German Courts, in which he asked whether they would be willing individually to place their troops at the disposal of Austria, in return for a guaranty of the protection of their present possessions, and a propor­tionate share in the profits of the war. Certainly, it would have been hard to tell what advantages Würtemberg or Hanover might gain from a war in the Orient!

Although the Austrian proposals were seconded by very harsh and urgent notes from Drouyn de Lhuys, yet the result of these measures was merely a new defeat of the Vienna policy. Bavaria and Saxony answered immediately in the negative. Several of the smaller states instructed their deputies in the Confederate Diet to vote for every motion brought forward by both of the Great Powers, but for no others. Even ever-loyal Darmstadt was not willing to send away her troops in Austria’s service into unknown lands. At last, Brunswick alone remained at Austria’s side.

On the 8th of February the vote of the Confederate Diet was passed, that, in the absence of any danger whatever of a Russian attack, there was no occasion for mobilization, nor for the election of a Confederate commander-in-chief; yet in view of the uncertain state of things in Europe, the Confederation, conformably to its duty to care for the independence and inviolability of Germany as prescribed by Article II. of the Act of Confederation, ordered the contingents to be so far prepared for war that they could be ready to march from headquarters within fourteen days after being called out.

This note translated into practical language meant: We will have nothing to do with any aggressive war­policy, but will defend ourselves against every one that may try to break down our position of neutrality.

The anger of Count Buol over this unfavorable result knew no bounds. There followed, during February and March, a very lively correspondence between Vienna, Berlin, and the Lesser States, which was carried on in an irritated and threatening tone on the part of Austria, and on the part of Prussia with cool non-compliance.

The situation was not at all changed by this corre­spondence, but the breach between Austria and Germany grew constantly wider.

CHAPTER IV. RESULTS.

Meanwhile the opening of the peace-conferences was delayed from day to day, and from week to week. Before the claims in detail could be proposed to the common adversary, they must, of course, each be agreed upon by the three Powers among themselves. But in these consultations, difficulties arose over almost every word, for the simple reason that the mighty allies no longer, as on the 2d of December, had the same thing in mind. The Western Powers wished to make such demands as seemed to them imperative, and then to continue the war if these were refused; whereas Austria, after her recent experiences, wished to im­pose no conditions that seemed beforehand likely to be rejected, and thus likely to prolong the war

At first, France opposed this tendency on the part of Austria with reference to several articles, while England favored and upheld it; and after that, Drouyn de Lhuys declared that if such a lame conduct was to continue, France would conclude a simple peace with Russia, and leave to the allies alone the business of restricting Russia’s power in the Orient. Then came a change of ministry in England, which brought in place of the peaceful Lord Aberdeen the warlike Palmerston at the head of the Cabinet, so that soon the English demands were more pronounced than the French, and Count Buol could find no other excuse for Austria’s holding back than Prussia’s heinous friendship with Russia, over which he constantly grumbled.

In the midst of these distressing quarrels came then the news that the Emperor Nicholas, in consequence of a neglected attack of la grippe, which had developed into pneumonia, had died on the 2d of March. His career, once’ so famous as he stood upon the pinnacle of glory, had ended in darkness. His powerful constitution, exhausted already by chronic disease, had been at last completely broken down by the fearful mental strain of the last year. Fallen from his position as paramount sovereign of Europe, he had seen the errors into which his vanity had led him, condemned by the whole world, his gigantic empire become more and more defenceless, his army reduced by enormous losses, his fleet half destroyed, and his finances seriously disordered.

But all this had made him hold only the more tenaciously, till his last breath was drawn, to the role in which he had his whole life long appeared before the world. As he had from no motives of selfish ambition drawn the sword in 1828 to protect the Christian Greeks, and as he had in the same spirit in 1848 opposed the Revolution, so, too, he announced in a manifesto a few days before his death, that it had been fully free from selfish considerations, and only for the liberation of the orthodox church, that he had begun the war. Truly, this was not hypocrisy from the lips of him who was at once a political and an ecclesiastical autocrat. If in the event of a successful discharge of such holy duties, an extension of Russian territory came about as a secondary result, then it was only a confirmation of the truth that to those that serve the Lord, all things work for good.

Inasmuch as the young Emperor Alexander II declared on his accession to the throne that it was his intention to continue in every respect the policy of his father, this change of rulers had no further effect than to postpone the beginning of the conferences for two weeks, to enable Prince Gortschakoff to secure his new credentials. During this time the allies came to an agree­ment in regard to the details relating to the first two of the four requisitions: the position of the Danube Principalities and the freedom of navigation upon the Danube River. And then, after the arrival of a Turkish plenipotentiary, the deliberations could finally begin on the 16th of March.

It became evident very soon that no serious difficulties were to be experienced in the settlement of those two points, and after six sessions a long list of articles relating to them received the approval of all parties. But it was different with the third point, the revision of the treaty of 1841. Every one knew already that in more than one detail there would be dissenting opinions, and that consequently upon this point turned the question of peace and war.

The treaty of 1841 provided that in times of peace no war-ship should pass the Dardanelles. But since that time Russia had built upon the Black Sea a fleet far exceeding in strength the Turkish navy; and the true question at issue in the discussion of the third point was the abolition of this Russian preponderance of power upon the Euxine. When Prince Gortschakoff gave his assent on the 7th of January, it was with the reservation, strongly emphasized, that no sovereign right of the Czar’s should be encroached upon by the measures which were to be introduced.

The question was now, whether it would be at all possible to gain the object desired and to respect this reservation. One method would have been the abolition of the treaty of 1841, and then the establishment of permanent naval stations of the Western Powers in Turkish ports on the Black Sea: Russia would at that time have raised no objection. But England found in such an arrangement numerous difficulties, and proposed, as at once the simplest and most effective plan, the neutralization of the Black Sea; that is to say, the exclusion of all war-ships and naval stations from this whole region.

England made this proposition in spite of the fact that Russia would most probably reject it. Accordingly, whoever was anxious for a speedy conclusion of peace, must devise some mediatory measure: in place of complete neutrality some limitation of the navy to be maintained by either country upon the Black Sea. This end might be attained either by forbidding an increase in the size of the fleets as they then stood, or by determining for each of the two countries a certain permissible number of ships. In the latter case the matter could be determined either by the conference or by an independent treaty between Russia and Turkey.

The affair was considered so important, that at the end of March both England and the Porte each sent one of their most prominent ministers to the conference; namely, Lord John Russell and Ali Pacha; Drouyn de Lhuys also secured from Napoleon an appointment to undertake the same mission. Thus the conference of ambassadors became a conference of ministers; and one that was to be of great moment, not only for the issue of the Crimean war, but also for European politics during the whole of the next decade.

Drouyn de Lhuys was a well-informed and able man, firm and consistent in his convictions, not demonstrative in his actions, brought up under Catholic influences, and trained in the old school of French diplomacy. As a statesman he was thoroughly conservative and free from every trace of that kind of ambition possessed by the first Napoleon. He strove neither for glory in wars nor for reforms, but was convinced rather that for the maintenance of a high position among the European states nothing could be more beneficial for France than the order of things sanctioned in 1815 : union and consequently strength in the French nation, disunion and consequently weakness in her neighbors, that is, in Italy and Germany.

His repugnance to Italian Unity was increased by the fact that it was connected with danger to papal dominion; for he honored the Catholic Church not only as the guide to heavenly bliss, but as a conservative element in internal government, as an ancient ally of the French Nation, and as contributing largely to the great influence of the French in the Orient. In Germany he entertained a decided dislike for Prussia with her Protestant and unifying tendencies; for both of these qualities seemed to him to be ineradicably grounded in the nature and in the history of that State, however graciously Frederick William IV granted complete independence to the Catholic Church, and however ostentatiously he pretended to have great respect for the sovereignty of the German princes.

As the result of all these considerations, Drouyn de Lhuys looked upon the imperial State of Austria, the protector of the Pope and the anchor of the German Confederate Diet, as the best possible ally that France could find in Europe. He probably also thought to himself that such connections would prove to be not only a support, but a check as well, to the restless policy of his master. Therefore he was very anxious to see the league, entered into with Austria for the Crimean war, develop into a permanent alliance. He determined to leave no stone unturned in Vienna in the endeavor to remain united with Austria, whether for peace or for war.

Prudent diplomat that he was, he went first to London that he might know how to anticipate possible English obstructions to his plans. While he expressed himself there as being decidedly in favor of the neutral­ization of the Euxine, he nevertheless said he expected that Austria would hardly accede to such radical demands, and consequently would not consider their rejection as sufficient ground for the declaration of war. He declared, however, that it was of the very greatest importance that Austria should engage in active warfare, and this would most probably be brought about, if Russia should also refuse a more moderate demand in the way of a limitation placed upon her navy.

Therefore he proposed: That Russia and Turkey shall each be allowed only four ships of the line upon the Black Sea, four frigates and a corresponding number of smaller vessels ; each of the three allied Powers shall maintain the half of that number; Russia shall be denied the privilege of sailing out into the Mediterranean; the Porte can in case of imminent danger summon all the allied fleets into the Black Sea. The English lords declared themselves in favor of this whole plan; and Drouyn de Lhuys then started for Vienna, where after a rapid journey he arrived on the 6th of April.

Two days later he had an audience with the Emperor. He began with a few words about his master’s firm and honest determination to co-operate with his allies either to bring about a lasting peace or to continue a just war. “Yes,” exclaimed the Emperor, “let us secure peace!” Thereupon, the Minister explained his plans in reference to the third requisition: in the first place, the neutralization of the Euxine; in the second, limitation of the fleets. He called attention to the energy with which in the last few days France had advocated the points relating to the Principalities and the navigation of the Danube, points which above all interested Austria; and he now hoped that Austria would be equally resolute with regard to the third point, which was of vital importance, to the maritime Powers.

He then enlarged upon the common advantages of a close union between France and Austria. “To strengthen the tie that binds her crown-lands together, to assert her high position in Germany in the face of a dangerous rival, to stop the encroachments of Russia on the Danube, to suppress anarchy and socialism, and to promote the internal prosperity of the empire — these,” said he, “ are certainly the aims of Austrian politics! Now, what ally could contribute more to the attainment of these ends than France? The great problem is, to check the Revolution without the aid of Russia, and to check Russia without the aid of the Revolution. For thirty years the problem has been unsolved, and the result has been the simultaneous triumph of Russia and of the Revolution. Today the solution is to be found in the alliance of Austria and France. What has brought me to Vienna is not at all so much the wish to conclude peace with Russia as to confirm and render fruitful an alliance with Austria. In the eyes of true statesmanship, the Eastern Ques­tion, in spite of its significance, becomes in comparison with this other one a matter of only secondary importance.”

The Emperor replied to this with a few general observations. He considered it impossible for Russia to accept the plan of the neutralization of the Black Sea, and accordingly favored the system of limitation of the fleets. The French Minister went on to say, that the plan of campaign brought to Paris by Count Crenneville was entirely acceptable to Napoleon, and that it might therefore at once receive the form of an element of a mutual treaty. Francis Joseph, somewhat embarrassed, answered that he presumed it would be necessary to wait with that matter until the end of the conference, since it would not before that be quite certain whether Austria would be called upon to take part in the war.

After this conversation, Drouyn de Lhuys attended the conference with far less hope of accomplishing his purpose. He saw very clearly that Austria made no objection to Russia’s being pressed with warnings and urgent demands, but her former thirst for war had gone by. The plan which he had proposed in London, of reducing the Russian fleet to four ships of the line, etc., was positively declined by Gortschakoff, and the Western Powers now awaited with suspense a declara­tion of war on the part of Austria. Count Buol, however, insisted that the possibilities of finding a pacific solution were not yet exhausted, and made to the French Minister a proposal, by which indeed the Russian fleet on the Black Sea would fare decidedly better: it should not be limited to four ships of the line, but simply not increased beyond its footing in 1853.

“That is,” said Buol, “Austria’s ultimatum. We consider it unfitting to impose harder conditions upon Russia, but the rejection of our offer we shall answer with a declaration of war.” Drouyn de Lhuys, delighted now with the prospect of being able to carry out his scheme of a European system, agreed to this, and, while Gortschakoff’s language was growing more and more defiant, extorted from the somewhat more cautious Lord John his final consent. On the 21st of April, accordingly, both Ministers telegraphed to their Sovereigns for ratification of their action.

For the cause of German and Italian Unity this was a very critical moment. A close alliance between Austria and France would have meant the ruin of these national hopes for a long time to come. Fortunately for both people, it was not the lot of Drouyn de Lhuys, any more than of Prince Schwarzenberg four years before, to give the decisive and permanent turn to the destinies of Europe.

The sentiments of the Emperor Napoleon coincided, it is true, with those of his Minister in so far as lie who had no military vein in his body did not, like his uncle, contemplate the conquest of the world. But in other respects his wishes and aims stood in striking contrast with those held by Drouyn de Lhuys. The Emperor resembled his uncle in possessing no spark of French patriotism: brought up in exile, educated at the Augsburg gymnasium, having received his military training in German Switzerland, having drifted as pretender to the throne and conspirator to Italy, England, and America, and having been acquainted in France only with the walls of his prisons, he was cosmopolitan in his ideas and feelings. The government of France was not the goal of his efforts, but had become the means to a more remote end.

He was a good artillerist, and thoroughly versed in the history of his own family: but further than this, his education in the course of his irregular life had been superficial. That most necessary training-school for a statesman, an exact historical knowledge of the development and the needs of the European nations, was entirely wanting. So in the long years of his exile, without the constraint of regular occupation, he had given a loose rein to his restless morbid fancy. He everywhere believed that he had discovered in the existing state of things the most serious defects; and he convinced himself of the ease with which a scheme of reform comprehending all Europe might be carried out, always on the supposition, of course, that the champion of the reforms was strong enough to bring them forward to the attention of the European Great Rulers as one among them and in every way their equal. After he had, then, by the fame of his name and by inciting the masses and the soldiers, in a way as clever as it was unscrupulous, raised himself to the French imperial throne, he did not hesitate to begin the realization of his world-embracing projects.

The first necessary condition was the overthrow of the alliance of the three Eastern Powers, which hampered him in every direction; and we have seen how conveniently the vanity of the Emperor Nicholas played into his hands. So far triumphant, he doubted no longer of his further success. He considered that the very nature of things required the amalgamation of Spain and Portugal into an Iberian, and of Sweden and Denmark into a Scandinavian, Union. To his mind, justice and humanity demanded the freedom of Poland from Russian, and of Italy from Austro-Papal, oppression; for Germany, too, the removal of the cramping influence of the Eastern Courts would be a blessing.

Most certainly he did not aim at the national unity either of Italy or of Germany; on the contrary, the former seemed to him likely to be inconvenient, and the latter truly dangerous. But by supporting effectively in the one country the small yet ambitious Piedmont, and in the other the state of Prussia, which had been since 1850 very much undervalued, he hoped to gain for himself the influential position now held by Austria, and then to be able to bring about prosperity and thrift throughout the whole wide circle of the nations. For in this remarkably-organized brain, despotic, revolutionary, and humanitarian purposes were incessantly running into each other. As the Emperor Nicholas coated over his love of ruling with his suppression of the Revolution and his propagation of the orthodox Faith, so Napoleon III did the same with his ideal democratic scheme of making everybody happy.

Italian affairs lay naturally nearest of all to his heart, as an old member of the secret Italian league; and consequently, opposition to Austria became the mainspring of his future policy. However friendly his conduct was at this time towards Vienna, in order to incite Austria into an open war with Russia, and perhaps in this way to secure even now the restoration of Poland; and however much he praised to this end his Minister's wise speech to Francis Joseph,—yet he was as far as possible removed from sympathizing with Drouyn’s endeavors to establish a permanent alliance with Austria. He had no idea of lowering unduly for the sake of that object the demands to be made upon Russia; and such seemed to him, as well as to Lord Palmerston, to be the effect of the proposal of Count Buol on the 21st of April. He telegraphed immediately to Vienna that this could not for a moment be entertained.

That meant the discontinuance of the conferences, and also the separation of Austria and France. Count Buol declared that Austria considered any increase in the severity of the requisitions inadmissible, and that since the Western Powers insisted upon such increase, Austria would take no part in the war. Again he tried by changing its form to make his proposal acceptable to the Western Powers. Drouyn de Lhuys decided to return immediately to Paris, and try to change by personal persuasion the verdict of his master. At his final audience with Francis Joseph, the latter expressed his hope that a permanent alliance with Austria for the common protection of Turkey might eventually appear in the eyes of Napoleon also as of more importance than a greater or less number of Russian ships.

This hope, however, was destined not to be of long duration. A few weeks later it was announced that Drouyn de Lhuys was no longer in the Ministry, and on the 2d of July Napoleon opened the session of the legislative body with a speech that unreservedly com­plained of the conduct of Austria : “We are still waiting,” were his words, “ for Austria to fulfil her obligations, which consisted in making our treaty of alliance offensive and defensive in case the negotiations proved fruitless.” There was no longer any doubt in Vienna about Napoleon’s disfavor.

Also in Germany, the discontinuance of the peace­conferences that had been looked forward to so long, and the subsequent relapse of Austria into utter inactivity, produced a great excitement of public feelings. With deepest shame the people saw that enigmatical adventurer, at whose feet France had thrown herself, deciding the destiny of two great sections of the world; and where was Germany? Indeed, how could that mighty nation have played its proper part, wretchedly dismembered as it was, wanting any united, strong, and national organ, and crushed by a load of slothfulness, cowardice, and jealousy?

For the first time since 1850 the cry for a reform of the Confederate Constitution went again through the newspapers, and soon also through parliamentary circles. In the course of the summer of 1855, motions and resolutions sounding the same note followed in the Chambers of Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Gotha. That pregnant word,  popular representation,” was also heard in the Confederate Diet. Count Buol, at that time, as we know, thoroughly exasperated over the Confederate Diet, was foolish enough to allow himself to be drawn into those discussions. To the complaints about Austria’s Oriental policy, which had involved an expense of one hundred and sixty million florins, and had been entirely fruitless, he ordered in September the newspapers that were controlled or supported by him to print the following categorical reply: “ Most certainly is the present Confederate Constitution insufficient, and it has been the cause of the recent failure ; it ought never again to happen that iu the time of war one member of the Confederation should be left in the lurch by the others; there must be a Confederate court of arbitration, and a powerful authority, an Emperor, must watch over the execution of its decrees ; above all things it must be agreed that the claims of Austria, based upon historical foundation and develop­ment, shall receive their due consideration.”

It was soon very evident that such words as these were not especially adapted to increase Austria’s popularity in Germany. Inasmuch as Bavarian news­papers had published them, Minister Pfordten very deliberately sent a note to Vienna inquiring whether these newspaper articles expressed the sentiments of the Imperial Government. Buol then retreated and answered: “The Confederate Constitution is surely open to many improvements ; and in any case, the future of the German federative system depends upon the action of the Confederation in the Eastern Question.”

But by saying this, he lost favor completely in the eyes of his estimable Confederate associates; and Manteuffel was applauded on almost every side, when a few weeks later he explained that no more ought to be required from a confederation of sovereign states, like the German one, than it can accomplish, and further, that in no case could a critical examination of the present form of the Constitution have the least possible connection with the Eastern Question.

While all this ink had been flowing without furthering the German Cause a single step, immense streams of blood shed in the East had brought the European crisis at last to a close. When on the 23d of September, 1855, after a gigantic struggle of twelve months, Sebastopol, had at last fallen, and the martial ambition of the Western Powers had been thus satisfied, and when thereupon, on the 15th of November at the close of the World’s Exposition at Paris, Napoleon gave solemn expression to the peaceful sentiments of France, then the Vienna Cabinet made a new attempt to mediate; and to begin with, it sounded the Western Powers in regard to the conditions which were to be imposed by them.

The result was an Austrian despatch to St. Petersburg dated the 16th of December, containing a detailed discussion of the four requisitions, and emphatically insisting upon the entire neutrality of the Black Sea, and upon the cession of a small tract of country in Bessarabia, whereby the mouths of the Danube were wholly withdrawn from Russian supremacy.

At the same time the Czar Alexander, after the honor of the Russian banners had been maintained by important victories in Asia Minor, determined upon a more compliant course than in April, and sent, on the 23d of December, an offer on his part to Vienna, which contained only insignificant deviations from the Austrian proposition. Count Buol, however, now again anxious to recover the favor of the Western Powers, replied by announcing the unchangeableness of his conditions and the immediate cessation of diplomatic relations in the event of a refusal. The Russian Government thereupon overlooked its scruples, and expressed its willingness to sign the preliminaries according to the wording of the Austrian draft. Yet the angriest possible feeling at this domineering conduct of Buol remained deeply rooted in all Russian hearts; with malevolent eagerness they awaited a rupture with their ally that had once been rescued by themselves.

The definite document of peace was then to be drawn up at a great congress of the Powers. At the choice of the place of meeting, the pre-eminence was manifest, which the mighty deeds of France had already won for the Government of Napoleon1 neither Vienna nor London could secure the fulfilment of its wishes; the Congress was summoned to meet at Paris by a vote which was at last unanimous.

To Austria’s great displeasure, Sardinia appeared at Paris as one of the military Powers: on the other hand, Prussia, as a non-participant in the war, received for the time no invitation. When Austria and Russia in the second session, on February 28th, 1856, proposed that Prussia also be summoned, Lord Clarendon succeeded in having the motion passed, that this should not be done until after the Congress should have already arrived at an understanding about the main points at issue. In Berlin this was keenly felt as a humiliating isolation, and the Liberal Opposition lost no opportunity to throw this in the face of the Ministry as the natural result of their sorry policy. As a matter of truth, however, it was nothing more than a senseless expression of English vexation at Prussia’s neutrality; but by her firm persistence in this policy in spite of all threats and ado, she had at last again shown herself to be an independent Great Power. If the plan of excluding her from the Congress had been kept up, it would have been no worse for Prussia, but rather for those Powers that took part in the Congress, for the simple reason that in that case the Berlin Government would not have needed to be bound by the decrees of the Congress. Two weeks later, however, the Congress sent its invitation; and on the 18th of March the Prussian plenipotentiaries were received, Minister von Manteuffel and Count Hatzfeldt.

We have no reason here to follow in detail the course and the result of the negotiations of the Congress. It will be enough to take note what shape the mutual relations between the Powers gradually took during the same, especially in the last few sessions after the peace had already, on the 30th of March, been concluded; for in these sessions several other European matters and troubles were talked over without any binding decisions. France had from the very first day shown herself in every question about detail as deferential as possible to Russia, and agreed now with her proposition for the future union of Roumania, under the lively protest of Turkey and Austria.

Then Count Walewski, the successor of Drouyn de Lhuys, regretted the mismanagement in Naples and in Rome, which, he said, was constantly producing numerous followers for the cause of the Revolution, and made necessary the hateful presence of foreign troops in the States of the Church. Thereupon Sardinia’s great statesman, Cavour, complained of the Austrian garrisons in Tuscany, Parma, and in the Legations.

Count Buol solemnly objected to the continuance of this discussion, which did not, he said, in any way belong here, and was entirely out of place; but he received no attention from any quarter. In the last question England inclined to the French side, and in the one concerning Roumania, to the Austrian. Manteuffel held his tongue ; yet in his few and prudent remarks one could not fail to perceive aversion to Austria. On his part he might have mentioned here the claims of his King to the restoration of Neuchatel; but he carefully avoided bringing forward definite motions, which might have disturbed the social good feeling in these conversations. The most obvious features of these conferences were the isolation of the Court of Vienna and the lively sympathy of France for Sardinia.

Thus the covetous, changeable, and at last inert policy of Count Buol, although attended with enormous expense, had in no particular reaped any harvest. In Berlin there was rejoicing at having enjoyed the blessings of a continuous peace at less cost, the Government had preserved its warm friendship with St. Petersburg, and, after the fall of Drouyn de Lhuys, received from Paris only marks of affection and of good-will. In the Confederate Diet Prussia had at this time far out­stripped Austria in influence. Yet she was soon to learn how inconstant was the friendship of the Lesser States.

The course of events in the Eastern crisis had both in Munich and in Dresden raised to a high degree the feeling of self-satisfaction. “We cannot, it is true, rule Europe,” Baron von der Pfordten used to say, “but we are strong enough to be the little weight that turns the scales of Germany. Just as in 1850 we prevented Prussia from forcing Austria out of Germany, so now we have made it impossible for the Court of Vienna to gather about itself Germany without Prussia. We need the presence of two Great Powers in the Confederation. Then is the Confederate Diet the only salutary representation of Germany as a whole.”

CHAPTER V. THE CLOSE OF THE REIGN OF FREDERICK WILLIAM IV.

The general political situation continued to be very much the same as it was left at the conclusion of the Paris Congress. Napoleon, his mind already occupied with Italian plans and the hostility to Austria involved in these, showed uninterrupted friendliness toward Prussia and Russia, and beheld with satisfaction the feeling in regard to Austria engendered by the events of the Crimean War; that is to say, in Berlin a suspi­cious coolness, and in St. Petersburg openly-expressed hatred. When Count Buol once talked of the restoration of Austria’s old relations with Russia, Prince Gortschakoff told the Prussian ambassador that he would have nothing to do with Austria’s friendship, and that in any case he must await Prussia’s approval before listening to any advances from that direction. In the Government circles at Berlin there was no one who would not have looked upon such an arrangement with entire satisfaction.

This ill-feeling showed itself strongly on every occasion. The Congress of Paris had left many particulars in the provisions of the peace to be settled by mixed commissions, among others the new boundary between Russia and Wallachia, and the internal affairs of the two Danubian Principalities. In regard to the first question Russia put forth a claim to the city of Belgrade and the Serpent Islands; in this she received support from Prussia and France, but decided opposition from Austria and England.

Still more decided was the disagreement between these parties, when Russia, Prussia, and France re­newed the demand already announced at the Congress for the union of the two Principalities. England and Austria entered a passionate protest against this; and Prussia especially took occasion to find fault with the tone and the methods of their opposition. The haughty attitude of England was complained of, “ where unfortunately there was no prospect of improvement, so long as Palmerston’s malignity and Clarendon’s infatuation gave the tone to the English policy.” No less dissatisfaction was felt in Berlin at the attitude adopted in Vienna. “Austria’s behavior toward us,” wrote Manteuffel to the ambassador in Vienna, “ shows at once undue reserve and lack of consideration.”

In fact, Count Buol was now acting on precisely the same principle which he had followed when once, during the course of the war, he said to the ambassador of Würtemberg: “Würtemberg must learn that it is Austria’s right alone in all Germany to pursue an independent policy.” The Count made complaints at Berlin that the Prussian commissioner allowed himself to take part with France against the German allies of his Government; and he also sent to Frankfort to the presiding deputy of the Confederate Diet, Count Rechberg, a copy of the negotiations in Paris, in order that Rechberg might use them to prove to his fellow-members the un-German tendency of Prussia’s action. It is easily understood that under these circumstances there was no talk of an extension of the April Alliance: the idyllic state of things in which the unity of Germany was represented by the harmonious accord of its two Great Powers was as far removed as possible.

In the mean time the impressions, made among the German Lesser States by the demands for a popular representation in the Confederation, urged by several Chambers, and for an Empire with Austria at its head, urged by the Press that favored an entire Germany, had by no means disappeared. King Max of Bavaria would hear nothing of either of these demands. To him, the independence of Bavaria and the maintenance of his royal rights in his own state were the most important considerations; and from this point of view, the Constitution of the German Confederation was entirely satisfactory to him. So much the more did he complain because this excellent institution had by its complete barrenness fallen into so great contempt among the German people; and he therefore desired, with all the ardor of which his mild nature was capable, to assign to the Confederate Diet an extended sphere of usefulness and the solution of important questions of general interest.

But with this he also combined another idea. In his well-meant efforts, both for the increase of the Bavarian military force and for the improvement of the Bava­rian system of education, he found himself only too frequently hindered by Nativists and Ultramontanists in the Press and in the Chambers: he thought that if, according to his plans, the Confederate Diet should once have shown itself to the people as the author of great material advantages, it would then, as in 1820 and in 1850, be able to act for the strengthening of the princely dignity against cross-grained penny-a-liners and parliamentary haranguers. His Minister, Baron von der Pfordten, was not without grave doubts in regard to these plans of his master, which, in certain circumstances, might also result in seriously limiting the independence of Bavaria; but he was nevertheless obliged to send to Frankfort on the 10th of November, 1855, the proposal that the Confederate Assembly should consider the preparation of “Acts for the general good” concerning a German system of commercial law, a common citizenship throughout Germany, common coins, weights, and measures, and concerning German emigration.

Now it was well-known, that, according to the principles of its Constitution, the Diet was authorized to establish institutions of common utility, but for every decree of this kind a unanimous vote was required. Such a vote was, however, in most cases impossible, or could only be brought about by compromises, by which no one was entirely satisfied. Once decided upon, however, any such decree was unalterably fixed; for its repeal or change demanded again a unanimous vote.

Whenever, therefore, the need for an institution of this sort had arisen heretofore, those interested, Prussia especially, had preferred to attain their object by a free and easily dissoluble agreement, either by arousing interest in the matter in the Diet, or by acting entirely independently of the Confederation.

Prussia was the less inclined to abandon this method, inasmuch as during the last few years it had become more evidently Austria’s intention to use the majority of the Diet (which was subservient to her) in interfering with the independence of Prussia’s policy. Bismarck developed this principle on the 26th of November, immediately after the appearance of the Bavarian proposal, in a detailed report, which at once met with the entire approval of Minister Manteuffel. This view was further confirmed by the fact, that Count Buol expressed himself strongly in favor of the Bavarian proposal, in order, as Bismarck observed, to draw the objects of the same within the sphere of action of the Confederation, and if possible within that of the presidency.

Bismarck, however, out of consideration for public opinion and for the real advantages contained in the substance of the proposal, constantly warned the Government not to make open opposition, but during the course of the negotiations to manage in such a way as to take the solution of the question out of the hands of the Diet and to transfer it into the field of voluntary agreement. When, in February, 1856, Bavaria proposed that the Diet should at once proceed to the consideration of a German system of commercial law, the action taken by Prussia was based upon the view above explained.

But King Max was not long left alone in his efforts to extend the authority and the functions of the Confederate Diet. How could it be expected that that most active statesman of the Lesser States, Baron Beust, would not have something to say in the matter?

Already in October, 1855, on the occasion of the above-mentioned correspondence brought about by Austria, Herr von Beust had replied to Count Buol that Saxony also regarded Confederate reform as an urgent necessity, for Germany was actually under the dominion of anarchy. “ While Coburg,” he said, “ in questions of public domain disregards the decrees of the Confederation, the Sovereigns of Hanover and Nassau have assumed for themselves rights beyond all bounds. In the same way a sharp contradiction exists between Article XIII. of the Act of Confederation, which provides for constitutions based upon the Estates, and the inroads made by Franco-English constitution­alism : either the latter must be rooted out in the individual States, or it must also be introduced in the Confederate Diet.”

That Von Beust by no means favored this latter alternative was shown by a memorial sent by him at the end of June, 1856, to the chief Ministers in Vienna, Berlin, and the Lesser States, a private document, as he called it, concerning which he asked his colleagues for a preliminary judgment. In this he dwelt first upon the revolutionary character of those demands which sought German Unity by the complete subordination of the Sovereigns to a central authority in both military and diplomatic matters. “ All the Governments in the Confederation,” he declared, “ should join in a Confederate decree proclaiming that they would no longer suffer the expression of such demands. The groundlessness of the reproach, that the Confederation accomplished nothing for the external safety of Germany, has been clearly manifested in 1830, in 1848, and in 1854.

“The defects in the sphere of internal policy,” he continued, “ are of more importance. The fostering of material interests is certainly greatly hindered by the fact that unanimous votes are required. But in the line of the constitutions of individual States much might be done. We have no intention of breaking entirely with the representative system. But even a curtailing of the sessions of the provincial parliaments, which are forever talking and amending, would be a great gain. In the consideration of the budget, these parliaments should only be allowed to vote upon any increase in special items of expense and upon the reports of the auditors of accounts. The Chambers themselves would see the advantage of this and agree to it. The general adoption of such principles as these would also afford the possibility of a complete assurance to the states of the protection of their rights. In constitutional disputes, the members of the Confederate Diet would not, from the nature of their position, be fitted to give an impartial judgment. Only a Confederate court of arbitration would answer the purpose in such a case; but in order to make such a court possible, a similarity of the constitutions based upon a Confederate law would be a necessary condition.”

All this amounted, then, to a simple proposal to suppress by police measures every manifestation throughout Germany of a tendency towards unity or towards a more restricted union, and, in the individual States, to subject the authority of the Chambers to a decided limitation; in short, as Bismarck said, it was a proposal to renew the Carlsbad decrees of 1819. That the proclamation of such a plan should call forth a storm of indignation among all the liberal parties was natural enough: but it was an indication of changed times, that now Herr von Beust’s plan hardly found any recognition even among the Governments.

His friend, Herr von Dalwigk, called the memorial an admirable literary production, that contained much that was true and little that was new. The King of Hanover was well pleased with the idea of suppressing the enthusiasts for unity, but he had grave doubts about the establishment of a Confederate court of arbitration. On the other hand, in Stuttgart, the creation of a Confederate court of arbitration was considered much to the purpose, but the other propositions were held to be unpractical. The Elector of Hesse would not listen to any changes in the existing Constitution; the limitation of the rights of the Estates proposed by Von Beust, he had long ago carried out in his own country. King Max of Bavaria took exception to Beust’s indifference to the extension of the activity of the Confederation in the line of material reforms. From Berlin, Minister von Manteuffel sent to Beust an abundance of appreciative expressions, together with questions implying doubt, and closing with a request for a more detailed exposition of the practical application of his principles. Count Buol alone expressed, towards the middle of August, his entire satisfaction, and declared himself prepared to take part in prelimi­nary conferences of the principal Ministers of all the German States, after the fashion of the convention at Carlsbad.

But before any action could be taken in the way of introducing these endeavors to secure German national rights, an event of a very different nature occurred, which, springing from an insignificant cause, threw the whole of Prussia and soon all Europe into feverish disturbance.

We have seen above with what eager longing King Frederick William clung to the idea of rescuing his beloved Neuchatel from the clutches of the Swiss democrats. The number of those inhabitants of the little country that shared this wish was not small, since the rule of the Prussian kings, during the century and a half of its continuance, had been always mild and beneficent, and had not disturbed any of the ancient customs and institutions. In 1847, things in Neuchatel were very much the same as in 1747: in the country, the controlling influence of the great nobles; in the towns, the rule of the old citizen families, in which no new intruder had a share; everywhere a peaceful repose, with moderately comfortable conditions of life, and evidences of an active piety.

In 1848 the stream of revolutionary democracy had poured over all this, had abolished all differences be­tween the Estates, had established everywhere municipal governments based on universal suffrage, and had given cantonal citizenship to every Swiss after two years’ residence; so that in 1856 almost half the population of Neuchatel consisted of new accessions of this description. It was natural that so far-reaching a change should hurt deeply both the feelings and the interests of a great number of the old inhabitants; and the nobles, especially, addressed urgent petitions to Berlin to be delivered from the democratic yoke.

The London Protocol of 1852, in which all the Great Powers recognized the right of the King, raised the expectations of these people. They could not be sur­prised that during the great war in the Orient there was no talk of Neuchatel; but when in 1856, at the Congress of Paris, Prussia’s reference to Neuchatel fell flat to the ground, the last hope of foreign aid was extinguished, and the malcontents determined in despair to help themselves, after the ancient Swiss fashion, by a sudden uprising. Some of their leaders went to Berlin and laid their plans confidentially before various influential persons. Minister von Manteuffel urgently dissuaded them from their project; the King held back in silence.

This silence was taken for consent. On the night of the 2d of September, two small columns under Lieutenant-Colonel Meuron and Count Friedrich Pourtales put themselves in motion, surprised and captured the Castle of Neuchatel, arrested the authorities, and on the next day published their manifesto for the restoration of the royal government. But the revolt had been insufficiently prepared: there was no co-operation among the towns that were royalist in their tendencies. The Republican party, on the other hand, rose all the more eagerly in La Chaux de Fonds and Val Travers, as did the new citizens throughout the whole Canton. Some Swiss Confederate soldiers were also at hand; and on the 4th of September, Meuron with his men was overpowered, and the royalist movement was everywhere put down.

Two commissioners of the Swiss Confederate Council hastened thither from Berne. Some five thousand men of the militia of Aargau and Vaud took military possession of the little country; a number of arrests followed, and sixty-six prisoners accused of high treason were held for a state trial before the Swiss Confederate Court of Justice. The royalists who had not been imprisoned were pursued by party hatred in the same way that the Elector of Hesse had in 1851 persecuted the officials who remained true to the Constitution; that is, by quartering upon them great numbers of troops, the maintenance of whom ruined even well-to-do persons, and in a short time brought the poorer peasants to beggary.

The news of these proceedings now struck blow after blow upon the heart of the King. It disturbed and overwhelmed him. His own right of possession became a secondary matter in his feelings, when he considered the misfortune of those brave men who, out of loyalty to him and reverence for his right as recognized by Europe, had risked their lives in a hopeless undertaking, which he had not indeed instigated nor commended, but yet had known of and had not checked. He was beside himself with grief and anger at the thought of seeing his faithful followers brought before a tribunal as common criminals, and threatened with an imprisonment of many years. This could not and must not be: it seemed to him a most vital point of honor to use all means, and to put aside every other consideration, that they might be rescued and set free.

He was at that time in East Prussia, and at once commanded that letters should be prepared to the Sovereigns of the four Great Powers, urgently request­ing that they would support his demand addressed to Switzerland for the unconditional liberation of those who had been imprisoned. His Ministers were at the same time to appeal to the Cabinets of the Powers to the same effect.

But in this direction the King was doomed to unpleasant experiences. The Emperor Alexander of Russia gave assurances of warm sympathy, and promised to do what he could; but considering his geographical position, he had little to offer but good words. In Paris, Count Walewski declared that the King’s right was undoubted; but, lie said, it was an unfortunate affair. Switzerland also felt herself in the right in regard to the existing state of things, and would hardly interrupt the course of legal proceedings. Napoleon, moreover, at that time in Biarritz, expressed himself to the same effect, that Neuchatel would be no gain for Prussia, but a burden, and for Europe a constant source of embarrassment.

The answer of Count Buol sounded in Berlin almost like mockery: Austria, he said, would gladly support Prussia’s wishes, but she saw no possible means of doing so, and would be grateful if Prussia would point out any to her. The English Cabinet was indeed entirely ready to interpose in behalf of mild treatment of the prisoners, but had no other advice to offer than that the King should procure their freedom by speedily renouncing his sovereignty over Neuchatel. An appeal to the English recognition of this sovereignty in 1815 and in 1852 made no impression. “Many compacts and protocols,” said Lord Palmerston, “have been destroyed by the power of facts; today it must be confessed that peoples do not exist for princes, but princes for peoples, and that the right of a sovereign vanishes when the consent of the people is withdrawn from it.”

In a still sharper tone did the Swiss Federal Council refuse the demands of the Prussian ambassador for the cessation of legal proceedings, unless the King would first renounce all claim to Neuchatel. The Radical party at that time held control in Switzerland, and the President of the Federal Council, Stampfli, was a Radical among Radicals. “Neuchatel,” he said, “acted in 1848 no otherwise than did once the Forest Cantons against their Austrian governors; in such a way the entire Swiss Nation has been founded, and the popular will has been the inviolable basis of her rights. The Federal Council is not competent to stop the legal proceedings, and even if it wished to propose such a thing to the Federal Assembly, it would be swept from its seats by the indignation of the sovereign people, like chaff before the wind. Against threats of an armed interference, too, the Swiss Nation will rise like a single man.”

Whoever read the Swiss newspapers at that time found all this abundantly confirmed. The people felt that they were entirely in the right, and, what counted for quite as much, that they were perfectly safe. At first they pretended a contemptuous disregard for Prussia. Her cowardice at Olmütz and her dread of war during the last few years were talked about, and gross insults to the person of the King were indulged in. On the other hand, the friendship of neighboring states was dwelt upon, and the active commercial intercourse with the South German States, who would certainly not be desirous to see Prussian troops fighting with Swiss on their frontiers and perhaps in their own territory.

Above all, the Swiss thought it unlikely that France would suffer such proceedings, would allow the neutrality of Switzerland, which protected her own boundaries, to be violated, or would look calmly upon the march of a Prussian army through Baden. Napoleon had once dwelt as a fugitive upon Swiss soil: the Swiss Confederacy had boldly protected him against the threats of Louis Philippe; it seemed out of the question that the Emperor should ever allow a Prussian attack upon Swiss territory.

The legal proceedings against the prisoners were therefore allowed to pursue their course uninterrupted, and the Swiss Nation shrugged its shoulders with cheerful indifference at the stories of the impotent wrath, the letters, and representations of the Prussian King.

In the mean time, however, the King himself had seen where the critical point lay. His judgment in regard to Napoleon had undergone an essential change by reason of the course taken by the Crimean War and the bearing of French policy since that time. He had reconciled himself to the idea that in the present state of affairs Neuchatel must be renounced, and that an understanding on the subject was at once to be entered into with the Great Powers; but his determination was all the more fixed to begin no negotiations until Switzerland should first have set free the prisoners unconditionally. If the Powers should leave him in the lurch on this point, he would, by means of Prussian troops, possess himself of Schaffhausen and Basle as pledges, until his just demands were satisfied.

On the 16th of September, in a second letter written with his own hand, he communicated these intentions to the Emperor Napoleon. “ The tone of my official letter to Your Majesty,” he said, “was cold, and lacked the warm expressions which my heart and my confidence in Your Majesty would dictate. The moment has come when it depends upon Your Majesty to win a faithful friend that can be counted on in every trial, and who is an admirer of those great abilities which have restored safety and peace to Europe.”

After he had dwelt upon the good qualities and the misfortunes of his abused followers, he declared that, if worst came to worst, he should not hesitate to fight for them. “I know,” he said, “that Your Majesty might stay my arm at the instant of victory; but I do not fear this. Yet I shall be ready, so far as the Powers are concerned, to make any concession com­patible with honor.” He concluded by saying, “ I write this letter with a bleeding heart and with tears in my eyes.”

In the Berlin Cabinet these outpourings of the King’s heart on political questions were not very popular; but this time the letter gained its object. “The King’s letter,” said the Empress Eugenie to Count Hatzfeldt, “moved the Emperor deeply. What could have been more desirable for him for his future plans than such a disposition on the King’s part? The satisfaction of the King’s wishes would render likely the long continuance of a close understanding between the two Powers.”

Napoleon answered at once on the 24th of September from Biarritz. He did not conceal from the King that as sovereign of France he could not look upon a Prussian army in Switzerland without anxiety, but all the more decidedly did he offer his aid in taking peaceful measures to oblige Switzerland to release the prisoners. In fact, an official letter was sent from Paris to Berne, in which the attention of Switzerland was energetically called to the serious danger to her own interests involved in the continuation of the legal proceedings, and which conveyed the Emperor’s earnest advice that concessions should be made on this point. Napoleon, the letter said, would then do all in his power towards a final solution of the whole question. In addition to this, however, Count Walewski sent word to the Federal Council, that, in case of refusal, Prussia, with the support of the South German States, would march an army into Switzerland.

The King was in the highest degree satisfied with all this. He desired war as little as did Napoleon ; but he entirely shared the Emperor’s hope that the latter’s mighty word would be sufficient to bring about a favorable decision, certainly, if the other Great Powers were willing to express themselves to the same effect. In fact, what room was there for doubt? The liberation of the prisoners did. not involve any actual danger for Switzerland. It was a question of principle and of honor. The liberation did, indeed, mean recognizing that the prisoners had been in the right, and Switzerland in the wrong. For this very reason the King had demanded it, and Switzerland had refused it. But now a Power which was in no way concerned, which was at once the mightiest neighbor and the best friend of Switzerland, called upon her in her own interests and in those of France, not at Prussia’s demand, but at the request of France, to abandon legal proceedings : what reasonable ground could prevent Switzerland from fulfilling this wish? Without any loss of honor, she could, on this basis, enter into a negotiation that could result in nothing else than the King’s renunciation of his claim to Neuchatel.

But it was destined to turn out otherwise.

In spite of the energy with which Walewski had spoken, the Federal Council did not believe in the seriousness of his words. The liberal or democratic tendencies of the masses of the people in France and Germany had been, indeed, since 1851, kept under repression, but they nevertheless existed in all the greater intensity, and showed themselves in the Neuchatel question just as they had done during the Crimean war.

There was an overwhelming preponderance of opinion in favor of Switzerland ; it was held to be both absurd and monstrous, that the Prussian people should be forced into a serious war, for the sake of thirteen square miles of isolated territory, that had nothing whatever to do with the Prussian State. Now it was very well known in Berne how much attention was paid by Napoleon and the South German Courts to the public opinion of their people; the conviction was therefore felt, that, however hostile these Governments might be, they would not venture actually to permit the Prussian army to cross their territory.

There was another consideration.

Switzerland, without doubt, would even now have yielded to a demand made by the Great Powers collectively. But, as we know, since the Congress of Paris, the Great Powers had been divided into two groups, and this, too, made itself felt also in the Neuchatel question. While France supported the Prussian Cabinet, the Russian ambassador in Berne seconded the French with uninterrupted zeal. The representative of Austria, on the other hand, acted with extreme coolness, proposed, indeed, the liberation of the prisoners, but, after this had been refused, took no further steps. And the English ambassador, Gordon, even had daily consultations with Stampfli, as to how the King of Prussia could be forced, first to renounce his claim, and so to purchase the freedom of the rebels.

Under these circumstances, the Federal Council, after two days’ deliberation, decided to say in reply to the French Government, that the liberation of the prisoners could only take place after the beginning of a negotiation, based upon the King’s renunciation of his right to Neuchatel. “I hope,” said Count Walewski, thereupon, to the Swiss ambassador, “ that this refusal will not be your last word: it is not advisable for any one to cast to the winds, through obstinacy or carelessness, the earnest counsel of the Emperor of the French.”

The King, who in his excitement clutched at any straw that might prove of use, then seized upon the idea of summoning the German Confederate Diet. Count Buol declared this to be an excellent measure, but said that everything irritating must be avoided, every assertion of rights, and especially every threat. The Count had now the peculiar satisfaction of seeing the Prussian representative in the Diet induce his Government to limit its proposition entirely in accordance with Austria’s wishes, that is to say, to the participation of the Confederation in the London Protocol, and to the demand for the liberation of the prisoners, to be made in the name of the Confederation by all the German ambassadors in Berne. Only by implication did the proposition contain the expression of a hope, that, in case of necessity, the individual Governments — not the Confederation — would allow the Prussian troops to cross their territory.

In regard to this, Bismarck had called Herr von Manteuffel’s attention to the fact that nothing ought to be required of the Confederation that would not be unanimously agreed to. “ It would be extremely dangerous,” he said, “to declare a majority decision admis­sible and binding in this case; by so doing, we should expose ourselves to the possibility of being obliged sometime in the future, to recognize the validity of majority decisions concerning the defence of Austria’s possessions in Italy.” That Napoleon was occupied with plans in regard to these possessions, Bismarck had already perceived after the Congress of Paris, and he had communicated his view to his Government.

This consideration makes Austria’s attitude seem all the more incomprehensible, in that she did not take advantage of this unusual opportunity, and use every means to encourage Prussia in military action against Switzerland, so that a probably unanimous vote might be secured, to the effect that loyalty to the Confederation imposed as a duty the protection of every member of the Confederation, even in its non-German possessions. It would have been an important gain for Austria in the future, and would not have involved the least danger to her in the present. For nothing is surer, than that Switzerland would at once have yielded, so soon as Austria should have joined in the threatening attitude of Prussia and of France.

Instead of this, however, we see Count Buol everywhere, in Berne, in South Germany, and in Frankfort, offering hinderances to the wishes of Prussia, whereby he constantly wounded and irritated the King’s mind, and intensified the secure self-confidence of the Swiss. It is easily understood, that, this being the state of affairs, the Federal Council rejected the request of the German Central Authority, exactly as they had done all former demands.

Meanwhile Napoleon, much annoyed at the rejection of his advice, had by no means abandoned his activity. He at once asked the King for a private communication of the conditions upon which, after the liberation of the prisoners, he could bring himself, in conference with the Powers, to resign Neuchatel. He received the answer that the King reserved further details for the beginning of the negotiations, but would finally, at the request of the Powers, content himself with these three points: the continuance of the title of Prince of Neuchatel, the recovery of the princely domains, and the restoration of the old citizens to power in the Neuchatel towns, together with a guaranty for the maintenance of the charitable institutions. This, it was remarked, was communicated in profound confidence to the Emperor, but was not to be made known to Switzerland; so far as that country was concerned, the King was determined to insist upon the unconditional liberation of the prisoners as a preliminary. Napoleon was entirely satisfied with this, but conceived the idea of hinting to the Swiss Government, through the French ambassador, how cheaply he could obtain for it the King’s renunciation upon the release of the prisoners, and of thus inducing it to fulfil his own wishes.

But this good intention was rendered abortive in the moment of execution, by an almost comic occurrence. The English ambassador in Berlin had, by not wholly unusual means, become acquainted with the three points, and had at once communicated them to the Minister, Lord Clarendon. The latter, in his turn, had speedily made them known to the ambassador Gordon in Berne. The news then spread rapidly through the world, that England had proposed to the Federal Council to call in the mediation of the two Western Powers, on the basis of the three points and of the royal renunciation, which would be followed by the cessation of legal proceedings; it was also added, that the Federal Council had hastened to accept this friendly offer.

The best card in the Emperor’s game had thus been taken from his hand, and given to his opponent. Napoleon was indignant, and now announced to the Prussian ambassador, that, as English interference had taken away from the French Government the means of further action, he would throw his own personal influence into the balance. He invited the commander-in- chief of the Swiss Confederate army, General Dufour, his former instructor in military science, to come to Paris; he depicted to him the settled determination of the King, the unavoidable necessity of yielding in the matter of the prisoners, and the certainty of the consequent royal renunciation. He concluded with the definite declaration, that after the liberation of the prisoners he would support Switzerland in every way, but that, unless that liberation took place, he would in no way hinder the march of a Prussian army. At the same time, the representatives of France at the South German Courts received instructions to express them­selves to the ministers there in the same way; and Count Walewski quietly suggested to Count Hatzfeldt, that Prussia should make some military preparations: that, he said, was the only, but also the most effective, method of bringing the Swiss to their senses.

Since in taking warlike measures the thing most to be considered was the relations with France and the South German States, the President of the Prussian Ministry invited Count Hatzfeldt and the representative in the Diet to come to Berlin, for a conference, on the 2d of December. At this conference, Bismarck, in entire agreement with Napoleon, declared that the sole means which would be effective against the reluctance of Switzerland and the Powers, was a serious commencement of preparations. No one, he said, desired war; and for that very reason, Prussia would obtain what she desired if only there was no doubt left, that, in case of her failing to do so, war would ensue.

It was finally decided to act on this theory. To be sure, no very great appropriations were yet made to cover the expenses, but various arrangements were made such as are usually preliminary to a mobilization. It was decided that each of the nine army corps should contribute one division, with its militia, to the campaign, making in all about 160,000 men, of whom six divisions were to occupy Schaffhausen and Basle, and three to form a reserve. Military plenipotentiaries were sent to Darmstadt and Carlsruhe, to Stuttgart and Munich in order to arrange in detail for the maintenance and lodgement of the troops on the march. All this was not made public, but was communicated to all the Governments with the observation that an ulti­matum would at once be presented to Switzerland, and that, if the prisoners were not liberated by the 2d of January, the mobilization would take place on that day; and after that, more extensive demands would be addressed to the Swiss Confederacy.

A secret intrusted to so many naturally found its way into the Press; and a great rattling of sabres at once took place in the Swiss newspapers, with the cry for an offensive war for the overthrow of all the thrones in Germany. The Federal Council was still reluctant to take the Prussian threat, or Napoleon’s approval of it, in earnest. But on the 17th of December, the imperial Moniteur published a sharp note, portraying, on the one side, the unquestionable right and the long-continued moderation of the King of Prussia, and, on the other, the violence and obstinacy of the Swiss Federal Council, and concluded by saying, that, in view of this, Switzerland could not wonder, if she received in the future less consideration than had been shown her hitherto.

The effect of this public avowal was great. The Federal Council hastened to convene the representative gathering of the sovereign people, the Federal Assembly. There was still a hope that the Prussian minie­balls could be kept away from Schaffhausen; for it was known that Austria was employing every means to hinder the movement of the Prussian army.

In fact, Count Buol declared, in Berlin, that Prussia had promised in the London Protocol to take no steps on her own part during the continuance of those negotiations, by which the Powers were to endeavor to secure a recognition of her rights in Switzerland: from which it followed that she ought now to despatch no troops without first obtaining the approval of the Powers. The answer to this was simple: “For four years the Powers have neglected to begin any negotiations, and, consequently, we now shall do on our own account what seems to us proper.” At the same time, Count Buol declared, that the passage of the Prussian troops through the south of Germany could be authorized only by the Confederate Diet, and not by the individual States; but to this he received from all sides the reply, that the reverse of this was true by reason of the sovereign independence of the German individual States.

Quite as fruitless were the Count’s diplomatic efforts at the various Courts. When the anxiety about French intervention had disappeared, the ruling feeling in these Cabinets was the mere satisfaction that a severe lesson was at last to be given to the revolutionary element in Switzerland.

The sole result of Austria’s attitude was a daily­increasing bitterness on the part of the Prussian King, whose nerves were disturbed anew by every despatch from Vienna. In spite of everything, the old friendship was not yet quite stifled in his heart. At the end of December, he sent Colonel Manteuffel once again with a long autograph letter to the Emperor, who was then in Venetia. In Vienna there was a heated discussion between the Colonel and Count Buol, in which each persisted in his own view; and when the Emperor Francis Joseph a few days after received the Colonel, though his manner was gracious, he spoke substantially to the same effect as his Minister.

At this same time, the Swiss Federal Council despatched one of its members, Furrer, a prudent and moderate man, first to Frankfort, where he had a long consultation with the presiding deputy, Count Rechberg, and then to the three South German capitals, to inquire with regard to the passage of the Prussian troops through South Germany. The reply was everywhere the same: the passage of the troops had been approved of and provided for; it would certainly take place after the period specified had elapsed, unless the prisoners should be set free within that time. At Napoleon’s request Prussia had extended the time until the 15th of January; before that, the Emperor thought, the pear would be ripe.

And, in fact, so it was. While the Federal Council with great haste and very serious expense was getting together several divisions of militia, and pushing them toward the threatened boundaries, the martial ardor of the people, in spite of all the haughty newspaper articles, was gradually collapsing. Fifteen hundred soldiers deserted from Neuchatel across the French frontier, in order not to be obliged to fight against their King. The remaining cantons showed little desire to engage in a struggle with Prussia for the sole purpose of carrying to the end the drama of a criminal suit brought against sixty royalists. It was certainly not pleasant to be forced to yield to the threat of a Prussian attack; but in the mean time, Napoleon came to the assistance of his old friends in this difficulty with a new declaration. This was, indeed, only a repetition of what he had said in October; namely, that after the liberation of the prisoners, he would exert himself actively for the interests of Switzerland; but by means of it the Federal Council could now, without mentioning the Prussian army, bring forward in the Federal Assembly a proposition for friendly acquiescence in the wishes of France; that is to say, for the cessation of legal proceedings and for the liberation of the prisoners. On the 15th of January, just before the expiration of the period fixed by Prussia, the Assembly gave this proposition their approval.

The danger of war was thus averted. Three months earlier the sons of Tell and Winkelried might have obtained this result more cheaply and more honorably. But at the same time, as good men of business, they had some ground for consoling themselves. The longer and the more intensely the King’s zeal, and with it the excitement of Europe, had been concentrated upon the question of the legal proceedings, the more certain was it that, after the settlement of that question, a general relaxation of interest and indifference on the part of the other Powers would ensue, which would lead to a speedy recognition by all Europe of the territorial rights of Switzerland.

For this object, Napoleon eagerly urged the assem­bling of a conference of the Great Powers at Paris. England hesitated for a time, and would rather have transferred the negotiations to London; but she finally yielded, and on the 10th of February, Count Walewski sent the invitations to the four Cabinets, as well as to Switzerland. On the 5th of March a meeting of the representatives of the four Great Powers took place, and at this—since the King on the 4th of (larch had with an aching heart once more expressed to the Emperor Napoleon in a private letter his willingness to make a sacrifice—it was unanimously decided to ask the King, in the interests of Europe and of Neuchatel, whether he would be willing to give up his right to the possession of that country. In regard to the method of carrying on the negotiations, it was agreed, that, if Prussia imposed conditions to her renunciation, the representative of Switzerland should be summoned to the consultation, the arguments and counter-arguments should be heard, and then each point should be voted upon and settled by itself.

As to the probable outcome of all this, Count Hatzfeldt could not hold out to his Court any very great hopes. England, he said, would certainly favor very urgently every claim of Switzerland; the other Powers had no other wish in the matter than to bring it to a speedy conclusion, and would therefore be very reluctant to meet England with any serious opposition.

At this news, the King was once more greatly dis­turbed. He had expected that the Powers, on the basis of the Protocol of 1822, would begin with a renewed recognition of his right, would then come to an understanding with him as to the conditions of his renunciation, and would afterwards present the result of this to Switzerland as their unanimous decision. Instead of this, he saw himself obliged to treat with the Swiss Democrats, as a simple party in the same cause and on an equal footing before the tribunal of Europe. He indulged in very violent outbursts: “This is a case,” he said, “ in which we must speak straight out from the heart.”

On the 18th of March Count Hatzfeldt received instructions to make a complaint in the Conference that the Powers had abandoned the ground taken in 1852. “The King,” he was to say, “has right on his side, and consequently it belongs to him to fix the conditions of the sacrifice he is to make. It has never been his right, that has involved dangers to Europe or to Neuchatel, but the infringement of the same by the upholders of the Revolution. He will not, however, enter into any further discussion of the matter before Europe; he is willing to give up his right on the following conditions which he presents as an indivisible whole; so soon as they shall have been accepted by the Powers, he will make them known by an open letter, together with the renunciation of his sovereignty over Neuchatel.”

The conditions introduced with such stormy words were themselves exceedingly moderate, since many of the wishes formerly expressed by the King had been demonstrated to him by the Neuchatel royalists themselves to be impracticable. For himself, the King asked for the continuance of the title of Prince of Neuchatel, and Count of Valendis, as well as the payment of two millions of francs — the capital corresponding to the civil list of one hundred thousand francs formerly received yearly from Neuchatel. The remaining articles concerned the protection of the Neuchatel royalists. They included complete amnesty for all political offences before and since the event of September; the assumption by the Swiss Confederacy of all expenses arising from that event, so that Neuchatel and its inhabitants should only contribute their proportion like all the other cantons; the restoration to the former ecclesiastical authorities in Neuchatel of such church property as had been secularized since 1848; a guaranty to insure the inviolability of all charitable institutions and bequests throughout the country; and finally, at the end of a year, the convening in Neuchatel of a constituent assembly elected only by the long-resident citizens of the canton, the new arrivals in the country being excluded.

When Count Hatzfeldt, on the 24th of March, laid these instructions before the Conference, the introductory remarks caused opposition from many sides, and produced in general a painful feeling. It was decided to invite the Swiss representative, Dr. Kern, to be present on the 25th of March, that the Prussian conditions might be communicated to him. After hearing them, he naturally said that he must make a report to his Government; the actual discussion therefore could not begin before the 31st of March.

In that session, as well as in the following one on the 1st of April, great differences of opinion became mani­fest. To the greater part of the articles concerning the protection of the people of Neuchatel, Dr. Kern had no serious objection to make; but he declared the restoration of the church property to be impossible, as well as the exclusion of the new citizens from the elec­tions to the constituent assembly; he further entered a protest against the King’s continuing to bear the title of Prince of Neuchatel; and he rejected, with the greatest imaginable energy, the payment of the two millions. The discussion continued both days for four or five hours. Finally the four Powers agreed that the continuance of the title would do harm, and the principle of a money compensation should be commended to the consideration of the Swiss. “Even if the principle must be admitted,” cried Kern at this, “at least let us not have this crushing sum of two millions! ”

It was evidently impossible for the two parties to arrive at an agreement. “You might perhaps have obtained a great deal,” said Count Walewski to the Prussian ambassador, “if you had not imposed on Switzerland such an overwhelmingly burdensome demand of money.” The four neutrals now decided that the next thing was to agree among themselves upon a programme of mediation. They spent several weeks on this, for they also differed among themselves, England always taking energetically the part of Switzerland, while the three others favored Prussia, though Austria was the most inclined to yield to the English claims.

England would at first hear nothing of the Swiss Confederacy’s making a money payment, and finally declared it would be a great concession if the King were to receive a million. The Powers were unani­mously in favor of striking out the article in regard to the constituent assembly: on the other hand, the amnesty and the costs of the September uprising were settled in accordance with the Prussian proposal. Lastly, the church property was to remain in the hands of the State, but the churches were to receive compensation for the loss of income from the same. The representatives of the Powers then declared it indispensable — since the renunciation of the King involved a change in the Act of the Vienna Congress — that all these provisions should be drawn up in a formal com­pact, and signed by six contracting parties: the four neutral Powers, Prussia and Switzerland. In a separate protocol the Powers alone were to recognize the King’s right to continue to bear the princely title. These propositions were communicated to the two parties on the 20th of April.

All this disturbed the temper of the King afresh. He could not, indeed, from his own standpoint, deny at all the necessity of adopting the form of a compact; but the thought was horrible to him of taking such a step in common with the Swiss rebels. With lofty pride, he said that a protocol concerning the princely title was superfluous; that would only mean his keeping what he had already; who would take it away from him? And in a still higher tone he continued: “ I demanded two millions, not because I am anxious for the money, but because the payment would have involved a final recognition of my right; this principle has been quite as well expressed by the decision of the Powers; I am satisfied with that, and make no further demands concerning the payment; I will not haggle about money with Switzerland.”

After this his Minister believed that he would now receive instructions to accept the remaining propositions of the Conference. But the intense bitterness of the King’s feelings would not allow his anxious mind to rest by day nor by night; he suddenly gave orders that the announcement of his acceptance should be communicated to Paris, with the condition that all his rights should again be valid, if Switzerland failed to fulfil the smallest point of the compact.

This reservation seemed natural enough, and Balan began to draw up the papers. Then Frederick William’s feelings changed again, and there came a royal letter, to the effect that a compromise must be attempted, and that the Conference should be informed that all claim to payment would be given up, if Switzerland would agree to the articles concerning church property and the constituent assembly. “ They will refuse it,” said the King, “ but I shall have done my best, and afterwards nous verrons.” So it stood on the 26th of April

What was to happen afterwards was seen soon enough. On the 28th of April, the Swiss Federal Council, in confident expectation of a ratification by the Federal Assembly, unanimously accepted the outline of the compact proposed by the four neutrals. This decided the matter unmistakably. Bismarck, who had shortly before been at Paris, had on the 24th of April already pointed out to his Government what must follow. For Prussia, he said, it was a matter of small importance whether the King accepted the compact or not. But the rejection of the same would leave the Neuchatel royalists, for whose protection the whole matter had been undertaken, either helpless in exile, or defenceless against all sorts of party-machinations at home. Any step that the King might try to take in their favor in future would be met by the Powers only with the regret that Prussia had rejected the compact. There would then be no further talk of any possibility of military action.

In the beginning, the King was reluctant to accept this view; but on the 28th of April the force of an accomplished fact put an end to his doubts and his hopes. Beside this, he heard from all sides that the acceptance of his last proposition by Switzerland was out of the question. And when, on the 6th of May, the Emperor Napoleon in a confidential letter announced to the King the visit of Prince Napoleon to Berlin, expressed in warm terms a desire for true friendship in the future, and for loyal co-operation in all European affairs, and added the hope that the compact would be accepted, Frederick William, although with a heavy heart, finally made up his mind on the 10th of May, and wrote to the Emperor in reply on the 13th that he had no desire to take money from the Swiss, and further that he would agree to the outline of a compact proposed by the Conference. On the 16th, corresponding instructions were sent to Count Hatzfeldt, and on the 26th all parties joined in signing the compact.

This was the outcome of an affair that for nine long months had troubled and vexed the heart and the nerves of the King more seriously than any event since the March days of 1848. He had, indeed, obtained practically everything that could be expected under existing circumstances. But this consideration did not remove his sorrow at the loss he had sustained; and the sting remained deep in his soul, that the horrors of Revolution had won a new victory with the sanction of Europe.

There was, however, no further thought of any material injury. The possession of Neuchatel was of no value to Prussia; on the contrary, it was a great advantage to be hampered no more by the anomalous position of that country.

The indirect consequences of the long struggle were even more important; and among them the development of closer and more friendly relations with France. We have remarked above, that Napoleon’s moderation in the use of his victory had diminished the King’s old dread of the revolutionary upstart. Now, in the place of this, a warm personal feeling had arisen between the two sovereigns. In June, Napoleon declared in a private letter to Frederick William that he hoped the feeling which ten months before had led the King to offer him loyal friendship still existed; he said that on his part, he remained convinced that for the development of Prussia’s power and greatness, nothing could be more desirable than a close connection with France, whose interests were everywhere the same with hers. The King answered at once, concurring amicably in all that the Emperor had written.

From this to an alliance with France was certainly a long step. In the very circle of men that were personally most intimate with the King, the leaders and protectors of the Kreuzzeitung party, so powerful in internal politics, aversion to the Heir of the Revolution still continued undiminished. General von Gerlach with this feeling wrote vigorous letters to Bismarck, when the latter, in accordance with his observations made in Paris, mentioned to the King Napoleon's desire for harmony, and pressingly urged him to take advantage of this good-will on the part of the Emperor. Bismarck justified his view in several brilliant memorials, written with that perfect clearness of his vision which embraced at one glance the past and present of Europe. With convincing energy he pointed out the error of considering as of the greatest importance in foreign policy, not the aims, but the legitimate origin, of a neighboring sovereign; and he made clear by his conciseness and the incontrovertibility of his arguments the necessity for Prussia, considering the chaotic state of German affairs, to acquire a firm support by means of external alliances, and especially of being, or seeming to be, upon friendly terms with France. How much consideration these views met with at that time in Berlin, I do not know. But although Gerlach and the Kreuzzeitung continually opposed them, their accuracy was daily confirmed by the behavior of no less persons than Count Buol in Vienna and Herr von Beust in Dresden

The cool reception which in the summer of 1856 had been given to the memorial of the Saxon Minister on the subject of Confederate reform, that is to say, on the subject of restrictions to be imposed upon the Press and upon the rights of the Estates, had not frightened that ambitious statesman in the least. He knew that in his efforts for these objects he could count upon Austria’s support, and he therefore determined in the spring of 1857 to make the contents of the memorial, now formulated in definite propositions, the subject of fresh negotiations.

He had already found in March a rival in the person of the Baden Minister, Baron Meysenbug, who appropriated to himself one of Beust’s propositions, the establishment of a Confederate court of arbitration, and brought it forward officially in Frankfort. “The proposal,” said Bismarck, “owes its origin without doubt to a desire for popularity. It seems at the first glance very fine, that, in the future, constitutional disputes should be settled no longer by the assembly of diplomats at Frankfort, but by an independent tribunal; unfortunately, the pleasure caused by this will not last till one has read to the end of the proposal.”

In fact, everything which the other paragraphs took away from the Confederate Diet, Meysenbug restored to it by the simple clause, that, in any particular case of dispute, the Confederate Diet was to decide whether or no the authority of the tribunal extended to that case. Instead of this, Baron Beust would have preferred a provision according to which the Confederate Diet should have the right to interfere only when the tribunal should overstep the limits of its authority; but he did not allow himself to be deterred by this from welcoming his co-worker in Baden; and at the end of April he laid his plan in its new form before the Governments, with the .proposal that a grand conference of ministers should be assembled as soon as possible.

The judgment of the majority of the Governments, nevertheless, remained the same as in the preceding year. In Munich, King Max, indeed, angered by the resolute obstinacy of his Estates, was inclined to favor measures like those suggested by Beust; but his ministers argued, that it was better to carry out such measures on his own account in his own country, than to run the risk of injuring Bavaria’s sovereignty by proposing them in the Confederate Diet as a law for all Germany. “ I do not see,” said Baron Pfordten to the Prussian ambassador, “that we have, generally speaking, any ground for altering anything in the existing Confederate Constitution. So far as Herr von Beust is concerned, if a subject for political activity is not at hand for him, his energetic mind is only too ready to find it for himself.”

Bismarck reported to Berlin: “All that Beust proposes amounts simply to a new edition of the exception­laws of 1819 and 1834, an extraordinary means for elevating the Confederate Diet in the eyes of the nation.” Minister von Manteuffel adhered to this view entirely, and expressed it without reserve to the German ambassadors then at Berlin. Upon this Baron Beust communicated to him a copy of an Austrian despatch, in which Count Buol declared to the Saxon Minister his warm approval of all the propositions, and at the same time his deep regret that he was hindered for the time by Prussia’s manifold scruples from taking energetic steps to carry out the reform ; it was not Austria’s fault, therefore, if this time as well no desirable advance in the German question could be made.

The close connection of the Courts of Dresden and Vienna in opposition to that of Berlin was thus made as evident as possible. The proceeding caused the Prussian Court all the more dissatisfaction, since shortly before, in the west of Germany, a similar conquest made by Austrian influence had become manifest, and that, too, in a place where, considering the near relationship of the princely House with that of Prussia, it was least to be expected, namely, in Baden. Even since Herr von Meysenbug had undertaken the management of affairs, he had shown everywhere a tendency to turn away from Prussia and to look to Austria. In the affair of Neuchatel, he held back much longer than the other states in the matter of the passage of Prussian soldiers; although, so far as the Swiss Radicals were concerned, he would have been quite willing to see them punished for the hostility they had displayed toward the Jesuits in 1847. But an open dispute was at length brought on by the complicated negotiations about the fortress of Rastadt.

As early as the summer of 1856, there had been a lively discussion in regard to further grants of money for the completion of the fortress. Austria and the South Germans had shown themselves ready to give freely, but Prussia and some of the Northern States were of the opinion that these demands must at length come to an end. After a sharp debate, a compromise was unanimously agreed upon; but the struggle was renewed with redoubled vehemence, when in May, 1857, Austria and Baden proposed in the Diet that the peace garrison of Rastadt, which, according to a unanimous vote of 1841, consisted of 2,500 Badeners, should be henceforth doubled, and 5,000 Austrians added to it.

In the beginning, the Prussian King was not indisposed to agree to the change; but Bismarck pointed out that although the proposal (offering as it did a guaranty for the active participation of Austria in the defence of the upper Rhine) was advantageous to the interests of the Confederation, yet it was impossible for Prussia to allow such a permanent increase of Austria’s power in Baden without a corresponding gain for herself. He therefore received instructions to act accordingly.

The proposal had first to be reported upon by the committee on military affairs and by the military commission on technical details; but even in these prelimi­nary deliberations it became evident that a fierce battle was in prospect. For the majority were favorable to the proposal, and they made no effort to conceal their opinion that their decision on the subject would be binding: while Bismarck disputed their authority as a majority, besides opposing the motion itself, and demanded that any change in the existing state of things should be decreed unanimously. Every controversy on this subject, however, concerned, as we know, the very foundation of the Confederate Constitution and brought the whole existing system into danger.

With such uncertainties in prospect for the future, Bismarck was asked by the President of the Ministry to sketch out an answer to the above-mentioned propo­sitions of Buol and Beust on the subject of Confederate reform. In this work, which was completed on the 1st of July, 1857, Bismarck paid back the Vienna Cabinet with interest for the accusation that Prussia was the obstacle to reform. With abundant praise for the patri­otism and insight of Beust’s efforts, he pointed out to him the necessity of keeping his work far removed from any resemblance to the Carlsbad Decrees. “ The chief difficulty,” he said, “in regard to the main idea of the plan, the bringing about of greater uniformity in the constitutional rights of the German states, lies in the peculiar conditions of the Austrian monarchy. These conditions hinder the Government from granting to the parts of its country belonging to the German Confederation a representation of Estates which should be sufficiently similar to that of the remaining German states to render possible the general application of uniform principles to all the members of the Confederation. This is true also of the proposed Confederate court of arbitration. If all the members of the Confederation would submit themselves to such a court, Prussia would gladly give up the objections she has hitherto made. But it is evident how difficult the solution of such a problem would be for Austria. And to establish institutions in this direction that would be inapplicable to so important a member of the Confederation as Austria would not further the unity of the Confederation, but would confirm the tendency of the different parts to separate from one another. Above all things, therefore, the Saxon Minister must inform himself what Austria’s position is in respect to these questions.”

Herr von Manteuffel prepared his despatch to Dresden quite in accordance with this outline, and commu­nicated the contents of the same to Vienna. We will not attempt to describe the vexation of Count Buol. There was nothing to be said against this exposition of the state of things, but it was all the more annoying, because it disclosed with so much coolness the weak points of the absolute Imperial Government, or rather because it presupposed them as being naturally already well known. The Count made up his mind very decidedly not to remain in debt for an answer.

Meanwhile, for the moment, the diplomatic correspondence was interrupted by a hasty decision of the King of Prussia. The anxious and irritable state of mind in which the King had issued from the Neuchatel trouble had since that time been constantly made worse by the increasing difficulty with Austria. For in this case, as so often, his heart was moved by conflicting feelings. He saw clearly that his duty as a ruler forbade him to yield any further, but, in spite of all the slights he had received, the idea of a complete breach with the Imperial House was still most distressing to him. The fairest recollections of his youth were rooted in the brotherhood-in-arms of 1813, his riper years had been penetrated with the spirit of the Holy Alliance, and his accession to the throne had been accompanied by the last admonition of his father, that he should hold firm to Austria and Russia.

In the storms of the revolutionary time, he had indeed often been angry with Austria, but in the end the avoidance of war had been to him the greatest of all joys, and nothing had remained in his memory except their common action in the suppression of the Revolution. Since that time, he had year after year experienced a long succession of unvarying acts of hos­tility, first at the hands of Schwarzenberg and then at those of Buol, in matters connected with the Tariff­Union, with the Confederate Diet, with the German Cabinets, and with the European Powers, all having one end in view, either to surpass Prussia or to cripple her, to disturb her prosperity and to hinder her growth. Until within a short time he had endured this diplomatic skirmishing with indifference, as being necessarily connected with the politics of Kings; but the constant irritation gradually proved too much for his nerves.

In this situation, the idea came to him of making a last attempt in person. As he had once written to Queen Victoria, that where the skill of the diplomats fails, the sovereigns themselves must interpose, so he now determined upon a journey to Vienna, in order, if possible, to restore by a brotherly interview the ancient friendship. He set out with little hope, and returned completely undeceived. Filled with sad thoughts, foreseeing serious misfortunes in every direction, he arrived at Dresden, where he was to stay for a short time.

But here, too, disagreeable discussions awaited him, in which he proved unable any longer to control his excitement. Immediately after one scene of such a nature he swooned away; what he had endured in the last few years had consumed his strength; a stroke of apoplexy had fallen upon him. Hopes were still entertained, as several milder attacks of the same sort had occurred since the tremendous days of 1848, attacks in which memory was lost, or the King sank into a silent state of apathy from which it was dangerous to arouse him. These former crises had, however, passed away, and now also, after a short time of uncertainty, his condition improved; he reviewed troops, made a short journey, and presided once more at a session of the Ministry, at which one occurrence seemed afterwards to have been especially tragic. Since the March days the gloomy idea had possessed his mind that, for his own atonement and penance, God had appointed him to be the instrument for the punishment of all sinfulness. This showed itself amog other things in the fact that he, who was by nature so mild and cheerful, could after that time, only with great difficulty be induced to grant a pardon in serious criminal cases (while the reverse of this was true of his successor). At the sitting above­mentioned it happened that the Minister of Justice, Simons, made a report concerning thirteen death-sentences, which had been passed during the time of his illness. The King confirmed eleven of them. It was his last official act as a ruler.

The brain trouble once more appeared; the life of the spirit was enveloped in darkness; and towards the end of October a royal decree appeared, appointing the King’s brother, William, Prince of Prussia, to represent the Sovereign in the affairs of the Government for the next three months. To this decree the Prince appended a declaration, that he would undertake the charge and that he would carry on the government in accordance with the principles and intentions of his Majesty, which were well known to him.